
Dependable Partners?
Assessing Reliability in Alliance Politics



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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work, and except where otherwise stated, describes my own research.

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Abstract

From the perspectives of both theory and practice, perceived reliability is often assumed to be integral to strategic considerations vis-a-vis the formation and management of alliances. It not only significantly shapes the credibility of alliance commitment, but also looms large in the context of extended and immediate deterrence between a state's allies and adversaries. However, no systematic theorization of perceived reliability has been accomplished in the existing literature so far. To bridge this apparent gap, this D.Phil thesis is aimed at shedding light on a crucial question: How do states come to judge if their alliance partners are reliable? Specifically, it seeks to uncover the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess each other's reliability. Drawing upon insights from three existing approaches regarding intention assessments, this thesis sets out to develop two competing theories of alliance reliability judgment: The Rational Choice Model (RCM) and the Affective Reasoning Model (ARM). Then, it comparatively tests the propositions derived from both models by examining the histories of three Asia-Pacific alliances during the Cold War: (1) The Sino-Soviet alliance from 1949 to 1969, (2) the US-ROC alliance from 1949 to 1975, and (3) the US-Japan alliance from 1945 to 1987. The findings of the thesis can potentially contribute to on-going scholarly discussions in the areas of threat perception, strategic deterrence and alliance theories. In terms of policy implications, this thesis is particularly relevant to intra-alliance communication and alliance management.

Acknowledgements

This thesis is an indispensable part of my journey into emotions and human mind. When it began, I never expected that it would end up bringing me to the life of a monk in the forest of Myanmar. Yet, this transformation seems inevitable. After intensive intellectual efforts, I realized that emotions, as deeply conditioning forces of our consciousness, are beyond the grasp of intellect. Only through direct and profound insights into their nature, one begins to regain the power to accept them at present and with equanimity.

Thus, the thesis represents a conclusion of my intellectual journey. It would not be possible without the generous support of the Marie Curie Fellowship (European Commission) and the PRIMO Initial Training Network, jointedly managed by the University of Oxford and the University of Hamburg.

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The corrections of the thesis coincided with the Coronavirus lockdown in Myanmar. I'm staying in a bamboo hut on a forest hill, with no electricity for the first five months. I feel especially grateful to my preceptor Bante Mokkhita for his support through the process. I also feel indebted to the locals who provided me with daily subsistence, despite their general poverty.

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List of Abbreviations

ACJ	American Council on Japan
ARM	Affective Reasoning Model
ATOP	Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCPCC	Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Composite Index of National Capacity
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (US)
CMOFA	Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
CMC	Central Military Committee (CCP)
COW	Correlates of War Project
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPSUCC	CPSU Central Committee
DoS	Department of State (US)
DoD	Department of Defense (US)
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
FACOM	Far Eastern Command (US)
FEC	Far Eastern Commission
GGP	Guo-guang Project (ROC)
GLF	Great Leap Forward
GS	Governmental Section (SCAP)
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency

JGSDF	Japan Grand Self-Defense Force
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
JMOFA	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Gaimusho*)
KMT	Kuomintang or the Nationalist Party (ROC)
KPA	Korean People's Army
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
LNBT	Limited Nuclear Ban Treaty
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group (Taiwan)
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty (US-ROC)
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MST	Mutual Security Treaty (US-Japan)
NMC	National Material Capabilities
NPT	Nonproliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council (US)
NSDD	National Security Decision Directives (US)
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum (US)
RCM	Rational Choice Model
ROC	Republic of China
PACCAF	Pacific Air Force (US)
PACOM	Pacific Command (US)
PARC	Policy Affairs Research Council (LDP)
PBSC	Politburo Standing Committee (CCP)
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PPS	Policy Planning Staff (US)
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCAP	Supreme Command for the Allied Powers
SCC	Security Consultative Committee (US-Japan)

SDC	Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (US-Japan)
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
US	United States
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USFJ	United States Force in Japan
USTDC	United States Taiwan Defense Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

Chapter 1

Introduction: Managing Uncertainty in Alliance Politics

1.1 Reliable or Unreliable Partner?

Alliances are a central part of international politics. As George Liska comments, "it is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name."[1] Probably, few states would have entered an alliance had security been abundant in the international system. In fact, IR theorists have long considered alliance formation a trade-off between states' autonomy and security.[2] On the one hand, states often conclude alliances in order to receive multiple protections against threat, such as strategic deterrence and military assistance. Also, they frequently employ alliances as instruments to contain the influence of enemies and restrict the behavior of friends.[3] On the other hand, alliance formation is costly. Accompanying the decision to enter an alliance is restricted freedom of action. The rise of one alliance may unexpectedly trigger a chain reaction, through which rival alliances emerge along with a growing risk of unwanted conflict.[4] Yet, whatever benefits an alliance promises, it is difficult to emerge in the first place without the belief that its members will honor their respective alliance commitment.

As intuitive as it is reminding, this argument highlights an integral component of alliance politics, that is, the prevalent need for judging alliance reliability among states. Indeed, many

[1] Liska (1962: 3).
[2] See Altfeld (1984), Snyder (1984), Morrow (1991), Snyder (1997).
[3] See Schroeder (1976), Snyder (1997: 43-4), Weitsman (2004), Cesa (2010).
[4] Snyder (1997: 44); also see Benson (2012).

scholars of alliance have touched upon this subject. A prominent alliance theorist Glenn Snyder, for instance, argues that a state's evaluation of benefits from an alliance depends on its partner's capabilities and perceived reliability. "If there are any doubts about whether the ally will honor its commitment," Snyder suggests, the prospect for benefit must be discounted.[5] James Morrow, a rational theorist of alliance, contends that the perceived loyalty of partners influences states' orientation towards alliance commitment.[6] In his balance-of-threat theory, Stephan Walt has, in effect, rendered the notion of unreliability inseparable to a main source of threat, that is, the perception of aggressive intentions.[7] In his account of alliance formation, Andrew Miller points out that a state's perceived reliability positively correlates to its attractiveness as a candidate ally.[8] More specifically, scholars like Thomas Christensen and Matteo Dian have demonstrated how particular perceptions such as suspicion shape the course of intra-alliance interactions, hence, the cohesion and performance of an alliance.[9]

Practically, judging alliance reliability is a subject of far-reaching implications for alliance management. First and foremost, the unenforceable nature of alliance agreements under anarchy entails a substantial risk of nonfulfillment, due to states' changing preferences. Theoretically, this time-horizon problem compels states to constantly worry about abandonment, thus creating incentives to probe an ally's reliability.[10] Moreover, pervious empirical studies have found that a considerable proportion of alliances in modern history suffered from nonfulfillment problems, hence, were unreliable. This observation highlights the policy need to identify unreliable allies and to minimize the risk of nonfulfillment.[11] Although some scholars have examined alliance reliability as a function of observable strategic attributes of

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[5] Ibid, 45.
[6] Morrow (1994a).
[7] Walt (1987: 25-6).
[8] Miller (2012: 10).
[9] Christensen (2011), Dian (2014: 15-6).
[10] Snyder (1997: 180-81).
[11] Looking at if states fought with their allies in a war, some scholars find that only about one fourth of alliances in the COW dataset were honored, hence, reliable. Using the ATOP dataset, other scholars conclude that about 75 per cent of alliance commitments were honored since the early 19the century. See Sabrosky (1980), Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Leeds and Mitchell (2000), Leeds (2003).

a state, this approach refused to address the problem from an assessor's perspective.

Furthermore, understanding how states assess alliance reliability is meaningful for managing strategic communication in extended deterrence — the situation where a state seeks to prevent a third party to attack its ally.[12] In managing an alliance, a state often possesses the incentives to simultaneously deter an adversary and reassure its partner by demonstrating its commitment. Yet, given the risk of moral hazard, the state may need to simultaneously communicate opposite images to the ally and the adversary: It needs to convince the former of an ambiguous commitment while the latter of a credible one.[13] Since the Cold War, this dilemma had often confronted the United States, such as in a series of Taiwan-Strait Crises. Now, it continues to pose a challenge to the US alliance system in Asia, vis-à-vis the rise of China.[14] On the other hand, a state often needs to coerce an adversary into making concessions by discrediting its allies' commitment. This is what Beijing and Pyongyang have tried persistently to convey to Taiwan and South Korea: Washington's abandonment is inevitable. By and large, the success of such strategic communication depends on if states can effectively manipulate their targets' perceptions. And understanding how reliability is perceived must be the first step.

Despite the importance of the subject, there has been surprisingly little scholarly effort to make sense of how states assess the reliability of their allies. Existing research largely focuses on two closely related areas: (1) The examination of *ex post* alliance reliability, and (2) the study of the conditions underlying credible alliance commitment in extended immediate deterrence.[15] Each body of literature comes to suggest a range of observable indicators that may serve as diagnostic clues to infer the reliability of an ally. Ironically, while making gen-

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[12] Huth (1999: 27).
[13] Benson (2012).
[14] Tow (2009: 72, 79), Christensen (2015).
[15] Extended immediate deterrence refers to the situation where a state threatens retaliation in response to an existing challenge, while extended general deterrence is aimed at preventing conflict initiation. Although deterrence scholars have extensively studied the former and made hypotheses the latter, few empirical testing has been done regarding extended general deterrence. See Huth (1999), Johnson, Leeds and Wu (2015: 310).

eralizations about how states ought to assess alliance reliability, scholars following this tradition have shown little interest in understanding the core of the story — how states actually assess alliance reliability in practice.[16] Therefore, this thesis undertakes to fill the surprising gap. By focusing on leaders' psychology, it develops a systematic approach to theorize about states' judgment of alliance reliability. Furthermore, it also takes a step forward to examine how the psychological dimension of the story — assessments and perceptions — translate into strategic interactions in an intra-alliance setting.

In general, this study may contribute to at least three areas of research in International Relations. First and foremost, it amounts to one of the first projects to explore the cognitions governing intention assessments between alliance partners. Second, it also provides an opportunity to test various insights concerning alliance reliability which quantitative analyses and deterrence studies have produced. In particular, it can contribute to scholar understanding of extended general deterrence, which largely concerns a state's judgment of alliance reliability in the long run, and is currently under-examined. Third, by examining the casual linkage between perceived reliability and intra-alliance behavior, this study can also make an important supplement to the existing literature of alliance. Whereas conventional alliance theories mainly treat perceived reliability as epiphenomenal to structural constraints, this thesis justifies its role as an integral explanation to alliance behavior.[17]

The rest of the chapter is divided into three parts. Drawing from existing studies, the first part briefly reviews different theoretical insights regarding the mechanism by which states judge alliance reliability. The second part then summarizes the major theoretical arguments of this thesis. Finally, the last section outlines my research design for the empirical studies as well as the plan of the thesis.

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[16] Leeds (1999), Lai and Reiter (2000), Leeds (2003), Gibler and Wolford (2006), Leeds and Savun (2007), Poast (2012), Grant (2013).

[17] This observation applies particularly to neorealist theories of alliance. Even Walt's balance of threat theory is unclear about the boundary between capabilities and perception. See Walt (1987).

1.2 Judging Reliability: Rationality vs Psychology

Although few IR scholars have systematically theorized about states' assessment of alliance reliability, existing literature is not short of insights concerning the mechanisms for doing so. This section surveys three general approaches which existing studies have suggested. The first approach is drawn from the rationalist literature of strategic communication, particularly the costly signaling literature. The second approach is drawn from studies of decision-making in the psychological literature. The third approach has evolved from various studies of trust in IR; and it has increasingly converged with the constructivist literature of norms and identities. Each of them is based on a distinctive understanding of agency.

The rationalist approach is probably the most influential, because its central tenets permeate much of the positivist alliance literature, including studies of *ex post* alliance reliability. Rational choice theory prescribes that a rational actor is egoistic and should only strive to maximize her own interests or "expected utilities." As game theorists have illustrated, such a rational decision is characterized by a calculative process termed "backward elimination," through which players manage uncertainties in strategic interactions.[18] For instance, in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, a rational player should not prefer cooperation over defection, because the zero-sum structure of the game has determined that the gain of one player results in the loss of the other. Knowing this, a rational player should also be aware that choosing to cooperate first always faces a chance of loss (i.e. 50%), while choosing to defect eliminates such a risk. Thus, she should predict that the other player will always more likely to defect, as defection brings about a higher amount of payoffs in a probabilistic term. This is the temptation of the other, which a rational player should always anticipate before making a decision.[19] From this perspective, leaders' judgement of alliance reliability basically entails the same way of risk management as one does in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: They should

[18] Morrow (1994b).
[19] In the investment game, temptation refers to the other side's expected utility if s/he does not return the money that one invests. See Evans and Krueger (2009).

calculate the likelihood that an ally betrays by comparing its temptation from both the options: fulfilling or reneging on its alliance obligations. In this sense, reliability simply means the judgment that the ally is likely to benefit more from fulfilling its obligations, rather than the opposite.[20] Yet, in the real world, a state's ranking of preferences is hard to access by another. The assessment of alliance reliability, thus, essentially means to obtain credible information about an ally's incentives to maintain its commitment.[21] This task can always be difficult, because even an unreliable ally often has incentives to appear as reliable for its security or economic benefits.

To solve this problem, rationalist scholars suggest that costly signaling can serve as a primary device to differentiate honest and deceptive actors. According to Michael Spence, a signal can take the form of a message or an attribute that one cannot easily manipulate. An informative signal is supposed to incur certain costs which an ungenuine actor is otherwise unable to afford.[22] Short of such costs, a signal simply falls into "cheap talk" with little credibility. For example, higher education, Spence suggests, exactly provides such a signal as it is costly; therefore, it provides credible information about an applicant's competence in the job market. Applying this simple logic, Thomas Schelling argues that a state's willingness to couple substantial capabilities with verbal threats can serve as a costly signal for its resolve in a deterrence crisis.[23] Building on this insight, James Fearon, a formal theorist, suggests two types of costly signals in conveying credible foreign policy intentions — sunk-cost and tying-hands actions.[24] Andrew Kydd argues that costly signaling can help states to distinguish status-quo powers from revisionist powers in international politics. Specifically, he contends that the US-USSR relationship by the late 1980s can be largely viewed as the outgrowth of positive reciprocity through costly signals of reassurance between Washington and

[20] Morrow (1991).
[21] In the Prison's Dilemma, information about the players' incentives is public knowledge. Basically, this means that the players do not need to find it out with their own efforts.
[22] Spence (1973: 358), Fearon (1997b: 87).
[23] Schelling (1966: 49-55).
[24] Fearon (1992 and 1997b).

Moscow.[25] Similarly, regarding alliance reliability, Fearon mentions a straightforward formula: The more a state takes costly actions, the more the state's alliance commitment is supposed to appear credible to its partners.[26]

Moreover, rationalist scholars notice that certain state-level characteristics, which cannot be easily manipulated, may serve as credible information. For example, Charles Lipson argues that democracies should be viewed as more reliable candidates for alignment than non-democracies, because they are supposed to enjoy more "contracting advantage."[27] According to his theory of democratic peace, democratic institutions, such as constitutions and political transparency, not only make it very costly for leaders to reverse their promises, but also reduce barriers for foreign countries to access genuine information regarding its strategic incentives.[28] From a rationalist perspective, other state-level factors which add to one's reliability, may also include issue linkage, alliance portfolio and the reputation for reliability — a state's past records of alliance obligations fulfillment.[29]

In general, rationalists posit that states should judge alliance reliability on the basis of rational calculation. They should thoroughly compare the costs and benefits associated with different choices of an alliance partner. Thus, estimating the ally's ranking of preferences is central to the assessment. Also, the calculation should be conducted under a set of strictly-defined norms of decision, as exemplified by game theoretical analysis.[30] Being reliable essentially means one knows for certain (e.g. a probability of 70%) that an ally expects to benefit more from fulfilling its commitment than reneging on it. This ensures that one's own interests are, in Russell Hardin's words, "encapsulated" in the ally's incentives to cooperate.[31] In addition, a rational assessor should objectively update her beliefs about an ally's inten-

[25] See Kydd (2005: Chapter 8).
[26] Fearon (1997b), Benson (2012: 5).
[27] Lipson (2003: 8).
[28] Ibid, 6-7.
[29] Gibler (2008), Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg and Wood (2012), Poast (2012), Grant (2013).
[30] Simon (1985).
[31] Hardin (2002: 81-2).

tions, following a set of rules known as the Bayesian statistics. Essentially, though this deductive approach is systematic in suggesting external indicators of reliability, it neither looks into an assessor's psychology nor pays attention to a particularly problematic part of costly signaling: Can a receiver objectively interpret information from a sender?[32]

In contrast, the psychological approach challenges this deductive account. While political psychologists recognize that states often employ cost-benefit calculations for strategic reasoning, they point out that the information-processing involved is far from rational. Instead, decision makers' inferences heavily rely on various biases and heuristics.[33] First, psychological studies have long established that complexities in decision-making environments are usually overwhelming, given the rather limited capacity of human memories. Therefore, as "cognitive misers," people are predisposed to over-simplifying environmental complexities by generally resorting to the use of cognitive biases and heuristics as decision-making short-cuts or rules of thumb.[34] Second, in this sense, people's beliefs are not merely the objective reflection of incoming information. Rather, pre-exiting beliefs constantly interfere with information-processing, and significantly constrain information-updating, hence, adaptive learning with various mechanisms, such as schematic organization of memories, directing attention, and assimilating fresh information.[35] More importantly, recent studies in psychology and neuroscience have increasingly confirmed the inseparable linkage between affect and cognition. Affect not only constitutes an integral part of information-processing, it also precedes cognition in a largely unconscious manner. As a burgeoning literature in psychology suggest, "every stimulus evokes an affective evaluation," which "can occur outside of

[32] Yarhi-Milo (2014: 8).
[33] Simon (1985).
[34] Biologically speaking, cognitive short-cuts are hard-wired, because it serves as an effective strategy to cope with survival threats in human evolution. This is seen in what psychologists term "automatic thinking," which enables one to respond to external stimuli without extensively resorting to a conscious mind. See Fiske and Taylor (2013); also see Axelrod (1976), Khong (1992), Larson (1997).
[35] Larson (1994).

awareness."[36]

Drawing on recent psychological studies, IR scholars also began to theorize about the psychologic mechanisms underlying intention assessments, including the judgment of credibility, sincerity, and reputation. Yet, while existing studies offer useful insights, they are far from systematic in shedding light on our research question — leaders' assessment of alliance reliability. Mercer's *Reputation and International Politics* offers a remarkable, yet, indirect example. He examines states' assessment of revolve in extended immediate deterrence, where a defender seeks to prevent a crisis from escalating by threatening punishment to an aggressor. Disputing the rationalist argument that states should fight for their reputation in conveying credible commitment to allies, Mercer develops a theory of reputation formation, which draws on studies of attributional bias.[37] His analysis demonstrates that divergent expectations encourage adversaries and allies to interpret a state's crisis behavior in the opposite way: People tend to explain others' undesirable behavior with stable dispositions, but others' desirable behavior with transient situations. Thus, standing firm in a deterrence crisis tends to earn a state a reputation for resolve among its adversaries, but not among its allies. Conversely, backing down tends to generate a reputation for irresolution among its allies, but not among its adversaries.[38] His research essentially implies that allies and adversaries can judge a state's reliability quite differently.

Building on Mercer's insights, Andrew Miller's work represents a major attempt to make sense of perceived reliability in alliance politics, though from the perspective of reputation. Yet, challenging Mercer's findings, Miller argues that leaders do examine their candidate allies' reputation for reliability in the stage of alliance formation and renewal, particularly

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[36] International relations scholars have frequently cited Damasio's work to support the assumption that affect precedes cognition. For example, one of his patient Elliot who suffered from frontal lobe damages were unable to choose between calculated results while he was able to calculate. By demonstrating that people cannot even perform the simplest rational choice without affect, Damasio proposes that "cold" rationality also requires the participation of affect. See Damasio (1995), Gilovich and Griffin (2002), Kahneman and Frederick (2002), McDermott (2004), Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2007).

[37] Mercer (1996: 8-9).

[38] Ibid, 5-7, 53-63.

vis-à-vis the design of alliance commitment. Reputation for reliability, as he suggests, not only makes a state a more attractive candidate for alignment, but also gives it advantage in negotiating an alliance treaty. Conversely, reputation for unreliability decreases one's chance to acquire credible allies in the future.[39] Nevertheless, Miller's theory focuses solely on reputation as the source of perceived reliability. He is neither interested in examining the mechanisms by which leaders infer alliance reliability, nor exploring the pattens by which leaders use different types of information. In addition, without a rigorous conceptualization of reputation, Miller does not take any effort to distinguish his independent variable from certain biases (e.g. historical analogy), which pose important alternative explanations.[40]

Another group of scholars have examined the role of affect in intention assessments between adversaries. Drawing on recent psychological research on affect and face-to-face interactions, Todd Hall and Karen Yarhi-Milo are among the first to demonstrate how personal impressions help leaders to assess each other's sincerity in situations involving high degree of uncertainty.[41] Later, Yarhi-Milo developed this insight into a theory of vividness in her work on intention assessments between adversaries. She argued that leaders tend to pay attention to vivid information while overlooking abstract information, exactly because the former trigger emotional interests and responses.[42] In his recent work on emotions and deterrence in the Korean War, Mercer began to theorize about two crucial affective mechanisms in leaders' information-processing. Emotions, he suggests, not only assimilate information, but can also serve as information — "emotional beliefs" — on its own rights.[43] In his *Emotional Diplomacy*, Hall argues that precisely because emotions constitute an indispensable experiences of everyday life, emotional displays, regardless of their genuineness, can be informative about state intentions. His case studies of diplomatic gestures demonstrate that

[39] Miller (2012: 45-52).
[40] Ibid, Chapter 3
[41] Hall and Yarhi-Milo (2012).
[42] Yarhi-Milo (2014: 16-7).
[43] Mercer (2013).

even staged displays of emotions as collective performance, such as grievance and shame, can serve as credible signals.[44] Later, Hall and Ross also outline a framework through which affective processes influence decision-making in ways often outside people's control. High-intensity affective responses, such as anger and fear, shape leaders' perception of aggressive intentions and "color the decision-making process," while low-intensity affective responses, such as gut-feelings and mood, "can influence perceptions, judgments, and motivations even without the awareness of their effects."[45]

Lastly, two recent strands of research advanced respectively by Markus Holmes and Robin Markwica are particularly noteworthy. Drawing extensively on recent neuroscience studies, Holmes clarified the physiological foundation of intention assessments, which underlies Yarhi-Milo's theory of vividness.[46] Holmes posits that leaders' ability to assess each other's intentions on the basis of the hard-wired mirroring system in human brain. As the mirror neurons in human brain enable them to simulate each other's feelings, emotions, and implications of actions, leaders can effectively use minor clues during face-to-face diplomacy, such as facial expressions and body languages, to infer their counterparts' intentions.[47] On the other hand, drawing on appraisal theories in psychology, Markwica has developed an affective theory of coercive diplomacy. Going beyond the dichotomous categorization of emotions into positive or negative valence, he rather focuses on examining the appraisal tendencies and behavioral tendencies which five specific emotions — anger, fear, pride, hope, and humiliation — generate for leaders in the context of coercive diplomacy.[48] All those studies have significantly challenged the rationalist position that only costly signals can convey credible information about intentions.

The third approach calls our attention to the crucial role that trust can play in leaders' as-

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[44] Hall (2015).
[45] Hall and Ross (2015: 849-53).
[46] Holmes (2018: 37).
[47] Ibid, 45, 50.
[48] Markwica (2018: 15, 17-18).

sessment of reliability. Although scholars in this tradition also draw on psychological research, they do not focus on exploring the specific linkages between psychological mechanisms (e.g. biases) and states' communication of intentions. Whereas the psychological approach can accommodate the logic of consequences inherent to rationalism, the trust-focused studies have generally associated themselves with the logic of appropriateness.[49] Those studies owe much inspiration to social identity theory and Alexander Wendt's structural constructivism. Accordingly, their theorization of trust has been disproportionately linked to the interplay between ideational structure and strategic intention.[50] Inter-subjective structures, such as identities and norms, assume a central role in their notions of trust, often as a stable source from which the perception of reliability emerge.[51] For example, a recent and, probably the most comprehensive survey of trust in IR, offered by Nicholas Wheeler, conceptualizes trust on both calculative and inter-subjective bases. Although Wheeler argues that trust between leaders often "depends on a mix of calculation and bonding," his "bonding trust" focuses on the emergence of a "we" identity and should stem from a leader's "positive identification with the other's interests," to the extent that they "have come to place a high value on the other's security and care about that person's welling-being as an end in itself."[52] In this sense, trust is considered a cognitive mechanism distinct from rational calculation; and it can, as Wheeler argues, even make two state leaders feel "so secure in their trust with each other that neither calculates the risk of defection."[53] Credible information about state-level incentives is no longer necessary for trust to form. Trust can well emerge from a process termed "humanization," where leaders can "see the 'human' in their counterparts" with empathy and sensitivity through face-to-face interactions.[54] Thus, trust requires a leap of faith, as Booth and Wheeler suggest, despite the lack of information about the other's incentives to

[49] For the logic of appropriateness, see March and Olsen (2004).
[50] Wendt (1999: 241-2, 322-3), Wheeler (2018: 35-6).
[51] Hoffman (2002), Keating and Ruzicka (2014: 3), Urban (2014).
[52] Wheeler (2018: 7, 60-61).
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid, 42, 62-3.

be reliable.[55] Other scholars in this tradition have more or less conceptualized trust in a similar fashion, although they generally emphasize the mutually exclusive relationship between calculation and trust. For stance, Hoffmann contends that trust develops from a sense of obligation rather than knowledge of costs and benefits; Keating, Ruzicka, and Urban even take a step forward to contend that trust entails the antithesis of rational calculation; Keating and Ruzicka define trust "as the ideational structure that reduces or eliminates the residual risk and uncertainty that is part of any decision," while Urban argues that trust entails the absence of rational calculation.[56]

Following this line, some IR scholars also attempt to account for the rise of perceived reliability within alliances on the basis of trust. The security communities literature, for example, amounts to a main scholarly effort to explain inter-state trust with shared norms/identities. Karl Deutsch, a pioneer of this approach, argues that the pluralistic security community of North Atlantic has been built on a collective sense of "we-ness."[57] Later constructivist scholars, such as Thomas Risse-Kappen, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, advanced this argument by formulating a systematic account of trust-building in an intra-alliance setting. They hypothesize that "a strong sense of identification above that of the individual self" can result in "dependable expectations of peaceful exchange" between states. Such identification can be cultivated by shared values and practices, norms of self-restraint, and cultural similarity through "years of experiences and encounters."[58] In his landmark study, Charles Kupchan has formulated the most systematic theory of security community so far. Starting from post-conflict reconciliation, Kupchan outlines a four-stage course of evolution, where former adversaries can gradually develop confidence of each other. According to his account, trust arises in the stage of social integration, through states' perceptions of shared characters or

[55] Booth and Wheeler (2008: 230).
[56] Hoffman (2002: 379-80), Keating and Ruzicka (2014: 757), Urban (2014: 320), Urban (2015: 46).
[57] Deutsch, Burrell and Kann (1969: 5, 117).
[58] Risse-Kappen (1996), Adler and Barnett (1998: 45-8), Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), Adler (2008).

identities.[59]

Essentially, the trust-focused approach has made identity the single-most important indicator for intention assessments. This leads to a rather parsimonious tenet that generally underlies studies in this tradition: Given a relatively long-term, incremental process of identification, states tend to trust those who share their identities more than those who do not.[60] Recently, this scholarship has been increasingly advanced in bridging the gap between the construction of long-term ideational structures and short-term interstate interactions. For instance, Wheeler has contributed a sophisticated case where he incorporates the mechanism of face-to-face diplomacy into the account that how bonding trust can arise from humanization, and be translated to the level of state.[61] Nevertheless, two main issues of this tradition are noteworthy. First, many scholars often cannot escape from a zero-sum interpretation of the relationship between calculation and trust, which conversely adds to the rationalist criticism that trust is irrational; some studies even acknowledge that trust requires leaders to develop various degrees of insensitivity to realpolitik interests.[62] Moreover, while studies in this approach have outlined an increasingly comprehensive view of the ideational sources of perceived reliability on the basis of long-term interstate relations, they have not made much effort to account for the short-term dynamics where leaders' beliefs and emotions can vary in transient, diplomatic interactions.

By and large, each of the three approaches offers certain insights into one aspect of the mechanisms by which leaders cope with uncertainties. Yet, those approaches seem to suggest increasing divisions between themselves, hence, more obstacles toward an accommodating framework of reliability assessment. To the opposite, this thesis seeks to overcome some of the differences by developing two systematic models of reliability assessment.

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[59] Kupchan (2010: 35-6, 49-51).
[60] Tyler (2001), Tanis and Postmes (2005).
[61] Wheeler (2018: 12, 66-7).
[62] For this line of arguments, see Keating and Ruzicka (2014: 755), Urban (2014: 320), Urban (2015: 62).

1.3 Mechanisms of Reliability Judgment

Drawing on recent studies in psychology, neuroscience, behavioral economics, management and business, this thesis proposes to synthesize various insights about alliance reliability into two competing theories of reliability judgment: the Rational Choice Model (RCM) and the Affective Reasoning Model (ARM). First, the synthesis is aimed at developing theoretical frameworks which can accommodate certain main mechanisms about alliance reliability assessment, drawn respectively from the rationalist and non-rationalist insights. More importantly, following Graham Allison's classical example of analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, the development of two competing models also allows us to test each of them against the empirical data in a rigorous process.[63]

Building on rational choice theory, the RCM makes explicit the central rationalist insights which underlie much of the positivist alliance theories in the realist and neo-institutionalist traditions. As discussed earlier, the RCM prescribes a set of decision-making norms by which alliance partners should observe to assess each other's reliability. According to this view, rational states derive beliefs about their ally's reliability from a cautious calculation of its interests during strategic interactions. Being a reliable partner means that an assessor expects that an ally is more likely to maintain alliance commitment, as doing so secures more benefits for itself. This expectation should emerge solely out of one's knowledge about the ally's interests and competence. Thus, alliance reliability is knowledge-based *per se*, and the judgment of reliability represents a process where an assessor simply infers such knowledge from credible information regarding an ally's ranking of preferences.

This RCM aligns well with the predictions of mainstream alliance theories, because they have readily suggested a range of state-level traits which are telling about an ally's interests. Such traits reflect either domestic or international constraints on state behavior, and cannot

[63] Rather than disproportionately focusing on one theory or a main argument, Allison has set a good example by more evenly laying out the central arguments of each of his three models: (1) Rational Actor, (2) Organizational Process, and (3) Governmental Politics. See Allison (1971: 4-7).

be easily manipulated. Therefore, they are considered informative. Moreover, the RCM posits that a state is able to signal reliability through costly signaling. Specifically, one can deduce four classes of credible indicators from the literature. First, realist theories of alliance suggest states should pay attention to *aggregate and offensive power*. Second, neo-institutionalist theories of alliance point to an ally's *domestic institutions* and *records of past behavior*. Third, the costly signaling literature suggests that a state can take four types of *costly actions* in conveying its reliability: (1) Empowering actions, (2) demonstrating interest convergence, (3) demonstrating resolve, and (4) imposing audience cost. Conversely, signals of little informative value should be dismissed as "cheap talk."

In contrast, the ARM is, first and foremost, based on the assumption that the rationality of agents is considerably limited. In decision-making processes, leaders' rationality is constantly constrained by cognitive and affective biases/heuristics, while affect plays a fundamental role in regulating leaders' understanding of interest. During their judgments of alliance reliability, leaders are assumed to engage in dual, inferential processes simultaneously: On the one hand, they strive to carry out interest calculation as rationally as possible. On the other hand, they cannot escape the intuition to rely on prior beliefs and decision-making short-cuts in information-processing. The process of calculation cannot be separated from prior beliefs, particularly, the mental models they generate for leaders to interpret fresh information. Particularly, causal stories about an ally's strategic dispositions play a particularly important role for them to understand its behavior. As an instinct psychological need, such causal stories are also necessary for one to make sense of interpersonal relations. During the process, cognitive biases/heuristics almost unconsciously guide leaders' information-processing while often allowing for efficient problem-solving with rules of thumb. More importantly, underlying all those cognitive aspects, feelings and emotions not only constitute indispensable components of leaders' sense of interest, but also function as mechanisms of information assimi-

lation and triggers of perceptual change. By and large, an affective reasoner is by nature an ego-centric *homo sapiens*, and thus have little in common with a rational calculator — an egoistic *homo economicus*: Affective reasoning leaders are prone to understand interests as tangible feelings — "affective dynamics" in human consciousness — than as abstract knowledge. Often, they cannot help, but tend to equate the intensity of their emotional experiences to the magnitude of credibility.[64]

The ARM brings about three theoretical edges. First, it systematically theorizes about the roles that cognitive biases, heuristics and affects play in decision-making, and thus can explain certain anomalies in intra-alliance communication which a standard rational choice theory cannot. Second, the model posits that perceived reliability can grow out of both transient face-to-face interactions between leaders, as well as incremental processes backed by consistent, substantive actions by states. Furthermore, combining cognition and affect allows the ARM to account for leaders' reliability judgment on the basis of a much wider range of information and, more importantly, their emotional experiences. Now, indicators incurring little cost in a rational sense, such as personal impressions, diplomatic gestures, and identities can be even more influential than strategic imperatives and "costly" actions.

1.4 Research Design

To test for the two competing models is the empirical focus of this study. For this purpose, I develop a research design for analyzing three Asia-Pacific alliances during the Cold War: (1) The Sino-Soviet alliance between 1949 and 1969; (2) the US-ROC alliance between 1949 and 1975, and (3) the US-Japan alliance between 1945 and 1987.

The case study method particularly suits this research, because testing the two theories of reliability assessment requires fine-grained analysis using historical data. First, on the individual level, case studies allow one to extract evidence of decision makers' beliefs from doc-

[64] Hall and Ross (2015: 848-9).

umentary sources, such as diplomatic archives and diaries/memoirs of political elites. This class of data sources is essential for measuring perceived reliability and tracing leaders' information-processing mechanisms. Second, regarding state behavior, case study allows one to more easily reconstruct causal chains from leaders' use of information to perceptual changes. Also, such reconstruction can be used for testing the congruence between perception and behavior. This test, as Alexander George suggests, enables researchers to make inferences about the existence of certain causal mechanisms by observing whether certain behavioral outcomes correspond to predictions based on such mechanisms.[65] For this study, the congruence test is particularly important, because historical sources are by nature a biased sample. Additionally, it is often difficult to locate smoking-gun evidence for the effect of perceptions in documentary sources.

Our cases are selected for the following reasons. First, Asia-Pacific alliances are empirically under-examined in the literature on alliance theories. So far, mainstream theories of alliance have been largely based on the history of Europe and the Middle East. In quantitative studies of alliance, popular alliance datasets such as the Correlates of War (COW) and Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) even seriously misrepresent the key aspects of some major alliances in Asia-Pacific. Surprisingly, this occurs to all the three cases here.[66] Therefore, shifting our focus to Asia-Pacific alliances helps offset this bias, and also expands the empirical sample for alliance theorization. Second, all three alliances are asymmetric in terms of intra-alliance balance of power. This allows one to hold constant power asymmetry — a significant factor which can vastly influence a state's options of alliance strategies.[67] Moreover, each alliance is sufficiently long to generate variation in the values of the independent and dependent variables, while the duration is also manageable for conduct-

[65] George and Bennett (2005).
[66] For example, the duration and the renewal of all the three alliances of interest are wrongly coded by the COW project. In the COW dataset the Sino-Soviet alliance is coded as being terminated in the early 1980s, and the US-Japan alliance is coded as showing no formal update. The ATOP dataset also does not accurately reflect the development of the three alliances.
[67] For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1.

ing a relatively thorough process-tracing. The Sino-Soviet alliance lasted for twenty years, while the US-ROC alliance lasted about thirty year; both warrants a full-duration analysis which minimizes the problem of selection on the dependent variable. By contrast, although the length of the US-Japan alliance makes a year-to-year analysis impossible here, its most important periods of evolution also make a duration of about thirty years.

Last but not least, data availability is a crucial reason. As this study requires an extensive use of historical sources revealing leaders' cognition, the case selection is also made on the basis of easy access to primary and secondary sources. Regarding the first case study, the Sino-Soviet alliance has been one of the most thoroughly studied cases by diplomatic historians. Therefore, our analysis can extensively draw on secondary studies and a large amount of translated diplomatic archives from China and Russia. Regarding the other two cases, primary sources are available in a tremendous amount. Particularly, our analysis draws on a vast number of declassified US and Taiwanese archives, such as the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), National Intelligence Collections (NIC), the Chiang Kai-shek documents and the MOFA collection in Taiwan. Particularly, Chiang's diaries provide us with a valuable sample for examining his perceptual changes, because it contains nearly day-to-day records of his thoughts on the US-ROC relations from 1949 to 1975. In comparison, although Japanese governmental sources are limited, available Japanese sources include memoirs or diaries of most Japanese prime ministers between 1946 and 1990. Certain Japanese leaders, such as Yoshida Shigeru and Nakasone Yasuhiro, wrote extensively on their political lives, which provide valuable data for examining their foreign policy beliefs. Thus, those sources alone make an excellent sample for tracing perceptual changes of key Japanese leaderships since the American occupation.

To generate observations for within case variation, this study uses critical junctures to divide each case study into several episodes. According to the tradition of historical institu-

tionalism, a critical juncture is usually defined as a "relatively short period of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest."[68] In other words, it represents "a choice point when a particular option is adopted among two or more alternatives."[69] Depending on specific cases, a critical juncture in this study is employed as either a point of demarcation or a point of selection. Therefore, it should provide a representative measurement of variation in a state's adjustment of intra-alliance behavior. As a result, a critical juncture also provides an opportunity to conduct a congruence test between perceived reliability and intra-alliance behavior.[70]

1.5 Plan of the Thesis

The rest of this thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter 2 presents my theoretical arguments in full details. This chapter begins by offering a conceptualization of perceived reliability in its general form. Then, it moves on to formulating two theories of alliance reliability assessment on a comparative basis: The Rationalist Choice Model vs. the Affective Reasoning Model. The RCM synthesizes a range of central tenets of strategic communication which rational choice theory suggests, while it also incorporates crucial insights about indicators of alliance reliability from mainstream alliance theories. In contrast, the ARM is built on crucial insights regarding mechanisms of intention assessment from both the psychological and the trust-focused approaches. Also, it accommodates a wider range of indicators of alliance reliability, owing to the studies of cognitive and affective biases.

The following three chapters present the testing of the two theories through our empirical analysis of the three Asia-Pacific alliances. Chapter 3 examines the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance from its formation in 1949 to its eventual collapse in the Sino-Soviet border war in March 1969. It presents a typical alliance relationship which changed from friendship

[68] Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 348).
[69] Ibid, 347.
[70] See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.

to hostility. Chapter 4 is devoted to analyzing the historical process of the US-ROC alliance from 1949 to 1975. Despite negative mutual perceptions in the early 1950s, Washington and Taipei reaffirmed their partnership of necessity in response to rising Soviet and Chinese threat in the Far East. Eventually, this alliance of uneasy cooperation was formally coming to an end, along with America's fundamental adjustment of its China policy from the early 1970s. Then, Chapter 5 surveys the major historical steps in the evolution of the US-Japan alliance from the American occupation to the end of the Cold War. Contrary to the previous cases, US-Japan relations witnessed continuous progress in the mutual degree of perceived reliability and the institutionalization of the alliance in a period of almost seven decades. Surviving the Cold War, the bilateral alliance has successfully transformed itself into the cornerstone of the US hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia Pacific.

Finally, the concluding chapter provides a brief overview of the major empirical findings in this study. Apart from that, this chapter is also aimed at reflecting on a few important implications for alliance theories as well as communication in alliance management.

Chapter 2

How States Judge Alliance Reliability: Two Theories

2.1 Introduction

How do states come to judge if an alliance partner is reliable? As the previous chapter has discussed, the existing literature has pointed to two general directions of theorization. The first is to further the rationalist discussions about how states should assess alliance reliability. The second is to theorize about how states actually do it, namely, to develop a theory which better describes the psychology of reliability assessment. The advantage of this option is that it can address many insights about cognition, affect, and identities, which the rational tradition dismisses as unimportant, under an inclusive framework. While this thesis is committed to building a systematic theory in the second direction, it does not overlook those key rationalist insights concerning reliability assessment. Thus, it first presents the Rational Choice Model (RCM) as the main alternative theory, which can synthesize the central tenets underlying mainstream theories of alliance. Thereafter, the Affective Reasoning Model (ARM) is formulated to take from where rationalism stops; it is aimed at incorporating crucial insights about particular mechanisms of intention assessment from the psychological and the trust-focused approaches. This strategy of theorization also presents the alternative arguments under rational choice theory in a systematic form, hence, allowing a more rigorous test of the ARM. In the rest of the chapter, I will first outline an overarching definition of the dependent

variable — perceived reliability, as this provides a common ground for comparing the two models. Then, I move on to specifying the RCM and the ARM, as well as certain testable propositions following each. Finally, I also specify a rigorous design for testing the two theories with case studies.

2.2 Conceptualizing Perceived Reliability

As reviewed in the previous chapter, while the existing approaches agree that perceived reliability is essentially a form of beliefs, they do not necessarily converge on its underlying mechanisms. Rationalists suggest that a state may well perceive an ally as reliable on the basis of credible information about its incentives. In contrast, constructivists argue that the same perception can be derived from pre-existing intersubjective structures such as political identities. Yet, political psychologists find that leaders can use contingent short-cuts/heuristics, such as historical analogies, in assessments. Although there is no consensus on the relative importance of them, previous studies have more or less shown that decision-making practices in international politics involve all the mechanisms above.[1] Therefore, an overarching definition is provided here: On the one hand, it should capture the common ground of those approaches. On the other hand, it should allow for sufficient distinction between the RCM and the ARM. Thus, this section is aimed at, first, outlining a baseline definition, which is as accommodating as possible. As both the RCM and the ARM seek to explain decision-making outcome on an individual level, their explanatory power is also constrained by the assumption that a small group of leaders are disproportionately influential in foreign policy-making. This applies to both autocracies and democracies, at least, in terms of key areas of foreign policy, such as alliance strategies.[2] In this context, this study uses "leaders" and "state" in an inter-changeable sense for both the theorization and the case studies.

[1] For a review of different approaches to the mechanisms, see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

[2] Although the individualist approach is under criticisms, I consider this proper for theorization based on rationalism and psychology: First, both of them focus on independent variables at an individual. Second, even democratic leaders are personally responsible for decisions such as war initiation and alliance formation. All systemic and domestic constraints on they are ultimately mediated by their perceptions. For a similar argument, see Bueno de Mesquita (1981).

On this basis, the baseline definition can be simply derived from the existing literature of alliance reliability, as most rationalist studies largely converge on an operational concept of reliability, which is measured by the *ex post* outcome of obligations fulfillment — if an ally partner honors its commitment. As a result, such *ex post* records imply the existence of certain *ex ante* expectation about alliance reliability.[3] It should be noted that some rationalist scholars like Andrew Kydd also use "trust" as a conceptual equivalent to this type of *ex ante* expectation in a similar manner.[4] Therefore, in order to accommodate the rationalist approach, I will first define perceived reliability in a parsimonious way: *Perceived reliability is the (ex ante) expectation of the likelihood that an alliance partner will fulfill its alliance commitment*.[5]

Yet, to go beyond the rationalist perspective, such an expectation can emerge from both rational calculus and judgment involving cognitive biases and affects.[6] The former is inherent to rationalism, while the latter underlies the mechanisms which are crucial to the ARM. One should notice that both styles of reasoning are ideal types: In reality, it is unlikely that leaders cannot rely on either rational calculation or biases/heuristics exclusively. Rather, they resort to a mixture of both while making decisions. Typically, their judgment may initially entail an attempt of rational calculation, and it increasingly relies on decision-making shortcuts when information becomes increasingly complex.[7] Emotions rise and fall, and can deviate the assessment from its rational baseline. As a result, perceived reliability grows out of an interactive process.

Furthermore, perceived reliability should also vary in its degree of certainty. For rational-

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[3] For example, Smith assumes that conflict initiation is biased by states' estimates of alliance reliability, which provide basis for the *ex ante* beliefs. Smith (1996: 16-7).

[4] Kydd defines trust as beliefs that come from rational calculation about a target's likelihood of reciprocity. Kydd (2005: 4).

[5] This definition is close to what some term "confidence," as "a calculation based on an actor's perception that another actor will reciprocate a costly signal or act according to a predetermined agreement or social norm." See Keating and Ruzisca (2014: 756). Yet, in this study, the key difference is that perceived reliability can form as a result of rational calculation, but it does not necessarily depend on it. As this study does not engage any debates regarding the definitions of "trust" or "confidence," it uses the terms "confidence" and "trust" only when mentioned by authors or historical sources.

[6] See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

[7] As Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated, even professionals who are familiar with probability theory can not escape from relying on representativeness, availability, and anchoring biases. See Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982: Chapter 1).

ists, certainty is understood as a probability, which is repeatedly calculated with updated information. Typically, alliance reliability is conceptualized as a ratio between fulfilled and unfulfilled commitments.[8] Nevertheless, this picture is incomplete from a psychological perspective. According to Damasio, emotions serve as "somatic markers" that force people's attention on certain behavioral outcome. Feelings are integral to calculation, because they inform people of costs or benefits physiologically. Without feelings, people are deprived of their biological means to favor one option over another, and also, they are unable to perform even the simplest calculation.[9] In this sense, even "cold" calculation requires an affective trigger. Echoing this view, recent psychological studies of attitude change demonstrate that emotions are closely related to people's feelings of certainty. Particularly, a feeling of certainty fosters heuristic, theory-driven processing of information, while that of uncertainty fosters systematic, data-driven processing.[10]

The baseline definition can accommodate both views of certainty. For rationalists, certainty is usually conceptualized as probability. From a psychological perspective, certainty is understood as a feeling of likelihood based on varying degrees of affective intensity, which is directed toward particular targets. In this sense, one should be increasingly certain about another's reliability when one's feelings become more positive. Conversely, such certainty decreases when one's feelings become increasingly negative. Yet, contrary to a popular view of uncertainty as ignorance in rationalism, decreasing certainty instead should lead to ambiguity — a status of mixed feelings of both positive and negative valence. Such conflicting emotions, as psychological studies find, are usually co-existing, making ambivalence the most common status of feelings among people.[11] In this sense, there is no completely unemotional state; uncertainty is not a neutral state of ignorance, but rather particular feelings

[8] See such a typical conceptualization in Kydd (2005); for the classical definition of probability, see Todhunter (2014).
[9] Damasio (1995: 52, 173-75).
[10] Tiedens and Linton (2001: 974-5), Crano and Prislin (2006: 357-9), Marroquín, Boyle, Nolen-Hoeksema and Stanton (2016).
[11] Lewicki, McAllister and Bies (1998: 450); for the view of uncertainty as ignorance, see Rathbun (2007).

that reduce certainty.[12]

Building on the above definition, I present the two theories of reliability assessment in order. The next section addresses the RCM, which synthesizes some major insights about reliability assessment. Then, the ARM is formulated to synthesize various insights from psychological studies.

2.3 Rational Choice Model

2.3.1 The Logic of Rationality

Rational choice theory has been particularly influential in the alliance and the costly signaling literatures. One can hardly separate its central tenets from neorealist and neo-institutionalist theories of alliance. Although those theories do not look into the process of reliability assessment, they point to a number of state-level traits that leaders may use to derive credible information about intentions.[13] More importantly, the costly signaling literature suggests a primary mechanism by which states communicate intentions.[14] These rationalist insights supplement each other. Together, they constitute a deductive framework regarding alliance reliability assessment. Thus, understanding the general logic of rationalism provides a crucial background to discuss the rationalist mechanism of reliability assessment, in particular how states signal credible information.

In short, rational choice theory prescribes three rules in terms of decision-making. First and foremost, according to the expected utility theory, rational actors should always maximize their expected utilities, although this is not confined to materialistic interests.[15] They should compare the costs and benefits of all available options, and always go for the path

[12] See Section 2.4.2 for a detailed discussion of the affect-certainty linkage.
[13] Siverson and King (1980), Leeds and Mitchell (2000), Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell and Long (2002), Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg and Wood (2012).
[14] Spence (1973), Fearon (1992 and 1997b).
[15] Keohane (1984: 69-71).

which is likely to generate the highest payoffs.[16] Second, in calculating payoffs, rational actors should perform their calculation by "backward elimination" — a calculus based on the anticipation of others' responses. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a player should always prefer defection, because she can expect that the other player also prefer to defect, given the structure of the game.[17] Finally, such calculation requires rational actors to develop certain prior beliefs about the likelihood of others' behavior. Yet, such prior beliefs should be based on records of past behavior (i.e. *ex ante* records), and constantly updated in response to incoming information (i.e. *ex post* records). Rational choice theory posits that this belief updating can be described by the Bayesian statistics; and a rational actor's interpretation of new information should not be constrained by prior beliefs.[18]

Essentially, the rationalist judgment of alliance reliability is boiled down to a process through which leaders compare an ally's expected utilities for different options and the likelihood of each. If leaders expect that an ally is likely to benefit from fulfilling alliance commitment than from reneging, they should perceive the ally as reliable. Conversely, the ally is considered unreliable. In turn, credible information about the ally's incentives provides the single most important clue for leaders to update their prior beliefs. When an assessor receives such information, she should objectively factor it into the ally's past records of behavior, and then come up with a new probability of obligations fulfillment. This account leaves no room for cognitive and affective biases, which are simply dismissed as irrational.

What probably best illustrates it is a simple model of alliance commitment developed by James Morrow.[19] It offers a stylized representation of how rational allies judge each other's reliability (see *Figure 2.3* in *Appendix I*). There are three components of the model: First, the likelihood of victory (**p**) in a potential war between two allied states A and C, and their

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[16] While this rational egoism may not be true for some rational models, e.g. those in behavioral economics, it is what has been typically adopted in mainstream IR theories, such as realism and institutionalism. See Axelrod (1984), Keohane (1984).

[17] Morrow (1994b).

[18] Ibid., Kydd (2005).

[19] I slightly modified the model to suit the research agenda here. For the original model, see Morrow (2000: 65-7).

common adversary B; second, to what extent State C (the ally) values the issue at stakes (**u**), namely, the victory of State A (the assessor); third, the costs (**c**) for State C to honor or renege on its alliance commitment. In this sense, the reliability of C means that it should expect more payoffs from the option above [$\mathbf{p_{AC}\, u_{AC} + (1- p_{AC})\, u_{BAC} - c_h}$] than from the one below [$\mathbf{p_A\, u_A + (1- p_A)\, u_B - c_r}$]. Then, State A should expect State C to honor its alliance commitment after knowing such a ranking of preferences.

This preferences ranking, as Morrow suggests, can reflect three general strategic considerations of the ally. The first [$\mathbf{p_{AC} - p_A)(u_A - u_B)}$] represents how much C values A's victory *per se.* This factor is weighed by the marginal effect of the ally's capabilities on the result of fighting, that is, the extent to which C contributes to A's chance of winning. The second [$\mathbf{p_{AC}\, (u_{AC} - u_A)}$] reflects C's desire for war spoils in a scenario of joint military action. And the third [$\mathbf{(1- p_{AC})(u_{BAC} - u_B) > c_h - c_r}$] shows the costs of C in case of its defeat.[20] In practice, if C can influence any of those considerations on the part of A, it can also manipulate A's beliefs about its own reliability. However, this is usually difficult, because capabilities cannot be easily changed in the short term, and also C's intrinsic interests are private information, which A cannot access directly. As a result, C can only influence A's beliefs by communicating credible information regarding the following conditions:

i. All else equal, the lower the ally's cost of honoring commitment ($\mathbf{c_h}$) and the higher its cost of reneging ($\mathbf{c_r}$), the more the ally is reliable.

ii. All else equal, the larger ally's marginal effect on A's victory ($\mathbf{p_{AC} > p_A}$), the more the ally is reliable.

iii. All else equal, the more the ally desires for gains from intervening ($\mathbf{u_{AC} > u_A}$) the more the ally is reliable.

[20] Ibid, 66.

iv. All else equal, the more the ally values A's victory ($\mathbf{u_A > u_B}$) the more the ally is reliable.[21]

v. All else equal, the more C cares about its loss from the alliance's defeat ($\mathbf{u_{BAC}}$) in opposed its loss from the defeat of A alone ($\mathbf{u_B}$), the more C is reliable.[22]

2.3.2 Rational Judgment of Reliability

By applying this model, one can synthesize a variety of realist-rationalist insights about alliance reliability assessment. In short, the realist-rationalist literature suggests that leaders can derive credible information about an ally's intentions from four types of indicator: (1) Capabilities, (2) domestic institutions, (3) reputation for reliability and (4) costly signals.

Capabilities - The capabilities argument is derived from two major neorealist theories of alliance: the balance of power and the balance of threat. According to the balance of power theory, a hegemon poses the biggest threat to the survival of other states in the international system. Thus, to prevent the rise of a hegemon, weaker states should prefer to balance against a major power, rather than jump on its bandwagon.[23] Building on this argument, the balance of threat theory proposes a range of sources of threat perception, particularly offensive power.[24] More specifically, Robert Jervis has associated threat perception with the balance between a state's offensive and defensive power. If a state diverts its resources to offensive weapons, he argues, such behavior can serve as a signal of hostile intentions.[25] In general, the neorealist alliance theories imply that either aggregate or offensive power affects how a state understands its ally's interest at stake: The more powerful the ally becomes, the more self-reliant it is, thus posing a greater threat in the future. Accordingly, the ally should be less interested in the assessor's security ($\mathbf{u_A}$-$\mathbf{u_B}$). On the other hand, the more the ally's capabili-

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[21] Also, given $\mathbf{u_{AC} > u_A}$, If $\mathbf{u_{AC} \leq u_A}$, this means C either expects no gains from A's winning or even starts to perceive A as a potential threat.

[22] Because logic prescribes that the ally cannot value the defeat of the alliance more than A being defeated alone, $\mathbf{u_B}$ should be greater than $\mathbf{u_{BAC}}$. Thus, the ally should be perceived as the most reliable when $\mathbf{u_{BAC}}$ equals $\mathbf{u_B}$. This seems intuitive, as it suggests that the ally considers the defeat of A as disastrous as of itself.

[23] Waltz (1979: 105, 109, 111).

[24] Walt (1987: 22-4).

[25] Jervis (1978).

ties decline, the more useless it becomes with regard to the assessor's security ($\mathbf{p_{AC}}$-$\mathbf{p_A}$).[26] In either way, changes of intra-alliance power asymmetry should undermine the allies' mutual perceptions of reliability.[27]

Therefore, leaders should pay attention to an ally's aggregate and offensive capabilities. Moreover, as the balance of power theory suggests, capabilities make a real impact on threat perceptions only when it passes a certain threshold. This suggests that only a substantial change in the ally's capabilities undermines its perceived reliability. In this context, the role of nuclear weapons becomes particularly noteworthy, as nuclear weapons can serve as a sign of dramatic increase in a state's offensive capabilities. Even though "their immense destructive power," as John Hertz puts, cannot be easily employed for military purposes, they have "completely revolutionized statecraft."[28] The possession of nuclear weapons alone can grant a state massive power of deterrence, which eliminates its disadvantage in manpower and resources and facilitates coercive diplomacy.[29] Therefore, one should expect that possessing nuclear weapons should substantially add to a state's offensive power, hence undermining its perceived reliability. This is exactly what happened between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1940s, while they remained wartime allies against Nazi Germany.[30]

Domestic Institutions - From the perspective of neo-institutionalism, the ally's domestic institutions, particularly regime type, can serve as indicators of its reliability. In his theory of democratic peace, Charles Lipson argues that constitutional democracies are equipped with unique "contracting advantages" in making promises with each other.[31] Such advantages include political transparency, consistent rules of governance ($\mathbf{u_A}$-$\mathbf{u_B}$ changes slowly), high audience costs for breaking promises (higher $\mathbf{c_r}$), and constitutional constraints of bureau-

[26] Morrow (1991).
[27] Ibid, 914-18, Walt (1997: 158).
[28] Wheeler (2008: 497).
[29] For example, Eisenhower's advisors suggested that the US should not rule out the use of nuclear weapons because the Western allies would never match the military manpower available to the Communist bloc. See Gaddis (2005: 78).
[30] Gaddis (1997: 92).
[31] Lipson (2003: 4).

cratic power.[32] Thus, whereas democratic politics tend to reduce leaders' flexibility to alter policy with checks and balances, it adds to the credibility of a democracy's promises in international bargaining.[33] Those insights are supported by a series of neo-insitutionalist analyses of the correlation between domestic institutions and alliance reliability. For example, the studies of Leeds show that democracy does reduce the probability that a state abandons its ally. Moreover, scholars find that alliances comprised of democracies display a higher level of cooperation than alliances comprised of autocracies.[34]

Therefore, one should expect that leaders tend to pay attention to an ally' regime type: They should consider democracies more reliable candidates for alignment; increasing level of democracy tends to strengthen a state's perceived reliability.

Reputation for Reliability - According to the neo-institutionalist literature, reputation for reliability can also serve as a credible indicator. In the economics literature, reputation is considered a valuable asset, which develops through regular interactions. For example, business scholars find that a positive reputation brings about a range of benefits for corporations, such as the attraction of top recruits and higher loyalty from customers and employees.[35] Yet, reputation can be lost by misbehavior. According to Milgrom, North, and Weingast, medieval European merchants relied on a community-based reputation system to inform each other about traders' past behavior.[36] Thus, traders' reputation for honesty could be accessed by all members of the community; those who violated norms of honesty could face boycotts. Applying this logic to international politics, neo-institutionalist scholars argue that states can also acquire such reputations. A reputation for reliability makes them attractive candidates for alignment, whereas a reputation for unreliability undermines their chance of obtaining

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[32] Ibid, 14.
[33] Ibid, Cowhey (1993), Gaubatz (1996).
[34] Leeds (1999), Leeds (2003), Gibler and Wolford (2006), Leeds and Savun (2007).
[35] Miller (2012: 6).
[36] Milgrom and North (1990: 2-3).

allies ($\mathbf{c_r}$ becomes higher).[37] This argument is not only popular in the deterrence literature, but can also find some support in quantitative studies of alliance reliability.[38] Thus, one should expect that leaders tends to examine an ally's past records of obligations fulfillment.

Costly Signaling - As the costly signaling literature suggests, states can also communicate intentions by taking actions which incur certain costs. Particularly, prevalent uncertainty in the international system highlights the need of costly signaling. Given asymmetric information, rational actors often have incentives to misrepresent certain private information. As Akerlof illustrated with the example of car sale, a merchant would prefer to sell a "lemon" at the price of a new car if a buyer cannot tell the difference.[39] Applying this logic to deterrence, Fearon argues that even an aggressor would always love to take over a country peacefully. In a similar fashion, a defender would always prefer to appear as resolute.[40] Following this line, words alone, Thomas Schelling suggests, can never serve as credible information about a state's benign intentions. Without the backing of substantive evidence, words are too "cheap" to distinguish a genuine actor from those who intend to deceive.[41] To solve this problem, rationalists propose costly signaling as a mechanism which can back one's words with substantive guarantee. The logic behind is simple: An honest actor should be willing to substantiate her words with certain costs which a liar otherwise cannot afford.[42] For instance, in deference situations, a resolute state would couple its threats to an aggressor with substantial actions, such as deploying tripwire forces on the territory of its ally so that any attack on the ally ensures automatic involvement of the defender.[43]

More specifically, Fearon described two major types of costly signals: sunk-cost and tying-hands cost. The former enables a state to signal its intentions by incurring certain cost

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[37] Worth mentioning is the difference between the rationalist and psychological perspectives on reputation. Although some psychology-oriented scholars believe that reputation matters, their understanding is different from the rationalist notion, which treats reputation as a commodity accessible by different observers.
[38] Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg and Wood (2012), Gambetta and Sz e kely (2014).
[39] Akerlof (1970: 480-90).
[40] Fearon (1997: 68).
[41] Schelling (1966: 35).
[42] Fearon (1992 and 1997b).
[43] Schelling (1966: 31).

outright, which immediately alters its payoffs structure, hence, its ranking of preferences. Moreover, a sunk-cost signal should also explicitly convey the cost it incurs, thus informing the receiver's beliefs about the sender's incentives. In comparison, a tying-hands signal may not incur any immediate cost. Yet, it should commit the sender to suffering certain potential cost in the case that it fails to honor its promises.[44] Following this logic, states can usually employ the following four types of actions to signal its reliability:

i. ***Empowering Actions*** - First and foremost, the transfer of resources which empowers an ally makes one of the most common signals of reliability. Following from our model of alliance commitment, this type of actions can directly increase the ally's chance of winning in a potential conflict with the adversary (higher $\mathbf{p_{AC} - p_A}$). Besides, it can also demonstrate that the sender's security is compatible to the receiver's interest (no decrease in $\mathbf{u_A}$). Specifically, empowering actions can be typically manifested in economic and military assistance, such as foreign aid and transfer of weapons systems.

ii. ***Demonstrating Convergence of Interests*** - Although empowering actions naturally signal certain convergence of interests, there are means to do so without increasing an ally's capabilities. First, deployment of military forces or military bases in an ally's territories is a classical way to signal converging interests (higher $\mathbf{u_A}$). Military deployment, as Schelling suggests, can simultaneously serve as tripwire troops, which ensure the sender's automatic involvement in an attack on the receiver.[45] Also, it conditions a substantial loss ($\mathbf{c_r}$) on the sender's failure to defend its ally. Second, actions which concede the sender's autonomy can also serve as a signal of interest convergence. For example, a state can advance military integration with its ally, which, in turn, increases their collective vulnerability if the alliance fails to coordinate properly in a war against a third party

[44] Fearon (1997).

[45] Schelling argues that the 400,000 US troops stationed in Europe in 1955 were rather tripwire troops because they would be unlikely to survive under a Soviet nuclear attack. Yet, the presence of such troops "leave the Soviet Union in no doubt that the US would be automatically involved in the event of any attack on Europe." See Schelling (1966: 47).

($\mathbf{u_{AC}}$ increases while $\mathbf{u_{BAC}}$ becomes closer to $\mathbf{u_B}$).[46] The state can also increase constraints on its autonomy by deepening alliance institutional-building, such as installing consultation mechanisms. Also, it can unilaterally expand its treaty obligations or relax the conditions under which it should come to the ally's aid.[47] Finally, another type of signal is establishing issue linkages which do not bear on the ally's military power. For example, a state can establish a linkage between trade and its defense commitment to an ally.[48]

iii. ***Demonstrating Resolve*** - This action is particularly relevant to a state's perceived reliability in deterrence situations. A state can signal its commitment by threatening to intervene in a potential aggression against an ally. Perceived reliability depends on the extent to which the sender is resolute, that is, how much it is willing to risk an actual conflict. Therefore, the sender usually needs to demonstrate that it values the ally's security more than the cost for fighting the aggressor (lower $\mathbf{c_h}$). Such actions often entail a strategic posture which increases the risk of war, such as launching a nationwide mobilization and the deployment of nuclear retaliation forces. However, in extended general deterrence, a state may also demonstrate its resolve with provocative strategic postures, such as joint military exercises which target an adversary.

iv. ***Imposing Audience Cost*** - Certainly, a state can signal its reliability with promises, which will incur domestic or international audience costs (higher $\mathbf{c_r}$). Dishonest foreign policy behavior risks undermining one's reputation and the chance to secure allies in the future. Therefore, the state's public promise to international audience should be considered credible. In addition, violating international promises may stir discontent among domestic audience. If domestic audience can effectively punish leaders who failed to honor alliance commitment, the action to subject one's promises to domestic rating is

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[46] Morrow (2000).

[47] In this sense, the forms of alliance commitment serve as costly signals. For example, mutual defense pact signals stronger commitment than nonaggression treaties and entente; unconditional alliance is more reliable than conditional alliance. See Smith (1996), Benson (2012).

[48] See Poast (2012).

considered credible.[49] In this sense, democracies should be considered more credible than autocracies, as voters can punish leaders who renege on their promises. However, autocratic leaders may also generate credible promises if failing to uphold such promises causes substantial loss to them. For instance, nationalistic propaganda which may backfire can serve as a credible indicator of alliance commitment.[50]

In general, the predictions following the RCM appear clear-cut: First, all the four types of actions should serve as signals of reliability. Conversely, opposite actions which should work as signals of unreliability. Finally, words, gestures, and actions which incur little cost cannot serve as credible indicators of reliability, hence, should be dismissed as "cheap talk."[51]

2.4 Affective Reasoning Model

As a synthetic framework, the RCM provides a good comparison to our main effort of theorization — the ARM. In general, the ARM is aimed at more accurately describing the mechanisms by which leaders assess alliance reliability, vis-à-vis two general deficiencies underlying rationalism. First and foremost, a range of experimental studies in psychology and behavioral economics have found systematic deviations of subjects' behavior from the rationalist prescriptions of decision-making.[52] A classical example is shown in the "trust game" experiments conducted by Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith.[53] With two players, this game represents the type of interactions typical to alliances in international politics: At the outset, player 1 has some cash by which she can invest in player 2 at time *t*, in exchange for the latter's promise to return the favor at time *t+1*.[54] If player 1 chooses not to invest, the game ends with each party gaining $10. If player 1 chooses to invest, player 2 can choose to reciprocate ($15 to player 1 and $25 to player 2) or defect (zero to player 1 and $40 to player 2).

[49] Smith (1996).
[50] Ibid, Weeks (2008), Weiss (2013).
[51] Kydd (2005: 198).
[52] Simpson (2007), Evans and Krueger (2009), Evans and Krueger (2011), Schniter and Shields (2013).
[53] McCabe and Smith's game is a simplified version of an earlier game developed by Berg et. (1995). See Berg, Dickhaut and Mccabe (1995), McCabe and Smith (2000), McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003).
[54] McCabe and Smith (2000: 3777).

Thus, the investor is always confronted with the risk of losing $10, given the receiver's temptation ($40-$25 = $15).[55] Standard rational choice theory would predict no cooperation at all: Knowing that player 2 always receives higher payoffs by defection, player 1 should never invest; given its strong incentives to defect, player 2 should be considered unreliable.

Nevertheless, McCabe and Smith's studies have demonstrated that over 50 per cent of investors chose to invest while 75 per cent of receivers reciprocated. The proportions are very high, given the strong incentives to defect.[56] Using a variety of investment games, other scholars have found a similar pattern of interactions from their experiments: Despite the payoffs structure which determines stronger incentives to defect, over 50 per cent of investors chose to cooperate on average, and such interactions generally resulted in a high rate of reciprocity.[57] In some experiments using the ultimatum game — a variant of the trust game — researchers even found that receivers frequently violated the rule of utilities maximization by turning down a profitable offer, which amounts to 20-50 per cent of the sum cash.[58] Such deviations highlight the failure of rational choice theory in explaining actual decision-making.

Furthermore, another issue concerns a latent assumption in the RCM — leaders' mechanism of interpretation. As the previous section shows, all the four classes of indicators — capabilities, institutions, reputation, and costly signals — can only signal credible information if a receiver interprets them in the same way as the sender. Yet, even if one assumes both sides perfectly follow the deductive rules as the model prescribes, rational choice theory offers no solution for harmonizing the meanings of information across different social and cultural backgrounds. In particular, this problem has plagued the dichotomy between costly actions and cheap talk. As Mercer and Yarhi-Milo point out, whether a signal is costly is essen-

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[55] For a typical example of the investment game, see Ibid, 3778.
[56] Ibid, 3779.
[57] Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996), Evans and Krueger (2009).
[58] According to the ultimatum game, player 2 can only choose to accept or reject an offer made by player 1. See Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), List and Cherry (2000), Wilkinson and Klaes (2012: 400).

tially a subjective matter; the cost to a sender is, in effect, less important than how a receiver perceives it. Although it is parsimonious to assume that both sides agree on the meaning of a particular signal, the RCM denies the possibility that the receiver may interpret the signal differently.[59]

To overcome such deficiencies, the rest of the chapter formulates the ARM by synthesizing various insights regarding psychological mechanisms in leaders' reliability assessment. The ARM is aimed at both more accurately describing decision-making cognition and better explaining intra-alliance interactions. The next section lays out its building blocks by specifying the general mechanisms of leaders' reliability assessments. Thereafter, this chapter derives several propositions for theory-testing. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of operationalizing the empirical tests.

2.4.1 General Decision-Making Tendencies

First and foremost, the ARM posits that agents' rationality is considerably constrained by psychological biases; its building blocks are comprised of four general tendencies and the fundamental role of affect in decision-making. In a nutshell, the model describes reliability assessment as dual processes of constrained calculation. On the one hand, the dimension of rationality is manifested in leaders' conscious attempts to infer an ally's interest through calculation. On the other hand, such efforts are, at best, close to a rational calculus while they are constantly constrained by hard-wired cognitive and affective biases. As a result, leaders can never escape from interpreting the ally's behavior on the basis of their prior beliefs and feelings concerning its strategic dispositions; such constraints often significantly deviate a judgment, which initially intended to be rational, from its rational baseline.[60] Accordingly, learning or beliefs updating ceases to be objective. However, as Jonathan Baron a prominent

[59] Mercer (2013: 226); for the subjective credibility hypothesis, also see Yarhi-Milo (2013: 11).
[60] For example, one apparent limit is that, as Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman point out, most people are not equipped with adequate formal models to compute the probabilities of events. Nor can they access others' utility functions. See Tversky and Kahneman (1977).

psychologist of decision-making points out, searching for specific heuristics and bias that deviate judgments often results in "a long list of biases and heuristics, with no unifying concepts other than the methods used to discover them."[61] Many heuristics and biases identified by researchers also frequently overlap with each other in terms of their functions.[62] Thus, for the sake of parsimony, the ARM only generalizes about four types of general decision-making tendency by drawing from a wider range of biases and heuristics. On top of the integral role of affect, those four tendencies are assumed to be particularly influential among leaders.

