GENDER, SPACE AND EMPOWERMENT IN RURAL HAUSALAND, NORTHERN NIGERIA

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
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ABSTRACT

Reducing gender inequalities by enabling women's empowerment is a major focus of the literature and practices of gender and development. The work of this thesis contributes to debates about female empowerment, especially for peasant women in peripheral capitalist economies. The central themes of enquiry are power relations of gender and space in the socio-economic processes in which peasant households and their members are embedded. The focus of investigation is the extent to which commodity exchange outside the household reinforces, or reduces, women's position of power/disempowerment.

The central question taken for analysis is whether income earning via trading empowers women, thus reducing their subordination. This hypothesis is widely accepted. Many NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and other development institutions base efforts around the notion that income earning is liberating for women. This hypothesis is investigated for rural Hausa women in Northern Nigeria who are secluded within their homes by the religio-cultural practice of purdah, but who engage in trade, often through the agency of children. The major empirical part of the study develops and applies an original framework for analysis of empowerment that identifies and maps gender divisions of labour and space in the spheres of production, reproduction and circulation in which rural Hausa men and women are embedded.

The overall conclusion reached is that gender divisions of work, both inside and outside rural Hausa households, and especially in trade, reflect and sustain the subordination of women and their inferior position relative to men, especially through the control of space. The notion of income earning as universally empowering for women does not hold because rural Hausa women engaged in the market are not significantly empowered by their income earning because of the complex realities of patriarchy whereby women have weak bargaining powers.

DEDICATION

To those who know much more than I, but who have shared gladly of themselves, and their time. I hope they find what I have written here of some little worth.

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The origin of this project lies in conversations with Drs Janet Townsend and Gina Porter. That I began this research is thanks to their encouragement. Informally they have provided friendly and affirmative feedback now and again along the way. Completing this thesis has been a long journey and there are many others to be thanked for their help.

I am grateful to Miss Muriel Ikin and others who early on gave me advice, sharing with me 'how it was in their day'. Also before I ever set foot in Nigeria I was very touched to be given books by Miss Margaret Burness OBE and have used her 1949 edition of Abraham's *Dictionary of the Hausa Language*[1] with delight ever since. Judy Nwanodi and Meta Mongono both sent practical advice from Nigeria.

I owe special thanks to Dr E. O. Oladipo (now Prof.), then Head of Department of Geography at Ahmadu Bello University (A.B.U.), Zaria who assisted me greatly during my first visit to Nigeria in 1991 making the preliminary fieldwork possible. Ibrahim Musa, a graduate of that department, ably accompanied me for the initial fieldwork visits. Dr Kahsay Legesse provided practical support on numerous occasions and later sold me his car which provided faithful service. Hadiza Gadu welcomed me into her home and family, becoming my first real Hausa-Fulani friend. Dr Ola Uduku, fellow graduate student in the field, provided endless cups of tea and conversation - via cyberspace she has remained a firm supporter to the end. Other supportive friends in Zaria include Tonie Okpe, Ihab Hijaig, Mr Sikora, Roger and Sarah Petch. Dr Irena Iwegbu deserves special mention for her ever-generous provision of refuge, friendship, advice, assistance and companionship.

I first began learning Hausa at the Oxford Language Teaching Unit, but progressed slowly with self-teaching methods. Thanks to the financial assistance of Linacre College one-to-one lessons with Hauwa Mahmood in Oxford helped improve my vocabulary. With funding from the ESRC I joined Dr Phil Jaggar's Hausa class of 1991, relishing the library, lively atmosphere and cosmopolitan nature of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. In Zaria, Mallam Haruna Aminu gave generously of his time to coach me in his beloved mother tongue. He became a firm friend, welcoming me to his home in Zaria City and our long and frank exchanges provided many insights into Hausa life and culture.

I am grateful to the then-Vice-Chancellor of A.B.U., Prof. Saror, who approved my affiliation as a research associate at the Centre for Social and Economic Research (C.S.E.R.) during 1992-3. The then-director of C.S.E.R., Dr Jacob Voh, ensured I had a firm base from which to conduct the fieldwork. During my stays in Zaria helpful discussions and thoughts on my work were received from colleagues and visitors at A.B.U. including Dr Jacob Voh, Sanusi Abubakar, Prof. Mere Kisekka, Eric Bunselmeier, Prof. Schwerdtfeger, Fred Kamara, Dr Rauf Mustapha, Kate Meagher,

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[1] With "...poisonous insecticidal solution used in binding...specially prepared in order to render the work impervious to the ravages of insects".

and Dr Matthew Lockwood among others. I am thankful for cartographic assistance from Theo Samuel, and help in English-Hausa translation from Murtala Musa and others. Mr Kayode assisted me to obtain maps and aerial photos from the Polytechnic and Federal Survey Office in Kaduna.

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- Dr Murray Last, whose West Africa seminar series at University College London I have enjoyed for its stimulating gathering of like-minded scholars;
- Dr Sue Benson, who enthusiastically dissected ideas around her kitchen table in Cambridge;
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I am extremely grateful to those who read parts, or all, of this thesis and provided critical feedback on content including Dr Ayami Nakatani, Dr Ben Rogaly, Antony

Kirk Greene, Dr Glyn Williams; and others who proof read for sense and grammatical correctness including Sian Yeowell and my Mum, Dr Jill Robson.

I have been far from a model research student, but my supervisor, Prof. Barbara Harriss-White, has remained unstinting in her prompt and critical approach to the many thousands of words I have asked her to read over the years. Her rigorousness has taught me much. To her I owe special thanks.

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In Keele from 1995 I am grateful for friendly colleagues and understanding heads of department who have gently, but persistently, encouraged to ensure this thesis finally reached completion. Dr Glyn Williams has helped me sort out some finer points of statistical analysis. Andy Lawrence skilfully redrew some of my maps.

This thesis has undergone substantial revisions in the light of examiners' comments. Part of the reasons for their robust critique is that this study is situated on an intellectual landscape which some scholars have characterised as being in the ferment of a 'crisis of grand theory', or a 'crisis of representation'. Nonetheless we should take hope from this because as Michael Watts says "crisis does not mean collapse and death but signals the liberation of something vital and alive" (in Johnston 1986: 463). Nevertheless, at some level what we say about social relations helps to shape social reality - what postmodernists call the performativity of social representations (Gibson-Graham 1996: ix, 206-7). Reacting to the examiners' report has been useful in making me think about how I/we as academics make sense of the world. I must express gratitude to the examiners Drs Sam Jackson and Patricia Daley for their demanding critiques of the earlier version of this work which I hope have helped to improve it.

I am grateful to the various friends, family and colleagues who were supportive through the personal travails of revising and resubmitting this thesis. Special thanks are directed to Drs Nick Lee, Liz Young, Glyn Williams, Nicola Ansell, Judith Tsouvalis, Radhika Singha, Jill Robson and Profs. Ceri Peach and Barbara Harriss-White who read and commented on new drafts; also to Prof. Cindi Katz who gave me access to an unpublished manuscript which helped me to clarify my theoretical position. To Mike who made me finish this and to Matthew who made it worth it – thank you.

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Keele, September 2001

GLOSSARY

A

abokin arziki - trading friend/ contact

abokin ciniki - trusted male customer (lit. trade friend)

adashi - rotating credit group

ajiya - savings

alele - food made of beans mashed with palm oil and spices, placed in small tins and steamed

algaragis - wheat based sweet snack

alhaji - form of address for man who has been on pilgrimage to Mecca

allo - wooden board on which Koranic texts are written.

almajari (pl. *almajarai*) - young male Koranic student

amma - type of sweet

aro - loan arrangement for farmland

asusu - moneybox (usually child's or woman's)

attajiri (pl. *attajirai*) - wealthy merchant trader

awo - buying or selling grain by the measure

B

babban dan kasuwa - large-scale trader (lit. big man of the market)

babban riga - man's large loose gown worn over trousers and shirt

bashi - credit, loan

bazara - hot, dry season, February to June

bazawara - no longer married woman

biki - celebrations (especially wedding)

birni - walled town

bori - pre-Islamic spirit possession cult

budurwa - unmarried girl of physical maturity (lit. virgin)

buhu - sack

C

chin chin - sweet biscuit-like snack made by women

cikin gari - inside the town, a ward in Zarewa

cikin gida - the courtyard inside a house

D

daddawa - locust beans (seeds of Parkia filicoidea) made into flat black cakes, very pungent, used for flavour in cooking

dambu - steamed guineacorn (like cous-cous) with *zogale* leaves and onion. Eaten hot with ground *kuli-kuli*

damina - rainy season, October to April

dan bori (pl. *'yan bori*) – male devotee of *bori* rites

dan haya - hirer of bicycles, cars etc.

dan iska (pl. *'yan iska*) - idle young man, 'good for nothing', vagrant

dan kamasho (pl. *'yan kamasho*) - trader who takes commission on sales

dan koli (pl. *'yan koli*) - haberdasher, male trader selling small wares (*kayan koli*)

dan shayi (pl. *'yan shayi*) - male trader selling tea, hot drinks, bread and fried eggs from a stall

dan tanku (pl. *'yan tanku*) - grain trader/broker

dan tebur (pl. *'yan tebur*) - male trader selling goods from a table

dan tireda (pl. *'yan tireda*) - male trader

dan wake - small dumplings made of bean flour (with some guineacorn, cassava, sweet potato flour etc.) cooked in boiling water

dargaza - binding ingredient used to make food smooth, used in *dan wake* etc.

dami - bundle of grain (especially millet) before threshing

dawa - guineacorn (Sorghum vulgare)

dillali (pl. *dillalai*) - market grain broker or dealer

dokuwa - a hot and spicy sweetmeat made of groundnuts and

guineacorn ground together with sugar and spices

dutse - rock, especially outcropping granite inselbergs

F

fadama - wet land (low land) which can be cultivated perennially

fatake - long distance, itinerant traders

fate - thick soup made of coarsely ground guineacorn or boiled yams often with spinach, onions and tomatoes, eaten only by women

fura - balls of cooked millet (*fura*) which are eaten often as a midday food mashed into sour milk (*nono*), very labour intensive to prepare but keeps for at least three days

G

gabas - east

gandu - kin-based co-operation unit, production and consumption sharing arrangement

gari - flour, usually coarse cassava flour

garin rogo - cassava flour

gari - town

gauda - patties of ground cow peas, grain and cassava mixture, placed in *kargo* (Bauhinia reticulata) leaves and steamed, served with soup

gaya - small solid bits in *fura*, *koko* or *kunu* which are not mixed into solution with the milk or water liquid

gayauna - fields farmed independently by an individual as personal farmland

gero - bulrush millet (Pennisetum typhoideum)

gida (pl. *gidaje*) - house, compound, or home; physical residential unit

goro - kolanut, also small goodwill gift

gyada - groundnuts (Arachis hypogaea)

H

hajiya - form of address for a woman who has made pilgrimage to Mecca

hajj - pilgrimage to Mecca

hatsi - corn i.e. guineacorn (*dawa*) or millet (*gero*)

hunturu - harmattan season with cold, dry dusty wind blowing from the Sahara, November to February

I

itace - firewood

iyali (pl. *iyalai*) - conjugal family unit of man, wife/ wives and children

J

jari - capital

jingina - pawned

K

kaka - harvest season, September to October

kalallaba - small type of fried snack (like *waina*) made by children for sale to other children

kanti (pl. *kantuna*) - lock up shop for sale of manufactured items

kasuwa - market

kaura - sorghum (Sorghum vulgare pers.)

kayan daki - women's furniture and possessions including many bowls received at marriage and displayed in her room, (lit. things of the hut)

kishi - jealousy

kishiya - co-wife

kifi - fish

kofar - gate

koko - gruel eaten warm for breakfast made from guineacorn, maize, or millet flour soaked for at least a day, or two or three days before grinding, sieved through a cloth, left in the sun to

ferment for about two hours and made with boiling water

korama - head of women grain traders (historical)

kosai - beancakes; a snack of doughnut-like balls made of paste of cowpeas (blackeyed beans) fried in groundnut oil, often eaten as early morning breakfast food or late afternoon snack

kostoma - customer, especially if regular and trusted

kudin cefane - daily cash sum given to wives by their husbands for sauce ingredients

kuka - leaves of the baobab tree (Adansonia digitata) dried, pounded and used to make soup (*miyan kuka*) eaten with the main staple food *tuwo*.

kuli-kuli - groundnut cakes which are fried groundnut balls made from the residue after expressing oil from groundnuts in the process of making groundnut oil

kulle - from the Hausa to lock up, *kulle* marriage involves wife seclusion or purdah

kunu - gruel of millet or guineacorn flour eaten as a morning meal, cooked in water and flavoured with tamarind, potash or pepper

kunun tsamiya - tamarind flavoured *kunu*

kunya - cultural behaviour of shyness and modesty; especially displayed by young married women towards pregnancy and childbirth

kwadago - agricultural labour hiring

kwano - bowl or measure used for measuring grain and collected by women as part of their wedding gifts

L

lalle - henna (Egyptian privet) grown in fields often as border shrub; dried and crushed henna leaves are used to stain the hands and feet of new-born infants, brides, girls and women, especially at festivals

limam - Muslim religious leader (male)

lokacin dari - cold, dry season, November to February

M

ma'aji, or *mai adashi* - male treasurer of *adashi* group, equivalent of *uwar adashi* (f.)

ma'auni (f. *ma'auniya,* pl. *ma'auna*) - market grain measurers/broker-traders (from *auna* - to measure)

mai gida - male head of household (lit. owner of the house)

mai gyada - groundnut oil

mai kanti - shop trader (male)

mai kifi - fish trader (male)

mai shanu - butter

mai tebur - male trader who sells goods from a table

makaranta islamiyya - Islamic primary school for boys and girls

makarantar allo - Koranic school for boys and girls

malam - polite male form of address (lit. teacher)

miya - soup or sauce made with vegetables, various condiments and sometimes meat to be eaten with *tuwo* or rice as main meal.

miyan kubewa - okra soup

miyan kuka - baobab leaf soup

miyan taushe - vegetable soup

mudu (pl. *mudaye*) - grain measure, 2.25 *mudaye* = 1 *tiya* (2 to 2.7 kg grain)

N

nono - sour milk sold by nomadic Fulani women and girls who bring it for sale on a daily basis

in villages and towns, eaten mashed together with *fura* as midday food

R

rani - hot, dry season, February to June
riga - gown (worn by men)
riko - to foster or keep a child until marriage (also *tallafi*)
rumfa - shelter, especially for trader in a market to sit under

S

sallah - annual Muslim festivals of Eid-el-Kabir and Eid-el-Fitr
sana'a (pl. *sana'oy'i*) - occupation, especially one earning income (derived from Arabic *san'a* meaning craft, or trade)
sarki - chief
sarkin awo - person appointed in charge of grain measurers
sarkin kasuwa - man appointed in charge of a market
sassa - house section occupied by married man and dependants (also called *waje*)
shago - man's own room in a domestic compound with an external entrance, may be used as a shop
shayi - tea
shigifa - passageway between the *kofargida* or *zaure* and the *cikin gida* used to enter a house
soye - fried meat
suya - fried meat on sticks (kebabs) prepared and sold by men, seasoned with powdered groundnuts and chilli pepper

T

tafsir - commentary on Koran, religious activity by men most common during Ramadan
talaka (pl. *talakawa*) - member of the populace, the ordinary people, the working classes, the peasantry
taliya - handmade noodles or spaghetti
talla - hawking and selling of goods from house-to-house or in the marketplace, especially by children
tallafi - adopting, fostering, bringing up someone else's child (also *riko*)
tanadi - savings
tazargade - dried medicinal herb used in water to prevent vomiting in children
tiya - volumetric measure based on standard enamel bowl containing about 2 to 2.7 kg grain
tozali - ground galena used as cosmetic to decorate eyes of women and babies
tubani - food (like *gauda*) made with guineacorn, *dargaza*, and salt boiled in small cakes wrapped in maize leaves (known as *zandoro* in some places)
tudu - dry land (upland) which is cultivated on the basis of rain fed agriculture.
turaka - male household head's personal room, in wealthy compounds only
turare - perfume
tuwo - staple food made from rice or flour of millet, guineacorn etc. by cooking in boiling water and stirring until thick and well set, basis of the evening, and sometimes morning meals with sauce (*miya*)

U

uban gida - patron, especially in trade
unguwa (pl. *unguwoyi*) - quarter, or ward, of a settlement
uwa - mother, capital (money for trade)
uwar adashi - female treasurer of *adashi* (rotating credit) group
uwar gida - most senior wife or woman in a household (lit. woman of the house)

W

waina - small cakes of beans, rice, millet or guineacorn flour fried in oil often using an earthenware tray with indentations (*tunda*).

waje (pl. *wajeje*) - house section, place of a wife and her children

wando - trousers

Z

zaure - entrance hut

zogale - leaves of horse radish tree (*zogalagandi*, Moringa pterygosperma) used in cooking either fresh or dried

FOREWORD

Throughout the thesis Hausa words are italicised, with the exception of proper nouns for persons and places. Hausa terms are used where there is no precise, or straightforward, English equivalent and vernacular words, or phrases, are more appropriate. Hausa terms are commonly used in the literature on Northern Nigeria (and neighbouring West African countries) where Hausa is widely spoken. Brief definitions of Hausa terms are included in the glossary, and, in most cases when first introduced in the text, fuller explanations are provided. Hooked letters of Hausa orthography are not used here - due to printing limitations. For the convenience of the reader some common Hausa words are anglicised in the plural e.g. *Hajiyas*, *tiyas* instead of using the more correct, but often less familiar and clumsier, Hausa plural. Some common plurals (as well as masculine and feminine forms) are included in the glossary. Following standard Hausa notation an apostrophe indicates a glottalized plural, as in '*yan* (sons). Abbreviations are made of two polite forms of address for Hausa men. *Malam* is abbreviated to M. and *Alhaji* to Alh.

In order to protect individual identities informants' names have been changed to other common Hausa names.

Unless specified otherwise all quotations from the Koran are from the English translation by Dawood (1974).

All plates are from original photographs taken by the author unless stated otherwise.

The following publications have resulted from the research conducted for this thesis:

Robson, E. 2000 'Wife seclusion and the spatial praxis of gender ideology in Nigerian Hausaland', *Gender, Place & Culture: Journal of Feminist Geography* 7 (2), pp179-199.

Robson, E. 2000 'Exploring dimensions of sustainability in Nigeria: A question of scale' pp123-143 in M. Redclift (ed) *Sustainability: Life Chances and Livelihoods* Routledge: London.

Robson, E. 1999 'Gender, markets and fieldwork in developing countries; with special reference to West Africa' pp287-304 in B. Harriss-White (ed.) *Agricultural Markets from Theory to Practice: Field Experience in Developing Countries* Macmillan: London.

Robson, E. 1997 'From teacher to taxi driver: Reflections on research roles in developing areas' pp36-59 in E. Robson & K. Willis (eds.) 2nd ed. *Postgraduate Fieldwork in Developing Areas: A Rough Guide* DARG Monograph no. 8.

Robson, E. 1996 'Working girls and boys: Children's contributions to household survival in West Africa' *Geography*, 81 (4), pp403-407.

Robson, E. 1995 'The economic activities and status of rural Muslim Hausa women in Northern Nigeria' pp313-336 in P. Makinwa & A. Jensen (eds.) *Women's Position and Demographic Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* IUSSP: Liege, Belgium.

PREFACE

My own interest in trade in Africa dates from spending a year in my late teens as a voluntary worker for an NGO-run children's centre in Kenya, and visiting neighbouring Uganda and Tanzania. During my undergraduate years I was back in Africa twice - to Kenya to research my undergraduate dissertation, as well as travelling in Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. In both East and West Africa I discovered markets to be colourful and interesting places. I relished bargaining in Swahili in the Nairobi craft market. I discovered buying and selling were not faceless transactions with big firms, but were about people and relations between traders and customers, traders and money. Accompanying children's centre staff to buy supplies of fruit, vegetables and foodstuffs in Ruiru market the bustle and local economic importance of regular periodic markets to which people walked from great distances, were impressive. Later, travelling in West Africa introduced me to a way of eating and shopping (i.e. of daily reproduction) that revolves around the ever-present women and men selling things everywhere - along roadsides, in market places, wherever trains, buses and taxis leave, arrive or pause. So eating and drinking become a long parade of snacks and meals bought from the street without having to think ahead about cooking, or where the next meal comes from. Whenever hungry, there is ready-to-eat food to be bought (maybe McDonalds shouldn't be the ultimate global symbol of instant consumerism?).

The most formative influences on my intellectual development as an undergraduate were lectures on geography and gender, particularly by Dr Janet Townsend. I remember the excitement of discovering *Geography and Gender: An Introduction to Feminist Geography* (WGSG 1984) and reading it through at a single sitting one afternoon in the library. I was gripped by the ideas and saw that geography could mean trying to change fundamental injustices. It was exciting to think wasn't I a woman too, so this had something to do with me. So I guess I was sure by then (if not before - perhaps something to do with my mother?) that I was a feminist. Towards the end of undergraduate days when encouraged to think about doing research I decided to work on women and markets in Africa. I was attracted to researching market women in West Africa - so much part of the fabric of everyday life and portrayed as

strong and independent in the literature. The classic works of Polly Hill first introduced me to the secluded women traders of Hausaland. I was intrigued by her suggestions from the 1960s that secluded female grain traders enjoyed certain competitive advantages in trading and considerable autonomy:

> "Despite their virtual incarceration for the first thirty-five years of their married lives, the women of the *gari* enjoy a considerable degree of economic independence ...a wife's economic autonomy is often sufficient to insulate her from her husband's poverty - as shown by the examples of prominent house-traders whose husbands are notably poverty-stricken" (Hill 1969a: 398).

My first intention was to investigate how women secluded traders of rural Hausaland were faring today after Nigeria's many changes in the intervening three decades. During my fieldwork it slowly became clear that things were very different from Polly Hill's day - there simply were no women grain measurers in rural markets any more and it took me until the final month of fieldwork in Zarewa village before I finally tracked down a single secluded woman grain trader. Also none of the other women house traders I was interviewing and getting to know appeared richer than their husbands and whatever wealth there was appeared to be accumulated by men and displayed in ownership of vehicles, building of properties, going to Mecca and marrying more wives. Women did not seem to be doing any of these things. Although some women were very active and busy as traders, others seemed to be precluded from trading as this fieldwork vignette illustrates.

> "*Visiting Gidan Malam Umaru this afternoon around 5pm we found Zahara'u who is a widow and the sister of M. Umaru, busy in the zaure (entrance hut) sitting on an old upturned bucket straining koko into a big clay pot through a cloth. She explained to us that making koko is a long process involving lots of work grinding and sieving over several days for each batch. She sells the hot koko as breakfast porridge from the zaure early each morning. She has been doing this sana'a (occupation) for 15 years.*
>
> *As we talked to Zahara'u in the zaure a lot of children clustered round to see what was going on. Most of them seemed to be carrying trays of things like kolanut, gari (cassava flour) and sugar for talla (hawking).*
>
> *We went through the zaure to talk to the three secluded wives inside the compound. Raihanatu, the uwargida (first wife) was in her room praying. When finished she came to talk, telling us she earns a little money from husking rice. While talking she picked up a sieve she was repairing - another activity she earns money from. In addition she sells palm oil and as we were leaving her daughter entered the compound with a crate of empty bottles from the drinks her mother makes which she had been out selling. Through various trading strategies from seclusion Raihanatu told us she has managed to buy a sewing machine and so*

she also makes clothes for women and children.

M. Umaru's second wife was breastfeeding, went to say her prayers and began chopping okra for the evening soup. She told us that she usually makes alele (bean cakes) for sale but she stopped because beans have become expensive and as she says 'nowadays there is no money' (ba kudi). So she is not doing any trading. Aisha the youngest wife in the compound, is about 16 years old. She was very shy and unwilling to talk to us directly, but we determined she has been married for two years and as a young wife who has not yet had children she has no sana'a."

Field notebook 7/7/92

So as I looked more closely at the situation of rural Hausa women in relation to men and in relation to each other, the notion of empowerment appeared an appropriate one to try and understand the processes at work.

At a practical level I was familiar with the notion of empowerment from NGO efforts encountered in Kenya - Catholic nuns in Ruiru teaching women and girls dressmaking skills so they could earn money; a VSO volunteer establishing fish farming to raise local incomes; other Catholic missionaries at Wema mission, Garsen promoting women's income earning via baking and selling bread; and the children's centre I worked in educating children for eventual formal employment to ensure their financial security and better incomes than less fortunate destitute children. All these efforts were based on the conviction that earning money would somehow help and empower the marginalised (whether female, poor, or deprived), to take charge of their own destiny. At a conceptual level I was also familiar with the notion of empowerment from my feminist reading.

So as the research progressed, the focus shifted. I began to ask whether Hausa women were in fact being empowered by their income earning as secluded traders. Polly Hill had suggested they were powerful economic forces in the 1960s, but at first sight this did not appear to be the case any longer. I hope this thesis goes at least some way to answering this question. In doing so, the story of Hausa women in this thesis is various ways not the story I wanted to tell. It is in many respects an unhappy story of female subordination and is not one of empowerment situated within a triumphal celebration of women's agency and resistance.

When I began this research my head was filled with notions of feminist research with

women, responding to their agendas in a bottom-up emancipatory way. I jettisoned that approach as unsuitable to the economic research questions formulated about the role of secluded Hausa women traders and the location of them and their trade in the spheres of production, reproduction and circulation. I went out to the field armed with questionnaires to women about their trade. During reflections post-fieldwork wading through stacks of empirical data, the ambivalence of trade for women began to really emerge and the research question shifted to whether trade is empowering to (Hausa) women. As I reflected further on how power works inside the processes of production, reproduction and circulation the limits for women's agency became all too apparent. History does not always go in one direction – individuals can be deprived of power, as well as gain it, through processes of social change. We need only refer to Maria Mies (1982) for a classic example of how the development of a handicraft industry in Andhra Pradesh reduced women to secluded pieceworkers grossly exploited for their lace making work.

The picture of rural Hausa women presented here may contrast with that portrayed by earlier researchers. But the absence of female spaces of agency in spirit possession cults (*bori*), houses of women (*gidan mata*) and independent women (*karuwai*) was what I found in Zarewa. This research represents Zarewa in some ways as a very different place to the one Baba of Karo (Smith 1954) lived in. As a researcher I was not able to record and analyse what she expected to find (which would have meant working almost to preconceived conclusions); rather the opposite. Efforts were made to find evidence of women market grain measurers (*ma'auniyai*), *bori*, *gidan mata*, *karuwai*, big female grain traders and so on which from earlier studies were expected to be evident. Yet extended periods in the field led to the conviction that, in Zarewa and neighbouring markets, at least, women simply no longer occupy such roles. What follows in this thesis is a detailed exploration and analysis of what was found – not the independent women expected from much of the preceding literature, rather women who were indeed trading on their own account, but also embracing an increased practice of seclusion.

This thesis sets out to examine the power relations between women and men in Zarewa households and thus measures income, expenditure, time use, occupation of space and so on. The analysis offered is a material one; to try and understand how

gender relations, women's seclusion and their trading operate. It should be emphasised at the outset that this is not a study engaged with Hausa women's subjective understanding, perceptions and experiences of their situation, including seclusion. Although the picture which emerges is of asymmetries of power between women and men (as indeed in many, if not all, societies) this does not imply women are (or experience themselves as) victims. Indeed during the experience of working among women in Zarewa on the whole I found them to be cheerful, busy, active, friendly, happy, hospitable, generous and kind. Certainly a few complained to me of being poor, of illiteracy, not making profit in their trading, of absent husbands, being unable to expand their business, not being able to farm their own land and so on. Others undoubtedly also suffered in material ways – death in childbirth occurred with alarming frequency and infant death was also common. This may be characteristic of many developing countries, but it is arguable that configurations of gendered power in rural Hausaland often prevent women seeking medical care for themselves and their children (see discussion in Chapter 6). As among any group of people there were notable individual differences, between women and between households. However, most of the rural Muslim Hausa women interacted with in Zarewa appeared to be resourceful, creative and resilient. Unequal gender relations do not infer a universal story of suffering and oppression for women. It is clear that Hausa women would not co-operate with seclusion if it did not offer them some benefits within their own circumstances.

On reflection it seems to me all academic writing should "be seen as a process rather than a product" (Pratt 1993: 51). This study is like a step on the way in that it represents a certain point in my development as a scholar. If I were to start this research again I would without doubt do it differently and if I were to follow it up I would approach many questions differently. This is a thesis that represents a learning process - an outcome of a hard journey, a struggle; a tussle with philosophies and empirical material, a struggle to get things done in a country where my expectations about work and output were but just a step on that journey. This thesis is a beginning to better understanding.

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INTRODUCTION

Based on fieldwork conducted during 1991-1993 this thesis presents an exploration of the lives of secluded women who live in a particular village in Northern Nigeria's Muslim Hausaland. The analysis presented here focuses on power within gendered economic and social relations in Nigerian Hausaland. A spatial and social analysis of rural Hausa women's economic engagement and its implications for their empowerment is presented.

One of the major themes is that secluded rural Hausa women may be able to exert little resistance to unequal gender relations and co-operate with men as the practice of seclusion becomes more widespread. Women's agency seems to be reduced and to be further domesticated as women continue to retreat further into the domestic sphere. Here they still earn low incomes (as shown earlier by Simmons 1973, 1975, for example) and continue to work for themselves and their children (as earlier argued by Pittin 1984: 481; 1987b: 29). Contemporary opportunities for resistance and subversion through *bori* spirit possession, courtesanship (*karuwanci*) and so on appear much reduced since the earlier investigations of other scholars (e.g. Pittin 1979, Smith 1954). In this picture of change and changelessness in rural Hausaland (Shenton 1986: 120) seclusion has not been eroded by widespread primary education as predicted (e.g. Schildkrout 1981a: 105, Callaway 1987a: 79).

Modernisation, economic development and increasing prosperity associated with increased rural incomes brought about by improved agricultural yields may have brought rural Hausa women liberation from arduous field labour, respite from the tediousness of spinning and groundnut shelling; relief from hauling water or firewood and acting as beasts of burden; and freedom from some manual food grinding and processing tasks. But it has not brought them higher incomes or improved financial gains. Women appear not to be empowered to achieve capital accumulation through

their trading. It is argued in the following chapters that while male income can and does lead to 'power over', or 'power to', women's income largely does not or cannot.

Organisation of the Chapters

In order to place the theoretical position adopted within current debates the first chapter lays out the theoretical background against which the analysis presented in this thesis is to be viewed. Firstly, theoretical approaches to gender, subordination and space are reviewed; before mechanisms connecting women's income earning and their empowerment are identified. The latter part of Chapter 1 examines approaches to women and their agency and how these conceptualisations can relate to Hausa women living in seclusion. This discussion leads to formulation of the key research questions.

Chapter 2 details the methodology adopted in the political economy approach to analysing gendered power within the context of the material relations of political economy. Empowerment indicators from various sources are drawn on in Chapter 2 to build the set of empowerment variables applied in this study (in Chapter 8). The chapter also introduces the case study village and sets the scene for the analysis by outlining the macro-context of the Nigerian economic crisis, the salient characteristics of Northern Nigerian Hausaland and describing the study village of Zarewa. The data collection methods are described and evaluated.

The core thesis chapters are preceded by an analysis of how and why gender relations and gendering of space have changed over historical time, with special reference to the spread of seclusion in Chapter 3. The historical perspective presented draws on lifestory data collected in the field as well as secondary sources.

Chapter 4 focuses on how (contemporary) gendered construction of space and mobility maintain and reflect unequal gendered power relations; especially as shaped

by everyday praxis of gendered power and ideology through institutions like seclusion.

The core of the thesis is organised into chapters based around gender, space and power within the spheres of production (Chapter 5), reproduction (Chapter 6) and circulation (Chapter 7). These themes ground a feminist historical materialist analysis of gender power (after Hartsock 1983: 9-10) and reflect the everyday roles of low-income women in production, reproduction and circulation identified by Moser (1989). Thus, production, reproduction and circulation are taken as spheres of the economy around which complex data can usefully be organised.

Chapter 5 examines gender, space and power relations in production. Gender and spatial divisions of labour in mainly agricultural production activities (but also gathering, construction, craftwork, service provision and formal employment) are examined. Variables analysed include decision making, ownership, acquisition and control of raw materials and means of agricultural productive work (namely land, livestock, tools, fertiliser, labour, formation of net income). Data on sources and income levels for men and women from multiple income earning activities are presented, showing the relative degrees of power that cash profits bestow.

In Chapter 6 the intersection of gender and space within reproductive work is examined for Hausa men, women and children. Gendered positions of power in the organisation of reproduction are the focus, using field data collected in Zarewa village. The variables identified in Chapter 2 to examine women's empowerment via reproduction are applied to look at disposal of farm product for reproductive use, acquisition of the means of consumption and reproductive work, divisions of labour and decision making in reproductive work and disposal of net income. The chapter asks whether and how seclusion shifts domestic labour to men, whether seclusion is a

way men control women's sexuality and overall whether women are empowered in the reproductive sphere.

Chapter 7 investigates the two key questions: 'Does engaging in commodity trade empower peasant Hausa women?' and 'What activities within the sphere of circulation empower which women and men and how?'. Data gathered from male and female rural Hausa traders of Zarewa is scrutinised to answer these questions and further demonstrate whether seclusion limits women's incomes and accumulation and if so how.

Chapter 8 summarises the key findings and presents the conclusions of the thesis set within a longitudinal perspective of socio-economic change in rural Northern Nigerina Hausland. Data on the key variables measuring women's empowerment are pulled together from the preceding chapters. Extensive discussion of Hausa women's empowerment, their bargaining positions and income earning is offered. Suggestions are offered for directions for future research. Reflection is included on how the research could have been conducted differently.

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUALISING GENDER, SPACE AND EMPOWERMENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This first chapter justifies a (peasant) political economy approach to the analysis of Hausa secluded women traders' power relations, following the circuits of production, exchange and reproduction. The approach is evaluated in response to developments in postmodern theory. Giddens' structuration theory (taken to be heavily influenced by and compatible with Marxian theory); with its focus on intersections between capable, knowledgable human agents and the social systems or structures they are implicated in; helps us conceptualise and understand women's actions (especially in regard to trade) within the structures of seclusion. The focus on agency and structure is continued further on in the chapter by drawing on Sen whose work takes us from Giddens' focus on the large scale and applications of his ideas of structuration to late twentieth century expressions of high modernity; to the household scale and for this study more helpful focus on gender relations, especially in non-Western societies.

The first sections (1.1, 1.2) of this chapter review theoretical approaches to gender, subordination and space. Section 1.3 examines concepts of power, empowerment, structure, agency and subordination; as well as identifying mechanisms connecting women's income earning and their empowerment. The approach taken in this thesis, justified in section 1.4, is broadly materialist-feminist convinced of the value of focussing on the political economy of gender (in the analysis here within the context of a peasant society) despite the prevailing influence of recent critiques arising from postmodernism and post-structuralism. The latter part of the chapter (section 1.5) then turns, in the light of the preceding discussion of theoretical approaches, to consider various conceptualisations of Hausa women's seclusion and their positions of power. In the penultimate section (1.6) the key research questions for the thesis are elaborated. How these questions are approached analytically is elaborated in the final section (1.7) that outlines the framework derived from rural political economy for the analysis of gendered peasant economy, refined to include social reproduction and exchange.

1.1 GENDER AND SUBORDINATION: POST-MODERN CRITIQUES

In geography, development studies and other social sciences the destabilising rise of ideas and practices associated with postmodernism,[1] post-structuralism,[2] post-colonial theory,[3] the linguistic and cultural turn, have shifted emphasis away from predominant focus on the material - from things, to focus also on words. This 'paradigm shift' usefully referred to by the (essentialist?) shorthand, 'postism'[4], has been stimulated by the work of Michel Foucault and others. Postisms have led some geographers to new analyses of gender, power and domination by deconstructing text and language in such terms as discourse, identity politics, textuality, symbolisation, representation and linguistic construction (e.g. Blunt and Rose 1994, Bondi and Domosh 1998, Mayer 1989).

For many feminists, including myself, discursive analysis should not be at the cost of losing connection with the realm of the material. Such a position can appear a perplexing distraction from giving attention to gendered inequalities of well being. If research is to have a bearing on human wellbeing then experiences such as poverty, illiteracy and maternal mortality appear to us more significant to women's daily lives than merely the textual constructions of marginality (Barrett 1992: 201, Jones III, et al. 1997: xxxiii). Postmodernists might argue that discourse shapes the terms of women's subordination and text/discourse shape policy and politics that have real outcomes in terms of women's well-being. Thus, making discourse a pertinent focus of analysis. However, I would argue that without a strong grounding in political

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[1] The post-modern movement in the social sciences is sceptical towards grand claims and universalising (modern) theory. Rather observers' authority and observations are considered partial, contingent and socially constituted. Postmodernism is thus pluralist, emphasising openness to a range of perspectives and voices, claiming that reality (including knowledge) is a social product. Ultimately, however, this can lead to crises of representation and/or an intellectual dead ends by refuting any meaningful representation or knowledge of the Other. Thus, postmodernism can generate paralysis making any meaningful politics impossible.

[2] Post-structuralists are criticised for reducing the world to language, whereas the relations between the discursive and the material are more fruitfully assessed as messy and interwoven.

[3] The post-colonial project is to understand the impact of (C16th – C20th European) colonialism and its successor projects on the cultures of colonised and colonising societies. Post-colonialism is closely engaged with post-structuralism and advocates close and critical reading of colonial discourse. I share critical alarm with other scholars when it appears that interest in the cultures and discursive formations of colonialism is being achieved at the expense of an older, but still vital, interest in the political economy of capitalism.

[4] 'Postism' is a loose description of approaches which have "...challenged the rationalist world view, grand and meta-theoretical projects, Western conceptions of scientific objectivity, universalist assumptions and the notion of progress" (Young 1999: 107). This is not to suggest that there are not significant differences of approach between postmodernists, post-structuralists and post-colonialists, or that they are categorically non-materialist.

economy, the limits of analysis are reached very rapidly, and tend to work within a rather static framework of power. To enable an elaboration of the production of gender the Marxian categories of social organisation - production, reproduction and circulation - are adopted as an analytical framework. Political economy[5] seeks to explore power in the economy and emphasises that the economic and the political are inseparably linked in all social and spatial practices. After Peet (1997: 85) I assert the case for a critical political economy continuing to believe in coherence, reasoning and structure in all spheres of social life. Thus, a materialist account does not explicitly consider post-modern notions of performance (after Butler 1990: 145)[6]. I hold it to be most useful to acknowledge (after Jackson & Palmer-Jones 1999: 560) the body is simultaneously a discursive construct and a wide set of biological opportunities and constraints.

This is not to fall back on reductionist framework that prioritises analysis of economic factors in the production of gender inequalities, overlooking other, less visible contributing factors to subordination. I accept the worth of certain ongoing critiques of structuralism (e.g. Duncan and Ley 1982) and have also derived useful insights from the postmodernist focus on the micro-scale relations of power and difference.

I approach gender relations as the power relations between men and women embedded and visible in ideologies and practices, for instance, in the divisions of resources and labour and the ascription of different needs, desires and behaviours to women and men. Material gender relations are evaluated as socially constructed and rooted in material structures, variable across time and space and complexly intertwined with race, class and other social hierarchies. Gender relations are also viewed (following Sen 1987, 1990) as characterised by both co-operation and conflict; inequalities being changed or maintained by bargaining between individuals with varying economic, social and political power. Gender matters to, and is part of,

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[5] Here I agree with Jane Wills "These are exciting, puzzling and sobering times in which to practise political economy" (1999: 443), not least because of the collapse of socialism and uprooting of older political, economic and philosophical regimes.

[6] Butler's notion of performance proposes that gender identity is constituted by performance, i.e. repetition or regulated forms of behaviour. Thus, some post-structuralists, like Judith Butler (1990), view bodies as entirely socially constructed, performance is everything as they have proclaimed the death of the subject, thus there is no subject being behind identity,. But we must ask if there is no subject then who is directing the performance? Thus, I reject the foregrounding of performance, because it seems to leave no space for subjects to have agency (Nelson 1999).

social, human geography but has been neglected in regional geographies.[7] This thesis works towards a gendered regional geography. I focus on the village of Zarewa in rural Nigerian Hausaland building up empirical data on the gendering of space and mobility, the spatial divisions of labour and of social reproduction. I also touch upon the gendering of well-being, of biological reproduction, and of the sexual contract.

Postmodernist approaches in the social sciences and humanities problematise, deconstruct and even reject the categories man/woman and male/female (e.g. Butler 1990) in favour of shifting uneven social constructs without permanence and consistency over time. Walby speaks of "...cross-cutting discourses of femininities and masculinities which are historically and culturally variable" (1992: 34). However, acknowledging the discursive fluidity of gender does not negate the distinctiveness and usefulness of 'woman' and 'man' as categories for empirical research and social analysis (e.g. Mayer 1989, Walby 1992: 35). "Not only is the concept of 'woman' essential to grasp the gendered nature of the social world, but so is that of 'patriarchy' in order that we do not lose sight of the power relations involved" (Walby 1992: 48). Gender categories structure socio-economic institutions and practices define, constrain and shape the positions of women and men in society (McDowell & Pringle 1992). In addition across cultures there are widely repeated characteristics and historical continuities in the gender patterning of female subordination. This may be described as patriarchy – discussed below.

While keeping the emphasis on the power relations that structure inequalities between men and women, this thesis recognises that gender is not a simple binary, but is cross-cut by many hierarchies. Issues of diversity, difference and multiple cross-cutting interests which have formed a significant critique and feature of recent feminist and post-modern debates in the social sciences are accepted and integrated here not least because they are important factors in determining and understanding distributions of power. However, I agree with Udayagiri that "(h)owever problematic the essentialized conception of women, the constitution of gender as a category of analysis even in

[7] Linda McDowell (1997: 386-7) reminds us of this by presenting Janet Townsend's (1991) earlier comprehensive list of data disaggregated by gender that is needed just to give a 'factual' regional geography of gender.

mainstream academic scholarship is a political achievement" (1995: 172).[8] Likewise, "To obliterate the men/women opposition is thus a move that pulls the rug from under feminist struggle" (Barrett & Phillips 1992: 8). Furthermore, in merely talking about men/women some degree of nominal, or linguistic, essentialism is unavoidable. Use of the linguistic labels 'men' and 'women' need not imply, however, that they are being conceived as unchanging essences.[9] As Fuss (1989: 4-5) argues, what matters is how this essentialism is employed.

Erasing the transformative feminist political agenda (which a wholehearted embrace of postmodernism would imply) worries many feminists, like Christine Di Stefano (1990: 76) who considers postist positions an anti-feminist backlash, and postist theoretical positions more beneficial to men than women. As Linda Alcoff asks "What can we demand in the name of women if "women" do not exist?" (Alcoff 1988: 420). Susan Bordo says "I believe that feminism stands less in danger of the "totalizing" tendencies of feminists than of an increasingly paralyzing anxiety over falling (from what grace?) into ethnocentrism or "essentialism"."(Bordo 1990: 142).

In the light of the foregoing critiques I adopt an approach of 'strategic essentialism'[10]. This approach recognises the gap between postist feminists' conceptualisations of gender as relational and contingent, and the tools used by development researchers and others. For the latter, existing gender divisions and other social demarcations, presented as self-evident by the people with which they work are taken as meaningful analytical categories (Kandiyoti 1998: 146). Dramatic contrasts in power between the genders do exist 'in the field' and detailing them is a necessary analytical and political activity. Work on the politics of representation and the discursive character of Hausa gender relations would be useful and valid, but in this thesis I have approached the terms 'men' and 'women' as meaningful categories in a specific local context.

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[8] I support this achievement and adhere to continued belief in "the necessity for a progressive political struggle for a less unequal world" (McDowell 1996).

[9] As Jackson & Palmer Jones say "the terms women and men should not be taken to suggest an implicit essentialism, but merely as shorthand for the generally significant gender relations in social life, the content of which is, however, everywhere different" (1999: 559).

[10] The notion of strategic essentialism, put forward by Fuss (1989), is the idea that women share struggles against common experiences of subordination. This is a way to retain the need for change and feminist politics without resorting to universalism, or biological essentialism.

A material approach to analysing gender involves documenting practices connected to widely held beliefs and systems of social meaning, in Marxian terms, to the ruling ideology, that regulates and defines gender relations. Within this conceptualisation the practice of ideology entails exploitation and domination while obscuring the sources and mechanisms of power.[11] This notion has been usefully developed in Giddens' account of the constitution of human societies in structuration theory (Cohen 1989, Giddens 1984).

Structuration theory claims that all social actors have a significant situated knowledge of the conditions of reproduction of the society to which they belong. Structure is conceptualised not as a barrier to action, but as crucially involved in the production of action. Social systems are seen as systems of interaction whose interdependencies can be analysed as recurrent social practices that involve the situated activities of human subjects. Subjects are tied to systems by rules and resources instantiated in systems of social interaction by capable and knowledgeable human subjects. The rules and resources derive from the structures that are in turn reconstituted via these recurrent social practices. All systems of social interaction entail power and so depend on structures of legitimation and domination. For Giddens, time-space relations are central to his argument that day-to-day life continues via routinised interactions between actors typically co-present in time and space (Giddens 1984, 1985).

Within structuration theory ideology is seen as operating in two modes: discourse and institutionalised routine (Cohen 1989: 194-5, Giddens 1979: 183). Thus, gender ideology as practice (praxis) actually produces gender (Alcoff 1996) and as such can be thought of as a social structure. Gender practices, in the production and reproduction of gender, are a foci of this study. I attempt to elucidate the limiting constraints of the social structures in which power operates via the tacitly reproduced, implicitly accepted and undisputed structures of day-to-day life within which individuals have agency[12] (Giddens 1979). The scope for agency may be limited. In some times and places, for example, subverting gender norms is something

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[11] "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas...The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it." (from Karl Marx The German Ideology cited in McLellan (1995: 188)).

[12] Defined as men's and women's capacity for voluntary and willed action that is not given by social

undertaken by a few individuals - occasional 'outliers' or dissidents. This is not to suggest that only marginal individuals have the capacity to exercise agency. As quirky individuals (albeit of note) they cannot be taken as constituting the vanguard of a revolution and thus do not feature centrally in an analysis here that concentrates on identifying patterned behaviour.

Post-modern ideas reject patriarchy as an oversimplified grand theory guilty of universalism, unable to adequately understand or resolve gender oppression (Parpart and Marchand 1995: 4-5); or at best taken to be a partial perspective. Within feminist geography there have been shifts from an overarching concept of universal patriarchal domination to more nuanced ways of thinking about women's subordination. Patriarchy, however, remains a helpful concept in analysing daily activities and interactions within specific contextualised gendered labour divisions of production, reproduction and trade so as to elucidate how gender is constructed within the scope of particular economic and social domains (e.g. Kandiyoti 1998, Walby 1986, 1990, 1997). I maintain patriarchy remains a useful idea:

> "...a specifically gendered organising framework composed through a series of historically emergent articulations between gender and other social practices...constituted by, and in turn constituting, social interactions, processes and relations, patriarchy benefits men. It 'advantages' them...enabling men to exercise power in ways not similarly open to women" (Cooper 1995: 10).

While using the concept of patriarchy, the intention is not so much to claim it as an abstract universal system, but to examine the particular operation of patriarchy in gender relations in the specific circumstances under analysis.

Sylvia Walby suggests patriarchal sets of relations together constitute a 'gender regime' and identifies two main regimes: a domestic regime (private patriarchy) and a public regime (public patriarchy) (Walby 1997: 6).[13] The domestic regime is based on male appropriation of female unpaid domestic labour (household reproduction) and female sexuality, as well as on a strategy of excluding women from public spheres which primarily benefits individual husbands and fathers within the household. The

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structures (Giddens 1984).

[13] Walby's efforts to distinguish (albeit overlapping) regimes of patriarchy bear some resemblance to Kandiyoti's (1988) earlier work which made distinctions between broad geographical differences in patriarchy, helpfully recognising the importance of place in determining patriarchal systems' particular characteristics.

public patriarchal gender regime segregates and subordinates women to men's collective benefit within the structures of paid employment, the state, culture, sexuality and violence. Such theorisations of different forms of patriarchy go some way to avoiding oversimplistic reductionism. An important question for theories of patriarchy is why do the dominated, i.e. women, tend to conform to, rather than resist, powerlessness. This issue is addressed below in the discussion of power and empowerment.

1.2 SPACE

Space and spatiality, i.e. the organisation and social production of space, feature as key analytical concepts throughout this thesis. This thesis draws upon Lefebvre (1991) and Giddens (1984), to focus on spatialised and gendered daily practices, whereby social life and its power relations are produced and reproduced via sites, surveillance, control and routines. I also share the concerns of feminist geography with the influence of gender on men and women's ability to occupy, access and traverse space (e.g. Massey 1994, McDowell 1996: 39; 1997: 382).

Feminist social scientists have also long argued that public – private spatial divisions are reflected and replicated in social terms. Thus public space, the space of power, politics and production is largely male space; while domestic, private and reproductive space is frequently female and occupied by women (e.g. Spain 1992). More recently Duncan (1996) has suggested that this public-private space distinction is not an entirely stable or unproblematic binary divide. Nevertheless the distinction retains a conceptual usefulness; not least because real people live their lives in material spaces that are produced by inclusions and exclusions based on gender, age, race, class and so on.

Under the influence of key post-structuralist thinkers, feminist and cultural geographers have also extended their attention to the placing of men's and women's bodies (e.g. McDowell 1995, Nast & Pile 1998). In part, post-structuralist discussions of the body acknowledge that the 'text' is not everything, but has limits imposed by material bodies. This thesis examines how spaces and places are partially constructed and produced through social definitions of male/female bodies as 'in' or 'out' of place

in particular time-space localities. Finally, restrictions and constraints on the spatial mobility of individuals and/or social groups have been widely shown to restrict access to information and power (e.g. Laws 1997).

Taking up Zarewa village in Northern Nigeria as what Massey (1994: 5) terms an 'envelope of space-time' I examine relations of gendered spatiality for their effect on everyday lives. Some important issues here are spatial boundedness, time-space constraints, spatial segregation, place-based networks and their implications for power/empowerment. Another concern is to identify the spatial structuring of production, reproduction, circulation and distribution.

1.3 POWER AND EMPOWERMENT[14]

Notions of power fall into two broad categories: conflictual and non-conflictual power. Conflictual notions of power include 'power over', whereby when A affects B in a way contrary to B's interests, A exercises power over B (Lukes 1974: 27) in a form of domination involving the use of rewards, sanctions or even violence. Conflictual notions of power assume power exists in a fixed amount, so as one side loses power then the other gains power –the notion of 'power as zero-sum'. This implies that for women to gain power, men must be disempowered – an unhelpful and unrealistic notion, because real empowerment should create win-win situations for women and men.

The opposite notion to 'power over' is 'power to' which rather than being dominating is non-conflictual, transformative and generative. Thus, the notion of 'power to' is favoured by those advocating empowerment, because it conceives a non-aggressive form of power, which does not threaten men and is not necessarily 'zero-sum' (Batliwala 1993, Harold 1991). Also more satisfactory is 'power-as-variable-sum', another non-conflictual model of power in which new power can be created.

Foucault (1980: 119) also criticises 'power over' as an inadequate concept of power relations because power is not only repressive, but produces things like pleasure, knowledge, discourse and thus, is more like 'power to'. In considering women's

[14] I acknowledge the usefulness of Ansell (1999: 26-7) and our discussions in reviewing these concepts.

empowerment both forms are important (and indeed feminists recognise that many sorts of power can co-exist) because women need 'power to' address their own interests that may include tackling 'power over' exercised by men and other women. To be useful and appropriate to the analysis the theories of power adopted must (i) satisfactorily resolve tensions between structure and agency; (ii) effectively address the question of why dominated groups and individuals (e.g. women) tend to conform to, rather than resist, powerlessness; (iii) effectively conceptualise power relations within the household;[15] and (iv) translate into a practical empirical research strategy.

1.3.1 Structure, Agency and Power

The tension between structure and agency,[16] i.e. the degree to which human beings are able to determine how they act within prevailing structures, remains a central philosophical problem in the social sciences and especially in conceptualising power. To caricature somewhat, for the sake of illustration, at one extreme structural theories seek holist explanations and stress structure rather than agency - people are assessed as vehicles, or conduits, of power rather than having free will, or choice, in exercising, or not exercising, power. In structural Marxism the relations of production, (reproduction and circulation), along with their political and ideological superstructure, determine the places and functions of the agents of the processes of production, reproduction and circulation (as critiqued by Duncan & Ley 1982); although for Marxists social systems are always sites of struggle and contradiction. Power is thus broadly conceived as an effect of structure, and structural constraints are uniquely determining, in a theoretical position which is unsatisfactory in its powerful denial of agency and privileging of structure.

At the other extreme are those who adopt a voluntarist position in which structural constraints are minimal and agency is privileged. For example, in the free operation of capitalist markets such a view implies that a powerless individual, or group, chooses not to exercise power and their powerlessness is merely a consequence of factors internal to themselves. Most other theories of power (e.g. Connell 1987, Galbraith 1984, 1979, Giddens 1979, 1984, Lukes 1974, 1977, 1986) fall between these two

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[15] Consistently recognised by feminists as the major locus of women's oppression (e.g. Young et al. 1984).

[16] At its simplest, the concept of agency encompasses human beings' abilities to do and to act.

extremes of wholly privileging either structure or agency.

I agree with Lukes (1977: 29) and Giddens (1979) that a median position is useful. Any approach ignoring the consciousness of human subjects is unlikely to be of much use as a social theory even if we cannot always recognise the constraints limiting action. Giddens' (1984) structuration theory attempts to resolve the agency-structure dilemma via the notion of the duality of power and structure. For Giddens, structure is produced (and hence also changed) by knowledgeable agents, while at the same time those structures act back on agents who are both the subjects and constitutors of the structure. Agency is tied to power and is possessed to some degree by all agents. It is the capability to do something encompassing being able to make a difference and to exercise some kind of power (Giddens 1984).

To cite Marx's useful formulation 'individuals make their own history but not in circumstances of their own choosing'[17]. Women individually choose to actively bargain, make choices (rational and irrational) and resist oppression in a myriad of ways within the circumscribed parameters of dominant gender ideologies (Kandiyoti 1998, Walby 1997: 7). Structures are not considered immobile or fixed, but as shaped in part by people's actions (and inactions).

Women's agency often seems to be more severely restricted by their gender than men. Yet while women may be subordinate in certain circumstances, they are not necessarily subordinate in all areas of their lives. As Sen (1990) identifies, in the 'distribution'[18] of agency preference tends to go to men, but agency is not fixed and although men may cling to power women may continually struggle over their little agency, within households. As Jackson (1999a: 137) suggests, gender analysis of development in recent years has been wrestling with taking agency seriously to understand social change in terms of women's choices and trajectories, as much as bounded patterns of closure (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1990). Despite looking for powerful women the distressing absence of female agency I discovered impelled me to search

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[17] "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past." Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (McLellan, 1977: 300).

[18] This is not to imply that agency is somehow a finite resource, clearly it is not.

for explanation in the structures of political economy.

1.3.2 Power Relations within the Household

The structural inequalities of intra-household gender relations, emerging in the distribution of tasks, resources and expenditure; are important to women's empowerment through income earning. Sen's (1990) co-operative-conflict bargaining model provides a useful conceptualisation of the household, taking account of multiple actors with varying/conflicting interests and preferences and different abilities to pursue and realise those interests. His model, which derives in part from New Household Economics (NHE), suggests how conflicts between competing individual interests and joint interests in co-operation can be understood. Sen (1990) proposes that household members try to increase their power both through co-operation, which increases total power available to the household by maximising production over which power can be exercised, and through conflict that increases their individual share of household power.

Sen identifies individual members within households face incentives to co-operate, thereby adding to the total resources and prosperity of the household; and also face disincentives towards co-operation, i.e. motives for conflict because resources must be divided between household members. While it is in household members' interests to co-operate, the results of that co-operation reflect the relative bargaining strengths of individual members, which are often constrained by age, gender, kinship relations, norms, customs and 'tradition'.

An important concept in bargaining is 'breakdown position', or 'fallback position', (i.e. outside options if co-operation ceased), which contribute to individuals' strength or vulnerability in bargaining. Where co-operation breaks down, the person who has the weakest breakdown position will be worse off. In many communities women face worse breakdown positions than men because they make lower actual (and/or perceived) contributions to households' economic fortunes (Sen 1990: 137). Further contributions to women's weak breakdown position are the socially constructed gender inequalities - what Sen calls 'socially generated asymmetries', e.g. in ownership of resources, education, or training (op.cit. 138).

Like Sen, I embrace the bargaining concept, but not being an economist I am less concerned with formalised economic expressions of bargaining, than with ideas and theories about how power relates to the flow of resources (goods, services etc.) between people, in a materialist account of power. In the final analysis I find the concept of relative bargaining powers and positions useful, not least being consistent with empirical evidence. Furthermore, I agree with Sen that we must acknowledge complexity and to study co-operative conflicts we need wider informational bases than narrow formal bargaining models alone. For instance, it is suggested that the bargaining power of individuals influences their ability to determine what is bargained about (Kabeer 1994b: 58).[19]

Additionally, Sen's co-operative conflict model provides another way of looking at internalised oppression (Wilson 1991). Women may not acknowledge inequalities, or challenge them, because they need to co-operate within the household to survive. In other words their breakdown position means they would be worse off without co-operation, so women tend to support the dominant ideology which does not acknowledge inequality, but maintains the status quo as acceptable, good, fair and proper.

Within this thesis (see Chapter 8) the notions of co-operative conflict and bargaining are used in analysing women's empowerment relative to men. Sen's model is not very encouraging in relation to prospects for social change regarding women's weak household bargaining positions. His model suggests that for more powerful individuals, the transmission of bargaining power over time increases, e.g. from generation to generation, because being in a stronger position and a greater beneficiary of the outcome of co-operative conflict places them in a stronger position for the future (Sen 1990: 137). Thus, Sen postulates an explanation for women's continued subordination over generations, i.e. patriarchy, by suggesting "...the relative weakness of women in co-operative conflict in one period tends to sustain relative weakness in the next" (op. cit. 138).[20] Thereby, Sen privileges structure, or at least the

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[19] This echoes Lukes' conceptualisations of power as including the ability to determine the agenda (Lukes 1974: 25).

[20] This phenomenon could also be ascribed to patriarchy, but that is not a term Sen uses. Nor does he

self-reinforcing impact of male agency, over women's agency. He does not see much scope for individual women to break out of this cycle, to resist and be empowered or empower themselves. This seems to contradict his assertions that income earning can improve women's position within the household vis-à-vis their bargaining power relative to other household members. Nonetheless, Sen's suggestion (1990: 148) that this is an important area for investigation supports the attempt in this thesis to pursue the question of women's involvement in income earning and its relation to women's positions of power/dis/empowerment within the household.

A further criticism of Sen's co-operative conflict model is that much of what Sen stylises as intra-household bargaining may follow norms and is not necessarily discussed.[21] Overall, I conclude that Sen's co-operative conflict model, despite its imperfections, is useful for scrutinising gendered social relations within households. Furthermore, bargaining is a very useful concept that proves helpful in measuring empowerment. Bargaining power also clearly operates not only within the household, as focused on by Sen, but also beyond the household in the marketplace (Kabeer 1994b: 72) and thus has wider dimensions of use in considering women's economic empowerment.

1.3.3 Subordination, Power and Resistance

An important mechanism suggested as sustaining an unequal status quo is the idea of oppression internalised by the oppressed. For example, Amartya Sen describes how persistent gender inequality can lead to 'internalised subordination', although he himself does not use that term:

> "There is much evidence in history that acute inequalities often survive precisely by making allies out of the deprived. The underdog comes to accept the legitimacy of the unequal order and becomes an implicit accomplice... It can be a serious error to take the absence of protests and questioning of inequality as evidence of the absence of that inequality (or of the nonviability of that question)" (Sen 1990: 126).

Sen, like others (e.g. Young 1993: 148) further suggests that women and other deprived groups may become habituated to their inequality such that they cannot

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take much account of feminist scholarship.

[21] Wilson email comm. 7/9/98.

imagine otherwise, thereby making them fatalistic and accepting of discrimination. This idea which has been described as 'false consciousness', derives originally from Marx to explain why working classes seem to act in ways apparently not in their interests,[22] but was adopted by feminists to explain why women may act to support, and even reinforce, patriarchal gender inequalities. From Giddens, however, we have a non-class explanation - describing this phenomenon as the unacknowledged interests of subordinated agents and shows how ideology operating via daily routine (and discourse) produces 'dull compliance' with exploitation. He argues that structures of domination can be more powerful than agency and prevent individuals from considering or making fully informed decisions.

The notion of false consciousness has come to be rejected by later feminists. For example, Rankin prefers the notion of the established social order being accepted in the lives and minds of social actors as the world's natural state as being an ideological construction. What Comaroff & Comaroff (1991: 22) call a nonagentive manifestation of power. Bourdieu uses the term doxa to describe a realm of social life within which "what is essential *goes without saying because it comes without saying*:...tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition" (1977: 163, emphasis in original). Thus, individuals adopt dominant ideologies as their own common sense worldview, thereby colluding in the maintenance of social structures that oppress them – culture has the power to blind people to their own oppression but it always remains possible for people to develop critical consciousness of the social order as a constructed political order (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991: 26). Rankin argues women's outward "...compliance with cultural practices signalling their subordination and dependence on men...does not necessarily mean that they accept these practices as legitimate and moral. Their actions suggest consent, not blindness; practical dominance, not total hegemony." (Rankin forthcoming: 10).

In similar vein Agarwal (1994: 57) disputes the notion of 'false consciousness' on the grounds of limited and unreliable evidence. I agree with her that women's co-operation with practices that disadvantage them does not mean they accept these as

[22] "The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws." (Marx 1867: 899). For Marx, false consciousness is ideology.

legitimate. Rather, even if at cost to their immediate wellbeing, they may actually be acting in their own long term self-interest or concerns for their security which is bound up in that of their household, children, wider kin and community because women depend on these networks for their survival. Thus, Agarwal usefully stresses how external constraints shape women's perceptions of their self-interests. In conclusion, embracing the notion of false consciousness is not to patronise women or deny women's agency, as women (or other marginalised groups) may never be totally subordinated (Giddens 1979: 6, 149). Women always remain conscious actors aware of their self-interest as they perceive it.[23]

From the 'women in development' literature are critiques of the feminist idea that the (falsely universalising) modernist notion of Enlightenment senses of rational, individual centred subjectivity[24] can be simply extended universally to all women. I agree with the argument that so-called 'third world', or 'non-Western'[25] women, sometimes, or even often, have a different ('non-Western') sense of self and self-hood. Such women thereby see themselves and their wellbeing as inextricably bound up with the wellbeing of networks of their children, kin and community (Apffel-Marglin and Simon 1994: 33-34, drawing on Sen 1990: 126-7).[26] This does not mean that women are so subjugated by internalised oppression they entirely lack agency but that their actions as conscious actors reflect self-interest, although their self-interest is not always what would be expected from the perspective of a Western, liberal sense of self. Personal well-being is relational. Their self-interest is constrained by structures and the limiting circumstances within which women find themselves. As Sen recognises, the 'lack of perception of personal interest combined with a great concern for family welfare' is an attitude that supports existing inequalities. I agree with Sen who argues we must look beyond women's (or other subjugated groups') apparent lack of perceptions of their own wellbeing, or non-individualistic senses of subjectivity, to seek to expose actual material inequality of wellbeing (Sen 1990: 127). However, we must do this without invalidating women's perceptions of self-interest as false.

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[23] As argued by Agarwal (1994).
[24] Subjectivity refers to ways men and women perceive themselves and their situations.
[25] I am aware of the inadequacies and stereotyping dangers of these terms, while finding them nonetheless poor but convenient shorthands.
[26] This is not to suggest that 'western' women do not also have identities bound up with their children,

Women's relative powerlessness and inability to articulate their needs is widely recognised as a characteristic of patriarchy (Young 1993: 148). A common explanation for lack of resistance is that subordinated individuals lack organisational resources to outmanoeuvre existing alliances and power networks, so they can only achieve effective resistance via organising collectively which is frequently beyond their capacity. Much feminist work has mapped the actual patterns and the multiplicity of sites of gendered power/women's oppression. Lukes' three-dimensional (hegemonic) model of power also touches on the nature of power within false consciousness:

> "...is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people... from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?" (Lukes 1974: 24).

Lukes' (1974: 25) three-dimensional model of power refers to the 'real interests' of those subject to power, which they may not express or be conscious of. Although Lukes extends the notion of power into individuals' thoughts and consciousness, adopting the Marxian notion of false consciousness, a central problem with Lukes' model is these 'real interests' are not readily identifiable or justifiable (Hoy 1986: 126). For feminists such an 'invisible' operation of power (what Lukes terms unobservable conflict) can be recognised as a succinct description of internalised subordination under a hegemonic patriarchal system of ideology. Power produces 'false consciousness'.

Understanding the oppressed's co-operation with oppression means identifying how power operates invisibly because power visible as 'naked force' is rare (Connell 1987). Michel Foucault's work is helpful in this regard. Foucault maintains that power touches people's lives in real material ways, but more through their social practices[27] than by their beliefs. In particular he identifies two types of 'the gaze'[28] as important techniques whereby power operates. Firstly, the 'synoptic gaze' based on architectural

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parents and so on, but in a different way, perhaps less of a matter of survival.

[27] Like Giddens' notion of ideology operating via institutionalised routine.

[28] The gaze refers to the process whereby things and people become objects by the vision of a privileged subject. The gaze involves subjects being turned into objects via instruments of visuality and implies a viewer in a privileged power position.

and spatial arrangements that facilitate an overview of the population and the relations among its components. Secondly, 'individualising visibility' involving exhaustive observation of individuals by those in authority and each other. Ultimately, individuals internalise 'the gaze' because, as Foucault illustrates with the Panopticon, individuals do not know when and whether they are actually being watched and hence in effect surveil and censor themselves (Foucault 1977: 200-203, 1980: 155; Fraser 1989).

Thus, for Foucault, power operates continuously, widely replaces violence and force and keeps a low profile. Such self-surveillance is a helpful notion which can be considered a way in which internalised oppression operates. Furthermore, for Foucault embodied power relations are in part maintained by the secrecy and silences that are kept about them. For example, it is often very difficult for men and women to talk about money within conjugal and household relations.[29] Money, its distribution, and who has access to and power over money within the household are deeply bound up in unequal inter-personal power relations.

Given the huge influence of Foucault on recent shifts in theorising power, his work and its impacts deserve further evaluation. Foucault has been the originator of a now widely accepted postist idea of the relation between power and knowledge, frequently expressed as power/knowledge encompassing the notion that knowledge constitutes power and power makes knowledge. In application to women's subordination a Foucauldian approach might say that power is exercised over women via their (false?) self-knowledge. Foucault views power as reflexive, impersonal, acting autonomously, producing subjects as much as subjects reproduce power. This is among the problems with Foucault's approach to power – action without agency. Influenced by Foucault's concern with the effects of power on the body showing how different discursive regimes produce very different bodies, a major focus of work by feminists on power today has shifted to discursive practices constituting the body. However, I reluctantly take on board limited Foucauldian notions of power, aware they need refining not least because they are gender blind, impersonal, determinist and "...fail to provide a

[29] As Wilson (1987) found in her study of gender and money in London households. Similarly women have been found (albeit also in a British context) reluctant to talk about or admit that their male partners exerted power over them in certain areas of their relationships (Langford 1999).

theory of power for women" (Hartsock 1990: 158).[30]

Thus, many feminists like me still work on power within earlier conceptual frameworks, while incorporating useful insights from Foucault. Firstly, the notion that silence and secrecy are integral to the operation of power, is helpful for this analysis. Foucault's emphasis on understanding power by analysing everyday 'micro-physics' to illuminate larger social conflicts is useful. It is an empathetic approach for feminists who have long been interested in women's everyday lives and extending the principle of the personal as political in order to understand, and change, gendered power relations in society. Foucault's micro-level approach to social praxis is attractive for this type of study that engages with individuals and households via fieldwork. Thus, this study examines some of the specific ways gendered praxis and power work out in a particular time-space envelope. Muslim Hausaland is an interesting setting for such an examination because control, (self) discipline and (self) surveillance of individuals figure highly in the production of what Foucault calls 'docile bodies' that conform to historically and spatially specific ideas of 'normal' appropriate forms of daily behaviour and presentation of self. We should expect everyday social practices and self-discipline to contribute to the construction and imposition of norms in a village community.

To accept empowerment as a possibility it is necessary to conceive of power such that those involved in the exercise of power relations have agency so they could act differently, albeit within the structural constraints of their social, economic, political and cultural contexts. Ideological, or hegemonic power (e.g. patriarchy) in this thesis is thought of both as effected/visible firstly, through material praxis - sets of daily practices including self-surveillance. And secondly, (without denying agency) through a state of mind, i.e. false consciousness or internalisation of the gaze. The approach here to gendered analysis of power relations is influenced more by structuration theory and materialist Marxian-inspired thought than post-structuralist perspectives. I

[30] A relatively minor, but significant, problem with Foucault (and much post-modern intellectualising) is that his (albeit currently fashionable) writing (even in translation from the original French) too often wraps obvious insights in unhelpfully dense prose. This is particularly ironic considering firstly, his own assertions about the relationship between knowledge and power; and second, that the analysis in this thesis is concerned with the power (or its lack) of largely illiterate rural villagers. As a feminist I feel strongly that even complex ideas can and should be expressed in straightforward language, thus attempting to avoid elites privileging knowledge.

maintain, like Hartsock, that "...we must not give up the claim that material life ... structures ... the understanding of social relations" (1990: 172). Therefore, analysis of power in this thesis focuses on the tangible expressions of gendered power in the material, i.e. the activities of production, reproduction and exchange.[31] Thus, power relations are considered to be conditioned, but not wholly determined, by ideology as praxis, false consciousness, economic, political and other structural relations.

An important question in relation to theorising power is whether the dominated, i.e. the powerless, are able to resist. Reflecting Giddens' ideas of power in structuration theory (1979: 6), it is generally agreed by feminists that despite appearances of conformity total domination is impossible. There will always be incidences of resistance: "in reality even those who appear to have very little power are still able to resist" (Kabeer 1994b: 224). Feminists, and other social theorists, including proponents of subaltern studies (e.g. Spivak 1987), have been productive in searches for resistance, loudly proclaiming that wherever there is oppression there is resistance (Agarwal 1994: 421ff, Jackson 1978, Jones 1987, Scott 1990). Giddens (1985: 9-11) goes so far as to suggest that as control by superordinates increases, the opportunities for subordinates to resist may increase. Foucault declares "Where there is power, there is resistance" (1981: 95).[32] It seems resistance is suddenly everywhere (e.g. Pile and Keith 1997), a popularity in the social sciences which Abu-Lughod (1990) critiques as romanticising resistance.

