# The limits of intervention:
# Coercive diplomacy and the Jewish question in the nineteenth century

## 1. Intervention in the Jewish question: concepts and practices

What can the Jewish question tell us about the evolving practice of humanitarian intervention during the nineteenth century?

The answer depends partly on how we define the problem. For understandable reasons, scholars in this emerging field have directed their attention towards militarised action - above all, the international campaign against the slave-trade and European interventions on behalf of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire.[1] Such an approach obscures the broader ways in which humanitarian ideology intersected with various forms of coercive diplomacy, particularly in the later nineteenth century.[2] For this was a period marked by the striking integration of humanitarian concerns into the broader architecture of international agreements that emerged from a series of conferences and congresses held in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as European powers sought to carve up Africa and the Balkans. On the one hand, we have the General Acts of Berlin (1885) and Brussels (1890), which collectively targeted what humanitarians saw as the triple evils of trade in slaves, liquor and arms and, in the case of Brussels, bound signatories to take practical measures against them.[3] On the other hand, we have the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, with its well-known provisions to safeguard religious equality and the status of minorities. Hitherto, humanitarian preoccupations with Africa and concern for Christians in the Ottoman world have tended to be treated separately. Connections between the established literature on humanitarianism and empire and the emerging scholarship on intervention and minority protection consequently remain under-explored.[4] Yet the Jewish question bridges these different fields.

Geographically, it brings together experiences in Eastern Europe, the Ottoman Empire and North Africa. Conceptually, it sets contemporary concerns for the fate of religious minorities alongside concerns for the material and cultural well-being of Jews in the Balkans and Muslim lands that were framed in the language of civilization and promoted in ways that dovetailed with rival European imperialisms. In this context, my own work on international Jewish relief has underlined the synergy between humanitarian philanthropy and humanitarian diplomacy, and between Jewish activists and the anti-slavery lobby in Britain.[5] More generally, there are parallels between the way in which the preoccupations of Edwardian anti-slavery activists and Jewish minority rights activists fed into the international structures of the interwar era.[6] Yet the problem of humanitarian intervention in the Jewish question has been largely overlooked.

This neglect is surprising if we consider the long-standing nature of Jewish claims to humanitarian protection by 'civilised powers', dating back at least to 1745.[7] In the 1780s, the case was powerfully made by no less a figure than Edmund Burke, when he defended the claims of Jews living on the West-Indian island of St. Eustatius, who had been disproportionately harshly treated by British forces during the conquest of that island from the Dutch.[8] In a landmark speech, Burke declared:

> [h]aving no fixed settlement in any part of the world, no kingdom nor country in which they have a Government, a community and a system of laws, [the Jews] are thrown upon the benevolence of nations and claim protection and civility from their weakness as well as from their utility ... From the east to the west, from one end of the world to the other, they are scattered and connected ...Their abandoned state and their defenceless situation calls most forcibly for the protection of civilised nations. If Dutchmen are injured and attacked, the Dutch have a nation, a Government and armies to redress or revenge their cause. If Britons are injured, Britons have armies and laws, the laws of nations ... to fly to for protection and justice. But the Jews have no such power and no such friend to depend on. Humanity then must become their protector and ally'.[9]

Nearly a hundred years later, the British Consul-General in Bucharest put an almost identical argument to the Romanian Foreign Minister: 'I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that the humanitarian

treatment of the Jews in the Principalities is not a subject for foreign interference. The peculiar position of the Jews places them under the protection of the civilised world.'[10] That this view was voiced by a British diplomat *in situ* rather than a parliamentary politician suggests that it did, to some extent, influence the conduct of British foreign policy. But while it is certainly possible to trace a tradition of humanitarian intervention in the Jewish question during the nineteenth century, it is important to recognise its limitations - although equally important not to read too much into them.[11]

Here, it may be helpful to explore what we mean by humanitarian intervention. While coercive diplomacy and (often reactionary) interventions were recurring features of the political landscape in nineteenth-century Europe, particularly during the Metternichian era, interventions 'in the name of humanity' were essentially restricted to the Ottoman lands and extra-European zones, reflecting the synergy between humanitarian intervention and liberal imperialism.[12] There are two critical distinctions. On the one hand, we should distinguish between 'humanitarian' and more narrowly 'liberal' causes. Liberal constitutionalists in Spain and Portugal and emancipatory nationalist movements in Poland, Italy and Hungary attracted widespread popular support amongst European liberals, particularly perhaps in Britain. Tellingly, however, only the Greek nationalist movement attracted military intervention on the 'liberal' side and here, as Bass has argued, humanitarian concerns were a significant factor. On the other hand, we should distinguish between militarised interventions in the internal affairs of another state 'in the name of humanity' and the coercive diplomacy that reflected a similar 'humanitarian' agenda.

Militarised interventions entailed the active deployment of military resources, although the actual scale of military involvement varied considerably. Such interventions should be distinguished from war by their limited scope, aims and duration. As Rodogno argues, the ability to stage an intervention of this kind also implied the tacit acceptance of this limited action by other foreign powers. Coercive diplomacy, by contrast, represented an intervention in the domestic affairs of another state that rested more on the reality of greater military power than on actual military action. Sometimes this took the form of collective action at the highest diplomatic level in the shape of international congresses and conferences. Sometimes, diplomatic action was more informal and spontaneous, taking the form of collective notes and jointly staged interventions by local consuls intended to redress perceived abuses. Consular protection

falls outside these categories, although it may be related to developments in both areas. While local consuls often acted to defend local religious minorities, this was clearly distinct from the exercise of consular protection on behalf of individuals who were formally attached to the embassy of a particular European power, whether as foreign citizens or because they performed concrete services for consulates, embassies and foreign businesses. Consular protection of this kind was related to the historic right to protect Ottoman Christians granted France and, later, Russia under the Capitulations, but these practices raise a separate - if not wholly unrelated - set of issues.

How does this typology apply to the tradition of humanitarian intervention in the Jewish question as it evolved during the nineteenth century?

First, and most obviously these were never militarised interventions. The contrast with European military action on behalf of Ottoman Christians in Syria and the Balkans is striking, and easy to frame in terms of religious affinity. European powers, so the argument goes, readily expressed their commitment to freedom of conscience, and to civil and religious liberty for religious minorities. They were even willing to write this commitment into international agreements like the Treaty of Berlin. But when it came to implementing these aspirations, European powers only ever intervened militarily on behalf of Christian minorities in extra-European states. Thus religious affinity militated against active intervention in the Jewish question both because the victims in question were Jewish and because the states that appeared to flout these norms - most obviously Romania and Russia - were Christian and, in the case of Russia, too powerful to brook interference. The conspicuous failure of European powers to intervene on behalf of Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus (or to recognise properly the violence to which they were subjected) tends to confirm such an analysis.