The first tendency is widely reflected in people's general inclination to simplify complex decision-making environment. Specially, leaders tend to develop oversimplified understanding of an ally's behavior by relying on their prior beliefs, particularly, causal narratives. This is effectively captured by attribution theory, which posits that people are disposed to constructing causal stories in making sense of interpersonal relations. Particularly, they tend to explain others' behavior by emphasizing their internal characters, such as "motives, intentions, sentiments," instead of paying attention to transient, situational factors. This tendency is also termed the "fundamental attribution error."[63] Those causal beliefs usually stem from long-term memories of interpersonal relations and abstract thought about social codes.[64] In turn, they form the basis for what psychologists call "schema" — closely interrelated clusters of general assumptions and specific instances, exemplars, and analogies in people's belief systems, through which they can reduce complexities in strategic environment.[65] It is this tendency that disposes leaders to attributing the underlying causes of an ally's behavior to certain strategic dispositions.[66] According to Snyder and Diesing, such beliefs are commonly

[61] Baron (2008: 54).
[62] See a classification provided by Baron, which includes over 50 heuristics and biases with different labels. Ibid, 56-8.
[63] Heider (1958: 81), Jones and Harris (1967).
[64] Michotte (1963), George (1969), Jervis (1976: 154-67), Larson (1994), Malle (2011), Huddy, Sears and Levy (2013: 338-39).
[65] Axelrod (1973: 1248), Larson (1994: 20).
[66] Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982a: 118), Fearon (1992).

manifested in prototypical, background images of a state — the short-cuts which help leaders to grasp the interests of the state in an efficient, but often inaccurate way.[67]

Second, a closely related tendency is beliefs perseverance or defense: Leaders tend to assimilate fresh information into pre-existing beliefs. Underlying this tendency is the consistency bias. In short, psychological studies find that people are uncomfortable with inconsistencies in their belief systems. Conflicts between prior beliefs and fresh information lead to cognitive dissonance — aversive feelings which usually drive people to remove them by compromising dissonant information.[68] As Jervis suggests, political elites particularly tend to suffer from this motivational bias because of their desire to defend their prestige, legitimize policies, and assure themselves that their resources were not spent wastefully.[69] Therefore, in an intra-alliance setting, deep-seated dispositional beliefs can be notoriously resilient, and cannot be easily altered by new information. Also, leaders' desire to eliminate cognitive dissonance often leads to various strategies of beliefs defense, which often cannot cease without a "shock," such as a major crisis.[70]

The third tendency is ego-centrism in taking perspectives: While interpreting an ally's behavior, leaders tend to take a self-centric perspective and, more importantly, they tend to assume that such a perspective is shared by the ally. In their experiments using the trust game, Anthony Evans and Joachim Krueger have demonstrated that the ego-centric bias plays an important role. They find that player 1 tends to judge player 2's reliability in relation to the direct consequences to the former's interest. In contrast, player 1 tends not to focus on player 2's incentives, such as temptation.[71] Their study provides strong evidence that people reason in a forward-looking manner, as opposed to the backward elimination. That means, once a target's behavior is observed, people pay most attention to its immediate con-

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[67] See Boulding (1959), Snyder and Diesing (1977), Cottam (1994).
[68] See Festinger (1957), Bem (1967: 183); also see Jervis (1976: 383).
[69] Ibid, 386, 393.
[70] For beliefs defense strategies, see Tetlock 2005; also see Snyder and Diesing (1977).
[71] Evans and Krueger (2011).

sequences to their own interests, rather than to deducing how such a behavior effects the target's incentives structure; the latter is unintuitive.[72] Such a case can be found in Jonathan Renshon's study of the Cuban Missiles Crisis. Renshon finds evidence that political leaders tend to "project their own understanding of a decision (and its attendant risks) onto that of a target," and "to assume that the target of assessment perceives and understands a given risk in the same way that you do."[73] Despite the presence of intelligence report confirming unusual Soviet operation in Cuba, such an error of "mirroring risk," as Renshon shows, still occurred to the majority of the US principals (including Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy), because they believed that the Soviets would not pursue the high-risk action of missiles buildup.

Following this line, leaders should be constantly tempted to interpret an ally's interests on the basis of their own beliefs: What they believe about the ally's behavior tends to minimize the importance of fresh information regarding its incentives. Even though leaders are aware of the golden rule of "putting myself into your shoes," they often fail to observe this. Such a bias, Mercer argues, can also be understood as the function of affect: Emotions can serve as information on its own right. For example, in strategic deference, whether a signal incurs cost is subjective, hence, a matter of the receiver's experience. As a result, the receiver tends to focus on her own feeling about a signal, rather than its cost to the sender.[74]

The fourth tendency is that leaders tend to treat information selectively: Vivid and high-frequency information assumes particular saliency and tends to attract disproportionate attention, whereas abstract information tends to be downplayed, discounted, or even ignored. This tendency of information-processing is strongly supported by research on both cognitive and affective biases. In their classical studies of the availability heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman have demonstrated that the frequency of occurrence of certain events tends to serve

[72] Ibid, 175.
[73] Renshon (2009: 320).
[74] Mercer (2013: 226-7).

as the marker for retrieving them from memories. Thus, occurrences of large classes of events tend to be better recalled than those of small classes. As a result, they conclude that people tend to suffer from the availability bias, that is, to equate the easiness of recalling past instances to the probability of similar events in the future.[75]

Recently, this issue of information saliency has been increasingly approached from an affective perspective in studies of political psychology. The role of emotion is particularly highlighted. According to Yarhi-Milo's theory of vividness, vivid information tends to attract people's "emotional interest," and "our emotional responses shape the certainty of our beliefs and preferences for certain choices." Thus, she posits that "information about intentions that is vivid, personalized, and emotionally involving is more likely to be remembered, and hence to be disproportionately available for influencing inferences," whereas "information that lacks vividness, such as information that is abstract, colorless, and less concrete, is more likely to be neglected or ignored."[76] Drawing on neuroscience studies of the mirroring neuron, Marcus Holmes further clarifies the physiological reason why information inducing emotional responses is particularly salient. The mirroring system in human brains, he argues, "plays an important role in allowing individuals to 'feel' the emotions of others when looking at their faces by imitating the emotion in their own body."[77] Thus, leaders are not only able to defect emotions in the face of their target, but are also able to "feel the emotions of others by simulating, through observation, the emotional experience another is going through." More importantly, such a process of simulation "is not an effortful, deliberate pretense of being in somebody else's shoes"; rather, it is "an effortless, automatic, and unconscious inner mirroring."[78]

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[75] Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982b: 163).
[76] Yarhi-Milo (2014: 16-7).
[77] Holmes (2018: 50-1).
[78] Ibid, 50.

2.4.2 The Fundamental Role of Affect

Affect not only underlies some of the important biases or heuristics behind those decision-making tendencies. As a burgeoning literature in IR has shown, it plays an integral and fundamental role across all the cognitive dimensions of information-processing.[79] Just as contemporary appraisal theorists suggest, "cognitive-ideational processes are closely intertwined with physiological changes" which underlie "appraisals as key elicitors of emotions," although "emotions may also come about through relatively non-cognitive routes, such as bodily feedback."[80] Generally speaking, affect enables three integral components for leaders' reliability judgment: First, affect regulates the sense of interest. Second, it regulates the selection of memories. Third, it governs certainty about beliefs and, thus, perceptual change and perseverance.

First and foremost, without affect, leaders will be deprived of their basic sense of interest. This linkage between affect and interest is, in fact, an old insight dating back to Jeremy Bentham. In his theory of utility, Bentham proposes the association between utility and subjective feelings. The notion was prominently embedded in the attempts to quantify feelings by later generations of economists associated with the "marginal revolution."[81] From the 1950s, such efforts gradually gave way to the axiomatic notion of utility proposed by Neumann and Morgenstern. However, as behavioral economists become increasingly aware of the limits of the standard rational choice theory, many have returned to Bentham's classical notion of utility.[82] Recently, studies in neuroscience, such as Damasio's case of his patient Elliot, have offered strong evidence to this insight, as they have revealed that people cannot even perform a "cold" calculation of interest when the part of the brain regulating emotions is damaged.

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[79] For earlier IR studies on emotions and affect as a basis for beliefs, see Mercer (2006 and 2010), McDermott (2004), Ross (2006), Peterson (2011).
[80] Markwica (2018: 55).
[81] Schniter and Shields (2013: 2).
[82] Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2007), Schniter and Shields (2013), Schniter, Sheremeta and Shields (2015).

According to Schniter and Shields's recalibrational theory of emotions, affect regulates people's sense of interest through a system of adaptive learning with emotional reward and feedback. Positive emotions from strategic interactions reward people with pleasant feelings, hence, create the incentives to demand similar experiences in the future. In turn, such feelings reinforce the expectation about interest convergence between self and other. Conversely, negative feelings contribute to the opposite loop of feedbacks as well as one's desire to remove such unpleasant experiences. In accordance, people will downgrade their expectation about the convergence of self-other interests and adjust their behavior accordingly.[83] Thus, it is this affective forecast that enables decision makers to understand the consequences following certain behavior and, more importantly, the incentives to update one's prior beliefs.[84] In line with this insight, some psychological studies have confirmed that variation of emotional states brings about corresponding changes in people's sense of interest. For example, people tend to see higher benefits and lower risk in those objects they feel positive about; and they tend to see higher costs and risk in those objects they feel negative about.[85]

The second primary role affect plays is that it can guide leaders to select their memories. Psychologists find that people tend to remember things which are thematically congruent with their emotions. When positive emotions dominate, they tend to recall positive experiences about others. Conversely, negative emotions encourage their retrieval of negative memories.[86] Similarly, appraisal theorists term this "appraisal tendencies," which, as Markwica suggests, may affect the content of thought by influencing "what information people pay attention to" or shaping "decision makers' perceptions of risk."[87] Thus, it is reasonable to assume that contingent emotions in intra-alliance interactions can reinforce leaders' defense of prior beliefs that are congruent, hence, enhancing their consistency bias. Neverthe-

[83] Schniter and Shields (2013: 9), Schniter and Sheremeta (2014: 3), Schniter, Sheremeta and Shields (2015: 49).
[84] Schniter and Shields (2013: 3)
[85] Gilovich and Griffin (2002), Dunn and Schweitzer (2005), Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2007: 411), Druckman and McDermott (2008), Brader and Marcus (2013: 177).
[86] Hastie and Dawes (2010: 96).
[87] Markwica (2018: 69-70).

less, emotions can play the opposite role: When leaders' feelings are increasingly dissonant with their prior beliefs, they are motivated to alter the beliefs rather than to discount their feelings. This is the reason why perceptual change does occur, despite the tendency of beliefs perseverance.

The third function of affect has to do with its direct linkage to leaders' sense of certainty. With affect, the notion of certainty goes beyond a calculated figure of probability. While perceived reliability cognitively reflects the same beliefs about commitment, the magnitude of such beliefs depends on leaders' transient emotions or long-term feelings. This linkage between feelings and perceived reliability, as Dun and Schweitzer suggest, has been increasingly confirmed in experimental studies. As Michelle Williams summarizes, studies in management and business generally agree that positive feelings stemming from activities such as social exchange, self-verification, and emotional support, influence affective attachments and liking for particular targets. In turn, these affective attachments add to the "feel" that another's actions can be relied on "in a situation involving the risk of opportunism."[88]

Furthermore, drawing on the appraisal theory, Markwica argues that "the impact of appraisal tendencies on cognition depends to an important degree on the intensity of affective experience. The more strongly an emotion is felt, the more pronounced tend to be its appraisal tendencies."[89] Yet, apart from emotional intensity, certainty also depends on both the positive-negative valences of emotions and specific appraisal tendencies. On the one hand, the positive-negative valences correlate to leaders' certainty regarding a target's dispositions. For example, an experimental study in 2016 suggests that "angry individuals perceive a situation as more likely to happen when it is caused by humans whereas sad individuals perceive a situation as more likely to happen when it is caused by situational non-human factors."[90] Other experiments show that feelings of pleasantness, such as contentment, gratitude, happi-

[88] Dunn and Schweitzer (2005: 737-8), Williams (2007: 608, 610).
[89] Markwica (2018: 70).
[90] So, Achar, Han, Agrawal, Duhachek, and Maheswaran (2015: 361).

ness, and hope, enhance leaders' optimism about a target's behavior.[91] On the other hand, the positive-negative valences do not correlate to leaders' certainty regarding their ability to control situations, that is, situational risk.[92] For instance, fear is often defined as "an aversive emotion that comes about when people sense an immediate, concrete physical or psychological threat."[93] Whereas fear can trigger negative feelings about a threatening actor, it lowers people's self-confidence in coping with the situation, and is often associated with "maximal uncertainty about the situation" in many experiments. Negative feelings, such as anxiety and depression, are characterized by the same tendency.[94] By contrast, both happiness and anger strengthen one's sense of certainty regarding situational control. Given their different valences, such feelings can encourage leaders to feel more confident in their ability to gain control of a situation, and thus biases them "in favor of optimistic risk estimates and high-risk options."[95] Moreover, certain emotions, such as pride and surprise, can induce either positive or negative appraisals of a target. Whereas the valence of pride depends on whether the target is perceived as an in-group or out-group member, it generally enhances leaders' certainty about both the target's corresponding dispositions, and simultaneously encourages leaders to be overconfident about situational control, hence, risk-acceptant.[96] Also, depending on its valence, surprise can be divided into "pleasant surprise" (positive) and shock (negative). Whereas pleasant surprise, or simply "surprise," or shock usually brings about highly intense emotional experiences, hence, can significantly enhance positive or negative appraisal of a target, both feelings are associated with growing uncertainty about dissonant as-

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[91] Compared to pleasantness, hope entails a low-to-medium pleasant state, and the belief that attaining a goal is possible either "as a result of one's own efforts or due to external forces that may be beyond one's control." See Markwica (2018: 78-9), Smith and Ellsworth (1985: 831-2), Schniter and Shields (2013: 16-7).

[92] The study of the interplay between emotions and risk perceptions has been a main stream of research in consumer decision-making. These studies have generally agreed that the judgment of risk is determined by one's certainty about control of situations. For example, "unknown risk" refers to "hazards judged to be uncertain," and "dread risk" refers to "hazards judged to be out of individual control." See Smith and Ellsworth (1985: 832), Han, Lerner, and Keltner (2007: 162).

[93] Markwica (2018: 73, 88).

[94] For emotion-induced tendencies, see Smith and Ellsworth (1985: 827, 834), Tiedens and Linton (2001: 974, 979), Han, Lerner, and Keltner (2007: 162), So, Achar, Han, Agrawal, Duhachek, and Maheswaran (2015: 367).

[95] Markwica (2018: 88).

[96] Ibid, 80-1, Smith and Ellsworth (1985: 831-32), Schniter and Shields (2013: 18).

pects of one's prior beliefs as well as the sense of situational control.[97]

In addition, it is worth noticing that one's sense of uncertainty should not be understood as a functional equivalent to certainty, but rather the reduction of certainty. As some psychologists argue, the sense of uncertainty allows beliefs "simultaneously to include both positive and negative evaluations," that is, a feeling of "ambivalence" characterized by mixed emotional states with simultaneous experience of both positive and negative affects.[98] Therefore, although uncertainty can lead to growing ambivalence, it is not the same of ambivalence.

In the light of such emotion-certainty linkages, when the intensity of specific emotions passes certain threshold, leaders may become so certain about an ally's reliability (or unreliability) that such emotional experiences can override their calculation. Yet, intense emotions do not necessarily eliminate dissonant and calculus-based beliefs; they marginalize such beliefs by surpassing dissonant affective valence. Conversely, growing uncertainty encourages leaders to engage in systematic information-processing, which diverts their attention to more careful deliberations and a wider range of potential options.[99] For example, when leaders are content with an ally's empowering actions while fearing its growing power, they can be relatively uncertain about the ally's commitment, hence searching for more information about its intentions. Suppose that those leaders are enraged by the ally's wrongdoing, they can also be increasingly certain that the ally will not fulfill its obligations. Conversely, leaders' continuous experience of intense positive emotions can initially reduce their certainty about an ally's unreliability, and gradually increase their certainty about its reliability.[100] Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the intensity of positive emotions may grow to such an extent that they can even enable leaders to grant the "discretion to the other to affect one's interests," that is,

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[97] For surprise see, Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988: 127); for shock, also see Smith and Ellsworth (1985: 827), Schniter and Shields (2013: 19).
[98] Tiedens and Linton (2001: 974-5), Crano and Prislin (2006: 365, 358-9), Schniter and Shields (2013: 10), Marroquín, Boyle, Nolen-Hoeksema and Stanton (2016).
[99] Tiedens and Linton (2001: 975).
[100] Luhmann, Luhmann, Davis, Raffan and Rooney (1979: 72).

the willingness to be vulnerable.[101]


Furthermore, varying degrees of certainty determine the sustainability of perceived reliability, conditioned on different sources of such beliefs. As discussed above, although intense emotions can significantly shape leaders' beliefs by overriding calculation or dissonant affective experiences, they are transient and hard to sustain themselves in the long run. Yet, the immediate emotional waves they produce can often provide a starting point for perpetual change in a short term. For such beliefs to be sustained in the long term, affective experiences have to function in an incremental manner, together with stable sources which can induce leaders' congruent feelings on a regular basis. For example, identities, as carried by historical memories and ideologies, can serve as a typical source of deep-seated beliefs, which induce leaders' emotional responses to affirm such identities. By and large, as these patterns are explained in greater details in the following section (see *Section 2.4.4*, ***Proposition 6***), it

Table 2.1: Affective Reasoning Model: Central Components

	Decision-Making Tendencies
Over-Simplication	Simplify strategic environment with schemas, and rely on heuristics/biases as cognitive short-cuts.
Beliefs Assimilation	Pre-existing beliefs/feelings tend to discount and assimilate dissonant information.
Ego-Centric Perspective-taking	Leaders tend to assume the the target of assessment share their own perspectives of interest and risk etc.
Selective Information-processing	Leaders tend to pay disproportionate attention to vivid information while downplaying abstract information.
	Regulatory Roles of Affect
Sense of Interest	Affect determines what is felt as interest, and how much it is felt.
Congruent Memories	Affect tends to retrieve and select memories that are congruent to it.
Change of Certainty	The intensity of emotions positively correlates to the strength/ credibility of affectively congruent beliefs.

[101] As this study has no intention to theorize about trust, I argue that intense emotions can produce similar affective experiences associated with trust; yet, emotional experiences alone cannot equate "trust," as defined in the trust-based approach, because they do not ensure their own sustainability as trust should. See Arrow (1969: 14), Arrow (1974: 23), Hardin (2002: 7, 11), Hoffman (2002: 377-8).

Figure 2.1: Comparison of the Two Models



is sufficient to state here that leaders' perceptual change and continuity depend on the interactions between both transient and resilient affective experiences. Finally, for better illustrating the theory, *Table 2.1* and *Figure 2.1* summarize the ARM's main components, and its key differences to the RCM.

2.4.4 Affective Judgment of Reliability

As summarized above, the ARM departs from its rationalist counterpart in two crucial aspects. First and foremost, leaders' processing of new information is heavily constrained by

their prior beliefs and feelings. Usually, incoming information does not bring about direct and objective change in leaders' perceptions; rather, leaders have to rely on pre-existing beliefs to make sense of it. Second, with affect playing an integral role in regulating leaders' assessments, their interpretation of information also differs much from what the RCM predicts. In particular, this aspect has profoundly shaped the mechanism of signaling for affective-reasoning leaders: Now, an ally's behavior can no longer be properly understood in terms of the rationalist dichotomy between costly actions and cheap talk. Rather, the saliency and credibility of behavioral signal largely depend on the following four dimensions of a signal: (1) its direct consequence vis-à-vis self-interest; (2) its compatibility with pre-existing beliefs and feelings; (3) its affective valence; and (4) its affective intensity. As a result, the ARM allows leaders to make use of a wider range of information as credible indicators of alliance reliability, such as personal impressions and identities.

Specifically, the rest of the section formulates six propositions; ***Propositions 1 - 4*** summarize four main mechanisms by which leaders derive indicators of reliability, while ***Propositions 5 - 6*** explain the patterns by which leaders preserve and change their perceptions.

Proposition 1 - *Leaders tend to disregard aggregate power, institutions, and reputation as indicators of an ally's reliability. Yet, substantial change in military power tends to negatively affect their perception when the ally is considered unreliable.*

First, as discussed earlier, capabilities can be broken down to aggregate and offensive power, while institutions reflect regime type, hence, domestic constraints of state behavior. Yet, both aggregate power and institutions are not very informative, owing to an intuitive logic: As both aspects usually take the form of abstract information about state-level traits, they can neither attract vivid attention nor serve as behavioral clues for leaders to infer an ally's strategic dispositions. Moreover, leaders largely perceive aggregate power in non-behavioral measurements, such as population and industrial capacity. Assessing aggregate

power alone, as Aaron Friedberg demonstrates in his study, often becomes a controversial matter between different governmental agencies.[102] This makes it hard to attribute aggregate power to short-term state behavior. For the same reason, institutional constraints are not outcomes of immediate strategic behavior, and thus are usually perceived as situational explanations to an ally's behavior. As a result, dispositional attribution can hardly take place.[103]

Second, due to the ego-centric bias, leaders often fail to see the effect of institutional constraints from an ally's perspective. For example, during the Cold War, Chinese leaders often viewed America's democratic system as a facade of imperialism, mirroring their own understanding of politics.[104] In her study of intention assessments between adversaries, Yarhi-Milo finds that states rarely linked capabilities to their perceptions of each other's intentions.[105] Also, in a recent study using experiments, Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo find that people tend to view democracies as less resolute than autocracies. Their subjects seemed to largely disregard the "contracting advantages" of democracies in relation to crisis deterrence.[106] In addition, leaders' information of aggregate power and institutions tends to be relatively abstract. Thus, they are less salient, compared to more vivid experiences of leaders.

Third, from a rationalist perspective, reputation for reliability is drawn from a state's past records regarding its fulfillment of alliance obligations. According to the ARM, this form of reputation simply cannot exist as a stable asset.[107] However, some previous studies find that leaders do pay attention to states' past behavior while assessing their resolve or long-term intentions.[108] Often, this does not validate the rationalist argument, but instead can be attributed to people's tendency to rely on historical analogies under the representativeness bias.[109] In other words, leaders tend to draw on analogies with a state's past behavior in es-

[102] Friedberg (1988: 280).
[103] Mercer (1996).
[104] Chen (2010).
[105] Yarhi-Milo (2014: 12).
[106] Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo (2015).
[107] Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg and Wood (2012).
[108] Miller (2012).
[109] Tversky and Kahneman (1973), Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982a), Gilovich and Griffin (2002: 231).

timating the likelihood of future events. During this process, they usually pay most attention to the similarities between the past and present situations while downplaying their differences.[110] Such use of superficial analogies, as Jervis and Khong have shown, is prevalent among decision makers.[111] The experiments by Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo also lend support to the presence of analogous thinking in deference crisis: Their subjects tend to believe that those leaders who back down in the current crisis are also less likely to stand firm in the future, and vice versa.[112]

In contrast, offensive power can be partially informative about alliance reliability, because it can be easily perceived as the outcome of a state's intentional actions in the short term. In her study, Yarhi-Milo finds that military capabilities often served as the most significant indicator of an adversary's intentions among intelligence communities, while its impact on civilian leaders was marginal.[113] Thus, it is assumed that military power has limited impact on leaders' assessment of reliability. Only substantial increase of military power tends to undermine an ally's perceived reliability, as such change can both easily attract leaders' attention and be attributed to the ally's intentional attempt. In this sense, leaders' style of inference resembles a rational calculation, given the absence of strong beliefs defense against dissonant information about negative traits of the ally.

However, the possession of nuclear weapons may constitute an exceptional form of military power in leaders' assessments. Although similar to the rationalist prediction that the pursuit of nuclear weapons tends to undermine a state's reliability, the ARM posits that the negative impact of nuclear capabilities tends to be much more profound on the basis of the emotional responses leaders may develop. In the early Cold War, for example, both American and Soviet leaders, such as Truman and Khrushchev, had been astounded by the massive de-

[110] Kahneman and Frederick (2002).
[111] Jervis (1976), Khong (1992).
[112] Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo (2015).
[113] Yarhi-Milo (2014: 12).

structive power of nuclear weapons and were appalled by the prospect of their military use.[114] Therefore, the psychological effect, particularly fear, associated with nuclear weapons, can make them a much more salient indicator of unreliability than the RCM predicts (also see ***Proposition 3***).

Proposition 2 - *Leaders tend to pay attention to substantive signals which may cause direct consequence to state interests. Favorable behavior tends to strengthen an ally's perceived reliability while unfavorable behavior tends to undermine it.*

As discussed earlier, affective-reasoning leaders do not necessarily share an ally's view about how costly a particular behavior is. The rationalist logic of costly signaling cannot apply. Instead, the ego-centric tendency encourages leaders to take a forward-looking perspective in evaluating the consequence of the ally's behavior, vis-a-vis their own state interests. As such actions usually effect a state's interests in a substantive sense, they are categorized as "substantive signals" here. From the ARM's perspective, "costly signals" in the RCM are not necessarily informative; only those costly signals which are qualified as "substantive" can be informative. Therefore, leaders should pay attention to an ally's empowering actions and its demonstration of interest convergence, as those actions are commonly perceived as favorable. Nevertheless, resolve-demonstrating actions and imposing audience cost tend to generate little impact, as they are easily subject to multiple interpretations. Often, an ally's demonstration of resolve can even be counterproductive, as that simultaneously increases the risk of an unwanted conflict. For instance, during the Berlin Crisis in 1958, Washington sent 1,200 troops to West Berlin in order to demonstrate its resolve to defend Europeans. Yet, such an action immediately undermined the French perception of US reliability, as General de Gaulle viewed Washington's policy as provocative and risky.[115]

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[114] Gaddis (2005: 65, 73-4, 80).
[115] See Zimmermann (2002).

In addition, it is noteworthy that the saliency of such signals also depends on the magnitude of affect involved. This proposition should generally apply without the participation of prior beliefs or intense feelings which are in conflict with an ally's behavior (see ***Proposition 3***). In other words, favorable or unfavorable actions work most effectively when there is compatibility between a sender's behavior and a receiver's pre-existing feelings. Otherwise, the impact of such signals may easily suffer from leaders' beliefs perseverance (see ***Proposition 5***).

Proposition 3 - *Leaders tend to pay attention to affective signals which cause vivid, emotional consequences to themselves. Behavior inducing positive feelings tends to strengthen an ally's perceived reliability while behavior inducing negative feelings tends to undermine it.*

As affect plays an integral role in leaders' understanding of interests, the salience and credibility of a signal also depend on what tangible feelings it creates in leaders' minds. In opposed to the RCM, the cost of a signal is a subjective matter, and cannot be deduced solely from a sender's perspective. What a sender considers a costly action may pass unnoticed by a receiver, because it fails to stir tangible feelings from a receiver's perspective.[116] Conversely, even though a signal generates no effect on an ally's ranking of preferences from the rationalist viewpoint, it can significantly influence leaders' beliefs by creating intense emotions. Thus, signals which incur no cost in a rational sense can well serve as credible indicators of alliance reliability. In other words, rational cost no longer matters. What really matters is the affective consequences that information brings about for the receiver.

Recent studies on emotions in IR have strongly supported this proposition. As Hall and Yarhi-Milo demonstrated in their analysis of the Munich Crisis, what they term "costless signals," such as facial expressions and languages, can be even more influential to leaders'

[116] Mercer (2013), Yarhi-Milo (2014).

assessment of intentions than signals which are supposed to incur rational cost.[117] In his theory of emotional diplomacy, Hall argues that diplomacy as collective emotional displays or "emotional labor" — a deliberate projection of emotional state — can work through several pathways in influencing state-level behavior, exactly because "emotional expression and behavior are integral parts of how human beings communicate their thoughts, feelings, and intentions to others."[118] Echoing their positions, Seanon Wong summarizes two basic functions of emotions in communicating intentions in international politics: First, emotions can serve as indices which carry some inherent evidence of intentions, as their genuine expressions are, "to a certain extent, beyond an actor's conscious control."[119] Also, diplomats, he argues, tend to be more sensitive to and better at discerning emotions than the average.[120] Second, emotions as informative signals can even assume a higher degree of effectiveness, because of the social context of diplomacy, which imposes more restraints on the use of deception and diplomats' display of emotions. In this sense, Wong contends that "even if emotions are perfectly manipulatable and unverifiable, their expression may still be meaningful if a social context enables them to be so."[121] Supplementing these views, Holmes also points out that the highly-nuanced mirroring system in human brains is "able to pick up on micro-changes in facial expressions and realize subtle shifts in the emotional states of others, which conveys their level of sincerity." This enables leaders to clearly convey their sincere intentions in certain instances, as well as to "overcome long-standing intractable conflicts where distrust is abundant."[122]

Therefore, compared to the rationalist prescription, the participation of affect now allows credible signaling to take a much wider range of forms. Technically speaking, any signals which induce tangible feelings or emotions may be used by leaders to convey credible in-

[117] Hall and Yarhi-Milo (2012: 561-6).
[118] Hall (2015: 21-22, 60).
[119] Wong (2016: 154).
[120] Ibid, 155.
[121] Ibid, 156-8.
[122] Holmes (2018: 6-7).

formation about reliability. Recent studies in psychology and IR have particularly paid attention to certain forms of signals, such as personal impressions and diplomatic gestures. First and foremost, personal impressions which leaders develop from face-to-face interactions have figured prominently in recent IR studies of emotions and diplomacy. As Hall and Yarhi-Milo describe, personal impressions, in fact, originate from a range of "presumably uncontrollable aspects of personal behavior," which can serve as indices to one's intentions. That may include "facial expressions, body language, tone of voice, even unconscious movements or reactions."[123] Their analysis of Chamberlain's assessment of Hitler's sincerity during the Sudeten Crisis shows that, despite the absence of substantive German guarantee, "Hitler's appearance and manner" still led to the Chamberlain's belief that Hitler was "a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word."[124] In their recent works on face-to-face interactions, both Holmes and Wheeler have also paid much attention to the crucial role of personal impressions in leaders' intention assessments. While Holmes notices that leaders facing latent information scarcity and ambiguity tend to rely more on personal impressions of intentions, Wheeler posits that "seeing the 'human' in their counterparts' attitudes and behavior, rather than just a representative of cold state interests" is central to the process of "humanization," which enables "a fully form relationship of bounded trust."[125] Such positions have been widely supported by a range of psychological experiments using economic games. These studies have particularly examined the impact of facial expressions on reciprocity, and found that faces which trigger positive feelings tend to increase people's expectations of others' reciprocity.[126]

Second, diplomatic gestures can also function prominently as a credible, affective signal, as it can well serve the purpose of emotional displays. Hall is probably among the first to

[123] Hall and Yarhi-Milo (2012: 562).
[124] Ibid, 566.
[125] Holmes (2018: 145), Wheeler (2018: 60, 62-3).
[126] Wout and Sanfey (2008), Posthuma, Chen and Ayoko (2012), Campellone and Kring (2013), Greiner, Caravella and Roth (2014).

offer a conceptual framework for diplomatic gestures. In *Emotional Diplomacy*, he uses the term "expressive gestures" to refer to official gestures which entail "all actors in the government stick to the same script in terms of rhetoric and symbolic acts," in "projecting an outwardly sincere image"; and such gestures should also incur relatively little or no "cost" in the rational sense.[127] By examining states' employment of staged emotional displays, Hall found that even ritualistic gestures can be informative of leaders' sincerity, hence, shape the target's perceptions and behavior.[128] However, recent studies of face-to-face interactions have also highlighted the importance of individual-based gestures, such as leaders' sharing of meals.[129] Thus, a more inclusive notion of gestures is adopted here. In principle, diplomatic gestures can refer to both collective or individual actions, which are largely symbolic, that is, involving no backing of substantive state behavior. Then, this may entail a wide variety of behavioral forms, such as a leader's personal speech, leaders' exchanges of letters, state media's emotional discourse, and an official invitation to an international conference.

Finally, it is worth noticing that affective signals can certainly overlap with some of the substantive signals discussed in ***Proposition 3***. In fact, an affective signal not necessarily excludes substantive consequences to state interests; whether a signal induces vivid, emotional consequences is the sole standard on which it is judged. Therefore, when a substantive signal influences leaders' assessment through the emotional responses it creates, one also has to demonstrate such assessment is not primarily influenced by its calculative aspect.

Proposition 4 - *Political identities tend to dominate leaders' initial judgment of alliance reliability. While shared identities tend to strengthen an ally's perceived reliability, divergent identities tend to undermine its perceived reliability.*

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[127] Hall (2015: 30).
[128] Ibid, 37.
[129] Wong (2016: 160), Wheeler (2018: 63).

Shared identities, particularly those manifested in deep-seated beliefs about social-political ideologies, constitute one of the most stable indicators of reliability, as it shapes the fundamental paradigms which structure leaders' understanding of interpersonal relations. Moreover, psychological and biological studies have shown that "identities and emotions are closely intertwined and influence each other continuously."[130] As Markwica points out, "identities may shape emotions via emotion norms and through identity work," while "affective experience is central to these identity validation and rejection process."[131] Thus, "positive emotions generated by the confirmation of identity claims" tend to "lead individuals to commit themselves to their identities," which in turn encourage them to act such identities out in everyday life.[132]

In international politics, A well-known example of such, as Alexander Wendt has provided, is the distribution of role identities in the international system, which can shape states' understanding of each other's intrinsic intentions. An enemy role, as Wendt argues, induces the perception of irreconcilable conflict between states, whereas a friend role induces the perception of benign intentions.[133] According to experiments conducted by social identity scholars, such as Tajfel and Turner, inter-group differentiation and in-group favoritism can simply emerge out of membership labels which are randomly assigned to subjects.[134] Using investment games, Tanis and Postmes also find that, when social identity is held constant, in-group membership can directly serve as a short-cut for intra-group reciprocity, because it correlates positively to the rate of cooperation among in-group subjects.[135]

Yet, one should also note an important limit of identity as credible information about reliability. As psychological studies suggest, the impact of identity in decision-making tends to

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[130] Markwica (2018: 65).
[131] Emotion norms refers to "socially learned standards of appropriate affective experience and expression," and identity work refers to people's action to formulating and reformulate identity claims about their self-conceptions. Ibid, 60, 65.
[132] Ibid, 66.
[133] Wendt (1999).
[134] See Tajfel and Turner (1979), Tajfel (1982).
[135] Tanis and Postmes (2005).

weaken over time, particularly after actors become more familiar with each other. In a study using investment game, Foddy, Platow and Yamagishi have found that the effect of group identity is only present in a common knowledge setting, in which the subjects were aware of each other's membership. However, as they had acquired more specific information about each other, group membership ceased to make a big difference in their interactions.[136] Therefore, it is plausible to assume that shared identity usually induces positive mutual perceptions in early stages of intra-alliance reliability assessment; but other salient information, such as emotion-inducing signals, can override its influence as intra-alliance interactions progress.

Proposition 5 - *As perceived reliability intensifies with positive feelings, leaders tend to discount information about an ally's unfavorable behavior (positive beliefs defense). As perceived reliability intensifies with negative feelings, leaders tend to discount information about the ally's favorable behavior (negative beliefs defense).*

As discussed earlier, this pattern is jointly determined by people's general tendency of beliefs perseverance and the assimilating function of affect.[137] When leaders' beliefs are accompanied by intense feelings, their inclination to preserve affectively congruent beliefs about an ally will become increasingly resilient. In turn, leaders tend to employ various strategies to defend their prior beliefs. For example, when positive feelings grow significantly, leaders holding a more positive image of an ally may simply downplay its unfavorable behavior by attributing it to transient situations — What is termed "positive beliefs defense" here; this falls typically into an external attributional bias. For example, in the Suez Crisis of 1956, Eisenhower downplayed Britain's cheating by calling it a "family spat." He reasoned that such behavior was caused by necessity, as "British had not been in on the Israeli-French planning until the very last stages when they had no choice but to come into the

[136] Foddy, Platow and Yamagishi (2009).
[137] See Sections 2.4.1-2

operation."[138] Conversely, when negative feelings grow significantly, leaders tend to downplay or even ignore an ally's favorable behavior, that is, "negative beliefs defense." In this case, a common strategy for beliefs defense is that leaders often attribute the ally's friendly actions to its self-interest or certain malicious intentions. For example, in 1943, the Allied invasion of Italy created a second front in the European battlefields. Ironically, Stalin suspected that this was Washington's and London's conspiracy to exhaust the Soviet Union in a conflict with Nazi Germany, because they did not launch a direct invasion of Western Europe.[139]

Proposition 6 - *Substantial perceptual change among leaders tends to take place through diplomatic exchanges involving intense emotions.*

As diplomacy creates the main opportunity for leaders to interact in person, diplomatic exchanges between allies can often help us to identify the most likely timing where leaders use face-to-face interactions to assess their counterparts' intentions. In turn, such exchanges also tend to become the tipping points for substantial perceptual change between allies. In his recent work of face-to-face diplomacy, Holmes clarifies the physiological basis on which diplomatic exchanges can play such a powerful role. As visuality occupies a strong role in the mirroring system, he points out, "much of what is occurring is replication of action and intention based on observing that behavior." Thus, "face-to-face interactions involves constant firing of mirror neurons," likely through intensive efforts on both sides to simulate each other in order to "understand the other person's overt and inferred meanings." As a result, people can "move from private to shared experiences."[140] Moreover, signaling during face-to-face interactions is particularly important, because much of its information exchange is unconscious.[141] Therefore, people engaged in face-to-face interactions will often begin to

[138] Risse-Kappen (1996: 384).
[139] Gaddis (2006: 18-20).
[140] Holmes (2018: 48).
[141] Ibid, 40.

copy each other's behavior and, more importantly, emotions. And experimental studies also show that face-to-face environment can significantly amplify existing feelings between subjects.[142] Following this line, as face-to-face diplomacy provides a particularly strong form of vivid information, as Yarhi-Milo defines, its saliency can be disproportionately high compared to other forms of credible information, hence, can also more easily trigger perceptual change among leaders.[143]

From slightly different perspectives, both Wheeler and Wong have paid attention to the particular value of face-to-face diplomacy in generating or enhancing affective information about intentions. Wheeler specifically focuses on the importance of face-to-face interactions as a chance for leaders to acquire "a general impression of another's trustworthiness that is not linked to a specific issue area or focal point of concern"; that is, an index of "inherent credibility as to another's trustworthiness."[144] He argues that face-to-face diplomacy provides an excellent chance for doing so, exactly because, in line with Holmes's theory, it enables leaders to acquire an index at "the so-called 'system 1' level of interaction," namely, "the automatic and unconscious part of the brain that processes information in milliseconds."[145] Yet, Wheeler also notices that the stability of such an index cannot be automatically guaranteed in the future, given its transient nature.[146] On the other hand, Wong emphasizes a few reasons why face-to-face diplomacy particularly offers the social context which makes emotions as salient information about intentions. First, face-to-face interactions, Wong argues, actually place more social constraints on diplomats' use of deception, hence, making their emotional expressions more likely to be genuine. Second, because "emotions are often considered anathema to diplomatic best practice," emotional displays in a diplomatic setting can be especially telling about one's true intentions.[147] Third, he posits

[142] Ibid.
[143] For the vividness thesis, see Yarhi-Milo (2014).
[144] Wheeler (2018: 6, 51-2).
[145] Ibid, 54.
[146] Ibid, 7.
[147] Wong (2016: 156-7).

that face-to-face diplomacy at the dyadic level can significantly highlight the strength of an emotional signal, because "interlocutors are often acquainted with each other from previous encounters, and they make as much of an emotion per se as its contrast and consistency with its displayer's behavior in the past."[148]

Finally, as Eznack reminds us, even for close alliance relationship as that within NATO, passionate clashes may often occur and are exacerbated because of "the affective value attached to this relationship."[149] Although surviving such crises among close allies, she argues, serves as a testimony for the strength of the relationship, the opposite situation, that is, a spiral of conflict and deteriorating relationship might be the consequence as well.[150] Given that communications tend to be more frequent between allies, one would expect that face-to-face diplomacy provides a rich ground for such clashes to take place and to amplify emotional responses on both sides.[151] In this sense, one may look at intra-alliance negotiation as a primary platform for major perceptual changes to take place: First, negotiations often set up an institutionalized environment for face-to-face interactions to sustain between leaders, hence, ensuring the continuity of their emotional exchanges on a regular basis. Furthermore, such negotiation settings also create a fertile ground for contingent biases and heuristics to occur. For example, experimental studies have shown that the false-consensus bias and the loss-aversion bias have been particularly associated with rising tensions in bargaining.[152]

By and large, as face-to-face interactions tend to significantly enhance the effectiveness of emotional signals, it is plausible to assume that intra-alliance diplomacy between leaders should play the most prominent role in initiating perceptual changes. Yet, a remaining question has to do with the causal weight of face-to-face diplomacy, particularly in relation to

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[148] Ibid, 158.
[149] Eznack (2011: 240).
[150] Ibid, 263, Eznack (2012).
[151] Burnham, McCabe and Smith (2000), Tingley (2014), Centorrino, Djemai, Hopfensitz, Milinski and Seabright (2015).
[152] Loss aversion and false consensus are particularly important here, because both biases are associated with a spiral of negativity in bargaining settings. Loss aversion refers to the tendency that people value relative losses more than gains. This leads them to devalue an offer if it is conditioned on certain concession. False consensus is the ego-centric tendency to assume that others share one's own perspectives, such as risk.It often leads to divergent interpretations of risk between alliance partners. See Pronin, Puccio and Ross (2002), Renshon (2009), Hastie and Dawes (2010: 81).

leaders' prior beliefs. Just as Wheeler points out, credible information acquired from face-to-face interactions might be relied upon in the present; but when the context changes, it is dangerous to assume "that signals that are conveyed in the present are a reliable guide to future behaviour."[153] Therefore, this issue boils down to the question of how transient emotional experiences during face-to-face diplomacy can translate themselves into more stable forms, to the extent that their influence may match or even surpass stable sources of perception, such as leaders' prior beliefs.

Essentially, answering this question requires some elaboration on the patterns of perceptual continuity and change vis-à-vis intra-alliance diplomacy. As discussed in ***Proposition 5***, beliefs perseverance and affective assimilation underlie the stability of prior beliefs. Given the presence of face-to-face diplomacy, the mechanism of perceptual continuity largely works through two mechanisms: assimilation or affirmation. First, dissonant information which does not carry sufficient emotional intensity will simply be discounted on the basis of prior beliefs. Second, consonant emotions from face-to-face interactions affirm and sustain prior beliefs. Therefore, perceptual continuity depends on both the strengthening of emotions generated by face-to-face diplomacy, and whether such emotions are congruent with leaders' prior beliefs.

Perceptual change, however, involves more complex interactions between intense emotions and prior beliefs. When face-to-face interactions are affectively congruent with leaders' prior beliefs, the mechanism of affirmation can further strengthen it with growing emotional intensity, hence upgrading pre-existing perceptions in either positive or negative direction. Nevertheless, when face-to-face interactions generate affective dissonance with prior beliefs, perceptual change to the opposite direction can involve two mechanisms. The first works through "shock" (negative) or "surprise" (positive), which usually comes about following

[153] Wheeler (2018: 7, 57).

the occurrence of "unanticipated desirable and undesirable events."[154] A profound shock or surprise can set forth dramatic emotional experiences which may completely shatter leaders' prior beliefs and can even, as Markwica suggests, bring about sudden transformations in emotion norms.[155]

In the case of such deep emotional transformations, it is incorrect to assume that transient emotions in the present cannot project enduring influence into the future. This has to do with how beliefs are structurally organized in human mind — what cognitive psychologists term "schema." According to Richard Herrmann, schema generally refers to a "cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among these attributes." For example, "a person's knowledge about a given actor is organized" into schema, which "influences the selection, interpretation and memory of information pertaining to the actor in question."[156] A schema can represent both "pre-existing assumption about the way the world is organized," as Robert Axelrod suggests, and specific images or examples which are clustered underneath it.[157] As Deborah Larson points out, people organize their beliefs in a schematic manner exactly because of the "limits on the capacity of short-term memory" — a key component tendency of affective reasoning (see *Section 2.4.1*); "schemas influence initial encoding of information" into belief system and, in turn, enable people to better comprehend a complex stimulus and also "to make additional inferences using preexisting knowledge and concepts."[158] In this sense, schema plays an important role in encoding particular feelings and emotions arising in transient situations into people's long-term memories. Therefore, profound affective experiences can be even more easily transformed as deep-seated parts of belief systems, overriding conflictual pre-existing memories. For example, psychologists have found that prior traumatic events in childhood is

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[154] Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988: 125-7).
[155] Markwica (2018: 60).
[156] Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi (1997: 406).
[157] Axelrod (1973: 1248), Larson (1994: 20), Alexander, Levin, and Henry (2005: 31).
[158] Larson (1994: 22, 24).

causally linked to internalized mental problems later, such as anxiety disorders, rising emotional distress, and paranormal beliefs.[159] Studies of trauma and religious beliefs have also found that traumatic experiences can significantly increase or decrease people's religious beliefs, despite that this is one of the most stable forms of schema; and the studies also find that the greatest changes of such beliefs tend to occur among people who developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).[160]

In the field of international politics, Yuen Foon Khong offers a classical example of how the Munich Crisis and the Korean War, as historical analogies, had influenced memories of generations of American leaders.[161] In turn, such accessible schemas can guide leaders to code similar future events or experiences on the basis of congruent memories, hence including similar feelings or emotions. For example, Khong's work shows that brilliant American leaders, including Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk often invoked such analogies in their intention assessments during the Vietnam War.[162] Using a three-stage experiment, Herrmann and his colleagues demonstrate that scenarios describing a country's specific traits, which link it to stereotypical schemas of ally or enemy images, had elicited strong affective ratings from subjects. Not unexpectedly, their subjects generally displayed a strong dislike for the enemy country, and strong liking for the ally.[163] In short, this schematic way of information-processing essentially overlaps with a key component of our ARM — the integral role affect plays in regulating and selecting memories congruent to transient experiences (see *Section 2.4.2*). In this fashion, if incoming experiences carry sufficient emotional strength, it is reasonable to expect that a profound initial shock or surprise may bring about enduring influence on leaders' perceptions.

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[159] Lawrence, Edwards, Barraclough, Church and Hetherington (1995), Koenen, Roberts, Stone and Dunn (2010: 20).
[160] See a structured review of trauma and religious beliefs by Leo, Izadikhah, Fein, and Forooshani (2019).
[161] Khong (1992).
[162] Ibid, Larson (1994: 21).
[163] Herrmann (1997: 411, 415).

Second, face-to-face diplomacy can also work through an incremental mechanism, coupled with affectively congruent signals over time. For instance, leaders' positive interactions may initially create certain favorable impressions, although such transient impressions lack the strength to eliminate their counterparts' pre-existing negative beliefs or sustain a positive turn in the long run. Yet, by managing future signaling in a consistent manner, leaders can continuously reinforce the initial impressions until a turning point arrives. What Charles Osgood terms GRIT (Tension Reduction Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives) showcases exactly such positive cycles: A state can use confidence-building diplomacy to achieve an initial breakthrough in its relationship with an adversary; this is then followed by a series of unilateral concessions to reduce pre-existing suspicion between them.[164]

It is worth noticing that the two mechanisms do not assume the same causal weight in initiating positive or negative perceptual changes. The "sudden" mechanism is commonly associated with shocks and downturns in perceptual change, usually driven by intense negative emotions such as fear and anger. In other words, a surprise which can set forth enduring positive perceptual change is possible, though relatively unusual in reality. As evolutionary psychologists point out, negative feelings are generally more powerful and resilient at an individual level. Citing the theory of natural selection, they also suggest that such a tendency has been strengthened by people's need to be sensitive to danger and threat, in order to improve their chance of survival during the long history of evolution. As a result, fear and anger become the most fundamental traits of man: While fear allows one to detect threats in natural environment, anger motivates effective bargaining behavior during conflicts.[165] Unfortunately, both emotions can make a shock experience particularly strong or even traumatic to those who went through it. In comparison, the second, incremental mechanism is associated more evenly with both positive and negative perceptual changes. Positive change can come about

[164] Osgood (1979).
[165] Öhman and Mineka (2001), Haselton and Nettle (2006), Tang (2013), Buss (2015), Schniter, Sheremeta and Shields (2015).

with initial positive impressions from leaders' face-to-face interactions and a consistent employment of GRIT, whereas negative change may gradually emerge with continuous misunderstanding and misuse of gestures in a series of intra-alliance negotiations. However, given people's disproportionate sensitivity to threat, it is more difficult for positive change to sustain itself in an incremental manner.

Ultimately, regarding both the sudden and the incremental mechanisms, to establish the causal role of face-to-face diplomacy against leaders' prior beliefs requires careful examination of the following evidence: (1) The existence of affective dissonance between prior beliefs and leaders' impressions from diplomatic interactions; (2) the relative strength of emotional signals involved in face-to-face diplomacy; and (3) the covariation between leaders' emotional discourses and the sequence of intra-alliance behavior following their face-to-face interactions.

2.5 Design of Empirical Studies

As the ARM and the RCM have produced a long list of predictions, *Table 2.2* compares their main features respectively in order to better guide our empirical analysis. In addition, this table summarizes potential measurements for each indicator suggested by the models. Moreover, in order to test the theories, a rigorous methodology is required for organizing the empirical analysis. Given the invisible nature of beliefs, it has always been a challenge to investigate the causal effect of perceptions. Therefore, this final section is aimed at specifying a systematic design of the case study. It first operationalizes the dependent variable: perceived reliability, and then moves on to laying out the organization of our empirical analysis.

2.5.1 Operationalizing Perceived Reliability

A rigorous empirical test requires both operationalization and valid measurement of our dependent variable (DV) and independent variables (IV). Given the difficulty to study percep-

Table 2.2 - Overview: Predictions of the Two Models

Independent Variables		Measurement	RCM		ARM		
						Effect	
			Attention	Effect	Attention	prior beliefs (low intensity)	prior beliefs (high intensity)
Capability	*Aggregate Power*	CNIC Score (COW)	Yes	substantial change undermines reliability	No	—	—
	Military Power	NMC Data (COW)	Yes		Yes	substantial increase undermines reliability	substantial increase undermines reliability, if congruent to prior beliefs
Institution	*Institutional Constraint*	rimary sources & secondary historical studies	Yes	contribute to reliability	No	—	—
	Democracy	regime type scale (Polity IV)	Yes	contribute to reliability	No		
	Autocracy	regime type scale (Polity IV)	Yes	undermine reliability	No		
Reputation	*Obligations Fulfillment*	records of obligation fulfillment (ATOP)	Yes	correlates positively to reliability	No	—	—
Behavioral Signals	*Empowering Actions*	primary sources & secondary historical studies	Yes	correlates positively to reliability	Yes	may contribute to reliability	may contribute to reliability, if congruent to prior beliefs
	Demonstrate Convergent Interest		Yes		Yes	may contribute to reliability, if not misinterpreted	
	Demonstrate Resolve		Yes		No	—	—
	Impose Audience Cost		Yes		No		
	Diplomatic Gestures		No	—	Yes	affective valence correlates positively to reliability	affective valence correlates positively to reliability, if sufficiently strong
	Personal Impressions		No	—	Yes	affective valence correlates positively to reliability	affective valence correlates positively to reliability, if sufficiently strong
Identities	*Political Ideologies*	primary sources & secondary historical studies	No	—	Yes	convergence/divergence positively/negatively correlates to reliability	convergence/ divergence positively/negatively correlates to reliability, if congruent

Table 2.3: Variation of Perceived Reliability

Category	Affective Valence	Emotional Intensity	Contents of Reliability Judgement
Highly Reliable	positive	high	Certain that the ally will fulfill its alliance commitment.
Probably Reliable	positive	low-medium	Expect that the ally is more likely to fulfill its alliance commitment, while uncertain.
Ambivalent	mixed	low	Do not know the ally's intentions.
Probably Unreliable	negative	low-medium	Suspect that the ally is more likely to renege on its alliance commitment, while uncertain.
Highly Unreliable	negative	high	Certain that the ally will renege on its alliance commitment.
Probably Hostile	negative	high	Suspect that the ally will threaten one's security, while uncertain.
Definitely Hostile	negative	very high	Certain that the ally threatens one's security.

tions, I design a systematic method to locate the presence of the DV: In the first step, one identifies perceived reliability against both its cognitive and affective dimensions; in the second step, one also tests for the congruence between such cognitive/affective dimensions and the behavioral tendencies associated with particular perceptions. *Table 2.3* conceptualizes the potential variation of perceived reliability against three measurable, interrelated dimensions: (1) affective valence, (2) emotional intensity, and (3) contents of reliability judgment. In total, this typology allows the DV to vary along a spectrum of seven cognitive/affective values. Using such a spectrum, evidence for leaders' beliefs and emotional states can be systematically derived and coded from a range of primary and secondary sources. Thereafter, the next step will validate the genuineness of derived perceptions against leaders' behavioral tendencies. Put it simply, a perception should be genuine when leaders' beliefs match their behavior. Otherwise, inconsistency may indicate both possibilities: Either leaders' words do not reflect their genuine beliefs, or leaders' beliefs are genuine but have limited influence. The rest of the section discusses the operationalization in details.

Cognitive & Affective Dimensions - In general, each of the seven categories identifies a distinctive stage of leaders' perceptual change. Each stage can be measured jointly by its *af-*

fective valence (positive/negative/mixed), *emotional intensity* (low to high), the *content of reliability judgment* (textual evidence for beliefs) by leaders. Although the degree of leaders' certainty correlates positively to emotional intensity, it is also related to affective valence, and the specific types of emotion involved (fear, anger, surprise etc.). "Ambivalence" reflects a state of mixed and balanced valences, with low emotional intensity. In theory, a state of complete ambivalence is possible when leaders' positive and negative feelings perfectly balance each other out. Then, they should feel extremely uncertain about a target's intentions.[166] In principle, the seven categories can also be adapted to a probability scale in order to measure the degree of certainty under the RCM.[167]

With this spectrum of variation, the ARM can describe leaders' perceptual change on a more realistic basis, as the interplay between beliefs and emotions. Often, at the formation stage of an alliance, member states' perceptions tend to be neither too positive nor too negative. Intra-alliance relationship is typically characterized by a normal status of mixed feelings among leaders. For instance, one may find in a policy discussion that a leader reaffirms the generally positive images of an ally while recalling some unpleasant diplomatic events in the past. When leaders' feelings about an ally are generally more positive, this is identified as *probably reliable*. Accordingly, leaders should generally expect that the ally is more likely to honor its commitment. In this case, the existence of certain negative feelings, such as leaders' anxieties over the ally's long-term commitment, can denote uncertainty. Conversely, the opposite case should be identified as *probably unreliable*: Negativity increasingly dominate leaders' emotional experiences, indicating growing suspicions, whereas their simultaneous positive feelings denote the remaining uncertainty about the ally's unreliability.

Then, growing intensity in emotional experiences makes affectively congruent prior beliefs increasingly resilient. When leaders' emotions are intensely positive, they tend to be-

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[166] By contrast, rationalists tend to define such uncertainty as a state of affectively-neutral ignorance, see Rathbun (2007).
[167] Yet, converting the categories into probabilities may not make any sense for empirical analysis. A state with complete certainty may not exist at all, though it can be logically rendered as 100 per cent of one's certainty.

come highly certain about an ally's reliability. This characterizes the perception of *highly reliable.* Conversely, the perception of *highly unreliable* should come out of leaders' experiences of intensely negative emotions. Both perceptions should also be characterized by the relatively little presence of dissonant feelings. In other words, the high-certainty stage of leaders' beliefs is accompanied by highly homogenized emotional experiences. In addition, leaders' beliefs may go beyond a certain psychological threshold, from which a former ally is considered an adversary. Such a perception is identified as *hostile.* Whether this perception entails more emotional intensity than that of high unreliability is a different question. As it has little to do with our main theme, this study just assumes that this is probably the case. Then, the distinction between *probably* and *definitely hostile* is largely used to denote whether leaders perceive a former ally constitutes an immediate threat to its security, such as planning a preemptive nuclear strike. According to Bueno de Mesquita's analysis of military conflicts, it is not unusual to find historical cases in which two former allies turned quickly into hostile parties in a war.[168]

Measuring Perceptions - Given the conceptual clarification above, measuring perception is still more of an art than of a science. This study mainly relies on three categories of historical sources in doing so: (1) Memoirs, diaries and other writings by leaders and key witnesses of decision-making, particularly leaders' personal aides; (2) governmental documents which reveal leaders' policy discussions and deliberations; (3) declassified intelligence reports and analyses. In principle, I give priority to documental evidence produced in private settings, because they are generally more credible in revealing leaders' actual thought and mental status. To provide supplementary evidence, I also draw on published governmental documents, newspaper reports, and secondary historical studies.

However, to prevent wishful interpretation, I observe certain coding rules for analyzing

[168] Bueno de Mesquita (1981).

textual evidence which reflects leaders' beliefs about reliability. Drawing on the business and management literature, I focus on four aspects of leaders' discourses which are conventionally assumed to be primary, but not exhausted, characteristics of a target's reliability: (1) *Benevolence*, which means "caring and being motivated to act in one's interest rather than acting opportunistically"; (2) *Integrity*, which means "making good faith agreements, telling the truth, and fulfilling promises"; (3) *Competence*, which means "having the ability or power to do for one what one needs done"; and (4) *Predictability*, which means "actions (good or bad) that are consistent enough to be forecasted in a given situation."[169] In fact, these aspects have been widely used in business and management studies to identify "trustworthiness" — the characteristics by which a person can assess if another can be trusted.[170] In their original ABI model, Mayer, Davis and Schoorman offer a lenient version of the definition of "trust" — a party's willingness to take risk given its vulnerability to another's particular action important to the party. As this definition does not include any strict conditions such as the absence of calculation, it is, in effect, overlapping with our notion of perceived reliability to a considerable degree.[171] Therefore, this study adopts those characteristics identified by the ABI model, adapting them specifically to the context of alliance reliability judgment: First, *benevolence* should indicate leaders' beliefs that an ally's action is in the common interest of the alliance. Second, *integrity* should indicate the beliefs that the ally's action is motivated by moral principles to maintain alliance commitment. Third, *competence* should indicate the beliefs that the ally is capable of fulfilling its promises. Finally, *predictability* should indicate the beliefs that the ally's behavior shows a consistent pattern by which its future actions can be predicted.

Finally, in order to identify the intense stages of leaders' perceptions (i.e. highly reliable

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[169] The three indices of ability, benevolence, and integrity were originally developed as the ABI model in Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995: 717-20); for its further application in the business and management literature, see McKnight and Chervany (2001: 28-31), Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007: 345).
[170] Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995: 716).
[171] See the stricter definitions of trust under the trust-focused approach in Chapter 1, Section 1.2


or unreliable), one should particularly examine three types of evidence: First, a convenient form of evidence can usually be found in certain primary sources which contain overt records of leaders' emotional states. A memorandum of leaders' policy conversations, for example, may explicitly describe that one leader turned angry against another. One may find even more juicy evidence in this form — e.g. a Whitehouse tape which recorded a US president putting swearwords against a foreign leader. Second, one may identify intense emotions by looking at leaders' causal stories which attribute an ally's behavior to dispositional images at a collective level. This may suggest that leaders' feelings are associated with deep-seated prototypical beliefs. Third, as emotional intensity correlates positively to the occurrence of decision-making biases in, the presence of bias/heuristic in growing frequency can also serve as a short-cut for the presence of intense emotions.

Behavioral Tendencies - Another main component of the research design is to test for the congruence between perception and behavior. This step is also necessary for causal inference when textual evidence is rare. Yet, the linkage between perceived reliability and alliance behavior is generally under-theorized in the alliance literature. A notable exception is Andrew Miller's work on reputation for reliability. According to Miller, perceived reliability not only effects states' attractiveness as an ally, but also influences policies of intra-alliance institution-building.[172] By choosing intra-alliance institutions, Miller argues, states adjust their strategies of commitment in response to their perceptions of alliance reliability. Although Miller's insight provides a useful starting point, his theory limits alliance behavior to a narrow dichotomy. Essentially, a state is allowed to either abandon an alliance or expand its commitment. Thus, whereas his theory is suited for explaining institutional design at the onset of an alliance, it fails to shed much light on the process of intra-alliance interactions.

Building on Miller's insight, the ARM is aimed at expanding the range of alliance strate-

[172] Miller (2012: 44, 51).

Figure 2.2: Perceived Reliability and Alliance Strategies



gies vis-à-vis leaders' perceptual change. This approach is comprised of two dimensions: (1) A spectrum of strategic tendencies, and (2) power asymmetry. First, a state is assumed to adjust their level of dependence on an ally with a range of strategic options. As Snyder and Morrow suggest, intra-alliance dependence reflects a trade-off between a state's external threat and the autonomy that the state is willing to cede in order to contain such threat.[173] Thus, dependence implies vulnerability, as they argue, "the more dependent the partner, the greater one's ability to inflict harm by withholding values."[174] Therefore, in order to manage such a risk, states often need to adjust the level of intra-alliance dependence in response to their changing perceptions of alliance reliability.

As *Figure 2.2* illustrates, the ARM assumes that states can choose from five general types of alliance strategy during intra-alliance interactions: (1) Empowerment, (2) dependence, (3) independence, (4) control, and (5) containment. First, to an increasingly reliable ally, states tend to empower it or increase its own level of dependence. The two strategies can be mani-

[173] Morrow (1991: 910), Snyder (1997: 168).
[174] Snyder (1997: 168-9).

fested in a wide range of political, military, and economic policies, such as conceding one's freedom of action, delegating political influence, military assistance, and technology transfers.[175] Often, it is difficult to separate empowerment from the dependence strategy: For example, military integration, which increases allies' interdependence, will also strengthen their military capabilities in general. However, one can distinguish between the two strategies in many cases. For instance, transferring weapons to an ally does not necessarily make it more dependent on the sender, given that it does not increase the receiver's reliance on continuous training or supply of special parts from the sender. In addition, if a state launches a nationwide propaganda campaign to promote an ally's image among its domestic audience, this often indicates the increasing level of dependence alone.

Furthermore, for an increasingly unreliable ally, states tend to reduce their intra-alliance dependence, that is, the independence strategy. This can be manifested in a state's increasing pursuit of autonomy through both active and passive means. Typically, the independence strategy includes hedging behavior and demand for reassurance. Both actions work to restore a certain degree of autonomy in an active manner. Particularly, hedging refers to the action to divide a state's bets on multiple options which may not be compatible with each other at the end.[176] As Keating and Ruzicka points out, hedging "allows states to self-insure against possible defection or opportunism by other states" and "avoid the worst outcome," thus also reducing "one's dependence on and vulnerability to others."[177] For example, a suspicious state may demand its ally to deliver additional guarantee or to impose stricter mechanisms for monitoring obligations fulfillment. When this does not work, the state can resort to hedging "by cultivating alternative partners, projects, and networks" in order to reduce the potential

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[175] Dian (2014: 8-11).

[176] For example, in the post-Cold War European security policies and the US-China relations, hedging behavior is typically shown by states' pursuit of balancing and integrating mechanisms at the same time. By hedging, as Foot points out, states may avoid the situation where a straightforward alternative such as balancing "might in the end be unworkable." See Art (2004: 184-5), Foot (2005: 88), Medeiros (2010: 145).

[177] Keating and Ruzicka (2014: 8-9).

harm of betrayal by the unreliable partner.[178] Certainly, a state can also achieve this goal in a passive way, for example, by resisting pressure or control from its ally. Ultimately, a state's perceptions may become so negative that it already considers an ally a threat. Then, it should move toward a standard balancing strategy (containment) against the ally.

Nevertheless, states are not confined to a single general strategy at a time. With enduring uncertainty, a more realistic situation is that states often need to adopt a mix of different strategies simultaneously. For example, leaders' perceptions may be divided over multiple aspects of an ally. They may not worry about the ally's benign military intentions, but have doubt over its increasing economic power. In this scenario, the state can choose to increase its dependence on the ally through military integration while resisting the ally's demand to open up its domestic market.

Finally, the second dimension —power asymmetry— adds to the complexity of intra-alliance behavior. From a realist perspective, power asymmetry is a conventional factor which makes a big difference in alliance formation.[179] Yet, it is also important for intra-alliance interactions, because it can significantly constrain one's strategic options. In a symmetric alliance, a state can typically choose from all the five alliance strategies. By contrast, an asymmetric alliance usually reduces the range of options. First, the stronger state often needs little or no dependence on the weaker. Instead, the former may demand more control over the latter's policies, particularly when the minor partner is likely to provoke unwanted conflicts with a third party.[180] Also, the weaker state is often unable to empower the stronger. Thus, when huge power asymmetry co-exists with a high level of perceived reliability, the stronger state tends to unilaterally empower the weaker, while the weaker state tends to increase its intra-alliance dependence. Conversely, the stronger tends to control the weaker, while the weaker tends to pursue increasing autonomy.

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[178] Ibid, 9, Poast (2012), Grant (2013).
[179] Morrow (1991).
[180] Benson (2012), Miller (2012), Cha (2016: 5-6).

2.5.2 Organizing the Test

A systematic test of the ARM and the RCM requires one to trace the causal linkage between the IVs and the DV. The former aspect can be best observed across a range of episodes in a case study, demarcated by critical junctures. In comparison, the latter can be more efficiently probed through the chain of events within a particular episode. Therefore, the empirical analysis is designed to reconstruct a balanced picture of both. As our list of propositions requires a cautious examination of the causal chain from identified indicators to perceptual changes, a reconstruction of the decision-making processes is necessary. Therefore, a large part of the analysis will focus on uncovering the mechanisms of information-processing from leaders' reasoning and behavior. However, pooling the results of the analytical episodes can also provide an overview of the covariation between the IVs and the DV. In general, each case study should go through the following three steps:

Step I - Using critical junctures for intra-alliance interactions, the history of a particular alliance is first divided into multiple analytical episodes, each of which constitutes a basic unit for examining the covariation between the IVs and the DV. Thereafter, against the decision-making context of each case, I will then identify those leaders who were particularly influential in shaping intra-alliance interactions.

Step II - After establishing the general pattern of variation on the DV, I then identify the values of the DV, respectively, at the start and the end of each episode. In doing so, I first look for evidence of leaders' prior beliefs toward their ally, and then examine their perceptual and behavioral changes throughout the course of intra-alliance interactions.

Step III - Finally, I will check whether any IVs were present in a given episode, and develop specific predictions regarding the values of the DV, which should respectively follow from the two models. Then, I examine the degree to which each model can explain

the actual outcome of alliance relationship in an episode. To test the robustness of our findings, I then discuss major alternative explanations and contingent historical factors.

In general, a rigorous theory testing requires a detailed exploration of three types of evidence for the causal mechanisms outlined in both models. First, one should check whether and to what extent leaders pay attention to an IV as an indicator in their assessments. Second, one should observe if variation in the IV corresponds to the value of the DV as suggested by a given proposition. Third, one should further observe if leaders' perceptual changes converge with their behavior to adjust alliance strategies. Finally, in order to reject a null hypothesis, one should also check if the presence of competing IVs makes no difference to the value of the DV.

In principle, a proposition cannot survive a test under the following circumstances: First, leaders either do not pay attention to an indicator, or interpret it differently from the prediction. Second, whereas leaders do rely on an indicator, their actual behavior contradicts the expressed beliefs. Yet, in this situation, the proposition may still stand if the contradiction is caused by contingent factors. In other words, leaders may fail to adjust to their genuine beliefs because of external constraints. For example, a *coup d' état* may well prevent a state to stay in an alliance even though the previous leadership perceives the ally as reliable. Third, if certain predicted behavior occurs without the presence of congruent perceptions, this may also indicate a failed test. Furthermore, if a proposition only applies to the minority of leaders under examination, this usually indicates its invalidity. Nevertheless, if the minority constitutes a group of dominant actors in a given case, the proposition should also be considered valid. Finally, if a proposition does not apply to certain episodes, but applied to most of the episodes in a case study, this should well be considered surviving a test on an overall scale.

Chapter 3

From Fraternity to Animosity: The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1969

3.1 Overview

The formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance significantly influenced the balance of power in East Asia during the Cold War. Witnessing the rise of the Communist monolith, probably no American leader would imagine that in just twenty years the former partners would come to perceive a greater threat from each other than from their adversary, the United States.[1] Given that the split had taken a decade to reach its peak, culminating with the Sino-Soviet border war, this outcome seems particularly puzzling for rationalist alliance theories, which often locate the source of threat perceptions in structural imperatives. However, this chapter shows that, contrarily, perceptual changes through intra-alliance interactions provide a compelling alternative explanation of the rising hostility between Beijing and Moscow by 1969. In this chapter, I will first address two important background issues: (1) the decision-making context of the alliance, and (2) the selection of critical junctures. Then, by examining the covariation between perceptions and intra-alliance interactions, I will demonstrate that the superiority of the Affective Reasoning Model (ARM) vis-à-vis leaders' reliability assessments. Finally, I will also address the major alternative explanations that the Rational Choice Model (RCM) suggests.

[1] Christensen (2011: 32).

3.1.1 The Decision-Making Context

In general, the Sino-Soviet alliance makes it relatively easy to identify key actors, because the authoritarian system of each party determined that their foreign policy-making entailed a high degree of centralization. First, the foreign policy-making mechanisms in both countries were autocratic, with power centralized in a small group of leaders — the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Politburo in the Soviet Union, and the Central Secretariat and the CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) in China. In practice, the paramount leaders, such as Stalin and Mao, tended to monopolize foreign policy decisions and minimize the role of professional bureaucracies. Often, the dominant role of paramount leaders encouraged a small group effect among their subordinates, whose ideologies and perceptions were increasingly homogenized. Also, slow turnover of leadership facilitated such homogenized patterns of perceptions.

Table 3.1: Main Actors in Sino-Soviet Relations, 1949-1969

	PRC	USSR
Paramount Leaders	Mao Zedong (49-69)	Joseph Stalin (49-53) Nikita Khrushchev (53-64) Leonid Brezhnev (64-69)
Secondary Leaders	Liu Shaoqi Zhou Enlai Deng Xiaoping Peng Dehuai Chen Yi Li Fuchun Peng Zhen	Anastas Mikoyan Vyacheslav Molotov Andrei Gromyko Mikhail Suslov Alexei Kosygin
Ambassadors	Wang Jiaxiang (49-51) Zhang Wentian (51-55) Liu Xiao (55-62) Pan Zili (62-66)	Nikolas Roszczin (49-53) Pavel Yudin (53-59) Stepan Chervonenko (59-65) Sergey Lapin (65-67)

Before the Cultural Revolution, the big three — Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai — had dominated China's policy-making toward the Soviet Union (see *Table 3.1*). Mao held disproportional influence while Liu and Zhou played secondary but indispensable roles: They not only served as important gatekeepers for Mao, but also frequently participated in Sino-Soviet diplomacy. Often, their personal ties to Soviet leaders had a direct impact on the

bilateral relations. Other Chinese leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun and Peng Zhen, generally served as aides and policy implementers. While Deng often handled specific policy-making issues on behalf of Mao, the other three actively participated in key areas of the alliance relationship, such as economic diplomacy and ideologies.[2] On the Soviet side, Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov dominated China policy before 1953.[3] Anastas Mikoyan was both Stalin's gatekeeper, and a main actor in the intra-alliance diplomacy. After 1953, whereas Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev consecutively held decisive influence on China policy, their roles were less dominant than Stalin. While Mikoyan continued to play an important role, Mikhail Suslov, Andrei Gromyko and Alexei Kosygin were actively participating in the alliance relationship. In addition, although ambassadors were not supposed to hold substantial influence, they can play a significant role by shaping information flow between senior leaders. Given China's dependence on the Soviet Union, this situation particularly applied to Soviet ambassadors before 1960.

