
CLOSURE GAMES

The Politics of Clubs in International Society

Tristen Naylor
University College, Oxford

11 August, 2014 – Trinity Term

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations in the Department of Politics and
International Relations at the University of Oxford

86,577 words /298 pages

Closure Games: The Politics of Clubs in International Society

Tristen Naylor
University College, Oxford

11 August, 2014 – Trinity Term

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations in the Department of Politics and
International Relations at the University of Oxford

86,577words / 298 pages

Abstract

This thesis develops a theory of international social closure to examine (i) the politics of membership in status groups – or, clubs – in international society and (ii) the persistence of clubs in international society. This thesis offers new concepts to improve the English School's understanding of international society, its expansion, and its reproduction. In so doing it also addresses limitations and gaps in the IR status literature and the global governance and diplomacy literatures concerned with clubs and networks. This thesis analyses strategies of exclusion, entry, and incorporation used by actors to deny, attempt, or grant inclusion into clubs as well as the institutional contexts underpinning those clubs. Specifically, this research undertakes a study of instances of exclusion, entry, and incorporation in the context of three clubs: the Family of Civilised Nations, the Great Powers club, and G-summitry. In the first two cases, this research relies primarily on secondary sources while in the case of G-summitry it presents original empirical research gathered through archival research, interviews, and ethnographic participant observation. This thesis presents four main conclusions about the operation of closure: (i) the logics of different closure games are defined by overarching normative institutions of international society; (ii) despite a collectivist closure rule, closure in international society is predominantly individualistic; (iii) actors seeking entry tend to employ deferential entry strategies that reproduce a stratified *status quo* order; and (iv) incorporation promotes stratification along both functional and cultural lines. This thesis also draws three specific conclusions that run counter to much current scholarship: (i) contemporary international society is neither more open nor less hierarchical than nineteenth century international society; (ii) hierarchy is reproduced to a large degree by entry and incorporation strategies rather than exclusion strategies; and (iii) closure does not run along a 'west versus the rest' fault line.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction	1
1.1 Order and International Society	1
1.1.2 Wider Theoretical Implications	5
1.2 The Main Points	9
1.3 Empirical Contributions	13
1.4 Theoretical Foundations	16
1.4.1 The English School	16
1.4.2 Clubs and Networks	21
1.4.3 Status in International Relations	33
1.5 The Plan	35
Chapter Two: International Social Closure	36
2.1 Introduction	36
2.2 Closure Theory	37
2.2.1 Actors and Groups	37
2.2.2 Divisions	38
2.2.3 Logics Rules, and Criteria	43
2.3 Closure Strategies	49
2.3.1 Exclusion and Mobility Strategies	50
2.3.2 Entry Strategies	53
Relational Strategies	55
Identity Adaptation	58
2.3.3 Incorporation Strategies	59
2.4 Conclusion	64
Chapter Three: Method	66
3.1 Introduction	66
3.2 Elite Interviews	68
3.3 Textual Sources	74
3.4 Ethnography	76
3.5 Case Selection	79
Chapter Four: Institutions and Mobility	87
4.1 Constitutive Institutions	87
4.2 Mobility Dampeners	93
4.2.1 Pragmatism	95
4.2.2 Precedence	100
4.2.3 Credentialism	105
Chapter Five: Exclusion	113
5.1 Introduction	113
5.2 Closure	116
5.2.1 Unachievable Criteria	116
5.2.2. Achievable Criteria	125
5.2.3 Ostensibly Achievable Criteria	133
5.3 Conclusion	139

Chapter Six: Entry	142
6.1 Introduction	142
6.2 Relational Entry Strategies	143
6.2.1 Usurpation	144
6.2.2 Banding	148
6.2.3 Differentiation	157
6.2.4 Legitimation	163
6.2.5 Normalisation	170
6.3 Identity Adaptation	180
6.3.1 International Mimicry	181
Geopolitical Mimicry	181
Cooperative Mimicry	187
6.3.2 Internal Mimicry	190
6.4 Conclusion	196
Chapter Seven: Incorporation	198
7.1 Introduction	198
7.2 Functional Stratification and Incorporation	202
7.2.1 Functional Stratification	203
Great Powers	203
G-Summitry	208
7.2.2 Functional Incorporation	224
Great Powers	224
G-Summitry	227
7.3 Cultural Stratification	234
7.4 Collectivist Stratification	242
7.5 Conclusion	250
Chapter Eight: Conclusion	253
8.1 Closure Theory	255
8.2 Closure in International Society	256
8.3 Order and its Reproduction	261
8.4 Clubs and Networks	264
8.5 Further Research	270
Works Cited	274
Primary and Archival Sources	288
Interview Subjects	294

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 – Exclusion Rules	52
Figure 2.2 – Entry Strategies	55
Figure 3.1 – Groups and their borders	85

Acknowledgements

The “save the best for last” principle seems to guide acknowledgements sections. The result is that those of most importance get mentioned only after everyone else has been praised. In a thesis about status and order wherein rank and precedence are of central importance, it seems wrong to blindly follow the trend. So, first and foremost, to my family (my parents, Sue and Tyrone, *primi inter pares*), thank you for all the ways that you’ve supported me; not just over the past four years, but the past thirty.

To my friends who became my family here in Oxford, you are the brightest, funniest, booziest people I have ever met. The real accomplishment of the DPhil is that I figured out a way to spend four years with you; so many stories of which no one will ever believe. We drank together, we laughed together, and we muddled through together. I am in the lucky, happy position of there being too many of you to name. At the risk of wrongly missing any of you, I’ll name no one to avoid unintentional insult (indeed, as this thesis is about exclusion and inclusion, this seems like a safe strategy). You all know who you are. At the most difficult moments and in each your own way you carried me, kept me working, and - most importantly of all - kept me smiling. Each of know exactly what you mean to me; if you should ever need to be reminded, I’ll always be there for you as you have been - and are - for me (likely with a bottle of red in hand).

If there is anything in this work that is worthy of merit, know that Edward Keene is responsible. When I was first accepted to the DPhil I had to choose between coming back to Oxford or going to Cambridge. I turned to Mark Salter for his advice and I told him that Eddie would be my supervisor if I were to accept Oxford’s offer. Unequivocally he told me to return to Oxford, as there is no one better than Eddie. He couldn’t have been more right. Without him, what would have filled the pages that follow would have been nothing but an incoherent mess. If I could be half the mind or half the teacher that he is, I’d be in good standing (indeed, the same is to be said of Mark).

The two Montague Burton Professors of International Relations, Iver Neumann and Andrew Hurrell, served as this thesis’ examiners. I’m grateful to them both for their comments and for taking the time out of their busy schedules to read this thesis so closely. Jennifer Welsh, Kalypso Nicolaidis, and Yuen Foon Khong served as examiners at the Confirmation and Transfer stages of this thesis’ development (as did Andy) and I’m likewise grateful to them.

University College became my home in Oxford. The staff (notably those in the hall and the lodge), Sir Ivor Crewe, and the Fellowship, have my greatest thanks for making the college the warm, friendly place that it is. Its graduate community is an especially wonderful thing; I hope that I gave to it even a fraction of what it gave to me. Christ Church later became my second home in Oxford. I’m grateful to have been trusted with teaching the college’s students. Our tutorials were often the highlights of my week, regularly reminding me of what I love about the study of politics and providing welcome breaks from the drudgery of drafting.

Thanks must also be given to John Kirton and Madeline Koch of the G8 and G20 Research Groups at the University of Toronto. So much of what forms the empirical base of this work would not have been possible without them, allowing me to join their team and undertake research in such hardship posts as Los Cabos and Saint Petersburg. Similarly, I'm grateful to *Sciences Po* for hosting me as a visiting researcher during the summer of 2014 so that I could sequester myself in Paris to write the final draft of this thesis. The writing of what follows in these pages was fuelled by a steady, daily stream of croissant, coffee, brie, and wine (sometimes even in that order).

Finally, I'm of course also grateful to those who paid the inordinate sums of money it costs to do a doctorate. The Clarendon Fund supported my first three years and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada in-part supported my final year; Univ and the Department of Politics and International Relations both supported a number of research trips; and my family were generous enough to fly my home for Christmases, pay for computers when it seemed that something fancy and new would help finish the job, and feed and shelter a starving student when we'd be together. Post-graduate research is exorbitantly expensive, thank you to every institution and every person who financially contributed to making this possible. I'd like to say that I'll be able to repay you; but, as it was once noted, a doctoral student is a person who forgoes present income to forgo future income.

Finally, to whomever might someday read this (if there ever happens to be someone who picks this up and blows off the dust): if you're reading this for your own research, I hope that what I've assembled here can help; if you're reading this thinking that you'd like to do a doctoral dissertation, either do it for the love of your subject or for the love of the lifestyle it allows, don't do it because you think it might be a fun thing to do (it's not); and if you're reading this for pleasure or just to kill time, stop. Go read something – just about anything – else.

June 2015
The King's Arms, Oxford

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Order and International Society

The concept of ‘international order’ can be understood in two ways: as a social ranking, and as an institutionalised set of norms, values, and practices; order as position and order as disposition. This thesis is concerned with both of these expressions of order. It examines their interaction and aims to deepen our understanding of how particular forms of international order are reproduced and, on occasion, transformed. Its main contribution is to develop a theory of international social closure that yields an improved account of how the positional structure of international order hangs together and generates new hypotheses about its changing character.

This thesis takes the English School’s work on international society as its foundation, as Section 1.4 discusses below. While the English School offers many valuable insights, there are holes in its approach, however, which it is this thesis’ aim to address. Existing English School scholarship provides many rich accounts of instances of what this thesis will call international social closure, particularly in its analysis of the expansion of international society, entry into international society, and exclusion from international society (and thereby in each case, instances of the reproduction of the specific form of international order involved in the idea of a society of states).¹ The crucial thing that the English School lacks is a general theory that captures how membership of international society – and, just as importantly, membership of *groups within international society* – is denied, sought, and granted. What is necessary is a theoretical perspective that allows

¹ For the classic English School accounts: Bull and Adam Watson 1984; Gong 1984. More recent contributions include: Fabry 2010; Keal 2000; Keal 2003; Johnston 2008; Keene 2002; Keene 2014; Neumann 2011; Neumann and Welsh 1991; Okagaki 2013; Towns 2010; Stivachtis 1998; Suzuki 2013; Watson 1992; Zarakol 2010; Zhang 1998

us to see how the various elements of the politics of clubs – exclusion, entry, and incorporation – coherently relate to one another. We need a theoretical toolkit that will allow us to answer questions about how the politics of clubs work in international society: what are the ‘closure games’ that states play with one another?

Moreover, the English School’s expansion and entry stories largely come to a halt after international society’s universalisation after the post-Second World War era of decolonisation. With international society’s universalisation, there no longer remained a boundary to be traversed by outsider states seeking entry. According to the dominant conception of international society, with decolonisation the doors to the international club of states were flung open and all states became members. As such, the story of international society’s expansion is one that takes place predominantly in the 18th, 19th, and first half of the 20th centuries. What later accounts there are tend to look at the dissatisfaction and frustration of newer entrants to the club who despite gaining entry as nominal equals, remain subjected to marginalisation and subordination as substantive inferiors.² Work that does examine contemporary international society’s outer boundary, that which separates it from the nebulously conceived world society, tends to look at the ideational and normative interaction across this border, as opposed to the material dimensions of interaction that are predominant in accounts of states’ entries into international society prior to its universalisation.³

The expansion and entry stories tend to focus on the darker side of international society’s “Janus face.”⁴ Whether it be accounts of the denial of membership, such as through China’s violent early encounters with European international society; the achievement of entry into the club, such as through Japan’s imperial mimicry of

² See especially: Adler-Nissen 2014; Okagaki 2013; Suzuki 2008; Zarakol 2010

³ See especially: Buzan 2004a; Clark 2007

⁴ Suzuki 2013

European powers; or the incorporation of others into the club such as through imperial imposition over colonised subordinates, the reproduction and maintenance of order is largely a violent story. With few exceptions is the more pacific account of international society's expansion told wherein order is reproduced with surprisingly little coercion and imposition.⁵

Finally, what is necessary is a general theory that is capable of dealing with the 'micro-story' of the reproduction international order, building on the rich empiricism of existing English School accounts and bringing these accounts within a single framework. In contrast to a macro account that tells the story of the reproduction of – and change in – order over the course of decades or centuries, we need one that tells us how the structure of international society is reproduced through the specific interactions of the statespeople who give international society its physical expression.⁶ In short, we need an account of the reproduction of order as a quotidian practice.⁷

Against this backdrop, the thesis develops a theory of international social closure to shore up these weaknesses in the English School's understanding of international society. A theory of closure allows us to understand: (i) how the membership game is played in terms of exclusion, entry, and incorporation within a single framework; (ii) how contestation over rank within groups is the same game being played at a group's border, closure is a game played simultaneously at a club's borders against outsiders as well as within it amongst its members; (iii) how the closure game played in European international society's expansion is still being played today in contemporary international society; (iv) how the material and ideational dimensions of order's

⁵ Okagaki 2013; Zarakol 2010 come closest to telling the story in this way. However, Zarakol's choice of title, *After Defeat*, still ties her account to the more violent version of the expansion and entry stories.

⁶ c.f. Jackson 2000, 29–43; 112–113; Navari 2002; Neumann 2002; Peterson 1997, 1

⁷ See: Chapter Three

reproduction can be accounted for in all instances of the game being played, regardless of what type of actor is involved; and (v) how the more assertive and more pacific dimensions of the closure game can be played contemporaneously. In short, the theory of international social closure developed here offers a new conceptual language for understanding the structure of international society which captures the above dimensions that existing accounts miss or marginalise.

The theory of international social closure developed here thus allows us to give more complete and comprehensive answers to core English School questions about the structure of international society: how does membership in international society and groups within it work? How is order – as position and disposition – reproduced through the mechanisms governing (and contesting) membership? Has the way that international society reproduces itself by these means changed – and if so, how – over time? And, what does this tell us – if anything – about the relative justness of contemporary international society compared to its earlier iterations? From these general questions three operationalisable research questions flow, each of which are addressed in this thesis' core empirical chapters: (i) how do group insiders exclude outsiders? (ii) how do outsiders try to overcome their exclusion and gain entry into groups? And, (iii) how do insiders incorporate others into groups?

It is necessary to stress that while much of the empirical content of this research concerns how the membership game is played – how actors exclude others from groups, seek entry to groups, and incorporate others into groups – the primary interest of this research is to understand how clubs integrating multiple types of actors in (and outside of) international society hang together, rather than merely explaining the outcomes of

closure strategies.⁸ This thesis is thus more sociological in its orientation than more mainstream IR, offering an account of how international society is constructed rather than taking its constitution as assumed and for granted. To accomplish this aim, this thesis examines the membership politics of three different international status groups: the Family of Civilised Nations, the Great Powers club, and G-summitry. As is detailed in Chapter Three, these are the clubs from which our cases of exclusion, entry, and incorporation are drawn.

1.1.2 Wider Theoretical Implications

It is necessary to note that within contemporary IR, two other literatures are also concerned with broadly similar questions about order that we are from within the English School, though articulated within different languages: the body of scholarship concerned with status in international relations and the global governance and diplomacy literature focused on the shift from a club to network form of governance. The contribution of this thesis to these literatures is discussed in detail below, but it is necessary to identify here how the questions being asked in these literatures relate to those explored in this thesis.

The status literature is particularly concerned with order expressed in terms of rank, while contemporary English School scholarship is predominantly concerned with order expressed in terms of norms, values, and practices. As is developed in the following chapter, an added benefit of closure theory allows us to discuss order in both its guises at once. The status literature's concern with rank prompts scholars to investigate how order is changing, how and which actors are rising, and how the change in rank seems to

⁸ This thesis uses 'group' and 'club' interchangeably to refer to social arrangements in which actors arrange themselves to signal and affirm likeness to one another and, conversely, dissimilarity with others. The use of 'group' harkens to the sociological language in which this thesis has its roots; however, 'club' is used more often here as the term adds the connotation of status which is of central concern here. This work is not about any groups but, specifically, *status* groups (that is, clubs).

be more peaceful than in the past.⁹ T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William Wohlforth's 2014 edited volume *Status in World Politics*, which incorporates a broad array of perspectives from across the field, being the most recent significant work addressing these questions from the point of view of status.¹⁰ Conversely, though with less emphasis in the literature, the concern is also with the fall of powers and the implications of their loss of ranking status.¹¹ To directly relate this to order in both its guises, when we speak of rising powers or the decline of American hegemony, as examples, it is the two dimensions of order – as position and disposition – that we speak about at once. We refer to the rise and fall of actors in terms of a social hierarchy while concurrently referring – and pondering the implications of – the possible replacement of a set of norms, values, and practices by others.

Second is the literature concerned with a shift in the governance order from a club to a networked form. Broadly, this literature argues that the principal agents of international relations are no longer an exclusive group of state diplomats working within strict and exclusive hierarchies according to defined set rules; that there is now a heterogeneity of relevant state and non-state actors working at all levels of interaction simultaneously on governance issues beyond just the tradition issues of 'high politics.'¹² In short, the most salient elements of this shift is the entry of non-state actors into what was exclusively the preserve of states and the replacement of hierarchy with flatter forms of governance. What is significant to note here is that the concern with order as rank concerns more the relative statuses and positions of state and non-state actors and the shift in the system's management through diplomatic practice.¹³ While the perspective is different, focusing more on the relative positions of state and non-state actors, as

⁹ See especially: Paul and Shankar 2014

¹⁰ Paul, Welch Larson, and Wohlforth 2014

¹¹ c.f. Ringmar 2002

¹² See especially: A. F. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008a; A. F. Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013a; A.-M. Slaughter 2005

¹³ A. F. Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013a; A.-M. Slaughter 2005

opposed to the relative positions of states alone, both literatures are fundamentally concerned with order in both its guises.

This thesis directly addresses a number of the core research questions identified by Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth as motivating the present focus on status across the IR discipline.¹⁴ Articulated in terms of status, this research identifies the mechanisms of status accommodation and management, identifies the criteria used in status games, and looks to the past so that we may gain an understanding of how the present international social system compares with past configurations. Of central concern to the present status literature is the question of whether or not admission to status groups works differently than it did in the past.¹⁵ This thesis answers this question by looking at the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club in addition to contemporary G-summitry – three groups from different periods of international society’s history – and finds that indeed claiming, maintaining, denying, and granting status does work differently in today’s international society. However, as below, this thesis argues that contemporary international society is actually a more closed and unfair status system than in the past. What seems like a more open, just, networked international domain is actually, surprisingly, not.

Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth’s questions parallel those presently open in the diplomacy literature concerned with the shift in governance order from a club to networked form. While there is agreement in the literature that the composition and character of the diplomatic environment has changed – made more complex with new actors, new problems, and new levels of interaction – there is no agreement on the degree to which

¹⁴ Welch Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014, 19

¹⁵ See especially: Neumann 2014

these novelties are included nor on the means by which they are included.¹⁶ On the one hand, the traditionalist diplomacy literature holds that diplomacy remains practiced within and by a club of state actors, downplaying the inclusion of new types of non-state actors by characterizing them as either having peripheral and subordinate places in the diplomatic milieu or as having no place at.¹⁷ On the other hand, the literature that characterizes diplomacy as shifting towards a more networked and apparently inclusive practice sidesteps answering the question of exactly *who* is included and *why*.¹⁸ The relatively recent and seminal work of Paul Sharp, a leading theorist on diplomacy, serves as a noteworthy example. Sharp discusses at length the fact that membership in the diplomatic realm is always contested, that the identities of actors in that realm are shifting, and that so too are its boundaries.¹⁹ He does not, however, discuss what the new rules of membership, identities, and boundaries might be, purposely leaving these as “open questions.”²⁰ Indeed, as Sharp writes, “[i]t is much easier to imagine, however, a world in which such questions do not get resolved, and yet in which different types of actors enjoy some sort of diplomatic standing and representation.”²¹ Just because these are “difficult questions to which there are no settled answers,” it does not follow that it is not possible, and indeed not desirable, to explore these questions so as to find a way to answer them and so as to clarify what sorts of statuses might be said to exist.²² Deliberately leaving them unanswered leaves us with a vague and limited picture of what the contemporary governance landscape looks like.

¹⁶ For example, more traditionalist understandings of diplomacy, such as *Satow*, characterize non-state actors as having peripheral and subordinate places in the diplomatic milieu, while others that give greater focus to the changing nature of global governance do not give such a preferential place to state-actors (A. F. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008a; see especially: Heine 2008a; Thakur 2008a)

¹⁷ G. Berridge 2005; Barston 2006; Kleiner 2010; Roberts 2009

¹⁸ Sharp 2009; A. F. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008a

¹⁹ Sharp 2009, 276–67; see also: 238–42, 290–92

²⁰ Sharp 2009, 291

²¹ Sharp 2009, 291

²² Sharp 2009, 266

In sum, both literatures are thus fundamentally asking questions about group membership, asking the same sorts of questions at the English School and, significantly, asking them in the context of contemporary international society.

1.2 The Main Points

This thesis argues five main points: that (i) closure barriers in international society's clubs are predominantly functional-individualist in nature; (ii) collectivism endures in international society; (iii) closure and stratification are predominantly caused by factors other than exclusion strategies; (iv) international society has become more closed over time; and (v) clubs survive in contemporary international society *because of* networks, not despite them.

Chapter Five argues that closure barriers in international society are predominantly open, being functional-individualist in nature. The criteria that an actor needs to achieve in order to gain entry into a club are predominantly based on an assessment of the functional contributions that the actor can make and the ability to acquire the characteristic or competence to make this contribution are within that actors' abilities to achieve. The exclusion barriers are not crafted in such a way to prevent an actor from improving its own position, with there being relatively little in the way of collectivist barriers preventing an actor's entry. That is, there are relatively few barriers that automatically and absolutely exclude an actor based on attributes that are ascribed to it which render it necessarily unsuitable for inclusion.²³ A domestic analogy to this is racial exclusion. In short, looking at the exclusion barriers erected by and for states, the status competition is actually a relatively meritocratic one. This is a surprising finding as inductively we observe that there is much exclusivity and stratification in international society. As such, this indicates that something other than exclusion barriers must be the

²³ See Chapter Two for a more detailed explanation and development of these concepts.

cause of the bulk of closure in the system. This does not mean that climbing the status ladder is easy, only that from a functionalist perspective it is mostly a fair contest.

Collectivism, though, endures. This is the second main claim of this thesis. At the heart of international society is a deeply embedded legal-collectivism which serves as the primary closure rule of the system and renders the society such that different types of actors face fundamentally different closure contests. In short, the legal requirement of sovereignty divides the international domain in two, dividing state and non-state actors. What is significant is not the existence of this division but what it means for closure and the governance order. In short, legal-collectivism ensures that any networked expansion with non-state actors is necessarily secondary and subordinate to the interactions of states. As is detailed in Chapter Eight, this is the primary way that the ranking status group surrounds itself with networks and endures; not substantively threatened by the shift to a networked governance order. Furthermore, collectivism endures in the “cultural” ways that club insiders ascribe others as being unworthy or unsuitable for equal membership. Just as the Standard of Civilisation used its cultural criteria to stratify the Family of Civilised Nations with its marginally included semi-civilised semi-barbarians, so too are G-summitry’s newer entrants marginally or subordinately ascribed.

The third main claim of this thesis is that stratification is predominantly caused by means other than closure barriers, thus explaining how stratification is possible in a predominantly functional-individualist system and thereby prompting major revisions of extant closure theory which are detailed in Chapter Two.²⁴ This thesis adds Mobility Dampeners to the range of strategies available to insiders (and aspirant outsiders) which serve to prevent the rise of outsiders while concurrently preventing their own

²⁴ This is elucidated in Chapter Two

loss of status. Mobility Dampeners are unlike closure barriers in that they are not rules or criteria governing membership, but are means of preventing status changes that rely on the prevailing ideas, norms, values, and practices of the club to achieve closure. They are thus more furtive means of exclusion than exclusion barriers. *Contra* Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, it is not enough to just describe status as being “sticky,” as if it is naturally resilient against forces that warrant a loss in status.²⁵ Actors take deliberate measures to safeguard their status and these must be accounted for in order to have a comprehensive and accurate account of the way the status game works in international society. Mobility Dampeners and Incorporation Strategies are the means by which status is guarded against loss that make it appear “sticky.”²⁶

This thesis also identifies the entry strategies of outsiders as being a significant cause of stratification and closure in the system. Counter-intuitively, the very way that outsiders try to get into clubs actually serves to reproduce the *status quo* order. In addition, the range of possible entry strategies is expanded beyond that offered by extant closure theory – solely that of Usurpation – to also include: Banding, Differentiation, Legitimation, Normalisation, and Identity Adaptation. Significantly, deference and mimicry are embedded in these entry strategies which entrench the *status quo* order more through volition than imposition. Moreover, intra-group closure of insiders against other insiders and of outsiders against other outsiders further accounts for stratification. As concerns insiders, Chapter Seven details that a particular kind of stratified incorporation makes this possible while Chapter Six details how outsiders engage in Differentiation and Abandonment to make this possible. Moreover, Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate that relations between insiders and outsiders are not necessarily antagonistic, prompting a further revision of closure theory.

²⁵ *Contra* Welch Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014

²⁶ In addition to exclusion strategies, obviously.

The fourth primary claim of this thesis is that international society's clubs have become more closed since the nineteenth century. This is surprising given the shift to an apparently more open, representative networked governance order. The Family of Civilised Nations was actually a more meritocratic club than G-summitry is today. This is so for a number of reasons developed throughout Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. First, G-summitry's functional-individualist closure barriers are predominantly only ostensibly achievable. That is, while they seem like viable objectives for all actors, in reality only a small sub-set of actors are structurally positioned and enabled to achieve them, whereas this was not the case with the Standard of Civilisation (making G-summitry more alike the Great Powers club in this respect). The legal-collectivism that G-summitry shares with the other clubs is more pernicious in contemporary international society. In the Family of Civilised Nations, legal-collectivism was not perfectly unachievable to non-state actors as it is now, thus rendering legal-collectivism as being less absolute than it is today. In the Great Powers club, non-state actors were not seeking inclusion as they are in G-summitry, thus legal-collectivism was less relevant as an exclusion barrier in that context. Moreover, there is greater deference and mimicry required in contemporary entry strategies which further entrench the *status quo* and make entry in G-summitry as equal members more difficult for outsiders. There are also fewer opportunities for entry in G-summitry than in other clubs. Finally, the shift to international society's ranking status group being governed by norms, ideas, and practices of the diplomatic institution within international society further renders the club as relatively more closed, owing to the centrality of precedence and pragmatism in the group's governance. In all, despite the new global governance context, G-summitry is actually a more closed status group.

The fifth main claim of this thesis is that assertions that international politics have shifted to a more open, just networked governance order are overstated.²⁷ This thesis

²⁷ *Contra* A.-M. Slaughter 2005; Thakur 2008b

demonstrates that clubs endure via social closure and that they do so by more stealthy means than previously and that they achieve greater closure than in prior clubs. This is not to say that there is not a networked governance order, but rather to claim that at the heart of the networked international domain are clubs. Networks have not supplanted clubs. Rather, clubs endure surrounded by networks. More than this, though, clubs in a large part survive *because of* the networks that they surround themselves with.

Networks are the club's bulwarks, not their challengers. This is explored more fully in Chapter Eight.

In all, a theory of international social closure allows us to examine and analyse the status game in international society in a way that we were previously unable to, the consequence being that we gain a way of understanding the contemporary governance order in a way that club and networked forms of governance are not viewed as conceptual opposites. Further, this thesis adds to our understanding of how international society expands and reproduces itself; and, critically, allows us to explain how international society's *status quo* order can be maintained and perpetuated with surprisingly little coercion and imposition.

1.3 Empirical Contributions

In keeping with the empirical and theoretical research programme of the English School, this work has important empirical aims beyond the theoretical contributions outlined above. Empirically, it seeks to assess the makeup and rules governing membership in the contemporary global governance domain and how this compares with previous configurations in international society. In short it is to ask: if the world has shifted to a more "networked" governance order as much of the contemporary literature suggests, what do the networks look like, who is a part of them, and why? To achieve this

empirical task this research examines the most important ‘hub’ of contemporary global governance, the G20.

This thesis makes three contributions to the G-summitry literature. First, as is detailed in Chapter Two, it does so by producing new knowledge. Second, it fills two lacunae in the literature. There is much work on (i) what topics the summits have grappled with and on its institutional development,²⁸ (ii) whether or not the G8 and G20 will survive as governance forums,²⁹ and (iii) who is included in the groups and whether or not the membership is just.³⁰ What is missing is any detailed account about how membership, let alone inclusion, actually works, which is the principal concern of this research.³¹ This is surprising given that the compositions of the groups receive so much attention from observers. Second, there are surprisingly few works in the literature that situate G-summitry as a phenomenon within IR that are not of a positivist leaning, John Kirton’s latest, neo-positivist work on the G20 being an archetypal example.³² This thesis serves as a model for how to analyse G-summitry from a post-positivist perspective. Third, this thesis highlights the roles of civil society in G-summitry, which is surprisingly missing from the more substantive works on the topic.³³ To again point to the latest work on G-summitry, Kirton’s *G20 Governance for a Globalized World* is squarely state-centric, containing no thorough analysis of civil society’s position and role in the G20,

²⁸ Bayne 2000; Bayne 2005; Putnam and Bayne 1987; Putnam and Bayne 1984a; Bayne 2007; Smith 2011a

²⁹ A. F. Cooper 2012a; Heinbecker 2011b; Carin 2010; A. F. Cooper and Bradford 2010a; G. Hodgson 2010; A. F. Cooper 2012a

³⁰ Caliori 2011; Leifso 2011; Fitzgerald 2009; Vestergaard and Wade 2012; Ertel 2010; Schneider et al. 2008; Lawson-Remer 2012; Frankel 2010; Barry 2005; Subacchi and Pickford 2011; Gnath, Mildner, and Schmucker 2012; Rana 2011; Tareen 2010; Russian International Affairs Council 2012; Vestergaard 2011; S. Slaughter 2012; S. Slaughter 2013; M. Callaghan et al. 2013

³¹ By membership, I mean a seat at the table as a full member of the group. By inclusion, I mean a degree of involvement in the year-round preparatory and summitry processes.

³² Kirton, 2013. Other notable works that situate G-Summitry within broader positivist IR discussions include: Hodges, Kirton, and Daniels 1999; P. Hajnal 2007; P. I. Hajnal 1999; Larionova 2012; Daniels, Kaiser, and Kirton 2000; Fratianni, Savona, and Kirton 2007; Fratianni, Savona, and Kirton 2003; J. J. Kirton 2001; J. J. Kirton and Takase 2002a; J. Kirton 2012; Rubio-Marquez 2009; Martinez-Diaz 2009; Renard 2010

³³ C.f. Hajnal

governance, or globalisation. The focus of this work – particularly in Chapter Six – of non-state actors also speaks to the broader literature on the roles of positions of transnational actors in international relations, much of which remains limited to highlighting the role of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs.³⁴ Moreover, as Jönsson and Tallberg write, “much of this literature remains engaged in the exercise of proving against a state-centred picture of world politics that transnational actors matter, and the literature is still weak in its analysis of how state and international institutions enable or constrain transnational participation (Risse, 2002: 259)”³⁵ This thesis directly contributes to shoring up this weakness by offering closure as a theoretical lens for understanding how actors enable and constrain one another’s ability to participate internationally and provides a rich account of how this has been achieved in contemporary politics, as well as historically.

The historical dimensions of this work seek to add to the way that IR looks at Great Powers, particularly as concerns the foundation of the Great Powers’ concert system at the Congress of Vienna. Great Powers and Great Power management is central to the discipline across all its theoretical approaches, from the neo-realist concern with the balance of power amongst the Great Powers;³⁶ to the English School’s concern with international society’s institutions, within all of which Great Powers are the most important actors;³⁷ to constructivism’s concern with the identities and interests of the Great Powers.³⁸ Work that refers to the Congress of Vienna predominantly does so by pointing to it as the formal and legal beginnings of the Great Power system and by giving good, descriptive overviews of the events of the Congress.³⁹ Too few works, however, note the discord at the Congress over who was to be considered a Great Power and

³⁴ Jönsson and Tallberg; Clark; others.

³⁵ Jönsson and Tallberg, pg. 9; (Risse, *Transnatl. Actors and World Politics* 2002: 259)

³⁶ Waltz 1979

³⁷ Bull 1977; Watson 1991; Wight 1946

³⁸ Hopf 1998

³⁹ Bisley 2012

none, as far as I am aware, offer any analysis or explanation of how the Great Power club's composition came to be what it was beyond a typical distribution of capabilities assessment, leaving the "micro-politics" to the historians.⁴⁰ Following Neumann's ethnography of diplomacy, this thesis seeks to avoid the pitfalls of armchair analysis and observes directly the "microphysics of power."⁴¹ This thesis also moves away from the bulk of literature that looks to the UN Security Council as the right object to examine in order to analyse contemporary Great Power politics, asserting that G-summitry's economic powers also warrant attention in this respect.

1.4 Theoretical Foundations

1.4.1 The English School

As is articulated in the opening section of this thesis, the primary theoretical aim of this work is to contribute to the English School's understanding of how the structure of international society is reproduced by developing a theory of international social closure. The most important contributions to this thesis to the English School are sketched above in Section 1.1. What follows here is a more of a discussion of the foundations within English School scholarship that this theory builds upon (as opposed to the focus in Section 1.1 on the holes in existing accounts which have already been identified).

The English School's classic accounts of the expansion of international society come close to expressing membership in terms of social closure. Bull states that the standard view of the expansion of international society was that non-Europeans joined a formerly exclusive club once they met certain entry conditions, with the Europeans maintaining a

⁴⁰ One exception is Fry, Goldstein, and Langhorne 2004, 115 who note the contested nature of the club but do nothing beyond that.

⁴¹ Neumann 2012

superior position within this club.⁴² This account, of which Bull, Wight, and others were critical, is itself a straightforward description of system governed by closure.⁴³ It is the assumed superiority of the Europeans in this account that Bull questions, arguing that it is the European *conception* of what international society is, which developed concurrently with its expansion, that is what is dominant, and therefore advantageous, to the original club members.⁴⁴ Bull's revision is still describing a system governed by closure, the difference being that his account shifts the emphasis on order expressed in terms of rank towards an emphasis on order in terms of disposition. For Bull, it is the underlying norms, values, rules, and institutions which define what an international society is that are important- the variables that shape what international society looks like rather than the resulting form. Furthermore, Bull's account contains a dynamic element which recognizes that the very conception of international society is itself fluid, and therefore open to contestation. Thus, it is not just the membership that is mutable and contested but, more importantly for Bull, the very rules that govern membership that are in flux. Expressed in terms of social closure, what Bull is describing here is the contestation over closure logics.

It was the dominant, "directorship of European states" that set the rules of membership and who alone enjoyed membership in the society.⁴⁵ As Bull wrote in a paper presented to the British Committee, the predominant position of the western powers "was protected by the rules and institutions of international society, in which... European or western states alone enjoyed full membership of international society."⁴⁶ In other words, their superior position was guarded by the rules of order (in both its expressions) that they set. Closure was how they maintained their own superior status

⁴² Bull 1984, 123

⁴³ Bull and Watson 1984a, 6; Bull 1984, 123

⁴⁴ Bull 1984, 123-4

⁴⁵ Bull and Watson 1984b, 438

⁴⁶ Bull 1977, 175

and the inferior statuses of others. Bull and Wight thus also portrayed international society as being stratified. As Bull relates about order in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, “[i]n the gradations of independence recognized by the European powers in the extra-European world, the spectrum of positions intermediate between full sovereignty and the status of colony... there could be seen the survival, alongside the concept of a society of equal sovereign states, of the older and historically much more ubiquitous concept of international relations as the relations between suzerains and vassals.”⁴⁷

The setting of membership criteria was, in part, directed by European assumptions about their superiority of religion and civilization.⁴⁸ It is these ‘standards’ to which non-members were made to adhere and it was against these standards that non-Western states “laboured under the stigma of inferior status: unequal treaties, extraterritorial jurisdiction, denial of racial equality.”⁴⁹ Bull writes, “nor should it be doubted that [the Europeans] sometimes used these criteria to deny others their rights and to acquire special privileges for themselves, or that that they required standards of behaviour they failed to observe themselves.”⁵⁰ Bull’s observation here is an almost exact restatement of one of the most important tenets of Parkin’s theory of closure, wherein the rules are used to confer unequal advantages to those in the club.⁵¹ Furthermore, the levying of the rules is most strict at the club’s borders.⁵² As Chapter Four demonstrates, this can be understood as an exercise of unevenly applied credentialism.

⁴⁷ Bull 1984, 125–6

⁴⁸ Bull 1984, 125

⁴⁹ Bull 1984, 125

⁵⁰ Bull 1984, 125

⁵¹ Parkin 1979, 44

⁵² But not exclusively so. Discussions about the barbarism of Germany serve as an example of the rules being tested within the club.

Recognition of the centrality of deference to the prevailing order is also central to the traditional articulation of the expansion story. Bull places an emphasis on the adoption of procedural values in the society's expansion, those that define how international relations are conducted- diplomatic protocol being a prime example.⁵³ While agreement on substantive values is unlikely – perhaps even impossible – the expansion of international society involves the increasing adoption of the institutions through which questions of substantive values are negotiated. It is these procedural values of Western Europe that remain dominant, despite changes in the membership of international society and the relative power-political rank of those included. Actors who wish to be included in this society must adopt its values and in so doing necessarily consent to its rules and institutions.⁵⁴ They may or may not, however, adopt its substantive values; but, it is only by being in the club that they may contest and seek to reform them once included so as to “reflect their own special interests.”⁵⁵ It is because of this that there is an institutionalisation of deference, in which ascendant actors submit to the order which they may not be entirely content with, but do so in order to at least be included. It is only by being included in the club, even if only in a marginalized position, that an actor has an ability to reap at least some of the benefits afforded to club members; be they material, such as an increase in trade, or ideational, such as the recognition of status. Thus, even though substantive values may not be in alignment, ascendant outsiders nonetheless seek entry because it is the only way to improve their position and so necessarily reproduce and perpetuate the prevailing order despite objecting to substantive elements of it and even their own position within that order.

The current generation of English School scholars' updated accounts of international society's expansion and membership are, like their paradigmatic predecessors,

⁵³ Alderson and Hurrell 2000, 6

⁵⁴ Bull 1984, 124

⁵⁵ Bull 1984, 124

interested in the sorts of things (and interested in them in the sorts of ways) that closure theory is. Most notably Edward Keene and Ayse Zarakol explicitly draw links between social closure theory and international society, though they do so with little in the way of reform of closure theory.⁵⁶ It should also be noted that more social-oriented theorists similarly examine IR in ways that closure theory does and focus on the same kinds of questions, the recent work on hierarchy and stratification being of greatest import.⁵⁷ While not about the expansion of international society *per se*, they are nonetheless about its form.

In all, within IR, sociological approaches and the English School approaches (not just the current more-sociological versions of the English School) are congruent with a theory of international social closure and this theory aims to build upon this work, developing an explicit approach to understanding international society's expansion in terms of closure. As below, a significant addition of this thesis to this literature is to demonstrate how it relates to discussions about club and network governance. While there is widespread acknowledgement of stratification within international society, there is – as far as I can tell – no work that accounts for non-state actors' positions and actions in/around this stratified international society and there is too little work looking at how the outside of international society is itself also stratified. While the English School is strong in looking at world society as being populated by norm entrepreneurs,⁵⁸ there is little that looks at how world society actors interact with international society in concrete, material ways. While today's international society is universal among states, there is a constellation of non-state actors surrounding it. International society still has a frontier to manage.

⁵⁶ Keene 2012b; Keene 2014; Zarakol 2010

⁵⁷ Cooley 2008; Buzan and Albert 2010; Albert, Buzan, and Zürn 2013; Lake 1996; Lake 2011; Keene 2007a; Keene 2007b; Keene 2007c

⁵⁸ See especially: Clark 2007

1.4.2 Clubs and Networks

The second theoretical concern is to develop a way of overcoming a tension in the contemporary governance and diplomacy literatures wherein two, partial, incompatible accounts of the governance order are offered in parallel: that of the club and that of the network orders. This thesis develops a theory of international social closure that overcomes this conceptual and theoretical problem. The major focus of the contemporary diplomacy literature is on the apparent shift in diplomacy from a club to network form.⁵⁹ This is one manifestation a larger discussion about a shift in IR to a networked form of global governance.⁶⁰ The focus here is on the diplomacy dimension of this discussion because of the empirical purchase we gain by looking at diplomats. The idea of the diplomatic culture is what saves the concept of international society from theoretical abstraction. In James Mayall's words, diplomats are "the most tangible expression of international society that exists" and it is the institution of diplomacy that "translates international society from a theoretical proposition into some kind of practical reality."⁶¹ A position echoed by Sharp and Wisemann, "...if the idea of an international society serves as an organizing principle that gives meaning to our international relations, then the diplomatic corps gives an important measure of concrete expression to that idea."⁶² The focus on diplomats – sherpas, in G-summitry parlance – is an effort to balance against what Andrew Hurrell has observed as the tendency in English School scholarship to focus on the "invisible college" of international lawyers that has become the "empirical meat" of work on international society.⁶³ Noting the relative dearth of such comparable work focusing on diplomats, Hurrell suggests that it would be useful to know if there "is anything left of the traditional diplomatic culture that embodies the idea of international society and reflects the shared values of

⁵⁹ Most notably, *The Oxford Modern Handbook on Diplomacy* devotes its entire first section to this topic (A. F. Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013a)

⁶⁰ Most notably: A.-M. Slaughter 2005

⁶¹ Mayall 2008, 5

⁶² Sharp and Wiseman 2008, 272

⁶³ Hurrell 2002

a transnational community of diplomatists... At the very least we I think that we need a great deal more empirical knowledge of the sociological underpinnings of such a community.”⁶⁴ This thesis makes such an effort.

The club and network camps in the diplomacy literature largely speak past one another, problematically offering us two incongruous, parallel accounts of the governance environment. This thesis serves as a check on the fashionable network literature, arguing that it ignores too much of the continued centrality of clubs in contemporary governance. This thesis offers a way to better conceptualise international society’s networked structure as being one with clubs at its heart. Despite an apparent shift to a network governance order, the core of the governance structure substantively remains as a club.

In this vein, this thesis also contributes to the literature on international democratisation. Much of the debate on this topic has been focused on the possibility of democratisation.⁶⁵ This work offers a perspective that focuses on the consequences of international democracy, particularly for social mobility, and questions the degree to which non-state actors are substantively included in an ostensibly more democratised international domain. While this thesis thus does not address the desirability or possibility of democratisation, it does provide more empirical matter with which to conduct the debate.

The following brief analysis of the twentieth century diplomacy literature reveals, a general transition in emphasis in the literature from a club-oriented understanding of diplomacy to a networked one. However, the club-oriented conception remains in the contemporary literature, at odds with networked accounts. Textually, the club and

⁶⁴ Hurrell 2002

⁶⁵ Dahl 1999; Held 1995; Scharpf 1999

network understandings may be seen as narratives through which the diplomacy discourse is articulated. They describe the same phenomenon, diplomacy, in different and incongruous ways, thus signalling a problem in the literature which requires investigation. What follows is an overview of this literature that details what is conceptually meant by the “club” and the “network,” with particular emphasis given to the dimensions of each narrative which are most relevant to our focus on group membership.

Diplomatic Clubs

The ascribed identity of an actor is central in the club narrative, being the primary means by which membership in the diplomatic club is granted or denied. Ascribed characteristics are what matter. As concerns collective entities, membership in the club is largely a matter of international law and practice, where it is sovereign states alone, which have been recognised as such by other sovereign entities, that have the right to send and receive diplomats and it is solely the representatives of those actors that may properly be called diplomats. As Chapter Five argues, this is the result of the primary, legal-collectivist closure rule. As Sharp notes, the Westphalian system allows for decisions on who counts as a diplomatic actor to be made relatively easily, providing apparently definitive answers to this question of membership according to straightforward criteria.⁶⁶ In *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, which is widely acknowledged to be *the* definitive practical authority, considerable attention is devoted to the question of membership in the diplomatic club and the process by which it is granted and maintained.⁶⁷ Further to this, Berridge, Barston, and Kleiner's relatively recent work, all written as practical guides, stress sovereignty as being the principle for determining membership.⁶⁸ Kleiner's treatment of the rules is particularly revealing of

⁶⁶ Sharp 2009, 290, see also 277

⁶⁷ See especially: Roberts 2009, 6:20–21. For discussions on the centrality of Satow, see: Neumann 2002; Neumann 2012; Otte 2001

⁶⁸ G. Berridge 2005; Barston 2006; Kleiner 2010

the club's ordering of diplomatic space and the rules which govern its ordering. In discussing changes to the diplomatic system brought about by globalisation, particularly the increased participation of non-state actors in diplomacy, Kleiner writes that "[n]ew rules should be drafted in a way that no additional fragmentation is added to the present international disorder."⁶⁹ This sentence highlights two aspects of the traditionalist club narrative: first, that formal rules are the chief means by which diplomatic space is ordered; and, second, that the entrance of new actors into the diplomatic arena is viewed as a negative development.

The club narrative either situates non-state actors in relatively inferior subject positions to the "core" state actors or entirely excludes them. When they are marginally included it is to serve the functional needs of the club. In *Satow*, non-state actors' involvement in the diplomatic environment is always cast as being peripheral to the diplomatic activities of states and they are only ever discussed in relation to states, not once in *Satow* are non-state actors examined as substantive diplomatic actors in their own right.⁷⁰ *Satow* acknowledges the Track-II diplomatic activities of NGOs, but the very language of second-track diplomacy necessarily subordinates it to the first-track diplomacy of states.⁷¹ For *Satow*, NGOs are included only because they can help state diplomats to obtain good information and to avoid criticism for non-cooperation.⁷² Kleiner similarly asserts that, "[r]epresentatives of NGOs can be helpful in diplomacy, but that does not make them diplomats."⁷³ Finally, while it is not surprising that the practical literature has a state-centric focus, it cannot be concluded that the traditional narrative's state-centricity is such solely because of practicality. As Constantinou discovers in his examination of Nicolson's writing, Nicolson, in deriving his definition of

⁶⁹ Kleiner 2010, 26

⁷⁰ Roberts 2009, 20–9

⁷¹ Roberts 2009, 510

⁷² Roberts 2009, 511–514

⁷³ Kleiner 2010, 25

the diplomacy from the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), purposely decided to leave out the OED's third definition of diplomacy which provides the discursive space for non-state actors to be considered a type of diplomatic actor.⁷⁴ The club thus subordinates, marginalises, or wholly excludes the role of non-state actors in diplomacy.

Diplomatic Networks

In contrast to the club narrative stands the network narrative. A comparison of the most significant differences between the first (1982) and second (1991) editions of Watson's *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*, demonstrates how the network narrative began to be incorporated into understandings of diplomacy, noting the inclusion of public diplomacy, the shift in channels of communication, and the change in scope and subject matter of diplomacy.⁷⁵ In contrast to the club, which stresses order and draws clear distinctions between who is and is not a diplomat, the network does not arrange the diplomatic landscape so neatly. Complexity is a hallmark theme of the narrative and it is an actor's capabilities – their achieved characteristics – that are emphasised in determining inclusion.

The complexity of the globalised world fundamentally changes the environment in which diplomacy is conducted in the "levels" of diplomatic activity, the "domain and scope" of the subject matter, and the "number and types" of actors involved.⁷⁶

Additionally, globalisation's effects on the time and speed with which events occur and responses are required have necessitated an accelerated tempo with which diplomacy must be conducted. In terms of the levels of activity, the network narrative does not privilege state-to-state interaction in the way that the club narrative does. Sub-state, para-state, and supra-state interaction are all accepted as a legitimate forms of diplomacy, and operate in parallel or in support of one another. The state has lost its

⁷⁴ Constantinou 1996, 72–3

⁷⁵ Watson 1991

⁷⁶ Thakur 2008a, 291; see also: Neumann 2008a; Scholte 2008

monopoly on diplomacy in this narrative and it is not something that is lamented as it is in the club.⁷⁷ Rather, the proliferation of levels of diplomatic interaction is an accepted and even lauded development.⁷⁸

The challenges which diplomats must address have changed, becoming more complex in the nature of the problems and requiring complex solutions to address them. Riordan characterises the challenges as being interconnected and interdependent; lacking clear, existing, or uncontested solutions; requiring global collaboration to address; necessitating the collaboration of civil society actors to be effective; and requiring high levels of expert knowledge to solve.⁷⁹ As Ross notes, to deal with the complexity of the global issues that diplomats are tasked with tackling, they must “promote multiple links at multiple levels between governments,” and thus one dimension to the complexity of global issues is to adopt a complex governance structure that works at multiple and overlapping levels of diplomatic activity.⁸⁰ The domain of the challenges that feature centrally in the network narrative are thus necessarily global and the scope of the challenges is almost limitlessly broad.

Complexity also manifests in terms of the number and variety of types of actors in the diplomatic environment. In the club conception, state actors are the only actors fully in the diplomatic club. In the network, other types of actors, including international organisations, non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations, and even individual people, can be said to be part the diplomatic environment.⁸¹ In the club conception, they are included, but marginally and subordinately. In the network narrative, relative positions are not so defined. The heterogeneity of the environment

⁷⁷ Kleiner 2010, 1st:1–30; see especially pg. 26

⁷⁸ A. F. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008a

⁷⁹ Riordan 2008, 136; see also: Heine 2008a; C. Ross 2007

⁸⁰ C. Ross 2007, 210–11

⁸¹ C.f. Sharp and Wisemann, pg. 267

also challenges the hierarchical structure associated with the club narrative, “[c]ommand and control must give way to facilitation- with diplomats nudging and cajoling a variety of non-state actors that are more readily defined through a governance framework.”⁸² In addition to complexity being derived from an increase in the variety of types of actors, the number of a diplomat’s “relevant others” – those actors with whom a diplomat engages in the conduct of diplomacy – has grown.⁸³

In the most radical version of the network narrative, the distinctions between state and non-state actors are almost entirely erased, relying almost entirely on functionalist criteria determining belonging. Jönsson contends that states and their diplomats are “co-participants” in “post-territorial diplomacy.”⁸⁴ Within the network narrative the plurality of types of actors reduces the state actor to being one type of actor among many; and, as is asserted through Jönsson’s phrasing, these other types of actors are equal in status to states in the environment. Furthermore, the “nature and roles of participants are increasingly indistinct” as the structures that ascribed those identities are undercut by the network narrative.⁸⁵ In conceptualising diplomacy as being “post-territorial” one of the central criteria that justifies state actors’ exclusive monopoly on the conduct of diplomacy within the traditional narrative is challenged by the network narrative- the possession of sovereignty is not a factor in determining membership, any type of actor can be involved.⁸⁶ State and non-state actors and collective and individual entities alike are equally included and they can cooperate at and between any level(s) of activity.

⁸² Neumann 2008a, 23–5; A. F. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008a

⁸³ Neumann 2008a, 25

⁸⁴ Jönsson 2008, 35; see also: Hocking and Spence 2005, 285; Keukeleire 2003, 1

⁸⁵ Hocking 1999, 21

⁸⁶ Neumann 2008a; Scholte 2008

Technology is also central to questions of inclusion this narrative. Technological advances have enabled new types of actors to engage in diplomacy and to be engaged by diplomacy.⁸⁷ Non-governmental organisations, for example, can make appeals directly to foreign governments or foreign populations, and are far better enabled to be present (and have a presence) in the forums in which diplomacy is conducted. Technology is critical to the rise of public diplomacy in that advances in communications technologies make engagement with publics – both foreign and domestic – easier and less costly.⁸⁸ It also allows for diplomacy by publics, in that it allows for individuals to themselves engage in “citizen diplomacy,” circumventing, or at even marginalising, state-based diplomacy.⁸⁹ In all, technological advances allow non-state actors to be more engaged by diplomacy and to engage in diplomacy.

“Being a good communicator in media-driven societies is of paramount importance in network diplomacy.”⁹⁰ While being a good communicator has traditionally been defined as an essential quality of a diplomat, the nature of communication has changed such that media is key in communication, not just communication via the sending and receiving of letters between officials. State diplomats are not necessarily the best enabled to effectively communicate in this context. Hence, partnerships are required in order to gain the abilities necessary to have influence. As Rosenau states, “what makes actors effective in world politics derives not from the sovereignty they possess or the legal privileges thereby accorded them, but rather lies in the relational phenomena, in the authority they can command and the compliance they can thereby elicit”.⁹¹ This creates a functional necessity for other types of actors to be included. As Cooper relates,

⁸⁷ Jönsson 2008; Neumann 2008a

⁸⁸ Bravely-Wagner 2009, 107

⁸⁹ Hocking 1999, 24

⁹⁰ Heine 2008b, 281–82

⁹¹ Rosenau 1990.

celebrities and the transnational business elite are particularly more adept in this context than state diplomats.⁹²

Clubs and/or Networks?

Membership in the club conception of diplomacy is thus principally about whether or not an actor has legitimate standing as the representative of a sovereign, whereas in the network membership is principally about what functions an actor serves. The distinction between the two follows the ascribed versus achieved divide. The club focuses on the order and rules that delineate who is a member of the diplomatic “club” and who is not, and those that define the relative status positions of club members. The network narrative, in contrast and in opposition, focuses on how a variety of actors are enabled to address global challenges. The club’s imposed simplicity for defining membership is replaced with an embrace of complexity and multiplicity by the network, allowing for all types of actors to be included in the diplomatic environment. Additionally, whereas the club emphasizes hierarchy in diplomacy, the network conceives of this same environment as being either less-hierarchical – and even, for Thakur, as being “flat.”⁹³

I share the criticisms of the club conception of diplomacy that the networked literature advances. However, as this thesis details, I am critical of the network characterization of the governance landscape for failing to account for the way in which processes continue to feature. I am also critical of this literature for overstating the extent to which hierarchy has been replaced with a “flatter” governance structure and I argue that the club model’s focus on hierarchy still has analytical purchase, though I suggest that stratification is a more useful concept.

⁹² A. F. Cooper 2008a, 127 see also pp. 3, 71, 113

⁹³ Thakur 2008b, 292; A.-M. Slaughter 2004, 19

These narratives thus conceptualise the diplomatic environment in different ways and yield very different accounts of what diplomacy entails and by whom it is conducted. These narratives exist in parallel and in tension with one another. The narratives are in parallel with one another in that both concurrently exist in the contemporary literature. The club narrative remains particularly dominant in the practice-oriented literature, *Satow* being the paradigm example. They are in tension with one another in that they incongruously offer different answers to the same fundamental questions of who has membership in the diplomatic club and why. The traditional narrative has roots in an early twentieth century understanding of diplomacy as being the high politics game of Great Powers played out amongst gentleman diplomats, and is brought into the academic literature via the study of international history, law, and rationalist political science. In contrast, the network narrative is rooted in the world society and globalisation literatures which are antithetical to such conceptions of the international domain, decentralising the state as the object of study, problematising the role and existence of an international elite, and broadening the scope of IR to include sub-, supra-, trans-, and para-national actors and interactions. Within the club narrative the only wholly legitimate diplomatic actors are the representatives of states by virtue of their states' claim to sovereignty. That is, an identity as the representative of a sovereign entity is what confers diplomatic status according to this account- the answer to who counts and why is clear-cut. In the network narrative the answer is not so straightforward, as inclusion is based on an actor's ability to contribute in some way to a network's goal, anyone or anything can be included so long as they are functionally relevant.

In addition to being parallel narratives in tension with one another, these are both partial accounts of the same environment, each having different strengths in terms of the ways in which a narrative "captures" what diplomacy is and by whom it is

conducted. The club narrative is adept at characterising the hierarchies present in the diplomatic environment and inclusion/exclusion rules that govern state representatives' membership in this environment. It does so, however, ignoring the significance of the variety of non-state actors engaging in diplomacy and the extent to which the ways in which global interaction has changed due to shifting structures of governance. In short, the club narrative is unable to, and indeed at times wilfully ignorant of, the complexity of contemporary international politics. The network narrative, on the other hand, embraces this complexity and is particularly adept at taking account of the multiplicity of actors engaged in diplomacy, the changes made to the conduct of diplomacy, and the complex environment – filled with complex challenges – in which these various actors engage with one another. The network narrative, however, does so in almost complete absence of any discussion of the extent to which hierarchical relations or power endure, not just in the context of state-based diplomacy but also in terms of relations between state and non-state actors. As examples, the network narrative includes non-state actors in the diplomatic environment based on an actor's relevance to a given issue or on that actor's particular abilities to contribute to addressing that issue, but there is almost no discussion about who decides what counts as relevancy, who decides what abilities count as being useful, or how actors become "networked" in the first place. The network narrative, in short, can deal with complexity but is unable to give an account of the structured relations of power that persist in the diplomatic environment.

In the shift from the club to the network understandings of diplomacy we move from one partial account to another. In this move we gain an ability to capture the complexity that is a quintessential feature of contemporary global politics and we lose the rigidity of the club narrative. These are positive developments. However, in this move we also lose the ability to talk about hierarchy. The problem is that the network narrative overstates

the extent to which order is less – or even no longer – hierarchically structured.

Generally speaking, the club narrative is thus unable to deal with complexity and the network narrative is unable to deal with hierarchy.

Hierarchy, and its accompanying unequal relations of power, remain central to the way that diplomacy works. As such, they ought to continue to figure in how we understand diplomacy. The network narrative, as it presently exists, however, is unable to incorporate discussions of hierarchy in any way that is as rich and developed as it is in the club narrative. The loss of the ability to deal with the hierarchies that persists in diplomacy is not a positive development. This is the network narrative's blind spot which makes it a partial narrative, and, indeed, a problematic one.

These incongruous narratives remain in the literature in parallel with one another as they both have utility in characterising important dimensions of the contemporary governance order, but do so only partially. What is necessary is a new way to look at diplomacy, in particular, and the governance order, in general, that is a complete picture. Such a perspective would not have trade one blind spot for another as one does in choosing either the club or network narrative, having an ability to capture both complexity and hierarchy at once. This thesis is thus not a part of the literature that argues against the conservatism of the club narrative in favour of the network narrative, nor is it a stoic defence of the club narrative.⁹⁴ It champions the strengths of both narratives while equally deriding each of their shortcomings. Furthermore, this thesis is equally not a bridge building exercise to span the divide between the two narratives. Rather, this research aims to supersede the existing partial accounts, whereas recent scholarship leaves them as is.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Hocking 1999

⁹⁵ A. F. Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013b, 24

We cannot just discard the traditional narrative wholesale on account of it being rooted, and indeed in many ways stuck, in an out-dated conception of diplomacy because it still has some value in the way that it characterises the hierarchical relations of power at work. That is, it still can make a contribution to helping us to answer the central research questions of this thesis. Indeed, the club-based model of diplomacy that it presents us with yields unsatisfactory answers because it largely ignores the degree to which non-state actors are significant, but its focus on rules and hierarchical order gives us a way to understand membership in a way that the network narrative is unable to do. Indeed, this is why the club narrative persists. At the same time, though, we need to be able to capture the complexity that the network narrative captures. A theory of international social closure allows us to do both at once.

1.4.3 Status in International Relations

The third theoretical aim of this thesis is to use closure theory to improve IR's current approach to the study of status. In particular, this work seeks to provide a theoretical framework that looks at status more in terms of general mobility –status moves in both upward and downward directions – rather than current accounts which tend to look at status movements in only one direction at a time- up or down. That is, the risings and fallings of powers are examined as two parts of the same social process and the interplay between the two movements is given primacy. It goes beyond, for example, looking at how an actor's rising status may be denied by superiorly positioned others to look at how that denial of status is itself a move on the part of the superiorly positioned to safeguard their own status.⁹⁶

Related to this, international closure theory is not solely concerned with positive identity moves. To fully understand how the status game is played it is not enough only

⁹⁶ c.f. Suzuki 2008; Volgy et al. 2011

to look at how status is gained, but also at how it is denied. Indeed, as is particularly argued in Chapter Five, the denial of status to others is in some ways a positive move for superiorly positioned actors as it serves to maintain their position, but this is less a positive movement than it is a maintenance of a *status quo*.

Additionally, Paul and Shankar point to a key curiosity of the current change in world order being that it seems to be more pacific in nature than previous shifts.⁹⁷ Oddly, there is no explicit historical dimension to the research programme that Paul, Larson and Wohlforth outline in that same volume.⁹⁸ At best, more violent changes in order are assumed to be the way that rank changed through power competition by military means. While this is mostly true, the historical dimension of this thesis demonstrates that claiming status in the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club involved more than just violent exercises of material power, there are significant dimensions to achieving entry into those clubs that do not involve exercising assertive or aggressive strategies. The story of achieving greater status historically, in other words, is not so straight forward as being just about the exercise of power. In addition, this thesis also offers an explanation for why current changes in order feature less aggression. Chapters Four and Six in particular highlight the importance of the normative context in shaping what sort of closure game can be played. In brief, using an English School perspective that accounts for the role of constitutive institutions in conditioning the character of relations between actors allows us to see how the contemporary context excludes the possibility of assertive strategies to gain entry into today's ranking status group, thus resulting in a more pacific closure game.