Needless to say, the reality is more complex. ‘Oppression’ of Jews in Eastern Europe and parts of the Islamic world like Persia and Morocco was for the most part systemic rather than episodic. Even the anti-Jewish violence that accompanied the exclusionary legislation and mass expulsions directed at Romanian Jews in the 1860s and 1870s entailed relatively few mortalities. Reliable figures are hard to come by, but it is telling that the forced expulsions of Jews across the Danube at Galatz, which so scandalised international public opinion in 1867, involved only a handful of drownings. Only in Russia do

we see religious and ethnic violence on a scale that begins to parallel developments in the Ottoman world. The pogroms of 1903-6 in particular stand out as dramatic incidents of mass anti-Jewish violence involving death and injury. The first wave of 1903-4 left 93 Jews dead and 4,200 seriously injured; a second wave in 1905-6 left 3,103 dead, 2,000 seriously injured and a further 15,000 wounded.[13] Even this pales beside the atrocities and massacres perpetrated by Eastern Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and Syria 1860-1 and in the Balkans during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-8 - or, indeed, the death toll of Jews in the Western borderlands of the Russian Empire during and after World War One. Still, the pogroms of 1903-6 do bear comparison for instance with the Cretan 'massacres' of 1866-9 or the violence attending the Macedonian uprising of 1902-3, both of which attracted limited European intervention on humanitarian grounds.[14] Russia, of course, was a European Great Power. As such, it attracted humanitarian criticism in the West, but was never a candidate for humanitarian intervention. Yet neither the Armenian massacres of 1894-6, which took some 80-100,000 lives directly, nor the 1909 Cilician massacres which saw the murder of some 20,000 Armenians, attracted European intervention either, suggesting that absolute levels of suffering were never the key criterion for action.[15] Even so, the scale of the death toll suggests that only by the early twentieth century had anti-Jewish violence reached a level that might, in other contexts, have sparked military intervention.

Second, the tradition of humanitarian intervention in the Jewish question consisted primarily of *ad-hoc* initiatives by local diplomats, acting either on their own or in conjunction with other foreign representatives, in ways that reflected both the general instructions issued by their governments and humanitarian ideology.[16] Such interventions could make a difference to individual Jewish victims. They did shape the political environment in which policy towards Jews evolved on the ground. Occasionally, they even dovetailed with more concerted efforts to change the legal context in which Jews lived. With British support, the Anglo-Jewish activist Sir Moses Montefiore obtained a *firman* from the Ottoman Sultan in 1840, promising protection and religious toleration to his Jewish subjects - something admittedly guaranteed in different terms under Islamic law.[17] In 1864 Montefiore obtained an equally finely balanced *dahir* from the Sultan of Morocco, and in 1865 a similar letter from the Shah of Persia. Such documents served as important points of reference: foreign powers took them seriously as assertions

of religious equality.[18] In the Ottoman case, they were reinforced by European pressure on the Porte to grant equal rights to religious minorities as part of the modernising Tanzimat agenda.[19] It was in this context that diplomatic intervention in the Jewish question moved beyond the episodic, with formal guarantees of religious equality incorporated into the Treaty of Paris (1856) and the Treaty of Berlin (1878). Since the latter led the Romanian government to alter its constitution in the face of entrenched popular resistance, it can certainly be understood as an example of coercive diplomacy at the highest level. As Carol Iancu and others have noted, however, while the Powers did insist on token constitutional changes, these changes made little difference to the overwhelming majority of Jews living in Romania.[20]

Despite these limitations, the Jewish question remains an illuminating case study because it crossed key boundaries between Western and Eastern Europe, and between Europe and the Muslim world. On the one hand, the Jewish story matters as an early example of intervention on behalf of a group who were 'not people like us'. This served to reinforce the claim that European powers acted in the cause of 'humanity' and 'civilisation' to stop massacre and relieve suffering, rather than simply on behalf of fellow Christians, or in the covert pursuit of pragmatic aims. Indeed, interventions in the Jewish question suggest the practice of humanitarian intervention acquired universal implications earlier than sometimes assumed. On the other hand, concern for the plight of Jews ensured that Christian states, as well as Muslim ones, were called to account before the court of 'enlightened' public opinion. If the first great Mansion House meeting held in the name of persecuted Jews was prompted by the Damascus Affair (1840) and the emergence of blood liberal allegations in the Middle East, then the next two were occasioned by reports of anti-Jewish violence and persecution in Christian Europe (Romania, 1872; Russia, 1882).[21] Interestingly, moreover, the first Jewish calls for international guarantees of freedom of conscience emerged in the context of the Mortara Affair (1858), which concerned the kidnapping of a forcibly converted Italian Jewish boy by Papal authorities. Canon Law, and not Sharia, was the target.[22]

Here, I want to explore some of these issues by contrasting international responses to atrocity reports and the broader question of Jewish minority rights in Morocco and Romania during the 1860s and 1870s, with particular reference to the Congress of Berlin (1878) and the Conference of Madrid (1880). My findings draw above all on unpublished British foreign office material, and on published collections

of British and US state documents, as well as on coverage in the British, French, German and Hebrew language Jewish press.[23] The focus on Britain is justified by the importance of humanitarian rhetoric in British foreign policy and by the particular interest Britain took in both Morocco and the Ottoman lands. The US provides a useful comparator given the humanitarian undercurrents of US foreign policy in both Morocco and Romania, and the relative lack of strategic considerations. More generally, the Congress of Berlin and the Conference of Madrid were important episodes of collective intervention in the Jewish question at the highest diplomatic level. They are therefore more revealing than consular action or the initiatives taken by individual Great Powers. The latter may have had greater impact on the lives of Jews, but the coercive diplomacy embraced at Berlin and Madrid stands better comparison with militarised humanitarian interventions which, as Rodogno has argued, took place within the framework of the international system.

Interestingly, moreover, the outcomes of these gatherings were strikingly different. Both were formal gatherings at which all the European Great Powers were represented, alongside the US. Both addressed, in different ways the question of citizenship rights and discrimination against religious minorities in historic zones of Muslim empire on the edge of Europe. Thus the Congress of Berlin sought to redraw the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states in the Balkans, while the Conference of Madrid sought to regulate the problem of foreign protection in Morocco. Yet Berlin resulted in a Treaty clearly endorsing the principle of religious equality in both the Ottoman Empire and the emerging nation-states of the Balkans, while Madrid resulted only in a non-binding Declaration in favour of religious freedom, appended to the Convention and signed by the representatives of the Powers - with the notable exception of Morocco. Here therefore, the international system appeared to favour diplomatic intervention on behalf of religious minorities in the Christian Balkans, but not in Muslim Morocco. In considering why this was, we need to reflect not merely on the role of religious affinity in the international practice of humanitarian interventions during the nineteenth century, but also on the ability of non-state actors to focus international interest on particular problems and influence diplomatic outcomes.

## 2. Informal diplomacy and international activism: Jews as non-state actors

As Burke had argued in the late eighteenth century, Jews differed from other religious groups precisely because they were everywhere a minority, without a state or a government to call their own. Historians of the Early Modern era have highlighted the phenomenon of *shtadlanut* or 'intercession', whereby individual Jews (typically the 'Court Jews' of Central Europe) acquired personal influence with monarchs and their advisors as the providers of state finance, and used this influence to improve the condition of Jewish communities.[24] Most *shtadlanim* (intercessors) operated locally, but some forms of intercession transcended political boundaries.[25] As David Sorkin has argued, traditional Jewish influence of this kind rested on 'the vertical alliance', whereby Jews in the Diaspora looked to the highest power in the land for legally guaranteed privileges and for protection in times of need.[26] But the nature of states changed during the nineteenth century and Jews acquired new opportunities for exerting influence as a result. They built 'horizontal alliances' with other groups in society with whom they shared a common political agenda, and sought to influence 'public opinion' through petitioning, high profile public meetings and the various forms of public advocacy that were becoming standard components of democratic politics. This did not replace traditional forms of closed-door politics; rather, the old and the new existed side by side. Bankers like James de Rothschild in Paris and Gerson von Bleichröder in Berlin continued to wield behind-the-scenes influence as a result of their financial position, and exerted it on behalf of their coreligionists abroad, from the Damascus Affair to the Congress of Berlin. Meanwhile, public Jewish advocacy became increasingly institutionalised.