3.1.2 Critical Junctures

A critical juncture marks a point of choice which significantly shaped path dependency in the Sino-Soviet alliance relationship.[4] In turn, such points should reflect notable variations in the intra-alliance behavior, as reflected by either side's adjustment of alliance strategies.[5] Therefore, as *Table 3.2* specifies, I divide the full lifespan (with minor omissions) of the alliance into five episodes, each of which represents a distinctive stage of the Sino-Soviet relationship. While the end of each episode marks a critical juncture, some episode contains more than one junctures, which present significant changes in the bilateral relations. By and large, those critical junctures mainly serve as points of demarcation, given that selection biases are significantly reduced by analyzing the full history of the alliance. Based on my in-

[2] For Deng's special role in the Sino-Soviet relations, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (2009), Zhong (2013: 380).
[3] Khrushchev (2007: 409).
[4] Capoccia and Kelemen (2007).
[5] See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1

dependent review, this demarcation should reflect diplomatic historians' general consensus on the Sino-Soviet relationship.[6]

The next section sets out to test the ARM and the RCM across the five episodes. First, it will examine the causal linkages between perceptual changes and intra-alliance behavior in the two decades, while identifying the presence of other indicators in leaders' assessments of reliability. Then, this chapter will synthesize the main findings while elaborating on the three main competing explanations — capabilities, institutions and reputation.

Table 3.2: Analytical Episodes

Leadership	Episodes	Critical Junctures	Main Adjustment of Alliance Behavior
Stalin-Mao	1949-53	Jan 1950 - alliance formation & Oct 1950 - China intervened in the Korean War	Beijing adopted the lean-to-one-side policy, increasing its dependence on the USSR; Moscow was committed to empowering China with increasing military and economic assistance.
Khrushchev -Mao	1954-57	Nov 1957 - Sino-Soviet unity in the Moscow Conference	Moscow substantially expanded aid to China, including assistance in its nuclear program; Beijing began to contain excessive Soviet influence in domestic politics.
Khrushchev -Mao	1958-60	Aug 1960 - the withdrawal of Soviet assistance to China	Beijing launched the first polemics against Soviet revisionism; Moscow withdrew all aid projects from China while terminating the nuclear cooperation.
Khrushchev -Mao	1961-64	Apr 1964 - the Sino-Soviet split became public	Beijing escalated the polemics and increasingly resorted to border disputes; Moscow publicized the Sino-Soviet dispute, beginning to contain Chinese influence.
Brezhnev -Mao	1964-69	Mar 1966 - Beijing boycotted the 23rd CPSU Congress & Mar 1969 - the Sino-Soviet border conflict	Beijing cut off official relations with Moscow, and escalated the border disputes; Moscow began to strengthen Soviet border defense by deploying conventional forces and nuclear missiles.

[6] As historians have extensively studied the trajectory of the Sino-Soviet alliance, it is relatively easy to demarcate distinctive episodes using published historical works. For this purpose, I mainly rely on Lüthi (2010), Shen and Yang (2011).

3.2 Perceptions and Intra-Alliance Interactions

3.2.1 The Communist Monolith (1949-1953)

Pre-alliance Perceptions

Well before the birth of the Sino-Soviet alliance, Moscow had acted as a patron of the Chinese revolution since its early contact with Sun Yat-Sen in the 1920s. Since 1921, the CCP had identified itself as a subordinate to the international Communist movement, represented by the Soviet Union and the Communist International (Comintern). The CPSU, therefore, was able to maintain a strong influence on the CCP for almost fifteen years through pro-Moscow leaders like Wang Ming. Such influence did not significantly decline until the rise of Mao Zedong in 1935.[7]

In short, before 1949, Moscow remained considerably uncertain about the CCP's reliability. Particularly, Stalin was suspicious of the CCP's independent orientation. According to Khrushchev, Stalin "had a fairly negative view toward Mao Zedong"; calling Mao a "cave Marxist," he "criticized Mao from a classical Marxist point of view more than once."[8] From 1937, Mao increasingly ignored Soviet instructions on military strategies in the anti-Japanese war. This led to Moscow's mixed assessment of the CCP from the early 1940s. On the one hand, shared Communist ideologies led Stalin to partially explain away the disobedience of the CCP by its lack of experiences. On the other hand, ideologies also served as resilient prior beliefs for Stalin to interpret the CCP's nationalistic orientation by the reasoning that "Mao based himself on the peasantry and not on the working class."[9] After the anti-Japanese war, this concern quickly translated into, in Khrushchev's words, Soviet leaders' lack of "confidence" in the CCP. For example, when the CCP troops ceased to take over Shanghai by force in mid-1949, Stalin reasoned that Mao "disregarded the workers of Shanghai […],

[7] Westad (1998: 5-6).
[8] Khrushchev (2007: 401).
[9] Ibid, Sheng (1997: 96), Westad (1998: 48-9).

and he didn't want to base himself on them."[10] According to the memories of a Yugoslavian leader, Stalin confessed later that, until 1948, he did not believe the CCP would win the Chinese civil war and might even provoke an unwanted conflict with the US.[11] Despite consecutive military victories of the CCP in 1949, Stalin still doubted that the CCP would completely defeat the KMT and establish a real Communist regime.[12]

Compatible to such perceptions, Moscow's policy before 1948 was to consolidate its sphere of influence in Manchuria by recognizing the Nationalist government, while pressuring the CCP to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek.[13] Before 1946, Moscow not only restricted the CCP's military activities, but also delivered few assistance. Even when Moscow began to loosen its tethering policy along with the Chinese civil war from 1947, its assistance was passive: Moscow turned a blind eye to the CCP's takeover of the Chinese Northeast, which was under Soviet occupation. This passive attitude did not change until late 1948 when Stalin increasingly recognized the CCP's military success and started to sanction small-scale assistance, such as delivering captured Japanese weapons and sending logistic experts.[14]

Well aware of Stalin's suspicions, CCP leaders were disappointed with his "unfair treatment," but remained loyal to the Soviet Union. In retrospect, Mao said that he did not have very positive feelings about Stalin before they met. Mao's negative feelings stemmed from exactly such unfair treatment, including Stalin's support for his rival Wang Ming, and the Soviet pressure on the CCP to accept peace with the KMT.[15] Yet, ideologies remained central to Mao's assessments. He continued to show great respect for Stalin's authority on Marxist-Leninist principles, and also actively sought Moscow's sanction on the CCP's adaption of

[10] Khrushchev (2007: 401).
[11] Kong (2011: 24).
[12] Shen (2014, Vol.1: 401).
[13] Westad (1998: 54-6), Shen (2013, Vol.1: 25, 42).
[14] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 63-6).
[15] Wu (1999: 12-3), Yan (2015: 201).

the Soviet theory to the Chinese revolution.[16] Marxist-Leninist ideology, as Chen Jian observes, played a decisive role in Mao's identification of friends and adversaries in the international system. As Mao clearly saw "the Chinese revolution as part of a world proletarian revolutionary movement initiated by Russian Bolsheviks," he developed a vision of irreconcilable conflict between communists and imperialists.[17] Therefore, although Mao insisted on maintaining the relatively independent position, he remained optimistic about the eventual arrival of Soviet support. This attitude was evident in Mao's consecutive assessments by the end of the 1940s. In early 1948, he told a group of senior cadres that a "new Communist society […] is developing in the Soviet Union," and "all human societies of the world are heading toward the path that the Soviet Union has taken."[18] In a Politburo meeting later this year, Mao predicted that "the international force of people's democracy led by the Soviet Union" would eventually cooperate with the CCP following the establishment of a Chinese Communist government, because Moscow represented a "force of democracy and peace in world politics."[19]

Birth of the Alliance

From early 1949, the mutual perceptions increasingly improved. In Moscow, Stalin increasingly gave credit to the CCP, acknowledging its successful revolutionary experience vis-à-vis the international Communist movement. Yet, he was now concerned about the CCP's non-Marxist elements and nationalism. On the Chinese side, the CCP leaders increasingly recognized the urgency of winning Soviet support. As a result, a series of face-to-face diplomacy between Chinese and Russian leaders, led to significant improvements in their mutual perceptions.

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[16] Westad (1998: 49).
[17] Chen (2013: 20-1).
[18] Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (1993: 56).
[19] Ibid, 132, 143.

During this process, of particular importance were two diplomatic missions conducted respectively by Anastas Mikoyan and Liu Shaoqi. First, in January 1949, Mikoyan's mission to China became a breakthrough in reversing Stalin's negative beliefs about the CCP. During his meetings with senior CCP leaders in Xibeipo, the location of the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC), Mikoyan thoroughly reviewed their positions on political, military, and economic strategies of the forthcoming government; he not only was impressed by the CCP's pro-Soviet gestures, but also developed the impression, according to Shi Zhe, Mao's interpreter, that the Chairman was "far-sighted, highly skillful at strategy, and excellent in leadership."[20] In their first meeting, Mao not only expressed his full agreement with Moscow's positions on the Chinese revolution, but also voluntarily admitted the CCP's mistakes in adopting Marxist-Leninism, showing his willingness to accept Stalin's tutelage. Identifying the CCP as "weak Marxists," Mao said that the party had made "many mistakes"; he even went so far as to claim that the CCP "have nothing" if one compares its "work with Russia's measure." While stating he would take "full responsibility for mistakes," Mao stressed that the party would be more than willing to "correct them frequently."[21]

The chairman also promised to cut off ties with the US. In the last meeting, when Mikoyan defined the Sino-Soviet treaty on Port Arthur as unequal, he was surprised that this appraisal "was so unexpected for Mao Zedong and the members of the Politburo that it caused their frank astonishment." Then, Mao and the Politburo members "almost in unison spoke to the effect that now one should not withdraw Soviet forces from Liaodong and liquidate the base at Port Arthur," as the Soviet withdrawal would only help the US. At the end, Mao continued to show gratitude to the existing Sino-Soviet Treaty, while expressing his wish to conclude a new "Sino-Soviet mutual help treaty along the lines of the Soviet-Polish

[20] Shen (1996: 97-100, 111-3), Shi (1991: 385).
[21] The Sino-Soviet treaty refers to the treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the KMT government in 1946. See "Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong" (January 30, 1949).

treaty."[22] According to Shen Zhihua, Soviet leaders paid great attention to Mikoyan's visits; Stalin and CPSU Politburo members held meetings every day to discuss telegrams from Mikoyan.[23] By the end of the mission, Stalin already began to reciprocate Mao's positive gestures by promising to withdraw Soviet influence from Xinjiang and terminating unequal treaties with China.[24] The impressions that Mao projected via Mikoyan seemed so effective that, even during the mission, Stalin proposed that the CCP would assume the leadership of the Communist revolution in East Asia — a position that reversed his pessimism.[25]

This breakthrough was significantly enhanced by Liu Shaoqi's mission to Moscow in June. Although Liu was mainly to enlist Soviet assistance, his exchanges with Soviet leaders significantly improved CCP leaders' positive feelings about Stalin. During the first meeting between Stalin and Liu, the Chinese delegation were impressed by Stalin's generous offering of assistance, which not only satisfied almost all Chinese requests, but also included unexpected favors, such as Soviet assistance to the CCP in occupying Xinjiang.[26] However, what left deep impressions on the Chinese was Stalin's self-criticism regarding his unfair treatment of the CCP. According to Shi Zhe, on 27 July, Stalin showed a highly pleasant mood while drinking with the Chinese delegation during a reception. Then, he turned emotional, and spoke with a touching passion:

> *Chinese Marxists have already become mature, it is not just flattering that, as I said, the Soviets and the Europeans must learn from you. Because of their pride, West Europeans had lagged behind after the death of Marx and Engels. The center of revolution had moved from the West to the East, and now to China and East Asia.*[27]

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[22] "Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong" (February 06, 1949); also see Shen (2014, Vol.1: 374-5, 425).
[23] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 98).
[24] Ibid, 104, Shen (2014, Vol.1: 442).
[25] Shen (2014, Vol.1: 411); according to Shi Zhe, the atmosphere of those talks became more relaxing by the end of Mikoyan's stay. Mikoyan started talking positively about some CCP leaders in private conversations, particularly developed high opinions of Ren Bishi and Zhou Enlai. See Shi (1991: 385-8), Li (2006: 97-8).
[26] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 113-4), Shen (2014, Vol.2: 71-74).
[27] Shi (1991: 411-2).

While Liu tried to show humility by depicting the CCP as a "younger brother," Stalin suddenly began to talk about his mistakes in hurting the Chinese revolution. As Shi remembered, while publicly apologizing to the Chinese, Stalin was "speaking sincerely in a deep mood of guiltiness and repentance."[28] Whether or not Stalin's apology was a staged performance probably can never be verified. Yet, his emotional displays created a substantial impact. Shi remembered that "though Stalin's gesture was unexpected to the Chinese delegation, […] he won over even more respect and affection."[29] To substantiate his words, Stalin not only appraised the CCP's achievements in front of other communist leaders, but also reassured Liu of his commitment to nearly all the CCP requests for Soviet economic, military and technological assistance.[30]

Back to Beijing, Liu reported his mission in details. All those Chinese leaders "were deeply impressed by Stalin's self-criticism," Shi observed, "and not a single one of them did not feel touched and inspired."[31] More importantly, the CCP leaders viewed the gesture as "a clear sign of Stalin's willingness now to treat his Chinese comrades as equals."[32] They immediately understood Stalin's gesture on the basis of his Marxist character. Many of them, including Mao, Liu and Zhou, frequently mentioned this event when justifying Beijing's pro-Soviet foreign policy.[33] Such perceptual changes were shortly manifested in the inter-party relationship. Following the Mikoyan mission in January, the following three months immediately witnessed a substantial increase in Soviet military assistance — a clear sign of empowerment.[34] After Liu's mission in June, the CCP saw the second wave of Soviet assistance on an unprecedentedly massive scale. From mid-August, Moscow not only agreed on bilateral trade and financial aid to China, but also dispatched groups of technicians, military per-

[28] Ibid, 414-5.
[29] Ibid, 415.
[30] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 114).
[31] Shi (1991: 426).
[32] Chen (1996: 73).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid, 109, Shen (2014, Vol.2: 447).

sonnel, and large amounts of equipment to the People's Liberation Army (PLA).[35] By late 1949, Soviet military assistance had grown rapidly to a total value of 160 million rubles. For the first time, the Soviet Air Force, as Stalin promised to Liu, intervened in the PLA's military operations against the KMT troops in Xinjiang.[36]

Following each mission, the CCP reciprocated by taking a pro-Soviet diplomatic posture, while its scope of substantive actions was limited. After Mikoyan's visit, the CCPCC soon moved to prioritize trade with the Soviet Union by cutting off trades with capitalist countries. In March, Mao readily proclaimed to senior CCP cadres an "intimate brotherhood between China and the Soviet" in the second plenum of the 7th Party Congress.[37] Following Liu's mission, the CCP stepped up its pro-Soviet posture. First, although trying to hedge between the Americans and the Soviets earlier, Mao voluntarily severed the CCP's existing channel of contact with Washington; he even provoked an incident to expel American diplomats from Shenyang, the capital of the Chinese Northeast. More importantly, Mao announced the CCP's lean-to-one-side policy through the *People's Daily* on 1 July, indicating his commitment to siding with the Soviet Union.[38] After the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China already behaved as a *de facto* Soviet ally. The CCP not only lifted up its resistance to heavy Soviet influence, but also sought a dependent position by actively requesting Soviet guidance. For example, Mao frequently consulted Stalin on almost all important strategic issues, regarding military planning and the new regime's foreign policy.[39] Beijing also began to implement its pro-Soviet posture through a nationwide campaign — the creation of the official Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (SSFA) to promote the Soviet model of socialist construction.[40]

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[35] The CCP forces were formally assigned the term of PLA from November 1948.
[36] Shen (2009: 73), Shen (2013, Vol.1: 120-1), Shen (2014, Vol.1: 108).
[37] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 106); for the concept of selectorate in autocracy, see Bueno de Mesquita (2003).
[38] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 128-32).
[39] Ibid, 201-2, Shen (2014, Vol.1: 140, 158).
[40] Chinese governmental agencies were also instructed to organize group visits to the USSR for learning the Soviet experiences in institutional building. See Priestley (1952), Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiuishi (2015b: 52).

Yet, by early 1950, despite his growing optimism, Stalin remained concerned about the CCP's nationalistic orientation, particularly whether Mao would become another Tito.[41] Yet, this concern was heavily influenced by his sense of divergent Communist ideologies. In the late 1940s, for example, ideological specialists of the CPSU Central Committee (CPSUCC) conducted a report about Mao's theory of new democracy, concluding that it deviates from Marxist-Leninism and might foster bourgeois privileges in China.[42] Similarly, in late 1949, Ivan Kovalev, the leader of Soviet experts group to China, reported certain problems of the CCP, which would contribute to its bourgeois tendencies, such as its reluctance to rely on the working class, and its dominant peasantry elements — a resilient part of Stalin's negative prior beliefs.[43]

Accordingly, the Soviet alliance strategy at the time was characterized by simultaneous empowerment and control. While upgrading Soviet assistance to China, Stalin deliberately retained a degree of control over China's autonomy. This attempt was reflected in the alliance negotiations when Mao arrived in Moscow in December 1949. In the first meeting between Mao and Stalin, although the Soviet ritualistic gestures "showed full trust and respect toward the Chinese comrades," as Shi Zhe recalled, their conversations reached little progress, because Stalin was reluctant to touch upon treaty renewal.[44] His inaction lasted for two weeks until Mao staged an angry protest to Ivan Kovalev: "You asked me to come to Moscow, but did nothing," Mao vented his anger, "So what I'm doing here? Eating, shitting, and sleeping every day? Is that the reason I came?" Yet, after Kovalev's departure, Mao immediately returned to a pleasant mood, telling his aides that he was deliberately showing his discontent to Stalin.[45]

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[41] Christensen (2011: 56-7), Shen (2014, Vol.2: 351-2).
[42] Goncharov, Lewis and Xue (1993: 37).
[43] However, Stalin turned over Kovalev's report to Mao during his stay in Moscow, and recalled Kovalev from China. Although both Mao and Khrushchev believed that this was Stalin's tactic to win over Mao's favor, Stalin's gesture can also be understood as a sign of his improved perception of Mao and the CCP. See Bernstein and Li (2010: 177), Shen (2014, Vol.2: 180).
[44] Shi (1991: 435-7).
[45] Ibid, 437-8.

Mao's emotional displays seemed to work effectively, as Stalin shortly conceded. On 2 January 1950, he sent Molotov and Mikoyan to Mao, discussing the conclusion of a new alliance treaty. From mid-January, the negotiations started when Zhou Enlai arrived as the primary negotiator. However, Chinese leaders soon found that Moscow did not treat Beijing equally, as Stalin insisted on retaining Soviet privileges in China by imposing certain unequal conditions. This mainly included the continuous Soviet control of Port Arthur and the Chinese Changchun railway, and the establishment of three Sino-Soviet joint ventures to explore China's natural resources.[46] On the positive side, the treaty committed the Soviet Union to not only defending China against the potential threat from America, but also assisting in fifty projects which paved the foundation of China's industrialization.

Despite the unequal conditions, beliefs about convergence in Communist ideologies dominated Chinese leaders' assessments.[47] In spring 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai reported to the State Council that the chairman's mission to Moscow had resolved most of the problems in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Hence, the two countries should now converge in their interests on the basis of internationalism and patriotism.[48] More importantly, instead of inferring malicious intentions, Mao attributed Stalin's unfavorable behavior to his "lack of confidence" in the CCP — a transient cause that he could overcome with himself. On 27 December, the chairman told Wang Dongxing, his chief bodyguard, that "the Soviet Union's retention of Lüshun, Dalian, and the Chinese Changchun railway, in fact, showed its doubt about the competence of the Chinese Communist Party."[49] Yet, he stated that "after a few conversations, Stalin appreciated a lot the chairman's abilities and courage, deepening his understanding of the CCP." Thus, Mao tried earnestly to prove to Stalin that the CCP was "capable of

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[46] Stalin did not respond to Mao's request for renewing the treaty for two weeks, until mid January. Then, during the initial stages of the negotiation, the Soviet side tried to maintain its economic and legal rights in Xinjiang. See Shen (2013: 162); the three joint corporations were on aviation, metal and oil. Although the Chinese side was more active in establishing the corporations because of their economic benefits, Mao perceived the corporations as unequal conditions. See Shen (2000: 68), Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (2008b: 56), Shen (2013: 91).

[47] Zhang (2004b: 70-1).

[48] Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (2008b: 283).

[49] Wang (1993: 167, 202), Wu (1999: 13-4).

liberating the whole China, and of governing the unified country."[50] Similarly, according to Liu Xiao, the future Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, even by 1955 Zhou still held the belief that Stalin's reservation stemmed from his worry that China might provoke "the Third World War" with the US. Zhou reasoned that "the Soviet Union certainly felt happy about the victory of the Chinese Communist Party when it began to border new China."[51] Both of their inferences fell typically into external attribution. Instead of looking for the causes of unfavorable Soviet behavior in Stalin's negative dispositions, Mao and Zhou emphasized the CCP's own shortcomings.

Particularly, despite the tension during the alliance negotiations, Mao appeared to hold generally positive beliefs about the Soviet Union. In a journey to Leningrad in early 1950, Wang Dongxing recalled, the chairman highly appraised the Soviet Union in a conversation with his bodyguards. After briefly recalling the history of the anti-Facist war, Mao went on to explaining the Soviet victory on the basis of a largely prototypical image of the Soviet superiority:

> *The people from different nations in the Soviet Union had generated endless power under the leadership of the CPSU. The source of such power lies in the people, and in the Soviet Red Army. And the CPSU, founded by Comrade Lenin, has also enjoyed magnificently high reputation and authority among the people.*[52]

Yet, Mao's personal feelings about Stalin were complicated. On the one hand, according to his bodyguards Wang and Li Yinqiao, the communication between Mao and Stalin generally resulted in positive atmospheres, despite his disappointment with Stalin's arrogance toward China.[53] Such accounts are also confirmed by Shi Zhe's observation, where he often noticed positive atmospheres of the leaders' conversations and benign Soviet gestures con-

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[50] Wang (1993: 167-8).
[51] Liu (1995: 2-5).
[52] Wang (1993: 183-4).
[53] Ibid, 157-8, 166, 171, Li (2006: 222).

veying "full trust and respect to the Chinese comrades," such as Stalin's special reception of Mao and his cautious attitude toward the Chinese.[54] On the other hand, Shi noticed nuanced signs of Mao's discontent vis-à-vis his memories of Stalin's unfair treatment. It was such oppressed feelings, Shi inferred, that often led Mao to avoid revealing his real intentions during his first meeting with Stalin.[55] Therefore, it is reasonable to say that, by the time of the alliance formation, Mao's perception of the Soviet Union was likely between *probably reliable* and *highly reliable*. Whereas shared Communist ideologies provided him with resilient positive beliefs on which the assessment was based, face-to-face diplomacy further strengthened it. Simultaneously, Mao's personal feelings about Stalin also improved, although his negativity remained, but was largely suppressed.

The Korean War

From mid-1950, the Korean War became a turning point in the Sino-Soviet alliance relationship. Prior to the Chinese entry into the War, Beijing and Moscow experienced a short phase of increasing uncertainty. Although cooperating closely with each other since the outbreak of the War, Stalin and Mao became increasingly risk-averse before China's intervention. Thus, both sides withheld further concession of autonomy in military cooperation.

On the Chinese side, the alliance negotiations led Mao to take a more confrontational approach to bargaining with Stalin. More than once, he mentioned to close aides that not budging was the right strategy when confronting Stalin's arrogance. This style of communication resulted in growing frictions between the two leaders over Sino-Soviet cooperation.[56] On the other hand, progress in the alliance relationship was also seen in the interactions between Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang regarding North Korea's war plan from early 1950.[57] In May, the three parties already began to discuss a potential Chinese involvement.

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[54] Shi (1991: 434, 436).
[55] Ibid, 435-7.
[56] For example, Mao tried to bargain when Stalin proposed a plan for China to produce rubber for the USSR. This angered Stalin. See Wu (1999: 14, 65), Khrushchev (2007: 401-3).
[57] Goncharov, Lewis and Xue (1993: 136), Wada (2014: 48).

Yet, Stalin's worries about China's expanding influence in Korea led him to oppose an early Chinese intervention.[58] After the Incheon landing, Stalin, according to Khrushchev, became increasingly convinced that the North Koreans would suffer an all-out defeat. However, feeling unready to fight a war with the US, Stalin now preferred an immediate Chinese intervention, particularly when the KPA (Korean People's Army) was pushed beyond the 38th parallel.[59] By this time, the alliance cooperation would shortly meet a test, when both sides became uncertain about each other's commitment to saving North Korea.

In fact, China's war preparation began as early as in July. When Beijing decided to amass a large number of PLA troops on the borders, it requested military assistance, particular Soviet air cover.[60] Yet, from the beginning, Stalin was clear that Beijing had to take substantive actions, namely, deploying "nine Chinese divisions on the border with Korea," in exchange of the Soviet air support.[61] In subsequent conversations, Chinese leaders repeatedly ensured that "the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to defeat the American troops," which were regarded as "weaker than the Japanese."[62] However, by early October, Mao started expressing his doubt about the PLA's chance of success, given its poor equipment. He even sent a telegram to Stalin on 3 October, stating that "it is most likely that [the Chinese operations] will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war."[63] Noticing that this message contradicted China's original position, Roshchin, the Soviet ambassador, expressed his uncertainty about Chinese intentions, while explaining this inconsistency with both "the worsening of the position in Korea" and "the intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc through

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[58] Shen (1998: 220-1), Shen (2013, Vol.1: 238-41).
[59] Khrushchev (2006: 94-5l) ; on Oct 1st, Stalin send a message to Mao and Zhou via the Soviet Embassy, proposing the start of the Chinese intervention. See "Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (via Roshchin)" (1 October, 1950).
[60] "Incoming Cable No. 19413, Roschin to the Central Committee" (2 July, 1950).
[61] "Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)" (13 July, 1950).
[62] "Ciphered Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov (Stalin)" (3 October, 1950).
[63] Ibid.

[Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru, who has urged the Chinese toward patience and abstention [from intervention] in order to avoid catastrophe."[64]

Now, concerning about Beijing's resolve, Stalin tried to reassure Mao that "the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war," while he also withheld orders to dispatch prepared military assistance, including four fighter air divisions.[65] According to his telegrams to Mao and Kim Ii Sung, Stalin clearly worried that China would "adopt a passive wait-and-see policy," and try to avoid "serious struggle and an imposing display of force."[66] Mao quickly reacted to Stalin's reassurance by showing his full support for the dispatch of Chinese troops. Yet, he insisted that the military operations would be postponed until Soviet military assistance, particularly air support, was provided.[67] In a telegram on 13 October, Roshchin reported that Mao expressed his anxieties regarding "questions about the Soviet assistance to us" and "questions about air cover" as part of the reasons for "past hesitations "among Chinese leaders.[68] This concern was also shown in Zhou Enlai's telegram to Stalin on 14 October, in which he earnestly asked about the details of Soviet air cover.[69]

Ultimately, in mid-October, Mao decided that the PLA would soon start military operations while re-affirming his commitment to Stalin. This message seemed to carry some credibility, as Moscow immediately informed Kim of the Chinese decision. Stalin expressed his contentment that "the Chinese comrades at last made a final decision to render assistance to Korea with troops," though "after vacillations and a series of temporary decisions." Given "the final and favorable decision for Korea," he ordered Kim to cancel his earlier plan to retreat to Soviet territories.[70] Yet, Stalin did not stop hedging until the PLA engaged the UN

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[64] Ibid.
[65] "Letter, Cde. Filippov [Stalin] for Mao Zedong" (5 October, 1950); for a list of prepared Soviet military assistance, see "Soviet Council of Ministers Resolution on Sending Soviet Troops to China" (October, 1950); also see Shen (2011, Vol.1: 247).
[66] "Letter from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtytkov)" (8 October, 1950).
[67] Shen (2014, Vol.3: 92-3); for Mao's positive reply, see "Ciphered Telegram No. 25348, Roshchin to Filippov [Stalin]" (7 October, 1950).
[68] "Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin)" (13 October, 1950); also see Shi (1991: 495-501).
[69] "Letter from Zhou Enlai to Stalin" (14 October, 1950).
[70] "Ciphered Telegram, Feng Xi (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov)" (14 October, 1950).

forces in late October. By 18 October, Mao had again postponed his decision twice in responses to vague Soviet answers about the air cover. Simultaneously, Stalin ordered the Soviet Air Force to amass fighter planes to be sent to China, while holding back on battle instructions.[71] On the same day, well aware of Stalin's suspicion of him, Mao finally made a decisive move by ordering two PLA armies to enter Korea, despite the delayed Soviet assistance. On 25 October, the PLA launched its first campaign.[72]

As a clear-cut signal, the unilateral Chinese intervention finally eliminated Stalin's doubt, becoming a turning point in his perception of China's reliability. To fulfill his promises, Stalin reacted quickly to the Chinese intervention, ordering the Soviet Air Force to begin their missions on 29 October.[73] Moscow also steadily stepped up assistance to China. By 1953, the USSR had invested massively in creating the PLA Navy and Air Force, and updating the PLA Army's equipment.[74] The Soviet Air Force participated in over 1,800 sorties in the border area. Throughout the war, Stalin showed his overwhelming support for Beijing in terms of military coordination between the PLA and the KPA.[75] In terms of economic aid, the USSR not only transferred large numbers of science and technology documents to China (see *Table 3.3*), but also completed about 70 per cent of the aid projects by early 1953; an-

Table 3.3: Soviet Transfer of Technology to China, 1950-1953

Year	Science & Technology Documents/Books	Sets of Technological Design Documents
1950	9955	60
1951	31653	676
1952	37098	1014
1953	42136	1198

Note: Data from Shen (2000: 78).

[71] Shen (2014, Vol.3: 100).
[72] Shen (2011, Vol.1: 251-2); Mao seemed well aware of Stalin's suspicion, and the significant impact of the Chinese intervention on Stalin's "trust" of the CCP. In a meeting with a group of senior CCP leaders in 1956, Mao said that "when the Korean War started, and our troops crossed the border river and started fighting, he [Stalin] was relaxed, and convinced that we are not half-Titoists, but internationalists, and true Communists." See Wu (1999: 18), Yang (1999: 319), Chen (2013: 208).
[73] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 249-53).
[74] Ibid, 261, 276.
[75] Ibid, 274.

other ninety projects were added to the list after the death of Stalin. In addition, Moscow returned the Changchun railway in 1952, indicating its relaxation of control.[76]

While the Chinese intervention significantly improved Moscow's positive perceptions, it did not completely eliminate Stalin's uncertainty about Mao. Evidence shows that even by early 1953, Stalin still asked Ambassador Yudin if he thought Mao was a true Marxist.[77] Yet, evidence also shows that Stalin's impressions of the CCP improved remarkably. For example, while meeting with an Indian delegation in 1951, Stalin openly promoted the CCP's revolutionary path as a successful model for Asian countries.[78] Particularly, according to Shi, Stalin developed favorable impressions of Peng Dehuai, the PLA Chief Commander in Korea. During the general's mission to Moscow in 1952, Stalin had paid special attention to Peng and showed affection for his personality. In the aftermath of a night reception, Stalin invited Peng alone for a private conversation; their face-to-face interactions ended up with a pleasant atmosphere and quite some laughter.[79] During this period, Stalin also developed a close relationship with Liu Shaoqi, who led the Chinese delegation to attend the CPSU 19th Congress. As Shi recalled, Stalin highly valued Liu's mission, partly because he considered Liu "an old friend." During their conversations, Stalin not only talked frankly about "the inner politics of the CPSU," but also did not avoid touching upon "his personal situations, feelings and other details in his daily work."[80] In addition, Khrushchev remembered that, during this period, Zhou Enlai "came to our countries fairly often, and we discussed all questions with him." As a result:

> *Very good relations were established between Zhou and us. We treat him with great respect. He proved to be an efficient, businesslike person, and it was easy to talk with*

[76] Data in Table 3.3, from Shen (2000: 78); see Shi (1991: 522), Shen and Yang (2011: 163).
[77] Shen (1998: 285).
[78] Shen (2014, Vol,3: 231).
[79] Shi (1991: 510-2).
[80] Ibid, 529-31.

him and easy to find mutually advantageous solutions. We thought that in general good, businesslike relations had been established between China and ourselves.[81]

Even between Mao and Stalin, there emerged an increasingly constructive style of communication. As the Korean War advanced, both leaders often found each other in full agreement on a range of strategic issues, such as the pace of military advances. Such perceptual changes can also be verified by the tone of Soviet intelligence reports concerning pro-Soviet attitudes in China. A telegram from the Soviet Embassy in early 1951 reported that the Chinese press extensively used propaganda materials provided by the Soviet News Agency, and thus there was much potential to establish "closer ties between us [the Embassy] and Chinese publishers and magazine editors."[82] Another report by the Soviet Chief of Staff highly appraised the combat abilities of the PLA; also, it confirmed that, despite the existence of caution, "the Chinese comrades well respected the Soviet military advisers, and seriously listened to all the options and considerations from the advisers."[83]

China also showed growing alliance commitment, as Mao and Zhou concluded that Stalin finally treated the CCP as true Marxists. Beijing not only reciprocated with firm support to Soviet international strategy, but also dramatically increased China's dependence. First, Mao actively sought Stalin's opinion or census on virtually all important issues of military planning in Korea.[84] In 1952, in response to the US-Japan Security Treaty, Beijing requested a prolonged Soviet control of Lüshun as a deterrent to American aggression. This decision reversed Mao's previous position, reflecting China's increasing willingness to rely on the Soviet Union.[85] By mid-1952, when the fighting parties in Korea almost reached a ceasefire agreement, Beijing demonstrated its commitment to fighting while disagreeing on the US proposal to turn over its prisoners of war.[86] By early 1953, even Mao appeared to genuinely

[81] Khrushchev (2007: 418-9).
[82] Shen (2014, Vol.3: 265).
[83] Ibid, 316-9.
[84] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 264, 270-4), Wada (2014: 266).
[85] Shi (1991: 522).
[86] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 273), Shen (2014, Vol.4: 290).

feel remorse for the death of Stalin. In March, as a Russian interpreter recalled, Mao and all members of the CCP Politburo visited the Soviet Embassy to mourn for Stalin. Zhou arrived earlier, and "he soon cried aloud together with Vasili Kuznetsov," the Chairman of the Soviet Central Council of Trade Unions.[87] When Mao arrived, "he tried hard to restrain his emotions. But he failed and was seriously touched by what was happening in front of him, and he could not hide the tears in his eyes."[88]

More importantly, Beijing's positive beliefs were indicated by its willingness to accept a high level of dependence. From 1952, Beijing almost exclusively relied on Moscow's advice in drafting blueprints for China's First Five-Year Plan. The range of Soviet assistance covered almost every strategic domain of Chinese economy. In producing the plan, Li Fuchun, the Chinese Minister of Industry, led a large delegation to Moscow for over eight months.[89] Simultaneously, the CCP firmly promoted adoption of Soviet modernization experience through nationwide campaigns in promoting favorable Soviet images.[90] From 1951, Beijing even assigned pro-Soviet propaganda as a political mission to governmental agencies. Party cadres were organized to study Soviet institutions, CPSU organizations and Stalin's theoretical works; military and civilian officials were instructed to comply with the advice of Soviet specialists. For example, the PLA launched a campaign to adopt Soviet military education in that year. General Li Zuocheng recalled his surprise at hearing Peng Dehuai's instruction at a senior officers' training session: "Whoever does not learn patiently from the Soviet Union will be kicked out (of the army)!"[91] By 1953, the movement reached such a magnitude that the members of the SSFA had reached nearly seventy million, about one sixth of the Chinese population.[92]

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[87] Shi (2013: 322).
[88] Ibid.
[89] Moscow sent its final advice on the 1st five-year plan in May 1953, and it was quickly approved by Beijing. See Zhang (2004).
[90] Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (2005b: 203), Shen (2013, Vol.1: 314-21).
[91] Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (2005a: 266), Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiuishi (2015a: 238, 290), Li (2011: 464).
[92] Zhang (2008).

Overall, the Sino-Soviet relationship from 1949 to 1953 lends better support to the ARM, despite that the RCM may partially explain the intra-alliance interactions in the early Korean War. First and foremost, during the alliance formation stage, affective signals, particularly personal impressions and diplomatic gestures, played a dominant role in shaping mutual perceptions through face-to-face diplomacy. Particularly, leaders' feelings of surprise seemed to effectively challenge their negative prior beliefs, as exemplified respectively by the missions of Mikoyan and Liu. By voluntarily admitting their mistakes, Mao and Stalin successfully induced each other's positive emotions. Particularly, Stalin's self-criticism seemed to exert a profound impact on the CCP leaders. Only after each mission, one sees a corresponding update of Soviet commitment. Had those leaders only valued actions incurring substantial cost, the sequence of the intra-alliance behavior would have been different: Given Stalin's lasting suspicion of Mao, Moscow would have not abandoned its passive policy from early 1949, until the Chinese had taken "costly" actions. Similarly, in mid-1949, the CCP should also have not committed China to the lean-to-one-side policy, following Liu's mission to Moscow. Instead, the CCP should have kept hedging between Washington and Moscow before receiving substantial guarantee for concluding an alliance with the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the intra-alliance interactions in the initial months of the Korean War seemed to lend support to the RCM. Even before the Chinese intervention, Moscow clearly conditioned military assistance on Beijing's substantive actions, such as large-scale concentration of troops. In other words, Stalin explicitly asked for costly signals from Beijing. Following the Incheon landing, his uncertainty led him to deliberately wait for Mao to take actions which bet China's fate on fighting on the Soviet side — a signal which is costly enough to demonstrate the convergence of interests. On the other hand, for a short period, Mao also hesitated to begin the Korean campaign, given his uncertainty about Soviet air cover. Ultimately, the Chinese intervention became a dramatic turning point in Stalin's perceptions of

China's reliability, and also Moscow's upgrade of its empowering policy. Therefore, it seems that costly signaling provides a compelling alternative explanation.

Nevertheless, this by no means refutes the ARM. First, with no hard evidence pointing to Stalin's perspective-taking, he might just look at the Chinese intervention as a substantive signal which directly benefited Soviet security. This factor, as Khrushchev suggested, was a real concern of Stalin at the time when the KPA was pushed north.[93] In addition, the Chinese decision to intervene, without any reassurance incurring sunk-cost from the Soviets, poses exactly counter-evidence to the RCM: Despite Mao's uncertainty, the absence of costly Soviet guarantee did not prevent him from relying on Stalin's words alone. More importantly, apart from their initial interactions, one can find abundant evidence that affective signals also figured prominently in sustaining positive cycles of perceptual changes via leaders' face-to-face diplomacy throughout the Korean War. Last but not least, convergence or divergence in Communist identities provided both sides with the most widely-invoked dispositional beliefs on which leaders based their causal attributions of each other's behavior. Therefore, in general, the ARM does make a more thorough and balanced explanation.

3.2.2 The Peak of Fraternity (1954-1957)

Throughout the Korean War, China almost unconditionally followed the Soviet leadership on international strategy. By July 1953, Beijing was even readily accepting an armistice on less favorable terms. This pattern of Sino-Soviet cooperation persisted in the Khrushchev period, which would see the peak of the alliance relationship. Yet, on the Chinese side, unfamiliarity with Khrushchev complicated Beijing's initial beliefs. On the one hand, general beliefs about Soviet reliability remained strong among Chinese leaders. Premier Zhou, for example, expressed in a State Council meeting his belief that Moscow would definitely help China develop its own nuclear weapons.[94] On the other hand, Chinese leaders were relatively ignorant

[93] Khrushchev (2006: 95).
[94] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 529).

about Khrushchev in early 1954. According to the memoirs of Ambassador Liu Xiao, Mao instructed him to establish contacts with the new Soviet leadership, particularly Khrushchev, because the chairman had little knowledge of him.[95]

Compared to Stalin, Khrushchev showed much more sensitivity to Chinese concerns. Although he also inherited from Stalin somewhat negative beliefs about China, Khrushchev was particularly conscious of Stalin's arrogance in dealing with China.[96] For instance, while recalling Moscow's proposal to establish the joint Sino-Soviet companies, Khrushchev considered this "an insult to the Chinese," as the Soviets were reminding them of the memories that "earlier the French, British, and the Americans had sat on Chinese territories [and exploited it]." The result of this "was that seeds of distrust were sown."[97] Khrushchev seemed to genuinely appreciate the revolutionary achievements of Mao and the CCP, and sympathized with their unfair treatment by Stalin. Thus, he was well aware that winning the heart of the CCP by correcting Stalin's errors was crucial to Soviet interests in Asia. From the beginning of his tenure, Khrushchev prioritized improving the alliance relationship.[98]

Compatible with such beliefs, Moscow began to employ a mixture of benign Soviet gestures and substantive actions to win Beijing's favor. In late 1953, despite his unconsolidated authority, Khrushchev began to pressure Soviet governmental agencies to speed up aid projects to China. On 1 October 1954, Khrushchev led a large Soviet delegation to attend the anniversary of China's national day, immediately after he was elected as the first secretary of the CPSUCC.[99] This summit diplomacy generally unfolded in a friendly atmosphere. As Khrushchev recalled, "they gave us a hearty welcome. We ourselves were very glad to be on Chinese soil, to meet and talk with the leaders of its people."[100] However, Khrushchev's mission was designated not only as a gesture to signify Soviet respect of China, but also as a

[95] Liu (1995: 2).
[96] Khrushchev (2007: 387-8).
[97] Ibid, 401-2.
[98] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 293-8).
[99] Shi (1991: 568-9).
[100] Khrushchev (2007: 420).

chance to win over China's heart with substantive actions. During his meetings with Mao, Khrushchev not only offered to extend the scope of the existing Soviet assistance, including 150 industrial projects and new military loans, but also agreed to return the joint ventures and Lüshun to China.[101] It is worth noticing that the return of Lüshun alone means that Moscow would give up one of its most valued military ports in the Far East, and would withdraw over 300,000 Soviet troops stationed there.

On the Chinese side, the summit diplomacy left mixed, yet, relatively positive impressions at best. On the one hand, the massive Soviet empowering actions did impress the Chinese, but not too much. For instance, the return of Lüshun, as Khrushchev recalled, initially stirred Mao's concern that the Soviet withdrawal would attract a new round of American aggression.[102] Also, the CCPCC officially praised the Soviet action as "symbolizing the latest development of the great brotherhood between China and the Soviet Union."[103] Nevertheless, other evidence reveals that whereas Mao did express gratitude to Khrushchev's generous offers, he lightly described the Soviet actions, in retrospect, as "a few things Khrushchev gave us." Although Mao partially attributed such signals to Khrushchev's pragmatic and flexible personality, the chairman reasoned that such favor was owing to Khrushchev's need for "our support in order to consolidating his power, hence, he needed to improve the Sino-Soviet relationship a bit."[104] On the other hand, what Khrushchev left more to his Chinese hosts seemed to be the unpleasant side of his personality. The Chinese witnesses, particularly Mao's interpreters, have described similar unfavorable images of the Soviet leader: a man of low education, rudeness, and emotional impulses.[105] According to Shi Zhe, Khrushchev appeared to be "chaotic in his mind, illogical, and mainly rely on wishful thinking, but without correct understanding of policies and strategies." Shi even said that he felt so awkward about

[101] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 296-300).
[102] Ibid, 306-7, Khrushchev (2007: 420).
[103] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 308).
[104] Wu (1999: 6).
[105] Shi (1991: 569), Li (2001: 100), Yan (2015).

Khrushchev's irresponsible way of speaking that he considered the Soviet leader "complacent and arrogant."[106]

On the Soviet side, Khrushchev reported generally positive impressions of most senior CCP leaders, particularly Liu and Zhou. "Liu Shaoqi as a person impressed me the most," he wrote, "when we conversed, I felt that we thought in the same way, that we understood each other right away, without everything having to be spelled out, even though we were speaking through an interpreter."[107] Zhou was ranked "second after Liu Shaoqi"; and Khrushchev recalled he as "a pleasant conversationalist and a man who understood economic problems and knew his way around on political questions," and "a flexible and quite modern person with whom it was possible to talk about many things and come to a full mutual understanding."[108] Nevertheless, Khrushchev clearly showed his worries about Mao's nationalism and his sense of Sino-centrism.[109] In retrospect, he recalled that Mao talked a lot about "the superior qualities of the Chinese nation." "The Chinese nation," Mao claimed, "had proven to be a studier force and it had assimilated conquerors who had come to China." This immediately struck Khrushchev as "a haughty attitude toward other nations." Mao's personality also worried Khrushchev, as he felt the chairman "considered no one else his equal."[110] While such personal impressions soon became Khrushchev's source of uncertainty about potential difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations, he believed the problem was manageable. Clearly distinguishing Mao from other CCP leaders, Khrushchev expressed his generally positive beliefs about China, and he was also optimistic that Soviet reassurance would prevent Mao's personal influence from dominating the CCP.[111]

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[106] Shi (1991: 569-70).
[107] Khrushchev (2007: 487).
[108] Khrushchev (2006: 96), Khrushchev (2007: 487-8).
[109] Khrushchev (2007: 399-405, 424, 429).
[110] Ibid, 423.
[111] This stated fear of Chinese threat is partially confirmed by third party witnesses. In Adenauer's memoirs, he recalled that Khrushchev spoke about threat from Red China in Berlin in 1955. Later, Adenauer mentioned this conversation to Herbert Hoover in 1956, see Adenauer and Gaulle (1973: 66), Khrushchev (2007: 424), Brady (2009: 153).

In the aftermath of the Khrushchev-Mao summit, Moscow substantiated Khrushchev's reassurance by increasingly expanding the scope of Soviet empowerment. A primary indicator is the increasing number of industrial aid projects to China during this period. From 1953 to late 1956, the figure rose remarkably from about 150 to 241. By 1959, the number of Soviet-assisted industrial projects had reached 366 (see *Figure 3.2* in *Section 3.2.3)*. At the same time, the number of transferred Soviet science and technological documents continued to rise at a stunning pace. Between 1954 and 1957, the number of transferred sets of technological design documents alone rose to about 80,000, almost eighty times of the quantity in 1953.[112]

In return, China reciprocated with firm diplomatic support for Soviet international strategy. During the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Chinese delegation led by Zhou Enlai closely cooperated with Molotov in projecting a unified stance against the US. As Shi recalled, while closely supplementing the Soviet leadership, Zhou tried diligently to make sure that exchanges of opinions, intelligence sharing, public expressions, and even symbolic gestures between the Chinese and Soviet delegations were highly unified. As a result, Molotov and Zhou projected "an excellent example for friendship and brotherhood" on the international stage.[113] In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalled that "in that period we had the very best relations with Vietnam and the same kind of relations with the Chinese Communist Party. […] We jointly worked out our position for the Geneva Conference and looked into the situation existing in Vietnam."[114] In 1955, Peng Dehuai led another Chinese delegation to attend the Warsaw Pact conference, during which Peng showed full agreement to Khrushchev's proposal of the Sino-Soviet cooperation on conventional disarmament. The two leaders even discussed potential ways of military integration between China and the War Pact countries. In expressing his gratitude, as Ambassador Liu recalled, Khrushchev stated that "the partici-

[112] Shen (2013, Vol.1: 331, 334).
[113] Shi (1991: 540, 548-50), Shen and Yang (2011: 223).
[114] Khrushchev (2007: 500).

pation of General Peng himself particularly demonstrated China's firmest support to the Warsaw Pact," hence, this makes a strong deferent to American aggression from Taiwan or Korea.[115]

More importantly, in reaction to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization during the 20th CPUS Congress, the Polish and Hungarian Crises in 1956 led Beijing and Moscow to significantly strengthen their cooperation via face-to-face diplomacy. First, despite confusion and protests in the Communist bloc, Beijing decided to put aside its discontent over Khrushchev's unexpected shock attack, firmly supporting Moscow's ideological orthodoxy.[116] Second, Beijing actively stepped up its diplomatic efforts to mediate between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, particularly Poland, on which China enjoyed considerable influence. Given Beijing's opposition to the Soviet military intervention in Poland, senior CCP leaders, such as Liu, Zhou, and Deng, travelled extensively in East Europe in order to coordinate joint efforts with Moscow for settling the crises. By late October, when Khrushchev went on for military intervention in Hungary, Beijing showed its full support for Moscow's action on the basis of Hungary's perceived deviation from Communist ideologies.[117] In turn, China's gestures and diplomatic efforts significantly improved Khrushchev's positive beliefs. In his discussions with Liu, for example, Khrushchev described that they worked "like a joint Chinese-Soviet Commission," who "had a feeling of absolute confidence in one another — of each delegation toward another, and of each party toward another."[118] In addition, "despite all our waverings, hesitations, and arguments," Khrushchev recalled, "the attitude of the delegations toward each other was very good, based on full confidence and sincerity." At the end, the Soviet leader recalled that he was "very pleased by their (the Chinese) visit and had not observed any disagreements between our two parties."[119]

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[115] Liu (1986: 9-10).
[116] Wu (1999: 5, 19), Shen (2013, Vol.2: 444).
[117] Lüthi (2010: 54-61), Shen (2013, Vol.2: 444-67).
[118] Khrushchev (2007: 430).
[119] Ibid, 430-1.

The improved perceptions were validated by Khrushchev's actions to further step up the Soviet empowerment policy. First, by closely coordinating with Beijing on organizing the World Communist Movement Conference in 1957, Moscow showed growing willingness to accommodate China's rising influence in the Communist bloc. Khrushchev allowed the CCP to play an increasingly active role in shaping the conference's guiding ideological principles. For instance, even the idea of launching the World Communist Conference and its communique was originally an initiative from the CCP.[120] More importantly, Khrushchev's relatively high certainty about China's reliability was prominently shown in his consent to assisting in China's nuclear weapons program in 1957. In fact, Mao made a request for such Soviet assistance as early as the Stalin era. Despite Beijing's repeated requests from then on, Moscow consistently responded with inaction while cautiously limiting its assistance to China's peaceful employment of nuclear technology.[121] Given the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons, the Soviet decisions had been compatible to the Soviets' considerable uncertainty about China's reliability since the Stalin years. In his visit in 1954, Khrushchev's concern about Mao's nationalism was also compatible with his decision to turn down a similar request by the chairman.[122] In this sense, the simple fact that Moscow now accepted China's potential membership in the nuclear club was a significant indicator that Beijing was likely deemed *highly reliable*. A particularly telling fact is that Khrushchev made such a decision shortly after the Hungary crisis; he even agreed to deliver to China a model atomic bomb by 1959.[123]

Nevertheless, even a substantive Soviet signal like such seemed not to elicit too much gratitude from Mao. With almost wishful confidence toward China's nuclear program, Mao seemed to consider the Soviet assistance secondary. In a Politburo meeting, for instance, Mao claimed that "once this issue (nuclear weaponization) is on the agenda, and we take

[120] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 478, 497, 547-51), Shen (2014, Vol.7: 329, 335).
[121] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 527, 530-2), Shen (2014, Vol.7: 338).
[122] Shi (1991: 572-3).
[123] Shen (2004: 496), Lüthi (2010: 74), Shen (2013, Vol.2: 580).

some serious efforts, it must be a success […] now, the Soviet Union was helping us, and we must get it done." Yet, he emphasized that "even if we do it on our own, we can surely make it! With our manpower and resources, we can create whatever miracles."[124]

By contrast, certain affective signals began to underlie Beijing's growing concerns about Soviet reliability from 1956, although their influence had not yet come to the surface. First and foremost, Khrushchev's secret report to the 20th CPSU Congress left an enduring, negative impact on Chinese leaders. About one month after Khrushchev's shock attack, Mao held consecutive Central Committee meetings where all Politburo members gathered to discuss Khrushchev's intentions. Noteworthy is that even then the CCP had not yet received the official report from Moscow, while their meetings relied on a copy previously leaked to the *New York Times.*[125] Expressing his feelings of shock and discontent, Mao slightly touched upon the benefit of revealing Stalin's wrongdoings, whereas he stressed that Khrushchev's style of communication was just like restoring the great power chauvinism of Stalin. In turn, the first meetings quickly turned to a group criticism of the resilient chauvinism in Soviet foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping supplemented evidence about inadequate Soviet behavior toward the Chinese delegation to the 20th CPSU Congress. Citing his experience with Molotov at the Geneva Conference, Zhou also complained about the rigidity in Soviet foreign policy-thinking, which was then attributed to a Stalin-style extremism.[126] Moreover, Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, two former ambassadors to Moscow, contributed to the discussion by recalling examples of Soviet arrogance toward Asian and African countries.[127] Zhang even carried his criticism to a level of prototypical image of Russian imperialism. "Since the time of Peter the Great," he argued, "great-power chauvinism had been deep-seated in the Russian mind-

[124] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 529).
[125] According to Wu Lenxi, the later vice director of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the participants include Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Peng Zhen, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhang Wentian. See Wu (1999: 2-4).
[126] Ibid, 6, 10.
[127] Ibid, 9-11.

set." Therefore, Wang reasoned, "probably the great-power chauvinism within the CPSU is hard to correct."[128]

Furthermore, given China's supportive stance, the East European Crises, in effect, reinforced such a prototypical image of rising Russian chauvinism among the CCP leaders. As the Politburo discussions went on from late March in 1956, Mao's unpleasant memories of Stalin increasingly came to his mind.[129] Particularly, his negative feelings seemed to intensify as the Polish and Hungarian Crises unfolded. From September to November, according to multiple witnesses, Mao at least repeated his Stalin-bashing on six different occasions.[130] In October, Khrushchev's attempt to use force against Poland immediately prompted Mao's discontent. As Wu Lengxi recalled, Mao told him that "it is too awkward to deal with a Socialist country like Poland with military forces. […] And it looks like that the Soviets treated Poland like their son." "The Soviet-Polish relationship went so bad," Mao continued to reason, "I think this is caused by the Soviets' great-power chauvinism. Khrushchev's treatment of Poland looks even worse than Stalin's incorrect policy toward Yugoslavia."[131] In addition, when Liu and Deng returned from their missions to East Europe, their vivid memories about Polish leaders' grievance against Soviet behavior immediately supplemented the Politburo discussions with fresh worrying signs for rising Russian chauvinism.[132] At the end, Mao concluded that the benefit of the CPSU 20th Congress was that "it has liberated our thought, so people no longer believe that the Soviet Union holds the absolute truth in everything it does […] Therefore, we also have to rely on our own thinking, in order to solve the problems in the revolution and construction of our nation."[133]

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[128] Ibid, 7.
[129] Zhou also had disagreement with Khrushchev during his visit to Moscow, see Ibid, 13-4, Tong (2006: 590).
[130] Yan (2015: 332).
[131] Wu (1999: 35-6, 57); also see "Report, 'My Observations on the Soviet Union,' Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the Central Leadership (Excerpt)" (1957).
[132] Wu (1999: 57-8).
[133] Ibid, 59.

Compatible to Mao's words, late 1956 began to see Beijing's gradual move to a more independent strategy. On the one hand, Beijing had not yet fundamentally changed its policy to rely heavily on Soviet assistance in the areas of economic and military modernization. In drafting China's Second Five-Year Plan, Beijing was still willing to invite heavy influence from Moscow, while it remained open to the integration of Sino-Soviet military industry.[134] However, this period saw a simultaneous tendency in China to restrain disproportionate Soviet influence. First, to its domestic audience, Beijing started to reverse the previous propaganda for loyal adoption of Soviet experiences, increasingly emphasizing the superiority of localization. As the data from *Figure 3.1* demonstrates, pro-Soviet propaganda in official media, measured by frequency of key words in the *People's Daily*, dropped by 60 per cent in 1956, compared to that in 1954. Moreover, Beijing's changing propaganda was accompanied by a nationwide campaign of anti-dogmatism, which was targeted at uncritical adoption of the Soviet model; this political movement spread quickly from socio-economic areas to the daily practices of the PLA.[135]

Fortunately, Chinese leaders' concerns were temporarily relieved in 1957. In July, after Khrushchev purged his political opponents from the Kremlin, the CCP signaled its public support to his legitimacy via the *People's Daily*, given Mao's opposition to the ousting of Molotov. Again, Mikoyan played an important role in coordinating Beijing and Moscow's positions via face-to-face diplomacy. In turn, he projected positive images of the CCP while reporting to the CPSUCC Presidium.[136] Then, during the Moscow Conference in November, the Soviet gestures to allow the CCP almost equal footing on shaping the conference's ideological principles — the drafting of the Peace Manifesto — made Mao feel considerably satisfied. In a conversation with Khrushchev, Mao expressed his contentment:


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[134] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 343, 553, 580).
[135] Xiao Ke, a Chinese general, recalled the start of the anti-dogmatism movement in the PLA from 1956. See Xiao (1997: 439-42), Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (1996b: 74).
[136] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 518-20).

I'm really pleased that you treated us as equal this time and made a successful Manifesto. In the past, you just paid lip-service to the so-called 'fraternal parties.' […] But since this Moscow Conference, you've changed that unequal attitude toward the fraternal parties; we began to discuss issues with equality, and this is the best relationship, which I wish to sustain in the future.[137]

In a conversation with the Polish leader, Mao again affirmed that "now we can really discuss problems with the Soviets; this is much better than the Stalin period […] now the atmosphere is better, and more democratic."[138] Yet, at the same time, the chairman continued to downplay Moscow's substantive actions of empowerment. In one of the most notable cases — the Soviet assistance to China's nuclear weaponization — Mao even found a new realpolitik explanation for Moscow's motives. According to Wu's memoirs, the chairman often mentioned that Khrushchev agreed to help China develop nuclear weapons because the CCP supported him during the Kremlin's in-fightings in 1956.[139]

Figure 3.1: People's Daily Publications on "Learning from the USSR," 1946-1966 (Data Source: People's Daily Digital Archives)



For Moscow, although optimism generally dominated Khrushchev's assessment of the Sino-Soviet relations at the time, worrying signs of Mao's intentions also began to arise from leaders' face-to-face interactions in 1957. As Khrushchev recalled: "on the whole, the conference proceeded on a high political and ideological level. No particular disagreements

[137] Li (2001: 149, 158-9), Wu (1999: 100-1).
[138] Wu (1999: 105).
[139] According to the Soviet memorandum of the conversation, Mao again recalled to Gromyko his quarrel with Stalin on November 19, 1957, during the Moscow meeting. See Wu (1999: 94), Shen (2014, Vol.7: 351), Yan (2015: 418).

arose among the delegations."[140] Yet, Soviet and many socialist leaders were soon disturbed by Mao's speech on the question of war in the Conference. Khrushchev clearly remembered that when it came to China, Mao stated that:

> *If imperialism imposes a war on us, we have 600 million people, and if we lose 300 million of them, what of it? After all, that is war. Years will pass, and we will raise up a new batch of people and restore the population to its previous numerical strength.*

The "rough" and "crude" way in which he spoke, the Soviet leader wrote, was greeted with "a deathly stillness," because "everyone was thinking about how to find ways of avoiding war."[141] Such wishful overconfidence and careless attitude to nuclear war not only challenged Moscow's peaceful co-existence policy toward the US, but also brought about negative impressions among many socialist leaders. Some East European leaders immediately voiced disapproval; even the Polish party leader Gomulka, whom Beijing supported in 1956, reacted sharply to Mao's words.[142] Evidence shows that Mao's careless words had left far-reaching influence on Soviet leaders' negative beliefs about China's intentions. As Richard Nixon recalled, even fifteen years after the Moscow Conference, Brezhnev was still telling the president that "I remember how Mao said: 'Let 400 million Chinese die; 300 million will be left.' Such is the psychology of this man."[143]

Overall, the alliance relationship from 1954 to 1957 highlights the superiority of the ARM. On the one hand, China's position changed from almost unreserved dependence on the Soviet Union to restrained acceptance of heavy Soviet influence. Driving this strategic adjustment was Beijing's increasing concern about rising Soviet chauvinism following the CPSU 20th Congress (i.e. *highly reliable* to *relatively reliable*). Particularly, what initially set forth China's growing uncertainty about Soviet intentions from 1956 was typically a se-

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[140] Khrushchev (2007: 435).
[141] Ibid, 436; for the Chinese version of Mao's speech, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (1996b: 625).
[142] Khrushchev (2007: 436), Lüthi (2010: 77), Shen (2013, Vol.2: 570).
[143] Nixon (1978: 17032).

cret speech which cannot incur any audience cost in the rational sense at its deliverance.[144] Yet, it seems that Chinese leaders, particularly Mao, paid much more attention to the content of Khrushchev's words, which set forth waves of shock in the Communist bloc, than on substantive actions Moscow had taken. In addition, Mao also showed an inclination to discount Soviet empowering actions by either showing overconfidence about China's competence — a likely indicator of pride — or invoking internal attribution to Khrushchev's selfish motivations.

Soviet leaders, on the other hand, had developed growingly positive beliefs about China, through a series of diplomatic interactions and cooperation (i.e. *relatively reliable* to *highly reliable*). Face-to-face diplomacy played a crucial role in the perceptual changes through the feelings and emotions it elicited among Sino-Soviet leaders. The sequence of main perceptual changes and alliance behavior is also telling about the salience of affective signals: First, the substantial upgrade of Soviet empowerment in 1954 was preceded by Khrushchev's mission and Soviet leaders' assessment of their China experiences. Second, Moscow did not agree to assist in China's nuclear program until Khrushchev significantly improved his beliefs about the CCP's reliability in 1957.

Furthermore, prior beliefs about ideologies and historical memories played a slightly different, but structuring role in leaders' assessments. Shared Communist ideologies continued to provide strong background beliefs, on which Chinese leaders based their positive perceptions, as shown in their assessments of the Soviet military intervention in Poland. Conversely, diverged ideologies, as shown in the case of Hungary, added to perceived unreliability. Yet, the CCP leaders' memories of Stalin and Russian imperialism increasingly became a resilient part of their prior beliefs, from which analogies were often invoked to interpret Soviet behavior. On the other hand, Moscow tended to interpret Beijing's behavior along simi-

[144] In fact, Moscow did not distribute the report. The Chinese delegation to the 20th CPSU Congress only received an oral summary. Even the copy of the secret speech was a leaked version in English newspapers.

lar ideological lines. Khrushchev frequently assessed Mao's intentions by examining how far the chairman's nationalism had taken him away from Marxist-Leninist ideologies. By 1957, despite the presence of negative impressions, positive perceptions remained resilient on both sides.

3.2.3 Alliance Adrift (1958-1960)

Declining Brotherhood

From 1958, imbalance in the Sino-Soviet mutual perceptions started to create serious misunderstandings, which eventually led to the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. This change initially originated in China's growing uncertainty about Soviet intentions, given perceived rising chauvinism in Moscow. Essentially, the Chinese concern was the outgrowth of Mao's emerging suspicion since the CPSU 20th Congress, together with his negative feelings, which were significantly intensified by unexpected incidents in the alliance relationship from mid-1958. Then, Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence with the US particularly became a primary issue, against which Mao assessed his revisionism.

Triggering this vicious cycle was a minor friction regarding Sino-Soviet naval cooperation. In July 1958, Moscow proposed a plan of constructing a radio station and a joint submarine fleet in China. This was in response to an earlier Chinese request for naval cooperation. Yet, when Ambassador Yudin brought the proposal to Mao, the chairman became furious.[145] The Soviet proposal, particularly regarding the joint fleet, stirred Mao's unpleasant memories of Stalin's imposition of the joint ventures in 1950. After Mao repeated his lengthy complaints about Stalin's arrogance, Yudin's attempt to clarify was counterproductive. The enraged chairman felt that Yudin was evasive on Moscow's real intentions.[146] Eventually, Mao asked him to convey his angry protest to Khrushchev:

[145] Shen (2013, Vol.2).
[146] Wu (1999: 158-60), Shen (2014, Vol.8: 124).

What you said made me very uneasy and displeased. Please report all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: you must tell him exactly what I have said without any polishing so as to make him uneasy. He has criticized Stalin's [policy] lines but now adopts the same policies as Stalin did.[147]

Mao's emotional responses prompted Khrushchev to secretly visit Beijing in late July. Confused about Mao's reaction, Khrushchev attempted to clarify Moscow's benign intentions. Yet, by arguing that the joint fleet proposal was Yudin's misinterpretation, Khrushchev deepened Mao's suspicion that the he tried to conceal the Soviet intention to use the joint fleet proposal as a pretense to control China's coastal areas.[148] As a Soviet memorandum reveals, their conversation was quickly dominated by negative emotions. Claiming that he had lost sleep for the Soviet proposal, Mao accused Khrushchev of treating China like a semi-colony, just like what Stalin did. The proposal, Mao claimed, had hurt his self-esteem.[149] The confrontation brought Khrushchev into a very unpleasant mood. He protested that the Soviets' self-esteem was also offended, then questioning Mao that "How can you possibly misunderstand our policy?"[150] Yet, in retrospect, Khrushchev seemed to be more aware of the Chinese sensibility. He wrote that:

But we didn't take the national sensibilities of the Chinese leadership sufficiently into account. Mao was stung by our proposal. His national pride had been wounded, and China's sovereignty had been infringed on. He evidently thought we were trying to establish a base for ourselves in China, and he had a very stormy reaction to our proposal, although he himself had earlier asked us to help China build submarines armed with missiles.[151]

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147 "Minutes of Conversation, Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin" (22 July, 1958).
148 According to Yan Mingfu's conversation with Vasili Arkhipov in the 1990s, the whole incident was likely caused by Yudin's miscommunication of Khrushchev's original proposal for naval cooperation. See Yan (2015: 459, 465, 499, 895), Wu (1999: 163-6), Shen (2014, Vol.8: 127-37); also see Yudin's conversation with Mao, in Zhong guo wai jiao bu (1994: 322).
149 Shen (2014, Vol.8: 128-9, 133).
150 Ibid, 133.
151 Khrushchev (2007: 456).

Although the dispute was finally shelved with Khrushchev's insistent claims of Yudin's miscommunication, Mao never accepted this explanation, believing that Yudin was used as a scapegoat.[152] Mao's growing suspicion quickly played into his dealing with Moscow during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, which took place half a month after Khrushchev's departure. This time, China's military operation came as a shock attack to Khrushchev, because Beijing informed Moscow of nothing beforehand. Soviet leaders generally expressed a feeling of disturbance and confusion by Beijing's provocative behavior. Khrushchev was increasingly worrying about being dragged into an all-out war with the US.[153] Yet, he decided to demonstrate firm support to China's position on the international stage. In September, the CPSUCC passed a letter to the CCPCC, promising that once the US "uses large yield nuclear weapons, and in this way risks widening the war," the Soviet Union will "make a retaliatory strike with nuclear weapons."[154] Moscow also issued a serious deterrent message to President Eisenhower, warning Washington "not to adopt any step that will lead to irreversible consequences."[155] From September, Moscow twice offered to deploy the Soviet Air Force and missiles troops to the Chinese coast, in order to deter potential aggression from the US and the ROC Air Force.

Nevertheless, Mao refused the Soviet offer outright. When assessing Khrushchev's intentions, he immediately linked the new proposals to that of the joint fleet. In a Central Committee meeting in November, Mao reasoned that "It looks like that they [the Soviets] still wanted to control our coastal areas, and control Fujian." And he continued to make the analogy between Fujian and Taiwan: "This is just like the American troops stationed in Taiwan. If so, we must ask for his consent for whatever we do in the future, just like what Chiang Kai-Shek did to America."[156] Similarly, Ambassador Liu also reasoned that the Soviet offer

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[152] Wu (1999: 167).
[153] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 673-4).
[154] "Letter, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communist Party, on the Soviet Union's Readiness to Provide Assistance to China in the Event of an Attack" (27 September, 1958).
[155] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 680), Lüthi (2010: 102).
[156] Wu (1999: 181-2, 187), Shen (2013, Vol.2: 683-4).

reflected Khrushchev's intention to "employ the crisis situation in the Taiwan Strait," hence dragging Taiwan into the sphere of the Soviet-American global competition.[157]

Beijing's suspicion grew particularly strong when Moscow and Washington attempted détente in 1959. During Khrushchev's mission to the US in late 1959, Chinese leaders coldly watched his friendly gestures to Eisenhower. Khrushchev's speeches on peaceful co-existence simply gave more evidence for their belief that Moscow was trying hard to appease the imperialists.[158] On his return trip, the Soviet leader visited Beijing to attend China's 9th national anniversary. Yet, he found that the Chinese had considerably downgraded the protocols for receiving the Soviet delegation. His secretary immediately expressed discontent.[159] Then, small frictions soon arose when Sino-Soviet leaders began to exchange their opinions about peaceful co-existence. On 2 October, in a meeting with Mao, Khrushchev even tried to mediate between Beijing and Washington by conveying Eisenhower's proposal to postpone resolving the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, his attempt quickly failed, and opened up a fierce quarrel with Mao and other CCP leaders. Both parties got very angry, and found each other increasingly divergent on a range of international issues, ranging from Eisenhower's sincerity about peace to the Sino-Indian border conflict. Ultimately, the interactions became so emotional that, as the Soviet memorandum reveals, Marshal Chen Yi seemed to even spit at the Soviets. Khrushchev angrily protested: "You think you can spit on others just because you are a marshal? You don't have that much saliva! And we are also not the persons who can be spit on!" Ultimately, impressed by the CCP's intransigence, Khrushchev left China full of complaints.[160] From the Chinese leaders' perspectives, Khrushchev was trying to interfere in their domestic politics; he was even standing on Washington's side in pressuring Beijing to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait.[161]

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[157] Liu (1984: 85).
[158] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 719-22).
[159] Ibid, 717.
[160] Ibid, 720-22, Shen (2014, Vol.8: 420-2).
[161] Shen (2014, Vol.8: 422, 424(.

