Presence of Mind: Consubstantiality and Extended Cognition in Montaigne's Writing

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Où quant et soy, seul Dieu, et pere essential
A eu son fils, son Christ, son consubstancial

Maurice Scève, *Microcosme* (1562), III, 979-980.

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Notes on Conventions, Spelling and Abbreviations

I refer to titles by the MHRA system. Dates placed after the titles of books in the main text refer to their first publication in printed form. Original spellings have been preserved, except that the use of *i* and *j*, *u* and *v* has been modernized, and standard early modern contractions have been expanded. Where punctuation and capitalization has been altered to avoid confusion, or non-standard contraction or abbreviations have been expanded, this is indicated in square brackets. As per the Villey-Saulnier edition of the *Essais*, used here, I include [A, [B] and [C] to indicate text present in the 1580, 1588 and posthumous editions where this seems particularly relevant.

The following abbreviations have been used for publishers frequently cited:

AUP = Amsterdam University Press
CUP = Cambridge University Press
EUP = Edinburgh University Press
HUP= Harvard University Press
OUP = Oxford University Press
PUF = Presses Universitaires de France
PUP = Princeton University Press

Unless otherwise specified, translations are my own.

'Presence of Mind: Consubstantiality and Extended Cognition in Montaigne's Writing'

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Hilary Term 2022, by Nathalie Oddy, Brasenose College, University of Oxford

Short Abstract

This study investigates how the notion of consubstantiality can be rethought fruitfully as a distinctively cognitive figure in Montaigne's writing. It argues that the consubstantiality 'allegory' through which Montaigne secures his reader's sense of authorial presence in the *Essais* can be brought into dialogue with contemporary cognitive scientific theories of extended mind, in a way that does not foreclose the controversial sacramental implicatures of the term in its sixteenth-century French context. Using a combination of methods (close readings, philological analysis and word histories, Relevance Theory) and drawing on a range of materials from the early modern to the contemporary, the three chapters of the thesis demonstrate key affinities between i) Montaigne's early modern sense of the mind's ramification and extension into the material, technological and social environment, and ii) contemporary conceptions of 4E cognition. The interdisciplinary (or comparative) and transhistorical approach adopted in this study enables a reflection on consubstantiality as an ontological and discursive concept from a variety of interconnected points of view. Firstly, from the perspective of memory, which is considered within a premodern *mentalité* closely bound up in Humanist rhetoric and poetics, and in relation to the *Essais* as a technology of memory, an artificial extension of Montaigne's biological mind and lifespan. I then explore the scope for reading Montaigne's early modern ecological thought in tandem with contemporary theories of cognition, through the lens of 'contexture'. By linking contexture to relevance, I explore the interpretative implications for reading consubstantiality as operating along a continuum between the literal and the metaphorical, the natural and the artificial, the secular and the sacred. The third perspective from which I consider my main topic is prosthesis. I argue that the linguistic, medical and discursive concept of prosthesis affords another means of thinking about memory, identity, extended mind and intertextuality in Montaigne's writing; as I show, this differently-embodied perspective complements consubstantiality and sheds important light on Montaigne's conception of how part, 'membre', or fragment relates to the whole. By reconceptualizing consubstantiality through extended cognition, this study not only builds on existing cognitive approaches to Montaigne, but also, in reassessing a notion at the heart of Montaigne's writing project and pivotal to successive generations of readers' sense of Montaigne's enduring presence and relevance, engages a broader methodological reflection on interdisciplinary readings of texts from the past.

Long Abstract

This study of consubstantiality and extended mind in Montaigne's writing argues that reconceptualizing consubstantiality as a distinctively cognitive notion and, more specifically, one invested in an understanding of the mind's inherently *extended* nature, can recalibrate our perspective on a number of familiar themes in Montaigne criticism. The project started life motivated by curiosity about how the reader's experience of Montaigne's authorial presence in the *Essais* — characterized by Montaigne as 'livre consubstantiel à son autheur' and 'membre de ma vie' — is engineered and sustained, and how a fuller understanding of the *enjeux* of consubstantiality might shed light on this feeling of 'presence' which endures beyond the 'death of the author' (Barthes) and the deconstruction of presence (Derrida). From there it developed into an enquiry into how extended mind can enable a reading of Montaigne's distinctively early modern 'consubstantiality' – in essence, a metaphysical notion – in dialogue with contemporary understandings of cognition. The purpose of this dialogue across historical periods is not to claim that Montaigne prefigures or anticipates insights in contemporary cognitive science but rather to set out particular aspects of the overarching conceptual ecology in which all readings of past texts take place. The study thereby considers consubstantiality both as an endogenous term and early modern keyword, and as a notion having a recognizable family resemblance with contemporary understandings of cognitive extendedness. Aware that consubstantiality is commonly read as a purely secular metaphor, my intention was to approach it with an open mind, and to leave room for the possibility that the term's confessional charge and eucharistic implicatures have a certain role and efficacy within Montaigne's text.

In order to gain a handle on how consubstantiality functions in Montaigne's writing, I explore it from three interconnected perspectives. Each of these perspectives considers the idea of consubstantial writing through the lens of extended cognition, by examining how cognitive technologies bridge categories of natural and artificial, and of internal and external, enabling a conception of mind as inherently ramified and extended into the individual's material, social, technological and symbolic contexts. Firstly, running with Montaigne's claim in 'De l'expérience' that his book is a form of artificial or paper memory ('A faute de memoire naturelle j'en forge de papier') I explore, in Chapter One, how Montaigne positions his book relative to the early modern interface between natural and artificial memory. Situating Montaigne's attitude to memory within a number of relevant traditions in philosophy, rhetoric, portraiture and poetics, I show that Montaigne is influenced by an understanding of writing both as a metaphor for memory, and as a form of artificial memory which is a site of ambition and anxiety around man's 'natural' or innate cognitive powers, and the dynamic between memory and forgetting, at a particular historical moment: when the enduring presence of the classical past and the burgeoning of print technology were changing people's understanding of mind, memory, writing and survival. I consider Montaigne's two main models of memory — the 'magasin' and the 'outil' — analyzing how these conventional models of the storehouse and the instrument themselves rely on the interplay between the material (architectural or artefactual) and the abstract, and function precisely because they figure the

metaphoric 'interiorization' of external structures, artefacts or supports. Borrowing Montaigne's phrase from 'Des menteurs' with which he qualifies his near-absence of memory — 'je n'en reconnoy quasi trasse en moy' — I argue that the 'quasi trasse' spectrally embodies the written trace's strange combination of permanence and impermanence, presence and absence, memory and forgetting.

Chapter Two considers the place of cognitive extendedness within early modern ecological thinking, arguing that the affinities between the notions of 'contexture' and relevance can shape and guide our interpretation of consubstantiality in significant ways across historical and disciplinary idioms. Through close readings and using lexicographical resources I show that early modern senses of 'contexture,' and those employed by Montaigne in the *Essais,* provide historical enrichment for the concept of relevance in Relevance Theory, which offers an inferential alternative to code-based theories of communication. Using the 'Apologie' (II, 12) as my primary textual focus in the first part of the Chapter, I show that 'contextures' in the form of intricate natural-historical artefacts (notably spiders' webs and birds' nests) — which feature in the natural historical writings of Aristotle and Plutarch — figure as material motifs or emblems for cognitive compositions, and metaphors for the hermeneutic challenge of reading in various forms. Drawing on early modern and contemporary ecological thought (Gibson [1979], Hutchins [1995]) I read early modern niches alongside the contemporary evolutionary-biological and cognitive-scientific concept of 'niche construction' (developed by biologists such as Lewontin [1983/2000[, and Laland [2000] and taken up by philosophers Clark [2008] and Sterelny [2003]), which refers to the actions and choices through which an organism modifies and moulds its environment. Niche construction here affords a wide-lens perspective on consubstantiality that situates it both within a conceptual lineage and on a 'literal-loose-metaphorical continuum' set out in Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson [1986/2012]), while providing a nexus between discursive and biological senses of agency, improvization and purpose. In a second part of this Chapter I focus on samples from the *Essais* which show us the ecological cast of Montaigne's thinking about cognition and the affinities, down to lexical choice and detail, between his and contemporary uses of notions such as scaffolding, hybridity and extended introspection. Overall, the Chapter offers a point of view on how consubstantiality 'fits' within the contemporary notion of cognitive ecology, in an account which tries to be historically attuned to two different moments in the genealogy of cognitive and ecological thought.

In a first part, Chapter Three shifts focus from the *Essais* to the *Journal de voyage*, in order to examine how Montaigne's *other* text modulates consubstantiality, and our understanding of how limb or 'membre' relates to body. Employing the linguistic-medical-discursive concept of prosthesis as a heuristic, and contextualizing prosthesis in its early modern and contemporary settings, the chapter argues that prosthesis affords another means of thinking about memory, identity, extended mind and intertextuality in Montaigne's writing. Via a selection of close readings from the *Journal* I show that Montaigne's patterns of attention along his itinerary (over Reformation lands to the seat of orthodox Catholicism) indicate his responsiveness to the material and technological dimensions of memory and, in parallel, to the variety of confessional perspectives on the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist which he encounters on his travels.

In a second part, I return to the *Essais* to examine how, across a cluster of essays, Montaigne probes the porous metaphorical/ literal boundary of the concept of 'arms' and uses the figure of the horse as an affordance for exploring the ethical implications of prosthesis, understood both as a means of auxiliary support in warfare and in writing. I suggest that particular material emblems originating in the natural world (the 'feuille', the nest, and the 'plume') operate as conceptual seams or sutures running the boundary between natural and artificial, self and other, while simultaneously blurring those boundaries. Montaigne's characteristic slippage between literal and metaphorical forms situates his practice of writing on a continuum with the artefactual fabrications and behaviours of other species.

This study uses methods and instruments of close reading, lexical and word-historical analysis, and contemporary theories of language use such as Relevance Theory, adopting a comparative approach to readings of extended mind in two quite different but, as I argue, communicable, historical periods. The stance of the thesis has, then, been deliberately experimental, offering a perspective on consubstantiality which has not yet been fully explored in existing studies, but which sheds light on understandings of cognition, identity and authorship. It was designed to investigate the scope and limits of a cognitive reading of consubstantiality, and to test out how the metaphysical implicatures of consubstantiality might interact with a secular contemporary idiom of extended mind, rather than to show that Montaigne intended consubstantiality to be read as a clear ontological or quasi-theological statement about his 'real presence' in the *Essais* or anything equally categorical. It thus differs from resolutely secular interpretations of consubstantiality which explicitly foreclose its sacramental reverberations, instead suggesting that Montaigne can be read, on one level, as engaging in a form of sacramental poetics in which the reader participates in the cognitive ecology of Montaigne's writings which move between the consubstantial and the prosthetic, the integral and the supplemental.

This thesis offers three main arguments. Firstly, that consubstantiality operates as a distinctively cognitive figure bound up in a number of early modern ways of conceiving the relation between memory and composition. Secondly, Montaigne's deployment of consubstantiality is deliberately underdetermined, which guides his reader's possibilities of thinking as we read. This is, in part, what conditions our sense of Montaigne's (real or memorial) presence in his book, in addition to rhetorical techniques such as *enargeia*. More specifically, consubstantiality can fruitfully be read as an articulation of extended mind. Thirdly, I show that the apparent merelogical tension between part and whole that Montaigne sets up, and slippage between material and metaphorical, forms part of the *matiere* or substance of his thinking and of his book: weaving together distinctively Renaissance senses of restoration, rehabilitation and resurrection, mediating between consubstantiality and prosthesis. By recalibrating our perspective on the pivotal Montaignian notion of consubstantiality, this study contributes to the ever-burgeoning field of cognitive approaches to early modern thought, and offers, in dialogue with the important methodological reflections of scholars including Cave (2016/2018), a reflection on the special fittingness of the *Essais* for this interdisciplinary mode of exploration.

Introduction

> Je n'ay pas plus faict mon livre que mon livre m'a faict, livre consubstantiel à son autheur, d'une occupation propre, membre de ma vie; non d'une occupation et fin tierce et estrangere comme tous autres livres. (II, 18, 665)

This statement, so familiar to readers of Montaigne as to feel essential not only to the *Essais* but to our readerly relationship with them, is extraordinary.[1] But what might it mean, aside from what one might call the 'weak' reading, expressed by some scholars, that Montaigne's invocation of the theological concept of consubstantiality is purely secular, and 'simply' refers to the perfect entanglement of the *Essais* and their author?[2] The notion of a state of consubstantiality between, or across, author and book, is introduced by the striking claim of substantial reciprocal fashioning, mirrored structurally by the chiastic 'Je n'ay pas plus faict mon livre que mon livre m'a faict' , which has the effect of putting himself and his book on an equal footing of co-existence and shared agency. Consubstantiality is tied from the outset to the idea of a two-way exchange, a kinesic – and enactive – dynamic process occurring over time. [3] This notion, a little like a spider spinning a web which forms both part of its habitat and, arguably, its *extended mind* – the meaning of this phrase will emerge in the course of the thesis -- has strong affinities with what in contemporary criticism is sometimes known as 'textual autopoiesis': the self-creating processes of a biological system through text, which can be words, images or a combination of both. [4] The concept of *autopoiesis*, developed by the Chilean biologists Francisco Varela

1 As Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, author of the only study which to my knowledge explicitly focuses on Montaigne's sense of *consubstantiel*, notes: 'That was no ordinary assertion in plain language'. See 'Montaigne's Consubstantial Book', *Renaissance Quarterly,* 50 (1997), 723-749 (p. 723). Boyle argues that the 'traditional interpretation' (the word as symbolic) is a 'literary laxity', and goes on to offer her own more nuanced, more precisely substantiated interpretation, to which I return, but also move beyond.

2 This view is expressed, for example, by Philippe Desan: 'Dans le cas de M., la consubstantialité n'a rien à voir avec la Trinité, c'est une affaire plus personnelle et séculière qui consiste en un chevauchement parfait entre le corps et le livre', *Dictionnaire de Montaigne* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2018), p.207.

3 The adjective 'enactive' in this context refers to the idea that cognition must be understood as a practice, fundamentally inseparable from agency, emerging from sensorimotor interaction and exploration between an organism and its environment: perception, sense-making and action (and therefore phenomena such as choice and deliberation) are not separate from one another. Every mental or psychological aspect should be taken as belonging to a nest of biological processes that allows for the emergence of agency. For an example of the enactivist perspective see Alva Noë, *Action in Perception* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT, 2005) and for an overview see Manuel Heras-Escribano, *The Philosophy of Affordances* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), especially Chapter 5, 'Towards an Ecological Approach to Agency', pp. 115-145.

4 For a general, informative overview of some of the cultural stakes of this notion see Miranda Anderson, 'Textual Autopoiesis: Extending Minds and Selves', http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2016/05/06/the-materiality-of-research-textual-autopoiesis-extending-minds-and-selves-by-miranda-anderson/ [accessed 7 July 2020].

and Humberto Maturana in the 1970s, concerns the self-organization and self-regulation of a system through its own internal processes.[5] As such, it already raises the problem of what counts as being 'internal' or 'external', or in Montaigne's phraseology, what might be 'propre' and what might be 'tierce'. In its technical or strict sense, it is a theory of cellular organization, but has in the ensuing decades gained visibility and relevance in various areas of cultural enquiry.[6]

One way that the concept is relevant to a text such as Montaigne's *Essais* stems from his insistence that his book is radically processual, rather than representing a finished product or object. The book itself as a work can be understood as what Alva Noë calls a 'strange tool'.[7] Noë's idea is that 'Our lives are one big complex nesting of organized activities at different levels and scales': art, including writing, is a philosophical practice and is an engagement with the ways in which our practices, techniques, and technologies, organize us.[8] On his view art is tied to biology, insofar as organization, central to the account he offers, is at least in part a biological notion. The distinction between the natural and the cultural disintegrates from the standpoint of the biology of human organization. What is interesting about the idea of the practice of art as a tool is that it combines the processual with the artefactual, the dynamic with the notion of a static object situated relationally to the subject, in a way that resonates with Montaigne's thinking on 'consubstantial writing'. This carries implications which lie at the heart of Montaigne's cognitive and philosophical project.[9]

These implications derive some of their rich ambiguous force from the theological doctrine of consubstantiation – the radical idea attributed to Luther that the bread and wine substantially co-exist with the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist – to which Montaigne appears to be gesturing through his own

5 Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana, *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living* (Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel, 1980).
6 In his reflection two decades after publication of *Autopoiesis and Cognition* on the interdisciplinary significance of the concept, Varela remarks: 'If *autopoiesis* has been influential it is because it was able to align itself with a further project, one which focuses on the *interpretive capacity of the living being* and conceives of the human as an agent which doesn't discover the world, but rather constitutes it.' Preface to the Second Edition of *De Máquinas y Seres Vivos - Autopoiesis: La organización de lo vivo',* trans. by Alberto Paucar-Caceres and others, reprinted in *Systems Research and Behavioral Science*, 28 (2011), 601-617 (p.602).
7 Alva Noë, *Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015).
8 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
9 One might think here of Wittgenstein's characterization of philosophical problems: 'A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about."' *Philosophical investigations*, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillian, 1958), p. 123.

lexical choice in II, 18.[10] While it is entirely possible that Montaigne means something purely secular by his characterization of his *Essais* as 'consubstantial' with him, and intends us to pursue a figurative reading, his use of the term nonetheless sets in motion for the reader a chain of possible inference which carries significant implications for how we understand his text to function, memorially (both psychologically and rhetorically) and perhaps even ontologically. Moreover, might it not be part of what it means to be a twenty-first century reader of Montaigne to think about the distinctively period notion of consubstantiality in dialogue with insights and concepts shaping how we think about ourselves as biological, discursive beings today, and the relation between our being and our utterances, our minds and our works?

Christ's real presence in the sacrament of the Eucharist was affirmed in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) through the medieval Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (literally, the changing of one substance into another), which made use of the Aristotelian distinction between 'substance' and 'accident'.[11] The theory of transubstantiation affirms that the accidents of the bread and wine (their outward aspect or *species*: taste, smell, and so on) remain unchanged at the moment of consecration, while their substance changes from that of bread and wine to that of the body and blood of Jesus Christ. By the 1520s, the interpretation of the words of institution --'hoc est corpum meum'-- was being intensely debated. Luther considered Aristotelian metaphysics to have no place in Christian theology. In his reforming treatise of 1520, *De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae* (*The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*), Luther launched a major attack on the Catholic understanding of the sacraments, understood as visible signs of invisible grace which somehow acted as conduits of grace. He did not object to the underlying idea of real presence, and in fact maintained it, but rejected the Catholic manner of attempting to rationalize the mystery of real presence through a specific theory as to how Christ is present which made use of misplaced scholastic subtlety. Luther maintained the Saviour's presence 'in, with, and under the in-substance-unchanged bread and wine' ('in, mit, und unter dem der Substanz nach unveränderten Brode and Weine'), illustrating this through the analogy of an iron placed in a fire and heated: in that glowing iron,

10 *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, ed. by F.L Cross and E.A. Livingstone, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p. 408.

11 For a clear and concise overview of different denominational perspectives on the sacraments see Alister McGrath, *Reformation Thought: An Introduction,* 4th edition (Malden, MA; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 163-190, as well as Lee Palmer Wandel, *The Eucharist in the Reformation: Incarnation and Liturgy* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), pp. 1-14 and pp. 256-260. See also Neil Kenny, 'Reformers and Dissidents', in *The Cambridge History of French Thought*, ed. by Michael Moriarty and Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: CUP, 2019), pp. 41-46.

both the iron and heat are present, yet neither is substantially transformed.[12] Both Catholics and Lutherans hold a belief in the literal Real Presence of Christ in the elements of bread and wine. Zwingli instead espoused a commemorative understanding of the sacrament: the Eucharist is a memorial of the historical event leading to the establishment of the Christian church and a public demonstration of the believer's allegiance to that church and its members. Zwingli upheld a purely symbolic interpretation of the words 'this is my body'; the words signify the manner in which Jesus wished to be remembered. On Zwingli's view it is 'as if' Christ had said, 'I entrust to you a symbol of this my surrender and testament, to awaken in you the remembrance of me and of my goodness to you, so that when you see this bread and this cup, held forth in this memorial supper, you may remember me as delivered up for you, just as if you saw me before you as you see me now, eating with you.'[13] The Eucharist can be compared with a ring given by a groom to his bride as a pledge or token to commemorate him in his absence. It is only the communicant's faith that makes Christ 'present' in the Eucharist. Zwingli drew on the rhetorical concept of *alloiosis* ('exchange', 'qualitative alteration' - used in rhetorical theories for metaphorical expressions), in his Christology: it enabled him to argue that the communication of attributes between the divine and human natures of Christ (*communicatio idiomatum*) is in fact a rhetorical device expressing the unity of Christ's two natures in one person and does not signify an actual exchange of the properties between God's two natures (divine and humanly-incarnated) as such.[14] Zwingli asserted that the word 'is' (in 'This is my body') was simply a rhetorical figure of speech, which really means 'signifies' or 'represents' and is not to be taken literally.

The central debate between Luther and Zwingli concerned the relation between the sacramental sign and the spiritual gift which it signified. Calvin attempted to steer a middle course between their rival viewpoints by denying that any real change in the elements took place but maintaining that the faithful received the power or virtue of the Body and Blood of Christ (a doctrine which became known as virtualism). For Calvin, the sacraments are intimately linked to accommodation, or divine adjustment to our fallen understanding: sacraments are gracious accommodations to our weakness and, as an external symbol, a sacrament is preceded

12 The term 'Consubstantiation' was not in fact used by the Lutheran Church itself, and mainly used by Calvinists to indicate that Luther's doctrine differed from Catholic belief by mere prefix.
13 McGrath, *Reformation Thought*, p. 176.
14 Richard Cross, '*Alloiosis* in the Christology of Zwingli', *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 47 (1996), 105-122 (105).

by a promise, to which it is joined as a kind of appendix, in order to confirm and seal the promise itself, making it more clear to us and in a sense ratifying it.'[15] The idea of a sacrament standing in a quasi-prosthetic relation to a binding promise is intriguing: understood as a tangible support clarifying and making more apparent and, in a sense, real, the invisible promise or pledge which it betokens, it concerns the relation of the material world to transcendence, which was the core issue at stake in the interpretation of the Eucharist.[16]

The brief and schematic account of the key theological positions, given above, gives some flavour of the range of confessional perspectives on real presence in which a range of questions were a source of debate: the relation between sacramental sign and the signified, literal versus metaphorical interpretation, speaker's intention, the role and efficacy of language and material tokens in the ecology of faith, and the extension of animacy into objects. These questions were not confined to theologians but spilled over into society more broadly and circulated in some form in the minds of Montaigne and his contemporaries. Montaigne's own marked technical, as well as anthropological, interest in precisely these types of questions is evidenced in the *Journal de voyage.* Whether Christ is really present or his sacrifice 'merely' commemorated in the Eucharist matters theologically, and the fact that this matters extends to how we might understand this book which has made or created its author no less that it has been created by him. In Basel, the secretary's account of a multi-confessional dinner party, composed of a number of learned minds – some professing to be adherents of Zwingli, others of Luther '(Martinistes'), others still of Calvin – demonstrates Montaigne's keen attention not only to what is said, but what is implied, and what is unintentionally betrayed by his fellow diners:

> Nous y vismes force gens de sçavoir, comme Grineus, et celui qui a faict le *Theatrum*, et ledit medecin (Platerus) et François Hottoman. Ces deux derniers vindrent soupper avec messieurs, lendemein qu'ils furent arrivés. M. de Montaigne jugea qu'ils estoient mal d'accord de leur religion par les responses diverses qu'il en receut: les uns se disans Zvingliens, les autres Calvinistes, et les autres Martinistes; et si fut averty que plusieurs couvoit encore la religion romene dans leur coeur. La forme de donner le sacrement, c'est en la bouche communément; toutefois tend la main qui veut, et n'osent les ministres remuer ceste corde de ces différences de religions.[17] (15-16).

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15 John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, IV.xiv.1–3.
16 *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 3rd edition, ed. by E. A. Livingstone (Oxford: OUP, 2005).
17 All page references are to the François Rigolot edition of the *Journal de voyage* (Paris: PUF, 1992). The identity of 'Grinaeus' is not completely clear: in Rigolot's edition of the *Journal* the notes tell us he is Johann Jakob Grynaeus or Grineus (1540-1617), a Protestant divine and professor at the University, who was a well-known defender of Zwingli's theological doctrine. The notes in the Thibaudet and Rat edition suggest this a reference to Simon Grineus, author of an *Ecomion medicinae* or 'Éloge de la medécine' published the year of Montaigne's death in 1592. See Montaigne, *Oeuvres complètes*, eds. A. Thibaudet and M. Rat (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), p.1682. 'Celuy qui a fait le Theatrum' is a reference to Theodor Zwinger, Swiss humanist scholar, Professor of theoretical medicine at the University, and physician who authored the proto-encyclopaedic *Theatrum vitae humanae*, first published in 1565 by Oporinus, like Vesalius's *Fabrica,*

Part of this account may be intended to record the divergences among Reformers; the lack of internal unity between the Evangelical factions – a sample of which can be seen at this dinner party – posed a major threat to their success against the Catholics.[18] Attempts to mediate between these differences of position on the sacraments had already been made at the Colloquy of Marburg (1529) and the *Consensus Tigurinus* (1549). However, this passage also suggests Montaigne's openness and curiosity about the technical aspects of the sacrament -- here, specifically as to its being taken on the tongue or in the hand -- as well as respect for religious tolerance. The phrase 'Ceste corde de ces différences de religions' conveys a kind of unity within disunity (while Rigolot glosses 'corde' as *accord,* the image is of different strings bound together).[19] Whether Communion is taken on the tongue or in the hand depends on differing understandings of real presence: the more ancient practice of distributing Holy Communion was, probably, to give it in the palm of the hand, but this underwent a process of change in the eighth and ninth centuries, motivated by the wish to avoid the dropping of Eucharistic particles, and to increase in the faithful devotion to the Real Presence of Christ. The controversial practice of 'Communion in the hand,' rather than the more common Communion on the tongue, generated a great deal of controversy over which practice is the more ancient, which mode of reception embodies the most reverential or intimate form of Communion, and which way best articulates what it means to belong to the body of the Church.

A later entry from the *Journal*, in Isny, shows Montaigne picking the brains of a local theologian over dinner, as a means of getting a distilled overview of the situation there. His interest in the differing confessional positions on the location and physical presence of Christ's body, both in the Eucharist and sitting on the right side of God in the tri-unitarian Godhead, is more than a passing one:

> M. de Montaigne, comme estoit sa coustume, alla soudain trouver un docteur theologien de cette ville, pour prendre langue, lequel docteur disna avec eux. Il trouva que tout le peuple estoit Lutherien, et vit l'eglise Lutherienne qui a esté usurpée, comme les autres qu'ils tiennent, es villes imperiales, des eglises Catholiques. Entre autres propos qu'ils eurent ensemble sur le sacrement, M. de Montaigne s'avisa qu'aucuns Calvinistes l'avoient averty en chemin que les Lutheriens mesloient aus anciennes opinions de Martin plusieurs erreurs

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and whose *Methodus apodemica* (1577) I have already touched on. François Hotman, was a French protestant lawyer and polemical writer who fled Paris after the Saint-Barthélemy Massacre of 1572, settling in Basel. Montaigne had been in contact with him via letter since 1574.

18 For a study of the chaos caused by the diversity of positions see Auke Jelsma, *Frontiers of the Reformation: Dissidence and Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).

19 *Journal de voyage*, p. 345. Given that Montaigne often employs 'accord' in the *Essais*, it seems likely that the locution 'corde' was chosen to reinforce the material dimension of religious belief.

> estranges, comme l'Ubiquitisme, maintenant que le corps de Jesus Christ estre partout comme en l'hostie; par où ils tomboient en mesme inconvénient que Zvingle, quoy que ce fust par diverses voies: l'un par trop espargner la presence du corps, l'autre pour la trop prodiguer; car à ce compte, le sacrement n'avoit nul privilege sur le corps de l'Eglise, ou l'assembléee de trois hommes de bien; et que leurs principaux argumens estoient que la divinité estoit inseparable du corps, par quoy, la divinité estant partout, que le corps l'estoit aussi; secondement, que Jesus Christ devant estre tousjours à la dextre du Père, il estoit partout, d'autant que la dextre de Dieu, qui est sa puissance, est partout; ce docteur nioit fort de parole cette imputation et s'en defendoit comme d'une calomnie; mais par effet, il sembla à M. de Montaigne qu'il ne s'en couvroit guiere bien. (33-34)

Luther and Zwingli were unable to agree on the meaning of the phrase 'at the right hand of God,' which – in direct contrast with their interpretations of 'this is my body'– Luther interpreted metaphorically and Zwingli literally. Luther's (supposed) ubiquitism affirmed that Christ in his human nature is present everywhere, and in all times, posing a problem for the Catholic orthodoxy that he sits at the right hand of the Father in heaven according to his natural mode of existing.

These two examples from Basel and Isny show that Montaigne is acutely sensitive to the important matters at stake in the question of Eucharistic real presence and the related question of the locus of Christ. Montaigne's phrase 'livre consubstantiel à son autheur' invites the reader to translate these concerns across to the more apparently secular context of writing, to wonder about Montaigne's own spatiotemporal coordinates as we read him. In the *Essais* writing is articulated as an embodied, enactive process, a proprioceptive practice akin to a probing kind of walking or treading, where *stilus* (in the dual sense of pen-as-instrument or cognitive prosthesis and individual writing style or *maniera*) and the pointed 'util' of judgement ('la pointe de nostre esprit', I, 14, 58) converge at the same place and *alleure*: '[C]Mon stile et mon esprit vont vagabondant de mesmes', (IIII, 9, 994). Crucially, the 'place' where mind and pen meet is not static but involved in a constant, dynamic process of continuous change or becoming, which, in Aristotelian terms, is the essence of material things. In the context of this project specifically, the precise relation between 'consubstantiality' (a noun stemming from the Latin *consubstantialis* denoting the state of being of the one substance or essence, or, in Greek *homoousion,* the term used in the Nicene Creed to express the relations of the Father and Son within the Godhead) and 'consubstantiation' is relevant to how we understand Montaigne's book in relation to extended mind. One way of thinking about the relation between textual *autopoiesis*, alluded to above, and extended mind is that the former foregrounds the notion of process (and particularly internal processes) to a greater degree, while extended mind foregrounds the integrality of what is usually taken to be 'external' to the cognizing organism. The key difference is that con-substantiation, like trans-substantiation, is a noun of action: the terms designate

substantial co-existence and substantial change, respectively, the prefixes 'trans' and 'con' modifying the notion of 'substantiation' (s*ubstantiatio*) - the action of giving something substantial existence or form; incarnation or embodiment. The processual, reciprocal fashioning dimension of this ('Je n'ay pas plus faict mon livre que mon livre m'a faict') has a clear duration, differing from the idea of consubstantiality which marks the *aperçu* of a single enduring moment. These different temporalities are relevant to the interconnected notions of 'presence' and 'representation' (both mimetic and temporal), in relation both to their metaphysics and their epistemology.

To today's reader, notions of 'auteur' and 'écriture' are inevitably inflected by a range of critical stances. Barthes' 'death of the author' and Foucault's 'fonction auteur' supplanted the intentions of a biological individual (as it were, 'en chair et en os', to borrow from 'Des boyteux') with a disembodied, purely rhetorical *alter ego*, recasting the author as an elusive hermeneutic category.[20] Derrida's work analyzes the Western philosophical tradition's ingrained patterns of thought connecting writing, memory, presence and signs. His critique of the West's deep-rooted logocentric 'metaphysics of presence,' which understands writing as secondary, supplemental, fundamentally *external* to speech, a 'technique au service du langage, *porte-parole,* interprète d'une parole originaire elle-même soustraite à l'interprétation', sought, via its 'double gesture' of deconstruction to break down ingrained polarities and hierarchies between writing and speech, mind and body, signifier and signified (*signans* and *signatum*).[21] Let us recall that one of Zwingli's chief arguments against real presence was that the sign and the signified cannot be identical, and so the consecrated bread *cannot* be the body of Christ. Derrida's analysis of the act of writing as 'le plus grand sacrifice visant à la plus grande réappropriation symbolique de la presence' identifies writing as an attempt to remember and restore a lost presence, an effort to make the partial whole again. [22] In some respects, Derrida is an obvious interlocutor for Montaigne: the key point of deconstruction as a practice and of *différance* as a concept is the decentering of opposition and hierarchy to accommodate a more peaceful and tolerant co-existence of 'facing terms,' consciously to defer meaning construction. These aspects show clear affinities between the two. On another level, Derrida's own practice in critiquing the 'racines métaphysico-théologiques' of Western systems of

20 'Combien plus naturel que nostre entendement soit emporté de sa place par la volubilité de nostre esprit detraqué, que cela, qu'un de nous soit envolé sur un balay, au long du tuiau de sa cheminée, en chair et en os, par un esprit estrangier?' (III, 11, 1032)
21 Jacques Derrida, *De la grammatologie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), p. 18.
22 Ibid., p. 205.

thought and in deconstructing the 'metaphysics of presence' might suggest incompatibility with the organizing interests and methods of this project. Firstly, as concerns the project's subject matter. And secondly as concerns the aim, not to 'deconstruct' the binaries at work in the history of thinking about human cognition but rather to recognize just how porous, fluid and dynamic the boundaries between such categories are, and have long been.

In response, I might say that in what follows I acknowledge (above all implicitly) the historical moment in cultural criticism in which the notions of presence and the author received 'bad press,' and draw on those insights in returning to these same notions. Moving beyond deconstruction, this study attempts to think about what – in the minds of early moderns, and in the minds of twenty-first century readers – real presence has to do with writing, and specifically with Montaigne's *Essais,* in some form of dialogue with today's theories of cognition.

Consubstantiality has taken up surprisingly little focused space in Montaigne studies, and is routinely conflated with, or taken to be another side of, self-portraiture despite the clear conceptual distinctness between the two ideas. The main exception to this is, as I have noted, Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle's article, which does important work in setting out the philological and conceptual stakes, arguing against the reduction of consubstantiality to a theory of imitation. The problem with reducing identity to the 'copy' or the 'portrait' is, I suggest, that the two notions (identity and copy) rub against one another in a frictional tension which is, in part, Montaigne's subject matter. This emerges with particular significance in relation to the materiality and metaphysics of memory, as we will explore. For Boyle, Montaigne's usage of the term *consubstantiel* -- a term he 'very probably' read in authors as diverse as Tertullian and Scève - 'projected his design beyond the literary theory of imitation into a theological paradigm of divinity.'[23] Tertullian introduced the concept (*consubstantialis*) in Latin, proposing an analogy for the relation of Father to Son: the Son as divine speech proceeded from God like a ray projected from the sun. The ancient natural analogy of the sun and its ray therefore afforded a means of thinking about the relation of speech and speaker. As Boyle observes: 'The Eucharistic controversies likely figured in Montaigne's musings on how a man could be present in another substance: Christ in the bread, Montaigne in the book. But his salient model for consubstantiality was that of the creedal father-to-son.' She concludes:

23 Boyle, p. 723.

'Montaigne's sense of *consubstantiel* was the traditional relationship of generator-generated. Like mind to speech as father to son, Montaigne dared to be consubstantial with his book in an identity transcendent of the theory of literary imitation.' [24]

Terence Cave and Lawrence Kritzman both offer readings of consubstantiality which overlap with some of the concerns of this study, both identifying consubstantiality as a deliberate source of interpretive uncertainty. As Cave notes: 'A figure of consubstantiality allows the text to indulge its own concretions and to controvert any attempt to derive from it an abstract conceptualized structure. Presenting itself as a body, the text claims the living body's sovereign right to resist being dissected or turned inside out in the search for its principle of life'.[25] As Kritzman notes: 'The symbiosis between author and text advocated by those who subscribe to the idea of consubstantiality in its most literal sense fails to consider the fate of a self inscribed in the archive that the *Essays* have become. For Montaigne the act of reading becomes an act of translation projected beyond the horizon of an indissoluble origin. The question therefore arises whether discursive meaning has a proper term and whether one can recuperate meaning as originally intended'. [26] Both these readings suggest that consubstantiality is really a form of excess and non-containment: as a means of securing survival the book is problematic because it does not exist as pure supplement but takes on a life of its own.

One reason scholars do not often focus specifically on consubstantiality might be that it is perceived as a dead metaphor: so well known to have lost its semantic edge, we assume we know what Montaigne means by it, so it does not need further elucidation. If the dead metaphor explanation were true, it would be paradoxical — given that consubstantiality is, in a sense, what keeps Montaigne's *Essais* perennially vital and relevant, their author so 'life-likely' situated both in our present moment, and in his own. 'The *Essais* are the best ghost that Montaigne could have wished for: they remain in this world, always ready to speak for him', writes Terence Cave in *How to read Montaigne,* reflecting on exactly this dimension of the text, which is at once its most salient, and yet in some ways its strangest — both uncanny and companionable.[27] This sense of Montaigne having one foot in our

[24] Ibid., p. 745.
[25] Terence Cave, *The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance* (Oxford: OUP, 1985), p.150.
[26] Lawrence D. Kritzman, *The Fabulous Imagination: On Montaigne's Essays* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2009), p.6.
[27] Terence Cave, *How to Read Montaigne* (London: Granta, 2007), p. 107.

world, and one in the next — whilst all the time deeply embedded in his own time — is rhetorically engineered in the opening moves of his *Essais*, the 'Au lecteur', where Montaigne speaks to us with an apparently embodied immediacy from a vertiginous and ambiguously deictic *au-delà: '*A Dieu donq, de Montaigne, ce premier de Mars mille cinq cens quatre vingts'. This combination of vivid, tangible embodiment and spectrality attends Montaigne's whole project. In 'Des boyteux' he writes, 'plus je me hante et me connois, plus ma difformité m'estonne' (III,11, 1029); the verb 'hanter' — meaning 'haunt' (in the sense of to 'practice habitually' or frequent, especially a place, etymologically linked to the notion of 'home'), but also suggests 'handle' (in middle French 'hante' is a handle or stick) — seems to negotiate his own posthumous presence in his consubstantial book, which plays with different notions of embodiment, materiality and instrumentality. This 'presence', real or otherwise, is rooted in early modern conceptions of memory and the ancient tradition linking memory with writing, where writing is construed as externalized memory, a disembodied 'voice' speaking through its material supports, whether impressions on wax or inky traces or characters on paper. While modernity has taken for granted the notion of matter as fundamentally inert, to the premodern mind matter carries inherently transformative potential, whether in the realm of natural philosophy or that of the miraculous. Late medieval and early modern piety was characterized by an 'intense awareness of the power of the material'; while materiality was both a decaying force it simultaneously represented a saving grace, as it was God's incarnation into a human body composed of flesh and blood which held out the promise of Christian salvation.[28] As I will explore, Montaigne's intimations of resurrection and survival are shaped by a number of factors, including the Renaissance understanding, popularized by Alberti, of portraiture as a quasi-miraculous art of memory, capable of bringing subjects (back) to life, investing the material artefact with a special kind of animation and agency, between subject and object. These intimations are also informed by the Eucharist, whose meaning as a memory-event was being fiercely debated, as well as the new modalities of survival afforded by print. Montaigne's discursive handling of consubstantiality draws on these various influences, placing his book at the centre of a meditation on the presence and extension of mind or spirit into material artefacts.

[28] Caroline Walker Bynum, *Christian Materiality: An Essay on Religion in Late Medieval Europe* (Camb., Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), p. 18.

Recent work on early modern authors' theoretical and practical reflections on metaphor links cognitive and conceptual accounts of metaphor to the uses of early modern metaphor conceived as a form of 'vivacité d'esprit'. These studies offer new insights into early modern authors' understanding of the sensorimotor dimension of figures of speech, the scope for movement between abstract and embodied meanings, and their reinterpretation of ancient conceptions of metaphor.[29] A loose combination of ideas around live and dead metaphor — from Emerson's notion of language being 'fossilized poetry' to Ricoeur's reflections in *La métaphore vive* (1975) in implicit dialogue with Derrida in *La mythologie blanche* (1972)— underlies the original impetus to engage with the old consubstantiality commonplace afresh.[30]

When Montaigne was writing his *Essais*, understandings of the complex relations between representation, memory, mimesis, temporality, materiality, legacy, presence and poetics, as well as the politically fraught climate of the religious wars and the eucharistic controversies of the time, all participate in forming his particular sense of what it might be for an author to be consubstantial with his book. Consubstantiality is a term of theology, and yet Montaigne uses it to express the essence of a book whose matter is himself, a 'registre de durée' which serves as paper memory: a running record of the movements, errancies and wanderings of his mind which he claims is in some sense an archetypal mind. It is therefore also a cognitive concept, which invites reflection on how a material artefact might not only be the archive of a mind in action but might also participate in or even constitute that mind, beyond its author's natural or biological lifespan. In the course of the writing, and the palimpsestic *dureé* of composition and emendation, Montaigne's way of referring to his writing project undergoes a change: the book seems to take on its own quasi-independent life. The idea that the work is an instrument for his self-deciphering or 'espluchement', or a means to an end, is substituted in later emendations for an emphasis on his book's substantial nature in its own right, its capacity both to contain and to exceed its author, its potential both for co-existence and independent existence. I suggest that Montaigne's

[29] For example, Kathryn Banks, 'Metaphor, Lexicography, and Rabelais's Prologue to *Gargantua*', in *Movement in Renaissance Literature: Exploring Kinesic Intelligence*, ed. by Kathryn Banks and Timothy Chesters (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 81-107, and Timothy Chesters, 'La Métaphore et les catégories ad hoc', in *Le Retour du comparant: La métaphore à l'épreuve du temps littéraire,* ed. by Xavier Bonnier and Ariane Bayle (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2019), pp. 33-44.

[30] Paul Ricœur, *La Métaphore vive* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), especially Chapter Three, 'Métaphorique et méta-physique', pp. 356 - 374; Derrida, 'La mythologie blanche: la métaphore dans le texte philosophique', in *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Minuit, 1972), pp. 247-324. Relatedly see Cornelia Müller, *Metaphors Dead and Alive, Sleeping and Waking: A Dynamic View* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

placing of the cognitive under the sign of the metaphysical modifies the reader's own cognitive environment, inviting us to ponder whether we are meant to think that Montaigne is really present in the *Essais*?

This thesis investigates the possibilities and limits of a cognitive reading of consubstantiality in Montaigne's writing that leaves some space for the eucharistic implicatures it carries. More specifically, it examines the potential of theories of embodied and extended mind in order to reconceptualize consubstantiality using these frameworks — which started out as research projects in fields *other* than literary study — as a method for getting a different kind of handle on Montaigne's statement about the co-constitutive nature of author and book. In contemporary discourse, 4E cognition refers to the interdisciplinary research programme that works with the idea that the 'seat' of cognition is not the brain, conceptualizing cognition rather as embodied (as thinking is rooted in our bodies and their movement), embedded (as the mind/body connects to social environments and interactions with others), extended (as cognitive processes involve both the mind/body and material artefacts in environment), and enactive (as perception depends on the body).[31] These approaches explore the distinction between the quite ordinary idea that we are involved in causal interactions with things outside the head, and the much stronger thesis that those things are partially constitutive of mind. Bridging that conceptual gap — a gap of which early moderns were also aware — remains a major challenge. Practitioners of what the philosopher John Sutton calls 'historical cognitive science' have shed light on the ways that early modern literature thematizes, investigates and leverages the situated nature of cognition.[32]

Early modern debates over arts versus sciences — and how medicine, anatomy and other technical modes of enquiry and production such as engineering were to be categorized in disciplinary terms — provide an interesting historical counterpoint to contemporary disciplinary tensions, which projects such as the embodied and extended mind hypotheses try to negotiate. It is perhaps the role of memory, and specifically the art of memory, in the development of scientific method that most tellingly illustrates the deep interactions in the period between the 'artificial' tools and devices contrived by the human mind and the object of scientific, or

[31] See *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition,* ed. by Albert Newen, Leon De Bruin, and Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: OUP, 2018) and *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition,* ed. by Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede,(Cambridge: CUP, 2009).

[32] John Sutton, 'Body Mind and Order: Local Memory and the Control of Mental Representations in Medieval and Renaissance Sciences of Self', in *1543 and All That: Image and Word, Change and Continuity in the Proto-Scientific Revolution*, ed. by Guy Freeland and Anthony Corones (Dordrecht; London: Kluwer Academic, 2010), pp. 53-116 (pp.54-57).

natural philosophical, enquiry: Nature itself. Renaissance projects for totalizing human knowledge, which reached their full expression in the schemes for an artificial language devised by English philosophers in the 1650s and 1650s, can only be understood within the context of a tradition which fused the medieval notion of the *ars artium*, which reached its apogee in the *Ars magna* of Raymond Lull, mnemotechnics, emblematics, cryptology, the cabala and other symbolic modes of communication.[33] As the scholarship has shown, these traditions were a living presence in early modern Europe and participated vitally in the rise of logic and early modern method developed by Ramus, Bacon and Descartes.

Reciprocal influence in the period between Biblical hermeneutics and literary interpretation can, and should, inform our own reading of what Montaigne intends by consubstantiality, a term with a problematic valence in the period. [34] I suggest that a purely secular sense of consubstantiality fails to address the efficacy of its sacramental implicatures within Montaigne's meditation on the relation of matter to mind, between substance and accident. By bringing Montaigne's early modern consubstantiality into dialogue with contemporary secular currents of thought I explore the affinities between an understanding of artistic and literary creation as 'sacramental' in nature, and extended mind at two quite different moments in history. In so doing I also shed light on how the eucharistic and polemical implicatures of consubstantiality are deployed as an oblique but effective means of handling ethical and political questions of agency, contingency and necessity.

Montaigne's post-1588 addition to 'Du dementir', expressing as it does the author's late perspective on the book that is in constant development since the early 1570s, sets up a merelogical tension between parts or 'membres' and wholes, the notions of belonging or estrangement, community and singularity. In medieval Western Christianity, the body and the relation between part, whole and identity are crucial to understandings of redemption: paradise is conceived as the restoration of wholeness from a state of fragmentation and dismemberment, the overcoming of partition and decomposition, the passage from temporality into eternity,

[33] See Rhodri Lewis, *Language, Mind and Nature: Artificial Languages in England from Bacon to Locke* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007).

[34] In his analysis of the Erasmian approach to biblical interpretation, Cave notes: 'In other words, the scriptural text is made consubstantial with the reader and is then re-uttered in a speech-act grounded in the living presence of the speaker, a process which achieves its end in that vivid penetration of the listener's mind which is in itself a mark of authenticity.' *The Cornucopian Text,* pp. 85-86. This understanding of 'an Erasmian theory of a self-allegorizing Scripture' suggests interesting overlaps with the notion of a cognitive ecology in which author or speaker and reader or listener participate, particularly in relation to consubstantiality and the problem of scriptural reading. For a historical, theological reading of this type of poetics, see Gérard Defaux, *Marot, Rabelais, Montaigne: l'écriture comme présence* (Paris: Slatkine, 1987).

from corruptibility to incorruptibility. In a variety of ways, the Eucharist, and the debates it generates, provided a model and an idiom for articulating experiences, needs and human problems which are ineffable through other means. Relegating, in the final words of the quotation cited above, all other books to third party status, the *Essais* — limb of Montaigne's life — assume a living gravitas, enriched by Biblical and Pascalian reverberations.[35] Yet throughout the *Essais*, and in true Humanist fashion, other authors and texts, including Montaigne's own other (albeit then intentionally unpublished) 'book' or *conte*, the *Journal*, and the 'reliques' of La Boétie are, to varying degrees, recalled, incorporated, forgotten, and reworked. Besides, limbs and other 'membres' are by no means unproblematic or controllable anatomical parts in the *Essais* and their wider medical and military context. What hangs on how we interpret 'ma vie'? Is 'ma vie' Montaigne's biological, embodied lifespan, or does it potentially encompass a life artificially extended, temporally and spatially, though a material artefact with its own sociocultural properties, a book, and all the consequences or 'suites' it carries?[36] The answer seems to be: both.

Most first readers of the immediately successful *Essais* thought of them as belonging to the Renaissance genre of the vernacular miscellany - a perspective reflected in Florio's English title for his 1603 translation for the first book, *The Essayes: or Morall, Politike and Militarie Discourses*. Reading the *Essais* as being, primarily, an elastic navigation and charting of cognition is by no means incompatible with the idea of them as moral, political and military 'discourses': as I argue through my close readings, much of the discursive content of Montaigne's writing — whether it be the ethics of memory and military arms and armour, or the politics of skepticism and tolerance — behaves as an affordance for his thinking on cognition.

The question of print, as distinct from manuscript writing, raised in 'Du repentir' (' En mon climat de Gascogne, on tient pour drolerie de me veoir imprimé', III, 2, 809) might seem to problematize Montaigne's

[35] I am thinking here of the lines: 'Qu'on s'imagine un corps plein de membres pensants', and 'Tout est un. L'un est en l'autre comme les trois personnes' ('Morale chrétienne', fragments 371 and 372), Pascal, *Pensées, opuscules et lettres,* ed. by Philippe Sellier (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2010), pp. 404- 406. On the Biblical sources of Pascal's meditation on the merelogical and theological relations of member and body, see Pierre Magnard, 'Un corps de membres pensants, ', *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, 190 (2000), 193-200. These metaphysical considerations, concerning the Tri-unity of God (whereby God is three persons yet one substance) and the interdependency of part and whole have a deep connection with processes of consubstantial composition. On ancient understandings of the metaphysics of composition see, for example, Verity Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure* (Oxford: OUP, 2005).
[36] On literary artificial life see Peter Boxall, *The Prosthetic Imagination: A History of the Novel as Artificial Life* (Cambridge: CUP, 2020).

identity with his book, even as print promised new modalities of survival and forms of linguistic life: the multiple copies of the book produced in any print run generate multiple Montaignes, one for every reader or, alternatively, a single Montaigne distributed across the collective body of copies. Unless Montaigne means that consubstantiality inheres in the blueprint or design of his text, or in his own hand-emended version — the 'exemplaire de Bordeaux' — perhaps the closest thing we have to a final draft of an unfinalizable text.[37] These half questions risk the charge of over-literalization, but the 'problem' of consubstantiality turns precisely on this ambiguous and fertile interplay between literal and metaphorical, material and immaterial, secular and spiritual, corporeal and cognitive. Within the linguistic and technological context of the period, notions of 'natural life' — including the life of language itself — and the possibilities of extending that life are modified by the re-imagining, by printers and writers, of the mother tongue as mechanically reproducible. The *topos* of resuscitation and resurrection through print takes hold in French Humanist discourse and is a central motif in the French vernacular movement from Geoffroy Tory to Du Bellay.[38]

The metaphysical notion of 'consubstantiality' — denoting being of one substance, essence or nature — also has its distinctive and ambivalently charged place in the cultural vocabulary of the early modern period. Polysemous and polemical, it is together with its cognates an early modern 'keyword' in Raymond Williams' sense.[39] While 'consubstantiality' does not feature in *Renaissance Keywords* alongside words including 'grace', 'sense' and 'discretion', it has a firm claim on inclusion within this family or network of terms and concepts which, enriched by understanding of context, feed into the early modern cultural idiom and can act as interpretative portals for modern readers.[40] The concept has a long history: from its Gnostic origins (as *homoousion* —'of one substance', the test-word of theological orthodoxy in the fourth-century Trinitarian controversies), to its introduction into Latin by Tertullian, integration into the Nicene creed and Catholic orthodoxy, and its later Protestant vicissitudes —was often marked by controversy, which became particularly fierce in the Eucharistic debates of the Reformation over real presence versus memorialism, the view,

[37] For questions around the (un)finishedness of the *Essais*, see John O'Brien, 'Are we reading what Montaigne wrote?', *French Studies*, 58 (2004), 527-532. O'Brien notes the existence (according to Jean Balsamo, and others) of another hand-emended lost copy used by the printer for the 1595 posthumous edition.
[38] Katie Chenoweth, *The Prosthetic Tongue: Printing Technology and the Rise of the French Language* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), p. 13.
[39] Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Fontana 1976).
[40] *Renaissance Keywords,* ed. by Ita Mac Carthy (London: Legenda, 2013). See also the recent volume by the TIDE network: *Keywords of Identity, Race and Human Mobility in Early Modern England,* ed. by Nandini Das and others (Amsterdam: AUP, 2021).

associated with Zwingli, that the rite 'called to mind' Christ's last supper among the faithful rather than re-enacting it or re-living it. Debates turned on the meaning of the words of institution, and how the realm of matter is implicated in the Incarnation; reformers characterizing the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation as idolatrous and potentially cannibalistic; Catholics dismissing Calvinist and Lutheran interpretations of the Eucharist as heretical and reductive.[41] The term's theological sense also crossed over into the discursive arena, becoming a means of thinking about poetics and Humanist authors' relationship with the Ancients. As Michel Jeanneret notes, within Renaissance theories of *imitatio*, interiorization of the other involves a reciprocal nourishment, a communion between master and disciple, and a suspension of identity 'which may owe something to the ideal of the Eucharist which was haunting everyone's conscience at the time'.[42] The ideal of suspension courses through the *Essais*: whether reflecting a skeptical epistemological stance or an ontology and ethics of coexistence. That Montaigne's thinking on the relationship between *matiere* (both physical and discursive kinds of 'stuff'), mind and memory is marked by these debates can be inferred from his allusion, in the 'Apologie', to the 'superstitious' belief that the best way for progeny to honour and 'remember' their father, is to consume him, effecting a transmutation into their own 'chair vive', which is also a reference to *immutritio*:

> Il n'est rien si horrible à imaginer que de manger son pere. Les peuples qui avoyent anciennement cette coustume, la prenoyent toutesfois pour tesmoignage de pieté et de bonne affection, cerchant par là à donner à leurs progeniteurs la plus digne et honorable sepulture, logeant en eux mesmes et comme en leurs moelles les corps de leurs peres et leurs reliques, les vivifiant aucunement et regenerant par la transmutation en leur chair vive au moyen de la digestion et du nourrissement. (II, 12, 581)

As I explore in this study, Montaigne meditates on the cognitive import of material traces and relics of different kinds, and on how 'la chair vive' relates to other forms of materiality, such as that of paper. Identity — a concept to which memory is pivotal — is central both to eucharistic metaphysics and to Humanist poetics, where identity of author and model intertwine and commingle. As James Kearney has argued, the Reformation brought about a 'a crisis of representation' in which artistic representation as a way of externalizing memory

[41] See Lee Palmer Wandel, *The Eucharist in the Reformation: Incarnation and Liturgy* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: CUP, 1991); Frank Lestringant, *Une sainte horreur, ou le voyage en Eucharistie XVIe au XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: PUF, 1996); Thomas J. David, *This is My Body: The Presence of Christ in Reformation Thought* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008) and *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology*, ed. by Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: OUP, 2011). On the materiality of the Eucharist, see David Grummett, *Material Eucharist* (Oxford: OUP, 2016), especially, 'Flesh, Substance and Change', pp. 144-192.

[42] Michel Jeanneret, 'The Renaissance and Its Ancients: Dismembering and Devouring', *MLN*, 110 (1995), 1043-1053 (p. 1050).

came under attack on grounds of eradicating idolatry and superstition.[43] A combination of faith in text and distrust of material forms — icons and images — brought about a 'crisis of the book' that shaped how future generations conceived of the relation between text and image, mind and objects.

The primary focus of this thesis is not Christian doctrine, sacramental controversy, or Montaigne's own religious attitudes, although there is interesting contemporary work being done on the implications of extended and embodied cognition for understanding the metaphysics of the Eucharist and the Incarnation.[44] Rather it seeks to set up a dialogue between the notion of consubstantiality and contemporary understandings of mind that leaves space for sacramental poetics in our interpretation of consubstantiality, particularly in its interactions with extended mind. By 'sacramental poetics', a phrase borrowed from Regina M. Schwartz, I mean a mode of composition where the notion of writing might implicate or invoke, however strongly or weakly, a range of eucharistic potentialities and ambiguities: the mystery and physicality of the resurrection, ideas of incarnation, redemption and communion.[45] These eucharistic implicatures can be secular as well as sacred and intersect with aspects of contemporary thinking on cognition in what might be unexpected ways. In French, embodied cognition is 'la cognition incarnée' — something not without theologically-significant undertones. While contemporary cognitive-scientific approaches tend (unsurprisingly) to be secular, their preoccupations with flesh, processes of incarnation, and presence — reflected in their titles (for example: *The Mind Incarnate*, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, *Varieties of Presence*) [46]— implicitly invoke what Derrida refers to as the 'racines métaphysico-théologiques' of the Western tradition, which clearly endure immanently in our own secular, empirical age.[47] This of itself reframes the fairly prevalent notion that 4E approaches offer a new 'challenge' to

[43] James Kearney, *The Incarnate Text: Imagining the Book in Reformation England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). On Lucretian materialism in Renaissance representation see Jonathan Goldberg, *The Seeds of Things: Theorizing Sexuality and Materiality in Renaissance Representations* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009).

[44] See *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation,* ed. by Anna Marmadoro and Jonathan Hill (Oxford: OUP, 2011), in particular Marmadoro's 'The Metaphysics of Extended Mind in Ontological Entanglements', pp. 205-228. Studies of Montaigne's religious attitude include Maturin Dréano, *La Religion de Montaigne* (Paris: A.G. Nizet, 1969) and Philippe Desan, *Dieu à nostre commerce et société: Montaigne et la théologie* (Geneva: Droz, 2008). A range of other works include parts on Montaigne's religious outlook in the context of the civil wars: for example Géralde Nakam, *Montaigne et son temps : les événements et les* "Essais": *l'histoire, la vie, le livre* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).

[45] See Regina M. Schwartz, *Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), and also David Jones, 'Art and Sacrament', in *Epoch and Artist* (London: Faber, 1959), pp. 143-179.

[46] Lawrence L. Shapiro, *The Mind Incarnate* (Camb., Mass.; London: MIT Press), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), and Alva Noë, *Varieties of Presence* (Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[47] Derrida, *De la grammatologie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), pp. 24-25. On questions of post-secular theology, religious pluralism, and the deconstruction of religion, which in certain respects chime in fruitfully with Montaigne's

Western thought, rather than being a continuation, or contemporary iteration, of notions circulating in premodern cultures.

Stepping away from these questions, taking consubstantiality seriously as a model, pattern, or way of thinking about the relation between Montaigne and his *Essais* involves recognizing the term's confessional and political charge in its sixteenth century context, a charge of which Montaigne could not have been unaware, suggesting intention, even if of an underdetermined variety. As we have seen, particular *loci* in the text of the *Journal* make plain how tuned in Montaigne is to such interpretative and positional differences on matters of religion. This is not properly separable from my central topic — Montaigne and cognition understood as an embodied and extended process — because, as I show, its problematic charge is Montaigne's means of navigating a number of difficult, porous 'boundaries' and frontiers, real or supposed: self and other (texts), nature and artifice, mind, body and environment. The playful or witty aspect of Montaigne's usage of the term, at the intersection of poetics, rhetoric and metaphysics, does not have to undermine the seriousness, or solidity, of his intended meaning, any more than his statement in 'De l'experience' — 'Je m'estudie plus qu'autre subject. C'est ma metaphisique, c'est ma phisique' (III, 13, 1072) — is reducible to an ironic quip at Aristotle, even if it is also that. In fact, the slipperiness of Montaigne's intended meaning, the equivocation around its polemical or problematic intent and import, and the possibility that he meant less by it than its metaphysical potential suggests, is part of the content of what I will call Montaigne's overarching consubstantiality extended 'metaphor', or 'allegory', the inverted commas signalling the difficulty of thinking of his meaning as exclusively or exhaustively figurative, and marking my use of the term as provisional, part-suspended, rather than conclusive. In a sense this thesis might have been subtitled, 'Towards a cognitive 'metaphisique' of the *Essais*'.

From the outset, Montaigne sets this chain of possibility in motion for the reader. It seems significant that this entry in a dictionary dedicated to a Montaignean idiolect gives such short shrift to other ramifications of the term, given the Reformation context.[48] In some sense such readings are presented as 'literal' readings, which knowingly edit out the doctrinal and metaphysical connotations of consubstantiality on the basis that Montaigne

thinking in his early modern context, see the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, e.g. *La Déclosion: déconstruction du Christianisme* (Paris: Galilée, 2005). The enduring presence of the sacred within poetics on the threshold of secularism is studied in Schwartz, *Sacramental Poetics* (above). In a more contemporary context see also *The Sacred in the Secular*, ed. by Daisy Gudmunsen and Claudia Dellacasa, *MHRA Working Papers in the Humanities,* 13 (2018).

[48] In Greimas's *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français* the brief entry for 'consubstantiel' gives two meanings: '1) Qui est de la même substance ('les biens et les meaulx qui sont consubstantiels à nostre vie', Mont.) and 2) 'Intégré à.' (p.139).

himself has little time for metaphysics or religious polemic and therefore his meaning is more straightforwardly secular. Yet choice between literal and metaphorical readings of this term specifically is not really available. Some readers edge closer to taking Montaigne at his word — despite his word's very under-determination; for example, Hoffman suggests that one might *almost* think that Montaigne means more than metaphorical presence, that Montaigne's well-known desire to portray himself 'au vif' may say 'something more interesting than what one usually takes the phrase to mean' but then squarely opts to interpret Montaigne's meaning as a 'secularization of the second coming'.[49] This almost-ness itself gestures towards, and nearly touches, the ambiguity that Montaigne implants. If, as Timothy Chesters has written, 'A properly attuned historicist criticism can show how disturbances in the early modern religious sphere might ripple into the literary one', then consubstantiality as a means of understanding writing seems to express precisely this kind of rippling or reverberation.[50]

In contrast, it is one of the central claims of this thesis that this perfect or ideal entanglement ('chevauchement parfait') of body and book is underdetermined and equivocal, oscillating playfully and experimentally between physics and metaphysics. The germ for the thesis lay in an interest in Montaigne's authorial presence — in what it is about his writing that makes the reader *feel*, more potently than in almost any other writer, that we are in his company, in (some sense of) real time, even though we know otherwise.[51] This magic, if not to say beguilement, is worked through his deployment of rhetorical, linguistic and otherwise broadly psychological resources (how could it be otherwise?). But these effects on the reader are tied to his understanding of his own presence in his book: they supervene on Montaigne's particular understanding of the co-constitutive relation between writing, memory and mind, and the material nature of the book itself. Important insights into this are revealed by Montaigne's conception of La Boétie's posthumous literary presence: in his 1570 dedication to Henri de Mesmes, he expresses the view that it would be a great failing, both to his friend ('le plus grand homme, à mon advis, de nostre siecle'), and to posterity, if he let 'esvanouïr et perdre un si riche nom que le

[49] See George Hoffmann, 'Portrayal from Life, or to Life? The *Essais*'s Living Effigy', *French Forum*, 25 (2000), 145-163 (p. 146). Hoffmann notes: 'Were it not for his skepticism, one might have argued that Montaigne's claim of real rather than metaphorical presence for his portrait aligns his views with the Catholic position in the eucharistic debates that characterized the confessional struggles of the late sixteenth century. But such would exaggerate the doctrinal importance of an attitude at heart radically secular, wrongly taking as purposefully orthodox a highly personal hope of salvation that may more likely be the expression of estrangement from institutional responses to the problem of death.' (p.157)
[50] Timothy Chesters, 'Cognition, Relevance and Early Modern Ghosts', in *Cognitive Confusions,* pp. 53-69 (p. 53).
[51] This has of course interested generations of Montaigne readers: see, for example, Gérard Defaux, *Marot, Rabelais, Montaigne: l'écriture comme présence* (Paris: Slatkine, 1987).

sien, et une memoire si digne de recommendation' by failing to publish La Boétie's works, and if ' je ne m'essayois, par ces parties là, de le ressusciter et remettre en vie'.[52] The sepulchral function of La Boétie's edition is emphasized in Montaigne's dedication of the book to various political figures in order to 'le refreschir en vostre memoire' and to 'recommander sa memoire'. As (Hoffmann again) puts it, 'the book reincarnates La Boétie in what Montaigne refers to as 'ce sien second livre'.'[53] While the assumption is generally that this 'resurrection' is meant allegorically — a dematerialized survival in other people's minds, through the power of memory, rather than material survival and continuity through the presence of authored artefact — can we also think he means something more (to us) strangely literal — a form of real presence, linked to ideas about the resurrection of Christ as a paradigm for our own?[54]

A core claim of the present study is that consubstantiality is above all explorable as a distinctively cognitive concept in Montaigne, and a further strand of argumentation turns on the idea that Montaigne is thinking through, or around, writing and remembering in a technical way, in technical terms. Considered within a network of reflections about the interactions — between mind and memory, body and book, material and sociocultural environment — across these texts, it signals an understanding of cognition as embodied and extended process, quite removed from understandings of cognition as a form of brain-bound inner theatre or internal representation. Given that this neurocentric conception of cognition, commonly referred to as a traditional or first generation 'cognitivist' model, is only a relatively recent, post-Cartesian (and in its more recent configuration, essentially digital) feature of intellectual history, it is hardly a matter of surprise that Montaigne does not subscribe to it, any more than his contemporaries do. Thus the aim of the present study is not to marvel at Montaigne's modernity in 'anticipating' contemporary cognitive science but to bring early modern understandings of mind and memory — in the specificities of their own cultural moment — into

[52] Dedication to Henri de Mesmes, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), p. 1362.
[53] Hoffmann, 'Portrayal from Life', p.149.
[54] As Caroline Walker Bynum points out, what modern readers find most 'disturbing' about medieval theological and eschatological debates over the doctrine of bodily resurrection at the end of time is their 'extreme literalism and materialism', seen most acutely in scholastic discussions about cannibalism. See *Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion* (New York: Zone Books, 1991) p. 241. Bynum notes that — embarrassed and baffled by this literalism and materialism — modern commentators have, like Renaissance polemicists, used these debates to illustrate and condemn scholastic obscurantism. Yet, for all their troubling materialism, the stakes of these debates on bodily resurrection involve fundamental issues of identity and survival which themselves survive in modern philosophical discussions on personal identity, notably concerning the question of teleportation. For more on the theological historical context on notions of resurrection and embodied survival see Bynum's later study, *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christendom, 200-1336* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

meaningful dialogue with contemporary notions, which enable an enriched reading of consubstantiality in Montaigne.

Preserving the theological and metaphysical dimension of consubstantiality does not translate into a) a facile or overstretched Trinitarian or Eucharistic identification between the 'papier' Montaigne uses for his writing and Eucharistic bread, between his 'ancre' and Communion wine, or the blood shed in the civil wars in the name of religion — or b) the fact that the *Essais* are constituted by three books. But an idea integral to my reading of the *Essais* in this project is that some level of negotiation is going on in Montaigne's writing that involves slippage between religious and secular — as well as literal and figurative, or perhaps even transfigurative — registers. In light of this, exploring the interaction of materialities of writing and technologies of cognition (including, of course, writing) is an important aspect of consubstantiality's meaning in the ecology of Montaigne's texts. The central question of this study — how might we rethink consubstantiality in dialogue with the paradigm of extended cognition — branches along three main paths (each corresponding, broadly, to a chapter) organized around particular moments and movements in Montaigne's *Essais* and *Journal.*

Chapter One examines how Montaigne's writing project and practice relate to memory conceived as natural and extended into technology and art. The thematics of memory has been a source of critical interest for many Montaigne scholars but — with one recent exception— none have focused specifically or in detail on embodied and extended approaches.[55] Montaigne recurrently claims that his natural memory is so poor he must supplement or substitute it, either materially, with one made of paper, or even using human supports, who temporarily remember things on his behalf until he writes them down.[56] Understanding writing — 'la première

[55] Miranda Anderson, 'Extending the Renaissance Mind: 'Look What Thy Memory Cannot Contain', in *The Cognitive Humanities: Embodied Mind in Literature and Culture*, ed. Peter Garrett (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016), pp. 95-112. Anderson's close readings of Donne, Montaigne, Ficino and Shakespeare make an enriching complement to the work of philosophers such as John Sutton — whose collaborative work with Evelyn Tribble is drawn on in the thesis — who work on 4E memory in a historical perspective. This builds on Anderson's first study in this area, *The Renaissance Extended Mind* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Kritzman also explores Montaigne's 'mémoire en papier' as artificial 'pseudo-mémoire' in 'La nouvelle rhétorique', *Destruction/ Découverte* (Lexington: French Forum, 1980), pp.100-105, and Ann Moss's study on Renaissance commonplace-books also hints at Montaigne's use of commonplacing as a kind of artificial memory. See below note 92.

