
Border Contagion:

Transit migration from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic c. 1860-1914



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For my grandparents Arcangelo, Ezio, Maria e Renata

Abstracts

I

My thesis looks at transit migration from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I follow the development of both the legal and illegal trade in order to account for the persistence of clandestine flows despite the liberalisation of emigration, with the removal of bans on exit in emigration countries and the transition to the bureaucratic regulation of migration flows. This includes examining not only the causes behind clandestine migration, but also the ways in which clandestinity was legislated for, policed, classified and ultimately archived. Documentary checks on identity are thus considered alongside migration laws, the policing of emigration agents, the regulation of the hospitality industry in ports of transits, controls at embarkation and sanitary policy. Its chronology extends from the beginning of mass transatlantic migration from the Mediterranean, starting in the 1870s and 1880s, until the outbreak of World War One, which saw a sudden decrease in migration from Europe (including the Mediterranean) to the Americas and the hardening of migration controls in both countries of origin and arrival for the purpose of conscription and defence. This time arc was punctuated by various crises in migration control, resulting from a number of factors, such as disease epidemics or the feverish spread of propaganda. Although the thesis takes a comparative and interactionist approach to Mediterranean transit flows, ranging from the Ottoman empire and Greece in the east to the Levant in the south and Italy in the west, it focuses primarily on the ‘western transit corridor’ that linked the port cities of Beirut, Naples and Marseilles.

II

Prior to the arrival of steamships in the Mediterranean, migrating to the Americas in search for work was a remote possibility. Unlike France or Spain most other Mediterranean countries had played a small or no role at all in the longer history of Atlantic colonial conquest and settlement. Not only that but, as is well known, travelling on sailing ships made migrating to the Americas costly, slow and dangerous. Repeat or return migration was inconceivable for most. Most forms of migration, whether temporary or seasonal, occurred with neighbouring countries, whether across the Sea or along land routes. Labourers moved to the industrialising cores of Northern Europe or to the budding colonial cities in North Africa, Greek islanders picked the harvests in the Levant and Italians did so in France. Calabrian refugees might move to Sicily or to Tunis, Armenian refugees might migrate to Marseilles and Jewish refugees to Livorno. Labour mobility was too limited in scale and too seasonal in nature to warrant to warrant the creation of a complex migration regime. When migrants started leaving by the tens and then the hundreds of thousands for the Americas, countries on both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean responded by banning transatlantic emigration. Eventually, when they realised they couldn't stop the flows, they abandoned restriction in favour of regulation. Why, how and with what consequences this change of regime occurred is the subject of this thesis.

The causes behind the mass departure of migrants from the Mediterranean to the Americas have been discussed at some length in the context of national histories of emigration or immigration. Many of the conditions that applied to emigration from Germany, Norway or Great Britain also applied to countries in the Mediterranean, from the dispossession of farmers that resulted from the commercialisation of agriculture to Malthusian pressures on resources that came about due to improvements in material living conditions and population growth. Wage differentials between countries of origin and destination were structural factors behind the migration of labourers from Liverpool and from Naples. The spread of new transport infrastructure, symbolised by the coal driven iron-hulled steamships, paired with the activities of emigration agents and foreign recruiters, created further incentives for migration. Historians have poured over push and pull factors. Those who have taken a comparative European approach have usually drawn the line at Italy. Most countries south of the Italian peninsula or France rarely feature in comparative accounts of European transatlantic migration, or of Mediterranean emigration to the

Americas, and no work that systematically pursues the comparison exists at present. Maritime histories of Mediterranean emigration have emphasized the role played by shipping companies in kick-starting emigration from the southern and eastern Mediterranean in particular. The Mediterranean phase of transatlantic emigration is otherwise characterized as unique or distinct in historiography on account of its chronology, which tail ends with the waning of emigration from central and northern Europe starting in the 1880s; by the lower rates of industrialization typical of Mediterranean economies compared with northern and central Europe, commonly linked to higher wage differentials with countries of destination; and the supposed cultural (and racial) homogeneity of the sending nations, the 'Mediterranean character' so often referenced by immigration authorities.

One feature of mass transatlantic migration from the Mediterranean that is commonly overlooked is that of transit. Unlike Great Britain or Germany, most countries or regions of emigration that bordered the Mediterranean lacked direct connections to the Americas. Migrants leaving the Levant, Greece or Italy prior to 1887 usually had to transit via a port city on the continent, sometimes spending days or weeks waiting for the next steamer headed across the ocean after having already crossed the Mediterranean by boat or travelled around its margins by train. The consequences of transit were not restricted to the length of migrants' journeys. It affected the entire emigration business, from shipping companies to emigration agents and recruiters, which in turn had an effect on emigration rates. Shipping companies were encouraged to pick up migrants the length and breadth of the Mediterranean in order to cover costs; emigration agents were charged with the task of providing for the accommodation and transport of migrants across multiple countries and multiple cities, at the risk of having to potentially pay a fine or being stripped of their license; hotel-owners in ports of transit owed their living to the incoming flow of transients, as did shop-owners who sold them merchandise, and runners, translators, passport forgers and many different kinds of middlemen who oiled the wheels of the migration industry. As the transit trade grew in significance, so did competition for migrants among hotel-owners, agents, shipping companies, but also between cities and transit countries. Consequences varied: they ranged from the build up of diasporic networks of recruitment and hospitality to the spread of epidemic diseases.

They also resulted in the spread of illegal practices and of clandestine routes. For Italian migrants, transit via France was sometimes an effective way of circumventing controls on migration, such as the vetting processes associated with the issue of emigrant passports after 1901. In fact, transit – defined not only as the intermediary passage of

migrants across the Mediterranean, including their temporary stay in port cities, but also the legal, economic and logistical infrastructure behind it – had significant consequences for the way migration flows were governed across the entire region. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that without reference to transit, including the power-dynamics between transit and sending countries in the Mediterranean, the transition from a regime based on restrictions to one based on regulation cannot be adequately explained. This held true for emigration laws, the contents of which were based on agreements with shipping companies, as it did for the policing of emigration agents and recruiters, the regulation of the housing market and indeed the control of migrant transience in port cities.

Even remote immigration checks at embarkation points were designed partly on the basis of the geography of transit. Prophylactic measures that were implemented to contain the spread of disease epidemics paid homage to the circuitous route that diseases took, not only, but in part, due to the peripatetic movements of both regional and international migrants. Remote recruitment flourished when it exploited legal loopholes between sending and transit countries. When bans on emigration were still in place, clandestine flows were a testament to the inability of sending countries to resist the encroachment of foreign actors. Once bureaucratic regulation became the main instrument for governing migration flows, clandestine departures continued either to elude regulations or to sidestep them altogether. Yet, what was classified and archived as 'clandestine' by police, port or emigration authorities was in itself a form of regulation of the transit trade. Emigration agents were arrested, fined or deported for unfair competition or for practicing without a license. The same could apply to runners, and other middlemen in the trade. Even shipping companies were targeted for not adhering to sanitary requirements, crew members were arrested or fined for smuggling migrants on board. Crucially, it was not only the laws of sending countries, but also of countries of transit, that provided the legal framework in which they operated. More often than not, it was also the police forces and governmental personnel in transit ports – such as Marseilles and Naples – that were tasked with dividing the legal from the illegal, the regular from the clandestine.

This thesis thus provides a new framework for analysing the ways in which transatlantic emigration from the Mediterranean took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and for understanding the passage from a regime based on restrictions to one based on regulation. In doing so, it traces the spread of controls, of regulations and policing practices, from Europe to the southern and eastern Mediterranean, or border contagion, as this process is referred to throughout the thesis. It does so not only by

examining how migration laws sought to regulate the transnational industry of migrant recruitment, transport and hospitality, but also by accounting for how some major forms of clandestine emigration persisted despite its liberalisation and, concurrently, how clandestinity was constantly re-worked and re-defined according to a number of factors – from local power struggles between hotel-owners and emigration agents to issues of international sanitary prophylaxis – and various legal and bureaucratic criteria, as methods of identification and detection changed. The chapters in the thesis are ordered chronologically according to the various phases in the journeys of migrants – starting with the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea and land transit to ports of final departure respectively in Chapters One and Two, to migrants' temporary residence in Naples, Palermo and, in particular in Marseilles in Chapter Three, and finally to embarkation in Chapter Four – but also according to the various kinds of migration control that were introduced to govern flows – emigration laws, the policing of agents, passport controls, the regulation of the hospitality industry and, last but not least, physical and medical checks at embarkation.

Transit is a commonly overlooked phase in the chain that makes up international or transcontinental migration flows. In the context of nineteenth and twentieth Mediterranean history it is also a useful lens through which to observe how the region's position was changing with regard to the global economy. For centuries the Mediterranean had been at the centre of global commerce between some of the most powerful states on the planet. Goods, people, diseases, ideas had moved across its shores, but only in less significant proportions had they transited across it to reach markets, cities and states flourishing in what were historically considered peripheries. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 the Mediterranean had been transformed into an imperial highway, connecting European metropoles to the 'Near and Far East.' With the advent of mass transatlantic migration in the late nineteenth century it was transformed into a channel for labourers looking for work and fortune on faraway shores in the distant West.

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Preface

"….E pur parenti siamo un po' di quella gente che c'è là che come noi è forse un po' selvatica, ma che paura che ci fa quel mare scuro che si muove anche di notte e non sta fermo mai…"

Paolo Conte, *Genova per noi*

Although migrants had been attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe since the late 1990s, during the first eight months of 2014 over three thousand people died trying to make the journey across the 'Middle Sea'.[1] A new, deadlier phase of the refugee crisis had begun. Around the same time, I started working on a new version of what has become my DPhil thesis. Instead of attempting to understand if and how, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, men and women living in port cities on opposite shores of the Mediterranean shared a cultural kinship that transcended the dividing lines of nation and empire, as I had originally intended to do, I decided to focus instead on how mass migrations across the Mediterranean Sea had been governed in the past. The period that I had chosen to study seemed to hold a lot of promise.

Not only was it a time in which many of the key features of modern migration policy had been defined – the word 'immigrant' became popularised in French policy circles in the 1880s according to Gérard Noiriel – but it also coincided with the advent of transcontinental forms of mass labour migration. [2] More people were leaving than ever before for destinations that were further afield. The age-old system of Mediterranean seasonal migration, of cosmopolitan mingling of sailors, merchants, fishermen, labourers, political exiles and refugees had been disrupted by a mass outflow of men and some women, across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, borders were multiplying.[3] By the 1920s, the gradual decline of the Ottoman and Austria-Hungarian empires and the imperial advance of France and Britain in the Mediterranean added several new borders to the political and cultural map of the region. However, more than any other other factor, the exodus of hundreds of thousands of migrants,

[111] International Organisation for Migration 'Fatal Journeys' [Online Report], https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf (Accessed 2nd november 2018), p. 18

[2] Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot. Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1996)

[3] For some insights into the world of Mediterranean cosmopolitanism see: Maurizio Isabella and Konstantina Zanou (Eds.), *Mediterranean Diasporas. Politics and Ideas in the Long 19th century* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016)

their courageous and at times desperate flight on board the new machines of the sea, steamships, seemed to have been responsible for inducing states on both sides of the Mediterranean to change the way they governed migration flows.

Since the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean reached chronic proportions, the transit of migrants from the Sahel to north Africa, across the Mediterranean and through the European Union's southernmost countries, such as Italy and Greece, has become the cause of terrible suffering on behalf of refugees and a source of constant discord between transit and receiving states, both EU and non-EU. In this case the politicisation of transit is not the result of economic competition between the 'owners of the means of mobility', shipping companies and the like, although transit countries like Libya or Turkey continue to wield their position as 'transit powers' to economic and political advantage. Rather, it is the result of ongoing antagonisms that have erupted because of a costly and inhumane immigration policy. Prolonging and deferring transit has been used as a strategy to discourage further immigration and to divert migrants from their intended destinations. Migrants crossing the Mediterranean today transit for longer and from further away in worse conditions compared to the nineteenth century, despite huge improvements in transport and greater prosperity enjoyed in Europe today. The few day crossing of the Mediterranean in third class or in steerage by nineteenth century migrants and the days or weeks spent drifting in port cities, in emigrant hotels or informal lodgings, have been replaced by a more brutal form of transience in refugee camps, by the infernal crossing of the Mediterranean on rubber dinghies (and of the Sahara in trucks) and the forced detention of migrants in prisons and identification centres. Despite the growing technological and bureaucratic complexity of contemporary immigration regimes, clandestine channels are today as difficult to police, to divert and to break up, as they were in the previous century when shipping companies and emigration agents ran riot. The Mediterranean Sea, with its many corridors, nodes, islands and irregular coastlines, continues to make a mockery of border controls. And so does the lack of common institutions and of cooperation across the Sea.

Many of the themes of this thesis – from passport checks and the externalisation of border controls to the antagonistic relationship between sending, transit and receiving countries – will offer, I hope, a different perspective on the current refugee crisis and on the history of migration controls in general. Hopefully it will also make a contribution to the history of the Atlantic emigrant trade and to the vast and noble canon of Mediterranean history, in particular to the study of interactions and connections that are considered fundamental to its validity as an object of historical analysis. The search for an answer to the

question of how the great frequency and intensity of interactions that has characterized Mediterranean history, its structural interdependencies, could coexist with the creation, both in the past and in the present, of huge barriers to human movement and migration, has guided me since the very beginning.[4] How could divergence and integration coexist? It is a riddle for the Mediterranean and for the world, one that, I believe, history might help to solve if it is not treated as genealogy.

After the first few months of research I gradually abandoned any pretence that I was attempting to write an 'origin story' of modern migration regimes. This is a conceit that is at the root of a lot of literature on the history of immigration regimes which somehow seek to trace back current methods and problems in migration control to western imperial expansion and the development of modern nation-states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. My approach throughout the last few years has been to treat the past as a carnival mirror, in which the present can be reflected and distorted not in the hope of creating an amusing (or disturbing) image, but in order to seek out unusual or unexpected resemblances and make new connections. The search for worthy comparisons, rather than for continuities or legacies, is thus at the heart of this project. Perhaps the ambition of historical research after all should be that of gifting us with a sharper image of ourselves by bewildering our sense of what is normal and commonplace; to supply us with better concepts and examples by which to construct such an image through the study of the past, of what was and no longer is.

In pursuing that end I have benefitted from the guidance of several historians. Professor Axel Körner provided the initial encouragement to pursue a doctorate in Mediterranean history. I am very grateful to him for his enthusiastic example and generous support. Professor John Darwin has supervised me with great patience and good humour. In the course of our conversations, and by watching him teach, I have learned a lot not only about history but also about scholarly rigour and poise. If I am slightly less feral now, it is, to a significant extent, thanks to him. I would also like to acknowledge my transfer and confirmation examiners Professor James Belich and the late Dr. Jan-Georg Deutsch for their help and encouragement.

At Oxford I am also indebted to several scholars working in anthropology and migration studies who, in one way or another, nudged me along new avenues of research, in particular Dr. Dace Dzenovska, Professor Nicholas Van Hear, my sister Dr. Giulia

[4] For two recent examples see: David Abulafia, *The Great Sea. A Human history of the Mediterranean* (London: Penguin, 2011); Nicholas Purcell and Peregrine Horden, *The Corrupting Sea: A study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)

Liberatore, Charline Kompf and Yan Matusevich. I would also like to thank Lena Rose who tirelessly organises the migration and mobility research network at Oxford, where I was given the opportunity to discuss my work with scholars in other fields. The Oxford centre for Global History has been the source of much inspiration and support over the least few years and in particular I would like to thank Claire Phillips for her unfailing support and Dr. Erica Charters for her wit, warmth and grace. By allowing me to lecture on migrations and border controls in the global twentieth century, Dr. James McDougall provided me with the opportunity to crystallise some of the ideas in this thesis. I have shared many interesting conversations (and meals) with colleagues and my mentors at the Global History of Capitalism Project, Professor Chris McKenna and Dr. Rowena Olegario, who I must thank for having included me in this exciting new venture. The same applies to my college supervisor Dr. Adriana X. Jacobs who was also kind enough to read an early draft of a book chapter that needed rescuing.

My archival research was made much easier and more pleasant by the staff in Italy, France and the United States and in particular by Hélèn Ten Hove in Le Havre and by Angelique Bontoux and Gwénäelle Rio-Lemang in Marseilles. In France I benefitted greatly from contact with students and staff at the École Normale Supérieur (Cachan) and at the Sorbonne. My thanks go to Jean-Paul Gagey and to Professors Anne Couderc and Corine Defrance at the Sorbonne and to Professor Olivier Wieviorka, who smiled encouragingly when I told him I had been to Marseilles and decided that I would not continue researching quarantine but would focus on shipping companies instead. Professor Robert Gildea rewarded my application to go to France and answered several requests for references.

Throughout researching and writing this thesis I have endured and enjoyed a much gentler form of transience. I have changed cities four times, and home several others. I would not have been able to do so without the generous financial support provided by St. Cross College and Brasenose College at Oxford in the form of various grants, including the Amersi Fund Studentship at Brasenose. I would also like to thank Jeremy Moyse of the Arts and Humanities Research Council. The AHRC provided an Italian national in Great Britain with the means of conducting research on Mediterranean history: their openness inspires confidence in the future. The history faculty also deserves my thanks for, among many other things, an Erasmus grant that allowed me to spend several months conducting research in France.

Last but not least, my loving gratitude goes to my family, who turn transience into stillness and fullness daily. My parents have always supported my sisters' and my own

education, making plenty of sacrifices along the way. It is a testament to their idealism as much as to their goodwill as parents. In Oxford I wish to thank Giulia and Micheál for their hospitality and support and Gregorio, Marzia, Tecla, Alberica, Jeremy, Edouard, Matthew, Stefano and John for their friendship. My fellow doctoral students and co-convenors of the Transnational and Global History Seminar, in particular Greg, Olivia, Harriet and Sean, deserve credit as ardent members of our scholarly brotherhood. For the time shared in Washington D.C. (and elsewhere) my loving thanks goes to Francesca, Spencer, Penny and Lorenzo, who are always a home away from home. In Paris I discovered a cousin and a friend in Giacomo and more family in Anna, Flavia and Marc. In Rome and Naples my aunts Eugenia and Marianna were loving hosts and confidants and Simone and Linda provided endless intrigue and companionship. In London I have made another family with Viola and Mike and friends of old, both near and far: Niccolò, Herbert, Alex, Joe, Rachel, Ceola and Emily. My loving thanks also goes to my friends and fellow volunteers on the islands of Chios and Samos, to Filippo, *compagno di avventure*, and to the kind souls who lived or live there, transient or otherwise.

Introduction

Between 1860 and 1920 roughly 14 million people left the Mediterranean for the New World.[1] This accounts for almost a third of total migration from Europe to north and south America in this period; a considerable sum, whose decision to leave had a profound effect on both societies of origin and of arrival.[2] It also had profound consequences for transit countries. Transit countries were territories that migrants were obliged to pass through on their journeys. This could be due simply to geography – the distance of certain localities from Atlantic seaways – or to man-made factors – such as the slow uptake of steam technology as a result of low levels of industrialisation in emigration countries relative to transit countries, or the underdevelopment of port cities. Whatever the structural causes behind it, migrant transit in the Mediterranean was actively pursued, cultivated and sustained by shipping companies, foreign and local recruiters, emigration agents and their commercial partners in transit countries, with the tacit blessing and the aggressive support of political elites.

Migrant transit was good for business: it was good for shipping companies that could not subsist on government subsidies and cargo traffic alone; it was good for emigration agents, who owed their living to the trade in migrants; it was good for the 'petty bourgeoisie' and middle classes in Mediterranean and European port cities who stood to gain from feeding, hosting and clothing transients or selling them merchandise and, indirectly, from maritime commerce. It was also good for political elites who sought to expand their country's industry and maritime capabilities at a time of growing international trade and – great power rivalry.

[1] See Table 1 in Appendix

[2] Dirk Hoerder, 'Transcultural approaches to gendered and labour migration: from the nineteenth-century proletarian to twenty-first-century caregiver mass migrations', in Dirk Hoerder and Amarjit Kaur (eds.) *Proletarian and Gendered Mass Migrations. A Global Perspective on Continuities and Discontinuities from the 19th to the 21st centuries* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 19-64: "According to Adam McKeown, the migrations of the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the China-Manchuria macro-region involved similar numbers of about 46-58 million each in the century from the 1840s to the 1940s. McKeown and Jose Moya estimate the total number of international migrants in this century amounted to 320 million men, women and children who had to connect family lives between local spaces and regional economies across continents and oceans." (p.45). For more on global migrations in the long 19th century see: Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (Eds.), *Globalising Migration History*: *The Eurasian Experience* (16th-21st Centuries) (Leiden, 2012)

In theory, it was also good for Mediterranean migrants who would otherwise have only been able to reach their destination at a higher price and potentially after longer journeys, if at all. Transit across the Mediterranean Sea was one of the defining characteristics of Mediterranean transatlantic emigration compared to that from central and northern European countries, such as Germany, Great Britain or Scandinavian nations such as Denmark or Norway, all of which had direct connections to the western Atlantic. Some migrants leaving from northern Europe did have to transit via a second country on their way to the Americas, often for reasons linked to competition over routes by shipping companies. For example, continental port cities like Hamburg and Bremen sought to exploit Liverpool's cheap fares by providing ferry connections to it and selling prepaid tickets for the Atlantic crossing. The Hull-Liverpool route was also used by many Scandinavian emigrants and a Bergen-Newcastle service was established in 1890.[3] In the second half of the nineteenth century, maritime transit along the European continent's Atlantic coast, the English Channel and across the North Sea became the object of competition among several well-matched companies, as the gradual ascendency of German lines testifies. No company enjoyed a monopoly and domestic demand for emigration did not result in an automatic advantage, which made the conditions of maritime transit volatile.

Most historical literature on the transatlantic emigrant trade does not attempt a comparison between emigration from northern Europe and southern Europe and the Mediterranean, or indeed between the early and later stages of mass emigration to the Americas. Regional approaches are rare, and the Mediterranean is woefully absent from the historiography. Maritime frameworks have found their way into only a limited number of studies on the nineteenth century emigrant trade.[4] These usually focus on individual shipping companies or single countries, without accounting for the differences in maritime migration across the Mediterranean and without considering in depth how shipping interests and those of foreign states converged to shape migration flows and, significantly, how they impacted the ability of governments to restrict emigration. In part, this has been due to a longstanding assumption that shipping companies (and generally brokers in the 'emigration business' like agents) had only a secondary role in shaping emigration.[5] It has also been due to the use of

[3] Agnes Bretting, 'From the Old World to the New' in Dirk Hoerder, Diethelm Knauf (eds.) *Fame, Fortune and Sweet Liberty. The Great European Emigration* (Bremen: Temmen, 1992), p. 82; Lauritz Pettersen, 'From sail to steam in Norwegian emigration 1870-1910' in Klaus Friedland (ed.) *Maritime Aspects of Migration* (Böhlau, 1989), p. 129

[4] For example see: Nicolas Manitakis, 'Transatlantic Emigration and Maritime Transport from Greece to the U.S., 1890-1912: A Major Area of European Steamship Company Competition for Migrant Traffic' in Torsten Feys, Lewis R. Fischer, Stéphane Hoste and Stephan Vanfraechem (eds.), *Research in Maritime History,* No. 33. Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections Between Maritime and Migration Networks (St. John's Newfoundland, 2007), pp. 63-74

[5] For example see: Dudley Baines, *Emigration from Europe 1815-1930* (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 48-9

national archives to write national histories of emigration or immigration, which inevitably tend to overlook transit migration and the role played by 'foreign actors'. Yet, the history of shipping companies operating in the Mediterranean at this time is inseparable from that of the emigrant trade, and vice versa. Moreover, both would be incomplete without reference to the broader geopolitical and diplomatic context in which the emigrant trade developed. Monographs on emigration from the Kingdom of Italy, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, including Greece, and the Ottoman Empire already exist. They have proven invaluable in understanding some of the structural economic, social, including demographic, and political 'push' factors behind emigration. In the same way, histories of immigration to the Americas and to the United States in particular provide excellent detail on the 'pull factors' as well as on some aspects of immigration and sanitary controls. Yet, transatlantic migration from Mediterranean countries has been mostly studied along national lines and the context of Mediterranean systems of transport and communication are absent, as are connected and interactionist histories of migration between the various countries that make up the Mediterranean region.

Aside from an interest in what was occurring in the Mediterranean at the time, and how the region fits into a broader history of the transatlantic emigrant trade, migrant transit across the Mediterranean Sea serves as an interesting case study for several reasons: Firstly, its 'legal regime' was significantly distinct from that in which emigration from central and northern Europe occurred in the preceding phase of the emigrant trade. The spread and multiplication of various kinds of mobility checks and migration controls took new and unprecedented form, as did clandestine emigration, both as a social and economic phenomenon and as a legal-bureaucratic problem. This was due in part, but not exclusively, to the fact that emigration from the Mediterranean coincided with a gradual shift among destination countries in the Americas towards greater regulation and restriction of immigration. Clandestine emigration in particular has not received thorough and systematic investigation, despite its significance to the nineteenth century emigrant trade and its contemporary resonance. Secondly, it overlaps in significant ways with the history of European maritime, commercial and logistical expansion in the Mediterranean, and of the Mediterranean's 'integration' with Europe and the Americas. Thirdly, the lack of direct access to Atlantic connections and the distance and complexity of migrants' journeys across the Mediterranean Sea, make it an interesting addition to the, as yet, underdeveloped research topic of transit migration. Only recently have scholars taken transit migration to

hold more interest than the simple act of passing through a territory, and historians have yet to take notice.[6]

The canon of Mediterranean history, already rich in celebrated works, has grown richer in recent years thanks to a number of new histories of the changes it underwent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. David Abulafia's *The Great Sea* takes the arrival of steamships as a starting point for the history of the 'fifth Mediterranean (1830-2014)' and provides a basic scaffolding for an interactionist framework capable of containing the convulsions that, in turns, drew the Sea together and pushed it apart.[7] Other historians have traced the histories of intellectual and political diasporas in the long nineteenth century, have analysed the new kinds of mobility control that accompanied large infrastructural projects, have theorised new ways in which the Mediterranean was redrawn under European hegemony or by novel migration flows, or indeed of how it was 'displaced' in the global economy, moving from its centre to its periphery, a highway of global commerce, rather than its receptacle: an area of transit.[8] None have thoroughly examined transatlantic migration from the Mediterranean.

How, in what ways and, in particular, under what legal and police constraints, migrants were recruited, transported and hosted as they transited across the Mediterranean is the main question this thesis tries to answer. The changing nature of clandestinity, of transit, the spread and multiplication of migration controls, in one word 'border contagion', all fall within its remit. Their history is not tied exclusively to that of changing national migration regimes or the history of individual countries, but to a number of international, transnational and global developments, such as technological change in the transport industry, innovation in identification practices and disease control, the spread of agent propaganda and cholera pandemics, the advance and retreat of recruiting networks across national borders, the interaction of transit migrants with diasporic communities in ports of transit and the

[6] 'People in transit' is the title of a monograph by historian Dirk Hoerder, a rare example of a historians' focus on transit migration that, however, in this case is not distinguished from emigration. Dirk Hoerder and Jörg Nagler, *People in transit : German migrations in comparative perspective, 1820-1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). A scholar working in the field of migration studies noted in 2008 the lack of other works on the topic: Aspasia Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, *Transit migration: The missing link between emigration and settlement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Since then, the number of works on transit migration has grown. For example: Franck Düvell, Irina Molodikova and Michael Collyer, *Transit migration in Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014)

[7] David Abulafia, *The Great Sea. A Human history of the Mediterranean* (London, 2011)

[8] Julia Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an age of migration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Paul Caruana Galizia, *Mediterranean Labor Markets in the First Age of Globalization. An Economic History of Real Wages and Market Integration* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Maurizio Isabella and Konstantina Zanou, *Mediterranean Diasporas. Politics and Ideas in the Long 19th Century* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); Manuel Borutta and Sakis Gekas, 'A Colonial Sea: the Mediterranean 1798-1956' in *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire,* 01 February 2012, Vol. 19 (1), p. 1-13

changing fortunes of port cities in the Mediterranean, in particular of Beirut, Naples and Marseilles.

Port transit was the maritime counterpart to railway transit. The latter gained in importance as continental ports established direct services to American destinations. Price wars between railway companies and steamship companies ensued; starting in the 1870s steamship companies running the trade – British, French, German, Dutch, Belgian and Scandinavian – began to offer 'through tickets' which covered railway connections to the port of final departure. In the 1880s special emigrant trains were established on the main lines.[9] As remote recruiting flourished, connections improved and native emigration rates fell in northern Europe, countries like Holland, Germany and Belgium became primarily places of transit. Aided by the work of emigration agencies the pre-paid business enticed migrants from as far as Poland, Hungary, Austria, Croatia, Italy and Greece.[10] The frontier of the transatlantic trade in migrants had finally reached the Mediterranean. Of all the countries bordering the Mediterranean, Italy contributed the most people to the transatlantic trade. Roughly 7.5 million Italians made their way to the Americas between the 1870s and 1920s, 4.5 million of whom moved to the United States of America. They were followed by Ottoman migrants from the Levant and Anatolia, including Ottoman Armenians, and by Greeks and other migrants from former Ottoman and former Austria-Hungarian possessions in the Balkans, such as Montenegro and the Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slovenia.
Land-transit on railway lines from southern terminals to Atlantic ports, like Le Havre and Bordeaux in France, Belgian Antwerp, Dutch Amsterdam or German Hamburg and Bremen continued, particularly from Eastern Europe and, for a time, Greece.

The Balkan route remained active until after the Great War, but as steam technology revolutionised Mediterranean shipping in the 1870s and 1880s, maritime transit grew in importance. It was sustained, for the most part, by emigration from Italy, from the Ottoman Empire, in particular from Greater Syria and, to a lesser extent, by emigration from the Adriatic and the northern shores of the Aegean.[11] It occurred primarily along a 'western

[9] Bretting, 'From the Old World to the New', p. 83
[10] Francis E. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic. 1840/1973* (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 76-77; Ulf Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe. Emigrants, America, and the State since the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: Lexington Books, 2016)
[11] The first boom in emigrant shipping from northern Europe (including Great Britain) was said to have taken place in 1816 and Isambard Kingdom Brunel's steamship 'Great Western' accomplished the Atlantic crossing entirely by steam in 1838. The transition from sail to steam however was slow and is hard to pinpoint exactly. Many of the naval protagonists of the Atlantic emigrant trade were still producing ships powered by both wind and steam up to the final decades of the nineteenth century, and it was not until 1884 that the Cunard's *Umbria* performed the crossing without any sails at all, by which point emigration from northern Europe was in full swing. Eric Richards dates the beginning of mass labour migration from Britain to the 1820s. Eric Richards, *Britannia's Children. Emigration from England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland since 1600* (London: Hambledon and London, 2004), p. 117; Nugent, *Crossings. The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870-1914,* p. 31; Wilcox and Ferenczi date the "mass movement of European populations" to the 1840s and link it to the removal

transit corridor' that connected Marseilles, Genoa and Naples – which, in addition to Barcelona, were the main western Mediterranean ports with Atlantic connections – to areas of emigration in Italy and in the south-eastern Mediterranean.

Not everyone stood to gain from the transit of migrants in multiple countries. Receiving societies had an incentive to ensure that migrants heading their way were carefully inspected and monitored to inhibit the transfer of contagious diseases and of other 'undesirable characteristics'. Journeying through various countries, each with unique migration laws, methods of policing and even disease environments, complicated this task. It also made it more expensive for countries of final destination to supervise and coordinate the processing of migrants in foreign ports. Long layovers in port cities further exposed migrants to networks of smugglers and illegal emigration agents, multiplying clandestine channels. Sending countries, or migrants' countries of origin, also had reasons to divert, curb or end migrant transit abroad. When Italy prior to 1888 or the Ottoman Empire before 1893 banned transatlantic migration, opposing transit was a matter of countering illegal emigration. Once emigration was legalised, and regulated, transit was frequently opposed on the grounds that it imperilled and impoverished migrants. Their safety could be guaranteed better and illegal migration could be policed more effectively by making foreign emigration agents and shipping companies accountable to national authorities, it was argued. In fact, transit also threatened the earnings of domestic shipping companies. It diverted traffic from domestic to foreign ports, with all the attendant disadvantages that losing access to the trade in migrants entailed.

The 'battle' over migrant transit serves as a reminder of the economic significance of the emigrant trade and, in particular, its importance for the growth and expansion of western shipping. According to one estimate, migrant shipping represented roughly 90 per cent of total revenues for shipping companies in the Atlantic, equal to 20 million dollars in 1900; by 1913 it had increased to 70 million dollars, making it one of the largest examples of capitalist enterprise at the time.[12] Similar estimates are hard to make for the Mediterranean trade, particularly given the high incidence of clandestine emigration. If the Messageries Maritimes, France's 'postman' in the Mediterranean, can be taken as an indicator, the trade

of legal obstacles to movement. In this canonical work, emigration statistics date back to 1846, not earlier. They show that in the major countries of emigration (British Isles, Germany, Netherlands etc.) emigration was already in the thousands or in the tens and hundreds of thousands. See Table I – Intercontinental Emigration of Citizens, 1846-1920. Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Wilcox, *International Migrations. Volume I Statistics.* (New York: Gorden and Breach, 1969), pp. 230-231

[12] Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914* (Zurich: Chronos, 2012), p. 44

in migrants was, in this period, one if not the biggest source of income for European shipping companies that plied between the Straits of Gibraltar, Suez and the Dardanelles.

Without the emigrant trade shipping companies would have found it much harder to find cargo other than agricultural goods to fill their hulls on the way back from transporting tourists, government personnel, post and manufactured goods towards the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Although shipping companies picked up cotton, fruit, nuts and other agricultural products in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, these tended to be bulky but inexpensive products. Migrants, on the other hand, were inexpensive to transport (compared to 1st class passengers, including tourists, who travelled in private cabins) but generated high revenues through the bulk sale of tickets. Moreover, they were the 'gift that kept on giving', as they provided welcome income to emigration agents, runners, translators, hotel-owners, shop-keepers and the entire ecosystem of hustlers and entrepreneurs that made up the emigrant trade.

In the Mediterranean, the expansion of European shipping was directly linked to the development of transport links and maritime infrastructure by European political elites and capitalists, including shipping magnates. The link between international finance, imperial expansion and the migrant trade is particularly interesting in this respect. Among the owners of the main shipping companies that participated in the Mediterranean emigrant trade were the Rothschild family (one-time owners of the Austrian Lloyd of Trieste), the French Péreire brothers (owners of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique and of several financial groups, such as the Crédit Mobilier) and the Italian Rubattino (co-founder along with the Florio family of the Navigazione Generale Italiana, Italy's main shipping company).

The Rothschild family invested in a number of infrastructural development projects across the Mediterranean in this period, including the Suez Canal, when in 1875 they provided the then British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli with a loan of £4 million to purchase Suez Canal shares. The Péreire brothers were closely linked to the French colonisation of Algeria and Tunisia, having invested in the modernisation of ports and railway construction in both countries. They lent their support to the French military campaign of 1881 by transporting more than 12,000 soldiers and military equipment to Tunisia. Rubattino also speculated on railway construction in Tunisia (on behalf of the British government) and masterminded the expansion of Italy's possessions in Eritrea. His rise to prominence was aided and abetted by Italy's political and banking elite, including

Carlo Bombrini, the head of the National Bank and personal friend of Camillo Benso di Cavour, united Italy's first Prime Minister.[13]

Transit migration to the Atlantic overlapped and intertwined with empire migration and other forms of regional migration. European colonisation of north Africa resulted in the flight or forced migration of indigenous peoples and the arrival of European settlers. The flows of refugees from the north African provinces of the Ottoman empire, including Egypt, to the Levant and towards Constantinople, was actually a substantial source of income for European shipping companies. Settlers in north Africa were joined by other Europeans who had been moving to the Maghreb for decades as labourers, as merchants, as political refugees from Napoleonic and revolutionary wars of the nineteenth century, and even as convicts as a result of a time-honoured tradition whereby European undesirables were 'dumped' in north Africa.

The migration of European labourers in Algeria and Tunisia was so substantial that it has prompted historian Julia Clancy-Smith to hypothesise the existence of a 'central Mediterranean migration corridor.' Alexandria's population grew from 6,000 in 1798 to 231,000 in 1882 and to roughly 320,000 by the end of the century, with a significant number of the new residents hailing from Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, the Balearic Islands, Greece, and Malta. Many people of the same backgrounds migrated to other urban centres dotted around the Mediterranean basin such as Beirut, Izmir (Smyrne), Tunis, Algiers and Tangier.[14] In Algiers the total number of Europeans was only 100 in 1830; by 1881 French nationals and Europeans outnumbered native residents by nearly 200,000.[15] They were joined by European travellers engaged in the Grand Tour of classical civilization. In the eastern Mediterranean refugees from the Greek war of independence gravitated towards the Levant and central Anatolia where they crossed paths with Muslims fleeing Russian encroachment in the Caucasus and in the Balkans. The total number of people who immigrated into the Ottoman Empire between 1860 and 1914 was approximately 5 to 7 million. Ottoman statistics indicate

[13] Marthe Barabance, *Histoire de la Compagnie Générale Transatlantique. Un siècle d'exploitation maritime* (Paris, 1955) ; Marie-Francoise Bereneron-Couvenhes, *Les Messageries Maritimes. L'essor d'une grande compagnie de navigation francaise,* 1851-1894 (Paris, 2007); Simone Candela, *I Florio* (Palermo: Sellerio Editore, 1986); Giorgio Doria, *Debiti e navi. La Compagnia di Rubattino 1839-1881* (Genova: Marietti, 1990); Umberto del Bianco, *Il Lloyd Austriaco e la marina postale dell'Austria e dell'Ungheria. La rete austriaca nel Levante ed il ruolo della Società Triestina* (Udine: Del Bianco Editore, 1979); Ronald E. Coons, *Steamships, Statesmen, and Bureaucrats. Austrian Policy Towards the Steam Navigation Company of the Austrian Lloyd 1836-1848* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag Gmbh, 1975)

[14] Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an age of migration,* p. 3; Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, 'Fin-de-Siècle Egypt'. A nexus for Mediterranean and Global Radical Networks' in James L. Gelvin and Nile Green (eds.) *Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print* (London, 2014), p.90

[15] Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an age of migration*, p. 5. The total number of Europeans present in Tunisia in 1815 is estimated by Clancy-Smith to have been around 100,000 out of a population of roughly one million at mid-century. By 1880 the proportion of immigrant Europeans had climbed roughly five percentage points to around 15 per cent.

that the total population of the country rose by about 40 per cent in the period 1860-78 and by about 10 per cent by the end of the century, despite mass emigration to Europe and the Americas.[16]

As in Europe, many of the migration flows in the Ottoman empire were smaller in scale and are best described as regional and trans-cultural, rather than trans-national, imperial or continental. Some were spurred on by the aggressive resettlement policies pursued by the Ottoman Porte, such as the settlement of the Çukurova region in eastern Anatolia and the conversion of the nomadic people to cotton production, or, earlier in the century, the refugee flows that resulted of the forced occupation of western Syria and Palestine by the Egyptian Khedive Ibrahim Pasha.[17] Others were the result of economic factors, including the construction of large infrastructure projects such as the Suez Canal. Greek emigration to the Ottoman empire was a sign that domestic economic expansion was still a sufficient pull for foreign labourers; until 1902, Greeks of the Aegean and Ionian islands for example preferred seasonal employment in the booming coastal economies or productive heartlands of the Ottoman empire to the Americas.[18]

Many of the economic, technological and social changes that accompanied the country's modernisation provoked the departure of tens of thousands of migrants for other countries and distant continents. This was true of the Ottoman province of Greater Syria, from which the majority of the empire's transatlantic migrants hailed. There, economic and social changes linked to urbanisation, the commercialisation of agriculture and the creation of surplus labour provided powerful incentives to leave for a different continent. Continued immigration to the region accelerated the demographic transition that had resulted of economic growth and of improvements in material living conditions. The development of the port of Beirut and of commercial connections between the silk-producing region of Mount Lebanon and French port cities, such as Lyon and Marseilles, also favoured emigration and transit migration to Europe. Many of the same conditions that applied to Mount Lebanon also applied to areas in Italy that 'exported' migrants to the Americas:

[16] Kemal H. Karpat, 'The *hijra* from Russia and the Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman state', pp. 131-152, p. 133

[17] Meltem Toksoz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Making of the Adana-Mersin Region 1850-1908* (Boston, 2010), pp. 41-2; Sarah A. Curtis, 'Charity Begins Abroad: The Filles de la Charité in the Ottoman Empire' in Owen White and J. P. Daughton (eds.), *In God's Empire. French Missionaries and the Modern World* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 89-108

[18] AMAE, Émigration Grecque, 339, Nouvelle Série, Lettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangers M. Delcassé, la Légation de la République Française en Grèce 26 mai, 1902. « Jusqu'à présent, les iles Ioniennes, les Cyclades, la Grèce continentale, l'Eubée, la Thessalie, ne sont pas touchées; quelques cas isolés seulement d'émigration [transatlantique] n'y sont signalés. Les gens des iles ont l'habitude de chercher du travail au dehors, au Syrie, à Constantinople, dans les grandes villes de la Méditerranée, en Asie Mineure et en Egypte. Mais cet exode spécial est distinct de l'émigration proprement dite j'en dirai autant de l'habitude qu'on les indigènes…d'aller faire le commerce du tabac en Egypte, costume dont sont sorti des grosses fortunes et qui enrichit Volo… »

emigration in the north was linked to the development of the port of Genoa and grew off the back of its commercial connections with Argentina and other South American ports, whereas southern emigration was linked to the development of the ports of Naples and Palermo. Emigration trickled down the peninsula together with industrialisation, the spread of modern transport networks and the commercialisation of agriculture. Enduring poverty, disease epidemics, high taxation and political unrest did the rest.

Passenger Acts, Emigration Laws: the southward spread of controls

France represents something of an exception relative to other places of emigration in the Mediterranean, such as Italy, Greece and Greater Syria. It stopped being a country of emigration after the 1850s and most of those leaving France subsequently headed to its colonies. Unlike Naples and Genoa, the growth of the port of Marseilles was not due primarily to trade with the Americas, but with the colonies, in particular with Algeria and with the Levant. After the opening of the Suez Canal, it also became France's main portal to the East. Unlike Naples and Genoa, its growth spurt was also due to the influx of foreign migrants, in particular from Italy. Although Naples grew more slowly than other major Italian cities in this period – such as Rome, Milan and Turin – it was still the Kingdom's most populous city.

This heterogeneity of movements and migrations required Mediterranean states to develop supple migration policies. In Europe the codification of national citizenship or subjecthood and the desire to regulate the employment of foreign labour had combined with growing unease regarding the impact of large numbers of foreign nationals on the cultural and, due to racial theories, even on the biological lives of nation-states, to produce new forms of migration control that varied from protectionist legislation to forced repatriations. They also included new methods for documenting the presence and verifying the identity of citizens and aliens alike, such as certificates of citizenship and national identification cards. This also occurred in a context in which the access of nationals to the labour market and regional labour migrations were carefully monitored and, sometimes, brutally policed.

At a time when most major European countries (such as Great Britain, France and Germany) were tightening their immigration policies, increasing the surveillance of 'aliens' or foreign nationals crossing their borders, enacting temporary bans or passing restrictionist

legislation, countries neighbouring the Mediterranean both in the north and to the south adopted a more liberal approach to immigration. Italy, for instance, welcomed foreign citizens from 'unredeemed lands' still under the control of former hegemons like Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire also welcomed refugees from the wars of independence, from Russian aggression or European imperial expansion in north Africa. Only in European colonies, such as Algeria, was immigration, in the form of settlement, more tightly controlled.[19]

By contrast, emigration represented an area of more active (and invasive) policy intervention. Traditional concerns, such as that of retaining man power for agriculture or raising taxation to wage wars, combined with new fears elicited by novel forms of recruitment and transport, the distance of new countries of arrival and the volume of the mass exodus, to produce new and more complex policies. The interest, involvement and interference of political elites in the emigrant trade is unsurprising given the high commercial stakes involved. However, while they aimed to further domestic commercial interests, they were also called to balance them with the interests of migrants. Many of the improvements achieved in this realm were initially the result of changes to laws regulating the transport of migrants on steamships.

The British led the way in 1803 by passing Passenger Acts designed to guarantee higher standards of safety and hygiene on board ships. They limited the number of passengers ships were allowed to carry based on their size and set minimum standards for food and drink rations. [20] States in northern Europe followed suit: Bremen also passed a Passenger Act in 1832, followed by the Netherlands in 1837, Belgium and Norway in 1843 and Hamburg in 1845.[21] Immigrant communities in the United States turned their indignation at the high mortality rates among their compatriots into action by petitioning Congress to hold vectors (shipping companies) to a higher standard and prevent the exploitation of migrants. The first Passenger Act in the United States was passed in 1819 at the behest of the German Society of Philadelphia.[22] As subsequent Passenger Acts (1847, 1852, 1881) tried to correct the shortcomings of the original legislation by establishing

[19] For histories of European immigration see: Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot. Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis, 1996); Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Sabina Donati, *A Political History of National Citizenship and Identity in Italy 1861-1950* (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2013) ; For a discussion of Ottoman migration policy see : Muhammet Kazim Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', DPhil in Global and Imperial History, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

[20] Maldwyn Allen Jones, 'Aspects of North Atlantic Migration: Steerage Conditions and American Law 1819-1909', in Klaus Friedland (ed.) *Maritime Aspects of Migration* (Köln: Böhlau, 1989), p. 323

[21] Ibid., pp. 321-331

[22] Ibid., p. 321

minimum space requirements for migrants, progress was made at the expense of thousands of lives as passengers could not endure the trials of the journey in cramped and unhygienic surroundings or drowned at sea due to technical failures of poorly maintained vessels. Notably, 20,000 Irish who attempted the crossing during the great famine of 1846-48 lost their lives in the process. Towards the turn of the century, the regulation of migrant passage in the United States was increasingly hijacked by anti-immigration lobby groups. Steamship companies suddenly found themselves on the other side of the barricades fighting alongside immigrant communities. Nevertheless, by the 1850s inspections had become standard practice and migrant mortality rates were down.[23]

Passenger Acts were sometimes reinforced through laws aimed at restricting or regulating emigration. Writing in 1862 the eminent French statistician Alfred Legoyt observed that the previous few years had seen the birth of a great number of emigration laws which, he noted optimistically, had as their objective that of benefitting migrants and particularly of improving their journeys across the Atlantic. [24] It was another striking example of the international spread and standardisation of migration controls, or 'border contagion'. Although laws varied depending on the country, in most northern European countries emigration laws invariably set the conditions of passage, whether by including rules on steerage or by regulating the activity of vectors or agents. In Bremen a law was passed in 1854 requiring emigration agents to be citizens of the Hanseatic city, to have paid a deposit and to have received official authorisation to engage in emigration business. It also obliged agents to host transit migrants in appropriate lodgings and set out detailed requirements for the conditions of transport on-board emigrant ships, such as hygiene and minimum space requirements.[25]

Hamburg, where emigration was legal like in Bremen, passed a number of laws ("ordonnances du Sénat") between 1850-1854 aimed at regulating the transport of emigrants.[26] In Prussia, on the other hand, emigration was not considered an automatic right, but rather than restricting emigration by setting quotas, the government also passed a law in 1853 regulating the transport business and the right to practice the profession of emigration agent.[27] Having repealed earlier laws restricting emigration, Scandinavian countries passed new legislation modelled on English laws. In quick succession Norway (1863), Sweden (1864) and Denmark (1868) established police regulations for emigration which focused on

[23] Walter Nugent, *Crossings*, p. 31.
[24] A Legoyt, *L'émigration Européenne. Son importance, ses causes, ses effets.* Paris, 1862, p.i - xxiii
[25] Ibid., pp.265-6
[26] Ibid., 266
[27] Ibid., p. 272

agents and shipping companies.[28] As a quintessential transit country, France passed its first modern emigration law in 1860 primarily to profit from the substantial trade in Prussian migrants who had previously been banned by the Prussian government due to the absence of appropriate legislation in France.[29] So firmly was the new emigration law anchored in the customs of maritime migration that the French statute of 1860, which was revised several times thereafter (without, however, altering its fundamentals) defined emigrants as passengers who did not dine at the captain's table and paid less than 40 francs a week on sailing vessels and less than 8 francs a week on steam vessels.[30]

Emigration laws went hand in hand with the gathering of statistics on emigration. Much like immigration statistics have been linked to efforts by states to restrict or simply police immigration, emigration statistics were compiled by states anxious to exercise an administrative control over those who were leaving their country.[31] With mass emigration across the Atlantic, emigration statistics became part of many European states' tools of government. Port statistics emerged as an important social-scientific instrument in the government of migration and not just of maritime affairs. The British started collecting statistics on emigration in 1815. By mid-century, emigration rates were calculated based on the number of third-class passengers carried by vectors.[32] In Germany, Bremen and Hamburg, both port-cities involved in the emigrant trade, were the most advanced posts of statistical collection on emigration. Bremen began its record-keeping in 1832 and Hamburg followed soon after in 1836. They were greatly improved when in 1870-71 it became law for shipping companies and agents to put migrants' travel arrangements in writing.[33]

In the early decades of Norwegian emigration statistics were collected by consuls in America but in 1867 the government switched to using emigration contracts. Sweden used passport records until roughly the same period (1861), when it turned to records kept by religious congregations, which were considered to be more reliable.[34] In France, the statute of 1860 obliged Emigration Commissioners in emigration ports to collect data from ship captains.[35] Some ports released statistics on clandestine emigration to account for those

[28] Adolph Jensen, 'Migration Statistics of Denmark, Norway and Sweden', in Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Wilcox (eds.), *International Migrations. Volume II Interpretations* (New York: Gorden and Breach, 1969), pp. 283-312
[29] Henri Bunle, 'Migratory Movements between France and Foreign Lands' in Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Wilcox (eds.), *International Migrations. Volume II Interpretations* (New York: Gorden and Breach, 1969), pp. 201-236
[30] Ibid.
[31] For example see Gérard Noiriel's study of immigration in modern France: Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot. Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis, 1996)
[32] Dr. C.E. Snow, 'Emigration from Great Britain' in Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Wilcox (eds.) *International Migrations. Volume II Interpretations* (New York: Gorden and Breach, 1969), pp. 239-260
[33] Dr. F. Burgdörfer, 'Migration across the Frontiers of Germany', in Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Wilcox (eds,) *International Migrations. Volume II Interpretations* (New York: Gorden and Breach, 1969), p.32
[34] Jensen, 'Migration Statistics of Denmark, Norway and Sweden', pp. 283-312
[35] Bunle, 'Migratory Movements between France and Foreign Lands', pp. 201-203

migrants who eluded their controls but were recorded in immigration statistics. For example, a nineteenth century Croatian demographer Josip Lakatos estimated that roughly one-third of all Croatian emigrants bound for the United States had left illegally, while the disparity between Austrian and U.S. statistics showed that roughly 600,000 Austrians had reached American shores illegally, out of a total of 2.1 million.[36] In Sweden, error margins were considered to be between 10 and 20 percent for the period subsequent to 1860.[37]

The extent to which these controls succeeded in regulating emigration is not easy to assess. Improvements in transport technology arguably achieved just as much for passenger safety and comfort than any law.[38] While steerage conditions improved, the passage of migrants in port cities, their lodging and their recruitment by agents continued to elicit concern. Wherever there were profits to be made by selling tickets, lodging migrants or arranging for their transport, an illegal economy of agents, passage-brokers and middle-men flourished. Irish runners working on behalf of passage brokers in the port of Liverpool came to be known as 'man-catchers' because of the way they fleeced migrants.[39] Commissioners of Emigration and Emigrant societies present in New York found it equally difficult to protect new arrivals from similar depredations.[40] Emigration agents were viewed with suspicion and scorn all over Europe for their recruiting practices and many of the emigration laws, such as the French statute of 1860 or the regulations enacted in Bremen in the period 1850-4, were designed to exert some form of control over them.

The worst transgressions involving vectors usually occurred when they attempted to circumvent regulations on hygiene or space requirements for passengers by overloading their

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[36] For example: Ulf Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe. Emigrants, America, and the State since the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: Lexington Books, 2016)

[37] Jensen, 'Migration Statistics of Denmark, Norway and Sweden', p. 286

[38] Francis E. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic. 1840/1973* (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 82-116. The passage from sail to steam not only shortened the Atlantic passage from three weeks to ten days in the space of half a century, it also helped reduce ticket prices (eventually) and improve the regularity of service. More important still, by making masts redundant, it allowed for more space on deck and created the potential for building bigger and more spacious accommodation. The ongoing use of steerage room for the transport of cargo and the polluting presence of coal, particularly the dirty business of refuelling, detracted from these improvements which remained, nonetheless, significant. The introduction of 2nd and 3rd class accommodation on passenger ships was a hallmark of this progress. For most of the nineteenth century migrants travelled as steerage passengers in the cramped lower decks of ships, often with poor food and limited sanitary facilities. The third class was introduced in the second-half of the nineteenth century. Depending on the country it consisted of a communal dormitory or of deck accommodation, what were called '*passagers du pont'* in France. For the Messageries Maritimes, France's major navigation company in the nineteenth century, the third class was introduced in 1851 as part of an agreement with Napoleon III's government for a postal subvention.[38] Its rivals, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique only replaced steerage with third class passage in 1892 following complaints by U.S. authorities that its 'migrant class' was too unsanitary.[38] Migrants who were better off could travel in 2nd class alongside less well-off tourists or the servants of 1st class passengers. It was priced as roughly double that of steerage and half that of first class and there was arguably a stronger element of marketing and business strategy to its pricing than for the 3rd class. Regardless, the association between migration and 3rd class remained strong throughout the century to the extent that in some countries like the United Kingdom, migrant statistics consisted of records of 3rd class passengers.

[39] 'Liverpool as an emigration port 1850', pp. 247-254. 'Document 38. Morning Chronicle, London, 15 July 1850'. Emigration from Europe 1815-1914. Selected Documents edited by Charlotte Erickson. (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1976)

[40] Richard Garrett, *The Search for Prosperity. Emigration from Britain 1815-1930* (London: Wayland, 1973), p. 71

ships or embarking 'undesirables'. One notable exception was the collusion of German shipping companies from Hamburg and Bremen in the clandestine transport of migrants from Russia and Austria-Hungary. Significantly, this followed the introduction of immigration restrictions by the U.S. in the early 1880s. To overcome income requirements shipping companies directly participated in illegal loans, passport fraud and the bribing of Russian border guards. Eventually, the German government moved to normalise the situation by allowing migrants with Lloyd or HAPAG steamship tickets to cross the border without having to prove that they could support themselves financially. Subsequently, they even introduced second class cabin accommodation for migrants to circumvent U.S. sanitary directives banning potentially contagious passengers from steerage.[41]

The fact that the clandestine transport of migrants did not develop as a fundamental aspect of maritime transit in the North Sea and in the English Channel can be attributed to the existence of a number of conditions that were favourable to the regular or legal transport of passengers, such as the early lifting of bans on emigration; the existence of a variety of affordable services with good connections; a commitment among vectors to respecting the rules of competition as set out in the conference system (i.e. market sharing agreements among shipping companies designed to prevent competition from driving down prices); legal integration and institutional cooperation among sending and transit countries; the lower incidence of disease epidemics in northern European countries; the low susceptibility of officials to bribes and corruption and others still.

Several of these conditions did not apply to the Mediterranean, where the trade in transatlantic migrants developed while emigration restrictions were still in place in various countries of emigration. Passenger Acts were adopted and adapted in some countries (e.g. Italy) but not in others (e.g. the Ottoman Empire). Shipping Conferences failed to take hold and competition among shipping companies remained volatile. Remote recruitment by shipping companies, foreign consuls and emigration agents was widespread, indeed a structural factor of the emigration trade in the Mediterranean, due in part to the imbalance between transit and sending countries. Disease epidemics, in particular the fifth and sixth cholera pandemics, unleashed new flows and new forms of control. Bans on emigration were progressively lifted, and emigration laws introduced, but could only channel transit flows imperfectly. Some of these processes, such as remote recruitment or the power of shipping companies, were both cause and consequence of transit via multiple countries. Others, such as the spread of disease epidemics, were not, although transit often exacerbated them. If and

[41] Agnes Bretting, 'From the Old World to the New' in Dirk Hoerder (ed.), *Fame, Fortune and Sweet Liberty,* pp. 97-100

how transit made the policing of migration more difficult and clandestine migration more likely is examined alongside other factors, ranging from the nature of the urban economy of port cities like Marseilles and Naples, to the unique motivation migrants might have for picking one route over another. In the absence of restrictionist legislation, following the liberalisation of migration laws across the Mediterranean, the persistence of clandestine migration calls for a more complex explanation that does not rely on bans on entry or exit alone.

In order to do so, transit migration across the Mediterranean is broken up into several phases that migrant journeys took, across both land and sea, from communities of origin to ports of final departure, and according to various 'control regimes' that accounted for the way that clandestinity was both produced and policed. These varied from legislation targeting recruitment and transport, to the policing of migrant transience in port cities, the regulation of urban hospitality, sanitary controls, the spread of information or 'agent propaganda', documentary checks and even the private or intimate sphere of family life and marriage.

Chapter One starts with migrant journeys across the Mediterranean, from societies that lacked direct connections to the Atlantic to ports of transit in southern Europe, primarily Naples and Marseilles. It assesses the role that European shipping companies played in both the legal and illegal recruitment and transport of migrants that followed their southward expansion. It looks at how the introduction of steam technology created new opportunities for migration and changed the nature and direction of existing flows. It also shows how shipping companies broke emigration laws when they thought they would go unpunished and, with the help of the governments of transit countries, ultimately succeeded in changing them, shaping the way migration was regulated and policed in several countries of emigration.

Chapter Two focuses on one particular form of transit, that of Italian migrants via France. Before the ban on emigration in Italy was lifted in 1888, this particular form of transit was illegal. After 1888 it was discouraged, but both legal and illegal forms of transit continued to take place. Whereas restrictionist policies and the lack of direct connections to the Atlantic prompted clandestine flows from Greece and the Ottoman Levant, in Italy migrants chose to leave illegally via France despite the lifting of the ban and the existence of shipping lines linking Genoa and Naples to the American continent. This chapter explores some of the reasons why. It shows how France positioned itself as a 'recruiting haven' for emigration agents, independently of its support for its mercantile fleet and its status as a

maritime power. It ponders the effect of repressive legislation and the introduction of passport controls on land-transit along the western corridor. Finally, it also tackles the question of what the uneven spread of passport controls can tell us about the mechanics of border contagion.

Chapter Three focuses on the temporary stay of migrants in port cities, in particular Marseilles. It investigates another kind of 'transience control', that of the temporary housing of migrants in hotels and private accommodation run by emigration agents and their associates. The control of migration flows could sometimes take unpredictable forms, such as the targeting of well-integrated diasporas and forms of government intervention in the hospitality sector. In theory, migrant hospitality was regulated by public authorities in order to protect migrant welfare, to defend public order and maintain public hygiene. Other concerns, such as the earnings of hotel-owners, emigration agents and other middlemen involved in the trade, also played a role. Public authorities in Marseilles, like elsewhere, were adamant that the city's reputation as a transit point for transatlantic migrants be preserved and that migrants continue to pass through it. The temporary stay of migrants in port cities did bring real risks to the local population, most notably, contagious diseases such as cholera and yellow fever. In both the fifth and sixth cholera pandemics of 1884 and 1910, transients were vectors of disease across the Mediterranean.

Chapter Four looks at how disease control by the United States directly impacted the controls that transit migrants were obliged to undergo at embarkation in port cities like Naples and, to a lesser extent, Palermo and Marseilles. The results were surprising: not only did this period see the build-up of considerable infrastructure for remote immigration controls on the continent, setting an important precedent in the history of the United States, but it also increased the number of migrant rejections, bringing the total much closer to those achieved under the commonly denounced illiberal interwar quota system.

Due to time constraints, there are a few aspects of migrant transit across the Mediterranean that this thesis does not explore. Although the Balkan route features in historiography on emigration from Eastern Europe, including Greece, it would be interesting to understand in greater depth how it changed in relation to migrant shipping in the Mediterranean. Similarly, the clandestine transit of Italians via France could be compared to that of Ottoman migrants in British areas of influence, such as Cyprus, Malta or Egypt. Research in the archives of German and British shipping companies would also add further detail and perhaps new twists to the ways in which European maritime expansion in the Mediterranean occurred and how it shaped the dynamics of transit. Perhaps the lack of

research on Barcelona, another major transit port in the Mediterranean, represent the greatest gap in my research. Other gaps are archival in origin. At the time of writing, the archives of the Florio-Rubattino shipping company, also known as the Navigazione Generale Italiana, remain lost, and the archives of the Italian Ministry of the Merchant Marine inaccessible. The Parliamentary inquiries into the state of the Italian Merchant Navy, held in the Italian Foreign Ministry Archives in Rome, were a useful substitute.

My decision to focus on France and Italy, and in particular on Marseilles and Naples, was determined by France's primacy (and 'purity', given the low level of emigration) as a transit country for Mediterranean migrants, and Italy's role as the largest 'exporter' of migrants in the region. This was reinforced by France's special influence in the Levant and its unique position as a Mediterranean maritime power, comparable only to that of Great Britain. Italy was also one of the five major maritime powers active in the Mediterranean at this time. The bulk of my research thus took place in archives in Italy and France. As I grew aware of the influence of the United States' Marine Hospital service, re-baptised as the Public Health Service in 1912, to the history of migration controls in Europe, and in particular in Naples, I decided to include U.S. archival material. Given the incompleteness of archival material on the fifth and sixth cholera pandemics in both Marseilles and Naples, without it I would have missed a very important vector and catalyst of migration control.