Finally, Larson and Shevchenko's use of Social Identity Theory to understand status in international relations is useful, but not for every case of status seeking in international

⁹⁷ Paul and Shankar 2014. See also: Onea 2014

⁹⁸ Welch Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014, 19

society as it “explores how social *groups* strive to achieve positively distinctive identity.”⁹⁹ The theory developed in this thesis differs in two respects. First, it is concerned with individual actors. As is detailed in the following chapter, the use of groups in this research is as contexts in which to observe closure in operation. Gaining entry into status groups is the means of achieving and signalling status, rather than in Larson and Shevchenko’s conception where groups are used to achieve status. Group membership is the ends of status seeking, not the means. Actors make status claims through more than just “*rhetoric, diplomatic activity, and acquisition of status symbols*” they also do it by gaining membership in elite clubs.¹⁰⁰

1.5 The Plan

Chapters Two and Three present the theoretical and methodological frameworks for this thesis. Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven serve as this thesis’ core empirical chapters. Chapter Four is concerned with the ways that order is reproduced by means other than closure strategies, examining how the different institutional contexts of the clubs condition how the closure game is played in each of them. Chapter Five looks at exclusion strategies, Chapter Six at entry strategies, and Chapter Seven at incorporation strategies. Chapter Eight ties the various strands woven in the empirical chapters together, particularly focusing on how the contemporary order is actually more closed than its historical antecedents, despite seeming more open.

⁹⁹Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 66. Emphasis mine.

¹⁰⁰ Welch Larson, Paul, and Wolfarth 2014, 22

CHAPTER TWO

International Social Closure

2.1 Introduction

Understanding an international order requires a social theory, as order is fundamentally social. To understand how group membership works and, as a result, what any particular governance order looks like we thus need a sociological approach. In terms of membership and the status that is derived from membership, what is required is an approach that is able to (i) identify the mechanisms through which membership is claimed, denied, maintained, and granted and (ii) compare how this works today compared with how it might have worked differently in the past. In terms of governance order, what is required is an approach that is able to (iii) account for hierarchy and exclusion in the system while at the same time (iv) account for the complexity and apparent inclusiveness of the current governance order which, as is detailed below, extant accounts are unable to comprehensively achieve. Finally, in line with the English School's concern with order and justice, the kind of approach that is required is one that can (v) assist us in making judgments about the relative fairness or justness of status systems.

This chapter develops a theory of international social closure to achieve these tasks. In so doing it improves upon problems with extant approaches discussed at the end of Chapter One. Furthermore, this theory serves as a corrective to the post-structuralism's emphasis on ideational dimensions of material dimensions of closure. This chapter proceeds with an outline of social closure theory, drawing heavily from the work of neo-Weberians Frank Parkin and Raymond Murphy. I am critical of the existing theory and

propose seven substantive revisions to the theory that render it appropriate for use in studying international society.¹

Specifically, this reformed closure theory (i) develops a means of classifying how relatively open or closed an entry barrier is; (ii) provides a means of explaining how exclusion can be achieved in what seem to be open closure systems; (iii) demonstrates how closure can be achieved by group insiders through more than just exclusion strategies; (iv) shows how closure can also be caused by the strategies adopted by outsiders seeking inclusion; (v) reconceptualises the range of strategies available to outsiders seeking entry; (vi) demonstrates how the closure game can be relatively peaceful; and (vii) accounts for closure games played within groups, not just between them.

2.2 Closure Theory

2.2.1 Actors and Groups

The ontology of extant closure theory is groups. Its principal concern is the political struggle between them- how the superiorly positioned attempt to monopolise advantages for themselves and how the inferiorly positioned try to overcome their inferiority and exclusion.² As below, closure theory's emphasis on the strategies groups use to participate in this struggle, either to maintain or change their position, is particularly useful for addressing this research's guiding questions.

The ontology of closure theory, however, is the first element that warrants reform in order to be a useful tool for studying international society. To study international

¹ While it is beyond the bounds of this thesis, I suspect that the improvements on the theory developed here also render closure theory better able to study domestic societies.

² Murphy 1988; Parkin 1974; Parkin 1979b

society the focus needs to be on individual actors working to improve their position rather than actors collectively organising themselves in groups to improve their position (though, remaining open to the possibility of such organisation). As this thesis demonstrates, there is actually very little in the way of collective organisation to improve status in international society. While political struggle for status is rife in international society, it rarely manifests as class struggle as it does in domestic societies. This is not to say that there is no collective organisation in international society, the G77 and the BRICS being prime examples, only that the overwhelming majority of status moves are individualistic in character rather than collective. Of all the cases examined in this research, very few involve collective action by groups. As Chapter Six details, even those cases that do involve group coordination, such as a Banding entry strategy, are more accurately seen as a means for particularly status conscious actors in a group – not necessarily the most powerful – to improve their position, often at the eventual cost of others in their group.³ Zarakol agrees, pointing to Turkey and Japan as examples of actors choosing to go their own way rather than seek a collective status rise.⁴ The status game in international society is predominantly an individualist game.

2.2.2 Divisions

There are three concepts that form the basis of this theoretical framework: social division, social stratification, and social closure. Social division refers to society-wide distinctions that divide groups composed of individual actors.⁵ Stratification, a theoretical sub-set of social division, refers to a social hierarchy being organized according to these groups (rather than individuals) and that this ordering persists over time;⁶ and social closure refers to the process by which groups monopolize advantages

³ The cases in this work are neither groups nor individual actors, but rather are instances of inclusion and exclusion in status groups- attempts, successful or otherwise, of traversing a status group's border.

⁴ Zarakol 2010, 174, 249

⁵ Payne 2000, 242–43

⁶ Bottero 2004, 1–5

for themselves by closing off opportunities for other groups to access those advantages. These advantages may be material or ideational, such as the ownership of the means of production or the accumulation of social prestige. These are related concepts that need to be momentarily disentangled. In short, though, I use social division to refer to differentiation between groups (i.e. the production and identification of groups in a system), stratification to refer to the structure of differentiation between groups (i.e. the relative position of groups in a system), and closure to refer the processes by which stratified groups – or, more precisely, the individual actors who make up the group operating collectively – contest resources, set or meet rules for membership, and maintain or overcome the system of differentiation (i.e. the political struggle between groups in a system). Division is about identity, stratification is about position, and closure is about conflict and control.

There are three principal constitutive features involved in social division: (i) the (re)creation of group identities, (ii) the (re)creation of group subject positions, and (iii) the perpetuation of the logic which gives the rationale for the groups and their relative positions. The construction of subject identities and subject positions is thoroughly developed in post-positivist literatures and it is not the aim of this thesis to rehearse it here, but it is necessary to acknowledge its importance in underpinning this theoretical framework.⁷ In the closure process an advantaged group constitutes itself and the disadvantaged group(s) by defining itself as being hierarchically superior in relation to other groups that are defined as being inferior and excluded. Group identities and group positions are thus intrinsically linked with one another, though they are conceptually distinct aspects of a single productive process of differentiation.

Additionally, not only are the disadvantaged groups cast in inferior subject positions but they are also defined as being ineligible for the opportunities that are closed off to

⁷ Doty 1993; Doty 1996; Hall 2003; Medina 2004; Neumann and Welsh 1991; Weldes and Saco 1996

them.⁸ This is especially crucial and warrants repeating: actors are denied membership because of some sort of ineligibility. There is a logic underpinning their exclusion.

What defines this ineligibility is the third constitutive dimension, that of the logic of division, which is given emphasis throughout this work as examining the changing rationales and justifications for division and the membership rules which make these divisions possible in international society are of central concern to this research's guiding questions. Changes in the underlying logics are what we are looking for in our aim to investigate whether or not the status game has changed over time in international society.

Group identities are formed around a trait common to all members of the group. Each group is a social construct that is made "real" or "natural" through the exercise of productive power.⁹ The identities of groups are thus inherently political. To refer to domestic analogies, groups may be defined by physical characteristics – tall/short, male/female – or they may be amorphous – bourgeois/proletarian, uneducated/educated. It must be stressed that groups are not necessarily dyads, systems in which groups are defined by nationality or ethnicity, for example, have multiple groups in them. Weber contends that the attribute around which groups are constructed forms the justification for exclusion.¹⁰ I am critical of Weber in this respect, however, as it misses the importance of the underlying logic of the system that justifies the selection of a particular attribute in the first place. The attribute that forms the basis of a group and, in turn, serves as the means of closure, must be supported by a rationale for that particular attribute being the marker of a group and the means of closure. An attribute, in other words, cannot be chosen arbitrarily in a system of closure. For

⁸ Murphy 1988; Weber 1978, 34–6, 302–7, 339–48, 635–40, 926–66

⁹ Barnett and Duvall 2005

¹⁰ Parkin 1979, 44

example, in a closure system defined according to gender, males may be superiorly positioned to females. Males are not superiorly positioned just because they are males, but because the masculine identity is produced so as to ascribe to it qualities that are constructed as being superior within a system governed by particular values.

To import this into IR, in an international system wherein sovereignty serves as the organising principle, states are superior to other actors because the possession of sovereignty is mutually held as being exceptional. This is so because of the underlying rationale and values of the system which prioritise values including representative legitimacy, non-intervention, self-determination, and the monopoly control of the means of violence. Sovereignty is an expression of these values and is thus neither arbitrarily the attribute that organises the system nor the sole justification for exclusion. For example, when actors justify the exclusion of non-state entities as full members of multilateral forums, such as the UN General Assembly or the G20, they do so claiming that they lack democratic legitimacy.¹¹ The argument does not stop at stating that they do not possess sovereignty, but goes one step further to appeal to a commonly held value. Pointing solely to an attribute of closure is thus insufficient for justifying closure and thus Weber's framework falls short in this respect.

The (re)production of identity and subject positions is always co/multi-constitutive. That is, defining one's own group according to a particular attribute necessarily defines other groups and the power to name and define one's own group and others' group(s) is itself a privilege of the superiorly positioned. Closure theorists tend to focus on material resources, opportunities, and advantages secured by closure processes. In doing so they tend to underplay the significant ideational advantage of being able to name and define – to identify groups and to ascribe qualities and positions to those groups. This

¹¹ This argument is explored in depth in Chapter Six

monopolized ability allows the superiorly positioned to continually (re)enforce the system's structure which is articulated so as to serve their own interests at the expense of the inferiorly positioned. Closure is thus a result not only of the monopolization of material advantages, such as territory, wealth, or arms, but also of the ideational advantage to name and define. Accounting for both the material and ideational dimensions is thus necessary for a comprehensive account of how closure works. Extant social closure theory over-emphasises the material dimension, owing to its Marxist roots, which this reformed theory of international social closure corrects for.

I am equally critical, however, of post-structuralist IR scholarship for over-emphasising the ideational dimension, a critique I share with Rebecca Alder-Nissen.¹² I thus adopt a middle position that accounts for both the ideational and material, a particular advantage of approaching this topic from an English School perspective.¹³ Social division, stratification, and closure is not just about the (re)production of identities. The construction and co-constitution of the Self/Other dyad is critically important.¹⁴ However, a comprehensive account of international society does not just take stock of group identities but must look at how the borders between them are traversed. As the empirical chapters of thesis detail, this is a material undertaking. Salter points to Gong's explanation of how the Standard of Civilisation "was mobilized to distinguish those states that could expect sovereignty and those that could expect domination. This boundary between Western and non-Western states was patrolled earnestly."¹⁵ This thesis, however, goes one step further. The Standard was not just about identifying a stratified social division and the boundary divide was not just something that was patrolled to keep outsiders out. The Standard was not just a border guard but also an immigration tribunal. The Standard judged the suitability of an actor to cross the border

¹² Adler-Nissen 2014, 146; Okagaki 2013, 30

¹³ Black and Hwang 2012, 432; Buzan 2004c, 61

¹⁴ Campbell; Lebow 2008; Neumann 1999; Said 1978

¹⁵ Gong 1984, 10; Salter 2002, 17; see also 10-11

(in either direction). Closure theory allows us to see that what is also involved in processes that produce Others is the management of the border between the Self and Other; that is, providing a means - one that is often material - to know and judge when the other is no longer belonging to the out-group, but has become self-same (and conversely, when an actor ascribed as being self-same is no longer so).

2.2.3 Logics, Rules, and Criteria

Closure logics are the criteria according to which inclusion in, and exclusion from, groups is governed.¹⁶ Parkin identifies two logics of closure that broadly categorise the types of membership criteria: collectivist closure and individualist closure. Collectivist closure criteria refer to group traits such as gender or race. Examples of a collectivist system of closure include patriarchy or apartheid. Individualist closure criteria refer to individual traits such as academic credentials or wealth. Examples of individualist closure systems thus include meritocracy or capitalism. Collectivist traits tend to be impossible for an individual actor to amend whereas individualist traits – at least ostensibly – are changeable. The significance of this is that if an actor is excluded on collectivist grounds, there is nothing that that actor can do to overcome his/her/its exclusion other than to overturn the entire logic of the closure system. In contrast, individualist exclusion can be overcome by the achievement of whatever is necessary for entry without the need to challenge the prevailing order. No system is purely collectivist or purely individualist; they are ideal types. However, a system can generally be characterised according to the dominant mode of closure.

There are two other axes of delineation along which we could categorise types of closure rules: ascribed versus achieved criteria and legitimist versus functionalist

¹⁶ Parkin 1979

criteria. To categorise rules along collectivist versus individualist lines is to emphasise in our analysis the *type of attribute* that is being selected by the in-group to judge the suitability of an actor for membership. In analysing closure in this way our chief concern is identifying whether exclusion is being based on the characteristics of the group to which an actor belongs (collectivism) or a characteristic of the individual actor (individualism). Categorising closure along ascribed versus achieved lines delineates closure rules in almost the same way. What is different is that this delineation emphasises the possibility (or lack thereof) of an actor changing those characteristics. Ascribed characteristics cannot be changed whereas achieved ones can be acquired. Race-based exclusion provides a clear example: If a club has a rule banning black people from entry, an individual excluded by this rule can him/herself do nothing to make him/herself suitable for entry. The way to overcome this unjust exclusion is to challenge the entire logic of the closure system. If a club, on the other hand, has a rule preventing entry to anyone below a certain income level, an individual seeking entry has the ability – at least ostensibly – to increase his/her earnings. Ascribed versus achieved characteristics thus map closely onto the collectivist versus individualist delineation, but in this analytical frame the emphasis is on the *changeability of attributes*.

The third way to categorise closure rules is along legitimist versus functionalist lines wherein the analytical focus is on the *justification* for an actor's suitability for membership. Legitimist closure holds that an actor should be included because of who/what it is, whereas functionalist closure justifies inclusion based on what the actor can do or contribute. Legitimism includes (and excludes) based on *who the actor is* of the actor whereas functionalism does so based on *what the actor can do*. Again, this delineation follows the other two closely- legitimist, collectivist, and ascribed closure focus on the group identity of an actor whereas functionalist, individualist, and achieved closure focus on the individual identity of an actor.

We thus have three different axes along which we can classify types of closure rules. It is tempting to opt for parsimony and opt for using only one schema, but doing so comes at the cost of missing important dimensions of closure. We need to hold on to all three axes in order to achieve a thorough analysis of closure that accounts for attribute type (collectivist versus individualist), attribute changeability (ascribed versus achieved), and membership justification (legitivist versus functionalist). To focus only on attribute type is to miss how actors try to change their attributes in order to improve their chances of gaining inclusion. Chapter Six particularly demonstrates how central this is in entry strategies. Likewise, to only focus on changeability is to miss the importance of underlying justifications for membership. Actors can improve their achieved characteristics, but if they face a legitivist mode of closure, their efforts will be of no effect in gaining inclusion. As this thesis argues, this is the situation faced by non-state actors who, despite significant efforts to boost their achieved credentials and use them to provide functional benefit to the club, they can never overcome the legal-collectivism at the heart of international society which demands the possession of sovereignty by its membership. States are included by legitivist right as sovereign actors at the exclusion of all other types of actors, regardless of their functional importance.

A collective-legitivist closure system that excludes (or includes) based on ascribed characteristics is a more closed system than a functionalist-individualist that excludes (or includes) based on achieved characteristics. Social mobility is greater in the latter as actors have the ability to achieve whatever is necessary for them to gain entry into higher ranked status groups. Conversely, actors in groups who fail to no longer have whatever achieved characteristic(s) is required for membership can lose their position in the group. Social mobility works in both directions. In a collectivist system the

position of the in-group members is far more secure. As outsiders cannot gain the ascribed characteristic(s) necessary for inclusion and as insiders cannot lose those characteristics, positions are entrenched so long as the logic of the system holds.

This theory's treatment of mobility is especially useful as it comprehensively captures social mobility in all directions, whether it be an actor's rise or fall of status. In addition to the above critique of Social Identity Theory's focus on positive status moves, this is a more broad critique of and improvement upon the bulk of IR's approach to status which tends only to focus on movement in a single direction. Scholarship tends either to look at rising powers or at falling powers, but rarely at both rising and falling movements at once and failing to look at how the strategies of rising and falling actors relate to one another. Onea and Dicco and Levy make the same point, the strategic interaction between the superior/falling and inferior/rising actors needs to be accounted for.¹⁷

Social stratification is thus more easily perpetuated over time in a collective-legitimist system. Collectivist modes of closure allow dominant groups to better guarantee the transfer of their privileges to their generational successors than individualist modes of closure. An aristocratic system is a case in point wherein hereditary titles and property are passed down generationally, almost guaranteeing that the continued dominance of the superior status group and the continued exclusion of the "lower orders." In contrast, the inheritance of privilege and the consequent perpetuation of a particular stratified order are not so assured in systems of individualist closure. In a meritocracy, for example, a superior position is the result of individual characteristics that are "achieved," such as a professional qualification, rather than "ascribed," such as a hereditary title. Again, these are ideo-typical situations; as Keene notes, many meritocratic societies allow for the inheritance of properties or use elite education as a

¹⁷ DiCicco and Levy 2003, 138; Onea 2014, 125–6. Others who hint at this but do not pick up on it include: Doran 1991; Lebow 2008

means for ensuring structural advantages for privileged groups to gain sought after credentials.¹⁸ Equally, as Murphy contends, “[t]here was always a certain degree of upward mobility for a few individual members of the dominated collectivity, especially when the dominant collectivity saw those individuals as useful means for the accomplishment of specific ends.”¹⁹ This is an important point, mobility, though rare and difficult in socially differentiated societies marked by collectivist rules of closure, can be achieved if the attributes of an individual is judged by the dominant group to be functionally useful.²⁰ Murphy raises this point as part of his discussion of Weberian rationalization, claiming that in the shift from 19th century collectivist closure to 20th century individualist closure the dominant class could secure its position “by a more rational use of the talents of those under its domination.”²¹ This rationalisation of exclusion resulted in a shift in the closure logic such that “the capacity to convince others that one had the means to accomplish valued goals” became the criterion for inclusion in the dominant group.²² As a result of this shift, membership in the dominant group was no longer generationally transferred strictly according to *who* an individual is, but according to *what* an individual can do, which, in this example, is the ability to accomplish a goal valued and desired by those in the dominant position. What is significant about this for our purposes here is that the power to decide who is included in the dominant group (and who is excluded from that group) remains with those already superiorly positioned. However, the membership criteria for inclusion in that group changes and so too does the group’s composition, but the status position of actors do not.

¹⁸ Keene 2007b; Keene 2007c

¹⁹ Murphy 1988, 220

²⁰ Payne 2000, 242–3

²¹ Murphy 1988, 220

²² Murphy 1988, 220

This is key for understanding how incumbents' status positions in international society endure despite a shifting normative context and shifts in power-political capabilities. The ability to set a system's closure rules is itself a monopoly privilege of the superiorly positioned group insiders which affords them the ability to structure the closure game in ways inferiorly positioned outsiders cannot. In this respect the closure game is rigged in favour of superiorly positioned group incumbents. Not only does the in-group have the ability to decide what outsiders – if any – could be included in the club, they have the ability to define on what terms they could be included. As this thesis demonstrates, the ability to decide who gets included and on what terms has had a significant effect on maintaining the status of G-summitry's incumbents. In short, despite the shift to an apparently more open, inclusive, less-Western G20, the decision of whom to include and on what terms was firmly that of the incumbent G7 members and was decided on by two men: then-Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin and then-US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers. Excluding any incumbents was “out of the question” in crafting the new group and the inclusion of new members was decided based on whom they perceived to be the regionally “systematically significant” countries who subscribed to a largely neo-liberal economic agenda and upheld a good governance agenda domestically.²³

This thesis argues that international society is predominantly a functional-individualist closure system, but one with a deeply imbedded collectivism at its heart.²⁴ This collectivism, as Chapter Five argues, is a legal-collectivism that sets the possession of sovereignty as being the primary closure rule of the system, creating the broad social division in international society between state and non-state actors. By virtue of this primary closure rule, state and non-state actors are structurally cast into two very

²³ Interviews: Martin 2012; Summers 2012

²⁴ See Chapter Five. My formulation is distinctly different from Zarakol's which holds that international society excludes via collectivist criteria but individualist criteria to evaluate members (Zarakol 2010, 53–4).

different closure games. The functional-individualist rules serve as the system's secondary closure rules which are what mark international society as being a relatively meritocratic society wherein full membership in status groups is theoretically possible so long as an actor overcomes the primary closure rule.²⁵ Should an actor not satisfy the primary, collectivist rule, however, regardless of whatever functional contributions it might make, it can never achieve full membership by virtue of its ascription as a non-sovereign actor.

2.3 Closure Strategies

Closure strategies are the means by which actors exercise power in the status game in order to achieve status for themselves, deny it to others, grant it to others, or maintain their own. Discussions of power cannot be separated from discussions of closure as power is an "attribute of closure."²⁶ Parkin outlines two basic types of closure strategies: exclusion and usurpation.²⁷ He defines exclusion as "the attempt by one group to secure for itself a privileged position at the expense of some other group through a process of subordination... it is a form of collective social action which, intentionally or otherwise, gives rise to a social category of ineligibles or outsiders."²⁸ He characterizes this as "the use of power in a 'downward' direction because it necessarily entails the creation of a group, class, or stratum of legally defined inferiors."²⁹ While strategies of exclusion are the most prevalent strategy in stratified systems, the second strategy outlined by Parkin is that of usurpation which is a consequence of, and a response to, exclusion.³⁰ Whereas exclusion is the strategy adopted by the superiorly positioned group, usurpation is the

²⁵ Having primary and secondary rules marks international society out as having a 'tandem' closure structure (Murphy 1988, 73-4).

²⁶ Parkin 1979, 46

²⁷ For more comprehensive overview and critique of Parkin's treatment of closure see: Murphy 1988, 10-14; 65-81

²⁸ Parkin 1979, 45

²⁹ Parkin 1979, 45

³⁰ Parkin 1979, 45

strategy adopted by inferiorly positioned groups “to win a greater share of resources” by “bit[ing] into the privileges of legally defined superiors.”³¹ Usurpation always contains “a potential challenge to the prevailing system of allocation and to the authorized version of distributive justice”³² and it tends to manifest as mass mobilizations, such as demonstrations or marches.³³ Parkin also identifies a third type of closure strategy, that of dual closure. In dual closure a subordinate group exercises a strategy of exclusion against other subordinate groups, while, at the same time exercising a strategy of usurpation against the dominant group. Dual closure is thus the exercise of the two basic forms of closure strategies at once. Dual closure thus accounts for how divisions and political struggles amongst subordinate groups form further substrata in a system.

2.3.1 Exclusion and Mobility Strategies

It is closure theory’s conceptualisation of closure strategies that are most heavily reformed in this thesis. First, as concerns the exclusion of actors, it is necessary to adopt greater sophistication in understanding how closure barriers work. I reform closure theory’s treatment of rules (outlined above) adding an additional dimension to their categorisation. I do so as the existing framework does not adequately capture how rules govern closure in international society. Indeed, the closure rules are predominantly functional-individualist in nature, however this does not give an accurate picture of how the rules structure the closure game. Chapter Five thus categorises closure rules as Achievable, Unachievable, and Ostensibly Achievable. Achievable rules and unachievable rules graft onto the individualist and collectivist distinction respectively. Ostensibly achievable rules are those that are functional-individualist in character but are

³¹ Parkin 1979, 45

³² Parkin 1979, 45

³³ Parkin 1979, 74. Parkin states that usurpation *strategies* rely upon usurpation *activities* (such as mass mobilizations), whereas here I treat what Parkin characterizes as activities as manifestations of a usurpation strategy. I do so as I cannot see how what Parkin characterises as strategies are distinct from activities.

structurally impossible (or, nearly so) for most actors in the system to actually achieve. Exclusion based on wealth serves as a useful domestic example. A club may set conditions for entry such that a member must be a billionaire. This is an individualist criterion and so on the face of it, according to closure theory's framework, marks the club out as being relatively more open than one levying a collectivist criterion. However, this is a very highly set barrier to entry that is extraordinarily difficult to overcome, thus rendering it as only ostensibly achievable. Additionally, the achievement of such wealth is structurally impossible for most actors in a society to achieve, again marking it out as merely being a nominally fair rule. Chapter Five argues this case in the context of international society as concerns powers seeking entry into the Great Powers and G-summitry clubs based on their achieved material attributes. It is thus not enough just to characterise the rules of the system as being open or closed based on the *types* of attributes the criteria select entry upon, we must also evaluate them based on the *degree* to which those attributes are demanded.

	Collectivist	Individualist
Achievable	-----	Functionalist criteria
Ostensibly Achievable	Legal- Collectivism in early expansion of international society	Functionalist criteria (highly set barrier)
Unachievable	Legal- Collectivism (sovereignty)	-----

Figure 2.1 – Exclusion Rules

Second, closure and stratification are achieved by more than just exclusion strategies, as Chapters Four, Six, and Seven demonstrate. This is how it is possible to have a relatively open international society in terms of its closure barriers but one that is nonetheless marked by much exclusion, stratification, and entrenched status positions. The maintenance and denial of status is thus far more complex than extant closure theory suggests and thus significant reform is warranted.

Most significantly, this thesis introduces the concept of Mobility Dampeners as a means of both maintaining and denying status that extant closure theory and other sociological

approaches fail to capture. As Chapter Four details, they are a furtive means of closure as they rely upon the norms, values, and practices of a system in their operation. Mobility dampeners are not entry criteria that govern membership, but are other means of preventing the loss of status of insiders while concurrently preventing the rising status of others. They prevent both upward and downward social mobility. The diplomatic norm of precedence is a hugely influential force that perpetuates the *status quo*. Thus, closure is not just about membership rules, it is also about less explicit conventions and practices. Further, mobility dampeners, like closure strategies, are concerned with the status of outsiders and are ‘exercised’ against them, what Parkin would characterise as “the use of power in a ‘downward’ direction.”³⁴ However, mobility dampeners are also applied to insiders to safeguard their own status. Achieving closure and maintaining status is not just about exerting a force externally, but also about the norms, values, and practices of the club.

2.3.2 Entry Strategies

Extant closure theory’s treatment of the strategies available to inferiorly positioned outsiders is also problematically too simplistic. As Chapter Six demonstrates, this thesis broadens the list of strategies available to outsiders beyond just usurpation and in so doing improves the analytical ability of closure theory in this respect. This thesis offers a more complete account of entry strategies, allowing for a greater ability to make analytical claims about the impacts of the types of strategies that outsiders adopt. Entry strategies are divided into two general categories: Relational Strategies and Identity Adaptation Strategies. With Relational Strategies, outsiders’ actions are directly trying to situate themselves in a particular position within the status hierarchy. They seek to reform order in terms of rank. Both general types of strategy range from being more assertive, involving geopolitical competition, to more deferential, involving diplomatic,

³⁴ Parkin 1979, 45

institutional cooperation. This is an appropriate way to conceptualise the various strategies as it tells us what type of status game is being played in what sort of normative context.

Relational Strategies range from being more assertive, wherein an actor tries to situate itself at or near the top of the hierarchy and in so doing assertively challenging the existing order - usurpation strategies being categorised as such - or being more deferential, wherein an actor tries to situate itself within the hierarchy and thereby reinforces it - Legitimation and Normalisation strategies being strategies at this end of the spectrum. Banding and Differentiation strategies sit somewhere in between these two ideo-typical poles.

With Identity Adaptation, outsiders are indirectly trying to improve their position in the hierarchy by mimicking the practices of the in-group. They seek to reform order in terms of disposition. Outsiders/lessers try to make themselves more like insiders/greaters and in so doing signal their suitability for inclusion in the club. Concurrently, outsiders make themselves seem less like outsiders, thus differentiating themselves from the excluded. There is a more assertive brand of mimicry, categorised as Geopolitical mimicry and a more deferential brand, categorised as Cooperative mimicry. Absent as an Identity Adaptation strategy in operation in international politics but theoretically possible is an entirely deferential mimicry practice which we can refer to as Grovelling. Its absence is unsurprising as grovelling is not an effective way to acquire status. It can, however, achieve a degree of marginal inclusion. The closest manifestation of it that we see in international politics are instances where civil society actors willingly assume a role as functionaries of state actors, seeking to at least have a degree of inclusion (and hopefully influence) in governance processes.

	Assertive	Deferential
Relational	Usurpation	Banding Differentiation Legitimation Normalisation
Identity Adaptation	Geopolitical Mimicry	Cooperative Mimicry Grovelling (Absent)

Figure 2.2 – Entry Strategies

Relational Strategies

Banding involves actors organising themselves as a group in order to attempt to achieve inclusion collectively. If an individual actor cannot achieve inclusion on its own, banding serves as a useful fall-back strategy. What is noteworthy about banding is that actors seek inclusion as a collective group, which marks it out as distinct from other types of strategies wherein seeking inclusion is an individualist undertaking. This is the closest type of entry strategy wherein actors seek entry as a class. Banding may thus be a collective enterprise wherein an absolute gain of inclusion is sought for a group of outsiders rather than an individualist activity seeking the relative gain of inclusion for a single outsider. However, it does not have to be so. As the analysis in Chapter Six details, banding can be an interim means for an outsider to seek inclusion with the help of other outsiders but then can be quick to abandon its group once inclusion as been achieved.

Whereas, banding may broadly be characterised as individual actors organising themselves as a group in order to gain a greater absolute degree of inclusion for them all collectively, differentiation, in contrast, may broadly be understood as its inverse wherein an actor differentiates itself from other alike actors in order

to gain its own inclusion while denying it to similar others. While Banding is cooperative, Differentiation is competitive. Parkin identifies a “dual closure” as a strategy wherein an actor at once tries to usurp those positioned superiorly while concurrently excluding those positioned inferiorly.³⁵ Closure is not just exercised by a dominant group against a lower one but may be exercised by actors within a group against others in that same class/stratum.³⁶ Conceptually, the problem with dual closure is that it is not one closure strategy exercised by an actor but two different closure strategies (usurpation and exclusion) exercised by an actor against two different actors (or, groups of actors). The exclusionary move against other inferiorly positioned outsiders need not have any relation to the usurpatory move against superiorly positioned insiders. Differentiation, however, is a single strategy wherein an outsider excludes other outsiders in order to make a claim for entry to insiders. The actor differentiates itself from others whom are ascribed as being similar in order to signal its suitability for entry into the club. The differentiation strategy is truly a dual movement in that the force exerted on other outsiders is designed to have an effect of improving the position of the actor exerting the force by means of an appeal to insiders. It is not just about keeping other outsiders in marginal positions and/or relatively inferior positions as it is in Parkin’s formulation, but about keeping them in those positions in order to improve one’s own position.

As above, entry into international status groups is predominantly a functionalist matter. Material contributions are not the only type of functional benefit that an actor can bring to a group, as is predominantly the case concerning the benefits that actors bring via Cooperative mimicry which is discussed below. A legitimation strategy is exactly the same quality of strategy in that outsiders seek

³⁵ Parkin 1979, 89–116; see especially 91–92

³⁶ Parkin 1979, 89

entry by offering the club something that it is deficient in: legitimacy.³⁷ What is different about legitimation is that the 'good' being offered by outsiders is ideational rather than material. Broadly, there are two moves involved in a legitimation strategy: First, a claim made by an outsider (or group of outsiders) that the club is unrepresentative and therefore illegitimate; second, a claim is made that inclusion would bolster the legitimacy of the club. Who or what the actor is/represents is what confers legitimacy. The focus with these types of strategy is on the legitimacy of the group to be an exclusive club whose members, by virtue of inclusion, are superiorly positioned to outsiders. The concern of the present discussion is not the legitimacy of particular actors for inclusion, but that of the group as a whole.³⁸ In order to have authority clubs must be legitimate. If a club lacks legitimacy it means that it may lose its dominant position in the governance of international politics. Therefore, any legitimacy deficit is an entry opportunity for outsiders if their inclusion would bolster the club's legitimacy and in so doing maintain its superior position.³⁹ Each of the clubs under consideration here is legitimate in different ways and there is therefore variation in the entry opportunities across the clubs for entry by this strategy.

The final Relational Entry Strategy is that of Normalisation. Normalisation is based on the diplomatic norm of precedence and thus is only found in G-summitry as it is the only one of the groups under consideration here that is a diplomatic institution.⁴⁰ An outsiders' Normalisation strategy can be seen as the inverse of insiders' mobility dampeners as both use the force of precedence to improve (or maintain) an actor's position in the closure game. What must be

³⁷ *Contra* Yonding 2004, 20. Yonding argues that G-summitry does not require legitimacy.

³⁸ For a discussion of the legitimacy of particular actors for inclusion, see Chapter Five's analysis of membership criteria.

³⁹ See: Chapter Seven for an analysis for how clubs incorporate others.

⁴⁰ See: Chapter Four

noted is that Normalisation does not just rely on precedence but involves its establishment in the first place. This sets Normalisation apart from mobility dampeners as dampeners do not set precedence, but only rely upon it for its operation to preserve status (and deny it to others).⁴¹ Normalisation is the routinisation of an actor's inclusion; or, more colloquially, it is the strategy of getting one's foot in the door. As a term, 'normalisation' is used here rather than simply 'precedence' because while the strategy relies upon the concept as a norm, the term does not entirely capture the dynamics of the strategy. The strategy does not involve an actor simply pointing to past occurrence and justifying inclusion based on that antecedent, as in how precedence works as a legal concept. Rather, the strategy necessarily involves the actor setting up that antecedent in the first place. The strategy begins before the claim for precedence can be made.

Identity Adaptation

The second general category of entry strategy is that of Identity Adaptation (or, mimicry, for short).⁴² Outsiders mimic insiders to make themselves seem like club members, thus signalling their suitability for inclusion by virtue of being alike insiders. Thus, those seeking entry not only *do* particular things to get into the club, they also generally *act* like they are suitable for entry. More than this, though, in mimicking insiders they are concurrently signalling dissimilarity with other outsiders. In this way the move is akin to a Differentiation strategy. In all, outsiders mimic insiders to look suitable for entry and then use those mimicked attributes to try to gain entry; for example (and as is expanded upon below), using newly adopted international law to overturn unequal treaties and gain entry into international society; mobilising newly acquired armies to defeat

⁴¹ The other difference, of course, is that mobility dampeners are a tool of insiders, not outsiders.

⁴² C.f. Johnston 2008

other powers and acquire colonies to gain entry into the Great Powers club; or employ diplomatic assets to lobby for inclusion into G-summitry. What is significant about mimicry is that is another way in which those seeking entry reproduce the *status quo* order. Adopting the practices of the club means perpetuating the values and institutions in which they are embedded. Even if the same actors do not remain superiorly positioned in the club, their values, ideas, norms, and practices do. Mimicry is thus another significant way that a particular kind of international society is perpetuated in the absence of coercion.⁴³

It is important to distinguish mimicry from just rational moves to reduce transaction costs. An outsider may act like an insider in relations with insiders because it has chosen to carry out that interaction within the same institution for reasons of efficiency. Or, they may do so because that practice has been imposed upon the outsider.⁴⁴ What allows us to be sure that we are observing mimicry is when outsiders carry out such mimetic practices in relations with other outsiders, wherein there is no transactional advantage to be had in acting like the in-group and when outsiders use practices of the in-group for its own advantages in relations over insiders which signals more than just a tacit acceptance of the club's practices.

2.3.3 Incorporation Strategies

I am critical of closure theory's emphasis on conflict between groups which is a residue of its roots in Marxist theory. Extant closure theory entirely lacks an account of how the superiorly positioned may bring inferiorly positioned actors into higher strata and it equally lacks an ability to accept that inferiorly positioned actors may accept their subordinate status and not contest it. These are problematic omissions because they

⁴³ For more on the more pacific ways that closure perpetuates order, see below.

⁴⁴ The two scenarios are not mutually exclusive.

miss prevalent dynamics in the closure system. With the interaction being limited to exclusionary or usurpatory strategies, there is no accounting for the possibility of incorporative action on the part of superiorly positioned insiders where they bring the excluded in – or, at least closer – to their status group; nor is there any space in extant closure theory for cooperative action on the part of the inferior actors to accept their position and try not to change it, but to work cooperatively with the superiorly positioned club members. The only hint of this may be found in a few brief lines in Murphy’s work, but it is excused as “an unusual exception” rather than as a primary feature of how practices of closure stratify a society.⁴⁵ Again, with the theoretical focus being so directed at conflict between groups it is not hard to understand why the prospect of cooperation or an acceptance of subordination is disregarded as an exception.

As Chapter Seven details, however, such dynamics are by no means an exception in international society. Owing to the predominant functionalism governing the system, group insiders often bring outsiders into the club according to its functionalist needs. Outsiders are incorporated so as to make use of their (cap)abilities in order to maintain the club’s overall aims and thus perpetuate its position as the ranking governance group in the system. The relationship between superiors and inferiors can thus be cooperative.⁴⁶

The significance of the identification of incorporation strategies is not just that it reveals how the status game can be played with relative pacificity. It also demonstrates that status may be maintained through means other than exclusion as it is through a particular mode of incorporation that outsiders are brought in: *stratified* incorporation.

⁴⁵ Murphy 1988, 220

⁴⁶ C.f. Lake 2011

Outsiders are necessarily brought into the club in marginal and subordinate ways so as to protect the relatively higher status positions of the club's incumbent members. Incorporation is cooperative, but it is also stratifying. Whenever possible, outsiders are not brought in as equals to incumbent members. Insiders justify stratification according to *functionalist* necessity. More than this, though, when functionalist necessity fails to keep others in a relatively lower position, insiders will stratify according to a more *collectivist* logic. Insiders guard their status positions against emerging/rising others by pointing to collectivist traits as justification for a continued inequality of status. This is significant. While there has been a normative shift in international society which requires a club to be representatively legitimate, the club may stratify newly included members according to collectivist ascriptions. Thus, while the contemporary ranking status group seems more just and open, it is not because of this persisting collectivism. As above and as is detailed in Chapter Five, legal-collectivism endures as a means of closure and Chapter Seven makes the case for adding a 'Logic of Culture' as enduring as a collectivist means of closure.⁴⁷ A collectivist Logic of Culture stratifies rather than excludes, as legal-collectivism does, but both types of collectivism involve the same sort of closure move wherein the superiorly positioned differentially protect its/their status position against relative inferiors. In short, there are two important dimensions to highlight here: that international closure theory must be able to account for instances of cooperative incorporation between superiorly positioned insiders and inferiorly positioned outsiders and that it must add incorporation strategies to the list of ways that status can be maintained (by insiders) and gained (by outsiders) as incorporation is a *stratified* incorporation.

While there is this more pacific dimension to the closure game played *between* groups that must be accounted for, there is conversely a more conflictual

⁴⁷ c.f. Neumann and Welsh 1991; Stivachtis 1998

dimension that extant theory largely misses: that of the closure games being played *within* groups. Group members engage in closure strategies against one another in a further game of status differentiation. Thus, to get a full account of the status game being played in international society, intra-group closure must also be accounted for. Stratification is not only the structure of the relationship between groups, it is also the structure of the relationship between individual actors within those groups.

The significance of this is that it moves us away from a Eurocentric, “West versus the Rest” narrative in conceptualising the international status game.⁴⁸ As what follows in this thesis demonstrates, the contemporary status game is not played in such a way that closure is exercised by a cohesive West against rising others. As Chapter Seven particularly emphasises, the closure game is actually played more viciously by Europeans against other Europeans than it is against non-Western states. This runs contrary to Zarakol’s claim that international society’s socially stratified groups have “changed very little in the intervening century between the Standard of Civilization and the present day.”⁴⁹ It is not just a broadly conceived Other that closure operates against in order to protect status through its denial to others. The status game is as pernicious (and in many instances even more so) in instances wherein closure is exercised against an actor that is self-same. This is so for two reasons. First, the rise of a self-same actor threatens the incumbent superior’s regional or cultural dominance. As what follows details, Japan was especially reluctant to acquiesce to the inclusion of China in G-summitry because doing so would affirm China’s Asian dominance via an institution that had hitherto recognised Japan alone as being worthy of membership in the club. For this reason it is likely that any attempts to include

⁴⁸ c.f. Kayaoglu 2010

⁴⁹ Zarakol 2010, 252

an additional African state in the G20 will be resisted by South Africa who would consequently lose its exclusive position as being the only African member of the club.

The second reason why this is so is due to the contemporary normative governance context wherein, as is argued later in this work, representative legitimacy is required for a governance group to be accepted – however begrudgingly – by those excluded from the group. As Chapter Five details, smaller European states that would otherwise be included in the G20 owing to their systematic significance are not because their inclusion would mean that the club would be even more heavily populated by Europeans and would thus decrease its legitimacy. For this reason rising European states are denied status by their fellow Westerners, whereas non-Europeans’ rising statuses are affirmed with membership.

As such, while it is accurate to characterise the Standard of Civilisation as setting the status competition as being the West versus the rest, an analysis of the contemporary status game via a theory of international social closure reveals that it is not the same in today’s international society.

It should also be noted that this conceptualisation allows us to identify a problem with Volgy *et al.*’s treatment of “status inconsistency” in their formulation of the status game.⁵⁰ For them, status inconsistency characterises those who are stratified into subordinate strata as “under-achievers” who “appear to have the capabilities and desire to act as major powers, yet do not receive the full attribution of major power status by other states.”⁵¹ While Volgy *et al.*’s conceptual category is useful, their terminology ascribing such states as under-achievers is problematic as it suggests that the denial of

⁵⁰ Volgy et al. 2011

⁵¹ Volgy et al. 2011, 7, 11. Bridge and Bullen similarly characterize late-19th century France as a “dissatisfied power” (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 7)

status is a result of their own insufficient efforts. This completely misses how collectivist stratification works. Actors become frustrated powers whose recognised status is inconsistent with their objective standing because it is the club that fails to recognise them as equals. They are not underachieving so much as not being recognised for their achievements. As a further criticism, Volgy *et al.* describe the denial of recognition as a Great Power as the “lag effect.”⁵² This terminology emphasises the temporal but implies that the status will eventually be granted, however delayed. The overemphasis of the temporal dimension comes at the cost of recognising that the closure game is not just about the a delay in the recognition of status but is simultaneously, and just as importantly, about the protection of incumbents’ status. What Volgy *et al.* characterize as the “halo effect”, wherein a state is attributed as a great power after it has objectively ceased to be one is not another phenomenon but is the flipside of the lag effect in the closure game. Moreover, status is not so much delayed as it is subordinated to that of incumbents. A status is conferred, but as a status of a lesser quality within the club; “under-achievers” are incorporated into the club, though as stratified lessers within it.

2.4 Conclusion

A theory of international social closure allows us to see how actors contest membership in clubs and how clubs themselves endure in international society. This chapter has developed a theoretical framework through which we can identify how this happens by looking at the institutional contexts in which closure games are played and by looking at the strategies through which closure games are played. That is, we look at the field on which the game is played and the moves that are made by players on that field. This framework categorised the types of exclusion criteria set by insiders as achievable, unachievable, and ostensibly achievable and introduced mobility dampening as a further means of maintaining the *status quo* order. Conversely, as concerns entry

⁵² Volgy *et al.* 2011, 7.

strategies, it conceptualised them as ranging from being assertive to deferential in character and significantly broadened the classification of entry strategies beyond a the limited conceptualisation found in extant closure theory. Moreover, the theoretical framework developed here stressed the significance of mimicry and deference in entry strategies as they in effect serve to reproduce the *status quo* order that the strategies are trying to overcome. Finally, this chapter introduced the notion of incorporation strategies in closure, being a means by which outsiders are brought into the club, though in unequal and marginal ways. The recognition of the importance of incorporation strategies demonstrates how closure is not necessarily an antagonistic contest between actors and emphasised how a particular mode of incorporation in international society causes stratification.

CHAPTER THREE

Methods

3.1 Introduction

How do we access groups to study the closure games played within and around them? Cornelia Navari remarks that English School Scholars “spend their time in archives getting their hands dirty. They come immersed in diplomatic archives, memoirs, and newspapers. They spend time in international institutions, listening to what international civil servants say and observing what they are doing.”¹ As is detailed below, this is how information was collected for this research by complimenting text-based sources with elite interviews and ethnographic research. Interviews and ethnographic observation amount to the collection of “different kinds of data from the field”,² thus marking this research out as not an “armchair analysis” and situating much of it methodologically within the practice turn.³

What is being looked for in this information gleaned from an array of sources and by a diversity of methods are “the self-conceptions of actors who are participating in the processes that constitute international life.”⁴ Jackson and Navari alike assert that statespeople/agents/actors are the proper objects of English School Scholarship,⁵ a methodological commitment shared by Wight and Bull.⁶ The participant actors in the international domain are the appropriate object of research as it is they who

¹ Navari 2009a, 12

² Hansen 2006, 107

³ Neumann 2002, 628. See also: Adler 2008; Jackson 2000; Navari 2011; Neumann 2012, 16; Pouliot 2008, 265

⁴ Navari 2009a, 12

⁵ Jackson 2000; Navari 2009b, 42

⁶ Bull 1977, 13; Wight 1977, 36; see also: Navari 2009b, 41

(re)produce international society's common interests, values, rules, and institutions.⁷ The aim in each of the empirical chapters is to thus access the micro-politics at play amongst the individuals who are playing the closure game on behalf of the actors they represent. Diplomats, for Bull, are the "visible expression" and "tangible evidence of international society."⁸ Bull notes that diplomats serve as the "custodian[s] of the idea of international society, with a stake in preserving and strengthening it."⁹ Their self-conceptions and inter-subjective recognitions give international society expression and they themselves serve as the closest thing to a physical embodiment of the abstract society as is possible to approximate.¹⁰ It is for this reason that, as concerns the historical dimensions of this research, the recollections of individual statesmen, via secondary sources, form this work's empirical basis; while, as concerns the contemporary dimensions of this research, the accounts and records of government sherpas and their non-state interlocutors serve as this work's primary empirical evidence. Be it from a history, a biography, an archival record, a research interview, or participant observation, what this research looks for are (i) statements where these actors discuss instances of inclusion or exclusion from club and (ii) actions that concern the inclusion or exclusion of actors from a club. From these it is then further possible to infer (iii) what norms and values underpin and structure the system of closure and the international society whose membership that system governs. Thus, this research primarily seeks to infer rules, norms, and order from diversity and wealth of information.

We are also able to infer information about the other central concepts in the English School, those of the international system, international society, and world society.

According to Richard Little, they are "different environments of action – different social

⁷ c.f. Bull 1977, 36

⁸ Bull 1977, 166; see also 176–7; Mayall, James 2007, 5

⁹ Bull 1977, 176

¹⁰ Hurrell 2002

realities or 'structures', which exist in a dynamic relationship with one another, and which require incorporation into the consideration of [proper] conduct."¹¹ The analysis of the data collected thus also looks to draw inferences about order concerning the relationships between these theoretical conceptions, particularly as concerns the relative positions of international society and world society.¹² Thus, this analysis looks for information in the data about order amongst states as well as order between states and non-state actors.

The third type of information sought makes use of the English School's historical orientation. Inferences drawn from each of the club contexts under examination are compared with one another to see if there have been any changes in the way that closure has worked throughout international society's evolution. This analysis is comparative, but necessarily amounts to more than just 'thick description'. Rather, it seeks distinctions in closure rules, strategies, or norms over time, identifying "the different elements that motivate action."¹³

3.2 Elite interviews

This research employed mixed methods. For its analysis of the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club, this work relied on secondary sources,¹⁴ while its analysis of G-summitry principally used primary sources and evidence. This new knowledge about contemporary summitry in international society thus forms the main empirical contribution of this research.

¹¹ Little 2009; Navari 2009a

¹² c.f. Buzan 2004a; Clark 2007

¹³ Navari 2009a, 5; see also: Little 2009

¹⁴ The use of textual sources is detailed below

The most significant means of generating new knowledge was via elite interviews. Forty individuals were interviewed as part of this dimension of my research. Of this sampling, the most significant category of interviews were with G8 and G20 sherpas- the personal representative of heads of state and government responsible for their country's participation in the summits. The sherpas were the starting point for sampling as they are the critical nodes in the summitry networks; or, in other language, the most important people in the summitry process. Starting with sherpas allowed a sampling of subjects to carry out process tracing in the optimal way to link independent and dependent variables in this context.¹⁵ The aim in sampling was not to achieve a representative, statistically significant sample, but to get a sample of the most important political players in the environment under study.¹⁶ It is also worth highlighting that interviews are not the cases but the sources for observations about the cases, thus again noting that the object of my sampling is not to obtain a representative sample as it is in positivist research.

To say that sherpas served as the starting point is to imply that my sampling had subsequent trajectories. In addition to interviewing the centrally important sherpas, their interlocutors representing civil society and international organisations; and, when possible, their deputies and political masters were also interviewed. The technique by which access was gained to these subjects (as well as the sherpas in the first place) was through what the methodological literature refers to as "snowballing".¹⁷ Though, this thesis refers to this technique as "networking" or "chain-referral" as the snowball metaphor implies a cumulative addition of new knowledge with each subsequent interview which, as is elaborated upon below, is not borne out in practice once the saturation point of information collection is reached. At the saturation point the

¹⁵ George and Bennett 2005

¹⁶ Tansey 2007, 765

¹⁷ Babbie 1995; Tansey 2007, 775

snowball, despite continuing to roll, stops collecting snow. This sampling strategy involves asking a subject to recommend others to subsequently interview. Sampling thus is based in part on their subjective recommendations. This is an effective strategy for two reasons. First and foremost, it helped to map out who was viewed intersubjectively as being important players in the field, thus helping with the task of identifying the best sources from which to glean information for process tracing.¹⁸ Such an approach is especially appropriate for studying status, as it enables us to map the relative positions of actors based on their inter-subjective appraisals of one another's importance. Status, as a fundamentally social, subjective, relational phenomenon must be methodologically approached as such.

Second, it helped to overcome the methodological challenge of gaining access which is a chronic problem of elite interviewing. When requesting interviews, the approach had greater force when it was possible could say that a colleague or superior had suggested that they participate in this research. Moreover, subjects would often speak to their recommended contacts directly which gave an even higher success rate in getting interviews. To break into the sherpa network in the first place I sought out a sherpa who had moved into academia after completing his public service career as such sources are more likely to be comfortable with accepting scholarly research interviews.¹⁹

This approach, furthermore, selects sources less based on "positional" criteria, and more on "representational" criteria.²⁰ Thus, the aim was not just to sample subjects because of the title of their position, but to sample based on how players in the field viewed their importance to the topic, again serving to help with process tracing and, most significantly, to identify the relative status of actors based on the self-understandings

¹⁸ George and Bennett 2005

¹⁹ Peabody et al. 1990, 453. Thus, former-sherpa Gordon Smith (a four time sherpa and host sherpa) served as my entry point.

²⁰ Tansey 2007, 770

and inter-subjective appraisals of those playing the status game. That said, positional selection did feature in the method as certain actors in positions of significance were selected independently of interview recommendations based on the extant literature. Notably, host sherpas are particularly important by virtue of their position as being the *primus inter pares* among Sherpas during the year in which their country serves as president of the club. Additionally, I identified Paul Martin and Lawrence Summers as being of critical importance to providing useful information as they were the two who established the membership list for the G20. Similarly, George Shultz was singled out as the sole surviving sherpa who created the G7. Having identified them as important I used the networking method to secure interviews with the sources. Thus, this dimension of sampling is most accurately described as relying predominantly on reputational criteria, though with significant positional selection in a few instances.²¹

As concerns the representatives from different actor types whom I interviewed – be they representatives of international organisations or civil society – I ensured that sources were diverse so as to not bias the picture of the G-summitry environment in a particular direction.²² The risk, for example, of only interviewing sherpas would be to skew the perspective unhelpfully towards state-centricity. My identification of critical elites and the means of securing them as sources was the same for non-state actors as it was with the sherpas.

The interviews themselves were carried out in a semi-structured form. That is, prior to beginning the interviews a set of themes were established and, within each theme, questions to ask subjects were set. Which questions were asked were amended depending on the interview subject and the questions themselves evolved over the process of information collection as my own understanding of the topic developed.

²¹ Tansey 2007, 770–1

²² Tansey 2007, 770

Semi-structured interviews thus sit in the middle-ground between the rigidity and formality of structured interviews and the fluidity and informality of unstructured interviews.

This technique was adopted for a number of reasons. First, it allowed subjects to “open up and express themselves in their own words” in a way that structured interviews do not.²³ Likewise, it was more amenable to a natural conversation flow which helped to keep subjects both relaxed and interested in the discussion. It allowed the subject to lead the general course of the discussion but equally allowed me to probe at the right moments and to choose when to shift themes.²⁴ It was good for building rapport with subjects, particularly as the majority of this research’s subjects were/are high-level bureaucrats and political figures, “people who are accustomed to efficient use of their time”, demonstrating to the subjects that I was knowledgeable about the subject and in control of getting the desired information out of the interview.²⁵ This was particularly so as interviews started with simple and factual questions before moving, when a judgement call was made that the subject was comfortable and that rapport had been established, to questions of an interpretive and judgemental character.²⁶

Notes were taken to record information in lieu of using an audio recorder.²⁷ There is a trade-off involved in the use of recorders. While using a recorder allows the researcher to review his/her interview and produce a transcript (both for his/her own reference and for that of other scholars), this comes at the cost of the potential of the interview subject holding back on useful information because he/she does not want it to be public record and/or attributable to him/herself. Thus, while I do not have transcripts against

²³ Bernard 2006, 211

²⁴ Bernard 2006, 215

²⁵ Bernard 2006, 212

²⁶ Peabody et al. 1990, 453

²⁷ With the exception of my interview with Paul Martin.

which claims can be verified (which itself presupposes the validity and authenticity of transcripts), I have gleaned richer information from interviews which was only possible in the absence of recorder and the promise of anonymity when requested. To bolster the validity and robustness of claims gathered in this way, multiple, independent sources for information was sought; and, when possible, were cross-checked against archival or textual sources.²⁸ This approach is especially useful when dealing with contemporary events where the interview subjects are elites whose information may be damaging to themselves, others, and/or the entities they represent. In addition to taking notes in the interviews, upon conclusion of each interview I would immediately review my notes and fill in any gaps from memory if there were any. In this review process I also made note of initial summary observations about the information gathered.²⁹

The interview process stopped when the “saturation point” was reached.³⁰ The saturation point is when no new significant information is being gleaned from interviews. This does not mean that there is no remaining information left unknown, only that the diminishing returns from each subsequent interview are such that it is no longer worth the investment of resources towards continuing with this dimension of the empirical research. Saturation also occurs with interview referrals, when “respondents begin repeating names to the extent that further rounds of nominations are unlikely to yield significant new information.”³¹

Interviews are not without limitations, however. As Tansey points out, interview subjects can give distorted accounts in a number of ways. It is possible for them to inflate or minimise their roles in an event or the roles of others, a particular concern

²⁸ More on this below.

²⁹ c.f. Peabody et al. 1990, 454

³⁰ Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006; Mason 2010; Ragin and Becker 1992

³¹ Tansey 2007, 770

when dealing with political subjects.³² George and Bennet warn of the “instant histories” produced immediately after than event as they tend to “portray a ‘careful, multidimensional process of policy making’ to the public” which does not match the reality of what occurred.³³ This was a particular concern when doing interviews at summits, especially when conducting interviews with the Canadian Prime Minister and Finance Minister immediately after the conclusion of the 2013 Saint Petersburg G20. To mitigate this potential problem, interviews at summits did not focus on immediate events. Moreover, summit attendance was mostly used to meet subjects in order to set up interviews at a later date. This not only mitigated the “instant history” problem, but also allowed time for reflection on events by the subjects, and did not interfere with the subjects’ roles at the summit. On the other end of the time scale, if much time has elapsed since an event, a subject’s memory of it is likely to be less than perfect. In interviewing US Treasury Secretary George Shultz about the formation of the G7 and its precursor, the Library Group, it was especially important to be aware of this potential problem with of the information conveyed. Archival sources were particularly important for mitigating this potential limitation. As is detailed below, they were useful means of verifying interview subjects’ claims and were thus central for calibrating the level of confidence to have in the subject’s accounts.

3.3 Textual Sources

As concerns the use of textual sources –historical literature and archival materials –this thesis adopted a comparative-historical approach. The closure strategies employed by actors were inferred from the reconstruction of historical events via historical and archival texts.³⁴ Following Zarakol’s similar approach to the historical literature, “the

³² Tansey 2007

³³ George and Bennett 2005, 99; Tansey 2007, 10

³⁴ On the use of historical narratives to reconstruct causal processes see: Abbott 2001; Brady and Collier 2010; Glass and Mackey 1988; Griffin 1993; Mahoney 2004; Reisch 1991; Sewell 1990;

approach is neither purely indicative nor purely deductive, but should rather be thought of as layered, moving back and forth between various levels of abstraction, inference, and observability.”³⁵

Interviews were essential as a compliment to my archival research, and *vice versa*. Holdings of the Thatcher Archive (which includes the papers of James Callaghan); the Carter, Ford, and Reagan Presidential Libraries; and the Australian National Archives were consulted to construct a history of the formation of the G7. This work produced an account of the institution’s development that served as an important corrective to what has become the axiomatic history of the summit’s origins. Interviews are complimentary as they serve as interpretive, corroborative, and additive tools. They are interpretive as they can help to “decode” the language of official documents.³⁶ They do so in two ways. First, they were helpful with G-summitry documents as the diplomatic cables were classified as secret and some memoranda were code-word classified. Interview subjects helped me to understand the significant of particular classifications; most notably, code-word “Burning Bush” which concealed efforts by the US, UK, West Germany, and France – the Four – to exclude Japan, Italy, and Canada from substantive political discussions. Interviews also helped to decode specialist language and fill in gaps in information, particularly if in correspondence certain facts are assumed as common knowledge between correspondents and so are left unstated or defined (and thus rendered unintelligible when reading these sources without the benefit of having the same contextual knowledge). Interviews with Sir Nicholas Bayne and George Shultz were especially helpful in this respect. Shultz’ recollections gathered for this research are, to my knowledge, the only scholarly account of his involvement in the creation of G-summitry.

Shermer 1995; Stryker 1996

³⁵ Zarakol 2010, 24

³⁶ Davies 2001, 74

In this way interviews are also additive, filling the blanks that history has left us. Additionally, interviews may be additive as they can help us to understand debates and contestations that are often missing in official documents due to the fact that such texts tend only to report what was agreed upon in meetings, not the details of debates which led to the decision.³⁷ This is especially so in the case of debates contesting the inclusion and exclusion of actors in the club. The two surviving exceptions to this tendency is a fragment of French account of the Helsinki meeting at which the Four's leaders first discussed the possibility of a summit and an British account of a sherpa meeting in which Australia's possible inclusion was discussed.³⁸

Finally, interviews are corroborative in that they help us to understand the validity of archival sources. It is erroneous to assume that textual documents are necessarily valid or accurate.³⁹ Conversely, archival sources can be corroborative of information from interviews in a technique called "triangulation".⁴⁰ This is particularly useful if there is only a single source of information from an interview, which was the case of much the interview information concerning the formation of the club.⁴¹ The two types of information can thus be used to corroborate one another and yield greater validity and robustness to the findings as a whole.

3.4 Ethnography

Ethnographic fieldwork was the third method employed in this research to produce new knowledge. The technique employed was participant observation at the G20 summits in Los Cabos, Mexico in June 2012 and Saint Petersburg, Russia in September 2013.

³⁷ Davies 2001, 75; George and Bennett 2005, 103; Tansey 2007, 767

³⁸ Archival sources: Hunt 1978a; Sauvagnargues Calinet 1975

³⁹ Booth and Glynn 1979, 315; Davies 2001, 74

⁴⁰ Tansey 2007, 766

⁴¹ Davies 2001, 78; Eftimiades 1994, 11; Webb, Cambell, and Schwartz 1966

The largest challenge to this approach was gaining access to the summits, a kind of problem that “looms large” in ethnography more generally.⁴² As Hamersby and Atkinson assert, overcoming this obstacle is often a “thoroughly practical matter” involving the deployment of resources and strategies.⁴³ Gaining inclusion as a researcher was itself an exercise in engaging in the closure game. Through the network of contacts I developed over the course of my research I became affiliated with the G20 Research Group at the Munk School of International Affairs, University of Toronto. The research group has privileged access to summits owing to its sister-group, the G8 Research Group, having a long involvement with the summits. It was established in 1987 as part of a legacy of Canada’s term as summit host in 1988. As an initiative with the blessing of the host government, it received an exceptional degree of inclusion at the summit which it has enjoyed ever since thanks to the force of precedence in G-summitry.⁴⁴ Through my affiliation with the group I was able to obtain credentials to the summit as a journalist owing to the arrangement that the research group has with media outlets in Canada and the UK who put members of their group on their list of journalists and media technicians which is sent to the host government to request accreditation to cover the summit.

