Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

*Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens' Behaviour*

By Oliver Cover, New College

78,540 words

Submitted in Trinity Term, 2007
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Abstract

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This thesis involves the examination, using sophisticated statistical techniques, of whether political corruption measured at the national level, and individual level perceived corruption, can help explain a) levels and forms of political participation, and b) directions of partisanship and vote choice. It proposes that corruption creates conditions of distrust and disaffection towards political institutions and actors that has behavioural and partisan consequences. It finds that perceived corruption has limited influence: dampening turnout, although having only weak effects on extra-institutional behaviour and on party support. Yet national level corruption is found to have highly salient contextual effects. It dampens turnout and induces higher levels of extra-institutional participation where corruption is particularly high, and particularly low, owed to citizen disillusionment in the former case, and elite responsiveness in the latter. Some nuanced theoretical explanations for the prowess of contextual effects over individual level effects, relating to the ability of contextual effects to entrench participatory forms, are offered. The same theme is analysed in regard to a British case study, and specialist data yields consistent results regarding perceived corruption. Important effects relating to perceptions of broader standards of public life determining party support in the UK are also found.

The thesis also addresses two other themes. By examining the nature of perceived corruption in the UK, it finds that citizens display significant attitudinal sophistication. They are well able to differentiate corruption from other impropriety, and develop their perceptions of corruption more from consideration of institutional performance than from engrained orientations produced by processes of socialisation. Second, the thesis provides discussion of the intellectual challenge of defining and measuring corruption, shedding light on the limits, as well as the potential, of applying quantitative techniques to such a complex field of study.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Corruption, Participation, and Political Support: The Key Themes

This thesis examines whether levels and perceptions of political corruption influence rates of political participation, and the direction of citizens’ political support, in countries across the world. It proposes that where political corruption is high, citizens participate in ways that reflect distrust in, and alienation from, institutions and political actors, with important consequences for the political system more broadly. Hence, this study examines how particular effects of political corruption may act as hindrances to democratic consolidation and democratic quality. Although this is the first systematic analysis of citizen participation as endogenous to political corruption and perceived corruption, it is by no means the first time political corruption has been analysed as an exogenous determinant of the quality of democracy and of economic functioning, and of social cohesion.

Indeed, the most recent contributions are largely critical of corruption, rejecting functionalist perspectives where corruption is seen as enabling the working of an effective bureaucracy, and propose post-functionalist perspectives that recognise corruption as wasteful and unfair (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1996). For examples, Johnston (1986a), analyses corruption’s political consequences. Market corruption, such as the black market, is often stable, he asserts, and it would in fact imbalance the economy to suddenly remove it, implying that it is not a significant threat to a political system. He argues that patronage, cronyism and nepotism can lead to exclusion and inequality that can lead to conflict between winners and losers, however.
He also identifies crisis corruption, which takes place during instability and may serve to aggravate political and economic conditions.

Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) focus on corruption’s economic effects, and argue that small and medium sized firms suffer from rent-seeking and bribery, which allocates talent and resources away from productive activity. Thus, “there is a positive and significant association between the allocation of talent to unproductive activities and corruption” (p. 22). Meanwhile Theobald (2000) analyses the difficulties inherent in preserving stability and democratic principles concurrently during development. State building, he suggests, requires dealing with instability, crime, corruption and economic upheaval. Yet obtaining such control may require the violation of democratic principles. Considering sequencing crucial, Theobald advocates state building first and the installation of democracy second. To establish a strong and healthy civil society, sufficient institutional development is required to mediate between citizens and groups and lay the foundations for democratic procedure. Given this, corruption, along with other destabilising forces, should encourage a firm, top-down approach to democratisation.

This thesis aims to contribute to such post-functionalist perspectives of corruption by arguing that political corruption, and citizens’ perceptions of high levels of political corruption, affects forms and levels of political participation in ways that may be detrimental to the stability and cohesion of the political system. This is a challenge. Undeniably a host of forces are at work in shaping citizens’ participatory characteristics: institutional and structural factors affecting the level of opportunities available to citizens to participate are, of course, crucial. However the effect of public opinion on politics and society should not be understated. Inglehart (1997, p. 49), for example, states that his work on modernisation and post-modernisation rests on the
notion that “mass belief systems have important economic, political, and social consequences,” and his evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. Culture, politics, and economics are found to be highly related, although difficult to disentangle. Furthermore, the influential role of perceptions involving trust and alienation in informing political participation have been established before. Putnam (1993), for example, suggests that civic trust and norms of reciprocity help create conditions of coordinated civic engagement. Furthermore, if perceptions affect citizens’ political behaviours, then they may have a bearing on the functioning and quality of democracy more generally. Just as the attitudes one holds concerning money, such as one’s propensity to save or spend, may have a tangible effect on economic growth, so too attitudes towards politics may have a salient effect on democracy.

So what effects on political participation may we anticipate political corruption to have? We may assume that in democracy, one expects representatives will behave in ways that ensure the majority’s interests are protected, not just the interests of particular agents who offer to buy favours. One may also hold competence, honesty, and fairness to be important to democracy, which surely involves the expectations that representatives, and also civil servants, behave scrupulously, legally, truthfully, and in the public interest. The incidence of political corruption among elected or unelected officials may undermine these principles and leave citizens alienated, distrusting, and sceptical of democratic actors, institutions, or perhaps democracy itself.

This might be construed as a process that is self-correcting. Some commentators have found that the discrepancy between citizens’ ideals and political reality translates into pressure for change (Norris, 1999). However, if this pressure is not sufficient to encourage meaningful change, it is possible that political corruption
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and perceptions of its incidence may lead to behaviour which further undermines the political system. If politicians or civil servants are perceived to be abusing their position or resources, citizens may become cynical towards the political process and institutions and fail to vote. If substantial political corruption highlights the inadequacies of established political institutions generally, they may be seen as arenas in which corruption may occur, or alternatively as bodies too weak or ineffective to prevent corruption. This may encourage extra-institutional rather than institutionally-based political participation. And extra-institutional participation, particularly if it is anti-systemic, such as the illegal occupation of buildings or violent protest, may be damaging for the political system. It may bring forth instability that nations with new or poorly functioning democratic systems will find difficult to contain, and is likely to further exacerbate deficiencies in democratic practice in established democracies.

It is notable that none of these activities have to link to political corruption or perceived corruption directly (although, for example, expelling corrupt officials via the ballot box or protesting against widespread corruption in politics are of course plausible participatory activities). Protest, voting, and any other form of political participation may be used in relation to any political issue, yet political corruption and perceived corruption may create conditions in which some forms of participation may be preferred to others. Corruption may increase distrust and scepticism of institutions, and, consequently, when any issue motivates citizen action, this action neglects and occurs outside of established rules, procedures or assemblies. Furthermore, if politicians associated with parties or other partisan interests are perceived to be corrupt, this may affect citizens’ political support, not only their inclination to engage in different forms of political behaviour. A corrupt incumbent government may encourage support for opposition parties, particularly those mobilised to combat
corruption, which will ultimately affect vote choices and the make up of future governments.

To analyse these broad claims, this thesis will deploy statistical analysis involving national level data, and data from individual level surveys. We will test hypothesised relationships between political corruption and perceived corruption, and a) political participation, and b) partisanship and vote choice. Though in this introductionary stage the reasoning has been general, more nuanced theoretical expectations will be proposed in each chapter, and these will be rigorously tested using appropriate methods. At the same time the methodological limitations of using survey responses and data pertaining to a phenomenon as elusive as corruption will be raised. Thus the thesis will demonstrate how quantitative analysis of a set of behaviours that participants purposefully attempt to hide, and of which citizens consequently have limited knowledge and plausibly divergent understandings, involves many complications. It will thus consider how theoretical treatments of political corruption may aid the application of political science to the topic – specifically, how theory and definitional typologies may help in sophisticating the operationalisation of variables, and help us to understand the limitations of pre-existing data.

Early Objections

At this early stage some theoretical objections to the key ideas and arguments may be confronted. A first objection is that the blanket treatment of ‘political corruption’ is theoretically naïve. Hence in this thesis attention will be paid to the conceptual difficulties inherent in defining and measuring political corruption, and its complexity
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as a heterogeneous and (to some) a culturally relative and immeasurable phenomenon. Different forms of corruption may have markedly varied effects on different forms of political participation. The perception of high levels of electoral fraud may, for example, encourage disdain for electoral institutions and thus act as a disincentive to turnout. The perception of high levels of bribery may contribute to anger directed towards politicians, the political system, or political institutions that expresses itself in extra-institutionalised, even anti-systemic and violent participation. Consequently, it will be important to contextualise quantitative analysis; to carefully specify how measures of corruption are operationalised, and to question how far survey questions really tap perceptions.

A second objection concerns causality. It may be that the nature of citizens' participation itself affects levels of political corruption. Low levels of some forms of participation may signal to elites that the public are uninterested in politics and may encourage malpractice against the backdrop of an unresponsive citizenry: low turnout and high perceived corruption may mutually reinforce each other. Therefore, in regard to the empirical chapters of the thesis dealing with participation, it must be acknowledged that we assume that, in regard to the relationship between a) corruption and perceived corruption and b) participation, the stronger notion of causality is that the former determines the latter, rather than vice-versa. With the available data it is difficult to test this assumption empirically (and it is indeed likely that a degree of mutual causality would be evident), but its strength may be argued to lie in the high plausibility of the theoretical reasons why corruption affects participation. These theoretical reasons are outlined in depth in the empirical chapters, and the strength of these reasons, in the absence of other ways of precisely determining causality, should dampen worries over endogeneity.
Determining causality is more problematic with regard to the relationship between corruption (and particularly perceived corruption), and political support. Voter X may perceive a government to be clean and decide to vote for them because he thinks they will continue to keep corruption under control; but equally voter Y, a highly partisan voter, may claim the government is clean simply because he supports them. Either way, perceived corruption appears to associate with vote choice, but we cannot deduce the causal arrow. Thus in the empirical chapter dealing with corruption and political support, this endogeneity problem will be outlined and discussed in depth. Nonetheless the causal direction we assumed earlier, that corruption affects political support, will be argued to be highly plausible.

A third objection concerns the simple question of whether corruption can be construed as a form of participation itself. Philp (2001, p. 366) suggests that: “(a)lthough most democratic systems rely on rules designed for a government of strangers, the viability of such governments depends heavily on a baseline of motivation in political life which can only be generated by friendships, familial and quasi-clientelist connections, old-boy networks and local and collegial connections.” In essence, corrupt transactions are a way of accessing politics and some citizens will do so to ensure they get what they want: to forge a business deal, to obtain a job, to encourage certain policies to be put in place. Nonetheless, there is no theoretical reason why we should not examine the effect of one form of participation on another, as participatory activities affect each other directly and indirectly all the time. The vote choice of some citizens may produce governments that enact policies that are abhorred by other citizens, who in turn respond by protesting. Being mobilised to sign a petition may encourage one to develop a greater interest in politics that expresses itself in far greater participatory activity over time. Furthermore, the proportion of
citizens in established democracies, especially in nations such as Britain (a key case study in this work) that would engage in corrupt behaviours is likely to be limited, certainly when compared to other forms of participation such as voting. As a result, corrupt behaviour may be viewed as a very particular form of political participation, as it is likely to be elitist and may sustain, and be a consequence of, inequality (You and Khagram, 2004, for instance, find that inequality and corruption relate). However, in other nations, widespread corrupt transactions may mean that citizens do not associate it only with high level political elites, but with public officials at the parochial level. In these circumstances it may nonetheless be assumed that citizens recognise such behaviour is not formally correct, and that perceptions of the quality of established political institutions are still likely to be affected.

Other Themes

This discussion has concerned the importance of the key research themes to be addressed in the study: the impact of corruption and perceived corruption on a) political participation, and b) political support and vote choice. However, to garner a better understanding of perceived corruption itself, this thesis will also consider other themes. Using specialist British data, in-depth analysis of the nature of perceptions of corruption may be undertaken. In essence, do these perceptions differ in a pertinent way to perceptions concerning other forms of impropriety in public life, such as incompetence? This is important, since if a substantive difference between the types of perceptions is not shown, we may simply be proxying far broader perceptions pertaining to the quality of democracy when we talk of 'perceived corruption'. Previous literature using 'perceived corruption' as a variable, and not controlling for
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other, related perceptions, may consequently be called into question. Furthermore, the analysis of the determinants of perceived corruption, and of censoriousness concerning perceived corruption, will enable the previous findings of other scholars to be tested using rigorous statistical techniques. Specifically, previous work researching the determinants of citizens' perceptions of corruption, both their censoriousness towards it and the extent they believe it to occur, tends to prioritise socioeconomic and demographic factors. Yet these works often fail to control extensively for attitudinal factors. Perhaps such socioeconomic and demographic effects merely tap alienation or 'distance' from the political system that attitudinal variables may tap better. Or, perhaps these effects genuinely reflect distinct socioeconomic and demographic faultlines relating to who wins and loses from corruption. The question of how far this can be the case in nations reported generally to have very little 'objective' corruption (and hence few big winners and losers from corruption) such as the UK remains, however.

The use of Britain as a case study also allows us to review the findings concerning the key research theme using data from respondents in a nation generally believed to experience low levels of corruption. If corruption is less salient than other issues in Britain, is it possible that any findings derived from cross-national analysis that suggest perceived corruption does help predict patterns in political participation or political support will not be replicated in the British case? If they do not show up, what is explanatory instead? Are any standards-related perceptions significant?
The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis will commence with consideration of the phenomenon of corruption (Chapter 2). Corruption's definition, and issues concerning its measurement, will be subject to critical examination, and some tentative solutions will be proposed. In particular, this chapter focuses on deriving a useful cross-national scale to proxy corruption at the national level. There is discussion of the limitations of this and how far a scale can relate to both theoretical definitions of corruption and other measures of corruption and indices of "bad" governance.

We may then move on to cross-national analysis of one of the key themes of the thesis: just how does corruption and perceived corruption affect political participation? After setting out the theoretical expectations of empirical analysis, we will first examine only data at the level of the nation (Chapter 3), to see if corruption appears to have an effect on aggregate measures of political participation. The results may then be used to shape expectations for a deeper question to be addressed in Chapter 4: how might perceived corruption, at the level of the individual, relate to citizens' behaviour, and does it have an effect that is congruent with any contextual effects of political corruption found to be significant in Chapter 3? Might individual level effects displace contextual effects, or may they exist concurrently? The use of multilevel modelling, which enables the inclusion of both individual and national level data to predict participatory levels, will be a highly useful tool at this stage.

Having established whether perceived corruption has a salient effect on participation, we may then turn to the British case study to obtain a better understanding of perceived corruption itself (Chapter 5). Are perceptions of corruption in any way distinct from other opinions concerning standards in politics,
such as perceptions of competence, honesty, and open government? Are they a product of socioeconomic and demographic factors, and perhaps related to social cleavages and divisions, or are they better related to social and political attitudes?

The case study may then be used to test if the findings of cross-national analysis of perceived corruption’s effects on political participation hold in the British case (Chapter 6), before its effect on political support and cross-nationally will be examined (Chapter 7). To confirm and develop analysis of any link found between perceived corruption and political support in the UK, some cross-national, multilevel models will also be used in this final empirical chapter, to see once again how contextual and individual level effects compare.

Finally, the main findings of the study, and their theoretical implications, will be outlined clearly in the conclusion (Chapter 8), and the consequences for democracy more broadly discussed. Recommendations for future research in light of the key findings will also be stated.
Chapter 2. Defining and Measuring 'Political Corruption'

Political corruption has undeniably received considerable academic interest. The literature pertaining to the topic spans legal contributions (for example, Edwards, 1996; Lowenstein, 1985), theoretical treatments (for example, Girling, 1997), area and comparative works (for example, Little and Posado-Carbó, 1996), and issues of corruption control (for example, Larmour and Wolanin, 2001). In the introduction, we considered some ways corruption was deemed a post-functionalist, damaging phenomenon for democracy and the economy. In other works, the root causes of corruption are traced and discussed (for example, Treisman, 2000).

Yet an overriding initial concern for any scholar of corruption is to pinpoint exactly what he or she means by the term. And clearly for the purposes of this thesis, in which the concept of political corruption is central, consideration of competing definitions is crucial. Moreover in the practice of politics, defining corruption is vital as this dictates the nature of its “investigation, prevention and prosecution” (Philp, 1997, p. 437). The definition of corruption is a major point of contention in the literature, however, and numerous scholars have offered differing accounts of what constitutes corrupt behaviour. Such definitions cluster in four types, which may now be outlined. None are without their problems.

1. Definitions appealing to the correct or legal exercise of public office:

These types of definitions, espoused by scholars such as Nye (1967), suggest that corruption marks behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of public office: “Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding
influence" (p. 419). To Nye, this embraces behaviour such as bribery, nepotism, and
misappropriation, and does not necessarily have to refer to 'immoral' or
'unacceptable' actions, which require stringent definition themselves. Yet this begs
the question of exactly what determines the duties of public office, if not a set of
ethical principles. Generally, proponents of this type of definition will fall back on
norms provided by the legal system, and it is by doing this that the definition's
problems may be exposed. It may be that the law does not adequately cover
behaviours that others would argue are corrupt or unethical, or that loopholes
undermine its ability to protect citizens from corrupt practice (Philp, 1997; Peters and
Welch, 1978; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000). Moreover, what are the norms that
underlie the legal system, and who should determine them (Philp, 1997)? Indeed, in
an extreme case, it may be that legal norms are the result of corrupt action. Hence
referring to legal standards as the criteria for what is and is not corrupt circumvents
the central problem of what these standards are based on. And, as these standards
differ in time and place, as Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) recognise, does the
acceptance of this type of definition not undermine attempts to adequately compare
corruption across nations or over time?

2. Definitions appealing to the public interest:

Here, corruption is considered to be behaviour which contravenes the public interest
by benefiting bribe-payers, and providers of other corrupt rents, instead of the public
generally (see, for instance, Friedrich, 1966). Yet as many critics have recognised,
there is some slipperiness concerning the concept of 'public interest' (Peters and
Welch, 1978; Philp, 1997; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000). If it refers to the base
function of politics as indicated by Philp (1997): the installation of order to resolve
conflict and prevent war, then the definition tells us little more than that corrupt acts
are apolitical. It is also contestable as it begs the question of who should be charged
with acting in the public interest (Heidenheimer et al, 1989). Is this implicit to every
public office holder? Are judges, for example, representatives and defenders of the
law instead of the public interest, as it may be contestable to argue that they are one
and the same thing. And how do we tell if the providers of rewards to politicians do
not represent the public interest? If corruption is functional, as some analysts have
proposed, should it not be revered as a political phenomenon directly in the public
interest?

3. Definitions appealing to public opinion:

Definitions that appeal to public opinion see ‘corruption’ as best defined by the views
of members of a political system. Scholars such as Rundquist and Hansen (1976, cited
in Peters and Welch, 1978) have advocated such an approach, which avoids the issues
of defining what is required of holding public office, or of pinpointing what
constitutes the ‘public interest’. Several problems are evident here though. First, who
exactly should provide the opinion informing us what is and is not corrupt? The
citizenry generally, or elites, or indeed politicians themselves? After all, it seems
likely that opinions will differ, between and among groups. Second, is this definition
not undermined by the notions that beliefs may not square with the way people
behave (Philp, 1997)? One’s propensity to report a ‘corrupt’ behaviour may not neatly
relate to the degree of censoriousness with which one condemns it. Indeed, reporting
corruption will rely on one perceiving officials and procedures to be efficacious in
punishing corruption, as well as believing one to be safe from reprisals from reporting
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it, and even resisting an incentive to blackmail corrupt individuals to stay silent. Third, even if high degrees of agreement are notable among all citizens of what constitutes corruption, it may be that legal norms or public conceptions of the 'public interest' inform and shape conceptions of corruption, which blurs the uniqueness of this definition (Philp, 1997; Peters and Welch, 1978).

4. Definitions appealing to market principles:

This type of definition describes corrupt behaviour as a form of personal utility maximisation (usually financial) in public office, and can be contrasted to the maximisation of the public’s utility. Rose-Ackerman (1978) suggests that corruption may be defined as illegal “third-party payments” to “agents that are not passed on to their superiors” (p. 7). Such a definition, as Rose-Ackerman acknowledges, is highly congruent with bribery, confirmed by the nature of the relationship by which she conceives such an exchange may occur. The ‘third person’ is assumed to be able to “benefit by the agent’s action, (and) seeks to influence the agent’s decision” (p. 6). Yet a focus on bribery is problematic. What of patronage, nepotism, official theft, or electoral fraud? More generally, the concept of utility maximisation here may be brought into question. To Philp (1997), this form of definition contributes to an understanding of the causes of corruption and incentives to impropriety, but fails to actually define it. This is a pertinent point: one could simply interpret behaviour that runs against the public interest or the norms of public office within a utility maximisation framework, making this form of market-focused definition compatible with other supposedly rival definitions.

We see, therefore, that there is no simple way of defining corruption. We can, in more abstract terms, at least be consoled by the realisation that corruption seems to
be implicitly understood as deviation from an ideal or preferred political arrangement, or set of political behaviours. Philp (1997) recognises this point strongly, and attempts to outline notions of a ‘natural condition of polities’ which dictates how corruption may be better understood. Political relations, to Philp, are not purely communal relations or market-based relations, despite sharing features with both. Central to them are concepts of legitimacy, consent, public standards, and the ‘sustainability’ of political rule. Corruption implies deviation from such concepts, although their own contestable definitions problematize our inquiry further.

So too does drilling further into the puzzle by attempting to specify a conception of what constitutes the ‘political’ and what comprises its beneficial effects. Philp’s discussion of four plausible ‘ethical appeals’ for political rule centre on the capacity of politics to provide some form of resolution to societal conflict. In this vein, corruption is damaging as it undermines the capacity of political rule to ‘order’ conflict. It resembles an incompatibility between the key function of political rule, and particularistic interests of political actors misusing political rule for their own ends. We might be able to make sense, however, of the argument that corruption may in some respects be functional, by, for instance, facilitating economic exchange, but such arguments may only be taken so far. Corruption will still represent the installation of two cultures, one official and the other unofficial, and may be more directly damaging by a) forging power relations between corrupt actors where one has more to lose than the other in their corrupt behaviour being disclosed, and b) acting as a disincentive to a less corrupt political system as actors fear that in a reformed system their previous impropriety may be punished (Philp, 1997).

Thus by implying deviation from ideal political arrangements, through the particularistic behaviour of corrupt actors, we have an intuitive sense of corruption’s
meaning in an abstract sense. In more practical terms, the four rival definitions are useful to help validate, contextualise, and critique variables that pertain to perceived corruption, or proxies of ‘actual’ levels of corruption. Not to do so would invite analysis without an awareness of the heavily debated theoretical backdrop. Thus in empirical work, care will be taken to reference relevant measures to definitional problems. This links directly to the next theme for discussion, which considers the issues involved in measuring and quantifying corruption, an important task given the empirical basis of the research to be undertaken.

Cross-National Quantification and Index Choice

In this section, the measurement of corruption will be discussed, with a view to justifying the use of a cross-national index in the empirical chapters that follow. It will involve both theoretical reasoning and basic statistical analysis.

The first question to address is whether it is possible to measure corruption sufficiently to allow cross-national comparison at all. Fundamental to this problem is whether corruption should be considered a relative phenomenon, tied only to specific countries or areas and the unique standards by which politics is conducted in each place, or an objective phenomenon tied to a universal set of norms. The relativist-universalist controversy is further complicated by the competing definitions of corruption outlined earlier. How might one measure corruption for cross-national analysis if one agrees with the legalistic or the ‘public interest’ perspective, for instance, if what is legal, or what is in the public interest, differs by nation?

Nonetheless, in this thesis, cross-national comparison will be undertaken, and this requires defending. One defence is that purely relativist accounts are equally
problematic as purely 'objective' accounts. Scholars such as Heidenheimer et al (1989) and Philp (1997) have recognised that committing to either perspective is precarious. Objective accounts might be charged with Western 'imperialism', but relativist accounts give corrupt public servants an excuse to engage in self-serving malpractice by defending it in terms of cultural 'acceptability'. Moreover Xin and Rudel (2004) point to commentary by Galtung (1998), who argues that there has been a growth in an objective sense of corruption, that is now 'universally recognised', and pertains to activities such as embezzlement, grand corruption and taking from political party funds.

The second question to ask is whether it is actually necessary to use corruption indices at all. Essentially, an index of corruption is an attempt to measure the extent of corruption in nation using some reliable means (generally via perceptions of those who might be expected to have specialist knowledge, such as businessmen and country experts) such that each nation is given a score comparable to the scores given to other nations. And essentially, if we are to analyse the effects of corruption in cross-national context, the answer to our question is yes. Other possible means of measuring corruption do not suffice. As Kalnins (2005) discusses, relying on formal statistics of convictions relating to corrupt practice may simply reflect the successfulness of corrupt practitioners' covertness; relying on audit data carries with it an assumption there is no regulatory capture within the auditing process, a dubious prospect in the most corrupt nations; while relying on a variable associated with corruption is contentious – even if a variable moved with one type of corruption, perhaps with another type it would not do so. As a basic example, nepotism in the public sector may relate to the size of the civil service and the supply of jobs within it. Assuming a constant probability of nepotism, a larger pool of civil service jobs would
lead to greater incidence of nepotism. Yet the size of the civil service is unlikely to
tell us much about levels of payments for parliamentary questions. Thus the use of
measures of corruption is appropriate, albeit with care and introspective caution. So
which indices are available?

The first measure, and perhaps the best known, is the Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International (TI). ¹ This yearly index involves
the aggregation of surveys from numerous sources that ask respondents to report their
perceptions of corruptions in identified nations via scaling systems. Following
standardisation, an ‘average’ level of corruption is calculated for each nation. The
sources of these perceptions are firms and professional analysts: the index uses
surveys by, among others, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the World Economic Forum.
Xin and Rudel (2004) show that the TI CPI correlates well with perceptions of
citizens and expatriates, while Treisman (2000) suggests it is correlated across years,
and with other relevant indexes.

The CPI’s use in recent corruption literature is extensive, perhaps most
significantly as a dependent variable, enabling analysts to determine what might cause
corrupt activity. Treisman (2000), for instance, uses the CPI to find that countries that
are more developed, and to a limited extent those exposed to greater trade, have lower
levels of corruption. ² Furthermore, Treisman finds that nations with Protestant and
long-standing democratic traditions are also less corrupt. ³ This is also true of countries

² Such results, the product of data analysis, might be viewed as ‘cutting edge’ research, and do well in
displacing older arguments concerning corruption which were based on observation and case-study
work rather than data analysis. In contrast to Treisman’s finding that development damps corruption,
for instance, Huntington (1968) suggested that ‘intense’ modernisation sparked higher levels of
corruption because the installation of universalistic, meritocratic norms made behaviour that was
previously thought acceptable now thought of as corrupt; because new forms of wealth and power raise
the potential for illicit exchanges to occur; and because the growth in government policy and regulation
which is witnessed during modernisation increases the number of opportunities for political malpractice.
³ This is perhaps a development of Rose-Ackerman’s (1978) older argument concerning corruption,
which emphasises the link between corruption and scruples. She argues that political actors’ values
that had installed a procedural justice system under British rule. Finally, corruption is found to be lower in unitary states, in which stronger lines of command may limit corruption. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), also predicting determinants of CPI scores, confirm some of Tresiman’s findings and find that nations with less wealth, greater state intervention in the economy, less international economic integration, less democracy, and less of a Protestant component in society, have greater corruption. Xin and Rudel (2004) also examine macro-level factors which plausibly influence political corruption, finding that regional effects, wealth, population, and size of the public sector are determinants of CPI scores. Finally, You and Khagram (2004) postulate the interesting thesis that inequality causes corruption, by creating a societal backdrop in which the exploitation of lower social strata by the wealthy is deemed legitimate. This is empirically indicated via regression analysis involving an established measure of inequality, and both the CPI and the World Bank ‘Control of Corruption’ variable.

Despite providing such highly interesting results (and mattering for our purposes because they outline plausible variables to control for when including corruption at the national level as an independent variable), the CPI is problematic. Relying on business perceptions as a proxy for corruption in an objective sense is risky: particular scandals and even greater transparency may exaggerate perceived corruption, or successful covertness lead to its underestimation (Kalnůš 2005; Johnston, 2002). And, although the consistency over time exhibited by the CPI may reflect important socio-political characteristics of nations, the very high correlation coefficients exhibited between sets of CPIs from year-to-year may indicate that

have a direct effect on whether corruption is to be contained, such that “the personal moral beliefs of voters, politicians and bureaucrats play an essential role in a modern democracy” (p. 234). This is likely to be true, yet the specification of particular religious and political traditions which may link to such morality represents an advance.
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens' Behaviour

sources are being too frequently re-used, hindering its responsiveness (Johnston, 2002). The CPI for year \( t \) is, however, calculated from data from years \( t \), \( t-1 \), and \( t-2 \). This ‘3-year rule’, designed to dampen short-term fluctuations in scores caused by particular incidents of corruption, partly explains the CPI’s consistency over time, and is defended by Transparency International on the grounds that levels of corruption are steady. The rule therefore acts as a buffer against short term leaps in scores caused by specific incidences of corruption affecting perceptions.

However, the comparability of CPI scores is another worry, as different sources inform scores for different nations and these fluctuate according to the year of the CPI. It also seems difficult to envisage a single number encompassing diversity within the state vis-à-vis forms and levels of corruption. Work such as Alam (1995), for example, has explicitly sought to explain variation in levels of corruption across different public sector agencies.

One must also address questions of validity which are involved in using external businessmen’s perceptions, as they form the basis of many sources. Although businessmen share assumptions and biases that might mean they predict similar levels of corruption in a country, they may not share the values of the countries they are queried over and they may even be involved in corruption themselves (Sik, 1999, cited in Hungarian Gallup Institute, 1999). It seems likely that the types of corruption they are likely to be interested in reporting are those involving business contracts, principally bribery and financial misdemeanour. If this is the case, what about nepotism, patronage, electoral fraud, extortion and official theft? (Johnston, 2002). Moreover, can we tell whether perceptions of substantively corrupt nations refer to the extent of corruption, or the seriousness, or both? (Johnston, 2002).

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4 Citizens’ perceptions also form a small portion of the sources used by the CPI, but this proportion is indeed small enough for us to conclude that CPI scores are overall national level data, rather than averages derived from individual level surveys.
One must also be wary of the wider criticism levelled by Knack and Azfar (2000) – that the CPI exhibits selection bias. They argue that the propositions that smaller countries and those with greater trade openness are less corrupt are faulty. This is because the CPI focuses on nations that businessmen might be interested in investing in, and thus misses out smaller, poorly governed states. When models are run with larger sample sizes and with different measures of corruption, some of the relationships predicted using the CPI are not evident.

Such criticisms provide a good basis to believe that if the CPI is to be used in analysis, it is productive to consider it alongside alternative measures of corruption. Indeed, the use of several measures of corruption in the same study has been attempted before. Persson et al (2003) and Knack and Azfar (2000), for example, use the CPI and one of its composite indices – the ‘Corruption in Government’ score given by the International Country Risk Guide (which consists of country expert perceptions), and the World Bank’s ‘Control of Corruption’ variable, while Persson et al (2003) use the World Bank’s ‘Government Effectiveness’ variable (both World Bank indices are shaped using business and country expert perceptions, similar to the CPI).

Such work gives us an indication of how we could go about integrating other measures. Yet, given that we desire a reliable and valid index, which is independent, appropriately weighted, and taps corruption specifically, some of the choices made by these authors seem problematic. Using the International Country Risk Guide variable alongside the CPI is inappropriate because it is itself a component measure of the CPI. Scaling it with the CPI would be giving substantial weight to one particular source.
This same problem applies to other impressive indices such as the Opacity Index.\(^5\)

Furthermore, 'government effectiveness' involves public service performance broadly, which consists of much more than the avoidance of corruption. Thus the key alternative measure to consider first off is the 'Control of Corruption' variable (also called the 'Graft Index'), included as a dimension in the World Bank's Governance Indicators data.\(^6\) This variable, although suffering from similar flaws to the CPI, and indeed sharing many of the sources used to inform it, has the advantages of covering more countries and of being accompanied by perception and non-perception oriented variables pertaining to other aspects of governance (one of which being the aforementioned 'Government Effectiveness' item). This variable also shares with the CPI the advantage of having sufficient \(N\) to be used in quantitative models that include a reasonable number of control variables.

A simple approach might be to simply scale the CPI and the Graft Index. However, when one scales the 1998 CPI\(^7\) with the 1998 Graft Index,\(^8\) one obtains a bivariate correlation statistic of 0.98 (\(N = 84\)). This indicates an extremely high level of association between the two statistics, and this is unsurprising, given that many of the sources which the two indices employ are shared (Knack and Azfar, 2000).\(^9\)

Essentially, the indices display the same results, although the differences between the measures are that:

"(The 'control of corruption' variable) weights more heavily those indicators that tend to be most highly correlated with others...the

\(^{5}\) See PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001). The Opacity Index aims to tap the degree to which there are restrictions on information that facilitates the functioning of effective markets, which might hide corrupt practice. Although the sources of these perceptions are again businessmen, the index is perhaps a sophistication of other businessmen-based indices by focusing on a particular mechanism by which corruption may operate rather than including responses to a broader set of corruption-focused perceptions.


\(^{7}\) Source: Transparency International (2005).


\(^{9}\) These authors find the same correlation statistic between the items using the 1999 CPI.
major difference between the indexes is country coverage...(it also)
provide(s) ratings even where there are only one or two underlying
data sources” (Knack and Azfar, 2000, p. 9).

So which measure should we choose? One argument may be to use the Graft Index
simply because its country coverage is greater. However, although the ‘control of
corruption’ variable covers a larger number of countries, this is because fewer sources
are required for a country to be included: indeed, just one is adequate, as Knack and
Azfar (2000) report. In contrast, at least three sources feed into each nation’s CPI
score, which implies it is more reliable than the Graft Index (and as many of the Graft
Index sources are the same as the CPI’s, there is little weight in arguing they are any
better). Furthermore, the increase in $N$ resultant from using the Graft Index would not
be substantial. Nations that could be included are generally small, authoritarian, and
undeveloped, and other data (that informs control variables and dependent variables in
later chapters) for such nations is often lacking. Hence, this thesis will use the CPI.\(^{10}\)

Yet how does the CPI relate to other corruption indices which include only a
small number of countries? Testing it against these scales enhances our confidence
that it is robust. Several such scales exist, and are worth reviewing before we attempt
to predict them using the CPI. All of them, furthermore, have their own problems,
indicating the overall difficulty in measuring a phenomenon as complex as corruption.

First, there are the Bribe Payers’ Index,\(^{11}\) and BEEPS,\(^{12}\) which query
businessmen in detail upon the propensity for corrupt activity in given societies, and
integrate responses based on both experience and perceptions – although the two are
undeniably interlinked (Kalnīš, 2005). Though tapping experience as well as
perceptions may increase the reliability of responses, this is undermined by the

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\(^{10}\) The CPI is besides generally preferred to the Graft Index in existing academic work.

\(^{11}\) See: Transparency International (2005).

\(^{12}\) World Bank (2005).
potential for the ‘winners’ of corruption being less likely than the ‘losers’ to report corrupt practice. Decreasing this probability by asking questions in a hypothetical or distanced way raises the problems with perceptions once again (Kalnīš, 2005). Moving on, a recent survey that focuses exclusively on ‘experts’ in the field rather than businessmen is the Center for Public Integrity’s ‘Public Integrity Index’ (Kalnīš, 2005). This index is compiled of numerous composite indices, the most relevant for our interests being the ‘Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and the Rule of Law’ statistics, in which the assessment of each state’s capacity to avoid corruption are evaluated by selected social scientists and journalists, and summed in an index. To ensure the scores are valid and unbiased, they are subject to peer-review. Yet this index suffers from a fallacy recognised by scholars such as Kalnīš (2005): states’ capability in installing potential anti-corruption institutions may not be correlated with actual levels of corruption. Indeed, the assessment of such a capability is highly theoretical, relying on intricate institutional analysis. Corruption in the messier world of real politics may evade institutional attempts to capture it, moreover the sheer complexity and diversity of ‘corrupt’ behaviour may encourage analysts to adopt a simplistic or biased interpretation of corruption, and peer review might not detect this.

Thus a survey of prominent corruption indices reveals that measuring and quantifying such a complicated and evasive phenomenon is unsurprisingly very difficult. The CPI is not alone in being problematic. Yet how well do these three smaller indices relate to the CPI? If they are well-related, the likelihood that we are validly tapping corruption may be argued to increase. The bivariate correlations between them, and the CPI, are presented in Table 2.1.

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13 Center for Public Integrity (No Date).
14 The CPI scores pertain to the years in which the other corruption measures are calculated, and country selection for this analysis is based on the countries actually included in the indices being correlated. The years of the indices are: 2002 (the Bribe Payers Index); 2002 (BEEPS); 2003 (The Bribe

- 25 -
Table 2.1  Bivariate Correlations Between the CPI and Alternative Measures of Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Bivariate Correlation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Bribe Payers Index</td>
<td>0.82***</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEEPS scores</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Public Integrity Index Component</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p < 0.01

In all three cases the CPI is highly positively related to the measurement under consideration. We may conclude that the CPI accurately predicts other measures of corruption, which is indeed encouraging for our assessment of its validity.

Finally, consider the five World Bank governance indicators other than the Graft Index, which are similarly constructed using relevant business and expert sources tapping perceptions. These are voice and accountability, tapping the extent of rights, liberties, and participation; political stability and absence of violence, tapping the likelihood of avoidance of violent political unrest; government effectiveness, tapping the quality of services provided by the public sector and the quality and objectivity of the civil service; regulatory quality, tapping the effects of regulation on the market; and rule of law, tapping the effectiveness of the legal system. The CPI, when correlated to these indicators, exhibits statistics of over 0.7 in each case (all are

"Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Rule of Law" component of the Public Integrity Index - 2003 was the year of the research although the reports are dated 2004). The BEEPS question chosen was: Thinking about officials, would you say the following statements are always, usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom or never true? It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular additional payments/gifts to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. This was deemed to be a good indicator of levels of average corruption as it spanned industries, and was coded based on the percentage size of the 'never' category. A score of 100% signifies the least corrupt response; a score of 0% signifies the most corrupt response. Where data is missing for a country, it has not been included.
also statistically significant at the 1% level).\textsuperscript{15} Such high correlations show that corruption and other aspects of bad governance are highly related, as we might expect.

The Corruption Index

In the CPI, we thus have a usable cross-national measure of corruption, which will henceforth be simply termed the ‘Corruption Index’. To aid simple interpretation as a measure of levels of corruption, in this thesis it will be coded from 0-10 where higher values indicate greater corruption (this inverts the original CPI coding).\textsuperscript{16}

We have, however, acknowledged some potential flaws and difficulties involved with its use. We may now briefly integrate the two previous sections of this chapter, and ask how established definitions of corruption, and the chosen index, are linked. The answer is disappointing. Because of the breadth of the component surveys which inform the index, and the compilation of responses to numerous questions, the Corruption Index cannot be sensitive to the subtleties of the competing definitions outlined earlier. Indeed, Transparency International describe the Corruption Index very broadly, suggesting that the surveys used to inform it involve questions which relate to ‘the misuse of public power for private benefits’.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Using 1998 data, consistent with the statistics used to correlate the CPI and the Graft Index earlier, and with the data to be used in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{16} Scatterplots are provided in the appendix in Figures A2a to A2e which confirm the empirical analysis so far. Figures A2a to A2d show the strong relationship between the Corruption Index and other corruption indices discussed above. These plots use the same data used to construct the bivariate correlations, but note that other than the Graft Index, which has been coded equivalently to the Corruption Index, the other indices are coded so that higher scores indicate lower levels of corruption, hence the downward sloping relationship between the variables. Meanwhile, Figure A2e illustrates the strong relationship between the other five measures of governance provided by the World Bank. To maintain parsimony they have been scaled together and coded equivalently to the Corruption Index so we produce a ‘bad governance’ index that runs from 0-10. The Cronbach’s Alpha obtained from the scale is 0.94, which indicates a very high level of reliability.

\textsuperscript{17} Transparency International (2005).
From the theoretical standpoint of this thesis such a broad definition is undesirable, because we cannot clearly draw out how different forms of corrupt behaviour offer different incentives for participation or political support. Widespread patronage, for example, might encourage participation and political support if citizens aim for a stake in government. Bribery may act to alienate citizens and thus dampen participation and support for parties seen as corrupt actors. Electoral fraud may act as a specific incentive to avoid voting on the basis that one's vote may not be accurately registered. The corrupt actor is also not specified, therefore we cannot draw conclusions about how the corrupt practice of specific public servants affects citizens' incentives. Indeed, corrupt practice by judges may theoretically act as an incentive for reform-oriented voting; corruption by politicians may increase alienation and non-voting.