Some of the more interesting and exciting archival material I have come across is kept at the French Lines warehouses on the outskirts of Le Havre. They include captain and agent reports for the Messageries Maritimes, France's postman in the Mediterranean and one of the main shipping companies involved in the legal and illegal trade in migrants. In a sense then, this thesis begins not in Marseilles but in Le Havre, where the archives of another French shipping company, the Compagnie Générale des Transports Maritimes, are kept. Without reading French consular reports from the Levant and Italy and, more generally, on emigration, I would not have been able to fully understand the intersection of French commercial and maritime interests in the region, but also the full scale of lobbying, on behalf of shipping companies, on the part not only of the French but also the British government in the Levant and in Greece. Italian foreign ministry archives on the other hand contain the archives of the General Commissariat of Emigration, an indispensable resource for anyone wishing to write a history of emigration from (and via) the peninsula after 1901. They include material on the Commissariats of emigration in Genoa, Naples and Palermo, and on shipping companies involved in the trade, both foreign and Italian.

Constructing an archive for the Mediterranean is an arduous task; constructing one for the study of a global phenomenon (transcontinental migration and migration controls) is even harder. Both require selectivity and therefore omission. Constructing an archive for the study of clandestine migration is, perhaps, hardest of all. This is both due to the difficulty of documenting the undetected, which is an issue I discuss at various points in the course of this thesis, but in particular depth in relation to passport controls in Chapter Two. An awareness of the differences in the legal and documentary regimes between sending and transit countries has proven necessary in order to understand not only how and where clandestine flows occurred, but also in deciding which archives to use to intercept them. Municipal and regional (or in the French case, departmental) archives have proven particularly useful in understanding the effects of migrant transit on the urban economies of Marseilles and Naples, and vice versa. What this amounts to is the need to construct an archive that can fully account for clandestine migration's nature not only as a legal and bureaucratic creation, but also a social and economic phenomenon.

A word on statistics

Since its publication in 1929, the work on International Migrations by Imre Ferenczi and Walter Wilcox has been the standard reference text for historians of transatlantic migration. Impressive in its scope and detail, including in the range of explanations and historical context given for mass labour migrations and for the creation of migration statistics, it nonetheless remains flawed. One of its shortcomings is that the majority of statistical estimates for rates of national emigration, from the Balkan states to the Levant, are extrapolations of U.S. immigration statistics. In addition to statistics being unavailable for significant stretches of time, they remain projections based on estimates. They are also organised and classified in ways that are on occasion anachronistic and unhelpful. The most striking example is the division of emigration from the Ottoman Empire into two categories, 'Turkey in Europe' and 'Turkey in Asia' (meaning Anatolia and the Levant).

Other scholars have drawn attention to these flaws and in the case of Ottoman migration specifically, have demonstrated that the figures given by Ferenczi and Wilcox are

potentially as much as 170 per cent lower than the real total.[42] In other ways, however, the statistics contained in the volume are useful. For some countries, such as Italy and most of western and central Europe, Ferenczi and Wilcox compiled and reproduced official statistics faithfully. They even include statistics on clandestine emigration where possible and, surprisingly, on transit migration, although not for France post 1890. According to these statistics (Table 2 in the Appendix) Germany followed by the British Isles experienced the highest rates of transit migration, although the proportion of transatlantic migrants among total number of transients is unclear.

In order to overcome some of these drawbacks, I have used the statistics contained in the work of Ferenczi and Wilcox as guidelines for estimating the relative importance or size of migration flows rather than trying to recover exact totals. Where possible I have tried to compare them with other official statistics and occasionally to use more reliable sources in their place. Where the statistics compiled by Ferenczi and Wilcox are found to be most wanting, with regard to emigration from Greece, Balkan countries or from the Ottoman Levant for example, I have relied on the statistics compiled by historians in secondary texts and the occasional French consular report or shipping company report. For statistics on the transit of migrants through Italy and France, and in particular via the ports of Naples and Marseilles, I have relied primarily on police reports, on the archives of the Chamber of Commerce in Marseilles and on the occasional ministerial report or specialist publication on the subject, such as Gustave Lagneau's work on French emigration published in 1884.[43] They are recorded in Table 1 in the Appendix.

The most difficult statistics to come by were those pertaining to clandestine emigration. Although some sending states (such as Italy) and contemporary statisticians (such as Leone Carpi in Italy) collected statistics on clandestine departures they were, by definition, estimates based on the number of individuals who were caught in the act of crossing an international border without the right documents or while trying to board a ship without a ticket or a passport. Those who succeeded in doing so usually left little trace. Once again, rather than trying to quantify the total of clandestine migration I have tried to characterise it qualitatively. Where possible I have tried to estimate what its order of magnitude might have been. For example, agent reports for the Messageries Maritimes

[42] Muhammet Kazim Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', DPhil in Global and Imperial History, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom. Footnote, "Based upon the administrative records of 24 million migrants who entered Ellis Island, Imran Rasul, Oriana Bandiera and Maritna Viarengo's empirical study suggested that the flow into the USA was 20% and 170% higher than Ferenczi and Wilcox's estimations." p.61

[43] Dr. Gustave Lagneau, *L'émigration de France.* Paris, 1884.

showed that it was common practice among all European shipping companies to pick up hundreds of migrants illegally when emigration was still banned in the Levant. In all likelihood, this would have engendered clandestine flows of several thousands in the years prior to 1889-1892, when emigration was finally liberalised and regulated. The statistics compiled by the Emigration Commissioner of Marseilles can give us an idea of the volume of Italian transit via that port, but it does not account for what proportion of those flows was illegal. Given that Italian transit migrants continued to be the main source of income for emigration agents operating in that city, and that emigration agencies continued to flourish throughout our period, it is likely that it continued to be in the vicinity of 10,000-15,000 a year, which is roughly the volume of Italian migrants who left via Marseilles in the 1870s.[44]

[44] Leone Carpi, *Statistica Illustrata Della Emigrazione All'Estero del triennio 1874-1876* Roma: Tipografia del 'Popolo Romano', 1878

Chapter One

Along the Mediterranean Service: Emigration Controls, Shipping Lines and Transit Powers

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, transatlantic emigration from the Mediterranean took place primarily on board of European shipping companies. As emigration from northern and western Europe slowed down in the final decades of the nineteenth century, emigration agents, shipping and railway companies looked southwards for new markets and more migrants. Many major shipping companies involved in the emigrant trade, like the French Messageries Maritimes or the British Peninsular and Oriental, expanded to the Mediterranean not only to profit from passenger traffic but also to benefit from the opening of the Suez Canal and generally, European imperial expansion, both political and economic. In doing so, they faced little local competition. Mediterranean countries like Greece and Lebanon and regions in Italy like Campania and Sicily prior to 1887, lacked a direct passage to the Americas. Their merchant marines had not yet harnessed steam technology and could not compete with their northern rivals in speed, regularity and number of passengers carried and, ultimately, on ticket prices. They also lacked maritime infrastructure that could cope with a high volume of steamship traffic and railway networks connecting maritime terminals to northern European cities, markets and ports. As a result, passage aboard British, French, German, Austrian and eventually Italian and Greek shipping companies, and transit in European port cities became a necessary and defining part of emigrant journeys from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The consequences of this transport and logistics gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, and the arrival of steamers bearing European names would have a determining effect on regional migration regimes and ultimately on the history of transatlantic emigration.

The southward advance of European shipping companies was met with great demand by migrants, but also by the protectionism of sending countries that were eager to shield migrants from exploitation, improve the conditions of passage and to favour the

development of their own merchant fleets. Atlantic 'contagion' followed Atlantic connections, as was most evident in the transfer and adoption on Mediterranean shores of continental and northern European institutions that had originally been set up to manage the Atlantic emigrant trade. As foreign shipping interests were pitted against those of countries of emigration and as foreign vectors and agents rivalled native businesses, the competition gained a geopolitical dimension. This was further shaped by the ability of northern European vectors and agents to exploit not only the technological potential of industrialized nations, but also the advantage that derived from their proximity to Atlantic routes. In order to develop their trade, shipping companies had not only to secure the backing, financial and political, of domestic governments – either by acting as postal couriers or by lending their support to imperial ventures – but also to negotiate with sending countries or, alternatively, to defy their laws and elude their controls. Indeed, the spread of shipping services along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean took place, to a substantial degree, in defiance of existing restrictions on emigration and was therefore illegal. Where the authority of emigration states was at their weakest, shipping companies even asserted forms of control independent of state authority. These were not simply market sharing agreements designed to avert price wars among companies, but replaced rather than complemented national passenger laws and bilateral treaties between shipping companies and countries of emigration and transit.

Although the Messageries Maritimes were not the only shipping company transporting transatlantic emigrants across the four corners of the Mediterranean, their history, and their archives, offer precious insights into many of the changes discussed above. Born as the Messageries Nationales in 1851, it was later re-baptised 'Messageries Maritimes' when it expanded its maritime services. Its four Mediterranean lines (from France to Italy, Malta and the Levant (including modern day Syria, Lebanon and Egypt)) all radiated from Marseilles, one of the main transit ports for migrants heading to the Atlantic and the capital of France's expanding Mediterranean empire. Its significance as a source of information on the Mediterranean trade is also due to its active participation and, in the case of the Ottoman Levant in particular, its pioneering role in the illegal emigrant trade, in the clandestine recruitment and transport of thousands of migrants.

Through the use of French and Italian diplomatic archives as well as documents relating to the Italian merchant marine, this chapter focuses on the contested and clandestine origins of the migrant shipping 'corridor'. The arrival of European shipping companies in Mediterranean ports set the foundations for the first phase of migrant transit from the

Mediterranean to the Atlantic, via European ports. It not only jumpstarted mass transatlantic migration from the region, but it also catalysed the spread of new forms of migration control. In addition to explaining how and why these changes occurred, and by tracing the spread of shipping networks across the Mediterranean, this chapter also seeks to account for the transfer of emigration legislation to Mediterranean shores, and the relationship between protectionist and humanitarian agendas and the clandestine trade. Was the illicit transport of migrants overcome and the burgeoning clandestine transport industry brought under control? Should this be attributed to improvements in policing, to humanitarian concern for migrants, to the liberalisation of emigration or to greater cooperation between sending, transit and receiving countries? Did it happen because or despite of the 'modernisation' of the migration industry? Was the latter the doing of bureaucrats and diplomats or of shipping companies and their agents? And what were the consequences for shipping companies involved in the emigrant trade?

Pioneering Mediterranean Transit: Vector Competition and Protectionism in Italy

Starting in the 1860s-1870s the technological potential of steamships and the aggressive practices of modern recruiting met with the demand for migration among the labouring classes of Italy, Greece, the Balkans, the Levant and Ottoman Turkey. Men and women from eastern European countries like Hungary also swelled the ranks of those embarking on trans-continental journeys from Mediterranean harbours by taking their passage in Adriatic ports like Trieste. Some corners of the Mediterranean, like Genoa, had been exporting migrants across the Atlantic since the early decades of the nineteenth century. However, it was not until British, French, German, Austrian and Italian steamers began to dock in at ports the length and breadth of the Mediterranean that yearly rates of emigration numbered in the tens and then hundreds of thousands. The development of railways linking European ports of transit, like Le Havre or Marseilles, to emigration hotspots added momentum to migration from southern and south-eastern Europe in particular. The mass outflow of labourers headed to the Atlantic started in the late 1870s and 1880s, and it would not end until after the Great War that shook the world in 1914. By 1920 roughly 14 million people had left for the

Americas from the Mediterranean. Among all Mediterranean countries, Italy contributed the most migrants, some 7.5 million in total.[1]

Italian emigration is something of a misnomer. As in other countries of emigration, it developed irregularly and showed considerable regional and local variation.[2] De Zerbi, an Italian deputy, made this point very well during the parliamentary discussions that preceded Italy's first law on emigration (1888). He noted that if emigration was spread equally throughout the peninsula then the departure of roughly 150,000 people a year would not deal a terrible blow to a country that was growing at a yearly rate of 200,000 people, but its unequal distribution across regions (*province*) made it a very serious concern.[3] Italy's landowners were likely to agree given the way emigration from a certain area could drive up wages fairly rapidly. Maritime emigration from Liguria and the Veneto peaked in the 1860s and 1870s and was largely directed towards South America. Neighbouring regions such as Lombardy and Piedmont produced far fewer emigrants. Migration to France or Germany was more common in these regions than trans-continental migration to the Americas.[4] Roughly speaking, the intensity of emigration from Italy followed a southward trend, with emigration from the southern regions of the Abruzzi, Molise, Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily overtaking that from Liguria and Veneto as the nineteenth century drew to an end.

The regional nature of Italian emigration was reflected in the port statistics of the peninsula's three main points of departure: Genoa, Naples and Palermo. Of the roughly 84,000 emigrants who left Italian shores in 1885, 70,000 did so from Genoa.[5] As maritime emigration was estimated to have grown to 209,225 in 1896, Genoa maintained its dominance over Naples, transporting roughly 40,000 third-class passengers more than the latter's total of 70,513.[6] Five years later Naples had overtaken Genoa by transporting 95,000 compared to its 66,000.[7] The shift from north to south largely coincided with the growing volume of maritime emigration to the United States relative to South America (primarily La Plata but also Rio Grande do Sol in Brazil). As late as 1895 more Italians were leaving Italian shores for Brazil than for the United States, but this changed in the new century. In 1907

[1] See Table 1 in Appendix.
[2] Historians have argued that all migration is trans-local or trans-regional, rather than trans-national (ie. between nations). For example see: Amarjit Kaur and Dirk Hoerder, 'Understanding International Migration: comparative and transcultural perspective', in Dirk Hoerder and Amarjit Kaur (eds.) *Proletarian and Gendered Mass Migrations. A Global Perspective on Continuities and Discontinuities from the 19th to the 21st centuries* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 3-18
[3] *Atti Parlamentari,* Camera, II Sessione 1887-88, Doc. N. 85A e Discussioni, giornate del 5-6 e 7 Dicembre.
[4] Ercole Sori, *L'emigrazione italiana dall'Unità alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale* (Bologna, 1979), p. 295
[5] ACS, Biblioteca. Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1895. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1896.
[6] Ibid.
[7] ACS, Biblioteca. Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1900. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1901

recorded departures for the United States were more than double those for La Plata (97,315) and almost twenty times those for Rio (11,995).[8]

Prior to the establishment of direct steamship services to American ports, migrants from the northern regions of Italy regularly chose to travel to Marseilles to take one of the steamers owned by the Messageries Maritimes, Cyprien Fabre or other companies that operated out of the *Ville Phocéenne*. A parliamentary inquiry on the state of Italy's mercantile navy conducted in 1881-2 linked migrant transit to Marseilles and to British channel ports to the poor state of Genoa's facilities. According to one testimony, Italy's main commercial port (Genoa handled two thirds of Italy's trade at this point) lacked calm waters, its wharfs and storage facilities were inadequate and the loading and unloading of passengers and cargo was too slow to accommodate steamship traffic. It also argued that Genoa was being let down by the bad railway connections to other parts of northern Italy. It was feared that the imminent inauguration of the San Gottardo railway tunnel connecting Switzerland and Italy (completed in 1882 with the backing of some of Europe's most important financial groups such as the Rothschilds and the French Péreire brothers, both of whom owned shipping companies that were active in the emigrant trade, respectively the Austrian Lloyd and the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (CGT)) could backfire, like the Fréjus rail tunnel connecting France and Italy that had been completed in 1872 which, to cite one interviewee, had turned Genoa into a "suburb ["*succursale*"] of Marseilles". The deputy Chiozza concluded that migrant transit to Marseilles was direct proof of the inadequacy of Genoese maritime and railway connections.[9]

Yet, not only was Genoa the best port owned by the fledgling Italian monarchy, but it was also home to a thriving emigration business, both native and foreign. Venice had declined following investment by the Austria-Hungarian monarchy aimed at developing Trieste and Fiume.[10] According to the 1881-2 inquiry the ports of Naples and Palermo were not better off. Conditions in Naples were judged to be "deplorable": the port lacked quays, cranes, sufficient docks and a railway to connect the port with the train station. Palermo was in similarly dire straits. Moreover, railway transport in Sicily was judged to be too expensive to be of much use to shipping companies.[11] By 1870 many of the main ports in Italy had railway connections: Genoa was linked to Savona and Chiavari, La Spezia and Livorno were

[8] ACS, Biblioteca. Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1907. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1908

[9] ACS, Biblioteca, Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile 1881-2, Volume I. Riassunti dell'Inchiesta Orale e Scritta. Roma. Tipografia Eredi Botta 1882., pp. 533-541

[10] Vito Dante Flore, *L'Industria dei Trasporti Marittimi in Italia. Parte I. Dagli inizi del sec. XVI al 1860* (Roma: Bollettino Informazioni Marittime, 1966), pp. 168-9

[11] ACS, Biblioteca, Inchiesta Parlamentare sulla Marina Mercantile 1881-2, pp. 515-516

connected to Naples via Civitavecchia and Rome, while on the Adriatic coast a line connected Bari to Taranto.[12] Yet, according to Italy's shipping companies, railway connections worked just as much against their interests as in favour of them. Not only did they provide migrants with cheap and relatively speedy passages to northern European ports but, in the first two decades following unification in 1861, they had also proven to be staunch rivals in the delivery of post and the transport of goods and passengers along Italy's coasts.[13]

The development of passenger lines in Genoa took place not only in defiance of the infrastructural inadequacies lamented in the inquiry, but also of the Italian government's reluctance to commit to significant investments to advance its mercantile navy. This was quite unlike rival European nations, whose governments had soon seized upon the importance of postal subventions to help steamship companies overcome substantial barriers to entry and to spread some of the risk involved in experimenting with new technologies. To take the French mercantile navy as an example, not only had postal contracts been essential to the establishment of its flagship service in the Mediterranean, which the Messageries Maritimes started running at the beginning of the century, but it continued to depend on them to turn a profit well into the following century.[14]

On the other hand, Camillo Benso di Cavour, united Italy's first Prime Minister, had been content to let English and French shipping companies deliver Italy's post in the 1860s.[15] A commission set up in 1876 by the newly instituted left-wing government proposed creating seven new lines, only one of which was designed to transport migrants from Naples and Genoa to Buenos Aires (the creation of a direct line to North America was envisaged only for commercial exchanges). The commission's main concern was that of improving communications with the near and far East: it recommended intensifying connections with Egypt and Tunisia and instituting new lines from Ancona to Zara and between Genoa and Singapore. It also envisaged the possibility of subsidizing ships that used the Suez Canal.[16] The law that resulted from the commission's work, however, excluded subsidies for all long-distance itineraries, including the only emigrant itinerary that had been envisaged from

[12] Giorgio Doria, *Debiti e navi. La Compagnia di Rubattino 1839-1881* (Genova: Marietti, 1990), pp. 107-111
[13] Ibid., pp. 107-111
[14] Philippe Ramona, *Paquebots vers l'Orient* (Joué-lès-Tours, 2001), p. 17
[15] Doria, *Debiti e navi. La Compagnia di Rubattino 1839-1881,* pp. 80-83. In 1860 Cavour initiated a treaty with the Messageries Imperiales for a service to Sardegna and Tunis, with Fraissinet Père et Fils for a line to Genova-Palermo and Livorno-Palermo in return for a state subsidy of 30 Lira per maritime league. Subsequently to the plebiscites of November 1860, following which le Marche and Umbria were annexed to the Italian nation, the Italian government resumed treaties with four English ship-owners (Moore, Henry, Joung and Begbie, Robinson), three French companies (Fraissinet, Touache and Bazìn) and only two Italians (Florio and Credito Mobiliare). Foreign vectors were also awarded subventions for international services, eg. Charles Mark Palmer was granted L.35 per league for service between Ancona and Alexandria.
[16] Ibid. Cited p. 190. Commissione presieduta da Cesare Correnti negli allegati al progetto di legge sulle nuove convenzioni marittime presentata alla Camera dei Deputati nella seduta del 5 febbraio 1877.

Genoa and Naples to Buenos Aires. Italian naval production on the whole declined in this period, and shipping companies continued to purchase vessels from British and French shipyards.[17]

The trajectory of Italy's most successful shipping magnate in the nineteenth century, Raffaele Rubattino, is indicative of the early disinterest in Atlantic connections and the emigrant trade among the peninsula's commercial and political establishment.[18] Having founded his company and inaugurated his first steamship service in 1837, by the late 1840s Rubattino had become the most important ship-owner in Genoa. His rise to local and then national hegemony was enabled by his political contacts and his willingness to place his business in the service of the national interest, in line with the political ambitions of his sponsors. During the Risorgimento campaigns Garibaldi and his battalion of a thousand patriots ("*I mille*") made the journey from Genoa to Sicily on Rubattino's ships; later in the century when Luigi Menabrea's government surreptitiously acquired the port of Assab in Eritrea, it placed it under the name of Rubattino so as to avoid irking the British by betraying its colonial ambitions.

As Giorgio Doria has demonstrated, the Genoese merchant's loyalty was rewarded with lucrative postal conventions and state subsidies which allowed him to become by his death, in 1881, the most powerful ship-owner in Italy (together with Florio, with whom he founded the Navigazione Generale Italiana (NGI)), despite having debts worth almost as much as his business. Unsurprisingly, given the kingdom's commercial interests and early foreign policy, Rubattino's shipping empire stretched from the western Mediterranean to its eastern and southern arteries (the Black Sea and the Red Sea), with one limb jutting out into the Indian Ocean. His expansion subsequently took place on the back of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, with new lines to Alexandria and Port Said, and of the growing cotton trade with Egypt and India. In 1875 the lines to India were extended all the way to Singapore and Colombo. Aside from encouraging further Italian expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and establishing a line to Cyprus, following Britain's invasion of the island, Rubattino created a media-storm to support military intervention in Eritrea and increase Italy's holdings in Assab. In 1878, on the back of these new colonial gains Rubattino set up a Red Sea service to capitalise on the growing pilgrim traffic from North Africa to the holy sites of Mecca and Medina.[19]

[17] Giuseppe Barone, 'Lo Stato e la Marina Mercantile in Italia (1881-1894), *Studi Storici,* Anno 15, No.3 (Jul-Sep., 1974), p. 629

[18] For a discussion of the vested interests behind the emigrant trade in Italy see: Fernando Manzotti, *La Polemica sull'emigrazione nell'Italia Unita* (Milano, 1969).

[19] Doria, *Debiti e navi. La Compagnia di Rubattino 1839-1881,* pp. 180-222

The task of developing Italy's Atlantic connections and supporting its emigration was thus left almost entirely to the initiative of a handful of minor Genoese companies. Starting in the 1850s companies like Lavarello, Danovaro, Pratolongo, Vignolo and Piaggio used subsidies from south American governments to establish services to La Plata, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Following a private agreement with the Argentinian President in 1870 Lavarello even agreed to exceed its role as a passenger service by recruiting agricultural labourers for settlement in the nascent Republic. The Italo-Platense company, another popular service, was established in 1869 in Argentina with the input of immigrants from the Liguria region. [20] Services to North American ports on the other hand were the making of Italy's southern entrepreneurs. It wasn't until 1877 that the Sicilian company established by Paolo Florio, the scion of a dynasty of Calabrian apothecaries and merchants who had arrived in Sicily as refugees when an earthquake had destroyed their home city of Bagnara Calabra in 1783, established the first direct steamship line to New York. Its first year it ran two services to New York; the following year it ran four, but from Marseilles via Palermo. By 1880 the Marseilles-New York service took place on a monthly basis.[21]

The early decades (1850-1870s) were marked by relatively little competition among Italian companies. On the South American route, the main contender was the Societé Generale des Transports Maritimes à Vapeur (SGTMV) which in 1867 launched a new line from Marseilles to Brazil and La Plata. Four large *paquebots* (packet ships, originally referring to vessels employed to carry post, later used to refer to regular, scheduled services carrying both freight and passengers) stopped at Genoa and Naples to pick up migrants before leaving Marseilles. They conducted intermediate stops in Gibraltar (for more migrants) and Saint-Vincent in the Antilles before docking in at Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Buenos Aires. Smaller than the CGT and the Messageries Maritimes, SGTMV continued to conduct the service successfully into the next century.[22] Starting in the 1880s-1890s it was joined by the main German companies, Norddeutscher Lloyd and Hamburg-America Line which, not satisfied with migrant arrivals via railway transit from Italy's northern regions, started docking in at Genoa. While in 1890 German companies transported only 388 emigrants from Italian ports (according to the Italian Ministry of the Navy's statistical office) in 1895 that number had grown to roughly 18,000 – primarily migrants heading to the United

[20] Augusta Molinari, 'Porti, trasporti, compagnie' in Piero Bevilacqua, Andreina De Clementi, Emilio Franzina (Eds.) *Storia dell'Emigrazione Italiana. Partenze* (Roma, 2001), pp. 244-250
[21] Doria, *Debiti e navi. La Compagnia di Rubattino 1839-1881,* p. 210
[22] Jean Randier, *Histoire de la Marine Marchande Française* (1980), pp. 73-75

States. Norddeutscher Lloyd alone transported roughly 2,500 migrants to the United Sates from Genoa.[23] Capital from German shipping companies even contributed to the much-anticipated modernisation of the port of Genoa.[24]

At the turn of the century Norddeutscher Lloyd was transporting more migrants from Naples than Genoa (22,608 compared to 5,270 from Genoa in 1900).[25] This was symptomatic not only of the southern shift in emigration from Italy, but also of the gradual ascendency of German companies over French and British rivals.[26] Out of the various companies operating from Naples, the British Anchor and Cunard Lines and the French Cyprien Fabre and Messageries Maritimes had obtained some success providing transit passages to Liverpool and Marseilles. By 1895 the Germans were transporting more passengers than the British, but not as many as the French; five years later they had overtaken both (Germans 39,539; French 30,820; English 28,519).[27] While collectively all three merchant navies transported more migrants than Italian ships that year (98,878 compared to 66,978), the latter enjoyed a sizeable relative majority. Beneduce has estimated that from the 1860s to the 1920s Italian companies transported no more than half of all Italian migrants.[28] While this sounds reasonable, it conceals the shifts in the makeup of the trade. By the turn of the century, Italian vectors had overcome some of the technological backwardness of their mercantile fleet and occupied an increasingly prominent position in the trade.

One of the obstacles that Italian mercantile fleets had to overcome was the volume of clandestine departures of Italian migrants leaving from foreign ports, in particular from France. Unsurprisingly, given the poor quality of services from Italian ports, these had reached quite considerable proportions in the early decades of mass emigration (1860s-1870s), as the statistics compiled by Leone Carpi show. Throughout the 1860s and 1870s (until 1876) clandestine emigration never decreased below 8,000 per year, with peaks of

[23] ACS, Biblioteca. Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1890. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1891; Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1895. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1896

[24] Molinari, 'Porti, trasporti, compagnie', p.245

[25] ACS, Biblioteca, Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1900. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1901

[26] Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914,* p.98, p. 114. Ousted by Cunard from Trieste, German companies belonging to the NDLV (Nordatlantischer Dampfer Linien Verband) had reached a favourable market sharing agreement in 1903 with the French CGT and the White Star company with regard to emigrant traffic from Genoa. Unlike in the Atlantic, Conference agreements in the Mediterranean were few and have been little-documented. Part of the reason may be that as emigration from Italy and the Ottoman Levant flourished in the final decades of the nineteenth century state institutions stepped in to fix prices, thus eliminating the possibility of a price war breaking out.

[27] ACS, Biblioteca, Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1895. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1896; Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1900. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1901

[28] Sori, *L'emigrazione italiana dall'Unità alla seconda guerra mondiale,* p. 316. According to Beneduce, in 1905-6 the Italian mercantile fleet was responsible for 46% of total emigration and only 43,5% of return migration.

27,000 (in 1875). The actual figures were probably higher, but they still accounted for a quarter to a third of total migration in this period.[29] Departures of Italian migrants from French ports grew in parallel to the growth in total and clandestine emigration: in 1866 they numbered 1,531 compared with 8,790 departures from Genoa, in 1873 they numbered respectively 21,727 and 20,364.[30] Leone Carpi drew a direct link between migration from foreign ports, clandestine departures and restrictive Italian legislation. Writing in 1875 he argued that "the decree by Lanza [*circolare Lanza*] and the other annoying limitations to free emigration…achieved little more than to rob Italian ports, and in particular Genoa, of the benefits of transporting thousands of emigrants who found the way of eluding controls and embarked in Marseilles and Le Havre…".[31] Unlike Carpi, Italy's Statistical department took little interest in measuring clandestine departures. Aside from the logistical difficulties involved in obtaining statistics from foreign ports, this was in all likelihood indicative of the desire on the part of the young and insecure state to divert attention from its perceived failings. Even the Commissariat for Emigration which was set up under the stewardship of the statistician Luigi Bodio, produced statistics on departures from foreign ports, but not on clandestine emigration.

Prior to Italy's first law on emigration (1888), emigrant departures from Italy had been governed only via three ministerial decrees. They obliged prefects, mayors and police (Public Security Officers under the Ministry of the Interior) to block all emigration to Algeria and America (Circolare Menabrea, 1868) and demanded that migrants show they had sufficient funds to pay for a return ticket in case of repatriation (Circolare Lanza, 1873). The final decree (Circolare Nicotera, 1876) sought to soften the previous two, but it also stuck to the underlying premise that emigration was a social ill that had to be remedied. As other scholars have argued, the Italian state's early migration policy was determined primarily by the interests of the landowning classes who feared wage rises and labour shortages. Restrictionism was also favoured by the political establishment who saw emigration as undermining the achievements of the Risorgimento.[32] Concerns for the welfare of migrants, which had animated parliamentary discussions since Ercole Lualdi raised the issue for the first time in the Italian parliament's history on the 30th of January 1868, and which had motivated the early campaigns of Monsignor Scalabrini, were of little legislative consequence until 1888. Neither were the interests of Italy's shipping industry, which the

[29] Leone Carpi, Statistica Illustrata Della Emigrazione All'Estero del triennio 1874-1876, Roma: Tipografia del 'Popolo Romano', 1878; Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. WilIcox, *International Migrations. Vol I. Statistics,* pp. 812-815
[30] Ferenczi and Wilcox, *International Migrations. Vol I. Statistics,* pp. 817-818
[31] Carpi, *Statistica Illustrata Della Emigrazione All'Estero del triennio 1874-1876*, p. 34
[32] Fernando Manzotti, *La Polemica sull'emigrazione nell'Italia Unita*, pp. 11-14

government showed no intention of advancing by legalising emigration or by using migration laws as a means of protectionism. Clandestinity was policed with little success and with little interest for the mechanics of the emigration trade, the general aim being that of discouraging emigration by criminalising it. (It is worth remembering that until 1885-1890 continental emigration outnumbered intercontinental emigration in Italy, although the former was considered only 'temporary').[33]

While these decrees made no provisions for departures from foreign ports, they inevitably contributed to them. The Italian government was presented with the challenge of trying to establish some form of shared international control in order to stop migrants from crossing the border into neighbouring countries, including France. In 1875 it embarked on a diplomatic mission to try and persuade foreign officials to allow the Italian judiciary to prosecute offenders outside of Italy' s national borders and to instruct French local authorities to act as proxies for Italian institutions. The Italian Ministry of the Interior initially approached the French Foreign Ministry asking for Italian consuls to be granted the power to review all emigration contracts issued to Italian emigrants in French ports. In exchange it offered to block French emigration for Brazil and Venezuela, in compliance with France's emigration law of 1860. The French were sceptical of this claim, seeing as it promised things that Italian laws couldn't deliver, since emigration to South America was not restricted in Italy at this point. They also feared that it would burden police authorities with the cost of having to repatriate Italians who found themselves stranded in France.[34] They simply lacked the incentives to ban a flow that caused few problems and had considerable benefits for their own emigration industry.

In 1888 Italy finally passed a law declaring emigration to be free, thus marking a decisive shift from a repressive policy based on restrictions to one based on regulation.[35] As the then Prime Minister Crispi put it, "I judge it useless to examine if emigration is a good or an ill…emigration is a fact that we do not have the right to suppress and we do not have the means to stop." The law's critics claimed that it was little more than a police measure and did nothing to address the underlying causes of emigration.[36] In fact, several measures were introduced to benefit the welfare of migrants: the law banned indentured passage, set

[33] Ferenczi and Wilcox, *International Migrations. Vol.1 Statistics,* p. 813
[34] AMAE, Affaires Consulaires (-1908) 426QO/ Prostitution, protection internationale des émigrants, bb. 336-337
[35] *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* Lunedi 31 Dicembre, Num. 306, Anno 1888. Articolo Primo: "L'emigrazione è libera, salvo gli obblighi imposti ai cittadini dalle leggi. I militari di prima e seconda categoria in congedo illimitato, appartenenti all'esercito permanente ed alla milizia mobile, non possono recarsi all'estero, se non ne abbiano ottenuta licenza dal ministro della Guerra."
[36] Lucio Avagliano, *L'emigrazione italiana. Testi e documenti* (Napoli, 1976), p. 34. For example, the deputy De Zerbi compared emigration to brigantaggio, blaming the new state for not mobilizing effectively to solve Italy's social and economic problems.

minimum space and rations requirements for shipping companies, established procedures for registering complaints and for repatriating migrants. Its greatest boast, and the primary ambition of the law, was to regulate the activities of emigration agents, which Crispi judged to be redundant now that emigration had become a well-established and well-documented phenomenon, with plenty of information available to those wishing to migrate. Anyone wanting to operate as an agent was required to apply for a patent, pending ministerial review and the payment of a deposit worth 3,000 to 5,000 lira, which was intended to cover the cost of potential repatriations. They were not entitled to any remuneration by emigrants. Any transgressions, including the clandestine embarkation of minors or escaped convicts, would be punished.

Together with norms targeting sub-agents (Articles 7-8) and those outlawing aggressive recruitment by "inducing excitement" among agricultural labourers (Article 11), they perpetuated the distinction between 'real' and 'spontaneous' or 'induced' emigration, which was the fundamental premise of earlier restriction acts – which sought to restrict migration on the grounds that it was 'unnatural' – and which now provided the rationale for policing the activities of emigration agents. It resulted in an administrative investigation into the world of agents, sub-agents and their associates that would last decades, as reflected in the state archives of Italian port cities where the trade flourished.

Yet, the law of 1888 sought not only to protect migrants by policing 'aggressive recruitment', it also aimed to make transit in foreign ports more difficult for migrants, thereby favouring the Italian merchant marine. While it made provisions for stopovers in foreign ports (Article 15 required emigration agents to foot the bill for the room and board of migrants), it sought to discourage transit by indirect means. Article 3, which set some of the conditions for practicing the profession of emigration agent, required agents to be Italian citizens. Article 11 on the other hand banned recruitment by foreign agents operating outside of Italy.[37] Shipping companies or foreign agents could still recruit Italian migrants indirectly by paying a local agent to represent them, but this would come at a cost. Rules that set minimum space and hygiene requirements for migrant vectors also had the effect of favouring newer fleets, like that of the Navigazione Generale Italiana, over those of both

[37] *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* Lunedi 31 Dicembre, Num. 306, Anno 1888. Article 3 required agents to be Italian. "Per ottenere la patente di agente d'emigrazione occorre essere cittadino italiano domiciliato nel Regno, maggiore di età, non privato dei diritti civili, ne sottoposto alla speciale sorveglianza di pubblica sicurezza, e non essere stato condannato per reati contro la fede pubblica, o relative al commercio, o contro il buon costume, o contro le persone e la proprietà, ne essere stato condannato per contravvenzione alla presente legge o al relativo regolamento. La patente non può essere conceduta a ministeri di culti ne a funzionari dello stato o impiegati in amministrazioni pubbliche locali." ; Art 11: "Gli arruolamenti di emigranti potranno essere fatti dall'agente o subagenti soltanto entro il territorio in cui è autorizzato ad agire; ma ne l'uno ne l'altro potrà percorrere il paese eccitando pubblicamente i cittadini ed emigrare."

national and foreign competitors. It also set harsh fines for foreign shipping companies, three times those proscribed for Italian companies that did not respect existing rules (Article 18).[38]

As Italian ports and shipping improved and direct connections grew in number, transit migration to northern ports became less and less attractive. The Messageries Maritimes had set up an agency in Naples in 1872 and continued to transport passengers (mostly migrants) from there into the new century. However, by 1880 the agent in Naples was writing back to management explaining that competition was such that the company could not turn a profit unless it established a direct service from Naples to Brazil. The cost of transiting passengers to France and then across to Bordeaux had simply become too high.[39]

Foreign shipping companies attempted to find a political solution to their financial problems. Their attempts to keep abreast of the competition ended up shaping the legal definition of transit and ultimately, the way emigration was policed in Italy. Firstly, they mobilised in order to stop Italy from banning the 'trans-boarding' of migrants from one ship to another. Writing in 1895 to his colleagues at the Quai D'Orsay, the French consul in Naples explained that the only way that the French had been able to keep up with British, German and, to some extent, Italian companies had been to ferry emigrants on smaller vessels to Marseilles where they were then placed on transatlantic steamers. The Consul further explained that "certain French ship owners, who it would be redundant to name" had found a receptive interlocutor and willing ambassador in the fiery newspaper editor and right-wing Neapolitan deputy Rocco De Zerbi, who had succeeded in modifying the regulations on their behalf. Two articles had been added in 1891 – articles 23 and 24 – which allowed for the 'trans-boarding' of migrants from one boat to another. (Article 24 ruled that the trans-boarding of emigrants was allowed only for ships coming from Italian ports, thus effectively banning transit in multiple foreign ports).[40]

As the letter explained, the practice had met with resistance from shipping companies and the Italian public generally: "It has been said […], 'The public purse is robbed of the duties that the emigrant ships of larger tonnage would pay were they obliged to come look for migrants in Italy – national commerce is robbed of the profits it could make from the presence of large transatlantic steamers in our ports.' In sum, it is demanded that the regulation of '92 be modified once again and the articles 23 and 24 disappear and that French companies lose the right to trans-board emigrants in foreign ports. In Genoa, Naples and

[38] The Law of 1888 was not the first to do so – a sanitary law passed by the Savoy Monarchy established rules for conditions of issuance of passports, set penalties and punishments for any transgressions (including the incarceration of ship captains who embarked too many migrants) and created inspection units in Italian ports. Law n. 3544, 31.7.1859.
[39] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agent Report, Naples, 1880
[40] *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 27 Novembre 1891, n. 652

Livorno, by the press and through deputies, Italian shipping companies are calling for the question to be examined by parliament by the end of the year and it is to be expected that Italian companies will do everything in their power to ensure that the French merchant navy is excluded from the trade."[41] It is unlikely that Italian commerce would have protested much in favour of the ban of trans-boarding; what mattered to hotel owners, shop keepers and small merchants in Naples was the volume of people flowing through the city and the number of connections with foreign ports, not whether the emigrant ships were Italian or French. Incidentally, De Zerbi built his political career in part as a spokesperson for Neapolitan interests, not those of foreign or Italian shipping companies. Regardless, his intercession proved that Italian shipping companies had gradually accrued greater influence over migration policy in Italy, at the expense of the landed aristocracy, but also that they did not, as yet, command the full attention and loyalty of the country's legislators in the matter.

The controversy surrounding the conduct of French emigrant ships and more generally the dangers associated with transit migration, continued to capture the attention of the public and legislators alike. As parliament prepared to discuss a new 'comprehensive' law on migration, which would equip the Italian state with the means not only of policing emigration but also of "directing it effectively", as its proponents argued, talk of banning trans-boarding and embarkation in foreign ports, which had been bubbling under the surface since 1892, came to the fore once more. Again, the French diplomatic machine geared into action. Writing in 1898 the French Ambassador to Rome warned that, "[…] all the passengers who currently transit via Marseilles, Paris and Le Havre could be obliged to embark in Genoa where German or British lines will rob French Companies of this very substantial traffic."[42] French maritime companies like the SGTMV and Cyprien Fabre were quick to lodge their complaints with the Quai D'Orsay. Even a prominent railway company that provided connections to channel ports wrote to the Foreign Ministry stressing that their receipts from Italian emigrant traffic were substantial and that the prosperity of the channel regions they serviced was at stake.[43]

Two articles of what would become Italy's first emigration law (1901) were of particular concern to foreign competition. What had initially been written as Article 7 obliged foreign vectors to obtain a license as emigration agents. The companies feared this

[41] AMAE, Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale, Naples – 6CCC, 1892-1897 juin, Lettre au Quai D'Orsay, Naples, 22 août, 1894
[42] AMAE, Émigration Italienne, b. 337, Lettre de l'Ambassadeur Français en Italie au Ministre des Affaires Étrangerès, Rome, 15 décembre, 1898
[43] AMAE, Émigration Italienne, b. 337, Lettre de l'Ambassadeur Français en Italie au Ministre des Affaires Étrangerès, 14 juin, 1899

would make them liable to pay taxes on their property in Italy and oblige them to set up new agencies in the country. Article 13's stated aim (it was subsequently split up into several articles) was to keep emigration agents – and shipping companies - under surveillance at points of embarkation: it provided for embarkation to happen only in Genoa, Naples and Palermo and outlawed trans-boarding in places other than in western Atlantic ports. Several companies also lamented that fact that the law under discussion would make it a legal obligation for all shipping companies to carry Italian doctors, to whom the supervision of the ship's hygiene would be entrusted. Again, the intercession of an Italian deputy, the future Prime Minister of Italy Luigi Luzzatti, proved to be crucial.[44] The French Ambassador Monsieur Camille Barrère – who had already proved his worth by initiating a new commercial treaty with Italy, thus improving diplomatic relations between the two countries, which had worsened following Italy's alliance with Germany in 1881 – wrote back triumphantly a few days prior to the law being published in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale*: "I am pleased to be able to inform you that I was able to obtain from the Government and from the authors of the bill almost all the concessions that we had requested in order to ensure equal competition [between French and Italian shipping companies]…For the requirements pertaining to speed, cabin space and tonnage of vessels, the right to trans-board migrants and to embark them in a French port, the heavy duties to be paid by French foreign companies: the initial bill was revised on all these counts, winning this embassy considerable praise."[45]

In its final version, the law of 1901 accommodated the interests of foreign shipping companies while also granting the Italian state considerable power over emigration outside of its national borders. Firstly, it concentrated power in the hands of the Commissariat of Emigration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Articles 8 and 9), granting it special diplomatic powers, and in those of the Council of Emigration, composed of the Chief Officer in charge of emigration (Commissario d'Emigrazione), five delegates from the Ministries of the Interior, of the Treasury, of the Navy, of Public Education and Agriculture together with prominent members of the Academy (statisticians, geographers, economists) and of civil society. Article 12 provided for Offices for the Protection of Emigrants (Uffici di Protezione) to be set up in various points of arrival, such as New York, designed to provide migrants with information and assistance in finding a job. It also established the role of 'Roaming Inspector', who would travel to foreign ports, including ports of transit, and report back to

[44] AMAE, Émigration Italienne, b. 337, Lettre de l'Ambassadeur Français en Italie au Ministre des Affaires Étrangerès, 26 mars, 1900
[45] AMAE, Émigration Italienne, b. 337, Lettre de l'Ambassadeur Français en Italie au Ministre des Affaires Étrangerès, 11 décembre, 1900

the Commissariat on the conditions in which emigration occurred. They were also charged with inspecting emigrant ships. Interestingly, the law extended the protection of Italian authorities to foreign migrants who were transiting in Italian ports (Article 6). Article 23 officially banned shipping companies from sending emigrants to embark in foreign ports, but did not ban embarkation outright. However, the trans-boarding of emigrants was banned in all ports "that were not further than the [Atlantic] Ocean."[46]

The law of 1901 provoked ire both at home and abroad. Emigration agents were among the most vocal opponents at home: the law effectively made them redundant, by giving ship owners and shipping companies a monopoly over the recruitment of migrants (Article 13). They stood accused of being 'parasites' and of interfering with the proper conduct of migration. In Naples this was interpreted as a coup by shipping companies and by Italy's northern entrepreneurial class.[47] Agents in Naples published pamphlets to protect their reputation and make their case: they disclosed their earnings, to show that they had not appropriated sums and that their takings were modest compared to passenger receipts earned by shipping companies. They even pledged to abide by a set of self-imposed rules in matters of payment and recruitment.[48]

French companies chafed under some of the obligations imposed by the new law. In order to comply with the law they were obliged to use trans-Atlantic steamers to pick up migrants in Italian ports. Technically, the Messageries Maritimes could no longer use its Mediterranean fleet to ferry migrants to Marseilles, adding a few hundred welcome passengers to its ships returning from the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the requirement for French vectors to carry Italian doctors caused no shortage of incidents, as the latter regularly clashed with their French counterparts and the doubling of positions plunged port authorities in points of transit and arrival into a state of confusion.[49] The law also obliged vectors to shoulder some of the responsibilities that had previously sat with emigration agents, such as that of hosting migrants or reimbursing them in the event of a delay.[50] By the turn of the century emigration oscillated around 500,000 a year and Italian authorities used it to their advantage by making ever more extravagant demands on foreign shipping companies. The proposal that French shipping companies serve only Italian wines

[46] *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* N. 23 e 24 concernenti disposizioni sull'emigrazione, Lunedi 4 Febbraio, n. 2, 1901.
[47] ASN, Fondo Questura, Archivio Generale II Serie, b. 3387. *Don Marzio*, Articolo datato Lunedi-Martedi 11-12 Dicembre 1899
[48] ASN, Fondo Questura, Archivio Generale II Serie, b. 3387, Opuscolo. Lega Marittima Italia Napoli, 1899
[49] AMAE, Émigration Italienne, b.338, Lettre au Ministre de l'Intérieur de l'Ambassadeur Français en Italie, 1 septembre, 1902
[50] *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, Leggi nn. 23 e 24 concernenti disposizioni sull'emigrazione, Lunedi 4 Febbraio, n. 2, 1901. Articolo 13

to Italian emigrants, for instance, sent the Society for the Defence of Commerce at Marseilles into a frenzy.[51]

The protestations of foreign shipping companies were a sign that the Italian government had succeeded in reigning them in or, in other words, of institutionalizing their practices, thus reducing the potential of the country's emigration flows of being co-opted 'clandestinely'. It marked a shift in 'the national interest' and in the social classes it sought to benefit (not only migrants, but also shipping companies and the coastal merchant and commercial classes, in particular in Naples, as opposed to landowners). Moral and legal culpability had shifted from the ungrateful emigrant, to malicious agents and foreign shipping companies. According to this new logic, the nation was being undermined not from within but from without, its integrity was compromised not by weakness at its centre, but at its borders. Emigration was not a necessary evil, but an advantage, the emigrant not a traitor but a courageous pioneer, an ambassador of Italian commerce or a 'merchant prince' as the esteemed economist and future Prime Minister of Italy, Luigi Einaudi wrote in 1900.[52]

It also marked a change in strategy, from restrictionism to migration policies that sought to police flows – and 'produce clandestinity' – by channelling emigration along specific routes. Shifting arrangements of logistical capital, the liquid geography of railway and maritime connections on which emigration relied also left their mark on migration laws, laws which, increasingly, targeted not only the exploiters of migrants (such as emigration agents) but also Italy's economic rivals. The interference of international shipping interests in Italy's legislative process took place in recognition of this fact. In the context of migration law, the national interest came to be identified ever more closely not only with the interests of the migrants themselves – as defined in paternalistic fashion according to contemporary notions of social compassion and sanitary law – but increasingly with the economic interests of Italy's maritime industry, which was linked to the country's infrastructural development and therefore to its power and reputation as a modern industrial state and, as its steam driven colonial expansion in East Africa proves, to its reputation as an imperial power.

Aside from the negotiations over 'transit', which sought to favour direct services from Italy to the detriment of foreign ports such as Marseilles and of foreign shipping companies that enjoyed an advantage there, the other most significant aspect of this policy was the Italian state's arrogation of the right to set the price of transport, or *noli,* as they were known in Italy. Article 14 of Italy's Emigration Law (1901) declared that all shipping companies

[51] AMAE, Émigration Italienne, b. 338, Lettre de l'Ambassadeur Français en Italie au Ministre des Affaires Étrangerès, 25 septembre, 1901
[52] Luigi Einaudi, Un Principe Mercante. 1900

would have to submit their proposals to the Commissariat, which would review them in council with the Ministry of the Navy and the Chambers of commerce of Italy's major port cities. Any company that defied this measure would have its license revoked.[53]

The protectionist intention was self-evident. It effectively ended a 'pool system' which had arisen in imitation of its northern counterpart, between British and German companies, initially in an effort to stop emigration agents from playing shipping companies against each other, and later, once competition between companies had intensified, to stabilize prices. Around the turn of the century two pool systems had existed: one for the subsidised lines running to South American destinations from Genoa, the other for the Naples-New York line. The NGI had been forced off this line in 1894 due to price-cutting by Anchor Line, Cyprien Fabre, Hamburg-America Line and Norddeutscher Lloyd. Prices fell from roughly 150 lira per place to around 70 lira in a few months. In 1899 it resumed its services, and shortly afterwards, the major navigation companies met in Paris to agree on common prices.[54]

It is hard to judge with precision what effect Italy's emigration laws had on the nature of competition among the various shipping companies that transported Italian emigrants. According to the statistics collected by Italy's Ministry of the Navy, it coincided with the decline of foreign companies' share of the overall traffic. Prior to the Law of 1901 German, French and British companies were transporting roughly 60 per cent of all Italian emigrants.[55] Twelve years later that proportion had fallen to roughly 30 per cent.[56] Results could vary considerably among companies from the same countries. For example, in 1912 Cyprien Fabre transported 39,059 emigrants, which was roughly in keeping with Italian companies such as Lloyd Italiano (44,082) and La Veloce (39,933) and with its German rivals Norddeutscher Lloyd (33,814) and Hamburg-Amerika Line (17,823). The Messageries Maritimes on the other hand, had completely retired from Italian ports.

[53] *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, Leggi nn. 23 e 24 concernenti disposizioni sull'emigrazione, Lunedi 4 Febbraio, n. 2, 1901. Articolo 14.

[54] ASN, Fondo Questura, Archivio Generale II Serie, Rapporto Questura di Napoli, Il Delegato Capo di P.S al Questore di Napoli, 18 Dicembre 1899

[55] ACS, Biblioteca. Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1900. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1901. Statistics for 1900: Italian 66,978; Germans 39,539; French 30,820; English 28,519

[56] ACS Biblioteca. Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina. Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana al 31 Dicembre 1911. Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma, 1912. Statistics for 1912: In 1911 NGI transported 73,549 passengers, primarily to the US (35,719) and La Plata (32,868), only 4,577 to Brasil. Followed by Lloyd Italiano (44,082, mostly to same destinations: 27,149 and 13,600 respectively), and Società Italiana (41,181) and La Veloce (39,933) and Cyprien Fabre (39,059). They were followed by: Lloyd Sabaudo (33,873), Norddeutscher Lloyd (33,814), Società Siculo-Americana (35,625). White Star carried only 20,830 passengers. SGTM only 15,778. Anchor Line only 15,660. Hamburg Amerika only 17,823, pp. 546-7

Broadly speaking, they had served to make up for the backwardness of Italy's mercantile fleet and of its maritime infrastructure, together with greater public investment in the maritime industry, and had allowed Italian shipping companies to overcome competition from more advanced and well-established foreign companies. Postal contracts remained a necessary source of revenue for shipping companies and other factors, such as epidemics or strikes, could spell the difference between success and demise. Traffic from the port of Marseilles, for instance, suffered a momentary decline at the turn of the century due to repeated strike action by longshoremen. While increases in emigrant receipts certainly helped Italian companies grow, government subsidies were equally, if not more, important, as seen with the rise of Rubattino and the creation of NGI.[57]

The case of the Messageries Maritimes is instructive in terms of how competition amongst shipping companies evolved in Italy in this period. By the 1880s, the Messageries Maritimes were busy picking up emigrants in Italian ports and trans-boarding them in Marseilles. They experienced a decline in their receipts starting in the middle of the decade, due to a cholera outbreak, which resulted in quarantines being imposed on ships coming from Naples, and the diplomatic hiatus between France and Italy, as their agent in Naples explained to management in 1886: "Following the denunciation of the Maritime Treaty all French services have stopped coming regularly to Naples. The CGT and Fraissinet have endeavoured to keep a weekly steamer service to Italy…". Interestingly, in 1886 the Messageries Maritimes disembarked roughly four hundred fourth class passengers in Naples, presumably return migrants.[58]

Traffic continued irregularly thereafter: in 1887 the company's agent in Naples rejoiced in the fact that the city had become "an important port for the embarkation of emigrants" and explained that companies both foreign and Italian made good earnings during high season, but that the Messageries Maritimes were struggling to compete with the direct service provided by the SGTMv, which could afford to charge less compared to them, seeing as they were obliged to transit passengers headed to Brazil in Bordeaux, which had become their most remunerative service. In 1888 the agent reported once more that as a result of a new treaty between France and Italy, which raised port duties for French ships, French shipping companies had stopped running regular services there.

Following the passing of Italy's two emigration laws (1888 and 1901) passenger services from the port of Naples grew in number and variety and also started following more

[57] Doria, *Debiti e navi. La Compagnia di Rubattino 1839-1881,* p. 196
[58] AFL, Messageries Maritimes*,* Rapport Agence Naples, Secrétariat, 1886

regular schedules. A typical report by the Messageries Maritimes' agent would list three French companies, excluding the Messageries Maritimes, as conducting regular services in the port, with two companies running a regular passenger service to South American ports (usually SGTMv and NGI, occasionally the French Compagnie de Chargeurs Réunis), four or more connecting Naples with New York (usually NGI, Lloyd Bremen, Hamburg-America, Anchor and Cunard Lines) and one or two transit services to Marseilles (Compagnie Adria, Cyprien Fabre).[59] The other development was the gradual ascendency of the NGI, which the agent attributed to a number of factors, including government contracts and preferential treatment in the port.[60]

The number of services to and from southern and eastern Mediterranean ports gradually increased in the first decade of the century. Following Marseilles' lead, Naples established itself as a port of transit for migrants from southern Italy (such as Sicily and Sardinia) but also, to a lesser degree, from Greece, Mount Lebanon and mainland Turkey. Due to its role as France's postman in the Mediterranean, the Messageries Maritimes had actually run a bi-monthly service from Marseilles to Istanbul, Athens (Piraeus) and Smyrne (Izmir) since 1871, with connecting services to the Black Sea and along the Syrian coast. In 1903 the Dominion Line had set up a service connecting Alexandria to Naples and New York; the following year Cunard transported passengers from Greece to London; in 1905 Norddeutscher Lloyd also expanded eastwards, connecting Naples with Alexandria. The Messageries Maritimes' agent reported that Norddeutscher Lloyd was planning on running a regular service between Batumi (Georgia), Constantinople, Smyrne, Piraeus and Naples.[61] A new wave of maritime migration had swelled up, and the shipping companies were poised to reap the benefits.

Parting the Seas: Emigration from the eastern Mediterranean

Emigration fever reached the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean starting in the late 1870s and early 1880s. By the time Italy had passed a law liberalising emigration (1901) the pioneer stage of Levantine migration had already been under way for several

[59] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Agence Naples, Secrétariat, 1894
[60] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Agence Naples, Secrétariat, 1904
[61] Marie-Francoise Bereneron-Couvenhes, *Les Messageries Maritimes. L'essor d'une grande compagnie de navigation française,* 1851-1894 (Paris, 2007)

decades.[62] Indeed, Italy's creeping protectionism provided shipping companies with an additional incentive to look for passenger receipts in the eastern Mediterranean and, for many, Naples and Genoa were but a return stop on the way back from Ottoman lands. Writing in December 1896, the French Consul in Beirut estimated that local emigration was of more recent origin and had only taken off a dozen years prior when "a few Lebanese who went to Brazil with a bundle of oriental objects came back with a small fortune."[63] Whereas previous generations of Lebanese had migrated primarily to Egypt and to the main centres of trade between Europe and the 'Near East' such as Livorno, Marseilles and Manchester, the second half of the nineteenth century had opened the doors to the American continent. They were joined not only by their neighbours in modern-day Syria and Palestine and, to a lesser extent, by the labouring classes of North Africa, but also by labourers from Greece, the Balkans and eastern Anatolia (including historic Armenia).

Emigration from the Levant and from Ottoman Turkey developed along a variety of routes. Trans-oceanic emigration from eastern Anatolia, which also started in the 1870s and reached new peaks in the 1890s and again in the first decade of the 20th century, relied on wagon transport to ports in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Prior to 1911, Samson was the main port of embarkation for Armenian migrants and refugees. Mediterranean ports like Beirut, Tripoli and Alexandretta became more popular with Armenian migrants thereafter.[64] Emigration from Mount Lebanon and from the Vilayet of Syria generally was tied to the rise of the port of Beirut. Starting in the 1840s, Beirut was linked with regular steamship lines to some of the main European ports active in the Atlantic emigrant trade, like Marseilles and Naples. Following its success it was expanded in the 1890s.[65] British, French, Austrian and Russian steamers all docked in regularly at Lebanese ports, usually on a bi-monthly basis.[66] Italian companies were late to the trade: Raffaele Rubattino had attempted to set up a Syrian service in 1877 but had failed to secure a government subsidy to support it.[67] Minor ports like Alexandretta, Jaffa and Tripoli only catered to a minority of migrants and benefitted disproportionately from 'irregular flows' from Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria. Istanbul remained an important crossroads for both emigrants leaving Ottoman lands and Muslim

[62] Alixa Naff, *Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience* (Illinois, 1985), p.12
[63] AMAE, Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale, Vol. 11, Rapport commercial 15 dècembre, 1896.
[64] Russian Armenians would usually travel to Batum. For a history of Armenian emigration to the United States see: Robert Mirak, *Torn Between Two Lands. Armenians in America 1890 to World War I* (Harvard University Press, 1893), pp. 36-48
[65] Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi 'Introduction', *The Lebanese in the World: A century of emigration* (London, 1992), pp. 4-5
[66] AMAE, Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale, Beyrouth, Vol. 11, Lettre de Consul-General à Beyrouth au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 8 janvier 1895
[67] Doria, *Debiti e navi. La Compagnia di Rubattino 1839-1881,* pp. 196-202

refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus. Despite its centrality to maritime communications in the area, it was only of secondary importance for the emigrant trade.

Much like southern Italy at mid century, many of these regions lacked a direct passage to the Atlantic. Typically, migrant journeys from Levantine ports required one or several layovers in other Mediterranean ports. Aside from Marseilles and Naples, Barcelona emerged as a significant point of transit for Levantine migrants. Transit passage via Egypt and Cyprus on the other hand became a convenient route for migrants hoping to elude controls. In the decade prior to World War One, Piraeus also grew in importance not only as a place of departure for migrants from Greece and the Balkans, but also for those leaving Ottoman lands. Less fortunate emigrants also found their way to Dakar where they would then wait for a passage across the Ocean, usually to Buenos Aires or to New York.

Throughout this period, Ottoman ports lacked a direct passage to the Atlantic: the technological inferiority of the Ottoman merchant navy and the unfavourable conditions of trade, characterised by high customs duties in European ports, where steamships inevitably had to stop in order to refuel, certainly played a role, as did the greater distances from the Atlantic.[68] The Egyptian Khedival line, which provided passenger services along the Syrian coast, to the Red Sea and eventually to Marseilles, only inaugurated an Atlantic service in the 1940s.[69] By the first decade of the new century it had become a serious contender, on a par with other European companies such as the Prince Line and the Messageries Maritimes, for transit services to Marseilles.[70] Other lines, such as the Ottoman Makhsousse company, were kept out of the market by European companies: again, this new phase of migration witnessed the spread of shipping consortiums that, like in Italy, were effective tools of continental and northern European control.[71]

[68] As will be discussed later, those wishing to emigrate from Greece, like the Balkans, generally enjoyed a greater variety of options: they could take either a boat or a train to a point of embarkation. Indeed, in Austria-Hungary like in Bulgaria it was not uncommon for migrants to take their passage from a German or a North Sea port ; roughly 80% of all emigration from Macedonia in this period was said to have taken place from Trieste or from a North Sea port.

[69] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Smyrne, Rapport Général de Service. Secrétariat. Exercice 1896. Agency reports from Ottoman ports like Izmir and Istanbul attest to the Khedival line's success in running passenger services along the Syrian coast. For example, writing in 1894 the Agent of the Messageries in Izmir reported that: « Les paquebots de la Cie Khédivié sont grands, bien aménagés et de marche rapide. Ils récupèrent la plupart des voyageurs de Smyrne pour Constantinople et pour Alexandrie. Leur départs hebdomadaires, réguliers tous les Samedis pour Constantinople, était précise surtout pour la post, car les correspondances arrivent promptement en Europe par cette voie. »

[70] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Beyrouth, Rapport Général de Service. Trafic. Exercice, 1913. Testament to this, the Khedival lines received a mention in the Messageries Maritimes agent's traffic report in 1913: « Beyrouth est régulièrement desservie par cinq compagnies postale étrangères: le Lloyd Autrichien, la compagnie Russe, la Marittima Italiana, la Società di Servizi Marittimi et la Khédival Mail. En outre, la Compagnie Deutsche Levant Linie et la Prince Line effectuent des voyages réguliers non postaux et diverses compagnie secondaires, la compagnie Roumaine. »

[71] AFL, Agence Alexandrette, Rapport Général de Service. Traffic. Exercice 1887. "Ainsi que j'en ai déjà informé la Direction, j'étais parvenu non sans peine, à établir une convention entre mes divers collègues, pour mettre fin à cette concurrence qui est onéreuse pour toutes les Compagnies, amis la Compagnie Russie n'a pas adhéré et soutient la concurrence afin de n pas laisser prendre pied sur la cote la Comie Ottomane 'Makhsousse' qui vient d'établir, depuis quelques mois, une ligne assez régulière sur la Syrie."

The Ottoman government's hostile attitude towards emigration was also a significant barrier to the development of a native trade. Unlike in Italy it was motivated not by the economic self-interest of landowners as much as by fears that the state' s tax base and military reserves would be depleted if it were allowed. The need to maintain an agricultural force capable of feeding the empire also presented a compelling reason to curtail emigration as did the desire to protect from the moral and financial consequences of repatriations and, particularly under Abdu Hamid II, to hinder the activities of Ottoman opposition abroad. [72] Thus, until the turn of the century the Porte banned and criminalised attempts by its subjects to expatriate, while maintaining an open door to immigration, particularly of Muslim refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus. In doing so it had to yield to the demands for autonomy by local authorities, such as the Governorate of Mount Lebanon, which continued to issue travel passes to migrants throughout this period (albeit selectively and inconsistently).