But highlighting resistance, although it affirms the agency of a few and produces momentary spaces of relief for subordinates (Kandiyoti 1998: 142), does not explain compliance of the many. And it is the subordination of the majority, rather than the resistance of the few which is the focus of this thesis.

1.3.4 Empowerment

Broadly speaking, empowerment refers to the condition of having or process of

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[31] After Hartsock (1983: 9-10) who argues that only analysis at the three levels of exchange, production and reproduction can provide complete grounding for a feminist historical materialist analysis of gender power.

[32] Although in Foucault's notions of power there is no room for co-operative effort in resisting (or creating) power, as his approach envisages only social relations of power consisting of one individual acting on another (Rowlands 1997).

developing power. Since the 1980s the notion of empowerment has increasingly appeared in feminist, gender and development discourses (e.g. Chigudu 1992, Friedmann 1992, Karl 1995, Lopez & March 1990, Moser 1989, Rajamma 1993, Westergaard 1994). Empowerment means different things in differing contexts,[33] often being used without clarification, but, being a key analytical term in this thesis, it is elaborated here.

There are several models of empowerment. Friedmann (1992: 116) suggests empowerment comprises three aspects: social - information, knowledge, skills, financial resources, participation in social organisations; political - access to decisions about one's future individually, democratically and collectively; and psychological empowerment - individual sense of potency or self-confidence. What Friedmann refers to as social empowerment is a broad category also covering economic empowerment. Empowerment thus encompasses having 'power over' and 'power to' in each of these three broad spheres.

From the wider literature on empowerment and power we can elaborate Friedmann's model to suggest that empowerment involves maximising opportunities and comprises at least the following:[34]

Economic Empowerment

- **Ownership of and access to resources** (material and non-material) especially income, time and assets including means of production (land, tools etc), employment, education, skills, services, goods, products of own labour, property, workers, information, knowledge.
- **Decision making/bargaining power** – especially economic decision making, control over resources, e.g. time, mobility, income and assets, and ability to determine life choices.

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[33] Reviews of the concept of empowerment are provided (among others) by Rowlands (1997), Oxaal & Baden (1997), Batliwala (1993) and Harold (1991).

[34] Drawn from a number of sources including WIDE (1994: 10), Berninghausen & Kersan (1992: 17), Batliwala (1993), Blumberg (1991: 100) and Moser (1989: 1815). The components of empowerment identified here closely reflect the resources of power and domination outlined by Giddens (outlined in Cohen 1989). The emphasis on control of material resources as a constituent element of power reflects both Marxist thought and structuration theory.

Political Empowerment

- **Changing the power balance -** between superior and subordinated groups or individuals, e.g. within the household, collective organising, access to networks, groups, organisations.

Psychological Empowerment

- **Dismantling internalised oppression** – self-development and self-expression.
- **Self-reliance, internal strength** – status of dependence/independence.

Being empowered is thus multifaceted and hence requires a multidimensional approach to its measurement. Just as there are inequalities in power so too in empowerment: "...inequality of empowerment is not a historic given but a continually reproduced practice" (Cooper 1995: 5). However, as power/empowerment relations of equality/inequality are reproduced through practice the balance is not fixed, but can be altered.

Wilson (1987) draws attention to power differentiation among women in relation to lifecycle stage - older women with established marriages and older children tend to have better earning power, manage their husbands and budgets better, i.e. are more empowered. Studies from the global South support this argument, often reporting older women as more 'empowered' than younger ones (e.g. in Africa, Potash 1986: xix). Thus, we can expect complex intersection of economic, lifecycle and other social factors to shape differentiated experiences of power/empowerment.

Clearly, different types, levels or degrees of empowerment[35] can be achieved by various means, although a common premise is that women's lives can only be improved if power is restored in their favour. In this process, empowerment cannot be bestowed as a gift, or imposed because it is a relation, not a commodity. Rather power relies on agency and can only be taken or exercised. As Friedmann points out, empowerment must take place within a society's cultural parameters because liberation struggles have to be fought from within cultures, not imported or imposed from outside (1992). Empowerment thus means creating opportunities for leverage

[35] Empowerment, however, is not conceived by all as a product or a condition (steady state), but as a process which operates at different levels from the individual to the organisational and the societal (Batliwala 1993; Rowlands 1997).

under existing rules, frameworks, hegemonies and dominant ideologies. It can also mean changing those rules etc. in order to meet women's strategic gender interests. Unlike many examples, this study is not concerned with the positioned development efforts of an NGO, or other development programme, where outside experts try to stimulate empowerment. Rather, this study concerns economic activity taking place within Hausa culture and economic life in a given social and spatial territory and asks whether that economic activity empowers women. In using the concept of empowerment I am referring, like Hartsock "...to the empowerment of women as a group, not simply a few women "making it."" (1990: 158).

1.3.5 Income Earning and Empowerment

As shown in the review above, it is argued in this thesis that income and control of economic resources are key elements of (economic) empowerment. The links between income earning and economic empowerment are a key focus of analysis in this thesis. This section evaluates the notion, especially prevalent in gender and development discourse, that income earning in itself empowers women. Increasing women's access to income is thought to result in mutually-reinforcing 'virtuous spirals' of economic empowerment, improving women's well-being as well as their social, political and legal empowerment (Mayoux 1999: 959). This 'economic empowerment' thesis, much favoured by NGOs, governments and donors, reflects ideas derived in part from neo-classical economics. Similarly social exclusion paradigms emphasise how income confers financial power as well as the value of being employed as part of being perceived as a contributing member of society (Jackson 1999a: 142). Such ideas view money as a source of enabling power and freedom by virtue of its exchangeability with other things.[36] There are numerous examples in the women and gender in development literature of female empowerment via income earning in the South (e.g. Agarwal 1994: 67-68, Blumberg 1991, Mayoux 1999, Rose 1992: 198, Sen 1990: 146, Yasmin 1993: 50). However, there are also examples of women's income not being translated into changes favouring women in control of the disposition of that income, over assets, or over household decisions (e.g. Harriss-White 1998: 203). We do not fully understand the links between income generation and

[36] That gaining an income by trading, or engaging in the labour market, empowers women is not a new idea - Engels thought women would be liberated by employment in public industry (Engels, 1986 (1st pub. 1884): 137-8).

power/empowerment.[37]

It is imperative to seek to elaborate in more detail how income earning operates to give women earners a greater status of control and empowerment than non-earners. Within the discourse that increasing women's individual incomes brings about empowerment, Linda Mayoux (1999: 974) identifies three paradigms indicating different mechanisms whereby income is thought to empower. Firstly, the financial self-sustainability paradigm - empowerment by increasing income alone; secondly, the poverty alleviation paradigm - empowerment by meeting practical gender needs[38]; and thirdly, the feminist empowerment paradigm - empowerment by tackling strategic gender needs[39]. Earlier, Sen suggests three ways outside earnings give women better status, i.e. improves their power position and empowers them: "(1) a better breakdown position, (2) possibly a clearer perception of her individuality and well-being, and (3) a higher "perceived contribution" to the family's economic position" (1990: 144). Each of these ways tackles strategic gender needs – thus, Sen's hypothesis supports the feminist empowerment paradigm.

As identified earlier, to be empowered by earning, individuals need control over (at least some of) their income, its disposal and how it is earned. However, control over certain kinds and levels of expenditure - particularly food and basic wage goods - is not always a source of power, because where incomes are small it is a non-negotiable burden. When food or income is scarce, not using resources to feed hungry children is not an option. The control of expenditure becomes a source of power when available income is more than adequate for survival. Controlling surplus resources may be a power source (Blumberg 1991: 100). Similarly, Kabeer (1994b) reminds us that we need to examine not just the fact of women's earning, but important related factors including the period and level of earnings, community attitudes and norms about women's income earning. In broader terms, the bargaining position of individuals within a household is not simply determined by economic factors, because gender

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[37] There is also some similar evidence from the North (e.g. Wilson 1987: 124).

[38] Practical gender needs concern the immediate, practical and everyday issues women face within existing unequal gender relations. Discussion of women's incomes, as an important element of empowerment, features in debates around practical (and strategic) gender needs and interests (Moser 1989, 1993).

[39] Strategic gender needs encompass challenging women's systematic disempowerment as encoded in institutions and structures (Moser 1993: 37-41).

ideologies about men's and women's appropriate behaviour in real material ways affect women and men by constituting political and economic processes (Moore 1994).

Sen elaborates the complications to the simple thesis that income earning alone empowers by showing how the form of earnings influences its impact. He cites women making lace as home workers (Maria Mies' classic study 1982) whose income is perceived as supplementary. Mies and Sen argue both that the lace makers are overexploited and that their income does not empower. Sen attributes this to their very weak bargaining positions both with their employers and within the household. This case is pertinent for Hausa women who are secluded and also earn from home. Sen (1990: 145) explains the lace makers' lack of empowerment via notions of legitimacy - perceptions of what is 'natural' and 'legitimate'[40] by the parties involved preclude women from earning such as to change their situation. Thus, ideology regarding appropriate behaviour in using income, as well as the comparative amounts of men's and women's earnings, must also be taken into account in analysing income earning and empowerment. For example, women are frequently subject to powerful ideologies such as maternal altruism which dictate they put children's needs first in expenditure decisions (Whitehead 1984: 111-2). This may also reflect strategic self-interest where women's long term security depends on their children's futures.

The extent of women's empowerment through trading/income earning depends on what opportunities are open to them, how much they earn and what women can, or cannot, do with their income and in what ways this challenges patriarchy. So the levels and use of income, decision-making power and social spending expectations must be taken into account in evaluating the empowering effect of income earning. Furthermore, Sen sensibly reminds us that "...the empirical picture is far too complex to be summarized in the form of a simple model of quantified cause-and-effect relationships." (1990: 148). For feminists, empowerment of the oppressed and equality of power/ empowerment between men and women are ideals to strive for. There are no utopias, only more and less empowered women and men living under patriarchy in today's world. Thus, it is necessary to be cautious about suggesting that a

[40] In other words, ideologies and internalised oppression, only Sen does not use such terms.

certain activity, like income earning, will necessarily lead to 'empowerment' (Oxaal and Baden 1997: 6). The state of gaining 'empowerment', or of being 'empowered', is unpredictable and arguably never wholly achieved under patriarchy. With these provisos in mind, the complexities, diversities and patterns in relation to women's income earning and their relative empowerment are explored in this thesis.

For reasons given above it is not proposed that income earning is a panacea and alone, or automatically, can bring about full and total liberation from gender oppression - whether by increasing income, meeting practical and/or strategic gender needs. Here the concern is with whether, what and how income earning contributes to empowering women; i.e. can markets operate in women's interests? In other words, a central question for analysis is whether, for Hausa women, engagement with the economic sphere empowers them by challenging existing female subordination.

The approach of encouraging women's income earning as a route towards empowerment recognises the roots of subordination lie, at least partially, in men and women's unequal access to employment, the market and hence their poorer bargaining power. There has been debate in relation to micro-credit and income-generating projects about the ways income in the hands of poor women does, or does not, lead to empowerment, increased intra-household bargaining power or to greater gender conflict and even domestic violence (Jackson 1999a: 142). As Mayoux (1999: 968-973) recognises, in this respect the evidence is contradictory, in some cases empowerment resulting from income earning is clear, but there is also opposing evidence (e.g. Moser 1989: 1804, 1813; 1993: 40, Tichagwa 1992: 45). Overall Mayoux concludes the data "...is inadequate in many ways and needs to be substantiated by much more indepth qualitative and quantitative work." (1999: 969). This thesis attempts to do just that.

1.3.6 Measuring Empowerment

Having shown empowerment to be multi-faceted, it is not therefore easily quantifiable and given the broad and varied nature of its definition, its assessment is problematic. Thus, extreme caution is needed in using quantitative indicators as indices of women's empowerment (Kandiyoti 1998: 138, Mayoux 1999: 963). However, it is useful to try

to measure (bargaining) power/empowerment, not least to make some comparison of 'degree of empowerment' between individuals and groups.

Various empowerment 'indicators' have been put forward (see Oxaal and Baden 1997), especially as a proliferation of development programmes and policies aiming to empower women have required measures of effectiveness. Such measurable elements of empowerment include: access to and control over material resources (including income, time and assets), knowledge, education, information, skills and decision-making. A further element of empowerment relevant to this study is mobility and ability to travel which enables individuals to see themselves as agents in a context beyond the household, immediate kin and community (Kabeer 1994b: 251, Rowlands 1997: 135). It is acknowledged that it is not possible to measure empowerment in all its dimensions and details; for example, intra-household bargaining processes are not often explicit or observable. Thus, measuring all dimensions of empowerment is not the intended aim. But a working set of measurable elements of empowerment (set out in Chapter 2) in the economic domain is implemented in the analysis.

1.4 THEORETICAL STANCE

In recent years materialist and structuralist modes of explanation and analysis, which focus on the abstract/formal, sometimes invisible, structures underpinning social organisation have been critiqued by various schools of postism, that generally reject meta-narratives as ways of studying the economy and the economic domain. Post-modern approaches tend to de-emphasise economic relations. These critiques are evident and vocal across many disciplinary areas relevant to the concerns of this thesis. Although varied, those advocating postist approaches commonly argue there can be no adequate single universal scheme to understand all social life.[41] To caricature (and admittedly overlook their complexity) postisms shift emphasis from structure to discourse, from Marx to Foucault, from the general to diversity, from uncovering 'truth' to examining its production.[42]

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[41] As Quentin Skinner points out, ironically even those who most fiercely reject grand theories are themselves engaged in theorising and that Foucault, Derrida and their followers "...have proved to be among the grandest theorists of current practice throughout a wide range of social disciplines" (1985: 13).

[42] Despite this oversimplification which is useful for the broader argument, I nonetheless recognise that postist approaches are complex and varied. For example, much of Foucault's work was for the most

Rather than align myself with post-structuralist suspicion of totality and big empirical theories of historically specific social formations, in sympathy with Nancy Fraser (1989) and others, I hold it to be politically useful and feasible to pursue a bigger diagnostic picture. Such an approach entails (grounded) research relating to local spatial and cultural contexts. In this thesis my analysis is pursued, within the frame of Enlightenment thinking, in the traditions of political economy and feminism, without resorting to a traditional Marxist totalising framework, that would attempt to explain all social inequalities in terms of class alone. Gender and other social divisions too are also used to explain inequality. Thus, the approach adopted here opposes those elements of post-modern critiques which unhelpfully reject or deny the categories 'men' and 'women'; and overarching theories of patriarchy (also racism and capitalism), because patriarchy and gender do remain potent social forces and divisions (Walby 1992: 32-33).

In this thesis the author refuses to accept self-imposed immobilising angst, but struggles to remain humble and reflective, while at the same time responding to the urgencies to do research which attempts to reveal the complexities (including oppression) in women's daily lives. The aim embraced here is to speak out, but not to patronise by claiming to speak for. The desirability of eliminating oppression, is an idea defended albeit an idea closely associated with Enlightenment notions of progress. Thus, the stance adopted in this thesis embraces a reflective kind of modernity that accepts there are some universal, objective truths (like the existence of poverty and oppression) and strives to pursue them in a context-sensitive manner. The approach maintains firstly economic relations have profound implications for gender and other social inequalities; and secondly, that political economy is the most useful approach for understanding the economic domain. The author adheres to belief in "the necessity for a progressive political struggle for a less unequal world" (McDowell 1996: 44), while wishing to insist that, despite post-modern destabilisation, some ideas like gender justice are non-negotiable. Marx[43] said "...philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." (Marx & Engels

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part deeply structural (such as The Archaeology of Knowledge) and only in his final works did he try to bring the subject to the fore.

[43] Karl Marx's XIth thesis on Feuerbach.

1846: 23). The author wholeheartedly agrees with Pieterse that these days a cynical response is often meted out to ambitions to 'change the world', "(y)et all this does not alter the necessity to 'change the world'" (Pieterse 2000: 187).

The approach taken here remains, albeit at times ambivalently, feminist, sympathetic (like Hennessy 1993) to a broadly modernist, materialist, political economy analytical perspective convinced of the need for simple yet powerful theory to explain the world. It remains attentive to larger economic and political structures, i.e. social totalities like patriarchy, without denying complexity and difference and the ways specific spatial, historical and cultural contexts influence women's lives.

1.4.1 Women as Subjects/Agents

In relation to recent debates over subjectivity I am wary of too much post-modern deconstruction, or decentring, of the female subject that may undermine the foundations for a specifically feminist politics. However, I am sympathetic to elements of decentring the subject and a (feminist) position which demand critique of humanist/western notions of a privileged, unitary, implicitly masculine subject, i.e. notions of human subjects as self-knowing, bounded, unique bodily individuals separate from others/the Other and from their surroundings. Such critique derives from a belief, which I share, that individuals are shaped and constructed by many processes and forces in everyday life. We are gendered and crosscut by multiple differences, and there are limits to our self-awareness/self-fashioning because as real subjects we are embedded in dominant ideologies, e.g. patriarchy and capitalism, which shape our ways of understanding ourselves and our world.

Thus, it may be asserted that all individuals are unique ensemblages of shifting and contradictory subjectivities, and therefore do not fundamentally share any identity with other people. However, it may nonetheless be convincingly argued that all women and men are situated by the most persuasive and powerful social discourse of the 'binary hierarchy of gender' into shared subject positions with others similarly identified as women, or men (Gibson-Graham 1996: 241). This enables us strategically to research and speak of men and women as social categories while avoiding essential essentialising. Gender (like race and class) is certainly a construct,

but is nonetheless relevant to important questions such as how economies operate for women and men, or to questions of truth and justice.

Thus, after Teresa de Lauretis, I argue habits and cultural practice, like Bourdieu's notion of habitus (Bourdieu 1977: 78ff, 1990: 55ff) are crucial to constructions of meaning because gendered subjectivity is actively formulated through a complex matrix of discourse, habits and practices. Furthermore, the notion of gendered, embodied subjectivity is useful to the analysis of gender because it recognises that subjectivity is material. Thus, the notion that "The subject is never separated from the material conditions of its existence" (Moore 1994: 79-80) is pursued in the analytical approach here. However, I recognise (like Jackson 1997: 149) that it is impossible, or at least almost impossible, to attempt to speak 'about women' without denying subjectivity to some degree.

1.5 CONCEPTUALISING HAUSA WOMEN'S SECLUSION AND POWER

In the preceding sections the theoretical stance adopted in the thesis has been positioned within current debates around gender, space and empowerment. This section now makes connections to how the particular situation of Hausa women's position with respect to seclusion can be conceptualised. In this section the view is taken that seclusion is largely given by social structure which precludes large-scale consideration of performance, subversion, or structuration. In-depth consideration and careful discussion is given here to ways of conceptualising female seclusion - a key feature of gender relations and their spatial organisation in Northern Nigeria. Some of the complex and unresolved issues around seclusion are identified, while sign-posting to places where a selection of these are pursued in further chapters.

Seclusion markedly distinguishes Hausaland from the other, mostly non-Muslim, regions of Nigeria, and in some respects, strongly echoes the wider Muslim world. The seclusion (purdah), or restrictions, of married women in Hausaland, being always social, cultural and historical constructs, are linked both to the ideology and practice of Islam,[44]. Seclusion merits close examination because the gendered spatial

[44] It is too simplistic to accept that seclusion is simply a response to religious teaching, although less rigorous observers may give this explanation; and indeed it is a response often given by Hausa women

separation it entails is intimately linked to power and control. However, because since colonial times seclusion (also the veil) has been a powerful symbol of women's oppression in Western narratives of the non-western world (Ahmed 1992), we need to approach this discussion cautiously and wary of presumptions.

Since its introduction into Hausaland in the fourteenth century, Islam has been deeply intertwined with pre-Islamic Hausa cultural and religious 'tradition'. It is, however, relevant in this context to examine 'traditional' Islamic constructions of female sexuality as they in part inform today's dominant Hausa gender ideologies. The 'classic' position is that Islam's particular worldview of sexuality considers individuals' sexual desires as powerful and hard to restrain. Women's sexuality in particular is conceptualised as active and uncontrollable (in the absence of patriarchy), making men feeble victims of seduction (e.g. Mernissi 1985: 41).

Thus, female sexuality within Islamic traditions is broadly perceived as potentially chaos inducing and disruptive. Mernissi and others suppose direct links between these Muslim beliefs about sexuality and socio-spatial organisation of gender relations. Conceptualising women as dangerous seducers justifies institutionalising female surveillance and seclusion to spatially constrain women, control their sexuality and thus, retain social order.[45] Indeed Hausa men justify seclusion as necessary to keep their wives from other men, and from possible extra-marital affairs; while women refer to men's jealousy as spurring husbands to enforce seclusion (Pittin 1988: 269).

Imam (1993: 4) takes wife seclusion to mean spatial restrictions for wives (and reciprocally some restrictions for men, e.g. barred from entering *kulle* houses of non-kin). Thus, seclusion can be thought of as a spatial boundary defining gender. This thesis examines how the institution of seclusion impacts on the spaces of Muslim

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and men themselves (Pittin 1988:269).

[45] Apart from Islam, many other religions and cultures hold similar ideas about women's sexual powers as dangerous and needing control, e.g. Hindu women in certain cases in north India observe purdah after marriage (Caplan 1985, Jeffery 1979: 3). A diametric concept is of a weak women's sexuality, i.e. female passivity, and a counterpart forceful male virility. According to Mernissi's (1985) analysis, in societies such as those of the Judeo-Christian West, where such notions of female sexual passivity prevail, women's behaviour is not constrained by physical external limitations (such as veiling), but rather by powerful internalisation of sexual prohibitions. Similarly, Katz (1993) suggests that fear of violence, or personal violation, is the purdah of the West, effectively restricting women and girls' mobility and access to space. So notions of sexuality, operating via mechanisms of patriarchal control,

Hausa women's lives. Although the spatiality of seclusion is examined in detail its explicit theological justifications are not discussed.[46]

In much of both rural and urban Muslim Hausaland (Northern Nigeria and southern Niger) the religious and cultural ideology of seclusion (*kulle*) (if not always the practice) impinges on married Hausa women to greater or lesser degrees. In Hausa *kulle*[47] refers to the practice of married women keeping within their domestic compound. *Kulle* is not strictly expected of unmarried, divorced or widowed women, and those beyond their childbearing years, whether or not they are married. There are class variations in *kulle* as practised – their historical evolution is examined in Chapter 3. Complete seclusion, *kullen dinga* ('continual seclusion'), whereby a married woman never goes out, is largely restricted only to wives of malams (Islamic religious teachers) and emirs (Islamic political rulers).[48] *Kullen zuci* ('seclusion of the heart'), stressing modesty, proper judgement and good behaviour, rather than physical seclusion is a modern variation limited to married women in a few urban elite educated families. *Kullen tsari* ('arranged seclusion'), near-universally observed among the urban and rural majority, enjoins that wives may go out occasionally with their husbands' permission and accompanied (Callaway 1987: 57), so can be considered a form of partial seclusion.

The widespread Hausa ideology of *tsari* seclusion maintains that during their sexually reproductive years married women should participate little in the public sphere, but remain in the private sphere secluded behind the high walls of domestic compounds, 'invisible' to all men but close kin. This also restricts Hausa men who, from boyhood, are socially permitted only to enter houses of their own kin. Married women may leave their houses, often only after dark and for essential visits to kin on occasions such as births, marriages, sickness, or death. They may also go out infrequently to

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appear similarly to constrain women in widely differing geographical contexts.

[46] For a very thorough and impressive theological discussion of the historical evolution of veiling and seclusion by a Muslim feminist, see Mernissi (1991: 92). Imam (1993: 11-14) also reviews exegetical approaches to seclusion and veiling.

[47] *Kulle* literally translated means to lock up and refers to the locking up of wives in their husbands' houses. Under *kulle*, Abraham & Kano's (1949: 555) Dictionary of the Hausa Language gives as examples of usage '*kofa tana kulle* the door is locked. *tana kulle* she is in purdah'. Post-modern attention to language and corporeality might suggest that 'locking up' be about closed vaginas, as well as closed doors.

[48] In a sense wives of malams and emirs thus appear paragons of womanhood emulated by ordinary,

seek healthcare and for other reasons deemed appropriate. The socio-spatial construction of the domestic realm is such that women occupy and utilise reproductive space inside the home. The domestic space of every house is a women's sphere linked to other domestic women's spaces by children, unmarried and unsecluded women who move around the village freely able to enter any house.

If seclusion limits women's occupation and access to space (as shown in Chapter 4) and potentially (or actually), to other elements of power/empowerment, a critical question is why and how Hausa women co-operate with and are even favourable towards seclusion? Why do women embrace something that may be viewed as a patriarchal institution? Several explanations for why women co-operate with seclusion are examined here: (i) they have internalised seclusion ideologies by socialisation (e.g. acceptance of custom or convention); (ii) because they lack choice to do otherwise (e.g. through weakness, helplessness, fear); (iii) because they anticipate some advantage or realisation of their own interests from compliance. These various merits of seclusion for women are put forward in the literature on Hausa women and are briefly outlined below.

In the first explanation of socialisation, i.e. internalised oppression, women appear to accept the legitimacy of the unequal order as common sense (the natural state of the world) and continue seclusion "...through internalisation of Hausa rules and restrictions" (Pittin 1984: 475, 1987b: 26). As Schildkrout explains "...the ideal of purdah is ubiquitous" (1979: 82) and to a large degree women control their own seclusion by self-imposed constraints (Cooper 1997: 139).

The second explanation rests on constraints of structure whereby women may conform out of fear; or because they have, or believe they have, no other options. We might expect domestic violence to be a major factor controlling conformity to seclusion. However, reference to domestic violence in the literature on Hausa women is rare but includes cases of domestic violence of husbands towards wives resulting from adultery and often leading to divorce (Smith 1954: 169, 204, 232-5). Men whose wives are seen outside in daylight fear taunts of other men (Hill 1977: 84) and face

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lesser women.

shame (Pittin 1984: 474, Watts 1983b: 404). Women who go out in public may face insults, rude and hostile treatment from men who claim they are not behaving as proper Muslim women (Callaway 1987a: 58). Even other women may threaten to tell a woman's husband if they see her going out a lot (Pellow 1991: 67); or condemn in gossip women who go out in public as loose, immoral, easy (Cooper 1997: 140).

Thirdly, many authors argue that seclusion can be seen to offer Hausa Muslim women benefits and they actively choose to embrace it out of self-interest; or even consider it a right (Pittin 1988: 269). Thus, seclusion can be seen to bestow social, cultural, and/or religious status, honour, family pride and prestige (Hill 1972: 23, 279, Schildkrout 1979: 83, Jackson, 1978: 29, Barkow 1972: 323); and be a marker of nobility or Koranic scholarship (Pittin 1988: 269). For example, according to Polly Hill farmers seclude wives to be "...as socially sophisticated as city dwellers" (Hill 1977: 84). Seclusion is believed to have spread from an upper class urban feature into the rural areas (e.g. Pittin 1984) (this is closely documented in Chapter 3).[49] Katja Werthmann (1995a: 333-334) argues that Hausa women continue to co-operate with seclusion as it gives them status in four ways. Firstly, seclusion acts as a sign of respectability (echoing Barkow 1972: 320) and high social status, identifying secluded women (and presumably their husbands and households) as pious Muslims.[50] For rural dwellers seclusion also indicates their imitation of the social sophistication of city dwellers (Hill 1977: 84). Thus, the absence of seclusion brings shame, so that even poorer households keep their wives in seclusion despite the economic strain this affords (Pittin 1984: 474). Secondly, seclusion is a powerful sign of cultural assimilation as Muslim Hausa.[51] Thus seclusion can act to differentiate from pagan *maguzawa* or Muslim Yoruba (Pittin 1988: 270). Thirdly, seclusion protects women from the outer world (and the perceived danger of falling prey to their own sexual impulses). Finally, seclusion also protects men's status as providers.

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[49] There are examples elsewhere that seclusion is closely associated with upper classes/castes and high social status. For example, in Kerala (Holly Hapke email 13/6/00) seclusion and withdrawal of women from paid work outside the home was a Hindu upper class norm now being mimicked by low-caste Hindus and other low status Muslim and Christian communities.

[50] Similarly, Mack (1997) argues that for women of the Kano Palace religious piety including strict observance of seclusion brings respect and authority.

[51] This may be more significant in the context of a cosmopolitan urban environment like Kano, where Werthmann did her research, than in a largely culturally homogeneous village like Zarewa.

In addition to the higher socio-religious status it bestows and its association with prosperity, other benefits put forward to explain Hausa women's preference for seclusion include the higher economic returns and less drudgery (or even more leisure) secluded women enjoy from food processing rather than doing field labour (e.g. Smith 1954: 23, Barkow 1972: 323, Tarfa 1999). This explanation merits further scrutiny and discussion. Certainly, I would agree wholeheartedly with M. G. Smith's (1954: 24) argument that economic factors are more important than religion or prestige in understanding Hausa women's seclusion. Similarly scrutiny is due to the suggestion that seclusion is preferable to women's exploitation in farming (Pittin 1984: 474); an argument also put forward by Hausa men (Hill 1972: 24) and others (Pittin 1987b: 29) - that women prefer seclusion, with its freedom from carrying water and firewood.

There is mixed evidence that secluded women enjoy higher incomes from trading. A degree of financial independence or ability to contribute to the household budget appears viable, but it is suggested that secluded women do not earn as much as unsecluded traders and secluding wives can increase a household's overall poverty (Benson and Duffield 1979: 14, 16, Hill 1977: 84, 139, 158, 173-4, Watts 1983b: 218, 404, 432). Some highly educated urban women enjoy the leisure seclusion affords then as well as female companionship, security and household help (Callaway 1987a: 161).

Ayesha Imam (1993) has more recently put forward the view that seclusion may be best considered a bargain or exchange, whereby women do seclusion for men because men do things for them. This builds on earlier evidence that Hausa male-female relations are characterised by manoeuvring for power and conjugal conflict (Barkow 1972, Salamone 1976). So within the operation of seclusion are rights and responsibilities for both men and women, not simply repression of women's freedoms. Men whose wives are secluded are obliged to provide them with firewood, food, shelter, clothing, freedom from farm labour, and freedom to trade or pursue their own occupation (*sana'a*) within the spatial restrictions of seclusion.

Similarly, seclusion can be viewed as part of the 'patriarchal bargain' (Kandiyoti's term) such that moral conformity, co-operation and observing their side of the

patriarchal bargain offers women many gains (as pointed out by Jackson 1996: 500). In other words, the normative constraints of seclusion bind both the powerful (men) and the dominated (women) groups.

Following Giddens (cited in Cohen 1989: 152) we may suggest that as Hausa men become wealthier and are able to exert more control over their wives by imposing stricter seclusion (e.g. the *kullen dinga* expected of emirs' and mallams' wives) then their wives can simultaneously demand or negotiate better conditions and provisions for themselves, i.e. have greater bargaining power, than wives of poorer husbands.

Observing seclusion and other Hausa norms of gender behaviour means co-operating with the 'community' (meaning the overlapping communities of kin, friends, neighbours, the village, local government, state, the Hausa and Islamic communities etc.). Conforming to norms of social behaviour involves not challenging the operation of hegemonic political power and decision-making authority within the community. Co-operation means women may be better off and better able to survive as part of the community – the benefit of seclusion. Co-operating with the community brings economic, social and political support for women such as provision of basic needs, the opportunity to earn income and support in crisis times of childbirth and illness.

In considering how Hausa women benefit from conforming to seclusion we must ask what are the costs of non-conformity. Individual women who break with seclusion norms face being shunned and aspersions being cast on their character. Thus, gossip brings shame and rejection as very powerful penalties for non-conformity. Non co-operation with seclusion means opting out and thus no longer belonging to the community. The occasional woman choosing this option may relocate (e.g. to the anonymity and possibilities for alternative lifestyles offered in large urban centres like Kano) to gain greater social freedom.[52] Potentially, non-conformity to seclusion and rejection by the community may cost women contact with and rights over their children (Hill 1972: 24, Pittin 1986: 50), close kin, friends and neighbours; as well as loss of respect and provision of basic needs from husband or natal kin because "Women's ultimate security is based on their kin, their children, and themselves"

[52] *Yawon duniya* (lit. walk of the world) is the Hausa expression describing such action.

(Pittin 1987b: 39). Opting out of seclusion in this way is only an option for those women who have sufficient resources (e.g. property, other capital, support from their natal family, skills, education, strength of character and/or economic opportunities) to make it independently elsewhere. In other words they have a strong enough fall-back position to survive outside the immediate community. Overall the positives and negatives of conforming to seclusion and thereby belonging to a community are incentives for co-operation and conflict; but for most women opting out is an option of last resort.

Certain recent developments in feminist theory advocating recovery of the female subject would suggest it is imperative to explore what women themselves think about seclusion. The reasons why this was not possible, nor entirely appropriate, in this study are detailed in Chapter 2.

Seclusion itself is not homogeneous but varies across time and space. The variations in the ideology or 'rules' of seclusion and their interpretation are heavily intertwined with patterns of local understandings and actual observance of seclusion reflecting a range of geographical, historical, environmental, economic and social factors. Commentators on Hausa seclusion suggest it to be increasing this century (e.g. Smith 1954), while other more contemporary observers suggest that tensions between tradition and modernity are leading to slow relaxation of restrictions on women's movements (or redefinitions of seclusion praxis) even in urban areas (Mortimore & Adams 1999: 148). Yet there are ambiguities: Hausa women in Kaduna are pursuing occupations outside the home, while at the same time young women are exhorted to remain in seclusion (Coles 1996). These variations and historical shifts in seclusion and gender relations are explored in detail in Chapter 3.

Understanding the dynamics of seclusion is not straightforward; not least because its ideology and praxis vary across time and space, across class and region, and even between individual women of same class in same space-time instant. As shown above the interpretations for seclusion are various. As a piece of critical social science this thesis considers and explores these interpretations in more detail, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4.

Problematising seclusion leads us to ask several further questions.[53] One of these is why men as farmers sacrifice women's farm labour (focused on in Chapter 5). Further issues for enquiry include the implications of how seclusion shifts domestic labour to men; and whether seclusion is a way that men control women's sexuality (both these questions are addressed in Chapter 6). Furthermore, the question of whether seclusion limits women's income and accumulation, and if so how, is investigated in Chapter 7.

1.6 KEY RESEARCH QUESTION

The connections between gender, space and empowerment investigated in this thesis are part of the complex patterns of gender relations of Hausa societies. A purpose of this work is to identify and describe some of the components of those patterns and wherever possible to place them in the context of other wider patterns, thus emphasising change and diversity. The emphasis is on investigating the complexity of issues involved in the following core research question:

- Does access to income via trade empower women?

The question is important, researchable and relevant to development studies and development practice in general, as well as to gender and development in particular. In addition, this research has implications for feminist geography, regional and human geography. In relation to the wider goals of feminist politics this piece of feminist geography contributes an example of how identities of power and gender are constructed in the specific place of a rural Northern Nigerian village, as part of our understanding that place matters to 'axes of difference' (Pratt 1993: 60). Despite the current ambience of postism(s), research on the objective, material geographies of gender remains legitimate and it is still possible to speak out about subaltern interests this way without denying women's self-perceived gender interests.

1.7 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis sets out to analyse the key research questions identified above by examining income earning and empowerment for rural Hausa women via a village study. Women's everyday paid and unpaid work takes place in all spheres of the

[53] Thus responding to Jackson's (1981: 219) call for further research on seclusion.

economy – production, reproduction and exchange (Moser 1989). In pursuit of Marxian and feminist traditions of political economy these spheres provide the focus and organising framework for the thesis as also adopted from a conceptual framework for empirical analysis of the organisation of peasant households by Deere and de Janvry (1979). Furthermore, this three-fold framework provides for a firmly grounded feminist historical materialist analysis of gender power (after Hartsock 1983: 9-10).

Production is a foundational Marxian concept, posited by Marxists as the basis of any society. Relations of production as the basis of the social organisation of production, encompass the material relations under which men and women do productive work and are central to gender divisions of labour and the complex ways gender relations affect production (Mackintosh 1984: 6). Traditional Marxist analyses of production have been critiqued by feminists as theoretically inadequate with respect to invisiblising women (Delphy 1984: 160), despite Engel's (1884) later efforts to stress the concern of historical materialism with reproduction of life, as well as production.

Therefore, in addition to gendered production relations (the focus of Chapter 5) this analysis also focuses on the reproduction of humans as physical, as well as social, beings and of society. Reproductive work, characteristically done by women and girls, is often invisible, unpaid, unmeasured and unvalorised (Goldschmidt-Clermont 1982, 1987, 1994). Processes of reproduction are basic to the construction of everyday gender systems in all societies, so understanding reproduction must be central to any analysis of the intersections of gender and political economy. Marxian feminists brought analysis of reproduction to the fore, maintaining that women's subordination (and/or empowerment) is reflected in and determined by the ways women are incorporated into productive and reproductive work. Understanding the social relations under which domestic work is done is a link between economic and non-economic factors which maintain women's subordinate (and/or empowered) position (Mackintosh 1984: 11). Intersections of gender, space and power in the sphere of reproduction is the focus of Chapter 6.

Circulation, first identified by Marx, is the third significant process of economic and social organisation and one that links together production and reproduction processes. Circulation refers to the movement of money between production (which creates

surplus value) and exchange (under which surplus value is appropriated and distributed). The process of circulation integrates the many commodity sectors of an economy. Exchange is a broad type of economic activity, including market exchange which is the buying and selling of goods. It is men's and women's involvement in market exchange which is of concern here because the operation of real markets, circulation and commodity exchange involve social relations operating through power mechanisms (Mackintosh 1990: 47). Markets are social institutions (Hodgson 1988), socially embedded (Polanyi 1968) in gender and space. The role of gender in the marketplace has been largely ignored in the literature (Robson 1999). Chapter 7 of this thesis investigates whether Hausa men's and women's involvement in markets, is empowering.

To analyse women's empowerment in rural Hausaland the analytical framework draws on the models of: (i) Deere and de Janvry (1979), which sets out processes of reproduction, production and circulation operating at the level of peasant households; (ii) Clark (1987), that analyses reproduction as an integral part of a mode of production; and (iii) Leplaideur (1992), to analyse relations and forces of distribution operating in the sphere of circulation. These models are used to develop a multidimensional set of variables (as elaborated in Chapter 2) to gauge aspects of women's empowerment within the spatial and gendered organisation of production, reproduction and circulation in rural Hausaland.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH SETTING, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

> "*From the households of the emirs to the lowliest rural gida, Northern Nigerian society remained and in many ways continues to remain a closed book to outside observers, both foreign and Nigerian - hence the dominant impression of changelessness*" (Shenton 1986: 120).


2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the setting and strategy for investigating the research questions highlighted in the previous chapter. The relevant features of Northern Nigeria are outlined, then the reasons for a small rural case study are explained before describing the case study village. This is followed by explaining the conceptual and practical justifications for the research methods. Thereby, an empirical method for analysing the relative empowerment of men and women within the gendered social, economic and spatial organisation of rural peasant households is mapped out. The chapter concludes with clarification of the nature of the data collected and some of the challenges of fieldwork are reflected on.

2.1 THE RESEARCH SETTING

Northern Nigerian Hausaland was selected as the setting for this research because it contains many communities with Hausa-Fulani populations that are fairly homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture, but in which gender is a highly significant variable of social organisation. Precise delineations of Hausaland[1] vary (Map 2.1), but it is by any account a very large region covering around 310,000 km^2.

Map 2.1 Hausaland



After:Nast 1992: 2

With respect to the construction of gender, the widespread practice of wife seclusion (examined in Chapter 4) is one of the most important aspects of the Hausa cultural environment dating back to the Sokoto Jihad in the early nineteenth century which

[1] Strictly, Hausa (and Hausaland) is a term based on linguistic, rather than ethnic definition because "There are really no Hausa people; there are only people who speak the Hausa language and practise the Hausa way of life" (Fage 1955: 34).

launched a powerful campaign of Islamic religious reform that left major impacts on today's Hausaland (further discussed in Chapter 3).

Research on Nigerian Hausaland (which has always been and continues to be urban biased), flourished from the late 1960s to the early '80s. Yet, despite all this scholarly activity, predominantly by outside researchers, there remained an underlying awareness of the extent of our continuing ignorance about Hausaland, as reflected in the quotation opening this chapter.

With the economic and political difficulties faced both in Nigeria and in overseas academic institutions, during the late 1980s research carried out in Nigeria dwindled and by the 1990s, recent and ongoing research became scarce. Thus, there is a recognised need for more up-to-date scholarship (Mustapha 1993). This thesis attempts to illuminate in a small way the lack of knowledge about the changes and transformations undergone by one of West Africa's most significant societies during the twentieth century's last decades.

In relation to Northern Nigeria there have been very few studies that have focused on gender (i.e. considered both men and women comparatively). The work of Richard Longhurst (1980, 1982) on rural gender divisions of labour is an exception. He claims women's dependence on men and mobility restrictions are exacerbated by seclusion, yet women are able to earn money despite women's work being poorly paid and impermanent. He recognises that class intersects with women's weak positions relative to men, because higher class women have access to higher income earning occupations. As shall be seen in subsequent chapters, Longhurst's findings were largely replicated in Zarewa and his predictions (1982: 114, 116) are evaluated in Chapter 8.

There is a significant body of work on Hausa women, but recent material mostly has an urban focus - centred around the cities of Kano, Kaduna and Katsina. The overemphasis in the literature on urban women represents a considerable imbalance because the majority of the Hausa population of Northern Nigeria do not live in cities,

but in rural areas where they are dependent on farming and other off-farm economic activities. In 1986, 82.6% of the population of Kano State were living in rural areas.[2] Today there remains a need for more research in rural areas.

There have been two major intertwining themes in the literature on urban Hausa women relevant to the research questions pursued here - their seclusion and economic activities. Enid Schildkrout began by documenting the trading activities of secluded women in Kano (1983, 1988), highlighting women's dependence on child hawkers (1978, 1979, 1981b, 1981a) – a theme echoed in Zarewa (Chapter 7). In Katsina, Renée Pittin focused on minority Hausa women pursuing alternatives to marriage and seclusion by supporting themselves as courtesans (1979, 1983, 1984, 1988) – an option not available by and large to Zarewa women in the 1990s. The economic position and diverse occupations of mostly secluded Hausa women in Kaduna is elaborated by Catherine Coles for the 1980s (1983, 1991) demonstrating the growing importance of women's incomes for household survival in times of economic insecurity – something echoed in Zarewa. Barbara Callaway's work focuses on the political status of secluded women in Kano City (1984, 1987a, 1987b, Callaway & Creevey 1994, Callaway & Kleeman 1985) and its possibilities for change via law and education (Callaway & Schildkrout 1986). Their predictions that seclusion would be eroded by increasing formal education of girls have not been fulfilled in the findings presented here.

In recent years there has been less work on Hausa women in rural areas. *Baba of Karo* (Smith 1954) is one of the earliest, and remains one of the richest, sources on rural Hausa women. We find rural women in Zarewa much more widely secluded now than in Baba's day (Chapter 3). The economic significance of secluded women traders was first identified by Polly Hill over three decades ago (1969a, 1971). Her picture of powerful women grain traders and successful, wealthy, independent rural house traders in the late 1960s and early 70s provides stark contrast to the situation in

[2] Calculation from figures in the *Kano Statistical Yearbook 1987* which are based on projections from the 1963 national population census - the last to be published. More recent Nigerian censuses are notoriously unreliable, prone to under- as well as over-counting, cancellation, dispute and non-

Zarewa in the 1990s. However, my findings echo Emmy Simmons' analysis of the economics of women's food trade as a rural industry (1973, 1975, 1981) which finds seclusion to be a severely limiting factor. Cecile Jackson approached the changing position of rural women in the context of economic and other opportunities offered by an irrigation scheme (1978, 1981). She found that older unsecluded women were able to take advantage of wage labouring opportunities but younger married women found themselves more strictly secluded as husbands' prosperity increased. Focusing directly on seclusion, a major theme in all the literature on Hausa women, Ayesha Imam has recently delineated the historical changing development and spread of female seclusion in Hausaland, as well as its current ideological constructions and practices (1991, 1993). She illustrates how ideologies around seclusion are not monolithic, but intersect with other ideological terrains about marriage, ethnicity and so on while people negotiate within and across these ideological fields. Seclusion ideologies and practices shift with political and economic changes but always involve conflict, power relations and reconstruction of ideological fields in arenas of contestation and negotiation.

In this review of literature on Hausa women relevant to the question whether income empowers Hausa women, we can identify two contrasting and contradictory representations of Hausa women as victims or as agents.[3] In many ways both are (regulatory?) fictional identities, in addition to being rather narrow and uni-dimensional. Alternative discourses and subject positions might be provided by Hausa women themselves but we have very little information on how Hausa women would account for themselves. Clearly, who writes partially determines how Hausa women are viewed and represented. Even such accounts as there are by Hausa women themselves provide contradictory accounts. Baba of Karo provides evidence both of Hausa women resisting seclusion (Smith 1954: 80) and initiating divorce (ibid. 107-8); but also as victims of violent domestic abuse from their husbands (ibid. 169, 204, 232-5).

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publication. Although since 1963 there has undoubtedly been increased urbanisation, Northern Nigeria's population remains predominantly rural.

[3] Albeit this is a somewhat crude and caricaturing binary division, it nonetheless draws out the extent of widely differing portrayals of Hausa women.

Discourses of Hausa women as victims see them as subjugated by patriarchal oppression, subordinate, dependent on men/children, dispirited drudges, constrained, restricted, immobile, to be pitied, imprisoned by seclusion, controlled by husbands, men, and patriarchy; illiterate, poor, ignorant, powerless and isolated.

In contrast discourses of Hausa women as agents portray them as intelligent, creative, strong, independent, self-reliant and even subversive agents actively resisting patriarchy. They are seen as powerful individuals, initiators of divorce, able to hold husbands in debt and control children's labour. Images of Hausa women as agents illustrate how they are socio-economically active within and despite of seclusion; in control of their own lives, their children, the economic and other affairs of their households. Such women are seen to have strong networks and be powerful, active traders, courtesans, *bori* adepts and so on. Some would argue that Hausa women are not victims because they subvert the restrictions of seclusion. For example, Werthmann (1995a, b) and Imam (1993) argue that while women may not be able to choose not to be secluded, they can and do manipulate its conditions. Similarly, Tarfa (1999: 223) reports that Hausa women constantly devise ways to exploit and work around restrictions of seclusion.

Despite the physical restrictions of seclusion on mobility secluded women are shown to have an impact (albeit indirect) on external political affairs through influencing their husbands and the upbringing of their children. For example, this is shown by Mack (1997) among the most tightly secluded of all Hausa women – the royal wives in the Kano Palace. Such portrayals are found in the work of O'Brien (1999) and others (e.g. Echard 1991) on Hausa women *bori* adepts who do not observe seclusion, who go on Hajj without their husbands etc. However, even Hausa women *bori* adepts while portrayed as powerful independent agents, are also recognised to be affected by the strong social norms of Hausa femininity and its equation with seclusion, in that their mobility is nonetheless restricted relative to male *bori* adepts (O'Brien 1999: 32). A tiny minority of highly educated Hausa women scholars and poets (mostly from the

past, but some today) are portrayed as influential in political and social matters (Boyd & Mack 1996; Koko & Boyd 1992).

A related discourse sees Hausa women occupying 'women's worlds' that are portrayed as sites of strength, separateness, reflecting feminine value systems. This is a valorisation of the private sphere in which women are viewed as culturally autonomous, active agents rather than passive victims wielding the potential for subverting established male power. Thus, women resist through covert or indirect bargaining (not in overt organised ways) in face-to-face relations with husbands, children, co-wives, other kin, friends and neighbours with such strategies as diversion of food, income or labour resources.

We shall return in later chapters to the issue of contradictory and ambiguous claims that Hausa women's trade is both empowering and disempowering: empowering because it makes seclusion economically viable and hence bestows the benefits of social status; disempowering because women's trade is severely limited in scope, few women are able to accumulate significantly by trading and to trade at all women are dependent on children and other agents.

2.1.1 Selecting the Case Study

This thesis is based on a case study: the detailed examination of individuals and their households within a single settlement. The strength of such a micro-level study is its provision of in-depth analysis of specifics and realities, rather than broad generalisations. Furthermore, a case-study of this nature presented a feasible research agenda given the researcher's limited time and resources. Rich data was collected from just one village, thus deriving better insights than if the research had been thinly spread across several locations.

As opposed to survey analysis, a case study may be seen as unique, atypical and an unrepresentative sample, from which generalisations cannot be made. In a similar way Foucault uses case studies in order to make a problem intelligible: my talking to men and women in Zarewa was in order to understand women's empowerment), yet the

case study remains unfinished business, ever subject to further rectification (Cousins & Hussain 1984: 3). While not claiming representivity,[4] however, this study is contextualised in the findings of previous studies. Furthermore, to contextualise the fact that a case study necessarily implies a detailed snapshot at one time, a historical perspective is taken in Chapter 3. In these ways, an extended case study is presented. Thus, the findings outlined in subsequent chapters are not presented as results directly generalisable to the wider Hausa population, because it is a study of a particular Nigerian, rural, nucleated Hausa settlement. Although if the research could be replicated, it would increase our knowledge, rather than produce identical results, because the respondents, researcher, research assistants and the research environment would have in some ways altered.

The fieldwork site was chosen after eliminating as potential sites three other rural Hausa[5] settlements in Kano State on the grounds of being either too large (i.e. more than 10,000 population) to be manageable by a single researcher, or sites characterised by development foci (rural hospital, local government headquarters and an irrigation project). Zarewa, at the extreme south west corner of Kano state (Map 2.2), was selected because its size (in geographical and population terms) was reckoned to be appropriate being below 10,000. Furthermore, it is not an administrative headquarters, nor in any development project area and it is not on a major transport route. Also in favour of Zarewa was the fact that although no substantial research has ever been carried out in the settlement,[6] it is described, for the period 1870-1950, in the lifestory of *Baba of Karo* (Smith 1954).

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[4] Polly Hill rightly argues that for Hausaland (like most places) due to variations in population density, ecological and geographical features "...the very notion of a representative village is obviously absurd" (1972: 4).

[5] In the 1963 census 94% of the population in Kano state were recorded as Hausa-Fulani, a situation which has not changed for rural areas although urban centres have become more ethnically diverse (Kano State 1987: 84).

2.1.2 Northern Nigeria - The Region

Northern Nigeria is a savannah landscape of undulating plains with granite outcrops (*dutse*) (Plate 2.1).[7] The soils of the area are fertile and intensively cultivated, although rainfall is highly variable and also uneven at a local scale; Zarewa lies approximately on the 1000mm annual average isohyet (Mortimore 1989: 43). There is evidence that rainfall has been lower since the 1960s (Mortimore 1994: 379). Surface water in the region is limited to seasonal flow in most rivers, watercourses and marshy areas (*fadama*), but the water table is accessible in wells. Zarewa lies on the northern edge of the guinea savannah ecological zone[8] with natural vegetation of grass, thorny scrub and denser woody vegetation along watercourses. The tropical savannah climate of the region has distinct wet and dry seasons (Plate 2.2, Figure 2.1). Agricultural activities centre around rain fed, non-mechanised cultivation and closely follow the seasons (Figure 2.1[9]).




Plate 2.1 The undulating plain around Zarewa in the wet season with granite outcrops and isolated farmsteads.

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[6] Zarewa has been included in official population censuses. In the 1970s it was visited by Phil Shea researching nineteenth century textile production (Shea 1975: 74) and was the location for an undergraduate political science dissertation (Jibrin 1977).

[7] For detailed geographical study of the area around Zaria with discussion of its land forms, soils, climate and vegetation see (Mortimore 1970).

[8] For a detailed description see Jackson (1970).


[9] Source of rainfall data: Akintola (1986).

Figure 2.1 Climate, Seasons and Agricultural Activities


ZAREWA SEASONAL CALENDAR

CLIMATE


(Figures for Samaru, Zaria)




SEASONS



AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES



Map 2.2 Karaye Local Government Area



Zarewa is under the administration of Karaye Local Government (L.G.),[10] in the far south-west of Kano State (Map 2.2). Population growth rate in the Karaye L.G. area appears to have been low throughout this century - 1.28% p.a. average growth 1963-1991 (based on census figures) which is well below the rate of 2.5% used as the basis of projections for rural Kano State (Kano State 1987: 36).[11] Population densities in parts of Northern Nigeria are high, associated with long established intensive land use by a smallholder agricultural sector. Population density in Karaye L.G. has increased throughout this century (Table 2.1). Population levels around Zarewa in the Kano hinterland continue to increase and areas of continuous cultivation are expanding.

Table 2.1 Population Density, Karaye Local Government

Census Date	Population Density	Sources
1913	15-34 km^{-2}	Mortimore (1974: 133)
1931	34-77 km^{-2}	"
1952	34-77 km^{-2}	"
1963	125 km^{-2}	Calculated from Kano State (1987: 42)
1991*	179 km^{-2}	"

*Projection based on 1963 census




Plate 2.2 Dry season - empty fields littered with remnants of last year's grain harvest.

[10] At the time of the fieldwork. Zarewa is now under the administration of the new Local Government of Rogo created in October 1996.

[11] Population growth rates in Karaye L. G. area appear to be below rates for the whole of Nigeria: 2.9% 1970-80, 3.0% 1980-1990 and 2.9% 1990-1995 (World Bank 1994, 1997: 220). The population of Northern Nigeria is undoubtedly growing, but probably not as fast as some of the (alarmist) estimates - even Nigeria's Federal Office of Statistics (1995: 5) cites 3.4% p.a. Mortimore (1994) maintains that a figure of 2.2% p.a. for the period 1960s-1990s is a realistic estimate based on the 'good' (but annulled) 1963 census.




Plate 2.3 Sarkin Zarewa outside his room in the centre of the village. His son beside him crouches respectfully. The sack (formerly for fertiliser) of grain is a standard volume of 40 *tiyas*.

2.1.3 Zarewa - The Case Study

Zarewa is approximately 125km south-west from Kano (the state capital and the largest city in Northern Nigeria) and about 50km north-east from the nearest urban centre of Zaria (Map 2.3). Zarewa has a population of around 5,200 in about 533 residential households (*gida*).[12] After Karaye and Rogo, Zarewa is the largest settlement in the local government area. As long ago as 1928 Karaye District was described as the wealthiest district in Kano Emirate because of its rich natural resources and industriousness of its inhabitants, while in the 1980s it was cited as the most developed agricultural area of Kano State (Mustapha 1990: 169).


Zarewa village is a nucleated settlement (Plate 2.5) comprising six wards, or quarters. (*unguwa* pl. *unguwoyi*) (Map 2.4): Cikin Gari, Yan Aciyama, Yan Falalu Yamma, Yan Falalu Gabas, Sabon Gari and Fegi.[13]

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[12] Estimates based on mapping the village and enumerating membership of approximately 10% of the village households.

[13] The ward boundaries run along roads through the village and were identified in discussion with villagers.

Map 2.3 Location of Zarewa




In recent years Zarewa has spread beyond the old defensive walls which encircled the village[14] and established a new residential area, Fegi,[15] to the south on what was previously farmed land.

Cikin Gari ('in the town') is the smallest, most central, ward at the heart of the village being the location of the chief's compound, the old market place and the mosque (Plate 2.4), with a wide adjacent street for Friday prayer gatherings. Sabon Gari ('new town') is on the eastern side of the settlement where new houses are being built on the village periphery. Sabon Gari is the traditional quarter in a Hausa settlement for newcomers and strangers. The population of Zarewa are indigenous Hausa-Fulani. Inmigration is not significant, with the exception of a few temporary Igbo sojourner-traders.

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[14] In the nineteenth century many Hausa settlements had walls to protect the inhabitants from slave raiders. Such raids and the walls of Zarewa are described in the account of Baba of Karo (Smith 1954) and were recalled during life story interviews carried out for this research. Traces of the walls appear on air photos (Figures 2.2, 2.3) being more visible in 1962 than 1991, but their remains can hardly be found on the ground today.

Map 2.4 Zarewa Sketch Plan






Plate 2.4 Zarewa's new mosque in the centre of the village (viewed from inside a compound).



Plate 2.5 The nucleated village of Zarewa. The predominantly mud-built houses are tightly clustered together within the village boundaries. In the foreground is a pit from which building earth has been dug.


Figure 2.2 Aerial View of Zarewa 1962



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Vertical Air Photo **Date:** 1962
Source: Kaduna Polytechnic
Season: Dry season (bare fields light in colour)
Visible features: The compact village of Zarewa appears centrally with town walls on north, south and west sides. Fields surrounding the village are small, characteristically rectangular and in places demarcated by dark lines of shrubs (e.g. *lalle* bushes). Farm trees appear as black dots. Water courses appear as dark meandering lines in a dendritic pattern draining northwards. *Fadama* areas surround the watercourses as darker more heavily vegetated areas of smaller fields. Uncultivated scrubland appears grey and rough. A cattle track crosses the area from the south-west to the north as a darker grey wide line between fields. Pathways and roads appear as narrow white lines.

Figure 2.3 Aerial View of Zarewa 1991



N


Vertical Air Photo

Source: Environmental Resource Surveys Ltd., Kano **Date:** 1991

Season: Rainy season (fields appear dark with growing crops)


Visible features: In comparison to the 1962 photo there is a greater farmed area of fields. Fegi ward to the south of the village centre is visible, laid out on a rectangular grid pattern of unsurfaced roads. The town walls are no longer visible having largely been demolished or disappeared through neglect. School and dispensary buildings appear as white rectangles in Fegi.

Map 2.5 Zarewa and Environs



Source: Adapted from air photo, 1991 (Environmental Resource Surveys Ltd., Kano)

Figure 2.4 Small Scale Aerial View of Zarewa 1991



Source: Air photo, 1991 (Environmental Resource Surveys Ltd., Kano)

There is evidence for Zarewa's growth during the preceding three decades. In the 1962 census it recorded a population of less than 1,000 persons (Mortimore 1968: Map 6, p299). Aerial photos of Zarewa show population growth with expanded settled and farmed areas between 1962 and 1991 (Figures 2.2, 2.3, Map 2.5). At a rough estimate the settlement increased by over 25% in about three decades. The proportional increase in farmed areas is lower than that of the settled area and is more difficult to calculate.

2.1.4 The Context of Instability and Crisis in Nigeria

The context for the case study is Nigeria's highly unstable economic and political environment. For the decade 1986-1996 economic decline has been a constant, long term process (Table 2.2). In this period, the exchange value of the Naira fell progressively,[16] and constant high inflation caused most consumer prices to rocket. Over the same period interest rates fluctuated in a generally upward direction and after 1986, when interest rates were deregulated, the cost of borrowing rose dramatically. The rapid collapse of Nigeria's economy means the period for which the data in this thesis was collected (1991-1993) was characterised by unpredictability and shifting economic conditions.

Table 2.2 Nigerian Economic Statistics 1986-1996[17]

Year	Exchange Rates† ₦ per US$	Consumer Prices Index: 1990=100	Interest Rates Lending Rate**
1986	1.76	36.0	9.96
1987	4.02	40.1	13.96
1988	4.54	61.9	16.62
1989	7.36	93.1	20.44
1990	8.04	100	25.30
1991*	**9.91**	**113.0**	**20.04**
1992*	**17.03**	**163.4**	**24.76**
1993*	**22.07**	**256.8**	**31.62**
1994	22.00	403.3	20.48
1995	21.90	696.9	20.32
1996	21.88	901.0	20.12

† Central Bank official exchange rate.
* Fieldwork period.
** Lending Rate: rate charged by banks on first-class advances.
Sources: IMF (1997: 534-7, 1992: 540-543)

Prices and costs in the thesis are quoted in Nigerian Naira (₦1 = 100 kobo) and refer to the prices current when data was collected in 1991-93. The context of inflation (exacerbated by a devaluing currency), makes comparing price data over time difficult.

[16] However, since 1993 the Naira appears to have stabilised somewhat and fractionally strengthened.
[17] Table 2.2 shows an economic decline which progresses steadily from year to year, however, the averaged annual data smoothes out the extreme fluctuations in prices and exchange values occurring on daily, weekly and monthly bases.

A further element in the state of economic flux and change in Nigeria is state responses to economic crisis. The first austerity package was introduced under President Shagari in 1981 (Table 2.3). Various economic belt-tightening exercises followed, along with efforts to resist adjustment. Eventually, however, a raft of structural adjustment measures were implemented with the 'home-grown' structural adjustment policy (SAP) instigated by President Babangida which rapidly became directed by the IMF and World Bank in 1986. The main structural adjustment policy instruments are summarised in Table 2.3. These are conceived by some to be a response to, and by others as contributing to economic uncertainty.

Table 2.3 Structural Adjustment Measures Implemented in Nigeria*

Civilian government of Shehu Shagari 1979 - 1983
1981 - first austerity package **Apr. 1982** - Economic Stabilization (Temporary Provisions) Act: reduce government expenditure & curtail imports by imposing &increasing import duties, business travel allowances cut, compulsory advance deposits required from importers of food, industrial raw materials, capital goods & spare parts **Jan. 1983** - further austerity measures: import restrictions, tariff charges on consumer & non-consumer goods increased, private jetties closed, borrowing by state governments restricted
Military government of Buhari 1983 - 1985
Foreign travel allowances slashed, business travel allowances suspended, major public sector retrenchment, embargo on new civil service employees, public expenditure curtailment, new government projects frozen, state governments prohibited from raising loans, excise duties & bank interest rates raised, domestic sourcing of manufacturing raw materials encouraged
Military government of Ibrahim Babangida 1985 - 1993
Oct. 1985 - 15 month state of national economic emergency declared: civilian & military personnel pay cuts **Jan. 1986** - home grown structural adjustment budget: 80% reduction in petroleum subsidy; Nigerian National Supply Company disbanded; commitments to public enterprise privatisation, trade & exchange liberalisation, reducing administrative controls in the economy **Jun. 1986** - Babangida's 2 year structural adjustment programme launched: commitment to devalue Naira **Jul. 1986** - IMF & World Bank adjustment programmes adopted: import licensing abolished, capital expenditure reordered, exports (especially agricultural) promoted, money supply reduced **Sept. 1986** - Naira allowed to devalue, programme of subsidy removals, deregulation of prices & interest rates, public expenditure reduction, credit squeeze imposed, agricultural commodity boards abolished **Jan. 1987** - IMF loan & SAP cutbacks signed **Mar. 1992 - Jan. 1993** freely determined market rate exchange rate introduced
Military government of Sani Abacha 1993 to 1998
Jan. 1994 official exchange rate fixed **1995** - 'autonomous' foreign exchange market opened

*Sources: Olukoshi (1993), Mustapha (1991), Watts (1994).

The overall impact of the prevailing economic conditions in Nigeria has been a sustained context of acute uncertainty, worsening livelihood conditions and increasingly desperate struggles for survival. These circumstances form the backdrop of the study presented in this thesis. The simultaneous and related increases in ethnic conflict, corruption, the suppression of democracy and civil liberties, while serious matters, are not foci of direct attention in this work.

Although this study is situated in the context of structural adjustment, it does not directly set out to measure the impacts of the SAP. Furthermore, while there is a body of literature (e.g. Afshar & Dennis 1992, Palmer 1991) which suggests that structural adjustment measures have differential gender impacts: increasing the burdens of women more than men; the research presented in this thesis does not attempt to directly measure the gendered effects of the SAP.[18] Within the work for rural Northern Nigeria, the SAP appears to have had contradictory impacts on rural livelihood strategies (Mustapha 1991:17), and has increased the importance of women's incomes, but traditional constraints (especially seclusion) continue to restrict women's opportunities for agricultural participation and accumulation (Meagher 1995). These findings are largely confirmed for the case of Zarewa as shown in the following chapters.

2.2 STUDYING GENDER, SPACE AND EMPOWERMENT

This research attempts to build on the current state of Hausa scholarship contribute by investigating current issues of space and empowerment for women and men in rural households. The research design begins with the materialist conceptual framework for analysing gendered political economy encompassing the processes and relations of production, reproduction and circulation. It incorporates the innovative, generalisable method of Deere and de Janvry (1979) designed to observe, describe and understand the internal economic and political organisation of peasants. Their method was

[18] Analyses have shown Nigerian women to be disadvantaged by and disproportionately bear the costs of SAP programmes (e.g. Elabor-Idemudia 1994, Dennis 1991). For Northern Nigeria an urban study shows SAP forcing more women into the lower end of the informal sector while widening the gap between male and female incomes (Meagher & Yunusa 1996).

designed to look specifically at the differentiation of peasants over time, but is adapted in this thesis to analyse the gendered organisation of production, reproduction and circulation. Deere and de Janvry's method has limitations that include a simple and somewhat ambiguous (because it lacks precise definition) idea of the household, lacking precise definition. How a working definition of Hausa households was derived and used in this study is explained in Chapter 5.

Folbré criticises Deere and de Janvry's method for focusing on the peasant household as a whole, ignoring material inequality within households (Folbré 1986: 248). But their method can be refined to the level of individuals. The approach adopted here looks inside the household, disaggregating by gender,[19] also sometimes by age, class, and other relevant variables such as women's seclusion status, each of the variables suggested by Deere and de Janvry (listed below). Such an approach follows the suggestion of Moore and others that the household be viewed as a locus of member's competing rights, interests, resources and obligations; being a site of bargaining, negotiation and conflict (Moore 1994: 87). My method focuses both on individual men and women, and on social groups such as households, male farmers, secluded and unsecluded women, and children. Thus, it is a multi-scale analysis so as to investigate and assess social frameworks of gender at the macro-structural scale of society; at the meso-level of households and markets; and at the micro-level of individual actions and behaviours. In addition, links between the levels are identified and drawn out.

The framework for analysing production is derived from Deere and de Janvry (1979), and refined in the light of Clark's (1987, 1993a, 1993b) work on political economy of gender to include analysis of reproduction, covering means of production and reproduction, labour divisions and decision making – the full range of variables is given below. The framework for analysing circulation combines the method of Deere and de Janvry (1979) with a framework put forward by Leplaideur (1992) for analysing at a micro-level the forces and relations of distribution in commodity

[19] To reinterpret power distribution the analysis of gender in all Hausa social relations has been advocated by Coles (1991: 25).

systems – variables for analysis are listed below. The analytical framework used here includes the four critical dimensions identified by Kabeer (1991b: 36) for researching the social relations of production and power within the household - distribution of productive resources, divisions of labour, management of decision-making and claims on welfare enhancing resources. The overall method evolved and adopted here is a way of looking at the spatialisation and gendering of the socio-economic organisation of the processes of production, reproduction and circulation within which women and men's relative degrees of power are embedded. The following measurable variable sets, as intersected by space and gender, were identified for data collection and analysis:

(i) **Production Variables**[20] (analysed in Chapter 5)
- Means of production
- Acquisition of raw materials for production
- Divisions of labour in production
- Decision making power and control in production
- Activity choice in production and income formation.

(ii) **Reproduction Variables**[21] (analysed in Chapter 6)
- Disposal of farm product for reproductive use
- Means of consumption and reproductive work
- Acquisition of means of reproduction,
- Divisions of labour and decision making in reproduction
- Disposal of net income.

(iii) **Circulation Variables**[22] (analysed in Chapter 7)

Forces of Distribution
- Trading institutions and activities
- Trading resources: labour, information, assets
- Means of distribution: mobility, credit, capital

Relations of Distribution
- Divisions of labour in trade
- Dispute regulation

[20] Derived from Deere & de Janvry (1979).
[21] Refined from Deere & de Janvry (1979) in the light of Clark (1987, 1993a, 1993b).

In addition, the following set of socio-economic measures[23] to gauge the power, or degree of empowerment, of women relative to men was identified:

(iv) **Empowerment Variables** (data on these variables is presented throughout Chapters 4 - 7 and specifically analysed in Chapter 8)

- Income Variables:
  - Net income
  - Use and control of income
  - Share of household income
  - Control of products of labour

- Asset Variables:
  - Ownership (in own name); access to and control over means of production i.e. land, labour, tools, capital, credit, livestock, property, transport etc.
  - Healthcare, formal education; informal skills; access to information

- Time Use Variables:
  - Time spent on income earning
  - Time spent on domestic reproductive work
  - Time for leisure

- Decision-Making:
  - Control of assets including freedom of choice of trading activity
  - Control of income and products of labour
  - Control of time
  - Freedom of movement and choice of domicile

- Gender Opportunities:
  - Gender divisions and gender opportunities in income earning
  - Collective organising
  - Status of dependence/independence

This research project investigates patterns in an effort to identify causal relationships between income earning and empowerment. Many of the above variables chosen for analysis are essentially economic criteria. However, much of the actual data collected is relatively 'soft'. Accumulating detailed systematic survey data of income, also costs and returns figures was difficult (as elaborated later). No quantitative statistical methods of formal hypothesis testing are used, nor were attempts to identify independent or dependent variable, or determine causality by multi-variate analysis

[22] Derived from Leplaideur (1992) and as elaborated by Harriss-White (1995, 1999).

made. Much of the economic data in Chapters 5-7 is based on small surveys, or individual example cases. Nonetheless the data indicates the nature and degree of economic structures, emphasis being placed on the complexity of the research questions and the diversity of findings. The patterns revealed can be informative, possibly even predictive, rather than explicitly causal. The following section describes how data to illuminate each of the above variables was collected.

2.2.1 Study Methodology

Gendering and spatialising the field enquiry posed particular challenges because it was necessary to talk to both men and women and to enter as many spaces of village life as possible. This was achieved by collecting data together with a male and a female Muslim assistant (Plate 2.6).




Plate 2.6 Research assistants: Ibrahim Mohammed B.K. and Rakiya Baba

[23] Derived from a variety of sources including Berninghausen & Kerstan (1992: 19), Womankind

Both assistants were first language Hausa speakers and students of Ahmadu Bello University. Male household heads were not solely relied on to give information about other, especially female, household members, but clarification was sought from individual household members. All interviews were held with respondents in their own spaces i.e. with secluded women in their homes, with men outside their homes, at their stalls if village traders, or wherever they spent their leisure time in the village.

The fieldwork was carried out between August 1991 and August 1993 with 15 months spent in Nigeria involving varied periods of residence in Zarewa (Appendix IV). What follows is a brief outline of the fieldwork methods used. Each method was selected as appropriate for measuring particular variables identified within the framework already outlined.



Plate 2.7 The researcher adopted local dress throughout the fieldwork.