Overall, however, we must be content with a pragmatic approach. We may take heart that many of the sources do orientate around a key form of behaviour — corrupt practice involving financial transfers to public officials in exchange for benefits to firms or individuals, and conceive of the Corruption Index as a broad indicator of corruption across types of public servants. Besides, in view of the bivariate correlations calculated above, the Corruption Index appears to be tapping something well-related to alternative measures of corruption, enhancing our confidence that the Corruption Index is an adequate proxy for an objective phenomenon that is almost impossible to measure.

Finally, it is necessary to revisit the criticism made by Knack and Azfar (2000), that the CPI displays selection bias because it focuses on the countries that businessmen perceive to be productive in terms of investment, and excludes small, badly governed states. Such selection bias matters for Knack and Azfar, who attempt
to re-examine the link between corruption, country size and economic openness, but given the tasks of this thesis, the problem is unlikely to matter. There is no obvious reason why small, badly governed states as a group should have unique patterns of participation. Bad governance may stimulate significant protest and voting against the incumbent, but this may occur in large, badly governed states too. Nations of a smaller size may have somewhat different patterns of participation and political support – perhaps less regional party opposition to centralised parties than in larger nations, for instance, but this may occur in small, well governed states too. Essentially, the multidimensionality of influences on participatory activity in small, badly governed states suggests that such activity is unlikely to be unique.

It has been argued, therefore, that the judicious strategy is to pursue analysis using the Corruption Index (albeit with awareness of its flaws). On this basis, we may proceed to the next chapter, in which analysis of corruption’s effects on participation will be undertaken at the level of the nation.
Chapter 3. National Level Corruption and Citizens’ Behaviour

Explaining Political Participation

In this chapter we will undertake the first stage of the analysis of whether political corruption affects citizens’ wider political participation. This will involve examining whether the Corruption Index, derived in the previous chapter, ties to levels of two forms of political participation—electoral turnout and demonstration activity—where the units of analysis are nations. To help predict whether corruption will have an effect on these behaviours, we may review three general schools of thought which presently explain political participation. This discussion, which aims to comprise a heuristic and concise literature review of approaches towards the problem of explaining political activity, helps contextualise the focus of this study and enables us to gain a preliminary indication of how corruption might have an effect. It is also necessary to examine these explanations to get a sense of the measurements we should control for when modelling political participation, to ensure corruption has an independent effect. These schools of thought are clustered as those that focus on a) resources, b) political culture, and c) organisations, institutions, and rationality.

Resources:

A prominent set of explanations for political participation refers to socioeconomic phenomena such as upbringing, class, religion, gender, and age, which affect individuals’ resources for political participation. To clarify these arguments, we might separate such explanations into two categories: those referring to restrictions on
physical resources for participation (such as time and money), and those affecting cognitive resources (such as understanding and awareness of the issues).

In terms of physical resources, those with greater financial means may be expected to have greater propensity than the poor to engage in political activity which requires expense (Verba et al., 1978). The middle classes, as opposed to working classes, may be anticipated in these terms to participate more. Gender may also be influential here. Traditionally, women were found to exhibit lower rates of participation across a multitude of behaviours compared to men (Norris, 2002), though some scholars find this difference is not significant (Ayala, 2000; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). Where such a gender gap has shown up, Schlozman et al. (1994) suggest men participate more than women in non-electoral participation in the USA precisely because of women's disadvantage in terms of resources conducive to political activity. They particularly emphasise the 'domestic political economy' where "women have less money and less control over the money in their households than men do" (p. 986), which is necessary for participation and for financial contributions to political campaigns.

Regarding cognitive resources, those with greater understanding and awareness of the political issues in hand may be more likely to participate than those without. Thus Verba et al.'s (1978) class bias may not just relate to the wealth of citizens directly, but also to their use of resources in obtaining political knowledge, and their schooling more generally, suggesting that education as well as class may be important in prompting participation. Meanwhile other variables may affect citizens' awareness of political issues and the information they are given on them, as well as the sensitivity with which they react to political events and government policies. Taking religion, McVeigh and Sikkink (2001) find that contentious tactics in social...
protest are more likely to be accepted by US protestants who are less tolerant of deviation from Christian morality, believe humans are more inherently sinful, and feel religion is under threat. Considering elections, Wilcox and Sigelman (2001) find that religious groups in the USA in the 1990s mobilised citizens to turnout and vote in particular ways, which shows that the potential power of interest groups to mobilise support may be greater than that even of parties, because, “the message can be more narrowly targeted” (p. 534).

Age may also affect the cognitive orientations of citizens, and has been shown to affect levels of political participation. Tilley (2002), for example, analyses WVS data and shows that: “as age increases, people are less likely to agree to political activism, and this seems to be a trend regardless of country” (pp. 242-243). However, from the observation of other studies we confront the interesting finding that when considering electoral turnout instead of activism, age has the opposite effect. Older people appear to vote in higher numbers than do the young (Norris, 2004; Norris, 2002). Tilley notes that the young are often proposed to be divided among the politically apathetic and the politically active, a notion that is supported by these opposing results. Thus by affecting physical and cognitive resources, variables concerning gender, education, religion, and age appear to influence levels and forms of political participation. Yet perhaps the key resource-based explanation is class and social stratification, an aforementioned focus of Verba et al’s (1978) seminal study.

With this in mind, however, the predictive power of resource-based explanations, when applied to modern political phenomena, appears to be limited. In the last parliamentary elections in three advanced liberal democracies the following statistics may be reported: the UK had a 61.4% turnout; Canada a 64.9% turnout; and
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France a 60.3% turnout. Not only do these rates seem low objectively, but when set against earlier turnout rates in the same countries we see a clear downwards trend since World War II. This is contrary to the expectations one might form from the basis of resource-based explanations: in view of the long-term growth of living standards, education levels and the middle classes, increased political activity should be expected over time, not evidence of lower participation (Evans, 2003). Hence, while resource-based explanations are useful, they are clearly incomplete.

Political Culture:

Political cultural explanations of citizens' behaviour associate participation with individuals' orientations toward the political system, spanning feelings of political trust, alienation, political efficacy and political cynicism. Let us take alienation first, a concept scholars usually seek to operationalise as a variable tapping the extent to which a citizen feels excluded by politics, along with the closely related concept of political efficacy, which tends to refer to the extent that a citizen feels they wield influence in the political system. Reef and Knoke (1999) identify several works which are concerned with the effect of citizens' alienation from political processes or of citizens' perceived political inefficacy. McDill and Ridley (1962), for example, observe that failure to vote or be aware of the issue at stake is well correlated with feelings of political powerlessness. Thompson and Horton (1960) show that political alienation has a small but negative effect on levels of turnout, and Olsen (1969) reports that levels of perceived political 'incapability' and 'discontent' are a good predictor of voting patterns. Sometimes such studies include concepts of alienation that touch on politicians' behaviour. Finifter (1970), for example, calculates that

perceived political 'normlessness', defined as perceptions that politicians are not obeying rules and norms in the political system, has a weak inverse correlation with political participation, while perceived powerlessness has a strong inverse correlation.

Citrin and Muste (1999) identify authors who suggest that political 'cynicism', derived particularly by perceptions concerning political 'trust', is a determinant of political activity. On the one hand, Muller and Jukam (1977) find a correlation between mistrust in government and aggressive political participation, although this effect dissolves when political support is controlled for. On the other hand, Parker and Parker (1989, cited in Citrin and Muste, 1999) observe that their 'trust in representative' variable is an important determinant of voter turnout. A broader form of trust — social trust, or the propensity to believe the bulk of citizens or society is trustworthy, may also affect political participation. Scholars such as Putnam (1995a) and Stone (2001) have suggested that 'social capital', or productive sets of relationships in society that enable co-ordination between individuals, links to greater trust in society. It is reasonable that such co-ordination may translate into political participation.

Yet one of the most significant problems with political cultural analysis involves the ambiguity of the concepts used. Whereas Parker and Parker construct their scale of trust in government based on respondents' views on honesty and keeping promises, representative capacity, and selflessness, Muller and Jukam construct a scale based on how far politicians 'do the right thing', 'act as they should', and speak the truth to the media. Such perceptions will surely involve each

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19 Muller and Jukam (1977) define 'aggressive' behaviour as that which: "encompasses overt political actions which, if manifested by segments of society that are powerful or sizeable, can threaten the stability of the regime" (p. 1564). Their measure involves non-payment of tax or rent, wildcat strikes, occupying buildings, fighting with other participants or the police, and revolutionary activity.

20 It is also conceivable, and under-acknowledged, that social capital may have negative effects. Trust and norms of reciprocity may form the basis of organisations such as the Mafia, terrorist groups, and, perhaps, networks of corrupt public officials and those who engage in illicit exchange with them.
individual’s ideological stance: can a politician of the left enacting left-wing policies ever do ‘the right thing’ from the perspective of a voter on the right? To advance this theorising, it would be helpful to better define attitudinal explanations, and some recent work has looked to do this. Inglehart (1997) shows that postmaterialist values (which refers to the prioritisation of values related to democratic quality and civic rights and liberties) tie to decreased party-oriented behaviour, as parties tend to represent materialist interests, and increased unconventional behaviour, as those with postmaterialist orientations tend to have been socialised in secure nations in which there are time and resources for political education, an awareness of key issues, and the means to participate in attempts to influence them.

Thus co-joining resource-based explanations of political participation are political cultural, attitudinal factors. Controlling for such items in models of behaviour which include individual level variables is therefore essential.

Organisations, Institutions, and Rationality:

Other explanations of participation emphasise the effects of institutional features of the political system, or of social and political groups, on the individual citizen. Indeed, individuals’ participation in organisations is often shown to correlate well with their levels of political participation. This may relate to the ability of groups to mobilise political action. We have already outlined Wilcox and Sigelman’s analysis tying political activity to mobilisation by religious groups. Yet organisational membership also links to ideas about political culture, especially the concept of ‘social capital’. If social capital is facilitated by ‘social connectedness’ (Putnam, 1995a) and ‘networks
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of social relations' (Stone, 2001), then organisations may act to promote co-ordinated political participation.21

Institutional explanations of participation are linked most solidly to turnout. Powell (1980) finds that voting laws and party competition are key explanations for turnout in 30 democracies. Jackman and Miller (1995) report that institutional determinants shape a 'reasonable explanation' of turnout in advanced democracies, while cultural variables are less salient. Franklin (2004) suggests that socioeconomic and cultural variables generally fail to increase the variance explained in models of turnout, and instead emphasises the explanatory power of the nature of elections themselves, which involves the immediate effects of competition and entrenched institutional factors: "(t)urnout declines, if it does, because elections change their character" (p. 147). Finally, Norris (2004) points to the importance of institutional rules and procedures as prominent effects on levels of voting.

In the proceeding outline of independent variables, the specific incentives offered by institutional structures will be discussed, yet for now it is adequate to acknowledge the core of these explanations: the behaviour of rational individuals responds to institutional signals. In this sense, these theories are linked to rational choice assumptions and modelling of participation, initiated by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), who developed the work of Anthony Downs. In such calculations, the costs and benefits of voting (including utility gained from the satisfaction of exercising one's electoral civic duty) are said to be crucial to citizens' decisions over whether to

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21 However, mobilisation and organisations are themselves unable to function without adequate resources, and without strategic and institutional opportunities to enable political behaviour. Indeed, Della Porta and Diani (1999) argue that social movements' characteristics are shaped by institutional influences on opportunities for action, along with determinants relating to social movements' allies and their opponents' behaviour. Tilly (1979) has suggested that disaffection with the status quo and desire for change are not enough to induce social movement activity, and that the internal organisation of groups, and the opportunities and 'repertoires' available to them are crucial to their functioning. Similarly, Freeman (1979) emphasises the importance of social movements' human and financial resources, and their need for adequate capacity and information to push for change.
vote or not. Of course, rational choice models are subject to considerable criticism. Following data analysis employing frameworks given by rational choice models which seek to explain participation, Whiteley (1995) challenges rational choice assumptions after finding that “activists are motivated by expressive concerns and by a sense of collective efficacy” (p. 227). He suggests that a deeper notion of rationality is required, to avoid an overly narrow focus on individual decision-making and to understand the rational basis of collective behaviour.

Thus, in reality, no branch of theorising aimed at explaining political participation, whether based on resources, culture, institutions or organisations appears to be complete. Indeed the complexity of participation means a complete explanation is very unlikely to emerge. Yet these different types of explanation offer helpful inroads into framing expectations concerning the potential impact of corruption on behaviour, and having reviewed these explanations, we may also ensure we try to tap variables core to them when modelling participation.

Categorising Participation and the Potential Impact of Corruption

An important point that can be taken from a review of work on participation is that categorisations of political participations are often not discussed in depth; more often, specific participatory activities are analysed. Turnout, for instance, is the focus of Franklin (2004); protest activity is the focus of Kitschelt (1986). Other works construct scales of participation which provide a continuous measurement of political behaviour which include more than a single item. Schlozman, Burns, and Verba (1994), for example, construct a scale which includes voting alongside other forms of behaviour; while Tilley (2002) uses a scale of ‘political action’.
Moreover, in the present literature there is considerable reliance on a 'conventional' – 'unconventional' dichotomy to help categorise political participation. Evans (2003), for example, distinguishes between conventional political participation and unconventional political participation, including voting and being a member of a political party as conventional behaviour, while items such as protest and demonstration participation and directly aggressive political behaviour are construed to be unconventional political participation. Janda et al (2002) also emphasize the division between conventional behaviour and unconventional behaviour, suggesting that the former involves common, institutionalized means of participation which may intend to support or influence the government, while the latter involves less common acts that are usually defiant in their format, intended to challenge government policy through more direct means. Meanwhile Brady (1999) splits participation into indirect actions (such as political discussion), electoral activity, non-electoral conventional behaviour, and non-electoral unconventional behaviour. Non-electoral conventional behaviour includes items such as informal political contacts or organizational membership; non-electoral unconventional behaviour includes petitioning, demonstrations, boycotts, wildcat strikes, occupation or blocking transport routes, rent and tax evasion and even vandalism, assassination and terrorism.

However, the conventional – unconventional dichotomy is contentious, as indicated by the initial problem that scholars appear to include the same behaviour in different categories. Whereas Brady (1999) excludes voting and party membership from the 'conventional' and 'unconventional' labels, for example, Evans (2003) incorporates both in the conventional category. This leads to a key question: what are the appropriate criteria for differentiating between 'conventional' and 'unconventional' behaviour? Brady (1999), for example, appears to associate
unconventional participation with behaviour that is rarely undertaken, and may be illegal or aggressive. Yet is it therefore consistent for Brady to include organisational membership and serving on boards in the conventional category, given that partaking in these behaviours may actually be quite rare, while petition-signing, which may be more common, is classified as unconventional behaviour? Meanwhile, Janda et al's (2002) conception of conventional behaviour as habitual and institutional, and conception of unconventional behaviour as uncommon and system-challenging, is simplistic. Voting for an anti-system party, for example, uses institutions but at the same time challenges the system.

Instead of relying, therefore, on the flawed and ambiguous 'conventional' and 'unconventional' distinction, an alternative distinction may be postulated separating behaviour in which citizens use or involve existing political institutions, and behaviour which is extra-institutional. Although this distinction involves a complexity relating to multidimensionality that will be discussed later, it will be argued that this divide is more tangible than the vague conventional – unconventional dichotomy, and is useful when considering the potential effects of political corruption on forms of political behaviour.

To understand this distinction one must first consider the meaning of 'political institutions'. Political institutions refer to forums, procedures and organisations that have persisted over time, and form, collectively, a set of rules and processes to enable politics in a nation to function. Institutions include, for example, electoral systems and voting procedures, political parties, legislatures and constitutional courts. It is clear that some behaviours occur within existing institutions: voting, for example, makes use of the electoral system and electoral processes. Political party membership and

\[\text{To be sure, Brady does acknowledge this problem.}\]
activism involves a political institution directly. In contrast, other behaviours take place independently of political institutions, such as demonstrations and boycotts. These 'extra-institutional' behaviours differ from 'institutional' ones.

This distinction is useful. It is more tangible than the vaguer notions of conventional and unconventional behaviours. Petition-signing or party membership, which may be difficult to locate in conventional or unconventional categories when the guiding criterion is the extent to which these activities occur, are clearly extra-institutional and institutional behaviours respectively. Furthermore, the categories are analytically complete: the 'universe' of behaviours is encompassed by a distinction which is based on an X (institutional) or not-X (extra-institutional) classification.

The institutional – extra-institutional distinction is nonetheless not without some complexity. Primarily, it may be subdivided. For example, participation may also be classified in terms of whether it is enacted with the intention of fundamentally challenging the political system in place. A political system is the collective grouping of political institutions in a given polity, the regime in place, and the civil society in operation. In a democracy, any political participation which has the intention of removing the political system, such as an attempted coup, certainly differs from those that take place with no intention of fundamentally challenging it, and this distinction may for our purposes be important. Indeed, political corruption may create alienation and mistrust that encourages anti-system behaviour and anti-system behaviour may take both institutional and extra-institutional forms. It may represent protest or even revolutionary activity, and this is clearly extra-institutional. However it may also take the form of joining or voting for a party that is anti-system. Essentially, therefore, we confront the interesting problem of multidimensionality complicating the institutional – extra-institutional distinction.
However our distinction may be defended on the grounds that the number of behaviours representing institutional, anti-system participation is likely to be heavily outweighed by institutional pro-system participation. Indeed, a high prevalence of support for anti-system parties would be likely to disrupt democracy and may create anti-democratic conditions in which political participation would be suppressed. Moreover, given that anti-system participation may be disorderly, it is probable much of it would take place outside the framework of existing political institutions. So long as we are aware of the issue of multidimensionality, so we may look for sub-categories when we predict different behaviours, thus facilitating nuanced analysis.

Hence, how may we relate this categorisation of political participation to the potential effects of political corruption? First, it would be a mistake to regard the argument underlying this chapter as a belief that corruption has direct effects on participatory outcomes. Rather, corruption is likely to have indirect effects on the broader political system which feed into the participatory choices of the citizenry, whereby the actual issues immediately motivating participation may be diverse, and are indeed too numerous to be specified exhaustively. More specifically, we must first assume that citizens are responsive and aware of political corruption, perhaps as corrupt individuals are caught and punished, or through media reports or even informal knowledge and rumours of corruption. We may then suggest that corruption signals to the masses that institutions are either inadequate, that is, they are unable to contain corrupt practice; or that institutions are inherently biased towards those that profit from corruption when in office. It might even signal that institutions (such as the police in highly corrupt nations) are themselves part of the corruption problem. Culturally, corruption may undermine the relationship between those that are corrupt and benefit from such malpractice, and the majority of the citizenry who are unlikely
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to benefit. It may undermine norms of trust between rulers who engage in corrupt activity, and the ruled, and thus alienate citizens, creating a sense of inefficacy and resentment towards holders of public office. A coherent and unitary political culture is hence unlikely to be evident in areas that are particularly corrupt.

From this basis—that corruption may result in citizens mistrusting established political institutions and the political elite—it is feasible that where corruption is substantial a sense of inefficacy and apathy towards institutional participation in politics is likely to result, in turn leading to dampened levels of activity such as voting. That is, of course, unless citizens are willingly complicit in corrupt transactions. However given that inequality appears to tie to corrupt practice (You and Khagram, 2004), and that many citizens may resent participating in transactions in which officials abuse their power, it will be assumed that willing compliance is restricted, perhaps more evident among entrepreneurs who stand to gain significantly from elite-level transactions. Instead, citizens might, for instance, question the point of voting in legislative assembly elections if the legislative assembly appears not to be able to contain corruption.

Regarding extra-institutional participation, our expectations must be a little more complex. Although it is feasible that antipathy and disillusion with political institutions will prompt more extra-institutional behaviour as levels of corruption increase, it may not be the case that this association is linear. Instead, in highly clean

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23 There is, admittedly, a theoretical basis from which to predict that turnout can be stimulated by high levels of corruption, but under specific conditions. Indeed, Gillespie and Okruhlik (1996) identify several contexts in which a corruption clean-up might occur. They identify a 'post-election' context, observed in the cases of Singapore, Mexico, India and the Philippines, in which new governments are motivated to stem corruption in the hope of obtaining support and consolidating themselves electorally. If this type of situation is common, perhaps in corrupt nations turnout may be positively motivated, if non-incumbent parties in corrupt nations are popularly believed to fulfil promises to clean-up. Nonetheless, it is assumed that such a context is rare. An opposition party must be credible in its promises to stem corruption, and perceived to be more scrupulous than the incumbent, which may be difficult in a political system in which corruption appears endemic—a widespread phenomenon rather than a fragmented one. In consequence, it is predicted that in a broad, cross-national context, the dampening effect of corruption on turnout will outweigh its capacity to incite it.

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nations, the responsiveness and efficacy of public servants may mean that any form of participation, including extra-institutional behaviour, is promoted. It may simply be that passionate causes invite more direct means of participation which involve a body of citizens expressing their demands together, causing citizens to choose extra-institutional behaviour, such as attending demonstrations, ahead of institutional behaviours such as lobbying politicians. Therefore two effects may be at work: first, in highly corrupt nations, considerable extra-institutional participation as institutions are deemed inefficient and inadequate; second, in highly clean nations, considerable extra-institutional participation simply because public servants are highly responsive and scrupulous and react well to citizen demands, whatever means are used to express them. In consequence it is plausible that the lowest levels of extra-institutional behaviour will in fact occur where levels of corruption are neither particularly high or particularly low – where neither of these effects act to motivate citizen action.

To test these claims, two dependent variables at the national level—electoral turnout and demonstration activity—will be used. These are ideal participatory activities to consider: voting is a central institutional behaviour in democracy, involving constitutionally entrenched electoral institutions and political parties, and deriving an outcome leading to the composition of a nation’s legislature and, in parliamentary systems, its executive. Demonstration activity, meanwhile, embodies motivated extra-institutional behaviour. It takes place outside of established institutions: on the streets, for examples, or outside factories or parliaments, and it is a form of participation that does not follow or accord to procedures laid down by a country’s constitution. On the basis that voting is institutional behaviour, and demonstration activity is extra-institutional behaviour, and following the theoretical reasoning above, we may therefore state the following hypotheses:
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H1: Greater political corruption predicts lower electoral turnout.

H2: Demonstration activity will be highest where political corruption is particularly low and particularly high, and lower among intermediate nations.

We may move on to ask how previous literature has attempted to address the themes and hypotheses being discussed. But the literature is sparse. Della Porta (2000) reports that political corruption and scandals link to distrust in government, but that this carries over into mixed effects on participation. The lack of a tidy finding is not altogether surprising given that only three nations are under extensive analytical scrutiny in her study. To make the claim that corruption and participation fail to have a coherent link requires more widespread evidence than that which she presents. The larger country N in this thesis will test this claim robustly.

Bravo-Ortega and Hojman (2002) find that turnout and political corruption are inversely correlated. The scholars suggest people are put off voting because the benefits of doing so are undermined by corrupt politicians. This has a 'feedback' effect so that in a corrupt nation, non-corrupt, scrupulous individuals are disinclined to run for office as low turnout signals public pessimism and disdain for elected officials. The sensibilities of those unwilling to be corrupt simply make other career options more attractive. What results, therefore, is a situation of mutual causality. From rational decision-making perspectives both voters and politicians perpetuate corrupt practice, and low turnouts are both a cause and consequence of this. The model reports that turnout and corruption are thus jointly determined in equilibrium,
and that in corrupt nations “the wrong sort of people are always in power because they would not be in power if they were not the wrong sort of people.”  

Bravo-Ortega and Hojman’s (2002) suggestion that corruption prompts low turnout is comparable to the theoretical basis of this chapter, as it suggests corruption prevents voters from fulfilling their political demands which, in turn, affects institutional participation. They also suggest that low turnout prompts continued corrupt practice, which essentially inverts the causal direction assumed in this chapter, and may be true in some circumstances – indeed, electoral fraud may act as a clear incentive for non-corrupt potential politicians not to bother standing in elections. However, with other forms of corruption such as financial misdemeanour and bribery (which, as we have seen, is the key sense of corruption involved in the Corruption Index) this link is less clear, as reformist candidates may attract support.

Furthermore, there is a key difference to our methodology to that adopted by Bravo-Ortega and Hojman (2002). Their variable tapping corruption is derived from IV regression: the fitted values of the prediction of an older, now unavailable corruption index, where the instrument is a measurement of ‘natural openness’ of the economy, a measure constructed by Wei (2000). At first this may seem a confusing route to pursue: indeed they do not discuss the link between corruption and openness of economies in depth, merely referring the reader to other works such as Treisman (2000). It is true that Treisman finds a relationship between corruption and economic openness, but he specifically indicates that this is weak: “Openness to foreign trade apparently reduces corruption. But here, too, the effect is depressingly small. To make a noticeable difference to a country’s level of perceived corruption would require a radical opening rather than a marginal shift” (p. 439). In Bravo-
Ortega and Hojman’s defence, their use of Wei’s natural measure of openness, which takes into account ‘national geographic and size variables’, helps validate their variable. Indeed Treisman draws attention to how the impact of openness on corruption is liable to be influenced strongly by whether a nation is large or small. But what is confusing is why Transparency International and Business International data, which Wei (2000) himself uses to test how well his measure of openness fits with corruption, is not used by Bravo-Ortega and Hojman themselves. This gap is something the research in this chapter will fill.

Data

The data informing the regression analysis linking corruption and participation will be specific to 1998.\(^2\) This is not an arbitrary choice, and several reasons justify this focus. First, in the following chapter involving multilevel modelling much of the individual level data used concerns the period 1995-98, so it is consistent to centre analysis on a time period in this bracket. Second, 1998 is preferable to 1997 or before because of the development of corruption indices by this stage. Transparency International’s 1998 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the indicator used to proxy corruption, covered 85 countries (listed in Table A3.1 of the appendix), while in the 1997 CPI, only 52 countries were included, a consequence of an increased number of sources being available from which to calculate a score, and a reduction in the minimum number of such sources required for a country to be included: from four to three.\(^3\) Although subsequent CPIs cover more countries, many of the newly added

\(^{2}\) In the case of turnout, the national election in each country which is nearest to the year 1998 (on either side) will be analysed.

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ones are nondemocratic or recently democratized, which often makes turnout data unavailable. Third, much of the required national level data in the late 1990s, in contrast to some of the data in later years, is readily available, and this is a pressing concern given the importance of controlling for other plausible explanations for political participation.  

We have two dependent variables. Turnout data is relatively easy to locate, provided by Idea International (2006), an organization that embarks on significant amounts of research concerning levels of and trends in political participation over the globe. However, a choice between two alternative measures is necessary – votes over registered voters, or votes over voting age population, and the former measure has been chosen for the research in this chapter. One reason for this is that from observation of both sets of statistics, the votes over registered voters measure seems more reliable. Indeed in some elections the votes over voting age population statistic exceeds 100%, indicative of very considerable error. Franklin (2002; 2004) reports that population data tends to be unreliable, criticizes it for failing to take into account individuals who are ineligible to vote, and chooses to use voters over registered voters in his influential work on the determinants of turnout. Although Idea International warns that electoral registers may be inaccurate or may not be used, given the plausible inaccuracy of calculations of the voting age population, and the certainty that by being registered, the citizens we are analysing are able to exercise the choice to vote or not, the turnout measure involving registration will be preferred. The

28 At the time of writing, national level data on demonstration activity is, for example, not available beyond the year 2000. Turnout scores for many countries also take time to compile, and a substantial lag in data availability is evident.

29 For example, at the time of writing, Idea International (2006) reports that the Votes / Voting Age Population measure for Malawi's legislative election of 1999 is 105.9%, and for its presidential election of the same year, this statistic is 107.6%.

30 Although some voters who are alienated by the system could choose not to register. This is a plausible problem, but in view of the numerous factors that may lead to non-registration other than alienation: apathy, insufficient awareness of politics, illiteracy, practical or administrative difficulty
turnout statistics pertain to the nearest legislative (lower house or unicameral chamber) election to 1998 for each nation; the highest in the sample is that of Singapore, at 95.9%, the lowest is that of the Ivory Coast, at 31.5%.

Data on extra-institutional participation at the national level is harder to find, however data pertaining to demonstrations in each nation in 1998 has been obtained from Jenkins and Taylor’s *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators IV* project, an extensive dataset that seeks to code political and social actions for nations across time. ‘Actions’ refer to activity reported by Reuters that can be logged within one of the categories specified in the project. Other ‘actions’ include, for example, reported comments, requests, complaints and threats by actors, alongside sanctions, expulsions, seizures, the use of force and economic activity.

The operationalisation of ‘demonstration activity’ requires discussion. One way to tap demonstration activity is simply to use the number of reported demonstrations in each country being analysed. A second way might be to divide numbers of demonstrations by each nation’s population, to tap ‘demonstrations per person’ and to ensure significant numbers of protests are not simply a consequence of a large politicised society. Yet these measures are methodologically problematic. In particular, Reuters is the source of information, which may produce a bias towards news coverage of Western nations and inflate their scores.

Hence the chosen measure will be scores that report for each nation the percentage of ‘all actions’ that are categorised as demonstrations, or as anti-demonstration armed force mobilisation.31 Of course, this raises questions too. The

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31 It is recognised that the second component of this variable, referring to armed force mobilisation, may inflate the measure of demonstration activity for very repressive states that are simply more inclined to mobilise armed forces to suppress citizens’ protests. However, when authoritarianism is
statistics derived indicate only the relative propensity of citizens in each nation to engage in demonstration activity, set against other actions. There may be a particular concentration of certain actions in some states because of characteristics that act as incentives for them: ‘threats’ and ‘seizures’, for example, are more conceivable in states that have unstable political regimes. Nonetheless, there is a large spread of actions in the dataset, meaning that high values for particular forms of action should be diluted by the volume of actions reported. It is notable that no-one has considered operationalising demonstration activity in this form before, despite it being the most valid measure available. The percentage scale runs from 0 (exhibited by a few nations) to 8.7 (Bolivia’s score).

The strategy is thus to predict these two dependent variables with a host of independent variables, which can now be defined. The key variable to be analysed in this chapter is the Corruption Index, which has been extensively discussed in the previous chapter. This variable, though clearly not an objective indicator of levels of corruption across countries, is a justifiable proxy. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it will be coded so that higher scores signal greater corruption.

At this stage we may undertake some basic data analysis to see how the key independent variable and the two dependent variables relate. The following table of bivariate correlations provides an initial indication: corruption and demonstrations are positively related, and corruption and turnout are negatively related.

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used to predict demonstration activity, it fails to be explanatory, suggesting that this concern is unproblematic.

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Table 3.1 Bivariate Correlations Pertaining to Corruption, Turnout and Demonstrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Corruption Index</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Demonstration Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Index</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration Activity</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1

Of course, these results are limited because they do not involve controlling for other plausibly salient determinants of political participation, nor do they enable testing for a nonlinear effect of corruption on demonstration activity (this latter effect can be tapped by including a corruption as squared term in the relevant models). Regression analysis, with suitable controls which will now be outlined, enables us to test with greater confidence the hypotheses driving the chapter, and specify more comprehensively the impact of corruption on these measures of political behaviour.

The control variables cluster in four groups. The first group relates to governance, and comprises the five World Bank quality of governance indices that were correlated with the Corruption Index in the previous chapter and also scaled together as a ‘Bad Governance’ Index and plotted against the Corruption Index in the appendix. Because of the need for parsimony in the models, this five-item scale will be re-used here. The inclusion of this index helps ensure that any impact of corruption on participation is not simply a proxy for the impact of another aspect of bad governance.

The second group of controls pertains to institutions, and are relevant to the models of turnout. These variables thus link to the institutional explanations of participation discussed earlier. Institutional explanations for turnout have evolved to include a raft of variables, and certainly too many for our purposes, given that the
sample of nations for which we have corruption data number only about 80. Indeed, as a result of this focus, it is also not possible to replicate others' models of turnout and to simply add corruption in: corruption data is recent and limited, which restricts sample size and acts as an incentive to keep models parsimonious. Consequently it is our aim to integrate the most useful institutional explanations found in the literature into the turnout model presented.

One variable which is uncontentious to include when considering voter turnout is compulsory voting. Countries which enforce a law for compulsory voting are likely to exhibit higher rates of turnout than countries that do not (Powell, 1980; Jackman and Miller, 1995). Voters face a range of sanctions, according to the nation, which include having to provide an explanation, paying a fine, or even being imprisoned. It is therefore highly appropriate to control for the variable, and a dummy variable will be included which taps whether the country enforced a nationwide law for compulsory voting or not at the time of the particular election.

Also potentially pertinent to voters are indicators of the competitiveness of the system and the degree to which he or she is likely to perceive their vote as efficacious. Indeed it is likely that party competition acts as an incentive to vote. Franklin (2004), for example, finds this is the case, and suggests that: "(h)igh margins of victory...stand in the way of the individual vote having clear and immediate

32 This contrasts to, for example, Franklin (2004), who does not look at whether corruption is an explanatory variable. As corruption indices were unavailable before the mid-1990s, his dataset is thus able to be less restricted, and his national level models of turnout include elections from 1945-1999. This enables a vast array of institutional variables (some significant and some not) to be included: time since previous election; numerous measures of competition; party discipline; female franchise; executive power; lagged turnout; absentee and weekend voting laws; proportionality and the electoral system; district magnitude and electorate size; electoral decisiveness; party polarisation; coalition government; along with generational effects which interact with institutional factors. As Franklin's focus is to generalise explanation of turnout, this is all very well, but as we focus on the plausible effect of corruption, we must assume a more selective, parsimonious approach.

33 Source of information and for data pertaining to this variable: Idea International (2006).

34 Some states, such as Austria and Switzerland, only practice compulsory voting in particular regions, and will not be classed as having compulsory voting given that we are dealing with national elections. Furthermore, states which provide for such a law but do not enforce it will also be classed as not having compulsory voting.
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consequences” (p. 112). Indeed, the lack of competition between parties (and indeed difference in policy positions among parties) has been cited as a reason for low turnouts in recent Labour-dominated British elections (Clarke et al., 2004; Evans, 2003). On the other hand, it may be that a dominant party attracts ‘bandwagon’ support, resulting in high levels of turnout even where party competition is weak. Indeed, empirical work has shown contradictory effects of measures of competition. Norris (2004) finds that multipartyism increases turnout, suggesting it expands choice for voters, but also reports that turnout grows with vote share for the dominant party (perhaps revealing a ‘bandwagon’ effect). Meanwhile Jackman and Miller (1995) report that multipartyism decreases turnout, suggesting that it can lead to coalition formation, putting off voters by failing to procure a decisive result. Constraints on model parsimony make the inclusion of more than one measure of party competition unattractive, so a clear, single measure of party competition will be included: the percentage of seats of the largest party in each nation’s legislature in the year of each specific election; that is, the percentage after the election, which should indicate the level of competition between parties during the election campaign which might affect voters’ propensity to turnout.36

Finally, it has been found elsewhere that more proportional electoral systems help ensure higher electoral turnout (Norris, 2004; Jackman and Miller, 1995). In proportional systems there is a guarantee that one’s vote makes an impact, however slight, because the chosen party benefits from all votes which push up its share of the total ballot. This contrasts to majoritarian systems, particularly those which are constituency-based, in which it may frequently be the case that a voter in a ‘safe’ seat consistently dominated by a particular party may make no impact by voting for the

35 She also reports that turnout declines when such dominance gets very strong.
36 Data downloaded from Norris (2004; original source: Vanhanen, 2000). Data for Russia was unavailable, so its score was calculated manually from election result data.
non-dominant party. Yet some scholars dispute the salience of this effect. Franklin (2004) suggests the effects of competition displace the effect of the electoral system, whereas Powell’s (1980) cross-national analysis finds that it is not electoral rules that are explanatory, but rules relating to voter registration. However, it remains important to control for the electoral system because it may also affect the level of corruption present in each nation. Indeed Persson et al (2003) find that these phenomena are linked. They argue that countries with larger district sizes and lower thresholds to representation experience less corruption, possibly because ‘barriers to entry’ are lower, giving citizens greater ability to remove corrupt officials from office. Simultaneously, they suggest that in plurality systems with small districts, high levels of competition act to encourage clean political practice as candidates attempt to woo swing voters. Thus, the type of electoral system used by each nation in parliamentary elections will be tapped when predicting turnout, along a three point scale of proportionality.\footnote{This employs the typology of electoral systems used in Norris (2004), where 1 = majoritarian and plurality systems, 2 = mixed systems, and 3 = proportional systems. The source of information about electoral systems was IDEA International (1997) Handbook of Electoral System Design, retrieved from IDEA International (2006). The only nation difficult to classify was Jordan, which possesses the Single Non-Transferable Vote System. As this system resembles neither a majoritarian / plurality nor a proportional system, it has been grouped with the mixed systems. This is still problematic, as SNTV is not a mixed system, but it does ensure it is not clustered with either ‘purer’ type of system.}

The third group of controls involves socioeconomic factors. The base proposition of such explanations is that among higher socioeconomic groups political action is stimulated by greater understanding and knowledge of politics, supplemented by the prospect that wealthier citizens have greater physical resources to deploy in political action. Wealth may also correlate with levels of resources available to social movements, a notion important to theorists who focus on resource mobilisation as a key determinant of social movement activity (Tilly, 1979; Freeman, 1979). It is also important to control for development due to its possible link to levels of corruption.
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Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), for example, suggest that corruption and development are negatively related. 38 Two variables should suffice in indicating the degree of development and wealth in a given nation, in terms of educational and material status: literacy and logged GDP per capita respectively. 39 GDP has been logged as we might expect participation to be particularly low in very poor nations, where voters have few resources to invest in political activity, but to increase considerably as wealth increases and to steady out at a certain threshold of wealth.

The size of each nation's public sector will also be controlled for due to its potential impact on levels of corruption. One possibility is that a larger public sector means there are more opportunities for public servants to engage in corrupt practice. However, Xin and Rudel (2004) find that the larger the public sector, the lower the level of corruption, perhaps, they suggest, because citizens in nations with large public sectors are willing to meet tax demands only if their public officials are clean. Bravo-Ortega and Hojman (2002) also include 'government size' (or, more clearly, size of the public sector / welfare provision). They suggest that high turnout is likely among societies with large public sectors as there is more at stake to citizens if parties have different policies concerning welfare provision, though their variable is not found to be statistically significant.

38 In fact, a scatterplot between the Corruption Index and the Human Development Index (1998 data, consistent with the rest of the analysis in the chapter) is shown in the appendix in Figure A3a and reveals a degree of nonlinearity between the variables. The HDI scales life expectancy, literacy, and income and runs from 0 (highly under-developed nations) to 1 (highly developed nations). Low corruption scores are well associated with high levels of development, although as corruption levels increase, more variability in development is observed, although the overall trend is an inverse relationship, evidenced by the bivariate correlation between the variables of -0.67. Note that the HDI has not been selected as an independent variable in the models in this chapter itself because the potential importance of education and wealth on political participation are deemed to warrant their inclusion as independent factors.

39 Literacy rates will be reported as percentage rates. Source: the CIA World Factbook 1999. Definitions of literacy do differ slightly by nation, yet this was the best data available and most definitions would derive similar statistics anyway. No measure was available for the Slovak Republic from this source, so the 2000-04 statistic given by Unicef (No Date) will be used. The source of GDP statistics is the CIA World Factbook 1999.
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens' Behaviour

Size of government may also be useful to proxy equality in society. Indeed, inequality may create societal conditions in which the wealthy may more legitimately exploit the masses, perhaps through corrupt activity (You and Khagram, 2004). Controlling for the distribution of wealth is therefore appropriate to ensure that any effect of corruption on participatory activities does not simply proxy it. The possibility of including a measure of income inequality directly was considered, but was found to be problematic: the coverage of available data was limited and differing surveys made cross-national measures incomparable. However, wage inequality is clearly linked to inequality in society generally, and the former has been found to be negatively associated with public sector employment, which appears to promote less heterogeneity in wage rates (Pontusson et al, 2002; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000—although the latter article suggests this is the case specifically in social market economies). To control for size of government, a scale concerning levels of state-run enterprises and public sector investment will be included.

Modelling demonstration activity at the national level is a form of analysis that is very difficult to find in the literature on political participation, so it is necessary to add further socioeconomic variables that may influence aggregate levels of demonstration activity, and may also help us tap the effect of 'postmaterialism' at the

---

40 The United Nations Development Programme's (2005) Human Development Report 2005, acknowledges this problem, while You and Khagram (2004) are motivated to adopt techniques such as instrumental variable regression owed, in part, due to measurement error pertaining to their inequality variable.

41 Unemployment and union density are also found to be linked to wage inequality, and these factors are also controlled for in the model of demonstration activity.