Issues of 'imperial interest', such as counter insurgency measures like the surveillance of Armenian subjects, diverting Jewish subjects away from Palestine or increasing trade by lubricating the mobility of the merchant classes, softened the otherwise rigid classification of emigrants as 'escapees' or 'traitors', adding significant elements of selectivity to Ottoman migration policies. Some labour migration was allowed, but not to the Americas: starting in 1889 the migration of labourers to Greece, Bulgaria and Romania received official permission. Repeated failure to stem migration prompted the Ottoman government to try to regulate it through citizenship laws. Starting in 1893, emigration was de-criminalised, but loss of citizenship was administered as punishment for clandestine departures. When this failed to stem the tide, new bans were temporarily enforced. It wasn't until the Union and Progress Party came to power in 1908 that emigration was fully 'liberalised' and even bail bonds for emigrants, which had been introduced in order to cover the potential costs of repatriation and discourage the emigration of the poor, were removed. [73]

The ability of the Ottoman government to restrict emigration was limited by the waning of its sovereignty at its territorial borders. Migrants from Greater Syria and Anatolia regularly travelled to Cyprus or Egypt where controls under British authority were lax and it was easier to take passage to a foreign port without a passport. Visa-free travel to ports in

[72] Akarli, 'Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910', p. 124

[73] For a discussion of Ottoman immigration policies see : Muhammet Kazim Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', DPhil Thesis in Global and Imperial History, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom ; or Kemal H. Karpat, 'The *hijra* from Russia and the Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman state' in in Dale F. Eickleman and James Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Travellers. Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination* (New York, 1990), pp. 131-152

France, Greece or the United Kingdom, had been allowed up to the second half of the nineteenth century when new restrictions on emigration were introduced. To travel to Egypt or Cyprus, Ottoman subjects were obliged to apply for a certificate of travel (*tezkere*). It became common for Syrians to exploit their contacts in Egypt and to apply to Ottoman authorities for a travel permit to 'conduct business' there.[74] To stop the illegal transit flow to Cyprus and Egypt the Ottoman central government issued a decree on the 8th of October 1894 raising the bail bond to approximately fifty gold ottoman lira.[75] Alternatively, emigrants used internal travel permits to take their passage from ports of lesser surveillance along the Syrian coast, like Tripoli or Jaffa. Authorities in Mount Lebanon and Beirut attempted to control and restrict these flows by regulating the issue of travel documents, rather than of passports. [76]

Their efforts were undermined by the collusion of local and foreign emigration agents with European shipping companies. Agents based in Beirut and Tripoli would regularly smuggle migrants without passports to ships docked outside of the two ports. The Ottoman Consul in Barcelona, Yusuf Bey, succeeded in exposing a smuggling ring based in Tripoli with links to Bordeaux, Le Havre and Marseilles that resulted in the arrest of several corrupt Ottoman officials and the confiscation of boats used to ferry emigrants clandestinely. When Ottoman authorities tried to pursue shipping companies in European courts the charges did not lead to sentencing.[77] Where Ottoman restrictionist policies were not directly undermined by foreign expansionism, they were undermined indirectly by the action of foreign shipping companies. As Ottoman authorities attempted to restrict emigration, clandestine flows were a measure of its inability to resist foreign aggression and police its coasts effectively. The administration's limitations played into the hands of technologically superior foreign shipping companies that were able to elude controls and had sufficient political capital to escape the consequences.

The emigrant trade thus developed irregularly and clandestinely along Ottoman coasts. It could vary very suddenly in response to political events. For example, the British occupation of Egypt in 1881 set off a stream of refugees towards Marseilles and Istanbul, much to the joy of shipping companies like the Messageries Maritimes.[78] The return of longer quarantines in Italian ports following the cholera epidemic that devastated Naples

[74] Alixa Naff, *Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience* (Illinois, 1985), p. 80
[75] Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', p. 120
[76] Engin Deniz Akarli, 'Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910' in Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi (Eds.), *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration* (London: Tauris & Co, 1992), pp. 109-138
[77] Ibid.
[78] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Beyrouth, Rapport générale de service. Secrétariat. 1881.

around 1884 had the effect of directing transit traffic towards Marseilles and therefore of favouring shipping companies that were based there.[79] In 1891, traffic from Alexandretta was similarly hindered by the re-introduction of quarantine in the port.[80] Moreover, while the measures adopted by the Governor of Mount Lebanon failed to stop the outpouring of migrants, they could cause considerable annoyance to shipping companies.

In 1888 the Messageries Maritimes' agent in Beirut painted a slightly different picture regarding the effectiveness of the Ottoman administrative machine: he complained that the new restrictions on the emigration of Christian subjects had been rigorously enforced, resulting in a considerable decline in receipts.[81] In 1891, he noted again how the profits for 1890 had been lower on account of fresh restrictions: in 1889 half of the company's fourth class passengers on the Mediterranean service (in all likelihood migrants) were headed to Marseilles, which accounted for 43,000 francs of the total gap of 54,492 francs in earnings with the previous year.[82] Considering passenger receipts from Beirut usually ranged between 45,000 – 55,000 Frs, this was a considerable difference.

Nonetheless, the company's receipts grew steadily throughout the first decade or so of restrictions as the Messageries Maritimes participated in both the licit and illicit trade. On the 26th of August 1896, the captain of the steamer *Orénoque*, M. Duchateau, noted that he had been unable to proceed with the order to embark roughly 200 emigrants waiting in Beirut after having been warned by the company' s agent that the absence of one of the sons of the port's sanitary personnel made it undesirable.[83] The captain reports for *Portugal,* another steamer used for the transport of migrants, were filled with suspicious references to emigrants and fourth class passengers embarked at Tripoli in Syria, even though it was not an official stop in the company's itineraries.[84] The very same year (1896) the captain of the *Portugal* recounted that during the embarkation of migrants a boat carrying six men had been chased and fired at by the police. As a policeman attempted to grab migrants as they were boarding the ship, the captain ordered a crew member to force him to let go. According

[79] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Naples, Rapport générale de service. Secrétariat. 1886.
[80] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Alexandrette, Rapport générale de service. Secrétariat. 1892.
[81] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Beyrouth, Rapport générale de service. Secrétariat. 1888. « La compagnie qui avait en quelque sort profité, pendent le dernier exercice, de la situation précaire que les exactions des autorités font aux population chrétiennes du Liban, eu prenant une part importante au mouvement d'émigration qui s'était dessiné parmi-elles, a été privée en partie de cet élément de recette, durant l'exercice qui nous occupe, grâce à la rigueur avec laquelle le Gouvernement du Vilayet a entravé cette émigration. Quant à la douane elle persiste plus que jamais dans son système habituel de vexation qui règle désormais les rapports avec les compagnies de navigation et le commerce. »
[82] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Beyrouth, Rapport générale de service. Secrétariat. 1889.
[83] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général du Voyage. Ligne de Syrie n. 2. Marseille. Orénoque, M. le lieutenant de Vaisseau G. Duchateau, le 26 août 1896
[84] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général du Voyage. Ligne d'Egypte, le 15 mai 1912.

to the ship's log on that day the *Portugal* had carried 345 fourth class passengers from Beirut.[85]

The role played by shipping companies in the illicit emigrant trade was an open secret. When Rechid Bey was appointed Governor of Mount Lebanon in 1896, the company's agent in Beirut reported back to Marseilles: "…Rechid Bey believes that he may stem the movement of emigrants by forbidding all Lebanese from departing, whether they are in possession of a travel pass [*teskéré*] or not. Now, seeing as he does not dispose of sufficient means to keep the entire coastline, from Tripoli to Beirut, under surveillance, his ban has been largely ineffective and emigrants embark clandestinely in other points along the coastline, and they will continue to do so as long as this ban remains in place. As a result, roughly 1,500 migrants have left towards the end of this business cycle on board one of the several ships that operate from Beirut, whose captains, after having left the port, don't hesitate in heading towards certain pre-determined locations in order to embark emigrants under the cover of darkness."

While the ship records showed that the Messageries Maritimes were regularly embarking emigrants from Syrian ports at this time (at rates roughly in keeping with other years), and despite the incriminating accounts by the company's ship captains, the agent in Beirut feigned ignorance of it all and downplayed the Messageries Maritimes' involvement in the illicit trade.[86] "[…] The Vali's new measure," he continued, "thus hasn't only failed to

[85] AFL Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général du Voyage, Portugal, 10 septembre 1904, voyage no. 19. 1904.

[86] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence Beyrouth, Rapport Générale de service, Traffic, 1881; Rapport Générale de service, Sécretariat, 1883; Rapport Générale de service,Traffic, 1887; Rapport Générale de service, Traffic, 1891; Rapport Générale de service., Traffic, 1910; Rapport Générale de service, Secrétariat, 1913. The agency reports from Beirut show that the Messageries Maritimes profited consistently from a large volume of IIIrd and IVth class traffic from Beirut starting roughly around 1885. Since the agency had been opened in 1880 most of its profits from passenger traffic had resulted from third class and steerage passengers fleeing British military advances and the cholera epidemic in Egypt. The company's chief agent argued as much when he noted in 1881 that 725 passengers had arrived in Beirut from Alexandria and 436 from Port Said. In 1887 the same agent stated that the increase in receipts was primarily due to the presence on the Mediterranean service of large steamers used for the transport of migrants to South America and therefore to Lebanese emigration. Whereas the company's steamers had transported only 104 IVth class passengers to Marseilles in 1886 the number had risen to 921 the following year. In 1891 he declared that emigrant receipts were the agency's main source of revenue. By 1910 passenger receipts were worth over 1 million francs (1, 108, 905) – in 1891, a very good year, they amounted to 165,918 francs - compared with 88,349 francs from the transport of merchandise and 82,501 francs worth of postal packages. Writing in 1913 the agent confirmed that receipts from emigrants still played, "a very important role in the results obtained in Beirut." In 1908 the company's steamers had carried 5,191 emigrants; in 1909: 6,142; in the final years leading up to the beginning of World War I more than ten thousand a year left the coast of Syria aboard the Messageries Maritimes, with a peak of 11,661 in 1913. For more examples compare the following captain reports: AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général du Voyage. Ligne de Syrie Marseille, le 26 aout 1896. Orénoque, M. le lieutenant de Vaisseau G. Duchateau. « Arrivé à Beyrouth le 14 à 1h de l'après midi, je n'ai pu débarquer les passagers quarantenaires que le 17 à 9h du matin. J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous signaler les inconvénients inhérents à cette façon de faire. Kaiffa avait signalé qu'il y avait, en ce pont, environs 3000 frs de fret à prendre; mais M. L'agent des Messageries Maritimes à Beyrouth m'a fait savoir, qui étant donnée l'absence en cette fils de personnel sanitaire, je ne pouvais m'y rendre. Bien qu'une circulaire de la Direction nous donnait l'autorisation de prendre à bord 200 émigrants Syriens à Beyrouth, nous n'en avons pris aucun pour des raisons que j'ignore." Rapport Général du Voyage no. 43. Ligne de Syrie. 28 octobre 1903. Commandé par M. Guigues. Les passagers ont été très nombreux au départ de Marseille…Au départ de Beyrouth les passagers de classes ont été très nombreux. Malheureusement les événements politiques qui ont déterminé ces départs ont fait décroitre l'émigration régulière." And yet, the captain embarked 185 IV class passagers at Beirut, 218 in I-IIIrd class. This compares rather favourably with statistics from

produce the intended effect but it has also resulted in denying this company – which doesn't engage in illicit operations – of a part of the benefits that these passengers would otherwise have given it, the majority of whom would not only have embarked at Beirut but would probably have done so aboard your ships; moreover, they also provided runners with a chance to extort even more money from these poor passengers, under the pretence that clandestine embarkations are more difficult and therefore more costly."[87] The agent was careful to deflect blame on other shipping companies.

In 1898 he reported that clandestine embarkations had continued to happen, but this time he named names. "Due to the difficulties experienced by emigrants taking ship in Beirut, many of them have continued this year to travel to Lamaca where they have embarked on sailing vessels unbeknown to local authorities, and in Tripoli and Saida where they have travelled on land to areas of low surveillance in order to reach steamships owned by the Prince, Khedival and Fabre lines, all of which will regularly U-turn after having left port ["rebrousser chemin"] in order to pick up these passengers at night fall."[88] Occasionally Ottoman authorities were also blamed for their corruption and their alleged complicity in the clandestine trade. The agent also held the same authorities morally responsible for the mass exodus of emigrants, drawing a straight connection between the "indifference" and "cupidity" of Ottoman officials and Lebanese emigration.[89] In a tribute of vice to virtue, such incidents were never mentioned in annual stakeholder meetings. No formal acknowledgment by the company's senior management of the extent to which the Messageries Maritimes owed its profits to the illegal emigrant trade exists.

The persistence and volume of clandestine departures eventually forced the Porte to acknowledge that the current regime was unsustainable and to regulate emigration. (This decision was partly motivated by the assurance that the Porte's political rivals, including the Young Ottomans in exile in Europe, would not benefit from the new laws). [90] In December 1899 it authorised the government of Mount Lebanon to issue travel permits to whomever it saw fit. This did not end attempts to stop illicit departures, however. The emigration of Muslim subjects in Syria who – unlike the residents of Mount Lebanon – were not exempt

1896. It was also in keeping with roughly how many passengers the ships were carrying in this period. Eg. AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général du Voyage N. 27 B et 26 A. Marseille, 21 Juin 1903 : 261 passengers were embarked at Beirut, 127 disembarked, 393 disembarked at Marseilles ; or AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général du Voyage no. 21. Ligne de Syrie. Commandé par M. Guionnet. 19 mai 1903. « Le nombre des émigrants pris à Beyrouth n'a été que de 196: cela tient à ce que le cholera vit toujours à Damas et que les gens de l'intérieur éprouvent des difficultés pour traverser les cordons sanitaires. »

[87] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Beyrouth, Rapport Général de Service. Exercice 1897. Secrétariat.

[88] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Beyrouth, Rapport Général de Service. Exercice 1898. Secrétariat.

[89] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Beyrouth. Rapport Général de Service. Exercice 1887. Secrétariat.

[90] Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', pp. 168-169

from military duties, regularly provoked new attempts to stop the flow of migrants from the Syrian hinterland towards Beirut. Clandestine embarkations from ports along the Syrian coast reportedly still continued to take place. Regardless of the company's accusations, corruption among Ottoman officials was in fact held partly responsible for the failure of Ottoman restrictions. Moreover, as the documents of the Messageries Maritimes and the French Consul in Beirut attest, the crackdown on corruption ended up weakening Ottoman authorities further by pitting them against each other. These documents show that the country's gradual transition to a 'liberal emigration regime' was characterised not only by changes to citizenship laws and the lifting of the emigration ban, but also by semi-official agreements among local authorities, brokers and shipping companies that served in lieu of the 'transit laws' passed by the Italian government.

Indeed, this period was characterised by the activism of the new Governor of Mount Lebanon, Muzaffer Pasha. Shortly after becoming Governor in 1902, Muzaffer Pasha waged war on the runners and agents in the port of Beirut who, along with the local emigration committee composed of members of Beirut's administrative council, stood accused of defrauding migrants by charging bogus registration and transportation fees, and embezzling public funds.[91] The French Consul had described in detail how this system worked in a letter to the Quai D'Orsay in February 1903: "Out of the 8,000 Syrians who leave their country every year, roughly, 6,500 embark in Beirut where the epicentre of the emigrant trade is found. This flourishing but disreputable industry is the monopoly of 4 or 5 individuals. They enjoy the patronage of the local administration and European shipping companies and emigration agencies are obliged to respect their demands ["passer par leurs exigences"].

Not one ticket is sold without their intermediation and without them drawing commission. If a shipping company were to try to free themselves of their tutelage, it would be immediately boycotted to the benefit of other shipping companies […]. Recruiters ["racoleurs"] send migrants to runners [who were known as 'samsars' locally] in Beirut who in turn provide them with two tickets, one for Marseilles, the other for the connecting service to their destination of choice. They provide them with room and board in Beirut, with embarkation tickets and arrange for them to be transported aboard, and they protect them from harassment by police and boatmen. All of this comes at a cost naturally. We can calculate that each emigrant pays, in addition to the ticket, on average 30 to 40 francs. Since runners obtain significant reductions on ticket prices from shipping companies and emigration agencies, overall they make a good profit. The total can be estimated at 450,000

[91] Akarli, 'Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910', pp. 119-124

francs, not less. However, these earnings don't end up only in their pockets…half at least ends up in the pockets of the functionaries of the Vilayet."[92]

Despite the Consul's indignation at the depredations endured by migrants and by French shipping companies at the hands of native agents, runners and local authorities in Beirut (who they themselves patronised), he was primarily unnerved by Muzaffer Pasha's attempt to divert traffic away from the port city and dismantle the existing network of clandestine emigration. After repeated threats by Muzaffer Pasha to do just that, including a vow to divert emigrant traffic to the port of Jounieh, an inspection committee was sent to Beirut and, on the back of its findings, the city's Governor was dismissed. A naval squadron was dispatched to assist the new Governor, Halil Pasha, with policing the coastline.[93] According to the Consul, this had also resulted in the introduction of a series of measures designed to place shipping companies and emigration agencies under local scrutiny. In practice, many of the existing arrangements were kept in place: shipping companies were required to sell tickets directly in Lebanon through agent intermediaries in Beirut. Corruption was turned into tax revenue by legitimizing recruitment by shipping companies. Vectors were required to pay the government of Lebanon a tax of 5 francs for every emigrant they transported and to allow for the inspection of vessels by Lebanese officials. Moreover, the Governor's new measures also sought to regulate the transit of migrants in foreign ports. It did so by providing for the sale of connecting tickets directly in Lebanon and by regulating prices for each leg of the journey. Like in Italy, Ottoman authorities demanded the right to control ticket prices. 'Channelling' did not only involve bureaucratic regulation, however, but also the attempt to physically funnel migrant flows to certain ports and along specific routes, both in Greater Syria, across the Mediterranean and beyond.

The French Consul had regarded Muzaffer as idealistic but gullible: he portrayed him as a puppet of the British Prince Line to wrestle control away from French shipping companies (French shipping interests in the region were identified most strongly with the Messageries Maritimes).[94] The British company ran a connecting service to New York via Naples and had already been favoured by the stricter quarantines imposed in Marseilles in response to the threat of a plague epidemic. Indeed, on the French Consul's advice, sanitary authorities in Marseilles had relaxed controls in order to attract more traffic, but their gains were being threatened as a result of the Governor's new measures. Given his commitment

[92] AMAE, Affaires Consulaires (-1908) 426QO/Emigration Libanaise et syrienne 340, Consulat Général de France en Syrie. Rapport sur l'émigration libanaise, 26 février 1903.
[93] Akarli, 'Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910' pp. 125-129
[94] AMAE, Affaires Consulaires (-1908) 426QO/Emigration Libanaise et syrienne 340, Consulat Général de France en Syrie, Lettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangers, 7 Avril 1902.

to eradicating the illicit trade, it is most likely that Muzaffer Pasha was attempting to leverage foreign shipping companies in order to achieve his original aim of controlling emigration from Mount Lebanon and protecting Lebanese migrants, or indeed of spurring on the Ottoman government to that effect.[95]

The Porte's default position until that point had been to regulate migration by decentralising its control and thus refrain from intervening by imposing new bans on emigration or by legislating directly against clandestinity (the new citizenship code, which prescribed the loss of citizenship for those who had emigrated illegally, was an exception).[96] The Governors of Mount Lebanon and Beirut had been allowed the freedom to police emigration bureaucratically. Unlike in Italy they had not tried to do so by favouring native shipping interests, but their policies had been informed by an understanding of the nature of transit across the Mediterranean. This had allowed Muzaffer Pasha to play shipping companies against runners and emigration agents, thus closing down the emigration racket in Beirut. Instead, many of the practices that he had attempted to eradicate were simply institutionalised under the new Governor. France's influence on the way migration was controlled had been mostly indirect, via its support of shipping and railway companies. The favourable conditions for French investment and business that resulted from its power in the region, and which could ultimately be traced back to the capitulations, were a fundamental premise for its influence.

In a note dated 1903 and addressed to the Governor of Mount Lebanon the Messageries Maritimes accepted the new conditions, despite the Consul's fears that it would not only subject them to an intolerable interference on the part of the Ottoman authorities ("...the Governor is effectively demanding to control the accounts of foreign shipping companies…"), but also that it would have a ripple effect across Ottoman waters, with other provinces claiming similar rights. As he reminded the Quai D'Orsay, "We must not forget that emigration does not only take place in Lebanon, but in the whole of Syria, including Provinces where we don't enjoy similar privileges."[97] However, in a letter to the Governor of Mount Lebanon the Messageries Maritimes agreed to several of the requirements: they stated the company's prices for emigrant services to Marseilles, New York, Brazil and Canada, effectively agreeing to keep them fixed; they accepted the payment of 5 francs to the government of Mount Lebanon for each emigrant they transported; they also referred to

[95] Akarli has argued as much: Akarli, 'Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910', pp. 110-111
[96] Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', pp. 152-162
[97] AMAE, Affaires Consulaires (-1908) 426QO/Emigration Libanaise et syrienne 340, Consulat Général de France en Syrie, Lettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangers, 7 Avril 1902.

new measures requiring tickets to be delivered directly to Mount Lebanon: "We hope that His Excellency will assign our agents a place in the Kazas [sub-districts] so that they may deliver tickets under the surveillance of the Government." Three further pledges were made: a contract was drawn up, promising to teach ship captains how to check emigrant passports; the company also pledged to notify the Governor upon the arrival of emigrants at their destination and to only use split tickets (with various parts that could be ripped off and used as receipts).[98]

The Messageries Maritimes' 'capitulation' to the Governor's demands offer a different picture of Ottoman success in regulating the emigrant trade from Greater Syria. Foreign shipping companies may have been immune from prosecution for breaking Ottoman laws, but they were not completely above the law or indeed above having to negotiate with Ottoman authorities. Clearly, there were several advantages to be gained from doing so, not least that of cutting out 'middle-men', like the runners and agents in Beirut, who had held the strings when emigration had been illegal. Like in Italy, the balance of power was tipped away from emigration agencies, or rather the local emigration racket, and in favour of shipping companies, even though, unlike in Italy, they were overwhelmingly foreign.[99] In fact, despite the Consul's fears, the new measures had the effect of stabilizing shipping companies' profits from the emigrant trade, which grew in proportion with the number of Lebanese and Syrians who left Ottoman shores.

As the Messageries Maritimes' agent in Beirut remarked, the effect was noticeable particularly during the final decade before the outbreak of the Great War, which largely

[98] AMAE, Affaires Consulaires (-1908) 426QO/Emigration Libanaise et syrienne 340, Consulat Général de France en Syrie, Lettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangers, 7 Avril 1902. « Voici les propositions: I. Installation de Sept agences aux sept principaux villages du Liban; II. Délivrance de billets directs en service combiné avec d'autres Compagnies pour tous les points de destination définitive des émigrants; III. Fixation d'un prix de passage pour chaque destination; IV. Remise du nombre des billets de passage, ainsi que des manifestes aux bureaux Libanais pour permettre au Gouvernement de contrôler le nombre des places délivrées V. Reconnaissance au délégué du Liban du droit de contrôler le nombre des places délivrées'; V. Reconnaissance au délégué du Liban du droit de contrôler l'embarquement des libanais à bord des paquebots de la Compagnie; VI. Engagement de faire venir des divers points de destination un manifeste nominatif des Libanais débarqués visés par le Consul de Turquier; VII. Engagement de payer au Gouvernement du Liban 5 francs sur chaque passage délivré à des Libanais."

[99] Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Emigration to America 1860-1914' in *Int. J. Middle East Sutd. 17 (1985),* pp. 175-209), p. 187: As ever barriers between 'native' and 'foreign' were blurred and contradictory. As emigration agencies thrived, they provided new kinds of employment to foreign labourers, some of whom presumably had been displaced as a result of the social and economic changes that in part 'were to blame' for emigration. In his study of Ottoman emigration Kamel Karpat emphasizes the importance of a passage from an agricultural to a proto-industrial economy in bringing about mass emigration from various parts of the Ottoman empire. He draws attention to the preponderance of 'traditional professions' – such as carpenters – among Ottoman emigrants and the success enjoyed by those in new professions, such as in transporation. ; AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général de Service. Agence de Constantinople. Personnel. Exercice 1881 : The Messageries Maritimes' agency in Costantinople, for which there are complete personnel records, employed both Europeans and Ottoman subjects. Most of its runners, who worked at the docks or were assigned to the customs house, spoke both Greek and Turkish in addition to French, Italian and occasionally English. Armenian was also listed as a common language. The names of the employees reflect the diversity of personnel at the Agency of Constantinople in 1881: Pisani Faustin, Réchiche Jean, Boukowksy Antoine, Imbert Simon, Déodali Emile, Gradban Pierre, Ruésévich Jean.

coincided with the lifting of all restrictions on emigration by the UPP. From 1908 to 1914 the company earned an average of c. 560,000 frs a year from transporting migrants. In years like 1910-1913, passenger receipts (including 1st and 2nd classes) ranged between 1.3 and 1.68 million frs and were roughly equivalent to receipts from carrying cargo (1.58 mil to 1.9 mil frs in 1910 and 1913). In 1913 emigrant receipts alone stood at almost 874,000 Frs. The same year the agent in Beirut called emigration "the single most important branch of the company's Mediterranean traffic". He also added that even though police in Beirut occasionally attempted to throw a spanner in the works, they had swiftly overcome any difficulties thanks to the intercession of the French Consul and the "official arrangements between the police and our intermediaries."[100] Unsurprisingly, given the continued growth of the trade, new competitors had appeared on the scene, including the first Greek company named Cozzicas, which ran a line between Syria, Egypt and Marseilles.[101] Emigrants had also grown more discerning, thanks in part to the greater variety of services: the Messageries Maritimes were able to stay ahead of competition, argued the agent, because they were the only company offering regular services to Marseilles.[102]

At the Frontier of Vector Expansionism: Emigration from the Black Sea and the Aegean

In Greater Syria the Messageries Maritimes had been able to reach a mutually convenient arrangement with the Governor of Mount Lebanon with regard to how emigration should be managed. Weaknesses on both sides, Ottoman difficulties in policing the coastline and dismantling networks of corruption in Beirut and French vulnerability to competition from other shipping nations, such as Great Britain, combined with the high volume and persistence of emigration, had made a compromise desirable for both parties. This was rather

[100] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Beyrouth. Rapport Général de Service. Exercice 1913. Secrétariat. « Parfois les services de la police ont essayé de nous occasionner des difficultés pour l'embarquement de nos passagers de pont, mais ces difficultés ont été assez vite aplanies sur l'intervention officielle du Consulat Général de France ou les arrangements officieux entre la police et nos courtier d'émigrants. »
[101] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Beyrouth. Rapport Général de Service. Exercice 1909. Secrétariat. « La premier [Société Cozzicas, sous pavillon Grec] qui avait établi une ligne de quinzaine entre la Syrie, l'Egypte et Marseille, dans le but surtout de profiter de l'émigration de nos régions[...] »
[102] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Beyrouth. Rapport Général de Service. Exercice 1913. Secrétariat. « La compagnie des Messageries est la seule qui ait, au départ de Beyrouth, un service régulier sur la France. » ; « Beyrouth est régulièrement desservie par cinq compagnies postales étrangères: le Lloyd Autrichien, la Compagnie Russe, la Marittima Italiana, la Sociètà di Servizi Maritimes et la Khédival Mail. En outre, la compagnie Deutsche Levant Linie et la Prince Line effectuent des voyages réguliers […] »

different to what took place at the Ottoman state's borders on the Black Sea, where emigration had not reached comparable proportions and traders in the emigration business, the familiar cast of shipping agents, emigration brokers, hotel-owners and runners, had few and shallow roots. Moreover, on account of poor maritime connections, maritime emigration was often eschewed in favour of caravan travel to transit ports on the Ottoman Empire's Mediterranean coast, from Istanbul to Beirut.

Black Sea maritime and land routes, like that between Trebizond and Erzurum, had fallen into disrepair in the nineteenth century and were but a shadow of their former selves. As the Messageries Maritimes' agent in Trebizond explained in 1880, new infrastructural projects undertaken by the Ottoman state were commonly abandoned before completion and were regularly subject to pillaging. Harsh winters made them impracticable during half of the year and Kurdish raids added a further element of risk. The port's success was threatened by Russian investment in the port-city of Pot, in modern-day Georgia, and the development of a railway line connecting it to Tbilisi. Despite all these hurdles, the Messageries Maritimes ran a regular Black Sea service that stopped at Trebizond and Batumi, primarily to cater to the trade in tobacco and nuts, and to the growing passenger traffic. (Its first postal convention with the French government to deliver post in the Black Sea was signed in 1857). They were joined by other European companies, chief among which were the Compagnie Paquet from Marseilles and the Austrian and German Lloyds.[103]

When maritime emigration started picking up in the 1880s, the only form of regulation affecting the company's passenger service from Trebizond was a private arrangement the Messageries Maritimes' chief agent in Constantinople had come to with the chief agents of other shipping companies.[104] In keeping with Ottoman laws, all emigration was officially banned and Christian subjects were kept under careful surveillance due to fears that they might join dissident groups abroad.[105] Nonetheless, shipping companies reigned supreme and the Messageries Maritimes took part in the trade, with some profit. In 1880, passenger receipts from passengers only amounted to c. 29,000 francs (compared to passenger receipts from Beirut that averaged around 50,000 francs, as discussed previously) and were roughly a third of those from the transport of merchandise.[106] In 1887, the agent reported that emigration had grown to roughly 15,000 people, in part, he argued, because of the drop in ticket prices. Unlike in Beirut, where the Messageries enjoyed the lion's share of the trade,

[103] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Trébizonde. Rapport Général de Service, 1881. Traffic.
[104] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Trébizonde. Rapport Général de Service, 1885. Traffic.
[105] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Trébizonde. Rapport Général de Service. Trébizonde, 1881. Secrétariat.
[106] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Trébizonde. Rapport Général de Service, 1880. Secrétariat.

on the Black Sea coast they were mostly on the back foot (they had only transported 891 migrants out of a total of 15,000 in 1887), allegedly due to their awkward schedule.[107] According to the company's agent, emigration restrictions were kept in place following the passing of the Citizenship Code of 1893 and the de-criminalisation of emigration. In the absence of local authorities demanding change, the bans remained in place and the emigrant trade continued to function illicitly in moderate, if significant, proportions.[108]

Only with the rise to power of the UPP in 1908 was emigration finally allowed. The lifting of the ban may have removed any stigma or fears surrounding clandestine emigration, for yearly rates rose rapidly. The Messageries Maritimes' agent singled out Christian labourers for reaping the benefits of the change in policy. It may also have reduced incentives for emigrants to transit via Syrian ports. While this new form of emigration constituted a "remarkable increase in freight" it did come at a price. Unlike in Syria, where the labour supply was if not endless then sufficient, by providing passage to the markets of the New World, the agent argued, European shipping companies were sowing the seeds of their own demise; by draining the labour supply they were also undercutting the region's ability to export agricultural products, the transport of which was the company's main form of revenue in the Black Sea.[109]

The exigencies of war provided an answer that was, however, far from being a solution. The new ruling party's commitment to honouring the rights and needs of its subjects, including that of emigration, as well as to greater intercourse, commercial and intellectual, with western powers, were abandoned in 1914. Its surprise attack against Russia's Black Sea coast and its subsequent entry into war made conscription an urgent requirement. Emigration was once again banned, surveillance and censorship of immigrant publications intensified, and the capitulations were lifted, which stopped return migration in its tracks. Like in Italy the 'modernisation' of emigration laws in the Ottoman Empire was inspired by the Atlantic emigrant trade and involved engaging with the new vocabulary of migration controls, whether in the form of bureaucratic checks on mobility (passports, travel passes etc.) or of agreements with shipping companies. It was not, however, the doing of the liberal forces that came to power in 1908, but primarily of the reluctant pragmatism of Abdul Hamid II. The moment of revolutionary idealism was but a brief parenthesis.

[107] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Trébizonde. Rapport Général de Service, 1880. Traffic.
[108] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Trébizonde , Rapport Général de Service, 1906. The agent reported that the majority of the company's trade consisted of 4th class passenger traffic.
[109] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence de Trébizonde. Rapport Général de Service, 1906. Secrétariat.

On the other side of the Aegean, the Greek state had shown greater interest in following a liberal line in migration policy. Conservative governments had not attempted to restrict mass emigration, having realised its potential as a safety valve for alleviating poverty among Greece's rural communities. Mass emigration had started in earnest in the 1890s, primarily to the United States but also to Panama, where the construction of the canal had attracted labourers from all over Europe, and the Caribbean. Unlike Britain and continental European powers the Greek government did not exercise a strict surveillance over emigration and relied on the records of shipping companies and US immigration statistics to estimate the rate at which migrants left its shores. Writing in 1902, the head of the French Legation in Greece estimated that roughly 25,000-30,000 Greeks had embarked on Atlantic journeys to the main port-cities of the eastern and south-eastern seaboard, where many subsequently settled: New York, Boston, Washington D.C. and New Orleans. The majority hailed from the Peloponnese and a minority only came from central Greece and Macedonia. For the most part the island communities in the Ionian and Cyclades and in eastern Greece remained locked into patterns of seasonal migration to Ottoman Turkey, Levant and Egypt that went back generations, if not centuries.[110]

Unlike the seaways between Black Sea ports and Mediterranean terminals, maritime connections linking Greek and continental ports had not been lost to time. The emigrant trade did not, however, have a strong maritime presence in the Aegean and commercial institutions that catered to the business of moving migrants had shallow roots on Greek territory and were mostly foreign. Not unlike Greater Syria and southern Italy prior to the 1880s, Greece lacked a flagship service for migrants and direct connections to Atlantic terminals. Maritime transit in French ports, from Marseilles to Le Havre, and in Trieste, was considered a more convenient route. Patras in western Greece, rather than Piraeus in Athens, emerged as the main embarkation port for Greek migrants and the Austro-American line the service of choice.[111] Railway transit to German ports via Austrian territory was the main alternative facing those wishing to migrate to the United States from western and northern Greece.

Writing in 1880 and 1882 the Messageries Maritimes' agent in Athens explained that the sorry state of land routes across the Peloponnese and the as yet incomplete railway

[110] AMAE, Émigration Grecque, 339, Nouvelle Série, Lettre du Chef de Légation de la République Française en Grèce, Direction des Consulats, S. D. des Affaires Commerciales, à M. Déclassé, 26 mai 1902.
[111] For an account of how shipping services shaped emigration from Greece see: Nicolas Manitakis, 'Transatlantic Emigration and Maritime Transport form Greece to the US, 1890-1912: A Major Area of European Steamship Company Competition for Migrant Traffic', in *Research in Maritime History* No. 33. Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections Between Maritime and Migration Networks. (Eds.) Torsten Feys, Lewis R. Fischer, Stéphane Hoste and Stephan Vanfraechem. St. John's Newfoundland, 2007, pp. 63-74

projects had isolated the country's capital, failing to provide a second outlet for both migrants and agricultural exports. The sale of fourth class tickets for Ottoman ports accounted in large part for the company's modest receipts from Piraeus. Despite the lean pickings, competition, primarily among European shipping companies, was intense: in 1880 the agent explained that the number of passengers had fallen from 1,064 to 764 due to the competitive scheduling of the Austrian Lloyd, Florio and Khedival lines.[112] Like in Italy and in the Ottoman Empire, emigration from Greece developed in the context of an internationalised and competitive shipping environment. For some of these companies, picking up emigrants from Greece, like from the Levant, was a way of making up for the fall in custom from Italian ports that had followed in the wake of the left's protectionist streak. For example, Cyprien Fabre, which was based in Marseilles, got into trouble with Italian authorities for using ships that had failed the ever more demanding quality tests carried out by the port authorities in Naples on the orders of the Commissariat of Emigration in Rome.[113]

In their hungry pursuit of migrants, continental shipping companies therefore played a decisive role in kick-starting trans-Atlantic emigration from Greece, forcing the government to play catch-up. Unlike on the Black Sea frontier where the rules around emigration were set by a regional shipping conference under the stewardship of the Messageries Maritimes' agent in Istanbul, the hegemony of foreign agents was not tolerated for long. Starting in 1903 Greece's political and commercial elites started to show an interest in the economic opportunities surrounding the emigrant trade and the future of shipping from Piraeus. A consensus emerged that it was not only the duty of the Greek government to protect emigrants from foreign emigration agents in ports of transit, but that it was also in the country's general interest to nationalise the migrant transport industry.

According to the French representative in Athens, the Ministry of the Interior had first taken concrete action to regulate emigration from Athens following a visit by a French politician from Bordeaux, Mr. Prèvost, who had travelled to Greece as part of a tour designed to promote French shipping and port services across the Mediterranean (he was headed to Beirut next). The two men had discussed plans to build a residence for Greek migrants in Marseilles, but the French politician's real achievement had been to bring about the closure of "most of the emigration agents operating in Athens". This, the French diplomat warned, would however have the unfortunate consequence of benefitting primarily German

[112] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence du Pirée. Rapport Général de Service, Exercice 1880. Secrétariat; AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général de Service, Pirée, Exercice 1882. Secréteriat.
[113] AMAE, Émigration Grecque, 339, Nouvelle Série, Lettre du Chef de Légation de la République Française au MAE 23, octobre 1907.

companies that operated a direct service to New York.[114] At the time discussions were also underway in the Greek parliament regarding a new law on emigration. What followed was the familiar pattern of lobbying by foreign shipping companies and transit countries. As the French delegate explained, the Greeks had adopted a strategy rather similar to Italy: they planned to ban the 'trans-boarding' of emigrants in foreign ports, effectively banning transit migration, and to boost the domestic emigration industry by requiring all agents to be Greek and by aiding the creation of a transatlantic service by the Greek ship-owner Mr. Moraitis.[115] It was not the French but the British who came to the rescue: on their repeated insistence the articles forbidding trans-boarding were dropped from the bill.[116]

The law was repeatedly delayed (it was not enacted until 1920), but the Greek government succeeded in setting up a national emigrant line. Mr. Moraitis's company went bankrupt after only one year of activity, but it was soon replaced by two new services, the Greek Transatlantic Steam Navigation Company and the National Greek Line, which merged in 1912 and finally succeeded in tilting the emigration market in their favour and away from foreign shipping companies. Their success had no doubt been possible by the access to continental (European) capital, which had been out of reach for Ottoman companies, but it also coincided with greater government investment in shipping and (modest) improvements to the port of Piraeus. Writing in 1904, the Messageries Maritimes' agent remarked that while the Greek government had been unable to overcome party divisions to legislate in favour of its mercantile navy and while the customs office at Piraeus was in a state of disarray (for example, the port lacked regulations for the entry and exit of ships), roughly 90 steamers visited the port each week.[117] Roughly ten year's later the company's agent was forced to dismiss earlier misgivings: if in 1903 the Greek mercantile fleet consisted of 209 ships, in 1913 they had grown to a very respectable total of 360.[118]

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[114] AMAE, Émigration Grecque, 339, Nouvelle Série, Lettre du Chef de Légation de la République Française au MAE, 18 mars, 1903.

[115] AMAE, Émigration Grecque, 339, Nouvelle Série, Lettre du Chef de Légation de la République Française au MAE, septembre 1906. « Il est résulté de cet accord un projet de loi suit a être prochainement soumis au vote du Parlement et qui est destiné: 1° à faciliter le control de l'émigration pour pouvoir le régler suivant les circonstances 2° à assurer un certain confort aux passagers en les procurant des installations plus convenables et ne mettant obstacle au transbordement dans des ports étrangers 3° à permettre aux armateurs grecques d'organiser des service directs au moyen de cette règlementation nouvelle. »

[116] AMAE, Émigration Grecque, 339, Nouvelle Série, Lettre du Ministère de l'Interior au MAE 25 mai 1907: « Ce projet de loi dont vous trouverez le texte, ci-joint, a été amendé à la suite des démarches effectuée par le Ministre d'Angleterre à Athènes, qui avait cru devoir faire observer au gouvernement que certaines dispositions tendent à interdire tout transbordement des émigrants étaient incompatibles avec les droits reconnus aux étrangers par les traités de commerce. Ces restrictions ont été supprimés. Toutefois la clause qui assure aux seules sujet grecques l'avantage d'organiser et de diriger des agences d'émigration a été maintenu malgré les réserves faites à cet égard par le Ministre d'Angleterre et notre représentent à Athènes. »

[117] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence du Pirée. Rapport Générale de Service, Exercice 1904. Secrétariat. The agent also declared it the "first port of Greece [by importance]".

[118] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence du Pirée. Rapport Générale de Service, Exercice 1912. Secrétariat.

On the eve of World War One, Greek trans-continental emigration had a well established epicentre in Piraeus. Of the roughly 45,000 migrants who left Greek shores in 1913, roughly 33,000 did so from there. Of these, 25,000 were carried by Greek and German companies offering a direct service to Atlantic ports. Only 8,000 transited in Marseilles or Naples; the Messageries Maritimes however could claim the lion's share of this traffic (roughly 6,500) as they had done in previous years.[119] While the Greek government made plans to centralise all emigration traffic in Piraeus, other ports, like Patras, continued to pull their weight. Indeed, the decade prior to the outbreak of the Great War saw new centres of emigration swell up outside of the Peloponnese, as far east as Thessaloniki and in the Cyclades to the South. The new phase of expansion was marked by the rise of Volos: the French Vice-Consul in the city reported in 1907 that several new shipping companies had established emigration agencies in the area, including Cyprian Fabre, in order to recruit the "many Macedonians who emulated their compatriots from Thessaly and the Peloponnese". Cyprien Fabre confirmed and added that the residents of the island archipelagos had joined the migrant masses.[120]

Centuries of trans-Aegean seasonal migration thus came to an end, not because of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire or the advent of nationalism, but on account of the expansion of the Atlantic emigration industry to Greece's eastern stretches and island communities. The arrival of direct connections from Piraeus also had the effect of attracting transit migrants from the Levant. Price wars between the southern European shipping consortium and Greek companies offering direct passages had lowered prices to as little as 30 francs for a one-way ticket.[121] The threat posed by Athens to Marseilles and Naples was neutralised by the war, and the dynamics of Mediterranean transit remained largely unaltered. Piraeus would never become a transit port for emigrants on the scale of Naples or Marseilles. However, the invisible lines connecting it to the various corners of the Mediterranean now pointed past the 'middle sea's' perimeter to waters deeper and lands more distant than Provence or Campania.

[119] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence du Pirée. Rapport Générale de Service, Exercice 1913. Secrétariat; AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence du Pirée. Rapport Générale de Service, Exercice 1908. Total numbers for transport of Greek migrants to Naples and Marseilles stood at: 3,491 in 1907 and 8,955 in 1908.
[120] AMAE, Émigration Grecque, 339, Nouvelle Série, Lettre au Ministère des Affaires Étrangerès du Vice-Consul à Larisse et Volo, 20 mai 1907. "Plusieurs agences d'émigration se sont installés dans ma circonscription, et même une compagnie française, la Maison Cyprien Fabre de Marseille a envoyé ici un représentant qui délivre des billets directs pour New York au prix de 240 francs. Il aurait été très désirable que cette compagnie ou toute autre se soit décidée à établir la tête de ligne de son service spéciale à Volo, ou mieux encore à Salonique pour y prendre les nombreux Macédoniens d'origine Hellên qui suivent l'exemple de leurs compatriotes de Thessalie ou de Péloponnèse."
[121] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Agence du Pirée. Rapport Générale de Service, Exercice 1913. Secrétariat.

Conclusion

By the time World War One broke out, Mediterranean shipping had been transformed and with it emigration. This was not only the result of technological change, of the steam revolution in transport, nor was it only the product of big feats of civil engineering, such as the completion of the Suez Canal. Two other factors played a decisive role.

Firstly, northern and western European shipping companies transformed maritime communications in the region by expanding southwards and eastwards. The emigrant trade was only one of several prizes they pursued in doing so, but it was nonetheless significant and accounted for a large share and in some cases the majority of profits from the region.[122] Mass emigration to the Americas would have been inconceivable without steamships plying seas and oceans regularly and efficiently. The extent to which the emigrant trade was, in the decades prior to World War One, a predominantly clandestine or illicit trade, also bears testimony to the role played by shipping companies in kick-starting emigration from regions where it wasn't allowed, in numbers that helped sustain its momentum over time.

The political and legal reaction of sending countries to their expansion was another way in which European shipping shaped regional migration regimes. It has been one of the main contentions of this chapter that emigration laws passed by Italy, the Ottoman Empire and Greece in this period should be interpreted not only as laws devised to protect and police

[122] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Procès Verbaux, 31 Mai 1885 and Traffic, 1883,6,7. From the Archives of the Messageries Maritimes kept in Le Havre it appears that migrant receipts were their primary source of revenue across the length and breadth of the Mediterranean. Any mention of migration in the records of the company's shareholder assemblies was limited for the most part to remarks on the economic significance of IIIrd class and IVth class receipts. Reporting back to shareholders in 1885 the company's management noted that the "enormous proportion of passengers" transported by the company hailed mostly from the Mediterranean region where "crossings were shorter and the ticket prices cheaper." While the total number of passengers transported by the company was 83,721 that year, in following years (eg. 1891) it oscillated around 120,000. In 1895 management noted how passenger traffic had fallen by 5,514 as a result of a fall in migrant traffic to Brasil and five years later it noted with disappointment a further reduction in IVth class migrant traffic across the Mediterranean. Rarely was public acknowledgement of the centrality of migrant traffic for the company's coffers made more explicitly. The directors offered no details on the revenues the company made from transporting migrants, no account of how this transport actually took place and no justification for taking part. Yet, even in this period of relative decline migrant traffic still accounted for a substantial part of the company's activity, and of course, of it profits. In the Mediterranean in particular, the *Messageries* relied on migrant traffic from Naples, where they would take their share of Italian emigration, and from ports along the coast of Syria. Agency reports written by employees of the *Messageries* repeatedly remarked on the importance of the migrant traffic to their business and sometimes described, often obliquely, some of the more unsavoury aspects to their trade. These reports suggest that for the period in question IIIrd and IVth class passenger traffic was the most important source of autonomous income for the *Messageries Maritimes'* Mediterranean service. According to the Chief Agent in Naples passenger receipts were consistently and considerably higher than those for merchandise. For example, in 1883 total passenger traffic earned the company 217,615 francs as opposed to 83,112 francs in freight transport. In 1886 the same trades earned the company 88,177 francs and 10,720 francs respectively. Throughout this period the majority of passengers consistently travelled in IIIrd and IVth class. Of the passengers who travelled aboard the ships of the *Messageries Maritimes* from Naples to Marseilles that year, 343 did so in 1st and 2nd class and 1,662 travelled in 3rd and 4th class. Of 467 passengers heading to Marseilles in 1885, 366 travelled in IVth class alone. The last available data on passenger traffic for the agency in Naples dating to 1889 claimed revenues for the previous year of 39,189 francs in passenger traffic to Brazil and only 29 francs in merchandise.

emigrants or to discipline agents and sub-agents, but also as economic laws aimed at regulating the emigration industry and, in particular, the shipping industry. They targeted competition among shipping companies and shaped the nature and regional distribution or geography of transport, which clearly illustrates how the spread of migration controls reflected not so much the territorial sovereignty of nation states, but the (unequal) distribution of logistical capital across the entire region. The lobbying efforts by transit powers to counter laws that sought to ban the trans-boarding of migrants in foreign ports or, in other words, to have the 'transit rights' of shipping companies recognised, were clear evidence of this. Both the Italian and Greek governments recognised the economic potential of the emigrant trade and tried to favour the development of domestic shipping on the back of it. In the Ottoman Empire, where the mercantile fleet had no chance of competing with European companies, the measures undertaken by Muzaffer Pasha were primarily aimed at reigning in the illicit economy that had grown around clandestine emigration. Modernisation in this case meant fewer restrictions, but it also meant recognising as legitimate what had hitherto been illegal. Emigrant transport was modernised by meaningfully codifying economic activity, by creating new incentives for infrastructural development (spurred on by foreign investment) and by directing profits towards shipping companies and away from agents and sub-agents.

This stood in contrast with how the Atlantic trade had developed in northern and central Europe. Shipping companies also entered alliances with domestic governments. For example, Cunard received subsidies from the British government, allowing it to weather competition from German rivals. In Germany, employees of the German Norddeutscher Lloyd physically manned the border with Austria alongside German police in order to direct migrants to their own ships. Shipping companies also conducted bilateral agreements with emigrant countries, like the British and German companies did in Scandinavia, to supplement private agreements reached among shipping companies through the 'conference system'. Nonetheless they were never able to exert as much pressure – and indeed get away with so much – as they did in the early stages of emigration from the Mediterranean, where shipping companies regularly broke the law and eluded controls, or made up the rules as they went along. [123] The weakness of sending countries coupled with their initially restrictionist agendas and the lack of domestic emigration services accounted to a large extent for the prevalence and success of the illicit shipping trade in the region. By contrast, both Italy and the Ottoman province of Greater Lebanon eventually distinguished

[123] Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914,* pp. 99-127

themselves because of their interventionism: they intervened directly to shape the market by such measures as price-fixing, making conference agreements among shipping companies redundant.

Shipping companies brought about something akin to 'technological contagion' by creating a powerful incentive for the less technologically advanced emigrant powers to modernise their mercantile fleets and, crucially, their ports and transport infrastructure. Not only did growing passenger traffic spur on the creation of new lines and regular services, but the emigrant trade provided the incentive for Italy and Greece to create their own lines and for ports, from the Aegean to the Tyrrhenian, to modernise in order to cater to steam transport and to improve railway connections. One of the lesser known consequences of the expansion of European shipping was the establishment of a network of emigration agents in the entire region, from the Tyrrhenian to the Black Sea. In addition to supervising the thoroughfare of ships in and out of ports they were stationed in, agents also publicised their company's business and sought to expand it, not least by currying favour with local officials but also by working with other agents and sub-agents to seek out new business opportunities. Without contact with shipping companies, emigration agencies and their sub-agents would have had precious little to offer migrants to induce them to emigrate. In Italy, following the passing of the first emigration law of 1901, shipping companies were forced to directly employ Italian emigration agents whereas in Greater Syria, the local Governorate stepped in to institutionalise their relationship with recruiting agents in the *kazas* or 'sub-districts'. Where state institutions were weak, such as on the Black Sea, agents even managed emigrant traffic and competition between shipping companies directly by setting up shipping consortiums. Where the state was either unwilling or unable to control them, emigration agents replicated the aggressive recruitment carried out by shipping companies, and the clandestine trade flourished. This was the case along the porous border between France and Italy, to which we turn to next.

Chapter Two

Crossing the border: remote recruitment and clandestine flows from Italy to France

In addition to being a place of transit for Mediterranean migrants, France also occupied the position of 'emigrant nation' in the jig-saw of sending, transit and receiving countries that made up the trans-Atlantic emigrant trade. Although the emigration of French men and women across the Atlantic in this period never matched in volume that of its continental neighbours like Italy or Germany, it was sufficient to rouse some concern among contemporaries. France's defeat in the war against Prussia that ended in 1871 and its loss of Alsace-Lorraine had sparked new fears of the weakness of its army and, by extension, of the inferiority of its male population compared to its Teutonic neighbour. Fears regarding the 'degeneration of the French race' were compounded by a sluggish birth rate and anxieties regarding the effects of industrialisation on the French people, from the corrupting influence of consumerism to urban pollution and growing detachment from nature. Colonial anxieties, such as the effects of tropical climates on French male bodies, added another layer of paranoia. The emigration of able-bodied French men of working-age threatened to make matters worse by depleting the nation's resources further. In the eyes of those hostile to immigration, the loyalty of immigrants to French institutions could not be relied on, nor could their contribution to French society or culture equal that of the native-born.

Low rates of emigration were reassuring to contemporaries. Yet, the recruiting efforts of South American nations on French soil spread new fears. While the superiority of French life to that of countries on the other side of the Atlantic was beyond discussion, the possibility remained that labourers might be persuaded to leave by tales of vanquished hardship and an easier life abroad. Surplus energies and manpower should be directed instead towards France's new colonies.

Although foreign recruitment had been taking place for over two decades, by the late 1880s it had also grown in intensity. Around the end of the decade an announcement reached France that the Argentinian government would subsidise up to 20,000 free passages in France the following year, double that of previous years. The author of an article published in 'Le Lyon Republicain', a political journal, reasoned that in a few years' time this could rob France of thousands of soldiers and good labourers. He further denounced the network of recruiters that Argentina had built up in the country, including his native Lyon. Their aggressive tactics, he argued, posed an inescapable question of international law: "Do foreign governments have a right to organise for a profit the draining of nations and their capital on the territory of another state?"[1]

In 1888, the same year the article was published, Italy lifted its ban on emigration. Migrants who had previously smuggled themselves into France in order to leave for the Americas, could now depart legally from both French and Italian ports. The previous year, a gateway to the Atlantic had been opened in southern Italy when regular direct connections between Naples and New York commenced. Yet, Italian migrants continued to travel to France in order to take their passage from there. Talk of banning the trans-boarding of migrants from one ship to another had been successfully silenced in 1888, but became law in 1901, together with a ban on Italian agents sending migrants to embark abroad. Foreign recruitment had already been banned in 1888, but agents continued to pull the strings across the Alps.

Migrant transit from Italy remained, for the most part, clandestine. Italy's late liberalisation of emigration, the sudden opening up of its migration market to foreign shipping companies, emigration agents and recruiters, and the slow modernisation of its own mercantile fleet and transport infrastructure are not sufficient to explain the persistence of clandestine emigration and, in particular, of clandestine transit via France. Why French emigration agents continued to wield so much power over the minds and hearts of foreign migrants, how they were able to conduct their activities clandestinely without facing severe repercussions, and why migrants continued to resort to illegal channels require further explanation in order to understand why clandestine emigration occurred and how 'clandestinity' evolved as a social reality, an economic phenomenon and a form of migration control. For this reason, the causes behind clandestine departures need to be examined in connection with changing definitions of clandestinity, which determined the ways in which

[1] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2153, Extrait Journal 'Le Lyon Republicain', 5 Nov, c. 1888

it was policed in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Italy, but also shaped the way in which the information was archived and later used by historians.

Remote recruitment: legal and illegal pathways abroad

The true villains of the Atlantic emigrant trade were not shipping companies or clandestine migrants, but emigration agents. Throughout Europe they were commonly regarded as parasites who fed on the anxieties and naïveté of migrants, offering them nothing but the fraudulent promise of an elusive paradise and a ticket to get there. Their wickedness inspired a wealth of commentary and abuse. While they were commonly compared to vermin, there was no shortage of anthropomorphic name-calling. According to the U.S. Consul in Naples Edward Camphausen, they roamed around Naples like "locusts covered Egypt…swarms of emigrant agents whose business it is to point to the glory of the New World to the peasantry of the Old World, for a percentage." In countries of immigration they were loathed for over-supplying immigrants indiscriminately. The states of emigrant nations despised them for producing 'artificial emigration'. Shipping companies blamed them for siphoning off migrants to competitors and for smuggling undesirables on-board their ships. Local port authorities commonly accused them of exploiting migrants and of perpetuating the clandestine emigration trade. Migrants lived in fear of exploitative emigration agents who would sell them an overpriced ticket for a non-existent destination and leave them stranded in a foreign port. While emigration agents could be held responsible for a vast array of crimes and misdemeanours, they also oiled the wheels of the emigration machine very effectively. Agents not only sold tickets but they advertised destinations and itineraries. They were the reason that labourers in remote provinces might decide to pack up their belongings and leave with the intention of crossing not the Alps or the Mediterranean but the Atlantic and to do so via Marseilles, rather than via Genoa or Naples.

Agents did 'multiply' rapidly across the continent as emigration reached mass proportions in the course of the nineteenth century. In France, a new generation of emigration agents had to adjust to their country's transformation from a land of emigration to one of transit migration. This was reflected in their distribution across the country. In the early decades of emigration (1850-1870s) most of the applications to the Ministry of Commerce for licenses to practice the profession of emigration agent were from France's

main Atlantic ports, le Havre and Bordeaux. Applications from Marseilles grew in number starting in the late 1870s and early 1880s. In response to a letter by one Samuel Lévy from Marseilles in 1867, the Prefect of Bouches-Du-Rhône responded that there were already three emigration agents in the city, which he deemed to be a sufficient number (in 1869, emigration from Marseilles averaged around 400 to 600 people per month).[2] Lévy was nonetheless granted the license out of principled attachment to the ideal of free trade.[3]

Some general changes regarding the social and economic status of those aspiring to the profession are also discernible. Early emigration agents working from northern France were steeped in a tradition of imperial settlement. They tended to recruit labourers on behalf of wealthy landowners or foreign powers for a fee. Some were also 'armateurs' who made money not only from subsidies but also from transporting migrants on ships they owned. They included men like Victor Demeezemaker, merchant, ship-owner and Knight of the Legion of Honour (before applying for a license Demeezemaker had previously used his ships to transport Algerian labourers to Brazil) or Auguste Brougner, a doctor from Caixon, in the French Pyrenees, who in 1857 had recruited French migrants to work for a large farm he had established in the argentine province of Correintes, obtained through a government concession. His political contacts included the then Consul of both Montevideo and Buenos Aires at le Havre who informally acted as an emigration agent, eliciting the concern of French authorities who accused 'South American consul-agents' of exploiting thousands of French families. They also included a former director of the Messageries Maritimes (then known as the Messageries Impériales), Mr. Ambroise Bullot, who had lost more than half of his fortune (60,000 of 100,000 Francs) financing the construction of barricades during the 1848 revolution. In other words, he was a long-time liberal and a friend of the Third Republic.[4] Emigration Agents tended to be French, but as transit migration picked up, foreign agencies opened up offices on French soil to try to siphon off a portion of the traffic. This included the Scottish Anchor Line and German Hamburg-Amerika line, which had sent agents respectively to Paris in 1875 and Le Havre 1865. They owed their arrival partly to traditional forms of elite patronage: the Anchor Line's agent could boast the support of Europe's financial elites, the Rothschilds and the Péreire brothers, whereas the Hamburg-

[2] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2149, Correspondence entre le Préfect Bouches-du-Rhône et le Commissaire d'Émigration Charles Expilly, janvier-décembre 1869
[3] ANF, Fonds Ministère Commerce & Industrie, Marine Marchande – 19790627/1, F/12/4880 - 4887, Préfect Bouches-du-Rhône au Ministre du Commerce, 4 octobre, 1867
[4] ANF, Fonds Ministère Commerce & Industrie, Marine Marchande – 19790627/1, F/12/4880 - 4887

Amerika Line's agent in Le Havre enjoyed the support of wealthy Parisian landowner, Louis-Alphonse Chateauneuf.[5]

In Marseilles, emigration was less of a gentlemanly pursuit. Four emigration agents, including Lévy, dominated the trade from Marseilles in the late 1860s and 1870s. They were men of lesser means than their northern counterparts. Lévy was awarded a license because his wife owned a property worth 15,000 francs.[6] The remaining three agents – Reynaud, Trotebas and Tabiasco – were employed by other men who financed their activities. Reynaud and Trotebas were effectively sub-agents for an emigration agent based in Le Havre, Mr. Peulevey, whose network of sub-agents spread across France to Switzerland and Italy.[7] Trotebas's application fee had actually been paid by another agent based in Le Havre, a certain Mr. Currie while Tabiasco's license had been paid for by Mr. Odinet from Le Havre, who belonged to a family of middle-managers of the Messageries Maritimes.[8] Tabiasco's loyalties were not to one shipping company alone, however, and he also conducted business with the Italo-Platense company (which specialised in emigration from Italy to La Plata) and with the Société Générale des Transports Maritimes, based in Marseilles.[9] In this they resembled emigration agents who later dominated the trade from Marseilles and elsewhere in France, who also tended to hail from humbler, middle-class backgrounds. They were men (and occasionally women who were married to emigration agents) who had not inherited but earned or were loaned the little capital they invested to pay the fee of 20,000-40,000 francs required in order to obtain the license of emigration agent. They sought to recruit migrants on a regular basis, rather than as a single enterprise. It appears that starting around 1875, agents in Le Havre and Paris in particular and Bordeaux to a lesser extent, started to commission sub-agents in Marseilles, Modane and in south-eastern France generally, so as to direct migrants from that region towards ports in the north-west of the country.[10]

Dossier Bullot

[5] ANF, Fonds Ministère Commerce & Industrie, Marine Marchande – 19790627/1, F/12/4880 - 4887, Dossiers M. Duncan (Hamburg-Amerika) and M. Bryce Stewart Gay (Anchor Line)

[6] ANF, Fonds Ministère Commerce & Industrie, Marine Marchande – 19790627/1, F/12/4880 - 4887, Préfect Bouches-du-Rhône au Ministre du Commerce, 4 octobre, 1867

[7] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2149, Ministre de l'Intérieur au Préfect Bouches-du-Rhône, 6 février, 1877

[8] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2148, Ministre de l'Intérieur au Préfect Bouches-du-Rhône, 17 août 1875 ; ANF, Fonds Ministère Commerce & Industrie, Marine Marchande – 19790627/1, F/12/4880 - 4887, Dossier Odinet

[9] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2148, Article on Neapolitan paper, *Il Pungolo,* Undated

[10] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2148, Various. One example is a certain M. Roser from Paris, who employed agents in Le Havre, Marseilles, one in Savoy and one in Nancy. For a time Tabiasco was also part of a network of sub-agents that had an emigration company in Bordeaux at its head but went from the Pyrenees to Modane at the border with Italy, via Marseilles.

Some southern agents recruited migrants on behalf of foreign governments or foreign capitalists, including shipping companies. Like the Messageries Maritimes' agents in the Levant, these agents worked exclusively for the shipping companies that employed them and did everything that an emigration agent would do: they spread information about itineraries, effectively recruiting migrants; they sold them connecting tickets to the Americas via a Mediterranean port; occasionally they even found them temporary accommodation in transit ports, or put them in touch with agents who could. While competition was intense, rivalry among agents abroad was softened by the opportunities for cooperation. Some agents doubled up as hotel-owners, hosting migrants they had recruited as they waited to leave for the Atlantic. The services they offered were sometimes intangible and their role ambiguous, despite their profession being increasingly circumscribed by law. As the conditions for the transport and recruitment of migrants became more stringent, so did those affecting agents. They were only allowed to act as intermediaries, to assist migrants on their journeys by providing them with information on itineraries, with tickets and arranging for their transport. That could include organizing a stay in a hotel as they waited for the ship to leave and ensuring that their transit from their point of departure to the port of embarkation went smoothly.