[56] My primary textual sources in the *Essais* for this are a post-1588 addition to De l'experience, 'A faute de memoire naturelle j'en forge de papier' (III, 13, 1092) and in 'De la praesumption': 'Ma librerie, qui est des belles entre les libreries de village, est assise à un coin de ma maison: s'il me tombe en fantasie chose que j'y veuille aller cercher ou escrire, *de peur qu'elle ne m'eschappe en traversant seulement ma court, il faut que je la donne en garde à quelqu'autre.*' (II, 37, 650, emphasis added).

métaphore' in Derridean terms — as memory is as old as writing itself.[57] Yet it is in relation to the technology of writing that the distinction between natural and artificial memory disintegrates: natural memory is a kind of writing or impression in the soul but writing conceived as an auxiliary or surrogate threatens the power to hold memories in the mind by displacing the loci of memory into a vulnerable external support: paper or vellum. Montaigne's re-expression of this ancient idea calls attention to ethical and epistemic anxieties around memory, writing and forgetting. What is distinctive about Montaigne's attitude to it is, as I show, the degree to which he reflects on the details and textures of the technology of writing and of its materials, implements and instruments. Furthermore, his understanding of memory, and cognition more broadly, as a distributed and sometimes intersubjective process has, as I will explore in the course of this chapter, unexpected points of contact with Edwin Hutchins' insights in *Cognition in the Wild* — a foundational text for the distributed cognition paradigm. Situating early modern memory in the context of its rich rhetorical and medical heritage, I analyze Montaigne's language of memory and ask how Montaigne positions his book relative to the interface between mind and memory conceived in embodied biological terms, and in non-neural, artificial (including in the rhetorical, *ars memoriae* sense) and extended terms.

Chapter Two explores how Montaigne's texts engage with and dramatize early modern precursors to the contemporary notion of cognitive ecology — emerging from the interaction of neural, technological, sociocultural and otherwise environmental possibilities and constraints that are in play. I relate it to the early modern word 'contexture', reading this encounter through a range of 'cognitive reincarnations' — places in the *Essais* where ideas about the hybrid and extended nature of cognition, bridging biological and non-biological, anatomical and architectural, human and non-human, are foregrounded. The phrase 'cognitive reincarnations' is intended to express how understandings of cognition stemming from one set of historical circumstances can emerge, or body forth, in meaningfully analogous ways at different moments in history. How are non-human elements — whether material objects, animals, or broader socio-cultural structures — accommodated into this cognitive contexture? Through close engagement with Montaigne's language — both lexical and syntactic

[57] Derrida, *De la grammatologie,* p.26: 'L'écriture sensible, finie, etc., est désignée comme écriture au sens propre ; elle est alors pensée du côté de la culture, de la technique et de l'artifice : procédé humain, ruse d'un être incarné par accident ou d'une créature finie. Bien entendu, cette métaphore reste énigmatique et renvoie à un sens « propre » de l'écriture comme première métaphore.'

aspects — I demonstrate Montaigne's understanding of mind as inescapably hybrid, embodied and scaffolded, even within its most 'private' and 'inner' recesses of introspection.

In Chapter Three, I propose the linguistic, medical and critical concept of prosthesis as a heuristic affordance for considering a number of related aspects of Montaigne's writing, drawing on relevant aspects of his technological context and stopping off with Montaigne at key points of his journey, with particular focus on Basel and his first stay in Rome. This allows for an exploration of the relation between Montaigne's consubstantial book and the more apparently extraneous *Journal*, between spoken and written word, via notions of dictation and 'truchement' or interpretation, and Montaigne's own language of (problematically) embodied cognition.

Together, these three chapters track the various ways Montaigne's writing navigates between matters and metaphors of mind and memory, and probes the frontier — real or supposed, naturally porous, clearly drawn, deliberately unravelled or removed altogether— between nature and artifice, author and book, mind and situation or context.

My method combines a number of approaches and techniques of reading, which work at different levels of granularity and different levels of proximity or removal from the particular words of the texts themselves: close cognitive readings of passages from the *Essais* and *Journal*, focusing on materialities and technologies of cognition, are set up alongside lexicographical analysis of particular key words and their histories, and a more meta-critical, and meta-physical, perspective on Montaigne's writing practice. As with other cognitive approaches to early modern texts, a challenge has been one of negotiating this co-temporal as well as interdisciplinary dialogue — between language at different periods in history and between the languages of literary criticism and cognitive science. As with all communication, sometimes it doesn't quite work, but the positive part of that feeds back into a better understanding of what it is that cognitive approaches are trying, in various ways, to achieve.

The umbrella term 'Cognitive Humanities' has reached a place in its own trajectory where it can be viewed in something of an historical perspective. There is no need to trace out this history in detail here, interesting as it is from a cultural and institutional point of view, but sketching some background will help to situate my own

approach.[58] Drawing on a number of foundational works (or combinations thereof) in cognitive science, cognitive anthropology, cognitive linguistics and philosophy in the last decades of the last century – Gibson's *Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (1979), Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), Varela, Thompson and Rosch's *The Embodied Mind* (1991), Clark and Chalmers' *The Extended Mind* (1998), Edwin Hutchins' *Cognition in the Wild* (1995)[59] – 'second generation' cognitive approaches to literature employ ecological, embodied and distributed understandings of cognition to read texts. In contrast, 'first generation' refers to an understanding of mind as composed of abstract, computational, internal representations, largely disembodied and independent of environment. My use of 'employ' is deliberately open, to reflect the variety of ways that reading in a cognitive perspective, or via cognitive methodologies, can be interpreted and practiced.

Different levels of theoretical detail and investment and varying degrees of instrumentality reflect differing interpretations of what interdisciplinarity is and can be and the different aims behind taking a cognitive approach to begin with. As Raphael Lyne notes, a cognitive approach to literature may or may not engage (or engage to different extents) with scientific experiments themselves, or, I will add, acknowledge or grapple with the details of specific concepts in cognitive science and philosophy, which acquire problematic textures within the often technical discussions in their 'home fields'.[60] To do such work is to 'aspire to the possibilities of fully interdisciplinary study, in which both the affinities and the frictions between fields can be engaging and informative'. [61] Other approaches prefer to maintain a certain distance from some philosophical or otherwise technical levels of engagement, sometimes self-described as a strategy of avoidance or 'less technical mode of transfer'. Cave for example states his preference for the notion of affordance, which he adapts from its

[58] The excellent introductions to collections of essays, including *Movement in Renaissance Literature: Exploring Kinesic Intelligence,* ed. by Kathryn Banks and Timothy Chesters (Cham. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); *The Cognitive Humanities: The Embodied Mind in Literature and Culture,* ed. by Peter Garratt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), and *Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern European Culture,* ed. by Ita Mac Carthy, Kirsti Sellevold and Olivia Smith (Cambridge: Legenda, 2016), provide usefully synthetic overviews of the field.
[59] Gibson, James, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (London, Houghton Mifflin, 1979); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1980) ; Francisco Varela, Eleanor Rosch and Evan Thompson, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (Cambridge, Mass ; London: MIT Press, 1991); Andy Clark and David Chalmers, 'The Extended Mind', *Analysis*, 58 (1998), 7-19; Edwin Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).
[60] For example, what is embodiment and how does it relate to notions of proprioception and body schema? How much sense does it make to think of individual sets of cognitive processes, like memory, as embodied, or is it cognition as a *whole system* that is thinkable as embodied and extended?
[61] Raphael Lyne, 'Shakespeare, Perception and Theory of Mind', *Paragraph*, 37 (2014) 'Reading literature cognitively', 79-95.

Gibsonian origins, because it shares ground with extended mind or distributed cognition, insisting on notions of improvisation, agency and purpose, while circumnavigating the philosophical problems that arise with those expressions.[62] Patterns of scholarly interest run, at least partially, along disciplinary lines, for reasons of training and habit as much as inherent interest. The rationale for this seems clear: by tuning out certain philosophical aspects (often thorny, inconclusive, and operating at a higher level of abstraction than always seems relevant to literary particularity) it's possible to free up more bandwidth for other questions and aspects. However, the realization of the fully interdisciplinary study mentioned by Lyne only seems possible via two channels: either true disciplinary bilingualism or through a model of co-authorship, between authors in different fields. [63]

Cognitive approaches to literature have in part organically grown from two related 'turns' in cultural study — the material and the corporeal. As Wes Williams notes, it is as yet unclear whether 'the cognitive turn' is 'best described as a Renaissance or a Counter-Reformation; from the perspective of an early modernist it has characteristics of both'. [64] By tuning into questions of (sometimes theologically-inflected) cultural periodization, this reflection usefully situates early modern cognitive readings as a function whose coordinates are plotted on the broader axes of historiography.[65]

A number of scholars interested in the early modern relations between mind, body and environment — where these categories are not envisaged dualistically but as potentials for exchange, interaction, mirroring, and mutual influence and contagion — have built up a contemporary lexicon of fluidity, permeability, porosity and scaffolding. These studies probe how early moderns handled the inherent leakiness of the humoral mind, situated within a web of continuous reciprocal causation and transaction between physiology and technology, inside and outside, self, other and culture. Such understandings stretch dualism to its limits but also rely on the

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[62] Terence Cave, *Thinking with Literature: Towards a Cognitive Criticism* (Oxford: OUP, 2016), pp. 46-62.

[63] Such co-authorship would not be a solution to the 'problem' of interdisciplinarity, but rather a heuristically courageous testing out of its possibilities, in part by exposing gaps in understanding and knowledge rather than plastering over them. It would not be designed to generate 'better' cognitive approaches, just different ones, capable — in principle — of matching the fine-grained analysis characteristic of close literary reading with a high level of detail, including technical detail, on the cognitive theoretical front. On interdisciplinarity within the Academy see, for example, John H. Aldrich, *Interdisciplinarity* (Oxford: OUP, 2014), and Felicity Callard, and Des Fitzgerald, *Rethinking Interdisciplinarity Across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[64] Wes Williams, 'Epilogue: 'The proof of the pudding...': Common Knowledge and the Matter of Taste', *Paragraph,* 37 (2014), 143-151 (p.144).

[65] Key studies in the field include (to name just a few): *Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture* ed. by Margreta de Grazia and others (Cambridge: CUP, 1996); *The Body in Parts*: *Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe,* ed. by David A. Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York; London: Routledge, 1997), and Guillemette Bolens, *La logique du corps articulaire: les articulations du corps humain dans la littérature occidentale* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2000).

idea of difference, or gradient, without which exchange or transport across membranes would not happen. Memory, as a form of stability within the flux of experience but which is understood, in its natural form, as a form of affect or passivity (the outside imprinting itself on the inside) emerges as an especially important site of anxiety and ambition about meaning, and man's capacity to overcome his inherently incomplete nature and to shape, or at least rough-hew, his own 'fortune'.[66]

The notion of cognitive ecology — and, relatedly, cognitive environment, cognitive fluidity — which stemmed from the work of Leroi-Gourhan in his 1964-1965 enquiry into the relation between embodiment, technology and artefacts, *Le geste et la parole* (though this is not routinely recognized), Gibson and Hutchins — has been taken up vigorously in multiple contexts as a means of denoting the distributed system — of objects, agents, structures and artefacts that constitute and instantiate cognition, even cognition ordinarily considered individual. The idea of ecology, meaning dwelling or lodging, is bound up with notions of domesticity, accommodation and belonging — which takes on particular Montaignian significance in relation to 'contexture' and 'niche' in the 'Apologie', which I raise in Chapter Two, in addition to the idea of cognitive environment evoked via 'giste' and 'climat' in III, 2. Explicitly linking memory to cognitive ecologies, and drawing on Kim Sterelny's and Andy Clark's notion of 'epistemic engineering', the work of Tribble and Keene has examined the English Reformation as a test case for exploring how embodied and extended mind might move us closer to what they call a 'cognitive cultural history of early modern religion' — the relation between memory, cognition and culture — by tracking how reforming practices can be understood in an ecological perspective.[67]

In certain significant respects this study is situated in the *sillage* of the Oxford-based Balzan project, 'Literature as an Object of Knowledge', directed by Terence Cave and deputy-directed by both Wes Williams and Raphael Lyne, which ran between 2009 and 2013, but is in many vital respects ongoing. Many of my interlocutors, implicit or explicit, in the project were and continue to be closely involved in that joint and interdisciplinary enterprise.[68] The Balzan project was an important laboratory for testing the potential for

[66] I borrow this expression from Hamlet, speaking to Horatio: 'There's a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough-hew them how we will', *Hamlet*, Act V Scene II.
[67] Evelyn Tribble and Nicholas Keene, *Cognitive Ecologies and The History of Remembering: Religion, Education and Memory in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
[68] I refer here to scholars including Miranda Anderson, Kathryn Banks, Guillemette Bolens, Timothy Chesters, Karin Kukkonen, Kirsti Sellevold, and many more.

combining cognitive methodologies meaningfully with literary study, building on and extending the existing work already mentioned.

In light of these considerations, Montaigne's own 'registre de durée', his *Essais* — a space of supple, experimental probing over time and a record of the same — is a particularly distinctive and exciting laboratory or 'ouvroir' for cognitive readings. [69] Terence Cave's early cognitive study, *How to Read Montaigne*, geared toward the curious general reader rather than specialist, positions the *Essais* as a cognitive rather than philosophical project. In his 2016 *Thinking with Literature*, Cave develops this further, drawing on the *Essais* as a key case study in his sample, or showcase, of cognitively-inflected readings which foreground embodied and extended aspects of literary language and composition. This book is, as I have already noted, a full-scale, if broadly and deliberately non-technical, manifesto — also in some ways, an apologetics — for a cognitive approach to literary study, which firmly situates Montaigne as an early modern author particularly suited to this variety of analysis. Cave's method here — of focusing on questions of communication, both propositional and inferential, using relevance theory as a key tool — has itself been a model for many subsequent approaches which, like Cave, take Montaigne's paradigm for conversation, a game of j*eu de paume* in 'De l'expérience', as an interpretative springboard, alongside other essays such as III, 8, 'De l'art de conférer'. This makes very good sense, given that the *Essais* are emphatically framed, cognitively speaking, as a conversation or 'live' exchange — between Montaigne and the ancients, and between author and reader — a form of 'speaking to paper', somewhere between speaking to a friend and to a perfect stranger, something I explore with my own set of focal points in Chapter Three.[70] Drawing on a central idea in second generation cognitive science, of language as the ultimate cognitive artefact, Cave's readings of literary texts, including the *Essais*, argue for their status as instruments of extended cognition, capable of fine-tuning and modifying the reader's cognitive environment. Close readings attend to how Montaigne's language mediates sensorimotor response through

[69] Montaigne uses the plural form of the word 'ouvroir' — in the lexical field of artisanal activity, like 'boutique'— in II, 18 (663). In light of the dynamic between artisanal and epistemic modes in the period, this is a fitting word for conveying the spatial, quasi-architectural idea of the book, which I explore in relation to the art of memory and Montaigne's 'arriere-boutique' in Chapter One. See Pamela H. Smith, 'Making as Knowing: Craft as Natural Philosophy', in *Ways of Making and Knowing: The Material Culture of Empirical Knowledge*, ed. by Pamela H. Smith and others (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), pp. 17–47.

[70] 'De l'utile et de l'honneste': 'Je parle au papier comme je parle au premier que je rencontre' (III, 1, 790).

syntax as well as lexis — for example through chiasmus, analyzed as a kinesic figure — which can be saturated with bodily, highly situational inputs.[71]

This thesis is a distinctive contribution to existing Montaigne scholarship, and specifically in the field of cognitive approaches, in two main ways. Firstly, no existing study focuses specifically on reading consubstantiality in a cognitive perspective. In doing so I contribute to understandings of an early modern keyword by exploring how its semantic charge in its own cultural environment can interact with contemporary thinking in ways that can elucidate both. In a sense, in focusing on consubstantiality as a cognitive 'figure', I am standing back from the text of the *Essais*, looking at it as a text as a whole, from a place where, as it were, the text might counterfactually speaking not have existed at all. This differs quite substantially from many other cognitive approaches, whose stance is very much directed at the semantic, lexical, syntactic detail of the writing. I too engage closely with these textures, which after all *are* Montaigne's writing — but through a lens, handed to us by Montaigne himself, where consubstantiality is an overarching paradigm, expressing and activating his, and our, embodied and extended cognition. Thus this project, while adding to existing work, also does a different kind of work in some respects. Furthermore, in rethinking consubstantiality in relation to prosthesis, as a variant of it which heightens particular aspects and problems of embodiment (what it is, where it ends and begins), I contribute to the scholarship on the relation *between* Montaigne's text — primarily the *Essais* and the *Journal*, but in one instance I also draw on his correspondence with his own father — and the cognitive implications of this intertextual dynamic.

Secondly, I argue that embodied and extended cognition are central to the thematics of Montaigne's writing: it is communicated as part of Montaigne's propositional content and not only something his use of language enables us to infer. Although, like many others interested in the cognitively-engaged nature of Montaigne's writing, I attend to the semantic, lexical and syntactic features of his language as communicating embodied mind— between the pre-reflective and reflective, or the gradient between sensorimotor response and higher-order conceptual activities—an essential part of the thesis's argument is that embodied and extended cognition are his *matiere*, as well as his *manière*. He sets up this opposition in his meditation on conversation in III, 8:

[71] Terence Cave, 'Chiastic Cognition: Kinesic Intelligence between the Reflective and the Pre-reflective in Montaigne and Scève', in *Movement in Renaissance Literature*, pp. 13-30.

'Autant peut faire le sot celuy qui dict vray, que celuy qui dict faux: car nous sommes sur la maniere, non sur la matiere du dire. Mon humeur est de regarder autant à la forme qu'à la substance'. [72] My own 'humeur' in this context has been to switch the order round and look at substance as much as form.

[72] Géralde Nakham, *Montaigne: La Manière et la Matière* (Paris: H. Champion, 2006).

CHAPTER ONE

'Chaque piece en son siege': The Nature and Art of Memory in the *Essais*

Tant y a qu'en ces memoires, si on y regarde, on trouvera que j'ay tout dict, ou tout designé ('De la vanité', III, 9, 983)

There is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument. Like a drop of water on oilskin, attention runs down them without stopping for a moment (Robert Musil, *Posthumous Papers of a Living Author,* 1936)

La curiosité pour les lieux où se cristallise et se réfugie la mémoire est liée à ce moment particulier de notre histoire (Pierre Nora, 'Entre mémoire et histoire: la problématique des lieux', *Les lieux de mémoire*, 1984)

Introduction: 'De fresche mémoire'

In the *Essais*, Montaigne uses 'de fresche memoire'— a linguistic trope in the period — and the comparative form ('de plus fresche memoire'), in quite a specific way. Both tend to refer to relatively recent historical, as opposed to personal or anecdotal, events. But the two tend to co-habit and intersect in Montaigne's narrative. In Littré's dictionary, the phrase 'Avoir la mémoire fraîche' is 'avoir un souvenir très présent'. The idea of freshness involves newness or recentness (or the impression thereof) but the image invoked is of something — possibly between a liquid and a solid, like paint — which has not yet dried or set. Perhaps through association with paint, the adjective 'fresche' also conveys colour, as though its freshness can be read as lustre or vividness, not having faded or worn over time.[73] Its being a very 'present' memory foregrounds one aspect of memory's representational power — the uncanny temporal power of making something present again — and by implication, its mimetic power (by which a memory accurately resembles its 'original') is, one might suppose, correspondingly strong. However, two competing or conflicting ideas linked to veracity and reliability are at work in this notion of fresh memory: fresh paint might be vivid but is liable to being smeared before time's fixative work has been done. [74] In different terms, this corresponds to the transfer between the vivid but short-lived record of short-term memory and the more stable form of long-term memory.[75] Montaigne's use of temporal deixis in the *Essais,* through which he orients events in time, and creates palimpsestic layers of

[73] The significance of colour or lustre in the idea of 'vive representation' in Renaissance reworkings of *energeia* in classical rhetoric is discussed below.

[74] Montaigne's reflection on the veracity of memory, construed since antiquity as a highly imagistic faculty, is not separate from a wider cultural preoccupation, both scientific and artistic, with the reliability of sight and the devices which subverted settled understandings of its physiological workings. See for example Stuart Clark *Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture* (Oxford: OUP, 2007).

[75] Larry R. Squire and Eric R. Kandel, *Memory: From Mind to Molecule*s, 2nd edition (Greenwood, Col.: Roberts, 2009), especially Chapter 7, 'From Short-Term Memory to Long-Term Memory', pp. 141-171.

recentness — 'hier', 'avant-hier', 'de fresche memoire, 'de plus fresche memoire' — pivoting on the then-present, pulling the reader into his present and presence but all the while drawing our attention to the temporal gulf between his time and ours.[76] Deixis of this kind points to the context of the utterance in which it is produced and in which it can be understood, making it especially relevant to pragmatics.[77] In the *Essais* the linguistic factors of these discursive configurations shape the reader's sense of Montaigne's situated subjectivity, and the reader's self-contextualization in relation to the author. Because deictic expressions do not have stable or fixed meaning, but pivot according to context, they are small but potent markers of flux within Montaigne's text and draw the reader into closer communion with him.[78]

[79]

While there is ample existing work on Montaigne and memory, the relation between consubstantiality and memory explored from a 4E perspective has not yet been specifically treated in the scholarship.[80] This Chapter

[76] See Jacqueline Bacha, 'Ici et là dans les *Essais* de Montaigne: entre deixis et anaphore', *L'Information Grammaticale* 128 (2011), 36-39 and Emmanuel Fouah, 'Voix et voies de l'auteur aspects de l'énonciation dans les discours de Rabelais et de Montaigne' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Université de Tours François Rabelais, 2012).

[77] William F. Hanks, 'Deixis and Pragmatics', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics,* ed. by Mark Aronoff (Oxford: OUP, 2017) [Accessed online 16 March 2021]; Stephen C. Levinson, *Pragmatics* (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), especially Chapter Two, 'Deixis', pp. 54-96.

[78] Other places in the *Essais* where the crossroads is important include II, 12, in the context of Chrysippus' dog choosing which direction to pursue: 'Chrysippus, (...) considerant les mouvements du chien qui, se rencontrant en un carrefour à trois chemins' (463). In *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson cite the crossroads as a key metaphor for expressing the idea that life is a journey that involves deliberation and choice.

[80] Work includes but extends far beyond: Andrea Frisch, 'Montaigne and the Ethics of Memory', *L'Esprit Créateur,* 46 (2006), 3-31, and 'Montaigne on Memory', in *The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne,* ed. Philippe Desan (Oxford: OUP, 2016), pp.649-662; Ellen Loughran, 'Defective Memories, Deception, and the Writing Process: Montaigne's Attempt at Truth in Essay I: 9', *Neophilologus,* 94 (2010), 33–41; Alex Gray, 'Remembering Lucretius: Memory and Identity in Montaigne's *Essais*' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, Royal Holloway, 2017), 'Another Montaigne: Imagining an Atomic Afterlife', *Early Modern French Studies,* 40 (2018), 25–35; Nicolas Russell, *Transformations of Memory and Forgetting in Sixteenth-century France: Marguerite de Navarre, Pierre de Ronsard, Michel de Montaigne* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011); Angelica Goodden, *The Backward Look: Memory and the Writing Self in France, 1580- 1920* (Oxford: Legenda, 2000), especially Chapter 1, 'Breaking the Mould', pp. 10-28. In some respects, Dorothy Stegman's study, 'Cannibalism and Communion: Montaigne's Consubstantial Memory' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Indiana, 1999) most strikingly shares some of my core interests, although her study does not approach consubstantial memory from a 4E cognition perspective. Daniel Martin, *L'Architecture des Essais de Montaigne: memoire artificielle et mythologie* (Paris: A, G. Nizet, 1992); William E. Engel, 'The Art of Memory and Montaigne's Scene of Writing', *The Order of Montaigne's Essays.* ed. by Daniel Martin (Amherst, Mass.: Hestia Press, 1989), pp. 33-49; Cynthia Israel, 'Montaigne and Proust: Architects of Memory', *Romance Languages Annal,* 6 (1994), 105-110. Some of these studies propose that Montaigne had a mental model or visual mnemonic plan, preceding the writing of the text, designed and arranged explicitly as a classical architectural mnemonic scheme. Engel argues that the *Essais* function primarily as a storehouse of classical *sententiae* or vestiges of reading, and that his book mirrors his 'scene of writing' — his library — which served as an architectural model or memory palace. These studies' attention to the interplay of mental and material architectures is quite different to my own, though there is some overlap given our shared interests. They emphasize the notion of a mental 'maquette' into the text of the *Essais* slots, which I find constraining in that it doesn't give adequate space to chance or improvisation or otherwise 'real time' aspects of Montaigne's compositional process. Other studies have focused on Montaigne and forgetting; see for example, Elisabeth Hodges, 'Montaigne and the Will Not to Forget', in *Memory and Community in Renaissance France*, ed. by David LaGuardia and

investigates the place of the *Essais* in relation to the fault line between early modern constructions of memory as natural and as a product of art. I propose that in the *Essais* Montaigne is navigating and negotiating this interface in significant ways, thinking of the 'divide' between nature and culture as a living membrane which things and concepts are moving *across* all the time. As I show, 'consubstantiality' is an invitation, as playful as it is substantial, to read his book as a cognitive artefact situated an unstable position between nature and artifice, as a commingling of essence and accident: a path both chosen and dictated by nature.

How do Montaigne's reflections on memory relate to consubstantiality and to an extended cognition framework? What is Montaigne's understanding of memory, and of its relation to writing? How can this enrich, and sharpen, the meaning we give to consubstantiality, and to his remarks in 'l'De l'institution des enfants' and 'De la gloire' concerning survival in 'la memoire des livres' (I, 26, 156; II, 16, 628)? How does he use and adapt his own sources and models in thinking about the scope, and limits, of memory, and what is his sense of how the technological relates to the cognitive and discursive matter of memory? These questions involve some understanding of how people pictured the memory in the early modern period, and of which elements from ancient and medieval understandings of memory had been absorbed and reworked to create the early modern 'memory' which Montaigne lambasts, claiming his own is monstrously, or revealingly, defective, but also suggests elsewhere is precisely how his text functions as a form of survival. And, in light of early modern understandings of the imbrications between memory, technology, forgetting and poetics, how to understand Montaigne's interventions in the early modern natural-artificial memory debate in the context of his own 'consubstantial' book?

A common place for considering memory in the *Essais,* and particularly Montaigne's sense of the memorial function of the *Essais* themselves, is a passage in 'Du démentir', in the context of a reflection on the place of his own written traces in relation to those of great men who have left 'commentaires (...) de leurs gestes':[81]

Cathy Yandell (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 161-170 ; Teresa Chevrolet, '"Si excellent en l'oubliance": oubli, humanisme, écriture chez Montaigne', in *Figures de l'oubli IVe-XVIe siècles*, ed. by Patrizia Romagnoli and Barbara Wahlen, Special edition of *Études de lettres* (Lausanne: Faculté des lettres de l'Université de Lausanne, 2007), pp. 323-346. Daniel Ménager, 'Le mythe du Léthé dans quelques œuvres de la Renaissance', in *Mémoire et oubli au temps de la Renaissance* ed. by Marie-Therèse Jones-Davis (Paris: Classiques-Garnier, 2006), pp. 107-120.

81 I use the phrase 'common place' deliberately, in reference to the vital role of the 'commonplace' in Renaissance thinking about memory, some elements of which I draw out here.

> [A]Je ne dresse pas icy une statue à planter au carrefour d'une ville, ou dans une Église, ou place publique.
> [B] *Non equidem hoc studeo, bullatis ut mihi nugis*
> *Pagina turgescat.*
> *Secreti loquimur.*
>
> [A]C'est pour le coin d'une librairie, et pour en amuser un voisin, un parent, un amy, qui aura plaisir à me racointer et repratiquer en cett' image. (II, 18, 664).[82]

These lines, present in the French from the first edition, disavow any claim of monumental memory or memorability on behalf of his book, and juxtapose Montaigne's far more modest claim on the collective memory with the claim of great men ('De telles gens on ayme et estudie les figures, en cuyvre mesme et en pierre. Cette remontrance est tres-vraie, mais elle ne me touche que bien peu,' 663).[83] Montaigne's relational model is one of intimacy, domesticity and sustained kinship, friendship and exchange, stated in remarkably similar terms in his 'Au lecteur': 'C'est icy un livre de bonne foy, lecteur. Il t'advertit dès l'entrée, que je ne m'y suis proposé aucune fin, que domestique et privée.' Montaigne's insistence that his writing should not be understood as him raising a statue is more than part and parcel of the humility topos; it also participates in a distinctively sixteenth century reflection on material remains — statues, relics, ruins, but also texts and art works — which, in ways analogous to the biological body, can be ravaged and dismembered by time and violence but can be reconstructed and restored to wholeness, materially and imaginatively: in the period classical statues' missing limbs were added back on, their positions and expressions subject to differing interpretations, in a form of prosthetic redemption.[84] This reflection is mediated through the period's complex relation with ancient 'lieux de mémoire', in particular Rome, whose own scattered ruins and fragments and ruins offer obstacles to

[82] 'I do not seek to swell these pages with dark-robed nonsense. In privacy we speak'. These lines are from Persius, *Satire* V (19-21). The English translation is taken from the online Loeb edition (DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.persius-satires.2004). Posthumous editions of the *Essais* miss out the words which follow 'pagina turgescat': 'dare pondus idonea fumo', ('fit only to give weight to smoke'), which Montaigne repurposes in III, 11: 'Nostre discours est capable d'estoffer cent autres mondes et d'en trouver les principes et la contexture. Il ne luy faut ny matiere ny baze; laissez le courre: il bastit aussi bien sur le vuide que sur le plain, et de l'inanité que de matiere, *dare pondus idonea fumo*.' (1027).

[83] Montaigne's use of 'figure' here might be related to his self-description as 'Nouvelle figure' in the 'Apologie' (II, 12, 546). The term 'Figure' is inscribed within classical and medieval traditions which, when combined with 'nouvelle', forge a hybrid stance between history and contemporaneity. 'Figure' then, is part of the crossroads metaphor. See Erich Auerbach, 'Figura', in *Scenes from the Drama of European Literature: Six Essays* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 11-76. As Ann Hartle also recognizes, through his deployment of the concept of the 'figure' Montaigne situates himself in a distinctive way, that both preserves and transforms classical and medieval meanings of 'figure' and gives him a 'contemplative stance' towards the temporal. See Hartle, *Montaigne and the Origins of Modern Philosophy* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2013), p. 24.

[84] On this, see Chapter Three.

and opportunities for visioning the past. [85] Furthermore, statues, then as now, can (like dusty archives) be *loci* of forgetting rather than remembrance or commemoration: they can mark absence rather than survival.[86]

Mimetic representations and likenesses of all kinds, in two and three dimensions— effigies, portraits, statues — have a particular re-presentational power, implying an in-built worthiness of commemoration and respect, a claim to substantiality and enduring relevance which places them outside of the stream of time, as Auerbach's analysis of the 'figure' suggests.[87] Their inorganic materiality — 'de cuyvre mesme et en pierre,' the 'mesmes' seeming to push the figure forward into three dimensions on the page — makes them hybrid forms, enjoying an artificial afterlife, still claiming a place among the living safely albeit removed from the ineluctability of biological decomposition.

The three figures of place Montaigne chooses as examples of where his not-statue will not stand — town crossroads, a church, a public square — are themselves particular kinds of *loci communes*: they are, literally, *lieux communs*, or *topoi,* places of confluence, passing-though, and encounter. Of the three, the crossroads distinctively captures the combination of stasis and motion which characterizes premodern conceptions of memory and recollection, and reflects the cultural coordinates of early modern memory, for which it stands as a metaphor: steeped in and patterned on classical models and conditioned in important respects by the enduring presence of medieval memorial culture, Renaissance memory was reviving and transforming these historical models while simultaneously responding to very current technological change and the violent instability of the civil wars.

I start with places owing to their immense importance, in premodern culture, in organizing and generating thought and speech, and to their role in theories and practices of memory, both natural and artificial. Following A.J. Greimas, premodern memory is a cultural 'modalité' in an anthropological sense, what Latour

[85] Margaret McGowan, *The Vision of Rome in Late Renaissance France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
[86] See Harald Weinrich's reflection on a 1957 short story by Heinrich Böll, *Der Wegwerfer* ('The Thrower-Away'), a parable about memory, forgetting, relevance of information, and the practical art of forgetting, in *Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting*, trans. Stephen Rendall (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 207-217.
[87] On the notion of 'hommage', see Myriam Watthee-Delmotte, 'Commémorer pour légitimer: du Tombeau des gloires au cénotaphe des obscurs', in *Rituels de la vie publique et privée du Moyen Âge à nos jours*, ed. by Anne Friederike Delouis and others (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2021), pp. 225 -241.

calls a 'mode d'existence'.[88] In order to provide context for the specific aspects I consider in Part two, I will now briefly set out some of the traditions of memory in the period notably from the perspectives of premodern faculty psychology stemming from the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, pedagogical practice, and rhetoric.

Premodern notions of memory combined an idea of it as a neurophysiological process – a literal printing of physical images onto a specific location in the organic or sensitive soul – and of it as a skill or technique, modelled on the natural workings of memory, to be instrumentalized in rhetoric, logic, pedagogy, and the advancement of knowledge. It is therefore conceived both as a natural, biological, essentially *passive* process – though this could be managed to an extent through diet and other broadly 'environmental' or physiological factors, in the Galenic tradition – and as an active, disciplined art (variously referred to as *ars memorativa*, *ars memoriae*, or mnemotechnics) generating new knowledge and enabling man to reach beyond his natural or biological capacities. This combination of the natural and the artificial, the organic and inorganic, is central to how early moderns thought about memory.

The organic soul was understood to be the principle responsible for those life functions connected to the bodies of living beings and immediately dependent on their organs. These functions ranged from the vital operations of digestion and reproduction through sensation and emotion to the higher cognitive functions of imagination and memory. The faculties of intellect and will were excluded, not requiring physical organs and could therefore survive the body's death. Distinctive to humans, these latter faculties constituted his immortal soul and differed distinctly from the functions of the organic soul, which humans shared to a greater or lesser degree with plants and animals.[89] Memory was understood to be one of the five internal senses or 'inward wits', with *phantasia*, *imaginatio*, *cogitatio* and the *sensus communis*, the adjective 'internal' referring to perception of absent sense objects (the external senses of taste, touch, sight and so on perceived *present* sense objects). Each mental power was thought to be seated in particular cerebral ventricles, *memoria* being located in the posterior

[88] Modality is an idea drawn from A. J Greimas to describe the publicly-shared system with identifiable practices and procedures which in turn affect other aspects of culture, see A.J. Greimas, 'De la modalisation de l'être', in *Du sens: essais sémiotiques,* vol. II (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970, 1983), pp. 93-102; Bruno Latour, *Enquête sur les modes d'existence: une anthropologie des modernes* (Paris: La Découverte, 2012).

89 See Ruth E. Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: Warburg Institute, 1975) and Katharine Park, 'The Organic Soul', in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. by C.B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler and Jill Kraye (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), pp. 464-484. On the history of brain 'scanning', including premodern diagrammatic representations of psychological function, see Stanley Finger, *Origins of Neuroscience: A History of Explorations into Brain Function* (Oxford: OUP, 1994).

ventricle or *cella,* as can be seen from early neuropsychological schematic portraits. In the Aristotelian tradition, memory is somatic, and there is symbiosis between memory and body.

Originating in Plato's distinction in *Meno* between memory (*mnemne*) and recollection (*anamnesis*), memory was understood as two processes: storage followed by retrieval, based on the idea that memories are metaphorical objects or traces stored in mind space at specific locations, and we search for and retrieve these ideas-objects using procedures analogous to physical search and retrieval.[90] For Plato all learning and seeking is recollecting: following the traces of knowledge already present in the soul by divine agency. Anamnesis is thus a form of dialectical method and in this we can see the origins of the association between memory and the notion of intellectual steps and orderly arrangement, method and dialectic which becomes so significant in the early modern period. Plato's distinction was taken up by Aristotle who divided memory into two processes: that of storage (corresponding with the term *memoria)* and that of retrieval (*reminiscientia*).[91] This conceptualization of remembering as a combination of stasis and a dynamic process of recollection or investigative recovery involving a sequence of intellectual 'steps' to re-locate the particular memory is a governing paradigm which has pivotally shaped the public image of memory, but also that of forgetting. To forget is to be unable to track down the memory, or for it not to have been imprinted and stored adequately to begin with. It thus involves anxiety about a person's relationship with time — to forget is to lack a handle on the past — and with matters of control, agency, and identity. The defining task of recollection — *investigatio* — is related to the notion of *vestigia* ('tracks' or footprints'); the retrieval of what has been 'set aside' (*oblit*) is an intellectual 'tracking down' of the same mental footprint again. As Carruthers observes, all mnemonic organizational schemes are heuristic in nature, being retrieval schemes for the purpose of *inventio* or 'finding.'[92]

The distinctively humanist practice of compiling commonplace books, or commonplacing - gathering *topoi* in one place so as to have them within easy reach -- grew out of ancient rhetoric, from Aristotle's *Topics* to quintilian's *Institutio oratorio,* which developed a list of the places or *loci* of use to the orator, including the 'seats' (*sedes*) of arguments, and rhetorical embellishments (amplification, *captatio benevolentiae*, and so on).

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[90] Henry Roediger, 'Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology', *Memory and Cognition*, 8(1980), 231-46.
[91] Though, as Carruthers notes, in broader contexts than strictly philosophical ones, *memoria* is used to refer to both activities and not just to storage. In rhetoric, *memoria* refers to training and discipline in both memorial and recollective technique, *Book of Memory*, p. 46.
[92] Ibid., p. 20.

With medieval precursors like florilegia and, looking ahead, seventeenth century practices of vernacular compilation, there is a whole 'history of commonplace cognition'.[93] In the Renaissance the notion of place continued to expand, as pupils throughout Europe were taught to keep their own commonplace books while in school and afterwards through a lifetime of reading and thinking. As the most quintessentially humanist method of reading and storing information in a specific book designed as a register of striking or notable passages to be especially remembered or referred to, with or without arrangement, commonplacing is closely linked to the premodern understanding of memory as both passive – the imprinting of a physical sign or image in the organic soul, which is then stored – and active or creative: as integral part of rhetoric, *memoria* functioned both as a means of generating new arguments and combinations of ideas (*copia*) and of recalling those arguments in their proper order. While commonplacing is a storage system, a commonplace as an argument *structure* is dynamic. From a cognitive point of view, a commonplace book serves both as a form of artificial memory, enabling one to extend beyond the limits of natural memory, and an engine of argumentation: it is technological in nature.[94] As will be brought out in greater detail further on, writing and writing *down* (copying) has, since antiquity, been quasi-synonymous with knowing and remembering.[95] The trend for exploring parallels between two distinct historical moments, the first age of print and the information age, has drawn out how communication and information technologies have, historically, created feedback loops in how we think about memory and cognition. At the same time, these 'progressive' technologies are, by some, mistrusted on grounds that they are potentially deleterious to our 'natural' capacities.

Of Montaigne, Moss notes: 'Disingenuous as ever, Montaigne says that he does not keep notebooks to store quotations from his reading. The fact is that he transcribes them straight into his commonplace-book, and that

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[93] Terence Cave, 'Thinking with Commonplaces: The Example of Rabelais', in *Retrospectives: Essays in Literature, Poetics and Cultural History*, ed. by Neil Kenny and Wes Williams (London: Legenda, 2009), pp. 38-47 (p.46). On the vital role of commonplacing in the organization of Renaissance thought, information management and argumentation, see Ann Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structure of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), Peter Mack, *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic* (Leiden: Brill, 1993), and Ann Blair, 'Humanist Methods in Natural Philosophy: The Commonplace Book,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 53 (1992), 541-551.

[94] On technologies of information management in the context of early modern print culture see *The Renaissance Computer: Knowledge Technology in the First Age of Print,* ed. by Neil Rhodes and Jonathan Sawday (London: Routledge, 2000), and, in relation to information 'overload' see Ann Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information Before the Modern Age* (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2010).

[95] See *Writing on Hands: Memory and Knowledge in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Claire Richter Sherman and others (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

most uncommon of commonplace-books is the book of *Essais.*' [96] Moss here directly engages with a core aspect of extended mind in Montaigne's writing -- the book as a material extension of mind -- as well as with his rhetorical stance as an author with a 'monstrously' defective memory who publicly distances himself the memory arts. [97]

The notion of artificial memory developed from the classical art of memory, whose Latin source texts were Cicero's *De oratore*, Quintilian's *De institutione oratoria*, and the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (mistakenly attributed by medieval scholars to 'Tullius'/Cicero).[98] It was understood as a methodical technique with a scientific foundation, imitating and building on theories of the existing neurophysiology of natural memory.[99] The three principles of the art, which Cicero introduces — *loci* or places, order and images (forms, marks or simulacra) or *imagines agentes* ('images that act') —were originally identified by analyzing the mind's natural circuitry, as the story of Simonides of Ceos (c.556-468BC), widely considered the inventor and 'cult hero' of the art of memory, suggests. [100]

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96 Ann Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structure of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 213.

97 A number of studies have considered the *Essais* in relation to the memory arts. See Daniel Martin, *L'Architecture des "Essais" de Montaigne: memoire artificielle et mythologie* (Paris: A, G. Nizet, 1992); William E. Engel, 'The Art of Memory and Montaigne's Scene of Writing', in *The Order of Montaigne's Essays*. ed. by Daniel Martin (Amherst, Mass.: Hestia Press, 1989), pp. 33-49; Cynthia Israel, 'Montaigne and Proust: Architects of Memory', *Romance Languages Annal*, 6 (1994), 105-110. Some of these studies propose that Montaigne had a mental model or visual mnemonic plan, preceding the writing of the text, designed and arranged explicitly as a classical architectural mnemonic scheme. Engel argues that the *Essais* function primarily as a storehouse of classical *sententiae* or vestiges of reading, and that his book mirrors his 'scene of writing' — his library — which served as an architectural model or memory palace. These studies' attention to the interplay of mental and material architectures is quite different to my own, though there is some overlap given our shared interests. They emphasize the notion of a mental 'maquette' into the text of the *Essais* slots, which I find constraining in that it doesn't give adequate space to chance or improvisation or otherwise 'real time' aspects of Montaigne's compositional process.

98 A body of now- classic scholarship in the field has shown how memory cuts to the heart of premodern ideals, values, theories and practices, in rhetorical, pedagogical, ethical, spiritual and creative — whether artistic or scientific — contexts in a way that now seems (at least superficially) remote. On the rich significance, and the classical ancestry and medieval and Renaissance transformations of *ars memoriae* in the period see especially Frances Yates, *The Art of Memory* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); Paolo Rossi, *Clavis Universalis: arti mnemoniche e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1960) and Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*. Other notable studies include: Lina Bonzoni, *The Gallery of Memory: Literary and Iconographic Models in the Age of the Printing Press* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), Mary Carruthers, *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Janet Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past* (Cambridge: CUP, 1992) and *Ars Reminiscendi: Mind and Memory in Renaissance Culture,* ed. by Donald Beecher and Grant Williams (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2010).

99 The same theory from a contemporary computational neuroscience perspective can be found in Edmund T. Rolls, 'A scientific theory of *Ars Memoriae*: Spatial view cells in a continuous attractor network with linked items', *Hippocampus*, 27 (2017), 570-579.

100 In *De oratore* Cicero recounts the story in the context of a discussion of the five parts of rhetoric. Leaving a banquet hosted by a nobleman named Scopas shortly before its roof collapsed, Simonides was able to identify the disfigured bodies of his fellow guests having remembered the places at which they were seated around the table. From this he inferred that an ordered arrangement of discrete mental images is important for memory.

The art of memory, which is essentially a system for the *organization* of memory impressions to enable their accurate and fluid recall, operates through the interplay of mental and material artefacts, and mental and physical architectural space, as well as between the passive, static processes of imprinting in a particular order and the active, dynamic process of mentally 'walking' back along that path to retrieve the impressions. As Yates shows, the imagined, inner architecture of the memory palace (which has its material corelative in the elaborate memory theatres of Giulio Camillo and Robert Fludd) composed of *loci* and *sedes*, structures and organizes – in a sense stylizes – the processes of natural memory: it adds a layer of metaphoricity to what is, in the period, conceptualized as literal. [101]

Today, situated approaches to memory attend to how various coordinated contexts — including neural, corporeal, affective, technological, institutional and political — shape, constrain and enable functions and practices of remembering. Remembering is understood not as an isolated, private, intracranial process, but as an interpersonal, collaborative skill, which is enacted or instantiated across various features of our environments.[102] On this view, external resources — note and sketchbooks, cultural artefacts, different forms of notation, other people — are not understood as merely adding supplementary storage capacity, but as participating in the mind. In parallel, not all cognitive technologies are located outside the skin: by internalizing the mediating function of artefacts, we co-opt a range of 'inner' prostheses. Within 4E approaches to cognition, and the approaches to literature that draw on them, the topic of memory as an embodied, distributed, scaffolded, and situated process has inspired an ever-growing body of work. During the past few decades, situated and ecological approaches to memory have come to (re)occupy something like the mainstream,

101 Yates, *The Art of Memory*, pp. 2-26.

[102] See, for example, John Sutton, 'Remembering', *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, ed. by Phillip Robbins and Murat Aydede (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), pp. 217-235. For an overview of recent work on embodied memory, see Christian Tewes and Thomas Fuchs, 'Editorial Introduction: The Formation of Body Memory', 'Embodied Memory', Special Edition of the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 25 (2018), 8-19. Contemporary extended, embodied and distributed approaches to memory, which all engage in a rethinking of dualism, are indebted, if not always explicitly, to the work of Henri Bergson in *Matière et mémoire: essai sur le arelation du corps à l'esprit* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1896) and to that of Maurice Halbwachs on collective or group memory, see especially *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1925) and *La mémoire collective* (Paris: PUF, 1950), which explores how shared remembering among members of a group — among musicians, in families and religious worship — is a form of mnemonic community which transcends the incomplete nature of individual memory. In reconstructing the past, we draw not only on the fragments we hold on our own, but draw on the resources of our social groups, material symbols and cultural practices. On the role of commemorative re-enactment and prescribed bodily practice in preserving versions of the past, as well as skilled performance ('habitual skilled remembering', a more specialized form of the broader category of motor memory or procedural memory), see also Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), pp. 72-104.

replacing the computational, cognitivist models which held sway around the middle of the last century. Taking a more longue durée view, there is much in the contemporary ecological and situated approach that was also at work in the early modern period. Then, as now, the crux of memory lies in the intersection between personal and collective narratives. The public, social dimensions of memory — its broader cultural, ethical, political and polemical aspects, and how these relate to forgetting or collective amnesia and place— analyzed by thinkers including Halbswachs, Nora, Ricoeur, and Huyssens, inhere within a prior psychophysiological, or neuroscientific account of individual memory: societies and communities that remember and forget are composed of remembering, and forgetting, members.[103] Nora's political-architectural concept of 'lieux de mémoire' is likewise about the *croisée* between private cognition and public 'place'; the interaction between the individual mind and its experience with sites of memory, which encompass shared practices and rites.

The phrase in the Chapter title —'Chaque piece en son siege' — is from an essay which in some respects best represents Montaigne's dramatization of the intersection of perspectives on history, narrative and memory, 'De l'exercitation':

> Je peins principalement mes cogitations, subject informe, qui ne peut tomber en production ouvragere. A toute peine le puis je coucher en ce corps aerée de la voix. Des plus sages hommes et des plus devots ont vescu fuyants tous apparents effects. Les effects diroyent plus de la Fortune que de moy. Ils tesmoignent leur roole, non pas le mien, si ce n'est conjecturalement et incertainement: eschantillons d'une montre particuliere. Je m'estalle entier: c'est un Skeletos où, d'une veue, les veines, les muscles, les tendons paroissent, chaque piece en son siege. L'effect de la toux en produisoit une partie; l'effect de la palleur ou battement de coeur, un'autre, et doubteusement. Ce ne sont mes gestes que j'escris, c'est moy, c'est mon essence. (II, 6, 379)

This passage marks an important elaboration of the tension Montaigne sets up in II, 18 between the *Essais*' status as both consubstantial and 'membre de ma vie': both whole and limb. This tension and indeterminacy is a fulcrum for conveying Montaigne's sense of the metaphysics of composition, which is framed as a puzzle whose pieces only partially fit together in a kind of 'marqueterie'.[104] As he moves between first and third person perspectives, from spying 'inward' to witnessing himself as 'tierce', Montaigne oscillates between a notion of

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103 Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1925); Pierre Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire,* 3 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992); Paul Ricoeur, *La Mémoire, l'Histoire, l'Oubli* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), Andreas Huyssens, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford: SUP, 2003).

104 'Mon livre est tousjours un. Sauf qu'à mesure qu'on se met à le renouveller, afin que l'acheteur ne s'en aille les mains du tout vuides, je me donne loy d'y attacher (comme ce n'est qu'une marqueterie mal jointe), quelque embleme supernumeraire. Ce ne sont que surpoids, qui ne condamnent point la premiere forme, mais donnent quelque pris particulier à chacune des suivantes par une petite subtilité ambitieuse.' (III, 9, 964). On Montaigne's sense of 'marqueterie' see Barbara C. Bowen, 'What does Montaigne mean by "marqeterie"', *Studies in Philology,* 67 (1970), 147-155.

ideal or total entanglement between ontology and discourse, and the sense that such integration is never quite complete. One of the main ideas of the essay is that his horseriding accident has afforded him a glimpse, a rehearsal, a sample, of death: contingency has sampled necessity. By the time the reader reaches this passage, situated towards the end of the essay, we have followed Montaigne's account of his accident, in which he falls from his horse one league from home, and of the complex sequence of his states of mind as he regains consciousness. Here Montaigne integrates the 'Skeletos' or 'anatomie seche'— seen by Montaigne firsthand in the house of Felix Platter in Basel in 1580 as he tells us in the *Journal*— as a model for thinking about the dynamic between self-study, or self-dissection, and composition.[105] In a sense which will emerge later in the thesis, in the early modern period the model can be understood to work cognitively both as a type of accommodation and of scaffolding, a technical means of auxiliary, provisional but essential support for further understanding and knowledge.

'Chaque piece en son siege' is a deliberately static image of localized parts within an organized system, which contrasts with the other more dynamic, physiological aspects of the passage. A pedagogical tool and scientific artefact, the skeletos links structural and functional representation in a way that maps anatomical loci onto the quasi-architectural *loci* of memory. In yet another role, the Skeletos functions as it does in 'Que philosopher c'est apprendre a mourir', as a *memento mori*, inscribing it within the visual allegorical tradition of the *Vanitas*, at the intersection between the perspectives of art and science. [106]

Montaigne draws on the Scholastic distinction between essence (those properties of a substance which establish and sustain its identity) and accident (those secondary qualities a substance has only contingently) to convey another aspect of consubstantiality: how outward actions or deeds ('effets') and 'gestes' relate to his essential self, how form relates to substance and the particular to the universal. Replying to hypothetical critiques that he should be bearing witness to his own life through visible action ('entendent ils que je tesmoigne de moy par ouvrages et effects', 379) rather than words, he points out that some of the most wise and devout men have led lives without outward sign of activity. Works and deeds are difficult to interpret men by, as they say more about the role or part of chance or accidents of Fortune than they bear witness to a person's essential nature; they are

[105] Montaigne, *Journal de voyage,* ed. by François Rigolot (Paris: PUF, 1992), p. 15. All references in this study are to this edition.
[106] 'Ainsi faisoyent les Egyptiens, qui, au milieu de leurs festins et parmy leur meilleure chere, faisoient aporter l'Anatomie seche d'un corps d'homme mort, pour servir d'advertissement aux conviez.' (I, 20, 87)

(in Florio's translation) 'parcels of a particular shew', 'samples and reveal only particulars' (Screech), 'samples which display only details' (Frame).[107] Endless particulars do not add up to a coherent whole or afford knowledge of one's necessary nature: they are always fundamentally extraneous and contingent ('tierce'), rather like 'tous autres livres' in contrast to his consubstantial book (in 'Du démentir').

Yet elsewhere, Montaigne seems to reverse this whole-parts logic, saying that actions and 'occupations' — which he equates with the 'parcelle' — can show the entire man: 'Chaque parcelle, chasque occupation de l'homme l'accuse et le montre également qu'un autre (I, 50, 303). In this essay, 'De Democritus et Heraclitus', Montaigne expresses consubstantiality as capturing his 'maistresse forme', describing his composition as a range of samples or pieces of the whole, 'eschantillons depris de leur piece' (302). The 'eschantillon' shares the same incomplete ontological and epistemic status of the 'lopin', the 'piece', and the 'parcelle' , which are all terms freighted with conceptual importance throughout the *Essais.* While the term is located in the same broad semantic field as a number of other words including specimen, model, pattern (all carrying an implication of representativeness or exemplarity), 'eschantillon' connotes commerce and trade (in Old French 'eschandiller' means to verify the measures of merchants). In contrast, Montaigne seeks to uncover the whole, essential configuration, or deep structural pattern, of himself, beyond the appearances and accidents (mere epistemic swatches) of deed and 'ouvrage'; so he splays himself out, showing how his entire existential contexture is arranged and connected, each piece in its proper place, constituting a unique embodied whole whose 'plan' cannot be mapped onto any other: 'Qui me defend d'en parler selon mon sens, experience et usage, qu'il ordonne à l'architecte de parler des bastimens non selon soy, mais selon son voisin'. (379). Yet Montaigne's conceit is that the opposition between particular and universal, part and whole, contingency and essence or necessity, self and 'voisin', which he has just set up, is already unwoven by his claim that his own pattern or measure, though of a particular person operating within specific historical coordinates, bears the timeless imprint or proportions of the whole human condition: 'Chaque homme porte la forme entiere de l'humaine condition' (III, 2, 805), adding after 1588, 'Les autheurs se communiquent au peuple par quelque marque particuliere et estrangere; moy le premier par mon estre universel' (805).

[107] Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, trans. by Michael Screech (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 426; *The Complete Works of Montaigne*, trans. by Donald Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 274.

The model and the 'eschantillon' — like the Skeletos — are both devices of display and *standard* or typical measurement or example, scientifically, artistically and ethically; the model shows a congruent scaled-down whole, while the 'eschantillon' behaves metonymically as a typical (one might say microcosmic) fragment of the whole. As such, their ontological status, and their scientific, epistemological role or part in learning and explanation carry a fertile sense of suspension that ties in with Eucharistic indeterminacies that shaped the time. Montaigne draws on these in modelling his own project, probing the relation between author, writing, and mind; in this light 'consubstantiality' is not so much a figure of perfect communion as the cohabitation and encompassing of different, not necessarily compatible, perspectives on the physics and metaphysics of composition.

In Part One of this chapter, I focus on early modern representations. The categories of natural and artificial are shown to imbricate and interact in important ways that are relevant to how nature and artifice were conceptualized, especially in relation to human cognition as part of creaturely cognition more broadly. In Part Two, I sketch out a number of contexts, discourses and their corresponding understandings of memory, both natural and artificial, in the period, in relation to changing understandings of the relationship between science, nature and art. I trace out a brief history of artificial memory or *ars memorativa* and its unstable value in sixteenth century culture. I reflect on the significance of the 'quasi-trasse' in 'Des menteurs' as a way of thinking about dynamics of memory and forgetting, presence and absence, and give three 'samples' of the way memory and forgetting interact in relation to composition in Montaigne's text: in relation to the Humanist practices of commonplacing and *imitatio*, in relation to artificial memory in the form of the 'protocolle' (again in 'Des menteurs'), and in relation to the 'vraye image' of himself to which Montaigne refers in 'De la vanité', but then edits out.

Part One: Representing the Memory

Il méssiet à tout autre de se faire cognoistre, qu'à celuy qui a dequoy se faire imiter, et duquel la vie et les opinions peuvent servir de patron. (II, 18, 663)

Representations of memory used in particular periods of history capture an intellectual climate and themselves function as a form of memory, or what one critic has called 'guide fossils,' many of which continue to inform our everyday language of memory and forgetting.[108] Such images often signal the projection 'inside' of external devices and artefacts which aid and supplement natural memory. [109] These supports, which arm us against its frailties, become integrated into our understanding of how memory works, in a quasi-biological feedback loop.

In this section I consider two of Montaigne's most salient and recurrent images of memory — memory as storehouse or *magasin* and as instrument — in the context of early modern constructions of memory and their ancient or medieval ancestry. The apparently banal (because conventional) nature of these often interconnected images is what makes them interesting on two counts: their entrenchment in our ways of thinking is revealing, and Montaigne's particular use of them often subverts or complicates what might be called their standard use.

In the context of relevance theory, which informs my examination of metaphor in this thesis, the indeterminacy of metaphor and its non-conformism to truth conditional semantics — involving what have been called 'semantic leaps' — is what makes it an 'alternative route' to achieving optimal relevance, which human cognition is geared to.[110] Metaphor is a strong example of a 'loose' use, which conveys an array of weak implicatures, typical of poetic uses of language.[111] Indeed, the whole idea of an array of implicatures has a distinctly copious ring to it. Although some take historical (pre-mid-twentieth century) portrayals of metaphor as 'mere colourful language' — as Seana Coulson puts it 'aesthetically pleasing but without cognitive import' — this doesn't do justice to it (or for that matter to the notion of colour which is itself a powerful intentional metaphor in ancient rhetoric and medieval neuropsychology).[112]Aristotle thinks of the understanding of a simple metaphor as a stimulating exercise in analogical equation-solving. Use of metaphor activates, and invites one to explore, a

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[108] Douwe Draaisma, *Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas About the Mind,* trans. by Paul Vincent (Cambridge: CUP, 2000); Henry Roediger, 'Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology', *Memory and Cognition*, 8 (1980), 231-46; Kurt Danziger, *Marking the Mind: A History of Memory* (Cambridge: CUP, 2008); Stephen Rose, *The Making of Memory* (London: Bantam Press, 1992), especially Chapter 4. On models of memory in the context of religion, see 'Models of Mind and Memory in the Cognition of Religion: a Case Study in Early Quakerism', in *Cognitive Ecologies and the History of Remembering,* pp. 107-131.

[109] I put inside in inverted commas to signal the potentially figurative nature of categories like inside and outside, internal and external.

110 For an exposition of the main tenets of Relevance Theory, especially in connection to metaphor, see Chapter Two.

[111] This has been discussed in relevance theory under 'poetic effect'. See Wilson and Sperber, 'Pragmatics and Modularity', *Chicago Linguistic Society,* 22 (1986), 68-74.

[112] Seana Coulson, *Semantic Leaps: Frame-shifting and Conceptual Blending in Meaning Construction* (CUP, 2001).

potentially fruitful analogy. In *De oratore*, Cicero suggests that we have recourse to metaphor for the sake of the pleasure our audience will take in puzzling it out, and the quasi-sensory vividness it brings to the audience's apprehension of whatever we say with its help. [113] In tracing the continuities between early modern, and modern, poetics and the ancient rhetoric from which they developed one understands the revitalized interest from the mid-twentieth century in the apparent power of metaphor to communicate, or at least suggest, something inherently open-ended and resistant to compact literal expression.

Metaphor gets ambiguous press in the *Essais.* Montaigne's treatment of it in 'Sur des vers de Virgile' is embedded in his copious reflection on language, authority, systems and practices of knowledge, imitation, writing, and the sometimes unclear relationship between poetry and living well. In the essay Montaigne performs some magisterial manoeuvring, linking his familiarity with ancient verse to an almost confessional account of his own sexuality. The essay is one of the most significant for grasping Montaigne's embodied perspective on language and writing, and the notion of metaphor as a gradient or continuum – in a sense, a linguistic analogue to the onto-biological notion of *gradus*. Connectedly, it is a meditation on memory; in particular how the creating individual interacts with the Muses (the daughters of Mnemosyne in Greek mythology), and with authors of the past, in engendering his own 'ouvrage.' Isolating the term 'metaphore' in the essay makes little sense; it needs to be read in situ:

> Comme en nostre commun, il s'y rencontre des frases excellentes et des metaphores desquelles la beauté flestrit de vieillesse, et la couleur s'est ternie par maniement trop ordinaire. Mais cela n'oste rien du goust à ceux qui ont bon nez, ny ne desroge à la gloire de ces anciens autheurs qui, comme il est vraysemblable, mirent premierement ces mots en ce lustre. Les sciences traictent les choses trop finement, d'une mode trop artificielle et differente à la commune et naturelle. Mon page faict l'amour et l'entend. Lisez luy Leon Hébreu et Ficin: on parle de luy, de ses pensées et de ses actions, et si il n'y entend rien. Je ne recognois pas chez Aristote la plus part de mes mouvemens ordinaires: on les a couverts et revestus d'une autre robbe pour l'usage de l'eschole. Dieu leur doint bien faire! *Si j'estois du mestier, [C] je naturaliserois l'art autant comme ils artialisent la nature.* [B] Laissons là Bembo et Equicola. Quand j'escris, je me passe bien de la compaignie et souvenance des livres, de peur qu'ils n'interrompent ma forme. Aussi que, à la verité, les bons autheurs m'abattent par trop et rompent le courage. Je fais volontiers le tour de ce peintre, lequel, ayant miserablement representé des coqs, deffendoit à ses garçons qu'ils ne laissassent venir en sa boutique aucun coq naturel (III, 5, 874; my emphasis).

Here is a rich mine of material on Montaigne's understanding of the relationship between nature and art and the interaction between the verbal and visual. The passage is a witty pondering — through an artful combining

[113] Cicero, *De Oratore*, trans. by Harris Rackham, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, University Press, 1948) 3.159–161, pp. 125-127.

of metaphors — on how the 'clothing' of thought defines its substance, and how lustrous poetic garments become dull or worn through overuse in commonplace language or by being touched routinely by ordinary 'hands', where hands stand for the embodied and extended mind as a whole system. Montaigne strums on the cross-fertilization and interplay between rhetorical and ordinary language to explore the distinction between nature and artifice and brings these reflections to bear on the relation between memory and writing, self and other, and between literal and figurative language use. In saying that he deliberately eschews 'la compaignie et souvenance des livres' for fear they will break the integrity of his own 'forme' and spoil his courage, he implicitly draws on the metaphorical and literal dimensions of memory representations (as affections literally imprinted in the organic soul, causing a material alteration, but which are simultaneously metaphorical, as signifying something not 'really' present): steering clear of these allows him to make his own tracks, unencumberd by what has come before (which, as he says elsewhere, is a matter of historical contingency anyway; ideas and truths are not 'owned' by whoever happens to express them first).[114] Yet because Montaigne is steeped, like his contemporaries, in an understanding of thinking and writing as a process of generative *copia,* the idea that he can walk purely in his own footsteps, free from any early modern 'anxiety of influence' can only be interpreted fluidly, as a playful enactment of the literal-metaphorical continuum described in Relevance Theory, to which I return in the next chapter. By extension, the question of Montaigne's disingenuousness, raised by Ann Moss in relation to Montaigne's professed attitude to commonplacing and a big question for any author who claims to be as frank as Montaigne does, can only be assessed as positioned somewhere on a gradient or sliding scale between candour and insincerity, playfulness and earnestness. After all, it is entirely possible that Montaigne himself does not know the *locus* or coordinates of his intended meaning.

In this passage, Montaigne draws on two apparently interconnected distinctions, which have already been set up earlier in the essay (between the ordinary or 'commune' and the poetic, and between the natural and the artificial) and one principal conflation, or blending, of verbal and visual imagery. The natural seems, at first, to be what is 'commune' or 'ordinaire,' and the artificial is aligned with what is different or uncommon. The heightened colours and lustrous verbal imagery deployed by the ancient writers who originally coined them

114 'De l'institution des enfants' (I, 26, 152). I return to this citation briefly in the next part of this Chapter.

become dulled and faded through excessive or routine handling by others ('par maniement trop ordinare'). The 'sciences', represented here by Leone Ebreo (a Jewish Portugese doctor and Neoplatonist), Marsilio Ficino, and Aristotle, treat matters 'd'une mode trop artificielle': Montaigne cannot recognize his own 'mouvemens ordinaires' — physiological and psychological — in Aristotle.

Montaigne's declaration, 'Si j'estois du mestier, je naturaliserois l'art autant comme ils artialisent la nature' is about these processes of transfer and exchange between art and nature, self and other, native and alien— and it is one of Montaigne's ways of recognizing how within his own writing he shifts between participation in and distance from these categories. The counterfactual cast of the sentence — 'Si j'estois du mestier' — conditions its tone and sense, illustrating this dynamic of being 'apart' from and 'a part' of (often articulated in the *Essais* as a 'membre'/ 'corps' dynamic). 'Mestier' is a loaded term in Montaigne's personal lexicon, one he (sometimes) uses to distance himself from all forms of professionalizing discourse and associated jargon, including that of the 'mestier' of writing. Though, as many have noted, this is in large part a socio-economic move, it is also about how he conceives of his writing project as authentic, rather than a job performed. 'Mestier' ('Mister' in English) is closely connected to 'occupation', denoting the practice of a profession, skilled art or handicraft especially those associated with the mechanical arts (*artes mechanichae)* — historically, a craftsman's trade, and the term was used to denote the tools used ('mestier' was used to refer to the loom or frame of a weaver).[115] This ties in directly with consubstantiality: his *Essais* are 'd'une occupation propre' in contrast with all other books, which are 'd'une occupation et fin tierce et estrangere' (II, 18, 665). The adjective 'propre' denotes a range of connected senses: natural, fitting, appropriate, correct, particular, private, and also literal ('au sense propre').[116] In III, 12, he counterfactualizes 'mestier' again — 'si j'en eusse voulu faire mestier d'escrire' (1056-1057), in a passage again, about memory, creativity, nature and artifice:

> Nous autres naturalistes estimons qu'il y aie grande et incomparable preferance de l'honneur de l'invention à l'honneur de l'allegation. Si j'eusse voulu parler par science, j'eusse parlé plus-tost: j'eusse

[115] Cotgrave also notes that the plural form, 'Mestiers', refers to 'A certaine Game wherein all trades are counter feited by signes', which is of potential relevance in relation to Montaigne's attitude to the 'mestier' of medicine and its 'signes' (notably in 'De la phisionomie', III, 12).

[116] Cotgrave lists the following senses: ' One sproper, or peculiar substance, estate, livelyhood, condition; ones owne'.Derrida's analysis and usage of the term 'propre' is useful for thinking about Montaigne's own, particularly in relation to the idea of the trace, supplementarity and 'secondarité' (and how this relates to 'tierce'); see Derrida, 'Différance', in *Marges de la Philosophie,* pp. 2-30. Derrida most often intends all the senses of 'propre' at once: that which is correct, as in 'le sens propre' (proper, literal meaning), and that which is one's own, that which may be owned, that which is legally, correctly owned— deploying all the ties between proper, property, and propriety.

> escript du temps plus voisin de mes estudes, que j'avois d'esprit et de memoire; et me fusse plus fié à la vigueur de cet aage là qu'a cettuy-icy, si j'en eusse voulu faire mestier d'escrire.

Montaigne adds the 'd'escrire' by hand after 1588, to a heavily emended page, which records many additions in the margins which Montaigne then had second (and third) thoughts about.

The significance of this hypothetical sheen is that it indicates alternative potentialities and outcomes, which may have materialized under other conditions. On one level it is part of the same rather otherworldly dimension of the *Essais* existing alongside its robust corporeity, evoked in the part-phantom 'vraye image' and, differently, the 'quassi-trasse'. And these 'other conditions', in which life and writing are both Montaigne's art, exist within the *Essais* themselves: 'Mon mestier et mon art, c'est vivre' (II, 6, 378) and, in II, 18, he identifies as 'celuy qui en faict [m'estre rendu compte de soy] son estude, son ouvrage et son mestier, qui s'engage à un registre de durée.' (665)

'Naturaliser' denotes then, as now, to make native, or invest with the same privileges as a native-born subject, and is among other things (including association with a scientific stance on reading the book of nature) an allusion to Humanist practices of imitation. The verb 'artialiser', which appears to be a neologism, appears in Cotgrave as 'To make artificiall; or, to make an art of'. [117] Thus the prima facie sense of Montaigne's compact, chiastic, quasi palindromic sentence — about him reversing the process of making nature artificial, by making art natural —is unravelled at a fundamental level: Montaigne's language corrodes these distinctions. This is not to suggest, of course, that he flattens and reduces everything to a relativistic mess. But the energy of his writing weaves together the poetic with the mechanical and technical and unravels by turns, and in so doing thinks about the place of composition — as an art, a science and a function of nature — in important, if necessarily inconclusive, ways.

As we have seen, there is tension between the static and the dynamic in conceptualizing memory as a dual process of storage and retrieval corresponding with the processes at work in the commonplacing tradition – in which a fund of communal places or *topoi* can be drawn on in making new configurations and 'tracks' and in generating logical arguments (*sedes argumentorum*). Intertextuality and Humanist *imitatio*, too, are analogously

117 Randle Cotgrave, *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (London: Adam Islip, 1611).

dynamical in nature: the author being cited or recalled works, or is coupled, with the author doing the citing or recalling as an extended system, across time and space. As Andrea Frisch notes, 'The *Essays* are an illustration of a memory network constructed out of a deep yet perpetually open engagement with the various sites it links. They are thus as "mediatized" as any digital publication.'[118] The notion of open engagement captures the sense that the text is not fixed, but constantly updates and recalibrates itself, like the values in an equation when their variables are changed.

