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Eric Eve

Memory, Orality and the Synoptic Problem

Diskussionen des synoptischen Problems berufen sich oft auf „mündliche Tradition" als Erklärungsmodell, ohne angemessen darauf zu achten, wie mündliche Überlieferung tatsächlich funktioniert. Es ist hilfreich, mündliche Tradition in ihrem Zusammenhang mit Erinnerungsprozessen zu betrachten. Dieser Artikel gibt zunächst einen Überblick über einige Aspekte der Gedächtnisforschung, die für das Neue Testament von Belang sind, insbesondere für Fragen der mündlichen Tradition im Unterschied zu *oral history* oder anderen weniger formellen Arten mündlicher Kommunikation. Die Ergebnisse dieser Überlegungen werden anschließend auf drei Punkte des synoptischen Problems angewendet, bei denen mündliche Überlieferung zur Erklärung herangezogen wird: Abweichungen bei synoptischen Parallelen, *minor agreements*, und das Phänomen der wechselnden Priorität zwischen Mt und Lk. Es wird argumentiert, dass der Rückbezug auf mündliche Tradition als Erklärungsmodell nicht generell unangebracht ist, dass dabei allerdings eine gewisse Vorsicht geboten ist, weil es keineswegs immer die Standpunkte stützen kann, die es unterstützen soll.

Keywords: Synoptic problem, memory, oral tradition, minor agreements, alternating primitivity, Lord's Prayer, Beatitudes.

1. Introduction

It is no novelty to suggest that oral tradition and memory might have a bearing on the Synoptic problem. It has been over a century, for example, since William Sanday suggested that the use of memory in copying a source might explain the variations of Matthew and Luke from Mark,[1] while orality has long featured in discussions of Synoptic relations.[2] Over the last decade or so there has been a welcome burgeoning of interest

1 W. Sanday, "The Conditions under Which the Gospels Were Written, in Their Bearing upon Some Difficulties of the Synoptic Problem," in *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (ed. W. Sanday; Oxford, 1911), 3–26, here 18–19.

2 E.g., J.C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae* (Oxford, 1899), 53–55, 62–63, 138–139. For a more thoroughgoing example, see A.B. Lord, "The Gospels as Oral Traditional Literature," in *The Relationships Among the Gospels: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue* (ed. W.O. Walker; San Antonio, Tex., 1978), 33–91.

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in these areas.[3] Less attention has been paid, however, to the specific issue of how memory relates to oral tradition, and what implications this may have for appeals to "oral tradition" to support or challenge particular theories of synoptic relations. It is this issue that the present essay will explore.

We shall start by reviewing some relevant aspects of memory and orality studies, going on to emphasize that oral tradition needs to be distinguished from oral communication in general, not least by its being subject to particular mnemonic constraints. While this is scarcely a new insight in itself,[4] its implications for the possible roles of oral tradition in the Synoptic problem seem not always to have been thought through. This will be illustrated through three examples: the appeal to "orality" to account for parallel pericopes that exhibit relatively little common wording, the suggestion that some minor agreements could be explained by oral tradition, and questionable assumptions about which versions of synoptic parallels are likely to represent the more primitive tradition.

2. Memory

Three different kinds of memory study have a potential bearing on biblical studies. For the sake of convenience we may call them the sociological, the psychological and the literary-historical.

The sociological study of memory refers to what is variously termed collective, social or cultural memory, going back to the work of Maurice Halbwachs in the thirties and forties of the last century.[5] Halbwachs's key contention was that all memory is collective memory, and that memory is always a social act supported by socially-constructed frameworks. Halbwachs insisted that collective memory has to do with social identity,

3 On memory, see, for example, A. Gregory, "What Is Literary Dependence?" in *New Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (ed. P. Foster et al.; BETL 139; Leuven, 2011), 87–114, here 95–103; R.A. Derrenbacker, "The 'External and Psychological Conditions under Which the Synoptic Gospels Were Written': Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem," ibid., 435–457, here 445–454; A. Kirk, "Memory, Scribal Media, and the Synoptic Problem," ibid., 459–482; on orality see, e.g., J.D.G. Dunn, "Altering the Default Setting: Re-Envisaging the Early Transmission of the Jesus Tradition," *NTS* 49 (2003), 139–175; and T.C. Mournet, *Oral Tradition and Literary Dependency: Variability and Stability in the Synoptic Tradition and Q* (WUNT 2/195; Tübingen, 2005).

4 See, e.g., the remarks in W.H. Kelber, *The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul and Q* (Voices in Performance and Text; Bloomington, Ind., 1997), 26–28, 50–51, 57–59.

5 M. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (ed. D.N. Levine, trans. L.A. Coser; Chicago, 1992).

which suggests that collective memory shifts to meet new social needs, although it has also been pointed out that the desire to preserve social identity through time can have a conservative effect on social memory. Collective memory is a concept that has since been developed in a large body of literature and applied (among other things) to the study of the New Testament.[6] Its relevance to the present topic is restricted to that intersection of social and psychological studies of memory that can help clarify what makes oral tradition memorable. In essence this is an overlap that stems from the seminal work of Frederick Bartlett.[7]

The psychological study of memory focuses on the mechanisms of remembering, forgetting, and misremembering in individuals, typically drawing on models taken from computer science and correlated with investigations of brain behavior.[8] The psychology of memory does not seem to have penetrated very deeply into New Testament studies, although there are some exceptions. For example, both John Dominic Crossan and Dale Alison have stressed the frailties of human memory in matters of detail, while Richard Bauckham and Robert McIver have emphasized the general reliability of memory (especially as it is likely to relate to the Jesus tradition).[9] While such discussions tend to focus on the reliability or otherwise of memory, often conceived as autobiographical memory (or the episodic memory of individuals), the interesting questions are not simply whether, say, autobiographical memory is generally reliable or unreliable, but under what conditions it may be one or the other, what kind of

6 On collective memory in general see, e. g., P. Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge, 1989); G. Cubitt, *History and Memory* (Manchester, 2007); J.L. Fentress and C. Wickham, *Social Memory* (Oxford, 1992); B.A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (Maidenhead, 2003); A. Kirk, "Social and Cultural Memory," in *Memory, Tradition, and Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity* (ed. A. Kirk and T. Thatcher; SemeiaSt 52; Leiden, 2005), 1–24. For some examples of the application of social memory theory to New Testament studies see A. Kirk and T. Thatcher (eds.), *Memory, Tradition, and Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity* (SemeiaSt 52; Leiden, 2005); R.A. Horsley and J.A. Draper, *Whoever Hears You Hears Me: Prophets, Performance and Tradition in Q* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1999); R.A. Horsley, *Jesus in Context: Power, People, and Performance* (Minneapolis, 2008); R. Rodriguez, *Structuring Early Christian Memory: Jesus in Tradition, Performance and Text* (London, 2010).