42 Source: Gwartney, Lawson, and Samida (2000). Data retrieved from the Fraser Institute (2004). This has been inverted so the higher the score, the greater the size of government. The scale now runs from 0 (very few state operated enterprises and little public sector investment), to 10 (economy dominated by state operated enterprises and public sector investment), and pertains to the 1996-97 period. Data is missing for Belarus, which has been assigned a high score consistent with those the bulk of ex-Soviet republics receive.
national level. Three such variables will be added: trade union density, unemployment, and inflation. The role of organisational membership in mobilising participation has been discussed in depth in literature concerning the political activity of citizens (Ayala, 2000; Verba et al, 1995). Activity in trade unions, which are important in industrialised societies as organisations likely to mobilise protest, can therefore be tapped through the inclusion of a measure of trade union density. The nations have been clustered into two groups, one pertaining to high and low union density respectively, and the resultant dummy variable is added to the models. 44

The two macroeconomic variables that will be included in the models of demonstration activity are the percentage rate of inflation and the percentage of unemployment in each nation. It is expected that economic problems such as inflation or unemployment may act as an incentive to demonstrate. Such macroeconomic problems may also affect levels of resources available to social movements that promote demonstration activity. There appears to be little theoretical basis to include these three variables in the model of turnout, however, and to maintain parsimony they will not be.

43 Broadly, the inclusion of variables such as union density, unemployment, and inflation, alongside variables tapping development such as literacy, GDP, and authoritarianism, will help us indirectly tap materialist concerns (which are likely to tie to less developed societies, or those with substantial economic problems) and postmaterialist concerns (which should be prominent in more developed societies, and in those with less substantial economic problems).

44 Source of percentage rates of union membership: International Labour Organisation (2002). The year each statistic refers to differs by nation, yet they predominantly pertain to years in the early 1990s, with the bulk of the statistics pertaining to 1995. This period is assumed to be sufficiently near to 1998 for our purposes, given that trade union density—which involves socioeconomic structure—is unlikely to dramatically change over the course of a few years. That said, the choice to group the nations in two clusters (tapping whether the percentage of union membership within each nation’s non-agricultural labour force is 50% or greater) is justified, as the fact data on union membership is obtained across different years for different nations means that a more specific variable may be unreliable. Data was unavailable for Latvia, but was found in the 2003 European Commission employment report, and pertains to the year 2000.

45 Both inflation and unemployment are measured as percentage rates. Source: CIA World Factbook 1999, in which the bulk of scores pertain to 1998. Data concerning unemployment in this handbook was unavailable for the following countries, and the alternative sources are as follows: Pakistan – CIA World Factbook 2000; Ivory Coast – CIA World Factbook 2001 (accessed online from University of Missouri – St. Louis); India and Senegal – CIA World Factbook 2002 (accessed online from University of Missouri – St. Louis); Tanzania – Youth Development Network (2000/01 standard/ILO rate); Uganda – International Labour Organisation (2004).
The fourth, final cluster of controls relates to political cultural characteristics of each nation, and comprises two variables. First, a measure of how authoritarian each state is will be included in both sets of models, and is represented by each nation’s 1998 Polity IV score. Polity IV data provides a measure of the level of democracy in a given nation through the consideration of a number of institutional variables such as the competitiveness of executive recruitment and the feasibility of competitive political activity. Controlling for the level of democracy in each nation is important because it may have a fundamental impact on levels of political participation. Autocratic regimes may intimidate citizens from active participation and suppress pluralist activity, reducing, for example, the opportunities available for social movements to engage in participatory activity. (For arguments pertaining to the importance of opportunities for social movement activity, see Delia Porta and Diani, 1999; Tilly, 1979.) Furthermore, it is important to control for authoritarianism to ensure corruption does not proxy it. Less democratic regimes may have fewer impartial checks and balances to contain corruption. Alternatively, corruption may be highest in regimes in transition, which lack the relative institutional stability of established democratic or autocratic systems (Montinola and Jackman, 2002).

46 Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002). Luxembourg and Iceland are not included in the Polity IV dataset, and thus require coding. In line with the other established Western democracies, both countries have been given the 'most democratic' score available. Note also that all scores have been transformed so that 0 = highly democratic, 10 = highly undemocratic.

47 It was also considered to introduce a variable tapping length of democracy by nation, in case, for example, newly democratic nations are less likely to exhibit participatory cultures due to timidity of citizens used to an authoritarian past. Yet two problems deterred this avenue. First, it is difficult to operationalise such a variable. What determines whether a nation is an established democracy? If we are to use scores such as those in the Polity IV dataset, for how many years must a score signal a ‘democratic’ regime before we code the nation as an established democracy? Must we also control for speed of transition and consolidation, which may also affect participatory timidity or enthusiasm? Second, research elsewhere has shown that proximity to democratic transition has little impact on participation. Jackman and Miller (1995), analysing turnout, suggest that in South European nations there has been little substantive change in turnout over time, despite younger, perhaps more democratically-tuned cohorts, having replaced older generations since the inception of democracy (interestingly, in Portugal turnout levels were actually seen to decline). Jackman and Miller (p. 480) consequently conclude: “people adapt rather quickly to new political regimes and...this adaptation is influenced more by institutions in place than it is by cultural remnants of an authoritarian past.”
Second, a variable will be added to the model of demonstration activity which indicates whether the nation was involved in armed conflict in 1998. This variable is included on the grounds that it is possible demonstrations and incidences of inter-state or intra-state war or conflict will be positively associated. Armed conflict may spur demonstration activity, if protestors dislike war on grounds of the severe hardship it brings, or if—perhaps in the case of liberal democracies involved in conflict overseas such as in the recent case of the Iraq war—protestors are mobilised by ethical opposition to armed conflict. To assess this possibility, data from the Polity IV project concerning ‘armed societal conflict’ will be included in the model to indicate if the nation is involved in any of the following forms of conflict: ‘inter-state warfare’, ‘revolutionary warfare’, ‘ethnic warfare’, and ‘genocide or politicide’.48 To maintain parsimony, and in view of few nations being coded as having any form of armed conflict in 1998, instead of these categories of conflict being modelled separately, a simple dummy tapping whether any form of societal conflict is present will be included.

Analysis

Some nations have been omitted from the models due to the unavailability of data (these nations and the missing variables are outlined in Table A3.2 in the appendix). The model for turnout includes 80 nations, and the model concerning demonstrations includes 79 nations, from the initial sample of 85 nations included in the 1998 CPI. Recall that the cases to be analysed in the turnout model involve the national election in each country nearest to the year 1998 (on either side), and that they pertain to

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48 Iceland and Luxembourg are not included in the Polity IV dataset, but they may clearly be coded as 0 as neither experienced armed conflict of these forms in 1998.
legislative elections: to the lower house where there is more than one chamber, or simply to the unicameral chamber where there is not.\footnote{If two elections for a particular nation are equally spaced from 1998, then the earlier election will be selected. Also note that in the case of Egypt the 1995 election has been preferred to the 2000 election, despite being further from 1998, as data pertaining to the latter is unavailable.} The restriction of analysis to these forms of election is based on the assumption that the factors and issues at stake in them are likely to be significantly different compared to higher legislature and presidential elections.\footnote{This point links to a further factor: the question of how suitable it may be to control for whether each election involves polling for just the lower parliamentary chamber, or only part of it, or for higher chambers, or even the election of a president. An election might also involve the election of local representatives or representatives in supranational assemblies. Given the relatively small sample in hand, controlling for such factors would significantly reduce the degrees of freedom in each model and will not be pursued.} In established literature (for instance, Jackman and Miller, 1995) such a restriction is also evident.

The results of the turnout models are shown in Table 3.2. Model 1 is a partial model which omits corruption and bad governance—the two key standards-related variables—to show an important effect involving logged GDP that will subsequently be discussed; Model 2 is the full model, with these items added in.
Table 3.2 Results of OLS Regressions Estimating Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Partial</th>
<th>Model 2: Full</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Index (0-10)</td>
<td>-3.27**</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Governance (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory Voting</td>
<td>9.31**</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Seats Largest Party</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality of Elec. Sys</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic &amp; Political-Cultural Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy (%)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP / Capita (1000s, logged)</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Government (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>54.51***</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1; OLS regressions using robust standard errors.³¹

As the partial model involves an important effect better illuminated when the full results have been mapped out, let us first address the full model. The bad governance variable shows no association with turnout, indicating that measures (other than corruption) tapping bad governance do not predict citizens’ propensity to vote. Of the institutional variables, compulsory voting is unsurprisingly found to be statistically significant, with a substantial positive coefficient showing that legal requirements to vote appear to be effective. Interestingly, the other two institutional variables are not

³¹ Diagnostic testing and exploratory work was undertaken on the full model with the following results. Heteroskedasticity will not be problematic because robust standard errors were used. Although some variables are highly correlated (corruption, bad governance, and logged GDP in particular), testing revealed no problem with multicollinearity nor (when the model was run without robust standard errors to enable testing) with outliers. It was deemed important to undertake exploratory work involving the Corruption Index because of its status as the independent variable of key interest. It may, for example, display a nonlinear effect (for instance, only nations with very high levels of corruption may display certain effects involving participation). However, a squared term on the Corruption Index was not found to have a substantive effect, indicating that a linear relationship is evident between corruption and turnout.
statistically significant, although the signs on their coefficients are as expected. Lack of competitiveness, indicated by the percentage of seats occupied by the largest party, is negatively related to turnout; electoral system proportionality is positively related. Meanwhile literacy predicts higher turnout, as we would expect, but size of government and authoritarianism are not found to be explanatory.

However for our purposes the most important results exhibited by the model pertain to corruption, and also to logged GDP, as this variable links to corruption in an interesting way. Two core conclusions can be drawn. First, corruption appears to have a negative relationship with turnout (p-value = 0.03). The coefficient of about -3 indicates that in a hypothetical country with a corruption score of zero, a highly clean nation, turnout would be predicted to be about 30% higher than a hypothetically highly corrupt country with a score of ten, controlling for the other factors. This is an important and strong result and directly confirms hypothesis $HI$.

Second, logged GDP per capita is found to be inversely related to turnout, suggesting that turnout is inclined to be higher in poorer countries. Interestingly, however, this runs against most of the established literature which ties socioeconomic wealth to greater participation (for example, Verba et al., 1978). Exploratory work shows that omitting corruption and bad governance, which correlates with GDP, neutralises the statistically significant negative relationship between logged GDP and turnout, as the partial Model 1 shows. These results are important because they show that without controlling for corruption and bad governance we derive a misspecified model. We see that including corruption and bad governance is important, as it draws out that what really inclines richer countries to have higher rates of turnout: it is their propensity to be well governed and non-corrupt, not their rates of wealth.

The statistical insignificance of this variable might be explained by the dampening effect of less competition being countered by higher turnout in “critical” landslide elections, thus weakening its explanatory power.
Finally, regarding the models of turnout, to ensure the results were not heavily impacted by the strong impact of compulsory voting, the full turnout model was re-run twice, first excluding nations that enforce compulsory voting, even where this enforcement is weak; second excluding nations that strictly enforce compulsory voting. By excluding these sets of countries we are able to observe the effect of corruption on turnout where variation among nations' levels of voting is not affected by a strong institutional incentive for citizens to vote, and therefore where variation in turnout is observed as functions of the remaining factors. The resulting models, presented in Table A3.3 of the appendix, illustrate that corruption remains an important determinant of turnout even though its statistical significance weakens slightly (the p-value for corruption in the model excluding nations that enforce compulsory voting, even weakly, is about 0.05; and is about 0.1 in the model excluding nations that strictly enforce compulsory voting). The magnitude of the effect of the Corruption Index does not change significantly, with the coefficient hovering at around -3, and the effects of the control variables are consistent with the results of the full model in Table 3.2.

Let us turn now to modelling demonstrations. From initial exploratory work, it was found that when all of the independent variables were included, only the Corruption Index and its squared term (included to tap the nonlinear effect hypothesised) were statistically significant, and multicollinearity between corruption and bad governance was evident. Interestingly, on removing the Corruption Index and its squared term, only bad governance related to demonstration activity, with the two variables exhibiting a positive relationship, suggesting corruption drowns out its

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53 The categorisation of countries with compulsory voting into those with weak and strong enforcement is made by Idea International (2006), and their categorisation is deployed here.
54 When a full model was run without the squared term on corruption, no variable was statistically significant at all. This gives a clear indication that the effect of corruption on demonstrations is indeed nonlinear. Due to the lack of explanatory power of variables in this model, it has not been presented.
effect. To derive a more informative and robust model, some non-explanatory variables were removed. This parsimonious model resulted in the R-squared dropping only slightly: from 0.23 to a still respectable 0.20, suggesting that the original model was telling us little more anyway. Note too that the effect of corruption in both the original and the parsimonious model is essentially the same, thus the validity of the results involving corruption that we can draw from the parsimonious model is not undermined. The variables removed to form the parsimonious model were: logged GDP, size of government, inflation, authoritarianism, and armed conflict. It is curious that at the national level these variables are not significant, yet given the fact that no work has been found which attempts to model national level demonstration activity, our expectations that they were had to be tentative. The omission of these variables enabled the inclusion of a further case: Namibia, which was initially excluded for lacking data on its size of government. These two models, a full model and the parsimonious, preferred model, are outlined in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3 Results of OLS Regressions Estimating Demonstration Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (Full)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>s.e.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Scale (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.48**</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.50***</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Scale</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance Variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bad Governance (0-10)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic and Political-Cultural Factors</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy (%)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP / Capita (1000s, logged)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Government (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Union Density</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.47**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation (%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.06**</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
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<td>80</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1; OLS regression using robust standard errors.55

Given the little explanatory power of the full model (Model 1), let us discuss the key effects of the preferred model (Model 2). An important result concerns the effect of union density. It was anticipated that greater union density would encourage more demonstration activity, as unions would be able to mobilise protest among their members. However, the opposite effect appears to be evident, with nations who have low union density likely to exhibit relatively more demonstration activity. One way of explaining this result is by reference to the potential effect of the growth of postmaterialism in post-industrial societies. On the basis that low union density nations would be those in which postmaterialist values are significant, and in line with

55 As robust standard errors have been used, heteroskedasticity will not be a problem. Tests indicated no problems with outliers (when the model was run without standard errors, which is necessary for testing). The collinearity evident between corruption and bad governance in the full model appeared far less problematic in this parsimonious model, and no other problems with multicollinearity were evident.
Inglehart (1997), greater demonstration activity in such nations may simply reflect the presence of higher numbers of postmaterialists who enjoy greater political and societal stability enabling greater political involvement. However, the effect of materialist orientations is also evident: unemployment is positively tied to demonstration activity, suggesting that the urge to protest may also be related to economic hardship. It is alternatively plausible that low union density and high unemployment may reflect wage inequality in society (Pontusson et al., 2002; Rueda and Ponstusson, 2000), and that this may also induce demonstration activity among the worse off.

Yet for our purposes the most interesting results concern corruption and its squared term, which are both statistically significant. The signs on the coefficients imply that countries with very low or very high levels of corruption appear to have substantially more demonstration activity than those with little or moderate levels of corruption, deriving a J-curve effect that supports hypothesis $H2$. This result is easiest to appreciate when it is presented graphically, and this is done so in Figure 3A.$^{57}$

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$^{56}$ To ensure this result was accurate, further exploratory work was undertaken. The Corruption Index was recoded into categorical variables, and, when regressed on demonstration activity, the signs on the composite dummies’ coefficients indicated that they had equivalent effects to those displayed by the Corruption Index (as a continuous variable), and its polynomial.

$^{57}$ The effects of the continuous independent variables other than corruption and its squared term were taken into account in the graph by multiplying their mean values by their estimated coefficients in Model 2, and adjusting the intercept by the aggregated effect. For simplicity, the union density dummy was set to 0.
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Figure 3A

The Nonlinear Effect of Corruption on Demonstration Activity

The graph illustrates an important result that suggests that the two effects discussed earlier appear evident:

1. Demonstration activity in highly non-corrupt nations is higher than in countries with middle-range corruption score. In highly clean nations, perhaps demonstration activity is encouraged by the knowledge that politicians are diligent and highly responsive, prioritising public rather than private interests. Consequently, even extra-institutional participation may be stimulated. We may call this the 'efficacy' effect.

2. This effect tails off as levels of corruption increases, leading to the dip in demonstration activity before it is stimulated again by considerably different reasons: by citizens' responses to inadequate political institutions and
associated negative cultural perceptions, an effect that gets increasingly strong as levels of corruption increase. We may call this the ‘disillusionment’ effect.

Countries with moderate levels of corruption may not possess the first or second effects, leading to lower levels of demonstration activity relative to highly corrupt and highly clean nations.

Summary

This chapter sought to test two hypotheses – that political corruption would have a negative relationship with electoral turnout, and predict greater demonstration activity in particularly clean and particularly corrupt nations. These hypotheses were derived from theoretical reasoning which emphasised corruption’s potential role as a signal, undermining citizens’ faith in political institutions and creating cultural orientations involving mistrust and inefficacy. From this basis, it was predicted that corruption would act as a disincentive for institutional forms of political participation such as electoral turnout and, in corrupt nations, an incentive for extra-institutional forms of political participation such as demonstration activity. Yet it was also predicted that in particularly clean nations, extra-institutional participation would be prompted anyway, due to public servants being particularly responsive to any form of participation, motivating all forms of citizen behaviour. These twin expectations regarding the impact of corruption on demonstration activity brought forth the prospect that their relationship would be nonlinear.

Turning to findings, basic data analysis and subsequent regression analysis has suggested that hypothesis HI, predicting that corruption and turnout will be inversely
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correlated, is supported. The Corruption Index successfully predicts turnout, and has a negative relationship with it. This fits with our theoretical reasoning that corruption undermines perceptions of institutional quality, creating detrimental cultural orientations that lead to the neglect of institutional participation.

The more complex hypothesis $H2$ is also supported. Corruption exhibits a nonlinear relationship with demonstration activity, such that demonstrations occur more in highly clean nations and highly corrupt nations in contrast to countries in the middle. The significant rise in demonstration activity as corruption grows distinctly high suggests that this may be owed to increasingly negative cultural orientations and perceptions towards institutions (the 'disillusionment' effect). Yet in highly clean nations, greater elite responsiveness to all forms of participation, whether institutional or extra-institutional, may be evident, also motivating demonstration activity, but relating to a very different form of incentive (the 'efficacy' effect).

Thus this chapter has been useful in providing initial inroads into our thinking on how corruption and participation relate. In the next chapter, we may analyse the link deeper by asking how well individual level perceptions of corruption, as well as national level corruption, predict participation. It must be remembered that the models presented in this chapter are limited by their focus on national level data. Although inferences have been made that concern individual level decision-making, this represents ecological reasoning and must therefore remain tentative. In the next chapter the integration of both national and individual level factors using survey data allows us to analyse both the effects of both corruption and perceived corruption on political participation.
Chapter 4. Corruption, Perceived Corruption, and Citizens’ Behaviour

Introduction and Hypotheses

The previous chapter examined the effect of national level corruption on two forms of political behaviour: demonstration activity and electoral turnout. It confirmed hypotheses that corruption was positively associated with the latter, and had a nonlinear effect on the former, such that extra-institutional participation was high when corruption was very high and very low, but lower at intermediate levels. It was postulated that this was related to the impact of corruption on perceptions of institutional quality in given political systems, and on political-cultural orientations involving trust, alienation, and efficacy, which influenced the decision-making calculus of a citizen considering engaging in political participation. Consequently, when stimulated to participate because of an issue, a citizen is argued to be influenced by levels of corruption in politics and will behave in certain ways accordingly. Yet we cannot be certain about citizens’ motivations without further analysis, testing the effects of individual level perceived corruption on participatory activity.

Hence this chapter expands this analysis of the participatory effects of corruption by using multilevel modelling techniques to analyse the impact on political behaviour of both national level corruption and individual level perceptions of corruption together. Using individual level perceptions of corruption as an independent variable means that the inferences we make from models of political behaviour do not suffer from the ecological fallacy (that is, the tendency to
extrapolate conclusions pertaining to individuals’ behaviour from results of models using national level indicators of political participation). In the previous chapter, the models concerning turnout and demonstration activity were useful in indicating coherent relationships between forms of political behaviour and corruption at the national level, yet the conclusions drawn from them that relate to individuals’ decision-making have to be tentative. By using data on perceived corruption from survey respondents we avoid this problem.

Moreover, it is interesting to explore how the individual level and national level corruption measures relate vis-à-vis effects on political behaviour. Do they carry the same effects? Thus far we have discussed the effects of national level corruption generally, assuming that corruption promotes orientations regarding the trustworthiness and efficacy of politicians and institutions, although more nuanced expectations may be offered at this stage which can divide between the individual level effects of perceived corruption, and the contextual effects of corruption at the national level.

Regarding individual level corruption first, few established works appear to use individual level perceived corruption as an independent explanatory variable for participation at all, and they are geographically specific: Davis et al (2004) examine Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico, while McCann and Domínguez (1998) focus only on Mexico. McCann and Domínguez (1998) hypothesise that lower turnout is likely to result from higher perceived electoral fraud. They suggest that citizens rationally weigh the costs and benefits of turning out, and that: “the practice of electoral fraud implies that voters would believe there is little benefit to them from voting; they may also believe that they would suffer intimidation or worse if they attempt to vote for the opposition” (p. 484). Their model of electoral turnout reports that perceived electoral
fraud has a strong inverse relationship with turnout. This assertion is also supported by Davis et al (2004), who find that turnout and perceived corruption are negatively related. Davis et al also examine whether perceived corruption appears to tie to other forms of political behaviour. They divide between ‘conventional’ participation, defined as legal forms of action such as petition signing and attending a demonstration, and ‘unconventional’ participation, defined as illegal forms of protest. However they find no relationship between perceived corruption and these types of behaviour. In consequence, they believe perceived corruption contributes to political detachment.

It is notable, however, that Davis et al’s work initially operates from the theoretical assumption that turnout is influenced by the ability of actors to invoke perceptions of corruption to their electoral advantage. They suggest that opposition parties are effective ‘vehicles’ for dealing with corruption because they are able to make corruption a pertinent electoral issue to mobilise support. They steer away from Aldrich’s notion which McCann and Dominguez cite – that an individual’s decision to participate involves a rational assessment of the potential costs and benefits of doing so. Yet from their data analysis it is found that perceived corruption does not affect opposition voting, but does motivate non-voting. Taken together, the results of these works imply that perceived corruption is highly likely to dampen turnout.

The congruence of the results relating to turnout appears compatible with the reasoning used to explain the turnout result in the previous chapter: that corruption implies poor institutional quality that translates into decreased institutional participation. Meanwhile Davis et al’s finding that extra-institutional participation is not affected by perceived corruption is perhaps surprising given our theoretical expectations that disaffection created by perceiving substantial corruption may motivate extra-institutional activity.
Thus our hypotheses concerning perceived corruption may be driven by the expectation that it is likely to be negatively related to institutional participation (again, turnout is used in this chapter to examine this). This expectation is prompted by the findings of McCann and Domínguez (1998) and Davis et al. (2004). Meanwhile, no established findings indicate that perceived corruption will have an effect on extra-institutional behaviour, however the cross-national data at our disposal means that we can test this possibility more thoroughly. In line with the theoretical expectations and findings regarding the national level corruption in the previous chapter, it might be expected that perceived corruption, when high, creates disdain for institutions and politicians that results in extra-institutional behaviour being employed. We may also expect that very low perceived corruption encourages extra-institutional participation because politicians are deemed responsive, and participation efficacious. Hence:

H1: Individual level perceived corruption will predict lower propensity to vote.

H2: Extra-institutional behaviour will be occur more where individual level perceived corruption is particularly high and particularly low, and less where perceived corruption is at intermediate levels.

Yet what of the effects of national level corruption? In the previous chapter it was assumed that national level corruption proxied citizens’ orientations and we talked of distrust and inefficacy affecting the turnout calculus in general terms. Yet perhaps the contextual effect of corruption is more nuanced. Perhaps corruption has the capacity to influence citizens’ behaviour whether or not they personally happen to perceive low, medium or high levels of corruption. Participation in a nation by those that
perceive particular levels of corruption congruent with the national level score (or by those that perceive certain levels of responsiveness of politicians that corruption may proxy)\textsuperscript{58} may embed norms and paths such that the forms of participation across those with differing perceived corruption are similar, whatever their reasons for participating.

Such reasoning links to previous work on political participation, and even non-academic works on individuals' behaviour. Gladwell (2000), for example, writing for a populist audience, elaborates how 'social epidemics' can be triggered from just a few citizens initiating a certain form of behaviour. Meanwhile Granovetter (1978), recognises that once a certain 'threshold' of individuals has decided to undertake an action, the number of participants can essentially snowball, at least until things get out of hand and participants drop out. Tarrow (1994) suggests that participants in an activity will grow after a critical mass of citizens display that the behaviour generates a beneficial response. The argument here is related, but somewhat different: it is a mistake to assume that this theory only tells us that levels of participation snowball exponentially as some individuals participate and others join them. The theory goes beyond this notion by suggesting first that rather than focusing on particular incidences of behaviour (such as a peaceful demonstration snowballing into a riot) certain levels of participation among citizens institutionalise particular means of behaving. Thus these trends may stimulate a series of participatory acts. Indeed, once norms and paths of participation are set, citizens face costs in attempting to modify these norms, including motivating others to join them in participating in unfamiliar ways, and these alternative means may have questionable efficacy if public servants

\textsuperscript{58} It is fair to say that corrupt politicians are likely to appear less responsive to citizens than are clean politicians. Even if their corrupt practice is covert, the fact that they are not prioritising the interests of the public may be recognised and interpreted in more general terms as a lack of interest or elite efficacy, even if, in reality, their true priority—profiting from illicit exchange and particularism—is well-hidden.
are unused to them. Second, the theory is primarily one of corruption. It shows, heuristically, that corruption is one form of trigger that may prompt the initial behaviour that has a wider effect. Once a threshold of individuals holding certain perceptions relating to corruption or responsiveness has been met, this may lead to wider contextual effects. National level corruption may be a useful explanatory, ‘trigger’ variable in this regard. To pinpoint the precise theoretical orientations involved, Figure 4A explains this line of reasoning systematically:

**Figure 4A**

The Potential For Corruption to have a Contextual Effect on Participation

Levels of national level corruption are accurately recognised by some citizens who behave in certain ways accordingly, consistent with the effects described in the previous chapter regarding distrust and alienation. For instance, very high levels prompt demonstration activity. Or, these initial reactions are not necessarily prompted by recognising corruption itself, but instead by a realisation among some citizens that certain public servants (who are corrupt, whether this is perceived or not) are generally unresponsive to citizens’ demands, and that others (who are clean) appear to be more responsive.

After a threshold level of citizens start behaving in certain ways as a consequence of these reactions, other citizens embrace the paths of participation they have trodden. Hence corruption (along with other variables) acts to set the norms of participation, embedding a propensity for citizens generally to use certain means of activity when attempting to obtain political objectives.

This eventually means that participating citizens may or may not perceive accurate levels of national level corruption, or may or may not sense the responsiveness or unresponsiveness of public servants. Hence national level corruption is witnessed to have effects on participation independent of individual level perceived corruption.

The feasibility of such a contextual effect is indicated by studies that find similar effects in regard to other forms of behaviour. Regarding voting behaviour, for
example, it has been found that independent of an individual’s social class, the class
make-up of their locality appears to influence their vote choice (Andersen and Heath,
2002; Andersen et al, 2006; Fisher, 2000a). Individuals appear to be influenced by
those they interact with. Furthermore, contextual effects of campaign spending have
also been shown to affect individual’s vote choice, even when controlling for
individual level characteristics (Andersen et al, 2006).

Meanwhile, Ibrahim (1998) discusses how democratisation overseas has had
an important contextual effect on the civil society and particularly the middle classes
of Arab regimes, in their demanding greater liberalisation. In economics, Kobrin
(1985) has pointed to the importance of a ‘domino’ effect in regard to trends in
international oil nationalisation in the 20th Century; while Karlson (1986) shows how
innovation in the US steel industry has been strongly influenced by initial and
competing innovative developments.59 Thus contextual effects appear to influence
firms’ and governments’ behaviour, not just individuals’, and even in analyses quite
removed from these fields of study have comparable contextual effects been found.
The Boston school music movement’s development in the 19th Century through
schools, for example, has been analysed as a consequence of a ‘snowball’ effect, and
in terms of some schools aspiring to the status of schools that had established the
movement well (Jorgensen, 1983).

Given the theoretical basis of Figure 4A, and the extraction of works
displaying similar arguments regarding contextual effects on behaviour, we may thus
state hypotheses about how national level corruption might affect participation. The

59 Often these effects are called ‘demonstration effects’, as they operate on the basis that the behaviour
of some agents demonstrates, directly or indirectly, how others may behave. We will avoid using this
term, however, as it risks being confused with demonstration activity, one of the forms of participation
analysed.
nature of the effects will be assumed to be consistent with the findings of the previous chapter:

**H3:** National level corruption will predict lower propensity for citizens to vote.

**H4:** National level corruption will exhibit a nonlinear relationship with extra-institutional behaviour such that high and low levels of corruption predict increased propensity to participate compared to intermediate levels of corruption.

**Data**

To evaluate the effects of perceived and national level corruption on a spread of participatory activities, an ideal dataset would offer a good measure of perceived corruption alongside variables pertaining to numerous forms of political participation. The closest two datasets to this ideal, which both explicitly tap individual level perceptions of political corruption and measures of forms of political behaviour, are wave 3 of the Worlds Values Survey (WVS) (1995-98), and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 2 (2001-2006). Wave 3 of the WVS covers many nations, surveying 70,000 people. A list of the 48 countries for which data is available is provided in Table A4.1 in the appendix.

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60 Source: Inglehart et al, 2000. Unfortunately, the other waves of the WVS failed to include a question to tap perceived corruption.

61 Extracted from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2006). The specific edition to be used is the April 10, 2006 ‘advance’ release. Module 1 of the CSES is not used because it lacks an individual level question on perceived corruption.

62 Five regions—Andalusia, Basque, Galicia, Tambov, and Valencia—were also included in the dataset, yet have been excluded from analysis from the outset because the focus is cross-national and ‘macro’ data is generally unavailable for subnational units. West and East Germany, and Serbia and Montenegro were four independent units in the WVS, yet ‘macro’ data in the 1990s is almost always
The other dataset, CSES Module 2, comprises individual level election surveys from across nations, along with numerous variables at the district and national levels, and, like the WVS wave 3, it contains variables concerning perceived corruption and political participation. CSES data will only be used to examine turnout, which cannot be undertaken using the WVS. The decision to use the WVS more extensively in this chapter has been made because the non-turnout political participation variables in the CSES are not substantively any better than those included in the WVS (indeed the focus of the CSES is largely on electoral matters), while the number of countries covered is smaller. A list of the 30 countries surveyed as part of the CSES for which data is available is provided in Table A4.2 in the appendix.\textsuperscript{63}

Turning now to dependent variables, recall that we are interested in two forms of participation: institutional and extra-institutional. As in the previous chapter, turnout represents the former, but we can expand the range of extra-institutional behaviours available beyond just demonstration activity due to the coverage of the WVS. In regard to institutional participation, therefore, turnout remains the key variable. In the CSES dataset, the item pertaining to whether the respondent cast a vote in the ‘current election’ will be used.\textsuperscript{64} We should remember, however, that there

\textsuperscript{63} For the German 2002 election, two surveys, one conducted on the telephone, the other via post, have been included. These surveys were simply combined to form a unitary German sample. Furthermore, the Portuguese sample consists of surveys pertaining to two elections: 2002 and 2005.

\textsuperscript{64} As the CSES comprises numerous election surveys, the operationalisation of this variable was somewhat idiosyncratic. Often it formed a simple response to the question of whether the respondent cast a vote in the presidential or legislative election being analysed, yet on occasion it was derived from related variables, such as vote choice. (Another variable picked up on whether the respondent voted in another component or stage of the election, and for many countries it was irrelevant. Indeed 80% of respondents have ‘missing’ responses. It will thus be ignored.) It is clear, therefore that the variable is not ideal: it pertains to both parliamentary and presidential elections and is sometimes derived from a separate variable. However, checks for inconsistency were undertaken by the CSES, and the component surveys attempted to phrase questions to avoid individuals claiming they voted when they did not. The variable is thus deemed adequate to measure turnout at the individual level. It has been coded simply, with 0 signifying non-voting, and 1 signifying that the respondent voted. Inconsistent
are difficulties with self-reported turnout such as that provided by the CSES. Previous research has suggested that turnout measured by the proportion of survey respondents who report that they voted tends to be rather higher than ‘official’ turnout figures. Swaddle and Heath (1989), for example, report that the difference between official turnout figures in the 1987 British election and self-reported turnout in the 1987 British General Election Study is 11%. Through surveying respondents for whom there is official data on turnout, it is found that misreporting accounts for some of this difference. Such misreporting may be owed to individuals feeling ashamed to admit to not voting, or simply due to respondents forgetting whether or not they turned out. Furthermore, analysis of non-respondents suggested that some of the official – self-reported difference may also be explained by ‘response bias’ – or the greater inclination of those willing to complete a survey to also have greater inclination to vote. Redundancy in the electoral register and house movers (who are often under-represented in surveys and tend to vote less than non-movers) were also proposed as contributory explanations in the difference exhibited.

Using the CSES data, we can compare the proportion of respondents by country with the official turnout statistics reported by Idea International, and this is tabulated in the appendix in Table A4.3. We see a mean difference across countries of 13.3%, which is comparable to the gaps reported in other surveys. In the 1983 British election the difference between official and self-reported statistics has been shown to be 10%, in the 1976 American presidential election it has been shown to be 11% (Swaddle and Heath, 1989). A possible explanation for why our number is slightly higher may relate to the fact that we are looking at a survey which includes some less-

responses, refusals, and don’t knows have been dropped. Respondents with missing data for this variable, and indeed any of the other dependent and independent variables to be defined, will be dropped from the relevant models. Dropping respondents has been preferred to the imputation of scores first because these techniques are contentious, second because by not imputing data the models are more conservative, which gives us additional confidence that the effects reported are robust.
developed nations, and it may be that in these countries the unwillingness to admit to not fulfilling a perceived civic obligation may be particularly strong, yet this is not borne out by the data on the official – self-reported differences in individual countries – although there is a very considerable gap in Mexico, comparable differences are seen in Canada and Switzerland. It is difficult to remedy the problems of misreporting, response bias, and the like, however it is prudent to be aware of them.

Some initial analysis of the relationships between self-reported turnout scores from the CSES and the Corruption Index is shown in a scatterplot in Figure A4a in the appendix. It is comparable to the equivalent scatterplot showing the relationship between official turnout and corruption (Figure A4b, which uses the data from the last chapter). The linear predictions of the lines of best fit suggest turnout and corruption are negatively related, although there is considerable variation, with nations located above and below the lines.

In regard to extra-institutional participation, we extend the analysis of Chapter 3 to consider demonstration activity along with other items. The WVS asks the following question:

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it?

a) Have Done
b) Might Do
c) Would Never Do
d) Don't Know
The five actions are: *signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories*.\(^6\) Of these five behaviours, it appears suitable to model the first four, but not *occupying buildings or factories*, as so few respondents, less than 2%, have actually engaged in this activity, and only 11% suggest they ‘might’ do it. Furthermore, some nations appear to display particularly low propensities for citizen involvement in the occupation of buildings: no-one in the Taiwanese sample reports having done so, for instance, and only three individuals in the Japanese sample report that they have.

We model the four items as dichotomous dependent variables, allowing us to compare directly the results of this chapter to those pertaining to demonstrations in the previous chapter. Furthermore, we will take the objective approach of dividing between those that have and those that have not done the activity, rather than worrying over those who ‘might’ do the activity, which is vague and difficult to quantify. The items are coded so that 0 indicates the respondent has not done the activity, and 1 indicates that they have.

Moving on to independent variables, the individual level focus of this study involves testing whether perceived corruption affects individuals’ propensities to engage in several forms of political behaviour. The key independent variable for the WVS models asks:

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6 It is worth briefly considering whether it is valid to describe strikes as ‘political’ participation. Indeed, striking in an effort to force a private firm to boost wages might be construed as a ‘private’ form of protest, and we must leave open the theoretical question of how far respondents themselves construe strike activity to be ‘political’. Nonetheless, a number of factors lend credence to considering strike activity with other, political, behaviours. Strike activity may involve workers in the public sector, and wage levels of government employees are undeniably political. Furthermore, the potential disruption to society and to the economy generally by strike activity, even if it is geared to private employers, can make it a ‘public’ phenomenon (it is, after all, ‘unofficial’ strikes that are tapped). Lastly, the government may be involved in preventing or settling industrial disputes, acting as an arbiter or regulator after a dispute has arisen, or installing mechanisms such as a minimum wage in an attempt to avert strike activity in the first place.
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?

a) Almost no public officials are engaged in it
b) A few public officials are engaged in it
c) Most public officials are engaged in it
d) Almost all public officials are engaged in it
e) DK

For the CSES models, the key variable asks:

How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]:

a) Very widespread
b) Quite widespread
c) Not very widespread
d) It hardly happens at all
e) DK

These questions form the key individual level independent variable and deserve discussion. From one standpoint it is clear that it is not theoretically nuanced. We

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66 Analysing perceived corruption variables extensively was not attempted in related research. Both Davis et al (2004) and McCann and Dominguez (1998) tend to use variables biased towards perceptions of particular forms of corruption (which is understandable given their goals), but there is a clear lack of theoretical input into the nature of such variables. Davis et al compose a three item scale comprising perceptions of whether corruption is a perceived obstacle to democracy, whether elections are fraudulent, and relating to the proportion of officials in government deemed to be corrupt. McCann and Dominguez look at perceptions of the extent of corruption and expected electoral fraud. Such selections would have been improved by framing variables more clearly within definitional and conceptual frameworks, and emphasising inherent problems with attempting to conduct analysis involving citizens' perceptions of such opaque phenomena. Much more analysis of perceived corruption itself is undertaken in the next chapter, focusing on Britain.
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might question the use of the words 'few', 'most', 'quite', 'very', and so on, to quantify proportions of public servants or the degree to which corruption is 'widespread'. Such terms might be differently and subjectively interpreted. Moreover, the term 'corruption' is mentioned in each question, and this word, as we have already discussed, creates difficulties. As we saw in Chapter 2, academics and analysts fundamentally disagree on the meaning of corruption. Definitions appeal to the role of public office (Nye, 1967), to the public interest (Friedrich, 1966), to public opinion (Rundquist and Hansen, 1976, cited in Peters and Welch, 1978), and to market principles (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). It is conceivable that citizens may knowingly or unknowingly use any one of these ideas as their guide to what is meant by the term 'corruption'. This is complicated further by the fact we are using cross-national data, so subjective definitions idiosyncratic to different nations may be influential. The other problematic term, included in the WVS question, is 'public officials', as this encompasses a very broad set of individuals. While some citizens may think of elite politicians, others may think of judges, local officials, or even the police. 'Politicians' in the CSES question specifies individuals more closely, but it is uncertain as to which level citizens may conceive of politicians. Is it local or central politicians being assessed? Are ministers of key concern, or are politicians more broadly being considered?

In regard to the type of behaviour under consideration, bribe taking is mentioned specifically in the questions, and this may guide citizens’ responses, moving the focus away from wider corrupt practices towards perceptions of financial misdemeanour in particular. Furthermore, scholars have found that citizens deem behaviour involving financial exchange from which public officials profit to be regarded as more corrupt than other plausibly 'corrupt' behaviour (Peters and Welch,
1978; Kalniņš, 2005). It is reasonable to predict that citizens will think of behaviour they deem most corrupt when they are asked about ‘corruption’, and given that bribe-taking joins the word ‘corruption’ in the questions, we may conclude that perceptions of financial misdemeanor are likely to be key.

Yet despite the possibility that the simplicity of the questions leaves them broad and open to interpretation, it is important to recognise that this simplicity may also be beneficial. The surveys are cross-national, and posing simple questions like these may fill the need to facilitate items that, after undergoing translation and checks for consistent meaning, are at least roughly equivalent across countries. This lends itself to what is essentially the same notion uncovered when we considered the difficulties of obtaining a national level measure of corruption: empirical efforts must tolerate, to some extent, a tentative approach due to the limitations of the data available.