Given the importance of the notion of storage, it is unsurprising that the memorial storeroom or warehouse has been a recurrent image used in conceptualizing memory throughout history. As an image it gives rise to several interlinked metaphors for the activity of an educated mind but all, as Carruthers observes, centre on the notion of a *designed* memory as the inventory of knowledge, and especially of those truths of ethics, polity and law which are 'copious' in their very nature.[119] It is essentially static model: the emphasis on spatial subdivision mirrors the *loci* of artificial memory, with 'chaque piece en son siege' (the ordered compartments of learned or trained memory), which finds material form and presence in the Humanist common-place book. 'Store', denoting to stock, furnish or supply, suggests materials gathered with which to re-store in future, and so carries with it a sense of 'fulfilling a demand' or making up for or compensating a lack or absence.[120]

In contrast, in Book X of the *Confessions*, Augustine's intensely spatial description of searching through the vast territory of memory, tracking down memories through recollection — apparently modelled on aspects of classical architectural mnemonic with which, as a trained orator, he was familiar — becomes an embodied process of Platonic self-anamnesis recast in his own terms, of gathering together in one mental place the constituent parts of his own extended identity over time.[121] The range of images Augustine uses for memory in the *Confessions* are drawn both from the natural world (fields, caves and caverns) and from the humanly built

118 Andrea Frisch, 'Montaigne on Memory', in *The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne*, p. 662.
[119] Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, p.34.
[120] This ties in with the 'eschantillon' as a sample of stock (II, 6) and, as we will see in the next chapter, with the samples of evidence of intended meaning in Relevance theory.
[121] 'So I shall transcend even my natural life force, and climb in stages to him who made me. I come to the fields and the grand palaces of my memory where there are treasure stores of countless impressions brought there from every imaginable kind of thing that my senses perceived. Stowed away there is everything we reflect upon either by accentuating or depreciating it or in any way whatever modifying the actual things which our sense apprehended; and anything else that has been preserved and deposited and that forgetfulness has not yet consumed and buried'. *Confessions* X 8.12 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 86.

environment, which above all is domestic in nature. The language Augustine uses in relation to oblivion — which 'engulfs' and 'buries' but does not efface is influential in how forgetting is later conceptualized.[122]
I now turn in greater detail to Montaigne's own use of the storehouse trope.

I. The *magasin*

Montaigne employs the storeroom image several times in the *Essais*, expressed by the noun 'magasin', defined as 'publike storehouse, or warehouse (Cotgrave), and 'Lieu où l'on met une quantité de marchandise'. The public dimension overlaps with the archive, as the location of public records, as well as the statue, as a public effigy. In the context of his critique of certain uses of memory in 'Des menteurs', he writes, 'le magasin de la memoire est volontiers plus fourny de matiere que n'est celuy de l'invention' (I, 9, 35). The copious matter of memory, thought to nourish invention in the Middle Ages, takes a solid material form, as though the memory is overstocked with images, overwhelmed, impeding new thoughts. In 'De la praesumption', memory is 'le receptacle et l'estuy de la science que la memoire: l'ayant si deffaillante, je n'ay pas fort à me plaindre, si je ne sçay guiere.' (II, 17, 651).

This 'magasin' is one example of many in which we can discern a tension between thinking of memory — and by extension, of books — either as a repository of stale, decontextualized, shelved or archived information, on one hand, or as a creative, reconstructive, and abundantly relevant and fertile activity on the other. In a line from 'De la ressemblance des enfans aux peres', Montaigne distances himself from being identified as a 'maker of books' and distances his book from the 'magasin' model of memory, privileging his present and essential 'commoditez' (that which is proper, apt or fitting to a particular person): 'Je suis moins faiseur de livres que de nulle autre besoigne. J'ay desiré de la suffisance pour le service de mes commoditez presentes et essentielles, non pour en faire magasin et reserve à mes heritiers' (II, 37, 784). Here, there are strong parallels both with the passage from 'De l'exercitation', which we considered earlier, where 'effects' are mere 'eschantillons d'une montre particuliere', in contrast to the essence which he is in the process of writing ('Ce ne sont mes gestes que j'escris, c'est moy, c'est mon essence', 379), and with the central consubstantiality passage from 'Du démentir'.

[122] On Augustine and forgetting see Philippe Frieden, 'Non lieu de l'oubli', in *Figures de l'oubli (IVe-XVIe siècles)*, pp. 19-34.

The 'magasin', here, is something separate, like an attachment or extension, reminding us of Montaigne's remark in 'de l'institution des enfans': 'Or il ne faut pas attacher le sçavoir à l'ame, il l'y faut incorporer' (1 26, 140). The 'magasin' and the 'reserve' also have a particular relation to temporality: they both signal deferral, the setting aside of goods for future use or consumption (here, by his 'héretiers', a significant word choice, tied into the Renaissance 'book as progeny' trope and identifying those who 'come after'; as being genetically and legally bound to him, as successors and heirs to his property, that which is propre to him; in other words, his 'occupation propre' - his consubstantial book), which keeps them unintegrated, withheld from the present moment. This negative interpretive slant on 'magasin' is in tension with the notion expressed in 'De l'expérience' that his *Essais* are a paper memory, standing in lieu of his inadequate natural memory: the latter casts the deferral as a transfer between the internal, biological memory trace (later conceptualized as an 'engram') and the outward, written trace or 'exogram', which is also in part a temporal deferral.[123] *Prima facie*, it is likewise in tension with the idea, expressed a few lines earlier in the same essay (II, 37) that his *Essais* are a 'logement' for his 'conditions et humeurs', 'un corps solide qui puisse durer quelques années ou quelques jours apres moy, où vous les retrouverez, quand il vous plaira vous en refreschir la memoire,' (783). The key difference seems to be that the 'store' — unlike the 'logement', a present habitation — removes things from the stream of 'real time', when Montaigne's intention is to remain in an enduring, continuous present, resolutely unarchived. Thus, in a sense, the 'magasin' is read as a figure of anachronism, even as Montaigne's project or plan to endure through his book beyond his 'natural' life deliberately plays with the very idea of anachronism and natural duration. Montaigne's alternative model is, to borrow Cave's words, 'a ramifying network of movement between fragments of stored knowledge (which in the process become possibilities of thought)': the 'pieces' are not static, positioned in stable *loci* but part of a dynamic ecology.[124] The tissue of connections between memory, pedagogy and composition mean that there is a deep correspondence between the cognitive project of the *Essais* and Montaigne's transformation of the commonplace book (itself a Humanist pedagogical conventional genre), by inventing a new one, the essay. Through improvisation, convention is transformed, overspilling its boundaries.

[123] On engrams and exograms see Merlin Donald, *Origins of the Modern Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1991), and John Sutton, 'Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process', in *The Extended Mind*, ed. by Richard Menary (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010), pp. 189-226.
[124] Cave, 'Thinking with Commonplaces', *Retrospectives*, p. 44.

The 'magasin de la mémoire' takes a slightly different form in 'Sur des vers de Virgile', as also in 'De l'art de conférer':

> Gallus parle simplement, par ce qu'il conçoit simplement. Horace ne se contente point d'une superficielle expression, elle le trahiroit. Il voit plus cler et plus outre dans la chose; son esprit crochette et furette *tout le magasin des mots et des figures pour se représenter*; et les luy faut outre l'ordinaire, comme sa conception est outre l'ordinaire. Plutarque dit qu'il veid le langage latin par les choses; icy de mesme: le sens esclaire et produict les parolles; non plus de vent, ains de chair et d'os. (III, 5, 873; my emphasis)

> Ce n'est pas assez de compter les experiences, il les faut poiser et assortir; et les faut avoir digerées et alambiquées, pour en tirer les raisons et conclusions qu'elles portent. Il ne fut jamais tant d'historiens. Bon est il tousjours et utile de les ouyr, car ils nous fournissent tout plain de belles instructions et louables du magasin de leur memoire (III, 8, 931)

In the first passage, the notion of storage with which the 'magasin' is bound up transforms from a static resource into a model closer to the *thesaurus* (treasury), or *arca sapientae* (chest of wisdom): a trove affording the forms of true and adequate expression: Horace's mind 'picks open' (like a lock) and ferrets out the materials for self-representation from the vast varied stores of memory.[125] This adequation of concept and 'parole' — the adequacy between intended meaning and interpretation — is enacted through the quasi materiality of these mental artefacts which populate the 'magasin': Plutarch 'sees' language through things, they are not immaterial abstractions but like flesh and bone. In 'De l'art de conférer', the 'magasin' of the historian's memory seems to be relegated, once again, to static shelves of information, in contrast to lived experiences which must undergo processes of digestion and distillation in order for the individual to learn from them. Here, first-hand autobiographical memory is privileged over second-hand memories furnished by the historian's store, even though this fund can admittedly furnish 'belles instructions et louables'. As these examples indicate, Montaigne ascribes varying degrees or kinds of value to memory conceived via the conventional idea of the warehouse or storeroom. In part, these differences of value turn on the distinction between the 'magasin' of autobiographical memory and the store of second-hand or third-hand memories (or, we might say, the distinction between memories which are 'propre' or those that are 'tierce'), to which I return in relation to the notion of prosthetic memory in Chapter Three.

II. *L'outil*

The second main concept Montaigne uses in relation to memory is the tool or instrument:

> C'est un outil de merveilleux service que la memoire, et sans lequel le jugement faict bien à peine son office: elle me manque du tout. Ce qu'on me veut proposer, il faut que ce soit à parcelles. Car de

[125] On the 'arca sapientae' see Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, pp. 42-45.

> respondre à un propos où il y eut plusieurs divers chefs, il n'est pas en ma puissance. Je ne sçaurois recevoir une charge sans tablettes. ('De la praesumption, II, 17, 649)

The word 'outil' (or 'util') is far from being reserved for the memory, but it is conspicuously a term Montaigne employs in relation to human cognition. This is hardly surprising given the correlation between cognitive 'sophistication' and tool-designing and making capacities, though in other respects it is at variance with his dismantling of such hierarchies of intelligence. 'Util' is used in relation to the mind as a 'whole' as well as to the mind's constituent 'parts' or functions. [126] Montaigne's use of 'util' also encompasses broader cognitive categories such as 'science', rhetoric and language itself.[127] Here, as elsewhere, Montaigne insists on his reliance on material aids which enable him to externalize and fix information: 'tablettes' here function in a similar way to the 'protocolle', as his memory's extension into, and scaffolding by, the material environment. Montaigne explicitly thinks of them as an extension of mind, intention and agency, beyond biological death: in 'Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir', he notes, 'Quelcun, feuilletant l'autre jour mes tablettes, trouva un memoire de quelque chose, que je vouloy estre faite apres ma mort' (I, 20, 88). The association of 'util' and 'ornement' in I, 26 is just one way Montaigne complicates any straightforward utilitarian reading: though 'ornement' suggests equipment or trappings (kit), though its association with the idea of decoration it becomes ambiguous: Montaigne might intend superficial or cosmetic embellishment, or a deeper aesthetic and ethical grace and honour. The plural form, 'utils', has a different range of use: from the literal and artefactual— 'outils du mesnage' (II, 17), 'outils et operation du chirurgien' (II, 12) to 'les utils naturels et humains que Dieu nous a donnez' (441). Differing degrees of literal or material artefactuality can be traced in use of the semantically related nouns 'instrument' (or 'instrumens') — associated with musical, medical or scientific, investigative contexts — and 'ustensile', usually used to refer to domestic and household implements, especially in the kitchen. Other broadly related terms — such as 'engin' and 'machine'— belong to different orders of artefactuality and complexity; I focus mainly on the former category.

[126] 'Apologie': 'Nostre esprit est un util vagabond, dangereux et temeraire' (II, 12, 559); 'Sur des vers de Virgile': 'nostre esprit, dangereux util en desreglement!', (III, 5, 879); 'De Democritus et Heraclitus': 'Le jugement est un util à tous subjects, et se mesle par tout' (I, 50, 301).

[127] 'De l'institution des enfans': 'C'est un grand ornement que la science, et un util de merveilleux service (I, 26, 149); 'De la vanité des paroles': 'C'est [la Rhetorique] un util inventé pour manier et agiter une tourbe et une commune desreiglée, et est util qui ne s'employe qu'aux estats malades, comme la medecine (I, 51, 305); 'Du démentir': 'C'est [la parolle] le seul util par le moien duquel se communiquent nos volontez et nos pensées, c'est le truchement de nostre ame' (II, 18, 667).

The transition from 'ustensile' to 'util' tracks the interplay between material and mental artefacts which is at the heart of artificial memory and of much thinking about biological or natural memory.

In the fifteenth century, the early Humanist German theologian and philosopher Nicolaus Cusanus reflected closely, in his *De mente*, on the nature of artefacts — wooden spoons, glass prisms, a religious icon — in the context of human creativity in relation to God, and in *De coniecturis* wrote about using conjectures or surmises to rise to better understanding of the truth.[128] Montaigne owned a copy of Cusanus's works, and the latter thinker's method of borrowing symbols from geometry to articulate his vision of man's epistemic condition and striving may have influenced Montaigne's understanding of cognitive gadgets. For Cusanus the act of invention is also an act of measurement: the human mind is a living measure [*illam mensuram esse vivam*], and the artefact is an externalized image of our interior capabilities which both measures us and enables us to measure. The compass provides him with the image of the artefactual reflex of the mind itself: it is a living pair of compasses [*circinus vivus*].[129] These ideas on the connection between art and man's nature also find significant expression in Renaissance theory of art, most notably in the thought of Leonardo— whose notebooks contain many sketches of compasses, positioned within the human interior — and Alberti (whose notebooks Cusanus annotated), in relation to the God-like nature of the virtuoso artist, capable of drawing out immaterial, spiritual traits into visible form.[130] The circularity between mind and artefact mirrors the circular line traced by the compass, which can also be understood as a function of the medieval concept of *adaequatio,* which reappears in relation to natural history and natural theology in the 'Apologie'.[131] In that essay, Montaigne subverts this figure of commensurability between man's mind and Nature: the 'compas' — like the astrolabe — becomes instrumental emblem of our ignorance and lack of self-knowledge:

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[128] The full title of Cusanus's work is *Idiota de mente,* reflecting his belief that the plainspeaking lay person or lay philosopher (*idiota*) often has more wisdom to teach than the highly trained and eloquent philosopher.
[129] Pauline Moffatt Watts, *Nicolaus Cusanus: A Fifteenth Century Vision of Man* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), p. 148. On Nicholas of Cusa on human knowledge and dignity in relation to God, and necessity and contingency, see also Charles H. Lohr , 'Metaphysics', in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, pp. 535-638 (548-557).
[130] Montaigne had a copy of the works of Cusanus, bought on his journey to Italy, and as Jan Miernowski has shown, is negative theology influenced Montaigne's approach to hermeneutics and skepticism, which considers learned ignorance as the humility of faith. See Miernowski, *L'Ontologie de la contradiction sceptique: Pour l'étude de la métaphysique des "Essais"* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 1998); 'Montaigne on Truth and Skepticism', *Oxford Handbook of Montaigne,* pp. 545-561. On Cusanus's possible influence on Montaigne see also Ian Maclean, *Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance* (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), p. 105, esp. n. 21.
[131] See Chapter Two.

> Et qui ne s'entend en soy, en quoy se peut-il entendre? « *quasi vero mensuram ullius rei possit agere, qui sui nesciat.* » [132] Vrayement Protagoras nous en comtoit de belles, faisant l'homme la mesure de toutes choses, qui ne sceut jamais seulement la sienne. Si ce n'est luy, sa dignité ne permettra pas qu'autre creature ayt cet advantage. Or, luy estant en soy si contraire et l'un jugement en subvertissant l'autre sans cesse, cette favorable proposition n'estoit qu'une risée qui nous menoit à conclurre par necessité la neantise du compas et du compasseur. (557)

In *Cognition in the Wild*, Hutchins proposes an understanding of the mediating role of artefacts which shifts the perspective from technology (in the form of compasses, rulers, astrolabes and so on) as situated 'in between' mental events; instead, mediating technologies stand 'with' the user. Artefacts have their own cognitive 'life' rather than being purely objective and external to mind.[133] Artefacts are 'interiorized', replaced by what Sutton calls inner 'surrogates' or prostheses, which cause lasting changes in our minds and in how we understand them (scaffolding is an example to which I return).[134] These perspectives on the mediating role of artefacts in cognition recasts the boundaries of inner and outer, nature and artifice, in ways which resonate in the *Essais*.

III. Internalized Technologies of Memory and 'as if' thinking

While Montaigne does not explicitly use the word 'representation' when drawing on historical philosophical-poetic ways of thinking about mind and memory — for example as a storehouse or instrument — and goes straight to these images without dwelling, explicitly, on their intermediary nature, these are all technological modes of understanding what it is to retain fragments of information, and of the past.[135]

In the *Essais* the 'modelle' (or 'modele') is both a material object ('le modele d'un navire' (III, 13) and the more abstract pattern or structure under which something larger is brought in order to be understood. In the *Journal* entry for the Italian town of Prato, which he passes through in June 1581, Montaigne uses it to mean 'pattern' in a material sense but to denote an organized structure rather than an object: 'la forme de ce bastimant est le modele de Pratolino' (152). In Cotgrave (1611), 'modelle' is 'A modell, patterne, mould, plot, forme, frame'. In Nicot (1606), it is that which 'l'imagier ou fondeur fait de terre ou de plastre pour puis apres

[132] 'As though the measure of anything could be taken by him that knows not the measure of himself', in Pliny the Elder, *Historia naturalis* II.1.
[133] See also Lambros Malafouris and Colin Renfrew, *The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind* (Cambridge: McDonald Institute, 2010).
[134] Sutton 'Remembering', p. 228.
[135] It is not a word Montaigne uses extensively; indeed he only uses it seven times in the *Essais* and once in the *Journal.* The argument for its significance is therefore more on conceptual grounds than its explicit presence in Montaigne's texts.

faire l'image de pierre ou quelque ouurage de fonte à la semblance d'iceluy'.[136]The Middle French 'modelle' derives from classical Latin *modulus* (standard unit of measurement, becoming, in the sixteenth century, an architectural unit of length) via the Italian *modello*, denoting a figure made of wood or other materials used to make a mould in metal casting.

Models are a form of 'truchement' between the mental and the material, the privately imagined and publicly visualized which makes them rich sites of information about how we think. Models are constructs designed to simplify, and sometimes idealize, complex processes and behaviours to enable analysis and prediction, but they also generate new knowledge by giving form to what cannot be held purely in the 'mind's eye'. For example, Hutchins argues that the astrolabe — a mechanical model of the heavens — 'encodes a kind of knowledge that cannot be represented internally'.[137] One question concerning the relation between models and metaphors is whether the notion of the model is itself being deployed metaphorically when used outside of specific disciplinary contexts, such as mathematics (or other strongly quantitative disciplines). Max Black's taxonomy of 'cognitive models' — including scale models, analogue models, mathematical, theoretical — surveys the conceptual stakes in various kinds of model.[138] Black differentiates between two fundamentally different understandings of how models work: models can be used as heuristic fictions (as a mode of 'as if' or counterfactual thinking) or used existentially (the model describes what actually exists). Using the example of memory-as-writing, this is the distinction between thinking of memory *as if* it were writing (on a wax tablet) or thinking that it does actually constitute a form of writing or notation. This distinction resembles the distinction between metaphoric and literal interpretations.

The 'quasi' dimension of models — the counterfactual, 'as if' or conjectural thinking seen in the images of memory — characteristic of the use of some kinds of model can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle for whom it is impossible even to think without a mental picture. The same affection is involved in thinking as in drawing a diagram; for in this case although we make no use of the fact that the magnitude of a triangle is a finite quantity, yet we draw it as having a finite magnitude. In the same way the man who is thinking, though he may not be thinking of a finite magnitude, still puts a finite magnitude before his eyes. And even if the nature of

136 Jean Nicot, *Thresor de la langue francoyse* (Paris: David Douceur, 1606).
[137] Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild*, p. 97.
[138]Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

the object is quantitative, but indeterminate, he still puts before him a finite magnitude.[139] In *De memoria* Aristotle notes that our means of distinguishing memory images from other images involved in all thought is our awareness of a time lapse built into the memory image. Our understanding of this temporal 'gap', and the relative duration of time more generally, is rooted in an imaging process similar to that by which we judge magnitude, by constructing a sort of scale model in the mind.[140] Later Aquinas describes the way we come to have conceptual knowledge — for example a concept such as 'curvature' — by means of a hypothesis, as 'as though' or 'as if' proposition. On the other hand, Aristotle portrays the understanding of a simple metaphor as a stimulating exercise in analogical equation solving: in working this out, we activate and begin to explore a complex and potentially fruitful analogy. The figurative redeployment of a given term counts as a metaphor regardless of precisely how the term's usual referent and its special temporary referent are related.[141] As modern poetics develops out of ancient rhetoric, the temptation to regard metaphors as meaning or communicating or at the very least suggesting something inherently complex, open-ended, and resistant to compact literal statement became increasingly pronounced.

Thus while both metaphors and models operate in an 'as if' manner, the images they construct are qualitatively different: metaphors operate through a form of analogy which enables the pooling or cross-domain mapping which can potentially spark a thought unavailable by other means. Metaphor thrives on indeterminacy, while models tie indeterminacy down, pegging it to a finite magnitude for the sake of progress in thought. Here I wish to suggest that Montaigne's own conceptual 'gadgets' — metaphors and models — for understanding memory's powers and limitations deploy the combination of materiality and abstraction, actuality and potentiality, immanent in memory itself.

Part Two
The 'quasi trasse': Sketches of Remembering

Cette peinture est conduitte non tant par dexterité de la main comme pour avoir l'object plus vifvement empreint en l'ame. ('Sur ves vers de Virgile', III, 5, 873)

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[139] *De memoria,* 450a. See 'Parva naturalis: De memoria e reminiscentia', trans. by J.I Beare, in *The Works of Aristotle,* ed. by J.A. Smith and W.D Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908). References to Aristotle are to this edition.
[140] *De memoria*, 449 b, 452 a-b.
[141] *Poetics* 21, 457b; *Rhetoric* 3.2 1404b-1505b; 3.4 1406b–1407a; 3.10–11 1410b–1413b.

Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction', F.C Bartlett, *Remembering* (1932) [142]

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The essay most directly and explicitly concerned with the operations and ethics of memory, 'Des menteurs' (I, 9), opens with the following lines: 'Il n'est homme à qui il siese si mal de se mesler de parler de memoire. Car je n'en reconnoy quasi trasse en moy, et ne pense qu'il y en aye au monde une autre si monstrueuse en defaillance.' (34) The polysemous epithet 'monstrueuse' suggests something either bred or fashioned contrary to nature or a pattern or example showing or pointing at another thing.[143] Focusing on the 'monstrous' deficiency of Montaigne's memory might lead one to overlook the seemingly slight expression 'quasi trasse', which itself playfully points to a long tradition of memory.

'Quasi trasse' has been translated in a number of ways. Florio proposes, 'There is no man living, whom it may lesse beseeme to speake of memorie, than my selfe, for to say truth, I have none at all'. Cotton's later (1685) translation suggests, 'There is not a Man living whom it would so little become to speak of Memory as myself, for I have none at all'. In the twentieth century, it is rendered 'There is no man who has less business talking about memory. For I recognize almost no trace of it in me (Frame), and 'There is nobody less suited than I am to start talking about memory. I can hardly find a trace of it in myself' (Screech). [144] The range of sense is between straightforward absence, a 'no trace', the 'quasi' serving to entirely annul or efface the 'trasse', or as a bare trace where the trace is spectral, potential or virtual. Shifting our attention to the 'trasse' — usually spelled as 'trace' in the *Essais;* indeed this is the only instance of it with this spelling — it corresponds with the mark or print (usually a treading with the foot), derived from the Latin *tractus* from the verb *trahere*, denoting the movement of drawing or pulling something in a particular direction with force (whence 'traction' and 'tractor'). Certain premodern notions of the joint processes of memory and recollection are organized around the figure of the trace. Already an unstable concept, it is made still more unstable through the modulating 'quasi', which sets up a quantitative gradient and serves to double up the ambiguity around its physical (literal) or figural presence. After Mnemosyne, philosophical genealogies of memory begin with Plato and Aristotle who both

[142] F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge: CUP, 1932), p. 213.
[143] On the rich and various meanings of monsters and monstrosity in the period see Wes Williams, *Monsters and their Meanings in Early Modern Culture: Mighty Magic* (Oxford: OUP, 2011).
[144] John Florio, *The Essayes* (London: Edward Blount, 1603), p.15; Charles Cotton, *Essays of Montaigne* (London: T. Basset, 1685), p. 49; Donald Frame, *The Complete Essays of Montaigne* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 21; Michael Screech, *The Complete Essays* (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 32.

refer to memory as a 'kind of' mark-making on the soul involving mental imagery. These marks, as we have seen, were thought of as material changes to the organic soul and thus the traces are literal. However, the 'sort of' or 'kind of' nature of this verbal and/or pictorial portraiture simultaneously suggests that these marks or imprints are also somehow symbolic or figurative.

Plato uses a number of different terms which can reasonably be translated as 'image' —*eidolon*, *phantasma*, *tupos*, and *eikon*. In *Theatetetus* Plato's Socrates invites us to imagine the existence of a wax tablet in man's soul where images — marks, imprints, impressions, stamps — can be inscribed or drawn and preserved, like the marks of signet rings.[145] The wax block is already at that point a commonplace (he tells us he is using a metaphor already present in Homer), and its persistence through Western history as a model for thinking about memory makes it a 'cognitive archetype'. In *Philebus*, in the context of a definition of pleasure, Plato gives a complex analogy for the soul and memory, related to the *Theatetus* metaphor but extending the type of inscription to drawing and painting: 'to me it seems that our soul is like a book' (38e12-13), and that memory seems to write (*graphein*), via a scribe (*grammateus*) speeches (*logous*) depending on the impressions it receives. According to Socrates there is another craftsman, a painter (*zographos*), who draws (graphei) images (*eikons*) of what has been said, after the inscriptions of the scribe. (39b 3-7). [146] On this multi-stage conception of memory, scribes and craftsmen figure as inner humunculi, involved in various acts of representation, both verbal and pictorial, and in acts of *translation across* these modes of representation.

In *De memoria et reminiscientia*, Aristotle uses similar terminology to Plato, but he emphasizes the bodily dimension of memory, involving physical change, and the hypothetical aspect present in Plato is heightened. [147] One of the key terms he uses is *tupos* - variously translated as 'sketch', 'impression', 'quasi-imprint' or 'mould'. Georges Roux, in his detailed analysis of the term 'tupos' in a number of ancient writers and contexts, argues that it is a broadly architectural term denoting 'bas-relief' - in other words, an 'ouvrage de sculpture en saillie sur un fond uni — and not, as others have suggested, 'moules', 'gabarits creux' or 'modèles'.[148] Thus what is often thought of in terms of *im*pression (which is concave) becomes *e*xpression (convex), although Roux also

[145] *Theat.* 191. c-e; 192a-194d.
[146] Giuseppe Cambiano, 'Problemi della memoria in Platone', in *Trace nella mente: Teorie della memoria da Platone ai moderni*, ed. by Maria Michela Sassi (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2007), pp. 1-23.
[147] Richard Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory,* 2nd edition (London: Duckworth, 2004) pp. 50-51.
[148] Georges Roux, 'Le sens de ΤΥΠΟΣ ('tupos'), *Revue des Études Anciennes,* 63 (1961), 5-14 (p. 5).

contends that others have wrongly rendered 'tupos' as 'statues' and 'tableaux'. The question arises as to whether it matters whether what we are asked to visualize, when we think of memory-images, is in relief or in counter-relief (or *cavo-rilievo*), or in two or three dimensions; in colour or monochrome? Is it not sufficient to know that memories are copies or images? The argument for the relevance of the detail is that these are, at origin, technical terms relating to representational practices, in architecture and art, and so the detail of how they are understood to function has a bearing on how the process they are metaphors for can be understood. In this context, it is sufficient to note that it seems likely that these various shades of meaning and association may have been in (or around the fringes of) the mind of anyone thoughtfully engaging with the past's governing paradigms of memory, including Montaigne.

To illustrate how the modulating figure of the 'quasi-trasse' can help one to think about memory in the *Essais*, I now turn to three examples.

I: Memory, Copiousness and Forgetting in Humanist Poetics and Rhetoric

Whereas medieval conceptions of *inventio* emphasized memory — as a faculty of gathering elements together to form new combinations — Humanist composition, shaped by classical authors, most prominently Quintilian and Cicero, and Humanist thinkers like Petrarch and Erasmus, gives forgetting its own role within the economy of remembrance.[149] These ideas, absorbed and reworked by sixteenth century French writers including Rabelais, Du Bellay and Ronsard as well as Montaigne, can be linked to changing understandings of the concept of *auctoritas* and of the figure of the *auctor* as owner of the final composition. In such a context, the boundary between memory and forgetting necessarily becomes porous.

[149] On imitation in Renaissance literary theory and practice see, for example, Martin McLaughlin, *Literary Imitation in the Italian Renaissance* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) and Colin Burrow, *Imitating Authors: Plato to Futurity* (Oxford: OUP, 2019) and their jointly-edited (with Stephen Harrison and Elisabetta Tarantino), *Imitative Series and Clusters from Classical to Early Modern Literature* (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2020).

> Je feuillette les livres, je ne les estudie pas: ce qui m'en demeure, c'est chose que je ne reconnois plus estre d'autruy; c'est cela seulement dequoy mon jugement a faict son profict, les discours et les imaginations dequoy il s'est imbu; l'autheur, le lieu, les mots et autres circonstances, je les oublie incontinent. [B] Et suis si excellent en l'oubliance que mes escrits mesmes et compositions, je ne les oublie pas moins que le reste. On m'allegue tous les coups à moy-mesme sans que je le sente. Qui voudroit sçavoir d'où sont les vers et exemples que j'ay icy entassez, me mettroit en peine de le luy dire; et si ne les ay mendiez qu'és portes connues et fameuses, ne me contentant pas qu'ils fussent riches, s'ils ne venoient encore de main riche et honorable: l'authorité y concurre quant et la raison. [C] Ce n'est pas grand merveille si mon livre suit la fortune des autres livres et si ma memoire desempare ce que j'escry comme ce que je ly, et ce que je donne comme ce que je reçoy. (II, 17, 651)

In this passage from 'De la praesumption' Montaigne substitutes Lethe for Mnemosyne as Mother of the Muses; his excellence in 'oubliance' is only matched by his monstrousness of memory. His own *Essais* share the same fortune as all other books, thereby reversing his consubstantial book's singularity which here, when perceived as an object, becomes like 'tous autres livres' (II, 18 665); he forgets what he writes (or gives) as much as what he reads (or takes), his identity and sources commingling.[150] In 'De l'institution des enfants', he writes in a similar humoral vein:

> Qui suit un autre, il ne suit rien. Il ne trouve rien, voire il ne cerche rien. « *Non sumus sub rege; sibi quisque se vindicet.* »[151] Qu'il sache qu'il sçait, au moins. Il faut qu'il emboive leurs humeurs, non qu'il aprenne leurs preceptes. Et qu'il oublie hardiment, s'il veut, d'où il les tient, mais qu'il se les sçache approprier. (I, 26, 151-152)

Montaigne declares himself to be more interested in the ideas than the words themselves, noting that truth and reason are universal and do not belong in any privileged sense to the first to express them:

> La verité et la raison sont communes à un chacun, et ne sont non plus à qui les a dites premierement, qu'à qui les dict apres. Ce n'est non plus selon Platon que selon moy, puis que luy et moi l'entendons et voyons de mesme. Les abeilles pillotent deçà delà les fleurs, mais elles en font apres le miel, qui est tout leur; ce n'est plus thin ny marjolaine: ainsi les pieces empruntées d'autruy, il les transformera et confondera, pour en faire un ouvrage tout sien: à sçavoir son jugement. Son institution, son travail et estude ne vise qu'à le former. (152)

Montaigne gives similar imagery — of flying creatures, gathering nectar or materials — a quite different turn in 'Du pedantisme', where he interrogates the notion of erudition and deconstructs his own practice 'en la plus part de cette composition':

> Il falloit s'enquerir qui est mieux sçavant, non qui est plus sçavant. Nous ne travaillons qu'à remplir la memoire, et laissons l'entendement [C] et la conscience vuide. Tout ainsi que les oyseaux vont quelquefois à la queste du grein, et le portent au bec sans le taster, pour en faire bechée à leurs petits, ainsi nos pedantes vont pillotant la science dans les livres, et ne la logent qu'au bout de leurs lévres, pour la dégorger seulement et mettre au vent. [C] C'est merveille combien proprement la sottise se loge sur mon exemple. Est-ce pas faire de mesme, ce que je fay en la plus part de cette composition? Je m'en vay, escorniflant par

[150] This cyclical aspect brings to mind the merchant from Cremona Montaigne mentions in the *Journal*, p. 174. I return to this in the concluding section to this chapter.
[151] 'We are under no king; let each vindicate himself.' Seneca, *Moral Epistles*, 33.

> cy par là des livres les sentences qui me plaisent, non pour les garder, car je n'ay point de gardoires, mais pour les transporter en cettuy-cy, où, à vray dire, elles ne sont non plus miennes quen leur premiere place. Nous ne sommes, ce croy-je, sçavants que de la science presente, non de la passée, aussi peu que de la future. (I, 25, 137)

Here the same verb 'pilloter' (to pick or gather one by one) is used as in I, 26 but now to suggest the content of what is gathered is not digested or even tasted, but merely gets transported, as grain is conveyed by a bird to its offspring.[152] Montaigne's self-disparagement reaches a pitch in 'Escornifler' — suggesting a *parasitic* relationship with his sources and models, as though he were feasting at other men's tables at their expense.[153] All he does is transpose, not transform: 'Elles ne sont plus miennes quen leur premiere place'. This sense of his gathered materials not belonging or being properly assimilated problematizes the relationship between copiousness and Montaigne's distinctive form of writing that he tells us is consubstantial.

Within the sixteenth century context of proliferation that becomes a theme of the writing itself, the notion of consubstantiality and the discussions (often quasi-polemical) around processes of imitation, transcription, diversification, interpretation, and improvisation, the *Essais* might appear as a form of excess which the author cannot bring under control. In this open-ended process an initial group of texts is extended, experimentally, in a sequence of imitation and variation. Another way of reading this copiousness is not as a lack of control so much as the exercise of control within a broader context of anxiety about text in relation to memory, technology and forgetting. Consubstantiality, as a polysemous concept employed metaphorically in Montaigne's late perspective on his book — is Montaigne's way of figuring the move toward, and arrival at ownership and authorship of a particular life, legible to all. As Cave has shown, the Humanist practice of *imitatio* was theorized by Erasmus as the desire to appropriate or naturalize an alien discourse. Within this framework of adaptive *imitatio*, the notion of incorporation or consubstantiality operates by transferring to language the possibility of a process through which external or alien materials may be transformed so that they may re-emerge as a function of 'nature', and more specifically of the speaker's own nature.[154] On this view Montaigne's self portrait represents a reaction against the pressure of what has already been written. Forgetting the other, and the model, is an integral part of Humanist composition often described in terms of liquefaction, digestion,

[152] Montaigne is drawing on the long association of memory with birds and bees also echoes his argument in II, 12 about creaturely ingenuity. See Chapter Two.
[153] In Cotgrave (1611), 'escornifler' is 'to smell a feast, or eat hard, at a feast (which another man payes for); to procure himselfe accesse vnto feasts, or other mens tables'.
[154] Cave, *The Cornucopian Text*, p. 37.

and incorporation. In this light, 'Consubstantiality' is a figure already implicit within Humanist poetics and rhetoric, as a theologically (and therefore politically) inflected variant of other such concepts. It is also importantly connected to *adaequatio*, figuring as the destination of a journey towards full representation or identity between word and thing (or person).

Colin Burrow's recent study shows how sixteenth-century Ciceronian debates between Pietro Bembo and Gianfrancesco Pico — which raised questions about what it was to imitate an earlier text so as to 'adapt' it to the times, but also stimulated wider speculations about what the characteristic and imitable features of an author were — stimulated a complex range of thinking about how to imitate the 'form' rather than the words of an earlier author; and that thinking developed, through the work of Philipp Melanchthon, Johannes Sturm, and Roger Ascham, into a view of *imitatio* which stressed how imitating authors should read the texts they imitated with an eye to how those texts were structured. Pico's understanding of formal imitation brought to the traditional opposition between body and shadow a distinctive version of the notion that *imitatio* involved 'following in the footsteps of the ancients': because foot sizes vary, unless we could find the 'lasts' or moulds ('formulae' - little moulds) which were used in an ancient shoe-shop to make shoes for every different size of foot we will end up slipping around in or spilling over the edges of the footsteps of the ancients. Cicero uses *formula* when discussing the 'type and pattern of each genre of speaking' but, as deployed by Pico, it becomes double-edged, implying that each foot has its own proportions and needs its distinctive 'pattern' to make shoes that would fit it.[155] But it can also mean both a scalable model or paradigm (and present-day mathematical usage of the term is based on those senses) and what we still call a 'formula' of words that can be used without variation in a particular context. As Burrow observes, this detail in Pico's wording is highly significant. The word implies that Pico regarded what is now called a literary 'model' or example as a thing of its own size and peculiar shape, but also as something which might by quasi-mathematical means produce a replica of the same proportions but different dimensions. The memorial 'quasi-trasse' of *imitatio* takes a strange mathematical form of embodiment and three-dimensionality which has affinities with Cusanus's use of models to bridge the human and divine.[156] Pico argued that it is in practice impossible without adaptation to make the 'formula', or the little mould, of an earlier author fit the feet of a new one, since everyone has a genius—and Pico appears to

[155] Cicero *De Oratore* 75.23.
[156] See Jan Miernowski, *L'ontologie de la contradiction sceptique*, p. 29, n. 23.

have been the first person to have used this word as a substitute for *ingenium*—and natural propensity ('*genium propensionemque naturae*') which is distinctive to themselves. [157]

As Carruthers and Bolzoni emphasize, premodern 'texts' were understood to be constituted by both words and (visual) images, which were mutually translatable. Making the text, and therefore reading it, involved one in a code (what Bolzoni refers to as a 'hermeneutic game') based on the interplay of imitation and variation. This code is central to the concept of copiousness: the play of imitation or emulation and diversification makes the text employed as a model a 'Cornucopian' text (an image happily 'picked' from Rabelais), a fountain of infinite wealth, a figure we find allegorically in the Italian segment of Montaigne's *Journal* in the form of the 'acqua di fontana viva' and its 'infiniti disegni'.[158] The distinction between identity and adequation that consubstantiality invokes becomes significant in relation to questions of control, mastery of sources, skill, proliferation, excess and containment arising with the Renaissance ideal of virtuosity. After 1588, Montaigne re-reads the sense of his own book, substituting the *process* of 'curious' and endless painstaking deciphering of self ('je me deschiffre si curieusement') for that of the *object*, 'livre consubstantiel' , which expresses a co-extensiveness that denotes containment and mastery as much as expressing unfinishedness and excess. Literary and linguistic copiousness is also a matter of epistemology, linked to premodern understandings of knowledge as a collection of truths awaiting expression in human languages and fitted, as appropriate, to various occasions. Augustine's philosophy of language is altogether inspired by this Platonic conception of the relation between truth and human articulation, whether in thought or speech. These truths (except mathematical axioms) can never be singly expressed, but must be expressed copiously, and this need for plentiful articulation applies most particularly to ethical truths.[159] Copiousness, like decorum, is an essential part of a rhetorical understanding of the nature of human speech, and both inhere in a medieval epistemological concept of *adaequatio rei et intellectus* (fit, or proportion), used above all by Augustine and Aquinas, which is important in Renaissance theory (in ethics, aesthetics and poetics alike). On each plane of reality there exists an instrument adequate to the task of knowing its objects. The Scholastic dictum 'veritas est adaequatio verbi et rei' encapsulates a rhetorical view of

[157] See Burrows, *Imitating Authors*, Chapter 7, 'Formal Imitation', pp. 206 - 235 (pp. 207-212).
[158] This interpretation of Humanist *imitatio* is, of course, central to Cave's *The Cornucopian Text.* On intertextuality as a form of memory, see Raphael Lyne, *Memory and Intertextuality in Renaissance Literature* (Cambridge: CUP, 2016).
[159] On these points see Carruthers 26-27, and Gerald L. Bruns, *Inventions, Writing, Textuality, and Understanding in Literary History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

the representational relationship between word and thing based on the principle of decorum. The prefix 'ad' (in 'ad-aequatio') is crucial to its meaning, as it makes the term about relation between two likenesses rather than identity — truth contained in words is always moving towards identity but never quite achieving it. In light of its role within rhetoric, memory — and specifically artificial memory — is bound up the process of judging which words are most adequate and decorous, which linguistic formula best *fits* the truth of the situation or occasion. This notion of fit or adequation between form and function, discourse and nature, is probed and undermined from another perspective in the 'Apologie', as I explore in Chapter Two.

In Petrarch, the concept of consubstantiality is already elementally cognitive: composition, as a process of reading, remembering, and writing, involves a communion of minds which is resolutely material — medullar and mineral — bringing the concept of mind itself within the compass of Lucretian materialism but with a robust transfusion of human blood and plasma, taken up in Rabelais' own medullar metaphor for composition as a joint effort of author and reader.[160] The opening passage from II, 20 ('Que nous ne goutons rien de pur') illuminates the same logic from another angle, and explicitly draws out composition as a process of *altering* nature:

> [A]La foiblesse de nostre condition fait que les choses, en leur simplicité et pureté naturelle, ne puissent pas tomber en nostre usage. Les elemens que nous jouyssons, sont alterez; et les metaux de mesme; et l'or, il le faut empirer par quelque autre matiere pour l'accommoder à nostre service. [C] Ny la vertu ainsi simple, qu'Ariston et Pyrrho et encore les Stoïciens faisoient fin de la vie, n'y a peu servir sans composition, ny la volupté Cyrenaique et Aristippique. Des plaisirs et biens que nous avons, il n'en est aucun exempt de quelque meslange de mal et d'incommodité,
>
> *medio de fonte leporum*
> *Surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat.*[161]
>
> Nostre extreme volupté a quelque air de gemissement et de plainte. Diriez vous pas qu'elle se meurt d'angoisse? Voire quand nous en forgeons l'image en son excellence, nous la fardons d'epithetes et qualitez maladifves et douloureuses: langueur, mollesse, foiblesse, deffaillance, *Morbidezza*; grand tesmoignage de leur consanguinité et consubstantialité. (673)

[160] 'C'est pourquoi fault ouvrir le livre et soigneusement peser ce que y est déduict. [...] Puis, par curieuse leçon et meditation frequente, rompre l'os, et sugcer la substantificque moelle, [...]'. Rabelais' 'substantificque mouelle' and 'os medulare' in the Prologue to *Gargantua* does allegorical work in relation to his text: only those whose 'curiosity' is able to break the bone and suck out the marrow will be properly able to read it. As in Montaigne, the reader is implicated, in an elemental way, in the meaning of the text, which is generated through 'commerce' between minds. See Rabelais, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. by Mireille Huchon (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 7.

[161] 'From the very fountain of enchantment rises a drop of bitterness to torment even in the flowers' (IV, 1130): Lucretius, *De rerum natura,* trans. by William Henry Denham Rouse (Cambridge, Mass.: HUP, 1924; repr. 2006), p. 365.

While the most immediately arresting element of this passage, for my purposes, is the conjoined terms 'consanguinité et consubstantialité' — Montaigne's sole use of either word in the *Essais* — this forms part of a wider and more elaborate structure of thought around composition. Montaigne's key point — that the negative or painful qualities of *volupté* are inseparable from the positive ones, that they have a oneness of nature — is articulated forcefully in terms of genetic kinship or blood relation, or sameness of substance. He refers here to the process of representing those qualities ('quand nous en forgeons l'image'), thereby making a direct link between the notions of moral mixture and the process of representation and writing.

The terms 'consanguinité et consubstantialité' play on the commingling of blood and bodily substance, as well as the clear commingling of material and immaterial, metaphorical and literal, and operates in the same conceptual field as Petrarch's image of the marrow of his mind and elsewhere, Montaigne's use of 'cervelle' and 'moiau'. Rabelais's metaphor of marrow bone jelly has been read as alchemy, but here Montaigne crafts a conceit of reverse transmutation or anti-alchemy: our weak condition only allows us to process the 'pureté naturelle' of things (elements; gold here) when alloyed with a baser metal, which brings them within our reach in compound form.[162] There are correspondences here with the 'purement mental' and 'meslange materiel' Montaigne discusses in the 'Apologie' (see Chapter Two) in relation to conceptual knowledge; the process of admixture is here contamination — or, significantly, 'composition' — in which even virtue and pleasure are contaminated by signs of pain or discomfort. Montaigne's conceit, a parody of alchemy, forges commonalities between alchemical processes (in either direction) and composition, which are both processes of denaturation and alteration. In particular 'consanguinité' denotes blood relation — investing kinship with a literal, biological meaning of shared life-force — and in conjunction with 'consubstantialité' may well have stirred a troubling and vivid image in a contemporary reader, familiar with the sanguinary nature of the religious conflicts.

The chapter opened with Montaigne's use of the phrase 'de fresche memoire', suggesting something newly made, or retaining its original qualities, not deteriorated, changed or faded through the passage of time. The phrase suggests that the memory is not stale, but remains unarchived, within easy reach of the living, present moment. The representational dimension of memory – involving both the mimetic and the temporal -- makes

[162] Mary Farrell, 'The Alchemy of Rabelais's Marrow Bone', *Modern Language Studies* 13 (1983), 97-104.

presence a crucial concept. The classical rhetorical concept of *enargeia,* discussed by Quintilian in the tenth book of his *Institutiones*, is central to his rhetoric of presence, denoting a quality of speech bringing absent things before the eyes and arousing lively emotions. As vivid and detailed description bringing things before the eyes of the listener or reader as if they *were* before them and could feel them, *enargeia* creates what Ruth Webb calls 'the feeling of presence.'[163] In Renaissance treatises on poetics by Du Bellay, Muzio, Pelletier, the concept —a stylistic and expressive ideal for the poet — transforms into a range of terms including 'vive representation', 'vif exemple', 'vive image,' 'depeindre au vif'.[164]

We find this language of vividness and vitality most explicitly in the context of Montaigne's twin metaphors of the self portrait and consubstantiality: 'Me peignant pour autruy, je me suis peint en moy de couleurs plus nettes que n'estoyent les miennes premieres' (II, 18, 665). The same sense is conveyed in the 'Au Lecteur', where we find the language of 'vive representation' brought into dialogue with the image of the self portrait: his friends and relatives will, on reading his book, be in a position to 'retrouver aucuns traits de mes conditions et humeurs, et que par ce moyen ils nourissent plus entiere et plus vifve, la connoissance qu'ils ont eu de moy'. The idea that their knowledge of and familiarity with him will be 'plus entiere et plus vifve' through reading his book is invested in the early modern understanding of composition as digestion or innutrition ('par ce moyen ils nourissent...') The deliberately comparative aspect of Montaigne's language — 'couleurs *plus* nettes, '*plus* entiere et *plus* vifve' — expressly locates the *Essais* in relation to his readers' natural or unaided memory of him, based on their own experience of him when he was alive. Colour itself has an important conceptual and rhetorical role which passes beyond (though includes) the 'obvious' fact that paintings often employ pigment as part of their representational strategy. Colour is both intensely visual and exemplary of that which is ineffable. (How to explain or represent 'green' to a person blind from birth?) Quintilian's rhetorical system in the *Institutiones* charts the important interactions between three interconnected powers or functions of speech: improvisation (as a function of chance, which irrupts into a speech flowing from an orator's artificial memory), *enargeia* or *demonstratio* (making the absent present *as if* before the eyes), and the processes of visualization. [165]

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[163] Ruth Webb, *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice* (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), pp.100-104.

[164] See, for example, Emiliano Ferrari, 'Montaigne on Fictional Emotions: from Rhetoric to Knowledge', *Montaigne Studies*, 30 (2014), 83 - 96, and Heinrich F. Plett, *Enargeia in Classical Antiquity and the Early Modern Age: The Aesthetics of Evidence* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 7-21.

165 Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, ed. and trans. by Donald A. Russell, 5 vols (Cambridge, Mass.; London: HUP, 2001) X. 7. 33-34

In Quintilian, the movement towards presence (*praesentem fortunam,* X.7.33-34) is simultaneously a movement into the field of vision. He stresses that, in the context of improvisation, words must not only be known but held 'in conspectu', in full view of the mind's eye (X.1.6): the images of things (he uses the terms 'rerum imagines' and 'phantasiai' - the same terms as used for memory images) must be 'before the eyes'. *Enargeia* brings about a time shift, in that something from the past or future is made present and, as it were, visibly exhibited.[166] If some lustrous improvisation — some chance extempore event — shines out (*effulserit*) as 'colour' in the midst of discourse then the orator should temporarily 'forget' his premeditated scheme and move into this space of inspiration before returning to his remembered course.[167]

It is in this space left for happy inspiration within a premeditated speech that rhetoric accommodates the speaker's move 'out of time' (*extempore*) and out of the prescriptions of memory, by his allowing himself to make a detour from (temporarily, and knowingly, to 'forget') his premeditated *itinerarium mentis.*

It is no accident Book X of Quintilian concludes by pointing towards the treatment of memory in Book XI. In relation to Montaigne, the 'couleurs plus nettes' of his consubstantial book/ self portrait stand out as something between, or combining, memory and forgetting, because the 'vive representation' these more brilliant colours suggest is something that — like memory itself — steps out of the fiction of linear time, in an extemporizing, 'forgetful' gesture that brings the reader closer to Montaigne's own presence. On this view, the visualizing metaphor of the self portrait can be read as another perspective on the position of the *Essais* in relation to traditions of rhetoric and memory, traditions theoretically and practically crucial to early modern understandings of composition which Montaigne works within but also responds to and sometimes reacts against. Montaigne's attitudes to memory and forgetting in the *Essais* are a telling index of his own navigation around these interconnected fields. However, any reading of Montaigne and memory which interprets his poor memory as a straightforward reaction or rebellion against these cultural traditions, does not take adequate account of the extent to which, in the period, forgetting is already built into theories and practices closely involving memory.

166 Heinrich F. Plett, *Enargaia in Classical Antiquity and the Early Modern Age: The Aesthetics of Evidence* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 8.
167 *Institutio Oratorio*, vol 4, Book X.7.33-34.

II. The 'protocolle'

Montaigne's use of the term 'protocolle' in 'Des menteurs' (I,9) forms part of his argument linking a poor or weak memory to certain more significant intellectual and ethical virtues. He argues that there are 'two' principal advantages to poor memory (marked by 'premierement' and 'secondement' but in practice Montaigne packs several more strands of argument within each). First, the lack of memory enables the correction of 'un mal pire' — namely ambition — insofar as it hinders 'negotiations du monde'. And, as other examples from nature show, this 'deffaillance insupportable' has strengthened other faculties:

> Premierement sur ce que c'est un mal duquel principallement j'ay tiré la raison de corriger un mal pire qui se fust facilement produit en moy, sçavoir est l'ambition, car c'est une deffaillance insupportable à qui s'empesche des negotiations du monde; que, comme disent plusieurs pareils exemples du progres de nature, elle a volontiers fortifié d'autres facultés en moy, à mesure que cette-cy s'est affoiblie, et irois facilement couchant et allanguissant mon esprit et mon jugement sur les traces d'autruy, comme faict le monde, sans exercer leurs propres forces, si les inventions et opinions estrangieres m'estoient presentes par le benefice de la memoire; que mon parler en est plus court, car le magasin de la memoire est volontiers plus fourny de matiere que n'est celuy de l'invention. (35)

Montaigne's play on words here — his weak memory is 'insupportable' but has supplied the 'supports' and fortifications for other faculties, by making him exercise his 'propres forces' — holds the key to the tone and shape of his reflections on a number of problems of writing.

He continues:

> [B] Secondement, qu'il me souvient moins des offenses receues, ainsi que disoit cet ancien; [C] il me faudroit un protocolle, comme Darius, pour n'oublier l'offence qu'il avoit receu des Atheniens, faisoit qu'un page à tous les coups qu'il se mettoit à table, luy vinst rechanter par trois fois à l'oreille: Sire, souvienne vous des Atheniens: [B] et que les lieux et les livres que je revoy me rient tousjours d'une fresche nouvelleté. (35)

'Protocolle' — a technical term which Montaigne uses only on one other occasion, in the 'Apologie' — has a number of meanings in the sixteenth century, all linked to its etymological sense (from the Latin *protocollum*) of the first sheet or page, whether in a roll of papyrus or, later, a book. [168] This first page typically bore the manufacturer's official mark. From this primary sense the meaning extends into others including that of the authenticated original record or minutes of a transaction or negotiation, drawn up by a notary or other official.

[168] 'Ce fleuteur protocole de Gracchus, qui amolissoit, roidissoit et contournoit la vois de son maistre lors qu'il haranguoit à Rome, à quoy servoit il, si le mouvement et qualité du son n'avoit force à esmouvoir et alterer le jugement des auditeurs? Vrayement il y a bien dequoy faire si grande feste de la fermeté de cette belle piece, qui se laisse manier et changer au branle et accidens d'un si leger vent' (II, 12, 595).

In a transfer from the object — the roll of paper — to the person holding it, 'protocolle' could also denote the person prompting a public speaker, or other performer, when that person faltered or went off course.[169] Montaigne's addition of the phrase after 1588, 'il me faudroit un protocolle, comme Darius (...)' , straight after his reference to Cicero ('cet ancien') thus inscribes his own weak memory within a classical tradition which is at once rhetorical and performative (precisely the appropriate context for artificial memory in its classical form), and ethical: poor memory is seen as a form of forgetful magnanimity, an ability to let go of grudges but the flipside is a lost opportunity to learn from history. Montaigne's language situates him within a public, civic context, either as public speaker and performer (as the gestures and not only the words can act) needing to be helped along, or through the connection with official written or printed record, filed and stored. The picture that unfolds is one of a layering of different forms of artificial memory, both internal (in the form of interiorised symbols and artefacts) and external (notably, paper, or 'tablettes'), but it also feels like a complex layering of attitudes to memory, whether understood as 'natural' or 'artificial': in the public speaking context, the need for the 'protocolle' means that the orator's artificial memory itself has *failed* — its inner strengthening of natural memory's powers is inadequate and needs bolstering from outside with the use of props.[170] Yet Montaigne's oblique reference to 'cet ancien' — broadly interpreted to refer to Cicero, the key Latin source of the art of memory and one of Montaigne's most beloved classical interlocutors - also casts forgetting in a favourable light. Indeed, this is one illustrative instance of how Montaigne's writing conveys a complex take on the various kinds of value that can be attributed to different forms and expressions of memory. Here as in many other places in the *Essais*, forgetting emerges in the context of artificial 'versus' natural memory as an opportunity, embedded within memory itself.

A function related to that of the 'protocolle' is that of 'truchement' — most closely corresponding to the idea the spokesperson, or interpreter — which figures in the *Journal* (in the context of Montaigne's travels abroad among foreign tongues), and the *Essais.*[171] Rather like the 'protocolle', the 'truchement' can be embodied and personified — as it is in 'Des Cannibales' ('Je parlay à l'un d'eux [the natives] fort long temps; mais j'avois un

[169] Nicot's *Thresor* notes that 'Protocolle aussi est vsurpé pour celuy qui porte le roollet par derriere et à l'espaule d'vn qui harangue, ou iouë en farces et moralitez, pour les raddresser et remettre au fil de leur harengue ou roollet, quand ils varient ou demeurent courts'. He adds, 'Ainsi dit on d'vn qui a bonne memoire, il ne luy faut point de protocolle'.
[170] On the cognitive role of props in theatrical contexts of the period, see Sophie Duncan, *Shakespeare's Props: Memory and Cognition* (New York: Routledge, 2019).
[171] Relatedly, see the sections 'interpreter' and 'translator' in *Keywords of Identity, Race and Human Mobility in Early Modern England,* ed. by Das Nanindi and others (Amsterdam: AUP, 2021), pp. 148-156 and pp. 258-266.

truchement qui me suyvoit si mal, et qui estoit si empesché à recevoir mes imaginations par sa bestise, que je n'en peus tirer guiere de plaisir') — or be used in a more dematerialized sense to refer to any means of expression, often 'la parolle' itself: 'Nostre intelligence se conduisant par la seule voye de la parolle, celuy qui la fauce, trahit la societé publique. C'est le seul util par le moien duquel se communiquent nos volontez et nos pensées, c'est le truchement de nostre ame: s'il nous faut, nous ne nous tenons plus, nous ne nous entreconnoissons plus ('Du dementir', II, 18). It is significant that this same big ethical and anthropological preoccupation with the fabric of our relations with one another, and of society as a whole — which puts sincere and accurate communication at the centre of a social construct hanging together by the thread, both exceptionally strong, and fragile, of our word and our *giving* our word — also features in 'Des menteurs': 'Nous ne sommes hommes, et ne nous tenons les uns aux autres que par la parole.' (I, 9) This is just one of a number of important correspondences between the two essays 'Des menteurs' and 'Du dementir' — apparently signalled by their interlinked titles — on the subject of memory, forgetting and ethics.

III: 'Ma vraye image'

The interplay between visual and verbal discourses which runs throughout the *Essais* is most concentrated in relation to the figure of the portrait which for Montaigne clearly functions as a form of memory. The deep connection between memory and image-making is voiced in the Renaissance topos of art, particularly painting, as a means of transcending time and place, which is given its canonical expression by Alberti in Book II of *De Pictura* (1436):

> Tiene in sé la pittura forza divina: non solo quanto si dice dell'amicizia, quale fa li uomini assenti essere presenti, ma più i morti dopo molti secoli essere quasi vivi, ; tale che con molta ammirazione de l'artefice e con molta voluttà si riconoscono (...) E così certo il viso di chi già sia morto, per la pittura vive lunga vita.[172]

> Painting has in itself a divine power not only to make — as is said of friendship — the absent be present, but to render the dead almost alive after many centuries, such that they are recognized with much pleasure and much admiration for the artist. (...) And so it is certain that through painting the face of one already dead lives a long life.

Montaigne's deployment of a visual (or quasi-visual) register to express his sensibility to the ties between memory and friendship situates his book at the intersection between textual and visual cultures of memory,

[172] Leon Battista Alberti, *De pictura: redazione volgare*, ed. by Lucia Bertolini (Firenze: Polistampa, 2011), p. 247.

and is an important aspect of artificial memory in the *Essais*. It is through the elusive, and sometimes elided, figure of the portrait that ideas of absence and presence, natural and artificial, memory and forgetting, emerge as integral components in Montaigne's own shiftingly *clair-obscur* sense of textual composition as an art of memory.[173]

In the mind and hands of the virtuoso, the raw materials of canvas and paint can be wrought into an almost supernatural power against death and oblivion, a power which is also a magic art of memory. Alberti's comparison of painting to friendship alludes implicitly to Cicero's *De amicitia*— 'he who looks upon true friend, looks, as it were, upon a sort of image of himself. Wherefore friends, though absent, are at hand'.[174]

Cicero's 'sort of' image echoes the sort of image of memory (some notion of *quasi-trasse,* again), proposing a very felt reciprocity among artist, image and viewer that, rather like the magnetism exerted by the devotional image, goes far beyond the mere recording of outward appearances, capturing an interiority and intersubjectivity in ways that seem to transcend the scope of the material medium. Of course, the notion of 'likeness' itself is ethically and affectively charged: to have the almost God-like ability to make the absent present and the dead live on is to have a unique and even uncanny power over time and oblivion. This melding of friendship, art of memory and portraiture has its role in shaping Montaigne's understanding of his friendship with La Boétie.

There are a number of lines Montaigne struck out from 'De la vanité' in his late copy of the *Essais* — the *exemplaire de Bordeaux* — which have a certain spectral eloquence:

> Je sçay bien que je ne lairray apres moy, aucun respondant, si affectionné de bien loing, & entendu en mon faict, comme j'ay esté au sien. Il n'y a personne a qui je vousisse pleinement compromettre de ma peinture: luy seul jouyssoit de ma vraye image, et l'importa. C'est pourquoy je me deschiffre moy-mesme, si curieusement. (983)

There is much to ponder in relation to this short passage, which reflects on the the loss of La Boétie and Montaigne's own imagining of others losing him; from the editorial gestures (by Montaigne himself and his subsequent editors) surrounding these lines to the charge of individual lexical choices, in particular the verbs

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[173] I am aware of the apparent imprecision of this image ('clair-obscur' normally refers to monochrome sketches while Montaigne explicitly refers to his portrait being in colour — 'Me peignant pour autruy, je me suis peint en moy de couleurs plus nettes que n'estoyent les miennes premieres', II, 18) but the interplay of light and shadow, presence and absence, is my focus here, rather than chromatics.

174 Cicero, *De amicitia*, trans. by W.A. Falconer (Cambridge, Mass.; London: HUP, 2014), VII, p. 133.

'compromettre', 'emporter' and 'deschiffrer', as well as the adverb 'curieusement', used so similarly in II, 18 ('Ay-je perdu mon temps de m'estre rendu compte de moy si continuellement, si curieusement?).[175] The pathos of 'Si curieusement' — meaning, as it usually does in the period, 'diligently', here suggesting an almost excessive taking pains, which is both illness and cure —reinforces the move within a few words from the notion of 'peinture' to that of 'déchiffrement'. One salient aspect is how the quasi-absence (or presence) of these lines — excised by Montaigne from the main text but then partially reinstated, by later editors, in the notes — dramatizes the play of absence and presence which is their subject.[176] The juxtaposition between the 'peinture' — Montaigne's text — and the 'vraye image' of Montaigne which La Boétie carries off with him when he died, locates these thoughts under the sign of memory. De la Boetie was, in an important sense, the only one who *remembered*.

Montaigne holds out this now-lost possibility of a 'vraye image' then as soon withdraws it. One might speculate that his motive for this emendation may have been tact for his *fille d'alliance* Marie de Gournay, his own wish to forget, or — in a rare corrective move — a reflection of Montaigne's judgement that these lines were no longer true.[177] La Boétie's 'vraye image' registers — at least to me —as a mental or interior artefact, a quasi-object capable of being 'held' or 'carried off'. This notion of the interiorized portrait, artefacturally located in the mind of the loved one, is later staged by Donne in a way I think is useful for understanding what is meant by Montaigne:

When I am dead, and Doctors know not why
And my friends curiositie
Will have me cut up and survay each part
When they shall finde your Picture in my heart.[178]

These lines bear an interesting relation to Montaigne on a number of counts — the reference to friendship, to curiosity (echoing Montaigne's 'si curieusement'), to the dissection revealing a picture or portrait visually and anatomically inscribed in the heart, as the earlier locus of memory. The significance of the verb 'emporter' lies

[175] Neil Kenny, *Curiosity in Early Modern Europe: Word Histories* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), and *The Uses of Curiosity in Early Modern France and Germany* (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
[176] There is a clear irony in the fact that Montaigne most likely intended these lines to be absent from later editions, but later editors draw the reader's attention to them in their notes.
[177] Thibaudet and Rat, following Villey, account for this move in terms of tact for his *fille d'alliance* Marie de Gournay.
[178] John Donne, 'The Dampe', in *Poems of John Donne*. vol. I , ed. by E. K. Chambers (London: Lawrence & Bullen, 1896), pp. 67-68.

in the sheen of ambiguity it casts over the presence of this 'vraye image': withdrawn, carried away, but not destroyed, it is as though this ideally representative image were still somehow hung in a figurative 'room next door', albeit one that is condemned. The idea of the formal possibility of a true likeness haunts the book and is held out as an ideal paradigm in relation to which all other forms or understandings of representation — visual, verbal, mimetic, temporal — are configured as inadequate. Even once removed, after 1588, the trace of the meaning of those retracted lines can still be felt in several places — in the hypothetical visual portraits 'hanging over' the composition of the *Essais* — and Montaigne's *geste* in (apparently) trying to unspeak or unwrite the direct expression of those thoughts is a twofold marking of the page; it points to the paradox of trying to forget, which Montaigne signals in II, 12 and more playfully in II, 17 (passages to which I'll return below). Here Barthes' reflection, 'La parole est irreversible, telle est sa fatalité. Ce qui a été dit ne peut pas se reprendre, *sauf à s'augmenter*: corriger c'est, ici [en parlant], bizarrement, ajouter' is apposite — 'En parlant, je ne puis jamais gommer, effacer, annuler ; tout ce que je puis faire, c'est de dire « j'annule, j'efface, je rectifie », bref de parler encore.'[179] The intentional nature of this *geste* itself points to ('désigne') the paradox of trying to forget — by trying to unspeak what is spoken, or unmark the page, he marks it twofold, reinforcing our sense of those line's significance when read in the larger context of the *Essais.*

In one sense, Montaigne's excision of these lines is out of character — 'Laisse, lecteur, courir encore ce coup d'essay et ce troisiesme allongeail du reste des pieces de ma peinture. J'adjouste, mais je ne corrige pas' (965)— but then it largely depends whether we read this act of striking out the words as a 'correction', a setting straight, or as a palimpsestic addition of a subsequent *jugement.* If we read the *rature* from the 1588 text alongside one of Montaigne's most crucial additions — his long 'allongeail' in 'Du démentir' containing the words 'Livre consubstantiel a son autheur' — then the gestures of removal and addition, made during the same *tranche* of Montaigne's lifespan, are two parts of one thought: both speak the same sense of deep and substantial adequacy between man and book. On this view, Montaigne's withdrawal of his earlier statement is unrelated to consideration for the feelings of his *fille d'alliance* but rather because he felt, towards the end of his life, that his previous observation about other representations not measuring up was no longer true; that his 'vraye image' was in fact, here, present, in his book, and no longer absent or spectral. Yet this still doesn't account for his

[179] Roland Barthes, *Le bruissement de la langue: Essais critiques IV* (Paris: Seuil, 1984), p. 99. Emphasis in the original.

decision to remove it and not just make a qualifying or modifying addition. This leaves room for thinking it was, in fact, an attempt to 'forget' the real source of his seemingly boundless journey into writing ('Qui ne voit que j'ay pris une route par laquelle, sans cesse et sans travail, j'iray autant qu'il y aura d'ancre et de papier au monde?', III, 9, 945). — an attempt to forget which we know, from our own experience as well as that of Montaigne, to be almost certainly self-defeating, even while he elsewhere holds out a 'science de l'oubly' as (another) hypothetical, and desirable, but elusive, capacity.[180]

Moving outside the text of the *Essais*, to a letter to his father dated 30 April 1570, written the day after La Boetie's death, we can see Montaigne grappling with the interactions between memory, representation, composition and strong emotion or affect:

> Il est vray, Monseigneur, comme j'ay la memoire fort courte, & debauchée encore par le trouble que mon esprit avoit à souffrir d'une si lourde perte, & si importante, qu'il est possible que n'aye oublié beaucoup de choses que je voudrois estre sceuës. Mais celles desquelles il m'est souvenu, je les vous manderay *le plus au vray* qu'il me sera possible. Car pour le representer ainsi fierement arresté en sa brave démarche, *pour vous faire voir* ce courage invincible dans un corps atterré & assommé par les furieux efforts de la mort, & de la douleur, je confesse qu'il y faudroit un beaucoup meilleur stile que le mien. [181]

This epistolary fragment sets the scene, both of the deathbed in its existential drama, and of Montaigne's privileged insight into his friend's mind ('j'avois trescertaine cognoissance des intentions, jugements & volontez qu'il avoit eu durant sa vie'). He attempts to fix the lineaments of that momentous day, as they unfolded in relation to the broader context La Boétie's life, in an act of remembrance on paper which is ekphrastic ('pour vous faire voir') as well as memorializing, but he frames the entire notion of representation as being undermined by a combination of the shortness of his own natural memory and of his faculties being thrown into disarray ('debaucher') by his troubled state of mind in experiencing such a loss.

There are other instances of Montaigne's thinking with this currency, of friendship as a form of portraiture poised between the moral and the visible. For example, he writes, in II, 38:

> Quand j'eusse peu prendre quelque autre façon que la mienne ordinaire et quelque autre forme plus honorable et meilleure, je ne l'eusse pas faict; car je ne veux tirer de ces escrits sinon qu'ils me representent à vostre memoire au naturel. Ces mesmes conditions et facultez, que vous avez pratiquées et receuillies, Madame, avec beaucoup plus d'honneur et de courtoisie qu'elles ne meritent, je les veux loger (mais sans alteration et changement) en un corps solide qui puisse durer quelques années ou quelques jours apres moy, où vous les retrouverez, quand il vous plaira vous en refreschir la memoire, sans prendre autrement la peine de vous en souvenir. (783)

[180] As previously noted, if this were Montaigne's intention, it was even defeated in preventing posterity from 'remembering' this about him. Montaigne refers to 'a science de l'oubly' in II, 12.
[181] *Oeuvres complètes*, 'Fragment d'une lettre', p.1347. Emphasis added.

This portrait is presented to us as consciously inscribed within a tradition of art of memory which appeals to those elements described by Alberti. Whatever Montaigne's critiques of memory as a pedagogical technique, his book is clearly designed to function as a form of artificial memory between text and image.

The ideal if enigmatic nature of the 'vraye image' places it as archetypal memory portrait the *Essais* try to move toward but never reach. Other hypothetical visual representations of Montaigne implanted in the *Essais*, such as his 'mien pourtraict chauve et grisonnant' referred to in I, 26, are configured in relation to it. Its hypothetical quality resonates with the ambiguous virtuality of the trace, which involves a play on absence versus presence, actuality versus potentiality, becoming a shorthand for a number of associations surrounding memory and forgetting.