Participant Observation

Residence in the village was essential to enable participant observation in order to acquire direct observation of everyday 'genderings' and 'spacings'. Daily activities and observations were recorded in field notebooks that became a rich data source when indexed. In many respects I remained more an observer than a participant of gendered

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(correspondence 1994), Lopez & March (1990: 14), Palmer (1991: 11-15) and Batliwala (1993: 28-9).

spatial processes (Plate 2.7), and in many ways did not behave like a Muslim Hausa woman. For example, I spoke to men in public and private spaces, drove a car, went to markets and lived independently. While always careful not to knowingly offend or insult I was treated kindly, my activities and behaviour were tolerated and accepted on the whole, albeit considered different because of my outsider, non-Muslim, educated status.[24]

Mapping Construction of Space

Two methods of mapping uses and organisation of space were employed to answer central questions about the social gendering of space. Firstly, a village sketch map (Map 2.4) was prepared to examine public-private distributions and separation of space. Secondly, domestic space use was recorded by plotting sketch plans of different sized compounds in different wards of Zarewa to look at the socio-spatial construction of the domestic arena in the intra-household use and gendering of space (these are discussed in Chapter 4).

Sampling for collection of Survey Data

A roughly 10% sample of the village population was selected for systematic data collection by interview.[25] First, a census of all the households in the village was created by mapping the *gidaje* when preparing the village sketch map (Map 2.4). Most house compounds are numbered for administrative purposes so the total number of houses in each ward could be estimated. Using a random number table, 10% of households per ward were selected as a sample. Where the house selected could not be included in the survey because it was vacant, was not a residential compound, or had fallen into disrepair, another house selected with the random number table was substituted. Thus, a random sample of 58 households stratified by ward was created.[26]

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[24] Further reflections on my roles as an outside researcher are in Robson (1997).

[25] Appendix IV includes further details of when each set of interviews was conducted.

[26] A degree of uniformity was imposed in selecting the household sample by excluding widely aberrant households, specifically those of *almajarai* (Koranic students). A household of a single mentally ill man was also excluded and another household of a lone elderly man 'fell out' of the sample on his death.

Questionnaire Surveys

Several questionnaire surveys were used as an efficient way to collect comparable quantitative data in face-to-face interviews (copies of all questionnaires are included in Appendix IV). Several problems were encountered. Some respondents were unwilling to answer questions. For example, on visiting a compound to carry out interviews all the women hid in their rooms, closed the doors and refused to acknowledge our presence. There were problems of cultural mismatch where my theoretical concepts did not coincide with Hausa ways of thinking (e.g. ideas of time and value).[27] To avoid external inaccurate assumptions being an obstacle to data collection, the questionnaires were written in the field, consulting about questions' appropriateness with research assistants and villagers, thereby attempting to integrate local social institutions and concepts with academic theory. However, many academic notions e.g. empowerment, oppression, class did not coincide directly with local concepts. This does not mean they are discarded, but are valid at a different analytical level than that experienced by local people.

Questionnaires were completed in interviews with 58 household heads (57 male, 1 female) for a baseline survey of household members. In interviews with all 137 adult males in the households, questionnaires surveying farm production were completed in 1992 and 1993. Adult men and women in a subsample survey of 17 households were carefully selected on the basis of their willingness to co-operate in an in-depth questionnaire about household budgets (income, expenditure and gifts), trading activities and decision making. Although previous work has looked at male farm decision making (Longhurst 1985) and aspects of female decision making (Jackson 1981: 355), investigations comparing men's and women's decision making have not been previously carried out in Hausaland.

Asking both men and women about decision making was considered important because women and men have very different views of their relative power, rights and responsibilities and this is significant in how earning money does/does not empower

[27] Hausa villagers refer to the time of day with local terms and prayer times, whereas I use the concept of a twenty-four hour day and depend on watches. Similarly (western) notions of profit were not used by most Hausa traders, most of whom did not cost their own labour.

women (Mayoux 1999: 969). Obtaining accurate data on personal financial matters is difficult in any circumstances and the results of such a survey may not tell us precisely how decision making works, nor do they represent objective truth about decision making. Rather, the responses from women and men are interesting in the ways that their accounts, in response to questions from an outsider, differ. Inaccuracies are likely to be incurred through deliberate deceit as well as lack of written records and recall problems. In addition to encountering these problems in Zarewa, a very small number (a negligible percentage) of the potential respondents found the survey alienating and declined to participate.

Recording Time-Space Use

Individuals' time and space use was recorded to measure spatial mobility, divisions of labour, unpaid/unremunerated work[28] and time budgets for productive, reproductive and circulation activities. Two methods were used. First, recall methods involved interviewing 160 women, 129 men, 53 boys and 30 girls (age 7-16 years)[29] in the 58 households in three different seasons of the year and asking them to recount what they did the previous day during waking hours. The weaknesses of this method include the problems of accurate recall,[30] difficulties of ensuring willingness to participate and willingness of participants to reveal their actual activities and movements and difficulties of estimating the timing and duration of activities. However, with concerted effort, persistence, probing during interviews and careful coding a collection of recall data was gathered.

Second, a small number of time use measures by observation over a whole day were carried out with 6 men and 6 women to illuminate the recall data. Direct observation of a large enough number of cases from which to generalise would have been too time and labour intensive. These individuals were selected by their willingness to co-operate with what is a highly intrusive research method.

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[28] Unpaid work is frequently reproductive work done by women for which there is a shortage of available data because it is not included in conventional official statistics (Pittin 1984, Goldschmidt-Clermont 1987). Pittin calls for time use study in Northern Nigeria to measure women's unvalorised work (1984: 484).

[29] Children below 7 years were thought unable to give coherent recall and account of their actions.

There have been few previous studies of time use in rural Hausaland (e.g. Norman et al. 1982: 114), Jackson 1981: 340-344) but with considerably less coverage. Alternative methods of time use measurement include daily diaries although this method would have been impossible because of high illiteracy levels.

On reflection, random instant observation, as used by Jackson (ibid.) may have given more accurate indication of people's actual activities, but could not provide complete records of daily activities in the same way as recall methods. An overall weakness of measuring time use is that it overlooks work effort intensity (Jackson 1999b: 96). Thus, for example, women may work longer hours than men, but in less physically demanding tasks. However, it was not possible to 'include the sweat' by measuring work effort intensity within the constraints of this study.

Life Stories

Life stories were collected via in-depth interviews with ten elderly men, and twelve elderly women who were estimated to be over 70 years and generally no longer active farmers (men), or no longer having responsibility for cooking, and child rearing (women). These key informants were chosen from elderly members of the village community who had good rapport with the researcher. Interviews were held towards the end of the fieldwork period by visiting each informant several times with an assistant /interpreter. After an initial in-depth interview the lifestory events were written up in chronological order, then a second interview usually held to clarify and fill any gaps: see Appendix IV for complete interview list. This was a successful approach as older people were willing to talk about their lives and responded well to flexible questioning, gentle probing, and repeat visits. The life stories provided rich insight and qualitative data on all the variables under study, but are particularly drawn on for the historical perspectives (Chapter 3). Life stories have been used by few other Hausa researchers (e.g. Smith 1954, Schildkrout 1988, Coles 1996, Skinner 1977).

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[30] Married women, for example, may have under-reported movements outside the home because of a desire to present an image of 'proper' Hausa womanly behaviour.

Life stories were collected to provide historical depth to the study, rather than archive-based research, for several reasons. Primarily, this is not a historical study by or for any historian, or even a work of historical geography so archive work was not an appropriate research method. Secondly, considerable historical research on gender relations in Hausaland by more experienced scholars is available (e.g. Imam 1991, 1993, Kriger 1993, Porter 1989, Mack 1992a, Cooper 1993, 1997). Thirdly, practical considerations meant that as I have no training or experience of archive work it was not feasible given the limited time available, not to mention the reportedly serious state of disarray of the National Archives in Kaduna during the fieldwork period. Most importantly, the collection of life stories was pursued because they are a means of 'reconstructing reality' and illuminating the experiences of ordinary rural women and men, the like of whose accounts do not appear in the archives. Lifestory narratives are particularly helpful for shedding light on gender roles, relations and identities; illustrating how gender is important to relationships of power inequality (Coles 1996: 73).

Trader Interviews

To sample the huge amount of commodity exchange, interviews with all types of male and female traders resident in Zarewa provided information on gender in circulation activities, the range and institutions of trading (analysed in Chapter 7). All the 160 adult men and 129 women in the 58 sample households were questioned individually about their economic activities. Many of them were traders and gave information on commodities, prices, credit, mechanisms of sale, purchases, processing and so on. In addition, interviews were held with male and female grain sellers and measurers resident in Zarewa (selected by snowballing) as these were identified as a significant group of traders not represented in the random sample.

2.2.2 Positionality and Problems of Fieldwork

Having decided the research questions and variables, operationalising the methodology, via the fieldwork, was not always easy and nor straightforward. Various problems and challenges of my positionality had to be overcome. Recent trends in feminism and critical social science, including geography, have led to increasing

awareness that all researchers have positionality, i.e. personal and political locatedness by virtue of their identity, which affects their relations with the researched and influences data collection processes (e.g. England 1994).[31] This recognition is in response to the idea that knowledge is not transparent or entirely objective, but is situated, with the consequence that subjects' and researchers' social characteristics affect the construction, transformation and transmission of knowledge. Especially in a fieldwork situation involving direct relations between the researcher and the researched, positionality affects the quality of the data collected. Interpretations are therefore partial and context-bound (i.e. situated), rather than universal or wholly detached. Positionality imposes spatial and temporal limitations on the researcher and the knowledge available to them. Therefore, in order further to judge the data collected here it is necessary to examine how my location and identity including gender, age, marital status, religion, ethnicity, and my social position in hierarchies of power, (e.g. my status as a cultural outsider) were significant in affecting how I was able to carry out the fieldwork, within the prevailing socio-cultural context. For example, aspects of my identity, (i.e. my positionality), influenced who I could and could not talk to and what about.

Researchers seeking accurate and objective measurement face difficulties of accurate recall of events and transactions - 'courtesy bias' (Stone & Campbell 1984). There are also difficulties in enquiring about issues of power, especially when trying to obtain information about actual behaviour, rather than dominant ideologies of 'proper behaviour', for example in areas of decision making and household finances (Wilson 1991). Unwillingness to reveal actual behaviour patterns was a particular problem in this research. At times, women in particular, gave stock responses about time use such that occasionally all the women in a particular compound recorded minimal and identical patterns. In any situation what women and men can say (and think and do) bears a gender imprint of muted vocabulary (Jackson 1996; 500); being context-dependent, contingent and constrained by identities. Thus, standard replies and non-cooperation can be viewed as a form of resistance.

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[31] Understandings of positionality and its impact on the research process are developments of earlier recognitions of 'observer bias' and 'bias due to being observed'.

Previous researchers in Hausaland have experienced problems of concealment, exaggeration (even hostility and deception).[32] At times I also found respondents unwilling and evasive in the face of enquiries; an experience akin to that of Cecile Jackson who reported that women

> "...would answer but they would say nothing - Hausa women are past masters at the non-answer. In fact there is a whole battery of techniques that they use to evade questions, in the knowledge that for me to press beyond a certain point is rudeness" (Jackson 1981: 332).

Here I disagree with the many writers, like McDowell, who assert "...it tends to be the easiest thing in the world to talk to other women" (McDowell 1997: 391). For me the easiest interviews in Zarewa were talking to men about farming. The difficulties I had in talking to women, may be because I was perceived as a threat being unmarried, highly educated and wealthy; perhaps because I made women feel inferior; or because women pitied my unmarried and childless state which made me an oddity with which they had no commonalities. Certainly they seemed to welcome my visits and showed great interest in my personal life, but while they were keen for friendly chat, it may be my structured interview questions seemed alien and irrelevant to them. It is also possible that my conversations with women were sometimes frustrating and unrewarding because they knew I was also talking to men. Perhaps it would have been a better research strategy to talk first to women and then to men, but this was not possible because data on male and female trading activities, or time use, for example, needed to be gathered simultaneously with respect to changing market conditions and seasons. In working with Hausa women in Niger Cooper found that to gain the trust of women she had to give up her intention to talk to men and women (Cooper 1995: 854). All methodologies involve some trade-offs and the approach selected here is no exception.

While the data presented here are not wholly unaffected by such difficulties, various strategies were adopted to try and maintain data quality. These strategies included discarding information believed to be spurious and not pursuing interviews with

unwilling, or uncooperative, individuals. All data are valid in some way or other, even if they contain silences and stock responses. Thus, the data has to be interrogated and we must ask what the stock responses and silences tell us rather than assuming the data is valid at face value.

One of the biggest weaknesses of much research carried out in Northern Nigeria is the failure of a series of male researchers to include data on women because outside male researchers lack access to married women given the behavioural codes of Islamic seclusion. As a woman I faced no barriers to contact with women and access to women's spaces, only some limits of access to male space. In some respects I was given an 'honorary male' status. In relation to my age and marital status, in Hausa terms I am a child, an unmarried girl (*budurwa*), which for a woman in her mid-20s is an incomprehensible anomaly. My unmarried status was always a topic of discussion and searching questioning. This odd position may have had the slight disadvantage that perhaps I was not always taken as seriously as if I had been male, or married.

Ethnic, religious and cultural difference is often a considerable challenge for fieldworkers. Being white and European was part of my ethnic identity as a foreigner in Nigeria. I was addressed as *Baturiya*, a term used to refer to all Western women regardless of race, or ethnicity. As a white western woman, I was frequently accorded awkward degrees of deference and respect, particularly in the early days of fieldwork. Although I became treated with greater acceptance with time I still struggled to be permitted to pull my own bathing water from the well.

Not being Muslim meant my participation in some aspects of daily life (e.g. prayers) was limited, but it also meant I was not expected to conform to Muslim-Hausa norms of female behaviour. Identifying myself as a Roman Catholic was helpful as it meant I was seen as a 'person of the book' by Muslims and facilitated good rapport with the R.C. Igbo village traders. I familiarised myself with Hausa culture by widely reading

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[32] For example, M. G. Smith complained "...after six weeks of daily visits to compounds, one notebook of worthless information was all there was to show" (Smith 1955: 117).

the ethnographic literature, and adopted Hausa women's dress while in the field (Plate 2.7).

Language is often an aspect of cultural and ethnic identity. Problems of language face any researcher working beyond their own language group and most outside researchers in Hausaland have gained at least some degree of fluency in Hausa. In order to facilitate acceptance and rapport I attempted to learn and speak as much Hausa as possible by taking a Hausa language course over several months in the UK before undertaking the extended fieldwork. But I was never able to carry out interviews in Hausa without assistance.

Despite my efforts to manage ethnic, religious and cultural differences, throughout the fieldwork I was acutely (sometimes uncomfortably) aware of the differences between myself and the villagers especially in relation to education and wealth inequalities. Furthermore, I recognise that my data and the story presented in this thesis are only partial. By virtue of my identity and limited resources there are things I did not and could not ask, places I could not or did not go, and things that people chose not to tell me because of who I am and what I represent. As McDowell recognises, "In many societies a young, single, female researcher at the beginning of her academic career may lack the status and authority required to gain access to certain respondents" (1997: 391). I was not immune from such disadvantages and consequently my account remains in some ways partial and incomplete. However, I believe it still has value, not least for the empirical detail provided on rural Hausaland in the 1990s. I have discussed aspects of my positionality in more depth elsewhere (Robson 1997) - specifically how being a white, female, unmarried Western woman affected my range of adopted and given field roles.

2.2.3 Methodological Reflections

To some readers, a major flaw in the methodological approach taken here might appear to be neglect of the agency, will and consciousness of the research subjects by not making it a direct and major focus of the research to ask Hausa women and men

their opinions of the spatial restrictions of seclusion,[33] their roles, situation, positions of power (as traders and otherwise) and so on. Certainly some recent developments in feminist theory advocating recovery of the female subject (as discussed in Chapter 1) would suggest it is a methodological imperative to take women's voices seriously and directly engage with their world-view. As well as there being little precedence for this type of approach in Hausa studies, there are also major practical and conceptual reasons why such an approach was not pursued in this research.

Firstly, few authors writing about Hausa women have actually sought to represent women's own views– possibly because most research has been undertaken by outsiders and because the move towards recovering women's voices is a relatively recent one.[34] Certainly, this is a matter of regret for Hausa scholars and an area ripe for further research and exploration.[35] There are, however, a few sources in which Hausa women speak directly.

In *Baba of Karo* (Smith 1954) we have an exceptional extended lifestory of a Hausa woman told by Baba herself that provides valuable, historical insights into seclusion and many other aspects of women's lives and Hausa society up from about 1890 until the 1950s. Baba gives examples of some women being secluded and associates seclusion with urban living and high social status (op cit. 80, 203). She does not say what women think of seclusion and why they do it, other than that their husbands shut them up (op cit. 80, 137). Baba also gives examples of women resisting seclusion and running away, as well as seclusion being relaxed in times of household crisis (op cit 80, 211). Enid Schildkrout (1988) provides more recent notes on the life story of Hajiya Husaina, the wife of a tailor in Kano city. According to Schildkrout, Hajiya Husaina "...views purdah as a sign of a woman's respect for her husband and for herself and she observes the rules of seclusion strictly." (1988: 90). We should also remember that Baba's and Hajiya Husaina's words are mediated by the colonial/post-

[33] However, men and women did speak about this during life story interviews (see Chapter 3).
[34] Although, nearly three decades ago Polly Hill suggests the question of whether Hausa women actually prefer seclusion has never been investigated (1972: 279) and could only be done so by seeking women's own views.

colonial researcher who directed the interviews, translated and wrote the final text; so they may only be considered a Hausa woman's voice 'in translation'.

There are few sources authored by Hausa women directly.[36] These include recent chapters by Bilkisu Yusuf, Ayesha Imam and Balaraba Sule in Coles & Mack (1991), but none of these deal directly with women's views of seclusion. Ayesha Imam's other work deals directly with seclusion and she suggests it is a negotiated bargain between husband and wife in which both benefit (1993). But we should remember that Imam, although she may claim Hausa ethnicity, is not a Hausa first language speaker or herself secluded, and as a highly educated trained social scientist she too found Hausa women reluctant to talk directly about their feelings on seclusion (1993: 231-232).

Katja Werthmann (1995a: 329), although an outside researcher, reports how Hausa women view seclusion i.e. as a privilege. According to Werthmann, Hausa women say they 'do' seclusion for three reasons. Firstly, because it is a religious obligation for Muslims required by Allah; secondly, seclusion is part of 'traditional Hausa culture'; and thirdly, husbands are jealous and do not want them to meet other men. Werthmann says women do not complain about (i.e. resist) seclusion but only complain about the limited economic opportunities for secluded trade these days (1995b: 6). Similarly, *'ba kudi'* (no money) was a complaint voiced frequently by women in Zarewa (a matter investigated further in Chapter 7).

Secondly, the practical limitations of my outsider status, poor Hausa language skills and the difficulties encountered interviewing women (already touched upon) also played a part in why trying to ask women directly and in depth about their perceptions of their own positions of power would have been less than fruitful in the circumstances. There are also considerable difficulties in really hearing women's true thoughts and opinions, as opposed to what they are willing to tell a researcher.

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[35] Postist influences on Hausa studies are beginning to take hold. Cooper, for example, set out to research social history of the Maradi region 'grounded in questions about women's experiences and female agency' (Cooper, 1995: 853).

[36] Albeit in the English scholarly literature, although the work of Jean Boyd and others has increased awareness of Hausa women's poetry, song and religious writings (Boyd & Mack 1996, Mack & Boyd

Women may conceal information from a researcher, but also from themselves because of unwillingness to acknowledge power relations and threats to dominant ideology. This can be considered a conspiracy of silence: "there is little reason to think that dominant ideologies change as fast as economic and social conditions, so in any developing country there is likely to be a serious mismatch between the experience of women and the accounts they give" (Wilson 1991: 35).

Certainly, it proved difficult to talk to Hausa villagers about their views of such things as seclusion, not least because it belongs to the realm of what Bourdieu (1977: 164) calls 'doxa'. As already identified in Chapter 1, responses to gender inequality are likely to be "moulded by social conditioning and resigned acceptance of misfortune" (Sen 1990: 133). In other words seclusion appears largely accepted by villagers as self-evident, a natural part of the everyday social order that goes without saying, is not open to discussion (at least not with an outsider), questioning or contestation. Giddens refers to the same feature as the reification, or naturalisation, of the present status quo (Giddens, 1979: 195). Rather than collect uncritical, unquestioning responses to seclusion, I concentrated on measuring concrete parameters such as mobility, divisions of labour, access to and ownership of resources in an attempt to be objective and measure actual experience.

As well as lack of precedence and practical limitations, there are further reasons why an approach that forefronts women's perceptions was not an appropriate methodology for this research. This thesis does not set out to ask what women (or men) think about seclusion, but to ask whether trade empowers women by situating secluded women's trade within the systems of production, exchange and reproduction. It is economic and structural (not perceived) factors that are given attention here. There are many ways of doing feminist research and the material approach taken in this thesis may not allow women to speak, but the data nonetheless tell a valid story. Certainly I do not adopt the position of a standpoint feminist (e.g. as outlined by McDowell 1993a) who would argue the need for theories that begin from the point of view and experience of the

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2000). As Callaway (1987a: 60) points out, however, most Hausa women remain illiterate and do not write about themselves.

dominated to give clearer perspectives on conditions of oppression. While favourable to the notion of 'listening to women's voices' I remain wary of essentialism and the dangers of unrepresentative superficiality. However, I characterise my approach as feminist by giving attention to diversity, as this is necessary to reflect women's lives.

2.3 SUMMARY

In this chapter the strategy chosen to operationalise investigations of whether income earning is empowering to rural Hausa women in a Northern Nigerian case study has been elaborated. The methods and problems of gendered and spatialised data collection strategy have been described and the positionality of the researcher reflected upon. The following chapter provides the historical background to present gender relations in Hausaland.

CHAPTER 3

CHANGING SPACES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF HAUSA GENDER RELATIONS

3.0 INTRODUCTION

Women's positions of power/empowerment within rural households' organisation of production, reproduction and circulation activities are not fixed over time and space, but are always in flux. Gender ideologies and practices themselves are never fully fixed, but linked and shifting. The following four chapters (4-7) present a snapshot of gendered relations of power in rural Hausa households' gendered and spaced organisation. To counteract the limitations of the 'point-in-time' case study, this chapter asks how gender (and spatial) relations of power/empowerment for rural Hausa women have changed historically. Local changes in the structures and relations of gender in production, reproduction and circulation from the pre-colonial period onwards are scrutinised. This illustrates the socio-economic dynamic of rural Hausaland, the evolution of separate public and private, male and female spheres, the spread of seclusion and the erosion of women's power in farming and trade.

This chapter draws on elderly men and women's colonial and post-colonial experiences through life stories collected in Zarewa (Plates 3.1, 3.2) and the life story of Baba of Karo who lived in Zarewa from 1890-1951 (Smith 1954). The account is divided chronologically into three periods: before the nineteenth century, the nineteenth century Sokoto Caliphate and the period of British colonialism 1903-1960.




Plate 3.1 An elderly female resident interviewed about her life story.




Plate 3.2 An elderly male informant (right) interviewed about his life story.

3.1 PRIOR TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY ISLAMIC JIHAD

Not a great deal is known about Hausaland prior to the nineteenth century and even less about prevailing gender relations. The period precedes that covered by the Zarewa lifestories and Baba of Karo's account, so this section pulls together relevant threads in the published work of other scholars based on evidence of various kinds including the many Hausa and Arabic written historic texts.

3.1.1 Pre-Jihad Hausaland

The earliest settled communities on the area of West African savannah now called Northern Nigeria were built around the patrilineal family group (*gida*), collected into the *kauye* (village) and dependent on agricultural production. Communities were essentially agricultural, but with some full-time craftworkers. Women, (it is suggested), engaged in household-based production alongside men, both genders cultivated land, having their own *gayauna* land reared animals and were craftworkers (Imam 1993: 135). So we have a picture of equal gender divisions of labour in production.

In pre-Jihad times caravan routes crossed Hausaland. Often the impression is that long-distance trade involved only men, but it is likely that male traders were accompanied by their wives and children, as journeys took many months. There may also have been a limited number of women trading in their own right. Trade at the local scale probably involved participation by both men and women. Throughout the 1600s and 1700s women had specialised trading occupations, including *ma'auniya* (grain selling, controlling prices and weights). In the eighteenth century women exercised political and economic power in the grain trade: women from the Kano palace who collected grain taxes were called *jakadiya* and a woman titled *Korama* controlled Kano market grain trade (Nast 1993: 67-8, 71). So women were powerful forces in the all-important circulation of grain.

With respect to pre-Jihad gendered political power distributions, women rulers appear alongside men in legends and chronicles. For example, according to tradition before the ninth century, Daura state rulers were women (*magajiya*) (Pittin 1979: 459).

Although that female dynasty was replaced with the patrilineal succession of immigrant groups by the tenth century, some offices continued to be occupied by women.[1] Uniquely, in the state of Zazzau at least two women ruled in highest office during the sixteenth century: Queens Bakwa and Amina. Queen Amina (Plate 3.3) led numerous military expeditions (Abubakr 1992: 21; Trimingham 1962: 129). As well as *magajiya* and *jakadiya* other pre-Jihad titles open to women included office of *iya* (Abba 1980: 44). There is thus evidence of women in early Hausaland occupying institutionalised positions wielding religious, political and military power significant in the relations of state politics and social reproduction. However, such office-holding was restricted, being open only to a minority of high-class women (Imam 1994: 127).



Plate 3.3 Queen Amina of Zaria - an artists' impression (source unknown, obtained from Miss H. M. Burness O.B.E.).

[1] In the Hausa city states, succession was matrilineal in the eleventh and twelfth centuries but was later substituted by patrilineal succession (Trimingham 1962: 126-7).




Plate 3.4 Pre-colonial crafts survive and it is still possible during the dry season to find traditional Hausa pots sold by the roadside.

3.1.2 Pre-Jihad Introduction of Seclusion

The introduction of seclusion in Hausaland is linked to Muslim influence (Imam 1993: 134-6). In the fourteenth century the Arab traveller Ibn Batuta (1304-1368) regarded the Hausa states as pagan, although by then Islam was nominally adopted by the rulers of Kano and Katsina. Due to opposition, until the early fifteenth century, only immigrant communities practised Islam (Trimingham 1962: 130-1). During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Islamisation proceeded alongside the rise of towns and cities responding to influences of trade, pilgrim traffic and neighbouring Islamic states. Islam was adopted by urban commoners providing a legal framework helpful in the increasingly commoditised urban life. They partly abandoned various earlier spirit and ancestor cults (*bori*) having numerous spirits, or deities associated with nature and agricultural cycles (Imam 1993: 135). However, the rural areas remained largely untouched by Islam (Trimingham 1962: 132), where peasant women remained powerful *bori* adepts.

The Kano Chronicle[2] recounts seclusion in Hausaland as having begun in the late fifteenth century with the wives of Muhammadu Rumfa Sarkin Kano (1463-1499) (Trimingham 1962). Seclusion's introduction coincided with Islam becoming the major religious discourse of the rulers, women's gradual exclusion from state positions and women's titles falling into disuse, or being transformed into male titles (Imam 1993: 137, Pittin 1979: 458).

In its earliest practices, seclusion was strict, whereby secluded married women rarely went out. It was restricted to wealthy rulers, not so much for religious reasons, but for the social status attained by virtue of the economic ability to afford provision for their women. Therefore, seclusion was limited only to households of urban and prosperous classes in authority, including learned Muslim scholars. It is thought that later seclusion was copied by lower chiefs and titled persons (Abba 1980: 44, Imam 1993: 136).

3.2 NINETEENTH CENTURY JIHAD & SOKOTO CALIPHATE (c.1804-1903)

The seventeenth century was a period of increasing material prosperity based on trade, agricultural and craft production, by the end of which Hausaland encompassed centralised city states with sophisticated tax collection apparatuses (Smith 1965: 129, 134). The eighteenth century saw increasing inter-*birni* conflicts over control of hinterlands accompanied by increased taxation and enslavement, with associated disruption to agriculture and commerce. Against this background, Usman Dan Fodio led an Islamic Jihad from 1804 to 1810 in revolution against the ruling lineages of the Hausa *birni*. He established the Sokoto Caliphate, which covered much of Northern Nigeria for about 100 years. Gender roles entered the discourse of revolution:

> "The moral purity of Muslim women was one of the markers used to legitimate and set off the distinction between the "reformer" Muslims ... and the "lapsed, corrupt" emirate Muslims" (Imam 1994: 125).

Those in opposition to the Jihadist also included 'pagans' who opposed conversion to Islam and forbade *kulle* (Trimingham 1962: 198).

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[2] A local chronicle recorded by lettered archivists in the Arab Islamic tradition, thought to be compiled

Before the nineteenth century it is believed most women in the region participated in farming, with seclusion being limited only to urban areas and wealthy ruling classes (e.g. Abba 1980: 44; Imam 1991: 6). Dan Fodio preached that, although *kulle* was not obligatory for Muslims, married Muslim women should stay at home, except when necessary for them to go out to obtain education, go on pilgrimage, attend funerals of kin and visit the market (if there was no one to go on their behalf). He preached it was best for women to pray at home and that married women's obedience to Allah took precedence over obedience to their husbands (so women's primary duties were as Muslims, not in preparing food or washing clothes). It appears that *kulle* was practised in the Shaikh's own family and was of the most restrictive kind, being associated with wealth, respectability, piety and high status. Some argue the period after the Jihad was unstable and characterised by sexual laxity and growth in concubinage, so seclusion by respectable households was an effort to protect women from unwanted male advances (Okonjo 1983: 212). With the growth in authority of Islamic teaching seclusion became a widespread ideal, as women's seclusion was one of the most visible indicators of daily Islamic practice. Gender divisions of labour by the end of the nineteenth century developed increasing specialisation so that many tasks done by women could be performed in seclusion inside the compound (Imam 1994: 126). During this period the practice of women covering their head and/or shoulders with a cloth, i.e. veiling, became widespread (Imam 1994: 125).

It is arguable that women organised labour and necessary material support, providing the reproductive labour to back up the Jihad (as in other earlier military campaigns). Thus, women carried out strategic and increasingly domesticated, if often overlooked, roles in the Jihad reform movement (Boyd & Last 1985: 296). By 1870 Hausa society was organised by hierarchies of authority through (mostly male) titleholders. At the end of the Sokoto Caliphate a few offices for women still existed, but were endowed with only a fraction of their former authority.

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largely from oral tradition in the late nineteenth century.

During the Sokoto Caliphate, Muslim identity was associated with power and patronage in a period of unprecedented economic expansion (alongside famines and epidemics), based on slavery of both men and women. Although, slavery "...together with the perpetual wars, ruined and depopulated vast areas." (Trimingham 1962: 205).[3] Slavery was recalled as late as at least the turn of the nineteenth century by Zarewa informants[4] and Baba of Karo (Smith 1954: 38). By some informants slavery is recounted as stories learnt from grandparents. They mention grandfathers with concubines, men who went on slave raids, women who owned slaves to wash, sweep and do domestic chores. Because of wars and slave raiding Zarewa was built for defence surrounded by high mud walls and a ditch built by slaves (Map 2.5). There were four gates in the walls - north, south, east and west, each with a gatekeeper. The villagers fought against attack with swords, bows and arrows.[5]

Slavery was an important aspect of the production relations in the Sokoto Caliphate, with a huge slave population of roughly equal numbers of men and women. Slaves were bought and sold in the houses of slave dealers, in the slave sections of Kano and other large markets (Skinner 1977: 17-20; Hill 1977: 203). Male and female slaves were sold separately, female slaves being more costly (Hill 1977: 221), because of their attractiveness as sexual partners for slave masters, their capacity for biological and social reproductive work (Mack 1992b: 100). While both male and female slaves were used for their productive capacity, especially to perform agricultural work, only female slaves were used for reproductive work as food preparers, wood gatherers and concubines.

In the Sokoto Caliphate *gandu* was the basic labour unit of agricultural production. Male slaves and sons worked alongside one another in *gandu*. Both free and slave women worked in agriculture alongside men. Sometimes women (like men) cultivated personal *gayauna* land. Individuals also engaged in secondary craft and agricultural production outside *gandu*. Slaves had rights to engage in remunerative occupations, to

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[3] Barth (1857) describes prevailing anarchy as he travelled through Hausaland. Slave raids around Zarewa are vividly described by Baba of Karo (Smith 1954: 66-82).
[4] Interviews with Malam Isahu (m), Alhaji Tukur (m), and Alhaji Yahaya (m).
[5] Interviews with Alhaji Tukur (m) and Malam Isahu (m).

cultivate their own land (in the portion of the day not allotted to working for their owner) and to use their own income as they wished, including paying for their freedom and buying slaves to work on their own farms.[6] Slaves could also inherit property from their masters and be inherited themselves. Wealthy free farmers owned many slaves, but large proportions of poor farmers owned none. Some women owned slaves.[7] Slave desertion was easy and frequent. Although abolished by the British colonialists early in the twentieth century slavery has left its imprint on present-day social (and economic) class hierarchies.

In rural areas apart from households' agricultural production, hunting contributed to consumption needs during the Sokoto Caliphate. Hunting of birds and small animals as a male activity in public, open, wild spaces continued until the mid-colonial period when populations and farmed areas expanded. Hunters appear in Zarewa lifestories – informants recount how the area between Zarewa and Filatan village is called Dawan Giwa ('elephant bush'), for its previous associations with wild animals.[8]

After agriculture, textiles were the most important form of production in the nineteenth-century Kano emirate. The textile industry involved skilled men and women as cotton growers, spinners, weavers, dyers, beaters, tailors and traders (many being slaves[9]). Increases in *kulle* following the Jihad and increasing prosperity in the late nineteenth century allowed more women to be secluded and their labour diverted to textile production, notably spinning. Gender divisions in textile production in the northern Hausa region of the Sokoto Caliphate were fairly rigid, corresponding to gender divisions of work spaces and technologies (i.e. materials, tools, techniques). Although most weaving was done outdoors by men on horizontal looms; by the end of the nineteenth century women's vertical looms, operated within the compound, were introduced from the south (Shea 1975: 59, 70-71, 166), but according to the Zarewa informants and Baba of Karo (Smith 1954: 54) women did not weave in Zarewa. In

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[6] Thus, male slaves could more easily buy their freedom than female slaves who could more easily marry out of slavery.

[7] Of slave owners in Dorayi, 13% were women (Hill 1977: 213).

[8] Interviews with Lariya Hadiza (f) and Rukkaiya Gambo (f).

[9] For example, Baba of Karo's aunt captured as a slave at the end of the nineteenth century spun cotton for her master's wife (Smith 1954: 82, 106).

Zarewa and throughout the region cloth beating, tailoring, embroidery and most dyeing were male occupations.

The maintenance of these gender divisions has several facets. The dissemination of new techniques was selective. The ruling elite favoured spinning as women's work, so generally women did not take up weaving, or dyeing. In their opportunities for learning textile production skills, girls were largely restricted to spinning. Potential dissemination of knowledge and skills among women was mediated by men who also controlled women's movement via marriages and as slaves. Textile production needed many more spinners than weavers. Spinning was gendered as a female task, to the extent that not even male slaves spun cotton. Women were systematically excluded from lucrative trades of tailoring and embroidery (Kriger 1993: 368, 374, 376, 377). However, in the nineteenth century women occasionally owned dyepits, but as dyeing was not a female activity they relied on their sons - to dye cloth often belonging to the women dyepit owners (Shea 1975: 187).

Overall in the textile industry women, unlike men, had little opportunity to employ wage labour, organise along economies of scale and exploit favourable income earning opportunities. However, where men and women occupied the same occupations they earned similar incomes. Women were generally unable to enter the most lucrative lines of textile production, although almost all women had small earnings from spinning (Hill 1972: 321; Kriger 1993: 379). For slaves, the consequences of gender differentials in textile production earnings meant male slaves skilled in textile production were more able to earn the money to buy their freedom than female slaves (Kriger 1993: 378). On gender differences in textile production in the Sokoto Caliphate, Kriger concludes:

> "Women were not a uniform social group, but at all strata of society they had relatively less control over their own and others' labor. The textile industry depended heavily on female workers, yet whether slave or free, they experienced greater exploitation than their male counterparts in the Sokoto Caliphate." (1993: 397).

As well as agricultural and textile production, women engaged in production of pottery (Plate 3.4), snacks and prepared food for sale which arose (among poor women) with expansion of settlements and the economy. As economic opportunities broadened, it is thought women were scarcely dependent on husbands because individuals retained their own income (Imam 1991: 7, citing Adamu 1982). Some rural women withdrew from farmwork, adopting seclusion in order to spin and process crops within the compound. But seclusion spread mostly among wealthy urban groups with the growing authority of Islamic precepts throughout the Sokoto Caliphate (Imam 1993: 139-41).

During the Sokoto Caliphate divisions of labour in production appear to have become increasingly spatialised (between urban and rural, by region) and specialised (between men and women and by craft). Thus, for example, within pre-colonial settlements different occupational groups occupied different quarters (Mustapha 1990: 250). As Imam argues, "...by the end of the nineteenth century...although most women were not secluded, the ideal of seclusion was widespread and there was the development of an increasingly specialized gender division of labor, in which many of the tasks allocated to women could be carried out within the compound." (Imam 1994: 126).

3.2.1 Gendered Trade in the Sokoto Caliphate

Trade in nineteenth-century Hausaland was highly organised. In the literature little is said of nineteenth-century gender divisions in trade. It is probable that middlemen and long-distance male traders across Hausaland were predominantly men - as in earlier times. In telling their lifestories Zarewa residents recalled nineteenth-century male long distance traders, for example the grandfather, father and husband of Hajiya Amina Maigida. Her maternal grandmother and co-wives travelled with their itinerant trader husband across West Africa together with the rest of his family household and slaves. Her paternal grandfather kept a guesthouse for itinerant traders.

In rural areas opportunities for women to trade were limited mostly to women's house trade, selling threshed grain and other goods. Polly Hill maintains that this flourished in the countryside alongside several other non-marketplace male-dominated trade

forms including small-scale:- male itinerant traders going from house to house on foot, grain buyers travelling on donkeys, rural-based long-distance traders, landlord-based long-distance trade and transactions between farmers (Hill 1977: 11-12). A few women in the Caliphate amassed great wealth as traders (Kriger 1993: 393) and not all were limited to house trade. For example, a woman merchant in Bebeji market, south of Kano, dealt in cloth, livestock and kola, going on trading expeditions for kola to Asante selling Kano cloth and potash along the way (Hogendorn 1978: 85). Also a woman salt trader, Mai Beza, is recorded as sufficiently wealthy to own land and slaves in Dorayi (Hill 1977: 216). At a reduced scale, individual women invested in small amounts of dyed cloth to store against a price rise, or future need, and went on minor trading expeditions (Shea 1975: 244).


Barth (1857: 164) referred to informal groups of Hausa women trading openly by the road. Other nineteenth-century European travellers also describe women selling in Hausa markets (Coles & Mack 1991: 7). However, as Imam (1991: 7) points out they may have been women beyond the age of seclusion. The gradual process of grain trade masculinisation began in the nineteenth century with erosion of the power of Kano palace women grain tax collectors and controllers of market grain trade as they withdrew into seclusion (Nast 1993: 67-8, 71).

3.2.2 Summary

The above provides a brief account of Hausa gender relations in the nineteenth century (Figure 3.1). With the Jihad and establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate stricter social constraints were imposed on women, justified on religious grounds. The behaviour of Hausa women became a matter of public debate such that for pious, high status Muslims the ideal for married women meant that only certain circumstances justified leaving the domestic sphere. Although the authority of Islamic discourses increased during the period and women's titled positions of authority dwindled, many women remained unsecluded, but vulnerable to enslavement. Slave women lost their individual freedom and/or security (Mack 1992b: 105). Both free and slave women farmed, some having their own *gayauna* land, but women generally had less access to

lucrative occupations than men (e.g. in textile production and trade). Women bore the major burdens of reproductive work, including children's religious instruction.

Figure 3.1 Nineteenth Century Sokoto Caliphate: Evolving Gender Divisions



In this period there were few big women traders, long-distance and periodic marketplace trade becoming increasingly male-dominated. There were shifts towards the masculinisation of grain trading, previously a female-centred activity. During the nineteenth century, divisions of labour and space became more specialised, such that most female gendered tasks could be carried out within the privacy of the compound. For the few women withdrawing into seclusion, economic opportunities in spinning, crop processing and house trade began to be available during the Sokoto Caliphate.

3.3 THE PERIOD OF BRITISH COLONIALISM (1903 - 1960)

"The white people brought two good things: peace and fertiliser"
Zarewa farmer, Alhaji Yahaya

The European colonial conquest of Nigeria was a period of immense transformation in gender relations against a background of Islamisation. When the British occupation began, 50% of the Hausa were thought to be Muslim, rising to 80% by 1962. By a number of means the British colonialists legitimised Islam, not least by recognising it as the state religion (Trimingham 1962: 206, 229-230). Inadvertently, in bringing about peace, security and improved transport, the British administration promoted conversion to Islam among non-Muslim Hausa, by enabling Muslims to penetrate into new areas. Christian missionaries were largely excluded from the north, while Muslim courts with precedence over indigenous law were established (Imam 1994: 126-7).

3.3.1 Gender Relations in the Colonial Period

Across Hausaland the period of British colonial rule, with its associated shifts in gender relations, was linked to the region's capitalist incorporation into the global economy, transforming social relations of production through closely linked processes of monetisation, new taxes, replacement of grain taxes with cash taxes, and encouragement of export commodity production (Watts 1983b: 51). From the 1920s-60s, peasant export commodity production in Northern Nigeria focused on groundnut exports from Kano. The only ways for peasant households to obtain coinage for

colonial taxes was by selling groundnuts and cotton, or semi-forced labour on colonial projects (Mustapha 1990: 169).

The groundnut boom was vividly recounted in the lifestories of elderly Zarewa residents.[10] Groundnuts grown in Zarewa were sold to agents in Zarewa market, or at the railway station on the Zaria-Kano line at Gimi, 15km away. Young unmarried men made money filling and sewing up sacks, headloading, or transporting groundnuts by donkey and in the early days by camel too. Many Kano region farmers prospered and some merchants acted as buying and transporting agents and became very wealthy. All the agents at Gimi named by informants bore the title Alhaji (having made the pilgrimage to Mecca), indicating the degree of their financial success. Notably, all these individuals were men.

Women played a crucial role in groundnut production, being paid to shell groundnuts and at the beginning of the groundnut export trade, women were involved as headloaders to Kano (Hogendorn 1978: 80-82). Presumably women continued this transport work in later years, taking groundnuts to buying points. The groundnut boom also provided opportunities for considerable financial gains for women, although not equal to those for men. The expansion of production profoundly affected (the praxis of) gender relations by extending and reinforcing seclusion. Not only was secluded female labour mobilised for shelling, but increased rural prosperity meant farmers were able to pay for services outside the compound (including farm labour) which their wives, on entering seclusion, no longer performed (Hogendorn 1978: 145). Thus, masculinisation and commercialisation of previously unvalorised female jobs occurred.

As encouraged by the colonial regime, cotton was grown in Zarewa.[11] Harvesting cotton involved children and women, including married women before the spread of *kulle*. Raw cotton was sold in Sundu and Makarfi markets where villagers recall it being weighed on large scales. Cotton was also sold in Zarewa in a place then called

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[10] The following is based on extracts from interviews with Hajiya Maigida (f), Malam Liti (m), Malam Sanusi (m), Malam Isahu (m), Malam Aminu (m), Malam Hafisu (m) and Alhaji Tukur (m).
[11] This paragraph is based on interviews with Gaje (f), Malam Sanusi (m) and Malam Hafisu (m).

Anguwar Yan Auduga.[12] Outside middlemen bought cotton in Zarewa and cotton thread was sold in Zarewa market. Male traders also took cotton by camel to Kano for sale to government agents.

At the beginning of British rule, colonial reports record crafts, including textile production, as significant portions of production in every Hausa settlement.[13] Baba of Karo frequently refers to blacksmiths, dyers, weavers and spinners in Zarewa during the first half of this century. Baba did spinning and weaving, and men in her mother's family were blacksmiths (Smith 1954: 118, 76). Similar to the previous century gender divisions in textile production involved women as spinners and weavers on upright looms. Zarewa lifestories recount how almost all women were spinners, while men did most weaving, almost all dyeing and all cloth beating. Malams Hafisu, Isahu and Sanusi all recalled learning to weave from their fathers or grandfather in the 1930s-40s. Like many other weavers in Zarewa they wove cloth for themselves to wear, as well as to sell in local markets.

The ownership of indigo dyepits was predominantly male, but was disputed in at least one instance in the 1920s in Wudil district, Kano, where women owned dyepits (probably by inheritance) and were becoming wealthy from their operation. Female dyepit ownership was not permitted in most towns (Shea 1975: 60, 68, 180). As in earlier times, women textile workers generally earned less than men. In the 1950s male weavers earned 17 times the yearly income estimated for female spinners (Kriger 1993: 378, citing Smith 1951).

Eventually, by various means, capitalism and colonial legislation powerfully eroded men's and women's practices of indigenous handicrafts. By the 1930s previously flourishing cottage industries had disintegrated (Mustapha 1990: 168). Colonial legislation banned iron mining and promoted hide exports, so blacksmiths turned to being mechanics, or using scrap metal,[14] and leather workers to making inferior footwear from car tyres (Plate 3.5).

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[12] Literally 'hamlet, or ward, of the sons of cotton'.
[13] Often 30-50% of the population engaged in craft production, especially textiles.
[14] Phil Jaggar (1994) traces the innovation and entrepreneurship of Kano blacksmiths in the twentieth century.



Plate 3.5 In Zaria City leatherworkers are few and still continue to adapt - today they make fashion handbags.




Plate 3.6 The dye pits in Zaria City as portrayed in an old photo. In 1992 they were semi-derelict with only a couple of pits remaining in use. (date c1930s? Source unknown; postcard obtained from Miss Burness OBE)

Public works were a further aspect of colonial production, especially the provision of transport infrastructure via road and railway construction (Hogendorn 1978: 24-5).

For this purpose the colonial state appropriated mostly male labour, but also that of girls and women, some of whom were required to cook and provide sexual services for male labourers (Shenton 1986: 136). While women would have earned some income from these activities, in all likelihood female wage rates were lower than mens' and their forced engagement in appropriated labour cannot be described as empowering.

Although not discussed in the literature, we can presume that during the colonial period, as previously, women continued to do much of the work of daily and generational reproduction in the prevailing divisions of labour. Some of women's domestic work burdens increased during the colonial period. For example, introduction of manufactured soap increased expectations about frequency of laundering (Skinner 1977: 43). However, there were other innovations which contributed to alleviating women's domestic burdens e.g. towards the end of the colonial period grinding machines were introduced into rural areas; potentially giving women more time to pursue income earning and improving the efficiency of food processing both for consumption and for sale.

During the colonial period Western education was introduced and schools established in towns and larger rural settlements. Ostensibly the British encouraged both boys and girls to attend such schools, but faced local opposition, especially towards educating girls. Despite the efforts of colonial women's education officers, girls did not attend schools in large numbers (Callaway 1987c: 129-30, Burness 1955, 1957). Women who were growing up during the colonial period remember few girls but many boys including their brothers, being sent to school. For example, Hajiya Amina Maigida whose parents so opposed girls going to school - and she too was afraid - that they hid her, even though the colonially appointed village head (Hakimi) had registered her name. Others bribed the Hakimi to take only their sons' names and not their daughters'. Thus, young men had opportunities with education to enter higher earning occupations, while young women stayed at home, assisting their mothers' income activities and learning to trade while their brothers were in school.

Colonialism rapidly transformed trading patterns, by introducing the railway, manufactured goods and establishing cash crop exports. The railway (reaching Kano from Lagos in 1912) put many rural communities, like Zarewa, within a day's walk of mechanised transport enabling the export of agricultural commodities as encouraged by government agents. For example, the boom in groundnuts, as described earlier, saw massive increases in rural incomes, but more for men than women, many of whom opted for seclusion and incomes from shelling groundnuts. Later in the colonial period, road provision meant motor transport became more widespread. However, bicycles appeared in Zarewa before motorcycles, or cars.[15] Then, as now, investment in motor transport was a common route to capital accumulation for male merchants and wealthy farmer-traders, but not an opportunity open to women.

Earlier trade patterns also continued. Colonial anthropologist M. G. Smith (1962: 307) reported Hausa markets as still having a *korama* or *sarkin awo* – the title of the women in charge of those selling grain by the measure. For example, in the 1930s long-distance male Hausa traders on camels brought potash to Zarewa from Hadejia and Bornu staying in the village 3 or 4 nights buying beans, guineacorn, cotton and fodder from the villagers.[16] Trade in kolanut imported from Asante (the best and biggest source) continued to flourish during the colonial period. Men from Zarewa recall involvement in this trade: Malam Aminu recalled how he used to travel by train to Zaria to buy sacks of kolanut to resell in Zarewa, the neighbouring periodic markets and even as far afield as Kano. Malam Mairuwa similarly engaged as a kola trader and for a time he also went to Lagos and Ondo to buy kolanut (and oranges) closer to source, until he stopped kola trading in the 1970s.

3.3.2 Expansion in Seclusion During the Colonial Period

It appears that during the twentieth century wife seclusion became a key element in gender relations for many more households than previously in rural Hausaland. It is suggested that during the British colonial period seclusion spread far beyond royal, urban, religious and wealthy households (Hill 1972: 24; Porter 1989; Smith 1954: 22).

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[15] Interviews with Malam Aminu (m).
[16] M. Hafisu recalls feeding their camels as a boy.

Although it is clear there was a major shift of women's labour out of agriculture and into the home during the colonial period as seclusion increased, precisely when and why remain matters for debate. This section examines and problematises the growth of seclusion.

In Baba of Karo's account seclusion is evident in the rural area around Zarewa, but it was not universal for married women of all social classes. Koranic scholars secluded their wives and since Baba's father was a Koranic *malam* (Islamic teacher) Baba's own mother, and her co-wives, were secluded (Smith 1954: 55, 137). But their seclusion was such that they went out for farmwork (ibid. 70) i.e. it was partial (*tsare*) seclusion. Baba stresses the way her father controlled his wives' mobility in describing how he married Ramatu, who left a previous marriage and had lived independently and unmarried:

> "My father used to keep his wives in his compound, he shut them up, Ramatu did not go out anymore - she felt the difference ... Her kinsfolk used to come and say 'Well done, Malam. You've got her neatly tied up!' He had a plan for keeping her, she hadn't a chance...When Ramatu came to his compound she noticed the difference - the house of the prostitutes and the house of a malam are very different things" (ibid. 137).[17]

The quotation suggests a general attitude of approval of seclusion for married women, but that Ramatu may not have been entirely happy with the restrictions placed on her mobility. Although seclusion was not the norm for all married women in Zarewa during her lifetime, Baba refers to strict seclusion being common in urban areas: "All the men of Kano City lock up their wives completely, so that no-one shall see them" (ibid. 80).[18]

In the elderly Zarewa informant's lifestories seclusion is a recurrent theme, with emphasis that in the past people in Zarewa did not rigorously observe seclusion. Some

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[17] In Baba's reference to Ramatu coming from the house of prostitutes, Mary Smith translates the Hausa term *karuwa* as prostitute. Others prefer the term courtesan, but a more accurate understanding is of independent unmarried women who in part depend for their livelihood on the support of a regular sexual partner (or partners).

[18] This may represent commonly held views, rather than Baba's personal experience because as Imam (1993: 151) points out Baba had never visited Kano, but she had much contact with people from Kano City.

informants knew their mothers and grandmothers had not been secluded but had worked on *gandu* farms and on their own *gayauna* land, collected firewood and carried food and water to their kin and workers labouring in the fields.[19]

Villagers recalled that previously some wives were always secluded, but not all. Those most strictly secluding their wives were the village *Sarki* (chief), members of the royal family (*mai sarauta*), rich men (*mai kudi*), the Imam and *malams*, i.e. those with wealth, status and religious authority.[20] Informants agreed that since their parent's and grandparent's generations, seclusion has become more widespread. One woman, Zubai, experienced the shift to seclusion directly in her own life (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 The Shift to Seclusion

Zubai was not in kulle during her first marriage to M. Garba. During Zubai's second marriage to M. Sule, she was his only wife but he did not ask her to do kulle. She had her own farm, given to her by her husband, where she planted groundnuts, rice, cotton and guineacorn. Zubai also foraged firewood for use at home, but she did not go to market. During her third marriage (returning to her first husband because her children were with him), unlike the first and second, Zubai was in kulle. When M. Garba asked her to do kulle the second time she married him, that meant he brought firewood and other things for her which otherwise she would have to go out and carry herself. She explained that she preferred kulle because she had more rest and did not have to do heavy work in the fields.

Zubai Gambo (f)

In the lifestory interviews informants stressed that, as seclusion expanded, women in Zarewa became "all the same", i.e. all secluded. Various reasons were given by villagers for the expansion of seclusion -'progress', 'religion' and education. They emphasised that religion has become more powerful and villagers better educated about Islam.[21] These arguments may be viewed as discourses invoked to legitimate a particular ideology. On the whole despite the restrictions of *kulle*, women like Zubai (Figure 3.2) may have preferred not to have to do heavy farmwork and firewood collection.

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[19] Interviews with Lariya Hadiza (f), Zubai Gambo (f), Maryam Gwamma (f), Hajiya Halima (f) and Malam Hafisu (m).
[20] Interviews with Zubai Gambo (f), Maryam Gwamma (f), Zubai Habi (f) and Malam Hafisu (m).
[21] Interviews with Maryam Gwamma (f), Hajiya Halima (f), Alhaji Yahaya (m), Malam Babajo (m), Malam Aminu (m) and Malam Hafisu (m).

Not only the extent, but practices, of seclusion appear to have changed so that while all (rather than a few) married women claim to be secluded, the actual practice of seclusion is now less severe in restricting women's movements. *Kulle* was described as formerly being stronger and stricter, especially for new wives who would not go out at all for the first two years of marriage. Now this is observed for only about two months after marriage. According to informants in Zarewa, established wives in seclusion in the past only went out at nights, covered their bodies, did not talk loudly, never looked out of the compound entrance or called to attract the attention of someone outside the compound. These practices are now more relaxed.[22]

The life stories show that within living memory in Zarewa at least, seclusion became more widely adopted across classes, changing from a practice adhered to only by wives of Islamic teachers, the wealthy and the urban aristocracy, to being a near-universal practice for married women. We may therefore surmise that simultaneously economic changes occurred enabling households to afford withdrawal of female agricultural labour from the fields. To allow a shift to near-universal seclusion of married women, there must have been changes in the enabling factors and motivations for *kulle* and possibly also in the practices of *kulle.* These changes, although articulated by Hausa men and women as legitimated on religious grounds, require economic bases.

As seclusion became more widespread, it became less rigorous and developed, such that married women went out more often, albeit (supposedly) with their husband's permission for legitimate reasons (e.g. to visit a sick relative). In effect this suggests seclusion practice was redefined. Shifts to more universal, but less severe, seclusion practices in Zarewa during the colonial period are not unique within rural Hausaland. Polly Hill (1972: 22; 1977: 84) recounts from Batagarawa village, near Katsina, in the late 1960s, that almost all married women were observing full seclusion in the village and (as in Zarewa today) claiming all marriages to be *auren kulle*, i.e. marriages of complete seclusion (Hill 1972: 22-23).

[22] Interviews with Malam Isahu (m), Mairo Liti (f), Delu Karimatu (f) and Hajiya Amina Maigida (f).

Dating these shifts to seclusion is challenging, but there are several suggestions. Watts refers to colonial records noting increases in rural seclusion as early as the 1930s (1983b: 218). Imam suggests that a move to greater seclusion could have started about then, or earlier, although her fieldwork data in rural Kano settlements suggests widespread moves to seclusion more likely to have taken place after 1945 (1993: 150).

Examining the evidence for Zarewa in closer detail helps to date the shift to seclusion more definitively. In Baba's lifestory it is not clear whether she was secluded in her first and second marriages, however, she was secluded in her third marriage from c.1922 (Smith 1954: 198, 226). In the field data the lifestory of Zubai (Figure 3.2) is pertinent. She was not secluded in her first two marriages, only in her third marriage that took place c.1966. This limited evidence could suggest that moves to near universal seclusion in some nucleated villages at least, took place between the 1920s and 1960s. Geographical variations in adoption of seclusion were no doubt considerable and their patterns today are examined in Chapter 4.

Considering the widening practice of seclusion and the stronger embracing of an ideology (if not actual practice) of near universal seclusion raises the question of why many women across Hausaland withdrew into their compounds, although their mothers and grandmothers and perhaps they themselves in previous marriages, had not embraced such practices. What were the processes behind the redefining of seclusion and corresponding shifting patterns of gendered power and space? The earliest suggestion, from M. G. Smith, is that reprieved slave women entered seclusion after the British abolished slavery at the beginning of the twentieth century (1954: 22-23). He argues women's choice of seclusion was both rejection of their previous slave status, in which they farmed and gathered from the bush, and rejection of the hard labour of these tasks, preferring the economic gains of trading and craftwork in seclusion.

There are several flaws with this argument, not least that neither trading nor craftwork requires seclusion, and indeed may be hindered by the constraints of *kulle*. Like Imam

(1991: 10-11) I reject M. G. Smith's explanation as unlikely on further grounds including that firstly, as confirmed in the lifestories from Zarewa, evidence exists for free Muslim women doing farmwork alongside slaves. Secondly, it is uncertain what portion of the population were slaves. It is suggested that at the end of the nineteenth century there were more than 1 million and perhaps as many as 2.5 million slaves, more than half being women comprising about one quarter to one half of the total population (Lovejoy & Hogendorn 1993: 1, 234). So the argument that women chose seclusion in rejection of slavery would only apply to 25-50% of the female population.

Furthermore, a counterargument to the notion that ending slavery made seclusion more widespread, is evidence that for slave owners' wives the ending of slavery made *kulle* less possible with the loss of slaves to fetch water and firewood (Lovejoy & Hogendorn 1993: 54).[23] Free women were excused from farmwork only where there was sufficient other labour in the household. Being the daughter of a *malam* and wealthy slave owner Baba did not farm, but indicates that farming was usual for rural women: "A townswoman prefers money, a countrywoman prefers grain - give a countrywoman a hoe and she will do her own farming" (Smith 1954: 101). Imam concludes, "It is unlikely... that farmwork would have been widely used by ex-slaves as the symbol of distinction between slave and free Muslim, or that this could be the explanation for the increasing prevalence of women's seclusion." (1993: 152).

As suggested by M. G. Smith, one reason why women may have embraced seclusion is that it reduces the demands a husband can make on his wife's labour, enabling her to invest time in personal (and thus net household) income earning. Both groundnut shelling and cotton spinning enlarged economic opportunities for women who were already established independently in spinning and processing occupations carried out within the home. In this way they were also responding to colonial promotion of cash crop production.

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[23] This argument is supported with a poem by a Kano poet shortly after 1903

> "I have no slave, I am not able to practice purdah,
> I have no slave girl who shall fetch water,
> Who will go to the bush and fetch me a little wood." (Lovejoy & Hogendorn 1993: 54)

The colonial authorities do not appear to have either opposed, or encouraged, seclusion. In part that may have been due to their policy of non-interference in Islamic affairs, and also because with their British colonial attitudes to women they were unlikely to question the notion of a woman's place being in the home.[24]

An additional incentive for married women's movement into the home may well have been land pressure in some areas. Increasing areas cultivated for consumption and cash crops, as well as the colonial appropriation of land for experimental farming and forestry meant less uncultivated bushland and fewer opportunities for women's economic foraging activities (Imam 1994: 128). Marriage and seclusion were also means of avoiding joining colonial forced labour parties (Imam 1991: 11). We can thus identify many likely factors that together led to increased seclusion.

In addition to material and economic innovations in the rural Hausa economy, outlined above, the spread of seclusion is related to the changing religious and ideological climate of Northern Nigeria. Imam suggests that during the colonial period Islamic practices hearkened back to a pre-colonial golden era, becoming a source of group identity and cultural resistance to (Christian) British rule (1994: 126). Part of embracing Islam, seclusion became a most visible marker and symbol of Islamic practice. Seclusion was incorporated into dominant ideology and political rhetoric, as well as Muslim Hausa/Northern tradition and custom. During the colonial period rural adoption of seclusion was partly in response to preaching in rural areas about women's proper place in Islam, and in emulation of wealthy urban classes. To an extent this change may have come about because the ruling elite, who practised seclusion throughout the nineteenth century, were expected by the British to live in the rural areas over which they had jurisdiction. This move made Fulani elite ways of life, including wife seclusion, visible to the masses and an object of social aspiration (Imam 1991: 12).

The shift to more widespread rural seclusion during the colonial period, as documented by the lifestory data above, is confirmed by Imam (1991: 12; 1993). She

[24] I am grateful to Dr Ola Uduku for this suggestion.


argues that in its extension to the peasantry, seclusion became of necessity less strict, because among the *talakawa* (peasantry), needs for women's labour performing female gendered tasks beyond the *gida* (harvesting cotton, shelling groundnuts, collecting water, fuelwood and bush products) continued. Thus, *tsari* (partial) seclusion developed, whereby women went out more frequently than with full seclusion as practised by ruling *masu sarauta*, but apologetically and only with permission from their husbands (Imam 1994: 128). In embracing seclusion women made a trade-off between mobility and other factors by first, increasing their time for *gida*-based income earning occupations and thus their economic autonomy, secondly, assuring their material security with a husband (so long as he was not desperately impoverished), and thirdly, gaining status and respectability (Imam 1994: 135). Furthermore, it can be argued that in embracing seclusion women were also opting to avoid heavy farm labour. All this points to women choosing to exercise agency in their own protection of their bodily well-being by using hegemonic ideas of men as male providers, even while women thus apparently support gender ideologies that devalue their contributions (after Jackson 1999b: 105).

However, by the late 1960s the cotton and groundnut production that enabled women to withdraw into seclusion without dependence on their husbands, slumped and industrial processing took over with the establishment of urban textile and groundnut processing mills. But by then married women were widely secluded and *kulle* was fixed in a religio-cultural ideology of full seclusion as the ideal and only proper behaviour for Muslim women of all classes.

3.3.3 Summary

In summary (Figure 3.3), gender relations during the colonial period were shaped by widespread conversion to, and strengthening practice of Islam as a source of group identity partly as resistance to British rule. Women's labour, shifting out of agriculture (public sphere), into secluded crop processing (private sphere), was crucial to the groundnut revolution which increased rural incomes (though more for men than women).

Figure 3.3 Colonial Period: Widening Gender Divisions



Gender divisions remained rigid in textile production which was in decline by the 1920s. Capital penetration destroyed many handicrafts, and therewith income opportunities for men and women. It can be presumed that women continued shouldering most reproductive burdens, but technical innovations towards the end of the colonial period began alleviating their food preparation burdens, thus, potentially giving them more time to pursue income earning occupations and mechanising some processes in the preparation of food/snacks for sale thereby boosting earnings. In trade, male groundnut merchants prospered, while women's more limited opportunities for accumulation, included headloading, small scale trade and grain retailing. Most women's trade was house-trading linked to wife seclusion spreading into rural areas. Although, the peak of cotton-groundnut production that made women's withdrawal into seclusion possible was over by 1950-60, wife seclusion was established and remained firmly embedded in the group identity of Muslim Northern Nigerians.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has sought to examine and reflect on the historical changes in spatial and gender relations, with respect to women's positions of power, for rural Hausaland from as early as the fourteenth century up until Independence in 1960. Given the lack of sources, much is hazy for the earliest pre-Jihadic period. However, it appears there was a kind of 'golden age' prior to the introduction of Islam in which women and men worked alongside each other in production. Likewise, women held important political and commercial positions of power alongside men, including control of the grain trade that was the core of the agrarian economy.

During the Sokoto Caliphate (Figure 3.1) with the spread of Islam a few elite and wealthy women withdrew into seclusion to spin, process crops and establish house trade, thereby earning respect and social status. For the majority of free and slave women, farming remained the norm, but seclusion became a widespread and admired ideal and women's tasks became increasingly located within the compound.

Simultaneously women's earlier power in political life and the grain trade was gradually eroded by masculinisation. For women the British colonial period provided new economic, social and ideological incentives for seclusion (Figure 3.3). Women's seclusion became firmly fixed as the norm and it was adopted by many rural women, albeit in a more relaxed (*tsare*) form. The following chapters (4-7) build on this historical background to bring the story of women's power, access to space and income up to date.

CHAPTER 4

SPATIALITY OF HAUSA GENDER RELATIONS

> "...*space is a (social) product ...in addition to being a means of production it [space] is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power*"
> (Lefebvre 1991: 26 emphasis original).

4.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the physical loci and determining structures in the gendered divisions of space in the case study village of Zarewa. Gendered daily spatial practices, like seclusion, which produce and reproduce gendered social relations of power via surveillance, control, routines and the construction of male and female bodies as 'in' or 'out' of place in particular time-space localities are scrutinised. Women and men's occupation of, access to and traversing of space in routine activity patterns reveal how spaces and places for this rural Hausa community are constructed and maintained. The central question asked in this chapter is 'What are the time-space constraints, segregation and opportunities associated with the institution of wife seclusion as practised in Zarewa?' Patterns of spatial mobility for individuals and groups of men, women and children are considered in relation to how they shape and reflect divisions of labour and how they restrict and/or provide opportunities for access to power and information.

This chapter follows from the examination in Chapter 3 of the gradual historical increase in the separation of the sexes via the introduction and spread of seclusion alongside greater gender and spatial divisions of labour. The present chapter concerns the particular post-colonial situation in a Hausa village in the 1990s.

4.1 SECLUSION SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Since the colonial era, Islamisation has remained important in shaping gender relations in Hausaland. The institution of wife seclusion remains the most significant

feature shaping the production of space and hence women's power relations. Ideological legitimation and support for seclusion continues, as confirmed by recent work on Islamisation in Kano (Barkindo 1993). Seclusion today remains embedded in Northern identity, setting the Hausa apart from both Christian and Muslim Southern Nigerians (Imam 1991: 13).

However, seclusion ideologies and practices, along with women's rights and gender relations, are not uncontested. They are topics on today's political agenda, discussed and debated by urban-based politicians, religious leaders, academics, women's groups and the media. What filters down to rural villagers is that for Hausa Muslims, women's rightful place is married and secluded, as confirmed by views from Zarewa encountered in the lifestory interviews (Chapter 3). Since Independence seclusion has remained widespread, if not actually increased, in rural areas of Northern Nigeria.

Variations in women's position within the money and cultural economy shape seclusion practices. Northern Nigeria is generally noted for the strictness and prevalence of seclusion, unlike Bornu (where Cohen (1961: 1235) describes a marriage of seclusion in which wives go to work on farms and go out to fetch water as needed) and other neighbouring Muslim areas (Hill 1972: 279). Although settlements of Hausa settlers, or their descendants, beyond Hausaland tend to have stricter seclusion than their Muslim neighbours (e.g. Mortimore & Adams 1999).[1] Today in Nigérien Hausaland, for example, the incidence of seclusion is widening, but remains a minority practice, e.g. in the early 1980s only 11% husbands claimed to seclude their wives in Yekuwa village near the border with Nigeria (Miles 1994: 260) as contributing to greater observance of seclusion. Cooper argues increasing seclusion in Niger is in response to influences from Northern Nigeria; while other observers point to widening economic prosperity (e.g. Miles 1994: 260), but these factors would appear to be linked. Certainly, women's engagement in farming as well as ownership of land and property continues to be more widespread in Niger than in Nigerian Hausaland (Cooper 1997, 1998). Similarly, in Yola, in North-eastern Nigeria, among

[1] However, it takes time for a new Hausa migrant community to become sufficiently established for seclusion to be possible (Coles 1996: 83).

newly urban settled Fulbe[2] seclusion is increasing which VerEecke (1993) argues they are adopting as increased social status signified by dependence on men. These brief examples serve to illustrate that seclusion practices within the geographical region of Hausaland vary dramatically across space in response to socio-cultural-historical factors. But the impression is that seclusion is becoming more widely admired, emulated and practised where prosperity allows.

However, within Nigerian Hausaland there are further geographical variations in seclusion practice. The general theme of the literature (from the 1960s) is that wife seclusion is fairly ubiquitous and universal in rural Nigerian Hausaland, but we should remember that available information is biased towards nucleated villages and lacks rigorous observation – 'our ignorance is great' (Hill 1972: 279). It is suggested by some researchers that in peripheral hamlets and dispersed farmsteads seclusion is less comprehensively observed (Hill 1972: 355, 1977: 84; Longhurst 1982; Jackson 1978: 21; Jackson 1981: 77-79, 224; Imam 1993: 65). Greater seclusion in larger settlements would appear to be largely explained by prosperity and economic security. Jackson found a direct link between improved incomes from a development project and increased seclusion (1978: 23). Deeply rural dispersed farmsteads tend to be poor with meagre subsistence margins making seclusion an unaffordable luxury. For such households, a socio-religious status indicator like seclusion is simply unaffordable because all labour is needed in the fields, wells are scarce (and likely to be public), and without access to markets there are few or no opportunities for secluded trade in sparsely inhabited hamlets, or lone compounds. Furthermore, the hold of religious ideology prevailing in urban and larger rural centres is likely to be weaker in peripheral areas. Even within individual rural settlements, the observation of seclusion varies in strictness between married women, not all of whom claim to be secluded (Konan 1975: 6; Jackson 1981: 224; Imam 1993: 65). Such variations can be taken to reflect the relative class and income status of women and their households.

There are other parts of Northern Nigeria where seclusion is not observed, despite adherence to Islam. It appears that in other more ecologically marginal areas

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[2] The traditionally pastoralist Fulbe may be considered as not quite Hausa, but are Muslim Nigerians and neighbours of the Hausa living alongside them in much of Northern Nigeria. In the past extensive

of Hausaland the agrarian economy cannot support full seclusion. For instance, in Matsai village close to Katsina the dry climate makes rain-fed peasant agriculture barely viable. The water table is fairly low, therefore with fewer wells in private compounds women are unsecluded as they have to go out to collect water from public wells (Lockwood 1992). However, lack of private wells does not always make seclusion impossible. For example, in villages of North-east Jigawa State on the Hadejia Nguru floodplain wells are few and communal because they need to be concrete lined in the sandy soil, but water is collected for secluded women by older unsecluded women, husbands and poor men working as water carriers.[3] Thus, the (albeit limited) evidence seems to reveal that varying with ecological and core-periphery status areas of Hausaland are differently able to maintain ideals of wife seclusion. Despite patchy data it appears that the rural economy plays an important role in influencing the precise nature of seclusion praxis.