We may now discuss the operationalisation of these questions. First, as it is hypothesized that perceived corruption has nonlinear trends on participation, and due to the ordinal nature of such an important variable, it will be treated as categorical. Second, observation of the distributions of both variables shows that proportionally very few individuals are placed in the category believing there to be the least amount of corruption in politics. Consequently, it is sensible to create a ‘low’ perceived corruption category combining: a) in the case of the WVS, those who perceive ‘almost no’ or ‘a few’ public officials to be corrupt; and b) in the case of the CSES, those who believe corruption ‘hardly happens’ or is ‘not very widespread’. This 'low'
category can be used as baseline for two other categories: medium perceived corruption, and high perceived corruption.\footnote{The medium category consists of those who perceive 'most' public officials to be corrupt (WVS), or those who perceive corruption to be 'quite widespread' (CSES). The high category consists of those who perceive 'almost all' public officials to be corrupt (WVS), or perceive corruption to be 'very widespread' (CSES). In regard to don’t know responses, these may often be interpreted as intermediate or apathetic responses, but concerning a variable directly tapping corruption, an elusive phenomenon, it is quite likely a don’t know response signals just that: a lack of knowledge or interest. It is not useful to include respondents who do not have clear opinions about how corrupt their public servants are in regressions with a central focus on the estimation of how such perceptions affect behaviour, thus they will be excluded from analysis.}

At this point, we may consider how responses to the questions relate to ‘national level’ corruption, as proxied by the Corruption Index scores. To do this, for both datasets we may assign 1 to low perceived corruption, 2 to medium perceived corruption, and 3 to high perceived corruption. The bivariate correlation between the mean scores of each nation’s perceived corruption variable in the WVS,\footnote{The following nations in the WVS do not have data pertaining to perceived corruption and have thus been excluded: China, Ghana, Japan, and Pakistan.} and each nation’s Corruption Index score,\footnote{The Corruption Index scores are Transparency International CPI scores, coded so that 10 represents very high levels of corruption and 0 very low levels. In regard to the WVS data, each statistic is from the 1998 CPI, or the nearest year subsequent to it with data available. This ensures that in the bulk of cases the year in which each nation was surveyed is present as one of the years TI collected data (the ‘3-year’ rule means 1996, 1997, and 1998 were used, and this wave of the WVS spans 1995-1998). Where the years do not coincide, this is not problematic because CPI statistics are inclined to stay very stable. Finally, Puerto Rico, though having a statistic pertaining to average individual level perceived corruption, does not have a national level corruption score and has thus been excluded.} is 0.8. The bivariate correlation, using the means of each nation’s CSES perceived corruption score and each nation’s Corruption Index score\footnote{As this data pertains to 2001-2006, the Corruption Index scores relate to 2004, the later ‘median’ year.} is greater than 0.85. The scatterplots between the Corruption Index and these perceived corruption scores are shown in Figures A4c and A4d in the appendix, and indicate graphically that national level corruption scores are highly associated with individual level perceived corruption. High levels of national level corruption are likely to result in citizen awareness of such malpractice, whether they engage in corrupt exchange themselves, hear rumours and stories of corrupt practice from others, or are aware of court trials involving and punishing corrupt individuals (although, of
course, levels of prosecutions involving incidences of corruption may not correlate with actual levels of corruption in a nation. Although national level and perceived corruption correlate well, it remains important to include them separately in models to facilitate testing of the hypotheses that both perceived corruption and national level corruption as a contextual effect influence participation.

Let us now turn to control variables to be included in the models. Firstly, numerous individual level socioeconomic controls will be included. Three factors concern gender, age, and religiosity, items said to affect political behaviour discussed in the previous chapter.71 Three more controls concern core sociological measures: education, class, and income. These are important controls, given the importance scholars place on components dividing those in different social strata. Education can be tapped equivalently in both the WVS and CSES models.72 However, the differing quality of the income and class variables in the two datasets means that only one of each can be included in each case. In the case of the WVS, the income variable is problematic: several nations do not include this variable or have poor data, reducing the number of nations that would be available for analysis. Class can be tapped more

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71 A dummy to tap gender will be created from the appropriate WVS and CSES gender variables. A categorical variable in which the respondents will be divided into three age groups: 16-34, 35-54, and 55+, will be included to tap age. Finally, in the WVS models religiosity will be included in the model using a simple dummy which pertains to the frequency with which citizens attend religious services. Those who attend services at least once a month will be deemed religious, and those who attend services less frequently will not. Religiosity will not, however, be included in the CSES models due to missing data. Equivalently recoding the relevant CSES question to tap religious attendance would lead to four nations dropping out of the models. The other measure of religiosity included in the CSES dataset, which taps strength of religious feeling, is even more problematic: due to missing data, ten nations would have to be excluded.

72 Although, however, much of the data pertaining to educational status in the WVS wave 3 is problematic. Therefore a simple measure will be included, a dummy dividing between those who have completed secondary school and those that have not. In the case of Croatia these responses appear flawed, so the dummy will be created from the variable tapping the age at which the respondent completed their schooling. It will be assumed in this case that those whose formal education ended at the age of 17 or over completed a secondary school education (this is not an arbitrary choice: age 17 is the CSES cut-off point for completing secondary school). The CSES education variable will be recoded to be congruent with this.
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easily. Yet in the case of the CSES, the available variables make the construction of an adequate class schema very difficult. The key 'socioeconomic status' variable has only four broad categories, and it has many missing respondents. The CSES income variable has fewer missing responses, and will be recoded and used in the models involving this dataset.

It is also necessary to control for organisational and attitudinal items. Thus one factor is organisational membership. As discussed previously, organisations can mobilise citizens, encouraging political behaviour to further their goals, while they may also train citizens in 'civic skills' used in political participation and increase 'social capital' which may encourage collective action. The WVS asks about respondents' membership of organisations in the many areas, including religion, labour movements and the environment. Yet when a variable is created to count the number of memberships each respondent possesses, it results in missing data which is detrimental to our national level N; many respondents fail to have responses for all the categories, and, because they are not comparable to those that do, would have to be excluded. Therefore, a key organisational membership—labour unions—will be tapped specifically, dividing between those that are members and those that are not. An equivalent variable can be created from the CSES dataset.

An important attitudinal control concerns citizens' interest in politics. This has been shown to tie to political participation, with the more interested more likely to

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73 It will be included as a recode of several variables, which enables the construction of a categorical variable placing the chief wage-earner of the respondent's household within a simplified version of the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema used by Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999). The categories to be included are: the service class; the routine nonmanual class; the petty bourgeoisie; skilled manual workers and farmers; non-skilled manual workers and agricultural labourers; armed forces / security personnel; and those who have never worked. The reference category will be the service class.

74 It might be assumed that missing respondents are not the key wage earner in the house, but such respondents generally having missing data for their spouses' socioeconomic status too. Using the class variable would lead to three nations being excluded from the models due to missing data.

75 Don't knows and refusals have been excluded, leaving five income categories, labelled lowest (reference), low, middle, high, and highest.
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engage in political behaviour (Whiteley et al, 2001). Furthermore, perceived corruption may vary according to the interest of the respondent in politics, and the degree to which the behaviour of public servants matters to them. The WVS has a variable tapping self-reported interest in politics which may be used, although unfortunately the CSES does not have an equivalent variable.

Another important variable concerns satisfaction with government. Greater dissatisfaction with the incumbent government’s policy performance has been shown to decrease turnout in the context of an ineffective opposition (Whiteley et al, 2001), though an effective opposition might presumably gain increased support. Furthermore, it is likely that those who are dissatisfied with the government’s performance are more likely to perceive corruption than are those who are satisfied with the government; conversely, perceiving corruption may increase dissatisfaction. Thus it is appropriate to control for the effect of this variable in case it proxies perceived corruption.

It will be included as a four-point continuous variable running from not at all interested to very interested, and is a recode of WVS question which is now outlined, along with the value attached to each response in square brackets:

- How interested would you say you are in politics?  
  - Very interested [4]
  - Somewhat interested [3]
  - Not very interested [2]
  - Not at all interested [1]

or don’t know, which presumably signals a lack of interest, and will be coded as ‘not very interested’ responses.

Satisfaction in government will be included via a four-point continuous variable running from very dissatisfied to very satisfied. In the WVS models, this will be based on responses to the question asking:

- How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs?  
  - Would you say you are very satisfied [4]
  - Fairly satisfied [3]
  - Fairly dissatisfied [2]
  - Very dissatisfied [1]

Don’t know responses are likely to indicate a degree of satisfaction, otherwise it is probable respondents would be motivated to record a dissatisfied response, thus they will be marked as ‘fairly satisfied’ responses. In the CSES models, it will be based on responses to the question asking:

- Now thinking about the performance of the government in [capital]/president in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election OR change in govt.] years. Has he/she done a very good job? [4] A good job? [3] A bad job? [2] A very bad job? [1] Don’t know responses are likely to indicate perception that the government has done quite a good job, otherwise they would presumably be motivated to record a more critical response, therefore they will be clustered with individuals who responded that the government had done a ‘good job’. (Values assigned to the responses are in square brackets.)

It is unfair to assume, however, that perceived corruption is just a proxy of dissatisfaction in government. Using CSES data, we find that the correlation between satisfaction in government and perceived corruption is only about -0.25.
Finally, there are two further variables included only in the WVS which will be useful as controls. First, general levels of trust. Perceived corruption might be a reflection of citizens' general levels of trust instead of an independent assessment of the behaviour of public servants (Davis et al., 2004). Furthermore, it may be that greater trust encourages 'social capital' to facilitate co-ordination among citizens and, potentially, participation. Second, individuals' placements on a categorical variable pertaining to degrees of postmaterialism. Postmaterialist orientations refer to concerns over 'quality of life' and 'self-expression', ahead of traditional economic, materialist orientations (Inglehart, 1997). Postmaterialism is argued to tie to greater 'active' participation such as petition signing, boycotts and demonstrations. Perhaps because the CSES dataset is focused largely on attitudes towards electoral matters, rather than social attitudes more generally, it does not include equivalent items to tap social trust and postmaterialism, which is unfortunate.

Using multilevel modelling techniques means that we incorporate variables at the national level as well as the individual level. Yet given the relatively small national N it is important to include only a few pertinent national level indicators. One way to help this selection is to observe what was explanatory in the models of the

---

Trust will be included via the inclusion of a dummy variable relating to citizens responses to the following WVS question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Don't know responses, which presumably indicate that citizens harbour doubts about peoples’ trustworthiness, will be coded as responses indicating distrust.

Trust, co-joined with organisational membership, ensures 'social capital' is tapped indirectly. We might, indeed, be forgiven in not worrying about failing to tap it directly, given the ambiguous nature of the concept.

We have the advantage of two postmaterialism variables already having been created in the WVS dataset, one relating to four key postmaterialist / materialist items to derive a three-item variable; the second relating to twelve items to derive a five-item variable. Although, ceteris paribus, the more detailed variable would be preferred, the disadvantage in its use is the fact that it contains many more missing values. For simplicity, therefore, and to maintain as many responses as possible, the more parsimonious variable will be included. To derive it, respondents are questioned on how relatively important the following four issues are: maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government decisions, fighting rising prices, and protecting freedom of speech, where the first and third items reflect materialist orientations, and the second and fourth items reflect postmaterialist ones. The responses are converted into a three-item variable differentiating materialist orientations, mixed orientations, and postmaterialist orientations. The variable to be included will be categorical, with materialist orientations set as the reference category.
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previous chapter. In the turnout models, corruption, compulsory voting and logged GDP per capita were significant at the 5% level; in the demonstration activity models, corruption, corruption squared, and union density were significant at the 5% level.

In all models corruption\textsuperscript{82}, which is of key interest, will be included, along with logged GDP per capita,\textsuperscript{83} which is a crucial indicator. Recall from the more extensive discussions in the previous chapter that it is important to control for wealth due to its negative relationship with corruption, and its potential impact on participation. Furthermore, the authoritarianism variable will be included despite its lack of statistical significance in the previous chapter, because it remains a key political measure which is positively associated with corruption and may affect the capacity for meaningful participation in politics.\textsuperscript{84} A disincentive to subversive participation in the form of repressive government reaction is possible in more authoritarian regimes. Finally, compulsory voting will be included for the models of turnout.\textsuperscript{85}

Many of the other variables used in the previous chapter will not be used, as individual level variables effectively measure them. Education and union membership,

\textsuperscript{82}Corruption will be tapped through the inclusion of the Corruption Index scores constructed earlier in the chapter to calculate the bivariate correlations between the Corruption Index and the means of the two individual level perceived corruption variables.

\textsuperscript{83}Source: CIA World Factbook 1999 for the WVS models; the CIA World Factbook 2005 (retrieved online from the University of Missouri – St. Louis) for the CSES models.

\textsuperscript{84}Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002). Scores pertain to the year of each nation’s election, although average scores have been used in the one case (Portugal) when two elections are analysed. Some nations in the CSES dataset were surveyed after 2003, which is the limit of the Polity IV data, thus they were given their 2003 score. This is not problematic, as there is no reason to believe that during the one or two years between the Polity score and the survey, there was a significant regime change to have substantively modified the scores of any of these nations: Australia, Canada, Britain, Japan, the Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and the USA. Hong Kong, however, was problematic: it does not have Polity score, and it was surveyed in 2004. As an official region of China, it was therefore assigned China’s 2003 score (which had been consistent for over twenty years). Iceland also does not have a Polity score, but was assigned the ‘top’ democratic score as it was in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the scores were coded in an identical manner to the same variable in the previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{85}This is tapped in a variable included in the CSES dataset itself. It has been recoded to create a dummy dividing between states in which a) compulsory voting is not in place, or it is, but it is not enforced; and b) compulsory voting is in place, and is at least weakly enforced.
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for example, are already included, and may replace literacy and union density at the national level.

Analysis

As already discussed, the models to be considered will include both individual and national level variables. This enables us to evaluate whether perceived corruption and contextual, national level corruption have independent effects on political participation. It is also methodologically desirable to use models with a multilevel structure when dealing with surveys across units such as nations because we estimate more reliable standard errors and avoid complications involving intra-nation correlation that we would be likely to confront in pooled models.

The specification of the multilevel models may now be outlined formally, following the equations in Snijders and Bosker (1999). First, \( y_i \) may be specified as the dependent variable at the individual level, but because of the nature of the variables we are attempting to predict—they are all binary and thus require logistic regression—the specification of \( y_i \) is somewhat complex, and represents \( \log\frac{p}{1-p} \).

---

86 However, it should be acknowledged that had our degrees of freedom been greater, it would be preferable to include these variables anyway. A contextual variable such as union density may have an effect on participation independent from an individual level measure of union membership, just as we have hypothesised independent effects for perceived and contextual corruption. A highly unionised society, for example, may involve the creation of 'access points' around decision-makers that may act as an incentive for all individuals to increase participatory activity, whether these individuals are union members or not. But due to the need for model parsimony, and the fact these variables are anyway of secondary interest to our key variables involving corruption, they will not be included.

87 It was necessary to exclude nations with inadequate data. The distribution of responses to individual and national level factors was examined by country, to see if irregularities existed which threatened to bias results. In the case of the WVS, nine countries had such irregularities and had to be excluded; in the main part these countries had missing values for particular variables. Table A4.4 in the appendix outlines the countries and variables in question, and their exclusion has left 39 nations available, listed in Table A4.5 of the appendix. The CSES dataset was less problematic in this way, and only one nation—Belgium—was excluded, as it had missing values for income, leaving 29 nations available for analysis.
where $p$ is the probability of an individual having turned out, or having participated in the behaviour in question (Agresti, 1996).

The full model specifications are as follows. Random intercept models will be predicted, which enable the constant to vary across nations. Let us define $x_1,...,x_p$ as the independent variables at the individual level, $z_1,...,z_q$ as the independent variables at the contextual level, and $\gamma$ as the coefficients. $U_{0j}$ signifies the residuals at the level of the nation, and $R_{ij}$ signifies the residuals at the level of the individual. The model is thus:

$$y_{ij} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{1ij} + \ldots + \gamma_p x_{p_{ij}} + \gamma_1 z_{1ij} + \ldots + \gamma_q z_{q_{ij}} + U_{0j} + R_{ij}$$

In the results, two statistics additional to the coefficients of the explanatory variables will be presented. First, because we are estimating a random intercept model, we can get some indication of the extent to which the estimated intercept varies across groups through the presentation of the standard deviation of $U_{0j}$, which in our case represents the standard deviations of the intercept by nation (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). The intra-class correlation, which gives an indication of the degree of homogeneity of individuals within groups, may also be presented. In the case of logistic multilevel regression, this coefficient, $\rho$, is specified as: $$\frac{\tau_0^2}{\tau_0^2 + 3.29}$$ where $\tau_0^2$ is the variance of $U_{0j}$, while 3.29 is the fixed variance of level-1 residuals in a logistic distribution (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).

Another aspect of model specification concerns weighting. By constructing multilevel models, it is taken into account that individuals are located within clusters, and there is no need to weight each nation equally. At the individual level, it is unfortunately not possible to weight for individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics using the statistical software (STATA) and the available commands. However, controlling for socioeconomic and demographic variables in the
Before the models are presented, note that a squared term on the national level corruption variable was added to the models of the four extra-institutional behaviours, in line with the hypotheses that such behaviours may have nonlinear relationships with the Corruption Index. Finally, note that available diagnostic tests were undertaken on the models, and no substantive problems were observed.  

**a) Turnout**

Two models will be predicted. First, the national level Corruption Index will be included without the perceived corruption variable, along with the controls (Model 1). This model will give us an idea of how the Corruption Index associates with propensity to turnout independent of individuals’ perceived corruption. Second, the full model will be presented which will comprise both corruption-related variables, and all the control variables (Model 2). The results are presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Results of Logistic Multilevel Regressions Estimating Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td></td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption &amp; Perceived Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Corruption Index (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Perceived Corruption (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Perceived Corruption</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Perceived Corruption</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.45***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Level Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP / Capita (1000s, logged)</td>
<td>-0.41***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory Voting</td>
<td>2.00***</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.77***</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Factors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 16-34 (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 35-54</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.72***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 55+</td>
<td>1.16***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.15***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Education</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: Lowest (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: Low</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: Medium</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: High</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: Highest</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural / Attitudinal Factors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction in Government (1-4)</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.06***</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1.40***</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N= (Micro, Macro)</td>
<td>35318, 29</td>
<td>35318, 29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Random Intercept Std. Dev.</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Class Correlation</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: CSES Module 2. *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1.

Let us first address the national level control variables except logged GDP per capita, which has notably unstable effects that will be discussed later. Authoritarianism is negatively associated with turnout, as we might expect. Democracies exhibiting authoritarian characteristics may contain a dominant party that make elections less competitive. A rational voter may thus abstain from voting if the result is expected simply to confirm an incumbent’s dominance. Interestingly, this result is not reflected in the national level models of turnout of the previous chapter, where the sign on
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Authoritarianism is correct, but it is not statistically significant. This anomaly is lessened, however, when one considers that the effect is small here, and also quite unstable: it grows significantly from Model 1 to Model 2. Moreover, as the CSES covers fewer countries than the models in the previous chapter, and given that these countries are generally very not authoritarian, this result reflects lower turnout in the handful of countries that are more authoritarian. The models in the previous chapter are not sensitive to a cluster of a few nations in this way which shows a limitation of our relatively low N. Meanwhile, compulsory voting is highly positively related to turnout, as we expected, and is congruent with the macro level models predicted in the last chapter. Institutionalised disincentives to non-voting clearly affect the calculus of a voter and encourage electoral participation.

Turning to the individual level controls, we see that the results are largely unsurprising. Older people, the better educated, higher earners, union members, and those who are satisfied with government are more likely to vote. The generational effect of older individuals being more inclined to turnout (although not necessarily to participate in other ways) is documented elsewhere (Norris, 2004; Norris, 2002). The socioeconomic effects of income and education are consistent with Verba et al (1978). Perhaps the only surprising effect is that those satisfied with the incumbent government are more likely to vote. On the one hand it might be anticipated that it would be dissatisfaction that would prompt voters to turn out, as dissatisfied voters would be likely to support opposition parties. On the other hand, satisfaction in government may translate to the incentive to turnout to keep the incumbent in power. The aggregate effect of these incentives, it seems, is that greater satisfaction, not dissatisfaction, prompts electoral participation.
Yet for our purposes the two corruption variables are of more interest. Consistent with hypothesis $H_1$, we see in Model 2 that perceived corruption predicts lower levels of turnout. Furthermore, hypothesis $H_3$, which predicts that national level corruption also promotes lower turnout, is also supported, despite the coefficient on the Corruption Index weakening somewhat when perceived corruption is added. Therefore, consistent with both relevant hypotheses, corruption has a contextual and an individual level effect.

Recall that in regard to individual level perceived corruption, the effect is intuitive. Perceiving greater corruption decreases trust in political institutions, including electoral institutions, and heightens mistrust of elected officials, which results in diminished electoral participation. Greater perceived corruption implies a decreased sense of efficacy associated with voting that has a direct effect on the individual being examined. The contextual effect, meanwhile, may be argued to rest on the notion that national characteristics such as corruption induce particular participatory trends among citizens of a particular nation, that lead to aggregate effects on items such as turnout. As hypothesised, whether one perceives high levels of corruption or not, the tendency among citizens to vote or not (which is affected by corruption at the national level) will still influence an individual citizens’ voting calculus, and thus lead to decreased electoral participation where corruption is high.

The strength of these effects is tricky to determine from logistic regression, which derives coefficients that are difficult to interpret, so if we make some assumptions for a hypothetical individual,\(^9\) we may consequently derive the predicted

\(^9\) These assumptions are: that they live in a nation with no compulsory voting and mean scores for the Corruption Index, logged GDP per capita, and authoritarianism; that they have a mean score for satisfaction in government; and that they are male, aged 16-34, have a secondary school education, are in the medium income bracket, and are not a union member.
probability that they turnout at each level of perceived corruption based on Model 2. Table 4.2 presents these results.

Table 4.2 Perceived Corruption and Predicted Probabilities of Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Corruption Level</th>
<th>Probability of Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference in probability of voting between one who perceives high corruption and one who perceives low corruption is 7%. This is not a huge effect, but it is not trivial, after all this is an effect greater in size as the predicted change in turnout when we move from the lowest income bracket to the medium bracket, and almost as large as the same effect when we move from the lowest bracket to the high bracket.

Also using Model 2, and making assumptions about another hypothetical individual, we may graph the effect of national level corruption to aid interpretation. Figure 4B shows how the predicted probability of voting changes as the national level Corruption Index increases. Note that as the highest corruption score in the CSES dataset is 7.4, the graph will run from scores of 0-8 rather than 0-10.

91 The same assumptions as those used to calculate the predicted probabilities in Table 4.2 are held, with the exception that the Corruption Index score is allowed to vary, and that perceived corruption is not. The individual is assumed to perceive low levels of corruption. Lowess smoothing has been used to improve graph presentation.
Individuals in highly clean nations are 10% more likely to vote than those in highly corrupt nations. The effect is marginally nonlinear, such that high levels of corruption are associated with a slightly greater downward rate of change than lower levels of corruption. The effect is slightly larger than the effect of individual level perceived corruption, and shows that our hypotheses were correct in appreciating the possibility of an important contextual effect. It is not simply perceptions of corruption that matter, but also levels of corruption in the political system itself.

The only variable not yet discussed in the models is logged GDP per capita, which exhibits rather unstable effects. In Model 1, logged GDP per capita is shown to be negatively related to turnout, that is, richer nations are predicted to have lower propensity to turnout. Yet this model does not include perceived corruption. Consequently, the effect of logged GDP per capita is illusory. In wealthier nations, citizens are inclined to perceive less corruption, and thus vote more, which would
cancel this predicted relationship. Indeed, the inclusion of both perceived corruption and national level corruption in Model 2 shows that higher levels of both perceived corruption and national level corruption predict lower propensity to turnout, while logged GDP per capita is not statistically significant. Its negative sign is, however, consistent with the results of the previous chapter regarding turnout, and it may be that the inclusion of greater national level cases would make it statistically significant and hence directly equivalent to those results.

b) Extra-Institutional Behaviour

We now predict models of the four extra-institutional behaviours: petition-signing, boycotts, demonstration activity and strike participation. Once again, two models for each behaviour will be predicted, the first omitting the individual level perceived corruption variable to examine the independent effect of the national level Corruption Index, the second including all the variables. Consequently, eight models in total are predicted, and are shown in Table 4.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Petition-Signing (Partial)</th>
<th>Model 2: Petition-Signing (Full)</th>
<th>Model 3: Boycott-Joining (Partial)</th>
<th>Model 4: Boycott-Joining (Full)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$ s.e.</td>
<td>$B$ s.e.</td>
<td>$B$ s.e.</td>
<td>$B$ s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption &amp; Perceived Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Corruption Index (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.47*** 0.03</td>
<td>-0.30*** 0.03</td>
<td>-0.95*** 0.04</td>
<td>-0.87*** 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Corr. Squared (0-100)</td>
<td>0.05*** 0.00</td>
<td>0.04*** 0.00</td>
<td>0.09*** 0.00</td>
<td>0.01*** 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Perceived Corruption (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.12*** 0.04</td>
<td>0.11** 0.05</td>
<td>0.23*** 0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Perceived Corruption</td>
<td>0.10** 0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Perceived Corruption</td>
<td>0.06*** 0.01</td>
<td>-0.13*** 0.01</td>
<td>0.00 0.01</td>
<td>-0.05** 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Level Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP / Capita (1000s, logged)</td>
<td>0.74*** 0.03</td>
<td>0.36*** 0.04</td>
<td>0.04 0.06</td>
<td>-0.42*** 0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism (0-10)</td>
<td>-0.06*** 0.01</td>
<td>-0.13*** 0.01</td>
<td>0.00 0.01</td>
<td>0.05 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.02 0.03</td>
<td>0.02 0.03</td>
<td>-0.23*** 0.04</td>
<td>-0.22*** 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 16-34 (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 35-54</td>
<td>0.08*** 0.03</td>
<td>0.07*** 0.03</td>
<td>0.03 0.04</td>
<td>0.04 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 55+</td>
<td>-0.17*** 0.04</td>
<td>-0.17*** 0.04</td>
<td>-0.41*** 0.06</td>
<td>-0.38*** 0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>-0.04 0.03</td>
<td>-0.04 0.03</td>
<td>0.00 0.05</td>
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Data: WVS wave 3. *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1.
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<tr>
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<th>Model 5: Demonstration Activity (Partial)</th>
<th>Model 6: Demonstration Activity (Full)</th>
<th>Model 7: Strike Participation (Partial)</th>
<th>Model 8: Strike Participation (Full)</th>
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<td>s.e.</td>
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<td>0.03**</td>
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<td>Union Member</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction in Government (1-4)</td>
<td>-0.17***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusting</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>Intra-Class Correlation</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Data: WVS wave 3. *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1.
Let us discuss the controls first. The national level variables show rather disparate effects. As both authoritarianism and GDP per capita relate to individual level perceived corruption (although the correlations are weak, about 0.2 and -0.3 respectively, if perceived corruption is coded as a continuous variable), the partial models for each behaviour (Models 1, 3, 5, 7) may be considered mis-specified, as individual level perceived corruption is not controlled for. The effects of the individual level controls appear robust between the partial and full models, but the effects of the national level controls are not, therefore the full models should be regarded as more reliable indicators of contextual effects than the partial models, in which authoritarianism and logged GDP per capita may be proxying perceived corruption's effects.92

What do the full models tell us about the effect of wealth and authoritarianism? Logged GDP per capita appears to have a positive effect on petition-signing, a negative effect on boycott-joining, but no substantive impact on demonstration activity or strike participation. Petition-signing tends to occur in richer nations, perhaps because greater resources are available for marketing and obtaining support for political causes. However boycotts tend to occur more in poorer nations. We might speculate that this is because much boycott activity may relate to nationalist economics, that is, the desire to ensure goods are domestically produced. In poorer states such sentiment may be higher, as the need for domestic industry to flourish may encourage citizens to shun internationally produced goods. Meanwhile, the more
vigorous political activities, demonstrations and strikes, appear to occur independently of national level wealth.

Authoritarianism appears to deter petition-signing and boycotts, yet is very weakly positively associated with demonstration activity. This is contrary to the notion that authoritarian regimes may suppress such activity, and suggests instead citizens in authoritarian states are willing to actively voice grievances. Such behaviour may, indeed, reflect political conflict in more authoritarian regimes. Alternatively, it may be political rallies in support of authoritarian regimes, and demonstrations voicing antipathy towards foreign powers, that is being predicted by this variable. Finally, strike activity appears unrelated to authoritarianism.

The individual level controls show an interesting spread of effects. Males are more likely to have engaged in all extra-institutional behaviours except petition-signing, which may indicate that females are disadvantaged by having fewer resources to enable participation (Norris, 2002; Schlozman et al, 1994). Age generally shows an interesting nonlinear pattern. Those in the ‘middle’ age category are more likely to have participated in extra-institutional activity compared to the youngest category, while those in the oldest category are least likely to have engaged in such participation. The last effect is consistent with existing literature on political activism including Tilley (2002), but the former effect is likely to relate to a generational explanation: we are predicting who has engaged in such activity, and those in their middle years have simply had greater time to participate in such ways (and were young in the 1980s, during the growth of New Social Movements). There are also clear class and education-related effects consistent with Verba et al (1978). Those in lower social strata are generally less likely to have participated in these behaviours
than those in higher social strata, while possessing a secondary school education also has a positive effect.

The structural and attitudinal variables produce unsurprising effects. Union members are more likely to have participated in extra-institutional behaviours, as are those with greater interest in politics and those who are dissatisfied with the government. Those with postmaterialist orientations also have a greater propensity to have engaged in such activities, which we would expect (Inglehart, 1997). Finally, the socially trusting are more likely to have participated, perhaps capturing increased social capital and a shared sense of social efficacy among participators.

Yet clearly the most important variables given our focus are those pertaining to corruption. Recall that hypothesis \( H4 \) predicted that the Corruption Index would exhibit a nonlinear effect on extra-institutional participation, such that higher activity is likely to be reported in nations that are either highly corrupt or non-corrupt, but not in those with intermediate levels of corruption. In all the models, the coefficients pertaining to the Corruption Index and its polynomial term indicate that this hypothesis is supported.

To gain a fuller appreciation of these results, using Models 2, 4, 6 and 8, a graph may be presented in which a hypothetical individual’s probability of having engaged in the four extra-institutional behaviours is computed as national level corruption increases. In addition to a set of assumptions about this individual,93 the Corruption Index and its polynomial are allowed to move through their full ranges. Figure 4C results.94

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93 These assumptions are that: the individual perceives low levels of corruption, is male, aged 16-34, is not religious, has a secondary school education, is service class, is not a union member, is trusting and has materialist orientations. He is also assumed to have mean scores for the political interest and satisfaction in government variables, and to live in a nation with mean logged GDP per capita and authoritarianism scores.

94 To enhance presentation, the statistical program was instructed to use Lowess smoothing.
It is clear that there are nonlinear relationships between national level corruption and the probability of individuals participating in extra-institutional behaviours. In all cases, citizens in nations with 'intermediate' levels of corruption are less likely to participate in extra-institutional behaviour than are citizens in a) very clean nations, and b) very corrupt nations. The results are thus congruent with the findings regarding demonstration activity in the previous chapter.
In nations with very low levels of corruption, institutions and politicians are likely to be diligent and responsive. It is likely that public officials prioritise the public interest ahead of selfish private interest that would encourage corrupt behaviour. Therefore, all forms of participation are inclined to be higher, as public servants are deemed to be highly responsive to all forms of citizen participation, whether this participation is institutional or not. In tandem with the analysis of the previous chapter, we might see this as an 'efficacy' effect. In very corrupt nations, in response to institutional inadequacy and the failure of politicians to place the public interest ahead of their self-serving, corrupt interests, extra-institutional behaviour is stimulated. Institutional forms of participation are deemed redundant, reflecting their inadequacy at preventing corrupt transactions, thus extra-institutional mechanisms are the means by which citizens resort to express their demands. Congruent with the previous chapter, we might see this as a 'disillusionment' effect. In nations with moderate levels of corruption, the limited impact of the efficacy and disillusionment effects makes extra-institutional behaviour less likely.\textsuperscript{95}

Moreover, these effects are contextual. Recall the theoretical basis outlined at the beginning of the chapter. The effect of national level corruption is to contribute to trends (stimulated by the efficacy effect or the disillusionment effect) among the citizenry, which means that certain levels and forms of political participation are

\textsuperscript{95} It is, admittedly, possible that these effects relate to the way in which the data informing the Corruption Index is collected. The efficacy and disillusionment effects may relate to businessmen and country analysts perceiving such effects themselves – perhaps being informed by levels of participation to reach these conclusions, and tying these perceptions to low and high levels of corrupt activity respectively. It is difficult to circumvent this notion, which suggests we might be relying on businessmen's perceptions of characteristics of political systems more than we would like. This problem is potentially applicable to the models in the previous chapter, and the other models in this chapter, too, if analysts' perceptions of corruption are tied to wider beliefs about the health of political systems, of which participation may form a part. Yet, once again, given the impossibility of obtaining a truly objective measure of corruption we should acknowledge this problem while remembering that analysis has to be undertaken with the best of the limited measures available. Besides, it is possible that a) this problem is not evident – it is, after all, not possible to measure it; or b) these perceptions of the efficacy and disillusionment effects are correct. Informed country analysts may, in particular, recognise accurately the nature of politics in different nations, and their reflections linking corruption to other characteristics of political systems may be valid.
moulded into established means of expressing demands. As corruption, or, perhaps, associated levels of unresponsiveness, is perceived by some citizens, and they participate in certain ways, this prompts others who observe and imitate their behaviour (particularly if it is efficacious) to behave in similar ways when they have demands, independent of how much corruption they perceive. Socialisation is actively carried out such that citizens and politicians become used to entrenched ways of expressing political demands, which are then employed when salient issues prompt citizen activity. Thus, independent of individual level perceived corruption, corruption at the national level remains salient, affecting the nature of citizens' participation even when citizens perceive levels of corruption that are different from what is implied by their nation's Corruption Index score.

Moving on, it is interesting that the magnitudes of the efficacy and disillusionment effects differ according to type of behaviour. In the cases of petition-signing and demonstration activity, the efficacy effect and the disillusionment effect are fairly equal: the graphs are approximately U-shaped, not skewed to either side. Yet in the case of boycotts, the efficacy effect is substantially greater; while in the case of strike activity, the disillusionment effect is greater. These differences might be explained by the nature of the two behaviours. Boycott-joining is relatively placid: in fact it is by definition not doing something – that is, not buying particular products. Strike activity is vigorous participation, not placid at all. Consequently, the subversive nature of strike activity lends itself more to a disillusionment effect which stems in part from citizens' anger with political institutions and public servants. The far less subversive nature of boycott-joining lends itself more to an efficacy effect which involves instead increased responsiveness of public servants to citizen demands.
Let us now consider the magnitude of the effects regarding individual level perceived corruption. If we make assumptions about a hypothetical individual, the perceived corruption coefficients in Models 2, 4, and 8 (Model 6 shows that perceived corruption is a poor predictor of demonstration activity) can be converted into predicted probabilities to gauge their effects more simply. The results are presented in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4  Perceived Corruption and Predicted Probabilities of Participating in Extra-Institutional Behaviours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Corruption Level</th>
<th>Probability of Petition-Signing</th>
<th>Probability of Boycott-Joining</th>
<th>Probability of Strike Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although statistically significant when 'low' perceived corruption is the baseline statistic, we see that the effects of perceived corruption on extra-institutional participation are extremely weak. Compared to the significant effect of national level corruption on the predicted probabilities of extra-institutional behaviour (seen in Figure 4C), perceived corruption is far less explanatory. Nonetheless, we overall see from these very small effects that higher perceived corruption is tied to increased inclination to participate in each behaviour, which is an individual level finding congruent with the disillusionment effect described above in regard to the contextual effects. Yet perceived corruption fails to explain demonstration activity, and is simply overshadowed by the contextual effects of the Corruption Index across the models. Thus while hypothesis $H4$ is supported strongly, hypothesis $H2$, which predicted nonlinear relationships between perceived corruption at the individual level and extra-institutional behaviours, is not.
Summary

In this chapter, variables tapping both national level corruption and individual level perceived corruption were used to test four key hypotheses concerning their effects on different forms of extra-institutional and institutional behaviour. Hypothesis H1, which suggested that increased perceived corruption would deter propensity to vote, was supported. Turnout and perceived corruption were inversely related, as anticipated, and perceived corruption failed to displace national level corruption, which itself, in line with hypothesis H3, had an equivalent effect, suggesting that corruption has both a contextual and an individual level effect on voting.

Moving on, it was predicted that national level corruption would display nonlinear relationships with extra-institutional behaviours comparable to a key result of the previous chapter, where particularly high and low levels of corruption gave rise to increased demonstration activity. On the basis that in clean nations increased efficacy promoted participation generally, and in corrupt ones disillusionment with political institutions and public officials would motivate extra-institutional behaviour, this hypothesis (H4) was robustly tested using multilevel models to predict four particular activities. The association in each case was nonlinear, thus supporting H4, and indicative that once again, important contextual effects are in play.

The curves calculated in Figure 4C showed that boycott joining was particularly high in clean nations, yet that unofficial strike participation was particularly high in corrupt nations. This is interesting, as it implies that the effects of corruption on extra-institutional behaviour are not unitary. Instead, subversive extra-institutional behaviour such as unofficial strike participation appears to be motivated
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens' Behaviour

more by the disillusionment effect of corruption induced by poor institutional quality. Less subversive behaviour, such as boycotts, appears to be promoted by an increased sense of efficacy likely to be evident where corruption levels are low. In essence, this result challenges the institutional – extra-institutional division which has been argued to be an improvement to the conventional – unconventional dichotomy. It shows that political participation is inherently multidimensional: it can be subversive or placid; in or out of institutions, and this point acts to temper the reliance we can have of any simple categorisation of citizens' behaviour.

Hypothesis H2, which predicted that individuals' perceived corruption would predict greater propensity to engage in extra-institutional behaviour where such perceptions where particularly high and particularly low, was not supported. Perceived corruption was found only to very weakly promote some of these behaviours, but in other cases (demonstration activity) it failed to have a significant effect at all. In one sense, therefore, we confirm Davis et al's (2004) finding that perceived corruption contributes to a sense of political detachment. Yet by highlighting the importance of the contextual effects of national level corruption, we simultaneously sophisticate this result through indicating the presence of complex non-linear relationships not found by Davis et al (2004) or any other piece of existing literature.

Hence this chapter has taught us a considerable amount. We learn that corruption and turnout have inverse relationships at both the individual and national levels, findings which develop established literature that points to the existence of such an effect at only one or other level (Bravo-Ortega and Hojman, 2002; Davis et al, 2004; McCann and Domínguez, 1998). Furthermore, regarding extra-institutional behaviour, the models of this chapter have uncovered contextual effects of corruption.
on participation that were previously unrecognised in the literature. Such results
emerge from the use of sophisticated statistical methods, and help display the
powerful capabilities of multilevel modelling.
Chapter 5. The Nature and Determinants of Citizens’ Perceptions of Corruption in British Politics

Introduction: Justifying the British Case Study

Thus far we have talked of perceived corruption at the individual level as a concept that is difficult to measure in survey research. The questions we have used in previous chapters have failed to embrace the nuances of definitions of corruption outlined in Chapter 2. Despite this limitation, we have pressed on with analysis of how perceived corruption may affect participation and found some interesting results. It affects some behaviour considerably, such as turnout, yet it has less explanatory power when determining levels of extra-institutional behaviour. As part of this analysis, we have controlled for variables that perceived corruption might proxy, such as satisfaction in government. Yet in this chapter, we will use specialist British data to look in much more depth at whether perceived corruption and a related concept—censoriousness of corruption, or the degree to which corrupt activity is condemned—might proxy more nuanced perceptions of politics concerning items such as competence, trust, and openness in government. As well as analysing the nature of perceived corruption more deeply, we will also evaluate some of the claims in the literature concerning perceived corruption as a dependent variable, as well as analysing the extent to which citizens in the UK are censorious of corruption, and whether they think it is widespread.

As this chapter (and the next) are concerned with Britain as a case study, we should justify this choice in some depth. Indeed, many surveys of corruption at the
national level indicate that there is little corruption in British politics. Consider the Corruption Index used in the previous two chapters. From 1995 to 2005 Britain is located in the cluster of countries at the clean end of index. Recall that it is coded so that $10 = $ a very corrupt country and $0 = $ a very clean one. Britain possesses a score from between 1 and 2 in these years, which Figure 5A tracks. To put Britain in context to other countries, the scores for three other nations, the USA, Japan, and Italy, are also presented: 96

![Corruption Index Scores in Four Nations](image)

We see that levels of corruption in British politics are consistently low relative to the other nations. So why should a study of perceived corruption focus on Britain? In answer, because the focus is here on subjective perceptions, it is irrelevant if the UK is 'objectively' non-corrupt. As a review of relevant literature will show, analysts

have found the determinants of perceptions of corruption salient and interesting in other nations such as the USA and Canada, which are also 'objectively' clean when their Corruption Index scores are compared to those of developing democracies. Such perceptions are different among citizens, often according to socioeconomic and demographic faultlines, suggesting that individuals' perceptions do not simply reflect the amount of 'objective' corruption in each nation. Furthermore, the limited body of research on perceptions of corruption and standards more broadly in the UK that does exist reveals substantial concern over these issues, which makes explaining the discrepancy between cross-national indicators of low corruption, and individual concern over substantial corruption, interesting. Dunleavy et al (2001), for example, present the results of a poll conducted in 2000 which queries the extent to which numerous phenomena are deemed problematic. Over 49% of respondents said each of the following are a 'major problem' (although whether they are 'corrupt' is another matter): the use of spin doctors, ministers' appointment to agencies of financial donors, the granting of honours to financial donors, nepotism, and financial sleaze. Also, the evidence suggests that there is very little tolerance for MPs lobbying for money, acting in their private interests, or taking cash for questions.