Conclusion: 'la science de l'oubly'

It is in the cellars of the memory that the best conditions for forgetting are found. (Harald Weinrich)[182]

In the section of the *Journal de voyage* composed in (Montaigne's) Italian, during his first sojourn at the baths at La Villa in Tuscany, Montaigne describes a merchant from Cremona, who is suffering from a particular kind of memory loss:

> Ci venne ai bagni in questi giorni un Cremonese, mercante, abitante a Roma. Pativa di molte infirmità estraordinarie. Parlava tuttavia, andava, e, da quel che si vedeva, assai allegro della vita. Il principal difetto era alla testa: per la debolezza della quale, dice ch'avea in modo persa la memoria, che mangiando mai non

[182] Harald Weinrich, 'Stored, in other words, Forgotten', in *Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting*, trans. by Stephen Rendall (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 207-218 (p. 208).

> si ricordava di quel che li era stato messo innanzi alla tavola. Se partiva di casa per andar per qualche suo servizio, dieci volti bisogna che tornasse a casa a domandar dove era per andare. Il *Pater noster* a pena lo poteva finire: dal fine veniva cento volte al principio, non s'avvedendo ai al fine ch'avesse cominciato, né al ricominciare ch'avesse finito.[183]

What is interesting about Montaigne's treatment of the merchant's cognitive condition is that it is ambiguous whether or not Montaigne considers the apparent *alegresse* of the merchant's life to be thanks to or despite the pathological frailty of his memory. Montaigne's account of the merchant's tangled attempts to recite the Lord's prayer (presumably the 'hundred times' is an exaggeration) is both parodic and sympathetic: no sooner has the *Cremonese* reached the end, then he loops back to the start, having forgotten he has just recited it. The image is of the Lord's prayer mechanically chasing its own figurative tail. The problem is not so much the sequence of lines, but the merchant's lack of awareness of his place in the sequence which entails this seemingly endless repetition. Montaigne's frank curiosity in this impairment of memory is medical but also ethical: the merchant seems to be able to lead a 'good' or at least jolly and seemingly innocent life, the lack of pleasure derived from memory being offset by his fresh pleasure each time he has an experience he 'reads' as new.

Consubstantiality understood in the light of extended mind has much to do with identity and control: as a form of artificial memory his book 'embodies' what he, writing, chooses to mark on the page. This, then, would seem to concern 'voluntary memory,' deliberate recollection. The other, less voluntary side of memory — memory as its own 'person' — emerges alongside involuntary corporeal movements. Telling the reader his poor natural memory means he must ploddingly resort to *memoria ad verba* — memorizing verbatim, following a fixed sequence with no improvisation — to retain remarks of any length, he relates this to this writing practice, where he has the freedom and authority to stir up the 'order' of words and notions:

> Et, quand j'ay un propos de consequence à tenir, s'il est de longue haleine, je suis reduit à cette vile et miserable necessité d'apprendre par coeur mot à mot ce que j'ay à dire; autrement je n'auroy ny façon ny asseurance, estant en crainte que ma memoire vint à me faire un mauvais tour. Mais ce moïen m'est non moins difficile.[C] Pour aprandre trois vers, il me faut trois heures; et puis, *en un mien ouvrage, la liberté et authorité de remuer l'ordre, de changer un mot, variant sans cesse la matiere, la rend plus malaisée à concevoir.* Or, plus je m'en defie, plus elle se trouble; elle me sert mieux par rencontre, il faut que je la solicite nonchalamment: car, si je la presse, elle s'estonne; et, depuis qu'ell'a commencé à chanceler, plus je la sonde, plus elle s'empestre et embarrasse; elle me sert à son heure, non pas à la mienne. *Cecy que je sens en la memoire, je le sens en plusieurs autres parties.* Je fuis le commandement, l'obligation et la contrainte. Ce que je fais ayséement et naturellement, si je m'ordonne de le faire par une expresse et

[183] *Journal de voyage*, p. 174: There came to the baths around that time a merchant from Cremona, living in Rome. This man was suffering from several extraordinary infirmities. Nevertheless he talked and walked about and, from looking at him, appeared to be cheerful enough. His principal defect was, he said, his head: he had lost his memory to the point that he forgot what had been served to him at table. If he set off on some errand, he had to come back ten times to ask where he was off to. He could hardly finish the Lord's prayer: no sooner had he reached the end that he returned to the start, a hundred times over, not realizing at the end that he had started or at the beginning that he had finished.

> prescrite ordonnance, je ne le sçay plus faire. Au corps mesme, les membres qui ont quelque liberté et jurisdiction plus particuliere sur eux, me refusent par fois leur obeyssance, quand je les destine et attache à certain point et heure de service necessaire. (II, 17, 649-650, emphases added)

This passage turns on how memory relates to the tension between his 'ouvrage' understood as fully consubstantial with him and as 'membre de ma vie'. Because his book is his own, Montaigne is free to alter the order and sequence of words, ceaselessly varying its *matiere*, making it difficult to apprehend or express in stable form. Here 'matiere' and 'memoire' commingle in the text, both difficult to bring under control, and therefore conceived as independent of the author but at the same time this instability and waywardness is what is most essential to him. So the capriciousness of memory — in this passage expressed in a wittily eroticized power dynamic, in which memory is cast as a 'coy mistress' in Marvellian vein — is fundamental to consubstantiality, even as the idea of there being a part of Montaigne's mind with a mind of its own seems to threaten its (consubstantiality's) integrity. Montaigne's interlinking of corporeality and erotics with the play of composition in III, 5 expresses the same overarching idea. While traditional methods of artificial memory are designed to establish order and control over the memory by training it, here the book as artificial memory mirrors the play of memory and forgetting, choice and chance, and the experience of the self as partially 'other', inherent in embodied life: 'Cecy que je sens en la memoire, je le sens en plusieurs autres parties'.

It is useful to consider this alongside what Montaigne writes in 'De l'affection des pères aux enfans', about his book's independent knowledge : 'A cettuy-cy, tel qu'il est, ce que je donne, je le donne purement et irrevocablement, comme on donne aux enfans corporels: ce peu de bien que je luy ay faict, il n'est plus en ma disposition; il peut sçavoir assez de choses que je ne sçay plus, et tenir de moy ce que je n'ay point retenu et qu'il faudroit que, tout ainsi qu'un estranger, j'empruntasse de luy, si besoin m'en venoit. Il est plus riche que moy, si je suis plus sage que luy'. (II, 8, 401-402). The transfer between author and book ('ce que je donne') is akin to that between parent and 'enfans corporels'; what knowledge or experience is given cannot be retracted and becomes incorporated in the other's mind, even when that knowledge concerns things about Montaigne which have become 'strange' to him and need to be borrowed (but not permanently taken) back. Books, then, are portrayed as having minds and memories of their own, while also being the locus of past minds' survival (I, 26). Consubstantiality is enriched, complicated and even threatened by conceiving the book in this way, as remembering and knowing what the author has forgotten and taking on independent existence, 'tout ainsi qu'un estranger'.

In the political climate of the Wars of Religion (c.1562-1598), memory is rethought in light of polemicists' efforts to shape and legitimize new Reformation identities, and a politics of *oubliance* — the cultivation and rhetoric of forgetting — emerges during and in the aftermath of the religious wars as a means of breaking free from the past, capitalizing on the connection between amnesty and amnesia.[184] The language of forgetting, linked to forgiveness, acceptance and tolerance, is presented as a means of making peace with the past, and a form of wisdom which seems to subvert the necessary connection between memory and sapience or *sagesse* but in fact confirms the need for balance between remembrance and forgetting. The historiographical notion of an event or person being 'digne de memoire' — the condition which justified something being recorded for posterity — is transformed into 'digne d'oubly'. As Frisch has shown, in legislation on the civil wars and polemical literature of the period the image of the king evolves from that of an agent of clemency and pardon to that of an agent of amnesty, 'whose gesture of forgetting embodies both a turning away from the past and a wager on the future'.[185]

Can forgetting be an art, or skill, the way memory can? 'One who has perfected himself in the twin arts of remembering and forgetting is in a position to play at battledore and shuttlecock with the whole of existence'. [186] Kierkegaard's kinesic image, linking mastery of the subtle balance of memory and forgetting with control over existence itself, might recall Montaigne's own metaphor of real tennis, or 'jeu de paume' in 'De l'expérience', to express the inferential movement to- and-fro of communication and, more specifically, conversation. In the 'Apologie' Montaigne scoffs at philosophy's counsel to forget past suffering, 'comme si nous avions en nostre pouvoir la science de l'oubly':

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[184] See Vivian Bradford, *Public Forgetting: The Rhetoric and Politics of Beginning Again* (University Park: Penn State, 2010).
On 'oubliance' as a political strategy during and in the wake of the wars of religion see Mark Greengrass, 'Amnistie et oubliance: un discours politique autour des édits de pacification pendant les guerres de Religion', in Paul Mironneau and Isabelle Pébay-Clottes (eds), *Paix des armes, paix des âmes* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 2000) pp. 116–18; Andrea Frisch, *Forgetting Differences: Tragedy, Historiography, and the French Wars of Religion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015) and Paul-Alexis Mellet and Jérémie Foa, 'Une « politique de l'oubliance » ? Mémoire et oubli pendant les guerres de Religion (1550-1600)', *Astérion* [Online], 15 (2016), accessed 10 January 2020. On the politics and *politiques* of memory and the religious wars see also, Philip Benedict, 'Shaping the Memory of the French Wars of Religion: The First Centuries', in *Memory Before Modernity: Practices of Memory in Early Modern Europe,* ed. by Erika Kuijpers and others (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 111-125, and in the same volume, on trauma and personal memories of the conflicts, see Susan Broomhall, 'Disturbing Memories. Narrating Experiences and Emotions of distressing Events in the French Wars of Religion', pp. 253- 267.
[185] Frisch, *Forgetting Differences*, p.127.
[186] Søren Kierkegaard, 'Either/Or', in *The Essential Kierkegaard,* ed. Howard V. Hong (Princeton: PUP, 2000), p. 57.

> Car la memoire nous represente, non pas ce que nous choisissons, mais ce qui luy plaist. Voire il n'est rien qui imprime si vivement quelque chose en nostre souvenance que le desir de l'oublier: c'est une bonne maniere de donner en garde et d'empreindre en nostre ame quelque chose que de la solliciter de la perdre (494).

The idea that there cannot be an art or technology of forgetting analogous to the art of memory is based on the conception of forgetting or oblivion as the absence of a trace: a negation of presence, as a 'gap' in the text, a *lack* of sign or copy imprinted in the soul. It denotes what is wanting or missing; ontologically in need of supplementation or restoration. This notion of failed imprint, or failure — in anamnesis — to track down the correct print, shapes a view of forgetting as fundamentally beyond human volition or skill in learning. Yet forgetting conceived as an art and even as a method or policy has a long history, from antiquity to the present, and has been considered crucial to all forms of artistic and scientific enquiry. [187] In political rhetoric, collective forgetting is sometimes instrumental to peace-making efforts. The policy of *oubliance*— the royal policy of amnesia laid out in the edicts of pacification, from the edict that ended the first civil war in 1563 through the edict of Nantes in 1589— emphasized the need to forget differences and past discord, forbidding specific memorial practices which might revive memories of the troubles, thereby turning the usual assumption that it is collective and individual memory that affords unity and coherence on its head. [188] These amnesty clauses, intended chiefly to prevent lawsuits and vendettas and provoked by a loss of faith in royal authority, posed a profound rhetorical problem for the writing of history in the period, because contemporaries also understood them to set limits to what published historical works could recall. The exhortation to consider what had happened in the prior tumults as essentially 'dead and buried' and to be passed over in silence, or at least not written about, places the connections between community, memory and writing in another light. Montaigne's own excellence at 'oubliance' within the *Essais* — his forgetting of sources and models, as well as forgetting of his own writings, his being unable to bear a grudge — can be read as an oblique commentary on 'oubliance' as a rhetorical and political stance. Montaigne is very conscious that not writing involves the loss of history and memory, noting, in 'De la gloire' that 'Ce sera beaucoup si, d'yci à cent ans, on se souvient en gros que, de nostre temps, il y a eu des guerres civiles en France' (II, 16, 628). In a later emendation, he notes that 'Les fortunes de plus de la moitié du monde, à faute de registre, ne bougent de leur place et s'evanouissent sans

[187] Harald Weinrich, *Lethe*; see also *Better off Forgetting? Essays on Archives, Public Policy, and Collective Memory* ed. by C. Avery and M. Holmlund (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017).
[188] Andrea Frisch, *Forgetting Differences*; Penny Roberts, 'The Languages of Peace During the French Religious Wars, *Cultural and Social History*, 4 (2007), 297-315.

durée' and that if he could, he would substitute the known for the unknown, the remembered for the forgotten: 'Si j'avois en ma possession les evenemens inconnus, j'en penserois tres facilement supplanter les connus en toute espece d'exemples' (627). Montaigne also considers silence — the absence of outward expression, vocal or written - to be beneficial in imprinting things in the mind, writing in a late emendation, 'Car il est bon que les mots qui sont le moins en usage, moins escrits et mieus teuz, sont les mieux sceus et plus generalement connus. Nul aage, nulles meurs l'ignorent non plus que le pain. Ils s'impriment en chascun sans estre exprimez et sans voix et sans figure' (III, 5, 847-848).

The wax tablets metaphor of memory is, of course, not only a way of thinking about how living human memory works, but also reciprocally fashioned the culture's attitude to the written text, as an aesthetic object, and as a 'memory' of the living voice. [189] If natural memory is writing on the 'wax' of the soul, and writing on paper functions as artificial memory, then what is reading, and what does it perform? While the notion of consubstantial writing is most often associated with memory and remembrance — whether partially constituting the author's extended memory or enabling others to remember him in their reading — Montaigne also imagines the possibility that one day he (as in, his *Essais*) will be used for some purpose *other* than reading. He tells us in II, 17 that he himself does not read but leafs through books ('Je feuillette les livres, je ne les estudie pas'), foregrounding their paperiness and handleablity. In 'Du démentir'- the same essay where Montaigne's claim of consubstantiality with his book is made — he reflects on the potential future fortunes of its pages and therefore of himself: 'j'empescheray peut-estre que quelque coin de beurre ne se fonde au marché'. (664) This vision of his consubstantial book's destiny as what is essentially waste paper reflects a sixteenth century motif illustrating the shift from the intellectual to the material, from paper as vehicle for information to paper as waste matter, that can be recycled and repurposed, presumably remaining unread, and its maker therefore forgotten. Elsewhere, Montaigne describes his *Essais* as 'des excremens d'un vieil esprit' (III, 9, 943), identifying his writing as a biological process of expelling metabolic waste from his system: this idea of separation and sifting of waste matter — what is not necessary or is even potentially toxic — complicates the notion of consubstantial writing as memory by suggesting that what is written is excess and needs to be purged. As Emily Butterworth notes, 'The waste-paper motif evokes ideas about conjoined literary and physical

[189] On the implications of the wax tablets metaphor for conceptualizing the written text, see Peter Agócs, 'Speaking in the Wax Tablets of Memory', in *Greek Memories: Theories and Practices*, ed. by Luca Castagnoli and Paola Ceccarelli (Cambridge: CUP, 2019), pp. 68-90.

mortality', which are clearly pertinent to the notion of consubstantiality.[190] Here, Montaigne's self-identification with his book, signalled by 'j'empescheray', and specifically with its *paper* rather than what is written, suggests that consubstantiality understood as paper memory and involving an act of reading can be subverted by the very materiality of printed matter. On one hand it seems to matter, for consubstantiality, whether the *Essais* are actually read, as it is in the reading that Montaigne can be revivified or reanimated, but on the other, the importance of consubstantiality does not depend on the act of reading. In the same essay ('Du démentir') Montaigne, projecting into the future, imagines not being read, and reflects on the implications of that for the meaning of his project: 'Et quand personne ne me lira, ay-je perdu mon temps de m'estre entretenu tant d'heures oisifves à pensements si utiles et aggreables? Moulant sur moy cette figure, il m'a fallu si souvent dresser et composer pour m'extraire, que le patron s'en est fermy et aucunement formé soy-mesmes' (665). Here, the importance of consubstantiality is not about posthumous living by being read, so much as about self-distillation through composition, and finding his own pattern, within the confines of his natural lifespan. Montaigne interrogates whether the act of reading — implicitly understood as a tracking of the *same trace* as that left by the author — is capable of genuine remembrance: [C] La plus part des lecteurs, pour avoir trouvé une pareille robbe, pensent tres-faucement tenir un pareil corps. La force et les nerfs ne s'empruntent point; les atours et le manteau s'emprunte. La plus part de ceux qui me hantent, parlent de mesme les Essais: mais je ne sçay s'ils pensent de mesmes'. (I, 26, 172) In this late (post 1588) emendation Montaigne posits a potential, and radical, disjuncture between author and reader, between superficial resemblance in a style of expression versus genuine affinity of thought. As elsewhere in the *Essais* 'hanter' operates between the embodied and disembodied, suggesting a habitual exercise or the frequenting of a particular place but also adumbrating the gesture of handling a material object. In a sense, he suggests most of his readers may not be reading *him* at all: they are not following the intentionality of his trace and therefore their reading is not anamnesis. Together, these three examples — the butter paper, the 'excremens' and the disjuncture between the trace and its retrieval — associate consubstantiality with the potential for loss and waste. The problem of legibility and interpretation is also a problem of memory, if remembering means the reader must track down the same mental print — the same thought — as the author.

[190] On this motif in relation to Montaigne (among others) and its implications for consubstantiality, see Emily Butterworth, 'Apothecaries' Cornets: Books as Waste Paper in the Renaissance', *MLN,* 133 (2018), 891–913.

As we have seen, the notion of situatedness so germane to contemporary thinking on cognition resonates strongly with some of the main features of premodern memory — from the architectural *loci* of artificial memory and commonplace-books to the anatomical localization of *memoria* in the ventricular brain as understood by faculty psychology in the Aristotelian and Galenic traditions. This Chapter has considered some of the varied ways in which Montaigne treats the complex interactions between writing, memory and forgetting from a perspective informed by extended mind. Starting with a reflection on the memorial role of material artefacts such as statues which, like archives can be *loci* of forgetting as well as of memory, I have explored how Montaigne positions his consubstantial book, but also books more generally, as a form of artificial memory, extending the mind beyond the biological body and its finite lifespan. I have suggested that the key metaphors and models of memory drawn on by Montaigne operate as cognitive devices which mediate the distinction between internal and external, material (or embodied) and abstract and mental. In the *Essais*, the presence of the external — in the sense of alien and foreign — figures as the 'estranger', which Montaigne couples with 'tierce', denoting not only the key idea of the 'tiers' ('third party', or 'third hand'), but which also has a specific meaning in the context of printing and editing: the 'tierce' is the 'troisiéme épreuve', which the author sees, the first and second having been 'seen' by the 'correcteur'. [191] The phrase 'tierce et estrangere' occurs in two contexts where he is talking explicitly about composition, in II, 6 and II, 18.[192]

I have then considered three instances or modes of artificial or supplemental memory in Montaigne's writing, which can all be understood under the sign of the 'quasi-trasse': the remembering of other works and authors through *imitatio*, the paper prop of the 'protocolle', and the spectral 'vraye image'. As I argue, these examples all demonstrate the precarious balance, and shifting play, between partial memory and partial forgetting, presence and absence, and situate Montaigne's book ambiguously between the natural and the artificial, self and other. What remains with him of *other books* is that 'substance' which he no longer recognizes as the product of another; the accidents— author, place, particular words and 'autres circonstances' — leak through the membrane of his memory: 'je les oublie incontinent'. In this way, the Aristotelian and Scholastic distinction between accidents and essence — the properties of a substance that are contingent and necessary, respectively,

[191] 'Le Correcteur voit la premiere et la seconde épreuve et l'Auteur les tierces. Envoiez môi la tierce de cette feuille que je la voie exactement'. Richelet, *Dictionnaire francois* (1680).
[192] I discuss Montaigne's concept of 'estrangeté' in relation to prosthesis — both as early modern surgical practice and as affordance — in Chapter Three.

and which here translate into those 'material' aspects 'worth remembering' and those which are 'immaterial', forgettable, inessential— plays out in the ontology and identity of his consubstantial book, which is itself a scriptural space or extended *quasi-trasse*, leading him along a 'chemin' only previously attempted by two or three ancients ('Nous n'avons nouvelles que de deux ou trois anciens qui ayent battu ce chemin; et si ne pouvons dire si c'est du tout en pareille maniere à cette-cy, n'en connoissant que les noms. Nul depuis ne s'est jetté sur leur trace. II, 6, 377-378). This extravagant and unusual 'trace', he says in 'De l'exercitation', might *accidentally* serve others: 'Ce qui me sert, peut aussi par accident servir à un autre' (377), inscribing his writing within a dynamic of accident (illustrated in particularly embodied form in that essay) and essence, contingency and necessity, linking composition, memory and metaphysics.

CHAPTER TWO

'Membre de ma vie': Contexture, Communication and Extended Cognition

Introduction: *écologies*

Et changeons d'idiome selon l'espece (II, 12, 458)

Quel animal? L'autre (Derrida, *L'animal que donc je suis)*

The word 'Contexture' crops up in the *Essais* where Montaigne's ecological thinking is at its most powerful. Here 'ecological' is intended, as it is across this study, as something akin to holistic, referring to inclusive and expansive patterns of thought: conceiving individual beings as creaturely wholes, lives as encompassing — rather then ending with — biological death, and man's situated and accommodated condition, at the local and cosmological scale. In the *Essais*, 'contextures' are forms of organization, and tend to figure either as intricate woven artefacts or wonders in the natural world, such as birds' nests and spiders' webs, or discursive structures, appearing to place human artifice on a continuum with other forms of creaturely composition, though at the less marvellous end of the spectrum. This linking of discursive and natural structures reflects, in a different tradition, the Renaissance understanding of the relation between nature and organized, particularly encyclopaedic, knowledge as a form of structural mimesis. [193] Montaigne's linking of animal contextures — nests and webs, both morphologically round or circular — to human-built edifices plays with and partially undermines the foundations on which the Renaissance notion of a 'circle of learning' rests.

The idea of ecology as we know it has its roots in premodern natural historical, meteorological and cosmological thought. Early modern climate theorists, including Bodin, Le Roy and La Framboisière, proposed an imbricated ecology of nature and culture, figuring the border between them as porous, mutually enriching and determining or fashioning.[194] Ecologies are, by virtue of their etymological roots, dwellings or

[193] Neil Kenny, *The Palace of Secrets: Béroalde de Verville and Renaissance Conceptions of Knowledge* (Oxford: OUP, 1991).

[194] For a recent exploration of the parallels between early modern climate theory and contemporary ecological anthropology, see Sara Miglietti, 'Between Nature and Culture: The Integrated Ecology of Renaissance Climate Theories', in *Early Modern Écologies: Beyond English Ecocriticism,* ed. by Pauline Goul and Phillip P. Usher (Amsterdam: AUP, 2020), pp.138 -159.

habitats for individuals or communities, situating them in the natural world. Coined by zoologist Ernst Haekel in the 1860s to denote the relation of the organism (plant, animal, human) to its organic and inorganic environment, the idea of ecology has been taken up as a means of thinking about cognition since the 1960s in the work of Roger Barker, Gregory Bateson, James Gibson, and Edwin Hutchins among others.[195] Since the 1990s work on the ecological nature of cognition has gathered momentum, often focusing on the cognitive ecology of the internet.

As the anthropologist Philippe Descola observes, contemporary cosmologies tend to think of nature as a discrete ontological category, with stable borders.[196] Taxinomies of life, which classify flora and fauna, organisms and species, according to a hierarchy of biological and cognitive complexity, take nature to be a whole characterised by discontinuities, with the same 'internal architecture' across cultures and historical periods. Descola's deconstruction of the idea of nature draws critically on ethnobiological work on the cognitive foundations of natural history. [197] He argues that the notion of a universal nomenclature that reflects how cultures conceptualize living organisms in their environment is a distorting form of naturalism which is a direct descendent of the Thomist dictum, '*nomina debent naturae rerum congruere*' (names must be adequate to the nature of things). For Descola, naturalism means subscribing, whether implicitly or explicitly, to the idea — widespread in the West since the seventeenth century — that only humans have a distinctive interiority (a soul, subjectivity, intentionality, reason, in some cases even a conscience, the capacity for repentance, dependent on some form of memory) but that on the physical level humans are on a continuum with other forms of life, confirmed in a phylogenetic perspective by Darwinism. He contrasts this 'discontinuité des intériorités entre humains et non-humains et la continuité des physicalités' with the ontologies of other cultures which configure human-nonhuman relations differently.[198]

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[195] Ernst Haekel, *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1868). See Roger Barker, *Ecological Psychology: Concepts and Methods for Studying the Environment of Human Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Gregory Bateson, *Steps Towards an Ecology of Mind* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1972); James Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (London, Houghton Mifflin, 1979).
[196] Philippe Descola, *L'écologie des autres: l'anthropologie et la question de la nature* (Versailles: Quae, 2011) pp. 45-50. See also his earlier study along similar lines, *Par delà nature et culture* (Paris: Gallimard 2005).
[197] Brent Berlin, *Ethnobiological Classification: Principles of Categorization of Plants and Animals in Traditional Societies* (Princeton: PUP, 1992), Scott Atran, *Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990).
[198] Descola, *L'écologie des autres*, pp.85-89.

The widespread historiographical notion of a Cartesian rift between mind and body and between human and animal is a distorting lens through which to view premodern understandings of cognition.[199] As Derrida notes, 'La bordure multiple et hétérogène de cette rupture abyssale [entre l'Homme et l'Animal en général] a une histoire'.[200] Considering specifically early modern extended cognition is an opportunity to remind ourselves of this partially submerged fact and to allow different *varieties* of extendedness to enrich our approach by historically situating discourses of human exceptionalism.[201] The roots of such discourses, which place the creaturely beyond the reach of man's linguistic, legal, political and moral structures, are ancient —Aristotle's *Politics*, and his theory of the soul's functions in *De anima*— but so are the roots of a different, parallel vision. Aristotle's 'nested' hierarchy of souls — the nutritive, sensitive and intellective —also suggests that what is most distinctively human is embedded in those qualities and functions shared across the plant and animal kingdom. The ancestry of what, in the mid twentieth century becomes 'the concept of mind' can be traced back to the concept of breath or air in motion, which stands in for the whole life of a being as the distinguishing mark and animating or vital principle of all living things, including plants: from the Greek *psuchē* and *pneuma*, and the Hebrew *nepesh* and *ruach*, and the Latin 'anima', 'spiritus' and 'fumus' — derived from or related to words meaning 'breath, 'blow', or 'smoke'.[202] The physiological process of breathing connects the living organism to its environment, already situating the organic soul within its local and cosmic ecology and accommodating all forms of life, from the plant — whose processes of photosynthesis involve the passage of air into and out of its cellular structures — to the human respiratory system.

The anthropocentric tendencies of contemporary discourses of 4E cognition often posit the extendedness of cognition as a specific function of the human — as an essentially 'incomplete machine', and typically frame our

[199] It is also, in important respects, a misleading lens through which to read Descartes. For a recent reappraisal see Raphaële Garrod and Alexander Marr, *Descartes and the Ingenium: The Embodied Soul in Cartesianism* (Leiden: Brill, 2021).
[200] Derrida, *L'animal que donc je suis* (Paris : Galilée, 2006), p. 53.
[201] In addition to the work of Laurie Shannon, notably *The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013)*;* 'Invisible Parts: Animals and the Renaissance Anatomies of Human Exceptionalism', in *Animal Encounters* ed. by Manuela S. Rossini and Tom Tyler (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 137- 157 — other studies of early modern culture have pursued, in their quite different ways, Derrida's project in two late seminar series, *L'animal que donc je suis* and *La Bête et le souverain* (Paris: Galilée, 2008)*,* of historically situating discourses of human exceptionalism: see *Human and Animal Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy and Medicine,* ed. by Stefanie Buchanau and Roberto Lo Presti (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017); Erica Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality and Humanity in Early Modern England* (Ithica, N.Y; London: Cornell University Press, 2019).
[202] Paul S. MacDonald, *The History of the Concept of Mind* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).

extendedness and inherent hybridity in a positive light. This particular vision of extendedness comes out especially forcefully in evolutionary accounts of human cognition which focus on the role of language and other artefacts and technologies in forming the cognitive niches which enable and constitute our particularly 'advanced' kind of cognition. However this view is, to borrow a phrase from Laurie Shannon, 'more provincially human' than what might be considered analogous early modern discourses.[203] While Donne expresses the difficulty of imagining the soul — one early modern synonym for mind, though not identical — of other creatures as being like ours ('But if my soule were no more than the soul of a beast, I could not thinke so'), one aspect of early modern extended cognition is that it is not reserved exclusively for humans. [204] Another relevant aspect is that premodern understandings of cognitive extendedness are closely related, in religious or skeptical vein, to man's inherent insufficiency, rather than being part of a triumphalist discourse of humankind's wondrous cognitive sophistication. During the Renaissance the ancient commonplace of man flung disarmed and ill-equipped into the universe, naturally worse adapted for survival than his fellow animals, is constantly paraphrased, including by Montaigne: 'nature, par une douceur maternelle, les accompaigne et guide, comme par la main, à toutes les actions et commoditez de leur vie; et qu'à nous elle nous abandonne au hazard et à la fortune, et à quester, par art, les choses nécessaires à nostre conservation (...) de maniere que leur stupidité brutale surpasse en toutes commoditez tout ce que peut nostre divine intelligence' (455). The verb 'quester' recurs in the 'Apologie' as a distinctively human, quasi-blind form of searching or rummaging, which contrasts with more creaturely and sure forms of pursuit.[205] While nature guides other creatures *as if by the hand* man is left to his own devices, which can only attempt to mimic those found in nature.Thus in Montaigne's writing, cognition's extended nature is more often a function of a distinctive form of inadequacy rather than testimony of a superior design or grander purpose. In the *Essais*, non-human creatures — most particularly birds and horses — carry part of the load of human cognition, and their appearances are far more than cognitive cameo performances. These creatures fly, and bolt, perch and trot, in and out of Montaigne's writing; as affordances, metaphors and presences within the text they are integrated within Montaigne's cognitive ecology, but the text sometimes gestures towards the possibility that they have a cognitive ecology of their own, beyond human ken. Their modes of being and movement, and their different varieties of

[203] Shannon, *The Accommodated Animal*, p. 8.
[204] Donne, *Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions*, XVIII, ed. by Anthony Raspa (Montreal; London: McGill University Press, 1975), p. 92.
[205] Such as that conveyed by the verb 'fureter'.

embodiment — horses as one of the 'four-footes beastes', birds as perchers, portents, migratory fliers and expert builders, cats as potential instrumentalizers of humans for purposes of play—becomes part of an argument about the extendedness of cognition which plays on a dynamic of equivocal reciprocity and different senses and aspects of extendedness. [206] Yet while Montaigne, in keeping with his time, considers animals to be exempt from the corruption and confusion of mankind, he acknowledges that they too can divert from the path of nature: 'Car il est bien vray que'elles mesmes [les bestes] ne vont pas tousjours exactement dans la route de la nature mais ce qu'elles en desvoyent c'est si peu que vous en appercevez tousjours l'orniere. Tout ainsi que les chevaux qu'on meine en main font bien des bonds et des escapades, mais c'est la longeur de leurs longes, et suyvent ce neantmoins tousjours les pas de celuy qui les guide; et comme l'oiseau prend son vol, mais sous la bride de sa filiere' ('De la phisionomie', III, 12, 1050). The autonomy of animals, seen in the wheel-marks or 'ruts' which deviate from but remain close to the 'route de la nature', is reined in, extending only so far as their 'longes' (lunge rein) and 'filieres' (a falconry term referring to the long string attached to the foot of a bird of prey) will allow. The 'longe' and 'filiere', both kinds of cord or rope designed to circumscribe the animals' liberty, operate between the literal and metaphorical, figuring the materials of a contexture in which humans instrumentalize and guide nature.

The premodern conception of nature and cosmos as 'the order of things' — the constant play of force and matter in which all species participate and are interconnected — is poised between a number of traditions: the evolving Late Antique notion of *gradus*, more commonly known as the *scala naturae* or great chain of being, originally a theological claim connected to the Emanation doctrine of the Neo-Platonists, where everything has its proper place— from inanimate matter, to plants, animals, humankind, angels and finally God; the Stoic vision of the universe as a living being composed of parts; and Epicurean materialism which holds that all of nature is ultimately composed of the same matter or stuff. [207] The notion of a *scala* is inherently ambiguous, in that it indicates a fixed or hierarchical *étagement* but also suggests movement between the steps or rungs grouping together forms of life. Metempsychosis, and animal-vegetable ambiguities or zoophytes and other classificatory equivocations transgressed any fixed positioning for plants on the chain of being, as do

[206] Edward Topsell, *The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes* (London: William Jaggard, 1607).
[207] The classic study of this concept is Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936).

understandings of the magico-medical virtues of plants and their links to the planets in medieval thought. As Dominique Brancher has shown, in early modern culture plants were not always simply anthropomorphized or marginalized as radically other, but circulated within discourse as sensitive, even erotic, beings in their own right, relevant to human knowledge and mankind's place in the world: in the period, the vegetal is both 'instrument cognitif et construction discursive'.[208] Hybridations and ambiguities between species form resulting in chimères, monsters and other 'singularitez' are part of nature's boundless virtuosity but also serve to remind that 'toute espèce naturelle est un étrange bricolage éphémère toujours en train de se transformer à partir de formes qui nous ont précédées.'[209] The energetic, open-ended reserves and potential of metamorphosis and mixture in the natural realm — the scope for exceeding existing forms of containment— are a source of epistemological and creative as well as biological ferment.[210] As Emanuele Coccia notes, 'Vivre est essentiellement vivre de la vie d'autrui, vivre dans et à travers la vie que les autres ont su construire ou inventer. Il y a une sorte de parasitisme, de cannibalisme universel, propre au domaine du vivant'. [211] This conception of life as bricolage of other lives and fragments of pre-existing life situates cultural discursive forms of life — such as those which 'animate' books, themselves quasi-parasitic transformations and combinations of parts of other texts — on some form of continuum with biological and physical life.

As Katherine Ibbett has shown, the language of the human, like the term 'compassion', is always polemical; it often surfaces just at the moment that its potential fails.[212] While the notion of *philanthropon* is translated in Ciceronian discourse as *humanitas* — designating relations between humans — the term's history indicates it was used to refer to a zone of transition between human and animal, in the form of a domesticated animal. Domestication is, as we now know, an evolutionary process whereby particular species are selected for

[208] Dominique Brancher, *Quand l'esprit vient aux plantes: Botanique sensible et subversion libertine* (Geneva: Droz, 2015), p. 26. On plants in Montaigne's writing more specifically, see Antonia Szabari, 'Montaigne's Plants in Movement', in *Early Modern Écologies: Beyond English Ecocriticism*, pp. 265 - 285.
[209] Emanuele Coccia, *La vie des plantes: une métaphysique du mélange* (Paris: Rivages, 2016).
[210] In Furetière (1690), 'ferment' is a 'Terme de Physique', associated with 'dereglement' and 'desmesure' dans les esprits. On the creative forces of the Renaissance see Michel Jeanneret's now-classic *Perpetuum mobile: métamorphoses des corps et des oeuvres de Vinci à Montaigne* (Paris: Macula, 1997).
[211] Coccia, *La vie des plantes*, p.19
[212] Katherine Ibbett, *Compassion's Edge: Fellow-Feeling and its Limits in Early Modern France* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press , 2018) p. 13. On the question of fellow-feeling's extension to animals, see Susan Squier, 'Fellow-Feeling', in *Animal Encounters,* pp. 171-196.

their benefits to humans; domesticated species are genetically different to their wild ancestors.[213] Notions of wildness and domestication are tied to understandings of 'accommodation' as both a cosmological and natural historical (and later, evolutionary and ecological) concept of belonging and adjustment, and a theological one, of scripture's legibility in the natural order. In the *Essais*, the verb 'apprivoiser' — from the Latin *privatus*, to release or free — is species-inclusive; it gestures towards a liminal zone, of incremental transitioning and essaying, which is sometimes not so much a domestication of the thing unknown or feared, as taming our own ignorance and fear through gradual adjustment or acclimatization.[214] While creatures figure the *limotrophe*, or border of what can and cannot be known, in parallel they have been considered man's greatest teachers, imparting an embodied authority and wisdom which man could only strive to incorporate through imitation (*imitatio* and *innutritio*).[215] The ancient idea, expressed by Democritus and repeated by Montaigne, that animals serve as models for human imitation, suggests a link between natural history and Humanist poetics which Montaigne brings into focus via the concept of contexture.

The Renaissance vision of correspondence, commerce and communicability between sometimes vastly different scales accommodates what Shannon calls a 'larger vision of belonging'. This sense of cosmic membership leaves room for interspecies connectedness, translating into a zoographic idiom which frames humankind as part of a much greater living community where cross-species relations often had a political cast. In the period, animal ingenuity or *sollertia* —the swift assessment of and response to the environment — was often identified as a form of embodied prudence relevant to politics, a strand of political thought stemming from the Renaissance reception of Plutarch. [216] In the spiritual sphere, the early modern period saw the development of what Catherine Randall calls 'a theology of creatureliness' which offered new configurations of

[213] One notable exception is the domestication of cats, whose domesticated species is near-identical to its wild forebears, which makes Montaigne's description of the ambiguous reciprocity between cats and humans in the 'Apologie' especially intriguing.

[214] For example, in II, 6: Montaigne writes of death, 'Il me semble toutefois qu'il y a quelque façon de nous apprivoiser à elle et de l'essayer aucunement' (371).

[215] The medieval bestiary tradition, with its roots in the *Physiologus,* combined classical natural history, observation and fable, offering a richly embroidered and moralized inventory of creatures real and imaginary, used to vehicle Christian truths. See Michael J. Curley, *Physiologus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Francis D. Klingender, *Animals in Art and Thought: To the End of the Middle Ages* (London: Routledge, 1971), Florence McCulloch, *Medieval Latin and French Bestiaries* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). On the Greek Physiologus and its translations, see *The Multilingual Physiologus: Studies in the Oldest Greek Recension and its Translations*, ed. by Caroline Macé and Jost Gippert (Turnhout: Brepols 2021).

[216] Montaigne, in his response to the anti-Machiavellian, protestant lawyer Innocent Gentillet, sides with Plutarch, notably in 'De la praesumption' (II, 17). See Raphaële Garrod, '"The Animal Outside." Animal Ingenuity and Human Prudence in French Renaissance Political Thought', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 49 (2019), 521-540.

the relationships among animals, man and God. [217] A confluence of two major resources — classical natural history and Genesis's narrative of the six days of creation, the Hexameron, rendered poetically in Du Bartas's *Sepmaine* (1583) — shaped this more connected vision by proposing joint origins in a common process that unfolded on a grand temporal scale, closing the gap between classical natural history and Christian doctrine. This joint reading of Genesis and nature — or 'two books tradition'—is most clearly seen in the theological doctrine of divine accommodation, according to which both Books convey consistent messages, but man's intellect, dulled by the Fall, needs these messages to be 'translated' into a format adequate to his limitations.[218] Understandings of divine accommodation take two mutually supplementary forms: on one view, knowledge of nature is a hermeneutical process through which man deciphers divine agency in Creation; on the other, all descriptions of God in Scripture are understood as oblique or underdetermined, justifying biblical hermeneutics. The idea that God, though in his nature unreachable and unknowable, communicates with man through adjustment and adaptation has its roots in classical rhetoric and the concept of *adaequatio*, decorum or fit: Cicero, Quintilian, and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* - the same classical sources as the arts of memory. Drawing on the classical traditions of natural history — Aristotle, Pliny the Elder, Aelian, Plutarch, Seneca — early modern natural history saw its project as the describing and ordering of natural particulars so as to enable the interpretation of nature, where the seed for knowledge is planted by God: as Bacon expresses it, all knowledge is 'a plant of God's own planting' and the fulfilment of an Old Testament prophecy. [219] The natural-historical and theological were entwined, because nature, and in particular nature's wonders — special *loci* of distilled, microcosmic significance — are a vehicle for divine communication, and seen from another angle, a

[217] Catherine Randall, *The Wisdom of Animals: Creatureliness in Early Modern French Spirituality* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), p.13.

[218] The doctrine of divine accommodation was developed in Patristic theology and later by Erasmus, and taken up by Reformation theologians, especially Calvin, though Zwingli, Luther and Vermigli also discuss it. See Arnold Huijgen, *Divine Accommodation in Jean Calvin's Theology* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011). On accommodation in Calvinist hermeneutics see also Garrod, 'Idolatry and Accommodation: "Histoires" and Their Natural-Philosophical Interpretations in Simon Goulart's *Commentaires et annotations sur la Sepmaine de Du Bartas* (1583)', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 72 (2013), 361-380. I return to the notion of accommodation in relation to Ambroise Paré and early modern prosthesis in Chapter Three.

[219] Francis Bacon, *Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature,* reprinted in *The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon,* ed. by John M Robertson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p.189. A re-edited version of *Bacon's Valerius Terminus* will be published in the *Oxford Francis Bacon,* Vol. V, 'Early Philosophical Writings to c.1611', ed. by Rhodri Lewis and others (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming). In Bacon and other early modern texts, 'planting' also carries a colonial and political sense: plantations and colonies expanded the bounds of empire, creating a correlation between territorial expansion and the conversion of souls. In *A Discourse Concerning Western Planting*' (1584), Richard Hakluyt proclaimed that the first aim of western plantation 'will be greatly for the inlargement of the gospel of Christe, whereunto the princes of the refourmed religion are chefely bounde', *A Discourse Concerning Western Planting* (1584), ed. by Charles Deane (Cambridge: Wilson & Son, 1887), p. 3.

driver of scientific enquiry. Small-scale patterns and designs in the natural world reflect and communicate God's grander design, through a form of natural metaphor; we can reach God's intended meaning through a hermeneutic process whereby Scripture becomes legible or comprehensible in nature.

Metaphor translates wonder. Within this vision, the concept of divine accommodation figures the interplay, or continuum, between the literal and metaphorical within a human-divine perspective, whilst also expressing incommensurability and the attempt to transcend it. [220] Bacon understands nature as having been 'set in man's heart' by God, 'So as whatsoever is not God but parcel of the world, he hath fitted it to the comprehension of man's mind, if man will open and dilate the powers of his understanding as he may'.[221] The lexicon of fit so central to accommodation, and later central to theories of evolution, is instrumentalized by Montaigne to show how our knowledge is limited by our 'formes de cognoissance' and is literally shaped and circumscribed by our embodied condition ('limites corporels'). Embodiment is itself a form of accommodation, and God's incarnation in Christ is the ultimate example.

In parallel, another branch of natural history and early ecological thought, distinct from Plinian natural history, took shape in the neo-Stoic revival of the sixteenth century, derived from the reception of Seneca's natural philosophical *Quaestiones Naturales.* In the writings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, 'nature' has a double meaning: it is, with *Proairesis* (human deliberation and choice in giving or withholding assent to impressions or *phantasiai*), Fortune and Necessity, one of the four causes of all events in the cosmos, and also carries the more technical sense of 'the nature of things', their essential qualities, a form of potential that must be realized. The project of the *Quaestiones Naturales* is to take the measure of God (I. 17) and to walk through the universe (*mundum circuire;* 3.1), in order to celebrate the works of the gods (3.5), and to free us from fear induced by natural events (6.4) by adopting what Pierre Hadot calls 'le regard d'en haut' — rather than *sub species aeternitatis,* the view from the stars, or perhaps of a bird in flight— or 'conversion of attention' away from vain preoccupations.[222] The aim is not to awaken wonder or *curiositas*, but to naturalize or tame wonder, by

[220] On the signs of divine presence being also signs of divine incommensurability, see Jean Calvin, *Institution de la religion chrestienne* (Geneva: J. Crespin, 1560), I.5. I. 8.
[221] Bacon, '*Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature', in Bacon,* Works, ed. by James Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath, 7 vols. (London: Longman et al., 1859)
[222] Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophiques antiques* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1981). On aerian or cosmic imaginative perspective on terrestrial life in the period, see Thibaut Maus de Rolley, *Élévations: l'écriture du voyage aérien à la Renaissance* (Geneva: Droz, 2011) and, more broadly, Hadot, 'La Terre Vue d'en Haut et le Voyage

understanding how what appears to be miraculous connects to the rest of nature in a causal way. While Seneca believes in divination — natural events are sacred signs — it is important to identify natural causes. This perspective influenced the encyclopaedic and natural historical project of Pierre de la Primaudaye (1546-1619) whose interpretations are based on a particular cosmological reading of the *Quaestiones Naturales.* On Seneca's view, the study of nature concerns itself with the human place in the cosmos: we investigate nature as a large living being of which we are part, and so nature pertains to (*se pertinere,* I. 13) human nature. Historians of early modern cosmography identify two traditions which shape Renaissance cosmographies: the mathematical geography of Ptolemy and the descriptive geography of Strabo.[223] In the 'Apologie', Montaigne's preoccupation with measurement and notions of adequacy and commensurability (and their opposites) can be read in the light of these traditions, as a means of shifting the perspective from how we are a harmonious part of nature, to how we distort nature to fit our own epistemological and cognitive forms and measure nature with denaturing instruments.

Renaissance natural history resists being being slotted into a linear view of cultural history: it does not 'evolve' from medieval zoology or into enlightenment biology but is animated by a distinctive sense of convergence between different kinds of language. As Philippe Glardon puts it:

> L'histoire naturelle de la Renaissance n'est pas un bourgeonnement temporaire, né entre la «zoologie» médiévale, essentiellement symbolique et technique, et la biologie moderne née au XVIIIe siècle, mais un moment abouti de l'histoire de la pensée, des pratiques et du regard sur la nature, qui s'échafaude sur des bases solides, tout à fait caractéristiques de la Renaissance, autour de la réflexion sur les signes et leur interprétation, et qui se cristallise autour des points de convergence entre le langage humain et le langage naturel, d'origine divine.[224]

Glardon's use of the reflexive form of the verb 'échafauder' justifies a brief foreshadowing comment because the notion of scaffolding will be important in Part Two. This lexical choice seems intended to express how the (elaborate) edifice of early modern natural history is built on solid foundations and is not merely 'un bourgeonnement temporaire'. Glardon's contrasting of the ephemeral and fragile 'budding' or offshoots of the

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Cosmique: Le point de vue du poète, du philosophe et de l'historien', *in Frontières et Conquête Spatiale, ed. by J. Schneider and M. Léger-Orine,* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1988) pp. 31-40. The notion of inhabiting a point of view freed from the spatiotemporal constraints dictated by one's embodied, finite, human nature seems, prima facie, remote from Montaigne's own, but the strange posthumous *futur antérieur* perspective set out in his 'Au lecteur' is inflected by this sense of possibility beyond ordinary limits.

[223] See Jean-Marc Besse, *Les grandeurs de la terre: aspects du savoir géographique à la Renaissanc*e (Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2003).

[224] Philippe Glardon, 'L'histoire naturelle du XVIe siècle: historiographie, méthodologie et perspectives', *Gesnerus*, 63 (2006), 280–298 (p. 293).

vegetal world with the more permanent, or solid, architectures of the inorganic built environment itself plays on our embedded notions of how human-built structures impose themselves on and shape the world, while nature bends 'passively' to our volition. Yet, as I show, the metaphor of scaffolding is inherently ambiguous, suggesting both structural solidity and precariousness, interiority and exteriority, permanence and temporariness. Montaigne puts this to good use in the 'bastiment' of his own writing.

From its beginnings, then, the study of nature has been considered a work of translation and inference: creatures, whether anthropomorphized, celebrated for their alterity or for embodying wisdom, were seen as vessels for divine messages intended for humans. As Tom Conley remarks, in the sixteenth century birds served as instruments for measuring physical space as well as signs of divine presence, inviting the observer to reflect on the double perspective of seeing the world in scientific and sacred ways.[225] Amyot, in his 1572 translation of Plutarch's *Moralia*, invokes this ingrained sense of animal involvement in human meanings and human-divine communication: 'il y a cent mille choses que les dieux nous monstrent, nous predisent , et nous prognostiquent par le moyen des animaux tant de la terre que de la mer'.[226] Birds in particular are thought to be ciphers and instruments of agencies beyond the human making them intermediaries between the expressible and ineffable.[227] Plutarch notes birds' special significance as adept and flexible instruments of the gods:

> Il est tout certain que l'une des plus grandes, des plus nobles, et plus anciennes parties de l'art de deviner, est celle qui se tire du vol des oyseaux , d'autant que leur naturel , qui est leger, remuant et spirituel , et qui pour sa subtilité se plie aisement , et s'accommode à toute demonstration, sert à dieu comme d'un instrument propre à tourner ainsi qu'il veult, tantost en un mouvement, tantost en quelque voix et quelques gazouillemens , tantost en quelque geste et quelque port , les unes pour retenir , les autres pour poulser et haster , ne plus ne moins que des vens , par lesquelles voyes il retient et empesche au cuines de ces actions et affections , et dirige les autres jusques à leur fin et accomplissement. [228]

Birds are quasi-immaterial forms of embodied *truchement* between the terrestrial and celestial spheres, creating a web of contingency, agency and intentionality, instrumentality and autonomy which Montaigne gathers up into his own understanding of culture's relation to nature as a form of ontological and discursive

[225] Tom Conley, 'A Space-Event: The "Apologie" in the *Essais* of 1595', *Montaigne Studies* VIII (1996), 103-118 (p.110).
[226] Jacques Amyot, *Oeuvres morales et meslées de Plutarque* (Paris: Imprimerie de Michel de Vascosan, 1572), 'Quels animaux sont les plus advisez, ceulx de la terre, ou ceulx de l'eaux', 517v.
[227] Birdsong itself posed, and poses, an interesting example or problem within discussions of language and meaning: for a discussion of (interpretations of) avian vocalization in an historical perspective see Justin E. H. Smith, 'Between Language, Music and Sound: Birdsong as a Philosophical Problem from Aristotle to Kant, in *Human and Animal Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy and Medicine,* pp. 127-146.
[228] Amyot, 'Quels animaux sont les plus advisez', 517r.

entanglement rather than straightforward distinction. Plutarch's description of birds' natural malleability ('Leur naturel (...) se plie aisement et s'accommode à toute demonstration, sert à dieu comme d'un instrument propre à tourner ainsi qu'il veult') reminds us of Montaigne's description in the 'Apologie' of reason as 'un instrument de plomb et de cire, alongeable, ployable et accommodable à tous biais et à toutes mesures; il ne reste que la suffisance de le sçavoir contourner' (565). In the context of the 'Apologie', the bendability and adaptability of reason ('accommodable à tous bias') fits into the broader sceptical argument, which humbles the human scale against the vaster inhuman scales of cosmology and takes the measure of our epistemological and institutional structures. Notions of measurement, adequation and congruence or fit are linking threads in an overarching logic of accommodation: in the polyvalent senses of *habitus*, or fit within the world, and of adaptation, adjustment or distortion.

Montaigne gives an apparently more down to earth example of animals' role in human communication in 'Des Postes' (II, 22):

> L'invention de Cecinna à renvoyer des nouvelles à ceux de sa maison avoit bien plus de promptitude: il emporta quand et soy des arondelles, et les relaschoit vers leurs nids quand il vouloit r'envoyer de ses nouvelles, en les teignant de marque de couleur propre à signifier ce qu'il vouloit, selon qu'il avoit concerté avec les siens. Au theatre, à Romme, les maistres de famille avoient des pigeons dans leur sein, ausquels ils attacheoyent des lettres quand ils vouloient mander quelque chose à leurs gens au logis; et estoient dressez à en raporter responce. (680-81).[229]

Here the swallow's nest — which recurs as an object of wonder elsewhere in the *Essais*, drawing on a long natural historical and natural theological tradition — is a prop within the economy of communication: the swallows' homing instinct draws them back, bearing colour-coded signification, to the nests from which they have been strategically dislodged.

This Chapter explores how Montaigne's writing situates human cognition within a broader ecology, emerging from the array of environmental possibilities and constraints that are in play. In the first part I explore the affinities between the notions of contexture and relevance across idioms and historical periods, and the possible implications for interpreting Montaigne's figure of consubstantiality as connected in pertinent ways to extended mind. In contemporary pragmatics, the study of how contextual factors interact with linguistic

[229] It is worth noting that the concept of 'post' understood as the transport of missives or dispatches originally refers to the place place where horses are stationed for riders transporting messages along a route.

meaning in the interpretation of utterances, relevance theory provides a cognitive model of human communication based on the central idea that communication, like cognition, has developed in the course of evolution to be relevance-oriented and geared to maximum efficiency.

The 'Apologie de Raimond Sebond' is my main textual basis for setting out this perspective. The 'Apologie' frames humankind's situated condition, and by the same token his lostness, as the inadequacy of man's instruments to plot his coordinates along a spiritual path or in a metaphysical or epistemological geography: 'Nous ne sommes non plus pres du ciel sur le mont Senis qu'au fons de la mer; consultez en, pour voir, avec vostre astrolabe' (II, 12, 531). The astrolabe — a portable mechanical model of the heavens, a calibratable memory of their structure, used as a navigational tool in seafaring — only figures once in the whole of the *Essais*, where it serves rather paradoxically as a measure of incommensurability, a futile instrument emblematizing our remoteness from the heavens. [230] Seafaring and navigation are prominent notions in the 'Apologie', both in Montaigne's expression of man's epistemic disorientation and in the reader's experience of navigating the essay itself. Reason flounders in the sea of human opinion ('tout aussi tost elle se perd s'embarasse et s'entrave tournoyante er flotante dans cette mer vaste, trouble et ondoyante des opinions humaines sans bride et sans but', 520), and the reader, as Conley observes, gets lost on its rippling, rolling seas: 'its very aspect is set forth, it seems, to defamiliarize or "deterritorialize" whoever sets sail upon the *mare oceanum* of its reflections on the limits of human reason'.[231] The thematics of communication, accommodation, and congruence or fit, across scales and planes, combines discourses of natural history, natural theology, science and cognitive anthropology. Montaigne's handling of embodied or gestural communication and different forms of language — including animal language, and the multiplicity or Babel of confused human languages, indicating our fallen condition— in the 'Apologie' decentres the human subject, questioning his conventional status as a linguistic and rational creature, above all others.

In reconfiguring the coordinates of man's habitus, Montaigne draws heavily on Plutarch, whom Montaigne describes as 'de tous les autheurs que je cognoisse celuy qui a mieux meslé l'art à la nature et le jugement à la

[230] In *Cognition in the Wild* (1995), Edwin Hutchins describes the astrolabe as 'A physical residuum of generations of astrological practice, a sedimentation of representations of cosmic regularities' which is also an analogue computer, 'encoding a kind of knowledge that cannot be represented internally', p. 97.
[231] Conley, 'A Space-Event', p.104.

science' (III, 6, 899). In *De sollertia animalium*, Plutarch expresses the intention of showing that any creature capable of sentience is also capable of understanding. Alongside a number of other essays, in particular 'De la cruauté,' the 'Apologie' presents a sensitive ecological empathy and awareness of the web of causality and responsibility between the human and other forms of life cohabiting the planet, making it an essential case study for eco-critical approaches to early modern culture:

> J'en rabats beaucoup de nostre presomption, et me demets volontiers de cette royauté imaginaire qu'on nous donne sur les autres creatures. Quand tout cela en seroit à dire, si y a-il un certain respect qui nous attache, et un general devoir d'humanité, non aux bestes seulement qui ont vie et sentiment, mais aux arbres mesmes et aux plantes. Nous devons la justice aux hommes, et la grace et la benignité aux autres creatures qui en peuvent estre capables. Il y a quelque commerce entre elles et nous, et quelque obligation mutuelle. (II, 11, 435). [232]

In the 'Apologie' the language of the human becomes re-assimilated into the overarching category of the creature. While in some respects Montaigne remains firmly zoocentric and plants do not take on a cognitive life of their own in the *Essais*, plants do matter and are presented as animated beings, whose cultivation is understood as a form of 'soing', taking care, coextensive with man's need to cultivate and self-manage.

The *Essais* are a document of a situated mind at work in an earlier stage of the Anthropocene, our own geological age of a humanly-shaped, and damaged, planet. Montaigne's five hundred year old attentions to man's footprint — our built environments of stone and text, the technologies through which we reach over and overreach ourselves, and our impacts on the delicate biological-ethical imbrications and reciprocities regulating terrestrial life, which, I argue, form integral part of his reflection on extended cognition — face today's readers with spectres of an early modern hybrid of optimism and warning, which casts a foreshadow over the contemporary dissonance between complacency and alarm. Montaigne's response to creaturely suffering in 'De la cruauté' (II, 11) situates the philosophical question of 'other minds' in the context of sentience, reframing (as does Bentham much later) the question as 'Can they suffer?' rather than can they reason, or talk (in ways recognizable to humans), as being the relevant test.[233]

[232] The verb 'attacher', from Old French 'estachier' to fix, support, stake up, signals the notion of stakeholdership, denoting common interest.

[233] See Dan Zhavi and John Michael, 'Beyond Mirroring: 4E Perspectives on Empathy', *Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*, ed. by Albert Newen, Leon De Bruin, and Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: OUP, 2018), pp. 589-603 < DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.29.

In Part Two I draw on the ecological lens of contexture in a number of readings — 'cognitive reincarnations' — from the *Essais* where Montaigne considers the hybrid and extended nature of cognition, bridging biological and non-biological, anatomical and architectural, human and non-human. The phrase 'cognitive reincarnations' is intended to express how understandings of cognition emerging from one set of historical circumstances can emerge in meaningfully analogous ways at different moments in history. One of the key questions this chapter addresses is how non-human elements — whether material objects, animals, or broader socio-cultural structures — can be accommodated into this cognitive contexture?

There is clear overlap between ecological approaches and cognitive approaches to early modern texts, to the point that cognitive studies — especially those which take situated, environmentally co-constituted cognition as a reading paradigm — might be thought as a species of eco-criticism. The main difference is of perspective and ethical stance: while both see humans as embedded in context, ecocriticm reads our cultural responsibilities towards other species and nature at large through the lens of literature, while cognitive approaches work at breaking down the distinction between nature and culture. Through close engagement with Montaigne's language — both lexical and syntactic aspects —I demonstrate Montaigne's understanding of mind as inescapably hybrid, embodied and scaffolded, even within its most 'private' and 'inner' recesses of introspection.

Part One: Contexture and Relevance

Un organe de plus ou de moins dans notre machine auroit fait une autre éloquence, une autre poésie; une contexture différente des mêmes organes auroit fait encore une autre poésie (Montesquieu, *Essai sur le goût,* 1757)

The argument set out in this section is that the concepts of contexture and relevance have structural and functional affinities across disciplinary, cultural and historical idioms, and that these affinities can guide and enrich our sense of consubstantiality and extended mind in Montaigne's writing. Central to this argument is the idea that 'contexture' as deployed in the *Essais*, and in particular in the 'Apologie', is pivotal to Montaigne's poetics of scale — moving between micro and macro — and offers a dual perspective on questions of consubstantiality seen both as a function of the part ('membre de ma vie') and of the whole ('livre consubstantiel à son autheur'). In Chapter One, I considered human artefacts and tools — 'ouvrages' and

'outils' — in relation to mind and memory; I now turn to Montaigne's treatment of natural artefacts, to explore his sense of how these might relate to extended mind in an early modern ecological perspective.

Since antiquity, certain natural artefacts — including birds' nests and spiders' webs — have been considered nodes which distill a particular elaboration and significance. These structures have a variety of functions linked to the conservation of the species: as habitats, and, in the case of the spider web, affordances for communication, camouflage and catching prey. These artefacts and the creatures that produce them are *topoi* of classical natural history — figuring in the natural historical writings of Aristotle, Pliny, Aelian, Plutarch — who register varying degrees of wonder in contemplating their structural intricacy and functional efficacy. This sense of wonder operates at the intersection of transcendent experience and the realization of human inadequacy faced with the complexity of creation and its 'singularitez'.[234]

In the 'Apologie' Montaigne draws on this rich natural historical tradition and elaborates it in a more explicitly cognitive perspective. The imbrication of creaturely and human life is figured by the nest of the swallow constructed and suspended in the eaves, rafters and corners of human dwellings:

> Les arondelles, que nous voyons au retour du printemps fureter tous les coins de nos maisons, cherchent elles sans jugement et choisissent elles sans discretion, de mille places, celle qui leur est la plus commode à se loger? Et, en cette belle et admirable contexture de leurs bastimens, les oiseaux peuvent ils se servir plustost d'une figure quarrée que de la ronde, d'un angle obtus que d'un angle droit, sans en sçavoir les conditions et les effects? Prennent-ils tantost de l'eau, tantost de l'argile, sans juger que la dureté s'amollit en l'humectant? Planchent-ils de mousse leur palais, ou de duvet, sans prevoir que les membres tendres de leurs petits y seront plus mollement et plus à l'aise? Se couvrent-ils du vent pluvieux et plantent leur loge à l'Orient, sans connoistre les conditions differentes de ces vents et considerer que l'un leur est plus salutaire que l'autre? (455)

The significance of this passage travels far beyond its local context in the 'Apologie', as part of a skeptical argument dismantling the pretensions of reason, organized philosophy and dislodging man from his conventional place in the ontological and epistemological scheme. A large portion of this argument consists of a discussion inspired by Sextus Empiricus's *Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes*, which were translated into Latin and printed by Henri Estienne in 1562. Most of Montaigne's examples are lifted, often practically verbatim, from

[234] Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, *Wonders and the Order of Nature 1150-1750* (New York: Zone Books,1998). The word 'singularitez' forms part of the lexicon of early modern natural history and travel writing, reflected in the title of Pierre Belon du Mans's *Les Observations de plusieurs singularitez et choses memorables, trouvées en Grece, Asie, Judée, Egypte, Arabie et autres pays estranges* (Paris, Guillaume Cavellat: 1554) and Thevet's *Singularitez* de la France Antarctique, autrement nommez Amerique (Paris: chez les heritiers de Maurice de La Porte, 1558).

Jacques Amyot's translation of Plutarch's *Moralia*, published the same year as Montaigne started composing the *Essais*[235] Montaigne adapts Amyot's translation, placing it under the sign of human uncertainty which contrasts with the swallow's cognitive sure-footedness and its solid, instinctive embodied knowledge, which has no need for supplementary instruments. Here, the notion of contexture is a potent emblem of creaturely ingenuity and adaptive fit between organism and environment, tracing a link between human and animal architectures present in the Vitruvian myth of the origins of architecture, and Philibert de l'Orme's visual integration of the swallow, as quasi-fabled builder bird, in his allegory of the good architect in the *Nouvelles inventions pour bien bastir*.[236] Another salient modification is Montaigne's addition in connection with the swallow's nest of the term 'contexture' whose meaning ramifies in the *Essais* with important interpretative implications. In particular, the notion of contexture mediates Montaigne's complex reflection on the relation between the organization of nature (and the tension between its vicissitudes and its unity) and of human knowledge, constructed as a form of mimetic interpretation of nature which also mirrors the human mind, itself part and parcel of the natural world.

'Contexture', denoting both the texture that surrounds and the texture that constitutes, the formal arrangement or organization of parts within a larger pattern or whole, is predominantly an early modern term.[237] It is a term focused on parts-whole relations and, from a rhetorical perspective, it functions the same way as *dispositio*. The webbed structure it designates also represents the Renaissance conception of language generally, understood as a 'seamless web'.[238] Unlike 'constructure', a word which occurs just once in the *Journal* and nowhere in the *Essais,* which suggests the building of a material, fixed structure, 'contexture' implies a certain

[235] See Olivier Guerrier (ed.), *"Moralia" et "Oeuvres morales" à la Renaissance* (Paris, Honoré Champion, 2008). The classic study on the the reception of Plutarch in the period is Robert Aulotte's, *Amyot et Plutarque: La Tradition des 'Moralia" au XVIe siècle* (Geneva: Droz, 1965).

[236] Philibert de l'Orme, *Nouvelles inventions pour bien bastir, & à petits fraiz* (Paris: Regnauld Chaudiere, 1561). On the Vitruvian myth, see Indra K. McEwen, *Vitruvius: Writing the Body of Architecture* (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 2003).

[237] Contemporary usages of 'contexture' are mainly within anthropology and social science, notably ethno-methodology ('Gestalt-contexture' features as a key element of Garfinkel's method of enquiry into how members of society use practical reasoning in their everyday actions) and, in French sociological writing, 'contexture' is used in a Marxist critical sense. See also *Culture/Contexture: Explorations in Anthropology and Literary Studies*, ed. by E. Valentine Daniel and Jeffrey M. Peck (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

[238] I have borrowed this expression from Ann Moss, *Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn* (Oxford: OUP, 2003), p. 49. The notion of a seamless web of language resonates in Montaigne's words, in I, 26: 'Je n'ayme point de tissure où les liaisons et les coutures paroissent,' (172).

flexibility; rather than solid form, it denotes a tissue of complex and unstable relations.[239] The entry in Cotgrave's 1611 *Dictionairie* indicates that it denotes a 'web, or weauing; composition, worke, frame'. Greimas records three main senses, citing one of Montaigne's uses ('la contexture du nid du moindre oyselet') : 'Forme obtenue par l'union des parties tressées. Nature humaine. Développement, déroulement.'[240] Like its cognate 'texture,' 'contexture' stems from 'tistre' (to weave, to fold within), but foregrounds a fine-grained complexity of composition, a more elaborate arrangement or concatenation of parts. [241] This accent on complexity and intricacy highlights both the ingenuity involved in the creation of such structures and the hermeneutic challenge of unravelling — a more hands-on, embodied variant of deciphering — the individual elements so as to understand how they fit together and interact. In the *Essais*, contexture denotes different types of corpus — theological, political, social, discursive, institutional — which can be a tightly woven fabric, but can also be in a state of unravelling and vulnerable to destruction, something at the forefront of Montaigne's mind in the context of the civil wars ('La liaison et contexture de cette monarchie et ce grand bastiment ayant esté desmis et dissout, notamment sur ses vieux ans, par elle, donne tant qu'on veut d'ouverture et d'entrée à pareilles injures', I, 23). The biological body too is a contexture, vulnerable to dissolution by illness: 'Je laisse faire nature, et presuppose qu'elle se soit pourveue de dents et de griffes, pour se deffendre des assaux qui luy viennent, et pour maintenir cette contexture, dequoy elle fuit la dissolution' ('Divers Evenemens de Mesme Conseil', I, 24, 127).[242]

The reader's first encounter with the term 'contexture' in the 'Apologie' is in relation to Montaigne's project of translation. In 1569, eleven years before that essay was first published, Montaigne published the *Théologie naturelle,* his translation of Sebond's *Theologia Naturalis sive Liber naturae creaturarum* at his father's request.

> C'estoit une occupation bien estrange et nouvelle pour moy; mais, estant de fortune pour lors de loisir, et ne pouvant rien refuser au commandement du meilleur pere qui fut onques, j'en vins à bout comme je peus: à quoy il print un singulier plaisir, et donna charge qu'on le fit imprimer; ce qui fut executé apres sa

[239] In the entry for Macerata: 'Il n'y a pas beaucoup de bastimens eaux. J'y remerquay un palais de pierre de taille, tout taillé par le dehors en pointe de diamant quarrée, comme le palais du Cardinal d'Este à Ferrare cete forme de constructure est plesante à la veue' . Montaigne, *Journal de voyage*, ed François. Rigolot (Paris: PUF, 1992) 138.
[240] Greimas, *Dictionnaire du moyen français*, p.141.
[241] In Cotgrave (1611), the verb 'Tistre' is: 'To weaue; also, to plait, infould, enwrap, interlace one within another'; In Nicot's *Thresor* (1606) it is: 'faire de la toile', while the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* (Paris: J.-B. Coignard, 1694) defines it as: 'Faire de la toile, ou des estoffes, en entrelassant les fils dont on les doit composer. Il est peu en usage hors des temps formez du participe: Contexture.'
[242] In Nicot, *Thresor de la langue françoyse* (1606), 'corps' is defined as: 'La totale contexture mortelle, de ce qui est animé'.

> mort. Je trouvay belles les imaginations de cet autheur, la contexture de son ouvrage bien suyvie, et son dessein plein de pieté. (440)

In the last line, 'bien suyvie' — well constructed, following a plan or design— seems to confuse, in the passive form Montaigne uses here, the distinction between acting and following; this draws the reader's attention to his own instrumentality in *not* following Sebond, and in not following the apologetic intent indicated by the essay title.[243] The inadequation or incongruity between the declared projet of the 'Apologie' and its realization itself has a particular function, as it maps out the tension between commensurability and incommensurability, adequation or inadequation, determinism and autonomy, which is part of the discursive matter of the essay. If the reader visualizes the contexture of the work as a network of pathways and turns, laid out by the author as an itinerary to guide the reader, then Montaigne's attitude to Sebond's work raises ambiguities around agency and deliberation that attend his own thorny undertaking, 'de suyvre une alleure si vagabonde que celle de nostre esprit' (II, 6, 378), placing the mind, its wayward ramifications and routes, beyond conscious agency. The verb 'suyvre' suggests that one can only tail the mind, which bifurcates — like a path — into first and third person perspectives, carrying implications for the book, which takes on a life of its own, and, like Montaigne's accident in II, 6, reveals truths inaccessible through less contingent means.