First, the 'national' Jewries of constitutional states acquired official representation: either in explicitly secular form (as in the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Board of Delegates of American Israelites, and the *Deutsch-Israelitischer Gemeindebund*); or through a consistorial system (as in France and Holland). The Board of Deputies and the French *Consistoire Central* in particular proved crucial to the development of international advocacy on behalf of beleaguered Jewish communities in Eastern Europe and Muslim lands, and in forging 'horizontal alliances'. From the 1840 onwards, they lobbied their governments on a case-by-case basis, publicised violations of Jewish rights through public meetings

and the press, and provided critical leadership internationally through the high profile activities of Montefiore and his French counterpart, Adolphe Crémieux.[27] The absence of similar leadership in Germany, despite the massive influence exerted by Ludwig Philippson through the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, reflects both political fragmentation and the far more extensive political rights Jews enjoyed in France and Britain.[28] Tellingly, while Salomon de Rothschild of Vienna did use his influence with Metternich in 1840, he did so in the traditional fashion.

Second, the later nineteenth century saw the emergence of formally constituted transnational Jewish organisations dedicated to international Jewish relief: the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (1860), and its more nationally configured offshoots, the Anglo-Jewish Association (1871), and the *Hilfsverein deutscher Juden* (1901).[29] These organisations combined international advocacy with educational, cultural and quasi-humanitarian outreach in Eastern Europe and Muslim lands. In the Ottoman Empire, Persia and North Africa, their activities reinforced currents within French, British and German imperialism, promoting the association between local Jews and European powers.[30] This dovetailing of Jewish with particular national and imperial interests became more pronounced over time, as imperialism itself gathered pace in the decades before 1914. It is therefore important to stress the genuinely transnational nature of the *Alliance Israélite* in its early years. Between 1862 and 1880, 345 local *Alliance* committees were founded, including 55 in France, 114 in Germany, 15 in Austria-Hungary, 4 in Bulgaria, 1 in Crete, 5 in Gibraltar, 1 in Luxembourg, 15 in the Netherlands, 1 in Portugal, 1 in Rhodes, 35 in Romania, 1 in Scandinavia, 2 in Serbia, 6 in Switzerland, 5 in Algeria, 4 in Egypt, 2 in Libya, 7 in Morocco, 1 in Tunisia, 2 in Iraq, 3 in Palestine, 26 in Turkey, 2 in the Western Antilles, 2 in Brazil, 2 in Colombia and 8 in the USA.[31] Their existence lent legitimacy to the activities of the central committee in Paris led by Adolphe Crémieux, and to collaborators like Sir Francis Goldsmid, who wielded significant influence in other European capitals. But the *Alliance* and it spokesmen were only one voice among many within what I have elsewhere described as 'the Jewish International'.[32] They supplemented rather than displaced the activities of figures like Montefiore, national bodies like the British Board of Deputies, and newspaper editors like Philippson, his North American counterpart Isaac Leeser and the more maverick figure of Benjamin Peixotto: a journalist who combined Jewish advocacy with low-level humanitarian

diplomacy in the early 1870s as American Consul to Bucharest - appointed by President Grant, accredited to the U.S. government and funded by Jewish philanthropic contributions.[33]

Decentred as they were, these formal and informal national and international networks came together at moments of crisis.[34] This response was epitomised by the international Jewish congresses held to address the situation in Romania in October 1872 (Brussels) and in December 1876 (Paris). 30 delegates from France, Germany, Britain, Belgium, Holland and Romania attended the former, while the latter attracted additional representation from the USA, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Turkey. But such attempts to coordinate international action were relatively unsuccessful. Analyses of Jewish diplomatic activity at the Conference of Versailles in 1919 do not suggest that unity increased over time.[35]

This article is concerned above all with the balance between humanitarian and other considerations in collective diplomatic decision-making. Here, we need to consider the relationship between Jewish activists, institutionalised lobby-groups and the broader political environment in which they operated. Ultimately, Jewish influence on diplomatic outcomes reflected not just the extent to which 'Jewish' concerns chimed with state interest, but also the ability of Jewish organisations and individuals to exert influence on particular governments and, in democratic polities, to work with the grain of 'public opinion' as evidenced in the press, in public meetings and, by extension, in parliamentary debates.

Officially recognised institutions like the Board of Deputies and the *Consistoire Central* had a somewhat different remit from the *Alliance Israélite* and its affiliates. Nevertheless, the underlying aims of both national and international Jewish organisations were broadly consonant in that they sought to promote the civil and political integration of Jews within wider society at home and abroad. Cultural adaptation was implicit in this agenda. Yet these organisations encouraged Jews in Europe and North America to adapt to their surroundings, while they preferred Jews in Muslim lands to adopt Western standards of 'civilization' (for instance by learning French) rather than integrate with the Muslim societies in which they lived. Partly, this reflected the extent to which British and French Jews, in particular, had adopted the cultural assumptions and 'civilizing' agenda of British and French imperialism with reference to their 'oriental' brethren. Partly, it reflected a recognition dating back to 1840 that the 'moral' condition

and civil status of Jews in Muslim lands and Eastern Europe had concrete implications for political debates about emancipation and the Jews in the West.

Crucially, the ability of both national and international Jewish lobby groups to exert influence on national governments depended to a large extent on their ability to connect with a broader domestic political constituency and to portray the cause of international Jewish relief as consonant with well-established ideological concerns. The British case was paradigmatic in this regard, and my own work has demonstrated how Montefiore successfully leveraged his personal connections with Quaker businessmen and anti-slavery activists and the language of 'civil and religious liberty' to embed the cause of Jewish relief within the broader agenda of British humanitarian politics.[36] Lisa Leff, meanwhile, has shown how French concern for Eastern Jews during the Crimean War was consonant with secularist conceptions of the French 'civilizing mission', while the subsequent activities of the *Alliance Israélite* dovetailed with the secularist ideology of the Third Republic.[37] The same was, arguably, true in the US, where successive governments demonstrated a sensitivity to Jewish concerns for the plight of their coreligionists and a willingness to support their cause, in ways that testify to the persistence of religiously inflected humanitarian undercurrents in US foreign policy and to the growing influence of a Jewish lobby.[38] In short, the ability of Jewish activists to influence Great power politics on behalf of their co-religionists was critically dependent on their ability to justify such interventions in the culturally coded language of 'humanity' and 'civilization'. As we shall see, however, the precise policy recommendations they advocated in Romania and Morocco diverged markedly, reflecting the gulf between their pragmatic aims and the universalist language they deployed

### 3. Romania and Morocco: a basis for comparison

Viewed in purely diplomatic terms, the Congress of Berlin and the Conference of Madrid were not strictly comparable episodes. The former was a landmark event, designed to agree a formally binding international treaty with far-reaching territorial and political implications. The latter was a relatively unimportant affair, its aims strictly limited to considering international consular protection in

Morocco. There are obvious differences in the size and international standing of the two empires. The Ottoman Empire had been recognised as a member of the Concert of Europe in 1856; Morocco was not. Both were vast polities, bordering the Mediterranean and participating in its maritime trade-routes, criss-crossed by mountain ranges, home to urban civilisations and nomadic tribal cultures, in which the sultan's power rested heavily on his religious authority.[39] Yet there could be no real comparison between the peripatetic Moroccan sultanate and the sophisticated, increasingly effective machinery of government in Ottoman lands.[40] Nor was there a basis in Moroccan society for anything like the Ottoman constitutional movement or the Young Turk revolution. Indeed, without a bureaucracy to foster the government had little incentive to sponsor the emergence of westernising elites.