What they were *not* allowed to do was to entice migrants to leave and to recruit them directly on behalf of foreign employers or foreign governments. One of the legacies of the abolition campaign against slavery was to ban, in name at least, other forms of quasi-slavery, such as indentured passage. Unless it was sanctioned by the government of the sending country as part of a commonly agreed scheme with foreign governments or employers, such as with the Construction of the Panama Canal, migrants could not legally enter a contract in which they pledged their labour in return for a free passage to the 'New World'. Arrangements of this kind were considered to be too unequal and to lend themselves to the exploitation of migrants, which indeed they often did. Months could turn into years before debts accumulated by migrants were considered re-paid. Meanwhile migrants were furnished only with the minimum necessary to survive, remaining in their employers' control. It was irreconcilable with the ideal of 'free migration' that western states aspired to for their own subjects and citizens, despite their active participation in the trade of indentured labourers elsewhere, notably the 'coolie trade' of 30-50 million indentured labourers from Asia.[11]

[11] Lydia Potts, *The World Labour Market. A History of Migration* (London, 1990), pp. 64-95

Emigration agents in France were legally obliged to protect the welfare of migrants in other ways too. Not endangering them by promoting misleading information or 'propaganda' which could lead to their exploitation at the hands of foreigners was paramount. But increasingly, emigration agents were made morally and legally liable for the exploitation of migrants in all phases of their journeys at the hands of sub-agents and other associates such as runners and hotel-owners. If migrants were left stranded in a port city because the ship they were supposed to travel on was delayed, emigration agents were obliged to foot the bill. Indeed, some of the responsibility that had previously rested with shipping companies was 'dumped' on emigration agents. The gradual targeting of emigration agents in public debate, in policy and in law has led some historians to argue that they were increasingly 'criminalised' in this period.[12] The review of applications for the license of emigration agent involved assessing whether applicants were 'honourable men'. This meant verifying that they would be able to pay the necessary fee and sustain the costs of providing for the welfare of migrants. They also checked for criminal records and for potential involvement in illicit activities, including smuggling. Individual reputation and social standing were also taken into account in the decision, as were an individual's politics. Mr. Brougner's "very advanced political views" seemingly were considered a credit to him.[13] The less fortunate Mr. Brethon, on the other hand, was denied a license because his family was seen as "lacking in morality": his father, sister-in law and father-in-law owned and ran several brothels in Paris.[14]

Increasingly, to be successful, agents needed good networks of sub-agents and a sound understanding of the logistics of transport, rather than capital and strong connections with foreign employers, like their predecessors. As native emigration from France declined and emigration from neighbouring countries grew, so did remote recruitment of foreign migrants. This was directly connected to the volume of migrant transit to le Havre, Bordeaux, Marseilles and, to a lesser extent, Lyon. Italians constituted the majority of that traffic, but they were not alone.[15] In 1880 for example, Austrian, Swiss, Greek, North African, Levantine and even Asian migrants transited through France in addition to Italians, who represented nonetheless almost 90 per cent of the total.[16]

[12] Adam M. McKeown, 'How the box became black: Brokers and the creation of the free migrant', in *Pacific Affairs*, Volume 85, No. 1, March 2012
[13] ANF, Fonds Ministère Commerce & Industrie, Marine Marchande – 19790627/1, F/12/4880 - 4887, Dossier Brougner
[14] ANF, Fonds Ministère Commerce & Industrie, Marine Marchande – 19790627/1, F/12/4880 - 4887, Dossier Bréthon
[15] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2150, Préfect au Ministre de l'Intérieur, 12 janvier 1881 et 31 janvier 1882. In 1880, out of a total of 14,856 migrants leaving France, 13,000 were italian. The following year italians counted for 16,641 out of a total 18,350.
[16] Ibid.

Geographical proximity to a country of emigration was an advantage for emigration agents, making it easier to foster a network of sub-agents, but it was not indispensable. Remote recruiting flourished along steamship lines, it spread within diasporic communities, conforming in part to what migration scholars refer to as 'chain migration', it was fostered by foreign powers by means of their diplomatic corps. It also flourished along railway routes, which French emigration agents were quick to exploit. For instance, Greek emigrants might reach a French port either by steamer (usually Marseilles), but also by train, commonly across the Balkans and through Austria and Germany. Good railway connections linking French ports on the Atlantic to those on the Mediterranean engendered a third, mixed type of transit. French emigration agents in southern France attempted to exploit both railway and maritime connections to Italy in order to recruit migrants as discussed in the previous chapter. They picked up migrants from Naples, Genoa, Livorno and other ports along Italy's western coast and transported them to Marseilles. They also opened up channels across the Alps, exploiting infrastructural developments carried out by the Savoy state, such as the Fréjus tunnel.

Like shipping companies, agents were not above abetting clandestine emigration. Sheltered from Italian laws by French diplomats and aided by French laws on emigration, which did not regulate remote recruitment by French agents, they were free to pursue migrants abroad in defiance of foreign laws. In 1889, the Minister of the Interior revised French emigration law via a ministerial decree, but only to prevent French emigration agents from robbing French ports and French shipping companies of migrants by sending them to embark in foreign ports. It was reasoned that French migrants also stood to gain from their departure being supervised by French authorities.[17] While transit to France was protected and encouraged, transit from France was criminalized. In general, agents were free to pursue not only those who did not want to leave directly from Italy, but also those who couldn't.
Despite this, their methods did sometimes attract the attention of French authorities. When an Italian agent in Marseilles named Boero smuggled into France a few hundred Italian labourers who were headed to Guatemala to work on a plantation owned by an associate, a wealthy landowner named Saturnino Feiroco, the French Prefect gave Italian authorities the name of the vessel the labourers would be travelling on and the location of the country house in France where Boero had been keeping them while they waited for their steamer to depart. (Mr. Boero had previously worked for the emigration agents Tabiasco and Trotebas).

[17] ACCM, ML 4271/01, Lois sur le transport par bateau des émigrants (1860-1861); Transport des émigrants, restrictions et réglementations, indemnités de séjour (1869-1894); Italie. Loi sur le transport des émigrants italiens (1897-1912), Ministre du Commerce au Président Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, 7 juin, 1894

However, when Italians failed in their chance to intercept him before he left Italy not only did French authorities refuse to expatriate Boero, they also refused to assist the Italian Consul in his efforts to dissuade the emigrants from leaving, for fear that they might remain stranded in Marseilles.[18] In a separate incident in 1880, when a French Marquis attempted to smuggle Italian migrants to Papa New Guinea, via Barcelona, French police intercepted them in Gerona and repatriated them to Italy.[19] Seemingly, French police were not above cooperating, as long as their national sovereignty was not 'violated' by foreign interference and transit migrants were not left stranded in its cities.

Yet, in the absence of any legislative 'harmonization' between emigration and transit countries and of a transnational police force, or of regular cooperation between national police forces, remote recruitment by agents continued unobstructed. Once Italy's ban on emigration was lifted in 1888, the new legislation that was introduced restricted remote recruitment by narrowing recruitment to agents domiciled in Italy. A transition period followed until 1901, when it became illegal to trans-board migrants or to send them to embark in foreign ports. In that time, two supreme court rulings (15th October 1891 and 10th September 1896) had upheld the right of emigration agents to send migrants to take their passage in foreign ports. The activities of foreign emigration agents were also 'disciplined' via a series of measures which included a ban on the recruitment of indentured labourers (including contract labour). They primarily targeted conditions of transport and transit (including the length and conditions of stay in a transit port) and the spread of information or 'propaganda' on destination countries.

In Marseilles, agents were if not unperturbed then undeterred, as the history of the 'house of Trotebas' illustrates. Since the early 1880s, Trotebas came regularly to the attention of the Emigration Commissioner in Marseilles and the Prefect of Bouches-du-Rhône for violating the emigration code of 1860 on a number of counts, whether for consorting with clandestine agents (e.g. Mr. Georges Sabath, of Syrian origin, found guilty of having illegally recruited Ottoman Syrians for migration to Montevideo) or for leaving migrants stranded (e.g. in 1888 he left Spanish migrants stranded in Marseilles for over ten days with little sustenance).[20] Nonetheless, he succeeded in holding on to his license as an emigration agent until 1890 when, upon his death, it was inherited by his widow, Sylvie

[18] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2150 Commissaire d'Émigration au Préfet, 1 mars 1879

[19] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2150, Commissaire d'émigration au Sécretaire Génerale de la Surété Génerale, 31 mars 1881

[20] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2151, Dossier Benicarlo, Commissaire D'Èmigration au Préfet Bouches-Du-Rhône, 4 février, 1888 ; ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2151, Procès à Georges Sabath, 11 avril, 1888

Trotebas, and subsequently, in 1909, by their chief agent, Mr. Bousquet.[21] Moreover, Trotebas remained the primary point of contact, indeed the chief agent in Marseilles of South American Republics for all things emigration. In 1889 he provoked a furious exchange of letters between the French Minister of the Interior and the Emigration Commissioner in Marseilles because of his recruitment of Italian labourers on behalf of the Chilean Government. Together with a French agent in Bordeaux he had been circulating pre-paid tickets to Italian migrants, contracting them for years of unpaid work in Chile. The Chilean Consul in Marseilles happily confirmed that Trotebas was their man. Not only was Trotebas unrepentant, but he actively sought the protection of French authorities from the 'unfair competition of unauthorised agents' who, he claimed, were trying to carve out a slice of the business for themselves. [22]

As the Commissioner remarked to the Minister, Trotebas was only one player, albeit an important one, in a vast network of emigration agents in Bordeaux, le Havre and Marseilles who collaborated with the Consuls of South American nations, first among which were Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in order to recruit masons, carpenters and other kinds of labourers. All the French government could or wanted to do, among growing fears that French men in the prime of their youth would be parcelled off across the Atlantic, was to sit and watch the emigration industry churn away as Trotebas and his peers turned the wheels. On the 20th of November 1908, the Emigration Commissioner reported that two ships had left Marseilles for Chile between June and September carrying a total of 350 emigrants, of whom 50 were French, mostly labourers (« mécaniciens, serruriers, peintres, boulangers, un seul était cultivateur. »). [23] Again, the Trotebas agency, this time under the stewardship of Sylvie Trotebas, was among the agencies involved. In the meantime, free emigration to South American countries had come under greater regulatory scrutiny in France as well. The collaboration of Chilean authorities was secured and their consular delegate was charged with co-supervising the embarkation of migrants. He also gave assurances that migrants would be safely housed upon arrival and provided first-hand information regarding their conditions of employment, which were later verified by the French. In Marseilles, all emigrants had to present themselves at the office of the Emigration Commissioner in order to have their contracts verified and stamped by him.

[21] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2153, Plaintes Trotebas, Président du Conseil, Ministre de l'Intérieur au Préfect Bouches-du-Rhône, 7 novembre 1910

[22] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2153, Commissaire d'Émigration au Ministre de l'Intérieur, 27 mars, 1889

[23] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale b. 2153, Rapport Commissaire d'Émigration, 20 novembre, 1908

The Trotebas agency was still found wanting, however. As part of their recruitment efforts in Italy and France they had published and circulated pamphlets with information on work opportunities in Chile and practical details regarding the journey and selection process. (Applicants were required to present four different certificates – birth certificates, criminal records, certificates of employment and health – with the warning that applicants found to be crippled by an infirmity or carrying a contagious disease, like trachoma, would be excluded). This included information on the benefits and salaries that migrants could be expected to receive upon arrival, which were later exposed as exaggerated. For instance, salaries initially stated as 7 pesos for painters were later corrected to 4 pesos.[24] While their attempt to mislead labourers might appear innocuous, it caused quite an uproar when migrants arriving in Chile found that they had been lied to. As local Chilean newspapers picked up the news and publicly denounced Trotebas, on the 6th of September 1908 even the French Prime Minister wrote to the Prefect, in his role as Minister of the Interior, to voice his discontent.[25]

The remote recruitment of Italian labourers did not only happen from France or via the intermediation of French emigration agents. Swiss emigration agents had rivalled their French counterparts since the early decades of Italian transatlantic emigration, and the change in legal status of the Savoy monarchy's migration regime (i.e. the successive bans on foreign recruitment of Italian migrants and the restrictions on transit) did not deter them. Like French agents, they hid behind their country's status as a 'recruitment haven'. They also exploited their geographical proximity to Italy to develop recruitment networks and to smuggle migrants across the border. Lacking emigration ports like Marseilles, they positioned themselves in border towns with railway links to Italy, like Modane for the French. At the turn of the century, Italian authorities counted half a dozen 'border agencies' in Switzerland.[26]

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[24] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2153, Agence d'Émigration Trotebas, 'Lloyd del pacifico', Undated. These are some of the conditions that the Sylvie Trotebas agency offered migrants : « L'émigration est entièrement gratuite du port de Marseille à ceux de la République du CHILI (principaux ports, Talcahuano, Valparaiso, Antofagasta). A leur arrivée au CHILI les émigrants sont reçus à l'Hôtel de l'Emigration ou ils sont nourris pendant 9 jours aux frais de Gouvernement dans l'attente qu'ils trouvent du travail. » ; « Seront exclue les personne infirmes, atteints de trachome (maladie de yeux), syphilis, tuberculose, ou de toute autre maladie contagieuse ; celles ayant été condamnées seront refusées. » ; « L'émigrant est absolument libre à son arrivée au Chili de se livrer à tous les travaux qui pourront lui convenir ; il pourra également résider dans n'importe quelle ville du Chili, et retourner dans son pays quand bon lui semblera. » ; « Le Gouvernement chilien s'oblige à rapatrier à son compte les familles dont le chef pourrait être mort ou end inhabile au travail. ».

[25] ADBDR, 4M Préfecture Bouches-du-Rhône, Commissariat D'Émigration, Sûreté Générale, b. 2153, Président du Conseil, Ministre de l'Intérieur au Préfect Bouches-de-Rhône, 6 septembre, 1908

[26] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie. Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione. Affari Diversi, b. 3387, Commissariato Generale dell'Emigrazione, Ministero degli Affari Esteri al Prefetto di Napoli, Arruolamento clandestino per conto degli agenti Federico Ludwig, Corecco e Brivio, 'La Svizzera', Ditta Reglin ('Olandese), Zwilchembart e dell'agenzia francese di Modane Jordin Désiré, Inchiesta Malnate, 31 maggio 1901

As emigration from southern Italy came to displace that from the North, the agencies extended their networks southwards. Shortly after the Law of 1901 the recruitment network of unauthorised agent Federico Ludwig from Chiasso – a town in the southernmost province of Switzerland, nestled between Lake Como and Varese – was exposed by authorities in Naples. They counted thirteen sub-agents positioned strategically in the main working class areas of Naples (Mercato, San Lorenzo, Poggioreale) as well as in other major towns and cities in southern Italy (Palermo, Reggio Calabria, Gioiosa Ionica). They also included the owner of a hotel for migrants in Naples known as The Hotel of the Two Americas (l*'Albergo delle Due Americhe*). The sub-agents, most of whom were unauthorised, were believed to captain a team of 'clandestine recruiters' (*arruolatori clandestini*) who criss-crossed the surrounding countryside looking for potential clients. Those who decided to migrate to the Americas were handed coloured cards that they would use to signal their presence to Ludwig who would be waiting for them at the railway station in Chiasso. Upon arrival they would be handed tickets, without having to sign an emigration contract or display a passport, no questions asked.[27]

The world of clandestine recruiters was not only one of deft entrepreneurs exploiting 'haven jurisdictions', flitting across national borders, enjoying the benefits of employment or collaboration with wealthy entrepreneurs or foreign powers. It also included petty criminal elements. For instance, another emigration agent who operated from Brusio in Switzerland, an Italian named Zanolari, employed a convicted criminal in Naples by the name of Giuseppe Basile as a sub-agent. He also collaborated with a woman who owned furnished apartments in the city and who had already been convicted of abetting clandestine emigration.[28] This applied to non-Swiss agencies too, and even to shipping companies. The German shipping company, the Norddeutscher Lloyd, decided to replace its agent in Naples, Vincenzo de Luca, after local newspapers uncovered that he had been charging migrants extra to disinfect their luggage and then pocketing the money. They replaced him with his son, Dr. Emilio de Luca, who it later emerged, was also in on the swindle. When they finally agreed to appoint a new agent who was not related to the De Lucas, they chose a business associate of one of the most notorious clandestine agents in the city, Vincenzo Savarese.[29] While geographical distance between agents and sub-agents inevitably made it more difficult

[27] Ibid.
[28] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie. Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione Clandestina, b. 4067, Lettera R. Commissario di P.S. Sez. Mercato (Napoli) al Questore di Napoli, 23 dicembre 1909; Lettera R. Commissario di P.S. Sez. Mercato di Napoli al Questore di Napoli, 18 Maggio 1909
[29] ASD, Comissariato per l'Emigrazione. Archivio Generale c. 1901-1913/4, b. 15, Vettori, Lettera Commissario Generale al Principe di Scalea, 16 marzo 1910

to vet intermediaries and keep them under surveillance, in all likelihood foreign recruiters were not overly scrupulous in selecting their associates. Moreover, after 1901, when Italian emigration agents could no longer legally send migrants to embark abroad, the pool of authorised personnel that foreign agents could rely on became more limited.

Like French emigration agents, those domiciled in Switzerland also worked for foreign recruiters, although South American Republics did not tend to look for agents in the Helvetic state. Zanolari recruited migrants on behalf of Holmes Ltd, a North American emigration company.[30] Ludwig worked on behalf of Canadian recruiters. Indeed, the biggest investigation into the world of Swiss emigration agents carried out by Italian authorities at this time involved Canada. It took place in 1901-2 and was sparked by the publication of a letter by Lord Strathcona. In its original form the letter had been published by the Manchester Guardian on the 18th of January of 1901. In it, Lord Strathcona invited British citizens to settle in the Dominion, stressing the vast improvements in agriculture, the abundance of forests, mines and fisheries and the wealth of trade with Great Britain. The letter, however, was subsequently adapted for an Italian audience and used by agents on the continent, including Ludwig and other Swiss agents (Reglin, Carecco, Borivio, Berte and Andreazzi). The power of printed advertisements was a tried and tested recruiting method and was regularly used by agents in this period. When combined with the promise of free (i.e. subsidised) emigration or with a direct offer of employment, it could be explosive. Around the same time, exaggerated reports of free passages to Brazil on board French shipping companies (SGTMV) resulted in tens of families in the southern regions of Apulia and Basilicata selling their possessions, including their homes, in a matter of weeks.[31] As several reports made clear this pattern had been repeating itself for years.[32] Italian authorities had attempted to regulate it: the law of 1901 punished the spread of inaccurate information for the purpose of recruitment with imprisonment for up to six months and a hefty fine (a thousand lira).[33] However, 'agent propaganda', as it was known, found a captive audience among illiterate labourers who were hungry for employment.

When the Swiss agents decided to circulate a doctored version of Lord Strathcona's letter with the help of two Neapolitan agencies, Alvino and Grammatico, they succeeded in recruiting between 1,500 and 2,000 migrants in the space of just a few weeks. They arranged

[30] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie. Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione Clandestina, b. 4067, Lettera R. Questura di Napoli, Commissariato di P.S. di Porto di Napoli al Prefetto di Sondrio, 22 giugno 1909
[31] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie. Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione, Affari Diversi, b. 3387, Circolare Speciale, R. Questura di Napoli, 14 novembre 1901
[32] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie. Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione, Affari Diversi, b. 3387, Prefettura della Provincia di Basilicata. P.S al Questore di Potenza, 4 ottobre 1895
[33] *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, Leggi nn. 23 e 24 concernenti disposizioni sull'emigrazione, Lunedì 4 febbraio, n. 2, 1901. Art. 17

for their transit via Switzerland to France and then to Liverpool, where they took their passage on a steamship owned by the Beaver Line, their associates and principal instigators. The Beaver Line was much smaller than rival shipping companies. Together with a British emigration agency named Elder, Dempster & Co., also based in Liverpool, they used their 'outsider' status in order to undercut other shipping companies that were part of the pool by charging less for the passage. Only 20 Lira (out of a total of roughly 200) were sufficient to send migrants their way. Once again, Italian authorities could do little more than issue a complaint and intensify their surveillance of the two agents. On this occasion, the prospect of lucrative employment and well-publicised and competitively priced itineraries were enough to entice hundreds to cross the border clandestinely. Connections from Italy to Canada were poor, and transit to British ports via Switzerland was a financially attractive option.

Yet, clandestinity was not only the refuge of the frugal migrant. Its tide did not simply rise and fall with agent propaganda. It did not only result from the unequal distribution of transport infrastructure or Italy's proximity to transit countries or even to the existence of 'recruiting havens' in neighbouring countries, although all these factors were important. Not all migrants who chose to depart clandestinely were necessarily aware that they were doing so, but some were. Not all were dupes or victims of slippery emigration agents. Some were willing participants. In order to understand the history of clandestine transit flows from Italy to France and Switzerland, its social causes and the motivations of migrants must be considered alongside the actions of foreign and domestic recruiters.

Clandestine emigration revisited: crimes against the family

When Lord Strathcona's letter was circulated in Italy the prospect of a reasonably priced journey to a new job enticed hundreds of Italians to cross the Atlantic in just a matter of weeks. For those migrants, transit via a third country was not seen as an insurmountable obstacle, or even as a tiresome complication, but as an opportunity. As transatlantic emigration reached its maturity, information regarding itineraries and how to navigate bureaucratic hurdles became more widely-known; improved migration literacy made planning journeys without the assistance of emigration agents easier for migrants. In turn, this made lawful transit a more realistic possibility. Nonetheless, illegal transit via France

and other countries north of Italy persisted. As in the case of the sudden surge in clandestine emigration to Canada in 1901, small differences in journey prices combined with the aggressive recruitment efforts of emigration agents could be enough, not only to persuade individuals to resort to clandestine means, but also to choose a more complicated and risky itinerary over a simpler and safer one.[34]

The police records held in the state archives in Naples point to a different aspect of clandestine emigration from Italy that had little to do with preferences over itineraries, ticket prices or the persuasiveness of agents. While clandestine departures from Naples were not always a prelude to transit via France, they sometimes were. More to the point, they help sketch the context in which clandestine transit took place, particular after 1888, once the ban on transatlantic emigration had been lifted and direct connections to Atlantic ports had been established in Italy. The police records give voice to protagonists on the other end of recruitment, the 'illegals'.

One of the fundamental premises behind clandestine departures in Italy was an individual's inability or unwillingness to apply for permission to emigrate. What the Italian authorities liked to call 'artificial emigration' often was not the product of agent propaganda, but of a calculated decision to flee. The decision not to apply for permission to migrate may have been motivated by economic considerations. Not only did the application actually involve the payment of a fee roughly equal to a fifth of a ticket to the New World (i.e. roughly 40 lire), but it also prompted an investigation into an individual's family finances.[35] Just like the United States' government did not want immigrants who were 'likely to become public charges', the Italian government also acted to ensure, to the best of its abilities, that families not be left destitute by the man of the household departing without at least a commitment to continue to provide for his family and proof that those who stayed behind could sustain themselves without him until the remittances started flowing back.[36]

The integrity of the family also had to be protected: emigration could not be allowed to chip away at the paternal and the matrimonial bonds that kept families and communities together. Nor could it be allowed to weaken the ties of national brotherhood by undermining

[34] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie. Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione. Affari Diversi, b. 3387, Prefetto al Questore di Napoli, Inchiesta per l'emigraione al Canadà, 13 Giugno, 1901

[35] Aliza S. Wong, *Race and the Nation in Liberal Italy, 1861-1911. Meridionalism, Empire, and Diaspora* (Palgrave-Macmillan : New York, 2006), p. 113

[36] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, I Serie 1860-1887, Emigrazione Clandestina 1884-6, b. 1334/6, Rapporto Delegazione Marittima di PS al Questore di Napoli, 12 febbraio 1884. « Dagli agenti dipendenti Manfredi e Maiolini furono ieri sera sorpesi due individui che tentavano di prendere imbarco sulla Messaggeria Francese…uno di essi confessò chiamarsi invece Laudadio Giustino, di aver tolto quell passaporto al Moschetto, e di averlo poscia corretto nella data scaduta per giovarsene alla emigrazione, che gli era stata impedita dall'autorità a causa principalmente della moglie e dei figli che egli lasciava senza mezzi di sussistenza. »

obligatory military service. Only in 1912 did the Italian government finally compromise on this point by allowing second generation emigrants who had retained their nationality to perform their military duties in their host country. Unlike for their parents, service in a foreign military did not automatically result in loss of nationality.[37]

The records in Naples suggest that of those caught in the act of emigrating illegally, only a fraction did so for financial reasons. Unsurprisingly, some of the migrants who decided to leave clandestinely were doing so to avoid military service. In 1884, there were a handful of registered cases in Naples. They included a man who had smeared his body with coal to impersonate a returning migrant of African descent and a twenty-one year old who had enlisted a man of considerably smaller stature to impersonate him.[38] Some fugitives had been convicted of more serious crimes, like personal injury or child abduction.[39] Writing in 1902 the *questore* (or police superintendant) in Naples noted that the port city had become a transit point for convicted criminals from the entire south of Italy, many of whom were deserters. In March of that year he counted nine men who had attempted to emigrate clandestinely and had prior convictions for violent crimes.[40]

Clandestine departures of minors and child smuggling were fairly common and exceptionally insidious crimes. As transatlantic emigration picked up in the 1880s, so did the forced migration of Italian children into France. Known as the white slave trade, tens of thousands of children were smuggled across the border to work in glass factories and other industries for very little pay in a state of near captivity. Desperate and ignorant parents would sell them into slavery to emigration agents who, having arranged for their transport and employment, would make promises regarding the easy nature of the work and the pleasant accommodation; upon arrival they would censor all correspondence between children and their parents in order to stop them sounding the alarm. Sometimes, however, it was the parents who would smuggle the children directly into France. Some parents even doubled-up as emigration agents, recruiting other people's children.[41] Along with the trafficking of women to brothels (Mediterranean countries such as Malta were common destinations) and

[37] Sabina Donati, *A Political History of National Citizenship and Identity in Italy 1861-1950* (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 112-117
[38] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, I Serie 1860-1887, Emigrazione Clandestina 1884-6, b. 1334/6, Rapporto, 7 febbraio, 1884
[39] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, I Serie 1860-1887. Emigrazione Clandestina 1884-6, b. 1334/6, Lettera al Questore di Napoli, Sotto-Prefettura Larino, 11 Marzo, 1888
[40] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, IIa Serie. Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 3469-3471, Rapporto, 20 marzo, 1902
[41] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie. Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione, Affari Diversi, b. 3387, Promemoria R. Questura di Napoli, 23 Maggio, 1899

the exploitation of migrants at the hands of foreign recruiters, they constituted the dark side of 'free emigration' in Europe.[42]

Yet, when it came to transatlantic emigration, protecting the unity of the family was considered paramount, particularly if women were the offending party. Among those caught trying to leave for France in 1884 was a twenty-seven-year-old man who had been denied a passport for leaving his wife and child behind without sufficient means to survive (he was caught eloping with another woman). The same year a woman of less than legal age was caught while trying to leave clandestinely with a man in his twenties. She had been denounced by another man, in his late thirties, with whom she had allegedly had a child. She was denied embarkation and was subsequently jailed for fear that she might try to leave once more, despite the fact that the man who had denounced her to the authorities was not her husband and could not claim her as his wife because she was a minor, and regardless of the fact that she claimed to have suffered abuse at his hands. Nonetheless, she was treated as a threat to social order.[43] As a minor, in order to legally obtain an emigrant passport she would have had to receive permission from her father (the same applied to men). However, men had a double hold over women: once married, husbands could deny their wives the right to emigrate without incurring an equivalent limitation. In practice, this meant that emigration authorities were constantly battling with cases of daughters leaving their parents and women leaving husbands by fleeing as far away as was conceivably possible at the time (i.e. across the Atlantic). Episodes of romantic disappointment, marital discontent and even domestic violence thus came to be classified, regulated and policed under the rubric of 'clandestine emigration'.

The imbalance of rights between the sexes lent itself to various forms of abuse that gravely prejudiced the policing of emigration. In order to stop women from defying them, men would regularly resort to a number of expedients. A common tactic was to report a woman as a prostitute to the police superintendent or the mayor, causing her to be harassed and possibly detained at embarkation. While women accused of being prostitutes were not automatically denied embarkation, they could be delayed while an investigation into the accusation was carried out.[44] Prostitution was not a crime, but prostitutes were regularly detained by authorities and subjected to a number of humiliating checks, such as health

[42] Ibid.
[43] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, I Serie 1860-1887, Emigrazione Clandestina 1884-6, b. 1334/6, Lettera Questore, Delegazione Marittime di P.S., 9 febbraio, 1884
[44] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 3861, Nota Questura, 23 aprile, 1904

checks by police surgeons.[45] Husbands who reported wives to authorities could also succeed in having them kept under special surveillance. In instances where a woman tried to escape with her children, the children were immediately returned to their father, irrespective of their will or even of reports of abuse.[46]

A husband's authority over 'his' wife extended to the entire family. It also existed in a 'state of exception' with regard to the legal system from which it drew its legitimacy. For example, a man could count on his right to restrict his wife's freedom to emigrate to be enforced by the police and defended by the courts from jail, i.e. when he himself had forfeited his right to freedom by committing a crime. When a woman whose husband had been imprisoned sold the family property and prepared to emigrate with their children, the husband wrote to the *questore* from prison asking him to deny them embarkation. The *questore* acceded to the request and reported the case to the police of the port of Naples (Polizia dello Scalo Marittimo di Napoli) exhorting them to be vigilant.[47] It also transcended the confines of the Italian peninsula where it was upheld by the jurisdictions of destination countries that also sought to protect the integrity of the family. Thus, a naturalised United States' citizen could enlist the support of the American Consul in Naples to arrange for the return of his wife and children who had 'overstayed' in Italy.[48] The pendulum swung both ways. When a naturalised Italian-American citizen left his wife and children stranded in Naples, the U.S. Consul repatriated them to New York.[49]

Male authority over his wife and family was tempered only by the legal weight carried by the institution of marriage. Adultery, considered a crime only for women, was however sufficient grounds for denying embarkation to both women *and* men and the police would frequently receive pleading letters from women asking them to stop their husbands from leaving or eloping with other women. In acting to protect their marriage and family unity, women could rely on the support of public authorities, both local and provincial. In 1909 a woman from the province of Salerno, for example, enlisted the support of the local mayor who wrote to the police superintendent in Naples to report the escape of her husband. In his

[45] John A. Davis, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-century Italy* (Humanities Press International: New Jersey, 1988), pp. 228, 232

[46] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria. b. 4067, Regno d'Italia, R. Sotto-Prefettura di Vallo Della Lucania, Il sottoprefetto al Questore di Napoli, 1 settembre, 1909

[47] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 3861, Lettera del Detenuto Curti Giuseppe fu Luigi, 22 agosto, 1904

[48] NARA, RG 84, Consular Posts, 0022, Letter from Jake Conti, Manufacturer of High-Class Fire Works in New Castle Pa to the U.S. Consul in Naples, New Castle, February 27th, 1913 ; NARA, RG 84, Consular Posts, 0022, Letter from American Consul in Naples Mr Handley, 2nd March, 1913

[49] NARA, RG 84, Consular Posts, / 0022, Letter to Immigration Authorities at Ellis Island, from American Consul in Naples, October 3rd, 1912 "The bearer of this letter, Mrs. Lizzette Paca is an American Citizen, the wife of a Naturalzied Italian, whose Citizen papers have been presented at this Consulate. Mrs. Pace has been shipped aboard S.S. 'Perugia' at my request. She and her two small children were abandoned by her husbadnad and left here absolutely destitute."

letter he included a physical description of his appearance, to facilitate his identification.[50] Their right to be supported by their husbands was recognized even in the absence of children.[51] Women's power to limit a man's right to emigrate did not only derive from her right to protect their marriage, the basis of family life, but also her honour. In 1909 the *questore* in Naples interjected on behalf of a woman from Bari, in Apulia, who denounced the imminent departure of a man who "having stolen her honour now refused to marry".[52]

Nonetheless, women's influence over men's right to emigrate was not recognized on the basis of their legal and civil equality to men, but only as a means to ensure family unity and protect the sanctity of marriage. In the words of John Davis, Italy's Civil Code of 1865 was designed to 'enforce patriarchial hierarchy.'[53] Women's subaltern legal status was not limited to emigration law, from voting rights to the right to own property or indeed of control over their own bodies, it pervaded every aspect of jurisprudence, including the very basis of citizenship, nationality. Family unity was considerd both constitutive of the nation and, as far as female membership was concerned, superior to it.[54] Women could not pass their nationality on to their children and upon marriage they automatically acquired their husbands' citizenship. If their husbands changed their nationality and naturalised in a foreign country, women were automatically stripped of the status of Italian. Their husbands therefore could not only report them to the authorities as 'clandestine migrants', but by changing nationality they could alienate them from the status of emigrating national altogether.

Like all rights, the right to emigrate was limited by a number of conditions. Some targeted an individual's relationship to the various stakeholders in the emigration business, shipping companies, emigration agents and the like, and to his or her prospective employers. Others targeted an individual's relationship to the state, to public institutions such as the

[50] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura di Napoli, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 4067, Lettera Sindaco Municipio di Capaccio, Provincia di Salerno, Circondario di Salerno, al Questore di Napoli, 30 Giugnio, 1909

[51] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura di Napoli, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 4067, Nota del Questore al Sig. Commissario di P.S Scalo Marittimo, Undated.

[52] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 4067, Nota Questore al Commissario P.S Scalo Marittimo, 7 Gennaio, 1909

[53] Davis, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-century Italy*, p. 276: "The main thrust of the Code was to reaffirm the authority of the male head of the household, which was seen as the key to the unity and well-being of the family. There was no lessening of the husband's authority over his wife, no provision for divorce, while women were debarred from entering into any commercial or legal transactions, from contracting debts or significant bills, without their husband's consent. A wife was obliged to take her husband's name and to reside with him, while being excluded from the 'family councils' that until 1942 were legally empowered to take decisions regarding the disposal of collective family, inheritance and dowry settlements."

[54] Sabina Donati, *A Political History of National Citizenship and Identity in Italy 1861-1950* (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2013) "The rules concerning the women of the peninsula , like those touching on the nationality of females in many other countries, were seen as necessary to uphold and realize in practice the deeply rooted 'principle of family unity' according to which the domestic household, created through the institution of marriage, was a primary state cell and a social entity to be kept united through the husband/father's traditional authority *and* nationality status. In particular, by defining the nationality of all family members through marital and paternal citizenship (that is through the *status civitatis* fo the male adult within the couple), the authorities saw to it that the family remained united from a legal point of view, whereas if individuals held different nationalities within the same household, the latter would disintegrate." (p. 41)

army, and to (semi) private institutions such as the family. Free and legal migration did not always coincide. These limitations could sometimes alienate free migration from legal channels in cases where a migrant was obliged to leave clandestinely in order to protect his or her own freedom. Migrants left clandestinely because they might have committed a crime, but they might also choose to put themselves at odds with the law by emigrating clandestinely out of a feeling of being oppressed by their economic condition or by the repressive nature of existing laws. In cases such as these, the distinction between free and forced migration becomes difficult to establish. Once the ban on emigration had been lifted, clandestine emigration from Italy was motivated less by the lack of legal pathways and more by the activity of foreign recruiters and agents. But it continued to be directly motivated by the desire to escape the legal confines of the state. Unlike with recruitment by foreign agents and employers, transit via third countries was not directly linked to these particular kinds of rebellious or seditious forms of clandestine migration, although the two did overlap.

The trail to France was littered with cases of criminals fleeing justice, of men eloping with other women or wives leaving their husbands (and husbands leaving wives). Italy's laws on adultery, on citizenship and on emigration were not a sufficient deterrent, nor was the policing of nodal points or the sustained efforts at surveillance supported by both civil society and public authorities. By introducing passport controls, the Emigration Law of 1901 presented a means for bringing clandestine flows to the surface, for detecting the undetected. In doing so, it redefined clandestinity and changed the ways in which the state sought to counter clandestine emigration. It created a new bureaucratic rationale for its policing, the protection of a system of legal documentation, which in turn multiplied and spread controls further. In order to work, this system relied on a national network of surveillance and inspection. It was not designed to be transnational. It was undermined both by the weakness of the passport as a form of identification and by Italy's proximity to France. While in this case transit to France did not shape the content of controls, it was fundamental to their failure.

The paper-less trail to France: clandestine emigration and passport controls

Among the cases of clandestine emigration from Naples in 1902 is that of a 28-year-old farmer from the province of Catanzaro, in Calabria, who wound up in a police cell after

having been found wandering the streets at night, drunk, with a substantial amount of cash in his pockets (over two thousand lira). After being arrested for public disturbance he was asked to account for the considerable sum of money he carried, to which he replied that he had earned it in the United States. Having consumed vast quantities of wine the previous night, he could not remember much that had happened after having disembarked from the steamer that had taken him to Italy from New York. Unable to produce a passport to prove his identity, the police added his file to the records for clandestine migration.[55] Whether or not he was charged is unknown, but his inability to document his identity was sufficient grounds for the authorities to suspect him of 'clandestinity' even if, paradoxically, it was also considered sufficient proof that he had indeed returned from the United States and was, in fact, a migrant. Aside from providing further proof of the contradictions implicit in documenting the undocumented (and the undocument-able) and of the difficulties in policing migration bureaucratically, it also points to another reality of early twentieth century migration control in Italy: the policing of clandestinity had become dependent on documentary checks on individual identity. After 1901, smuggling oneself or being smuggled across a border or on-board a ship was no longer the only marker of clandestinity. In fact, the decision to go without a passport, whether deliberate or forced, was commonly the first phase in an illegal journey. Not only that: the passport had become a common proof of identity and of migrant status.

The invention of the national passport in Italy is one of the overlooked legacies of nineteenth century transatlantic emigration. The citizenship laws introduced under the Savoy monarchy following unification had (in theory) done away with the need for passports to travel among the peninsula's various regions that, until that point, had been divided politically among seven states. Unlike in the United Kingdom (with the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 and Aliens Order of 1920) or the United States (following the Asian Restriction Acts of the 1880s and the Immigration Restriction Act of 1891), in Italy the task of regulating immigration did not inspire the need for passport controls at this time. Prior to World War One, immigrants never amounted to more than 1 percent of the Italian population. The new state welcomed political refugees from former occupying powers and fast-tracked their route to full citizenship by granting them a special immigrant status as 'non-national Italians' (*italiani non regnicoli*). It also welcomed Swiss bankers, British aristocrats, German engineers, French merchants and other groups of elite migrants. The most numerous

[55] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, IIa Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria. Rimpatri, b. 3469-3471, Stranded returnees. Colabraro Francesco Di Pietro, ottobre 22, 1902

immigrants were Swiss, German and Austrian, primarily labourers who had come looking for work in the industrializing regions of northern Italy (Lombardy, Liguria and the Veneto), but they were still relatively few in number (in 1871 Austrians were the largest immigrant group, totalling 18,660, roughly one third of Italy's overall immigrant population at the time). Immigrants from Asia and Africa were in the hundreds.[56] In policy circles the word 'immigrant' was not heavily politicised and racialised or as yet hostage to xenophobes.

In fact, the task of defining the status of migrants was left to the emigration lobbies. The Law of 1901 defined a migrant as anyone who travelled in third or fourth class on a steamer beyond the Mediterranean, defined as the stretch of water between the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. It required migrants to carry a passport, which would be checked upon embarkation by shipping companies, port authorities and by emigration commissioners. In order to obtain a passport, Italians had to apply to provincial authorities, usually the local mayor, who checked that emigration was not being used to dodge military service or flee justice. Applications also involved the payment of a fee and an investigation into an individual's finances, as well as his or her good conduct, particularly if married and with children. Immigrants had to naturalise in order to obtain a passport, but it was not awarded as proof of citizenship. Lack of full citizenship, like in the case of colonial subjects, also did not entitle one to apply. In times of epidemics, applicants could also be subjected to a health screening.

Passports came in various shapes and sizes. Some were closer to letters of introduction, requesting safe passage for the holder, also known as *laissez passer* or 'lascia passare' in Italian, meaning 'to grant passage'. They came from an older tradition of diplomatic correspondence that pre-dated the invention of the nation state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; in Europe they dated as far back as the eleventh century. As Craig Robertson argues in his history of American passport, their purpose was that of verifying the identity of the issuing authority as much as that of the traveller.[57] Foreign officials were not supposed to dwell on the traveller's personal information in order to identify him or her. Rather, they were expected to examine the heraldry and other insignia with which the issuing authority had marked it, in order to verify the authenticity of the document. In the absence of a modern bureaucratic infrastructure and identification technologies, such as photography, necessary for mass inspections of passengers, inspections relied more heavily on trust and familiarity with the symbols of state.

[56] Luca Einaudi, *Le politiche dell'immigrazione in Italia dall'Unità a oggi* (Roma : Laterza, 2007), p.9
[57] Craig Robertson, *The Passport in America. The History of a Document* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 25

Following the Law of 1901 passports in Italy became smaller, more succinct and impersonal documents, closer to the modern day equivalent (Figure 1). They included information on an individual's civil status (date and place of birth, of domicile, profession) along with a description of the individual's anatomical 'data', usually in the form of a list, and, crucially, their signature. The change in their design reflected changes in techniques and technologies of individual identification – from the discipline of calligraphy, which sought to make the inspection of signatures a science, to bertillonage, which for each individual established a unique identity based on physical measurements that could be rapidly checked and efficiently archived, to the use of fingerprinting, photography as well as of new weaving and printing techniques intended to thwart passport fraud. It also reflected demographic changes, the increase in population size and in the scale of migrations. Personalised documents could only be produced for hundreds of thousands (indeed millions) of people at great expense of time and resources. This also applied to their inspection upon departure or arrival.

Passports were documents that had been designed for a mass society, appropriate both in size and in format for mass circulation and inspection. Standardization was an outgrowth of this development. It marked a significant change with respect to the letters of introduction which served a more personalised interaction between traveller, issuing authority and inspecting authority. The emphasis in their design on the recording of individual civil status and physical features, in a standardized form, also reflected the new challenges and aspirations of migration control. Mass migration made it desirable to be able to link individuals to a document, rather than simply matching a document to a state. In the rising tide of mobility controls in Italy, the standard national or 'emigrant' passport (Figure 1) mixed with other hybrid forms of identification papers. Letters of introduction continued to be issued to those travelling or migrating to foreign countries in Europe or the Mediterranean (Figure 2), alongside emigrant passports designed for transatlantic migrants. However, new elements typical of the emigrant passport, such as anatomical data, came to be incorporated in their design. The transatlantic emigrant trade influenced mobility control in Italy beyond the remit of managing emigration flows. As the cross-fertilization of documents shows, it updated the vocabulary and grammar of mobility controls across government bureaucracy. As power was centralized, the language of emigration control, enshrined in the Law of 1901, provided a conceptual and formal unity which, in many respects, the Italian peninsula still lacked.

Other kinds of documentary controls existed at the time. Together with other identification documents, such as internal passports, emigrant passports were part of the growing paper mosaic that constituted an individual's legal identity as a subject or citizen of a nation: a neglected but important ingredient in 'imagining communities', but also in governing communities, as access to services and the exercise of public rights, including the right to emigrate, was increasingly dependent on documentary proof of national membership. Internal passports continued to be issued to Italian subjects for decades after Unification, such as for the purpose of curtailing vagrancy. They were even used to police certain kinds of international migration, like the smuggling of Italian children abroad, where passport controls were lacking, as at the border between France and Italy.[58]

The mobility of 'suspect groups' was also typically controlled via documents. Migrants suspected of clandestinity were only one of several groups whose movements were subject to special restrictions. They included criminals with previous convictions and political dissidents, but also vagrants (who lacked a fixed place of residence) and the 'idle', i.e. the unemployed. If detected by Public Security police, usually in urban spaces, which were the remit in which they operated, internal migrants could be ordered to find work and lodgings within a fixed period of time or issued a *'foglio di via'.* This was similar to the British 'ticket-of-leave' system, which obliged individuals to return to their place of origin via a fixed route or face imprisonment, except that it did not entitle individuals to free lodging along the way.[59]

The forced mobility of criminals or former convicts in Italy was also managed via other kinds of documents. The records of the state archives in Naples are full of instances where individuals were granted or denied passports and documents for residency or 'passage' ('carte di soggiorno o di passaggio'), or were issued documents of expulsion or of repatriation. One of the more touching testimonies archived in Naples is from a prisoner on the island of Ponza, off the coast of Lazio, who wrote to the questore to reject the passport

[58] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione, Affari Diversi, b. 3387, R. Questura di Napoli, Promemoria, 23 Maggio, 1899. "…il vergognoso traffico rende vittima i poveri minorenni della più riprovevole corruzione e che la lamentata corrente migratoria non accenni a diminuire è dimostrato dal fatto che non di rado, uomini e donne di età matura tentano di imbarcarsi in questo porto per Marsiglia, conducendo minorenni d'ambo i sessi, propri figli, o estranei, loro affidati, sforniti di mezzi e con scarso peculio, di condizione braccianti in genere o senza mestiere provenienti in massima parte da comuni rurali, i quali, sottoposti ad interrogatori, confessano che vanno in cerca di fortuna.E poiché, per reciproca tolleranza di buon vicinato, per recarsi in Francia non occorre il passaporto per l'estero, e buona parte, se non tutti, si presentano muniti di passaporto per l'interno, senza che si possa loro opporre ostacolo all'imbarco, raccomando vivamente alle suddette autorità, ciascuno per la parte che la riguarda, questo importante ramo di servizio, tenendo presente, tra l'altro che I passaporti per l'intenro …non si debbono rilasciare senza prima bene accertarsi dell'identità personale dei richiedenti, della loro moralità e dello scopo della richiesta; il che implica di non dar facile corso alla domanda quando si avessero ragioni a ritenere che gli interessati appartengano alla pericolosa classe dei pervetitori dei minorenni."

[59] Davis, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-century Italy* (Humanities Press International: New Jersey, 1988), p. 220

issued him for his return to Rome, his native city. In the letter he explained that he was reluctant to leave the island of his exile on account of having found there the company, respect and peace of mind that as a hunchback he had been denied in Rome and that, by making employment difficult, had led him to a life of crime to begin with.


REGNO D'ITALIA

PASSAPORTO

PER L'ESTERO

ROMA

Tipografia del Ministero degli Affari Esteri




Connotati del Titolare del Passaporto

Figure One. An emigrant passport c. 1901
ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, Polizia Amministrativa, b. 4071, Passaporto Emigrante per il Brasile, c. 1901


In Nome di Sua Maestà

UMBERTO I.

per grazia di Dio e per volontà della Nazione

RE D'ITALIA

Figure 2. A nineteenth century Italian passport, closer in its design to the diplomatic 'laissez-passers'.
ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, Polizia Amministrativa, b. 4071, Passaporto per studente italiano diretto a Alessandria D'Egitto, Durata 1 anno, c. 1896.

The arrival of international passports or the 'emigrant' passport did not spell the end of all other identification documents associated with individual citizenship and professional status, nor that of other kinds of documentary checks on mobility, such as the 'fogli di via' or the 'permesso di soggiorno'. In fact, national passports started at the bottom of the pile but grew in importance relative to other kinds of documents, because of the transatlantic emigrant trade. By the turn of the century, they were legally indispensable to emigration. Increasingly, they were also considered legitimate proof of identity and of citizenship as well as being useful tools for governing the mobility of criminals or former convicts. However, not only did Italy's crowded documentary landscape make their institutionalisation more difficult and their uptake slower, it also made their use as forms of 'transience control' redundant. They were never used in order to police the movements of vagrants or the unemployed. In practice, this made it very difficult for authorities to detect and identify clandestine migrants among those who wandered around port cities or in border towns in northern Italy, ready to cross into neighbouring Switzerland or France. Even if they were issued a 'foglio di via' or simply cautioned, they still had a window of time in which to make their escape undetected.

The second, fundamental limitation of emigration passports as forms of migration control was that they were not internationally recognized, which meant that they carried little value as documents for transit migrants. In Italy, while passports were required of emigrants, they were not demanded of foreigners prior to World War One. Their introduction in 1901 did not mark the sudden substitution of passport checks at international borders for those at regional barriers. National citizenship did not automatically guarantee the right to roam the nation freely and it also didn't automatically inhibit mobility across international borders. Crucially, passports were not needed for travel between European countries.

Not that Italian immigrants were free to enter or leave France as they wished. Whereas in the 1860s Italians, like other immigrant groups, had been able to cross and re-cross France's land-borders without too much hassle, in the 1880s even white-collar immigrants, such as doctors, were obliged to register their presence in hotels – which legally had to register aliens – and also with the mayor of the town of final residence. In order to do so they were obliged to present some kind of identification document, proving their true identity, but not necessarily passports. Letters of recommendation, national identification cards or a legal certificates of some kind (such as a degree) were also acceptable.

Passport-less travel between the two countries is partly explained by the fact that immigration controls in France at the time lacked bite. Unlike in the United States for

instance, immigrants were not selected according to health or their ability to perform physical labour. In Paris, like in other European centres of learning, demographers, statisticians, economists and, increasingly, the medical community, debated the reasons and ways by which it might be desirable to contain the immigrant population, whether to reduce Malthusian pressures on land, to avoid urban overcrowding and preserve public order and health or, more eerily, to prevent national 'degeneration'. Shocking incidents of violence against immigrants, such as the murders of Italian salt workers at Aigues-Mortes in France in 1893, punctuated the growing social as well as political hostility to foreign aliens. However, without wishing to detract from the harsh reality of immigration, xenophobia and anti-immigrant policies did not automatically translate into a hardening of borders. Passport-less travel between Italy and France remained intact, testimony to the principle of 'good-neighbourliness' between the two countries. As the questore of Naples wrote in 1899 in regard to the illegal flow of migrants to France, "[…] as a result of reciprocal tolerance and good neighbourliness with France there is no need for the use of passports and the majority, if not all [who attempt this migration] present themselves to our authorities with an 'internal passport', making it impossible for us to erect any barriers to their migration…'".[60] Introducing passport controls with France would have been seen as a hostile act, despite it being necessary in order to successfully channel transatlantic flows.

However, it also attests to the low status of the passport in France at the time relative to other forms of documentary checks on mobility. French law did not make passports a legal requirement for emigrants. The law on emigration (18 July 1860) made no mention of passports or of any documentary checks on migrants. The only document it mentioned were emigration contracts, but mainly to assert the rights of emigrants with regard to shipping companies and emigration agents, such as the right to receive compensation from emigration agents in the event of a delay of ten days or more (Article VII). A subsequent decree (13 March 1861) ruled that emigration agencies were obliged to provide emigrants with a copy of their contract in addition to a calling card ("bulletin nominatif") indicating the passenger's nationality, stated destination and the conditions of transport (the name and company of the vessel). Emigration Commissioners in French ports were obliged to 'visé' or stamp the contract before departure.[61] This created a significant loophole for transit migrants to exploit.

[60] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Amministrativa. 1888-1901, Emigrazione, Affari Diversi, b. 3387, R. Questura di Napoli, Promemoria, 23 Maggio, 1899

[61] *Décret Impériale, 5 mars 1861* (XI, Bull. DCDXVU, n.8S77.) « Article V : Les compagnies ou agences d'émigration seront tenues de remettre à l'émigrant avec lequel elles ont traité, soit en France, soit à l'étranger, à défaut d'une copie de son contrat, un bulletin nominatif indiquant la nationalité de cet émigrant, le lieu de sa destination et les conditions stipulées pour le transport. Dans les vingt-quatre heures de l'arrivée des émigrants dans le port d'embarquement, les compagnies ou agences devront faire viser le contrat de l'émigrant par le commissaire de l'émigration»

It was a loophole that French authorities did not have an obvious incentive to close, beyond that of obliging foreigners to settle their status as immigrants if they did not intend to leave the country shortly after arriving. Although departing migrants might need a passport in order to take their passage (legally) on a steamer headed to the Atlantic, this was hard to enforce. In theory, Italian Consuls and roaming inspectors could check their identification documents and their contracts in ports of departure, but this did not always occur. Thus, the lack of personnel and sufficient resources to process migrants abroad combined with the existence of passport-less travel between sending and transit countries combined to undermine the policing of clandestine emigration.

Contemporary accounts corroborate the existence of this loophole. Not only were passports not compulsory, they were closer to *laissez passers* than to modern personal identification documents. Writing in 1864 about embarkation checks in the port of Marseilles, Emigration Commissioner Charles Expilly told of an incident when the theft carried out by a minor at the expense of his mother and his subsequent escape onto an emigrant ship led to the discovery of a further three passengers of 'irregular status', all of whom were from the Basses-Pyrénées in France: "Unknown in Marseilles, these emigrants had been provided with passports by the contact of a shipping company clerk. Each possessed a booklet, but there was no proof that linked it to them. Their identity, therefore, could not be ascertained neither by this booklet, nor by the passport furnished them by an individual they had met only a few days prior. These Frenchmen were, we like to believe, perfectly honest; however, the circumstances they found themselves in gave their embarkation the unhappy air of clandestinity."[62] Clearly, they were of little use as personal identification documents. Writing on the subject of French emigration roughly twenty years later in 1884, doctor and anthropologist Dr. Gustave Lagneau (author of *Anthropologie de la France*, 1879) complained that its study was greatly impaired by the incompleteness of official statistics which was due, in part, to the end of obligatory passport controls in 1860.[63] Presumably, by requiring migrants to carry calling cards and not passports, France's new emigration laws had made them redundant as forms of identification and as markers of lawful emigration.

[62] Charles Expilly (1814-1886), *Du Mouvement d'émigration par le port de Marseille* (1864), p.10

[63] Dr. Gustave Lagneau, *L'émigration de France* (Paris, 1884), p.7. « Quels sont les documents qui peuvent nous permettre d'apprécier l'importance de notre émigration ? Quoique fort incomplets et forts insuffisants, les principaux documents relatifs à notre émigration nous sont donnés d'une part en France par les pass-ports, par le service de l'émigration, par les dénombrements de nos colonies, et par l'enquête fait par nos consuls sur nos compatriotes fixes en pays étrangers; d'autres parts, dans certain de ces pays par le service des immigrants, et par les dénombrements selon les nationalités effectués dans quelques états de l'Europe et de l'Amérique…L'insuffisance de ces divers documents au point de vue de l'émigration est évidente. L'obligation du passe-port n'existe plus depuis 1860…»

Not only were passports not considered a useful form of identification and mobility control in France, but neither transit nor clandestine emigration provoked much legal or political debate compared to the more contested topic of immigration. The sidelining of transit migration as a subject of study and debate is rather surprising given the high volume of transit migration in France. In the decade between 1865-1875, a few years after the passing of France's emigration law, roughly 78 percent of total emigration from France was transit migration (269,710 out of a total of 342,471).[64] In 1888, emigration from Marseilles totalled 35,513 foreigners compared to 1,561 French.[65] Both transit migration and emigration remained pariah subjects in the academy. Although someone of the calibre of Alfred Legoyt, France's chief statistician and the country's delegate to the International Statistical Congresses between 1853-1876, did tackle the subject, many of the stars of the Academy towards the end of the nineteenth century, such as geographers Paul Vidal de Blanche and Pierre Émile Levasseur, demographers Alfred Sauvy and anthropologist René Martial, preferred the subject of immigration. So did public intellectuals who made of anti-semitism a badge of honour, such as Maurice Barrès.[66] By comparison, in Italy emigration had captured the imagination of an entire generation of scientists and men of letters, from statisticians like Leone Carpi to poets like Giosué Carducci and, famously, the bestselling author of *Cuore* and the 'voice' of the Italian nation, Edmondo De Amicis, who even travelled to visit Italian colonies in South America and wrote about them.[67]

When emigration was discussed directly in France, it was usually in relation to empire and settlement abroad. Medical treatises on the acclimatization of French men and women in tropical climates abounded, and some were even written about the Mediterranean, despite its temperate climate. French settlement of Algeria had brought about an outpouring of 'scientific' literature on the perils of degeneration of the French race through contact with the Sahara. [68] Alternatively, emigration was discussed to make a point about the dangers posed by 'excessive' rates, not so much in relation to France's economic progress but to its military forces, tax revenues and to its ethno-cultural character, sometimes described as its

[64] Ibid., p.9 : « De 1865 à 1874, sur 342,471 émigrants embarqués sous le control du service spécial il y avait 72,761 français et 269,710 étrangers (1), soit annuellement 7,276 français et 26,971 étrangers. De 1875 à 1877, sur 70, 391 émigrants on comptait 8,590 français et 61,801 étrangers (2), soit annuellement 2,863 français et 20,600 étrangers. De 1878 à 1881 sur 161,519 émigrants on comptait 15,018 français et 146,501 étrangers, soit annuellement 3,754 français et 36,625 étrangers»

[65] ACCM, ML 4271/01; Police du commerce ; immigration ; introduction ; législation 1855-1929. 'Une étude historique des statistiques des migrations', dans la *Revue internationale du travail*, Vol. XX n° 3, sept. 1929. Ten years later (in 1898) out of 6,535 migrants leaving Marseilles only 538 were French citizens.

[66] Noiriel, *Le Creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration XIX-XXème siècles,* p. 19

[67] Edmondo De Amicis, *In America,* Roma. 1897

[68] Thibaut's *Acclimatement et colonisation: Algérie et colonies* (1858), cited in Eric T. Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers. Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and Fench Colonial Spas* (London, 2006); See also: Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *L'Empire des hygienists. Vivre Aux colonies*. (Paris: Fayard, 2014)

'race'. Thus Legoyt wrote of emigration as a world-historical constant, typical of immature or of aging nations. He considered emigration to be a problem for France because it robbed it of the 'healthiest, most vigorous and most intelligent' parts of society'; indeed he judged it to be a total loss because, unlike the British (but like the Germans), most French emigrants did not start a new life in French colonies, adding to the strength of rival nations.[69] The statistician and demographer Jacques Bertillon noted that the mass emigration of French men and women was needed in order to preserve the health and vigour of the French race by guaranteeing its expansion and prosperity, but only if it could be directed towards colonies like Algeria, which could also provide new opportunities for trade with the homeland.[70] Occasionally the topic of clandestine emigration was tackled head on. Both Legoyt and Lagneau provided tentative and sporadic statistics for clandestine emigration and both described it as substantial. They also both made a connection between transit and clandestine migration, but primarily in order to divine what percentage of French emigrants may have departed from foreign ports.

Expilly was more vocal on the subject and his discussion of clandestine departures is more interesting. The picture he painted of embarkation controls in Marseilles around 1860 was that of a fairly lax regime and of widespread clandestine departures. This was due to French administrative sloth – a Commissioner for Emigration had not yet been appointed in Marseilles, but only in Paris, Le Havre and, surprisingly, Strasbourg – and also to the bullishness of both French and foreign shipping companies, which commonly resisted inspections from local officers. They also cunningly exploited loopholes in the Law of 1860, which only considered vessels carrying 40 or more migrants as emigrant ships which had to be subject to emigration laws. It was not uncommon for shipping companies – including the Messageries Maritimes – to embark 39 and a half (for children counted half) in order to avoid inspections.[71] The lack of interest in clandestine emigration in France is also surprising given that France was developing an expertise in matters of identification techniques (and technologies) that revolutionised policing and aroused considerable interest abroad. Bertillonage, or the use of anthropometric techniques of physical measurements for the identification of criminals (rather than for the classification of racial types, as in

[69] A. Legoyt, *L'émigration Européenne. Son importance, ses causes, ses effets.* Paris, 1862, p. 220
[70] Jacques Bertillon, *La statistique humaine de la France. Paris, Librairie Germer Baillère et Cie*. 1880, pp. 146-156
[71] Lagneau, *L'émigration de France,* p. 10 : « Parmi nos nationaux s'embarquant dans nos quatre ports du Havre, de Bordeaux, de Marseille et de Bayonne, un grand nombre échappe au contrôle des commissariats de l'émigration. Les navires de la compagnie des Messageries Maritimes, emportent à eux seuls près d'un tiers des émigrants qui vont s'embarquer à Bordeaux. Le nombre des passagers qui ont eu recours à son office s'élève à 6,190, pour les quatre années (1878-1881). Cette compagnie étant affranchie du control du service de l'émigration, les émigrants transportés par ces paquebots ne figurant, dans les états, que pour le nombre»

anthropometry) was the brainchild of Frenchman Adolphe Bertillon (brother of Jacques Bertillon), who introduced the practice to the Paris police in the 1880s. By the turn of the century his work was translanted on both sides of the Atlantic.[72]

In France, both emigration and transit migration thus developed in a context of little regulatory scrutiny and policy debate. Due to the absence of passport controls at the border and at embarkation points, the transit of Italian migrants via France was, to an extent, a hidden or somewhat invisible flow. Italian migrants continued to be recruited by French and other foreign agents, despite the ban, and to cross the border without stating their intention to depart for the Atlantic. They continued to embark clandestinely without passports, exploiting loopholes and ambiguities in the law and the porousness of Italy's land-border with France. Without an interest on the French side to cooperate with Italian authorities to curtail clandestine transit, the Italian state had little chance of preventing it. And without either side enforcing passport controls for all migrants, not simply trans-Atlantic migrants, catching 'irregulars' was bound to be an arduous task.