4.2 SUSTAINING SECLUSION

We now consider how, in material terms, Muslim Hausa practices of wife seclusion are being sustained in rural areas. Particularly significant is that seclusion, as practised today, is insupportable without child labour. Both boys and girls (especially girls) are vital in maintaining seclusion because children carry messages and run errands for secluded women. To a lesser degree unsecluded post-menopausal women are also significant in this regard. It is significant that seclusion is not being eroded by widespread formal education of children, especially girls, as some authors (e.g. Callaway 1987a) predicted following the 1976 Nigerian universal primary education (UPE) policy. There are several explanatory factors for this. Firstly, for rural children the provision of mainstream primary and secondary schools is lower than for urban children. Secondly, the Nigerian economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s saw falling school enrolments, and declining quality of government provided education, especially in rural areas. Thirdly, Islamiya primary schools are increasingly being established, attended mostly by girls (see Chapter 6), which are a means of upholding

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intermarriage between the two ethnicities created the elite Hausa-Fulani.

[3] David Thomas pers. comm. 1/2/95.

praxis and ideologies of seclusion by teaching 'ideal' Muslim lifestyles, and are compatible with girls marrying young and entering seclusion.

Aside from the availability of child labour, Polly Hill (1972: 24, 279; 1977: 84) was first to point out that in part the material sustainability of seclusion lies in the widespread availability of affordable transport (in her day donkeys, now bicycles and motorcycles), and a relatively high water table ensuring the viability of wells within compounds. Affordable transport enables women to be excused as labour for transporting goods, and wells (also pit latrines) within the compound mean they can stay inside all day.[4] However, as Ayesha Imam identifies "...while the availability of well water seems plausible as a possible enabling condition for women's seclusion, a positive association between the two is rather more difficult to establish" (1993: 151).

In recent decades widespread adoption of chemical fertilisers, improved maize, ox ploughs and other agricultural innovations have led to agricultural transformation and net labour displacement from agriculture in what is described as Northern Nigeria's 'green revolution' (Goldman & Smith 1995). Resulting increased rural incomes sustain many households' abilities to dispense with women's agricultural labour outside the home and have contributed to infrastructure development.[5] Since the time Hill was writing (over two decades ago), not only are wells and latrines now the norm in most rural compounds (rather than the elite few), there is also piped water and electricity in some rural villages and homes. Rural transport has been revolutionised with bicycles in nearly every household, motorcycles common, and the wealthiest minority own motor vehicles. Expansion of tarred roads mean 'public' transport reaches nearly everywhere. Thus, not only are women not required as 'beasts of burden', but bicycles and motorcycles have dispensed with the need for women to carry food and water to men working in the fields - men return to eat, pray and rest in the village at midday. This develops Hill's original arguments and further suggests the rural peasant economy can provide both limits to, and opportunities for, seclusion.

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[4] There is support for this argument from other regions of Hausaland. Cooper (1997, 138) comments for rural Niger that "...it has only been with fairly recent development efforts to build latrines and to provide general access to wells and pumped water that seclusion has even been imaginable".

[5] A similar case of increased socio-economic prosperity leading to women's withdrawal from agricultural fieldwork and vending outside the home is in Muslim farming and fishing communities of Kerala (Mencher 1988, Holly Hapke pers. comm. 23/6/00).

4.3 GENDERING OF TIME-SPACE

Given the widespread and growing practice of seclusion, the description of socio-spatial aspects of gender relations in Nigerian Hausaland as 'utter segregation between the men's and women's worlds' (Pittin 1987a: 234) would seem appropriate.[6] However, men's (public) and women's (private) spaces do of course intersect, being entirely dependant on each other and forming a single integrated system, rather than two separate systems. Furthermore, the basic male-female separation is made more complex by the crosscutting of age and marital status. Children (boys and girls), elderly widows and post-menopausal[7] women may freely move around and enter domestic spaces. In theory secluded women require a good reason to go out, such as to attend a naming ceremony, or even to vote (Plates 4.1, 4.2). When going out secluded women are often required to be clothed from head to foot (Plate 4.3), to move under cover of darkness, taking their youngest children with them. The male/public and female/private spatial dichotomy has been widely identified elsewhere, but is particularly stark in the context of Hausaland, although the boundaries apply only to certain age/marital status cohorts of the population.


Thus, age is an important variable that intersects with gender in the use of space associated with seclusion practices. Young girls before the age of puberty and women beyond childbearing age have greater liberty to occupy public space than married women of reproductive age, to whom the ideology of seclusion applies (Figure 4.1). These general Hausa age and gender patterns in the use of space are further altered by wealth status. As identified above, poorer households may not be able to afford to seclude their wives, although it would be a source of shame if they were forced to work in the fields, or trade in the market. Age, 'class' and gender patterns in use of space vary regionally and historically.

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[6] Although this statement arises from Pittin's extensive research in the Hausa city of Katsina (Pittin 1979, 1983) it can also be said to accurately reflect the situation for many rural dwellers, particularly in dense, nucleated villages like Zarewa where seclusion appears as the norm.

[7] Precisely when and how a woman is defined, or defines herself, as post-menopausal varies. Justice Abdul Kadire Orire (Grand Kwadi of the Shari'ah Court of Appeal, Kwara State) maintains only women above 55 years of age are permitted by Sharia law to mix freely in public life because they are no longer a temptation to men (Imam 1991: 16).

Figure 4.1 Gender as a 'Career'[8]



[8] Career is used here in the sense of a path through life.



Plate 4.1 Women leaving a naming ceremony.



Plate 4.2 Polling for presidential elections 1993 - a rare occasion for a small number of women to enter public space (men queuing left, women to the right).

4.3.1 Social Construction of Domestic Space

The domestic domain in rural Hausaland is composed of extended family houses built out of mud as rooms around a central open space surrounded by a high wall.[9] These compounds are entered through an entrance hut (*zaure*) which prevents a direct view into the house as the way in and out of the *zaure* is offset (Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4), thereby shielding married women in the house from the male gaze of the external (male-dominated) world. Notices at the entrance of the village warn passengers in high lorries not to gaze over the compound walls at women (Plate 4.4).

The courtyard (*cikin gida* lit. stomach, or inside, of the house), is where women engage in daily domestic tasks, childcare, food preparation, craftwork and relaxation (Plates 4.5, 4.6).[10] Houses in which married women reside are known as *ba shiga* (no entry) houses because entry to such houses is not permitted for men other than close male kin. The socio-spatial construction of the domestic realm is such that women, especially married secluded women, occupy and utilise reproductive space inside the *gida* - the place of women and children. Thereby, the domestic space of every house is a women's sphere linked to other domestic women's spaces by children and post-menopausal women who freely move around the village able to enter any house.[11]

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[9] The high wall surrounding the typical Hausa compound has been described as one of the hierarchy of veils: the city wall, the house wall, the courtyard wall, seclusion and the veil of women, (Amini 1989 cited in Barkindo 1993: 92).

[10] See also other descriptions of Hausa compounds (Hill 1974: 120-1, Schwerdtfeger 1971: 62-67, 1982: 28-33, Smith 1954: 23, 1955: 17-19, 1965: 130-1).

[11] This is described by Pittin as the "...clear-cut spatial arrangements whereby men and women are rarely together, even within the home" (1987a: 234).



Plate 4.3 Secluded married women veiled to go out.



Plate 4.4 Signboard at entrance to Zarewa - warning (male) passengers passing through on lorries not to stand up and look at secluded women behind the compound walls.




Plate 4.5 Women and children at home in the *gida*.



Plate 4.6 Women pose formally within Gidan Sarki - (chief's four wives seated).

Figure 4.2 'Typical Hausa Compound'



(Source: Smith 1954: 36)

Within the domestic compound, space is also divided and organised. While acknowledging that compound layouts vary with the wealth and status of the household, forty years ago M. G. Smith presented the earliest plan of what he describes as a 'typical compound of a moderately prosperous villager' (Smith 1954: 36, Smith 1955: 17, 1965: 130) (Figure 4.2). Although more recent actual rural compound layouts are recorded (Hill 1972: 12, Jackson 1981: 343), the humble rural *gida*, which is the dwelling of the majority of the population, has been largely overshadowed in the literature. Greater attention being given to large urban compounds and more elaborate urban buildings of mosques and palaces (Moughtin 1964, 1985, Schwerdtfeger 1971, 1982, Nast 1992, 1994 and others).

Figure 4.3 Plans of Small Compounds in Zarewa





Figure 4.4 Plan of Large Compound in Zarewa



Sketch plans of compounds in Zarewa (Figures 4.3, 4.4) are presented to demonstrate something of the variation in contemporary rural compounds. The plans show differences in size and form between small compounds occupied by two generation nuclear families, i.e. 'young' households, and larger compounds occupied by multi-generation extended families, i.e. 'old' households. Within larger household compounds spatial analysis illustrates that women's working and living space inside the *cikin gida* is further delineated into separate *waje* which are the places, or sections (*sassa*), of individual wives and their children.

Most compounds have only one well shared by all the compound members (women and children do most drawing of water). In poor compounds without a well, women have to go out to a public well, to a neighbour's well, or depend on children/menfolk to fetch water. Most secluded women cook near their rooms, either outside on a fire between three stones, or in a kitchen hut during the rainy season. Co-wives use the same cooking place in rotation. Within most compounds there is a walled, or screened, pit latrine and adjacent separate bathing place used by all but the youngest children (who are bathed by women in the open courtyard). Older boys and men may also (discretely, given their long shirts) defecate in open spaces around the village. Thus, latrine and bathing areas are not gender specific, but are used more by women because men spend a lot of time away from the *gida*. Most secluded women traders prepare goods for sale in their rooms, *waje*, or kitchens and send children out to sell them. Widowed, or older, women nearing the end of their reproductive years may occasionally cook and sell food from inside the *zaure* where they can catch passing trade from this semi-private space. Every married woman has her own room, but only some married men have their own room (*turaka,* or *shago*), most sleeping in the room of their wife (or wives, in turn). Where there are walls between *sassa*, they are often lower than the external compound walls. Use of space within the compound is dominated by women and children. Men spend little time inside the *gida* and often appear as apologetic visitors, especially during the day. Men often rest, pray and take their meals in the *zaure*, or outside the compound entrance. Thus, in the domestic sphere women exercise power over children, their trade, cooking, agricultural processing and social activities.

The plans also show that since colonial times domestic spaces, the spaces of daily and generational reproduction, appear to have changed. House plans have apparently shifted towards weaker divisions of male and female spaces within the compound. This is illustrated by comparing the plan of a Hausa compound in *Baba of Karo* (Smith 1954: 36) (Figure 4.2) with present day house plans (Figures 4.3, 4.4). The forecourt, which appears on the 1940s plan gives the impression that secluded women formerly lived deep inside the house in an inner courtyard. Over the last five decades this 'semi-private' (Moughtin 1985: 33) forecourt seems to have disappeared (and with it the *shigifa*), no longer appearing in Zarewa's 1990s compound layouts. This could indicate a shift to greater female occupation of more domestic space, and possibly correspondingly less male occupation of domestic space. Pursuing a discourse of Hausa women as active, empowered agents, this could be seen as a 'victory' for women's regendering of space - claiming the domestic sphere as wholly female. Equally, it could be viewed as corresponding to the spread of seclusion across classes, at the same time weakening in practice so that secluded women occupy the whole of the compound, rather than being cloistered deep within.

4.3.2 Construction of 'Public' Space[12]

In rural Hausaland there are different arenas of 'public' space - marketplaces, open space in residential areas, roads and paths between houses, mosques, and fields. Similar to other Muslim societies, these 'public' spaces are men's domain. Men spend most of their time working, eating, praying and socialising in the public sphere. What 'public' spaces all have in common is that they are socially constructed as predominantly male spaces, i.e. those who occupy them are by and large men and the activities taking place in public space are largely masculine activities.

Being the bases of the agricultural economy, fields form the most obviously 'public' and productive spaces. Work in the fields is predominantly male activity (Plate 4.2). Only a few unsecluded widows are paid to help occasionally with harvesting and

[12] 'Public' space is so denoted because as is shown, much of 'public' space excludes women and is therefore not open to everyone in the usual meaning of public.

sometimes unmarried girls help with planting. Uncultivated 'bushland' is the arena for collecting and gathering activities - mostly firewood collection generally carried out by men, children and widows. Collecting firewood for sale, rather than for household use, is a very low income activity usually only associated with poor, elderly and unsecluded widows. Just one married woman reported collecting firewood to sell (presumably forced to do so by poverty) thereby engaging in a 'public' space activity not usually carried out by secluded women.

Village streets and open spaces within each ward are shared communal space for men; spaces for conversation, discussion, prayers, business agreements and transactions. The main streets in Zarewa run regularly north-south and east-west having been created by selective demolition to allow the passage of motor vehicles. In the streets, children hawk goods for women, while men trade from stalls, and from the personal rooms of their houses which open outwards (*shago*). Streets are public places where social, political, religious and economic power is wielded by men (Plate 4.7). Narrow alleys between high compound walls form pedestrian routes frequented by women who avoid main streets when moving in public space.

Marketplaces are spaces of financial and commodity exchange which few women enter (Plate 4.8). Since the early 1970s Zarewa has not had a regular market, although there have been attempts to re-establish one. In the early 1990s the former village marketplace was just a butcher's slaughtering slab and a daily cluster of a few male traders selling meat, sugarcane, oranges, sweets and suchlike. Barbers, shoe repairers and child hawkers also congregate around the area and there is an Igbo-owned store, while several tailors have their *shago* nearby. Chapter 7 examines how the modes and spaces of trade are gendered, organised spatially and how income from trade affects men's and women's power relations.

Mosques are places of male prayer and preaching; they are spaces and sites of religious and political activity. Only a few very elderly widows attend the communal Friday prayers (Plate 4.9). Outside and a long way from the mosque they are placed behind the hundreds of male worshippers. Similarly, women of child-bearing age do

not attend the communal prayers at the festivals of Eid-el-Kabir and Eid-el-Fitr each year which take place at the Eid prayer ground outside the village (Map 2.5). Likewise, the few elderly women present sit in groups far behind the main male worshippers (Plate 4.10), but do join the crowds in the village afterwards to watch the Sarki's procession (Plate 4.11).

Throughout the months of fieldwork only a few older (probably no longer secluded) married women were occasionally observed going to market, working in the fields (Plate 4.12), or praying in mosques. Generally, women's movement about the streets was mostly after nightfall. Today seclusion appears near universal among married women in Zarewa regardless of their husband's occupation, status, or wealth of the household. There are very occasional exceptions where women resist social norms of marriage and seclusion. During the fieldwork in Zarewa at least one woman was encountered who on divorce left the village for Kano city and was said to have gone '*yawon duniya*' (lit. 'to walk in the world'), i.e. chosen to reject marriage and seclusion and live independently. Another woman, having divorced, remained unmarried, living with her young daughter in the village.

The general gendered spatial pattern is that men occupy public space, as do children to a lesser extent. Elderly women who are no longer secluded (but may be divorced, widowed or married), can pass through, but not linger in, public space. Married women and women of child-bearing age are largely excluded from public space. They may walk through the streets at certain times (mostly after dark) if veiled, but secluded women should not hang around and linger. Thus, the central way the Hausa environment is socially gendered is through the division of public and private space corresponding to space for men and space for women respectively. The restriction of married women is a direct expression of the gendering of space in Northern Nigeria that varies over time and space. The physical construction of the external built environment both reflects and reinforces the institution of seclusion.



Plate 4.7 Men and boys in street, Zarewa.



Plate 4.8 Periodic market place - male crowds except for unmarried girls hawking and errand running.



Plate 4.9 Men attend Friday prayers, Zarewa.



Plate 4.10 Older women in public at the Eid prayers.




Plate 4.11 Women in public during sallah celebrations – identifiable to the right by the crowd of coloured headscarfs and veils.



Plate 4.12 Men working in field near Zarewa.

4.4 PATTERNS OF SPATIAL MOBILITY

Observations during the fieldwork months identified regular patterns in gender divisions of space. Daily routines are such that during daylight hours very few women are seen in the streets and along the paths in the village. By nightfall however, women are to be seen moving about the town, veiled and carrying lamps to guide them. Men, in contrast, are scarcely inside their houses during the day, but are in the farm, the mosque, the market, or the street. By late evening men enter their houses to sleep. Thus, daily routines for both men and women in public and private spheres are 'zoned' in time and space.

There are also weekly patterns in spatial mobility. For example, during Friday prayers much of the streets are empty as men gather for communal prayers at the mosque so, while their husbands are occupied elsewhere, some women take the brief opportunity to leave the house. On the periodic market days (Sundays and Wednesdays) in settlements neighbouring Zarewa many men go to market to buy and sell, for social and other reasons. Many children also go to market to hawk goods for adults, or on errands for their secluded mothers, and a few elderly widows go to market to buy, or sell. Although married women do not generally go to market they may take the opportunity of the transport availability to visit kin, e.g. on the occasion of illness, childbirth or bereavement. On market days there are frequent minibus taxis to and from the market and further afield making these the easiest days to travel to, or from, Zarewa by public transport.

Time-space data was collected from women, men and children (as described in Chapter 2). The information gathered provides material for the examination and representation of individuals' daily routines of movement in time and space.[13] In a community with a peasant agricultural economic base many activities follow an annual cycle (Figure 2.1), so data was collected to represent three seasons:[14] the dry season (November-April), when farming is least demanding; the wet season (May-

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[13] This resembles time geography developed by the Swedish geographer, Hägerstrand (1975), which provides a methodology for illustrating the paths of individuals as daily time-space prisms, bounded by activity constraints which delineate the boundaries of paths possible to different individuals. While I sympathise with the feminist critiques of time-geography's failure to distinguish between private and public space, and assumptions of universal masculinist space (Rose 1993b), like Giddens (1984) I nonetheless accept it as a useful methodology.

[14] The focus on seasonal differences in mobility is in response to critiques by Chambers et al. (1981) that researchers and development practitioners neglect seasonality despite its importance to rural life.

October), when farming is at its peak; and the Muslim month of Ramadan, when fasting reduces general activity and mobility levels.


Table 4.1 Gendered Daily Time-Space Activity Patterns

TIME	WOMEN		MEN	
	Place	**Activities**	***Place & Movement***	**Activities**
DAWN	*Home*	Rise. Perform ablution and pray at home. Draw water. Make fire, heat bath water. Cook morning meal (*tuwo*).	*Home → Mosque*	Rise. Perform ablution. Go to mosque to pray. Greet friends and neighbours.
EARLY MORNING	*Home*	Divide food. Give husband breakfast. Feed children. Eat breakfast. Give husband bath water. Bathe and dress children. Bathe self. Send sons to primary school. Send daughter out hawking.	*Mosque → Home* *Home → Farm*	Listen to radio news at home. Eat breakfast. Take bath. Go to farm on foot, or bicycle.
LATE MORNING	*Home*	Wash cooking pots and dishes. Sweep compound. Wash clothes. Feed animals. Make fire. Prepare and cook midday meal.	*Farm*	Work on farm - planting, weeding. Pick grass for compound sheep and goats.
NOON	*Home*	Divide food. Feed children. Eat midday meal. Wash pots and dishes. Take in dry washing. Sweep compound.	*Farm → Home*	Return home. Wash. Eat midday meal.
EARLY AFTERNOON	*Home*	Make fire. Cook snack (*waina*) for sale. Send daughter to sell *waina*. Send children to Koranic school.	*Home*	Perform ablution. Pray. Rest - lie down in *shago*. Perform ablution. Pray.
LATE AFTERNOON	*Home*	Clean and pick over grain. Pound grain or send daughter to grinding mill and to buy sauce ingredients. Shell groundnuts (for payment). Chop vegetables, make fire and cook sauce. Sieve flour, boil water and cook *tuwo*. Draw and heat bath water.	*Home → Farm/Market* *Farm/Market → Home*	Go back to farm on foot or bicycle. (or take bus to market in adjacent village, if market day). Return home. Take bath. Wash working clothes at well/tap.
EARLY EVENING	*Home*	Clean, fill and light lamps. Divide food. Serve husband evening meal. Feed children. Eat. Draw water. Heat bath water. Bathe children. Put children to sleep.	*Home → Mosque* *Home & Around Village*	Perform ablution. Go to mosque for prayers. Eat evening *tuwo* at home. Relax - listen to radio, go to visit friends, neighbours.
LATE EVENING	*Home*	Take own bath. Perform ablution. Pray. Retire to sleep.	*Home & Around Village* *Home*	Out visiting, or at home relaxing. Retire to sleep.

Table 4.1 shows a typical daily pattern of activities and movement for men and women during the wet season when men spend a lot of time in the farms, going there

almost every day at least once, and often twice. It is in a sense a generalised, 'ideal' account, a composite of observations and the time use survey results. In such an account, during the course of a typical day a married woman is unlikely to leave her house, but spends the whole day inside the compound occupied with domestic tasks of household reproduction (including cooking, washing, caring for children). In contrast men spend most of their day out of the house coming home only to bathe, rest and sleep. Men commonly take their meals outside in front of the house. The account in Table 4.1 suggests that men do the heaviest work of farm labour but women's domestic burdens, e.g. drawing water from the well and pounding in food preparation, are not inconsiderable.[15] The detailed results of the time-use records are summarised in Figures 4.5-4.7 and Table 4.2 showing seasonal and gender variations in mobility. In the following discussion we should remember that given the strength of seclusion norms in Zarewa these recall accounts reported to outside researchers are in some ways likely to be massaged to show conformity to seclusion. In that these are largely accounts of what people say they do we should recognise they do not tell us if or how women and men act up and against (i.e. subvert) hegemonic norms of spatial behaviour.


Figure 4.5 Gendered Mobility Patterns - Dry Season



Women n=32, Men = 61.


[15] Although this is a shift in gender divisions from the past when Hausa women engaged more widely in agricultural labour, as studies show men's physical work capacity is greater than women's (Jackson & Palmer-Jones 1999: 569) it would indicate greater prosperity whereby women are not forced by poverty to do work beyond their capability.

Figure 4.6 Gendered Mobility Patterns - Ramadan[16]



Women n=32, Men n= 61.

Figure 4.7 Gendered Mobility Patterns - Wet Season



Women n= 160, Men n= 129

4.4.1 Men's seasonal mobility patterns

Men's daily activity records, presented in Figures 4.5-4.7, reveal that during the dry season all men go out of the house every day, although a few (17%), who are mainly elderly men, go only to the mosque. In fact men visit the mosques and prayer places, which are scattered throughout the village (Map 2.4), up to five times a day for five

[16] Mobility data for adult men was collected in the three seasons. Equivalent data for adult women covers only the wet season and Ramadan. However, women's mobility data for Ramadan reflect dry season patterns because in 1993 when the data was collected Ramadan occurred during the dry season. Furthermore, the seasonal variations in women's mobility are not as significant as for men and the biggest contrast for empirical illustration is that overall women's mobility is much lower than men's.

daily prayers (Table 4.2). Men visit the mosque 3-4 times a day on average in the dry season (more often than in the wet season) when agricultural activities are not very demanding. In the dry season only about a third of men (30%) recorded going to the fields on the outskirts and in the immediate vicinity of Zarewa. Overall, in the dry season adult men make a trip outside the village nearly one day in four. Over 60% of all such trips are to local periodic markets. Only four cases (out of a total of 46) were recorded of men going to visit other villages, or travelling further afield, for example, to Zaria, the nearest urban centre.

Table 4.2 Men's Mosque Attendance by Season

MOBILITY	WET SEASON (n=129)*	RAMADAN (n=61)*	DRY SEASON (n=46)*
Go out only to mosque	0% (129)	3.3% (2)	17% (8)
Av. no. of daily mosque visits	2.9	4.2	3.7
Attend special prayers at mosque	2.3% (3)	9.8% (6)	2.2% (1)

* n varies because the size of samples of men reflect the number within time and labour constraints who could be interviewed about time-space use records at the different seasons.

The data collected during Ramadan (Figure 4.6) showed comparable patterns of movement for men. However, this is a season of fasting and prayer and shows the intense nature of men's religious activities during the fasting period is evident - 75% of men visited the mosque at least four times a day, compared with 63% in the dry season outside Ramadan. Furthermore, about 10% men not only said their daily prayers at the mosque, but also attended additional special prayers and religious teaching sessions (*tafsir*) at mosque, compared with only about 2% of cases throughout the rest of the year. Movement around the village to visit friends and relatives, or to attend ceremonies (such as weddings or namings) and suchlike show a small reduction from 76% of respondents during the dry season to 70% when fasting. This mobility reduction is due to the fact that when fasting, men spend a lot of the daytime either in the mosque, or resting and sleeping at home.

When men fast during Ramadan their visits to local markets were about twice a week i.e. 25% of cases compared with only 15% in the dry season outside Ramadan. This greater frequency of market visits may reflect needs to acquire the special food items eaten when breaking fast each day during Ramadan and for the celebration of Eid-el-Fitr at the end of the holy month. Men made longer journeys to the more distant urban centres of Zaria (55km), Kano (125km) and Kaduna (120km) on average 1 in 15 days during the dry season, but only 1 in 30 days in Ramadan. Such visits account for just 10% of all the trips made by men outside Zarewa during Ramadan, while short trips to markets were 75% of all such movements.

So men's mobility during Ramadan, in contrast to other times of the dry season, is characterised by more visits to the mosque; less movement around the village, more time resting; more frequent visits to nearby villages and periodic markets (to buy special seasonal consumption items); but fewer longer journeys to more distant centres (fatiguing while fasting). In comparison with Ramadan and the dry season, the wet season is a busy and exhausting time for men, because (except for occasional use of tractors, or bullock ploughs), all farming operations are performed by male labour. During the farming months men spend much of the day labouring in the fields ploughing, planting, applying fertiliser, weeding and harvesting. Thus, over 80% of men reported going to their farms during the wet season compared with only about one-third during the dry season when the only work is clearing fields and applying manure. In the wet season men have less time to spend on religious activities and visit the mosque only about three times a day on average, being more likely to say their prayers at home. Similarly visiting friends and family out and about in the village falls to 61% of cases in the rainy season, compared with 70% in Ramadan and 76% in the dry season, because men have less time, and/or may be too tired after farmwork. However, visits to market during the farm season are about as frequent as during Ramadan and more frequent than during the dry season because farmers go to buy seeds, fertiliser or farm tools, or to sell vegetables. Trips to other places are less frequent than at other seasons because of farmers' time constraints given the farming demands (Figure 4.7).

Gender relations are central in creating and organising space. The mobility data for men shows that men's movements correspond to the male positions in 'public' life outside the household arena. This is part of the 'male spatial order of things'.

4.4.2 Women's seasonal mobility patterns

The majority (85%) of women in the sample households are married and claim to be secluded. The unsecluded minority (15%) are 25 widows and three divorced women. Data collected in Ramadan[17] (Figure 4.6) show that three-quarters (75%) of women did not report going out of their compound at all during the day of the daily activity recall record. Thus, it appears that on average adult women leave their houses just one day in four during the fasting period; while men go out every day. On the infrequent occasions women recorded going out (just 9 out of 32 cases for Ramadan), the majority of their movements were just within the village to visit friends, or relatives; to attend a wedding, or naming ceremony for a new-born child; or to visit another woman to plait their hair, for example. Only in 6.2% of the cases (2 out of 32) did women leave the village, and then only to nearby villages. Unlike men, women recorded no visits to the mosque, to farms, periodic markets, or more distant locations.

Data for 160 women[18] during the wet season show that 64% of women did not leave their house on the day in question (Figure 4.7). But 36% went out at least once and a total of 70 outings were recorded for the 60 women who went out. Visits around the village were recorded for 33% of cases, compared with 22% during Ramadan. So the figures for women's mobility are slightly higher during the rainy months than in the fasting period. A possible explanation for this, if we see Hausa women as agents capable of resisting seclusion, is that while men are busy in the fields in the rainy season their wives take the opportunity to go out unobserved. Conversely during Ramadan men are about the home, village and mosque when fasting and able to observe any illegitimate movement of women, who consequently stay at home more.

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[17] For a sub-sample of 32 women: 88% married, 9% widows, 1% divorced.
[18] 85% married, 14% widows, 1% recently divorced.

The data shows the biggest contrasts in mobility (Figures 4.5 - 4.7, Tables 4.1 and 4.2) are between men and women rather than between seasons. Women go out less often and to fewer places than men. Women record no visits to mosques and there are only single cases of women going to farm, or market - but not during Ramadan. This is because in Ramadan women have very demanding food preparation schedules that keep them within the domestic sphere. They cook special food during the day for breaking the fast at dusk, and cook for children too young to fast, as well as getting up in the night to prepare hot food to be eaten before dawn. As Ramadan is a special time of religious observance it is not surprising that women conscientiously observe seclusion at this period.

The intersections of gender with age and stage in the life cycle are highly significant for women in determining spatial mobility in women's daily lives. Older post-menopausal women and widows are not expected to observe seclusion and indeed most of them leave the house approximately one day in three (dry season) compared with just one day in four for secluded married women. The contrast is reflected in the difference between women of different marital status, i.e. married (secluded until post menopausal) and non-married (i.e. divorced and widowed) women. From the analysis of time use records married women spent an average of 72 minutes a day out of the house (8% of their day), going out an average of 2.7 times a week. Unsecluded widowed women spent a longer 1.5 hours a day[19] on average (10% of their day) outside the compound, going out more frequently (4.2 times a week). In comparison the divorced women appear to be even more strictly secluded spending the least time (almost an hour/day, or 5% of their day) out of the house. But they go out slightly more often (4.7 times/week), although obviously for shorter periods. However, as the figures refer only to three women the sample is not large enough to be representative. But we can suggest an explanation that these three women are likely to be recently divorced and observing *iddah*, the ritual three months after a divorce in which a woman is not free to remarry. Given that *iddah* is a period of waiting to see if pregnancy is present from the abandoned marriage, strict seclusion at this time would

be expected. This would coincide with explanations that seclusion is a means to control women's sexuality.

Thus, it appears many post-menopausal and widowed women who are not secluded go out more than secluded married women, although they do not go out every day. This is because notions of seclusion influence social norms of appropriate gender behaviour, even for non-secluded women. Also the contrast in mobility between secluded and non-secluded women is not greater, because among unsecluded widows mobility varies markedly. Some younger (albeit post-menopausal) and active widows even engage in marketplace trade, hawk goods house to house and travel to urban centres to buy commodities for resale (Chapter 7). They have greater mobility than very elderly and infirm widows who spend their days within the walls of the *gida* being cared for by their relatives.

Age intersects with marital status and life cycle creating differences in women's mobility with age. The mobility of girls before they marry, generally in their early teens,[20] is higher than for any adult women. For adult women mobility appears to decrease with age from marriage in their teenage years through their 20s, 30s and 40s, coinciding with increasing child care responsibilities, until the relative freedom of mobility in post-menopausal years after seclusion (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Women's Mobility by Age

AGE of women	n	Hours per day out of house (Av.)	% of day out of home (Av.)	Times per week go out (Av.)
14-19 years*	37	2.0 hours	13%	3.4
20-29 years	61	1.1 hours	7%	1.8
30-39 years	42	0.8 hours	5%	3.0
40-49 years	19	0.5 hours	3%	2.9
>50 years	30	1.6 hours	10%	4.2

*Below 16 years only young women who are, or who have been married are included.

[19] The time use data is presented here (and in subsequent chapters) in hours and fractions of hours that should not be taken too seriously in terms of accurate portrayals of reality, rather as relative measures useful for comparative purposes.

[20] Average age at marriage is 14 years for the Zarewa women surveyed.

This pattern contradicts expectations (from e.g. Hill 1977:139, Pittin 1988: 269, 270; Schildkrout 1988: 86, Coles 1991: 172, Cooper 1997: xx) that seclusion is strictest for newly married women. However, it fits with suggestions already put forward (Chapter 3) that in the past seclusion was more strictly observed than today. Thus, older women appear to be following behavioural patterns (of less mobility in seclusion) of earlier decades as established when they married.

Women's daily responsibilities also affect whether they go out or not on a particular day. Women in a particular household consumption unit cook in rotation. The data shows that, on days when they are not responsible for cooking women are more likely to go out (3.9 outings/week) and for longer (1.5 hours); than on days when they have to cook meals for their household (2.2 outings/week, av. half an hour/day).

Social status is reflected in spatial terms - the most strictly secluded women in Zarewa are the four wives of the village Sarki. They have the greatest formal status in the community and least spatial freedom, being restricted to the walled confines of their (albeit very extensive) compound. Wives of less important men (perhaps with the exception of those married to Koranic teachers) tend to be less strictly secluded. Overall, seclusion and the patriarchal structure of traditional authority ensures that women remain largely in the hidden female domain. This reflects the gendered and patriarchal nature of traditional Hausa society, based on a male political order.

4.4.3 Children's Mobility Patterns

Data collected for unmarried boys and girls (age 6-15) shows they spend more time engaged in public space activities than they do in the private space of the home. There is a slight gender difference with girls spending nearly twice as much of their days outside the *gida* (av. 66% of day) than inside (av. 34% of day); while boys spend a little more of their day in public space (av. 69% of day). For girls the largest amounts of their time in public space are spent attending school (traditional Koranic school, *makarantar allo*, and primary school) and hawking for secluded women in the streets, house-to-house and even in nearby periodic markets. But the activities that most occupy boys beyond the compound are agriculture, religion and attending school. In

comparison to adult women, whether secluded or unsecluded, children spend much more time beyond their home compounds and go out daily (except when sick). But boys and girls spend less time outside than adult men. Thus children are important go-betweens, connecting male public and female private space.

4.4.4 Transport Modes and Ownership

In addition to gender and age, patterns of spatial divisions and mobility are also shaped in part by differential ownership, access to and use of means of transport. The research revealed that in Zarewa women (on the infrequent occasions they go out) are more likely to walk to places within and beyond the village than men. Women walk to nearby hamlets (up to several kilometres) for ceremonies while men walk only to the fields around the village. Men often go to the fields by bicycle, or motorcycle.




Plate 4.13 Men and bicycles.




Plate 4.14 Men with motorcycle in the street.




Plate 4.15 An Alhaji and his car in Zarewa.

All forms of transport - donkeys, bicycles, motorbikes and vehicles are owned and used almost predominantly by men (Plates 4.13, 4.14, 4.15). On rare occasions women ride on the back of a motorcycle, in a car or a bus. Donkeys are the 'traditional' and oldest form of transport in Hausaland (Hill 1972: 210-1, 226-7, but have been largely displaced by mechanised modes of transport. Now donkeys are few in Zarewa (owned by only 2% households sampled) and are used mainly to carry manure to farms and firewood, or bundles of harvested millet etc. Bicycles are the most common and widely owned (16% households) form of transport with a ratio of 0.7 bicycles to each adult man in the Zarewa households surveyed. Motorbikes have also become more widespread, despite being more expensive than bicycles. In approximately 14% households in Zarewa a man owns a motorbike. A few wealthy men (3.4% households) own motor vehicles, among them are local government officials who have bought cars for their own use and successful businessmen who invest in minibuses as a profitable taxi business.[21] Only 7% households surveyed did not have any means of transport.

Women do not own any means of transport except their feet and have little money to pay for (and in theory need their husband's permission) use of 'public' transport. Clearly there are serious inequalities of opportunity for accessing places and resources where women have little, or no, access to transport. The restrictions on women driving cars, riding bicycles and motorbikes is an extension of the ideology of seclusion that incorporates restriction of women's ability to travel. [22]

4.4.5 Intersections of Gender, Public and Private Space

Although social and physical space in Zarewa can be described as divided into male public space and female private space, intersections of the two arenas occur. The time and space use data presented in this chapter show that women spend little time in

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[21] For example, Alhaji Yakubu in Zarewa is a wealthy man who has three minibuses which his sons run as taxis.

[22] A young man in Zarewa explained to me 'it is forbidden for our women to travel on the back of a motorbike because they would be likely to touch the man driving the motorbike and maybe when they are passing through an isolated area the woman might seduce the man to go off into the bush with her' (paraphrased from memory in field notebook). He did not elaborate whether the situation differed if the

public spaces. In public space men generally ignore secluded married women who merely pass through the streets, usually in groups, veiled, walking rapidly and quietly. Married women passing along streets do not greet, nor are they greeted by men. When men sit in the streets they merely observe women passing, but do not make eye contact, nor comment on women's presence. However, post-menopausal women interact more frequently and easily with men in public, as they spend time more casually in public space - often singly and engage in direct conversation with men outside houses. Girls before marriage relate very freely with men and boys in public - selling items as hawkers and engaging in the lively banter, teasing and cheeky behaviour characterising the relations between young women and men. Men and boys court girls individually in public spaces.

Although the *cikin gida* is predominantly a female realm, it also represents private home space for men even though men spend very little time there. When eating, or resting, in the *gida* (maybe in their private room), men are not generally approached by female household members. Women keep their distance from men at home, remaining engaged in their own activities and conversations elsewhere in the compound. During daytime if a man enters his family compound e.g. to collect farm tools, or to change his clothes, he generally does so without greeting, or speaking to the women there.

4.5 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has focused on how gendered constructions of space and mobility in Zarewa in the early 1990s maintain and reflect unequal gendered power relations; especially as shaped by everyday praxis of gendered power and ideology via seclusion. The above examination of the material structures of space identifies how the practice of wife seclusion shapes male dominated public spaces and female arenas of private space. Some argue that the association of men with public space and hence political power and corresponding feminisation of private, inner and/or domestic spaces associated with nurturing and watchfulness is a universal gender division of

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man were the woman's husband. However, this illustrates the prevailing Hausa construction of female

space with classical, or renaissance, roots (Wigley 1992). The public - private distinction has been debated and critiqued. The distinction can be seen as a false representation because, for example, relations of intimacy are not restricted to the private sphere, and market relations, or the state, have powerful influences on domestic social relations. Nonetheless, I find it a helpful understanding of a division which has helped legitimate and reinforce unequal and gendered patterns of spatial occupation. Duncan (1996: 137) suggests that private spaces are not necessarily spaces of exclusion or oppression. The possibility that for Hausa women their domestic spaces of the *gida* could be, or become, spaces of empowerment, perhaps by being sites of their food processing and trading businesses is pursued in subsequent chapters.

This thesis approaches gender via political economy and this chapter has focused on place as a physical locus and determining structure. Such an approach does not explicitly consider spatial performance as an aspect of gender, although this is an influential idea in much recent work by feminist geographers and other feminist social scientists. However, we could say there is a clear sense that Zarewa women and men do perform their gender identities through the practice of seclusion. Some recent Hausa scholarship (e.g. Cooper 1995: 855) talks of the 'performance' of Hausa women. But such an account, while explaining some of the 'how' of gendered power relations, does not explain much of the 'why'. The materialist approach adopted here, however, sees seclusion as an everyday material practice that acts as a social institution determining gender through constraints on and opportunities for mobility, occupation of space and hence for economic activity. Taking the argument further with a feminist political economic approach we add patriarchy (giving men widespread controlling power over women) and the wider political economy (making withdrawal of female agricultural labour feasible in a relatively prosperous Hausa agrarian peasant economy), as underlying explanations for seclusion. The analysis of seclusion in this chapter illustrates the importance of material spaces as determining structures within that political economy.

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sexuality as uncontrollable and dangerous (a reversal of Western notions).

The story of the processes of degendering/regendering space in Hausaland over time was begun in Chapter 3 and continued in this chapter as the time-space recall records and observations indicate the continued practice of more or less universal wife seclusion. Very little evidence was found for women and men acting up, or against, i.e. subverting, the prevailing norms of seclusion, gender discourse and ideology in practice. Hausa women manipulating seclusion or challenging male control of public space is mentioned by others (e.g. Werthmann 1995, Cooper 1995), but was scarcely observed in Zarewa. It could be argued that the remarkably uniform conformity to seclusion was found because subversion was not explicitly looked for – to do so would perhaps be a fruitful direction for a different study.

The gendered daily spatial practices documented in this chapter demonstrate how the norms of seclusion as practiced in Zarewa in the 1990s construct male and female bodies as 'in' or 'out' of place in particular time-space locations. Broadly speaking, female bodies are 'in' place in the domestic arena, and married secluded female bodies are 'out' of place in markets, mosques and fields. Conversely, male bodies are out of place for much of the time in the *gida*. This broad male public – female private separation is complicated by age, lifecycle, seasonal and other variables as documented above. With albeit limited scope, this chapter shows some particular ways spatial relations come together to make bodies and places in Zarewa, although it not wholly in the vein of the recent upsurge in interest in the body within cultural geography (e.g. Nast & Pile 1998). The chapter privileges embedded material social practices constitutive of particular Hausa bodies in the specific locale of the case study village. In a sense then this is a study of body-place relations, albeit within a feminist, materialist framework. The mobility patterns documented above form a study of bodies that make and are made through the practices and geography of Zarewa – what Foucault would call docile bodies.

A Foucauldian approach provides helpful insights suggesting that the organisation of the house in which certain bodies (mostly female) stop, move, stay and reproduce within a bounded environment differentiated from male public space, expresses and disciplines bodies, confining (or embracing) women and excluding men. Via

seclusion, individual men and women are locked into spatial practices that define and reproduce spatial patterns, gender and power relations. Thus, power is manifested in the set of spatial practices through which Hausa villagers 'learn' and 'take up' their more or less circumscribed places in the world. Crudely speaking men have public sphere power over politics, religion, much of the spaces of the market and agricultural production; while women have private sphere power over the domestic spaces of reproduction, children, food processing and secluded trade.

In the spatial arrangements and material praxis (sets of daily practices) documented above we can identify evidence for Foucauldian notions of power operating through the gaze. Firstly, the synoptic gaze whereby the architectural and spatial organisation of the built environment separates private and public space makes possible constant overview (in daylight at least) of who is in public streets and spaces. Men largely occupy and survey the streets and public spaces through which women pass at certain sanctioned times on appropriate business, veiled and without greeting the men they pass by. The male gaze is kept out of the private female sphere by high compound walls and edicts not to look over those walls. Secondly, the individualising gaze operates via the exhaustive detailed observation of individuals, their behaviour and histories which is feasible in a tight knit densely clustered village like Zarewa with strong interlinked networks of kin, friendship, family, marriage and trade etc. Hence women are almost always at risk of meeting their husbands, male relatives or neighbours if they go out inappropriately, or are found not at home. At the very least this can lead to stares, gossip, comments, embarrassment and shame. Thus, the gaze is ultimately internalised so that women and men surveil themselves to practice seclusion.

This chapter has shown gendered constructions of space and mobility maintaining and reflecting gendered social relations of power. Space in Zarewa has been illustrated to be a means of production and reproduction, as well as a means of control, domination and power. Because space embodies social relations, the following chapters present a spatial analysis of men and women's positions and power status in the gendered divisions of labour within organisation of the processes of production (Chapter 5), reproduction (Chapter 6) and circulation (Chapter 7).

CHAPTER 5

MEN'S PLACE IS IN THE FIELDS?: GENDER, SPACE AND PRODUCTION

> *"Just as there are no purely spatial processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes. Nothing much happens, bar angels dancing, on the head of a pin."*
>
> Doreen Massey (1984: 52)

5.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines gender, space and power relations in the sphere of production activities of women and men in Zarewa. Doreen Massey's quotation above affirms that as a social (economic) process production also has spatial dimensions. We can also expect it to have gendered power dimensions. This chapter tackles the research questions (identified earlier) of 'How is production gendered and spatially organised?', 'What positions of power do women and men occupy in the organisation of production?', 'Does access to income from production empower women, increase their bargaining power, meet their practical or strategic gender needs?', 'Why do men as farmers sacrifice farm labour by secluding women?'.

The opening section introduces the general context of the agricultural economy in terms of intensification and masculinisation of agriculturally-based production over time. The units of analysis - households and their individual members are defined and justified. In the remainder of the chapter the case study data is used to investigate the forms of production and the importance of gender, space and economic power in households' economic production activities. The intersection of space and gender with the production variables outlined in Chapter 2 is examined. The chapter concludes by considering the degree of Hausa women's empowerment in rural production (in relation to the variables identified in Chapter 2).

5.1 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL UNITS

Peasant Agriculture is the major form of production in rural Hausa settlements like Zarewa. In recent decades Hausa peasant farmers have continued to react to changes in local and global markets, generally intensifying agricultural production alongside population growth, transport improvements, bans of food imports and structural adjustment policies. Agrarian intensification has been occurring with effective inorganic fertiliser adoption, legume intercropping, organic manuring, fallow reductions, expanding permanent cultivation and new cash crops, especially maize. The high cash value food crops now grown in Zarewa (maize, chilli peppers, grains and vegetables) have largely replaced colonial cash crops of cotton[1] and groundnuts; significantly reducing demand for women's labour for spinning, weaving and shelling groundnuts. Research on the permanently cultivated soils of the region over a period of more than ten years shows no indication of soil nutrient decline (Mortimore 1994). In prosperous villages at least, agricultural productivity and yields have increased. Zarewa farmers report bigger harvests than their fathers, or grandfathers.[2]

Most of the Hausa households in this study are peasant households with direct access to the means of production, meeting some of their subsistence needs through family labour. Within the organisation of peasant production the family farm and a widespread form of male kin-based co-operation known as *gandu* is the basic productive unit.

Gandu today is a largely male institution[3] as women (in Zarewa at least) generally do not do farm work and do not participate in *gandu* alongside men. Thus, farming is

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[1] Although cotton cultivation is not seen around Zarewa, it is grown around nearby Malumfashi, where three roadside cotton ginning mills, serving large and small-scale farmers, have been established since 1992 (Dr Murray Last pers. comm. 2/12/94). An explanation for recent increases in cotton cultivation lies in increased demand for cheap cloth during the current economic crisis, so the Kaduna textile mills working at capacity need supplies of local cotton. Mechanisation of cotton processing and cloth production has displaced women from these activities and the income derived therefrom.

[2] *'All the grain the farmers produce cannot be eaten by their families alone. If they did not sell any of their harvest they could spend the next two years without farming and have enough to eat'* Malam Hafisu.

[3] But in the past women did belong to *gandu* units. Based on fieldwork in 1949-50 M. G. Smith reports that "Women of the *gandu*... will receive a farm-plot (*gayauna*) if they wish to farm themselves, or by use of employed labour " (1955: 20). According to Polly Hill, elderly informants in Batagarawa

predominantly a masculine production activity operating in male spaces. Women's work in non-farm production activities and household maintenance, as well as men's non-farm occupations and much of children's labour are outside the remit of *gandu*. In discussion of *gandu* women appear only as consumers and dependants reflecting dominant ideology, but not reality (Imam 1993: 40). The absence of women from *gandu* does not mean that women are not producers; in fact the production system is highly gendered involving men and women separately in different stages, processes and places in the production process, as will be shown.

There is, however, speculation of a gradual trend away from *gandu* (and especially large *gandu* units) in Hausaland (Hill 1968, 1972: 55-6; 1977: 125, Shenton & Lennihan 1981: 63, Buntjer 1970, Raynaut 1976). Compared with earlier studies (Watts 1983b: 402, Hill 1972: 170, Goddard 1973: 213, Buntjer 1970: 160) Zarewa appears to have a smaller proportion of *gandu* farming units which suggests a confirmation of earlier findings. However, there is little to indicate that *gandu* is disappearing fast, although the kinds of *gandu* arrangements found in Zarewa are more flexible and less demanding of *gandu* members than previous studies show. *Gandu* continues as an indigenous institution probably because it is proving to be adaptable and viable in the face of the unpredictability and insecurity of the rural political economy within Nigeria's economic crisis.

However, *gandu* units are not used as a focus for the analysis in this thesis because *gandu* involves only the joint productive activity of some of the male household members for part of their time thus, *gandu* excludes women's activities. Instead, the residential unit of the *gida* (pl. *gidaje*) and the individuals within it is selected as a more useful analytical unit. In Hausa the word *gida* has wide meaning referring to house, compound or family. *Gida* can mean the physical structure, as well as the group of people resident in a compound, or even related kin who do not live there, nor share livelihood arrangements. Polly Hill defines the Hausa *gida* in spatial terms as "...a residential compound such that all sections of it are accessible to any resident

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reported women in some areas were in *gandu* with their husbands in the past and more than twenty years ago she reports incidences of women in *gandu* in Niger (Hill 1972: 43, 250).

without going outside" (1974: 120). *Gida* are typically multi-generational and may include non-kin visitors and adopted children.

Choosing the *gida* unit does not ignore *gandu* production units because most *gandu* units roughly correlate with *gidaje*, as *gandu* members usually live together in the same compound with their wives and children, which may or may not be the same as the principal consumption unit. Furthermore, the *gida* was selected as the unit of research because it is the site of daily and generational reproduction. In spatial terms the *gida* is the place where most of female household member's work of production, reproduction and circulation takes place while similarly for male *gida* members it is the 'home base' of their productive, reproductive and circulation activities even if these also involve people outside the *gida*. Additionally, having a tangible physical and spatial identity makes the *gida* and its members a feasible research unit thus it is straightforward to take the residential compound (*gida* pl. *gidaje*) as the de facto Hausa household because of its clear spatial definition.

5.2 SPATIAL AND GENDERED ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION

To identify women's and men's relative positions of power within the sphere of production the gendered and 'spaced' organisation of production in Zarewa is analysed in the main body of this chapter according to the variables identified in Chapter 2: means of production; acquisition of raw materials and means of work; divisions of labour in production; decision making power and control in production; and formation of net income.

5.2.1 Decision Making Power and Control in Production

This section examines the gendered distribution of decision making power and control over choices of production activities (family farm and other income earning activities), the allocation and the transfer of resources (labour, sale of livestock and grain) in production. It should be acknowledged that in reality intra-household decision making is a highly complex process which it would be nigh impossible to capture fully. The questionnaire and structured interview approach (asking male and

female informants how different areas of decision making are gendered) used here has its weaknesses (as already identified in Chapter 2) but even if it produces accounts of norms, these in themselves and the gendered nature of such accounts is informative.

According to the male respondents, 81% of all decisions about household production are made by men alone (Table 5.1, A-F average). The only area in which men acknowledge women to be significant decision makers is control of children's labour for women's trading activities, especially hawking (*talla*). Excluding *talla,* 98% of all household decisions are made by men. From a female perspective the picture of male hegemony over household production decisions is less clear. Women responded that only 67% of the specified household decisions concerning production are made by men alone (Table 5.1, A-E average); or 75% excluding *talla*. Not only do women view women alone as responsible for more decisions than men (24% compared to men's figure of 15%) but they also see that more decisions are made by either men, or women (9% compared to 2%) suggesting that women have greater autonomy than men assume, or would like to think they have. Furthermore, unitary decision making by a male head of household, as suggested by some conceptual models, does not correspond with the evidence presented here.

Table 5.1 Intra-Household Decision Making about Production

HOUSEHOLD DECISION MAKING	Female Respondents (N=44) DECISION MAKERS % of all respondents* (no. of respondents)			Male Respondents (N=31) DECISION MAKERS % of all respondents* (no. of respondents)		
Area of Decision Making in Productive Strategy	Female	Male	Male or Female	Female	Male	Male or Female
A. Family Farm	–	95% (42)	5% (2)	–	100% (31)	–
B. Grain Sales	2% (1)	95% (42)	2% (1)	–	90% (28)	6% (2)
C. Animal Sales	–	93% (41)	7% (3)	–	94% (29)	3% (1)
D. Individual Choice of Own Income Earning Activity	73% (32)	7% (3)	20% (9)	–	97% (30)	–
E. Utilisation of Children's Labour on Family Farm	5% (2)	84% (37)	11% (5)	–	100% (31)	–

* Percentages may not total 100% because non-standard replies are excluded from calculations.

Decision Making in Agricultural Production

Decision making in farming, already suggested to be a major area of male activity, appears not surprisingly to be an area of male control. Generally men choose the crops to be grown and make decisions over the consumption, use, and sale of the products of the land and control any income derived therefrom. In Zarewa 97% men and 91% women agreed that decisions about farm management are made by men only (Table 5.1, A, B, E average). Women's and men's comments during interviews also indicate the dominance (whether normative, or actual) of male decision making in farming (Figure 5.1).

In decision making over agricultural production, the male institution of *gandu* is an important structure. *Gandu* acts as a hierarchical decision making unit in which the male *gandu* head takes basic decisions (e.g. what to plant, times of working, tasks to be performed, disposal of produce) and the other *gandu* members are subordinate. But they often decide what to plant in consultation with the *gandu* head who can impose a veto.

Figure 5.1 Decision Making in Agricultural Production

Female Perspectives

'The husband decides what to plant on the farm - he just comes and tells his wife what he has planted.'

Aishatu Zakari

'It is the husband who decides what to plant in the farm, but sometimes the wife may ask him to plant something she wants and if he sees it may be useful to the family he will plant it.'

Talatu Maimuna

'If the wife decides what to plant on the farm then the harvest will measure only a few tiyas.'

Hajera Uwani

Male Perspectives

'The farm is the mai gida's concern only, so only the mai gida is responsible for selling things from the farm.'

Malam Muazu

'It is the job of the mai gida to buy fertiliser.'

Alhaji Lawal

'The mai gida is responsible for feeding his wives so he can plant what he likes.'

Malam Halilu

Paraphrased from household budget interviews, Zarewa, September 1992

Male *gandu* members are able to exercise decision making over their own farm (*gayauna*), but the *mai gandu* can veto purchase of items like radios, or bicycles with

income from the sale of *gayauna* products although the *gandu* head's right of veto is rarely used (Buntjer 1970: 158). The *gandu* head is rarely dictatorial in decision making. He must consult with other *gandu* members to give them the necessary time off to attend market days, funerals, naming ceremonies and the like. Clearly the *mai gandu* needs to keep peace within the *gandu* unit to sustain its existence (ibid. 159). Buntjer suggests (from his village studies around Zaria) that the father-son authority relation is preferred (paternal *gandu*) to brother-brother authority (fraternal *gandu*), i.e. the exercise of decision making authority is more acceptable to men between different generations, than within the same generation. This may be borne out by the fact that in Zarewa, as well as in other studies, paternal *gandu* is more frequent than fraternal *gandu*.

Having seen that the men and women interviewed in Zarewa responded that the vast majority of decision making over farming is a matter for men only, we go on to look at how men and women have variable access to the means of production.

5.2.2. Ownership, Acquisition and Control of Raw Materials and Means of Agricultural Productive Work

This section outlines how access to and control over the means of agricultural productive work: land, livestock, tools, fertiliser and labour power is gendered.[4]

Gendered Ownership, Acquisition and Control of Land

Land is the basic resource for agricultural production, and therefore a most important means of production in rural Hausaland. The fields cultivated by family or individual farming units, may comprise several fields scattered around Zarewa. All the households (but not necessarily all the adult individual household members) in the sample, except the single female headed household,[5] cultivate land. Like Zarewa, most of rural Hausaland outside the close settled zones does not (yet) suffer from land

[4] Due to an unfortunate oversight, however, the Zarewa survey is somewhat sparse with respect to men's and women's land and livestock ownership.
[5] Cultivation by the single female headed-household is restricted to growing a few vegetables within her compound.

shortages, although almost all the land around Zarewa is now under cultivation (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3).

Scrutinising land as a means of production requires taking account not just of access to land but also its quality. The spatial differences in land quality depending on its micro location are difficult to quantify and measure but the distinction between 'dry' land (*gona*) and wet land, (*fadama*), is well defined. *Fadama* is highly valuable because, unlike cultivation of *gona* land that is wholly rainfed, *fadama* can produce cash crops (e.g. tomatoes, sugarcane) all year as it is low lying and wet.[6] While the poorest households have no *fadama* the most prosperous households and individual male farmers all cultivate *fadama*.

Access to land is acquired under various arrangements in Hausaland including *gado* (inheritance), *aro* (loan), *haya* (rent), purchase, gift and *jingina* (pawn or pledge)[7] (Ega 1984, Lockwood 1994). By and large, land in rural Hausaland is owned and controlled by men. In Zarewa most land used for rainfed cultivation (*gona*) is inherited (reported by 87% male farmers), generally from fathers. Although most male farmers own the land they farm, this is not necessarily the case – 4% male farmers in Zarewa rent, 36% were farming land given to them, i.e. *gayauna* (usually given by *gandu* heads e.g. from father to son). There are often dormant inheritance claims on land - mostly from women. According to Muslim law when a man dies his land and property is shared between his sons and daughters, with daughters' shares half the size of sons' portions.[8] In practice women's legal inheritance rights are often infringed, ignored or denied and frequently women's inherited land is taken over by male relatives, who may have been farming it for some time anyway (Kaduna State Government 1982).[9] Women can sometimes use dormant claims as bargaining power to get income or other assistance from male relatives, or others, who are farming their land. Women may take, or threaten to take, claims to the local alkali (Islamic) court,

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[6] Given its particularly high ecological and economic value the sustainable use of *fadama* in Northern Nigeria has been a focus of researchers (Kolawole et al. 1994).

[7] The Hausa terms for different land tenure arrangements vary regionally - cf. Ross (1987).

[8] But until the 1950s the practice was that women did not inherit land unless there were no male heirs (Ross 1987: 233).

but contesting power relations within families can be very fraught as the following case indicates. One woman in Zarewa had tried to gain control of her inherited land from her brother, who had appropriated it. She commented that had she taken the case to court she would have won back her land, but such action would have caused serious bad feeling within the family and she had concluded that '*...peace is better than a farm*', deciding not to pursue the matter further. This reflects other cases in Africa where women are dissuaded by pursuit of marital stability not to acquire land even if they have the right to it or financial means to do so (Gore 1994: 31 cited in Jackson 1999a: 140).

Land can also be bought outright for cash – 7% male farmers had purchased land. Richer male farmers reported purchasing *gona* land more frequently than poorer male farmers. Particularly if they have more land than they can farm, male and female landowners may loan (*aro*) the use of their land on a seasonal basis for payment (sometimes only a token payment) in cash and/or kind (e.g. portion of harvest). Often, however, women receive little, or no, payment from male farmers (usually relatives) who cultivate their land.

In comparison with dryland, less *fadama* is inherited by male farmers; more is rented, purchased and used on a gift basis. This is because *fadama* is a valuable resource, consequently it is more commoditised and therefore, more involved in transactions to be acquired by male farmers who can afford it in all but the poorest households.

Almost one third (29%) of women surveyed in Zarewa own farmland inherited from their parents, yet only one woman in the sample farmed her own land paying for labourers, seed and fertiliser etc.[10] Another woman rented her land and in all the other cases male relatives (brothers, 'fathers', husbands) were actively farming it and in nearly half the cases did not give them any of the harvest. It has been argued that the

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[9] Also documented by Perchonock (1985) and Imam (1993: 72) who found that only 11% of rural women owned land, compared with more than 50% of men.

[10] These findings echo earlier work in rural Hausaland. For example, Watts (1983b: 404, 432) notes that land ownership by women to be increasing although they do not belong to the agricultural labour force. Earlier Hill (1977: 133) similarly reports that although formerly women sometimes owned slaves

strength of seclusion, i.e. women's non-participation as cultivators and the need to resist excessive land fragmentation, contribute to the tendency for women's land inheritance to be delayed, dormant or de facto ignored, but in situations of need women are more likely to press their inheritance claims (Ross 1987).

Clearly, control of resources of land and space for agricultural production is largely in the hands of men who, being the majority of landowners, also make decisions about buying and selling family farmland. There is not a visible landless population, nor a strata of poor households losing out on land access via household differentiation processes (Lennihan 1988: 119), nor is the rural Hausa economy becoming increasingly polarised between classes of (semi) landless wage labourers and a class of incipient capitalists (Clough 1995). However, we could argue that women as a class systematically are disempowered by having less access to and ownership of land.

Gendered Ownership, Acquisition and Control of Livestock

Most households keep livestock (sheep, goats, chickens, ducks and occasionally pigeons) owned by individual male and female household members. The number and value of households' livestock is lowest for the poorest households. Livestock contribute to household consumption, provision of organic fertiliser as well as being living and growing investments and savings which can be sold and converted to cash when necessary; thus making them crucial to household reproduction and survival. In line with earlier studies we can assume that a large proportion of sheep and goats in rural Hausaland belong to women[11] who keep them after divorce (Hill 1972: 66, 317; Watts 1983b: 406, 433). Bullocks are also working animals belonging to men. They increase farm incomes for male farmers by improving their ploughing efficiency and bringing in income from ploughing for others. Twice a year at Eid festivals, livestock provides meat for celebratory consumption. Women and men may invest in small flocks of sheep and goats that they fatten for profitable sale at Eid.

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who cultivated their farmland but by the early 1970s hardly any women employed farm labourers and if women in Dorayi owned land it was cultivated by others as if it were their own.

[11] The survey data on gendered ownership of small livestock in Zarewa is unfortunately incomplete.

Livestock may be received as gifts, bought at markets or from a neighbour. When chicks, lambs or kids are born they may be eaten, sold or given away. Young people are sometimes given young livestock of their own to care for. Secluded women are not able to buy (or sell) livestock in person at market but do so through male relatives acting as intermediaries.

Although men and women possess their own animals and are able (at least in theory) to make independent decisions about their sale, women's seclusion means they do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy in this respect as men. In the survey 93% of women and 97% of men agreed selling animals was an area of male only decision making[12] (Table 5.1, C). But as most livestock belong to women we may suggest (but cannot be sure) that these responses would seem to reflect ideological beliefs about women's subservience in normative gender roles (or at least how they should be presented to strangers) rather than 'real life'.

Gendered Ownership, Acquisition and Control of Means of Cultivation

Tools and Fertiliser

In addition to land as the main means of production, successful farming requires means of work. As only one woman was found in the Zarewa survey to be farming, it is clear that in general men own tools of agricultural production, which in the case of bullocks,[13] ploughs, fertiliser, *fadama* irrigation pumps and suchlike represent considerable capital investment. Hence there is differentiation between men by wealth/class with respect to ownership of tools of agricultural production. Most hand tools for digging, ploughing and harvesting are made by local blacksmiths, and purchased in Zarewa, or local periodic markets. Tools are bought and owned by individual male farmers and labourers, or by the *mai gandu* for the men who work in

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[12] As Tsaiba Abdulkarim (f) succinctly put it when interviewed '*If the animals belong to a woman she has to tell her husband she wants to sell them and he will take them to market and sell them for her. But a man can sell his own animals and his wife won't even know.*'

[13] Ox ploughs have become a common sight in Hausaland (Plate 5.1), but are a fairly recent investment (Smith et al. 1994: 545). Although a 1930s scheme encouraging Hausa farmers to purchase oxen and ploughing equipment through credit programmes met with some success (where there was a profitable cash crop), as recently as two decades ago, scholars thought bullock ploughs were unviable in this region because of the small area of many fields and the dispersed nature of fragmented land holdings (e.g. Mortimore 1974: 138, Norman et al. 1979: 83).

his *gandu* unit. None of the households in the sample possessed any oxen or ploughs, but hired them from other male village farmers. For tractor ploughing by only the wealthiest farmers the tractor belonging to the local government is hired from Karaye.



Plate 5.1 Men ploughing with bullocks.
(Original source unknown: obtained from Miss Burness OBE)

Purchased inorganic fertiliser has become an important means of production to maintain yields as fallows have been reduced with agricultural intensification (Norman et al. 1982: 45). Fertiliser forms the most expensive purchased input. Farmers face problems of unpredictable, erratic, untimely and insufficient fertiliser availability and high price increases (Appendix I).

All male farmers interviewed reported using chemical fertiliser and will go to great lengths to obtain it.[14] Male farmers in wealthier households, not just bigger households, are able to buy more fertiliser. With respect to gender the trade, purchase,

[14] Similarly, in 1989 fieldwork Smith et al. (1994: 545) found 100% use of chemical fertiliser among farmers in Kano and Kaduna villages.

ownership and use of fertiliser is overwhelmingly masculine. With reference to the spatial aspects of fertiliser use it is used more on 'dry' than *fadama* land.

Most farmers in Zarewa buy inorganic fertiliser from a few male traders in Zarewa who trade in fertiliser. This lucrative income earning (albeit it requiring much capital and being high risk) long distance trade is open to only a few of the wealthiest men in the community. If more secluded women farmed they would find it difficult to access inputs like fertiliser being likely to be dependent on male intermediaries. There is stark differentiation between the genders in access to tools and fertiliser but also significant differentiation between the input-rich wealthy male farmers and the poor farmers who plough by hand, own few old tools and can afford less fertiliser.

Labour

A household's labour resources are primarily the members of that household. Labour is not homogeneous, but differs by age and gender because men and women engage in different areas of productive work and very young and very elderly people make little contribution to production. Households' average labour resources in Zarewa are 10 household members (5.3 female, 4.8 male), 3 being dependants (ages 0-5 or 60+ years) and 7 productive individuals giving an average dependency ratio of 2.4.

Obviously, the largest households have the greatest labour resources, and the smaller households have less family labour at their disposal. The richer households have more male than female members (contributing to their higher output), while the less well-off households have fewer male than female members (corresponding with lower production). Thus, it would appear that the sex ratio within households is an input to household production, rather than an output. The distribution of productive and dependent members is associated with household size. The smallest households have the least productive members relative to dependent members; and the largest wealthiest households have fewer dependants.

As well as using own family resources (especially via *gandu*), male and female farmers also hire labour - mostly male labourers but unsecluded women and girls are

also paid for work at harvesting. Harvest time is when most labour is hired, followed by planting time. Male farmers in the wealthiest households consistently hire labour more than less well-off male farmers. At the other end of the spectrum poorest male farmers depend on family labour for most tasks.

Thus, all strata of male farmers use wage labour, roughly in proportion to their wealth. Although men and women from poorer households are more likely to work as wage labourers, poor male farmers without sufficient household labour and secluded female farmers also often have to employ wage labour. By selling their labour poor farmers may miss the most ideal times for planting, weeding etc. on their own land, thus contributing to their lower output.

Only one unmarried young man in the sample reported doing agricultural labouring (*kwadago*) as an occupation. But a large number of households reported employing labourers for farmwork. An explanation for this seeming disparity may be that agricultural labouring is largely done casually by men who are able, or forced by cash need, to leave their own farms to labour for another farmer. Labouring may also be carried out by what Mustapha (1990) describes as a 'hidden proletariat of '*yan iska*'[15] who are missed by sampling and excluded from analysis because being itinerant young men they do not belong to fixed households. *Almajarai* (Koranic students) may also do farm labour but were not included in the sample because they do not belong to fixed households.

The ability to control and utilise household labour power is a significant factor in the power structures maintaining gender relations. For work in the field male household heads control much of the junior and unmarried male labour time in the household via *gandu*. They also control some of female kin's labour, especially in post-harvest processing. Male farmers may pay for extra farm labour, especially if they are white collar wage earners in the formal sector without time to work in the fields and espousing a higher social status which rejects field work. The *mai gida* is accorded

[15] *'Yan iska* (lit. sons of the wind) describes rootless young men.

extensive control of household labour for agriculture including children's labour (table 5.1, E).

Gender and Means of Production

The analysis above shows that men and women in Zarewa are highly differentiated in terms of their ownership of, access to and control of means of production. There are differences between groups of men as well as among women, e.g. those belonging to relatively richer households have greater productive resources than those in poorer households. The foregoing shows that although by and large men have greater control of productive resources and the spaces of agricultural production and women do not farm, they do exert influence, particularly via land claims and ownership of own livestock.

Although the analysis above gives a 'snapshot' of ownership of means of agricultural production it is a picture that changes over time and follows annual cycles. In the wet season farm production is at its peak and in the dry season off-farm occupations are pursued. For both men and women in Zarewa, trading in various forms is their major non-farm income source (examined in Chapter 7).

5.2.3. Divisions of Labour in Production

Divisions of labour vary with various factors including gender, age, stage in the life cycle, as well as across space and time. This section examines divisions in different areas of productive labour in Zarewa firstly, by gender, age and women's seclusion status. Secondly, by spatial realm and thirdly, as paid or unpaid work. Productive work in Zarewa for men and women is far from solely agricultural but involves animal husbandry, gathering, post-harvest processing, construction, craftwork, and labouring; service provision and the formal sector.

Table 5.2 Divisions of Labour in Production

Unpaid Production	**Activity Sphere**	**Secluded Women**	**Unsecluded Women**	**Unmarried Girls** (<16yrs)	**Men**	**Unmarried Boys** (<16yrs)
Agricultural Work	public	---	---	✓	✓	✓
Animal Care	private	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Gathering	public	---	✓	✓	✓	✓
Food Processing	private	✓	✓	---	---	---
Construction	pub/priv	---	---	---	✓	✓
Handiwork	pub/priv	✓	✓	---	✓	---
Paid production Food Processing	private	✓	✓	---	---	---
Craft Work	pub/priv	✓	✓	---	✓	---
Labouring	public	---	✓	---	✓	---
Paid Services	pub/priv	✓	✓	---	✓	---
White Collar	public	---	---	---	✓	---
		n=177	n=27	n=30	n=286	n=54

Table 5.2 illustrates the work of production and which tasks are performed by different age and gender groups. While there are very clear divisions of labour between men and secluded women, the production tasks performed by unsecluded women are much more similar to those tasks performed by men. Children make important contributions to production.[16]

Labour Divisions in Agriculture

When questioning men and women about their occupations (*sana'o'i*) farming was reported as a completely masculine activity (Plates 5.2, 5.3) (Appendix II). This finding was contrary to expectations from the literature that poorer rural women do farmwork and richer women pay male labourers to work for them.[17] This was not confirmed by the fieldwork in Zarewa - no women reported doing farmwork in the time use recall records. However, in-depth interviews with women revealed that some unsecluded elderly women occasionally do paid farmwork. For example, Mai Koko, a

[16] The significance of children's work for household survival is elaborated in Robson (1996).

[17] In Zarewa there is not really a significant market of female agricultural labour. Other authors report opportunities such as offered by irrigation projects (e.g. Jackson 1981). Selling labour generally has low status and is usually considered only undertaken by poor women (Pittin 1984: 476).

widow in her seventies, harvests beans[18] and peppers, but does not do planting (interview 12/8/93).

Men's time spent in farmwork varies with age, 'class', season and day of the week. Men spend on average about three hours per. day[19] engaged in farmwork, that is nearly 20% of their time, but this fluctuates seasonally between a peak of 30% during the wet season and falls to 6% in the dry season.




Plate 5.2 Farmer with hoe.

[18] She worked 11/8/93 from 11am to 4pm picking beans alone on a farm belonging to a non-relative, for which she was paid ₦8 and given a small container of beans. Where women regularly do farmwork such as planting or picking they are invariably paid less than men (Longhurst 1982: 103, Clough 1986: 26).

[19] The length of the working day varies and is shorter than the waking day (average for men = 16.7 hours, women 15.6 hrs, children 15 hrs).The longest working day is potentially from dawn until dusk i.e. about 12 hours, because people rarely work before dawn (except women who have to cook before dawn in Ramadan) and after dusk (except by some male traders selling from village shops and street tables until around 10-10.30pm).



Plate 5.3 Young men planting maize.

Age is also a factor in how much time men spend on farmwork - men over 50 years do least because some are elderly, infirm and retired; and men in their 20s do most when they are younger and stronger. Farmwork is carried out on all days of the week, but least on Fridays which is the Muslim day of rest when the men gather for community prayers in the afternoon. Wednesdays and Sundays are market days in nearby villages and consequently are days when men do less farmwork.