Additionally, for the Los Cabos summit I was able to concurrently get accreditation as a member of civil society via the network of civil society contacts I developed through my interviews. This dual accreditation was important as it allowed me to observe and compare if – and, if so, how – inclusion was differently granted to civil society representatives than it was to the international media. Civil society accreditation was more difficult for civil society representatives to achieve, with their accreditation only finally being granted only a few days prior to the summit after the Mexican president’s

⁴² Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 41

⁴³ Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 41

⁴⁴ See Chapter Four.

office got worried that accredited civil society representatives would cause trouble.⁴⁵ It was only after one of the lead civil society representatives who coordinated their Banding strategy⁴⁶ wrote a letter endorsing all of the UK NGO representatives vouching for them that accreditation was granted.⁴⁷ Furthermore, this points to one of the significant means of exclusion which civil society banding seeks to overcome, which is for advocacy groups to differentiate themselves with protest groups.⁴⁸

Participant observation contributed significant information to this research. First, it allowed for multiple types of data to be included as a complement to that produced from interviews and archival sources. This data is observational in nature; for example, observing who interacted with whom and how; who was allowed into which parts of the summit; what different actors used the summits and preparatory processes to achieve; and how different categories of actors were treated at the summits. This method also reduced the problem of “reactivity” where an actor under observation changes his/her behaviour because he/she knows that she is being observed, such as in an interview-. The two further benefits of this approach are that it helped to contribute to an intuitive understanding of the object of study. This both allowed for greater confidence in findings and claims, and helped with conceptual refinement during the course of research (which, in turn, aids the refinement of interview questions). Finally, it helped to gain access to elites for interviews. Attendance at the summits allowed for interaction with these individuals and allowed for the observation of whom is important in the environment. Additionally, attendance built my credibility as a researcher on the topic. This allowed me to make stronger ethos appeals when approaching elites to request an interview and, subsequently, to build rapport more quickly in the interviews themselves.

⁴⁵ Interview: Rea 2012

⁴⁶ See: Chapter Six

⁴⁷ Interview: Rea 2012

⁴⁸ See: Chapters Five and Six

3.5 Case Selection

The theoretical focus – or, object – of this research is social closure, the process through which inclusion (and exclusion) in clubs is governed.⁴⁹ The Family of Civilised Nations, the Great Powers club, and G-summitry are lenses – or, the subjects – through which we can view closure at work in international society. They are not this study’s cases, but rather are the contexts from which cases are drawn. This research’s cases are instances and attempts at inclusion and exclusion in these clubs. These contexts provide us with a large number of cases to study and an even larger number of observations to make.⁵⁰ Marginal cases of closure, those in which an actor nearly made it into the group but failed to do so and those in which an actor nearly was excluded but was not, are those which particularly feature as it is in these limit cases that processes of closure may most readily be observed. This case selection is inline with that of Zarakol who examines the “most fortunate” of international society’s outsiders.⁵¹ As concerns the Family of Civilised Nations, the case of Japan’s inclusion is of prime importance as are the cases of China’s and Russia’s inclusion. In the Great Powers club, closure as it applies to France and Russia are of particular concern, with the cases of Austria’s, Italy’s, and Prussia’s roles and positions in the club also being revelatory. Concerning state actors in G-summitry, closure strategies as they relate to Canada, Italy, Australia, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nigeria serve as key cases in this way.⁵² Concerning non-state actors, strategies related to larger civil society organisation (CSOs), including the Gates Foundation, ONE, and Oxfam; to labour unions, including TUAC and ITUC; and to Business 20 (B20) participants equally serve as key cases.

⁴⁹ See Chapter Two for a full account of closure theory.

⁵⁰ C.f. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994

⁵¹ Zarakol 2010, 253

⁵² By “relate,” I mean inclusion strategies exercised by the actors in vying for inclusion, exclusion strategies exercised by actors trying to deny their inclusion, or incorporative strategies exercised by club members bringing them into the club.

By G-summitry this thesis includes all the configurations that the club has had since its foundation in 1975 as a G5, through to the present wherein G-summitry has stratified to have two groups within it: the G7/8 and the G20. While the G7/8 and G20 are two different groups, they are conceptually dealt with as a single club, like the Great Powers at the Congress of Vienna. As Chapter Seven details, the G20 is a creation of the G8 within the same institutional framework. The G7/8 and G20 are not two clubs, but two strata within G-summitry. When referring to the club generally, this thesis thus refers to G-summitry; when referring to a particular configuration of actors or a specific moment in the club's history, the G"X" is referred to.⁵³ For example, in discussing the originally envisaged club this thesis refers to the G5;⁵⁴ the G6, when referring to the group of six that met at the first summit in Rambouillet;⁵⁵ the G7, when referring to the club from 1976 to 1996;⁵⁶ and the G8 when referring to the club from 1997 onwards.⁵⁷ This thesis refers to the G7/8 as doing so acknowledges the stratification within the top-tier of the club, between the G7 and its most recently incorporated member, Russia. The necessity of acknowledging this internal club division is particularly important now with Russia's current suspension from the club in reaction to its actions in Ukraine.⁵⁸

Why are these groups the most suitable contexts to use in developing a theory of international social closure and to use in examining how closure works in international society? First, they are all status groups, wherein inclusion in them is a means of obtaining, maintaining, and signaling a social position. They are thus the right type of phenomenon for closure theory to be looking at. Second, in periods when the clubs coexist, a status move related to one club can be related to a status move concerning another. A defeat signaling unsuitability for the Great Powers club, for example, can

⁵³ That is, whatever G-number the club is in size at the moment. E.g. G7, G8, G20.

⁵⁴ G5: France, US, UK, West Germany, and Japan

⁵⁵ G6: The G5 plus Italy

⁵⁶ G7: The G6 plus Canada

⁵⁷ G8: The G7 plus Russia

⁵⁸ See Chapter Five. Technically, the G7 suspended themselves from the G8.

serve as a motivation for inclusion in the Family of Civilised Nations.⁵⁹ These clubs are each part of a more general status game in international society and so should be studied together as such; analysing them in isolation of one another creates the possibility of missing important closure moves.

Further, as one of the main aims of this study is to improve the understanding of status in IR, it is necessary to look at these groups as *status* groups as it is through such social associations that actors achieve, deny, claim, confer, and signal status. In terms of upward mobility, like a debutante's ball, it is how actors announce their arrival into the upper echelons of society. This serves as a corrective to leading work on this topic in IR that focuses on how groups achieve position rather than how individual actors use groups to achieve a position for themselves.⁶⁰ That is, the ontological focus is on the status game played by individual actors using groups in the status game rather than collective actors (i.e. groups).⁶¹

Fourth, they are all governance groups, ways of collectively and cooperatively ordering international society and managing international relations. All these clubs set standards for actors' conduct, both domestically and internationally- be it through the Family of Civilised Nations' Standard of Civilisation or G-summitry's more implicit neo-liberal criteria for membership. Indeed, Andrew Cooper's identification of the liberal "glue" that has held G-summitry together mirror Garret Gong's elucidation of the Standard almost exactly.⁶² In short, these are the clubs that set and enforce the rules of conduct in

⁵⁹ Neumann and Welsh 1991, 344. See Chapter Five.

⁶⁰ Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Welch Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014

⁶¹ Of course, in the context of IR, what I label here as individual actors are themselves actually collective actors: states, NGOs, etc. In line with the overwhelming majority of IR scholarship, I treat them as individual actors for sake of analytical clarity.

⁶² A. F. Cooper and Thakur 2013, 25. In the case of the Great Powers club, the emphasis is more on the international dimensions of order and management.

international society- when we speak of global governance, they are the governors of the globe.

Studying these clubs is also important for the development of international closure theory because, as is argued in the following chapter, they are each products of different institutions of international society and so allows for greater confidence in the generalisability of this research's conclusions. G-summitry is a diplomatic institution, distinct from the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club, and is an institution that arises from an economic and financial crisis rather than war.⁶³ They are groups of different character, yet are groups nonetheless and groups whose memberships are governed by closure. As Cooper relates, "Diplomacy cannot in turn be divorced from global governance... States gain or lose territory and access to the negotiation table and negotiated institutions, such as a permanent membership of the UN Security Council [in postwar settlements]. Diverging from this script, the G20 was formed as a response to an immediate economic crisis rather than a war. *Yet the exclusionary practices used to create its membership ensures that there remain both winners and losers.*"⁶⁴

Finally, concerning this dimension of institutional origins, as the Great Powers club and G-summitry both arose from international crises, political and economic respectively, studying their foundations allows allow us to see otherwise marginal actors taking advantage of crises to try to improve their positions. As Clark relates, "...it is exactly the opening created by the large-scale disturbance of war that can be thought to have presented this opportunity [to begin to search for the presence of world society]"⁶⁵ Clark is concerned with the border between international society and world society,

⁶³ A. F. Cooper and Thakur 2013, 25

⁶⁴ A. F. Cooper and Thakur 2013, 75. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁵ Clark 2007, 9

which this thesis is too, principally in Chapter Six. Such disturbances allow us to see divisions within international society too, though, be it the clamouring of smaller, less powerful states seeking entry into the Great Powers club at the Congress of Vienna or those seeking entry into G-summitry at the club's foundation in the 1970s or its expansion in the wake of the Asian Financial Crises in the late-1990's and the Global Economic Crises a decade later. These clubs allow us a glimpse into dimensions of international politics that are otherwise missed.

Having thus justified the examination of these particular clubs it is necessary to clarify their relation to one another and their orientation with respect to international society. Following Keene, I take the 18th and 19th centuries' Family of Civilised Nations as being a status group within international society.⁶⁶ I am sympathetic, however, to the English School's conflation of the Family of Civilised Nations and international society, which is the predominant way that the expansion story is told and that Keene aims to reform, as the notion of the Family of Civilised Nations and the club of civilised states seem to have been held as largely synonymous by statespeople during this period. Before international society became universal, the Family of Civilised Nations was the status group dividing those states considered by dominant Europeans to be civilised states from those considered to be uncivilised entities, be they semi-civilised, barbarian, or savage. After the idea of a Family of Civilised Nations fell out of favour and international society became universal over the period covering the first half of the 20th century, this broad social division changed in terms of what it was dividing; no longer dividing civilised and uncivilised states, but dividing states and non-state actors. Thus, at different periods covered by this thesis, the idea of international society as a status group produced two different social divisions. For sake of ease, when referring to the historical division between civilised states and non-civilised entities, I refer to the status

⁶⁶ Keene 2014

group as the Family of Civilised Nations; when I refer to the contemporary divide between state and non-state actors, I refer to the status group as international society. This is a point that must be emphasised as it is central to one of this thesis' main claims: social closure is still in operation at the outer border of international society and profoundly shapes the international order, defining who or what can rightly be said to have the status of membership within the international milieu. What has changed is that closure no longer keeps out barbarian states, but now excludes (or, at least, significantly marginalises) the entire panoply of non-state actors.

The other two clubs are decidedly within international society, thus in contemporary international society they are status groups within a status group. It is important to note how closure in the Great Powers club and G-summitry relates to closure between the inside and outside of international society. Great Power membership is tied to membership in the Family of Civilised Nations, particularly as concerns the acquisition of territories as a means of achieving Great Power status. As Chapter Six relates, a state would try to acquire territory as part of a bid for Great Power status, a by-product of which was the expansion of international society through the acquisition of colonies. Similarly in contemporary international society, as Chapter Six details, the management of the inclusion of civil society in G-summitry is concurrently the management of the boundary between the inside and outside of international society.




Figure 3.1 – Groups and their borders

This research seeks to make significant contributions to G8 and G20 scholarship and to provide a new way to examine historical – and as Chapter Four argues, normative – contexts. However, the material is not presented in a way that tells a linear history of any of the clubs under examination.⁶⁷ Rather, the thesis is structured so as to emphasise the analytical points about international society that answer this thesis’ research question. The arrangement of this thesis’ empirical material may thus disappoint readers whose primary interest is in summitry rather than English School or neo-Weberian closure theory. Thus, to anticipate a possible criticism of this work, this thesis does not tell the history of any of these clubs in as easily read a way as possible. It is not meant to. This thesis is principally about international society.

⁶⁷ On the expansion of international society, see: Bull and Adam Watson 1984; Gong 1984; Keene 2002; Keene 2014; Neumann and Welsh 1991; Neumann 2011; Okagaki 2013; Stivachtis 1998; Suzuki 2013; Zarakol 2010. On the Great Powers club, see Webster, Nicholson Holbraad 1970; H. Nicolson 1946; Osiander 1994; Webster 1950. On the development of G-summitry, see: Bayne 2000; Bayne 2005; Putnam and Bayne 1987; Putnam and Bayne 1984a; Bayne 2007; P. I. Hajnal 1999; P. Hajnal 2007; Smith 2011a; Smith 2012 Bayne 2000; J. J. Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2001; J. J. Kirton and Takase 2002b; J. J. Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2001; J. J. Kirton 2010a; J. J. Kirton, Fratianni, and Savona 2013; J. J. Kirton 2013; P. I. Hajnal 1999; P. Hajnal 2007; P. I. Hajnal 2013; P. I. Hajnal 2014; Putnam and Bayne 1984a; Putnam and Bayne 1987; Smith 2011a; Smith 2012

The utility and generalizability of this research is not limited to these clubs alone. The Family of Civilised Nations, the Great Powers club, and the G7/8 are most likely contexts for observing club-style governance; while the G20 is a most likely context for observing networked governance, owing to its emphasis on the inclusion of non-state actors in its governance processes.⁶⁸ If indeed there has been a substantive transformation in global governance, we should observe distinctly different relations of power amongst actors in the earlier compared to the G20. This is why G-summitry it is a particularly good lens for examining an apparent shift in governance order from a club to network form. If indeed diplomacy has shifted to a network form of governance, we should observe fundamentally different dynamics of closure in the G20 than in the G8 and its historical antecedents. Inclusion should be substantively equal and open, with an actor's inclusion being based on its achieved characteristics. Vestiges of the logics underpinning club-style closure should not be found to be influencing the inclusion or exclusion of actors in any significant way in contemporary summitry. As what follows in this thesis argues, what is observed is the opposite.

⁶⁸ See Chapters Six and Seven for details.

CHAPTER FOUR

Institutions and Mobility

4.1 Constitutive Institutions

A different institution of international society constitutes each of the clubs.¹ What follows is a discussion of the English School's conception of international institutions and their relevance to the clubs under consideration here. One of the key differences between the clubs under examination here and the way the status game is played in and around them is that each is constituted by different institutions of international society.² What is significant about the following discussion is that it dramatically reforms closure theory, demonstrating how the institutional contexts within which the closure game is played matter. Closure is not just achieved through strategies, but also through the norms, values, and practices imbedded within the field in which the closure game is played.

English School scholarship does not tend to problematise group constitution and yet the very heart of the paradigm's understandings of the effects of institutions suggests that it should. To build upon Buzan (who builds upon Manning), the institutions of international society define in the game of states "what the pieces are and how the game is played."³ More than this, though, institutions not only constitute actors but also the social categories through which they arrange themselves. That is, the institutions of international society constitute the status groups through which actors signal their identity as well as constituting the actors themselves.⁴

¹ For the classical formulation of international society's institutions, see Bull 1977; for a more up-to-date take, see Buzan 2004b.

² See also: Neumann 2008b, 148; Zarakol 2010, 197

³ Buzan 2004b, 162

⁴ Buzan 2004b, 167

This is significant because different institutions imbue that which it constitutes with different norms, values, and practices which means that the way the closure game is played in each club is different because the field upon which it is played is fundamentally different. It is this dimension of club constitution that sets the status game in G-summitry apart from the other clubs more than any other because its constitution as a club of the diplomatic institution means that particular norms are in play that render G-summitry's closure system more closed than other clubs. As is argued throughout this thesis, while the diplomatic institution renders G-summitry apparently more open because it permits the inclusion of non-state actors into the game, it is only ostensibly so as the norms of the institution allow for closure practices that actually entrench the *status quo* order more than other clubs.

Institutions structure order in both its expressions. Order as rank is defined by international society's institutions as they define what types of actors are permitted to have any sort of standing in a society. That is, they define who counts. Order as norms, values, and practices is structured by defining how those who count relate to one another, particularly as concerns how those actors preserve their society. To use Bull's classical formulation of the institutions as an example, the Balance of Power's function has been to prevent the emergence of world empire and domination as well as provide the conditions through which the other institutions can operate.⁵ International law has provided the organising principle of sovereignty, states the rules of coexistence of sovereign states, and mobilises compliance with international rules.⁶ Diplomacy contributes through facilitating communication, negotiating agreements, gathering information, reducing friction, and symbolically reproducing the society.⁷ War has

⁵ Bull 1977, 102

⁶ Bull 1977, 134-6

⁷ Bull 1977, 163-6

determined the shape of the international system, provided the impetus for maintaining the system, and provided a means of enforcing international rules.⁸ Finally, Great Powers have provided a means of resolving conflict, containing conflict, and promoting the survival of international society itself.⁹ Later generations of English School scholars have added to the list of institutions and their functions, including the market, nationalism, human rights, and environmentalism.¹⁰ Keene notes that the Standard of Civilisation has also been added to this list on the basis of its function in determining the membership of international society, as “the key institution for differentiating political communities in the global international system and mediating their ‘entry’ into international society.”¹¹ Each institution thus makes a different contribution to maintaining the same order, though in varying degrees depending on the type of society and the particularly historical context, while reinforcing one another.¹² This is significant for understanding closure because the norms, ideas, values, beliefs, and practices of a club’s constitutive institution condition how closure works in that club.

Clubs can be products of different institutions in that their identity, practices, norms, values, and beliefs have their origins in those of a particular institution (or combination of institutions). If we accept the addition of the Standard to the list of international society’s institutions then it is easy to identify the institutional roots of two of the three status groups under examination here. G-summitry’s institutional roots are not so straightforward as it is not in and of itself an institution of international society. The institutions of war and international law can be discounted as possibilities for being G-summitry’s constitutive institutions as the club shares little in the way of norms, values, beliefs, and practices with these institutions. This is not to say that issues of war and

⁸ Bull 1977, 180–1

⁹ Bull 1977, 199–200. Of course, later generations of English School scholars have reformed Bull’s formulation considerably and often. See especially: Buzan 2004b

¹⁰ Buzan 2004b, 187

¹¹ Keene 2014

¹² Buzan 2004b

peace have not been discussed by the club - they have since its very beginning - but rather that the club is not a venue that actors deem to be legitimate for making authoritative decisions concerning international security. As concerns international law, the club has played a role in perpetuating the organising principle of sovereignty - indeed, this is a central claim of this thesis - but this is not an explicitly defined or intended function of the club. Moreover, the club itself does not even have standing in international law.

The Balance of Power and Great Powers institutions can also be ruled out as G-summitry's constitutive institutions for a number of reasons. First, the configuration of the club is not like any that are products of such institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the Concert of Europe. G-summitry is by no means a concert. This is particularly so in the case of the G7 as it includes non-great powers and as it does not include all the great powers.¹³ For most of the club's existence its composition excluded powers of sufficient size and geopolitical import that they would be expected to be included, namely Russia and China, while including states that can make no reasonable claim to be worth of that status, namely Canada and Italy. Additionally, the club's creators never saw the group as a club of great powers, but rather as a club of major industrialised economies (and, later with the G20, a group of economically systematically significant countries). Additionally, the club failed to get the consent of lesser, excluded powers, which is necessary in a great power management system, and the club's focus at its founding was economics rather than geopolitics.¹⁴

If we accept the market/trade as an institution it appears to be a likely candidate for the constitutive institution of G-summitry given the club's core focus on economic and

¹³ J. J. Kirton 1989. This second dimension does not hold in the case of the G20, but the first does.

¹⁴ At least, ostensibly. As Chapter Seven demonstrates, from the very beginnings the core of the group discussed political matters.

financial matters.¹⁵ The thematic focus of a club should not be confused with the club's underlying constitution, however. What is important to focus on is *how* the club operates rather than whatever particular task it happens to be doing. This seems to be what delineates War and the Balance of Power as institutions in Bull's formulation.¹⁶ Both institutions are primarily tasked with maintaining the shape of the international system, though achieve it in very different ways. The market can thus also be ruled out as the constitutive institution of G-summitry.

G-summitry is best understood as a construction of the diplomatic institution. G-summitry displays all the hallmarks of the diplomatic institution. First, one of the defining characteristics of the group is the emphasis on personal contact and frank, informal exchange. The public face of diplomacy is characterised by much formality, most often articulated as protocol. The private face of diplomacy, in sharp contrast, is very much the opposite. Indeed, what was interesting about people's reactions to Wikileaks' release of secret diplomatic cables was not so much the content of the messages, but the informality through which their content was communicated. Parris and Bryson's books presenting British diplomats' valedictory messages are intended as comedy but equally reveal this point- in private the conduct of diplomacy is very informal.¹⁷ Informality was at the very heart of what French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing had envisaged for the group, given its centrality in the club's immediate antecedent, The Library Group.¹⁸ Indeed, Giscard vehemently objected to the entry of any new members on the grounds that it would reduce the ability of the group to conduct itself informally.¹⁹ In objecting to the inclusion of the EC he argued, "that further

¹⁵ Buzan 2004b, 183–5

¹⁶ I share the position of later English School scholars who have subsumed one into the other, though refer to Bull's formulation here for sake of ease of argument.

¹⁷ Parris 2011; Parris 2012

¹⁸ See below and Chapter Seven for further details of The Library Group

¹⁹ Archival document: Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt 1975

additions were likely to destroy the informality of these meetings.”²⁰ So centrally important is frank exchange to the operation of the club that when the G20 was established at the ministerial level, Paul Martin ensured that the practice of interacting in frank, informal exchanges would be adopted by all the new entrants to the club. Observing that “certain members had some difficulty adjusting to the G7’s tradition of informal, unscripted exchanges with all members at equal footing”, Martin started the first G20 meeting by inviting the South African finance minister, Trevor Manuel, and Lawrence Summers to “have at it on the issue of agricultural subsidies.”²¹ Martin’s intent was to show the new members how to conduct themselves in the meetings, to demonstrate that frank, informal exchange was not just allowed, but was the rule. This is so for sherpas as much as it is for leaders. Sherpas repeatedly stressed the importance of informality in their contact with one another.²² As British sherpa Lord Armstrong related, sherpas “meet often enough to develop a camaraderie and a network of personal friendships which persists even when they cease to be sherpas.”²³ Indeed, G-summitry was created through personal diplomacy. It required personal diplomacy on the part of George Shultz to meet with Wilson, Giscard, and Schmidt to get the idea off the ground. Thereafter, it was the diplomats in the invited countries that shepherded the idea to fruition; and, conversely, it was through diplomatic channels that the excluded states protested their status as outsiders.²⁴

G-summitry is not a single, annual meeting of leaders; it is a continuous diplomatic process. Cardinal Richelieu is axiomatically marked as being the progenitor of “continuous diplomacy” which has even since been at the heart of the diplomatic

²⁰ Archival documents: J. Callaghan and Giscard 1977; “Record of a Telephone Conversation Between Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 March 1977” 1977; UK Government 1977

²¹ Martin 2013

²² Interviews: Anonymous Interview Subject 1.1; Aranda Bezaury 2012; Harder 2012; Smith 2011a

²³ Armstrong 1991, 43

²⁴ Archival documents: Greenwald 1975; Hillebrand 1975b; Wright 1976

institution's practice.²⁵ G-summitry is not limited to one (or two) summit(s) per year as they are popularly portrayed. Rather, G-summitry is a year-round process that involves constant interaction between leaders, their sherpas, ministers, and their foreign and finance departments.²⁶ Third, the symbolic emphasis of the summit is placed on a textual output, just as it is in diplomacy. The summit communiqués are the pinnacle of the preparatory process. The communiqué is the outcome that all stakeholders are trying to influence, the dimension of the summit that involves the most intense negotiation by the sherpas, and is the artefact that is used by outsiders as a means to gain inclusion.²⁷ Indeed, that the focus of the entire summitry process is a negotiation over the communiqué further emphasises the extent to which G-summitry is a diplomatic institution- the process itself is an exercise of one of the essential elements of diplomacy.²⁸

4.2 Mobility Dampeners

G-summitry is thus an institutional context – or, field – that is significantly different from its historical antecedents. The contemporary governance context is a highly institutionalised one within which actors' interdependence is mediated via diplomacy.²⁹ As is detailed in the following chapter, this removes more assertive, geopolitical status claiming strategies from the closure game as they are rendered both more difficult to carry out and less legitimate even if they are.³⁰ The second consequence of this is that diplomatic norms enter the status game which has a profound effect on how the status game is played.

²⁵ G. R. Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte 2001

²⁶ And many more departments too as the club's agenda grows, including labour, environment, and international development ministries.

²⁷ See: Chapter Six

²⁸ Jönsson and Hall 2005; S. H. G. Nicolson 1988

²⁹ Ikenberry 2009; Keohane and Nye 1977; Sharp 2009b

³⁰ Russia's recent annexation of Crimea illustrates this point well. While such a move was possible it has not been accepted by the international community as being legitimate. Furthermore, it as is detailed in the following chapter, it has prompted its effective suspension from the G8.

As G-summitry is constituted by the diplomatic institution, the norms, values, beliefs, and practices that are central to diplomacy serve as the foundation of the club's operation and it is these norms that inject mobility dampeners into the club. Specifically, it is the diplomatic principles of pragmatism and precedence that bolster closure in this way. Pragmatism privileges concerns for expediency over principles of fairness or justice while precedence gives privileged standing to incumbents to the detriment of newcomers. In the case of the G20, the principle of representative governance is also central to its construction. That is, the G20 is not just a club of systematically significant economies but also is a club whose membership was crafted to ensure just geographic and cultural representation in order for the club to be able to claim the representative legitimacy that the G7/8 lacks. In attempting to be a more representatively legitimate institution, however, the G20 ends up actually being a more unfair closure system because of the twin effects of precedence and pragmatism. Thus, despite well-intentioned principles guiding its composition, the institutions which shape its identity and operation as a club actually render G-summitry as more closed than its antecedents.

Unevenly applied credentialism is the other way in which mobility dampening renders G-summitry more closed than the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club. Similarly to the principle of representative legitimacy, the notion of testing the credentials of club entrants is well-intentioned and serves the goal of ensuring that the club's composition is made up of only those actors that are worthy of inclusion. Credentialism, in other words, is a meritocratic means of governing closure. In the case of G-summitry, however, credentials are unevenly tested. The credentials of potential entrants to the club are tested while the credentials of those inside the club are not. Outsiders can be denied entry because of insufficient credentials but insiders cannot be kicked out of the club for lacking those same credentials. Both dimensions of social

inertia caused by mobility dampeners may be observed here: at once the upward mobility of outsiders is prevented by testing their suitability for the club, while, concurrently, the downward mobility of insiders is prevented by not testing their suitability. Actors could be - and were - expelled from the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers clubs based on their credentials. In G-summitry, however, they cannot be.

4.2.1 Pragmatism

Pragmatism guided the club's membership composition from the very beginnings of G-summitry. The purpose of the brief history below is to highlight the extent to which G-summitry is a diplomatic institution in which pragmatism is central in two ways: in guiding the foundation of the club and in justifying the exclusion of outsiders from the club. Pragmatism is thus a central dimension of the construction of the club, the erection of barriers to divide insiders and outsiders, and the dampening of mobility in the contemporary international status group.

The G7 was envisaged as being small and exclusive so as to help ensure that the group's meetings were intimate and informal. The rationale guiding this imperative was that the fewer the number of people in the room, the more likely that frank, informal exchanges could be used to break political deadlocks. This was what prompted US Treasury Secretary George Shultz to first bring together the individuals whom would later be key in founding the club. The standard account of the G7's development puts its roots in "The Library Group," describing the G7 as the elevation of this group to the leaders' level.³¹ The Library Group was composed of the UK, US, French, German, and Japanese finance ministers who met in the early 1970's in response to the oil crisis and problems

³¹ See, for example: Putnam and Bayne 1984a

with the international monetary system. As Chapter Seven details, the group quickly took on a political dimension and thus is properly understood as not just being an economic club, but as political one too. Indeed, it is important to recognise that the club formed not just in the midst of economic upheaval, but also against a volatile backdrop including détente in the Cold War and the end of the decolonisation processes. That said, the group first came together in 1972 as a result of an effort lead by Shultz to fix the international monetary system. The Smithsonian Agreement, which was signed in December 1971 and amended the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, had failed to work as the signatories had hoped, with further devaluation of the US dollar against European currencies and readjustment of the value of the US dollar against gold required. Prior to an IMF G20 meeting³² Shultz invited the finance ministers of Germany, France, UK, and Japan to come to his office one at a time to read a speech that he had prepared about the problems with the current system in an effort to forge some sort of common position before meeting with the larger, “unwieldy” IMF G20.³³ This group continued to meet on the sides of IMF meetings as well as at other times.³⁴ They met often enough and was small enough that the members became friends who, in the words of Shultz, “could call on one another... we could trust each other, we were honest and candid.”³⁵

In July 1975 Giscard mused about the idea of a summit of “industrialised nations” to discuss economic and monetary affairs.³⁶ Giscard suggested a summit in Paris in the autumn amongst France, UK, US, West Germany, Italy, and “other industrialised nations”

³² Not to be confused with the current G20.

³³ Interview: Shultz 2012

³⁴ Interview: Shultz 2012

³⁵ Interview: Shultz 2012

³⁶ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976. It’s unclear when exactly the interview occurred. Bayne refers to the idea having been reported in the press on the 8th and 9th of July, 1975 (Bayne 1975), later references to the interview state that it was on the 9th of July (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976). Unfortunately, the original transcript of the interview has been lost.

which would not reach any formal agreements, but would focus on frank, informal exchanges over the course of a week of private talks.³⁷ From the moment that the possibility of a summit was raised those who thought they ought to be included began lobbying for an invitation, most notably Canada and Italy.³⁸ Outsiders seeking inclusion continued for a number of years as the summit became an annual event, with appeals made by smaller Europeans including Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland, and Denmark; as well as Australia.³⁹ There are two important things to note: first, those seeking inclusion did so by mobilising their diplomatic corps (as is explored further in the following chapter), thus lending weight to the argument here that G-summitry is a derivative of the diplomatic institution. Outsiders did not appeal to international law or threaten to wage war; rather, they mobilised their diplomats.⁴⁰

Second, the club repeatedly denied entry to outsiders on the grounds that doing so would jeopardise the informality and intimacy of the summit. The club excluded outsiders in order to keep the group small and therefore effective. Giscard was particularly adamant on not letting anyone but the original G5 countries into the group on these grounds. This was most clearly articulated in objecting to Canada's inclusion wherein he stated that increased membership would reduce the informality and flexibility and would increase the difficulty in "declining the claims to participation from still additional countries; especially in Europe, and from international organisations like the OECD."⁴¹ Similarly, in objecting to the participation of the European Community

³⁷ Archival document: Ingersoll 1975

³⁸ Archival documents: Volpe 1975a; Volpe 1975b; Kissinger 1975d; "Memorandum of Conversation" 1975; Morris and Kissinger 1975; Morris 1975; Volpe 1975c; Hillebrand 1975a; Kissinger 1975g; Sonnenfeldt and Ingersoll 1975c; Sonnenfeldt and Ingersoll 1975b; Kissinger 1975f; J. Hodgson 1975; Kissinger 1975h; Kissinger 1975c; Kissinger 1975a; Kissinger 1975b; Volpe 1975d; Volpe 1975e; Greenwald 1975; Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt 1975; Porter 1975a; Porter 1975b; Hillebrand 1975b; Rush 1975; J. Callaghan 1976; Ford 1976a; Ford 1976b; Ford 1976c; Ford 1976d; Ford 1976e; Enders 1976

³⁹ On exclusion of smaller Europeans: Wright 1976; on exclusion of Australia: Percival 1976; Hunt 1978a; Rose 1979; Government of Australia 1976; Government of Australia 1975

⁴⁰ Luxembourg went so far as to send a formal diplomatic *démarche* to the US to protest their exclusion. Archival document: Wright 1976

⁴¹ Archival document: Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt 1975

Giscard likewise argued “that further additions were likely to destroy the informality of these meetings.”⁴² It is worthwhile to note here that Giscard not only objected on the grounds that the inclusion of more actors in this particular case would threaten the efficacy of the meetings, but also objected to the possibility of a non-state actor having the same standing as a sovereign state, threatening that “[i]f the view was taken that the Commission had to attend, by right, he would not himself go.”⁴³

The pragmatic imperative to keep summits small in order to remain effective has endured throughout G-summitry’s history. Sherpas repeatedly brought up the extent to which summits had expanded far beyond the small gatherings they were envisaged to be.⁴⁴ The 2009 L’Aquila G8 summit was popularly regarded as being the most extreme example of this, being described as “an absolute circus” with the G8, the O5, 13 other guest countries, ten IOs, and civil society invited.⁴⁵ The Canadian government, who hosted the following summit, purposely designed their Muskoka summit to halt this trend and “strip the summit back to what it was.”⁴⁶ For this reason the Canadian government invited only the G8 heads of government (and the EU) to the summit, much angering those actors whom had become accustomed to inclusion, such as representatives of the UN, IFIs, and civil society. The continued imperative to keep the club small remains as it was in 1975- to ensure that the club is effective. This is particularly important for the G7/8 who lack representative legitimacy. It is only by being effective that they can maintain some - however marginal - claim to their special

⁴² Archival documents: J. Callaghan and Giscard 1977; “Record of a Telephone Conversation Between Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 March 1977” 1977; UK Government 1977

⁴³ Archival document: UK Government 1977

⁴⁴ Interviews: Allan 2012; Anonymous Interview Subject 1.1; Aranda Bezaury 2012; Bayne 2012; Carin 2012; Edwards 2012; Fowler 2012; Harder 2012; Khatchadourian 2012; Kitajima 2012; Ramos 2012; Smith 2011b. It should be noted that this was not necessarily judged as being a negative development. Gabriella Ramos, for example, stressed that the relatively open G20 architecture allows for the inclusion of IOs which brings additional efficacy, legitimacy, and representation to the club without having to increase formal state membership as much as would otherwise be necessary.

⁴⁵ Interviews: Burnley 2012; Edwards 2012; Khatchadourian 2012; Rea 2012

⁴⁶ Interviews: Edwards 2012; Khatchadourian 2012

status.⁴⁷ Sherpas often stated that the biggest threat to the G20's survival is that it will be unable to reach meaningful consensus decisions because the club has become too large.⁴⁸ Much contemporary scholarship on the G20 also focuses on this trade-off between the size of the membership and the legitimacy that it confers and the efficacy of the group.⁴⁹

The point to emphasise here is that pragmatism is a guiding principle for determining the composition of the G-summitry club. Outsiders, despite a potential ability to functionally contribute to the club and/or be potentially worthy of inclusion by virtue of achieved characteristics, are excluded on these grounds. This has the twin effect of maintaining the status of insiders as (i) no additional members means that the prestige derived from inclusion in the group is not diluted by more actors being in the group and as (ii) the continuance of a smaller group increases the likelihood of the club being effective and therefore maintaining its claim to the right of special status. Conversely, this pragmatic exclusion prevents the upward mobility of outsiders whom otherwise might be expected to be in the club.⁵⁰

This is distinctly different from the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club as in neither of these clubs was exclusion of an actor whom otherwise was judged to be suitable for inclusion denied entry for reasons of expediency. Indeed, it would not make sense for these clubs to exclude on such grounds by virtue of the functions that these institutions of international society are responsible for. It does not make sense for international society to exclude those whom are judged to be worthy of inclusion and as such could contribute to the society. The same is the case for the Great Powers club, it does not make sense - in fact, it is counter productive - to exclude a power of sufficient

⁴⁷ Interviews: Anonymous Interview Subject 1.1; Rea 2012

⁴⁸ Interviews: Aranda Bezaury 2012; Anonymous Interview Subject 1.1; Edwards 2012; Harder 2012; Smith 2011b

⁴⁹ See especially: A. F. Cooper and Bradford 2010b; A. F. Cooper 2012b; Martin 2013

⁵⁰ With the establishment of the G20, the upward mobility of some actors is managed via stratified inclusion. See: Chapter 7

import as doing so prevents the club from effectively managing international affairs.⁵¹ As a diplomatic institution, however, G-summitry does close off opportunities for rising (or risen) outsiders as, in the case of this club, the larger its composition, the potentially less effective it is at achieving its function.

4.2.2 Precedence

The second mobility dampener in G-summitry that renders it a more closed group than previous clubs is the force of the diplomatic norm of precedence. Much of the status quo composition of the club can be explained as a result of the conservative nature of diplomacy in which precedence is a central norm for ensuring continuity and order.⁵² In terms of continuity, diplomacy is an inherently conservative practice, concerned with maintaining the status-quo, unless ordered otherwise by political masters.⁵³ In terms of order, precedence governs protocol in all manners of diplomatic practice, such as in the identification of the doyen of a diplomatic corps - the longest serving diplomat in any given capital (that is, whomever happened to arrive in that capital before any of his or her peers). Precedence guides order in a landscape where, at least formally, all diplomats are meant to be equal in standing as representatives of sovereign states. It is the conservative dimension of precedence that is of most relevance to the present discussion concerning closure.

Precedence is a useful means of exclusion because it depersonalises the decision to exclude from any particular other, placing the responsibility for exclusion on an external norm rather than as an authoritative decision made by an individual. Questions of closure can be politically costly for a host leader, owing to the offence taken by the excluded. Giscard's decision to exclude Canada from Rambouillet was damaging to the

⁵¹ As Chapter Seven demonstrates with the initial exclusion of France from the inner club at Vienna.

⁵² The following chapter explores the role of precedence in inclusion strategies in depth.

⁵³ Neumann 2007; Neumann 2012

relationship between France and Canada, and between Giscard and Trudeau personally.⁵⁴ Precedence as a norm provides a means to avoid the personal political cost of excluding others. Korea's expulsion of the Netherlands from the G20 as an invited guest was thus convenient for Sarkozy who would be the next summit host. Sarkozy was under pressure to reduce the number of Europeans around the table in order to increase the legitimacy of the group. He did not want to have to be the one to take the decision to exclude a fellow European owing to the difficulties this could yield within the EU.⁵⁵ Korea's decision to exclude the Netherlands from the Seoul summit, in a status-motivated move that would display Korea's standing as a power capable of "shooting a European", provided Sarkozy with the precedence not to include the Netherlands. For this reason France did not come to the Netherlands' rescue in sherpa meetings to argue for its continued inclusion as an invitee.⁵⁶

The same holds true for any contemplation of major revisions to the club's membership. One of the G20's founders, Paul Martin, described it as a "Pandora's box that no leader in their right mind would try to open."⁵⁷ Revisiting membership subjects the club to bids for inclusion that it likely will have to turn down and thus cause offence to the excluded which comes with political costs. It is less costly to appeal to precedence. It is for this reason that the composition of the G20 did not change when it was elevated to the leaders' level in 2008.⁵⁸ This holds for the mass addition of invitees to the summit too. As a prime example, in crafting the invitation list for the Kananaskis summit in 2002 the Canadian hosts had to decide which African countries to include as invitees. The Canadian sherpa, Robert Fowler, decided to rely on precedence as the strategy to craft the invitation list so as to cause minimal offence to the excluded and provide a clear

⁵⁴ Interview: Bayne 2012

⁵⁵ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

⁵⁶ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1. This particular move is explored further in Chapter Seven.

⁵⁷ Interview: Martin 2012

⁵⁸ Interviews: Anonymous Interview Subject 1.1; Martin 2012; Summers 2012

rationale with which to confront bids for inclusion.⁵⁹ He decided to invite the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) framers.⁶⁰ Despite “lobbying from all of Africa and the rest of the G7 to let others in” the Canadians held the line along this rationale.⁶¹

More significantly, precedence allows for actors whose relative standing in international affairs has fallen to remain in the club. There are more Europeans in the club than states from any other region. At first glance this seems to suggest collectivist closure but, as above, it is not. Rather, the continued plurality of Europeans in the group is better explained as being a result of the club being governed by individualist closure wherein the in-group, composed disproportionately by those who first industrialised and grew their economies to be larger and more systematically significant than others, has found a way to protect its status position through means other than closing itself off on the basis of collectivist attributes. The mechanism through which this is achieved is the norm that once an actor is in the club, it cannot be kicked out as precedence is a governing norm. Despite the original club members no longer being undisputedly larger economies than all other states, they remain in the top-tier group. G7 members have not maintained the relative economic power that they enjoyed in 1975. Within only five years both China and Brazil had displaced Italy to make it ranked eighth in 1980.⁶² By the time the G20 was established at the ministerial level in 1999, India had achieved the rank of being the seventh largest economy.⁶³ Despite club members’ declining relative power their status was unaffected. This was particularly so for Italy and Canada. They were able to maintain their G7 status because of the central importance of precedence.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Interview: Fowler 2012

⁶⁰ Interview: Fowler 2012

⁶¹ Interview: Fowler: Fowler 2012. Only Algeria “played a spoiler role” (Fowler 2012)

⁶² Canada was never ranked as a top seven economy.

⁶³ When the G20 was elevated to the leaders’ level in 2008 India was ranked 4th

⁶⁴ Not only was Canada never ranked as a top seven economy, Italy has not been worthy of the distinction since 1980.

As a result, having gained inclusion they could not lose it; by extension, having gained status, they could not lose it.

The same could be said of actors whose continued presence in the club detracts from the legitimacy of the club, as is the case with the predominance of Western states in G-summitry. Whether the argument for their unsuitability for membership is articulated in power-political terms of no longer meeting the economic size criterion or in normative terms of unfairly over-representing the developed, industrialised West, the point remains the same that precedence prevents incumbents from being kicked out of the club. This is especially disadvantageous to outsiders who want into the club but are in the same geographic region as the plurality of insiders- namely, other Europeans. This is a significant observation. The club is reluctant to include other Europeans as doing so detracts from the club's already shaky legitimacy. The club could fend off critiques of its illegitimacy by virtue of its unrepresentativeness by reducing the number of Europeans in the group but it is unable to do so by virtue of precedence. As such, the best it can do is not increase the number of Europeans in the club, an imperative which drove closure in the early years of the G7 when smaller European states were clamouring for inclusion and in the formation of G20 at the ministerial level and in its elevation to the leaders' level.⁶⁵ States who otherwise meet individualist criteria for inclusion - whether it be economic size in the G7 or systematic significance in the G20 - are thus denied entry because of the twin effect of precedence and the need for representative legitimacy. The Czech Republic, Switzerland, Poland, Spain, and the Netherlands all sought inclusion in the club but were excluded because of the combined effect of geography and precedence. The latter three, in terms of economic rank, would be expected to be in the club if economic heft were the sole inclusion criterion. This is significant. The norm requiring global governance groups to have fair geographic representation actually serves to

⁶⁵ Interviews: Anonymous subject 1.1; Martin 2012; Summers 2012; Archival sources: Wright 1976; Hillebrand 1975b; Morris 1975

exclude actors whom might otherwise be included in a purely individualist system which lacks a precedence as a mobility dampener. This is also a significant observation for IR theory as it undercuts simplistic, Eurocentric analyses that delineate the system's broad status groups as being the West versus the rest.

To a degree the effect of precedence may be observed in the Great Powers club wherein falling or fallen powers' status is secured, at least temporarily, by remaining in the club despite having lost the material basis that warrants its inclusion. Austria-Hungary after the Seven Years War and Britain and France after 1945 serve as good examples.⁶⁶ As is detailed in Chapter Seven, Volgy *et al.* describe this as the "halo effect."⁶⁷ Precedence in the group may thus allow for exit from the club to be softened. Note, though, that there is still an exit, however delayed. This is not the case in G-summitry. It is possible to point to the Netherlands' eventual exclusion from the G20 as an incidence of an actor being removed from the club. The Netherlands, though, were never fully included as a member but rather marginally kept on the periphery of the club as an "invited guest". That they were no longer extended an invitation after the Toronto G20 summit in 2010 is not so much an exit from club, but rather best understood as a denial of entry.

Precedence is thus one significant way in which, in the absence of collectivist safeguards to potential losses of status, insiders protect their positions.⁶⁸ The system is thus not purely individualist and meritocratic. However, it is not purely so because of collectivist elements but because diplomatic norms underpin its operation in the absence of any formally set rules.⁶⁹ Members cannot be kicked out. This marks G-

⁶⁶ Scott 2006; Wight 1946, 50. Bridge and Bullen contend that Spain and Sweden "clung tenaciously to great-power status long after they had ceased to possess its attributes" in the 20th century (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 1). While they may have claimed the status, it is highly questionable as to whether or not other great power or lesser powers recognised them as such.

⁶⁷ Volgy et al. 2011, 7

⁶⁸ In addition to the other mobility dampeners discussed in this chapter, see also the discussion of how insiders create sub-strata to maintain their relative position in chapter 5.

⁶⁹ That is, not as concerns state actors. It is not purely so for non-state actors because of collectivist elements.

summitry as being distinctly different from the great powers club and the family of civilised nations as states could be kicked out of those groups. In this way there is less social mobility in contemporary international society than it was in the 19th and 20th centuries.

4.2.3 Credentialism

Social theorists, Collins chief among them, have pointed to credentialism as a significant way of ordering individualist societies- something that makes them notably distinct from collectivist societies.⁷⁰ Credentials are achieved characteristics which signal the competence of an actor. Testing the credentials of an actor is a meritocratic way of ascertaining the suitability of an actor for inclusion in a group. The most evident domestic analogy is the use of academic degrees to indicate the suitability of an individual for employment.

Credentialism features in each of the international status groups under consideration here as credentials signal the suitability of an actor for admission to the club. Much of the content discussed in the following chapter may be read as the strategies by which outsiders achieve and signal these credentials. That credentialism is so present in international society is itself further evidence of one of this chapter's general claims that the closure game is actually a fairly open one in international society. However, credentialism does not work in the same way in all of the clubs. The way credentialism works in G-summitry renders it less fair to outsiders than it does in the family of civilised nations and the Great Powers clubs. Hence, from this perspective too, G-summitry is surprisingly less open than the other clubs.

The Standard of Civilisation, as above, served as a clear list of the credentials that an outsider needed to achieve in order to gain entry into international society. What is significant about the Standard in the context of the current argument is that it was

⁷⁰ See: Collins 1979; Parkin 1979, 54–60

applied both to the club's insiders and outsiders.⁷¹ While the notion of the Family of Civilised Nations ceased and its accompanying Standard of Civilisation was no longer in use by the 1920's, implicitly the key dimensions of the Standard still governed a division amongst states such that an actor could be kicked out of the club if it failed to uphold the membership criteria.⁷² Bolshevik Russia serves as a prime example. In an earlier period when the Standard was in use, the removal of smaller Germanic and Italian principalities from international society denotes their failure to meet the legal-collectivist criteria for inclusion.⁷³

Likewise, states that no longer met the criteria for the status as a Great Power were kicked out of the club. "A great power", Wight remarks, "does not die in its bed."⁷⁴ Great powers have their membership credentials tested in war. This is not surprising given that the closure criteria for the Great Powers club is so predominantly based on military power.⁷⁵ A failure to meet the criteria almost necessarily means a violent loss of status. The loss of status, like its achievement, is often a gradual process such that pointing to a specific event or battle cannot denote the moment of an actor's exit from the club but may serve as a useful proxy.⁷⁶ Status may be lost by defeat - such as Sweden's loss to Russia in the Great Northern War in 1721 or Spain's loss to Napoleon in the Peninsula War in 1808 - or by Pyrrhic victory - such as Holland's defeat of Louis IX's France in 1672 or Britain's defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 - after which the victor becomes dependent on other, greater powers.⁷⁷ Conversely, a successful 'display' of a power's credentials in conflict either verifies its position as a Great Power or, as is examined in further depth in the following chapter, confirms a state's entry into the club. The

⁷¹ Though not necessarily equally- insiders were held to a lesser standard than outsiders. The general point holds, however, as insiders were nonetheless still measured against a standard and failing to meet it meant the possibility of being kicked out of the club.

⁷² See Chapter Five for a full analysis of the Standard's membership criteria

⁷³ c.f. Fazal 2007; Spruyt 1996

⁷⁴ Wight 1946, 47; See also: Bridge and Bullen 2005, 7; Levy 1984; Scott 2006

⁷⁵ Levy 1984, 24; Modelski 1972, 150

⁷⁶ Levy 1984, 24; see also: Volgy et al. 2011; Volgy et al. 2014

⁷⁷ Wight 1946, 48. Wight notes that Great Powers may also temporarily lose status after war.

relatively modest contribution of Austria-Hungary to fighting the Boxer Rebellion exemplifies two aspects of credentialism in the great powers club. First, that Austria-Hungary contributed military assets at all signifies the importance of contributing just to stay in the club. Austria-Hungary had no real interest in China and comparatively few resources to send, but did so anyway because doing so signalled their status. Second, as a falling power, contributing to the club's cause kept the state in the club, thus dampening its exit from the group.

In G-summitry, credentialism is exercised in a particular way that serves as a means of protecting the status positions of existing members. First, it is only the credentials of aspirant members that are tested. Existing members' credentials are not re-tested. This uneven application of credentialism acts as a mobility dampener, because their suitability is not re-tested, they cannot be kicked out. Credentialism in G-summitry is thus distinctly different than it is in the other clubs. As above, the relative decline of the economic importance of G7 club members, particularly Canada and Italy, has not resulted in their dismissal from the club. The force of precedence is here again evident and reveals how G-summitry, as a diplomatic institution, is relatively closed by virtue of this norm. Precedence prevents the incumbents' credentials from being tested. From the beginning of G-summitry Italy had been regarded as not contributing much to the club.⁷⁸ Unlike in the Great Powers club, though, a lack of contribution does not provide the grounds for the country's dismissal because as an incumbent insider in this particular club, this is irrelevant- the credentials of insiders are not tested. In contrast, as the above cases of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Nigeria exemplify, and as the following chapter does too, the credentials of ascendant outsiders are scrutinised considerably and a failure to meet the entry criteria means exclusion from the club. This uneven application of credentialism in G-summitry thus dampens mobility in both directions. It prevents the falling powers from losing status because their credentials are not tested as they

⁷⁸ Archival document: Hunt 1976

otherwise were in the great powers system. It conversely limits or slows the rise of ascendant actors by scrutinising their credentials.

Russia's nominal expulsion from the G8 in March 2014 as a censure of its annexation of Crimea provides an opportunity to test one of this thesis' main claims, that G-summitry is a relatively closed club because, unlike in the Family of Civilised Nations or the club of Great Powers, members cannot be kicked out. Russia, however, was not kicked out. G7 members met in The Hague on the side-lines of the Third Nuclear Security Summit to discuss Russia's possible expulsion.⁷⁹ In advance of the meeting, Canada was most vocal about expelling Russia from the club, with Italy taking the opposing position.⁸⁰ The language in the sixth paragraph of the meeting's communiqué is the relevant one for our purposes here.⁸¹ The G7 neither suspended nor expelled Russia from the G8 but rather suspended themselves from the G8, "[w]e will suspend our participation in the G-8 until Russia changes course and the environment comes back to where the G-8 is able to have a meaningful discussion..." Not only was Russia not kicked out of the club, in the same sentence as the G7's self-suspension was announced, the intention to meet in the future as a G8 is expressed. As one G7 foreign minister stated, "[f]or the time being we will keep the suspension but in the long term we want Russia to be part of the group."⁸² This is significant. Not only was Russia neither suspended nor expelled, there was no intended permanency to the act of the G7 suspending themselves. The club, at best, took a hiatus from itself.⁸³

⁷⁹ Russian annexation of territory has been relevant to discussions of its suitability for membership since inclusion was first discussed by the club. Japan originally opposed Russian inclusion because of its annexation of the Kuril Islands (Oxenstierna 1993, 18)

⁸⁰ Canadian and Associated Press 2014; Goodman 2014; ITAR-TASS News Agency 2014; Lunn 2014; Parry 2014

⁸¹ See: President, European Council 2014

⁸² McGregor and Fontanella-Khan 2014

⁸³ This case presents us with a solid means to test the validity of a major claim of this thesis. Should upper tier of G-summitry return to being a G7 with the G8 never meeting again, the argument that G-summitry is a less fair closure system because of its unevenly applied collectivism would be disproved.

The most significant theoretical insight to draw from this case is to note that Russia's credentials for membership were tested by the rest of the club, but its failure to meet this standard had no serious consequences for its inclusion. The G7 stated in their Hague communiqué that "This Group came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. Russia's actions in recent weeks are not consistent with them" thus testing Russia's suitability for inclusion against the principles and purpose of the club.⁸⁴ This case thus lends considerable weight to this thesis' claim concerning unevenly applied credentialism. Despite a military invasion of sovereign state and the annexation of territory "flagrantly violating international law and the order the G7 has helped to build since the end of the Cold War", as President Obama's Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes characterised it, Russia was not kicked out of the club.⁸⁵ It is difficult to imagine another scenario, short of a declaration of all-out offensive war that would identify a state as failing to be suitable for membership. Russia was given a 'time out' but remained a member. This is the only time in its history that the club considered expelling a member and it has proven to be unable to do it. Just as the failure of G8 members to remain the ranking global economies fails to have the effect of removing them from the club, so too does the failure of a member to continue to abide by values of the club fail to result in the loss of their membership.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov captured the essence of how membership in the club works in response to the suspension, "[t]he G8 is an informal club. No one hands out membership cards and no one can be kicked out of it."⁸⁶ Lavrov here eludes to the G8's institutional underpinnings as a diplomatic club, with an emphasis on informality and precedence. This move isolated, however temporarily, Russia from the rest of the group; however, by virtue of the way that closure works in G-summitry, distinct from its

⁸⁴ President, European Council 2014

⁸⁵ McGregor and Fontanella-Khan 2014

⁸⁶ De Clercq 2014

historical antecedents, the group could not expel a member, but could only have members suspend themselves. It may come across as trivial to distinguish between the expulsion of others and self-suspension given that the outcome is effectively the same, but from a closure perspective it is a significant distinction for analysing the membership dynamics of any club. G-summitry is atypical of other clubs given that it is a product of the diplomatic institution of international society and social mobility is significantly restricted in it as a result. In this case, errant members cannot be stripped of their status, thus dampening downward mobility.

The opportunities for the testing of credentials in G-summitry are fewer than in the other clubs, thus further narrowing the chances of outsiders to attempt entry into the club and thereby further marking out G-summitry as being more closed. International conferences are typically used as proxies for identifying an actor's membership status in international society and wars have served the same purpose with respect to the Great Powers club. Entries and exits from clubs are properly understood as more gradual processes but conferences and wars are usual means of pinpointing events in which actors can demonstrate their suitability - or lack thereof - for inclusion.⁸⁷ In the case of international society, however, participation in international conferences is not the sole opportunity for an actor to demonstrate its suitability owing to the fact that there are more dimensions to the Standard than just diplomatic engagement. Japan's 'just' conduct and victory in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War just as well signals the state's suitability for entry as does the Ottoman Empire's participation in the Treaty of Paris in 1856.⁸⁸ Different dimensions of an actor's adherence to the Standard could be tested in the different institutions, be it, as examples, war or diplomacy. There are thus multiple avenues through which an actor may have its credentials tested to

⁸⁷ c.f. Levy 1984, 24; Neumann 2011, 466

⁸⁸ Clark 1989, 95; Gong 1984, 32 and 107; Holbraad 1970, 2; Okagaki 2013, 86; Neumann and Welsh 1991, 343. Though, they were incorporated into the club in a lower stratum. See Chapter Seven.

enter international society owing to the multidimensional nature of the Standard. Moreover, there are fewer temporal constraints on when an actor could seek admission owing to the fact that there are multiple forums demonstrating suitability and as the relative frequency of some of these events, such as international conferences, is greater.⁸⁹

This is less the case with the great powers and G-summitry. There are fewer opportunities for testing credentials in the Great Powers club because the credentials required for inclusion are so predominantly focused on military power and so, as above, credentials are only tested in war or military interventions. Thus it is only at times of war that the recognition of Great Power status can be won or lost and therefore there are fewer opportunities for club membership to be achieved (or lost). A power may rise or decline in interim periods but it is only in war that its suitability is actually tested. The composition of the Great Powers club may then change depending on whether or not there is a change in the distribution of power as a result of conflict, with those included in the club being those powers of sufficient size that as a concert they can provide the club's functional goal in international society of providing a relatively stable political order.

With economic power being the predominant criterion for inclusion in G-summitry, it is similarly the case that there are comparatively fewer opportunities for inclusion as it is only at significant historical moments where the club is unable to accomplish its functional aim of ensuring international economic stability that the club is amenable to change. Even at those historical moments where club membership may be revisited, it is done so in a way that is less open than the great powers club because incumbency is protected by the norm of precedence. G-summitry has thus changed very little since its

⁸⁹ Though, not necessarily often.

inception in 1975- surprisingly little given the breath of changes internationally in the ensuing forty years.

Mobility dampeners are thus means other than barriers of maintaining a *status quo*, relying on the normative context to achieve closure. They are not overt means of exclusion; rather, like the ostensibly achievable closure barriers discussed in the following chapter, they are a means of achieving closure by stealth.

CHAPTER FIVE

Exclusion

5.1 Introduction

Club insiders erect barriers to secure material and ideational advantages for themselves at the exclusion of others. These are closure barriers. Moreover, as the previous chapter detailed, they also may employ mobility dampeners ensure that their privileged position persists and, conversely, that the subordinate or marginalised positions of others remains so. Employed together, closure barriers and mobility dampeners constitute an exclusive grouping's closure strategies to maintain a *status quo* order in which they are the dominant and privileged actors. This chapter examines the strategies other than dampeners that club insiders use to accomplish this in international society, being principally concerned with the implications of what it means for closure to be achieved according to a particular set of strategies rather than others.

To be clear, this chapter is not an exhaustive taxonomy of closure strategies; rather, it is an analysis of the types of strategies that have been employed in international society to achieve and maintain closure. Broadly, the aims of this chapter are two-fold: (i) to observe how the deployment of particular mixes of strategies produce particular kinds of clubs (and *vice versa*) and (ii) to examine how closure works in different clubs in order to make claims about how relatively open or closed international society is.

This analysis draws four primary conclusions. First, international society's closure rules are predominantly functionalist and individualist in nature. This is significant because this functionalism makes club expansion possible, both in terms of the number and types of actors included. Thus, while international society's clubs are (re)produced and

perpetuated via closure, the types of entry criteria which govern closure are actually relatively open. As the rules are also predominantly individualist in nature, this further allows for the system to be characterised as being relatively open as it means that outsiders, for the most part, are able to achieve the required entry criteria.

Collectivism, however, is present in the system. Indeed, its role is central in giving international society its broad shape and character by making the possession of sovereignty the primary closure rule of the system. This legal-collectivism thus reproduces international society as a homogenous club of states. A second conclusion of this chapter is thus that international society's system of closure has a tandem structure.¹ Legal-collectivism serves as international society's primary closure rule while functional-individualist entry criteria serve as secondary closure rules governing the positioning of an actor after the primary rule has broadly assigned that actor as being either inside or outside of international society. Additionally, because the system is structured in such a way that it has a legitimist primary closure rule and functionalist secondary rules, it ensures that any expansion or opening of the club involving non-state actors necessarily involves an unequal subordinate inclusion of these outsiders. This how networked expansion is achieved while the core of the international system remains a club. This is explored in depth in Chapter Eight.

Third, this analysis finds the closure barriers erected in international society to be generally open. The means by which dominant insiders exclude outsiders from status groups do not provide a complete explanation of closure in the system. This indicates that the system is shaped by more than just exclusion strategies. This prompts us to examine entry and incorporation strategies in the following two chapters. However,

¹ c.f. Murphy 1988, 73

while generally an open system, there is variation in the degrees of openness amongst groups within international society.

Fourth, G-summitry is actually a more closed club than the Great Powers club and the Family of Civilised Nations. This is particularly counter-intuitive given the extent to which principles of representative governance underpin G-summitry, particularly in the G20 with its membership in part being determined by a need for legitimacy derived from regional representation and the absence of a domestic liberal democracy being a criterion upon which an actor may be excluded.² Indeed, as is argued below, it is in fact partly because of the need for legitimacy derived from geographic representation that contemporary G-summitry is a relatively more closed club than its historical antecedents.

Additionally, this chapter provides the empirical justification for reforming closure theory's classification of closure rules, which was detailed in Chapter Two, presenting them here as: unachievable, achievable, and ostensibly achievable.

This chapter proceeds by analysing the presence and uses of these entry criteria in the status groups under examination. In so doing this chapter demonstrates: (i) how closure governs the border between the inside and outside of international society; (ii) how the status game is played as a closure game within international society; and (iii) how the present international high-status club, G-summitry, is a less open system than the other clubs under examination.

² Note that a liberal democracy is not a required condition for entry into the club, as is exemplified by the presence of Saudi Arabia and China in the G20. Its absence is a sufficient condition to justify exclusion but its absence does not necessarily warrant exclusion.

5.2 Closure

5.2.1 Unachievable Criteria

As is argued below, closure in international society is predominantly governed according to functionalist-individualist rules, thus rendering international society as a relatively open system. However, a collectivist-legitimist rule forges the broad division in global politics between the inside and outside of international society. Legal-collectivism, rooted in the principle of sovereignty creates the division between state and non-state actors. The effect of this is that membership in international society, and consequently all status groups within it, are restricted to one type of actor based on that actor's identity as a sovereign state. It does not matter how functionally useful a non-state actor might be, by its very identity as a non-sovereign entity its inclusion in the society of states is impermissible.

The Standard of Civilisation set the conditions for entry into late-eighteenth and nineteenth century European International society. As is detailed in the following section, the Standard was predominantly comprised of individualist criteria. The major collectivist element, however, necessitated the possession of sovereignty and had the effect of ensuring the homogeneity of international society as being a club solely of states.³ While the remainder of this chapter follows Garret Gong's categorisation of the Standard closely, it is necessary to be momentarily critical of it for not explicitly identifying recognition as a sovereign state actor as being one of the core elements of the Standard.⁴ It underpins all five dimensions which Gong rightly identifies and the legacy of this rule endures in present-day international society.