By comparison, passport controls in Genoa and Naples made clandestine emigration from these cities more difficult. They placed more pressure on migrants to secure, at a price, the collaboration of ship crew, commonly via the intermediation of emigration agents.[73] This was rendered easier by the fact that passports were sometimes handed to agents or sub-agents rather than being given directly to migrants, a practice that in Naples had led to widespread abuse as migrants were charged a 'tax' by agents in order to retrieve their passports.[74] At an extra cost, migrants could also elude controls either by acquiring fake passports from agents specialised in forgery (this trade had mushroomed in Naples around the turn of the twentieth century) or, for a time, by embarking as first or second class passengers, thereby eluding controls altogether, both on departure and arrival.[75] Alternatively, they were obliged to test

[72] For example: *Signaletic Instruction. Including the Theory and Practice of Anthropometrical Identification*, by Alphonse Bertillon, Chief of Judicial Identification Service of France. Translated from the latest French Edition. Edited under the Supervision of Major R. W. McClaughry, late General SuperIntendent of Police in Chicago. Chicago, 1896

[73] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 3470, Rapporto, c. 1902. For example : "L'anno millenovecento due il giorno undici novembre in Napoli. Interrogatorio di Bettuccio Angelo fu Dannaro e fu Pegnallo Margherita …Dico risponde: 'Nello scorso mese di settmebre mi allontanai da Valle Agricola e mi trasferii a Napoli allo scopo di partire per l'America del Nord in cerca di fortuna. …immaginai che mancadomi di passaporto sarei sato arrestato alla visita medica. Decidetti, perciò, di partire clandestimante come infatti ci riuscii con l'aiuto dei due battellieri che non conosco ai quali diedi poche lire. Sono sfornito di mezzi di sussitenza e di carte giustificative"

[74] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Amministrativa, Emigrazione, Affari Diversi, b. 3387, Delegazione di P.S. Scalo marittimo, 13 Aprile, 1896

[75] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Amministrativa, Emigrazione, Affari Diversi, b. 3387, Promemoria, Lettera annessa D. Generale PS Scalo Marittimo, 6 novembre 1898, «A dire il vero pare anche a me che con queste avvertenze cosi esplicite si verrebbe ad incoraggiare quasi in certo qual modo a garantire l'emigrazione dei disertori e renitenti di leva di condizione e dei delinquenti d'ogni speci poiché se le avvertenze predeste venissero alla lettura osservate basterebbe mettersi sotto la protezione di un semplice biglietto di 2a classe per essere sicuri di partire indisturbati dai porti d'imbarco italiani. Di questo si preoccupano anche il Prefetto di Cosenza e i Sottoprefetti di Bovino e di Paolo i quali fin dal 1896 rilevarono che le espliciti assicurazioni predette avrebbero favorito la emigrazione clandestina dei renitenti, dei delinquenti a reprimere la quale la vigilanza non è mai stata soverchia»; Ercole Sori, *L'emigrazione italiana dall'Unità*

their nerves, physique and talent for disguise by attempting to embark on ships without being noticed. Sometimes, those who tried were let down by their own craft, as in the case referred to above of the man who was caught while in the act of smearing his face with coal in order to pass as a return migrant of African descent.[76] According to the records held in Naples, disguise was a commonly used tactic. Identity theft sometimes took on a subtler character, such as in the case of a man who attempted to change his name on his own passport in order to use a ticket purchased by his cousin and that bore his relative's name.[77]

The fact that this particular case of forgery was noticed by emigration police in Naples suggests that controls at chokepoints could be quite thorough. Perhaps this was dueto the fact that Naples, like Genoa, was not only an exit point for migrants, but also a 'sorting house' for prisoners. In Naples the police superintendant's territorial authority exceeded the port and the city and as far as mobility control was concerned, it extended to foreign nationals, including transit migrants, who found themselves stranded in Naples.[78] As the Grand Tour grew in popularity, so did the inflow of tourists to Naples, whose security the police superintendant was obliged to guarantee. The same apparatus of control as was concentrated in Naples did not extend across Italy's land borders, which made transit to France a safer mode of clandestine emigration. Given the continued demand for passport-less forms of emigration, not least by men dodging conscription and military service or women fleeing unhappy marriages, and of course the aggressive recruitment by foreign agents and employers, the existence of a legal loophole was bound to find people ready to exploit it.

Documentary controls and the transatlantic emigrant trade: a passport regime?

The history of passport checks on migrants in and across both Italy and France raises a broader point about the international spread of passport checks, the most notorious example of immigration controls today, a symbol of global inequality and nativist anxieties. Was

alla seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna, 1979), p. 324. According to Bordiga and Brenna, cited in Sori's work, there existed in Naples clandestine organizations that provided fake passports which were run and owned by foreign maritime transportation companies. Apparently, this clandestine traffic was in full flow around the beginning of WWI, so much so that the Italian deputy Cabrini listed the 'war against clandestine espatriation' as one of the urgent requirements of new social legislation

[76] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, I Serie, Emigrazione Clandestina, b. 1334/6, Rapporto al Questore, 2 febbraio, 1884.

[77] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, II Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 3470, R. Questura di Napoli, Ufficio di PS, Scalo Marittimo. Rapporto, 23 luglio, 1902

[78] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, Polizia Giudiziaria, bb. 3469-3471, Rimpatri

Italy's case unique or did the trans-Atlantic emigrant trade directly result or indirectly contribute to the international spread of passport controls? Can their spread be attributed to the surge in international mass labour migration that accompanied industrialisation and the integration of the global economy? Do they not also bear witness to the exclusionary, eugenicist and racist tendencies of nation-building, hardened further and rendered more lethal by war (in particular by the First World War)? Were they not printed and distributed primarily for the purpose of engineering an ethnically homogenous national unit as John Torpey notably argued in his *Invention of the passport?*[79] Moreover, can we infer the purpose of passports from their design? Was the rendering of individual personhood via measurements and other 'scientific' information not exemplary of the totalitarian tendencies of the modern police state and of scientific nationalism?

Immigration controls, which in the late nineteenth century had been building in countries such as France and Germany, spurred on by nationalist anxieties and leftist labour protectionism, employed a different arsenal of migration control to that of the national passport. Neither Great Britain nor France required foreigners to carry passports until around the time of the Great War. Robertson cites a French legal text published around the turn of the century, in which the passport is described, rather painfully, as a "curiosité' of the science of jurisprudence, a subject for a doctoral dissertation, but not one of wider significance."[80] Germany re-introduced passport controls for immigrants from Russia in the wake of a plague scare in 1879. Passports were subsequently required of all immigrants at Germany's eastern borders for fear of a mass influx of labourers from Poland; however, it was not until June 1919 that passports were required of anyone – nationals and foreigners alike – entering or leaving Germany. Among sending countries in the Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire was the only country that required 'tezkerehs' of all foreigners, known alternatively as passports, travel permits or guaranty certificates. They were used to regulate rather than restrict entry, by placing foreigners (travellers and immigrants) under the protection of "a state that shared their religion" rather than directly under the Ottoman sultanate.[81] Tezkerehs were also used to regulate the exit of Ottoman emigrants for a time and the rules behind how and to whom they were issued were tightened to stop migrants using them to travel to Egypt, Malta and other areas of the empire where controls were softer and it was easier to leave clandestinely

[79] John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 1: "The study concentrates on the historical development of passport controls as a way of illuminating the institutionalization of the idea of the 'nation-state' as a prospectively homogenous ethnocultural unit, a project that necessarily entailed efforts to regulate people's movements"
[80] Robertson, *The Passport in America. The History of a Document,* p. 158
[81] Ibid., p. 137

for the Americas, an interesting parallel to what was occurring with Italian migrants who travelled to France.

Even the United States of America did not demand passports of all immigrants. The national passport was used for the first time for immigration purposes in order to inhibit the migration of Japanese subjects to the United States, following the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1906-8. Chinese Exclusion Acts had resulted in a number of documents being created in order to distinguish between merchants and labourers but also between naturalised Chinese, returning migrants and new arrivals. They were not passports but they were still personal identification documents. Chinese immigrants responded not only by forging documents but also by disguising themselves; some assumed the identity of immigrants of other nationalities and some even blackened their bodies with coal, like the Italian clandestine migrants mentioned beforehand, in order to pass as African-Americans. The bulk of immigrants arriving on U.S. shores from Europe and the Mediterranean were also exempted from passport checks although, as Italian deputies stressed while debating the Law of 1901, passports could provide a further guarantee of suitability. Nonetheless, manifest sheets compiled by steamship officials were used to collect information on individual passengers in order to identify criminals and those likely to become public charges or to be carrying contagious diseases. Their inspection took place after migrants had been visually screened for 'suspicious signs' by immigration officers and medical staff. Picking out individual passengers for further examination from the incoming masses mainly on the basis of their appearance was a time-efficient if unscientific way of regulating immigration. Officials were trained not only to spot signs of disease like trachoma, but also to observe physical deficiencies and identify clues that could give away a passenger's nationality or class. Many of the same observations apply to other destination countries in the Americas, like Canada or Brazil, although inspection procedures were not as comprehensive as in the United States. Some evidence exists that most countries used some kind of documentary controls to process the arrival of immigrants, including passports.[82]

With a few exceptions, the transatlantic emigrant trade was not a passport regime, but it was not a paperless regime either. Documentary controls were at its core, whether in the form of emigration contracts, manifest sheets or various forms of personal identification

[82] ACCM, ML 42731/01, Police du commerce ; travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône, 1857-1921, Commissariat de l'émigration à Marseille (1857-1870). When asked by Bordeaux's Chamber of Commerce whether in Marseilles the administration did not demand passports from Emigrants embarking for la Plata, the President of Marseilles' Chamber of Commerce replied that exceptionally for la Plata ID certificates were accepted in the place of passports, whereas passports were always asked of passengers heading to Brasil and were stamped or 'vised' by the Brasilian Consul prior to departure

documents, including passports. Increasingly, emigrating clandestinely involved getting around documentary controls. The trans-Atlantic trade and more generally mass labour migrations to the America did encourage the spread of passport controls in Italy and the United States and of documentary controls in general. Passports were not at the top of the pecking order of identification documents, which means that the introduction of restrictionist policies anticipated their arrival, rather than the other way round. The picture that emerges is that of passport-less migration on the continent, with some notable exceptions, such as at Germany's eastern border, and intense controls at the nodal points of the emigration trade. One of the paradoxes that characterizes this period is the contemporaneous increase in international mobility, including migration, and of checks and controls on human movement. The passport remained a rather secondary form of identification, but documentary checks were omnipresent, and varied with intensity according to time and place. Generally, emigration controls became more liberal (restrictions were suspended) but more thorough, while immigration controls grew in scope and intensity. Borders hardened in places but never sealed off nations entirely. The cholera and plague epidemics that punctuated the nineteenth century created far more serious crises in international mobility, they blocked or slowed down flows and resulted in the creation of new forms of detention, inspection and surveillance, far stricter and more intrusive than most migration controls. But they were only temporary.

Overstating the biological and cultural agendas behind late nineteenth and twentieth century passports can overshadow the economic considerations that, on the other hand, are apparent when they are examined in the context of the Atlantic trade in emigrants. Passports were also seen as 'facilitators' of emigration, not simply as 'restrictors', as Torpey himself notes with regard to the Italian emigrant passport of 1901.[83] In theory they carried with them the assurance that an individual had passed inspections by his home state and had reached his destination lawfully, and that in the event of a rejection he (and less commonly she) would be accepted back into the nation-state of origin and not became a public liability. In Italy passports were indirectly used to oblige shipping companies and agents to commit to itineraries that had been agreed upon and not to engage in the 'trans-boarding' of migrants, which by 1901 was officially illegal, and to force emigration agents not to send migrants to embark abroad. In other words, they served to 'channel' migration flows along desired routes. If they could be put to use in order to prevent fraudulent embarkations or unlawful transit via third countries, they could also be used to protect emigrants as 'consumers' and,

[83] Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State,* p. 104

of course, also to protect operators in the emigration business, including but not limited to shipping companies. Hotel-owners could be protected from emigration agents who left migrants stranded in their hotels without compensation. Emigration agents could be protected from sub-agents who recruited criminals or financially insolvent migrants who did not have the means to pay or might be arrested before payment. By checking with migrants that they had been issued a passport, emigration agents could also protect themselves from this risk.

Once they were introduced, passports became not only a lubricant to commerce but a guarantee of authenticity of the chain of transactions that made up the emigration trade, with nation states as arbiters, a seal of approval or a rubber stamp of sorts with which a sovereign state agreed to the commerce of its people and which, to an extent, gave it the power to shape it in line with the national interest, however defined. Theoretically, the 'price' it paid was the recognition that the same principles could be applied to the trade in foreign people, that incoming aliens could also claim the same rights as emigrating nationals. In this context the state was not competing against religious authorities for the 'monopoly over the legitimate means of mobility' to assert its own sovereignty, as Torpey has argued, but rather it was competing on behalf of a number of interests (such as those of emigrants and shipping companies) with overlapping and at times conflicting agendas. If anything, supremacy in a trade and, more generally, in a logistical war with foreign powers rather than over domestic rivals was the prize. Monopoly was never a realistic option.

As the first decade of the twentieth century came to an end, passports had emerged as an important part of the Atlantic emigrant trade. In this context, passports were not only used to restrict immigration in order to biologically engineer the nation-state or to exclude aliens from national citizenship, they were also used to control emigration and, more generally, to regulate the market for the recruitment and transport of migrants, according to a variety of agendas. Although not all countries that were part of the trade used them, notably transit countries, passport controls were nonetheless re-introduced at this time as part of the transcontinental migration of labourers towards the Americas, not only from Europe but also from Asia. Labour migration on the European continent was not a passport regime at this point, nor was transit migration. Other documents, such as identity cards or 'fogli di via', were used for the purpose of regulating the labour market locally and nationally, in France like in Italy. While they could be complementary to national passports and undoubtedly served as inspiration for them, they were also used in substitution of passports, particularly in countries that did not experience high rates of transatlantic emigration or immigration.

Indeed, countries that did, like German, Italy or the United States (not France) were more likely to use passports as proof of citizenship or to police labour migration or convict mobility more generally, a testament perhaps to the impact of the transatlantic trade on their countries' 'documentary landscape'. This undermines arguments that seek to trace back the origins of the interwar introduction of stringent passport controls at European borders to the late nineteenth century. When in the twentieth century authoritarian forms of nationalism looked for a means for circumscribing further the rights of their subjects and citizens, including the right to migrate, they built on the existing infrastructure of migration control. In enacting a novel design, they reached for a familiar object. Yet, the passport's sudden primacy over all other documents as markers of nationality, as proof of individual identity and as evidence of legal transit were the legacy of the sudden upheaval in European societies that followed the Great War, not the end result of nineteenth century nation building or of mass labour migration to the Americas.

Conclusion

Emigration from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic was not only trans-continental and international, it was also transnational. As migrants made their way to the Atlantic they crossed several national borders before arriving at their final destination. This was not only because of the vast distances that separated migrants from ports with direct connections across the Ocean. Some were obliged to cross the Mediterranean in order to reach Naples, Marseilles or ports further north, whereas others, like Italian migrants, could simply cross a land border in order to take their passage from a foreign port. However, many did so clandestinely, driven not by the absence of direct connections but by the enticements of foreign recruiters, mostly emigration agents and foreign employers rather than shipping companies. Their clandestine pilgrimage was a tribute to the power of 'propaganda', as sending countries pejoratively labelled the advertisements circulated by recruiters. Unwittingly they also paid homage to the effectiveness of agents' transnational and international networks and in particular to the recruiting zeal of South American countries like Argentina, Peru and Venezuela, which continued to spin their web, clandestinely, via their consular offices abroad, despite the efforts of sending states to stop them. They also reflected the ambition, cunning and savvy of migrants who were quick to respond to offers

of subsidised or cheaper travel and guaranteed employment abroad. They were ready to undergo considerable hardship and even to defy the law in order to obtain them. While traditionally the emphasis of historians has been on migrants as victims and dupes of emigration agents and foreign recruiters, there is little to indicate that they did not undertake these risks willingly and knowingly. It raises the question of whether the outlawing of 'contract labour' by European states in the wake of the abolition of slavery, one of the cornerstones of liberal regimes favouring 'free migration', was perceived as an advantage by migrants.

Some did not decide to transit clandestinely via a third country out of convenience but out of necessity. Italian migrants were not alone in doing so and other forms of clandestine land-transit existed. As discussed in the previous chapter, Ottoman subjects routinely transited clandestinely via Egypt or Cyprus, where it was easier for them to embark on a European steamer at a time when emigration was heavily restricted. Migrants from the Balkans regularly transited via Austria and Germany and it is reasonable to assume that a portion were fugitives and did so clandestinely. Increasingly, clandestine emigration and transit were paperless or undocumented forms of migration, in the sense that they eluded the gaze (and the archives) of the state, making any estimate of their overall volume difficult. As passport checks were introduced, primarily by sending and receiving countries, they also became passport-less forms of migration. Whether in the Ottoman Empire or in Italy, passport fraud was motivated by the desire to resist restrictions on the right to emigrate, such as income or poverty clauses or as proscribed by penal and civil codes. Despite the efforts of lawmakers to protect migrants as consumers and as employees they offer a stark reminder of the fact that free and legal migration did not always coincide.

One of the structural causes behind clandestine transit flows of Italian migrants to France was the unwillingness of French authorities to cooperate with their Italian counterparts and to enforce controls at the border, and the inability of the Italian state to carry out checks abroad, on French soil. Paradoxically, so was good neighbourliness among countries: passport-less travel on the continent also undermined the effectiveness of the budding transatlantic system of passport controls. Whether in the distribution of logistical capital, including transport infrastructure, differences in legal systems or in policing methods, geography mattered. Befitting its status as a transit country, France, like Switzerland, was being turned into a 'recruiter haven', draining migrants from its southern neighbour, much to the distress of the Italian state, of its shipping industry and to all those legally employed in the emigration business. As its merchant navy and its emigration agents

were busy recruiting migrants abroad, safely shielded by the country's diplomatic corps, and abetted by the indifference of its migration laws to foreign recruitment by French agents, the incoming stream of foreigners into transit ports like Marseilles, issued a new challenge to authorities: the control of the transient population.

Chapter Three

Hotel Wars: Hospitality for Transit Migrants in Marseilles

Mourad Diarbekirli arrived in Marseilles in 1909, aged 35. Originally from Lebanon he had spent several years in Naples where he had come to the attention of local authorities for spreading subversive propaganda. During a brief trip to Tripolitania (in modern-day Libya) he had authored a number of articles criticising European colonialism, and in particular the Italian army and navy. According to the Commissioner for Emigration in Marseilles, he was capable through his writings of "igniting spirits across the Arab world" and therefore needed to be kept under surveillance. Apparently under pressure from fellow Syrians, he had left Naples and had found temporary refuge in Marseilles while he waited for the complaints to be withdrawn or dismissed. After a couple of years he moved from Marseilles to Genoa, another capital of the Mediterranean emigrant trade, where he decided to set up a business as a hotelier, using what capital he had to open and run a hotel for Syrian transit migrants.[1] Presumably, his prolonged stay in Marseilles had helped him in his business venture. Since the beginning of mass emigration from the southern Mediterranean, Marseilles had become one of the favoured transit points for Levantine migrants. The arrival of ships returning from Beirut, Jaffa, Alexandria, Istanbul and other ports along the Ottoman coast brought with them scores of Ottoman subjects. Some continued their journey northwards, leaving by rail shortly after arriving in Marseilles for Le Havre, Cherbourg or for ports in neighbouring countries. More often, they stayed in the city for days, or in some cases weeks, mixing with other transit migrants – including Italians, Greeks and Armenians – and with the local populations, both French and foreign. Occasionally, some decided to abandon their project of migrating to the Americas in favour of trying to make a living in Marseilles. In doing so, they found new purpose in the emigrant trade.

[1] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1253, Rapport au Ministère de l'Intérieur, 1 septembre, 1911

From the 1870s to circa 1911, which was when Diarbekirli's arrival in Genoa was reported, Ottoman diasporic communities in Marseilles had changed in character and in size, from a small tightly-knit community of mostly Levantine and Armenian merchants, to the larger motley crew of failed migrants, fugitives, adventurers, and self-styled entrepreneurs. Mostly men, the poor among them tried to scratch a living as translators or runners while wealthier residents sold jewellery and other merchandise to migrants on their way to the New World, or set up shop as emigration agents and hotel-owners, using their family-name and reputation at home for publicity.

While Ottoman immigration to Marseilles has a long and well-documented history, the same cannot be said of Ottoman transit via the city, or of the role played by the diasporic community in recruiting and hosting transit migrants. Three historians of Ottoman transatlantic migration, Akarli, Karpat and Baycar, all refer in passing to the significance of transit via Barcelona and French ports.[2] Surprisingly, Barcelona features more prominently than Marseilles in Akarli's and Karpat's accounts of Lebanese emigration, mainly because of the way in which the sad spectacle of indigent Syrians in the city prompted Ottoman authorities to take the first few steps towards restricting emigration. Furthermore, the Ottoman Consul in Barcelona was instrumental in uncovering a smuggling ring that was based in Beirut but had chapters in Barcelona, Marseilles, Le Havre and Bordeaux. Lacking corroboration from local sources in these cities, the trail went cold. However, emigration agents, both Ottoman and French, continued to recruit Levantine and Armenian migrants from Marseilles into the twentieth century, and it is likely that the centre of diasporic involvement in the emigrant trade moved from Barcelona to Marseilles, although some agents still entertained contacts with the latter, suggesting that the Catalan city had not fallen off the map entirely.

[2] Muhammet Kazim Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', DPhil in Global and Imperial History, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom; Engin Deniz Akarli, 'Ottoman Attitudes Towards Lebanese Emigration, 1885-1910' in Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi (eds.), *The Lebanese in the World: A century of emigration* (London, 1992), pp. 109-138: "The local agents enticed the poor of Mount Lebanon and its vicinity to emigrate to the Americas. They also made the necessary arrangements to circumvent Ottoman inspection officials and check-points and for the transportation of the migrants to West European port cities. This they often did by smuggling travellers in small boats from a deserted spot along the coast on to ships waiting off shore. In order to meet the costs involved, the emigrants sold their lands to the very same agents at low prices or borrowed money from them at exorbitant interest rates. Upon reaching a West European port city, usually Marseilles, emigrants found themselves caught deeper in the claws of the network, whose European agents stripped them down to their last penny while arranging for their transportation to the Americas.", p. 114. Or again: "Quite commonly, the traveller made an exhausting tour of several Mediterranean and Aegean ports before finally reaching Marseilles and sometimes Barcelona, from where he or she would move on to the Americas or, les frequently, to Australia and West or South Africa.", p. 117; Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Emigration to America 1860-1914' in *Int. J. Middle East Sutd. 17 (1985),* pp. 175-209: "Once landed in some Mediterranean port, such as Marseilles, Genoa, Naples, Barcelona, or Corfu, emigrants were given trans-Atlantic tickets and embarked for their chosen destinations. Passengers for North America frequently transhipped through Marseilles, although Italian ports also were sued and Maronites from Mount Lebanon sometimes embarked from Cyprus and even from Liverpool in England; for those bound to south America, Spanish ports, notably Barcelona were the standard transhipping points.", p. 187

More generally, the social and economic importance of accommodation for transients, and its implications for migration control, are under-appreciated. If the build-up of transient populations in Marseilles, like in other port cities, represented an opportunity for local commerce, it also posed a number of challenges and problems for public authorities. Commissioners for Emigration were appointed to all the major emigration ports in France (including Marseilles post 1878), ostensibly to protect the welfare of migrants passing through the city. Together with local police authorities, they supervised migrants' arrival, departure and their stay in the city. This was crucial to how migration flows were regulated and filtered.

Unlike in some northern European port cities (such as in Le Havre, where the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique built a hotel for hosting transit migrants), migrant hospitality in Marseilles was not designed and run by shipping companies. The task of preserving public order, policing vagrancy and other criminal activities, and preserving public order generally, were part of the immediate context of migration control. Indeed, they sometimes served as its direct justification. Public hygiene was a particularly salient aspect (especially during or after epidemics), and had a direct bearing on both housing and on the hospitality sector. The decision of French authorities in Marseilles not to nationalise public accommodation for migrants (unlike what had been done in Italy after 1901) and the gradual marginalisation of the Ottoman diaspora within the migrant hospitality sector in Marseilles, point towards an alternative explanation for how controls on urban transience developed there. They might even have accounted for Diarbekirli's departure and his decision to set up a hotel in Genoa, commercially a far less attractive option to Marseilles. Political considerations resulting from Marseilles' status as the prime transit point for Mediterranean transatlantic migrants and the economic interests of local commerce took centre stage compared to freedom of trade and migrant welfare.

Cities of passage: Urban transience and hospitality

The history of migrant transit via Marseilles was also characterized by the psychological and social experience of 'transience', of passage. This, rather than the bureaucratic and logistical meanings of the term, seems to have been foremost in the minds of migrants at the time. Lacking first hand accounts, such as diaries left by transients, the mixture of trepidation and

anxiety commonly recorded by immigrants arriving at Ellis Island station for instance, is hard to verify. Yet, similar experiences and emotions emerge in part from the accounts and testimonies kept in the police archives in Marseilles. The bewilderment, desperation and shame at having failed in their migratory project is occasionally perceptible despite the rigid questioning migrants were subjected to by police. For the most part, however, the testimonies tell of minor setbacks, such as having been tricked by runners.

One of the first recorded complaints brought to the attention of the Commissioner was by the Swiss Consulate in Marseilles in 1881. It was made on behalf of several Swiss emigrants headed to South America who, upon arrival at the St. Charles railway station in Marseilles had been packed into a buggy by runners employed by the Hôtel du Havre. According to the Swiss Consul they had intended to stay at the Hôtel Suisse, run by compatriots who had originally arranged for their transport to Marseilles. Runners from the Hôtel Suisse had arrived to retrieve the migrants from their competitors and return them to their intended lodgings and the matter was easily resolved (except for the owner of the Hôtel du Havre claiming compensation for the cafés au lait he had prepared for his guests).[3]

In all likelihood episodes such as these fuelled fears that competition among runners was getting out of hand and jeopardising relationships between local and foreign emigration agencies and hotels. The lack of a publicly run housing program for transit migrants accentuated the consequences of even minor incidents, such as the failure to secure a place in a hotel or the inability to pay for one, whether due to lack of funds or, like in the case of the transit migrants from Switzerland, the risk of having to pay for it twice. Transients who lacked funds could expect to be hosted together with other 'indigents' in a 'poor-house' run by the state. But the majority of migrants had to fend for themselves. When eighteen Armenians passing through Marseilles were found to have more resources than they had originally admitted to, they were asked to leave the Hôtel de la Charité where they had been housed for free. The Commissioner noted that it was not the first time migrants had "abused" this service.[4]

Diasporic communities provided a useful safety net for transients. The eminent *Marseilleise* historian Émile Temime has captured the psycho-spatial dimension of transience in the city, and particularly through the neighbourhood of Belsunce, located in the historic centre of Marseilles, near the Old Port (known as *Le Panier,* meaning 'basket', because of its depth and capaciousness) and squeezed between working class

[3] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4 M, B. 2150, Lettre Commissaire d'Émigration au Consul Suisse, 20 décembre 1881
[4] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2152, Lettre Commissaire d'Émigration au Préfet, 29 juillet 1896

neighbourhoods to the north and bourgeois mansions to the south. Largely a Levantine and immigrant neighbourhood, it was there that Syrian and Lebanese transit migrants gravitated towards in this period. It was also in Belsunce that many of the hotels and boutiques catering to them sprung up. The most famous according to Temime was 'Plichon et Cie' on Rue Pavé d'Amour, also home to several emigration agencies and hotels. Although the urban environment that temporarily hosted migrants is rendered evocatively by Temime, migrant voices are only ever indirectly inferred. While there is reason to believe that they would have been warmly received by some who lived in the neighbourhood, not least because they represented a welcome source of income, there is evidence to suggest that, apart from some unpleasant encounters with fraudsters and con-artists, their presence in the neighbourhood elicited some alarm and suspicion. However genuine the discomfort felt at the presence of strangers may have been, in the evidence it is often framed by socio-economic concerns. For example, Temime cites anecdotally a letter addressed to the Prefect by a shop-owner in Belsunce in which he expressed concern that migrants were dirty and potential vectors of disease and as such posed a threat not only to public hygiene but to commerce.[5]

Regardless of incidents of this kind, there is no evidence to suggest that relations between transients and local residents ever plumbed the depths of violence that occurred between Italian immigrants and French residents following the victorious return of French troops from Tunisia in 1881, for instance. National antagonisms and rivalries were seemingly far more likely to spark violence and to conjur up deep hatreds than 'foreignness'. In all likelihood this was also due to the temporary nature of migrant transit, which aside from episodes when large numbers of migrants were left stranded in Marseilles, had few social costs. Yet, as the example cited by Temime suggests, and as the police archives reveal, the history of migrant recruitment and hospitality was littered with micro-aggressions and manifestations of xenophobia. This might appear all the more surprising given the city's reputation as a melting pot.

Immigrants had arrived in Marseilles from all corners of the Mediterranean. In the late nineteenth century Armenians fleeing Hamidian persecutions joined merchant families and craftsmen who had settled in the city around mid-century. According to one historian of the Armenian diaspora in Marseilles, prior to the 1920s these numbered only around 500 individuals.[6] In the 1820s Greek refugees from Ottoman aggression in Izmir and in other Aegean islands joined the Greek merchant diaspora in Marseilles that, according to legend,

[5] Émile Temime, *Marseille transit: les passagers de Belsunce* (Paris, 1995), p. 52
[6] Stephan Boghossian, *La communauté arménienne de Marseille. Quatre siècles de son histoire* (Paris : L'Harmattan, 2009), pp. 30-35

descended from the Genoese ruling family in Chios.[7] They were joined by more refugees fleeing conscription, war and persecution over the subsequent century. The latter hailed not only from Armenia, but also from Greece, the Balkans, the Levant, Russian territories following the Bolshevik revolution, Italian anarchists and refugees from the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian empire.[8] Their arrivals overlapped with those of labourers, immigrants and seasonal economic migrants, primarily from neighbouring countries in Europe.

The city's immigrant population rose from 10,000 in 1830 to 110,000 in 1914. Including newly naturalised residents this amounted to almost a twenty-point percentage rise relative to the total population (i.e. from 7-8 percent of the total to 25 percent).[9] In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the most conspicuous immigrant group in Marseilles (rather than simply 'foreign', which in then contemporary popular perception would still have included French men and women from regions other than Provence, or indeed from the city of Marseilles and its hinterland) was from Italy. Italian residents in the city were roughly 100,000. In 1906 12,000 Italians (including roughly 10,000 from Naples) were thought to be residing in the neighbourhood of St. Jean alone, in the vicinity of the Old Port, the majority of whom earned a living as fisherman. As Michel Ficetola explains in his work on the Neapolitan community of Marseilles, the evidence suggests that in small numbers they had originally moved to Marseilles with the intention of continuing their journey to the United States.[10]

Marseilles was unique but not exceptional in this respect. Immigration, both transient and sedentary, added to the population of many of the major Mediterranean port cities in this period. Tunis, Algiers, Alexandria and Cairo all grew in size in this period due to mass immigration from Europe. New opportunities in trade and construction attracted regional migrants who mixed with European adventurers, tourists, revolutionaries, and refugees from European colonial expansion. Beirut grew more than any other city in the eastern Mediterranean, from a population of roughly 6,000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century to over 120,000 at the turn of the twentieth.[11] Administrative changes, greater trade with France and Britain, and improvements to its transport infrastructure (including the expansion of its port, backed by the Messageries Maritimes) accounted for its enrichment. Starting in

[7] Michel Calapodis, *La Communauté Grecque à Marseille. Genèse d'un paradigme identitaire 1793-1914* (Paris : L'Harmattan, 2010)
[8] Émile Temime (Ed.), *Histoire des Migrations à Marseille. Tome 3. Le Cosmopolitisme de l'Entre-Deux-Guerres (1919-1945)* (Marseille : EDISUD, 1990), pp. 5-6
[9] Temime (Ed.), *Histoire des Migrations à Marseille. Tome 2. L 'Expansion Marseillaise et 'L'invasion italienne'* (1830-1918). (Marseille: EDISUD, 1990), p. 6
[10] Michel Ficetola, *Les Neapolitains de Marseilles* (Marseilles, 2015)
[11] Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1983), p.1

the 1840s regular waves of immigration, of refugees from Egypt and primarily of Christians from Mount Lebanon, of economic migrants from the Syrian hinterland and, in more modest proportions, of European merchants and missionaries, added to its population. The number of transients, primarily Christian merchants and the rural poor, also grew.[12] Urban sprawl, swanky hotels and the building of new mansions were some of the marks left on the urban landscape.

As far as elite architecture was concerned, comparable changes took place in Naples. The city was a mainstay of the Grand Tour, with the exception of the years in which the fifth and sixth cholera pandemics took hold. Although Naples did not undergo any substantial form of industrialisation, government investment in public services and financial speculation, both foreign and domestic, urged on new urban renewal projects, exemplified by the construction of the celebrated commercial galleries and the 'lungomare' (waterfront). A property boom followed the commercialisation of ecclesiastical and aristocratic property that took place in the wake of Unification. The *risanamento* project that followed the 1884 cholera epidemic also transformed the city's topography, resulting in the creation of large working class neighbourhoods (Arenaccia and Vasto).[13]

As a Murray handbook to Naples from 1892 commented: "Under the House of Savoy a great deal has been done for the improvement of the town during the reign of the late and present monarch. Many of the squares have been planted with trees and gardens; several new streets cut through the populous parts of the town and a magnificent embankment carried from the quay of S. Lucia, along the front of the Chiatamone, and the Villa Nazionale: and a capital road, the Corso Vittorio Emanuele, made all along the heights above the town. Since the terrible visitation of cholera in 1884, which caused such havoc in the crowded quarters of the city, the authorities have commenced an entire reconstruction of these sites, and are gradually removing the poorer part of the population to new and healthy dwelling places in the outskirts of the town. This important extension lies chiefly in the direction of the railway station, and on the heights of the Vomero. Immense works are also in progress

[12] Ibid., pp. 40-41. "Beirut's prosperity also attracted some of the destitute [in addition to Christian merchants], as Egyptian taxation and other exactions brought hardship to the peasants in Mount Lebanon, and many migrated to Beirut along with other coastal towns. Thus it was mentioned by the inhabitants of the district of Kisrawan and others in Mount Lebanon that the poor of Lebanon were 'scattered among the cities and villages of Syria.' Many left their villages in the region of Sidon, between Tripoli and Hama, and in the province of Akkar to seek refuge in the cities of the coast and elsewhere. Nor was their departure always voluntary, as the Egyptians forcibly recruited labor for their projects along the coast. Peasants were made to work in the mines a few hours away from Beirut; masons and builders were levied to build Egyptian fortifications; sometimes even the youth in Beirut itself were picked up to work on the coast."

[13] Giuseppe Galasso, *Intervista sulla storia di Napoli,* A cura di Percy Allum (Bari: Laterza, 1978), pp. 172-173

along the quay, comprising a new harbour, solid embankments, and handsome promenades. The total cost of these improvements will exceed four millions sterling."[14]

In Naples urban expansion was also propelled by population growth. In the late nineteenth century, Naples' vast population (of over half a million people around 1884, the largest of all cities in Italy) increased further due to the influx of the transient poor. Like in Marseilles, they slept in the centre of the city, near the port, in notoriously unsanitary accommodation, known as *fondaci* and *bassi.* In the mid 1880s, between 30,000 and 90,000 people, it was estimated, slept in these urban dormitories. Among those who came from Naples' hinterland, many would only stay in Naples for the week, returning home during periods of inactivity or unemployment.[15] Naples' status as a maritime capital and the city's role as a 'clearing house' for convicts, as discussed in the previous chapter, also played a role. The police archives in Naples attest to this mixed flow of clandestine migrants, drifters, convicts, refugees and urban poor. They included vagabonds from Egypt and Poland, Greek sailors who had fallen foul of their crew, fugitives from Sicily, an infamous relic thief by the name of Franz Werdau, 'a caravan of six arabs' who had angered a local hotel-owner by overstaying their welcome, migrants rejected by immigration authorities in the United States, and other 'clandestines'.[16] Unlike Marseilles and Beirut, Naples was an ailing city, not a budding metropolis. Although it continued to grow, it did so at a slower rate than most other major Italian cities, such as Milan, Rome or, in the south, Bari in Apulia. Moreover, while the expansion of its port (primarily on the back of coal imports and the emigrant trade) helped connect it internationally, railway development reduced the dependency of neighbouring regions on Naples, isolating it commercially from its hinterland.

In some cases, these changes had significant links to and consequences for the emigrant trade. The rural poor who moved to Beirut's suburbs to pick the harvests and work on the mulberry plantations joined the city's underclass in steamers headed to the Atlantic. The urban destitute who could amass a little capital or find a sponsor for their trip, could occasionally be found stranded later in Marseilles, Naples or in other ports of transit. The same applied to emigrants from southern Italy, including Naples' urban poor. Knowledge of steamship lines and Atlantic routes was linked to migrants' familiarity among migrants with cities like Beirut and Naples. Thanks in part to the Atlantic emigrant trade, a new kinship was born among the Mediterranean poor, made of transience in and between its various maritime terminals. The arrival of steamships in Naples, which signalled the growth of

[14] Murray's Handbook for Travellers in Southern Italy and Sicily. 9th Edition. London, 1892, pp. 23-24
[15] Frank M. Snowden, *Naples in the time of Cholera 1884-1911* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), p. 19
[16] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, Seconda Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, b. 3469-3472

emigration from southern Italy to the Americas starting in the 1880s, also resulted in the growth of transit traffic of foreigners, both migrants and travellers, and of the growth in the number of foreigners left stranded at the port. In Naples, local hotel owners gained from this traffic by allying themselves with both Italian and foreign agents, helping to recruit migrants as well as providing accommodation, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Emigrant traffic in Naples was predominantly Italian, however, and cultural differences did not significantly complicate the relationship with transients, but neither did they work in favour of some hotel-owners who enjoyed no obvious cultural advantage compared to others. Occasionally, hotel owners would hire foreigners as translators (the 'Casa degli Emigranti' in Naples employed an Abyssinian translator by the name of Gugsa Darghi), to appeal to the small numbers of 'orientals', but for the most part it was, culturally speaking, a level playing field.[17] In this respect Beirut, where it was mostly local samsars (runners) providing migrants with tickets and with room and board in the city, was more similar to Naples or Palermo.[18] However, with the emigration law of 1901, the Italian government had begun to take a more interventionist approach in regulating migrant hospitality too. In order to shield migrants from exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous agents and runners, but also to monitor their transit in port cities, parliament established that shipping companies would have to pay for their room and board. Recognizing the close connections, indeed complicity, between runners and hotel-owners, the law ordained that migrants would be escorted from the port and from railway stations to hotels by appointed staff.

Hotels – *locande* and *alberghi* – were obliged to apply for permission to host migrants and were classed and supervised accordingly. This became particularly important during the cholera epidemics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when it became more urgent to monitor the health of local residents, and maintain the general hygienic condition of cities, as well as the passage of foreigners. In practice, this produced mixed results, as

[17] ASD, Archivio Generale, B.12, Dossier Casa Emigranti in Napoli, Circolare Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1 dicembre 1913

[18] AMAE, Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale, Beyrouth, Vol. 11**,** Lettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 26 février 1903: "Out of the 8,000 Syrians who leave their country every year, roughly, 6,500 embark in Beirut where the epicentre of the emigrant trade is found. This flourishing but disreputable industry is the monopoly of 4 or 5 individuals. They enjoy the patronage of the local administration and European shipping companies and emigration agencies are obliged to respect their demands […] Recruiters send migrants to runners in Beirut who in turn provide them with two tickets, one for Marseilles, the other for the connecting service to their destination of choice. They provide them with room and board in Beirut, with embarkation tickets and arrange for them to be transported aboard, and they protect them from harassment by police and boatmen. All of this comes at a cost naturally. We can calculate that each emigrant pays, in addition to the ticket, on average 30 to 40 francs. Since runners obtain significant reductions on ticket prices from shipping companies and emigration agencies, overall they make a good profit. The total can be estimated at 450,000 francs, not less. However, these earnings don't end up only in their pockets[…] half at least ends up in the pockets of the functionaries of the Vilayet."

hotels continued to host migrants clandestinely. Regulation took the familiar form of the policing of the illegal economy, effectively consisting of a form of economic regulation for the hospitality sector. The involvement of petty and organized criminals with illegal hospitality in Naples had particularly pernicious effects, as local hotel owners were successful in blackmailing the government in Rome and forestalling the construction of public accommodation for migrants.[19] Nonetheless, pavilions for the inspection and 'processing' of migrants were built at the train station, and an 'asylum' for migrants (the 'Casa degli Emigranti') was eventually constructed towards the end of our period, after a considerable delay. Civil society also stepped in to fill some of the gaps. The Dante Alighieri society, established in 1889 to promote Italian culture and heritage abroad, inaugurated a new office in Naples in 1905 where migrants were helped to read and write postcards and letters, provided with reading material, offered information on Emigration offices abroad (and on the Banco di Napoli, one of the sponsors and the primary conduit of remittance payments from the Americas to southern Italy). In addition to offering assistance, it also collected statistics and information on departing migrants, exercising an additional form of surveillance.[20]

Surprisingly, Palermo bested both Naples and Genoa. An asylum for migrants was constructed several years later, but with private funds. The U.S. Consul in Palermo, Hernando De Soto, provided a flattering account of the migrant sanctuary in 1910 that had been constructed there a few years earlier: "The 'Asilo degli Emigranti' is a spacious building situated a few hundred yards from the waterfront to the city and can accommodate about 350 persons. It is a private institution and was erected in 1906, when, with the steady increase of migration to foreign countries, it was found that the small inns and lodging houses scattered along the port were inadequate to cope with the large number of emigrants arriving from all parts of the island. The house is provided with every modern equipment, including spacious bath and wash rooms, and a large court-yard with trees that afford an agreeable pass-time to the inmates while waiting to be embarked on the ocean steamers. The house rules with regard to rising, retiring and hours for meals must be implicitly obeyed.

[19] Augusta Molinari, 'Porti, trasporti, compagnie' in Piero Bevilacqua, Andreina De Clementi, Emilio Franzina (eds.) *Storia dell'Emigrazione Italiana. Partenze* (Roma, 2001), p. 252. "In questa città le attività delle locande rappresentano una risorsa strategica per quell'economia sommersa che vive sui piccoli traffici illegali. Per questo, quando si sentono minacciati i locandieri di Napoli, si organizzano e protestano. È ciò che avviene nel 1911, quando, a causa dell'epidemia di colera che ha colpito la città, viene allestito nel porto un ricovero per emigranti. Preoccupati di perdere i loro 'clienti', i locandieri inscenano uno sciopero di protesta che dura una settimana e che coinvolge tutta la città"

[20] *Gli Uffici della 'Dante' nel Porto di Napoli*. La Commissione per l'Emigrazione. Napoli, Stab. Tip. L. Pierro e Figlio. 1908

The cost for boarding and lodging is lire 2,50 ($0,50) per day."[21] Only a few years prior, however, Italian commentators had not been as forthcoming with praise, or as optimistic. Writing in 1908 to the General Commissariat for Emigration in Rome, the director of the Asilo in Palermo complained that his city had received less attention than Naples or Genoa. This, he judged, was partly justified by the higher number of migrants transiting through the other cities.[22]

The total number of licensed migrant hotels in Palermo in 1908 were, according to his estimate, 42. In 1905, Genoa counted 33 (for a total of 720 people) and Naples 87 (for a total capacity of 2,400), although there were alleged to have been over 200 hotels operating without a license, usually in cahoots with shipping companies.[23] The construction of the Asilo in Palermo was blemished by the failure of the Commissariat and the government to secure the cooperation and the funding of shipping companies, rather than their unwillingness to resist the demands of local hotel-owners as in Naples.

The existing hotels in Palermo – all 42 of them – were judged to be inadequate, because of their position on opposing sides of the city (unlike in Naples or Marseilles), making surveillance difficult and giving rise to flows of transients crossing the city to reach the port or to undergo medical examinations prior to embarkation, which was a perceived hazard for public order – and because of their generally sordid conditions. Migrants arriving in the station, usually at night, were lured to small habitations "filthy, tiny, dark, with bad ventilation" where they were "amassed, irrespective of existing rules, and made to sleep on a hay pile…".[24] The problem, however, was not only with the runners, who skilfully manipulated arriving migrants by packing off their belongings on a cart and directing them to a hotel before they had a chance to find their bearings, but with shipping companies, that regularly allied themselves with clandestine hotel owners who charged them lower rates.[25] Once emigrant hotels were able to exist outside the realm of the law, transgressions multiplied, and the hotels became "the epicentre of the exploitation of migrants". Migrants were regularly persuaded to undergo a fake preliminary medical exam and quacks posing as doctors prescribed them ineffectual remedies for non-existent illnesses. Migrants were then

[21] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from American Consul in Palermo Hernando De Soto to Secretary of State, Palemro, Italy, October 31, 1910
[22] ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B. 23. L'Asilo per gli emigranti di Palermo. Opuscolo. 1908.
[23] Molinari, 'Porti, trasporti, compagnie', p. 252 "La legge del 1901 stabiliva infatti che le spese di vitto e di alloggio dell'emigrante in attesa dell'imbarco fossero a carico delle Compagnie. La sistemazione nelle locande favorisce ogni genere di speculazione a danno dell'emigrante. Da parte delle Compagnie che cercano di contenere al minimo le spese e alloggiano gli emigranti in veri e propri tuguri; da parte dei locandieri che spesso fanno gravare sugli emigranti le spese di vitto e alloggio, realizzando in questo modo un doppio guadagno."
[24] ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B. 23. L'Asilo per gli emigranti di Palermo. Opuscolo. 1908., p.12
[25] Ibid., pp. 12-13

persuaded to buy insurance they didn't need, and were sold merchandise they would never use. Moreover, hotels become hiding places for 'clandestines' and as such acted as a stimulant for further lawlessness.

Compared to Palermo, where transit flows numbered around 300 people daily (roughly 100,000 a year), authorities in Naples had to contend with a considerably more voluminous flow which, around 1907, the Inspector for Emigration in the port estimated to be around 200,000 people a year, roughly double that of Palermo.[26] The lack of a state-run 'asylum', not regarded as a panacea by the Inspector, was only one of several factors behind the 'hospitality problem' in the city. As he explained to his seniors in Rome, emigration and police authorities could only monitor and inspect authorised locales; they had no control over unauthorised ones. Nor could they control the stay of migrants in private accommodation, a fairly common practice among return migrants in particular, who tended to have more disposable income than departing migrants.[27] Emigrant hotels, he admitted, was where the majority of the 'abuses and crimes' affecting migrants took place, and were the epicentre of the Neapolitan clandestine emigrant trade. In hotels migrants came in contact with the criminal elements that ran the clandestine trade, from the sale of tickets to unauthorised migrants to the forgery of passports. It was also where various kinds of fraud were practiced on migrants, such as the sale of fake currencies (mainly U.S. dollars). However, he optimistically maintained that there was nothing exceptional about these crimes, nothing that was unique to Naples, shifting the blame on the inexperience and naivitë of migrants. All that could be done, aside from continuing the good work already carried out to uncover unauthorised hotels, was to police the movement of migrants in the port and the railway station, where they were likely to first come into contact with clandestine hotel-owners.[28]

In Marseilles, migrant hotels were also under the authority of the Commissioner. But in the early decades of emigration, there was little discussion of building public infrastructure for migrants or – surprisingly – of asking shipping companies to do so. One possible explanation is that existing arrangements were considered sufficient, but the evidence suggests that by the 1880s the edifice was starting to show some cracks. Another points to the commitment to economic liberalism, which prevented authorities from

[26]ASD, Commissariato generale dell'Emigrazione, Archivio di Gabinetto, B. 9, Lettera al Commissario Generale dell'Emigrazione, 1 febbraio 1907
[27]ASD, Commissariato generale dell'Emigrazione, Archivio di Gabinetto, B. 9, Lettera al Commissario Generale dell'Emigrazione, 14 marzo 1911
[28]ASD, Commissariato generale dell'Emigrazione, Archivio di Gabinetto, B. 9, Lettera al Commissario Generale dell'Emigrazione, 1 febbraio 1907

interfering too heavily in the hospitality sector, although this principle was not borne out in other aspects of the emigrant trade, like with regard to migrant shipping. That shipping companies, such as the Messageries Maritimes, did not take the initiative unto themselves to build emigrant halls, the way the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique had done in Le Havre, suggests that whatever cracks did exist were not sufficiently large for them to fear that migrants would be dissuaded from travelling on their ships in order to avoid transiting via Marseilles. Perhaps the similarly dire conditions of hospitality in other Mediterranean ports such as Naples and Palermo, made it an unnecessary investment. The CGT in Le Havre on the other hand was competing with Liverpool and Hamburg, where Cunard and Hamburg-Amerika Line respectively had built new accommodation for migrants. Professor Franz-Labriola, who had been sent by the Italian government to Bremen and Hamburg to inspect accommodation for transit migrants, reported on his return that even private migrant hotels in the two cities were kept under "extreme vigilance" and were of impeccable hygienic conditions.[29]

The idea of transients as 'consumers' was severely put to the test by a series of incidents that took place in the early decades of mass transit migration to the Americas, in the 1870s-1880s. One rather dramatic case featured a merchant named Henri Strauss. Mr. Strauss had rented a ship from a ship owner in Belfast with the intention of transporting migrants, primarily Italian and Levantine, to South America. He had acted in association with Mr. Depas, one of the main emigration agents in Marseilles at the time. Ships were, at this point, more closely regulated than migrant hotels and upon its arrival in Marseilles the vessel was deemed to be of poor hygiene, and to be lacking a sufficient number of beds and adequate food supplies. While the necessary improvements were made, the migrants were temporarily hosted on the ship at the expense of the Commissariat, until a row broke out between Italians and Syrians over the distribution of food and several were injured and one killed. Subsequently, migrants were moved to a number of hotels scattered around the city.[30] One of these hotels, owned by man named Dorta, was the object of further complaints by his Syrian guests. An officer sent to investigate found migrants sleeping on the floor without mattresses or bed sheets in a state of utter disarray and in extremely crowded conditions: between 100 and 150 of both sexes had been crammed into rooms meant only for 40. Some were injured and had infections that, he judged, could engender contagious diseases.

[29] ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B. 23. L'Asilo per gli emigranti di Palermo. Opuscolo. 1908., p. 19
[30] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2152, Annexe, Lettre au Commissaire pour l'émigration, Marseille, 7 juin, 1887

"Roughly 15 migrants were already ill and 4 of these had been transported to the hospital. An infant of 18 months had already passed away."[31]

Four months later, in April 1887, several hundred Syrian migrants (the Commissioner had stated that roughly 850 Syrian migrants had been made to disembark) were still stranded in Marseilles. "The Syrians are still in Marseilles and are living in three hotels where they have been looked after and fed since February 10th at a rate of 1 Fr 50 per day per person. I have visited the hotels personally to ensure that the food they were being served was adequate and healthy. I have noticed that over the last few days these Syrians have manifested their desire to leave Marseilles for Brazil, their destination of choice […] It seems that it will be no small challenge to find the right connection for them to leave at a price that Depas can afford."[32] A month later, the remaining migrants had finally left Marseilles after 5 months spent in the city. According to article 18 of the decree of the 15th of March 1861, the agent Depas was obliged to foot the bill, not only for their new tickets but also for their stay in Marseilles, which had been temporarily paid for by the French state. The affair may have bankrupted the agent, for in subsequent documentation he was no longer cited as one of the main agents in the city.

The trail of creditors left by Strauss and others reveals the extent of the economic damage that the Commissioner was expected to remedy. But it also gives an insight into the rich and varied ecosystem of hospitality that already existed at the time. Among the various people that Strauss and Depas owed money to were three hotel owners, all with French and Italian sounding names, respectively Joseph Aubin, Joseph Garolat and Joseph Pesce.[33] In a second incident in 1888 that involved the emigration agency Suchet, which was in the habit of selling tickets to migrants without actually booking their passage across the Atlantic (occasionally for ships that didn't even exist), 48 Syrian migrants headed to Buenos Aires were left stranded in Marseilles for several months. In 1892 the creditors still claiming payment included four different hotels and both the Italian and Greek consulates. The Italian consulate claimed 72 francs for having hosted nine Italian emigrants left stranded in Antwerp. The Greek consul claimed as much as 595 francs in compensation.[34]

Migrants left stranded in Marseilles seemed to have relied primarily on Consulates, poor-houses and ultimately on the Commissariat. The latter's approach was reactive rather than proactive or interventionist. As the previous examples illustrate, institutional and

[31] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2152, Lettre au Préfet, 20 janvier, 1887
[32] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2152, Lettre du Commissaire pour l'émigration au Préfet, Marseille, 7 avril,1887
[33] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2152, Lettre du Commissaire pour l'émigration au Préfet, Marseille, 29 juillet, 1887
[34] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2152, Lettre du Commissaire pour l'émigration au Préfet, Marseille, 6 mai 1892

commercial arrangements involving hotels were rather informal. While poor-houses did welcome vagrants, including immigrants, the municipality of Marseilles did not have the logistical capacity, political will or foresight to deal with large numbers of stranded migrants. This also applied to other kinds of migrants in addition to those transiting to Marseilles on their way to the New World. In 1881, when tens of Corsican labourers who had been working in the military dockyards in nearby Toulon suddenly found themselves without a job, they travelled to Marseilles, hoping to catch the first steamer back to Ajaccio, but were left stranded due to long quarantines in the Corsican port. They made a campsite outside the offices of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique and some even slept in stables. Tensions with locals arose, driven by fears that the Corsicans were carrying cholera, and only under the threat of an imminent conflict did local authorities step in and repatriate them.[35] Even in the case of the Affaire Suchet, when the migrants left stranded in Marseilles were as few as 48, the municipality obliged hotel-owners to host the migrants. Clearly, the Emigration Commissioner was facing bigger problems than the baiting of migrants by runners.

Even economic arguments for the importance of dismantling runner networks as a means of ensuring fair competition among hotel-owners and emigration agencies seem to have held little appeal at the time. In an 1884 report on the clandestine economy that had grown around the emigrant trade in Marseilles the Emigration Commissioner addressed runners as 'parasites', but he also dismissed the problems they posed as being too minor to require his direct intervention, arguing that it was a matter for local police instead. He also attributed their persistence to the inability of emigration agencies to reach an agreement among themselves to 'eliminate' runners from the equation by refusing their services collectively. Surprisingly, competition among hotel-owners was not identified as a problem, but as an opportunity. In the same report the Commissioner rehearsed the argument for the economic significance of transit to hotel-owners ("Hotel owners primarily owe their profits to the custom of passengers who transit through this city"). In a further blow to emigration agents, he exonerated both hotel-owners and runners by suggesting that distinctions between the two were, in this particular phase of the emigrant trade, superfluous, for at his behest hotel-owners would regularly act as runners by picking up migrants directly on-board ships upon their arrival in the port. They did so, he argued, because "passengers did not really become migrants until the agent has delivered them a contract that bears my stamp/authority ["visé par moi"]."[36]

[35] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2150, Lettre du Commissaire pour l'émigration au Préfet, 11 mai 1881
[36] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2150, Lettre du Commissaire pour l'émigration au Préfet, 28 mai, 1884

The Emigration Commissioner's position was full of contradictions, testament to the absence of a coherent vision for the temporary hosting of transit migrants in Marseilles at the time. Emigration agents were repeatedly shielded from blame for illegally recruiting migrants abroad, a fact that the Commissioner brazenly acknowledged in the report ("Emigration agencies," continued the Commissioner, "have two different kinds of clientele: that which consists of passengers who are recruited on the spot and those who are recruited by their correspondents, the majority of whom live in Italy.").[37] Yet, the Commissioner also held them responsible for 'the problem of migrant hospitality' that, however, was clearly not limited to migrants who were left stranded in Marseilles for extended periods of time as a result of the misdoings of emigration agents alone. Although emigration agents needed to learn to respect the law, at least on French territory, the Commissioner was not going to do anything about it any time soon. This was evident in the leniency with which emigration agencies that repeatedly fell foul of the law were treated. Despite Depas's involvement with Henri Strauss in the Lake Champlain affair he was not stripped of his license. Neither was another of the main agents active in Marseilles, the infamous Trotebas. As early as 1878 Trotebas had been issued with a warning by the Minister of the Interior for failing to pay for the room and board of migrants transiting through le Havre who were rescued from the streets by the Commissioner for emigration in that city. Despite being warned that his license would be revoked, Trotebas was consistently spared punishment. In 1888 he once again neglected to look after a number of Syrian migrants who he had placed on the wrong end of a train heading to Bordeaux, a number of whom had mistakenly ended up in Lyon. Unperturbed, Trotebas had replied that the migrants had lacked the brains to stay awake during the journey, a response that invited punishment but was not met with any from the authorities.[38]

Despite the various reports of lawlessness, which prompted the Commissioner to write to the Prefect on the state of the clandestine emigrant trade in Marseilles, the Commissioner insisted that any clandestine activity was too small and too inconsequential to warrant significant reform. In the absence of any major disease epidemic or sanitary crisis, migrant housing had not elicited the need for further scrutiny. Major urban riots, such as the clash between Italians and French following the Tunisian campaign of 1881, were seen as having little bearing on transit migration. Not even the many instances of abuse and exploitation of migrants by runners and hotel-owners, such as the plight of migrants sleeping in conditions

[37] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 2150, Lettre du Commissaire pour l'émigration au Préfet, 28 mai, 1884
[38] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 152, Lettre du Commissaire pour l'émigration au Préfet, Marseille, 7 août 1878.

that would not have been tolerated on a migrant ship, were capable of shaking the Commissioner's belief that all these matters could be resolved with a few stern rebukes to emigration agents. What needed fixing, in his view, was the commercial relationship between agents and migrants, on which the whole system turned. The emigration trade may have made hotel-owners rich, but they were not the ones pulling the strings. Crucially, they had few enemies, except for embittered migrants. The challenge of regulating the temporary housing of transients in Marseilles at the time was conceived of primarily as an economic issue affecting business owners, not the migrants themselves, aside from their role as 'consumers'. There is no evidence to suggest that the Commissioner desired, like the director of the *Asilo degli Emigranti* in Palermo, the "total and complete vigilance of migrants."[39] It is hard to escape the suggestion that had transit flows been less recent and migrants less foreign then perhaps the municipality and the prefecture would have moved more quickly towards building public infrastructure for hosting – and for monitoring – migrants, perhaps with the financial assistance of the Messageries Maritimes. The concentration of migrant hotels in one area of the city may have made this less urgent, but other factors were not exceptional to Marseilles: the city was not too large, diverse or crowded (compared to Naples) to make forms of transience control impractical. All this was about to change, with significant consequences for the way transience and transit were regulated in Marseilles and, in particular for the Levantine diaspora in the city.

Levantine Hospitality Networks & Ottoman Transit Migration c. 1890-1900

As the final decade of the nineteenth century started the chances that local authorities in Marseilles or actors at the national level would change the way they regulated transit migration, least of all migrant hospitality in Marseilles, seemed very slim. The 1880s had been a turbulent decade. Migrant transit through Marseilles had grown in absolute terms, even though the port city had lost ground to Genoa and Naples.[40] Shipping companies were bringing in migrants from the length and breadth of the Mediterranean, emigration agencies

[39] ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B. 23. L'Asilo per gli emigranti di Palermo. Opuscolo. 1908. Parte Seconda. p. 3
[40] ACS, Relazione a S.E il Ministro della Marina, *Sulle Condizioni della Marina Mercantile Italiana Al 31 Dicembre 1890, Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, Roma.* 1891. In 1890 roughly 23,000 migrants left via Marseilles, compared to 40,000 from Naples and 70,000 roughly from Genoa.

recruited them from across southern Europe, tens and sometimes hundreds were left stranded in the port, occasionally for several months.

The city's life was marked by bouts of xenophobia and anti-semitism, and its political climate was increasingly polarised (it was home to Charles Maurras, founder of the reactionary right-wing movement Action Française and to Clovis Hugues, who in 1881 became the first socialist in France to win election to the National Assembly). At a national level, the 1880s saw the passing of new legislation aimed at tracking immigrants. Yet, not even the cholera epidemic of 1884 in which more than a thousand residents of the city perished, was motivation enough for local authorities to take a lasting interest in where and in what conditions transit migrants slept and lived.[41]

When a further epidemic episode took hold of the Mediterranean in the early 1890s the city council decided to temporarily halt the entry and debarkation of passengers from vessels coming from the Levant, but this did not lead directly to stricter regulation of migrant hospitality.[42] For the most part, authorities continued to rely on laws that were almost two decades old and that had been passed in what was now a foreign context. What might have seemed like a victory of reason over prejudice – the cholera epidemic after all had not been caused not by immigrants but by military personnel returning from Saigon to Toulon – might have had more prosaic origins. In emergencies, exceptional measures were adopted with regard to the housing of transients. When cholera returned again to Marseilles in 1910, Greek transit migrants from Chios were quarantined in private accommodation that had been temporarily converted into an emigrant hotel. The walls were whitewashed and a police officer was stationed outside the door. Three migrants passed away, and one fell ill and was taken to the hospital. Eventually, the hotels were evacuated and all residents, including staff, were taken to the city's lazaretto on the island of the Frioul.[43]

One change that did not pass unnoticed by the authorities was the growth in the number of Ottoman Levantine and Armenian migrants who were residing in Marseilles and their growing economic clout. Estimating how the overall size of transient populations changed over time is an arduous task. Temime has written that already at mid-century the number of transients living in hotels was roughly 1,600, with a further 2,500 living in furnished accommodation (although these did not include only transit migrants) estimating

[41] Dr. Fernand Giraud, À l'Hôpital du Pharo pendant l'Épidemie de 1884 à Marseille. Marseille, 1885
[42] ACCM, ML 42731/01, Police du commerce ; travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône, Lettre au Directeur de la Santé Marseille, 29 décembre, 1892
[43] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Report from French Ministry of the Interior regarding the transit of migrants from Chios to Marseilles. October, 1910

that the overall transient population was "in the thousands."[44] Using Ottoman consular records Karpat has estimated that roughly 1,200,000 Ottoman subjects (600,000 from Lebanon and Syria) migrated to the Americas between 1860-1914, the majority of whom probably transited via Marseilles, particularly in the final decades of the nineteenth century as emigration restrictions in the Ottoman empire were relaxed.[45]

Statistics on emigrant departures from the Archives of the Chamber of Commerce suggest that the number of foreign migrants transiting through Marseilles could have been higher in the 1880s than in the 1890s. As many as 12,580 foreign migrants were counted as having embarked on a trans-Atlantic voyage from Marseilles in 1881 (compared to 725 Frenchmen and women). The total had risen to 35,513 in 1888 (1,561 French) and 20,9234 in 1889 (1,660 French). In 1893 only 3,970 foreign migrants are recorded as having taken passage in Marseilles and in 1898 the total was 6,535, of whom 5,997 were foreign. This is corroborated by the statistics recorded in a case featuring a Syrian emigration agent in Marseilles. The report, dated 12th February 1896, explained that due to the Hamidian Massacres the flow of Syrians and Armenians had grown from 3,235 in 1893 to 4,283 in 1894 and finally to 9,221 in 1895.[46] When plans to build a hotel to host all Syrian migrants were first put forward towards the beginning of the new century, it was estimated that no more than 2,000 Levantine migrants were transiting through the city at any one point.[47] An article published in 1902 estimated that the yearly total of Ottoman migrants to transit via Marseilles was much higher however, totalling around 25,000 people.[48]

The number of Italian transit migrants passing through the city had been roughly similar in the first decades of emigration (in 1873 according to Ferenczi and Willcox over 20,000 Italian migrants had transited via French ports), only to fall significantly after the law of 1901 outlawed embarkation in foreign ports (while allowing the trans-boarding of migrants).[49] As the quibbling over indemnity payments for migrants left stranded in the city by French shipping companies show, not only were Italian transit migrants commonly hosted in "important hotels" owned by Italians, but the latter had the blessing of local authorities

[44] Temime (Ed.), *Histoire des Migrations à Marseille. Tome 2. L 'Expansion Marseillaise et 'L'invasion italienne'* (1830-1918). (Marseille: EDISUD, 1990), p. 32
[45] Karpat, 'The Ottoman Emigration to America 1860-1914' in *Int. J. Middle East Sutd. 17 (1985),* p. 185
[46] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Rapport expulsion A. Fares – M. Nhemie – M. Loutfi et M. Cattar, 12 février 1896
[47] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Annex III, Lettre de M. Lignon au Président de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, Marseilles, 17 juin, 1902
[48] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Annexe IV, 'La Traite des Levantins', Extract from Journal 'La Journée, 23 octobre, 1902
[49] Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Wilcox, *International Migrations. Volume I Statistics.* (New York: Gorden and Breach, 1969), p. 817

with which they actively cooperated (by providing information on the cost of stay).[50] Italian hotels, however, rarely feature in the records of the Commissariat. While this might have had something to do with falling numbers of Italian transit migrants through the city, it also suggests that police and emigration authorities in Marseilles followed them with less interest than that with which they followed their Ottoman counterparts.