Mortimore (1995) finds that in the context of very limited trust in and respect for politicians, British citizens exhibit considerable censoriousness concerning corruption, and many believe that corruption is a feature of British politics. This perception is strong enough for nearly half the sample to suggest sleaze would influence their vote choice, and there is significant support for stringent regulation. Surprisingly, many think that Britain is as corrupt as many foreign countries:

There is a stereotype of 'middle England' as being full of jingoistic Colonel Blimps who, however much they may grumble nostalgically
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens' Behaviour

about declining standards, are still convinced that the British system is the best in the world and that corruption begins at Calais. Not so. (Mortimore, 1995, p. 581).

Though such studies are useful, they are largely based on single, vague questions. The nature of such data is thus questionable – in brief polls there is unlikely to be sufficient time for briefing respondents with what ‘corruption’ or ‘sleaze’ will be construed to mean, or for asking them (perhaps in open-ended questions) for their own definitions. These problems can be overcome, to some extent, by the use of a new and more comprehensive dataset which will be analysed in depth here. This dataset, the Survey of Public Attitudes towards Conduct in Public Life 2003-2004 (BMRB, 2005) was produced for the Committee on Standards in Public Life and has not yet been subject to rigorous academic analysis. 97

The appropriateness of studying perceived corruption in the UK is also justified by consideration of some concrete examples of high profile, standards-related incidences that have been prominent in recent years. Their consideration shows, furthermore, the difficulty involved in offering an opinion on the extent to

97 The BMRB’s report for the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2004, p. 18) claims to be “the first systematic examination of the expectations and perceptions of the general public in relation to the standards of conduct of senior elected and appointed public office-holders in Britain.” It indicates that British citizens have high expectations concerning public officials’ conduct, and that although citizens perceive levels of explicit corrupt practice to be low, there is a belief that politicians cover up their mistakes and that favouritism is apparent in recruitment practices. The dataset commissioned for the survey offers us an opportunity to examine citizens’ perceptions in greater depth. In contrast to this data, analysis of related perceptions in the UK has thus far been limited to polls that tap broader attitudes to ‘sleaze’, and are generally far less systematic or comprehensive in their approach. For instance, a recent YouGov survey for the Telegraph (YouGov, 2004) is let down by the use of questions that essentially state a negative statement, such as: “The Conservatives these days give the impression of being very sleazy and disreputable”, and then asking respondents to comment on them. Questions phrased this way may generate biased results inclined to be pessimistic due to the nature of the initial statement offered. Moreover, the vagueness of the terms included in questions—the ‘impression’ parties give; being ‘disreputable and sleazy’; whether the ‘minority’ or ‘majority’ of politicians accept gifts or bribes—is stark, and highlights further crudeness. The response categories, furthermore, are highly inadequate. Indeed, respondents are unable to suggest that they believe none or very few politicians engage in the misdemeanour they are queried about. Moreover, an overarching problem concerns the methodology of the questionnaire: as it is an online poll the respondents are essentially self-selecting, and this, even when incentives are offered, may lead to bias. In view of such flaws in one of the better polls relating to the topic, statistical analysis of the more rigorous BMRB dataset will be advantageous.
which British politics is corrupt. Only on occasion are incidences of corruption clear. In 1994, for instance, two Parliamentary Private Secretaries, Graham Riddick and David Treddinnick, were suspended for allegedly being involved in facilitating cash-for-questions, and far more prominently and in the same year, accusations surfaced that the Corporate Affairs Minister, Neil Hamilton, and junior minister for Northern Ireland, Tim Smith, had accepted money both directly and via Ian Greer’s lobbying firm for asking questions for Mohamed Al Fayed (Doig, 2003). Smith’s confession and resignation, and Hamilton’s being pushed out of office, raised the issue of standards and the prospect that high profile politicians in the UK were willing to exchange political favours for money. 98 Cash-for-questions contravened parliamentary rules and resembles ‘corruption’ under the ‘public office’, ‘public interest’, and ‘market principle’ definitions outlined in Chapter 2. Another example concerns the Poulson affair, in which an architecture firm offered favours to councillors and obtained contracts. Such a lack of open competition, and the exchange of influence for material incentives, makes such activity ‘corrupt’, and indeed prompted calls for reform to ensure more open interest declaration (Doig, 2003).

It appears more ambiguous whether other incidents represented ‘corruption’ or not. In 1996, for example, the Scott Report criticised the government for not adequately informing parliament of new rules concerning arms trading, after confusion arose over whether an arms manufacturer had parliamentary permission to export arms to Iraq during the 1980s. In view of the definitions of corruption discussed in Chapter 2, this might be regarded as ‘corrupt’ activity – perhaps if one ties this trading as something outside the ‘public interest’, however it might also have represented government incompetence. Moreover, the Major government of the 1990s

98 The Standards and Privileges Committee cast some doubt, nevertheless, on the finding in the report by the Commissioner for Parliamentary Standards, which concluded that Hamilton directly accepted substantial amounts of money from Mohamed Al Fayed.
was ridden with allegations of 'sleaze', which covered a broad spread of forms of misconduct. The convictions of Jeffrey Archer and of Jonathan Aitken for perjury and the government’s support of the Pergau Dam project in Malaysia in the early 1990s (which preceded Malaysian orders for British arms), may all be construed as ‘misconduct’, for example – but whether they represent ‘corruption’ is less certain.

This ambiguity has also surrounded issues occurring more recently during Labour’s tenure. The issue of party funding and donors has come to prominence during Blair’s leadership, raising the possibility that favouritism might be shown to high-profile party donors. Such controversy has been heightened further by the recent ‘peerages for loans’ row, which has involved Labour and opposition parties being accused of selling Lordships. Equally, individual ministers have been called into question over ‘sleaze’. In 1998 Peter Mandelson and Geoffrey Robinson resigned as ministers after Mandelson was found to have not registered a loan from Robinson. Although not ‘corrupt’ under the prominent definitions of the term, this marked substantive evasion of regulation by a prominent politician. Mandelson was also implicated in a scandal prompting his second resignation in 2001, when he failed to explain his part in the fast-tracking of Srichand Hinduja’s passport application, although he was later cleared. In addition, David Blunkett was forced to resign as Home Secretary following allegations he was influential in fast tracking a visa application for the nanny of the woman with whom he was having an affair, and for misusing rail privileges. This was followed by a second resignation as Secretary of State for Work and Pensions after he failed to declare directorship and share ownership in a firm bidding for contracts related to his department. Furthermore, Tessa Jowell was indirectly linked to the corrupt activity alleged to have involved her
husband and the former Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. Such problems have also been apparent among ministers in the new devolved assemblies in the UK. In the Scottish case, Henry McLeish resigned as first minister in 2001 after it surfaced that he had not declared income gained from renting out parts of his publicly funded constituency offices when an MP; Jack McConnell, his successor, has also been accused of financial impropriety (Peele, 2004).

What emerges, therefore, is justification for our British focus based on the significant concern surrounding standards issues indicated by polls on the topic, the prominence of standards-related incidents, and the added intellectual pull of the difficulty in conceptualising them. Having contextualised our case study choice, the next two sections will outline the specific questions we look to answer, and state some concrete hypotheses for testing. Two key themes, mentioned at the outset of this chapter, will drive analysis: first the exploration of how far corruption perceptions differ from other, related perceptions; second, analysis of the determinants of a) censoriousness of corruption among British citizens, and b) perceived corruption incidence.

Theme I: Perceived Corruption as Distinct From Related Perceptions

The above overview of incidences in which standards of propriety have been called into question show that some examples square more easily with definitions of corruption discussed earlier in the thesis (especially the Cash for Questions affair), whereas others are less easy to categorise. Yet our concern in this chapter is to examine citizens’ perceptions, and a key area of analysis queries how perceptions of
Corruption are similar or different to perceptions of other misconduct such as dishonesty, incompetence, and lack of openness. Yet the present literature on perceptions of corruption does not focus on this question, despite offering some other useful insights. Johnston (1986b) for example, queries US citizens over whether a set of twenty hypothetical behaviours are corrupt, and reports that ‘formally’ corrupt acts are viewed as more corrupt that ‘informally’ corrupt acts; that public officials’ corrupt behaviour is viewed with greater censoriousness than private citizens’ corrupt behaviour (which is congruent with Johnston and Wood, 1985, who analyse the UK); and that the larger the ‘stakes’ and the more prominent the corrupt actor, the more corrupt the act. Johnston and Wood (1985) also find that favour-giving and nepotism are behaviours less harshly perceived than bribery in the British case. Moving on, Peters and Welch (1978), examining the perceptions US public officials hold concerning different forms of political malpractice, find that influence peddling, such as getting a friend into law school, is not regarded as significantly corrupt; conflict of interest situations, such as a secretary of defence holding stock in a firm which has a government defence contract, are regarded as more corrupt; and that behaviour that is clearly illegal or involves direct financial gain is most corrupt.

Meanwhile, regarding non-Western cases, Fric (2001), analysing Central and Eastern European nations, shows that condemnation of bribery is not widespread: there is often agreement with the notion that bribery is necessary to tackle shortages and for state machinery to function, although this differs by nation, with Eastern European citizens more likely than Central European citizens to agree with such ideas. Kalniņš (2005) suggests that polls in Latvia indicate that the activities respondents deem most corrupt are those involving illegal payments to public officials, while gifts and dishonesty in the private sector are considered much more leniently.
It is perhaps unsurprising that Western citizens are generally more censorious of corruption than are non-Western citizens. This is congruent with the model provided by Heidenheimer (1970), which predicts that in civic culture based systems such as those in the West, routine corruption (such as the acceptance of gifts, nepotism and profiting from conflicts of interest) and aggravated corruption (such as public servants expecting gifts and organised crime paying off politicians) both represent 'black' corruption – activity prompting strong censoriousness among the elite and the majority of citizens that inclines them to demand punishment of the perpetrators. This contrasts to other, more traditional political systems, in which greater leniency is likely to be evident.

Yet the focus of such existing work has left open a gap in research. Too little has been written on the comparison of perceptions of corruption to other, related perceptions, particularly forms of distrust, closed government, incompetence, and other standards-related concepts. Indeed, what if perceptions of corruption simply tap perceived misconduct or dishonesty more generally? On the one hand, on the basis of the literature reviewed, such conceptual blurring appears doubtful. Clear nuances in citizens' perceptions appear evident, which heightens the prospect that opinions concerning corruption will be substantively different to perceptions of other standards-related items. On the other hand, the standards-related cases cited above in the case of the UK raise the dilemma that citizens may legitimately have difficulty differentiating between acts that are corrupt and those that are, for instance, incompetent, dishonest, or just not good practice. Nonetheless, the hypothesis to be developed will be congruent with the findings of previous literature, which points to a certain sophistication among citizens when considering corruption:
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens’ Behaviour

H1: Perceptions concerning behaviours that can justifiably be defined as ‘corrupt’ will be substantively different from perceptions of other types of misdemeanour in public life.

We may thus move on to discuss the second key task of this chapter, explaining why citizens differ in their censoriousness of corruption, and in their perceptions of how widespread corruption is in British politics.

Theme II: Determinants of Corruption Censoriousness and Perceived Corruption Incidence

Previous literature has shown that some people think corruption is a more important issue, and a more widespread phenomenon, than others. Questioning what determines such different perceptions in the contemporary British case is interesting, given that other scholars have found clear socioeconomic and attitudinal dividing lines in other nations, and in Britain in earlier time periods. However, hypothesis development for this portion of the thesis is difficult, and our approach must be carefully justified.

An initial point to make is that some variables seem to offer consistent relationships with orientations towards corruption. Indeed, it is curious that one variable often seen to exhibit a relationship with censoriousness is gender: women condemn corrupt acts more than men. Female public officials in the US, for example, score higher than men in a composite scale of censoriousness which takes into account a number of hypothetical acts deemed corrupt and the degree to which each is considered ‘corrupt’ (Welch and Peters, 1977; see also Gorta and Forrell, 1994). Different explanations have been offered. Welch and Peters (1977) suggest that
women in office tend to come from a ‘reformist’ angle that inclines them to increased censoriousness. Seligson (2002) raises the ideas that women are discriminated against in the political system, and have a greater chance of observing corrupt practice.

It is unfortunate, however, that it is overall difficult to draw up clear hypotheses from previous work regarding socioeconomic and demographic predictors of perceptions of corruption, as findings pertaining to other variables are often contradictory. Gorta and Forell (1994), for instance, draw attention to controversies in the direction of two potential determinants of perceptions of corruption. Greater age has been associated with both greater tolerance of corruption and optimism concerning its incidence (Gardiner, 1970), but, contradictorily, with greater censoriousness and pessimism (Davis et al, 2004; Gibbons, 1985). So too greater education and socioeconomic status has been linked to more censoriousness and pessimism (Gardiner, 1970; Davis et al, 2004; McCann and Dominguez, 1998), but also with greater tolerance (Welch and Peters, 1977). It is problematic too that few of these studies comprehensively cite why such socioeconomic predictors have the effects they do.

The effects of numerous attitudinal variables that appear to explain censoriousness and perceptions of actual levels of corruption in politics are, perhaps, less liable to be contradictory. Greater censoriousness is evident among those who place themselves as ideological liberals, who may be reformers and less accepting of the self-interest involved in corrupt behaviour (Welch and Peters, 1977). It is evident too among those who perceive there to be significant levels of corruption in actual political life, perhaps because perceptions of such incidence ties to awareness of its detrimental effects, in turn motivating less tolerance (Welch and Peters, 1977). Censoriousness is also higher among the politically alienated (Gibbons, 1985).
Perceptions of actual levels of corruption in Latin America have, perhaps unsurprisingly, been shown to be higher among the less socially trusting, and among—for the most part—the economically pessimistic (Davis et al, 2004). Experience might also act as an influence on attitudes: increased censoriousness of corrupt behaviour is evident among politicians with limited experience in political office, who are presumably unaware of the plausibly murky reality of political life (Welch and Peters, 1977; Mancusco, 1993).

However, the problem remains that it is difficult to form expectations from the literature hitherto considered. A wealth of variables is found to be explanatory; contradictory findings concerning potential socioeconomic and demographic determinants are presented; and the work reviewed predominantly deals with nations other than the UK. Admittedly, Johnston and Wood (1985) do examine the British case from twenty years ago, and provide some interesting insights. They find that men are more censorious of behaviours involving the exchange of money or resources, and that women are harsher over favouritism, and it is suggested that these divisions may be owed to individuals’ differing perceptions of the extent to which they win or lose from the particular behaviours, which cluster by gender. Another of their findings, that higher classes are more censorious of favour-giving and bribery than are lower classes, is cautiously explained equivalently: those in higher social strata may more readily perceive themselves as losers from such behaviour. This identification of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from corruption deriving clusters of individuals holding coherent perceptions gives us one possible basis for analysis. Indeed, in previous literature, the tying of socioeconomic variables to corruption censoriousness and perceived corruption incidence may also relate to the substantial amount of corruption in these nations creating sets of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in these societies that may
cluster in socioeconomic and demographic divisions. Those who lose out from corruption the most, such as women or the poor, may consequently perceive exaggerated amounts of corruption or be more censorious of it.

However, because in contemporary Britain the incidence of corruption is, according to the Corruption Index, relatively limited compared to corruption in the USA and Latin American nations analysed in previous literature, and because social divisions in the UK may have less salience due to a) the softening of 1980s free-marketeering, and b) less absolute poverty in the UK compared to developing nations, the feasibility of clusters of 'winners' and 'losers' from corrupt practice holding coherent perceptions is lessened.

We may hence consider the broader question of which, out of a) attitudinal or b) socioeconomic and demographic variables as groups, are more likely to be explanatory. Indeed, it is notable that many of the previous studies fail to comprehensively control for a range of political attitudes, which, when included in modelling, may displace socioeconomic differences. It may be, for example, that the poor are shown to be more pessimistic concerning corruption in politics because this characteristic simply proxies political distrust and social distrust.

The importance of testing whether socioeconomic or attitudinal explanations are key to explaining perceptions of corruption is heightened too because it ties to broader theories of political trust. It is fair to assume that perceived corruption incidence is comparable to political trust, as a) trust in politicians broadly, and b) trust in their propensity to engage in clean political practice, will surely relate. In regard to theories of political trust, Mishler and Rose (2001), suggest that the literature is split loosely into two schools of thought that attempt to explain trust in political institutions.
The first, 'cultural' school involves trust as a product of individual socialisation, shaping a relatively coherent national culture of trust or mistrust. This, in turn, 'spills over' into civic co-operation, which 'spills up' into representative institutions capable of accommodating civic organisations (Mishler and Rose, 2001, citing Putnam, 1993, 1995b). As socialisation in particular cultures is likely to be similar, it is perhaps to be expected that a cultural approach would play down the idea of variation in levels of trust among citizens of the same nation. Yet Mishler and Rose (2001) suggest that this is not the case:

A finer-grained analysis of political trust emerges from micro-level cultural theories that emphasize that socialization into a culturally homogenous society nonetheless allows substantial variation among individuals based on gender, family background, education, and so forth. (Mishler and Rose, 2001, p. 35).

Unfortunately, Mishler and Rose (2001) fail to specify which of the categories—women or men; the elderly or the young; the poor or the rich, and so on—are likely to be more or less trusting. Their own research shows that socioeconomic and demographic variables are overall not substantively explanatory.

The other interpretation of trust specified by Mishler and Rose (2001) comprises an 'institutional' school which views trust as a function of the performance of institutions. After institutions are put in place, citizens are said to evaluate their performance, although this assessment may be affected by individuals' circumstances and values. In the case of recently democratised states:

Individuals who highly value freedom can be expected to trust newly democratic institutions despite economic hardships, whereas those who give priority to economic growth may react more negatively in similar circumstances. (Mishler and Rose, 2001).
Thus the determinants of political trust are likely to be attitudinal and, to a lesser extent, socioeconomic, as values and socioeconomic status may influence individuals' evaluation of institutional performance. Mishler and Pollack find, indeed, that attitudinal variables, spanning perceptions of institutions' political and economic performance (including perceptions of corruption), are highly explanatory. The failure of socioeconomic and demographic variables to be important gives weight to the notion that citizens' evaluations are crucial, and is far less damning for the 'institutional' school than for the 'cultural' school, as the latter is reliant on socioeconomic and demographic factors linking to levels of trust directly.

It is predicted, therefore, that because of a) the limited salience of socioeconomic divisions, b) the wealth of attitudinal variables available, and c) due to the findings of work on political trust, the results of models predicting British citizens' perceptions will show that perceived corruption incidence is unlikely to reflect socioeconomic cleavages, and is more likely to relate to differences in orientations towards politics and society more generally. It is forecast too that the same reasoning can be applied to corruption censoriousness, which after all proxies a sensitivity to corruption which may either be learnt via socialisation, or generated in reaction to institutional performance. In sum, therefore, although levels of corruption are objectively 'constant', individuals' reflections on corruption and its seriousness will relate less to exogenous socioeconomic and demographic cleavages, and more to information derived from assessment of institutional quality, and the 'quality' of politics in Britain more broadly, encapsulated by attitudinal factors. Thus:
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H2: Attitudinal factors will have greater explanatory power than socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of respondents in models of their corruption censoriousness.

H3: Attitudinal factors will have greater explanatory power than socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of respondents in models of their perceptions of the extent of corruption in politics.

The means of testing these hypotheses, and the hypothesis developed in the previous section, will involve the following process. Initially, the nature of British citizens' perceptions of corruption will be outlined in descriptive form. This gives us a basic indication of the nature of citizens' expectations concerning the avoidance of corruption and how far these expectations are being met. We will then turn to factor analysis, in an attempt to see how distinct perceptions of corruption are to other, related perceptions. Then we will attempt to construct two scales: one pertaining to how important the avoidance of corruption is to citizens (effectively, their censoriousness), and another pertaining to perceived incidence of corruption. The determinants of the scales may then be predicted using regression models which include socioeconomic and demographic variables and attitudinal factors.

Descriptive Analysis

In this section of the chapter, the hypotheses stated above will therefore not be tested directly. Instead, the aim of this analysis is to provide some background to the nature of the data to be used to do so subsequently. First, let us examine perceptions
concerning a) the misuse of power for private gain, and b) bribery. The former variable is a base definition of corruption commonly found in the literature. It is very broad – indeed what ‘misuse’ means is contestable. Proponents of the ‘public office’ definition of corruption would differ in their interpretation to proponents of the public interest definition. Nonetheless the notion gives citizens an easily identifiable conception of corruption, even if it is a superficial interpretation and even if it invites interpretation of ‘misuse’ of power. Bribery is a more concrete and tangible phenomenon, a subset of corruption more broadly. As one would basically understand it, bribery—the exchange of favours (such as government job contracts) for money—may be understood as ‘corruption’ when the main definitions of corruption (outlined in Chapter 2) are considered. It marks: a) a violation of the rules of public office in the UK; b) a violation of the public interest, as it represents behaviour favouring particular interests; c) a violation of what public opinion considers legitimate behaviour (revealed in the statistics below); and d) a form of illegitimate ‘utility maximisation’ on behalf of the public official, which corresponds to definitions of corruption drawing on market principles.

The ‘importance’ to citizens of public officials not engaging in these acts may be argued to be a good indication of their censoriousness: believing the avoidance of an action is very important surely implies high censoriousness. An initial set of responses covers perceptions of the importance of two types of public servant avoiding these misdemeanours: a) MPs and government ministers as a combined group, and b) senior public servants. Table 5.1 records citizens’ responses.

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100 It is understandable, therefore, why perceptions of it comprise an important part of prominent national level indices of corruption, including the Corruption Index.
101 Senior public servants are described in the questionnaire in the following way: I mean people with senior management jobs in government departments, local councils or other public bodies, who make important decisions about the service they work in. For example, the head of a council’s housing
Table 5.1 The Perceived Importance of Avoiding Potentially 'Corrupt' Behaviours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>MPs and Government Ministers</th>
<th>Senior Public Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;They should not use their power for their own personal gain&quot;</td>
<td>XX%  XX%</td>
<td>XX%  XX%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;They should not take bribes&quot;</td>
<td>XX%  XX%</td>
<td>XX%  XX%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Important</td>
<td>72%  88%</td>
<td>68%  83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>18%  8%</td>
<td>24%  14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite Important</td>
<td>6%   2%</td>
<td>6%   2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Important</td>
<td>2%   1%</td>
<td>1%   0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not At All Important</td>
<td>2%   1%</td>
<td>1%   1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>1,094 1,095</td>
<td>1,090 1,091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that a large majority of citizens perceive the avoidance of both types of behaviour to be highly important – bribery in particular is regarded as something it is extremely important to avoid by over 80% of respondents in the case of both types of public servant. Somewhat higher expectations are recorded in regard to MPs and government ministers than senior public officials, reflecting higher standards for elected office holders than appointees.

Let us turn now to how far British citizens believe these two types of public servant actually engage in such corrupt practice. The Table 5.2 reports the results.
Table 5.2 The Perceived Incidence of Potentially 'Corrupt' Acts

| Statement      | 'How many MPs do you think this applies to?' | 'And government ministers...?'
|----------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------
|                | "They use their power for their own personal gain" | "They take bribes" | "They use their power for their own personal gain" | "They take bribes"
| All            | 6%                                         | 1%                                         | 8%                                         | 1%                                         |
| Most           | 24%                                        | 7%                                         | 25%                                        | 8%                                         |
| About half     | 19%                                        | 10%                                        | 19%                                        | 11%                                        |
| A few          | 48%                                        | 71%                                        | 44%                                        | 64%                                        |
| None           | 3%                                         | 11%                                        | 5%                                         | 16%                                        |
| N =            | 1,082                                      | 1,064                                      | 1,083                                      | 1,064                                      |

The data appears congruent with other reports of substantial pessimism (Dunleavy et al, 2001; Mortimore, 1995). About 50% of British citizens believe that half or more of MPs and ministers misuse their power for personal gain. This result is striking given the low levels of corruption given by external sources such as Transparency International, though it is of course dependent on what people interpret to mean ‘personal gain’. However, considerably lower levels of bribery are perceived, although the vast majority of respondents believe that there is at least some bribery in British political life, with results centring on the perception that a ‘few’ public officials engage in this form of misdemeanour – although the number comprising ‘few’ is admittedly subjective.

Let us turn to other forms of plausibly corrupt behaviour. One strand refers to perceptions of the motives behind MPs’ voting decisions. Of ten possible motives, three do not involve commitments concerning constituents, the public, party political motives or personal beliefs. These involve voting to benefit one’s political career, one’s family, or one’s job chances outside of politics. Although these questions are principally concerned with indicating citizens’ norms pertaining to politicians’ behaviour, they also indicate censoriousness towards motives that may, in a sense, be
interpreted as 'corrupt'. Indeed, voting in these ways involves decision-making based on personal gain, and thus involves individual utility (linking to the 'market-centred' conception of corruption), it is thus potentially not in the public interest, and—as MPs are official representatives—it marks their deviation from their formal roles in public office. Nonetheless there are limits on the extent to which one might interpret these motives as corrupt: a disciplined party may make the idea of voting against certain measures unviable, for example, and can a candidate really be deemed 'corrupt' if they seek to ensure their political careers are kept intact by towing the party line?

Furthermore, what affects one’s family may coincide with what would benefit many families. Nonetheless, Table 5.3 shows responses to whether these motives are reasonable or likely.

Table 5.3 Citizens’ Views on the Determinants of MP’s Vote Choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plausible Determinant</th>
<th>Unreasonable?</th>
<th>Most likely?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What affects MP’s political career</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What affects MP’s family</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What affects MP’s job chances</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A high level of public censoriousness over these motives appears evident, with over 80% of respondents believing it is unreasonable for each motive to influence an MP’s

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104 The question asked pertaining to the reasonableness of the behaviours is: Suppose there is a vote in parliament on an important national issue. Which of these do you think it is reasonable for MPs to take into account when deciding how to vote and which should they definitely not take into account? The wording of the three motives of interest are: a) how the decision might affect the MP’s political career; b) what would benefit the MP’s family; and c) how the decision might affect the MP’s chances of getting a job outside politics. The question pertaining to the likelihood of the behaviours is: And in practice, which one do you think most MPs would base their decision on? Don’t knows presumably indicate doubt over whether the behaviours are unreasonable or likely, and thus have been taken into account, forming parts of the percentages of those who do not agree the behaviours are unreasonable or most likely.
voting decision. Perceptions of actual levels of these motives being influential are also presented, and indicate a certain degree of optimism. The suggestion that MPs might vote according to the interests of their families or their job prospects is rejected by all but a few respondents, although 11% of respondents believe that MPs’ concerns over their political careers is likely to be the most influential factor. To get a better picture, however, it is disappointing not to have some indication of how far the public believes such factors are at least partially contributory to MP’s voting decisions, rather than querying what the most likely motive is.

Let us finally observe responses to questions concerning favouritism. Favouritism, or ‘cronyism’, in the context of political corruption, can refer to practice whereby public sector employers, or those influential in the recruitment process to public office, prioritise certain applicants (usually friends) for jobs. Whether favouritism of this form is or is not ‘political corruption’ is a difficult question (this may depend on whether it is done for money, or on a partisan or non-partisan basis), but its link to two definitions of political corruption is clear. Non-meritocratic selection processes for public jobs are surely not in the public interest, nor would they comply with formal rules that require open recruitment. The link between favouritism and the market-centred definition of corruption is perhaps more tenuous, as the individual utility gained by recruiting a friend, say, is less obvious than that obtained by the payoff from a bribe. Nonetheless, it is important to examine perceptions of favouritism and, later, to see how well they tie to perceptions of other, more tangibly ‘corrupt’ behaviours.

105 Also unsurprising is that responses to a further question indicated that barely any respondents believed that any of these items should be the ‘most important’ consideration.
Table 5.4 shows that British citizens are highly condemning of two hypothetical behaviours involving favouritism.\(^{106}\)

**Table 5.4  Citizens' Views on the Acceptability of a Council Official's Behaviour in regard to their Friend's Job Application**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Unacceptable?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give friend publicly unavailable information</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Put in a good word</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure the interviewing committee</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(N = 1097\)

Nearly all respondents suggest that a council official advantaging a friend applying for a job by pressurising the interviewers is unacceptable, and nine-tenths of the sample suggests giving the friend publicly unavailable information is unacceptable. Only when the favouritism is less direct, such as putting in a good word for the friend, are respondents more divided, with only 65% suggesting this form of behaviour is unacceptable.

Moving on, Table 5.5 records responses to the idea of favouritism more generally.\(^{107}\)

---

\(^{106}\) The wording for the question is: Suppose a vacancy has been advertised for a senior job in the local council. A council official, who is not involved in deciding who gets the job, thinks a friend would be good for the job. Which of these things do you think it would be acceptable for the council official to do and which would definitely not be acceptable. Two statements then refer to encouraging the friend to apply, and helping them prepare / helping them find publicly available information; but the three that are more morally dubious are those focused on: give the friend information that is not publicly available and would help them prepare for the interview; put in a good word for the friend with the person doing the interviewing for the job; and try to put pressure on the interviewing committee to appoint the friend. This wording had been simplified for presentational reasons in Table 5.4. Don’t knows presumably indicate doubt over whether the behaviours are unacceptable, and thus form parts of the percentages of those who do not agree the behaviours are unacceptable. It is notable too that although the term ‘favouritism’ has been used in this thesis, neither it, nor the term ‘cronyism’ were used during the process of data collection.

\(^{107}\) The statement citizens are asked to consider, and the possible responses, are shown in the table. The wording for the question posed before the statement is offered is: In your opinion, how important are the things on these cards when government departments and other public services are recruiting people for jobs? Don’t knows have been dropped. The percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Table 5.5 Citizens' Views on the Importance of Avoiding Favouritism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Important</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite Important</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Important</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not At All Important</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,092

The distribution of responses seems to indicate that favouritism is viewed with some censoriousness: 80% of respondents suggest that not recruiting applicants on the grounds of knowing them or liking them, is at least 'very' important.

Finally, how prevalent do citizens believe certain incidences of favouritism are in British political life? Table 5.6 provides an indication. 108

Table 5.6 Citizens' Views on the Prevalence of Favouritism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Lot</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Fair Amount</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly Ever</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,066

It appears that favouritism is construed to be substantial in British politics, with nearly 70% of respondents suggesting it occurs 'a lot' or 'a fair amount'. The other variables show that British citizens appear both pessimistic and optimistic concerning its

108 The questions asked, and the plausible responses, are stated in the table. Don't knows have been dropped. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
occurrence. Slightly more respondents believed favouritism had increased recently compared to those who believed it had decreased, although slightly more respondents believed the authorities were increasingly clamping down on it in comparison to those who believed they were decreasingly doing so.

These descriptive statistics have overall indicated a number of important points. British citizens have somewhat higher expectations of elected officials than of non-elected officials, and believe that at least some bribery and misuse of public office is evident. Favouritism is viewed less harshly, but is perceived to occur more. Lastly, the prospect that MPs vote in ways that might be construed as ‘corrupt’ is largely condemned, although not deemed to occur often.

Factor Analysis and Scale Construction

At this stage we may test hypothesis \( H1 \) and lay the foundations for testing hypotheses \( H2 \) and \( H3 \). To do this, we will firstly undertake factor analysis to indicate the extent to which censoriousness concerning plausibly ‘corrupt’ acts differs from censoriousness concerning other forms of misdemeanour in public life, and the extent to which perceived corruption incidence differs from perceptions of other improper behaviours among public officials. Once this analysis has been undertaken, we may secondly attempt to derive two scales. First a, ‘perceived importance of corruption avoidance’ scale, which aims to measure the extent to which citizens deem it important that public servants do not engage in corrupt behaviour. Such perceptions are likely to proxy censoriousness towards corrupt behaviour, allowing us to evaluate the determinants of censoriousness in the British case. Second, a ‘perceived corruption incidence’ scale, tapping how far citizens believe corruption is widespread,
again providing us with a dependent variable to test which, of socioeconomic and demographic factors, or attitudinal factors, appears to explain it better.

Taking censory first, with the data available, the potential contributory variables already run along a scale. The four variables whose results are reported in Table 5.1 are five-point variables that tap expectations concerning the avoidance of bribery and the misuse of power for personal gain among a) MPs and government ministers, and b) senior public officials. If we analyse responses not only to the questions tapping expectations concerning the avoidance of these behaviours, but also to questions concerning the avoidance of eight accompanying behaviours, we may observe whether it is appropriate to isolate perceived corruption, as hypothesis H1 predicts. 109 Factor analysis will be conducted for both sets of public servant separately.

First let us examine expectations concerning the hypothetical behaviours of MPs and government ministers. When perceptions concerning these behaviours are equivalently recoded,110 and factor analysis is conducted, the Eigenvalues indicate that two principal factors (coherent variables within the data) are being tapped.111 Observation of the rotated factor loadings in Table 5.7 indicates that they represent a division between the statements pertaining to the two corruption-related items, and all other statements listed.112

109 Recall that the wording of the question is: Please put these cards on this board to show how important you think it is that MPs and government ministers [in the second case, senior public servants] do the things shown on the cards. The ten statements offered are listed in Tables 5.7 and 5.8.
110 In all behaviours listed, respondents' answers are scored as follows: 'extremely important' = 5; 'very important' = 4; 'quite important' = 3; 'not very important' = 2; 'not at all important' = 1. Don't knows have been dropped.
111 The standard convention, by which factors are deemed significant if their Eigenvalue exceeds 1, will be observed. This 'Kaiser-Guttman' rule ensures that each factor adds positively to the overall variance explained by the analysis, as an Eigenvalue expresses the variance explained by the addition of a component.
112 For each factor, bold type will be used to highlight the factor loadings indicating the items that group together.
Table 5.7  Rotated Factor Loadings: Expectations Concerning Ten Behaviours (MPs and Government Ministers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'They should be dedicated to doing a good job for the public'</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should not use their power for their own personal gain'</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should not take bribes'</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should own up when they make mistakes'</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should explain the reasons for their actions and decisions'</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should set a good example for others in their private lives'</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should tell the truth'</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should make sure that public money is spent wisely'</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should be in touch with what the general public thinks is important'</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should be competent at their jobs'</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction by Maximum Likelihood; Varimax Rotated Loadings.\(^{13}\)

At this stage it appears appropriate to isolate the perceived corruption items, supporting hypothesis H1. Yet how do these results compare to expectations of the same behaviours, but in regard to senior public officials? The rotated factor loadings, shown in Table 5.8, illustrate a more complicated picture than that presented when MPs and government ministers are the subject of analysis.

Table 5.8  Rotated Factor Loadings: Expectations Concerning Ten Behaviours (Senior Public Officials)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'They should be dedicated to doing a good job for the public'</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should not use their power for their own personal gain'</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should not take bribes'</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should own up when they make mistakes'</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should explain the reasons for their actions and decisions'</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should set a good example for others in their private lives'</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should tell the truth'</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should make sure that public money is spent wisely'</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should be in touch with what the general public thinks is important'</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They should be competent at their jobs'</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction by Maximum Likelihood; Varimax Rotated Loadings.\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) The Eigenvalues for Factor 1 and Factor 2 are, respectively, 3.4 and 1.2.

\(^{14}\) The Eigenvalues associated with Factors 1, 2, and 3, are, respectively, 3.5, 1.2, and 1.0.
Three factors are evident. The first appears to tap honesty, proximity to the public, and private ethics; the second pertains to competence; the third isolates the two corruption-related items. The factor loadings of the two corrupt behaviours in factor 3 are considerably higher than all of the remaining items, suggesting that it is once again justifiable to isolate perceptions of corruption. For simplicity, the first two factors may be combined as a general indicator of expectations concerning non-corrupt behaviours, as this makes the data for both types of public servant equivalent, with items dividing between expectations concerning corrupt and non-corrupt behaviours.\footnote{Nonetheless it is interesting to query why more nuanced findings are revealed here. If we observe Table 2 in the BMRB report (BMRB, 2004, p. 28), we see that senior public officials are generally trusted more than MPs and ministers. Perhaps the coherence of Factor 1, which is comprised of three components which broadly relate to honesty (owning up when having made mistakes, explaining reasons for behaviour, and telling the truth), is explained by citizens' increased trust in such public officials, making expectations concerning their honesty coherently distinct from perceptions concerning competence and corruption. As MPs and ministers are trusted less, perhaps the coherence of expectations relating to honesty is less distinct, explaining the less nuanced findings in Table 5.7. This possibility is weakened, however, by the importance of items relating to proximity to the public and private ethics in Factor 1 in Table 5.8. Their contribution makes incorrect the description of Factor 1 as a latent variable only tapping honesty.}

To obtain a general perceived corruption scale, it is theoretically useful to combine responses vis-à-vis both sets of public servant. Thus, a 'perceived importance of corruption avoidance' scale is obtained by scaling for the two types of public servant the two items pertaining to bribery and the misuse of power for personal gain, deriving, in total, a four-item scale which exhibits a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.64.\footnote{The scale's values run from 5 = very important (and hence proxies high censoriousness), to 1 = not at all important (and hence proxies low censoriousness). It was hoped the scale could tap a broader conception of corruption by including the variable tapping citizens' perceived importance of the avoidance of favouritism (the five-point variable whose results are presented in Table 5.5). However, when it was equivalently recoded and used to comprise a five-item scale, the Cronbach's Alpha reduced to 0.6, so it will not be used for this purpose. This indicates that citizens hold different expectations over the avoidance of favouritism than they do for the avoidance of bribery and the misuse of power for personal gain. Comparing Tables 5.1 and 5.5 suggests citizens are less censorious of favouritism.} We may also group together the other sixteen items (eight items pertaining to each type of public servants) to derive a more general 'perceived importance of
general standards' scale useful to control for when we predict the determinants of the 'perceived importance of corruption avoidance' scale, to ensure it is perceived corruption that is being analysed. The Cronbach's Alpha obtained from this scale is 0.85.\textsuperscript{117} This scale taps expectations concerning politicians' and public officials' performance in a broad sense, embracing expectations of honesty, competence, openness, and proximity to the public.

We may now turn to constructing a scale pertaining to the perceived incidence of corruption in politics. The same procedure for the scaling of expectations may be followed, but using responses to the extent to which public servants engage in the hypothetical behaviours. The types of public servants differ in this case, with responses pertaining to perceptions of a) MPs and b) government ministers.\textsuperscript{118}

When factor analysis is conducted on perceived levels of the behaviours in regard to MPs, the Eigenvalues obtained once again indicate one dominant factor and a weaker second factor. Observation of the rotated factor loadings (Table 5.9) indicates that similarly to the responses concerning expectations of MPs and ministers, and congruent with the expectations of HI, the division between the factors involves the corruption-related items, and all other items.

\textsuperscript{117} The scale's values run from 5 = very important, to 1 = not at all important. Note that a marginal increase in the Cronbach's Alpha is obtained by including the four items used to construct the 'perceived importance of corruption avoidance' scale, but separating them is theoretically beneficial, and justified by factor analysis.\textsuperscript{118} The descriptive statistics for the variables pertaining to perceived corruption are shown in Table 5.2. Recall that the wordings of the questions tapping how far public officials are believed to engage in such malpractice are first: Next, looking at the screen, please say how many MPs and government ministers you think actually do these things...I'll be asking about MPs and government ministers separately. Then: How many MPs do you think this applies to? Then: And government ministers...? In the case of the two plausibly corrupt behaviours listed, respondents' answers are coded as follows: 'all' = 5; 'most' = 4; 'about half' = 3; 'a few' = 2; 'none' = 1. In the case of the other eight behaviours, respondents' answers are coded as: 'all' = 1; 'most' = 2; 'about half' = 3; 'a few' = 4; 'none' = 5. This makes the items equivalent, with higher levels of perceived impropriety deriving a higher score. Don't knows have been dropped. It is recognised that this data is not ideal, given that the variables are not continuous: we have to assume, essentially, that we can quantify the five categories such that a value of 1 separates each one. Nonetheless, this assumption facilitates the factor analysis and scale construction necessary to test our hypotheses, and given that it would be contentious to attempt to quantify the categories in a way more correspondent with their implied values (a 'few' might mean 1 or 100 public servants, for instance), continuous coding seems a more sensible choice.
Table 5.9  Rotated Factor Loadings: Perceived Incidence of Ten Behaviours (MPs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'They are dedicated to doing a good job for the public'</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They use their power for their own personal gain'</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They take bribes'</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They own up when they make mistakes'</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They explain the reasons for their actions and decisions'</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They set a good example for others in their private lives'</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They tell the truth'</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They make sure that public money is spent wisely'</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They are in touch with what the general public thinks is important'</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They are competent at their jobs'</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction by Maximum Likelihood; Varimax Rotated Loadings.