Boys' contribute to production on the family farm and it is within the remit of a father, or *gandu* head, to appropriate boys' labour for farm work on the *gandu* fields. Girls help a little with very labour intensive tasks like planting, e.g. Baba (aged 12) reported planting groundnuts in the farm from 9am - 1pm (interview 10/6/93). Time use records show that boys are twelve times more likely to report doing agricultural work than girls. Boys appear to do farming work more often as they get older. Although many children do not attend school and are able to work in the fields on any day of the week, figures remain highest for Saturday and Sunday (on average 48% boys reported doing agricultural work on Saturdays and Sundays, but only 30% on other days). Boys in poorer households do more agricultural work than boys in better off households.

The fields surrounding the village are the spaces of agricultural production – the work of which is mostly carried out by men and boys with occasional input from girls or secluded women (Plate 5.4). Thus, fields are masculine spaces where women on the whole, and particularly married, secluded women, do not go. Women generally do not participate in the places and activities of farming (fields) although they carry out post-harvest processing within the homesteads. Some women cultivate vegetables in their compounds for daily cooking use, but not for sale.



Plate 5.4 Men and boys transplanting onion seedlings.

Labour Divisions in Animal Husbandry

From the time use records it appears that adult men and women largely care for the small livestock kept within compounds. Children did not record any time spent on animal care. However, children were observed at adult's bidding feeding sheep/goats, rounding up chickens and so on. Generally, very little time is required to feed and water animals, ensure sheep and goats are tied up, and chickens, ducks and pigeons are shut up at night. The only larger amounts of time spent on animal care are by the few men who own bullocks which require greater care as working animals. While women care for animals in private domestic space, men and boys sometimes collect

fodder for household animals from public space - the fields, or uncultivated bushland. Boys, especially *almajarai* (Koranic pupils), collect grass for livestock for small payment of a few kobo and men often bring bundles of grass as fodder from their farms (Plate 5.5).



Plate 5.5 Farmer collecting grass for sheep and goats kept in the compound.

Labour Divisions in Gathering

Gathering activities utilise outdoor public space and as sources of income are largely the preserve of men and small numbers of unsecluded women who gather (and sell) products from the land. Collecting honey and henna (*lalle*) were reported exclusively by men; firewood exclusively by women; and *zogale* and baobab leaves (*kuka*) by both men and women. Gathering is a low status and low profit activity. Twice as many men (8) than women (4) reported gathering occupations. But these figures exclude occasional gathering by women when a particular medicinal plant is needed; nor does it include the regular gathering of firewood by men for household needs. More usually men do not strictly gather firewood from the 'bush', but carry home bundles of dried guineacorn, millet and maize stalks from stacks remaining in the fields after harvest. Children, especially girls, spend more time gathering (especially firewood) on average than adults.

Labour Divisions in Food Processing

The post-harvest processing of farm products is largely women's work. With the exception of drying peppers men were not observed food processing, nor did they report food processing as economic occupations. This is confirmed by time use figures in which men do not spend any time food processing for the household. Women's labour is crucial to this part of agricultural production carried out largely unpaid for household purposes (Plate 5.6), or for very low remuneration. The work of processing agricultural products includes shelling groundnuts, husking rice, threshing, winnowing and pounding millet, guineacorn, and sorghum; drying and shelling maize and beans; drying okra and peppers.

Women spend an average of nearly half an hour/day on food processing for the household. This figure varies seasonally being highest during Ramadan when special meals and foods are prepared to break fasting each day. Women cook on a rotational basis with their co-wives. On their cooking day they spend marginally more time food processing than on days when they are not cooking, but may still help other women. Secluded married women recorded more time household food processing than unsecluded divorced and widowed women. There are no patterns of variation across household group. Girls, but not boys, also assist with household food processing tasks.

As income earning activities some women also process locust beans into *daddawa*, groundnuts into oil (*mai gyada*) and pressed ground cakes (*kuli-kuli*). Food processing activities were reported by 21% of women as work done regularly (or seasonally) as an income source (*sana'a*) (Appendix II). More women in better off households than in poorer households report food processing as an income earning activity. For household use women pound grain without payment, but poor women may pound for wealthier households for remuneration (*surfe*). The kind of woman doing most paid post-harvest processing is most likely to be unsecluded, widowed or divorced, and aged in her 60s. But agricultural processing as an income source belongs to women of all household groups, ages, marital and seclusion statuses. Children do not report

contributing to paid food processing. Women spend more time on agricultural processing as a paid activity than unpaid for the household. Paid agricultural processing varies seasonally, being highest during the wet season. Secluded women do less agricultural processing than unsecluded women and on those days women are not responsible for cooking they do more than when they have to cook.




Plate 5.6 Women pounding grain.

Spatially agricultural processing is usually done in the domestic sphere, i.e. inside the *gida*, but sometimes threshing and winnowing are done just outside the compound entrance where there the chaff can blow away. In large households processing a

particular harvest can take several days of intensive work requiring all available household labour.[20]

Labour Divisions in Construction

Men build and repair their own houses. House building is also a (mainly) dry season commercial activity for a few men who belong to families of builders (just one man in the sample) and others who work as building labourers. Builders are employed by those who can afford it and who lack the skill, time, or inclination to construct or repair their own houses. Men spend more time on construction activities, during the dry season. Boys (but not girls) also help in construction activities. Women do not participate in construction, but often paint the inside of their rooms before sallah (Eid-el-Fitr) at the end of Ramadan.

Labour Divisions in Craft work

Men's and women's craftwork remains part of the production base today in post-colonial rural Hausaland. 'Traditional' craft production, by women and men, e.g. spinning, thatching, weaving, dyeing are much diminished since colonial times. Since Independence dyepits have virtually been abandoned across Kano State (Shea 1975: 175, 217). Their remnants are barely visible in Zarewa (Map 2.4) since dyeing was all but abandoned in the village in the 1970s.[21] During lifestory interviews men recounted how they used to weave, but many stopped in the 1960s – 70s when it became less profitable. Now there are just a few old men who still weave in Zarewa during the dry season (Plate 5.7).

In Zarewa of the 1990s spinning, tailoring, knitting, and weaving were recorded by only 9% of women as income earning activities they engaged in (Appendix II). Tailoring is only possible for those in wealthier households able to afford a sewing machine. Women carry out all their craft activities at home within the compound;

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[20] An illustrative case is Alh. Yahaya, a big farmer with three wives, whose 1992 maize harvest was 100 sacks. Shelling the maize was done in July 1993 after the dried maize cobs had been stored (in two locked storerooms) until prices climbed. For 3-4 days women worked shelling the maize by hand. The sons filled the bags and sewed them closed. Alh. Yahaya paid the women ₦8 per sack of shelled maize, each receiving ₦200 in total (Interview Alh. Yahaya 13/8/93. Conversation with his wives 4/8/93).

[21] Interviews with Malam Sanusi (m).

more in the dry season and less in the wet season. Craft activities are engaged in to a greater extent by women in poorer households than by women belonging to wealthier households. Reproductive burdens also dictate the time available for craft activities - on their non-cooking days women record more time doing craftwork, than on the days they are responsible for household meal preparation.




Plate 5.7 In Zarewa a few elderly men still continue traditional Hausa weaving.

Seclusion status is also a determining factor of women's engagement in craftwork - unlike secluded women, unsecluded women do not report doing craftwork. Age and lifecycle also differentiate between women - women early in their married life do least craft activities, more as they get older, most at the end of their childbearing years, but less in old age. Children did not record engaging in any craft activities.

Men's productive craft activities include 'traditional' occupations of hand embroidery (Plates 5.8, 5.9), leather work (Plate 5.10), tailoring (Plate 5.11), and weaving,

recorded as regular income earning activities by 7% of men in the sample (Appendix II).




Plate 5.8 Young man embroidering a cap.



Plate 5.9 Men and boy wearing hand-embroidered caps and gowns.




Plate 5.10 Male tailors at their sewing machines in Zarewa



Plate 5.11 Zarewa leatherworker.

With a saddle he made (when horses used to be ridden for transport).

In the village there is also at least one calabash decorator (male), and a compound where blacksmiths make and repair tools. On average men spend less time than women doing craft activities. In the wet season when farm work is demanding men spend negligible time on craft activities, but do more craftwork in the dry season and especially Ramadan. For men as well as women, pursuing crafts is associated with the less well off. An indication that craft activities may be declining is the fact that men over 70 years of age reported doing the most craft work. Younger men are generally not learning and practising traditional crafts like weaving.

Cap embroidery remains a thriving Hausa craft. However, there appears to have been a shift in the gendering of cap embroidery, or there are possibly regional differences. Cap embroidery has been documented as carried out by women in both rural and urban areas (Konan 1975: 15; Pokrant 1982: 116; Schildkrout 1981a: 88). But in Zarewa only young men were found embroidering caps. We may speculate that possibly as other craft opportunities dwindled, men displaced women from this lucrative activity; further reducing women's income earning opportunities.

The most common place for men sit to carry out their craft work is outside the compound in the public street. Or they may have an area along the outside of their compound which is cemented, or even roofed over. Some men have a room opening onto the street (*shago* or *kanti*) where they work. In contrast, women carry out their craft activities privately within the home.

Labour Divisions in Services

The only paid service women record as an occupation is hair plaiting, reported by 4% of women (Appendix II). Women and girls come to their home to have their hair plaited, especially before the annual Muslim festivals. In comparison, men perform more service activities and spend more time on them; most in the dry season and least in the wet season when farming demands are highest. About 17% men report a range of 15 different activities which they do on a paid basis, the most common being butchering, Koranic teaching, and work as a market middleman to sell grain (*awo*). Men in wealthiest households report no paid service work and those belonging to the

poorest households do most. Men's paid service work is performed in public spaces - in markets (e.g. butchering, *awo*) streets (e.g. barber), workshops (e.g. carpenter, radio/bicycle repair, ironing), or where needed (e.g. ward head, driver).

Formal Sector Labour Divisions

Only a small number (6) of men sampled who have formal education and paper qualifications do paid formal sector work outside the household production unit. Little of this waged employment is located in the village (a teacher), but is mostly in Kano (2 civil servants, a nurse and a typist) and the local government headquarters at Karaye (1 case), i.e. it is in a different, distant and mostly urban, location. Rural women are excluded from formal sector employment through seclusion, lack of mobility and, like most men, inadequate formal education. However, at least one woman in the sample had attended secondary school and another completed her education at Zaria Women Teachers College. Being married and secluded in a rural area, however, she is unlikely ever to teach anyone other than her own children.

Space, Gender and Productive Labouring

The gender and spatial divisions of labour in production show paid and unpaid productive activities are carried out in both public and private spheres. But there is not a simple, straightforward division of women carrying out productive activities in private space of the *gida* and men doing production in public spaces - the fields, streets and open spaces (Table 5.3). Although there is a strong degree of male domination of productive activities, with men predominantly involved in public production especially farming in public space outside the home, men and boys also do some productive work in private spaces e.g. contributing to animal care.

For women the life course and also their status of seclusion, or non-seclusion, determines the spatial location of their productive activities. Secluded women's non-farm productive activities are those which can be carried out from within the private space of the domestic realm. Unsecluded women, however, have greater mobility and do take part, albeit in a limited way, in public sphere productive work. Children, both girls and boys, contribute to the work of production in public and private spaces.

Thus, it is shown that divisions of labour are largely determined by customary institutions and non-market factors including gender, seclusion, age and marital status.

Table 5.3 Labour Divisions in Productive Work

PUBLIC	**PAID**	men	✓
		secluded women	---
		unsecluded women	✓
		girls	✓
		boys	✓
	UNPAID	men	✓
		secluded women	---
		unsecluded women	✓
		girls	✓
		boys	✓
PRIVATE	**PAID**	men	✓
		secluded women	✓
		unsecluded women	✓
		girls	---
		boys	---
	UNPAID	men	✓
		secluded women	✓
		unsecluded women	✓
		girls	✓
		boys	✓

5.3 FORMATION OF NET INCOME

In this section firstly the sources and secondly the levels of men's and women's incomes are considered. The preceding discussion of labour divisions illustrate that despite their 'invisibility' in public space, secluded women actively participate in production. The practice of Islam, although it affects mobility, does not bar women from earning money and in Hausaland, "...women's economic activities are mainly carried on independently of their husbands: their produce is their own to dispose of, and any loans made to their husbands are recoverable in court" (Hill 1972: 334).

The income of Hausa households comes from various sources; home production, as well as trading and white collar waged work. The income earning activities engaged

in are very diverse for women and men (Table 5.4). Income sources are gendered reflecting the gender divisions of labour. All female activities include paid agricultural processing and sale of food. Farming and formal employment are wholly male activities; while both women and men are traders and pursue craft/artisan occupations.

Table 5.4 Income Earning Productive Activities by Gender

ACTIVITY	Women		Men	
	n	%*	n	%*
Farming	0	0%	120	89%
Agricultural Processing	47	35%	0	0%
Trading	60	45%	45	33%
Sale of Cooked Food	52	39%	0	0%
Craft/ Artisan Activity	16	12%	23	17%
Formal Employment	0	0%	6	4%

* Totalled percentages exceed 100 because categories are not mutually exclusive

Men and women largely agree that participating in non-farm production activities is a matter of personal choice (Table 5.1, D). Both women and men reported having autonomy to decide how they earn money (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2 Choice of Non-Farm Production Activities

Female Perspectives

'*Sometimes the husband decides, sometimes the wife.*' Habiba Mairo

'*If a woman is sitting idle her husband may tell her to do sana'a.*' Maimuna Lahadi

'*If a woman has money she will use it to do sana'a, if she doesn't have money the husband will help her if he has money.*' Hadiza Sadiku

Male Perspectives

'*A man decides for himself if, and how, he earns money.*' Malam Isa

'*Everybody will find his own way to get money.*' Malam Haruna

'*The mai gida will do his own sana'a and the uwar gida also.*' Malam Ibrahim Muazu

'*Wives decide what sana'a they do. A few men don't allow their wives to do sana'a.*' Malam Tijani

Figure 5.2 illustrates that although women generally choose their own income earning activities, they are not always able to decide for themselves in every situation as husbands may not allow them or they may lack start up capital. Within the sample 73% women cited themselves, 7% their husbands and 20% either, as primary decision maker about if, and how, they earn money (Table 5.1, D) which makes this a significant area of potentially empowering autonomy for women.

Not only do men and women engage (in part) in different income earning activities, but from findings elsewhere among the Hausa peasantry (e.g. Hill 1972, Mustapha 1990) it would be expected that Zarewa women and men combine multiple occupations not just as response to the seasonal nature of farming, but to increase economic security in an unstable and unpredictable financial climate.[22] The majority of men and women in Zarewa do have multiple occupations, combining productive strategies and activities in different and gendered ways (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Adults' Multiple Income Earning Occupations

No. Income Earning Activities	Women		Men	
	n	%	n	%
None	14	10%	2	1.5%
One	77	57%	58	43%
Two	29	22%	72	53%
Three	12	9%	3	2%
Four	0	0%	2	1.5%
Sample Totals	**132**	**100%**	**137**	**100%**

The proportion of adults with income sources is high for both men and women, indicating the high levels of necessity, opportunities for and socio-cultural acceptability of, income earning. The social requirement for gifts at births, deaths and weddings means almost all men and women need to earn at least a little income. As many as 98% of men, and 90% women, engage in at least one activity that provides income (Table 5.5). Many women (33%) and even more men (55%) combine two, or more, activities. However, the proportion of women with no income earning activity is greater than the proportion of men.

The largest group of men are those with two income earning activities i.e. farming and another activity. But the largest group of women reported just a single source of income. The maximum number of combined activities reported by men is four. Women also appear to be able, or forced to, juggle up to three different income earning activities as well as reproductive labour. One way women and men manage multiple occupations is through seasonal patterns of activities which reduces conflicting time demands. Women tend to have more complex and varied activity

[22] For other non-peasant Nigerian households multiple modes of ensuring livelihoods are a more recent

combinations than men. The combinations of activities reported by men and women represent a snapshot because adults frequently change the number and combination of their activities in response to personal circumstances (e.g. availability of time, money or other inputs), seasonal changes (e.g. seasonal availability of agricultural products for processing, selling or cooking) and other circumstances including external factors (e.g. price changes).

Life cycle stage affects income earning opportunities for men and women. Generally adult men are income earners, primarily by farming (often combined with trading or craft/artisanal work), until they become elderly and are no longer capable of working. The two men (2%) in the sample who reported they had no money earning occupation were both elderly and had effectively 'retired' (i.e. were dependants). But wealthier elderly men who no longer work may have established profitable income sources through sons farming in *gandu* and have invested in property, or capital, such as grinding machines and motor transport.[23] The fourteen women (10%) who do not engage in any income earning activity fall into several categories. First, those who are too elderly; secondly, those who are newly married who according to Hausa culture are not permitted to work either on their own account to earn money (*sana'a*), or to do general household work.[24] Secondly, some women are fully occupied with reproductive burdens looking after children and managing domestic duties, so that even if their husbands permit them to engage in income earning they simply do not have the time. Other women have no children to hawk goods for them. Thus, while men's first call on their time is to be involved in productive activities and to earn money, before a woman can engage in income earning she is first responsible for fulfilling her duties of domestic reproduction (discussed in detail in Chapter 6).

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survival strategy turned to under economic structural adjustment policies (Mustapha 1991).

[23] For example, Alh. Yahaya is an older man in Zarewa who no longer farms or works himself, but his sons run his three minibus taxis and a commercial grinding machine (interviews 21/7/93, 13/8/93).

[24] Polly Hill vividly describes the position of newly married women who are restricted from working in the home and from earning money:

> "A young wife has few domestic duties; her secluded life is tedious, the other women in the house treating her almost as though she were an invalid, so that she is likely to spend a large part of the day lying on her bed. Such a state of affairs may continue for some years until the wife is old enough to give birth, and as a young mother she will continue to have few duties" (1977: 139).

A striking feature of the way adults combine income earning occupations is firstly the large range of different activity combinations. Secondly, the way that most combinations are quite gender specific stands out, e.g. only men combine farming and trading, but only women combine trading with sale of cooked food. A further feature of the activity combinations is individuals' efforts to attain uniqueness and difference in their economic behaviour, i.e. these tiny firms strive for diversity.

Income formation is further gendered in terms of the stability and levels of earnings. Women's incomes are less stable than men's, because women tend to change their income earning activities frequently according to inclination, circumstances, or economic climate. For example, women may discontinue food selling (hence foregoing income) during absences to visit relatives; or at times when incapacitated by illness, or childbirth; or child labour for hawking goods may be periodically unavailable. Seasonal and economic variations also contribute to the instability of women's income earning including unreliability in the supply of raw materials such as certain fruits, leaves, or vegetables. The price of inputs at certain times may force a woman to discontinue a particular activity, for example, women cease making groundnut oil (*mai gyada*) and groundnut cakes (*kuli-kuli*) when the price of groundnuts is high. Other seasonal factors such as the weather (e.g. heavy rain may prevent street hawking) and changes in the levels of trade with the availability of seasonal foods are additional factors contributing to the unreliability of women's incomes. Women commented on this instability of income frequently during interviews. It is examined further in Chapter 7 (section 7.2.1).

There are also spatial dimensions shaping opportunities for income earning activities for women especially in Zarewa. Trading and hawking, particularly by women, are most successful in large compounds and busy streets. This favours women living in the central wards of Zarewa. Those on the edge of the village, or in the newer ward of Fegi (beyond the traditional village boundary) are more likely to be in a small nuclear compound in an area lacking the bustle and high level of street and house-to-house hawking of the village centre. Fegi streets are wide, empty and hot with few comfortable shade trees where hawkers and customers can gather. This means

secluded women in Fegi find fewer visitors coming into the house selling things and are less likely to have a thriving secluded occupation that depends on hawking. Fegi is generally not a well serviced area with no gatherings of male traders, or child hawkers at street corners and no commercial grinding machine. Thus, spatially marginalised women in terms of peripheral spatial location are also economically disempowered by virtue of their position in the village spaces.

A striking feature of the income data from the household budget survey is women's lower cash incomes than men (Table 5.6). However, the difficulties surrounding the data collection should be noted. Income and expenditure data is sensitive and accurate recall is difficult. When questioned about the net returns from their income earning activities women explained it is impossible to give accurate estimates because they do not actually make a financial gain every day and cash income may be spent on immediate needs, making profits a foreign concept.[25] Often profits are non-existent because risk renders profit margins very small. Furthermore, financial profit may not be the only, or most significant, motivation for trading. Such difficulties encountered during the survey illustrate the highly problematic nature of applying capitalist concepts such as 'profit' to peasant economic activities. They also suggest we should treat the figures as indicative (at least of what informants were willing to tell strangers) rather than wholly accurate and realistic.

The household budget survey indicates men's average total cash incomes are many times higher and more variable than women's incomes (Table 5.6). Perhaps surprisingly, the biggest component of men's income comes from off farm activities, despite farming being the major male occupation and underpinning the rural economy it is not the most important source of male prosperity as measured by net income. Taking women's and men's total net earnings from non-farm activities, averages for all men and women in the sample (earners and non-earners) show men's net non-farm incomes are 6.3 times greater than women's. Men's non-farm incomes also vary across a greater range than men's farm incomes and women's incomes.

[25] Generally, however traders may be able to recall their recent cash income and exenditure.

Table 5.6 Average Annual Adult Incomes

	WOMEN'S' INCOME	MEN'S' INCOME	
		Farm	Off-farm
Averages	₦2,075 (net)	₦9,940 (gross) ₦5,448 (net)	₦13,127 (net)
Range	₦0 to ₦14,256 (net)	₦0 to ₦88,100 (gross)	₦0 to ₦420,000 (net)
Standard Deviation	₦2,894	₦15,800	₦75,446
N	51 women	40 men	

While women across different household groups have similar income levels, men in better-off households have higher incomes than men in poorer households. Across household groups inequalities in men's agricultural earnings are greater than inequalities across household groups in off-farm earnings.[26] Across the households sampled, on average women earn 10% of the total household income,[27] (from both farming and non-farming sources). Recent comparative data is only available for urban areas.[28] Compared with urban Hausa women, peasant women's contributions to overall household incomes appear slightly lower. Although women's actual income levels across households are about equal in poorer households women's earnings form about 16% of total household income, but only 8% in richer households. This suggests that women's incomes are more significant to overall household survival in poorer households and possibly give such women greater bargaining leverage than women earning similar amounts in wealthier households where their income is less significant. The origins of women's low incomes compared with men are examined by detailed scrutiny of men's and women's trading activities in Chapter 7.

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[26] This finding contradicts Gavin Williams' suggestion that inequalities in off-farm earnings exceed inequalities in farm incomes (1988: 30). But it should be noted that the Zarewa data is based only on a small sample of villagers and it is known that there are a few households outside the sample with very high off-farm earnings, for example, from fertiliser and taxi businesses.

[27] The net total household income is calculated as the sum of net income of all adult men and women in the household, but in reality there is no real practice of a 'common purse', and no common household pool of income. Rather, there are individual income and expenditure strands.

[28] For Kano City households, women's contributions to household incomes are put as high as one third by Frishman (1991). Coles (1991: 190) is more cautious about giving firm figures for urban households in Kaduna, but reports knowledge of some households where women's contributions to the family budget are in the region of 25 - 50%. Her research in Kaduna in the late 1980s reveals women's incomes to be of growing importance for Hausa households in difficult economic times. With rising prices and increasing male unemployment women's incomes become of greater significance to household survival. This appears to be less the case for rural peasant households which are self-

Not only are men perceived as household providers and have considerably greater cash incomes and expenditure than women, they are also more likely to have cash savings than women. Savings institutions are gendered in rural Hausaland. Nearly one quarter (22.5%) of men in the household budget survey have bank accounts with balances in the range ₦10 - ₦7,222 (average ₦1,585).[29] Women are much less likely to hold and use a bank account (only one woman in the sample had a bank account[30]), but are more likely to participate in rotating credit groups (*adashe*). When surveyed just 7.5% of men (3 cases), but 27% women participated in *adashe* groups which are organised around daily, weekly, or monthly contributions (ranging from ₦1 daily to ₦28 monthly for women; ₦20 weekly to ₦200 monthly for men).[31] Expectations were that most women would belong to *adashe* savings groups like Hill's findings (1969a: 402) of 80% women in at least one *adashe* group. But Zarewa women's participation in *adashe* was much lower. Reasons for this are considered further in Chapter 7.

Men would appear to occupy stronger positions for earning income than women because, in contrast to women, they possess, control and have access to most of the useful productive resources available - land, tools, fertiliser and labour. Therefore, it is not surprising that men have higher incomes than women. However, differences exist not only between men and women, but also within the gender groups. A small proportion of men and women have no incomes being therefore, economic dependants with low economic status.

5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter dealt with the embeddedness in space and gender of rural production in Zarewa. The chapter dealt with the highly gendered organisation of production in terms of access to the means of production, divisions of labour and decision making.

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provisioning to a greater extent and for whom structural adjustment policies have brought some positive aspects, notably higher selling prices for agricultural produce (Mustapha 1991: 16).

[29] Overall, most of the account holders at the Zarewa branch of the Nigeria-Arab Bank are male.

[30] Perhaps an unusual case - being young and newly divorced it is possible that her bank account containing ₦800 belongs to the divorce settlement.

[31] It is possible that more women do not participate in *adashe* because it can be a source of conflict if members default - one women commented during an interview that her reason for not doing *adashe* was because 'they only bring fights and trouble'.

Women (especially when secluded) are shown to be generally excluded from farming - a major source of commodities for consumption and circulation. Decline in craft production has reduced income opportunities, especially for women. Less remunerative production opportunities open to women are mostly conducted within the *gida*. Women earn less than men. The weak economic power position of women is thus both an input to and an outcome of the processes of production.

The intensification of food cash crop production would appear to reinforce existing gender divisions of labour. As field labour requirements have increased, they have not been met by women coming out of seclusion, but by natural population increase, male labour and mechanisation: adoption of ox ploughing and tractors, for the wealthiest farmers. Cultivating food cash crops provides post-harvest processing work for women that can be carried out within the compound, e.g. maize husking. Thus, rural prosperity is sustaining wife seclusion. This leads us to answer the question of why men as farmers and *gandu* heads sacrifice women's farm labour. We know men gain status and prestige from their wives being secluded (as examined in Chapter 1). Agricultural intensification and increased profitability make this possible. We can also speculate that women are being squeezed out of farming and losing access to land partly as land availability becomes scarcer with increasing population. Although inheritance of land gives women bargaining power it would also be expected to improve their fall-back positions in both marital and natal homes.

The material in this chapter leads to several answers to the question of how gendered space intersects with production. Hausa women are subordinated, rather than empowered in rural production because although they work as agricultural processors, and although they have some independent earnings they do not have the same level of access to resources, opportunities for profitable activities and decision making as men do. With respect to how gender and space intersects with production men control the major productive activities, and men control space, especially public agricultural production spaces. Their control of this space is an aspect of the expression of power.

Secondly, gender divisions with respect to paid and unpaid work are revealed to be such that men are involved in waged work and women do unvalorised, unpaid work. It is men who dominate the small formal wage-work sector (mostly local government and public sector). Overall, men have higher incomes than women derived from agricultural and substantial off-farm activity. In contrast most women appear to perform productive work for very low wages, for low net returns, or unpaid (as in the case of agricultural processing for household use). There is little variation in women's lower incomes across households.

Thirdly, in relation to the central hypothesis of the thesis about empowerment for women via income earning this chapter shows that women's opportunities to earn income operate within the restrictions of seclusion. The socially constructed gender divisions of labour which restrict women largely to activities which they can carry out from within the compound generate only small incomes (echoing Longhurst's (1980: 60) earlier findings). However, non-secluded women do not appear radically more powerful in production for they too have limited access to labour, land and other resources (as Jackson 1981: 226) concluded). This chapter does not tell the whole story and we must first examine women's and men's reproductive work and trading in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

CHAPTER 6

WOMEN'S PLACE IS IN THE HOME?: GENDER, SPACE AND REPRODUCTION

"The village had an air of being industrious and yet nothing seemed to change. Was there something African in the way that all this energy and motion left no trace? Women carried firewood; big girls carried small children or else buckets of water; boys played or hoed the rows of corn; men squatted in groups, muttering and smoking pipes. Food was grown and cooked and eaten. Firewood was burnt. The buckets of water were emptied. The people were sustained, and the achievement of the work was that life continued. All this effort was to hang on to life and remain the same."

Paul Theroux (1994: 149)

6.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the intersection of gender and space in the work of reproduction. The ways peasant Hausa households and individuals 'hang on to life' (i.e. reproduce) and prosper are the focus of the investigation by means of an enquiry into women's and men's positions of power in the organisation of social reproduction. This is achieved (within the limitations of the available data) through analysis of variables characterising reproduction (identified in Chapter 2) in order to examine the disposal of farm product, the acquisition of the means of consumption (food and income) and reproductive work, the divisions of labour and decision making, the disposal of net income. The data analysed in this chapter were gathered in surveys of household members, budgets, decision-making, and time use (as detailed in Chapter 2). The central questions related to seclusion asked are 'Whether/how seclusion shifts domestic labour to men', and 'Whether seclusion is a way men control women's sexuality'. The overall question 'Whether women are empowered within the sphere of reproduction in rural Hausaland' is considered in the chapter's conclusions.


6.1 DISPOSAL OF FARM PRODUCT FOR REPRODUCTIVE USE

In this section the gendered control of various household farm products used for reproduction are described in order to compare women's/men's power/empowerment with the Hausa gender norm that married men are responsible for meeting the food

needs of their household members.

The ratio of cash to food crops grown by male farmers[1] across the surveyed households in Zarewa is roughly similar (Figure 6.1). Chilli peppers, are the most significant cash crop forming about 19% (by volume) of agricultural production, followed by various food crops of grains, groundnuts and beans. Vegetables including cassava, okra, sweet potatoes, *yalo* (a bitter tomato) and kokoyams are also grown in small amounts for household culinary use and the occasional sale of surplus.[2]


Figure 6.1 Agricultural Crops (by volume: sacks)



The average across all households is that 23% of food crops are sold and 77% retained, with the poorest households retaining the greatest proportions (88%) of food crops for subsistence and wealthier households retaining less (63%). Apart from peppers, households retain on average over half of all other crops for household use (Figure 6.2).

[1] As only one woman was found actively farming in the surveyed households generalisations cannot be made about crops female farmers grow.
[2] The production of minor vegetable crops is difficult to estimate because, vegetables are not harvested at one time, nor in 'standard' units.

Figure 6.2 Disposal of Agricultural Products



In line with Hausa expectations of normative gender roles the disposal of agricultural products between household consumption and market sale is a matter for individual male farmers and *gandu* heads. The income obtained thereby forms a major part of male income (as detailed in Chapter 5) making big farmers very powerful men. Women have little, if any, power over the disposal of farm products except in the rare case of female farmers. Although this is a change from the not too distant past when fewer women were secluded and more married women farmed (Chapter 3).

6.2 THE MEANS OF CONSUMPTION: HOUSEHOLD FOOD AND INCOME RESOURCES

The means of consumption comprise available food plus income for purchasing other means of reproduction which (according to expectations) Hausa men should provide for their families. This section asks whether this expectation is met. The means of consumption are crucial to household members' well-being and nutritional status. On average the households surveyed produce 0.77 sacks of pepper (cash crop) and 4.29 sacks of food crops per household member.[3] Food crops retained for consumption average 2.8 sacks per capita (p.c.), equivalent to 262kg p.c., or 2512 calories p.c. per

[3] Because women and children provide little direct labour in agricultural production these figures largely reflect production by men of the households.

day.[4] Unfortunately collection of actual data of consumption by men, women and children was beyond the remit of this study.

There is variation among households, but based on an average per capita consumption need (in a mixed population of women, men and children) of 164 kg/year (Hill 1977: 117-38) all households appear to be self-sufficient in grain. With a higher estimate of average grain needs of 218 kg/year (Amerena 1982: 153 cited in Mortimore 1993: 385) then the poorer Zarewa households would appear deficient in grain production. Whatever the precise level of sufficiency the degree of differentiation between household groups remains large; in other words men in poorer households have less power to meet their household food needs by direct production. So these households may suffer food shortages and/or household members (men and maybe even women) are forced to try and meet household food needs by other income earning activities.

In addition to food production, livestock are a subsidiary means of consumption. Net incomes potentially available for reproductive consumption are given in Chapter 5 and income disposal including expenditure on reproductive needs is examined later in this chapter. Agricultural production, livestock rearing and income are the means of consumption available to rural Hausa men, women and their households. As already illustrated, most agricultural products are produced by men. Women contribute more to livestock rearing, but earn smaller incomes than men. Own food and livestock production as means of consumption vary across households. Wealthier households have greater subsistence production than poorer households, and hence greater power to meet their reproductive needs, but many households also purchase food.

Most food purchases are made either in Zarewa, or at nearby weekly periodic markets. About 44% of households surveyed appear to be self sufficient in grain and do not report grain purchases, but just over half the households (56%) report some grain purchases. Food purchasing is a gendered activity. Purchasing grain and other food items for household consumption is male dominated in line with the ideological expectations that men are providers (Table 6.1). A quarter of all men bought grain in

[4] Conversion factors: 1 sack = 40 *tiyas*, 1 *tiya* = 2.34 kg, 1kg grain = 3500 calories

the week previous to the survey (conducted in Sept. 1992).[5]

Table 6.1 Gendered Food Purchasing Patterns

% men/ women reporting purchase of particular food items	Women	Men
Grain	23%	66%
Vegetables	33%	55%
Other daily food items e.g. oil & seasoning	80%	90%
All food items	86%	100%

Data from household budget survey

Vegetables are a necessary daily food requirement for the sauce accompanying the staple grain dish, *tuwo*. Some households produce all their own vegetables but over half the men and a third of women buy vegetables for household use (Table 6.1). Men exhibit different food spending patterns (in type and amount of food purchased) according to their position in the life course and in particular according to whether they have dependants – unmarried and divorced men report less food purchases. Both women and men report buying daily cooking ingredients, although such purchases were reported as predominantly an area of male decision making (Table 6.5). Indeed all men recorded some food purchases. Women, being responsible for the preparation of meals, purchase ingredients either directly from children hawking from house to house, or by sending a child to buy the ingredients, often from a secluded woman trader. Thus, 80% women recorded purchasing food items but this does not necessarily contradict men's roles as providers because men may pay. Clearly, however, there is some degree of power and autonomy here for women by the very fact of being in control of food preparation.

Some women say their husbands give them money (*kudin cefane*) or refund them later for the money they have spent on food. Not all, only 55%, of the married women surveyed receive an allowance to buy food for themselves, their children[6] and for preparing household meals. The 45% who do not receive allowances may either be provided with all their household food needs by their husband/mai gida or use their own money to supplement food provision. Divorced or widowed women do not

[5] There is undoubtedly seasonal variation in grain purchasing. September is pre-harvest so the proportion of households needing to purchase grain because their own grain stores from the previous season's harvest have finished would be high.
[6] Only 18% of women surveyed do not buy food for themselves and their children.

generally receive allowances, but feed themselves if living alone.[7] Correspondingly a third of married men surveyed reported giving their wives a food allowance, of ₦1 to ₦5/day (average ₦2.7/day).[8] One view of this practice is that because many women are involved in the production and sale of ready-to-eat food, then "In a collective sense, the female population ... has developed a method of effecting monetary payments from the male population for the "normal" female task of cooking" (Simmons 1976: 5). Some men do not give their wives an allowance, preferring them to cook their midday meal. Indeed, 45% wives surveyed did not receive such a daily allowance. Allowances received are generally less than the amounts actually spent, so can be seen as token gestures supporting the ideology of men as providers and women dependants.

So purchasing, which ensures the availability of food, is gendered in complex patterns. The notion of male providers is supported by findings firstly, that men spend three times the amount on food purchases than women. Secondly, that there are no men in the sample who do not spend any money on food, and thirdly, that a small number (14%) of women do not spend any money on food. However, 86% women do report making food purchases that in all likelihood exceed the allowances they receive from their husbands. This suggests that women do contribute to meeting household food needs from their own resources. This is examined in detail later in the chapter.

6.3 THE MEANS OF REPRODUCTIVE WORK: GENDERED OWNERSHIP AND ACQUISITION

The means of reproductive work encompass the resources and conditions ensuring reproduction: water supply, food preparation technology, conditions of biological reproduction, facilities for education and healthcare, housing and clothing. The means of reproduction and their acquisition are examined here, highlighting the gendered nature of their acquisition and ownership.

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[7] Divorced women living in their natal household awaiting remarriage are considered dependants and generally have their food needs met by a father, brother or uncle. Poor widows (mostly elderly) living alone may receive a daily meal from neighbours as charitable almsgiving (*zaka*).

6.3.1 Water Supply

Collecting water is a task shaped by gender and space. Collecting water from wells and taps in public space is rarely undertaken by secluded women, because most water for household reproduction needs is drawn by women from wells within the compound, although children are frequently expected to do this work. Nearly all Zarewa compounds have a well and a few wealthier households have a tap connected to the irregular (but cleaner) borehole supply (Plate 6.1). Men draw water usually only for personal needs and may use public or private wells.




Plate 6.1 Zarewa's borehole water supply.

Spatial location is an element in determining the availability of water supply for Zarewa households. Households not near main streets, such as those located on the edge of the village, are less likely to collect water from the street standpipes (Map 2.4). Compounds without wells are mostly newly-built, poor compounds in Fegi, where the male head of household has not yet been able to afford to pay well-diggers.[9] In these few compounds of necessity secluded women may have to go out to collect

[8] Food allowances are not only given to wives. Two men give food allowances to dependants other than wives: A wealthy butcher gives ₦2/day to his sons, and a government employee gives his elderly father ₦14/day. Also a widow receives ₦2/day from the *mai gida* who is her son.

[9] Well-digging is a male occupation practised in most rural Hausa communities (Hill 1972: 333).

water, e.g. from a well in a neighbouring compound.

Thus, Hausa women may be considered to be empowered by three factors: (i) the environmental conditions of a high water table (which mean wells are relatively cheap and easy to dig), (ii) Zarewa's stage of economic development (which has achieved wells in most compounds and a borehole) and (iii) seclusion. Together these release Hausa women from the arduous task of hauling water long distances.

6.3.2 Food Preparation Technology

Previous studies document food preparation in rural Hausaland as a female task traditionally involving grinding grain by hand with grinding stones (e.g. Smith 1954: 51). By the 1960s mechanical grinding machines were rare in rural areas (Hill, 1972: 256) being used only for certain tasks (Simmons 1975, 1976: 76).[10] Grinding machines are now more common and Zarewa women no longer grind with stones, although they still pound certain foodstuffs, husk rice (for income) and do most other food preparation tasks manually (Plate 5.6). There are at least eight commercially-operated petrol-driven grinding machines in Zarewa - an average ratio of one grinding machine per 62 - 68 households. However, there is spatial unevenness in the location and distribution of the grinding machines (Map 2.4), most being located around the older, central, densely populated village wards. In the newer Fegi ward with a lower population density on the village margins there is no grinding machine, so Fegi women are likely to have to do more physical work to prepare food.

The use, ownership and operation of grinding mills is highly gender specific. As women are responsible for food preparation, they send children to carry grain and sauce ingredients (for daily meals and food selling businesses) to the grinding mill once, twice or more often each day. The introduction of grinding machines can be regarded as empowering by reducing women's domestic food preparation burdens as women acknowledged during lifestory interviews. For example, Lariya Hama recounted *'Women's lives have changed because when I was young we had to husk and*

[10] Over a century ago a European traveller encountered (patriarchal?) resistance to introducing grinding mills into Hausaland, as the chiefs "...asked where the work for their women folks was to come from; they were wicked and vicious enough as it was, and wanted constant supervision; but without work!" (Robinson 1896: 214).

pound and grind grain before cooking, but now women just send a child to take the grain to the grinding machine'.[11] However, grinding machines also empower the men who own, operate and make profit from them. According to dominant cultural expectations the money women pay for grinding comes from men, as husbands are supposed to pay for cooking costs according to prevailing ideologies about the duties of married men, but this is unlikely to always be the case.

Emmy Simmons also found that the mechanisation of food preparation (for sale) has occurred to only a very limited extent and suggests this may be "...to some extent self-imposed in the interests of wide employment and village harmony" (1975: 157). Certainly in Zarewa women widely pursue food preparation and processing as income earning strategies, but welcome the introduction of grinding machines that do not appear to have caused discord or conflict.

The utensils and tools for cooking necessary to ensure daily sustenance and reproduction are generally owned and acquired by women on marriage as part of her *kayan daki*. They are indisputably her property that she takes with her on divorce. During women's married lives their collection of *kayan daki* becomes smaller as they are used, sold when cash is needed being an important source of income and power in this respect, given to daughters at their weddings, or as gifts on other occasions. But basic cooking utensils[12] are retained by all married women, and some widows, giving them the means to meet basic practical gender needs of food preparation, as well as strategic gender needs by earning income from selling own-prepared food and snacks.

As well as ownership, the purchase of cooking equipment is gendered. Only 14% women (n=7) in the household budget survey purchased any item of cooking equipment paying between ₦2 and ₦100 (average ₦27 per item). Fewer men (only 2) had purchased cooking equipment within the preceding twelve months, but recorded a higher average expenditure of ₦105. This suggests women may be reliant on men to make infrequent purchases of more expensive items of equipment.

Households across Northern Nigeria rely predominantly on wood and cornstalks

[11] Sentiments echoed by Rukkaiya Gambo, Mairo Liti, Delu Karimatu and Raihanatu.

(*kara*) for cooking.[13] Most of the firewood used in Zarewa is obtained by men from crops, trees and shrubs on their farms, as well as from the small remaining communal bush lands. Firewood is also sold in Zarewa. But in the household budget survey, expenditures on firewood are minor compared with expenditure for foodstuffs. Only 9% men surveyed spent money (average ₦15/week) on firewood, but at least two of the men were civil service employees who do not actively work on their farms and lack easy access to their own firewood sources.

There appears to have been a historical shift in the burden of responsibility for acquiring firewood from women to men[14] which is very likely linked to the spread of seclusion earlier this century (as discussed in Chapter 3) and arguably an empowering shift for women. However, two women (and no men) in the 58 households sampled reported collecting and selling firewood as an occupation (Appendix III) and more women (12%) reported buying firewood (but of lower monetary value than purchases by men). Firewood collection is associated with low socio-economic status, being in the past carried out by slaves and *almajarai* (Cline-Cole 1994: 69-70). However, previous studies only mention men as firewood collector-sellers (e.g. Hill 1972: 73). The entry of women into such low status, low earning, arduous activity should not perhaps be hailed as a victory for female empowerment.

6.3.3 Biological Reproduction

For women, the conditions of biological reproduction have greater direct influence on their lives and positions of power than for men. Generally, Hausa girls are married at a younger age than their husbands,[15] begin childbearing early[16] and have a long childbearing period during their life courses which limits their opportunities to gain formal education and/or earn income. In Zarewa women reported up to ten living children - an average of 2.4 children per. adult woman under 45 years and 4.1 for women 45 years and over. But the ratio of women's dead to surviving children of all

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[12] Described by Simmons (1976: 76, 107).
[13] As well as for cooking, large amounts of fuelwood are also required for a woman's ritual baths after giving birth, its provision being husbands' responsibility (Trevitt 1973, Alti-Mu'azu 1985a, 1985b).
[14] As pointed out by Hill (1972: 247).
[15] The Zarewa data indicates 14.4 years as women's average marriage age, but there are problems of inaccuracy in recalling and accurately estimating ages.
[16] Women's average age at birth of first child from the survey in Zarewa is 16.8 years which parallels other studies (e.g. Kisekka et al. 1992: 54).

ages is 0.53, i.e. only a two-thirds survival rate. This resembles the findings of other studies in the region (e.g. Lockwood 1994b, Verma & Singha 1982: 193). Thus, women are likely on average to undergo more than six pregnancies and births during their reproductive years.[17]

However, it is not uncommon in Zarewa, as in most Hausa communities, to find women and men who have many children, as well as those who have no, one or only two children. High fertility coexists with a high prevalence of sterility in both Hausa men and women (Lockwood 1991: 18, Verma & Singha 1982: 195, Trevitt 1973: 223). Infertility brings loss of social status. Couples who fail to produce children, especially in first marriages, frequently divorce and remarry in an effort to conceive. Infertility may thus contribute to the high rates of divorce and remarriage in Hausaland. Infertile women overcome the lack of children, who they need to hawk goods (*talla*), by adoption, or fostering (*tallafi*), within the extended family.

The riskiness of biological reproduction also contributes to high mortality. Studies in the region report maternal mortality figures of 8-11 per 1,000 births (Kisekka et al. 1992: 54). Rates of maternal mortality are higher among younger women. With women sometimes left in labour for 2 or 3 days without being taken to hospital, maternal death in childbirth is not uncommon in Zarewa.[18] Fertility, maternal and infant mortality figures reveal that biological reproduction is an uncertain business for childbearing women and their infants.[19] Socio-economic status, age and location (i.e. spatial) factors all influence the conditions of biological reproduction. Thus, urban women bear children in situations of less risk than rural women. Although only unsystematic observations were made in Zarewa it is highly likely that poorer and teenage women are more vulnerable to childbearing related morbidity and mortality, than older and wealthier women. Being the biological reproducers of children is a mixed blessing for women with respect to power and empowerment.

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[17] In Zarewa contraceptive technology, apart from condoms, is largely conspicuous by its absence.
[18] At least three deaths of women in childbirth were noted May - September 1992.
[19] This is recognised by Hausa traditional birth attendants who maintain "...a grave is dug for the expectant mother by the angels as soon as she becomes pregnant. That grave remains there throughout the pregnancy period, during childbirth and for forty days after delivery. On the fortieth day, the empty grave is covered and the new mother is congratulated on her good fortune." (Alti-Mu'azu 1992: 158)

6.3.4 Education

School education forms part of generational reproduction for some children and relates to household reproduction in at least two ways. Firstly, teacher's wages can contribute to household incomes, thus providing the means of consumption. However, few teachers (all male) in the Zarewa schools are village residents and only one fell in the household sample. Secondly, children's school attendance in the short term reduces the labour they can contribute to household reproduction, but in the long term it may empower them (boys at least) to enter more financially remunerative occupations. Loss of children's labour while they are in school is particularly disempowering to secluded women who are heavily dependent on child hawkers in pursuing income earning.

Education provision in Zarewa is gendered. The many informal Koranic schools (*makarantar allo*), the two government primary schools and the Islamiyya primary school are open to boys and girls, but the Junior Secondary School is for boys only. Teachers in all schools are male. In terms of spatial organisation Zarewa Central Primary School, Zarewa Junior Secondary School and the Islamiyya Primary School (Plates 6.2, 6.3) are all clustered together near the south entrance to the village. Dawan Giwa Primary School, which has the least resources of teachers and buildings and serves children from surrounding hamlets, is located beyond the southern edge of Fegi ward some short distance off the road (Map 2.4). So in the case of education (as already shown for other resources too) relative spatial isolation from the village core corresponds to lack of resources.

Education is not only a facet of generational and social reproduction, it also influences biological reproductive behaviour. Female education often correlates with a later start to childbearing, wider child spacing, lower infant and maternal mortality and lower total fertility. Education can also be considered an asset. Education was identified as an empowerment indicator (Chapter 2) because in these and other ways education can increase opportunities for power, independence and self-reliance in a range of spheres.



Plate 6.2 New classrooms of Islamiyya primary school, Zarewa.




Plate 6.3 Girl wearing uniform (except veil) of Islamiyya primary school in Zarewa.

Being a peripheral rural settlement, the educational status of women in Zarewa is

generally lower than the averages across Kano state.[20] In Zarewa, with the odd exception of a few married women who grew up outside the area, adult women (and many men) are functionally illiterate. Even if they attended some childhood schooling, reading and writing is not part of women's everyday lives. Furthermore, without formal education women (and most men) are excluded from formal wage employment – recorded by only 4% men.

Women in the household budget survey do not record any expenditure on education, which corresponds with normative gender expectations that meeting the cost of children's education falls to men, 19% of whom record giving sums to Koranic teachers and paying for the fees, books and uniforms needed by children in primary and secondary education. We can infer that roughly about two-thirds of households do not have children of school age, or they do not attend school. The Nigerian economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s (Olukoshi 1993, Mustapha 1991) (Figure 6.4) meant fluctuating enrolments[21] and deterioration in the quality of education. Furthermore, the degree of functional literacy pupils attain in any of the schools is questionable given the lack of teaching resources and crowded classroom environments.

Girls are a minority (25%) of pupils enrolled at Zarewa's primary schools. The reluctance to send girls to primary school is not new or confined to Zarewa.[22] In 1991 43 boys leaving the primary school continued their education at Zarewa Junior Secondary School and six boys went to secondary school elsewhere. Only two girls (daughters of a school inspector and a head teacher) passing out in 1991 got places at boarding secondary schools elsewhere in Kano State.

In contrast to the mainstream primary schools, Islamiyya schools have a very high proportion of female enrolment. In 1992 nearly four times as many girls (176) as boys (43) were attending the Zarewa Islamiyya School.[23] Islamiyya primary schools provide only four years of primary education, instead of six years, and do not prepare

[20] In 1987 in Kano State girls were only 32% of total primary school enrolment; just 8% of primary school teachers and 8% secondary school teachers in the state were women, while girls formed only 16% of secondary school pupils (Kano State 1987; Nigeria, Federal Office of Statistics 1995: 90).
[21] Data provided by school headteachers in Zarewa.
[22] In 1976-7 85.6% primary school students in Hadejia town were male (Stock 1985: 280-1).
[23] Higher female than male enrolment in Islamiyya schools is reported across Hausaland (Bray 1981: 63).

pupils for secondary school admission. Thus, they do not conflict with marriage and subsequent seclusion of girls shortly after puberty.

Figure 6.3 The Condition of Nigerian Education



Daily Times (Nigeria) 13/8/93

Often parents send their daughters to an Islamiyya primary school, while sending their sons to the mainstream primary schools. A reason for the evolution of Islamiyya schools and parental preference for this type of schooling for daughters would appear to be that the education provided by Islamiyya schools is not seen as threatening, unlike 'Western' education that is perceived as a threat to early marriage, *kulle* and pre-marital chastity for girls (Stock 1985: 283). An Islamiyya school education is perceived as preparing girls to fulfil expectations of what 'good' women should be and thus, perpetuates prevailing gender ideologies. For example seclusion, as part of gender praxis, is maintained in part by women's conformity, so its continuation as a social institution, depends on the socialisation of young women (and men) to act to ensure its reproduction. Islamiyya schools are among the new ways of sustaining gender ideologies, including seclusion and its praxis; providing schooling in tune with local customs and gender practices. The Zarewa Islamiyya primary school has not been established long enough to determine whether for women attending this type of

school outcomes (in relation to biological reproduction and empowerment) differ from those who attended state primary school, or no school at all.

Generally boys and girls in Zarewa also all attend Koranic school (*makarantar allo*) from an early age, but boys tend to study the Koran longer than girls. In the village only men complete recital of the Koran from memory. There is a spatial dimension to this indigenous form of education which has been in existence for centuries. *Almajarai* (Koranic students) come to Zarewa to study under a Malam, especially during the dry season (some may stay in the village for some years); likewise, many boys from Zarewa are sent by their parents to study the Koran elsewhere and may not return for five years or more. The high mobility levels required in acquiring religious knowledge is a barrier to women's participation beyond a basic level. At the age boys go off to study girls are approaching marriage, if not already married and secluded.

So overall access to formal and informal education is highly gendered in rural Northern Nigeria. Men get more access to education than women. Women are disempowered by their lack of formal qualifications, illiteracy and the loss of labour when children attend school. Furthermore, the gendered construction of education contributes to the reproduction of the social construction of gender – in particular seclusion.

6.3.5 Healthcare

Healthcare is a gendered means of reproduction. In Zarewa state health care provision includes a health centre which opened after the fieldwork was completed, adjacent to the previous dispensary (Plate 6.4). The Zarewa dispensary at the time of fieldwork had only a male dispenser[24] (employed by the local government). Few drugs were available from the dispensary, but there are three commercial medicine shops in the village, run by men, and numerous male commercial (and traditional) drug sellers in nearby periodic markets. The nearest hospital with 24 hour care is in the adjacent rural town of Makarfi. Serious medical cases may be taken to hospital in Zaria, or Kano. Traditional (male) village healthcare providers include malams and barbers who

[24] The fact that the dispenser is male may dissuade some women (or their husbands may forbid them) from seeking treatment.

administer *rubutu*, circumcision and removal of the uvula from newborns. Traditional birth attendants in Hausaland are the only female (traditional) healthcare providers. They are older and experienced women, who are mostly married but have had children, and are usually post-menopausal (Alti-Muazu 1985b: 183, 1992: 149).



Plate 6.4 New health centre in Zarewa - armchairs for dignitaries being delivered for official opening ceremony.

Access to healthcare is also gendered. The acquisition of modern healthcare by women appears lower than by men as shown by hospital patient data at Kano State and local government level[25] (Kano State 1987: 309, 316). At village level however, in Zarewa a greater number of women than men present themselves at the dispensary for treatment. This contradiction of state and local government statistics may be because women and children get sick more than men (Last 1976: 110). In part this is because women have greater close contact with children resulting in more cases of infectious conditions like scabies and conjunctivitis, and women alone suffer from menstrual and pregnancy related conditions. In addition gender and spatial inequalities interact such that the village dispensary is within walking distance for women who have less access to transport than men and therefore are less likely to attend a more distant health facility which would require their husband's permission,

financial support and rearrangement of domestic burdens.

Financial resources, ideological beliefs, age, gender and the social status of the patient are all factors which affect the healthcare acquired by an individual. This is illustrated by the death of Rakitu the weak first-born infant of the Chief's fourth and youngest wife. She died in the cool rainy month of July when there was much sickness throughout the village. At the time the Chief himself (the infant's father) and one of his daughters in law were in hospitals in Zaria. The women caring for Rakitu knew her condition, but lacked the financial and social resources to acquire medical treatment. The infant's father and uncles were preoccupied with their own and other family member's hospitalisation and the women were reluctant to 'disturb' them. The women also said they could not take Rakitu to hospital because if one family has three people in hospital at the same time people will say their suffering is because of bad deeds of other members of the family. Furthermore, they expressed the attitude that it was the will of God that the child should die. The underlying understanding was that the child was a girl, was never very strong, the mother was young and also not very strong, but she would have more children and the chief already had children, sons especially. Rakitu's death occurred also in a context where young children are very often ill and very often die. Furthermore, as well as age, gender and status biases the situation also reflected Hausa approaches to sickness, frequently characterised by wait-and-see (Last 1976: 121).

Food distribution among household members is hierarchical. What was written over four decades ago is still very much the case, "... in most of rural Nigeria ... (t)he head of the family and then the other men tend to get priority for food over the women, and the children under the age of 13 years come last." (Nicol 1959: 305). Children also have to compete for their food and may get less than they need because, although children less than two or three years of age generally share a bowl with their mothers, older children often share a bowl with others of the same age and gender, thus disadvantaging slow, reticent, or weak children. Furthermore, while cooking and feeding children is the responsibility of women, providing food is men's responsibility, so they may not always provide what is most needed. Although women do buy snacks for their children they cannot always afford to buy 'extra' foods which

[25] Adjacent to Karaye local government.

would improve their children's nutrition.

Healthcare provision is socially gendered as a male responsibility and may be grounds for divorce if a husband does not fulfil these responsibilities.[26] However, Zarewa women make small and frequent expenditures on aspirin tablets and suchlike, while men make larger and less frequent expenditures for medical treatment. This pattern of mothers paying for treatment of minor illnesses with the father's role becoming more important as the cost rises, coincides with findings of other health and budget studies in Nigeria (Orubuloye et al. 1991).

Economic, cultural and locational factors determine women's access to contraceptives, and to reproductive healthcare in clinics, or hospitals. Women of relatively wealthy households, urban women and more educated women are more likely to get access than rural women, those in poorer households and lacking schooling (Feyisetan & Ainsworth 1994). For example, when a Zarewa woman had a miscarriage in the middle of the night her husband who is son of the chief and a local government employee, drove her in his car to hospital in Zaria where he paid for her treatment and she recovered fully, while other women in poorer/less educated Zarewa households have died in childbirth.

Space interacts with economic factors in the acquisition of healthcare because transport from a rural area to a health centre in a town, or an urban hospital, may be difficult and expensive. Taxi drivers may be reluctant to carry patients with serious conditions and/or may charge extortionate rates. Government healthcare resources may be inadequate and costly - staff are even reported to demand bribes from patients, or their relatives. There are also cultural barriers preventing healthcare access. The behaviour of *kunya* (culturally prescribed shyness), for example, affects Hausa women's acquisition of medical treatment even if they reach hospital because they may refuse to be examined or to answer questions, leaving a relative to explain their condition (Alti-Mu'azu 1985a). In addition secluded women need permission from their husbands to seek hospital treatment which may not be forthcoming, or husbands may be away, on business for example, and unavailable to give permission (Ejembi

1992, Alti-Mu'azu 1985a, 1985b, Kisekka et al. 1992: 57-8). Once women reach hospital their husbands may be required to sign consent forms for them to receive treatment (Ojanuga 1991: 536).

Overall the provision and acquisition of healthcare is gendered in a way that often disadvantages women (and children) compared to men. Furthermore, secluded women with poor absent husbands in rural locations far from health facilities are least likely to have access to healthcare, compared with unsecluded, or wealthier women.

6.3.6 Housing Construction and Maintenance

Married men are responsible for providing shelter for their dependants. Female dependents do not pay for house repairs, construction materials, building land, or labour (as reflected in the household budget survey). But in the previous twelve months nearly 20% of the male survey participants spent ₦100 - ₦2,000 on house repair and construction. One man spent ₦7,200 purchasing a village plot for a house. Male local government employees may receive building loans to construct a house. Most houses are built by household members for personal residential use but houses are also built to rent as investment, and can be inherited. Both women and men can and do invest in and inherit houses.[27] In the occasional cases where women invest in houses they purchase land, construction materials and labour, albeit often through a male intermediary if secluded.

The distribution of houses and buildings of different materials in Zarewa is spatially patterned. The oldest and largest compounds built only of mud are found in the central wards of the village. A few of these mud houses have an upper storey and belong to wealthy households. Modern, painted, concrete houses, some even with glass windows, are in Fegi on the newer, regular, rectangular plots. In most cases some member of such households has urban employment and the houseowner and his household may even be absent residents living in a city elsewhere in Nigeria.

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[26] In July 1993 the court in Zarewa dealt with a woman seeking divorce because her husband would not pay for treatment of her children when they were sick, so she had to buy them medicine.
[27] The extent of property investment by secluded women traders is discussed in Chapter 7. The implications of property investment for women's empowerment is dealt with in Chapter 8.

6.3.7 Clothing

Dress in Hausaland is distinctively gendered. Men's clothes consist of long trousers and shirt with an embroidered cap and for special occasions a loose over-gown (*babban riga*). Women's clothes consist of a piece of cloth (approx. 1m x 2m) tied as a wrap-around skirt, with a blouse, headscarf and a second wrapper to cover the head and shoulders while in public places. Secluded married women and unsecluded elderly widows wear this 'veil' only outside the home, but in different ways. While secluded women wrap it around their head, shoulders and arms so only their face and hands are visible; older unsecluded women drape it over their head and behind their shoulders leaving their face, neck and arms visible. It is suggested that such veiling by married secluded women is a way of controlling their sexuality by hiding their bodies from view of men in public spaces; of invisibilising them there in order to emphasise their 'out of placeness'. Children's clothes are miniature versions of adult clothes. Zarewa tailors (equally men and women) with manual sewing machines make clothes from cloth provided by their clients (5% women surveyed were tailors and 4% of men). Most of Northern Nigeria's rural population wear clothes made of Nigerian produced cotton cloth. Many people in Zarewa spend much time without shoes, but the most common footwear are the plastic shoes cheaply available in local markets and in Zarewa.

Purchasing shoes, cloth and sewing new clothes in Hausaland is closely linked with conspicuous consumption of ceremonial occasions: Eid-el-Fitr, weddings and naming ceremonies. Cloth is purchased mostly by men in local markets, or on visits to cities, but a few old widows and secluded women, sell odd lengths of women's cloth in Zarewa. According to prevailing gender ideologies men are responsible for providing cloth, clothes and shoes for dependent women and children. In reality cloth or clothes purchasing is recorded by a few women (6%), and twice as many men (15%).

6.3.8 Summary

In this section the gendered provision of, access to and ownership of means of consumption, namely water supply, food preparation technology, conditions of biological reproduction, education, healthcare, housing and clothing for rural households in Zarewa have been examined. Culturally men are considered responsible

for providing food, water supply, cooking fuel, education, healthcare, shelter and clothing for dependants; but the data reveals women frequently appear to contribute as well, albeit in small quanitities . Women and girls get less education and healthcare than men. Biological reproduction is risky for mothers and infants (but not directly so for men). Women own food preparation utensils and their own clothing, but rarely their own houses. Some water and most education and healthcare services are publicly owned, but their access is regulated by gender, culture and socio-economic factors. Lack of contraception, poor access to reproductive healthcare, seclusion and veiling are all ways that men control women's sexuality. The next section investigates the divisions of labour in the work of reproduction, and the question of whether/how seclusion shifts domestic labour to men.

6.4 DIVISIONS OF REPRODUCTIVE LABOUR

Divisions of reproductive labour are expected to vary with gender, age, life course, social status, through time and across space. The expectations are that women have greater burdens of reproductive work than men (Seager 1997: 60-6), and that children make significant contributions to reproductive work, as has been shown in studies throughout the developing world (e.g. Katz 1993, Nieuwenhuys 1994, White 1976) and recognised in Northern Nigeria (Norman et al. 1982: 70-71, Schildkrout 1978: 128, 1979). Divisions of labour in reproductive work in Zarewa are examined by gender, age, season and other variables,[28] from participant observation and time-space use data. Reproductive work is divided conceptually into generational (childcare and education) and daily reproduction (unpaid domestic work and activities contributing to personal maintenance e.g. sleep, bathing).[29]

6.4.1 Generational Reproduction - Childcare

Childcare work which contributes to reproducing the next generation is done mostly by women, almost exclusively within the domestic compound and often simultaneously with other activities (Plate 6.5). In line with expectations few men

[28] This is innovative because most previous discussions of gender divisions of labour in Muslim Hausaland ignore women's reproductive burdens (e.g. Longhurst 1982, 1980). Even work that considers reproduction (e.g. Jackson 1981: 310-320) does not provide detailed time measurements of reproductive burdens.

[29] Categorisation of activities of reproductive work is listed in Appendix III.

spend any time caring for children. Some girls do a little childcare work (Plate 6.6), but boys do not record any although boys were observed minding younger siblings. Age, seclusion and marital status all influence the amount of time women spend caring for children. Not surprisingly, secluded women do more childcare than unsecluded women. The time women spend on childcare fluctuates through the life course peaking in their late teens. There are problems in recording time spent in childcare. Recall methods tend to underestimate compared with observation methods because childcare is often carried out as a secondary and/or passive activity, i.e. women 'keep an eye' on children while doing something else, and/or carry their infants on their backs while engaged in other activities. Observation of six women's daytime activities recorded more time spent in childcare compared with recall methods.




Plate 6.5 Woman combining childcare and cooking.



Plate 6.6 Girl caring for a baby.

6.4.2 Generational Reproduction - Education

Going to school is gendered - not only do more boys than girls go to school, but from the time use data boys also appear to spend more time there. Age too affects the differentials in education - whereas older boys get more education than younger boys, the reverse is the case for girls for whom early marriage is a factor in their withdrawal from school (if they attend school at all).

6.4.3 Daily Reproduction - Domestic work

The domestic work of daily reproduction consists of a myriad of tasks, most of which are performed by women (Plate 6.7), but some of which are also done by men and children (Table 6.2).



Plate 6.7 Woman washing dishes and clothes.

Table 6.2 Divisions of Domestic Labour

Tasks Performed by Women	Tasks Performed by Men	Tasks Performed by Children
Prepare firewood	Wash own clothes (sometimes)	Fetch water
Food preparation	Collect water from well outside compound (occasional)	Go on errands e.g. take grain for grinding
Serve & distribute food	Repair & maintain bicycles, motorcycles, buildings and radios	Purchase household needs in village
Sweep compound	Send children on errands	
Wash utensils & clothes	Purchase household provisions in village/market	
Fetch water from well inside compound		
Heat bathing water		
Send children on errands		
Supervise children's daily domestic tasks		
Purchase daily household needs from hawkers coming to house		

Not only do women bear the major burden of domestic work in their own compounds, but some women have a double domestic burden because they also do the chores of a sick or elderly relative. Men participate in fewer tasks of domestic reproduction. Mirroring adult gender divisions, children, especially girls, help with many women's domestic tasks (Plate 6.8).



Plate 6.8 Girls helping women to sort and clean rice for cooking.

With respect to the spatial aspects of gendered domestic work, women's tasks are performed within the home. With the exception of some building and repair work most of men's (few) domestic tasks are done in public places - streets, in front of the house and in the market. Children do domestic chores both inside and outside the household compound (Plates 6.9, 6.10).

Time spent on domestic work is unevenly distributed. Very few women (4%), no girls, about 1 in 5 boys, but over half of all men report doing no domestic work. The amount of domestic work performed also varies by age. Women do on average nearly 5 hours domestic work per. day, whereas men on average do less than an hour[30] and children over 2 hours, i.e. twice as much as men, but less than half that of women. But as might be expected, in view of the processes of socialisation and generational reproduction, children's contribution to domestic work is gendered as girls do more than boys, especially as they get older. Examining women's domestic labour burdens further shows there are significant divisions between women according to their domestic responsibilities, seclusion/marital status and age, as well as seasonal variations.

[30] Possibly the recall method of data collection invisibilises some of men's domestic work because men failed to record tasks like bringing firewood from the fields




Plate 6.9 Boy drawing water from a well.




Plate 6.10 Boys plucking chickens for the pot.

Women's domestic work burdens are lower during Ramadan when, because of fasting, they have only to prepare two meals a day. Women record more than twice as much time doing domestic work on days when they are responsible for cooking meals for the household than other days. Therefore cooking forms a large portion of the overall domestic work women do (Plate 6.11). Life course also influences the amount of women's domestic work - married secluded women do more than 2.5 times the domestic work non-secluded divorced and widowed women do. Widowed women engage in domestic tasks for less time than divorced women, probably because on the whole they are more likely to be elderly and frail dependants. The amount of time women spend on domestic tasks increases gradually from their teens when newly married, through their 20s and 30s to their 40s and then drops rapidly once beyond childrearing in their 50s and are lowest in their elderly years beyond 60. It is the cultural practice that young women in the first year or so of marriage do little reproductive work and initially they have no children to take care of. Similarly elderly women (mostly widows) have light reproductive burdens, no longer having childcare responsibilities. Generally they do not cook for themselves but receive meals prepared by a son's wife. So being a woman is a 'career', not a constant, in rural Hausaland (Figure 4.1).




Plate 6.11 Woman sieving flour for the evening *tuwo* in *gidan sarki*.

Men's domestic work burdens, although generally small, vary with season and age.

Men spend most time on domestic work in periods when they have fewer other work burdens, i.e. during the wet season when farming is most demanding they do least domestic work, but do more in the dry season and most during Ramadan because they spend time purchasing special foods etc. during the fasting period. With respect to age, more domestic work is done by younger men in their teens and 20s, who may be newly married so help their mothers, or wives, with domestic work. But men do progressively less daily domestic work as they get older and acquire children who can run errands for them. By their 60s men do little more than ½ hour domestic work a day - unsurprising considering their likely degree of frailty in later years.

Children's patterns of gendered domestic work burdens mimic the roles they will play in adult life. As girls get older and progress towards adulthood, their domestic work burdens increase. But as boys grow up they do progressively less domestic reproductive work, approaching their roles as adult men, who have low domestic work burdens.

6.4.4 Daily Reproduction - Self-Maintenance and 'Leisure'

All individuals spend a portion of their waking hours ensuring their own daily self-maintenance by eating, drinking, grooming and personal hygiene. Also classified as self-reproduction are buying food and snacks for personal consumption, being ill, seeking treatment and sleeping in the daytime. Children spend least time on their own personal maintenance - girls over 2½ hours and boys over 2¾ hours. Men spend fractionally more time taking care of themselves - nearly 3 hours a day; while women spend nearly 3½ hours each day meeting their personal needs. Figures are highest for women and perhaps surprisingly so. This is partly because of the time they spend applying henna and taking ritual baths after childbirth, but the figures would suggest that women do have time for themselves, their own care and grooming.

But the divisions by gender and child-adult status are further cross-cut. Women responsible for cooking have less time available for themselves, so spend less than 3 hours/day on their needs compared with over 3.5 hours/day when they are not responsible for cooking household meals. Similarly, seclusion and marital status mean that secluded women have greater levels of domestic burdens and hence less time to

spend on themselves than unsecluded women. Married women have least time for self-reproduction compared with widowed and divorced women. Many widowed women are also very elderly and a lot of their day is spent sleeping. This accounts for the over 60s spending the most time on self-maintenance activities of any age group. Men spend more time on themselves in the dry season than in the wet season when farming is most demanding of their time. Boys spend more time on their own maintenance when older than when younger, but the reverse is apparent for girls who, as they get older, appear to have greater domestic burdens of work and less time for their own needs. So the demands of marriage, seclusion and cooking all reduce women's opportunities to spend time looking after themselves.

There are also spatial dimensions to self-maintenance activities. While women eat their meals inside the compound with their younger children, food is served to men and older boys which they may eat where they please - outside in front of the house, in a *zaure* (entrance hut), or in their own *shago*. Everyone bathes privately in screened bathing places within compounds. While men have their hair and nails cut in public by a barber in the streets, or marketplace; women go to the house of another woman for hairplaiting. So apart from going to the dispensary to seek healthcare, all women's self-maintenance activities take place within private domestic space. The same applies to most children. In contrast, most of men's self-maintenance activities take place outside the home in public space.

'Leisure'[31] can also be included in the category of self-maintenance. There are gender divisions in the type and time spent in leisure activities (Table 6.3). Men spend on average more than 4 hours a day on leisure pursuits in the village.[32] Seasons influence the amount of time men spend relaxing; they have most time for non-work activities during the dry season and least during the wet season when farming is most demanding. Leisure time decreases for men from their teens progressively to their

[31] 'Leisure' is rather an ambiguous term in the context of a peasant community. For example, what may appear to be recreational chat can involve important business discussion and information exchange. Women, in particular, are rarely idle, but when relaxing at home are invariably also carrying out 'passive' activities such as keeping an eye on or carrying children, breast-feeding and/or shelling beans or suchlike.

[32] There are problems associated with accurately recording 'leisure' time. Periods of inactivity fall under this heading which during the wet season may be increased when daytime rain prevents normal activities forcing people to stay idly indoors.