In turn, this fallout had a decisive impact on Beijing's belief that Khrushchev was readily on the path to revisionism, namely, a dangerous trend within socialism which was vulnerable to the "peace evolution" of the imperialists. Again, Communist ideologies figured prominently as the assimilating mechanism by which Chinese leaders interpreted Moscow's perceived divergence. Immediately after Khrushchev's departure, at a Politburo meeting, the CCP leaders expressed their impression that "Khrushchev has illusion about Eisenhower; while taking seriously the American government's peace-loving facade, he failed to recognize its imperialist nature."[162] In early December, Mao further assessed Khrushchev's intentions at a Politburo meeting. After attacking the Detente as an American strategy to destroy socialism from within, Mao concluded that "Khrushchev is not a good Marxist. Although he has not yet been a full revisionist, his worldview is pragmatism, his way of thinking is metaphysics, including great-power chauvinism, and bourgeoisie liberalism."[163] While Mao went on to associate Khrushchev's incorrect thinking to Stalin, he judged that the Soviet leader was more likely heading further on the wrong path.[164] The CCP leaders generally accepted this view. At a Politburo meeting in early 1960, they continued to blame Khrushchev for his two major mistakes: the secret speech and his flattering gestures toward Eisenhower. They complained that what Khrushchev had done in the last half a year was "to hit his comrades hard with a stick, but to beautify our enemies, the American imperialists, as if they were in heaven."[165] As a result, Mao predicted that although Khrushchev was more likely to walk on his revisionist path, it is possible that some hard lessons would change his behavior, and push him back to the right way.[166]

Accompanying this perceptual change was China's rapid turn to an independence strategy from 1958. First, from mid-1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in order

[162] Wu (1999: 227-8).
[163] Ibid, 232.
[164] Ibid, 233.
[165] Ibid, 238.
[166] Ibid, 237-8, 241.

to boost economy through mass campaigns. In this period, his internal speeches clearly show an attempt to end China's dependence on the USSR.[167] Second, the authorities began to dramatically reduce pro-Soviet propaganda, particularly the promotion of the Soviet model. As *Figure 3.1* (see *Section 3.2.2*) illustrates, the *People's Daily* took a dramatic turn to discourage "learning from the USSR" in that year.[168] Beijing even tried to persuade Soviet experts to accept GLF experiences. This led to increasing disputes between Soviet experts and their Chinese colleagues.[169] By late 1958, Mao confidently declared the superiority of the GLF over the Soviet model in a meeting of senior cadres.[170] Third, Beijing began to voice official deviation from Soviet international strategy, primarily, the peaceful co-existence policy. In mid-1958, in response to the Soviet pursuit of nuclear disarmament, Chen Yi informed Yudin of Beijing's opposition to an international disarmament agreement. Also, Beijing showed increasing reluctance to consult Moscow on foreign policy issues.[171]

Apart from China's military adventurism in the Taiwan Strait, the GLF stirred increasing concerns in Moscow. As it provoked a new wave of radicalism in the Warsaw Pact countries, and even in the Soviet territories, the Kremlin was frightened by rising Chinese aggressiveness and recklessness.[172] Moreover, what made the situation worse was the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959. From Khrushchev's perspective, China's aggressive behavior not only challenged Moscow's peaceful co-existence policy, but also damaged the common interests of the Communist bloc by pushing India closer to the US.[173] In his fight with Mao in early October, Khrushchev blamed Beijing for damaging Sino-Indian relations, and complained: "Not only the press of the whole world don't know what you will do tomorrow, even us, your ally, do not know!"[174] As his uncertainty grew, Khrushchev was increasingly alerted to the

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[167] Shen (2013: 590-2).
[168] The data for *Figure 3.1* is derived from a simply content analysis of the *People's Daily* articles between 1946 and 1966, using the key word "*xue xi su lian*" (learn from the USSR).
[169] Shen (2013: 602, 608).
[170] Ibid, 596.
[171] Lüthi (2010: 250).
[172] Khrushchev (2007: 442, 447).
[173] Lüthi (2010: 104).
[174] Shen (2014, Vol.8: 420-30).

danger to allow China to possess nuclear weapons. Particularly, his impression that Mao was a military adventurist resurged.[175] As early as Khrushchev's visit in 1958, the two leaders' conversation in a swimming pool significantly reinforced this image. As Khrushchev recalled, Mao tried to estimate "the balance of forces between imperialism and socialism" with a simple calculation of the number of troops all the socialist countries could place under arms, against that of NATO. Then, Mao continued to make his point that socialist countries should not be afraid of an all-out war.[176] This argument alerted Khrushchev to his unpleasant memories during the Moscow Conference, as he recalled:

> *These arguments corresponded to the point of view he had expressed earlier at the international conference of fraternal parties in 1957, when Mao had stated that for China the loss of 300 million people, that is, half the population, would not be a tragedy. Now he was bringing up this same matter again, using arithmetical calculations to reinforce his thesis that we should not be afraid of war.*[177]

The Soviet leader quickly came to the impression that "Mao regarded as the top priority not the question of peaceful coexistence, but the question of preparing for war with the aim of crushing our enemies in a war, no matter how great the losses such war might bring to the socialist countries."[178] Disturbed by such military thinking that was perceivably "unintelligible," Khrushchev increasingly doubted that whether Mao was "simply incapable of thinking clearly."[179]


By the end of 1959, Soviet leaders' assessments of China's reliability resulted in a report to the CPSUCC Plenum by Mikhail Suslov, which draw heavily on his negative impressions of Mao.[180] First and foremost, the report defined Beijing's aggressive posture as harmful to the common interests of socialist countries. Invoking memories of Mao's speech on nuclear

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[175] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 689).
[176] Khrushchev (2007: 458).
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid, 459.
[179] Ibid, 461.
[180] Shen (2014, Vol.9: 64-78).

war, Suslov located the explanation for Beijing's reckless behavior since 1958 in Mao's insensitivity to the disastrous outcome of war.[181] Furthermore, his report clearly invoked an analogy between Mao and Stalin. China's deviation from peaceful co-existence, as it explained, was originated in Mao's nationalistic ambitions and personality cult. Against this context, the report went on to substantiate many of Khrushchev's negative impressions of Mao since his mission in 1954.[182] Although the report was grounded on Communist ideologies, it had not yet carried the assessment in a highly prototypical manner. The individual factor of Mao was clearly distinguished from the positive aspects of China as a whole. Even citing recent benign gestures from Beijing, the Soviet assessment remained optimistic about overcoming the difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations by confronting the CCP's mistakes.[183]

Figure 3.2: Annual Agreements on Soviet Aid Projects, 1950-1959 (Data Source: Shen 2013)



Therefore, while Moscow began to hedge against China's military adventurism, it did not significantly alter its empowering policy. As *Figure 3.2* illustrates, the two countries continued to sign 125 formal agreements on Soviet industrial aid in 1958 and 1959. Also, in 1958, Moscow made considerable contributions to China's development of missile and naval technologies.[184] On the other hand, from late 1958, Moscow delayed the fulfillment of various agreements on military assistance. Khrushchev particularly felt that it would be too risky to make China a nuclear power. Although the bilateral nuclear cooperation was not scrapped, Moscow postponed delivering a model atomic bomb.[185] Yet, the Soviet "betrayal of its prom-

[181] Ibid, 69-70.
[182] Khrushchev (2007: 482), Shen (2014, Vol.9: 75-7).
[183] Shen (2014, Vol.9: 77-8).
[184] Data of *Figure 3.2* from Shen (2013, Vol.1: 331); also see Shen (2013, Vol.2: 545, 694).
[185] Shen (2013, Vol.2: 336, 692).

ise" led to a widespread sense of grievance among Chinese leaders. Since then, the incident has been fervently depicted in various works of Chinese propaganda.[186]

Initial Fallout

From early 1960, Beijing and Moscow already considered each other unreliable while still struggling with hope for improvement. However, diplomatic frictions quickly pushed the mutual perceptions to a downturn. This was initiated by the first open confrontation between Beijing and Moscow over peaceful co-existence. At a Warsaw Pact meeting in February, the Chinese and the Soviet delegations crossed swords on the issue. The quarrel became personal when Khrushchev got drunk and publicly called Mao as "nothing other than 'a pair of worn-out galoshes standing disregarded in a corner.'"[187] In response to this insult, Mao secretly organized a high-level propaganda team, and launched an ideological attack in April. Five days prior to the celebration of Lenin's birthday, *Hongqi* and the *People's Daily* opened fire by attacking revisionism and peaceful co-existence as the products of imperialism.[188] Two months later, the CCP seized the opportunity to fervently promote the anti-revisionist campaign among delegates from socialist countries during a World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) meeting and the Romanian Party Congress. Beijing went so far as to push for anti-revisionist propaganda among Soviet specialists in China.[189] Yet, these confrontations only reinforced Beijing's conviction of Moscow's malicious intentions. At a Politburo meeting in May, Mao clearly identified Khrushchev as a semi-revisionist. Particularly, this assessment was made against Khrushchev's abrogation of the Paris Summit in reaction to the U-2 incident in May. His demonstration of resolve, however, did not impressed Beijing. Instead, CCP leaders paid most attention to Khrushchev's flattering attitude toward the West, and his revisionist positions. During this meeting, Deng even suggested that Khrushchev's

[186] Wu (1999: 332).
[187] Lüthi (2010: 161-2).
[188] Ibid, 163.
[189] Wu Xiuquan, the vice foreign minister, recalled events in the Bucharest Congress as a surprise attack by Khrushchev. Deng Xiaoping the leader of the Chinese delegation engaged in a fierce confrontation with Khrushchev in Bucharest. See Wu (2009: 253), Lüthi (2010: 167-75).

tough reaction to the U-2 incident was insincere, as the Soviet leader's true motive was to collaborate with Washington.[190]

In Moscow, the series of Chinese provocations considerably undermined Soviet leaders' hope for reconciliation. By mid-1960, the Soviet leaders had already reached a new consensus that Beijing's positions on foreign policy had deviated from Marxist principles; it would pose a "serious threat" to the unity of the socialist countries. Particularly attracting Soviet attention was the CCP's provocative behavior during the WFTU meeting and the Romanian Party Congress. The Soviet leaders believed that the CCP attempted to promote factionalism within socialist parties.[191] In order to teach Beijing a lesson, Khrushchev decided to withdraw from all Soviet-assisted industrial projects, and recalled all Soviet specialists from China. In August, Moscow eventually terminated all projects involving nuclear cooperation with Beijing.[192]

By this time, Beijing had reinforced its belief that Khrushchev indeed betrayed Marxism. In July, Zhou Enlai delivered a lengthy report on Sino-Soviet relations at a CCPCC meeting. His assessment largely recapped Mao's negative beliefs about Khrushchev: First, Zhou clearly defined Khrushchev as a revisionist. Moreover, he reasoned that Khrushchev was envious of the achievements of the CCP, and attempted to take autonomy away from China. Once the attempt failed, as Zhou suggested, Khrushchev would turn to contain China. This explained why he had appeased the US at the expense of China since 1959.[193] Probably best indicating the deteriorating perception was Beijing's initial deployment of border disputes in order to provoke the Soviets: In June 1960, the first incident involving Chinese transgression took place on the borders near Soviet Kyrgyzstan.[194]

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[190] Wu (1999: 271-2).
[191] Lüthi (2010: 149-63).
[192] Ibid, 174, Shen (2004: 509-10).
[193] Wu (1999: 330-2).
[194] Lüthi (2010: 181).

The alliance relationship between 1958 and 1960 offers an excellent case of the interplay between prior beliefs and behavioral signals. First and foremost, the Sino-Soviet fallout was initiated by Beijing, along with Chinese leaders' growing suspicion of Soviet intentions since 1956. From 1958, diplomatic incidents triggered a spiral of suspicion, amplified by intense negative emotions involved in Sino-Soviet leaders' face-to-face diplomacy. As negativity appeared to dominate the Chinese assessments, Beijing began to discount virtually all major Soviet empowering actions as secondary, and also dismissed Moscow's substantive offers of military assistance as evidence for its malicious intentions. This tendency seemed to reflect both the in-saliency of abstract information and a strong presence of negative beliefs defense via external attribution. Moreover, both sides' assessments extensively resorted to leaders' personal impressions of each other's negative traits. Particularly, Chinese leaders tended to focus on the negative aspects of Khrushchev's behavior and carry their assessments to a prototypical level by invoking memories of Russian imperialism.

Finally, the mutual perceptual changes consistently preceded major adjustments in alliance behavior. The occasions of face-to-face diplomacy appeared to be the crucial turning points for such changes. For instance, in 1958, Mao was convinced of Khrushchev's dishonesty only after their meeting resulted in intense negative emotions. As exemplified by their fight in 1959, Khrushchev did not speak out against Beijing's foreign policy until he was enraged by Chinese leaders' intransigence. Thus, it is likely that Beijing had reached the point of seeing Moscow as *probably unreliable* by October 1959, as Mao showed general pessimism about Khrushchev's revisionism but remained uncertain. Similarly, Moscow likely reached a similar point by 1960 when Khrushchev decided to withdraw Soviet assistance, following a series of face-to-face interactions generating intense negativity between Beijing and Moscow.

3.2.4 From Polemics to Containment (1961-1964)

Following fierce debates at the Moscow Meeting of World Communist parties, China and the Soviet Union arrived at an ideological ceasefire in early 1961.[195] Also, the failure of the GLF forced Mao into self-criticism and a retreat from central decision-making. Thus, Beijing and Moscow saw a quick revival of cooperation. By mid-1961, they even agreed to resume many Soviet-assisted projects.[196] However, both sides perceived the truce as the outcome of hard struggle, instead of rapprochement. Uncertainty remained high because they saw each other as holding to incorrect ideologies. In particular, Beijing suspected that Khrushchev was pursuing a Sino-Soviet split.[197]

Against this background, major diplomatic incidents quickly led to a spiral of negativity. Throughout 1961, Beijing's assessments were dominated by impressions of Soviet chauvinism. The deteriorating Soviet-Albanian relations became a primary indicator. Observing growing Soviet pressure on Albania, Mao saw this as new evidence of Moscow's arrogance. He was further convinced that Khrushchev was appeasing imperialists while exercising chauvinism toward fraternal parties.[198] Moreover, the party program for the 22nd CPSU Congress strengthened Beijing's belief that Khrushchev went further on revisionism. During a Politburo meeting in late 1961, Mao and Liu already concluded that Khrushchev betrayed Marxism, as his revisionism became mature. Now, Khrushchev, they reasoned, no longer represented the proletarian revolution, but an emerging bourgeoise class in the Soviet society.[199] This reasoning also provided a good ideological explanation for Moscow's revisionist behavior in the past, such as the US-Soviet disarmament talks and Khrushchev's criticism against China during the Sino-Indian border dispute.[200] Then, observing the general tone of the 22nd CPSU Congress, Chinese leaders were even more concerned that Khrushchev now

[195] Ibid, 191.
[196] Ibid, 195, 197, Shen (2014, Vol.9: 351).
[197] Wu (1999, 455, 457), Shen (2014, Vol.9: 288).
[198] Wu (1999, 464, 483).
[199] Ibid, 463-7.
[200] Ibid, 462.

preferred a Sino-Soviet split, though they were not completely certain. Yet, Mao was already convinced that China had to take efforts in order to hedge against a Soviet betrayal.[201]

Chinese suspicions were soon amplified by an incident. In early 1962, famine in Xinjiang caused around 67,000 refugees to flee to Soviet Kazakhstan. Beijing immediately interpreted the event as evidence of subversive Soviet actions. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) accused Moscow of facilitating the mass influx of Xinjiang residents and demanded the forceful return of those refugees. Disturbed by the Chinese charge, Moscow counterattacked by blaming Beijing for its irresponsibility.[202] In May, as the incident developed into a full-scale rebellion in Xinjiang, Beijing openly accused Moscow of subversive intentions, annulling the bilateral consular treaty and shutting down official Soviet institutions in China.[203]

Simultaneously, Mao returned to the power center, shattering any hope of reconciliation. This coincided with the Second Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the border dispute, Beijing was discontented with Moscow's reluctance to show unconditional support. Despite the Soviet decision to pause weapons transfer to India, the CCP leaders rather focused on Khrushchev's criticism that Chinese military actions were unnecessarily provocative. Mao took it as evidence of Khrushchev's anti-China policy, and accusing him of supporting a non-socialist country.[204] Then, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Beijing not only showed little diplomatic support to Moscow, but even launched a propaganda campaign which attacked Khrushchev's adventurism and capitulation to America.[205] Despite that Khrushchev communicated the Soviet missile deployment in Cuban early on, Chinese leaders believed that this friendly gesture was motivated by Khrushchev's need for Chinese support in the crisis.[206]

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[201] Ibid, 486.
[202] Lüthi (2010: 215).
[203] Ibid, 217.
[204] Liu (1995: 152), Shen (2014, Vol.9: 429), Yan (2015: 738).
[205] Radchenko (2009: 33-4).
[206] Liu (1995: 154).

Even before Mao's resumption of power, the Soviets came to a worsened perception of Chinese intentions. Moscow had been long suspicious of Chinese backing in Albania's feud with the Soviet Union. In mid-1962, given its fragile economy, China decided to suspend many Soviet-assisted projects. However, Moscow reasoned that Beijing attempted to sabotage those aid projects in order to blame the Soviet Union for the failure of the GLF.[207] Following Mao's return, Moscow soon launched its ideological counterattack in five Communist party congresses in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy and East Germany from late 1962. At the Bulgarian Party Congress, the Soviet delegation started a quarrel by accusing the CCP of backing Albania's anti-Soviet position. The conflict quickly spread. As Wu Xiuquan the head of the Chinese delegation recalled, the following party congresses were replete with Soviet conspiracies to "encircle" China with ideological offensives.[208] By January 1963, at the East German Party Congress, Khrushchev engaged in a fierce debate with Wu. The Chinese delegates soon found that their speeches were greeted with booing and trampling from the audience.[209]

These confrontations increasingly convinced Beijing that Moscow attempted to contain China. At a Central Committee meeting in 1963, CCP leaders expressed their impressions of Khrushchev's consistent anti-Chinese efforts. As they perceived, those ideological offensives sought to divert attention from his revisionism, as exemplified in the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis.[210] More importantly, the CCP leaders estimated that a Sino-Soviet split was more likely to occur in the near future. Though without considerable uncertainty, they even foresaw the possibility that Khrushchev might declare war on China thereafter. This emerging sense of Soviet hostility was also confirmed by a CIA analysis in 1975.[211]

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[207] Lüthi (2010: 201), Shen (2014, Vol.9: 351, 353).
[208] Wu (2009: 257).
[209] Lüthi (2010: 235), Yan (2015: 740, 761).
[210] Wu (1999: 532).
[211] Ibid, 536-7, Yan (2015: 772-3), U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1975:5).

Yet, by this point, Moscow was far from foreseeing Chinese hostility. In Khrushchev's assessments, he was particularly impressed by the inconsistencies, recklessness and lack of integrity in Chinese foreign policy from 1958. But he concluded that Beijing's anti-Soviet propaganda was largely motivated by Mao's personal ambition for domination of the Communist movement, and his intention to divert domestic grievances against the GLF. Therefore, Khrushchev reasoned that China opposed peaceful co-existence in the socialist camp in order to provoke a Soviet-American confrontation.[212] Particularly impressed by the haughty attitude in the Chinese propaganda, Khrushchev concluded that the CCP leaders increasingly turned to nationalism and chauvinism. Yet, an ideological ceasefire, Khrushchev reasoned, was possible if Moscow could contain Beijing's radicalism by gathering strong international support.[213]

From early 1963, intensified perceptions of unreliability gave rise to a new round of ideological warfare. In February, Beijing turned down a CPSUCC request to pause the ideological debates under the assumption that Khrushchev attempted to blame China for splitting the alliance. A similar Soviet proposal in March reinforced such beliefs. At the same time, Mao tried to provoke Moscow to take the blame for a Sino-Soviet split; he stepped up the Chinese polemics to the extent that it would kill "any prospect of a Sino-Soviet compromise."[214] The result was the release of an unprecedented fierce piece of criticism: "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement." Moreover, Beijing dramatically increased its propaganda directed at Soviet nationals. According to a National Security Council report, China distributed over 6,000 anti-Soviet pamphlets to Soviet territories in that April alone.[215] In addition, Beijing increasingly resorted to border disputes. A *People's Daily* editorial publicized the border disputes for the first time in March. Chinese diplomats

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[212] Shen (2014, Vol.10: 326-7).
[213] Ibid, 235, 327.
[214] The CPSU letter on 21 February was, in fact, in response to North Vietnam's calling for "the unity of the international communist movement" in order to fight against the US. It pleaded for an end to polemics in the interest of the common communist cause. See Wu (1999: 543, 556), Lüthi (2010: 238-9, 242).
[215] Lüthi (2010: 242), Shen (2014, Vol.10: 46).

were observed to more frequently voice military threats to resolve the territorial disputes. Local Soviet authorities reported increasing incidents of intrusions by Chinese patrols, who regularly fired into the air. In anticipation of an incoming conflict, Beijing simultaneously pressed Moscow to hold border talks while strengthening border forces.[216]

Yet, when Moscow remained hopeful regarding an ideological ceasefire, it also turned to containing China. From early 1963, Moscow began to systematically check China's anti-Soviet propaganda.[217] The China border witnessed a considerable increase in the number of KGB border guards and Soviet military exercises.[218] By mid-July, Moscow for the first time publicized details of the Sino-Soviet disputes in *Pravda.* Also, it started to organize polemics against the CCP. More importantly, Khrushchev even began to orient the Warsaw Pact toward China by integrating Mongolia into Soviet defense positions.[219] While Beijing escalated its ideological attacks, Moscow moved to contain China's international influence. This year, the USSR and the US made decisive progress in their nuclear disarmament talks. In August, the two superpowers eventually signed the Limited Nuclear Ban Treaty (LNBT), which was clearly aimed at containing China's nuclear program.[220]

Observing the disarmament talks, Mao found the smoking-gun evidence that Moscow finally turned against Beijing by colluding with the American imperialists. In turn, he believed that a split with the Soviets was inevitable. From early 1964, Beijing began to hedge against potential Soviet raids on China's strategic facilities. The result was the construction of "the Third Line" — a nationwide effort to move China's defense industries to inland provinces.[221] Mao concluded that Khrushchev was fully converted to a revisionist; hence, he

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[216] Radchenko (2009: 112), Shen (2014, Vol.10: 40).
[217] Lüthi (2010: 264), Shen (2014, Vol.10: 44).
[218] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1970: 6).
[219] Moscow decided to publicize the ideological disputes after the Sino-Soviet talks in mid July. For the record of the talks see "Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party" (5-20 July 1963); Lüthi (2010: 260, 264).
[220] Lüthi (2010: 269-71).
[221] The third-line projects include the construction of Beijing's underground railroad as a potential fallout shelter against the Soviet nuclear raids. See Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (1996a: 327, 329), Shao (2010).

might well turn Moscow's anti-China campaign into a military attack.[222] In Moscow, Khrushchev's feelings about Mao also reached a new low. During a meeting with a Romanian Party delegation in mid-1964, he repeatedly complained that "Mao Zedong is sick, crazy, that he should be taken to an asylum." By this time, Khrushchev were certain that Beijing had no interest in a rapprochement. Finally, Moscow signaled its readiness for an open split by publicizing a series of accusations against China.[223]

From 1961 to early 1964, the patterns of intra-alliance interactions essentially replicated the previous episode. Before Mao's return to power, negative feelings stemming from previous interactions sustained resilient prior beliefs about each other's unreliability. Despite the presence of substantive reconciliatory actions, Beijing and Moscow tended to dismiss each other's benign intentions, paying attention to perceived malicious intentions behind contingent incidents in Sino-Soviet relations. When their ideological polemics resumed, negative emotions, particularly anger and humiliation, intensified and spread via leaders' face-to-face interactions and official medias; the major downturns in mutual perceptions preceded each other's adjustment of alliance behavior. For instance, the escalated ideological debates during the five European party congresses led Mao to foresee an upcoming Sino-Soviet split. Feeling increasingly certain about Soviet unreliability, he decided to step up the polemics from 1963. Furthermore, even though much of the negative reciprocity between Beijing and Moscow took place in official presses, leaders often reacted emotionally to the languages of newspaper articles. In turn, such indirect communications significantly contributed to their intense feelings about each other's unreliability. By mid-1963, both sides' propaganda campaigns had increasingly taken an assertive tone; the escalated debates significantly reinforced Moscow's perception of Chinese hostility, hence, its decision to publicize the Sino-Soviet disputes.

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[222] Wu (1999: 778).
[223] "Note on the Conversation between the Romanian Party and Government Delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev" (1964); Radchenko (2009: 104).

On the other hand, while negative emotions strengthened both sides' beliefs about ideological divergence on international strategy, resilient prior beliefs became increasingly prominent in guiding leaders' assessments toward negative beliefs defense. First, both parties tended to characterize each other's behavior with labels, such as "revisionist," "Soviet chauvinism," and "Chinese nationalism," which were heavily informed by their ideologies and historical memories. Second, whereas the assessments on both sides drew extensively on personal impressions, diplomatic gestures, and press articles, leaders tended to either pay disproportionate attention to the negative aspects or interpret each other's behavior with malicious intentions. For example, the Xinjiang incident immediately drew Beijing's attention to a possible Soviet conspiracy, which did not exist. In 1963, Mao repeatedly ignored Soviet requests of ideological ceasefire, because he attributed it to Khrushchev's malicious intentions. On the other hand, Khrushchev became increasingly certain about Mao's irrationality, believing that this posed an irreconcilable obstacle to the alliance relationship. Therefore, by early 1964, both sides appeared to perceive each other as *highly unreliable*.

3.2.5 Emerging Hostility (1964-1969)

Broken Partnership

The ousting of Khrushchev brought another chance for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement in late 1964. Yet, that was quickly lost due to a diplomatic incident. Whereas Beijing regressed to strong suspicion, Moscow remained hopeful of joint Sino-Soviet actions in the Vietnam War until late 1965. From 1966, the Cultural Revolution completely overshadowed the outlook for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

After October 1964, Beijing grew increasingly uncertain about the new Soviet leadership. Mao held a series of Politburo meetings to assess Moscow's intentions. Initially, he believed that Khrushchev's ousting signaled Soviet leaders' discontent with his revisionist

policies.[224] Yet, an almost prototypical image of an emerging Soviet bourgeois class prevented Mao from seeing Moscow's radical departure from Khrushchev's policies, which, as he reasoned, represented certain class-wide interests. Thus, while estimating little change to Moscow's great-power chauvinism, Mao predicted that Soviet foreign policy might show increasing flexibility.[225] He decided to probe Soviet intentions by "calm observation."[226] Thus, in November, Zhou Enlai led a delegation to Moscow, in the name of celebrating the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution.

Yet, Zhou's mission soon ended in disaster. On 6 November, after examining the wording of Brezhnev's report, Mao concluded that the Soviet leadership had not broken away from Khrushchev's revisionism.[227] The next day, a diplomatic incident deepened his negativity: In a reception, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovskii got drunk and told the Chinese delegation that Mao should be overthrown. Despite repeated Soviet apologies, Zhou believed that a drunk person was honest in his words. In Beijing, Mao interpreted the incident as clear evidence of the dominance of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" in Moscow. He instructed Zhou to counterattack.[228] As both were more certain that the Soviet leadership had not departed from Khrushchev's revisionism, Beijing soon resumed the ideological attacks and dismissed consecutive Soviet efforts at reconciliation as deceptive.[229]

By November 1964, Moscow was still uncertain about Beijing's intentions. At a CPSUCC meeting, Soviet leaders considered both positive and negative signs during Zhou's mission. On the one hand, they noticed that Beijing claimed victory over Khrushchev's revisionism, and continued to oppose the Soviet ideological line since the CPSU 20th Congress. Moreover, Beijing kept rejecting the Soviet proposals for reconciliation on the basis that

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[224] Wu (1999: 833).
[225] Ibid, 837-8.
[226] Lüthi (2010: 287).
[227] Wu (1999: 858-9).
[228] In the following meetings, Mikoyan specifically told the Chinese delegation that the new Soviet leadership did not differ from Khrushchev in terms of their attitude toward China's radical ideologies on international strategy. Certainly, this received considerable attention in Beijing's assessments. See Ibid, 863-4, Lüthi (2010: 289-90), Yan (2015: 864-5).
[229] Wu (1999: 883, 910).

Moscow was not sufficiently tough to Washington. Thus, the Soviet leaders reasoned that Beijing appeared more interested in forcing their own ideas than in a real conversation.[230] On the other hand, Moscow also noticed Beijing was actively making contact with the new Soviet leadership. Particularly, Brezhnev believed that as the biggest obstacle in the bilateral relations — Khrushchev — was eliminated, a Sino-Soviet rapprochement was possible if Moscow could make the CCP "drop their illusions." In turn, he proposed avoiding conflict with Beijing by downplaying the Chinese polemics.[231]

This asymmetry in mutual perceptions was manifested in Sino-Soviet interactions from early 1965. As the Vietnam War escalated, Moscow repeatedly called for a joint action with Beijing to support the war efforts of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). In order to win Beijing's favor, Moscow took a range of reassuring actions, such as resuming trade and technology cooperation.[232] In February, Alexei Kosygin went on a mission to persuade the CCP to attend the Moscow Meeting of the World Communist Parties. He also pleaded for a joint statement of Sino-Soviet unity in supporting the DRV.[233] Yet, Beijing interpreted the Soviet proposal as a means to pressure China. In a meeting with Kosygin, Mao refused his request for a truce, claiming that the polemics would "last for ten thousand years."[234] Also, Zhou criticized the Moscow meeting as a product of revisionism, accusing the CPSU of bossing other Communist parties. Chen Yi even told Kosygin that to attend the meeting would mean the surrender of the CCP.[235]

Moreover, during the Vietnam War, China increasingly assumed an obstructive role in USSR-DRV cooperation. Beijing not only opposed peace talks, but also tried to sabotage Soviet military assistance to the DRV. First, from late February, Beijing rejected all Moscow's proposals for a new Indochina conference as well as joint actions supporting the

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[230] Shen (2014, Vol.10: 496-7).
[231] Ibid, 476-7, 497-99.
[232] Ibid, 18-20.
[233] Lüthi (2010: 317-8).
[234] Yan (2015: 874).
[235] Ibid, 872-3, Wu (1999: 914).

DRV.[236] Second, from spring, Beijing started to obstruct the transporting of Soviet military equipment to Vietnam through Chinese territories, while discouraging Hanoi from approaching Moscow. From March, Beijing delayed a Soviet request to transport weapons and military personnel by plane for months. When Moscow proposed to build an airbase in Kunming, Chinese leaders immediately invoked memories of Khrushchev's proposals in 1958, concluding that Moscow's true intention was to take control of Kunming and the Sino-Vietnamese border.[237] Apart from sabotaging Soviet assistance, Beijing also competed with Moscow for political and military influence in North Vietnam.[238]

By late 1965, frustrated attempts to mend the alliance relationship resulted in Soviet leaders' disillusionment with Beijing. As the Soviet perceptions deteriorated, Beijing also dramatically reduced its official contacts with Moscow. Lapin, the Soviet ambassador, had experienced frequent denials of meetings with the Chinese leaders since then.[239] According to Yan Mingfu, the director of the CCP General Office Translation Team, his last job was to translate the polemics against the Moscow meeting in March 1965. Thereafter, he received no task before the team's dissolution during the Cultural Revolution.[240] Simultaneously, Beijing expanded the scale of anti-Soviet propaganda, trying to contain Moscow's international influence by blocking its participation in the Asia-Africa Conference.[241]

In 1966, the advent of the Cultural Revolution brought the tensions between Moscow and Beijing to a new height. By this time, Mao was convinced that the new Soviet leadership would make no change to Khrushchev's revisionist policy.[242] Thus, Beijing signaled the *de facto* termination of the CCP-CPSU contact by boycotting the 23rd CPSU Congress. On the other hand, Moscow also reached a gloomy outlook of Beijing's intentions. A prototypical

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[236] Zhai (2000: 174), Radchenko (2009: 148-9).
[237] Shen (2014, Vol.11: 76), Radchenko (2009: 152-5).
[238] Lüthi (2010: 306-7, 325).
[239] Radchenko (2009: 158-9)
[240] Yan (2015: 875, 889).
[241] Shen (2014, Vol.11: 108).
[242] Wu (1999: 914).

image of Chinese chauvinism became increasingly clear in Brezhnev's mind. He reasoned that chauvinism underlay many problematic Chinese actions, from Beijing's objection to a joint Sino-Soviet action in the Vietnam War, to the Sino-Soviet border disputes. In a CP-SUCC report, Brezhnev concluded that Beijing preferred a prolonged war in Vietnam, as the Chinese intention was to take advantage of a US-USSR conflict.[243] Also, he viewed the Cultural Revolution as a display of China's state militarism directed toward the Soviet Union; the Soviet leader even claimed that Mao perceived the Soviet Union as the main obstacle to his ambition of world domination.[244] However, compared to Khrushchev, Brezhnev not only viewed China's unreliability as stemming from Mao's personal influence — an individual-level source, but also carried his assessments on the basis of prototypical images of China as a whole. China's problematic behavior, Brezhnev reasoned, was rather rooted in the traditional socio-economic conditions of China, which deeply informed the bourgeois thinking and narrow-mined nationalism of the CCP.[245] Even seven years later, in 1973, Brezhnev told President Nixon that "Chinese policies would not change" even after Mao's death, as he was "certain that the entire Chinese leadership was instinctively aggressive."[246] This is a telling sign that Brezhnev's prior beliefs were coupled by resilient negative emotions; his increasingly prototypical manner of inference is also corresponding to the tendency of over-simplification.

Thus, from 1966, violent incidents, border disputes and military containment defined the tone of Sino-Soviet relations. In August, Chinese Red Guards besieged the Soviet Embassy with violent protests. Moscow perceived this as a staged performance stirring anti-Soviet sentiment among the Chinese.[247] Also, Beijing continued to apply pressure over its claim for massive territories lost to Russia while leveling up provocations on the border. According to

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[243] Shen (2014, Vol.11: 238, 243)
[244] Ibid, 270, 272.
[245] Ibid, 276; for the growingly negative Soviet assessments of China as a whole, also see "Polish Informational Note from the Interkit Meeting in Moscow, December 1967" (1968).
[246] Nixon (1978: 17032).
[247] Radchenko (2009: 179).

Chinese newspapers, the number of border incidents jumped to over 4,000 after 1964, which doubled the figure in the last four years.[248] In response, Moscow moved to a full-fledged posture of containment on the China border. In early 1966, Brezhnev signed a defense pact with Mongolia, pledging Soviet military assistance in the event of a Chinese attack. In May, he discussed with Kim Ii Sung on strategies to contain growing Chinese threat. In addition, the Soviet Union began to deploy regular back-up forces on the China border from late 1965.[249]

During this period, Beijing's assessments were generally characterized by deepened suspicions, which eventually resulted in Chinese leaders' firm beliefs about Soviet hostility. In early 1964, although Beijing was shortly uncertain about the new Soviet leadership's intentions, negative emotional experiences from the face-to-face diplomacy in late 1964 rapidly eliminated Chinese leaders' hope for reconciliation, driving their assessments toward high certainty about Soviet hostility. Since then, almost all Soviet reconciliatory signals, particularly with regard to potential Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam, had been consistently dismissed by Beijing as concealing malicious intentions. On the other hand, the ousting of Khrushchev initially brought Moscow to the hope of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Yet, this optimism was destroyed by consistent unfavorable Chinese responses. Thus, by mid-1966, Soviet leaders were also highly certain about China's hostility.

Leaders' assessments on both sides were also characterized by the same patterns of the interplay between prior beliefs and behavioral signals. Although the *de facto* break of the alliance relationship by late 1965 gave little chance for leaders' confrontation in person, negative feelings and emotions became an enduring part of each other's long-term memories. Along with the start of the Cultural Revolution and rising border frictions, fear of military attacks from each other arose as a major factor in leaders' assessments (i.e. *probably hostile*);

[248] Kong (2011: 339).
[249] Radchenko (2009: 161-2), Shen (2014, Vol.11: 188-9), U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1970: 18).

hence, both parties started to build up defense capabilities on the Sino-Soviet borders. Furthermore, prototypical images had figured prominently in their assessments. Particularly, after Khrushchev, Soviet leaders' assessments were gradually dominated by their perceived negative dispositions of China as a whole, rather than Mao's negative dispositions. Also, the assimilating effect of negative beliefs had grown to such an extent that dissonant information could hardly challenge it.

Brothers in Arms

From 1967, the escalating Sino-Soviet confrontation rapidly pushed both sides toward open conflict. In January, a clash between Chinese students and Soviet police in Moscow's Red Square led to another siege of the Soviet Embassy by Red Guards. As reports of the Soviet Foreign Ministry reveal, Moscow suspected that Beijing stepped up anti-Soviet actions in order to improve its relations with Washington.[250] A report from the Soviet Embassy in early February paid attention to a growing amount of discussions about military conflict among Chinese officials and Red Guards. Citing Cheng Yi's words that "a war is possible," the report concluded that the Chinese government was behind the siege of the Soviet Embassy. By late March, both governments began to expel each other's embassy staff.[251]

On the borders, the situation was rapidly deteriorating. The Chinese intrusions into Soviet territory reached an unprecedented level, while Chinese troops were also massing on the Soviet border. Groups of Chinese "civilians" which numbered over 1,000 started to challenge the authority of Soviet border guards in a more confrontational manner, provoking the Soviets to take an increasingly assertive stance.[252] According to a record of the CPSUCC Plenum, the Soviets estimated that there were 2,000 incidents of Chinese intrusions and border violations in just three months between late 1967 and early 1968. A US intelligence re-

[250] Radchenko (2009: 188), Shen (2014, Vol.11: 299).
[251] Shen (2014, Vol.11: 309), Kong (2011: 335).
[252] Radchenko (2009: 189), Liegl (2017: 161).

port estimated 1,200 border-guard clashes in 1968 alone.[253] By early 1968, a series of border skirmishes had resulted in the first fatalities on the eastern border. In response, the Central Military Committee (CMC) of China was already considering a military ambush.[254]

Moscow responded to Chinese provocations with a massive military build-up on the border. In February 1967, the 39th Soviet Army was deployed to Mongolia. Local authorities in Krygyzstan received instructions to strengthen the civilian defense system in the border areas.[255] More importantly, by late 1967, Moscow had decided to provide their field commanders with a tactical nuclear weapon — a new land-mobile missile system — which "could hit targets […] up to 450 miles within China." The CIA estimated that this indicated that "the Soviets in 1967 assigned a greater degree of probabilities to the prospect of a border war than they had done in 1966."[256]

Nevertheless, in March 1969, it was Beijing — the weaker side — that provoked a border war by ambushing Soviet border troops on the Zhenbao/Damanskii Island, following a series of incidents from January. Historians of Sino-Soviet relations generally agree that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 became a watershed for the Chinese assessments of Soviet threat. First and foremost, the declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine significantly enhanced Beijing's fear of an immediate war against China, as it claimed Moscow's right of intervention in socialist countries. Observing the Czechoslovakia incident, Mao was worried that this was a prelude to a Soviet invasion of China. Sharing this concern, Defense Minister Lin Biao allegedly warned the Politburo and the CMC that the Soviet Union might attack.[257] Furthermore, according to some historians, the Brezhnev Doctrine also stirred China's traumatic memories of Russian imperialism. The chairman was angered, hence, felt increasingly certain that Moscow's "socialist imperialists" might launch a war against China and divide

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[253] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1970: v), Shen (2014, Vol.11: 348).
[254] Lüthi (2010: 340), Liegl (2017: 161).
[255] Radchenko (2009: 190), Shen (2014, Vol.11: 305, 313).
[256] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1970: 24, 28).
[257] Chen (2010: 245), Khoo (2011: 45), Liegl (2017: 163).

the world with the US.[258] Anticipating that Moscow was not ready for a general war, Mao ordered the PLA to teach the Soviets "a bitter lesson" in response to previous incidents on Zhenbao Island in January.[259] The border war ultimately declared the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

3.3 Findings and Discussions

3.3.1 Patterns of Reliability Assessment

In the two decades between 1949 and 1969, the Sino-Soviet fraternity turned dramatically into open hostility. The trajectory of the alliance can be divided into three stages: In the first stage before 1957, the alliance relationship went through consolidation via successful face-to-face diplomacy and intra-alliance cooperation. Yet, from 1958, growing suspicions rapidly pushed Beijing and Moscow into a vicious cycle of negative reciprocity, followed by escalated frictions involving intense emotions. From late 1964, driven by rising fear, both sides were readily on the path toward animosity. Overall, the ARM offers a more comprehensive explanation to such an outcome, whereas the RCM largely fails to help us understand much of leaders' face-to-face interactions, which involves little "cost" in a rational sense. This section highlights the most important findings from the empirical analysis.

In terms of leaders' use of information, our case study has found little evidence that leaders paid much attention to general capabilities as an indicator of reliability (see *Table 3.4*). This finding is in line with ***Proposition 1*** of the ARM.[260] Available evidence even suggests the opposite. For example, Khrushchev did mention China's huge population as a source of its potential threat, during his conversation with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1955.[261] While this concern was compatible with Khrushchev's impressions of Mao follow-

[258] Such a view is reflected in the political report to the 9th CCP Congress, see Xiong (1999: 164-5).
[259] Yang (2000: 27-8), Chen (2010: 246); According to Xiong Xianghui, a senior diplomat and intelligence officer, Mao was worried about an immediate war with the USSR and asked four PLA Marshalls to conduct an evaluation of the international situation during this period. See Xiong (1999: 162).
[260] For *Proposition 1 - 6*, see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4.
[261] See Section 3.2.2 for Khrushchev's conversation with Adenauer.

ing his mission to China in 1954, it did not prevent Moscow from substantially expanding Soviet assistance to China. This suggests that either capabilities played a trivial role in Khrushchev's assessments, or his words were only instrumental in winning Adenauer's favor. More importantly, at the peak of the Sino-Soviet fraternity, even China's possession of nuclear weapons ceased to be a source of unreliability, as Moscow's increasingly substantive assistance demonstrated. This observation matches exactly what ***Proposition 1*** predicts: massive increase in offensive power tends to undermine an ally's perceived reliability when it is considered unreliable. As the Sino-Soviet split went on, military capabilities increasingly became a source of fear between Beijing and Moscow. Then, nuclear weapons became a source of unreliability in Khrushchev's assessments.[262]

In addition, little evidence shows that Sino-Soviet leaders did pay attention to institutions and reputation for reliability in the way the RCM predicts. First, contrary to the RCM's prediction, democracy exactly served the opposite function, as a primary indicator of unreliability in terms of Communist ideologies. Particularly, Beijing tended to interpret democracy

Table 3.4 - Findings: Use of Information

Periods	Assessor	Propositions 1 - 4: Which indicators leaders pay attention to?						
		Capability	Institution	Reputation	Identity	Behavioral Signals		
						costly	substantive	affective
1949-1953	China	no	no	no	yes	limited	yes	yes
	USSR	no	no	no	yes	partial	yes	yes
1954-1957	China	no	no	no	yes	limited	yes	yes
	USSR	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1958-1960	China	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	USSR	partial	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1961-1964	China	partial	no	no	yes	no	partial	partial
	USSR	partial	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
1964-1969	China	partial	no	no	yes	no	partial	partial
	USSR	partial	no	no	yes	no	partial	partial

[262] See the belief assimilation tendency of the ARM in Chapter 2, *Table 2.1*

against its beliefs about irreconcilable conflicts between communism and imperialism. Second, although leaders' assessments did frequently involve references to each other's past behaviors. Our analysis has rather demonstrated that such memories of past behavior were mostly invoked in the context of historical analogies, or for leaders' re-interpretation in a negative way. After the 20th CPSU Congress, the resurgence of Mao's unpleasant memories of Stalin can serve as a classical example in illustrating this mechanism. Such a pattern more likely indicates the presence of the representativeness bias and leaders' selective retrieval of memories congruent to their emotions. Also, it exactly contradicts the notion of reputation the RCM suggests, that is, an open-assess asset as objective records of past behavior, calculated in a Bayesian style of beliefs updating. With regard to both alternative arguments, the next section also provides a more detailed analysis vis-à-vis quantitative data.

By contrast, the case study found that leaders tended to pay disproportionate attention to affective signals and political ideologies, whereas they paid much less attention to substantive signals involving no apparent emotions, which were also easily subject to re-interpretation over time. First, in line with ***Proposition 4***, Communist ideologies, together with historical memories, consistently provided resilient background beliefs against which leaders derived general categories or labels, such as Marxist and chauvinist, to make sense of their counterparts' dispositions. As prior beliefs became increasingly coupled by intense congruent emotions, leaders also tended to apply such labels on a collective level, often developing oversimplified prototypical images of each other. Divergence or convergence in Communist ideologies often became the baseline against which the other's behavior was judged.

Moreover, as ***Proposition 2*** and ***Proposition 3*** predict, leaders did pay attention to both substantive and affective signals, although affective signals tended to generate much more powerful impact. Particularly, personal impressions and vivid gestures, including the use of languages, tended to draw stronger emotional responses from leaders, hence playing a central role in initiating perceptual changes. In comparison, while substantive signals received

attention as well, they generally failed to significantly alter leaders' prior beliefs. Particularly, when substantive signals and prior beliefs were affectively incongruent, favorable actions tended to be discounted, or more easily suffered from re-interpretation. A typical example is that Mao showed an inclination to downplay Soviet assistance even before the Sino-Soviet split. From 1958, he almost re-interpreted all the massive Soviet assistance from 1954 as the outcome of Khrushchev's selfish motivations to appease China for his personal ambitions. Examples like such also contradict what the RCM suggests on costly signaling. First, little evidence suggests that Sino-Soviet leaders tended to examine the rational cost of substantive actions in a backward-elimination pattern. In general, their attention was directly focused on a signal's relevance to their own interests. This was also the case in 1958, when Mao rejected Khrushchev's offer of Soviet Air Forces and missile troops during the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Second, even though costly signals seemed to matter sometime, particularly in the case of China's intervention in the Korean War, the observation that leaders paid less attention to substantive actions also means that costly signals, if any, played a rather limited role.

With regard to perceptual changes, our case study shows strong support for both ***Proposition 5*** and ***Proposition 6*** (see *Table 3.5*). First, in line with ***Proposition 5***, the strength of leaders' beliefs defense correlates positively with the intensity of congruent feelings or emotions. With relatively high uncertainty, leaders often held positive and negative beliefs about their counterparts simultaneously. Growing emotional intensity increasingly eliminated leaders' ambiguity by moving their beliefs defense to either a positive or negative direction. When leaders' emotional profiles became highly homogenized, congruent beliefs came to dominate their assessments. Dissonant beliefs tended to be either challenged or suppressed, while congruent beliefs about a target's dispositions tended to become prototypical.

In general, such patterns have characterized the function of the resilient core of ideological beliefs and historical memories in the Sino-Soviet alliance relationship. From 1949 to 1953, highly positive beliefs about the CPSU led CCP leaders, particularly Mao, to suppress

Table 3.5 - Findings: Perceptual Change and Alliance Behavior

Periods	Congruence Test				Proposition 5		Proposition 6	
	End Perception		Alliance Behavior	Congruent	Support	End Pattern	Support	End Pattern
1949-1953	**China**	highly reliable	Dependence (+)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
	USSR	probably reliable	Empowerment (+) Control (-)	yes	yes	relative balance	mostly	positively reinforced
1954-1957	**China**	probably reliable	Dependence (-) Independence (+)	yes	yes	relative balance	yes	positively reinforced
	USSR	highly reliable	Empowerment (+)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
1958-1960	**China**	probably unreliable	Dependence (-) Independence (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
	USSR	probably unreliable	Empowerment (-)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
1961-1964	**China**	highly unreliable	Independence (+) Contain (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
	USSR	highly unreliable	Contain (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
1964-1969	**China**	definitely hostile	Contain (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	partial	negatively reinforced
	USSR	definitely hostile	Contain (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	partial	negatively reinforced

their discontent about Stalin. In turn, the CCP tended to explain unfavorable Soviet behavior with external causes, while inferring favorable Soviet intentions on the basis of Communist ideologies. From 1956, however, negative emotions, initially set forth by Khrushchev's shock attack in the 20th CPSU Congress, led Mao to increasingly bring the memories of his humiliation by Stalin to the surface. From 1958, when the analogy between Stalin and Khrushchev was firmly established in Mao's beliefs, negative beliefs defense rapidly dominated his interpretation of Soviet actions. Similarly, during the Sino-Soviet "honeymoon" from 1954 to 1957, Khrushchev initially surpassed his negative impressions of Mao on the basis of his generally positive feelings about the CCP. Not until late 1959, despite his confusion about problematic Chinese actions on the international stage, Khrushchev only gradually came to attribute this to Beijing's malicious intentions. Only then, Khrushchev's negative experiences with Mao began to resurge prominently in his assessments of China's reliability. Yet, from the mid-1960s, when Soviet leaders increasingly developed negative prototypical

images of China, they tended to believe that the Chinese leadership, as Brezhnev claimed, was intrinsically aggressive.

Furthermore, as ***Proposition 6*** predicts, diplomatic exchanges involving intense emotions, particularly leaders' face-to-face diplomacy, functioned generally as decisive turning points in perceptual changes. Essentially, leaders' face-to-face interactions provided the most important vehicles to probe each other's intentions and engage in intense emotional experiences, hence significantly reaffirming or challenging their prior beliefs. In 1949, the diplomatic missions conducted respectively by Mikoyan and Liu effectively improved both sides' perceptions through surprise, namely, leaders' unexpected displays of emotions and symbolic gestures of apology. During the Polish and Hungarian Crises in 1956, face-to-face interactions between Chinese and Soviet leaders virtually turned Khrushchev's concern about Mao to an unimportant part of his assessments, hence significantly raising his optimism about the CCP. Conversely, intense negative emotions can rapidly shatter positive prior beliefs. In 1958 and 1959, the two fights between Mao and Khrushchev respectively turned each other to a rapid conviction of the other's unreliability. Despite existing divergence in both sides' ideological beliefs, negative emotions resulting from face-to-face diplomacy directly brought them to a high level of certainty about each other's malicious intentions. Also, the Sino-Soviet split did not reach its peak after cycles of intense confrontations between leaders at various diplomatic platforms, including the five European party congresses. Such a style of interactions often turned so personal that negative feelings became almost self-amplifying. After 1966, although high-level diplomacy ceased between Beijing and Moscow, previous interactions involving intense negative emotions had already been transformed into each other's enduring prior beliefs.

3.3.2 Alternative Explanations

Although a first-cut tracing of intra-alliance interactions does not find much evidence that Beijing and Moscow paid much attention to capabilities, institutions and reputation in reliability assessment, this does not eliminate the possibility that those factors still make a compelling alternative explanation. This doubt is reasonable because historical sources, by nature, make a biased sample. Thus, to test the robustness of the above analysis, this section elaborates on the extent to which these three factors under the RCM explain the perceptual and behavior outcomes of intra-alliance interactions.

Capabilities

Following the tradition of the positivist studies of state power, I rely on three variables coded by the National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset in the COW project to measure the balance of power between China and the USSR. First, a Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) score aggregates the values of the following six components of national material capabilities: (1) Military expenditures, (2) military personnel, (3) iron and steel production, (4) primary energy consumption, (5) total population and (6) urban population. This reflects "an average of a state's share of the system total of each element of capabilities in each year."[263] In addition, military spending and military personnel are used separately as measurements of offensive power. For a more thorough analysis, the capabilities of the US were added, because it was the common threat of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

In short, none of those factors makes a consistent pattern of correlation to the trajectory of the intra-alliance interactions. First and foremost, as *Figure 3.3* shows, the CINC difference between China and the USSR — the primary measurement of power balance — did not see any substantial shift between 1949 and 1972. This overall pattern does not correlate to the dramatic U-turn in both countries' perceptions of each other, taking place from the late

[263] NMC Codebook v5, p.7, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/nmc-codebook-v5-1/at_download/file

Figure 3.3: Composite Index of Capacity Score, 1949-72
(Data from the COW project)




Figure 3.4: Military Expenditures, 1949-72
(Data from the COW project, in USD)





Figure 3.5: Military Personnel, 1949-72
(Data from the COW project)



1950s and early 1960s. A realist might argue that the slight upturn in China's power from 1958 (0.0995) to 1959 (0.108), which reflects the GLF, could make it a greater threat to the USSR. Although this did accompany the initial deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, history shows that it was Beijing that first saw Moscow as unreliable and took the lead in damaging the bilateral relations. Moreover, with the US in the picture, a balance of threat theorist could

argue that the overall decline in US power led to a decreasing relative value in the Sino-Soviet alliance, hence, fewer incentives for mutual dependence. Yet, the US did not lose its power advantage until well after China and the USSR were embroiled in the territorial disputes and mutual containment from the late 1960s. In turn, that does not account for the timing of the Sino-Soviet split.

Now, what if, as some realists suggest, the Chinese and Soviet leaders mainly paid attention to the balance of military power? The short answer is that this does not offer a consistent explanation either. First, as *Figure 3.4* illustrates, increasing military spending of both countries in relation to the US may lead a rationalist to argue that Beijing and Moscow increasingly viewed each other as a threat. This even coincided with the deepening Chinese concern about the USSR from 1961, when the USSR was almost on a par with the US in military spending. Yet, just like the shift of the CNIC, the pattern does not explain why the Sino-Soviet ideological fallout did not occur after 1969, when Soviet military expenditures surpassed that of the US. Neither does it explain why the peak of Soviet assistance to China took place between 1954 and 1958, when the Soviet military spending was declining vis-à-vis China.

Second, even though the absolute number of military personnel increasingly played a trivial role along with the advances in weapons systems, particularly nuclear weapons, one could still argue that the dramatic decline in the number of Soviet troops from mid-1950s (see *Figure 3.5*) contributed to its perceived incompetence, hence, increasing unreliability. Yet, an immediate inconsistency in this argument is why the increase in Soviet military personnel from mid-1960s did not bring about a corresponding improvement in the Chinese perception. Also, what occurred to Chinese leaders in the mid-1950s was exactly the opposite of this rationalist prediction: In fact, Beijing perceived Moscow as more threatening rather than incompetent.

Finally, one could also argue that the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons played an important role in Soviet leaders' assessments regarding the Sino-Soviet border disputes from the early 1960s. Although evidence shows that some Soviet officials indeed perceived China's nuclear tests from 1964 as signs of increasing danger for Soviet security, this largely supports what ***Proposition 1*** suggests about the undermining effect of offensive power under perceptions of unreliability.[264] Also, as our analysis has shown, neither side saw the other's nuclear program as an indicator of unreliability before 1958. On the other hand, a close look at historical evidence reveals that the sequences of threat perceptions concerning nuclear weapons in the 1960s were the reverse: It is Beijing who initially developed a fear of nuclear attacks from the USSR from 1963 — the peak of the Sino-Soviet polemics, due to vaguely formulated warming of "catastrophic" border situation from Moscow. Then, from 1965, China already started to construct underground facilities in Beijing against potential Soviet nuclear attacks.[265] Yet, Moscow did not begin its deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the border until 1967.[266] This process rather lends more support to the ARM, as it shows that, instead of looking at actual deployment, Beijing relied on Moscow's gestures as primary indicators of Soviet nuclear threat.

Domestic Institutions

To measure domestic institutions, I rely on the Polity IV project. According to the coding of Polity IV, a democratic political system can be identified with the following elements: (1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; (2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive; and (3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. In contrast, an autocratic system can be identified with a range of factors which reflect the suppression of competitive politi-

[264] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1970: 18).
[265] Ibid., 7-8, Shao (2010).
[266] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1970: 24).

cal participation, and the degree of directiveness over social and economic activities. Based on these indicators, a country's level of democracy or autocracy can be rated on an eleven-point scale between 0 and 10.[267]

Not unexpectedly, whereas the US is rated as 10 for its democratic institutions, both the USSR (9-7) and China (8-9) are considered highly autocratic during the two decades of their alliance relationship. According to Polity IV, although China showcased a highly autocratic system overall, the CCP regime became even more totalitarian during the Cultural Revolution; this is reflected by the higher autocracy score it receives after 1965 (increase from 8 to 9). However, the Soviet political system went through a slightly different course after Stalin. Stalin's rule represents the most oppressive era of the Soviet dictatorship, characterized by mass terror and with about 15 per cent of its male adult population being imprisoned in labor camps.[268] Under the rules of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the Soviet Union went through a period of de-Stalinization and administrative reforms which were aimed at de-centralization, economic development, and expanding political participation.[269] As a result, the USSR had been transformed from a highly oppressive totalitarian regime to an authoritarian, bureaucratic state.[270] Accordingly, Polity IV denotes this change by lowering its autocracy rating from 9 to 7 for the post-1953 years.

As the RCM suggests, increasing institutional constraint should grant more credibility to a country's alliance commitment. Yet, the Sino-Soviet case does not support this prediction. When Khrushchev pushed for his de-Stalinization policy and political reforms from the mid-1950s, Beijing did not in any sense interpret it as a positive sign of Soviet reliability. Con-

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[267] Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016, Dataset Users' Manual: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf

[268] Sakwa (1998: 51-2).

[269] As Sakwa points out, the main achievements of de-stalinisation were "the termination of twenty-five years of mass terror and the limitation of the powers of the security police. Millions of prison-camp survivors were released, many administrative and bureaucratic abuses were curbed, and the role of charismatic one-person rule was reduced." And the Brezhnev period was characterized by "a limited and pragmatic view of social engineering, an end to revolutions from above, continued restraints on mass terror, a commitment to improved social welfare and a broadening of consultation with specialist groupings and the political elite." Ibid, 57, 67; for Khrushchev's de-centralization policies, political and legal reforms, see Ibid., 58-9, Smith and Melanie (2011: 26, 41).

[270] For Khrushchev and Brezhnev's authoritarian leadership styles, see Breslauer (1982: 269-270).

trarily, Mao viewed Moscow's anti-Stalin orientation as a dangerous sign politically. Termed the secret report at the 20th CPSU Congress a shock attack on socialist countries, he rather paid more attention to the ideological chaos Khrushchev's de-Stalinization created in China and East Europe. The Soviet transformation to oligarchic rule, ironically, became evidence of Moscow's growing revisionism.

Reputation for Reliability

To measure reputation for reliability, I rely on a commonly used dataset in the large-N studies of alliance reliability: The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP) developed by Brett Ashley Leeds.[271] By observing a state's fulfillment of specific alliance obligations, the ATOP dataset provides a more precise measurement of a state's record of honoring or reneging on alliance commitment between 1815 and 2003. It measures the existence of a formal alliance obligation by either a defense/nonaggression pact or treaty to remain neutral in a war involving an ally and a third party.[272]

As *Table 3.6* illustrates, the records of obligations fulfillment for China, the USSR and the US do not support the rationalist argument that reputation matters to perceptual change. Among the three countries, the USSR ranked as the most unreliable candidate for an ally by the rationalist standard, that is, the reputation for reliability is a state attribute that comprised

Table 3.6: Records of Alliance Obligations Fulfillment

	USA (1815-1969)	USSR (1917-69)	PRC (1949-69)
Nonfulfillment Rate	0%	34%	17%
Number of Agreement	20	50	12
Number of Violation	0	17	2
Number of Violation (1949-69)	0	4	2

Note: Data from the ATOP dataset

[271] See the ATOP project: http://atop.rice.edu/
[272] Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell and Long (2002: 269-270).

of one's past record of fulfillment. Between 1917 and 1969, the USSR reneged on 17 alliance commitments, out of a total of 50; its probability of nonfulfillment reached 34 per cent. Also, China had reneged on two commitments out of a total number of 12 since 1949, reaching a nonfulfillment rate of 17 per cent. In comparison, the US enjoyed a surprisingly excellent record of obligation fulfillment between 1815 and 1969.

From the rationalist perspective, leaders should perceive a state with a better reputation for reliability, namely, a higher rate of obligations fulfillment as more reliable. Given the past records from ATOP, both China and USSR should consider the US a more reliable candidate for aligning in late 1949. Yet, this rationalist prediction is exactly contrary to the actual perceptions of Chinese and Soviet leaders at the time. Both sides, in fact, viewed the US as their greatest threat in the international system. Furthermore, between 1949 and 1956, Beijing's assessment of Soviet reliability provides a strong case against the rationalist prediction. Since 1945, the USSR had already reneged on five of their alliance commitments, respectively, to the UK and France (the early 1940s), Yugoslavia (1945), Poland, and Hungary. Yet, Chinese leaders paid little attention to those instances, except for Poland, in their assessments. Even in the case of Poland, Beijing's protest against the Soviet intervention was based on its beliefs about shared Communist ideologies with Poland. Essentially, Chinese leaders believed that Moscow's behavior could not be justifiable because Warsaw was still under a Communist leadership. Conversely, as Beijing believed that both Yugoslavia and Hungary were deviating from the Communist ideologies, it quickly moved to support Moscow's punitive behavior while disregarding the fact that it actually constituted a violation of Soviet alliance commitment.

3.3.3 Conclusion

Generally speaking, the history of the Sino-Soviet alliance lends a stronger support for the ARM. It shows that the ARM makes much better sense in explaining the overall patterns of

leaders' use of information and perceptual changes during the course of intra-alliance interactions. In particular, it transcends the dichotomy of costly-costless signals, as a product of the rationalist logic of strategic communication, and calls our attention to leaders' feelings and emotions as the micro-foundation of intention assessments. By contrast, the RCM cannot grasp this logic of affect, and some of its most important insights, regarding capabilities, institutions, reputation, and signaling, can hardly be supported against fine-grained analysis of leaders' information-processing.

Finally, from an empirical perspective, the dramatic change of the Sino-Soviet relationship from fraternity to hostility calls our attention to the question concerning the nature of state interests. What matters more to leaders' sense of convergent or divergent interests? Is it strategic imperatives? Substantive actions? Or the way information about interests are vividly presented and experienced by leaders? Undoubtedly, the case of the Sino-Soviet alliance rather points to the last answer. The examination of leaders' face-to-face interactions particularly suggests that alliance management is more of an art of statecraft, than of a science of prediction by hard measurements of strategic imperatives. Thus, effective communication, sensibility to others' feelings and, probably more importantly, the ability to prevent one's destructive emotions from getting out of control appear to be more valuable skills for a cautious leadership.

Chapter 4

Uneasy Cooperation: The US-ROC Alliance, 1949-1975

4.1 Overview

In December 1954, the US and the ROC signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in Washington. This symbolized the revival of the alliance between the American and the Nationalist government since World War II. For Chiang Kai-Check, it was a hard-won diplomatic victory during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.[1] Nevertheless, the treaty was a step further from a *de-facto* alliance relationship between the two countries since the Korean War — the outgrowth of the US strategy of containment during the Cold War.[2] Thus, as Washington prioritized its rapprochement with Beijing in the late 1970s, the MDT became increasingly unattractive. Although US interests almost unilaterally determined the duration of the alliance, it only tells a lopsided story. In nearly three decades, the alliance relationship featured a complex pattern of interactions, characterized by recurrent suspicions. It is this aspect that gives us rich insights into motivations behind the major adjustments of intra-alliance behavior. This chapter focuses on revealing the psychological dimension underlying the continuity and change of leaders' beliefs about reliability. Apart from an important test for the theories, this case study merits attention on its own right, because few studies of US-ROC relations have systematically applied a psychological approach. To begin with, the next section outlines the decision-making background of the alliance and its critical junctures.

[1] Tucker (1994: 40).
[2] For the US Strategy of Containment, see Gaddis (1982).

4.1.1 The Decision-Making Context

A notable feature of the US-ROC alliance is the wide gap between its members' decision-making structures. In Washington, the system of foreign-policy making is institutionalized and decentralized. Since the Cold War, it has not experienced dramatic changes. In principle, the presidents always have the final say, and they may well bypass formal bureaucracies, relying on informal decision-making mechanisms. In practice, for most of the time since the late 1940s, the National Security Council (NSC) has served as an overarching mechanism through which the presidents can forge inter-departmental consensus.[3] During the Cold War, Washington's China policy usually took heavy inputs from three governmental agencies: the State Department (DoS), the Defense Depart (DoD) and the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS). Frequently, it was subject to their divisions and compromises. Due to Taiwan's relative insignificance, Washington tended to rely on information from those gatekeepers who worked on-site. As a result, US officials in Taiwan were often gave much policy influence.[4]

In comparison, Taipei's policy toward the US came out of a different organizational setting. First and foremost, the authoritarian system of the ROC led to a centralized mechanism of foreign policy-making with Chiang Kai-shek exercising disproportionate personal influence. Particularly, Chiang tended to manage US-ROC relations "to the minutest details, often without consulting his closet advisors."[5] Yet, compared to Beijing, Taipei developed a more institutionalized and professionalized bureaucracy of foreign affairs, partially owing to a constant pressure of governmental reform from Washington. Although Chiang shared his thoughts about US policy with a small group of aides, including his son Chiang Ching-kuo, the role of his aides "was strictly to provide advice when asked." Chiang gave little tolerance to any transgression; even the closest aides, such as his brother-in-law, T.V. Soong, would face severe punishment if they overstepped the limits.[6] Moreover, due to the ROC's heavy

[3] The NSC was created by the National Security Act of 1947. For a history of the NSC, see Brown (2008).
[4] Regarding Cline's special influence on US policy to the ROC, see Tu (2007).
[5] Chi (2016: 697).
[6] Chiang often mentioned the name of such KMT officials in his diaries; Chi (2016: 697).

dependence on the US, Chiang considered relations with the US one of the most important foreign policy issues, and tended to be hyper-sensitive to even subtle gestures of Washington. Such sensitivity stands in sharp contrast to key US leaders' relative ignorance of Taiwan, particularly from the 1960s. An overview of key actors in the alliance relationship is provided in Appendix II.

4.1.2 Critical Junctures

From 1949 to 1974, Washington witnessed five presidencies, whereas Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo monopolized the paramount leadership of the ROC. Such differences in decision-making context inevitably inform the selection of critical junctures. To make the task easier, I simply demarcate the history of the alliance with the starting point of each US presidency: First, as historical studies have shown, the five presidencies displayed certain systematic changes in their perceptions of Taipei. Given the genuineness of such beliefs, US alliance strategies should be adjusted accordingly. Second, as Chiang and other

Table 4.1 - Analytical Episodes

US Presidencies	Episodes	Main Adjustment of Alliance Behavior
Truman	1949-52	Washington shifted from a policy of abandonment to empowering Taipei during the Korean War. Though depending on Washington, Taipei pursued more independence in hedging against US betrayal.
Eisenhower	1953-60	Washington steadily stepped up alliance commitment via massive aid and the MDT. Taipei increasingly complied with the US strategic design in Asia following an initial period of growing suspicions and deviation.
Kennedy	1961-63	Washington moved toward an explicit Two-China policy while tightening control of Taipei's military behavior. Taipei became increasingly active in pursuing its reconquest of the Mainland by entrapping the US in a war with China.
Johnson	1964-68	Washington applied stricter restrictions on Taipei's military behavior. Taipei initially increased its attempts of entrapment, but moved to search for alternative security guarantees after Beijing tested its first atomic bomb.
Nixon & Ford	1969-75	Washington attempted to reassure Taipei of its commitment while normalizing relations with Beijing at the time. Taipei actively pursued nuclear weaponization as an alternative security guarantee while preparing for US abandonment.

ROC leaders were conscious of bipartisan divisions on China policy in America, US presidential elections should be times of hyper-attention for Taipei — the most likely occasions of ROC leaders' perceptual change. Conversely, if strategic imperatives overwhelmingly constrain intra-alliance behavior, such rotation in office should generate little impact on ROC leaders' reliability assessments. Thus, this study treats the start of each US presidency as a critical juncture, dividing the alliance relationship into five analytical episodes (see *Table 4.1*).

To begin with, the next section examines the causal linkage between perceptions and behavior through the US-ROC intra-alliance interactions. Afterwards, this chapter discusses the main findings and the three major alternative explanations in order.

4.2 Perceptions and Intra-Alliance Interactions

4.2.1 Nearly Broken Alliance (1949-1952)

Dismal Outlooks

The MDT in 1954 was the revival of an old alliance dating back to World War II.[7] From 1946, the Truman administration sided with Chiang in the Chinese Civil War, and provided substantial assistance to the KMT.[8] In late 1949, when Chiang fled to Taiwan, the alliance relationship was characterized by mutual negativity. Washington moved toward a policy of abandonment while Taipei perceived the US as *highly unreliable*.

Before 1950, resilient prior beliefs about the KMT's unreliability had already dominated Washington's assessments. Particularly from 1948, US opinions turned against the KMT for its successive defeats by the CCP. Key members of the Truman administration possessed an "extremely jaundiced view of the Nationalist elite." According to General MacArthur, Truman "had conceived a violent animosity toward Chiang; and that anyone who favored the

[7] That was mainly in the form of a small share of US lend-lease aid and military assistance, see Mitter (2013: 330, 447).
[8] Lin (2016a: 43).