All this meant that Morocco was a far less significant player in the international system than the Ottoman Empire. Strategically, however, the position of these two Muslim empires was broadly comparable. Perched on the edge of the straits of Gibraltar, Morocco commanded the Western gateway to the Mediterranean and the sea routes to Africa, India, Australia and the Far East. Straddling the straits of the Bosphorus, the Porte commanded access to the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and, more generally, to the land and sea routes connecting Europe with Asia and North Africa. Both states were certainly better integrated in the world of European diplomacy than that other great Muslim empire, Persia, whose internal affairs never became the subject of a major gathering of the Powers in a European capital.[41] Crucially too, both Morocco and the Porte were at least formally represented as participants at the gatherings in Berlin and Madrid - contrasting sharply with the position of African powers at the Conferences of Berlin and Brussels. Morocco and the Ottoman Empire may have been zones of informal empire, but both were also accepted as active players in the world of international diplomacy. In both cases, moreover, British policy was crucial to the preservation of sovereignty.

Historians may be more familiar with the diplomatic contours of the Eastern Question and the impact of Great Power rivalries in the Balkans, but Britain's reliance on Morocco to provision her strategically vital naval base in Gibraltar meant that the British government was almost as concerned to limit the imperial ambitions of France and Spain in Moroccan North Africa as she was to limit Russian ambitions in the East.[42] The independence of both Morocco and the Ottoman Empire was a key plank of

British foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century, and there are obvious parallels between the influence exerted by the British consul John Drummond Hay in Morocco and that more famously exerted by his counterpart Sir Stratford Canning in Constantinople.[43] These parallels are particularly relevant to the concerns of this article, given the importance of the nineteenth-century British humanitarianism both in domestic politics and internationally, as a powerful legitimising rhetoric.[44] Nevertheless, it is worth noting the strong interest taken by other powers in the future of both Morocco and Romania. While the former was a focus of Spanish imperial ambition during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60 and would later become the object of French expansionism in North Africa; the latter had been the object of Russian and Austrian rivalry during the Crimean War, when Austria occupied what were then the Danubian Principalities. Here, it is time to pause and consider how all this relates to the broader problematic of humanitarian intervention in the Jewish question.

The rights of religious minorities were an important concern for diplomats in Berlin and Madrid, but the context in which this issue arose was very different. The Ottoman Empire had already made a series of formal commitments to the full civil equality of religious minorities under Article 23 of the Treaty of Paris, the binding nature of which would be reiterated under Article 53 of the Treaty of Berlin.[45] In practice, however, this commitment to religious equality proved hugely problematic, contributing to large-scale ethno-religious violence in Lebanon and Syria, circa 1860, and during the 1876 revolt of Bulgarian Orthodox Christians in Rumelia.[46] As is well known, the famous 'Bulgarian atrocities' generated a massive public outcry in Europe, which contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war and led, finally, to the Congress of Berlin itself.[47] Besides recognising the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Romania, the ensuing Treaty of Berlin guaranteed formally the rights of religious minorities living within them, but failed to create an architecture for collective enforcement.[48] Although these commitments were framed in general terms, the preoccupation of the powers to defending the rights of Christian minorities was paramount. European powers paid lip service to Muslim rights in the Balkans, but they did little to protect Muslim refugees from war zones after the Russian invasion of 1877.[49] The position of Jews was more complex. They had benefited from both the Hatt-i Hümayun and the provisions for religious equality in the Treaty of Paris, even though in practice they usually found

themselves on the Muslim side during episodes of ethnic and religious violence. By contrast, Jewish communities in the emerging states of Serbia and Romania complained repeatedly to their brethren in Western Europe about the unequal treatment and persecution they suffered.[50] The success of Jewish activists and lobby groups in attracting publicity for their cause rendered the plight of the large Romanian Jewish community an international *cause célèbre*. The protections accorded religious minorities in the Balkans by the Treaty of Berlin - particularly Article 44 which dealt with the rights of religious minorities in Romania - therefore need to be situated not only within the broader tapestry of ethno-religious conflict in this region, but also within the context of the emergence of an increasingly active international Jewish lobby and the role this lobby played within the domestic politics of states like Britain, France, the United States, the new German Empire and Austria-Hungary.[51]

It is here that the question of minority rights in Romania dovetailed with that in Morocco. For while the Conference of Madrid was originally intended to limit the number of Moroccan citizens claiming the consular protection of foreign powers as a means of strengthening the authority of the Moroccan state against European encroachment, the high proportion of Jews among foreign protégés enabled Jewish activists and lobby groups like the *Alliance Israélite* and Board of Deputies to situate the aims of the Conference within a longer-standing campaign to improve the condition of Jewish communities in Morocco.

Romania and Morocco are not often considered together, but the Jewish question in both countries presents interesting parallels. Most of the 200,000 strong Moroccan Jewish community could trace their origins back to the fifteenth century or earlier.[52] Romania too had sustained a small Sephardic presence for centuries, but most Romanian Jews were first, second or third generation Ashkenazic immigrants.[53] Crucially, the number of Jews in sparsely populated Moldavia had doubled from 30,000 to 60,000 between 1803 and 1848; it doubled again in the next ten years. By 1859 there were nearly 120,000 Jews in Moldavia, compared with just over 9,000 in neighbouring Wallachia.[54] All this had obvious implications for inter-communal relations. Jews in Morocco were outsiders, but they were insiders too. Burdened by their status as *dhimmis*, by extra taxes, the lack of legal equality and a range of ritualized humiliations, Moroccan Jews also valued their separateness and lived their lives within a web of mutual

obligation bridging the confessional divide.[55] This was less true in Romania. The small community of Jews in Wallachia may have been relatively acculturated, but the burgeoning Ashkenazi community in Moldavia was culturally distinctive and generated inevitable demographic and economic strains.

These contrasting situations played out in the parallel but fundamentally contradictory debates about Jewish citizenship in Morocco and Romania that underpinned negotiations in Berlin and Madrid. The critical point is that the overwhelming majority of Jews had far deeper roots in Muslim Morocco than they had in Christian Romania, where many had immigrated within living memory. Yet the thrust of Jewish advocacy was to persuade the Powers assembled at Berlin to force the government into recognising Jews as natives with full citizenship rights, while persuading the Powers assembled at Madrid to preserve Jews from the disadvantages of local citizenship by maintaining the pre-modern system of consular protection. That such inconsistent claims were made by Jewish activists at roughly the same time, and framed in similarly humanitarian terms, is highly revealing of the very different positions Morocco and Romania occupied internationally, and the opportunities these presented for international Jewish advocacy.

Both Morocco and Romania had been the object of international Jewish activism in a humanitarian key since the early 1860s. Popular concern for the Jews of Morocco was ignited by the Jewish refugee crisis triggered during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859.[56] International interest in Romanian Jewry took off a little later, when the overthrow in 1866 of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza led to the birth of a new constitutional monarchy under Prince Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, in which the politics of nation-state formation and Jewish exclusion became intricately linked. Both countries attracted a series of high-profile Jewish visitors from Western Europe. Moses Picciotto of London and Albert Cohn of Paris visited Morocco in 1860, on behalf of the Board of Deputies and the Consistoire Central des Israélites de France, followed by Montefiore in 1864. Crémieux addressed the Romanian parliament on the issue of Jewish rights in 1866 and Montefiore was received by Prince Carol a year later: neither approach met with success. The situation of Jews in both countries consequently became a source of on-going international concern: prompted by frequent appeals from Jewish communal leaders in Morocco and Romania; sustained by a diet of atrocity reports in the press; characterised by regular interactions

involving European Jewish leaders, Foreign Ministers, local consuls, and representatives of the Moroccan and Romanian governments. Such appeals followed a typical, well publicised pattern whereby complaints received by prominent Jews and Jewish organisations in Paris and London (although sometimes elsewhere), led to pressure on British and French (but later also American, German and Austrian) governments, whose consuls were instructed to investigate the complaints and bring official pressure to bear as appropriate - sometimes collectively but mostly through individual interactions with government ministers and local officials. So well established was this pattern that the authorities in both countries frequently protested against the malign influence of the international Jewish lobby and its attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the state - either internally, as in the case of Morocco, or externally, as in the case of Romania.