7 F.C. Bartlett, *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge, 1995).

8 See, e. g., A. Baddeley, M.W. Eysenck, and M.C. Anderson, *Memory* (Hove, 2009); D.L. Schacter, *Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past* (New York, 1996).

9 J.D. Crossan, *The Birth of Christianity: Discovering What Happened in the Years Immediately after the Execution of Jesus* (San Francisco, 1998), 59–84; D.C. Allison, *Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination and History* (London, 2010), 1–30; R. Bauckham, *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 2006), 319–357; R.K. McIver, *Memory, Jesus and the Synoptic Gospels* (Atlanta, 2011).

distortions or reinterpretations are likely to occur, and what kind of information is typically most reliably retained.

The sociological and psychological approaches agree that even individual memory has an essentially social dimension, and that individual memories no less than social ones are in part constructions, since both alike have to call upon socially-supplied language, concepts and frameworks for their articulation. The same terminology of framing, keying, schemata and scripts is found in discussions of both social memory and the psychology of memory.[10]

A schema is a piece of knowledge about the world, or a general belief about how our world works, that helps us to structure our experiences and fill in the gaps in our perceptions and recollections. Schemata influence the way information is stored and subsequently recalled.[11] A script is a particular kind of schema defining the typical sequence of events in a given situation. For example if I mention that I was unable to find any interesting magazines the last time I went to the dentist, due to your knowledge of our common visit-to-the-dentist script you will probably assume that I was looking for magazines in the waiting-room rather than in the dentist's chair or under the receptionist's desk. Precisely the same kind of script can be used to help recollect or reconstruct events. Thus, for example, if you are trying to remember what happened the last time you went to a restaurant you will be helped by the fact that one typically consults the menu at the beginning of the meal and pays the bill at the end, and that there is typically a set order for the courses. In addition, if you are trying to remember what happened by narrating the incident to yourself or someone else you will typically use one of the narrative forms current in your culture, which may in turn shape the way you remember the event.

To be sure we may remember particularly vivid exceptions simply because they are striking exceptions, and in practice our use of scripts and other schemata seems to be more complex and nuanced than these simple examples suggest. People do not in fact make as many memory errors as a crude application of schema theory might suggest.[12] That said, there does

10 The notion of "schema" derives from the work of F. Bartlett; see Bartlett, *Remembering* (see n. 7), 199–204, 300–304, 312–314. For "schemas," "scripts" and "frames" as currently applied in the psychology of memory, see Baddeley, Eysenck, and Anderson, *Memory* (see n. 8), 128–132. The terminology of "keying" and "framing" appears to have originated with B. Schwartz, "Memory as a Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II," *ASR* 61 (1996), 908–927, here 911, although the latter term clearly reflects the notion of "frameworks" that goes back to Halbwachs.

11 Baddeley, Eysenck, and Anderson, *Memory* (see n. 8), 5, 128–132.

12 Baddeley, Eysenck, and Anderson, *Memory*, (see n. 8), 132.

seem to be some tendency for both individual and social memory to shift in the direction of what a schema might lead us to expect; we often tend to perceive and to remember what we think should have happened.[13]

"Keying" refers to the attempt to make sense of the present or recent past on analogy with salient events from the more distant past, such as when Americans interpreted their experience of the Second World War in terms of the American Civil War, so that, for example, the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt was keyed to that of Abraham Lincoln.[14] A more biblically-based example might be the Pilgrim Fathers interpreting their flight from England in terms of the Exodus narrative. As Richard Horsley in particular has argued, something similar may have been happening in the Jesus tradition when, in order to make sense of what Jesus had recently said and done, he was thought of in terms of a new Moses or a new Elijah or a new David, or, if you prefer, in terms of a prophetic script or a messianic script.[15]

This clearly has consequences for oral tradition, which will tend to be shaped into culturally available schemata that help make it more memorable. It also has consequences for the situation of the Evangelists whose work formed part of, and was thus constrained by, the social memory of the communities of which they were a part; oral tradition would have been only one aspect of that wider matrix of social memory. That does not mean that the Gospel authors could not be creative or revisionist, but it does put some limits on their freedom to meddle with what people "knew" about the past. Rafael Rodriguez, for example, points out that the Evangelists would have been to some extent restricted by the already existing tradition of the (oral) performance of Jesus material. As oral-derived texts embedded in an ongoing tradition they would continue to reference that tradition as a whole in line with John M. Foley's account of the workings of oral-derived texts.[16] In Rodriguez's view this means that the Gospels were primarily oriented to the performance tradition rather than to other written texts.[17] This leads him to state that "the gospel texts are instances of the ambient Jesus tradition rather than *editions* or *redactions* of each

13 See also the discussions in J.S. Kloppenborg, "Memory, Performance and the Sayings of Jesus," *JSHJ* 10 (2012), 97–132, here 98–112, and E. Eve, *Behind the Gospels* (London, 2013), 87–98.

14 Schwartz, "Memory" (see n. 10), 911.

15 R.A. Horsley, *Hearing the Whole Story: The Politics of Plot in Mark's Gospel* (Louisville, Ky., 2001), 231–252.

16 Rodriguez, *Structuring* (see n. 6), 81–112.

17 Rodriguez, *Structuring* (see n. 6), 90–92.

other."[18] While this is a useful corrective to understanding the Synoptic problem in purely literary terms (especially in print-culture literary terms), and while Rodriguez does not want to deny the possibility of some form of literary dependence, this account probably plays down the question of literary relations a little too far. For one thing, it does not address the features of the Synoptic Gospels that have led scholars to postulate a literary relationship between them in the first place.[19] For another, it fails to take into account the strong possibility of textual memory.