Generalissimo might arouse the present's disfavor."[9] Also, the DoS were well-known for its general dislike of the KMT. In the China White Paper of 1949, it sharply criticized the KMT for their widespread corruption and loss of people's loyalty. Their illusory mindset, the White Paper pointed out, led to an unwanted civil war; their incompetence resulted in humiliated defeat and the waste of extensive US resources.[10] As Ambassador Wellington Koo observed in 1948, such impressions were quite representative of the general US attitude toward Chinese Nationalists. Particularly, the image that Chiang was incompetent and unpopular not only existed in "the thoughts of those Washington leaders, but was also the perception for much of the country […]."[11]

In fact, such prior beliefs had accumulated from the US-China wartime alliance. Particularly, the experiences of a group of US officials in China significantly shaped Washington's perceptions. Probably best illustrating it is the relationship between Chiang and Joseph Stilwell, the US commander in the China-Burma-India theater. Together with Ambassador Clarance Gauss, Stilwell became particularly influential in shaping the American stereotype that Chiang was incompetent and corrupt. Well-known for calling Chiang "peanut," Stilwell depicted him as "a man of ignorance and poor education," and "a phony, narrow-minded, intransigent, and hopelessly anachronistic person."[12] Despite of his inexperience as a military commander, Stilwell believed that KMT officers lacked the skills needed for modern warfare, and Chiang failed to recognize "China's desperate need for major reforms to its army." The KMT, he suspected, was more eager to use US aid for crushing the CCP, than for fighting Japan.[13] From early 1942, tensions between Stilwell and Chiang grew over military strategies in Burma. By 1944, it became so strong that Chiang demanded Washington to replace Stilwell.[14] Yet, given his close relationship with General Marshall, Stilwell's reports

[9] Garver (2015: 12), MacArthur (1964: 341).
[10] Tucker (1993: 119-20), Liu (2008: 271); Acheson pushed for the publication of the White Paper, although Marshall suggested to not release it in order to protect the Nationalist government's prestige. U.S. Department of State (1967: 31-44).
[11] Koo (1983, Vol.10: 320).
[12] Ibid, 712.
[13] Mitter (2013: 342), Chi (2016: 712).
[14] Mitter (2013: 347-9, 469).

significantly contributed to negative impressions of the KMT among US leaders.[15] Such images were reinforced by US diplomatic reports. For instant, a DoS memorandum of 1943 commented that "the general incompetence and corruption are almost unbelievable." It concluded that "the Generalissimo is now an Emperor in all but name," and "some of the finest brains in China are working to keep him misinformed."[16] Echoing Stilwell's view, a memorandum for Ambassador Gauss spoke negatively about the Chinese government's reluctance to "resume the offensive against Japan." It perceived "a Chinese inclination to rely upon the United States to defeat Japan," emphasizing "the lack of organization, political factionalism, incompetence, apathy and corruption in the Chinese army."[17]

Making things worse was Washington and Chongqing's discontents over their cooperation.[18] Originally, Roosevelt wanted to utilize China's manpower to mount counter-offensives against the Japanese forces in Burma. Yet, whereas Washington expected to maximize China's combat performance, it only devoted limited resources to the China theater.[19] As a result, Chiang was disappointed by Washington's passiveness and arrogance, as he expected an equal partnership and generous US assistance. Also, he became wary about US intentions. In 1944, Washington approached the CCP under Stilwell's suggestion. Chiang immediately suspected that Roosevelt attempted to overthrow him — a typical internal attribution to malign US intentions.[20] Thus, the US-China wartime alliance was already confronted with "a constant flow of acrimonies and outright confrontations."[21]

From the Chinese Civil War in 1947, mutual suspicions grew further. Affective signals, namely, negative personal impressions from the Marshall mission played a key role. Accord-

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[15] Stilwell's lack of faith in Chiang and the KMT led him to cut off US lend-lease aid. He even began to draw up plans to assassinate Chiang. Stilwell could directly appeal to Roosevelt on China affairs. Also, he enjoyed Marshall's unwavering trust of the information he gave on China. For Stilwell's impact on US public opinion about China, see Dorn (1971: 75), Bagby (1992: 96), Mitter (2013: 478), Chi (2016: 698).
[16] U.S. Department of State (1963: doc.108).
[17] Ibid, doc.17.
[18] Chongqing was the wartime capital of the Chinese government in the early 1940s.
[19] Mitter (2013: 341-2), Chi (2016: 706-9).
[20] Mitter (2013: 455, 472, 480).
[21] Ibid, 331-2, Chi (2016: 709).

ing to Truman, Marshall failed to prevent the civil war "because the government of Chiang did not command the respect and support of the Chinese people." Chiang's attitude and actions, he perceived, "were those of old-fashioned warlords, and, as with the warlords, there was no love for him among the people."[22] Also, through face-to-face interactions, Marshall was deeply frustrated by Chiang's intransigence and the KMT's corruption. Thus, after returning to the US as the new state secretary, he pressured the Nationalist government for a ceasefire talk with the CCP by threatening arms embargo.[23] On the other hand, Chiang's unfavorable impressions of Marshall led to deeper suspicions of US intentions. From late 1949, Chiang's resentment toward Marshall dominated his assessments. He particularly blamed Marshall for misadvise, which cost the KMT the chance to defeat the CCP. Concluding that Marshall "sold out" his government, Chiang even blamed the general for "deliberate attempts" to encourage Communist expansion in Asia. Also, he wishfully attributed Marshall's intentions to the "leftist" ideologies of the Democrats.[24] With a deep sense of humiliation, Chiang's hatred reached such an extent that he had always been scornful of Marshall since then, writing Marshall's name in a humiliating Chinese homonym: *ma xia er* — a child falling down from a horse.

In accordance, Washington became increasingly pessimistic about Taiwan's fate in 1949. As State Secretary Dean Acheson began to prepare for disengagement from China, this quickly turned to a policy of abandonment.[25] After exploring alternative options, including an UN trusteeship on Taiwan, Acheson tried to restrict US assistance to the ROC to non-military forms. By late 1949, the DoS had readily formulated a policy of disengagement in NSC 48/2. As a result, Washington stopped military aid and did not appoint a new ambassador to the ROC. In his well-known speech on 5 January 1950, Truman announced Washington's

[22] Truman (1956: 90).
[23] U.S. Department of State (1973: doc.373), Kurtz-Phelan (2018).
[24] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 642, 667, 697, 753).
[25] Acheson (1970: 140), Li and Shi (2011: 64).

new Asia policy, which excluded Taiwan and South Korea from the US defense perimeter in the West Pacific.[26]

Although Washington intended to encourage Titoism in Beijing, its disengagement policy contradicted US security interest in the West Pacific, namely, the defense of the islands chain from Japan to the Philippines. US leaders' divergent beliefs began to translate into State-Defense divisions on Taipei's reliability. Since 1948, the JCS had consistently pushed for continuing military assistance to the ROC, as it considered Taiwan strategically important to defend the island chains in a war with the Soviet Union.[27] Yet, Truman rejected the proposals because of the DoS's opposition. Truman and Acheson were pessimistic about Taipei's self-defense capabilities, and believed that Taiwan would soon fall to the Communist hands. A CIA report estimated that it would fall by the end of 1950. Since early 1950, the DoS already started to withdraw US diplomats from Taiwan.[28]

On the ROC side, negative prior beliefs also structured Chiang's assessments. Learning about Truman's speech on 5 January, Chiang immediately explained the paused US military aid with the DoS's "persistent attempt to overthrow Chiang and destroy China" — an internal attribution to malign US intentions.[29] Also, making an analogy with Marshall, Chiang reasoned that Acheson deliberately ordered US consulates in the Far East to spread fatalist message about Taiwan in order to obstruct US military aid; he even went so far as to claim that both Marshall and Acheson were under heavy influence of American communists, who were capable of creating upheavals in China through US diplomats.[30] In January, Chiang wrote that:

> *Recently, although the American society have been largely clear about its State Department being manipulated by the leftists, and this makes a grave mistake. Yet,*

[26] Garver (2015: 16-20).
[27] Poole (1998: 199), Schnabel and Watson (1998: 15).
[28] Poole (1998: 213), Shen (2013, Vol.1: 213).
[29] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 428).
[30] Ibid, 428, 430.

Acheson was struggling to conceal his mistakes. Particularly, trying to appeal to Americans' fear of war, he claimed that the abandonment of Taiwan could avoid dragging the US into a war.[31]

Upon Acheson's speech on the US defense perimeter, Chiang quickly reasoned that Washington was colluding with Moscow. "Nowadays, America's China policy," he wrote, "was completely manipulated by the Communists within the Department of State." Therefore, Chiang concluded that "the US expressed its eager desire to come to terms with Russia, showing its main strategy for solving the China problem, that is, to sell China out, and to recognize the Chinese Communists."[32]

Yet, such beliefs were far from prototypical. Chiang not only was aware of the American bipartisan divisions on Taiwan, but also had supporters from the US military establishments and the Republicans. Before the Korean War, Taipei attempted to win support from US military leaders, including Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the SCAP, and Arthur Radford, the head of the Pacific Command (PACOM).[33] Both were hawkish toward Communism, and converged with Chiang's anti-Communist positions. Both had also developed positive impressions of Chiang through face-to-face diplomacy. Particularly, MacArthur viewed Chiang as his "old comrade-in-arms of the last war," and expressed his admiration to Chiang's determination to fight Communism.[34] Compatible to such perceptions, they shared the DoS's position on Taiwan's strategic importance and the necessity of military aid.[35] Thus, from early 1950, MacArthur began to establish contact with Taipei. In January, he sent Chiang a personal message of defense commitment, starting to exchange proposals of anti-communist strategies via Admiral Charles Cooke, former Commander of the Seventh Fleet.[36]

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[31] Ibid, 438.
[32] Ibid, 432.
[33] Koo (1983, Vol.10: 551), Chen (1994: 369).
[34] MacArthur (1964: 339-40).
[35] For MacArthur's "Memorandum on Formosa" on June 14th, 1950, in NSC37/10, see U.S. Department of State (1976: doc.240), Koo (1983, Vol.9: 716).
[36] Chiang developed a good impression of Admiral Cooke. See Lü (2014, Vol.9: 472); also, see Chiang Kai-shek Chronicles database: http://www.ccfd.org.tw/ccef001/web/

At the time, pro-ROC members of Congress, mostly Republicans, pushed for an aid package of $50 million to Taiwan; many of them were also MacArthur's friends. For example, Senator Howard Alexander Smith — a close friend of MacArthur — visited Taiwan in 1949 and developed positive impressions of the KMT.[37]

From Chiang's perspective, "although American foreign policy seems hopeless now," he still believed that there was room for improvement.[38] Taipei had the chance to fight its way through the influence of those "bad guys" and "American traitors" in the Truman administration, whom, as Chiang wishfully thought, belonged to the minority, and they were eager to sacrifice Chinese and American interests in appeasing the Soviets.[39] He even charged that Acheson was fearful of confronting the Soviets because of his British origin, hence, his vulnerability to London's pro-PRC policy.[40]

The Turning Point

From mid-1950, Washington gradually reversed its hands-off policy. The Korean War significantly deepened Washington's perception of a threatening Communist monolith, hence, eliminating any hope for Chinese Titoism. Convinced of Moscow's ambition for world domination, Truman and Acheson believed that US concessions in Asia would only reward Russian aggrandizement.[41] Truman not only reversed the decision to stay away from Korea, but also ordered the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait.[42] Yet, resilient suspicions still dominated Washington's struggle between resumed commitment and its reluctance to give up the disengagement policy. Truman not only restricted the Nationalist forces' operations

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[37] Wellington Koo noticed that MacArthur's friends in the Congress once proposed to extend the SCAP's scope of responsibility to Taiwan. See Koo (1983, Vol.9: 716-7), Zhao (1994: 190-2).
[38] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 438).
[39] In his diaries, Chiang repeatedly called Acheson "*jian*," which means traitor to one's own country. See Ibid, 433-5, 609.
[40] Ibid, 713.
[41] U.S. Department of State (1977b: 405), Mercer (2013), Garver (2015: 27).
[42] Garver (2015: 35).

against the Mainland, but also limited the scope of US defense responsibilities to the minimum.[43]

By contrast, the DoD urged Truman to authorize a military aid program to Taipei.[44] In late June, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson personally reassured Chiang of his commitment to renewing military assistance.[45] Also, the Far Eastern Command (FACOM) actively took efforts to improve Taiwan's defense capabilities. In July, Commander of the Seventh Fleet-Arthur Struble visited Taipei and worked out a coordinated plan of defense with the ROC. According to their division of labor, the Seventh Fleet would guard the outer approaches of the Strait, while the Nationalist forces would defend the inner zone. On 31 July, MacArthur visited Taipei and engaged in cordial conversations with Chiang. Impressed with the "good potential" of the Nationalist forces, MacArthur showed his great interest in Chiang's proposal to offer three divisions of the Nationalist forces to fight in Korea.[46] In August, despite Acheson's opposition, the general sent a military survey group to find out Taipei's requirements for military resources. Simultaneously, the Pacific Air Force (PACCAF) also ordered the development of the 13th Air Force to Taiwan.[47]

Nevertheless, a contingent factor — the Chinese intervention — shattered Washington's illusions about Chinese Titoism. Washington eventually gave up its reservation on resuming defense commitment to Taiwan. On 21 September, NSC 68/1 specified various programs for implementing a strategy of empowerment to US allies.[48] In the same month, the DoS announced Washington's resumption of military assistance to the ROC. By November, Washington had completed the first shipment of ammunitions worth $9.8 million since the end of

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[43] For example, in July, Washington opposed Taipei's bombardment of the Mainland, and also informed Taipei that Jinmen was not in the scope of responsibilities of the Seventh Fleet. In August, Truman warned Taipei that any ROC attack on the Mainland would be considered unfriendly behavior by the US.
[44] Schnabel and Watson (1998: 232), Garver (2015: 37).
[45] Tucker (1994: 68), Lü (2014, Vol.9: 512-3).
[46] MacArthur (1964: 339), Schnabel and Watson (1998: 232, 235), Lü (2014, Vol.9: 531-3).
[47] Qin (1978: 4332), Tucker (1994: 69).
[48] It is widely believed that NSC 68 in April 1950 marked the initial formulation of the US strategy of containment in the Cold War. See Gaddis (1982), Drew (1994: 106).

1949.[49] Also, the NSC officially listed Taiwan among the nations which should receive Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) in NSC 68/4.[50] Then, 1951 saw a steady restoration of US commitment. In January, Washington and Taipei signed an agreement on China Mutual Defense Assistance, which entailed a military aid program worth $150 million.[51] In May, the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Taipei, in order to implement the program. In August, Truman proposed an upgraded program for Taiwan's defense under the Mutual Security Act. This included an aid package worth $300 million, and resulted in the US-ROC Mutual Security Agreement in early 1952. From mid-1952, Washington further issued guarantees for private American investment in Taiwan.[52]

Simultaneously, Washington began to reassess the military value of the Nationalist forces. In early 1951, while the NSC was considering a naval blockade of China, it recommended the president to remove the restrictions on the Nationalist forces' operations against the Mainland and provide logistic support.[53] By mid-1951, the JCS had not only reconsidered Chiang's offer of three divisions to MacArthur, but also incorporated the mission of Taiwan defense to the scope of responsibility of the UN Forces in Korea.[54] These developments were clearly in line with the course of action outlined by NSC 48/5. This assessment clearly set three strategic objectives on Taiwan in preventing a communist takeover: (1) To continue the mission of the Seventh Fleet in the Strait; (2) to boost the influence of the KMT regime in China through political reforms; (3) to improve the capabilities of the Nationalist forces through military and economic assistance.[55]

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[49] Chen (1953: 65-6), Poole (1998: 203).
[50] MDAP was according to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act signed by Truman on October 6th 1949, which was the first US military foreign aid legislation in the Cold War period. See Drew (1994: 122-4).
[51] Koo (1983, Vol.10: 311-2).
[52] Ibid, 459, Gibert and Carpenter (1989: 122-4, 180), Poole (1998: 207).
[53] U.S. Department of State (1983: doc.62, doc.70, doc.122).
[54] Schnabel and Watson (1998: 225).
[55] U.S. Department of State (1977a: doc.12).

Unhappy Partnership

By late 1952, as Ambassador Koo observed, the inter-governmental relationship had seen growing cordiality.[56] Yet, down the surface, enduring suspicions remained influential in either side's assessments. In Taipei, Chiang warily watched signs for change in America's China policy; US leaders' statements and gestures attracted most of his attention while substantive US actions, such as military assistance, largely failed to impress Chiang. In general, he was not excited about resumed US aid. For example, in mid-1951, Chiang wrote that the arrival of the MAAG "did not move his heart at all."[57] Conversely, Washington's perceivably slow implementation of aid often annoyed him, even becoming new signs of malicious US intentions — an obvious indicator of negative beliefs defense. In late 1951, when the US Congress approved an aid package of $300 million to Taiwan under the Mutual Security Act, Chiang recorded his "deep feeling of humiliation":

> *With regard to the American assistance of $300 million, […] others viewed this as a fortunate thing, and took it as a comfort. However, I simply thought that our humiliation was deepened by this. Therefore, I can only view this with disregard; and how can I ever feel lucky about it?* [58]

Again, in early 1952, feeling discontent with the quality of delivered US weapons, Chiang complained that this indicated "the current administration's vicious intention to us, which can hardly be expressed by words."[59] Also, what reinforced Chiang's downplaying of US assistance was his awareness that the Korean War played a decisive role in reversing Truman's policy of abandonment. As a result, Chiang largely resorted to external attribution in explaining Washington's empowering behavior, concluding that the resumed commitment

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[56] Koo (1983, Vol.9: 549).
[57] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 470, 659).
[58] Ibid, 702.
[59] Ibid, 5.

was the outcome of both the ROC's diplomatic efforts and the help of his Republican supporters.[60]

By contrast, diplomatic gestures, together with personal impressions, figured prominently in ROC leaders' assessments, particularly when it came to sovereignty-related issues. Chiang and ROC diplomats were highly sensitive to the political messages behind US behavior. A typical example is Chiang's response to the US neutralization of the Taiwan Strait. In June 1950, Chiang protested angrily against Truman's instruction to the Seventh Fleet. He bitterly complained that Washington disregarded "Taiwan's sovereign status," and prevented the Nationalist forces to "attack the bandit area of our mainland territories, treating us like a colony."[61] Similarly, Ambassador Koo's attention was primarily drawn to the "ruthless wording regarding Taiwan's status" in Truman's speech. In addition, he noticed the careless attitude of US political elites, because none of his American friends "had noticed the apparent intention of the statement, that is, to freeze the international status of Taiwan and the Nationalist government."[62]

From mid-1950, a series of such gestures deeply hurt ROC leaders' national sentiment. First, in forging consensus among US allies, Washington sought to pass the issue of Taiwan's sovereign status to the UN General Assembly for discussion. Yet, this action stirred consistent objections from ROC officials on the basis of sovereignty.[63] Second, in late 1950, when Washington agreed to Moscow's proposal to discuss the status of Taiwan in the UN Security Council (UNSC), Chiang immediately considered it humiliating to the ROC. Viewing Taiwan as a domestic issue of China, he took the internationalization of Taiwan issue as evidence of Acheson's malicious intention to undermine Taipei's prestige.[64] In addition, when the UNSC dispatched a commission to investigate the Soviet accusation of America's inva-

[60] Qin (1978, Vol.9).
[61] Ibid, 515.
[62] Koo (1983, Vol.10: 7-8).
[63] Bush (2004: 90-2).
[64] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 542-3).

sion of Taiwan, Chiang wrote that this was "the biggest humiliation to our country on the international stage in this year."[65]

Ultimately, what humiliated Chiang most was Washington's decision to exclude Taipei from the Japan peace treaty. From early 1951, US allies were divided on China's participation in the peace treaty. In particular, Britain supported Beijing's participation. Eventually, Washington and London reached a compromise: Both Taipei and Beijing were excluded. Instead, Washington mediated a separate peace treaty between Japan and the ROC.[66] Yet, from Chiang's viewpoint, Washington's tolerance of the very idea to exclude the ROC was deeply humiliating. Also, it was sufficiently strong to challenge his general image of America. In July 1951, Chiang assessed that:

> *Since Britain and America jointly released their approach to the Japan peace treaty, and the exclusion of our country from the signatories, […] it had fundamentally changed my worldview and view of nation in the last forty years; in particular, it changed my view of America. This is like starting to awaken from a nightmare, and I'm aware of my short-sightedness, and the deep guilt of misguiding my country and people.*[67]

Even a month later, Chiang could not stop expressing grievance over this humiliating treatment. "My wife," he wrote, "also felt extremely painful and angry about this. She was often pessimistic because of the painful experience that a nation had no freedom and was treated by others at will."[68] Then, in a dramatic manner, Chiang went on to conclude that "such betrayal by America is not only extremely humiliating to the Chinese nation; and even if this would not lead to the start of a world apocalypse, it will cause a tragedy of human beings on the globe."[69]

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[65] Ibid, 603.
[66] Bush (2004: 92-3).
[67] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 699).
[68] Qin (1978, Vol.9: 30 August).
[69] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 713).

Under enduring negative feelings, Chiang became increasingly suspicious of American officials in Taiwan, particularly the MAAG. Chiang suspected that the DoS secretly ordered American officials to "take control over the military and financial authorities of Taiwan." Also, he reasoned that Acheson and Marshall's vicious intentions came out of their ambition to establish new Asian colonies and to dominate the Yellow Race.[70] Then, Chiang quickly interpreted other US actions as evidence to Washington's conspiracy to oust him, including Washington's supportive attitude to Sun Li-jen, the Chief Commander of the ROC Army, and the MAAG's attempt to abolish political departments in the KMT forces.[71] As a result, lasting suspicions led to Chiang's strong desire for an independence strategy. From 1949 to 1952, his diaries were replete with expressions of frustration with democracy and the American leadership of the Free World. He regretted his blind acceptance of US advices during the Chinese Civil War, and pledged to never rely on Washington too much.[72] Nevertheless, the ROC lacked substantial means to influence Washington's policy by 1952. Taiwan could barely sustain itself because of the influx of over one million mainlanders. Its survival was solely dependent on America's goodwill. Militarily, the Nationalist forces suffered from a severe shortage of military resources.[73]

Yet, the heavy dependence did not reduce Chiang's incentives for regaining autonomy. From early 1950, Chiang frequently protested against unfavorable US actions, as manifested in a mixture of resistance and non-cooperative behavior. In early 1950, Chiang ordered the Nationalist Air Force to bombard power and gas plants owned by American business during an air strike on Shanghai.[74] Also, he became increasingly confrontational toward unfavorable American diplomatic gestures. For example, in June 1951, Chiang went so far as to publicly

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[70] Ibid, 699; Koo also shared part of Chiang's such suspicion, although he felt more uncertain about the US intention. See Koo (1983, Vol.9: 582-3).
[71] In mid-1951, General Chase questioned the function of the politics department, headed by Chiang Ching-kuo. He pushed for reform of the system consistently in the following two years. This became a lasting point of conflict between the MAAG and the ROC Defense Ministry. See Chen (2014: 79-80), Lü (2014, Vol.9: 723).
[72] Lü (2014, Vol.9: 534, 714).
[73] Lin (2016a: 142).
[74] Chiang recorded the event in his end of the year summary, see Lü (2014, Vol.9: 607).

denounce the exclusion of Taipei from the Japan peace treaty, and also threatened to exercise veto power in response to UN discussions on China representation. In addition, he continued to resist American interventions in the ROC's domestic politics.[75]

More importantly, to hedge against US abandonment, Chiang began to create an alternative system of military education in the Nationalist forces from mid-1949. However, the pivot of the reform — *bai tuan* (white regiment) — was a group of Japanese officers who previously served in the Imperial Japanese Army.[76] Despite oppositions from Nationalist generals, Chiang launched the operation of *bai tuan* from early 1950. Although the monitoring of the MAAG forced Chiang to turn *bai tuan* underground from 1952, it quickly became a major training institute for senior officers. It is calculated that nearly 4,700 Nationalist officers were sent to *bai tuan* for military education from 1950 to 1952. Later, *bai tuan* also won the reputation as the "underground National Defense University"; its training was even deemed necessary for promotion to senior positions in the army.[77] Though originally using the Japanese to balance against US influence in the military, Chiang developed close relationship with key members of *bai tuan*, such as its leader Tomita Naosuke.[78]

Last but not least, Taipei began to show its growing preference to escalate on-going conflicts with Beijing, which might eventually drag Washington in. During the Korean War, for example, Chiang and some Nationalist elites, including T.V. Soong, wishfully expected the Third World War to break out shortly.[79] Also, in 1950, Chiang's offer of three Nationalist divisions to MacArthur was partially motivated by his attempt to extend the Chinese Civil War to a larger geographic scope. Accordingly, the Nationalist forces also made attempts to bypass US restrictions in order to launch operations against the Mainland.[80]

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[75] Bush (2004: 93), Koo (1983, Vol.9: 384).
[76] Nojima (2015: 45).
[77] Lin (2015: 120), Nojima (2015: 212, 222).
[78] Tomita used a pseudo Chinese name Bai Hong-liang, and the group was in fact nicknamed after his Chinese surname. See Lin (2015: 116), Nojima (2015: 200).
[79] Koo (1983, Vol.9: 367).
[80] Lin (2016a: 9, 204-7).

Not surprisingly, Washington's perceptions were far from positive. As Koo observed in 1952, the DoS's aversion to Chiang remained unchanged.[81] Now US leaders were more concerned about Taipei's attempts of deviation, while personal impressions from US officials in Taiwan figured prominently in Washington's assessments. First, US leaders were well aware of Taipei's intention of entrapment. In a letter to Defense Secretary Lovett, Walter Bedell Smith, the director of the CIA, noticed that the KMT officials were still "hoping to recapture control of China as a by-product of US victory in World War III."[82] In 1952, Another CIA report cautioned against the risk of "preparing the Chinese Nationalists for offensive operations," as this might encourage Taipei to invade the Mainland "regardless of US directives or the prospects of success."[83] Moreover, Washington was aware of Taipei's resistance to US pressure on domestic reforms. In 1951, a MAAG report estimated that "aging, cantankerous, suspicious and intensely sensitive Gimo may be expected [to] resist certain aspects [of] US military aid, particularly anything which he considers affects such highly sensitive matters as secret police activities, political work in armed forces." It went on to suggest a tit-for-tat strategy, because Chiang "would yield any point" if Washington pressed firmly.[84]

On the other hand, US officials' reports on Taiwan's self-support efforts led to moderate rise of Washington's perceptions. Personal impressions, particularly out of face-to-face interactions between Chargé d'Affaires Karl Rankin and Nationalist elites, figured prominently in this change. In a memorandum in early 1952, General Chase, the Chief of the MAAG, observed that "Minister Rankin enjoyed excellent relations with the Chinese government personnel."[85] A later article in *Taiwan Review* also testified to this conducive relationship at a personal level:

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[81] Koo (1983, Vol.9: 472, 553).
[82] Poole (1998: 209).
[83] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1952: 2).
[84] U.S. Embassy Taiwan (1951b).
[85] Department of State (1985: doc.8).

No foreign envoy has left China leaving behind such warm feelings for him that are not unmixed with a touch of sadness. Others have spent their lifetime in China, learned to speak the language and made thousands of acquaintances, yet they do not generate in the hearts of the Free Chinese the kind of sentiment usually reserved only for close friends and comrades-in-arm who have shared with them the darkest moments in the history of their country.[86]

By late 1951, corresponding to his growing sensitivity toward the ROC's concerns, Rankin judged that Taipei had done "rather well during the past year" on putting "its economic house in order." He also assured the DoS that "the need for more economic aid for Formosa" was not exaggerated.[87] When the DoS attempted to subject Taiwan's "unusually high military expenditures — 70 per cent of the total budget of the island" to Washington's review, Rankin argued against it and proposed, instead, to expand Taiwan's local currency availability, hence, loans available to the Nationalist government, on the basis that the DoS program would result in overall dissatisfaction.[88]

Furthermore, the MAAG also reported considerable improvement concerning Taiwan's defense capabilities. By early 1952, General Chase felt that "the operations of the MAAG group in Formosa were beginning to show results although a lot of work remained to be done. […] however, that it was worth the effort."[89] Particularly noteworthy is that the Nationalist forces' morale became an important factor which US leaders constantly relied on. In February 1952, during a conversion with John Allison, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Chase assessed that "the morale of Chinese forces was satisfactory or better"; he estimated that "the Chinese nationalist forces were a potentially effective fighting force."[90] The same month, while discussing with John Foster Dulles the President's Special

[86] Taiwan Review (01 January 1958).
[87] U.S. Embassy Taiwan (1951a).
[88] Lin (2016a: 191).
[89] U.S. Department of State (1985, doc.8).
[90] Ibid.; also see MAAG Progress Report 1951 and 1952 in Wu (2013, Vol.2: 304, 402).

Ambassador, Chase emphasized that "while absence from their homes on the mainland was a psychological disadvantage, […] the morale of Chinese forces was satisfactory or better and that given proper training they would fight well and remain loyal."[91] Corresponding to these reports, senior US leaders also increasingly cited Taiwan's morale in their own assessments. In a memorandum to Defense Secretary Lovett in March 1952, the JCS showed its inclination to accept the MAAG's estimate concerning the "morale" of the Nationalist forces "as far as it is based on first hand observation over an extended period by a qualified representative of the Department of Defense."[92] In April, during a DoS-JCS meeting, Dulles readily accepted the morale-capabilities linkage, as he argued that "a morale factor is involved. If the Chinese on Formosa do not believe that they have a chance to return at some time in the future I don't believe we will succeed in developing larger capabilities on the island."[93] Accordingly, both the JCS and the CIA commented positively on the improved combat ability of the Nationalist forces. By mid-1951, the JCS even considered requesting two Nationalist divisions for offensive use in Korea. By this time, even Truman, Koo recalled, had developed more positive impressions of the KMT.[94]

Overall, from 1950 to 1952, the *de facto* alliance between Washington and Taipei was largely characterized by mutual suspicions. The ARM makes a better explanation of the intra-alliance relationship in general. First and foremost, negative prior beliefs and divergent identities largely dominated leaders' initial assessments, which drove Washington's policy of disengagement in the first place. During the Korean War, such negativity gradually directed US leaders' attention to Taipei's intentions of entrapment. While Washington resumed its policy of empowerment, it also regulated Taipei's military behavior through a mixture of monitoring and threat. With regard to Taipei, supportive evidence for the ARM is abundant.

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[91] Dulles was appointed by Truman as his special representative in the peace treaty negotiations with Japan at the time. See U.S. Department of State (1985: doc.8).
[92] Ibid, doc.9, doc.53.
[93] Ibid, doc.17.
[94] Poole (1998: 209), U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1952: 2), U.S. National Security Council (1952), Koo (1983, Vol.9: 569).

First, Chiang's assessments were largely shaped by his suspicions of malicious US intentions, which he had developed since the Chinese Civil War. With strong negativity against US leaders including Truman, Marshall, and Acheson, Chiang tended to frequently ignore the positive aspect of substantive US signals, as demonstrated by his consistent downplaying of resumed US commitment from mid-1950.

Furthermore, although capabilities seemed to figure prominently in Washington's assessments, a closer look suggests that US leaders did not perceived capabilities in a rationalist sense. First, US officials in Taiwan often relied on their impressions of subjective measures, particularly morale as an important indicator of capabilities. More importantly, Taiwan's capabilities were also subject to different interpretations, depending on the degree to which an assessor shared the Truman administration's negative prior beliefs. The DoS's pessimism highly corresponded to its general dislike of Chiang — a typical pattern of negative beliefs defense. Accordingly, it perceived relatively unimportant strategic value of Taiwan. By contrast, the defense establishments, particularly those US leaders who had positive interactions with Chiang, tended to be more optimistic about Taiwan's capabilities, and also see its greater strategic value. On the one hand, Washington's alliance behavior was partially compatible to its perceptions, particularly from late 1950. It is undeniable that the Korean War decisively influenced Washington's decision to reverse its policy of abandonment. Thereafter, Taiwan's efforts to strengthen its defense, largely via American officers' personal impressions, contributed to Washington's improved optimism.

Finally, little evidence shows that Washington and Taipei examined the cost of each other's substantive actions rationally. On the one hand, Washington simply could not rely on much sunk-cost signals from Taipei. To improve Taiwan's self-sufficiency, the US financed a heavy aid program. Since 1951, US aid "involved annual obligations averaging almost $100 million," and "annual deliveries averaging about $80 millions" by the time of its termination. The aid "averaged 6.4 per cent of Taiwan's GNP, formed 34 per cent of its gross investment,

and covered 91 per cent of its aggregate net surplus of goods and services." Thus, Taiwan received "the richest US aid program in Asia," apart from Korea and Vietnam.[95] On the other hand, Chiang tended to ignore those signals' cost to Washington, as he consistently responded to substantive US actions with complaints about insufficiency — a typical forward-looking perspective. Under negative prior beliefs, Chiang also tended to infer malign intentions from benign US gestures; particularly, insensitive gestures which hurt his nationalist sentiment disproportionately influenced his assessments. Such affective signals negatively added to a prototypical image of America.

Nevertheless, by the end of 1952, Chiang's negativity had been mainly directed on individual US leaders; he remained hopeful that American public opinion would come to his aid. Chiang's optimism about his friends and supporters, particularly MacArthur and the Republicans, constituted a considerable part of his beliefs about US reliability. Though he could not stand up to the "bad guys" in Washington, Chiang waited patiently for a power transition.

4.2.2 The Peak of Cooperation (1953-1960)

Renewed Perceptions

In November 1952, Dwight Eisenhower's election initiated a new period in the US-ROC relationship. Given convergence in ideologies and its key members' relatively positive impressions of Taipei, Washington showed growing optimism toward the ROC. First and foremost, convergence in anti-Communist ideologies profoundly structured the strategic thinking of both the president and State Secretary Dulles. Compared to Truman, Eisenhower embraced a more aggressive vision of anti-Communist strategy, which highly converged with Chiang's firm anti-Communist stance. According to his New Look for US security, the president prioritized America's capability of "inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking

[95] Jacoby (1966: 5-7, 17).

power"; he also highlighted the importance for allied forces to respond rapidly to counter Soviet aggression, hence, the need to strengthen US allies' capabilities.[96]

Furthermore, key members of the Eisenhower administration did not hold general aversion to the Nationalists. Instead, many of them were friendly toward the ROC. The president viewed Chiang as his fellow solider during World War II; he also showed considerable understanding of Chiang's difficulties and sympathy toward Taipei.[97] The new Chairman of the JCS, Arthur Radford, not only was a hard-liner toward the Soviets, but also developed a personal friendship with Chiang during his visits to Taiwan.[98] State Secretary Dulles was probably one of the most firm supporters of Chiang among US leaders. His prior beliefs were not only positively influenced by his earlier impressions of Chiang, but also by his Christian faith. In 1938, Dulles met with Chiang for the first time in China. As a young diplomat, he was impressed by the generalissimo's courage to resist the Japanese invasion.[99] More importantly, seeing Christianity as a key to leadership in the struggle for democracy, Dulles developed a particularly favorable image of Chiang. He even considered Chiang, together with the Korean President Rhee Syngman, among the "modern-day equivalents of the founders of the Church," who "had suffered for their faith." Thus, the Communist takeover of China was also a painful experience which Dulles could never reconciled with.[100]

Thus, it is not surprising that Washington immediately assigned the ROC an increasingly crucial role in the US grand strategy. From early 1953, Washington began to officially incorporate Taiwan within the US defense positions in Asia. US leaders valued its strategic importance to such an extent that, as NSC 146/2 reveals, they expressed the willingness to take "all necessary measures to prevent hostile forces from gaining control thereof, even at grave risk of general war." According to NSC 162/2, such "necessary measures" included the use

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[96] Garver (2015: 75), Gellman (2015: 180), U.S. Department of State (1979: doc.100).
[97] Eisenhower (1963: 480-2).
[98] Cole, Jaffe, Poole and Webb (1995).
[99] Jespersen (1996: 170).
[100] Tolles (1974: 34-5).

of nuclear weapons for massive retaliation against an attack on Taiwan.[101] Furthermore, Washington was also planning to transfer Taiwan into "an essential weapon in the continuing struggle with the Communist world."[102] It attempted to develop Taipei's military potential while transforming the ROC government into an effective political alternative to the CCP regime. Thus, an empowering strategy toward Taipei became highly compatible to America's security interests in the Far East.[103]

Nevertheless, the new strategic view did not exclude Washington's remaining uncertainty about Taipei's intentions of entrapment. Simultaneously, US leaders felt the need for continuous monitoring the ROC's military behavior. For instance, in early 1953, Dulles proposed to stop the delivery of jet bombers to Taiwan until Washington obtained Chiang's personal commitment that Taipei would not use them to attack the CCP; Eisenhower immediately concurred.[104] Whereas this event is telling about Washington's uncertainty, it also indicates that Dulles and Eisenhower were more optimistic about Taipei's reliability, as they clearly relied on Chiang's words as signals of credibility.

By contrast, ROC leaders were struggling between their positive beliefs about the new administration and negative prior beliefs about America. On the one hand, relieved by Eisenhower's victory, Chiang wished for a substantial improvement of the US-ROC relationship. In his diaries, Chiang described the election of Eisenhower as "the dawn light for the liberal world" and that of "hope for the gloomy sky of the East in four years."[105] Personally, Chiang also developed favorable impressions of Eisenhower. Throughout his diaries, Chiang always called the president by his pet name "Ike"; this stands as a sharp contrast to his insult of US leaders, such as Marshall. Also, Eisenhower seemed to leave generally good impressions on the Nationalist elites. As Ambassador Koo recalled, Eisenhower struck him as a

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[101] U.S. Department of State (1985: doc150), U.S. Department of State (1979: doc.100).
[102] U.S. Department of State (1985: doc.150).
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid, doc.93.
[105] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 119).

very kind personality; particularly, his courage in taking actions in international politics stood in sharp contrast to the timidness of Truman.[106] In addition, Dulles also struck Chiang as sincerely committed to the struggle against Communism — a sense of convergent identities, despite that Chiang was unpleasant about Dulles' special role in the Japan peace treaty, which excluded the ROC.[107]

On the other hand, increasingly prototypical images of America sustained Chiang's uncertainty. From his previous experiences with the DoS, Chiang believed that American elites appeared short-sighted in foreign policy and arrogant toward Asia. As Americans were naive, Chiang believed, US policies were particularly vulnerable to manipulation by European powers, such as Britain and Russia. American short-sightedness, he pointed out, was evident in the lack of consistency in US foreign policies. Also, Americans were even willing to make peace with the Communists — an irreconcilable adversary from Chiang's perspective.[108] In fact, even Chiang's exchanges with MacArthur, whom he identified as his "single best friend" among Americans, contributed to this prototypical image. In 1953, citing MacArthur's affirmative opinions, Chiang concluded that "the US has no long-term policy or plan. While Russia has plans for one or two decades, US policies may even change every few months. This is different from the Chinese grand plans for a hundred years." Then, he reasoned that "Americans' sympathy to China is just the function of emotions, hence, is not grounded on reason and intelligence."[109] In addition, Chiang expressed the feeling that even MacArthur could not escape from the arrogant attitude toward Asians. Thus, while feeling relieved about Eisenhower's election, Chiang remained uncertain about to what extent the president could realize his anti-Communist initiatives. On 20 January 1953, he tried to assess US reliability by examining Eisenhower's inauguration speech in details:

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[106] Koo (1983, Vol.8: 15).
[107] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 154, 159).
[108] Ibid, 184, 534-5.
[109] Ibid, 199, 262, 521, 543.

In Ike's inauguration speech today, he mentioned Asia first, and then America and Europe. Also, regarding Asia, he just mentioned the Korean War and the Vietnam War, but did not mention the Russian and Chinese Communists, and also the Republic of China. I believe this was adequate. Yet, the whole speech is targeted at the Russian Communists. According to my experiences of international diplomacy in the last ten years, international politics are full of hypocrisy and deceptions. I've never seen anyone who can convince me with both honesty and justice in diplomacy. Thus, I'm not sure if Ike can really implement what he is saying today and do not break his promises.[110]

In short, from 1953, both parties became more optimistic about the other's reliability while harboring considerable uncertainty. Compared to Washington, Chiang was hyper-sensitive to US gestures, hence, would soon experience rapid fluctuations in his perceptions.

Strengthened US Commitment

The formulation of NSC 146/2 marked the formal integration of Taiwan into the US defense perimeter in the West Pacific. Washington immediately sent signals of strong commitment through a series of substantive actions — a sign of ungraded empowerment. First, following his inauguration, Eisenhower announced the termination of Truman's neutralization of the Taiwan Strait in February. He lifted most restrictions on the ROC's military operations against the Mainland, while ordering the Seventh Fleet to continue its regular mission of patrolling the Strait. Although Taipei's major operations were subject to the consent of the MAAG, Washington indicated a major policy adjustment by "unleashing" Chiang.[111]

Furthermore, from 1953, Washington began to substantially upgrade its empowerment policy toward Taiwan. US assistance to Taiwan witnessed a dramatic increase. As *Figure 4.1* shows, the transfer of military aid in 1953 alone jumped to $173.8 million, which was four

[110] Ibid, 146, 151.
[111] Tucker (1994: 36).

Figure 4.1: US Military & Economic Assistance to ROC, 1949-70 (Million $)




Figure 4.2: Transfer of Naval Vessels, 1950-78




Figure 4.3 - Deliveries of Military Aircraft, 1950-72





Figure 4.4 - Deliveries of Reconnaissance Aircraft



Note: All data derived from Garver 1997, Chapter 4 & 10

times of the record in 1952 ($38.5 million). The amount of military aid continued to rise in the next three years, reaching its peak at $354.1 million in 1956. By this time, the US aid packages included nearly 600 warplanes of almost all advanced US air-superiority fighters, 30 naval vessels of various types (see *Figure 4.2 and 4.3*) and a large amount of weapons which equipped over 20 Nationalist army divisions.[112] By 1960, Taipei had received a much higher amount of military aid on average, which was about $208 million per year. This number is about ten times of the average figure between 1950 and 1952, and two-and-half times of the figure during the Kennedy-Johnson years. Also, growing US commitment was evident in Washington's efforts to strengthen military cooperation with the ROC. Washington extended the scope of US-ROC military cooperation from the defense of Taiwan to offensive operations against Communist China. In early 1953, the JCS approved Chiang's proposal of US-ROC joint operations. Washington started to provide logistic support for small-scale Nationalist raids on the China coast and for training of the Nationalist guerrillas on the Mainland. In this period, the MAAG also proposed to employ the ROC navy for blockading the China coast.[113] To facilitate military integration, a US-ROC joint staff was established for coordinating joint actions. The progress of alliance institutional building became evident in the burgeoning size of the MAAG. By 1955, the number of MAAG personnel had grown from 361 to 2,347, increasing almost sevenfold.[114]

Last but not least, probably no single action could more clearly signal Washington's commitment than the conclusion of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1954. The treaty was proposed by Taipei in 1953.[115] Although Washington gave no clear answer at the time, it fully realized the importance of formalizing the US comment to the ROC. In fact, the DoS evaluated this option positively. Rankin and Walter Robertson, the Assistant Secretary for the Far East affairs, quickly became firm supporters of the MDT. Within the military

[112] Wu (2013: 481), Garver (2015: 65-9).
[113] Tucker (1994: 64).
[114] Wen (1990: 162).
[115] Garver (2015: 54).

establishments, a number of influential leaders, including Radford, also showed a welcoming attitude.[116]

Nevertheless, two reasons impeded Washington's decision. First, the risk of entrapment still loomed large in US leaders' assessments. Whereas Washington was committed to defending Taiwan, it attempted to minimize its responsibility to a few offshore islands controlled by the Nationals. The most notable of them, Jinmen and Mazu, are located only a few kilometers off China. The Nationalists defended the islands as their stepping stones for a future return to the Mainland — Chiang's ultimate goal for the rest of his life. Yet, although NSC 146/2 specified that the US would assist Taipei to defend those islands, the support should be provided "without committing US forces." Thus, in 1953, Dulles told Taipei that he had not found a solution for the offshore islands in a potential treaty.[117] Second, Dulles also believed that a purely defensive treaty might tie the hands of the ROC in conducting limited offensives against the Mainland. In a conversation with Ambassador Koo in mid-1954, Dulles said that Washington would be happy to see Nationalist attacks on the Mainland. Yet, a defense treaty, he stated, would impose certain limitations which might make the impression that Washington did not support Taipei's offensive operations.[118]

It is the First Taiwan Strait Crisis that finally pushed Washington to extend its defense commitment to the offshore islands. In September 1954, the Communist bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu triggered Washington's fear that America would be embroiled in a war with China. Although Eisenhower and Dulles preferred Nationalist evacuations of Jinmen and Mazu, they took seriously the risk that the loss of the islands would severely damage Taiwan's morale, thus its stability.[119] In October, Washington signaled its willingness to conclude a treaty. The two parties signed the MDT after Chiang agreed that all Nationalist oper-

[116] Chang (1994).
[117] Koo (1983, Vol.11: 182).
[118] Chang (1994: 70), Garver (2015: 54).
[119] Garver (2015:123-6).

ations against the Mainland should be subject to US consent.[120] While the MDT only committed the US to defending Taiwan, Washington moved to secure extra guarantee of Taiwan's security in the Congress. In early 1955, this effort resulted in the Formosa Resolution, which essentially authorized the president to use US forces to defend both Taiwan and the offshore islands.[121]

The MDT and the Formosa Resolution marked a fundamental adjustment of the US-ROC alliance relationship. Indicating this was not only a steep rise of military aid after 1954 (*see Figure 4.1*), but also Washington's efforts to strengthen alliance institution for military integration. First, from early 1955, the US-ROC cooperation on intelligence sharing saw substantial progress. In mid-1955, the CIA agreed to supply technological and financial support in exchange of the ROC's complete sharing of intelligence and geographic survey data. Accordingly, efforts of joint aerial reconnaissance, which began during the Korean War, developed to a much larger scale, with increasing US deliveries of specialized reconnaissance planes (see *Figure 4.4*). The cooperation eventually led to Washington's decision to provide Taipei with U-2 in 1959.[122] More importantly, from early 1955, the US-ROC Joint Chiefs of Staff was established, along with a system to coordinate regular exchanges between military leaders. From March, Washington and Taipei further discussed their division of labor in potential events of hostility. Four months later, the joint efforts resulted in the Le-cheng Project — the first joint battle plan between US and ROC forces.[123]

Additionally, in early 1955, the Formosa Liaison Center (FLC) was established in Taipei in order to coordinate US-ROC joint military operations. In November, the FLC was promoted to a sub-unified command reporting directly to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), that is, the United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC). In the event of

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[120] Chang (1994: 88-92), Garver (2015: 57), Lin (2016b: 127).
[121] Accinelli (1996: 193-4); For the Formosa Resolution, see: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-69/pdf/STATUTE-69-Pg7.pdf
[122] Garver (2015: 188, 191).
[123] Guofangbu (1996, Vol.1: 472, 572).

hostilities, USTDC would command the MAAG, the 327th Air Division, the Taiwan Patrol Force drawn from the Seventh Fleet. This arrangement placed the USTDC on the equivalent rank of the US commands in Japan and Korea, clearly indicating that Taiwan's defense was among top US security interests in East Asia.[124]

Taipei's Growing Wariness

Nevertheless, both Washington's upgraded empowerment efforts and the MDT had limited influence on Taipei's beliefs. Even the Formosa Resolution failed to significantly impress Chiang. By contrast, his anxieties about US unreliability continued to largely grow out of unfavorable US diplomatic gestures until 1956. First, Chiang's diaries reveal abundant evidence of the assimilating effect of his negative prior beliefs in this period; he also tended to downplay substantive US actions. In June 1953, for example, when the Nationalist forces received the first unit of F-86 jet fighters, Chiang immediately invoked external attribution to explain this primarily with his own efforts rather than benign US intentions. "Although I have earnestly expected the arrival of such jet fighters to Taiwan for the last three years," he wrote, "its first-time delivery is, firstly, owing to our self-help and diligent efforts, then also others' help."[125] Later, when the Congress approved a substantial increase to US military aid to Taiwan, Chiang did show gratitude to his Republican supporters and American public opinion, viewing this as a sign of improved bilateral relationship. Yet, he also did not forget to explain this action with the diplomatic efforts of his nephew and wife. In August, Chiang assessed that:

> *The US Congress would increase the amount of military aid to us by 20%. This act was unusual, and really valuable. This shows that the work of my nephew Jie (Kong*

[124] "Report of progress made in reduction, simplification and consolidation of command structures in the Pacific Command" (8 January, 1958: 317).
[125] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 204).

Ling-jie) as well as Madam Chiang's activities to America in the last five years have finally produced some effect.[126]

By 1955, while the amount of US military aid almost doubled, Chiang rather compared substantive US actions to the Soviet assistance to China, wishfully complaining that Moscow was far more sincere and generous than Washington. As a result, he even charged that America "does not see us as allied forces" and "had not shown sincerity at all." Later this year, Chiang claimed, more than once, that he would no longer keep a high expectation of US military aid in the future.[127]

Second, Chiang remained suspicious of US intentions behind military cooperation. In particular, Chiang was annoyed by the MAAG's recurrent attempts to reform the Nationalist forces. For example, when the US-ROC Joint Staff was established in 1953, Chiang immediately suspected that the MAAG intended to control the Nationalist forces.[128] What triggered the biggest dispute was Washington's request to reform the Soviet-style commissar system in the Nationalist forces. Although Chiang partially conceded, he viewed the reform as counterproductive.[129] In mid-1953, China even claimed that "most of Chase's requests to our government were destructive." And he readily explained this with the "traditional bias against Eastern races" of the US army — an indicator of Chiang's beliefs about American arrogance.[130] Particularly noteworthy is that while examining such substantive signals, Chiang took a forward-looking perspective, focusing on how those actions affect Taipei's interests, rather than if they are costly to Washington.

By contrast, the generalissimo paid disproportionate attention to US diplomatic gestures and his impressions of US leaders. In general, Chiang regularly examined US leaders' statements, gestures, and attitudes toward Taiwan in details; he particularly loved reading be-

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[126] Ibid, 226, 237.
[127] Ibid, 448, 494, 508.
[128] Ibid, 184.
[129] Chen (2014: 75, 80).
[130] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 197).

tween the lines. By simply assessing whether Eisenhower mentioned Asia before Europe in his inauguration speech, for instance, Chiang foresaw a fundamental change in Washington's Taiwan policy. In mid-1953, Eisenhower's reply to Chiang's letter served as a significant signal of benign intentions, as he reasoned that this gesture "had been the first exchange of letters with a US president in the last seven years."[131] The generalissimo became so sensitive to such small gestures that, even after the signature of the MDT, Eisenhower's non-response to Chiang's letter of celebration quickly threw him into renewed suspicion. On 31 December, his assessment of Eisenhower's attitude serves as excellent evidence for the greater psychological impact of affective signals, in comparison to substantive actions, such as the MDT:

> *I sent a telegram to Ike for celebrating the signature of the China-US treaty on 3rd. Yet, he didn't reply. This was not only incompatible with international convention, but also clearly showed his reluctant attitude toward the treaty or his psychology of disregard. I should particularly pay attention to this development in the future, and cannot ignore it.*[132]

Yet, what overwhelmingly attracted Chiang's attention was US leaders' lack of determination in fighting the Soviets, particularly when it came to sovereignty-related issues. For this reason, he felt increasingly disappointed with Washington, and even began to make analogies between Dulles — one of his foremost American sympathizers — and Acheson. The first issue that significantly raised Chiang's suspicion was Washington's attitude during the Korea Armistice talk. In mid-1953, Seoul demanded a US-ROK defense treaty before it agreed to proceed with an armistice. After Dulles threatened to withdraw US forces from Korea, President Rhee Syngman backed down.[133] Chiang tried to mediate between Seoul and Washington, but only met assertive response from Dulles. Feeling humiliated, Chiang complained bitterly of the American arrogance to "weak nations," taking this as evidence for

[131] Ibid, 146, 193.
[132] Ibid, 403.
[133] Liu (2008: 270-2).

Washington's discrimination against "Chinese and Eastern nations."[134] Also, he suspected that Washington was tempted by Moscow's peace offensive and might well sacrifice Korea or even Taiwan in order to reach an armistice. Shortly, he concluded that the DoS did not give up its dream of encouraging Asian Titoism. Dulles's threat to Seoul was quickly compared to Acheson's "conspiracy" to abandon Taipei in 1950 — a clear sign of negative beliefs defense with historical analogy.[135]

The second issue is Dulles's advocation of a Two-China policy. To gather international support for Washington's intervention in the Strait, Dulles sought to legally separate Taiwan from China through actions at the UN. This approach particularly raised Chiang's suspicions.[136] In early 1953, Chiang was angered by an unverified newspaper report on Washington's attempt to impose a UN trusteeship on Taiwan.[137] Describing Dulles as a "pure opportunist," he soon reached the conclusion that the danger of US sell-out did not go away. He even suspected that Dulles deliberately leaked the news to the press in order to undermine Taipei's authority.[138] Following the US ratification of the MDT in early 1955, Chiang's suspicions quickly arose when Dulles spoke about a peaceful solution for the ongoing Taiwan Strait Crisis in Canada. UN involvement in the Crisis, he believed, was the first step toward Washington's recognition of Beijing.[139] In his assessment, Chiang again made an analogy between Dulles and Acheson:

> *If this had been materialized, then Dulles's plan would have been even more stupid than Acheson's policy of cancelling us [Taipei] out. This would have been no different from implementing the policy that Acheson wanted to do, but had not yet done.*[140]

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[134] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 210).
[135] Ibid, 208, 285.
[136] Garver (2015: 113).
[137] As Ambassador Koo recalls, Walter Robertson confirmed later that there was no such a plan under consideration in the State Department. See Koo (1983, Vol.8: 91).
[138] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 180-1).
[139] Bush (2004: 101-2).
[140] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 437).

Last but not least, Washington's passive attitude on the offshore islands largely overshadowed the positive aspect of the MDT. Particularly, Chiang's face-to-face interactions with US officials decisively strengthened his beliefs about US unreliability. First, during the crisis in 1954, US diplomatic gestures largely worked to raise Chiang's anxieties. On 8 September, Dulles visited Taipei for a five-hour transition on his way back from the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) conference. Although Chiang felt that Dulles was generally respectful, the state secretary's seemingly careless wording in a speech immediately triggered Chiang's prototypical image of Americans as "naive and exaggerating."[141] Later, Washington's proposal for a UNSC resolution to oppose the use of force in the Strait again led Chiang to invoke analogies by linking the current situation to his painful memories of the Marshall mission.[142] From October, assertive US postures of deterrence, such as the increasing patrols of US naval ships, did reduce Chiang's uncertainty about US commitment. Yet, his suspicions rapidly grew when Washington began to pressure the Nationalist forces to evacuate from Dachen — the north most of the offshore islands — in early 1955.[143] Against this background, it is not surprising that while reflecting on the conclusion of the MDT, Chiang explained the treaty with his painstaking struggle and even God's grace, ignoring any "audience cost" that Washington might incur. Three days after signing the treaty, he wrote that "this was the outcome of my forbearance of humiliation in the last ten years as well as consistent struggle in the last five years."[144] In early 1955, after the Congressional ratification of the MDT, Chiang wrote again that the treaty was won by his painstaking diplomatic efforts, without expressing any gratitude to America.[145] At the same time, even Washington's overt threat to use nuclear weapons against Communist China — a major tying-hands signal — failed to impress him.[146]

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[141] Ibid, 365.
[142] Chang (1994: 80).
[143] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 382-3, 420).
[144] Ibid, 395.
[145] Ibid, 426.
[146] Accinelli (1996: 216).

Yet, shortly after the crisis, Chiang's perceptions worsened with Eisenhower's outpost proposal. In April 1955, the president sent Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary Robertson on a mission to convince Chiang to transform Jinmen and Mazu into expandable outposts. Seeing little strategic value of the offshores, Eisenhower believed that this proposal could satisfy Taipei's psychological need of them as symbols of legitimacy while concentrating the Nationalist forces for the defense of Taiwan.[147] However, the outpost proposal immediately enraged Chiang, who accused Washington of reneging on its alliance commitment. On 24 April, in a meeting with Radford and Robertson, the assistant secretary particularly struck Chiang as deceptive when he tried to persuade the generalissimo to evacuate Dachen. In his diaries, Chiang laid out a lengthy charge against the Americans' malicious intentions:

> *Robertson's talk was totally deception, which even a primary school student can understand. The fact that such words could even come out of an assistant secretary of state shows that Americans are naive and ignorant; their shallowness, stupidity, and arrogance are truly unprecedented. And his talk to Yeh Kung-chao was boring and full of threats, and was even more rude, arrogant, and disrespectful. So, I know that [American] diplomats and politicians, and Army officers who worked for Ma Xia Er (Marshall) before, […] all see our Yellow race as inferior and are always thinking about bullying and exploiting us as their slaves.*[148]

Now, a small gesture — Eisenhower's non-response to Chiang's celebrating telegram concerning the MDT — resurged in his memories, and became evidence of Washington's lack of sincerity.[149] Thus, despite Washington's pressure, Chiang fiercely resisted the outpost proposal by arguing that the loss of the islands would devastate the Nationalist morale. Although Washington withdrew the proposal in May, this dispute significantly reinforced Chiang's prototypical image of US unreliability.[150] On 1 May, Chiang wrote that: "American

[147] Garver (2015: 131).
[148] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 451).
[149] Ibid, 454.
[150] U.S. Department of State (1986: doc.258), Lü (2014, Vol.10: 705).

pressure and their vicious words and deeds last month were chilling to my heart; [such behavior] makes me increasingly feel that betraying allies is especially a common practice of this country."[151] In retrospect, Chiang even suspected that Washington attempted to deceive him even before the signature of the MDT. He rapidly associated Roberson's attempt of deception regarding Dachen to his renewed suspicion that the CIA was plotting to replace him with General Sun Li-jen.[152]

Following the Radford-Robertson mission, Chiang's rising certainty about US unreliability preceded a major adjustment of Taipei's military posture on the offshore islands. From 1956, exactly against Washington's will, Chiang rapidly concentrated his troops on Jinmen and Mazu. By April, the number of Nationalist soldiers on the islands had grown threefold, reaching 100,000; Chiang deployed about 50 per cent of his best troops and one third of the Nationalist army's equipment to the tiny islands.[153] As an assertive military posture that grossly increased the risk of entrapment, Taipei's action essentially put Washington in a dilemma. As a NSC memorandum reveals, US leaders believed that the concentration of Nationalist troops on the offshores already affected Taiwan's defense. Washington would be compelled to committing US forces, Eisenhower estimated, if the offshore islands came under Communist attacks; US leaders concluded that Taipei's military posture essentially indicated its intention to embroil America in a war with China.[154]

Resumed Optimism

Following Eisenhower's outpost proposal, US-ROC mutual perceptions significantly deteriorated by early 1957. At the time, the Reynolds incident — anti-American riots in Taipei resulting from a murder committed by a US sergeant — quickly caught US leaders' attention. Following mob attacks on the US Embassy, Washington also perceived Taipei's malicious

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[151] Ibid, 456.
[152] Ibid, 456-8.
[153] Immerman (1990: 253), Garver (2015: 134-6).
[154] U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.33), Garver (2015: 135).

intentions. Even pro-ROC leaders, such as Rankin, suspected that Chiang was orchestrating the riots.[155] Yet, in the same year, the alliance relationship started to experience a dramatic upturn. While Chiang became increasingly optimistic about Washington's anti-Communist resolve after a series of US diplomatic gestures, Washington's uncertainty about Taipei's intentions of entrapment was significantly reduced after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.

The downturn in mutual perceptions was first reflected in Chiang's tendency to downplay benign US actions with negative beliefs defense. Since 1955, Washington had taken a series of substantive actions in the form of military and economic assistance, including an agreement on training 3,000 Nationalist paratroopers, cooperation on peaceful use of atomic energy, and multiple agreements on economic and naval assistance.[156] Yet, by mid-1957, such actions had failed to improve Chiang's perceptions; contrarily, he even developed a general impression that "America had not taken much active assistance to us [Taiwan]."[157] Specifically, when assessing the US assistance in training paratroopers, Chiang rather complained that Washington restricted the use of the paratroopers according to the MDT.[158] In mid-1957, when Washington deployed nuclear-capable Matador missiles to Taiwan, Chiang expressed some excitement, considering this a clear indicator of US resolve in fighting the Communists — a notable exception. However, he also expressed uncertainty about Washington's intentions. On 10 May, Chiang wrote that the missiles deployment might be also aimed at "deterring Taiwan from any anti-American behavior."[159] Later, he continued to notice progress of the missiles deployment while downplaying this signal, on the basis of his impressions of Eisenhower's unenthusiastic attitude in a telegram:

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[155] The riot is also called Liu Ziran incident by the ROC side. It was caused by Taipei citizens' protests to a court-martial trial on the killing of a ROC citizen by US military personnel. As Chiang's diaries reveal, both he and the Nationalist government had no involvement in the riot. Conversely, Chiang was very concerned about the consequences of the incident, which, as he perceived, might impede the recent improvement of US-ROC relations. See U.S. Department of State (1986: doc.289), Lü (2014, Vol.10: 703).
[156] U.S. Department of State (1973b: 49).
[157] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 725).
[158] Ibid, 765.
[159] Ibid, 699.

Although this [the missiles deployment] is another indicator of the US determination to fight Russian Communists, Ike was showing a cold attitude to us. There is no sign of active mutual assistance from him, which leaves me in extreme doubt and anxieties.[160]

By contrast, US diplomatic gestures attracted most of Chiang's attention. By mid-1957, a series of assertive statements toward Communism by Eisenhower, Dulles, and US military leaders considerably raised Chiang's optimism. These statements, Chiang judged, demonstrated "an active and determined intention to fight Russia" and a supportive attitude toward the ROC.[161] On 28 June, Dulles' speech in San Francisco on American policies toward Communist China particularly impressed Chiang. He expressed excitement about Dulles's opposition to recognizing Beijing: "This is clearly a determined and unique speech, which makes a thunder in American discussions on trade and diplomatic relations with the CCP, and can also clear the doubt over the Taipei riot since 24 May."[162] By December, Chiang's optimism grew to such an extent that he even reversed his negative image of Dulles. He not only credited Dulles as the foremost representative of America's hawkish voices on Russia policy, but also began to address Dulles as "*du qing*" — a classical Chinese expression meaning "honorable Dulles." As Chiang assessed, Washington eventually began to "make much correction on its China policy."[163]

Such correction was shown primarily in Washington's asserted support for Taipei's plan to "recover the Mainland (*fangong dalu*)." From 1955, Washington began to signal a supportive attitude toward the Nationalist reconquest of China. Dulles once implied that the US might support a Nationalist invasion, contingent on certain favorable developments in China, such as domestic riots. Yet, given rising tensions over the offshores, Chiang was hard to take

[160] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 700).
[161] Ibid, 652, 657-8, 676.
[162] Ibid, 719-20, U.S. Department of State (1986: doc.268).
[163] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 778, 790).

the message seriously.[164] From late 1957, Chiang's improved perceptions resulted in a renewed prospect for Washington's support for the reconquest. Both parties engaged in concrete discussions on plans for joint operations. In September, Chiang considerably raised his hope upon the creation of a US-ROC joint planning group for reconquest. Also, he estimated that Washington would become more supportive as helping Taipei could offset the existing US-USSR missile gap.[165] From 1958, Chiang saw an enlarging window of opportunity to launch his campaign. Hoping that Washington would give the green light, Chiang attempted to prove his reliability by increasingly complying with US strategic design in Asia.[166]

Thus, by the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, US-ROC mutual assessments took on a different course compared to that in 1954. For Chiang, negative beliefs defense remained in his assessments. Whereas substantive US actions continued to attract his complaints, Washington's diplomatic gestures considerably strengthened his positive beliefs. On the one hand, although Washington responded to Beijing's aggressive actions with a massive deployment of forces, the US deterrent failed to significantly reassure Chiang. First, following the PLA's bombardment on 23 August, Chiang protested that Washington failed to understand Taiwan's urgent situation, hence, interpreting the MDT in a way that prevented Taipei to take an active defense posture.[167] On 31 August, after meeting with Chiang, Admiral Ronald Smoot, Commander of the USTDC reported his "deep disappointment at non-receipt of reply to his request of President Eisenhower for concurrence in making retaliatory air attacks against Communist air fields, et cetera." According to Smoot:

> *He [Chiang] was not mollified by our position on hot pursuit and spoke of our attitude as being "inhuman" and "unfair" to his soldiers on islands and destructive of*

[164] Ibid, 410, 412, Garver (2015: 81).
[165] Lü (2014, Vol.10: 750, 773).
[166] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 140), Chang (2001: 272, 276), Lin (2015).
[167] Garver (2015: 137), Lü (2014, Vol.11: 96).

public morale. His reaction was the most violent I have seen him exhibit and at one point he called our policy "not that of an allied nation."[168]

Moreover, Chiang also showed discontent with the reaction of the DoD and the US Navy. On 26 August, for example, despite the DoD's decision to increase military supplies to Taiwan, Chiang complained that "such a decision is too slow and cannot relieve our urgency, hence, it cannot solve the practical problems in the present crisis of Jinmen and the Strait."[169] Obviously, Chiang evaluated those substantive US actions in a forward-looking manner, vis-à-vis the ROC's immediate interests, ignoring if such actions were costly to Washington.

On the other hand, Washington's benign gestures, together with face-to-face diplomacy, significantly increased Chiang's optimism. On 2 September, Eisenhower sent a telegram to Chiang, reassuring his support to Taiwan. The generalissimo immediately took this as a sign for US support to Taipei's more active defense posture. "Initially I mistakenly thought that it was a telegram of warning, and felt quite anxious," Chiang wrote, "[…] now I understand it's meant for explanation and comforting us, and expressing no more than his firm determination to support our policies." He expressed the relief that the letter signaled Washington's possible consent to lift its restrictions on the ROC's freedom of action.[170] In a meeting next day, Admiral Smoot seemed to convince Chiang that Eisenhower's initial non-reply was not meant to restrict the ROC's defense operations. The generalissimo then promised to "seek [US] concurrence prior to conducting retaliatory attacks against mainland positions and forces." Both sides moved further to discuss creating a coordinating center of US-China joint operations.[171]

Chiang's certainty about US reliability seemed to rise significantly, as even the resumed US-PRC Warsaw Ambassadorial Talk did not shake his optimism. On 7 September, Chiang

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[168] U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.56).
[169] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 97-8).
[170] Ibid, 98, 104.
[171] U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.65), Lü (2014, Vol.11: 105).

responded to the news of the Warsaw Talk by confidently explaining this with successful US deterrent: "Washington did not realize the statement until its convoy safely reached Jinmen and the Communist bandits didn't have courage to fight," he assessed, "this was an inevitable outcome of America's policy of deterrence."[172] More importantly, on 9 September, Moscow's threat to use nuclear retaliation against America was also not impressive; Chiang immediately judged that "the dark devil's [Khrushchev] reactionary propaganda should not shake the American positions toward our offshore islands."[173] Conversely, Washington's assertive response strengthened his positive beliefs defense. A week later, Chiang wrote that:

> *Following the bandits' resumed bombardment on Monday and their reinforced besiegement of Jinmen, Ike issued a statement of non-tolerance policy toward the bandits, also responding to Khrushchev's letter in showing his unmovable determination. This is the most important factor concerning whether or not our struggle against Communist bandits will be successful.*[174]

It is noteworthy that Eisenhower's statements appeared to be disproportionately influential on Chiang. A classical example is found in his reaction to Eisenhower's radio speech. On 12 September, Chiang experienced a sudden panic while he heard the term "neutralization" from a Chinese transcript of Eisenhower's speech: "I was extremely shocked and fearful after hearing this," Chiang wrote, as this immediately reminded him of Truman's neutralization of the Strait in 1949.[175] According to his diaries, the panic attack even lasted for a whole day until Chiang eventually figured out that "neutralization" was, in fact, a mis-interpretation from a newspaper translation the next morning. By early October, a series of supportive statements by US leaders, including Eisenhower, Dulles, and Admiral Herbert Hopwood, the

[172] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 106).
[173] Ibid, 107.
[174] Ibid, 109.
[175] Ibid, 108-9.

Commander in Chief of the PAC, continued to attract Chiang's heavy attention and generally reinforced his positive beliefs about US reliability.[176]

Furthermore, face-to-face diplomacy played an increasingly prominent role in both parties' assessments. In mid-October, Chiang developed positive impressions of Defense Secretary Neil McElroy by meeting with him. In his diaries, Chiang expressed the feeling that McElroy was sincere about his benign intentions. The meeting obviously relieved his fear that "US is advocating reduction of offshore defenses," which was "heightened by President's and Secretary's most recent press conferences and by persistent news reports," as Ambassador Drumright observed.[177] Therefore, by the time when Dulles proposed a visit to Taiwan in mid-October, Chiang's beliefs about US reliability seemed to become increasingly strong. This renewed image, together with his positive impressions of Dulles, largely directed his assessments toward a positive manner. For example, in late September, Dulles once told the press that concentrating troops on vulnerable posts like Jinmen was "foolish" while calling the Nationalist reconquest of China a "highly hypothetical matter."[178] Though Chiang was unhappy about the comments, he soon reasoned that "The suddenly worsened attitude of Dulles" was due to "unbearable pressure" from Britain and American leftist attacks — a clear sign of positive beliefs defense by external attribution.[179]

Dulles was aimed at persuading Taipei to renounce the use of force in liberating the Mainland, as he believed this would strengthen the ROC's international support. His mission ended up with a series of intensive meetings with Chiang, and also the issuing of a US-ROC joint communique underscoring Taipei's intention to recover China principally by political means.[180] Although Chiang initially felt unpleasant about Dulles' proposal, and cautioned against a resurged US attempt to neutralize the Strait, the talks surprisingly went on smooth-

[176] Ibid, 114-7.
[177] Ibid, 124, U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.181).
[178] Immerman (1990: 253), Garver (2015: 139).
[179] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 117).
[180] Halperin (1966: 518), Garver (2015: 139), U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.180, doc.188).

ly, without provoking any negative emotions.[181] This stood in charge contrast to Chiang's responses to other sovereignty-related issues.