40s, is lowest for the over 60s, but shows a surprising peak in the 50s age group.

Table 6.3 Leisure Activities by Gender and Child/Adult Status

Men's Leisure Activities	Women's Leisure Activities	Children's Leisure Activities
Listening to radio Reading newspapers/books Talking to wife Watching/playing football Relaxing around village Courting girls Visiting friends/kin Strolling (*yawo*) Chatting (*hira*) Receiving visitors	Chatting at home Telling stories Talking with co-wives/ husband Receiving visitors	**Boys** Play at home Play around village e.g. borrow bicycle **Girls** Play at home Play around village

Women have less leisure time than children, or men. Not surprisingly cooking burdens reduce women's leisure time. Women have more time for relaxation during Ramadan, when their cooking responsibilities during daytime are reduced. Seclusion and marriage also reduce women's leisure. Of unsecluded women, divorced women have less leisure than widowed women, who have the most. With respect to age, leisure time is highest for the elderly, especially the over 60s, who no longer perform much domestic work. Women in their teens also have much leisure because they are often newly married and expected to do very little. The age group with least 'leisure' are women in their 30s with heavy domestic and childcare responsibilities.

About 3¾ hours of children's average day is spent as recreational time. Boys spend more time recreationally than girls. As children get older their leisure time is somewhat reduced as other work burdens increase. There is a spatial, as well as gender and age, dimension of leisure time. All women's and children's leisure time is spent in the village. Only men spend any time on leisure outside the village. On market days they also spend 45 – 60 mins/day on leisure outside the village, going to market in Sundu, or Makarfi, for mainly social purposes.

So overall women, especially married and secluded women in their 30s have least leisure time, which is spent within the domestic sphere.

6.4.5 Social Reproduction - Religious and Social Obligations

The activities examined here as 'social reproduction' are associated with religious and social obligations (Table 6.4). Time invested in such activities ensures the reproduction of important aspects of socio-cultural structures. In spatial terms women's religious activities take place within their own room, while men's religious activities take place either in private or public, but mostly in public spaces of the mosque, outside houses or in the street (Table 6.4). Whereas most social obligations are fulfilled within the village, both men and women do also travel outside Zarewa to attend family functions especially naming ceremonies and condolence visits to bereaved kin and/or friends.

Table 6.4 Adults' Religious Activities & Social Obligations

Women's Religious Activities	Men's Religious Activities	Women's Social Obligations	Men's Social Obligations
Praying at home	Praying at home/ mosque Reading religious books/ Koran Koranic study (*tafsir*) Attending teaching in mosque	Attending naming ceremonies & weddings Visiting the bereaved/ sick/ newly delivered mothers/ new brides Receiving visitors Greeting/ visiting relatives	Attending naming ceremonies, weddings & funerals Visiting the bereaved/ sick Receiving visitors Greeting Sarki

Men record more time pursuing religious activities than women, because men visit the mosque for prolonged periods in the mornings and evenings and often spend time reading the Koran, or religious books, after nightfall, or in the early morning. Women just say their prayers at home trying to avoid (or ignore) interruptions from children.[33] Religious activities follow an annual rhythm. The dry season is a period when men can spend more time on religious activities, but it is during the religious month of Ramadan that men spend the most time on religious activities in the mosque, performing special prayers, studying and listening to Koranic recitals on the radio. In the wet season when farming is demanding, men spend least time on religious

[33] A problem with recording time women engage in religious activities is that many of them report praying at the five correct times a day. This may derive from the translator-assistant imposing the frame of prayer times onto women's recall accounts, or women wishing to present images of 'proper' behaviour as 'good' Hausa women. In reality, women are often unable to say their prayers at the proper time because of demands of other work, but tend to say all their prayers together in the late evening before sleeping. Thus, the time women reported praying may be overestimated.

activities. In terms of weekly patterns men spend most time on religious activities on Friday (over 4 hrs/day) compared with other days of the week (3 - 3.5hrs/day) because it is the day when all men are obliged to gather in the mosque and the main street of the village for communal prayers.

Children record the shortest periods spent on religious activities, but even they on average devote over an hour a day. Reflecting adult divisions, boys spend more than twice as much time on religious affairs than girls. From a very early age boys are taken with their fathers, or elder brothers, to Friday communal prayers. As soon as they learn to perform the prayers properly boys may join adult men for daily prayers in a mosque. Thus, space and gender divisions in religious activities are socially embedded early in the life course.

Children's religious practices increase with age, so that younger children (age 6-9 years) spend less time praying etc. than older (age 10-15 years) children. Boys spend more time on religious activities on Fridays (2 hours) compared with other days of the week (1 - 1½ hrs/day), but the sample of girls is too inadequately distributed throughout the week to make comparisons.

Women spend more time praying when not responsible for cooking than when cooking meals for the household. Although only a few very old women go to mosque, on Fridays on average women overall spend more time on religious activities than on other days of the week. As they are able to attend Friday prayers and do not have such heavy childcare and domestic work burden, widowed and divorced women (no longer secluded) spend more time praying than secluded women. Young women (15-19 years) spend least time in prayer compared to older women. Women in their 40s and 70+ appear to spend most time engaged in religious activities. Similarly elderly men in their 60s have more time for prayer than younger men.

Social obligations are analysed in two spatial categories:- those performed within Zarewa and those which take place outside the village. Men spend time on social obligations outside, rather than in, Zarewa. Many more women than men spend longer going to social ceremonies and the like, but only a few women travel outside the village. Naming ceremonies and other social occasions provide opportunities for

secluded women to meet and exchange news and information.

Ceremonies are seasonally distributed throughout the year, with more weddings during the dry season than at other times. Thus, men spend more time on social obligations during the dry season. Women spend more than twice as long meeting social obligations on days when they are not cooking than when they have to cook for the household. Seclusion has some impact on the time women spend attending ceremonies: secluded women spend less time than unsecluded women. Older women over 60 spend the most time on social obligations because they are free of other responsibilities, but women in their 40s have least time available. Reflecting adult gender divisions in commitment to social obligations, fewer boys than girls attend ceremonies and spend less time there. For both boys and girls the amount of time increases with age.

6.4.6 Summary

The distributions of reproductive labour examined above indicate the complex nature of the intersections between gender, age, marital/seclusion status (for women), season and space. The broad patterns to emerge, however, are of women having greatest burdens of generational and daily household reproductive work which limit their time for other activities. However, both women and men contribute to social reproduction - men dominating religious activities and women the performance of social obligations. Spatially women's reproductive tasks are largely confined to private space and men's (and children's) to public space. Women's heavy reproductive burdens limit the opportunities open to them to earn income (to be examined in Chapter 7). Seclusion does not redirect much domestic labour onto men. Frequently men simply send children to make purchases of basic household needs (e.g. soap, sugar), to bring cornstalks from the fields for cooking fuel, or grass for livestock in the compound. So seclusion shifts some domestic tasks beyond the compound onto children.

6.5 DECISION MAKING POWER OVER REPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCES

The question of who makes decisions concerning acquisition, distribution and use of means of consumption is significant in controlling reproductive processes. This

section examines decision making power and control over the organisation of reproductive work, as well as the allocation and transfer of resources in the reproduction process. Having shown above that in the divisions of reproductive labour most reproductive work is done by women in domestic space, this section examines gendering of decision making associated with this work.

Table 6.5 Intra-Household Decision Making about Reproduction[34]

HOUSEHOLD DECISION MAKING	Female Respondents (N=44) ---------- DECISION MAKERS % of all respondents* (no. of all respondents)			Male Respondents (N=31) ---------- DECISION MAKERS % of all respondents* (no. of all respondents)		
Area of Decision Making in Daily Reproduction	Female	Male	Male or Female	Female	Male	Male or Female
A. Grain Purchases	18% (8)	73% (32)	9% (4)	3% (1)	97% (30)	–
B. Buying Daily Sauce Ingredients	32% (14)	59% (26)	9% (4)	10% (3)	84% (26)	6% (2)
C. Other Daily Food Purchases	45% (20)	45% (20)	9% (4)	6% (2)	87% (27)	6% (2)
D. Purchases of Non-Food Daily Needs	50% (22)	41% (18)	9% (4)	13% (4)	74% (23)	13% (4)
E. Clothing Purchases	2% (1)	77% (34)	20% (9)	–	100% (31)	–
F. Medical Care of Household Members	11% (5)	66% (29)	23% (10)	–	94% (29)	6% (2)
G. Build/Repair House, or Well	–	95% (42)	5% (2)	–	100% (31)	–
Area of Decision Making in Generational Reproduction						
H. Investment in Children's Education	7% (3)	82% (36)	11% (15)	–	100% (1)	–
I. Marriage Partner for Daughters	2% (1)	82% (36)	9% (4)	–	68% (21)	23% (7)
J. Marriage Partner for Sons	2% (1)	84% (37)	7% (3)	–	71% (22)	23% (7)

* Percentages may not total 100% because non-standard replies are excluded from calculations.

According to the male respondents, 88% of all decisions about household reproduction are made by men alone (Table 6.5, A-J av.). But women are acknowledged by men to have some control over food, as well as purchases of daily household needs, and almost one quarter of men felt that decisions regarding the

[34] Household decision making about reproduction was investigated by the same method as decision making about productive strategies (Chapter 5).

marriage partner of children is a decision-making area for either men or women. Women, however, consider themselves to have greater control over decision making than is recognised and acknowledged by men. According to the data collected women maintain that an average 15% of all decision making areas are female controlled, but 70% are subject to male-only decision making power and 11% of decisions may be taken by either men, or women (Table 6.5, A-J av.). As with the findings concerning decision making in production (Chapter 5) it would appear that women consider themselves to have greater autonomy than men report.

6.5.1 Decision Making and Biological Reproduction

It is thought that in Hausa culture generally women and men do not discuss and decide about the number and spacing of their children but widely believe that the number and survival of children is God's will (Feyisetan & Ainsworth 1994: 1). Thus, if a mother has many children who survive to adulthood it is explained as Allah's blessings (Last 1992: 806, Lockwood 1992: 15, Rehan 1984: 840). An important area of decision making influencing conditions of biological reproduction is access to contraception and medical care surrounding childbirth. Men exert powerful control in these areas, not least because as husband's permission is often demanded for married women to receive services and treatment. Furthermore, there is a culturally widespread attitude that, what happens, particularly in childbirth, is the will of God and should be thus calmly accepted. So God is seen as the ultimate decision maker.

6.5.2 Decision Making and Generational Reproduction

In Zarewa all men and most women agreed that decisions regarding children's education of children are made by men alone (Table 6.5, H), but 7% women felt this was an area for women to decide and 11% that either men, or women, took decisions about children's education. Presumably, women have more influence over such decisions than men imagine. Decisions about marriage partners for sons and daughters are important in ensuring and shaping the reproduction of future generations. Questioning men and women about this area reveals that women have more influence over daughters' marriage partners than for sons and vice versa for men (Table 6.5, I, J). Presumably women are closer to daughters and involved in accumulating their wedding goods, while men are more closely concerned with son's marriages.

6.5.3 Decision Making and Daily Reproduction

Asking women and men who makes decisions in their households concerning food purchases, reveals an area of dominant male control: most men perceive themselves as making food purchasing decisions. But women give more mixed responses and do not attribute men with such overarching power (Table 6.5, A-C av.). Within food buying, grain purchase appears the most male dominated area of decision making. Men consider women to have greatest say in decisions about buying daily sauce ingredients, while women consider themselves to have greatest influence in other daily food purchases.

Men claim that they decide the vast majority of non-food daily needs purchases, but only 41% of women agree (Table 6.5, D). More women (50%, but only 13% men) consider non-food purchases as a predominantly female, rather than male, decision taking area (Table 6.5, D). From a male perspective, decisions concerning clothing purchases are a matter for male decision taking alone, but only two-thirds of women questioned (77%) agree. While only one women (2% of the sample) consider that only men decide about buying cloth, clothes and shoes, as many as 20% women view it as a matter for either men, or women, to decide (Table 6.5, E.).

Decision making about medical treatment is seen as an area of greater male than female control. But women consider themselves to be decision makers regarding medical treatment more often than men (Table 6.7, F). Cultural attitudes contribute to reluctance to do anything in some situations of illness and sickness. It has also been suggested that married women's general sense of insecurity and powerlessness, because of husbands' easy means to divorce by repudiation (Arabic *tallaq*), make it difficult for women to defy, or question, husbands' decisions even if consequences are detrimental to their own health (Kisekka et al. 1992: 57). Men's comments reflect their view of health as an area of male decision making. Alhaji Abashe said '*The mai gida gives his permission for a wife to take a child to hospital and the mai gida pays the medicine costs. If it is very serious the mai gida will go with them to the hospital*'.

Women, however, see matters of healthcare decisions differently. Only two-thirds of

women agreed with the majority of men. A further 23% stated it is a matter for either men, or women, to decide, and 11% view health decisions as a matter for women only (Table 6.7, M). Women's comments about healthcare decisions, particularly concerning their children were more pragmatic and represented less of an ideal scenario than men's. For example, Hassana Abashe said '*If children are sick it is the wife who decides about medical care because she is always with them.*', and Ramatu Sanusi responded '*Some men if they don't see their child around will ask if the child is sick and take care of them. Other men don't care so the wife has to do everything.*'

Women appear to see it as desirable that men should ensure sick children receive medical treatment and pay the costs, but in reality it is often the case that women take responsibility both for deciding to seek medical care and for its payment especially for minor illnesses. Children's fathers play greater roles in more serious illnesses. Thus, a woman's access to cash, whether her own, or from her husband, is crucial in ensuring the health and well-being of her children.

Overall, men would appear to exert greater decision making power over reproductive activities and resources than women. But gender divisions in decision making partly reflect gender divisions of labour, e.g. construction is largely a male activity, so it is also an area of male decision making. Similarly cooking and daily reproduction are women's work so the decision makers about purchase of necessary food items are more widely perceived as women. A theme emerging from the decision making data is that men consider themselves having greater control of all areas than women do. In a sense men's responses more strongly reflect 'ideal' representations of patriarchal male control, i.e. reflect the prevalent socio-cultural ideology. Women's responses are more pragmatic and more strongly reflect actual everyday practical situations in which women exert greater amounts of decision making power than the ideological perspective suggests. So women are more empowered than men think they are.

6.6 DISPOSAL OF NET INCOME

Having discussed the sources and patterns of income acquisition previously (Chapter 5), this section examines how expenditure on reproductive needs are gendered. Before looking at actual spending patterns, the ideological expectations surrounding gender

and household provisioning are briefly examined.

Culturally normative expectations of Hausa social organisation maintain it is the responsibility of adult men to provide for their dependants. These ideal expectations, based on Muslim dictates derived from the Koran,[35] are that men have a moral and legal obligation (under Maliki law) to maintain their family by providing the necessary means of reproductive work including food, healthcare, shelter, and clothing.[36] Thus, men are positioned as providers and women to be provided for - as a male Zarewa farmer said '*A woman's place is only to be given, not to provide*'. Within this ideal societal framework women's incomes are (theoretically at least), their own to dispose of as they wish. The reality of these strongly (and widely) held ideological beliefs is examined here by documenting the place and importance of women's income within Zarewa's rural household economy.

Men control disposal of farm incomes and gave several uses of money gained from crop sales (Table 6.6). Almost half of farmers primarily invest their income from farming back into farming to maintain the annual agricultural production cycle. A third of them use farm income primarily to meet household reproductive needs, especially food purchasing. It is illustrative to compare men and women's expenditure patterns. Table 6.7 indicates a breakdown of gendered expenditure patterns. Expenditure in category 'self' refers to items purchased solely for individual consumption. 'Household' expenditure comprises items purchased for use by other household members, including dependants as well.

Table 6.6 Disposal of Gross Farm Income

Primary Use of Income	% Farmers	Remarks
Farming	46%	Predominantly fertiliser and labour
Household Needs	29%	Especially food.
Personal Use	14%	Often land and house building.
Trading Capital	7%	
Kin	3%	
Education	1%	
Total	100%	

[35] Particularly Sura 4: 36:

> *Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, Because God has given The one more (strength) Than the other, and because they support them from their means.*
>
> Ali (1946)

[36] A view echoed by some Muslim women writers in Nigeria (e.g. Lemu & Heeren 1978?: 18).

Table 6.7 Gendered Patterns of Expenditure

Item	User	Men's Expenditure* (average per year)	Women's Expenditure* (average per year)
Food	Household	₦3,344	(gross**)₦1,681
Food	Self	₦3,538	(gross**)₦1,300
Total Food Expenditure		**₦6,872**	(net**) **₦2,108**
Goods & Services	Household	₦5,718	***
Goods & Services	Self	₦1,847	***
Total Goods & Services		**₦7,565**	**₦970**
Total Household Expenditure	Household	₦9,062	***
Total Expenditure for Self	Self	₦5,385	***
Farm Inputs		₦3,992	zero
TOTAL		**₦18,439**	**₦3,078**
% expenditure on food	Household & Self	37%	68%
% expenditure on non-food	Household & Self	41%	32%
% expenditure on farm inputs		22%	0%
	Total	**100%**	**100%**
% expenditure on household	Household	49%	***
% expenditure on self	Self	29%	***
% on farm	Farm	22%	zero
	Total	**100%**	

* Figures extrapolated from household budget study, September 1992.

** Women's net expenditure on food was calculated after deduction of food allowances (*kudin cefane*) from gross expenditure.

*** It proved impossible to distinguish between women's expenditure on goods and services for themselves and for their household.

Food is the most important item in the provisioning of Hausa peasant households to ensure reproduction, especially grain (the staple basis of all main meals), and ingredients for the accompanying sauce, or soup. According to cultural expectations men are supposed to provide grain for their dependants, either from their own farm, or purchased. Comments made by both women and men during interviews reflect this expectation (Figure 6.3), as has also been found in other studies (Norman et al. 1982: 111).

The household budget survey reveals that even taking food allowances (*kudin cefane*) into account, 78% of women report expenditure on food, beyond the money husbands provide. So women appear to be choosing to help with meeting household needs, in line with Hausa cultural expectations of the conjugal contract that wives can expect husbands to provide but if they choose to they can and do help.

Figure 6.4 Views of Food Provisioning

Female Opinions

'It is the wife who uses the grain, so if it finishes she has to tell the husband. If he has it he has to open another bag.' Fatima Shehu

'A wife asks her husband for soup ingredients and he will buy. It is the job of the mai gida to buy meat and fish' Halima Abubakar

Male Opinions

'Sometimes the mai gida buys food for the family soup and sometimes the uwar gida, but the mai gida gives her the money' Malam Yahaya


'In some families the wives decide what to buy for soup and in others the husbands decide. If there is only one wife it is easier for her to cook what she likes. It is best if the wife and husband decide, but the husband must decide sometimes because the wife may decide to cook something costly that the husband cannot afford. The husband has responsibility for feeding so he has to think of economy in feeding.' Malam Mohammed Yusuf

Paraphrased from household budget interviews September 1992

While women appear as food purchasers for their households, in order to determine to what extent they are providers, it is necessary to compare the amounts women and men spend on food. On average men spend nearly four times more on food than women do, which means that women provide just about one fifth to one quarter of all household food needs (Figure 6.4). But caution is needed in considering this figure - it may be a conservative estimate because women wishing to be seen in interviews to conform to 'ideal' behaviour consequently underestimate their spending on food; or the figures may be overestimates because some amounts recorded as food expenditure by women may have been later reimbursed by husbands. Indeed, quite a lot of women's expenditure on the household could be transfers from their husbands because women appear to spend (Table 6.7) more than they earn (Chapter 5).[37]

The second important area of provisioning ensuring households' reproduction is the acquisition of non-food goods and services. Distinguishing between women's expenditure on goods and services for the household and for themselves proved almost impossible in processing the data. Goods like washing powder, soap, matches, and kerosene are likely to be used by a woman for her own personal use, in her trade activities as well as by her husband and children. Where distinctions were possible it appears women spend 4.5 times more money on goods and services for themselves, than for their households.

Figure 6.5 Average Total Expenditure by Gender



By spending more on themselves this would appear to confirm the ideology that women are not totally, but are more often provided for, than are providers for their families. It may also be considered a highly unusual finding as generally women are found to engage in maternal unselfishness, putting expenditure on their children above purchases for their own needs. Distinguishing men's expenditure on goods and services in terms of personal expenditure for themselves and purchases of goods and services for their households was easier. Men reported spending 1.7 times more on goods and services for themselves, than for their households. On average men are able to spend more on themselves because they have more money (as portion of own income and net amounts) than women for non-essential purchases. Compared to women, on average, men spend three times more than women on goods and services overall.

Considering total expenditure, women's spending on average is roughly two-thirds on food and one third on goods and services. Table 6.7 also shows that men spend proportionally more of their total expenditure than women on goods and services and less on food because they also contribute nearly a quarter of their spending on farm inputs. But overall men have a higher level of spending (Figure 6.4) which is 4.5 times the average amount for women (Table 6.7). Of the average total expenditure for

[37] Alternatively, women underreported their income, overestimated their expenditure and/or

households only 19% is by women (Figure 6.4). Women's household food purchases in Zarewa are not unusual as other rural studies also found women contributing to household food needs (Norman et al. 1982: 113-4).

So spending patterns in the disposal of women's incomes show women contributing to the means of reproduction for their households meeting nearly a quarter of household needs, presumably from their own earnings, although men have considerably greater incomes and purchasing power than women. As well as contributing to household needs both women and men face powerful normative expectations of spending and giving especially around reproductive life events (births, weddings, deaths) and obligations to family members in need. Thus, women need money for small gifts at namings, births, deaths and marriages which invest in kin and friendship networks. Although in theory, and largely in practice, women control their own income, these incomes remain small (compared to men's incomes). Furthermore, because of having to contribute to household reproduction, as well as generational reproduction (weddings, naming ceremonies) women appear less able to invest, or build up capital.

There are also spatial aspects to patterns of income disposal. Men make purchases mostly in periodic markets and in the village. Secluded women have lower mobility and do not attend markets, but send children to make purchases on their behalf from stores and stalls in village public spaces, or from secluded women traders in other domestic spaces. Women also make their own purchases from child and elderly women house-to-house hawkers.

Analysis of income disposal requires data which is difficult to collect and difficult to ensure completeness. The data presented here, although not wholly ideal, nevertheless firmly contradict cultural and locally held normative expectations that women do not contribute financially to household reproduction.

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underreported *kudin cefane* received.

6.7 CHANGING SPACES OF GENDER AND POWER IN REPRODUCTION

Seclusion and other gender ideologies and practices are maintained by women's and men's actions and non-actions. Gender relations are continually reproduced as social institutions and part of the social fabric. Sustaining and reproducing them depends on the socialisation of women and men to act to ensure their reproduction, rather than restructuring. But social shifts do occur over time, often in response to economic and other changes.

For instance, diffusion and adoption of grinding machines during the post-colonial period has mechanised some food processing, releasing some women from certain time and energy consuming activities of daily reproduction and freeing time for trade/leisure. Although mechanisation has also eradicated manual pounding and grinding grain and other food ingredients (but not rice husking) as an income source for some women it has not changed overall gender divisions of labour or gender inequalities. If anything they have been reinforced as men own and profit from operating grinding machines while women pay to use them.

Another aspect of social reproduction and gender relations which has changed in recent decades is the virtual disappearance of *bori*, the female dominated non-Muslim spirit possession cult, and *gidan mata* (houses of unmarried women providing sexual services), from Zarewa, if not from other rural settlements. Decreasing tolerance of *bori* and *gidan mata* appears to have shifted women's spaces of social power in places like Zarewa in post-colonial Northern Nigeria. The practice of *bori* spirit cults, often associated with *gidan mata* no longer takes place overtly in Zarewa. There were about four to six *gidan mata* in Zarewa but like *bori* are now completely absent, according to informants[38] and observations, although recounted by elderly residents and Baba of Karo (Smith 1954: 43, 63-4, 222-226, 229) as features of village life in the not too distant past.[39] For example, Lariya Hadiza reported *'In Zarewa there used to be one house that was a gidan mata...but now it is no longer there'* (life story interview extract).

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[38] Interviews with female informants Lariya Hadiza, Mariya Salisu, Hajiya Amina Maigida, Rukkaiya Gambo and Maryam Gwamma.

[39] From earlier literature *bori* and *gidan mata* were expected to be features of village life and important spaces of women's agency, but despite concerted efforts to find otherwise no current evidence for these activities could be found while villagers insisted they were a feature of the past.

Declining *bori* and *gidan mata* represent significant decreases in women's spaces and/or a shift to other places - possibly settlements on major roads where manufactured beer is available. Among the reasons given for the disappearance of *bori* and *gidan mata* by Zarewa's elderly female informants are the prayers of male Islamic teachers which meant the prostitutes left (possibly driven out). Mariya Salisu recounted when interviewed '*In Zarewa there were six gidan mata, but the malams prayed and all the prostitutes in the town left and today there are no more gidan mata.*' A second reason given by Rukkaiya Gambo, for example, is that '*Today there are still some dan bori in Zarewa, but these days the spirits do not ride them anymore and so they do not perform*' Thirdly, Hajiya Maigida reported *'In Zarewa there may be one old woman still doing bori, but mostly they have all died...In the Fegi ward there used to be bori dancing in Gidan Salima, but not any more.*' Similarly, Maryam Gwamma recounted in her lifestory interviews that '*In Zarewa there used to be a lot of bori cult adepts, but they have mostly died... there used to be lots of gidan mata, but now all the prostitutes have left because the men who kept charge of the gidan mata have died.*' These explanations can be interpreted as different ways of accounting for the termination of particular cultural practices. However these practices died out, as a consequence there are now fewer choices of lifestyle for women in Zarewa. To be unmarried *karuwai* women must go to another village, or city.

Barkindo suggests that pimps[40] and prostitution have been facing decreasing tolerance in Kano city since about 1970, with growing Islamism (1993: 94). It would appear that spread of Islamism from urban areas to rural places like Zarewa has also reduced the toleration of *bori* and *gidan mata*, resulting in decreasing autonomous spaces for women.[41] A further possible explanation for the intolerance of 'non-Islamic' behaviour may be partly linked to the fact that Zarewa is a particularly strong centre for Koranic study. Although there were greater numbers of scholars there in the past, many boys still come to Zarewa to study as *almajarai*.[42] Possibly, Zarewa is a particularly

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[40] Transexual/homosexual men (*'yan dauda*) may also occupy *gidan mata* acting as pimps (Pittin 1983). No *'yan dauda* were identified in Zarewa during fieldwork.

[41] As seclusion spread from urban classes to rural areas, so has intolerance of *bori* and prostitution. It is not a new observation that rural peasants follow urban centres in adopting innovations.

[42] This characteristic of Zarewa was confirmed by Malam Babajo, himself an elderly Koranic scholar.

'religious' place, but recent (1988-9) surveys of two rural Kano state settlements also found no *karuwai* (Imam 1993: 38).

6.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As in Theroux's description of a Ugandan village which opened this chapter, the efforts and energies of rural Hausa dwellers are largely directed towards sustaining life via simple reproduction for many households (some wealthy households also achieve expanded reproduction), thereby enabling continuation of the processes of production examined in Chapter 5.

In the introduction to this chapter several variables were set out to examine gender, space and power in reproduction. Section 6.1 considered household farm products used for reproductive use showing male farmers control of food crop allocation for household consumption. Section 6.2 showed households' own produced food is supplemented by food purchases, mostly by men who ideologically are expected to provide for their dependent household members. The answer to the questions 'Is ownership and acquisition of means of reproduction gendered?' (section 6.3) is 'yes'. Women collect water, own equipment for manual food processing, give birth and do most child care at risk to their health and at loss to their trading careers, and overall are disadvantaged in accessing healthcare. The men own grinding machines which make a profit from food processing, provide firewood, get most education (except in Islamiyya primary schools), construct and repair housing.

The nature of gender divisions in reproductive labour examined in this chapter (especially section 6.4) reveals that women have the heaviest responsibility for the unpaid and generally low status tasks necessary for generational, social and daily continuation of the household. Although children (particularly girls) provide a further source of reproductive labour, in part controlled and utilised by women to contribute to daily household work. This pattern is common elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa: women do unpaid and unvalorised work in the house - spatially the private sphere. Thus, married adult women spend most of their time secluded in the house doing domestic tasks. The means of reproduction are such that rural Hausa women have not been entirely 'liberated' from the burden of reproductive work by labour saving technology but grinding machines have reduced the labour intensiveness of food

preparation. The use of women's labour in the reproduction processes is controlled by patriarchal expectations about gender divisions and the socio-culturally defined responsibilities of women.

Much reproductive work is gendered as female. Many men rely largely on women (usually their mothers or wives) to perform some essential reproductive tasks (e.g. food preparation) for them. In addition, seclusion ties married women to the reproductive sphere is a mechanism in male control of their sexuality and effectively transfers some domestic labour (e.g. firewood provision, food purchasing) to men. However, seclusion shifts very little actual daily domestic labour onto men because children substitute, being sent (by men and women) on errands (e.g. to make purchases) even if husbands are responsible for paying for those basic needs. In Zarewa while men are responsible for providing firewood, they simply bring bundles of cornstalks from the fields, or in wealthier households buy firewood, but do not go out to forage and gather. Only poor unsecluded women undertake this low status activity. Women may decide how to use their own time, but the heavy demands of childbearing, raising infants, caring for children and ensuring the provision of daily meals (even with rotating systems of polygynous cooking schedules) mean women have less time for leisure (and hence presumably also income earning) than men. Thus, as Walby (1990) suggests, the construction of domestic work as female can be identified as a structure through which patriarchy operates.

However, the perception of what is gendered, and how, varies with the perspective taken. Thus, there is slippage between the gender divisions. This is particularly so in decision making, according to men and according to women (examined in section 6.5). It is further demonstrated above that there is slippage between Muslim Hausa socio-religious prescriptions of the ideal, and actual reality. There are very few non-productive secluded women who do not contribute to household reproduction (perhaps newly married young wives) and likewise there are almost no men who are sole providers. There exists a large gulf between women's and men's experiences and the ideal model.[43] In some activity areas contributing to households' survival and well-being, notably within reproduction, women are the overwhelming providers and

men the provided for, as recipients of domestic services. In other areas, especially farming, production and provision of household food men are the overwhelmingly dominant (but not sole) providers.

The final variable set out at the start of this chapter concerned the gendering of income disposal (analysed in section 6.6). From Chapter 5 we know that women have less income to dispose of than men. Ideologically men are expected to use their income to meet the needs of their dependants (namely wives and children) and indeed almost half their income is spent this way. However, farming (which goes to meet household needs too) also accounts for over a fifth of men's expenditure. But still men spend nearly one third of their income on themselves. In direct contrast, most women use more of their income to buy food for the household, than for other non-food expenditure (Figure 6.4, Table 6.7). Reasons why wives contribute some of their income to meet household needs, that culturally are considered husbands' responsibility, may include the fact that in some cases husbands simply are unable to generate enough income to support their dependants as expected. Women may choose to contribute to meeting household needs to ensure household survival and to increase their bargaining power by not being entirely dependent.

It would appear from the data that power relations exist along gender lines in the institutions of Hausa households. Women do not wield equivalent power as men, e.g. in decision making power and monetary spending power. In relation to this thesis' central research question concerning the links between women's income earning and empowerment, it is regrettable that the data are inadequate to show whether there are intra-household differences in expenditure patterns depending on the relative importance of women's income. But, nevertheless, there are some useful insights concerning decision-making and control of income. It has been shown that decisions concerning reproduction and expenditure on household reproductive needs are largely areas of male control; but, that women control their own income, and, we have shown that men's and women's decision making are not as separate as men presume. Furthermore, the data illustrate that gendered individual budgets/strands of income and expenditure within the same household are not completely separate, but

[43] Fatima Mernissi calls it a "...male fantasy of the 'husband provider', who supports his wife and

transactions occur between men and women. For example, men give women money (*kudin cefane*) to buy daily household meal ingredients from which it is imaginable women might save from for their own purposes (if the amounts were large enough); or if the *kudin cefane* they receive (if any) is insufficient women meet household needs from their own income.

Having shown that women have smaller incomes than men, should women be expected to have an equal, lesser or greater, role in decisions about expenditure of money they have not earned? It has been suggested, e.g. in Sen's co-operative conflict model (Sen 1990), that individual's decision-making in allocating household income is closely related to their role in generating that income. If this suggestion is correct, then the expected finding would be male dominance in areas of solely male income generation, e.g. farm production. Indeed, it is the case that Hausa men farm, acquire income from agricultural production and have control over its expenditure, primarily for reinvestment in farming and to meet household needs.

Furthermore, although women dominate reproduction processes, both in terms of time input and ownership of tools (e.g. cooking utensils) if not all the other means of reproduction (e.g. grain and food stores), these are not income sources and women do not control all the decisions ensuring reproduction. These decisions concern expenditure of considerable income earned by men. Not least because of overall greater male acquisition of income, men largely control decision making, cash resources and its expenditure. Thus, women and children are at the bottom of the expenditure hierarchy. So the small incomes women do earn are generally channelled into meeting a portion of household reproduction needs (i.e. making up male shortfalls) and expected patterns of social expenditure. This may appear to limit possibilities for empowerment, for example, via spending on personal indulgence (e.g. buying cloth, going on Hajj), or by investing in further income earning. However, by choosing to spend some of their income on household food women may increase their bargaining power within the household. Indeed we should not assume that women are 'forced' to use their small incomes to meet needs which culturally husbands are expected to meet because the option to choose otherwise, even to exit the marriage, is

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children" (1988: 7).

ever present. Women initiated divorce rates and remarriage are high in Hausaland. The reality is that women having their own money to do with as they please is something of a myth. Women effectively subsidise their husbands by contributing to meeting the daily consumption needs of their household. Women's small incomes are necessary and used to meet the demands of children and the household. Women may continue to do this knowledgeably if it is preferably to divorce, e.g. because they do not want to lose custody of their children.

The few exceptions of successful secluded women traders are considered in the next chapter on gender and trading. In relation to reproduction the proposition that there are links between reproduction and trading patterns is examined by scrutinising trading processes to identify their spatial and gendered nature.

CHAPTER 7

WHOSE PLACE IS IN THE MARKET?: GENDER, SPACE AND TRADING

> *"Trade within a Hausa community never ceases; children hawk cooked foods around the village from dawn till dusk; petty traders keep tables laden with kola nuts, cigarettes, matches, soap, kerosene at their entrance hut, while carrying on some craft or conversation. However, the great bulk of exchanges takes place at the regular market meeting"* (Smith 1965: 127-8)

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding two chapters have examined gender, space and power in the organisation of production and reproduction in Zarewa. This chapter turns that focus onto the third set of social and economic processes in which rural Hausa women's and men's positions of power are entwined: processes of circulation and market exchange. In relation to the central research foci of the thesis, two key questions are tackled. First, 'What circulation activities financially empower which women (and men)?' Secondly, 'Does seclusion limit women's incomes and accumulation?' 'If so, how?'.

7.1.1 Spatial and Gender Embeddedness Of Circulation

Commodity circulation and exchange is embedded in space. Transport costs, transaction costs (including information costs) and marketed surpluses vary systematically with linear, and culturally perceived, distance. Long-distance traders operate across the largest distances. At the medium scale there are traders who attend two, or three, local periodic (weekly) markets. Traders confined to trade within rural settlements operate across the shortest distances.

Markets are also embedded in gender relations. Gender and spatial embeddedness interact to produce a set of gendered market institutions operating at specific spatial scales. In this chapter the forces and relations of distribution are examined for the rural traders of Zarewa.[1] The village has no periodic market, however, participation in

[1] In Zarewa there are not enough of each and every possible trader type for a systematic survey, but case studies provide richly detailed examination of trading forms.

local nearby periodic markets is important to the local economy. As this chapter's opening quotation emphasises, trade is ubiquitous in Hausa communities. It has already been shown in Chapter 5 (and Appendix II) that many men and women in Zarewa engage in a wide range of income earning activities including trading.

Table 7.1 Trading Institutions by Space & Gender[2]

Scale of Trade/ Selling Point	Female Trading Institutions	Male Trading Institutions
Village Trade	House Traders (secluded & unsecluded women) Hawkers (children & unsecluded women)	*'*Yan Tebur*[3] *Mai Kanti*[4] House Traders Artisans
Periodic Marketplace Trade	Intermediaries & Hawkers for secluded women Unsecluded Women Traders	Butchers, Grain Middlemen, Retailers of provisions, cloth, haberdashery, and agricultural produce etc.
Extra-Regional Trade	-------none------	Long-distance Merchant Wholesalers

* Throughout this chapter where there are no precise and succinct English equivalents indigenous Hausa trading terms are used. These terms are defined at first reference and appear in the glossary.

Trading institutions for Zarewa traders are identified firstly by gender and secondly, by location of selling point i.e. spatial scale of trade, falling into three categories of intra-village trade, periodic marketplace trade and long-distance trade (Table 7.1). This categorisation was evolved as a way of organising information about traders resident in Zarewa. It provides a scheme,[5] for organising complex realities. Individuals may engage in different modes of trade simultaneously and changes in activity are frequent in response to changing economic, or personal, circumstances including life cycle and seasonal changes.

The material presented in the following sections draws from fieldwork data (see Chapter 2) on traders and their activities to examine the forms and operations of trade

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[2] The table covers all the trading activities reported by adult men and women in the random household sample. The sample, however, did not include all types of trader in Zarewa. So based on additional observation 'missing' types of trader are also included. Furthermore, several institutions of trade observed occasionally in Zarewa are not included here because they fall outside the framework of traders resident in the village, e.g. peripatetic Igbo women traders who hawk goods from house to house, Fulani women who sell milk products by the roadside.

[3] See Table 7.2.

[4] See Table 7.2.

[5] Albeit not without limitations, e.g. not every trading individual falls neatly into a single category.

that male and female village, marketplace and long distance traders of Zarewa engage in. The framework used here (established in Chapter 2) to analyse the gendered political economy of the processes and relations of circulation is based on a range of variables intersected by space and gender. For each trade level the following variables are examined:

Forces of distribution - activities (commodities, time input, scale, supply of goods, prices and quantities, profits and turnover), resources of labour, information, assets, mobility, credit, entry capital, savings, and investment.

Relations of distribution - organisation of labour, dispute regulation.

The chapter concludes with discussion of women's empowerment via trading.

7.2 GENDERED INTRA-VILLAGE TRADE

7.2.1 Male and Female Village Traders[6]

In the household survey 22% of men were village traders who can be categorised (Table 7.2) into four types: *'yan tebur*, (Plate 7.1), *mai kanti* (Plate 7.2), house traders and artisans.

Table 7.2 Male Village Traders

Trader Type	Description	Ethnicity	% (n) Composition
'Yan Tebur	Table top traders - sell snacks, meat provisions outside their houses and situate at street corners and under shade trees in adhoc informal groups	Hausa	10% (4) male village traders
Mai Kanti	Sell goods (e.g. grocery provisions, medicines, motor spares) from lockup stores and kiosks	Mostly Igbo migrants (young single) from Southern Nigeria, some Hausa	negligible % - less than half a dozen in Zarewa
House Traders	Sell goods (e.g. fertiliser, grain, petrol) from their homes	Hausa	14% (5) male village traders
Artisans	Skilled workers and craftsmen (e.g. tailors, builders) who need only skill and tools to operate and not capital: petty commodity producers cum traders	Hausa	76% (24) male village traders

[6] I am hugely indebted to the traders interviewed, especially for the trust and candour which some of them showed me in opening their books and records to my scrutiny and discussing turnover.




Plate 7.1 *Dan tebur* selling on street in Zarewa.



Plate 7.2 Igbo trader inside his shop in Zarewa.

Village trading by women takes the forms of house trading by married secluded women and hawking via children, as well as more mobile trading by unsecluded

widows[7]. This feature of the socio-economy of Hausaland has attracted much scholarly attention, although most of the work on Hausa women's trading and income earning activities has been within urban environments, particularly in the cities of Kano, Katsina and Kaduna.[8] With the exception of work by Hill (1969a, 1971, 1972, 1977), Simmons (1973, 1975), Jackson (1978, 1981), Longhurst (1980, 1982), Imam (1993) and Tarfa (1999) (the fieldwork for much of which was conducted some decades ago) detailed study of women's trade in rural areas of Northern Nigeria has been scarce, although it receives passing mention by many scholars.

The trading activities of secluded women are especially important as interlinkages between households. Secluded women traders form what is referred to as a 'honeycomb market' (Hill 1969a: 369) in which women in individual households form the cells of an economically interconnected, but spatially separated equivalent of a marketplace. The forms of trade open to women, how, and how much women earn, as well as whether, and how, their earnings are empowering are examined in this chapter.

Women's participation in trade varies during the lifecourse. Some sense of occupational histories was obtained by collecting women's life histories. Unmarried girls hawk goods, but they do not trade in the first few years of marriage especially during the first year of complete seclusion.[9] They often begin trading on a small scale - selling snacks is the most common occupation for secluded women under 20 years (Table 7.3) who then move onto, or additionally take up, selling a few foodstuffs such as sugar and salt. Knitting is a craft of only a few young women, indicating their conspicuous leisure and status as newly married women dependent on husband's support, as it is a labour intensive, low return craft.

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[7] Divorced women are also unsecluded, but they are generally few in number (only 1% of the women sampled in this research) and they usually remarry quickly. Being divorced is a transitory status during which women rarely have time and resources to establish trading. For these reasons divorced women do not appear specifically in this analysis of women traders.

[8] For Kano, see Bashir (1972), Callaway (1984, 1987a), Frishman (1991), Schildkrout (1979, 1983) and Werthmann (1995a, 1995b); for Katsina see Pittin (1979, 1988, 1991); and for Kaduna see Coles (1991).

[9] Generally women do not start trading until after the birth of their first child.

Table 7.3 Trades of Secluded Women Traders by Age

TRADE\AGE	<20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	71+	Totals	%
Trade - foodstuffs	10	17	9	2	1			**39**	25.8%
Prepare/sell food	4	14	13	3	3			**37**	24.5%
Prepare/sell snacks	12	4	1					**17**	11.3%
Shell groundnuts	4	4	3	4				**15**	9.9%
Husking rice	5	6	3	1				**15**	9.9%
Process/sell foodstuffs	4	2	3	1	2			**12**	7.9%
Pounding	4	5	2					**11**	7.3%
Hairplaiting	1	6						**7**	4.6%
Tailoring	2	4						**6**	4.0%
Spinning	1				1		2	**4**	2.6%
Trade - non-foodstuffs		1	1		2			**4**	2.6%
Knitting	2	2						**4**	2.6%
Leatherwork		1						**1**	0.7%
Totals	**49**	**66**	**35**	**11**	**9**	**0**	**2**	**172***	**

*172 income earning occupations were reported by 151 secluded women in the household sample. Some women have no trades, others multiple occupations

**Totals greater than 100% because some women pursue more than one trade line

For women during their main reproductive period (21-40 years) selling cooked food is the most common occupation. Pounding is limited to women under 40 years who have the physical strength it requires. Tailoring is a 'modern' skill restricted to women of the younger generation (under 30 years). As they get older women move into more secure and established occupations. The only trade recorded by married women over 60 years (claiming seclusion) is spinning – a 'traditional' female craft that is not physically arduous.[10] Women stop trading when either their elderly frailty makes it impossible, or their relations provide for them. A quarter of women (secluded and unsecluded) in the sample do not trade at all - among the reasons cited were being newly married, recently widowed, recently given birth, too busy with household responsibilities, 'no money' and too old.[11] While most women (48%) have just a single trade, many combine more than one trading activity: 23% have two trades, 3.5% three, and 1.2% four trades. The combinations are diverse. Selling cooked food and snacks

[10] In Batagarawa in the late 1960s 85% married women engaged in spinning (Hill 1969a: 399), but spinning is no longer a near universal activity for rural Hausa women. In Zarewa today very few women spin.

[11] Pittin suggests where all married women have the 'leisure' of seclusion, the ultimate expression of wealth and status is deliberate non-utilisation of 'leisure' time for trade and personal economic advancement (1984: 475). While this is the case for a minority of elite urban women, it does not seem to hold true for rural women as generally women in Zarewa were unable to afford conspicuous idleness other than for short periods associated with life events.

is very common because it is compatible with women's reproductive burdens and the confines of seclusion.

In Zarewa today there are few secluded women house traders who sell grain. This contrasts starkly with the situation in Batagarawa, described in the late 1960s, of secluded women controlling all the buying and selling of grain within the village (Hill 1969a, 1971, 1972: 268-9, 1977: 178-9). In the past there were more women grain traders in Zarewa, but with its increasing commercialisation and profitability it has become masculinised and the centre of its activity moved into periodic markets beyond operation at the village scale. Later in the chapter this important transition is discussed further. The few female grain traders in Zarewa today sell grain mostly on credit to other secluded women traders for food selling businesses. Usually they buy the grain in the market, sending intermediaries to make purchases. There are also widows engaged in grain selling in the village. Women also sometimes buy or keep gifts of produce around harvest time reselling it when prices rise. It is a risky activity that requires capital to invest short term unless trade is restricted to grain, or other produce, received as gifts from male farming relatives. The irregular nature of this activity means systematic data on it could not be collected.

Women traders frequently change trade activities responding to availability of child labour, the costs/availability of inputs, availability of start-up capital, or personal conditions (e.g. childbirth, illness). Frequent change is a familiar characteristic of women's trade (as already identified in Chapter 5, section 5.3). Although secluded trade by women appears very buoyant with a lot of economic activity taking place, the reality is that all the time many ventures fail and many start out. As well as the many women traders who engage in economic activities intermittently with little permanence, or accumulation, there are also a few established and successful women traders who have stable businesses and significant 'profits' giving them ability to accumulate and invest. As elaborated later, part of the success of these few women is due to the lack of frequent changes or breaks in their trading careers and ability to maintain a combination of different economic activities. This is part of the differentiation among women traders.

FORCES OF DISTRIBUTION

(i) Time input

Less than a third of all men but 75% women engage in village trading. Rural Hausa men trade in addition to farming. Only the Igbo *mai kanti* and chemists are full-time male village traders (Plates 7.3, 7.4). Village trading is seasonal for women and men. Recall time use data shows that trading occupies more than twice as much of men's time in the dry season when male farmer-traders spend 8½ hours on village trading activities on an average 'trading day';[12] than in the farming season when the average is only 3.5 hours.




Plate 7.3 Igbo trader outside his store in Zarewa.

[12] Village farmer-traders do not necessarily trade every day because of competing demands on their time from farm work etc.




Plate 7.4 Chemist in his shop.

The time women spend trading, is often interspersed with numerous other daily activities. Unlike male village traders they do not report farming related seasonal variations in trade activities. The time use data reveals that on average, 'trading days' secluded women traders spend just over 2 hours/day engaged in trading activities. Among secluded women there is considerable variation from 15 mins/day to 8¼ hours/day. Time input variations can be accounted for because occupations vary in the amount of time they require. Even the same occupation may be pursued with variable intensity by different individuals and even by the same woman at different times. Some activities vary in intensity according to demand, e.g. women tailors may spend most of every day sewing in the week before *sallah* (Eid), but only a couple of hours a day, or week, at other times of year when business is slack. Food preparation can be very time intensive: some *kosai*, *koko* and *waina* sellers spend up to 3-4 hours/day seven days a week preparing and selling one food line. Those who prepare several types of food for sale at different times of day may spend up to 8 hours/day on this activity. Some trading activities are intermittent carried out in conjunction with childcare and domestic labour, e.g. selling provisions requires short inputs of time when customers (children, or older women) come into the compound to buy things.

Women have to find time to trade in competition with other family obligations, e.g. rearing children, participating in family ceremonies and the like. Thus, trading for all women is a part-time activity in addition to their domestic reproductive obligations (as already indicated in Chapter 5, section 5.3). This largely accounts for the average time women spend on village trade being lower than that for men. The costs of biological reproduction for women's potential earnings are high. A child entails the reduction, or cessation, of women's trading for some, or all, of the 9 months of pregnancy. No income earning is possible during the 40 days after the birth due to custom and observance of ritual bathing. This is followed by at least 4 - 5 months not trading after the birth because of the need to breast-feed and complex cultural taboos and observances (e.g. dietary restrictions and requirements) for mother and child during the post-natal period (known as *jego*). In total women forego at least a year's income with each pregnancy.[13] As pointed out already in Chapter 6 (section 6.3.3), on average Zarewa women over 45 years old have 4.1 living children, with a survival ratio of 0.53. Thus, in a lifetime they forgo at least 7.7 years of income earning which hinders long-term accumulation and trade expansion because of the interruptions to, and time lost from, trading. For men, fatherhood has no such impact on trading activities and they tend to become progressively bigger traders over the life-course.

(ii) Scale

Male village traders operate across a range of scales from the large-scale, full-time Igbo *mai kanti*, with the largest range of commodities (e.g. 171 lines) of any trader in the village, to the occasional *dan tebur* selling a few sticks of sugarcane. For Hausa men in Zarewa trading is a secondary activity to farming, so they generally trade at a smaller scale than Igbo full-time traders in the village. For the majority of secluded women trade is small-scale, but there are considerable variations among traders. Scale is difficult to measure, but generally the few larger scale secluded traders deal with more commodities, have higher inputs and greater turnover (even ten times more) than most smallest-scale traders.

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[13] Jackson (1981: 236-7) makes a similar calculation.

(iii) Supply of goods

Male village traders generally obtain their commodity supplies from nearby periodic markets, or larger markets further afield in Zaria and Kano cities. Perishables (e.g. bread, fruit, meat) are obtained as often as twice weekly. Most traders make journeys to purchase stock themselves, but may occasionally send someone on their behalf. Petrol and bottled drinks, however, are supplied directly, but sporadically, to the village. Petrol is delivered by tanker from the Kaduna refinery. Deliveries are irregular (up to fortnightly) because of mismanagement, breakdowns, strikes and so on.

There are various sources from which secluded women traders obtain ingredients, raw materials and commodity supplies for resale. Sources include husbands and male kin (for grain and agricultural produce), other secluded women traders (for grain and other ingredients), male village traders (for provisions to resell in smaller quantities) and periodic markets. Women identify suppliers through networks of kin, neighbours, friends, household visitors, knowledge of the village and its commercial environs. Trust is established either on the basis of kinship, friendship, personal acquaintance or via introduction by another trusted individual known by both parties.

By not always operating face to face with their suppliers secluded women may be more vulnerable to chicanery than male village traders, but their intermediaries (children and kin) take steps on their behalf to prevent such behaviour wherever possible.

(iv) Prices & quantities

Women traders sell commodities in the smallest units and lowest unit prices for direct consumption. Some male traders also deal in very small units but others deal in larger quantities which they may sell (sometimes on commission basis) to other smaller scale male or female traders to sell. Prices and quantities vary little between individual

traders (i.e. across space), but change seasonally and over time.[14] Competition between traders keeps prices at minimum levels because customers (except secluded women) have flexibility to buy from the trader with lowest prices (per unit volume).

Selling prices of individual items sold by secluded women traders are generally low (average ₦0.98) - less than a third of the average (₦3.5) for items sold by male village traders. Grains and beans per *tiya* are higher priced, but women may also sell these in smaller unstandardised units to buyers unable to afford a full *tiya*.

(v) Profits and turnover

Turnover varies daily. For example, turnover for an Igbo *mai kanti*, is 5-8 times higher on market days than on other days because the number of retailers and outlets is effectively increased by his brother and other men (on commission) taking goods to sell in the market. Other seasonal variations in turnover relate to cultural and religious observances. For many traders, turnover reaches an annual peak during Eid - a festival of consumption and is at its lowest in September preceding harvest when there is little spare cash. However, long term trends of economic decline (1991-3) appear stronger than short term annually based seasonal fluctuations. At this 'low season' many women, and even some men, cease trading temporarily because as they say 'ba kudi' (no money).

'Yan tebur, house traders and artisans when asked about profits frequently made comments to the effect '*Unable to say exactly how much gain, because it is only an educated man who can calculate everything to know how much he gains*', or '*Cannot say, all I know is I get income from the work and use it to solve my problems*'. Although *riba* is the Hausa word which most closely corresponds to 'profit', not all traders were able to respond to the question of *riba* in monetary terms correlating precisely to the difference between revenues and costs. So only the best estimates can be given.

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[14] The fieldwork period 1991-93 was generally a time of rising prices for consumer items.

Overall, of male institutions of village trade, *kanti* are most profitable (Table 7.4), have largest stocks and highest levels of turnover; while *'yan tebur* are towards the opposite end of the scale. Exceptional wealthy merchant house traders have high absolute returns from capital intensive activities like taxi ownership but most house traders have considerably lower levels of return. Artisans have lowest levels of return. Constraints on the accumulation and expansion of artisans include intense competition and lack of co-operation among them as a group. If individual artisans manage to move beyond the threshold of low profitability associated with artisan activities they generally move into other trades. For male village traders and artisans the range of net returns from trade (₦40-₦4,650/week) is considerable with few (mostly full time Igbo traders) occupying the upper end of the scale.

Table 7.4 Returns of Male Village Traders

Male Village Trader		Weekly Net Returns
Mai Kanti	provisions	₦4,650
	provisions	₦2,000
	chemist	₦1,300
	provisions	₦390
House Trader	taxi owner	₦2,700
'Yan Tebur	tea stallholder	₦280-350
	fish seller	₦120-200
Artisans	radio repairer	₦70
	bicycle repairer	₦40

Compared with male village traders, secluded women's trade is characterised by low turnover of capital, low retail prices per item/unit, small price mark-ups and low net returns (₦2-₦360/week) based on representative 'averages'. Cooked food selling appears to have highest returns (up to N360/week), while artisan activities like pounding and knitting have the lowest returns (₦10-₦40/week). The amount of inputs and returns vary, not only between different lines of trade, but also along the scale at which a particular woman carries out that trade, e.g. a woman who makes *kosai* with 1 *tiya* beans each day has costs of ₦58 and net returns of ₦5-10, while a woman who uses 2 *tiyas* of beans at nearly twice the cost (₦93/day) for ingredients makes more than double the net return (₦20/day). So, unsurprisingly, economies of scale mean that women operating at a larger scale have relatively larger net returns.

The difficulties of calculating profit figures has been already identified (Chapter 5, section 5.3), not least because it is impossible to include money values of women's labour time in working out overall returns in trade activities given the absence of a monetised female labour market. Therefore, figures of net 'return' are in the main based on rough estimates because (as Simmons (1975: 147) also found) women do not write down, or calculate their trading accounts. Calculations of net return attempt to identify differentiation within female trade and forms the basis for a gendered comparison of the systematic differentiation between male and female trade.[15]

As already discussed, women generally combine several lines of trade and the scale of trade varies between individual women. Scale is an important determinant of turnover and profit levels. For example, Habiba sells only 10 *tiyas* millet per week, making just ₦20 a week. Ramatu is also a secluded grain trader operating with similar mark-up levels, but makes a return 16 times greater than Habiba because she deals with more commodities (5 grain types) with a correspondingly larger turnover. Few secluded women traders make over ₦100/week - only successful and large-scale food sellers, big grain traders and a few of those combining two, or more, other occupations. In terms of returns most female traders are on a par with the least profitable male traders.

(vi) Labour resources

Male village traders vary in their use of labour. Some Igbo *mai kanti* employ apprentice-assistants and/or other men who take their goods on commission to sell on market days. Some artisans do employ labour. However, most male village traders do not employ wage labour, but may use unpaid assistance of kin. Traders' non-employment of labour is due in part to the small size of 'firms', problems of trust and the costs of labour to traders whose returns are unpredictable.

Secluded women in Zarewa generally trade as individuals, but, unlike male traders, are heavily dependent on the labour of others, mostly children and other kin, as

intermediaries (Plate 7.5). Unsecluded divorced and widowed women can trade directly. Without control of children's labour secluded women could not be economically active. Children take goods, money and information from place to place, as well as carrying out transactions under instructions from their mothers, or other women.




Plate 7.5 Woman trader with children and drying *taliya* (noodles).

Trading and kinship are interlinked. For women who do not trade, the main reason is lack of children to assist. Not all women have access to child labour, especially those who are newly married, infertile, or whose children are grown up. The need for help in trading is one reason why women foster children. Other relatives (sons, brothers,

[15] It was not possible to carry out such a detailed survey as Simmons (1975) or Longhurst (1982: 107-

husbands) and also elderly unsecluded widows are often vital in assisting secluded women to trade, for example, by purchasing raw materials for them in periodic markets, or urban centres.

(vii) Information

Male traders face no particular barriers accessing information. Current market prices, for example, are topics of everyday discussion throughout rural Hausa communities. Bigger traders with larger and more powerful networks may have greater access to information from urban centres, or other regions of the country.

Secluded women do not trade in information vacuums, but obtain information about prices, competitors and suchlike from many sources including male relatives, unsecluded women and children who spend much time in the streets and markets, yet go in and out of the compounds where secluded women are resident. Importantly, information is also exchanged between women living in the same compound and with women in neighbouring compounds - where they can communicate over walls. When women from different compounds meet at naming ceremonies, weddings, visits on occasions of death, birth, sickness and so on they share news and information including about intermediaries and reputational factors. Via rádio, secluded women may also be aware of prices and events affecting trading conditions, e.g. strikes, public holidays. However, there is no doubt that seclusion limits women's access to information outside the compound.

(viii) Assets

Tangible assets of male village traders include commodity stocks, tools and equipment (e.g. sewing machine, workshop) needed for trade. Less tangible assets include skills, contact networks, access to credit, capital and other resources, which cannot easily be measured. Generally bigger, more successful traders have greater assets.

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8).

Bicycle ownership is an asset to many male village traders because it increases mobility. To learn a craft, or trade, may take years and may involve working alongside a 'master', but Hausa skill acquisition does not involve the formal apprenticeship arrangements, unlike for Igbo traders. Retail sale of medicines and petrol requires a formal licence that can represent a significant financial investment.

Children are the biggest economic assets of secluded women traders. Although little child labour is needed for activities like hairplaiting (Plate 7.6), tailoring and pounding, most other lines of trade are highly dependent on child hawking. Furthermore, most trade lines require very little in the way of assets other than ordinary household utensils. *Koko* making requires a large clay pot, *alele* necessitates a set of tins (originally containing evaporated milk) which may last a year, or two, and lack of them deters casual entry into *alele* production.



Plate 7.6 Secluded woman trader - hairplaiting.

Tailoring is the only activity that requires significant financial investment - in a sewing machine, which women in wealthier households may receive as a marriage gift, or which could be inherited.

Girls learn trading skills before marriage by working alongside their mothers. Once married, women may learn preparation of other dishes from co-wives, but most cooking skills for trading are no different from those required by every adult woman in her reproductive responsibilities. Knitting and tailoring are generally learnt from other women in the compound. Formerly, women acquired weaving and spinning skills in their youth, but girls no longer learn these disappearing crafts.

(viii) Mobility

The Igbo *mai kanti* are highly mobile, having travelled long distances from their homes to spend months or years living in Northern Nigeria for trading purposes. Like most of the male village traders, their daily mobility is low as most days are spent serving customers in the store. However, village traders need sufficient mobility to travel fortnightly, weekly or more often to obtain goods for sale outside Zarewa, i.e. in neighbouring periodic markets, the more distant cities of Zaria and Kano, or further afield. Some village traders sell their goods/services in nearby periodic markets once or twice weekly, travelling by minibus-taxi, motorcycle, or bicycle. Artisans are the village traders with lowest mobility because they usually practice their trade only within the village.

As already discussed in Chapter 4, secluded women traders operate from the enclosed private space of the *gida,* this trade is referred to as 'hidden' (Hill 1969a). They engage mainly in house trade, but via hawkers (usually children sent out with trays of goods to sell) they retail goods in the village and less often in periodic markets. It is a cultural practice that Hausa women, except girl hawkers and elderly widow traders, do not go to periodic markets.

(ix) Credit

In general male village traders do not participate in credit relations, because the preconditions for credit including trust, ability to repay and mechanisms for dispute regulation and redress in event of default do not readily exist. However, there are a

few exceptions where credit is extended between known and trusted individuals. Although most *mai kanti* do not generally obtain goods on credit, or extend credit to customers and even have hand-written signs in their stores proclaiming '*ba bashi*' (no credit); some occasionally owe a small amount (<₦100) to a wholesale supplier to be repaid the following week. Larger storekeepers also supply commodities on credit to other village men to retail in periodic markets (or from their *shago*).

Although reluctant to do so, some *mai kanti* extend credit to trusted male customers (*kostoma*, *abokin ciniki*) and occasionally to elderly unsecluded widows. One *mai kanti* acts as pawnbroker giving men temporary loans on custody of a radio or watch. A chemist has an arrangement with a couple of Zarewa men who work in the city, whereby he gives medicine to their wives and children if they need it and receives payment next time the husbands come to Zarewa.

Seclusion is a powerful obstacle for women traders in gaining credit. However, some secluded women establish credit despite lack of regular face to face contact with credit givers. They depend largely on intermediaries. For example, credit may be extended to secluded women for trade inputs - some women collect goods on credit (e.g. washing powder, salt, sugar) from male village store holders and pay after sale. *Mai kanti* say such credit arrangements with secluded women house traders are infrequent and only entered into with a particular secluded trader if she has a trustworthy reputation and they know her husband and children. 'Bigger' women traders even collect a bag/sack of salt from a male storekeeper to sell and give to smaller women traders by the plate (also on credit) for them to sell. However, credit relations remain largely unregulated and may be short lived. Part of the success of big women traders is their ability to establish and maintain strong and stable credit relations, which is achieved in part by proving to be reliable and trustworthy.

Secluded women traders may also give credit to their regular customers. For example, a *fura* seller readily extends two, or three days credit to well known purchasers. Sellers of beans and grains sell mostly on credit, allowing women buyers to pay after they have made and sold *alele*, *kosai*, *koko*, or *fura* to recoup their costs. However,

many secluded women traders are wary of giving credit to customers because they have to send a child, or other relative, to ask for payment, which may not be forthcoming. Ultimately they may be unable to enforce repayment. Women traders in Zarewa confirmed that some customers do not pay for what they buy which causes quarrels and refusal to give them credit again. Some secluded women foodsellers say they can give credit 'to help people out', but cannot go and ask them for the money, so depend on their goodwill to repay. Hence their profits are eroded.

(x) Entry capital

Most male traders' enterprises in Zarewa require start-up capital to buy stock. Establishing a *kanti*, or beginning house trade, in costly items like fertiliser and petroleum products requires greater start-up capital than selling a local product like sugarcane (possibly obtainable on credit) as a *dan tebur*. Igbo apprentices receive from their relatives, or master, a lump cash sum (₦2-3,000) and/or stock at the end of their apprenticeships to begin independent *kanti* trading alone. The Igbo storekeepers in Zarewa each began with capital this way. Trade for larger Hausa businessmen is often organised within *gandu* units until sons are given capital or goods (*uwa*, or *jari*) by their fathers to start their own enterprise, or break-up of the *gandu* unit on death of the *mai gida*. As shown earlier (Chapter 5) agricultural returns are used to finance trading. Successful trading organisations are not generally inherited across generations because trading networks revolve around successful individuals dependent on their individual contacts and personal trust. Furthermore, on a man's death his estate (including trading capital) is subdivided among his offspring according to Islamic procedures (although as identified earlier in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2) women do not always actually receive their inheritance). Thus, sons may prefer to establish their own enterprises once they have gained sufficient means and expertise.

Secluded trading is easy to enter for married women, because it does not violate social expectations of behavioural patterns for secluded women (husbands do not often object to their wives trading, but generally appreciate their being gainfully occupied). Most raw materials can be obtained in the village, relatives can purchase and deliver

materials to the house, cooking and food processing are usual female skills, and necessary equipment and capital are minimal. Like for men, some occupations do not require any financial capital. For example, women can pound grain (for payment), without any entry capital because it requires only labour power, as well as a pestle and mortar - part of every woman's household equipment established on marriage. Likewise, it is possible to begin selling cooked food without capital because ingredients can be purchased on credit and paid for after retailing. Selling small amounts of provisions (like salt, sugar, washing powder) in individual use-portions can also be embarked upon with no financial capital because women can obtain goods on credit from other (sometimes women) traders.

To begin other trades however, women only need a little capital which can come from various sources: skimmed from husbands' allowances for household needs (if they receive such (generous enough) allowances), obtained from selling/pawning personal property, a gift from a relative/female friend, pool from *adashi*, some inheritance, or other gift. For example, husbands may give wives financial capital to begin trading; women may receive some agricultural products at harvest and sell them to begin trading, or they may receive a sewing machine (perhaps on marriage). Inheritance and the intergenerational transfer of resources between women plays a fairly small role in the patterns of female trade because women are often denied inheritance rights. Women in wealthier households are most likely to be recipients of largest capital sums or equipment (e.g. sewing machine), enabling them to establish more lucrative trading activities. These can include rice husking, groundnut processing or large scale provisions selling which need greater amounts of capital to begin, but also have higher returns.

(xi) Savings & investments

It has already been identified (Chapter 5) that men have more savings than women and that savings institutions in Zarewa are gendered, such that banks are used mostly by men and rotating savings associations (*adashi*) by women. Some male traders have bank accounts, but most keep savings concealed in their private rooms. Most smaller

scale male village traders use their meagre returns to meet immediate household needs and to purchase farm inputs. Larger scale investments, where possible, may be made in equipment for trade, e.g. bicycles, sewing machines, grinding machines, or even vehicles. Only one male trader in the village (an Igbo *mai kanti*) contributes (₦600 monthly) to a rotating savings group whose members share identity as Igbo entrepreneurs.

The Igbo *mai kanti* have the largest sums for investment. One of them puts aside ₦50 daily for his 'master' to collect and bank approximately monthly. Another Igbo *mai kanti* in Zarewa keeps his savings (almost ₦10,000) in two bank accounts. He also invested in a bicycle for ₦1,000 in 1991 and plans to buy a van for ₦30,000 (he has half the money already), take on more apprentices, open more shops and when he has saved ₦500,000 he intends to move back to Enugu.

Women reported that they direct the little incomes they have to ceremonies, their *san'a'oi* and meeting household needs. Few secluded women traders (3.8%) reported simply saving their earnings. The majority (40%) invest via ceremonies (*biki*) - a form of exchange with friends. *Biki* takes place between women of equal status whereby women making a gift at an occasion of a wedding, or child naming etc. are expected to return a gift of same, or greater, value at some subsequent occasion. In this way *biki* exchanges are a form of redistribution of returns and investment for greater future return among women as a group. Almost one third (29%) of secluded women traders reinvest profits back into their businesses.

Women also invest (15.4%) in immediate family and kin networks buying things for their household (e.g. washing powder), and their children (snacks and clothing), as well as sending money to kin (especially to elderly mothers). About 4% women mention saving for visits and giving money to relatives. Generosity in giving among friends, neighbours and kin is part of the village moral economy which ensures women reciprocal support in case of personal misfortune such as sickness, theft, divorce, or other loss. Thus, investing in people makes them 'assets' for the investor; and is reflected in the time women spend (approx. 1 hour/day on average) on social

obligations (detailed in Chapter 6). Generally, because of the high likelihood of divorce, women's greater longevity, and unlikelihood of remarriage after their mid-30s, women invest in the security of themselves and their children, rather than tying their fortunes to those of their husbands.

Women's investment of income for 'ceremonies' also includes purchasing household goods (*kayan daki*) for daughters' weddings and contributing to the expenses of sons' weddings. One view (Schildkrout 1983: 124-5) sees this as achieving little because by reinvesting the small profits women and girls make into the marriage system they maintain their subordinate positions as dependent wives. However, ensuring their children marry well is necessary future insurance for secluded women who, when elderly, and widowed, will look to them for support and may need to live with them. Investment of women's savings into *kayan daki*, notably *kwano* (enamel bowls), is argued to be investment in a distinct female economy. However, the kind of 'kwanomania' described by Cohen (1969) among Hausa women of Ibadan in the 1960s and by Jackson (1981: 116-120) for rural Hausa women of Kano state in the 1970s was remarkably absent from Zarewa in the 1990s. Although married women have enamel ware on display in their rooms in glass fronted cabinets they do not appear to actively buy *kwano* from income as a form of savings and status symbol (as remarked on by Douglas & Isherwood (1979: 141-151)). Only 3.8% secluded women traders report investing trading proceeds in personal purchases (cloth, mat, furniture). This would suggest that either women have other avenues for investment, or simply that in a time of economic hardship they have no surplus cash.

Nowadays in Zarewa fewer women (only 3.8%) contribute to *adashi* groups than in previous more stable economic times. Among secluded women traders, those continuing to participate in *adashi* groups are mostly larger scale, more successful traders. From previous studies (Coles 1991: 183, Hill 1969a: 402) it was expected that *adashi* collectors (*uwar adashi* who receives payment in turn from each *adashi* member when receiving her pool) would be prominent women house traders - older and wealthier than the contributors. However, it was found that under the uncertain economic conditions prevailing during the fieldwork only prominent house traders

themselves are still able to contribute to *adashi* groups.[16] No woman interviewed was an *uwar adashi* and the groups they contributed to were almost all run by wealthy men (*mai adashi*, or *ma'aji*) based in marketplaces outside the village. For example, a successful *waina* seller contributes to *adashi* run by an Alhaji who is a motorcycle trader in Markarfi and Sundu markets. Unlike men, secluded women depend on intermediaries (e.g. *fura* seller Bilkisu sends her son) to convey their contributions to these savings groups.

Thus, it is significant that along with the masculinisation of trade, there appears in the face of economic insecurity and instability to be ongoing masculinisation of 'female' savings/credit systems, with their accessibility to women declining. This is an interesting and unusual situation where a few successful women traders stand head and shoulders above the majority of women traders and despite seclusion contribute to essentially male *adashi* networks of accumulation by using trusted male intermediaries. A decline in the ability of women traders to contribute to *adashi* groups has a negative effect on their ability to accumulate.

A very few successful women traders may have the capacity to invest in property. For example, Mariya is a 55-60 year old highly successful secluded trader of foodstuffs and cooked food who has bought a house in a neighbouring village and a plot in Zarewa with her earnings. She rents the house and plans to raise sheep and goats there, as well as to build a house on the plot.

Some women traders in the not so distant past were able to make the pilgrimage to Mecca on their earnings. In the women of the fifty-eight sample households only two had been to Mecca. One very old woman had made the Hajj in the early 1980s with profits of her *daddawa* business. Now she engages only in very small scale trading on an occasional basis. The other Hajiya is a medium-scale trader whose wealthy husband paid for her Hajj. At least three other women in Zarewa are Hajiyas, but all are from particularly wealthy households and are married to Alhajis. Attaining the title

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[16] For example, when interviewed in March 1993 Mariya was contributing ₦140/week to *adashi* groups but by June she had ceased contributions because she said she had no money.

