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Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Stratgies for Recruitment and Retention.

Abstract:
This paper analyses the contract-posting equilibrium in a general equilibrium matching model of the labour market with on-the-job turnover. Privately optimal contracts have a rising wage-tenure profile, even when productivity is constant. The effect is to reduce equilibrium turnover; when jobs differ in productivity, turnover is below the level required for efficient matching of workers to jobs.

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Series:
Economics Working Papers
Publication date:
2000-01-01
URN:
uuid:e328fa3c-cdbb-4e72-a0a5-c2f5c2a647fe
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11969
Language:
English

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