Yet the quality of public interest in these two on-going 'humanitarian' crises was of a different order. Anti-Jewish outrages in Romania translated into a degree of public concern far exceeding that generated by the smaller (but still significant) stream of atrocity reports from Morocco. This, in turn, resulted in greater diplomatic engagement with Romanian Jewish issues both on the part of foreign governments and on the part of international Jewish organisations. Events in Romania prompted telegraphic disapproval from Napoleon III; official sponsorship of the 1867 Montefiore mission by all five Great Powers; the dispatch of a US consul explicitly empowered to represent Jewish interests in the shape of Benjamin Peixotto; parliamentary discussion in England, Italy, the United States and Germany; the great Mansion House meeting of 1872 in London; and the two ground-breaking conferences of international Jewish activists held in 1872 and 1876.[57] Events in Morocco prompted nothing of the kind.

The difference is only partly explained by the greater numbers involved, and the more overt nature of the threat in Romania. A telegram from Jassy in 1867, for instance, described 'upwards of 20,000 families in the greatest danger of our lives; men are pursued in the streets, thrown in chains, hunted we know not whither; about 300 families have already been ruined. Every moment threatens to annihilate all.'[58] There was certainly nothing like this in Morocco, although observers like Drummond Hay believed the threat of such disturbances was real.[59] Ultimately, the second-class status of Jews in both countries rendered them vulnerable to arbitrary treatment by the authorities and victimisation by the

rest of society at a time of rapid social, economic and political change precipitated, in both cases, by contact with the West.

**4. The feasibility of intervention: religious affinity and political realities**

The story of Jewish lobbying at the Congress of Berlin has been told several times, most recently by Carole Fink.[60] Historians have stressed the critical influence exerted by Bismarck's personal banker, Gerson von Bleichröder, and the fortuitous interaction between Jewish demands for emancipation in Romania and the existence of an influential lobby of German stockholders who had lost heavily through investments in Romanian railways and demanded to be bailed out by the Romanian state.[61] Of course, Bismarck's goodwill made a difference. Yet the resulting commitments to religious freedom and equality embedded within the constitutions of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were framed in general terms that reflected longer-term diplomatic patterns. Of the sixty-six articles in the Treaty of Berlin, eleven dealt with religious freedom and civil and political rights - not just in the new Balkan states, but in the rump Ottoman Empire. These, in turn, drew on a tradition stretching back beyond the Treaty of Paris to the Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane, in which European powers sought to promote the principle of civil and religious equality for religious minorities in the Ottoman world - a process in which Jews had been integrated from the start. Importantly, this preoccupation with civil rights for religious minorities was a central plank of the broader modernization agenda imposed on the Ottoman Empire by European powers, particularly Britain, from 1839 onwards through diplomatic and military means. The logic of the emerging international system therefore supported the introduction of these clauses into the Treaty of Berlin, whilst ensuring they were phrased in highly general - not to say innocuous - terms. Thus Article 44 of the Romanian constitution never explicitly mentioned the Jews, although it was written with them in mind. For even without the Bismarck-Bleichröder connection, decades of campaigning on behalf of oppressed Jewry had helped to render the treatment of religious and ethnic minorities a pre-condition of acceptance into an international state system that was increasingly governed by Western norms.[62] Interestingly, however, these considerations did not apply to Morocco, even once the Vatican formally

requested 'the high offices of the Catholic Powers, in order that at the Diplomatic Conference about to be opened at Madrid on the affairs of Morocco relative to the religious freedom of the inhabitants there, similar to that which was adopted at the Congress of Berlin for the subjects of the Sublime Porte.'[63] Why not?

Contemporaries were certainly aware of the parallels. In a letter to the Grand Vizier protesting a series of recent anti-Jewish outrages that had garnered much attention in the press, US Consul Felix Matthews warned the Moroccan government in 1880 that '[a]bout three years since Turkey, that powerful nation, still persisted in misusing her non-Mohammedan subjects, who, oppressed and worn, raised their voice and they were heard; another nation came and emancipated them, through which Turkey lost several principalities and territories, larger than the Empire of Morocco, and all this happened for having persecuted those subjects who were not of their religious persuasion.'[64] Concerned as it was with the fate of Catholic missionaries and converts, the Papacy too saw Berlin as a precedent, arguing that it was 'not allowable to suppose that the moorish Government, bound by so strong a tie to the Supreme Representative of Islamism, can refuse to follow the example afforded by the adhesion of the Emperor of the Ottomans to the articles stipulated in the congress of Berlin...'[65] Writing in support of the Papal initiative, the Austrian Count Károlyi appears to have accepted this argument, while recognising that 'the actual situation in Morocco will not allow it to proceed immediately to a declaration as complete and positive as that made by Turkey in Berlin'.[66] Unsurprisingly, diplomats like Matthews, Cardinal Nina, and Károlyi highlighted the parallels between Morocco and the Ottoman Empire as Muslim polities. For Jewish activists the similarities between the situation in Romania and Morocco appeared equally compelling.[67] Yet if we look at the actual negotiations in Madrid over religious toleration and foreign protection, it is clear that neither the Ottoman precedent nor the humanitarian concern directed towards Moroccan Jewry counted for much in the face of the British foreign policy commitment to Moroccan independence and broader concerns about the nature of the Moroccan polity itself.

On other occasions - Berlin (1878), Berlin (1885), Brussels (1890) - Britain consistently took the lead in forcing humanitarian concerns up the diplomatic agenda, partly for ideological reasons but also because the Foreign Office recognised the need to cater to the influential humanitarian constituency in

British politics.[68] Jewish lobbyists like Montefiore had taken care to build horizontal alliances with leading figures within this lobby ever since the 1830s. The willingness of British Christians to contribute funds to relieve Jewish refugees and famine victims, and the readiness of political and religious leaders to appear on the platform alongside their Jewish counterparts at meetings held to protest Jewish persecutions in 1872 and 1882 suggest that these alliances still held. Yet when the Austrian Count Ludolf called on Sackville West, the British Ambassador in Madrid, seeking 'a declaration in favour of religious liberty in Morocco in the sense of Article LXII of the Treaty of Berlin' and claiming that '[o]ther Powers ... had agreed to this proposition', he met with a polite rebuttal.[69] Her Majesty's Government entirely concurred in the spirit that had animated the Austrian government in promoting this course of action, but consistently refused to expand the scope of the Conference beyond its initial agenda - although it would happily participate in a more informal initiative once the Conference had ended.[70]

This attitude proved decisive. When Emanuel Veneziani and Charles Netter of the *Alliance Israélite* arrived in Madrid to lobby for the inclusion of a clause on religious toleration, they found that most of the diplomats gathered there were 'in favour of the subject being introduced, but at the same time no one was prepared to take the initiative'.[71] Crucially, Sackville West maintained 'the impossibility of the Jewish subjects of the Sultan being placed upon religious equality with the Mussulman subjects, and referred to Sir John Drummond Hay's decided opinion that if the Sultan was forced by foreign Powers to take any such step, he (the Sultan) would be unable to restrain the fanaticism of the Mahommedan population, and that a general massacre of the Jewish inhabitants of the towns would ensue'. Events in Syria, where the Hatt-i Hümayun did provoke the massacre of Christians - suggest that there may have been truth in this observation. But the spectre of Damascus was never raised by diplomats discussing the Moroccan question, who conspicuously failed to consider why an argument that applied quite as much to the Ottoman Empire as it did Morocco, should only carry weight when considering the institutional arrangements of the latter.