This is the point at which the third, literary-historical, approach to memory may provide a useful corrective. By this I mean the work of scholars such as Mary Carruthers, Jocelyn Small and David Carr who describe how memory has been understood and employed in the mediaeval and ancient past, and how it was related to written texts.[20] In the Middle Ages and Antiquity memory played a far more central role in intellectual life than it does today and was conceived as encompassing aspects of imagination and mental manipulation that *we* tend not to think of when we speak of "memory."

One of the things that stands out from these studies is the role played by the memorization of texts, not least sacred texts. To be competently literate in a tradition was to know its key texts by heart. This was no doubt due in part to the fact that prior to the coming of print, the human memory was the most effective retrieval device available. Constant recourse to codices and scrolls would have been cumbersome at best, and their availability was in any case relatively restricted. Ancient authors thus often relied on their memories when citing other works, rather than employing the modern scholarly habit of checking their references.[21] This way of thinking about memory stands in some tension with the more dynamic social memory approach typically associated with oral tradition. Writing

18 Rodriguez, *Structuring* (see n. 6), 111 (emphasis original).

19 See, e. g., E.P. Sanders and M. Davies, *Studying the Synoptic Gospels* (London, 1989), 51–60; Gregory, "Literary Dependence" (see n. 3), 87–107; Kloppenborg, "Memory" (see n. 13), 104–106.

20 M. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge, 2008); J.P. Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and Literacy in Classical Antiquity* (London, 1997); D.M. Carr, *Writing on the Tablets of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature* (Oxford, 2005). For discussions of the relevance of these studies to the Synoptic problem see Gregory, "Literary Dependence" (see n. 3), 98–102; Kirk, "Memory" (see n. 3), 462–465.

21 For the transformative effect of print on the use of texts, see E. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1980).

makes a difference by providing a fixed text that can be used as the basis of memorization in a way that would not be possible in a purely oral environment.

Both Matthew and Luke must have been at least relatively literate in a society where literacy rates were low. Given that their Gospels were quite quickly regarded as authoritative, it is reasonable to suppose that Matthew and Luke occupied leadership positions in their respective churches, that is, that they were regarded as persons of some authority. Texts in antiquity were often (though not always) used as aids to memorization, and if Matthew and Luke were regarded as authorities on the Jesus tradition it is eminently plausible that they would know the key texts of that tradition more or less by heart so that they would have had memory command of their principal sources – Mark and whatever else it was they used – when they composed their Gospels. Andrew Gregory suggests that in common with other ancient authors the Evangelists could have written with only their main source – presumably Mark – open in front of them and relied on their memory of their other sources.[22] A more radical possibility, if Matthew and Luke were thoroughly conversant with Mark, is that they relied on their memory for *all* their sources much of the time.[23] Where both redaction criticism and Synoptic problem studies have traditionally envisaged later Evangelists *editing* their sources it might thus be better to think in terms of the later Evangelists reworking their sources in memory, with lesser or greater fidelity to the source material dependent on a number of factors.[24] While this by no means precludes the influence of the wider tradition as discussed by Rodriguez, it suggests a model of scribal composition that is as distinct from oral performance as it is from literary production in a print culture.[25]

3. Oral Tradition

Biblical scholarship has sometimes used the term "oral tradition" with distressing vagueness, as if it meant just about anything communicated by word of mouth. This has allowed scholars to use "oral tradition" as a kind of wildcard to play in default of any other explanation that fits

22 Gregory, "Literary Dependence" (see n. 3), 95–103.
23 Cf. Carr, *Writing* (see n. 20), 280–281.
24 R.A. Derrenbacker, *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem* (Leuven, 2005), 46–47.
25 See Kirk, "Memory" (see n. 3), for a nuanced discussion of this kind of scribal model.

their preferred theory. On the Two-Document Hypothesis (2DH), one possible explanation of the minor agreements between Matthew and Luke against Mark that has occasionally been offered is that they are due to "oral tradition."[26] But one then has to ask how such putative "oral tradition" could actually function to generate minor agreements. Conversely, on the Farrer Hypothesis cases where Luke appears to have the more primitive form of tradition are sometimes explained by Luke's preference for "oral tradition" over against what he read in Matthew.[27] But this again invites questions about the actual workings of oral tradition in such cases. So long as scholars never really explain what they mean by "oral tradition," they can use it to mean whatever they like and to explain whatever they like.

Oral tradition is not casual rumor or everyday conversation. Neither is it oral history, from which the Africanist Jan Vansina quite sharply distinguishes it. According to Vansina, oral tradition is that which is passed down from one generation to another, or persists over a number of generations, while oral history is rather the personal reminiscences of eyewitnesses or those who have heard eyewitnesses more or less at first hand.[28] Thus, for example, if Richard Bauckham were correct about the relationship between the Evangelists and the eyewitness sources they drew upon, then as Bauckham realizes, there would be no oral tradition involved at all, only oral history.[29]

Vansina's insistence that something only counts as oral tradition if it is passed on between generations is probably too restrictive, but to count as oral tradition something does have to be passed on in reasonably stable form through a number of people well beyond its point of origin. To survive in reasonably stable form, an oral tradition has to be memorable, and this places constraints on what can count as oral tradition. Stability does not mean total fixity, however. Although surprisingly little work seems to have been done on marrying up the two fields of study, the kind of processes that occur in oral tradition observed by folklorists and anthropologists and the kind of memorial transformations that might be predicted by studies of memory are fully congruent. Whether one speaks of an oral tra-

26 See M.E. Boring, "The 'Minor Agreements' and Their Bearing on the Synoptic Problem," in *New Studies* (see n. 3), 227–252, here 243; P.M. Head, "Textual Criticism and the Synoptic Problem," ibid., 115–156, here 150 n. 155.

27 E.g., M. Goodacre, *The Case Against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic Problem* (Harrisburg, Pa., 2002), 64–66.

28 J. Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (London, 1985), 12–13.

29 Bauckham, *Eyewitnesses* (see n. 9), 30–38.

dition becoming conformed to an existing genre or of (social or individual) memory becoming conformed to an existing schema, one is probably talking about very similar things.

There is no reason to suppose that everything that came to the Evangelists by word of mouth was an oral tradition in this restricted sense, namely a piece of verbal art designed to be memorable and successfully embedded in the collective memory of some carrier group. Moreover, the form of something may not always be a reliable guide to whether it originated as oral tradition, not least because individual and social memories are so thoroughly intertwined. Since similar memorial processes are involved, oral history can come to resemble oral tradition even on the lips of an eyewitness, particular if that eyewitness is an habitual raconteur of his or her memories. What is far less likely is the reverse, a genuine oral tradition that resembles the typically more artless narration of oral history that might occur, say, in response to a spontaneous request for information.