Hajiya brings an increase in social status. Similar investment in the prevailing religious system by many women is their small, but regular, expenditure (in cash, or food) to *almajarai* (Koranic students) who come to compound entrances at regular times of the day loudly calling out blessings to announce their presence. This investment may bring social if not spiritual reward.

Another way women save is with an *asusu*. An *asusu* piggy bank is a savings device used mostly by unmarried girls and a few women. It is a small closed clay container with a slit in the side into which coins girls earn from *talla*, running errands, or given as gifts are placed and kept under the supervision of an older relative. To extract the coins the *asusu* is simply broken - another costs only a few kobo.

RELATIONS OF DISTRIBUTION

(i) Labour organisation

The following pages pull together various items already discussed, as well as some new information to give a complete picture of the labour arrangements of male and female village traders. Male village traders have varying labour arrangements. Of the Hausa *mai kanti*, two run their own businesses alone, another keeps a chemist store unaided for his brother, who owns the business. Of the Igbo storekeepers one runs his general store with his brother assistant-apprentice, another manages a general store on behalf of his absent 'master', and another operates his own chemist shop, while he also has a second chemist shop in a nearby village looked after by an assistant-apprentice. '*Yan tebur* do not usually employ labour, but some artisans employ assistants, e.g. builders often use paid labourers, who may be informal apprentices. Expansion to the status of a big successful house trader requires the labour of sons, e.g. Alh. Yahaya's sons operate a grinding machine and three minibus-taxis for him.

Secluded women in Zarewa trade as individuals and generally do not co-operate in joint ventures with other women in the same compound, although occasionally they work together on tedious preparation tasks (e.g. pounding) and may substitute for one

another in cases of illness, or absence.[17] This ensures valuable clientele are not lost, e.g. when Mariya is away visiting relatives, her 'daughter' (actually her granddaughter) prepares and sells *waina* for her; if Mai Koko is sick one of her co-wives makes the *koko* keeping that days' takings.

Secluded women traders generally use children's (especially girls') labour to hawk goods (*talla*) in the streets, house-to-house and in the marketplace. In the household decision making survey 90% men and 64% women agreed that women control children's labour for *talla*. Children may receive occasional gifts in remuneration, although *talla* at its most sophisticated involves children hawking wares for agreed pay or commission e.g. Hajiya Hafsatu, a cooked food trader, pays a girl from a neighbouring house ₦5-₦7/day to hawk for her. Children may also go to periodic marketplaces and pick up wares from neighbours/traders to sell for commission.

Children act as links between cells in the 'honeycomb' market being 'intermediaries between the male and female domains' (Schildkrout 1983: 108). For children (especially girls) hawking forms a kind of training in trading skills. Children do *talla* from as young as 5 or 6. Girls continue until they marry in their early teens. Boys are less likely to continue hawking into their teens because as children get older their activities become more gender specific and hawking is not seen as a manly activity. Also boys have other options for earning small payments (e.g. cutting grass for fodder), which are not open to girls. Where possible women are more likely to use girls for *talla* than boys because girls are expected to be more closely supervised, biddable and subordinate than boys in their daily activities. Within *talla* boys and girls generally perform similar roles. Child hawkers are usually related to the women trader, but not always. If a woman has no children to do *talla* for her she may easily ask the children of a neighbour or friend. Fostering is also very common thus ensuring that infertile or older women have access to child labour. Older girls trade to accumulate money to buy goods for their marriage. *Talla* is also a way for girls

[17] While co-operation between co-wives is possible the social nature of their relationship largely precludes any such co-operation in actuality - in Hausa the word for co-wife, *kishiya*, derives from the word *kishi* meaning jealousy.

approaching marriage age to be visible to prospective suitors as they can be approached by strangers in public.

Although adults have formal authority, children can, and do, avoid carrying out tasks, including *talla*, by simply absenting themselves or claiming that another adult asked them to do something and because of their limited spatial mobility secluded women are unable to exercise authority in such situations.

Women may (but do not always) pay those who assist them with tasks such as going to market to buy supplies. In urban areas secluded women traders trading on a large scale employ other women (Coles 1991: 175-6), but in rural areas cultural norms appear to prevent such expansion. An established woman food seller in Zarewa expressed a wish to employ a woman assistant (since she was soon to lose her granddaughter's help on marriage), but she reflected gloomily it would be impossible because the villagers would think her a 'prostitute'. Thus, prevailing notions of appropriate female behaviour restrict their economic expansion, hindering accumulation through means of social disapproval including gossip and criticism.

Not all secluded women traders sell their goods by *talla*. Some women rely on customers sending children to their house (Plate 7.7). Even young children are sent to buy goods (with coins tied in a handkerchief pinned on their clothes[18]). Thus, spatial location affects secluded women's trade opportunities. Women trading from compounds in busy areas at the centre of the village are in favourable sites for customers to come to them. In very big compounds, e.g. the village chief's, there is sufficient demand from the women and children within the compound (essentially circulating a small amount of capital by 'taking in each others' washing') to make hawking and external customers unnecessary. However, most secluded women traders combine approaches - selling to other women (or men) in the compound, sending their children hawking and selling to customers who send for purchases. An unusual case is Mariya who sells *waina* from home, mostly to men who come into her house to buy and eat (Plate 7.8). This implies her own seclusion is partial. This is possible because

[18] Even a toddler who can barely talk may be given a coin and sent to buy kolanut from a neighbour.

there are no other secluded women in her household and, although married, Mariya is in her 50s (presumably post-menopause) and at about the end of the secluded period of her life.




Plate 7.7 Child being sent on errand by secluded woman trader.



Plate 7.8 Mariya - successful large scale *waina* seller.

(ii) Regulation of disputes and delinquent behaviour

Information about delinquency and regulation of disputes is not easy to gather. Disputes arise in the operation of all trading institutions, often over the misappropriation of commodities, or capital. Credit is the area over which most disputes occur. If creditors fail to repay after several requests then the trader refuses further transactions. Reclaiming debts by and from secluded women is especially problematic. Most debt defaults are too small to merit taking the matter to the ward head, village chief, or court, but such legal action may be undertaken in serious circumstances.

Theft of cash or goods is another common delinquent behaviour. For traders dealing with large amounts of cash the situation is most risky. For example, an Igbo trader in Zarewa lost ₦5,000 in 1991 to persons claiming they would print money and make him rich. Then in 1993 a calculator worth ₦800 and ₦15,040 in cash were stolen from his apprentice incapacitated by a drugged drink given him in a taxi on his way to buy stocks in Kano. Residents in Zarewa reported how formerly grain and sacks of other farm products could safely be left outside houses but now they must be locked away. In addition a vigilante group of young village men have been organised to patrol the village streets late at night and in the early morning hours, as a form of physical protection of villagers' property with the objective of preventing (i.e. regulating) theft.

Like credit defaulting *adashi* can break down if contributors fail to contribute and/or the *uwar adashi* keeps the pool. These offences are more likely during periods of economic duress. There do not appear to be mechanisms ensuring *adashi* co-operation, apart from social criticism and regard for personal reputation. Many women interviewed in Zarewa said they no longer formed *adashi* groups because they caused only quarrels and bitterness. This may be a result of the situation whereby there is no mechanism of regulation apart from trust and in difficult economic times trust breaks down.

Talla is also fraught with possibilities of 'misbehaviour'. Child hawkers may eat, or give away, what they are supposed to sell; they may drop freshly cooked snacks in the dust, fall over on muddy ground, lose goods, or money, and many other such misfortunes may befall them. Hawkers' co-operation is ensured by the power women wield over children's behaviour by virtue of their authority as adults, parents or guardians. Children may be threatened with punishment for failing to bring home the correct takings. Mostly children co-operate because they feel they are working for payment, usually towards their own marriage expenses that are usually saved on their behalf by their mothers. In this way incentives help regulate child hawkers' behaviour.

Theft is also a type of delinquent behaviour that disrupts secluded trading. Children hawking house-to-house may steal and all manner of other thefts may take place, but generally do not. The close-knit nature of a small community and its informal regulatory mechanisms are usually sufficient deterrent. Petty thieves (especially if male, but not children or women) may be taken to the village chief and even publicly paraded through the village followed by crowds of deriding children.

7.2.2 Female Village Traders - Unsecluded Women

The high mobility of unsecluded women (already identified in Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.) enables them not only to be house traders, but also to hawk goods house-to-house and trade in periodic marketplaces. In spatial terms house-to-house trade involves passing through public space in order to sell goods in private space. A few unsecluded women trade in the public space of periodic markets (e.g. selling *dokuwa* cakes, *zogale* leaves and hand spun cotton) but none set up stalls in the public village streets. Unsecluded women in Zarewa carry out their trading activities individually and independently without reliance on the labour of others. Generally they do not use child hawkers even for cooked food like *koko*, but often prepare and sell food from a *zaure*. This is a semi-public space which opens onto both the public space of the street and the private space of the *gida*. In the time-use records the unsecluded women traders are all widows spending on average nearly three hours per 'trading day' engaged in house trading activities, which is more than for married women. In addition they spend four hours trading around the village. Unsecluded women have

greater spatial mobility than secluded women, so they also have potentially greater access to information which they can supply to secluded women.

Unsecluded women trade similar goods to secluded women, but with a smaller range. Certain goods restricted to unsecluded women include firewood because gathering firewood requires mobility beyond the village. Shelling groundnuts is the most common activity of unsecluded women (Table 7.5). It is highly labour intensive, but can be carried out while sitting down chatting and is favoured by older (50+ years) women, especially those whose infirmities prevent them from more physically demanding trading activities. Like spinning, groundnut shelling is a time-filling activity. Although the returns are small many women say they like to keep their hands busy out of habit and they are also sociable activities.

Table 7.5 Trade Activities of Unsecluded Women by Age

TRADE/AGE	<20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	71+	Totals	%
Shell groundnuts					1	2	2	**5**	23.8%
Process/sell foodstuffs			1		1		1	**3**	14.3%
Prepare/sell food			1	2	1			**4**	19.0%
Trade - non-foodstuffs							3	**3**	14.3%
Trade - foodstuffs	1		2		1			**4**	19.0%
Husking rice	1				1			**2**	9.5%
Spinning			1					**1**	4.8%
Prepare/sell snacks							1	**1**	4.8%
Totals	**2**	**0**	**5**	**2**	**5**	**2**	**7**	**23 ***	**

*23 trades were reported by 21 unsecluded women - some had no occupation, others more than one
**Totals >100% because some women pursue more than one trade line

Secluded and unsecluded women essentially sell many of the same goods in the same spatial and economic markets so turnover and return are equivalent. However, among unsecluded women traders there are age differences in mobility/ability and thus, in the scale of their trading activities. Young and active widows have greater mobility, more turnover and 'returns' than very elderly, more frail widows. Very elderly and infirm women are completely dependent (usually on younger male kin) and do not trade (26% of the unsecluded women in the sample).

Widows and older women often go to buy trade goods and raw material inputs in person from within the village and periodic markets. They may also travel to urban

centres to buy stocks as often as two, or three, times a month. However, even though they are not secluded, older women may still send a son, or other relation, to market on their behalf, e.g. to buy cigarettes, perhaps out of discretion because cigarettes are not smoked openly by women and only by few men, as smoking contravenes Islamic teachings. Some widows sell goods on commission for others. For example, Zainab who was recently widowed still sells grain from home for her grandson and Halira sells goods (earrings, mothballs, spoons, *tozali*, baby clothes etc.) for other secluded female kin on commission of about ₦5-10/day.

7.2.3 Gendered Village Trade

From the preceding survey of village level trade, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it is an area of diverse and complex commercial production relations cross-cut by space and gender. Men and women engage in modes of trade highly differentiated by gender, ethnicity and economic scale. The gender embeddedness of village trade (by site, type of organisation, commodities and scale) also reflects its spatial embeddedness, because modes of operation are open to traders by virtue of their mobility and location. Gender ideologies, especially seclusion and taboos on trade associated with the life course, form the strongest social entry barrier for women, thereby restricting the majority of their trade to house trading, dependent on the co-operation and assistance of others. Gender differences in location/site, commodities and scale lead to gender inequalities in trade outcomes.

Thus, the trading activities of male village traders are diverse and operate at a variety of scales and modes of organisation. The most financially successful are young (late 20s-30s) Igbo storekeepers. Factors contributing to the Igbo traders' accumulative abilities include their full-time engagement in trade, their access to start-up capital greater than ₦1,000, their lack of dependants and high mobility. Generally male Hausa traders are not as successful in financial terms because, as indigenous members of the community with dependants, they face many demands from kin and neighbourhood networks for money in various forms of financial largesse. In addition Hausa farmer-traders cannot trade full-time due to farming demands. They also lack large amounts of start up capital and have restricted mobility because of household

ties. Male Hausa traders in Zarewa who reach high levels of accumulation share certain characteristics. Typically they are older (late 40s-50s), have a diversity of business and trade lines (a risk averting tactic), use the labour of sons, are big farmers who as individuals rarely engage in field labour (but depend on hired and son's labour), and have developed extensive networks of kin and trading connections extending beyond the village. They also have access to capital resources including start-up capital, especially from farming.

Secluded village traders' activities focus around processing and retailing food. Their activities are not as diverse as those of male village traders. Most secluded traders operate at a small scale, because of domestic demands on their time, limited mobility, constraints on expansion and interruptions in their trading career from childbearing. The few financially highly successful secluded women traders have access to child labour and intermediaries, good central location, acquiescent husbands, few (or none) of their own children, and are strong characters.

Unsecluded women traders have advantages of higher spatial mobility over secluded women and ability to devote more time to trading because their reproductive burdens are smaller. This means they can be more economically successful traders, but it is not the case in Zarewa that all unsecluded women are bigger traders than secluded women.

Although there are degrees of difference among groups, tentative generalisations can be made that most female village traders have low 'returns' (<₦100/week), while only a few report medium level returns (>₦100/week). In comparison, male traders have a greater range of returns. Although male artisans have equally low returns, '*yan tebur* make medium-level returns (₦100-₦400/week), while the most asset-rich male house traders and storekeepers have high returns (>₦1,000/week). Longhurst (1982: 110) also found returns to women's work low relative to men's. This ranking among gendered village trade institutions coincides with ranking in terms of scale of trade, value of stock, turnover, amount of capital and investment. The relative degrees of

empowerment and barriers to accumulation experienced by village traders of varying ranks are discussed further in a later section.

7.3 PERIODIC MARKETPLACE TRADE

> "*The Hausa market (kasuwa) is an officially recognized and controlled gathering which meets at a particular place on fixed days and has a fixed organisation and form*" (Smith 1962: 306).

This section examines and compares gendered and spatialised trading involvement at periodic marketplace level. Rural periodic markets, as defined by M. G. Smith above "...provide the integrating force in the socio-economic life of northern Nigerian smallholders" (Scott 1972: 316) because they provide links to a national economic system. Periodic markets are central to the spatial organisation of the rural economy. The temporal and spatial organisation of periodic markets has been subjected to much study that suffers from gender blindness and rarely goes beyond the marketplace as a site in time and space (e.g. Gana 1973, 1976, 1978, Scott 1972, Hill & Smith 1972). However, since the late 1970s there has been little focus on periodic marketplaces in Northern Nigeria.

It was estimated over two decades ago that rural weekly markets in Hausaland serve populations from 7,000 to 13,000 persons (Hill 1971: 310). The current figures are probably higher because the region's population has increased but the density of market distribution has not substantially changed. Zarewa is situated between two large weekly periodic markets both with good tarred road access. Markarfi market (8.5 km road distance) takes place on Wednesdays (attendance est. 10,000) and Sundu market (5.5 km road distance) on Sundays (attendance est. >10,000) (see Map 2.3 for locations).

7.3.1 Gendering of Periodic Marketplaces

Most of the traders and customers in the periodic markets of Hausaland are men. Due to the sheer size of the markets near Zarewa it was not possible to survey the

retailers.[19] But previous surveys (Smith 1955: 245, 1962: 327, Hill 1969a: 401) show that over three-quarters of traders in Hausa periodic markets are male, retailing up to 89% of commodity lines. Hausa markets today remain as much, if not more, male dominated.

Focussing on the changing institution of market grain dealing illustrates the evolution of masculinisation in Hausa periodic markets. As identified in Chapter 3, in the past the occupation of grain-measuring belonged more often to older women than to men (Hill 1972: 292). A woman titled *Korama*, or *Sarkin Awo*, was responsible for the grain measurers and the maintenance of fair measures/prices in periodic markets (Smith 1962: 307). By the late 1960s Hill found no evidence for titled head or chief measurers in Katsina markets (Hill 1971: 315). Today few, if any, of the grain measurers in Sundu and Makarfi markets are elderly Hausa widows - *ma'auniya*[20] and none of them are from Zarewa. Lots of younger men occupy this trade, and few elderly women, suggesting recent masculinisation of marketplace grain trade. Hill suggests that market grain measurers and secluded women grain traders are analogous roles so farmers expected women to sell their grain in the market in the same way their wives sold grain in the village. Thus, the decline in secluded and marketplace grain trading by women are parallel and related trends resulting from agricultural intensification and better rural transport which mean farmers today trade more of their harvest than previously. Thus, they sell more grain than women grain traders could deal with in villages. So, the position of secluded female grain traders no longer resembles earlier descriptions of powerful and titled women grain traders in open markets selling grain, collecting grain taxes, controlling prices and weights. While masculinisation of the grain trade began during the Sokoto Caliphate, in more recent decades men have come to dominate grain trading. Masculinisation of grain trade partly relates to its increasing scale. Grains are now a major cash crop (displacing colonial crops like groundnuts) for the northern savanna region, traded across long distances, thus precluding secluded women from participation. As grain is produced in

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[19] Even with much assistance M. G. Smith admits that "The Hausa market is a busy milling throng which it is difficult to count and classify, and virtually impossible for the student to arrest or to interview individually" (1962: 324).

[20] A ***ma'auniya*** (f) (m. *ma'auni*) takes her/his title from the word to measure (*auna*).

large amounts and disposed of via external markets women grain traders are bypassed. There seems to have been a general disappearance of secluded and unsecluded women grain traders from marketplaces and reduced their numbers in villages. Already in the early post-colonial period Polly Hill remarked

> "...there are few women traders who compare in importance with a number of famous (unsecluded) women traders of former times" (1977: 178).

The declining scale of operation by women traders has continued. With increased scale of grain trade commercialisation and better road transport grain exchange has largely moved out of settlements to periodic marketplaces.

Within a periodic marketplace the spatial organisation of traders is such that traders are clustered in particular locations according to trading type, commodity (Plate 7.9), gender and scale of trade (Smith 1962: 309). Each section can be referred to "...as a minimarket within the market as a whole" which serves a restricted clientele (Scott 1978: 456). Hawkers (mostly male, but a few female, and some children) continuously move through the market throng.



Plate 7.9 Grain section in periodic marketplace.

7.3.2 Male Periodic Market Traders

Many men in Zarewa (37% of men in household sample) engage in periodic marketplace trading. The male periodic marketplace traders resident in Zarewa comprise 61% of all male village traders (in the sample) and can be categorised as: grain traders, agricultural produce traders, retailers (of provisions, cloth, haberdashery and other commodities (Plates 7.10, 7.11)) and butchers (Plate 7.12).



Plate 7.10 Haberdasher in periodic marketplace.

For male periodic market traders, as for all traders, trade incomes are not constantly flowing (unlike most kinds of wage work). Being a form of 'self-employment', incomes from trade fluctuate - meaning there is always uncertainty. Male marketplace traders are diverse in their types and scale of operations. They make bigger profits by trading in periodic marketplaces, some of which are quite distant from Zarewa. Thus, by selling outside their immediate community they are able to accumulate, some on a greater scale than others.




Plate 7.11 Perfume trader taking goods by bicycle to periodic marketplace.




Plate 7.12 Butcher in periodic marketplace.

Alhaji merchants[21] represent the most successful traders, especially butchers who have high profits (up to ₦400/market day). Compared to male village traders, the majority of male periodic market traders operate at greater level of profits than artisans and *'yan tebur*, but do not reach the scale of full-time storekeepers. The minority[22] operating at the smallest scale in periodic markets (small agricultural produce traders) have small returns (<₦100/market day) equivalent to village artisans.

7.3.3 Female Periodic Market Traders

Few traders in Hausa periodic markets are women (Table 7.1). Hausa women's trade in periodic markets is an extension of their village trading activities. A small number of unsecluded women sell a small range of low value goods (spun cotton thread, *zogale* leaves, *dokuwa*) in the marketplaces and secluded women also send children to hawk goods (*chin chin*, rice and stew, husked rice, spun cotton thread) on their behalf. Sending children to hawk in the marketplace enables secluded women to prevent loss of turnover on market days when many of their regular male customers are absent from the village. It is not an option open to all women because it requires a child of sufficient age and responsibility to be able to travel by public transport and hawk successfully among the busy hurly-burly of the marketplace.

Unsecluded Zarewa women who trade in periodic marketplaces spend only 3.25 hours/day trading on market days, which is about half the comparable figure for male periodic market traders. Married Hausa women are excluded from periodic market trade in person because of seclusion and gender ideologies.

7.4 LONG-DISTANCE TRADE

Long-distance trade forms an important part of the extensive trading networks involving rural areas. Long-distance trade 'imports' and 'exports' crops between

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[21] Making the hajj bestows an important social status and gives Hausa traders entry into a kind of exclusive club of alhazai which brings about co-operation and assistance between traders – as elaborated in detail for Nigérien merchants by Grégoire (1992, 1993).

different ecological zones, e.g. southern Hausaland produces grain, cattle, sugar cane, tomatoes, onions and chilli peppers which are transported for sale in other areas. Long-distance traders (*fatake*) and merchants (*attajirai*) resident in Zarewa buy grains and agricultural cash crops wholesale from local periodic markets (which function as bulking points) and transport them to urban markets in other regions of Nigeria. The long-distance traders in Zarewa are men dealing in chilli peppers, tomatoes, onions and kokoyams (Table 7.38). It is a trade restricted to a small group - only 3.6% of men in the household sample. But nearly half of them are Alhajis, so they are (or are becoming) wealthy farmers functioning as long-distance merchant wholesalers.

Long-distance trading is a large-scale, high risk business requiring much capital to for goods and transport (Plate 7.13) (none of the Zarewa long-distance traders in the sample were wealthy enough to have invested in lorry ownership). Turnovers are high and profits also potentially high (up to thousands of Naira per 3-4 day trip), although sometimes no profit is made. Potential and actual profits generally exceed those made from farming. Successful trading depends on foresight, entrepreneurial skill, and reliable information about prices in markets hundreds of kilometres away. Long-distance traders spend several days each week trading away from home. Some operate only in the dry season making trading trips once a week, or more, and less frequently when farming requires attention. Profits are fed into agriculture, social expenditure, other forms of investment and wealth accumulation.

No Hausa women (secluded, or unsecluded) engaging in long-distance trade which, among other attributes, requires high mobility incompatible with seclusion were observed during the fieldwork, nor are they reported in the literature. Long-distance trade also excludes Hausa women because it requires large capital sums which women are unlikely to have access to.

Although the sums involved in long-distance trading are often spectacularly high, the losses can be as much as the returns. Generally, however, profits exceed those of most

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[22] It is not possible to be precise about what percentage of male periodic marketplace traders these are because a wholly systematic survey of a representative sample size could not be carried out.

male periodic market and village traders. At times profits may be at levels equivalent to large and successful village storekeepers, village Alhaji-merchants and butchers, but at other times they may be many times higher, although much less regular.



Plate 7.13 Lorry for long distance trade.

7.5 TRADING AND EMPOWERMENT

Circulation is socially embedded, so trading is inextricably interwoven with Hausa life and culture. For traders there is a dilemma in separating economic trading activities, from the cultural values and social pressures of sharing with, and assisting, kin and neighbours (Evers 1994). Indeed male Hausa traders are expected to give gifts and donations at the marriages of age-mates and fellow villagers, at naming ceremonies of their children and those of kin, friends and neighbours. Husbands must buy cloth for wives and children and slaughter a ram for annual Muslim festivals, as well as giving religious gifts and tithes (*zakka*). At naming and wedding ceremonies, women, too, are expected to exchange gifts with close kin and friends. Ability to meet these demands earn status and prestige and form part of the motivation for trading. However, this means accumulation and expansion can be difficult because traders are forced to spend their profits on maintaining social relations. It may also be difficult

for traders to demand debt repayment, because of social expectations of generosity in the village moral economy. Thus, traders are embedded in various redistributive and reciprocal exchange networks which become more demanding as earnings increase. It is a situation of some rationality because investment in marriages and births ensures reproduction of family labour, while generosity within the community ensures help in times of need. Also ability to contribute to redistribution and reciprocal exchange networks earns 'symbolic capital' through the achievement of cultural approval. Clough (1995) refers to this sharing and assisting in Hausaland as a non-capitalist form of accumulation. However, the traders' dilemma of 'breaking in' to (capitalist) accumulation is faced by male and female traders alike and has a number of solutions.

The Igbo storekeepers in Zarewa (and elsewhere in Hausaland) exploit the niche of ethnic difference to solve the traders' dilemma. Strangers, as a trading minority, are advantaged by virtue of their ethnicity because they have no, or few, ties of kinship, or solidarity, with the community. As sojourners in Hausaland they are thrifty, endogamous, avoid local political involvement, use the Hausa language, but maintain cultural distance. However, while occupying a position which enables accumulation via trade, Igbos in Hausaland also fear discrimination and prejudice while risking the occasional eruption of ethnic conflict often leading to loss of life and property as has happened in cities of Northern Nigeria.

Another solution to the trader's dilemma is limiting trade to a very small scale, so that quantities and profits are meagre, thus reducing demands from family and friends for redistribution and sharing. There are many traders (women, '*yan tebur*, artisans, small periodic marketplace traders) engaged in this type of very small-scale trading institution. There are frequent fluctuations of such trading enterprises (women traders especially). A final way out of the trading dilemma is to stop trading. That is what some individuals (especially women) do, at least temporarily and restart business when circumstances become more favourable. Overall, the traders' dilemma is of quite different intensity for female and male traders. For women traders the dilemma is an especially real one to which there are few, if any, satisfactory solutions. This contributes to their difficulties in accumulating.

Financial returns for women's trading are generally low; so we ask why do women (and even some of the smallest scale male traders) continue to trade for such little, or even no profits? The answer has several strands. Not least, other, more profitable, trade lines are not open to secluded women. Men are less likely to be trapped in low return occupations. In such situations with no better options, it is preferable to continue with even very slim returns than with no activity at all. Idleness is not viewed favourably – in rural communities like Zarewa it is not socially respectable for adult women not to pursue an occupation. Profit may not be the only goal or motivation for women traders. It may be just as important to 'keep busy', to prepare snacks or food to feed to children and share with friends, as to make money. Even if women traders do complain of '*ba kudi*' (no money), we can speculate that male and female traders may have different expectations and behaviours as traders.[23] For women, at least, the non-financial gins of trading may be important reasons why they continue to trade despite low profits.[24] Women face a plethora of social, cultural and/or, economic barriers to profitable trade including the traders' dilemma. The cycle of physical and cultural taboos prevent them from trading during childbearing. Through the subtle operation of socio-cultural norms women are inhibited from accumulation by a moral code which dictates against such behaviour for women and directs their meagre earnings into sustaining social networks including saving for daughters' weddings. However, the cultural approval and hence 'symbolic capital' earned thereby (as well as through *biki* exchange) is especially important for women.

So for many women trade appears to be a kind of subsistence activity, i.e. non-accumulating, simple (not expanded) reproduction, but is it empowering? Only very few women manage significant accumulation and investment. Husband's class position influences wives' trading success, such that women with larger scale and/or more lucrative trade lines are often from wealthier households and frequently married to Alhajis, because women in such high status marriages frequently have access to

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[23] It is perhaps a weakness of the approach here that power and empowerment are strongly associated with making large financial profits – possibly an overly masculinist conception making the picture for female traders appear especially bleak.

more capital and/or other assets. Overall the strongest factor in success for women traders appears to be the nature of their reproductive burdens and access to child labour. Mature women beyond childbearing who have had none, or few, of their own children, but access to child labour, form a disproportionate number of the highly successful women traders. Life-cycle factors are important for women traders differently than for men. The trading success of barren and subfecund women is also due to a large measure of luck, ability to build up a regular clientele, personal qualities and enabling husbands. They have overcome constraints on expansion which include lack of time, labour, capital and co-operation. As well as being physically isolated by seclusion, women also generally eschew business partnerships between co-wives or other women living in their compound. Culturally relations between co-wives are constructed as characterised by jealousy. While plenty of evidence of friendship and some degree of co-operation between women in the same compound was observed, women's trading activities were pursued independently. Highly successful (in financial terms) women traders, while often better entrepreneurs with strong personal skills, did not necessarily begin with a higher initial investment, nor are they concentrated in more capital intensive lines of trade, but they do tend to spend more time trading than less successful women traders.

Long term gender trends in trading involve the masculinisation of trade and reduction in opportunities for women traders – continuing the historical changes in gender and power relations described for Hausaland in Chapter 3. For example, trading institutions in Zarewa and rural Hausaland have radically altered in response to transformations in transport over the last half-century. There are severe gender inequalities in the ownership of and access to, means of transport (see Chapter 4) such that women in trade have not benefited from transport improvements in the same way as men. Over the last few decades women have been squeezed out of more profitable niches (e.g. the grain trade), and earlier this century cut off from farming. More recently in economically uncertain times, women are losing access to accumulation mechanisms (e.g. *adashi*). Declining economic opportunities and squeezed profit

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[24] It could be argued that measuring trading success in terms of financial profit (alone) is andocentric and even ethnocentric. However, the deliberate focus here is on material income and its benefits.

margins, in the face of competition and rising input costs, contribute to low profits. Increasing demands on women to contribute to household subsistence has the contradictory effect of reducing women's trading assets and capital, thereby decreasing their ability to participate in lucrative, or capital intensive trades. In the resulting diversification the majority of women are becoming concentrated in a small number of low input, low income trades; while more lucrative activities (e.g. rice husking, groundnut processing, provisions retailing beyond micro-scale) become the province of wealthier women in households where husbands meet household needs. This differentiation is a feature not identified in earlier work on Hausa women's trade.

Deep gender divisions still characterise post-colonial trade. Men continue to trade cash crops while ideological and physical barriers exclude women from such profitable trade. Ideologies limit the mobility of married women excluding them from periodic marketplaces in greater numbers than previously, while lifecycle taboos interrupt their trading careers. Women's trade has become small-scale, based around a limited pool of sales to friends, neighbours and relatives in a village market of many sellers, making capital accumulation and expansion difficult. Thus, as Jackson (1981: 226) argued for the 1970s and more recently in the 1990s Meagher and Yunusa (1996: 40) argue too, accumulation and economic independence is difficult for all women, not just those who are secluded.

The historical masculinisation of trade which continues during the post-colonial period has several strands of explanation: patriarchy, the rise of capitalism, commercialisation of agriculture, shifts from a grain to a money economy and an expanding domestic food market since about 1970. The post-colonial period is characterised by development of integrated national markets, and male dominated long-distance inter-regional trading in food staples. These processes have been fuelled by state and foreign investments in agriculture, such as World Bank support for agricultural projects. Commercialisation has led to increased gender differentiation.

Male domination of trade and marketing, both economically and numerically, constrains female market participation and commercial accumulation. This situation

has not come about by changing gender divisions of work, but by expansion of (historically) male dominated types of work. Increasing, or maintaining, prosperity for men via trade profits also enables continued male support for seclusion.

On the other side of what might appear as a gloomy story for rural Hausa women, there has been some progressive social change for women. The introduction of grinding mills means that some of the back breaking work of daily food preparation (for household consumption and for sale) has been removed from women. Certainly, when interviewed elderly women felt that younger women today have more comfortable lives and on the whole do not have to farms or gather firewood. Neither do women have to carry water long distances, or act as beasts of burden (because bicycles, motorcycles and vehicles) are used for transporting commodities (e.g. to and from markets).

For many female traders, another feature of change during the post-colonial period is the diversification and widening of their product range. Women traders now sell things their mothers and grandmothers did not, including a greater number of imported and manufactured goods from Nigeria and around the world; more cooked food/snacks, but less home produced crafts. Diversification of women's trade goods is partly a response to the reduction in their income opportunities from craft production. New technology has also led to diversification and investment in women's trading resources e.g. sewing machines. However, only wealthier women benefit from such capital investments and also have to compete with men (in tailoring).

It has been suggested (Longhurst 1980: 115 and others) that the rural Hausa food trade is being invaded by men, i.e. gender divisions in trade are changing; or that the food trade is becoming masculinised as tastes change to manufactured snacks/food including bread, bottled drinks, tinned food, biscuits and sweets, which are traded by men, i.e. demands are changing, but gender divisions remain static. Either way, more men would be increasingly competing with women food traders. But the trend to expensive manufactured items associated with the oil boom times, is currently countered by rising prices, putting such items out of reach except as luxury

consumption (mostly by men). However, male traders are in competition with female traders in selling food and snacks by introducing new commodities, e.g. *suya*, fried fish, tea stalls (bread and eggs), fruits (oranges, sugarcane, coconut) not previously purchasable in rural settlements like Zarewa. So Longhurst's (1980) prediction is proving at least partially correct.

Trade is at its most empowering from the perspective of monetary gains and what that can achieve where it brings significant levels of income, individual ownership and control of decision making about its use. While Hausa women's incomes are incontrovertibly their own, their choices about its disposal are limited by the fact that amounts are small (although this is not a new finding, see e.g. Simmons 1973, Callaway 1987a: xvi, Jackson 1981: 203, Coles & Mack 1991: 15), and there are strong social expectations about the uses for women's money including to top up spending on household and children's needs and possible divert to natal homes.[25] Thus, not all of women's incomes can be considered as 'liquid', or 'real', income. In a sense there is a threshold between largely inconsequential amounts of income (simply enough to contribute small gifts at ceremonies) and substantial income levels (enough to accumulate and invest for greater returns). Breaking out of the cycle of making merely inconsequential amounts of money from huge investments in time and energy, is achieved by only a few women, and is harder in the harsh economic climate. Among male traders in comparison the proportion of successful to unsuccessful traders is higher, although it is impossible to give precise figures.

Substantial income earning can give women control over their own lives by enabling a degree of social mobility, an increase in social power and an ability to renegotiate the conjugal contract; for example, the ability to withstand the loss of male support after divorce, or widowhood, and even the wherewithal to instigate divorce and manage independently.[26] In some cases women traders can negotiate more advantageous

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[25] The investigations in Zarewa did not actually measure such transfers.

[26] Only one unmarried woman living alone while supporting herself, and no cases of women traders instigating divorce, were recorded in Zarewa. Other (albeit urban) studies highlight independent urban unmarried women supporting themselves completely, or in part, by sale of sexual services (Pittin 1979, 1983) and women (*bazawara*) no longer married supporting themselves by other income-earning activities (not prostitution) while living with their families (Coles & Mack 1991: 9).

marriages for themselves and their daughters, which is important because women's kin are her primary allegiance. Income earning may increase women's status and prestige, improve their material well being, give them power over others, as well as greater independence and control in their own lives including lifestyle choice. Women traders who can accumulate sufficiently to go on Hajj gain much prestige and social standing.

Highly successful women traders can have greater power, because of their affluence, than the majority of other women, and than men of lower financial standing and trade success. But, for most women, trading gives them only limited economic leverage and poor resources to renegotiate their position within a very restricted domain. Income earning translates into merely an ability to subvert some of the implications of purdah without achieving much status, or power, in the public arena. Earnings from trade are generally insufficient to bring autonomy, i.e. are insufficient to release women from dependence on men. Hausa women, compared to men, have lower access to credit and capital, their ability to enter occupations of greater material returns is limited, so they have limited control of wealth and thus, power.

Schildkrout (1983) argues that women, as a group (or class), use the money men give them for domestic consumption to buy ingredients/food for themselves and their children, as a way of generating income by channelling it into a female sphere of exchange. Within this sphere women act as independent producers, not wives, because by buying food from other women they are, in effect, transforming unrewarded domestic work into income generating work (albeit low paid). By not cooking for their families three times daily women release time to cook for sale and for other income earning activities. However, this system only results in overall financial return when women make profit and the cost of women's labour is included in the retail price of the prepared food; otherwise they merely provide domestic services for each other. In Zarewa although women do buy food for their children and feed them food cooked for retail, whether they always take payment from 'housekeeping' money received from husbands' is unclear. For most women in Zarewa (where few women make profits and labour costs are not included in retail prices) their prodigious trading activities are exchanges of reproductive activity among women, rather than being

expansive and accumulative in nature. This seems to confirm the earlier proposition that because women's trade is largely at the level of subsistence reproduction, rather than involving generation of surplus income, it is rarely empowering.

7.6 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has analysed gender, space and power within the market organisation of daily transactions that characterise rural Hausa men's and women's embeddedness in processes of circulation and exchange. On the whole, it is concluded the operation of circulation maintains rather than challenges unequal gender relations. In other words engaging in trade for most women meets their practical, rather than strategic, gender needs. Most male traders appear to maintain specific trading roles for longer periods than women, and successful male traders increase the scale of their trading operations throughout their life cycles. There appear to be clear links between (social and biological) reproduction and trading. Responding to external forces, especially reproductive burdens, women tend to change their trading occupations frequently, and experience frequent disruptions to their trading careers. Without continuity they rarely achieve the scale of male traders.

This chapter illustrates that gender as a social institution dictates normative gender roles for women and men in markets. Problematising seclusion (Chapter 1) leads us to ask several questions. A key question tackled in this chapter is 'does seclusion limit women's income and accumulation, and if so how?' Scholars of Hausa seclusion generally concur on this question. In her study of food processing and trading by rural Hausa women, Simmons (1975: 157) concludes that seclusion limits social interaction, information gathering, innovation and learning from others; hence contributing to a lack of dynamism in village food processing. According to the Kano women in Werthmann's study (1995a, 1995b) seclusion does limit their income and accumulation. Similarly, Cooper says that in Niger "...women are excluded from the most profitable enterprises by local perceptions of appropriate behaviour for Muslim women" (1993: 69). Certainly this chapter shows how seclusion in Zarewa influences the gender and spatial embeddedness of markets.

While men operate as traders at village, periodic market and long-distance scales: women are excluded from long-distance trade. participate only marginally at the level of periodic markets and are largely restricted to the confines of village trade. Due to constrained access to capital, credit, information and other resources women's participation in market exchange is limited to restricted use of space, low mobility and selling commodities on a small scale - mainly items of high demand but low value, resulting in meagre or non-existent profits[27] at subsistence levels (Table 7.6). Overall, male traders largely deal in goods of higher values (especially manufactured and imported goods) over wide areas, including long distance trade and at larger scales with higher mobility, higher profits and opportunities to achieve potentially very high profits in long distance trade. Thus, women's place appears to be largely in positions in markets enabling simple reproduction, while men occupy markets enabling expanded reproduction, power and accumulation.

Table 7.6 Characteristics of Gendered Commodity Trade[28]

Gender	Trade scale	Profit margins	Capital inputs	Risk	Traders' Mobility	Example
FEMALE DOMINATED TRADE	Small	Low	Low	Low	Low	intra-village trade in food and snacks
MALE DOMINATED TRADE	Large	High	High	High	High	long distance grain trade

Another way of looking at this is to suggest that the non-accumulating trade of women actually subsidises the accumulating trade of men. Several mechanisms for this can be identified. Firstly, women's trade in cooked food and snacks sold in the streets and public places by child hawkers actually helps to support men's presence in the public sphere of trade and the marketplaces, because men can buy and eat food and meals in public. It may cost a man less to purchase a single meal for himself than to provide money/foodstuffs for his wife/wives to cook for themselves and their children. Albeit

[27] Simmons (1975) also found women food traders often fail to make any profit from particular commodities in certain circumstances.

[28] This table is a summary generalisation, so the trading activities of a minority of women and men do not resemble these characteristics.

they may be reluctant to eat outside the home because socially adult men bear shame and are derided for the failure to ensure a wife provides home cooked *tuwo* (Salamone 1976: 365, Barkow 1972: 322), although Hill (1972: 147) reports that some poor husbands in Batagarawa bought their own cooked meals. However, this also means that for wives withdrawal of meal preparation can be an effective bargaining tool[29] (albeit less so perhaps in polygynous marriages where there are other wives to cook).[30] This belongs to the recognition that among the Hausa married men fear being wifeless (Barkow 1972: 324) and "...a man needs a wife more than a woman needs a husband." (Salamone 1976: 366). Secondly, small amounts of money gained by women in trading go into meeting the daily needs of children and the household, thus, lessening the burdens of provision for men and indirectly boosting male accumulation. Thirdly, by bearing and raising children women provide sons to boost men's accumulation by working with them in agriculture and trade. For men having children is a benefit, but for women there is a cost to their trading careers draining their time and meagre profits in biological, daily and generational reproduction. Although secluded women are dependent on children to hawk goods for them.

Thus, we see trading can maintain unequal gender relations empowering men rather than women. For the operation of trade to be a source of exploitation and subordination requires mechanisms. For example, market structures in the restricted circumstances that sellers have when (women especially) entering trade, then the exchange conditions between buyer and seller may not be mutually beneficial. For

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[29] Other cultural resources used by Hausa women for negotiating in conjugal co-operative conflict situations which appear in the literature are the use of proverbs to challenge a husband's sexuality, maleness or 'power' (Salamone 1976) and powerful displays of temper, grief and joy by yelling and shouting (Barkow 1972: 321). Evidence for such verbal duelling and emotional outbursts was not uncovered in Zarewa. Explanations for such apparent absences could be firstly methodological - the chosen research methods were not directed to analysis of verbal discourse, the researcher lacked sufficient fluency in Hausa to pick up such evidence of bargaining and/or that as Salamone suggests (1976: 364) Hausa men rapidly retreat from conflict with women making such verbal expressions of conflict very difficult to observe. Further explanations encompass the spatial and temporal differences between Zarewa in the 1990s and Hausaland in the 1960s - 70s. As Salamone points out (1976: 367) his case study relates to a *banza* emirate and he calls for comparative research within the Hausa *bakwai* emirates (where Zarewa lies). Indeed male-female social interaction may be quite different in the *bakwai* emirates and/or social change since the 1970s may have eroded this art of negotiation. Indeed this would be supported by the considerable evidence for Zarewa's spatial-temporal differences in other respects, e.g. its lack of resemblance to the tolerance of courtesanship and women's financial independence which Salamone describes (1976: 365).

[30] Although it is not unknown for co-wives to join forces against an unreasonable husband.

example, women have little choice but to agree to sell at prices that mean low profits, because of strong customer resistance to price increases and competition from other sellers. The processes of bargaining and negotiating prices are not divorced from the social context which includes prevailing gender relations, so contractual arrangements may be superimposed on and reinforce a highly unequal base.

A factor in the gender differences in accumulation is that male traders are able to exploit numerous ties between family members, friends in trade and neighbours. The structures of clientelage and direct co-operation mean that male Hausa traders 'accumulate together' (Clough 1985: 26). But these aids to accumulation do not operate to the same extent among women traders. Although they have elaborate networks of reciprocity (based on *biki*), women traders largely eschew co-operation with co-wives and female kin in the same *gida*, are less able to make use of their social networks to build up trade and compete in relative isolation from one another because of seclusion. Men also use success in agriculture to promote their trading by channelling profits of farming into non-farm income earning activities. Thus, agricultural production and trade are linked and profits feed into each other. So in response to the question 'Which men are empowered by engaging in trade?', it has been shown in this chapter that poor farmers tend to be small traders and large wealthy farmers, big traders. There are direct links between men's roles and accumulation in production and in trade. For women the input of capital from agricultural production is not possible, because they are removed from farming by seclusion and are rarely able actively to farm inherited land. So women are unable to use their land as a capital resource for trade as men do.

Before concluding we should pause to reflect that, obviously men and women are very different and gender divisions of labour and space in rural Hausaland mean they occupy largely different spheres. Similarly, trade may well occupy different places in women's and men's livelihoods and identities. This chapter in many ways has measured women and men up to the same metric of (male?) accumulation and found that women more often than men do not make the grade. This is part and parcel of trying to pursue an objective materialist analysis based on some comparative (if not

universalist) measures. It may be argued that accumulation means different things to women and men. Women may be more interested in having a child to run errands for them; cooking attractive food and snacks for visitors, children and kin; keeping busy; not having to ask their husbands for money, for gifts at namings and other ceremonies; than in making big cash profits. Defining precisely what accumulation means to women is a difficult task and one not wholly achieved here. Although such an in-depth investigation might well reveal relevant information about the hidden male subject in the 'trader' etc. it was not a direction directly pursued in this study. However, we can say that not trading means several things for women. It may be a conspicuous sign of their leisured status, e.g. as new wives, or it can be an indication of impoverishment, e.g. if unable to trade through disability or elderly frailty, or because of lack of capital or children to do *talla*.

The final conclusion, relating to the central hypothesis that engaging in commodity trade empowers women, suggests that Hausa women are largely subordinated in circulation. Thus, as has been suggested (Harriss-White 1998: 191) market exchange in this instance reinforces the highly unequal bases and fallback positions of men and women. Processes of commodity marketing in this instance do not ensure female emancipation, remove gender subordination or "...remove the shackles from female property ownership or accumulation" (Harriss-White 1998: 200). Although they work as traders and craftworkers with independent earnings, women traders do not wield similar power to men in terms of access to resources (e.g. labour, information, assets, mobility, credit and capital), profitable activities and decision making. Thus, there is significant differentiation between the socio-economic positions occupied by male and female traders. Furthermore, in answer to the question in the introduction of 'What circulation activities empower which women and how?' the answer is apparent that a few women become highly successful, profitable secluded traders on a scale comparable with institutions of male trade. The majority of women, however, are prevented from significant accumulation and expansion by socio-economic constraints including seclusion, repeated childbearing, patriarchal gender relations and ideologies. The few women who manage to earn a substantial income despite constraints, experience increases in social and economic power. In response to their financial

success, which challenges normal gender relations, they may meet opposition. Certain women break out of small-scale trade beyond the limits of the moral economy (characterised by limited credit, limited capital and few skills) by virtue of their access to child labour, small reproductive burdens (i.e. barren or less fertile women), and personal characteristics of business instinct, 'thick skin', husband's co-operation (or at least non-hindrance) and wealth. Greater access to capital (through inheritance, husbands or dowry) at entry to trade does not appear to be a significant determining factor of secluded women's success in trade.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

> "*Power is tolerable only when a good deal of its workings are concealed. Its efficacy is proportional to the degree of that concealment. For power, secrecy is not an abuse but a necessity; and this is not only for its greater efficiency but also for its acceptance*"
> Michel Foucault (in Sheridan 1980: 181).

8.1 INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of this concluding chapter, a summary reiterates the main points of the thesis. This is followed by discussion of past trends in gender relations in Hausaland, and speculation about possible future developments. Third, there is discussion of empowerment, assessing the positions of rural Hausa women of Zarewa with respect to income, assets, time use, decision making and opportunities. In discussing conclusions about gender and empowerment, women's relative positions within the patriarchal bargain are identified. Finally, directions for future research are outlined and some reflections on the research account are offered.

8.2 THESIS SUMMARY

This thesis set out to scrutinise power in gendered economic, social and spatial relations within Nigerian Hausaland in a broadly materialist-feminist approach to the political economy of gender. In the light of the review of analytical approaches to processes of female subordination and empowerment in the literature on gender, space, and power (in Chapter 1), a checklist of indicators for evaluating empowerment was laid out in Chapter 2. The suggestion that engagement with relations of commodity exchange beyond the household empowers peasant women was singled out for analysis. Hausaland provides a unique social location for this analysis because of the ideology of seclusion. Potentially this gives empowerment dramatic consequences (e.g. for women to abandon seclusion and live economically independently) and/or significant limitations (e.g. in hindering women's ability to trade).

The first chapter established the importance of gender relations at the household level to an understanding of power relations expressed in peasant societies through gender and space. So throughout the thesis, the analysis was based on household units and on individuals within the context of their households. Chapter 2 described rural Northern Nigeria as the setting for investigation of trading and empowerment via a village case study. The framework adopted for data collection around key processes of household organisation was outlined. This framework incorporated a set of variables developed from Deere and de Janvry (1979) and Leplaideur (1992) to capture gender, space and power in the processes of production, reproduction, and of forces and relations of circulation.

Chapter 3 used colonial and post-colonial life stories collected in the field alongside secondary sources, to provide a historical perspective of shifts in Hausa gender relations over time with changing social relations of production, reproduction and trading. The major theme which emerged is the adoption of seclusion practices alongside the development of gender and spatial divisions of labour. Associated trends include moves in household production from use-value to exchange-value, increasing integration into global capitalist economies, the masculinisation of trading, the erosion of women's control of the grain trade, movement of women out of farming, reduction of women's physical work burdens in production and reproduction, and the strengthening role of Islam in social reproduction.

In Chapter 4, following concerns of feminist geography, and the approaches of Lefebvre (1991) and Giddens (1984), an analysis of mapped and time-space field data revealed the spatial dimensions of the recurrent social practices of gender relations in contemporary rural Hausaland. The focus was on these practices, through which social life and its power relations are produced and reproduced via sites, surveillance, control and routines. The data illustrated how the system of social interactions between villagers in the practice of wife seclusion ties men and women to rules and resources, restricting married women's mobility in public spaces and denying men entry to much domestic space. The social organisation and construction of space separates male public space from female private domestic spaces via the ideology of seclusion which

is a structure of legitimisation and domination. Thus, women were identified as disadvantaged, relative to men, in their ability to move about and in their control of space. We have here a clear case of how (according to structuration theory) time-space relations are central to the continuance of day-to-day life and gender inequalities via routinised interactions.

Adopting Marxian categories of social organisation, the following Chapters 5, 6 and 7 explored power/empowerment in the gendered and spaced organisation of production, reproduction and circulation, based on field data from Zarewa village. Chapter 5 showed how Hausa gender divisions of labour in rural household-based production (mainly agriculture) coincide with the gender divisions of space identified in Chapter 4. Men control much of the spaces, resources, inputs and decision making of agriculture. Women's main agricultural involvement is in post-harvest processing. It was concluded that women are generally marginalised in agricultural production processes, because, although they work as agricultural processors, they lack significant access to, or control over, productive resources and decision making. Women were also revealed to earn less than men from non-farm activities. Women's income earning opportunities appear constrained by their restricted spatial mobility, and by dependence on child (and other kin) labour.

Chapter 6 then focused on the gendered and spatial organisation of reproduction in the household showing how the ideology of seclusion ties married women to the domestic sphere. Women do almost all unpaid reproductive work, involving considerable time and labour burdens, although men take a share in some areas of decision making and generally control the cash resources ensuring household maintenance and reproduction. It was concluded that women are subordinated in and via reproduction processes, having less decision making power and lower cash expenditure than men. Thus, the weight of reproductive burdens appears disempowering for many women. Women's lack of capital and property appeared to be an outcome of their heavy reproductive burdens and a symptom rather than a direct cause of their disempowerment.

Chapter 7 dealt with the gendered and spatial organisation of commodity circulation and exchange - processes integral to household and social reproduction, as well as possible sources of economic empowerment. It was concluded that markets operate to maintain unequal gender relations. Women appear subordinated as traders; unable to wield economic power equivalent to that of men in terms of profits, resources and operating scales. Additionally, all but a few women are less able to accumulate and expand trading because of social expectations about expenditure, and frequent interruption of their commercial activities by life-events (marriage, childbirth, divorce, widowhood, illness). Male traders do not face the same degree of interruption by biological and social life-events. In addition, women alone face more restrictions in using others' labour for trading, or income earning activities. Social opposition further obstructs women from expanding in trade.


Thus, in relation to the central hypothesis we are led to conclude that although women, including secluded women, have access to exchange (i.e. ideology does not deny them access to exchange), that exchange does not generally empower them in the way it empowers some categories of men. For most women engagement in trade is not per se empowering, because what is empowering is not simply economic participation, but control of the product of participation, and/or control over uses of that economic participation, and/or level of economic participation. Thus, we can confirm that economic power for women is determined by control of economic resources, and suggest further that control over the distribution of surplus is more likely to have positive outcomes for female power than control over resources needed for bare subsistence. However, it raises the question of why women continue to allocate their labour to trade even when the profits are very small to non-existent. It can be suggested that trading gives women direct control over food resources and money (but not necessarily profit) and enables them to gain access to resources for provisioning their households and for contributing to networks of social obligation. These networks are important for insurance and risk spreading, especially in the context of polygynous households and unstable marriages.

Chapters 4 to 7 showed (after Giddens 1979, 1984) that gender ideology in the rural Hausa setting of Zarewa and its environs operates via institutionalised routine, especially the observation of seclusion and social definitions of male/female bodies as 'in' or 'out' of place in particular time-space localities. Thereby, the gender ideology of separate spheres for men and women (etc.) as praxis actually produces gender as a social structure. Reflecting Bourdieu's notion of habitus, cultural practices and habits were shown to be crucial to constructions of meaning because gendered subjectivity in Zarewa (as elsewhere) is actively formulated through a complex matrix of discourse, habits and practices. The material in preceding chapters documents such gender practices in the spaces and spheres of production, reproduction and circulation. The social structures within which power operates provide limiting constraints for women's empowerment via the tacitly reproduced, implicitly accepted and undisputed structures of day-to-day life within which women and men in Zarewa have (albeit limited) agency. The central chapters of the thesis thereby revealed the particular operation of patriarchy in gender relations in the specific context of a village in a peripheral region of the capitalist global economy.

8.3 HAUSA GENDER RELATIONS PRESENT AND FUTURE

Economic shifts during the colonial period were a major force behind creation of existing gender relations, as a result of which the vast majority of rural Hausa married women are secluded and economically dependent on their husbands. Gender relations and divisions of labour since 1960 have been strengthened along the directions established in earlier periods (Figure 8.1) outlined in Chapter 3. Married women's seclusion continues as part of Northern identity, supported ideologically by continuing and strengthening Islamisation. Rural seclusion has continued to be sustained via child labour, mechanised transport, relative rural prosperity and provision of domestic conveniences. The intensification of agricultural production since Independence has contributed to reinforcing gender divisions of labour, under which men farm with some mechanical assistance and women do much post-harvest processing. Traditional craft production for men and women has all but disappeared, in the face of incorporation into the market economy. New artisan activities established in the last few decades offer less lucrative opportunities for women, than men.

Figure 8.1 Post-Colonial Period: Reinforcing Gender Divisions



Trade has been transformed by transport developments, largely to the benefit of male traders, thus contributing to the continuing masculinisation of trade. Daily and generational reproduction remain firmly women's work within the domestic sphere, while the introduction of mechanised food preparation technology leaves labour divisions unchallenged. Women's spaces outside the domestic sphere have been challenged with the increasing intolerance for 'non-Islamic' behaviour.

Thus, the post-independence period has been characterised by Islamisation, masculinisation of trade, intensification of food cash crop production in a quiet 'green revolution', further commercialisation, greater integration of household reproduction into the global economy and more recently structural adjustment. These factors all reinforce existing gender divisions of male agricultural production linked to accumulative male trading activities; alongside female reproduction with little female trade, and that mostly at small-scale as individual traders.[1] This fulfils predictions made by Longhurst (1982: 114) that agricultural improvements in rural Hausaland (namely adopting ox ploughs and chemical fertiliser) would improve men's incomes but that these income improvements would not be passed onto women.

Today, almost all the land around Zarewa is farmed. It is possible that land may become scarce in the future, as the population continues growing. However, peasant farmers in the Kano close settled zone, where all land was under cultivation by 1964, have continued to maintain sustainable agricultural production without declining output over two decades, although intensification has not kept pace with increasing residential populations of farm households (Mortimore 1993: 376).[2] It was suggested in Chapter 5 that in the future the one-third of women in Zarewa who own land by inheritance will be more likely to pursue dormant land claims, as land becomes scarcer. It is shown here, however, that while shifts to female agriculture seem

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[1] Similarly in rural Uttar Pradesh in India processes of green revolution and modernisation were also found to have negative effects on women's status (Wadley 1993).

[2] Although Zarewa is not in a particularly marginal or dry area, rainfall regimes are changing which could be harbingers of future environmental and social changes, which could in turn trigger dramatic shifts in gender relations.

unlikely in the current social climate, women may increasingly be urged to claim land for close male relatives to farm.

It has also been suggested that population increases would lead to rural-urban migration, which could shift present gender divisions. Current migration in Northern Nigeria is mostly seasonal and male labour is rarely absent during the farming season. There are no indications of general moves to the cities, because, since structural adjustment began, urban populations find themselves closer to survival margins and are even renewing their rural roots and farming to ensure subsistence, i.e. are undergoing reagrarianisation (Meagher 1995, Mustapha 1991: 10). Child labour is also very important to the rural economy and to maintaining seclusion. Loss of child labour via education has not occurred in significant numbers and is unlikely in the near future. So seclusion remains supported by appropriation of junior labour. The recent establishment of Islamiyya primary schools contributes to the continuance of early marriage, seclusion and notions of 'proper' Muslim behaviour for Hausa women. A consequence of general lack of access to decent quality primary education (not least for women) is the continuation of high mortality and fertility rates. Furthermore, repressing women's agency in general does nothing to improve survival chances for everyone. Drèze and Sen (1995)[3] suggest economic production may be lower where women lack gender equality; civil society is less vigorous and achievements of social development lower.

The social environment of rural Hausaland appears to have changed over the second part of this century with decreasing tolerance of what are now perceived as unacceptable, unIslamic modes of behaviour. Thus, *gidan mata* (houses of independent women) and *bori* spirit possession have all but disappeared from rural settlements like Zarewa and survive only in more cosmopolitan urban settings. For women (and men) this means that village life offers fewer options for alternative lifestyles, or resistance to norms. Stricter social conformity to ideologies and practices of seclusion are required of village women than in urban settings. Women trying to live outside the culturally expected practices of seclusion and marriage may be forced

[3] Based on comparisons between states in India with different levels of female empowerment.

to move to more accommodating city environments. Predictions (by Longhurst 1982: 116 and others) that seclusion would become less binding during the 1990s have proved inaccurate, as seclusion practices have been maintained, if not become more widespread.

A further question concerns the future of gender relations and in particular, seclusion. It has been shown that seclusion, was selectively adopted from the Islamic corpus, has only been widespread for a few decades and is not universal even across Muslim regions of northern Nigeria and southern Niger, but is intensifying in many places. Thus, as an ideology and practice, seclusion is not inevitably going to continue to intensify but could be socially reconstructed, responding to future social and/or economic changes (e.g. labour market needs). Such changes could require redefinition of seclusion such that women would (re)emerge from domesticity as has occurred elsewhere in the world.[4]

8.4 EMPOWERMENT IN RURAL HAUSALAND

Chapter 2 established a set of empowerment indicators working from a conceptual framework resting on the premise that reproduction, production, non-market and market activity are closely related to and organised by power relations. The situation of rural Hausa women in relation to these indicators, has been considered in the preceding four chapters through the data from Zarewa. Here the indicators of empowerment are reviewed together for a final assessment of women's empowerment relative to men, not ignoring variations among women and men; showing that structures of reproduction powerfully shape women's relations to markets with a largely disempowering outcome.

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[4] There are cases in other parts of the world where women have redefined purdah and increased their physical mobility to ensure household survival (e.g. Bangladesh garment workers, Kabeer 1991a, 1994a: 175). There are parts of Muslim Nigeria (e.g. Bornu) where women do not define their practice of *kulle* as excluding going out of the *gida* to farm or collect water.

8.4.1 Income and Empowerment

Net Income Women's net incomes from trade and income earning activities are on average lower than men's; but a few women earn more than some men. Incomes vary less among women than men. Men from wealthier households are more likely to be long-distance and market traders with higher incomes, while men among poorer households include artisans and village traders with lower incomes. There are more women than men without any income, unable to earn because they are very old, or newly married. Long term economic changes have squeezed women into low income trades. Hausa women say 'children mostly eat our profits', because their potential profits disappear buying and giving food and snacks to children and visitors. Social and moral restrictions are further reasons why women earn inconsequential amounts, and hence lack any significant degree of financial empowerment. The few women who earn higher than average incomes have the advantages of age, already wealthy households and/or husbands, strong personal acumen, no (or few) children, few marriages and residence in a good location for house trade. They are also perhaps 'thick skinned', i.e. more able to resist subtle pressures (e.g. gossip)[5] to conform to social norms. These characteristics of the few unusually successful women traders perhaps indicate why most women do not succeed in accumulating profit because of the nature of structural and social constraints they face, not least in a lifetime of childbearing and a succession of marriages, such that their gender careers interrupt their trading careers.

Use and Control of Income We have confirmed that income alone does not empower if social structures restrict its uses. The contribution of income to empowerment cannot be measured merely by quantitative amounts earned; the use and control of that income needs also to be accounted (as discussed in Chapter 6). According to Hausa social conventions women and men are free to spend their own income as they wish. But there are restrictions, e.g. seclusion means married women cannot go to market for purchases. Also *gandu* heads can veto purchases from *gayauna* income (e.g. radios, bicycles) - but usually do not. The most common primary use of income by men is for farm inputs, followed by household needs, personal use and trade. The

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[5] Gossip constrains women from becoming 'too successful' as traders, in a sense being a threat of community sanction (if not direct violence), what Walby (1990) identifies as a structure of patriarchy.

convention of domestic expenditure is that husbands meet household food and daily needs, but it was shown that with their own income wives supplement the 'housekeeping allowances' received from husbands. One quarter of women buy household grain (staple food), while women provide 20% of household needs from their own earnings, although this figure should be approached cautiously. Overall, men spend 4.5 times more than women simply because men have got more money.

This leads to the question of how do women and men determine how to spend their money. There are strong customary expenditure patterns by gender that complicate any simple relation between relative economic status (measured by income) and relative social status (measured by decision making power). This is the "traders' dilemma" (Evers 1994) which both men and women face in using the income they earn from trade - whether to meet cultural and social norms by sharing, and supporting members of their community, or to invest in business and increase personal incomes. Both men and women face obligations in using their incomes which can limit what is available for personal empowerment or accumulation. Women are expected to give to family members in need and make gifts at ceremonies of friends and kin (*biki*), as well as saving for daughters' weddings. What incomes women have, do not empower them far in financial terms because the small amounts are mostly not put back into trade, but are used towards meeting household needs and maintaining social networks (which may support and empower them in other ways). Men are expected to provide gifts for marriages and naming ceremonies, to buy cloth for dependants and slaughter a ram at annual Muslim festivals (*sallah*).

When possible, men and women make investments which vary by gender. Men invest in technology (bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, grinding machines) and the Hajj to gain membership of an elite social group, enabling further financial empowerment via trade expansion. Women are less often able to invest, because their incomes are small and demands on them high. Women who are able to do so buy livestock, purchase property for rent and in more prosperous times of the not too distant past paid to make the Hajj. Formal institutional methods of saving and accumulation, e.g. via banks and bank loans, rarely figure in the uses of men's and women's incomes in Zarewa. The

organisation of informal rotating credit schemes (*adashe)* appear to be decreasing among men and women, eroded by economically unstable conditions.

Share of Household Income A further aspect of the capacity of an individual's income to empower is the measure of their contribution to overall household income. Field data showed that women generally contribute small shares, earning on average 10% of total household income. The biggest share of households' income is farm income, controlled by men. Clearly, men are most empowered financially: contributing and controlling the majority share of households' total income, but they have responsibilities to meet household reproductive needs from that income and to maintain agricultural production.

Control of Products of Labour Controlling the products of one's labour is a basic source of empowerment. By and large in rural Hausaland, the disposal of agricultural products is controlled by male *gandu* heads (*mai gida*), even though most household members contribute labour to agricultural production. Thus, other household members are disempowered of their contribution to household agricultural production. Own income earning by women and men and *gayauna* farming by men is conducted independently with personal control of the products of their labour.

8.4.2 Assets and Empowerment

Ownership, Access to and Control over Means of Production

Land is the most basic means of production in a rural economy. Ownership, access and control over land is male dominated. Although about one in three women own land, women are frequently disempowered as their land is largely appropriated by male relatives (Chapter 5).

Labour is vital to production. Male *gandu* heads appropriate male *gandu* labour and to a lesser extent, the labour of women and children household members (boys more than girls) for household agricultural work. The only labour over which women have any significant control is their own and that of their children for hawking (*talla*).

Tools are both a means of production and a source of empowerment for their owners. Men own and control agricultural tools and fertiliser (Chapter 5). Women own domestic and household tools for cooking and reproductive purposes (Chapter 6). Tools can be inherited, sold or transferred by men and women. Artisans and traders, both male and female, generally own their tools including sewing machines and tables. Grinding machines belong only to men. All mechanised means of transport (bicycles, motorcycles and vehicles) have male-only ownership and control, and are little used by women (Chapter 4).

Capital is an essential asset for commercial activity. There is more capital circulating in male-operated, than in female-operated, trade (Chapter 7). Women may obtain some capital to start trading from a relative, or by liquidating an asset. It is difficult for women to accumulate capital, because of low profit levels, constant expenditure obligations and intermittent nature of their trading activities. Hausa men may receive start-up commercial capital from their fathers, *gandu* heads, or by inheritance. Hausa men also put capital into trading from agricultural profits. Trading stock is a form of capital, (except when obtained on credit), large-scale traders (mostly men) generally have more stock than small-scale male and female traders.

Credit is a further means of production which can empower. In trade men tend to obtain more credit than women traders (Chapter 7). There are strong gender differences in access to credit. Rotating credit schemes are used by only 8% men, but 27% women. Forward contracts are a form of credit open to more male than female traders giving them greater opportunities to accumulate. Trust is very important in extending credit, usually on the basis of personal knowledge and relations. Overall there is general reluctance to give credit because of the difficulties in recovering debts, especially by and from secluded women.

Livestock are a means of production owned by both men and women. Unlike men, secluded women may not have total autonomy in selling their own livestock, because they have to go through a male intermediary to sell them at a periodic market.

Property is something only few women inherit, or are able to invest in. Most buildings and houses are built by, paid for and belong to men (Chapter 6).

Formal Education is associated with power via the documented relation between education and women's control over their reproductive fertility, access to the state etc. Chapter 6 illustrated the gendered provision of formal education in Northern Nigeria. Across Kano State and the North there are fewer secondary schools for girls than boys. Zarewa has no girls' secondary school. National and regional literacy rates are a little higher for men than women, but in rural areas of Kano State the vast majority of women and men are illiterate. The gender gap may be widening, as fewer girls than boys receive formal education. In Zarewa of those who go to school the proportions of girls in formal education decreases from primary school (enrolments about 25% female, 75% male) to secondary school (enrolments about 1% female, 99% male). The gender discrepancies are a result of parental choice over whether and which of their children to send to school and the type (single sex, co-ed) of schools available in the village. The implication for trade is that written account keeping is the prerogative of those with formal education and hence unknown to rural Hausa women and most men, except younger men who attended school. Lack of formal literacy also precludes access to banks and many state institutions.

Knowledge, Use and Control of Marketing Methods Boys, and girls especially, begin learning trade skills by hawking (*talla*) - an informal training in market operations. Later while young men may enter informal apprenticeships with established traders, young married Hausa women learn from other women in their compounds. In accessing market information, men as a gender group have advantages over women, because they dominate attendance at periodic markets. Secluded women do not occupy complete information vacuums because visitors to the compound bring price and other information, but unsecluded women have more access to information - widows especially can obtain price information attending periodic markets. About 12% of adult women are unsecluded at any one time. Except for elderly women, being unsecluded is not a 'permanent' category because re-marriage after divorce or widowhood is the norm. Participation in local commodity markets is highly gendered.

Unsecluded and secluded women retail low value, but high demand, items, operating at a small-scale with low mobility. Male traders operate with high mobility, retailing high value goods. Markets were shown to maintain unequal, male biased gender relations (Chapter 7).

Healthcare Good health is an important personal asset. In rural Hausa communities men often enjoy a more varied diet than women and children because men have money and mobility to purchase a wider range of food and snacks for own consumption; women have less money for healthcare, need a father's, or husband's, permission to seek healthcare, require transport to access healthcare, and are more likely to have health problems associated with childbearing. However, women attend clinics staffed by male medical personnel at village level in greater numbers than men, while men are patients in larger numbers at specialised centralised healthcare outlets, because they have money and transport to get there. These factors suggest that men enjoy better health and healthcare than women.

We can conclude that, relative to their male counterparts, women are significantly disempowered by their lack of assets including healthcare, market knowledge, formal education and ownership of means of production.

8.4.3 Time Use and Empowerment

Time Spent Income Earning is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. There are almost no full-time female traders because nearly all adult women have various domestic responsibilities. The few full-time women traders are widows who have no, or few, domestic burdens, as well as good health and strength, together with trading skills and capital. There are no full-time male Hausa traders in this locality, because all adult men farm (unless very elderly and infirm) or have sons/brothers/labourers who farm for them. Many children are part-time hawkers on behalf of adults (mostly women), with girls doing more hawking than boys. A few children trade in their own right beginning as early as 5-7 years old. Seasonal variations are such that men spend twice as much time trading in the dry season. Women are intermittent traders having to start and stop income earning in response to seasonality, social taboos and availability of

child labour. Some women can spend no time trading if they lack children to do *talla* (being infertile, newly married, or having grown up children although fostering is common) and social taboos prevent trade in the first few years of marriage, and when observing ritual periods after childbirth, divorce and widowhood. Thus, marriages and children interrupt women's trading careers and can amount to a loss of trade time of about 8 years, or more, in a lifetime. Heavy household domestic responsibilities and lack of capital also reduce the time women spend income earning.

Time Spent on Domestic Work as measured in Zarewa was reported in Chapter 6. Women do more domestic work than children (girls do more than boys). Children do more than men. Variations in this general pattern are related to seclusion, age, marital status and cooking duties.

Time for leisure is enjoyed more by men than children. Children have more leisure time than women. There are variations with season, age, class and for women seclusion status and cooking duties (Chapter 6).

Overall in use of their time, men are most empowered, being most able to use their time for income earning, enjoy most leisure and be least burdened by domestic work. Children's use of time reflect the importance of child labour in reproductive and income earning activities, as well as the gendered adult patterns they are being socialised into.

8.4.4 Decision Making and Empowerment

Results of investigating decision making were discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Control of income is dealt with above.

Control of Assets Men control all assets of agricultural production, with *gandu* heads making overall decisions concerning farming within the *gandu* unit. Men in *gandu* make their own independent decisions about use of their personal *gayauna* plots. Men and women largely control their own assets, as mentioned above in regard to means of production.

Choice of Income Earning Activity Women and men are free to make choices of trading activity, within the constraints of their overall social, economic and personal context. Constraints for both men and women include limits of capital, skills, customers, motivation, initiative, resources and physical capabilities. For secluded women the strongest determinant of choice of income earning activity is the ability to mobilise the labour of children and kin. Unsecluded women have a wider choice of trading activity than secluded women because, being unfettered by location, they are able to trade from a *zaure*, hawk goods from house to house and attend periodic markets. For men the biggest constraint on trade choice is capital. For example, long-distance trading requires much capital, reflected in half of male long-distance traders being wealthy Alhajis.