The diplomatic correspondence does not provide categorical answers to this conundrum, but it is suggestive. Felix Matthews, the US Consul to Tangier, was particularly uncompromising in his support for Jews in Morocco, and the US government categorically endorsed both the Austrian proposals and

Mathews' energetic stance.[72] Yet even Felix Matthews accepted when considering the issue of protection for naturalised US citizens, that '[i]t would be absurd to compare Morocco with Turkey, notwithstanding that the Ottoman Government still lacks many reforms and much morality to place it within the circle with Germany and other civilised nations'.[73] In his view, the complete lack of bureaucracy and the prevalence of venality rendered Morocco 'an exception to all other nations'. Likewise, the tenor of Drummond Hay's reports led Foreign Secretary Granville to conclude that the government of Morocco was 'one of the worst in the world', and that 'if this state of affairs continues, it must, sooner or later, end in a catastrophe.'[74] Both sides of the argument, therefore, shared a belief that Morocco was incapable of rising to the standard of 'civilised nations'. The difference was merely that whereas Hay believed it was necessary to bolster the Moroccan state by restricting foreign protection so that it could regain control and institute modernising reforms in order to improve the condition of religious minorities, Matthews believed there would be no need for foreign protection if the Moroccan state endorsed religious liberty, but that the plight of Moroccan Jews fully justified their exceptional status until it did so.

Both Hay and Matthews came from countries with a significant Jewish lobby and a real if problematic tradition of endorsing a humanitarian foreign policy agenda.[75] Both countries had, moreover, demonstrated official sympathy for the Jewish cause during the Damascus Affair of 1840 and, more recently, during the prolonged difficulties in Romania. The Mortara Affair of 1859 had demonstrated the reluctance of US governments to take moral high ground before the abolition of slavery, since they did not wish to endorse the principle of humanitarian intervention for obvious reasons.[76] Thereafter, however, the US government repeatedly responded to the lobbying of American Jewish citizens by demonstrated its sympathy for their coreligionists abroad. Such support rarely endangered strategic considerations, however. As I have argued elsewhere, Britain was sometimes willing to go against the grain of state interest in defending Jewish rights, but not at Madrid, where considerations of *realpolitik* were simply overwhelming.[77] These differing interests led to Hay and Matthews to adopt different policies, but they both acted on the same fundamental premise of Moroccan exceptionalism.

This, indeed, was the nub of the matter. The requirement that the Ottoman Empire adhere to supposedly European norms of religious freedom and equality may well have represented unwarranted

interference in its internal affairs, but it was also a compliment. With time and effort, Europeans like Palmerston and Stratford Canning really believed that the Ottoman Empire might aspire to membership of the European state system. Both the Tanzimat reforms and the Ottoman constitutional movement of the late 1870s testified to the acceptance, at least in principle, of quasi-European norms. As Matthews explained to the Moroccan foreign minister in February 1880:

> in Turkey exists a parliament where the voice of its subjects is heard, and justice is administered by a mixed tribunal, where the testimony of Mohammedans, Christians and Hebrews is held alike; Morocco has no parliament, and you once officially informed me that the Moorish tribunals of justice admitted of no other testimony but that of those only professing the Mohammedan religion. If justice were administered in Morocco as it is in Turkey, I am confident that no subject of Morocco would seek or accept foreign protection or jurisdiction.[78]

In short, the adoption of European constitutional and judicial forms during the Tanzimat, specifically where religious minorities were concerned, gave the Ottomans a viable defence against the abuse of consular protection while, at the same time, creating new expectations that justified a different kind of intervention. Less seemed possible for the barbarous and 'unstable' state of Morocco, prompting diplomats like Drummond Hay - who was firmly committed to its independence - to conclude that a 'policy .... of too active an interference on the part of the foreign Governments in such matters' was 'much to be deprecated.'[79] The role of international Jewish relief within the broader constituency of British humanitarian politics was not big enough to overturn this policy of caution, although the Jewish press launched a smear campaign against Drummond Hay in the aftermath of Madrid, claiming that his vested interests in Morocco led him to take such a firmly anti-Jewish line.[80] Had the religious minority in Morocco been primarily Christian rather than primarily Jewish, it may be that the balance between humanitarian ideology and strategic interests would have shifted and that Britain would have adopted a policy more similar to that of the United States, which might, in turn, have led to a different outcome in Madrid.

The comparison with Romania does not support this suggestion. For Romania was, of course, a Christian country with a Jewish minority, and yet Romania - unlike Morocco - was forced to embrace the

principle of civil and religious liberty, at least on paper. On the one hand, this reflected higher expectations of a Christian and European polity, on the other hand it reflected the broader diplomatic context in which the Treaty of Berlin emerged. Speaking to the House of Lords in 1867, Stratford Canning clearly situated the problems faced by Romanian Jewry within the broader context of Balkan politics and the emergence of a constitutional state: 'When a country had undertaken, as this had done, and could actually carry out its undertaking, to give institutions of a free and liberal character to the Principalities on the Danube, and to secure them from what they considered oppression at the hands of the Turkish Government, it was irritating to see the Government of those Principalities, so placed, as it were, under the sanction of a European benevolence, turning round upon a people of a different religious persuasion, and subjecting them to the treatment described in what he had read.'[81] In theory, the adoption of western constitutional forms under European tutelage transformed the possibilities available to Jews in countries like Roumania, rendering citizenship a more attractive proposition than consular protection. In practice, where citizenship was not forthcoming it removed a source of external support and rendered them potentially more vulnerable. Ultimately, the situation in Romania confounded expectations both of Christian civilisation and constitutional democracy. 'I cannot believe that Your Highness' enlightened government authorises measures so contrary to humanity and civilisation', wrote Napoleon III to Prince Carol of Romania in 1867.[82] Blinded as they were by Romania's adoption of western constitutional forms, European public opinion failed to appreciate the disjuncture between these forms and Romanian realities. By contrast, atrocity reports from Morocco merely confirmed in built prejudices, leading the powers at Madrid to accepted that such a 'barbarous' polity could not be held to account.

All this suggests that we need to rethink our own assumptions about the impetus behind humanitarian interventions in the Ottoman Empire and the emerging Balkan states. Both Gary Bass and Davide Rodgono have emphasised the importance of religious affinity between Western and Eastern Christians and the place of humanitarian intervention within the international system of the nineteenth century. Their emphasis, however, has been on the need for cooperation between the Great Powers to ensure that intervention was not too clearly a proxy for diplomatic self-interest or imperial expansionism. The experience of Jewish activists when trying to promote civil and religious liberty in Morocco and

Romania suggests that humanitarian intervention was primarily a product of the international system with religious affinity a secondary factor, since the logic of the former so clearly trumped the latter in the case of Romania. In weighing the relative importance of strategic considerations, international stability and religious affinity, the perceived ability of governments beyond the European core to engage with a 'modernizing' agenda by adopting state structures that reflected Western priorities was of crucial importance. Situating the Romanian example in comparative context should prompt us to consider more seriously the role of constitutional forms within the emerging diplomatic structures of the late nineteenth century, and the role of civil and religious liberty as a proxy for 'civilised values' in the international construction of new diplomatic norms.