In order to play a significant role in explaining synoptic relations, however, oral material would have to be genuine oral tradition rather than oral history. That is, if oral material is to be invoked to account for either detailed similarities or detailed differences in wording between synoptic parallels, it must be oral material that is stable enough to influence an Evangelist's choice of wording, and if it is to be invoked to explain similarities of wording it must moreover be sufficiently stable to have reached both Evangelists in much the same form. In other words, it must be oral tradition in the strict sense. Not only that, but it must be a particular kind of oral tradition, namely oral tradition that is relatively stable not only at the level of gist but that of wording. This is by no means true of all oral tradition. Despite what is sometimes asserted, there is little or no evidence to suggest that non-literate people have better memories in general than literate ones, and even less to suggest that they would be particularly good at transmitting the precise wording of oral traditions.

One apparent argument to the contrary is that presented by Kenneth Bailey, which has proved quite influential with some New Testament scholars. Based on long observations of oral tradition in the contemporary Middle East Bailey has argued for a relatively high degree of stability in material transmitted by what he calls formal controlled and informal controlled oral tradition, but the evidence he produces for the latter scarcely supports his theory, and his work has accordingly come in for consider-

able criticism.[30] That said, some kinds of material, such as proverbs and aphorisms, can achieve a degree of verbal stability, particularly if phrased in a memorable way.[31] If we restrict our discussion to oral tradition in this most strict sense, namely material that has been honed to be memorable and reasonably stable over the course of extended transmission, we can go on to ask what it is that *makes* such oral traditions memorable and relatively stable. For this we can turn to the work of David Rubin, a psychologist who has studied precisely this question in the belief that oral tradition and the psychology of memory can be mutually illuminating.[32]

Rubin's starting point is to ask how it is that oral traditions can be remarkably stable over time, not in the sense of being completely unchanging but in the sense of remaining recognizable. The three types of oral tradition he specifically considers are epic poetry, folk ballads and child's counting-out rhymes. None of these may seem particularly close to the kind of oral tradition we imagine to lie behind the Gospels, but they are presented as particular examples of a more general theory of memory in oral tradition.

In a manner of speaking, Rubin is seeking to generalize the oral-formulaic theory of Milman Parry and Albert Lord developed in relation to Homeric and South Slavic epic poetry.[33] This began from the observation that Homeric verse makes quite heavy use of a number of set formulae, so that, for example, in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the dawn is always rosy-fingered, the sea wine-dark, and Achilles swift-footed, even in situations when he is not actually going anywhere. One advantage of such set formulae is that they neatly fill out one half of a Greek hexameter, and so form a useful stock of phrases for composition in performance, effectively forming the basic units of the poet's vocabulary. According to Parry and Lord the Homeric poems were composed in performance long before they

30 K.E. Bailey, "Informal Controlled Oral Tradition and the Synoptic Gospels," *Them* 20 (1994), 4–11 (originally published in *AsJT* 5 [1991], 3–54); id., "Middle Eastern Oral Tradition and the Synoptic Gospels," *ExpTim* 106 (1994), 363–367. For enthusiastic espousals of Bailey's work see J.D.G. Dunn, *Jesus Remembered* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 2003), 133–136, and N.T. Wright, *Jesus and the Victory of God* (London, 1996), 205–210. For critiques see T.T. Weeden, Sr., "Kenneth Bailey's Theory of Oral Tradition: A Theory Contested by Its Evidence," *JSHJ* 7 (2009), 3–43, and Kloppenborg, "Memory" (see n. 13), 112–117. For a discussion of these arguments see Eve, *Behind the Gospels* (see n. 13), 66–85.

31 As Kloppenborg, "Memory" (see n. 13), 117–118, acknowledges.

32 D.C. Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and Counting-Out Rhymes* (Oxford, 1995).

33 A.B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); J.M. Foley, *The Theory of Oral Composition: History and Methodology* (Bloomington, Ind., 1988).

were written down. They would have been re-performed many times, but no two performances would have been exactly alike; instead the poems would have been created afresh in each new performance, calling on the same stock of phrases, the same overall story outline, and the same stock of intermediate elements, such as scenes that follow the same outline or script. Thus, for example, more or less the same order of events is followed in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* every time there is a banquet or every time a hero dons his armor.[34] It is their mastery of this stock of phrases and of these intermediate and larger structures that is meant to have enabled the Homeric poets to recreate their epics in multiple performances without the aid of writing; in particular, no verbatim memorization was involved. In support of this thesis Parry and Lord carried out extensive fieldwork in Yugoslavia observing illiterate bards compose in performance in much the manner just described, the best of them well able to rival Homer at least in terms of the length of the epics produced.

The oral formulaic theory of Parry and Lord has met with a number of criticisms. Not least, critics have challenged the sharp divide it postulates between orality and literacy.[35] Moreover, the relevance of the Parry-Lord theory for the study of the Gospels has been questioned on the grounds that the Synoptic tradition is plainly not epic poetry.[36] Rubin's attempt to generalize Parry and Lord's findings to other types of oral tradition on the basis of the psychology of memory is thus helpful in providing an alternative model.

Rubin agrees with Parry and Lord that oral tradition does not generally work by rote memorization of a fixed text. But while Parry and Lord stress composition in performance, Rubin prefers to talk in terms of serial cueing, the idea being that when someone sets out to perform a song or poem each line or unit prompts the memory of what comes next.[37] Rubin's key suggestion is that oral tradition maintains stability by employing a series of multiple constraints or cues. In other words, if you are trying to remember

34 Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions* (see n. 32), 210–220.

35 R. Finnegan, *Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context* (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 18–19, 22–24, 160–168, 258–260, 272–273; J.M. Foley, *The Singer of Tales in Performance* (Bloomington, Ind., 1995), 66, 79, 210–211; id., *How to Read an Oral Poem* (Urbana, Ill., 2002), 26, 36–39, 66–69.

36 See, e. g., P. Foster, "Memory, Orality, and the Fourth Gospel: Three Dead-Ends in Historical Jesus Research," *JSHJ* 10 (2012), 191–227, here 205.