³ c.f. Keal 2003

⁴ See: Gong 1984, 14-5

Paul Keal traces this criterion's roots to the shift from natural to positive international law while others, notably Halden and Keene, focus the increase in treaty making capacities.⁵ According to Keal, individuals could be included in international society according to natural law but "the more that international society came to be defined as a body of rules to regulate relations between states, the more it excluded individuals, sub-state groups, and political communities that did not meet European criteria for statehood".⁶ Gerry Simpson echoes this observation exactly in noting that "[t]he whole idea of statehood and sovereignty operates as a discourse of exclusion and hierarchy. Equality is possessed by sovereigns and states are universally subject to international law. The state has monopolised international legal life to the exclusion of other forms of political organisation."⁷ Jönsson and Hall take the argument a step further to argue that it is via diplomacy that this delegitimisation of all other forms of political entity from having standing in the international domain occurs.⁸

It is diplomacy's role as an institution of international society to carry out the function of reproducing a particular kind of society.⁹ For Bull, the first universal goal of International society is "the preservation of the system and society of states itself."¹⁰ Diplomacy's symbolic function is precisely to reify and give tangible expression to this International society. Indeed, in lamenting the decline of the solidarist international society he remarks that "the symbolic role of the diplomatic mechanism may for this reason be more important."¹¹ This is not to say that diplomacy necessarily (re)produces a states-only international society, but rather to emphasise that diplomacy is the practice through which the recognition of others as either belonging to the club or not is

⁵ Haldén 2013; Keene 2012a

⁶ Keal 2003, 86. See also: Clark 2005, 9; Lake 2003; Neumann 2011, 465; Okagaki 2013, 7, 37–41, 104–7; Vincent 1987, 106

⁷ Simpson 2004, 84

⁸ Jönsson and Hall 2005, 125

⁹ Jönsson and Hall 2005, 119–135

¹⁰ Bull 1977, 16

¹¹ Bull 1977, 176, 286–306

conducted. It is legal-collectivism rooted in sovereignty that (re)produces the particular, homogenous international society. Diplomacy merely serves as the institution through which this principle is given expression. Moreover, diplomacy not only constitutes actors' subject positions but it produces their identities via socialisation. Diplomacy is thus not a passive institution in the closure game. It does not just recognise an actor's belongingness (or lack thereof) in a more or less binary way, but it has the active ability to recast actors' belongingness through the mechanism of socialisation.¹²

It has not always been the case that non-state actors were unable to traverse the border and join international society. It was only with the calcification of the Standard of Civilisation that the legal-collectivist criterion became an unachievable one, thus slamming the door shut on other types of actors. During the early formation of the European international society and its expansion elsewhere, some non-state entities could gain recognition as states or as being sufficiently state-like that they could gain entry.¹³ There was thus a window of opportunity in this period for some actors to achieve this criterion and thus this legitimist closure rule was not always perfectly unachievable. It was, however, nearly so as only a small sub-set of actors were state-like enough to be positioned and enabled to morph into states- namely, dynastic monarchies such as Siam.¹⁴ Okagaki describes such entities as "functional equivalents" that "could be remoulded and recreated so that they would fit the Western mould."¹⁵ These outsiders achieved sovereignty via mimicry which is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. What is necessary to stress here is not how they achieved this criterion but that it was necessary that they do so and that during this period of time it was possible to do so. Legal-collectivism has thus been central to the Standard for as long as it governed closure and

¹² Jönsson and Hall 2005, 119–121

¹³ Keene argues that prior to the Standard, many non-European entities were regarded as states. With the setting of the Standard, this status was no longer recognized by the European club and it had to be earned back. (Keene 2002, 26–8; see also: Alexandrowicz 1967).

¹⁴ Gong 1984; Spruyt 1996

¹⁵ Okagaki 2013, 97–101, 106

the sovereignty which it demands was not always an unachievable criterion, despite being so now.

Reshaping one's polity as a state according to the Western image was necessary for overcoming this primary closure rule but insufficient for actually achieving sovereignty. By virtue of being a collectivist rule and by virtue of membership in any club being fundamentally a game of inter-subjective recognition, sovereignty must be ascribed by others rather than solely achieved by one's self. The incumbent club members are still in the position to grant or deny membership.¹⁶ As such, the significance of legal-collectivism serving as the primary closure rule goes beyond just telling us how sovereignty is the primary criterion for positioning an actor either inside or outside of international society, it also tells us how a particular hierarchy is reinforced and perpetuated within international society.

Anthony Anghie argues that the recognition of outsiders "was about affirming the power of the European states to claim sovereignty, to reinforce their authority to make such determinations, and consequently, to make sovereignty a possession that they could then proceed to dispense, deny, create, or grant partially".¹⁷ The monopoly privilege of insiders to confer such status is a central theme of this thesis which is examined further in Chapters Six and Seven. What is important to note in the present discussion is that it is sovereignty itself which the insiders have the ability to grant or deny to others and that this authority positions them as being relatively superior vis-a-vis new entrants to the club. Inclusion in the club does not mean equality in the club.¹⁸ Unequal relations of power persist even after a former outsider has been made an insider and the primary

¹⁶ Which points to further a question of who within those states determined membership: was it statespeople, lawyers, journalists? A combination?

¹⁷ Anghie 1999, 36. Though, I would go one step further than Anghie to suggest that it was not broadly European states, but a particular ranking set of Western European states.

¹⁸ A central theme of Chapters Six and Seven.

collectivist closure rule plays a significant part in maintaining this hierarchy. As such, collectivist closure reproduces hierarchy in both sites or contexts of international closure: between the inside and outside of the club and within the club.

Legal-collectivism is not just achieved through recognition games played within diplomatic practice. Power-political moves made by the club concurrently bolstered this type of closure as is best exemplified through the club's imposition of unequal treaties on outsiders with either the threat or use of force. As above with questions of recognition, insiders were not passive in merely setting the closure criterion but actively denied the achievement of sovereignty. While the club required territorial sovereignty as the primary condition for entry, at the same time they denied its full achievement through the imposition of unequal treaties on potentially ascendant actors.¹⁹ In the case of China these were most strictly imposed after the cessation of conflict. The Treaty of Nanking, the first of the unequal treaties, was forced by the British on the Chinese after the Opium War. The treaty ceded Hong Kong to British and forced the opening of five treaty ports - Amoy, Canton, Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai - thus ending the Canton system through which China could control its trade with the West. Subsequent treaties signed with China, Japan, and other East Asian countries granted extraterritoriality to the club members' citizens, as well as opened further treaty ports. The articles of The Boxer Protocol, signed after China's defeat in the Boxer Rebellion, exemplifies well the degree to which unequal treaties undermined China's ability to claim itself as being fully sovereign.²⁰ Among other articles the protocol granted the victors the right to occupation in twelve Chinese regions; exclusive control over the Legation Quarters in Beijing, which excluded Chinese nationals from residing in the area and gave the victors

¹⁹ c.f. Gong 1984, 67; Marks 2002, 213–5. See also: Resolution of Unequal Treaties of the *Conference des Juristes Afro-Asiatique, Damas*, 7-10 November 1957, pg. 198, cited in Sinha 1965, 123–4 (Cited in Gong 1984. 67)

²⁰ The Boxer Protocol is also significant in terms of Japan's entry into international society. Japan is a signatory of the protocol alongside the seven victorious European powers.

the right to defend the territory; and mandated the punishments for leaders of the rebellion including execution, exile, and life imprisonment. Actual conflict did not feature in forcing Japan and Siam to sign unequal treaties but the threat of the use of force motivated their acquiescence to them, particularly as they had the example of China to learn from and know that it would be as costly, if not more so, for them to resist as China had tried to do.²¹ Overturning unequal treaties were a priority for those vying for membership in international society as their conditions so obviously - indeed, legally - marked the subordination of those upon whom they were imposed as colonies at worst or as unequal (quasi-)sovereigns at best.

The following chapter explores how this was achieved as part of ascendant actors' mimicry strategies. What is important to note about unequal treaties in the context of the current argument, though, is that are emblematic of how the club used its power-political advantage to make it even more difficult for outsiders to overcome exclusion and to achieve any sort of equality even if they made it nominally into the club. The club thus not only set difficult - if not entirely unachievable - closure barriers, they defended those barriers both through both military and diplomatic means and they undermined the ability of outsiders to overcome those barriers, most notably through the denial of full territorial sovereignty via unequal treaties. For outsiders in the closure games, the odds were never in their favour.

Yesterday's savages are today's civil society. Whereas the primary closure rule formerly excluded political entities that club insiders viewed as not possessing sovereignty, the very same rule now excludes the entire array of non-state political actors. In all research interviews with state representatives, the lack of sovereignty was cited as the primary reason for which non-state actors are denied full inclusion in G-summitry, civil society

²¹ c.f. Gong 1984, 170-2, 212-3; Okagaki 2013, 49-53

particularly so.²² While this is obvious and intuitive, that it is points to degree to which legal-collectivism has naturalised as the primary closure rule ordering international society. It is an unquestioned social fact that is so discursively successful that it is “virtually impossible to think outside it”.²³ Indeed, this discursive construction is successfully - or, hegemonically - dominant such that those who are marginalised and subordinated by it accept it as a *de facto* reality.²⁴ This was particularly evident in a response given by a European Union sous-sherpa when asked about the EU presidents’ privileged place alongside heads of state governments at the G8 and G20, “there are nation-states sitting around the table and the EU. We have a high level of integration, but we’re not yet a nation-state. So you have to behave accordingly at these meetings.”²⁵ The OECD sherpa expressed much the same sentiment, stressing multiple times that IOs inform the policy making process but “unlike countries [they] have no say in political decision making.”²⁶ Despite the greater degree of inclusion afforded to the EU and, to a lesser extent, the OECD, their non-sovereign status informs the behaviours and perceptions of its representatives who accept their subject positions.

Civil society are doubly excluded by virtue of collectivism. As above, their legal status as non-sovereigns render civil society actors as being impermissible as members. In addition to this, collectivist stereotypes about civil society further justify their exclusion. They are ascribed by state actors as being disorganised and narrowly interested; and, as such, as being unsuitable for inclusion. As Chapter Six details, civil society advocacy groups engage a banding strategy in a large part to overcome this stereotype. Despite

²² Interviews: Anonymous Interview Subject 1.1; Aranda Bezaury 2012; Edwards 2012; Arturo Gomez 2012; Grey 2012; Khatchadourian 2012; Kobele 2012; Martinez 2012; Ramirez 2012; Reynoso 2012

²³ Doty 1993; Searle 1995

²⁴ Naylor 2011, 181. See also: Doty 1993; Doty 1996; Hall 2003; Medina 2004; Weldes and Saco 1996

²⁵ Interview: Kobele 2012

²⁶ Interview: Ramos 2012. “The G20 is a member driven process. Countries are the only actors to have a political say in the G20 process. IOs contribute to the negotiation with our substance but don’t provide political point of views” (Ramos 2012).

many years of engagement with the G-summitry process the idea that civil society lack the capacity to contribute effectively endures. Civil society was granted a greater degree of inclusion at the 2012 Los Cabos G20 summit than they had ever before been granted. A Mexican sous-sherpa relayed that one of the primary motivations for granting unprecedented inclusion to civil society at Los Cabos was to give civil society an opportunity to build “the technical capacity and lobbying expertise that comes from experience.”²⁷ Particularly revealing was the sous-sherpa’s comparison of civil society with the B20, an entity created only two years prior at the 2010 Toronto summit, and the Think20 a new initiative in its first year, “Who are the B20? This is a network that has met before, they’re existing, having representation and legitimacy, having the capacity to organise themselves...They’re entities that are already there. There is no core entity to civil society.... not one cupola, no unified body. If they were like this, we would have taken care of them”, he continued, “Mexico has opened spaces for them to build this body, build a single platform like with the B20 or Think20.”²⁸ This echoes a comment relayed by the French sous-sherpa responsible for civil society to civil society representatives a year earlier at the Cannes summit stating that “[we] know what to do with business and the unions, but we don’t know what to do with you guys.”²⁹ Civil society was almost entirely cut out of the 2010 Toronto summitry process because, “Canadian civil society wasn’t big enough; they were non-players with no policy sophistication.”³⁰

As Chapter Six details, civil society groups, particularly the large advocacy organisations such as Oxfam, Action Aid, and ONE have no shortage of in-house capacity to engage in this policy environment; moreover, through organisations like Bond and InterAction, advocacy groups band together as a sector to engage in the summitry process. This

²⁷ Interview: Reynoso 2012

²⁸ Interview: Reynoso 2012

²⁹ Interview: Rea 2012

³⁰ Interview: Anonymous subject 3.3

ascription of civil society as a category of actor thus serves to marginalise civil society actors regardless of the individual attributes of any particular advocacy group. That other non-state groups, like the B20 and Think20, are held as exemplars of models for civil society to emulate reveals the degree to which this collectivist stereotyping is particularly aimed at civil society as a sub-category of world society.

That said, like any stereotype, the ascribed characteristic may have some degree of grounding in reality. InterAction's Director for International Advocacy conceded that "global civil society is disorganised- advocacy groups don't get along with the protest groups and NGOs fight each other on who's more legitimate."³¹ The following chapter examines this in further detail in two ways. First, looking at how advocacy groups differentiate themselves from protest groups in order to vie for inclusion; and, second, looking at how the imposed need for civil society to band together and present themselves as a unified sector constrains range of policy positions that they can present to the club.

Legal-collectivism is thus how the international society of states maintains its central position in global politics, keeping world society at its margins.³² This collectivist closure is near impossible to overcome in the current international society- only a revolutionary shift wherein sovereignty would no longer serve as the underlying ordering principle of international society could change conditions such that any substantive equality of membership in international society would be possible for non-state actors. While this primary, collectivist closure rule is a blunt and sweeping means of exclusion that necessarily subordinates the plurality of types of international actors vis-à-vis states, it is above board. That is, there is nothing hidden about this means of social division.

Actors know where they stand in relative terms to one another. Non-state actors know

³¹ Interview: Ruthrauff 2012.

³² c.f. Jackson 2000, 106-13

that, so long as the ordering principle holds, they will never achieve equality of standing with state actors and so can plan and execute their strategies for engagement with these actors within this framework. As Chapter Six details, operating within these conditions non-state actors can adopt deferential strategies to improve their position and influence within this order. In contrast, moves made by non-state actors challenging this order, such as protests by anarchist groups, are met with heavy resistance. Furthermore, being an overt closure barrier marks it out differently from other means of closure discussed in the remainder of this chapter, namely what are defined herein as ‘ostensibly achievable’ closure criteria and mobility dampeners. Again, actors know where they stand according to this social division and can operate to achieve their interests accordingly, whereas this is not the case with more covert means of exclusion.

5.2.2 Achievable Criteria

The primary closure rule aside, closure barriers in international society are predominantly functional-individualist in nature. As such, for sovereign state actors it is a relatively open system; though, as the remainder of this chapter argues, it has become less so. Once the primary closure rule has broadly positioned an actor as being either inside or outside of the status group, the secondary closure rules serve to determine more precisely an actor’s relative position to others. The significance of these rules is that by virtue of being individualist criteria their achievement is possible by any given actor. Whereas the claim of sovereignty requires the recognition of others and the ability to be recognised is limited to a narrow set of actors (or, after the calcification of international society, a single type of actor), this is not the case with individualist criteria. This is not to say that their achievement is easy, but that it is possible.

The Standard of Civilisation set predominantly functional-individualist closure criteria. Indeed, as above, prior to international society’s calcification it was even more - if not

entirely - functional-individualist. Gong divides the Standard according to five dimensions.³³ In general, the first dimension requires basic, liberal rights including the freedom of movement, commerce, and religion; the second requires an organised polity, including an efficient bureaucracy and an ability to muster defence; the third requires an adherence to law, both in terms of international law and the laws of war as well as a liberal, domestic legal system involving courts, the principle of legal equality, and published codes; the fourth requires participation in the international diplomatic system; and the fifth requires conformity to liberal domestic norms, ranging from the banning of suttee, polygamy, and slavery to the acceptance of Western cultural more broadly such as sartorial styles and musical tastes.³⁴

There are two important things to note about the Standard's criteria. First, moves made towards the achievement of any particular criterion are related to the achievement of another. Investment in achieving any dimension of the Standard yields a knock-on benefit towards achieving others. The adoption of international law, which is in part applied through domestic courts, is a means of excising polygamous practices; just as the imposition of society-wide sumptuary laws requiring the wearing of Western business suits supports the requirement to adopt a particular diplomatic habitus, to take two examples. Second, the criteria are achievable. There is no collectivist barrier that limits the chances of any state actor to achieve the Standard. Once the Standard became explicitly articulated, sometime after Russia and the Ottoman Empire's inclusion, it served as a list that was relatively easy to follow, though not necessarily easy to achieve. Those bidding for inclusion were able to identify the key elements that constituted the Standard and take deliberate steps to achieve them. Japan's Iwakura mission and the revolutionary reforms put in place thereafter in the 19th century and Ataturk's

³³ Gong 1984, 14–23. See also: Watson 1992, 273–4

³⁴ Gong 1984, 14–5

modernisation of Turkey in the 20th century serve as good examples.³⁵ The secondary closure rules of international society are thus a relatively open set of entry criteria.

The one caveat to this, as is further argued in Chapter Seven, is that there is a degree of elasticity to specific criteria within the Standard which affords the superiorly positioned members of the club the ability to raise or lower particular closure barriers in particular cases. This is especially so in the case of what Gong identifies as being the fifth, cultural dimension of the Standard and as concerns racial equality. Furthermore, as Okagaki remarks, material power was the dominant measure of suitability for inclusion until the normative shift to positivist international law which meant that at different periods different elements of the Standard were judged to be of different importance.³⁶ The club could shift the goal posts. If an ascendant actor were playing by the old rules after the shift to a greater emphasis on positive international law and they were thus increasing their material power but not investing as much in institutions consistent with the legal dimension of the Standard, they would continue to find themselves excluded.³⁷ Japan's bid for great power status within the club exemplifies this well as they set about their imperial expansion in the 1930's, at precisely the period when imperialism was losing its legitimacy.³⁸ Furthermore, the timing of an actor's bid for inclusion not only mattered because of changes in emphasis within the set of closure rules, but also in the explicit articulation of those rules in the first place. Russia and the Ottoman Empire faced a

³⁵ See Chapter Six; see also: Zarakol 2010, 143–8

³⁶ Okagaki 2013. Timing also matters in that later aspirant members have the benefit of observing other outsiders' bids for inclusion which provides exemplars to emulate or mistakes to avoid. One of Okagaki's main arguments is that Japan benefited greatly from observing China's troubled earlier encounter with the West (Okagaki 2013, 9–11, 49; see also: Zarakol 2010, 162). Zarakol also argues that Japan's relative success with entry as compared to Turkey's is that its encounter – in her words, defeat – with the West came after that of the Ottoman Empire, Zarakol 2010, 196–7

³⁷ Gong 1984, 42–44; Okagaki 2013, 41; Zarakol 2010, 248

³⁸ Marks 2002, 208–13; Okagaki 2013, 118–9; Zarakol 2010, 192–3

slightly different closure game than later entrants as they sought inclusion before the Standard's criteria were explicitly articulated.³⁹

As discussed above in the context of the denial of sovereignty through unequal treaties, insiders could manipulate (i) closure barriers and (ii) the ability of others to overcome them. We can put this to the side for now though as manipulation of particular barriers served more to stratify the club rather than to outright deny inclusion. Japan, for example, gained inclusion in the club though as a racially inferior member. That said, the point about closure, as opposed to stratification, holds- the club's closure rules are by and large functional-individualist, thus rendering its system of closure a relatively open one.

The liberalism that runs throughout the Standard's criteria endures in contemporary international society. The same liberalism governs membership in G-summitry. From its beginning the G5 was conceived as a group of like-minded, Western democracies. It remained so until Russia's inclusion in the 1990's, which began with contact between Gorbachev and the club in 1991 and steadily developed until Russia was included as a member in 1997.⁴⁰ Russia was included, however, not because the club changed its membership criteria but because Russia had changed - or, more accurately, had signalled its intent to change - into a Western, liberal democracy. G7 membership was viewed by the Americans as one significant way to help with this transition. As Nixon less than eloquently relayed to Clinton's Ambassador-At-Large responsible for Russia's transition, Strobe Talbot, "What Clinton will be remembered for is how he deals with

³⁹ Gong 1984, 238

⁴⁰ See Chapter Seven for an analysis of how Russia was included an unequal member within the club.

Russia. And that means leading the rest of the world, especially those G-7 assholes, in support for what we're in favour of in Russia."⁴¹

The limits of the liberal criteria are properly tested with the advent of the G20. A distinction between a commitment to domestic and international liberal principles here becomes evident. All members broadly subscribe to the neoliberal economic agenda internationally. Indeed, as below, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed's economic policies to respond to the Asian Financial Crisis diverged sufficiently from the Washington Consensus that Malaysia was in part judged to be inadmissible to the club. The same cannot be said of domestic, liberal governance principles- Saudi Arabia and China being suitable exemplars. With the G8, Russia may not have achieved the full set of domestic, liberal criteria at the time of their admission but they at least subscribed to them aspirationally. This is not so for many members in the G20, thus marking out the G20's membership criteria as being different from both the G7 and the Standard. This suggests that the contemporary status club likely operates according to different closure rules. However, an examination of the marginal cases of G20 inclusion - those actors that nearly got into the group but ultimately failed to do so and those that were nearly excluded but managed to get in - reveals that the story is more complicated. As the discussion of Nigeria, Malaysia, and Indonesia's inclusion below indicates, the adoption of domestic liberal principles is not necessary for inclusion in the group but their absence is sufficient to justify exclusion. This is significant. These particular barriers can be used to exclude but their achievement does not guarantee inclusion.

Nigeria and Malaysia were both originally identified by Martin and Summers as candidates for inclusion.⁴² After being identified as potential members, however, their domestic political contexts worsened such that they were subsequently deemed

⁴¹ Talbott 2007, 51

⁴² Interviews: Martin 2012; Summers 2012

unsuitable for inclusion.⁴³ Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, was well known and respected amongst his finance minister colleagues around the world. When Summers and Martin first assembled the list of potential G20 members in 1998 Malaysia was included in a large part due to their opinion of Ibrahim, having been "incredibly, highly thought of by all of us."⁴⁴ However, shortly after drafting their list of potential members, Anwar broke with Mahathir diverging on positions concerning the appropriate response to the Asian Financial Crisis as well as concerning civil liberties domestically. Perceiving Ibrahim as a political threat, Mahathir ejected him from government and his party.⁴⁵ Mahathir, subsequently having personally taken over the finance portfolio, adopted policies responding to the financial crisis that ran contrary to the Washington Consensus and the IMF's advice to respond to the crisis.⁴⁶ Eighteen days after his expulsion, following a mass rally against Mahathir in Kuala Lumpur, Anwar was arrested after a raid on his home and charged with corruption and police interference related to allegations of sexual misconduct levelled against him.⁴⁷ Two months later he was also charged with sodomy.⁴⁸ He was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. The international media saw the charges, arrest, and imprisonment of Ibrahim as a "blatantly political fix-up."⁴⁹ Amnesty International deemed him to be a prisoner of conscience⁵⁰ and his fellow finance ministers were outraged.⁵¹

While they had neither set specific inclusion criteria nor explicitly defined a cohesive identity for the group, Martin and Summers agreed that Mahathir's defiance of the neoliberal economic agenda and his treatment of Anwar made Malaysia doubly unsuited

⁴³ On the domestic dimension to status recognition, see Neumann 2008b

⁴⁴ Interview: Martin 2012

⁴⁵ BBC News 1998a

⁴⁶ Interview: Martin 2012

⁴⁷ BBC News 1998b; BBC News 1998c

⁴⁸ BBC News 1998b

⁴⁹ Hartcher 2010

⁵⁰ Amnesty International 2008

⁵¹ Interviews: Martin 2012; Summers 2012

for inclusion.⁵² Other states on their list of members also did not subscribe to the Washington Consensus, notably Argentina and Brazil, and had spotty records on human rights and democratic governance, notably China and Saudi Arabia. Mahathir's actions were thus not necessarily barriers to Malaysia's inclusion in the club, but they did serve as reasons for exclusion.

Nigeria too nearly made it into the G20 but ultimately failed to do so. Nigeria was on Martin and Summers' initial membership list but in the lead-up to the first summit the poor governance situation in the country caused it to be excluded.⁵³ So wanting to include Nigeria in order to have greater representation for Africa in the new club, a spot was held for the country in hopes that its domestic situation would improve in time for the first summit. It did not, and so the 20th (and to this day unfilled) spot in the G20 is theirs.⁵⁴ This is why there are only nineteen states in the G20.

Indonesia was a third country that was initially identified as a member but then ran into domestic governance problems at the time that the G20 was being formed. After having become the country hardest hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, Suharto began to lose his grip on power as he faced having to deal with the effects of the economic crisis which included "massive unemployment, food shortage, and a significant drop in living standards, as well as a rise in crime, looting, and other symptoms of social breakdown."⁵⁵ At the same time new accusations of cronyism, corruption, and undue limitations on the freedom of speech and press were levelled against Suharto.⁵⁶ The political situation fast deteriorated as with mass demonstrations, bombings, gang rapes, kidnapping, and ethnic violence. Local human rights monitors and the National Human

⁵² Interviews: Martin 2012; Summers 2012. Summers added to the list of reasons for which Malaysia was ultimately excluded that "Mahatir was on the edge of anti-Semitism."

⁵³ Interviews: Martin 2012; Summers 2012

⁵⁴ Interview: Martin 2012. The EU likes to claim that they are the 20th member (Kobebe 2012; Martinez 2012). They are not.

⁵⁵ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State 1999

⁵⁶ Erlanger 1998

Rights Commission identified the Indonesian military and policy as having participated and incited the violence against Sino-Indonesians.⁵⁷

What sets Indonesia apart from Malaysia and Nigeria, however, is that after Suharto's resignation, the two successive governments, those of B.J. Habibie and Try Sutrisno, managed to reverse the situation. Indonesia embarked on a transformation programme which sought democratic reforms across all branches of government, a return to free speech, the prosecution of those responsible for violence, and greater regional autonomy. The transition governments were also able to see through the IMF reform programme, reluctantly signed in 1998 by Suharto. Indonesia thus returned to a position where its domestic situation was palatable to the club and its domestic and international policies were in line with those of the democratic, neoliberal West. As a result, "we [Martin and Summers] put them in."⁵⁸

Malaysia, Nigeria, and Indonesia thus serve as three useful cases for analysing closure in contemporary international society. Malaysia and Nigeria nearly made it into G-summitry, having first been judged to be economies of systematic importance who provided greater geographic representation - and therefore legitimacy - and were sufficiently alike in terms of liberal, democratic values to the existing club. They were ultimately excluded, however, when circumstances changed such that this domestic liberal dimension was no longer satisfied. They became unsuitable for the club because their domestic governance changed. Indonesia was successful in gaining inclusion because the country was able to bring itself back in line with the club's values. It is also important to stress that in the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia, it was not their economic position that decided whether or not they were to be included or excluded. Both were hit hard by the Asian Financial Crisis and were faltering when the G20 membership list was first assembled. The economic situation of both improved between

⁵⁷ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State 1999

⁵⁸ Interview: Martin 2012

the creation of the list and the first meeting of the group. The critical difference was in their domestic governance.

In all, the predominant type of closure barriers faced by states in international society are functional-individualist in nature, thus marking international society as a relatively open system for this type of actor. The domestic criteria in the Standard were liberal criteria which continues in governing inclusion into today's international status group. This has the effect of reproducing the same type of international society that the Standard sought to produce- namely, one within which the norms, values, ideas, and practices of Western Europe are dominant (if not exclusive). However, this particular type of order is reproduced not through coercive imposition by the club over others but by making adherence to it the condition for an actor to improve its position in the system and because these criteria are functional-individualist, their achievement is possible. This is not to deny the more violent or imperial side of international society's Janus face, but to point out that much of Western international society's reproduction, particularly today's international society, is achieved with a carrot rather than a stick.⁵⁹

5.2.3 Ostensibly Achievable Criteria

Closure in international society was thus a relatively open system when membership was governed according to the Standard of Civilisation and the liberal criteria for admission to the G-summitry club within contemporary international society are equally achievable criteria. However, the other closure rules governing inclusion in status groups within international society are not as achievable as they at first glance seem. The majority of criteria governing inclusion to the club of Great Powers and its modern G-summitry equivalent are only *ostensibly* achievable. They are nominally achievable but structural constraints render their achievement possible to only a small proportion of actors in the system. Inclusion seems like an open and fair contest, but it

⁵⁹ c.f. Suzuki 2013

actually is not because very few actors are in a position to play the game at all. Exclusion is thus achieved not by the setting of collectivist rules but by allowing structural factors to condition the contest.

Nearly all definitions of what counts towards achieving the status of a Great Power focus on war.⁶⁰ Taylor, Modelski, and Rake all define great power status as a power capable of fighting a major war.⁶¹ Modelski in particular points to a positivist approach that was used to calculate great power status, wherein status was confirmed by counting the number of infantrymen in a state's army. Haas, Bull, Rothstein, Hoffman, and Treitschko define it as a power that can only be defeated in war by a coalition of others.⁶² Howard defines it as a power that can "control events beyond its own borders", usually by military means.⁶³ Levy gives a composite definition as "a state that plays a major role in international politics with respect to security-related issues. The Great Powers can be differentiated from other states by their military power, their interests, their behavior in general and interactions with other Powers, other Powers' perception of them, and some formal criteria."⁶⁴

The formal criteria Levy points to are international conference participation, congresses, organisations, and treaties.⁶⁵ Simpson similarly points to the importance of these non-material dimensions of great power status, such as "diplomatic experience and cultural acceptability, which can compensate for a lack of raw power."⁶⁶ Simpson points to Austria in 1815 and Britain in 1945 as examples of falling powers that maintained their status because of these resources and, conversely, to China in 1945 as

⁶⁰ Levy 1984, 11; Scott 2006, 117

⁶¹ Taylor 1971; Modelski 1972; Ranke 1973 (cited in Levy 1984, 11)

⁶² Bull 1977; Haas 1975; Hoffmann 1965; Rothstein 1968; von Treitschke 1916, 607 (cited in Levy 1984, 11)

⁶³ M. E. Howard 1971

⁶⁴ Levy 1984, 16

⁶⁵ Levy 1984, 17

⁶⁶ Simpson 2004, 108

a rising power that was denied this status by virtue of lacking them.⁶⁷ To be included in the Great Power club a state thus has to act like a Great Power, not simply have the material resources of a Great Power. The notion of Great Power responsibility exemplifies this well. Scholars have a difficult time identifying when the United States can be said to be a part of the club, placing its entry as early as the Civil War and as late as the end of the Second World War.⁶⁸ What makes identifying America's entry point difficult is that it had achieved the material criteria to warrant the status but its isolationist and ideological policies meant it was not engaging internationally in a manner consistent with that of a Great Power. Contemporary debates about China's Great Power status similarly focus on the question of whether or not the status is properly recognised if it is agreed that the country is not playing the role of a responsible Great Power.⁶⁹ Membership in the Great Power club is thus about more than just material power.⁷⁰

The non-material criteria for membership highlight the relational dimension of achieving status. Exactly as membership in the international society of states requires the recognition of sovereignty by others, so too does membership in the Great Powers club within that society require the recognition of others. It is not enough for a state to claim that they are a Great Power, expressed in terms of material capabilities and international action, they must be recognised as such by others. Scott likens the Great Powers club to a "a British gentleman's club, with admission controlled by the existing members. If the established great powers began to treat another state as one of their number, that county *ipso facto* became a great power."⁷¹ Scott's analogy is only half right, however. What is different about intersubjective recognition in this club is that it

⁶⁷ Simpson 2004, 108. See Chapter Seven for a discussion on these types of cases as "Frustrated" or "Status inconsistent" powers.

⁶⁸ Wight 1946, 47

⁶⁹ Huang, Patman, and Zhao 2013; Xiao 2011; Hu 2000; Cheng 2004; Buzan and Foot 2004

⁷⁰ Though, of course, having material power is a necessary condition of membership.

⁷¹ Scott 2006, 119

is not just the insiders that must confer recognition, recognition also must be conferred by the lesser powers. Recognition from below signals the acceptance on the part of excluded lesser powers of the institution of Great Power responsibility and in so doing confers upon it legitimacy.⁷² The Great Powers club thus has a degree of exogenous legitimacy that the society of states does not as Great Power recognition comes from within and without.

These criteria are nominally achievable. What makes them different in quality from those that make up the Standard of Civilisation and the liberal dimensions of G-summitry's entry criteria is that their achievement is only possible for a sub-set of the population in the system. All states can join international society but not all states can become Great Powers. As concerns the material criteria for entry, only a relatively few states are structurally positioned to amass sufficient power. Most states do not have a large enough territory (or secure enough territory) and population to become military powers of the first order.⁷³ The Netherlands in the 18th century was able to make itself a commercial power but it never was - nor would be - large enough to make itself a military power.⁷⁴ Smaller colonial powers are similarly excluded. Despite acquiring colonies - whether it be the Netherlands with the East Indies, Belgium with the Congo, or Portugal and Spain with their African colonies - this mimicry move does not overcome the fact that they too small to achieve parity with the likes of Britain, France, Russia, or Austria-Hungary.⁷⁵

⁷² Bull 1977, 196; Dunne 2003, 307; Gilpin 1983, 30

⁷³ Smaller powers may, however, seek to acquire the conspicuous status symbols of great powers, such as nuclear weapons in contemporary international society. Their acquisition does not, however, give them a place in the great powers club. Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea do not share the US and Russia's status positions.

⁷⁴ c.f. Levy 1984, 18

⁷⁵ G. Ross, 5

The same can be said of small, rich Italian city states like Genoa, Naples, and Venice. While they were able to amass economic and diplomatic power, their limited territory and population rendered Great Power status entirely unachievable. This definitively became the case with the advent of nationalism which made the mass mobilisation of a population possible.⁷⁶ As a result, the larger the population, the larger the power, thus cutting the small, but rich actors out of the game. The social transformation brought about by the French Revolution thus paved the way for a Great Powers club which excluded these entities who were unable to amass large armies through conscription and who were no longer able to rely on mercenaries as they erstwhile had.⁷⁷ This at once made France the predominant power that it was in the late-18th and 19th centuries while concurrently rendering smaller entities from ever being able to achieve membership in the club, thus providing an impetus for the 19th century unifications of Germany and Italy.⁷⁸ It should be noted that this did not just create division between Great Powers and lesser-powers, but created a stratum of middle powers too. This also had an effect on the primary closure rule, making the nation-state the sole actor in the system.⁷⁹

Prussia was a marginal case of inclusion in the Great Power club that exemplifies well how achievable criteria are only ostensibly so such that despite efforts to gain and/or secure a position in the club, some actors are structurally unable to completely overcome the closure barrier. As Scott relates, Prussia, “always lacked the demographic and economic strength to compete with the establish powers on anything approaching an equal footing”;⁸⁰ moreover, “very limited available resources, along with her strategic

⁷⁶ Nationalism and a large population are necessary conditions but not sufficient for mobilisation. A state bureaucracy is also required. C.f. Scott 2006, 5

⁷⁷ Osiander 1994, 236

⁷⁸ As is a theme running throughout this thesis, Italy’s unification was not enough to secure for itself an unquestioned a ranking power.

⁷⁹ c.f. Holbraad 1970; Tilly and Ardant 1975

⁸⁰ Scott 2006, 49

vulnerability, were always serious obstacles to Prussia ever securely establishing herself as a leading European power.”⁸¹ To improve its marginal position Frederick the Great tried to increase its population, most by taking territory such that Prussia’s population grew from 2.25 million in 1740 to 5.8 million in 1786.⁸² With near-universal male conscription, Frederick was able to build a large army, but at an unsustainable cost of seventy percent of the crown’s annual revenue.⁸³ These moves were complimented by the creation and maintenance of a “widely admired administrative system, the centrepiece of which was the General Directory”.⁸⁴ Frederick made these moves well aware that Prussia, “while a great power in name, she was essentially a second-rank state in fact”, as Tallyrand would often remark.⁸⁵ It is for this reason that securing the legitimacy of territorial conquest within Europe was so important for Prussia at the Congress of Vienna, without it they could never gain equality with the other powers.⁸⁶ As a result, Prussia allied with Russia at the Congress as they alone supported this Prussian goal, unsurprisingly so as Russia too needed to expand its territorial holdings in Europe in order to secure its own position in the club.⁸⁷ Prussia remained, however, at best a junior member in the Great Powers club, due to its structural limitations. It achieved status as a European Great Power, like Austria, but could not achieve status as a World Great Power, like Britain or Russia.⁸⁸

G-summitry’s closure criteria are also predominantly ostensibly achievable criteria. As the following chapter details, gaining entry involves achieving and mobilising a mix of material and non-material resources, however like with the Great Powers club, only a

⁸¹ Scott 2006, 49

⁸² Scott 2006, 49

⁸³ Scott 2006, 50

⁸⁴ Scott 2006, 50

⁸⁵ Scott 2006, 4

⁸⁶ Osiander 1994, 182. See Chapters Four and Five for further discussion.

⁸⁷ Osiander 1994, 183. The terms of their bargain would give Saxony and the Rhineland to Prussia and Poland to Russia (Osiander 1994, 180–1)

⁸⁸ Bridge and Bullen 2005, 1–5; c.f. Martin Wight’s discussion of Powers with General Interests and Powers with Limited Interests (Wight 1946, 50).

relatively few number of states are able to achieve these criteria- not every state is structurally fortunate enough to be positioned as an economic power or, to use the phraseology of the G20, a “systematically significant economy.” The point need not be explored further as it is fairly intuitive, but what is important to highlight is how different these clubs’ treatment of achievable criteria are from those governing entry into the Family of Civilised Nations. There are no structural reasons barring outsider states from entering international society. A state does not need to be a powerful state to enter the club of civilised states, but it does to become a Great Power or a G-summitry member and not every state can be a military or economic power. As such, while the three clubs’ closure criteria are predominantly achievable as functional-individualist criteria, the Great Powers and G-summitry club are actually more closed than the Family of Civilised Nations because most actors are, *ab initio*, not contenders for membership

In all, while the entry criteria for admission to the status groups within international society are functional-individualist in nature, and therefore the groups seem apparently open, because the barriers to entry are set so high, only a few actors are structurally capable of overcoming them. The *status quo* can thus be maintained in a system with apparently open closure rules. In contrast to overt legal-collectivism, ostensibly achievable barriers achieve closure by stealth.

5.3 Conclusion

If one looks at only the closure barriers faced by states in international society it appears to be a mostly open closure system with the predominance of rules being functional-individualist in nature. This marks international society out as being a surprisingly open society. Indeed it is and as such this warrants an investigation of dynamics in the system other than the closure strategies of insiders to see if other

factors can explain more of the stratification in the system than the moves of insiders can. This is the focus of Chapter Eight.

However, before even before turning to the entry strategies of outsiders in the following chapter, the argument presented above reveals that there is much more going on in the system to govern closure and protect the status positions of insiders. Collectivist closure plays a big role in social division in the international domain, dividing state and non-state actors into two broad categories and entrenching this division legally. Legal-collectivism gives international society a tandem closure structure wherein sovereign states are by right positioned superiorly. While this is a blunt means of closure but it is an overt one, thereby allowing actors to operate in the system with full knowledge of what degree of inclusion is a possibility for them.

While barriers are predominantly functional-individualist in nature, they can be set in such a way that overcoming them is structurally impossible for many or most actors in the system. This is one significant way that even in an ostensibly open system, the position of insiders is protected by covert means. There are two significant implications to derive from this. First, that clubs with more ostensibly achievable criteria are more closed than those wherein the same type of functional-individualist criteria are genuinely achievable. This marks the Great Powers and G-summitry clubs as being more closed than the Family of Civilised Nations. Second, this offers a significant revision of existing closure theory, offering one explanation for how a *status quo* can be maintained in an ostensibly open system.

Finally, this analysis brings us a step closer to addressing the conceptual puzzle involving the parallel, competing accounts of diplomacy which we were left with at the end of Chapter Two. A predominantly functional-individualist closure system means that there is space open for the clubs expansion, particularly networked expansion which is by definition concerned with functionalism. However, because of the tandem

structure of the closure system, non-state actors are necessarily subordinated in this expansion by the primary, legal-collectivist closure rule. This is picked up in Chapters Seven and Eight.

In short, despite the shift to an ostensibly more just, networked global governance order, International society is actually becoming more closed in the 21st century.

Moreover, this greater degree of closure is being achieved by more covert means than those previously used to maintain a *status quo* order.

CHAPTER SIX

Entry

6.1 Introduction

How do actors get into clubs? And what do their strategies, successes and failures at entering clubs tell us about international society? Chapter Five left us with only a partial explanation of closure in international society. Inductively we observe that there is much stratification in international society. However, the previous chapter's findings do not adequately explain all the stratification in the system, as the closure barriers through which insiders exclude others are relatively open by virtue of the predominance of closure rules being functional-individualist. Even in more closed clubs, those with predominantly ostensibly achievable entry criteria and/or mobility dampeners in operation, the extent to which a *status quo* is reproduced cannot be explained by the exclusion strategies of insiders alone. We thus turn our attention to the other side of closure.

This chapter makes two general claims. First, as is suggested above, it claims that the entry strategies adopted by outsiders to try to gain entry into the club explain more of the stratification in what is a relatively open closure system. Outsiders trying to achieve entry actually cause stratification more than insiders trying to prevent their entry. This is so because deference to the existing order is a key part of successful entry strategies. Outsiders seek to improve their position within the existing order rather than try to usurp insiders and overturn it; in so doing the existing order is reproduced and perpetuated. A *status quo* is maintained not just - or even mostly - because of the exclusion strategies of insiders who seek to secure their own status positions. The existing order - expressed both in terms of the ranking within the hierarchy and the

practices of the club - is reproduced through the Mimicry, Legitimation, and Normalisation strategies of outsiders seeking to improve their own position within the existing order.¹

Closely related, this chapter analyses the types of entry strategies to conclude that engaging in a more assertive strategy is risky, though is the only way to gain entry as an equal (or, nearly so); engaging in a more deferential strategy is less risky but almost necessarily precludes the possibility of inclusion as an equal in the club.² Moreover, related to the claim above, as there is no ability to assertively gain entry to G-summitry, there is greater stratification in the current social order and fewer possible paths to entry into this status group.

This chapter also provides the empirical basis for the reformation of closure theory's conceptualisation of entry strategies, rendering usurpation as being one of many strategies and broadly categorises entry strategies as being one of two types: Relational Strategies or Identity Adaptation Strategies. In the case of the former, they attempt to change order in terms of rank; in the case of the latter, they attempt to change order in terms of disposition.

6.2 Relational Entry Strategies

Relational entry strategies involve an actor attempting to directly insert itself into a particular place in the status hierarchy via specific interactions with other actors.

Relational entry strategies range from being assertive to being deferential. A more assertive strategy, if successful, has a greater likelihood of an actor entering the club as an equal to its incumbent members. Conversely, more deferential strategies, if

¹ See below for details on these strategies.

² Risk refers to the likelihood of failure to achieve entry and cost refers to the amount of resources required to mobilise the strategy.

successful, are unlikely to achieve entry as an equal for an outsider. The trade-off involved is that an assertive strategy is more costly and less likely to succeed than a deferential strategy. There are two main, related claims advanced through the analysis of relational entry strategies below. First, there is no ability to gain entry into G-summitry via an assertive strategy, thus rendering it a more closed club than others. There are fewer ways to seek entry and the ways that are possible necessarily require deference. Second, because the act of deference perpetuates the *status quo* order, superiorly positioned incumbents in G-summitry are more secure in their status positions than incumbent members in other clubs. This not only further renders G-summitry as a more closed system, but also ensures that a particular kind of international society is perpetuated. What is significant is that the *status quo* is perpetuated by those seeking entry through their deference, not through the coercive imposition of that order. In this way, the particular international society is reproduced via a more Gramscian conception of hegemony.³ This dimension of the argument is explored in Chapter Six.

6.2.1 Usurpation

Usurpation is the most assertive entry strategy available to outsiders wherein they try to forcefully gain a position equal to others within the club or by setting up a rival club. It is by definition conflictual, particularly as the club members resist such moves in order to preserve their own positions.⁴ By virtue of this, usurpation does not feature in the strategies of outsiders seeking inclusion in the Family of Civilised Nations or G-summitry. In the case of the club of civilised states it is absent as a closure strategy because its membership is not limited in numbers and as one actor's inclusion is not dependent on another actor's exclusion. This is not to say that seeking entry into international society does not involve conflict - indeed, demonstrating a civilised

³ Cox 1981

⁴ Parkin 1979, 74

practice of warfare was an integral part of signalling an achievement of the Standard - but that engaging in conflict with members of the in-group is not necessary for trying to get into the club. International society can be a universal society - at least as states are concerned in the present - which indeed it has since decolonisation after the Second World War.

G-summitry is limited in the size of its membership. However, usurpation, is absent as an entry strategy for a different reason. As a diplomatic institution its identity as a group is premised on cooperation rather than conflict.⁵ Fighting one's way into a diplomatic club does not make sense. G-summitry's function is to help facilitate complex interdependence of the globalised world and so, as below, entry strategies seek to demonstrate an actor's suitability for contributing to this function. This too contributes to G-summitry being a relatively more closed club because an assertive usurpation strategy is not a possible means of entry. The possible ways to seek inclusion are thus necessarily more deferential in nature, reproducing and perpetuating the *status quo* order. It is only by paying deference to the existing order that an actor can hope to gain even a degree of inclusion. It is, however, possible to usurp the club altogether and set up a rival institution, such as the BRICS which was viewed as a threatening rival and co-optive moves were accordingly taken.⁶ As Paul Martin related about the lunch at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit to which the Outreach 5 (Brazil, India, China, South Africa, and Mexico) were invited, the O5 were waiting outside the meeting room to be summoned in by the G8. Those inside the room were keeping the O5 waiting as they discussed strategy to deal with them in the luncheon. "There we were talking while making the leaders of the emerging economies wait outside. The heads of China, India, and Brazil were just sitting there. Looking at Berlusconi I said 'We're talking about all this stuff, but the leader of the Chinese is outside.' There is something worse going on, Lula and Singh

⁵ For a discussion of G-summitry as a diplomatic club, see Chapter Three

⁶ Bremmer 2012

and Jintao are out there. We're in here preparing for them, you don't think they're out there preparing for us? The last thing we want to do is create a G5."⁷ Usurpation is thus a serious threat to the status of the G-summitry club. It is not, however, a means to get *into* the club.

Usurpation is also absent as an entry strategy to the Family of Civilised Nations, but it is less an issue of closure in that context because the club is not limited in numbers. G-summitry is more like the Great Powers club, with membership credentials primarily being based on material resources and with a limited club membership but entering G-summitry as an equal and/or as a revolutionary of the *status quo* order is not possible. The absence of this entry strategy in this context thus reveals another important dimension of the claim that G-summitry is a relatively more closed club.

Aggression can get an actor into the Great Powers club, however. Indeed, as war is where a power's credentials are tested, it is required.⁸ That a power must seek entry into the club via war is in itself neither surprising nor interesting, but the nature of the way that that status needs to be claimed is. A power is not great if it is a victor against just any power- it must be a power that is (or hitherto was) recognised as a Great Power. Like a boxing title, a heavyweight champion must beat the current heavyweight champion to gain the status.⁹ Beating up on any country will not do. The claim of status in the Great Powers' club is differential, to claim it you must be able to show that you can deny that status to others. This is what is so significant about Japan's defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, it unquestionably made Japan's entry into the club

⁷ Interview: Martin 2012

⁸ On credential testing, see Chapter Three.

⁹ Thus refining Wight's headhunter analogy of great power status. A headhunter becomes a headhunter not when (s)he has taken any head, but that of another headhunter (Wight 1946, 46).

possible because it beat a European Great Power.¹⁰ Likewise, Britain's exact entry point in the club is debated by scholars but is undeniable as of its 1588 defeat of the Spanish Armada.¹¹ With Russia and Sweden we observe a direct swap in status wherein Russia's victory over Sweden at the Battle of Poltava marks Russia's entry into the club and Sweden's exit from it.¹²

Usurpation is a contextually limited entry strategy, featuring as an effective entry strategy in the Great Powers club alone. Its absence, however, yields useful insight into those clubs within which it does not feature, marking them out as clubs wherein entry cannot be achieved as an equal. The analysis below of Geopolitical Mimicry further explores how usurpation bears out in practice. What is significant to note is that while usurpation is possible in the Great Powers club, because entry is governed according to the particular type of credentialism described in Chapter Five and alluded to above, the values embedded in these credentials and the way they are tested are perpetuated with each new entry (or exit) from the club. In the case of the Great Powers club, these values include status being derived through territorial conquest and the ability and willingness to uphold the social order and its values through the projection of power.¹³ As such, entry as an equal is possible in ways that it is not in other international clubs, but even still the values of the system are maintained even if the actors whom originally instilled them in the society are not.

¹⁰ Zarakol notes, when "Japan struck the Russia fleet in 1904; the Russians were completely unprepared as they thought the Japanese would never dare to attack a major Western power" (Zarakol 2010, 167).

¹¹ Levy 1984, 29; see also: Petrie 1949

¹² Levy 1984, 38–40. The formal date given is 1721 with the signing of the Treaty of Nystadt.

¹³ C.f. Bull 1977, 51–73

6.2.2 Banding

Banding is largely absent as a strategy to gain entry into the Family of Civilised Nations. The closure game to gain entry into international society was largely an individualistic one, as was detailed in Chapter Two. A big exception to this, however, was the decolonisation era. What is important to point out is that colonial banding was a fall-back strategy for gaining entry. After a long history of individualist attempts to gain equal recognition in and by the club, banding served as the means to ultimately achieve entry. As is particularly detailed in Chapter Seven, the Standard's collectivist elements made it such that even if an actor achieved the Standard's criteria, it could still be marginalised and subordinated in the club through collectivist (indeed, mostly racial) prejudice, Japan's frustrated entry being a clear example. Banding was the successful means of overcoming this collectivism and indeed often is- as Chapter Two remarks about closure in domestic societies, collective action is almost necessarily required to overcome collectivist exclusion as exemplified by the civil rights, women's suffrage, and anti-apartheid movements. As below, it is through such collective action that civil society actors in contemporary international society attempt to overcome the collectivist exclusion levelled against them.

Banding was a means of entry into the Great Powers club, likewise as a fall-back strategy. The Congress of Vienna and the Great Powers system to which it formally gave birth was a stratified system. Chapter Seven examines this stratification in greater detail. The concern here is with how France gained entry into what Charles Webster called the "real inner committee" of the Congress.¹⁴ Initially, the four ranking powers were Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia whom together self-selected themselves as being the controlling directorate of the Congress. Below them were Spain and France

¹⁴ Webster 1950, 81. See also: Gulick 1967, 188

who, added to the Four, made up the Congress' formal directing Committee.¹⁵ Spain and France were recognised as being Great Powers of the "first order" but were regarded as having relatively less status than the central Four.¹⁶ France managed, however, to gain entry into the exclusive top-tier club, achieving full recognition as having standing equal to the Four, thus enlarging the "real inner committee" in size from four to five.

France, through the diplomacy of Talleyrand, achieved entry through a Banding strategy. The Four initially excluded France to prevent Talleyrand from taking advantage of cleavages amongst the group in order to further France's own interests.¹⁷ Upon learning of France's exclusion from the inner committee Talleyrand at first protested and argued for inclusion on the grounds that France was an equal to the other four powers, thus trying to assertively position himself at the top of the status hierarchy.¹⁸ As Webster relates, "Talleyrand... used all his diplomatic arts of persuasion, insinuation, and intimidation to claim from the first a position of full equality with the four Powers..."¹⁹ Despite his best efforts, he failed.

In response to his failure Talleyrand switched to a more deferential Banding strategy, positioning himself as a lesser who had a right to inclusion based on a principle of legitimate representation for the excluded parties. An analysis for Legitimation entry strategies follows below, but it is necessary to momentarily pause and explain why Talleyrand's actions at Vienna are properly understood as a Banding strategy rather than a Legitimation strategy. While Talleyrand argued for inclusion using the rhetoric of legitimacy, his words were empty of substance. As is detailed below, Talleyrand had no

¹⁵ Which Webster describes as being a "sham" (Webster 1950, 81)

¹⁶ Simpson 2004, 98-9; Webster 1950, 80

¹⁷ Webster 1950, 81. France won Britain and Austria's support for inclusion because France would side with them against Russia and Prussia over the Polish-Saxon question. They were excluded to prevent this critical division amongst the Four being exploited for France's gain, but then won support for inclusion because France's interests aligned with Britain and Austria's.

¹⁸ Webster 1950, 84

¹⁹ Webster 1950, 84. See also: Pallain 1881 (cited in Webster)

genuine intention of representing the smaller, excluded powers and thereby increasing the legitimacy of the group, as is evidenced by his abandonment of the other excluded powers once he had won France's inclusion.²⁰ Appeals to legitimacy are red herrings, what is significant is the way that Talleyrand organised the marginalised powers together and acted as their leader in order to win France's entry into the inner committee.

Recognising that the Four would not recognise France as a top-tier power, Talleyrand chose to embrace this ascription and base his entry bid on having this lesser status rather than try to continue to try achieve entry by asserting that France was an equal to the Four. This is important as it is the crux of what distinguishes a more deferential banding strategy from a more usurpatory one: Talleyrand deferentially accepted France's position within the existing order and used the identity conferred by this position to claim a right of entry. As below, Switzerland made the same sort of strategic switch in trying to gain entry into the G20. The brilliance of the move was that once France was included, despite winning entry as a relatively lesser power, France would gain the status of being an equal. Accepting deference could eventually achieve equality.

Talleyrand banded together with excluded lesser powers, claiming a position as a leader amongst them. Mexico's assumption of leadership within the "Outreach 5" is a comparable contemporary strategy, as is detailed below. The decision of the Four to exclude all others from the inner committee meant that Saxony, Bavaria, Denmark, Sweden, Hanover, Holland, Spain, Portugal, and the Pope were all marginalised and were as such frustrated by this position.²¹ Independently of one another they could not force their way in but they could improve their common position by organising themselves together a group whose shared common identity was that of powers who

²⁰ Webster 1950, 93

²¹ Gulick 1967, 230

felt unjustly excluded. While they had different and often opposing interests, by banding together and at least temporarily putting their differences to the side they could potentially improve their absolute position.²² Talleyrand assumed leadership of this group.²³ As the leader of the marginalised powers Talleyrand could then appeal to principles of legitimacy to bolster France's position, arguing that the Four lacked any legal foundation for their power and exclusivity and so required at the very least political legitimacy - what he called "political morality" - to affirm their position. The absence of any legal treaty legitimating the exclusivity of the Four was a particular vulnerability for the group which they acknowledged in private amongst themselves.²⁴ The inclusion of France, Talleyrand argued, gave the Four this legitimacy.²⁵

It was over the Polish-Saxony question that Talleyrand's strategy yielded success. Russia wanted to take Poland making Tsar Alexander the King of Poland and Prussia sought Saxony in order to increase its own power.²⁶ Russia's and Prussia's interests were aligned as both sought to increase their territorial holdings in Europe, while Britain and Austria were allied in opposition, fearing that territorial increases would destabilise the balance of power, particularly by making Russia too powerful. It is worth noting that Russia's bid for Poland was itself an entry strategy to improve its position in the club.²⁷ Russia saw Poland as its "foot in the European door",²⁸ with the Tzar and his ministers believing that only by controlling Eastern Europe would Russia be taken seriously by the dominant west, particularly as Russia perceived itself to be seen by the club as being

²² Gulick 1967, 230

²³ Gulick 1967, 230; Osiander 1994, 171-2; Webster 1950, 93

²⁴ Webster 1950, 85

²⁵ H. Nicolson 1946, 142; Osiander 1994, 233-4

²⁶ Prussia wanted to annex Saxony as doing so would increase its power through an increase in population and territory.

²⁷ See discussion below on Geopolitical mimicry.

²⁸ Osiander 1994, 181

semi-barbarous outsiders.²⁹ The Four were evenly spilt on the issue without any scope for resolution; indeed, they came to the brink of war over the issue.³⁰ War, however, was desirable to none of the group, not least of all Russia who sought to avoid war with the other powers for fear of being pushed back to the European periphery.³¹ The solution was to include France in the group. Britain and Austria supported France's inclusion as they had assurances that Talleyrand would support their position of halting (or at least limiting) Prussia and Russia's territorial expansion; Prussia and Russia acquiesced to France's inclusion as a means of avoiding war and the breakdown of the Congress process.³² France thus gained entry into the top-tier of the Great Powers club having banded together with the smaller Europeans as their representative and exploiting the major cleavage between the Four at the opportune moment. This is further explored in Chapter Seven in terms of incorporation.

Banding may also be observed in G-summitry. In 2005 the G8 began an outreach process with five "O5" partners: Brazil, China, South Africa, India, and Mexico. The stratification dimension of the G8 and O5 relationship is discussed in detail in the following chapter; for now, the important observations to note are (i) the way that the group banded together in order to be a more powerful bloc vis-a-vis the G8 and (ii) the way that Mexico assumed a leadership role within the group to help ensure its own inclusion. The O5 were not a cohesive group, sharing little in the way of common policy positions. The O5, like the BRICS, share an upward economic trajectory as emerging economies but little else. With less policy coherence there was a greater opportunity for the G8 to play those differences off against one another as a way to divide and rule, as was particularly successful when dealing with climate change policy.

²⁹Osiander 1994, 180. Indeed, Osiander relates that Russia's own leaders also saw the country in these terms. See also: Osiander 1994, 178 and 225.

³⁰ Webster 1950, 91, 225-234

³¹ Osiander 1994, 178-9

³² Webster 1950, 132

The closest thing to a common position within the group that could be found was a collective distrust of Mexico who were seen by the others as being too close to the US.³³ As the only OECD member in the O5 they were the odd one out. Furthermore, recognising its relatively smaller size and less significant systematic importance compared to the other O5 states, Mexico felt that it had a need to guard against the possibility of being marginalised by the others, particularly as the BRICS began formally organising themselves in 2006.³⁴ As such, to mitigate the risk, Mexico assumed the role of the leader of the group in order to secure their position. By assuming a role as the central organiser of the O5, Mexico at once could try to bring a degree of coherence to the group so as to strengthen the O5 vis-a-vis the G8 while at the same time securing its own position. One difference to note about Mexico's banding strategy in the O5 from that of France at Vienna is that Mexico was the most vulnerable member of the excluded lot while France was the strongest.

Non-state actors also engage in banding to gain inclusion in G-summitry. In the US, an organisation called InterAction serves as the coordinating body for American NGOs; in the UK, it is an organisation called BOND. Both are large umbrella groups, with InterAction having 190 organisations in its membership and Bond having 358.³⁵ Just as organisation as a group was critically important for the O5 so too is it the case for civil society as organising in this way has the objective of overcoming the collectivist stereotype ascribed to civil society as being too disorganised and as having too many divergent policy positions to be manageable to work with.³⁶

³³ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

³⁴ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

³⁵ See: Bond UK 2013; InterAction 2014

³⁶ Interviews: Khatchadourian 2012; Price-Thomas 2012; Rea 2012; Reynoso 2012; Ruthrauff 2012

Not all NGOs, however, band together in this way. ONE, as a noteworthy example, chose not to be part of the InterAction Alliance prior to 2010.³⁷ The reason for this was because they were powerful enough on their own to be influential and powerful enough that they could avoid having to shift their positions in order to band with the others.³⁸ As InterAction's Director of International Advocacy assesses, "When you have Bono you don't need anybody else, you don't need alliances, you don't need to make compromises."³⁹ The absence of the Gates Foundation from InterAction's membership roll further supports this point. By virtue of their power they do not need to join in coalitions to achieve their goals, whereas less well-resourced actors do.

However, just as the banding together of the O5 could only gloss over major policy differences, especially those on climate change, the same is true for civil society. As an example, after analysing all of InterAction's position papers relevant to the G8 and G20 it is apparent that there are no references to abortion or contraception contained in them.⁴⁰ This is curious given the G8's recent focus on child and maternal health since 2010. The inclusion of especially large and influential NGOs such as World Vision and Catholic Relief Services in InterAction's membership that such topics cannot be included as part of a unified civil society position.

There are two significant implications to be drawn from this. First, Banding has the effect of marginalising some policy options and this occurs even before engagement with the club begins. The benefit of organising in this way is that it presents a united front to the state actors as a means of gaining inclusion and

³⁷ ONE itself began as a campaign involving the partnership of 11 civil society organisations. See: ONE 2014a

³⁸ Interview: Ruthrauff 2012

³⁹ Interview: Ruthrauff 2012

⁴⁰ There is one exception to this, which is a media release from 2012 by Save the Children which does mention contraception and family planning. See: Save the Children 2012.

having influence. However, it comes at the cost of narrowing the range of acceptable policy positions. Second, by virtue of their size and power, larger and well-resourced NGOs in these umbrella groups have the ability to set the conditions for their participation with their 'partner' NGOs, thus revealing gradations of power within civil society. This is in-line with the point made above about the Gates Foundation and other more powerful NGOs. By virtue of their size and strength they are able to have considerably more influence than smaller NGOs who are resigned to following their lead. These implications are indicative of how this strategy can gain greater inclusion in the summitry process but at the cost of limiting an actor's freedom of its policy positions.