Let us now follow the same procedure but in regard to perceptions of government ministers. The Eigenvalues obtained from factor analysis again show that one dominant factor and a weaker second factor are indicated, and the rotated factor loadings reveal too that the division between the factors involves the items that are corruption-related and those that are not. See Table 5.10.

Table 5.10  Rotated Factor Loadings: Perceived Incidence of Ten Behaviours (Government Ministers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'They are dedicated to doing a good job for the public'</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They use their power for their own personal gain'</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They take bribes'</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They own up when they make mistakes'</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They explain the reasons for their actions and decisions'</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They set a good example for others in their private lives'</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They tell the truth'</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They make sure that public money is spent wisely'</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They are in touch with what the general public thinks is important'</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'They are competent at their jobs'</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction by Maximum Likelihood; Varimax Rotated Loadings.

119 The Eigenvalues associated with Factor 1 and Factor 2 are, respectively, 4.2 and 1.2.
120 Here Factor 1’s and Factor 2’s Eigenvalues are 4.4 and 1.1 respectively.
Thus, following the same procedure for the earlier scale pertaining to the importance of corruption avoidance, we may firstly scale together the four items pertaining to a) bribery and b) the misuse of power for personal gain for both sets of public officials (in this case MPs and government ministers separately) in order to gain a general scale. The Cronbach's Alpha obtained is 0.82, an indication the scale has high inter-item reliability. The scale comprised of these four items will thus represent the 'perceived corruption incidence' scale. To control for the effect of perceptions of levels of other (although non-corrupt) misdemeanour, represented by the other eight behaviours for each set of public servants, a sixteen-item 'other misdemeanour incidence' scale can be constructed (Alpha = 0.92), which taps the extent to which respondents perceive that MPs and government ministers behave in ways that are not corrupt, but are dishonest, incompetent, and distanced from the public.

In sum, four scales have now been constructed for analysis:

1. A 'perceived importance of corruption avoidance' scale, tapping the stringency of public expectations concerning the avoidance of bribery and the misuse of power for personal gain.

2. A 'perceived importance of general standards' scale, tapping more generally the stringency of public expectations concerning public servants' honesty, competence, openness, and proximity to the public.

121 It runs from 1, where no politicians are perceived to engage in the corrupt practices asked about, to 5, where all politicians are perceived to engage in the corrupt practices asked about. It was hoped the scale could be broadened by including the variable tapping the extent to which citizens' perceive favouritism to occur in public office recruitment (the five-point variable whose results are recorded on the left-hand side of Table 5.6). Yet when this variable was appropriately recoded and scaled with the other four items, the Cronbach's Alpha reduced to 0.77, so this variable will not be included. Just as citizens appear to hold different expectations over the avoidance of favouritism than they do for the avoidance of bribery and the misuse of power for personal gain, so they perceive its incidence differently. Comparing Tables 5.2 and 5.6 illustrates that favouritism is believed to be more prevalent in British politics than the other behaviours. The introduction of this variable is probably undesirable for alternative reasons too: MPs and government ministers do not make that many appointments, and some partisan-based recruitment is permitted.
3. A ‘perceived corruption incidence’ scale, tapping the degree to which the misuse of power for personal gain and bribery is perceived to be prevalent among politicians.

4. An ‘other misdemeanour incidence’ scale, tapping the degree to which politicians are perceived to behave in ways that are dishonest, incompetent, and distanced from the public.

While these scales will be useful for our next task – predicting the determinants of perceptions of corruption, this section is also useful in addressing hypothesis HI. It was predicted that perceptions of corrupt acts would substantively differ from perceptions concerning other forms of misdemeanour in public life. Factor analysis has shown empirically that the corrupt acts do group separately from the other acts under consideration, indicating that HI is supported. Observation of the descriptive statistics of the derived scales in Table 5.11 indicates why this is the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Importance of Corruption Avoidance Scale</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Importance of General Standards Scale</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Corruption Incidence</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Misdemeanour Incidence</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From observation of the mean values it appears that British citizens are a) more censorious of the corrupt acts than they are the other misdemeanours (and, from the standard deviation, there is limited variation in this high level of censoriousness), and b) perceive corruption to occur less than other forms of misdemeanour in public life (although citizens vary slightly more in these beliefs).
Determinants of Perceptions of Corruption: Data

Our next task is to predict the determinants of the corruption scales that we have derived. This work will test the two hypotheses suggesting that, in the British case, it is unlikely that socioeconomic and demographic effects will be as salient as attitudinal ones. It will go some way in examining whether existing explanations of corruption censoriousness and perceived incidence in other studies hold up, and test, when applied to perceptions of corruption, whether the ‘cultural’ or the ‘institutional’ model of political trust can be equivalently applied, thus giving us an opportunity to understand the basis of citizens’ orientations towards corrupt behaviour. Consequently, numerous independent variables may be defined spanning both socioeconomic and demographic factors, and attitudinal factors. Non-respondents to any variable defined will be excluded from analysis.

Gender will be included using a simply dummy variable dividing between males (0) and females (1). Age will be included as a categorical variable dividing between six groups: 18-24 year-olds (reference), 25-34 year-olds, 35-44 year olds, 45-54 year olds, 55-64 year olds, and respondents 65 or over. Education will coded as a categorical variable dividing between those that report they have obtained qualifications at: university: ‘higher’; post-school level: ‘further’; secondary school level: ‘school’; and those that report they are not qualified or refuse to answer (reference). Indeed, it is curious that about a quarter of the sample do not offer an answer. Speculating why this may be the case is difficult, but one notion is that during the process of being interviewed, respondents with limited education may feel embarrassed to volunteer this fact to a researcher. On this assumption, these respondents will be included in the unqualified category.

Class will be included using a recode of the categorical variable included in the dataset which indicates the NS-SEC (National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification) category in which respondents are included. The five categories are: managerial and professional occupations, intermediate occupations, routine and manual occupations, never worked, and FT student. Very few respondents are in the never worked / student categories, thus, on the basis that the economic engagement and income of such groups will be low, they have been added to lowest strata: the routine
importance of corruption avoidance' scale it is appropriate to control for expectations concerning the behaviour of public servants more generally, thus the 'perceived importance of general standards' scale will be used as an independent variable. Similarly, the 'other misdemeanour incidence' scale will be used as an independent variable when predicting the determinants of the 'perceived corruption incidence' scale. This ensures we are tapping the determinants of perceptions of corruption instead of perceptions relating to other, non-corrupt, behaviours. We may intuitively anticipate that citizens’ higher expectations concerning public servants generally will be mirrored by higher expectations concerning the avoidance of corrupt behaviour; similarly increased pessimism over levels of misconduct actually present in politics may be mirrored by increased pessimism over levels of corruption. It is also necessary to control for perceived incidence of corruption when predicting the perceived importance of avoiding corruption, and vice-versa. They are likely to mutually affect each other: higher expectations may be provoked by greater perceived incidence, and those with higher expectations may be more inclined to perceive greater incidence. The causality is likely to flow both ways, and these variables are expected to be positively related.

Numerous other attitudinal variables will also be included. First, in each set of models a variable pertaining specifically to political trust related to the public servants under consideration will be included. Although political trust is tapped indirectly in

127 In the case of the 'perceived importance of corruption avoidance' scale, which pertains to elected officials and senior public officials, political trust will be tapped by a dummy dividing between those that suggest all of the following are trustworthy: Senior managers in the National Health Service, Senior managers in local councils, Senior Police Officers, MPs in general, Top civil servants, and Government ministers, and those that do not, or offer a don't know response, which will be assumed to indicate a certain element of distrust. The same coding will be undertaken for the political trust variable to be included in the regressions relating to the perceived corruption incidence scale, although it will
the ‘other misdemeanour incidence’ scale, it is useful to tap it directly, as it is expected to be a strong predictor of lower levels of perceived corruption incidence, and it may prompt higher expectations of politicians. Two further items to be included, found to be significant in previous literature, are social trust and political alienation. Furthermore, because political knowledge has been found to link to both increased censoriousness and pessimism over the incidence of corruption (Gibbons, 1985; McCann and Dominguez, 1998), a variable tapping the effect of self-reported knowledge of the topics in hand may be included, scaled with two other items tapping political interest and strength of feeling concerning the topics in hand.

It may be expected that citizens’ attitudes concerning the likelihood that corrupt politicians will be caught and punished will also affect perceptions:
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expectations are likely to be influenced by the stringency with which formal political authorities seek to treat misdemeanour, while greater perceived stringency may link to lower levels of perceived corruption incidence. Two variables to tap these effect will be included in both models, one addressing authorities' propensity to catch perpetrators, another tapping their propensity to punish them after perpetrators have been caught.  

Finally, it is interesting to include a variable tapping whether the respondent is a regular national tabloid or broadsheet reader, or reads no national newspapers. It is predicted that those who read tabloid newspapers are more inclined to be censorious and pessimistic over corruption, given the sensationalist way such newspapers report politics. It is alternatively possible that those who read either type of paper may be more pessimistic and censorious than those who read neither, as these respondents are likely to be more in touch with reports of misdemeanour in public life. Lastly, a dummy will be included which taps whether respondents report that one of the salient influences on their opinions is television. It is anticipated that

131 Confidence in political misdemeanour being tackled by the authorities will be tapped by recodes of the following questions: a) And how confident do you feel that the authorities will generally uncover wrongdoing by people in public office? And b) And when people in public office are caught doing wrong, how confident do you feel that the authorities will punish them? In both cases the plausible responses, and the codes assigned to them, are: very confident [4], fairly confident [3], not very confident [2], not at all confident [1]. Don’t knows have been dropped.

132 A categorical variable has been created for this purpose. In regard to the category tapping tabloid readership, respondents have been included if, to the question: Do you read any of these daily newspapers regularly? By that I mean two or more issues a week, they record positive responses to any of these papers: Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Sport, The Daily Star, The Sun, Daily Record, and/or, to the question: And, do you read any of these Sunday newspapers regularly? By that I mean two or more issues a month on average, they record positive responses to any of these papers: Mail on Sunday, News of the World, The People, Sunday Express, Sunday Mirror, Sunday Post, Sunday Sport. In regard to the category tapping broadsheet readership, the same procedure has been followed, with those who read the following daily and Sunday newspapers included: Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times, The Scotsman, The Independent on Sunday, The Observer, Sunday Telegraph, Sunday Times. The base category will be those who do not state that they read any of the above papers; while those who state they read both types of paper have been included in the broadsheet category, as they have access to the better quality journalism in these papers. Note finally that the traditional understanding of the difference between tabloids and broadsheets has been assumed. This has been complicated in the UK by the re-sizing of broadsheet newspapers.
the more vivid and potentially sensationalist way news is reported on television may also encourage increased censoriousness and pessimism. 133

Before the models are presented, it is briefly appropriate to discuss why variables tapping political participation and political support will not be included in the models. For a start, as outlined in the introduction to the thesis, it has been emphasised that political participation and political support may be important consequences of perceptions of corruption, rather than determinants. Admittedly, arguments could be made proposing that the causality runs the other way, particularly in regard to political support, and we will flesh out and address this latter possibility in greater depth in Chapter 7, when models specific to political support are predicted. Yet briefly, one might propose participation may encourage deeper engagement with politics and more informed perceptions of corruption; support of the incumbent party may motivate less censoriousness and a more optimistic appraisal of actual levels of corruption, and non-support may motivate the opposite. So to test for these possibilities, variables tapping a) participation and b) political support were added to the final models presented, but were not found to have substantive effects and have not been included. 134

133 The question this dummy uses is: And thinking about the opinions you’ve given, which, if any, of these they are based on? (Plus a What else? follow up.) If respondents indicate a positive response to What you see on news programmes on television, they have a value of 1; if they do not, they have a value of 0.

134 The variables added into four exploratory models (two pertaining to each full model presented in Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 below) concerned a) two dummy variables tapping partisanship for the two main British political parties: Labour and the Conservatives (note that the question deriving partisanship is outlined in the two chapters that follow), and b) two scales of extra-institutional and institutional behaviour along with a variable tapping turnout in the 2001 general election (note that these participation variables are outlined fully in the next chapter).
Analysis

The method of examining the determinants of the derived scales will be multivariate OLS linear regression. The results of models using the defined independent variables to predict the 'perceived importance of corruption avoidance' scale are presented in Table 5.12. It comprises three regressions. First, only the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are introduced; second, the attitudinal variables are added; third, and lastly, the full model, including the media-related controls, is presented.
Table 5.12  Results of Linear Regressions Estimating the ‘Perceived Importance of Corruption Avoidance’ Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic / Demog. Vars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-24 (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 25-34</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 35-44</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 45-54</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 55-64</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 65+</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: None / Refused (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: School</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: Further</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: Higher</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Manager/Professional (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Intermediate</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Routine/Manual</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinal Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Imp. of Gen. Standards (1-5)</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Corr. Incidence (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Trusting</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially Trusting</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation (1-5)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Catching (1-4)</td>
<td>0.04**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Punishing (1-4)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No National Newspaper (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabloid Reader</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadsheet Reader</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed by TV</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.51***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1; OLS regressions using robust standard errors.

Addressing the socioeconomic and demographic variables first, we see that education and age are the only significant variables in Model 1, with older generations and the intermediate-level educated most censorious. In the full model, however, we see that the age effect drops out. Education, however, remains significant in the full model, where it is reported that the intermediate and the highest educated are substantially...
more censorious of corruption than are the uneducated, possibly because the educated are better aware of the damaging effects of corrupt practice and the illicit nature of such behaviour.

Attitudinal variables are shown to go some way in explaining corruption censoriousness. Indeed, the R-squared increases from 0.03 to 0.21 between Model 1 and Model 2, where we see that first, the perceived importance of general standards is highly explanatory. Unsurprisingly, those with higher expectations concerning general standards are more likely to hold high expectations vis-à-vis the avoidance of corruption. However, contrary to the expectation stated earlier, those that perceive higher levels of corruption in actual political life are likely to believe that corruption avoidance is less important. This indicates, perhaps, that respondents who perceive high levels of corruption in actual political life acclimatise to what they perceive to be a corrupt environment, and their expectations may lower accordingly. Social trust is found to have a positive relationship with corruption censoriousness, which may tie to the notion that among socially trusting citizens, expectations concerning all people in all jobs are likely to be higher, as people are deemed to be fundamentally honest. Finally, knowledge / interest in the topics in hand are found to be weakly explanatory in Model 2, with the more knowledgeable and interested inclined to be more censorious of corrupt practices. This effect drops out, however, in the final model, where correlates of knowledge and interest, such as higher age, education, and class, are controlled for.

The media-related variables appear to have very little explanatory power. This is perhaps surprising, as it was anticipated that sensationalist reporting, particularly by tabloid newspapers and television broadcasts, would stimulate considerable censoriousness of corrupt behaviour, but this does not appear to be the case.
Individuals' levels of censoriousness appear to be independent from the media from which they receive information about politics, and better related to norms associated with other attitudes towards politics, and to their level of education.

So how do these results relate to the hypotheses developed earlier? Hypothesis H2 predicted that socioeconomic and demographic variables would be poor predictors of censoriousness of corruption, while attitudinal variables would be more explanatory. To some degree, this hypothesis is supported. Only one socioeconomic variable, education (categorical), is explanatory in the full model, while three attitudinal variables are shown to be statistically significant predictors. Nonetheless, it is notable that rather few variables are overall explanatory. Political distrust and alienation, for instance, might be expected to lead to political detachment that dampens expectations of politicians, but this was not found to be the case. Neither does media sensationalism appear to play a role. Instead, it may be that the norms feeding into corruption censoriousness are highly individual, not easily explained by measures of socioeconomic and demographic status or by broader political attitudes.

Furthermore, there is rather little variation in censoriousness among British citizens, as Table 5.11 shows, which is likely to make it difficult to draw out explanatory factors.

At this stage we may turn to predicting the determinants of perceptions of actual levels of corruption in the UK. Table 5.13 outlines the results of linear regressions. Like the models presented in Table 5.12, Models 1, 2 and 3 will introduce the socioeconomic / demographic, attitudinal, and media-related variables in stages.
Table 5.13  Results of Linear Regressions Estimating the ‘Perceived Corruption Incidence’ Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>$B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic / Demog. Vars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-24 (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 25-34</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 35-44</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 45-54</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 55-64</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 65+</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: None / Refused (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: School</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: Further</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: Higher</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Manager/Professional (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Intermediate</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Routine/Manual</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Misdemeanour Incid. (1-5)</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Imp. of Corr. Avoidance (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Trusting</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially Trusting</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge / Interest (1-5)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Catching (1-4)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Punishing (1-4)</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No National Newspaper (ref)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabloid Reader</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadsheet Reader</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed by TV</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.59***</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = $p < 0.01$; ** = $p < 0.05$; * = $p < 0.1$; OLS regressions using robust standard errors.\(^{136}\)

Model 1 reveals that socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, when regressed alone against perceived corruption incidence, have little explanatory power. Although two categories in the education and age variables are statistically significant, this is only at the 10% level and this does not appear indicative of an overall pattern. Interestingly, however, age appears more significant in the final regression, when two

\(^{136}\) Again, neither heteroskedasticity, nor outliers, nor multicollinearity, are troublesome in these models.
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of the three eldest age categories are shown to perceive less corruption than do the other age categories. Older people are perhaps less quick to believe their politicians are corrupt, which in the British case (where, objectively, corruption is likely to be limited in extent) may link to older citizens being more politically engaged and patient in their assessment of public servants. This finding nonetheless seems anomalous in being revealed in the final model but not the partial one. Yet from exploratory work, the reason for this seemingly peculiar result is revealed. The same statistically significant effects of age show up when only one attitudinal variable, the perceived ‘other misdemeanour incidence’ scale, is added to Model 1. Consider at this point that descriptive statistics show that older individuals tend to perceive less corruption, but more ‘other misdemeanour’ than younger groups. Consequently, in the under-specified Model 1, the inverse relationship between the older age groups and perceived corruption is not drawn out because greater age proxies higher perceived ‘other misdemeanour’, which is highly positively related to perceived corruption. As age effectively proxies this effect, it cancels out its own negative effect. Hence, when ‘other misdemeanour incidence’ is controlled for, the age effects are drawn out. 

Moving on, the attitudinal variables display several statistically significant effects that are consistent across Model 2 and Model 3. Perceiving misdemeanour in public life generally is associated with higher perceived corruption, which we expected. We also find that less censoriousness ties to higher perceived incidence. This may indicate that those who expect less of their politicians are rather resigned to the idea of corruption in politics, and this pessimism may carry over into higher perceived corruption incidence. Political trust is negatively related to perceived

137 Why the 55-64 age group does not predict less corruption as the other older age groups do remains uncertain, however. Perhaps the insecurities of retirement incline individuals in this age bracket to become suspicious of politicians: indeed, this group also has a lower mean score on the political trust variables too.
corruption incidence, as we expected. Unsurprisingly too, those who lack confidence in the authorities punishing public servants who commit malpractice tend to perceive higher levels of corruption, a finding that is congruent with a national level finding mentioned in Chapter 2, that rule of law correlates well with lower levels of corruption.

Turning to the media-related variables, tabloid readers are, as anticipated, inclined to perceive higher levels of corruption than those that do not read tabloids, a reflection, perhaps, of the sensationalist way politics is reported in such newspapers and the ostentatiously cynical way politicians linked to malpractice might be presented. However, this is a relatively small effect, and neither broadsheet readership, nor citing television as a key influence on responses, has an equivalent effect.

So how should we consider these results more broadly? Recall first that hypothesis H3 predicts that socioeconomic and demographic factors are less explanatory of perceived corruption incidence than are attitudinal factors. This expectation is based on several grounds. Previous studies have shown contradictory findings concerning socioeconomic factors; social divisions in the UK are less prominent than in other nations, and hence may not proxy groups of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from corruption or mark faultlines across which perceptions of corruption differ; and the testing of theories of a related attitude, political trust, suggest that it is rational assessment of institutions, rather than socialisation grounded in socioeconomic roots, that is explanatory.

Yet, as the Survey of Public Attitudes towards Conduct in Public Life report indicates, it is interesting that tabloid journalists themselves are deemed highly untrustworthy by many respondents – even by tabloid readers, yet it is simultaneously found that tabloid newspapers are highly influential in determining these readers’ perspectives (BMRB, 2004, p. 27).
Our results seem to support hypothesis H3. The only pertinent effect of a socioeconomic or demographic factor involves age, and this is drawn out only when other misdemeanour incidence is controlled for. Gender, education, and class do not appear to have robust explanatory power. In contrast, attitudinal effects are found to be more explanatory. Perceiving other misdemeanour by public servants, expecting less of them (probably due to this proxying resignation to the incidence of corruption), distrusting them, and believing that in the event of their being caught for wrongdoing they are unlikely to be punished, are all good predictors of high levels of perceived corruption among British citizens.

Summary of Findings and Discussion

The central aim of the chapter has been to test three hypotheses pertaining to the nature of citizens’ perceptions of the censoriousness and extent of corruption in Britain. We sought to see how far perceptions of corruption differed from perceptions of other forms of impropriety, and to determine whether it is socioeconomic and demographic or attitudinal explanations that better determine two key orientations: corruption censoriousness, and the degree to which corruption is perceived to occur in reality in British politics.

Let us tie together the key findings of this chapter. First, to lay the basis for further analysis, we analysed descriptive statistics concerning perceptions of corruption, finding that citizens have significant expectations concerning the avoidance of bribery, and to a slightly lesser extent the avoidance of the misuse of power for private gain, and to a lesser extent again, the avoidance of favouritism. We revealed that citizens are somewhat more stringent in their expectations concerning
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elected officials than unelected officials. In regard to perceptions of the actual incidence of corruption, bribery is perceived to occur infrequently, though the majority of citizens believe at least ‘a few’ politicians engage in it. The misuse of power for private gain is reckoned to occur more frequently, and favouritism more frequently still.

To more directly test the hypotheses under consideration, we then used factor analysis, finding that the key items pertaining to ‘corrupt’ acts, in contrast to those relating to other misdemeanour—including dishonesty, lack of openness, unscrupulous behaviour in private life, and incompetence—consistently represented an independent factor, giving weight to the notion that citizens think about corruption differently than they do other forms of impropriety in public life. Scaling the relevant variables and observing their mean scores suggest that this difference in orientations is owed to two key beliefs: first that the avoidance of corrupt acts is more important than the avoidance of other misdemeanour, in essence that corruption is viewed more censoriously; second that corrupt acts are perceived to be less prevalent in British public life than are other forms of misdemeanour.

The prediction of the determinants of scales of censoriousness towards corruption and of levels of perceived corruption incidence has indicated that these items are poorly explained by socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of respondents in contemporary Britain. This, it may be argued, is explained by corruption’s limited impact in the UK. Corruption benefits some, while others lose out, and the divide between winners and losers may well congregate within socioeconomic divides. In terms of financial corruption, for example, the elite—high powered businessmen and politicians—are likely to be those who ‘win’ from corruption. It follows that in Britain, low ‘objective’ levels of corruption means its impact on
equality among citizens is mild, which may in turn make social divisions poor predictors of corruption censoriousness and perceived levels of corruption. This argument may also help explain the contradictory effects of some socioeconomic divisions found in countries with greater corruption. In some cases poorer citizens may be censorious as they lose out from corruption among the elite, for example, but in other cases scrupulous, legitimately rich citizens may be more censorious as they may operate in elite circles and understand the impropriety of others' corrupt behaviour better. In the case of the UK, however, attitudinal variables are shown to be better predictors of perceptions concerning corruption, along with tabloid newspaper readership in the case of perceived corruption incidence.

Some of this work links to, and shed lights on, a wider literature. In the introductory sections of this chapter, work on political trust by Mishler and Rose (2001) was cited, and was argued to present a useful synopsis of two competing explanations for how orientations concerning trust in public servants emerge. The first, a 'cultural' school, suggests political trust is a product of processes of socialisation, which can vary according to socioeconomic and demographic differences. The second, an 'institutional' school, suggests that political trust is a function of citizens rationally evaluating the performance of political institutions.

It seems reasonable that both corruption censoriousness and perceived corruption incidence are orientations equivalent to political trust, at least in terms of how they might originate. We may learn that corruption is bad or something to be tolerated, and something that is limited or very widespread, from processes of socialisation; or we might develop these orientations based on the evaluation of the performance of politicians and the political institutions in place. Hence a 'cultural' interpretation of how individuals develop different perspectives on corruption would
emphasise heavily the importance of socialisation, which in turn links to socioeconomic and demographic variables. For instance, socialisation in past generations amidst a political climate in which corruption was widespread may induce individuals of a certain age to consistently report higher 'perceived corruption incidence' when compared to individuals of other ages. Socialisation in poor families, meanwhile, who might have lost out from economic policies, may lead individuals to have misgivings over politicians which might lead to much greater censoriousness. Meanwhile, an 'institutional' interpretation would reject these claims, and suggest that perceived corruption incidence is likely to tie more strongly to attitudinal variables – particularly rational evaluation of institutional performance.

Hence the findings that socioeconomic variables were largely non-significant, and that attitudinal variables better explained corruption censoriousness and perceived corruption incidence, suggests that an 'institutional' approach to perceived corruption fits better than a 'cultural' approach. It is reasonable to propose such attitudes reflect rational evaluation of institutions, and that these attitudes affect levels of corruption perceived in British public life. Indeed, if you believe that institutions fail adequately to punish wrongdoers, it is perfectly reasonable to believe levels of corruption are considerable, as politicians and public servants have less incentive not to engage in corrupt practice. This result is shown in Table 5.13. However this overall conclusion should be made with a certain degree of caution: although attitudinal factors seemed to better explain orientations of corruption than did socioeconomic variables, the strongest explanatory variable in each case related to scales of similar attitudes, but directed towards other forms of impropriety. Furthermore, not all the attitudinal variables are explanatory, and the R-squared exhibited by the models shows there is considerable variation among the attitudes that our defined variables cannot predict.
A further point is that the finding that tabloid readership has a small effect on perceived corruption incidence illustrates that media influence on perceptions of institutional performance is also salient, which may or may not be deemed ‘rational’. It is rational if we conceive of citizens as responding reasonably to the information they are given via such media. It is not rational if we go further and suggest that it would be reasonable for citizens to be wary of the sensationalist way impropriety in public life may be reported by tabloid newspapers. Yet whether rational or not, the same theme applies: citizens are responding to information; they are not simply relying on orientations learnt during socialisation processes.

Yet this conclusion overall fits with the previously ventured explanation that the limited impact of corruption on specific social divisions contributes to the lack of explanatory power of socioeconomic and demographic variables. With increased impact of corruption on social divisions, it is possible that socialisation could become more important, as a divided society in which some groups are particularly affected by corruption would result in more pronounced and distinct sub-cultural groups with unique processes of socialisation. This could be reflected by different socioeconomic and demographic strata exhibiting significantly different perceptions of corruption, but this was not, from our analysis, the case.

What emerges instead, therefore, is a picture of considerable citizen sophistication. British citizens seem well able to disentangle corruption from other forms of impropriety, in terms of both their perceptions on the seriousness of corrupt behaviour, and on the extent to which corruption exists in reality. They also appear to base these orientations more on evaluation of institutions and elite actors, rather than prejudices derived from socialisation. This is heartening, as it implies that politicians are not immune from well-informed citizen orientations concerning their
unscrupulous behaviour. We can now raise the question, then, of how far such
perceptions, operationalised following factor analysis and scale construction in a more
sophisticated manner than the equivalent perceived corruption items in cross-national
analysis, explain participation in the British case.
Chapter 6. Perceived Corruption and British Citizens' Behaviour

Introduction

In this short chapter we will test whether perceived corruption has an effect on political participation in the UK. In the cross-national analysis of Chapter 4, it was found that perceived corruption, measured via single item survey questions, had very little explanatory power on items of participation other than turnout, and even with turnout the contextual effect of national level corruption had an equivalently strong effect. A contextual effect was also found in regard to extra-institutional behaviours, and displayed important nonlinear effects. Yet testing whether perceived corruption in the British case is able to explain political participation is important because of the nuances of the specialist BMRB data at our disposal. First, the perceived corruption variable we are using has undergone rigorous analysis in the previous chapter, found to be a coherent factor when set against other forms of misdemeanour. Second, the specialist data available in the British case enables us to control for other standards-related variables. Thus this case study chapter will be of substantive use in testing the robustness of the results found in cross-national analysis, and allows us to analyse a more nuanced dataset.

In general, perceived corruption has not been considered as important in promoting or dampening participation in Great Britain. Rather, party identification has been found to be salient in promoting turnout, and partisanship has been argued to interact with marginality to prompt voting in the UK (Evans, 2003). Meanwhile the
perceived salience of the election (such as its competitiveness), perceptions of parties’ past and anticipated future performances, and campaign-related factors have been found to link to the turnout calculus (Clarke et al., 2004; Pattie and Johnston, 1998). In regard to participation outside of the electoral arena in Britain, party centrism has been proposed as a motive. If parties have highly similar policies, citizens may seek to find constituencies for issues as parties fail to adopt a strong or distinct line (Evans, 2003). It is important, however, that the inability of socioeconomic and institutional factors to fully explain recent decreases in general election turnout in Britain is also acknowledged (Evans, 2003; Pattie and Johnston, 1998; Clarke et al., 2004). With regard to standards-related variables, opinion seems mixed. Although Peele (2004) suggests the detrimental effect of ‘sleaze and corruption’ may have contributed to political distrust that has decreased political participation over time, Curtice and Jowell (1995) and Evans (2003) argue that political distrust, of which ‘sleaze’ is a component, has a very limited impact on political participation.

Although in this chapter we seek to use nuanced data to sophisticate our understanding of the effects of perceived corruption, it is prudent to use the findings of the cross-national analysis as a basis to form our initial expectations. As the models to be presented here are country-specific, and, consequently, will not make use of national level indicators, results involving the Corruption Index are clearly not relevant but results involving perceived corruption at the individual level are. Chapter 4 showed that perceived corruption stimulated a lower propensity to vote, congruent with the argument that perceiving greater corruption undermined faith in political institutions and prompted less willingness to engage in electoral participation. However perceived corruption had little substantive impact on propensity to engage in extra-institutional behaviour.
As the data available enables us to predict the determinants of institutional behaviour generally alongside turnout, and in line with the theoretical basis established in Chapter 3, whereby institutional behaviour was argued to be dampened by perceiving considerable levels of corruption, we may hypothesise that precisely this effect will be drawn out in these case study models. Unfortunately, no equivalent general variable tapping institutional participation was available for use in the cross-national chapters. We can also assume that congruent with the cross-national analysis, perceived corruption will not be a good determinant of extra-institutional behaviour. Thus the following hypotheses may be tested:

**H1:** Greater perceived corruption will predict lower turnout.

**H2:** Greater perceived corruption will predict lower institutional behaviour.

**H3:** Greater perceived corruption will have little effect on propensity to engage in extra-institutional political participation.

Data and Methods

In terms of data, we will deploy the BMRB dataset used in Chapter 5. It is once again important to state the advantages of the BMRB dataset. It is the first comprehensive dataset to cover the themes of interest in this case study, and its wealth of variables pertaining to political participation and political support makes its use justifiable. It is also preferable to use the BMRB dataset rather than just the British sample in the CSES module 2 dataset used to predict turnout in Chapter 4. From the BMRB dataset
we have drawn out a more nuanced perceived corruption variable alongside other standards related variables that can be used as controls. Although the CSES module 2 dataset, like the WVS wave 3, has been highly useful in cross-national modelling, its perceived corruption variable is cruder than the scales we have developed from the BMRB data in previous chapters. Ultimately this choice of data indicates a trade-off in data choice that has been evident through this thesis. There has been a necessary reliance on cruder perceived corruption variables when undertaking large-scale cross-national analysis from which we can draw broader generalisations. Yet we have the ability to use more nuanced perceived corruption variables and controls in the smaller domain of the British case study.

Thus it is necessary to define variables in the BMRB dataset that pertain to turnout, institutional participation, and extra-institutional participation. Fortunately, the survey includes a spread of questions which enable the inclusion of these forms of political participation. Turnout is tapped simply, when respondents are asked:

*Did you vote at the last general election in 2001?*

Turnout can thus be modelled as a binary dependent variable using logistic regression.

Other behaviours can be tapped from other options following up the question of what respondents had done over the previous 12 months. In Table 6.1, these items are listed, along with the classification they have been given and a brief explanation for why they have been classified this way.\(^\text{139}\)

\(^{139}\) The exact wording of the activities has been abbreviated, but their essential meaning remains the same.
Table 6.1 Classifying the Participatory Activities Asked About in the BMRB Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Institutional or Extra-Institutional?</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted local councillor</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Involves contact with individual who works for a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted MP / devolved assembly representative</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Involves contact with individual who works for a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted public official in council</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Involves contact with individual who works for a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted public official in central or devolved government</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Involves contact with individual who works for a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended public meeting</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Likely to involve contact with elected representatives or take place in 'official' surroundings 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted representative in London assembly</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Involves contact with individual who works for a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted public official in London assembly</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Involves contact with individual who works for a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken part in protest / demonstration</td>
<td>Extra-Institutional</td>
<td>Activity does not take place within arena of a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed petition</td>
<td>Extra-Institutional</td>
<td>Activity does not take place within arena of a political institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined boycott</td>
<td>Extra-Institutional</td>
<td>Activity does not take place within arena of a political institution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these behaviours, we may omit the items pertaining specifically to contacting representatives in the London, as this is likely not to be applicable to the respondents living outside London (and, indeed, very few respondents offer positive responses). We thus define five applicable institutional behaviours, and three extra-institutional

160 Classifying 'public meetings' is difficult due to the vagueness of the term. It might refer to meetings chaired or organised by elected officials in the confines of, for example, a town hall, which is an institutional form of participation. However, respondents might interpret the term 'public meetings' more broadly, and include less official meetings organised by individuals not connected to any political institution. It will, however, be classified as an institutional form of participation due to the likelihood of elected officials at least being in attendance to hear citizens’ opinions and objections.
behaviours. Yet how should we operationalise them? In Chapter 4, it was decided to simply model each participatory activity individually. Yet in the case of the British case study, as the sample size is substantially smaller, some behaviours have rather few positive responses, which may lead to unrepresentative results. To maintain parsimony and to ensure that the dependent variables derive more representative results, scales of 'institutional' and 'extra-institutional' behaviour can be obtained by simply adding the quantities of each type of behaviour each respondent has taken part in. This results in variables with fewer 'zero' responses, and enables us to take into account respondents who have participated in many of the behaviours.

To use these scales, it is necessary to adopt appropriate quantitative techniques. Indeed, both the institutional and extra-institutional scales are skewed: few individuals participated in several of the behaviours, so the frequencies of lower values of each variable are substantially greater than the frequencies of higher values. The use of Poisson regression corrects for this deficiency, as it assumes the 'count' data we wish to explain follows a Poisson distribution: that is, the mean and the variance of the variable are about the same. Yet is this the case? Table 6.2 displays the mean and variance of the two dependent variables under consideration.

Table 6.2 Mean and Variance of the Institutional Behaviour and Extra-Institutional Behaviour Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Behaviour Variable</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Institutional Behaviour Variable</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between the mean and the variance is, in the case of the extra-institutional variable, very small. There is, however, greater difference in the case of the institutional behaviour variable as fewer respondents have participated in more
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens' Behaviour

than one activity, yet it will be deemed sufficient for analysis using Poisson regression. The Poisson regression equation is:

\[ \log \mu = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \ldots + e \]

Where \( X_i \) are the independent variables, \( \beta_i \) are the coefficients, \( e \) is the error term, and \( \mu \) represents the expected value of the 'count' variable displaying a Poisson distribution (Agresti, 1996).

The most important independent variable to be included in the models is the 'perceived corruption incidence' scale.\(^{141}\) To ensure that this variable specifically taps perceived corruption and not other perceived inadequacy in government, the 'other misdemeanour incidence' scale will also be included, along with the 'perceived importance of corruption avoidance' scale – or censoriousness, as this controls for the extent to which each individual believes corruption is a detrimental phenomenon; in other words, how much corruption matters to them.

The demographic and socioeconomic control variables to be included in the models will be gender, age, education, and class. As socioeconomic and demographic variables are not the key variables under analysis (as they were in the case of the last chapter) they have been simplified to make the models more parsimonious and congruent with the models of political participation included in Chapter 4.\(^ {142}\)

\(^{141}\) This variable and all the other variables mentioned are, unless otherwise stated, the variables derived in Chapter 5 and used in the models predicting censoriousness towards corruption and perceived incidence of corruption in the UK.

\(^{142}\) More specifically, the gender and class variables have been coded exactly as they were in Chapter 5, however age has been simplified into a three category rather than a six category variable, and now divides between ages 18-34 (reference), 35-54, and 55+. Education has also been recoded to make it equivalent to the education variable included in the models of political participation in Chapter 4, dividing simply between those that have received a secondary school education (i.e. those with at least some O-Level or GCSE grades), and those that have not.
Justification for these variables’ inclusion in models of political participation has already been outlined in previous chapters and will not be repeated here.

The remaining variables to be included in the models will be knowledge / interest in the issues in hand, which would presumably motivate greater political activity. Citizens that are better informed and interested in standards issues are likely to be more politically engaged. Furthermore, social trust will be included to satisfy the notion increased social capital (of which social trust is a component) stimulates civic activity and political participation. Lastly, satisfaction in government, an important variable in the models of political participation in Chapter 4, is unfortunately not available for inclusion in these case study models. To proxy this, however, support for the party in office (Labour) will be controlled for. This will simply consist of a binary variable dividing between those that indicate Labour (1) and those that do not (0), when asked the following question:

Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?

Satisfaction in government is more likely among Labour supporters than among non-supporters. Indeed, using CSES Module 2 data pertaining to the 2005 British General Election, we see that over 90% of Labour voters believe the government has done a very good or good job. Among non-Labour voters, this figure falls to about 40%.
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens' Behaviour

Analysis

We may now estimate the logistic model pertaining to turnout and the two Poisson regressions, which pertain to the institutional and extra-institutional variables we have defined. The results are presented in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Logistic and Poisson Regressions to Predict Political Participation in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B s.e.</td>
<td>B s.e.</td>
<td>B s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards-Related Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Corruption (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.03 0.12</td>
<td>0.04 0.07</td>
<td>0.12** 0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Imp. of Corr. Avoidance (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.06 0.17</td>
<td>0.05 0.12</td>
<td>0.08 0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Misdemeanour Inc. (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.16 0.15</td>
<td>-0.04 0.08</td>
<td>0.06 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic / Demog. Vars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.43** 0.18</td>
<td>0.06 0.10</td>
<td>0.43*** 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-34 (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 35-54</td>
<td>1.18*** 0.20</td>
<td>0.46*** 0.15</td>
<td>0.03 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 55+</td>
<td>1.85*** 0.25</td>
<td>0.53*** 0.16</td>
<td>-0.18 0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Education</td>
<td>0.24 0.22</td>
<td>0.53*** 0.15</td>
<td>0.52*** 0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Manager/Professional (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Intermediate</td>
<td>-0.15 0.25</td>
<td>-0.21 0.13</td>
<td>-0.18 0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Routine/Manual</td>
<td>-0.41* 0.22</td>
<td>-0.33** 0.13</td>
<td>-0.43*** 0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially Trusting</td>
<td>0.17 0.19</td>
<td>-0.08 0.11</td>
<td>-0.13 0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge / Interest (1-5)</td>
<td>0.50*** 0.13</td>
<td>0.71*** 0.07</td>
<td>0.53*** 0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party Supporter</td>
<td>0.82*** 0.24</td>
<td>-0.30** 0.12</td>
<td>-0.20* 0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.27 1.00</td>
<td>-3.81*** 0.70</td>
<td>-3.82*** 0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1017</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1; uses robust standard errors.143

143 It was considered that an additional variable may also be explanatory in these models: an interaction term pertaining to perceived corruption and the perceived importance of corruption avoidance, on the basis that those who perceive extensive corruption and are also highly censorious of it may exhibit particularly strong propensities to act in certain ways. Yet when this variable was added individually to the models predicted, it failed to have a substantive effect in each case. In terms of diagnostic tests, the considerable N makes outliers unproblematic. Due to the specification of the models, it was not possible to test for multicollinearity directly; however exploratory work (finding pairs of variables that were closely correlated and experimentally omitting one of them to see if their effects changed) revealed that it is not problematic. Finally, note that the models were predicted using the design weight included in the dataset.
The two Poisson regressions are particularly difficult to interpret. In Poisson regression, a coefficient shows the impact of a one unit change in the independent variable on the log of the expected value of the 'count' variable displaying a Poisson distribution. As this is difficult to intuitively grasp, we may also predict the marginal effects associated with each independent variable. These effects pertain to the predicted increase in the number of political behaviours associated with a) a one-unit increase in a continuous variable at their mean; or b) in the case of a binary independent variable, the score moving from 0 to 1. They are shown in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Marginal Effects Associated With Poisson Regressions to Predict Institutional and Extra-Institutional Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 5: Institutional Behaviour</th>
<th>Model 6: Extra-Institutional Behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dy/dx</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Standards-Related Variables**
- Perceived Corruption (1-5) 0.02 0.03 0.05** 0.03
- Perc. Importance of Corr. Avoidance (1-5) 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05
- Other Misdemeanour Incidence (1-5) -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03

**Socioeconomic / Demographic Variables**
- Female 0.03 0.05 0.18*** 0.04
- Age: 18-34 (ref.) 0 0
- Age: 35-54 0.24*** 0.08 0.01 0.05
- Age: 55+ 0.28*** 0.09 -0.07 0.05
- Secondary School Education 0.23*** 0.06 0.19 0.05
- Class: Manager/Professional (ref.) 0 0
- Class: Intermediate -0.10* 0.05 -0.07 0.04
- Class: Routine/Manual -0.16*** 0.06 -0.17*** 0.05

**Other Variables**
- Socially Trusting -0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.04
- Knowledge / Interest (1-5) 0.34*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.03
- Labour Party Supporter -0.13*** 0.05 -0.08* 0.04

Initial Number of Predicted Behaviours 0.49 0.41

*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1.
Turning to control variables first, we find, interestingly, that females are more inclined to engage in extra-institutional participation. This runs against a good deal of the established literature (Norris, 2002) and implies that British women are more politically mobilised when it comes to activity out of institutionalised settings. Meanwhile, age is strongly correlated with increased propensity to turnout (congruent with Norris, 2004, and Norris, 2002) and increased propensity to engage in institutional behaviour; however there is no age effect significant in explaining extra-institutional behaviour. Class has some effect. In line with Verba et al (1978) we might expect those in lower social strata to be substantially less inclined to participate compared to those in higher strata. This effect is observed to a certain extent, because in each model the routine / manual class is less likely, when compared to the manager / professional class, to participate at a level that is statistically significant. However this effect is significant at only the 10% level in the case of turnout, and, surprisingly, there is no statistically significant difference between the manager / professional class and the intermediate class in their relative propensities to partake in any of the behaviours.