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1. Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle. The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008); *Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim, 'Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention,' in Simms and Trim (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: A History, ed. Simms and Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),* 1–24; Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre. Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914. The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) Both Bass and Rodogno focus on the Ottoman interventions, while Simms and Trim devote a section to each of these issues.

2. On the difficulties of defining humanitarian intervention as a historical practice see Trim and Simms, 'Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention,' 2–7. On the origins of humanitarianism, see Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown, ed., *Humanitarianism and Suffering. The Mobilization of Empathy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity. A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), though neither really addresses humanitarian intervention. For opposing views of the longer term origins of 'human rights' see Lynn Hunt, *The French Revolution and Human Rights. A Brief Documentary History.* (Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin's, 1996),

Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights. A History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007) and Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), especially Chapter 1.

3. See for instance *L. H. Gann, 'The Berlin Conference and the Humanitarian Conscience,'* and *Suzanne Miers, 'Humanitarianism at Berlin: Myth or Reality?' in Stig Forster et al (eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa. The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 321–31, 332–45.

4. On humanitarianism and empire see *Andrew Porter, 'Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,' in Andrew Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III, The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 198–221.

5. These connections are explored in detail in Abigail Green, *Moses Montefiore: Jewish Liberator, Imperial Hero* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).

6. On the connections between Edwardian anti-slavery and the international structures of the interwar period, see Kevin Grant, *A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884–1926* (Oxford: Routledge, 2005). On the continuities between pre-war Jewish activism and interwar minority rights, see above all Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); also *Michael R. Marrus, 'International Bystanders to the Holocaust and Humanitarian Intervention,' in Wilson and Brown (eds.), Humanitarianism and Suffering, 156–74.* For an alternative perspective on Jewish diplomacy at Versailles see Mark Levene, *War, Jews and the New Europe. The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919* (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1992).

7. See François Guesnet, 'Textures of Intercession - Rescue Efforts for the Jews of Prague, (1744–1748),' *Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook,* 4 (2005), 355–75.

8. On this episode see Guido Abbattista, ‘Edmund Burke, the Atlantic American War and the ‘Poor Jews at St. Eustatius’. Empire and the Law of Nations,’ *Cromohs*, 13 (2008), 1–39. More generally see *Brendan Simms, ‘”A False Principle in the Law of Nations”’: Burke, State Sovereignty [German] Liberty, and Intervention in the Age of Westphalia,’ in Simms and Trim (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, 89–110.*

9. Marrus, ‘International Bystanders,’ 159, n.8.

10. *Principalities. No.1 (1877) Correspondence Respecting the Condition and Treatment of the Jews in Servia and Roumania 1867–1876*, Parliamentary Accounts and Papers (London: Harrison & Sons, 1877), 47.

11. See *Abigail Green, ‘Intervening in the Jewish Question, 1840–1878,’ in Simms and Trim (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention,* 139–58, and Marrus, ‘International Bystanders,’ 158–9.

12. See for instance Marrus, ‘International Bystanders,’ 162.

13. *Shlomo Lambroza, ‘The Pogroms of 1903–1906,’ in John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (eds.), Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 216, 231.

14. Both Bass, *Freedom’s Battle,* and Rodogno, *Against Massacre* contain relatively detailed accounts of this violence, of which Rodogno’s is the more balanced. For an account from an Ottoman/ Muslim perspective see the contentious Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821–1922* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995).

15. On the Armenian case see Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide. Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Chapter 1 and Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, Chapter 8.

16. See Green, ‘Intervening in the Jewish Question’. More generally, on the interplay between such interventions and British humanitarian ideology see Abigail Green, ‘The British Empire and the Jews: An Imperialism of Human Rights?’ *Past & Present*, 199 (May 2008), 175–205.

17. For the text of the *firman* see Louis Loewe (ed.), *Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore, Comprising Their Life and Work as Recorded in Their Diaries from 1812 to 1883*, vol. 1 (London: Griffith Farran Okeden & Welsh, 1890), 278–9. On Ottoman Jewry, see Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry. A History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th-20th Centuries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society* (Holmes & Meier Publishers: New York, London, 1982). On Montefiore see above all Green, *Montefiore*.

18. The *dahir* granted Montefiore served as an initial point of reference in the collective address on religious liberty from the representatives of the Powers at the Conference of Madrid in 1880 to the Sultan of Morocco. Protocole No. 12 of the Madrid Conference, séance du 26 Juin 1880, text of the collective note on religious freedom addressed to the Sultan of Morocco in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid in 1880 Respecting the Right of Protection of Moorish Subjects by the Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of Foreign Powers in Morocco* (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1880: Morocco No. 1), No. 146 Inclosure 1, 170.

19. See Green, ‘Intervening in the Jewish Question,’ 147–9; Green, ‘British Empire and the Jews,’ 197–8.

20. See for instance Carol Iancu, *Les Juifs en Roumanie (1866–1919). De l’Exclusion à l’Emancipation* (Aix en Provence: Editions de l’Université de Provence, 1978).

21. See Jonathan Frankel, *The Damascus Affair: ‘ritual Murder,’ Politics, and the Jews in 1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

22. See Green, *Montefiore*, 278–81. On the Mortara Affair see David I. Kertzer, *The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara* (London: Picador, 1997).

23. In addition, I make use of archival sources analysed in the context of my biographical work on Sir Moses Montefiore.

24. On the 'Court Jew' paradigm see Selma Stern, *The Court Jew. A Contribution to the History of the Period of Absolutism in Central Europe.* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1950). On *Shtadlanut* see *François Guesnet, 'Die Politik der 'Fürsprache' - Vormoderne jüdische Interessenvertretung,' in Dan Diner (ed.), Synchrone Welten: Zeiträume jüdischer Geschichte* (Göttingen, 2005), 67–92; Guesnet, 'Politik der Vormoderne - Shtadlanut am Vorabend der polnischen Teilungen,' *Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow Instituts*, 1 (2002): 235–55.

25. See François Guesnet, 'Textures of Intercession' and Baruch Mevorach, 'Die Interventionsbestrebungen in Europa zur Verhinderung der Vertreibung der Juden aus Böhmen und Mähren, 1744–1745," *Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte*, IX (1980), 15–81.

26. David Sorkin, 'Montefiore and the Politics of Emancipation,' *Jewish Review of Books*, 1: 2 (Summer 2010).

27. On Crémieux see S. Posener, *Adolphe Crémieux, a Biography* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1940) and Daniel Amson, *Adolphe Crémieux, L'Oublié de la Gloire* (Paris: Seuil, 1988). On the interplay between national politics and international Jewish advocacy see Green, 'Intervening in the Jewish Question.'

28. British Jews were not fully emancipated until 1848 however. See M. C. N. Salbstein, *The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain: The Question of the Admission of the Jews to Parliament 1828–1860* (London: Associated University Presses, 1982).

29. See Eli Bar-Chen, *Weder Asiaten noch Orientalen. Internationale jüdische Organisationen und die Europäisierung "rückständiger" Juden* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2005). More specifically on the emergence of the *Alliance Israélite* see Lisa Moses Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity. The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in Nineteenth Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France. From the French Revolution to the Alliance Israélite Universelle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). On its activities see André Chouraqui, *Cent Ans d'Histoire. L' Alliance Israélite Universelle et la Renaissance Juive Contemporaine (1860–1960)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965); Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews. The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

30. On the role of these organisations as proxies for imperial rivalry see *Yaron Tsur, 'Religious Internationalism in the Jewish Diaspora - a Glance at the Community of Tunis at the Dawn of the Colonial Period,' in Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene (eds.), Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities Since 1750* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 186–205.

31. Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity*, 641.