The B20 and the L20 are two further examples of groups whom have also engaged in Banding in order to achieve inclusion in G-summitry. The B20 was officially formed at the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, however there is a long history of business leaders being included in parallel summit events dating back to the G7 summits of the late-1970s.⁴¹ The L20 was formed a year later at the Cannes G20 summit after union representatives argued to Sarkozy that it was unfair in the governance process to have business represented and not labour.⁴² What is significant about these forums is the degree of organisation that they have achieved as alike actors and how this has translated into a significantly greater degree of inclusion in the summits than has been afforded to civil society actors. To take the 2012 B20 summit as an example, the process received strategic, institutional direction from the World Economic Forum, McKinsey and Company, and the International Chamber of Commerce. Its eight task forces covered the same themes being discussed by the sherpas and included over 150 business leaders from 25 countries. The B20 prepared detailed

⁴¹ Archival document: Armstrong 1980c

⁴² Interview: J. Howard 2012

recommendations for the G20 two months in advance of the summit liaised with sherpas throughout the process. At the summit itself the B20 met for the first time with the G20, an unprecedented degree of inclusion. The L20 is equally active with a parallel planning process and a particularly close relationship with the G20 Labour Ministers. What is important to note is that the business sector's and labour sector's banding affords them greater inclusion than civil society.⁴³ As noted in the previous chapter, the collectivist ascription of civil society as being disorganised was a primary justification of state representatives to deny them a greater degree of inclusion and thus the entry strategies discussed in this chapter are predominantly aimed at overcoming this stereotypical ascription. The business and labour sectors are not so ascribed but nevertheless band together in the same way to present themselves to the club as a cohesive group, which the club rewarded with a greater degree of inclusion.⁴⁴

Finally, there is a mobility dampener that is a related closure move which must be noted before moving on. Ascendant actors who have newly achieved closure may exclude similar others whom they might otherwise be expected to band together with or whom they previously did band together with and subsequently abandoned. As the below section on Differentiation details, social competition is fierce amongst actors whom are ascribed by others as being alike. As in domestic societies, intra-class social competition is as competitive - if not arguably more so - as inter-class competition. As such, an actor within a group will differentiate itself from alike others in order to claim or protect a superior status. In the case of actors whom have newly gained entry, they dampen the upward mobility of alike others in order to guard the exclusivity of their new status position. As with differentiation strategies below, the significance of this

⁴³ Interview: Reynoso 2012

⁴⁴ Interview: Reynoso 2012

dampener is that it is one way that outsiders (or newly made insiders) cause stratification in the system. France banded together with the smaller European powers to gain entry into the inner committee at Vienna, arguing on their behalf for inclusion. Once France had achieved entry, Webster writes, "Tallyrand, now that he was admitted to the inner Committee, abandoned all ideas of constituting a general Congress; and no more was heard of the rights of the small Powers."⁴⁵ Nicholson relays Duff Cooper's characterisation of Talleyrand's abandonment of his former partners, "[h]e had succeeded in getting his foot into the door of the European Council Chamber... very soon those who were already ensconced there were glued enough that he should come in and shut the door behind him, leaving his former partners in the passage."⁴⁶ Likewise, Canada was happy to slam the door shut behind it after it gained entry into the G7, most notably shutting out its Commonwealth partner, Australia, who was bidding for inclusion.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Miles Kahler makes note of this move broadly in international relations, "[a]s [rising powers] enter the upper echelons of the international hierarchies, whether as traders, investors or nuclear-capable powers, their embrace of equality with other non-incumbents also become more ambiguous, exemplified by China's resistance to permanent UNSC membership for India and Brazil."⁴⁸

6.2.3 Differentiation

Differentiation was useful for seeking entry into the Family of Civilised Nations as those seeking entry could contrast themselves with other outsiders whom they pointed to as being barbaric. Neumann and Welsh highlight the centrality of differentiation in the construction of international society and the maintenance

⁴⁵ Webster 1950, 93

⁴⁶ D. Cooper 2001; H. Nicolson 1946, 143

⁴⁷ Archival document: Hunt 1978a; Interview: Bayne 2012

⁴⁸ Kahler 2013, 718

of stability within it.⁴⁹ The construction of a civilised identity necessarily requires a barbarian or savage Other against whom this identity is given definition.⁵⁰ Differentiation, however, is significant not just for constructing and maintaining identities but also for understanding how an actor may cross the civilised/barbarian divide and gain entry into the club. Outsiders differentiate against one another as an entry strategy. For example, Neumann and Welsh remark that “[i]n the case of Russia we have an outstanding example of how the idea of ‘the Turk’ as the Other is used to bolster the case for Russia’s own Europeanness, which was in doubt in quarters at home as well as in Western Europe.”⁵¹ This type of claim is not just about claiming an identity but about seeking an improved relative social position.

Japan likewise engaged in differentiation as part of its entry bid. Japan particularly differentiated itself from Korea, pointing to it as a barbaric country in contrast to itself.⁵² Japan cast itself in a paternalist role in South East Asia as a civilised leader whom could bring the others towards civilisation.⁵³ The “foremost intellectual leader of the era”, Fukuzawa Yukichi’s “‘Theory of Leaving Asia’ argued that, if Japan did not wish to be mixed with other underdeveloped countries, Japan must forget Asia.”⁵⁴ Okagaki asserts the influence of Darwinian theory on this thinking more generally, wherein Japan saw itself as being the ‘fittest’ actor in South East Asia.⁵⁵ The same was the case for Russia, as Neumann points out in quoting the Russian Foreign Minister Aleksandr P. Izvol’sky,

⁴⁹ Neumann and Welsh 1991, 329–30

⁵⁰ Neumann and Welsh 1991, 334

⁵¹ Neumann and Welsh 1991, 345. See also: Weisensel 1991 (cited in Neumann and Welsh)

⁵² Okagaki 2013, 72–3. The Koreans saw the Japanese in exactly as backward barbarians.

⁵³ c.f. Okagaki 2013, 73; Suzuki 2013, 176

⁵⁴ Okagaki 2013, 78. See also: Fukuzawa 1875 (cited in Okagaki)

⁵⁵ Okagaki 2013, 78

“decline to the level of a second class power [...and] become an Asiatic state [...] would be a major catastrophe for Russia’ (Lievan 1983:6)”⁵⁶

Japan was ascribed as being able to save Korea from being an uncivilised vassal of the barbaric China.⁵⁷ The Sino-Japanese War, in which the question of Korea’s allegiance to China or Japan was brought to a head, provided the opportunity for the Japanese to differentiate themselves from the Chinese, particularly in the conduct of warfare.⁵⁸ The Japanese similarly did so against the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War, “denounc[ing] Russia as an ‘uncivilised country still sunk in barbarism’.”⁵⁹ Differentiation was especially important in the context of war for Japan as the West was not convinced that Japan that would actually honour the Treaty of Geneva in warfare, despite signing it in 1886 as a signal of their adoption of Western civilisation.⁶⁰ War provided a means to assure the West.⁶¹ Deliberate steps were taken to ensure compliance, “[i]n their victorious war against China, Japanese soldiers were instructed to observe international law faithfully and to avoid any conduct that might invite accusations of violating these codes.”⁶² Just conduct indeed won the approval of the West but most importantly for the present discussion,⁶³ it signalled compliance via Differentiation. Okagaki relates,

Not only did [international lawyer] Ariga [Nagao] appeal to the West by displaying the lawfulness of the conduct of the Japanese army, but he also contrasted Japan’s behaviour with that of China as ‘unlawful’ behaviour. Ariga mentioned that the critical feature of the war between China and Japan was that one party (Japan) strictly followed international law, while another (China) never observed any legal practice of war. Moreover, Ariga stated that Japan’s unilateral observance in a case where mutual observance of international law was impossible showed the obligation to humankind that Japan was

⁵⁶ Lievan 1983, 6; Neumann 2008b, 129

⁵⁷ Suzuki 2013, 161–176

⁵⁸ Gong 1984, 183

⁵⁹ Gong 1984, 183; Jansen 1974, 186

⁶⁰ Okagaki 2013, 86

⁶¹ See Chapter Four on Credentialism

⁶² Okagaki 2013, 87

⁶³ Gong 1984, 23; Okagaki 2013, 88

demonstrating. He insistently emphasised that Japan never sacrificed its faithful observance of law in pursuing its strategic gains and that the war between Japan and China set a precedent for wars between the 'civilised' and the 'uncivilised'.⁶⁴

Takahashi Sakue, another leading international lawyer, made the same differential claim, characterising the fault lines in the Sino-Japanese War as being between civilised Japan and uncivilised China and "[h]e criticised China's not joining the Treaty of Geneva or the Paris Declaration and its 'barbarian' conduct of the war."⁶⁵

Interestingly, Japan did not just assume a role to lead the others towards Western civilisation; at the same time Japan saw themselves as a leader whom could defend the others against the West. For Japan, elements of the West thus at once served as a desirable 'Other' to emulate and as an enemy 'Other' to defend against.⁶⁶ That international society was 'Janus' faced allows for this apparent contradiction,⁶⁷ the 'good' side could be sought after while the 'bad' side could be secured against. Either way, there is a dual 'Othering' in operation. Ascribed positively, the West served as an actor whom Japan was more alike in contrast to its geographic and cultural neighbours; ascribed negatively, the West served as an Other whom the superior Japan could protect its relative inferiors against. Despite the enemy Other being the Europeans, this paternal role for Japan made it seem more alike those in the club as such as the type of role assumed by the European Great Powers. Regardless of the frame, Japan could claim to be worthy of membership in the Western club in contrast to the rest of South East Asia.

Differentiation amongst outsiders likewise features in G-summitry. There is no agreement in civil society over what the role of civil society ought to be in the

⁶⁴ Okagaki 2013, 87; Ariga 1896 (cited in Gong)

⁶⁵ Okagaki 2013, 88; Takahashi 1899; Takahashi 1908; Westlake 1894. The same differentiation may be observed in Italy's campaign in Abyssinia as part of its bid for entry into the club. Italy was accused of treating prisoners poorly (c.f. Gong 1984, 122).

⁶⁶ Gong 1984, 184; Okagaki 2013, 78

⁶⁷ Suzuki 2013

summitry process. Indeed, different elements within civil society have fundamentally different - and often incompatible - objectives. This cleavage is most apparent in the divide between protest and advocacy groups.⁶⁸ As noted in Chapter Five and in the above discussion on Banding, state actors collectively lump civil society actors together into a single category, regardless of major differences that may be between actors in civil society.⁶⁹ This is especially problematic for advocacy NGOs who seek cooperative inclusion in the summit process but are marginalised because they are yoked together with protest groups who seek to disrupt the process.⁷⁰ Broadly speaking, advocacy groups seek to influence the discussions while protest groups seek to disrupt them.⁷¹ Protest groups are granted a minimal degree of inclusion in G-summitry, if at all. Protestors' right to protest is recognised and respected but they are afforded little more in terms of inclusion. Indeed, when protests are allowed, they are most often well removed from the summit site and closely controlled and monitored by the host government.⁷² That media coverage of protests tends to focus on the negative dimensions of them - be it the death of Ian Tomlinson at the London G20 or the riots and heavy-handed tactics of police at the Toronto G20 - does not help to paint protest groups, in particular, and civil society, in general, in a good light.

Advocacy organisations engage in differentiation against protest groups in order to gain inclusion for themselves in the summitry process. The primary way in which they do this is through mimicry, adapting their identity and practices to

⁶⁸ A. F. Cooper 2013

⁶⁹ Interview: Reynoso 2012

⁷⁰ Interviews: Price-Thomas 2012; Rea 2012

⁷¹ This is an imprecise characterisation of protest groups' activities but highlights the main difference between advocacy and protest groups. Protest groups may not want to disrupt the club's discussions, rather they question the content of those discussions, the legitimacy of the group to discuss them, or take advantage of the presence of the media at a summit to communicate their message.

⁷² Naylor 2012

be more like insiders so as to seem less like outsiders. Mimicry is discussed in detail below; in general terms, so as not to preempt the analysis below, they differentiate themselves from protest groups by being professional and organised in an effort to signal that they defy the collectivist stereotype ascribed to them. There is a wide array of activities that advocacy groups engage in to draw this distinction, ranging from participating in the year-round preparatory processes, producing substantive policy documents, and even at the summits themselves dressing like insiders.

Successfully drawing a line of demarcation between advocacy organisations and protest groups is difficult given that the collectivist ascription made by state actors which yokes them together is such an entrenched, dominant narrative. It is even more difficult for advocacy organisations who engage in protests as part of their campaigns because they straddle the social division that differentiation attempts to create. These are actors that play both the “insider” and “outsider” games in the summitry process- seeking to be insiders influencing the policy process while at the same time being outsiders using public campaigns to pressure governments and communicate their message.⁷³ Oxfam and Make Poverty History are two well known examples of such advocacy organisations. Oxfam, for example, has become renowned for its “giant heads” protests at summits. This media stunt earns them coverage which gives them an ability to get their message out publicly, which is the most important task for civil society representatives to achieve at the summits themselves, but sits somewhat uncomfortably with their more substantive need to be seen as an integral and productive part of the summitry process. For those organisations who seek to engage both in advocacy and protest is thus difficult - if not ultimately impossible - for them to entirely differentiate themselves from entirely non-

⁷³ Interviews: Leo 2012; Price-Thomas 2012

collaborative protest groups such as Black Bloc, thus limiting their ability to achieve greater inclusion.

Cooper argues that the ability of some civil society actors to be flexible in their approach, at times acting like outsiders and at other times acting like insiders, can be advantageous in negotiations with state actors.⁷⁴ This was a particular strength of the Bono and Geldoff double act in the Make Poverty History Campaign that focused its activities on the 2005 Gleneagles G8 summit- Bono assumed the role of the insiders, while Geldoff assumed the role of the outsider.⁷⁵ Tactically this may be true, but from a strategic perspective it only serves to reenforce the collectivist stereotype of civil society that serves to marginalise them, thus ultimately undercutting their own inclusion efforts.

Differentiation is thus a significant entry strategy because of its effect on the structure of the closure system. It is not just significant because it is a strategy that produces stratification, but because it is outsiders who are causing it rather than insiders. An outsider differentiates against other outsiders to improve its own status position to the detriment of others.

6.2.4 Legitimation⁷⁶

Legitimation is absent as a strategy for entering the Family of Civilised Nations because its legitimacy does not rest on the composition of its membership. The legitimacy of the Family of Civilised Nations is premised on the idea that its members have achieved the Standard of Civilisation and that such liberal, advanced states should be dominant. Who the states are does not matter, so long

⁷⁴ A. F. Cooper 2008b, 11

⁷⁵ A. F. Cooper 2007; A. F. Cooper 2008b; Pigman and Kotsopoulos 2007

⁷⁶ Legitimacy is a central topic in social IR theory (Clark 2005; Clark 2007; Coicaud and Heiskanen 2001; Finnemore and Toope 2001; Hurd 1999; Steffek 2003). The relatively brief discussion of legitimacy and legitimation here is not meant to make a substantive contribution to this topic but rather to offer a way of looking at it from the perspective of closure.

as they have achieved the Standard. The entry of Japan does not make the club any more legitimate because it is an Asian country.⁷⁷ Japan did not enter as an Asian country *per se*, it entered as a civilised country. In this respect the club is a homogenous one. Legitimation strategies do not work in homogenous clubs because all its members (and potential members) necessarily represent the same thing; in this case, the Standard.

The composition of the Great Powers club is, in part, tied to its legitimacy but not in a way that a legitimation strategy would be useful. For the club to achieve its function as a steward of international political stability, all the relevant powers must be included. This is, by definition, a concert.⁷⁸ What matters in terms of composition is that the correct actors who can achieve the group's function are included. Who the actors are or what they represent does not matter, it is a functionalist consideration. Great Power legitimacy is in part conferred by excluded, lesser powers who give consent to Great Power superiority in exchange for the order and stability provided by the club.⁷⁹ The conferral of legitimacy has nothing to do, however, with the possible inclusion of any states who are otherwise excluded from the club.

G-summitry began with the same premise. Its exclusivity was justified on the premise that its members provided the function of international financial and economic stability.⁸⁰ Two changes in the international system, however, made the club subject to legitimacy critiques, opening the door for entry on those grounds. The first involves its static composition and the second involves the adoption of principles of representative global governance being adopted as an

⁷⁷ Japan's entry, however, did give legitimacy to the Standard as a means of governing closure, serving as a 'proof of concept' for the universal expansion of international society outside of Europe (c.f. Gong 1984, 7; Okagaki 2013, 110)

⁷⁸ J. J. Kirton 1989

⁷⁹ Lake 1996; Lake 2011

⁸⁰ Archival documents: G6 1975; Bayne 1975; Schmidt 1975

international norm. As concerns the former, and as is detailed in the previous chapter, the club's composition did not change in step with shifts in relative economic standing. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 demonstrated that the exclusive club did not have the capacity to provide order and stability and lacked the ability to order the compliance of outsiders (particularly during the Asian Financial Crisis). The club lacked authority and could not achieve its function without the inclusion of outsiders, thus opening the possibility for entry. In order to keep the club as the top-tier of economic governance it had to revisit membership.

The history of how the club incorporated others is laid out in the following chapter; what is important to note now, though, is how these crises caused legitimacy deficits in which made incorporation a necessary response in order to erase (or, at least reduce) the deficit. The Asian Financial Crisis tested the club's ability to achieve its function as the international economic steward, thereby reducing its legitimacy. The crisis demonstrated the limitations of the club in the late-90's where the group did not include the largest or fastest growing economies and the club no longer had the ability to dictate terms, principally via the IMF, to those worst affected. In recognition of the club's inability to address crises of globalisation with its current composition there was a movement within the club to expand. As the following chapter details, incorporation first happened via the establishment of the G20 at the Finance Minister's level as some of the incumbent G8 members did not want an expanded club at the leaders' level over fears of a loss of status.⁸¹

The 2008 global economic crisis forced the club to revisit its composition for the same reasons as it was forced to do so during the Asian crisis. Different in this

⁸¹ Interview: Martin 2012

instance was the fact that the G8 were those worst hit by the crisis. The premier club could not rescue itself. Recognising its impotence the G8 had to look to the G20 for help. The G20 was crowned as the premier economic forum with the elevation of the G20 to the leaders' level. The G8 members surrendered their identity as curators of the international economy in exchange for regaining efficacy (and therefore legitimacy) in that role, though now having to share the position with a larger group of former outsiders. The financial crises of 1997 and 2008 thus challenged the efficacy of club and thereby reduced its legitimacy as the crises revealed that the G8 lacked the capability to achieve the international function it was responsible for. The entry of others into the group could help the club regain its footing.

The second change that renders G-summitry subject to entry bids based on a legitimization strategy is the change in ideas about what constitutes just global governance. Functional efficacy became no longer sufficient for legitimating exclusivity. This is a more significant departure from the other clubs because it involves a fundamental change in thinking about what could legitimate inequality in a governance order.⁸² The consequences of this shift is two-fold. First, it opened up the space for the inclusion of civil society in the summitry process; second, it made regional and cultural representation criteria of inclusion in the G20, thus constituting this club in a fundamentally different way than its G7/8 predecessor whose conditions for entry were solely concerned with economic power. Membership in G-summitry is not purely functionalist, thus distinguishing it from the Great Powers club and making legitimization entry strategies possible

⁸² See Chapter Four

The first actor to seek entry to G-summitry according to a legitimization strategy were the smaller European states who felt they had a right to inclusion from the very beginnings of the club in 1975. The excluded Europeans protested that the club formed by self-selected *fiat* without any consultation, the implication being that such a move was illegitimate. Those excluded sought entry by critiquing this move and arguing that their inclusion would correct this legitimacy deficit.

After word about the G5/6 sherpa group's first meeting in 1975 leaked, smaller, industrialised EC states were particularly upset about their exclusion.⁸³ "The Benelux Ambassadors formally protested about the lack of prior consultation."⁸⁴ Brussels' position was that there should be a discussion within the EC for how France, Germany, and the UK could represent the EC.⁸⁵ Belgium's Deputy Permanent Representative, Hervé Robinet, relayed to the US that what particularly upset smaller European states was the way in which their exclusion was decided- by *fiat* by the five.⁸⁶ It is thus to the very way that the dynamics of closure work that Robinet claims the smaller European states object. In the days leading up to first G6 summit at Rambouillet, Commission officials took the line that the EC's exclusion from the summit would "have a negative impact on EC solidarity... exacerbating the small member states' concerns about being dominated by the large ones."⁸⁷ They also objected on grounds that their exclusion was unjustified as the issue of trade falls within the competency of the EC rather than the member states.⁸⁸ The EC finally won inclusion at the third G7 summit in London, though was incorporated as a second-tier member by means of the primary, collectivist exclusion strategy.⁸⁹ What is important to note here is that the EC sought entry based on

⁸³ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

⁸⁴ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

⁸⁵ Archival document: Morris 1975. At this time Italy's inclusion had not be secured in the club. The first occasion where a common EC position could be formed was at a meeting of EC Finance Ministers in Venice on the 24th of August, 1975.

⁸⁶ Archival document: Morris 1975

⁸⁷ Archival document; Greenwald 1975

⁸⁸ Archival document: Greenwald 1975

⁸⁹ See Chapter Five

an argument that the G5/6 club members failed to live up to procedural norms and rules that they were bound to by virtue of their membership in the EC (with the exception of the US), that as result the new club lacked legitimacy, and that thus legitimacy deficit could be corrected with the inclusion of formal EC representation in the club.

The literature on civil society as international legitimators is extensive so less treatment will be given here.⁹⁰ What is necessary to note, though, is that as ideas and norms of what constitutes just global governance have evolved since the founding of G-summitry. The exclusive, statist club that it is no longer rests on solid ground. What makes G-summitry vulnerable in this respect is that its purview extends well beyond the interests of only those included in the club. As the decisions that are taken by the club have an effect on excluded actors, its foundations as an exclusive club are illegitimate by virtue of the fact that those who are affected by the club's decisions have no say in their deliberative processes. This became particularly so when the G7/8 adopted a heavy focus on international development beginning in the mid-1990's and reaching its zenith a decade later with the 2005 Gleneagles Summit.⁹¹

Civil society actors' Legitimation strategy takes advantage of this particular legitimacy deficit in the club, contending that it can bring legitimacy to the club by virtue of being the representative voice of the excluded constituencies. Larger, better-resourced NGOs are especially successful in this move as they have a greater ability to point to a large constituency of members who support their position. The larger the membership of the NGO, the greater the ability it has to make this claim.⁹² Moreover, larger NGOs have a greater ability to mobilise its membership as part of its advocacy campaigns- Oxfam and Make Poverty History being two good examples. ONE, notably, "naturally gets a seat at

⁹⁰ See Clark 2007; Van Rooy 2004 for further discussion.

⁹¹ Interviews: Leo 2012; Ruthrauff 2012

⁹² Interviews: Leo 2012; Price-Thomas 2012

the table” because of its sizeable and active membership.⁹³ For specific policy initiatives NGOs may point to evidence of popular support for an issue, be it through online petitions or mass rallies. Regardless of the tactic that is employed, the logic of the strategy relies upon the notion that for decision to be legitimate, those affected by them must have some representation in the process.

It is according to these same principles that the O5’s and the G20’s membership is composed in the way that it is. The O5 shored up the legitimacy of the G8 at exactly the time that its international development agenda opened the club up to critiques on these grounds. The logic guiding the G20’s composition is distinct from the G7/8 by virtue of the fact that regional and cultural representation were criteria that were considered when forming the group. The creators of the group, Paul Martin and Lawrence Summers, considered more than economic size when creating the list of those whom would be included as it was felt that doing so was necessary in order for the group to be effective and legitimate post-Asian Financial Crisis.⁹⁴ The G20 is thus not composed of members with alike identities and values as is the case in the G7/8 and is not composed of only the top-ranking economies. Argentina, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia are included because of the representative legitimacy they confer upon the club. Because of the importance of representation, Summers was troubled by the exclusion of Nigeria, “a real African country”.⁹⁵ The under-representation of Africa continues to be a bugbear for the club. Paul Martin has since proposed a new organisation to represent African in the group to shore up this enduring legitimacy deficit.⁹⁶

A legitimisation entry strategy is thus a relatively new avenue for entry into international clubs by virtue of relatively new institutional norms over what

⁹³ Interview: Leo 2012

⁹⁴ Interviews: Martin 2012; Summers 2012

⁹⁵ Interview: Summers 2012

⁹⁶ Martin 2013

constitutes just governance. Representation now matters in ways that it did not in the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club. What is noteworthy is that legitimisation is a highly deferential strategy that serves to reproduce the *status quo*, both in terms of the status position of particular actors and in terms of the general international order. An outsider seeking entry via legitimisation is necessarily not attempting to usurp the club; such an entry strategy does exactly the opposite- peddling an ability to help prop up the club in exchange for a degree of inclusion. It is in a large part because of the high degree of deference involved in Legitimation entry strategies that the club can stratify to the extent that it has. The 'good' that outsiders offer the club does not buy their way into the club as an equal. This is picked up in Chapter Seven.

6.2.5 Normalisation

The final Relational Entry Strategy is that of Normalisation. As with Legitimation, it is an entry strategy that is found in the context of G-summitry but absent from the other clubs as it is the only one that is a diplomatic institution.⁹⁷ It is, in part, by Normalisation that Canada was able to secure itself a place as a permanent member of the G7. After failing to secure an invitation to the first summit at Rambouillet, Canada was invited to the second summit, in Puerto Rico, by the American hosts.⁹⁸ The Americans cited the close ties between the two countries as justification for their inclusion.⁹⁹ All the members with the exception of France supported Canada's inclusion, not just at Puerto Rico but at Rambouillet as well.¹⁰⁰ France, on the other hand, vociferously objected to Canadian inclusion on the grounds that it would make the club too large and that it would be difficult to continue exclude other European countries, thus

⁹⁷ See: Chapter Four

⁹⁸ Archival documents: J. Callaghan 1976; Ford 1976a; Ford 1976b; Ford 1976d

⁹⁹ Ford 1976d

¹⁰⁰ Archival document: Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt 1975. Contrary to what is the now popular and accepted account of G-summitry's origins.

attempting to exclude Canada on grounds of pragmatism.¹⁰¹ It was only after the Americans sold Canadian participation as a one-off occurrence justified by their prominence on the continent that France ceased to object.¹⁰² Canadian participation, however, was not limited to Puerto Rico. Thanks to precedence, they were then invited again to the Downing Street summit the following year as a full member.¹⁰³ It was in a sherpa meeting two years later that Canada's Normalisation strategy was explicitly singled out by the German sherpa during a discussion about the possibility of Australian inclusion. The British sherpa, John Hunt, recounted that, "[German sherpa] Schulmann (trying hard not to look at [Canadian sherpa] Johnstone) then said that he hoped the Japanese would not think it was a starter to suggest that Australia should come to Tokyo but not to subsequent Summits. This ploy had been tried before."¹⁰⁴

Spain's inclusion in the G20 as the club's permanent invitee is another case that exemplifies the normalisation strategy and particularly exemplifies the acceptance of deference in its operation. Spain had tried (and failed) to join the G7 in its early years.¹⁰⁵ The club denied it on the grounds that no further Europeans could be admitted on the grounds that they were uncertain about Spain in the immediate post-Franco years.¹⁰⁶ Spain campaigned for G20 membership based on its credentials as a country of systematic importance to the global economy, particularly due to its Globally Significant International Financial Institution (GSIFI), Santander, and its contribution to the short-lived Group of 33 in 1999.¹⁰⁷ At the same time as Spain lobbied for inclusion so too did

¹⁰¹ Archival document: Enders 1976. See Chapter Three for discussion of Pragmatism in G-Summitry.

¹⁰² Interview: Bayne 2012

¹⁰³ Archival document: Carter 1977

¹⁰⁴ Archival document: Hunt 1978a

¹⁰⁵ Interview: Bayne 2012

¹⁰⁶ Interview: Bayne 2012

¹⁰⁷ Possessing a GSIFI, it should be noted, is not a formal criterion for entry.

the Netherlands. The Dutch similarly argued for inclusion on functionalist grounds citing their systematic importance, especially owing to their GSIFI, ING Group. They also successfully lobbied the first three summit hosts – US, UK, and Canada – by citing their military contributions as an ally in the war in Afghanistan. The Dutch thus tried to make use of the relationship that it had established with its allies, seeking a spot at a table in return for their war efforts.¹⁰⁸

Critically, Spain also sought the sponsorship of France. Sarkozy and Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero had developed a close relationship and Spain was integral to Sarkozy's vision of a more integrated Europe.¹⁰⁹ France, who happened to hold the Presidency of the EU Council in 2008, was thus a close supporter of Spain. At the time of the first G20 summit in Washington in November 2008 the EU had not yet passed the Treaty of Lisbon which created the post of the President of the European Council who would be tasked with representing the EU at the G20 alongside the President of the European Commission. As such, it was the President of the Council who represented the EU alongside the President of the Commission. France was thus allocated four seats around the summit table, two to represent France and two to represent the EU. Sarkozy gave both of his EU seats to Spain so that Zapatero and his Finance Minister, Pedro Solbes, could attend. Sarkozy gave one of his two French seats to the Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende so that the Netherlands too could be represented.¹¹⁰ Officially, Spain was included as the representative of the EU. It was the first move in the country's normalisation strategy.

¹⁰⁸ Interviews: Edwards 2012 and Anonymous subject 1.1. Note the parallels here with credential testing win the Great Powers club.

¹⁰⁹ Sarkozy 2007

¹¹⁰ Summit records indicate that the Netherlands were representing the EU (G20 Information Centre 2014). Indeed, the Dutch representative sat behind an EU flag at the summit table. However, the seat itself belonged to France and was meant to be occupied by French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde who was relegated to the back row with the sherpas and deputies so that Balkenende could sit with the other leaders. This did not sit well with Lagarde, particularly when Balkenende sent his State Secretary Jan Kees de Jager to the summit in his place so that Balkenende could return to the Netherlands due to the death of his father.

As the second G20 leaders' summit in London approached the British hosts were faced with having to keep European membership in check as a defence against the legitimacy critique of the group having too many Europeans. They had to find a way to deal Sarkozy's move which brought Spain and the Netherlands in. Adding to this problem was that Czech had taken over the European presidency from France and also sought inclusion. Switzerland and Poland too continued to lobby for inclusion. The British sherpa's solution was to do as Sarkozy had done and play with the number of seats allocated around the table. Invited countries, the Netherlands and Spain, were each given one seat rather than the two allocated to each of the members. Czech also was given one seat as one of the two representatives of the EU. Spain, thus, held on.

As the host sherpa for the following Toronto summit related, the Canadians were left with the "*de facto* situation where Spain and Netherlands were present", a statement which hints at the effectiveness of the normalisation strategy. Both governments again lobbied the hosts for inclusion and both did so successfully as before. At the same time as Spain and the Netherlands were lobbying Canada for inclusion, Korea, the next summit hosts, were pressuring Canada not to invite them because they did not want to feel forced, by virtue of precedence, to invite them to the Seoul summit.¹¹¹ At Seoul, Spain was again included while the Netherlands were not. Spain converted its normalisation strategy into a permanent though deferential spot at the margins of the club as the "permanent invitee" of the G20. They thus accepted deference in accepting this lower-tier position though secured a place at the table.

While exclusion was the focus of the previous chapter, it is worthwhile to examine the Netherlands' exclusion here as it is a case that actually reveals more about entry than it

¹¹¹ Interview: Edwards 2012

does about exclusion. The Netherlands were the most vulnerable European country included in the summit, in that they had the least solid claim to a right to membership. Spain could rely on Latin American allies to keep it in the club whereas the Netherlands could not.¹¹² The Netherlands' European identity and its relative vulnerability made it a prime target for Korea, a newly included former-outsider, to claim status for itself by "shooting a European."¹¹³ This is the one instance of a more assertive entry strategy being exercised in the context of G-summitry, recalling the means of entry into the Great Powers' club. Note, though, that this is not strictly a strategy to gain entry into the club but rather a move made within the club to achieve greater status. The Koreans excluded the Dutch because they sought to claim greater status for themselves, particularly vis-à-vis the other newly included, non-G8 participants in G-summitry. The French who were to host the following summit aided them in this move as French President Sarkozy did not want to be in a position a year later as the summit host to be forced to exclude an invitee that had precedence on its side, particularly as that invitee was European and an ally. Not wanting to have to grapple with the issue of European over-representation and have to combat the strength of precedence in influencing inclusion as previous hosts, particularly the UK and Canada, had, France withdrew its support for the Netherlands' inclusion.¹¹⁴

Another failed (and, to my knowledge, undocumented) entry bid to note here is that of Switzerland. Like Spain and the Netherlands, Switzerland sought inclusion in the G20 based on its international economic and financial credentials. The Swiss mobilised their well-developed central banking and treasury networks to lobby, especially at the IMF. The Swiss Finance Minister, Hans-Rudolf Mertz, personally made the case to Gordon

¹¹² Interview: Interview: Kobele 2012; Martinez 2012; Anonymous subjects 2.2. and 3.3

¹¹³ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

¹¹⁴ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

Brown at every opportunity available to him.¹¹⁵ The Swiss made their case based on the functional contributions that they would bring to the club; first, in terms of their strength and experience in financial regulation; and, second, in terms of their contributions to international development as donors.¹¹⁶ Switzerland was unsuccessful in gaining inclusion at Washington and when it became clear that they would also be excluded from the London summit they changed their strategy in a significant way. Instead of continuing to seek full membership, they changed their tack to seek inclusion only as an invitee.¹¹⁷ This is significant as it reveals a deliberate shift in inclusion strategy towards a more deferential normalisation strategy. The Swiss changed to a strategy that would abandon their chances of entering the club as an equal, but to one that had a greater likelihood of success, just as Talleyrand did at Vienna. In other words, realising that they were not going to succeed in the short-term, they moved to a long-game. Despite this shift, however, they remained unsuccessful as they could not overcome the desire of the club not to further exacerbate the over-representation of Europe.

Non-state actors' Normalisation strategy is exactly the same as that practiced by state actors. When the G20 was elevated to the leaders' level there was no precedence for civil society inclusion.¹¹⁸ They thus worked to establish precedence as a first move in the strategy. There was precedence of inclusion for civil society with the G8, however uneven, that actors could point to as a basis for their engagement. NGOs with a history of engagement with the G8, particularly the BOAGs, were best positioned to rearticulate their bureaucracies to engage with the larger G20. G8 strategy managers for such NGOs, for example, enlarged their portfolios to include the G20. The point is that

¹¹⁵ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

¹¹⁶ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

¹¹⁷ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

¹¹⁸ Interview: Edwards 2012

these organisations were relatively better positioned to seek inclusion in the G20 process and that their G20 campaign efforts are rooted in their G8 work.

Without precedence civil society actors had to renegotiate their inclusion with every new host, aiming to establishing and normalising a routine for interaction.¹¹⁹ As Bond's Policy and Government Relations Manager relates, "the strategy is to set precedence for our presence."¹²⁰ At the 2011 Cannes summit civil society deliberately tried to formalise the accreditation process in hopes that it would set precedence for the 2012 Los Cabos summit and all those thereafter.¹²¹ This was especially important following the 2010 Toronto summit from which civil society were more easily excluded due to the lack of precedence.¹²² The move was successful as the Mexican government based their accreditation process entirely upon that which was negotiated with the French government.¹²³

The same was true for civil society inclusion in the preparatory process. With no established process, civil society created one. There is an interesting discursive move to this element of civil society's normalisation strategy wherein civil society points to authoritative statements made by those superiorly positioned to gain and maintain inclusion. In interviews for this research civil society actors repeatedly pointed to paragraph 73 of the Seoul Summit Document as the textual basis for the justification for their inclusion.¹²⁴ The paragraph asserts that the G20 leaders recognise "the necessity to consult with the wider international community" including "international organisations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society, trade unions and academia."¹²⁵ The

¹¹⁹ Interviews: Burnley 2012; Rea 2012; Ruthrauff 2012

¹²⁰ Interview: Rea 2012

¹²¹ Interview: Rea 2012

¹²² Interviews: Edwards 2012; Khatchadourian 2012; Rea 2012

¹²³ Interviews: Arturo Gomez 2012; Ramirez 2012; Rea 2012; Reynoso 2012

¹²⁴ Archival document: G20 2010

¹²⁵ Archival document: G20 2010

paragraph also commits the leaders to “increase [their] efforts to conduct G20 consultation activities in a more systematic way.”¹²⁶ The leaders’ statement and commitment gave CSOs a foundation upon which to build all future claims for inclusion.¹²⁷

Civil society also points the extra-ordinary inclusion afforded to the Gates Foundation at the 2011 Cannes summit as another precedence setting and inclusion legitimating phenomenon. Sarkozy asked Bill Gates to write a report on development financing to present to the leaders at the 2011 Cannes summit.¹²⁸ Like Bono, Gates had his own (pseudo-)sherpa, Geoff Lamb, who managed the development of the report which involved civil society consultation in its drafting. The consultation involved face-to-face meetings in Washington, Brussels, and Cape Town with Bond and InterAction, with written submissions also having been given.¹²⁹ After the report was tabled to the leaders at the summit Lamb met with the accredited civil society representatives to brief them on what happened in the private meeting between Gates and the leaders. Gates reported to the leaders how useful the input from civil society was, particularly the “time and capacity” for research that civil society could offer.¹³⁰ As Bond’s Policy and Government Relations Manager relates, this served as a “proof of concept” for civil society engagement.¹³¹ The same move is being made here as with the references to the Seoul Summit Document, civil society actors point to an authoritative statement made by a superiorly positioned actor as a way to set precedence and demonstrate their value in functionalist terms.

¹²⁶ Archival document: G20 2010

¹²⁷ Interview: Rea 2012. As one Sherpa related, the Sherpa group is perfectly aware of the game being played, “you always have a few words at the end of the communiqué that NGOs like so as to appeal to them, they get to say to their membership ‘look, we had an effect.’ We have to do it because without civil society engagement the whole thing looks illegitimate.” (Anonymous subject 1.1)

¹²⁸ See: Gates 2011

¹²⁹ Interview: Rea 2012

¹³⁰ Interview: Rea 2012

¹³¹ Interview: Rea 2012

Civil society has been aided in their Normalisation strategy by sympathetic states. The nature of the relationship between civil society and G20 governments varies considerably from country to country, just as the degree of inclusion afforded to civil society varies from summit to summit. The aim of the Normalisation strategy is to condition the process so that a greater degree of inclusion is achieved at each subsequent summit. The 2010 Toronto summit was widely seen as “disastrous” and “a huge step backward” for civil society because they were relatively more excluded from the process and from the summit.¹³² At the summit, for example, civil society representatives were barred from the media centre. This was especially problematic as it denied civil society the ability to use the summit as an opportunity to engage in their public messaging, which necessarily involves the media. This exclusion thus restricted civil society from the biggest opportunity that the summit affords them. It is for this reason that so much effort went into re-establishing precedence at Cannes the following year. In sharp contrast, the 2012 Los Cabos preparatory process and summit was widely regarded by civil society as the most transparent and open to-date.¹³³ In addition to regular and substantive consultations in the preparatory process, civil society were given daily briefings at the summit by the sous-sherpa responsible for civil society, and themselves gave daily press conferences.¹³⁴ What is significant for our purposes here is that the Mexican government afforded a greater degree of inclusion to civil society not just because of a subscription to the idea that civil society input is necessary for the legitimacy of the process and outcomes; but, critically, also because they hoped that it

¹³² Interviews: Burnley 2012; Rea 2012; Ruthrauff 2012

¹³³ Interviews: Burnley 2012; Rea 2012; Ruthrauff 2012

¹³⁴ On the final day of the summit, however, the civil society press conference was shut down by the Mexican Foreign Ministry as the Mexican government did not want any actor speaking before President Calderon. While greater inclusion was afforded, the host state was still firmly in authoritative control.

would set a precedence that future summit hosts could not deviate from, wanting it to be a part of their presidency's legacy, marking Mexico out as a governance innovator.¹³⁵

Labour groups engaged in the exact same strategy. As with civil society, labour groups too point to summit communiqués as being a critical element of their normalisation strategy. As ITUC's Director of Economic and Social policy and (pseudo-)sherpa, James Howard, reported, "having the L20 in Cannes that was on the first page of the leaders' declaration was very important for us."¹³⁶ Their strategy was incremental with the aim of establishing a routine.¹³⁷ ITUC first received an invite for consultation at the Washington G20 and built from there in a deliberative normalisation strategy, "what we're trying to do with G20 is create a pattern to make it part of the process."¹³⁸ Helping this process was a request by the leaders at London for the ILO to produce a report, with the "obvious logic" being that they would present it at the following summit in Pittsburgh. The leaders' request, in short, guaranteed a return invitation to the table.¹³⁹ The G20 again made the request at Pittsburgh for a report to be tabled at the following summit, thus continuing to cement the pattern of interaction.¹⁴⁰

Precedence is a norm of inertia. Whether an actor is included or excluded, precedence has the tendency for that condition to remain so. As such, an actor that is included, however marginally, tends to remain included. It is relatively more difficult for an actor that is excluded to gain inclusion by virtue of this same inertia, this is why normalisation strategies advance in gradual steps, as is detailed above particularly with reference to non-state actors' normalisation strategies. It is for this same reason that a move made

¹³⁵ Interviews: Aranda Bezaury 2012; Arturo Gomez 2012; Reynoso 2012

¹³⁶ Interview: J. Howard 2012; see the 2011 Cannes Summit Communiqué: G20 2011

¹³⁷ Interview: Pursey 2012

¹³⁸ Interview: J. Howard 2012; the notion was echoed by the ILO's sherpa, Stephen Pursey, "the L20 is likely to carry on because it becomes an established thing. These things have inertia." (Pursey 2012)

¹³⁹ Interview: Pursey 2012

¹⁴⁰ Interview: Pursey 2012

by a host to exclude others to a greater degree than the previous host is so vigorously opposed, as it is a move that directly undercuts the normalisation strategy. This explains civil society's fixation on their exclusion from the Toronto G20 as being "a giant step backwards" and Switzerland's moves of deference in order to avoid last-minute exclusion from the London G20. Like Legitimation Strategies, Normalisation entry bids perpetuate the *status quo* because they are highly deferential, wherein an actor in no way seeks to challenge the existing order but rather to slowly insert itself in it at the margins.

6.3 Identity Adaptation

This chapter has so far analysed how outsiders seek entry by advancing strategies that directly insert themselves in a particular position within a status hierarchy. There is a second category of entry strategy that may be employed in tandem, that of Identity Adaptation; or, mimicry.

The analysis below is divided into international mimicry and internal mimicry. This categorisation matches Neumann and Welsh's distinction between International Values - those explicated by Bull - and Domestic Values.¹⁴¹ Here, the term 'domestic' is revised to 'internal' so as to allow for an account of the identity adaptation practices of non-state actors, who have no domestic to speak of. In general, international mimicry involves the adaptation of in the international arena as an actor relates to others, while internal mimicry involves the reorganisation of an actor's internal structures to match those of insiders. Empirically, this is a false division as there is much elision between the two, but it is useful for our purposes of conceptual development to divide them ideologically here. Additionally, evidence of mimicry to enter the Family of Civilised

¹⁴¹ Neumann and Welsh 1991, 328

Nations relies heavily upon the work of Gerrit Gong as the authoritative source on how outsiders tried to meet The Standard. I do not seek to reproduce his work but rather to present a number of his key examples along thematic lines as opposed to his treatment which presents them on a country by country basis.

6.3.1 International Mimicry

Geopolitical Mimicry

Geopolitical mimicry is mostly a feature as an entry strategy into the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club, as questions territorial control matter little in G-summitry.¹⁴² The acquisition of territory is primarily a feature of entry into the Great Powers club, though there is overlap with entry into international society, as is exemplified by the cases of Russia and Japan who both were actors that concurrently sought entry into international society as well as into the Great Powers club.¹⁴³ They did not just want to be in the society of civilised states, but wanted to be a member of its ranking status club. Suzuki similarly relates this point with reference to Keal, “[a]s the guardians of the Society are great powers, this often means that aspirant members have to recast themselves ‘in the image of the dominant power or group of powers at the time.’”¹⁴⁴

To be a Great Power a state needs to *act* like Great Power and so territorial conquest is a central part of signalling this identity.¹⁴⁵ Territorial expansion, as above, contributes materially and functionally to achieving entry into the club; but the concern here is the way in which doing so is a conspicuous act that

¹⁴² Control of territory does matter in G-summitry in so far as territory and its population contributes to a state’s economic power.

¹⁴³ Taking territory in the G-summitry context is disadvantageous to an actor, as is evidenced by Japan’s opposition to Russia’s entry on grounds of its annexation of the Kuril Islands and Russia’s 2014 censure by the G8 for annexing the Crimea.

¹⁴⁴ Keal 2000, 72; Suzuki 2013, 12

¹⁴⁵ c.f. Zarakol 2010, 164

signals belongingness. The acquisition of colonies, Anderson relates, was a “striving for national status.”¹⁴⁶ This was especially so for those precariously positioned at the margins of the club, as taking territory was a conspicuous way of signalling belongingness in the club. Moreover, because the possession of territory is zero-sum, its possession necessarily denies it to others.¹⁴⁷ It is thus an efficient entry move in that at once taking territory signals likeness to insiders while concurrently denying others the ability to improve their position by having that territory.

Russia was ascribed by international society’s insiders as well as the exclusive Great Powers club within it as being at the margins both clubs. For the entirety of the European states-system’s creation, Russia was the constant “peripheral presence.”¹⁴⁸ As Russia was held as a barbaric (or, at best, semi-barbaric) entity much of its entry bid focused on overcoming this ascription. As Neumann details, a significant motivation behind Muscovy’s campaign against the Mongols and the conquest of their territory was to overcome this dual identity of being neither quite civilised nor quite great.¹⁴⁹ “Muscovy actually started propping up its claims to being an imperial power on par with the Holy Roman Empire by invoking its conquests of the successors states of the Golden Horde, notably Kazan’ and Astrakhan.”¹⁵⁰ Russia’s desire to take Poland at the Congress of Vienna continued this strategy. Poland was seen as being more developed, civilised, and European than Russia. By subsuming it, “Poland would be Russia’s foot in the European door.”¹⁵¹ Indeed, as Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII quoting

¹⁴⁶ Anderson 2003, 277

¹⁴⁷ Anderson 2003, 292

¹⁴⁸ Neumann 2011, 481

¹⁴⁹ Neumann 2011, 481–3

¹⁵⁰ Neumann 2011, 483

¹⁵¹ Osiander 1994, 101

a Russian minister, "They wanted to make an Asiatic power of us [Russia]; Poland will make us European."¹⁵²

Italy's attempts to take Abyssinia was a reaction to its second-class status at the periphery of the Great Powers club. Wight relates that Italy's status as a Great Power was a 'courtesy' after its unification in 1860 and "developed a national inferiority complex through never having proved her place among her peers by war."¹⁵³ Its attempted conquest of Abyssinia "was a desperate act of self-assertion" in reaction to this feeling of inferiority.¹⁵⁴ Note that this mimetic move appeals directly to the particular type of credentialism governing entry into the Great Powers club and the feeling of inferiority is a result of Italy not having been admitted to the club according to this credentialism.

Likewise, French colonialism after 1815 was a reaction to its precarious status, seeking to solidify its position within the club which Bridge and Bullen assert they achieved with the occupation of Algiers in 1830.¹⁵⁵ The humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War which severely threatened France's Great Power status later prompted "a renewed emphasis on colonial expansion" in the 1870s.¹⁵⁶ As Anderson argues, France's colonial drive in this period was a mostly symbolic act to signal prestige, especially in the face of Britain's naval domination.¹⁵⁷ This assertion is especially important for the claim being made here, that, *contra* Hobson, Lenin, and Brailsford, colonial expansion was not just - or even not at all - rationalist materialism.¹⁵⁸ The acquisition and possession of colonies was, at least in part, a signalling move to claim status in the international social hierarchy.

¹⁵² Osiander 1994, 181

¹⁵³ Wight 1946, 47

¹⁵⁴ Wight 1946, 47

¹⁵⁵ Bridge and Bullen 2005, 5

¹⁵⁶ Bridge and Bullen 2005, 5

¹⁵⁷ Anderson 2003, 277

¹⁵⁸ Anderson 2003, 283-292; esp. 291-2.

Japan's imperial activities were equally a part of this game and motivated by their precarious position in the club, particularly as a reaction to the inferiority affirmed by the imposition of unequal treaties and the racial inferiority that endured even after their overturning.¹⁵⁹ Japan wanted to be an equal in international society and an equal as a Great Power and so began to act as such a power through, as is detailed in the above discussion, Japan's subordination of Korea and its military campaigns against China. Indeed, Japan's contribution of forces towards putting down the Boxer Rebellion is a critical move in signalling its belongingness to both the club of civilised states and the even more exclusive club of Great Powers within it. What sets Japan's imperial mimicry apart from the imperialism of those whom it emulated was that Japan was relatively late to the imperial game.¹⁶⁰ As Zarakol quips, "Japan seemed to have missed the memo about overseas imperial enterprises being on their last legs."¹⁶¹ By the time Japan began playing this geopolitical dimension of the entry game, the international norms surrounded imperialism had shifted, delegitimised by Wilsonian norms of self-determination.¹⁶² Playing the right game at the wrong time came with significant consequences for Japan, actually pushing them out of the club rather than winning them an improved position within it.¹⁶³ Zarakol makes the same point about Russia's entry to the club. Zarakol argues that Russia sought entry to the Great Power club based on 18th century principles of dynastic legitimacy and reciprocity, which were soon rendered obsolete elsewhere in Europe in the 19th by the effects of the French Revolution.¹⁶⁴ Like Japan being late to the imperial game after it had been delegitimated in/by

¹⁵⁹ C.f. Okagaki 2013; Suzuki 2013. See Chapter Five for further discussion.

¹⁶⁰ The same can be said of Fascist Italy.

¹⁶¹ Zarakol 2010, 192

¹⁶² Marks 2002, 208–13; Okagaki 2013, 118–9; Zarakol 2010, 192–3

¹⁶³ Neumann makes a similar point with respect to Russia's current foreign policy (Neumann 2008b).

¹⁶⁴ Zarakol 2010, 204–5

international society, Russia played the dynastic game too late and likewise was marginalised and subordinated as a result.

In each case, these actors are ‘frustrated powers’, states whose positions are not recognised by others as being what it perceives itself to be based on a self-assessment of its attributes and an belief in having achieved the criteria necessary for entry into the club as an equal.¹⁶⁵ “Frustrated great powers’ are particularly likely to be sensitive to their lack of recognition as ‘legitimate great powers’ because they may already have sufficient material power, and some may also have been great powers in the past.”¹⁶⁶ The following chapter discusses frustrated powers in detail. For now, though, what is important to note is that frustration with status is a particularly strong motivation behind geopolitical mimicry. Furthermore, the discussion here details the material, hard-power dimension of how frustrated powers respond to their position, whereas Suzuki’s treatment emphasises the ideational, soft-power dimensions.¹⁶⁷

As in domestic societies, it is those precariously positioned between two social classes who tend to signal their belongingness to the higher social class. It is for this very reason that Canada invests as heavily in G-summitry and conspicuously touts its membership in as much as it does. It is (with the possible exception of Italy) the most precariously placed within the club. In the absence of its inclusion Canada lacks any other means to claim that status as a top-ranking world power. Canada’s inclusion allows it to at least claim to be able to ‘punch above its weight’ in international affairs.¹⁶⁸ As Osiander relates about Russia in the 19th century concert system, as a “relative outsider” the country invested heavily in the system for without it, the Europeans could band together against

¹⁶⁵ c.f. Suzuki 2008; Wallace 1973

¹⁶⁶ Suzuki 2008, 49

¹⁶⁷ See esp. Suzuki 2008, 50

¹⁶⁸ Heinbecker 2011a, 9; Penttilä 2013, 61 and 64

Russia such that “Russia could not play the role in Europe to which it aspired, but would be relegated yet again to the sidelines.”¹⁶⁹ For this reason Russia invested greatly in assuming a coordination role within the system, just as Mexico did in order assure itself a position within the O5.¹⁷⁰

Geopolitical mimicry involves more than just taking territory by force, *how* that force is applied and also matters.¹⁷¹ The first dimension to this is the rules by which war is fought. To gain entry into international society, war must be fought according to international law. The point is discussed in detail in the analysis of Differentiation strategies above so need not be rehearsed again here other than to note that mimetic aggression must be exercised within the constraints set by the norms and laws underpinning the club. An actor cannot gain entry into either international society or the Great Powers club within it through unjust warfare. The second dimension concerns what an actor fights with. A state seeking entry fights with an army that mimics those of insiders. Part of the explanation for this is fairly obvious- if to become a Great Power an actor must defeat a Great Power, they will need the technological, strategic, and tactical capacities to beat them which almost necessarily means adopting the techniques and tools of warfare already held by those in the club. It is for this reason that those seeking entry created Western military academies, such as those established by Russia and Siam;¹⁷² adopted Western military strategy;¹⁷³ and weaponry.¹⁷⁴ However, this mimicry was not just strictly functional. Actors seeking entry also discarded their own military dress in favour of Western

¹⁶⁹ Osiander 1994, 241

¹⁷⁰ Osiander 1994, 242; Interview: Anonymous subject 2.2

¹⁷¹ Additionally, as is discussed above, *who* one fights also matters. To become a Great Power a power must be successful against another other Great Power.

¹⁷² See: Gong 1984, 104–5 on Russia’s military academy; Gong 1984, 228 on Siam’s academy. See also Stivachtis 1998; Zarakol 2010, 208–9.

¹⁷³ Gong 1984, 101

¹⁷⁴ Gong 1984, 101 and 221

uniforms.¹⁷⁵ Likewise, the famous Ottoman Janissary band, the *mehter*, was disbanded in favour of a Western marching band. How aspirants fought, what they fought with, and what they fought in all mattered in seeking entry; and, critically, not just for functionalist reasons, the symbolic communication of similarity also was important. It is in these latter dimensions that mimicry is particularly evident as such practices do not yield any concrete functional benefit or advantage. The changing of an army's uniforms and its marching tunes is a conspicuous signal to claim belongingness in the club.

Cooperative Mimicry

International mimicry is not necessarily conflictual. Mimicry is practiced in institutions outside of war, be it in diplomacy, law, or trade. This is not to say that interaction through these institutions may not be conflictual or coercive, as the imposition of the Treaty Ports system makes clear. The focus here, though, is on the manner in which interaction is practiced, with the claim being that it is mimetic in order to gain relative positional advantage within and through that interaction. A particular kind of conquest and warfare is reproduced by outsiders mimicking the practices of insiders in the ways described above. So too are other international institutions reproduced in the same way.

Actors seeking entry mimic the diplomacy of insiders. Practicing the European conception of diplomacy was necessary for meeting the The Standard of Civilisation. English School scholarship is rich with accounts of how outsiders established and mobilised diplomatic assets and techniques modelled after those of the Europeans to meet The Standard in order to gain entry.¹⁷⁶ Examples here are not rehashed for their own sake, but rather to emphasise the extent to

¹⁷⁵ See: Gong 1984, 101, 110, and 221

¹⁷⁶ Gong 1984; Okagaki 2013; Stivachtis 1998; Suzuki 2013; Zarakol 2010

which the adoption of European diplomacy was not just to gain relational advantages in interaction, such as reducing transaction costs by conduction relations through a common institution, but was also mimetic- emulating insiders to signal belongingness. Beyond signing treaties, sending and receiving embassies, attending international conferences, sending government missions, and establishing foreign ministries, outsiders seeking entry adopted the habitus of Western diplomats. Japan's Iwakura Mission is a prime example of how an outsider adopted and used diplomatic mimicry to gain entry. The Iwakura Mission which "virtually empt[ied] the Japanese government for two years, with important national issues to be deferred" until the return of "almost all [the] prominent young Japanese statesmen" who originally left the country to negotiate treaty revisions.¹⁷⁷ The real significance, though was "in affecting the perceptions of the Japanese leaders concerning international politics and *on how Japan should act in order to enter the European club of international society.*"¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the mission did not just figure out how to act like a club member, but was also a means of differentiation. As Okagaki writes, citing Nish, "[t]he Iwakura Mission functioned as a measurement of Japan not only against the West, but also against Asian countries, China in particular, in the degree of modernisation and civilisation."¹⁷⁹ Notable mimicry during the mission itself includes the delegation's ditching of their kimonos upon arriving in the US and Iwakura himself cutting off his traditional Japanese topknot after being criticised in the US press for adhering to Japanese style.¹⁸⁰ As detailed previously, outsiders did not just mimic insiders in their relations with insiders; critically, they did so in their relations with other outsiders. After the Iwakura Mission, for

¹⁷⁷ Okagaki 2013, 65–66

¹⁷⁸ Okagaki 2013, 66. Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁹ Nish 1977, 24; Okagaki 2013, 64

¹⁸⁰ Okagaki 2013, 108

example, Japan began concluding treaty negotiations with Korea and China in English and according to European international law.¹⁸¹

This is equally observed through the institution of international law. Just as with diplomacy, outsiders adopted international law to meet The Standard.¹⁸²

Moreover, they used it in relations with other outsiders and they eventually used it against insiders to improve their own position. Outsiders signalled their adoption of Western international law through signing treaties and abiding by them. As is discussed above, the adoption and observance of the European laws of war serve as good examples. This is especially so in the case of the Sino-Japanese War wherein Japan could signal belongingness through mimicry by conducting themselves within the bounds of what Europeans considered to be just warfare in conflict with other outsiders.¹⁸³ Those seeking to improve their position could come to use international law to their own advantage, most notably by using it to overturn the unequal treaties that had previously and effectively prevented them from achieving full membership. Other illustrative cases include China's use of *de Vattel* to claim the illegality of the opium trade¹⁸⁴ and the nature of the treaty Japan imposed on Russia at the end of the Russo-Japanese War.¹⁸⁵ As Gong relates, Japan used the same punishing language in dictating the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 as Russia had previously used in the Triple Intervention when victorious over Japan in 1895.¹⁸⁶

In the context of G-summitry, excluded states employ the same means to gain entry as club members use to coordinate their activities among themselves—namely, their diplomats. This is neither interesting nor surprising so will not be

¹⁸¹ Dudden 1999, 165; Okagaki 2013, 70

¹⁸² More or less willingly, depending on the case— Japan more so; China, less so.

¹⁸³ C.f. Okagaki 2013; Suzuki 2013

¹⁸⁴ Gong 1984, 152–3

¹⁸⁵ Gong 1984, 197

¹⁸⁶ Gong 1984, 197. This sort of vengeance recalls the view that the severity of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk paved the way the severity of The German Treaty at Versailles.

dwelled upon here other than to say that the extent to which those seeking entry flex their diplomatic muscles is noteworthy.¹⁸⁷ The way that their diplomats signal belongingness is, however. The Italians, for example, were initially excluded from the club and engaged in a vociferous diplomatic campaign to gain inclusion. More than this demonstration of international diplomatic capacity, however, the Italians self-appointed their own sherpa even before they had been granted entry to signal their readiness for the summit's preparatory meetings.¹⁸⁸ The O5 made the similar mimicry moves. Not only did they also appoint their own sherpas, at the 2009 summit they produced a communiqué independent of the G8 on "G5" letterhead, which was met with raised eyebrows by the G8 leaders.¹⁸⁹ The O5 thus attempted to signal that they were not just an auxiliary, Outreach 5, but a Group of 5. It was a carefully calculated discursive move to shift the perception of the marginalised actors' identities. Cooper relates a similar story wherein, "[i]n a significant symbolic display President Lula de Silva handed out Brazilian football jerseys with the number '5' jersey at the l'Aquila summit as a display of apartness from the G8."¹⁹⁰ States thus do not just seek entry relationally; they adopt particular practices that signal their belongingness to the in-group.

6.3.2 Internal Mimicry

Those seeking entry do not only mimic others in their interactions with others, but they mimic others in terms of how they organize themselves.¹⁹¹ For state actors, internal mimicry is domestic mimicry, constructing domestic institutions to be alike those of club members. For non-state actors, internal mimicry is predominantly bureaucratic

¹⁸⁷ Archival records documenting Canada and Italy's entry bids are particularly rich. See bibliography.

¹⁸⁸ Archival document: Kissinger 1975g

¹⁸⁹ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1. The G5 also issued a separate Leaders' Statement at the 2008 Sapporo summit.

¹⁹⁰ A. F. Cooper and Thakur 2013, 64

¹⁹¹ The two dimensions are, of course, inter-related.

mimicry, organising themselves to act like insiders and match or approximate their capabilities. As with international mimicry, there are functional benefits to be derived from an actor adapting itself in this way, but mimicry is more than just functional, it also serves to recast an actor's identity to make it appear more like insiders and less like outsiders.

We have already seen in Chapter Five how dynastic monarchies reformed themselves to mimic European nation-states to overcome the primary collectivist barrier set by the Standard. They, and others seeking entry, reformed their domestic political and bureaucratic structures to fit the Western mould, a mimicry move that aided entry into both the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club. As is detailed below, non-state actors seeking inclusion in G-summitry engage in the same move. States seeking entry sent and received scholars to learn what reforms to make how to accomplish them. In the legal dimension they learned and adopted liberalism (however unevenly), constitutionalism, and courts systems.¹⁹² Furthermore, they outlawed traditional practices deemed uncivilised by the club- namely, slavery, polygamy, and suttee.

Mimicry to meet The Standard extended into the cultural realm too. Here, practices may be most clearly identified as mimetic practices as there is no (or, little at best) relational, functional value to their adoption. A description of mid-1870's Japan captures the totality of its mimicry of the West well,

By 1873 soaps, watches, gold chains, umbrellas, Western hats, jackets, trousers, and shoes were the vaneer of an adoration of things Western that went deeper to include Western literature, philosophies, politics, religion, architecture, painting, sculpture, and music. By 1875 gas lamps flickered at the Imperial Palace gates and the first brick buildings had been erected on the Ginza. In short, the changes in Japan's political

¹⁹² The English School's entry in international society literature is rich with details on the specific instances of mimicry referred to here. See especially: Gong 1984; Neumann 2011; Okagaki 2013; Stivachtis 1998; Zarakol 2010

organisation and its diplomatic and legal sectors, were part of a much larger movement to emulate the general civilization of the west.¹⁹³

Sartorial habits changed, either by convention or decree, recasting everything from people dressed to how men trimmed their beards. Entertainment became Western and so too did calendars. Even the honorific social order was reformed to match that of the Europeans, as in Russia and Siam with the introductions of knighthoods and in Japan with the abolition of clans. To enter the club, mimicry was totalising, leaving no facet of life unreformed.