Contexture can be compared with the rhetorical concept of *ductus,* which Mary Carruthers analyzes as 'the way by which a work leads someone through itself: that quality in a work's formal patterns which engages an audience and then sets a viewer or auditor or performer *in motion within its structures*, an experience more like travelling through stages along a route than like perceiving a whole object'.[244] This experience of artistic form as movement *through* a composition, rather than the examination of a static or completed object, is dynamic not only because one sets out on an inner itinerary (the way one does in the techniques of classical art of memory travelling through the loci to retrieve the relevant images corresponding with places in an argument) but because the itinerary itself is only partially mapped: its plan is not fully laid out in advance, and the traveller

[243] See Claude Blum, '"L'Apologie de Raimond Sebond" et le déplacement de l'apologétique traditionnelle à la fin du XVIe siècle', in *Le Signe et le texte: Études sur l'écriture au XVIe siècle en France,* ed. by Lawrence D. Kritzman (Lexington, Ky : French Forum, 1990), pp. 149-159.

[244] Mary Carruthers, 'The Concept of of *ductus* or Journeying Through a Work of Art', in *Rhetoric Beyond Words* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), pp. 190 - 200 (p.190), my emphasis. On *ductus* as a 'concept transversal' in Montaigne's writing see Déborah Knop, 'Écrire, conduire: maîtrise et fougue du *ductus* montaignien', *Montaigne Studies*, XXVII (2015), 73-88.

(the audience or reader) has agency in co-constructing the route and creating new connections.[245] *Ductus* is also temporal; it involves duration, as well as spatiality. Both the notion of ductus and contexture share a tension between passivity (being led or prompted through a pre-existing plan or design) and agency (participating in the creation of the work itself). This tension entails different conceptions of the functioning or life of a work, conceived as a machine or *engin*, an organism, or an itinerary. As Carruthers observes, 'Ductus is born of constant deliberation and various choices (...) While his mental plan is of the author's own volition and judgement, *ductus* is a quality of the work itself'. [246]

It is fitting that contexture arises in connection with Sebond's text, owing to the nature of Montaigne's rendering of it into the vernacular. More than a translation, Montaigne's *Théologie naturelle* recasts and reinterprets Sebond's cosmology, filling it will flora and fauna and demonstrating the crucial nexus between writing style and metaphysics, between description and epistemology. [247] Montaigne's interpretation mediates the gaps between natural science in the fifteenth-century author's lifetime and its anachronistic, time-lagged feel in the context of new discoveries eighty-four years later. [248] Montaigne's practice of translation can usefully be read in the light of Latour's understanding of translation in its various forms as 'attempting to retie the Gordian knot by crisscrossing', the hybridizing of nature and culture.[249] Where the Catalan theologian maintains the hierarchical vision — biological and metaphysical —of the *scala naturae,* Montaigne inverts this cosmic schema modelled on an Aristotelian conception of soul and insists on a greater horizontality, showing the ties that link man with the rest of nature, in what Conley refers to as 'a loose webbing of matter, signs and language'. [250] The contexture 'bien suyvie' of Sebond's text — its

[245] Montaigne's own itinerary in the *Journal*, of course, casts doubt on this assumption that a journey moves forward in a linear manner— rather than sideways or back on itself.
[246] These ideas are explored along different lines in Alfred Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1998), especially Chapter 9, 'The Extended Mind', pp. 221-258.
[247] On the larger context see R. Garrod and P.J. Smith (eds.), *Natural History in Early Modern France: the Poetics of an Epistemic Genre* (Leiden: Brill, 2018); Brian W. Ogilvie, *The Science of Describing: Natural History in Renaissance Europe* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), Rowan Tomlinson, *Inventive Inventories: Lists, Literature, and Natural History in Renaissance France* (Oxford: forthcoming).
[248] See Philip Hendrick, *Montaigne et Sebond: L'art de la traduction* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1996); Michel Simonin, 'La préhistoire de l'Apologie de Raymond Sebond', in *Montaigne, Apologie de Raymond Sebond, De la Theologia à la Théologie*, ed. by Claude Blum (Paris: H. Champion, 1990), 115-116; Jean Céard, 'Montaigne traducteur de Raymond Sebond', *Montaigne Studies*, 5, 1993, 11-26; Mireille Habert, 'Montaigne, Translator of Raymond Sebond', *The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne* (Oxford: OUP, 2016).
[249] Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 3, 39-43.
[250] Tom Conley, 'Review Essay: A Chaos of Science', *Renaissance Quarterly* 51 (3) (1998), 934-941 (941).

arguments and their disposition or arrangement — is transformed into an understanding of ontology as fundamentally web-like.

In *The Elements of Law* (1640), Hobbes employs the term 'contexture' in relation to the scope and pitfalls of communication, of accurate transmission and recognition of intentions, in the personal and the political spheres:

> Though words be the signs we have of one another's opinions and intentions; yet, because the equivocation of them is so frequent according to the diversity of contexture, and of the company wherewith they go (which the presence of him that speaketh, our sight of his actions, and conjecture of his intentions, must help to discharge us of): it must be extreme hard to find out the opinions and meanings of those men that are gone from us along ago, and have left no other signification thereof but their books; which cannot possibly be understood without history enough to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great prudence to observe them. [251]

The semantic habitat in which he uses the term makes it particularly instructive. For Hobbes— whose pragmatist interest in communication flows from a concern with how words as signs of our intentions can bind us legally and morally — equivocation of names or words stems from 'the diversity of contexture' in which they are to be understood; 'it is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language , to deliver himself from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said, and this is what we call UNDERSTANDING.' [252] On a Hobbesian reading, Montaigne — being 'one of those men that are gone from us along ago' in the biological sense — has left the trace of his intentions in his books, which can only be understood, even partially, with history or context enough. In *Elements of Law* Hobbes provides a bridge between contexture and communication which opens up affinities between contemporary and early modern ways of understanding communication which are explicitly contextualist.

Influential contemporary theories of cognition and communication propose that comprehension is a form of richly context-dependent inference. In particular, Relevance Theory proposes an inferential alternative to the code model of communication according to which a communicator encodes their intended message into a signal, which is then decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code. In its broadest traits,

[251] Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic,* ed. by Ferdinand Tönnies, 2nd edition (Oxford: Routledge, 2018), p. 48.
[252] Ibid, p. 10.

Relevance Theory proposes instead that human communication, like cognition, has adapted— over the long scales of evolutionary time — to be geared to the maximisation of relevance, and that interpretation of utterances is guided by this core principle.

Relevance Theory takes as its starting point a number of Gricean assumptions about communication — all stemming from the overarching notion that meaning is primarily a psychological phenomenon, and only secondarily a linguistic one — which it works through in detail. Firstly, communication results from cooperation between speaker or writer and the addressee and involves the expression and recognition of intentions, or 'mindreading'. Secondly, utterances are not signals but *pieces* or *samples* of evidence about the speaker's meaning, which is then inferentially constructed by the listener or reader on the basis of those intentionally-framed evidentiary fragments or pieces, fleshed out by context.

II. Relevance: Implicatures, Mutual Adjustment and Metaphor

In this section I transition from contexture in the form of birds' nests, as literal natural artefacts, to the notion of contexture as a wider dimension of communication and language. I use aspects of Relevance Theory to move between these different scales and planes, examining how contextures of various kinds can shed light on questions of interpretation and inference in Montaigne. Contexture and relevance clearly share a central investment in the notion of context and environment. To bring affinities beyond this prima facie one into focus, I will draw on the Gricean notion of the conversational implicature — and its relevance theoric off-shoot, the 'open-ended array of loose implicatures' employed mainly in the case of metaphorical uses of language. Then, homing back in on Montaigne's use of 'contexture' in relation to the intricate constructions of animals, both human and non-human, I suggest that the ecological concept of 'niche construction' in evolutionary biology and evolutionary cognitive science complements premodern understandings of fit between organism and environment, and provides a theory of communication and interpretation that accommodates communication between humans, between species and even between the human and the divine.

Communication involves the interplay of possibility and constraint, open-endedness that is not arbitrary, and meaning is co-built. For Sperber and Wilson, all utterances are positioned somewhere along a 'literal-loose-

metaphorical continuum', where different uses shade off into one another, and all utterances, including ones at the literal end of the spectrum, are interpreted according to the same inferential mechanism of mutual adjustment between explicit content and implicit content. The notion of 'implicature', originally developed by Grice, is central to relevance theory's insistence that language is only partially a code, offering fragments of evidence of the speaker's intentions. An implicature is that part of what is intentionally communicated which exceeds what is said. While implicatures arise from the speaker or writer's intended meaning (unlike implications which may not be intended) they operate across a broad spectrum of determinacy and open-endedness, a continuum between the strongly specified (or evidenced) and the underspecified. In this subsection I argue that the particular combination of flexibility and constraint inherent in contexture is also found in the array of implicatures that, in Relevance Theory, is an essential quality of poetic effects. I also suggest an important link between the notion of cognitive environment — the configuration of possibilities and constraints shaping extended mind — and the array of implicatures which modifies the addressee's possibilities of thinking. This parallel, or intersection, between the affordances of language and the affordances of the material and technological environment is central to how our own cognitive niche can be situated in a broader ecology.

According to Relevance Theory, a person registers an input — such as an utterance, a memory, a perception — as relevant when it *connects* with background or contextual information he has available to yield conclusions that *matter* to that person.[253] Human cognitive processes are geared to achieving the greatest possible cognitive payoff for the smallest possible processing effort, and this is how relevance is defined in a technical sense: other things being equal, the greater the cognitive effects and the smaller the processing effort, the greater the relevance. [254] Cognitive effects are stronger or more positive the greater the ties with environmental information and the more significant (relative to the individual) the conclusions it yields — in that it makes a 'worthwhile' difference to the individual's representation of the world. The greater the effort of perception, memory or inference the less rewarding the input is, and therefore the less deserving of our attention, from an efficiency perspective. The fluctuating range of interpretive hypotheses available at a pre-reflective level stabilizes when they (the explicit content and the implicatures) are mutually adjusted so as to jointly satisfy the hearer's

[253] Sperber and Wilson, *Meaning and Relevance*, p. 116.
[254] Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, *Meaning and Relevance* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), pp. 266–272.

expectations of relevance at which juncture interpretation or meaning construction can stop. In this way, Relevance drives and guides interpretation, by indicating both a *path* for the addressee to follow in constructing the interpretation of an utterance, and a stopping point.

While some utterances carry a narrow range of fully determinate and specific implicatures, others achieve optimal relevance via *an open-ended array of weak implicatures.*[255] Figurative language — metaphor and poetic effects —achieve relevance in this way.[256] While, according to Sperber and Wilson, all utterances, including literal ones, are interpreted according to an inferential mechanism of mutual adjustment between explicit content and implicit content, poetic effects heighten this fluidity: the communicator's aim is not necessarily to communicate a determinate set of propositions but to alter the addressee's *possibilities of thinking.* The closer one gets to the metaphor end of the spectrum, the greater the fluidity of interpretation left to hearers or readers, and the greater the likelihood it is that optimal relevance will be achieved through an array of weak or loose implicatures. The wider the array of propositions, the less plausible it becomes to think of this array as duplicated in the minds of communicator and addressee as the code model would suggest. Yet, as Cave observes, the idea of an array of implicatures is not as permissive and indeed arbitrary as that phrase might lead one to suppose: 'The operative (salient) details are placed in a precise relation to one another, thus imposing quite rigorous constraints on the range of readings that might be derived (...) there is therefore a sense in which, instead of using the centrifugal metaphor of an ever-widening array of implicatures, one could speak of a web or a cage of implicatures.' [257]

[255] Relative strength and weakness is calibrated according to the manifest strength or weakness of the intention by the communicator that a specific implication on which the relevance of the utterance relies be derived. degree of specificity of the implication). If a speaker has in mind a fairly wooly/ vague range of possible contextual implications, and has a weak intention that the hearer should derive any specific contextual implication within that range, then the implicature is weak. See *Meaning and Relevance*, p.117, and Deirdre Wilson and Robyn Carston, 'Pragmatics and the challenge of 'non-propositional' effects', *Journal of Pragmatics* 145 (2019), 31 - 38 (35).

[256] For a more classically philosophical perspective see François Recanati, 'Literalism and Contextualism: Some Varieties', in *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth,* ed. by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 171-196.

[257] Cave, *Thinking with Literature*, p. 91.

In Montaigne, the gap between decoding and inference is probed and played out across the instances of our own or others' acts of real or projected deciphering, interpretation or inferential unraveling.[258] One social setting in which Montaigne particularly dramatizes this gap is diplomacy ('la science de l'entregent') a highly socially codified goal-driven context, for example in 'Un traict de quelques ambassadeurs' (I, 17) and 'De l'art de conférer' (III, 8).[259] The idea of communication as a hermeneutic game — which is how Lina Bolzoni characterizes Renaissance *imitatio*— could be developed in relation to the following passage in the 'Apologie', which problematizes interpretation in general in relation to the legibility of other (animal) minds:

> Quand je me joue à ma chatte, qui sçait si elle passe son temps de moy plus que je ne fay d'elle. Platon, en sa peinture de l'aage doré sous Saturne, compte entre les principaux advantages de l'homme de lors la communication qu'il avoit avec les bestes, desquelles s'enquerant et s'instruisant il sçavoit les vrayes qualitez et differences de chacune d'icelles, par où il acqueroit une tres-parfaicte intelligence et prudence, et en conduisoit de bien loing plus heureusement sa vie que nous ne sçaurions faire. Nous faut il meilleure preuve à juger l'impudence humaine sur le faict des bestes? C'est à deviner, à qui est la faute de ne nous entendre point: car nous ne les entendons non plus qu'elles nous. Par cette mesme raison, elles nous peuvent estimer bestes, comme nous les en estimons. (II, 12, 452-3)

This works as a kind of mirror image to the famous passage in 'De l'expérience' where Montaigne conveys his understanding of meaning construction as a shared, two-way movement — of mutual adjustment and accommodation:

> La parole est moitié à celuy qui parle, moitié à celuy qui l'escoute. Cettuy-cy se doibt preparer à la recevoir selon le branle qu'elle prend. Comme entre ceux qui jouent à la paume, celuy qui soustient se desmarche et s'apreste selon qu'il voit remuer celuy qui luy jette le coup et selon la forme du coup. (III, 13, 1088)

It seems no accident that two important passages about communication in the *Essais* are couched in terms of *play,* given that play is a form of non-propositional communicativeness, instantiated though an array of cues, rules and embodied meanings of varying degrees of overtness, tacitness and determinacy. The image, in 'De l'expérience', of mindreading as mutual adjustment and accommodation — of tuning into another's movements

[258] One example from II, 34, 'Observations sur les Moyens de Faire la Guerre de Julius Caesar', involves the deciphering of the 'fabrique' of a bridge over the Rhine, ' là où il parle de son passage de la riviere du Rhin vers l'Alemaigne, il dit qu'estimant indigne de l'honneur du peuple Romain qu'il passast son armée à navires, il fit dresser un pont afin qu'il passat à pied ferme. Ce fut là qu'il batist ce pont admirable dequoy il dechifre particulierement la fabrique: car il ne s'arreste si volontiers en nul endroit de ses faits, qu'à nous representer la subtilité de ses inventions en telle sorte d'ouvrages de main. (738). The fact that it is a bridge seems significant insofar as bridges - like the scaffolding I discuss in Part Two — are 'affordances', or forms of materialized metaphor.

[259]The work of Erving Goffman on system constraints and ritual constraints in social constructions of meaning theorizes these dynamics, see *Forms of Talk.* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), and in relation to the 'game' of communication, 'Fun in Games', in *Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).

as more-or-less transparent signs of intention — moves, in the 'Apologie', to a perspectival opacity that shifts the emphasis from the limits of animal cognition to our own inadequacy in interpreting their meanings.

Meaning — understood as 'located' where explicatures, implicatures, and contextual inputs meet — places it in a cognitive environment where the intentions of the author and the interpretation of the reader interact causally in ways that are not straightforwardly predictable or linear. As Montaigne's historical context shows, interpretative fluidity can translate across into real world situations with grave implications. The array of interpretive possibilities available around underdetermined utterances took on a sharp polemical edge in the Wars of Religion. Subtle distinctions — what Sperber and Wilson refer to as 'shadings off' — forked off into radical theological differences in understanding the nature of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, which often resulted in acts of violence ('combien de querelles et combien importantes') in the religious wars.

Montaigne directly evokes the pivotal Eucharistic controversy in the 'Apologie', embedded within his discussion of the grammatical roots of most of the world's troubles and the inadequacy of human language to express the Divine, but focuses instead on the meaning of the syllable 'Hoc':

> La plus part des occasions des troubles du monde sont Grammairiennes. Nos procez ne naissent que du debat de l'interpretation des loix; et la plus part des guerres, de cette impuissance de n'avoir sçeu clairement exprimer les conventions et traictez d'accord des princes. Combien de querelles et combien importantes a produit au monde le doubte du sens de cette syllabe, Hoc!' (527)

By pointing the reader to the syllable 'hoc' and the controversies it unleashes, in the particular context in which he does so here, Montaigne guides our reading by linking the problem of communication and relevance with the problem of consubstantiality in quite a focused way.

The meaning of Christ's presence (real or figural) in the Eucharist and the interpretation of the precise role of the present-tense in the ritual, performative phrase *Hoc est corpum meum*, from Matthew XXVI, spoken by the priest or pastor during the Eucharistic rite, was a source of polemic, turning on questions of tense, temporality and presence. The extent to which communion is thought to involve a literal or metaphorical/ symbolic ingestion of Christ's body centred on the interpretation of this utterance. Though Montaigne singles out the deictic 'hoc', clashes occurred between Catholics and reformers over the meaning of other individual parts as well as the phrase as a whole, notably the meaning of the present tense 'est'. As a recent study notes,

the ritualized sense of the 'est' had already had a long history of analysis by the sixteenth century but this took on fresh intensity in the Reformation: what is the function and meaning of the 'est' within a narrative which is otherwise past-tense and what are its implications for thinking of Christ's presence irrupting actually into the present moment or, alternatively, understanding the ritual as one of memorialization - of thinking, in the actively retrospective present, about a past presence?[260] Underpinning this aspect of the controversy is a 'figural turn' in interpretations of the Eucharist which involved, as well as synechdochal and metonymic readings of the relation between the host and Christ, the grammatical figure of substituting one expected tense or mood for another, *temporum enallagē*. This grammatical figure of substitution took on a particular role in disputes between Huguenots and Catholics, with Huguenots accusing Catholics of inconsistently and covertly using it when it suited them and ignoring instances of its presence in the Bible.

As Relevance Theory suggests, literal interpretations are by no means *default* interpretations and are not necessarily easier or less cognitively effortful to construct than non-literal ones, as relying on the same inferential mechanism of mutual adjustment.On Sperber and Wilson's deflationary account, metaphor is important but not distinctive; rather metaphors heighten the gap — between the semantic structure an utterance encodes and the meaning a speaker actually (pragmatically) conveys by uttering it in a given situation— that exists in all kinds of utterance.

The primary affinity between contexture and the optimal relevance of metaphor is structural: the loose-knit array of weak implicatures 'maps' onto the concept of contexture if we were to visualize it (the array) as a series of lines or pathways, irradiating outwards from the centre (representing the utterance to be interpreted). Within a particular contexture — whether of our human social and political condition or the woven nest of a bird — each constituent strand or piece links both to the other constituent parts and to the whole in an organized way with a particular function or teleology. The nature of this state of organization can be thought of through different perspectives: it might be logical, structural, causal, functional, hierarchical, circumstantial and so on. The relevance theoretic array of implicatures functions like a *toile* where the web-like structure represents the climate of possibilities for thinking. Both ideas are embedded within an ecological — and in some sense,

[260] For a detailed discussion of the import of Catholic and Calvinist interpretations see Neil Kenny, 'The Eucharist', in *Death and Tenses: Posthumous Presence in Early Modern France* (Oxford: OUP, 2015).

evolutionary – perspective. In *The Web of Metaphor*, Carol Clark approaches metaphor in the *Essais* from the perspective of the network, yet her classification of images, whilst it includes passages which contain the word contexture, does not focus on contexture as an image in its own right. [261] While it would be anachronistic to speak of Renaissance theories of evolution, as later conceived first by Lamarck and then Darwin, ancient and early modern natural historians grasped the concept of 'fit' or reciprocal moulding between a species and its environment, partially vectored through the notion of *sollertia*, animal ingenuity or prudence, in Plutarch, although this form of adaptation or development is construed as behavioural rather than phylogenetic. At a functional level, the tissues of contexture and relevance, in the form of the array of implicature, both integrate tension between the deterministic notion of an interlocking chain, or the more supple idea of fortuitous, and underdetermined, interaction. Of course, relevance relies on the idea of regularity and some degree of predictability, otherwise its theory of communication and mindreading would collapse. But the loose-knit array of weak implicatures or possibilities for thinking in metaphorical discourse lends itself to comparison with contexture, as a form of flexible organization which integrates ambiguities around causal determinism and autonomy. Within the compositional context of Humanist poetics, both concepts also describe the elastic interplay of imitation and variation or improvization which enables authors to negotiate and rekindle the past while making fresh literary 'prints'.

I now turn, briefly, to a reflection on how this range of ideas – with 'contexture' providing the nexus between the materiality of natural artefacts and the interpretation of meaning – can inform our perspective on consubstantiality. An obvious, but difficult, question poses itself: what, from a rhetorical standpoint, *is* the phrase 'livre consubstantiel à son autheur'? As I note in the Introduction, this utterance is generally assumed to be 'straightforwardly' symbolic or metaphorical, even resolutely secular, an attitude that uproots the term from its own early modern habitat, where it exists as a term about which little can be safely assumed. Relevance Theory can help, not in identifying it as either literal or metaphorical, but by drawing our attention in a specific way to how its very underdetermination – the work of inferential movement along a spectrum of meaning that Montaigne implicates his reader in by employing it – is integral to its sense. If it is in fact a metaphor then perhaps paradoxically, one of its implicatures is (I suggest) is that we are to understand the book as literally of

[261] Carol Clark, *The Web of Metaphor: Studies in the Imagery of Montaigne's "Essais"* (Lexington: French Forum, 1978).

the same substance as its author. Considered from the perspective of extended mind, this metaphysical statement can be translated into a cognitive statement, about the book's participation in Montaigne's extended mind, during his lifespan and beyond.

III. Niche

In Middle French, the term 'niche' — from *nidus* (nest, abode, resting place) — is an architectural term referring to an alcove or recess for a statue or other decorative object.[262] Only later, around the first half of the eighteenth-century, does it come to be associated with an animal lair or retreat, and the figurative a place in which a person (or personified thing) lives or finds rest shelter of a secluded and comfortable nature. Later still, it acquires its figurative and ecological sense of a place or position particularly suited to the specific character and capabilities of a person or thing. [263]

In *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (1979), James Gibson defines a niche as a set of affordances, where the affordances of the environment are understood to be what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. A niche differs from habitat because a niche refers to how an animal lives than to where it lives: 'In architecture a niche is a place that is suitable for a piece of statuary, a place into which the object fits. In ecology a niche is a setting of environmental features that are suitable for an animal, into which it fits metaphorically.'[264]

In the 'Apologie', extended mind is both a function of a distinctively human inadequacy— physical, epistemic and spiritual — and man's primary route to surpassing our limits through the modification of our environment to change what it affords him. The notion of human adaptation to circumstance, by supplementing natural lack, is set side by side with the way our condition alters reality so as to fit our powers of comprehension:

> Or, nostre estat accommodant les choses à soy et les transformant selon soy, nous ne sçavons plus quelles sont les choses en verité: car rien ne vient à nous que falsifié et alteré par nos sens. Où le compas,

[262] For example, Cotgrave notes: 'A Niche; a hollow seat, or standing for a statue, or image, made into a wall'. The word appears once in the *Journal de voyage* in an entry during Montagne's first sojourn in Rome in the context of statues in the Vatican: *'/.../* & delà estant descendu au Vatican, pour y voir les statues enfermées aus niches de Belveder, & la belle galerie que le pape dresse des peintures de toutes les parties de l'Italie, qui est bien près de sa fin'. *Journal*, p. 100. Montaigne does not use the term 'niche' in the *Essais,* but his notion of the 'arriereboutique' captures the same idea of quasi-architectural retreat as conveyed by the later senses of 'niche'.
[263] OED entry for 'niche'.
[264] James J. Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), p. 129.

> l'esquarre et la regle sont gauches, toutes les proportions qui s'en tirent, tous les bastimens qui se dressent à leur mesure, sont aussi necessairement manques et defaillans. L'incertitude de nos sens rend incertain tout ce qu'ils produisent (600)

Unlike the swallow and kingfisher, who need no tools to build their miraculous nests, humans rely on instruments which measure all things, including nature, by their deforming yardstick: 'Autant en advient-il à la nature qui est mesurée, comme au temps qui la mesure.' (603) Drawing on the Galenic theory of the humours, Montaigne argues that accommodation means alteration and distortion:

> (...), n'est-il pas vraysemblable que nostre assiette droicte et nos humeurs naturelles ont aussi de quoy donner un estre aux choses, se rapportant à leur condition, et les accommoder à soy,comme font les humeurs desreglées? et nostre santé aussi capable de leur fournir son visage, comme la maladie? [C] Pourquoy n'a le temperé quelque forme des objects relative à soy, comme l'intempéré, et ne leur imprimera-il pareillement son charactere? Le desgouté charge la fadeur au vin; le sain, la saveur; l'alteré, la friandise.' (II, 12, 599-600)

In evolutionary ecology the notion of 'niche construction' refers to the process whereby organisms, through their activities, movements and choices, define, modify and partly create their own and each other's environments and niches. Niche construction, engaged in by all living organisms to some extent, can take many forms (including the manufacture of nests, burrows, holes, webs, pupal cases and other creaturely artefacts) and is a powerful force, affecting evolutionary processes through the alteration of natural selection pressures and by generating feedback in evolution.[265] A spider web, for example, modifies the sources of natural selection within the spider's selective niche, allowing subsequent selection for elaborate web-based forms of camouflage and communication. Niche-constructed effects persist longer than the lifetime of their constructors, over generations, in part determining the selection pressures to which they and their descendants are exposed, a notion known as ecological inheritance. The niche construction perspective, brought to prominence by the biologist Richard Lewontin, contrasts with the conventional perspective by emphasizing the capacity of organisms to co-direct their evolutionary pathways: 'Organisms do not adapt to their environments; they construct them out of the bits and pieces of the external world'.[266] The adaptive fit between organism and

[265] Kevin Laland, F. J Odling-Smee, M.W. Feldman et al., 'Niche construction, biological evolution and cultural change', *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 23 (2000), 131-146. On cultural transmission, embodied cognition and cognitive niche construction see also Wheeler, Michael and Andy Clark, 'Culture, Embodiment and Genes: Unravelling the Triple Helix', *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences*, 363 (2008), 3563- 3575.

[266] Richard Lewontin, 'Gene, organism, and environment' in *Evolution from Molecules to Men,* (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), ed. by D. S Bendall, pp. 273–285 (p.280). Lewontin's language recalls Lévi-Strauss's anthropological notion of 'bricolage', developed to describe how mythical thought is elaborated out of 'des résidus et des débris' salvaged from events, a process of patchwork or collage of 'found objects' (or fragments) which stands in contrast to the process of the engineer, who

environment is achieved through processes of reciprocal causation or moulding, rather than organisms adapting passively to their environment in a wholly asymmetrical way. Niche-constructing species play important ecological roles by creating habitats and resources used by other species and thereby affecting the flow of energy and matter through ecosystems, a process referred to as 'ecosystem engineering'.

Most cases of niche construction do not in fact involve the actual building of artefacts such as nests, merely the selection or modification of habitats. Yet the niche is taken as emblem of the complex patterns — shaped and unfolding across generations — of reciprocal causation and fit between organism and environment and the joint processes of selection and construction. In a relevantly similar way the notion of 'contexture'— materialized in exemplary form in nests, and webs — functions across the *Essais*, and in a particularly focused way in the 'Apologie', as an emblem of adaptive complementarity. Montaigne's attention to contexture-building creatures consciously fits into a long natural historical tradition of using birds' nests as examples of congruence between organisms' purposes and their natural and built environments.

Co-opted and reinterpreted by the cognitive sciences, niche construction becomes, in the context of human evolution, 'cognitive' or 'cultural' niche construction, where humans' capacity to modify and construct their cognitive niches takes a 'runaway' form marked by extreme modification of our surroundings and works alongside genetic inheritance in shaping our evolutionary pathway. In this picture, language is analyzed as central to humankind's emergence as what the philosopher Kim Sterenly calls 'the self-made species', a title justified by our singular propensity, as ecological engineers, to 'remake our physical, social and epistemic environment'. [267]According to Andy Clark, language is 'a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure', a form of cognitive scaffolding which, through the materialization or quasi-materialization of thought, enables us to organize complex thought.[268] This line of thinking can be retraced to the work of the Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1896 – 1934) in the field of developmental psychology. Vygotsky holds that during a child's acquisition of language, language bifurcates into an outward form and an inward form (inner speech), the latter

conceives, designs and builds a whole new structure. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La Pensée sauvage* (Paris: Plon, 1962). From its source in structural anthropology the notion of bricolage has travelled into the sciences (molecular and evolutionary biology) and the humanities (art criticism and critical theory).

[267] Kim Sterelny, *Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition* (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), Chapter 8, 'The Self-Made Species', pp.146-161 (146).

[268] Andy Clark, 'Word, Niche and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter More', *Theoria* 54 (2005), 255-268. Clark also discusses this in *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension,* especially Chapter Four 'World, Incorporated' (Oxford; New York: OUP, 2008).

serving as an inner tool which organizes complex thought, enabling processes of reasoning and representation.[269] Sterelny offers a niche-construction-based account of our evolutionary capacity to interpret others as intentional agents as an alternative to nativist and modular hypotheses (strongly influenced by Fodor's 1983 *The Modular Mind*) advanced in evolutionary psychology which suggest we are 'wired' from birth; instead they are acquired by rich developmental immersion:

> Selection for interpretative skills could lead to a different evolutionary trajectory: selection on parents (and via group selection on the band as a whole) for actions which scaffold the development of the interpretative capacities. Selection rebuilds the epistemic environment to scaffold the development of those capacities.[270]

Sterelny's account of our capacity for mindreading offers a useful bridge between niche construction and relevance theory.

While man's status as a linguistic creature capable of 'discours intérieur' is often thought to secure his place as a rational animal, a parallel strand of early modern thought — stemming from the reception of Plutarch — considered certain animals to be capable of learning analogous interior and exterior forms of language. Plutarch, via Amyot's translation, observes:

> Mais les merles, les corbeaux et les perroquets qui apprennent à parler, et qui baillent à ceulx qui les enseignent leur voix et haleine si soupple et si maniable pour la former et l'estraindre à certain nombre de lettres et de syllabes à leur volonté, me semblent plaider assez et defendre suffisamment la cause des autres animaux nous enseignans par maniere de dire, en apprenant de nous, qu'ils sont capables non seulement du discours interieur de la raison, mais aussi de l'exterieur proferé au dehors par la parole et la voix distincte et articulée. (516v)

Birds *learn* their song, 'Aristote tient que les les rossignols instruisent leurs petits à chanter, et y employent du temps et du soing' (464). Drawing on these traditions, a substantial portion of the 'Apologie' works to unpick the hierarchy between humans and animals, whose lives resemble one another in many respects, according to Aristotle in the *Historia Animalium.* In Aristotle the mirroring of human and animal life recurs when he is reflecting on teleology or final causes in the natural order. He explicitly denies that the causes operative in nature are intention-dependent. Organisms have final causes, but they are not come by via the designing

[269] Lev S. Vygotsky, *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes,* trans. by Michael Cole (London: Harvard University Press, 1978).
[270] Sterelny, *Thought in a Hostile World*, p. 221.

activities of an intentional agent.[271] With Plutarch, Montaigne seeks to rehabilitate other creatures' ability to shape their lives through deliberation or some form of reasoning ('pensement et conclusion'.) Following Democritus's dictum that "We are pupils of the animals in the most important things', Montaigne observes:

> Il y a encore plus de discours à instruire qu'à estre instruit. Or, laissant à part ce que Democritus jugeoit et prouvoit que la plus part des arts les bestes nous les ont aprises: comme l'araignée à tistre et à coudre, l'arondelle à bastir, le cigne et le rossignol la musique, et plusieurs animaux, par leur imitation, à faire la medicine (464).

Notions of development, learning and instruction in the animal world, including that of humans, are closely tied to mimesis. Yet the complexity and intricacy of natural structures are beyond our powers of representation, and so elude our paltry attempts at imitation: 'Tous nos efforts ne peuvent seulement arriver à representer le nid du moindre oyselet, sa contexture, sa beauté et l'utilité de son usage, non pas la tissure de la chetive araignée.' (Des Cannibales, I, 3, 206.) Montaigne interrogates the notion that animals 'act' only on instinct — understood as the inborn inclination or propulsion of a living organism towards a particular behaviour — rather than choice: 'pourquoy attribuons nous à je ne sçay quelle inclination naturelle et servile les ouvrages qui surpassent tout ce que nous pouvons par nature et par art?' (455). In *The Language Instinct*, Stephen Pinker argues that while language is a technology unique to humans, it is comparable to other species' specialized adaptations such as spiders' web-weaving or beavers' dam-building. By calling it an instinct rather than an invention, Pinker differentiates language from non-innate technologies such as metalworking and writing.[272] With Sterelny and Clark, Pinker holds language to be integral to the fashioning of our cognitive niches. [273] While the notion of the cognitive niche, and certainly the runaway cognitive niche, as constituting part of extended cognition, is most closely associated with hominid evolution, it has been argued that the spider's web constitutes part of its extended cognition too.[274]

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[271] In the *Physics* (ii 8), he argues that nature exhibits regularity and patterns, which enable predictability (he gives the example of teeth as a 'part of natural beings'; teeth are arranged in a predictable way with incisors at the front and so on). Either these patterns or regular arrangements arise by chance or for the sake of something. Elsewhere in *Physics* he ponders further on non-intentional teleological causes at work in nature — in the case of animals who 'make things using neither craft nor on the basis of inquiry nor by deliberation'— and links it explicitly to the swallow's nest and the spider's web: 'If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and send their roots down rather than up for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature. And since nature is twofold, as matter and as form, the form is the end, and since all other things are for sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which' (199a20–32).

[272] Stephen Pinker, *The Language Instinct* (New York: W. Morrow, 1994), pp. 7-28.

[273] Pinker, 'The Cognitive Niche: Coevolution of Intelligence, Sociality, and Language'. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,* 107 (2010), 8993-8999.

[274] Kevin N. Laland and Hilton F. Japyassú, 'Extended Spider Cognition', *Animal Cognition,* 20 (2017), 375-395.

In *De amore prolis*, Plutarch pays homage to the miraculous nest of the *halcyon*:

> Elle compose, ou pour mieulx dire qu'elle fabrique, comme un maistre charpentier batissant une navire d'une forme, qui seule entre toutes ne se sçauroit renverser ny enfondrer en la mer: car elle va premierement recueillir les espines et arestes d'un poisson qui se nomme aiguille, qu'elle conjoint et lie ensemble, les entrelassant les unes de long, les autres de travers, ne plus ne moins que sur l'estaim on jette la trame, y adjoustant des courbes et arrondissemens l'une dedans l'autre , tellement qu'elle en forme à la fin un sejour rond. [275]

He highlights the perfect morphological fit between the shape of the nest and the bird who has built it: 'Ce qui plus encore fait à admirer, c'est la proportion et la figure de la concavité du dedans du vaisseau : car elle est composée et proportionnée, de maniere qu'elle ne peult recevoir ny admettre autre chose que l'oyseau qui l'a bastie: car à tout autre chose elle est impenetrable, close et fermée.'[276] While Plutarch does not seek to interpret the wonder of this structure — whose hermetic form forecloses hermeneutics — Montaigne's borrowed version insists on its imperviousness to our powers of comprehension: 'Mais aucune suffisance n'a encores peu attaindre à la connoissance de cette merveilleuse fabrique dequoy l'alcyon compose le nid pour ses petits, ny en deviner la matiere'. (480-481). While birds can convey divine messages, their 'bastimens' remain inscrutable. Elsewhere, he insists on the correlation between miracles and human ignorance, situating wonder as a function of incongruity or incommensurability between the complexity of nature and our limited powers, an experience located at the intersection between awareness of complexity and inability to decipher it: '[A] Combien de choses appellons nous miraculeuses et contre nature? [C] Cela se faict par chaque homme et par chaque nation selon la mesure de son ignorance (II, 12 526); 'Les miracles sont selon l'ignorance en quoy nous sommes de la nature, non selon l'estre de la nature. [...] Les barbares ne nous sont rien de plus merveilleux, que nous sommes à eux' (De la coustume', I, 23, 112); 'J'ay peur que [...] nous avons plus de curiosité que nous n'avons de capacité ('Des cannibales', III, 6, 203).

Montaigne situates his own passage in relation to Plutarch ('Voilà une description bien claire de ce bastiment et empruntée de bon lieu') but underlines the inadequacy of Plutarch's description in foregrounding the artefact's challenge to our faculties: 'toutesfois il me semble qu'elle ne nous esclaircit pas encor suffisamment la difficulté de cette architecture. Or de quelle vanité nous peut-il partir de loger au dessoubs de nous et d'interpreter desdaigneusement les effects que nous ne pouvons imiter ny comprendre? (480-481). Unlike Plutarch, Montaigne dwells on the nest's formal structure and material composition as an uncrossable threshold or limit,

[275] Amyot, "Quels animaux sont les plus advisez", 522v.
[276] Ibid.

elaborating the topos in a more explicitly cognitive and hermeneutic dimension.[277] The 'merveilleuse fabrique' is a model which interrogates what one critic has called the Renaissance's 'ideology of invention', locating man's discoveries on the relativistic and plural scale of Epicurian cosmology. [278]

In the 'Apologie,' it is the swallow and its nest, built in human dwellings, that links up the notions of habitus, contexture. communication, and accommodation — in both ecological and theological senses. In the *Journal de voyage*, it is other species of nesting birds who alight in the text, where they are associated with a discussion of religion, and the accommodation of religious tolerance. Through the intermediary of his secretary, Montaigne describes his impressions of the ruins of the 'corps admirable' of ancient Rome during his first Roman sojourn between November 150 and April 1581:

> Il estoit vraisamblable que ces mambres desvisagés qui en restoint, c'estoint les moins dignes, & que la furie des ennemis de cete gloire immortelle, les avoit portés, premieremant, à ruiner ce qu'il y avoit de plus beau & de plus digne; que les bastimans de cete Rome bastarde qu'on aloit asteure atachant à ces masures antiques, quoi qu'ils eussent de quoi ravir en admiration nos siecles presans, lui faisoint resouvenir propremant des nids que les moineaus & les corneilles vont suspandant en France aus voutes & parois des eglises que les Huguenots viennent d'y demolir.(100)

Montaigne compares the grafting of new buildings into the ruins to the nests of sparrows and crows, built and suspended in the arches and walls of Catholic churches destroyed during the civil wars at home. While the hybrid, or palimpsestic, incongruity of this 'Rome bastarde' is an affront to the past, it simultaneously conveys a more positive sense of future possibility: of reconstruction, coexistence and tolerance of different forms of belief, in a cycle of renewal echoing the migratory birds' paths and seasonal patterns. [279]

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[277] The deployment of this topos ranges between authors as varied as Ambroise Paré, Du Bartas and Gaston Bachelard: in *Les Oeuvres d'Ambroise Paré, conseiller et premier chirurgien du roy*, 'Des animaux et de l'excellence de l'homme' (Paris, Gabriel Buon, 1579) Paré notes 'L'industrie & l'artifice laquelle tous les Oiseaux ont à fair leurs nids, est faicte tant proprement qu'il n'est possible de mieux: tellement qu'ils surpassent tous les maçons, charpentiers et édificateurs', and of the spider, 'L'araignée faict la toille d'une merveilleuse artifice, traversant maintenant d'un coté, & maintenant de l'autre, empoignant tout ce qui luy peut servir pour l'estendre & attacher (...) faisant toujours ouvrages nouveaux, & ce d'un merveilleux artifice, tellement que les tisserands, & lingeres, tapissiers & brodeurs, passementiers, pescheurs, veneurs, viennent à l'escolle pour apprendre d'elle à faire leurs ouvrages et rets'. In *La Sepmaine*, Du Bartas writes of the swallow, 'Ainsi que l'Arondelle/ Pour se bastir un nid, assemble pesle mesle' while 'La seule araigne instruit chacun de nous (...) Son ventre engendre-estain, crache-fil, porte-laine/ Fournit de quenouille à sa tant docte peine' (VII). Bachelard describes 'La phénoménologie philosophique du nid' as the manner in which 'un nid trouvé dans la nature (...) devient un instant — le mot n'est pas trop grand — le centre d'un univers, la donnée d'une situation cosmique'. See *La poétique de l'espace* (Paris: PUF, 1957), pp. 121-122.

[278] Eric MacPhail, 'Montaigne's New Epicurianism', *Montaigne Studies,* XII (2000), 91-103 (p.95). Montaigne notes that the multiple worlds hypothesis advanced by Epicurus is the opinion which has 'le plus de similitude' (II, 12, 524).

[279] Catherine Randall suggests it indicates an intriguing parallel between the birds' activity and the way Calvinists, originally lacking their own structures in France, appropriated Catholic churches for their own use: 'Montaigne's builder birds seem sympathetic symbols of the kinds of construction which Calvinists practiced when they both literally and figuratively nested into already established space'. Randall, 'The Swallow's Nest and the Hermeneutic Quest in the *Apologie de Raimond Sebond*'» *Montaigne Studies,* XII (2000), 137-145 (139).

Part Two: Cognitive Reincarnations

Un soing extreme tient l'homme d'alonger son estre; il y a pourveu par toutes ses pieces. (II, 12, 553)

The notion of extension is protean in Montaigne's writing, mediating the distinction between culture and nature that becomes particularly equivocal in a human context. Man stretches and prolongs himself, spatially, temporally and cognitively, through props and supports (literal and figurative), through the reputations that precede and succeed us, and through the deeds, and artefacts, we create during our biological lifespans, and which are maintained in life through contact with other minds even much later. Some of our props and supports are of our own invention; others pre-exist us and are co-opted and incorporated. Above all extension emerges as a recurrent means of thinking about writing and, still more broadly, about our condition as linguistic creatures enfolded in cultural processes: writing is likened to stretching out of a body ('Vous, pour qui j'ay pris la peine d'estendre un si long corps', II, 12, 557); subject matter is inflated by 'extention et amplification' ('Des Boyteux', III, 11, 1028), and our minds and memories can stretch into places or books, both during and after our biological lifespans ('De l'institution des enfans', I, 26, 156). In Part One, I argued that imbrications and integrations between human and non-human architectures serve to equivocate and perturb the distinction between nature and artifice, human and non-human animal. In this second part, I pursue this investigation into the uses of extension in the *Essais*, as both a heuristic for probing otherwise difficult to articulate aspects of man's situated condition and a means of describing the cognitive metaphysics of writing as a distinctively human form of self-extension. While animal speech, both inner and outer, may be understood by premoderns as superior to corrupt and confused human language, the particular form of exteriorization performed by writing — and by print, construed as a prosthetic tongue — belongs to the human. The notion of extension construed as extension beyond the 'natural' or inherent extent has epistemological, ethical and aesthetic ramifications. While Renaissance writers seek to accommodate the artificial and mechanical into their patterns of thought, machinery and artifice also resist that accommodation. The *Essais* display various degrees of integration, from the uneasy (or what Ellen Spolsky calls 'failed integration' or hybridity, a 'cooperative mixing' or 'productive grotesque') to the seamless.[280]

[280] Ellen Spolsky, 'Archetypes Embodied: Then and Now', *Poetics Today,* 38 (2017), 317-339. See also *Gaps in Nature: Literary Interpretation and the Modular Mind* (Albany: Albany: SUNY, 1993).

I. 'Moy qui m'espie de plus prez': Extended Introspection and Interiority

It is a critical commonplace that Montaigne is engaged in autobiographical or literary introspection, where introspection is understood as perception folded inward. [281] In his study of Montaigne's 'introspective mind', Glyn P. Norton notes that 'literary introspection demands, at best, the writer's constant attention to the task of relating the Self to the world of people'. He continues, 'Rather than become immobilized in prolonged self-description and scrutiny a mind like Montaigne's reaches out to encompass the complexity of life's experiences and thereby succeeds in describing itself and its own complexity (...) Literary introspection becomes an extension of life rather than a diversionary substitute'.[282] Norton does not question the appropriateness of the term 'introspection' for what Montaigne is doing or thinks (or says he thinks) he is doing, in the *Essais*; in several places he foregrounds the notion of extension without thoroughly detailing its implications. Rather in the same way that the meaning of 'consubstantiality' is often assumed to be nonproblematic, Montaigne's 'introspective' self-portraiture has been taken for granted, and the meaning of introspection taken as self-evident, in ways that Montaigne's writing — which draws attention to the ambiguities and opacities of self-interpretation — does not warrant. Montaigne conveys the 'strange blend of immediacy and opacity' that confronts us when we seek to grasp the mind of others, and even our own.[283] It's precisely this 'estrangete' that Montaigne revels in and grapples with.

While 'consubstantiel' and its cognates are endogenous to (and significantly pre-date) Montaigne's period, the term 'introspection' is much more recent, only entering the vernacular in English at the end of the seventeenth century and carrying over into French a good deal later, towards the end of the eighteenth century. [284] The term is often used retroactively to describe the various epistemological and ethical processes of self-seeking in which, historically, thinkers were engaged. Plotinus' movement of *epistrophē* (turning within) and Augustine's later practice of *confessio*, in which important 'memorial' traces of Plotinus can be found, bear some family resemblance to the modern conception of introspection, whilst not being in any way assimilable to it. In particular, Plotinus's psychology, though often labelled 'introspective', is in fact distinct from any contemporary

[281] Auerbach characterized the *Essais* as 'the first work of lay introspection', in *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, trans. by Willard R. Trask (Princeton: PUP, 2003), p. 308.
[282] Glyn P. Norton, *Montaigne and the Introspective Mind* (The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 1975), p. 7.
[283] I borrow this phrase from Tim Chesters, 'Social Cognition: A Literary Perspective', *Paragraph* 37 (2014), 62–78 (p.62).
[284] *OED* and *Littré*.

non-mystical understanding of the term. Both thinkers' different conceptions of inwardness are of a much more spiritual order, affording an indescribable glimpse of the Divine, and it is in such a fragmentary cognitive aperçu that we can intuit the whole, or extent of, our own ignorance.[285]

For early moderns self-knowledge was an inherently un-solipsistic aim, reaching into the more ecological or cosmological perspective of apprehending oneself in terms of a conception of human nature and of human beings' position in relation to the world and to God.[286] The complex cultural history of interiority — its cognitive, epistemological and spiritual implications, and relation to concepts of self and subjectivity — falls well outside my scope here; as a cultural concept it is far from homogenous, and as a loose and varied body of assumptions, intuitions and practices operates differently in different periods, some critics believing it to be an anachronistic projection in an early modern context. [287] Others are skeptical about assuming a linear correlation between the emergence of the concept of the self, reflected in use of the substantive 'moi', and individual and collective understandings of subjectivity and intentionality. Challenging such lexical arguments about the history of the self, James Helgeson proposes interiority as an alternative, or 'conceptual stand-in', for 'self' (or, SELF) and reflects on the potential of cognitive approaches to re-cast the historical perspective on the first-person stance.[288] In the *Essais*, attention to the rhetoric and the hermeneutics of introspection — turning on the distinction between inferential access to our own mental states and access that is interpretive — enriches the reader's relation to a text designed, as Montaigne tells us in his 'avis au lecteur', to mediate between the private recesses of his mind and the outer world. [289] Notions of interiority, privacy and freedom of judgement are evoked through the quasi-architectural forms of our 'bastiment interne' and the sanctuary of our 'arriereboutique toute nostre', where judgement can be uncontaminated by irrelevant influence. At the same time, relationships, whether with his readers, a kindred soul like La Boétie, or with God, are predicated on the availability of a first-person stance, but one that reaches into its context. In theories of meaning the distinction

[285] See Jean-Luc Marion, '*Mihi magna quaestio factus sum*: le privilège d'inconnaissance', *Archivio di Filosofia,* 75 (2007), 235-250.
[286] Michael Moriarty, *Fallen Nature: Fallen Selves* (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p. 275.
[287] Jean Howard, 'The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies', *English Literary Renaissance,* 16 (1984), 13-43. see also Katherine Eisaman Maus, *Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
[288] James Helgeson, 'Lexical and Conceptual Arguments and Historical Reading: on the History of SELF', *Paragraph*, 126-142. For an example of the position he is arguing against, see Susan Carey, *The Origin of Concepts* (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
[289] Mark Engelbert and Peter Carruthers, 'Introspection', *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science*, 1 (2010), 245-253.

between inference and interpretation hinges on the notion of externalization to the 'other' (even where the other is oneself, such as when an author is reader of his own work): to interpret is to explain or expound (including to oneself), to draw out the meaning of by representation or performance, to translate in a way that is clear. To infer is to bring in or draw a conclusion, by a process of reasoning, which can be a private or non-performative act.

Introspection ('internal examination' or any form of inwardly-directed attention, such as inspecting, scanning, monitoring or immediate retrieval of data with respect to cognitive processes) occupies a pivotal place in the cultural history of the self. A common conception of introspection is that the subject has privileged, non-interpretive access to their own thoughts or mental states, which can be objects of perception in much the same way as external features can but with added transparency and certainty. This transparent understanding of introspection stems in large part from Ryle's diagnosis, in *The Concept of Mind* (1949) of a traditional understanding of Descartes' conception of the mind, whose hallmark is that mental states are self-intimating, 'incapable of being delusive' and therefore 'incorrigible' — which Ryle refers to as a 'phosphorescence' conception of the mental, leading to the fundamental category mistake which consists in theorizing the mind and its operations as the 'inner' counterparts of the body and its activities.[290] In response to work in cognitive science, and in particular arguments from extended cognition and *epistemic situationism* (the view that our judgments are to a surprising extent influenced by factors in our environments, factors that are external to our cognitive agency), traditional models of self-knowledge as a form of direct self-perception have been challenged.[291] William Lyons's *The Disappearance of Introspection* tracks the dwindling fortunes of introspection as an instrument or model of self-knowledge, tracing it from its philosophical origins to its use by psychological 'introspectionists' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, up to the then-present day.[292] A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call 'first-person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be 'first-person self-knowledge' is really just 'third-person self-knowledge,' i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential

[290] Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), p. 158.
[291] J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard, 'Extended Self-Knowledge' in *Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative* ed. by Patrizia Pedrini and Julie Kirsch (Cham, Switzerland : Springer, 2018), pp. 31-49.
[292] William E. Lyons, *The Disappearance of Introspection* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).

and fallible.[293] On this view introspection is something of a figment, a culturally significant but fictional feature of folk theory of mind. Introspection is not literal inward vision but a metaphor grouping together multiple and heterogenous processes, for example the rehearsing of a narrative that could be made public, or wondering what to say in a given context. In this pluralist framework, the notion of a hypothetical audience beyond oneself is built in, making contemporary notions of introspection fundamentally narrative in nature, embedded in an outwardly-directed rhetorical stance. Therefore while introspection as transparent inward gaze is a fiction, it does not preclude genuine self-knowledge; it does enable us to learn about our own minds via the environment, enabling a form of extended self-knowledge. For example, Jesse Butler explores the possibility of extended introspection, through conjoining the extended mind hypothesis (EM) - whereby cognition reaches out into our interaction with the external environment - with a cognitive account of introspection. On this understanding, introspectively engaged cognitive processes are not neurally contained but rather are embodied and enacted through external events and artefacts. Thus, 'Just as a handwritten or electronically texted shopping list may serve as a cognitive constituent of stocking one's kitchen, so too may external cognitive vehicles play a role in the introspective process of knowing one's own mind'.[294]

> Moy qui m'espie de plus prez, qui ay les yeux incessamment tendus sur moy, comme celuy qui n'ay pas fort à-faire ailleurs,
>
> *quis sub Arcto*
> *Rex gelidae metuatur orae,*
> *Quid Tyridatem terreat, unice*
> *Securus,*
>
> à peine oseroy-je dire la vanité et la foiblesse que je trouve chez moy. (II, 12, 565)[295]

[293] See Patrizia Pedrini and Julie Kirsch, 'Getting to Know our Own Minds', in *Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative,* pp. 1-12. The productive tension between first and third person perspectives is acutely dramatized in 'De l'exercitation' (II, 6) where it is tied to questions of narrative, the figure of the witness, and reliability as well as interpretation: in the particular situation Montaigne describes, liminal states of mind, those situated 'aux bords de l'ame' — rather than intentional, inwardly directed ones — become the privileged site of knowing. In II, 6, the accident, with its rich connotations of the Fall and the metaphysics of contingency (accident versus essence) is staged as an ontological affordance, the locus of a bifurcation in an individual's life path, suggesting two parallel identities and fortunes. On the accident, see Catherine Malabou, *L'Ontologie de l'accident: essai sur la plasticité déstructrice* (Paris: Léo Scheer, 2009). I return to this briefly in my Conclusion. On the embodied experience of falling (down), in contrast to the imagined experience of flying upwards (cf. Maus de Rolley's *Élévations*) see Laurent Jenny, *L'expérience de la chute: de Montaigne à Michaux* (Paris: PUF, 1997).

[294] Jesse Butler, *Rethinking Introspection: A Pluralist Approach to the First-Person Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 94-96. In her study of extended mind in Renaissance culture, Anderson meticulously explores the interrelated notions of extended subjectivity and, in relation to self-knowledge, extended reflexivity, including Renaissance understandings of *inter*subjectivity within the EM framework. See *The Renaissance Extended Mind*, pp. 146-164.

[295] 'Quite indifferent to what ruler of the North inspires great fear, or what dangers frighten Tiridates' (Horace, *Odes*, I, XXVI, 3).

By characterizing writing as a kind of spying on himself, Montaigne plays on the *dédoublement* or twofold aspect inherent in the notion of looking inward as an extension of the perception of outward things: 'Et qui ne s'entend en soy, en quoy se peut-il entendre?' (557) The notions of 'entendement' (understanding), 'entendre' (denoting the action of hearing, listening, or meaning, i.e., the intention that a specific inference be drawn in communicative acts) and extension (denoted via the verb 'étendre or 'estendre', often used reflexively in the *Essais*) are all underpinned by a shared notion of intentionality or 'turning toward', stemming from the Latin *intendere*. Before 'intend' came to mean to direct the attention, or mind to, it denoted a bodily movement, namely to stretch forth, extend, to point forwards. So, in relation to the passage cited above, the act of self-spying, involving his attention (his mind's *yeux*) turned inwards rather than *ailleurs*, already engages an interplay of interiority and exteriority, gestures of body and gestures of mind.

Montaigne also identifies his practice as partially confessional, revealing — in addition to epistemic inadequacy and vacillation mediated by the metaphor of sight ('ma veuë si desregelee') — the moral failings of vanity and weakness which he finds 'chez moy' and that he can hardly dare utter. Pursuing this account of the incoherence of his impressions, he adds '[B] Un mesme pas de cheval me semble tantost rude, tantost aysé, et mesme chemin à cette heure plus courte, une autre fois plus longue, et une mesme forme ores plus, ores moins agreable' (565-566); this floating, vacillating indeterminacy also operates at the level of his writing:

> En mes éscris mesmes je ne retrouve pas toujours l'air de ma premiere imagination: je ne sçay ce que j'ay voulu dire, et m'eschaude souvent à corriger et y mettre un nouveau sens, pour avoir perdu le premier, qui valloit mieux. Je ne fay qu'aller et venir: mon jugement ne tire pas tousjours en avant; il flotte, il vague
>
> *velut minuta magno*
> *Deprensa navis in mari vesaniente vento.*[296]
>
> Maintes-fois (comme il m'advient de faire volontiers) ayant pris pour exercice et pour esbat à maintenir une contraire opinion à la mienne, mon esprit, s'applicant et tournant de ce costé là, m'y attache si bien que je ne trouve plus la raison de mon premier advis, et m'en despars. Je m'entraine quasi où je penche, comment que ce soit, et m'emporte de mon pois. Chacun à peu pres en diroit autant de soy, s'il se regardoit comme moy. (566)

Describing the failed attempt to retrace an idea or train of thought, Montaigne describes the mismatch, or inadequation, between memory and recollection, or between the 'air' of his first notion (therefore its spirit, its immateriality). The idea central to traditional 'folk' understandings of introspection of direct, non-interpretive

[296] 'Like a tiny boat buffeted on the ocean by a raging tempest', Catullus, *Carmina*, XXV, 12.

access to one's own mental states, is absent. In his 'escris mesmes', his physical properties ('mon pois') and corporeal postures and movements ('je m'entraine quasi où je penche') cannot be distinguished from his mind, and his writing carries him along in its current, his judgement floating and bobbing. Writing does not involve transparency and immediacy but carries Montaigne into a process of self-interpretation and self-observation, in which the self is both inward and outward. This is integral to Montaigne's wider meditation on interiority and community, parts and wholes. Montaigne understands writing itself as a form of continually extendible, elastic consubstantial memory: we might borrow his words from elsewhere in the 'Apologie' in thinking of writing, like reason, as 'un instrument de plomb et de cire, alongeable, ployable et accommodable à tous biais et à toutes mesures' (565). In this *optique*, localizing the self as 'inward' is itself a questionable construct; instead, built into Montaigne's language is the notion of a dialectical self; as Starobinski expresses it, a combination of 'le 'je' observateur et le moi observé'.[297]

The ephemerality and airiness of thought contrasts with the relative permanence of writing, and the way writing can distort thought by forcing it into linearity. He goes beyond the inadequation between the nominal subject of his essays and their content, facing us with the possibility that his *Essais* are ever to the 'left' of what he really had in mind, the record of a mind off-track, rather than faithful to his 'propos'.[298] In the *Essais* the verb 'gauchir' recurs in the context of linearity, expressing alternative, off-centre forms, or means of side-stepping the dictates of determinism, or the unpredictable swerving alt-linearity or Lucretian *clinamen* of chance motion. [299] In this light, the notion of consubstantiality becomes a decentred, spectral form of adequation, the text functioning as a record of loss — or lost threads — a 'quasi-trasse' or parallel trace of the mind in movement, which fits in with Montaigne's epistemic aesthetic of obliquity, where margins and fringes and other 'paratextual' spaces can be privileged sites. [300] Throughout the *Essais* Montaigne integrates the notions of tangentiality and contingency (linked etymologically through 'tangere' - touch) as a function of writing.

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[297] Jean Starobinski, *Montaigne en mouvement* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), p. 65.
[298] 'Mais je m'en vois un peu bien à gauche de mon theme' (II, 27, 699).
[299] 'Je n'ay guiere d'art pour sçavoir gauchir la fortune et luy eschapper ou la forcer, et pour dresser et conduire par prudence les choses à mon poinct.' (II, 17, 644).
[300] Montaigne employs the verb 'gauchir', in the sense of 'pencher', in the context of deviation and digression. Fittingly, the term appears four times in 'De la diversion' (III, 4): 'mais, declinant tout mollement noz propos et les gauchissant peu à peu aus subjects plus voisins, et puis un peu plus esloingnez, selon qu'elle se prestoit plus à moy, je luy desrobay imperceptiblement cette pensée doulereuse, et la tins en bonne contenance et du tout r'apaisée autant que j'y fus. J''usay de diversion' (831); 'On luy faict peu choquer les maux de droit fil; on ne luy en faict ny soustenir ny rabatre l'ateinte, on la luy faict decliner et gauchir.(833),

Montaigne deploys the rhetorical device of intentional digression, exemplified by Cicero, integrating it into the itinerary of his project — and, more literally, into his route in the *Journal de voyage* — where its ambiguous dynamic of deliberation and spontaneity playfully interrogates our interpretation of discursive consubstantiality. The premise of consubstantial writing is jeopardized via Montaigne's attentions to misalignment and off-centre co-extension. If consubstantial writing is to be conceived as an extension of mind, a form of written, so exteriorized, introspection, then Montaigne deconstructs this from the inside by suggesting his writing deviates and bends away from 'ma premiere imagination', the most authentic, unmediated, almost non-linguistic form of thought. [301] The notion that his book is a written form of introspection is doubly problematized (in the sense that the reader's attention is drawn to it as a 'problématique', or part of the discursive matter of the *Essais*): following the labyrinthine path of his vagabond mind is one thing; capturing it faithfully, or adequately, in writing is another. While Montaigne insists that he writes 'naively' as if speaking to paper or in the unpremeditated fashion of a chance encounter — thereby cultivating the idea that his writing is the real Montaigne one can hypothetically catch unawares, as though writing were a direct *truchement* of interiority — he also expresses the wish to be elsewhere than on paper: 'Quel que je soye, je le veux estre ailleurs qu'en papier (II, 37), the deictic 'ailleurs' gesturing towards the same troubling but creative misalignment at the heart of his idiosyncratic sense of consubstantiality. [302]

Couched as a counterfactual scenario, of a hypothetical every person engaging in Montaigne's introspective activity, Montaigne extrapolates, extends, and maps the microcosm of his own 'soy' onto the 'soy' of each individual, together making up a whole macrocosmic picture. This extending, inferential movement from individual, particular mind onto other minds and the possible notion of a collective, or extended, mind is important because this is the pivotal argument for the meaning of the *Essais* as book both consubstantial with its particular author and applicable to all. This counterfactual situation is replayed or reimagined in various other places in combination with various other 'introspective' verbs. For example, again in the 'Apologie', he writes:

> Quelque bon dessein qu'ait un juge, s'il ne s'escoute de prez, à quoy peu de gens s'amusent, l'inclinaison à l'amitié, à la parenté, à la beauté et à la vengeance, et non pas seulement choses si poisantes (...), peuvent insinuer insensiblement en son jugement la recommandation ou deffaveur d'une cause et donner pente à la balance'. (565)

[301] Almost non-linguistic because it remains shaped by 'discours intérieur' of the kind shared by animals, according to Plutarch.
[302] I return to this in Chapter Three.

The judge, whatever his conscientious *intentions*, when he actually listens 'closely' to himself, which precious few people do, he finds he is biased in all sorts of ways. The image is rather one of the judge spying on himself — and I note the structural similarity of this phrase with 'Moy qui m'espie de plus prez'— but with sound, rather than sight. These twin notions of self-eavesdropping and self-spying are recurrent and part of a broader idea of finding oneself precisely by catching oneself out — a kind of catching the mind *in flagrante delicto*. This is clearly at variance with the notion of deliberate introspective practice. Indeed the forensic aspect of the scenario — of the judge engaged in self-judgement, folding his judgement back on his own mind and its various leanings — sits somewhat incongruously with the more comedic dimension of the notion of self-eavesdropping.

It has been argued that for Montaigne a primary concern was finding a means of describing a self that he refused to reduce to the *homo interior*.[303] The *Essais* are constructed on the tension, or harmony, between two apparently incommensurable ideas: that the *Essais* are a microcosm, emblematic and representative of the *humaine condition* writ large, but also singular, idiosyncratic and even grotesque and monstrous from the perspectives of aesthetics and genre, situating Montaigne's discursive contexture as a mimesis of nature's boundless forms and hybrids. The dynamic between the two apparently very different cognitive processes of looking inwards and writing (extending) outwards — between interiority and community, inwardness and outwardness — is of foremost significance because this is the pivotal argument for the meaning of the *Essais* as book both consubstantial with its author and capable of enduring relevance for generation after generation of readers. This combination of universality and singularity can be seen in an important passage from 'De la praesumption' (II, 17):

> Le monde regarde tousjours vis à vis; moy, je replie ma veue au dedans, je la plante, je l'amuse là. Chacun regarde devant soy; moy, je regarde dedans moy: je n'ay affaire qu'à moy, je me considere sans cesse, je me contrerolle, je me gouste. Les autres vont tousjours ailleurs, s'ils y pensent bien; ils vont tousjours avant,
>
> *nemo in sese tentat descendere*,[304]
>
> moy je me roulle en moy mesme. Cette capacité de trier le vray, quelle qu'elle soit en moy, et cett'humeur libre de n'assubjectir aisément ma creance, je la dois principalement à moy: car les plus fermes imaginations que j'aye, et generalles, sont celles qui, par maniere de dire, nasquirent avec moy. Elles sont naturelles et toutes miennes. Je les produisis crues et simples, d'une production hardie et forte, mais un peu trouble et imparfaicte; depuis je les ay establies et fortifiées par l'authorité d'autruy, et par les sains discours des anciens, ausquels je me suis rencontré conforme en jugement: ceux-là m'en ont assuré la prinse, et m'en ont donné la jouyssance et possession plus entiere. (657- 658)

[303] John Jeffries Martin, 'The *Confessions* of Montaigne', *Religions*, 4 (2012), 950-963 (p.961).
[304] 'No one attempts to go down into himself,' Persius, *Satires,* IV, 23.

This passage is built on a conceit positing a fundamental difference of approach between 'moy' (Montaigne) on one hand and 'le monde', or chacun' or 'ils', on the other. What he, Montaigne, is doing is rare and unusual, while what others do in looking ahead or around 'tousjours' is the standard, commonplace thing. Yet it is a crucial part of the argument that it is the act of self-examination that is exceptional, not what is found as a result. His findings would map onto everybody's experience: 'Chacun à peu pres en diroit autant de soy, s'il se regardoit comme moy' (566). The ambiguity between descriptive and normative understandings of 'sample' ('eschantillon') or 'pattern' ('patron') feeds into Montaigne's logic. As previously noted in relation to the notion of the model in Chapter One, the concept of the 'sample' as representative pieces or 'lopins' of cloth cut from a larger fabric is equivocal, referring both to the metaphysical status of mankind as ontological fragment or *imago dei*, and to the representative function of the *Essais,* as representing their author ('eschantillons d'une montre particuliere', II, 6) and representing the *form* of others' hypothetical introspection. Therefore Montaigne's interiority is linked in a web of intersubjectivity, which mirrors the value of his book as singular excrescence of nature and universal 'patron' for all human experience.

In the passage from 'De la praesumption' we have been considering, the notion of listening to oneself is combined with with the verb 'enroller' — 'J'escoute à mes resveries, parce que j'ay à les enroller' (II, 18, 'Du démentir) — denoting the inscription on a roll, register, or 'booke' (Cotgrave, 1611). Montaigne's use of the transitive verb 'contreroller' and, shortly afterwards, the unusual, reflexive form of the verb 'rouller' ('je me roulle en moy mesmes') plays on the meaning of both, creating resonance between them. The meaning of 'Contreroller' (or 'counterouller'), from which our contemporary 'control' derives , is closely linked to the idea of (cross) checking an account against a (duplicate) register or roll, with a general intention of finding mistakes or faults (Cotgrave's entry for 'Contreroller': 'To controll; obserue, ouersee, spie faults').This literal sense of verifying against a physical register expanded in the fourteenth and fifteenth century to include more general sense of overseeing, supervising, or regulating expenses or statements.

It thus has the connotation of there being 'another' or other, external 'copy', against which something is checked, built into it. In keeping with this, many of Montaigne's uses of the verb are in contexts involving third parties, real or notional. Other uses, such as in the passage currently under consideration, only involve the self, while others still, involve both ('D'autant que nostre esprit ne trouve pas le champ moins spatieux à

contreroller le sens d'autruy qu'à representer le sien, et comme s'il y avoit moins d'animosité et d'aspreté à gloser qu'à inventer', III, 13, 1065-66).

The notion of the record or register — or the roll, from 'contreroller' and 'enroller'— is a significant one for the way Montaigne conceives his writing. In 'Du démentir' (II, 18), as part of the passage which forms a main textual basis for this thesis, Montaigne writes:

> Ay-je perdu mon temps de m'estre rendu compte de moy si continuellement, si curieusement? Car ceux qui se repassent par fantasie seulement et par langue quelque heure, ne s'examinent pas si primement, ny ne se penetrent, comme celuy qui en faict son estude, son ouvrage et son mestier, qui s'engage à un registre de durée, de toute sa foy, de toute sa force. (665)

Montaigne's language takes the static nature of the notion of a register or record ('compte rendu') and stretches it, accommodating it to life; the register is a 'registre de durée', which reflects the 'humaine durée' to which he refers in the 'Apologie', and the 'compte rendu' of himself is made 'continuellement'. We can see that the key themes of Montaigne's characterization and evaluation of his project — its exceptional nature, its incessant process, and also its metaphysical-physical nature ('de toute sa foy, de toute sa force') and the way it plays around with time — recur as a cluster. There are distinct parallels with his words in 'De la vanité' :'Qui ne voit que j'ay pris une route par laquelle, sans cesse et sans travail, j'iray autant qu'il y aura d'ancre et de papier au monde?'((III, 9, 945).The materiality built into the verb 'contreroller' — via the notion of the roll — interacts with the idea of the living record or register, to forge an intriguing and conceptually weighty dynamic between the cognitive, material aspects of writing and inwardly-oriented cognition.