37 In the context of oral tradition "poetry" does not necessarily refer to something that resembles formal English verse, say, but to any piece of verbal art the linguistic register of which is clearly distinct from that of everyday conversational speech and which has been mnemonically crafted for more than purely ephemeral use.

what comes next in a poem or song, you are much more likely to get it right if you use a number of cues to remind yourself than if you rely solely on a single cue. Rubin's research suggests that multiple cues used together are orders of magnitude more effective in prompting correct memories than individual cues used in isolation.[38]

Cues that might aid recall in oral traditions include such schema-related features as the overall plot or structure and intermediate structures such as the standard scripts for various kinds of scene. They also include such factors as vivid concrete imagery; other things being equal you are much more likely to remember a story about a tiger swallowing a camel than an abstract proposition about relative size and ferocity. But Rubin also found that what he calls surface features, such as rhyme, rhythm, alliteration, assonance, and melody, can be just as important in cuing recall as deeper factors such as meaning, gist, imagery and structure. In other words, what a piece of oral tradition sounds like can be just as important to its being retained in memory as what it means.

This is perhaps best illustrated by an example Rubin discusses at some length, the child's counting-out rhyme *Eenie, Meenie, Miney, Mo*, which he takes to be a piece of genuine oral tradition rather than something that children learn from books:[39]

Eenie, meenie, miney, mo
Catch a *something* by the toe.
If he hollers, let him go,
Eenie, meenie, miney, mo

Here, the nonsense first line prompts both the last line, which repeats it, and the meter for the entire piece, consisting of four lines of seven syllables with the stress on the odd-numbered syllables in each line. The sound of "eenie" cues the second word "meenie" via assonance. The alliteration of "meenie," "miney" and "mo" constrains the rest of the line together with the use of three vowel sounds in alphabetical order: e, i, o, an order also found, for example, in "fee, fie, foe, fum" or "Old Macdonald had a farm, ee-i, ee-i, oh!" The last word, "mo," then supplies the end rhyme used by every other line. The middle two lines offer the concrete image of something being caught by the toe hollering to be let go. In combination these multiple constraints make the rhyme quite hard to get wrong, but it is the sound at least as much as the sense that provides the multiple cueing that makes it so.

38 Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions* (see n. 32), 39–193.
39 Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions* (see n. 32), 227–252.

This little rhyme also illustrates the way in which a stable oral tradition can change. As printed above there is a placeholder "*something*" that is said to be caught by the toe. When I first encountered this rhyme half a century ago, the word that was used at that point is one that has since come to be regarded as socially unacceptable. More recent versions have therefore replaced it with something less objectionable, "tiger" being one of the more popular variants, presumably because it alliterates with "toe." The rhyme *Eenie, Meenie, Miney, Mo* thus illustrates, not only how multiple constraints can lend stability to a piece of oral tradition, but also the kind of change that can be accommodated within such constraints when circumstances change. Of course not all oral tradition is as tightly and neatly constrained as the short rhyme *Eenie, Meenie, Miney, Mo*, but the occurrence of so many constraints in such a short piece conveniently illustrates the general principle.

4. Agreements and Disagreements in the Synoptic Tradition

The assumption of scholars such as Bailey, James Dunn and Rodriguez seems to be that what oral tradition is good at preserving is primarily the gist or core of what has been said. That may well be true for prose narratives, but Rubin's argument that surface features such as sound patterns in the words used may be equally important in stabilizing tradition suggests that their assumption may not always apply in the case of more poetic or aphoristic material.

The reason is this: if Rubin's multiple-constraint theory of oral tradition is correct, then a piece of oral tradition has to maintain whatever multiple constraints define it in order to survive as a piece of memorable tradition, and those may well include surface linguistic characteristics as well as deeper or schema-related characteristics such as gist and imagery. To be sure, this does not apply to everything in the Synoptic Gospels that might be drawn from oral tradition. Something like the parable of the Good Samaritan, for example, can be reconstructed from its gist without any need to remember its precise phrasing, since it relies primarily on its imagery and its unexpected twists to make it memorable. With other kinds of sayings material the surface constraints are likely to be tighter.

On the other hand, once something is written down, it no longer needs to make use of oral mnemo-technology in order to survive. Writers do not have to observe the same poetic constraints as speakers in order for their words to endure beyond the present moment. Moreover, ancient authors

seem not to have been constrained by the wording of their written sources, generally preferring to reproduce the gist of their source in their own words. So, a difference in wording between Synoptic parallels could just as well be a sign of free literary reworking of a written source as a sign of oral traditional variants (not least if the written source was being used from memory). Conversely, particularly in more poetic material, a similarity of wording could be a sign, not of direct literary copying, but of the constraints upon the writer of a familiar oral tradition that had taken a relatively stable form.

This casts doubt on the attempts by Dunn and his former student Terence Mournet to argue that some of the variation between parallel pericopes in the triple or double tradition is likely to be due to the Evangelists' reliance on oral tradition rather than a written source.[40] Dunn, for example, points out that in certain synoptic pericopes such as the Stilling of the Storm and the Syrophoenician Woman there are very few words in common in the parallel accounts even though the same basic stories are being told.[41] He goes on to argue that the literary paradigm does a poor job of explaining this since the changes Matthew and Luke made to Mark, say, seem so inconsequential; as editors they would seem to be changing words just for the sake of it. Dunn concludes that it may be more likely that the later Evangelists drew on variants of the story they knew from oral tradition rather than editing the Markan text. He at once qualifies his case, however, by suggesting that alternatively Matthew and Luke may have simply taken the point of Mark's story and retold it "as a storyteller would," a possibility that removes the need to postulate oral tradition as a source, especially if one thinks Matthew and Luke were drawing on their memories of Mark. Mournet nevertheless tries to take the argument a step further by developing criteria to determine where Matthew and Luke might be dependent on oral tradition rather than Q in the double tradition, again based on the degree (and pattern) of common wording in parallel passages.[42]

On the face of it Dunn appears to be trying to have it both ways. On the one hand it is the supposed *variability* of oral tradition that is meant to account for the differences in wording. On the other hand for an Evangelist to be influenced by the wording of an oral tradition against that of a written source would seem to suggest considerable *fixity* in the wording

40 So also Foster, "Memory" (see n. 36), 206–210.

41 Dunn, *Jesus Remembered* (see n. 30), 210–238; see also id., "Altering the Default Setting: Re-Envisaging the Early Transmission of the Jesus Tradition," *NTS* 49 (2003), 139–175.