After their first meeting, Chiang wrote that "our talks completely focused on policy issues. Although we have not reached a conclusion, we are without any disagreement and ended in a harmonious atmosphere."[182] When Dulles proposed that the ROC renounced the use of force voluntarily on 22 October, being reminded of Washington's Two-China policy in the past, Chiang initially felt "painful and angry." Yet, without showing any grievance, the generalissimo agreed to issuing the communique after some minor adjustments of the text; he believed that this diplomatic gesture reaffirmed "the solidarity and unity of the ROC and the US, breaking the Sino-Soviet plot to split us as well as strengthening the China-US cooperation."[183] The prominent role of personal impressions is particularly shown by Chiang's confession later that he admired Dulles's personality, even though his first draft of the communique was almost no different from a Two-China proposal.[184] Nevertheless, only a week later, Chiang began to appreciate the benefits of the communique. "Particularly, 'the renunciation of the use of force' in the communique will largely disappoint our people," he reasoned, "yet, this phrase can help America to relieve its people's fear of being dragged into a war when assisting our defense. […] In fact, this does not obstruct our effort to recover the Mainland in the future."[185] In other words, as Chiang understood the communique as non-binding, he did not take it as "costly." More importantly, it was such a gesture that Chiang clearly relied on as a primary indicator of US commitment. On 31 October, he assessed that:

> *Observing honorable Dulles [du qing]'s statements after he returned to America and Ike's telegram of gratitude, I believed that this outcome [the communique] at least would lead the US to not reduce its military aid to us; and the aid might also in-*

[181] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 124-5).
[182] Ibid, 128.
[183] Ibid, 129-130.
[184] Ibid, 226.
[185] Ibid, 134.

crease. […] certain omissions in the text [of the communique], conversely, have not damaged the mutual feelings between the ROC and the US, but are rather beneficial to it.[186]

Even by the end of 1959, Chiang did not forget to reaffirm such a judgment in his diaries:

Since October 24th, Dulles' visit to China [the ROC], and the issuing of the China-US joint communique, […] I have believed that this communique was really the most proper policy domestically and internationally. Exactly as I expected, the US policy toward China had been clearly defined since then. Thus, there has been a big increase in its military aid this year; its economic aid also became more solid. It is not exaggerated that the foundation of China-US cooperation is solely paved by this joint communique.[187]

By and large, the Dulles mission profoundly influenced Chiang's beliefs about US reliability. Chiang's positive impressions of Dulles were also clearly shown in his diaries in May 1959, when the state secretary passed away:

He is a great statesman of the modern age, who helped the weak to contain the strong, and fight against the violent Communists. He is also a religious man who believed in God. For the spirit and power of his religious devotion, he was able to struggle, firmly and patiently, to the end of his life, for the sake of his ideology, nation, the freedom of man, and world peace. Every time upon his departure from Taiwan, he always said that "I have given my body to the Lord, and it is now totally subject to His will," showing his determination to exhaust himself for his duty, until the end of his life. Hereby, I can only express my respect of his greatness and sublime morality by repeating his own words.[188]

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[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid, 275.
[188] Ibid, 202.

Also, the Dulles mission significantly improved Washington's optimism. First, the Dulles-Chiang talks went on smoothly with good atmosphere. During the meeting, Chiang not only accepted the joint communique without protest, but also agreed to adjust the ROC's military posture by reducing 20,000 troops on the offshores.[189] More importantly, the two leaders engaged in a frank conversation about Taipei's intention of entrapment. Chiang began by expressing his feeling that "even the Eisenhower administration lacked trust in him." Dulles reassured that he would trust Chiang implicitly, "once he [Chiang] had given his word." Also, he talked openly about the fact that there were many people "who thought that the GRC, not necessarily the president himself, were trying to involve us [the US] in war as a means of returning to the Mainland."[190] Then, Dulles reassured Chiang that both he and Eisenhower had defended the generalissimo, whereas Chiang reassured that Taipei agreed with Washington "on the principle of not taking action which might precipitate a world war."[191]

After issuing the joint communique, Dulles showed a strong feeling of satisfaction. In a private conversation with US journalists, Dulles praised Chiang's resolve to resist Communism and his cooperative attitude.[192] In later assessments, Dulles extensively drew on his impressions from face-to-face interactions with Chiang and other Nationalist leaders. As a memorandum on 29 October reveals, Dulles depicted a generally positive image of Taiwan: "I was impressed by the caliber of the men in the Chinese Nationalist Government in addition to Chiang. It is by no means a one-man affair." Dulles even claimed that he was "convinced that the Free China Government will not disappear if Chiang should die." And he continued to give an optimistic assessment of Taiwan's stability:

The conditions on Taiwan are good and the people enjoy the highest standard of living of any country of Asia except Japan. The Taiwanese have never been so well off.

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[189] U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.226), Chang (2001: 276).
[190] U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.197).
[191] Ibid.
[192] Chang (2001: 270-3).

They have a large amount of local self-government and, according to reports, are on the whole quite contented.[193]

On 30 October, while reporting to the NSC, Dulles continued to challenge Washington's prior beliefs about Taipei's malicious intentions. After describing his many hours of conversation with Chiang, Dulles "expressed a certainty that the Generalissimo was converted to the idea that renunciation of the use of military force to retake the Mainland was a sound course of action."[194] Resorting to positive beliefs defense, he even attributed the stereotype that Taipei was "simply trying to involve the United States in a war with Communist China" to transient causes — primarily the propaganda of the Communists and Chiang's enemies in Taiwan. After reassuring US leaders that "it was not true of the top Nationalist leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek himself," Dulles then expressed the feeling that "our problems with Chiang Kai-shek in the future would be much more manageable than in the past." Specifically, he judged that the problem of the offshore islands "would be easier to deal with in the light of Chiang's new position regarding the problem of the reunification of China."[195]

Accordingly, the alliance relationship had also witnessed an unprecedented level of cordiality by 1960. First and foremost, Washington reaffirmed Taipei's strategic importance in its global strategic design. As NSC 5723 suggests, US leaders increasingly gave priority to strengthening Taipei's military potential. Compared to NSC 146/2, this document explicitly committed Washington to defending the offshore islands by a possible use of US forces.[196] Second, both parties began to engage in a more constructive way of planning joint operations against Communist China. In June 1959, Washington showed interest in a ROC proposal to attack Southern China with special forces. In 1960, Washington for the first time approved a concrete war plan proposed by Taipei — the Tian-ma Project. Although such signals were essentially non-binding, their symbolic meaning alone reinforced Chiang's beliefs about US

[193] U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.266), Chang (2001: 278).
[194] U.S. Department of State (1996a: doc.266).
[195] Ibid.
[196] U.S. Department of State (1986: doc.288).

reliability.[197] Nevertheless, the US-ROC security cooperation also served another strategic goal of Washington, that is, to strike a balance between its alliance commitment and Taipei's morale by maintaining ambiguity regarding its support to the Nationalist reconquest. Yet, for key members of the Eisenhower administration, particularly Dulles, there was a real chance that a large-scale use of Nationalist forces against China would be permissible under favorable conditions.[198]

By June 1960, the US-ROC relationship had reached its peak during the Cold War, when Eisenhower became the first US president to visit the ROC. As a diplomatic gesture, the Eisenhower-Chiang summit greatly satisfied the generalissimo. In general, Chiang felt that the atmosphere of conversations was quite successful. After their first meeting on 18 June, Chiang wrote that "he [Eisenhower] informed me in details of the real development of Russian and Chinese Communists recently; our conversation went very constructive."[199] Following the issue of a communique on 19 June, Eisenhower praised the progressive development of Taiwan, and reassured the continuation of American assistance. In reaction to the president's benign gestures, Chiang immediately reasoned that:

> *Eisenhower had shown his sincere intentions by his visit to Taiwan. His sincerity was also shown by the telegram of gratitude on his way back. Moreover, he openly expressed that there has been no other ally which stands more firm than the Republic of China on the US side. By this message, I believe that he has definitely understood our country's sincerity toward America during this trip.*[200]

Overall, the alliance relationship from 1953 to 1960 overwhelmingly supports the ARM. In the first stage by early 1957, mutual suspicions had grown on both sides. Given resilient negative prior beliefs, Taipei initiated the downturn; a high level of uncertainty dominated

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[197] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 140, 366).
[198] Chang (2001: 262), Garver (2015: 81-2).
[199] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 337).
[200] Ibid, 338.

Chiang's assessments. On the one hand, although convergence in anti-Communist ideologies improved Taipei's optimism, negative beliefs defense led Chiang to generally downplay benign US actions, including the MDT, whereas Washington's diplomatic gestures repeatedly touched his nerves on sovereignty. On the other hand, while Eisenhower and Dulles tended to be more optimistic about Taipei's reliability, hovering uncertainty led them to caution against its intention of entrapment. Yet, US leaders did take Chiang's personal reassurance seriously, exemplified by Dulles's impressions of Chiang during his visit to Taiwan in 1958. Moreover, despite the importance of Taipei's defense capabilities in Washington's assessments, evidence shows that US leaders did not treat this indicator in a rational manner. Instead, subjective impressions, particularly morale, became a primary factor in US assessments of Taipei's military capabilities.

In the second stage from mid-1957, both diplomatic gestures and face-to-face diplomacy played a decisive role in restoring Taipei's optimism, which led to positive reciprocity from Washington. First, extensively drawing on statements, attitudes, and gestures from US leaders, Chiang was convinced that Washington increasingly stood up to the Communist challenge. The dramatic change of his beliefs about Dulles was typically representative of the transition. Furthermore, face-to-face diplomacy tended to serve as tipping points for substantial perceptual changes. For example, in 1955, it was the Radford-Robertson mission that significantly raised Chiang's anger against Washington. Thereafter, Chiang responded with an overt attempt of entrapment with provocative military posture on the offshores. Conversely, in late 1958, face-to-face interactions during the Dulles mission significantly strengthened Washington's beliefs about Taipei's reliability.

Finally, one finds little evidence that leaders assessed each other's substantive actions with backward elimination which involves the consideration of rational cost. Contrarily, our analysis shows that the forward-looking perspective was dominant in general. This can be

typically seen in Chiang's repeated complaints about US aid, and his positive assessments of the joint communique, despite that it was considered largely costless to the ROC.

4.2.3 Years of Disillusion (1961-1968)

Fallout from the Beginning

Throughout the Kennedy and Johnson years, the US-ROC relationship was characterized by Washington's decreasing empowerment and increasing attempt to control Taipei's military behavior. In response, Taipei increasingly attempted to entrap the US while seeking more independence through alternative security guarantees. Even before Kennedy's inauguration, negative prior beliefs had largely structured leaders' assessments on both sides.

On the US side, key members of the Kennedy administration clearly inherited the Truman administration's legacy in terms of its perceptions of the ROC. Kennedy himself took a more complex position. Although criticizing Truman for the loss of China in 1949, Kennedy shared much of Truman and Acheson's policy toward Taiwan.[201] In 1955, Kennedy opposed the Formosa Resolution and considered Eisenhower's commitment to the offshores unnecessary to US interests. As a member of the DoS in 1949, State Secretary Dean Rusk actively participated in Acheson's policy of disengagement, and also subscribed to the DoS's general aversion to Taipei.[202] With negative impressions of Chiang, Rusk described the generalissimo as a remote dictator and a personality whom he could not get "close to in any real sense." More importantly, dismissing the Nationalist reconquest of China as a myth, Rusk complained that Chiang's dream imposed "an intolerable diplomatic burden" on America.[203] In addition, Acheson had headed the Democratic Policy Groups since the late 1950s, and continued to play an advisory role in Kennedy's foreign policy.[204]

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[201] Tucker (1994: 47).
[202] Ibid, Dai (2002: 459), Lin (2016a: 158-9).
[203] Rusk, Recorded interview by Richard Rusk and Uri Ra'anan, Part 2 (May, 1985); Rusk, Recorded interview by Richard Rusk, Thomas Schoenbaum, and Tom Ganschow (1985); Rusk, Recorded interview by Richard Rusk (January, 1986).
[204] Acheson, Recorded interview by Lucius D. Battle (27 April, 1964).

On the ROC side, prior beliefs and a sense of diverged anti-Communist ideologies predisposed Chiang's assessments. His memories of Truman and Acheson, along with the perception of the Democrats' "leftist" character, led Chiang to largely resort to negative beliefs defense. From 1959, Chiang was increasingly concerned about the rise of leftism among the Democrats.[205] In his presidential debates, Kennedy's position on the offshores annoyed Chiang; Taipei responded by publicly refuting his argument that Jinmen and Mazu would be indefensible.[206] Immediately, Chiang concluded that Kennedy's leftism would cause unfavorable changes in Washington's China policy. In October, Chiang already suspected that Kennedy would recognize Beijing and reduce US commitment to Taipei.[207] Thus, Kennedy's victory was deeply disappointing. Yet, by wishful thinking, Chiang tried to convince himself that anti-ROC voices were the minority in America. He reasoned that Kennedy was not representative of the majority of American public opinion. Moreover, invoking an analogy between Kennedy and Truman, Chiang anticipated that Washington's leftists, like Truman and Acheson, would try to humiliate Taipei. He was ready to fight against "ungrounded suspicions" and "ridiculous demands" from Washington.[208]

Washington indeed prepared for a major change in US policy toward Taiwan. As a NSC document in early 1961 reveals, US leaders attempted to make significant adjustments to Taiwan-related issues from the outset of Kennedy's office. Although this assessment clearly pointed out Taipei's growing fear of US abandonment, it suggested Washington to take advantage of its uncertainty.[209] Nevertheless, Kennedy never intended to abandon Taiwan. Contrarily, his new policy was motivated by a benign intention — to gather international support for Taipei's legitimacy, albeit with a Two-China solution which Chiang bitterly resented.[210]

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[205] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 360).
[206] Tucker (1994: 48).
[207] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 384-5, 388).
[208] Ibid, 398-9.
[209] U.S. Department of State (1996b: doc.23).
[210] Bush (2004: 105).

From 1961, US diplomatic gestures soon led to Taipei's rising negativity. First and foremost, given growing opposition to Taipei's UN membership from newly independent African countries, Washington proposed a Two-China solution for preserving Taipei's seat vis-à-vis increasing difficulty to block Beijing with a moratorium. The DoS proposed a successor-state theory, which implied the simultaneous recognition of Beijing and Taipei's as sovereign successor states to China. Simultaneously, growing US interest in supporting Outer Mongolia's UN membership led Washington to seek for Taipei's agreement.[211] Yet, both the Two-China proposal and the Outer Mongolia issue met vigorous opposition. Angered by the US proposals, Chiang rejected the successor-state theory outright, threatening to veto Mongolia's admission. Taipei launched a propaganda campaign against Washington; Nationalist-controlled newspapers even went so far as to criticize Kennedy for being "naive, childish, stupid, and frivolous."[212] Eventually, Kennedy pressured Taipei to comply with the US policy on Outer Mongolia, in exchange of Washington's continuous opposition to Beijing's admission.[213]

Yet, Washington's threats deeply humiliated Chiang. In March, after hearing report on Rusk's talk to Ambassador Yeh, he wrote that "America's China policy requires us to create a Two-China situation in the UN […] There is no greater pain and humiliation than this!" He even considered withdrawing from the UN, in case that Beijing was admitted.[214] By the end of 1961, Chiang had seen the two disputes as among Taipei's most serious challenges from Washington's leftists. "With regard to America, the issues of UN representation and Outer Mongolia," he assessed, "had been the most fierce, the most difficult, and probably the biggest or even last struggle in the last ten years."[215] Also, by invoking an analogy between

[211] Washington estimated that the Two-China solution would gain more support. Moreover, it is very likely that Beijing would reject the proposal anyway, so that Taipei would secure its membership. See Ibid, 106, Dai (2002: 464-5).
[212] Dai (2002: 467).
[213] Bush (2004: 109).
[214] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 431).
[215] Ibid, 526.

Rusk and Acheson, Chiang reasoned that the DoS's intention was "to fulfill Acheson's policy fourteen years ago, with the strategy of cancelling out the Republic of China."[216]

More importantly, negative face-to-face interactions between US and ROC leaders made Chiang increasingly certain about US intention to obstruct Taipei's mission of reconquest. Rusk's attitude particularly disappointed Chiang. On 25 March, the state secretary told Yeh that Taipei should not "expect the US to establish its own policy on your government's theory of returning to the Mainland or representing the Mainland." Seeing this as "completely against the principle of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty," Chiang took Rusk's words as indicating Washington's intention to renege on its alliance commitment.[217] In August, during Vice President Chen Cheng's visit to America, his talk with Rusk on Mongolia again led to Chiang's deep frustration: "According to Rusk's messages to Ci-xiu [Chen], his rhetoric is naive and stupid, showing his ignorance and lack of principle," he wrote, "such nativity and incompetence of the American state secretary is exactly like that of Acheson ten years ago." When Chiang's hope for US support to his reconquest of China diminished, he showed an increasingly risk-acceptant tendency to entrap the US.[218]

Entrapment vs. Control

In November 1960, Chiang already predicted that Kennedy's victory would significantly delay the implementation of the Tian-ma Project, which Eisenhower approved. Yet, he did not rule out the possibility of joint US-ROC operations against Beijing.[219] By early 1961, however, Chiang was disillusioned after Washington's Two-China proposal and its renewed pressure for evacuating the offshores. Chiang became so intransigent on the offshores that he even prepared to withdraw from the UN.[220] At the same time, the devastating Great Leap

[216] Ibid, 431, 525.
[217] Ibid, 431.
[218] Ibid, 469-70, Lin (2015: 144).
[219] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 398).
[220] Ibid, 461.

Forward on the Mainland let Chiang to perceive a window of opportunity for launching his reconquest. Thus, Taipei increasingly took on an independence strategy.[221]

Marking the watershed of Taipei's military posture was the launching of the Guo-guang Project (GGP) in 1961. First, the project itself indicated that Chiang lost patience with Washington.[222] The GGP symbolized Taipei's efforts to transform its war plan into operation in a short term. Whereas similar projects before 1961 were limited to conceptual planning, the GGP was fully operational and could be implemented at different sub-units of the Nationalist forces. By 1971, the project had been comprised of twenty six operation plans, contingent on a range of strategic scenarios.[223] Furthermore, the GGP was placed under Chiang's direct management, whereas similar projects in the past fell under Cheng Chen's responsibilities. As the project went on, Chiang personally resided in most of the meetings.[224] Also, the GGP was created on the assumption that Washington would obstruct Taipei's military operations. In order to cover it up, Taipei used various deceptive means to bypass the MAAG's monitoring.[225]

In this context, a new crisis was amounting in 1962. Seeking the chance of a deepening Sino-Soviet split, Chiang was actively preparing for a large-scale invasion of South China from late 1961. While planning to attack in mid-1962, Chiang even disguised part of his ongoing project as a regular military proposal in order to divert Washington's attention.[226] After Washington realized Chiang's intention, it pressured Taipei to stop the campaign with a mixture of persuasion and threat.[227] Yet, Chiang stepped up the propaganda for liberating China, and levied special war tax without consulting Washington.[228] Eventually, in mid-1962, Wash-

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[221] Lin (2015: 150).
[222] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 433-4).
[223] Peng (2005: 53, 191).
[224] Ibid, 46-8.
[225] Ibid, 193-4, Lin (2015: 152, 156).
[226] Taipei was in contact with Seoul and Saigon in discussing a joint action against Beijing. Chiang levied war tax and establish an institute for training Nationalist cadres to restore order on the Mainland. See U.S. Department of State (1996b: doc.84), Garver (2015: 90), Lin (2015: 155-6).
[227] U.S. Department of State (1998: doc.62).
[228] Lin (2015: 160).

ington indirectly alerted Beijing that Taipei was preparing for offensive actions during the Warsaw Talks. From late June, the Southeastern coast of China saw a massive PLA deployment of over 400,000 troops. Chiang finally gave up his campaign in July.[229]

Following the crisis, Washington began to placate frustrated Chiang with reassurance. First, in late 1962, Washington proposed a new plan for US-ROC joint operations against the Mainland with unconventional warfare. Moreover, Washington also satisfied Taipei's request for C-123 transport planes.[230] Yet, Chiang not only downplayed such US signals, but also saw Washington's malign intentions. In 1963, Chiang concluded that the new joint-operations project served as both a deceptive tactic and a potential mechanism to impose restrictions on Taipei's autonomy.[231] Despite Washington's pressure, Chiang continued to act in an opportunistic manner in order to entrap America. For example, in a military conference in mid-1963, Chiang told his generals that he was planning to provoke the PLA into a flight with artillery bombardment. Once Beijing was hooked, Taipei could successfully bypass the limits of the MDT by launching a counter-attack. Chiang believed that, once his troops had landed on China, Washington could never have stopped him.[232] In the light of Chiang's risk-taking behavior, Washington privately informed Taipei that US economic assistance would be terminated by 1965. In 1963, the US also temporarily stopped its supply of oil to the Nationalist forces. Such US obstructions made Chiang so annoyed that he even temporarily considered breaking the US-ROC alliance.[233]

This negative reciprocity did not stop until the face-to-face diplomacy between Kennedy and General Chiang Ching-kuo in late 1963.[234] In September, General Chiang's mission to the US resulted in considerable improvement of his father's perceptions of Kennedy. Through direct observations from his son, Chiang surprisingly discovered much convergence

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[229] Ibid, 162-3, Peng (2005: 194).
[230] Lin (2015: 164-5).
[231] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 610), Lü (2014, Vol.12: 49).
[232] Peng (2005: 201-2).
[233] Wen (1990), Lü (2014, Vol.11: 616).
[234] Chiang Ching-kuo served as a minister without portfolio at the Executive Yuan in 1963.

between his and Kennedy's perceptions of Beijing. Contrary to Chiang's prior beliefs, Kennedy was obsessively fearful of Communist China. He perceived the CCP as expansionist and intensely hostile to America and was particularly troubled by the possibility that Beijing would possess nuclear weapons.[235] In this context, during General Chiang's conversation with the National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, they began to discuss a potential joint US-ROC operation to destroy missile sites and atomic installations in China through maritime raids and airdrops. Bundy assured Chiang that "the United States places a high priority on measures to weaken the Chinese Communist regime, particularly its nuclear growth," and "would examine most carefully any possibilities advanced."[236] The next day, while meeting with the president, General Chiang went straightforwardly to the ROC's plan of maritime raids. Whereas Kennedy proposed a more careful study of the proposal based on more intelligence and realistic planning, he also stated that "he felt the Chinese Communists pose a tremendous danger to world peace, and that the United States is willing to do any reasonable thing which would weaken their power."[237]

In late September, Chiang Ching-Kuo's reports surprised the generalissimo. US leaders' messages immediately served as positive signs for Washington's attitude toward his mission of reconquest. On 21 September, he drew on General Chiang's impressions in making the following assessment of Kennedy:

> *My son reported on his conversation with Kennedy and their detailed discussions, which focused on the subject of destroying the Communist bandits' atomic installations. Regarding our proposal, he had generally agreed on the principles. Moreover, his talk on his resentment to the Communist bandits and uncompromising attitude was by no means deceptive. Also, he was also speaking out of sincerity while firmly disagreeing with our overt military operations that may trigger a world war; thus,*

[235] Kochavi (2002).
[236] U.S. Department of State (1996b: doc.185).
[237] Ibid, doc.186, Chang (1988: 1301); In fact, the military options had been discussed for months within the Kennedy administration since February 1963.

his words are credible. The first purpose of Ching-quo's visit was to know for sure the true thought about the Communist bandits in Kennedy's mind […] Since both have been achieved, the achievement is beyond my expectation.[238]

Now, Chiang not only believed that Kennedy was sincere in his resolve to fight against the Communists, but also discovered that the president largely shared his opinion that Beijing posed a world threat.[239] Expressing his relief, Chiang even unusually attributed Washington's objection to the ROC's military operations to benign US intentions: The president, he reasoned, was sincerely concerned about the danger that the ROC's military campaign would provoke a world war.[240]

Unfortunately, Kennedy's assassination deprived him of any chance to fully reverse Chiang's prior beliefs. By November 1963, Chiang had readily returned to his increasingly prototypical image of US unreliability. This was indicated by the start of the Ming-de Project from late 1963 — Taipei's renewed attempt to contain excessive US influence in the Nationalist system of military education by cooperating with West Germany.[241] Moreover, in the same month, Chiang was contemplating another military plot to entrap the US. In his diaries, Chiang specified a rather creative plan to provoke Beijing's retaliation against South Vietnam by launching a naval invasion of Hainan.[242]

Taipei's Fading Dream

In the Johnson years, US-ROC relations were essentially characterized by continuous deterioration. What reinforced Taipei's perceptions of Washington was a series of frustrations. In particular, Chiang was disappointed with Washington's tolerance of Beijing's nuclear program and its irresolute stance in the Vietnam War. By the late 1960s, Taipei had perceived Washington as *highly unreliable* in the light of an anticipated US-PRC rapprochement.

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[238] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 685).
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Lianhe Press (2008), Wang (2011).
[242] Lü (2014, Vol.11: 710).

President Johnson's inauguration saw an immediate downturn of Taipei's perceptions. Resilient prior beliefs, facilitated by Chiang's personal impressions, again dominated his assessments. In May 1961, Johnson's visit to Taiwan resulted in reinforcing Chiang's negative prototypical image of Americans. Although Johnson attempted to relieve Taipei's discontent on the Two-China proposal, his meeting with Chiang led to the impression that Johnson was dodgy and insincere on assisting the ROC's mission of reconquest. "I initially mentioned Communist bandits in the Mainland and our people's demand for anti-Communist assistance […]," Chiang wrote, "yet, he did not take it seriously, and seemingly tried to avoid answering, but was eager to talk about […] propaganda to journalists." Feeling frustrated, Chiang reasoned that "he just talked about what he wanted to talk, but ignored what I wanted to talk; this again added to my experiences about diplomacy to America."[243] As a result, Johnson's attitude and non-response served as a clear indicator that Washington "has no will to eliminate the Communist bandits and help us to recover the country."[244]

In 1964, Chiang immediately concluded that Johnson's presidency would give rise to leftist influence in Washington, which was particularly represented by Dean Rusk. Again, he feared that the DoS would embrace its old policy of encouraging Asian Titoism and seeking to recognize Beijing.[245] Nevertheless, new developments in international politics led Chiang to remain hopeful that he would recover the Mainland. First, Chiang believed that Beijing's amounting nuclear threat would force Washington to cooperate with Taipei in order to destroy China's nuclear facilities. Second, escalated conflicts in Vietnam raised his hope that the conflicts might spill over into Communist China.[246]

The first hope was considerably reinforced by Chiang Ching-kuo's mission in late 1963. Apart from his conversation with Kennedy, General Chiang even discussed with Bundy on

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[243] Ibid, 448.
[244] Ibid, 447.
[245] Ibid, 722.
[246] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 101-2), Lü (2014, Vol.11: 710).

technical means to take out Beijing's nuclear installations.[247] However, Johnson repeatedly turned down Taipei's proposals of military raids, which the DoS considered unrealistic and politically counterproductive. By mid-1964, Washington had largely given up the military option, and it increasingly turned to diplomatic means in applying international pressure on Beijing.[248] Eventually, the detonation of Beijing's atomic bomb caught Chiang by surprise. According to US intelligence estimates, this should not have happened until 1970. Feeling extremely depressed, Chiang began to blame the US for missing the opportunity to eliminate the grave threat. On 17 October, he complained bitterly about US inaction: "Although the MDT protected Taiwan on the surface, it actually protected the CCP and gave it a lot of time to finish today's detonation test." Thus, Chiang charged that "The United States is responsible for the success of the CCP's nuclear test."[249]

The shock was so great that Washington found it was impossible to pull Chiang out of panic. In a conversation with Ray Cline, the director of CIA's Taipei branch, Chiang said that he was extremely "disturbed and scared." He also dismissed Washington's nuclear protection as useless. US nuclear retaliation, Chiang reasoned, would mean nothing to Taiwan, because the people would already die then.[250] Even by 1966, ROC leaders had not escaped from enduring anxieties. In December, during his mission to Taipei, Rusk found the Nationalist elites, including Chiang Ching-kuo, could not be convinced by his repeated reassurance. In his conversation with the generalissimo, Rusk observed that Chiang spoke at some length that "in the 'past few days' he had become concerned about the possibility that Peking would launch a nuclear strike on Formosa with 'ten or twelve weapons' and reduce that island to ashes."[251]

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[247] Bundy seemed to be moved by Chiang Ching-kuo's proposal and assured him of Washington's willingness to review Taipei's operation plan. See Lin (2012: 128-9).
[248] Ibid, 130.
[249] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 101-2).
[250] Tucker (2009: 23), Lin (2012: 131).
[251] Lin (2012: 133), U.S. Department of State (1998: doc.224).

Furthermore, Chiang's hope with regard to the Vietnam War was eventually shattered by Washington's perceived irresolute stance. From 1964 to 1965, he interpreted a series of statements by US leaders as indicators of Washington's intention to appease Hanoi. Chiang was frustrated with such gestures to "beg the Communists for peace." In late 1964, Rusk's words in a television interview struck him as insulting to Taipei. Chiang immediately took it as evidence of the DoS's attempt of appeasement at the expense of the ROC. From then on, statements by Johnson and Rusk continued to reinforce this image.[252] In late 1966, Washington's exclusion of Taipei from the Manila Summit greatly offended Chiang. Again, he concluded that the isolation of Taipei indicated Washington's attempt to appease Beijing. An analogy with his humiliation in the Truman years came in Chiang's assessments. Johnson's exclusion of Taipei, he claimed, marked the culmination of a series of US betrayal of the ROC, which dated back to the Yalta Treaty.[253] With an intensified image of US unreliability, Chiang complained bitterly about Americans' lack of integrity. "Their tolerance of the Communist takeover of the Mainland and malicious policy of devastating Asia," Chiang wrote, "has finally awakened me from my eighty years' nightmare of America."[254]

Despite his hope for escalating the Vietnam War, Chiang rejected Johnson's request to dispatch the Nationalist troops to Vietnam.[255] Feeling highly uncertain about Washington's intentions, he wrote: "the US would definitely sacrifice Vietnam, and eventually Taiwan, for the purpose of its own withdraw from the Vietnam War. This has been their routine practice to sell allies out."[256] Also, even Washington's proposals for preserving Taipei's UN membership deepened Chiang's suspicions of US abandonment. Following the Congress hearings on US-China relations in 1967, Chiang essentially came to the judgment that "the tide of American policy had turned against Taiwan."[257]

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[252] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 129, 242-4).
[253] Ibid, 362.
[254] Ibid, 362-4.
[255] Tucker (2009: 25), Garver (2015: 212).
[256] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 364).
[257] Bush (2004: 112), Tucker (2009: 24).

Therefore, from the mid-1960s, Taipei actively searched for alternative guarantees of security. Two of such efforts are particularly noteworthy. The first was Taipei's pursuit of nuclear weapons. In 1965, Taipei started preparatory research and training programs for developing nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. By 1966, Taipei had already started to secretly construct its nuclear program.[258] Moreover, from the late 1960s, Taipei even began to make contact with Moscow through secret diplomacy. As historical evidence reveals, Chiang even considered the possibility that Taipei would overthrow Beijing's rule with Soviet assistance; he also considered long-term cooperation with Moscow following a potential collapse of the CCP regime.[259]

In general, the alliance interactions from 1961 to 1968 largely supports the ARM. First, prior beliefs, plus ideological divergence, led to a strong pattern of beliefs defense on Chiang's side. From the beginning, negative beliefs heavily assimilated Chiang's interpretation of US behavior. Washington's inherited negativity from the Truman years facilitated a less friendly policy toward Taipei from 1961. US diplomatic gestures, along with negative face-to-face interactions, quickly reinforced Chiang's beliefs about US unreliability, thus encouraging his risk-taking strategy of entrapment throughout the Kennedy and Johnson years. In this context, Washington's reluctance to empower Taipei only worked to raise Chiang's certainty about malicious US intentions. On the other hand, Taipei's active attempts of entrapment increasingly attracted tighter US control. Again, on both sides, leaders tended to interpret signals from a forward-looking perspective. Little evidence shows that they looked into the cost of substantive actions from the other's perspective. To favorable US actions, Chiang remained his largely unappreciative attitude.

Finally, personal impressions from face-to-face diplomacy continued to play an important role. Compared to diplomatic gestures, personal impressions did not seem particularly

[258] Lin (2012: 133-4, 137-8).
[259] Lianhe Press (2008: 7-9).

strong in enhancing affectively congruent perceptions. Nevertheless, it seemed quite effective in challenging leaders' dissonant prior beliefs. In this sense, the sudden change of Chiang's assessment of Kennedy's intentions served as a typical example of how positive impressions, facilitated by surprise, can quickly challenge one's resilient stereotype. By 1968, deeply depressed Chiang, under the fear of nuclear destruction, had been increasingly certain about his prototypical image of America as *highly unreliable*.

4.2.4 Nixon and Afterwards (1969-1975)

During the Nixon years and afterwards, the US-ROC relationship continued to see a downturn in Taipei's perceptions of US reliability. On the one hand, driven by America's strategic need to contain the Soviet Union, President Nixon, an old friend of Chiang, spearheaded the normalization of US-China relations.[260] On the other hand, Washington's serious blow to the ROC's legitimacy was not unexpected. In fact, ROC leaders' suspicions grew so deep that they could hardly be optimistic about even a Republican government's commitment to Taiwan.[261] As a result, the intra-alliance interactions were characterized by growing US efforts to approach Beijing and reassure Taipei simultaneously, and the ROC's increasing pursuit of alternative security guarantee.

By early 1969, Chiang's general image of America had become highly negative, to the extent that he could hardly separate it from his recurrent frustrations with Washington. Thus, despite Nixon's anti-Communist credentials and his personal ties to Chiang, the generalissimo was not too excited about his election.[262] Since the mid-1960s, Chiang had increasingly applied his prototypical beliefs to interpreting US behavior. In his diaries, Chiang frequently portrayed America as "the most unreliable ally," and occasionally vented his "intense feelings of disgust" at Americans in general. "After numerous events of deception and betrayal,"

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[260] Nixon was not only a frequent houseguest of Chiang, but also respected Chiang's status as one of the major leaders of the 20th century. And he did feel that many of his decisions to Taiwan made him uneasy. See Nixon (1978: 4917, 5406, 10686).
[261] Shen (1989: 4).
[262] Nixon (1978: 5406), Lü (2014, Vol.12: 568).

Chiang wrote, "how can I not awaken to recognize the true face of the Anglo-Saxons?"[263] What further troubled him was growing domestic support for a US-China rapprochement in America. Throughout the Johnson years, Chiang always suspected that Washington would recognize Beijing. Particularly, his fear was growing whenever Washington turned to a Two-China policy.[264] Thus, he warily observed Nixon's attitude toward Communist China from his presidential campaign.

Paying much attention to US leaders' gestures, Chiang's pessimism had grown increasingly ever since late 1968. Even in September, he began to detect signs of Washington's unfavorable policy toward Taipei from a series of statements by Nixon and other US leaders. Initially, Chiang's faith in Nixon began to fall as he believed that the president-elect was leaning toward an isolationist policy.[265] In November, Chiang detected another sign of US unreliability from Nixon's conversation with his nephew Kong Ling-kan concerning Vietnam. Nixon's mercurial attitude toward the peace talks, Chiang believed, indicated that Washington's foreign policy was selfish and had no integrity. He immediately warned Kong to not get too close to Nixon.[266] Finally, drawing from Nixon's statements concerning the US-China Ambassadorial Talks since early 1969, Chiang basically concluded that Washington again intended to sell Taipei out.[267] In mid-1969, Chiang found other evidence for this judgment from State Secretary Rogers's statement on US efforts to improve relations with the PRC. At this point, Chiang was almost certain that Washington was moving toward a US-China rapprochement; he even saw the possibility that Washington might sacrifice Taipei for satisfying Beijing's territorial ambitions.[268] At the same time, senior ROC diplomats, such as Chou Shu-kai, James Shen and Qian Fu, were all increasingly sharing Chiang's judgment, although they had not yet become as certain as the generalissimo.[269]

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[263] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 95, 333, 669).
[264] Ibid, 550.
[265] Ibid, 554.
[266] Ibid, 570-1.
[267] Ibid, 675-6.
[268] Ibid, 611.
[269] Shen (1982: 10, 44), Chien (2005: 172).

From then on, negative prior beliefs largely dominated Taipei's assessments. Both substantive and affective signals from the US had unfortunately reinforced ROC leaders' worst-case analysis. In 1969, Washington removed restrictions of travel and food export to China. More importantly, Nixon ordered the modification of the regular Taiwan Strait Patrol by the Seventh Fleet, although this was largely symbolic — the withdrawal of two destroyers from the Strait. Simultaneously, Washington reassured Taipei that other aspects of US commitment such as the Seventh Fleet's regular visits to Taiwan and its availability for immediate deployment to the Strait would continue.[270] Yet, by late 1969, Washington's gestures toward Beijing made Chiang bitterly resented Nixon. In October, he assessed that:

> *The Nixon administration's attitude to us was extremely bad, and even worse than the Democrats. I had a conversation with State Secretary Rogers in August, and indirectly warned them by complaining about the previous administration's non-supportive policy toward us. Yet, he has disregarded it so far. This is no different from admitting that his policy follows his predecessor, and does not care about my warning.*[271]

Particularly, the generalissimo showed his deep resentment toward "America's awkward diplomacy, especially its disgusting and ugly showing of flattering languages and actions toward the Communist bandits."[272] As a result, even Nixon, an old houseguest of Chiang, could not escape from his insults. Chiang began to call him "ugly Ni" (*ni chou*) in his diaries.

In a similar fashion, ROC leaders paid most attention to unfavorable US signals, whereas they tended to downplay Washington's messages of assurance. In April 1970, Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo visited America in order to probe Washington's intentions concerning Beijing. US leaders' attitude soon left him no doubt about Washington's inevitable move toward a US-China rapprochement. In his diaries, Chiang paid most attention to a failed at-

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[270] U.S. Department of State (2006: doc.19, doc.34).
[271] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 645-7).
[272] Ibid, 645.

tempt of assassination during his son's mission to the US, taking this as evidence for the deficiency of American democracy.[273] Simultaneously, Nixon's reassurance of US commitment largely fell on deaf ears, while Taipei could not stop thinking about US abandonment.[274] Chiang confessed that Nixon's words hurt him greatly. On the day of the ROC's withdrawal from the UN in 1971, his anger became so intense that he suffered a serious stomach. From then on, ROC diplomats, such as Ambassador James Shen, soon interpreted Washington's failed attempt to preserve Taipei's seat as a plot to victimize its ally. He believed that Kissinger deceived Taipei in order to oust the ROC.[275]

Nevertheless, Nixon's China policy was essentially different from Truman's policy in 1949. Whereas Truman was ready to abandon Taiwan in order to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, Nixon neither saw Beijing as truly reliable, nor did he consider sacrificing Taipei. During a conversation in 1972, Kissinger clearly pointed out to the president that the Chinese are "more dangerous [than the Russians] over a historical period," because "they've been a great power all their history."[276] Also, concerning about America's credibility, Nixon was largely aimed at normalizing US-PRC relations without endangering the US-ROC relationship. In this context, Washington did not perceive Taipei as highly unreliable. On the one hand, US leaders were clearly aware that ROC leaders would object to any substantive US actions to ease tensions with Beijing, whereas they did not believe that such actions "affect any vital security interest of Taiwan or diminish in any way our existing treaty commitments."[277] Simultaneously, as a DoS memorandum reveals, Washington was aware that the opposition of ROC leaders was based on their fear of Beijing's aggressive behavior and "an adverse effect on public morale in the Republic of China."[278] Moreover, occasional deviate actions by the ROC also raised Washington's alert of potential troubles

[273] Ibid, 688.
[274] Garver (2015: 268).
[275] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 763), Shen (1982: 51-5).
[276] U.S. Department of State (2003: doc.105).
[277] Nixon (1978), Tucker (2009: 30), U.S. Department of State (2006: doc.49).
[278] U.S. Department of State (2006: doc.45).

Taipei might cause to the normalization. In July 1969, for example, the DoS raised concerns to Chiang Ching-kuo about an uninformed raid by the Nationalists on the Chinese Communist boats. Yet, Ambassador McConaughy also relied on the vice premier's words as credible evidence for his assurance that the ROC "will in the future consult in advance is of considerable importance."[279]

Therefore, throughout their interactions with China, Nixon and Kissinger strived to reassure Chiang of Washington's unchanged commitment to Taiwan while they also made this clear to Beijing.[280] From early 1970, Washington prioritized upgrading Taiwan's air defense, and engaged in concrete discussions with Vice Premier Chiang concerning the provision of F-4 jet fighters.[281] From 1971 to 1972, during their conversations with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, both Kissinger and Nixon resisted their repeated attempts to sever US-ROC ties, insisting on the US interest in defending the ROC's right to exist as an independent country. In his meeting with Mao, Nixon insisted that he could make no secret deal on Taiwan. Instead, the president tried to persuade Beijing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan in exchange for a reduction of US military presence on the island.[282]

Yet, given ROC leaders' negative beliefs defense, such US efforts did little in reducing their suspicion that Washington made a secret deal with Beijing. For example, regarding the US assistance in F-4 fighters, the generalissimo even perceived insincerity from Nixon's supportive comments. In January 1970, after learning about Nixon's announcement that he did not object to the delivery of F-4 fighter planes, Chiang commented that "he cited the Department of Defense testimony in 1968, which stated 'this type of plane is very useful to the Republic of China, though not urgent.' Such languages are shrewdly hypocritical and resentful."[283] By early 1972, Chiang was readily prepared for forthcoming US abandonment; he

[279] Ibid, doc.16.
[280] Ibid, doc.52, Garver (2015: 267).
[281] U.S. Department of State (2006: doc.57, doc.58).
[282] Kissinger (2011), Garver (2015: 270-3).
[283] Lü (2014, Vol.12: 668).

even considered cutting off Taipei's official relations with Washington.[284] In a meeting with Nixon, Ambassador Shen asked him whether Beijing pledged to not use force against Taipei. With no affirmative response, Shen concluded that Washington "had sold its ally out."[285] In the following years, a series of substantive US reassurance consistently failed to rescue Taipei's declining faith. In 1971, the DoS approved the lease of two submarines to Taiwan in order to strengthen its defense against a potential PLA assault. Also, the CINCPAC informed Taipei that the patrols of the Seventh Fleet would be partially resumed in the Strait. Washington even resumed the joint exercises between US and ROC forces, which had been paused since 1968, in order to repulse a potential PLA attack on the offshores. Yet, unimpressed by those actions, Chiang even feared that Washington attempted to assassinate him.[286]

From 1974, although the US-China rapprochement was hindered by the Watergate scandal and China's political infighting, US-ROC mutual perceptions could hardly see any positive turn. While President Ford still resisted Beijing's attempts to sever US-ROC diplomatic ties, Washington was ready to designate the PRC as a strategic threat to the USSR. This willingness to empower Beijing frightened ROC leaders. As a result, Taipei increasingly resorted to non-cooperative strategies to sabotage US-China relations. The Nationalist government not only began to rally US domestic support against the rapprochement, but also employed its intelligence services in America to penetrate the US government and disrupt voices sympathetic to Beijing.[287] More importantly, while the ROC increasingly resorted to an independence strategy, this effort culminated in Taipei's pursuit of nuclear weapons as an alternative security guarantee. From the early 1970s, ROC leaders decided to move forward with their program of nuclear weaponization, under the cover of nuclear research for civilian purposes. The military establishments particularly showed a strong interest in integrating a nuclear ar-

[284] Ibid, 776.
[285] Shen (1982: 50-5).
[286] Garver (2015: 276-7), Lü (2014, Vol.12: 764).
[287] Tucker (1994: 128-30).

senal into Taiwan's national defense. It is noteworthy that Taipei's hypothetical enemies included not only Beijing, but also other foreign powers such as Japan.[288] By 1973, Taipei had made substantial progress, and developed the capacity to produce highly-enriched uranium.

Nevertheless, Taipei's secret nuclear program did not escape US surveillance. Washington well understood Taipei's intention to sabotage the normalization of US-China relations. In late 1972, a CIA analysis of the ROC's nuclear intentions estimated that its capability to fabricate and test a nuclear device could be achieved by 1976. The analysis also judged that Taipei's nuclear program was motivated by its urgent need to counter the new potential for Beijing's nuclear blackmail, and its concern over the reliability of America's nuclear umbrella.[289] In conclusion, it estimated that "so far, Taipei's prudent and cautious response to its series of international upsets over the past few years suggests no intent to risk provoking Peking or alienating the US and Japan."[290] While perceiving such intentions as risk-averse, Washington also moved to check Taipei's nuclear program with a mixture of monitoring and diplomatic pressures from 1973. Eventually, in 1977, President Carter decided to kill the program with forceful means. Under US threats, the ROC finally terminated its nuclear program and subjected all nuclear facilities to US inspections.[291]

Generally speaking, the intra-alliance relationship in the Nixon years was characterized by increasingly divergent perceptions. On the one hand, driven by strategic need to approach Beijing at the expenses of Taipei, US leaders had generally perceived Taipei's intentions in an understanding manner. Nixon's positive beliefs and ideological convergence sustained his sympathy toward Chiang and Washington's substantive reassurance of defense commitment. Whereas US leaders were well aware of Taipei's intentions of sabotaging US-China relations, they remained relatively optimistic about Chiang's reliability. Yet, external factors, such as Taipei's fear of nuclear attacks from Beijing, played an important role in eliminating

[288] Lin (2015: 326-8).
[289] U.S. Department of State (2007a: doc.266).
[290] Ibid.
[291] Ibid, 332-41.

Taipei's attempt of entrapment. Thus, it is hard to say that Washington did not derive its beliefs about Taipei's reliability on the basis of its fear of abandonment. Yet, it is notable that US leaders continued to assess Taipei's intentions by drawing on ROC leaders' gestures, as exemplified by McConaughy's reliance on Chiang Ching-kuo's words in restraining Taipei's maritime raids.

On the other hand, ROC leaders' assessments even lent more support to the ARM. First and foremost, Chiang's prototypical image of America grew to such an extent that it even assimilated his positive impressions of Nixon as an old friend. Converged anti-Communist ideologies ceased to play a substantive role, as Washington's behavior contradicted Nixon's anti-Communist credentials. Furthermore, although Taipei paid disproportionate attention to US gestures and personal impressions, negative beliefs defense led ROC leaders to focus on the downside of Washington's affective signals and heavily discount its substantive actions. This has been typically exemplified by Chiang's consistent inferences of malicious intentions from Nixon's statements. In addition, while negative reciprocity dominated this period, face-to-face diplomacy continued to offer tipping points in shaping leaders' uncertainty, as shown by Chiang Ching-kuo's conviction of US unreliability in his mission to Washington in 1970.

4.3 Findings and Discussions

4.3.1 Patterns of Reliability Assessment

From 1949 to 1975, the alliance relationship experienced uneasy cooperation under enduring suspicions. Except for the Eisenhower years, the intra-alliance interactions were generally characterized by vicious circles of negative beliefs defense, particularly on the part of Taipei. Chiang's prior beliefs about America's unreliability had become increasingly prototypical by the end of the 1960s. During the Nixon years, its assimilating effect even overrode the posi-

tive aspects of US affective signals. On the other hand, while Washington's perceptions of Taipei tended to replicate a similar pattern under the Democrats' presidentship, the Republican governments were less subject to negative prior beliefs. By and large, the ARM can explain most of the mutual perpetual changes, whereas the RCM finds little support. The rest of the section discusses our main findings and alternative explanations.

Table 4.2 - Findings: Use of Information

Periods	Assessor	Propositions 1 - 4: Which indicators leaders pay attention to?						
		Capability	Institution	Reputation	Identity	Behavioral Signals		
						costly	substantive	affective
1949-1952	ROC	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	US	partial	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1953-1960	ROC	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	US	partial	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1961-1963	ROC	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	US	partial	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1964-1968	ROC	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	partial
	US	partial	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1969-1975	ROC	no	no	no	no	no	partial	partial
	US	partial	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes

As Table 4.2 summarizes, regarding leaders' use of information, our case study has, firstly, supported the predictions of ***Proposition 1***: Whereas US leaders partially relied on the ROC's military capabilities in their assessments, institutions and reputation had generally not displayed any substantive impact. Yet, even in the case of capabilities, the empirical analysis has shown that US leaders did not process this factor in a rational manner, but rather draw on subjective measures, such as their impressions of morale. By contrast, although US military capabilities never became a source of unreliability in Taipei' assessments, Chiang also tended to draw on his personal impressions in evaluating the competence of individual US leaders and America as a general image. The details will be elaborated on in the discussions of alternative explanations below.

Second, in line with both ***Proposition 2*** and ***Proposition 3***, the US-ROC relationship presents an excellent case of affective signals' potent effect, and also the prevalence of forward-looking perspective in leaders' assessments. More specifically, leaders tended to extensively draw on diplomatic gestures and use the chance of face-to-face diplomacy as a primary means to probe intentions. Yet, a notable finding from the US-ROC relationship is that gestures in indirect forms, such as statements and news reports, may also work effectively to trigger intense emotions of leaders. This was particularly the case of the rapid rise and fall in Chiang's feelings about US leaders, even on a daily basis. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, his panic reaction to a mistranslation of Eisenhower's speech provides a classical example of such. On the other hand, personal impressions from face-to-face diplomacy also consistently received heavy attention from leaders. On the ROC side, Such evidence was abundant in Chiang's diaries. On the US side, there is clear evidence that US leaders and officials extensively relied on personal impressions, via both direct observation and indirect reports, in their assessments of Taipei's reliability. For example, following his visit to Taiwan in 1958, Dulles's assessments were replete with his personal impressions of Chiang and the Nationalist elites. Regular American assessments on a bureaucratic level also tended to draw on US officials' observations of ROC leaders' statements and attitude from their direct contact. Such cases can be well represented by Ambassador McConaughy's evaluation of Chiang Ching-kuo's reassurance regarding maritime raids in 1969.[292]

Furthermore, the analysis also shows that substantive signals, though indeed receiving leaders' attention, generally played a secondary role in shaping leaders' perceptions. This was particularly the case on the ROC side, given the prevalent assimilating effect of Chiang's negative prior beliefs, which will be addressed in our discussion of ***Proposition 5*** below. On the US side, however, Taipei's heavy dependence overwhelmingly constrained its ability to impress Washington with substantive benign signals. As a result, US leaders' atten-

[292] Also see U.S. Department of State (1986: doc.73, doc.162, doc. 206).

tion was more easily attracted by Taipei's negative behavior, such as its attempts of entrapment. Nevertheless, little evidence has shown that either US or ROC leaders tended to evaluate each other's substantive actions in a backward-elimination manner. Instead of examining the cost from the other's perspective, they generally focused on substantive signals' direct consequences to their own interests. By contrast, there is even evidence that leaders did assume that the other shared their own perspective of cost. This can be typically illustrated by the example where US leaders assessed that the symbolic modification of the Taiwan Strait Patrol did not affect Taiwan's vital interests in 1969.

Finally, as ***Proposition 4*** predicts, the degree to which US and ROC leaders converged in anti-Communist ideologies made considerable difference in their assessments. In the Truman years, the sharply different assessments of Taiwan's strategic values between the DoS and the defense establishments can typically illustrate its effect. Also, divergence in such identities, which often intertwined with leaders' personal impressions, largely structured Washing-

Table 4.3 - Findings: Perceptual Change and Alliance Behavior

Periods	Congruence Test				Proposition 5		Proposition 6	
	End Perception		Alliance Behavior	Congruent	Support	End Pattern	Support	End Pattern
1949-1952	ROC	highly unreliable	Independence (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
	US	highly unreliable	Control (+) Empowerment (+)	partial	yes	negative beliefs defense	partial	relatively improved
1953-1960	ROC	probably reliable	Dependence (+)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
	US	probably reliable	Empowerment (+) Control (-)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
1961-1963	ROC	probably unreliable	Independence (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
	US	probably unreliable	Control (+) Empowerment (-)	yes	partial	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
1964-1968	ROC	highly unreliable	Independence (+)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
	US	highly unreliable	Control (+) Empowerment (-)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
1969-1975	ROC	highly unreliable	Independence (+) Dependence (-)	yes	yes	negative beliefs defense	yes	negatively reinforced
	US	probably unreliable	Empowerment (+) Control (+)	partial	yes	relative balance	no	relatively unchanged

ton's different approaches to Taiwan policy-making from the inauguration of Eisenhower and Kennedy respectively. On the ROC side, convergence or divergence in anti-Communist ideologies even played a more powerful role in Chiang's assessments of US leaders. For example, his initial perceptions of Dulles and Kennedy were largely based on his misperceptions of their ideological positions. In turn, such judgements of identities tended to reinforce leaders' corresponding prior beliefs.

In terms of perceptual continuity (see *Table 4.3*), first and foremost, the US-ROC alliance is probably one of the most representative in showcasing the prominent effect of beliefs defense, as predicted by ***Proposition 5***. Resilient prior beliefs, heavily informed by both ideological positions and previous impressions, appeared to generally dominate leaders' initial assessments across most of the episodes, as both US and ROC leaders tended to heavily resorted to beliefs defense in assimilating fresh information about each other's behavior. Thanks to Chiang's diaries, one can see that he displayed an extremely strong tendency of negative beliefs defense, often replete with cognitive biases such as wishful thinking and historical analogies. More importantly, accumulated negative feelings and emotions during his generally frustrated diplomatic experiences with Washington resulted in Chiang's growingly prototypical image of America. In turn, such overarching schema led Chiang's assessments to be increasingly associated with his negative memories of previous US governments. In the Nixon years, such negativity had already grown to such an extent that even personal impressions and ideological convergence ceased to significantly challenge Chiang's increasingly strong suspicion of Nixon.

In addition, negative beliefs defense largely predisposed Chiang to discount substantive US actions, primarily its military and economic assistance to Taiwan. In general, Chiang resorted to two beliefs defense strategies: First, he focused on the negative aspects of a particular action and complained about deficiencies, such as low quality of US military equipment. Second, he often invoked external attribution, trying to explain away benign US intentions

by transit or external causes, such as his own efforts. This is the case of Chiang's assessment of the MDT, which is usually considered a major audience-cost signal from a rationalist perspective. Even though Chiang did show gratitude for certain substantive US signals, such usual occasions often proved to exert limited effect on his perceptions. This is the case of Chiang's assessment of the US deployment of the Matador missiles in 1957. Washington's substantive signals could even lead to a vicious circle of negative internal attribution: Discontent about present US signals reinforced Chiang's negative feelings, hence, his tendency to attribute Washington's unsatisfying actions to its malicious intentions. In this sense, it is likely that such substantive US signals would had been difficult to influence Chiang's increasingly resilient prototypical way of reasoning, unless they had been presented in a way that elicits strong positive emotions, such as successful face-to-face diplomacy.

On the US side, prior beliefs generally set Washington's course of action toward Taipei from the start of each US presidency. In 1949, Washington's policy of abandonment largely originated in the Truman administration's negative beliefs about Chiang and the ROC's unreliability. When Eisenhower began his office in 1953, Washington's sympathy toward the ROC led US leaders to conduct a major reassessment of Taiwan's strategic role in the rising US strategy of containment. As a result, Washington integrated the ROC into the US defense parameter in the West Pacific by formalizing its alliance comment. During the Kennedy and Johnson years, such a strategic orientation was significantly undermined, as the foreign policy legacy of Truman and Acheson regained influence in Washington.

In terms of perceptual change, face-to-face diplomacy continued to provide crucial tipping points for the change of leaders' prior beliefs, just as ***Proposition 6*** suggests. Such change can go in both directions: In short, face-to-face diplomacy can either reinforce leaders' affectively corresponding perceptions or renew their pre-existing beliefs often by surprise. As discussed earlier (see ***Proposition 3*** above), this does not necessarily means that personal impressions from leaders' direct contact always played a more prominent role than

diplomatic gestures, which, particularly in Chiang's case, also frequently triggered his intense emotional responses. This was the case when Chiang began to reverse his impressions of Dulles from mid-1957, largely by drawing on the state secretary's statements. Yet, it seemed that face-to-face diplomacy continued to function in a unique way, which diplomatic gestures cannot: It tended to serve as a crucial moment of conviction, namely, bringing about a dramatic increase in leaders' certainty about their beliefs, which might well override the effect of contradictory diplomatic gestures. Such was the case of Dulles' impressions of the Nationalist elites during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Similarly, one can observe a similar pattern when Chiang suddenly improved his perceptions of Kennedy, relying largely on his son's direct observations in late 1963.

4.3.2 Alternative Explanations

Now, following the earlier discussions, it is worth some effort to elaborate on the patterns by which leaders use information regarding capabilities, institutions, and reputation — the main alternative explanations under the RCM. The US-ROC alliance relationship provides more case-specific insights.

Capabilities

In short, our empirical analysis finds the evidence that military capabilities contributed significantly to US leaders' assessments of ROC reliability. For example, Washington's perception of Taipei's low capabilities played a decisive role in shaping Truman's policy of abandonment in late 1949. Despite the influence of the Korean War, Washington's beliefs about Taipei's reliability did not improved until the ROC government substantially strengthened its defense capabilities by 1952. Since then, capabilities had been a consistent indicator in US assessments, exemplified particularly by the MAAG's regular reviews. In turn, during the

Eisenhower years, Taiwan's strategic importance was positively related to its rise as the second most valuable US military ally in Asia, next to South Korea.[293]

Nevertheless, closely examining the patterns by which US leaders assessed capabilities provides little support to the RCM. First and foremost, resilient prior beliefs and feelings generally constrained US leaders' strategic expectations, hence, beliefs about Taipei's capabilities. For instance, before the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman's fatalist views of Taiwan were heavily informed by his previous image of the Nationalist regime. Taipei's military potential never became a major concern. Whereas Truman and Acheson saw little need to waste American strategic resources on the falling Nationalist government, many US military leaders, including McArthur and Radford, reached a completely different conclusion. Essentially, the State-Defense division on Taiwan from 1949 largely reflected US leaders' divergent prospects for the ROC's future role in the US strategic design in Asia. Similarly, in early 1953, Eisenhower and Dulles never took Taipei's meager self-defense capabilities as an impediment to assigning the ROC an integral role in the emerging US strategy of containment. Such differences in leaders' assessments reflected a typical motivational bias.

Furthermore, one of the primary factors by which Washington assessed Taipei's capabilities was "morale" — essentially a matter of subjectivity. Ever since the US resumed its military aid to the ROC in 1950, Washington tended to pay attention to the Nationalist morale as a crucial indicator of Taipei's military capabilities and regime stability. By 1952, the MAAG had always emphasized the importance of morale in its reports to Washington. During the Eisenhower years, US leaders took the issue seriously. Their concerns about Taipei's morale factored heavily in Washington's decision to formally extend its defense commitment to the offshore islands, which assumed little strategic importance. Also, as records of the NSC meetings suggest, US leaders could not help but judge the Nationalist morale by resorting to

[293] Tucker (1994: 64-71), Garver (2015: 63-8).

their own impressions, which largely stemmed from official reports and leaders' visits to Taiwan.[294]

On the other hand, subjective feelings about morale or weak determination also constituted an important part of Chiang's negative beliefs about US reliability. As his diaries reveals, although Chiang wished that America could assume a strong leadership in the Free World's struggle against Communism, he often felt frustrated by US leaders' perceivably irresolute attitude toward Moscow. In general, Chiang seemed to based his pessimism on the impression that US leaders were naive, ignorant, short-sided, and lacking fighting spirit, often after observing certain US diplomatic gestures. Along with the rise of the Vietnam War, such pessimism became increasingly associated with Chiang's intense negative emotions concerning his prototypical images of America. Yet, his anxieties had little to do with either balance of power at a systemic level or US military capabilities.[295] This finding suggests that leaders' assessments of capabilities can hardly be separated from their subjective feelings.

Finally, while nuclear weapons did receive certain attention in both parties' assessments, this factor operates in a different way than the RCM suggests. On the US side, Taipei's secret nuclear program from the mid-1960s did raise US leaders' doubt, which partially supports the ARM's ***Proposition 1***. However, not only did Washington show considerable sympathy toward Taipei's nuclear intentions, due to its impression of Taipei's fear of nuclear blackmail from Beijing; but also the nuclear factor only exerted limited impact on Washington's perceptions. As the CIA estimate in 1972 reveals, Washington largely based its judgement of Taipei's nuclear intentions on the impression of Chiang's risk-averse attitude at the time. On the ROC side, the question that if US nuclear umbrella can be counted on increasingly became a source of suspicion since 1964. Yet, our analysis has demonstrated that this had little to do with Taipei's objective evaluation of US nuclear capabilities per se. Rather, ROC lead-

[294] Chang (2001: 261).
[295] See Lü (2014, Vol.9: 609), Lü (2014, Vol.12: 244, 661).

ers' enduring fear of nuclear attacks from Communist China, as Rusk observed in 1966, virtually made US reassurance worthless from Chiang's perspective. This constitutes a classical example of how leaders' intense emotions can serve as credible information on their own right. In this context, the nuclear factor ceased to function as a primary indicator of offensive power, but rather an affective signal which stirred highly unpleasant feelings that strengthened leaders' risk-averse tendency.

Institutions

For similar reasons, Chiang did not believe that democratic institutions, as opposed to autocracy, added to the credibility of Washington's commitment.[296] Conversely, Chiang even held the opposite view. A democracy, he believed, tended to be unreliable, particularly because of inconsistency in its foreign policy-making. Usually, that would make it harder to predict changes in a democratic country's strategic behavior. In Chiang's assessments, such uncertainty was often associated with his disappointment with Western democracies and even the US leadership of the Free World. On the other hand, little evidence suggests that Washington tended to use regime type as a short-cut for credible alliance commitment. Again, in US assessments, the main source of credibility seemed to lie in leaders' personal impressions and prior beliefs about Chiang and Nationalist elites. As the above analysis has shown, US leaders did take personal promises seriously. For instance, in early 1953, Dulles believed that Chiang's promise to refrain from attacking the Mainland was credible enough for Washington to resume its delivery of military planes. During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, he extensively relied on personal impressions to assess Taipei's intentions. In this context, Dulles viewed the US-ROC joint communique as a landmark achievement for solving the Taiwan Strait Crisis, hence, the indicator of Taipei's reliability.[297]

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[296] See Polity IV's measurements of democracy-autocracy scores in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.
[297] Chang (2001: 278).

Reputation

Again, from a rationalist perspective, there is no evidence for the operation of reputation in US-ROC mutual assessments. Although Washington and Taipei did pay attention to each other's past behavior, their invocation of memories were generally biased, selective and subject to constant reinterpretations. Instead, there is much evidence for the widespread operation of historical analogies — the products of the representativeness heuristic — in US-ROC leaders' mutual perceptions. As the above analysis has shown, Chiang himself tended to extensively resort to superficial historical analogies. Because of his particularly painful experiences with the DoS, Chiang's assessments of US state secretaries since 1947 had been more or less based on analogies with either Marshall or Acheson. Even Dulles as a genuine supporter of Chiang could not escape from being compared extensively to Acheson in Chiang's early assessments. On the other hand, superficial analogies played no small part in Washington's perceptions of Chiang and the Nationalist government. In general, Democratic administrations were particularly vulnerable to negative memories about the KMT, dating back to at lest the early 1940s.

4.3.3 Conclusion

While cooperating under enduring negativity, the US-ROC alliance relationship provides a least-likely case for the ARM, because the rationalist explanations usually work the best for inter-state relations under constant fear and suspicion in an international system. Nevertheless, our empirical findings have demonstrated that the ARM, in effect, makes much better sense of the intra-alliance interactions throughout a period of over two decades. In both Washington and Taipei, leaders' judgments of alliance reliability were heavily shaped by affective signals and emotional responses, albeit largely in a negative way. Diplomatic gestures and personal impressions from face-to-face diplomacy figured prominently in this process. By contrast, the rationalist insight of costly signaling finds little empirical support from our

fine-grained historical data. Particularly, it is noteworthy that, thanks to Chiang Kai-shek's diaries, the US-ROC alliance provides strong evidence of the extent to which resilient negative prior beliefs can dominate leaders' reliability assessments by assimilating dissonant information, in the form of both substantive and affective signals. Thus, an immediate empirical implication would be that even affective signals designated for triggering intense positive feelings may backfire, under highly negative prior beliefs.

Chapter 5

From Occupation to Partnership: The US-Japan Alliance, 1945-1987

5.1 Overview

In September 1951, the Security Treaty during the San Francisco Peace Conference symbolized the birth of the US-Japan alliance. Almost seven decades later, the alliance not only survived the Cold War, but also successfully transformed itself into a central component of the US hub-and-spoke system of alliances in the Asia Pacific.[1] Such evolution was probably hard to foresee at Japan's humiliating defeat in 1945. Nevertheless, after four decades, the alliance not only outlived its main target in the Cold War — the Sino-Soviet alliance — but also developed into one of the most resilient bilateral security arrangements in the post-War order. The history of the alliance poses a hard test for the ARM, because conventional accounts of it largely focus on strategic imperatives, particularly external threat as its driving force. Yet, this chapter will demonstrate that conventional wisdom overlooks an important part of the story, that is, the equally important role intra-alliance interactions played in shaping the trajectory of the alliance.

5.1.1 Decision-Making Context

Prior to the analysis, it is necessary to outline the organizational background of the US-Japan alliance, because it presents certain unique features. First and foremost, the liberal democrat-

[1] See Cha (2016).

ic system of either party, not surprisingly, resulted in a regular rotation of power and a more complex profile of actors involved in the intra-alliance relations. As a result, uncertainties stemming from leaders' unfamiliarity with each other should be higher at the onset of renewed leadership. During the Cold War, the US had seen eight presidents and five cycles of power rotation. Japanese politics was even more complex, given its well-known instability and factionalism within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) — the conservative coalition which maintained its majority government since 1955. By the end of the Cold War, Japan had witnessed twenty prime ministers, who had organized thirty-two cabinets in total.[2]

Fortunately, the decision-making structures of both countries display certain systematic features over time. In Washington, policy-making toward Japan gradually moved from the periphery to the center of US grand strategy since the early Cold War. Although the decision-making process regularly involved interdepartmental divisions, the National Security Council (NSC) generally represented the collective assessments of American leaders, with a notable exception during the Carter years. As President Carter restricted the NSC's power by transforming it into mainly an advisory body, it did not undertake any major reassessment of Japan policy during this period.[3] Therefore, opinions of the State (DoS) and Defense (DoD) become particularly important, as both departments were directly in charge of political and security cooperation with Japan. Nevertheless, even this decentralized policy-making mechanism cannot prevent strong leaders, such as MacArthur and Dulles, from exercising heavy personal influence in Japan policy.

In Tokyo, foreign policy toward the US is characterized by paradoxical elements of homogenization and idiosyncrasy. The homogenizing process has originated from the increasing conservative dominance in Japanese politics, symbolized by the rise of the 1955 system. In turn, the general consensus on a close alignment with the US has gained consistent sup-

[2] Due to Japan's parliament system, it is conventional for a Japanese prime minister to organize more than one cabinet during his office. For example, Yoshida Shigeru headed four cabinets between 1948 and 1954. See Curtis (1999: 5, 246).
[3] For the changing role of the NSC in the Carter years, see, U.S. Department of State (1997), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm

port among LDP leaders. Strong personal ties between LDP leaders, as exemplified by the "Yoshida School," ensured that this consensus was passed down as a foreign policy tradition across generations of leaders. For instance, Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku, two star pupils of Yoshida Shigeru, became prime ministers respectively from the early and the mid-1960s, thus making the Yoshida Doctrine a particularly influential component of Japanese foreign policy.[4]

One the other hand, the idiosyncratic element originated, firstly, from a tendency of decentralization in Japanese politics. This is characterized by severe factionalism within the LDP and often blurred boundaries between governmental and party agencies, such as the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Moreover, extensive involvement of infor-

Table 5.1: The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance, 1951-1990

Year	Scope/Obligations	Coordinating Mechanisms	Defense Acquisition
1951	*The Security Treaty*		
1954	*Mutual Defense Assistance*		
1960	*The Mutual Security Treaty*	*Security Consultative Committee (SCC)*	
1961		*Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs (JCTEA)*	
1963-64		*Defense Study Group (DSG), Policy Planning Dialogue*	
1967		*Security Subcommittee (SSC)*	
1969	*Cooperation in Space Activities for Peaceful Purposes*		*F-4EJ aircraft (Japan)*
1971-72	*The Okinawa Reversion*	*Regular Strategic Dialogue*	
1973		*Security Consultative Group (SCG)*	
1976-78		*Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)*	*Sparrow missile, F-15 aircraft, P-3C aircraft (Japan)*
1983	*Transfer of Defense-Related Technologies*	*Joint Military Technology Commission (JMTC)*	
1985			*Patriot Weapon System (Japan)*
1987	*Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*		*XSH-60J Weapon System (Japan)*
1988-90	*Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology*		*EP-3 aircraft, SH-60J & UH-60J aircraft, HYDRA Rocket System, Sparrow Missile System (Japan)*

[4] Yoshida School is a term for a group of Yoshida Shigeru's close proteges, mainly young elite bureaucrats who worked with him since the early Occupation. See Edström (2004).

mal politics further contributed to the lack of an overarching, foreign policy-making mechanism such as the NSC.[5] Thus, Japanese foreign policy was easily subject to the personal influence and decision-making style of senior leaders. As a result, strong political figures, such as Yoshida, Sato, and Nakasone, tend to leave much more personal imprints on Japanese foreign policy.

Despite such contextual complexities, the development of the alliance can be easily divided into different stages in terms of institutional evolution. This is convenient for examining the congruence between perceptions and intra-alliance behavior. As *Table 5.1* reveals, a consistent pattern of evolution can be identified with the alliance's expanding scope of obligations: From 1951 to 1960, the alliance underwent the first major expansion with the Mutual Security (*anpo*) Treaty.[6] Then, a stage of consolidation went along with expanding institutions for security coordination throughout the 1960s. After the Okinawa reversion, the alliance had seen a period of strengthening defense relations since the mid-1970s, characterized by institutional building and a remarkable increase in security cooperation. Therefore, the institutional dimension of the alliance offers a parsimonious way to trace variation of its intra-alliance behavior. Hence, it can help us divide the history of the US-Japan alliance into multiple episodes. The process is particularly important, as the sheer length of the alliance makes it unfeasible to conduct a comprehensive examination here.

5.1.2 Critical Junctures

In this sense, critical junctures serve as points of selection rather than demarcation. As the analysis cannot cover the full history of the alliance, critical junctures should be selected in the light of selection bias. One should ensure that the selected episodes reflect the most significant adjustments of the alliance relationship, which are crucial for congruence tests. Fur-

[5] Minor (1985: 1230-1), Curtis (1999: 119).
[6] Yoshida (2012: 5-8); Dates from U.S. Department of States (2020), https://www.state.gov/treaties-in-force/

thermore, to make a strong case for theory-testing, one should also render those episodes hard tests for the ARM and, ideally, the most-likely cases for the RCM.

Table 5.2: Analytical Episodes

Leadership	Episodes	Critical Junctures	Main Adjustment of Alliance Behavior
Truman -Yoshida	1945-51	The San Francisco Conference	Washington relaxed control and shifted to an empowering strategy, while Tokyo decided to rely solely on the US for its security and rejected massive rearmament.
Eisenhower -Kishi	1957-60	The Mutual Security Treaty	Washington decided to grand Japan equal partnership, symbolized by the conclusion of a new *Anpo* treaty; Tokyo increased compliance to US security strategy
Nixon -Sato	1969-72	The Okinawa Reversion	Washington further loosed its control by returning Okinawa; Tokyo decided on an automatic extension of the MST, while stood firmly with the US on international strategy
Carter -Fukuda	1976-78	Guidelines for the Defense Cooperation	Washington increasingly pushed for burden-sharing on the part of Japan; Tokyo moved toward a more active defense posture. The US-Japan division of labor on joint defense began to take form.
Reagan -Nagasone	1982-87	Joint US-Japan Exercise & FSX co-production	The US-Japan security cooperation progressed on an unprecedented scale, with both sides committed themselves to shared grand strategic destiny and deepening military integration.