Control of Time Around the dictates of season, weather, school hours, market days and seasonal labour demands, men and women are free to use their time as they wish. Women are constrained by demands of domestic work, unless they are very old and incapacitated. Men have little choice but to farm, unless they are 'wealthy' (e.g. local government officer), high status (e.g. *sarki*), elderly, or incapacitated. Men have more leisure time than women, so have greater flexibility in organising their time. *Gandu* heads control portions of the time of men and boys in *gandu*, as well as some of the time of female kin for post-harvest processing. Women control some of children's time for *talla*, and any adult may ask a child to do something, although children can often simply evade adults' control. Conflicts may arise if both parents want a child to do different tasks at a particular time.

Freedom of Movement/Choice of Domicile Chapter 4 outlined in detail the constraints of seclusion on married women's movements. The most profitable trades are not open to secluded women because they need mobility. There is little choice of domicile after marriage, the usual pattern being that a wife moves to her husband's home. During a lifetime of several marriages women may live in different compounds, wards, villages, towns, or cities while retaining links with natal kin and

children. Moving with each marriage interrupts women's trade and inhibits establishment of secure trade networks, pools of customers and capital accumulation.

8.4.5 Gender Opportunities and Empowerment

Gender Divisions & Opportunities in Income Earning Women have fewer opportunities than men in income earning, because seclusion limits the majority of women to what they can do in the compound. Women's choices are further constrained by time, capital, skills, availability of child labour and socially constructed gender divisions.

Collective Organising, Access to Networks & Groups Women have less access to groups, networks and opportunities for organising than men. Women are not members or heads, only dependants of *gandu*, the primary collective agricultural labour unit. Working collectively is rare among secluded women; although there may be a degree of co-operation between women in a compound to ensure against loss of customers during short absences. Making the pilgrimage to Mecca ensures membership of an elite group, something available to more men than women. Periodic markets and long distance trade networks are only accessible to men and a few unsecluded women. *Adashe* groups, although dwindling in number, remain female-oriented credit and savings networks. Straitened economic conditions limit *adashe* mostly to large-scale women traders who can maintain regular payments. *Biki* is a form of exchange network between women of equal status that essentially redistributes profits. Women receive *biki* gifts when they are unable to earn income themselves, i.e. after childbirth, when sick, or marrying.

Status of In/Dependence Although women have dependent status and although ideologically men's role is to provide, the research presented in this thesis reveals contradictions in ideology and practice. Secluded women depend on children, male relatives and widows to carry out their trading, while unsecluded women are less dependent with respect to mobility. As shown above, women are not as dependent as ideology portrays, and perhaps men like to think, because they in fact contribute to household provisioning. However, although in part women channel their small

earnings back into the household (where, according to ideology, men should provide), this does not give women any kind of actual independence (because the amounts are small and largely invisible), but rather it binds women further into deeper dependence.

8.5 THE EMPOWERMENT OF HAUSA WOMEN

The review of empowerment variables above paints a bleak picture, with women appearing to lose out on every count. Finding women to be less empowered relative to men on almost every measure, contradicted pre-fieldwork expectations (derived from earlier literature) that women would earn substantial amounts from trading to contribute significantly to household income (Hill 1977: 159, 173), that some prominent women house traders would be wealthier than their husbands (Hill 1972: 147; 1977: 158, 173, 174), that some women would live independently in *gidan mata* (Pittin 1979, 1983, Smith 1954) and some women would be active in *bori* spirit possession cults (Smith 1954, Echard 1991, O'Brien 1999). In Zarewa it was found that men earn most household income (cash and kind), being overall richer than their wives and that women's incomes today are very much smaller than men's, the latter having greater disposable cash income. These findings indicate changes since the late-1960s. Explanations involve reductions in income earning opportunities for women. Big successful (male) farmers have overtaken all other rural dwellers in terms of income levels and ability to take advantages of the profitability of food crop farming despite rising costs of production (Meagher 1995). Islamisation seems to be the strongest of explanatory factors in the disappearance of *gidan mata* and the practice of *bori* from Zarewa.

Going beyond the inevitably coarse set of indicators dealt with above, empowerment also encompasses the processes that enable a group, or an individual, to perceive themselves as occupying a particular decision making space, having access to the full range of human potential and abilities; although it has to be acknowledged that the perception of abilities is socially constructed. Therefore, empowerment may involve undoing particular social constructions so that a group, or an individual, can perceive themselves with the capacity to act and have influence (Rowlands 1997: 14).

Rowlands (1997: 15, 1995: 103) suggests empowerment can take place at three levels: personal, household and collective, which closely correspond to Friedmann's (1992: 116) three aspects of empowerment (psychological, social and political). Firstly, at the personal level, empowerment involves developing a sense of self, individual confidence and ability which may involve undoing the effects of internalised oppression. Secondly, empowerment at the level of close relationships necessitates developing the ability to negotiate and influence decisions made within that relationship, e.g. at household level. Thirdly, at the collective level empowerment involves individuals working together to make a wider impact through involvement in political structures on a variety of scales, e.g. from the village, through to a national or international institutional level. How Hausa women are empowered at the individual level was difficult to measure - a point returned to in the reflections below. At the household level women have been shown to be relatively unempowered, with dominance of male decision making and control within the household. Female empowerment at the collective level is strongly hindered by seclusion because women are separated from political structures at the village level and beyond. Furthermore, the socially constructed norm of jealousy and competition between co-wives means that women are further divided among themselves.

To take conclusions about women and empowerment further involves consideration of some of the differences between women in this respect. To begin with, levels of empowerment change over the life course. Women are economically most powerless during the early years of marriage and childrearing, when they may not do any *sana'a*, often until after having their first child. Once a woman begins having children, child care is time consuming and until children reach the age of 5, or 6 they are not useful for *talla*. Women with older children are more able to operate successful income earning occupations (*sana'o'i*) and have greater earning power, even though it remains relatively low compared with men. The simple passage of time in a marriage corresponds with greater power for a woman as she learns to manage relations with her husband, co-wives and other compound members.[6]

[6] Wilson (1991: 34) also suggests this.

Age is also coupled with greater social power. Older women are socially most empowered, which is partially derived from being too old for seclusion (i.e. beyond the menopause). Empowerment of older women is a feature of many societies as Meillassoux recognises:

> "...after the menopause...socially she comes into her own, gaining an authority that was denied her as a wife and mother. When old and widowed, and no longer able to procreate, her position becomes closer to that of men" (Meillassoux 1981: 76).

In Hausa society although post-menopausal women are not quite 'honorary men' they have access to male spaces and some male activities, e.g. trading in periodic markets.

The number, gender and age of a woman's children are also an ambiguous factor in her ability to earn income. On the one hand more children mean greater interruptions to trade/business by childbirth events, on the other hand more children ensures the availability of child labour, essential for successful secluded trade. Women with adopted children, rather than their own, are often particularly successful traders because they do not lose time from trade in childbirth and childcare, but are able to adopt children old enough to act as agents and hawkers.

Another difference between women is that those living in bigger compounds are potentially more economically empowered because they enjoy a larger market of compound residents and visitors and there are many children available (not only their own) to send on errands or to hawk. A woman in such a compound may even manage to trade without children to hawk goods for her, if the compound's residential population is large enough.

Similarly, micro-level variations in location can affect women's potential empowerment. Women in spatially marginal households have less opportunities for economic empowerment via trade, because their location hinders access to customers. The social position of women's husbands and/or household also affect their position of relative empowerment. Secluded women in wealthy households may enjoy more empowerment because husbands may invest in their trade opportunities, for example,

by purchasing a sewing machine which is a sign of prosperity and dressmaking an acceptable trade for secluded women.

So far we have seen how women appear generally subordinated in the processes of production and reproduction. It is difficult to conclude whether women's subordination in production is a cause of their subordination in reproduction processes or vice versa. The classic (biological determinist) argument is that women's genetically determined role in biological reproduction means they are unable to participate in production on equal terms with men. Consequently men control the fruits of production (crucial resources ensuring household reproduction), thereby causing women's subordination in reproduction. This thesis did not set out to clarify the roots of women's subordination, i.e. patriarchy. What emerges from this study, however, is that causes of female subordination are not clear cut and singular, but many, various and hard to discern. It would seem that there is considerable overlap and interaction between female subordination in the organisation of the processes of production, reproduction and circulation, with some degree of causality operating (comprehensively) in all directions. We can suggest that gender relations in Zarewa fit Walby's notions of regimes of public and domestic/private patriarchy based on male appropriation of female domestic labour excluding women from public spheres, segregating and subordinating women to men's collective benefit in the structures of production, reproduction and circulation.

Drawing conclusions about female empowerment involves considering the apparent contradictions regarding the areas of independence and autonomy in Hausa women's lives, as well as contradictions in ideology (the ideal) about gender relations and praxis (the actual) identified in preceding chapters. Muslim-Hausa socio-religious prescriptions (ideology) and actual reality do not always coincide. Even where women are dependent, men are not the sole and total providers. Women contribute to household needs by choice and by necessity, while households would not survive without women's reproductive labour. Men depend on the domestic services that women provide.

How are Hausa women to be viewed within these contradictions? Some scholars writing on Hausaland developed Shirley Ardener's (1974) early concept of women as a 'muted group', to a notion of a dichotomous reality whereby women live in a separate spatial world from men (Callaway 1984: 87; Pittin 1979). Although the spatial worlds of Hausa men and women, as described for Zarewa, appear to be separate to a large extent, there are nonetheless complex overlaps. Furthermore, the term 'muted group' conveys an impression of women being silenced, or dumb, and lacking choices, but I suggest that Hausa women can and do have choices about seclusion. Women can choose to defy family and social pressures to remain married, or to remarry and observe seclusion, but in making that choice they face ridicule, rejection, social humiliation, loss of family, community and custody of their children. Such women may have to move to urban areas where 'deviant' behaviour is tolerated, but in doing so would lose existing support networks. So choices are limited within severe constraints.

Thus, a more appropriate concept is the 'patriarchal bargain', an agreement or understanding between women and men in which men dominate, but women secure specific perceived advantages (Kandiyoti 1988, discussed in Chapter 1). In the Hausa case, the advantages for women in the patriarchal bargain include protection from rape (except by their husbands), relative autonomy within a largely women's world and provision of reproductive needs (food, housekeeping money, clothes and shelter), as well as release from the arduous work of field labour, collecting water and fuelwood. Seclusion can be specifically identified as a bargain both imposed on, and also willingly engaged in by married rural Hausa women; even if it involves negotiation and trade offs (Imam 1993). In effect it is a bargain Hausa women make with their husbands, agreeing to be secluded in return for social status, material security and the opportunity to carry out personal income earning activities, albeit on a limited scale. It is a bargain because there is an element of choice. A very small number of women refuse to enter the bargain of seclusion preferring instead to live independently and unmarried, presumably leaving the village to go to the city. Within Hausa households and the wider social structure, women, as well as men and children, occupy positions that offer them particular strengths and weaknesses within the patriarchal bargain.

This understanding derives from Sen's bargaining and co-operative conflict approaches (reviewed in Chapter 1).

Women's economic bargaining position within Hausa households are governed by various external social, cultural and ideological factors which contribute both strengths and weaknesses in their efforts to negotiate their contributions to economic decision making (Table 8.1). Generally their bargaining weaknesses resulting from 'socially generated asymmetries' (Sen 1990: 138) outweigh their bargaining strengths so that they cannot refuse the bargain. Women are in an overall weak position of being able to leave the household's patriarchal set up (as divorce is easy, frequent and lacks negative stigma), but with the high cost of losing custody of children, lacking independent support and having little choice other than to remarry, or to become a city courtesan (*karuwa*).

Table 8.1 Women's Bargaining Positions*

Women's Bargaining Strengths	Women's Bargaining Weaknesses
Rural Hausa women's bargaining strengths derive from their ability to make a real threat of withdrawal from the household because: • Divorce is frequent, easy, and lacks stigma • Women return to their natal home on divorce/departure from husband's household • Leaving her husband's home a woman takes all her capital investments in wedding gifts (bowls, jewellery, cloth), her furniture, furnishings and means of work (cooking utensils, sewing machine etc.) • Children remain father's responsibility after divorce, usually in his custody • Remarriage is easy • Polygyny contributes to ease of future marriage and incorporation into a new household after divorce	Rural Hausa women's bargaining weaknesses within the household derive from their low income earning capacities due to: • Low levels of formal western education • Lack of wage earning training and skills • Little capital investment in means of production • Low levels of savings and access to credit • Cultural and religious ideology: - prevent women from engaging in waged work outside the home - prevent women from agricultural production even on own land - decree unacceptability for women of child bearing age to remain unmarried long term • High costs of withdrawal: - Loss of children on divorce (emotional cost) - Few options (especially rural) for independent living

*This table derives from the material presented in Chapters 4-7.

It should be noted that there are differences between women in their relative bargaining strengths and weaknesses within the household. In polygamous marriages

the first wife of a husband may have greater authority over second, third and even fourth wives. Although Islam dictates that husbands should treat their wives equally, new and younger wives may enjoy greater degrees of favour and attention from their husbands. In multi-generation households there is a hierarchy of authority in which old widows have higher status than married women. The strong bargaining position of elderly women, due to the respect accorded to old people, is often somewhat compromised by their economic dependency and inability to engage in any income earning activity given elderly frailty. Muslim Hausa ideology insists on the care and support of elderly relatives within the household by their children. This may not be driven entirely by altruism or ideology, but also by necessity to ensure inheritance of assets. Wealth and social status also affect women's empowerment.

Women in wealthier households usually have wealthier husbands and often access to greater capital and assets (e.g. sewing machine), so they can engage in more profitable trades and earn higher incomes than poorer women in less wealthy households. However, this may not necessarily give them greater bargaining power to negotiate within the household if women's income is not needed to meet household needs, whereas it may be crucial to household survival in poorer households. But wealthier women, particularly those with savings, investments or other capital may be in better bargaining positions because of stronger fall back positions. Should they leave the household they have greater economic resources. Similarly women with strong natal family networks in the same village have stronger bargaining positions because they can easily access support from kin.

In contrast to women's generally poor bargaining positions adult men enjoy the strongest bargaining positions within the households in terms of extra-household environmental parameters (Table 8.2). The strength of their position is due to largely male control of production and domination of trade. Women with land being farmed by male kin are in stronger bargaining positions that women without land because they can threaten to withdraw their consent to its use. Thus, there are a range of social and economic factors which differentiate women with respect to their bargaining strengths and empowerment via income earning.

Table 8.2 Men's Bargaining Positions

Men's Bargaining Strengths	Men's Bargaining Weaknesses
• Ownership of means of production: land, tools, inputs, transport • Engagement in farming and control agricultural production • Higher levels of western education may lead to employment in public sector for a few • Mobility to engage in periodic market & long-distance trade • Access to bank accounts • No social, or ideological, barriers to engaging in waged labour • Possession of traditional trades and skills e.g. butchering, farming, black-smithing, building	• Reliance on women to provide daily & generational reproductive services

Table 8.3 Children's Bargaining Positions

Boy's & Girl's Bargaining Strengths	Boy's & Girl's Bargaining Weaknesses
• Women in seclusion depend on children to run errands and hawk goods	• Do not possess means of production or skills to engage in waged labour • Under parental authority until marriage when girls pass to husband's authority

Children occupy the weakest bargaining positions within households, but sometimes get paid for running errands and may earn small amounts of money from doing small jobs. Generally children are dependent on the decisions of older household members about the resources (food, clothing, education etc.) they receive and occupy weak bargaining positions. But older children have stronger bargaining positions than younger children because they can be more demanding of personal wants and needs while also more able to earn their own small incomes and able to actively defy and resist adult demands on their time and behaviour. In the case study village examined in this thesis only a single household (of a woman and her daughter living alone) was found where a woman obviously occupied the strongest bargaining position. Such 'women and children only' households are likely to be more frequent in urban than rural areas, as subverting gender norms is something undertaken by few individuals and is not easy within tight knit, highly surveilled communities like Zarewa.

To explain how such general gender inequalities between strong male and weak female bargaining positions are maintained involves unpacking notions of gender and social reproduction, revealing its multi-layered complexities. Social reproduction involves reproducing women's subordination. It is difficult for women to combat disempowerment. According to Lukes' (1977) ideas, seclusion is a structural constraint on married women, because the price of not conforming to seclusion is so high that few women choose this option. Overcoming the (external) limits and opposing the constraints of seclusion by opting not to conform would mean facing gossip, divorce, social exclusion, having to leave the marital household, loss of contact with and custody of children and the risk of not being accepted in the natal home. Thus, scope for women's agency is limited and almost all women, almost all of the time conform to seclusion.

According to Naila Kabeer (1994b: 75) the ability of individual women to 'bargain' with their households and the community for greater personal freedom is more limited than for men – something borne out by the findings from Zarewa. The explanatory factors she proposes for this situation all equally apply to rural Hausa women. Firstly, they are excluded from public decision making positions (i.e. women cannot occupy the role of judge, chief, imam, school teacher or ward head) which enforce and modify rules governing the community. Secondly, women's intra-household bargaining power is weaker than men's and impinges on and/or weakens women's extra-household bargaining power. Thirdly, patrilocal intervillage marriage with non-kin, for some women at least, means wives lack kin support within the village, unlike men. Finally, loss to the community if women do not co-operate is small because as individuals they generally do not command significant economic or political status.

In Foucault's model (where power refers to an individual, or group, acting upon another) unequal power distribution generates secrecy and/or myths because (as observed in the chapter's opening quotation) were the real injustices exposed the situation would no longer be tolerable. If Hausa women, (or men!), were to recognise prevailing gender inequalities as unfair, unacceptable, or to openly acknowledge the mismatches between ideology and actual practice then conflict could arise. In such a

contest although wives could threaten withdrawal from the household and divorce, women's bargaining positions overall are weak. To avoid divorce and loss of daily contact with and custody of their children, married women are forced to co-operate with their husbands (most of the time). For example, the failure of husbands to meet dominant cultural-ideological norms becomes a no-go area for discussion, or negotiation. Even where women use their limited bargaining strengths within the household to remove themselves from a patriarchal bargain with a particular husband by seeking divorce, after a short period women generally remarry and re-enter a patriarchal bargain with another man.

For a married woman to want to farm her inherited land, to pursue an education, or to expand business/trade would conflict with men's hegemonic power in the patriarchal Hausa social order. Women have a lot to lose in such conflicts including physical security, social standing, acceptance in the community, relationships with friends and relatives, custody of their children and have few alternatives if faced with divorce, rejection, domestic violence, court action, and authority exerted by kin, ward heads, the village chief and imam. So women tend overall to co-operate in the patriarchal bargain, fiercely defending control of parts of their own and their children's lives. Overall dominant gender ideologies remain unchallenged and social constructions of gender divisions of labour and space reproduced. Most men are 'winners' in the bargain, and overall men as a gender group, the dominant social group, benefit, and continue to support and maintain dominant patriarchal ideology and realities.

For most of the time conflict is not observable between Hausa women and men. The suppression of conflict between the genders can be seen as the supreme achievement of male power because on the whole it is successful in preventing women from even thinking of resisting the status quo. Thus, the power equation is accepted partially through concealment and secrecy.

8.6 INCOME EARNING AND EMPOWERMENT

The major conclusion in relation to the question of whether income earning is empowering (the 'economic empowerment' thesis), is that frequently it is not. In the

case examined, the majority of rural Hausa women are engaged in market exchange, but they do not all appear significantly empowered by their income earning. Thus, while male income can and does lead to 'power over' or 'power to', women's income largely does not or cannot lead to similar forms of power. For women none of the three mechanisms (Mayoux 1999: 974) identified in Chapter 1 by which income is purported to empower apply. Women rarely become self-supporting by their income. While income may go some way to meeting their practical gender needs it does not generally relieve their dependence on men, nor does engaging in commodity exchange tackle women's strategic gender needs. While a few women 'make it' as big traders, this does not indicate empowerment of women as a group. However, the notion of non-symmetric opposites comes into play here. While women's earning appears on the whole not to significantly empower most women, not earning definitely disempowers.[7]

Reviewing evidence from elsewhere in Africa, Mayoux (1999: 973) suggests income earning empowers women because they value the opportunity to contribute to household wellbeing, are happy not to have to ask their husbands for cash to buy things and value their ability to contribute to social obligations. However, as in Zarewa this may actually disempower as it may enable husbands to neglect their responsibilities to provide for household needs and women's meagre earnings disappearing into meeting social obligations means they are unable to invest in their businesses or property or accumulate financially. Other caveats to the notion that income empowers rural African women (as identified by Mayoux 1999: 968) were also seen to be the case for Zarewa women. Namely, lack of physical access to customers and markets for secluded women hinders their empowerment and the problems of market saturation means sometimes they cannot charge prices for their cooked food and snacks which even cover their input costs, let alone make a profit. Furthermore, social pressures can lead successful women to give up more lucrative activities – for example, Mariya would not take on a woman to help sustain and expand her food selling business for fear of being labelled a prostitute. Also it is difficult to draw general conclusions about empowerment via income earning for all

[7] I am grateful to Wilson (email comm. 7/9/98) for this point.

women in a community because there are significant differences between individual women and men, husbands and wives with respect to their generation and use of income.

In addition, Mayoux (1999: 972) reviews the impact on female empowerment of increasing women's incomes and makes similar negative findings to those here. In other words Zarewa women are not unusual because their roles as guardians of family welfare, responsibilities for food preparation and other reproductive work limit their ability to invest in and expand economic activities. The incomes of women who earn tend to subsidise household consumption, rather than contribute to a process of upward mobility out of poverty. Furthermore, women's expenditure patterns may replicate (rather than challenge) gender inequalities, e.g. meeting women's practical rather than strategic gender needs. Finally, there is evidence from elsewhere (ibid.) that women's increased incomes can lead to withdrawal of male contributions and thus a limited total increased income for household well being.

While the positive relationship between income earning and empowerment certainly does not hold for all rural peasant women in all places and at all times; this is not to say it is a situation without struggle, conflict, or change over time. Preceding chapters have shown how the organisation of production, reproduction and circulation intersect with specific gender ideologies of femininity and masculinity to bring about a particular form of women's oppression expressed in gender divisions of labour, the built environment, the use of and power over space.

Like Mies' study of secluded lace makers (cited in Chapter 1) similar conclusions of income earning not empowering have been made elsewhere. For example, Barbara Harriss-White (1998: 203) finds in India that, except among the very poorest, women's income and economic participation alone does not translate into improved decision-making power for women. In Zarewa, it appears that except for the most successful large scale female traders women's income does not empower. Also Samuels (1989) maintains that income earning alone does not automatically improve women's status Where women's earnings are minimal and income earning is only a

part-time activity it can be relegated as a 'hobby', or pastime, considered unimportant compared with domestic and farm work. Furthermore, it is a fallacy that simply increasing women's incomes will lead to gender equity because women's subordination is not merely derived from women's economic poverty relative to men. Even where women have independent earnings as traders, food producers, agricultural processors and craft workers, they are not necessarily given the same power in society and the household as men. As we have already shown (Chapter 7) women and men do not participate on equal terms in Hausa markets. The social constraints on women's participation are not limited only to Hausaland, but more universally customs and traditions limit women's mobility in public space outside the home, as well as create codes excluding women from certain types of work.

We cannot readily equate women's empowerment and gender equity with economic participation. Assumptions about the direct translation of economic contributions to power and decision making within the household have been made (Batliwala 1993, Evers 1993). However, further inquiry into the dynamics and changing connections between women's economic activities and empowerment are needed. Making women's empowerment via income earning more effective requires reducing the social barriers to women's participation in markets. This could necessitate market expansion to open up new spaces for women, but there is a danger that market expansion may simply build on and/or reinforce existing unequal gender relations. Further ways of encouraging women's more equal market participation (suggested in Sen 1996) could include education to promote institutional change and removal of the 'reproduction tax' on women, i.e. the rigidly socially sanctioned division of labour in which women have primary responsibility for the care of human beings. We can suggest empowerment maybe cannot come about only via income earning, but via overall improvement in ability to act which may be more easily achieved through education and 'consciousness raising' processes. Whether income earning is empowering also depends on local gender and class relations. Economic activities may be an extra burden, especially for women and may not create empowerment in other aspects of women's lives. Unrealistic expectations may be raised about the potential use of

earned income, but where the actual amounts remain small these expectations can actually add to women's oppression.

8.7 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Like any piece of extended research the work presented in this thesis leaves various questions unanswered and raises new questions for future research. The lack of information collected on commoditisation of conjugal relations and of commodities traded within the household may, in retrospect, be considered a lacuna in the data collection, but it is also an opportunity for future research. Similarly, there is tremendous scope for investigating the different motivations, expectations and behaviours, including pursuit of non-finacial gains, of male and female traders as subjects. Indeed, a postist approach might attempt to rethink concepts like 'trader' for the hidden male subject within their gender neutrality and/or how traders identities are gendered beyond the different types of trade male and female traders carry out. Such areas of investigation, while beyond the scope of this study, would be fertile areas for future investigation.

Further questions suitable for greater in-depth research would cover other issues not directly tackled in this thesis. Such areas could include further exploration of the character of connections between trading and empowerment by looking comparatively at what are the positions occupied within their conjugal relations of women who trade and those who do not. Similarly it would be fruitful to investigate further the question of the leverage women gain from the non-financial benefits of trade and the connections between levels of male vs. female earnings in households and women's empowerment. Another area worthy of future in-depth research is to ask rural Hausa women directly whether they themselves see trade as empowering. Indeed an approach pursuing the post-modern idea of the importance of recovering silenced voices would directly ask Hausa women what they think, e.g. about seclusion – as already partially undertaken by scholars like Imam (1993) and Cooper (1997, 1998). Such an approach to future research, albeit in a rather different scholarly tradition to that taken in this thesis could usefully look in more depth at questions of agency, subversion of gender norms, performance, resistance and so on.

Furthermore, questions of the politics of representation, discourse and meaning could inform valid, interesting and complementary follow-up studies (albeit pursuing a quite different epistemological approach to that taken here). For example, to pursue study of the discourse of gender differences would require considerable fluency in Hausa to understand and interpret what is said in oral and literary texts which create, sustain and challenge gender inequalities. There is already some older and some more recent work by scholars in this direction, e.g. Salamone (1976) considered the use of proverbs in Hausa conjugal conflicts while Cooper (1995) has looked at the meanings around Hausa words referring to women and prostitution.

As this thesis documents a single village study then clearly an opening for future research is comparative study to ask 'How typical is Zarewa?'. Zarewa may be a particularly unusual 'winning' village, in terms of economic advancement. Similarly, it may be a place with particularly fervent religious practices. Further research could investigate how gender relations compare in other Hausa 'winning' or 'losing' villages. The conclusions here also raise several other possible directions for future research. Firstly, as we have shown that women's income earning is not always empowering it would be helpful to try and establish by future research what conditions (e.g. earning threshold, other economic and non-economic parameters) determine that income earning can actually be empowering. Further areas for investigation include control of fertility, co-operation in trade between women, access to and use of capital (e.g. inherited land) for female traders as it appears likely these have an impact on the subsistence or accumulative nature of women's trade.

Secondly, this study has shown rural Hausa women to be largely disempowered in the spheres of production, reproduction and circulation by the structures of patriarchy (interacting with capital and Islam). Thus, a useful approach to identify potential mechanisms for empowering rural Hausa women would be evaluation of the success, or otherwise, of strategies which explicitly aim to empower rural women. Although these are rare in rural Hausaland, possible efforts include government, or NGO (such as FOMWAM), operations at state and local level such as women's officers, women's

centres, groups or programmes such as training for traditional birth attendants by Women in Nigeria,[8] or schemes such as 'Better Life for Rural Women' which existed under the patronage of Maryam Babangida, wife of former Nigerian President Babangida and has evolved under subsequent heads of state.[9] Exposition of cases with clear evidence that empowerment has resulted would illustrate what parameters, both economic, social and personal, are required for such outcomes. Likewise, cases where empowerment was not the result, despite explicit efforts in this direction, would be enlightening about the elements needed for empowerment to occur.

8.8 FINAL REFLECTIONS

In concluding this thesis I am aware that it presents a partial research account in that all aspects of the multi-faceted realities of Hausa women's lives, experiences and subjectivities cannot be represented. Naturally, not all the desired information to shed maximum light on the research questions could be obtained. Straightforward explanations for this limitation may include unintentional oversight, my outside status as stranger and visitor, inadequate fluency in Hausa, use of research assistants, and/or time restrictions. It may be argued that in this account we do not hear Hausa women directly articulating notions, such as why women co-operate with seclusion, or describing and considering their economic and social situation in their own words. One reason for the absence of such accounts of gender inequality is a way in which the power of the dominant ideology and the dominant social group (i.e. men) is maintained. It is suggested that issues of power and threats to the dominant ideology (i.e. patriarchy) combine, making it necessary for most women to conceal information and/or an objective view of their situation both from themselves, and from outsiders (Wilson 1991: 33). This can be recognised as Foucault's secrecy and silences of embodied power relations. Social constructions of thought and language may mean women exhibit 'dull compliance' (Gidden's term) with ideology and give little indication they think about these issues.[10]

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[8] Although active for over a decade, by the late 1990s WIN was in disarray.

[9] Tarfa (1999) already investigated the (failed) efforts of a rice husking scheme under this programme which proved incompatible with female seclusion.

[10] Such women in classic mid-twentieth century feminist thinking would have been termed 'unconsciousness raised'; i.e. having internalised oppression as a survival mechanism to a point of

We may speculate that structures of domination are more powerful than agency. In other words it may be considered an ideological construction that the established social order of seclusion, gender inequalities and low female empowerment are accepted in the lives and minds of Zarewa villagers – what Bourdieu calls doxa. This does not mean resistance, or change, is not possible, but little such evidence was found in Zarewa. However, women's compliance with practices that may appear to disadvantage them may well be actually actions within constrained circumstances which are in their long-term self-interest, bound up with the well-being and security of their household, children, wider kin and community – the networks Hausa women depend on for their day-to-day survival and through life events of marriage, birth, divorce, remarriage and widowhood.

The 'objective' opinion of a privileged outside researcher, or observer, (such as myself) may give a differing account from that of men and women in Zarewa. Measuring mobility I conclude that women, especially secluded women, are 'docile bodies' restricted in their spatial movements, but conforming to time and place specific ideas of 'normal' appropriate forms of daily behaviour and presentation of self. Calculating the cost of inputs and earnings I judge that women's *sana'oy'i* give very low profits (if at all), and recording household incomes and expenditure I infer that women make substantial contributions to meeting household needs. I conclude that relative to men, women are disempowered. But men and women in Zarewa may well maintain that seclusion is good, proper freely chosen and enjoyed by women, that women are able to earn their own incomes, which they can spend as they wish, and that husbands take responsibility to feed and provide the needs of their wives, children and elderly dependent relatives. I may thus conclude from this that the subordinated may not acknowledge inequalities or challenge them because they need to co-operate (with their spouse, household and community) to survive. Thus, I conclude that men's power over women is largely silenced, that they internalise 'the gaze' to surveil themselves.

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unobservable conflict. As shown in Chapter 1 such terminology has widely come to be rejected as denying women's agency.

The overall picture which emerges in this thesis may make somewhat cheerless reading for those familiar with Hausa women as they appear in the literature of the 1970s and 80s as enterprising, speculative traders and dynamic manipulators of gender relations including pre-marital sex and initiating divorce. It is necessary to reflect on the reasons for this difference.

By the 1990s both global and local forces were contributing to Hausa women's loss of power – in the village of Zarewa at least. It is significant that Northern Nigeria has not escaped global trends of strengthening Islamisation. Furthermore, increased rural prosperity through a combination of price increases and technical changes (agrarian 'revolution') despite, or even maybe because of structural adjustment policies has enabled certain male farmer-traders to ensure that their women observe tight seclusion. This restricts their opportunities for trade. Trading spaces for secluded women traders have indeed diminished. So we are left to conclude that trade (and thus operation of the market) is truly ambivalent. It both does and does not empower. Trading empowers some (a few women traders who break into significant profits, but mostly male traders and long distance traders) and even empowers a few to reduce the power of others; but it does not empower others (mostly women secluded traders and small-scale traders). The trading sector therefore differentiates itself internally. Clearly, economic processes, such as trading, and institutions, like secluded trading, can have ambivalent outcomes for individuals and groups. This is not to deny that women, or other less powerful people have agency, but that economic and social institutions give them lesser or greater opportunities to act. I like to think I did not go looking for women's oppression, but have tried honestly to present the social configurations present.

Finally, we should ask ourselves whose account is more valid, and to whom? As Kandiyoti reminds us "The messiness of social reality continues to exceed the explanatory capacity of our conceptual frameworks especially in the area of gender" (1998: 147). I feel obliged to reveal my account because in agreement with other feminists (e.g. Renate Klein) I suggest "...we cannot speak for others, but that we can,

and must, speak out for others." (Reinharz 1992: 16). This piece of feminist geography is intended to do precisely that (as well as contributing towards a gendered regional geography), making gender and space central analytic categories, recognising difference and understanding the actual existing material world, albeit as socially constructed. This political economy of social relations in public - private spheres highlights (as Sen suggests) women and men engaging in struggles in which their interests may coincide. More usually they diverge to women's disadvantage. Income earning is not proved for rural Hausa women to be a route for the majority to empowerment. Yet, women continue to bargain (albeit from a weak position) and act in their own perceived self-interest within the constraining structures of material life, i.e. the activities of exchange, production and reproduction.

APPENDIX I

FERTILISER SUPPLY PROBLEMS

Fertilizer:

FG settles ₦100m debt to transporters

him, they were trying to sabotage the efforts of the Federal Government.

Alhaji Aliyu said the federal government had mandated all state governments to make their own arrangements to lift their fertilizer from the depots.

Meanwhile, Kano State Government has suspended all fertilizer allocations in the state.

According to the commissioner, the action was taken in order to decentralise the current system of distribution of the commodity.

He said with the new arrangement, all fertilizer allocation amounting to one tonne would now be lifted from Dangora depot, two to 11 tonnes would be lifted from the farm Centre in Kano, while 11 to 29 tonnes would be lifted from Amariri.

As for the defaulting transporters in the state, the commissioner revealed that out of the eight names given to his ministry, only three were found to be of genuine ad-

See Page 3, Col. 4

REMI ITIE, Lagos

NARTO, NAFCON probe alleged fertilizer diversion

A 10-MAN committee has been set up by the National Association of Transport Owners (NARTO), to liaise with the National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria (NAFCON) to investigate the alleged diversion of lorry loads of



ALHAJI ABUBAKAR HASHIDU
Agric Minister.

fertilizer by some 'unscrupulous drivers to unknown destinations and recommend solution to prevent such in future.

Disclosing this to newsmen in Lagos was the national president of the association, Mr. Martin Ikediashi, at the end of an extraordinary general meeting of the association at finding solutions to some problems militating against effective operations of members of the union.

He said although none of its members had been caught in the act, the committee was expected to identify the culprits.

Mr. Ikediashi believed that those involved in the act were those that were regarded as "contract transporters." Such people, he said, were being patronised by state governments and NAFCON officials.

He said a machinery had been put in place by the Minister of Agriculture to settle all monies owed the union members as freight charges.

Mr. Ikediashi also appealed to the federal government to allow the free movement of petrol tankers during the hours of the monthly environmental sanitation exercise to ensure constant distribution of fuel.

New Nigerian 29/8/92

Fertilizer

From Front Page, Col. 5

dresses.

The commissioner who welcomed the efforts of the state House of Assembly to investigate the missing 100 trailer-loards of fertilizer, disclosed that the Babban Wando transporters in Kano were now withholding 12 trucks with 3,600 bags, and Bunku transporters with 7,200 bags of the product.

He alleged that the Pino Motors Transporters which gave false address to the Federal Government, were now withholding more than 10,000 bags of fertilizer belonging to the state, while two other individuals in Lagos are withholding 71 trailer-loads of fertilizer meant for the state.

The commissioner revealed that he had been shuttling between Kano, Lagos and Port Harcourt over the missing fertilizer.

The office of the commissioner of agriculture in Kano has now become a bee hive of activities following the large number of fertilizer merchants who always bombard the place looking for fertilizer allocation to re-sell at exhorbitant prices.

New Nigerian 29/8/92

Find lasting solution to fertilizer problem

By ABUBAKAR T. RAHAMA, Kaduna

THE Minority leader of Kaduna State House of Assembly, Mrs. Florence S. Aya has called on the federal government to find a lasting solution to the yearly fertilizer problems.

Mrs. Florence Aya a representative of Kagoro constituency in Kaura Local Government, made this call while addressing Assembly Correspondents on national issues and the yearnings of the electorate.

She observed that for quite a long time now the issue of fertilizer has been one and most disturbing, that is its shortage or non availability at a time the input is most needed.

Mrs. Florence noted that the federal government could do better in this direction by making adequate arrangement to start sales of the fertilizer to farmers during the dry season so that the inherited problem of shortages or its non availability could be taken care off.

The minority leader also observed that the Kaduna State and the federal government are doing the best they could towards this direction but more emphasis should be given to enough procurement, earlier distributions and proper control of the sales.


In a related development the minority leader strongly opposed the bill passed by the Kaduna House of Assembly on fertlizer which will not reflect any positive measures on any bod caught mishandling the fertilizer for the farmers.

Minority leader

She observed that it was wrong for any bill to be passed without positive measures clearly indicated whether for offenders of such laws. As lawmakers she said they should have understood this and make necessary adjustment.

On the NRC, SDP working relationship, Mrs. Aya commended the members for their matured approach and peaceful coexistence in the house. This she noted had made them to achieve alot during their delibrations.

She finally thanked her male counterparts in the house for all the cooperation she has been getting from them which make her duty as a minority leader in the house successful.



MRS. FLORENCE S. AYA

New Nigerian 11/9/92

Govt auctions fertilizer

PLATEAU Government is auctioning fertilizers at official rates of between N30 and N40 per bag following a crackdown on illegal sellers who hoarded the commodity.

A correspondent of the News Agency of Nigeria in Pankshin reports that the commodity has now disappeared completely from the opened market, while government consignments are nowhere to be found.

However, some farmers who were initially jubilating and praising the government for auctioning the hoarded fertilizer had started regretting as the crackdown had led to the total disappearance of the commodity in the market.

Some farmers who spoke to NAN in Mangu and Pankshin appealed to the government to exercise caution in the operation against illegal hoarding with a view to minimising the hardship being experienced by farmers in the procurement of the commodity.

They maintained that in as much as government deserved to be praised for its concern for farmers, there was the need for the government to also ensure the availability of the commodity to farmers.

National Concord 21/8/92

APPENDIX II

ADULT OCCUPATIONS (*sana'o'i*)

The research into women and men's economic activities was based on the random sample of households in Zarewa, stratified by administrative ward. The sample consisted of 10% of all households in the village. A baseline household survey was carried out using a questionnaire-based interview with the head of household (57 of whom were male, 1 female). The survey established details of resident household members including their current occupations and economic livelihood strategies. The responses given by the heads of households were verified with all the individuals later in personal interviews. In many cases discrepancies were noted, often because the head of household is unaware of the precise economic activities his wives and other adults in his household are engaged in. The reasons for ignorance on the part of male head of households are partly because it is not a matter of his concern and also because women in particular frequently change their income earning activities. Furthermore, many adults, especially women have several occupations. The activities engaged in also vary seasonally. The occupations recorded are listed in Table IV.1.

Table II.1 Adult Occupations in Zarewa

MEN (n = 137)	No.	WOMEN (n = 172)	No.
Agriculture			
Dryland (*gona*) farming	123		
Wetland (*fadama*) farming	6		
Agricultural labourer (*kwadago*)	1		
Animal Husbandry			
Fatten sheep & goats to sell for Eid	2		
Gathering (to use/ sell)		Gathering (to use/sell)	
Zogale leaves	2	Firewood	2
Baobab leaves (*kuka*)	2	*Zogale* leaves	1
Honey	2	Baobab leaves (*kuka*)	1
Henna (*lalle*)	2		
		Food Processing	
		Shell groundnuts	19
		Husk rice	14
		Pounding (grain, *kuka*, cassava)	9
		Groundnut cakes (*kuli-kuli*) & oil (*mai gyada*)	9
		Make *daddawa* from locust beans	6

Craft work		Craft work	
Tailoring	5	Tailoring	6
Leather work	2	Spinning cotton	4
Weaver	1	Knitting	3
Embroidery	1	Leather work	1
		Weaver	1
Services		Services	
Butcher	7	Hairplaiting	7
Koranic teacher (malam)	3		
Market middleman (*awo*)	3		
Barber (*wanzami*)	2		
Radio repair	2		
Bicycle repair	2		
Driver	2		
Builder	1		
Photographer	1		
Motorcycle mechanic	1		
Welder	1		
Shoe shine/repair	1		
Ironing/laundry	1		
Carpenter	1		
Ward head	1		
Sale of cooked food		Sale of cooked food	
Grilled meat (*suya*)	1	Rice and sauce (*shinkafa*)	7
Fried fish	1	Roast tigernuts (*aya*)	6
Tea stall	1	Steamed bean cakes (*alele*)	6
		Fried bean cakes (*kosai*)	6
		Fermented grain gruel (*koko*)	6
		Beanflour dumplings (*dan wake*)	4
		Rice and beans (*shinkafa da wake*)	3
		Grain based gruel (*kunu*)	3
		Roast groundnuts (*gyada*)	3
		Dokuwa made from groundnuts	3
		Grilled meat (*suya*)	2
		Fried rice cakes (*waina*)	2
		Fried biscuits (*cincin*)	2
		Fried fish (*kifi*)	1
		Steamed bean patties (*gauda*)	1
		Boiled cassava (*rogo*)	1
		Wheat sweetmeats (*algaragis*)	1
		Bottled drinks (with tamarind etc)	1
White collar			
Civil servant - Kano	2		
Government school teacher	1		
Hospital nurse - Kano	1		
Local government employee	1		
Typist - Kano	1		
In Education			
Koranic student	2		
Secondary school pupil	1		
Student - Kano Polytechnic	1		
Teacher training	1		

Trading		Trading	
Trader (non specific)	11	Petty provisions	27
Cloth/clothes	5	Palm oil	8
Provisions(soap, omo etc.)	4	Kolanut	6
Tomatoes	3	Beans	4
Pepper	3	Tomatoes	2
Grain	3	Kerosene	2
Salt	3	Pepper	2
Cane sugar	2	Cigarettes	1
Kolanut	2	Local soap	1
Mats	2	Mangoes (in season)	1
Kokoyam	1	Onions	1
Cassettes	1		
No Occupation		No Occupation	
No occupation except farming	49	No occupation because very old, recently gave birth, married etc.	26
Retired farmer	1		

APPENDIX III

ACTIVITY CATEGORIES

Table III.1 Activity Categories Used to Analyse Time Use Data

Paid Production	
Craft work tailoring spinning cotton embroidery knitting Food processing boil/dry/husk rice pound cassava/grain (*surfe*) shell groundnuts/beans	Paid Services government work - civil servant (teacher) barber hair plaiting photographer radio repair laundry/ironing koranic teacher market middleman (grain) carpenter bicycles, motorbikevehicle mechanic shoe repair Labouring farm labour building labour
Unpaid Production	
Gathering firewood animal fodder (grass) food e.g. *zogale* Agriculture clearing/preparing fields prepare/tend seeds & seedlings planting seeds/seedlings tend/weed crops in field maintain tools buy fertiliser, apply fertiliser, supervise labourers harvesting manuring *fadama* work farm task (not specific)	Food Processing (for household) husk/dry/winnow grains dry/shell beans, shell groundnuts prepare *daddawa*, *kuli-kuli* etc. Animal Husbandry feed/water animals within compound Construction house building/repair supervise builders Handiwork for household tailoring
Trade/Circulation	
Market Trading (men/widows) preparing travelling selling from stall hawking in market collect debt Village Trading (men, widows, children) selling from stall hawking house to house collect debt	Secluded Trading (women) preparing e.g. cooking, husking rice etc send child out to sell selling at home (women) hawking (*talla*) (children) collect debt

Social Obligations/Leisure	
<u>Religious Activities</u> prayer at home prayer at mosque read/recite koran attend koranic school (adults) read religious books attend teaching in mosque koranic study (*tafsir*) <u>'Leisure' - in village</u> watch/play football listen radio read (newspaper,Arabic&other books) in village visit and socialise talk to husband/wife receive visitors chat at home - tell stories	<u>Social Obligations - in village</u> wedding, naming, bereavement receive visitors for bereavement, visit sick, new mother, new bride greet/visit Sarki greet elder relatives <u>Social Obligations - outside village</u> travel time (walking/vehicle) visit sick, new mother, new bride wedding,naming,bereavement visit relatives <u>'Leisure' - out of village</u> out of village visit go to nearby periodic market
Daily Reproduction	
<u>Domestic work</u> (unpaid) prepare firewood (chop, break, stack) making fire, take charcoals indoors cooking serve/distribute food clean, fill, light lamps cleaning-tidy, sweep room/compound washing plates/cooking utensils washing /iron clothes fetching water from tap/well heating water for bathing repairs and maintenance purchasing (for household) send child on errand do errand e.g. take clothes for ironing	<u>Personal Reproduction</u> eating/drinking buy food/snack for own consumption grooming and personal hygiene sickness/treatment rest/relax in daytime sleep in daytime
Generational Reproduction	
<u>Childbearing and child care</u> wake children in morning breastfeed/feed bath rub pomade dress plait hair care/treat sick wash children's clothes apply henna buy children snack/food carry baby on back playing with children	<u>Education</u> send children to school teaching children koran (unpaid) attend primary school secondary school islamiya primary school do homework buy school notebook attend koranic school (children)

Not recorded - defecating and sexual activity

APPENDIX IV

FIELDWORK PERIODS & RESEARCH TOOLS

During the three fieldwork periods (over 15 months total) in Nigeria although I retained a base in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria throughout, the majority of time was spent living in Zarewa:

- **Preliminary fieldwork 1991:**

  4 visits over 1 month: 7 days, 3 nights in Zarewa (20 Aug, 6, 19, 26-29 Sept. '91)*

- **Wet season fieldwork 1992:**

  Frequent and prolonged visits over 5 months (24 Apr. - 26 Sept. 1992)*

- **Dry season fieldwork 1993:**

  Frequent and prolonged visits over 6 months (16 Feb. - 19 Aug. 1993)*

*dates refer to first and last days spent in Zarewa during each period in Nigeria.

A summary of the interviews conducted in Zarewa appears in Table IV.1

Copies of interview schedules appear in the following pages.

Table IV.1 Research Interviews Conducted

Interview Type	Interviewee	No. Interviews Conducted	When Interviewed
Household Membership Survey	Male household heads	57 interviews (57 households i.e. 10% sample of village population)	May-Jun 1992
Farm Production Survey (1991 harvest)	Male farmers	83 interviews in 56 households	Jun-Aug 1992
Household Budget & Decision Making	Men	43 men in 18 households	Sept 1992
"	Women	51 women in 16 households	Sept 1992
Farm Production Survey (1992 harvest)	Male farmers	127 interviews in 52 households	Feb-Jun 1993
Time Use	Men	129 interviews	Wet season Jun-Aug 1992
"	"	61 interviews	Dry season Feb-Apr 1993
"	"	60 interviews	Ramadan Feb-Mar 1993
"	Women	160 interviews	Wet season Jun-Jul 1992
"	"	32 interviews	Dry season/Ramadan Mar 1993
"	Boys (7-15 yrs)	53 interviews	Apr-May 1993
"	Girls (7-16yrs, unmarried)	30 interviews	Apr-Jul 1993
Economic Activities*	Men	15 interviews	Feb-Jun 1993
"	Women	13 interviews	Aug 1993
Life Stories	Elderly men & women	Interviews with 10 women, 12 men (av. 2 interviews each adult)	Apr-Aug 1993

*These interviews targeted particular types of traders and were conducted in order to supplement the information on economic activities already gathered in the household survey, household budget survey and life stories. In order to 'fill the gaps' and gather data about particular trader types a snowball method was used to reach these traders - notably grain traders.

Table IV.2 Life Story Interviews

Male Interviewees*	Interview Dates	Female Interviewees*	Interview Dates
1. Malam Liman	12/6/93, 3/7/93	1. Lariya Hadiza	14/7/93, 11/8/93
2. Malam Sanusi	24/4/93, 23/6/93	2. Rukkaiya Gambo	16/7/93, 9/8/93
3. Malam Isahu	30/6/93, 12/8/93	3. Hajiya Amina Maigida	13/7/93, 10/8/93
4. Alhaji Tukur	17/6/93, 24/6/93	4. Gaje	2/7/93, 15/7/93
5. Alhaji Yahaya	21/7/93, 13/8/93	5. Zubai Gambo	14/7/93, 12/8/93
6. Malam Aminu	25/6/93, 1/7/93	6. Maryam Gwamma	2/7/93, 15/7/93
7. Malam Hafisu	25/6/93, 22/7/93	7. Hajiya Halima	2/7/93, 12/7/93
8. Malam Liti	20/7/93	8. Zubai Habi	30/6/93, 10/8/93
9. Malam Babajo	1/7/93, 22/7/93	9. Mairo Liti	13/7/93, 11/8/93
10. Malam Mairuwa	24/4/93, 16/6/93	10. Delu Karimatu	16/7/93, 9/8/93
		11. Mariya Salisu	20/3/93, 9/6/93
		12. Hadiza	3/7/93

*Pseudonyms are used for all informants.

HOUSEHOLD MEMBERSHIP

Household: Mal Danjuma
Ward: Gakin gari
Household Code: 002

Date: 23/5/92 Time: 4.30 – 5.0 p m
Interviewer: Ibrahim
Person Interviewed: Mr Danjuma

Code	Name	Relation to Household head	Sex	Age	Marital Status (1st, 2nd Married)	Age at Marriage	Age at birth of 1st child	No. Children alive	No. Children dead	Education: Standard Comptd	Education: Koranic Completed	Education: Koranic No Yrs	Occupation	Code
		Married	M	40	married to 1 wife	15 yrs	17 yrs	10	3	—	—	✓	farmer & Tailoring	
	Balkisu	wife of M Danjuma	F	35	married 1st wife	10 years	12 yrs	10	3	—	—	✓	Sells local onions	
	Mohd Ismail	2nd born of M Danjuma	m	23	unmarried	—	—	—	—	class 6 at Zarewa. Sec School Karaye		✓	Still in Kano, Diploma programme	
	Umaru	4th born of Danjuma	M	17	unmarried	—	—	—	—	Class 6 prim Sch Zarewa Jss1 Zaria		✓	Now in Koranic Sch in Zarewa just s	
+	Idris	5th born	M	14 yrs	child	—	—	—	—	class 6 prim Sch at Zarewa		✓	Jss1 at Zarewa & Zaria	In [illegible]
+	Hamza	6th born of Danjuma	M	12 yrs	child			—	—	Still in class 6 Zarewa		✓	still in Sihuol	
	Amina	7th	F	9 yrs	child	—	—	—	—	—		✓	In Koranic School 2 years	
+	Lukman	8th	M	6 yrs	child	—	—	—	—	class 1 primary at Zarewa			still in class one prim	
	Hadiza	9th	F	4 yrs	child	—	—	—	—					
	Ahmadu	10th	M	1 yr	child	—		—	—					

FARM PRODUCTION (1991) INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

FARM PRODUCTION

Household Malam Danjuma Date 12-6-91 Time 9:30am

Ward Kwaru House No. 002 Interviewer Malam

Gandu Farmers Mal Danjuma & Sons Person Interviewed Mal [illegible]

OWN LAND (NOT Fadama)

(I)nherit/Buy/Gift Area: (big)/medium/small Ploughing: 84 man/days

RENTED LAND (Not fadama)

Rent: N.....per... Area: big/medium/small Ploughing.....man/days

OWN FADAMA LAND None

Inherit/Buy/Gift Area: big/medium/small Digging.....0.....man/days

No. Wells..... Pump.....

RENTED FADAMA LAND

Inherit/Buy/Gift Area: big/medium/small Digging.....man/days

No. Wells..... Pump.....

PLOUGHING	M/day or self	No. Days
Hand 0 ✓	family	84
Bullocks	—	—
Tractor	—	—

PLANTING	No. Days	Naira per day
Family ✓	7	
Labourers	—	—

TRANSPORT	No. in household
Bicycle	2
'Machine'	1
Car/Truck	

FERTILISER No.bags 20 Cost/bag 130 Naira Where buy Cutin Zaria Nigeria Bank loan N.....

Manure: (Y)/N Ash: (Y)/N

TREES	Numbers & Types	Use
On farm	2 kuka, 1, baraura 1- rimi (Kapok)	
In Compound	1- baibeiya 1 kuka	
Other		

SEED	No. Mudus/Tins	Buy?	Total Cost	Were buy
Maize (Masara)	10 Mudus			
Guineacorn(dawa)	7 "			
Millet (gero)	7 "			
Sorghun(kaura)	5 "			
Rice(shinkafa)	—			
Beans (Wake)	—			
Groundnut(Gyada)	—			
Pepper(Barkonu)	13 k....			
Tomatoes(Tomatur)	[illegible]			
Onion (Albasa)	—			

Household Alh. Dangumu Ward Kwanar Dawaki House No. 042

1 = 42

LAST HARVEST i.e. 1991		No. Sacks /baskets	Sold: No. & Price (₦.....) & Time of sale	Family Use	Stored
Maize	(Masara)	12 bags	4 x 350 in March	✓ 8	—
Guineacorn	(Dawa)	8 "	4 x 300 in March	✓ 4	—
Millet	(gero)	4 "			
Sorghum	(kaura)	8 "		5	3
Rice	(shinkafa)	—		✓ 5	—
Beans	(wake)	—			
Groundnuts	(gyada)	—		✓	
Pepper	(barkono)	✓		✓	
Tomatoes	(tomatur)	✓			
Onions	(albasa)	—			
Sweet Potatoe	(dankali)	—			
Irish Potato	("bature)	—			
Kokoyam	(gwaza)	—			
Yam	(doya)	✓		✓	
Ochre	(kubewa)	✓		✓	
Cassava	(rogo)	—			
Guinea eggs	(yalo)	—			
'Cucumber'	(cujiya)	—			
Sugar Cane	(rake)	No. Bundles:		Price per Bundle:	

ANIMALS	Number	Born?	Gift?	Buy?₦	ANIMALS	Number	Born?	Gift?	Buy?₦
Sheep/ Ram	6 1	✓ ✓	—	—	Ducks	—			
Goats	2	1	1	175 ea	Chickens	15	✓	—	—
Cows	—				Guinea-fowl	—			
Bullocks	—				Horse	—			
Donkeys	—				Other	—			

FAMILY FARM WORKERS

Name	Relation	Sex	Age	Always/ Sometimes
M. Tanimu	Nephew	M	[illegible]	Always
Ahmed	"	"	17	Sometimes
Isa		"	14	1
Hamza			12	
Lukman		"	6	
Muhammadu		"	11	

LABOURERS

Yes/No? How Many? When?

Do What? Cost?.....

Details:

HOUSEHOLD BUDGET SURVEY INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

FOOD PURCHASE - 1

Respondent: Malam ..Bako Ward/No. C.G.018 ..... Gidan Malam ..Bako

Interviewer ..... Date: 31/8/91 ..... Time: 1.30 p.m Place Sheno

	Last Week			Last Month			Last Year		
GRAINS FOR FAMILY/RELATIVES	Amount	Total ₦	Where Buy	Amount	₦	Where Buy	Amo-unt	₦	Where Buy
Maize (Masara)									
Guineacorn(dawa)									
Millet (gero)									
Rice (Shinkafa)									
Sorghum (Kaura)									
Beans (Wake)									
Groundnuts(Gyada)									
Other:									

Comments: They are farming ancestral for the family.
They just have to go to sieve at twice or grains they need.

	Yesterday			Last Week			Last Month		
VEGETABLES FOR cooking	Amount	₦	Where Buy	Amount	₦	Where Buy	Amo-unt	₦	Where Buy
Yam (doya)	—								
Cassave (rogo)	—			✓	₦10	In garewa			
English potatoes (dankalin bature)	—								
Sweet potatoes (dankali)	—								
Kokoyam (gwaza)	—								
Onions (albasa)	—								
Tomatoes (tomatur)	—								
Pepper (barkorna)	—								
Okra (kubewa)	✓	₦2.00	garewa	✓	₦5	garewa	✓	₦15	garewa
Spinach (aleyaho)	—								
Baobableaves(kuka)	—			✓	₦5	garewa	✓	₦15	garewa
Leaf vegetable (karkashi)	—								
Garden eggs (yalo)	—								
Other TOTAL		3			20			30	

Date 31/8/11 Respondent Mal. Kabiru Ward/No. 018 Gidan M. Sacilayo

FOOD PURCHASES	Yesterday			Last Week			Last Month		
-2	Amount	₦	Where Buy	Amount	₦	Where Buy	Amount	₦	Where Buy
~~Mangos (mangwaro)~~									
Oranges (lomo)	—								
Bananas (ayaba)	—								
Sugarcane (rake)	—			✓	₦3.00	Jarewa			
Guava (gweba)	—								
Other fruit	—								
Eggs (kwai)									
Meat (nama)									
Fish (kifi)				✓	₦5.00	Jarewa			
Palmoil (manja)	✓	₦2.00	Jarewa	✓	₦7.00	Jarewa			
Groundnut oil - (maigyada)	—								
Cotton seed oil (Kanhilora)	—								
Sugar (sukari)	✓	₦2.00	Jarewa	✓	₦21.00	Jarewa		60	
Salt (gishiri)	✓								
Maggi (maggi)	—	₦1.00	"	✓	₦7.00	"		30	
M.G. (kafizabo)	✓	₦1.00	"	✓	₦7.00	"		30	
Locust bean cake (daddawa)	✓	₦2.00	"	✓	₦14.00	"		60	
Other spices									
e.g. cloves, ginger, potash	✓	₦2.00	"		14			60	
Gari (Gari)	—	—	—	—	—	—	✓	₦150	Onclo State
Biscuits (biskit)	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Bread (burodi)	—	—							
Minerals							✓	₦24.00	Onclo State
Peakmilk	—								
Powdered milk (madaran gari)	—								
Tea-Lipton (shayi)	—								
Bournvita	—								
Sweet/Chewing gum	—								
Kola (goro)	—	—	—	—	—	—	✓	₦66.00	Jarewa

Date 21/5/12 Respondent M. Echo Ward/No 018 Gidan Rat [illegible]

FOOD PURCHASES 3

BOUGHT MEALS & SNACKS	Yesterday Amount	₦	Who Eat	Give Food Money? (kudin abinci) Who to?
Fura + Nono	✓	₦6.00	himself	....Wives.....
Rogo				How much? ₦6.00
Shinkafa(+ Nama/ Wake)	✓	₦3.00	"	How often? every day
Alele	—			Receive Food Money? (kudin abinci)
Dan Wake	—			
Kosai	—			Who from?
Koko	✓	₦1.00	himself	How much?
Kunu	✓	₦1.00	himself	How often?
Other e.g. g/nuts, egg, fish, suya, chinchin sugarcane	✓	₦1.00	himself	

₦12

NON FOOD PURCHASES

	YESTERDAY Amount	₦	Whofor	LAST WEEK Amount	₦	Whofor
Kerosene	✓	₦3.00	families	✓	25.00	families
Matches	—	—	—	✓	₦0.50k	himself
Firewood	—					
Omo	✓	₦2.00	himself	✓	₦5.00	for family
Soap				✓	₦2.00	himself
Toothpaste						
Antimony						
Perfume	—	—	—	✓	₦40.00	family
Pomade	—	—	—	—		
Cigarattes	—	—	—	✓	₦16.00	himself, (for spray)
Batteries	✓	₦8.00	himself (torch)	✓	₦2.00	from family
Medecine e.g. (Cafenol)	✓	₦1.00	himself	—		
Clothes/sewing	—	—		—		
Shoes	—	—				
Newspaper/Book/ magazine	—					
Pencil/Biro/paper	—					
Other	—					

Date..... Respondent..... Ward/No..... Gidan.....

OTHER EXPENDITURE

	LAST WEEK ₦	LAST MONTH ₦	LAST YEAR ₦
Ceremony(naming/ Wedding etc)	—	—	₦100.00 to a (wedding) friends
Gift to family/ friend	—	—	—
Grinding money		—	—
~~Hairplaiting/Barber~~/ Haircare	—	—	—
Transport money	✓ ₦1.00	₦1.00 ✓	
Transport money	✓ ₦7.00 himself to mkt		
Hospital fees(Kudin asibiti)	—	—	—
Schools-	—	—	—
Fees, books, Uniforms	—	₦65.00 (Sch Uni)	—
Repairs-House, bicycle etc.	—	₦120.00	—
		₦100.00	
Taxes (kudin kasa/ haraji)	—	—	₦20.00
Water Bill	—		
NEPA Bill	—		
Toreh/Lamp	—	—	—
Furniture/Mat	—	—	
Stove/Pot	—	—	
Watch/Clock	—	—	
Radio/Cassette	—	—	
Bicycle/Machine	—	—	
Sewing/Grinding Machine.	—		
Building -house/wall	—	—	₦1200.00 (N 1 for wife)
Car			
Hajj			

Maghe? No..... per ..... Use.....

Bank Account? No..... balance Use.....

Bank Loan? Details:.....

Borrowed Money? Details:..... (₦1000 ₦200)

Loaned Money? Details: ₦1505.00 to 3 friends (1 ₦300).....

Money received from absent family member: Who? .....

per.....

Respondant Mal [redacted] Baba No. G 2 018 Name Mal Bako.

Interviewer..... Date..... Time..... Place.....

FARM PURCHASES AND INCOME

Farm of.....

PURCHASES THIS SEASON:

Tools (e.g. Plough hoe) N 1116.00 purchase month June

Animals:..... N..... purchase month.....

..... N..... purchase month.....

..... N..... purchase month.....

(checklist: cow, bullock, sheep, goat, donkey, chicken, guineafowl, duck)

GRASS/FOOD for animals N 15.00 per Month

LAND rent/buy N 200 per Year

PURCHASES SINCE PREVIOUS INTERVIEW

FERTILISER No. bags 14 N per bag 150-200 total N.....

LABOUR Total N 2500.00

SEEDS type Beans Mudus Total N 120.00

FARM INCOME

CROPS SOLD - Before Earlier Interview (*Fill in details from last interview*)

CROP	No. bags	Sale Month	N/bag	Total N	Use of money
Maize(masara)	1				
Guineacorn(dawa)					
Millet (gero)					
Sorghum (kaura)					
Rice (shinkafa)					
Beans (wake)	7 mudus	Nov/December		2000	Use for his for
Groundnuts(gyada)					
Popper (barkonu)	2	April	1,200	2,400	Use for his marria
Tomatoes (tomatur)					
Onions (albasa)					
Garden Eggs(yalo)					
Sugarcane (rake)					
Other					

Date ..... Respondent M. ..... Ward/No. D/S .... Gidan M. .....

CROPS SOLD – Since Last Interview

CROP	No. bags	Sale Month	₦/bag	Total ₦	Use of money
Maize (masara)	10	July	₦350.00		Use for farming
Guineacorn (dawa)					
Millet (gero)	7	July	₦350.00		Use for farming
Sorghum (kaura)					
Rice (shinkafa)					
Beans (wake)					
G/Nuts (gyada)					
Pepper (Barkonu)					
Tomatoes (tomatur)					
Onions (albasa)					
G/Eggs (yalo)					
Sugarcane (rake)					
Other					

ANIMALS/EGGS SOLD IN LAST YEAR

	No. sold	Sale Month	Total ₦	Use of money
Cow (Saniya/sa)				
Sheep (tunkiya)				
Goat (akuya)	1	July	₦300	Use for farming
Donkey (jaki)				
Duck (agwagwa)				
Chicken (kaji/zakara)				
Guineafowl (Zabo)				
Eggs (kwai)				
Other				

INCOME FROM RENT

	₦rent income	Frequency	Use of money
Land			
Plough			
Bullocks			
Tractor			
Pump	₦10 – ₦20	Weekly	farming use
Vehicle			
Building			

Comments:

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.....

Respondant Alh Sale Ward/No 045 Y.A Gidan Alh Sale

Interviewer..... Date..... Time.....Place.....

TRADING/INCOME EARNING

Item of trade/Income Earning Activity Trading on tomatoes and onions also everywhere in the local Buy at Market-er Sundu Mkt.

Time Spent

No. days a week? 3 days → every trip he makes

No. hours a day?.....

Months of year? every Month except in the raining season he will send some money to it.

Costs

Raw materials/goods..... the basket of tomatoes is about 50 - 60 Naira the basket is 6-7 Naira

Grinding ..... going in a day varies from Naira 6,000 - 10,000 total outlays

Market rent ...No.....

Transport to Sokoto - 12.00 Kaduna & Kano 10.00 1000s - 3a co.

Other .....

Profit(rina)/Income) loses about 1,000 on last trip

Per item ..... sometimes gain, sometimes lose

per day .....

per week .....

per month .....

Use of Income

Self ..... Friends .....Business.....Other e.g. loan and farming

Children ..... Relatives..... Home needs.....

Husband ..... Daughter's Marriage.....Adashe.....

Comments:

.....

.....

.....

Respondent M. Bako Ward/No C.G. 018 Gidan mal. Bako

Interviewer Ibrahim Date 31/8/92 Time 3 p.m. Place Shop

HOUSE HOLD DECISION MAKING

WHO DECIDES IN THIS HOUSE	DECISION MAKER / COMMENTS
if children go to school if children help) farm if children do tolla	maigida " wife
about daughter's marriage about son's marriage	maigida "
if/how you earn money (sana'a)	maigida
medical care for family member	m.g. give permission + pay medicine but wives go (with child). If v. serious m.g. will go. Wives can go to Z, if not
what to plant in farm employing farm labour buying fertiliser	maigida " "
to sell grain/crops from the farm to sell animals	" "
to buy grain for the family to buy soup ingredients (kayan miya) to buy food for the family e.g. salt, sugar, maggi to buy Omo, soap, kerosene, firewood etc.	— wife (giving the money by m.g.) give them money every day else to give them
to buy clothes for self to buy clothers for husband/ wife to buy cloth for children	maigida " "
to build/repair house	"

Comments:

FARM PRODUCTION (1992) INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Date: 11-4-93 Respondent: M Abdulmumini Ward/No 6.4.002 Gidan M. Dangu

CROPS SOLD - Since last Interview

'92 HARVEST

CROPS	No. Bags	Sold	Sale Month	₦ Bag	Total ₦	Use of Money
Maize(masara)	7 bags	—				
Guineacorn(dawa)						
Millet(Gero)	dami	—				
Soroghum(Kaura)	6 bags	3	feb	210-00	~~₦200.00~~ 420	use it to buy fertilizer
Rice(Shinkafa)						
Beans(Wake)						
G/Nuts(Gyada)						
Pepper(Barkonu)						
Tomatoes(Tumatur)						
Onions(Albasa)	2 bags	2	Sept-	150-00	300.00	Use to buy clothes & house expense
G/Eggs(Yalo)						
Sugarcane(Rake)						
Others						

ANIMALS/EGGS SOLD IN LAST YEAR

ANIMAL	No. Sold	Sale Month	Total	Use of Money
Cow (saniya/sa)				
Sheep (tunkiya)				
Goat (Akuya)				
Donkey (Jaki)				
Duck (Agwagwa)				
Chicken (kaji/Zakara)				
Guinea fowl (Zabo)				
Eggs (Kwai)				
Others				

INCOME FROM RENT

	Rent Income	Frequency	Use of Money
Land			
Plough			
Bwlocks			
Tractor			
Pump			
Vehicle			
Building			

Other Sana'a

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.....

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.....

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Tailor

TIME USE SURVEY INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

~~DAILY TIME USE RECORD~~ C.G 002

~~Date of interview~~ 11-4-93

Date of time record 10-4-93 Day of week Sat Month April

Interviewer Ibrahim Place and time of interview Shamo

Name of respondent Mal Danjuma

Compound C1 Mal Danjuma Ward C.K

Gender (M)/F Approx. Age ..... years

MARRITAL STATUS	not yet married	recent divorce & current unmarried	widowed	married	unmarried
				1 wife	

	Time of day	Description of Activity (task, place, duration, assistance, company etc)	Activity Code	Min per Day
	4.30 a.m.			
ASUBA				
Salla	5.00 a.m.			
Asuba				
	5.30	prayed al- mosque	F1	
SASSAFE	6.00			
			F1	60
	6.30	At home in the room sleep	F1	
		Spread [illegible]		
S	7.00			
A			F1	60
F	7.30	listening to news on radio	T4	
E			F4	30
	8.00	eat food cooked	B2	
			B2	30
H	8.30	Teaching [illegible] to the farm	C1	
A		with bike		
N	9.00			
T				
S	9.30			
I				
	10.00			
	10.30			
R	11.00			
A				
N	11.30	finish working at farm	C1	195
A			B2	
	12.00			
	12.30	eat lunch kunnu Alele	B2	60

Code: .....GD.2...C.S.

	1.00a.m.		F4	
R				
R	1.30	Relaxing	F	
Sallar			F4	60
Azahar	2.00	prayed at mq.	F1	
R			F1	30
A	2.30	sleeping at shado.	B2	
N				
A	3.00			
	3.30			
			B2	90
Sallar	4.00	prayed at home.	F1	
La'asar			F1	30
	4.30	To the bath	B2	
			B2	30
Y	5.00	still at shado - resting/relaxing	F4	
A				
M	5.30			
A				
	6.00			
	6.30			
Sallar			F4	120
Magariba	7.00	Prayed at mq	F1	
Sallar				
Ishai	7.30	Still at mosque		
			F1	60
D	8.00	eat- tuwo cooked by wife	B2	
A				
R	8.30			
E			B2	60
	9.00	At Kofar yido with friends	F4	
	9.30			
	10.00			
	10.30	Sleep time	F4	105
	11.00			

Comments

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Respondent Alh. Yusuf Ward/No C.G. 004 Gidan Alh. Yusuf

Interviewer Ibro Date ..... Time ..... Place .....

TRADING/INCOME EARNING

Item of trade/Income Earning Activity ..... TRADER ⇒ pepper tomatoes

Time Spent

No. days a week? 3 or 4 ... 5

No. hours a day? .....

Months of year? Only during the season ...

Costs

Raw materials/goods Pepper Tomatoes ... pepper ... 3

Grinding .....

Market rent .....

Transport .....

Other .....

Profit(riba)/Income

Per item ..... well then one ... for the business

per day .....

per week .....

per month .....

Use of Income

Self ..... Friends ..... Business ..... Other e.g. loan

Children ..... Relatives ..... Home needs .....

Husband ..... Daughter's Marriage ..... Adasha .....

Comments:

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