Social trust exhibits very little effect, which is contrary to the argument that trust encourages greater social capital and thus civic activism. Meanwhile knowledge and interest in the topics in hand is, unsurprisingly, highly related to participation across the models. Finally, Labour Party support predicts higher turnout, as citizens presumably have an incentive to register their partisanship. Labour members also tend to have lower scores in the institutional and extra-institutional participation scales, an indication perhaps, that satisfaction with the incumbent government acts to dampen impetus to engage in political activism. This is, indeed, encouraging for the
specification of the models, given that Labour Party support is used here as a proxy for satisfaction in government.

Yet our key focus is on the standards-related variables, and particularly perceived corruption. We see first that turnout and institutional participation are unrelated to the perceived corruption scale, results that find hypotheses $H1$ and $H2$ to be unsupported. This is contrary to the expectations derived from Chapters 3 and 4, whereby antipathy towards political elites and institutions were deemed to be likely to reduce incentives to participate in behaviour involving electoral and other political institutions. So why, in the British case, and using the BMRB data, is this effect not evident?

One possibility is that in Britain, the ‘objectively’ limited amount of political corruption means that even if corruption is perceived to be substantial, this is not necessarily a perception that lends itself towards disdain for political institutions, and thus fails to discourage behaviour that involves them. Rather, individuals perceiving significant corruption in the UK may base this belief on a few ‘bad apples’ engaging in corrupt activity. It might not be a consequence of institutional inadequacy or failure. 144

Moreover, as the over-riding conclusion of Chapter 4 concerned the importance of context over perceptions (which had just as large an effect as perceptions in the case of turnout, and far larger effects than perceptions in the case of extra-institutional behaviours) we might see this result as supporting the basic

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144 It may be, however, that this is something that could have changed over time, or may change in the future. One might speculate that the Conservative government of the 1990s, implicated by many incidences of sleaze, might have motivated citizens to see corruption (or misdemeanour at the very least) as entrenched. On this basis, it would be helpful in years ahead to use subsequent datasets which tap standards perceptions to examine their potential to explain citizens’ institutional participation against the backdrop of different governments.
principle that perceived corruption does not centrally matter for participation, but contextual comparison does.¹⁴⁵

Turning back to the results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, perceived corruption does appear to affect extra-institutional political participation, a finding which initially challenges hypothesis 𝐻３. Table 6.4 tells us that, holding other factors constant, if the perceived corruption scale increases by one at its mean, then we may predict an individual to participate in 0.05 ‘more’ of an extra-institutional behaviour. Thus if this marginal effect is assumed to hold across the perceived corruption variable as a whole, then moving from very low perceived corruption (1) to very high (5) derives an increase in the predicted number of extra-institutional behaviours the individual participates in, equivalent to 0.2 of a behaviour overall. But as with the cross-national analysis, though we see that the perceived corruption variable is statistically significant in explaining extra-institutional behaviour, the strength of the effect is actually very weak. As we move from the highest to the lowest possible perceived corruption scores, we gain only ‘one-fifth’ of a behaviour, which, though necessarily abstract, is clearly not a very considerable increase. This is congruent with the cross-national findings in Chapter 4 and supports hypothesis 𝐻３.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Nonetheless the difference between these results, and the cross-national findings creates two worries. First, because of the more nuanced specification of the BMRB-based models and the inclusion of perceived ‘other misdemeanour’ and censoriousness, it may be suggested that in Chapter 4, the significance of perceived corruption in predicting lower turnout across nations using CSES data is spurious, and may simply represent perceptions of standards more broadly. Yet we also see in the model of turnout using BMRB data in Table 6.3 that ‘other misdemeanour’ is also insignificant, and exploratory work shows it remains so when we omit a) perceived corruption; b) censoriousness; and c) both perceived corruption and censoriousness. Therefore this worry seems unfounded. The second worry is that the null result with the BMRB data may relate to the fact we control for censoriousness, whereas in the CSES-based model of turnout, which shows perceived corruption to be significant, we do not, and thus needed to control for censoriousness in cross-national work. But again, from exploratory work, when we omit censoriousness from the BMRB-based model of turnout (and indeed other misdemeanour both individually and with censoriousness also omitted) perceived corruption fails to be statistically significant in each case.

¹⁴⁶ It was considered that in line with the theoretical expectations postulated but not found to be correct in Chapter 4, perceived corruption and extra-institutional behaviour might actually have a nonlinear effect, and this was tested by including perceived corruption as a squared term, yet it, and the unsquared term, failed to be explanatory.
Hence, overall, the cross-national results of Chapter 4 which related to the effects of perceived corruption are reflected in the case-study of the UK, despite our ability to use more nuanced data, enabling controls for corruption censoriousness and for other perceived misdemeanour. The most directly comparable results concern extra-institutional behaviour. Perceived corruption predicts such participation at statistically significant levels, but its impact is actually very weak. And although perceived corruption is not explanatory in the British case in regard to turnout and institutional participation, whereas in the cross-national model of turnout it was, this serves to add to the central argument of Chapter 4 that it is overall contextual corruption, rather than perceived corruption, that helps explains citizens’ political participation. The statistical insignificance of perceived corruption regarding turnout and institutional behaviour in the British case may also relate to the idea citizens associate corruption not with systemic, institutional features of the political system, but with ‘bad apples’ among public servants.

We may now move on to see how perceived corruption and national level corruption affect another important dependent variable, political support, drawing in analysis of both British and cross-national data.
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens’ Behaviour

Chapter 7. Political Corruption, Perceived Corruption, and Political Support

Explaining Political Support

Much of the empirical work undertaken in this thesis has involved analysing levels of political participation. But it is also important to question whether perceived corruption can link to directions of political support. If perceived corruption causes citizens to not support or to vote against the incumbent government, then we raise an interesting question. Is this because perceptions of corruption orientate primarily towards distrust of the incumbent government, not political institutions more generally? Our previous work has shown that perceived corruption ties to trends in institutional and extra-institutional participation, yet perhaps the incumbent government may also be affected, electorally, by perceptions of corruption. Partisanship, or attachment to a particular party, may also be influenced by the extent to which they or rival parties are deemed to be corrupt.

It is also possible that political corruption at the national level is associated with trends in political support and vote choice. Political corruption as a contextual effect may result from some individuals accurately perceiving corruption and attracting bandwagon support towards clean parties; or it may result from a general societal inclination to vote for opposition parties who advocate corruption-related reform, and perhaps reform in a broader sense (securing the rule of law, for example), independent of individuals’ perceptions. To examine these suggestions we will look to the British case study first, and then turn to the analysis of potential effects of both
perceived corruption and the national level Corruption Index together in explaining vote choice.

Interestingly, very few studies have actually integrated standards related variables into models of political support. The possibility that corruption scandals may affect the 2006 US elections has been considered (see McCann and Redlawsk, 2006), although few firm conclusions about whether this would be the case were actually offered, and it remains to be seen if such perceptions did so. But of the few studies to integrate perceived corruption into analysis of political support, McCann and Domínguez (1998) show that when a spread of plausible determinants of opposition support in Mexico are controlled for, perceptions of electoral fraud and political corruption are significant at the 6% level, while the perceived probability of the governing party winning, and expectations concerning economic management and government responsiveness and competence appear to be more important. This limited effect is attributed to the limited perceived importance of corruption and electoral fraud relative to other issues. McCann and Domínguez (1998) thus suggest that among those perceiving higher levels of corruption, voter abstention instead of opposition voting is observed. Davis et al (2004) who focus on Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico, find congruent results: perceived corruption predicts abstention from voting rather than increased opposition voting. This effect is strongest in Mexico, where there is little party competition and citizens might be expected to withdraw from voting rather than vote for the opposition.

Thus some previous research indicates that it is possible that standards perceptions are unimportant in party choice. Nevertheless one study does show results which indicate that they may have an effect. Miller et al (1986) recognise the role corruption might have in shaping the direction of voting in US presidential elections.
They find that a number of coherent dimensions appear to shape evaluations of US presidential candidates. These are: competence, or political ability; reliability, which refers to the strength and dependableness of candidates; charisma, which refers to the capacity of each individual to interact with others; a personal dimension, embracing perceptions of a candidate's appearance and background; and finally, and most important for our purposes, an integrity factor. The integrity factor is made up of perceptions of corruption along with perceptions of candidates' honesty. They subsequently look at how well these dimensions predict candidate rating and the vote, and find that, although competence appears to be the dimension of the greatest importance, integrity has a significantly positive relationship with the tendency to support a given candidate. This effect is slightly stronger among Democratic candidate evaluations in contrast to Republican candidate evaluations, and is more important for highly educated voters. Thus Miller et al. is an interesting point of departure for research.

The development of the literature on political support more generally also provides impetus for the research in this chapter, as it contributes to interpretations of vote choice and partisanship that highlight the importance of salient political issues as guides to citizens' preferences. Older literature has emphasised the importance of socioeconomic variables feeding into partisanship and attachment to political parties which in turn affects vote choice (Campbell et al., 1960; Butler and Stokes, 1969). Yet a key problem with this approach lies in the difficulty it has in accounting for change in patterns of political support over time. If we expect stable attachments to political parties, it is difficult to explain political phenomena such as partisan dealignment and the transformation of party systems. Moreover, set against the wider context of fundamental economic change and increased social mobility, alongside generational
change, it may be that partisanship and ‘traditional’ social cleavages are less explanatory in determining vote choice in advanced democracies.

Although this prospect will depend on the age and level of maturity of the political system, and of levels and the nature of education its citizens receive, it is an important notion. Perhaps perceptions towards candidates and issues explain vote choice better than party loyalty. Indeed, public awareness of issues has been found to be significantly high. Franklin and Wlezien (1997) find that responsiveness to change in European policy is ‘striking’ when the issue of Europe is prominent. In the British case, Franklin (1992) finds a marked increase in the salience of issues between 1964 and 1974 amid the declining power of class in determining left voting. Clarke et al (2004) analyse surveys of voters and propose a ‘valence’ model of vote choice that prioritises the perceived competence of parties in office. Rejecting the centrality of socioeconomic variables: “By 2001, class effects on voting were negligible” (p. 316) Clarke et al (2004) find that perceptions of party leaders and to some extent partisanship, along with perceptions of parties’ abilities to handle political problems and the economy are key, and join forces with the effects of campaigning and tactical considerations to derive vote choice.147 Thus issues appear to matter, feeding into perceptions of the potential competence of parties in government. It is curious,

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147 Their position on class is supported by other works such as Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999), who find that in nations in which class voting was salient after 1945, it has markedly declined through the late twentieth century. In Britain, which was shown to have substantial class voting in comparative context, numerous indicators of class voting show a general decline across the post-war period. Nonetheless such analysis is not without controversy. Evans (1999) suggests that Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf’s analysis is flawed by inadequate coverage of many of the countries analysed over time. Furthermore, many of the case studies in Evans et al (1999) problematise Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf’s thesis by pointing to complex patterns of fluctuation and continuity across nations, rather than general class dealignment. Goldthorpe (1999), for example, analyses the British case and asserts that “the degree of stability present in the level and pattern of class voting has indeed been one of the dominant features of the class-parties relationship in British electoral politics” (pp. 80-81). It is perhaps questionable how far this is characteristic across states, but it is important given emphasis scholars have placed on Britain being congruent with class dealignment trends. Also, the thesis that parties now succeed by strategic marketing within competitive party systems (see, for example, Kitschelt, 1994, in reference to European social democratic parties) is argued not to be incompatible with the revisionist case: it may be the case that parties market to class interests (Evans, 1999).
nonetheless, that of the issues analysed by Butler and Stokes (1969), Franklin (1992),
and Clarke et al (2004), none specifically involve standards or propriety in
government.

Fisher (2000b) draws attention to Butler and Stokes' division between
'position' issues, those in which parties maintain a line which is plausibly challenged
by competing positions, and 'valence' issues, where only one position plausibly exists
(the type of issues Clarke et al find significant), and proceeds to suggest the
Conservatives' defeat in 1997 may be related to valence issues including party
cohesion, economic management, and, interestingly for our purposes, sleaze. This
notion begs the research question underlying the analysis that follows: could variables
pertaining to corruption associate with directions of political support? In view of the
very limited amount of existing work undertaken on the issue, the work presented
here will be exploratory in nature and will not involve testing concrete hypotheses
stated at this early stage. Before we undertake such analysis, however, it is first
important to consider issues of causality.

Endogeneity Problems

Key objections to the work we are attempting to achieve come in the form of
questioning causality between perceptions of standards, and indeed corruption itself,
and supporting or voting for an incumbent government or the opposition. These
objections can be expressed succinctly diagrammatically, and this is done in Figure
7A.
To understand the endogeneity problems, let us look at the four possible relationships between the two corruption-related variables, and partisanship / vote choice. Note that along with the labelled links key to the discussion of endogeneity issues, a link between political corruption and perceived corruption has been added to indicate awareness that actual levels of political corruption are likely to influence perceptions of such levels, due to media exposure of prominent cases and the possibility of corruption bring visible to citizens. Yet for our purposes, links A, B, C, and D are central to discussion.

148 Partisanship and vote choice are treated as equivalent in this diagram. To some extent, this is a fair assumption – partisanship would imply vote choice. However the inverse, vote choice implying partisanship, is not necessarily true. Individuals may vote impulsively, according to short term factors; or they may vote tactically. Although recognising these nuances is important, it does not really affect the theoretical reasoning being undertaken. Whether an individual is a partisan or just a voter for a party in a particular election, the nature of the link between a) corruption and perceived corruption, and b) this evidence of support, may be called into question along similar lines.
A: It is possible that perceiving considerable levels of corruption may encourage citizens to be suspicious of the incumbent, either as a corrupt actor itself, or as an agent that ineffectively prevents other actors being corrupt. Consequently, perceiving more corruption may discourage incumbent support, and perhaps increase the likelihood of opposition party support.

B: If an individual supports Party X rather than Party Y, then the incumbency of Party X may encourage the individual to perceive less corruption than if Party Y were in power. Partisanship may breed an inclination to exaggerate the perceived probity (and the strength in preventing others' corruption) of a government one supports, and an inclination to exaggerate the perceived corruption undertaken or ineffectively prevented by a government one is politically distanced from.

C: Political corruption may have a contextual effect on political support. First, it might stimulate certain citizens who accurately recognise certain actors to be corrupt to stop supporting these officials, and to support clean candidates or parties instead. This may encourage a 'bandwagon' shift in support, if citizens inform others of the considerable benefits of the party now supported (which may go beyond simply not being corrupt). This bandwagon shift in support may also relate to an increased ability of the party to advertise its features when it initially obtains increased support. The existence of 'bandwagon' effects is not simply a speculative notion – see evidence in Nadeau et al (1993) and Skalaban (1988). Second, a contextual effect may emerge if corruption contributes to prompting certain parties to promise reformist agendas, which may be quite broad in scope. Considerable corruption in a given nation, whether individual citizens perceive it or not, may be indicative of poor institutional
quality or insufficient institutionalising of the rule of law, motivating certain parties to promote reform. These agendas may be welcomed by citizens generally, deriving support for the party even from citizens who may see corruption as less of a problem than other issues.

D: Once political support and vote choice has translated into political outcomes – namely the election of one party or coalition over another, then it is reasonable to believe that this will influence levels of corruption. Some governments may simply be more corrupt and ineffective at preventing others from being corrupt than other governments. This is, however, complicated by the idea that some degree of ‘path dependence’ in terms of levels of corruption in politics may be observed. If corruption is entrenched, the ‘elbow room’ of new governments to reform may be restricted. Thus one must assume that at least some degree of autonomy to reform exists.

Given these problems, it is necessary to defend the causal directions prioritised in this chapter. Corruption and perceived corruption are considered possible explanations for partisanship and vote choice. In essence, we are assuming relationships A and C are key and are downplaying the importance of relationships B and D. Yet is this justified?

It is evident that citizens are becoming more critical of government institutions. Rather than simply displaying subservience to particular parties, recent research has shown that citizens in advanced democracies appear to be far less supportive of regime performance and government institutions than they do democratic and regime principles (Norris, 1999). Such ‘critical citizens’ do not, consequently, blindly support regimes whatever their performance, nor unquestioningly trust established political
institutions. Rather, they respond critically to perceived insufficiencies in regime performance and government institutions, such that reformist ambitions may be prompted in stronger democracies, and democratic consolidation might be challenged in weaker ones. This notion is strengthened when we consider evidence that partisanship has decreased in strength and salience across advanced democracies over time (Wattenberg, 1994; Dalton, 2006).

If we are to assume that partisanship and vote choice does feed into perceived corruption and wider institutional perceptions, we might expect not to find citizens that are so critical as those indicated by Norris (1999). By definition, in democracies the party or coalition supported by the majority or at least the plurality of voters is likely to form the government. Consequently, criticism of institutions is likely to be limited if constrained only to opposition voters. The notion that a considerable force of ‘critical citizens’ exists implies a more autonomous body of citizens than that we might expect if partisanship were to act as the key signal driving orientations towards predictors of institutional quality including corruption, which devalues causal link B.

Furthermore, realising citizens’ sensitivity to institutional inadequacy, it is probable that across a polity, parties will seek to promise standards of probity comparable to its rivals, downplaying considerable variation in levels of corruption that may be derived if we are to assume causal link D is important. This may, admittedly, have the knock-on effect that increased homogeneity of corruption across parties diminishes its salience in terms of partisanship or vote choice.

We cannot prove that causal links B and D are entirely unimportant. Indeed, the intuitions given to explain their possible effects seem highly plausible and defensible. Yet we can argue that there is more likelihood that causal links A and C are more important in contemporary democracies. Bodies of critical and autonomous
citizens who are less affected by party identification and partisanship than they were, may well be influenced by their own perceptions of corruption, and the contextual effects of corruption, when supporting a particular party or deciding who to vote for. They are less likely to be swayed in their corruption perceptions by party loyalty or party disdain.

British Analysis

In the British case study, the dependent variable is partisanship, and is derived from the same question used to tap Labour party support in the models of political participation in the previous chapter:

*Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?*

An affirmative response is then met by the request to specify the party. The variable will take the form of a categorical variable which divides between a) Labour partisans; b) opposition partisans; and c) non-partisans. Note that opposition partisans will be specified as those professing support for the other parties offered as options in the BMRB dataset. Using a categorical variable in this way enables us to predict how both opposition support and non-party support relative to incumbent support is affected as perceived corruption and the control variables vary. Just over 20% of the

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149. These are: the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, the Green Party, or other. It was considered to extend this categorical variable such that each party was included separately, to measure effects relating to support of the incumbent relative to each other party individually as perceived corruption grew. Yet this route was not attempted due to the few individuals supporting each opposition party when considered separately, therefore supporters of those parties will be combined as an ‘opposition collective’.
sample are Labour partisans, a similar proportion are opposition partisans, and 55% are non-partisans.

Turning to independent variables, the perceived corruption variable is of course the key predictor of interest, and the ‘perceived importance of corruption avoidance’ scale controls for the extent to which citizens are concerned about corruption in public life. It has also been found elsewhere that censoriousness itself links to political support. Johnston (1991), for instance, reports a limited link between censoriousness toward private wrongdoing and support for the 1987 incumbent Conservative government. This is interesting, Johnston suggests, as it implies that the less tolerant British turn towards a leader seen as moral, and the incumbent party of the time, suggesting that wrongdoing is perceived to link to dishonest individuals instead of the wider political system. However, Johnston and Wood (1985) find that censoriousness over a hypothetical council official (not themselves identified with a particular political party) accepting ‘expensive entertainment’ from a private sector service-provider is stronger among Labour voters. The inclusion of the ‘Other Misdemeanour Incidence’ scale both ensures that perceived corruption is being directly controlled for, and that it does not simply tap perceptions relating to other inadequate behaviour (such as incompetence and dishonesty) among public officials. As models in Chapter 5 suggested, it was these two attitudinal variables: censoriousness and other misdemeanour, that were the strongest predictors of perceived corruption, thus controlling for them to ensure any effect of perceived corruption is not just a proxy of these other predictors is highly necessary.

Although the findings of Chapter 5 suggest that social structural variables are unlikely to proxy perceived corruption in the UK, their inclusion is necessary as they may still be salient predictors of partisanship. Partisanship may relate to gender, for
instance, if Labour are perceived to offer favourable policies to particular genders relative to other parties. Age may also link to partisanship if, similarly to gender, Labour's policies and performance on issues salient to particular age brackets are influential. Age may also explain non-partisanship, as increased partisanship may be observed among older people brought up at a time when partisanship was more prevalent. Such partisanship may, alternatively, tie to increased political engagement among older individuals compared to a disinterested or apathetic youth. Education may also encourage political engagement, while class is important as a control variable. Traditionally, we would anticipate Labour partisanship to be more prominent among working class citizens.

Social trust may also be explanatory if it promotes civic engagement that leads to partisanship. It may also link to ideology. Socialism, for example, is commonly understood to be grounded in a positive conception of human nature and trust in people such that a more egalitarian society may prevail. Finally, knowledge and interest in politics and in standards-related issues is likely to be highly related to propensity to express partisanship, as a certain level of knowledge and interest in political issues is surely a pre-requisite for such a propensity.\footnote{These independent variables will all be operationalised as they were in the models of political participation presented in Chapter 6.}

We may thus predict a multinomial logistic model of a) opposition partisanship (Equation 1) and b) non-partisanship (Equation 2) relative to Labour partisanship. Before we do so, we should be clear what logistic multinomial models show. In this thesis we have already used standard logistic models. In logistic multinomial regression we aim to predict the determinants of a categorical dependent variable using equations calculating the log odds of the propensity to be in a particular category relative to a baseline category. In our case, we look to predict the
Political Corruption, Public Opinion, and Citizens’ Behaviour

log odds of being an opposition partisan relative to a Labour partisan in the first instance, and a non-partisan relative to a Labour partisan in the second instance. It is appropriate to use Labour partisanship as the baseline category, as we may observe clearly any movement towards or away from opposition partisanship and non-partisanship as perceived corruption and the other variables move. The results are presented in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Multinomial Logistic Model to Predict Partisanship in Britain; Baseline Category: Labour Partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Equation 1: Opposition Party Support</th>
<th>Equation 2: Non-Party Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards-Related Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Corruption (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perc. Imp. of Corr. Avoidance (1-5)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Misdemeanour Inc. (1-5)</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic / Demog. Vars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-34 (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 35-54</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 55+</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Education</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Manager/Professional (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Intermediate</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class: Routine/Manual</td>
<td>-0.62**</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially Trusting</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge / Interest (1-5)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.28***</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 1055

*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1; uses robust standard errors.\(^{151}\)

\(^{151}\) An interaction term between the perceived corruption variable and the censouriousness variable (the perceived importance of corruption avoidance item) was added speculatively to the multinomial model to test for any effect on partisanship of perceived corruption that was exacerbated by the degree to which corruption was deemed to matter. Yet it failed to have a substantive effect, and is not included.
Let us address the control variables first. Gender appears to have no impact on partisanship, although age shows significant effects. Older citizens, when compared to younger citizens, show a distinctly greater propensity to express Labour partisanship in comparison to non-partisanship, although not in comparison to opposition partisanship. Older individuals are thus generally more likely to express partisanship than younger individuals. Meanwhile, education appears not to explain incumbent party support relative to opposition support and non-party support. Class has some effect, as those in the routine and manual class are more likely to be Labour partisans in comparison to being opposition party partisans, and in comparison to being non-partisans. However, the effects should not be exaggerated too much. They are relatively weak and no difference is evident between the highest and the intermediate class in either Equation 1 or Equation 2.

Meanwhile, social trust appears to explain partisanship generally. There is a statistically significant difference in trust between Labour partisans compared to non-partisans, and this effect drops out when Labour partisans and opposition partisans are compared. Knowledge and interest are unsurprisingly tied to propensity to be a partisan generally. Having a certain level of interest and familiarity with politics and the issues discussed in the survey may be a pre-requisite for the expression of partisan alignment. Or, reversing the causality, it may be the partisans tend to pay more attention to politics, making it more likely that they have greater knowledge and interest.

Our key focus, once again, is however on the standards-related variables. It is most striking that neither perceived corruption nor censoriousness towards corruption
has any effect on partisanship. Instead, perceptions of ‘other misdemeanour’ are explanatory. Perceiving substantial other, non-corrupt, misdemeanour, such as incompetence, not telling the truth, lack of open government or ‘distanced’ government, and public servants setting a bad example in their private lives, has an effect. High perceived other misdemeanour means a lower propensity to be a Labour partisan relative to both opposition partisanship and non-partisanship.

To grasp the effect of ‘other misdemeanour’ more concretely, we may graph the predicted probability of expressing a) opposition partisanship, and b) non-partisanship, relative to Labour partisanship as the ‘other misdemeanour incidence’ scale increases, using the equations predicted in Table 7.1, and by making assumptions about a hypothetical individual. The results are shown in Figure 7B.

152 These assumptions are: that the individual is male, aged 18-34, is secondary school educated, is in the managerial and professional class, and is socially distrusting. They are also assumed to have mean scores for the perceived corruption variable, the ‘Perceived Importance of Corruption Avoidance’ variable, and the knowledge / interest variable.
Clearly, perceiving other, non-corrump misdemeanour has a substantive impact on the nature of citizens' partisanship. If very little other misdemeanour is perceived, then our hypothetical citizen, if he expressed support for any political party, would be significantly more likely to be a Labour supporter than an opposition supporter, however these effects steadily reverse as more 'other misdemeanour' is perceived. Indeed, if very high levels of other misdemeanour are perceived, and the individual scores between 4 and 5 on the scale, there is only about a 20% chance that they will be express support for Labour, and thus an 80% chance that they express support for an opposition party. Meanwhile, if we no longer assume that the individual has to express support for a political party, and may either be a Labour partisan or non-partisan, we see equivalent but weaker effects. There is, from the outset, a good chance (over 70%) that the individual is a non-partisan rather than a Labour supporter.

\footnote{For presentational purposes, Lowess smoothing was used.}
which is to be expected given the relatively low levels of party support expressed by respondents in the survey. Yet as more ‘other misdemeanour’ is perceived, we see that their chances of being a non-partisan reach over 90%. In sum, broad perceptions of misdemeanour, although not perceived corruption incidence, leads to a fall in governing party partisanship.

Thus what can we draw out overall from our British analysis of perceived corruption, participation, and political support, given the findings of this and the previous chapter? It appears that perceived corruption is very limited in its influence. Regarding participation, it appears to have statistically insignificant or weak effects, while in this chapter we find that is has no effect on partisanship. Thus corruption might be regarded as restricted to a few ‘bad apples’ rather than one associated with the incumbent government en masse. Rather, partisanship is closely predicted by perceptions of ‘other misdemeanour’ in British politics. This is comprised of perceptions concerning dishonesty, closed government, and incompetence: misdemeanour that may be more broadly associated with groups or blocs vying for power. Our analysis suggests that perceiving such items predicts reduced propensity to indicate incumbent (Labour) partisanship relative to opposition partisanship and non-partisanship. Such negative aspects of politics, therefore, may be blamed on the incumbent government (or, if we query the causality, identified as characteristic of the incumbent government) in a way that ‘corrupt’ behaviours are not. To sum up the argument of the thesis so far, then, it appears that national level corruption is important centrally as a contextual effect on participation, yet that perceived corruption at the individual level is limited in its explanatory power on both participation and partisanship. Yet can cross-national analysis of corruption,
perceived corruption, and their potential effects on vote choice, modify this conclusion?

Cross-National Analysis

In this section, we will return to cross-national analysis and examine whether the Corruption Index and perceived corruption can explain political support. More specifically, we will test whether corruption and perceived corruption appear to determine a) the propensity to vote in legislative elections for opposition parties relative to the incumbent; b) the propensity to abstain from voting relative to voting for the incumbent. We have already predicted turnout in the cross-national context, which is, of course, highly comparable to what we are doing in b), yet here we ask a more focused question: how do rates of abstention compare specifically to votes for the government in power as perceived corruption and national level corruption move? Predicting these two dependent variables expands to the cross-national context the same work in substance as the British analysis in this chapter. To do this, we will again deploy the CSES Module 2 dataset.

In cross-national analysis, defining the ‘incumbent’ is complex. We will be analysing votes for the unicameral chamber, or the lower chamber of the legislative assembly, except in the cases of Japan, where the 2004 election survey pertained to the upper house, or House of Councillors, and Taiwan, when the 2001 survey pertained to the Legislative Yuan, also the upper house. Therefore the incumbent party or bloc must be drawn from those parties and blocs contesting the election, but quite what to specify as the ‘incumbent’ is sometimes problematic. In parliamentary systems in which the prime minister and cabinet is drawn from the party or coalition
that dominates the legislature, it is clear who the incumbent government is. Yet a party that dominates the legislature is not always the incumbent government, if by government we might refer to, for instance, a president and his cabinet from another party and with a different agenda. In the 2006 legislative elections in the USA, for example, the Democrats gained control of Congress and the Senate, but can hardly be described as the ‘government’ when a Republican president is in place.

We therefore concentrate here on legislative elections. Research in the previous chapters suggested citizens were likely to respond to corruption and perceived corruption by behaving in ways likely to reflect antipathy for institutions caused by corrupt behaviour. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that corruption and perceptions of corruption may induce antipathy for the party or parties that dominate the legislature, perhaps the most important institution in a polity. Besides, we can still conceive of the dominant party as having a prominent role in government even when the president is from another party, as they remain the principal law-making agent and agenda-setter in a presidential regime (Tsebelis, 2002). The ‘incumbent’ will thus be defined as a) in parliamentary systems, the party or coalition who forms the executive just previous to the election being analysed; b) in presidential systems, the governing party or governing coalition or bloc just previous to the election being analysed.154 Table A7.1 in the appendix indicates which parties have been considered the incumbent in each nation. In regard to the CSES data being used, the dependent variables will a) divide between those supporting the legislative incumbent (the reference category) and those voting for opposition parties (opposition parties are necessarily specified as all those included in the CSES dataset but not listed in Table A7.1 in the appendix), and b) divide between those supporting the legislative

154 The sources of this information are the relevant CIA World Factbooks, accessed from the UMSL (2002) website, supplemented by further information from the relevant ‘Political Data Yearbooks’ included in volumes of the European Journal of Political Research.
incumbent (the reference category) and those who did not vote. These variables are obtained via recodes of the relevant variable to derive two binary (0/1) variables suitable for two logistic multilevel regressions. This variable taps vote choice in the lower chamber, but is appropriately different according to the nature of each nation’s electoral system. In systems involving preference voting, such as Ireland, it measures first preference votes; in mixed systems such as Germany and New Zealand, it measures party list votes; in majoritarian systems such as the UK it simply taps the party voted for.

Turning to independent variables, the key variable is once again perceived corruption, which will comprise the perceived corruption variable defined in Chapter 4, operationalised once again as a three category variable reporting coefficients for respondents who perceive low (reference), medium, and high levels of corruption. Including this item as a categorical variable enables us to detect nonlinear effects. For instance, if there were a particularly strong inclination to vote for the incumbent among those who perceive low corruption which is not shared by both the medium and high perceived corruption groups then this would not represent a neat linear trend.

We are analysing vote choice cross-nationally, so the nature of individual level independent variables will be considerably different from the control variables included in the British case study. As we are analysing data from across nations, in which the governments are heterogeneous in terms of their ideological make-up, we need not control for class and other socioeconomic factors which are necessary for a model of political support or vote choice when only one nation is under consideration.

155 Limitations of the available software make logistic multilevel multinomial regression unavailable. However this is not a concern, given that Alvarez and Nagler (1998) show that multinomial logit offers no substantive advantage compared to binomial logit. Hobolt et al (forthcoming) indicate that there is little substantive difference in results when they run their models using these two methods. Thus two logistic regression models can be used instead, which essentially carries out the same work, but not in one combined model. The different sample sizes for the two models will hence be reported in each case, as opposed to an overall sample size.
We are not looking to explain left or right voting across nations, and the dependent variables are not coded in ways that distinguish between left and right parties; they simply measure the incumbent and the opposition. Our focus may legitimately centre, therefore, on a) individual level perceptions of the government, and b) national level characteristics of the polity.156

Addressing the individual level variables first, two variables relate to perceptions of the previous government’s ‘performance’. Presumably, greater dissatisfaction with the government would be likely to express itself in less inclination to support the legislative incumbent and more inclination to support the opposition or not to vote.157 However we must be aware that there may be an endogeneity problem here. We are assuming that performance will affect political support, but it may be that the evaluation of such performance is influenced strongly by partisanship itself. Evans and Andersen (2006), for example, challenge those who stress economic perceptions in determining political support (see, for example, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000), and suggest that economic perceptions in the UK may be endogenous to party support. Yet the fact that these are control variables makes this endogeneity problem less significant. Furthermore, we earlier noted the growth of ‘critical citizens’ less likely to be partisans, and such citizens may critically evaluate

156 Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics may, however, link to the relative propensity of non-voting relative to incumbent voting, as they have been seen to affect turnout. This notion is developed and explained in the footnote presented along with the models, but it is sufficient at this point to consider these characteristics of secondary importance.

157 Again, however, this raises the question of the extent to which these variables are relevant if the legislative incumbent is not perceived to be the ‘government’. Although this is a problem, it should not be too worrisome: in parliamentary systems the government is the legislative incumbent and in many presidential systems the legislature will support the president, particularly when the legislature and president are elected simultaneously. Moreover, perceiving the president to be doing a poor job may also indicate dissatisfaction with the legislative incumbent, even when they are in opposition to the president. This may be precisely because the partisan division between the legislature and the president creates difficulties with deadlock and paralysis which hampers effective political functioning (Lijphart, 1992).
government performance, and not simply assume it to be good or bad because a particular party or bloc is in power.

The first ‘government performance’ variable simply tracks the extent to which respondents think the government is *generally* doing a good job, which was included as the ‘satisfaction in government’ variable in Chapter 4, and will be specified the same way.158 A second variable will also be added, however, which taps the degree to which each respondent is satisfied, or perceives the government is performing well, in regard to the political issue they regard as most important. One variable in the CSES Module 2 offers, for each country, a set of issues which pertain to a comprehensive set of broader political concerns: for instance education, health, immigration and foreign policy (in some nations an ‘other’ category was also offered), and respondents are asked to pick the particular issue they deem most important.159 The follow up variable queries the extent to which the respondent believes the government has tackled this issue, and will be recoded equivalently to the general satisfaction variable and included in the models which follow.160

The final independent variables at the individual level concern perceived efficacy of a) those in power, and b) voting. Believing that those in power can ‘make a difference’ is likely to influence the extent to which citizens disaffected from the

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158 It thus runs from 1-4, with higher scores pertaining to greater perceived performance / greater satisfaction.
159 The specific question asked is: *What do you think has been the most important issue facing [country] over the last [number of years that the last government was in office] years?*
160 The specific wording and the codes assigned to the four responses are: *And thinking about that issue, how good or bad a job do you think the government / president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and present election OR change in govt.] years. Has it / he / she done a very good job? [4] A good job? [3] A bad job? [2] A very bad job? [1].* As with the general government satisfaction variable, *don’t knows* will be interpreted as an indication the individual is largely satisfied with the government’s performance, as they would be motivated to indicate displeasure if they did not think this was the case. They have therefore been clustered with the respondents reporting that the government has done a ‘good job’ in regard to the issue.
current government believe voting against it is likely to have a productive outcome.\textsuperscript{161}

Perceived efficacy of voting itself is also likely to affect the propensity for dissatisfied citizens to express their antipathy for the incumbent government by voting for the opposition. If they believe that people’s votes make a salient difference, then they are presumably more likely to vote against the incumbent when dissatisfied.\textsuperscript{162}

Turning now to national level variables,\textsuperscript{163} clearly the Corruption Index will be included, as it is of principal interest.\textsuperscript{164} In line with theoretical reasoning outlined above when discussing potential problems with endogeneity, it might be expected that in highly corrupt nations, a contextual effect is evident whereby there are broad trends to oust corrupt incumbents and instil reformist governments instead. Meanwhile, the authoritarianism index will also be included, on the premise that in authoritarian regimes, the incumbent may be able to coerce or otherwise influence respondents into voting for them in ways that incumbents in freer nations would not.\textsuperscript{165}

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\textsuperscript{161} This ‘perceived efficacy of those in power’ variable is comprised of a recode to a question which asks: Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn’t make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn’t make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself? (The CSES notes show that some variants on this question were used in some nations, but they are highly equivalent.) The coding will be reversed, so that higher scores imply greater perceived efficacy, and each don’t know response will be scored as a 3, on the assumption that those who claim not to know think power-holders are neither highly efficacious or highly inefficacious, as such strong perceptions would presumably be readily reported.

\textsuperscript{162} This ‘perceived efficacy of voting’ variable is a recode of a question asking: Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won’t make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won’t make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference, where would you place yourself? (Again, CSES documentation indicates that some nations had different, yet highly equivalent questions which formed this variable.) The 1-5 coding remains the same, yet don’t knows will be given scores of 3, following the same logic as that expressed in the previous footnote.

\textsuperscript{163} It is worth pointing out a result relating to the individual level controls that arose from exploratory work. The addition into the full cross-national turnout model in Chapter 4 of the three individual level controls that were previously not included (this was the case with all but the general ‘satisfaction in government’ variable) leads to a model with results consistent with the one presented there. These variables were not included at that stage because the variables in the CSES model were kept consistent with the variables used in the WVS-based participation models, although it is recognised they may affect turnout, particularly the ‘perceived efficacy of voting’ variable.

\textsuperscript{164} Its specification is the same for that in Chapter 4: the 2004 scores for each nation.

\textsuperscript{165} The specification of the authoritarianism variable is also the same as that in Chapter 4, and scores pertain to the year of each nation’s election.
It was necessary, due to the few degrees of freedom available, to undertake some preliminary exploratory modelling to observe which other national level variables were appropriate to include. In regard to economic variables, rather than tapping GDP, which was useful at informing trends in levels of political participation, the national level economic variables of key interest are the percentage rate of unemployment at the year of the election, the percentage rate of inflation at the year of the election, and the percentage rate of GDP real growth at the year of the election.\textsuperscript{166} It appeared likely that detrimental economic effects (high inflation, high unemployment, poor growth, or indeed a mixture of the three) may predict voting against the incumbent, if they are blamed for poor economic conditions. However the inclusion of these variables in initial models revealed stark results: barely any national level variable had a statistically significant effect.

Nonetheless, in explaining this null result, other research has shown that the effects of economic predictors on government support are far from clear-cut. Carlsen (2000), who analyses such links across both time and across nations, finds that unemployment and inflation have different effects according to the left-right positioning of governments, and that even these effects can differ cross-nationally. The insignificance of the economic variables is also consistent with Marsh and Tilley (forthcoming), Powell and Whitten (1993), and Hellwig (2001), who discuss how more nuanced, contextual circumstances—particularly those lessening the ability to hold a government responsible, such as federalism, economic openness, and government duration—affect whether economic problems influence political support. As it is unfeasible to control for a wealth of contextual variables given our small

\textsuperscript{166} The sources for this economic data were the relevant CIA World Factbooks, which were again accessed from the UMSL (2002) website. If the statistic for the particular year was unavailable, the statistic for the year previously was used.
national $N$, it was decided to exclude the economic factors from the final models predicted.