According to such principles, *Table 5.2* presents five analytical episodes, which are selected against the strategic background of the Cold War. In total, these periods only make about one third of the duration of the alliance. Yet, they cover most landmark developments of the US-Japan alliance relationship throughout the Cold War. Each episode contains one or two critical junctures which mark a significant adjustment of intra-alliance strategies. This approach has two advantages. First, it generates a manageable profile of actors. On the US side, this includes five presidencies, respectively under Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan. These administrations approximately corresponded to the offices of five Japanese prime ministers: Yoshida Shigeru, Kishi Nobusuke, Sato Eisaku, Fukuda Takeo, and Nakasone Yasuhiro. Given the instability of Japanese politics, those prime ministers enjoyed a relatively stable period of governance. Particularly, Yoshida, Sato, and Nakasone led the three longest governments in post-war Japan before the 1990s.[7]

[7] Between 1946 and 1954, Yoshida was in office for seven years in total. Sato served as Prime Ministers for seven years, while Nakasone five years. For a detailed list of Japanese cabinets between 1945 and 1998, see Curtis (1999: 246).

Figure 5.1: Composite Index of Capacity Score, 1949-1996
(Data from the COW project)





Figure 5.2: Military Expenditures, 1949-1996
(Data from the COW project)



Second, drawing on the COW datasets, this selection ensures that most of the episodes serve as easy tests for the RCM and hard tests for the ARM. As *Figure 5.1 and 5.2* show, the shift of power balance between the US and Japan can be identified vis-à-vis their common threat — the Sino-Soviet alliance.[8] From a rationalist perspective, Tokyo should be sensitive to strategic constraints on a systemic level while assessing US reliability. Thus, a realist should predict that Japan would pursue a balancing strategy in 1951, given the preponderance of American power in the international system. Conversely, from the late 1970s, the decline of US power in Asia should have significantly undermined its perceived reliability. As a result, Japan should have pursued an independence strategy in hedging against the risk of abandonment. The presence of structural constraints made both periods hard cases for the ARM.

[8] Data from the COW Project, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets

The next section begins to examine the covariation between mutual perceptions and intra-alliance behavior. Then, the main findings will be discussed, followed by certain elaboration on the three alternative explanations.

5.2 Perceptions and Intra-Alliance Interactions

5.2.1 The Making of An Ally (1945-1951)

Initial Encounters

The US occupation particularly serves as a hard test for the ARM, because the alliance relationship, just as Keating and Ruzicka point out, not only grew from the enmity of World War II, but also its preliminary stage was characterized by a high degree of inequality.[9] However, given structural incentives to balance against America, Japan underwent a positive transformation of its elite perceptions toward the US from 1945 to 1951. During this period, affective signals, particularly face-to-face diplomacy, played a decisive role in initiating perceptual change, while substantive actions by both sides sustained positive reciprocity. Our analysis explains the process in two stages: First, from 1946 to 1948, the SCAP (Supreme Command for the Allied Powers), particularly General MacArthur's personal influence, profoundly shaped the US occupational policies, hence, Tokyo's perceptions.[10] Second, from 1948, Washington increasingly intervened, and reversed many early occupational policies, dominated by the SCAP.

The initial encounters between US occupiers and Japanese elites had a far-reaching impact on the long-term alliance relationship, given initial strong feelings of hostility between the former enemies — the perception of *definite hostility*. In August 1945, the nuclear attacks left Tokyo with little choice but surrender. Without any assurance from Washington, Japanese leaders feared the loss of the emperor (*tenno*) system — a holy symbol of their na-

[9] Keating and Ruzicka (2014: 766).
[10] Poole (1998: 223).

tional identity.[11] In Washington, except for a group of Japan experts within the DoS, such as Joseph Grew, US leaders generally favored a punitive occupational policy, given their wartime memories of Japanese brutality.[12] Such negative sentiment was first represented by Truman himself. In a letter on 9 August 1945, the president wrote that "I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can't bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner."[13] Even the soft-liners of the DoS, such as Secretary James Byrnes and Dean Acheson, considered Japan the principal threat to East Asia, and preferred a strict military occupation. Perceiving a high risk of riot among surrendered Japanese troops, the hard-liners from the defense establishments favored an even more punitive post-war settlement.[14]

In this context, US affective signals, largely via MacArthur's face-to-face diplomacy, decisively relieved Tokyo's uncertainty about US intentions. In a month after MacArthur's arrival, the SCAP rapidly installed a series of occupational reforms, which even appeared radical to moderate Japanese elites. Yet, MacArthur effectively employed benign gestures through face-to-face interactions with Japanese leaders. Such gestures ever started from the onset of his tenure: Despite Tokyo's opposition, MacArthur landed at Atsugi Airfield with only 4,200 American troops, surrounded by 300,000 Japanese troops in the region. The general attributed the big gamble to his decision to show "trust" in the defeated. This optimism probably had to do with both his positive impressions of Japan's national characteristic which MacArthur developed from his interactions with leading Japanese military leaders while serving as a young US military observer to the Russo-Japanese war.[15]

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[11] Finn (1992: 8), Buckley (1995: 6).
[12] As the leading Japan expert of the DoS, Joseph Grew served as ambassador to Japan in the 1930s and also undersecretary in the 1940s. See Brinkley (1993: 134), Swenson-Wright (2005: 23-5).
[13] See Truman and Ferrell (1997).
[14] Finn (1992: 7), U.S. Department of State (1969: doc.383, doc.97).
[15] MacArthur (1964: 269-70), Yoshida (1957, Vol.1: 104); also, due to his religious beliefs, MacArthur showed a strong interest in transforming Japan into a Christian state. This motivation might also contribute to his positive expectation of the Japanese. See Wittner (1971: 78, 83), Masafumi (2010: 393-4).

More importantly, MacArthur extensively resorted to face-to-face diplomacy immediately afterwards. According to historian Richard Finn, the general met more than one hundred Japanese elites during his tenure. But in September 1945, he "saw more Japanese than in any other month of the occupation," including the emperor, the prime minister and four other ministers, the leaders of the Diet, mayors of the big cities, and some former military men. MacArthur not only showed eagerness to hearing their thought, but also rarely started such meetings by summoning Japanese to visit him.[16] His gestures quickly reassured Japanese leaders. The first such important meeting took place on 3 September. In response to a SCAP order to institute military government, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru visited MacArthur to plea for a suspension. Shigemitsu found that "the Commander-in-Chief listened with sympathy and interest, and agreed to suspend operation of military government." In response, the supreme commander said that "There would be no difficulty if the content of the proclamations were carried out by the Japanese government and people acting in good faith."[17] Though this decision amounted to a substantive action, what greatly reassured Shigemitsu was the "magnanimity" of the general. He wrote: "In this talk, I was able to obtain MacArthur's understanding of many of the questions with which we faced." Then, the Japanese government "set themselves to honor the pledge they had given in the Instrument of Surrender and to carry out the Potsdam Declaration. On these foundations was built the success of MacArthur's Occupation policy."[18]

Positive impressions also emerged out of his initial meetings with Yoshida Shigeru, the new foreign minister, in late September. Yoshida was surprised to learn that:

> *General MacArthur's association with Japan was no new development and that he had a considerable knowledge of my country and the Japanese dating back over forty years. His father, Lieutenant-General Arthur MacArthur, had, when Commander of*

[16] Finn (1992: 16).
[17] Shigemitsu (1958: 375-6), Finn (1992: 17-18).
[18] Ibid, 18, Shigemitsu (1958: 376-7).

the U.S. Forces in the Philippines, paid a visit to the Japanese forces at Port Arthur and Dairen during the Russo-Japanese war, and his son — then a lieutenant — had accompanied the elder MacArthur as his aide-de-camp and met such Japanese national heroes as Admiral Togo and General Nogi, who had, it appeared, left a very strong impression on him as men who were remarkable not only in their respective fields of action but as individuals.[19]

Also, Yoshida was surprised that MacArthur showed a high estimate of Japanese as a race, based on his early impressions of the merits of those exceptional Japanese, such as Togo and Nagi. Although the general initially struck Yoshida as being strict in morality, he recalled that "this initial feeling soon wore off, however, after I had seen more of him, giving place to a warm appreciation of his other qualities and character."[20] In general, the first meetings were reassuring; Yoshida found that "he could exchange ideas with the general on sensitive matters." Shortly, they established regular communication, characterized by a frank style of exchange. Yoshida would become the most frequent Japanese guest of MacArthur; by 1949, he had met with the general 75 times in total, far more than any other Japanese.[21]

During the first MacArthur-Yoshida meeting, the most important reassuring gesture was the general's agreement to meet with the emperor. In turn, their meeting on 27 September generated a far-reaching impact on the psychology of Japanese elites, exemplified by Yoshida himself. Although MacArthur had been always sensitive of the emperor's cultural importance and carefully avoided actions that would "outrage the feelings the Japanese people," he appeared to develop a genuine liking of Hirohito. As the general recalled, the emperor surprisingly offered himself "as the one to bear sole responsibility for every political and military decision made and actions taken" by Japan during the war.[22] This unexpected gesture worked effectively, as MacArthur wrote:

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[19] Yoshida (1961: 48).
[20] Ibid, 49.
[21] Yoshida (1957, Vol.1: 106), Finn (1992: 16, 23).
[22] MacArthur (1964: 288).

A tremendous impression swept me. This courageous assumption of a responsibility implicit with death, a responsibility clearly belied by facts of which I was fully aware, moved me to the very marrow of my bones. He was an Emperor by inherent birth, but in that instant I knew I faced the First Gentle of Japan in his own right.[23]

Eventually, their conversation ended in a genial atmosphere, with MacArthur's reassurance that "the emperor could guide the Japanese people in carrying out the many orders they would receive."[24] After the meeting, news circulation of a photograph which depicted MacArthur and Hirohito standing together soon made quite an impression on the Japanese society. Although releasing the photo was partly MacArthur's gesture to show, as John Dower points out, that "SCAP was hospitable to the emperor and would stand by him."[25] The iconic image of the supreme commander towering over the emperor appalled many Japanese elites. The Japanese Imperial Household Ministry attempted to censor the photo as it unmistakably told the Japanese who possessed greater authority. But the SCAP insisted on its wide circulation.[26] Yet, The result of this meeting greatly relieved Japanese leaders. The emperor soon established a personal relationship with MacArthur, and had continued to visit him another eleven times by 1951. As the general recalled,

The Emperor called on me often after that, our conversations ranging over most of the problems of the world. I always explained carefully the underlying reasons for occupation policy, and I found he had a more thorough grasp of the democratic concept than almost any Japanese with whom I talked.[27]

Whereas Hirohito could not hide his nervousness at the first meeting, he was observed to be relaxed and talkative in the following meetings; he could also increasingly communicate with MacArthur in a frank manner.[28]

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[23] Ibid.
[24] Finn (1992: 24).
[25] Dower (1999: 637).
[26] Shibusawa (2006: 97), Matsuo (1990: 90).
[27] MacArthur (1964: 288).
[28] Yoshida (1957, Vol.1: 107-8, 117, 121).

In his memoirs, Yoshida particularly emphasized the importance of MacArthur's reassuring gestures toward Hirohito:

> *The General had come to have a great respect for the Emperor, and even told me once that, although Japan had lost the war, the Throne was still important to the Japanese people and the reconstruction of Japan depended on the people rallying to the Imperial symbol. It was this attitude towards the Emperor which must have dictated General MacArthur's policy in regard to the Tokyo war-crimes trial; at any rate, the fact remains that the respect and understanding shown by the General towards the Throne, and his decision to exculpate the Emperor from all and any relationship with war crimes, did more than anything else to lessen the fears of the majority of the Japanese people in regard to the Occupation and to reconcile them to it.*[29]

By and large, such initial face-to-face interactions profoundly influenced the general tone of the bilateral relationship. As Yoshida recalled, while mutual understanding between American and Japanese leaders gradually developed following the MacArthur-Hirohito meeting, Tokyo gained increasing optimism about benign US intentions.[30] The meeting with Hirohito particularly reinforced MacArthur's belief that the emperor was necessary for the smooth progress of the occupation. On the Japanese side, Tokyo responded to the general's goodwill with remarkable efficiency in implementing the occupational policies. In one month, 80 per cent of the Imperial Army were disbanded, along with the dissolution of most military bureaucracies in Japan.[31] The Japanese style of compliance surprised US leaders. In early 1946, MacArthur publicly expressed his satisfaction, and appreciated the constructive role the emperor played in facilitating the smooth progress of the occupation.[32] In Washington, even hard-liners were impressed by the benefits from indirect rule through the Japanese. Truman

[29] Yoshida (1961: 51).
[30] Yoshida (1963: 1489).
[31] Huang (2009: 9).
[32] MacArthur (1964: 288, 294-5).

came to the conclusion that Tokyo's "messages indicated a strong desire to accommodate the victors."[33] George Atcheson, political advisor to the SCAP, reported a satisfactory political development of Japan. Although as a China expert Atcheson showed little sympathy to Japan and considered Hirohito a war criminal, he reported that the emperor showed "sincerity in wishing to aid in the accomplishment of our general objectives."[34]

Ripe for Dependency

Despite improved mutual perceptions, uncertainty remained on both sides before 1948. US leaders generally did not favor a conservative Japanese government. In the SCAP, liberal officials considered Japanese conservatives reactionary to Japan's democratization.[35] While Washington was preoccupied with Europe, the SCAP carried out a series of radical reforms, such as political liberalization, purge of militarists, the dissolution of zaibatsu, and the installation of a peace constitution. MacArthur enjoyed virtually unrestricted power, and he "defined and implemented policy almost entirely independently." This leadership style resulted in his "scant regard for views of either Washington or the other Allied powers."[36] In turn, the reforms arose anxieties of Japanese leaders, particularly conservatives like Yoshida who preferred to restore Japan's political tradition in the Meji period.[37]

Nevertheless, the initial face-to-face interactions already set forth a positive change of American images among Japanese leaders. This tremendous impact was exemplified by Yoshida's changing perceptions toward the US. Although Yoshida won his political credentials as a "pro-Western" diplomat and anti-war politician before Japan's surrender, his conservative ideologies brought him little favoritism from Washington. Both the SCAP liberals

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[33] Truman (1955: 504), Buckley (1995: 16), Dower (1999: 357).
[34] U.S. Department of State (1971: doc.110).
[35] Finn (1992: 52).
[36] U.S. Department of State (1971: doc.116), Swenson-Wright (2005: 24-5).
[37] Sparrow (1951: 331), Hadley and Kuwayama (2002: 59).

and some Japan sympathizers in the DoS considered him reactionary.[38] Neither did Yoshida develop a positive prior belief about America. As a former ambassador to Britain, he largely perceived the US as unreliable. In the late 1920s, Yoshida believed that "the national character of the United States is such as to make it basically not very dependable in diplomacy." Perceiving US foreign policy as "irresolute," he even advised Prime Minister Tanaka not to take "its agreement or disagreement" too seriously.[39]

During the early occupation, personal impressions, particularly those from his interactions with MacArthur, substantially challenged his negative prior beliefs. Given his severe criticism of the radical occupational reforms and his suspicion of leftist penetration in the SCAP, positive beliefs generally characterized his assessments of MacArthur.[40] First and foremost, both MacArthur's positive gestures and face-to-face interactions convinced Yoshida of the general's benign intentions. Particularly, MacArthur's respect toward the emperor served as a profound indicator of his "goodwill." Second, Yoshida developed a sense of converged ideologies from his communications with MacArthur. Such impressions began to inform his beliefs about a realist-idealist division of the SCAP personnel. For Yoshida, the idealists — radical reformers from the Government Section (GS) — were responsible for the harsh aspects of the reforms, which not only treated "Japan much like a lab animal," but also encouraged the growth of Japanese leftists.[41] By contrast, the realists, including MacArthur and his Chief of Staff, not only shared Yoshida's conservative and anti-Soviet stance, but also served as a restraining factor to the idealists.

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[38] Yoshida served as the ambassador to the UK in the late 1930s, and made efforts to prevent the war the US in 1941. During the war, Yoshida predicted Japan's defeat early on and advocated a diplomatic solution. And he jointed Konoe in preparing a memorial to the Emperor, calling for ending the war in April 1945. For example, General Whitney termed Yoshida as one of the most reactionary element in the Shidehara Cabinet. Based on this impression, he doubted that Yoshida was against the new constitution when its draft was proposed by the GS in February 1946. See Yoshida (1957, Vol.1: 42), Dower (1979: 105, 227, 265, 307, 311), Finn (1992: 98-100).

[39] Yoshida (1962: 86), Dower (1979: 46).

[40] Dower (1979: 294, 296, 332-3), Swenson-Wright (2005: 26).

[41] Yoshida (1957, Vol.3: 107-8), Yoshida (1963: 1518, 1963), Dower (1979: 295, 552).

In this sense, Yoshida recalled that the Japanese government "established perfectly friendly relations with General MacArthur and his Chief of Staff."[42] He not only believed that MacArthur was not really happy about radicalism in the occupational reforms, but also applied external attribution to downplay the general's unfavorable behavior, the most notable of which was the dictation of a peace constitution.[43] In February 1946, when the famous MacArthur draft reached the Japanese cabinet, Yoshida was shocked by the fact that it deprives the emperor of formal authority.[44] Though he quickly took a highly conservative position, Yoshida did not question MacArthur's benign intentions. Despite his discontent, Yoshida reasoned that the general attempted to revise Japan's constitution mainly because he intended to preserve the emperor. In fact, this reasoning had consistently driven Yoshida's belief that MacArthur was a "great benefactor (*dai onjin*)" of Japan since then.[45] This was also compatible with his impression that MacArthur was sensitive to Japan's concerns and highly appreciative of Japanese national character. MacArthur struck him as sincerely caring about Japan's development. Even six years later, during his reunion with the general in America, Yoshida found that MacArthur "was as interested in Japan as ever, and was most sympathetic when I outlined to him the progress achieved on the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation there."[46]

Therefore, despite his protests against the occupational reforms, Yoshida retained the expectation that the SCAP would finally come to its sense. By 1947, this optimism was substantially reinforced by substantive US signals — MacArthur's tough actions against Japanese leftists. Early this year, Japan's economic instability led to gathering momentum for a general strike in Tokyo. Japanese conservatives were particularly fearful of its consequences. Eventually, what greatly reassured them was that MacArthur decided to ban the strike. As

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[42] Yoshida (1961: 49-51).
[43] Yoshida (1957, Vol.3: 105-8).
[44] Dower (1979: 319).
[45] Ibid, 321, Yoshida (1963: 1496).
[46] Yoshida (1961: 121-2).

Yoshida believed, this action strongly indicated the anti-Communist stance of the SCAP. In addition, the SCAP shortly started its own purge of "Reds," which further strengthened its conservative image.[47] In his memoirs, Yoshida assessed in a forward-looking manner that

> *Had the GHQ not acted, and the projected general strike been allowed to take place as planned, I could not conjecture what would have been the subsequent course of my nation. Looking back on that time, and remembering the revival of my country since then, […] I feel that the Japanese nation owes a profound debt of gratitude to General MacArthur for the decisive action he took.*[48]

During this period, the emerging Cold War shifted Washington's attention to the growing importance of Japan. Eventually, this would amount to Washington's initiative to reverse many of the early occupational reforms.[49] Yet, following the labor crisis, Tokyo readily signaled its willingness for a post-independence security arrangement based solely on US guarantee in late 1947. In September, Foreign Minister Ashida submitted to Washington a memorandum which proposed a security treaty solely depending on America's goodwill. According to the out-going Prime Minister Yoshida, Ashida's proposal largely reflected his own strategic objectives.[50] Before the memorandum, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMOFA) had considered two alternative options: Either Japan would assume permanent neutralization with security guaranteed by a regional collective security system, or Japan would take responsibility for its internal security, while its external security would be guaranteed via the UN.[51] Yet, ruling out both choices, Ashida prioritized the option to station "in Japan of American forces in connection with the supervision of the execution of the peace treaty." "Such stationing of armed forces," as he assessed, "will undoubtedly serve as a guar-

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[47] Ibid, 313, Finn (1992: 141).
[48] Yoshida (1961: 81-82).
[49] Dower (1979: 295), Swenson-Wright (2005: 32).
[50] Ibid, 373, Yoshida (1957, Vol.3: 140-1); Yoshida became prime minister following the conservative Liberal Party's victory in the general election in 1946, and his first cabinet ended in May 1947.
[51] Swenson-Wright (2005: 49-50).

antee against aggression."[52] Also, after specifying an arrangement to allow the stationing of US forces in Japan, the memorandum highlights that "the fact of the existence of such an agreement will be a powerful check upon any third Power which might contemplate aggression upon Japan."[53] In fact, Washington had not even contemplated on such an option by this time. While the DoD advocated a punitive peace, the DoS preferred the option of neutralizing Japan. However, in Ashida's assessment, only the US-guaranteed security could provide "the most effective means in ensuring Japan's independence."[54] This proposal, thus, served as a strong indicator that conservative Japanese leaders, such as Yoshida and Ashida, already perceived the US as *probably or highly reliable*.

Toward Peace and Security

In October 1948, Yoshida began his second cabinet following a decisive conservative victory in the Japanese election. In Washington, the rising Cold War made US leaders increasingly worry about losing Japan to the Soviets.[55] Simultaneously, given sustained intra-alliance interactions, an emerging image of Japanese democracy began to replace US leaders' prior beliefs about Japanese militarism. For instance, a SCAP report in this year estimated that "a resurgence of militarism in Japan is physically impossible for generations." MacArthur expressed his high expectation that Japan would become the most civilized and influential nation in the Orient.[56]

Yet, the impact of previous interactions, particularly face-to-face diplomacy, was reflected in the difference between hard-liners and soft-liners on the peace settlement. The SCAP and the DoS showed considerable optimism about Japan's reliability. MacArthur not only advocated a non-punitive peace as early as 1947, but also called for a drastic reduction of US troops in Japan. By contrast, the DoD and the JCS perceived a high risk of domestic violence

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[52] Hosoya (1999: 44-5).
[53] Ibid, 45.
[54] Swenson-Wright (2005: 36, 50).
[55] U.S. Department of State (1974a: doc.515, doc.9, Annex 2).
[56] Ibid, doc.507, doc.519, "General MacArthur's Remarks at Lunch," March 1, 1948

against the ongoing occupational reforms.[57] Divisions remained with regard to their beliefs about Yoshida. Liberals in Washington saw Yoshida's first cabinet as inept and disastrous, and considered his second cabinet a worrying sign of conservative resurgence. In contrast, despite MacArthur's discontent with Yoshida's criticism of certain reforms, he held a generally positive view about the prime minister and the conservative parties.[58] In 1946, for instance, when the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) expressed their concerns about the rise of a reactionary government in Japan, MacArthur defended the victory of the conservative parties as truly representative of the will of Japanese people. By 1948, the established working relationship between him and Yoshida also led the general to develop genuine respect for the prime minister's competence and political skills.[59]

Yet, what decisively pushed Washington toward a soft-line position was the personal impressions that George Kennan developed during his mission to Japan. While echoing MacArthur's position on a non-punitive peace settlement, the DoS actually viewed many of the SCAP-imposed reforms as counterproductive to the stability of Japan. In March 1948, Kennan visited Tokyo, and was surprised by Japan's inability to resist Soviet aggression. In his report, Kennan assessed that

> *To the Communists, the problem of capturing Japan is not a problem of winning over the favor of the majority of the Japanese people. It is a problem of penetrating Japanese society and seizing its key positions. At present, it looks to me as though Japanese society were decidedly vulnerable to such attacks.*[60]

The SCAP's radical policies, as Kennan believed, were increasingly undermining the genuine respect for the US which had developed among the Japanese since 1945.[61] As a result, his views formed the basis for NSC 13/2, which prioritized the recovery of Japanese

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[57] Sparrow (1951: 351, 353).
[58] Finn (1992: 218).
[59] Ibid, 107, 124, 134, 216-8.
[60] U.S. Department of State (1974a: doc.519, "Explanatory Notes by Mr. George F. Kennan," March 25, 1948).
[61] Swenson-Wright (2005: 33).

economy — a major adjustment of US policy toward Japan. Also, this marked the reversal of many occupational reforms, and a gradual return of authority to the Japanese government.[62] In addition, evidence shows that Kennan's recommendations already included the option that Japan could be permitted "to re-arm to the extent that it would no longer constitute an open invitation to military aggression."[63] Although realpolitik concerns were central to this re-adjustment, it is noteworthy that Kennan's impressions of growing anti-American sentiment in Japan, in fact, played a decisive role in shaping Washington's concerns.

Compatible to this perceptual change, Washington's policies increasingly focused on restoring Japan's economic capabilities. Yet, US leaders remained divided on the approach to peace settlement. The DoS and MacArthur had been increasingly concerned with the negative psychological consequences associated with prolonged occupation since 1947. An early peace, as they believed, would effectively ensure the US-Japan reconciliation.[64] By contrast, the DoD and the JCS opposed an early peace as they perceived considerable uncertainty about Japan's reliability. By late 1949, the JCS still held the belief that a non-punitive treaty could offer no assurance of a continuing close US-Japan relationship. Instead, the best guarantee of Japan's loyalty, they pointed out, was the continuous stationing of US forces.[65]

In this context, face-to-face diplomacy initiated by Yoshida played a decisive role in reassuring Washington of Japan's reliability. By 1949, Yoshida's perceptions of benign US intentions had grown to such an extent that he saw the US-guaranteed security as the only reliable option for Japan. He preferred a continuous US military presence, and ruled out the option that US forces would be stationed outside Japan. In a speech to the Diet, Yoshida even argued that the only alternative to the US-guaranteed security was an indefinite prolongation

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[62] A noteworthy aspect of Kennan's mission was that his thinking about Japan policy was under heavy influence from the Japan Lobby, which was formally known as The American Council on Japan — a pressure group comprised of American experts sympathetic to Japan. Their central members included Joseph Grew. See Schonberger (1977).
[63] U.S. Department of State (1974a: doc.519).
[64] Ibid, doc.19; Finn (1992: 246), Brinkley (1993: 135-6), Swenson-Wright (2005: 28-9, 34-6).
[65] Swenson-Wright (2005: 40).

of the occupation.[66] In early 1950, Yoshida sent his Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato to Washington in a secret mission. During a conversation with Joseph Dodge, financial advisor to the supreme commander, Ikeda conveyed a personal message from Yoshida that the Japanese government would find a way to offer "the maintenance of U.S. forces to secure the treaty terms and for other purposes."[67] In fact, Yoshida's private message — a diplomatic gesture with no rational cost — quickly solved the central issue prolonging the State-Defense division: Whereas the DoS wanted to postpone the negotiation on the rights to use military bases in Japan in order to facilitate the US-Japan reconciliation, the DoD believed that this approach would only reduce the chance of securing the base rights.[68] Thus, from mid-1950, Washington appointed John Foster Dulles as special ambassador to Japan, formally starting the peace negotiations.

On 25 June, the outbreak of the Korean War further cleared the path to the peace settlement. The crisis quickly called US leaders' attention to Japan's rising fear about communist aggression, and prompted the DoS and the DoD to jointly produce a peace plan.[69] Simultaneously, Washington moved to empower Japan by restoring its military capabilities. In late June, Dulles readily went on a mission to press the Japanese government for rearmament. In July, MacArthur authorized the creation of Japan's National Police Reserve — the paramilitary forces of 75,000 men, which would eventually become Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF).[70]

By May 1951, Dulles had conducted two missions to Japan. The special ambassador was very conscious of the role face-to-face diplomacy could play in assessing Tokyo's intentions. In a joint State-Defense meeting early this year, Dulles stated that "his mission was to discover whether or not it would be possible to get a reliable commitment of the Japanese na-

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[66] Dower (1979: 373-4).
[67] U.S. Department of State (1976: doc.714).
[68] Swenson-Wright (2005: 51-2).
[69] Finn (1992: 249), Poole (1998: 224-6).
[70] Dower (1979: 383), Swenson-Wright (2005: 43).

tion to the cause of the free world."[71] During his meetings with Yoshida in January, Dulles was left with little doubt that Tokyo intended to align with the West. "Mr. Yoshida gave the impression that the Japanese were so eager for a treaty that they are willing to accept almost anything," as a US memorandum reveals:

> *He seemed to believe that there would be no real difficulty in obtaining approval by the Diet of any treaty and informed Mr. Dulles that there was a secret agreement between the Liberal and the People's Democratic Parties with respect to treaty matters which would ensure approval.*[72]

By the end of the first mission, Dulles reported that "he believed that the Mission had achieved an acceptance of its approach by the Japanese which went beyond formal political acceptance."[73] Yet, while US leaders were increasingly optimistic about Japan's reliability, they began to view Japan's content with US protection, namely, its reluctance to embark on large-scale rearmament as a main source of unreliability.[74] Thus, during the negotiations, Dulles pressured Yoshida to start substantial militarization as a form of burden-sharing, while the prime minister consistently resisted the request on the basis that Japan could not afford the economic and political costs such rearmament would entail.[75] Eventually, the issue was closed with Dulles's acceptation of a vague promise that Japan was willing to assume the obligations of self-defense via gradual rearmament. He believed that "the US cannot press the Japanese to assume military obligations until they […] are in a position formally and publicly to assume such obligations."[76] In a sense, the US concern about Japan's defense capabilities supports what ***Proposition 1*** suggests in an opposite way: When Japan was considered reliable, substantial increase in military power could enhance its perceived reliability. Also, US leaders largely assessed this issue in a forward-looking manner, focusing on

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[71] U.S. Department of State (1977a: doc.476).
[72] Ibid, doc.478.
[73] Ibid, doc.504.
[74] Swenson-Wright (2005: 58-59).
[75] U.S. Department of State (1977a: doc.487, doc.488).
[76] Ibid, doc.498, Dower (1979: 383, 386-7).

Japan's direct contribution to the collective security of US allies, even though Yoshida clearly refused to bear the cost of rearmament, that is, withholding of a "costly" signal.

On the Japanese side, given his prior beliefs about US reliability, Yoshida readily perceived the interests of Japan and America as inseparable. In retrospect, he reasoned that "The US cannot stay away in a scenario of aggression against Japan," even without this obligation stated explicitly by a treaty.[77] Particularly, Yoshida prioritized the US guaranteed security after he strongly resisted Dulles' proposal of Japan's rearmament on a large-scale basis. Given Dulles's warning that the US "could not be expected to extend military assistance to Japan indefinitely," Yoshida's voluntary acceptance of nearly total dependence on the US would leave Japan extremely vulnerable to US betrayal.[78] Thus, it was very likely that he already perceived the US as *highly reliable* by this point.

Eventually, the US-Japan reconciliation culminated in the San Francisco Peace Conference. In response to Tokyo's request, Washington not only committed itself to defending Japan, albeit on a unilateral basis; it also convinced other US allies to agree on a generous peace settlement: No war-guilt clause was included in the peace treaty; Dulles even managed to minimize Japan's obligation for war reparations through his meticulous diplomatic efforts to persuade the other allies.[79] In return, Tokyo reciprocated the goodwill of the US by almost fully complying with Washington's grand strategic design in the Far East. In particular, Yoshida complied with Washington's strategy to isolate Communist China, and also allowed the US to use Japan as logistic bases for the Korean War.[80]

More importantly, the peace settlement itself played an important role in shaping American and Japanese leaders' mutual perceptions. First and foremost, face-to-face diplomacy largely worked to strengthen positive personal impressions on both sides. On the Japanese

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[77] Yoshida (1957, Vol.3: 143-5).
[78] Yoshida (1961, 265-7).
[79] Finn (1992: 304-5).
[80] Ibid, 280-85.

side, Dulles not only left an impression of sincerity and anti-Communism on Yoshida, but also won the prime minister's gratitude with his diligent efforts to mediate between Japan and US allies in order to realize the non-punitive peace. As a result, Yoshida not only perceived the peace negotiations as truly "reconciliatory and trusting," but also made an explicit analogy between Dulles and MacArthur; the prime minister hailed Dulles as the "benefactor for the peace (*kowa no onjin*)," and even stated that what Dulles had left for Japan was as much as the legacy of General MacArthur.[81] On the US side, American leaders also developed an impression of Yoshida as firmly anti-Communist and genuinely fearful of a militarist revival, although such an image never turned too favorable because of the prime minister's reluctance to remilitarize Japan.[82] In addition, Yoshida's diplomatic skills won him increasing respect from his American hosts and international participants during the conference. To his surprise, Yoshida witnessed a generally "good feeling displayed toward the Japanese delegation" from the participants. The smooth progress even led him to conclude that Japan had done better as a loser at San Francisco that it had done thirty-two years before as a victor at Versailles.[83]

By and large, the episode of the US-Japan reconciliation from 1945 to 1951 overwhelmingly supports the ARM. First and foremost, given initial prior beliefs characterized by intense bilateral negativity, face-to-face diplomacy decisively challenged American and Japanese leaders' prototypical beliefs. It is undeniable that MacArthur's prior beliefs about Japan were considerably associated his sensitivity toward the Japanese concerns. Yet, his personal impressions via direct interactions with Japanese elites, particularly the emperor, seemed to produce far more powerful emotional responses, which led him to advocate for a generous peace settlement. Second, the positive outcomes of face-to-face diplomacy were reflected in the dramatic change of Japanese leaders' prior beliefs. As a classical example of

[81] Yoshida (1963: 1702, 1711).
[82] Dower (1979: 395).
[83] Finn (1992: 305).

such, Yoshida went through the transformation from a pre-War diplomat seeing the US as unreliable to a post-War politician regarding the US as a reliable protector. As such beliefs grew resilient on the Japanese side, conservative leaders increasingly perceived benign US intentions or resorted to positive beliefs defense in understanding unfavorable US behavior, just like Yoshida's explanation of the peace constitution. This change of beliefs would profoundly influence generations of Japanese leaders, owing to the enduring influence of the Yoshida Doctrine and the Yoshida School — a *de facto* training camp of future Japanese prime ministers — in Japanese politics.[84]

During this transformation, the sense of converged anti-Communist ideologies, also became an indicator of reliability, which particularly led Japanese conservatives and American hard-liners to identify with each other. A typical example can be found in Yoshida's assessment of idealists vs. realists within the SCAP. In this sense, whereas Washington did look at Japan's democratization as an important source of its reliability, as opposed to its militarist past, little evidence shows that Tokyo evaluated US reliability on the basis of its democratic institutions; this provides a partial support for the RCM's alternative explanation by institution, yet, a better support to our ***Proposition 4*** — that is, US leaders tended to use democracy as a short-cut for political identities, while conservative Japanese leaders had no reason to do so.

Furthermore, diplomatic gestures, often inseparable from face-to-face interactions, tended to override the impact of substantive actions. On the one hand, benign US gestures had steadily strengthened Japanese leaders' optimism about US reliability, whereas even the harshest US actions, including the occupational reforms, did not change Yoshida's positive beliefs about US intentions. By contrast, positive US actions, such as MacArthur's ban of the general strike, immediately enhanced his optimism. This suggests that he had probably de-

[84] The Yoshida Doctrine laid the foundation for Japan's foreign policy during the Cold War, which committed Japan to its reliance on US guarantee for national security and a low level of militarization. See Sugita (2016).

veloped the tendency to discount unfavorable US behavior early on. On the other hand, despite Japan's lack of substantive actions to improve its defense capabilities, US leaders, particularly MacArthur and Dulles, also tended to take Japanese leaders' gestures as credible reassurance of its benign intentions. Such was the case of MacArthur's dealing with Shigemitsu's promise at the beginning of the occupation, as well as that of Washington's assessment of Yoshida's offer of base rights via a personal message. In addition, little evidence has shown that either side tended to examine the cost of signals as the RCM suggests. Contrarily, Dulles's concession to Yoshida's resistance of rearmament clearly provides counter-evidence to the costly signaling argument.

5.2.2 Consolidating the Alliance (1957-1960)

Tokyo's Search for Equality


In 1955, the rise of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) marked the start of the conservative dominance in Japanese politics, and its long-term majority government until the early 1990s. Although two short-lived Japanese cabinets after Yoshida displayed a growing independent stance, this tendency largely ceased when Kishi Nobusuke became the prime minister in 1957. Kishi's interactions with the Eisenhower administration led to a major renewal of the alliance relationship, marked by the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST) in 1960.

Yet, at the beginning of Kishi's office, the alliance relationship experienced a relative downturn. In Washington, US leaders became increasingly uncertain about Japan's intentions after Yoshida stepped down. While they were optimistic about Japan's short-term commitment, its long-term intentions remained a source of doubt. As NSC 5516/1 reveals, US leaders took Japan's dependency as the main source of its reliability, while they also emphasized "a still substantial residue of good will for the United States" particularly among conservative Japanese elites.[85] On the other hand, Japan's rising nationalist sentiment and its resis-

[85] U.S. National Security Council (1955: 1, 18).

tance to rearmament became the primary source of uncertainty. Particularly, rising Japanese nationalism raised US leaders' concerns about Tokyo's desire for greater acutonomy in foreign policy.[86] And they believed that the foundation of the alliance relationship must be replaced by "a sense of common purpose, mutual interests, and working partnership," rather than Japan's dependency, which would inevitably decline. Then, this assessment prioritized a sense of mutuality as the bases of evaluating "basic United States interests with regard to Japan."[87] Thus, it characterized existing conflicts with Tokyo, such as their division on Communism, as secondary, while expressing its willingness to apply "resources of good will and persuasion" and to improve Japan's international prestige and military power.[88] As *Figure 5.3* shows, from 1952 to 1956, US aid to Japan increased threefold, and the largest share of it came in the form of military assistance, which amounted to over 80 per cent in 1956.[89] Clearly, this shows that a sense of converged political identities increasingly formed an inte-

Figure 5.3: US Aid to Japan, 1952-1960
(Data Source: USAID)



[86] Ibid, 5-6, 23, Huang (2009: 144).
[87] U.S. National Security Council (1955: 4).
[88] Ibid, 8, 12-3.
[89] Data from USAID, Foreign Aid Explorer, https://explorer.usaid.gov/

gral part of Washington's prior beliefs about Japan, but also US leaders were readily downplaying Tokyo's substantive unfavorable behavior — a sign of positive beliefs defense.

However, on the Japanese side, the society increasingly voiced its grievance against the unequal character of the Security Treaty, which did not specify the US defense commitment as obligatory. In 1955, when Tokyo proposed to revise the treaty on an equal basis, State Secretary Dulles bluntly dismissed the request as premature.[90] Although as a member of the Japanese mission to the US, Kishi — the LDP Chief Secretary — was particularly impressed by Dulles's contemptuous attitude, he could not agree more with what Dulles had argued. "Of course," Kishi recalled, "Japan had no choice but to strengthen its self-defense capabilities in order to protect our own country by ourselves."[91]

Thus, in 1957, the Kishi Cabinet set treaty revision as one of its priorities. Yet, driving Tokyo's alliance strategy seemed to be a mix of Kishi's nationalism and his convergence with Washington's anti-Communist ideologies. On the one hand, as a member of the war cabinet and a former war criminal, Kishi once expressed his anger with the US occupation; he had developed personal aversion against MacArthur since then, and refused to visit the general for the rest of his life.[92] As the Japanese society developed a growing sense of inferiority to America, Kishi believed that revising the Security Treaty was crucial for restoring Japan's national pride.[93] On the one hand, particularly sharing Eisenhower's anti-Communist cause, Kishi believed that strengthening friendship with the US was necessary for the security of Japan in the light of the Soviet threat. In a similar fashion of NSC 5516/1, he also argued that the spirit of equality was necessary for constructing a US-Japan partnership based on "mutual understanding, respect, and trust."[94] Although Kishi shared Washington's con-

[90] Finn (1992: 223-4).
[91] Hara and Kishi (2003: 123).
[92] Ibid, 48, 52.
[93] Kishi (1983: 330), Swenson-Wright (2005: 224).
[94] Kishi (1983: 331), Huang (2009: 204-5).

cern about Japan's defense capabilities because of his nationalism, a sense of converged identities was clearly at work here.

Furthermore, face-to-face interactions via personal ties seemed to also play an important role in shaping Kishi's beliefs about the US. In fact, Kishi had transformed himself from an anti-Americanist to a firm supporter of the US-Japan alliance long before his premiership. Although Kishi was usually vague about this conversion, evidence shows that his pre-war friendship with Joseph Grew had won him the reputation as one of the best candidates for leading post-war Japan, among the American Council on Japan (ACJ) — a group of influential Japan sympathizers known as the Japan Lobby in America. With heavy influence on Kennan and Dulles, the ACJ's efforts resulted in Washington's patronage of Kishi's political rehabilitation.[95] After his release from prison, Kishi began to take "English lessons from *Newsweek*'s Tokyo bureau chief, and gained introductions to American politicians from Newsweek's foreign affairs editor, Harry Kern, a close friend to Allen Dulles and later in life a CIA conduit to Japan."[96] According to Pulitzer Prize winner Tim Weiner's interviews, Kishi closely cooperated with CIA personnel in launching his coming-back to the stage of Japanese politics in 1954. Since then, he had not only regularly met with CIA and DoS officials to elicit Washington's backing, but also pledged to remake the ruling conservative party and to "change the foreign policies of Japan to fit American desires."[97] Eventually, during the Shigemitsu mission in August 1955, he met with Dulles, who "told him face-to-face that he could expect that support — if Japan's conservatives unified to help the United States fight communism."[98]

In 1957, face-to-face interactions continued to play a prominent role through open diplomacy during the Eisenhower-Kishi summit. During his visit to Washington in June,

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[95] In his memoirs, Kishi just vaguely explained that his anti-American feeling gradually disappeared as his anti-Soviet feeling became stronger. See Hara and Kishi (2003: 55), Schaller (1995).
[96] Weiner (2008: 118).
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid, 118-9.

Kishi proposed to revise the Security Treaty on the basis of equal partnership. That means, the new treaty had to address two problematic issues: (1) the non-obligatory clause of the US defense commitment; (2) the right to transfer nuclear weapons without consulting Japan.[99] The summit resulted in a joint communique, in which both sides agreed in principle "to study problems arising in relationship to the Security Treaty."[100] During the process, personal impressions figured prominently. According to his memoirs, Kishi developed a very positive image of Eisenhower. The president's diplomatic skills left him an impression of competence, and his kindness became a straightforward indicator of goodwill.[101] Also, during their talks, Eisenhower's decision to cede jurisdiction over the Girard incident to Japan, despite domestic opposition in the US, particularly struck Kishi as morally far-sighted.[102] In a similar fashion, Kishi's impressions of Dulles were highly positive. In retrospect, the prime minister said he was impressed by Dulles's admirable personality, feeling that the state secretary was sincerely supportive of promoting Japan's international prestige. In addition, Kishi particularly gave credit to the golf diplomacy between American and Japanese leaders for creating a good atmosphere.[103]

Compatible to such perceptions, Tokyo began to use both diplomatic gestures and substantive actions to reassure Washington from the beginning of the Kishi Cabinet. In May 1957, Kishi showed his determination to follow Washington's Asia policy by becoming the first Japanese prime minister to visit Taipei — a gesture of support to Chiang Kai-shek and the ROC.[104] A month later, Tokyo announced its first plan for a rapid expansion of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in a three-year timeframe. The US government immediately greeted Japan's signals with benign substantive actions. In July, Washington announced a

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[99] Ibid, 209.
[100] Hosoya (1999: 401-2).
[101] Kishi (1983: 205, 336).
[102] The Girard incident the crime of a US soldier which triggered a major controversy in the bilateral relations. See ibid, 357.
[103] Ibid, 333-5, Hara and Kishi (2003: 142).
[104] The event was unprecedented because it was the first visit of a Japanese prime minister to the capital of the ROC since the Meiji period. Huang (2009: 203, 207).

substantial cut of US forces stationed in Japan in response to Kishi's rearmament plan, indicating its optimism about Japan's reliability. In September, the US-Japan Security Committee was also established to study practical issues regarding treaty implementation.[105]

Washington's Concession

However, Washington did not move on to the treaty revision until late 1958. Dulles remained unconvinced that it was mature for discussing a substantive adjustment of the alliance relationship.[106] As specified in NSC 5516/1, Washington's uncertainty about Japan's long-term intentions was far from disappearing. Although Kishi left US leaders with favorable impressions, Washington was still concerned that Japan might eventually break free from the alliance — pursing neutralism or turning to the Soviet bloc. Even in early 1957, a DoS assessment expressed uncertainty about Japan's reliability on the basis of a general impression of its fear of involvement in military crisis. The military even perceived Japan as "a dangerous military opponent if lost to the Free World."[107]

In this context, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, the namesake and nephew of General MacArthur, emerged as a key figure in abridging the perceptual gap between Washington and Tokyo. And his role again demonstrates the prominent impact of face-to-face diplomacy and personal impressions in shaping intra-alliance perceptions. Although MacArthur had no prior experience with Japan before his appointment in 1956, he soon developed a sympathetic attitude toward Japan. Particularly, he was sensitive to the Japanese grievance against the unequal partnership.[108] Before the 1957 summit, MacArthur regularly talked to Kishi with regard to the major ongoing problems impeding US-Japan relations.[109] During their communication, he not only highly appreciated Kishi's competence, but also believed that the prime minister was sincere in maintaining US-Japan friendship. MacArthur recognized that a major

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[105] Ibid, 207, Swenson-Wright (2005: 224).
[106] Kishi (1983: 332).
[107] U.S. Department of State (1991: doc.113), Swenson-Wright (2005: 223, 227), Gabe (2007: 108).
[108] Swenson-Wright (2005: 225).
[109] Gabe (2007: 124).

obstacle to the bilateral relations was the growing Japanese discontent with the unequal character of the Security Treaty; hence, there was an urgent need to bring a close to Japan's negative sentiment. As a result, MacArthur actively lobbied for concluding a new treaty with Japan.[110] In early 1958, for example, MacArthur assured Dulles that he was confident that this adjustment would put America's "all-over relations with Japan on reasonably firm and dependable basis."[111] Conversely, he pointed to the increasing risk that Washington would miss the chance to build US-Japan relations on a basis of true mutuality. Ignoring the urgent issue, he warmed, might even lead Japan to terminate the existing treaty.[112]

With Ambassador MacArthur's suggestion, the DoS completed a thorough reassessment of American policy toward Japan in March 1958. While it recognized a few sources of conflict between Washington and Tokyo, including the US-Japan tensions on trade and Okinawa, this assessment clearly identified Japan's fear of entrapment in a nuclear war and its dissatisfaction with the "one-side relationship" as the main sources of problem within the alliance.[113] Nevertheless, Washington simultaneously predicted a favorable development of the bilateral relations in the near future. Particularly, US leaders largely developed such optimism on the basis of their positive impressions of Kishi. The prime minister was given "a major share of credit" for the positive development of US-Japan relations since 1957. More importantly, Kishi was identified as a leader who was "intellectually far abler than his predecessors and much better acquainted with Americans, American views, and the world situation generally" — a clear sense of converged political ideologies.[114] Also, Washington took the unequivocal manner of Kishi's statement — a diplomatic gesture — as an indicator of his intention to "base Japan's foreign policy on the closest cooperation with the United States."[115]

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[110] Ibid, 127-8, 140.
[111] Hosoya (1999: 424).
[112] U.S. Department of State (1994: doc.11), Hosoya (1999: 425).
[113] U.S. Department of State (1994: doc.5, doc.6), Hosoya (1999: 431-3).
[114] Hosoya (1999: 430).
[115] Ibid, 431.

Yet, by early 1958, Dulles remained unconvinced. In a memorandum, Dulles explained his logic of suspicion:

> *The Japanese should accept the basic premise that their future lies in close cooperation with the United States to create a balance of power as against the Soviet Union and Communist China. If Japan is not ready for that decision, and if the dominant forces in Japan may operate on the theory that Japan's best chance is to bargain as between the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc, then I doubt that we are ready for a drastic change at the time, unless there can be confidence that the very fact of making the change will bring about the basic attitude we would like to see*.[116]

The state secretary, however, agreed that Ambassador MacArthur could be counted on in probing Tokyo's intention through continuous face-to-face interactions with Kishi.[117] Although MacArthur soon reaffirmed his optimism for Japan's reliability through his talks to Kishi, Washington did not drop its reservation until the LDP won a decisive victory in the Diet election of mid-1958. Under Kishi's leadership, the party won 298 seats out of a total of 469.[118] The continuous LDP dominance not only added to the credibility of Kishi's reassurance, but also convinced MacArthur, as he suggested to Dulles, that the timing was most favorable for "constructive discussions with the Japanese" in launching "a new era of true partnership" and in "removing a serious source of potential danger in Japanese-American relations."[119]

MacArthur's assessment seemed to work effectively, as Dulles shortly shifted to supporting the treaty revision. His final assessment was particularly telling about the impact of personal impressions and diplomatic gestures. In the interdepartmental discussions in September, Dulles again tried to assess if Japan might take the new treaty "as but a step in the

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[116] Ibid., 427.
[117] U.S. Department of State (1994: doc.5).
[118] Ibid, doc.11, Huang (2009: 215).
[119] U.S. Department of State (1994: doc.15), Sotooka, Honda and Miura (2001: 195).

process of breaking Japanese shackles to the United States."[120] In response to this question, MacArthur attempted to prove Tokyo's commitment by reading aloud "a Japanese newspaper editorial which demonstrated Japanese desire for a new treaty to strengthen their defensive arrangements with the US."[121] When Dulles asked for an impression of the Japanese national sentiment behind treaty revision, MacArthur simply cited Kishi's promise that he would convey the importance of maintaining the alliance to the Japanese people. In addition, when Dulles asked if Kishi could get the new treaty ratified. He was then answered with "a Tokyo telegram which used Mr. Kishi's own language and stated that a treaty of this sort could be used to lead Japan to a closer alignment with the United States."[122] Eventually, a consensus was reached during the meetings. Dulles expressed his expectation that Japan would recognize "the indispensability of a security relationship with the United States" when it regained "its pride and national spirit." MacArthur agreed and stated that aligning with the US was the only possible approach for Japan to gain security, in opposed to Germany's collective approach.[123]

On 11 September, Washington finally announced its decision for a fundamental adjustment of the alliance relationship. The negotiations took more than a year.[124] In January 1960, the final draft of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security formalized the US obligation to defend Japan in the scenario of an armed attack. Moreover, it committed both parties to resolving their conflicts in economic arena through institutional building. In exchange, Japan is obliged to grand America the right to use military bases and other facilities in its territories in meeting challenges to regional security, provided that any future US deployment is based on consultation.[125] Essentially, this clause acknowledged the possibility that

[120] U.S. Department of State (1994: doc.23, doc.4).
[121] Ibid, doc.23.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Sotooka, Honda and Miura (2001: 205).
[125] Ibid, 217, Hosoya (1999: 463-5).

the US might transfer nuclear weapon into Japan, and its continuous use of Japanese territories as logistic bases for potential conflict in Korea.[126]

Back to Japan, however, Kishi's forceful efforts to ratify the treaty enhanced domestic discontent with his undemocratic style of leadership. On 4 June 1960, this provoked a general strike, complemented by large-scale student protests under left-wing influence. The protest movement not only led to the cancellation of President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to Japan, but also resulted in growing anti-Kishi voices within the LDP, hence, his resignation in July.[127] Despite the violent anti-American protests in June 1960, Ambassador MacArthur generally attributed this event to "the well-orchestrated propaganda barrage directed against Kishi by pro-Communists and their sympathizers." To Washington, he reported that "we do not think feeling of friendship toward US on part of great majority of Japanese has been basically impaired as result of political crisis and anti-American campaign of pro-Communists."[128]


The Mutual Security Treaty (MST) marked the start of a stabilized alliance relationship. On the Japanese side, Kishi's outlook on the US-Japan alliance already went beyond Japan's specific strategic interest in containing the Soviet threat. Even the emergence of the US-Soviet détente from late 1959 did not shake his beliefs about Japan's continuous reliance on the US. Instead, he had already viewed the US-Japan partnership as an instrument for coping with international threats in a general sense — a sign of increasingly resilient prior beliefs about US reliability.[129] Simultaneously, Washington also increasingly regarded Japan as a reliable partner. According to NSC6008/1, US leaders increasingly recognized Japan as "a constructive international force" and an asset to "Free World military strength in the Pacific" from mid-1960. They believed that Japan's reliability should mainly stem from its enduring sense of common interest — namely, converged identities — and its beliefs about America's

[126] Swenson-Wright (2005: 227), Sotooka, Honda and Miura (2001: 218).
[127] Swenson-Wright (2005: 230-1, 234).
[128] U.S. Department of State (1994: doc.180).
[129] Hara and Kishi (2003: 220).

goodwill.[130] Though Tokyo's efforts of rearmament remained passive, Washington expressed optimism in its commitment to defense burden-sharing by emphasizing recent improvement in Japan's defense capabilities — a obvious sign of positive beliefs defense.[131]

This improved perception was testified by a steady trend of personnel reduction of the US Force in Japan (USFJ). As *Figure 5.4* shows, in response to Tokyo's stated program of rearmament, the number of US troops dropped almost threefold from about 120,000 to 48,000 between 1956 and 1960. This trend continued well into the 1960s. By 1967, the personnel strength of the USFJ further dropped to about 35,000. In particular, the most drastic reduction from 1956 to 1960 was accompanied by only a moderate increase in the strength of the JSDF.[132] Even by 1967, the strength of the JSDF was still far below Washington's original expectation in 1953, that is, a level of about 350,000 troops.[133] Yet, this gap also makes it clear that Washington's adjustment of alliance behavior was motivated more by its

Figure 5.4: Change of JSDF and USFJ Strength, 1956-1967
(Data from Weinstein 1971, p.111)



[130] U.S. National Security Council (1960: 7-8).
[131] Ibid, 4-5.
[132] Weinstein (1971: 111).
[133] Nakamura and Miyazaki (2003: 219).

improved perceptions, than by Japan's substantive actions. On the other hand, with its rapidly growing economic power, Japan now enjoyed greater bargaining leverage, compared to its position in 1951. Yet, given the normalization of Japan-USSR relations in 1954, Japan refrained from either hedging against Washington or playing a balancing game between the superpowers. Instead of pursuing an independent strategy, Kishi continued to loyally comply with Eisenhower's global strategy. There was a clear congruence between his perceptions and behavior toward America. Thus, one may reasonably conclude that Tokyo perceived Washington as *highly reliable* at this point.

During the Kishi-Eisenhower years, the strengthened alliance relationship via the MST makes a powerful case for the ARM. First and foremost, face-to-face diplomacy played the major role in challenging negative prior beliefs and reinforcing positive intra-alliance perceptions. The transformation of Kishi's personal beliefs about the US offers a typical example. From 1957, face-to-face diplomacy continued to provide American and Japanese leaders with a primary means to probe each other's intentions. During such interactions, personal impressions, particularly those developed by Kishi and MacArthur, proved to be highly influential in leaders' assessments. As a result, face-to-face diplomacy also contributed to the formation of resilient positive prior beliefs between Tokyo and Washington. By the end of this episode, positive beliefs defense, as the analysis has shown, had become a main pattern in either side's assessments. Furthermore, although ideologies did not assume a dominant role in initial assessments on both sides. American and Japanese leaders had increasingly and consciously identified the sense of converged political identities as a major source of reliability. It is such beliefs which led them to prioritize cultivating a sense of mutuality. Along with their growing positive beliefs, this clear awareness led both sides to resort to positive attributional biases. In turn, leaders on both sides tended to downplay each other's unfavorable behavior. This was the case of Kishi's reaction to Dulles' rejection of Japan's request for treaty revision in 1955. Similarly, though discontent with Japan's slow progress in rearma-

ment, US leaders generally downplayed this as a secondary factor in the alliance relationship — a major counter-evidence to the importance of capabilities in reliability assessments.

Finally, the primary affective signals — personal impressions — did show a general tendency to override the effect of substantive actions, particularly in US leaders' assessments of Japan's reliability. In September 1958, Dulles's reasoning about Japan's long-term commitment constitutes a classical example, as he explicitly relied on the personal impressions from Ambassador MacArthur during the interdepartmental discussions. MacArthur's impressions of Kishi and Japanese public opinion seemed to heavily influence Dulles's final support of the treaty revision. Similarly, US leaders' impressions of rising nationalist sentiment in Japan became a primary source of uncertainty in their assessments. At the same time, whereas US aid and military presence in Japan were declining in this period, Japan's rearmament was also slowly progressing and falling far below Washington's expectation. Yet, such unfavorable factors seemed to exert a limited impact on both sides' reliability assessments. In general, Washington, in particular, tended to downplay existing realpolitik conflicts with Tokyo, such as Japan's lack of defense capabilities and economic frictions. These findings provide little support to the RCM.

5.2.3 Renewing the Alliance (1969-1972)

A Reassuring Start

From 1960, the US-Japan alliance entered into a period of stability. Although the new treaty resulted in massive protests and the collapse of the Kishi Cabinet, his successors Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku — two star pupils of the Yoshida School — led post-war Japan into a period of unprecedented economic growth. By the start of Sato's office in 1964, the Japanese public expressed an all-time high approval rating of America, with 49 per cent of those polled describing the US as the foreign country they most respected.[134] Yet, the alliance soon

[134] Schaller (1997: 188).

met subsequent challenges from the Vietnam War, US-Japan economic frictions, and Washington's readjustment of Asia policy. Despite growing tensions, the alliance relationship became sufficiently resilient to survive them, witnessing the extension of the MST and the Okinawa reversion in the early 1970s.

The international environment from 1969 became increasingly challenging to the alliance relationship. The Vietnam War significantly undermined US image in Japan. Not only the Japanese public were sympathetic toward Vietnam; but also, America's military postures, which Washington considered resolute and reassuring to Tokyo, often became counterproductive.[135] For instance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) tended to downplay Japan's economic benefits from US military-related trade between 1965 and 1972. In addition, US interventions in Vietnam resulted in a general feeling of endangerment in Japan. Although Tokyo worried about being entrapped in America's conflict with the Communist bloc, it also feared a potential US withdrawal from Asia while watching Washington's attempt for direct negotiations with Hanoi from 1968.[136] On the US side, American leaders noticed the deteriorating relationship during the Vietnam War. In 1965, for example, Alexis Johnson, the US Ambassador to Japan, expressed his discontent with Japan's defense policies as well as its shunning of responsibility despite its benefit from the war. Thus, Washington began to press Japan to reduce tariffs and restrictions on foreign investment.[137]

Yet, by early 1969, resilient prior beliefs had dominated US-Japan leaders' assessments of each other's reliability. On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Sato — a protege of Yoshida — loyally followed the Yoshida Doctrine as the foundation of Japanese foreign policy. Sato's beliefs about US intentions were also heavily informed by his gratitude toward General MacArthur. Thus, he closely associated the Meiji tradition of *fukou* (rich country) with the

[135] Ibid, 190.
[136] Ibid, 199, 207; Dian (2014: 51).
[137] Schaller (1997: 202-3).

existing US-Japan partnership.[138] Moreover, a sense of converged anti-Communist ideologies led Sato to closely comply with Washington's policy of isolating Beijing. As a nationalist, Sato also saw little conflict with Washington's long-term goal of rearming Japan on a massive scale. Thus, despite domestic opposition to the Vietnam War, Japan's foreign policy took on a fervent, pro-US stance. Sato not only publicly supported US interventions in Vietnam, but also tried to increase Japan's economic contribution to the war.[139] In addition, an important motivation for such pro-US stance was Sato's ambition to recover Okinawa — a decisive step to restore Japan's national pride. Though he took the initiative during Johnson's presidency, little progress had been made since then. Therefore, Nixon's promise to end the Vietnam War in late 1968 immediately raised Sato's optimism.[140]

On the US side, Nixon held generally positive beliefs about Japan's reliability, which developed mainly from his extensive face-to-face interactions with Japanese elites since the 1950s. In Kissinger's words, the president "had a high opinion" of Japan's potential and Japanese leaders. In particular, he developed a special admiration of Kishi, who was in fact the elder brother of Sato.[141] Compatible to his perceptions, Nixon showed active support to Japan's rearmament. During a meeting with Nakasone Yasuhiro, the future prime minister, in 1954, Nixon expressed full agreement with Nakasone's idea that Japan needed to create its Self-Defense forces and also the withdrawal of US forces thereafter.[142] In 1967, Nixon interacted with a number of Japanese elites in Tokyo, including Sato and Kishi. As he recalled, this trip reinforced his belief about Japan's alliance commitment:

I met with Prime Minister Sato, former Prime Minister Kishi, and a number of other Japanese political officials. The Japanese leaders felt strongly that the United States

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[138] For example, on 6 April, 1964, Sato described MacArthur's death as the fall of a giant star, and MacArthur himself as a great benefactor of defeated Japan, in a similar fashion to Yoshida's thought. See Satō (1997), Hoey (2015: 2-3).
[139] For example, compared to the record high in 1964, the Japanese public's approval rating of the United States had dropped to 18 per cent by 1970. See Schaller (1997: 188-90), Ikeda (2004: 165), Hoey (2015: 26).
[140] Schaller (1997: 211).
[141] Kissinger (1979, Vol.1: 6894); Kishi was born as Satō Nobusuke, and he was adopted by a paternal uncle bearing the Kishi name, see:https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kishi-Nobusuke
[142] Nakasone (1992)

must remain in Asia, and that it was vital that we continue to help defend South Vietnam. They were keenly aware that, because of memories of World War II, there were limits to the leadership Japan could exercise. Nonetheless, they acknowledged the need for regional cooperation to contain the Communist challenge.[143]

In comparison, as a dominant figure in Nixon's foreign policy, Henry Kissinger was relatively unfamiliar with Japan. At the beginning of his office, the national security advisor tended to believe that Japan only assumed secondary strategic importance compared to China. Thus, while viewing Japanese officials as "lacking long-term vision, Kissinger also admitted that "neither I nor my colleagues possessed a very subtle grasp of Japanese culture and psychology," at the beginning of Nixon's office.[144] Nevertheless, Nixon and Kissinger shared a common attribute in strategic thinking, that is, their tendency to measure power by military factors. For example, in a conversation with Ushiba, the Japanese Ambassador to the US, Kissinger said "he knew nothing about economics and thought economic leaders are usually political 'idiots.' "[145] Essentially, this tendency led both leaders to downplay a major source of tension with Japan — the emerging US-Japan frictions on trade imbalance. To Nixon and Kissinger, the issue of trade was a matter of low politics, as opposed to security.[146]

Corresponding to such beliefs, Washington saw an urgent need to strengthen the alliance relationship. In the light of Japan's growing power, Washington conducted a major reassessment of Japan policy via NSSM 5 in early 1969. On the one hand, drawing on the impressions of a generally pro-Western attitude among Japanese elites, US leaders perceived "a projection of Japan's power into Asia" as "remarkably consistent with US interests."[147] On the other hand, they again identified rising Japanese nationalism as the primary source of

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[143] Nixon (1978: 5402), Schaller (1997: 211, 217-8).
[144] Schaller (1997: 211-2), Kissinger (1979: 6707).
[145] U.S. Department of State (2001a: doc.71).
[146] Schaller (1997: 212).
[147] U.S. National Security Council (1969: 3).

unreliability. While recognizing Japan's focus on "material growth," NSSM 5 emphasized that

> *The rising force of nationalism is beginning to make its voice heard against this materialistic bias […] in a widening debate on Japan's security and defense policies, and in a reviving interest in traditional culture and values. The nationalistic voices are heard mostly shrilly in reaction to Japan's "dependent" relationship on the US. Continued US administration of Okinawa and, to a lesser extent today, US bases in Japan draw the emotional fire of Japanese nationalism.*[148]

Thus, overlooking such a development, US leaders reasoned, would inevitably threaten such consistency in the bilateral interests in the near future. Therefore, although Washington concluded that the existing partnership was "strong enough so far to override" the conflict between Japan's nationalism and its dependence on the US, it specifically recognized the urgency in responding to growing nationalist pressures in Japan for recovering Okinawa.[149] Although US leaders also identified the bilateral frictions on Japanese textile exports as an urgent issue, they generally believed that Japan's growing economic power would serve as a source of benefits to the US.[150]

In this context, Washington and Tokyo started a series of talks on Okinawa and textile exports from early 1969. Compared to Johnson's reluctance to take substantive steps on Okinawa, Nixon was optimistic about Tokyo' reliability to the extent that he was even willing to return Okinawa on favorable terms to Japan, in exchange for a moderate condition — the US retention of base rights in Japan beyond the extension of the alliance in 1970.[151] More importantly, face-to-face diplomacy dominantly shaped Nixon and Sato's perceptions of each other's reliability through the negotiation process. What particularly testified to its credibility

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[148] Ibid, 2.
[149] Ibid, 3, 9, 18, 35, Kissinger (1979: 6745).
[150] U.S. National Security Council (1969: 4)
[151] Schaller (1997: 204-5).

was their extensive use of secret diplomacy. In fact, Nixon and Sato bypassed official channels, and completed the most important talks via Sato's emissary, Professor Kei Wakaizumi — a personal friend of Sato and Kissinger who had no official position in the Japanese government. As Kissinger recalled, "the unofficial was now negotiating with the uninformed. Both the emissary and I could easily be disavowed."[152] Yet, this "intricate *Kabuki* play" went on smoothly: Sato quickly satisfied Washington's demand for base rights, while insisting on withdrawing nuclear weapons from the Okinawa bases. Nixon conceded to his request, but persuaded Sato to sign a secret agreement which committed Japan to allowing for the re-introduction of nuclear weapons in the case of emergency.[153]

Following the secret diplomacy, Washington and Tokyo announced their agreement on Okinawa during the Nixon-Sato summit in November 1969. This meeting not only marked the resolution of the Okinawa problem, but also reaffirmed the bilateral decision to indefinitely extend the MST from 1970. During the summit, Sato not only "confirmed his government's strong commitment to continue the Security Treaty for a 'considerably long period,'" but also made a private promise to set limits on Japanese textile exports to America, in line with Nixon's campaign promise to the Southern textiles industry.[154] Yet, both leaders avoided making a linkage between textile exports and Okinawa. As Kissinger recalled:

> *Sato declared that he took full responsibility, that it was his 'personal credo' and vow" to keep his word, that he committed his sincerity and all his efforts to that end. Nixon said that was good enough for him; the two leaders shook hands.*[155]

In response, Nixon encouraged Japan to carry out its rearmament further, and he even implicitly welcomed the possibility that Japan may develop nuclear weapons.[156] The summit

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[152] Ibid, 217, Kissinger (1979: 6839).
[153] It is noteworthy that Sato was well-know for the Three Non-Nuclear Principles he introduced as a parliamentary resolution guiding Japan's nuclear policy. The Principles include not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. See Cui (2013: 293-7), Hoey (2015: 44).
[154] Kissinger (1979: 6894), Logevall and Preston (2008: 295).
[155] Kissinger (1979: 6971).
[156] Satō (1997: 20 November, 1969), Schaller (1997: 219).

ended with a very positive atmosphere. In his diaries on 19 November, Sato expressed his pleasant feeling of "a great success" following the first day's meeting. In addition, he also made a strong impression of Tokyo's alliance commitment on both Nixon and Kissinger.[157] Yet, none of them expected that the textiles dispute — a low-politics issue — would quickly cause a spiral of negative emotions between Tokyo and Washington.