It is no different in G-summitry wherein internal practices are reformed to mimic those of insiders in order to gain inclusion. This is best exemplified by the mimicry of non-state actors. Non-state actors mimic insiders by making themselves more like them through bureaucratisation. Much is written about Bono and Bob Geldoff's inclusion at the 2005 Gleneagles G8 summit.¹⁹⁴ They were included not just because they were celebrities who could give Tony Blair and Gordon Brown a domestic political boost; but, critically, also because they had a sophisticated bureaucracy backing them.

When we say that a leader is included, what we are really saying is that this individual was included as a representative of a large, sophisticated organisation- the government of a state. When we say that a state did something, it is shorthand for saying that an individual or individuals representing a large, complex entity acted in some way.¹⁹⁵ The same is the case for civil society representatives like Bono and Geldoff. It is not really them included as individuals, but as representatives of something else. In their case, as representatives of a broad civil society movement backed by Bono's twin NGOs, DATA

¹⁹³ Gong 1984, 187; Zarakol 2010, 163

¹⁹⁴ See especially: A. F. Cooper 2007; A. F. Cooper 2007; Pigman and Kotsopoulos 2007

¹⁹⁵ See: Jackson 2000, 34-8; Johnston 2008, xx

and ONE.¹⁹⁶ In 2010, ONE reported \$34,191,290 in net assets and claimed a membership of 3 million people.¹⁹⁷ It has a country presence across the G8 and significant influence in the G20.¹⁹⁸ Due to their celebrity backing the organisation is able to mobilise broad, worldwide support, best exemplified by the Live8 concerts held to influence the Gleneagles summit. These capacities and activities are complemented with in-house policy development, a well-connected board made up of international foreign policy elites, and a senior management that has worked in governments and as a result have strong personal relationships with those in power.¹⁹⁹ Their emulation even extends to Bono having appointed his own (pseudo)-sherpa at Gleneagles, Lucy Matthews.²⁰⁰ ONE is a good example of a large, well-resourced NGO with global reach, both in terms of their geographic presence and ability to lobby governments domestically and in terms of their ability to command global media and generate public support; it is a large, well-funded bureaucracy; they bring concrete function benefits to the club, both in terms of the knowledge and expertise, and also in helping leaders with their domestic political images.

The same is true of other civil society actors who have had success with their G8 and G20 engagement. Notably, the members of the British Overseas Aid Group (BOAG) which is composed of the five biggest NGOs in the UK, ActionAid, Oxfam CAFOD, Save the Children, and Christian Aid. More recently, the Gates Foundation has become hugely influential in G-summitry. Gates is “the 800 pound gorilla in the room,” as one civil society representative put it.²⁰¹ These are all large organisations, in terms of their global reach and bureaucratic heft, which have developed the capacities to make substantive

¹⁹⁶ The two organisations merged in 2007

¹⁹⁷ A. F. Cooper and Thakur 2013, 64; ONE 2014a

¹⁹⁸ Interview:Leo 2012. ONE only has a country presence in South Africa in the non-G8 members of the G20

¹⁹⁹ Interview Ben Leo. ONE 2014b

²⁰⁰ Traub 2005; Interviews: Burnley 2012; Rea 2012.

²⁰¹ Interview; Anonymous subject 6.6

functional contributions which are seen to be the key to their inclusion. As one civil society representative put it, “the aim for CSOs is to figure out how to prove our relevancy, we need to show that we have something useful to say.”²⁰²

Having a “country presence” is of critical importance to civil society’s inclusion efforts in two ways. First, having a significant presence in developing countries gives them the ability to claim expertise and knowledge on development issues. This was particularly useful in the mid-90’s as the G8 began to turn its attention to international development topics.²⁰³ The second way concerns the ability of these NGOs to lobby the club members as they also have “a country presence” in the G8 countries themselves. They thus have the ability to mobilise support for an issue in member countries and directly lobby the sherpas in order to influence each club members’ positions on the summit topics. The country presence of the large NGOs gives them a significant advantage, particularly those like the BOAGs who claim both types of country presence.

Labour organisations are another category of non-state actor that has sought inclusion via decentralised lobbying. Labour typically engaged with the G7/8 through the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the OECD; whereas in the G20 engagement is primarily conducted through the International Trade Union Confederation as most G20 members are not in the OECD.²⁰⁴ The ILO has been included in both summits, though exclusively with the G20 since 2009.²⁰⁵ It was pressure from ITUC that first got the ILO included, arguing that employment was the biggest issue for leaders and that the ILO’s presence was necessary as “they have the greatest expertise in the world about employment and wages.”²⁰⁶ The argument thus entirely appealed to the functional needs

²⁰² Interview: Jo Rea

²⁰³ Interview: Robert Fowler

²⁰⁴ Interview: J. Howard 2012

²⁰⁵ Interview: Pursey 2012

²⁰⁶ Interview; J. Howard 2012

of the club which had particular resonance as they faced the global financial crisis. Since then the ILO has achieved a significant degree of inclusion, with their (pseudo-)sherpa, Stephen Pursey, even listed alongside the state sherpas in official publications.²⁰⁷

Labour groups like TUAC and ITUC have adopted a decentralised approach because they rely on states to argue for their inclusion in their process. They can thus only achieve their goals by having their country affiliates pressure the member governments domestically.²⁰⁸ The coordinated response by ITUC to the near-exclusion of labour from the 2012 Los Cabos summit exemplifies this. The Mexican government was originally not interested in holding a second L20 which, as is detailed above, threatened the success of labour's normalisation strategy.²⁰⁹ After seeing a preparatory document early in 2012 that did not include the L20 at the summit, ITUC responded by putting pressure on other member states via their domestic affiliates to in turn pressure Mexico in sherpa meetings to hold an L20.²¹⁰ At a sherpa meeting on the 2nd and 3rd of February, 2012 the other sherpas stressed the need for an L20 despite efforts by the Mexican hosts to brush it off.²¹¹ Immediately after the meeting an L20 webpage appeared on the official 2012 Los Cabos website.²¹²

What is worthwhile to note is that size confers an advantage upon certain actors relative to others in contexts where inclusion is sought according to a functionalist closure rule. That is, it is the big non-state actors which have emulated the capacities of state bureaucracies that have succeeded the most in gaining inclusion in and, thus, having influence on the club (though to varying degrees). Thus, while there is a shift to a more open, representative global governance order with the increased inclusion of non-state

²⁰⁷ See: Civil20 Russia 2014

²⁰⁸ Interview: J. Howard 2012

²⁰⁹ Interview: J. Howard 2012

²¹⁰ Interview: J. Howard 2012

²¹¹ Interview: J. Howard 2012

²¹² Interview: J. Howard 2012

actors, this does not translate to substantive equality because it is the largest, best resourced non-state actors that have managed to secure the greatest degree of inclusion and wield the greatest influence. The group of non-state actors who fit this description are the large, well-resourced Western actors. As the Stanley Foundation's David Shorr related, Western non-state actors have an automatic privilege over others by virtue of the domestic political context in which they operate.²¹³ As above, this is one motivation for NGOs that do not fit this description to engage in a Banding strategy.

Non-state actors seeking inclusion in G-summitry thus organisationally mimic state actors in order to be able to make functional contributions which club members are unable to achieve on their own. What is significant about this is that seeking entry in this way reinforces the subordinate position of non-state actors in global governance as being useful functionaries for shoring up the capacity deficits of the club, but as nothing more.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the very ways that outsiders seek entry into international clubs serve to perpetuate the *status quo* order. With only the exception of assertive strategies used to gain entry into the Great Powers club, because of the prevalence of deference in the strategies that outsiders adopt to seek entry, ascendant actors by and large do not seriously threaten to the status position of superiorly positioned insiders. Moreover, because of the relatively greater deference required to enter G-summitry and the fewer possible means of entry available to outsiders to get into that club, insiders' positions are even more secure than insiders in other international clubs. Despite G-summitry – particularly the G20 – ostensibly being part of a more open, representative governance order, those seeking entry are actually less able to gain inclusion as equals

²¹³ Interview: Shorr 2012

in the club. Critically, this is so not because of the way that the club excludes, but because of the ways that outsiders seek entry.

This chapter has also served to further reform closure theory, offering a more complete account of the types of strategies that outsiders may adopt to improve their position.

What has been demonstrated is that usurpation is not the only possible strategy available to those seeking to improve their position. Indeed, in the international domain it actually features relatively little. Rather, those seeking entry predominantly do so not by trying to overthrow the existing order but by trying to improve their position within it. The particular norms, values, ideas, institutions, and practices of international society are thus reproduced and perpetuated because ascendant actors are not trying to be revolutionary powers. Thus, even if new actors do manage to assume dominant positions in the status hierarchy, they do so within the structure of system that predated their inclusion. While the members of the in-group may not be able to maintain their dominance indefinitely, because closure works in this way they are at least able to ensure that their values and institutions do. This is picked up in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Stratification and Incorporation

7.1. Introduction

Generally, the way that we have thus far analysed international closure gives us a fairly static description of the system: insiders guard their positions through exclusion strategies and mobility dampeners; outsiders try to overcome closure barriers, but mostly do so in such a way that the *status quo* is perpetuated. Status positions have thus been by and large characterised as largely entrenched and when change has been discussed it has been discussed only indirectly. This chapter fills this gap, focusing entirely on how change happens.

Full-fledged club memberships and the rise and fall of clubs themselves mostly change through incorporation.¹ Insiders bring outsiders into the club according to its functionalist needs, both sides of this dynamic having been explored in the previous two chapters. For a club to survive as a ranking status group it must be functionally effective. If its incumbent membership cannot achieve the club's function, incorporation is the means by which newer members are included so as to shore up the club's functional deficit. It is useful here to recall Bull's observation about the goals of international society, chief among which is the preservation of the society itself.² An outsider may be included if it contributes to this function of the club and if, equally, its inclusion does not threaten it. Closure rules are the means of ensuring entrants satisfy both dimensions. That insiders may incorporate outsiders to suit their own ends is straightforward and not particularly interesting. What is worthy of analysis, though, is how the club

¹ As Chapter Five argued, more assertive entry strategies wherein outsiders enter the club as equals are relatively rare in international society.

² Bull 1977

ostensibly includes outsiders as equal members but substantively incorporates in marginal positions.

The focus of this chapter is thus on intra-group closure. The focus returns to that of Chapter Five, looking mostly at moves made by the superiorly positioned; here, though, their closure moves are exercised not against outsiders but against other insiders who have achieved at least some degree of membership in the club. This chapter is principally about how the status game continues to be played when outright exclusion is not possible. That is, if status cannot be denied (and, conversely, maintained) by closing others out of clubs, how is it accomplished?

The inclusion of new members into international clubs occurs through incorporation. This chapter demonstrates, however, that clubs do so according to a particular mode of incorporation. Whenever possible, outsiders are not brought in as equals to incumbent members. Incorporation is achieved through stratification. Stratified incorporation is how superiorly positioned insiders play the status game when the outright exclusion of others is not possible.

This builds on Chapter Six where it was argued that outsiders stratify the system through deference and differentiation. Here, we see the stratification that is the result of insider's actions. Insiders justify stratification according to *functionalist* necessity, which is the focus of the first section of this chapter. More than this, though, when functionalist necessity fails to keep others in a relatively lower position, insiders will stratify according to a more *collectivist* logic. Insiders guard their status positions against emerging/rising others by pointing to collectivist traits as justification for a continued inequality of status. This is significant. While there has been a normative shift in international society which requires a club to be representatively legitimate, the club

may stratify newly included members according to collectivist ascriptions. Thus, while the contemporary ranking status group seems more just and open, it is not because of this persisting collectivism. Chapter Five demonstrated how legal-collectivism endures as a strategy of closure and below the case is made for adding a 'Logic of Culture' as enduring as a collectivist means of closure. A collectivist Logic of Culture stratifies rather than excludes, as legal-collectivism does, but both types of collectivism involve the same sort of closure move wherein the superiorly positioned protect its/their status position(s) against relative inferiors.

As is argued below, there are two means of achieving such stratification: Functional Stratification and Cultural Stratification. Functional Stratification involves the stratified incorporation of an actor where their marginalisation is justified on grounds of practicality. For example, as is detailed below, that stratification is justified because it makes functional sense for the Great Powers or the leading industrial economies to manage the international system. Cultural Stratification, in contrast, involves stratification within the club wherein the marginalisation of an incorporated actor arises from more collectivist means of closure. Actors are positioned into lower strata because of dissimilarity in their attributes with incumbent club members. Functional Stratification results from a status game grounded (at least ostensibly) in pragmatism or practicality; Cultural Stratification has no such justifiable cover. What is significant is that despite a shift in global governance norms to require a representative governance order in order for that order to be legitimate, as this chapter argues, collectivism endures which undermines the appearance of a more just order. Thus, when taken together with the argument advanced in Chapter Five, collectivism endures in two ways in international society: through legal-collectivism which maintains international society as a society of states and through Cultural Stratification, which maintains the superior position of incumbent club members.

At the theoretical level this chapter demonstrates how a reformed theory of social closure can account for cooperative relations between superiorly positioned insiders and inferiorly positioned outsiders while at the same time capturing antagonistic relations amongst actors within groups.

There are two dimensions of change captured here. First is change in club composition. That is, how new members are incorporated owing to functional necessity.³ The second dimension of change is that of the ordering principles of international society itself.⁴ The claim in Chapters Four and Six that new international norms requiring a just, representative global governance order changes the membership criteria in G-summitry. The change in membership criteria from the G7/8 in which inclusion is mostly based on functionalism, to the G20, in which inclusion becomes partially based on regional and cultural representation, exemplifies this shift. The new normative requirement for group legitimacy is still functionalist, but it is functionalism tempered differently than in the Family of Civilised Nations, the Great Powers club, or G-summitry when it was first established. In order for the club's actions to be legitimate and therefore accepted (or, at least, accommodated) by those excluded, it must be seen as a representative group. Composition is still functionalist, all that has changed is the addition of a new requirement shaping the club's composition in order for it to be able to carry out its function. This shift in the norms underpinning group composition in international society should not be underemphasised. The need for representative legitimacy marks contemporary G-summitry as being distinctly different than other clubs in international society.

³ We have seen how composition changes in the other direction in Chapter Three, with members exiting the club.

⁴ See: Chapter Four

This chapter proceeds in two stages. It first looks at how clubs incorporate and stratify according to functional necessity, focusing on inclusion at the Congress of Vienna and the early formation of G-summitry. The main point advanced is that stratification can be used to achieve the club's functional purpose, it is not just about protecting the status of insiders; though, ensuring that the club is able to perform its function is critical to maintaining the status and legitimacy of the group as a whole. The chapter then examines how the club achieves stratification according to more collectivist means, making the argument that the same sort of cultural logic that stratified the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club stratifies contemporary G-summitry. In contrast to functional stratification, this more collectivist – or, cultural – stratification is entirely about protecting the status of insiders.

This chapter shifts to more of a narrative rather than an analytical frame as has structured the previous two chapters due to incorporation having more to do with path dependence than do exclusion or entry. Incorporation is a closure strategy that changes as the group changes.⁵ Moreover, greater treatment is given to the context of G-summitry than the other clubs as this chapter provides no new empirical information relevant to the Family of Civilised Nations or the Great Powers club, relying entirely on the historical work of others, but does present new research concerning G-summitry.

7.2 Functional Stratification and Incorporation

It is difficult to analytically separate incorporation and stratification as the two go hand in hand in international closure. Clubs incorporate through stratification. They are divided here as best as is possible in order to accentuate the critical dimensions of each for our purposes of understanding how closure works. How clubs functionally stratify is first examined before turning to how they functionally incorporate. This labelling is

⁵ C.f. Zarakol 2010, 252

inaccurate as incorporation *is* stratification, but is useful because it allows us to isolate these two dimensions of closure. The first examines how and why club insiders *construct* a stratified structure and the second examines how and why insiders *change* the status positions of others through incorporation. Stratification focuses on *how* insiders bring outsiders into the club in such a way as to protect, as best as possible, status of insiders despite the enlargement of the club. Incorporation focuses on *why* they do this, which is to protect the existence of the club itself.

7.2.1 Functional Stratification

Great Powers

Two hundred states, cities, associations, and individuals attended the Congress of Vienna.⁶ Only four (later, five) participants, however, really mattered in influencing the Congress and the Great Powers Concert system to which it formally gave birth. As Webster relates, “[n]o appreciable difference would have been made in the final settlement at Vienna if the large majority of the plenipotentiaries had never appeared there at all.”⁷ What follows explores who mattered, why they mattered, and how they ensured that they maintained control by stratifying the Congress. The Congress was a highly stratified affair, with multiple gradations of standing. The uncertainty over how to constitute the Congress and contestation over the issue detailed below had the effect of continually delaying its formal start. After months of delay the ranking powers eventually concluded their closure game to stratify the Congress as they needed and desired. They achieved closure so completely that the lesser powers were entirely excluded from the decision-making process- The Congress of Vienna was never actually called together at all.⁸ The result of the closure game was to ensure that no one save the Great Powers had any substantive role in the management of the European system.

⁶ Osiander 1994, 168

⁷ Webster 1950, 74; see also Simpson 2004, 45

⁸ Webster 1950, 90

There were two imperatives driving this stratification. The first was a matter of practical concern. With so many actors included at Vienna it was seen as impossible to come to any sort of comprehensive agreement, let alone constitute a way to negotiate any agreements that included all concerned equally.⁹ “The idea of a constituent assembly, imagined by some... was found to be impossible. The large number of small States made such an assembly impracticable in any case.”¹⁰ Stratification of the Congress could thus be justified as a pragmatic exercise. This allowed the second motivation for stratification to be at least somewhat masked by ostensible functional necessity. The ranking powers – those who were to be formally ascribed as the Great Powers – wanted to maintain control of the Congress and its decisions.¹¹

The Four faced difficulty in constituting the Congress because there was no basis upon which to base the stratification that they practically needed and self-interestedly desired. The relevant treaties provided neither a guide for how to constitute the Congress nor a legal basis upon which stratification could be justified. Moreover, there was no historical precedence to rely upon as the Congress of Vienna was a new type of summit. Previous international conferences of a similar nature were called to sign peace treaties. Stratifying peace conferences was relatively straightforward as the primary combatants could easily and justifiably assume superior, advantageous positions in the proceedings. The Congress was different because its purpose was oriented more towards managing the future peace of Europe than it was towards just ending past hostilities.¹² As such, “there came to Vienna an enormous number of plenipotentiaries...

⁹ Osiander 1994, 168

¹⁰ Webster 1950, 97

¹¹ Webster 1950, 80

¹² The Treaty of Paris ended the Napoleonic Wars; The Congress of Vienna sought to ensure that hostilities could never resume.

only to find no principle which should govern their procedure and no machinery by which they could be made into a coherent body.”¹³

The Four communicated and met informally and secretly, mostly in Metternich’s apartment, to devise how to constitute the Congress. ¹⁴ Most problematic was figuring out a way to stratify the ranking powers who ostensibly were regarded as equals as “powers of the first order” but who were effectively considered as inferiors by the Four.¹⁵ Spain, Sweden, Portugal, and France were all signatories to the Treaty of Paris and along with the Four were considered to be the eight great powers. Moreover, with the Treaty of Paris, which formally called for the Congress to be convened to settle European affairs via Article XXXIII, providing the closest approximation to a legal basis for the constitution of the Congress, their inclusion in the directing committee was warranted. The Treaty of Paris had secret articles, however, that were unknown to all except France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The first of the secret articles, which France was also unaware of, called for the Allied powers to maintain control of the Congress for themselves.¹⁶ This was affirmed on the 13th of September, 1814 when the ministers of the four ranking Allies – Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia – met in Vienna and agreed to “the necessity of keeping control of the discussions in their own hands.”¹⁷ For the Four to meet and affirm this among themselves already marks out stratification amongst Europe’s ranking powers and signatories to the treaty as Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were also allied signatories who like Restoration France were excluded from this inner club, despite being recognized as first order powers by the others.¹⁸ They were seen by the Four as being relatively lesser first order powers, which is reflected in them having signed the Treaty of Paris after the Four had and having not

¹³ Webster 1950, 74

¹⁴ Gooch 1970, 57. There’s an interesting parallel here with the informality of the Library Group.

¹⁵ Simpson 2004, 6; Webster 1950, 80

¹⁶ See: The Napoleon Series 2008

¹⁷ Webster 1950, 79–80

¹⁸ Simpson 2004, 6; Webster 1950, 80

been party to the Treaty of Chaumont. Moreover, they were not the principal contributors to the land and sea campaigns against Napoleon, particularly the 1814 campaign that drove him from power after the Battle of Leipzig. They did not have their credentials tested in the way that the Four had.¹⁹

At first the Four came to the decision that they themselves would decide the most important matters- those concerning territory. The Four decided that the decisions that they took on these issues would first be communicated to Spain and France, and then to the rest of the Congress.²⁰ This arrangement was communicated to France and Spain “in as palatable a fashion as possible.”²¹ Despite the sugar coating of the Four, the idea was strongly objected to by Talleyrand which precipitated the Banding entry strategy detailed in the previous chapter. The idea of the Six was then abandoned in the face of Talleyrand’ opposition and maneuvering, accepting the eight signatories of the Treaty of Paris as the Congress’ directing Committee. Even still, though, the Four sought to maintain their privileged position. They continued to meet and correspond secretly at the exclusion of the others.²²

Spain’s, Portugal’s, and Sweden’s positions in a relatively lower stratum could thus be somewhat justified on credentialist grounds. Casting France into a similarly lower position was comparatively more difficult and, as is expanded upon below, ultimately impossible for the Four to achieve. Restoration France was seen as an equal in power to the Four but were nonetheless at first excluded from the inner group. France, diplomatically led by Talleyrand, was seen as being capable of taking advantage of cleavages in positions amongst the Four for France’s gain (and to the detriment of the

¹⁹ See Chapter Four for discussion on Credentialism

²⁰ Webster 1950, 83–4

²¹ Webster 1950, 84

²² Webster 1950, 87–91

Four).²³ France was thus initially excluded because of the threat they posed to the interests of the in-group. As was detailed in Chapter Four, France achieved inclusion in the top tier group, expanding the Four to become Five through a banding strategy which was soon thereafter followed by the abandonment of its partners, thus dampening mobility, preventing their upward rise while halting any potential fall for France from its newly achieved status position. Unable to rely on a rationale for France's exclusion that could be accepted because it was grounded in functionalist values – namely, claiming that France was insufficiently powerful to be worthy of the superior status – the Four instead relied on secrecy. Unable to justify their exclusivity, they simply hid their meetings from France and the others.

In their secret interactions the Four also discussed how to win the consent of the lesser powers for the stratified structure that they sought for the Congress.²⁴ At first they agreed that the Six, including Spain and France, would constitute the directing Cabinet of the Congress and that the distinction between the Six and the rest of Europe constituted the distinction between the great and lesser powers. It was at a series of meetings amongst the Four between September 15th and 19th, 1814 that this social division, which would form the basis of the European international society throughout the long nineteenth century, was first articulated.²⁵ Beyond this giving birth to the Great Powers club, it is also significant to note that this club had no legal grounding, having been self-selected and self-appointed by the in-group itself and having been so without any relation to even the Treaty of Paris. This club, in short, was formed in the exact same way as the Family of Civilised Nations and, as is detailed below, G-summitry. The Six, however, “was then to be a sham directing committee... with a real inner Committee of

²³ Webster 1950, 81

²⁴ See: Webster 1950, 81–88

²⁵ Webster 1950, 80

the four Powers...”²⁶ The Six could be socially divided from the rest according to a rationale based on the notion of there being gradation of power, the superiorly positioned of whom had special responsibilities which justified their special status. The exclusion of France and Spain from the real inner Committee could not be so justified, so they continued to effectively exclude them by meeting secretly, even after formally declaring an equality of standing with them.²⁷

G-Summitry

Like the Great Powers club, G-summitry formed to respond to a functional need for system-wide management and stratified the global economic governance order to accomplish that function.

The origins of the club are to be found in a pragmatic solution devised by US Treasury Secretary George Shultz to move beyond an impasse amongst the Group of Twenty at the IMF over how to respond to the oil crisis, stagflation, and conflict over floating exchange rates in 1972.²⁸ The Smithsonian Agreement, which was signed in December 1971 and amended the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, had failed to work as the signatories had hoped, with further devaluation of the US dollar against Europeans currencies and readjustment of the value of the US dollar against the gold standard. Prior to an IMF meeting Shultz invited the finance ministers of West Germany, France, Britain, and Japan to come to his office one at a time to read a speech that he had prepared about the problems with the current system.²⁹ This began a series of regular interactions where Shultz would secretly consult the other four in advance of meetings in order to come to a common position amongst those viewed as being the most important actors in advance of the “unwieldy” meetings. In March 1973 Shultz

²⁶ Webster 1950, 81

²⁷ Webster 1950, 88–92

²⁸ Not to be confused with the contemporary G20

²⁹ Interview: Shultz 2012

suggested a more formal meeting amongst the Five. Shultz cleared the idea for the meeting with Nixon who said that as he was out of Washington on the weekend that the meeting was planned for and suggested that Shultz give it “a little class and have it in the White House.”³⁰ The group met over lunch in the White House library. Seeing practical value in continuing to meet and collaborate but needing to maintain the secrecy of the group, the emerging club decided to call themselves, “The Library Group,” choosing something that would have meaning for those who were included but would not mean anything for those who were excluded.³¹ The Library Group continued to meet on the sides of IMF meetings as well as at other times.³² The group thus increasingly made itself more formal and its interactions more regular, but continued to hide its existence from the rest of the IMF as its exclusivity and the control it exercised could not be justified, being entirely devoid of any legal basis or any other source of legitimacy. As Chapter Three relates, after Giscard mused about the possibility of holding an economic summit, the Library Group became his model for what the summit could be, based on his experiences in the group as the French Finance Minister up until he assumed the French Presidency in May 1974.³³

The interactions of the leaders and their representatives over the following months were all entirely practical in nature, focused entirely on how best to constitute a summit that could make a significant contribution to solving the economic crisis. Giscard, US President Gerald Ford, and the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who also was in the original Library Group with Giscard, discussed the idea of a summit later that month.³⁴ The French claimed that Ford was favourable to the idea, but US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger seems to have been doubtful and Thomas Enders, US Assistant

³⁰ Interview: Shultz 2012

³¹ Interview: Shultz 2012

³² Interview: Shultz 2012

³³ Archival documents: Ingersoll 1975; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

³⁴ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

Under Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, indicated to Giscard earlier that month that the US would be opposed.³⁵ The British government's assessment was that the Americans were deeply skeptical of the idea.³⁶ Two months later the relevant actors all agreed for the need for a high-level discussion on economic and financial matters. Ford, Schmidt, Giscard, and Wilson – “The Four” – agreed to meet on the side of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in Helsinki over lunch on the 31st of July, 1975. Kissinger and Callahan were also present.³⁷ Just prior to the meeting Schmidt circulated a memorandum detailing his argument in favour of a summit and suggested that the idea be formally adopted at “the luncheon of the four.”³⁸ After outlining the problems affecting the world economy and the German position he presented a specific proposal for a preparatory process. Schmidt suggested that the central bank directors should meet, ideally within a month, to agree to a coordinated policy to lower interest rates.³⁹ He stated that “The Conference [*sic*] should be prepared by the personal representatives of the heads of State and Government” and stressed the need for a summit amongst the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, “and possibly also Italy” before the end of the year.⁴⁰ At the lunch the Four agreed on the utility of the summit and agreed on a process for preparing for the summit by coordinating things through a high-level group of experts, the group which would later become known as the sherpas. Wilson suggested that, “The Five,” finance ministers (including Japan) should also meet to prepare for the heads of government meeting.⁴¹

³⁵ Archival document: Bayne 1975

³⁶ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

³⁷ Archival document: Sauvagnargues Calinet 1975

³⁸ Archival document: Schmidt 1975

³⁹ Archival document: Schmidt 1975

⁴⁰ Archival document: Schmidt 1975

⁴¹ Archival document: Sauvagnargues Calinet 1975. This proposal, though, wasn't immediately adopted. Kissinger opposed it outright due to internal political problems he and Ford had with William Simon, the Secretary of the Treasury (Morris 1975)

What is important to stress here is that the club formed in response to the necessity to fix the world's economic system and did so adopting a governance model of that of the Great Powers club, wherein the need for exclusivity was justified because of functional imperative and superior status was the reward for assuming systemic responsibility. The group thus cast themselves as the great economic powers who as such shouldered the responsibility of managing the international economy.⁴² US President Ford's opening remarks at the first summit at Rambouillet emphasise this notion of great economic power responsibility clearly, "[o]ur nations have for three decades been the foundation of human progress and the cornerstone of global peace. We are of central importance to one another – economically, politically, and militarily. The cohesion and vitality of our societies is of central importance to the rest of the world."⁴³ So cast, a stratified global economic governance order could be justified in the same way that the European states system was under the stewardship of the Great Powers club.

This is evident not just in the declarations that the group members made calling for the establishment of the summit but also in the way that they justified the exclusivity of the group's membership to those actors who felt that they should be included. The club justified their exclusivity and their subordination of others on the grounds that doing so made it possible for the largest, industrialised, democratic economies to fix the world's economic crisis. The inclusion of any superfluous actors would harm the ability of the group to accomplish its function. French President Giscard most obstinately denied inclusion to others according to this argument, particularly as concerns the inclusion of Canada.⁴⁴

⁴² Archival documents: Hormats 1975; Sonnenfeldt and Ingersoll 1975a; Volpe 1975f

⁴³ Archival document: Hormats 1975

⁴⁴ Archival documents: Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt 1975; Rush 1975; Sonnenfeldt and Ingersoll 1975a; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1975

Despite Giscard's efforts to keep Canada, Italy, and the European Community out of the club they all gained inclusion.⁴⁵ The G5 expanded quickly to being a G7 (+ the EC) by 1977. As is detailed in Chapter Three, Giscard sought to keep the club as small as possible in order to make its meetings as effective as possible. As quickly as the group expanded it internally stratified in order for those superiorly positioned within it to remain in control, just as was the case of the Four at the Congress of Vienna. "The Four" – the US, UK, France, and West Germany – were a club within the club. From the start of the summit's genesis the Four were those most centrally important. The archival record is rich with communication amongst the Four from the moment the possibility of a summit is first mused about by Giscard. It was the Four that first met in-person in Helsinki and it was representatives of the Four who first formed the Carleton Group in Shultz's hotel room on the 16th of September, 1975.⁴⁶ Japan, Canada, and Italy were marginalised as they were not seen to be of equal political standing to the others. Canada and Italy were relatively more marginalized than Japan as they were also seen as being of sufficiently less economic standing than the others that further division could be warranted. Again, the Four adopted the same rationale as the leading powers at Vienna for internally stratifying the upper echelons of the Congress as the Four, the Five, the Six, and the Eight.

Stratification on political grounds was present from the genesis of the very idea of the summit. Giscard raised the possibility of Italy's inclusion in the interview where he mused about the possibility of holding an economic summit.⁴⁷ Italy's place was not secured though until relatively soon before the summit began, having been debated by the Four for nearly four months before finally being granted. As below, they were

⁴⁵ Italy in 1975, Canada in 1976, and the EC in 1977.

⁴⁶ Archival document: Sauvagnargues Calinet 1975; Interview: Shultz 2012. The Carleton Group was the name originally given to what has become known as the Sherpa group. It was so named after the Carleton Hotel in which they met.

⁴⁷ Archival document: Ingersoll 1975

eventually incorporated in order to give a symbolic boost to the governing Italian democratic party against the Italian communists. Italy was excluded by the Four from the early meetings to form the club claiming that they were meeting without Italy to discuss Berlin, an issue which Italy could not claim any responsibility for or claim any ability to contribute to.⁴⁸ The Four justified their own exclusivity in terms of their own perceived political importance.

What is significant, however, is not just that they initially excluded Italy on these grounds, but that they continued to maintain a superior position by internally stratifying the club even after Italy (and Canada) was brought into the club. The Four continued to meet “under the Berlin umbrella” to discuss political topics at the exclusion of the rest of the G7.⁴⁹ In a meeting between Callaghan and Giscard, Giscard said, “in a case of serious crisis or real emergency, it might be useful to have a meeting of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.”⁵⁰ Callaghan responded highlighting the necessity of excluding others to keep the meetings small and effective, proposing a strategy of, “fix[ing] up crisis meetings at very short notice, before the rats could get at them.”⁵¹ Giscard’s and Callaghan’s use of language is significant, discursively casting the marginal actors in a very unflattering way. Giscard’s language ascribes an identity wherein the marginalised are not fit to deal with “serious” or “real” issues. Callaghan’s language equally, though more bluntly, inferiorly positions these actors by relating them undesirably to rats. The Canadians, Japanese, and Italians were thus characterised as

⁴⁸ Archival documents: Kissinger 1975e; Kissinger 1975d; Morris 1975; Sauvagnargues Calinet 1975; Schmidt 1975; Volpe 1975a; Volpe 1975b; Volpe 1975c

⁴⁹ Archival documents: “Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d’Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977” 1977; Carter and Callaghan 1977; Pallister 1980

⁵⁰ Archival document: “Puerto Rico Summit Meeting” The sentiment was reiterated in a note a month later.

⁵¹ Archival document: “Puerto Rico Summit Meeting”

undesirable pests. To Callaghan, the only “valuable meetings” were those from which all but the Four were excluded.⁵²

Beyond the significance of this internal stratification, it is also worthwhile to note here that, contrary to dominant accounts of the summits, they were not just economic in nature. They were publically portrayed as economic summits in order to justify the exclusion of all but the few members of the club; substantively, the summits always had a political dimension.⁵³

The Four sought to meet privately in advance of the third summit at Downing Street. Carter’s Vice President, Walter Mondale, reported after a meeting with Giscard that the French President wanted to reach a formal agreement “hereby certain members of the summit should have separate political discussions.”⁵⁴ Carter subsequently sent a telegram to Callaghan stating, “I would hope that – as President Giscard suggested and you and the Vice President discussed – we might use the occasion to hold, discretely, a separate, smaller meeting of the four of us with special Berlin interests.”⁵⁵ In a conversation a few days later Carter again suggested to Callaghan that the Berlin cover be used as a cloak for a discrete meeting of the Four at the Downing Street.⁵⁶ Schmidt also agreed to Giscard’s suggestion “that before the meeting of the Seven we could have a meeting at four [*sic*]with the cover, if we need one, of Berlin, for instance.”⁵⁷ The need for secrecy was emphasised in a telephone conversation between Giscard and Callaghan prior to the summit as they discussed possible venues for the Four to meet that would

⁵² Archival document: “Puerto Rico Summit Meeting”

⁵³ At the 1978 Bonn summit the G7 began making formal statements, separate from the declaration, on political topics.

⁵⁴ Archival document: “Economic Summit” 1976. Mondale also discussed the possibility with Callaghan (“Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d’Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977” 1977).

⁵⁵ Archival document: Carter 1977

⁵⁶ Archival document: “Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d’Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977” 1977

⁵⁷ Archival document: “Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d’Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977” 1977. For a record of all that was discussed by the Four see: J. Callaghan 1977a

be, in Giscard's words, "a special place, like a kind of private place, perhaps it would be less offensive."⁵⁸ Not wanting to offend Japan, Canada, and Italy, much discussion was also had about whether or not the Four should meet before or after the G7 meeting.⁵⁹ The Four tried to find a time that would least offend the excluded, should the meeting's existence become known outside of the Four. Callaghan and Giscard discussed the possibility of the Four meeting the evening prior to the summit. Callaghan sent a telegram to Carter a few days later about the summit and Carter responded with a letter in which he suggested that the Four meet after the summit "to avoid embarrassing the others attending the Summit, who might conclude that the purpose of a May 6 meeting among the four was to prepare for the Summit meeting itself."⁶⁰

The French proposed a meeting of the Four in Bonn in 1978 but were opposed by the Americans.⁶¹ The Americans were not as concerned with retaining such exclusivity. Their status position was far more secure than that of the Europeans. The US' rank as the largest economy was undisputed and they lacked any neighbour who might pose a challenge to their position; whereas the Europeans' position was more precarious. Indeed, from the very beginning the US was resistant to France's push for a small directorate, preferring a larger "consultative group" made up of what would eventually become the G7 membership.⁶² Having opposed the French proposal for another meeting of leaders of the Four in 1978, the Four's foreign minister instead met on the side-lines of the Bonn summit where they planned a political meeting amongst the heads of the Four for the following year which would exclude Japan, Canada, and Italy.⁶³

⁵⁸ 1977 2 21 A phone call between Carter and Thatcher about the Four meeting in 1979 later parallels Giscard and Callaghan's conversation. 1979 7 4

⁵⁹ Archival documents: J. Callaghan 1977b; Carter and Callaghan 1977

⁶⁰ Archival documents: J. Callaghan 1977b; Carter and Callaghan 1977

⁶¹ Margaret Thatcher Foundation 2014

⁶² Archival document: Volpe 1975a

⁶³ Margaret Thatcher Foundation 2014

A 1979 political meeting of the Four took place in Guadeloupe. This meeting is significant because it cemented the status positions of the relevant actors, either through their inclusion or exclusion. As with their other meetings before, the Four justified the exclusion of others by claiming that the meeting was exclusively to deal with political topics. In so doing they co-constituted an identity for themselves which held the monopoly right to discuss such topics and an identity for the excluded which lacked this right, thus closing off any opportunity for inclusion. Equally, as before, they did not contain their discussions to political topics alone despite claiming to do so.⁶⁴ Notably, it was at this meeting that the Four decided to exclude Australia from the G7.⁶⁵ Japan, the upcoming summit host and sponsor of Australia's inclusion, was entirely excluded from participating in the discussion. Excluding Italy and Canada from the discussion as well demonstrates that the Four were entirely acting as an executive directorate within the G7. Japan, Italy, and Canada may have been nominally equal members in the G7 but substantively they were not so. Guadeloupe is also particularly significant as it was the first time that the Four were open about their exclusive meetings. With the cat out of the bag, the Four's coordination shifted from an emphasis on maintaining the secrecy of the meetings to protecting the sensitivities of those excluded. Furthermore, much effort went towards maintaining the secrecy of the content of their meetings, not wanting to alert Japan, Italy, and Canada to the extent to which the Four were colluding in advance of meetings of the Seven.

An exercise of deference on the part of Japan may be observed in their reaction to their exclusion. "Japan's feelings towards the Guadeloupe summit were ambivalent – a mixed reaction of taking exclusion for granted on the one hand, and a sense of humiliation on the other."⁶⁶ Deference was expressed in the Japanese population generally, with stating

⁶⁴ Archival document: Vile 1979

⁶⁵ Margaret Thatcher Foundation 2014

⁶⁶ Saito 1990, 62

that “it was almost a relief that the Japanese Prime Minister was not invited, for Japan did not have a leader of sufficient calibre to join in informal talks with these veteran politicians from the Western world.”⁶⁷ In particular, it was suggested that the Four felt that Japan was not qualified to discuss international strategy.⁶⁸

The Guadeloupe meeting was unlike the previous meetings of the Four as its existence was not kept secret, thus publically condemning Japan, Italy, and Canada to second-class status within the club. In reaction to being publically cast as not being suitable for the top stratum, Japan, Italy, and Canada had “a strong incentive to develop the economic summit into a more formal and visible vehicle of political discussion.”⁶⁹ The Four’s prohibiting of Japan, Italy, and Canada hosting a summit before the Four had themselves hosted as a means of affirming their status as the core of group provided the impetus for the integration of the second-tier. Because these three ended up being successive hosts they were able to control the summit process as host over three successive years and thus had a greater ability as hosts to organise things in such a way that they were able to secure greater inclusion. As is discussed below, The Four’s inability to hold an exclusive political meeting in Venice because of the hosts “susceptibilities” exemplifies this nicely.⁷⁰ The second-tier were thus able to wrestle away one of the exclusive competences claimed by The Four.

Thus, the Four used Guadeloupe to cast others into marginal positions. The meeting decided that Australia would be entirely excluded from the club and Japan, Italy, and Canada’s status as second-class members of the club was affirmed.⁷¹ Conversely, the meeting publically affirmed the top strata of G-summitry which was particularly

⁶⁷ Saito 1990, 62

⁶⁸ Saito 1990, 62

⁶⁹ Putnam and Bayne 1984b, 112; Saito 1990, 641

⁷⁰ Archival documents: Pallister 1980; see also: “Venice Summit” 1980

⁷¹ Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark were also insulted by their exclusion (Saito 1990, 63)

significant for Germany as Giscard saw the country's inclusion at Guadeloupe as symbolising its return "to equal international status."⁷²

For the 1980 Venice summit, the choreography involved in having a private meeting of the Four and managing the excluded was as much a concern for the Four then as it was at the Downing Street summit. This was especially difficult as Italy was the summit host. The Four's sherpas met in advance in Sardinia to plan the summit, one proposal for which was to have a "political day" at the summit which would effectively make the previously secret meetings of the Four known publically, but would still exclude Canadian, Italy, and Japan. This, the UK sherpa, Robert Armstrong, related would need to be explained "privately to the Canadian, Italian, and Japanese sherpas."⁷³ Armstrong questioned how to diplomatically "stage-manage" this arrangement, noting that "it will no doubt need to be pursued on a very discreet basis between the right people in the seven Governments nearer the time..."⁷⁴ The sherpas, again affirming the principle of secrecy, "stressed the need to restrict to an absolute minimum the number of people who knew that the idea of a political discussion was even being considered."⁷⁵ They also "recognised that there would be a problem over the lesser allies, who would resent exclusion from political discussion even more than from a purely economic Summit [*sic*]."⁷⁶ Not only does "lesser allies" discursively cast the excluded in a subordinate position, this dimension is particularly problematic, given that it would eliminate the group's strictly economic remit as a justification for having a stratified order in which they were superiorly positioned. The sherpas recommended that the Four be perfectly open about the political discussions in the communiqué so as to quell suspicions of the

⁷² Margaret Thatcher Foundation 2014

⁷³ Archival document: Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁷⁴ Archival document: Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁷⁵ Archival document: Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁷⁶ Archival document: Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

excluded which “would simply be exacerbated if the communiqué referred only to economic subjects.”⁷⁷

With the shift to a more formal arrangement, some sherpas were not prepared to discuss political issues, with the French sherpa, Bernard Clappier, having outright refused to discuss anything but economic topics.⁷⁸ One British proposal suggested that the UK draft a paper to be circulated amongst the Four on “Western foreign policy following Afghanistan” which would then be considered at a future meeting of the Four and then thereafter be shared with the Japanese, Italians, and Canadians.⁷⁹ This arrangement changed slightly over the next month such that each of the Four would prepare papers on different topics.⁸⁰ France suggested that Japan draft a paper on China which the rest of the Four agreed to.⁸¹ As concerns Italy and Canada, “[i]t was not envisaged that the papers to be drafted by the Four would be distributed unchanged to the Seven.”⁸² The sherpas agreed to decide at their next meeting whether or not Japan, Italy, and Canada would be required to undertake any preparation for the summit beyond “considering language for the communiqué.”⁸³

The Four’s sherpas continued to meet on political topics in the lead-up to the summit but did not conclusively agree on whether or not to make political discussions a formal part of the summit.⁸⁴ A month before the Venice summit on the 16th of May, 1980, the Four’s sherpas met at the British Ambassador’s, Lord Carrington, residence in Vienna, to continue the debate. France argued strongly for keeping a political meeting to

⁷⁷ Archival document: Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁷⁸ Archival document: Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁷⁹ Archival document: Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁸⁰ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁸¹ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁸² Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁸³ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁸⁴ At a meeting on the 8th of February, 1980, for example, they discussed Afghanistan, Iran, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and the Soviet Union among other topics.

exclusively the Four.⁸⁵ The US' representative at the meeting remarked that "there was a problem about excluding countries from groups where they felt they belonged. Some cover was needed, and the cover was never adequate."⁸⁶ The "Berlin umbrella" was as good a cover as the Four would ever get. After a further meeting of the Four's sherpas in Paris just before the summit it was decided that they could not exclude the second-tier members "because of Italian susceptibilities."⁸⁷

While the Four decided to include the second-tier, they still sought to hide their "prior collusion particularly to the hyper-sensitive Italians."⁸⁸ It was agreed amongst the Four that France would propose, as a unilateral French document, the Four's draft communiqué.⁸⁹ Then, shortly before the meeting, the US would propose, as a unilateral American document, the Four's proposed agenda. Michael Pallister, the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote, "[w]hen we all meet in Rome, the British, French and Germans will of course support the 'American' annotated agenda, without revealing our part in drafting it."⁹⁰ Pallister continued, "Similarly, we, the Americans and the Germans will in principle support the 'French' draft of the communique passage: but we will, by agreement, severally suggest certain modifications designed to cover the French text at Annex B into the slightly preferable version at Annex C."⁹¹ It was, in Pallister's words, "a rather complicated web."⁹²

⁸⁵ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁸⁶ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁸⁷ Archival document: Pallister 1980. Though they would meet at Venice as a G7, they would meet at the at subsequent NATO meeting in Ankara as the Four under the "Berlin cover." 1980 6 6 The Four also did the same again a year later during Tokyo's summit. Dubbed "The Tokyo Guadeloupe", The Four held a night meeting excluding all others, including, as at Venice, their hosts (Funabashi 1980, 26; Saito 1990, 65).

⁸⁸ Archival document: Pallister 1980.

⁸⁹ Archival document: Pallister 1980.

⁹⁰ Archival document: Pallister 1980.

⁹¹ Archival document: Pallister 1980.

⁹² Archival document: Pallister 1980.

The Four also still did not want the EC, as a non-state actor, in the room for the political discussions.⁹³ They thus decided to sandwich the political discussion between two economic discussions. The idea was that the finance ministers would leave after the first discussion to draft text for the communiqué, allowing the leaders to discuss political matters in their absence. The idea was that the finance ministers would leave after the first discussion to draft text for the communiqué, allowing the leaders to discuss political matters in their absence. It was thought that this would be a good way of ensuring that the European Community's representative, Roy Jenkins, would not be present.⁹⁴ It is at this time that a code word, "Burning Bush," began appearing on British documents referring to meetings of the Four.⁹⁵ The first Burning Bush memorandum detailed how the sherpas agreed to stage-manage the Four's meeting. They would sandwich the political discussion between two economic discussions. The idea was that the finance ministers would leave after the first discussion to draft text for the communiqué, allowing the leaders to discuss political matters in their absence. It was thought that this would be a good way of ensuring that EC's representative, Roy Jenkins, would not be present.⁹⁶

The focus here has predominantly been on Italy and Canada's relatively lower position in the stratified order within the club. Japan too, though, was marginalised by the Four, cast into a position between the Four and the Italians and Canadians, thus further increasing the number of strata within the club.

The near-total absence of communication with Tokyo about the summit is noteworthy. While included by virtue of their strong economic position, the Japanese were not influential in shaping the summit. In addition, the Japanese proposed to host the third summit in 1977 but did not ultimately do so as the "core" countries each wanted to take

⁹³ Note that this is an instance of legal-collectivist closure. See: Chapter Five.

⁹⁴ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

⁹⁵ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980; Pallister 1980

⁹⁶ Archival documents: Armstrong 1980a; Armstrong and Wade-Gery 1980

a turn at hosting before the summit would move to Tokyo.⁹⁷ Japan thus did not get to host until 1979. For the 1979 Tokyo summit the Japanese tried to use the host's privilege to have a greater say over invitations to include Australia at the summit, as they had intended if they had successfully won the bid to host in 1977.⁹⁸ They were unsuccessful in getting the Australians in. Japan's relatively marginal position to the Four is evidenced clearly in a statement made by Ford that, "I should like to stress that while we must, of course, conduct formal representations in a group of seven, this will not exclude continuing contact, when necessary, among Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, and with Japan where appropriate."⁹⁹ In all, while Japan was included as one of the initial G5, they were very much the 5th member with a lower rank than the other Four.

Japan, though, was positioned relatively higher than Canada and Italy. The marginality of Canada and Italy is most apparent in advance of the Puerto Rico summit as this is the first summit to which both are invited. Indeed, as above in the text for the announcement of the summit, proposed by France, goes out of its way to draw a distinction between the Five and expanded Seven.¹⁰⁰ In advance of the second summit in Puerto Rico, Ford suggested that the Five should meet secretly in advance of the Seven, and that the personal representatives of the Five should work together in Washington to decide on the summit's agenda and draft communique.¹⁰¹ The secrecy of their exclusion of Italy and Canada was threatened when at a sherpa meeting the US "half let out of the bag some of the discussion which had taken place at a private meeting on the first day which had not been attended by Italy or Canada."¹⁰² At the summit itself when the Four's

⁹⁷ Archival document: Government of Australia 1976; Interview: Bayne 2012

⁹⁸ Archival documents: Hunt 1978a; Rose 1979. On the proposed 1977 Tokyo summit, 1976 8 11, 1976 11 26 Government of Australia 1976; Enders 1976.

⁹⁹ Archival documents: Ford 1976e; see also: "Puerto Rico Summit Meeting"; Hunt 1976

¹⁰⁰ Archival document: Ford 1976c

¹⁰¹ Archival document: Ford 1976e

¹⁰² Archival document: Hunt 1976

leaders met secretly they even discussed Italy's domestic political situation, "but no mention of this was of course made to the other participants."¹⁰³ Not even Italy.¹⁰⁴ In the meetings to which Canada and Italy were included, their marginality was further apparent. For example, in a detailed note from Hunt to Callaghan reporting on a preparatory meeting in Bonn, Canada and Italy are not mentioned at all in the entire nine page memorandum.¹⁰⁵ Two years previously, in advance of Puerto Rico, Hunt reported that the Italians, Canadians, and Japanese contributed little to the Carlton Group.¹⁰⁶

Russia, like Italy and Canada before it, was incorporated into the club and cast into a marginal position within it. Russia was incorporated to achieve the political aims of stabilising the transitional Russian government and economy and helping to guide them towards the Western, capitalist economy. G7 finance ministries, the US Treasury chief among them, however were opposed to Russia's inclusion. While the political case for Russia's incorporation was strong, the economic case was not. The country, according to the US sherpa, was an "economic basket case."¹⁰⁷ Despite a large GDP, it shrank throughout the 1990's, only beginning a recovery in 1999 and returning to its 1990 levels in 2007. Moreover, the country's economic and financial institutions were either weak or absent. Within the US government, who were leading the effort within the club to include Russia, the Treasury argued fiercely in opposition to Russia's inclusion on these grounds, stressing its unsuitability owing to its lack of an industrialised, market economy.¹⁰⁸ The Treasury's concerns were quashed by the overriding political imperative to bring the Russians in "to support their movement away from communism

¹⁰³ Archival document: Hunt 1976

¹⁰⁴ Italy knew that their domestic situation was being discussed. Schmidt stated so publically (Rose 1979)

¹⁰⁵ Hunt 1978b

¹⁰⁶ Hunt 1976

¹⁰⁷ Interview: Fauver 2013

¹⁰⁸ Interview: Fauver 2013

towards the world economy and give them an anchor in the West.”¹⁰⁹As a result, Russia was brought into the “political 8” but not the “economic 8.” Like Japan, Italy, and Canada in the 1970s, Russia was included in some meetings but not those but not all. Moreover, those that it was excluded from – the economics and finance discussions – were those that were of most import to the club and Russia’s transition.¹¹⁰

In sum, those superiorly positioned at the Congress of Vienna and those superiorly positioned in G-summitry made the same types of moves to stratify their respective clubs, justifying it terms of functional necessity when possible and then getting away with it through secrecy when not.

7.2.2. Functional Incorporation

Great Powers

As was asserted in Chapter Three, Russia wanted to control Poland so that it could be its proverbial foot in the European door as part of its overall strategy to rid itself from being ascribed as a semi-civilised state and to increase its European power base so as to not be positioned at the margins the Great Powers club. Prussia wanted Saxony to likewise increase its own power. With their interests aligned Russia and Prussia joined together to carve up Europe for their mutual aggrandisement. Britain and Austria opposed the Russo-Prussian plan on the grounds that it would make them too powerful, destabilising the balance of power that the Congress was meant to correct in the wake of Napoleon’s conquests and that the Concert of Europe was then subsequently to maintain. The Four were in deadlock over the issue. Prussia threatened war and Russia called for a formal conference on the issue.¹¹¹ Both acts had significant consequences for

¹⁰⁹ Interview: Fauver 2013

¹¹⁰ It is interesting to note that there is a complete reversal here in terms of what meetings become exclusive. Japan, Italy, and Canada were included in economic discussions but not political ones; conversely, Russia was included in the latter but not the former.

¹¹¹ Webster 1950, 132

the establishment of order in the European system. Prussia's threat brought Britain, Austria, and France closer together and Russia's move resulted in the Four for the first time formally and openly being constituted as the exclusive directorate of Europe.

Britain and France immediately called for France to be included in the conference, arguing that their inclusion was warranted given their interests in the Rhine.¹¹² Prussia objected strongly, knowing that French inclusion would almost necessarily mean they would not be able to annex Saxony.¹¹³ Realising this Prussian troops began organising and fortifying Dresden in an attempt to force a quick and favourable resolution before France could be included and Russia's position weakened.¹¹⁴ In response to this aggressive posturing, Britain, Austria, and France met secretly and formed a defensive alliance. The move was a bluff – not least of all because Castlereagh had no mandate to commit Britain to war – but it was never called.¹¹⁵ Upon learning of the secret treaty Prussia backed down and agreed to France's inclusion in the group with the assurance that the Saxony settlement would be a genuine compromise. Russia likewise acquiesced the following day.¹¹⁶

What is significant about this is why France was incorporated into the group. As above, they were initially excluded out of the Four's fear of France's power. This by definition of how an international concert works makes the Four inappropriately constituted as an effective concert because not all the Great Powers were included.¹¹⁷ France was incorporated to break a deadlock that threatened the survival of the club itself and the system which it had responsibility for maintaining. France's incorporation was thus a

¹¹² Only a few weeks before they had likewise called for the inclusion of France in the critically important Statistical Commission as doing so was a condition of France's continued support for Britain and Austria's position on the Polish-Saxon question (Webster 1950, 92).

¹¹³ Webster 1950, 132

¹¹⁴ Webster 1950, 132–3

¹¹⁵ Webster 1950, 126, 133

¹¹⁶ Webster 1950, 135

¹¹⁷ J. J. Kirton 1989

functionalist move. The in-group accepted the expansion of the club with the elevation of France in order to maintain the club's overall position as the dominant and controlling club in the international system.

While I primarily rely upon Webster's account of the Congress because of the solid empirical grounds upon which his history is based, I disagree with his analysis of France's incorporation which he characterises as having "been less due to any effort or intrigue on [Talleyrand's] part than to the fact that the four Powers had been unable to agree, and had, in fact, come to the verge of war."¹¹⁸ I agree with Webster in so far as the disagreement amongst the Four opened the opportunity for France's inclusion. However, France's inclusion would not have been possible if Talleyrand had not engaged in the entry strategy that he had.¹¹⁹ Spain was not dissimilarly positioned than France at the start of the Congress. Spain, however, made no comparable effort to boost its status and gain entry into the top-tier group. Indeed, it is significant to note that France and Spain learned of the Four's designs for a stratified Congress wherein the Six were to be subordinate to the Four at the very same meeting. The proposal was no more acceptable to Spain but it was Talleyrand who led the objection to the plan with Labrador, the Spanish plenipotentiary, playing only a supporting role.¹²⁰ Moreover, Spain made no entry bid akin to France's banding strategy. While included alongside France in the Six, Spain in no way positioned itself to gain entry into the ranking club. Talleyrand's manoeuvres, conversely, correctly positioned France to exploit the cleavage in the club at the right time in order to gain inclusion. In short, the proximate condition for France's inclusion may have been the Four's disagreement, but what ultimately made France's incorporation possible was twin effect of Talleyrand's entry strategy and the club's desire not to break apart. By looking at France's admission to the

¹¹⁸ Webster 1950, 93

¹¹⁹ See Chapter Six

¹²⁰ Webster 1950, 84

Great Powers' club we may thus see both sides of the closure dynamic playing out via incorporation: the outsider seeking entry to increase its status and the insider(s) granting it to maintain their status.

G-summitry

The same functionalism motivated G-summitry members to incorporate other actors into the club and they did so by bringing them into marginal and subordinate positions. Italy was the first addition to the G-summitry club. Against persistent objections from Giscard, Italy was included as doing so served the purpose of providing support for Italian democratic forces against a surging communist party. Despite Giscard including Italy in the original list of potential invitees to the summit, the country became the sole one that was explicitly named in the original interview whose inclusion was up for debate.¹²¹ The US Ambassador to Italy, John Volpe, noted that Italy's exclusion would relegate the country to a "series B classification" which the Italian foreign ministry tried to avoid by principally lobbying the US to give support for Italy's inclusion.¹²² It was believed that the US would be more sympathetic to Italy's case for inclusion than its fellow Europeans as US support might please Italian-American voters; dilute Franco-German pressure on the US at the summit by increasing the number of invitees to the summit; and counter social and economic problems affecting Europe, which could affect the Atlantic alliance, by including the country – Italy – "in which social tensions appeared particularly grave."¹²³

Italy was excluded from the Helsinki lunch at which the Four met and gave constitution to the summit. Italy's exclusion from the meeting was protested strongly by the Italian government. Prior to the lunch meeting US Ambassador Volpe sent a telegram to Kissinger relating that Secretary General Raimondo Manzini, speaking on behalf of

¹²¹ Archival documents: Ingersoll 1975; Kissinger 1975d; Volpe 1975b

¹²² Archival document: Volpe 1975b

¹²³ Archival document: Volpe 1975b

Italian Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor, was upset to learn about the meeting amongst the Four.¹²⁴ Manzini argued that Italy should be included because of its position as President of the European Commission and as the Italian Treasury Secretary, Emilio Colombo, is Chairman of the European Finance Ministers.¹²⁵ Manzini also argued that Italy's exclusion weakened Prime Minister Aldo Moro's domestic position, which was already fragile as his "already shaky government" is under threat of being replaced by the Italian Communist Party, a concern which became a central point of discussion amongst the Four in their debates about Italy's inclusion.¹²⁶ Based on these arguments Volpe recommended to Kissinger that Italy be included.

In the morning prior to the Helsinki Kissinger met with Rumor. Sticking to the Italian strategy, Rumor argued for Italy's inclusion at the lunch by evoking the threat of the Italian Communists, asserting that it provided a big boost to their popularity if the current Italian government was to be seen to not be a big player economically on the world stage.¹²⁷ Kissinger countered that the lunch meeting was not to discuss economic matters and that the four powers met solely to discuss Berlin, stressing that it is symbolically important for the four to meet to underline their rights and responsibilities surrounding Berlin.¹²⁸ Kissinger further countered by stating that he would clarify publically that the lunch was to discuss Berlin and not economic matters.¹²⁹ The French account of the meeting, however, indicates that Kissinger was flat-out lying to Rumor. The French account details four pages worth of discussion about the economy, how to

¹²⁴ Archival document: Volpe 1975a

¹²⁵ Archival document: Volpe 1975a

¹²⁶ Archival document: Kissinger 1975d; Volpe 1975a

¹²⁷ Archival document: Kissinger 1975d

¹²⁸ Archival document: Kissinger 1975d

¹²⁹ Archival document: Kissinger 1975d

coordinate a response, what the preparatory procedure for a summit might be, and, at the suggestion that the summit should happen in the autumn.¹³⁰

Moro and Ford met at the Helsinki summit the day after the lunch.¹³¹ They discussed the threat posed by the election of communist parties at length, both domestically within Italy and internationally. At the meeting Rumor raised the question of the four-power luncheon, which he had asked Kissinger about the previous day when the two had met.¹³² Kissinger, with great diplomatic obfuscation, responded saying, “[t]hat has been denied by the British and by us.” Rumor presses him on the point, this time referring to rumours of a five-power meeting, to which Kissinger again obfuscated.¹³³ Rumor then related the consequences of Italy’s exclusion in terms of it giving a “several percentage points” political boost to the Italian communists and very bluntly related the perception of deliberate exclusion, “You stopped many times on your trips in Bonn and we have a feeling we are on the outside.”¹³⁴ The exchange continued, with Rumor pointedly asking why the US would not publically declare support for Italy’s inclusion and noted that there would be a significant psychological impact on the Italian electorate if Italy were to be included and if there were to be more official visits between the US and Italy.¹³⁵ Kissinger concluded the argument again denying that the US has agreed to the summit, relating that the US was willing to consult with Italy in its capacity as EC President, and that the initiative for the summit was European-driven.¹³⁶ Kissinger’s implication was that Italy should speak with his fellow Europeans.

¹³⁰ Archival document: Sauvagnargues Calinet 1975. Callaghan made the suggestion for an autumn meeting, echoing Giscard’s original proposition.

¹³¹ Archival document: “Memorandum of Conversation” 1975. Also present are Kissinger, Sonnefedt, Hartman, Rumor, Manzini, and Valluri

¹³² Archival document: “Memorandum of Conversation” 1975.

¹³³ Archival document: “Memorandum of Conversation” 1975.

¹³⁴ Archival document: “Memorandum of Conversation” 1975.

¹³⁵ Archival document: “Memorandum of Conversation” 1975.

¹³⁶ Archival document: “Memorandum of Conversation” 1975.