42 Mournet, *Oral Tradition* (see n. 3).

of that oral tradition. But perhaps what Dunn is envisaging is that the later Evangelist has displayed greater fidelity to a familiar oral tradition that the earlier one has paraphrased. But then if the earlier Evangelist is supposedly reproducing only the gist of the putative oral tradition in his own words (as he might well have done), the later one could equally well be doing the same thing with his written source, so that the appeal to oral tradition as an explanation of the differences between them becomes otiose. John Kloppenborg has likewise objected that the variations in wording between Synoptic parallels are well within the kinds of changes ancient authors typically made when using a written source, and that what stands in need of explanation is not the extent to which Matthew and Luke varied from Mark or Q but the extent to which they simply copied them.[43] To this objection might be added the further one that the wording of oral tradition may be so constrained by the needs of memorability that, at least on occasion, it may exhibit less flexibility than an author might exhibit in reworking a written text. In other words the degree of variation or similarity between parallel versions is not of itself an automatic index of whether the relation between them is oral or literary. In individual cases, of course, it depends on the nature of the material. A prose narrative can readily be retold in different words by either oral performers or writers, so a high degree of verbal agreement between prose narratives is likely to be indicative of literary dependence. But the converse does not necessarily apply for, as Dunn effectively allows, prose narratives can also be retold in different words by writers working from their memory of another written version. The degree of verbal disagreement between versions is thus a poor indication in general of the nature of the source employed.

Lack of verbatim agreement does not thus automatically signal recourse to oral tradition. Conversely, close verbal agreement between strikingly formulated sayings or memorable poetry need not be explained by literary copying, since this is the sort of material that oral tradition can stabilize quite well. On the other hand, close verbal agreement between two versions of a prose narrative from which the surface features of memorable oral tradition are lacking would strongly suggest some form of literary dependence.

In similar vein, "oral tradition" is also unlikely to be a good explanation for minor agreements between Matthew and Luke against Mark unless some account can be given of how the wording the two later Evangelists

43 J.S. Kloppenborg, "Variation and Reproduction of the Double Tradition and an Oral Q?" *ETL* 83 (2007), 53–80.

happened to agree upon could have formed part of some stable (and hence memorable) oral tradition that overlapped with the material they found in Mark. To take a couple of hypothetical examples: where the minor agreement in question consists in the common use of a word or two, e.g., ἐπὶ κλίνης added to Mark 2:3 at Matt 9:2 and Luke 5:18, against κράββατον appearing in a rather different construction at Mark 2:4, an "oral tradition" explanation would hardly be sustainable, since it is difficult to imagine what a mnemonically-constructed oral tradition that conveyed just these two words independently to Matthew and Luke could have looked like. Even in the case of a more substantial minor agreement, such as "who is it who struck you?" at Matt 26:68//Luke 22:64 as against Mark 14:65 there is little in the sequence of words τίς ἐστιν ὁ παίσας σε; that exhibits the kind of surface features which Rubin describes, and little indication in either the Matthean or Lukan version of this pericope that these five Greek words formed part of a larger mnemonically structured poetic unit that Matthew and Luke both took over (otherwise one would surely expect this more poetic version of the abuse of Jesus before the Sanhedrin to have influenced at least one of their accounts). In both cases the agreements occur in the course of prose narratives, where it is the gist rather than the wording that is likely to be preserved in oral tradition, so that any coincidence of wording in oral tradition would be no less a coincidence than independent decisions by Matthew and Luke to make the same changes to Mark's text. In any case there are better explanations for both these minor agreements; for example the striking agreement at Matt 26:68//Luke 22:64 has often been explained in terms of textual corruption,[44] or it could be that one of the later Evangelists was familiar with the work of the other.[45]

For oral tradition to be a plausible explanation of a minor agreement, there must be only a few words in common between Matthew and Luke, or the agreement is likely to look like a Mark-Q overlap (on the 2DH), rendering the appeal to oral tradition otiose. What would be needed is a passage in which the wording was closely similar but in which the Matthean and Lukan formulations appear to have a superior poetic or aphoristic structure to that found in Mark. One possible example of such a passage might be the saying about rendering to Caesar at Matt 22:21//Mark 12:17//Luke 20:25, where Matthew and Luke have ἀπόδοτε [οὖν] τὰ Καί-

44 See, e.g., B.H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins Treating of the Manuscript Tradition, Sources, Authorship, and Dates* (London, 1926), 325–328.

45 So, e.g., Goodacre, *Case Against Q* (see n. 27), 157–160.

σαρος Καίσαρι against Mark's τὰ Καίσαρος ἀπόδοτε Καίσαρι (Luke lacks οὖν). Here we have the kind of aphoristic material that might plausibly be preserved in oral tradition, and where Matthew's and Luke's common word order does a better job of bringing out the assonance and alliteration of Καίσαρος and Καίσαρι and of providing a structural parallel with the words καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῷ θεῷ with which all three versions end. In this instance, then, the minor agreement could perhaps be plausibly explained by Matthew's and Luke's independent familiarity with oral tradition; but it could also be explained by both Evangelists making the same poetic improvement to Mark's text,[46] or even by one Evangelist's recollection of the other's improvement.

5. Oral Tradition and Alternating Primitivity

One type of variation between Synoptic parallels that is especially significant for the Synoptic problem is that which is said to indicate alternating primitivity, the thesis that since it is sometimes Matthew and sometimes Luke that appears to give the more primitive form of a tradition, neither can have used the other but each must instead have employed a common source such as Q. Two parade examples of Luke supposedly having the more primitive version are the Lord's Prayer and the Beatitudes.[47] In the case of the former Mark Goodacre has suggested that Luke may have had access to an alternative oral tradition of the Lord's Prayer, a suggestion also made for different reasons by James Dunn.[48] In the case of the Beatitudes both Goodacre and Mark Matson argue for Lukan redaction of Matthew.[49] It may, however, be instructive to examine both these parallels in the light of Rubin's account of oral tradition.

46 This is the explanation apparently preferred, e.g., by W.D. Davies and D.C. Allison, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew*, vol. 3 (Edinburgh, 1997), 216; cf. p. 210 n. 3.