Unexpected Crises

In fact, the official US-Japan negotiations on textile experts began from mid-1969. By October, the talks reached a deadlock, with both parties disagreeing on even a formula for measuring the impact of Japanese textile exports.[158] Yet, during the summit, Sato's promise significantly improved Nixon's beliefs about Japan's reliability. In early 1970, Nixon privately told some members of Congress that "Japan had finally shed its reluctance to involve itself in world affairs." He even claimed confidently that Washington would not need to impose any economic restrain on Japan in five years.[159]

Nevertheless, from mid-1970, Sato's failure to deliver his promise soon made Nixon disappointed, and eventually provoked his anger against Tokyo. Back to Japan, Sato found out that he was unable to fulfill his promise due to legal constraints. In turn, growing frustration led Nixon to begin suspecting that he was deceived by the Japanese.[160] In retrospect, Kissinger attributed the dispute to Washington's unfamiliarity with Japanese politics, which put Sato on a position beyond his authority. To avoid domestic criticism, Sato wanted to keep secret his deal with Nixon. Thus, whereas Sato publicly admitted his commitment to Nixon regarding the solution of textile exports, he kept denying any agreement on a specific solution.[161] Yet, Sato's public attitude only added to the misunderstanding between Washington and Tokyo. From early 1970, Japanese negotiators from various ministers all denied the

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[157] Satō (1997: 19 November, 1969), Kissinger (1979: 6875, 6894, 6971).
[158] Schaller (1997: 216-7).
[159] Ibid, 220, Fujimoto (1994: 228-9).
[160] Schaller (1997: 220-1), Hoey (2015: 163).
[161] U.S. Department of State (2001b: doc.225), Kissinger (1979: 6971, 6991).

knowledge of the deal between Nixon and Sato. Despite Sato's effort to facilitate the talks by replacing MITI ministers, Tokyo's proposals to Washington made the impression that Sato had reneged on his previous promises. As a result, in late 1970, Washington moved to step up pressure on Tokyo by threatening to support a Congress bill that would impose harsh quota on Japanese exports.[162]

By early 1971, the deadlock increasingly stirred Nixon's negative emotions. A looming sense of failing his campaign promise led Nixon to begin talking about a Japanese betrayal. At the time, making things worse was Tokyo's welcoming attitude to a trade bill proposed by Nixon's Democratic rival.[163] In a Senior Review Group Meeting in March, Kissinger described Nixon's uncontrollable anger at Sato as the following: "Let me tell you his name is a dirty word around here. We had such an explosion around here this morning [on textiles] that I thought the pictures would be blown off the wall."[164] Although Washington and Tokyo eventually reached an agreement in October, the textiles dispute not only spelled over to US public opinion, but also had a direct impact on Nixon's decision to visit Beijing without notifying Tokyo. While Nixon's action was partially motivated by his love of secret diplomacy, his secret mission to China, as both Nixon and Kissinger confirmed later, was deliberately intended to embarrass Sato.[165]

Nixon's China trip not only shocked Tokyo, but also empowered Sato's rivals within the LDP, who stood for normalizing Japan-China relations.[166] Despite dismay among Japanese elites, resilient positive prior beliefs seemed to readily play a dominant role in Japanese leaders' assessments of US reliability. For example, while admitting his unpleasant feelings, Arima Tatsuo, a senior bureaucrat of JMOAF, believed that Washington failed to consult Japan because it genuinely feared the leak of the information — a sign of positive beliefs

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[162] Schaller (1997: 223), Kissinger (1979: 7011).
[163] Satō (1997: 12 March, 1971), Kusuda (2001: 11 March, 1971), Hoey (2015: 164).
[164] U.S. Department of State (2004: doc.335).
[165] Schaller (1997: 224, 228).
[166] Farnsworth (1972: 48-50).

defense. Even forty years later, Arima was certain that the Nixon Shock was not a revenge on Sato in relation to the textiles dispute.[167] While expressing his feeling of surprise, Nakasone, the then director of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), believed that Washington's new policy toward China was "not a bad thing to Japan."[168] Not surprisingly, the prime minister suffered from the feeling of being treated unfairly by Americans. Yet, it seems that this negative feeling did not significantly undermine his positive prior beliefs. On 15 July, Sato wrote in his diaries admiringly of Nixon's diplomatic maneuver, saying that "it deserves congratulations."[169] According to Mamoru Kusuda, Sato's secretary, the prime minister "did not lose his calmness, and he never added a single piece of criticism regarding President Nixon's way of doing things."[170]

Accordingly, Tokyo's reaction was a mix of gestures of discontent and consistent support to Washington's Asia policy. On the one hand, Tokyo resorted to complaints through diplomatic channels. The JMOFA and the PARC of the LDP conveyed official messages of grievance to State Secretary William Rogers. At a public speech in San Francisco, Ambassador Ushiba signaled a retrained but clear warning of Japan's growing concerns about the alliance relationship.[171] On the other hand, consistent with its generally positive beliefs about the US, Tokyo continued to closely follow Washington's Asia policy. In a press interview in September, Sato reaffirmed that the basis of Japanese foreign policy was still the "close relationship with the US."[172] Citing Nixon's reassurance that he had contemplated no change in China policy, Sato not only continued to support Washington's efforts to preserve Taipei's seat in the UN, but also resisted domestic pressure for a rapid normalization of Japan-China relations.[173]

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[167] Arima and Takenaka (2015, Vol.1: 140-1).
[168] Nakasone (2012: 222).
[169] Satō (1997: 15 July, 1971), Ikeda (2004: 315), Hoey (2015: 151-2).
[170] Kusuda (1983: 314), Hoey (2015: 148).
[171] Ikeda (2004: 318).
[172] The Dollar Shock refers to Nixon's new policy to protect the American economy by floating the dollar and levying a 10% surcharge on imports. This helped significantly to address America's trade imbalance at the expenses of Japanese economy. See Farnsworth (1972: 51-2), Reston (1971).
[173] Schaller (1997: 229, 242).

Recovering Damage

By early 1972, as Tokyo and Washington had experienced growing uncertainty about each other's intentions, they had recognized the urgency to recover the damages the textiles dispute and the Nixon Shock inflicted.[174] Against the background of their generally positive prior beliefs, face-to-face diplomacy shortly played a primary role in reassuring each other's benign intentions. The first such event was the Nixon-Sato summit at St Clemente in January 1972. Particularly, Tokyo took the summit as a chance to probe US intentions and signal its alliance commitment.[175] During the conference, Sato expressed gratitude on Okinawa and Tokyo's willingness to continuously rely on US nuclear umbrella, while anxiously paying attention to even minor diplomatic gestures by American leaders. For example, simply the scheduling of the summit after Nixon's visit to US allies in Europe led to Sato's feelings of anxiety. In response, Nixon reassured Sato of US commitment and encouraged Japan to play a greater military role in Asia.[176] Although their differences on burden-sharing remained, Sato clearly expressed the feeling that the alliance relationship was turning positively. In his diaries on 7 January, Sato described the US nuclear umbrella as "an umbrella which brings together two lovers in the rain of spring." As to US-Japan relations, although Sato admitted that the two sides were competing with each other, he deemed the status of the relationship as generally positive.[177] Upon the return of Okinawa on 15 May, Sato wrote down "appreciation (*kansha*)" twice in his dairies — a clear sign of his feelings of gratitude.[178]

Another such major event was Kissinger's mission to Tokyo in June. As Kissinger's report reveals, he had extensively engaged in face-to-face interactions with "the broadest possible cross-section of Japanese political, economic, intellectual and media leadership."[179] Apart from spending four hours talking to Sato, Kissinger met Foreign Minister Fukuda and

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[174] U.S. Interdepartmental Group for East Asian Pacific Affairs (1971: 3), Kusuda (1983: 316).
[175] Kusuda (1983: 317), U.S. Department of State (2018: doc.109).
[176] U.S. Interdepartmental Group for East Asian Pacific Affairs (1971: Preface), Schaller (1997: 242-3).
[177] Satō (1997: 7 January, 1972).
[178] Ibid, 15 May, 1972; Schaller (1997: 242).
[179] U.S. Department of State (2018: doc.122).

Minister of MITI Tanaka — the two candidates for succeeding Sato. He also met other LDP leaders, including three future Japanese prime ministers, Ohira, Miki, and Nakasone. Clearly, personal impressions played a decisive role in Kissinger's assessments. First, heavily drawing on his personal impressions, Kissinger expressed his optimistic feeling about Japan's commitment to the alliance. After his meeting with Sato, Kissinger reassured Nixon about the prime minister's "strong support of your Vietnam policy," and "his wariness that the Communist powers might attempt to split the Free World."[180] Also, the conversation ended up with Kissinger's feeling of Sato's satisfaction, as he recalled:

> *Although our conversation did not dwell as much on future U.S.-Japanese relations as I would have liked, I believe it was nevertheless very helpful in giving him a first-hand rundown on your perspective and policies. He clearly came away reassured about the basic U.S. course and demonstrated that, whatever the recent turbulence in our bilateral relations, he and Japan remain our good friends.*[181]

In a telephone call on 8 June, Kissinger again assured Nixon that "his conversation with the premier was amazing," because Sato really valued the establishment of a personal relationship with him.[182] Showing his keen interest on the subject, Nixon responded affirmatively: "It's important that he [Sato] feels he has the same relationship with you," because this tie, Nixon reasoned, could give Kissinger much credibility while dealing with the prime minister in the future. The president added, even his state secretary enjoyed no such credibility for the lack of a personal relationship with the Japanese.[183] This clearly testified to the prominent role personal impressions played in leaders' assessments.

Again, in a telephone call on 13 June, while Kissinger reported that he avoided pressuring Tokyo to rapidly ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), both leaders agreed that Sato

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[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Recording of a telephone conversation between the Present and Henry A. Kissinger in the White House, No. 133-020, 4:27–4:31 pm (8 June, 1972).
[183] Ibid.

was a "good guy." According to Kissinger's memoirs, he was particularly impressed by Sato's "moral force" and his sincere attitude in befriending America.[184] It is likely that this image also contributed to his stated sympathy toward Sato concerning the textiles dispute. In retrospect, Kissinger claimed that "Sato was sincere in his pledges," as he believed that the prime minister "was far too intelligent to attempt such clumsy evasions, far too honorable to resort to tricks with a country he genuinely liked and toward a president he respected."[185] Instead, he explicitly resorted to external attribution, downplaying Sato's unfavorable behavior by referring to the structural tension between economical rivalry and political partnership, which also occurred between America and its European allies — a clear sign of positive beliefs defense.[186]

Echoing such positive perceptions was consecutive US assessments of Japanese intentions from 1972. As NSSM 122 suggests, although US leaders generally expressed feelings of increasing Japanese reliability on the ground that the US-Japan diplomacy on Okinawa effectively eased Japan's rising nationalism.[187] Washington further described the US-Japan alliance as the single most important bilateral relationship for mutual benefits. This evaluation took on a much more positive tone than that in NSSM 5.[188] According to NSSM 172, US leaders began to explicitly evaluate Japan's reliability on their general impressions of Japan. The document expressed considerable confidence that "most Japanese have a clear recognition of the enormous importance of the US to Japan."[189] Nevertheless, Washington noticed that economic frictions and China policy would become two main sources of uncertainty: While Washington remained concerned about Japan's growing economic power, it also worried that Japanese leaders might suspect that the US would try to use the China card against Japan.[190]

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[184] U.S. Department of State (2007: doc.58), Kissinger (1979: 6764, 7029).
[185] Ibid, 7011.
[186] Ibid, 7029.
[187] U.S. Interdepartmental Group for East Asian Pacific Affairs (1971: 3-5).
[188] Ibid, 1, 3.
[189] U.S. Department of State (1974b: 3-4).
[190] Ibid, 4-5.

In short, the alliance relationship from 1969 to 1972 overwhelmingly supports the ARM. First and foremost, positive prior beliefs and face-to-face diplomacy worked in a mutually sustainable manner in reinforcing an increasingly resilient feeling of converged identities and interests between American and Japanese leaders. In general, prior beliefs had played a greater role in initially structuring leaders' assessments, as exemplified by Nixon's prioritization of the Okinawa return, as well as Sato's loyal adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine. Then, face-to-face diplomacy functioned mostly in strengthening such pre-existing beliefs/feelings or in repairing damaged relations. There is abundant evidence that leaders on both sides consciously took face-to-face interactions as effective and credible way of probing or communicating intentions. In addition, a strong counter-evidence to the RCM's prescription of costly signaling is that even Nixon and Kissinger, two well-known realist thinkers, appeared to particularly value secret diplomacy via non-governmental actor as a credible means of signaling, as shown in the Okinawa and Textile negotiations.

Furthermore, personal impressions appeared to be the most prominent indicator which US-Japan leaders extensively relied on. In the Okinawa and textiles negotiations, Nixon and Kissinger almost exclusively rely on their impressions of Sato in order to efficiently establishing a linkage between the two issues. Yet, when misunderstanding triggered Nixon's negative emotional responses to Sato's failure to deliver his promise. Personal impressions, again, played the key role in conveying each other's reliability through face-to-face diplomacy. Throughout the process, substantive actions showed only minor impact in altering leaders' prior beliefs. In the US assessments, for instance, Japan's limits on American textile imports largely fell into a secondary concern; its lack of substantial effort in remilitarization was considerably overlooked during this period. Instead, US leaders pay most attention to their general impression of rising Japanese nationalism as a primary sign of unreliability. In Japan, although the Nixon Shock brought about Tokyo's bitter protests, it still could not sig-

nificantly challenge resilient prior beliefs about US reliability among Japanese leaders, such as Sato, Fukuda, and Nakasone.

5.2.4 Crafting Joint Defense (1976-1978)

After Sato, the premiership of Tanaka Kakuei resulted in growing uncertainty between the allies. In the light of the Détente and the US withdrawal from Vietnam, Tokyo went on to pursue an increasingly independent foreign policy focusing on Asia. Tanaka struck Nixon as "more nationalistic than the old regimes that ran through Yoshida, Ikeda, Kishi and Sato."[191] Yet, following Tanaka's downfall in 1974, his successor Miki soon brought the alliance back to its old track. The Miki Cabinet preceded a period of substantial progress in the US-Japan security relationship, which began during the Fukuda Cabinet.[192]

As Sato's foreign minister, Fukuda Takeo was hand-picked by the former prime minister as his successor, hence, inherited much of Sato's foreign policy legacy. During the Tanaka Cabinet, Fukuda succeeded Kishi as the leader of a LDP faction which represented the most right-wing and anti-Communist voices within the party.[193] Not surprisingly, with regard to the US-Japan alliance, Fukuda also largely inherited Sato's strategic view. Although he began to advocate a "comprehensive pacifist diplomacy (*zenhoui heiwa gaikou*)," Fukuda argued that a close US-Japan alignment was fundamental to such a foreign policy.[194] For example, with regard to China policy, Fukuda not only supported Washington's effort to preserve Taipei's membership of the UN, but also opposed a rapid Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Yet, Fukuda's positive prior beliefs were soon challenged by America's changing policy toward Asia. From the beginning of Carter's office, Washington attempted to adjust to the rise of China and Japan by shifting to a balancing position which did not allow "any single power to achieve a preponderance of influence or military superiority" in Asia. Essentially,

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[191] Schaller (1997: 229-30), Kyodo (2013).
[192] Gregory (1972), Watanabe (1995), Curtis)1999: 1-2).
[193] Inoue (2015: 55-6)
[194] Fukuda (1995: 272-3), Inoue (2015: 60).

this entailed a declining American presence in the region, and pressuring Japan to take more responsibilities of its defense.[195] Yet, while considering Japan of secondary importance compared to China and Europe, Carter and his National Security Advisor Brzezinski initially showed a rather careless attitude in dealing with Tokyo. Their insensitivity toward Japan's concerns was manifested in more than one issues touching Tokyo's nerve. Typically, in early 1977, Carter's announcement of withdrawing US ground troops from Korea immediately raised Tokyo's doubt about Washington's commitment. As his memoirs reveals, Fukuda took this as a clear sign of the declining US presence in Asia, and shortly expressed his discontent by proposing that the "America should consult with both Korea and Japan before it figured out a way not to endanger the peace of the Peninsula."[196] In addition, compared to Nixon's optimism, Washington not only refrained from explicitly encouraging Japan to play a more active role in Asian security, but also attempted to restrain Japan's nuclear capabilities, such as its autonomy of processing spent nuclear reactor fuel.[197]

Rising uncertainty, thus, led Fukuda to pursue a more independent strategy vis-à-vis Asia and the Soviet Union while taking substantive actions to signal Japan's commitment to defense burden-sharing. Tokyo started to actively seek intra-alliance military integration, beginning to craft a mechanism of joint operations between the JSDF and the USFJ. In fact, the absence of such a mechanism is surprising, given the MST had been in force for two decades. From mid-1976, the JDA took the initiative to launch a series of joint US-Japan consultations, which resulted in a major step of alliance institutional building: the creation of the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) under the existing Security Consultative Committee (SCC).[198] Furthermore, the JDA released the first National Defense Program Outline in late 1976, together with its plan to increase Japan's defense spending to a level above 1 per cent of its GNP. The next year saw the publication of Japan's first Defense

[195] U.S. Department of State (2014: doc.88).
[196] Takeda (2015: 53), Fukuda (1995: 273-4).
[197] U.S. Department of State (1977: doc.2, doc.9), Arima and Takenaka (2015: 320).
[198] Tanaka (1997: 281-3, 285).

White Paper.[199] Also, Fukuda took the opportunities of summit diplomacy to communicate his personal commitment to Carter, consecutively, in 1977 and 1978.

Both Tokyo's substantive actions and face-to-face diplomacy worked to reassure Washington about Japan's benign intentions. Shortly before the Fukuda-Carter summit in 1977, State Secretary Vance described Japan's moving toward a more active defense posture with unprecedentedly positive languages. In general, he assessed that the current US-Japan security relationship was "free of contentious issues," and also "less controversial than at any time in recent history." Vance clearly attributed the progress to Tokyo's increasing activeness in security cooperation with Washington.[200] This assessment stands in sharp contrast to Washington's repeated frustration over Tokyo's reluctance to rearm itself. Furthermore, his perceptions show that the Carter administration was developing growing sensitivity toward Japan's concerns. While Vance was concerned about Tokyo's pursuit of autonomy and even its ambition to develop nuclear weapons, he accurately grasped the source of Tokyo's uncertainty — a possible US withdrawal from Asia.[201] Thus, drawing on various Japanese perceptions of America, he warned Carter of Tokyo's sensitivity to "even the nuances" of US behavior and advised the president to carefully design his wording in the forthcoming meeting with Fukuda.[202]

By the second Carter-Fukuda summit in 1978, Washington seemed to further upgrade its beliefs about Japan's reliability. In his assessment, Vance used even more positive languages to describe the status of US-Japan relations; Fukuda had already left him an impression as "a firm friend of the United States."[203] Whereas the secretary was well aware of the existing US-Japan differences on trade imbalance and Asia policy, he saw "a striking convergence of views" between Washington and Tokyo on political issues. As to future security cooperation

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[199] Nishihara (1983: 182), Takeda (2015: 35-6).
[200] U.S. Department of State (1977: 2).
[201] Ibid, 4-6.
[202] Ibid, 3.
[203] U.S. Department of State (1978: 2).

with Tokyo, Vance also expressed a high degree of optimism while downplaying the relatively slow progress of rearmament programs in Japan.[204] Instead, the state secretary paid most attention to Tokyo's active attitude on defense issues. Drawing on this impression, he concluded that "US-Japan security relations are sound and less controversial than at any time in recent history.[205]

By early 1979, personal impressions, both direct and indirect, had played an increasingly important role in Washington's assessments. First, US leaders' positive impressions of Fukuda also informed their views about his ally and successor Ohira. In a memorandum for the present, Brzezinski explicitly compared Ohira to Fukuda on foreign policy thinking, and concluded that the alliance relationship was "as strong as they ever have been."[206] After surveying Ohira's personal characteristics such as political skills and Christian faith, Brzezinski particularly emphasized that Ohira's "strong belief in the US-Japan connection" showed remarkable consistency over time. Thus, he confidently concluded that Ohira was sincere in demonstrating Japan's alliance commitment despite the existence of problems in US-Japan economic relations.[207] Furthermore, face-to-face diplomacy between Carter and Ohira also positively contributed to Washington's beliefs about Japan's reliability. As Carter recalled, he had liked Ohira since their first meeting in 1975. After Ohira becoming prime minister, the two leaders "grew to be personal friends." Their families went along well, and they "discussed sensitive personal and political issues without restraint or embarrassment, and really enjoyed being together." In his memoirs, Carter even called Ohira "a special friend of mine among the foreign leaders I knew."[208]


Under growing mutual perceptions, US-Japan relations witnessed continuous progress in the area of military integration from 1978. Following repeated joint consultations, Tokyo and

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[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid, 9.
[206] U.S. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1979: 1).
[207] Ibid, 2.
[208] Carter (1995: 113).

Washington announced the first Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in November 1978. The Guidelines outlined a clear vision for the division of labor between the JSDF and the USFJ, with regard to their joint deterrence posture and operations in response to a potential armed attack. According to this division of labor, Japan should take the lead in defensive operations in Japanese territory and waters, while US forward-deployed forces would play a supporting role.[209] Essentially, the Guidelines made a watershed in the intra-alliance security cooperation, as it committed the JSDF and the USFJ to joint planning, joint exercises, and intelligence sharing in the light of a possible Soviet invasion. As *Figure 5.5* shows, this progress is probably best shown by the remarkable increase of joint US-Japan exercises from 1978. Previous joint exercises were only conducted between American and Japanese navies on an extremely limited basis. However, by 1981, the number of joint exercises quickly rose to over six times of that in the last three years; both ground and air forces began to participate in the cooperation on an increasing scale.[210] In the same year, US-Japan joint strategic

Figure 5.5: US-Japan Joint Military Exercises, 1975-1990
(Data from Tanaka 1997, p.284)



[209] Przystup (2015); for the full text of the Guidelines, see Hosoya (1999: 964).
[210] Tanaka (1997: 284-5).

planning also saw substantial progress. The two governments completed their first battle plan for joint operations against a potential Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.[211]

The alliance relationship in the Carter-Fukuda years generally supports the ARM, while both sides' intra-alliance strategies can be partially explained by strategic imperatives, such as shifting balance of power on a systemic level. First, although positive prior beliefs remained strong on both sides, its relative decline from the outset of Carter's office was positively related to Washington's decision to prioritize its reduced presence in Asia — a sign which largely raised Tokyo's fear of abandonment. By contrast, resilient prior beliefs on the Japanese side led Tokyo to prioritize strengthening the alliance relationship, rather than resorting to a balancing strategy. This largely reflected the congruence between Fukuda's beliefs about US reliability and his behavior. As shown earlier, a sense of converged interest, though with less emphasis on anti-Communist ideologies, played an integral part in either side's assessment throughout the episode. By the late 1970s, thus, one can observed that Washington's positive beliefs had again become increasingly resilient. Face-to-face diplomacy played the most important role in facilitating the restored optimism on both sides. Particularly, US leaders showed a tendency to draw on personal impressions from such interactions in assessing Japan's reliability, as exemplified by Vance's changing perceptions of Fukuda following the Carter-Fukuda summits, and by Carter's friendship with Ohira. As a result, US leaders had developed increasing sensitivity toward Japan's concerns.

Furthermore, despite the importance of affective signals, substantive actions had played a greater role in leaders' assessments, particularly in the initial stage of the intra-alliance interactions. The withdrawal of American ground forces from Korea significantly contributed to Japan's uncertainty. Ironically, this led Tokyo to take substantive actions to increase its defense capabilities, hence, its alliance burden-sharing from the late 1970s.[212] While US lead-

[211] Curtis (1981), Fukuda (2006: 153).
[212] Nishihara (1983: 181-2).

ers immediately paid attention to Japan's increasingly active defense posture, affective signals, particularly personal impressions, raised their optimism well before Tokyo's new defense posture bore substantial progress. As positive beliefs increasingly structured Washington's assessments, a general image of friendship was increasingly used to assimilate Japan's unfavorable behavior. As a result, Washington's assessments of Japan's intentions resumed the old pattern of positive beliefs defense: Political and security relations were prioritized, whereas economic frictions were downplayed.

5.2.5 A Partnership of Solidarity (1982-1987)

The Ron-Yasu Relationship

By the end of the Cold War, the US-Japan alliance had seen its evolution to a full-fledged military partnership. Although this period was characterized by rising Japan-bashing in American media in response to the bilateral trade conflict, American and Japanese leaders increasingly assessed each other's reliability on the basis of a sense of highly converged political identities.[213] Accordingly. the US-Japan military integration grew to the extent that Tokyo was acceptant to the risk of being entrapped in a war with the Soviet Union. This development was characterized by the Ron-Yasu partnership — the personal friendship between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.

During this period, prior beliefs from face-to-face interactions played the most prominent role in shaping Nakasone's initial perceptions of US reliability. As a well-known nationalist and a former director of the JDA, Nakasone became prime minister in 1982. Yet, well before his premiership, Nakasone's effort to strengthen Japan's defense capabilities had attracted great interest from US leaders, such as Kissinger.[214] Heavily influenced by Kishi and the LDP's right-wing tradition, Nakasone's nationalism largely converged with his firm support

[213] U.S. Department of State (1982, 1).
[214] U.S. Department of State (2018, doc.41, doc.53).

of a close US-Japan alignment.[215] As his memoirs reveals, the linkage between his nationalism and pro-American attitude had begun to emerge as early as the occupation years. Although Nakasone was critical of the Yoshida Doctrine, his perceptions of benign US intentions were heavily influenced by face-to-face interactions with the occupation authorities. The SCAP officers, as he remembered, showed a considerate manner in communicating with the Japanese. Such experiences even convinced him of the inevitable failure of Imperial Japan, as Nakasone recalled:

> *I could not help but admire every action of American generals — especially Captain Pardo — other lower-level officers and soldiers; hence, I sincerely felt that Japan's defeat was inevitable. Even if Japan had won the war, it could very likely have become as unpopular as a rat crossing the street in Continental Asia. That was because of its arrogance and complacency.*[216]

From the late 1940s, Nakasone not only received English lessons from the SCAP officers, but also, as a member of the Diet, began to cultivate political and private ties with America. In 1951, Nakasone directly petitioned against radical occupational policies to General MacArthur. While his criticism provoked MacArthur into anger, it attracted the attention of Dulles during his mission to Japan.[217] Since then, Nakasone had travelled to America and shortly studied at Harvard, as a short-term student of Kissinger. As a result, he established wide contacts with American political elites, including the Kennedy family.[218] Later, Nakasone sent his eleven-year old daughter, Mieko, to study in the US, and his family developed a close relationship with Mieko's host family in Michigan — a clear sign of his genuine liking of America.

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[215] Nakasone (2012: 299).
[216] Nakasone (1992: 59).
[217] Ibid, 91-3.
[218] Ibid, 133-5.

Such personal feelings soon made a strong affective signal in his face-to-face diplomacy with US leaders. During the Reagan-Nakasone summit in 1983, the prime minister made an excellent display of goodwill at a state dinner, by rhetorically linking his daughter's story to US-Japan friendship. His emotional displays impressed US leaders, such as Vice President Bush and State Secretary Schultz, who, according to Nakasone's account, were both in tears.[219] Then, in a press meeting, Nakasone soon made headlines by promising to transform Japan into an unsinkable "aircraft carrier" for US forces in a potential war with the Soviets. In late January, with a clear sense of converged identities and interests, he again reassured Reagan that Japan and America "have a common destiny, and will share our joys and our sadness."[220]

Evidently, the prime minister made a strong impression on US leaders. The day after his emotional dinner talk, Reagan invited Nakasone and his family to Whitehouse for breakfast — a gesture of special respect — during which they started to call each other "Ron" and "Yasu." Since then, this Ron-Yasu partnership had been characterized by a close working relationship on the international stage. Nakasone described their relationship as being based on "mutual trust." In retrospect, he recalled various events of teamwork with Reagan in international conferences, and also showed much admiration of Reagan's leadership skills.[221] In Reagan's diaries, the president referred to Nakasone as his "truly fine old friend" on many occasions; he recorded more than once his pleasantness following meetings with Nakasone and his family.[222] Accordingly, the president particularly showed his sensitivity toward Nakasone's difficulties while cooperating with Washington. For example, Reagan made an explicit positive beliefs defense in his diaries of April 1985. While complaining about the Congress's pressure on Japan regarding trade issue, he highly praised Nakasone's competence:

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[219] Ibid, 240-1.
[220] Nakasone (2012: 319-20), Tanaka (1997: 297).
[221] Nakasone (1992: 241-3).
[222] Reagan and Brinkley (2007: 492, 505, 606).

Ambas. Mike Mansfield (Japan) is home on leave. He came by & is as distressed as I am over some of the Reps. & Sens. who are hysterically ranting about a trade war with Japan. The truth is we've made substantial gains in getting Japan to open her markets. A big factor in this is the best P.M. Japan has ever had — Yasu Nakasone.[223]

Corresponding to such beliefs, Washington perceived Japan as highly reliable. Even before the Reagan-Nakasone summit in 1983, US leaders showed consensus on this image via their collective assessments in NSDD 6. First and foremost, this assessment explicitly stated that the US-Japan relationship had evolved from a "developing partnership" to "an alliance based on shared values." Then, stressing on their sense of converged democratic institutions and respect for human rights, NSDD 6 concluded that "political cooperation between the United States and Japan, particularly in regard to third countries, was exceedingly smooth"; It defined the status of US-Japan security relationship as "extremely cordial and close."[224] Although US leaders were aware of Japan's insufficient military build-up, NSDD 6 largely downplayed its image as a free rider, while focusing on Tokyo's more active defense posture as an indicator of reliability — a sign of positive beliefs defense.[225] Moreover, it is noteworthy that US leaders explicitly derived such perceptions on the basis of their impressions. The document regularly drew on subjective factors, such as Japan's "deep dislike for Russians" and Japanese prime ministers' personal reassurance. On a major source of uncertainty, namely, Japan's nationalism, NSDD 6 even posited that "responsible Japanese themselves distrust latent nationalism and all indications are that they will lean over backwards to keep it under control."[226] Finally, as usual, this assessment also separated economic issues from political and security relations with Japan. In the 1980s, US-Japan relations saw a steadily expanding list of economic problems, including continuous trade imbalance, Japan's market liberalization and Yen-Dollar exchange rate. Yet, NSDD 6 set a clear principle that such economic is-

[223] Ibid, 313.
[224] U.S. Department of State (1982: 1-2, 4).
[225] Ibid, 1-2, 4.
[226] Ibid, 2, 4, 14.

sues should not endanger "the maintenance of good United States-Japanese relations."[227] In other words, US leaders continued to view economic frictions with Japan as secondary, vis-à-vis the overarching importance of security relationship.

Since then, personal factors, particularly the Ron-Yasu relationship, had also played an increasingly important role in Washington's assessments. For instance, drawing on personal impressions from the author's trip to Japan in 1984, a Policy Planning Staff (PPS) memorandum concluded that "Whatever troubles may bedevil trade relations, US-Japanese security relations are good and getting better. In fact, they are so good that one must look for flaws to balance the picture."[228] In particular, it cited the Ron-Yasu partnership as representative of "Japan's alleged national disposition to follow a respected and trusted leader in the hierarchy of states," emphasizing that the relationship was "still driven by personal and selected official contacts."[229] Whereas it recognized that Japan's fear of abandonment or entrapment remained its source of uncertainty, the assessment viewed such fears as posing little challenge to Japan's beliefs about US nuclear umbrella. Again, drawing on personal impressions, it concluded that:

> *But in Japanese eyes, the prospect of abandonment does not turn on brooding doubts about the credibility of America's nuclear deterrent. […] Lots of Japanese fear, in a rather abstract way, that Japan would be a (contrary to Nakasone's controversial characterization) sinkable "aircraft carrier" in a global war. […] But no one worries that a nuclear attack on Japan would fail to provoke an American strategic nuclear response.*[230]

By 1987, Washington's optimism remained unchanged, despite the fact that tensions over US-Japan trade imbalance grew to an unprecedented level. Before Nakasone's official visit

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[227] Ibid, 6-9.
[228] U.S. Department of State (1984: i, 1).
[229] Ibid, 2.
[230] Ibid, 4.

this year, a DoS assessment concluded that Washington and Tokyo were enjoying "excellent overall relations." Particularly, it credited Nakasone with this positive outcome.[231] Given the amounting economic problems, the document called for Washington's efforts to "halt deterioration in public attitudes toward Japan" and "promote alliance solidarity" by reaffirming the bilateral cooperation in "political, strategic, defense, and foreign assistance areas."[232]

Deepening Military Integration

Such positive perceptions find compelling evidence in the progress of US-Japan security relations during the Reagan-Nakasone years. First and foremost, Japan adopted a military posture which would automatically involve itself in a war between the West and the Soviets. Nakasone's promise to make Japan an unsinkable aircraft carrier was not just rhetorical. His words were substantiated by actions: The JSDF began to adopt an assertive military posture against the Soviet Union. In a scenario of conflict, the JSDF would support the US forces by blocking the sea lanes connecting the Sea of Japan and the Russian Far East. One year after the Reagan-Nakasone summit, Washington and Tokyo completed a war plan for joint operations against a potential Soviet invasion of Japan.[233] In 1985, Tokyo formulated its Midterm Defense Program, which was aimed at substantially improving the JSDF's combat efficiency, particularly its ability to interdict surface ship traffic in the Sea of Japan.[234]

Furthermore, Nakasone was also the first prime minister to explicitly push for defense burden-sharing in post-war Japan. During his office, Japan also fulfilled two earlier promises with regard to its defense capabilities. The first was made by Prime Minister Suzuki, Nakasone's predecessor, in 1981: Tokyo promised to extend its geographical scope of defense from 200 to 1,000 nautical miles southeast of Honshu. Second, as *Table 5.3* shows, Nakasone fulfilled the promise to increase its defense spending, set by the National Defense Pro-

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[231] U.S. Department of State (1987: 1-2).
[232] Ibid, 3-4.
[233] Iriye and Wampler (2001: 168), Koizumi (2002: 270-1).
[234] Corning (1989: 274).

gram Outline. By the end of his office in 1987, Japan for the first time broke the barrier of moving defense spending beyond 1 per cent of GNP.[235] Apart from these efforts, the prime minister also dramatically increased Japan's costs sharing for the USFJ. By 1985, Tokyo had increased the budget to 80.7 billion yen — a figure thirteen times of that in 1978.[236]

The US efforts for military integration with Japan were firstly seen in a moderate increase of US forces level in Japan. The number of troops rose from about 46,000 in 1980 to almost 50,000 in 1987, reaching its peak during the late Cold War.[237] Second, US-Japan joint exercises not only saw a remarkable increase in number during the 1980s (see *Figure 5.5*), but also witnessed significant progress in terms of combat readiness and interoperability. In 1986, the USFJ and the JSDF conducted the first unified exercise with the participation of the Air, Ground and Naval forces. Since 1981, a series of exercises and joint training had

Table 5.3: Japan's Defense Spending, 1977-1989


Year	Defense Budget (billion yen)	Increase (Percentage)	Percentage of GNP
1977	1690.6	5.47%	0.877%
1978	1901.0	7.60%	0.903%
1979	2094.5	7.65%	0.903%
1980	2230.2	0.90%	0.900%
1981	2400.0	4.65%	0.906%
1982	2586.1	6.21%	0.933%
1983	2754.2	4.88%	0.978%
1984	2934.6	4.16%	0.991%
1985	3137.1	5.28%	0.997%
1986	3343.5	5.03%	0.993%
1987	3517.4	5.26%	1.004%
1988	3700.3	4.73%	1.013%
1989	3918.9	3.49%	1.006%

Note: Data from Hanai and Asakawa 1995, p.179

[235] Ibid, Hanai and Asakawa (1995: 179).
[236] Koizumi (2002: 278).
[237] Yoshida (2012: 294-5).

successively transformed the JSDF into efficient supporting forces to the US.[238] In addition, there was also a dramatic increase of US nuclear submarine activities in Japan during this period. As *Figure 5.6* suggests, the average frequency of nuclear submarine missions to Japanese bases from 1982 to 1990 is much higher than such record in the Vietnam War. Essentially, it indicates that the US was taking a more assertive posture of nuclear deterrence in the Far East.[239]

Figure 5.6: Nuclear Submarine Visits to US Bases in Japan, 1964-1990
(Data from Koizumi 2002, p.135)



Apart from the evidence above, major progress for military integration was also visible in US-Japan cooperation on defense technology and production. The first stage of the cooperation was symbolized by Tokyo's agreement to export military technologies to the US. In 1983, the two countries established the Joint Military Technology Commission in reviewing transferable military technologies, which included missile guidance systems, weapons production systems and military computers.[240] From 1985, the US-Japan joint development of the FSX — the next-generation fighter support for the JSDF — symbolized another major step of the cooperation. As part of the Midterm Defense Program, the FSX was originally designated as a project relying exclusively on domestic technologies. Eventually, given the

[238] Koizumi (2002: 277).
[239] Ibid, 135.
[240] Corning (1989: 280-1).

need to ease the bilateral tensions over trade, Tokyo conceded to Washington's request for a US-Japan joint development.[241]

During the Reagan-Nakasone years, the US-Japan alliance relationship was characterized by an unprecedented degree of congruence between perceptions and intra-alliance behavior. From a rationalist perspective, one may well attribute the growing cohesion of the alliance to an overall high level of the Soviet threat (see *Figure 5.2*). Yet, this argument is self-contradicting for its inconsistency in explaining the absence of military integration by the end of the Vietnam War, when the Soviet threat appeared much more severe. In contrast, the Soviet empire in the 1980s was increasingly confronted with nationwide economic difficulties, which significantly constrained its power at a systemic level.[242] On the other hand, the ARM gains overwhelming support from the alliance relationship in this episode. First, there is abundant evidence for the crucial role that face-to-face interactions and personal impressions played in shaping Nakasone's resilient positive beliefs about US reliability. In turn, his face-to-face diplomacy significantly reinforced US leaders' beliefs about Japan's reliability, as exemplified by the Ron-Yasu partnership. More importantly, by the end of the episode, such positive beliefs via personal contacts had been effectively translated into collective assessments at a governmental level, reinforcing an increasingly positive prototypical image of US-Japan solidarity. Leaders on both sides tended to invoke a sense of converged democratic ideologies in their assessments. Finally, compared to the past, affective signals, particularly personal impressions, tended to receive disproportionate attention, while unfavorable Japanese actions in terms of both insufficient defense capabilities and trade imbalance tended to be downplayed.

[241] Kohno (1989: 457, 469-70), Hanai and Asakawa (1995: 192-3), Yoshida (2012: 293).
[242] Bialer (1981: 1004-5), Copper (1984: 3, 8).

5.3 Findings and Discussions

5.3.1 Patterns of Reliability Assessment

The US-Japan alliance has seen continuous progression in political and security relations, and also institutional development. Particularly since the 1980s, their intra-alliance interactions have been increasingly characterized by languages of solidarity; this trend lasted well beyond the Cold War. The analysis generally supports the ARM, and finds only lean evidence to explanations by costly signaling, capabilities, institutions, and reputation, under the RCM. Before addressing those alternative explanations, this section first discusses our main findings.

Table 5.4 - Findings: Use of Information

Periods	Assessor	Propositions 1 - 4: Which indicators leaders pay attention to?						
		Capability	Institution	Reputation	Identity	Behavioral Signals		
						costly	substantive	affective
1945-1951	US	limited	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes
	Japan	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
1957-1960	US	limited	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	Japan	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1969-1972	US	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	Japan	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
1976-1978	US	limited	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	Japan	partial	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes
1982-1987	US	no	no	no	yes	no	partial	yes
	Japan	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes

In terms of leaders' use of information (see *Table 5.4*), first and foremost, affective signals — particularly personal impressions — as ***Proposition 3*** predicts, proved to be disproportionately influential in strengthening perceived reliability in either side's assessments. In the US-Japan case, the function of diplomatic gestures was often inseparable from leaders' face-to-face interactions, hence, an integral part of the impressions they developed, just as General MacArthur's meeting with the emperor — one of the most notable gestures that de-

cisively assured Japanese elites of benign US intentions. As the alliance relationship grew closer, Tokyo became sensitive to even the slightest US gestures, while Washington's assessments tended to extensively draw on US leaders' personal impressions of leaders and general attitude in Japan. This tendency was the most obvious during the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan administrations, all of which cultivated particularly strong personal contacts with conservative Japanese leaders. Also, Nixon's love of secret diplomacy and the Ron-Yasu partnership typically showcase the credibility of personal impressions.

Moreover, as ***Proposition 4*** predicts, leaders increasingly resorted to a sense of converged identities when the alliance relationship grew stronger. Yet, such identities took on different forms along with the evolution of the alliance. By the early 1950s, Japan's transformation into democracy considerably added to its reliability in the eyes of Washington. In the Eisenhower-Kishi years, converged anti-Communist ideologies played an increasingly important role. By the end of the Cold War, Washington's assessments increasingly paid attention to the role of a sense of mutuality based on converged democratic institutions and humanitarian values.

Finally, while substantive actions, in line with ***Proposition 2***, did receive leaders' attention, both sides tended to downplay unfavorable behavior of the other. Thus, the development of the alliance relationship has been characterized by particularly positive reciprocity. On the one hand, favorable actions, such as MacArthur's ban of the general strike and Japan's active defense posture, tended to significantly improve each other's perceived reliability. On the other hand, unfavorable actions, such as the Nixon Shock and Japan's lack of defense capabilities, tended to play a secondary, even limited, role in leaders' assessments. By contrast, little evidence supports the costly signaling argument. First, both American and Japanese leaders, like their Chinese and Soviet counterparts, tended to interpret substantive signals in a forward-looking manner, vis-à-vis their direct consequences. More importantly, in the US-Japan security relationship, one can find strong counter-evidence to costly signal-

ing as exemplified by Japan's voluntary dependence on US security guarantee as well as Washington's consistent downplaying of Japan's reluctance to rearm itself, that is, its withholding of a costly signal.

In terms of the continuity and change of leaders' perceptions (see *Table 5.5*), first, there has been a strong pattern of positive beliefs defense in the US-Japan alliance relationship. This supports what ***Proposition 5*** predicts — Leaders tend to discount information about an ally's unfavorable behavior when positive feelings dominate their assessments. Such a pattern is also in line with the finding that unfavorable substantive actions tended to be downplayed on both sides. On the Japanese side, leaders' prior beliefs about the US were strong and consistent over time. Japanese leaders were particularly subject to a resilient prototypical image of America as friend and protector, due to the effect of path dependency — the long-term rule of the LDP and relatively homogenized pro-American tradition among LDP leaders since Yoshida. Yoshida himself made a typical example for positive beliefs defense while

Table 5.5 - Findings: Perceptual Change and Alliance Behavior

Periods	Congruence Test				Proposition 5		Proposition 6	
	End Perception		Alliance Behavior	Congruent	Support	End Pattern	Support	End Pattern
1945-1951	US	probably reliable	Empowerment (+) Control (-)	yes	yes	relative balance	yes	negative to positive
	Japan	highly reliable	Dependence (+)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
1957-1960	US	highly reliable	Empowerment (+) Control (-)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
	Japan	highly reliable	Dependence	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
1969-1972	US	highly reliable	Empowerment Control (-)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
	Japan	highly reliable	Dependence	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
1976-1978	US	highly reliable	Empowerment (-)	partial	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
	Japan	probably reliable	Dependence (-) Independence (+)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
1982-1987	US	highly reliable	Empowerment (+)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced
	Japan	highly reliable	Dependence Independence (-)	yes	yes	positive beliefs defense	yes	positively reinforced

assessing MacArthur and Dulles. His protege Sato had largely derived his beliefs about US reliability on the internalized Yoshida Doctrine, hence, harmonizing his nationalism and strong pro-US stance. On the US side, Washington also tended to locate the primary source of Japan's reliability in its rising nationalism. As the beliefs about US-Japan friendship and solidarity became increasingly resilient, different US administrations had shown a universal tendency to cautiously separate political and economic relations with Japan, while US leaders often believed that unfavorable Japanese behavior and the bilateral conflicts in economic area were secondary, hence, were manageable vis-à-vis their more important political and security partnership.

Furthermore, as ***Proposition 6*** predicts, face-to-face diplomacy appeared to play an indispensable role in initially breaking the US-Japan hostility and in sustaining long-term positive changes, along with increasingly resilient prior beliefs on both sides. Not only leaders consciously use face-to-face interactions to probe each other's intentions, but also significant improvements in the bilateral perceptions mostly preceded major adjustment of their intra-alliance behavior. Initially, this process was profoundly shaped by the ground-breaking interactions between MacArthur and Japanese leaders, such as Hirohito and Yoshida, in the occupation years. In the stages of the alliance's stabilization and extension, both Kishi's case and the Nixon-Sato interactions illustrate how face-to-face interactions could bring about a dramatic change of prior beliefs to the opposite direction, along with leaders' intensifying emotions. By the end of the Cold War, the prominent role of face-to-face diplomacy is strongly testified by the establishment of the Ron-Yasu partnership. Yet, given the growing salience of prior beliefs beyond the 1950s, face-to-face diplomacy largely worked to reinforce both sides' pre-existing beliefs, which already predisposed leaders' assessments toward a generally positive direction.

Finally, as *Figure 5.7* and *5.8* suggest, long-term trends of public opinion in America and Japan show much similarity to our findings about the pattern of leaders' changing percep-

tions. In Japan, the Cabinet Office's surveys suggest that the majority of the public have consistently expressed warm feelings about the US over time. Even the lowest record was 67.5 per cent, meaning that nearly 70 per cent of the subjects reported, at least, moderate affection toward the US. This is a strong indicator of perceived reliability with high certainty in the alliance relationship. Although this survey only started from 1979, its results have revealed a strikingly consistent pattern of Japanese public opinion in nearly four decades. Furthermore, according to the JMOFA's overseas surveys, US public perceptions of Japanese reliability have steadily improved since 1960, despite slight fluctuations over time. This pattern largely corresponds to the patterns of US leaders' perceptual change from the 1940s. In addition, the survey reveals a consistent gap between public and elite perceptions of Japan in America,

Figure 5.7 - US Opinion: Japan as A "Dependable Partner"
(Data source: JMOFA)





Figure 5.8 - Japanese Opinion: Public Feelings toward the US
(Data source: Japanese Cabinet Office)



prior to the 2000s. In general, a much higher percentage of US opinion leaders tend to view Japan as dependable. Although this data started from 1992, it suggests that this systematic gap might begin since the Cold War. This pattern also supplements our findings: Despite recurrent economic frictions, US leaders consistently expressed a high degree of optimism about Japan's reliability.

5.3.2 Alternative Explanations

Capabilities

In fact, the US-Japan alliance offers an excellent chance to compare the role of capabilities vis-à-vis affective signals in leaders' assessments. In general, US leaders did pay some attention to Japan's lack of military power as a source of Japan's unreliability particularly before the mid-1970s, whereas Tokyo responded with growing uncertainty to declining US presence in Asia in the late 1970s. While both developments are in line with the RCM's argument that declining capabilities add to perceived unreliability, a closer examination of the conditions actually finds more support for ***Proposition 1*** of the ARM. First, the influence of Japan's insufficient military power was limited in Washington's assessments over time. US leaders tended to downplay Japan's reluctance to rearm itself as secondary, as opposed to rising Japanese nationalism before the mid-1970s. From the 1980s, resilient prior beliefs increasingly strengthened such a pattern of positive beliefs defense, as shown by NSDD 6 in the Reagan administration. Despite persistent US discontent, Tokyo's lack of substantive actions did not prevent major progress in the alliance relationship, such as the MST in 1960, the alliance's indefinite extension in 1970, and the Okinawa reversion in 1972. Given Washington's alert of growing Japanese power, US leaders actually perceived this as highly compatible with American interests in Asia by early 1970s. The Nixon administration particularly encouraged Japan to play a more active role in Asian security — growing comprehensive power did not increase perceived unreliability.

On the Japanese side, the story is even more intriguing for the RCM. First, the preponderance of American power in 1951 (see *Figure 5.1 & 5.2*), together with the harsh occupation, should become a major source of threat perception to Tokyo. However, as early as 1947, Tokyo not only refrained from balancing against the US, but also voluntarily committed itself to a US guaranteed security. Yoshida and his successors even consistently resisted the US pressure to rapidly rearm Japan. From the late 1950s, growing power did not motivate Tokyo to pursue an independent foreign policy. The LDP leaders, such as Kishi and Sato, conversely showed a high degree of compliance with Washington's Asia policy. From the mid-1970s, declining US presence in Asia indeed led to Japanese leaders' fear of abandonment. Yet, partially in line with ***Proposition 1***, this development took place against a rising sense of unreliability due to Carter's initial insensitivity toward Japan's concerns. More importantly, its limited influence was testified by the fact that the Fukuda Cabinet prioritized a closer alliance relationship with the US, rather than moving toward an independence strategy. By the end of the Cold War, the relative decline of US global position did not turn Japan to balancing behavior, but rather saw the Nakasone Cabinet's growing commitment to military integration with the US, given the risk of being entrapped into a global war with the Soviet Union. Overall, this suggests that capabilities, despite receiving certain attention in leaders' assessment, generally failed to explain the intra-alliance interactions in a rational sense.

Institutions

From a rational perspective, the alliance relationship provides limited evidence for leaders' judgment of reliability on the democracy-autocracy dichotomy following the measurement of Polity IV project (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2). Rather, the US-Japan alliance even offers much counter-evidence to the RCM argument that democratic institutions contributed to an ally's perceived reliability. First, whereas Washington did pay attention to Japan's democratic transformation as its source of reliability during the occupation years, later generations of

US leaders rather increasingly focused on the conservative background of Japanese leaders as a short-cut for reliability. Thus, since the 1950s, Washington's assessments, as in the case of Kishi and Ohira, had generally paid attention to their ideological and foreign policy positions. As a result, the dominance of the LDP in Japanese politics — ironically, its single-party rule — became a key indicator of Tokyo's reliability.

More importantly, growing institutional constraints on the LDP, such as powerful leftist influence in the Japanese Diet — rather undermined the credibility of Japan's alliance commitment. Therefore, along with the rise of the 1955 system, Washington not only showed its tendency to discourage institutional constraints on the LDP's power, but also worked closely with conservative, right-wing Japanese leaders, such as Kishi and Nakasone, to strengthen the single-party government of the LDP. This was typically illustrated by the cooperation between Kishi and the CIA. In this sense, the ARM can also properly explain Washington's attention to Japan's democratization in the occupation years. It is arguable that this was owing to US leaders' reliance on the sense of converged political identities, namely, democratic values, rather than their evaluation of democratic institutions as a source of reliability.

Reputation

As in the previous cases, the history of the US-Japan alliance provides little evidence for the role of reputation in leaders' assessments. First, the occupation period determined that leaders on both sides were acutely aware of the limited value of reputation based on each other's past behavior. By 1951, US leaders' memories of Japanese militarism had already been replaced by a brand-new image of Japanese democracy. In Japan, a fresh image of friend and benefactor had also rapidly overridden the previous image of the US as deadly adversary. Second, similar to findings in the previous case studies, both American and Japanese leaders did look at each other's past records while assessing alliance reliability. Yet, such occasions were both highly subjective, and they usually involved the participation of superficial analo-

gies or other psychological biases. In the context of US-Japan relations, leaders' use of historical analogies was primarily associated with prototypical images concerning cultural or national characteristics. For instance, General MacArthur made a typical analogy between *Bushido* and Japan's national character when he assessed the risk of violence among the surrendered Imperial Army in 1945. Similarly, Yoshida's perception of US unreliability in the 1920s stemmed from his superficial impressions of US politics at the time, rather than from a thorough examination of past diplomatic records. Also, Washington's later assessments were not short of references to certain general characters of Japanese people or political elites. For example, the US assessment following the Nixon Shock downplayed Tokyo's grievance by asserting that Japanese officials tended to overreact to US policies.[243] Regardless of its accuracy, this type of perceptions seemed to typically confirm the impact of personal impressions, rather than the operation of asset-like reputation. In short, the above approaches to "reputation" are exactly contrary to the rationalist argument, which entails an objective treatment of past behavioral records.

5.3.3 Conclusion

The US-Japan alliance relationship makes a classical case for positively reinforced mutual perceptions and positive reciprocity over time. Yet, it is surprising that conventional discussions of it have largely depicted the alliance relationship along a realpolitik, dichotomous line of abandonment vs. entrapment. This oversimplified view of alliance politics largely overlooks the prominent role face-to-face diplomacy plays in relieving states' uncertainty about both risks, as exemplified by the US-Japan case.[244] Instead, our findings have revealed extensively the rich context against which the psychological mechanisms of reliability assessments worked through intra-alliance interactions between America and Japanese leaders. The ARM has provided a generally superior explanation, which highlights the prominent

[243] U.S. Department of State (1974b).
[244] See Dian (2014) for a typical account of such.

role of affective signals. Particularly, the US-Japan case excellently illustrates how face-to-face diplomacy and prior beliefs can function in a mutually constructive manner in sustaining a long-lasting, major great-power alliance in the international system.

Chapter 6

Psychology, Communication, and Alliance Management

6.1 The Psychology of Reliability Assessment

This research deals with a crucial, yet, under-examined question: How do states (leaders) assess the reliability of their alliance partners? For a long time, alliance reliability has been a subject of detailed examination for rationalist, large-N analyses; it also constitutes a latent concern in mainstream alliance theories.[1] However, conventional wisdom has rarely taken the question seriously; nor have many studies undertaken a systematic effort in theorizing about states' judgment of alliance reliability. Under the dominant influence of structuralism, conventional studies of alliance tend to focus on the determinist effect of systemic constraints while downplaying the role of diplomacy, particularly face-to-face interactions between leaders. Rationalist studies, instead, are easily tempted to formulate stylized models of strategic communication on the basis of a rigid set of game theoretical assumptions.[2] In turn, the mainstream realist-rationalist theories of alliance tend to associate structural or state-level imperatives with an oversimplified set of alliance strategies. Much of them have also failed to recognize the essential role of diplomacy in shaping intra-alliance relations.[3] A classical example of such is provided by Glenn Snyder's well-known dichotomy between en-

[1] See Chapter 1, 1-3.
[2] Altfeld (1984), Morrow (1991 and 2000).
[3] Walt (1987), Snyder (1997), Weitsman (2004), Cesa (2010).

trapment and abandonment.[4] According to Snyder's theory of alliance, states should constantly hold "the fear of being abandonment by one's ally," whereas they see the danger of being "dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share."[5] This alliance security dilemma largely confines a state's strategic choices to either a strong or weak strategy of commitment, while intra-alliance relations are assumed to focus on making a "trade-off between the costs and risks of abandonment and entrapment."[6] Nevertheless, according to Robert Trager's criticism of prominent rationalist models in IR literature, Snyder's theory has failed to "correspond to the options and incentives of states in the anarchic international context," where historical adversaries could well engage in a wider range of choices, in particular diplomacy, in "response to dissatisfaction with another country's conduct of foreign policy."[7]

In comparison, this study has made systematic efforts to address most of such deficiencies. First, by employing the RCM, it summarizes the central tenets underlying alliance reliability assessment which one can draw from the realist-rationalist tradition. Second, by formulating the ARM, this study has amounted to a systematic step toward the theorization of alliance reliability, as well as exploring the psychology by which leaders make judgments. More importantly, our empirical testing, against three cases of Asia-Pacific alliances during the Cold War, has revealed a picture which largely confirms the theoretical insights outlined by the ARM. Therefore, this chapter offers an opportunity to highlight the central findings regarding leaders' psychology of reliability judgment, particularly vis-à-vis their practical implications.

First, what constitutes credible information in leaders' reliability assessment? This study challenges conventional realist-rationalist answers centering on strategic imperatives as cred-

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[4] For the original abandonment-entrapment dichotomy, see Snyder (1984 and 1997); for major application of this dichotomy in later studies of Asia-Pacific alliances, see Christensen (2011), Benson (2012), Dian (2014).
[5] Snyder (1984: 466-7).
[6] Ibid, 467.
[7] Trager (2010: 350-1), Trager (2017: 5-7).

ible indices of intentions, such as capabilities, institutions, and reputation. In fact, one of the main findings across the case studies suggests that leaders paid limited attention to capabilities, but virtually no attention to institutions and reputation in their assessments of alliance commitment. Also, the role of capabilities is usually secondary, mostly when negative prior beliefs heavily inform intention assessments. In contrast, this study shows that information which brings about vivid, tangible feelings tends to most prominently signal alliance reliability.[8] Essentially, such influence lies in vivid information's ability to trigger leaders' intense emotional responses, which could even shatter resilient prior beliefs.

Second, how can states effectively communicate their intentions? Our findings strongly contradict the costly signaling argument while particularly highlighting the importance of face-to-face diplomacy. Essentially, a signal's credibility has little to do with its "cost" in a rational sense. Leaders rarely interpret signals in an unintuitive manner of backward elimination, but mostly reason from a forward-looking perspective, focusing immediately on their perceived direct consequences. Thus, affective signals, particularly personal impressions and diplomatic gestures, tend to override substantive actions that trigger little emotional responses. In comparison, substantive actions tend to assume a secondary role in leaders' assessments, because they are easily subject to divergent interpretations as well as the assimilation of prior beliefs.

Third, how do leaders' perceptions continue or change? Conventional studies of threat perceptions have been generally vague on the psychological mechanisms involved in the processes. By contrast, this study elaborates on the complex but systematic patterns by which perceptions vary through the interplay between prior beliefs and face-to-face interactions. Particularly, it reveals that perceived reliability is rarely clear-cut in terms of cognitive and affective contents. Usually, prior beliefs are comprised of both positive and negative im-

[8] This finding has provided more empirical support to what Yarhi-Milo terms "the vividness hypothesis" in her study of intention assessments. See Yarhi-Milo (2014: 16-17).

ages, which can simultaneously vary along with their respective degrees of certainty. Leaders' propensity for certainty not only depends on the positive-negative valence associated with particular feelings, but also is influenced by the appraisal tendencies following specific emotional experiences, such as fear, anger, and shock. Thus, an increasingly homogenized emotional experience can strongly reinforce affectively-congruent prior beliefs, whereas it can also rapidly alter incongruent stereotypes. In general, when specific emotional experiences become intense, leaders' congruent beliefs tend to become increasingly prototypical, that is, assuming wider generalizability from individual targets to a collective level. Yet, as such prototypical beliefs become increasingly resilient, they can even assimilate strong affective signals, hence, maintain the continuity of leaders' prior beliefs.

Finally, what constitutes the interests of a state? Although this issue goes beyond the original attempt of the study, our findings have also revealed abundant evidence that leaders' sense of interest can be quite fluid. Previous studies on intention assessments are easily tempted to invoke the notion of "interest" as a given, stable variable which leaders can conveniently factor in their reasoning.[9] Yet, our case studies suggest that the nature of interest is much more unstable; leaders' sense of interest tend to be heavily influenced by their feelings. Even though they often strive to calculate interests in a rational manner, such attempts are unconsciously guided by their moods or emotions. A classical illustration of such affective "glasses" is the Sino-Soviet polemics, which profoundly shaped a rising sense of diverged interests between Beijing and Moscow, hence, their emerging hostility. Furthermore, the Chiang Kai-shek diaries have also revealed compelling evidence that Chiang's assessments of US reliability can become so volatile that his perceptions often changed rapidly and dramatically, even on a daily basis, along with his fluctuating emotions.[10]

[9] Press (2005).
[10] See Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

6.2 Implications for Alliance Management

It is not surprising that the most valuable lessons which this study may offer have to do with the field of alliance management. Given the increasingly dense networks of alliance which makes up the fiber of the global security order since the end of World War II, the effective management of alliance assumes a central role in maintaining the post-War world order.[11] Probably no country better experienced its importance than the United States, the crafter of the Pax Americana following the end of the Cold War. As this study has revealed, the central mission for alliance management essentially boils down to the question whether a state can effectively communicate benign intentions and, if needed, successfully manipulate its image of reliability in the eye of the beholder. In this sense, our case studies generally highlight three essential implications for intra-alliance communication.

First and foremost, given the integral role of affect, both substantive actions and affective signals can be important in signaling alliance reliability. Often, vivid and emotion-inducing signals convey much stronger messages than those substantive actions which are presented in an abstract or unimpressive manner. This finding strongly challenges a central tenet of the costly signaling theory, that is, states should render a signal credible by either paying substantial sunk-cost or imposing hand-tying audience cost. However, as our case studies have demonstrated, a signal's credibility depends on leaders' feelings of specific emotions and their magnitude, while little evidence suggests that they pay attention to its cost. Affective signals, thus, tend to make the most efficient means in enhancing perceived reliability, particularly through face-to-face diplomacy where specific gestures can be designed to induce a target's intense positive feelings, such as pleasant surprise. Yet, this mechanism may well backfire, particularly when a signal is easily misinterpreted in an intercultural context. For example, what initially prompted Mao's suspicion of malicious Soviet intentions in 1958 was merely a miscommunication of a Soviet proposal which damaged his national pride,

[11] Maoz (2011).

hence, triggering Mao's feeling of humiliation. The opposite pathway is showcased by the interactions between American and Japanese leaders during the US occupation. McArthur's gesture of respect to the Japanese emperor proved to be highly effective in signaling benign US intentions, thus leaving far-reaching impact on Japanese leaders' beliefs about US reliability.

Conversely, substantive actions with little affective content tend to attract little attention particularly when dissonant prior beliefs or feelings become dominant. Under such conditions, substantive actions often generate limited affect against leaders' strong beliefs defense. In fact, throughout the case studies, one can find rather strong patterns of beliefs defense. In the US-ROC alliance, Chiang Kai-shek tended to significantly downplay US military and economic assistance over time, given his enduring suspicions. Also, his assessments represent a classical strategy of beliefs defense, namely, attributing one's benign actions to its malicious intentions. In a similar fashion, Mao Zedong repeatedly interpreted Moscow's generous assistance on the basis of self-fish Soviet motivations, hence largely dismissing them as indicators of Soviet reliability. The opposite case can be observed in the US-Japan alliance. Ever since the rise of the long-term LDP dominance in Japanese politics, US leaders had continuously downplayed Japan's resistance in building up defense capabilities. Although concerns were repeatedly expressed on the US side, Washington generally focused on individual Japanese leaders' words and behavior in assessing Tokyo's reliability.

In addition, even when leaders pay attention to substantive actions that are supposed to take certain rationalist cost, the salience of such signals is often insufficient in conveying credible alliance commitment. First, in order to persuade its target, an unreliable ally is often motivated to take substantive actions which, from a rationalist perspective, incur higher cost than a reliable ally does. Conversely, an anxious state may also have strong incentives to take substantive actions in order to reassure an ally, which is considered unreliable. In either case, such substantive actions may not work or can even backfire, particularly if the sender is

ignorant about the receiver's emotional state. Furthermore, even if such substantive signals do carry some influence on leaders' beliefs, such influence can also be easily overridden by dissonant affective signals that carry much more emotional strength.

The second implication concerns the design of credible information. An effective communication should always be designed on the basis of a sender's sensitivity to a receiver's profile of emotions. This not only includes a timely grasp of leaders' present feelings, but also the awareness of their socio-cultural backgrounds, against which the affective meaning of particular behavior is interpreted. Often, benign signals backfire, as the sender is ignorant about their negative meanings for the receiver. The ego-centric tendency essentially underlies such miscommunication, often working together with wishful thinking. For instance, one can frequently find such cases during the Chinese assessments of Soviet intentions since the late 1950s. Another typical example is Chiang Kai-shek's nearly pathological suspicions of the DoS's malicious intentions during the Democratic administrations. Even on certain occasions where negative prior beliefs do not build up, this type of misunderstanding can often arise out of leaders' divergent interpretations of each other's cultural background. For example, Nixon's frustration over Sato's dealing of the US-Japan textile frictions probably best illustrates how this type of problems can arise from unfamiliarity of the other's political system and behavior.

Last but not least, the most effective strategy for communicating reliability appears to be a balanced combination of affective signals and substantive actions. Ideally, the most cost-efficient approach entails the use of face-to-face diplomacy or emotion-including gestures in creating enduring positive impressions on an ally's leadership. Then, a gradual sending of mixed signals can follow suit as consistent evidence for the ally leaders to directly perceive their beneficial consequences over time. Also, it is noteworthy that substantive actions should be particularly designed in a manner that is vivid and emotion-inducing, lest an abstract form of presentation attracts little attention, hence, fails to trigger leaders' tangible

feelings. In practice, leaders do tend to probe each other's intentions through diplomatic exchanges before taking substantive actions. However, problems usually arise from managing their interactions to the right balance between reason and emotion. In autocracies, for example, as key leaders usually hold disproportionate influence over foreign policy-making, the exchange of their emotions through face-to-face diplomacy can easily spill over to a large part of domestic constituencies. Therefore, strong feelings of negativity between paramount leaders may quickly rack the fate of a major alliance, just like what happened during the Sino-Soviet split.

In this sense, democracies tend to better facilitate the endurance and performance of alliance. Nevertheless, our case studies have shown that such an advantage does not emerge from the mechanisms of audience cost the RCM suggests. Rather, it comes from the relatively decentralized decision-making mechanisms which constrain the spillover of individual leaders' emotions into foreign policy-making on a collective level. Probably, the US offers one of the best systems for containing leaders' personal grip on national foreign policy-making: its decentralized and highly institutionalized decision-making process via the NSC, the regular and heavy involvement of interdepartmental debates, and also the rotation of leadership through a bipartisan system. The evolution of the US-Japan alliance appears to benefit enormously from this organizational context.

6.3 On Theory and Practice

The last implications from this study have to do with theory. Today, in the field of Political Science, there has been extensive discussions on the criteria of theory building and evaluation. Most of them draw from the Philosophy of Science, starting from Lakatos's idea about progressive research program.[12] For a long time, IR theories have gradually become the colony of such a paradigm in order to frame itself as "scientific." Currently, the debates

[12] Lakatos (1976), Vasquez (1997).

within the field seem to center on the dichotomy between explanatory power and predictability.[13] Yet, if IR truly amounts to a systematic science, such a distinction is meaningless. If a theory captures the systematic patterns which explain the past, such recurrent patterns should ensure that the theory can also project well into corresponding outcomes in the future. Such a theory is considered useful, as it helps people to cope with uncertainty by increasing predictability. A useful theory should more effectively guide practice than a theory which poorly predicts. Yet, reviewing the wide gap between insights from the realist-rationalist tradition and our findings, certain key components in both theoretical traditions are called into question.

First and foremost, one needs to reconsider the usefulness of "structure" — a construct particularly widespread in the realist tradition. Drawing from Sociology, structure is usually conceptualized as the distribution of certain attributes, particularly observable strategic imperatives in the international system.[14] The main strength of this conceptualization, as structural realism suggests, lies in its function as a short-cut for measuring consistent patterns of constraints on state behavior. Therefore, in the alliance literature, capabilities tend to become a primary indicator of threat perception.[15] Realist scholars, such as Waltz and Mearsheimer, tend to claim that a recurrent pattern of conflicts in international politics can find its main source in structural change of the system.

Nevertheless, this study again challenges this view. Adding to a burgeoning literature which highlights the crucial role of diplomacy, our case studies generate strong evidence that leaders virtually pay little attention to the systemic distribution of capabilities as a criterion for identifying friends and foes.[16] Instead of external attributes that constrain human behavior, a primary structure seems to lie in the hard-wired psychological patterns within leaders'

[13] Kauppi and Viotti (2009).
[14] Wight (2006), Braumoeller (2012).
[15] Waltz (1959 and 1979), Walt (1987).
[16] Trager (2010 and 2017).

mind, that is, fear — an intense emotion which is disproportionately responsive to risk and uncertainty. It is the preponderance and resilience of fear in history that overwhelmingly makes the majority willing to readily sacrifice their feeling of the present for an illusion of control in the future. Also, it is the grasp of such a recurrent emotion in human society which grants the facade of "structure" explanatory power in realism. Constructivist scholars, such as Wendt, have successfully revealed the ideational nature behind the realist theorization of structure. Yet, they continue to build on the same logic by replacing realpolitik structures with ideational ones, such as the systemic distribution of Hobesian or Kantian ideas.[17] However, from a psychological perspective, it is arguable that structure is rather a redundant construct in the field of foreign-policy theories. All our case studies have demonstrated that predicting state behavior on the basis of structural imperatives would be generally misleading, hence, useless in guiding the practices of foreign policy-making and diplomacy.

The second theme concerns a highly related tenet in rationalism: backward elimination. Although rationalism does not necessarily require the concept of structure, its central decision-making prescriptions based on the assumption of *Homo Economicus* probably capture the most intuitive mindset by which human beings cope with uncertainties in an international system where fear dominates: That is, to maximize one's chance of survival through backward elimination. Essentially, making decisions rationally means one should always respond to uncertainties with suspicions, and to fear with even more fear. From a psychological perspective, this is what really makes a self-fulfilling prophecy: Playing safe by waiting for the other side to be vulnerable; at last, no party wants to cooperate first. Essentially, this is the underlying mindset captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma — the latent rules of international politics dominated by fear. Ironically, as our case studies show, the most successful security arrangement — the US-Japan alliance — also displays the least feature of backward elimination as opposed to the other two.

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
[17] See Wendt (1999)

Finally, the above reflections touch upon a broader question: To what extent conventional theorization, which is deeply influenced by the realist-rationalist tradition, can bring us closer to the original inspiration of the discipline of IR — human beings can prevent another great war by better understanding state behavior. Recently, some rationalist scholars spoke enthusiastically about the promise of a future-engineering enterprise through the creation of game theoretical models that increases predictability.[18] Probably no one knows the answer for certain. Yet, from the perspective of this study, it is doubtful that we are even close to understanding the extremely complex patterns within our own mind, which constantly arise out of a ceaseless flood of feelings and emotions.

[18] For a good example, see Mesquita (2010)

Appendix I

Figure 2.3: Rationalist Judgment of Alliance Reliability



Preference of Reliable Ally

1. Interests at stake
2. Potential gains
3. Potential loss

$$(p_{AC}-p_A)(u_A-u_B)+$$
$$p_{AC}(u_{AC}-u_A)+$$
$$(1-p_A)(u_{BAC}-u_B)>c_h-c_r$$

Notations			
p_A	probability of victory if A fights alone	u_A	how much C values A's victory
p_{AC}	probability of wining if C joins A in fighting	u_{AC}	how much C values their joint victory
c_h	cost of honoring alliance commitment	u_B	how much loss C suffers if A suffers defeat alone
c_r	cost of reneging alliance commitment	u_{BAC}	how much loss C suffers if both are defeated

Appendix II

Table 4.4: Main Actors in US-ROC Relations, 1949-1975

Period	United States	Republic of China
1949 - 1952	President: Harry Truman State: Dean Acheson Defense: Louis Johnson, George Marshall, Robert Lovett Military: Douglas MacArthur, Arthur Radford, Arthur Struble, William Chase Deputy Ambassador: Karl Rankin	President: Chiang Kai-Shek Foreign: Yeh Kung-chao Defense: Yu Da-Wei Intelligence: Chiang Chin-Kuo Military: Sun Li-jen Ambassador: Wellington Koo
1953 - 1960	President: Dwight Eisenhower Vice: Richard Nixon State: John Foster Dulles, Christian Herter Defense: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy CIA: Allen Dulles, Ray Cline Military: Arthur Radford, Alfred Pride Ambassador: Karl Rankin, Everett Drumwright	President: Chiang Kai-Shek Foreign: Yeh Kung-chao, Huang Shao-Ku, Shen Chang-huan Defense: Yu Da-Wei Executive/Intelligence: Chiang Chin-Kuo Military: Sun Li-jen Ambassador: Wellington Koo, Hollington Tong, Yeh Kung-chao
1961 - 1963	President: J.F. Kennedy Vic: Lyndon Johnson State: Dean Rusk NSA: McGeorge Bundy Defense: Robert MacNamara CIA: Allen Dulles, McCone, Ray Cline Ambassador: Everett Drumwright, Alan Kirk, Jerauld Wright	President: Chiang Kai-Shek Foreign: Shen Chang-huan Defense: Yu Da-Wei Executive/Intelligence: Chiang Chin-Kuo Ambassador: Yeh Kung-chao, Tsiang Tingfu
1964 - 1968	President: Lyndon Johnson State: Dean Rusk NSA: Mc George Bundy Defense: Robert MacNamara Ambassador: Jerauld Wright, Walter McConaughy	President: Chiang Kai-Shek Foreign: Shen Chang-huan, Wei Tao-ming Defense: Yu Da-Wei, Chiang Chin-Kuo Ambassador: Tsiang Tingfu, Chou Shu-kai
1969 - 1974	President: Richard Nixon State: William Rogers, Henry Kissinger NSA: Henry Kissinger Defense: Melvin Laird Ambassador: Walter McConaughy, Leonard Unger	President: Chiang Kai-Shek Premier: Chiang Chin-Kuo Foreign: Wei Tao-ming, Chou Shu-kai, Shen Chang-huan Defense: Chiang Chin-Kuo Ambassador: Chou Shu-kai, James Shen

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