The evidence available in the archives of the Prefecture provides no general statistics on the number of Ottoman residents of Marseilles who earned a living via the emigrant trade, but the many cases that were brought to the attention of the authorities do allow some observations regarding the general profile of the people who occupied various positions along the 'supply chain'. Given the scale and breadth of an inquiry launched in this period into the affairs of Ottoman hotel-owners and emigration agents and runners that was launched in this period, it is likely to be quite representative. For the most part Ottoman hotel-owners were Syrian or Lebanese, with Armenians being less represented. They were men, typically in their mid thirties or early forties, who had moved to Marseilles as fugitives or to try their luck as merchants. Many were transnationally mobile, moving easily between various terminals of the Mediterranean, like Diabekirli. They could also boast impressive networks of contacts, which stretched from Beirut and the Ottoman Levant to Paris and Barcelona. Commonly they were in business with members of their close or extended families, such as nephews or, occasionally, partners and lovers. They commonly employed other Levantine immigrants as runners, which reinforced the diasporic character of their profession. However, some did collaborate with French emigration agents.

One of the defining features and key differences among them was the means by which they earned a living, both in terms of the types of services they provided and the extent to which they engaged in illicit activities and were part of the illegal economy. Connected to this, was their social role and function within the diasporic community. In this case, bureaucratic understandings of illegality are not particularly useful because they tend to elide significant differences by over-emphasizing a common 'illegality' (for example an emigration agent who conducted his business honestly but did not possess a license was technically as 'clandestine' as one who did have a license but engaged in large-scale fraud), but also because in order to prove guilt police would tend to focus on whatever aspect of an individual's economic activity of the individual in question was illicit, thus distorting their actual economic role, for example by insisting that a hotel-owner was acting primarily as an

[50] ACCM, ML 4271/01, Police du commerce ; immigration ; introduction ; législation , 1855-1929; Transport des émigrants, restrictions et réglementations, indemnités de séjour (1869-1894)

agent and using a hotel as a cover-up, despite there being no clear evidence in the reports to support this. This betrays a certain zeal in persecuting (judicially) Syrian and Levantine agents.

Most of the hotels owned by Ottoman immigrants were located in the vicinity of the Old Port, near the neighbourhood of Belsunce. However, smaller, informal establishments coexisted side-by-side with what could be termed 'diasporic institutions'. An undated articled published on a Lebanese paper advised migrants to stay at the Hôtel Syrie, owned by a certain Melhem Elias Eskaf.[51] There were others. A report by the Commissioner for Emigration in 1902 explained how emigration agencies and shipping companies commonly paid or refunded hotels to host migrants, which in turn were only allowed to charge between 0.25 Frs and 0.50 Frs per day. For instance, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique entrusted 'its migrants' to V. Lefteri in rue de la Salle no.5, whereas De Mayo and Desbois (both prominent agents) relied, respectively, on the services of hotel-owners Gianélas and Nembis. Armenians, for the most part stayed with a French hotel owner named Miss Avériens, who employed an Armenian manager named Makradoumi. Unlike Greek transit migrants, Syrians bought pre-paid tickets in much lower numbers. The minority who did were generally hosted "chez Melhem" (presumably Eskaf, the owner of the Hotel de Syrie) in rue des Phocéens no.13, although when exactly this establishment was first set up remains unclear. The rest divided themselves between an estimated 8 informal lodgings run by their Syrian compatriots, making a total of 12. All were kept under surveillance by the Commissariat.[52]

One of the informal hotels was owned by one Antoine Farés who, in 1895, was accused by police and migration authorities in Marseilles of running a being the most important clandestine agent in the city. Originally from Damascus in Syria, Farés had arrived in Marseilles "without a cent" as a political refugee. He had been charged with vagrancy in Montpellier where he had initially opened a hotel for migrants (charging 20 cents a night) along with his nephew in order to "mask his activities as an emigration agent". According to the report in Marseilles Farés had hosted 2/3rds of 'Asian' [ie. Levantine] migrants who had passed through the city since July 1895, confirming therefore that the majority of Levantine transit migrants at this point did not purchase prepaid tickets. His clients were thought to have numbered in the hundreds, making him, according to the Emigration Officer, a total of roughly 180,000 francs in one year: a considerable sum.

[51] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Translation from newspaper Al Raounda, Liben et Lissen-Ul-Jobal, Undated
[52] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône, 1901-1902, Annex II, Commisioner for Emigration, Report to Ministry of Interior, Marseilles 11 juillet, 1902

This included the profits from another service that he provided transients with: that of sourcing and selling western style clothes so that they would not be identified as 'Asian' and rejected by immigration authorities in the United States. According to the police the margins on this trade were quite large: Farés bought clothes at 16 francs to sell them at 40. Such a lucrative trade invited competition. By 1898 it had grown sufficiently to arouse the jealousies of French shopkeepers from Rue de la République, one of the main avenues in Belsunce, who signed a joint letter to the Emigration Officer in which they accused Levantine merchants of over-charging migrants for clothes, which they insisted would end up diverting migrant traffic elsewhere, robbing Marseilles of precious income. Despite also employing Syrians from the neighbourhood as salesmen, the shopkeepers condemned Levantine merchants for employing their compatriots as runners. They considered this an unfair advantage that also negatively affected the quality of the products on sale, as shopkeepers tried to cut corners so they could afford to pay runners (their salaries constituted up to 20-30 percent of their total revenues).[53] This was not an uncommon complaint. In Palermo, part of the justification for building the Asilo degli Emigranti, was that of 'rescuing' migrants from the 'harassments' of local runners and shopkeepers. While cultural or ethnic rivalries were not part of the equation, the Asilo's management suggested building a 'bazar', citing the one in the migrant halls of Hamburg as a model.[54]

Given the size and repute of his establishment, Antoine Farés did not really resemble other merchants in the informal economy. They included men like Boulos Kaonan who, in addition to acting as a cultural mediator of sorts by selling western clothes to transit migrants, also sold goods that they could peddle upon arrival in the New World. Unlike Farès, he did not own a hotel for migrants, and doubled up as a runner. According to the police investigation he belonged to a wealthy family in Beirut and had been in and out of Marseilles for six or seven years, having once attempted to borrow money from the Turkish consulate in order to pay for his repatriation, only to have frittered it away in a short time. The testimony of a twenty-five-year-old transit migrant from Jaffa named Joubran Elias, who accused Kaonan of having swindled him by selling fake silver and gold bracelets, provides an insight into how the informal economy worked: "I was waiting in Marseilles for the next departure for Brazil, where I'm headed with four of my friends, when we met Boulos Kaonon in rue d'Aix who […] having told us that he was also a migrant went on to explain that he was a merchant and that he could sell us some watches, chains, razors at a good price that

[53] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Lettre d'un commerçant, 18 novembre 1898
[54] ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B. 23. L'Asilo per gli emigranti di Palermo. Opuscolo. 1908, p. 25

we could then re-sell in Brazil at five or six times the price. We were then joined by two more of his friends, including a runner named Selim, who repeated his advice and brought us to a shop owned by Mr. Mallan, in rue Pavé d'Amour [the main commercial street in Belsunce according to Temime] where Boulos selected and sold us the merchandise." They spent 180 francs on jewellery and trinkets, which was around the price of a ticket to New York.[55]

French hotel-owners in Marseilles also made use of the services of men like Boulos Kaonan in order to attract transit migrants. For instance, when the steamer *Pei-Ho* arrived from Alexandria on the 24th of May 1895 with on board tens of Levantine migrants on board, one Syrian runner named Couri Aramouni and a Greek man named Georges Christoff hurried to the port to shepherd them to two hotels, whose owners were highly networked in Marseilles' Syrian community. One, named Charles Baud, had been alerted of the imminent arrival of Syrian migrants by Marie Cattar, a twenty-seven-year-old Syrian woman who was known to the authorities as the lover and partner of a Syrian clandestine emigration agent. When the migrants first arrived at his hotel, they were joined by Georges Sabath, another Syrian runner who worked on behalf of a French emigration agent named Mr. Natali, who also wanted a slice of the pie. Both Sabath and Aramouni earned their livelihoods in the emigrant trade, but neither worked exclusively as a runner. At age 43 Aramouni was unusually old for a runner, he described himself as a 'translator', earning commission as a cultural mediator for his fellow countrymen. Sabath, who was born in Beirut and described himself as a 'hotelier', primarily acted as an agent for shipping companies that operated from Boulogne, not Marseilles. (Interestingly, despite the many agents and hotel-owners fighting over the migrants, many of them were forced to sleep with their luggage in a storeroom owned by Charles Baud).[56]

Mr. Henri Auque, a 61-year-old hotel owner from Tarne and Mr. Georges Cristoff, owner of a hotel in Place D'Aix and occasional runner, also employed the services of a certain Mr. Saïd Saghim, of Syrian origins, who worked as a runner and interpreter in Marseilles (Saghim had even signed an exclusivity agreement with Mr. Auque that required him to pay the hotel-owner an indemnity for any client he brought to a rival hotel-owner. Auque in return had agreed to share with him part of the profits from hosting migrants in his hotel, enlisting him as a business partner of sorts, rather than simply as an employee). Saghim had gotten into trouble with the authorities after he had run away to Genoa with

[55] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Rapport de police, 12 septembre, 1899
[56] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Interrogation, 28 mai, 1895

money belonging to Syrian migrants, some of whom had entrusted him with it in order to buy them tickets. Some of the money had actually been sent to M. Saghim at Mr. Auque's hotel from the relatives of Syrian migrants who were staying there, for them to collect upon arrival at their first stop.[57] Forward payments suggest that migrants tried to shorten their transit as much as possible (presumably both for financial reasons and because, as discussed, transit was riddled with difficulties and dangers), but it also illustrates another way in which migrants relied on diasporic networks of trust to navigate the globe.

Family networks also overlapped with informal credit networks: when Giakha Sofia, a Syrian woman who was transiting in Marseilles with her three children on her way to join her husband in New York, found herself short of money for a ticket, she visited several Syrians in Marseilles, including a relative by the name of Joseph Chagouri who worked as a runner there. Unable to provide her with the 80 francs she needed, Sofia was forced to call on another hotel owner named Farès Abou Arab, until another Syrian who had initially hosted her (and who she accused of having withheld her funds) finally agreed to foot the bill. Like in the case of Marie Cattar, Aramouni and Sabath, Sofia Giakha moved with relative ease among the various circles of the Syrian diasporic community, from one hotel-owner and emigration agent to the next.

It was quite common for transit migrants to exploit their personal networks to make contact with members of the diaspora who lived in ports of transit in order to book tickets and to arrange for their stay ahead of the journey. Sometimes these overlapped with commercial networks forged by emigration agencies based in the Levant, such as the Compagnie Française in Beirut. The agency, which obviously acted as a reference point for the migrant community there, arranged for payments to be made to their agent in Marseilles, Gabriel Antoine Khouri, a forty-four year old man from Damas who, in addition to running a hotel in rue Belsunce would also book migrants onto steamers on instructions from Beirut.[58]

As with Farés, to whose hotel migrants flocked, family reputation was an effective means of winning trust. Family prestige was exploited by some hotel owners as an alternative to the more frequent reliance on kinship or friendship networks. The case of Georges Sursock provides a striking example. "The most spectacular social climb of the nineteenth century", according to historian Leila Fawaz, the Sursocks were one of the seven wealthiest merchant families of Beirut at the time. All of them had achieved economic

[57] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Rapport de police, 18 avril, 1899
[58] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1262, Testimoniance de Kallil Helloué, Undated, c. 1891

success thanks to their alliance with European merchants which, in addition to providing them with business opportunities, also exempted them from Ottoman taxation. Originally from Anatolia, the Sursocks settled near Beirut as farmers in the 18th century. By the early nineteenth century several members worked as dragomans for foreign diplomats, while also trying their hand in business by shipping grain to London, Cyprus and elsewhere. They made a fortune, however, as bankers and speculators on the stock exchange (they invested in many of the primary infrastructural projects in the region: the expansion of the port of Beirut, the Beirut-Damascus railway and the Suez Canal), including by loaning money to the embattled Khedive of Egypt Isma'il, a personal friend, when he was under pressure from foreign creditors over the Suez canal deal.[59]

Georges Sursock, who in addition to hosting migrants also sold them clothes and goods, attempted to capitalise on his family renown by having runners wear a hat with his family name emblazoned across the front in Arabic. The story was related to the authorities by Kabil Helloué, a thirty-year-old from Damascus to whom Sursock had promised 200 francs in return for his services. According to Helloué, before sending him to the port, Sursock had turned to him and said: "You are brave and intelligent, you know that the Sursock family is well known in Beirut. Take this *daibouche* [Ottoman cap] and wear it on your head for the honour of the Sursock Company."[60]

Travel brokers, emigration agents and runners in Greater Syria offer an interesting comparison. As Baycar writes:

> "Most of these people were tradesmen or commercial intermediaries of Christian origin who had served European capitalists in conducting commercial relations and guiding their investments in Arab cities. Once they realised the increasing demand for all the particulars of emigration, they expanded their functions to meet emigrants' needs, using their established network with European steamship companies to do so. Brokers appeared not only in Syria but also in various Ottoman port cities that became hubs for emigration: Smyrna, Mersin, Trabzon, and Istanbul. The Ottoman Archives reveal that Syrian brokers were active in Anatolia, as well, after noticing opportunities for profit or after being banned from practising their profession in their villages […] As soon as Ottoman-Arabs arrived at their second stop,

[59] Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 86, pp. 95-6
[60] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1262, Testimoniance de Kallil Helloué, Undated, c. 1891

> a European port city (often Marseilles), they were welcomed by another broker who had been in touch with the broker at the home port, the one who had sent the passengers to Europe. Just like his counterparts in Ottoman villages, brokers in Europe provided emigrants with meals and accommodation for several days until they boarded another ship to cross the Atlantic." [61]

Although not all brokers were part of a diasporic chain as Baycar argues – some worked with or for French agents and hotels, others seem to have embarked on the profession suddenly upon arriving in Marseilles, others still lacked a clearly defined and well-developed network – the overall picture that emerges from these cases is that of a tightly-knit hospitality community, characterized by both formal commercial and informal familial networks, with strong links to migrants' places of origin. One piece of a vast puzzle, it existed alongside the more populous and more tightly regulated hotels affiliated with emigration agencies and shipping companies. Its heart was in the port, where runners did much of the selling, or customer acquisition. Its brain – and its wallet – were primarily in and around the neighbourhood of Belsunce, where agents and hotel-owners, both French and Levantine (primarily Syrian), pulled the strings. Agents and hotel-owners appear to have been mostly autonomous, even though they depended and occasionally were at the mercy of runners and translators. Adding to the fluidity of roles and relationships was the propensity of individuals to hold more than one role and offer more than one service at the same time.

This, along with the frequent deference to the Commissariat for mediation and, not least, the extent of cross-contamination between the French and Levantine, detracts from the thesis that emigration agents were the only ones pulling the strings in Marseilles, and that the emigrant trade, including the hospitality industry, lived and died at their command. It also undermines the argument that the Syrian hospitality industry was something of a 'mafia', a clan-based network of power that operated through violence and intimidation. The many cases of fraud, the instances of flight or, more rarely, of fight, give it an aura of disrepute. Its transitory nature and the informality of the economic arrangements, in addition to the many opportunities for easy pickings, did attract some unsavoury characters or, less damningly, gave them license to act in ways that were unsavoury. The plight of the transit migrant, left stranded in the city by a cunning emigration agent, tricked by a devious runner, ripped off by a callous merchant, mistreated by an unscrupulous hotel-owner, invites

[61] Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations in the Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', pp. 120-121

judgement and indignation. But was there something fundamentally immoral or illegal about the business practices of the Syrian community in Marseilles absent in those of French merchants with whom they sometimes collaborated?

Draining the Swamp: Public housing for transit migrants c. 1900-1910

What distinguished Antoine Farés from Henri Auque or Georges Christoff then, other than their nationality given that all three 'fished from the same pond'? Or Saghim from Khouri, given that they both 'baited' migrants, albeit for different masters? The French emigration law of 1860 and the subsequent decrees did not require hotel owners to apply for a license in order to host migrants. Nor did they ban runners from approaching migrants in ports, or hotel-owners or shop keepers from employing runners and translators to help with their business. The prominent historian of migration Adam McKeown has argued that the late nineteenth century was a phase in global history in which emigration brokers, like agents, were demonised worldwide, as powers as diverse as post-bellum United States and Qing dynasty China tried to regulate migration (both immigration and emigration). Anxious to pass off emigration as 'artificial' or to justify their inability to restrict unwanted immigration, brokers were scapegoated and vilified as 'traffickers'.[62] Runners, and to a lesser extent hotel-owners, were an easy target in this respect, insofar as their professional status or 'specialisation' was new, uncertain and hard to justify and to defend from accusations of being redundant, or as the Commissioner had argued in 1884, of being 'parasites'.

However, insofar as Marseilles was, for Ottoman migrants, primarily a place of transit rather than their journey's end, fears regarding emigration or immigration did not readily apply to the Levantine hospitality industry. The rationale invoked by shopkeepers in Marseilles who wrote to the Commissioner for Emigration to complain about Levantine merchants shows how economic anxieties could fuel cultural hostility but, crucially, it also shows how the two were mutually reinforcing. According to the shopkeepers, Ottoman merchants threatened "our city" and "our commerce" while exploiting "their bretheren", without considering that Syrians who lived and worked in Marseilles were also part of the

[62] Adam McKeown, 'How the box became black: Brokers and the creation of the free migrant'. *Pacific Affairs: Volume 85, No. 1 March* 2012; Adam M. McKeown, *Melancholy Order. Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)

city.[63] The Commissioner employed the same language when denouncing Antoine Farés: France had received over 9,223 transit migrants in 1895, for a total of over 2 million francs that, the Commissioner emphasized, had remained "on our territory". It was therefore "inadmissible that the finances of France and the Commerce of Marseilles could be stripped of this benefit because of Asians who take advantage of French hospitality in order exploit their compatriots."[64]

According to the Commissioner the decision to prosecute Antoine Farés and twenty-two other Levantine 'agents', mostly runners, in 1895 had also been motivated by the desire to "protect emigrants".[65] As discussed above, economic jealousies and nativism were not the only motivating forces behind the complaints that reached the Commissioner. There were many examples of Levantine transit migrants coming forward to denounce Levantine runners, translators, agents or hotel-owners, sometimes for crimes that ranged from fraud (such as in the case of the low-quality merchandise sold by Sursock) to various kinds of mistreatment. Even the Ottoman consulate in Marseilles had attempted to expel an emigration middleman named Ibrahim Chabalé in 1891 who, in addition to having stolen money from transit migrants on the pretence of buying tickets on their behalf, also stood accused of having defamed Ottoman authorities. Interestingly, the Commissioner in 1891 had declined to expel him on the grounds that "the expulsion of individuals from French territory was a serious action undertaken only if they posed a threat to public security".[66]

And yet the policies espoused by the Commissioner starting in 1895 left little doubt that anything short of the removal of Levantine competitors from the emigrant business in Marseilles would not have been desirable. One by one, runners like Michel Loutfi and Said Saghim, shopkeepers like Boulos Kaounan, Calfa Toufic and Hakim Salim (who formed a kind of triumvirate), hotel-owners like Damian Kabalian and Antoine Farés, and 'clandestine' agents like Gabriel Antoine Khouri and Georges Sursock were all deported back to their countries of origin or forced to flee. From the Commissioner's reports it does not seem that any of the French businessmen and hotel-owners who collaborated with them, such as hotel-owners Barton, Baud, Auque and Christoff or agents like Trotebas shared the same fate. In 1902 the Commissioner wrote to Émile Combes, who had recently been appointed Prime Minister, to announce the new policy. In the report he explained that "racolage" (ie. picking up migrants in the port) had until then been tolerated even though, in


[63] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Lettre des commerçants au Commissaire pour l'émigration, 18 novembre 1898
[64] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Rapport, 12 février 1896
[65] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Rapport, 12 février 1896
[66] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Lettre de Consul au Commissaire pour l'émigration, 6 octobre 1891

what was a highly specious interpretation, he argued that French emigration laws did not allow for anyone to accompany migrants as they "transited across French territory".[67]



Mug shots of Boulos Kaouan and his associate Tafic Calfa. Both were deported in 1895 on the orders of the Commissioner for Emigration. (ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252)

[67] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Report to Ministry of the Interior, 28 October 1902.



PRÉFECTURE
DES
Bouches-du-Rhône

1re DIVISION

1er BUREAU

POLICE DES ÉTRANGERS

EXPULSION

ARRÊTÉ

Le Président du Conseil
~~Le~~ MINISTRE DE L'INTÉRIEUR,

Vu l'article 7 de la loi des 13, 21 novembre et 3 décembre 1849, ainsi conçu : « Le Ministre de l'Intérieur pourra, par mesure de police, enjoindre à « tout étranger résidant ou voyageant en France, de sortir immédiatement du « territoire Français et le faire conduire à la frontière. »

Vu l'article 8 de la même loi, ainsi conçu : « Tout étranger qui se serait « soustrait à l'exécution des mesures énoncées dans l'article précédent, ou qui, « après être sorti de France par suite de ces mesures, y serait rentré, sans per- « mission du Gouvernement, sera traduit devant les tribunaux et condamné à « un emprisonnement d'un mois à six mois.

« Après l'expiration de sa peine, il sera conduit à la frontière. »

Attendu que le nommé Demian Kabalan-Effendi, né à Malo el Mouche (Liban), ne tire ses moyens d'existence que de la pratique de l'émigration clandestine

Considérant que la présence de l'étranger sus-désigné sur le territoire français est de nature à compromettre la sûreté publique ;

Vu la proposition du Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône ;

ARRÊTE :

ARTICLE PREMIER. — Il est enjoint au nommé Demian

de sortir du territoire français.

ART. 2. — Le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

A Paris, le 10 janvier 1899.

SIGNÉ : Ch Dupuy

Pour ampliation,
Le Directeur de la Sûreté Générale,
Le Chef du 2e bureau
SIGNÉ : Geoffroy

Pour copie conforme :
Le Secrétaire Général de la Préfecture des Bouches-du-Rhône,

Bureau Spécial

[illegible]



Left: An example of a deportation order. Demian Kabalan was accused of being a 'clandestine' emigration agent. Right: An image of Saïd Saghim, runner for French hotel owners Mr. Auque and Mr. Christoff. He fled Marseilles before the authorities could apprehend him. (ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252)

The deportation of Levantine hotel-owners, agents and runners left a gap in the hospitality industry of Marseilles that needed to be filled if the city was not to lose its primacy as the main port of transit for Ottoman migrants on their way to the New World. After a brief hiatus that lasted a few years and for which there is little evidence of native or foreign agents and hotel-owners stepping in to meet the demand for temporary accommodation, the new century

saw two separate attempts to build public housing in which migrants could be hosted for free. The first was by a Maronite priest named Ignace Doumit who, with the blessing of the Maronite archbishop in St. Jean-D'Acre (and Officer of the Légion d'honneur) and of E. Peitt, Director of the General Seminar of the Maronite church, and the financial support of various benefactors, set up a hotel "with a view to hospitalising [hosting] Oriental emigrants en route to the New World and provide them with a chapel where they could attend to their religious duties in their native tongue …".[68] Despite its philanthropic and pious objectives, which were limited to Maronites, the decision was not completely devoid of economic considerations. Indeed, in language that echoed that used by the Commissioner in defence of the 'city and commerce of Marseilles', Peitt explained in a letter to the President of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles that "this charitable initiative also rendered a service to our commerce and our influence in Syria, which the Germans have been trying to make their own."[69]

The second, more substantial, initiative was spearheaded by an olive oil merchant and philanthropist named Mr. Lignon. With the support of the Commissioner for Emigration and the Minister of the Interior (by whom he had been "designated") he proposed nothing less than to replace all 'informal' accommodation for Ottoman transit migrants with a free hotel, modestly named Hotel Lignon. His plans for the actual building betrayed more than a trace of megalomania. He envisaged building a hotel that could comfortably host 2,000 people at once, fully furnished, with separate rooms for families, a laundry so that migrants could leave wearing freshly cleaned linen, dining halls that could be transformed into recreational spaces, office space for emigration agents and 'correspondence halls' for migrants to write letters in or, he ventured optimistically, to dictate letters in. Everything would be to the highest standards of modern hygienic science and all would be free for migrants, much to the chagrin of emigration agents, who would be obliged to fund him by paying for their clients' temporary residence in Marseilles. Mr. Lignon's stated aim was threefold: to guarantee the health and safety of migrants passing through Marseilles; to ensure that those who were rejected by U.S. immigration authorities and left stranded in the city were repatriated safely at the expense of *their* state; to advance the interests of France in the Levant by investing in French businesses whatever sums were leftover after the parquet

[68] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Lettre de Joseph Nageur, Archevêque de St. Jean-D'Acre, au Président de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, 1 mars, 1901

[69] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Lettre de E Peitt au Président de la Chambre de Commerce, Marseille, 25 février, 1901

floors had been scrubbed, migrants had been wined and dined, their letters written or dictated and their linen ironed.[70]

Even though 2,000 bed-spaces were hardly sufficient to cater to the totality of migrants transiting through the city (the number of Ottoman migrants at the turn of the century was likely to be almost double), the Commissioner greeted this plan with enthusiasm, commending Mr. Lignon as a man of impeccable morals and even more impeccable wealth. In defending the project the Commissioner did not relate the complaints of shopkeepers or the economic concerns of rival hotel owners, nor, strangely, did he refer to the episodes of fraud and various other offences carried out by runners. What the city of Marseilles needed in order not to lose this lucrative trade – worth roughly 7 million francs according to Mr. Lignon – was for the insalubrious Levantine dwellings to be replaced by clean, airy, healthy, in one word 'modern' hotels: "We cannot expect from Greek and Syrian hotel owners who for the most part indulge in habits that we consider to be immoral but that are considered legitimate in their countries, just like we cannot inculcate hygienic practices, the necessity of which is lost on them."[71] This sentiment was likely to resonate with the reformist ethos of the *Bloc des gauches*, for which hygiene was something akin to a political religion. Mr. Lignon was also likely to agree. In his pitch to the Prime Minister, in which he asked to be granted permission to run the hotel for a minimum of twenty years, he sung from the same song book: "Hamburg can boast a wonderful hotel that was purpose built according to the dictates of hygiene; in Naples and Genoa that issue of migrant lodgings is the order of the day. Marseilles, which until now has been the epicentre of Mediterranean emigration cannot lag behind these cities without compromising its primacy in the same."[72]

The decision to back Mr. Lignon's hotel for migrants did not go unchallenged. One Syrian hotel-owner, Farès Abou Arab, sued Mr. Lignon for allegedly having resorted to subterfuge to acquire his hotel unlawfully. Abou Arab, who had originally set up a hotel for migrants with his wife in the 1890s, had entered a business partnership with two other Levantine hotel-owners. Together, they had run a hotel for migrants successfully, benefitting from close association with shipping companies as well as their own networks in the Levant. One evening in September 1902 they, along with seventeen other hotel owners who specialised in hosting Levantine and Greek migrants, were called to attend a meeting with

[70] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Annex III, Letter de Mr. Lignon au Président de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille, 17 juin, 1902
[71] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Annex II, Commissaire pour l'émigration au Ministre de l'intérieur, Marseille, 11 juillet 1902
[72] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Annex III, Lettre de M. Lignon au Présidente de la Chambre de commerce de Marseille, 17 juin 1902

the Commissioner who, without any warning, notified them that they were banned from hosting migrants, with immediate effect, and that Mr. Lignon would be taking over. If any of them were to persist, he warned, they would be deported from the country. According to the memorandum written by Abou Arab's lawyers for a lawsuit against Mr. Lignon, a few days after the meeting Abou Arab and his business associates were invited to the philanthropist's residence where he offered to buy their hotels for the purpose of hosting migrants temporarily while his 'palace for migrants' was under construction.[73] One of Abou Arab's business partners (Eskaf, the owner of the Hotel de Syrie) was accused of having colluded with Mr. Lignon for the purpose of facilitating the sale of the hotel at a convenient price, by weakening his former partners' resolve, in return for a role in the new business venture.

While the complaint lodged by Abou Arab concerned the manner in which this deal was reached, it also pointed out that the decision to hand over the business of hosting Levantine migrants to one man alone had only made conditions for migrants worse. According to him the new hotel had not been able to cater to all 4,500 migrants who had arrived in the three months since September, with some migrants being obliged to sleep on the ground, in defiance of the "elementary principles of hygiene." What was more, he alleged that despite the Commissioner's assurances to the contrary, Mr. Lignon's position within the emigrant trade had become monopolistic. All pretence that migrants were free to choose where to stay had been abandoned when, on the Commissioner's command, customs police in the port (from which runners had been banned) had forcefully directed migrants towards Hotel Lignon, even resorting to physical violence.[74]

Farès Abou Arab was not the only one to have protested the creation of a private monopoly. The local journal 'La Journée' mounted a cutting attack on Hotel Lignon, accusing the government of having fatally undermined freedom of commerce and Mr. Lignon of exploiting migrants by hosting them in squalid conditions, 15 or 20 to a room with barely any amenities. Hotel Lignon risked bringing about exactly what it purportedly had set out to avoid, they wrote, namely that migrants would choose to transit via a different city where they were not "brutalised by the authorities" and "deprived of all material comforts, including basic hygienic services".[75] The Ottoman Consul and even prominent members of

[73] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Dossier Farès Abou Arab
[74] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Dossier Farès Abou Arab
[75] ACCM, ML 4274/01, Logement ; hébergement des travailleurs étrangers à Marseille et dans les Bouches-du-Rhône 1901-1902, Annexe IV, 'La Traite des Levantins', Journal La Journée, 23 octobre, 1902

civil society, such as the President of the Law faculty, had joined the growing chorus of voices demanding justice.

The heroic resistance that had grown around Farès Abou Arab met an ignominious and farcical end, however. Firstly, a petition addressed to the Commissioner by an angry league of hotel-owners was later revealed to have been forged. Mr. Noel Albrand, 33-year-old owner of a restaurant in Frioul – an archipelago of islands a few kilometres west of the the *Vieux Port*, where the city's lazaretto was located – who was born and bred in Marseilles of French parents, had actually authored the complaint, driven by his affiliation with Miss. Nimbo, a Syrian hotel owner and widow who valued him not only for his talent as a polemicist but, having entrusted her son to him, clearly also for his parental abilities. When questioned by the authorities she denied ever having signed the letter, on the grounds that she could neither read nor write, and identified "Farès" as the *eminence grise* behind the campaign. Other hotel-owners, whose signatures also appeared on the letter, followed suit and denied their involvement. The last piece of the edifice came tumbling down when a few years later, in 1910, the remaining Levantine hotel-owners combined to form a syndicate and, in addition to pooling their profits, also agreed to adopt the 'Lignon method' and ban the use of runners. The signatories included Farès Abou Arab and his once estranged business partner, Eskaf.[76]

While it is possible that the Commissioner had reached a compromise with the hotel-owners, allowing the informal hospitality industry to continue to function alongside Hotel Lignon, it is more likely that Abou Arab had simply managed to join the ranks of Eskaf and other hotel-owners who worked for emigration agencies and shipping companies. In fact, their agreement specifically referred to commissions from the latter and made no mention of charging migrants for their stay. This would have made runners, whose chief task was that of winning migrants over as they arrived in the port, redundant.

It also shows how the lives and livelihoods of the Levantine hospitality community were tied not only to the political decisions of the Commissariat and its regulation of the hospitality market, but also to the evolving character of the emigrant trade that, as it became better coordinated (and more connected) tilted the scales in favour of the 'movers'. These included not only shipping companies but also emigration agencies that, through their extensive networks, could mobilise greater logistical capital. Their commercial networks eventually replaced the diasporic networks of the Levantine hotel owners of Marseilles, much like, on a smaller scale, runners – once indispensable both to the Commissariat and

[76] ADBDR, Préfecture, Série 4M, B. 1252, Annexe, Rapport du Commissaire pour l'émigration, 18 septembre, 1910

the hotels – were replaced by Mr. Lignon's employees. These changes were officially secured in the name of science, of protecting the health and general welfare of both transit migrants and local residents, with the blessing of the Ministry of the Interior. This was local politics at its most ruthlessly pragmatic. The somewhat ham-fisted manner in which public housing for transit migrants came into being in Marseilles, make the idealistic appeals to the importance of migrant safety and the overtures to hygienic science, with its connotations of political utopianism and reformist zeal, appear at best comically disingenuous.

Despite two epidemics, hundreds of deaths, and the obvious risks associated with foreign passage in the city, particularly of travellers from areas where cholera was basically endemic, hygienic considerations had played little part in reforming the housing sector for transients in Marseilles. Some urban reform did follow in the wake of the 1884 epidemic, but with little consequence for transit migrants, being primarily restricted to the middle-class, commercial areas of the city, like La Canebière. Sanitary cordons, quarantine in the local lazaretto and exceptional measures, such as the conversion of private accommodation into emigrant hotels, were considered, for the most part, sufficient.

Concern for public hygiene was hostage to municipal power games and corporate interest. Commercial speculation, in the form of material and moral investment in Mr. Lignon's hotel and, indirectly, his business enterprises in the Levant, proved more important not only than the welfare of migrants, but also than the economic interests of the Levantine diaspora and, related to this, of the French petty bourgeoisie who also sold merchandise, clothes, food and hospitality to transit migrants, with whom the Emigration Commissioner had hitherto identified the commercial interests of the entire city of Marseilles. By chaperoning migrants, shuttling them quickly from the port to the hotel, they were also isolated from the urban environment that was home to shopkeepers, hotel owners, restaurants owners and the world of small commerce. These changes may have had the potential to make migrant transit in the city more fluid, safer and cheaper, but problems with the construction of the hotel and early episodes of migrants left stranded in the port, suggest otherwise. Ironically, the Lignon project had come to fruition too late, towards the end of the mass transit flow of Levantine transients via Marseilles. The outbreak of the Great War a few years later gave it little opportunity to be tested.

A comparison with what took place in Naples and Palermo is instructive. The cholera outbreak of the late nineteenth century had provided an incentive for the re-design of the Lower city in Naples, where most transit migrants stayed. While working class neighbourhoods were dismantled and rebuilt, their population partly evacuated, and the

city's sewage and water systems innovated upon, the fundamental logic behind transient hospitality remained unaltered. Transients continued to be housed by local hotel-owners, many of whom functioned illegally, colluding with shipping companies and emigration agents, both domestic and foreign. The law of 1901 did little to change this, as the central government, including the General Commissariat for Emigration, remained hostage to local interests. Only around 1910, unexpectedly a turning point in migrant hospitality along the western transit corridor, did public accommodation for migrants become a realistic alternative. When cholera returned in 1910-1911, local authorities acted more energetically to host migrants in the newly constructed *Casa degli emigranti* and other public facilities (including asylums). Neither was sufficient to host all transients, and for this reason too other migrant hotels were allowed to continue their practice. Controls at the port and the railway station intensified, as did inspections of licensed hotels, but the clandestine or unauthorised lodgings were never reigned in.

A similar pattern occurred in Palermo where the constellation of migrant hotels in the poorest corners of the city were rivalled by the creation of a centralised structure for the containment of transients. The *Asilo degli Emigranti* in Palermo shared much with that created in Marseilles, both in its economic model (cheap board for migrants, refunds from shipping companies and emigration agents and a mixture of public and private funding) and in its modernist aesthetics and paternalist ideals. The underlying vision differed somewhat, however. In Palermo, prominent members of civil society backed a project that promised to produce few financial dividends beyond the revenue they could expect to make from housing, feeding, clothing migrants and selling them merchandise. It was motivated to a greater degree by the desire to centralize control of the emigrant trade, thus avoiding some of the social costs associated with the mass transit of migrants in the city centre, all the while performing a service that would have been greeted favourably in Rome because of the perceived benefits to hygiene, public order and migrant welfare.

In Marseilles, where transient hospitality was more culturally diverse and had strong links to the Levant, the creation of a single institution for hosting foreign transients was inspired less by concern for the way – and the thoroughness with which – migrants were processed, or indeed their welfare, and more by private financial considerations, France's perceived strategic interests and Marseille's status as a centre of Mediterranean power. Although the *Asilo* in Palermo received public backing, local and national authorities were unwilling to put other hotel-owners out of business, even though the police's hold on the *locande* was tightened (only 6 others were given the same status as the *Asilo*) and some were

shut down (including one of the six, called *I Mille,* for abetting prostitution). This crackdown came despite reassurances by the Inspector for Emigration that, unlike in Naples, hotel-owners in Palermo did not pose any real threats, having few political connections and consisting mostly of regional migrants who had set up hotels in order to host their co-villagers and townspeople on their way to the Americas.[77] Various setbacks affecting the *Asilo degli emigranti,* such as its decision to temporarily host national police in order to increase its revenues, at the expense of migrants and to the chagrin of the Commissariat in Rome, might have played a role; as perhaps so did the nationality of the hotel-owners. The perception of them as rightful residents of Palermo was an advantage that their Levantine counterparts in Marseilles could not rely on.[78]

Conclusion

In 1941 the German novelist Anna Seghers embarked on a steamer headed to Mexico from the port of Marseilles. Having fled the Nazis to France, she had made her way from the occupied zone to the Mediterranean port where a passage to South America awaited her. Once on-board she started working on what would become the novel *Transit,* in which she described her experiences and her journey as a refugee. *Transit* owed its name to Marseilles' symbolic value as a gateway to freedom. It stood for more than the act of passing through or of escape however. As the narrator stated towards the beginning of the novel, 'transit papers' were the master key that opened the locks of bureaucracy, allowing individuals to participate in a specific regime of collective movement. For a refugee desperately searching to leave war-torn France, it was the golden ticket. Interestingly, the connection between transit as a physical act and a phase in the journey had by this point, or in this context, acquired an additional meaning from which it was indissoluble, that of a bureaucratic signifier.

[77] ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B.23, Asilo degli Emigranti, Ispettore dell'emigrazione al Commissario Generale, Palermo, 3 novembre 1908; ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B.23, Asilo degli Emigranti, Ispettore dell'emigrazione al Commissario Generale, Palermo, 6 novembre 1908: **"**E finisco col significarle che l'eventuale esclusione delle altre locande della città a fornire vitto ed alloggio agli Emigranti non dovrebbe dare alcuna preoccupazione. Qui gli albergatori – gli autorizzati appena sette – gli altri una trentina – non sono come in alte città capigruppo di associazioni o agitatori elettorali, si da godere anche ingiustamente l'appoggio indiscusso di personalità spiccate nella vita pubblica. Sono nella massima parte provinciali, venuti a stabilirsi a Palermo dove hanno impiantato una locanda, frequentata quasi esclusivamente dai loro paesani. È gente quindi estranea al paese e senza alcun seguito."

[78]ASD, Archivio Generale Gabinetto, B.23, Asilo degli Emigranti, Ispettore dell'emigrazione al Segretario Generale, Palermo, 8 ottobre, 1908

Half a century earlier, the same word would probably have had little meaning to a migrant passing through Marseilles. In the late nineteenth century, those who arrived in Marseilles looking for employment or having fled violence, epidemics or poverty were usually known to the administration simply as 'migrants' or, alternatively, by their ethnicity. They required no *additional* papers, apart from passports or identification cards, depending on existing agreements between home and destination states. Italians might be referred to as 'Italians', but Syrians or North Africans could be classified as 'Arabes', signalling not only what was presumed to be their shared 'race' but also a different risk profile. Before the outbreak of the Great War, transit migration was therefore an adaptation of a commercial term used to refer to the funnelling of goods at nodal points of transport and commercial networks. In part this was because the status of refugee had not yet been meaningfully codified.[79]

In the police archives of Marseilles it was mostly used in its literal sense, to mean the 'passing through' of migrants and their temporary residence, usually in a port-city such as Marseilles and, metonymically, as the infrastructure of transport, recruitment and hospitality behind it. The recurring references to migrant transit by local administrators in Marseilles points to the growing awareness of its economic significance. The Commissioner for Emigration in Marseilles and his junior officers would regularly comment on the importance of 'migrant transit across our territory' to local business owners and shipping companies. It expressed the preoccupation that the trade, as much as the passage of migrants, be managed lucratively. Lurking behind this strategy was the fear that a switch in the direction of travel could have significant economic consequences for the transit economy.

One of the side-effects that accompanied this change was the growing bureaucracy surrounding migrant transit in Marseilles. France's emigration laws were updated and added to, not simply by the Ministry of the Interior, which reinstituted the Commissariat in Marseilles starting in 1878, but also by the Commissioner in his judicial and administrative capacities. Migrant lodgings were brought under closer scrutiny as were shops selling goods and clothes to migrants. The port itself was more heavily policed, resulting in the unpleasant incidents reported in 'La Journée'. Hotel-owners, emigration agents, shopkeepers and runners were progressively criminalised, starting with the 'deportation campaign' of 1895. This was comparable to what happened in Italy, where the passage of migrants across the city was monitored with growing intensity. In Palermo, one of the services attached to the

[79] Gérard Noiriel, *La tyrannie du national : le droit d'asile en Europe (1793- 1993)* (Paris, 1991). In France, the category of refugee was still defined by the revolutionary experience and largely overlapped with that of *émigrés,* which referred to the anti-revolutionary aristocracy that had fled the country after 1789.

Asilo degli Emigranti was the collection of migrants by officials upon arrival at the train station and their supervision until their arrival in the hotel. Clandestinity was both produced and policed in comparable ways, with similar targets (hotel-owners, runners) and according to a similar urban strategy (the policing of nodal points, the centralisation of accommodation), but to different ends. In Marseilles authorities met with the challenge of having to break the cultural and kinship ties that linked migrants to their hosts and to fabricate a pretext on the basis of which to do so. In Palermo and particularly in Naples, greater public sensibility surrounding urban squalor and the health risks posed by transients and the criminal nature of swathes of migrant hoteliers provided both a challenge and a pretext for greater intervention. In both Italy and France, urban transience was the middle ring in a series of concentric circles of deterrence, selection and inspection. The innermost circle, or the last hurdle, was at embarkation.

Chapter Four

The Unsanitary Route: U.S. Remote Controls and Mediterranean Prophylaxis

Checks at embarkation were commonly the last instance of migration control that departing migrants had to undergo on their route to the Americas. Many would have experienced similar procedures on their way to Marseilles and Naples or in other transit ports and some of these checks have been discussed in previous chapters. One of the more significant aspects of migration control, they usually entailed the checking of identification documents, including passports, and of tickets by shipping crews, consular officials and by emigration commissioners and their staff. Together with port authorities the latter were usually also called upon to inspect steamships carrying migrants, to ensure that the space and rations requirements set out in Passenger Acts and in emigration laws were being respected, and that the vessels were in good mechanical and hygienic condition. In ports of final departure, embarkation controls tended to involve a further level of bureaucracy on account of the immigration policies of destination countries. Typically, these controls aimed to select, and to selectively exclude, prospective migrants according to a number of different criteria. Although primarily enacted at the behest of destination countries, transit and sending authorities had strong incentives to comply, whether simply to spare shipping companies the cost of repatriating migrants rejected at ports of arrival, to avoid migrants becoming stranded abroad, or simply to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with foreign powers.

Disease epidemics, in particular the fifth and sixth cholera pandemics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, complicated matters further. Outbreaks of the disease resulted in regional sanitary cordons being enforced, in Italy like in Egypt and in the Levant, lengthening migrants' journeys and intensifying controls. Quarantine returned, slowing travel and commerce further and creating mutual suspicions and rivalries, despite the

achievements of the International Sanitary Conferences.[1] These changes resulted in the spread of medical surveillance across the entire Mediterranean. As far as the transit of transatlantic migrants in European ports was concerned, the cholera epidemics accelerated 'border contagion' considerably. A new category, that of 'carrier of contagious diseases', was added to the list of undesirable characteristics on the basis of which countries like the United States of America and Argentina excluded migrants. New checks and forms of surveillance were enacted in ports of transit and departure, as transit and sending authorities were anxious to protect migrants and local populations from contagion as well as to protect commerce from the damage that could result of lengthy quarantines or, worse, ostracism at the hands of foreign powers.

Among destination countries, the United States had not only the most stringent, but also the most influential immigration policy in terms of its remote implementation and its effect on transit controls. Other countries in the Americas, such as Argentina, had introduced laws restricting immigration by selecting migrants for physical and moral defects. After the Law of 1876, the Argentine government also tried to start screening migrants pre-emptively via its Consular officials in ports of departure. In Marseilles, its efforts were resisted, partly on the suspicion that remote controls were being used as a means for the illegal recruitment of migrants.[2] However, neither Argentina nor any country other than the United States possessed sufficient personnel and financial means to design and implement a large-scale system for pre-emptively screening migrants abroad. Surprisingly, it was not labour protectionism, xenophobia or apprehension regarding the mental and moral qualities of immigrants that directly sparked the build up of U.S. remote controls in Europe and the Mediterranean, although all these factors played a role. It was fear of contagion, and in particular of the late nineteenth century cholera epidemics, that provided the setting and the catalyst for the build up of external border controls, and it was the Public Health Service,

[1] For a survey of the accomplishments and failures of the International Sanitary Conferences see: Mark Harrison, 'Disease, diplomacy and international commerce: the origins of international sanitary regulation in the nineteenth century', *Journal of Global History*, Vol.1 (2006), pp 197-217; Valeska Huber, 'The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851-1894', *The Historical Journal*, 49 (2), 2006, 453-476

[2] ADBDR, Série 4M, Préfecture, Ministre de l'intérieur au Préfet de Bouches-du-Rhône, 13 mai 1882. « Monsieur le Préfet, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que sur ma proposition Mr. Le Ministre du Commerce, par une lettre circularie du 8 de ce mois, à fait connaître aux agents d'émigration autorisés, qu'a l'avenir les émigrants pour être reçus dans la République Argentine, devront aux termes d'une loi de ce pays, datée du 19 octobre 1876, être pourvus d'un certificat de bonnes vie et moeures délivré par les autorités de leur résidence et légalisé gratuitement par un Consul Argentin. Cette notification aura le double avantage d'entraver le courant de l'émigration à la Plata, où les émigrants n'ont généralement trouvé q'une misère plus grande que celle à laquelle ils croyaient se soustraire en quittant leur pays, et de prémunir ceux qui se détermineraient à émigrer contre les difficultés qui pourraient leur être opposées pour leur débarquement s'ils se trouvaient dépourvus du certificat de bonnes vie et moeures. » The Republic of Argentina also kept a General Commissioner for Emigration in Europe. Argentinian Consuls in Marseilles and Nice wrote regularly to the French Emigration Commissioner in Marseilles to ask for statistics on emigrant traffic. Unlike U.S. sanitary officials, it seems that they were not allowed to actively carry out controls.

with the assistance of U.S. consular staff, that provided the institutional means of enforcing them.

Remote controls had slowly been making their way to the forefront of U.S. migration policy as restrictionists gained the upper hand in the debate starting in the 1870s and 1880s. Mid-century enthusiasm for state sponsored emigration – embodied in the Act to Encourage Emigration passed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1864 – had waned as a result of global events, such as the 1877 economic crisis, which had galvanised animosity towards foreign workers among wage-earners, and domestic factors, such as cultural (and racial) dislike of new immigration by Republican elites, most notably Senator Henry Cabot-Lodge, and the growing electoral clout of traditionally anti-immigration frontier states like California. The brief parenthesis of pro-immigrant policies had served to set a precedent of direct U.S. interference or engagement with migration practices abroad, as the American Emigration Company, which was subsidised by the federal government, joined the long line of middlemen arranging for the transport of migrants across the Atlantic. However, remote controls flourished not as a means of stimulating migration but of hampering it. The first foreign barriers were erected in China, where the U.S. government was precociously active in immigration restriction. As early as 1862 – prior to the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 that recognized the rights of Chinese subjects to emigrate to the United States – the U.S. Congress passed a law requiring Consuls to inspect all American ships leaving China as part of an effort to crack down on involuntary migration. This principle was reaffirmed by a new law in 1875 that extended it to all 'coolies' and, upon the insistence of a delegation sent by the State Department to China in 1879 to re-negotiate the Burlingame treaty, to also include 'lewd women', 'criminals' and 'diseased persons'. Finally, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1884 required ID certificates issued by the Chinese government to be verified and stamped (*visaed*) by a United States diplomatic official at the port of departure.[3]

This chapter argues that remote controls had been building up across Europe, including the western Mediterranean transit corridor, from roughly the same time as they had been in Asia. Unlike the barriers erected in China they were not hard but soft, being limited initially to surveillance and to indirect forms of remote control that placed the burden of exclusion (or of selective inclusion) on shipping companies rather than on federal officials. Starting in

[3] Aristide R. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Harvard UP, 2006), p. 191. On the spread of Asian exclusion acts in the US and the British settler world see: Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008); Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order. Asian Migration and the Globalisation of Borders* (Columbia: Columbia UP, 2008); R. A. Huttenback, 'The British Empire as a "White Man's Country"-Racial Attitudes and Immigration' in the *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Nov., 1973), pp. 108-137

the final decade of the nineteenth century the United States flexed its Atlantic arm not so much as a direct consequence of the agitation of disgruntled constituents in California, but in response to a series of disease epidemics that made preventive screenings desirable and their cost a necessary burden in order to protect the 'body politic'. The build-up of consular surveillance of emigration was not limited to the Consulate but grew to encompass sanitary infrastructure and maritime facilities. Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary and Greece all resisted this encroachment. In Naples, the United States stepped in to replace local authorities where they failed to discharge of their duties correctly, eventually superseding their initial mandate by enacting novel forms of detection and exclusion.

For this reason, U.S. remote controls are an essential, if neglected, aspect of embarkation checks on Mediterranean emigrants, and in particular on those leaving from or transiting via Naples. While traditionally embarkation controls on nineteenth century transatlantic migrants have been discussed in reference to the migration policies of single countries, diplomatic and geopolitical approaches to the history of sanitary policies can help shine a new light on the history of U.S. immigration controls and on nineteenth century migration controls generally.[4] It also responds to the call made to historians by Alan Kraut that they should focus on the health components of immigration policy, and by Alison Bashford, that the origins of an international system for the control of human mobility are to be found in nineteenth century quarantine systems.[5] Early quarantine acts were designed in order to identify and exclude a minority among a sizeable majority, primarily on the basis of whether they were carrying contagious diseases or not. They differed from immigration legislation, which sought to exclude high numbers of prospective immigrants according to a complex catalogue of criteria and in response to a number of factors, such as labour protectionism, demographic anxieties or humanitarian concerns for migrants. However, not only did methods and infrastructures overlap but, as in the case of late nineteenth century Naples, quarantine became a vector of migration control.

[4] Italian historiography is strangely silent on the subject of U.S. remote controls in Italy and in particular in Naples. This applies to some seminal texts on Italian emigration such as: Piero Bevilacqua, Andreina De Clementi, Emilio Franzina (Eds.), *Storia dell'emigrazione italiana* (Roma: Donzelli, 2001-2002)

[5] Alan M. Kraut, *Silent Travelers. Germs, Genes and the 'Immigrant Menace'* (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Alison Bashford, *Quarantine: Global and Local Histories* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Alison Bashford, *The Oxford Handbook on the History of Eugenics* (Oxford University Press, 2010)

Early Surveillance Infrastructure & Remote Controls by Indirect Means c. 1860-1880s

As the nineteenth century entered its final third the United States' authority over the Atlantic passage was in gradual decline. The newly re-united nation had lost much of its merchant marine to European powers during the American Civil War, and it was slow to rebuild it through public subsidies. The main challenger of European shipping companies like Cunard, White Star, Norddeutscher Lloyd, Florio-Rubattino and the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, was J.P. Morgan's International Mercantile Marine.[6] Contemporaries considered it Morgan's 'greatest fiasco' and, having failed to secure a government subsidy prior to World War I, it never controlled more than roughly twelve percent of the market. It was also made up of several European lines that Morgan had acquired, among which was the White Star Line, which accounted for most of its revenue.[7] European shipping companies were thus able not only to control the better part of the trade, but also to exert considerable lobbying influence on U.S. lawmakers. According to Torsten Feys the main European shipping companies that were active in the Atlantic emigrant trade collectively hired lobbyists to wine and dine politicians, fund their campaigns, participate in Congressional hearings and to hire journalists to provide favourable coverage.[8] Their power both reflected and reinforced the regulatory influence of European states, as European Passenger Acts and Emigration Laws provided the basis for the legal framework used in the Atlantic passage. It set conditions for the recruitment and transport of migrants, including standards for the quality and condition of ships, food and sanitary requirements for third-class fares and embarkation procedures.

The United States' Congress responded by passing a number of Passenger Acts around the middle of the nineteenth century in order to regulate the traffic of all incoming vessels and not just European shipping companies. The Passenger Act of 1847 passed by the New York State legislature, the first national measure to deal directly with immigration since 1819, established space and volume requirements for third-class passengers and a tax of $50 for excess passengers. The subsequent Passenger Act of 1855 added a $10 death tax for

[6] While the Messageries Maritimes were very active recruiting and transporting transatlantic migrants across the Mediterranean, they were less prominent as a conveyor of migrants across the Atlantic, although they did operate some services from Marseilles.
[7] Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914* (Zurich: Chronos, 2012), pp. 80-81
[8] Torsten Feys, 'The Visible Hand of Shipping Interests in American Migration Policies, 1815-1914,' in *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedneis 7* (1), 2010.

passengers over the age of eight who died in transit. Unlike immigration restriction acts, this form of legislation could have the effect of attracting more migrants. In fact, immigrant arrivals in New York increased in 1848 and remained high for a few years thereafter.[9] Since the new legislation obliged shipping companies to renew their fleets they fought it tooth and claw. Having succeeded in obliging the state of New York to annul its first Passenger Act, only to see their gains nullified in 1855, shipping companies spent the following two decades lobbying states up and down the East coast to abolish head taxes on migrants (a direct form of immigration restriction that had been originally introduced to sustain the cost of processing migrants in ports of arrival but that, before its abolishment, had resulted in a 'race to the bottom' as ports competed to attract more migrants by lowering the tax).[10] In 1880, following yet another lawsuit from the shipping industry, the Federal District court of New York ruled that Passenger Acts did not apply to steamships. This time the number of persons landing from Europe nearly doubled over the following two years.[11]

If an immigrant was unable to pay the full price of the head tax or if a ship carried an excess number of third-class passengers, or again if they were found to be remiss of the conditions set out in the Passenger Acts (but had somehow managed to elude controls at embarkation points), the ship captain was obliged to pay the price of repatriation in addition to a fine, as required by the law. Drew Keeling has argued that the cost was initially offset fairly easily by shipping companies that only needed to disembark four 'good' migrants (who fitted the requirements) to make up the cost of one rejection. This was before the fine increased fourfold in the first decade of the twentieth century with the introduction of new clauses tackling the importation of contagious diseases.[12] The principle was reinforced by the Immigration Law of 1891. In addition to adding new exclusion clauses (the 'LPC Clause', whereby migrants had to prove that they were not likely to become a public charge) it also required shipping companies to provide port authorities with Manifest Sheets

[9] Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America,* p. 147. According to Zolberg, it increased from 154,516 in 1846 to 234,968 the following year. Although conditions in Europe deteriorated further the following winter, arrivals in 1848 decreased only slightly to 226,527.
[10] Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*, p. 190
[10] Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*, p. 192. In the case *Henderson vs. Mayor of New York* it was ruled that individual states did not have the right to impose head taxes because immigration was a federal matter on the grounds that "…. passenger transportation is a part of U.S. commerce with foreign nations, but also because immigrants qua labour constitute a factor of production and hence are inherently a component of commerce. And finally, because the regulation of immigration constitutes an international process, it 'ought to be the subject of a uniform system or plan' such as can be achieved only by way of a single law applying to the entire country'".
[11] Ibid., p. 192
[12] Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914,* pp. 169-170. Trachoma was added to the list of 'dangerous contagious diseases' in 1897, which coincided with the stepping up of passenger inspections in Europe according to Keeling: "especially after 1904 when U.S. immigration rules imposed a $100 fine on companies for each instance of a diseased passenger which 'might have been detected by a competent medical examination.'" Migrants themselves were slower to react. Several more years passed before the rate of rejection for trachoma began to decline."

containing information on each passenger. This created the administrative requirement for ticket or shipping agents to conduct preliminary examinations abroad before enlisting migrants.[13]

The 1891 Act also created the position of Superintendent for Immigration in charge of running the Bureau of Immigration in the Treasury department, and it initiated the institutionalisation of permanent controls at the nation's maritime and land borders. The port of New York – the main entry and deportation point for immigrants throughout this period (roughly seventy percent of all immigrants to the United States attempted entry there between 1892 and 1930 and on the whole Atlantic ports deported upwards of 5,000 immigrants a year with peaks of over 30,000) – was placed under federal control, paving the way for the creation of Ellis Island station.[14] Raised on a low-lying mud bank in the Upper Bay, Ellis Island was first constructed out of wood in 1892 , only to turn to ashes in a fire five years later, and resurrected in brick in 1897. It was both lauded by contemporaries for its modernity – in addition to the waiting and interrogation rooms it boasted various hospital buildings, a bathhouse, kitchen, restaurant and doctors' quarters and it was capable of processing 10,000 immigrants a day – and savaged in the press, most notably by Joseph Pulitzer's *World* (Pulitzer was born in Hungary and had arrived in the U.S. as an immigrant, which may explain his passionate interest in the issue) for being poorly managed and for abusing and humiliating immigrants.[15] Only steerage passengers were interrogated and examined by medical staff on Ellis Island, whereas first and second class passengers were usually examined by medical staff directly on board transatlantic steamships. Migrant testimonies typically record the fear they experienced at the possibility of rejection and the embarrassment at having to be subjected to invasive medical procedures, and the sense of alienation and boredom that accompanied passport controls.[16]

Although Ellis Island served as a model for inspection procedures, including medical examinations, the latter could vary considerably along the United States' national borders, as Amy Fairchild has written. The size and capacity of each individual station affected the nature of controls, as did regional needs: states in the north-east were more concerned with selecting according to class, for instance. Moreover, the Immigration Service had to contend

[13] Thomas M. Pitkin, *Keepers of the Gate. A History of Ellis Island* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), p.20; Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America,* pp. 215-228
[14] Amy L. Fairchild, *Science at the Borders: immigrant medical inspections and the shaping of the modern industrial labor force* (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2003), pp. 119 - 121
[15] Pitkin, *Keepers of the Gate,* p. 10
[16] Fairchild, *Science at the Borders*, pp. 119 - 124

with the lobbying power of shipping companies, which in eastern ports like New York and Boston worked more successfully to prevent rigid medical examinations.[17]

Medical inspections came to assume renewed importance in the final decade of the twentieth century. Other historians have written about how the tail-end of the fifth cholera pandemic, which claimed tens of thousands of lives in Europe (as far as Russia) and the Mediterranean (including North Africa and the Levant), combined with the spread of typhus, brought to the port of New York by the ship *Massilia* of the Messageries Maritimes, triggered the passing of the Quarantine Law of 1893 by Congress.[18] While a twenty-one day quarantine was established temporarily for all incoming ships, the law not only beefed up medical examinations but, according to Amy Fairchild, it authorized the United States to station Public Health Service (hereafter PHS) officers in European ports, to monitor the spread of epidemic diseases and to inspect departing ships.[19] The Public Health Service had actually been created in 1798 as the Marine Hospital Service before its name was changed in 1902: its mandate had originally been to care for U.S. seamen abroad but in the 1870s it had been revised to include the investigation of foreign epidemic diseases. This was reflected in its organisation, which was military in spirit, with titles and pay corresponding to Army and Navy grades.