To be consistent with the British models above, it was also decided initially to include 'bad governance', in case there was a contextual effect of poor standards in public office more generally on vote choice. Yet the inclusion of bad governance in these models, which have very limited macro $N$, was troublesome due to its collinearity with corruption. When included individually, the variables had similar effects (although the effect of corruption was in fact stronger than that of bad governance), but when included together, the variables exhibited unstable effects. We may thus conclude that the effect of corruption on vote choice is mirrored to a certain extent by the contextual effect of poor standards generally. As including both variables leads to a poorly specified model, and that corruption is the key variable of interest, we will drop bad governance from the final models. Its effect is weaker than that of the Corruption Index, but we must be aware when considering the results that the impact of national level corruption and the contextual effect of poor standards more generally are congruent.\footnote{It was also considered to include compulsory voting in the model of non-voting relative to incumbent voting, however it failed to have a statistically significant effect in initial modelling. As the sample for this model only involves non-voters and incumbent voters, rather than non-voters and voters broadly, the impact of this variable is negligible. In view of its inclusion not being explanatory, and given that it does not influence the other results, it has simply been excluded from the final models presented.}

With regard to the model specifications, the structure of the models will be the same as that employed in the model of turnout using CSES data in Chapter 4 (where the technical definition is provided). We will predict logistic multilevel regressions which allow the intercept to vary.

Turning to case inclusion, we should first note that there are 31 elections in the CSES dataset, despite there being only 30 nations. This is because surveys pertaining
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to Portugal's 2002 and 2005 election are included. In Chapter 4 this was not problematic, as the two Portuguese surveys were combined to derive one 'macro' case.\(^{168}\) It is pertinent that the macro 'cases' in the models that follow are not nations, as was the case with the multilevel models in Chapter 4, but are instead elections. It is therefore not possible to combine the Portuguese samples in this analysis because the dependent variables relating to each election are not the same: different parties make up the incumbent in each case, as Table A7.1 shows. It is also methodologically problematic to include both elections independently, as we effectively weight Portuguese respondents 'up' by including them in two macro cases, even if these cases do relate to different elections. Consequently, only the 2005 Portuguese election will be included in the models presented.

There are also five countries that have problems or salient missing values which preclude their use in the regressions which follow, thus not allowing us to analyse all 30 elections but leaving us with 25. The omitted nations are listed in the Appendix, in Table A7.2. The results of the two multilevel models predicting a) opposition voting over incumbent voting, and b) non-voting over incumbent voting, are outlined in Table 7.2.

\(^{168}\) The reason 29 CSES nations were included in Chapter 4's models, rather than 30, was due to Belgium being excluded as it lacked data for the income variable.
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Table 7.2 Results of Logistic Multilevel Regressions Estimating Vote Choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Opposition Voting (1) Versus Incumbent Voting (0)</th>
<th>Model 2: Non-Voting (1) Versus Incumbent Voting (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( B )</td>
<td>( s.e. )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption &amp; Perceived Corruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Corruption Index (0-10)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Perceived Corruption (ref.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Perceived Corruption</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Perceived Corruption</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Level Control</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism (0-10)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Level Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Satisfaction in Government (1-4)</td>
<td>-0.87***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue-Specific Satisfaction in Government (1-4)</td>
<td>-0.58***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Efficacy of those in Power (1-5)</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Efficacy of Voting (1-5)</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.74***</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N ) (Micro, Macro)</td>
<td>27861, 25</td>
<td>20589, 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Random Intercept Std. Dev.</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Class Correlation</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** = \( p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1\)^{169}

First off, authoritarianism appears unable to explain either opposition voting or non-voting relative to incumbent voting. This is surprising, as we might anticipate autocratic regimes to intimidate citizens into voting for the incumbent, however this null result may relate to the simple fact that the bulk of the 25 nations included in

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169 Several points must be raised. First, it was considered that the Corruption Index might exhibit a nonlinear effect on patterns of support, as it did on various participatory items predicted in Chapters 3 and 4. Nevertheless a squared term, when added to the models, failed to have statistically significant effects. Second, note that the same diagnostic tests carried out on the Chapter 4 multilevel models were also carried out on those presented here, and revealed no problems. Third, when these models are replicated with the dependent variables adjusted so that the Portugal 2002 election sample is substituted for the Portugal 2005 election sample, highly comparable results are produced that do not change our key conclusions. Fourth, and lastly, it is again necessary to point out that a weighting option is not available using the available software. Thus the models were also run with the inclusion of the education and income variables to control for socioeconomic differences and thus implicitly weight for them, and both sets of models displayed highly stable, consistent results. This also proved useful because we are modelling non-voting in Model 2, hence socioeconomic variables may, as with turnout, have effects. Of those effects that did show up, they were consistent with the models of turnout in Chapter 4. Their exclusion from the final models presented is based on their secondary importance in models concerned centrally with incumbent voting.
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analysis are highly democratic. Thus little variation in authoritarianism among states may have led to the failure of the variable to be explanatory in either model.

Regarding the individual level controls in Model 1 and Model 2, both general and issue-specific satisfaction exhibit effects that might be expected: greater satisfaction encourages incumbent support and discourages opposition party support and non-voting. Meanwhile, the efficacy variables display an interesting spread of effects. Model 1 shows that if you perceive those in power to be efficacious, you are slightly more inclined to vote for the incumbent than you are for opposition parties. Perhaps this perception itself arises from an effectual incumbent, which motivates support. Meanwhile the same model shows the reverse regarding voting efficaciousness, although this effect is weak. Believing your vote matters encourages opposition party support relative to incumbent voting. Voting for the former, as they are not in power, presumably requires adequate belief that your vote can help ensure regime change. Model 2, meanwhile, displays intuitive effects regarding efficacy. Perceiving both voting (as a political action), and politicians (as political agents), to be efficacious prompts one to vote for the incumbent ahead of not turning out at all. Perceiving inefficaciousness discourages voting, as we might expect.

Our key results, of course, concern national level corruption and individual level perceived corruption. The first point of interest is that in Model 1, corruption as a national level, contextual effect, is shown not to explain voting for the opposition ahead of the incumbent. Where corruption is substantial in politics, it appears that opposition parties are failing to transmit a credible message to citizens that they will be reformist and ensure corruption clean-up. It might also be the case, therefore, that corruption is perceived to be engrained in institutions, rather than in particular parties (recognising that parties themselves are a form of political institution). This point
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links, one might add, to the effect found in Model 2, wherein corruption does predict non-voting relative to incumbent support, a contextual finding congruent with the general model of turnout in Chapter 4. The theoretical reasoning for such electoral withdrawal was discussed in much greater depth then, so it will not be elaborated here. However the magnitude of the effect is strong: about double that of the equivalent effect found in regard to turnout in Chapter 4, owed, it is likely, to the larger relative proportion of non-voters in this sample (in Model 2 only non-voters and incumbent voters are included).

Moving on, perceived corruption does have a small effect in both models, and it is worth using the coefficients predicted to grasp the strength of these results. After we make assumptions about a hypothetical individual, and calculate the predicted probabilities that they a) vote for the opposition over the incumbent, and b) do not vote over voting for the incumbent, at each of the three 'levels' of perceived corruption, we may construct Table 7.3.170

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Corruption Level</th>
<th>Probability of Opposition Voting relative to Incumbent Voting</th>
<th>Probability of Non-Voting relative to Incumbent Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consideration of the predicted probabilities shows that the magnitude of the effects is small. This is particularly the case with opposition voting relative to incumbent voting. The probability of the latter with reference to the former barely moves from 60% when perceived corruption changes. The effect of perceived corruption is more

170 It is assumed that they live in a country with mean authoritarianism and national level corruption scores. It is also assumed that they have mean scores for the individual level controls: general and issue-specific satisfaction in government, and perceived efficacy of those in power and of voting.
pronounced in regard to abstention relative to incumbent voting, and displays an
effect which is congruent with the findings of the general model of turnout in Chapter
4. Those perceiving high levels of corruption are 10% more likely to abstain if they
perceive high levels of corruption compared to perceiving low levels of corruption,
but when set against the contextual effect of the Corruption Index, we can see that this
effect is relatively small. As the magnitude of contextual corruption is double the size
of that shown in Chapter 4, we may expect abstention to grow by 20% or more as the
Corruption Index moves from the clean to corrupt countries included in the CSES
dataset.

The limited magnitude of the perceived corruption effects may mean that it is
the large number of individual level \( N \), and hence small standard errors, that brings
forth the statistical significance of the effects. A more conservative model would be
unlikely to do so, as might a model including a broader range of perceptions
concerning the government, perhaps indicating that the cross-national analysis is in
fact consistent with the British analysis in regard to the effect of perceived corruption
on political support: it is rather weak. Far more pertinent is the contextual effect of
national level corruption, which, though not explaining incumbent relative to
opposition voting well, is once again highly salient in determining propensity to vote
at all. We may conclude that greater national level corruption prompts disengagement
from politics and leads to non-voting, rather than waves of voting for other parties.
The theoretical reasoning for such a contextual effect, outlined in depth in Chapter 4,
appears to be well-supported.
Summary of Results and Discussion

Let us first summarise the results of this chapter. The British case study showed that perceived corruption does not appear to affect trends in political support. Instead, we found that perceptions of standards more broadly, encompassing items pertaining to competence, honesty and openness, were much better at explaining opposition partisanship. Hence, assuming the causal direction justified at the outset of the chapter, British citizens appear to hold the incumbent government responsible for maintaining these broader standards but not, it would seem, for corruption. This is perhaps to be expected, given the lack of a party systemically associated with corrupt transactions in the UK (and, perhaps, the low 'objective' level of corruption in the UK). Moreover, the close proximity of incidents including the Iraq War to the timing of the survey may have brought more forcefully into the public mind the notion that the government should be honest when explaining policy choices, and competent in evaluating information that informs these choices. This is backed up by the finding that when respondents were questioned which events influenced their responses to the survey, the three most frequently mentioned events were the Iraq War (mentioned by 60%), the Hutton Inquiry (by 42%), and the Dossier on Iraqi arms (by 23%), all of which pertained to incidences of alleged government dishonesty, or incompetence, or both (BMRB, 2004, p. 25).

The cross-national study essentially confirmed the results concerning perceived corruption that showed up in the British analysis. Although the effects of perceived corruption are statistically significant, and loosely suggest that perceiving corruption encourages opposition voting and abstention ahead of incumbent voting, these effects are weak, and may tie more to the large individual level $N$ than to a more
substantive finding. The most important finding of the cross-national analysis re-emphasised the contextual effect of the Corruption Index regarding non-voting. It was interesting, however, that corruption at the national level appears not to affect opposition voting relative to incumbent voting. These findings show that the effect of corruption appears to involve institutions rather than particular political actors or parties. Indeed, the propensity for individuals to withdraw from electoral politics in highly corrupt nations ahead of voting for the opposition implies that institutions may be associated with corrupt practice, encouraging electoral withdrawal (albeit shown through a contextual effect). Or, more broadly, it may be that opposition parties do not present credible, reformist mandates that citizens perceive to be indicative that corruption clean-up or reform more generally will occur if that opposition party is voted in. While British citizens may perceive corruption to be a product of a few ‘bad apples’ rather than a particular party, citizens across countries may similarly believe corruption to be a product not of a coherent set of political actors, but of the institutional context to politics. Institutions may fail to prevent corrupt practice, or they may be undermined by corrupt practice within them, or which involves them directly. Electoral fraud, for instance, is essentially the corruption of an institution.

More generally, the findings of this chapter add to our understanding of vote choice and partisanship because the effect of standards variables has remained largely unconsidered. No literature looks at the possibility of a contextual effect of political corruption on political support, making the cross-national findings important. With reference to other, specific works in the existing literature which look at perceived corruption and political support, we confirm the findings of both McCann and Dominguez (1998) and Davis et al (2004) that perceived corruption has limited explanatory power in predicting opposition support. Furthermore, we confirm their
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finding that increased perceived corruption tends to prompt greater non-voting than it
does opposition voting, although the magnitude of this result is small. Furthermore,
the contextual effect indicating that non-voting relative to incumbent voting is
strongly influenced by the Corruption Index (the theoretical basis for this effect is
outlined in depth in Chapter 4) bears witness to the argument that citizen withdrawal
from electoral politics is a clear consequence of corruption, not increased propensity
to vote for opposition parties. The wider implications of this are normatively unhappy.
As Davis et al (2004, p. 701) suggest:

...perceptions of corruption can reinforce the existing distribution of
political power by effectively removing from the political arena citizens
who may have reason to challenge the system. A deepening of democracy
would imply the obverse... 171

Finally, we may also shed light on Miller et al’s (1986) finding that an integrity factor
is explanatory in shaping evaluations and support for US presidential candidates. As
this factor is comprised of broad perceptions that include perspectives on candidates’
corruptness and on their honesty, it is unsurprising that it is explanatory. The
perceived ‘other misdemeanour incidence’ variable included in the British analysis
was, after all, highly statistically significant and suggested standards in general do
matter. And as the focus of presidential candidate evaluations concerns individuals
rather than parties or blocs, perceiving one of them to be corrupt may have a very
strong effect on one’s likelihood to back them. Unlike with a party or bloc, we cannot
claim corruption is simply a function of a few ‘bad apples’ (as we have suggested
may be a common perception, and indeed a correct one, in the UK) when we have
only one apple under consideration. Thus further research into these themes may do

171 However in our case, we might prefer the term ‘electoral arena’ to ‘political arena’, and emphasise
the import of contextual corruption rather than perceptions.

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well to focus on presidential elections or electoral districts in which specific candidates are being elected, to analyse if the association between perceiving a candidate to be corrupt and lower support for them is significant. It seems, intuitively, probable that this would be the case.
Chapter 8. Conclusion

The conclusion to this thesis will restate why the research undertaken has been pursued: why it matters, what it has told us, and what further research themes we might propose to follow up the findings. It will analyse its contributions into theoretical understanding of political corruption, political participation, and political support, and reflect on what these contributions mean for both corrupt and clean nations in reality. It will consider the findings in context to the over-riding objective of seeking democracy that is healthy: that is, which is participatory and clean, in which citizens are well aware of the elusive but potentially damaging behaviours we cluster under the term ‘corruption’, and respond in ways that are potentially effective, prompting corruption reform and clean-up rather than the perpetuation of corrupt practice. The chapter will also explore what we have learnt about the methodological capabilities and limitations of the tracks of empirical analysis chosen, and what future research might aim to do in light of both the enlightening aspects of the research avenues pursued, and the limitations and frustrations involved.

The Aims of the Thesis Revisited

Recall that it is helpful to frame the work of this thesis as a contribution to the post-functionalist school of thought concerning political corruption. Scholars such as Gillespie and Okruhlik, (1996), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), You and Khagram, (2004) and Davis et al (2004), among many others, have rejected the premise that corruption is in some way helpful to the economy or to the political system (by, for example facilitating deals, however illicit). They have instead offered accounts suggesting
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corruption is wasteful to the economy, detrimental to the consolidation and strengthening of democracy, and contributory to citizen withdrawal from political arenas.

The aim of this thesis was to extend this body of evidence that corruption is harmful by looking at a particular set of subfields: the impact of national level corruption and individual level perceived corruption on a variety of forms of political participation among the citizenry, and on citizens' partisanship and vote choice. It was considered that corruption and perceived corruption may act to diminish confidence in the institutions of democracy and lead citizens to re-evaluate their decision to participate. Whereas the effect of perceived corruption on such calculations is tangible (for instance, if I believe electoral institution X is corrupt, I do not see the point in voting and hence will not), it was noted that the contextual, national level of corruption may also have an impact, and it is important that it is understood why this is the case. It implies that regardless of what a citizen thinks about corruption, their behaviour or direction of political support may independently be affected by the aggregate level of corruption in politics. In earlier chapters it was elaborated as to why this may be the case. Essentially, if a nation is corrupt, then some citizens may recognise this or other signals that tie to corruption, perhaps a lack of elite responsiveness, and may react by participating in certain ways. This 'core' of citizens may initiate others to participate as if they held similar beliefs. If the core neglect institutional participation and prefer extra-institutional mechanisms by which to express their political demands, then well-trodden paths by which such demands are expressed may be pursued by others outside of this 'critical mass'. Similarly, anger at a government perceived to be corrupt or unresponsive may incline voting for the opposition, and this shift in support may induce a 'bandwagon' effect. An opposition
party may gain greater financial resources by which to campaign after an initial increase in support, their agenda may become better publicised, the feasibility of their winning may increase, encouraging votes from other citizens who may or may not believe the incumbent is corrupt but dislikes them nonetheless. So perceived corruption alone is not the only predictor by which our analysis should depend.

Modelling should integrate the contextual effect of national level corruption in cross-national analysis, and for this reason analysis involving a national level measure of corruption was undertaken.

The importance of either national level corruption or perceived corruption at the individual level having an effect on political participation and political support is clear. If high levels of contextual corruption or perceived corruption induce subversive extra-institutional participation, or diminish confidence in established democratic institutions and hence lower levels of institutional participation, we may fear for the legitimacy of governments and their regimes. In consolidated democracies this may, beneficially, give rise to demands for reform. Or, detrimentally, apathy towards politics prompted by the perception that politicians are corrupt may mean citizens believe there is little point in using institutional avenues to change their behaviour. In developing democracies, threatening the legitimacy of precarious democratic regimes carries with it a danger of undermining a new regime which has yet to have a well-grounded democratic ‘safety valve’ to cope with such disaffection.

The thesis therefore required adequate measures or proxies of contextual corruption and perceived corruption, yet this was troubled by methodological difficulties. As we have shown, existing measures of national level corruption suffer from difficulties prompting the need for robust testing of their reliability and validity. Furthermore survey questions tapping perceived corruption at the individual level are
often grossly inadequate: vague, and built on the assumption that the average citizen finds the term ‘corruption’ unproblematic. Given the plethora of academic definitions of corruption, it is difficult to assume that the layman will fare any better in deducing a definition of corruption that will be shared by his contemporaries.

Thus another task of the thesis was to use specialist British data to determine how perceptions of corruption differ from perceptions of related forms of ‘bad’ government – incompetence, dishonesty, closed dealings and the like. And given that these items and corruption are unlikely (quite validly) to be perceived by the layman as mutually exclusive, regardless of the strict criteria academics might set for what constitutes ‘corruption’, it is interesting to query how far corruption perceptions differ from perceptions of related detrimental characteristics of governments and institutions. Moreover, given that research has already been undertaken in some nations on the characteristics of citizens that make them more or less censorious of corruption, and also more or less inclined to believe that there is considerable corrupt activity in reality, it seemed prudent to undertake the same form of analysis using the British case study. This area, in the British context, is simply under-researched.

Key Findings, Their Wider Implications, and Future Avenues for Research

It is of heuristic value to break down our discussion of findings into four smaller, digestible research themes that were covered in this thesis. Their ordering will roughly follow the order in which they were considered in the preceding chapters. First, did we find or develop an adequate measure of national level corruption and perceived corruption, and how did any retrieved items associate with other, related
measures? Second, did perceived corruption and corruption as a contextual effect impact political participation? Third, once we found an operational measure of perceived corruption in the British case, what determined it? What, in the UK, made citizens think about political corruption in different ways? Fourth, did perceived corruption and corruption as a contextual effect impact partisanship and vote choice? Let us take these themes in turn.

1. Measuring national level corruption and individual level perceived corruption:

Have we found an unproblematic measure of national level corruption that pinpoints exactly how much and what type of corruption each nation under analysis endures? Alas the answer is unsurprisingly no. The elusive nature of corruption makes this task impossible. But we have made inroads into the form of careful analysis that should be undertaken to establish a measure of corruption that has value for quantitative analysis. This work may help strengthen the case that scholars cannot blindly rely on one or other index of corruption without careful checks regarding the two criteria of reliability and validity.

In regard to the former criterion, reliability, the choice of the Transparency International CPI as the key national level measure of corruption was partly justified by correlating it with competing scales of corruption. These competing scales were constructed using similar and different methodologies, embracing external and internal perceptions of political phenomena. The high degree of correlation between the indices suggested that it was appropriate to proceed with empirical analysis using the CPI, but with awareness that we rely heavily on the perceptions of businessmen, who may not be analysing their own nation. It was acknowledged that this may lead to bias if such perceptions are guided only by the feasibility of corruption harming
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investment, as this may prevent consideration of other forms of behaviour that, when referenced to the academic definitions of corruption, may still be considered corrupt.

This point links to the second criterion—validity. The CPI conceives of corruption as a broad phenomenon, and informant surveys include questions that are couched in simple terms gauging the extent to which unspecified forms of 'corruption' or 'bribery' occur. It cannot inform us of levels of corruption among different types of public officials, nor pinpoint levels of particular types of corruption, nor identify how serious the corruption might be. This is, as it has been argued, indicative of the trade off between theoretical precision and the viability of empirical analysis that is involved in academic work of this kind. It is near impossible to solve, but important to recognise. We must aim for operational variables rather than theoretical completeness, no matter how desirable attaining both of these things may be. We can assert only that future research should a) consider more directly how measures of corruption fit with theoretical definitions of corruption, as their consideration is crucial to understanding how the validity of such measures may be compromised; and b) take heed of the pertinent criticisms of established indices by scholars such as Kalniņš (2005), Johnston (2002), Sik (1999, cited in Hungarian Gallup Institute, 1999), and Knack and Azfar (2000). Only when couched carefully can we have confidence in knowing exactly what we are doing when we include a corruption index in statistical models.

Another objective of the thesis was to analyse perceived corruption in Britain in a relative sense. That is, how perceived corruption was positioned relative to other, potentially related perceptions. We saw, using factor analysis, that two survey items that fit with academic conceptions of corruption were distinct from a cluster of other items. This distinction was sufficient for the corruption-related items to form an
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independent factor valid for use in empirical analysis. We also saw, overall, that British citizens believed there to be less corruption in public life compared to other forms of misdemeanour, and were more censorious of corrupt behaviour than of other misdemeanour.

The wider implication of this is heartening. It suggests that the 'critical citizens' identified by Norris *et al* (1999) are more critical and discerning than we might have thought. Corruption is considered different from and distinct to lie-telling, incompetence, and having closed government. More broadly, we might suggest that future research takes advantage of the nuances of citizen perceptions. If corruption is perceived differently from other, related perceptions, then it may be helpful to break down clusters of questions driving conflated constructs such as confidence or trust in government, and analyse how perceptions of different forms of misdemeanour inform them.

2. Does perceived corruption and corruption as a contextual effect impact political participation?

Some rich results were obtained in the empirical chapters questioning how contextual corruption and perceived corruption affect political participation. It was found that when regressed against both national level and individual level measures of participation, turnout displayed an inverse correlation with national level corruption and, to a weaker extent, perceived corruption. However, this association was weak enough not to show at all in the British model, and no association was found between perceived corruption and a general measure of institutional behaviour either. The turnout results indicated that disaffection caused by corruption, principally in terms of the contextual effect of the form outlined earlier, led citizens to abstain from voting.
In terms of extra-institutional behaviour, national level corruption displayed a nonlinear effect. Levels of extra-institutional participation were found to be higher among a) nations that were highly clean, perhaps prompted by the notion that responsive politicians would react to any form of participation (the ‘efficacy’ effect); and b) among nations that were highly corrupt, perhaps stimulated by citizen grievances and distrust in institutions (the ‘disillusionment’ effect). These contextual effects were not washed out with the inclusion of perceived corruption; they existed independently. Individual level perceived corruption, meanwhile, was found to have some effects on extra-institutional behaviour. Cross-national models showed that greater perceived corruption predicted more extra-institutional participation, but that this result was very weak. A comparable result was found in the British case.

These findings have a considerable impact because they greatly expand our understanding of how corruption and participation relate. And, as multilevel modelling proved so useful in integrating national level corruption into models of participation alongside individual level variables, it is proposed broadly that future research into political attitudes or behaviour considers the potentially important effects of contextual variables.

Yet what do these findings tell us about democracy and democratic prospects more widely? This question is best answered by recognising first that the impact of corruption may vary according to the nature of the regime under analysis. To think about this further, we might introduce Johnston’s (2005) typology of four corrupt regimes, which gives us scope to break down the possible consequences in depth. In the first of Johnston’s types, ‘influence market’ regimes, in which institutions are generally strong but politicians can act to mediate corrupt exchanges, the impact of corruption is to diminish trust and legitimacy. These regimes are likely to have low
Corruption Index scores. The participatory consequences of instances of corruption in such regimes may further exacerbate the drop in trust and legitimacy Johnston notes. If corruption lowers turnout, this hardly bodes well as an indicator of a regime having high levels of legitimacy. Consequently, in terms of a spectrum of democracy, it is hard to see how such detrimental effects on trust and legitimacy can help such regimes progress from ‘liberal’ democracies to ‘advanced’ democracies, as Schedler (1998) conceives of them. Indeed, Schedler’s conception of the distinction between the two is vague, although our findings may shed light on them. While liberal democracies are those in which there are: “civil and political rights plus fair, competitive, and inclusive elections” (p. 92), Schedler suggests advanced democracies: “presumptively possess some positive traits over and above the minimal defining criteria of liberal democracy” (p. 93). We might postulate that Western regimes liable to have ‘influence market’ corruption may not meet such an ‘advanced’ democratic status if this corruption hinders institutional participation such as turnout in the ways we have predicted. This also sets a more definite requirement for what is required to obtain ‘advanced’ democratic status. Further research which similarly takes on Schedler’s implied question of exactly which ‘positive traits’ progress liberal democracy would be welcomed.

Johnston’s second conception of a corrupt regime is one in which there are ‘elite cartels’ with less powerful institutions and elites that compete unfairly for power and resources, hindering competition and development. Although there is substantial corruption in such regimes, the rule of law appears not to be entirely absent. Instead, we see such regimes are uneven playing fields, although institutions are in place such that some degree of competition for resources may take place. Hence, we might impute that such fairly corrupt nations would have mid-level Corruption Index scores.
Consequently, relative to cleaner nations, such states are liable to have lower voter turnouts. They are also likely to have limited extra-institutional participation relative to other states that have both more and less corruption, if we take into account the nonlinear effects found to exist between national level corruption and extra-institutional behaviour. All this implies low political engagement, so to strengthen democracy surely requires breaking elites' holds on public servants and a stronger participatory citizenry may help do this. This is undoubtedly difficult, and this is prescriptive, but this analysis gives us some indication of how democratic consolidation may be further hindered by corruption's impact on participation.

The third and fourth types of corrupt regimes outlined by Johnston we may conflate as those regimes likely to have high Corruption Index scores; they are also likely to be more authoritarian, or in the early stages of democratic transition or consolidation. They comprise 'oligarch and clan corruption', wherein oligarchs have considerable illegitimate power amid few checks and balances, and may behave unpredictably; and 'official mogul' regimes in which, under very weak institutions, corruption is rife and civil society and liberalisation are under threat. Our cross-national models predict that such regimes will experience very low turnout, and considerable extra-institutional behaviour. Under these conditions, we can anticipate that democratic institutions are unlikely to develop legitimacy: they have little from the outset and citizens failing to use them as part of their participatory activity will only perpetuate this. We might also anticipate instability and unpredictability. Just as outcomes at the elite level come about from illicit exchange rather than transparent politics, citizens' behaviour may be similarly unpredictable if it takes place outside institutional arenas. These behavioural consequences may therefore be significant if they contribute to the failure of democratic institutions to put in place procedures and
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rights fundamental to democracy, and if they serve to increase societal instability. Under these conditions, the challenges for democratising regimes will be very demanding.

3. The determinants of perceived corruption in the UK:

There were two key perceptions whose determinants we sought to predict in the British case study. The first related to censoriousness of corruption, or the degree to which respondents do not tolerate it. The second related to the extent to which there is deemed to be corruption among British public officials. The findings were interesting: in the face of literature which suggests that socioeconomic and demographic factors have considerable influence on citizens corruption perceptions, in the British case these factors were largely insignificant. They were better explained by related attitudinal factors. Socioeconomic and demographic divides failed to incline citizens to be particularly censorious of corruption, nor incline them to perceive particularly high quantities of it.

In regard to the established literature, this result is not worrying. Analysis of the body of research into similar perceptions, across different nations, reveals that socioeconomic and demographic factors tend to have contradictory effects that differ among studies (see Gorta and Forell, 1994). Thus there is no consensus about how our variables should have predicted perceptions of corruption. Furthermore, it is striking that the previous work summarised by Gorta and Forell (1994) fails to control comprehensively for political attitudes in the way we did. Thus the previous literature appears rather inadequate. It is suggested that any future research intending to probe the determinants of perceptions of corruption should include a range of attitudinal variables. Without them, we are uncertain if socioeconomic and demographic factors
are really explanatory, or whether they just proxy coherent attitudes among particular groups.

Indeed, our results indicate the primacy of attitudinal factors in explaining corruption censorious and perceived corruption in real politics. The finding that socioeconomic and demographic items were less explanatory might be ascribed to relatively little social division in British society failing to prompt, say, lower echelons (who may lose out from corruption more) being any more censorious or perceiving more corruption than higher echelons. But it may also tell us something wider in regard to theories of political trust. Mishler and Rose's (2001) distinction between a) the cultural approach to political trust, in which socialisation prompts different levels of trust according to socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds, and b) the institutional approach to political trust, which sees trust as a function of citizens' responses to institutional performance, was argued to be helpful as ways of thinking about perceptions of corruption when we apply the reasoning equivalently. Our results lend themselves to an institutional approach. It is attitudes towards politics, partly in reaction to institutional performance, that determine corruption censoriousness and perceived corruption incidence; it is not perceptions that arise from socioeconomic and demographic groups experiencing similar processes of socialisation. However, it is important that we are cautious not to exaggerate the explanatory power of attitudinal variables. The strongest predictor of both dependent variables was in each case a scale comprised of attitudes towards other standards-related issues, even though factor analysis disentangled these from the corruption-related items. Furthermore, not all the attitudinal variables displayed statistically significant effects.

Nevertheless, by lending themselves to an institutional approach, the results are congruent with Mishler and Rose's own findings regarding political trust. And as
reference to such theories of political trust has heuristic value in terms of interpreting how our findings fit with established work, it is proposed that future research into corruption perceptions does make use of the work on trust. This suggestion is made, however, on the proviso that political trust and perceived corruption incidence are not simply clustered together as one and the same thing. Stress has already been placed on the value of analysis looking to differentiate between such perceptions.

4. Does perceived corruption and corruption as a contextual effect impact political support and vote choice?

It was found first that in the British case perceived corruption did not affect vote choice. It was instead perceptions of public servants' 'other misdemeanour': telling lies, being incompetent, not acting openly, and so on, that affected whether or not an individual would choose to vote for opposition parties, or abstain, in preference to voting for the incumbent party. This might be explained by the proximity of the survey to pertinent political events in which dishonesty and incompetence were associated with Labour, the incumbent government. Indeed respondents themselves reported that their answers were affected by the Iraq War and surrounding incidents more than other events, and this policy choice carried with it murky allegations of government dishonesty and incompetence. Thus a plausible research avenue is to investigate precisely how and why specific events (perhaps involving corruption, perhaps not) affect vote choice. Careful interview research, focus groups, or at the least highly specific surveys with open questions might be the best way to proceed.

The cross-national research supports the notion that perceived corruption is largely non-explanatory. Its effect on opposition voting relative to incumbent voting was negligible, although it did predict propensity to abstain from voting altogether.
relative to voting for the incumbent, congruent with the earlier, general model of
turnout. Yet we see a stronger contextual effect of corruption congruent with work on
participation. Non-voting relative to incumbent voting is predicted by increased
corruption in politics, when measured at the national level. This is again compatible
with the same finding relating to turnout more broadly. As it is a contextual effect, it
appears that abstention is a 'path' shaped by some individuals' unwillingness to vote
based on their perception of considerable levels of corruption or elite non-
responsiveness, and once this path is well-trodden, others are inclined not to vote too.
Essentially, it becomes a norm not to vote, and this effect shows through not just
when modelling turnout generally, but when modelling non-voting against incumbent
voting more specifically.

It is interesting that a contextual effect of this form is not noticed when we
model propensity to vote for opposition parties against the incumbent. Hence
corruption is presumably related more to institutions than it is particular political
parties. The effect concerns withdrawal from electoral politics rather than increased
propensity to vote for other, potentially reformist, parties. To address this problem, we
can make only prescriptive suggestions based on the set of research themes analysed:
that the opposition party states credibly that it recognises any problem of corruption
or elite non-responsiveness – including corruption seemingly entrenched in political
institutions; that it differentiates it from other phenomena to raise awareness of how
censorious voters should be; and that it seeks to capture support from those who
would otherwise withdraw from electoral institutions or participate more readily in
extra-institutional participation. With these strategies in place, the opposition party is
in a better position to gain support, and with any electoral benefit comes, we would
hope, a benefit for the country generally, as a credible commitment to corruption
clean-up may be realised. This will undoubtedly be difficult, as ‘path dependent’
trajectories of corruption and entrenched institutional corruption may be rife. Yet the
more credible their mandate regarding corruption clean-up, the more forcefully a new
incumbent may be encouraged to push through reform to benefit themselves (as
citizens should value their meeting mandate promises), and the citizenry more
generally, if corruption is curtailed.

In this thesis, we have learned rather more about the effects of corruption and
perceived corruption on participation and political support than we did based on the
existing literature. But this was not the only aim. When handling corruption as a topic,
there are frustrations and difficulties involving the reliability and validity of
operationalising such a highly elusive phenomenon. And there is a theoretical school
of corruption, which attempts to trace in more nuanced forms exactly what corruption
is, that must be taken into account. Hence the other aim of this thesis was to show that
as an intellectual exercise, the tasks in hand were stimulating but required a
systematic approach that took into account and addressed the considerable problems
and puzzles encountered. Corruption is not the form of topic a political scientist can
rush into analysing without thinking carefully about its form and its measurement. It
is an elusive phenomenon, and taking time to ensure measures of it are valid and
reliable is crucial advice to any political scientist looking to answer the complicated
questions of what determines corruption, and what its effects are.
Appendix

Figure A2a

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Graft Index

Figure A2b

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Bribe Payers Index
Figure A2c

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and BEEPS Scores

Figure A2d

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Relevant Public Integrity Index Scores
Figure A2e

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Bad Governance Index

Figure A3a

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Human Development Index
### Table A3.1 Countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 1998

<table>
<thead>
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### Table A3.2 Countries Excluded from Chapter 3 Models

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<td>Union Density, Unemployment</td>
<td>Demonstration Activity</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Size of Government</td>
<td>Turnout and Demonstration Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Turnout, Compulsory Voting, Electoral System Proportionality, % Seats Largest Party, Size of Government, Union Density</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>All variables except Corruption Index, Demonstration Activity, Authoritarianism, Armed Conflict</td>
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- 226 -
### Table A3.3 Results of OLS Regressions Estimating Turnout Excluding Nations With Compulsory Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Excluding nations that enforce compulsory voting</th>
<th>Model 2: Excluding nations that strictly enforce compulsory voting</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-3.34*</td>
<td>1.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption Index (0-10)</td>
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<td>Governance Variables</td>
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<td>Bad Governance (0-10)</td>
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<td>Institutional Factors</td>
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<td>% Seats Largest Party</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportionality of Elec. Sys</td>
<td>1.84</td>
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<td>Socioeconomic &amp; Political-Cultural Factors</td>
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<td>Literacy (%)</td>
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<td>GDP / Capita (1000s, logged)</td>
<td>-8.40**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size of Government (0-10)</td>
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<td>Authoritarianism (0-10)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<td>N</td>
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*** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1; OLS regressions using robust standard errors.

In *Model 1*, p-value on Corruption Index = 0.054, therefore very nearly significant at the 5% level.

† = In *Model 2*, p-value on Corruption Index = 0.102, therefore very nearly significant at the 10% level.
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Figure A4a

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Self-Reported Turnout

Figure A4b

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Official Turnout
Figure A4c

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Mean WVS Perceived Corruption Scores

Figure A4d

Scatterplot: Corruption Index and Mean CSES Perceived Corruption Scores
Table A4.1  Countries in Wave 3 of the WVS for which Data was Available

<table>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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Table A4.2  Countries in the CSES Module 2 for which Data was Available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>Australia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Israel</td>
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</table>
### Table A4.3 Official and Self-Reported Levels of Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Official Turnout (Votes / Registered Voters) (%)</th>
<th>Self-Reported Turnout (%)</th>
<th>Difference (% Points)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>-19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>-29.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>73.9</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>82.7</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>-22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>-26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>-30.2</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>96.9</td>
<td>-17.8</td>
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<td>77.0</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>75.0</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>86.5</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
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<td>46.2</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
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<td>76.3</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>81.3</td>
<td>-17</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>60.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>-13.5</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>74.0</td>
<td>-28.6</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
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<td>70.5</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>-13.3</td>
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### Table A4.4  *WVS Nations with Missing Data or Irregularities with Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Missing Variables</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Petition Signing, Boycotting Products, Demonstration Activity, Strike Activity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupying Buildings, Political Party Membership, Religiosity, Education, Class,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union Membership, Political Interest, Satisfaction in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Petition Signing, Boycotting Products, Demonstration Activity, Strike Activity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupying Buildings, Perceived Corruption, Religiosity, Political Interest,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfaction in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>(Although the Colombian sample does not exhibit missing data for any one variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>which involves all respondents having no response, it still contains so much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>missing data across the variables that listwise deletion excludes every</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individual in the Colombian sample from the models anyway. In other words, each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individual is missing at least some of the required data.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Perceived Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Perceived Corruption, Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Petition Signing, Boycotting Products, Demonstration Activity, Strike Activity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupying Buildings, Political Party Membership, Perceived Corruption, Religiosity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union Membership, Political Interest, Satisfaction in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Age, Corruption Index (National Level), Authoritarianism (National Level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Age, Education</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Class</td>
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### Table A4.5  *WVS Countries Included in Analysis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Croatia Dom. Republic</th>
<th>Mexico Moldova</th>
<th>Spain Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland Switzerland</th>
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<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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Table A7.1 Specification of Legislative Incumbents for Cross-National Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>System</th>
<th>Previous Incumbent</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Coalition: VLD, SP (later SP.A-SPRIT), Agalev Groen!, PS, Ecolo, PRL (later MR)</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Coalition: Brazilian Social Democratic Party, Party of the Liberal Front, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, Brazilian progressive Party, Brazilian Labour Party, PSD</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>United Democratic Forces</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Czech Social Democrat Party</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Coalition: Social Democratic Party of Finland, National Coalition Party, Left Alliance, Swedish People’s Party in Finland, Green League</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Coalition: Social Democratic Party and Alliance 90 / Greens</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Administrative Region of China</td>
<td>Pro-Beijing Bloc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Coalition: Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Coalition: Likud, Labor, Shas, Israel Baaliya, Yahadut Hatora – Agudat Israel – Degel Tora</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (South)</td>
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<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>Coalition: Labour and Alliance</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

172 Hong Kong is problematic in that although the Democratic Party (a pro-democracy party) had the greatest amount of elected seats in its legislature, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive was the pro-Beijing Tung Chee-Hwa. Thus it is not appropriate to categorise the Democratic Party as the incumbent at the time of the election: the pro-Beijing bloc effectively were, given that Hong Kong was (and continues to be) a Chinese ‘administrative region’, and that the executive was subjugated by pro-Beijing actors.

173 Note that in the previous election, the National Action Party joined the Mexican Green Ecological Party in the ‘Alliance for Change’ coalition and their candidate won the presidency. However, the coalition split between elections, meaning that only the National Action Party will be considered as the Mexican incumbent at the time of the 2003 election.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Government coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Lakas-CMD, Nationalist People's Coalition, Liberal Party, Nationalist Party, KAMPI, People's Reform Party</td>
<td>Dominant Bloc&lt;sup&gt;174&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Coalition: Popular Party and Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Government coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Partido Popular</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>Party in government</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<sup>174</sup> Due to considerable volatility among the parties and coalitions offered to voters between the 2001 and 2004 elections, for simplicity the incumbent will be interpreted as the 'K4' coalition which contested the 2004 election and included the key party of the previous government coalition: Lakas-CMD.
### Table A7.2 CSES Nations with Missing Data or Irregularities with Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Missing Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Issue Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Opposition Versus Incumbent Voting, Non-Voting Versus Incumbent Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Opposition Versus Incumbent Voting, Non-Voting Versus Incumbent Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Opposition Versus Incumbent Voting, Non-Voting Versus Incumbent Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Perceived Efficacy of Voting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography

a) Books, Chapters and Articles


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b) Electronic and Web-based Resources


Center on Democratic Performance, Department of Political Science, Binghamton University (No Date) *Election Results Archive*, http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/ (accessed 12 February 2006).