The question of the relationship between the 'moy' and the 'soy' of the other, which Montaigne describes in counterfactual terms ('if....then') in the 'Apologie', is implicitly engaged by the two passages from II, 17 and II, 18 respectively. In the passage from 'De la praesumption', Montaigne describes the process by which Montaigne validates and indeed 'contrerolle' his own cognitive 'findings' — in this case his 'imaginations' — with reference to 'l'authorité d'autruy':

> Depuis je les [mes imaginations] ay establies et fortifiées par l'authorité d'autruy, et par les sains discours des anciens, ausquels je me suis rencontré conforme en jugement: ceux-là m'en ont assuré la prinse, et m'en ont donné la jouyssance et possession plus entiere. (658)

Bolstered with the authority of others and the 'sains discours des anciens', provided they substantiate, rather than substitute, his own thinking ('conforme en jugement'), Montaigne is able to 'own', and enjoy, his own thinking more completely. This might remind us of his logic, in his 'Au Lecteur', when he suggests that his imagined audience — a close-knit circle of friends and relatives— will be afforded a knowledge ('connoissance') of him which is 'plus vifve et plus entiere' through his book than they were able to gain during his biological lifetime. Here, the 'authorité d'autruy' enables, indeed authorizes, him to gain a better grasp ('prinse') on his own cognitive processes. Thus, in a fairly clear sense, the other becomes a very real constituent part of Montaigne's own cognitive ecology.

II. Confession

En faveur des Huguenots, qui accusent nostre confession privée et auriculaire, je me confesse en publicq, religieusement et purement. (III, *5*, 846)

Introspection and confession overlap as a privileged site of self-disclosure. Augustine is routinely (but not unproblematically) described as the first thinker to practice introspection as later it would be conceived, and in doing so, 'invented', or discovered, subjectivity and the self, within the context of early Christianity, leaving a powerful and enduring paradigm which patterned subsequent understandings of the self in relation to the other. In the *Confessiones* and *De Trinitate*, at least two forms of proto-introspection can be discerned, the confessional and the contemplative. Confessional introspection, a probing of the sinful self, is aimed at purifying the soul and preparing it to ascend to the divine, as it is to be found both within and beyond the self. Through contemplative introspection, the creaturely self as a whole is enabled to rejoice in its relation to God. While confessional introspection has much in common with the modern concept of introspection defined as investigation of one's inner self, contemplative introspection differs significantly from it; far from being reflexive, it takes God as its intentional object. Thus in contemplative introspection the individual self of the introspecting subject has been displaced from the focal position that it had occupied in confessional introspection, which is the pre-cursor or 'handmaid' to contemplative introspection. [305]

[305]Suzanne Stern-Gillet, 'Colloquium 5: Consciousness and Introspection in Plotinus and Augustine', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,* 22 (2007), 145-183. The abiding presence of an Augustinian paradigm of introspection can be felt in the preoccupation among post-structuralist thinkers including Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Luc Marion who, mediated by Heidegger's thought, interpret Augustine's

> Quand je me confesse à moy religieusement, je trouve que la meilleure bonté que j'aye, a de la teinture vicieuse. Et crains que Platon en sa plus verte vertu (moy qui en suis autant sincere et loyal estimateur, et des vertus de semblable marque, qu'autre puisse estre), s'il y eust escouté de pres, et il y escoutoit de pres, il y eust senty quelque ton gauche de mixtion humaine, mais ton obscur et sensible seulement à soy. (674)[306]

From the late Middle Ages on, the Catholic doctrine of confession had made self-disclosure an essential component of the sacrament of penance and of one's reconciliation with the Church. Its function, by enabling the faithful to absolve their sins by disclosing or avowing them, was to reconcile the sinner with the Christian community. By the late sixteenth century, this confessional ideal had taken even deeper roots in Catholic Europe and likely contributed in significant ways to a more generalized notion of the value of self-revelation, not merely to one's priest but also to one's loved-ones, friends, and neighbours. Concern for self-expression, therefore, was not exclusively religious; it also carried over into what was an emerging ideal of sincerity in early modern culture—an ideal that was frequently evoked in this period to critique a political culture that appeared to many to discourage any form of honest speech or francparler. In the context of an omnisicent God, who already knows whether a person truly repents, confession makes the sinner own his sinful actions.

Montaigne's attitude towards the practice of religious confession can only be described as ambivalent. Part of this ambivalence can be linked to the fact that in the sixteenth century confession was a disciplining strategy, a means of simplifying and sorting identities along religious and political lines, and was prone to instrumentalization during the Wars of Religion. In this context confession was prominent among the issues over which Catholics and Calvinists were polarized. Montaigne explicitly states he is not given to schematizing his soul in such a manner: 'Je donne à mon ame tantost un visage, tantost un autre, selon le costé où je la couche. Si je parle diversement de moy, c'est que je me regarde diversement' ('De l'inconstance de nos actions, II, 1, 335). The very instability of his 'posture' is what makes him unable and unwilling to adopt 'artificial' or insincere postures, religious or otherwise: 'Non seulement le vent des accidens me remue selon son inclination, mais en outre je me remue et trouble moy mesme par l'instabilité de ma posture; et qui y

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epistemology and philosophy of language as sharing a family resemblance with theirs. Derrida's *Circonfession* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil,1990), through its imitation of Augustinian techniques and motifs, constructs a bridge to a premodern epistemology and aesthetics of subjectivity. Derrida is led, via the key Augustinian question 'why confess to an all-knowing Deity?' (*Cur confitemur Deo scienti*) and his own response (*veritatem facere*, 'to do or make truth'), to an understanding of confession as a process of (linguistic) self-constitution with reference to the other. For a reading of Augustine's corpus as an extended meditation on the alterity of the self to itself, and as a driving force for creative relations with God, others, and the world, see Jean-Luc Marion, *Au lieu de soi: l'approche de Saint Augustin* (Paris: PUF, 2008).

[306] I return to Montaigne's notion of 'mixtion humaine' in the next subsection.

regarde primement, ne se trouve guere deux fois en mesme estat' (335). In the 1580s, when the question of confession, auricular or public, was highly topical, Montaigne chooses to model his secular confession on a heterodox religious practice (in the lines from 'Sur des vers de Virgile' cited at the beginning of this subsection). Cave interprets this as 'clearly not intended to be read theologically: on the contrary, it is metaphorical, as can be seen from the fact that Hippocrates is named in the same breath as Augustine and Origen'.[307] I do not find this distinction between theological (by implication, here, literal) and metaphorical interpretations to be as clear-cut. Indeed, there is scope for thinking that 'confession', like 'consubstantiality', constitutes part of what might be called Montaigne's lexicon of confessionally-charged underdetermination, a set of terms whose context mediates and shapes their semantic import (reflected in the distinction in linguistics between semantics and pragmatics).

By extension, merely going through the motions of repentance is foreign to Montaigne: 'Je ne cognoy pas de repentance superficielle, moyenne et de ceremonie. Il faut qu'elle me touche de toutes pars avant que je la nomme ainsin, et qu'elle pinse mes entrailles et les afflige autant profondement que Dieu me voit, et autant universellement' (III, 2, 813). Along similar lines, faith is an extended and embodied cognitive process or attitude, which, through accommodation, is served by 'les utils naturels et humains que Dieu nous a donnez':

> Il n'est occupation ny dessein plus digne d'un homme Chrestien que de viser par tous ses estudes et pensemens à embellir, estandre et amplifier la verité de sa creance. Nous ne nous contentons point de servir Dieu d'esprit et d'ame; nous luy devons encore et rendons une reverence corporelle; nous appliquons nos membres mesmes et nos mouvements et les choses externes à l'honorer' (II, 12, 441)

Montaigne recognizes that faith is not, of course, purely an interior, or individual, cognitive phenomenon; as its etymology indicates, religion (from the Latin *religare*) denotes a *system* of practices and beliefs, a condition of being bound by particular vows and of belonging to a religious order.[308] The point here is that postures and artefacts ('choses externes') are not superficial or extraneous props or accessories to faith, but rather an integral

[307] Cave, 'Fragments of a Future Self', *Retrospective*s, pp. 130-145 (p.141).

[308] In his study of 'modes of religiosity', the anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse broadly defines religion as 'any set of shared beliefs and actions appealing to supernatural agency', see *Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission* (Oxford: Altamira Press, 2004), p.2. Whitehouse sets in motion a range of debates about the role of memory in religion, proposing a thesis about how religions are created, passed on, and changed, based on a distinction between imagistic and doctrinal religious forms. On the problems involved in delineating the domain of 'religious symbolism', more specifically with the ambiguities of the very notion of 'symbolism' and of demarcating the 'metaphorical' in the context of religious practice, see Pascal Boyer, 'Cognitive Aspects of Religious Symbolism' and Christina Toren, 'Sign into Symbol, Symbol as Sign: Cognitive Aspects of Social Process', in *Cognitive Aspects of Religious Symbolism,* ed. by Pascal Boyer (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), pp. 4-47; pp. 147-164.

and efficacious part of the ecology of ritual. 'Nos mambres mesmes' refers to individual limbs but also to the members of a religious community, connecting the idea of extended mind to that of collective mind, evoking a Eucharistic entanglement between corporeality, materiality and spirit.[309]Montaigne's understanding is radically holistic, but also kinesic and haptic: just as repentance, in 'Du repentir', must *touch* him 'de toutes pars', must *pinch* his intestines, movement itself participates in 'inner' postures of belief. Because religion itself is a contexture, a set of formal arrangements, at the intersection of the material and the spiritual, the symbolic and the effective (the Eucharist being a particularly potent instance of how this set of interactions is available to multiple conflicting interpretations) it represents the ultimate example, or model, of a cognitive ecology, demonstrating in particularly affective terms how the limb or member relates to the body. It recasts the notion of the 'prop' understood as a temporary, portable, somewhat accidental, accessory, reconceptualizing it as an essential prosthesis: he observes, 'une religion purement mentale, sans objet prefix et sans meslange materiel, is 'chose de nul usage' (513). The term 'prefix' is key, as it identifies the object which it modifies as a prosthesis, and 'usage' makes it plain that a purely immaterial religion would have no 'handle': it would be an instrument that could not be grasped by minds which are fundamentally embodied. The tension inherent in the notion of prosthesis and its implications for identity, which I explore in more detail in Chapter Three, translates (here and elsewhere in the *Essais*) into a certain ambivalence about whether the postures and appurtenances of religion participate in genuine faith or act as an external substitute for or mere supplement to a faith that is missing or inauthentic. In the *Journal* entry for his first visit to Rome, Montaigne records going on Christmas day to observe Mass at Saint Peter's, given by Pope Gregory XIII, and drily concludes, 'Ces ceremonies samblent estre plus magnifiques que devotieuses.' (93) This suggestion, which he also makes elsewhere, that such outward show may mask an inner absence, cannot be 'squared' with the idea that genuine religious faith is also constituted by postures, movements and objects. If we take religion to be some kind of a *pattern* for cognitive ecology, then this ambivalence matters because on one view 'external' objects are necessary constituents of mind, and on another view those objects are, irreducibly, accidental prostheses, unincorporated attachments. In the *Journal* Montaigne pays significant attention to the material culture of religion as he moves through Reformation territory, making clear his sense that people are thinking, believing and remembering with and through different sets of artefacts and social surrounds, situated in particular cognitive or

[309] On the role of 'incorporating practices' in liturgical performance, including re-enactments of past events, see Connerton, 'Bodily Practices', in *How Societies Remember*, pp. 72-104.

'remembrance environments'.[310] I wish to propose that, in the *Essais*, Montaigne is feeling his way through such questions about the relation between cognition, faith and the various forms of material scaffolding that support, constitute and sometimes even replace them, enriched by his experience of travel in those lands.

Another aspect of Montaigne's ambivalence toward confession concerns his personal ethics of identity: central to the traditional contemporary view of confession — and the accompanying repentance — is that the act can effect a fundamental change in the individual's soul. Montaigne pushes back against this possibility. Thus, again in 'Du repentir', Montaigne writes of the 'forme maistresse' of each individual, which does not suffer alteration, down to its 'vices naturels consubstantiels et intestins':

> Regardez un peu comment s'en porte nostre experience: il n'est personne, s'il s'escoute, qui ne descouvre en soy une forme sienne, une forme maistresse, qui luicte contre l'institution, et contre la tempeste des passions qui luy sont contraires. De moy, je ne me sens guere agiter par secousse, je me trouve quasi tousjours en ma place, comme font les corps lourds et poisans. Si je ne suis chez moy, j'en suis tousjours bien pres. (III, 2, 811)

Montaigne draws on the notion, present in Aristotle's *Physics*, and later conceptualized by Galileo as inertia, of the tendency for an object to rest in its 'natural' place, to convey the constancy of his *forme sienne* which, like the 'corps lourds et poisans' to which he refers, stays put ('chez moy') or nearby. This recalls the passage in 'De la vanité' in which he describes the edifice of the status quo as a contexture, sustained in place by its own weight and antiquity: 'La contexture d'un si grand corps tient à plus d'un clou. Il tient mesme par son antiquité: comme les vieux bastimens, ausquels l'aage a desrobé le pied, sans crouste et sans cyment, qui pourtant vivent et se soustiennent en leur propre poix.' (III, 9, 960). As has been noted, contextures are conceived in the period as complex quasi architectural or anatomical bodies or systems enmeshed in (or co-constituted by) their environment which can be vulnerable, but can also stay rooted, standing firm in the face of vicissitude. Here 'contexture' connotes resistance to change. Yet, as we will see in the next chapter, in relation to ruins contextures become temporal spaces, whose nature is palimpsest.

[310] On how material culture scaffolds memory, and the relation between 'economies of attention' and the artefactual environment (architecture, ecclesiastical furniture and so on) see Tribble and Keene, 'Sacred Space', in *Cognitive Ecologies and the History of Remembering,* pp. 47-70. The authors persuasively argue that an ecological approach to memory has the capacity to bridge the divide between individual, psychologically situated accounts of memory and culturally oriented accounts.

The very *consubstantiality* of an individual's vices — like 'les biens et les maux, qui sont consubstantiels à nostre vie' (III, 13, 1090) — makes the notion of repentance's ability to perform a radical change in the soul a difficult one, and even makes the notion of piecemeal perfectibility problematic. We cannot do without our own special mix of both good and bad, our identity and survival depend on maintaining it: 'Nostre estre ne peut sans ce meslange' (1090) Because, as he writes, he is a whole, composed of a distinctive *meslange* which is his unique essence or *ingenium* (making him a substance, in metaphysical terms), he can only pray to God for a wholesale reformation: 'Je fay coustumierement entier ce que je fay, et marche tout d'une piece' (812), and therefore 'je puis condamner et me desplaire de ma forme universelle, et supplier Dieu pour mon entiere reformation' (813).[311] I return in more detail to the importance of the notion of mixture for consubstantiality, below. For Montaigne a religious practice such as confession poses a particular challenge for consubstantiality, by threatening the very identity on which it rests, but at the same time he understands religion to work as a form of extended cognition, its practices and artefacts forming a 'consubstantial' part of its very nature. This is one important sign, I suggest, that consubstantiality operates as both a cognitive and a metaphysical concept in his writing.

III. Support and Scaffolding

Considerons donq pour cette heure l'homme seul, sans secours estranger, armé seulement de ses armes (...) *Essais*, II, 12, 449.

C'est une maxime chez les Maçons, que qui ne sçait pas eschafauder, ne sçait pas travailler - Furetière, *Dictionnaire universel* (1690)

Neither the bare hand nor the unaided intellect has much power; the work is done by tools and assistance, and the intellect needs them as much as the hand. As the hand's tools either prompt or guide its motions, so the mind's tools either prompt or warn the intellect - Francis Bacon, *The New Organon* , 'Aphorisms on the Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man,' I (1620)[312]

I will now revisit a passage I have already partially cited at the start of this section on 'cognitive reincarnations'. Humankind's propensity to self-extend is set out with particular force in the manuscript addition to the 'Apologie' made after 1588 to a part of the essay in which Montaigne surveys learned opinions on the immortality of the soul:

[311] The word 'reformation', naturally highly charged in the period, is used in the *Essais* to mean wholesale, genuine or radical change as opposed to piecemeal repair or redress (in De l'expérience' the word appears four times, including 'vraye reformation' and 'parfaicte reformation', 1077 and 1109); it stands at the far end of the continuum on which 'correction' and 'amendement' also lie.

312 Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, ed. by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p. 33.

> Un soing extreme tient l'homme d'alonger son estre; il y a pourveu par toutes ses pieces. Et pour la conservation du corps sont les sepultures; pour la conservation du nom, la gloire. Il a employé toute son opinion à se rebastir, impatient de sa fortune, et à s'estançonner par ses inventions. L'ame, par son trouble et sa foiblesse ne pouvant tenir sur son pied, va questant de toutes parts des consolations, esperances et fondemens en des circonstances estrangeres où elle s'attache et se plante; et, pour legers et fantastiques que son invention les luy forge, s'y repose plus seurement qu'en soy et plus volontiers. (553)

In this passage, mankind's extendable condition is implicitly compared with that of other creatures whose adaptability and fit within their environment — their ability to assess what is expedient 'au besoing', or to their conservation, and respond — takes up a large portion of the essay. [313] The word 'soing' is related to the notion of 'cure' (*cura*) in the period, carrying connotations of care, attention, preoccupation, concern, sollicitude, diligence, from which the polysemy of 'curiosity' derives.[314] 'Besoing' denotes both awareness of a want or lack of something ('Situation de manque ou prise de conscienced d'un manque') and of something being necessary or expedient (Cotgrave notes it means 'Needfull, behoofefull, expedient, necessarie'.) The modified form 'besoigne' or 'besogne' (verb: besoigner, besogner) refers to an arduous, laborious but necessary task, or work (*ouvrage*), denoting the pains or care taken in filling the want.[315] Man's extreme care in stretching his natural being is a function of his inherent, and so natural, adeptness. The individual parts or pieces making up man's contexture are collectively directed towards the extension they equip him (or are designed) for. It is this shared striving or intentionality that makes the pieces of man's fragmented nature cohere. The question of what composes a man's 'estre' is an open question in itself, as we lack an adequate cognitive and epistemic perspective from which to grasp our own being — a clair-obscur form of existence — or being itself, with which we have no communication: 'Nous n'avons aucune communication à l'estre, par ce que toute humaine nature est tousjours au milieu entre le naistre et le mourir, ne baillant de soy qu'une obscure apparence et ombre, et une incertaine et debile opinion.' (II, 12, 601). Our inability to seize the conceptual delimitations of man's *estre* itself affords a kind of cognitive open-endedness, or incompleteness which lends itself to seeking fulfilment in extendedness and ramification into the environment.

[313] In the *Philosophie Zoologique*, Lamarck observes that it is 'besoin', analyzed as a desire for change, that causes change in the organism's characteristics, behaviour or morphology, and thence in those of its offspring.
[314] Neil Kenny, *The Uses of Curiosity,* pp. 4-8; on the early modern connection between 'curiosity' and fragmentation' and collections of apparently isolated or unrelated objects not adding up to a whole, see pp.242-245.
[315] See https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/besoin. Montaigne's uses of 'besoigne' mirror this range of acceptions. Perhaps the most typically Montaignian is his characterization of death as 'la plus grande besoigne que nous ayons à faire' (II, 6, 371), and the opening lines of 'De l'amitié' in which Montaigne sets out the path of his writing project: 'Considérant la conduite de la besongne d'un peintre que j'ay, il m'a pris envie de l'ensuivre'(1I, 28, 83).

Other salient terms within the passage include the verbs 'forger' — suggesting artificial construction and over-reach beyond natural capabilities— and 's'estanconner' (literally, to support using 'estançons' or stanchions, sturdy upright wooden props or stays, usually relevant in mining, shipbuilding or masonry contexts). We can see the presence of 'stance' in the period spelling of the verb, recalling the notion (retained in the current Italian 'stanza') of 'stopping place' or standing position (from the Latin *stāre*, to stand). The verb's impact relates both to the visual — we see, imaginatively, a prop-like thing — and to the reader's embodied response to it. The lexical vigour of 'estançonner' generates an ambiguous sensorimotor response: connected to the strong sense of stance it conveys, but also the implied need for reinforcement. The material source of the image becomes an affordance for thinking of man's relationship with his own contrivances and designs, and the way any straightforward dichotomy of inner and outer, self and other, is troubled. As with Montaigne's many other uses of 'fortune' in the *Essais*, fortune is an external force, an allocated lot, resistant to human interpretation.

A significant aspect of the passage lies in what is absent rather than present in the printed 1595 text: in the Bordeaux copy Montaigne makes further emendations to his manuscript annotations in the margins, the traces of which are lost in some modern editions.[316] In the first line of the passage, after 'il y a pourveu par toutes ses pieces', he had added 'malcontant de leur naturelle duree', but afterwards struck out these words. Perhaps the structurally similar 'Impatient de sa fortune,' left intact, better expressed his thought by placing emphasis on pre-empting fortune's vicissitudes, rather than extension beyond the natural. It may also have been an act of disambiguation, given the inherently equivocal adjective 'naturelle', with descriptive and normative senses. Possibly he considered the addition to be superfluous, given that 'conservation' and 'preservation' already sufficiently convey duration. The notion of natural duration and temporal prolongation in thought recurs in 'De la phisiognomie' (III, 12) in the context of a reflection on how the human mind anticipates and dwells on what it fears: 'Nous troublons la vie par le soing de la mort, et la mort par le soing de la vie', asking 'A quoy nous sert cette curiosité de preoccuper tous les inconvenients de l'humaine nature (...)?' :

> [B]Jettez vous en l'experience des maux qui vous peuvent arriver, nommément des plus extremes: esprouvez vous là, disent-ils, asseurez vous là. Au rebours, le plus facile et plus naturel seroit en descharger mesme sa pensée. Ils ne viendront pas assez tost, leur vray estre ne nous dure pas assez; il faut que nostre esprit les estende et alonge et qu'avant la main il les incorpore en soy et s'en entretienne, comme s'ils ne poisoient pas raisonnablement à nos sens. (1050).

[316] It is traced in the 'Notes et variantes' in *Oeuvres complètes* ed. by Thibaudet and Rat (Paris: Gallimard, 1962).

The dimensions of negative experience are stretched beyond their proper bounds and natural duration (their 'vray estre'); we incorporate and sustain them.

The image of man co-opting structural support in the passage from the 'Apologie' considered above is one of a network, in which Montaigne — depending on the context —deploys the language of bolstering, buttressing, staying, incorporating, sustaining, maintaining, and so on, all vehicles for notions of hybridity, complementarity and supplementarity. Each type of image inhabits a subtly different semantic field and has a correspondingly different role, however, linked, partly, to the extent to which the support is characterized as predominantly compensatory, or synergistic; to conflate them would be to lose the conceptual and sensorimotor precision that makes them effective.

So for example, once again in the 'Apologie' Montaigne employs the image — similar to that of the 'estançon' — of another architectural support, the 'arc-boutant' or flying buttress, a masonry support typical of Gothic architecture. This time it is in a theological-political-linguistic connection with reference to the civil wars raging around him:

> Oyez l'horrible impudence dequoy nous pelotons les raisons divines, et combien irreligieusement nous les avons et rejettées et reprinses selon que la fortune nous a changé de place en ces orages publiques. Cette proposition si solenne: S'il est permis au subjet de se rebeller et armer contre son prince pour la defence de la religion, souvienne-vous en quelles bouches, cette année passée, l'affirmative d'icelle estoit l'arc-boutant d'un parti, la negative de quel autre parti c'estoit l'arc-boutant; et oyez à present de quel quartier vient la voix et instruction de l'une et de l'autre; et si les armes bruyent moins pour cette cause que pour cette là. (443)

Montaigne's figurative deployment is part of a broader pattern of use in the period, where the 'arc-boutant' is personified in polemical political or religious contexts to refer to a person supporting the dissonant side: Furetière notes 'On appelle figurément *Arcboutants,* les principaux deffenseurs d'un parti, d'une doctrine; ceux qui soûtiennent, qui protegent une affaire, un parti. Ce Ministre est un des principaux arcs-boutans de l'heresie'). [317] The metaphorical use of 'arc-boutant' packs a sensorimotor punch, articulating tensile resistance, grounded in the structural and dynamical particularity of the material 'arc-boutant' itself; in architectural and engineering terms, it is a segment of stone arch, 'springing from a pier or other support, and abutting against a structure, for the purpose of resisting thrust'. While the 'arc-boutant' is a stable stone fixture, its form is

[317] Furetière, *Dictionnaire universel,* p. 99.

dynamic, designed to balance or compensate for forces that would otherwise compromise the stability and integrity of the main structure. In the context of the 'orages publiques' of the religious wars parallels are drawn between the physical forces at play in an architectural edifice and the political dynamic between pushing and resisting. The instability of the situation — of taking sides, adopting postures and temporary verbal positions — contrasts with the 'contexture' of a society which holds firm even without cement. The integration of the 'arc-boutant' into the vocabulary of dissonance is an example of how the supplement both threatens and sustains notions of stability and permanence.

Notions of supplementation, extension and adaptation are central to the Humanist practices of *imitatio* and *innutritio*, where composition becomes a form of navigation, of following networks of existing and sometimes well-worn paths, but adjusting and reconfiguring the compositional circuitry through turns of choice, deliberation and judgement which re-casts agency as shared between author and text, something, as we have seen, brought out in the rhetorical notion of *ductus*. Montaigne sets these ideas out with particular clarity in an early essay, 'De Democritus et Heraclitus':

> Le jugement est un util à tous subjects, et se mesle par tout. A cette cause, aux essais que j'en fay ici, j'y employe toute sorte d'occasion. Si c'est un subject que je n'entende point, à cela mesme je l'essaye, sondant le gué de bien loing; et puis, le trouvant trop profond pour ma taille, je me tiens à la rive: et cette reconnoissance de ne pouvoir passer outre, c'est un traict de son effect, voire de ceux dequoy il se vante le plus. Tantost, à un subject vain et de neant, j'essaye voir s'il trouvera dequoy lui donner corps, et dequoy l'appuyer et estançonner. Tantost je le promene à un subject noble et tracassé, auquel il n'a rien à trouver de soy, le chemin en estant si frayé qu'il ne peut marcher que sur la piste d'autruy. (I, 50, 301)

The embodied and extended dimensions of this chiastic dynamic are clear: the vain and empty subject can be bodied forth and given structural support through the exercise of Montaigne's 'jugement'; however, when his judgement is 'walked' to a 'subject noble et tracassé' it has no choice but to follow 'la piste d'autruy'. In the first line the reflexive form of 'mesler' expresses both a material mingling or confounding and a more anthropologically-inflected busy-bodying. The lexical energy of Montaigne's scriptural trajectory flows from the sequence of sensory, kinesic and dynamical verbs, often denoting a reaching towards or pushing against: 'essayer', 'sonder', 'passer', 'donner corps', 'appuyer', estançonner (again), 'promener', coupled with strong adjectives (the plosive 'tracassé,' 'frayé'), whose sense in the passage negotiates the space between the literal and the metaphorical. This movement between abstract and embodied meanings, or to borrow Kathryn Banks'

expression 'modality switch,' is a feature of Montaigne's writing which enlists the reader's sensorimotor and proprioceptive responses, whether at a reflective or pre-reflective level.[318]

In this passage cognition is presented as form, an exploratory organizing principle, interacting with the subject *matter;* the mind moves even on terrain it does not yet recognize as 'terrain' as such: 'Si c'est un subject que je n'entende point, à cela mesme je l'essaye, sondant le gué de bien loing; et puis, le trouvant trop profond pour ma taille, je me tiens à la rive'. A quasi-geographical topology of mind is at work here, but there are also traces of the kind of medical parlance — for example in the verb 'sonder'. Here, the *terra incognita* of a particular subject is nonetheless tried; Montaigne 'sounds out' or probes the ford from a distance to assess whether it is sufficiently shallow to cross but, finding it too deep 'pour [s] taille', he sticks to the banks, cognitive *terra firma*.

Elsewhere Montaigne attends in more depth to the ethical implications of mankind's tendency to extend or bolster himself: in the context of his condemnation of the witch trials which were at their peak in Europe when 'Des boyteux' (was written around 1585), Montaigne's reflections take a distinctly more negative turn.

> Nostre discours est capable d'estoffer cent autres mondes et d'en trouver les principes et la contexture. Il ne luy faut ny matiere ny baze; laissez le courre: il bastit aussi bien sur le vuide que sur le plain, et de l'inanité que de matiere, (III, 11, 1027)

Through thought and language we fabricate parallel false realities, composing and inventing intricate detail, and pad them out with illusions of substance. Here, contexture is used in its rhetorical sense (*dispositio*), denoting the arrangement of parts contrived through *inventio*; rhetoric spawns other, counterfactual worlds, with no substance or foundation. From a cognitive point of view, the complexity of our inventions, here, is not a 'merveilleuse fabrique', mirroring nature, but empty structure, 'une muraille sans pierre' (III, 2, 805).

He continues:

> Ainsi va tout ce bastiment, s'estoffant et formant de main en main: de maniere que le plus esloigné tesmoin en est mieux instruict que le plus voisin, et le dernier informé mieux persuadé que le premier. C'est un progrez naturel. Car quiconque croit quelque chose, estime que c'est ouvrage de charité de la persuader à un autre; et pour ce faire, ne craint poinct d'adjouster de son invention, autant qu'il voit estre necessaire en son compte, pour suppleer à la resistance et au deffaut qu'il pense estre en la conception d'autruy. Moy-mesme, qui faicts singuliere conscience de mentir et qui ne me soucie guiere de donner creance et authorité à ce que je dis, m'apperçoy toutesfois, aux propos que j'ay en main, qu'estant eschauffé ou par la resistance d'un autre ou par la propre chaleur de la narration, je grossis et enfle mon subject par vois, mouvemens, vigueur et force de parolles, et encore par extention et amplification, non sans interest de la verité nayfve. Mais je le fais en condition pourtant, qu'au premier qui me rameine et qui

[318] See Banks, 'Metaphor, Lexicography, and Rabelais's Prologue to *Gargantua*', in *Movement in Renaissance Literature*, pp. 81-107.

> me demande la verité nue et crue, je quitte soudain mon effort et la luy donne, sans exaggeration, sans emphase et remplissage. La parole vive et bruyante, comme est la mienne ordinaire, s'emporte volontiers à l'hyperbole. (1028)

Montaigne is using the language of prosthesis that we find in the treatises of Ambroise Paré in the period but is applying it to cognition itself rather than to bodily 'lacks': 'pour suppleer à la resistance et au deffaut qu'il pense estre en la conception d'autruy' (1028).[319] The 'bastiment' of opinion is incrementally padded and stuffed, passed 'de main en main'. And yet this 'progrez', by which the 'verité nayfve' becomes distorted into something artificial, is nonetheless 'naturel'. This brings Montaigne to analyze his own case. The terms in which he describes the mechanism by which the truth is deformed are all terms related to physics, whose sense is extended into the use of language, and the momentum — and, through 'resistance' or friction, heat — that can be generated.

The notion of compensation developed in 'Des boyteux' is expressed, in 'Des Livres,' more as an inverse proportionality between mind and body: the more muscular the mind, the less muscular the body needs to be and vice versa:

> C'est cette mesme raison que je disoy tantost, comme Martial de soy, *minus illi ingenio laborandum fuit, in cujus locum materia successerat*. Ces premiers là, sans s'esmouvoir et sans se picquer, se font assez sentir: ils ont dequoy rire par tout, il ne faut pas qu'ils se chatouillent; ceux-cy ont besoing de secours estrangier: à mesure qu'ils ont moins d'esprit, il leur faut plus de corps. [B] Ils montent à cheval parce qu'ils ne sont assez forts sur leurs jambes. (II, 10, 412)

This passage is part of a longer discussion of his writing method and his borrowings from others and one of several instances of Montaigne's linking the figure of the horse with the cognitive dimension of prosthesis, some of which I discuss in the next Chapter.[320] Natural cognitive (intellectual or creative) weakness necessitates greater corporeal mass and strength. For Montaigne infirmity can re-circuit things in interesting ways that ultimately prove a source of strength; limping is an embodied form of skepticism, making us face what is already true of our condition, but to which the 'able' turn a blind eye.

[319] I discuss Paré's prosthetics in greater detail in Chapter Three.

[320] The title of the essay, can be linked to the symbolic correlation between states of knowledge or understanding and states of bodily (dis)ability. Catherine Randall argues that 'Lameness acts as a cipher for a cluster of terms conveying epistemological uncertainty and experiential instability.' See Catherine Randall, '"He Doesn't Have a Leg to Stand On": Lameness and Knowledge in "Des boyteux"', *Romanic Review*, 87 (1996), 1996, 319-328 (p.324).

If read in conjunction with the passage from 'De l'experience', the body-mind dynamic can be understood as a complex, with the literal sense of 'corps' being tacitly exchanged for a metaphorical sense (the body of his writing) and his own deficits being supplemented and compensated by 'secours estrangier' and the boundary between corps and esprit, as well as self and other, is deliberately blurred:

> A quoy faire desmembrons nous en divorce un bastiment tissu d'une si joincte et fraternelle correspondance? Au rebours, renouons le par mutuels offices. Que l'esprit esveille et vivifie la pesanteur du corps, le corps arreste la legereté de l'esprit et la fixe (III, 13, 1114)

In contemporary discourse, 'Scaffolding' is a concept widely used across disciplines and is a recurrent term in the emerging lexicon of 4E cognition.[321] The common thread between its applications — in cognitive science, human development, theoretical and evolutionary biology and social theory — is the notion that certain resources enable processes or achievements that would not be possible through unassisted effort.[322] The notion is especially prominent in expressions of the extended mind thesis which in its less strong form suggests that human cognizing leans heavily on various forms of external scaffolding and support and, in its stronger form, that such scaffolding is 'internalized' becoming a constituent part of the mind. A salient example is Andy Clark's idea, already mentioned in Part One, that language itself can be considered a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure, 'a kind of self-constructed cognitive niche: a persisting though never stationary material scaffolding whose critical role in promoting thought and reason remains ill-understood'.[323] Clark's proposal is that the very materiality of linguistic scaffolding is the source of its key benefits: that by materializing thought in words we create structures that are themselves 'proper objects of perception, manipulation, and (further) thought'.

Despite its widespread use, the concept of scaffolding is sometimes given short shrift, as though it were clear what the stakes of the concept are. The conceptual work performed by such ideas depends on some level of

[321] See, for example, *Developing Scaffolds in Evolution, Culture, and Cognition,* ed. by Linnda R. Caporael and others, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2013).
[322] The work of Lev Vygotsky (1896 –1934) in the field developmental psychology, especially in children, was instrumental in the genealogy of this perspective, although he did not make use the term scaffolding, instead setting out the idea of a 'Zone of Proximal Development', which refers to the difference between what a learner can do without help and what he or she can achieve with guidance from a skilled partner. See Vygotsky, *Mind in Society,* pp. 84-91.
[323] Clark, 'Word, Niche and Super-Niche', 255-268 (p.257).

clarity and distinctness. Scaffolding is generally understood to be a system of platforms, usually temporary, which makes particular positions available to craftspeople — stonemasons, painters — who need access which the scope of their own embodiment, or the scale of the building, won't allow. Contrary to what some usages of the term might imply, scaffolding is not designed to prop up and support the building itself but rather to provide a *spatial and functional affordance* for people working on the building. The sense of scaffolding being a means of propping up an edifice is a transferred, somewhat imprecise, meaning. In addition to its applications in construction, scaffolding is relevant to the spatial arrangements of theatre, and to the spectacle of corporal punishment and execution. In particular, Tribble's work leverages the cognitive implications of the theatrical scaffold in the context of the Globe. [324]

Structural support is not only mentioned figuratively in the *Essais*, but also, on the face of it at least, literally. In 'Des coches' (III, 6) Montaigne puts the architectural methods of the Peruvians in ethnographic perspective:

> Quant à la pompe et magnificence, par où je suis entré en ce propos, ny Graece, ny Romme, ny Aegypte ne peut, soit en utilité, ou difficulté, ou noblesse, comparer aucun de ses ouvrages au chemin qui se voit au Peru, dressé par les Roys du pays, depuis la ville de Quito jusques à celle de Cusco (il y a trois cens lieues), droict, uny, large de vingt-cinq pas, pavé, revestu de costé et d'autre de belles et hautes murailles, et le long d'icelles, par le dedans, deux ruisseaux perennes, (...) En l'estimation de cet ouvrage, j'ay compté la difficulté, qui est particulierement considerable en ce lieu là. Ils ne bastissoient poinct de moindres pierres que de dix pieds en carré; ils n'avoient autre moyen de charrier qu'à force de bras, en trainant leur charge; et pas seulement l'art d'eschafauder, n'y sçachant autre finesse que de hausser autant de terre contre leur bastiment, comme il s'esleve, pour l'oster apres. (914)

Montaigne's estimation of the finished work (the 'chemin' running between Quito and Cusco) is proportional to the particular cultural, geographical and technological context: the difficulty of the task 'en ce lieu la' is especially considerable, making its result all the more impressive. In constructing the beautiful paved road — lined with tall stone walls and with two streams running along the inner edge — the Peruvians did not use auxiliary (hydraulic or mechanical) means to transport the boulders, relying instead on their own arm power in what seems a superhuman effort. Lacking scaffolding techniques or any 'autre finesse' of the kind, they heap earth against their construction to raise the workers above the ground, then remove it afterwards. Montaigne's insistence that his judgement is adjusted or calibrated to the particular context goes hand in hand with the cultural relativism and open ethnographic perspective he shows throughout 'Des Coches' and in 'Des

[324] Evelyn Tribble, 'Distributing Cognition in the Globe', *Shakespeare Quarterly,* 56 (2005), 135-155; E. Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare's Time* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011).

Cannibales'. While not being quite the marvel of the swallow's nest or spider's web, this human ouvrage is impressive for having been made without recourse to elaborate tools or aids. Montaigne's tone is ambiguous and might even be interpreted as patronizing the Peruvians' 'rudimentary' ('primitive') methods of building, but more plausibly he is using this comparison as a *tremplin* for pursuing his reflection on epistemological and ethical questions around extended cognition. Running parallel to a literal reading of the passage is a more figurative interpretation, in which l'art d'eschafauder' emerges as a quasi-material example of man's extended cognition.

IV. Mixtion

A final angle from which to consider early modern cognitive extension is through the idea of hybridity, at origin a biological category, or rather the transgression of the 'normal' boundaries between biological categories or species carrying implications of 'unnaturalness'. A hybrid is a plant or animal of mixed lineage, a form of biologically-real chimera: 'Un hybride, c'est avant tout le produit d'un croisement, d'une greffe, d'une rencontre littéralement monstrueuse entre des espèces différentes'. [325] Latour's work draws extensively on the notion of hybrids, chimeras and monsters — mixtures of nature and culture, and cooperations between technological and scientific modes of enquiry and existence — as ways of inhabiting a hybrid and polytemporal world. [326] In architectural, artistic and discursive contexts the notion of hybridation is deployed in relation to the porosity or unstable boundaries of registers, genres, techniques and orders of representation. Ellen Spolsky has analyzed the 'archetype' of hybridity between the human and the non-human as a kind of failed integration, a recognition of the many 'threads and recombinatory possibilities' whose recurrence arises from their 'frustrating resistance to untangling'.[327] The genetic, biological notion of hybrid lineage, denoting the state of being piecemeal, becomes a means for thinking about other kinds of mixture, including contamination and contagion, considered to operate on many levels of reality, from the physical to the spiritual. While such different concepts cannot be conflated, they share the sense of something not having a uniform or homogenous composition. In the *Essais*, the word 'mixtion' and its cognates are used in relation to pharmacology and the practice of medicine, viewed as artificial and plagued by 'confusion et incertitude,' and, figuratively, in relation

[325] Laurent Gerbier, *Hybridations: Les Rencontres du Texte et de l'Image* (Tours: Presses Universitaires de Tours, 2014).
[326] On hybridity in Latour's thought see, for example, *Bruno Latour: Hybrid Thoughts in a Hybrid World,* ed. by Anders Blok, Torben Elgaard Jensen (Abingon: Routledge, 2011).
[327] Ellen Spolsky, 'Archetypes Embodied, then and now', *Poetics Today,* 38 (2017) 317-339.

to adulterations to purity and health. [328] Conceptual distinctness needs to be maintained[329] between a 'natural' state of mixtures, which applies to all things in the sublunar world in the Aristotelian and Galenic traditions, and an 'adulterated' state of mixture, as in pharmacology and alchemy.

The semantic range of 'mixtion' emerges in two essays in particular, 'De la ressemblance des enfans aux peres' (II, 37) and 'Nous ne goustons rien de pur' (II, 20), which we have already considered with a focus on introspection, in which Montaigne uses the expression 'mixtion humaine' to articulate the 'rapiessement et bigarrure', the spiritual and epistemic contamination inherent to us. This is in tune with La Porte's list of epithets connected to the idea of *meslange*, which indicate the term's connotations for contemporary readers: 'Confuse, bigarree, turbulente, populeuse, diverse, copieuse, desordonnee, combatante, guerriere'.[330]

In the period 'mixtion' is a technical, predominantly medical, term central to the Galenic conception of the healthy, or diseased, composition of the human body but also carrying connotations of adulteration, artificiality, and confusion. [331] In II, 37 Montaigne deploys the notion to turn medicine against itself:

> De tout cet amas ayant faict une mixtion de breuvage, n'est ce pas quelque espece de resverie d'esperer que ces vertus s'aillent divisant et triant de cette confusion et meslange, pour courir à charges si diverses? Je craindrois infiniement qu'elles perdissent ou eschangeassent leurs ethiquetes et troublassent leurs quartiers. Et qui pourroit imaginer que, en cette confusion liquide, ces facultez ne se corrompent, confondent et alterent l'une l'autre? (774)

This Babel-like 'confusion and meslange' recalls the jostling medley of human opinions in the 'Apologie' and Montaigne's words in II, I: 'Nous sommes tous de lopins, et d'une contexture si informe et diverse, que chaque piece, chaque momant, faict son jeu.' (337) Here 'contexture' captures the complexity of our compositional hybridity and heterogeneity. In Renaissance French, the lexis of mixture itself seems to have been contaminated by the fluidity denoted by the term *meslange*, which has several near-synonyms, such as

[328] R.B Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: a Study of the "De mixtione" with Preliminary Essay* (Leiden: Brill, 1976).

[330] Cited in Kenny, *Palace of Secrets,* p. 128.

[331] In Estienne's 1552 *Dictionarium Latinogallicum*, the verb 'mistionner' is rendered by the Latin 'Adulterare, Medicare, Permiscere'; in Cotgrave's *Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (1611), a 'mistion' is 'A mixture, mash, medley, melling, blending; a confounding; a sophistication'. Later, in Furetière's *Dictionaire Universel* (1690), 'Mixtion' is a 'Meslange artificiel de plusieurs drogues ou liqueurs qui entrent en la composition d'une chose, et sur tout d'un medicament. Le vin frelaté est celuy où il y a quelque mixtion. Le Catholicon se fait par la mixtion de plusieurs drogues'.

meslage, *mixtion*, *meslement*, *mesleure*, and *meslinge*, while alternatives for 'mesler' include 'meslier' and 'meslinger'. [332]

In the same essay (II, 37), Montaigne tells us two stories, both blood (and goat) related, to illustrate his comparative study of medicine in different locations intended to show its incoherent and cultural nature, but which turns into a reflection on inherited traits and purity of transmisson. In the first *conte*, he tells us of region at the foot of mount Lahontan, whose inhabitants lived a life almost entirely apart from other influences, and observed particular customs passed down 'de pere en fils' and avoided commerce and marriage with any beyond their own precincts 'pour n'alterer la pureté de leur police' (778). At some point one of them, motivated by ambition, wished his son to have an education and become a notary; having done so, this 'maistre Jean ou maistre Pierre' began to disdain the old customs, looking beyond his immediate environs for answers and authority in this practice of his profession. This unleashed a chain reaction, leading to corruption and adulteration 'jusques à ce qu'il eust tout abastardy'. Montaigne then tells us of another, graver, consequence of this concatenation of events:

> A la suite de cette corruption, ils disent qu'il y en survint incontinent un'autre de pire consequence, par le moyen d'un medecin à qui il print envie d'espouser une de leurs filles et de s'habituer parmy eux. Cettuy-cy commença à leur apprendre premierement le nom des fiebvres, des reumes et des apostumes, la situation du coeur, du foye et des intestins, qui estoit une science jusques lors tres-esloignée de leur connoissance; et, au lieu de l'ail, dequoy ils avoient apris à chasser toutes sortes de maux, pour aspres et extremes qu'ils fussent, il les accoustuma, pour une tous ou pour un morfondement, à prendre les mixtions estrangeres, et commença à faire trafique, non de leur santé seulement, mais aussi de leur mort. Ils jurent que dépuis lors seulement ils ont aperçeu que le serain leur appesantissoit la teste, que le boyre, ayant chaut, apportoit nuissance, et que les vents de l'automne estoyent plus griefs que ceux du printemps; que, dépuis l'usage de cette medecine, ils se trouvent accablez d'une legion de maladies inaccoustumées, et qu'ils apperçoivent un general deschet en leur ancienne vigueur, et leurs vies de moitié racourcies. Voylà le premier de mes contes (779).

In this anecdote, the physician figures the attempt to naturalize or acclimatize what is foreign or alien, either by a process of mixture —such as the mixing of bloods through marriage — or by imparting a science 'jusques lors tres-esloignee de leur connoissance', and habituating people to taking 'mixtions estrangeres' for the slightest ailment rather than the garlic they had traditionally used. As a consequence of this deathly trade the inhabitants' average lifespan is halved. The passage is shaped by a common conceptual thread, expressed through the language of custom ('coustumes particulieres', 'accoustumer', 'maladies inaccoustumees'), habit,

[332] Kenny, *The Palace of Secrets*, p. 128.

consanguinity, corruption, alteration and admixture. 'Unnatural' mixing and 'mixtions estrangeres' beget lethal ramifications.

In the next curious conte Montaigne tells of his trying the medical remedy of goat blood for his 'subjection graveleuse' only to find that within the goat's innards were found 'des pierres cousines des nostres' (779-780). The notions of consanguinity and relatedness — through the would-be therapeutic consumption of another species' blood, a species which turns out to carry stones apparently quasi-genetically related to the human variety, which likewise contaminate the virtues of its blood — also suggest an intriguing analogical anatomy between species. He concludes, 'c'est une esperance bien vaine aux graveleux de tirer leur guerison du sang d'une beste qui s'en aloit elle mesme mourir d'un pareil mal'. His next piece of analysis compares the belief that the goat's blood might remain pure despite the stones to the idea that nothing can be 'engendered' in a body without communication and consensus (or concerted breathing - *con-spiration*) between all its parts: 'Car de dire que le sang ne se sent pas de cette contagion et n'en altere sa vertu accoustumée, il est plustost à croire qu'il ne s'engendre rien en un corps que par la conspiration et communication de toutes les parties' (780). What is especially relevant about these two *curious* (and themselves *consanguins*) anecdotes is that 'unnatural' or artificial *mixtion* or commingling, conceived as alteration or contagion, is staged as a congenital, biological process which ramifies in time and space, blurring our sense of the delimitations of natural and unnatural. The concept of consanguinity explored by Montaigne both as a biological and a discursive notion, is closely related to consubstantiality. In 'Nous ne goustons rien de pur' (II, 20), Montaigne explores the 'joincture naturelle' between 'le travail et le plaisir, tres-dissemblables de nature' (673). He links them together in a sexual and discursive context in a passage quoted earlier:

> [A] Des plaisirs et biens que nous avons, il n'en est aucun exempt de quelque meslange de mal et d'incommodité (...) [B] Nostre extreme volupté a quelque air de gemissement et de plainte. Diriez vous pas qu'elle se meurt d'angoisse? Voire quand nous en forgeons l'image en son excellence, nous la fardons d'epithetes et qualitez maladifves et douloureuses: langueur, mollesse, foiblesse, deffaillance, *Morbidezza*; grand tesmoignage de leur consanguinité et consubstantialité. (673)

Montaigne's use of 'joincture naturelle' is itself interesting, as it suggests an embodied, material relation between two parts which are fitted or sewn together but remain separate entities, forming a whole but one that

is always a kind of 'marqueterie', 'mal jointe' or otherwise.[333] The 'jointure', like the seam or suture, is a place that both connects and separates, an *articulation,* which draws attention to the part even as it fits it to the whole. Elsewhere Montaigne tells us, 'Je n'ayme point de tissure où les liaisons et les coutures paroissent, tout ainsi qu'en un beau corps, il ne faut qu'on y puisse compter les os et les veines' (I, 26, 172), inviting us to wonder where his own *Skeletos* fits. Here, in I, 26, 'tissure' refers back to contexture, recalling the 'tissure' of the spider's web, and suggests that visible stitching compromises not only beauty but integrity, meant in its ethical and ontological senses: a fabric or contexture must be all of a piece ('Je (...) marche tout d'une piece'). In this way the notion of 'joincture' is situated in a lexical and conceptual field which includes some of the other key notions I have been considering so far: contexture, niche and fit. The modifying adjective 'naturelle' (it is a natural, not an artificial, *joincture*) seems, implicitly, to interrogate what, in a conjoining of parts, can count as natural or naturalized, and what remains essentially 'estrangier' and external, an artificial adjunct. In a way that will becomes clearer in the context of prosthesis in the next chapter, the concept of 'joincture naturelle', as a natural suture, puts pressure on the distinction between incorporation and supplementarity and its implications for identity (and therefore consubstantiality). In the above passage, Montaigne suggests that when we forge the language of 'Volupté', we deck it with painful and ailing epithets which testifies to the deep, quasi-biological (and here, sexual) connection between the apparently oppositional states of 'angoisse' and 'volupté'. Montaigne deploys a powerfully anatomical image to express how comfort and happiness wound us, taking us up into their jaw (machoir) chewing us up and spitting us out: '[C] L'aise nous masche'. As if to demonstrate in visual, linguistic terms the notion of commixture, Montaigne throws in an Italian word, 'Morbidezza', denoting wantonness. In both essays the notion of 'consanguinité' becomes a figure of hybridity, blendedness and corruption, like 'vin frelaté' or adulterated wine; when paired with consubstantiality in a move that seems at least partly provocative, the fluidity of commingled blood recalls the 'confusion liquide' (II, 37) of medicinal potions, and contrasts with the solid materiality of 'consubstantialité' denoting co-presence or identity, but which can also be read as a form of confusion or suspension.

[333] In Furetière, 'Jointure' is a 'terme de cordonnier: Couture qui joint les deux cartiers de souliez'. The technical and artisanal image of 'marqueterie' in 'De la vanité, used in relation to the identity of his book ('Mon livre est tousjours un') refers to the practice of inlaying — the insertion of thin slips of one material within the surface of another — a process of embedding and layering that evokes his own compositional layering, of adjustment and integration of others' writings, but also to the temporal layering inherent in a 'registre de durée'.

The last passage I will consider is once more from the 'Apologie', and part of a much broader reflection on the fitting or accommodation of truth to man's forms and structures of knowledge which are shaped and circumscribed by our 'limites corporelles':

> Pythagoras adombra la verité de plus pres, jugeant que la connoissance de cette cause premiere et estre des estres devoit estre indefinie, sans prescription, sans declaration; que ce n'estoit autre chose que l'extreme effort de nostre imagination vers la perfection, chacun en *amplifiant* l'idée selon sa capacité. Mais si Numa entreprint de conformer à ce projet la devotion de son peuple, l'attacher à une religion *purement mentale*, sans objet prefix et sans *meslange materiel*, il entreprit chose de nul usage: l'esprit humain ne se sçauroit maintenir vaguant en cet infini de pensées informes; il les luy faut compiler en certaine image, à son modelle. (513, emphasis added)

According to Montaigne's account of Pythagorean ontology and epistemology, our ideas, and minds, are moulded from material forms — objects and language — whose contours our thoughts must follow along a particular path: ''L'homme ne peut estre que ce qu'il est, ny imaginer que selon sa portée' (520). But the conformity or causality is two-way: ideas stretch or amplify according to the individual mind's capacity. This reciprocal fashioning or fit between mind, world and language is, as it is throughout the 'Apologie', expressed in terms of accommodation — the fitting of God's truth to man's comprehension — whose ultimate form is Incarnation, and serves a skeptical argument in favour of religious faith. In this context Montaigne is probing the provenance of our idea of the transcendent and the Divine. The notion of purity and adulteration by admixture is explicitly epistemological and cognitive: without 'objet prefix' and 'meslange materiel' the human mind is at sea in an infinite number of amorphous ideas; worse, the mind is in a state of disintegration to the point that it can barely be thought of as a unitary mind at all. Without corruption and artificial 'mixtion' — reference to the mind would not even be possible. The verb 'compiler' recalls the gathering and arrangement of various different written or printed materials in composing a volume, which might make us think of the didactic and memorial practice of making commonplace-books.[334] Playing on the doctrine of *Imago dei,* according to which man is fashioned in God's image, Montaigne argues that our chaos of 'pensées informes' only body forth into organized structure through a language embedded in the material realm, just as the chaos of undifferentiated, formless matter took body through the creation of the universe.

The notions traced out by Montaigne about the materialities of thought and the shaping role of language in cognition have clear parallels, if not equivalents, in contemporary theories of extended and embodied mind,

[334] In particular see Ann Moss, *Printed Commonplace-books and the Structure of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

although these have a distinctly less metaphysical cast. The notion of 'material symbols' developed by Andy Clark is one such example. The web or 'contexture' of the 'Apologie' — of matter, signs and language, of human, non-human or creaturely, and architectural — is organized by the underlying idea of a system of material symbolism which governs the conjoined interpretive and hermeneutic projects of natural theology and natural history. Clark investigates the relation between human thought and the material, conventional symbol structures encountered in the spoken and written word, arguing against natural language arguments and translation models of language (the idea that these material, conventional symbol-structures do their work by being translated into some kind of content-matching inner code or 'Mentalese').[335] Instead Clark and others argue that language is a complementary cognitive resource, an amplifier or enabler of human cognition understood as essentially and multiply hybrid involving a complex interplay between internal biological resources and external non-biological resources.[336] On this view, as we have seen, language is a particular system within a broader class of material symbols, to be understood as a form of mind-transforming cognitive scaffolding, a persisting, though never stationary, symbolic edifice'. Again, there is a tension in the notion of scaffolding, which could be interpreted as suggesting (along the lines of the translation approach to meaning) a temporary, non-constitutive tool or affordance, to be dismantled once meaning has been safely 'transmitted', or as a more integral and permanent, if inherently dynamic, cognitive structure.

In the *Essais*, the pharmacological and medical notion of 'mixtion', and the related notion of meslange, serves Montaigne's exploration of various forms of hybridity, biological, linguistic and discursive, which link nature with artifice. In particular, he uses it to explore how notions of purity or homogeneity make little sense in relation to the mind, which is inherently 'impure', alloyed, mixed and extended into its own linguistic and material environment. In the period, mixture is not only a state but also an ongoing process of change, a *discordia concors* in which the elements are constantly interacting, destroying old forms and creating new ones, which reflects the processes of Humanist poetics. One further aspect of 'mixtion' which warrants attention relates to elemental physics: alchemical transformation and the practice of alloying. The concept of the alloy,

[335] One important version of which is proposed by Jerry Fodor in *The Language of Thought* (Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press, 1975).
[336] Andy Clark, 'Material Symbols', *Philosophical Psychology*, 19 (2006), 291-307; Andreas Roepstorff, 'Things to Think With: Words and Objects as Material Symbols', *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,* 363 (2008), 2049-54.

to which Montaigne alludes in II, 20: '[C]Socrates dict que quelque dieu essaya de mettre en masse et confondre la douleur et la volupté, mais que, n'en pouvant sortir, il s'avisa de les accoupler au moins par la queue. [B] Metrodorus disoit qu'en la tristesse il y a quelque alliage de plaisir' (674). [337]

In the period the notion of alloying (in Old French, 'aloier) refers to the comparative purity of silver and gold and, in extended use, to the mixing of metals, especially the 'corruption' of gold by combining it with baser metals to achieve particular properties. There is little that is magical, or genuinely transformative, about the process; the alloy remains a hybrid, the sum of its mixed parts. On the other hand, alchemy — or transformation of baser metals into gold — is more than the reverse of the process of alloying metals: it is a complex and mysterious physical drama.

Montaigne presents the human mind as 'un grand ouvrier de miracles', a strange hybrid or ferment of nature, art and technique, a living laboratory between the created and the creating : 'C'est un grand ouvrier de miracles que l'esprit humain; mais cette relation a je ne sçay encore de plus heteroclite', (II, 12, 573).

Paracelsus had tried to Christianize alchemy in the early sixteenth century by revising the traditional Aristotelian four elements (earth, water, air, and fire) into a trinity (sulfur, salt, and mercury), and in doing so he encouraged a specifically sacramental interpretation of what actually happens when a baser metal is turned into gold. One of the great intellectual problems of the period was how to conceive what earthly matter is made of, a debate that sprang from, and was inseparable from, pre-and post-Reformation Europe's wrangling over the material composition and transformation of the Eucharist. As Katherine Eggert notes, this debate around the physics of the Eucharist, subject to serious question from the moment transubstantiation became Roman Catholic dogma in 1215, became the essential proving ground for the physics of the world.[338] In such a context, the highly charged concepts of trans- and con-substantiation are sites where the very drama of appearance versus reality, substance versus accidents, is performed. Montaigne presents the 'nouveau venu' Paracelsus, whom he mentions twice in the *Essais*, as an agent of mutation: 'Depuis ces anciennes mutations de la medecine, il y en a eu infinies autres jusques à nous, et le plus souvent mutations entieres et universelles,

[337] A detailed exploration of the concepts of alloy and alchemy in relation to early modern discourse and the organization of the mind falls beyond my scope here, but it would be an interesting study.
[338] Katherine Eggert, *Disknowledge: Literature, Alchemy, and the end of Humanism in Renaissance England* (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), particularly Chapter Two, 'How to Forget Transubstantiation' , pp. 55-109.

comme sont celles que produisent de nostre temps Paracelse' (772). Paracelsus held a distinctively Trinitarian understanding of man's situated condition, in relation to his earthly and cosmic environment. *In De genealogia Christi,* dated to around 1530, he argued that three principles, analogous to the three members of the Trinity ('drei species in ein corpus', the essential unity within the Trinity) were required to make up a perfect body in either the microcosm or the macrocosm, understanding 'anatomy' to be the science of the correspondences and sympathies between humans and the outer world. [339]

In the context of the *Essais*, Paracelsus's medical metaphysics — though not directly referenced, and despite Montaigne's apparent disapproval of him as a catalyst for change — seems to hold out a vision of the human mind with telling sympathies with Montaigne's own. Akin to the 'merveilleuse fabrique' of the kingfisher's nest in the 'Apologie', whose *matière* cannot be devined, impenetrable and resistant to interpretation, the human mind is a mystery to itself, a locus of transformation, transmutation, entangled complexity and wonder, accommodated within its ecological, cosmological and linguistic context yet reaching beyond it.

Conclusion: 'l'art d'eschafauder'

This chapter has explored a number of different facets of cognitive extendedness through the ecological lens of contexture, a polysemous notion which, as I have suggested in Part One, can be brought into fruitful relation with relevance. Contexture, in its range of senses — from material emblem of animal ingenuity and schema of the organization of human knowledge and of nature, to *mise en abyme* of Montaigne's own writing project — functions as a keyword in the thinking and writing of the *Essais*, affording another perspective on consubstantiality and the dynamic between part and whole. Contexture figures, in a quasi-visual way, the array of possibilities and constraints which shape the mind and enable the co-construction of meaning, particularly in the case of poetic images and effects. As I have shown, the birds' nest and spiders' web are *topoi* of early modern discourse which Montaigne adapts to reflect on the inherent extendedness of cognition and the problems of interpretation. Drawing on the contemporary notion of cognitive niche construction, which describes the reciprocal moulding of mind and world, I have proposed that the bricolage of nest-building is

[339]See Rudolph Allers, 'Microcosmus: From Anaximandros to Paracelsus', *Traditio*, 2 (1944), 319-407; G.P. Conger, *Theories of Macrocosms and Microcosms in the History of Philosophy* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1922), and Charles Webster, *Paracelsus: Medicine, Magic and Mission at the End of Time* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2008), p.134.

mirrored in the bricolage of Humanist poetics. By reconceptualizing the mind's relation to the world, and between self and other, as a form of organized entanglement, this perspective also recasts the relation between human and animal, nature and artifice. Niche construction denotes a pattern of behaviour and mutual integration between organism and environment whose non-linear effects extend, through the feedback processes of ecological engineering and ecological inheritance, beyond the organism's own lifespan.

Early modern understandings of instinct, ingenuity, and creaturely deliberation and adaptation to the environment are not assimilable to contemporary understandings of phylogenetic change and natural selection. With these reflections in mind I make the more modest claim that contexture provides historical enrichment for the contemporary notion of relevance, particularly in relation to the theory's account of metaphor interpretation. In keeping with pragmatics, this contextual enrichment allows one to interpret the concept of relevance in an early modern perspective. Across these different idioms — from niche construction to religious faith — the notions of mutual adjustment and adaptive fit are pertinent to the related matters of communication, interpretation, and accommodation. I have shown that attention to these affinities opens up routes which ramify throughout the *Essais* and beyond, into the *Journal*, in ways that bear on questions of consubstantiality and the extendedness of cognition, as well as questions of determinism and autonomy, substance and accident. While modern theories of climate and ecological systems often place emphasis on notions of causality and determinism, early modern climate discourses focus on embeddedness and dynamic, reciprocal fashioning between creature and environment.

In Part Two, I focused on a number of ideas and terms relevant to extended mind, reinterpreting them through the text of the *Essais* and Montaigne's attention to how the material structures and forms the mental: entendement, introspection and interiority, scaffolding and hybridity. This develops my exploration, in Chapter One, of Montaigne's understanding of the cognitive role of artefacts, and their 'interiorization' and of writing as an exteriorization of memory conceived as inner writing, which reveals the porous boundaries between what is conceived as interior and exterior. As I show, these cognitive reincarnations — ideas circulating both in early modernity and now — suggest ways of thinking consubstantiality differently. In such a perspective, the art of scaffolding emerges as a powerful metaphor

for the affordances in our (social, linguistic, technological, material) environment that shape our own cognitive contextures or niches.

CHAPTER THREE
Writing Limbs: Journeying, Prosthesis, Memory

En voiage, la necessité mesme des chemins couppe les propos (III, 5, 876)

Toutes choses sont aysées à certains biais, et inaccessibles par autres (*Journal*, 112-113)

For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, (...) why may we not say, that all *Automata* (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the *Heart* but a *Spring*; and the *Nerves*, but so many *Strings*; and the *Joynts*, but so many *Wheeles*, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer?' (Hobbes, *Leviathan*)

Introduction: 'soit à pied, soit à cheval'

The guiding question of this Chapter is: 'What happens to consubstantiality in the context of Montaigne's *other* text — the other member of Montaigne's corpus — the *Journal*?' Any enquiry into the meaning of consubstantiality in Montaigne's thinking and writing would be incomplete without venturing into this territory. There are a number of sub-questions stemming from this: how might the notion of Montaigne being one or consubstantial with his *Essais* be altered by the *Journal,* not only by its very existence, but by its form, its subject matter and, perhaps most pivotally, by its relation to the *Essais*? Are the *Essais* the main stuff of Montaigne's thinking and writing, with the *Journal* as a supplement or added, circumstantial, extra? Or is the writing and thinking instantiated in the *Journal* instrumental in enabling the *Essais* to exist in their 'final' form? If Montaigne supplements, or supplants, his natural memory with one forged from paper, as he tells us in 'De l'experience', where does the *Journal* stand in relation to the *Essais* as participating in this 'artificially' constructed memory which is both static and dynamic? There are, of course, other instances of Montaigne's direct or delegated manuscript writing on various objects: the inscriptions on the beams of his library which is a tangible example of how he constructs a physical mnemonic scaffold, and the books in his library where he inscribed both his *ex libris* and also, in some cases, annotations and marks, occasionally extensive ones.[340] These examples suggest an extension and distribution of mind into its immediate environment which he himself crafts and modifies, in a form of niche construction. Here, however, I wish to focus on the *Journal*, in

[340] See Alain Legros, *Essais sur poutres: peintures et inscriptions chez Montaigne* (Paris: Klincksieck, 2000) and Legros' chapter, 'Ex-libris, devises, ex-dono de Michael Montanus', in his study *Montaigne Manuscrit* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2010), pp. 55-66.

order to reframe the question of the intertextuality and reciprocity between the two texts play out in relation to notions of consubstantiality, supplementation, and memory, as one text recalls the other.[341]

Discovered in an old trunk in Montaigne in 1770 where it had lain forgotten for nearly two centuries, and first published in 1774, the first reception of the *Journal* registered surprise that the writer of this manuscript logging Montaigne's travels (and symptoms) across Reformation country and the author of the monumental *Essais* could be one and the same man.[342]A markedly different kind of text to Montaigne's consubstantial book, the *Journal* is compositionally hybrid, consisting of four sections: the first long section written in French by an anonymous secretary (possibly on Montaigne's dictation but important features of the text suggest the secretary enjoyed an unusual degree of autonomy), the second by Montaigne in French, the third by Montaigne in Italian and the fourth and shortest section, again in French by Montaigne on the way home.[343]
Montaigne's *Journal* has a family precedent: his own father's 'papier journal', recording his experiences in the Italian Wars (1494-1559). In 'De l'Yvrognerie', Montaigne describes his father, Pierre Eyquem, as a very upright man (in all senses), who took took 'Singulier soing de l'honnesteté et decence de sa personne et de ses habits, soit à pied, soit à cheval' (II, 2, 343).

He continues:

> [Mon père] avoit eu fort longue part aux guerres delà les monts, desquelles il nous a laissé, de sa main, un papier journal suyvant poinct par poinct ce qui s'y passa, et pour le public et pour son privé. (344)

On horseback or on foot, for the public or his own private circle, Montaigne's father performs 'honnesteté' consistently inwardly and outwardly, in dress, speech, action and thought. And the record of his experience in the 'gueres delà les monts' figures in that performance, standing in for biological memory, enabling his experience and his honour to be re-lived, albeit vicariously.

The written trace of Montaigne's journey — on horseback and as part of a 'troupe', numbering no fewer than twelve — to Rome through Switzerland, Germany, Austria and northern Italy between June 1580 and

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[341] As already noted, all references are to the François Rigolot edition of the *Journal de voyage* (Paris: PUF, 1992).
[342] According to Alain Legros the 'Exemplaire de Bordeaux' may have been discovered at the same time. See 'Visite à Montaigne au XIXe siècle', *Montaigne Studies,* 12 (2000), 185 -208.
[343] In those sections written by the secretary, Montaigne's observations are conveyed in direct or indirect reported speech but the voices of Montaigne and the secretary merge and mingle, the second person plural pronoun 'nous' becoming an umbrella term for their conjoined perspectives. On the ambiguous position of the secretary as a social role in the period and how Montaigne's relationship to his secretaries influenced his adoption of a style more compatible with speech see George Hoffman, *Montaigne's Career* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), pp. 39-62.

November 1581 has been called, among other epithets, the 'arrière-boutique' des *Essais*, and the 'anti-guidebook Guidebook.' [344] The third book of the *Essais*, in particular, and later emendations, bear important traces of Montaigne's journey. The text charts the observations and reflections, which often attend to salient details of topography, the material environment, churches of different denominations and their associated rituals, artefacts and trappings, architecture, craftsmanship and the feats of engineering and the mechanical arts, at which Montaigne marvels along his way. He reflects on the role of other intermediaries, aside from valets and secretaries — guides and 'truchement' (interpreters and *porte-paroles*)— which, as yet another addition to the traveller's apparatus, is as much of a hindrance as an enabler of communication. Being displaced from his usual linguistic habitat is an important dimension of his experience of 'dépaysement' and of finding himself, suddenly, *foreign.* It registers as a form of handicap, leaving him uncomfortably dependent on others: the entry for Bolzano (written by the secretary who integrates part of Montaigne's letter to the French protestant lawyer and polemical writer François Hotman) records Montaigne's feelings:

> De ce lieu M. De Montaigne escrivit à François Hottoman, qu'il avoit veu à Basle, « Qu'il avoit pris si grand pleisir à la visitation d'Allemaigne, qu'il l'abandonnoit à grand regret, quoyque ce fût en Italie qu'il aloit ; que les Estrangiers avoint à y souffrir come ailleurs de l'exaction des hostes, mais qu'il pensoit que cela se pourroit corriger, qui ne seroit pas à la mercy des guides & truchemens qui les vandent & participent à ce profit (...) » (57-58)

The above lines are, in their composition, symptomatic of the very problem of agency, and even of identity, they raise: the secretary's use of speech marks suggests verbatim reproduction of the content of Montaigne's letter, but shift to the third person, mixing citation with reported or indirect speech. The secretary is himself a kind of *trucheman*, speaking in Montaigne's place. The effect is off-key; authorial identity becomes decentred, hybrid, even indeterminate. The notion of 'truchement' is, unsurprisingly, recurrent in the *Journal,* where the more general problem of interpretation becomes a *literal* problem of not speaking the same tongue. As Montaigne writes in 'Du démentir', words are 'le seul util par le moien duquel se communiquent nos volontez et nos pensées, c'est le truchement de nostre ame' (667). As noted in my two preceding chapters (in Chapter One, in relation to models, and in chapter Two, in relation to accommodation and communication across species and the *scala naturae*), the concept of 'truchement' is crucial to interpretation: a 'trucheman' is an intermediary, 'celuy qui explique à deux personnes qui parlent des langues differentes, ce qu'ils se disent l'un à

[344] See Pierre Michel, 'Le *Journal de voyage*, arrière-boutique des *Essais*', *Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne*, 13 (1960), 14-21, and François Rigolot, 'Montaigne's *Travel Journal*', *The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne* [accessed online].

l'autre' or, more figuratively, 'personne qui parle en la place d'un autre, qui explique les intentions d'un autre'.[345] The interest this presents, from a cognitive point of view, concerns the role or participation of third parties (the notion of 'tierce and estrangier', again) in the mind. We are told, in 'Des cannibales' about a particular interpreter's inadequacies which impede Montaigne's pleasure in communication with a native: 'Je parlay à l'un d'eux fort long temps; mais j'avois un truchement qui me suyvoit si mal, et qui estoit si empesché à recevoir mes imaginations par sa bestise, que je n'en peus tirer guiere de plaisir' (214).

The interpreter's inability (which comes across as a kind of limping) to keep up and follow Montaigne's thinking makes it out of the question that he can, as a proper simultaneous interpreter is meant to do, speak in his stead. In fact, the *truchemen* is an impediment, a dead weight, fundamentally disconnected from (and even compromising) Montaigne's cognition. This contrasts with the idea, variously expressed in the *Essais*, that others can participate in his own cognition. In particular, 'third parties' can sometimes take an active role in his own memory: ' Ma librairie [...] est assise à un coin de ma maison: s'il me tombe en fantasie chose que j'y veuille aller chercher ou escrire, de peur qu'elle ne m'eschappe en traversant seulement ma court, il faut que je la donne en garde à quelqu'autre' (II,17,650). He figuratively 'hands' a thought to somebody else, presumably a secretary or valet, for minding or safekeeping until he can write it down, thereby transferring it to his own artificial memory. In this way, Montaigne clearly considers other minds, as well as objects like notebooks, to participate in his own cognitive ecology. In briefly considering this passage from the *Journal* I have focused on the notion of 'truchement' rather than that of the 'guide' but the questions of agency, intention and interpretation relevant to one are also relevant to the other. The guide leads and conducts the other, because he occupies a position of superior familiarity with the place, linking us back via contexture, to the notion of relevance guiding interpretation, and *ductus* as a property of a composition, leading the reader or viewer through itself. My point, here, is that the very circumstances of Montaigne's *Journal* bring us up against some of the questions around communication and extended cognition, such as the mediating function of artefacts (whether 'inner' or 'outer'), I have been considering in relation to the *Essais* in quite a tangible way. I further develop some of these aspects in this Chapter.

[345] *Dictionnaire de l'Académie françoise,* vol. 2, p. 603.

Montaigne's gamely experimental use of Italian in the third section ('Assaggiamo di parlar un poco questa altra lingua', 167), another kind of tongue-taking to that described in the entry for Isny ('M. de Montaigne, comme estoit sa coutume, alla soudain trouver un docteur theologien de cette ville, pour *prendre langue*', 33) contrasts with his words in 'Qu'il ne faut juger de nostre Heur, qu'apres la mort'. Here, he writes: 'à ce dernier rolle de la mort et de nous (...), il faut parler François' (I, 19, 80). [346] These linguistic and perspectival aspects of the *Journal* all contribute to its hybridity and otherness, in relation to the *Essais*, even as strong threads of intertextuality between the texts can be read in the commingled discourses of travel, heredity and lineage, social standing, illness, and therapeutics, writing and poetics, memory, enablement and disablement, deformity and conformity, which criss-cross productively between both texts. Sometimes this is causal — as when, for example, Montaigne's trip is partially motivated by his quest for relief from his hereditary 'colique' or kidney stones, passed on by his father Pierre. [347] The historical context, a crucible of politics, theology, and civil war as well as the technologies catalyzing various forms of cultural, cognitive and bodily change, looms large, intersecting with Montaigne's personal (sometimes, very personal) interests and preoccupations.

Montaigne's travelling crew is a medley of men and steeds (plus one mule), the former from widely different social hierarchies, including valets, secretaries, horsemen, and other domestics, as well as Montaigne's younger brother, Bernard de Mattecoulon, his widowed brother-in-law, Bertrand de Cazalis, and two family friends of high social rank, Charles d'Estissac and François du Hautoy. While this beginning holds out a brief promise of something of Chaucerian flavour, the reader soon realizes a completely different kind of text is afoot. The language of the opening lines immediately places us in a historical context associating social and military rank with being mounted on horseback. The composition of the group itself creates ambiguity about its level of coordination or dispersal: 'Troupe' (from the late Latin for flock (*troppus*) and 'equipage' both place the travellers under the sign of the military unit (reflected in the modern word 'troops'); in the period 'equipage' is

[346] In this essay, speaking French — the vernacular, 'native', 'domestic', 'indigenous' or natural language acquired as a mother tongue, as opposed to the formal classical languages, in a sense 'borrowed' (in the sense of 'second') or artificial— is equated with an individual's authentic or essential voice, the one to use when truth not only matters but is inevitable; slightly ironic given that Montaigne's mother tongue was Latin. In I, 19, then, speaking French is not set in contrast to speaking *other* vernaculars, while in the *Journal* the issue is that other mother tongues pose a barrier to communication, in a way that the more universal nature of classical languages does not. On the rise of the vernacular in tandem with print, and the staging of the vernacular in print as 'the idiom in which one hears oneself speak', see Chenoweth, *The Prosthetic Tongue*, pp. 12-21.

[347] See Margaret Healy, 'Journeying with 'the stone': Montaigne's healing Travel Journal', *Literature and Medicine,* 24, 231-249; Jean-Claude Caron, 'Lecture du Journal de Voyage: L'errance thérapeutique de l'essayiste', in *Montaigne et les Essais, 1580–1980*, ed. by F. Moureau, R. Granderoute, and C. Blum (Paris: Champion-Slatkine, 1983), pp. 271–278.

the fitting out of a soldier with accoutrements, and the word itself stems from 'equipace' — regular marching order, keeping equal step. Yet at the same time, 'troupe' carries the performative flavour of 'company of players', each with their individual identity and role. Indeed the secretary notes that Montaigne's approach to travel is not at all in sync with his fellow travellers:

> Quand on se pleingnoit à luy de ce que il conduisoit souvent la troupe par chemins divers & contrées, revenant souvent bien près d'où il étoit party (ce qu'il faisoit, ou recevant l'advertissemant de quelque chose digne de voir, ou chanjant d'avis selon les occasions,) il respondoit, qu'il n'aloit, quant à luy, en nul lieu que là où il se trouvoit, & qu'il ne pouvoit faillir ny tordre sa voïe, n'aïant nul project que de se promener par des lieus inconnus ; &, pourveu qu'on ne le vit pas retumber sur mesme voïe, & revoir deus fois mesme lieu, qu'il ne faisoit nulle faute à son dessein. (61)

The secretary continues:

> Il disoit aussi qu'il lui sambloit estre à-mesmes ceus qui lisent quelque fort plesant conte, d'où il leur prent creinte qu'il vieigne bientot à finir, ou un beau livre; lui de mesme prenoit si grand plesir à voïager, qu'il haïssoit le voisinage du lieu où il se deût reposer, & proposoit plusieurs desseins de voïager à son eise, s'il pouvoit se randre seul. (61-62)

The travelling 'corps', like a military corps, is a form of distributed cognition, instantiated or enacted in its various members and their equipment — including horses. There are curious parallels, here, with Edwin Hutchins' influential study of cognition as a distributed and collective (or concerted) process using naval ship navigation as a case study. On his view, members of the crew operate as a system, as one situated and extended cognitive ecology functioning across coordinated contexts. Yet here, instead of concerted action between members of the group, there is no collective intention: Montaigne is the central 'brain' of the operation leading the (rather reluctant) others according to his own 'projet' and 'dessein'. Even this ramifies into plural 'desseins', putting pressure on the notion of unified purpose. In the *Journal*, as in the *Essais*, solitude and independence have a particular cognitive reach and depth, in which the mind is able to keep its own company and counsel, armed both to assail and to defend: 'Nous avons une ame contournable en soy mesme; elle se peut faire compagnie; elle a dequoy assaillir et dequoy defendre, dequoy recevoir et dequoy donner' (I, 39, 241). Yet solitude also registers counterfactually; as being '*as if* without' valets ('comme sans [...] train et sans valetz', I,39), rather than valets being actually absent (the idea of being 'seul en la foule' or the 'presse'). Though Montaigne leads the group, mostly if not always, and is thus in some sense its 'brain' or nerve centre, the presence of the others seems an encumbrance, bridling his creativity and spontaneity as a traveller, his tendency towards improvization. The *Journal,* almost accidentally or circumstantially, engages questions of co-

action, agency and extended cognition, in ways that complement his different attentions to such matters in the *Essais*. As one study on 'the puzzle of co-action' asks, 'When people do things together, who is the author?' [348]

By the early 1580s travel to Italy had become fashionable, facilitated by the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) between Henri II of France and Philip II of Spain which inaugurated the *Pax hispanica.* In the sixteenth century, every French humanist worthy of the name would document a pilgrimage to Rome.[349] If these studies touch on the cognitive dimension — the voyage as epistemic journey, a process of getting to know — they only do so obliquely. [350] Yet in 'De l'institution des enfans' Montaigne employs a famously haptic image of friction, or exfoliation, to convey his understanding of learning from contact with other people, places and cultures: 'la visite des pays estrangers' enables one to 'frotter et limer nostre cervelle contre celle d'autruy' (1, 26, 153), which expressly links curiosity and cognition to materialities of texture.

Travel literature of the period, such as Paul Hentzer's *Itinerarium* (1592), Sebastian Münster's *Cosmographie universelle,* published in French in Basel in 1552 (in German in 1544 and 1550 in Latin) and Theodor Zwinger's *Methodus* (1577)— follow a rigorous method of exposition, the *methodus apodemica,* which reflects their mnemonic intent to chart cultural and geographical loci. The idea of methodizing travel to generate knowledge can be traced to discussions between Ramus and Theodor Zwinger, in Basel, and the mnemonic roots of the method, with its complex, orderly tree diagrams are distinctively Ramist. In his Preface, Zwinger expresses his intention to describe not necessarily those things he has observed firsthand but those memory-worthy things he *should have* observed when traveling through particular places.[351] The development of the *artes apodemicae*—travel advice literature—as an early modern genre illustrates that many individuals travelled

[348] Daniel M. Wegner and Betsy Sparrow, 'The Puzzle of Co-action', in *Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context,* ed. by Don Ross et al. (Camb. Mass. MIT Press, 2007), pp. 17-37.
[349] For varied accounts of the journey to Rome in the Renaissance see Eric MacPhail, *The Voyage to Rome in French Renaissance Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); George H.Tucker, *The Poet's Odyssey: Joachim Du Bellay and the 'Antiquitez de Rome'* (Oxford: OUP, 1990); Wes Williams, '"Rubbing up against others": Montaigne on Pilgrimage', in *Voyages and Visions: Towards a Cultural History of Travel* (London: Reaktion, 1999), ed. by Ján Elsner and Joan-Pau Rubiés pp. 101-123 (114-115); Richard Keatley, *Textual Spaces: French Renaissance Writings on the Italian Voyage* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2019).
[350] *Travel Narratives, The New Science, and Literary Discourse, 1569-1750,* ed. by Judy A. Hayden (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). This collection of essays takes as its focus the cross-fertilization between early modern travel narratives and the discoveries of new knowledge through scientific method, particularly the anxieties it generated.
[351] *Methodus Apodemica* (Basel: Eusebius Episcopius 1577), cited by Luigi Monga in 'Itinéraires de Français en Italie à l'époque de Montaigne," *Montaigne e l'Italia: atti del congresso internazionale di studi di Milano-Lecco* (Geneva: Slatkine, 1991), pp. 437-452 (p.448).

in order to investigate how experience of other lands and cultures could be optimized as a means of generating new, as well as mapping existing, knowledge. [352]

The link between travel writing and memory opens up questions about *who* is doing the remembering, and what *kind* of memory is instantiated in these texts. The recurrence of this phrase — worthy of memory or 'digne de mémoire' — already encountered in Chapter One in the context of material forms of homage like statues, positions these texts within an early modern historiographical tradition, where personal experience intersects with public history and collective narrative, and individual agency is mediated by conventional and implicit value judgements about what is worth seeing to begin with and, by extension, remembering afterwards. We are told by the anonymous secretary that Montaigne's route is often dictated, quite spontaneously, by his being told about something 'digne de voir'. The mnemonic and memorial function of more typical published guidebooks is a vicarious, or proxy form of remembering: the reader has not, presumably, been to all (or any) of the places he encounters virtually through this type of text, which is designed as a kind of substitute or surrogate itinerary. In the case of the *Journal*, written (it is generally assumed) with only Montaigne himself as envisaged future audience — though his intentions in this respect cannot definitively be clear — and therefore future rememberer, these culturally mediated and intersubjective notions of memorability and noteworthiness are personally inflected. Montaigne's own unsystematic 'method' is to allow his attention to be caught by what is most 'singulier', most salient to him, and not only those things which are universally recognized as being of 'objective' memorability. Famously he 'forgets' or omits (whether intentionally or not) to mention many famous monuments altogether, including the spellbinding Duomo in Milan. Yet the secretary notes that Montaigne has (as of 10 October 1580 when the *Journal* entry in question is written) three regrets 'en son voiage':

> L'une, qu'il n'eût mené un cuisinier pour l'instruire de leurs façons & en pouvoir un jour faire voir la preuve chez lui ; l'autre qu'il n'avoit mené un valet Allemand, ou n'avoit cherché la compagnie de quelque Gentilhomme du païs (car de vivre à la mercy d'un bélitre de guide, il y sentoit une grande incommodité) ; la tierce, qu'avant faire le voyage, il n'avoit veu les livres qui le pouvoint avertir des choses rares & remarcables de chaque lieu, ou n'avoit un *Munster*, ou quelque autre dans ses coffres. (32)

[352] On Renaissance travel writing and sixteenth century travel manuals see, for example, *Artes Apodemicae and Early Modern Travel Culture, 1550-1700* ed. by Karl A. E. Enenkel and Jan L. Jong (Leiden: Brill, 2019), and Joan-Pau Rubiés, 'Instructions for Travellers: Teaching the Eye to See', *History and Anthropology,* 9 (1996), 139-190.

Montaigne had a copy of Munster's *Cosmographie* in his own library at home and wishes he had taken it with him to consult en route. Instead of travel guides, he takes two freshly printed copies of his own *Essais,* one for the king Henri III, the other would be given several months later to Pope Gregory XIII. So while Montaigne wishes to see for himself, he is also drawn to the idea of being guided by 'un Munster or quelque autre'— even while at other junctures of the *Journal* he decries being 'à la mercy des guides et truchements' as we have seen. At particular points Montaigne even gestures towards other published accounts of what he has seen, as a reason for not including them in his own notes. After his visit to the Villa d'Este at Tivoli he notes: 'J'y consideray toutes choses fort particulierement; j'essayerois de le peindre icy, mais il y a des livres et peintures publicques de ce suject'. He indefinitely shelves depicting such sights in his own *Journal* because other public books and paintings are available, which can either jog his own natural memory or stand in for it. The notion of 'la memoire des livres' invoked in the *Essais* (I, 26 and II, 16) — as a form of 'artificial' afterlife, only activated in the process of reading — thus becomes, in the context of the *Journal*, something that engages the confrontation of private and public, or first hand and vicarious, experience.

In the *Journal* Montaigne sets up explicit analogies between travelling and reading. Montaigne's likening of the experience of travel to that of reading, a 'fort plesant conte' or a 'beau livre' which the reader is loath to finish, identifies both activities as an itinerary whose destination or end he would like to defer. The differences between the formal and social properties of the 'conte' and the 'livre' here seem to be conflated, the emphasis being on the experiential and hermeneutic exercise of reading rather than writing or otherwise telling.

If the *Essais* are, as Montaigne states in the lines from 'Du démentir' which are a constant touchstone in this enquiry, 'd'une occupation propre, membre de ma vie', is the *Journal* to be read as being 'd'une occupation et fin tierce et estrangere comme tous autres livres'? This question matters because it puts added pressure on the tension Montaigne sets up between 'propre' and 'autre', being a 'membre' of a life conceived as a whole, and a state of being 'tierce et estrangere', part of and apart from.Montaigne's investment in consubstantiality as metaphor invoking embodiment ('membre', 'limb') and the more metaphysical notion of wholeness ('ma vie' relates to his whole being, and entire lifespan - even beyond the strictly biological) itself becomes something

amenable to deconstruction, with the discursive and critical baggage that carries for a twenty-first century reader.

One means of changing our perspective on consubstantiality, and of testing out how it works in relation to the *Journal*, is to make heuristic use of a related but differently-weighed concept, prosthesis, a device which itself engages and interrogates some of the notions — of belonging and estrangement, accommodation and removal, partialness and wholeness, vicariousness supplementarity and integrality — sketched out so far. Freighted with military, technological and medico-surgical associations, it also puts instructive strain on the difficult concept of embodiment itself. Prosthesis considered as supplement, addition, accretion or emendation engages questions of accident and essence, contingent and necessary, shifting the focus on whole/part relations to the relation between artificial part and natural (albeit 'incomplete') whole. Prosthesis is a fluid conceptual category encompassing any technological or artificial interface between the body and the world, from artificial limbs or body parts to crutches, canes, and sticks used by the blind, weapons and armour, accessories, and a range of other extensions, supplements or replacements of the body and its parts, including writing, print and the material and technological supports and enablers of these activities.[353] The linguistic nature of its etymological origin makes its extended use as a discursive category— describing what have been called 'the dependencies of discourse,' and the supplemental relation of written to spoken word— a 'natural' (or in some sense literal) rather than strained or figurative use of the term.[354]

Because prosthesis displaces our sense of the centre which consubstantiality seems to take for granted, it offers itself as a useful route into thinking about the place of the *Journal* — itself a decentred, disjointed and plural text, written by different hands and in two languages, in a multiplicity of *loci*— in Montaigne's cognitive ecology. As a variant of the consubstantial which is both medically inflected and materially embodied (in whatever problematic sense), prosthesis has a particular kind of richness in the historical and cultural environment in which Montaigne is writing and is able to bridge the literal and figurative and mediate between discourses of dismemberment and remembrance in ways which are attuned to Montaigne's own modes of thinking. While,

353 On these period questions brought into productive dialogue with the thought of Derrida, see Chenoweth, *The Prosthetic Tongue,* pp. 48-86.

[354] Mitchell, David and Sharon Snyder, *Narrative Prosthesis: Disabilities and the Dependencies of Discourse* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

prima facie, prosthesis does not carry the Eucharistic associations of consubstantiality, it negotiates the relation between the member and the body and between the material and the mental or spiritual in a different way, putting pressure on the boundary between natural and artificial, biological and mechanistic, and on how early moderns understood such boundaries, in ways that develop the discussion of the previous two chapters.

The Eucharist and the controversies surrounding it are ubiquitous in the *Journal* as Montaigne traverses Reformation terrain along his serpentine route to Rome. I have already considered two key passages, in Basel and Isny, in the thesis Introduction, with attention to the content of different confessional beliefs regarding Christ's real presence in the Eucharist. Here, I would like briefly to consider the prosthetic dimension engaged, in the Basel passage which relates a multi-denominational dinner party, by the potential bifurcation between inner belief and its expression. For ease of reference I partially re-cite the passage here:

> M. de Montaigne jugea qu'ils estoient mal d'accord de leur religion par les responses diverses qu'il en receut: les uns se disans Zvingliens, les autres Calvinistes, et les autres Martinistes; et si fut averty que plusieurs couvoit encore la religion romene dans leur coeur. Le forme de donner le sacrement, c'est en la bouche communément; toutefois tend la main qui veut, et n'osent les ministres remuer ceste corde de ces différences de religions. (15-16)

Two prosthetic aspects of religion, and two senses of communion, are latent: prosthesis as participation in a body reflects mystical participation in God and literal taking-part in the Eucharistic rite; on the other hand, prosthesis as artificial, unintegrated add-on is a way of thinking about inauthenticity or disjuncture — lack of communion — between thought and deed. The supper table becomes a crossroads where confessional and doctrinal positions are not stable or necessarily convincing. The passage plays on the derivation of 'religion' as *religare* ('to bind fast') — understood as the binding together of different cords (or chords) into a whole, or of a state of life bound by vows: they are 'mal d'accord', but daren't shake apart 'ceste corde' into which are bound these differences of faith.[355] Notions of belonging and participation Montaigne's use of the word 'religion' is ambivalent: he distinguishes 'la religion' — used to refer to structures of belief generally, pre-Christian, Christian, pagan, Protestant and Catholic — from 'nostre religion', which is the 'Eglise Catholique Apostolique & Romaine, en laquelle je meurs, & en laquelle je suis nay'.[356] Another understanding of 'religion' denotes the

[355] Other derivations of religion include the Ciceronian interpretation of its provenance from *relegere* (go through again', (in reading or in thought) so that the supposed original sense would have been 'painstaking or careful observance of rites'. Among the later ancients (Servius, Lactantius, Augustine) it was interpreted through *religiare*, to 'place an obligation on', or 'bond between humans and gods'. Common to both is the notion of being bound to a particular way of life, both inward and outward, partly through observance of mental and physical rituals.
[356] In a post-1588 addition to I, 56, 'Des Prieres' (318).

conscience, and our capacity for a sense of wonder, reverence and sacrality outside of the precincts of organized religion. Distancing himself from scholastic theology ('Ce seroit mieux la charge d'un homme versé en la Theologie, que de moy qui n'y sçay rien'[357]) and particular positions on theological points — perhaps as a precautionary move — Montaigne is mindful of the theological attitudes of those he encounters on his travels, whether they be fellow Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, or Zwinglians.

Though primarily this Chapter is about using prosthesis in a quasi-material sense as a critical lens for reading aspects of the *Journal* and *Essais* which engage ideas about technologies of cognition and memory, the conditions and cultures in which early modern medical prostheses were developed remain a relevant hinge to the discussion. In the first section, I explore particular moments in the *Journal* which foreground material supports and technologies of cognition and memory, in two places: Basel and Rome (during Montaigne's first stay there). In a second, I return to the *Essais* to consider how, across a cluster of essays, 'Des Destries, 'Des armes des Parthes' and 'Des Livres', Montaigne uses the trappings of war — arms, armour and horses, all forms of military prosthesis— to muse metaphorically on the activities of thinking and writing, not just as a way of recording the mind, but extending it.

Part One: Situating Prosthesis and Prosthetic Memory

'Prosthesis,' which today denotes 'the replacement of defective or absent parts of the body by artificial substitutes,' is not an early modern term, at least not in its medical connotation. First recorded in English in 1553, 'prosthesis' starts out as a grammatical term, denoting 'the addition of a letter or syllable, usually at the beginning of a word', which effects a modification of sense. In dictionaries of the early modern period, 'Prothese' only appears as parts of other entries until Corneille's 1694 *Dictionnaire* where it appears as an entry in its own right.[358] In Corneille it is taken to refer, in the Greek Orthodox tradition, to a 'little altar' or credence table (alternatively sometimes a niche) where the bread and wine are prepared before being moved to the Communion table.[359] As that dictionary entry suggests, the polysemy of the etymological sense of 'placing before' — where before can be temporally prior or spatially in front of — is preserved in the term's liturgical

[357] *Essais*, II, 12, 440

[358] Notably in Nicot's *Thresor de la langue francoyse* (Paris: David Douceur, 1606) to refer to the insertion of vowels ('par prothese de la voyele') at the beginning of a word e.g. as part of the entry for 'Aulne', p. 59.

[359] 'En cet endroit, il veut dire Preparation, à cause que ce petit Autel sert à preparer le pain et le vin qui doivent estre consacrez sur le grand Autel', Corneille, *Dictionnaire des Arts et des Sciences* (Paris: J.-B. Coignard, 1694).

use: the symbols of bread and wine are placed on the prosthesis before placement on the altar, and this outward action mirrors the Communicant's inner preparation (the setting before himself of his intentions) for receiving communion: prosthesis as object, the table, is both taken metonymically for the whole office of prosthesis, and the material correlative of inward activity. The term only began to be widely used in medical and surgical contexts in the early eighteenth century.[360] This brief tracking of the term's meaning, from purely grammatical figure to preparatory part of Communion and then its medical acception of artificial limbs, points to the concept's role as a hinge between different senses of the linguistic and the embodied. David Wills has argued that the Reformation is a 'case in point in the structural history of prosthetisation': prosthesis' first edges its way into the English language in a period when knowledge in general and the disciplines of rhetoric and medicine in particular are being 'not just rearranged but prostheticised – broken apart and artificially reconstructed.'[361] He argues that Reformers explicitly used the lexicon of cutting and substitution, of surgery and prosthetics to discuss the grammatical revolutions forced by Protestantism.

Over the past few decades, the 'prosthesis trope' has flourished, becoming a mainstream mode of interrogating the seams and sutures along which human-technology relations run, as well as a means of figuring hybridity. [362] Technology as prosthesis has been used to describe the joining of materials, naturalizations, excorporations and semiotic transfer that reach beyond the medical definition.[363] Approaches straddle explorations of the rhetorical role of prosthesis in constructing and driving narrative, and text-as-prosthesis as artificial (after)life, to reflections on how the phenomenon of phantom limb— the continued feel of a limb now-absent — affects embodiment and identity. Others have examined prosthesis and related concepts, such as disability and disfigurement, in medieval and early modern discourse. [364]

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[360] According to the OED, its first recorded use in this way is in *Philips's New World of Words, or universal dictionary,* edited by John Kersey and published in 1706.
[361] David Wills, *Prosthesis* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 219.
[362] For example, Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (New York; Oxford: OUP, 2005), p.160.
[363] Studies include Cassandra Crawford, *Phantom Limb : Amputation, Embodiment, and Prosthetic Technology* (New York: New York University Press, 2014), Bernard Stiegler, 'Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith', in *Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader,* ed. by Tom Cohen (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), pp. 238 – 270; Sarah S. Jain, 'The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling and Disabling the Prosthesis Trope', *Science, Technology & Human Values* 24 (1999), 31-54.
[364] See *Prosthesis in Medieval and Early Modern Culture,* ed. by Chloe Porter and others (London: Routledge, 2018). Relatedly, the three-part series of talks at the Warburg Institute, 'Premodern Disability Histories' co-organized by Jess Bailey and Felix Jäger (February- May 2021) and, in a continuation of this, the 'Technologies of Disability: Material Histories of the Premodern Body in Europe' workshop (Wellcome Collection/ Warburg Institute, December 2021). Prior to this, a conference 'The Body Beyond Itself: Prosthesis in Early Modern Science and Art' took place at the Zentralinstitut für Kunstgeschichte, Munich, in June 2019.

In contemporary discourse and identity politics, the term 'crip', alongside 'queer,' has been reclaimed and used as a deconstructive perspective from which to understand contemporary and historical representations of difference and the communities formed by those who identify, and are identified, as differently abled or whose experience of embodiment is otherwise 'non-normative'.[365] Within disability studies, the treatment of disability as a metaphor or discursive crutch, or worse a pretext, for expressing something else, has been critiqued insofar as such approaches appear to instrumentalize the phenomenology of a lived condition for purely rhetorical or philosophical ends. Such debates illustrate the difficulties and sensitivities that arise at the intersection of embodied experience and discourse. They also show how the difference between literal and metaphorical interpretations and uses of particular notions (such as 'crip' and prosthesis, in this context) can carry political and ethical charge. I wish to suggest that some of these difficulties linked to instrumentalization, use of pro-thèse *as* pré-texte, are recognizably of the same variety as those Montaigne explores through consubstantiality in the *Essais*.

If early moderns lacked a/the medical sense of prosthesis, they were familiar with its meaning: the late fifteenth and sixteenth century saw major advances in the development of prosthetic technologies, in tandem with the development of military technology in the period. The incorporation of gunpowder into early modern warcraft — often hailed as a 'gunpowder revolution' — was, like the printing press, a major agent of change.[366] Gunpowder weapons in Europe date from the fourteenth century, but it was largely in the sixteenth century that these became central to the conduct of war. [367] The wounds caused by firearms were much more likely to lead to dismemberment and the need for amputation. Ambroise Paré started out as a barber in his native town of Maine before gaining experience as a barber-surgeon tending to the wounded on the battlefields in Italy (from 1536) where he learned and perfected his craft before making his entrance into the world of medical letters in 1545 with the lengthily-titled *La méthode de traicter les playes faictes par harquebutes et aultres bastons de feu, et de celles qui sont faictes par flèches, dardz et semblables*. This was later incorporated into his

[365] See Tobin Siebers on 'complex embodiment', *Disability Theory* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2011). See also Robert McRuer, *Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability* (New York: New York University Press, 2006).
[366] Francis Bacon, writing in 1620, ranked gunpowder with the magnetic compass and the printing press in having 'changed the appearance and state of the whole world (*Novum Organum*, aphorism 129).
[367] Bert S. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1997).

Oeuvres, first published in 1575. Book 23 of his *Oeuvres* is devoted to '[L]es moyens & artifices d'adjouter ce qui defaut naturellement ou par accident', using the formulations 'moyen d'avoir', 'moyen d'accommoder (des dents) artificielles', and 'moyen de contrefaire (un nez, une main, un oeil and so on...) par artifice.' Prosthesis is figured jointly as forging and accommodation: fashioning artificial parts that are wanting or missing and fitting or attaching them to restore a body to wholeness, or that imitates wholeness. As noted in the preceding Chapter, accommodation as a political, theological and ecological notion denotes mutual adjustment to enable communicative fit and/or co-existence: it involves adaptation for greater suitability or commensurability, often construed as being to the benefit of all. In relation to prosthesis, accommodation understood either as the 'fitting' of artificial body parts, or as the fastening or securing of parts, has a bearing on the relation between the part and the body to which it is (con)joined.

What is missing 'naturally'— at birth, or congenitally — is put on an equal footing as what is missing 'par accident', or misadventure, often in the course of armed (and possibly mounted) combat. In the Chapter preface he states these artificial limbs 'Representent les mouvements volontaires, de tant pres qu'il est possible à l'art d'ensuivre nature.'[368] Thus, the art and science of prosthesis is that of representing, or imitating, natural movement as closely as possible. Paré's language is understandably optimistic: he is in the business of remedy and restoration, enabling forward movement, not further problematization. Yet the twin notions of 'counterfeiting' and accommodation on which early modern prosthesis is predicated are themselves, undeniably, stumbling blocks. If prosthetic hands and limbs are thought of as material emblems of the drive to conjoin nature and artifice, and make them cooperate, they are also examples of how machinery might resist that accommodation into the human body. [369]

Counterfeits — related to the concept of 'counterfactual', or what *might* happen under different conditions— can be artificial (artefacts devised by human skill, such as Paré's prosthetic limbs) or can be nature-created; both suggest the potential to seem *other* than one is, indirectly engaging the distinction between accident and

[368] Paré, *Les Oeuvres* (Paris: Gabriel Lebuon, 1579), p. 838.
[369] On this notion of machinery's resistance to accommodation to the body and habits of thought, see Jessica Wolfe, *Humanism, Machinery and Renaissance Literature* (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp.1-28. In 'Des boyteux', resistance features as a galvanizer or mobilizer of narrative: 'Car quiconque croit quelque chose, estime que c'est ouvrage de charité de la persuader à un autre; et pour ce faire, ne craint poinct d'adjouster de son invention, autant qu'il voit estre necessaire en son compte, pour suppleer à la resistance et au deffaut qu'il pense estre en la conception d'autruy' (1028).

essence.[370] In the period, 'contrefaire' carries the sense, still current, of 'fabricated in imitation of the genuine article with intent to deceive', encompassing the ideas of 'disguise' and the still-current sense of the verb 'to forge' (to hammer into shape using heat or to fashion a material object, often with fraudulent intent). Period connotations span those of deformity to the point of monstrosity. Monstrosity is understood as displaying the diversity and possibilities of nature, rather than going against it; nature is non-normative and its most telling virtuosities are shown ('monstré') via its singularities. [371] Parés own *Des monstres et des prodiges*, first published in 1573, is in the words of Michel Jeanneret 'un hymne à la vie', an early modern vernacular exploration and celebration of nature's virtuosity in creating abnormalities in humans and other animals; the work sits, to modern sensibilities rather strangely, at an epistemological crossroads, between knowledge of this world and intimations of other worlds, and the next. [372]

Paré's best-known line, 'Je le pansay, Dieu le guarist' locates recovery of his war-injured patients between field medicine and faith.[373] The idea of the 'dressing' ('pansement') of wounds relates to the notion of arranging correctly or setting straight (conveyed by the contemporary French 'redresser'). The French 'panser' was originally the same word as 'penser' — as in, 'think of' (care for, tend or attend to, look after, mind, as in the gap or the child). In Cotgrave's *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (1611), 'Pensement: is as Pensée; or, a thinking, weening, imagining; also, a tending, dressing, or looking to; a curing, or Physicking of'. The semantic overlaps between 'pansement' and 'pensement' and the supple, unstable orthography of French in the period enabled wordplay between the two senses, something Montaigne avails himself of to make a point about the interplay and interdependency between the cognitive and curative. [374] In 'De ne contrefaire le malade', Montaigne muses on the entangled meanings of 'pa/ensement' and 'pa/enser' through a series anecdotes and puns. The essay reads as a collection of warnings — from classical and contemporary sources —

[370] In Cotgrave 'Se contrefaire' is: 'To dissemble, or disguise himselfe, to seeme other then he is'.
[371] See Wes Williams, *Monsters and their Meanings in Early Modern Culture: Mighty Magic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Jean Céard, *La nature et les prodiges: l'insolite au XVIe, en France* (Geneva: Droz, 1977). See also the collection, *Exceptional Bodies in Early Modern Culture: Concepts of Monstrosity before the Advent of the Normal,* ed. by Maja Bondesdam (Amsterdam: AUP, 2020). On premodern monstrosity as a precursor to modern concepts of disability, see Elizabeth B. Bearden, *Monstrous Kinds: Body, Space and Narrative in Renaissance Representations of Disability* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019).
[372] Ambroise Paré, *Des monstres et prodiges*, édition de Michel Jeanneret (Paris: Gallimard, 2015), p.33.
[373] See *Actes du Colloque international 'A. Paré et son temps': 24 et 25 novembre 1990 à Laval,* ed. by Bernard Crenn (Laval: Association pour la commémoration du quadricentenaire de la mort d'Ambroise Paré, 1991), and *Ambroise Paré (1510-90): pratique et écriture de la science à la Renaissance, Actes du Colloque de Pau 6-7 mai 1999,* ed. by Évelyne Berriot-Salvadore and Paul Mironneau (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2003).
[374] Julie Robert explores this same interaction along different lines. See 'Pa/enser bien le corps: Cognitive and Curative Language in Montaigne's *Essais*', *Journal of Medical Humanities*, 36 (2015), 241–250.

against faking infirmity lest it become real: 'Ne cherchons pas hors de nous nostre mal, il est chez nous, il est planté en nos entrailles' (II, 25, 689'). In one anecdote borrowed from Froissart, a group of English noblemen on a mission involving reconnaissance and subterfuge in France, would each bandage their left eye so as to feign poor sight. Their logic was that appearing disabled allowed them to be written off as innocuous civilians. Like others before them, they became blind in the bandaged eye. Montaigne notes that 'Je me suis souvent chatouillé de ce pensement, qu'il leur eut pris comme à ces autres (688-689)'. The double meaning of 'chatouiller' (like 'tickle in English) combines physical touch with mild discomfort and involuntary laughter. Still more relevant to the related themes of (dis)ability and prosthesis on which this Chapter hinges, Montaigne next tells us, in a post-1588 addition, about his habit of using a stick, whether on foot or horseback, to affect elegance and nonchalance of posture: 'De tout temps j'ay apprins de charger ma main, et à cheval et à pied, d'une baguette ou d'un baston, jusques à y chercher de l'elegance et de m'en sejourner, d'une contenance affettée' (689).

I am not sure how this stick would work from horseback, unless it was being used to spur the horse onwards, but in any case he tells us that he has been told many times that fortune might one day turn this 'mignardise en necessité', by creating a genuine need for support or prothesis. Shifting his logic from one of a compensatory dynamic (or fortune making feigners and fakers pay for their folly), to that of heredity, he claims he founds his confidence this won't materialize on the absence of gout in his family history: 'Je me fonde sur ce que je seroy tout le premier gouteux de ma race'. 'Des boyteux' (III, 11) is another example of Montaigne's reflection on the correlations and sometimes disjunctions between varyingly stable states of knowledge, the body, and discourse.[375]

Prosthetics is situated at the nexus of several confluent craft fields in the late Middle Ages and early modern period. As one critic notes, the technology behind these 'body attachments' emerged out of masculine artisans' communities associated with metalwork and often also with war: surgeons, locksmiths, clockmakers, and

[375] In their study of narrative prosthesis, Mitchell and Snyder take 'Des boyteux' as a case study, arguing that disability, through Montaigne's 'ethics of the "infinities of forms"' recurs as a potent force that challenges cultural ideals of the 'normal' or 'whole' body, but at the same time operating as the textual obstacle that causes the literary operation of open-endedness to close down or stumble. *Narrative Prosthesis*, pp. 48- 49.

gunners. [376] Attachment and accommodation occur together. In the *Essais*, the idea of 'attachment', especially when used in relation to knowledge or to others' writings, or his own emendations, lies troublesomely between extraneous and integral part, enabler and hindrance.

Early modern concepts of ingenuity were closely associated with warcraft design.[377] The artisanal know-how needed to fabricate such devices occurred in particular craft environments, or 'communities of technique' where, ironically if unsurprisingly, the skillset required to design and make the artificial limbs and hands for those lost in war overlapped with that needed to design weapons. Ironic, in one sense, but also fittingly reflective of the structure of prosthesis itself, which refers to two contradictory but complementary operations: amputation and addition. In particular, making mechanized limbs and hands, such as the ones illustrated in Paré's *Oeuvres,* required expertise in and tools for finely calibrated metalwork, triggers and gears.

Developments in the design, manufacture, and fitting of non-biological limbs (and sometimes eyes) had an impact on early modern understandings of the body, its possibilities and limitations, disablements and (re) enablements, beyond the experience of those immediately affected by loss and restoration of limb, often in war. The early modern bionic body, and the biological-machine coextension afforded by the shared technical skills between surgeons and other artisans — not only engages philosophical questions of ontological wholeness but those related to class, gender, embodiment and touch. The 'machine' derives from the Greek for means or remedy. Thus the remedial or curative aspect of machines — as designs for treating or making up for some cognitive or corporeal 'lack' of other — is deep-seated.

The notion of prosthetic memory is a clear relative of the artificial memory which is much of my focus in Chapter One, but one that carries, at least potentially, a particularly charged or complex notion of embodiment. Like the architectural artificial memories designed to hold compendious volumes of information and lengthy speeches, existing between mechanism and organism, 'prosthetic memory' involves a technologically-enabled form of hybridity.

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[376] John Gagné, 'Emotional Attachments: Iron Hands, their Makers, and their Wearers, 1450–1600, in *Feeling Things: Objects and Emotions through History,* eds. Stephanie Downes, Sally Holloway, and Sarah Randles (Oxford: OUP, 2018), pp. 134- 453. See also Heidi Hausse, 'The Locksmith, the Surgeon, and the Mechanical Hand: Communicating Technical Knowledge in Early Modern Europe', *Technology and Culture,* 60 (2019), 34-64.

[377] Hélène Vérin, 'La gloire des ingénieurs: l'intelligence technique du XVI au XVII siècles (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), p.31. On early modern 'engins' see also Jennifer Oliver, 'Rabelais's Engins: War Machines, Analogy and the Anxiety of Invention in the Quart Livre', *Early Modern French Studies*, 38 (2016), 97-110.

Two main senses are made of the term in contemporary scholarship. In relation to the age of mass media prosthetic memory is the capacity to remember events or experiences which don't form part of a person's direct lived experience, though photography and film. Alison Landsberg defines it as a new form of 'public cultural memory' which emerges at the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past at an experiential site such as a movie theater or museum. In this moment of contact, an experience occurs through which the person sutures himself or herself into a larger history'.[378] Celia Lury's earlier study examines the disabling power of technologies, specifically photography, to generate a 'prosthetic culture' whose capacities both extend and threaten our humanity, putting pressure on the relation between embodiment, consciousness and memory. [379] In cinematographical terms, 'suture' is a fairly complex theoretical concept which, broadly, refers to the techniques used to re-position the filmed subject as a 'reader' of the film. [380] In these contexts, the surgical term 'suture' is repurposed to refer to an individual 'sewing' themselves into a past they have never personally lived, at an experiential crossroads or interface. While these conceptions of memory are rooted in a modern or postmodern rather than early modern, context, they are relevant to Montaigne's historical moment. His sometimes dramatic treatment of the intersections and collisions of personal and collective history, as well as his attention to what Foucault calls 'technologies of the self' — writing and its supports — show that Montaigne is reflecting along similar lines. A second use of 'prosthetic memory' I have encountered, this time in an early modern connection, is in the context of the mnemonic function of armour as a political prosthesis. I will return to the significance of armour in the *Essais* below. [381]

In what follows, I focus on two places, Basel — emblematic as place of passage, as the *Journal* notes — and Rome (during Montaigne's first stay there). [382] The section on Basel is part of the first part of the *Journal*, dictated by Montaigne to the secretary, and the extended entry for Montaigne's first sojourn in Rome is split between the first and second parts, the latter being written directly by Montaigne. In these two loci I focus on Montaigne's attention to various types of prosthetic memory, whether in the form of technologies of cognition

[378] Alison Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 2.
[379] Celia Lury, *Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity* (London: Routledge, 1998).
[380] Jean-Pierre Oudart, 'Cinema and Suture', *Screen*, 18 (1977), 35–47.
[381] Felix Jäger, 'Bodies of Knowledge: Renaissance Armor and the Engineering of Mind', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, 6 (2018), 89-118.
[382] 'Basilée s'appelle, non du mot grec, mais parce que *base* signifie *passage* et Allemant', *Journal*, p.15.

and memory, including material supports and extensions, or ruins, statues and monuments from the classical past. The fragmented and dismembered state of these structures both recalls the wars at home in France and, in the period, generates debates among restorers and artists about how missing parts (limbs on sculptures and statues; sections of buildings) should be interpreted and restored.

I. Basel

Sixteenth-century Basel is a crucible for the cultures of science, medicine and theology, an important centre of learning and culture with a thriving printing business. Vesalius's *De humani corporis fabrica libri septem* and its shorter companion book, the *Epitome*, had been published there in 1543. The University, founded in 1460, attracted a cosmopolitan community of scholars from all over Europe. Though the Reform had been introduced to Basel in 1529, and the French theologian and reformer Jean Calvin had fled there in 1535 — the first (Latin) edition of his *Institutes* was published there the following year — there was a climate of religious tolerance and freedom of thought. Thus Montaigne's three-day stay in Basel, between 29 September and 1 October 1580, presented an opportunity to come into contact with a number of learned men in the fields of medicine, theology, and philosophy.

Following the secretary's brief survey of the town, comes a description of the house belonging to a famous Bâlois physician, Felix Platter. Platter, son of a Lutheran printer and humanist, had trained in Montpellier under Guillaume Rondelet, himself a renowned anatomist with a particular interest in botany and zoology:

> Nous y vismes de singulier la maison d'un medecin nommé Felix Platerus, la plus peinte et enrichie de mignardises à la francoise qu'il est possible de voir; laquelle ledit medecin a bastie fort grande, ample et sumptueuse. Entre autres choses, il dresse un livre de simples qui est dejà fort avancé; et au lieu que les autres font peindre les herbes selon leurs couleurs, luy a trouvé l'art de les coller toutes naturelles si proprement sur le papier que les moindres feuilles et fibres y apparaissent comme elles sont; et il feuillette son livre, sans que rien en eschappe; et monstra des simples qui y estoient collés y avoit plus de vingt ans. Nous vismes aussi et chez luy et en eschole publique des anatomies entieres d'hommes morts qui se tiennent. (15)

The hyperbolic description of the façade of the house suggests that Platter has stretched mimicry of French-style *mignardises* to the limit; but the house has a body that is robust, and somehow statuesque ('fort grande, ample et sumptueuse'). Two interrelated things capture Montaigne's interest: one is that Platter is preparing a 'livre de simples', or book of medicinal plants, already well underway. The other are the 'anatomies sèches' Platter keeps both at home and at the University, where they would be used for teaching. The parallelism between the human skeletons and the structural remains of the plants resides partly in their function: they serve

as practical *exempla* and, in a pedagogical context, as teaching props. The paratactic setting of the plant bodies alongside the *anatomies* defuses some of the uncanniness of having skeletons in the house, as does the semi-public dimension of Platter's home in keeping with his public function as physician and university teacher. Seen in this way, his 'chez luy' us an extension of his public teaching space.

The book of simples or medicinal herbs was a mainstay of medieval medicine which continued to play a central role in Renaissance pharmacology and medical practice, linked to the ancient doctrine of signatures according to which each plant communicates its therapeutic usefulness to humans via a particular God-given mark. Platter's 'livre de simples' distinguishes itself from other such books through Platter's method of sticking the plants themselves onto the paper, rather than rendering them in paint according to their true colours: the plants are literally present rather than figuratively re-presented. This way of attaching the botanical specimens so they are 'toutes naturelles' and appear 'comme elles sont' down to their last fibrous detail demands ingenuity and artistry, putting pressure on the binary between natural and artificial.

The 'nous' which seems to include Montaigne and his secretary goes on to remark that Platter is able to leaf through this treasury of dried botanicals, some of which are as much as twenty years old, yet intact, without letting a single leaf or fibre escape. Platter seems to exercise perfect control. The description pays attention to the material dimension, of the plants themselves, the paper they are mounted on and to the way the book lends itself to being handled: the nouns 'papier', 'feuilles', and 'fibres' and the verb 'feuilleter' create a palpable image of leaves layered on leaves which, when set into motion by being 'flicked through', has an almost audible texture. What is lost, however, seems to be colour; dried plants typically lose their living pigments. Stripped of their secondary qualities, they are reduced to a skeletal interrelation of parts, bearing less resemblance to their living selves in some respects than do the painted images. [383]

The verb 'feuilletter' distills a slippage from the literal, biological 'feuilles' to the figural action or gesture of leafing through — suggesting a fleeting yet intensely haptic contact with the paper on which the plants are stuck down. As the slippage is a continuum from literal to metaphorical, rather than a discontinuous leap, it seems Platter is 'leafing' through both the pages of the book and through the 'leaves' of the plants themselves thereby

[383] On the significance of colour and 'vif representation' see Chapter One.

also situating nature and artifice on a continuum: the commingled senses of pages and leaves means that Platter is handling nature and a memory of it in the form of a prosthetic extension. Because the verb 'Feuilletter' is predominantly used in the context of books it suggests a specifically cognitive dimension to the linkage here, of paper, leaves and tangible contact with the book as material artefact invested with metaphysical potential which is repeated in Montaigne's visit to the Vatican library, which I explore below.[384]

The use of verbs in this passage, combining active and passive, as well as reflexive and non-reflexive, forms — 'dresser', 'bastir' 'se tenir', 'faire peindre' , 'eschapper', 'monstrer' — creates a tense dynamic between movement and stillness that is carried by these effigies of biological life, the plants and human skeletons, and their postures of being laid flat, stuck onto paper, or made to 'stand up'.[385] The sense of vertical versus horizontal orientation corresponds with notions of activity and passivity. The reflexive verb 'se tenir' applied to the *anatomies sèches* seems curious, as though they were holding themselves upright or, in another sense of 'se tenir', they are preserved, have retained some strange kind of bodily integrity. Indeed the use of the verbs 'dresser' and 'se tenir' — both related to posture and carriage — creates a sense of tension in terms of the agency of the figures involved and give off a whiff of latent resurrection. Montaigne's patterns of attention, here, suggest that he is thinking about material traces and remains, whether of plant or human life, in relation to their participation in some kind of afterlife: not only by being part of an epistemological ecology (owing to their pedagogical use) but through their strange intimations of reanimation.

II. Rome

Montaigne arrives in Rome for the first time around eight o'clock in the evening of the last day of November, 1580, and does not leave until after mid April the following year. The account of this first sojourn bridges the first and second parts of the *Journal*, the first being delivered by the secretary (later revised by Montaigne) and the second written in Montaigne's own hand. This joint or tandem configuration between Montaigne and the

[384] In the period, 'Feuilleter' is also a term used by *patissiers* to refer the technique used in making puff pastry, which involves a time-consuming sequence of layering and folding over. On another kind of 'feuille', see See Andrea Carlino, *Paper Bodies: a Catalogue of Anatomical Fugitive Sheets*, trans. by Noga Arikha (London: Wellcome Institute, 1999).
[385] The 'skeletos' metaphor in II, 6 clearly carries the memory of the anatomies seches in Platter's house. It seems that Montaigne was truck by the idea that these bodies would generally be experienced as a public visual event. From his choice of the word 'skeletos' over the more common 'anatomies' can be interred a certain savouring of the technicality of the term. Before his journey, he employs the term 'anatomie seche' instead: in 'Que philosopher c'est apprendre a mourir' (I, 20), he writes, 'Ainsi faisoyent les Egyptiens, qui, au milieu de leurs festins et parmy leur meilleure chere, faisoient aporter l'Anatomie seche d'un corps d'homme mort, pour servir d'advertissement aux conviez'.

secretary results, as noted above, in the subject of the narrative being the second person plural, 'nous', with Montaigne being referred to, for the most part, in the third person. Sometimes, though, there is a *glissement* between the inclusive 'nous' and the excluding 'ils', even within the same paragraph, adding to the general disjointedness.

Montaigne's first encounter with geographical Rome, a place where the lines between the ancient and modern city are not definitively drawn, is full of reverberations and echoes of memory. Motivated in part by the wish to see for himself what remains of a city so integral to his classical education, it is self-consciously a following in the footsteps, literal and literary, of others gone before him: it is in a real sense an intertextual encounter, between his embodied imagination — which has shaped his inner vision of the sights of Rome, 'seen' though the writings of his beloved models, above all Cicero— and his actual (in the sense of current) bodily self, mediated through other Renaissance writers' poetic encounters. These literary reverberations, combined with the already palimpsestic nature of Rome, trigger an experience which is, inevitably, rather melancholy. The secretary notes, at the beginning of an extended section of reported speech which plays on distinctions between sights and sites of memory, their role as affordances for bridging past and present:

> Il disoit « qu'on ne voyoit rien de Rome que le ciel sous lequel elle avoit esté assise et le plan de son giste; que cette science qu'il en avoit estoit une science abstraite et contemplative, de laquelle il n'y avoit rien qui tombast sous les sens; que ceux qui disoit qu'on y voyoit au moins les ruines de Rome en disoit trop; car les ruines d'une si espouvantable machine rapporteroient plus d'honneur et de reverence à sa memoire; ce n'estoient rien que son sepulchre. (100)

The only visibly recognisable features of Rome are, above, paradoxically, the sky, endlessly fluid and permutating and yet simultaneously constant and, on the ground, the plan of its layout ('le plan de son giste'). This reflection is firmly situated within a French Renaissance rhetoric about antiquities and ruins: there are distinct echos of Du Bellay's *Antiquitez de Rome* sonnets published in 1558 - in which he ruminates on the 'poudreuses reliques' of once-glorious Rome, and Montaigne casts himself as a shadow of Du Bellay's 'nouveau venu' in the third sonnet of the series:

> Nouveau venu, qui cherches Rome en Rome
> Et rien de Rome en Rome n'aperçois. (...)

Montaigne's sky is the answer to Du Bellay's river in the same sonnet:

> Rome de Rome est le seul monument,

Et Rome Rome a vaincu seulement.
Le Tibre seul, qui vers la mer s'enfuit,

Reste de Rome. Ô mondaine inconstance !

Though knowingly inscribing himself within a convention — the *ubi sunt* topos— Montaigne goes further in his grappling with the interplay between states of absence and presence, visibility and invisibility, material and immaterial vestiges, which all engage notions of cognitive grasp: Montaigne's 'science' of Rome is an abstract knowledge which cannot be accommodated by any aspect of Rome as it currently stands which falls under his 'outer' senses. Only the inner senses of memory and imagination are able to make Rome visible and live again. He questions the use of the term 'ruin' which suggests a physical trace of the honour and dignity owed to the memory of 'une si espouvantable machine' as Rome. The stark reality is that what is left is a sepulchre: something buried, covered over, and in some sense rewritten by the present. This passage engages the problematic relationship between architectural remains and the representation of the past, between monument and 'lieux de mémoire' — *loci* of public or collective memory, where individuals remember and commemorate a history which they in some sense share, even if it is not part of their direct experience. In fact the passage registers a failed suture between mental and material, or imagined and lived, experience: if the ruins function as a form of prosthetic memory—extended from the past into the present—it is not because they enable Montaigne to sew himself seamlessly into the backcloth of classical Rome, but rather because they act as triggers to a series of echoes, ricochets and problems around the seams and conjunctions between different temporalities and forms of encounter.

The language used places Rome at the interface between the human and the machine: 'espouvantable machine' denoting Rome in its former glory, conveys the intricate and ingenious inner workings of a contexture composed of interrelated, non-biological parts, while in the lines that follow immediately, Rome is humanly embodied. [386]

> Le monde, ennemy de sa longue domination, avoit premierement brisé et fracassé toutes les pièces de ce corps admirable; et parce qu'encore tout mort, renversé et desfiguré il luy faisoit horreur, il en avoit enseveli la ruine mesme. Que ces petites monstres de sa ruine qui paroissent encore au dessus de la biere, c'estoit la fortune qui les avoit conservées pour le tesmoignage de cette grandeur infinie que tant de siecles, tant de feux, la conjuration du monde reiterée à tant de fois à sa ruine, n'avoient peu universellement esteindre. (100)

[386] As Oliver Pot notes, 'Qu'est-ce en effet qu'une ruine sinon une défiguration de l'aspect "humain" des lieux?', in 'Lieux, espace et géographie dans *le Journal de voyage*', *Montaigne Studies*, XV (2003), 63-104 (65).

The machine/body nexus is not antithetical but rather coextensive: the complexity and ingenuity of the Roman 'machine' and its 'pieces' are what give it a soul capable of being extinguished. 'Ce corps admirable' — brutally dismembered, disfigured, broken—is reduced to the 'petites monstres de sa ruine', signs of its ruin peeking out over its coffin, kept by Fortune to bear witness to its former grandeur.[387]'Petites monstres' plays on the double senses of display and deformity in an image of weird voyeurism/testimony. Though describing Rome, Montaigne's thoughts are also at home, in his own war-torn *patrie*, preoccupied by the damage inflicted on the body of France, and on on the bodies of his fellow Frenchmen. In a passage I have already considered briefly in Chapter Two Montaigne reflects via his secretary that often what remains is not what is 'de plus digne' (de mémoire) because the most beautiful and worthy things will have been destroyed first; the disfigured parts that remain and which are now mistaken for fitting emblems of the glory of ancient Rome may be atypical fragments rather than representative samples, or examples:

> Mais qu'il estoit vraisamblable que ces mambres desvisagés qui en restoint, c'estoint les moins dignes, & que la furie des ennemis de cete gloire immortelle, les avoit portés, premieremant, à ruiner ce qu'il y avoit de plus beau & de plus digne; que les bastimans de cete Rome bastarde qu'on aloit asteure atachant à ces masures antiques, quoi qu'ils eussent de quoi ravir en admiration nos siecles presans, lui faisoint resouvenir propremant des nids que les moineaus & les corneilles vont suspandant en France aus voutes & parois des eglises que les Huguenots viennent d'y demolir. (100)

While in Chapter Two my focus was on the birds' nests ('contextures' constructed using bits and pieces and imbricated within human buildings) here I am most interested in the language of hybridity and falseness: present-day Rome is 'cete Rome bastarde' — conveying the sense of misbegotten, counterfeit, adulterated or corrupted — whose buildings are 'attached' (fastened or annexed) to the antique ruins, but remain unintegrated, incongruous, ontologically suspended. While registering this incongruity and misrepresentation as negative, room is left for a note of positivity: by re-appropriating the ruins as a suitable place to build and suspend their nests, the birds also give these ravaged spaces and *lieux de mémoire* a fresh beginning. The idea that 'rapiecement' might be a a good thing, a mending or patching up rather than a 'botching' or bungling re-emerges later in the same lengthy entry, this time in the second part of the *Journal*, written by Montaigne rather than the secretary. Here, it is in the context of Rome's cosmopolitan nature which Montaigne uses to substantiate his own claim to Roman citizenship:

[387] Montaigne's use of 'Fortune' in the *Essais* was one of the main issues raised by the Roman Censors — but keeps using it unabashedly (See *Journal*, pp. 119-120, and also *Essais,* 'Des Prieres', I, 56).

> Je disois des commodités de Rome, entre autres, que c'est la plus commune ville du monde, et où l'etrangeté et differance de nation se considere le moins ; car de sa nature c'est une ville rapiecée d'estrangiers; chacun y est comme chez soy. (126-127).[388]

Rome is a patchwork city of foreigners, where nobody bats an eyelid at, or especially values, 'estrangeté et differance.' In this city pieced together by people who are not at home but are *as if* at home; each 'piece' retains its identity, but becomes part of an extraordinary whole, 'la plus commune ville du monde,' 'commune' denoting 'belonging to all' or 'universal' -- what would in the next century be called *cosmopolite*. The phrase 'chacun y est *comme* chez soy' (emphasis added) draws attention to its double meaning: Rome's accommodation of cultural diversity and difference, which means nobody feels out of place, but also the visitors' lack of integration. They almost seem to transport their own 'climat' around with them, so they literally feel 'chez soy.' At times this lack of integration even annoys him: practically the first thing the secretary notes on arrival in Rome is that Montaigne is angry about how many French people he encounters in the streets, 'M. De Montaigne se faschoit d'y trouver si grand nombre de François qu'il ne trouvoit en la rue quasi personne qui ne le saluast en sa langue.' (91). It is unclear whether he is most vexed by their *being* French or speaking French. His own 'essais' in the Italian tongue in the *Journal* can be read, as well as experimentation, as a kind of fitting in or adaptation to his linguistic context and climate. He argues that as 'le siege des persones ecclesiastiques', Rome has particular room for *Christian* 'estrangiers' more even than La Serenissima. Insisting on the authority of Rome extending to all Christianity — practically bowing and/or genuflecting in prose — Montaigne notes that he used every available means ('tous mes cinq sens de nature') to clinch the title of *civis romanus*, if only for 'l'ancien honneur et religieuse memoire de son authorité.' (127)

Montaigne's successful negotiation of the title, and the noble enfranchisement that accompanies it, is, as has been argued, one important aspect of Montaigne's consubstantiality with his *Essais*: by submitting his *Essais* to the Roman censors he secured his book's status as a book of good faith.[389] Montaigne's stated reason for wanting this honorary citizenship, 'ancien honneur et religieuse memoire' firmly situates his motives as commemorative in nature, harking back to a more glorious past. And yet, by becoming a contemporary Citizen

[388] In an addition to 'De la vanité' for the 1588 edition, Montaigne repeats this praise of Rome: 'Et puis cette mesme Romme que nous voyons merite qu'on l'ayme, confederée de si long temps et par tant de tiltres à nostre couronne: seule ville commune et universelle. Le magistrat souverain qui y commande est reconneu pareillement ailleurs: c'est la ville metropolitaine de toutes les nations Chrestiennes; l'Espaignol et le François, chacun y est chez soy' (III, 9, 974).
[389] Warren Boutcher, 'Montaigne at Rome, 1580-1581', *The School of Montaigne in Early Modern Europe; Vol. One: The Patron Author,* pp. 262-316.

of Rome, he is also splicing past and present, adopting —or being accommodated by — a citizenship which is only 'propre' to him in an extended, or even vicarious, sense.

The problematic suturing between cultures and historical periods I have considered above emerges in a different, more oblique, way in relation to statues. In early April 1581 Montaigne takes an excursion into Rome's surroundings, following the Renaissance's recurrent itinerary of tracing ancient inscriptions and Roman sepulchres: in his entry for Tivoli, he notes 'ce fameus palais & jardin du Cardinal de Ferrare', and the sounds of the elaborate musical fountains, where one hears the organ, the sound of 'trompetes contrefaict', and artificial birdsong, followed by sounds that, to Montaigne's ears, call to mind the characteristic sounds of the canon and arquebus ('Ailleurs il sort come un bruit de coups de canon; ailleurs un bruit plus dru & menu; come des harquebusade') suggesting he is still partially 'ailleurs', back home in war-torn France. Montaigne has already seen, and been impressed, by ingenious contraptions of the kind, in Florence and elsewhere, and his enthusiasm for such imitations of nature feels a little jaded: 'De toutes ces invantions ou pareilles, sur ces mesmes raisons de nature, j'en ai veu ailleurs'. He then adds a note about the statues he has seen there: 'notammant une Nympe dormante, une morte; & une Pallas celeste. L'*Adonis* qui est chés l'Eveque d'Aquino ; la *Louve* de bronze ; & l'*Enfant qui s'arrache l'espine*, du Capitole ; le *Laocoon* & l'*Antinoüs*, de Belvedere ; la *Comedie*, du Capitole ; le *Satyre*, de la vigne du Cardinal Sforza; & de la nouvelle besouigne, le *Moïse*, en la sepulture de *San Pietro in Vincula* ; la belle fame qui est aus pieds du Pape Pol tiers en la nouvelle Eglise de S. Pierre. Ce sont les statues qui m'ont le plus agréé à Rome' (129).

The significance of this passing reference to classical (and a few contemporary) statues lies beyond the *Journal* itself. The discovery of statues from antiquity — statues which often had parts missing — generated debates about how the statues' phantom limbs should be interpreted and restored, creating a curious parallel between Paré's restoration of human flesh and blood bodies and the 'rehabilitation' of inorganic bodies and effigies of marble and other materials, created in another epoch.The limbs are phantom rather than merely absent because their presence is still felt, by their discoverers, as missing part of a now-incomplete whole, conceptually and materially, functioning as a form of *quasi-trasse*. These debates, which were about ethics as well as aesthetics and visual historiography, turned on how the qualities of the original part (its position, expression, relation or contribution to the rest of the body or total structure) should be contextually inferred from the remains and from any

intertextual information, such as poetry whose figures the statues were designed to represent. When the *Lacoön and his sons,* the lost classical sculpture mentioned in Pliny's *Natural History* and depicting a pivotal if undeveloped character in Virgil's *Aeneid*, was excavated from a vineyard on the Esqualine Hill in January 1506, the Trojan priest's right arm was missing, as were parts from his sons, one of whom had become detached from the other two figures. The news of the find traveled immediately to Pope Julius II, who bought the statue in March and had it installed in a purpose- built niche in the Cortile Belvedere by July. On Vasari's account the pope held an informal contest, among leading sculptors, judged by Raphael and won by Jacopo Sansovino, to decide who would have the honour of finding a solution to the 'problem' of the statue's fragmentary nature. Its incomplete condition exercised an imperative on artists that they finish it; moreover, it became apparent that rather than merely imitating the model of their ancient predecessors, they had the opportunity to participate in a joint project across the intervening centuries, to take real part in the creative process. The restored limbs — by embodying fulfilment of the original artist's intentions — would be the connective tissue linking a living past to the present. Some went further, seeing the project as one of active improvement and correction rather than supplementation or restoration. In the case of the Laocoön, there were debates over the proper interpretation of the missing right arm, interpretation which would guide its restoration: discussion turned on the most fitting choice of position, whether it should be bent back or extended in a heroic gesture. [390]

Though listed by Montaigne as one of *several* excellent statues, the Laocoön's exemplary status, both in his time and ours, singles it out: as well as being the most famous statue of the sixteenth century it has come, via Lessing and others, to be the symbol of art as a whole. The life of the Laocoön in the visual culture of the Renaissance reaches far beyond the restorations, copies, and sketches of the statue itself; from the moment of its discovery, it inserts itself into the imagination and becomes the basis for new image making. The point is not that in mentioning the statues Montaigne is explicitly engaging with these various ideas and questions; rather that underneath Montaigne's brief and rather tangential mention of these statues — which he is on some level linking, if only negatively, with his own book, the *Essais,* which he carries with him — is an entire backstory, concerning the Renaissance understanding of the project of completion or of solution to the interpretive riddle posed by a

[390] See Leonard Barkan, *Unearthing the Past: Archaeology and Aesthetics in the Making of Renaissance Culture* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1999), especially pp. 2-27; Mary Beard, 'Arms and the Man: The restoration and reinvention of classical sculpture', in *Confronting the Classics* (New York: Norton, 2013); Fejer, Jane, Annette Rathje and Tobias Fischer-Hansen, eds, *The Rediscovery of Antiquity: The Role of the Artist* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2003); Seymour Howard, 'Laocoon Rerestored', *American Journal of Archaeology,* 93 (1989), 417-422.

classical statue found with missing parts: is the process one of replication, reinterpretation or reinvention of the limb? Is the new limb a piece of the present being attached to the past, always remaining excluded from the original's authentic identity, making the whole a hybrid, or does the new limb transfigure the whole, making it actively participate in the present and the present in the past?[391] Seen in this light, the statues are themselves 'petites monstres', little revelatory fragments, or significant 'eschantillons', of a larger cultural picture, in which the new problem of anachronism acts as an epistemological ferment. Poised between aesthetic restoration, medical rehabiliation or re-enabling and spiritual redemption and resurrection, the 'fitting' — whether understood as accommodation or annexing — of missing limbs is philosophically charged in the period. It also sits in a particular relation to Renaissance poetics, where the dynamic between imitation and improvisation, following footsteps and striking out onto another path, can be understood as emulation and mutilation, re-membering and dismembering, to re-assemble in a new way. As Greene observes, Renaissance imitatio 'produced a vast effort to deal with the newly perceived problem of anachronism (...) assigning the Renaissance creator a convenient and flexible stance towards a past that threatened to overwhelm him'. [392] The problem, and opportunity, of anachronism comes to be materially 'embodied' in the new limbs designed to replace, or supplement, missing parts, creating rich intertextualities between the literal or biological body (the work of Paré) and other (figurative) bodies of text and inorganic matter ('les figures, en cuyvre mesmes et en pierre', II, 18, 663).

Montaigne refers to his borrowing of the ancients as a kind of disguise and deformation:

> [C] Parmy tant d'emprunts je suis bien aise d'en pouvoir desrober quelqu'un, les desguisant et difformant à nouveau service. Au hazard que je laisse dire que c'est par faute d'avoir entendu leur naturel usage, je luy donne quelque particuliere adresse de ma main à ce qu'ils en soient d'autant moins purement estrangers. Ceux-cy mettent leur larrecins en parade et en conte: aussi ont ils plus de credit aux loix que moy [C] Nous autres naturalistes estimons qu'il y aie grande et incomparable preferance de l'honneur de l'invention à l'honneur de l'allegation (1056)

The drafting of this passage shows Montaigne at work chiselling his sense of the relation between an author and his ancient models, which is enriched by the lexical doubleness of the verbs 'desrober' (to thieve or to contrive; significantly, 'un enfant desrobbé' is a child begotten in adultery, according to Cotgrave) and 'desguiser' (conveying the current sense of disguise but also to falsify, counterfeit, sophisticate or make impure by admixture with a foreign substance — all suggesting something made in imitation of or against, out of conformity with,

[391] Some even argue that the entire sculpture is a forgery by Michelangelo. See for example Lynn Catterson, 'Michelangelo's "Laocoön"', *Artibus et Historiae,* 26 (2005), 29-56.
[392] Greene, *The Light in Troy*, p2.

nature). In an emendation subsequently crossed out he adds: 'et comme les larrons des chevaus je leur peins le crin et la queuë et par fois je les eborgne: si le premier maistre s'en servoit a bestes d'amble je les mets au trot, et au bast, s'ils servoyent à la selle'.[393] He puts his stolen 'horses' through different, faster paces to their original masters, painting their mane and tail to disguise their identity and sometimes depriving them of one eye. The verb 'eborgner' indicates an epistemologically-inflected kind of maiming; his one-eyed steeds are mutilated and unfit for battle but can be steered, or fashioned, to other uses. It is true that Montaigne wrote this out of his *Essais*, having tried it out as a formulation and decided against it; this alters its significance but does not efface it.