The law of 1893 marked a shift in policy towards direct prevention. Aristide Zolberg has written that the Quarantine Law "did not directly engender remote controls" and that a subsequent bill that called for the inspection of immigrants by U.S. consuls was voted down by the Senate because Consulates were deemed to lack sufficient manpower to actually implement them.[20] However, in practice this consisted of an indirect form of remote immigration control, as medical officers, while not officially allowed to reject immigrants directly, selected which migrants ship captains and domestic port authorities should exclude. In fact, U.S. Consular services and PHS officials had been keeping an eye on European emigration on behalf of Congress for a few years already. A collection of Special Consular

[17] Fairchild, *Science at the Borders*, pp. 123-129

[18] Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the fashioning of America,* p.224. According to Zolberg, after 21 day quarantines were imposed for the port of New York and a number of other measures were taken, including the rounding up of 1,200 fever victims from their East Side tenements and their quarantine on North Brother Island, calls for suspension of all migration flows from 'diseased countries' followed, which contributed to the passing of the Quarantine Law of 1893, which generated the Marine Hospital Service; Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914.* Keeling also traces the Law of 1893 to the cholera epidemic that swept Hamburg in 1892, which he argues was used as an excuse by the U.S. President Benjamin Harrison to impose a twenty-day quarantine on all vessels arriving from infected overseas ports with steerage passengers.

[19] Fairchild, *Science at the Borders,* pp. 56-57

[20] Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the fashioning of America*, p. 225 "A Bill providing for the inspection of immigrants by U.S. consuls was passed by the House in July 1894 but struck out by the Senate following Secretary of State Walter Gresham's opinion that U.S. consular offices abroad would not be able to discharge the duties placed on them, even with a tenfold increase of staff; instead, it was substituted with a bill to exclude anarchists."

Reports on Immigration written in the late 1880s sought to analyse the motivations and character of European emigration, assuaging fears that European governments were dumping their 'undesirables' (paupers, criminals and the sick, all the while eliciting concern over the 'stock' of new forms of immigration from southern and south-eastern Europe. Consuls were despatched to the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Malta. Curiously, the Ottoman Empire was absent from this list even though Levantine migration to the United States was already in full flow, as discussed in previous chapters. Unlike for the Dillingham commission, where reports on emigration flows were grouped and structured according to clearly identified problems (e.g. 'Immigrants as Charity Seekers', 'Immigration and Crime', 'Immigration and Insanity' etc.), they were rather more general in scope and benign in tone. In prefacing the volume, the Secretary of State T.F. Bayard concluded sympathetically that "the prevailing motive of emigration is the desire to secure a greater degree of welfare, to move from a place where the struggle for existence is continuous and intense, to a place where a higher degree of prosperity may be obtained for the same expenditure of labour or capital."[21]

The main task of U.S. Public Health personnel stationed in Europe was to provide intelligence on migration flows and to supervise the screening of migrants by emigration and transit authorities. In Italy, however, public health officials took on a more active role despite what in 1886 appeared to be a general sense of satisfaction with the existing migration regime, despite its many shortcomings.

Commenting on Italian migration controls in 1886, the U.S. General Consul in Rome claimed to be "satisfied that there was no emigration to the United States of chronic paupers or insane persons", adding that "the Government does nothing to prohibit or restrict emigration", perhaps a reference to the absence of an emigration law, which was passed for the first time by the new parliament in 1888.[22] The U.S. Consul in Genoa confirmed that there was no proof of 'dumping', adding, cheerfully: "The policy of the Italian Government towards emigration is very simple and, I think, praiseworthy. It requires its people to procure passports and insists on good and wholesome food and accommodation on board ship. To enforce the latter requirement government inspectors thoroughly examine every vessel

[21] Library of Congress, Reports of the Consular Officers of the United States. Emigration and Immigration. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887. 49th Congress, 2nd Session. House of Representatives. Ex.Doc. No. 157. Letter form T.F Bayard to the President, Undated

[22] Library of Congress, Reports of the Consular Officers of the United States. Emigration and Immigration. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887. 49th Congress, 2nd Session. House of Representatives. Ex.Doc. No. 157. Report by William L. Alden (Consul General), United States Consulate, Rome, Italy, August 2, 1886

carrying emigrants from Italian ports, and those inspectors have authority to correct any oversight on the part of officers or owners of sailing vessels or steamers."[23] This was echoed by the U.S. Consul in Naples, Edward Camphausen, who also confirmed that Italy was not deporting to the United States what he tellingly referred to as "chronic paupers" in addition to the sick and the insane, explaining that "criminals are sent to the prisons or mines of Corsica, Sardinia and other islands. They are not allowed to leave Italian ports."[24]

Not all was well in Naples, however, as checks on departing emigrants left much to be desired. Prior to 1880, "no record was kept by the authorities in Naples of the passengers and emigrants shipped from this port to the United States or to South America" because "all emigrants from the vicinity were shipped primarily from here to Genoa and from there to the port of destination in North or South America, the Italian law providing that the visitation must be by the respective authorities of the last Italian port from which emigrants sail…", another example of how transit undermined the effectiveness of controls. Moreover, Italian authorities seemed to focus more on migrant vessels than on the migrants themselves: "From the month of October 1880 the Captain of the port of Naples was required by the Italian government to keep a record containing the following data: 1st name of the steamer of vessel. 2nd nationality of the same 3rd Tonnage. 4th Name of Captain. 5th Dates of arrival and departure. 6th condition of steamer or vessels. 7th number of clear. 8th number of passengers and emigrants." According to the Consul every vessel was inspected by the Port Captain, rather than a Government inspector like in Genoa.

In his report, the Consul in Naples made a striking announcement to the effect that, "…the appointment of a medical inspector at this port by the Government of the United States has proved of great advantage. There has been very cordial cooperation between this officer and the captain of the port, and by their united efforts they have done much to prevent the departure of persons liable to become dangerous to the health or a burden to the people of the United States."[25] The previous year, in 1885, Consul Haughwout had written back to the Department of State claiming that, "one of the results of the rigorous examination of emigrants by this Consulate has resulted in obtaining a good class of emigrants as passengers from this port for the United States. Those who have been rejected *by this office* [my italics],

[23] Library of Congress, Reports of the Consular Officers of the United States. Emigration and Immigration. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887. 49th Congress, 2nd Session. House of Representatives. Ex.Doc. No. 157. Report by James Fletcher (Consul), United States Consulate. Genoa, October 26, 1886, pp. 257-260

[24] Clearly, Italy's deportation regime was circumscribed to its Mediterranean possessions (the island of Ponza, just off the coast of Tuscany, was another popular destination for the unwanted). The mention of passports as early as1886 is exceptional and is not substantiated by other sources.

[25] Library of Congress, Reports of the Consular Officers of the United States. Emigration and Immigration. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887. 49th Congress, 2nd Session. House of Representatives. Ex. Doc. No. 157. Report by Edward Camphausen (Consul), United States Consulate, Naples, July 9, 1886, pp. 279-283

or those whom the emigrant agencies and steamship companies have not wished to submit to our examination by reason of their physical disability or sickness, I am informed have been shipped to Marseilles and Genoa, there to take passage for the United States. Of this fact I at once notified the United States Consuls at those ports."[26] So much for the absence of remote controls in the Mediterranean prior to the Quarantine Law of 1893.

Why the United States had deemed it necessary to appoint a medical officer to the port of Naples as early as 1886 was not explained or explicitly stated by Camphausen, but clearly emigration from Naples was considered to demand greater scrutiny and Italian authorities were not trusted or believed to be capable of screening migrants satisfactorily. Perhaps, Camphausen himself was not entirely aware of the reason, having been appointed to his post only in 1885. The previous five years had seen four different U.S. officials hold the position of Consul in Naples: Mr. Odell Duncan (1869-1880 and then again 1882-1883), who after ten years in the service was appointed Consul in Smyrne (Izmir); Mr. Henry Conant (1880), who resigned shortly after arriving, claiming the climate had had a deleterious effect on his and his family's health; Mr. Edwin Smith (1880-1882) and Mr. Frank Haughwout (1883-1885) who had both remained in their post for roughly two years.

During that time most of the consular correspondence that dealt explicitly with emigration rarely tackled the question of U.S. controls. Early reports had touched only on the potential of emigration for improving the state of the American mercantile fleet. As Consul Duncan wrote prior to his departure in 1880, "…one source of business and profit for steamers properly prepared for it, I am confident might be begun and developed to an indefinite extent. I mean Emigration. I am well aware that the organ grinders and the other roving musicians and vagabonds have not impressed Americans over favourably with the lower orders of Italians. But these are not fair specimens of the industrious, patient and saving Italian peasantry and labouring classes who are most given to emigrating….Should an American Company contemplate establishing lines of steamers to the Mediterranean, I think they would do well to make arrangements for carrying emigrants from Italy, Switzerland and Austria, direct to Charleston or Norfolk."[27] This advice was repeated by Duncan's successor Edwin Smith who similarly favoured the establishment of U.S. shipping agents in Italy and the liberalisation of U.S. maritime law (which at the time prevented

[26] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from the United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 734, United States Consulate, Naples, Jun 19th 1885
[27] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 266, United States Consulate, Naples, May 15th 1880

American ship owners from buying ships abroad, where they were cheaper). It did not show a comparable interest in migration and was not as evangelical about its economic potential.[28]

While not expressed in the language of 'race' that was characteristic of restrictionist opinion at the turn of the century, Duncan's unsympathetic view of the 'lower orders' of Italian migrants and his attitude towards Italian emigration as a whole, were largely attuned to those of his successors. Take for instance F.L Dingley's view that the Latin race "possesses intellectual and industrial qualities which will prove of value in fusion with American stock", which he made known in a special consular report in 1890. According to Dingley, "the problem of Italian emigration is not to be solved by letting the emigrants *drift* [my italics], but by skilful manipulation of the factors of selection and education…You say, 'They [referring to migrants from Calabria] are not good citizens.' The obvious reply is, too much raw material is politically indigestible."[29] Regardless, this was not very different from what Camphausen had written in 1888, in a message that he insisted should be read as a supplement to his 1886 report on emigration: "The persons emigrated from this country to the United States during the last few years belong to the poorest and most ignorant classes; they are without any school education and with few exceptions are able to write their names; they have no conception of our institutions and form of government and are indifferent to the advantage and privileges acquired in becoming citizens of the United States. Their sole aim and object is the amelioration of their pecuniary condition…The majority of the class of people emigrating from this country….are in my opinion not a desirable element to increase our population."[30]

However, even the Dillingham commission did not make a case for more controls based on the incompatibility of southern and Mediterranean races with northern 'stock'. No fundamental change in mentality or attitude towards migrants seemed to have accompanied growing interest in local and consular migration controls throughout the 1880s and indeed the early 1890s, when U.S. remote controls were first introduced in Naples. The reference to the dangers associated with drifting, or transience, is intriguing, because it suggests that the issue of selection was closely identified with transit control. The reason behind the sudden activism of U.S. public health and consular officials in matters of migration control was lurking in the bowels of Naples.

[28] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 34, United States Consulate Naples, July 11th 1882

[29] Library of Congress, Special Consular Reports. European Emigration. Studies in Europe of Emigration Moving out of Europe, especially that flowing to the United States. Made under the authority of the Department of State during the year ending October 1, 1890 by F.L Dingley. Bureau of Statistics, Department of State. Washington, 1890

[30] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 102, Consulate of the United States, Naples, September 24th, 1888

Enter Cholera c. 1884: Disease Containment and the institutionalisation of remote controls in Naples

The bowels of Naples were located somewhere between *Piazza del Plebiscito* in the west of the city and *Piazza Garibaldi* in the east. As Frank Snowden has expertly illustrated in his work on the cholera epidemics in late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Lower City was a haven for the *vibrio cholerae.*[31] The city's sewage system was obsolete (with much of its waste being dumped into the bay at the feet of the Old City), its water sources were heavily polluted and its streets were compromised by refuse. They were also commonly used as toilets by the inhabitants of the infamous *fondaci* and *bassi*, the cramped and unhygienic living quarters of the urban poor. The *fondaci* were home not only to the local poor but to the transient masses: they included migrants awaiting departure, street peddlers, vagrants and agricultural labourers who came to Naples in search of work and slept ten to a room as they drifted from one abysmally low-paid job to the next. The most numerous among them were stonemasons and builders from the Neapolitan hinterland who lived a semi-nomadic existence and would return to their family homes on the weekend after having slept rough in Naples during the week.

All these problems were compounded by the negligence of local and national authorities. As Snowden has written: "In Britain, an Act of Parliament successfully regulated the sanitary conditions in boarding-houses after the first epidemic of cholera, and prevented their playing the same role in later outbreaks. In Naples, however, laissez-faire continued until the twentieth century in the matter of locande, despite their notorious insalubrity. These sordid hostels were already known, for instance, for their major role in the spread of typhoid. The particular contribution of the boarding-houses to the history of cholera was that they provide an ideal means for the disease to gain entry to the city. In the epidemics both of 1884 and 1910-11, cholera arrived in Naples with emigrants who slept in the lodging-houses of Porto until their departure. Once admitted with the travellers to the hospitable environment of the lodging-houses, cholera claimed its first victims among the builders who shared the emigrants' rooms. The disease then journeyed with their slops and their dejecta to the

[31] Frank M. Snowden, *Naples in the time of Cholera 1884-1911* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995). The first chapter of the book ('A City at risk') explores in some depth how the hygienic conditions of the city made it particularly vulnerable to a cholera epidemic.

unprotected water-tanks and wells of the neighbourhood on the way to becoming a wide-spread epidemic."[32]

Not much of this was lost on the U.S. Consul in Naples, Duncan, who wrote back to the State Department in a hurry as soon as the first news of a cholera epidemic in Egypt reached him: "Naples must of course be regarded as one of the most exposed ports, being one of the first touched in Europe by steamers from Alexandria or the [Suez] Canal. Besides it is one of three chief Quarantine Stations of Italy, and the station – Nisida – is so near the city that were the malady to break out there, it is considered that it would be almost certain to spread. It will be seen then how justifiable is the alarm in Naples, a city with the suburbs of 600,000 – 700,000 inhabitants, the most crowded and perhaps the worst drained city in Europe, and with its notoriously bad reputation for health even at its best."[33] When Haughwout took over from Duncan a few months later, he was rather more optimistic about the chances of Naples escaping the epidemic and even had a few words of praise for the sanitary measures taken in the city: "The Government has ordered, and enforces a strict quarantine from ten to fifteen days upon all vessels arriving within my jurisdiction from the Egyptian and Syrian provinces and the Municipal authorities maintain a careful watch upon the condition of the meat, vegetables, litter and other provisions brought to the city for consumption by the inhabitants…everything is being done to prevent the introduction of any thing that would endanger the good health of the inhabitants."[34]

Shortly afterwards Frank Haughwout took a leave of absence. When he returned to Naples in September after roughly one month, the cholera epidemic had already broken out. It had not arrived from Egypt but, unexpectedly, from Marseilles where it had been carried not by migrants but by French sailors who had recently returned from Indochina via Toulon. Again, the temporary passage of labourers in the Italian port city had proved to be fatal. "During the latter part of July," Haughwout wrote, "about fifteen of these sailors sailed from Marseilles and landed at Naples. At the time of landing their presence was unknown to the Municipal authorities in this City. They took up their abode in the Strada di Porto, where they passed one night after which they were discovered, sent back to their ship and left, as is supposed for Palermo. Their stay was sufficient, it is thought, to sow the germs of the disease in that portion of the city where they remained for the single night."[35] Transience

[32] Snowden, *Naples in the time of Cholera 1884-1911*, p.22
[33] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 36, United States Consulate Naples, June 30th, 1883
[34] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 36, United States Consulate Naples, August 17th, 1883
[35] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 45, United States Consulate, Naples, September 22nd, 1883

proved yet again to be a form of collateral damage, a dangerous side-effect of globalising processes like international travel and labour mobility. It was a considerable strain on global logistical processes, an unpredictable variable that thwarted the power of states (and of capital) to control risk and carry out 'damage control' effectively. As Dingley wrote a few years later in relation to the emigrant trade as a whole, the "drifting" of people was the problem.[36]

Within thirty-four hours of the disease taking hold in the city, 173 cases and 76 deaths had been reported. By September, Neapolitans had started to leave: between 50,000 and 60,000 people fled the city (of roughly 500,000 people, the biggest in Italy at the time) heading north towards Rome, Bologna and Florence, or south towards Calabria or along the coast towards Sorrento and Castellammare, and east towards Foggia (in Apulia). "Those persons who were left in the City of Naples," the Consul reported, "were the poorer classes, the trades-people, those in the employment of the various departments of Government service and the employees of private business houses, soldiers and marines, and those entirely dependent for their support upon their daily work." [37] By the beginning of September it was estimated that roughly 500 people had succumbed to the disease, but by October of the following year the number of casualties had grown to roughly 5,700. In the poorer neighbourhoods of Mercato and Pendino, in the Lower City, roughly one third of the population had been wiped out. Some of these casualties were actually the result of violence that broke out as panic spread. Such was the distrust in authorities that the relatives and friends of the sick attacked doctors, accusing them of the mass poisoning of poorer subjects on the orders of the government, something akin to a state sponsored class genocide.[38]

Italian authorities responded to these events with a mixture of denial, obfuscation and emergency measures that set an unhappy precedent for future epidemics. When the first case of cholera was recorded on August 2nd 1884 and the patient was removed to the Canocchia hospital, where he subsequently passed away, no official report was published and local newspapers underplayed the incident. It wasn't until a further outbreak took place at the end of the month that Municipal authorities broke into a frenzy of activity and bulletins recording the number and places of outbreaks were published daily, quarantine was lengthened to

[36] Library of Congress Special Consular Reports. European Emigration. Studies in Europe of Emigration Moving out of Europe, especially that flowing to the United States. Made under the authority of the Department of State during the year ending October 1, 1890 by F.L Dingley. Bureau of Statistics, Department of State. Washington, 1890

[37] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 45, United States Consulate, September 3, 1884

[38] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 48, United States Consulate, Naples, October 13th, 1884. This was a pattern that repeated itself throughout the Italian peninsula. For more on the history of cholera in Italy see: Eugenia Tognotti, *Il mostro asiatico. Storia del colera in Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 2000)

twenty-one days at Nisida and the islands of the Gulf of Naples (at Capri it was enforced "at the muzzle of the gun"), sanitary cordons were established on land including around the houses of the sick (who were removed not to the hospital but to appositely constructed wooden lazarettos destined for incineration), and fumigation chambers were constructed in railway stations of peripheral neighbourhoods like Castellammare and Vico. Improvements in the hygienic conditions of the city were met with new disappointment when a further outbreak took place in October of 1885. For over a year, the city was brought to a partial standstill, with thousands of people roaming the streets with little means of making a living and stores across the city either closed or operating on a limited basis.[39]

Inevitably, the emigrant trade ranked fairly low in the priorities of local and national authorities while incentives to leave the country were running at an all-time high. As the disease spread across the city in the summer months of 1884, U.S. consular authorities stepped into the vacuum left by the Municipality of Naples.

Immediately upon returning from his leave of absence Haughwout sent a telegram to the State Department announcing that he had appointed a Medical inspector.[40] He enlisted an Italian medical doctor and Professor of the Royal University of Naples, Dr. Antonio Fienga, to inspect ships carrying migrants to the United States. As the Consul explained in a despatch, in addition to inspecting passengers Dr. Fienga was also expected to act as a sanitary informant of sorts: "In appointing Dr. Antonino Fienga I have been guided by what I deem to be a regard for the best interests of the United States' sanitary service. He is painstaking, thorough and highly competent and is of great assistance to me in enabling me to know exactly the sanitary condition of this city and the adjacent country. I fixed his compensation at the full amount allowed by the Department for I consider that the services rendered by him to the United States Government are fully worth such pay...For the compensation given to him he performs and will perform the following services: 1. Inspection of all passengers bound to the United States – emigrants and first cabin passengers – and the luggage and merchandise such as can possibly be made. Such examinations consume from three to six hours each, especially when two vessels leave on the same day. 2. Almost daily reports to me of the sanitary condition of Naples and its vicinity, based upon reliable data. He is in constant communication with the physicians of the sections of Naples

[39] Ibid. According to the Consul some of these measures were of uncertain effectiveness: "Adopting the means of fumigation….it is clear that the method used is good for nothing, except to thoroughly impregnate one's clothing with the odour of chlorine. It is certainly not the the method of disinfection that has saved Castellammare and other towns from a serious spread of the disease."

[40] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 45, United States Consulate, Naples, September 22, 1883

that were first and most violently affected by the cholera last year and will receive news of the first cases of that disease to occur this year." [41]

By accompanying the doctor when he inspected ships and reserving himself the right not to issue a clean bill of health based on his recommendation, thereby preventing an individual ship from transporting migrants to American shores, the Consul provoked the ire of Italian shipping companies and local migration (port and police) authorities. Their initial reaction was to refuse the Consul the right to conduct inspections of any passengers, whether in the company of an appointed physician or not. However, existing animosities were quickly smoothed over in a few weeks, as the United States made its authority prevail: "The opposition to such examination on the part of the local authorities met by me on the inspection of the 'Gottardo' and her passengers on April 13th, has now given place to a more courteous and accommodating treatment free from all interference with the discharge of my duties. Yesterday the 'Independente' of the same line [Florio-Rubattino] and the 'Columbia' of the Anchor line carrying about 500 emigrants were carefully inspected by the examining physician and by myself personally, and both the condition of the ships and that of the passengers thereon were found to be most satisfactory."[42]

Although it was ships rather than individual passengers that were being selected for 'exclusion' on the basis of their potential for contagion, the outcome was that of a remote migration control. Controls bred more controls. Suddenly, the Medical Inspector was no longer checking only for traces of cholera amongst the emigrants but was singling individual migrants for exclusion on the basis of other medical criteria: "On the S.S Archimede [a steamer of the Florio Rubattino Line] our medical inspector found a boy of about twelve years of age with a contagious disease of the eyes – called *Congiuntivitis purolenta et cheratitis pustulosa* – to which he called the attention of the Italian authorities. They recognized that he was perfectly right and immediately disembarked the entire family. I think it just to add that at present the Italian authorities are doing all in their power to aid us in our medical inspection, and that they also are most rigorous in their medical visit." [43] Clearly, not only had remote controls on Atlantic routes been institutionalised prior to the Quarantine Law of 1893 or the Immigration Acts of 1891 and 1904, but the exclusion of migrants on the basis of trachoma had been taking place informally before then, even prior to the disease

[41] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 37, of April 11, 1885
[42] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 65, United States Consulate, Naples, April 28, 1885
[43] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 68, United States Consulate, Naples, May 26, 1885

being classed under the 'dangerous contagious' category by the United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service in 1897.[44]

However, the primary system that was in place at the time, both in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, was predicated not on the mass exclusion of undesirables, but on selective exclusion of individuals and, concurrently, on mass surveillance. In Naples and in southern Italy generally this was also due to the practical (including financial) constraints on the ability of limited United States personnel to effectively monitor all emigration. As the U.S. Consul wrote to the Department of State in September 1885 asking for an extension of Dr. Fienga's mandate, "…so that I will cover all vessels leaving the Bay of Naples and Salerno for ports in the United States. Very careful medical inspections and strict surveillance have been kept over each and every individual leaving this port for the United States, and will be even more rigidly enforced in the future; but they may prove of no avail to prevent the introduction into the United States of persons from the infected districts if steamers are permitted to take merchandise or passengers at any of the other ports in the Bay of Naples, without medical inspection, as I am credibly informed has been done…".[45]

Meanwhile, the Municipality of Naples had finally taken action. Even though in April 1885 the city was as "dirty and squalid" as it had ever been, the municipality had completed a new aqueduct to supply the city with uncontaminated water "of an excellent quality for drinking and in such abundance as to admit to its use freely for cleansing purposes."[46] Known as the Aqueduct of the Serino, so high was the level of expectation surrounding its potential to save the city from contagion that celebratory accounts of its construction and design were included in all the major European guidebooks to Naples shortly thereafter.[47] No plan had yet been made to arrange for the sewer refuse to be carried away from the city and not dumped in the Bay of Naples as it had been done previously. Moreover, no alternative provisions had been made for the transit and temporary residence of migrants in

[44] Zolberg, *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America,* p. 229. Regarding the Immigration Act of 1904 Zolberg writes, "It also required medical examinations abroad before embarkation, the first operationalization of remote control on the Atlantic side; although its constitutionality was immediately challenged by the shipping companies, the provision was sustained by the courts in 1909."; Fairchild, *Science at the Borders,* pp. 56-7 "The federal Quarantine law of 1893 authorized the United States to station PHS officers in European ports to monitor the prevalence of epidemic disease and to inspect and pass vessels wishing to embark for U.S. ports. Government officials in Naples, Italy, granted PHS quarantine officers permission to inspect departing immigrants under U.S. immigration law."; Regarding the classification of Trachoma as a 'contagious disease' by the PHS see: Library of Congress, Passed Assistant Surgeon T. Clark and Passed Ass. Surg. J.W. Schereschewsky, *Trachoma. Its Character and Effects*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914., p. 5: "In 1897 this disease was classed under the heading of 'dangerous contagious' disease by the United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, thus making mandatory the deportation of aliens also afflicted, under section 2 of the immigration laws."

[45] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 39, United States Consulate at Naples, September 3rd, 1885

[46] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 65, United States Consulate, Naples, April 28th, 1885

[47] For one example see: Guide Joanne, *Italie du Sud.* Paris, 1890, p. 65

Naples. Somewhat brutally, the Municipality had made plans to demolish the unsanitary buildings that lined the streets of the lower city, but work had been postponed to the 1st of May 1886 inasmuch as the leases on the houses in that particular quarter of the City did not expire until then.

Meanwhile, controls on emigration were tightened further by the United States' authorities which, having now secured a foothold in the city, were reluctant to let go. Subsequent events proved that their caution had been justified. Although cholera disappeared from Naples and its hinterland for a few months towards the end of 1885, by September of the following year it had made an appearance on its outskirts, at Torre dell'Annunziata, where there had been eighteen cases, three of which had been fatal.[48] More cases were registered in the town of Rosina, a short distance from Naples, in August of the following year.[49] Over the next three decades the city was visited by cholera once more, and once by plague and yellow fever. Until circa 1895, which was when yellow fever struck in Naples, the city was quiet, but U.S. inspections continued, growing in scope and intensity. Part of the reason was that procedures in Naples were not responding only to local and regional circumstances, but to domestic pressures too. Back in the United States, restrictionism was gaining new ground in political circles. In 1891 a new Immigration Law was passed and in 1892 the construction of Ellis Island Station had begun. Meanwhile, as a new cholera scare emanating from the ports of Europe and Russia threatened the United States and typhus reached its shores, Congress passed the Quarantine Law of 1893.

This new piece of legislation set out precise regulations for Consuls and medical inspectors stationed at foreign ports. Shortly after the law had been passed by Congress, it was announced by consular services to shipping agents in ports such as Naples, where it hung outside the Consular office for ten days for all to see.[50] In practice, the law institutionalised what had already been happening in Naples for almost a decade. But it also had the effect of intensifying controls. This was part of a re-organisation of the PHS corps in Europe generally. An Italian doctor, Dr. Mallio Empolei, was nominated the head of the European branch of the service whereas Dr. Fienga was replaced by an American doctor named J.B. Young, appointed directly by the Surgeon General in the United States. As the Consul recounted in April 1893, "He had a conference with the shipping Agents and

[48] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 39, September 3rd, 1886
[49] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 71, August 19th, 1887
[50] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 66, Consulate of the United States at Naples, April 6th, 1893

explained to them his duties and instructions today in this Office."[51] By 1898 the inspection corps had been expanded to include (in addition to the Medical inspector, the Consul and his clerks) the Vice-Consul and as many as seven assistants. Not that they always sufficed. When two or more ships needed inspecting on the same day for example, the work was carried out in concert with shipping company staff.

On a normal working day, it would take the team eight hours to attend to their duties, which from the simple medical inspection of third class passengers had grown in number and variety to include the inspection of luggage ("amounting to over 1000 parcels [per ship], every separate piece of which had been opened, carefully inspected and when needed, duly disinfected then labelled and stamped with consular seal") and the bureaucratic review of ship papers (primarily emigrant list cards and the bills of health) attesting to the sanitary condition of individual ships. As the Consul lamented, "The Emigrant inspections are promotive of neither health nor pleasure. While many emigrants are cleanly, in person and attire, the major portion are not, and our workers are always liable to infection and vermin. The examination of parcels and baggage is still more abhorrent. Decaying fruits, onions, garlic and putrefying cheese, are invariably found secreted in their effects, so paralyzing to stomach and nostrils as to involuntarily recall Dudley Warner's distressful exclamation, 'And Can a merciful God forgive such a stench?'…I am compelled to go to the ships anchored out in the harbour in a hired row-boat, often in wind tempests, rough seas and drenching rains, for which Naples is noted, and return frequently after work at the serious risk to health and safety."[52]

By 1904 the permanent medical service personnel in Naples had been increased to three and the service was capable of examining in one year, from the 1st of July 1904 to the 30th of June 1905, as many as 178,469 migrants. The vast majority (173,413 or roughly speaking 97%) were admitted while the rest were rejected on medical grounds (mainly trachoma (4,440)).[53] All of this came at a cost for U.S. authorities. The U.S. Consul and the PHS staff were obliged to try to find ways to raise revenue in order to pay for the inspections and they decided to charge shipping companies for the services rendered. The chance of making 'a quick buck' was not lost on consular officials, a stark reminder that even at its furthermost reaches the bureaucratic system of migration control was not impervious to the enticements of the emigration business. Once the abuses were reigned in – Consul Frank

[51] Ibid.
[52] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 15, February 15th, 1898
[53] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 180, December 12th, 1905

Dean had been found to be charging ten times the price of a regular ship inspection and keeping over a third of the profit for himself and his father – the fee was settled at 200 lira per ship by the Chief of the Consular Bureau and shortly afterwards a solution arrived in the form of the new Consul, Homer Byington.[54]

However, the intensification of controls also came at a certain diplomatic and social cost as relations with Italian authorities and migrants were strained further. While the cholera epidemic of 1884 - 1892 had resulted in new sanitary controls being instituted along the length and breadth of the Mediterranean, Italian public opinion was alert to the fact that in Naples this had been spearheaded in part by U.S. authorities and that it had resulted in a number of new restrictions on emigration. While the establishment of an American Sanitary Agency in Naples in 1893 was defended by U.S. officials on the grounds that the city lacked a 'clearing agency for ships' – the only law regulating emigration at that time being the 1888 'police law' discussed in previous chapters – the build-up of American infrastructure on Neapolitan shores was characterized as an unacceptable breach of Italy's sovereignty. A well-known Neapolitan newspaper at the time recounted tales of poor emigrants made to disembark for having eczema or for refusing to allow American authorities to disinfect their possessions in the belief that in the process, the technicalities of which they were oblivious to, their belongings would be destroyed. On the 18th August 1893 *Il Paese* roared: "In the name of what principle of international law can a foreign government establish a public office in our kingdom, with the only aim of harassing in every possible matter our citizens? […] Only the Giolitti government could tolerate a similar form of interference!".[55] However, it wasn't until a new cholera epidemic broke out in 1910 that the clash over migration controls became more than a battle of words.

From one epidemic to the next: The continental spread of controls c. 1892-1913

If the 1884 epidemic had resulted in U.S. controls being institutionalised in Naples, it also resulted in their spread across the entire European continent. In fact, Europe and the Mediterranean were part of a truly global network of American sanitary surveillance that in

[54] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 14 Consulate of the United States, Naples, February 15th, 1898
[55] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No. 71, Consulate of the United States Naples, August 18, 1893. Clippings from the newspaper *Il Paese.*

the East extended as far as Manila and Japan. The foundations for this form of 'border contagion' had been laid by the U.S. Quarantine Law of 1893, which saw to it that PHS staff were stationed in foreign ports to monitor the spread of contagious diseases and to inspect vessels carrying passengers to the United States. As the Surgeon General explained to the then Secretary of the Treasury in 1905: "Until 1893 the epidemics invariably were continued to the United States, and it was the knowledge of this fact that induced Congress to pass the Act of February 15, 1893, authorizing the detail of medical officers to the offices of the United States Consuls to enforce Treasury Regulations relating to vessels, their cargoes, passengers, and crews. The Senate Committee on Immigration previous to this had extended meetings and called before them a number of prominent physicians and sanitations for expressions of opinion as to the danger of the advent of cholera, particularly through immigration, and the consensus of opinion, as shown in the hearings, was that in '93 the United States would probably be afflicted with this disease. Then followed the law of 1893, under which the medical officers of this Service were detailed by the President to the offices of the Consuls in some fourteen principal ports of Europe, and it has generally been conceded that his measure prevented an epidemic of cholera in the United States in 1893."[56]

Naturally the formalisation of remote controls occurred at different times and in disparate ways. Roughly speaking, these varied according to the incidence of the disease in a certain locality and the level of resistance on behalf of local authorities and shipping companies to American interference. Shipping companies plying between Europe and the United States were likely to acquiesce to American demands for fear of having to bear the cost of repatriating immigrants and of being denied access to American ports by U.S. Consuls, who could choose not to issue a *libre pratique* attesting to the soundness of a ship's sanitary condition, but they were also likely to ally themselves with domestic governments to lessen the sting of quarantine. Largely speaking, sanitary inspections and migration controls enacted at embarkation and transit points tended to reflect the nature of these alliances and power dynamics.

In northern Europe, the institutionalisation of U.S. health controls took place under the threat of cholera emanating from Hamburg in 1892, the tail-end of the fifth cholera pandemic. Shortly after the passing of the law, the United States declared a twenty-day quarantine on ships coming into U.S. ports from Hamburg. In addition, Norddeutscher Lloyd's agent in New York, Gustav Schwab, arranged for medical inspections to take place

[56] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 053, Report from Surgeon General to the Secretary of the Treasury. September 5, 1905

in all transit ports. According to Keeling, Schwab envisaged using shipping lines as a form of "remote immigration control for the United States".[57] Meanwhile, Public Health officials were despatched to Hamburg and to connected ports to ensure that six-day observation quarantines were being carried out for all steerage passengers. As the American Consul in Hamburg explained: "This quarantine is enforced under the supervision of the Municipal Police Department and, as the chief of the Bureau in question personally stated to me, in the beginning not only for the purpose of self-protection but also at the request of the Hamburg American Line, for the reason that such measures were required by the sanitary authorities in the United States – at the suggestion of the Health Officer of the port of New York – for which reason it has continued to be enforced." [58]

In nearby Antwerp in Belgium, where cholera had spread from Hamburg, a PHS Surgeon took office as early as April 4th 1893, roughly two months after the passing of the law. Through the following spring and summer he inspected emigrants on shore in a non-official capacity, but was allowed by the Red Star Line to act officially on board their passenger steamers headed to the United States.[59] In Bremen, on the other hand, medical inspections took place under the direct authority of the American Consul and his assistants. The examining physicians were sworn in by the Consul to perform their duties in accordance with United States' laws and they discharged them together with steamship company physicians. The ability of U.S. officials to perform medical inspections, as assistants or as overseers, depended on the openness of shipping companies and transit authorities to cooperation. As the Consul in Bremen explained, "The German government, as well as the American, hold the steamship companies responsible for the health or rather for the want of health of the emigrant. Wherever the migrant fails to meet the requirements of the examination, either at any of the stations on the way or finally at the American port, he is at once turned back and returned to his home at the expense of the steamship company. It is therefore in the pecuniary interest of the steamship companies to have emigrants that are prohibited from landing in the United States returned to their former homes at the earliest possible time and place."[60]

This did not stop German authorities and shipping companies from trying to negotiate more favourable conditions. For example, representatives of the Hamburg-America line

[57] Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914,* p. 169
[58] NARA, RG 90, Central Files, 1897-1923, B. 52, Report from American Consulate General in Hamburg Germany to Assistant Secretary of State Honourable Robert Bacon, November 23rd, 1905
[59] NARA, RG 85, Subject and Policy Files, 1893-1947. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Consular Reports 1907-1909, 51525/22, Letter from U.S. Consul at Antwerp, Belgium, Henry W. Diederich, July 30th, 1907
[60] Ibid.

attempted to persuade U.S. officials in October 1905 to discontinue quarantine in the port following the abatement of the threat and the end of quarantine in rival ports in Antwerp and Rotterdam. In Belgium, authorities took a much stronger stance and from 1893 onwards no Consular or other foreign government officials were allowed to take part in the inspection of emigrants, if not in an unofficial capacity. The U.S. Consul in Antwerp wrote, the Commissioner had characterised U.S. involvement as an affront to Belgium's national sovereignty, defending the right of his team, which consisted of the assistant surgeon and nine inspectors, to "protect all emigrants passing over Belgian soil, irrespective of their destination" including that of inspecting lodging houses and enforcing necessary sanitary measures.[61]

Controls gained in intensity by the time a new cholera pandemic (the sixth) broke out in Russia in 1904, where it had arrived from Bengal in India via Afghanistan, Persia and the Caspian Sea. It was subsequently recorded in Germany and Poland in 1905. Again, what started as inspections for cholera quickly morphed into a more comprehensive set of controls. By 1905 transit migrants in Bremen were being examined for trachoma and other contagious diseases affecting the eyes, and their general physical condition was ever more closely monitored.[62] It also resulted in the spread of U.S. controls and surveillance beyond ports of transit, similar to what had happened in Naples and its hinterland. By 1907 controls in Germany were happening at the country's frontiers in the East, where over twelve control stations had been set up. The Consul reasoned that remote controls were in the interests of emigrants as well as of steamship companies and the population of transit countries: "It saves the emigrants the necessary expense of railway tickets from the frontier to the port of embarkation and the steamship company the cost of returning him to the frontier, while from a purely sanitary point of view the state of Prussia is also benefited thereby inasmuch as the transportation here and back of 11,049 people afflicted with more or less contagious diseases involves a great danger to the public, which is thus avoided." Those rejected at the control stations were likely to disagree. In 1905 they totalled 11,049 of whom 4,944 and 3,718 were rejected at control stations at the border with Russia and Austria for having contracted trachoma and *conjunctivitis granulosa* respectively. In Bremen proper, 1,861 were rejected at the 2nd 'sifting process', the majority for trachoma (1,121).[63] In 1908, the number of

[61] NARA, RG 85, Subject and Policy Files, 1893-1947. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Consular Reports, Letter from U.S. Consul at Antwerp, Belgium, Henry W. Diederich, July 30th, 1907
[62] NARA, RG 85, Subject and Policy Files, 1893-1947. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Consular Reports 1907-1909, 51525/5, Report by William Thomas Fee, U.S. Consul at Bremen, 15th November, 1907
[63] Ibid. Other illnesses included: measles, fever, scarlet fever, chicken pox, blindness, deafness, idiocy, diseases of the skin, crippled and lame, tuberculosis, favus. The total number of migrants processed in Bremen were 198, 861, mostly from Austria (50,891), Hungary (71,421), Russia (53,805).

emigrants rejected had decreased to 2,586 at the frontier control stations, and 1,553 due to trachoma affliction. Others still managed to slip through controls only to be rejected by Immigration authorities upon arrival in the United States.[64]

Geographically U.S. influence stretched past the confines of northern and central Europe, encompassing hitherto untouched parts of the Mediterranean. In the Arabian peninsula, the U.S. Consul General in Beirut provided regular updates on the spread of the disease in Greater Syria and backed the decision to dispatch a sanitary commission along the pilgrimage route to Mecca in 1908.[65] Similar procedures to those adopted by U.S. officials in Hamburg with regard to the transit of Russian migrants were adopted for the transit of Greek migrants in the Adriatic port of Fiume. In fact, U.S. surveillance and controls were closely associated with the the transit of Russian and Greek migrants in European ports who, along with Italian transit migrants, were seen as the most risky among all potential carriers. While in 1884 cholera had been carried to Marseilles by French officers returning from Indochina a French interior ministry report stated that in September 1910 it may have been brought there by Greek transit migrants from Chios who had travelled from Piraeus in Athens on a French steamer named *Le Bosphore* (and not by Italian migrants as suggested by Frank Snowden).[66]

Shortly earlier the U.S. PHS officer at Naples, Dr. Henry Downes Geddings, had described Marseilles as a "busy maritime city with a large trade, particularly with the Levant, but comparatively little, if any directly with the districts of Europe now cholera infected. The emigration via Marseilles to the United States amounts to little, seldom more than fifty steerage passengers sailing on any one vessel." Unable to predict the threat emanating from Greece, Geddings had provided reassurance to the effect that the necessary precautions were being taken to supervise the flow of migrants from Italy, where he maintained emigration to and via Marseilles remained slight and occurred mostly by sea, and from Russia. The U.S. Consul-General in Marseilles had been instructed by the State Department "to disinfect baggage from Russia and to detain all emigrants from Russia in observation five days after embarkation for the United States", whereas the French government had issued a decree

[64] NARA, RG 85, Subject and Policy Files, 1893-1947. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Consular Reports, 1907-1909, 51525/5, Report by William Thomas Fee, U.S. Consul at Bremen, March 13th 1909

[65] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 053, Report from American Consulate-General in Beirut, Syria, July 10th, 1908.

[66] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 053, Report from French Ministry of the Interior regarding the transit of migrants from Chios to Marseilles, October 1910; Snowden, *Naples in the Time of Cholera 1884-1911,* p. 337 "Furthermore, because of the temporary migration of labourers to southern France [from Italy], the disease was likely to be exported to Provence, reversing the direction followed by the infection of the summer of 1884. And in fact Asiatic cholera broke out at Marseilles in August and September, causing 120 unreported deaths in the city in August alone and perhaps an equal number in September."

providing for the inspection of passengers at the border.[67] This was more or less in keeping with what happened at other French emigration ports, such as le Havre, where the same measures had been adopted for the transit of Russian migrants and, the U.S. Vice Consul confidently maintained, "the officials of the French Line of steamers (the only one carrying passengers from this port to the United States) are disposed not only to observe our laws and regulations to the letter but for their own protection and that of their passengers, have refused to issue tickets to persons coming from cholera-infected regions."[68]

As Dr. Geddings's note indicates, Naples was the intelligence centre of U.S. Mediterranean quarantine, which befitted Dr. Geddings's expertise (he was chosen as the U.S. delegate to the Paris Sanitary Conference of 1903, which was convened in order to agree on a common response to cholera epidemics, and regularly travelled around Europe as a cholera expert). Presumably this owed something to the incidence of the 1884 epidemic which resulted in the build up of U.S. personnel in the port of Naples and added vigour to the conviction that the city could pose a special threat to the United States. It also reflected the high rate of Italian emigration to the United States from there. However, Naples also remained at the centre of U.S. PHS policy in Europe because of the systematic obfuscation of the truth by local and national authorities, as documented by Frank Snowden, and their denial of full cooperation, which initially created the premise for further involvement. This occurred not in the aftermath of the fifth pandemic, but in 1910 when cholera returned to the peninsula. An outbreak of plague in 1901 occasioned a call for more personnel by the U.S. Consul, but resulted in little of consequence as far as the institutionalisation of new forms of migration control are concerned.[69]

When cholera returned to Naples in august 1910 it was not carried there by French sailors, as had occurred in 1884, but travelled in the tired bodies of refugees from Apulia. Despite the urban reform projects undertaken with the backing of the national parliament following the previous cholera epidemic that had seen the removal of 'surplus population' from the overcrowded city centre to the industrial outskirts of town, and the demolishment of the unsanitary *fondaci* (slum dwellings) in favour of a more spacious, better ventilated and less populous accommodation, in addition to other drastic measures such as the building

[67] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. Surgeon PHS in Naples Dr. Geddings to U.S. PHS Surgeon-General, September 17, 1910
[68] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from America Vice Consul in Le Havre. France, September 10, 1910
[69] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch no. 98, Consulate of the United States at Naples, Italy, September 8, 1902. Interestingly, the U.S. Consul in Naples motivated his request for the re-instatement of a PHS officer Dr. Eager on the grounds that "the character of the Emigrant Trade Inspection work here calls for a knowledge of local conditions which can only be acquired by experience."

of a new aqueduct and sewage disposal system, transient dwellings and the homes of the urban poor proved lethal once again. According to Geddings cholera had entered the urban sewage system via the "small hotels, furnished chambers and lodging houses" of the 'Oriental quarter', where most of the refugees had taken shelter, and had been flushed down in the bay of Naples where it was picked up by unsuspecting bathers, the first four victims of the epidemic. From there it had probably spread across the lower class districts of the city due to the usual combination of bad personal and worse public hygiene. This was abetted by the recurrence of torrential rains in the latter days of August and the Feast of San Gennaro, the Patron Saint of Naples, for which Geddings provided an unflattering account: "...on this day there are enormous aggregations of people in various parts of the city, the usual soiling of streets in characteristic Neapolitan fashion, and much feasting and carousing with the consumption of many tons of foodstuffs of all kinds, much of which was in all probability unfit for consumption."[70]

In Naples the Public Health Office, anxious to protect the city's reputation and commerce, opted for public denial and early cases in the city were labelled as 'gastro-enteritis' in the hope that the outbreak was merely a recrudescence of the previous epidemic and would soon fade. When these cases came to his attention Dr. Geddings petitioned the Chief of the Public Health Office in Rome to secure a sanitary inspection of the city, but to little avail. The Chief of the Municipal Office of Hygiene and the scientific community in Naples conspired to hide the existence of cholera by disguising it in scientific jargon as gastro-enteritis, Neapolitan fever and Maltese fever. Newspapers followed his cue. On the 15th of September, *Il Mattino*, Naples' main daily, broke its silence with a story on the 'Cholera in Naples,' in which it attributed recent deaths to a local disease that it conveniently named "colera partenopeo" (Neapolitan cholera) and attributed the whisperings about the presence of Asiatic cholera in the city to the malice of French and Swiss hotel owners who were hoping to rob the Mediterranean city of its tourists.[71] The Italian government eventually acknowledged the outbreak of cholera in September, only to declare it extinguished the following month. In fact, the epidemic abated in winter, if at all, only to return in the spring of 1911.

By then the Italian government had undertaken a nation-wide sanitary campaign informed by the latest hygienist dogma, abandoning the coercive methods employed

[70] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. PHS Surgeon in Naples Dr. Geddings, Undated, c. 1910

[71] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. PHS Surgeon in Naples Dr. Geddings to Surgeon General, 15th September, 1910

immediately after the epidemic had broken out (such as the forced disinfection and destruction of personal property) and that had characterized its handling of the previous cholera epidemic in 1884. Meanwhile, it resumed its policy of concealment under the stewardship of returning Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti. Giolitti officiated the bribing of medical officers and journalists, as civil servants were told to deny all rumours of new outbreaks and reject requests for more information, whether from foreign officials or local residents. He was successful in resisting public acknowledgment of the epidemic and thus also in protecting some of Italy's trade with other countries (including the emigrant trade), but at the cost of spreading the disease to the United States (where cholera cases broke out in New York but were successfully contained) and potentially to France, imperilling the health of hundreds of people who had contact with infected areas, such as Naples, and potentially hundreds more by denying them rehydration therapy pioneered by Leonard Rogers in India.[72] If the epidemic had been declared once it broke out in Apulia in August, it might never have reached Naples.

The U.S. responded in various ways according to the degree to which they believed Italian officials' version of events and, on that basis, were prepared to cooperate with them or to defy them. This had obvious consequences for the processing of steerage passengers (most of whom were migrants) taking ship at Naples and, to a lesser extent, Genoa. As cholera cases started to build in August 1910, U.S. PHS officials decided to take matters into their own hands. On September 8th, 1910 Geddings wrote back to the Surgeon General in New York to make an extraordinary announcement: despite Italian reports to the contrary, the city was to be considered infected by cholera and, as the person embodying the United States Public Health Service, he was going to assume full control of the sanitary inspections of vessels leaving the port of Naples for the United States: "…steerage passengers from Naples [are] to be held under observation under the same condition as obtained in the case of steerage passengers from Apulia…all passengers (steerage) from other points to be embarked in Naples with a minimum of delay from trains to ships' side, and absolutely no food to be taken on board in the baggage or the hand or upon the persons of emigrants….Passengers of the first and second cabin classes [are] to be interrogated as to their whereabouts for the five days immediately preceding embarkation and to be required to present satisfactory evidence that they have not been exposed to the infection…The Shipment of Merchandise…to be forbidden if originating in Naples or the infected provinces or stored in Naples prior to shipment." His message betrayed more than a little anxiety: "In

[72] Snowden, *Naples in the Time of Cholera 1884-1911,* pp. 353-359

the past two days a condition of affairs so disquieting and so fraught with danger to the public health has come to light, that I am today perfecting arrangements to enforce the quarantine regulations of the United States with regard to cholera, purely as a precautionary measure, and pending the clearing of the situation." Geddings had reached a bitter conclusion: "I was living in a fool's paradise", he wrote.[73]

Once Italian authorities announced cholera had returned, a compromise was reached. Transit migrants already in Naples were to undergo a six-day quarantine on the hulk vessel *Marsala*, which was moored in the port of Naples. Dr. Geddings was given authority to assist with the running of a laboratory on the ship where bacteriological examinations of the faeces of transit migrants were carried out in order to identify any bacillus carriers.[74] Five days of quarantine in Naples, combined with the eleven or twelve-day crossing of the Atlantic and five more days of quarantine in the United States upon arrival were thought to be a sufficiently long period of time to cover the entire life cycle of the *vibrio*. No-one afflicted by cholera would enter the United States undetected. Those migrants who were arriving from outside the city were to be housed in the *Casa degli Emigranti* (literally, 'Emigrants' home'). As discussed in the previous chapter, although Italy's parliament had passed a law in 1901 (Italy's first emigration law) that provided for transit migrants to be hosted in hygienic locales at the expense of the state, progress had been slow. The opening of the *Casa degli Emigranti* in Naples was short-lived, as Luigi Luzzatti (Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of the interior from the 31st of March 1910 to March 29th 1911) capitulated to the demands of local hotel owners (who yielded considerable influence locally, not least because of their connections with organised crime, and who had effectively organised in order to protest the decision by forming the Association in Defence of the Interests of the 12th Electoral District) and reopened transit through the city, making the stay in the *Casa degli Emigranti* optional.

As ships carrying cholera-stricken migrants arrived in New York starting in June 1911 (the first was the *SS Berlin*, which docked at Ellis Island on the 20th June), the United States

[73] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. Consul to U.S. Surgeon-General PHS, Naples, September 7, 1910

[74] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 18797-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. PHS Surgeon in Naples Dr. Geddings to U.S. PHS Surgeon-General, October 26, 1910. "This bacillus carrier business is the hardest blow at quarantine administration which it has received in many years, for it complicates the situation here and everywhere else most arduously, and one never knows when the work is done. Upon board the quarantine ships Marsala here the faeces of over 2,000 persons, involving nearly 3,000 examinations, has been systematically carried on. Out of this number nine bacillus carriers have been found: five destined for the United States and four for ports in South America. Some were under observation for more than 12 days before they cleared up, and most remarkable, not one showed a day's indisposition, or gave any history of illness previous to coming under observation….They [the examination] were all made in the little clinical laboratory on board the Marsala and I was kindly allowed by the Capitano Medico G. Saccone and the Tenente Medico S. Muso to witness and to participate when I had the time. The work of these gentlemen has been admirable: they have exercised the greatest care with these cases, and have discharged none, until three successive examinations made at intervals of every other day have demonstrated the freedom of the stools from the vibrio."

confronted Italy with knowledge of the epidemic and many of the former controls were re-instated. As Frank Snowden has written, arrangements for the quarantining of passengers were made in Castel Nuovo (as opposed to the quarantine hulk *Marsala*) and the *Case degli Emigranti* were re-opened in both Naples and Palermo (which had also been affected by the cholera epidemic). U.S. PHS officials were allowed access to both, and their powers of inspection were restored. In addition, the Italian government pledged to employ navy personnel, with experience in bacteriology, as Royal Commissioners, and government inspectors, which the law of 1901 required to travel on board emigrant ships to keep an eye on the notoriously unreliable ship doctors. Geddings, who had spent the winter and spring collecting information on the epidemic which he believed to be ongoing, an effort that had cost him the friendship of polite society in Naples as well as the support of the American Consul, no longer enjoyed full control over the sanitary inspection of emigrants. An official investigation into his conduct was initiated, partly at the insistence of the Italian government whose Ambassador in Washington had formally requested for Geddings to be removed from his post. Meanwhile in Naples the Municipality stepped up its efforts at containment (which included the systematic inspection and disinfection of the *fondaci* and of streets in the Lower City along with other measures such as the surveillance of food markets and the ban on swimming in the Bay of Naples) while the Italian government continued to suppress information regarding the epidemic and block any leaks.[75]

The uneasy agreement that was reached with the United States, which judged it best not to disturb a friendly relationship and thus accepted to preserve Italy's secret, rested on the assumption that the Italian government would cooperate fully with them and disclose all facts regarding the epidemic.[76] In doing so, it was reasoned, the spirit if not the letter of the International Sanitary treaty signed in Paris in 1903, which required all signatories to cooperate during an epidemic emergency by coordinating prophylaxis and disclosing all relevant information, would not be violated. In practice, Italy continued to lie by providing doctored statistics that were dutifully reproduced and re-issued at home, in the United States,

[75] Snowden, *Naples in the Time of Cholera 1884-1911,* pp. 312-313

[76] NARA, RG 90, Central Files, 1897-1923, Box 055, Letter from U.S. Ambassador to Italy John G.A Leishman to the U.S. Secretary of State, June 14, 1911. This is how the U.S. Ambassador to Italy, John Leishman, justified the decision: "From an American standpoint, this seems rather absurd; but conditions are very different here as the people depend so much upon the foreign visitors, especially in a year like this, with the Expositions and Celebrations in honour of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union; to say nothing of the financial loss resulting from interference with exports – especially of fruits etc. from districts which depended so largely upon the sale of fruits abroad, which, if not shipped promptly become more or less a total loss. The antagonistic feeling among the people against a country forcing quarantine is so well understood by the European powers that they frequently refrain from taking any open notice of the existence of cholera, even when quite certain of its existence, as long as it has not been officially declared merely confining themselves to quietly taking such protective measures as the situation warrants, while waiting from some other power to take the initiative and consequent odium."

despite knowledge of their inaccuracy. A comparison with Argentina is instructive in this sense.

In their rush to recruit immigrants from Europe in order to settle their frontiers, South American Republics generally did not set stringent health requirements for incoming migrants. Argentina learned this at a great cost in 1884 when an Italian ship carrying migrants from Genoa lied about the presence of cholera on-board and the disease spread throughout the country, killing tens of thousands. When rumour broke out regarding the presence of cholera in Italy (incriminating accounts sometimes made it onto the international press, such as the *New York Times*), the Argentinian government took action: doctors (known as a Sanitary Commissioners) were dispatched to Rio De Janeiro to board migrant ships and supervise the final leg of the journey. All incoming passenger ships from Italy were obliged to observe quarantine for at least five days on the lazaretto island of Martin Garcia, off the coast of Uruguay. More inspectors were dispatched to Genoa and Naples, but they were recalled in the Spring of 1911. Unlike the United States, Argentina could not afford to maintain remote migration controls abroad, but instructed its Consuls to keep on eye on local sanitary conditions.

When the Argentine government re-introduced these measures in the spring of 1911, after the Italian state had declared the epidemic to be over, Giolitti reacted by banning all emigration to Argentina until the 24th of August 1912. Emigration from Italy fell from 104,718 in 1910 to 32,719 in 1911 and 72,154 in 1912.[77] All requests for information, whether to Italy or to the United States, regarding the existence of a cholera epidemic were rejected, all rumours denied. Although Argentina too was one of the signatories of the Paris Treaty of 1903, it was less important to Italy as a commercial and strategic partner than the United States; if it sounded the alarm few(er) eyebrows would be raised. More importantly still, blocking the emigrant trade to Argentina would not jeopardise the economic survival of Italy's largest and most volatile port city, Naples. Giolitti even enjoyed some unexpected domestic support on the issue among those on the Left who balked at the exploitation of Italian labourers in south American *fazendas*.

The idea of U.S. officials happily deferring to Italian authorities (and patiently tolerating Italian deceit) when promised that all necessary prophylactic precautions were being implemented, does not fully bear out in practice. When in the autumn of 1911 the Italian government declared that five-day quarantines, seen as an encumbrance to trade (and to shipping companies) in addition to being very expensive to run, were to be enforced only

[77] Snowden, *Naples in the Time of Cholera 1884-1911,* pp. 339-342

for transit migrants from infected regions and not for all transatlantic migrants, Geddings, whose status clearly had not been reduced to inconsequence, defied them. With the Surgeon-General's backing the previous sanitary regime was restored and Italian petitions to the U.S. and to France received little consideration.[78] Standing tall did not imply that U.S. officials were successful in implementing a coherent and effective strategy across the entire peninsula, or continent for that matter. For instance, the U.S. Consul in Genoa allowed migrants to embark pending a letter from the Mayor of their place of origin stating that the city, town or village and its surrounding areas were free from contagion. This policy met with considerable disapproval from the U.S. Consul in Le Havre, where some Italian migrants had taken passage to from Genoa, who insisted that they undergo quarantine there.[79]

Snowden's meticulous documentation of the changes to sanitary controls in Naples and the involvement of U.S. institutions – indeed their complicity – in the concealment of the epidemic of 1910, and the impact of both on migration flows and controls, has not been duly acknowledged by current historiography on the nineteenth century emigration to the Americas.[80] Other aspects of sanitary controls also remain under-explored, however.

The first regards the militarisation of migrant transit across Italy that resulted of the new 'sanitary regime' born of U.S. acquiescence to Italian deceit. In fact, one of the results was to change the nature of migrant hospitality in ports of transit during the sixth cholera pandemic and after. As early as the 24th of June 1911, steerage passengers transiting from infected areas or those at the risk of infection underwent a five-day observation quarantine at the *Casa degli Emigranti* (not only at *Castel Nuovo*). Those who did not hail from a potentially contagious area were nonetheless detained during their stay in the city, from which it must be presumed that they were not allowed to dwell freely in the *locande*, whose owners had persuaded Luzzatti, through intimidation, to re-open the port to the transit of migrants. In that respect at least Giolitti was different from his predecessor. Even second class passengers, who Geddings' assistant Dr. King considered to be "for the most part the same class of people as steerage from a quarantine point of view", in other words, to have a similar hygienic status and risk profile to those in steerage, were isolated in a small hotel

[78] NARA, RG 90, Central Files, 1897-1923, Box 056, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador, October, 26, 1911; NARA, RG 90, Central Files, 1897-1923, Box 056 Letter from Dr. Geddings, October 28, 1911
[79] NARA, RG 90, Central Files, 1897-1923, Box 056, Letter from Agent for U.S. and Canada, Compagnie Générale Transatlantique to U.S. Surgeon General Dr. Walter Wyman, November 1, 1911
[80] This applies both to historiography on U.S. immigration controls, which hasn't been updated to reflect Snowden's findings and Italian historiography on the emigrant trade, including that on the sanitary aspects of emigration. In their introductory works on the subject both Ercole Sori and Daniele Bo fail to mention cholera as an important factor in shaping controls in Italy. In her monograph on sanitary controls on-board Italian emigrant ships Augusta Molinari does refer to prophylactic measures against cholera, but not in connection to the 1910 epidemic in Italy.

that was maintained by steamship companies. There they were kept under observation by the notoriously untrustworthy steamship company doctors (yet another example of corporate interest (shipping companies) undermining the same system of control they had been entrusted with running) who, in turn, Dr. King kept under his supervision. First class passengers were usually spared this annoyance and their detention was conditional on their failing to provide convincing evidence that they had not spent the five days immediately preceding embarkation in compromised surroundings.