Italian protestations over their exclusion continued after Helsinki. Volpe reported to Kissinger about press reports in which Emilio Colombo, the Italian Treasury Minister, openly raised the question of Italy's exclusion. Volpe noted that the predominant fear of the Italians was that a new permanent economic directorate was being formed from which the Italians were either entirely excluded or, perhaps worse, "invited only as an apparent afterthought."¹³⁷ Italian anxieties over being cast in a subordinate status position outside of the "the Big Five or Big Six" were particularly palpable at this point.¹³⁸ The insecurities, in short, of exclusion were not articulated in terms of being upset about not being able to contribute to a solution to the world's economic problems or concerns over the size of a state's GDP, but rather in terms of social positioning.

The country's inclusion was characterised by Kissinger as "a matter of highest level consideration."¹³⁹ Kissinger wrote that that the Italians had "mounted majo[r] [*sic*] pressure to be included" even adopting a mimicry strategy by having "unilaterally designated Dr Rinaoldo Ossala as their expert [*sherpa*]."¹⁴⁰ An exchange of letters between Italy's UK Ambassador and Sir Thomas Brimelow, the UK's Permanent Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office and the chief UK diplomat, indicated that the UK had agreed to Italian inclusion at the New York sherpa meeting and for inclusion at the summit itself.¹⁴¹ The move by the UK surprised the US, but, as a result, the US agreed in principle to Italian inclusion, suggesting that Italy should check with Germany and France if indeed an invitation could be extended.¹⁴² France and Germany held out

¹³⁷ Archival document; Volpe 1975c. The feared permanence of the group was a particular concern of not just the Italians but other excluded countries, namely Canada and smaller European states that felt they had a right to be included (Greenwald 1975; Hillebrand 1975b; Morris 1975; Volpe 1975a)

¹³⁸ Archival document: Volpe 1975c

¹³⁹ Archival document: Kissinger 1975g

¹⁴⁰ Archival document: Kissinger 1975g; see also: Kissinger 1975f

¹⁴¹ Archival document: Sonnenfeldt and Ingersoll 1975c

¹⁴² Archival document: Sonnenfeldt and Ingersoll 1975c

the longest, refusing approval of Italy's inclusion until "the last minute."¹⁴³ Following French and German approval, Kissinger informed the Italian Ambassador on the 1st of October, 1975, just days before the New York meeting, that Italy would be included, transforming the G5 into the G6.

What is significant about Italy's arguments for inclusion is that the appeals were based on Italy's standing as President of the EC and based on an appeal to the threat of communism. Manzini did not argue Italy's right to inclusion based on the country's economic standing. Manzini's argument is not dissimilar from Talleyrand's at the Congress of Vienna, claiming that the country's inclusion would bring legitimacy to the group (as the EC President) and support the favoured principle governing domestic political organization (as a democratic government).¹⁴⁴ Recall that Talleyrand argued that Restoration France's inclusion would bring legitimacy as a representative of the smaller, excluded European principalities and that its inclusion would reaffirm the principle of dynastic legitimacy against the destabilizing force of revolutionism. On the other side of the closure coin, what is significant about the club's incorporation of Italy is that it was entirely functionalist move. The club's interests were advanced by its incorporation as Italy's inclusion bolstered legitimacy of the club in the eyes of the excluded, smaller European states and quieted (however momentarily) their objections to their exclusion and helped to prevent the communists taking control of the Italian government.

It is worthwhile here to briefly consider the other case of incorporation, that of Canada, in the early days of G-summitry. Canada's bid for inclusion closely parallels that of Italy and for sake of brevity the same points about France's reluctance to grant membership and the US' push for it need not be explored in great detail. It is sufficient to note that

¹⁴³ Archival document: Volpe 1975g

¹⁴⁴ Osiander 1994, 223

both Canada and Italy adopted similar inclusion strategies. What is noteworthy is that Canada's incorporation is like France's at Vienna as Canada's incorporation primarily served the particular interests of members within the club rather than the interest of the club as a whole. Just as France's inclusion at Vienna was championed by Britain and France as doing so helped them secure a favourable resolution to the Polish-Saxon question, so was Canada's incorporation into G-summitry a move that served the American desire not to be "alone in the room with a bunch of Europeans."¹⁴⁵ For the US, Canada's incorporation was a balancing move.

The Outreach 5 (O5) and newly included G20 members were similarly incorporated into G-summitry for the same functionalist reason to maintain the survival of the club. As argued in Chapter Three, unevenly applied credentialism has served as a mobility dampener which prevents the loss of status for incumbent club members, despite an objective decline in their relative standing internationally. As was argued in Chapter Four, a reduction in the efficacy of the club to fulfil its international function creates an opportunity for new actors to be included; or, from the perspective of the in-group, creates the necessity of revising the club's membership else risk the club becoming irrelevant. The imperative for the G8 to incorporate the rising/emerging powers was to protect its own status. This is exemplified well in the exchange detailed in Chapter Six amongst the G8 leaders at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit. With the O5's leaders waiting to be allowed into the meeting room to have lunch with the G8, the Canadian Prime Minister, Paul Martin, raised the possibility of usurpation by the O5.

Faced with usurpation the club moved to incorporate those that could challenge their status. It was preferable to expand the club and have a relatively smaller loss of status than to have the club to be eclipsed and entirely lose its status. This is further evidenced

¹⁴⁵ Interview: Bayne 2012. Japan's inclusion, it seems, was felt to be insufficient for the US to balance against the European bloc.

by the arguments made by Paul Martin to counter G8 members' objections to the G20's creation. The Germans were particularly opposed to the idea of the G20 out of concern for a loss of status resulting from the expansion of G-summitry.¹⁴⁶ Ian Bremmer misquotes and mischaracterises Martin in his work on the "G-Zero" governance order, asserting that "Martin believed that Canada could exchange its first-class seat on a sinking ship for a secure spot on a bigger boat."¹⁴⁷ This was not, however, Martin's motivation for including new actors; rather, it was the argument forwarded by Martin to counter German opposition to the inclusion of outsiders in a new G-summitry forum.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, the Germans were resistant to expansion of the club when discussions of the incorporation of the O5 were being made, being especially reluctant to expand the G8 to the G13. Their private objection ran counter to their public position, having formally launched a dialogue process between the G8 and Outreach 5 at the Heiligendamm Summit in 2007 to investigate the possibility of expansion.¹⁴⁹ The Germans were opposed to a larger group of twenty because they did not want to lose their status as a member of a more exclusive group of seven. Martin's counter argument was that it would be better to be part of a larger group that mattered than a smaller group that was becoming increasingly irrelevant; particularly in the face of the establishment of an "alternative global clique".¹⁵⁰

Japan, it should be noted, likewise resisted the G20's creation because of the perceived loss of status generally. Additionally, though, Japan also feared the elevation of regional neighbours' statuses.¹⁵¹ That is, Japan feared a general loss of global status and a particular loss of regional status. Japan did not want to lose its exclusive position as the

¹⁴⁶ Interview: Martin 2012

¹⁴⁷ Bremmer 2012, 2

¹⁴⁸ Interview: Martin 2012

¹⁴⁹ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

¹⁵⁰ Interview: Martin 2012. It was not only because of status-concerns that Germany objected to the G20. They were also concerned that the club would serve as a moral hazard, with members needing larger IMF bailouts should they default (Summers 2012).

¹⁵¹ Interview: Anonymous subject 4.4

sole voice of East Asia in G-summitry,¹⁵² feeling particularly threatened by the inclusion of Japan's main rival, China.¹⁵³

7.3 Cultural Stratification

The previous section detailed how outsiders justify the marginal incorporation of others in terms of functional necessity. Cultural stratification, on the other hand, likewise involves the incorporation of outsiders in unequal and subordinate ways, but instead involves stratification based on more collectivist attributes. Newly included actors are cast into lower strata within the club because they are unlike the club's incumbents. Incumbent members thus maintain their position through relatively greater collectivism.¹⁵⁴ What seems like a more just inclusion of new actors in a more just governance order actually is not: collectivist closure is still at work, but operating under the guise of inclusivity.

Chapter Three characterised the closure rules that make up the Standard of Civilisation as being predominantly functional-individualist in nature, with the exception of the criteria covering domestic culture. In terms of broader cultural practices and institutions, the cultural dimension included the prohibition of suttee, polygamy, and slavery. It was, however, quotidian norms and practices, such as wearing particular styles of dress, listening to acceptable styles of music, and observance of the Julian calendar that made this dimension of the Standard amenable to being subjectively adjudicated.¹⁵⁵ As a result, incumbent club members could use the mutability of particular rules to safeguard their status positions, picking and choosing which criteria

¹⁵² Saito 1990

¹⁵³ The inclusion of South Korea likely also plays into this; though interview subjects only pointed to China as being seen as a threat by Japan to its status.

¹⁵⁴ To be clear, the argument is not that Cultural Stratification is purely collectivist, but rather that it is relatively collectivist.

¹⁵⁵ Gong 1984

to emphasize in their adjudication of the suitability of a particular entrant, exacting a higher standard from a particular actor relative to another. This was especially useful for safeguarding the status of insiders as it is almost entirely impossible for an outsider, particularly one coming from somewhere geographically and culturally outside of Europe, to satisfactorily meet all of the cultural criteria, not least of all because quite what constituted meeting the criteria could be changed subject to the whims of the club. As Okagaki relates, “[s]ome of the criteria of the ‘standard,’ however, could be recognised more objectively than others.”¹⁵⁶ If wanting to be more exclusionary, the club could raise a particular barrier to entry for any particular actor whom the club did not wish to admit as an equal. The cultural dimension of the Standard is thus what allowed for stratification within the club as the achievement of these criteria could be less objectively recognised by the in-group, allowing for the creation of the sub-strata of semi-civilised and semi-barbarian actors.

The way that new entrants could be stratified within the club was a cause of much frustration. The Japanese charge d’affaires in France, Motono Ichiro, "was shocked to realise how much Japan was looked down on by the West" even after their victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War.¹⁵⁷ France even wanted to deny Japan the customary compensation owed to it by the defeated Russia as an Asian newcomer.¹⁵⁸ The denial of racial equality is the most well-documented dimension of Japan’s frustration with the club’s collectivist stratification, be it in their failure to secure a racial equality clause at Versailles or the racial discrimination faced by their American émigrés.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, Japan chose to exit the European international society in the 1930’s in reaction to the way that the incumbent Europeans treated the country as Japan “perceived itself to have

¹⁵⁶ Okagaki 2013, 40

¹⁵⁷ Okagaki 2013, 117–8

¹⁵⁸ Okagaki 2013, 118

¹⁵⁹ Gong 1984, 198

struggled hard to join them only to be denied a fair place after fulfilling the requirements set forth in their standard of 'civilization'."¹⁶⁰

Similar frustrations were felt by states who believed that they had achieved entry into the Great Powers club but who were likewise denied standing as an equal. Like the mutability of the cultural dimension of the Standard, the decision over who could be recognised as a Great Power was “vulnerable to manipulation (usually by the more powerful actors) and misperceptions. This does mean that for some states fulfilling the criteria need for entry can seem like chasing a floating target, and this only adds to their sense of annoyance.”¹⁶¹ Suzuki refers to such states as “frustrated powers” who “believe they have been refused social equality with other ‘legitimate great powers’ in the course of their interactions with their peers” and who are “not given privileges associated with ‘legitimate great power status’, and perceive a mismatch between their own expectations and the actual ‘constitutive privileges’ they are (or are not) accorded.”¹⁶²

Suzuki, following Ringmar, argues that a frustrated power needs to engage in recognition games in order to gain their denied status.¹⁶³ This involves identifying the norms and rules governing identity in the system and the persuading others that it fits the desired identity.¹⁶⁴ Note that this is in essence what is described in Chapter Four as mimicry. What is noteworthy is exactly what Suzuki asserts that frustrated powers need to mimic. Suzuki argues that being seen as a “good citizen” is especially important for recognition, particularly “in the post-Cold War international society under American unipolarity.”¹⁶⁵ Principally, this involves demonstrating a “respect for human rights and

¹⁶⁰ Gong 1984, 165; Okagaki 2013, 118

¹⁶¹ Suzuki 2008, 49

¹⁶² Suzuki 2008, 49

¹⁶³ Ringmar 2002, 121-2; Suzuki 2008, 50

¹⁶⁴ Suzuki 2008, 50

¹⁶⁵ Suzuki 2008, 50

liberal democratic governance as its core norms.”¹⁶⁶Moreover, quoting Reus-Smit, Suzuki gives a pride of place in the stratified order to liberal democracies whom “because of their distinctive qualities and historical standing... ought to have special rights in international society, both in international decision-making and with regard to domestic autonomy.”¹⁶⁷ There are a few significant things to note here. First, the attributes that need to be signaled are almost exactly the same criteria that made up the Standard of Civilisation. Moreover, recalling considerations over Malaysia’s, Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s memberships in the G20 detailed in the previous chapters, it was according to these same criteria that their suitability for inclusion was adjudicated. Getting out of a frustrated position requires the adoption of Western norms and institutions. Conversely, stratifying ascendant others into subordinate positions can be achieved by the club ascribing those actors as being unsuitably dissimilar in terms of their values and institutions. Simplifying this into the language of identity, the club stratifies as lesser others those who are otherwise objective equals by claiming that they are too dissimilar.

The Family of Civilised Nations used the cultural dimensions of the Standard and racial collectivism to stratify international society. The Great Powers club likewise used/uses hallmark criteria of the Standard to stratify, through at least ostensibly the Great Powers club stratifies based on the more individualist dimensions of the Standard. Both clubs thus stratified according to the same norms, values, and institutions of European international society, wherein incorporated actors ascribed as being dissimilar from incumbents were cast into inferior or marginal positions within the club. The absence – or, at least, lesser prevalence – of racial collectivism absent in stratifying the Great Powers club marks it as being a relatively more open closure system.

¹⁶⁶ Clark 2005, 157; Fidler 2001; Fukuyama; Morris 2004, 275; Suzuki 2008, 50

¹⁶⁷ Reus-Smit 2005, 76

G-summitry likewise culturally stratifies. Most significantly, it does so in such a way that those most similar in identity to incumbents are incorporated into relatively higher positions while more dissimilar actors are positioned more marginally. The qualities justifying stratification are predominantly individualist in nature, marking G-summitry as being relatively open. However, the way that others' unsuitability is discussed is reminiscent of the more paternalist discourse through which the Family of Civilised Nations ascribed those it viewed as outsiders/inferiors.

Chapter Three demonstrated how Russia was incorporated as a stratified lesser, being welcomed into the G7 political discussions – to form the G8 – but excluded from the G7's finance and economics meetings.¹⁶⁸ As the US sherpa at the time of Russia's incorporation related, "the scuttlebutt around the table was that it wasn't an industrial nation, wasn't a free market economy; why are we including them in the club?"¹⁶⁹ The debate over Russia's incorporation was fundamentally about their dissimilarity from the rest of the club. Russia was not just cast into a lower stratum because of its relatively weak economic position, but because its identity did not match those of the club's incumbents. There was a functional reason for its stratified incorporation but that was not the only logic guiding Russia's marginalization within the club.

What is necessary to add to the analysis of this case of stratification is that Russia's incorporation into G-summitry had the same significance as Japan's entry into international society in that Russia's inclusion demonstrated that the relatively homogenous, Western, liberal, democratic club could expand to include actors that did not fit this description and that unlike actors are willing to join. Just as Japan's entry into international society served as a 'proof of concept' for the expansion of

¹⁶⁸ Talbott 2007, 124–5

¹⁶⁹ Interview: Fauver 2013

international society, so too did Russia's entry into the G8 serve as a test case to demonstrate the ability of the institution to expand, as it would relatively soon thereafter do with the establishment of the far less heterogeneous G20. Moreover, that Russia could be incorporated ostensibly as a full member but positioned into a lower stratum than the rest of the club equally demonstrated that such stratified incorporation was possible in G-summitry. What sets the Russian case of stratification apart from that of Italy and Canada within the club in the 1970's was that their marginalisations were entirely cases of functional stratification, whereas in the case of Russia cultural stratification is at play. What is significant about Russia's incorporation is that it set the precedence for the same sort of stratification that divides the G7/8 and G20.

G-summitry's further expansion was further culturally stratified. The G20 did not replace or usurp the G7/8. Indeed, the clearest line of demarcation between strata in G-summitry is the division between the G7/8 and the G20. Interview subjects repeatedly stressed how the G8 and G20 were separate groups with distinct identities.¹⁷⁰ Paul Martin related the importance of having the G20 as a distinct entity from the G8 as it allowed the G8 incumbents' concerns over a loss of status to the institution's expansion to be alleviated. Conversely, having the groups stratified allowed for China to be able to accept membership. China could not join the G8 as doing so would force it to lose its status as the head of the G77 group of developing countries as it would be seen as joining "the rich man's club."¹⁷¹ China could, however, accept membership alongside other emerging/rising powers in the G20, thereby not forcing it to lose its status as the developing countries' leader.

The G7/8's endurance is met with animosity from those G20 members who are not included in the more exclusive club. This animosity was particularly evident when

¹⁷⁰ Interviews: Rea 2012; Martin 2012

¹⁷¹ Interview: Martin 2012

Canada hosted both the G8 and G20 in 2010, holding the G8 immediately before the G20 meeting which conspicuously displayed the marginalised G20 members' second-class status. The Canadians had intended for the sequencing of summits to signal that it was the G20 and not the G8 that had become the primary group for discussing macroeconomic issues.¹⁷² The effect, however, was to make the G20 feel like a group that served only to legitimate decisions already made by the G8.¹⁷³ The G20 was established as a second – indeed, secondary – institution.

What is most significant about the division between the G7/8 and G20 is that stratification is principally along lines of the likeness. Whereas the G7/8 is a “community of values”, the G20 is not so ideationally homogenous.¹⁷⁴ Interview subjects near-universally stressed how the G20 is distinctly different from the G7/8 because of the dissimilarity amongst its membership.¹⁷⁵ Much academic speculation about the future of the G20 revolves around whether or not the group will hold together in the face of the stress caused by the dissimilarity of the club's members.¹⁷⁶ Indeed, as one G8 sherpa related, “cleavages between actors will come to the fore. They're there, just suppressed because G20 is in crisis mode which forced people and countries to get along whereas they might have otherwise not.”¹⁷⁷ The continuance of the G7/8 is justified by its members, despite its lack of representative legitimacy and the G20 having taken the mantle of being the “premier economic forum”, on the grounds that the G7/8 works as a club of alike actors whereas the G20 does not.¹⁷⁸ In interviews the club's

¹⁷² Interview: Edwards 2012

¹⁷³ c.f. J. J. Kirton 2010b, 7

¹⁷⁴ Lesage 2010, 3

¹⁷⁵ Interviews: Anonymous subject 1.1; Anonymous subject 2.2; Bayne 2012; Burnley 2012; Edwards 2012; Fauver 2013; Fowler 2012; Grey 2012; Harder 2012; Martin 2012; Price-Thomas 2012; Rea 2012; Ruthrauff 2012; Smith 2011b; Summers 2012. What is particularly significant about this observation by interview subjects is that it was a claim made by representatives of the G8, G20, and civil society.

¹⁷⁶ A. F. Cooper 2012b; A. F. Cooper and Bradford 2010b; Martin 2013

¹⁷⁷ Interview: Edwards 2012

¹⁷⁸ Interviews: Anonymous Interview Subject 1.1; Edwards 2012; Harder 2012; Grey 2012; Martin 2012

incumbents often regarded the newly incorporated as inferiors. G7/8 sherpas and sous-sherpas as well as civil society representatives related how problematic they found working with those newly included into G-summitry. Civil society representatives were particularly frustrated with China's attempts to block any civil society outreach initiatives.¹⁷⁹ One G8 representative asserted that "the G8 is a real cultural thing. Russia acts very European so it works. But with the G20 you have new cultures in an there is a shift in how you conduct business and diplomacy, they come to the table in different ways. Our people show up with rough mandate and room for manoeuvre but they show no willingness to negotiate, have no room for manoeuvre, and are not willing to talk to the media. It's a new breed of players."¹⁸⁰ This representative continued by asserting that, "most of the intellectual ideas in the G20 were brought by the G8; and, of those from five countries- not Japan, Russia, or Italy."¹⁸¹ One sherpa remarked that "Argentina is in its own world."¹⁸² Another sherpa representing a newly included G20 country related that invited guests at the summit "contribute very little at all. Ethiopia just sat there. They didn't do anything at all."¹⁸³ Another sherpa related that "newcomers don't necessarily see that part of what confers legitimacy to a leader is compatibility with others. They don't have that level of maturity or level of domestic debate."¹⁸⁴ When an invitee bucked this trend, it was met with surprise, "Cambodia had a very good sherpa-very good participation, very good contributions. We found this surprising."¹⁸⁵ Others, however, related that, "I was very impressed with my sherpa colleagues from China, India and Brazil, their behaviours were better than I would have expected."¹⁸⁶ Though, the barely latent paternalism in the observation is worth noting.

¹⁷⁹ Interview: Rea 2012

¹⁸⁰ Interview: Anonymous subject 3.3

¹⁸¹ Interview: Anonymous subject 3.3

¹⁸² Interview: Anonymous subject 4.4

¹⁸³ Interview: Anonymous subject 2.2

¹⁸⁴ Interview: Anonymous subject 3.3

¹⁸⁵ Interview: Anonymous subject 2.2

¹⁸⁶ Interview: Anonymous subject 4.4

Further evidence of cultural stratification can be observed in the relative positions of the newly included. Those most alike the G7/8 are superiorly positioned to the others. Most significantly, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey were the first of the newly incorporated members to be granted the honour of hosting the summit. As one G8 sherpa admitted when asked about these three being the first of the new entrants to host, “They’re closest to us [the G8]. We’re most comfortable with them.”¹⁸⁷ What marks them out as distinct from their cohort of entrants is that they are the only OECD members. Note the Four stratified Japan, Italy, and Canada within the G7 in the exact same way by preventing them from hosting the summits before the Four did.¹⁸⁸

Despite what seems like “the systematically significant emerging countries [being] included as equals alongside the established G8 powers” in the G20, substantively they are not.¹⁸⁹ They are incorporated to provide both material and ideational benefits to the club such that G-summitry can maintain its position as the ranking status group.

However, the new members are not included as equals. Even in the new normative context that calls for a more just governance order, stratification endures. Moreover, stratification endures by this more pernicious cultural means wherein those inferiorly incorporated are positioned as such by virtue of their dissimilarity with the club’s incumbents.

7.4 Collectivist Stratification

The stratification of International Organisations is included here as their relegation to marginal positions within the club is result of the legal-collectivism leveled against them.¹⁹⁰ The nature of stratification is slightly different from what is categorised here as

¹⁸⁷ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

¹⁸⁸ Interview: Bayne 2012

¹⁸⁹ J. J. Kirton 2013

¹⁹⁰ See Chapter Five.

Cultural Stratification in that what has so far been examined is a dissimilarity from incumbent members in terms of secondary closure criteria. In the case of IOs, their dissimilarity is in terms of the primary closure rule. This analytic distinction aside, the nature of stratification remains the same: they are positioned marginally because of a dissimilarity with incumbents and not for functionalist reasons; moreover, they are so positioned in order to protect the status of incumbents. As non-sovereign actors, IOs' subordination within the club through legal-collectivism is a closure move that protects the primacy of states within international society. As is noted in Chapter Three, as state-like entities they are afforded a relatively greater degree of inclusion than other non-state actors, but they are nonetheless stratified according to a collectivist logic.

The first non-state actor to be incorporated into the club was the European Community. As was detailed earlier, the club's motivation for incorporating the EC was to quell the smaller, European countries' objections to their exclusion. The prospect of EC inclusion was first discussed in terms of Italy's inclusion as, in 1975, Italy held the rotating presidency of the EC. Prior to the Rambouillet summit one question that was circulating amongst the club when considering Italian participation was whether or not Italy could be included as a member in its own right or as President of the European Community. Italy's position on the matter was clear- if they were to be included it would be as a member country in its own right thus putting them on par with the other club members, not because they happened to hold the EC presidency. The closest that Italy came to suggesting that inclusion should be based, in part, on its position as EC President came when Volpe informed Kissinger that Rumor wanted to be included at the Helsinki luncheon "especially when [Italy] is president of the EC and Treasury Minister Colombo is Chairman of the Finance Ministers."¹⁹¹ Rumor's claim was still principally that Italy should be included because of its standing as a country, but claiming a right to inclusion

¹⁹¹ Archival document: Volpe 1975a

because of holding the presidency was put forward as a way to bolster that claim. Aside from this one instance, all other arguments put forward by Italy for inclusion were solely articulated in terms of Italy's position as being one of the largest industrialised western economies.¹⁹² As President Moro stated when Italy finally was granted inclusion at Rambouillet, membership was granted because Italy was seen as "a first class power by the other larger industrialized nations."¹⁹³ Indeed, when the question of EC representation at the summit arose, Italy did not want its inclusion to be interpreted as being a result of its position as EC President to the extent that it outright refused to coordinate the positions of the EC members not invited to the summit.¹⁹⁴ As the UK sherpa, John Hunt, later wrote, inviting the Italians because of the EC Presidency "could have created a potentially embarrassing precedent."¹⁹⁵ Having to invite a state only because it held the presidency would likely mean that smaller, less powerful actors would be brought into the group, even if only temporarily. The UK held the EC Presidency in 1977, the same year that the UK was to host third G7 summit. Callaghan asserted that he was hosting the summit solely as the UK prime minister and not in a dual capacity also as the EC President. He was careful to emphasise the UK's inclusion and role in the group in terms of its membership as a sovereign state rather than as the EC President, as any degree of inclusion on the grounds of the Presidency "might set a precedent for others, such as Luxembourg, in future."¹⁹⁶

After word about the Carleton Group's first meeting in 1975 leaked, smaller, industrialised EC states were particularly upset about their exclusion.¹⁹⁷ "The Benelux

¹⁹² Archival documents: Greenwald 1975; J. Hodgson 1975; Kissinger 1975f; Morris 1975; Volpe 1975d; Volpe 1975c; Volpe 1975g

¹⁹³ Archival document: Volpe 1975e

¹⁹⁴ Archival document: Greenwald 1975

¹⁹⁵ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

¹⁹⁶ Archival document: "Economic Summit" 1976

¹⁹⁷ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

Ambassadors formally protested about the lack of prior consultation.”¹⁹⁸ The excluded Europeans finally won their appeal for consultations in 1976, which Hunt characterised as something that “we... will have to live with.”¹⁹⁹ Brussels’ position was that there should be a discussion within the EC for how France, Germany, and the UK could represent the EC.²⁰⁰ Belgium’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Hervé Robinet, relayed to the US that what particularly upset smaller European states was the way in which their exclusion was decided- by *fiat*.²⁰¹ In the days leading up to Rambouillet, Commission officials took the line that the EC’s exclusion from the summit would “have a negative impact on EC solidarity... exacerbating the small member states’ concerns about being dominated by the large ones.”²⁰² They also objected on grounds that their exclusion was unjustified as the issue of trade falls within the competency of the EC rather than the member states.²⁰³ Their objections were exacerbated by the fact that Italy refused to coordinate EC views and represent them at the summit in an effort to not associate their inclusion with their position of EC President.²⁰⁴ EC members continued to protest the exclusion of the EC and their own exclusion as industrialised countries in the lead-up to Puerto Rico. Just prior to the summit, Callaghan’s Private Secretary, Patrick Wright, wrote that Luxembourg sent a telegram protesting the summit and that the UK received ambassadorial representations from Belgium (4 June), Luxemburg (4 June), and Ireland, and that “further representations are expected from the Danes.” (June 7).²⁰⁵ The Irish protested the lack of EC consultation and the Belgians protested the exclusion of the EC President. On the 3rd of June, 1976 Luxembourg went so far as to send a *demarche*, to the White House and the State Department requesting

¹⁹⁸ Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

¹⁹⁹ Archival document: Hunt 1977

²⁰⁰ Archival document: Morris 1975. At this time Italy’s inclusion had not be secured. The first occasion where a common EC position could be formed was at a meeting of EC Finance Ministers in Venice on the 24th of August, 1975.

²⁰¹ Archival document: Morris 1975

²⁰² Archival document: Greenwald 1975

²⁰³ Archival document: Greenwald 1975

²⁰⁴ Archival document: Greenwald 1975

²⁰⁵ Archival document: Wright 1976

the Luxembourgish Prime Minister, Gaston Thorn, be invited to attend the summit as head of the government holding the EC Presidency.²⁰⁶

The question of the EC's inclusion arose again in advance of the third summit in London in May 1977, with the American President, Jimmy Carter, pushed hardest for the EC's incorporation.²⁰⁷ The UK responded to Carter's position by asserting that Callaghan would consult EC members about the possibility of inclusion.²⁰⁸ Callaghan personally phoned Giscard and Schmidt to discuss the fact that Carter was now pushing for EC inclusion.²⁰⁹ Callaghan and Giscard raised the possibility of including Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, as the representative of the ECC. Giscard says it the decision ultimately rested with Callaghan in his role as current President of the Council.²¹⁰ Jenkins had become President in January 1977, having lost the race to succeed Wilson as Labour Leader and Prime Minister to Callaghan in March 1976. Callaghan and Jenkins by this point had become bitter political rivals,²¹¹ though Callaghan did not articulate his opposition to ECC representation in personal terms. In a phone call with Schmidt, Callaghan related, "I told him [Carter] privately I did not want to say anything against Roy Jenkins, as an old colleague, but privately my view was the Community would be adequately represented if you and Giscard and myself were there with [Italian Prime Minister] Andreotti."²¹²

²⁰⁶ Archival document: Wright 1976

²⁰⁷ Archival documents: J. Callaghan 1977b; "Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d'Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977" 1977; "Record of a Telephone Conversation Between Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 March 1977" 1977

²⁰⁸ Archival document: J. Callaghan 1977b

²⁰⁹ Archival documents: J. Callaghan 1977b; "Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d'Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977" 1977; "Record of a Telephone Conversation Between Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 March 1977" 1977

²¹⁰ "Archival documents: Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d'Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977" 1977

²¹¹ Interview: Bayne 2012

²¹² Archival documents: "Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d'Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977" 1977; "Record of a Telephone

The topic remained highly contentious. Callaghan described a European Council dinner for Heads of Government and the President of the Commission at the Palazzo Barberini later that month, as a “long and ridiculous argument” with “the Belgian and Dutch Prime Ministers [taking] extreme positions,” and indicated that “he was the only one present at the Dinner [*sic*] who did not lose his temper.”²¹³ Giscard objected on the now familiar grounds that the inclusion of any additional actors would ruin the informality of the summits.²¹⁴ Significantly, he also raised the primary closure rule in objecting to the possibility of EC inclusion, stating that “[i]f the view was taken that the Commission had to attend, by right, he would not himself go.”²¹⁵ Giscard took the position that the Council President (a state representative) could attend but not the Commission (a non-state representative), suggesting that Callaghan attend the summit in a double role as the UK Prime Minister and as the President of the Council.²¹⁶ To this Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister, exclaimed that he “could not possibly be represented at the Conference by Mr Callaghan!”²¹⁷ Giscard suggested that Callaghan could “be accompanied by the President of the Commission so that the latter could express an opinion on Community matters.”²¹⁸ “Accompanied” is the operative word here, denoting a position for Commission President that is second-tier to the state leaders. Callaghan retorted “that this would be an undignified role for Mr Jenkins.”²¹⁹

Conversation Between Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 March 1977” 1977

²¹³ Archival document: UK Government 1977. Callaghan later noted that Liam Cosgrave, the Irish Taoiseach “had not been ill-tempered.”

²¹⁴ Archival documents: “Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d’Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977” 1977; “Record of a Telephone Conversation Between Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 March 1977” 1977; UK Government 1977

²¹⁵ Archival document: UK Government 1977

²¹⁶ Archival document: UK Government 1977

²¹⁷ Archival document: UK Government 1977

²¹⁸ Archival document: UK Government 1977

²¹⁹ Archival document: UK Government 1977

Jenkins was ultimately invited to participate at the third G7 summit held at Downing Street in May 1977. Like the others cast into second-tier positions, he was excluded from all political discussions.²²⁰ At the press conference following the summit he was not given a microphone. At later summits, when political discussions became part of the official agenda, the sherpas agreed that it would be inappropriate for the EC representative to be part of any political discussions.²²¹ Giscard, speaking to Callaghan, mused that the inclusion of the Commission in any political meetings “would make it a very strange kind of meeting.”²²² While not a strict rule today, the European representatives continue to hold back from any political discussions by virtue of their standing as representatives of a non-state actor.²²³

In contemporary G-summitry, the EU has come closest to achieving equal standing to the state members of the club but still inhabits a secondary position. EU representatives characterise themselves as the 20th member of the G20 to claim an equal status but acknowledge that as the only non-sovereign actor sitting at the table with the club of states they have to “behave accordingly”.²²⁴ In so doing they thus reveal deference to the prevailing order which holds that states and states alone are worthy of full membership.²²⁵ That said, the EU is the sole non-sovereign entity that has near-equal standing to states. This is evident in both substantive and performative ways: EU sherpas and sous-sherpas are included in the entire preparatory process, the EU is mentioned alongside states in communiqués, and the EU presidents are included in the “family photo” at the summits.

²²⁰ Archival document: “Economic Summit” 1976. Callaghan related to American Vice-President Walter Mondale that the club had to be “careful” about political topics “because of possible trouble with the community.”

²²¹ Archival document: Armstrong 1980b

²²² Archival document: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1976

²²³ Interviews: Kobele 2012; Martinez 2012

²²⁴ Interview: Kobele 2012. The 20th membership spot, however, is not the EU’s, it is the place that was meant to be taken by Nigeria (Martin 2012).

²²⁵ Interviews: Kobele 2012; Martinez 2012.

There are a number of important things to note about the EC's stratified incorporation. First, the strength of the legal-collectivist closure rule first identified in Chapter Three is well exemplified, being used both to at first exclude the EC and then subsequently to justify its marginalization. More than this, though, it is worthwhile to note how strongly state actors resisted being tarred by the collectivist brush, with Italy and the UK both strongly asserting that their inclusion in the club in no way was related to their concurrent status as EC President. The EC/EU is a near-perfect case for identifying collectivism as a means of stratification. The EC/EU is alike the rest of the club members in all ways except that it is a non-sovereign actor. It is on these collectivist grounds alone that they are subjected to/through stratified incorporation.

Other IOs are also stratified in G-summitry, though with a relatively lesser degree of inclusion than the EU. Their position is explained by the fact that within G-summitry IOs are characterised according to a functional institutionalist understanding. That is, they are simply the passive instruments of states.²²⁶ They are included because they perform useful functions for the club such as producing reports and providing impartial advice which is especially helpful given that the club lacks a secretariat. Because their identity is ascribed in this way so as to stress their functionalist purpose, IOs are not threats to the prevailing order. They have agency in the system only in so far as states delegate it to them.²²⁷ They are in an entirely responsive position, coming to the table with no agenda of their own. The added numbers of IOs in the process at the G20 speaks to this point. The increase is not due to a shift in the closure order wherein these non-state actors have greater standing, but due to a shift in the needs of the club. With the elevation of the G20 to the leaders' level in response to the global financial crisis, the IOs

²²⁶ This characterisation of passivity was not shared by Gabriella Ramos who characterised IOs more actively as "useful impartial advisors" (Ramos 2012).

²²⁷ Interview: Ramos 2012

that were granted greater inclusion were those with the technical/functional capacities to contribute to an effective solution. The list of included international financial institutions at the 2008 G20 summit which was the first called at the leaders' level to address the global financial crisis reveals this: the IMF, World Bank, and Financial Stability Forum. In short, the point is that the inclusion of IOs is entirely dependent on the priorities of the state members.

IOs' swelled numbers do not mean that they are treated any differently in contemporary G-summitry. One sherpa related that in the preparatory process he threw all the IO representatives out of the meeting, only then inviting them in when their relevant issues were being discussed. "They went mad, they hated it. But you have to kick some people out to make those in the room feel special."²²⁸ There are two especially relevant points to note here. First, this move firmly underlines the fact that IOs are included solely for functionalist reasons and that states recognize no universal, legitimist claim for their inclusion. Second, IO representatives' exclusion is unambiguously relayed as being part of a status game.

7.5 Conclusion

International society is a stratified society. There is a division between those inside international society and those outside and there are gradations of positions – strata – within this broad division. Moreover, within international society's clubs there are further divisions, thus further adding further layers to the stratified order. It is thus incorrect to describe membership as a binary condition, wherein an actor is either inside or outside of the club.²²⁹ Clubs are internally stratified and to miss this feature of

²²⁸ Interview: Anonymous subject 1.1

²²⁹ c.f. Neuman's characterisation of international society as a "layered phenomenon" - "joining it is not a digital question of being in or out, but an analogue question of the degree to which one is in." (Neumann 2011, 466).

their structure is to miss a critical dimension of the politics of international status groups. International groups do not look as we think they do. Groups are not just clubs with members, they are stratified social systems defined by unequal relations of power.

This chapter has also argued that it is necessary to reformulate the way we understand that clubs govern the inclusion of new members. It is not a simple process of bringing an outsider inside. Incorporation is stratification. Outsiders are brought into a club in ways that protect, as best as is possible, the status positions of insiders. This is achieved by casting new entrants into marginal or inferior strata. Thus, the dynamics of club membership is also more complex than we think it is and to miss the way that clubs incorporate is to fail to grasp a key way that order is (re)produced in international society.

This prompts three revisions of closure theory. It requires that closure theory change the way it conceptualizes groups so as to understand them as stratified entities rather than as monoliths composed of members of equal standing. Related, it also requires closure theory to examine closure within groups, not just between them. Third, this chapter has demonstrated that relations between insiders and outsiders do not have to be antagonistic. Club composition changes through a more cooperative process of incorporation. Closure theory needs to reconceptualise how it understands the relations between insiders and outsiders and in so doing recognise that inclusion does not have to be the result of antagonism. This claim goes hand in hand with that made in the previous chapter which argued for the reform of closure theory's conceptualisation of the possible types of strategies that outsiders may engage in to seek entry into the club.

Finally, this chapter has argued that G-summitry stratifies in the same way as the Family of Civilised Nations and the Great Powers club. Critically, it does so not only through a

functionalist logic but also through a persisting cultural logic. Despite contemporary global governance norms requiring a more just, equal, inclusive, and representative governance order, stratified incorporation means that this this order is only ostensibly so. Greater and more diverse inclusion does not mean that entrants are included as equals. Indeed, they are not owing to the fact that the club incorporates through stratification.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

8.1 Closure Theory

This thesis' primary contribution to IR theory is to demonstrate that one of the ways that we can understand the reproduction of order in international society is through social closure. The added value of this theoretical lens is that it allows us to give coherent and comprehensive answers to questions about membership that the English School, the status, and the governance literatures all ask in IR.

Closure theory has not been introduced here into IR unamended from its neo-Weberian form, however. This thesis has made a number of significant reforms of closure theory, not only rendering it suitable for studying international politics but also improving its applicability for studying the original context that the theory was developed for, that of domestic societies.¹

First, this thesis stressed the need for understanding the institutional context in which closure takes place. Understanding the field on which the closure game takes place is critically important for identifying what types of closure strategies are available to actors; what means other than strategies are available to actors seeking to improve or safeguard their own status or seeking to deny it others; and for comparing systems of closure across clubs and temporal periods. This allows us to see how closure operates differently in various contexts, though it operates across them nonetheless. Just because status today is sought by less assertive, geopolitical moves does not mean that closure is any less present in ordering international society, only that it does so by more pacific

¹ It is beyond the scope this research to test these reforms on the study of domestic societies.

and hidden means. Most significantly, this thesis introduced the notion of mobility dampeners into closure theory rendering it possible to identify ways that insiders entrench the status positions of themselves and others by more subtle means than erecting closure barriers. Identifying and analysing mobility dampeners in Chapter Four served as the first step towards identifying causes of stratification other than exclusion rules (though, were still found to be insufficient for explaining all of the stratification in the system, thus necessitating Chapters Six's and Seven's investigations of closure in other dimensions of the system).

Second, this thesis improved closure's taxonomy of exclusion strategies and its understanding of how they actually order society. Chapters Two and Five argued that closure theory's conceptualisation of exclusion strategies is limited and improved it in two key ways. It categorised closure rules as being achievable, unachievable, or ostensibly achievable in order to highlight the necessity of knowing not just what type of rule is being levied in terms of whether or not it guards membership based on a ascribed or achieved characteristics, but also in terms of the relative ease or difficulty of achieving any particular characteristic. A functional-individualist criterion is characterised as being a relatively open type of rule, but its requirements may be so high that it is largely impossible to achieve, thereby rendering the system as ostensibly open but substantively closed.

Exclusion rules were also shown to be unable to explain all of the closure and stratification in the system. Chapter Five argued that closure rules in international society are predominantly functional-individualist in nature, meaning that the barriers to entry are relatively open. Taking only this dimension into account, the system appears to be relatively meritocratic, and indeed would be if it were the sole dimension of closure. The system, however, is marked by much stratification, indicating that

processes other than exclusion rules are necessary to account for in order to fully explain closure in international society.

Third, this thesis similarly improved closure's taxonomy and understanding of entry strategies. Usurpation was categorised as being one strategy among others as part of a spectrum of strategies ranging from being more assertive to more deferential. The full range of possible entry strategies was broadened to also include banding, differentiation, legitimation, and normalisation. There are two theoretical significances to this. First, it allows us to see how entry strategies can account for more of the stratification in the system than just exclusion strategies, principally because of the degree to which deference is embedded in the entry strategies. Differentiation and Abandonment on the part of aspirant members further account for stratification caused by outsiders. Second, as is expanded upon below, it allows us to see that inferiorly positioned outsiders predominantly seek to improve their position within the status hierarchy rather than try to overthrow it. Indeed, even reforming the terminology of strategies available to outsiders from being 'usurpation strategies' to 'entry strategies' is a discursively important move, recognising that non-club members predominantly seek to enter the club rather than usurp it.

This reconceptualisation of entry strategies also allowed us to see that status is not only guarded by exclusion rules, adding differentiation, abandonment and incorporation to mobility dampeners as other means of achieving closure. Beyond the significance of bettering our ability to understand what causes closure and stratification in general, this also allows us to better conceptualise how *outsiders* in particular cause stratification.

Finally, this thesis also demonstrated that closure need not be antagonistic, prompting a revision of closure theory away from its Marxist roots. As above, Chapter Six

demonstrated that entry strategies are predominantly deferential in nature, thus lacking the assertive antagonism of usurpation. Chapter Seven further argued this point by demonstrating how incorporation strategies are also less antagonistic means of achieving stratification. Thus, taken together, the closure moves of outsiders and insiders alike are not as conflictual as extant closure theory suggests.

8.2 Closure in International Society

This thesis has demonstrated that, broadly speaking, international society is a relatively open social system, owing the predominance of functional-individualist closure rules in operation with relatively few collectivist barriers limiting the social mobility of states. As such, overcoming international society's closure barriers is, at least ostensibly, achievable by any state. It also means that the criteria for entry require that an actor contribute to the aims of the club which serve broader functions in the maintenance of international society itself. From the explicit Standard of Civilisation to the requirements of the Great Powers club to the implicit criteria governing entry into G-summitry, the contest, as concerns closure barriers, is surprisingly open and its terms serve specific purposes.

However, a powerful legal-collectivism does sit at the very heart of the system, excluding all non-state actors from membership in international society and its status groups. Sovereignty is demanded as the system's primary closure rule; without it, an actor is necessarily marginal. As such, state and non-state actors face very different closure games. For states, the closure barriers are relatively fair and open; non-state actors, in contrast, are automatically disadvantaged as they face an insurmountable collectivist barrier. That said, there are still collectivist elements that work against state actors. Chapter Seven's analysis of cultural stratification detailed how relatively

collectivist means are used to internally stratify the club. Collectivism thus internally stratifies groups as well as stratifies the broader international domain.

This thesis identified that closure in international society involves more than just closure strategies. Closure barriers are only one element of the closure game. As above, by improving closure theory we are able to see other dimensions of the closure contest which allows us to see how a system can be so stratified despite being a system with predominantly functional-individualist closure rules. Mobility dampeners can be in play which prevent or slow a loss of status while concurrently preventing or slowing the rise of others. Relying on institutional norms, mobility dampeners help to maintain a *status quo* but in a way more subtle than blunt exclusion barriers.

Given this, through its comparative analysis of status groups, this thesis found that contemporary international society is actually more closed than its historical antecedents. Despite today's 'networked' governance order appearing to be more flat and more open, substantively it is not because of the way that the closure game is played. This is a significant claim that warrants emphasis: G-summitry is actually more closed than the Great Powers club and the Family of Civilised Nations. Conversely, this thesis also demonstrated that the Family of Civilised Nations is surprisingly more open than the clubs that followed it.

Chapter Five demonstrated that G-summitry is more closed because of the relative predominance of ostensibly achievable entry criteria guarding its borders. The Great Powers club and G-summitry are more closed than the Family of Civilised Nations according to this dimension of closure. G-summitry is more closed than the Great Powers club in this respect because of the way that legal-collectivism operates in G-summitry. Legal-collectivism is present in the Great Powers club but non-state actors

are not attempting to gain inclusion in that club, thus it is not a relevant closure feature of the Great Powers club in the way that it is in G-summitry. In this respect G-summitry is more like the Family of Civilised Nations, but even in the Family of Civilised Nations legal-collectivism was not a purely unachievable barrier to entry, as evidenced by the transformation and entry of dynastic monarchies into international society. In G-summitry, legal-collectivism is absolute.

Finally, the Family of Civilised Nations has relatively more achievable, functional-individualist entry rules than the other clubs (with the exception of the cultural criteria discussed in Chapter Seven). This further lends weight to the surprising conclusion that that the Family of Civilised Nations is actually a relatively more open club. Additionally, entry into 19th century international society was governed according to the explicitly articulated Standard of Civilisation.² G-summitry lacks any sort of defined, explicit entry criteria. Without explicit membership criteria, inclusion is more subject to the whims of those already superiorly positioned to decide who belongs and who does not, thus marking it out as a less just system. As this thesis' research found, the G20's membership list was entirely at the discretion of the club's incumbents.³ Thus, in this respect too the civilisational club is more open as the rules by which the closure contest is played are openly available to see, being the yard stick by which candidacy for inclusion was assessed and to which incumbent actors were held accountable. G-summitry, in contrast, has no comparable, explicitly articulated standard.

G-summitry is also a relatively more closed club because of the extent to which deference is required in entry strategies. Whereas more assertive strategies are possible for gaining entry into the Great Powers club, this is not so in G-summitry. In this same

² Russia and the Ottoman Empire, it must be noted, attempted entry prior to the Standard being explicitly defined.

³ So too, it should be noted, was the G7's, if we accept the G5 Library Group as its institutional predecessor.

vein, there are fewer opportunities for entry into G-summitry. In this dimension too the Family of Civilised Nations is actually more open than the other clubs because of the relatively greater number of opportunities and ways to seek entry. For the Great Powers club, entry (and exits) is limited to instances of war. For G-summitry it is even more limited to moments when the club cannot manage to achieve international financial and economic stability.

Two broad normative changes in international society also have affected the closure system that render the contemporary social as more closed: the shift in the institutional foundation of the ranking status group and the shift in norms constituting what is held to be a just governance order. Chapter Four advanced the claim that international society's contemporary status group is a construction of the diplomatic institution, rendering G-summitry's norms, ideas, values, and practices different than those of antecedent groups. The significance of the shift to a diplomatic status group is that it places norms of precedence and pragmatism at the heart of the club's operation which broadens the ways that mobility dampening can guard and deny status positions. While unevenly applied credentialism was a feature of the Standard of Civilisation, in G-summitry it endures alongside other dampeners. Unevenly applied credentialism in G-summitry prevents members' continued suitability for inclusion from being tested, meaning that incumbents cannot be kicked out of the club.

The second shift in governance norms changed what is required for a status group to be accommodated by those excluded from it. The Great Powers club and the G7 could justify their exclusivity on purely functionalist grounds- the members were the most powerful actors capable of carrying out the club's function in international society, whether it be maintaining inter-state peace or the international economy. The normative shift that marks the G20 as a different type of club injects the requirement of

representative legitimacy into the club. Functional – or, effectiveness – legitimacy is no longer sufficient; thus, having only the most powerful in the group is no longer what guides club composition. Concert-style governance is no longer held to be acceptable. Regional and cultural representation is required in order for the group to be accepted by those excluded from it, however begrudgingly. This thesis argued that despite this shift to an apparently more just governance order, this apparently more inclusive club is actually a less meritocratic one. Closure endures and this normative shift hides the ways the way that closure excludes better than in other clubs (and in early G-summitry). The imperative of regional representation has the effect of excluding actors who would otherwise be included if norms had not shifted. Economically powerful but geographically alike actors end up excluded from the club. In contemporary G-summitry, only non-European rising/emerging economies may be included. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is worth highlighting that the normative shift has consequences for the mobility of actors such that the system becomes less meritocratic and for particular actors – in this case, emerging European economies – face a more closed contest than others.

What is new is that closure is taking place in a context which normatively requires representative legitimacy from status groups and that closure is being achieved with greater stealth than in the past. That is, the contemporary governance order is meant to be more democratic, flatter, open, and legitimate than it has been in the past. Social closure, however, is still in operation. Closure is not necessarily at odds with such an order; indeed, closure can ensure that those in the society's ranking status group respect and maintain this order. However, as this thesis has argued, closure in contemporary international society (re)produces status groups that do not live up to these norms. Not only does group composition not live up to the normative ideals of the order but the way

that groups are constructed and maintained also fails as more surreptitious means of closure are used to conceal closure practices.

8.3 Order and its Reproduction

Order is reproduced through closure. As Chapter Six detailed, the more ideational dimensions of order are reproduced through the mimicry of outsiders seeking entry. Significantly, order is reproduced not just through imposition from above but through the very ways that actors seek inclusion from below. Moreover, the functionalism that motivates incorporation and forms the basis closure rules require that entrants commit to the maintenance and survival of the existing order. Failure to adhere to this functionalism to any degree means either outright exclusion from the club or stratification within it.

Outsiders predominantly seek to improve their position within the order, not overturn it. This is the case throughout international society's history, though it is most evident in its contemporary, institutionalised form where status concerns are addressed more through diplomatic interaction than geopolitical aggression.⁴ Chapter Six contributed to this claim by demonstrating the relative lack of usurpation in the system and the predominant degree to which deference and mimicry are features of outsiders' entry strategies. Chapter Seven further bolstered this assertion by detailing how outsiders accept incorporation into the existing order. What is significant about this finding is that it provides evidence that tempers the claim that rising states can usurp the existing order by constructing alternative sets of norms, ideas, and values to which other actors can subscribe.⁵ In other words, they produce a second order and place themselves at the top of the status hierarchy. While this thesis does not contest such usurpation as a

⁴ C.f. Ikenberry 2009

⁵ Hurrell 2006

possibility, this thesis' findings indicate that the aspiring actors by and large try to improve their position within the given order, particularly as concerns order in terms of disposition.

In this vein, it is worthwhile here to highlight the success of incorporation as a co-optive move. The rising economies posed a viable usurpatory threat to the club. What is especially significant about the construction of the G20 is that it shows how potential usurpers can be brought into the ranking institution in such a way that ensures that institution's survival, even though aspects of it might be unpalatable to those incorporated. China could not accept membership in the G8 as doing so would contradict its identity as the leader of the G77. It could (and did), however, accept membership in the envisaged G-summitry club, the G20. With this move, the vulnerable Western incumbents were able to incorporate the necessary actors and were able to do so in such a way as to stratify the club, ensuring the survival of G-summitry and the survival of the G7/8, thus maintaining their status. This incorporative move yielded the best of both worlds to the incumbents: the maintenance of status while concurrently expanding the club to maintain functional efficacy.

This thesis has demonstrated that incumbents are very securely positioned in the order and detailed the ways that they secure their positions and the way that others also serve to secure incumbents' positions. That said, a loss of rank is still possible, as international society's closure system has relatively open closure barriers. Even if insiders lose their rank, however, the way that closure works ensures that the second way we understand order is likely to survive. Particular members may lose their dominant position, but the(ir) values, norms, ideas, and practices are likely to endure because of the way that closure reproduces the ideational dimensions of order in an international society, via deference, mimicry, and incorporation. This is akin to an observation made by Parkin

about the shift in domestic societies from collectivist to individualist closure systems, that while bourgeois blood may no longer rank the status hierarchy because of the opening of the system, bourgeois values will continue to do so because their reproduction is embedded in the closure process.⁶ G-summitry may now no longer be exclusively a club of Western members, but it wholly remains a Western institution. Moreover, it remains so not due to coerced imposition, but because of the co-optive dynamics of closure in international society.

While order as rank is relatively vulnerable, what is significant is that the ideational dimensions of order can survive because of the way that the closure game is played. International society's relatively open closure barriers allow for expansion. International society could expand because the Standard was functional-individualist and embedded relatively little collectivism. So too is it the case for G-summitry and its expansion. What is critical is to highlight the tandem structure of the closure system as this is what allows for expansion to be relatively safe for incumbents' status positions. Non-state actors are incorporated into G-summitry and stratified according to the primary closure rule which protects the central position of sovereign states in international society vis-à-vis non-state actors. The secondary closure rules make expansion safe for incumbent states vis-à-vis other states, thus incorporating and stratifying them too. In short, as a category of actors, sovereign states are protected by the primary closure rule in expansion; as a club of particular states, the incumbents are protected by the secondary rules in expansion. This is how clubs survive in an ostensibly more networked order. Clubs fortify their positions by surrounding themselves with networks of outsiders. This is possible and unfolds in the way that it does because international society – like any society – is one governed and guarded by closure.

⁶ Parkin 1979

Closure is neither a bad nor a good thing; closure just is. Closure can be relatively unfair to some groups and not others; it can be more open or more closed (and, more open to some while more closed to others); and it can be governed according to certain criteria and not others. To analyse closure is not to make normative value judgements about the system but to make explicit the ways that closure orders the system. The objective is to make clear the choices, costs, and consequences of governing membership in a society according to any particular mode of closure. We can turn the normative gaze on the outcomes of closure as any particular order may come – and, indeed is likely to come – at the cost of justice or fairness. As this thesis has demonstrated, the shift to having a more geographically and culturally representative status group renders the system less meritocratic, closing off any hope of membership for actors who are geographically alike the plurality of the club’s incumbents- that is, rising European states. A state like Poland would see this as bad and unfair, while a state like Mexico would see it oppositely. The particular significance of this is that it undercuts the axiom that the international status game is one broadly played between the West and the rest. This thesis has demonstrated how closure amongst Western states actually most particularly disadvantages rising Western states in this current governance context, denying them status recognition.⁷ Similarly, a collectivist primary closure rule yields the benefit of a clear order and homogeneity in international society, but at the cost of membership for types of actors excluded by that collectivism- that is, non-state actors. States would see this as a good thing while civil society and the marginalised groups and interests they represent would not.

8.4 Clubs and Networks

Clubs have not become networks. Clubs are not becoming networks. Clubs are clubs and networks are their buttresses. Clubs survive in international society despite shifts in the

⁷ Or, articulated differently, it particularly disadvantages middling powers.

norms underpinning the governance order because they insulate themselves with networks. Networks do not govern the contemporary international society, but rather it is governed by clubs who have surrounded themselves with networks which give them the appearance of being more fair, open governance institutions despite not being entirely so. Network actors accept this governance order as they are trying to improve their positions within the order rather than trying to overturn it.

How do closure strategies produce this structure? As concerns the strategies of insiders, closure rules that are apparently achievable are predominantly only ostensibly achievable, while mobility dampeners concurrently restrict social mobility and preserve the club. Moreover, potential usurpers are incorporated into the club and stratified within its order. Incorporation is relatively easy to achieve for the above reason that outsiders are trying to improve their position within the order rather than trying to overturn it. As concerns the other side of the closure dynamic, outsiders' entry strategies predominantly pay deference to the club, thus perpetuating the *status quo* order and ranking. Insiders and outsiders alike contribute to the survival of clubs and the club-order.

Given this, how do we account for networks? The predominance of functional-individualism, broadly speaking, means that any relevant and competent actor has the potential for inclusion. As international norms shift to require new types of legitimacy in terms of the representation of actors in both region and type and as processes of globalisation make it possible for new actors (and new types of actors) to engage, the diplomatic environment becomes more populated with functional contributions coming from more actors and more types of actors. However, legal-collectivism divides international actors into two broad groups: states and non-states. The supreme value placed in sovereignty privileges states over non-state actors, constituting the broadest

division of international stratification. State/non-state interaction is necessarily stratified such that any network of non-state actors is secondary to the club of states and unequal relations of power mark any networked interaction between state and non-state actors. Because inclusion is functionalist and because the club determines the functional needs, non-state actors, however great their contributions might be, are ultimately in the service of the club. As such, networks are best conceptualised as buttresses surrounding clubs, shoring up their functional deficits.

Potential counter evidence to this are the actions of non-state groups that do try to usurp the order such as anarchist groups. They, however, are met with fierce resistance by the state, entirely marginalising them. Moreover, other non-state actors implicitly ally with the club in marginalising such groups as they differentiate themselves from them, thereby at once acting as a marginalising and stratificatory force within civil society while concurrently legitimating the primacy of states- all in an effort for advocacy groups to improve their own positions within the system. In this respect networked actors not only buttress the club but also serve as active defenders of it. Thus, networks involving non-state actors are secondary to the club for reasons of collectivism exercised against them, because of the functionalism underpinning entry criteria, and also because of their own actions – seeing entry through deference well as themselves engaging in differential closure against one another.

Moreover, it is necessary to highlight that the very way that international society's clubs expand also entrenches the given order as in the process of expansion incumbents are the ones empowered to decide on membership and the terms of membership. Simply put, it was the Family of Civilised Nations who decided on admission of former barbarians, just as it was Martin and Summers who drafted G-summitry's new membership list. Expansion affirms insiders' dominant and empowered position as

having the authority to decide on membership. So too is this the case as concerns non-state actors with networked expansion. States decide on their inclusion, and a particular sub-set of states at that. The inclusion of new states and new non-state actors is not transformative of the order, it reinforces the status and positions of insiders.

Furthermore, this is so in contemporary international society in exactly the same way as it was in 19th century international society.⁸ The expansion of the diplomatic network reinforces the centrality and dominance of incumbents in exactly the same way that the expansion of international society did for the leading European powers

Chapter One left us with two competing narratives from the diplomacy literature describing the same social space in two ways: diplomacy as a club or as a network. Taken as such the accounts are incongruous. Viewed as such we can see that these apparently incongruous accounts are capturing two different elements of closure in isolation of one another. The club account primarily captures legal-collectivist closure while the network account primarily captures functional-individualist inclusion. The two narratives are two partial images of a single social system.

It is not incorrect to say that international society is moving toward a more networked order, so long as the conception of that order recognises the enduring centrality of clubs in global governance. International society is moving toward a greater functionalist order that allows for the incorporation of new actors, but it is one in which collectivism remains deeply embedded. New states may be brought into the club, but the incumbents remain superiorly positioned within it; new non-state actors may also be included, but in such a way that they are necessarily marginal to state actors. This structure is possible because the international closure system has a tandem structure of a primary collectivist closure rule and secondary functionalist rules.

⁸ Anghie 1999, 36; Okagaki 2013, 110; see also: Suzuki 2008

This thesis has argued that, broadly speaking, groups in international society have moved to a more closed system, contrary to what much of the governance and diplomacy literature suggests.⁹ Clubs endure at the heart of the governance structure, with networks surrounding and – critically – protecting their centrality and supremacy. This has the benefit of giving order in what would otherwise be a messy, heterotopic international environment while granting degrees of inclusion to new actors (and new types of actors) who can make functional contributions to the maintenance of the society, its order, and its aims. It comes at the cost, however, of maintaining the status positions of a type of actor (states) and a particular sub-set of actors within that type (rich, industrialised, Western states) in the social order. G-summitry, in its present form, protects the status position of incumbents by incorporating new members of systematic significance to the global economy and including other actors of functional value. In some ways this renders the club more open while in others it renders it more closed. It is more open in that new actors are included; it is more closed in that status positions are more entrenched. This is not a contradiction as looking at it from the club and network narratives would suggest. It is simply how a particular mode of closure works wherein a mix of collectivism, functionalism, mobility dampening, unevenly applied credentialism, deference, mimicry, stratification, and diplomatic norms are all in play.

8.4 Policy Relevance

Of what use is this research outside of academia? It is most useful to policy makers in states who are either marginally included or excluded from the G20. For the likes of Canada and Mexico it demonstrates why such states should invest heavily in groups and that they should do so at the early stages of group formation, otherwise they are likely

⁹ Notably: A. F. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008b; A. F. Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013a; A.-M. Slaughter 2005

not to be included. Conversely, for those who are marginally excluded, not being involved in the group's formation early on means that they are likely not to gain inclusion, no matter how hard they try to gain entry at a later stage. This is particularly so when the principle of geographic representation is acting against their claim for inclusion, as in the cases of Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Poland.

For a marginally excluded country like Nigeria, there is a lesson to be learned from this research as to how to gain entry into the club. A banding strategy wherein Nigeria positions itself as a regional leader and representative is the most likely entry strategy to succeed. Much like France at the Congress of Vienna, Nigeria is positioned to be the leader of excluded African states and can credibly claim legitimacy in that role, particularly as Africa's largest economy. Furthermore, while the club is generally reluctant to accept any new members, it is most amenable to the inclusion of an additional African country.¹⁰ The one vacant spot in the G20 was intended to be Nigeria's, so while the club is unwilling to revisit membership in order to avoid a flood of entry bids by excluded actors, the incorporation of Nigeria could be made in such a way as to minimise the clamour of other excluded actors by pointing to there being a degree of precedence for Nigeria's inclusion and by pointing to the imperative to shore up the legitimacy gap caused by their exclusion. That said, if the incorporation of a further African country is to be considered, Nigeria faces competition for that spot from Ethiopia, who has been invited to six of the eight G20 summits.

There are lessons here for civil society too. Banding is an effective strategy, but actors need to be aware that doing so likely comes at the cost of compromising at least to some degree on policy positions. More significantly, banding also reinforces the collectivist ascription that civil society is a monolithic whole. Banding may be successful in gaining

¹⁰ Martin 2013

inclusion but it concurrently reinforces the false notion of there being *a* civil society. Banding, left unchecked, could thus yield the benefit of greater inclusion, but at the cost of integrity and identity. It is also worthwhile to highlight that civil society actors' allies are not just others in civil society but are states too. Indeed, the most powerful ally of civil society are the incumbent Western members of the club. It is these actors who have the history with, need for, and see value in networking with civil society, in marked contrast to the most powerful new entrants to G-summitry. These states are civil society's best bet of ensuring their continued inclusion. Allied with these states, though, has the consequence of reinforcing the *status quo* order, entrenching incumbents' dominant position as those with the authority to decide on questions of inclusion.

8.5 Further Research

The primary aim of this research was to improve how we think about status and order in international society. A further research programme would involve testing the empirical extendibility of the theory developed here. Especially useful would be an examination of entries (and exits, if possible) into international societies other than developed in Western Europe to test whether or not this theory of international social closure is limited to this single international society alone.

There is also further theoretical work to be done. While this thesis has answered open questions via international closure theory, in so doing other questions have presented themselves. Most significantly, this thesis has claimed that moves made to improve a status position in international society are predominantly individualistic. With very few exceptions, ascendant states do not work together to improve their collective lot. This is distinctly different from domestic societies wherein collective action may prevail; indeed, so much so that closure theory was originally formulated to look at how groups

play the closure game rather than individuals. In short, the open question is: why is there so little class struggle in international society?

One hint to the answer may be found in the fact that there is so much intra-group competition amongst outsiders, particularly via differentiation and abandonment which this thesis' reformed closure theory has allowed us to observe. Ascendant actors are willing to sell-out others in their self-same group if it means a boost in their own status.¹¹ Zarakol also identifies this, "One cannot but be struck by this fact - it is almost as if there was only one spot open for outsiders states at the great powers' table. While there are of course perfectly reasonable geographical explanations for this development, we should also note that this pattern is well observed in the established-outsider stigmatisation dynamics in domestic society: for instance, the advances of younger women or people of colour in business settings often come at the expense of people from their own sub-group."¹² The problem with Zarakol's domestic comparison, however, is that she points to individuals in the international domain while pointing to groups in the domestic sphere.¹³ This is a conflation that must not be glossed over. Putting this criticism to the side, the suggestion is that there are so few high status spots available that collective action is not an appropriate way to improve position because there are not enough 'rewards' of higher status to go around. However, this idea runs into problems when we look at the Family of Civilised Nations as a status group. As Chapter Six argued, one thing that sets the Family of Civilised Nations apart from the other groups is that its numbers are not limited. Indeed post-WWII decolonisation and the subsequent universalisation of equal sovereign membership in international society

¹¹ c.f. Zarakol 2010, 249

¹² Zarakol 2010, 175

¹³ Specifically, she refers to Turkey (The Ottoman Empire), Japan, and Russia. While states are indeed collective entities, I use them as individual entities in line with IR's general treatment of them.

proves that this is so. As such, even if the 'limited spots' argument proves to be true for the Great Powers or G-summitry clubs, it is not true for all international status groups.

Another possibility is similarly about numbers. The lack of collective action may not be due to the number of ranking status spots being limited, but due to the size of international society being so small. An absolute increase in status for a group of self-same actors amounts to a relative status increase vis-à-vis other groups but does not amount to a relative status increase for those within the group vis-à-vis one another. In a large society such collective action is acceptable because there are enough Others against whom an actor can differentiate itself and compare status. In a small society such action does not make sense (i) because collective action by an ascendant group does not leave enough others in lower status positions against whom status comparisons can be made and prestige can thereby be gained and (ii) because it would leave an actor with still too many self-same actors in the same social strata against whom they socially compete in further status games. An appropriate domestic analogy is children in a classroom rather than younger women or people of colour in business settings. To answer this question a comparative study of the ways the closure game is played in an international society with a larger number of actors would be useful. One possibility might be to examine closure in pre-Westphalian, Medieval Europe prior to the setting of the primary legal-collectivist closure rule which limited the number of legitimate actors to sovereign, territorially bounded states.

To conclude, what closure theory allows us to see is that while contemporary international society seems more open, more just, and less hierarchical than its earlier incarnations, in substantive ways it is not actually so. It allows us to detail precisely how it is not, who is disadvantaged by this, and what causes it to be so. All societies have

some form of order which means that there is some form of rank and some set of norms, values, and practices underpinning it. As such, in all societies there is a status game to be played and a second game to be played over the rules governing that status game.

International closure theory makes these games observable, despite being relatively hidden as they are in today's international society.

Works Cited

- Abbott, Andrew. 2001. *Time Matters: On Theory and Method*. University of Chicago Press.
- Adler, Emanuel. 2008. "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post—Cold War Transformation." *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 2: 195–230.
- Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. 2014. "Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society." *International Organization* 68, no. 01: 143–76.
- Albert, Mathias, Barry Buzan, and Michael Zürn, eds. 2013. *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alderson, Kai, and Andrew Hurrell, eds. 2000. *Hedley Bull On International Society*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Alexandrowicz, Charles Henry. 1967. *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies: (16th, 17th and 18th Centuries)*. Clarendon Press.
- Anderson, M. S. 2003. *The Ascendancy of Europe, 1815-1914*. 3rd ed.. Harlow: Pearson Longman.
- Anghie, Antony. 1999. "Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law." *Harvard International Law Journal* 40, no. 1: 1–80.
- Ariga, Nagao. 1896. *La Guerre Sino-Japonaise Au Point De Vue Du Droit International*. Nabu Press.
- Armstrong, Robert. 1991. *Summits: A Sherpa's Eye View*. Leeds: University of Leeds Review?
- Babbie, Earl. 1995. *The Practice of Social Research*. 7th ed Cengage Learning.
- Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. "Power in International Politics." *International Organization* 59, no. 01: 39–75.
- Barry, Tom. 2005. "G8/G7 and Global Governance." At http://www.fpif.org/reports/g8g7_and_global_governance, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Barston, R P. 2006. *Modern Diplomacy..* Vol. 3rd Harlow: Pearson/Longman.
- Bayne, Nicholas. 2000. *Hanging in There: The G7 and G8 Summit in Maturity and Renewal*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- . 2005. *Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- . 2007. "G8 Process and Performance: Past, Present, and Future." In Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona, and John J. Kirton, eds. *Corporate, Public and Global Governance : The G8 Contribution* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bernard, Harvey Russell. 2006. *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Rowman Altamira.
- Berridge, G. R., Maurice Keens-Soper, and Thomas Otte, eds. 2001. *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Berridge, Geoff. 2005. *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice..* Vol. 3rd Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bisley, Nick. 2012. *Great Powers in the Changing International Order*. 1st Edition edition Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Black, Lindsay, and Yih-Jye Hwang. 2012. "China and Japan's Quest for Great Power Status: Norm Entrepreneurship in Anti-Piracy Responses." *International Relations* 26, no. 4: 431–51.

- Booth, Alan, and Sean Glynn. 1979. "The Public Records and Recent British Economic Historiography." *The Economic History Review* 32, no. 3: 303–15.
- Bottero, Wendy. 2004. *Stratification*. Taylor & Francis Ltd.
- Brady, Henry E., and David Collier, eds. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Second Edition*. 2nd ed Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Bravely-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne. 2009. "The Diplomacy of Caribbean Community States: Searching for Resilience." In Andrew F Cooper and Timothy M Shaw, eds. *Diplomacies of Small States* Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bremmer, Ian. 2012. *Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World*. Portfolio Penguin.
- Bridge, F. R., and Roger Bullen. 2005. *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914*. Pearson Education.
- Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 4th edition edition Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 1984. "The Emergency of a Universal International Society." In Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. *The Expansion of International Society* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson, eds. 1984. *The Expansion of International Society*. OUP Oxford.
- Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. 1984a. "Introduction." In Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. *The Expansion of International Society* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1984b. "Conclusion." In Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds. *The Expansion of International Society* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Buzan, Barry. 2004a. *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*. Cambridge University Press.
- . 2004b. "Primary Institutions in International Society." *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* Cambridge University Press.
- . 2004c. *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*. 1 edition Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity.
- Buzan, Barry, and Mathias Albert. 2010. "Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory." *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 3: 315–37.
- Buzan, Barry, and Rosemary Foot, eds. 2004. *Does China Matter?: A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal*. New edition edition London; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Caliari, Aldo. 2011. "Multiple Multilateralisms in the Post-Crisis Response: UN vs. G20." *The Academic Council on the United Nations System* no. 1. At <http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/MultipleMultilaterisms.pdf>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Callaghan, Mike, Stephen Grenville, Jason Sharman, and Mark Thirlwell. 2013. "G20: Rebutting Some Misconceptions." *Lowly Institute G20 Monitor* 1, no. 2. At http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/g20_monitor_2.pdf, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. U of Minnesota Press.
- Carin, Barry. 2010. "The Future of the G20 Process." *CIGI G20 Papers* no. 3. At <http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/11/future-g20-process>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- . 2012. Interview by Tristen Naylor. Skype.
- Cheng, Sinjin. 2004. "Gauging China's Capabilities and Intentions under Deng and Mao Cheng." In Cathal J. Nolan, ed. *Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation Versus Transformation* Praeger.

- Clark, Ian. 1989. *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2005. *Legitimacy in International Society*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- . 2007. *International Legitimacy and World Society*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Coicaud, Jean-Marc, and Veijo Aulis Heiskanen. 2001. *The Legitimacy of International Organizations*. United Nations University Press.
- Collins, Randall. 1979. *Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification*. New York: Academic Press Inc.
- Constantinou, Costas M. 1996. *On The Way To Diplomacy*. Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cooley, Alexander. 2008. *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations*. Ithaca, NY u.a.: Cornell University Press.
- Cooper, Andrew F. 2008. *Celebrity Diplomacy*. Boulder; London: Paradigm Publishers.
- . 2012a. "The G20 as the Global Focus Group: Beyond the Crisis Committee/Steering Committee Framework." At <http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/worlds-of-global-governance/g20-global-focus-group>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- . "Celebrity Diplomacy and the G8: Bono and Bob as Legitimate International Actors." CIGI Working Papers CIGI. At <http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2007/9/celebrity-diplomacy-and-g8-bono-and-bob-legitimate-international-actors>.
- . 2012b. "The G20 as the Global Focus Group: Beyond the Crisis Committee/Steering Committee Framework." *G20 Research Group*. At <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/120619-cooper-focusgroup.html>.
- . 2013. "Civil Society Relationships with the G20: An Extension of the G8 Template or Distinctive Pattern of Engagement?" *Global Society* 27, no. 2: 179–200.
- Cooper, Andrew F., and Colin Bradford. 2010a. "The G20 and the Post-Crisis Economic Order." *CIGI G20 Papers* no. 3. At <http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/6/g20-and-post-crisis-economic-order>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- . 2010b. "The G20 and the Post-Crisis Economic Order." *CIGI G20 Papers* CIGI. At <http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/6/g20-and-post-crisis-economic-order>.
- Cooper, Andrew F., Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. 2013. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. OUP Oxford.
- Cooper, Andrew F., Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds. 2008b. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke England ; New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.
- Cooper, Andrew F., and Ramesh Thakur. 2013. *The Group of Twenty*. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Cooper, Duff. 2001. *Talleyrand*. Grove Press.
- Cox, R. W. 1981. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2: 126–55.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1999. "Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic's View." In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds. *Democracy's Edges* Contemporary Political Theory Cambridge University Press. At <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CB09780511586361.003>.
- Daniels, Joseph P., Karl Kaiser, and John J. Kirton, eds. 2000. *Shaping a New International Financial System : Challenges of Governance in a Globalizing World*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Davies, Philip H. J. 2001. "Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services." *Politics* 21, no. 1: 73–80.

- DiCicco, Jonathan M., and Jack Levy. 2003. "The Power Transition Research Program." In Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius, eds. *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* MIT Press.
- Doran, Charles F. 1991. *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*. Cambridge University Press.
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1993. "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines." *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3: 297.
- . 1996. *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Dudden, Alexis. 1999. "Japan's Engagement with International Terms." In Lydia H. Liu, ed. *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations* Duke University Press.
- Dunne, Tim. 2003. "Society and Hierarchy in International Relations." *International Relations* 17, no. 3: 303–20.
- Eftimiades, Nicholas. 1994. *Chinese Intelligence Operations*. Nicholas Eftimiades.
- Enders, Thomas. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1976. "Canada and Next Economic Summit.", November 26. 1976OTTAWA04687 / D760440-0624. US National Archives.
- Erlanger, Steven. 1998. "The Fall of Suharto: The Legacy." *The New York Times*, May 22, sec. World. At <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/22/world/fall-suharto-legacy-suharto-fostered-rapid-economic-growth-staggering-graft.html>, accessed August 4, 2014.
- Fabry, Mikulas. 2010. *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776*. OUP Oxford.
- Fazal, Tanisha M. 2007. *State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fidler, David. 2001. "The Return of the Standard of Civilization." *Chicago Journal of International Law* no. 137. At <http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/432>.
- Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen J. Toope. 2001. "Alternatives to 'Legalization': Richer Views of Law and Politics." *International Organization* 55, no. 03: 743–58.
- Fitzgerald, Erin. 2009. "G20 and the G8: Crowding Round." *The World Today (Chatham House)*, September: 2–4.
- Frankel, Jeffrey. 2010. "South Korea in the G-20 Spotlight." *Project Syndicate*. At <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/south-korea-in-the-g-20-spotlight>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Fратиanni, Michele, Paolo Savona, and John J. Kirton, eds. 2003. *Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Governance*. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- . 2007. *Corporate, Public and Global Governance: The G8 Contribution*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Fry, Michael, Erik Goldstein, and Richard Langhorne. 2004. *Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy*. New edition edition New York; London: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.
- Fukuzawa, Yukichi. 1875. *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*. Columbia University Press.
- Fukyama, Francis. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* no. Summer 1989: 3–18.
- Funabashi, Yoichi. 1980. *Samitto No Shiso (Philosophy of the Summits)*. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1983. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

- Glass, Leon, and Michael C. Mackey. 1988. *From Clocks to Chaos*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Gnath, Katharina, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Claudia Schmucker. 2012. "G20, IMF, and WTO in Turbulent Times: Legitimacy and Effectiveness Put to the Test." SWP Research Paper Berlin. At http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2012_RP10_Gnath_mdn_Schmucker.pdf.
- Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. *The Standard of Civilization in International Society*. Oxford University Press, Incorporated.
- Gooch, Brison. 1970. "Europe in the 19th Century: A History." At <http://www.abebooks.co.uk/Europe-19th-Century-History-GOOCH-BRISON/19093649/bd>, accessed July 28, 2014.
- Goodman, Lee-Anne. 2014. "Harper Ready to Urge G7 to Go Tougher on Vladimir Putin." *Global News*, March 24. At <http://globalnews.ca/news/1226245/harper-to-urge-g7-to-go-tougher-on-putin/>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Griffin, Larry J. 1993. "Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 5: 1094–1133.
- Guest, Greg, Arwen Bunce, and Laura Johnson. 2006. "How Many Interviews Are Enough? An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability." *Field Methods* 18, no. 1: 59–82.
- Gulick, Edward. 1967. *Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Haas, Michael. 1975. *International Conflict*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co Inc.,U.S.
- Hajnal, Peter. 2007. *The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hajnal, Peter I. 1999. *The G7/G8 System: Evolution, Role and Documentation*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- . 2013. *The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation*. 2nd Revised edition edition Ashgate.
- . 2014. *The G20: Evolution, Interrelationship, Documentation*. New edition edition Burlington: Ashgate.
- Haldén, Peter. 2013. "Republican Continuities in the Vienna Order and the German Confederation (1815–66)." *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 2: 281–304.
- Hall, Rodney Bruce. 2003. "The Discursive Demolition of the Asian Development Model." *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1: 71–99.
- Hammersley, Martyn, and Paul Atkinson. 2007. *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*. Taylor & Francis.
- Hansen, Lene. 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. Routledge.
- Hartcher, Peter. 2010. "Outdated Political Thuggery Embarrasses Malaysia." *The Sydney Morning Herald*. At <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/outdated-political-thuggery-embarrasses-malaysia-20100222-ornl.html>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Heinbecker, Paul. 2011. "The Future of the G20 and Its Place in Global Governance." CIGI G20 Papers CIGI. At <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=132560&lng=en>.
- Heine, Jorge. 2008. "On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy." In Andrew F Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Stanford University Press.

- Hocking, Brian. 1999. "Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond 'Newness' and 'Decline.'" In Jan Melissen, ed. *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Hocking, Brian, and David Spence. 2005. *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hodges, Michael R, John J Kirton, and Joseph P Daniels. 1999. *The G8's Role in the New Millennium*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hodgson, Glen. 2010. "Can the G20 Survive?" *Financial Post*, June 23. At http://www.conferenceboard.ca/press/speech_oped/10-06-23/can_the_g20_survive.aspx, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. 1965. *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics*. Praeger.
- Holbraad, Carsten. 1970. *Concert of Europe: German and British International Theory, 1815-1914*. Harlow: Prentice Hall Press.
- Hopf, Ted. 1998. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security* 23, no. 1: 171.
- Howard, Michael Eliot. 1971. *Studies in War and Peace*. Viking Press.
- Hu, Weixing. 2000. "Escaping the Periphery." *China's International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts* University Press of America.
- Huang, Xiaoming, Robert G. Patman, and Suisheng Zhao, eds. 2013. "Core Interests and Great Power Responsibilities: The Evolving Pattern of China's Foreign Policy." *China and the International System: Becoming a World Power* New York: Routledge.
- Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53, no. 02: 379-408.
- Hurrell, Andrew. 2002. "Hedley Bull and Diplomacy." New Orleans.
- . 2006. "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?" *International Affairs* 82, no. 1: 1-19.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2009. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Jackson, Robert H. 2000. *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*. Oxford University Press.
- Jansen, M.B. 1974. "Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan." In Robert E. Ward, ed. *Political Development in Modern Japan: Studies in the Modernization of Japan*, New edition edition Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Johnston, Alastair I. 2008. *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*. Princeton University Press.
- Jönsson, Christer. 2008. "Global Governance: Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation, and Recognition." In Andrew F Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jönsson, Christer, and Martin Hall. 2005. *Essence of Diplomacy*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.
- Kahler, Miles. 2013. "Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo." *International Affairs* 89, no. 3: 711-29.
- Kayaoglu, Turan. 2010. "Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Review* 12, no. 2: 193-217.
- Keal, Paul. 2000. "An 'International Society'?" In Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan, eds. *Contending Images of World Politics* Macmillan.
- . 2003. *European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society*. Cambridge University Press.
- Keene, Edward. 2002. *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism, and World Order*. Cambridge University Press.

- . 2007a. "A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making Against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century." *International Organization* 61, no. 02: 311–39.
- . 2007b. "Hierarchy and Stratification in International Society: A Comparison of the Old and New Diplomacies." Chicago.
- . 2007c. "Stratification, Hierarchy and Closure in International Relations." Chicago.
- . 2012a. "The Treaty-Making Revolution of the Nineteenth Century." *The International History Review* 34, no. 3: 475–500.
- . 2012b. "Social Status, Social Closure and the Idea of Europe as a 'Normative Power.'" *European Journal of International Relations*: 1–18.
- . 2014. "The Standard of 'Civilisation' the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space." *Millennium* Forthcoming: 1–23.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph Nye. 1977. *Power & Interdependence*. 4 edition Boston: Pearson.
- Keukeleire, Stephan. 2003. "The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional, and Structural Diplomacy." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14, no. 3: 31–56.
- Khatchadourian, Rouben. 2012. Interview by Tristen Naylor. In-person.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton University Press.
- Kirton, John J, and Junichi T Takase. 2002a. *New Directions in Global Political Governance: The G8 and International Order in the Twenty-First Century*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kirton, John J. 1989. "Contemporary Concert Diplomacy." London. At <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton198901/index.html>.
- . 2001. *Guiding Global Order : G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- . 2010a. "The G8-G20 Partnership." *Studia Diplomatica* 33, no. 2: 7–22.
- . 2010b. "The G20, the G8, the G5 and the Role of Ascending Powers." Instituto Matias Romero, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. At <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/biblio/index.html>.
- . 2013. *G20 Governance for a Globalized World*. Ashgate.
- Kirton, John J., Joseph P. Daniels, and Andreas Freytag, eds. 2001. *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. Ashgate.
- Kirton, John J., Michele Fratianni, and Paolo Savona, eds. 2013. "G8 Process and Performance: Past, Present, and Future." *Corporate, Public and Global Governance: The G8 Contribution* Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Kirton, John J., and Jun'ichi Takase. 2002b. *New Directions in Global Political Governance: The G8 and International Order in the Twenty-First Century*. Ashgate.
- Kleiner, Jürgen. 2010. *Diplomatic Practice: Between Tradition and Innovation..* Vol. 1st Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific.
- Lake, David A. 1996. "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations." *International Organization* 50, no. 01: 1–33.
- . 2003. "The New Sovereignty in International Relations." *International Studies Review* 5, no. 3: 303–23.
- . 2011. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. 1 edition Cornell University Press.
- Larionova, Marina, ed. 2012. *The European Union in the G8: Promoting Consensus and Concerted Actions for Global Public Goods*. Farnham ; Burlington, Vt: Ashgate.
- Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. 2010. "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy." *International Security* 34, no. 4: 63–95.
- Lawson-Remer, Terra. 2012. "Does the G20 Matter?" *Reuters Blogs - The Great Debate*. At <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/02/24/does-the-g20-matter/>, accessed April 18, 2013.

- Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. 1 edition
Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Leifso, Deanne. 2011. "Inclusion vs. Exclusion: Addressing the Problem of Legitimacy."
Perscriptions for the G20: The Cannes Summit and Beyond.
- Lesage, Dries. 2010. "Introduction: The G8 and G20 in Flux, under the Skilful Presidency
of Canada and Korea." *Studia Diplomatica* 33, no. 2: 3–6.
- Levy, Jack S. 1984. *War in the Modern Great Power System: 1495-1975*. The University
Press of Kentucky.
- Lieven, D. C. B. 1983. *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*. St. Martin's Press.
- Little, Richard. 2009. "History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism in the English
School." In Cornelia Navari, ed. *Theorising International Society: English School
Methods* Basingstoke England ; New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.
- Lunn, Susan. 2014. "Ukraine Crisis: G7 Leaders to Hold Summit in Brussels without
Russia." *CBC News*, March 23. At <http://www.cbc.ca/1.2583636>, accessed July
27, 2014.
- Mahoney, James. 2004. "Comparative-Historical Methodology." *Annual Review of
Sociology* no. 30: 81–101.
- Marks, Sally. 2002. *The Ebbing of European Ascendancy: An International History of the
World 1914-1945*. London : New York: Hodder Arnold.
- Martin, Paul. 2013. "The G20: From Global Crisis Responder to Steering Committee." In
Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. *Oxford Handbook of
Modern Diplomacy*, 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martinez, Raphael. 2012. Interview by Tristen Naylor. Skype.
- Martinez-Diaz, Leonardo. 2009. "The G20 After Eight Years: How Effective a Vehicle for
Developing-Country Influence?" In Leonardo Martinez-Diaz and Ngaire Woods,
eds. *Networks of Influence? : Developing Countries in a Networked Global Order*
Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mason, Mark. 2010. "Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative
Interviews." *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social
Research* 11, no. 3. At [http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1428](http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1428), accessed July 27, 2014.
- Mayall, James. 2007. "Introduction." In Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds. *The
Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society* Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
- Medina, Laurie Kroshus. 2004. *Negotiating Economic Development: Identity Formation
and Collective Action in Belize*. University of Arizona Press.
- Modelski, George. 1972. *Principles of World Politics*. Free Press.
- Murphy, Raymond. 1988. *Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion*.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Navari, Cornelia. 2009a. "Introduction: Methods and Methodology in The English
School." In Cornelia Navari, ed. *Theorising International Society: English School
Methods* Basingstoke England ; New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.
- . 2009b. "What the Classical English School Was Trying to Explain, and Why Its
Members Were Not Interested in Causal Explanation." In Cornelia Navari, ed.
Theorising International Society: English School Methods Basingstoke England ;
New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.
- . 2011. "The Concept of Practice in the English School." *European Journal of
International Relations* 17, no. 4: 611–30.
- Naylor, Tristen. 2011. "Deconstructing Development: The Use of Power and Pity in the
International Development Discourse." *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 1:
177–97.
- . 2012. "Civil Society Inclusion at Los Cabos 2012." *G20 Information Centre*. At
<http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/120626-naylor.html>, accessed July 28,
2014.

- Neumann, Iver B. 1999. *Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*. Manchester University Press.
- . 2002. "Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 31, no. 3: 627–51.
- . 2007. "'A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand For,' or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New." *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 2: 183–200.
- . 2008a. "Globalisation and Diplomacy." In Andrew F Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2008b. "Russia as a Great Power, 1815–2007." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, no. 2: 128–51.
- . 2011. "Entry into International Society Reconceptualised: The Case of Russia." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 02: 463–84.
- . 2012. *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry*. 1 edition Cornell University Press.
- . 2014. "Status Is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians Seek Great-Power Status." In T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds. *Status in World Politics* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Neumann, Iver B., and Jennifer M. Welsh. 1991. "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society." *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 04: 327–48.
- Nicolson, Harold. 1946. *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822*. Grove Press.
- Nicolson, Sir Harold George. 1988. *Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.
- Nish, Ian. 1977. *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka*. Psychology Press.
- Okagaki, Tomoko T. 2013. *The Logic of Conformity: Japan's Entry into International Society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Onea, Tudor A. 2014. "Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry." *Review of International Studies* 40, no. 01: 125–52.
- Osiander, Andreas. 1994. *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*. Clarendon Press.
- Otte, Thomas. 2001. "Satow." In G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and Thomas Otte, eds. *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Oxenstierna, Rosario F. 1993. *The 1992 Group of Seven Summit and Its Impact on the Middle East*. Edited by Rebecca Carleton and Iain Cleland Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, Limited.
- Pallain, Georges. 1881. *Correspondance Inédite Du Prince de Talleyrand et Du Roi Louis XVIII Pendant Le Congrès de Vienne*. Paris: E. Plon et Cie.
- Pallister, Michael. 1980. "Political Discussion at the Venice Summit.", June 6. PREM19/188 f124. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/115744>.
- Parkin, Frank, ed. 1974. *The Social Analysis of Class Structure*. Psychology Press.
- . 1979. *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*. Tavistock.
- Parris, Matthew. 2011. *Parting Shots*. London: Viking.
- . 2012. *The Spanish Ambassador's Suitcase: Stories from the Diplomatic Bag*. Penguin.
- Parry, Tom. 2014. "Stephen Harper Says He'll Push for Russia's Expulsion from the G8." *CBC News*, March 22. At <http://www.cbc.ca/1.2583034>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Paul, T. V., and Mahesh Shankar. 2014. "Status Accomodation through Institutional Means: India's Rise and the Global ORder." In T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson,

- and William C. Wohlforth, eds. *Status in World Politics* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Paul, T. V., Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds. 2014. *Status in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Payne, Geoff. 2000. *Social Divisions*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Peabody, Robert L., Susan Webb Hammond, Jean Torcom, Lynne P. Brown, Carolyn Thompson, and Robin Kolodny. 1990. "Interviewing Political Elites." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 23, no. 03: 451–55.
- Penttilä, Risto. 2013. *The Role of the G8 in International Peace and Security*. Routledge.
- Percival. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1976. "Economic Topics in Prime Minister's Discussion with President.", July 21. 1976CANBER05242 / D760280-0379. US National Archives.
- Peterson, M. J. 1997. *Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815-1995*. Macmillan Publishers Limited.
- Petrie, Sir Charles. 1949. *Earlier Diplomatic History, 1492-1713*. Hollis and Carter.
- Pigman, Geoffrey Allen, and John Kotsopoulos. 2007. "Do This One For Me, George: Blair, Brown, Bono, Bush and the Actor-Ness of the G8." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 2, no. 2: 127–45.
- Pouliot, Vincent. 2008. "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities." *International Organization* 62, no. 02: 257–88.
- Putnam, Robert D., and Nicholas Bayne. 1984. *Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits*. London: Heinemann for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- . 1987. *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits*. Rev. and enl. ed. London: Sage.
- Ragin, Charles C., and Howard Saul Becker. 1992. *What Is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rana, Pradumna B. 2011. "A Proposal to Enhance the G20's 'input' Legitimacy." *VoxEU.org*. At <http://www.voxeu.org/article/proposal-enhance-g20-s-input-legitimacy>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Ranke, Leopold von. 1973. *The Theory and Practice of History*. Edited by George G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Reisch, George A. 1991. "Chaos, History, and Narrative." *History and Theory* 30, no. 1: 1–20.
- Renard, Thomas. 2010. "G20: Towards a New World Order." *Studia Diplomatica* 63, no. 2: 7–22.
- Reus-Smit, Christian. 2005. "Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force." *Review of International Studies* 31, no. Supplement S1: 71–92.
- Ringmar, Erik. 2002. "The Recognition Game Soviet Russia Against the West." *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 2: 115–36.
- Riordan, Shaun. 2008. "The New International Security Agenda and the Practice of Diplomacy." In Andrew F Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Roberts, Sir Ivor. 2009. *Satow's Diplomatic Practice. Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. Vol. 6 Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rose, Clive. Memo. 1979. "Guadeloupe: Follow-up Action.", January 12. FOI release (FOI249141) following Internal Review (IR251559). Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111527>.
- Ross, Carne. 2007. *Independent Diplomat: Dispatches From an Unaccountable Elite*. London: Hurst.
- Ross, Graham. *The Great Powers And The Decline Of The European States System 1914-1945*. London ; New York: Longman.
- Rothstein, Robert L. 1968. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Rubio-Marquez, Vanessa. 2009. "The G20: A Practitioner's Perspective." In Leonardo Martinez-Diaz and Ngaire Woods, eds. *Networks of Influence?: Developing Countries in a Networked Global Order* Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rush, Kenneth. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975. "French-Canadian Relations: Ups and Downs.", December 18. 1975PARIS33151 / D750440-0719. US National Archives.
- Russian International Affairs Council. 2012. "G20, G8, BRICS Development Momentum and Interests of Russia." Moscow. At http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=677#top, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books.
- Saito, Shiro. 1990. *Japan at the Summit: Its Role in the Western Alliance and in Asian Pacific Cooperation*. London: Routledge for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Salter, Mark B. 2002. *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations*. London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press.
- Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2007. *Testimony: France, Europe, and the World in the Twenty-First Century*. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
- Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm. 1999. *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford University Press.
- Schmidt, Helmut. 1975. "Private Memorandum on International Concertation of Economic Action." PREM 16/356. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110972>.
- Schneider, Steffen, Jennifer Gronau, Zuzana Krell-Laluhova, Martin Nonhoff, and Frank Nullmeier. 2008. "The G8 as a Newly Emerging Legitimation Object in Global Politics." Vancouver, British Columbia. At http://www.academia.edu/477974/The_G8_as_a_Newly_Emerging_Legitimation_Object_in_Global_Politics, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Scholte, Jan Aart. 2008. "From Government to Governance: Transition to a New Diplomacy." In Andrew F Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Scott, Hamish M. 2006. *The Birth of a Great Power System: 1740-1815*. Longman Publishing Group.
- Searle, John R. 1995. *The Construction of Social Reality*. Simon and Schuster.
- Sewell, William Hamilton. 1990. *Three Temporalities: Toward a Sociology of the Event*. University of Michigan.
- Sharp, Paul. 2009. *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sharp, Paul, and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds. 2008. *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*. First edition. edition Basingstoke England ; New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.
- Shermer, Michael. 1995. "Exorcising Laplace's Demon: Chaos and Antichaos, History and Metahistory." *History and Theory* 34, no. 1: 59.
- Simpson, Gerry. 2004. *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Sinha, S. Prakash. 1965. "Perspective of the Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law." *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 14, no. 01: 121-31.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004. "Government Networks, World Order, and the G20." At https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.l20.org%2Fpublications%2F23_Bx_g20_ottawa_yongding.pdf.
- . 2005. *A New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Slaughter, Steven. 2012. "Debating the International Legitimacy of the G20: Global Policymaking and Contemporary International Society." *Global Policy* 4, no. 1: 43–52.
- . 2013. "The Prospects of Deliberative Global Governance in the G20: Legitimacy, Accountability, and Public Contestation." *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 01: 71–90.
- Smith, Gordon. 2011. "G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance." *CIGI G20 Papers* no. 6 CIGI G20 Papers.
- . 2012. "The Evolving Role of the G20." *Perspective on the G20: The Los Cabos Summit*. At <http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2012/5/evolving-role-of-g20>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. 1996. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton University Press.
- Steffek, Jens. 2003. "The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach." *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 2: 249–75.
- Stivachtis, Yannis A. 1998. *The Enlargement of International Society: Culture Versus Anarchy and Greece's Entry into International Society*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stryker, Robin. 1996. "Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological Explanation." *Sociological Methods & Research - SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD RES* 24, no. 3: 304–52.
- Subacchi, Paola, and Stephen Pickford. 2011. "Legitimacy vs Effectiveness for the G20: A Dynamic Approach to Global Economic Governance | Chatham House: Independent Thinking on International Affairs." At <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/178671>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Suzuki, Shogo. 2008. "Seeking 'Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO." *International Relations* 22, no. 1: 45–63.
- . 2013. *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society*. Reprint edition Routledge.
- Takahashi, Sakuyé. 1899. *Cases on International Law during the Chino-Japanese War*. Cambridge University Press.
- . 1908. *International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War*. New York.
- Talbott, Strobe. 2007. *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*. Random House Publishing Group.
- Tansey, Oisín. 2007. "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 40, no. 04: 765–72.
- Tareen, Asifa. 2010. "The UN and the G20: Efficiency vs Legitimacy?" *CIGI Blogs*. At <http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/6/un-and-g20-efficiency-vs-legitimacy>, accessed April 18, 2013.
- Taylor, A. J. P. 1971. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*. New Ed edition London; New York: Oxford Paperbacks.
- Thakur, Ramesh. 2008. "Conclusion: National Diplomacy and Global Governance." In Andrew F Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- The Napoleon Series. 2008. "Treaty of Paris 1814." *Treaty of Paris 1814*. At http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_paris1.html, accessed July 28, 2014.
- Tilly, Charles, and Gabriel Ardant, eds. 1975. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton University Press.
- Towns, Ann E. 2010. *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Traub, James. 2005. "The Statesman." *The New York Times*, September 18, sec. Magazine. At <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/18/magazine/18bono.html>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Van Rooy, Alison. 2004. *The Global Legitimacy Game: Civil Society, Globalization and Protest*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England ; New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.
- Vestergaard, Jakob. 2011. "The G20 and Beyond: Towards Effective Global Economic Governance." *Danish Institute for International Studies* no. 4 DIIS Report: 58.
- Vestergaard, Jakob, and Robert H. Wade. 2012. "Establishing a New Global Economic Council: Governance Reform at the G20, the IMF and the World Bank." *Global Policy* 3, no. 3: 257-69.
- Vile, M.J. 1979. "Guadeloupe Summit." FOI release (FOI249141) following Internal Review (IR251559). Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111525>.
- Vincent, R. J. 1987. *Human Rights and International Relations*. Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Volgy, Thomas J., Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird, eds. 2011. *Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Volgy, Thomas J., Renato Corbetta, Patrick Rhamey Jr., Ryan G. Baird, and Keith A. Grant. 2014. "Status Considerations in International Politics and the Rise of Regional Powers." In T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds. *Status in World Politics* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Von Treitschke, H. 1916. *Politics*. Translated by B Dugdale and T de Bille London: Constable.
- Wallace, Michael D. 1973. *War and Rank Among Nations*. - Lexington Books.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. 1 edition Waveland Press, Inc.
- Watson, Adam. 1991. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*. London ; New York, NY: Routledge.
- . 1992. *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Webb, Eugene J., Donald T. Cambell, and Richard D. Schwartz. 1966. *Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences*. Rand McNally.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich University of California Press.
- Webster, Sir Charles. 1950. *The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815*. Later Edition edition London: Oxford University Press.
- Weisensel, Peter R. 1991. "Russian Self-Identification and Travellers' Descriptions of the Ottoman Empire in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century." *Central Asian Survey*: p. 65-85.
- Welch Larson, Deborah, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth. 2014. "Status and World Order." In T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds. *Status in World Politics* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weldes, Jutta, and Diana Saco. 1996. "Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of 'The Cuban Problem', 1960-1994." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 25, no. 2: 361-95.
- Westlake, John. 1894. *Chapters on the Principles of International Law*. Camb. Univ. Press.
- Wight, Martin. 1946. *Power Politics*. A&C Black.
- . 1977. *Systems of States*. Leicester University Press [for] the London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Xiao, Ren. 2011. "The Moral Dimension of Chinese Foreign Policy." In Ren Xiao and Allen Carlson, eds. *New Frontiers in China's Foreign Relations: Zhongguo Waijiao de Xin Bianjiang* Lexington Books.

- Yonding, Yu. 2004. "The G20 and China: A Chinese Perspective." Ottawa: IDRC. At http://www.i20.org/publications/23_Bx_g20_ottawa_yongding.pdf, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Zarakol, Ayse. 2010. *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zhang, Yongjin. 1998. *China in International Society: Alienation and Beyond*. New York: Palgrave Schol, Print UK.

Primary and Archival Sources

- Amnesty International. 2008. "Anwar Ibrahim Continues Campaign despite Questionable Charges | Amnesty International." *Amnesty International*. At <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/anwar-ibrahim-continues-campaign-despite-questionable-charges-20080808>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Armstrong, Robert. 1980a. "Record of a Meeting at the House of HM Ambassador, Vienna at Breakfast on 16 May." PREM19/188 f161. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/115741>.
- . Letter. 1980b. "Quadripartite Meeting.", April 15. PREM19/188 f198 (Note: Misfiled as 14 April 1980). Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/115739>.
- . Memorandum. 1980c., April 24. PREM19/188 f183. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/115750>.
- Armstrong, Robert, and Wade-Gery. 1980. "Quadripartite Meeting, Vienna, 16 May." PREM19/188 f156. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/115742>.
- Bayne. Memorandum to C.Q. Fogarty. 1975. "Giscard's Proposal for a Monetary Summit Conference.", July 11. PREM 16/393. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111524>.
- BBC News. 1998a. "Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Fired." *BBC*, September 2, sec. Asia-Pacific. At <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/163200.stm>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- . 1998b. "Sodomy Charges Turn up Heat on Anwar." *BBC*, September 19, sec. Asia-Pacific. At <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/175339.stm>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- . 1998c. "Anwar Arrested amid Kuala Lumpur Protests." *BBC*, September 20, sec. Asia-Pacific. At <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/175896.stm>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Bond UK. 2013. "About Us | Bond." At <http://www.bond.org.uk/about-us>, accessed April 17, 2013.
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State. 1999. "Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998." *Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices*. At <http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/indonesia-1998.htm>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Callaghan, James. 1977a. "Note by the Prime Minister of a Meeting at 10 Downing Street with President Giscard, President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt on Monday, 9 May, 1977, from 1000 to 1230." PREM 16/1223. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111494>.
- . Diplomatic Cable to James Carter. 1977b. "Economic Summit.", February 21. PREM 16/1220. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111505>.
- . Letter to Gerald Ford. 1976., June 1. PREM 16/819. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111520>.
- Callaghan, James, and Valery Giscard. 1977. "Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d'Estaing." PREM 16/1221. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111501>.
- Canadian and Associated Press. 2014. "Stephen Harper Calls for Russia to Be Booted

- from G8 as U.S. Warns Vladimir Putin Likely Prepping for Invasion." *National Post*, March 23. At <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/23/stephen-harper-calls-for-russia-to-be-booted-from-g8-as-u-s-warns-vladimir-putin-likely-prepping-for-invasion/>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Carter, James, and James Callaghan. 1977. February 25. PREM 16/1220. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111506>.
- Carter, James. Diplomatic Cable to James Callaghan. 1977. February 12. PREM 16/1229. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111504>.
- Civil20 Russia. 2014. "G8/G20 Sherpa List." *Civil Russia 2014*. At <http://www.g20civil.com/sherpateam/sherpa-list.php>, accessed January 1, 2014.
- "Economic Summit." 1976. PREM 16/1220. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111500>.
- Enders, Thomas. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1976. "Canada and Next Economic Summit.", November 26. 1976OTTAWA04687 / D760440-0624. US National Archives.
- Erlanger, Steven. 1998. "The Fall of Suharto: The Legacy." *The New York Times*, May 22, At <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/22/world/fall-suharto-legacy-suharto-fostered-rapid-economic-growth-staggering-graft.html>, accessed August 4, 2014.
- Ertel, Manfred. 2010. "Norway Takes Aim at G-20." *Der Spiegel Online*, June 22. At <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/norway-takes-aim-at-g-20-one-of-the-greatest-setbacks-since-world-war-ii-a-702104-druck.html> accessed April 18, 2013.
- Ford, Gerald. Letter to James Callaghan. 1976a., May 5. PREM 16/819 (Note: Incorrectly labeled as 4 May 1975). Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111516>.
- . Letter to James Callaghan. 1976b., May 30. PREM 16/819. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111518>.
- . Letter to James Callaghan. 1976c., May 31. PREM 16/819. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111519>.
- . Letter to James Callaghan. 1976d., June 1. PREM 16/819. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111521>.
- . Letter to James Callaghan. 1976e., June 5. PREM 16/820. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111513>.
- G20. 2010. "The Seoul Summit Document." *G20 Research Group*. At www.g20.utoronto.ca/summits/2010seoul.htm, accessed July 27, 2014.
- . 2011. "G20 2011 Summit Communique." *G20 Research Group*. At <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-communique-111104-en.html>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- G20 Information Centre. 2014. "G20 Leaders Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy: Delegations." *G20 Research Group*. At <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008delegations1115.html>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- G6. 1975. "The Declaration of Rambouillet." *G8 Research Group*. At <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1975rambouillet/communique.html>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Gates, Bill. 2011. "Innovation with Impact: Financing 21st Century Development." *GatesNotes*. At <http://www.gatesnotes.com/Development/G20-Report-Innovation-with-Impact>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Goodman, Lee-Anne. 2014. "Harper Ready to Urge G7 to Go Tougher on Vladimir Putin."

- Global News*, March 24. At <http://globalnews.ca/news/1226245/harper-to-urge-g7-to-go-tougher-on-putin/>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Government of Australia. 1975. "Cabinet Minute: Resources Committee - Economic Summit Meeting." A5925 / 4130/CCR / 7500293. Australian National Archives. At <http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=7500293>.
- . 1976. "Submission No 613: Tokyo Economic Summit Possible Australian Participation - Decision 1356." A12909, 613 / 7426768. Australian National Archives. At <http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=7426768&isAv=N>.
- Greenwald, Joseph. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975. "Reluctance of the Member States to Assume Community.", October 30. 1975ECBRU09777 / D750377-0299. US National Archives.
- Hillebrand, Martin. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975a. "Conversation with Chancellor Schmidt.", September 25. 197 BONN 15731 251218Z / P850081-2126. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975b. "German Press Comment on Rambouillet Summit.", November 18. 1975BONN18880 / D750401-0754. US National Archives.
- Hodgson, James. Diplomatic Cable. 1975. "Economic Summit.", October 21. 1975TOKYO14951 / D750364-0303. US National Archives.
- Hormats, Robert. 1975. "Memorandum of Conversation." [Http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/docs.asp](http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/docs.asp). Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
- Hunt, John. Letter to James Callaghan. 1976. "Puerto Rico.", June 16. PREM 16/821. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111512>.
- . Memorandum. 1978a. "Ref. A08541.", December 12. FOI release (FOI249141) following Internal Review (IR251559). Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111528>.
- . Memorandum to James Callaghan. 1977. "Preparations for an Economic Summit.", January 19. PREM 16/1220. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111499>.
- . Memorandum to James Callaghan. 1978b. "Bonn Summit.", May 29. FOI release 248745. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111463>.
- Ingersoll, Robert. Telegram to US Embassy, Paris. 1975. "Giscard Favors Summit of Industrialized Nations.", July 10. STATE 161902 TOSEC 060031 / D750237-1002. US National Archives.
- InterAction. 2014. "About InterAction." At <http://www.interaction.org/about>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- ITAR-TASS News Agency. 2014. "Italy Calls for Preserving Present G8 Format." *ITAR-TASS*. At <http://en.itar-tass.com/world/725097>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Kissinger, Henry, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Diplomatic Cable to William Porter. 1975. "Presidential Letter to Prime Minister Trudeau.", November 8. 1975STATE265536 / D750389-0725. US National Archives.
- Kissinger, Henry. Diplomatic Cable to All US Diplomatic Posts. 1975a. "Economic Summit.", October 10. 1975STATE241658 / D750352-0022. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to All US Diplomatic Posts. 1975b. "White House Press Briefing on Economic Summit.", October 11. 1975STATE243283 / D750354-0408. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to US Ambassador Tokyo, US Ambassador London, US

- Ambassador Paris, US Ambassador Rome, US Ambassador Ottawa, and US Ambassador Bonn. 1975c. "Economic Summit.", October 10. 1975SECTO16056 / D750363-0140. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to John Volpe. 1975d. "Rumor's Complaint About Four Power Luncheon.", July 31. 1975 SECTO 08081 311359Z / D750264-0498. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to John Volpe. 1975e. "Italian Complaints about Rumors of Economic Meeting.", August 1. 1975 SECTO 08101 011528Z / D750266-0362. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to John Volpe. 1975f. "Secretary's Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Rumor.", September 30. 1975 STATE 232563 / D750340-0015. US National Archives.
- . Letter to Martin Hillebrand. 1975g. "Proposed Economic Summit.", September 25. 1975STATE228933 / P850036-2037, N750004-0651. US National Archives.
- . Letter to William Porter. 1975h. "Economic Summit.", October 9. 1975STATE241540 / P840178-2600. US National Archives.
- Lunn, Susan. 2014. "Ukraine Crisis: G7 Leaders to Hold Summit in Brussels without Russia." *CBC News*, March 23. At <http://www.cbc.ca/1.2583636>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 2014. "Declassified G7 Files." *Margaret Thatcher Foundation - Large Scale Document Archive*. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/g7.asp>, accessed July 28, 2014.
- McGregor, Richard, and James Fontanella-Khan. 2014. "Russia Suspended from G8, but Not Expelled." *Financial Times*, March 24. At http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ef5a543e-b32b-11e3-b09d-00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2F
- "Memorandum of Conversation." 1975. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. At www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553193.pdf.
- Morris. Letter to Henry Kissinger. 1975. "Proposed Five Power Economic Conference.", August 7. RU 07113 071239Z. US National Archives.
- Morris, and Henry Kissinger. 1975. "Proposed Five Power Economic Conference.", August 7. 1975 EC BRU 07113 071239Z / D750272-1178. US National Archives.
- ONE. 2014a. "About." *ONE*. At <http://www.one.org/international/about/>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- . 2014b. "Annual Report." *ONE*. At <http://one.org.s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs/oneannualreport2011.pdf>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Pallister, Michael. 1980. "Political Discussion at the Venice Summit.", June 6. PREM19/188 f124. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/115744>.
- Parry, Tom. 2014. "Stephen Harper Says He'll Push for Russia's Expulsion from the G8." *CBC News*, March 22. At <http://www.cbc.ca/1.2583034>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Percival. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1976. "Economic Topics in Prime Minister's Discussion with President.", July 21. 1976CANBER05242 / D760280-. US National Archives.
- Porter, William. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975a. "Presidential Letter to PM Trudeau.", November 10. 1975OTTAWA04210 / D750390-0967. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975b. "Government of Canada Views on Rambouillet Exclusion and Future.", November 14. 1975OTTAWA04265 / D750398-0684. US National Archives.
- President, European Council. 2014. "The Hague Declaration." At http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141855.pdf.

- Price-Thomas, Stephen. Tweet to Lourdes Aranda. 2012a. "Invitation...", April 25. At <https://twitter.com/stevept/status/195405107792318464>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- . Tweet to Lourdes Aranda. 2012b. "Congrats...", April 26. At <https://twitter.com/stevept/status/195701724315521024>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- . Tweet to Lourdes Aranda. 2012c. "@lourdesaranda...'", April 26. At <https://twitter.com/stevept/status/195706174438506497>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- . Tweet to Lourdes Aranda and David Shorr. 2012d. "@mexiconsult...", April 26. At <https://twitter.com/stevept/status/195701724315521024>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- "Puerto Rico Summit Meeting." PREM 16/821. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111510>.
- "Record of a Telephone Conversation Between Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 March 1977." 1977. PREM 16/1221. Mar. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111497>.
- "Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the Prime Minister and President Giscard d'Estaing on Friday 18 February 1977." 1977. PREM 16/1220. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111495>.
- Rose, Clive. Memo. 1979. "Guadelope: Follow-up Action.", January 12. FOI release (FOI249141) following Internal Review (IR251559). Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111527>.
- Sauvagnargues Calinet. 1975. "Sommet Monetaire." PREM 16/356. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110973>.
- Save the Children. 2012. "Save the Children Says Pregnancy Kills or Injures One Million Girls a Year." At <http://www.interaction.org/document/save-children-says-pregnancy-kills-or-injures-one-million-girls-year>, accessed July 27, 2014.
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, and Robert Ingersoll. Diplomatic Cable to US Ambassador Bonn, US Ambassador London, US Ambassador Paris, and US Ambassador Ottawa. 1975a. "Economic Summit.", October 2. 1975STATE235072 / P840178-2645, N750005-0032. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to US Ambassador Rome, US Ambassador Tokyo, US Ambassador Bonn, US Ambassador London, and US Ambassador Paris. 1975b. "Possible Economic Summit.", October 1. 1975STATE233518 / P850036-2088, N750004-0727. US National Archives.
- . Letter to US Ambassador London, US Ambassador Bonn, US Ambassador Rome, and US Ambassador Tokyo. 1975c. "Possible Economic Summit.", September 28. 1975 STATE 231096 / P850036-2076, N750004-0681. US National Archives.
- UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 1976. "The Economic Summit Conference at Rambouillet: 15-17 November 1975." PREM 16/838. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110959>.
- . Memorandum to James Callaghan. 1975. "Rambouillet: The French View.", November 25. PREM 16/838. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110958>.
- UK Government. 1977. "Note of Discussion During the European Council Dinner for Heads of Government and President of the Commission at the Palazzo Barberini on Friday 25 March 1977." PREM 16/1254. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111502>.
- Vile, M.J. 1979. "Guadelope Summit." FOI release (FOI249141) following Internal Review (IR251559). Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111525>.
- Volpe, John. Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975a. "Possible Big Five Monetary

- Summit.", July 29. 75 ROME 10839, 75 STATE 177516 / D750259-1006. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975b. "Big Five Economic Directorate.", July 30. 1975 ROME 10984 301447Z / D750263-0162. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975c. "Press Reports on Colombo-Giscard D'Estaing Talks.", September 13. 1974 [sic] ROME 12647 131807Z / D740256-1039. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975d. "EC Foreign Ministers Meeting in Lucca: Economic Topics.", October 22. 1975ROME15395 / D750367-0944. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975e. "Ambassador's Meeting with Prime Minister Moro.", October 27. 1975ROME15556 / D750372-0985. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger. 1975f. "Italian Press on Results of Rambouillet Summit.", November 19. 1975ROME16884 / D750402-0985. US National Archives.
- . Diplomatic Cable to Henry Kissinger, US Mission to Brussels, US Ambassador London, US Ambassador Paris, US Ambassador Ottawa, and US Ambassador Tokyo. 1975g. "Economic Summit.", October 7. 1975ROME14518 / D750348-0427. US National Archives.
- Wright, Patrick. Letter to James Callaghan. 1976., June 4. PREM 16/820. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive. At <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111514>

Interview Subjects

- 1) Alexander, Nancy
 Director, Economic Governance Program, Heinrich Boell Foundation, 2009-Present
 Participant, Think20
 - a. Interview conducted 8 June, 2012; 14:15-15:15 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 2) Allan, Sir Alex KCB
 Sherpa, 1994-97
 Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1992-1997
 Undersecretary, HM Treasury, 1989-1992
 - a. Interview conducted 31 July, 2012; 14:00-15:00 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 3) Aranda Bezaury, Ambassador Lourdes
 Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mexico 2003-Present
 Sherpa, Mexico, 2008-2012
 Host Sherpa, 2012
 - a. Interview conducted 21 August, 2012; 20:00-21:00 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 4) Arturo Gomez, Edgar Cubero
 Deputy Director General, CSO Liaison Office, Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - a. Interview conducted 19 June, 2012; 15:30-16:00 PST
 - b. Interview conducted in-person
- 5) Bayne, Sir Nicholas KCMG
 British Diplomat
 Economic Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, 1988-1992
 - a. Interview conducted 9 October, 2012; 13:00-15:00 GMT
 - b. In-person interview, The Travellers' Club, London
- 6) Burnley, Jasmine
 G8/G20 Policy Adviser, Oxfam GB
 - a. Interview conducted 30 January, 2012; 16:00-17:15 GMT
 - b. In-person interview, Oxfam International, Oxford, UK
 - c. On-going correspondence after initial interview including discussions at Los Cabos G20 Summit, 17-19 June, 2012
- 7) Carin ,Barry
 Assistant Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs, Canada 1992-96
 Sous-sherpa, Canada 1992-1996
 Organiser, Think20
 - a. Interview conducted 8 March, 2012; 16:30-17:30 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 8) Colloff, Nicholas
 Director, Strategy and Innovation, Oxfam GB, 2009-Present
 Country Director, Oxfam Russia, 2005-2009
 - a. Interview conducted 14 August, 2012; 11:30-12:15 CET

- b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 9) Cunliffe, Ambassador Sir John CB
 - Deputy Director of the Bank of England, 2014-Present
 - Managing Director, HM Treasury, 2001-07
 - Head, European and Global Issues Secretariat, Prime Minister's Office, 2007-2012
 - Sherpa 2008-2011
 - Host Sherpa 2009
 - a. Interview conducted 2 March, 2013; 13:00-14:00GMT
 - b. In-person interview, Patisserie Valerie, Oxford, UK
- 10) Currah, Kel
 - Senior Program Officer, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2012-2013
 - Associate Director, Policy and Advocacy, World Vision International, 2000-2008
 - a. Interview conducted 20 August, 2012; 18:00-19:00 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 11) Edwards, Leonard
 - Sherpa 2008-2010
 - Host Sherpa 2010
 - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada 2007-2010
 - a. Interview conducted 15 March, 2012; 16:00-17:00 GMT
 - b. Interview via Skype
- 12) Evans, John
 - General Secretary, Trade Union Advisory Committee
 - a. Interview conducted 2 April, 2012; 14:00-15:00 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 13) Fauver, Robert
 - Sherpa 1993-1994
 - National Intelligence Officer for Economics, National Intelligence Council
 - Undersecretary for International Affairs, US Treasury
 - Special Assistant to the President, National Security Affairs and Economic Policy
 - a. Interview conducted 16 July, 2013; 19:00-20:00 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 14) Flaherty, James
 - Minister of Finance, Canada, 2006-2014
 - a. Interview conducted 6 September 2013; 17:00-17:10 MSK
 - b. In-person interview, Constantine Palace, Saint Petersburg, Russia
- 15) Fowler, Robert
 - Host Sherpa 2002
 - African Personal Representative 2003-2006
 - Canadian Diplomat
 - a. Interview conducted 9 February, 2012; 14:00-15:15 GMT
 - b. Interview via Skype
- 16) Fues, Thomas
 - Economist, German Development Institute
 - Participant, Think20
 - a. Interview conducted 8 May, 2012; 16:30-17:30 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype

- 17) Gonzalez Laya, Arancha
 - Chief of Staff to the Director General, World Trade Organisation, 2005-2013
 - a. Interview conducted 30 March, 2012
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 18) Grey, Jean-Christophe
 - Spokesperson, Chancellor of the Exchequer
 - Deputy Director, General Expenditure Policy, HM Treasury, UK
 - a. Interview conducted 23 January, 2012; 12:45-14:30 GMT
 - b. In-person interview, HM Treasury, London, UK
- 19) Harder, V. Peter
 - Sherpa, 2005-2006
 - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada 2003-2007
 - a. Interview conducted 25 Jan, 2012; 16-17:00 GMT
 - b. Interview via Skype
- 20) Harper, Prime Minister Stephen
 - Prime Minister of Canada 2006-Present
 - a. Interview conducted 6 September 2013; 17:00-17:10 MSK
 - b. In-person interview, Constantine Palace, Saint Petersburg, Russia
- 21) Howard, James
 - Director, Economic and Social Policy, International Trade Union Confederation, 1986-Present
 - a. Interview conducted 2 April, 2012; 15:30-16:30 GMT
 - b. In-person interview, University College, Oxford, UK
- 22) Khatchadourian, Rouben
 - Host Sous-Sherpa Assistant for G8 and G20, 2010
 - Head of G8 Policy Unit 2008-2010
 - Canadian Diplomat
 - a. Interview conducted 8 February, 2012; 14:00-15:30 GMT
 - b. In-person interview, Canadian High Commission, London, UK
- 23) Kitajima, Ambassador Shinichi
 - Deputy Vice Minister, Foreign Ministry, Japan, 2002-05
 - Think20 Participant
 - a. Interview conducted 16 May, 2012; 8:30-9:30 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 24) Kobele, Florian
 - Sous-Sherpa, European Union, 2010-Present
 - a. Interview conducted 13 February, 2012; 9:00-10:00 GMT
 - b. Interview via phone
- 25) Leo, Ben
 - Global Policy Director, ONE, 2001-Present
 - a. Interview conducted 15 May, 2012; 14:30-15:30 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 26) Martin, Prime Minister Paul
 - Prime Minister of Canada, 2003-2006
 - Finance Minister, Canada, 1993-2002
 - Founding Chair of G20, 1999-2001
 - a. Interview conducted 23 August, 2012; 14:30-16:30 EST

- b. In-person interview, Martin Residence, Cowansville, Quebec, Canada
- 27) Martinez, Raphael
 - Sous-Sherpa, European Commission, 2010-2012
 - a. Interview conducted 16 March, 2012; 14:00-14:45 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via phone
- 28) Price-Thomas, Stephen
 - Deputy Advocacy and Campaigns Manager, Oxfam International, 2014-Present
 - G20/BRICSAM Strategy Manager, Oxfam International, 2010-2014
 - a. Interview conducted 1 August, 2012; 10:00-11:00 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
- 29) Pursey, Stephen
 - Senior Adviser to the Director-General, International Labour Organization, 1999-Present
 - a. Interview conducted 16 March, 2012; 13:30-14:30 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
 - c. Second interview conducted 30 July, 2012; 15:00-15:30 GMT (via Skype)
- 30) Ramirez, Leticia Lara
 - Civil Society Liaison Officer, Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - a. Interview conducted 19 June, 2012; 15:00-15:30 PST
 - b. Interview conducted via written correspondence
- 31) Ramos, Gabriela
 - Sherpa and Chief of Staff, OECD, 2008-Present
 - a. Interview conducted via written correspondence, 20 April, 2012 - 22 June, 2012
- 32) Rea, Joanna
 - Head of Policy and Public Affairs, Bond UK
 - a. Interview conducted 9 February, 2012; 11:30-12:30
 - b. In-person interview, Costa Coffee, King's Cross, London, UK
 - c. On-going correspondence after initial interview including discussions at Los Cabos G20 Summit, 17-19 June, 2012
- 33) Reynoso, Don Miguel Diaz
 - Director General, CSO Liaison Office, Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - a. Interview conducted 19 June, 2012; 16:00-17:00 PST
 - b. Interview conducted in-person (Translator present; English/Spanish)
- 34) Ruthrauff, John
 - Director, International Advocacy, InterAction, 2005-Present
 - a. Interview conducted 2 August, 2012; 15:00-16:00 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via phone
 - c. Also spoke at Los Cabos G20 Summit, 17-19 June, 2012
- 35) Shorr, David
 - Program Officer, Stanley Foundation, 2000-2014
 - Participant, Think20
 - a. Interview conducted 25 May, 2012, 15:00-16:30 GMT
 - b. Interview conducted via Skype
 - c. Further discussions at Los Cabos G20 Summit, 17-19 June, 2012
- 36) Shultz, Secretary George
 - Secretary of Labour, United States, 1969-1970

Secretary of the Treasury, United States, 1972-1974

Secretary of State, United States, 1982-1989

Sherpa, United States, 1975-1976

a. Interview conducted 5 September, 2012; 13:00-14:00 EST

b. Interview conducted via Skype

37) Smith, Dr Gordon

Sherpa, 1995-1997

Host Sherpa, 1995

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada 1994-1997

a. Interview conducted 19 December, 2011; 11:00-12:00 PST

b. In-person interview, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada

c. On-going correspondence after initial interview

38) Sobreira, Rogerio

Associate Professor, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration

Getulio Vargas Foundation

Participant, Think20

a. Interview conducted 30 May, 2012; 21:00-21:30 GMT

b. Interview conducted via Skype

39) Summers, Secretary Lawrence

Secretary of Treasury, United States, 1999-2001

Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, United States, 1995-1999

Chief Economist of the World Bank, 1991-1993

a. Interview conducted 23 October, 2012

b. Interview conducted via Skype

40) Zaldivar Adriana

Summit Accommodation and Transportation Logistics Coordinator

a. Interview conducted 17 June, 2012; 14:30-15:00 PST

b. Interview conducted in-person