In the context of Rome, unearthed artefacts are *loci* of exchange between words and pictures, antiquity and the present and between one artist and another. The notion of 'dénichement' — ancient statues and fragments being unearthed — stages a puzzling encounter between visible and invisible, material and symbolic. For the antique city to exist below the modern is an emblem of its collapse and ruin: physical, moral or spiritual. Yet the space underneath is also an emblem of the origins of the present-day world existing perpetually at its core, just as Virgil had narrated the subterranean origins of the Capitol. As Leonard Barkan notes, the rediscovery of ancient sculpture 'is not only the place where *a* canon is being formed; it is also a place where canonicity is itself receiving some of its crucial modern definitions'.[394] The discovery and resurrection of ancient statues in the ground places the ultimate test on a millenium and a half of belief in the purely symbolic nature of Roman space: suddenly the space of Rome is both real and symbolic, the past is both an idea and a buried physical reality. Linear history is rendered as vertical geography: 'The metaphors do not die but become enriched.' [395]

Rome as a place and an experience whose essence is palimpsest, polytemporality and the grafting of one culture and architecture onto another, in a way that problematizes notions of priority and precedence, emerges in a quite different context and from an altogether different angle in the 'Apologie', within Montaigne's discussion of accommodation and animal cognition. Here, Montaigne extends to other creatures the distinction between the outer sense of perception, and the inner senses of memory and imagination considered to be the privilege of humankind:

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[393] *Essais*, 1056, note 19.
[394] Leonard Barkam, *Unearthing the Past: Archaeology and Aesthetics in the Making of Renaissance Culture* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 3.
[395] Ibid. p. 25.

> Pour suivre encore un peu plus loing cette equalité et correspondance de nous aux bestes, le privilege dequoy nostre ame se glorifie, de ramener à sa condition tout ce qu'elle conçoit, de despouiller de qualitez mortelles et corporelles tout ce qui vient à elle, de renger les choses qu'elle estime dignes de son accointance à desvestir et despouiller leurs conditions corruptibles, et leur faire laisser à part, comme vestemens superflus et viles, l'espesseur, la longueur, la profondeur, le poids, la couleur, l'odeur, l'aspreté, la pollisseure, la dureté, la mollesse et tous accidents sensibles, pour les accommoder à sa condition immortelle et spirituelle, de maniere que Rome et Paris que j'ay en l'ame, Paris que j'imagine, je l'imagine et le comprens sans grandeur et sans lieu, sans pierre, sans plastre et sans bois; ce mesme privilege, dis-je, semble estre bien evidamment aux bestes: car un cheval accoustumé aux trompettes, aux harquebusades et aux combats, que nous voyons tremousser et fremir en dormant, estendu sur sa litiere, comme s'il estoit en la meslée, il est certain qu'il conçoit en son ame un son de tabourin sans bruict, une armée sans armes et sans corps. (481)

The interiorized architectures of contemporary Paris and ancient Rome, symbolic inhabitants of his imagination, are memory palaces, cognitive scaffolds of his inner life: stripped of their secondary qualities and 'accidents sensibles' — the superficial objects of current perception, 'vestemens superflus et viles' — they are figuratively scaled down to fit their timeless, incorruptible essence or 'condition immortelle'. The characteristics Montaigne mentions are mostly linked to texture ('pollisseure', 'aspreté', 'mollesse'). These dematerialized urban and architectural visions of Paris and Rome imprinted in Montaigne's mind are compared with the aural 'visions' of warhorses hearing phantom trumpets and reliving other traumas of battle as though caught up in the 'meslee', rather than alone asleep. Just as our soul is capable of imagining a Paris 'sans grandeur et sans lieu, sans pierre, sans plastre et sans bois', a horse accustomed to the sight and sound of war, who we see flinching and trembling in sleep, is certain to be remembering, or re-presenting, in sleep, 'un son de tabourin sans bruict, une armee sans armes et sans corps'. The striking image of a disembodied army — armless thus dismembered, of maimed identity — develops the hypothetical image Montaigne is creating of incorporeal bodies, placeless or nowhere places, contentless concepts. Here, the 'harquebusade', the shot of a cavalier or handgun, functions as an emblem, along with the 'trompettes' and 'combats', of a war which problematizes embodiment, by risking the integrity of the bodies in which concepts are grounded and by which they are shaped. Once again, the Scholastic substance-accidents distinction resurfaces to place cognition under the sign of metaphysics but also of prosthesis: the differentiation yet awkward conjoining of sign and substance, passing accident and atemporal essence brings us back, obliquely but firmly, to the indeterminacy and temporal suturing of the eucharist.

The last Roman interlude from the *Journal* I will consider is Montaigne's visit to the Vatican library on 6 March 1581. By this point the narrative has shifted from the indirect mode, via the secretary, into the first person

singular; in his turns of phrase we are, just about, able to recognize the author of the *Essais*. I quote at length so as not to truncate the unfolding of Montaigne's impressions as he recalls them:

> Il y a un grand nombre de livres attachés sur plusieurs rangs de pupitres; il y en a aussi dans des coffres qui me furent tous ouverts; force livres escrits à la main, et notamment un Seneque et les *Opuscules* de Plutarche. J'y vis de remerquable la statue du bon Aristide à tout une belle teste chauve, la barbe espoisse, grand front, le regard plein de douceur et de majesté: son nom est escrit en sa base très-antique; au livre de Chine, le caractère sauvage, les feuilles de certaine matiere beaucoup plus tendre et pellucide que nostre papier; et parce qu'elle ne peut souffrir la teinture de l'encre, il n'est escrit que d'un costé de la feuille et les feuilles sont toutes doubles et pliées par le bout de dehors où elles se tiennent. Ils tiennent que c'est la membrane de quelque arbre. J'y vis aussi un lopin de l'ancien papyrus, où il y avoit des caractères inconnus: c'est une escorce d'arbre. J'y vis le Breviaire de Saint Gregoire escrit à la main: il ne porte nul tesmoingnage de l'année, mais ils tiennent que de main à main il est venu de luy. C'est un Missel à peu près comme le nostre; et fut apporté au dernier Concil de Trente pour servir de tesmoingnage à nos ceremonies. J'y vis un livre de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, où il y a des corrections de la main du propre auteur, qui escrivoit mal, une petite lettre pire que la mienne. *Item* une Bible imprimée en parchemin, de celles que Plantin vient de faire en quatre langues, laquelle le Roy Philippe a envoyé à ce Pape comme il dit en l'inscription de la relieure; l'original du livre que le Roy d'Angleterre composa contre Luther, lequel il envoya, il y a environs cinquante ans, au Pape Leon dixieme, soubscrit de sa propre main, avec ce beau distique Latin, aussi de sa main.
>
> *Anglorum rex Henricus, Leo decime, mittit*
> *Hoc opus, et fidei testem et amicitae.*[396]
>
> Je leus les prefaces, l'une au Pape, l'autre au lecteur: il s'excuse sur ses occupations guerrieres et faute de suffisance; c'est un langage Latin bon pour Scholastique. (111-112)

The statue of the ancient Greek orator Elio Aristide (the 'bon Aristide', whose oration to Rome remains one of his most famous) presides in a sitting posture over the rows of books fixed down to reading desks, gazing out, as if still alive but inhabiting a permanent present, with a look 'plein de douceur et de majesté'. As Rigolot notes, it is not clear whether this selection of manuscripts and printed materials reflects Montaigne's own choice and curiosity, or the Library custodian's Counter-Reformation agenda.[397] An especially salient feature of this passage is Montaigne's fascination with the cognitive and affective power of the materialities of writing and of the book as artefact. Montaigne's attention is absorbed to the exclusion of any other sensory impression by the presence of the books themselves; it catches especially on the various organic materials of which they are made: papyrus, parchment, and the unspecified 'membrane de quelque arbre' which the foreign lettering

[396] 'Henry, King of the English, to Leo the Tenth, sends this work, bearing witness to his faith and friendship'. The work in question is Henry VIII's *Defence of the Seven Sacraments,* published in 1521 (*Adsertio septem sacramentum adversus Martinum Lutherum)* in exchange for which Pope Leo X awarded Henry the title *Fidei Defensor* (Defender of the Faith). Montaigne's allusion to this 'beautiful' handwritten distich ('ce beau distique') is tinged with irony, given Henry's overthrowing of that faith so soon after.

[397] François Rigolot, 'Curiosity, Contingency and Cultural Diversity: Montaigne's Readings at the Vatican Library', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 64 (2011), 847-874 (p.850). On the cultural significance of the Vatican library's holdings see Anthony Grafton (ed.), *Rome Reborn: The Vatican Library and Renaissance Culture* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1993).

('caractère sauvage') of the Chinese book is inscribed. He is responsive to their texture, colour, ink, suppleness or hardness, transparency, the binding or 'reliure', how the sheets or leaves are configured and how these differ from 'nostre papier' — in other words, to what elsewhere he calls their 'accidents sensibles', those material aspects which fall under his outer senses. The unknown and 'wild' characters, which he cannot read, serve to heighten the material nature of the books; legibility in a sense becomes a function of materiality. His noting of the natural source of papyrus — a fragment ('lopin') of which the 'caractères inconnus' are written on — suggests a correspondence between the cognitive and the material which is manifest throughout this passage: papyrus is 'une escorce d'arbre', recalling his remark in 'Des trois commerces', of most conversations (*entretiens*), that 'Je n'y preste que l'escorce de mon attention' (III, 3, 819). The interplay of surface and depth, opacity and transparency, legibility and illegibility, here, seems to be about mind and memory's relation to material traces. Later in the description, beyond the passage I have quoted, he writes of the *Actes des Apostres* he sees that they are 'escrits en très-belle lettre d'or Greque, aussi vifve et recente que si c'estoit escrit aujourdhui. Cette lettre est massive et a un corps solide et eslevé sur le papier, de façon que, si vous passez la main par dessus, vous y sentez l'espoisseur.' (113) This recalls his description of his own book as a three-dimensional 'corps solide' in 'De la ressemblance des enfans eux peres': 'Ces mesmes conditions et facultez, que vous avez pratiquées et receuillies, Madame, avec beaucoup plus d'honneur et de courtoisie qu'elles ne meritent, je les veux loger (mais sans alteration et changement) en un corps solide qui puisse durer quelques années ou quelques jours apres moy, où vous les retrouverez, quand il vous plaira vous en refreschir la memoire.' (783)

Alongside the spell cast by the materials, and their affective power to make the past relive, there is a real sense of his being struck by a feeling of awe, or reverence in the presence of these books because of the contact and continuity they preserve with their authors. It is they, rather than ceremonial rigmaroles, that inspire his genuine (non-prosthetic or counterfeit) veneration. Two of the manuscript books he sees are Seneca and Plutarch, authors with whom he has a particular affinity as he tells us in 'Des Livres,' an essay to which I return.[398] Saint Gregory's prayerbook, written by hand, has been (he is told) passed down hand to hand, from the author himself ('ils tiennent que de main à main il est venu de luy'). It is not clear whether Montaigne entirely believes this, but he seems to have been struck by the fact of handling, or at least being close to, an artefact

[398] 'Ils ont tous deux cette notable commodité pour mon humeur, que la science que j'y cherche, y est tracitée à pièces descousues, qui ne demandent pas l'obligation d'un long travail, dequoy je suis incapable, comme sont les Opuscules de Plutarche et les Epistres de Seneque (...)', *Essais*, 413.

which may have a direct historical connection with the author's embodied gesture of writing. The insistent attention paid to the manuscript as a living trace of the connection between writing and hands, and to the emendations and 'corrections' made in the author's own handwriting — as a material extension or exteriorization of mental intention — reinforces the sense that such contact, whether visual or haptic, resonates with Montaigne's sense of his own identity as a writer. Indeed, this is explicit in his remark that Aquinas had small, bad handwriting, which he places in direct comparative relation with his own.

Beyond this these hand-penned 'corrections' potentially serve as a reference for his own marginal adjustments to the *Essais* to come later, which the modern reader can see — in a curious form of dematerialized haptic contact with Montaigne — in the digitized copy of the Exemplaire de Bordeaux.[399] Montaigne's insistence that in revisiting his own text he is not correcting ('setting straight') but making modulating or harmonizing adjustments, which record moves towards the approximation of truth, like the notion of the *essai*, extends to ethics and to life itself, linking back to his words in 'Du repentir', which I have already considered. Thus the notion of correction versus adjustment concerns consubstantiality, coherence and the accommodation of the change, and adaptation, inherent in all life, whether biological or textual. Importantly, here, in the Vatican, textual corrections seem to emerge as literal, palpable correlative of the temporal palimpsest that is Rome. Books, and their habitats — libraries — are forms of currency, sites of commerce and exchange, enabling the meeting and intermingling of minds across (otherwise impossible) stretches of time and space.[400] In Montaigne's writing, the memorial function of books is presented in plural terms. Books are static and dynamic *lieux de mémoire*: repositories or archives of 'lifeless' information, books are also bridges across time and place, accommodating the souls and minds of great figures from the past ('ces grandes ames des meilleurs siecles' ('De l'institution des enfans', I, 26), and providing a rich rich intellectual and ethical resource.This affords a niche for their ever-renewing revival, and serves the pedagogical and ethical role of enabling those in the process of those developing their minds and characters to 'haunt' and 'practiquer' — enter into 'commerce' or familiarity with — 'ceux qui ne vivent qu'en la memoire des livres'.

[399] https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/efts/ARTFL/projects/montaigne
[400] See Jean-Luc Nancy in *Sur le commerce des pensées: du livre et de la librairie* (Paris: Galilée, 2005), in which he reflects on and pays homage to the 'circulation et commerce' of the book as material object and form of cognitive currency.

In this selection of readings from Montaigne's *Journal* entries for Basel and Rome, I have shown Montaigne's attentions to books in the *Journal* — from Platter's book of simples in Basel to 'ce seneque escrit à la main' in the Vatican simultaneously foreground the materialities of writing and of the book as an object, and the book's role as an agent of memory: the papyrus, parchment and mysterious membrane of an unknown tree are, like the wax tablets of memory, the surface where three-dimensional impressions are made, linking past and present through a direct haptic contact, is experienced by Montaigne as affect. The experience itself leaves an enduring *impression* which inflects his sense of how 'la memoire des livres' (I, 26) can keep the past circulating in the present, and how the material interacts with what I have elsewhere in the thesis referred to, suggestively, as cognitive metaphysics.[401] Ruins, fragments and traces of the past function across these readings, as a form of cognitive archipelago, in similarly emotional and affective ways, contextualizing material culture as part of a dynamic cognitive archaeology. It was Petrarch who first extended the usage of *fragmentum* to encompass, with pathos, all that was left over from the fall of Rome, and while Montaigne does not use the word fragment itself, its emotional charge, connoting loss, injury and breakage, can be felt in the other words in the same semantic field — , 'lopin' 'piece', 'vestige' — which seem to situate the partial nature of the trace within a larger contexture, operating across history to restore to wholeness or redeem what is lost .[402] In the context of Montaigne's patterns of attention in the *Journal,* the notion of consubstantiality, and consubstantial memory, becomes inflected by a prosthetic logic. The Christian reverberations of resurrection co-exist alongside the renaissance quest for finding, and then rehabilitating, classical fragments, prosthetics providing a useful hinge between the material, the bodily and the discursive, then as now. Across these various readings, the Eucharist is immanent (and in some places, like Isny and Basel, explicitly present) as a mode of understanding what it might mean for the mind to be extended into the material realm and for memory to be scaffolded. The intertextuality between the *Journal* and the *Essais*, itself a form of memory, shows the effect of these experiences on Montaigne's feelings about the cognitive power of books, remains and statues, revealing ways distinctive to the Renaissance that material culture and archaeology are also matters of mind.

Part Two: Writing Prosthetic Memory: Horses, Arms, Plumes

401 In the Introduction I call this a 'cognitive *metaphisique.*' See above p.28.
[402] Glenn W. Most, 'On Fragments', in *The Fragment: An Incomplete History,* ed. by William Tronzo (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2009), pp. 9-22.

Embedded within a reflection on style and substance in 'Des Livres', Montaigne remarks on those (modern) authors who feel the need to compensate for paucity or superficiality of content, and absence of true talent. In contrast with those ancient poets, who' sans s'esmouvoir et sans se picquer, se font assez sentir', lesser authors must make up in 'body' for what they lack in mind or wit:

> Ceux-cy ont besoing de secours estrangier: à mesure qu'ils ont moins d'esprit, il leur faut plus de corps. [B] ils montent à cheval parce qu'ils ne sont assez forts sur leurs jambes. (412)

Similar in relevant ways to his architectural language of supplemented cognition in the 'Apologie', discussed in Chapter Two (in particular, his use of 'estancons' and 'arc-boutants'), here in 'Des Livres' the supports are not in wood or stone, but living flesh capable of powerful movement. Contemporary comedies in particular are criticized on grounds that they are crammed with others' work — that of Terence, Plautus, or Boccacio, say — often several of these great authors' works are stuffed into a single comedy:

> Ils entassent en une seule Comedie cinq ou six contes de Bocacce. Ce qui les faict ainsi se charger de matiere, c'est la deffiance qu'ils ont de se pouvoir soustenir de leurs propres graces: il faut qu'ils trouvent un corps où s'appuyer; et, n'ayant pas du leur assez dequoy nous arrester, ils veulent que le conte nous amuse. (411)

The inverse relation between 'esprit' and 'corps' becomes, in this passage, a compensatory dynamic; unable to hold themselves up on the strength of their own legs or own 'graces', these authors must seek 'secours estrangier', by co-opting another body, equine or human. But what does Montaigne mean by this — we assume figurative use of — 'body' in relation to texts specifically, where the contrast is, at least partly, that between brains and brawn? And surely Montaigne's setting up an inverse relation between 'esprit' and 'corps' works directly against the notions of embodied and extended cognition elaborated, albeit in early modern terms, elsewhere in the *Essais*?

The first query is partially answered in another part of the same passage:

> Tout ainsi qu'en nos bals, ces hommes de vile condition, qui en tiennent escole, pour ne pouvoir representer le port et la decence de nostre noblesse, cherchent à se recommander par des sauts perilleux et autres mouvemens estranges et bateleresques. (412)

These are loaded lines, Montaigne's disdainful verve drawing parallels between social standing and authorial grace and honour, moving between discourses of nobility enacted through their characteristic instruments of

épée and pen.[403] In this segment of the passage, the body and its postures, bearing, 'alleure', and so on, is the site and guarantor of social identity and memory; embodiment is foregrounded as the *habitus* (or 'hexis corporel', in Bourdieu's terminology, drawing on Aristotle), where ingrained dispositions, patterns of bodily style and ritual are a form of 'mémoire corporelle', which clearly situate a person in the social hierarchy. [404]The body is deployed, often unconsciously, to communicate rank and corresponding qualities of mind. In 'Des Livres', the authors Montaigne is criticizing are compared to men of low social condition who, unable to represent 'le port et la decence de nostre noblesse' resort to (or are only capable of) what are perceived as grotesque acrobatics, or *singeries*— though it is unclear whether these are the result of botched attempts to imitate the nobility, or reflect a kind of wilful rebelliousness, because they are lucid about the impossibility of counterfeiting a whole embodied history.

Meanwhile in the *Journal* the idea of counterfeiting lineage resurfaces as part of the long and rich entry for Augsbourg (15-19 October 1580), which starts with Montaigne's usual attention to the interiors of the place — bedlinens, cleanliness and the polish of the wood — and moves through observations about the local churches, Catholic, Lutheran (where there are, typically, 'ny images, ny orgues, ny croix') and their services and sundry other customs of the place. Picked out for special interest are a number of architectural and mechanical particularities — 'engins': the secretary gives a detailed account of the ingenious 'fausse-porte' ('par laquelle on reçoit à toute heures de la nuit quiconque y veut entrer soit à pied soit à cheval') — an 'engin' which is marvelled at as 'une des plus artificielles choses qui se puisse voir'.[405] The particular ingenuity of the *fausse porte* is described minutely: broadly, it allows for a chain of communication, through a series of 'engins'— bells, springs and triggers — between porter and his 'compaignon' situated a level above, to assess the admissability of the 'estrangier' who, depending on the outcome, is either left to stew overnight or is let in. Of particular interest to me, though, is a passage in the entry where the secretary describes the pomp (and wine) with which Montaigne is met:

> Le corps de la ville fit cet honneur à Messieurs d'Estissac et de Montaigne de leur envoyer presenter à leur souper, quatorze grands vaisseaux pleins de leur vin, qui leur fut offert par sept sergens vestus de livrées, et un honorable officier de ville qu'ils convierent à souper.

[403] 'Bateleresque' is translated in Cotgrave as 'juggler-like'.
[404]Bourdieu, *Questions de sociologie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit,1981).
[405] Elisabeth I is thought to have sent an ambassador to find out its secret workings, to no avail.

The officer dining with them tells them visitors get wine and ceremony in proportion to their 'qualité', or rung on the social hierarchy: a Duke would be given more wine, and by a 'bourgmaistre.' The secretary notes, 'Ils nous prinrent pour barons et chevaliers. M. de Montaigne, pour aucunes raisons avoit voulu qu'on s'y contrefit, et qu'on ne dist pas leurs conditions; et se promena seul tout le long du jour par la ville; il croit que cela mesme servit à les faire honorer davantage'.[406]

The significance of this can only be read in the social, economic and military context. The late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were decisive in the development of capitalism and of the bourgoisie, a non-feudal, market-oriented class. Montaigne, having been mis-taken for a baron or a knight — two social categories which, though honourable and noble, are lower down than his own, and, importantly not independent — prefers not to reveal his status as a *robin* and to play along with this accidentally 'counterfeit' identity. 'La forme propre, et seule, et essencielle, de noblesse en France, c'est la vacation militaire', he states in 'Des récompenses d'honneur' (II, 7). The 'aucunes raisons' the secretary gestures toward vaguely are, at a guess, something to do with social and cognitive experiment, in some respects not dissimilar to his trying out, or on, of the Italian tongue. Perhaps most importantly, it appeals to Montaigne's own nostalgic sensibilities, enabling him — temporarily — to enjoy the illusion of belonging to a romanticized feudal age, which depended on fealty and military service, emblematic of a golden past often expressed by Montaigne as the time of 'nos pères'. Yet Montaigne's own family history and their transition from the name of 'Eyquem' to 'Montaigne' tracks their social ascent from the rank of affluent bourgeois to that of gentleman in three generations. Thus this feudal history of knights and barons is a prosthetic, imagined history, not his 'own' at all.

Elsewhere in the *Essais* Montaigne discusses the (literally) material indices of social hierarchy: in 'Des Loix Somptuaires' (I, 43) he uses the sumptuary edicts issued under François I and Henri II and renewed under Charles IX and Henri III to criticize the tendency towards ostentation and vanity in dress among *gentilhommes*, 'contre la forme de nos pères' (270). These laws were designed to regulate and reinforce social hierarchies by dictating dress codes, ensuring that those from lower social ranks (notably the rising bourgeoisie) did not dress like those from the higher echelons, essentially by *reminding* them, the middle classes, of their proper place; Montaigne remarks that they have in fact resulted in greater sumptuousness of dress in his own

[406] *Journal*, p.42.

class. Significantly, the sartorial extravagance and excess (possibly a form of overcompensation?) of his generation is an impediment to its (would-be) raison d'être, namely fighting and defending: 'ce lourd grossissement de pourpoins, qui nous faict tous autres que nous ne sommes' is 'si incommode à s'armer'. [407] While these are 'erreurs superficielles' (punning on the superficial, 'material' or accidental nature of costume compared with deeper qualities), they are portentous ('pourtant de mauvais prognostique'): using an analogy from masonry, he compares this warning sign to the cracking in the outer surface of a wall indicating trouble at its solid centre. [408] The medical connotation of 'prognostique' (prognosis) — denoting the likely course of a condition or disease — aligns the semiotic import of such errors with a potentially deep-seated ethical disease, while again harking back to the virtues, and sobriety of style, of his father's generation.

Taken together, these two examples turning on embodied cultural capital trace the interconnections between social identity, ancestry, memory, poetics, and the ways in which individuals consciously or unconsciously wear their lineage (understood as a cognitive and ethical concept as well as a genetic one) through the body dressed and draped, or though its movements and bearing.

The notion of the body sketched out in the passage from 'Des Livres'— whether construed as flesh or the 'bodying forth' of thought or speech in written text — as something giving compensatory support for a lack and as a site of (social) memory carries implications for the nexus in Montaigne's writing between states and experiences of embodiment and cognition, perhaps most particularly memory.

In both examples from 'Des Livres and 'Des Loix somptuaires', Montaigne navigates between two very different interpretations of the kinds of social marker in question. In fact this tension in in play in the 'loix somptuaires' themselves: on one hand, 'faking it' (by wearing clothes above one's station, or trying to imitate the gracious movements of the genuine nobility) is like a prothesis (an ill-fitting, not fit-for-purpose, one at that); on the other, the possibility that one social rank might appropriate the trappings of a higher one — by suturing itself into a history which doesn't properly belong to it —and that it might end up being *convincing* (in whatever surface sense), may have been sufficient to make some people anxious. As has been shown, the supposed

[407] There is significant overlap with 'Des Armes de Parthes', to which I return.
[408] 'Ce sont erreurs superficielles, mais pourtant de mauvais prognostique; et sommes advertis que le massif se desment quand nous voyons fendiller l'enduict et la crouste de nos parois' (p. 270).

'superficiality' of clothing and other forms of materiality is based on a misconception which fails to account for the close ties between materiality, cognition, and various forms of spirituality. [409] *Habitus* is at root a cognitive and ecological concept as well as a social ontological one: describing the way that agency is shaped by social environmental factors and patterns, resulting in individuals 'embodying' - remembering and incarnating— a collective (class) history.

Montaigne's attachment to an idealized chivalric past can be read as part of the broader pattern of equine symbolism in the *Essais*. [410]The figure of the horse — charged with knightly, sociocultural connotations sharply drawn against the military context of the civil wars — emerges as a distinctively and problematically cognitive agent in Montaigne's writing. Horses recur in the *Essais* as figures and agents of varying degrees of controllability and uncontrollability: they can represent Montaigne's own runaway mind, and are the means through which he— when on horseback — is able to do his best, most characteristic, thinking, as he tells us in 'Des vers de Virgile': 'Mais mon ame me desplait de ce qu'elle produict ordinairement ses plus profondes resveries, plus folles et qui me plaisent le mieux, à l'improuveu et lors que je les cerche moins; lesquelles s'esvanouissent soudain, n'ayant sur le champ où les attacher: à cheval, à la table, au lit, mais plus à cheval, où sont mes plus larges entretiens'.[411] They are Montaigne's favourite means of travel, and where he feels most comfortable (as he tells us in 'Des coches': 'Or je ne puis souffrir long temps (et les souffrois plus difficilement en jeunesse) ny coche, ny littiere, ny bateau; et hay toute autre voiture que de cheval, et en la ville et aux champs'). In the *Journal*, the secretary notes that riding offers Montaigne relief from the discomfort of his 'colicque' so he extends the time spent on horseback: 'Dès le chemin, il se plaingnoit de ses reins, qui fut cause, dit-il, qu'il allongea cette traite, estimant estre plus soulagé à cheval qu'il n'eust esté ailleurs'. [412]

I. Arms and Armour

Across a cluster of essays, Montaigne reflects subtly and incisively on the relationship between horses and armour — both conceived as types of military prosthesis — cognition, writing and honour. I have already considered one example from 'Des Livres'. In particular, in 'Des Destries' and 'Des armes de Parthes', he

[409] Daniel Miller, *Materiality* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2004). See also Peter Stallybrass and Ann Rosalind Jones, *Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000).
[410] For an enjoyably 'cavalier' biography of Montaigne in the saddle, see Jean Lacouture, *Montaigne à cheval* (Paris: Seuil, 1998).
[411] Montaigne's use of the verb 'brider' in the *Essais* would be interesting to consider in this context.
[412] *Journal*, pp. 54-55.

engages with the ethical and political implications of the use of armour and war horses, as forms of military prosthesis, in ways that link up richly with 'De l'exercitation'. Montaigne's commentary moves well beyond the conventional forms — of contemporary critique of early modern compared with Roman warcraft — into an analysis of prosthesis as a double-edged weapon, with both enabling and disabling potential.

In 'Des destries', an essay nominally on war horses or chargers, Montaigne writes 'Je ne démonte pas volontiers quand je suis à cheval, car c'est assiette en laquelle je me trouve le mieux, et sain et malade'. In this essay and 'Des armes des Parthes' Montaigne compares contemporary military art to that of the Romans and other ancient civilizations, offering a critique of modern-day techniques and attitudes which was fairly conventional for the period.

> Nos ancetres, et notamment du tems de la guerre des Anglois, en tous les combats solonnels et journées assignées, se mettoient la plus part du temps tous à pié, pour ne fier à autre chose qu'à leur force propre et vigueur de leur courage et de leurs membres. (I, 48, 289)

In fact much of the essay shows Montaigne considering whether fighting is more honourable performed on horseback or with 'pied à terre'. Thinking back to 'Des Livres' — and Montaigne's indictment added for the 1588 edition, 'Ils [les autheurs] montent à cheval parce qu'ils ne sont assez forts sur leur jambes' — horses leap out as an ambiguous figure for conveying inadequacy. Problematically for the idea that being 'à cheval' carries less valour than fighting on foot (like the infantry), medieval gentleman soldiers (knights) were typically heavily armoured and rode on horseback. Chevaliers are something of an ideal figure for Montaigne, and in the popular imagination at large, embodying the ideals of 'nos ancetres'. Still on the topic of authorial honour, in 'De l'institution des enfans' (I, 26) Montaigne weaves together discourses of writing and fighting, valour and cowardice, connecting notions of military strategy and planning ('dessein'), the use of arms and 'les inventions anciennes rappiecées par cy par là':

> De faire ce que j'ay descouvert d'aucuns, se couvrir des armes d'autruy, jusques à ne montrer pas seulement le bout de ses doigts, conduire son dessein, comme il est aysé aux sçavans en une matiere commune, sous les inventions anciennes rappiecées par cy par là: à ceux qui les veulent cacher et faire propres, c'est premierement injustice et lascheté, que n'ayant rien en leur vaillant par où se produire, ils cherchent à se presenter par une valeur estrangiere, et puis, grande sottise, se contentant par piperie de s'acquerir l'ignorante approbation du vulgaire, se descrier envers les gens d'entendement qui hochent du nez nostre incrustation empruntée, desquels seuls la louange a du poids.

In the same essay Montaigne criticizes the use of firearms, rather than the good old-fashioned sword:

> Comme je conseilleroy de choisir les armes les plus courtes, et celles dequoy nous nous pouvons le mieux respondre. Il est bien plus apparent de s'asseurer d'une espée que nous tenons au poing, que du boulet qui eschappe de nostre pistole, en laquelle il y a plusieurs pieces, la poudre, la pierre, le rouet, desquelles la moindre qui viendra à faillir, vous fera faillir vostre fortune. (290)

Here Montaigne contrasts the sword with the (then) new-fangled *arquebus*, or early handgun, which depends on 'plusieurs pieces' working together — failing which, fortune itself will fail. Montaigne is all for short-handled weapons which enable greater contact, responsiveness and above all, *control*, bound up with the ethical concern of responsibility and action: 'celles dequoy nous nous pouvons le mieux respondre'. [413] Furthermore, the handgun - though held in the hand - does not work through the hands as such: it strikes via a shot of the bullet *escaping* the gun.[414] In similar vein, in 'Des armes de Parthes' Montaigne passes in review various systems of armament and defence in ancient civilizations, as a pretext for a critical comparison, again, between the current state of warcraft and the greater valour of former times. In particular, the language of weight and distance is recurrent: armour is so heavy as to be an impediment, while firearms involves an undesirable physical, and ethical, distance. This concern with proximity and remoteness in warfare strikes me as being part of a prehistory of 'drone theory'.[415] Guillemette Bolens has explored the changes wrought by changes of military technology in the period to the cultural understanding and representation of the human body in literature through an analysis of the 'wounding gestures' — those of striking and of shooting — narrated in two sixteenth century texts. As she points out, what made portable firearms and handguns so troubling was that 'they placed devastating destructive power into the hands of combatants alien to the chivalric circle of elite heroism. (...) The prospect of such enticing yet horrific power in such hands created an ideological dilemma for writers of the early part of the sixteenth century'. Bolens holds that the actions of striking and of shooting, and their related kinesic verbs, were invested with moral values at a time when 'the gunpowder revolution was progressively changing warfare practices, the experience of embodiment and kinesic imagination'.[416]

Once again, his critique is couched in genealogical, ancestral terms:

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[413] A parallel can be drawn between this emphasis on direct contact and what is 'propre' in the context of battle and Montaigne's comments on surgery versus medicine in 'De la ressemblance des enfans aux peres' (II, 37) — 'C'est par là que la chirurgie me semble beaucoup plus certaine, par ce qu'elle voit et manie ce qu'elle fait'.

[414] The significance of the verb 'eschapper' is very clear: the bullet, rather like the 'cheval eschappé' metaphor Montaigne uses to express his own unruly mind, is bolting, out of control.

[415] See Grégoire Chamayou, *La Théorie du drone* (Paris: La Fabrique, 2013).

[416] See Guillemette Bolens, 'The Gunpowder Revolution in Literature: Early Modern Wounds in Folengo and Rabelais', in *Movement in Renaissance Literature,* pp. 109-132.

> Nos peres donnoient leur salade, leur lance et leurs gantelets à porter, et n'abandonnoient le reste de leur equippage, tant que la courvée duroit. Nos trouppes sont à cette heure toutes troublées et difformées par la confusion du bagage et des valets, qui ne peuvent esloigner leurs maistres, à cause de leurs armes.

There are parallels here with the 'troupe' of Montaigne's own journey, where the 'baggage' of other people and their different conceptions of travel is an impediment.

II. *Plumes*

Montaigne's account of the Parthians' arms and armour — framed as a direct citation from Marcellinus's *Res Gestae* (books XXIV and XXV), describes them in terms that convey the peculiar combination of lightness and flexibility — likening the components of the armour to natural, creature-y things such as feathers, and scales ('les escailles dequoy nos ancestres avoient fort accoustumé de se servir')— with the hardness of iron:

> Au demeurant, Marcellinus, homme nourry aux guerres Romaines, remerque curieusement la façon que les Parthes avoyent de s'armer, et la remerque d'autant qu'elle estoit esloignée de la Roumaine. Ils avoient, dit-il, des armes tissuës en maniere de petites plumes, qui n'empeschoient pas le mouvement de leur corps: et si estoient si fortes que nos dards rejalissoient, venant à les hurter" (ce sont les escailles dequoy nos ancestres avoient fort accoustumé de se servir). Et en un autre lieu: "Ils avoient, dict-il, leurs chevaux forts et roydes, couverts de gros cuir; et eux estoient armez, de cap à pied, de grosses lames de fer, rengées de tel artifice qu'à l'endroit des jointures des membres elle prestoient au mouvement. On eust dict que c'estoient ses hommes de fer; car ils avoient des accoustrements de teste si proprement assis, et representans au naturel la forme et parties du visage, qu'il n'y avoit moyen de les assener que par des petits trous ronds qui respondoient à leurs yeux, leur donnant un peu de lumiere, et par fentes qui estoient à l'endroict des naseaux par où ils prenoient assez malaisément haleine. (405-406).

The armour is woven like a tissue of 'petites plumes'; 'tissuës' combining the senses of textile, fabric, and also the more biological one of skin, composed of cells; 'escailles' summons the association of reptilian skin, or that of fish (or mythical creatures such as dragons), with the idea of interlinked parts or fragments making up one bodily barrier (or, indeed, contexture). The function of the phrase 'en maniere de' ('des armes tissuës en maniere de petites plumes') is not entirely clear, but suggests the arms are made of imbricated or interlinking pieces, shaped like plumes. Montaigne emphasises the kinesic potential of such bodily extensions to mimic, follow, or even enhance the course of the body's movements: the Parthians' arms 'n'empeschoient pas le mouvement de leur corps', and in the second paraphrase, 'elles [les lames de fer] prestoient au mouvement'.

From a positive-seeming description of the arms and armour of the Parthians, which draws connections with the natural world and its various means of defence and movement, Montaigne transitions into a parallel movement of more ambiguous imagery to describe these same arms. The tension between hardness and

fluidity becomes a seeming contradiction between ease and facilitation or enablement and impediment, as evidenced by the difficulty the iron-encased soldiers have in breathing through the 'fentes qui estoient à l'endroict des naseaux, par où ils prenoient assez malaisément halaine'. He participates in Marcellinus's exclamation about their likeness to iron men. In a paragraph which presented as reported speech ('dit-il', 'dict-il') — though the editions vary in their placing Montaigne's references to Marcellinus's text within quotation marks — the hypothetically-framed reported speech of 'on eust dict' places the author's subjective perspective at one remove, by making it impersonal, or a matter of near-objectivity. Indeed, 'on euct dit' as a conditional pronunciative stance, serves to group the real and hypothetical observers/ witnesses together, and as a result, to heighten the uncanniness of these 'hommes de fer'. This phrase, now a trope of science fiction, recalls Paré's 'mains de fer'. The tension between the natural and the artificial, the blurred boundaries between biological and synthetic, are palpable.

While the conceptual hinge between instruments of war and cognition is, in 'De l'exercitation' (an essay firmly embedded in the context of the civil wars) the 'harquebusade' or the shot of the arquebus, in 'Des armes des Parthes' the *plume* operates as a conceptual 'jointure' between arms and writing.[417] In 'Des Livres', the essay that comes immediately after, Montaigne writes:

> 'J'aimeray quelqu'un qui me sçache deplumer, je dy par clairté de jugement et par la seule dictinction de la force et beauté des propos. Car moy, qui, à faute de mémoire, demeure court tous les coups à les trier, par cognoissance de nation, scay très bien sentir, à mesurer ma portée, que mon terroir n'est aucunement capable daucunes fleurs trop riches que j'y trouve semées, et que tous les fruicts de mon creu ne les sçauroient payer' (408).

Reading the phrase 'J'aimeray quelqu'un qui me sçache deplumer' in the context of the post 1588 passage where it is found, we can appreciate how the duality of the verb 'deplumer' - denoting the act of plucking, or picking (flowers, fruit or feathers) but in this case equally that of disarming, or 'de-penning' - is part of a broader meditation, running across both the *Essais* and the *Journal*, between prosthesis, cognition and writing. The very enjambement between the two consecutive essays gives the notion of 'jointure' — referred to explicitly in 'Des Armes de Parthes' — a special kind of embodied feel, between the 'natural' and the prosthetic.

[417] For the wider context, see James J. Supple, *Arms versus Letters: The Military and Literary Ideals of the 'Essais'* (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1984).

'Deplumer' echoes the 'petites plumes' of the preceding essay — as well as the feathers from which birds' nests are constructed, in the 'Apologie' — and is the culminating touch in a buildup of word plays and images conveying the idea of his covering himself with others' feathers - or the words from their writing plumes: 'Il faut musser ma foiblesse souz ces grands credits'. This playful reflection on a crucial dimension of his own writing practice - borrowing from others, and making authorities speak for him (or, in light of Montaigne's conception of his writing as being a *speaking to* the page - 'Je parle au papier comme au premier que je rencontre' (III, 1) - somehow making them *write* for him) plays on the arms/ armour/ pen nexus. 'Plume'— like the 'feuille' (and gesture of 'feuilleter') in Basel, and the bird's nest in the 'Apologie' — figures the two-way slippage between material and abstract, literal and metaphorical. This movement along a spectrum, distilled in these particular emblems from the natural world, guides our understanding of Montaigne's writing as a process fluidly moving across dualities of nature and culture. It also guides our reading of consubstantiality, as moving between figural and literal, suspended between real presence and 'mere' memory.

Conclusion

Nous sommes chacun plus riche que nous ne pensons: mais on nous dresse à l'emprunt et à la queste: on nous duict à nous servir plus de l'autruy que du nostre (III, 12, 1038)

Contextus totus virilis est; non sunt circa flosculos occupati. (III, 5,873)

In 1, 26, Montaigne cites from Horace's *Satires,* but leaves out the third and fourth lines which are a direct transposition from Ennius's *Annales*:

Tempora certa modosque, et quod prius ordine verbum est,
Posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis,
[Non, ut si solvas: "Postquam Discordia taetra
Belli ferratos postis portasqua refregit."]
Invenias etiam disjecti membra poetae ,[418]

Adding, 'il ne se démentira point pour cela; les pieces mesmes en seront belles'. (170)

Montaigne's use of Horace, here, can be read both as a comment on identity and war, and on the inference of poetic identity: the irreducible recognizability of a poet from his scattered and dislocated remains, 'disjecta membra'. The phrase continues to be employed, in memory of Horace's original usage, alluding to Orpheus,

[418] 'Take from the verses which I am writing now, or which Lucilius wrote in former days, their regular beat and rhythm—change the order of the words, transposing the first and the last—and it would not be like breaking up:/When foul Discord's din/War's posts and gates of bronze had broken in,/where, even when he is dismembered, you would find the limbs of a poet.' Horace, *Satires*, IV. 58-62.

to refer to surviving fragments of manuscripts, poetry and other cultural artefacts, including pottery. The significance of Montaigne's inclusion of this 'piece' of Horace — with its spectral, absent lines from Ennius — is its bringing together themes of dismemberment, identity and memory, as relevant to bodies in war as to other culturally significant bodies. It also concerns the relationship between writing, identity, consubstantiality, and archaeological fragments, in ways that are relevant to some of the aspects I have considered in this chapter. One Renaissance understanding of the past, and of knowledge itself, as an archipelago of scattered fragments — linked into a contexture conceived as a 'whole' but a dynamic one, composed of numberless ties and possible connections —has affinities with contemporary understandings of cognition as being distributed and extended into the material, social and technological environment.

By way of conclusion I wish, very briefly, to reflect on how Derrida's analysis of supplementation can give a useful perspective on how consubstantiality and memory relate to writing and prosthesis — and, by extension, how the *Journal* can be understood in relation to the *Essais*. Tracing 'cette histoire techno-politique de l'écriture' back to its roots—as he refers to his project in *De la Grammatologie*, from the vantage point of *Papier Machine* some thirty years later — Derrida identifies the 'racines métaphysico-théologiques' central to the longstanding hierarchy between written and spoken word. As noted in Chapter One, writing conceived as artificial memory and substitute for the living or real presence of the speaker generated anxieties about its effects on natural memory. As Derrida puts it: 'L'écriture aurait donc l'extériorité qu'on prête aux ustensiles ; outil imparfait de surcroît et technique dangereuse'.[419] As we have seen, cognitively-speaking, the exteriority of the 'outil' is far from clear-cut; like the 'model', the tool is integrated into our cognitive ecology, which thrives on interactions and ambiguities between 'inner' and 'outer', what is 'propre' and what is 'tierce'. For writing, in this tradition, is reducible to one of the 'moyens de conserver le langage parlé, de le faire fonctionner hors de la présence du sujet parlant'.[420] Like Paré's prosthetic 'moyens de contrefaire' or 'd'accommoder', *l'écriture* exists to conserve and to 'make work' the spoken word in the absence of the speaker. The mechanicity of the 'faire fonctionner', which itself combines main verb and its auxiliary, is explicit. This 'logic du supplément' which shapes the Western sense of writing as replacement or counterfeit 'stand in' for the voice seems to be reflected in Montaigne's insistence that he is 'speaking' to the page. The interplay, at times verging on

[419] *De la Grammatologie*, p. 44.
[420] Ibid., p. 21.

conflation, between writing and speaking in Montaigne is further complicated by his account of the process by which his spoken thought comes to be written down. In 'De trois commerces', he tells us: 'Là, je feuillette à cette heure un livre, à cette heure un autre, sans ordre et sans dessein, à pieces descousues; *tantost je resve, tantost j'enregistre et dicte, en me promenant, mes songes que voicy*' (III, 3, 828, my emphasis). Through his thinking about consubstantiality and writing, which is itself a kind of kinesic 'double gesture' — interpreting the whole and the part or 'membre', the supplemental and the integral as different aspects of the same unity — Montaigne destabilizes any clear ontological hierarchy, and is already unravelling the dualities that Derrida, and many other twentieth-century thinkers, seek to deconstruct, but arguably in an even more sophisticated manner.

CONCLUSION

'Encore mieux en papier qu'en la chair vifve'? (II, 18, 665)

Les cendres mesmes d'une riche matiere, elles ont leur pris; et les os et reliques des personnes d'honneur, nous avons accoustumé de les tenir en respect et reverence. (II, 8, 389)

Quel que je soye, je le veux estre ailleurs qu'en papier. (...) Je suis moins faiseur de livres que de nulle autre besoigne. J'ay desiré de la suffisance pour le service de mes commoditez presentes et essentielles, non pour en faire magasin et reserve à mes heritiers. (II, 37, 784)

In its broadest traits, this study began with a curiosity about how presence might relate to extended mind. More specifically, with curiosity about what the reader's sense of Montaigne's authorial presence in his book, and his remarkable claim about his *Essais*' consubstantial nature, has to do with an understanding of mind as fundamentally extended into the environment and into artefacts and other *ouvrages.* How does the book conceived as a limb or member of Montaigne's life ('membre de ma vie') fit with the notion of consubstantiality, and what work does this apparent body-limb or parts-whole tension do? What kind of a thing or image is consubstantiality in Montaigne's thought and what historically-embedded interpretations are available to us that can also speak to contemporary perspectives on mind, memory and identity? These questions are as relevant to the temporally-extended act of reading as they are to the act of composing a 'registre de duree', as Montaigne does, carrying implications for our understanding of what reading performs — its efficacy — and of our understanding of the relationship between author and reader, and of the practice of reading texts from the past.

Conscious that consubstantiality is often read as a purely secular metaphor, I wanted to approach it with an open mind, both about its valency (secular or sacred or both), and about what kind of a thing or figure it is. One reading of consubstantiality available to us is, in a sense, a literal one, articulating Montaigne's real and enduring presence in the *Essais*, even as contemporary sensibilities make us shy away from the strange implications of such a 'literalist' interpretation and its metaphysical intimations of survival and resurrection. Part of the objective in this study has been to probe this interpretative uncertainty and underdetermination and to draw out how it is itself enfolded within Montaigne's *matiere*.

In order to investigate the relationship between consubstantiality, writing and extended mind in Montaigne, I have pursued three main pathways which approach the central concerns and key organizing concepts of the thesis — consubstantiality, presence, body, limb, materiality, artefactuality (the state of being made through skill), extended mind, composition — from a number of points of view which, together, can recalibrate our perspective on 'commonplace' and familiar themes. Consubstantiality is (I suggest) perhaps the central critical commonplace in Montaigne studies but it has not been given much sustained scholarly attention. The very notion of the commonplace (*topos* or *lieu commun)* and its points of contact with the *lieu de mémoire,* links rhetoric, pedagogy, subject matter, writing, compilation of knowledge for future reference, and the quasi-embodied act of passing through places many have passed through before; in the context of the *Essais*, written when the Renaissance tradition of commonplacing was at its height and which itself started out as a kind of commonplace book, and ultimately embodies a transformation of the genre, it has a particularly rich range of significance.

My particular choice of perspectives — in outline: memory, contexture, prosthesis —through which to investigate my topic reflects the view that the rich meaning of consubstantiality can be drawn out by rethinking it as a distinctively cognitive notion. Each of these perspectives considers the idea of consubstantial writing through the lens of extended cognition, by examining how cognitive technologies bridge categories of natural and artificial, and of internal and external, enabling a conception of mind as inherently ramified and extended into the individual's material, social, technological and symbolic contexts. Within each of these perspectives, my method has been to identify affinities between early modern and contemporary currents of thought on mind's extendedness, through Montaigne's texts. These affinities have been traced in a variety of ways: by considering similarities of the lexis used to articulate mind across these two different historical moments, by exploring overlaps between particular terms in early modern and contemporary discourse, and by using conceptual hinges (such as prosthesis) to draw out aspects of the interaction between the material and the discursive and the different forms of embodiment they can represent. I have taken a comparative, transhistorical approach, which engages two distinct historical and cultural periods in dialogue, both because I believe a 'polytemporal' and interdisciplinary perspective (or, more modestly, a perspective inflected by ideas and paradigms from disciplines other than literary study) lends itself especially well to early modern thinkers like Montaigne, and because it suits my particular subject matter. The common logic running throughout the

chapters, which are, *prima facie*, quite eclectic, is the understanding that consubstantiality needs to be approached from a variety of distinct but interconnected angles, to gain a handle on its three-dimensionality in Montaigne's thinking and writing. Therefore, this study has intentionally moved between direct and oblique approaches to Montaigne's consubstantial text; for example, it has tried to 'see' the *Essais* from the point of view of the *Journal* and vice versa, in order to think about questions of intertextuality, memory, and how consubstantiality relates to limbs. I set out on these doctoral travels with a working assumption that a cognitive approach would shed valuable light on consubstantiality — and how the concept might mediate between distinctively early modern and distinctively contemporary ways of thinking about cognitive extendedness — without any fixed idea about how. The three chapters here are a very partial trace of the 'diverses voies' explored along the way but which have stayed true to the essence of the project as initially formulated.

My opening chapter, entitled '"Chaque piece en son siege": The Nature and Art of Memory in the *Essais'* has taken memory as its focus, for three main reasons: Montaigne tells us in 'De l'expérience' that his *Essais* are a form of artificial memory he is forging as he writes ('A faute de memoire naturelle j'en forge de papier', 1092); memory is pivotal to questions of personal and collective identity;and consubstantiality understood as a eucharistic concept is itself closely bound up in matters of memory and re-presentation. This statement identifies his book as an artefact that participates in his extended mind and is not a mere attachment, in a way that shares a family resemblance with contemporary conceptions of extended memory. Running with the opposition Montaigne presents between natural and artificial memory, this Chapter charts Montaigne's positioning of his *Essais* in relation to a number of traditions of memory operative in the period: as a natural physiological process understood as the imprinting of images in the soul which can, through technique, be enhanced and harnessed to enable the mind to reach beyond its innate capacities, and a crucial constituent of rhetoric, pedagogy, and poetics. In order to explore the interactions between natural and artificial memory in the period, I consider how memory is historically understood as a technology of writing in the soul, leaving an imprint or mould to be retraced through recollection, and consider Montaigne's metaphors of memory.

By considering how memory is conceptualized through the 'interiorization' of technologies and material artefacts, which form part of a quasi-biological feedback loop, I show that Montaigne's understanding of memory and its relation to writing and composition is attuned to the subtle interplay and interdependency of

natural and artificial, material and mental, self and other, as well as memory and forgetting. In order to further examine the relation between natural and artificial memory I focus on three samples or sketches of memory's functioning which — like Montaigne's 'quasi-trasse'— involve both presence and absence, 'mémoire' and 'oubly'. In a sixteenth century context, consubstantiality understood as artificial memory, itself a variant or subcategory of extended mind, takes on a particularly complex resonance and significance owing to the interconnections between theology, metaphysics, politics, and identity (personal, collective and confessional) of the time. Through my readings in the Chapter, I have shown that memory is a key bridge between consubstantiality and extended mind, providing a way of understanding composition and intertextuality as treading a path between remembrance and forgetting, and between different identities, which itself has a political dimension, then and now. I have also shown that Montaigne's attitude to memory and forgetting is shaped by his understanding of the relationship between speech and writing.

Chapter Two, '"Membre de ma vie": Contexture, Communication and Extended Cognition' shifted the focus from memory to questions of communication, and how aspects of cognitive extendedness can be illuminated by considering them through the prism of 'contexture'. The objective here, was twofold: firstly, to explore, in relation to consubstantiality, how figurative language communicates intention, and what implications this might have for interpreting consubstantiality, and secondly, to consider early modern extended mind in an ecological perspective. The concept linking the notion of cognitive ecology with communication is contexture. In a first part, I shed light on the affinities between the notions of contexture and relevance across historical and cultural idioms: firstly, affinities stemming from their shared webbed structure, and secondly functional affinities, related to communication and meaning construction. Following Hobbes, I proposed that 'contexture' provides the environment where fitting inferences can be drawn, linking this to the 'array of implicatures' in Relevance Theory that alter the addressee's possibilities of thinking. Exploring Montaigne's treatment of natural artefacts, especially in the 'Apologie' — the creaturely, ingenious intricacies of webs and nests — I show that he elaborates traditional natural historical *topoi* and motifs in a more explicitly cognitive and hermeneutic perspective, deliberately situating human-designed gadgets, devices and *ouvrages* on a continuum with those natural kinds manufactured by other species.

I propose that the contemporary cognitive and biological concept of 'niche construction' can illuminate early modern notions connected to climate, habitat and ecology, as well as agency and determinism, which are all relevant to Montaigne's philosophy of writing and composition, without compromising their historical particularity. In a second part, I draw on the ecological perspective of contexture to identify a number of 'cognitive reincarnations' in the *Essais* — examples of Montaigne's engagement with the extended nature of cognition, bridging biological and non-biological, anatomical and architectural, human and non-human, which I suggest are in some sense 'reincarnated' in contemporary idioms and discourse. By directing attention to specific aspects of Montaigne's understanding of the mind, and the mental, as inherently extended — hybrid, embodied, scaffolded and materially supported and constituted, even in our most seemingly private, inner and spiritual activities of introspection and faith— I have shown that Montaigne understands all cognition to involve some form of material admixture or 'meslange materiel', including metaphor, which meditates between the embodied and the abstract. Together, these two parts have shown that our understanding of consubstantiality's relationship to extended mind can be guided by thinking with contexture, a concept that offers a dual, or joint, perspective on merelogical questions of consubstantiality seen both as a function of the part ('membre de ma vie') and the whole ('livre consubstantiel à son autheur'). Further, I suggest that the potency of consubstantiality as a cognitive figure derives in part from its underdetermination and its rich eucharistic implicatures, which do not commit Montaigne to a single meaning about what it is to be consubstantial with his *Essais*.

Chapter Three, entitled 'Writing Limbs: Journeying, Prosthesis, Memory', has explored how a shift of focus onto Montaigne's *other* book, the *Journal,* affects our understanding of consubstantiality in its relation to extended mind, memory and authorial presence. On the grounds that it connotes a complex style of embodiment and an uneasy integration of part to whole I proposed the linguistic, medical and discursive concept of prosthesis as a useful way into a number of related aspects of Montaigne's writing: the relation between Montaigne's consubstantial book and the more apparently extraneous 'membre', the *Journal* (implicitly numbered among the 'tous autres livres' of 'occupation tierce' in 'Du démentir'); the relation between spoken and written word, via notions of dictation and 'truchement' or interpretation; and Montaigne's own language of (problematically) embodied and extended cognition. After setting out prosthesis in a quasi-material sense as a critical lens for reading aspects of the *Journal* and *Essais,* I have suggested that 'prosthetic

memory' — a term used in some contemporary discourse — is a clear relative of artificial memory, but one where notions of supplementarity and embodiment are more salient.

In Part One I focus on two places on Montaigne's journey, Basel and Rome (*loci* which are *en route* and the destination, respectively) and Montaigne's attention to various types of memory which can be conceived as 'prosthetic' — whether in the form of technologies of cognition and memory, including material supports and extensions, or ruins, statues and monuments from the classical past. Linking this back through to consubstantiality, I trace Montaigne's marked interest in confessional difference, especially differing interpretations and practices of the Eucharist and the use of artefacts in worship, as he crosses Switzerland and Germany, to his broader investigation of extended mind and the role of the material and artefactual in cognitive ecologies and communities. Through my readings I have shown that Montaigne stages a problematic suturing between imagined and actual experience: ruins and fragments from the past, characterized by their decayed and partial aspect, must be imaginatively supplemented and restored to integrity and wholeness. I show that in his visit to the Vatican library, Montaigne's close attention to the materials of writing, especially their sensory qualities, the texture, thickness and feel of the parchment and papyrus, demonstrates a fascination for the presence and survival of the author in these books and manuscripts, which resonates with his own identity as an author, and his sense of living on in 'dans la memoire des livres', as paper memories capable of artificially extending the author's lifespan.

In Part Two, I returned to the *Essais* to examine how, across a cluster of essays, Montaigne considers the relation between horses and armour — both kinds of military prosthesis — and cognition, writing and honour. I have shown that in 'Des Destries' and 'Des armes de Parthes' in particular, he engages with the ethical and political implications of the use of armour and war horses in ways that link up with 'De l'exercitation', which embeds personal memory (Montaigne's *recordation* of a riding accident) within the collective experience and memory of the civil wars, which policies of *oubliance* would attempt to consign to collective forgetting. As I show, armour, by mimicking the natural defences of other species — their feathers, scales and so on — becomes a means of thinking about composition itself, just as creaturely contextures provide the model for human creativity: the 'plume' operating as a conceptual *jointure* between arms and writing. Overall, this Chapter has allowed me to show that the embodied itinerary of Montaigne's journey, traced with paper and ink in the

Journal, participates intertextually in Montaigne's consubstantial book. As a form of memory that is neither wholly consubstantial nor fully prosthetic, the *Journal* engages with the problems of writing and of his kind of autopoietic writing specifically. Most notably, the problem set out in 'De la vanité' of consubstantiality's co-extensiveness with the material supports of writing, extending the mind right up to the horizon set by the world's supplies of paper and ink: 'Qui ne voit que j'ay pris une route par laquelle, sans cesse et sans travail, j'iray autant qu'il y aura d'ancre et de papier au monde?' (III, 9, 945), a horizon which communicates both possibility and limit.

* * *

> En mon climat de Gascongne, on tient pour drolerie de me veoir imprimé. D'autant que la connoissance qu'on prend de moy s'esloigne de mon giste, j'en vaux d'autant mieux. J'achette les imprimeurs en Guiene, ailleurs ils m'achettent. Sur cet accident se fondent ceux qui se cachent, vivants et presents, pour se mettre en credit, trespassez et absents. J'ayme mieux en avoir moins. Et ne me jette au monde que pour la part que j'en tire. Au partir de là, je l'en quitte. (III, 2, 809)

The sense of this late addition to 'Du repentir' is enriched in the light of these three chapters' investigation into consubstantiality and extended mind in Montaigne's writing. Firstly the related notions of 'climat' and 'giste' take on a distinctively cognitive flavour; the concept of 'climat' (denoting 'zone' or 'slope or inclination' of a part of the earth considered with respect to long-term weather conditions), expands from its core geographical and meteorological sense into the broader sense of cognitive environment, where atmospheric conditions can be understood as the cognition-shaping possibilities and constraints of the individual's situation or context. 'Giste' too (from the past participle of 'gésir': to lie, to be located) is inflected by ecological notions of 'logement', niche and habitat as well as the loci of natural and artificial memory. The 'me' in 'de me voir imprimé' operates ambiguously between book as embodied subject and as material object; it can denote full consubstantiality (Montaigne as one substance with the *Essais*) or only partial consubstantiality, allowing Montaigne a perspective from 'ailleurs', from beyond or 'outside' his book, which he can perceive from a third-person perspective. The chiastic structure of the quip, 'J'achette les imprimeurs en Guiene, ailleurs ils m'achettent' tracks precisely this substitution of authorial subject for authorial object, mingling identities. The dynamic relation between a number of variables — 'connoissance', presence versus absence, proximity/distance from or to his 'giste', and the value and credit in which he/ his *Essais* are held — is proposed as a sliding scale: the further one gets from the epicentre or source, the less likely that his audience knows him as a biological man rather than as an author, and the greater his perceived worth. This peculiar inverse relation, he says, is an

'accident' — a chance psychological, circumstantial fact —which shapes the choices of those wishing to control and manage the credit in which they are held by deliberately limiting supply: by hiding themselves away when alive so as to be more valuable — in a way, more 'digne de mémoire' — in a posthumous life afforded by print. In a sense, they substitute their living presence for absence in the hopes of securing an 'artificial' literary afterlife of indefinite duration, unlike biological life. Together, these various elements in the passage are about contexture, in the multifaceted richness of its sense throughout the *Essais*: the web of relations and meanings, intentions and gestures, contingencies and causalities, accidents and essences, in which all life finds itself, and all meaning constructed. In this passage, the sliding scale operates as a form of wit that also says something important about the continuum, the axes along which absence and presence, proximity and distance are located and move, which is also a cognitive continuum or cognitive extendedness. We can relate this back to the notion of relevance, and the literal-loose-metaphorical spectrum on which Relevance Theory situates all written and spoken utterances: the meaning of this passage is located on the same kind of continuum it itself describes. It is not so much that this passage from 'Du repentir' is clarified by the various considerations of this study, but that its very underdetermination comes into clearer, sharper focus. In this way, consubstantiality, too, emerges as neither fully metaphorical not fully literal, but functioning – via the problematics of its own theological and political charge in the context of the Wars of Religion – as a means of navigating between the material and metaphorical, and probing the difficult-to-draw, porous boundaries between self and other, nature and artifice, all operating within the contexture of extended mind.

One obvious way that writing connects to extended mind is that through publication, and particularly print, the mind enters into contact with an array of other minds: it moves beyond the fiction of its own 'private' nature into collective or public 'confessional' space. In the essay preceding 'Du repentir' ('De l'ustile et de l'honneste'), in the context of a reflection on private and public interest and duty, Montaigne writes, ' C'est une instruction propre au temps: nous n'avons que faire de durcir nos courages par ces lames de fer; c'est assez que nos espaules le soyent; c'est assez de tramper nos plumes en ancre, sans les tramper en sang. (III, I, 802). Here, the immanent quasi-eucharistic connection made in the *Essais*, between blood, ink, and wine and between paper and flesh — an aspect of what in the introduction I called Montaigne's 'sacramental poetics' — is brought out more explicitly in relation to what is 'propre au temps', the religious wars dismembering (literally and metaphorically) his homeland.

From the start, the project was envisaged as having a methodologically reflexive aspect, involving a reflection on the value of a cognitive and transhistorical approach to my particular configuration of themes. This approach has posed challenges and constraints as well as possibilities; as is often the case, the limits and constraints cannot easily be differentiated from the affordances and opportunities, as they are different aspects of the same thing. One tangible 'limit' relates to the problem of commensurability: the communicability of different historical contexts as well as different methods of enquiry. These questions of anachronism and disciplinarity beset transhistorical and comparative or interdisciplinary approaches, but while the concerns are valid and instructive, and need to be held in mind for findings to be meaningful, memory is itself a machine of anachronism, situating us in polytemporal, palimpsestic space; reading the *Essais* beyond his biological death, in the succession of generations from the late sixteenth century until now is itself a form of anachronism that Montaigne deliberately *planned* and wrote for. Projects that aim to consider ideas and concepts across historical periods and disciplines are, by nature, hybrid and 'monstrueux', speaking (or trying to speak) across different 'tongues', which arguably makes them especially fitting for an early modern context, even if in other ways their identities sit awkwardly in institutional frameworks. Thinking of Montaigne as participating in the prehistory of contemporary cognitive science is useful, and truthful, precisely because his 'material remains' represent a situated body of information and evidence about mind and its workings at a moment when the enduring presence of the classical past and developments in technology were changing people's understanding of mind, memory, writing and survival.

Together, the chapters here reflect on how the meaning of consubstantiality can be illuminated, and refracted, through extended mind, with particular focus on memory, contexture, ecology and prosthesis. A number of common themes emerge across these chapters, knitting the material and the cognitive, the ontological and the discursive. The 'niche' is not only an architectural alcove to fit a statue, but functions in Montaigne (as well as in contemporary evolutionary biology) as an emblem for cognition in its ecological context; its complexities mirroring the miraculous material 'contextures' of the swallow and kingfisher, and the 'bricolage' of composition. Yet, linking back to the idea of a recess for a statue, the idea of the niche is also central to commemoration and mourning, and germane to Montaigne's project of hollowing out textual place for La Boétie to secure his living on. Montaigne's writing recognizes not only various materialities of memory — from

the three-dimensional 'moulds' or imprints on wax tablets in ancient thought, which recall the intertextual memory of Humanist poetics, to the material mnemonics of effigies such as statues and paper *aides-mémoire* such as the 'protocolle'— but that reconstruction of the past through its fragments, remains and relics is an inferential interpretative process, akin to the construction of meaning. Prosthesis is a *fil rouge* linking notions of 'lack' (*défaut*), absence or incompleteness to those of presence, restoration and redemption, as well as a frame for thinking about how the written word relates to the spoken word. Throughout the *Essais* the 'quasi-trasse' — the memory trace that is almost traceless, barely legible — articulates a radical ambiguity between spectrality and embodiment, which has a bearing on how we think about the *Essais* as a book of memory, securing Montaigne's place among those who live on in 'la memoire des livres.'

Aspects of the *Essais*' meditation on the relation between flesh and paper (and marks on paper) chime in with Derrida's meditation in *Feu la cendre,* on the trace – both 'signe de passage' and 'effacement' – and the trace's relation to time, memory and identity:

> J'ai maintenant l'impression que le meilleur paradigme de la trace, pour lui, ce n'est pas, comme certains l'ont cru, et lui aussi peut-être, la piste de chasse, le frayage, le sillon dans le sable, le sillage dans la mer, l'amour du pas pour son empreinte, mais la cendre. 421

The very fact of ashes ('lieu de brûlure, mais de quoi, de qui?') involves loss of identity, radical erasure, while simulaneously being a memorial site; for this reason cinders afford, for Derrida, a paradigm for the relationship of language to the living and the dead.

Across these three interconnecting chapters, I have explored some of the ways Montaigne handles his understanding of the mind's inherent extendedness or, seen from another perspective, its inherent incompleteness, and have found that consubstantiality and extended cognition are two sides of the same fundamental conception of the relation between author and *ouvrage,* artist and artwork. The enquiry does not attempt to find closure on the issue of Montaigne's 'real presence' (or otherwise) in his *Essais* but by entertaining this as a possible meaning has at least, I hope, restored the inherent openendedness of the term, oscillating between secular and sacred, literal and metaphorical, a reading that is strangely often 'missing' from contemporary readings with their emphasis on Montaigne's deliberate secularization of religious or spiritual

421 Jacques Derrida, *Feu la cendre* (Paris: Des Femmes, 1987), p. 27.

practices, such as confession, which extends to the notion of consubstantiality . Cutting across the chapters, the fragment, the sample, the 'piece' and the 'membre' emerge as the connective tissue between themes as apparently disparate as statues, the evidentiary fragments of intention in inferential communication, the *loci* of memory, Roman ruins and missing limbs in want of artificial supplementation and restoration. The fragment and the sample point us from the particular to the universal, show us how to construct (or reconstruct) a whole from partial traces, while the model represents the quasi-materiality of mental organization and the conceptual basis of Renaissance *imitatio*. The notion of the memorial 'quasi-trasse' operates as a counterfactual 'as if', threading a sense of suspension and indeterminacy through our reading, mirrored in the uncertain ontological scope of Montaigne's consubstantiality allegory. The metaphysics of essence and accident, necessity and contingency, crops up in contexts as varied as Montaigne's literal fall from his horse (in 'De l'exercitation'), to the eucharist, to the ontological, social and ethical matter of identity, and humanity's fallen nature. My approach has been to follow where the *Essais* and *Journal* have pointed but always with a focus on how these intratextual and intertextual connections create an ecology in which the overarching idea of consubstantiality is situated and through which its meaning can be more holistically interpreted.

Reading consubstantiality 'cognitively' has meant two main things: it has involved thinking about cognition (and particularly extended cognition) as self-consciously integral to Montaigne's *matiere*, and also provided an instrument of reading which makes salient those more implicit or immanent aspects of Montaigne's writing that reveal and enlist literature's power to think about thinking. What makes the *Essais* such an exemplary and potent candidate for studying these questions is that we are given to understand, from the very start, that his consubstantial book *is* his mind: he explicitly tells us, from an imagined perspective of one already biologically dead, that his essence can be reanimated through a material artefact, a book, which elsewhere he conceptualizes as an extension of mind, a form of artificial memory. Therefore the notion central to cognitive literary study — that literature provides an endlessly rich archive of the living mind in motion, revealing and harnessing the potentialities of language as a flexible cognitive instrument — in a sense reaches its fullest applicability in a Renaissance text which claims to be identical with its author's situated mind. In this way, a cognitive approach is not an add-on or a 'grille de lecture', a supplement or a tool co-opted (rather disjointedly) into literary study, though some do think this. All readings and interpretations are a kind of accommodation, organizing and fitting parts of texts together in particular ways. The difference offered by cognitive approaches

in their various guises, at least in principle, is that they draw on insights about mind and language from other disciplines (which seems particularly apposite when reading texts from a past before the invention of the 'two cultures' of arts and sciences) to understand the thinking and feeling power of literature.

Reconceptualizing consubstantiality in this way has involved the translation of familiar themes into more explicitly cognitive terms, enabling me to show that a slight shift of perspective can engineer quite a significant change both in how we might think about Montaigne's consubstantial book, as material artefact and limb of his literary living on, and how we might think of ourselves, as readers, as participants in a distinctive cognitive ecology around Montaigne's writing, in which the dual acts of reading and writing become a reciprocal process of incorporation or consubstantiation. My contribution to this distinctive ecology has been to shed light on how the idea of consubstantiality might be rethought in relation to a contemporary, secular idiom of extended mind, without simply ignoring its sacramental implicatures, and how those operate in Montaigne's sixteenth century context and continue to resonate in our own. Above all, it has sought to better understand, through aspects of the co-histories of rhetoric, poetics, philosophy, and cognitive science, how Montaigne has managed to secure his enduring place in the present.

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