Many of the same measures were implemented in Genoa in the summer of 1911 as in Naples: "Steerage passengers, irrespective of the locality from whence they come are required by the Italian authorities to pass five days on board the quarantine ship before embarking. All such are examined to exclude bacillus carriers. Cabin passengers for the first class are allowed to embark without other restriction than they must show they have not in all probability been exposed to infection. Second class passengers from infected places must remain in some good hotel under five days' observation by the company's physician. If from infected places they must remain under observation while in Genoa or go directly on board…There is no observation of bacillus carriers among passengers of either class, and, as all hotels serve fresh fruits and salads upon their tables there is some danger that some cabin passengers might become infected."[81]

In Sicily, where the cholera epidemic reached endemic proportions in 1911, Italian authorities unilaterally re-introduced prophylactic measures before U.S. suspicions regarding the existence of a new epidemic were confirmed. The previous year, in 1910, the American Consul in Palermo Hernando De Soto had suggested using the *Asilo degli Emigranti* to detain migrants headed to the United States.[82] As discussed in the previous chapter, it had originally been constructed as an alternative to the overcrowded lodging houses and hotels that transit migrants passing through Palermo commonly stayed in (it was finished in 1906 and unlike the *Casa degli Emigranti* was a private institution). By November 1910 migrants were being hosted there to protect them from contagion in Palermo, whereas transit migrants from infected districts were kept under observation for five days.[83] As of June 15th 1911, all migrants arriving from the interior of Sicily were directed to the *Asilo* whereas migrants from Palermo and its suburbs were obliged to undergo

[81] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, B. 055, Report, Dr. King to U.S. Surgeon-General PHS, Naples, September 11, 1911
[82] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. Consul in Palermo Hernando de Soto to the U.S. Secretary of State, October 31, 1910
[83] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from PHS Surgeon stationed in Naples to U.S. Surgeon General PHS, November 23, 1910

a five-day observation quarantine in an undisclosed location in the city. The news that cholera had reached Palermo reached the American Consul on the 18th of June, two days prior to the arrival of the *SS Berlin* on Ellis Island, when the Municipal Health Bureau of Palermo inadvertently sent the Consulate a real sanitary bulletin that had not been edited. It stated that in the previous week 41 people in the city had died from cholera and 135 from acute gastro-enteritis, which the Consul judged to be, "undoubtedly also cholera".[84]

Migrants who stayed in the *Casa* and *Asilo degli Emigranti* were supervised by sanitary personnel who administered quarantine, including the examination of faeces, and monitored their physical condition and behaviour. The intrusiveness of the 'medical gaze' was a comparable inconvenience to the destruction of migrant property (e.g. luggage or food) believed to be infected. Even in Palermo, where migrants paid roughly 0,25 Lire (or $0.50) a night to stay in the *Asilo*, they were obliged to follow a regimen under the authority of the Chief Surgeon of the Royal Marine Service. In the words of the American Consul "The house rules with regard to rising, retiring and hours for meals must be implicitly obeyed."[85] Many of the same rules were subsequently enforced by ship doctors or Royal Commissioners on-board migrant ships. They targeted diet and general conduct but, officially, also required the sleeping and living quarters of steerage passengers to be kept in adequate hygienic condition (although, by contemporary accounts, waste products and human excrements were a regular feature of both) and the forced isolation and treatment of sick passengers.[86] Not all of these measures were conducted in the interest of protecting migrants. Predatory officials frequently exploited fears migrants might harbour about being rejected or punished by sanitary authorities. In Naples, a clandestine trade in luggage tags flourished as migrants were promised that purchasing one would spare their luggage from disinfection.[87] As Augusta Molinari has written, in Palermo the Chief Medical Officer in charge of the Port resisted demands from both the Prefect and a society for the protection of migrants (*Il Patronato degli Emigranti*) to abolish sanitary procedures considered obsolete (the disinfection of migrant luggage with formaldehyde) because, in addition to lending his

[84] NARA, RG 90, Central Files, 1897-1923, Box 055, Letter from U.S. Consul in Palermo M. Hernando d Soto to U.S. Secretary of State, June 26, 1911
[85] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. Consul in Palermo Hernando De Soto to U.S. Secretary of State, October 31, 1910
[86] Ercole Sori, 'Aspetti sanitari dell'emigrazione italiana tra Ottocento e Novecento', in Giovanna Ognibeni (ed.), *Legislazione ed organizzazione sanitaria nella seconda metà dell'Ottocento,* pp. 621-2; Daniele Bo., 'Legislazione Sanitaria, Geografia Medica ed Emigrazione', in Giovanna Ognibeni (ed.), *Legislazione ed organizzazione sanitaria nella seconda metà dell'Ottocento,* pp. 646-7
[87] ASN, Archivio Generale Questura, Seconda Serie, Polizia Giudiziaria, n.b. 3900, Lettera Prefetto di Napoli al Questore, 2 luglio 1902

office greater authority, it also provided port functionaries with the opportunity to make a quick buck, or *lira*, at the expense of migrants.[88]

As these examples suggest, the housing and quarantine of migrants in Palermo, Genoa and Naples was part of a broader strategy aimed at channelling their passage. The transit of migrants through port cities came under ever closer scrutiny and control of government officials, both U.S. and Italian, military and civilian. Transit migrants arriving in Palermo by rail were transported to the *Asilo* "in duly disinfected vehicles" by U.S. Consular agents. They were not allowed to leave the premises of the *Asilo* until the day when their ship was due to leave, when they were once again escorted on "a short transit from the 'Asilo' to the wharf" and embarked on tenders under the watchful gaze of U.S. officials.[89] In Naples, where in the summer of 1910 U.S. officials had contemplated establishing a sanitary cordon around the entire city to prevent migrants from fleeing to Genoa, the passage from the railroad station to the "barracks" and again to the wharf was conducted "under guard" as Major Monaco, the Medical officer of the Royal Navy, was entrusted with this responsibility.[90]

Although the people taking ship were officially emigrants, these policies targeted their passage through the city, not their departure from it. Again, transit stood not only for migrant passage, but the control or policing of that passage. The same applied to the arrival of migrants in the United States. The transit of Italian migrants from the likes of New York, Boston or New Orleans to secondary destinations was monitored by PHS authorities to account for 'bacillus carriers' who had passed prior controls undetected. All incoming aliens from cholera infected 'districts' in Europe, including Italy, were issued 'immigrant destination cards', they were obliged to present to local authorities in their final place of residence. That way a record of their movements was kept in the port of arrival and their condition could be monitored until all possibility of contagion expired.[91]

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[88] Augusta Molinari, *Le Navi di Lazzaro. Aspetti sanitari dell'emigrazione transoceacnica italiana: il viaggio per mare* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1988), pp. 104-5

[89] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Report from Royal Superintendent of Emigration at Palermo. October 23, 1910

[90] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 055, Letter from Passed Assistant Surgeon in Naples Dr. King to Surgeon-General U.S. PHS, June 24, 1911; NARA, RG 90 Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. Consul in Genoa, James A. Smith to Secretary of State, Genoa, October 1, 1910. "Thus far Genoa is Officially declared free from cholera, although there have been rumours of several cases here. I do not, however, believe this favourable condition will long continue here. Emigrants from Naples are coming to Genoa to embark on ships leaving for the United States and South America. Other classes of travellers are doing the same thing. Some sanitary supervision is exercised but it is impossible to thoroughly control this movement. As quarantine barriers around Naples and other infected places would appear to be the only effective means to prevent the further spread of the disease."

[91] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 054, Letter from U.S. PHS Surgeon-General to U.S. PHS Surgeon in Naples, Dr. Geddings, November 22, 1910

At every stage of the journey controls were layered or selective, which reflects the class bias to sanitary policies and passenger controls at that time, but it also draws attention to the double function that U.S. PHS and consular personnel had in matters relating to human mobility. In Naples, like elsewhere, they served both as 'inhibitors' of mobile groups considered dangerous or undesirable by the United States government and as facilitators of other mobile groups who enjoyed a superior status, not only by virtue of their class background, but also on account of their nationality.

The reaction of an aristocratic female tourist from Boston (a first class passenger) to having been asked to fill out a questionnaire usually reserved for aliens, and the solicitousness of the Consul in coming to her aid, offers a humorous account of documentary controls in place in Naples at the turn of the century, but also make a poignant point regarding the inequalities of treatment characteristic of passenger controls. "A Boston lady, last spring called at the Consulate, showing her First class ticket, her American passport and numerous letters certifying to her respectability and social prominence, and with great indignation states the German Lloyd S.S Agents here, would not permit her to go on board their ship sailing that day from New York, unless she filled out the offensive blank, which she had spiritedly refused to do…knowing this new circular to be an exact copy of that on the Lists of 'Alien Emigrants' I personally visited the steamer's agents here, and assured them of my personal unofficial belief that no such certifications were designed to be enforced upon First class passengers bearing American passports….I then prepared a modified blank, with the strongly objectionable questions either omitted or so modified in phrase as to not seem humiliating to the lady, and which she signed and was permitted to sail." Apparently this was not an isolated incident, which explains the Consul's motivation for referring it to the State Department. Two months prior, "a Boston gentleman of fortune", Mr. Russell Whitney, had lodged a similar complaint. [92]

American consuls were obliged to lend assistance to all U.S. citizens present or passing through their district, regardless of station, which exposed them to some contradiction. Their ability to reconcile their duty as Consuls with that of agents of migration control was significantly put to the test when Congress softened the rules around naturalisation in 1907, lowering the bar for citizenship and allowing for the children of naturalised aliens to gain it automatically upon entering the United States. Seen from Naples, this made the funnelling of repeat migrants particularly difficult. Under these rules, steerage passengers, including

[92] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from United States Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Despatch No., 32. Consulate of the United States, Naples, Italy, September 2nd, 1899

the family of naturalised aliens, could embark on ships heading to the United States even if they fell foul of most LPC clauses. This included most debilitating illnesses, such as idiocy, and some contagious diseases, such as trachoma, but not cholera. Contagious citizens were allowed to board but were obliged to travel in isolation for the entirety of the journey during which they were kept under careful surveillance. Fast-lane migration obviously entailed a greater risk of contagion, and the idea that immigration destination cards be issued to newly naturalised migrants was briefly floated in 1911.[93] It was not unusual for U.S. Consuls to have to intervene in defence of migrants and their relatives who lacked proof of U.S. citizenship and were rejected at embarkation, but occasionally they were even called upon by U.S. citizens to inhibit the migration of unwanted family members or aid with their deportation from the United States, with surprising results. The records at Naples show several instances of domestic tragedy where husbands acted to exclude or deport their wives for immoral conduct, as discussed in Chapter Two.[94] It also included cases in which Consuls succeeded in reuniting family members who had been excluded after being diagnosed with trachoma, a contagious bacterial infection of the eyes that could result in blindness.

This is another aspect of remote migration control, targeting embarkation and departure rather than migrant passage through the city, that has been overlooked, despite having had a significant impact on the way flows of migrants from Italy and the Mediterranean to the United States were managed. Considered to be 'Oriental' in origin and Mediterranean in scope (it was said that trachoma had found its way west along the caravan routes from the Far East but had been conveyed to Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Napoleon's troops) the spread of the disease to the eastern seaboard of the United States, where it first manifested itself, was commonly attributed to migration from southern Europe and the Mediterranean.[95] There it was said to have persisted because of the unhygienic habits of the local population, even though, in the words of the U.S. PHS official Passed Assistant Surgeon J.W. Schereschesky, who co-authored a book on the subject in 1914, it was "particularly prevalent in Russia, Poland, certain parts of Austria-Hungary, as Galicia, and in Germany, in East Prussia near the Austrian-Hungarian frontier….In the south

[93] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 055, Letter from U.S. PHS Surgeon stationed at Port of Boston to U.S. Surgeon-General PHS, July 2, 1911

[94] NARA, RG 84, Box 022, Consular Posts, Letter from Attilio Castigliano to U.S. Consul General in Naples. Duluth., Minnesota, April 8, 1913. For example, A US citizen named Lorenzo Garofalo petitioned the U.S. Consul in Naples to prevent the landing in the U.S. of his wife, Giuseppina Gozzetta. According to a letter by his lawyer, Mr. Garofalo had "reason to believe that his wife is called to this country by a third party for immoral purposes". She had been jailed in Naples for being involved in a counterfeiting operation.

[95] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 269, Memorandum relative to the need of an appropriation of $10,000 for investigations of trachoma. October 3, 1912. "Prior to 1897s the increasing prevalence of trachoma in the eastern portions of the United States attracted widespread attention, which increase was attributed to the influx of a large alien population."

of Europe, Italy and, next to her, Greece are the countries more particularly cursed with this disorder."[96] According to his fellow author, Passed Assistant Surgeon Tagliaferro Clark, the "change in the source of arriving immigrants and resulting difference in their character of the people [from southern Europe and "countries bordering on the northern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean"] is very significant and in all probability accounts for the marked increase of the disease noted above."[97]

Similar conclusions provided the basis for a direct targeting of migrants from the Mediterranean, but the rationale for the preventive exclusion of carriers lay in the difficulty of curing it, in addition to its high contagiousness. Scherechewsky summed up the challenge thus: "The basic principle of treatment is to facilitate nature's attempts at a cure, and above all to prevent or restrict as far as possible corneal complications. In general, it may be said that the mildest case will require up to three months' treatment to effect a cure. While the time required for cases of moderate severity cannot be definitely predicted, it may be all the way from six months to a year…It is easier to prevent trachoma than to cure it. The best national prophylaxis is therefore the exclusion of aliens suffering from trachoma. In regard to the trachoma that is already in our midst that is a matter for the care of State and municipal health authorities."[98]

U.S. inspectors noted how the disease could spread easily on board and in closely confined spaces, like in tenement buildings and schools in American cities. While by 1914 shipping companies segregated passengers who exhibited any form of inflammation to the eyes and, in theory, conducted frequent examinations of passengers throughout the journey, the potential risk of contagion was considered too high to be un-regulated. After repeated petitions by medical professionals (most prominently Dr. Miles Standish of Boston via the Medical Communications of the Massachusetts Medical Society) in 1897 trachoma was declared a dangerous contagious disease in accordance with the provision of the Immigration Law of 1891, thus making mandatory the deportation of all arriving aliens who were afflicted by the disease.[99] As the trachoma epidemic spread west, gaining ground among the Native American population of Minnesota, the PHS was also charged with investigating its communication at home. Moreover, as cases among incoming immigrants continued to rise in the first decade of the twentieth century, with the Immigration Act of 1907 it became

[96] LOC, Passed Asst. Surg. T. Clark and Passed Asst. Surge. J.W. Schereschewsky, *Trachoma. Its Character and Effects.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914, pp. 14-15
[97] Ibid., pp. 4-5
[98] Ibid., pp. 31-32
[99] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 269, Memorandum relative to the need of an appropriation of $10,000 for investigations of trachoma. October 3, 1912

possible to penalize steamship companies by fining them $100 for bringing aliens afflicted with the disease.[100]

From a purely self-interested perspective, Italian authorities were primarily concerned with the importation rather than the exportation of trachoma. Like the spread of tuberculosis among Italian immigrants in the industrial centres of the United States, trachoma had become a worrying complication of return migration from South America where the disease was endemic (its presence on the continent was variously attributed to the forced migration of slaves from Angola or to emigration from Portugal). As Ercole Sori has noted, in the State of San Paolo, where Italian migrants tended to gravitate, 88 per cent of schoolchildren were found to have been afflicted with the disease around the turn of the century; infection rates among labourers in the *fazendas* were similar.[101] Based on the reports of shipping doctors, the incidence of the disease among return migrants could have been as high as 40 percent in the first decade of the twentieth century.[102] Indeed, the condition of Italian labourers abroad and the return of trachomatose migrants did much to raise the profile of the disease in Italy. While it had been present for over a century in Tuscany, Le Marche and Liguria, traditionally trading ports with Egypt, and had become endemic in the southern provinces of Sardegna, Sicily, Apulia, Calabria and Campania (where Naples was) due to the humid climate, high population density and proximity to maritime routes, it wasn't until 1905 that trachoma was declared a contagious disease in Italy. In 1907 the first national congress was held in Rome with the purpose of initiating a national campaign to tackle the disease.[103]

Long before that, on the orders of PHS officials, rejections of migrants for trachoma had already been occurring in ports of departure, such as Naples. As discussed above these controls were taking place as early as 1885, although if records in Naples can serve as an indication, the number of inspections and rejections for trachoma increased in the first decade of the twentieth century. There is some uncertainty regarding how many migrants were affected by these new kinds of controls. While in the literature on U.S. immigration controls, rejections in this period are usually considered to be around 3%, they don't

[100] NARA, RG 90, Central Files, 1897-1923, Box 269, Report on contagiousness and gravity of Trachoma by Assistant Surgeon Stationed at U.S. Immigration station in Boston, June 14, 1911
[101] Ercole Sori, *Aspetti sanitari dell'emigrazione italiana tra Ottocento e Novecento,* pp. 622-3
[102] Sori, *Aspetti sanitari dell'emigrazione italiana tra Ottocento e Novecento,* pp. 605-638; Daniele Bo., *Legislazione Sanitaria, Geografia Medica ed Emigrazione,* pp. 639-662. By contrast migrants affected with tuberculosis were fewer, around 10 percent. For example, Sori reports that in 1906 there were 457 cases of tuberculosis among return migrants from the United States, which corresponded to roughly 5,61% of all migrants. This might have been due to a combination of factors including more stringent controls upon arrival, higher rates of return among the diseased from South America than in North America and a lower prevalence of the disease in the latter. According to other statistics the number of migrants repatriated due to tuberculosis ranged from 179 to 518 per year between 1903 and 1909, for a total of over 3,000, whereas repatriations due to trachoma never surpassed 1,000.
[103] Daniele Bo., *Legislazione Sanitaria, Geografia Medica ed Emigrazione* pp. 639-662

commonly take remote controls into account. The consensus at the First Congress on trachoma, where the delegates inevitably dealt with the subject of emigration, put the rejection rate in Italy at roughly 20 percent.[104] Other contemporary accounts suggest that, excluding cholera, rejection rates for trachoma and related illnesses could reach as high as 70-75 percent of migrants; in a port like Naples that meant roughly 15,000 migrants a year.[105] PHS records refer to roughly 10 million eye examinations having occurred between 1897 and 1911.[106] This was roughly in keeping with rates of rejection of Asian migrants, which between 1903 and 1910 varied widely between 5 and 65 percent.[107]

Firstly, once trachoma was classified as a dangerous contagious disease, controls became more specialised, meaning that they became stricter but also, in a typical pattern of controls engendering new controls, extended to other kinds of eye infections, such as various forms of conjunctivitis that had similar effects to trachoma and were considered sufficient grounds for excluding migrants. From a medical standpoint, the differences between trachoma and other eye diseases, were negligible in the early phases of the illness. As the PHS Assistant Surgeon in Boston in 1911 explained, "As we gained in experience we learned to hold doubtful cases more and more under observation and to wait to see what would develop. As we have done so we have learned that trachoma, more often than otherwise, comes on insidiously or at least without marked inflammatory symptoms and that while perhaps most of the cases of acute inflammatory conditions of the conjunctive which we hold under observation readily recover, many others, indistinguishable at first in clinical appearance and apparently due to the same source of infection…will go on in spite of treatment and develop the essential characteristic of trachoma…".[108]

Clearly, the preventive exclusion of migrants on the basis of a preliminary diagnosis of trachoma would in all likelihood lead to a significant number of exclusions simply on the suspicion of trachoma. Uncertainty over the correct diagnosis of trachoma were shared by other colleagues. For instance, the PHS Assistant Surgeon stationed at the Immigration Station in Baltimore judged the diagnosis of trachoma to be the "most troublesome subject

[104] S. Leone, *Profilassi del Tracoma,* in *Atti del I Congresso per la lotta contro il tracoma, Roma, 1907* cited in. Daniele Bo., *Legislazione Sanitaria, Geografia Medica ed Emigrazione*
[105] O. Bordiga, '*Campania, Relazione per l'inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni dei contadini nelle province meridionali e nella Sicilia',* Roma, 1909, vol. IV cited in E. Sori, *L'emigrazione italiana dall'Unità alla seconda Guerra Mondiale,* Bologna, 1979, p. 216
[106] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 269, Report on contagiousness and gravity of Trachoma by Assistant Surgeon stationed at U.S. Immigration station in Boston, June 14, 1911
[107] Fairchild, *Science at the Borders,* pp. 59-60. According to Fairchild between 1903 and 1910 the PHS typically recommended for rejection a substantial percentage of intending Japanese and Chinese immigrants, anywhere from 5 percent to 65 percent. For example, in 1910 the PHS recommended rejection for roughly 30 percent (45.768 out of 1429.291) of the Asian immigrants examined for trachoma alone.
[108] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 269, Report on contagiousness and gravity of Trachoma by Assistant Surgeon stationed at U.S. Immigration station in Boston, June 14, 1911

with which the medical examiner of aliens has to deal. The diagnosis of a well marked case of trachoma presents no special difficulty to one at all familiar with this disease, but the borderland cases, those of long standing and quiescent at the time of examination or too acutely inflamed to classify, are difficult cases to decide."[109] So ambiguous was the definition that physicians abroad even wrote to the PHS service asking for a precise definition.

It is difficult to ascertain with precision the extent to which rejections for trachoma grew on account of domestic restrictionist pressures in the United States, as a consequence of the build up of U.S. personnel in Italy or of contagionist hysteria whipped up in the aftermath of the fifth cholera pandemic, which resulted in the passing of the Quarantine Law of 1893. What is clear is that the latter certainly played a role, as both the (albeit tentative) estimates for rejections suggest and as the paranoid assessments of some U.S. officials convey. As discussed above with reference to the work of Clark and Schereschewsky, the identification of trachoma with southern Europe and the Mediterranean, and not just with migration from those areas, had become orthodoxy by 1914. It is possible that this would have hardened the attitudes of American inspectors and fed enthusiasm for controls.

In fact, reports on trachoma epidemics tended to perpetuate exaggerated claims and were full of apocalyptic warnings. According to a PHS Surgeon writing in June 1911, a recent study by an Italian academic showed that the entire population of Sardinia and Sicily might be affected by trachoma. Trachoma, he argued, "was greatly on the rise in Italy".[110] Even the PHS Surgeon stationed in Honolulu had strong opinions about trachoma epidemics in the Mediterranean: " […] among the Syrians trachoma appears to have been so widely spread and for so long a time that the race seems to have acquired considerable tolerance to it. I believe that about fifty percent of Syrians I examined at Ellis Island have had trachoma and recovered. The disease had left characteristic scars in the eyelids but, as a rule, nothing more."[111] Was an aetiology of signs replacing one based on the careful analysis of symptoms? Even in Naples, where Syrian migrants made a rare appearance in the local police records, Ottoman migrants were being rejected by medical officials for carrying trachoma. One case concerned four students Ayad Abdullah, Azig Tam, Ermal Dos and Yosef Zeak who had been caught in transit. Another recorded the story of Arkis Gulazian,

[109] NARA, RG 90, Box 269, Passed Assistant Surgeon at Immigration Station, Baltimore to U.S. Surgeon-General, June 21, 1911
[110] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 189701923, Box 269, Report on the contagiousness and gravity of Trachoma from PHS Surgeon in Maine to Surgeon-General, June 10, 1911
[111] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 269, Report on contagiousness and gravity of Trachoma from PHS Surgeon at Honolulu Quarantine, September 22, 1911

an Armenian migrant who had endeavoured to make the crossing to the United States from Naples with his wife and child when his daughter was found to be suffering from trachoma and her rejection was advised. As the Consul reported, shortly afterwards the entire family had "embarked for Marseilles, France, intending to sail to the United States by one of the Northern routes." [112]

Conclusion

When the United States approached Italy in June 1911 to ask what was being done in order to protect from further outbreaks of cholera the Italian Foreign Ministry replied that while all possible precautions were being taken there was the possibility that cholera may re-enter clandestinely because of the transit of migrants from the 'Orient' across Italy's southern shores.[113] In fact, in all likelihood the *cholera vibrio* had entered Italy with long-shore fishermen returning to Apulia from the Eastern Mediterranean. It was then conveyed to France, potentially by Italian migrants transiting through Marseilles, and to the United States. In 1911, when Italian troops disembarked in Libya for the purpose of making it a colony, they carried cholera with them. Whether or not cholera spread to Tunisia via France or via Egypt remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that for a time the Mediterranean formed a distinct, if not unique, disease environment, not because of the 'race', ethnicity or culture of its people but because of its climate, its geography and the frequency of interaction between its shores and, blurring the lines between Europe and the Mediterranean, also across its land routes towards the Atlantic, the North Sea and eastwards, towards the Urals. Even notions of 'hygienic culture' loose efficacy when we take the spread of cholera to northern cities such as Hamburg into account or when we consider the influence of German, French and British hygienic science on Italian prophylaxis. After the 1884 epidemic Naples was re-designed in keeping with the hygienic principles of Max von Pettenkofer. This did not stop

[112] NARA, Consular Correspondence, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Naples, 1796-1906, Volume 12, Despatch No. 150, September 23, 1904

[113] NARA, RG 90, Central Files 1897-1923, Box 055, Note from Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 37, Rome, June 12, 1911. "To these provisions which bear every testimony to the correctness and scrupulousness of our conduct and to which no further precautions can be added, the Ministry has been induced by the consideration that however great the work of prevention may have been, nevertheless it cannot be denied that through carriers of germs who are unknown, or through contact with foreign emigrants from the Levant, or with persons apparently coming from the Black Sea or from Asia Minor or from Turkey in Europe, some choleric phenomena may manifest itself…. `these cases at Lungro and Serrastretta [in June 4] confirm the danger consequent upon emigration, especially from that special class of emigrants from the east (Syria and Asia Minor) who come to Italy on their way to America…".

cholera from paying a visit again shortly afterwards. The same argument could be made in relation to the spread and persistence of trachoma in countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece and some provinces of the Ottoman Empire, such as Greater Syria. As nineteenth century commentators on both sides of the Atlantic acknowledged, trachoma had initially spread to Europe via the trade routes that linked it to the Near and Far East, where it became endemic due to overcrowding, a humid climate and, yes, poor hygiene.

Along with troops, sailors, fishermen and other transients, migrants played a major role in spreading these diseases across the Mediterranean and beyond. The potential contagiousness of migrants was not lost on the states of both transit and destination countries, which devised strategies of containment and prophylaxis. In doing so, they only partly relied on racial theories of disease and contagion although, as in the case of trachoma containment, these occasionally could gain the upper hand and identification procedures could give way to prejudice and lapse into a search for clues rather than symptoms. However, the way PHS controls were organised across the continent reflected the primacy of place over race in the campaign against contagion. Rather than enacting bans on entire countries or subjecting certain groups to controls tailored to their supposed physical character or culture, or indeed enforcing controls in perpetuity without consideration for changes to the course and nature of an epidemic, they were implemented across countries of transit with a surprising homogeneity but with the objective of preventing contagion through mass surveillance and inspections.

The emphasis on a common approach tended to clash with the zeal of local actors and the autonomy that federal institutions allowed them. As a result, Congress and Federal institutions were frequently forced to play catch up with Consular authorities and local health officials. In a sense, as the presence of migration controls in Naples more than a decade earlier than the Quarantine Law of 1893 demonstrates, they legitimated practices that had already been taking place for some time. The precocious build up of remote controls in Naples could be read as a restrictionist campaign architected by Congress in response to domestic pressures and anti-immigrant sentiment at home and as a racist strategy designed to exclude migrants considered to be physically defective because supposedly of an inferior ‘race’. Neither interpretation can be totally discarded. Remote controls undoubtedly served as deterrents for the purpose of discouraging certain classes of migrants from attempting migration. But a stronger explanation would focus on the intersection of restrictionist agendas with prophylactic requirements as sanctioned by international treaties and as supported by intelligence on the recurrence (and the recurring denial) of disease in places

such as Naples. The sanitary component of remote migration control was not simply immigration restriction through the back door.

One of the reasons for the build up of U.S. controls was that too often both sending countries, such as Italy, and shipping companies could not be trusted to effectively carry out inspections and enforce controls, despite the threat of fines and sanctions. Ship doctors are commonly identified as the source of the problem: their wages were too low and their status too lowly for them to resist the pressures of their corporate masters. However, as we have seen in previous chapters too, corruption existed across the entire business and the interests of shipping companies were constantly played against those of other actors, such as emigration agents, rival shipping companies or the migrants themselves, for a number of reasons and with mixed outcomes for migration control. The inadequacy of shipping companies' medical staff became more apparent with the advent of bacteriology and in particular the discovery of bacillus carriers, which made disease containment a more complicated and expensive affair; one that, unlike the United States, a country like Argentina, could not afford. In fact, remote migration controls did not only spread and multiply through this period, they also intensified in line with shifting scientific consensus over the true character and costs of diseases like trachoma, and became more technologically sophisticated in the process. Medical doctors were more central to screening or funnelling processes on the eve of World War One than half or even a quarter of a century earlier, while Consular officials lost if not some authority then some operational importance while retaining powers of oversight and protection over 'US channels' abroad.

The pooling of scientific, bureaucratic, technological and, not least, diplomatic expertise and collaboration was one of the consequences of this shift, as demonstrated by the progress made in the realm of international sanitary law. Another was the effective prevention of the spread of cholera to the United States and elsewhere, including Argentina, with the inevitable gains in life and health that it entailed. Perhaps, even more lives would have been lost in Italy had it not been for the threat of a boycott of Italian ports and a potential ban on migration from and via Italy. Beyond reasonable doubt, it also resulted in considerable numbers of migrants (an average of 20 percent in Italy in the decade prior to World War One) being rejected by U.S. authorities, which should further temper triumphalist statements regarding the liberal credentials of the pre-War migration regime, with its supposed celebration of individual freedom and its firm commitment to humanitarianism. Unlike controls at U.S. territorial borders, remote checks were more likely to result in a rejection. The picture that emerges is that of a more complex, exclusionary and

de-centred migration regime than previously thought. As the Mediterranean's place in the world-economy changed in the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and as connections with the Atlantic increased, so did the nature and the nationality of migration controls. In this sense, immigration and sanitary authorities in the Americas were the latest in a series of global actors that national authorities had to contend with, from shipping companies, foreign recruiters, emigration agents and diasporic groups in ports of transit.

Conclusion

Clandestinity and the transatlantic emigrant trade: from restriction to regulation

One of the fundamental changes that occurred in the Mediterranean between the mid-nineteenth century and the beginning of the First World War was the passage from an emigration regime based on restrictionist policies to one based on regulation. Bans on transatlantic migration were progressively dropped, in Italy (post 1888) like in the Ottoman Empire (post 1893) and in several Balkan countries in intervening years. The governments of sending countries legislated, in paternalist fashion, to improve the conditions in which migrants were transported aboard steamships and to protect migrants from harassments and from the chimeric promises of recruiting agents. The recognition of the right of individuals to leave their country of origin was recognised as legitimate, but circumscribed by obligations to country and state (such as military service) and to family (through the institution of marriage). The 'liberalisation' of migration also occurred at the price of greater surveillance and the surrendering of other freedoms, whether in the name of public order, general hygiene or in defence of national or imperial interest. The right to emigrate was further tempered by the recognition of the right of destination countries to regulate and restrict incoming migration, whether domestically or abroad, via remote controls. As the century came to a close, south American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, revised their policy of subsidised emigration in a reductionist sense. The United States gradually moved to restrict incoming immigration further, via the Immigration Law of 1891 and the creation of new LPC clauses and, indirectly, via the Quarantine Act of 1893. Rates of rejection in Europe were considerably higher than those on U.S. soil and much more similar in scope and in character to those adopted as a result of the 'illiberal consensus' on immigration that gained ground on both sides of the Atlantic during the interwar years, symbolised by the introduction of immigrant quotas by the United States' government.

All of this took place in a context in which the pursuit of profit by businesses and large corporations involved in the trade, foremost among which were shipping companies, played an important role in shaping legislation and control mechanisms, when they weren't making a mockery of them. Liberalisation was also the brainchild of corporate interest and of

geopolitical strategising on the part of political elites. Regulation was designed in part to harness the economic power of mass emigration to benefit both local and national commerce. The interests of migrants were balanced with those of shopkeepers, hotel-owners, runners and 'liberal professions', such as emigration agents, and of course with those of large-scale enterprises and their backers, commonly financiers. Unless the former were able to make their voices heard, by securing political representation like hotel-owners in Naples or to hide behind diplomatic immunity like south American recruiters in France, then their needs were likely to be overlooked or sacrificed in favour of the interests of the latter group. The history of the migrant hospitality industry in Marseilles, the ousting of diasporic businesses in favour of the hotel for migrants of the oil entrepreneur Mr. Lignon is a fitting example, but so are the Italian government's concessions to the U.S. Public Health Service, including the temporary closure of privately-run migrant hotels, in order to avoid sanctions on Italian exports and protect Naples' viability as an international commercial hub. Liberalisation ultimately meant protecting migrants as consumers in the emigration market, but also ensuring that the market reflect the interests of producers or 'movers', whether via regulation or, in the absence of it, by allowing them to set the rules themselves.

The model or paradigm of a transition from restriction to regulation is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Most significantly perhaps, it fails to explain or account for the persistence of clandestine emigration flows following liberalisation. Once barriers to emigration were removed, migrants continued to depart illegally for the Americas. Even the narrowing of the technological and logistical gap between Italy and France with the inauguration of regular and direct steamship services, was not sufficient for curbing 'artificial emigration' and clandestine transit of Italian migrants via France. Clandestine flows did fall and rise with the changing tide of restrictions on emigration, particularly as countries on both sides of the Mediterranean prepared for war and intensified conscription, and on immigration, notably U.S. controls. In Naples migrants rejected by U.S. sanitary personnel commonly retreated to emigrant hotels where they could try to enlist the services of passport forgers or of clandestine emigration agents who could smuggle them on board. Other kinds of sudden changes or crises in public order could also catalyse clandestine emigration. Disease epidemics, in particular the fifth and sixth cholera pandemics, both provided a sudden stimulus to leave and hardened controls, the makings of a perfect storm. Cyclical downturns in the economy, failed harvests or environmental catastrophes, such as the phylloxera epidemic that devastated European viticulture in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, could have similar effects. The 1878 economic slump is credited with

having hardened attitudes to immigration in receiving countries and slowed down legal emigration while clandestine emigration soared.[1] So could sudden recruiting drives and propaganda campaigns or misinformation epidemics, such as in the case of false advertisements for Lord Strathcona's letter in Italy.

Focusing on liberalisation and on the impact of migration laws on flows can also conceal some of the other structural factors behind clandestine emigration that this thesis has focussed on. Inequalities between transit and sending countries, fundamental in shaping the course of migration flows across the Mediterranean Sea, go some way in explaining not only the clandestine origins of the trade and some of the content of migration laws, but also the persistence of various forms of clandestine migration. The technological superiority of European shipping relative to that of the Ottoman, combined with Europe's commercial privileges in the Levant, meant that shipping companies like the Messageries Maritimes were able to continue defying forms of regulation they themselves had helped to design together with local authorities. One captain report of the Messageries Maritimes' steamer *Portugal* recounts how Ottoman police had repeatedly fired at passengers trying to clamber on-board the ship as it loaded migrants outside the port, injuring a six-year old in the process. The year was 1904, almost a decade after bans on transatlantic emigration had been dropped.[2] Differences in the size and capacity of ports and, related to this, of the intensity of connections, account not only for pre-eminence of Marseilles and Naples along the western transit corridor, but also for the concentration of agents, runners, hotel-owners in those two cities. As nodal points in the emigrant trade, they were also epicentres of clandestine migration and the illegal trade.

The density of the urban environment and the scale of urban transience were two further factors affecting clandestine flows. As discussed in particular in Chapters Three and Four, the regulation of transatlantic emigration from the Mediterranean entailed the careful surveillance of migrants in ports of transit. The regulation of the urban economy and laws regarding public health and urban behaviour, such as those targeting vagrancy and idleness, informed 'transience control' as much as norms enshrined in immigration acts and emigration laws. International rivalries and national policymaking met their match in local politics and metropolitan power dynamics. One of the challenges faced by emigration authorities and police was that of penetrating the thick social relations that characterized

[1] On the relation between falling silk prices on the world market and Ottoman migration see: Muhammet Kazim Baycar, (2015) 'Ottoman-Arab Transatlantic Migrations int he Age of Mass Migrations (1870-1914)', DPhil in Global and Imperial History, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

[2] AFL, Messageries Maritimes, Rapport Général du Voyage. Ligne d'Egypte, le 15 mai 1912.

urban life. This applied to the Levantine diaspora in Marseilles and to the Neapolitan criminal underworld. Urban poverty, overcrowding and dire public housing, urban expansion and renewal and, not least, high rates of immigration and of other forms of human transit (whether of tourists, sailors or convicts) overburdened the administrative machine, making controls even more difficult and the 'production of clandestinity', or the over-classification of undesirable mobilities as clandestine, more appealing. Only in the early decades of the twentieth century did local authorities suddenly (and somewhat haphazardly) abandon policies of containment and regulation in favour of the centralisation of migrant hospitality in public hands and the 'militarisation' of migrant mobility in cities of transit. Disease epidemics provided a powerful incentive, or a convenient justification. This reflects both the importance of hygienism in nineteenth century European civic culture, and more broadly that of disease epidemics to societal change.

Another structural factor affecting clandestine flows, and attempts to police them, was the existence of haven jurisdictions. In the Ottoman empire, the proximity of British colonies, protectorates and quasi-protectorates like Malta, Cyprus or Egypt enabled the clandestine departure of migrants who would otherwise have found it far more complicated to exit Ottoman borders undetected. In some respects, France was to Italy what these jurisdictions were to the Levant and Ottoman Anatolia. Liberal emigration laws placed no restrictions on remote recruitment of foreign migrants by agents residing in France, despite the anxieties their activities roused and the condemnation they elicited 'at home'. The reluctance of French police to collaborate with their Italian counterparts in bringing emigration agents to justice and to accede to requests for extra-territorial authority, circumscribed only to consular officials and the occasional roaming inspector, facilitated forms of illegal transit. As did the lack of regulatory, police and statistical oversight of transit flows on both sides of the Alps. Despite the growing sophistication of police methods and complexity of the surveillance environment, much emphasized in existing scholarship as typical of bureaucratic centralisation and the intensifying disciplinary power in late nineteenth century European societies, and symbolised by anthropometry and the invention of 'scientific policing', cross-border control remained patchy and the pooling of social-scientific, technical-bureaucratic and police expertise uneven. International institutions struggled to fill the void. The creation of common organisations for the regulation of new technologies – such as telegraphs, shipping, etc. – was not matched in policing or in the remit of migration control or the regulation international labour flows. This occurred only after World War One, with the creation of the International Labour Office, and following World

War Two, with the establishment of two United Nations agencies for refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and for economic migrants (International Organization for Migration).[3]

This lag, or rather the unevenness of this particular form of globalisation, is reflected in the history of passports. Before the Nansen passport was introduced in the aftermath of World War One and the Russian Civil War in order to facilitate the mobility of refugees and stateless individuals across the European continent, the region lacked a single, standardized document for the control of cross-border mobility. Nation-building, from the French Revolution onwards (commonly credited with having reinforced the identification of foreignness with the lack of national status and the ability to prove it via documentation), certainly resulted in experimentation with paper-forms of identification and mobility control, including the creation of national passports. Yet, in most countries national citizenship and emigrant status were neither certified nor policed using emigration passports alone.

Manifest sheets, internal passports and various kinds of proofs of citizenship, including certificates of professional status, were the rule. Moreover, emigrant passports remained 'in competition' with other kinds of passports that derived their authority (and their design) from older traditions of diplomacy. Italy represented an exception in this regard, particularly due to the precocious identification of clandestine emigration with passport-less travel. Although there was a growing understanding among sending, transit and receiving countries that clandestine forms of emigration were, by definition, 'undocumented', passport checks were not ubiquitous to all forms of transatlantic migration and the entire migration regime lacked a common document. Emigration laws were similar in language and in remit, but they did not include identical provisions for the identification of migrants, or indeed for their transport and recruitment. Passenger Acts and quarantine legislation created a common legal and documentary framework for regulating vector traffic (documents included ship manifest sheets, on which the personal details of migrants were registered, quarantine bulletins and other kinds of sanitary documents), but they only targeted clandestine migrants indirectly.

These differences marked another kind of inequality in the distribution of bureaucratic infrastructure among sending, receiving and transit countries, which created new

[3] Internationalisation in the field of communications and transport technology was marked by the creation of institutions such as the International Telegraph Union (Paris, 1865). Similar organizations were set up in the field of information sciences, including statistics, such as the International Statistical Institute (1885) and the Union of International Associations (1910). Some tentative steps were taken in that direction with regard to migration, for example with the International Congress for the Protection of Emigrants in 1889. The first steps to achieve greater coordination between national police forces, to increase the possibility of repressive action against fugitives and take further steps towards the creation of a international signalaetic system of identification took place in Monaco in 1914, at the First General Assembly of International Legal Police.

opportunities for clandestine recruitment and emigration. It played an important role in reinforcing the status of haven jurisdictions, which were defined in part by their indifference to the documentary controls of sending countries, whether emigrant passports in Italy or internal passports (tezkherehs) in the Ottoman Empire. Reducing clandestine migration depended not simply on better policing, or the removal of incentives for migrants, but also on closing the gap in transport, information, laws and regulations between sending, transit and receiving countries. The lack of a common language or praxis for the documentation of clandestine emigration in the past, makes its reconstruction by historians in the present not only more difficult, but potentially anachronistic. This creates two kinds of challenges for historians: the first is that of overcoming the gaps in archival material; the second is that of not letting language and archival classification over-determine the practice of historical research, of not missing clandestine migration simply because it does not appear in the archives under that rubric.

New scholarly approaches to clandestinity and border contagion

Many of the themes in this thesis, from clandestine emigration to border controls, build on the work of scholars in a number of disciplines who have devoted themselves to the study of migration and migration control, from anthropology, geography and sociology to political science, philosophy and history. In these disciplines the study of migration has, in recent years, converged around a number of key concepts and problems regarding the way migration flows are governed, in the present and in the past, and, in many cases, how states fail to govern them adequately. The topic of clandestine migration, in particular, has its own academic following. Both inside and outside of academia, the ‘clandestine migrant’ has become a symbol of the inequalities at the heart of modern migration regimes and of globalisation, a symptom of the failure of the ‘global community’ to deliver on the promise of the free circulation of people, not only as a desirable, but as an indispensable counterpart to the free circulation of goods and the integration of the global economy. Together with ‘the border’, the ‘clandestine migrant’ is sometimes presented as a reminder that the global village has several walls running through it.

Institutionally, this has been marked by the appearance of new journals in ‘border studies’, ‘migration studies’ or ‘mobility studies’, and also by the creation of entire

departments devoted to these subjects.[4] New concepts and a new vocabulary has emerged to tackle the means by which states collect and classify information on individuals, whether citizens or alien immigrants, and on the variety of techniques, technologies and tactics of migration control, from deportation and forced repatriations to the externalisation of borders. Walls, fences and other kinds of physical barriers constructed at the territorial borders of nation states have been the focus of special attention not only due to their deadliness as weapons of mass inhibition, but also due to their cultural power, either as symbols of national security, pride and defiance or as expressions of nationalist paranoia, racial anxieties and feelings of collective impotence in the face of globalisation.[5] One of the consequences has been to re-centre the study of migration from the reasons for and consequences of mass labour migration, to the why and how of migration control. The limitations and dangers to this approach are manifest not simply in the re-labelling of old research as new (which hopefully does not apply to this thesis) but also in succumbing to the temptation of seeing the state and political elites as the sole architects of migration policy and, more dangerously still, of entire 'migration regimes', meaning the general constraints under which migration flows occur, whether technological, geographical, economic, social-cultural or political.

Historians have also weighed in on the debate, with accounts of the development of modern transport infrastructure (such as the Suez Canal), the creation of new forms of mobility control, such as the impressive range of work on quarantine and sanitary checks, and, increasingly, on borders and borderlands.[6] Part of this scholarship has focused on the spread and multiplication of borders across the globe in the 19th and 20th centuries, or what I refer to as border contagion. The uptake and adaptation of European and Atlantic forms of migration control in other parts of the world has focused in particular on the racially motivated immigration policies of white settler societies, the recruitment and segregation of

[4] For an introduction to some of the new disciplinary fields see: Donnan Hastings and Thomas M. Wilson, 'Borders and Border Studies', in Donnan Hastings and Thomas M. Wilson (Eds.), *A Companion to Border Studies* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 5-7; Maribel Casas-Cortes, Sebastian Cobarrubias, Nicholas De Genova, Glenda Garelli, Giorgio Grappi, Charles Heller, Sabine Hess, Bernd Kasparek, Sandro Mezzadra, Brett Neilson, Irene Peano, Lorenzo Pezzani, John Pickles, Federico Rahola, Lisa Riedner, Stephan Scheel and Martina Tazzioli, 'New Keywords: Migration and Borders', in *Cultural Studies*, 29:1 (2015), pp. 55-56; Mimi Sheller and John Urry, 'The New Mobilities Paradigm', *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 38 (2006), pp. 207-226.

[5] For example, see: Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (New York: Zone Books, 2010); Ruben Andersson, *Illegality Inc.*: *clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe* (Oakland, 2014)

[6] On the Suez Canal see Huber, *Channelling mobilities. Migration and Globalisation in the Suez Canal Region and Beyond*. Alison Bashford has worked on the intersection of quarantine and immigration controls, for example: Alison Bashford, *Medicine at the border: disease, globalisation and security 1850 to the present* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) or Alison Bashford, *Quarantine: Global and local histories* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). For examples of histories of borders and borderlands see: Oscar Martinez, *Life and society in the US-Mexico Borderlands* (Tucson, 1994) or Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: the making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989)

labour at the frontiers of capitalist development and the hardening of national identities.[7] Empire, European imperial expansion in particular, nation-building, the advent of scientific racism, the spread of eugenicist ideologies, labour protectionism and the segregation of immigrant labour, disease control and, more generally, the growth of centralised bureaucracies, have all been named as agents of border contagion. Despite growing interest in transport and communication technologies among historians of empire and of globalisation, as illustrated by the maritime turn in global migration history, only rarely have historians working on migration control focused on the regulation of transit migration, on the impact of international rivalry in the transport and recruitment of migrants and of competition among countries vying for supremacy as trading and logistical powers.[8] Even historians of nineteenth and twentieth century Atlantic migrations, such as Torsten Feys, Drew Keeling and Nicolas Manitakis have in recent years focused on the impact of transport infrastructure on migration flows, but only reluctantly on borders or on clandestine emigration.[9]

Underlying much of this scholarship are two conflicting understandings of borders and, related to this, differing understandings of clandestinity. In one camp borders are taken to demarcate national sovereignty. The impact of 'history' on the world's geography is summarised as the division of the world into a grid of interlocking and bounded nation-states, what is sometimes referred to as the 'Westphalian system'. Sovereignty is understood primarily as a function of control over territory and over the resources – natural, man-made, labour – contained in that territory. Borders exist primarily as markers of territorial sovereignty. They are first and foremost containers of political communities, rather than filters of global flows. According to this paradigm, clandestinity is more accurately understood as the result of the illegal or unauthorised crossing of an international border, whatever the reasons for it. Borders thus serve to inhibit unwanted forms of migration: they indirectly 'produce' clandestine migration only when they fail in their design. Clandestinity

[7] For more examples see: Aristide Zolberg, 'Global Movements, Global Walls: responses to Migration: 1885-1925' in Wange Gungwu (ed.), *Global History and Migrations* (Boulder, 1997), pp. 297-307 ; Donn Flynn, 'New Borders, New Management: The Dilemmas of Modern Immigration Policies', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (2005), pp. 463-49; Christian Joppke, *Selecting by Origin*: *Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State* (Cambridge, 2005); Castles and Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Ulbe Bosma, Gijs Kessler and Leo Lucassen (eds.), *Migration and membership regimes in global and historical perspective : an introduction* (Leiden: Brill, 2013)

[8] Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder (Eds.), *Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims. Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s* (Leiden: Brill, 2011)

[9] Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States 1900-1914* (Zurich: Chronos, 2012)*;* Nicolas Manitakis, 'Transatlantic Emigration and Maritime Transport from Greece to the U.S. 1890-1912: A Major Area of European Steamship Company Competition for Migrant Traffic' in *Research in Maritime History*, No. 33, pp. 63-74 ; Torsten Feys, Lewis R. Fischer, Stéphane Hoste and Stephan Vanfraechem (Eds.), *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections Between Maritime and Migration Networks* (St. John's Newfoundland, 2007)

is thus not thought of as a technical and archival term, used to classify and represent information on migratory networks, as in this thesis. 'Border contagion' has been used throughout this thesis synonymously to migration controls, to refer to a wide variety of practices and processes for regulating migration flows by producing clandestinity, both at territorial borders and at other nodal points in migration networks, and their spread or internationalisation; but also to illustrate their connection to, but autonomy from, controls at territorial borders.

This approach favours an understanding of history as the product of transnational interactions and of power as a function of control over both territory and over flows of goods, people and resources. The world's map is thus redrawn as a series of gateways, chokepoints and corridors illustrating the most important channels for the transfer, or the transit, of goods, of people and ultimately of power. It borrows from a 'networked' approach to geography favoured by practitioners of global history who have re-imagined the past as a land of "differential and uneven connectedness", a "borderless globe populated not by states but by a pullulating mass of networks; administrative, commercial, financial, religious, migrational, scientific, educational, and military - and bound together by investments, remittances, bills of exchange, reports and despatches, telegrams, letters, parcels, newspapers and books, as well as by soldiers and sailors, merchants and salesmen, indentured labourers and slaves, peripatetic officials, wandering scholars, journalists, travellers, and tourists." In this vision, port cities hold special importance as centres of various interlocking networks, or 'vertical nodes' for the collection and distribution of goods and people.[10]

The present approach to the Mediterranean as an 'integrated' transport network and as a common market for the recruitment of migrants draws on the impact of the nineteenth century revolution in maritime logistics on migration flows and on controls; not just the harnessing of steam power in maritime transportation, but also on the modernisation of port infrastructure, including quarantine, the enlargement of docks and, arguably, improvements in migrant hospitality in port cities as well as the creation of a new technical vocabulary and new laws and regulations in maritime trade. It builds on recent scholarship on the growing importance of logistical sciences to the lives of corporations and to maritime trade in the late twentieth century, often associated with the revolution of containerisation, to seek parallels with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[11] The power of corporations, such as

[10] James Belich, John Darwin, Margret Frenz and Chris Whickham (eds.), *The Prospect of Global History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 'Introduction', pp. 16-17, p. 20

[11] For example, see: Deborah Cowen, *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft: The power of Infrastructure Space* (London:

shipping companies, to redraw space as 'nodes' and 'corridors' is compared and contrasted with the power of states to resist, divert and channel flows. Borders thus feature both as the dividing lines between territorial units, such as the border between the Kingdom of Italy and the Republic of France, and as mechanisms for the production of clandestinity. However, border contagion is analysed uniquely in terms of the spread and institutionalisation of forms of migration and mobility control, not as changes to territorial borders.

The transit of migrants from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic offers a number of different perspectives on the the spread and evolving nature of migration controls in the region:

Firstly, it challenges the twin assumptions that the intensification of controls went hand in hand with the hardening of national borders and, secondly, that they occurred primarily or solely in order to create a segregated civic sphere and labour market along 'racial', national and class lines; or to engineer ethnically or biologically homogenous (i.e. white supremacist) societies from the top-down.[12] Focusing on migrant transit illustrates how 'transience control', or limiting the freedom of movement of migrants within – rather than across – national borders and particularly in urban environments was a crucial part of the overall design of governing migration flows. It helps to understand the ways in which emigration and immigration controls interacted, and to see how migration flows were not simply filtered at the border, as part of the symbolic enactment of national sovereignty, but were diverted and "channelled", usually at nodal points in migration networks, along routes considered commercially advantageous as much as socially desirable.[13]

Across the Mediterranean in this period, this form of control was not unilaterally imposed by nation-states. It usually relied on the cooperation of sending, receiving and transit authorities with shipping companies and private enterprises. Most importantly perhaps, it serves to emphasize how migration controls responded to a complex set of global phenomena, even if they manifested themselves nationally or locally. These included disease pandemics; changes to the global shipping industry; the spread of new technologies of identification and policing; diasporas; international recruiting and restriction drives by receiving countries and emigration agents, to name the main ones discussed in this thesis.

Verso, 2014); Edna Bonacich and Jake B. Wilson (Eds.), *Getting the Goods. Ports, Labor, and the Logistics Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2008)

[12] For three different approaches to the global spread of migration controls see: John Torpey, *The Invention of the passport: surveillance, citizenship and the state* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as method, or, the multiplication of labor* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge, 2008)

[13] Valeska Huber on 'channelling': Valeska Huber, *Channelling mobilities. Migration and Globalisation in the Suez Canal Region and Beyond,* 1869-1914 (Cambridge, 2013)

They also developed in relation to a number of global conjunctures, from economic recessions to the abolishment the slave trade, which may not have had a direct consequence on the legal regimes that were created to regulate 'free migration' from the Old world to the New, but certainly cleared the ground for migrants from Europe and the Mediterranean.

This is not to say that controls in the Mediterranean and in Europe were limited to the transatlantic emigrant trade. In countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, forms of immigration control were introduced prior to World War One independently of transit migration to the Americas. At the same time, European imperial expansion in the Ottoman Empire engendered new forms of mobility control. Some were tied to innovative forms of shared sovereignty, such as the Sanitary Councils of Alexandria and Constantinople or the administration of the Suez Canal.[14] Others were directly linked to colonial conquest and settlement, such as the creation of colonial citizenship codes by the British in the Levant or the French in north Africa or the forced expulsion of indigenous populations (e.g. the deportations of Algerian rebels by the French to Corsica and other penal colonies in the 1840s).[15] Ottoman reformism during the Tanzimat period also engendered new policies in matters of citizenship and migration, opening up the borders of the Ottoman Empire to Christians. Later flows of Muslim refugees on the other hand 'islamicised' Ottoman immigration policy in the 1880s.[16]

The kinds of border contagion that resulted from the transatlantic trade in migrants were, arguably, uniquely global in several respects. Firstly, on account of the active involvement of American receiving countries in the recruitment and processing of Mediterranean emigrants, they are the product of international diplomacy between several continents. They could also be considered 'global' because of the role they played in the 'integration' of the Atlantic and Mediterranean economies.[17] Arguably, they could also be characterized as global because they were responsible for the spread of western vocabulary and techniques of mobility control, such as identity checks on passengers or regulations regarding the transport and recruitment of migrants and shipping consortiums. (The question

[14] Daniel Panzac, *Quarantaines et lazarets*. *L'Europe et la peste d'Orient* (Aix-en-Provence, 1986), p. 121 ; Valeska Huber, 'The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851-1894', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 2006), pp. 453-476

[15] Julia Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an age of migration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), *pp. 70-71*

[16] Kemal H. Karpat, 'The *hijra* from Russia and the Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman state' in in Dale F. Eickleman and James Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Travellers. Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination* (New York, 1990), pp. 131-152, p. 131

[17] For a general discussion of migration and economic integration of the world economy see: Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *The Age of Mass Migration. Causes and Economic Impact* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998). For the Mediterranean context see: Paul Caruana Galizia, *Mediterranean Labor Markets in the First Age of Globalization. An Economic History of Real Wages and Market Integration* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)

of what makes one form of 'border contagion' more global than another is also, clearly, a matter of definition and therefore not of absolute significance).

My focus on the impact of global phenomena on the development of migration controls on the Mediterranean region has brought to the fore the ways in which migration controls were also a form of market regulation of the migrant transport, hospitality and recruitment 'industries', rather than solely of the labour market or of the cultural, political and biological lives of nations. As this thesis illustrates, migration controls were, to a significant extent, also the result of compromise among commercial and political actors engaged in a battle for supremacy in the emigrant trade and, more generally, for pre-eminence as commercial and logistical powers.

Migration controls posed several logistical challenges that shipping companies, emigration agents and other private enterprises engaged in the trade in migrants had to overcome. Emigration laws typically set conditions for the transport of migrants, but they also tried to set itineraries. Furthermore, they obliged shipping companies to carry out documentary checks on migrants, usually in concert with port and local police or emigration authorities. Port and migration authorities in both sending and receiving countries held vectors responsible for the health of passengers and the general hygienic conditions of vessels. All these things required the careful allocation of appropriate numbers and types of personnel, a challenging exercise in cost calculation and resource management, particularly when considered alongside other logistical challenges facing them, such as setting up and maintaining refuelling stations around the world, managing agencies in foreign countries, coordinating travel schedules and circulating maritime equipment efficiently.

Emigration agencies may not have experienced similar difficulties, but the transnational and international nature of migrant recruitment meant that they also faced the challenge of cultivating networks of sub-agents and recruiters across national borders and arranging for the transport of migrants over long-distances. The same could be said, on a smaller scale, of hotel-owners who employed runners and other staff to recruit and chaperone migrants in port-cities. Emigration authorities complicated these processes, by setting rules and enforcing them through the threat of fines and, in some cases, even imprisonment or deportation.

Public authorities and private enterprises were not always at loggerheads. They were also allies. Political support was part of the capital that allowed private enterprises to gain the upper hand in the trade. This was true of European shipping companies, which built their fortunes on the back of European commercial and imperial expansion. They also relied on

European diplomatic clout to influence migration controls abroad and to escape prosecution when they engaged in clandestine activities. It was also true of the middle-classes in port cities that participated in the trade in other capacities, not just the mercantile elite. States backed the trade by protecting emigration agents who engaged in foreign recruitment illegally; by growing the emigration industry, either via protectionist legislation or by liberalising the profession of emigration agents, depending on the context; by regulating the hospitality and recruitment industries in port cities in order to protect their reputation as viable transit points; and by attending to public hygiene to protect 'the supply chain'.

In doing so, national and local authorities in sending and transit countries faced their own logistical challenges of how to most efficiently control traffic and process hundreds of thousands of migrants. The development of migration controls, such as passport checks and other forms of documentary verification, were not only a means of controlling migrants and regulating access to the labour market, or of regulating the emigration industry and managing competition among shipping companies, recruiters etc. They were also technical solutions to the problem of how to manage the circulation of masses of people and of information regarding those people. Seen from this perspective, migration controls were also a tool of technocratic government, the application of a technical precept to a political issue.

The clandestine origins of the Mediterranean trade in transatlantic migrants, and the persistence of the clandestine trade, are two more distinctive features of Mediterranean emigration to the Americas compared to emigration from central and northern Europe. Some of the causes behind the clandestine trade, such as the unequal distribution of logistical capital (e.g. transport infrastructure) between transit and sending countries or the intensity of international competition between shipping nations and private corporations, were also some of the structural factors behind migrant transit. Measuring and understanding illegality is not only a means of ascertaining how unscrupulous European shipping companies were, or of determining how prone migrants were to leaving via illegal channels. Rather, it can serve to understand and explain the conditions in which, as well as the means by which, the expansion of the transatlantic emigration industry to the Mediterranean occurred at a time of general restrictions on emigration among sending countries, followed by liberalisation. When seen in their proper geopolitical context, forms of bureaucratic regulation of migration do not appear only as means of funnelling flows efficiently, of protecting migrants, helping local commerce or shipping companies, but also as forms of political appeasement, coercion or surrender.

Although I have attempted to illustrate some of the ways in which the criminalisation of unauthorised emigration further entrenched existing inequalities, I have treated clandestine migrants not simply as casualties of globalisation, but as active participants in global processes. This is not only due to the fact that migrants continued to succeed in leaving illegally for the Americas, but also because in doing so they patronized both the illegal and legal emigration trades. Crucially, clandestine migration was not simply the result of migrants breaking laws in a desperate effort to flee poverty or oppression, although all these factors mattered. It was also the result of political, economic and technological coercion from abroad, and of rebellion and disobedience from within. Although 'clandestine emigration' was also a direct consequence of the criminalisation of undesirable forms of migration by sending, receiving and transit states and, concurrently, of their inability to police them effectively, surreptitious or covert departures were a fact before sending countries attempted to police, measure and classify them as 'clandestine'.

Clandestine migrants were intercepted at land and maritime borders as they departed illegally on foreign shipping companies, smuggled themselves on board or onto foreign land; they could be detected if they were found in the possession of fake tickets or false documents; they were rejected by sanitary and consular officials if they showed symptoms of contagious diseases, sometimes only on the suspicion that they might be carriers, or betrayed physical and moral 'defects' that might bar them from entry at U.S. borders; they might be apprehended if found in an unlicensed hotel or in the company of an unauthorised emigration agent; they might be denounced as 'artificial emigrants' if they were found to have fallen under the sway of 'foreign propaganda'; they might even be detained and repatriated if caught transiting via an unauthorised route or denounced as vagrants if their stay in port cities was too transient. Their interactions with shipping company staff, with hotel-owners, with agents and with emigration officials was increasingly subject to vetoes and rules. In the shifting landscape of migrant transit, clandestinity was always in the background. Sometimes it was the dark corner of a migrant's personal network of contacts, which might include a corrupt port official or an unauthorised emigration agent in a foreign port, perhaps a contact from 'back home'. But in other instances it was public authorities that suddenly shone a light where before there had been none, and divided the 'regular' from the 'irregular', the legal from the illegal, making shadows out of darkness.

Appendix

Table 1

Country	Years	Total transatlantic Emigration (Emigration Statistics)	Immigration to U.S. 1820-1924 (U.S. Immigration statistics)
Italy	1876-1914	7,558,303	4,561,379
France	1881-1914	218,826	557,304
Spain	1882-1923	4,262,594	161,165
Greater Syria (including Mount Lebanon)	1860-1914	600,000	204,606
Ottoman (Total)	1860-1914	1,200,000	358,358
Greece	1880-1924	520,000	410,568
Romania	N.A	N.A	144,621
Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro	N.A	N.A	81,441
Montenegro	- 1912	9,000	N.A
Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia	1899-1914	206,953	N.A
Total		13,975,676	6,244,836

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Notes

The fourth column containing U.S. immigration statistics are from Ferenczi and Wilcox's *International Migrations.* They are only estimates, as demonstrated by the discrepancy between transatlantic emigration from the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman immigration to the United States. The significant difference between French Transatlantic emigration and French immigration to the U.S. is explained by the difference in chronology whereas that between Spanish immigration and transatlantic emigration is due to the fact that, unlike most other Mediterranean countries, the majority of migrants headed towards countries in Southern and Central America (Mexico above all). Emigration statistics are taken from a variety of sources. Those for Ottoman migration are based on Ottoman Consular records cited by Kemal Karpat. Only figures for total Ottoman migration (i.e. not Greater Syria) are used to estimate total rates of emigration. They are significantly higher than those provided by Ferenczi and Wilcox, which are primarily based on the immigration statistics of receiving countries. The same applies to statistics on Greek emigration, which are taken from a recent work by Nicolas Manitakis, and for emigration from Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Dalmatia. In Ferenczi and Wilcox they are classified under the rubric of emigration from 'Jugoslavia' and are organized along racial liens.

The work by Ulf Brunnbauer is also based on 'racial statistics', but the estimates are based on national emigration statistics, rather than immigration statistics in receiving countries. Although not Mediterranean countries, statistics on emigration from Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia are included insofar as migrants from those countries also transited, in part, across the Mediterranean on their way to the Atlantic. Statistics for France are available only post 1881 and, like those on Spanish emigration, are based on passenger statistics for the main ports of emigration. Italian emigration statistics cited in Ferenczi and Wilcox are the official statistics kept by the General Commissariat on Emigration. Between 1875 and 1901, when the Commissariat was established, they rely on the statistics compiled by Leone Carpi. North African countries – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt – did not keep statistics for emigration to the Americas which, by all accounts, was slight or non-existent.

Table 2

Transit migrations

Country of Transit	1876-1880	1881-1885	1886-1890	1891-1895	1896-1900	1900-1905
Belgium	N.A	N.A	145,622	151,494	111,698	270,546
British Isles	228,419	459,186	494,153	464,599	414,240	842,960
France	133,296	207,540	277,656	N.A	N.A	N.A
Germany	148,874	318,087	574,481	593,614	534,802	1,160,168
Netherlands	17,519	69,055	64,416	113,108	84,756	228,678
Total	528,108	1,053,868	1,556,328	1,322,815	1,145,496	2,502,352

Sources

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Notes

Regular statistics on migrant transit via France are not available. However, statistics contained sporadically in French archives suggest that transit migration via France continued to grow. For example, in 1885 alone 25,513 foreigners had left via Marseilles compared to 1,561 migrants of French nationality. In 1898, of 6,535 migrants leaving Marseilles, only 538 were French citizens.

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