32. See *Abigail Green, 'Old Networks, New Connections: The Emergence of the Jewish International,' in Green and Viaene (eds.), Religious Internationals in the Modern World*, 53–81; Abigail Green, 'Nationalism and the "Jewish International": Religious Internationalism in Europe and the Middle East c.1840-c.1880,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 50: 2 (April 2008), 535–58.

33. *Lloyd P. Gartner, 'Documents on Roumanian Jewry, Consul Peixotto, and Jewish Diplomacy, 1870–1875,' in Saul Liebermann and Arthur Hyman (eds.), Salo Wittmayer Baron Jubilee Volume,* vol. 1, (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1974), 467–90 Lloyd P. Gartner, 'Roumania, America, and World Jewry: Consul Peixotto in Bucharest, 1870–1876,' *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, LVIII (1968), 25–117.

34. See *Jonathan Frankel, 'Crisis as a Factor in Modern Jewish Politics, 1840 and 1881–2,' in Jehuda Reinharz (ed.), Living with Antisemitism. Modern Jewish Responses* (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1987), 42–58.

35. See Levene, *War, Jews and the New Europe* and Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*.

36. Green, *Montefiore*.

37. Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity*.

38. Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield Of Faith. Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Knopf, 2012), Chapter 11 deals with this in a slightly later period.

39. On Morocco, see Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and Its Interpretations in Pre-Colonial Morocco. State-Society Relations During the French Conquest of Algeria* (London: Routledge, 2002). On the Ottoman world, see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009).

40. On the problematic of modernisation and reform in the Ottoman Empire see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

41. Note, however, that Britain did take an active interest in the plight of Persian Jewry, as outlined in Daniel Tsadik, *Between Foreigners and Shi'is. Nineteenth-Century Iran and Its Jewish Minority* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

42. The classic account of the Eastern Question remains M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923. A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966). On Moroccan foreign relations see the monumental Jean-Louis Miège, *L'Ouverture*, vol. 2 of *Le Maroc et l'Europe (1830–1894)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), Francis Rosebro Flournoy, *British Policy Towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston (1830–1865)* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935).

43. On Hay see Ben-Srhir, *Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845–1886* (London: Routledge, 2005). On Canning see *Allan Cunningham, 'Stratford Canning and the Tanzimat,' in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds.), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East. The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 245–64.

44. On the British tradition of humanitarian politics see Grant, *A Civilised Savagery*. On humanitarianism and British attitudes to the Eastern Question see Michelle Tusan, *Smyrna's Ashes. Humanitarianism, Genocide and the Birth of the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

45. *Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East. Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878* (House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1878: Turkey. No. 44).

46. On events in Lebanon and Syria see Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War. Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994); Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).

47. See the seminal R. T. Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963).

48. On this see especially Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*, Prologue.

49. On this see Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 167–8.

50. For details of the Serbian appeal see Green, *Montefiore*, 342–3.

51. See Green, ‘Nationalism and the ‘Jewish International’; Abigail Green, ‘Sir Moses Montefiore and the Making of the ‘Jewish International’, *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies,* 7: 3 (November 2008), 287–307; Green, ‘Old Networks, New Connections’.

52. The classic account of Moroccan Jewry in this period is Mohammed Kenbib, *Juifs et Musulmans Au Maroc, 1859–1948. Contribution à l’Histoire Des Relations Inter-Communautaires en Terre d’Islam* (Casablanca: Najah el Jadida, 1994). H. Z. Hirschberg, *From the Ottoman Conquests to the Present Time*, vol. 2 of *A History of the Jews in North Africa* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1981) provides a useful Zionist counterpoint.

53. The classic history of Romanian Jewry remains Iancu, *Les Juifs en Roumanie*, available in slightly abridged translation as Carol Iancu, *Jews in Romania 1866–1919: From Exclusion to Emancipation* (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, 1996).

54. For general demographic statistics see Iancu, *Jews in Romania*, 47.

55. The classic account of Moroccan Jewish life remains Shlomo Deshen, *The Mellah Society. Jewish Community Life in Sherifian Morocco* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). On Muslim-Jewish coexistence see also Emily Gottreich, *The Mellah of Marrakesh. Jewish and Muslim Space in Morocco’s Red City* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007). For a summary of the debate over Moroccan Jewry see Daniel J. Schroeter, *The Sultan’s Jew. Morocco and the Sephardi World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 4–10.

56. For more information see Green, *Montefiore*, 255–58, 300–1.

57. The best account of the campaign is found in Iancu, *Jews in Romania*.

58. Telegram Communicated to Lord Stanley by the Chief Rabbi, Letter 30, *Principalities. No.1 (1877) Correspondence respecting the condition and treatment of the Jews in Servia and Roumania 1867–1876*, 14.

59. Sir John Drummond Hay to Earl Granville, Tangier, 24 June 1880, in *Morocco. No. 1 1880*, 137–9.

60. Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*, Prologue.

61. On Bleichröder's role see above all Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron. Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), Chapter 14.

62. This argument is further elaborated in Green, 'Intervening in the Jewish Question.'

63. Note from the Chambers of the Vatican to the Ambassador Extraordinary of Austria-Hungary at the Holy See, May 5 1880, in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid*, 100.

64. Translation from the Arabic of a letter addressed by F. A. Matthews to the grand vizier of the Emperor of Morocco, on the occasion of the recent atrocities committed on the Israelites of Morocco, Feb. 21 1880, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Transmitted to Congress, December 6, 1880*, 796.

65. Letter from His Eminence Cardinal Nina, extracted in Protocol No. 12, of the session of 26 June 1880, on the Question of Religious Toleration, FRUS 1880, Dec. 6 1880, 915.

66. Count Károlyi, London, to Granville in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid*, No. 105, 99–100.

67. 'The Morocco Conference', *The Jewish Chronicle*, 28 May 1880, 9

68. See the argument in Miers, 'Humanitarianism at Berlin.'

69. L. S. Sackville West, Madrid, to Earl Granville (received June 3) in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid*, No. 107, 103.

70. Granville, Foreign Office, June 5 1880, to Károlyi in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid*, No. 109, 104.

71. Sackville West, Madrid, June 3 1880, to Granville (received June 7) in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid*, No. 112, 109–10.

72. Translation from the Arabic of a letter addressed by F. A. Matthews to the grand vizier of the Emperor of Morocco, on the occasion of the recent atrocities committed on the Israelites of Morocco, Feb. 21 1880; WM. M. Evarts, Washington, June 15 1880, to Fairchild, FRUS 1880, No. 578, 897.

73. Mathews, Tangier, to Evarts, FRUS 1880, No 505,791.

74. Granville, Foreign Office, June 15 1880, to Hay in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid*, No. 118, 117.

75. See Preston, *Sword of the Spirit*.

76. See Bertram Wallace Korn, *The American Reaction to the Mortara Case: 1858–1859* (Cincinnati: American Jewish Archives, 1957).

77. Green, 'British Empire and the Jews.'

78. Mathews, Tangier, to Sidi Mohamed Bargash, FRUS 1880, No 505, Inclosure 2 in No 358, 794.

79. Memorandum of the Language held by Her Majesty's Representative at Tangier to the Anglo-Jewish association in England respecting the Protection hitherto afforded to the Jewish Population in Morocco by the Foreign Representatives, Inclosure 2 in No. 40 in *Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid*, 56–7.

80. 'The Jews of Morocco', *The Jewish Chronicle*, 12 Nov. 1880, 4.

81. 'Persecution of Jews in Moldavia,' *The Jewish Chronicle,* 8 July 1867, 7.

82. *Aus dem Leben König Karls von Rumänien. Aufzeichnungen eines Augenzeugen*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1894), 201.