47 This appears to be the assumption underlying the reconstruction of Q 11:2b–3 and Q 6:20b–21 in J.M. Robinson, P. Hoffmann, and J.S. Kloppenborg, *The Critical Edition of Q: Synopsis Including the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Mark and Thomas with English, German and French Translations of Q and Thomas* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis, 2000), 206–209, 46–49.

48 Goodacre, *Case Against Q* (see n. 27), 64–65; Dunn, *Jesus Remembered* (see n. 30), 226–228.

49 Goodacre, *Case Against Q* (see n. 27), 133–351; M.A. Matson, "Luke's Rewriting of the Sermon on the Mount," in *Questioning Q* (ed. M.S. Goodacre and N. Perrin; London, 2004), 43–70, here 65–67.

To take the Lord's Prayer first (see Table 1 below), it is apparent that the Matthean version has many of the features that Rubin argues makes for memorability in oral tradition. For example, there is a repetition of rhythm and sounds as well as a parallelism of sense in the three lines ἁγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου· ἐλθέτω ἡ βασιλεία σου· γενεθήτω το θέλημά σου while the subsequent ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ recalls the ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς of the first line. The couplet in v. 12 has lines ending in the similar sounding τὰ ὀφειλήματα ἡμῶν and τοῖς ὀφειλέταις ἡμῶν and employs a similar sound shift from a form of ἀφίημι to a word formed from the ὀφειλ- root a few words later: ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ ὀφειλήματα and ἀφήκαμεν τοῖς ὀφειλέταις. The final couplet in v. 13 employs the alliteration of πειρασμόν and πονηροῦ, as well as synthetic parallelism in sense. And overall, while there is no *strict* metre, the prayer does possess a certain rhythm. In other words the Matthean version of the Lord's Prayer employs many of the surface poetic devices that on Rubin's theory should help a piece of oral tradition to be memorable and thus reasonably stable.

Most of these features are lacking in the Lukan version. The opening Πάτερ stands baldly on its own, getting the prayer off to an abrupt, jerky start rather than a rhythmic one. The next two lines share some of the same assonance found in the corresponding lines of the Matthean triplet, but lack the ending -μά σου rhyme that occurs between the first and third Matthean lines. The use of ἁμαρτίας instead of ὀφειλήματα at Luke 11:4 destroys the parallelism and much of the assonance between the first two lines in this verse, and the reader (or listener) is brought up short both rhythmically and structurally by the lack of a line to form a couplet with καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν. Overall then, the Lukan version looks much less like something that would have survived well in oral tradition. If Rubin is right about surface structure being as important as gist for supplying multiple memorial cues to oral tradition, then the Matthean version is much better fitted to survive in oral tradition than the Lukan one.

Thus it is arguably the Matthean version that looks more "primitive," since it is his version that is better fitted to be remembered and passed on orally. The Lukan version, by contrast, looks suspiciously like the product of literary abbreviation. Being shorter does not necessarily make something more primitive, especially in oral tradition where seemingly redundant verbiage may not be so much a heaping up of empty phrases as an aid to memory. The features of the Matthean Lord's prayer that are so often identified as later liturgical expansions are in fact the very kinds of poetic features, including parallelism and redundancy, that fit a piece of oral tradition for stability over an extended period of transmission. Conversely,

the Lukan version would have a hard job to survive orally in any kind of stable form. This is also indirectly supported by the fact that it is the Matthean rather than the Lukan form of the Lord's Prayer that has become widely known. The Matthean version is therefore much more likely to have had a longer oral tradition history than the Lukan one, which in turn makes it more likely to be the more primitive version.

The case is less clear-cut with the Beatitudes (see Table 2 below). The Matthean version has two groups of four blessings, with the first four making heavy use of a π-alliteration, and an *inclusio* formed by a repetition of the blessing on the first group in the first stanza and the fourth group in the second one, while all the blessings in between begin with the words ὅτι αὐτοί. In addition, lines two and four of the first stanza, and one and three of the second, end with a rhyming -θήσονται, which is partly echoed by the ὄψονται at the end of the second line of the second stanza.

The structure of the Lukan version is rather different: a trio of blessings contrasted with a trio of corresponding woes (the fourth pair will be discussed below). The Lukan version exhibits rather less of the assonance, alliteration and parallelism found in the Matthean one and there is, for example, a comparative lack of balance and parallelism between the three ὅτι clauses in Luke's three blessings: ὅτι ὑμετέρα ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεου· ὅτι χορτασθήσεσθε· ὅτι γελάσετε. At the very least it is not immediately obvious that the Lukan version is the better fitted to be a memorable slice of oral tradition and that on *that* score that it looks the more primitive version.

What seems clearer is that the Matthean and Lukan versions of the Beatitudes are unlikely to be variants of the same oral tradition. If Rubin is right about the importance of surface features such as rhythm, assonance, alliteration and poetic form providing multiple cues to stabilize the tradition, it is very hard to see how two groups of four blessings could transform themselves into a group of three blessings and three corresponding woes or vice versa. To be sure, poetic features need not ensure absolute stability: for example, one might well expect the details of who is blessed and what the blessings are to change in the course of oral transmission; it is the complete change in poetic structure that is harder to envisage. It is conceivable that the Matthean and Lukan versions represent not variants of the same tradition but two quite separate traditions that happen to have some points of resemblance. It is also just about conceivable that someone orally recomposed one version of the Beatitudes from a memory of the gist of the other (although for the reasons adduced by Rubin one would have expected more of the original form to have survived). But neither the sepa-

rate tradition explanation nor the oral recomposition explanation can to do justice to the parallel between Matt 5:11–12 and Luke 6:22–23. In Matthew this ninth beatitude departs so strongly from the length, structure and pattern of the preceding eight that one wonders if it could ever have been part of the same oral tradition, and in any case it seems to be a kind of explanatory expansion of the theme of persecution introduced in the eighth beatitude. Matthew 5:11 does contain some alliteration and internal rhyme, so it could conceivably be part of the previous oral tradition or a separate tradition that has become attached to it. But the corresponding verses in Luke completely break the pattern set by the previous three Lukan beatitudes; instead of a brief μακάριοι οἱ ("blessed are you who …") we have the completely different formula μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν introducing a much longer clause, and instead of a brief explanation beginning ὅτι we get a lengthy command beginning χάρητε. The fourth Lukan blessing thus appears to be an intrusion into the pattern of three blessings and three woes, with the fourth Lukan woe a slightly clumsy attempt to match the intrusive fourth blessing. Given the similarity in content and some of the wording of Matt 5:11–12 and Luke 6:22–23, and given that these verses do not seem to fit the putative oral tradition surrounding them, it thus seems far more likely that these verses at least are the result of some kind of literary relationship between the two Gospels, whether a direct one or an indirect one via a common source. Given also the difficulties in seeing how the Matthean and Lukan versions of the Beatitudes can be variants of a common oral tradition, it seems much more plausible to think in terms of a (direct or indirect) literary relationship between Matthew and Luke for the entire passage.

It does not, of course, follow from any of this that Luke must therefore have used Matthew. The points being made are rather on the one hand, to throw doubt on the common assumption that Luke's versions of the Beatitudes and the Lord's Prayer are clearly the more primitive, and on the other, to suggest that the appeal to variant oral traditions may also not be the best way to explain these two sets of parallels.

One further caveat is in order. To say that the Matthean version of the Lord's Prayer or the Beatitudes exhibits the characteristics of memorable oral tradition is not to demonstrate the primitivity of his version in any absolute sense. Quite apart from the objection that the arguments above have relied heavily on features of the Greek wording of what may have been originally Aramaic oral tradition, there is simply no way of distinguishing a written deposit of a genuine oral tradition from a good lit-

erary imitation of one by a writer steeped in the tradition in question.[50] Formal linguistic features might persuade us that a particular passage could *never* have been genuine oral tradition, but they can never demonstrate that it *must* have been one. Thus nothing in the arguments presented here demonstrates that the Lord's Prayer or the Beatitudes could not have been composed in writing. All that has been argued is that if there was an oral tradition behind these texts then Matthew's version is the more likely to be a faithful reflection of it, particularly in the case of the Lord's Prayer, and that the assumption that the Lukan versions look more primitive is not well founded.

6. Conclusions

To call something "oral tradition" implies that it has endured through time. Strictly speaking, of course, oral tradition is not so much as thing as a process, a series of performances, although for the performances to have any relationship to one another also requires that some facets of the tradition should persist in memory. To the extent that "oral tradition" is used to refer to the content of what is handed on, it must therefore refer to something that is memorable. For prose narratives this could just be the structure and gist of the tale, aided by culturally available *schemata* that allow its ready reconstruction from remembered details. But it has been argued here that for specific wording to be transmitted as oral tradition, it must either be particularly striking (as in a well-cast aphorism) or poetically crafted so that surface features such as rhyme, rhythm, assonance, alliteration and melody can act as multiple cues in performance. As has also been argued, this has implications for the way in which oral tradition can be appealed to in relation to the Synoptic problem, whether one is trying to appeal to the flexibility of oral tradition (to account for variations in synoptic parallels) or to its stability (to account for agreements).

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50 See, e. g., Foley, *Singer of Tales* (see n. 35), 61–78.

Table 1: The Lord's Prayer in Matthew and Luke

Matt 6:9b–13	Luke 11:2b–4
(9b) Πάτερ ἡμῶν *ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*	(2b) Πάτερ,
ἁγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου,	ἁγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου·
(10)ἐλθέτω ἡβασιλεία σου,	ἐλθέτω ἡ βασιλεία σου·
γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου	
ὡς *ἐν οὐρανῷ* καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς·	
(11) τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον	(3) τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον
δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον·	δίδου ἡμῖν τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν·
(12) καὶ ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ *ὀφειλήματα* ἡμῶν,	(4) καὶ *ἄφες* ἡμῖν τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν,
ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς *ἀφήκαμεν* τοῖς *ὀφειλέταις*	
ἡμῶν·	
(13) καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς *ἡμᾶς* εἰς	καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ *ἀφίομεν* παντὶ ὀφείλοντι
πειρασμόν,	ἡμῖν·
ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι *ἡμᾶς* ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ.	καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν.

Table 2: The Beatitudes in Matthew and Luke

Matt 5:3–12	Luke 6:20b–23
(3) Μακάριοι οἱ **π**τωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, *ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν.* (4) μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακλη**θ**ήσονται. (5) μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσιν τὴν γῆν. (6) μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται. (7) μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται. (8) μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται. (9) μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ *κλη*θήσονται. (10) μακάριοι οἱ δεδιωγμένοι ἕνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, *ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν.*	(20b) Μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί, ὅτι ὑμετέρα ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. (21) μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες νῦν, ὅτι χορτασθήσεσθε. μακάριοι οἱ κλαίοντες νῦν, ὅτι γελάσετε.
(11) **μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν ὀνειδίσ<u>ωσιν</u> ὑμᾶς** καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ εἴπ<u>ωσιν</u> π<u>ᾶ</u>ν **π<u>ο</u>νηρὸν** καθ' ὑμῶν [ψευδόμενοι] **ἕνεκ**εν ἐμοῦ. (12) **χα**ίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, ὅτι **ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τ**οῖς **οὐρανο**ῖς· οὕτως γὰρ ἐδίωξαν **το**ὺς **προφήτ**ας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν.	(22) **μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν** μισήσωσιν **ὑμᾶς** οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὅταν ἀφορίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ **ὀνειδίσωσιν** καὶ ἐκβάλωσιν τὸ ὄνομα ὑμῶν ὡς **πονηρὸν ἕνεκ**α τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· (23) **χά**ρητε ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ σκιρτήσατε, ἰδοὺ γὰρ **ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τ**ῷ **οὐρανῷ**· κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ἐποίουν **το**ῖς **προφήτα**ις οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν. (24) Πλὴν οὐαὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς πλουσίοις, ὅτι ἀπέχετε τὴν παράκλησιν ὑμῶν. (25) οὐαὶ ὑμῖν, οἱ ἐμπεπλησμένοι νῦν, ὅτι πεινάσετε. οὐαί, οἱ γελῶντες νῦν, ὅτι πενθήσετε καὶ κλαύσετε. (26) οὐαὶ ὅταν ὑμᾶς καλῶς εἴπωσιν πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι· κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ἐποίουν τοῖς ψευδοπροφήταις οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν.