The material of this thesis is the area of personal humour roughly covered by τὸ ὁνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν - the body of jokes which involve reference or allusion to individuals from the contemporary or near-contemporary world, and which gave rise to the ancient compilation of Κωμῳδομένων. In an introductory chapter I draw on the combined evidence of plays and fragments to give some impression of the role of this type of satire in Old Comedy as a whole in the later fifth century, stressing in particular the overlap between Aristophanes' choice of targets and his rivals', and suggesting that this indicates the genre's capacity to create publicity for its own exploitation. The second chapter analyses the treatment of personal jokes in the scholia on Aristophanes, and shows that this typically involves a questionable model of satire, largely taken over by modern commentators on the plays, as a reflector of the truth about its targets. In the third chapter I argue that we need to adopt a view of Aristophanes as a much more active creator of publicity and of satirical images which may often owe as much to the appeal of popular stereotypes of disapproved behaviour as to the facts about the individuals to whom they are comically attached. Chapter four concentrates on choral jokes, demonstrating in particular the special scope for inventive satirical colour allowed by the separation of the major choral sections from the concerns of the dramatic episodes. The final chapter focusses on a variety of functional, formal and technical aspects of personal jokes: these include the ways in which jokes are integrated into the composition of dialogue; comically expressive uses of antilabe; the importance of the position of a name within the structure of a joke; and visual elements in personal satire. An index of names and references is included.
PERSONAL JOKES IN ARISTOPHANES

F. S. Halliwell

[H 1981]
## CONTENTS

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**Text & Abbreviations**

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I am privileged to have had my work on this thesis during the past four years supervised by Sir Kenneth Dover. In addition to the general inspiration which I have derived from his own writings on Aristophanes and from his combination of meticulous standards and humane vision, I am particularly grateful to him for the patience with which he treated the "inchoate ideas" that were all I had to offer in the earlier stages, and for the unfailing tact with which he gradually helped me to work out my ideas into a more coherent form.

My other main debt of gratitude is to my wife, Ruth, who made time amid many other commitments to type most of this thesis for me. Any flaws in presentation can be safely attributed to my own occasional interference at the typewriter.

F.S.H.
Except where otherwise indicated, quotations and line numbers follow the edition of V. Coulon (Paris, 1923-30). For convenience, however, I refer to Euripides' relative in Thesm. as Mnésilochus, though Aristophanes did not intend him to have any name at all (cf. Hiller (1874) pp. 449-52). Commentaries on and editions of Aristophanes are cited by the name of the editor alone. The fragments of Old Comedy are cited from Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, ed. Th. Kock (1880-88), except where marked by the abbreviation CGF or Edmonds (see below). The scholia on Aristophanes are cited for Ach., Kn., Nu. and Wasps from the Dutch edition, Scholia in Aristophanem, under the general editorship of W. J. W. Koster (1960- ), for the remaining plays from the edition of F. Dübner (1842). For details of works referred to in the notes by author's name and publication date alone see the bibliography. The abbreviations used for journals and works of reference are standard ones, but I note the following:

NPA = J. Sundwall, Nachträge zur Prosopographia Attica (1910).
PA = A. Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica (1901-3).
SEG = Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (1923- ).
Introduction

The subject-matter of this thesis is one of the most striking and characteristic forms of Aristophanic humour, and, as the fragments reveal, one which was employed by Old Comedy generally in the second half of the fifth century. While there are a plethora of kinds of joke in Aristophanes which might be termed personal, the kind with which I am concerned (and 'personal joke' and 'joke' will be used throughout to mean these) involve reference or allusion to individuals from the contemporary or near-contemporary world, usually from Athens itself, who are not 'on stage' when the jokes are made (though they may appear elsewhere in the play) — in short, roughly the category covered by Τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ψυχωδέαν, the body of jokes which gave rise to the Hellenistic compilation of ἱστοραν. Such jokes are a feature of all the extant plays, even the latest, yet although they form as a group a major factor in Aristophanes' involvement with his society, and although many of them deal with important Athenian figures or issues, they have never been systematically studied. From at least the time of Plutarch, who in a well-known passage mentions satirical references to individuals as an aspect of Old Comedy which makes it unsuitable as an accompaniment to drinking-parties, these jokes have been generally found rather inaccessible, tiresomely outside the appreciation of readers unfamiliar with the people concerned (though an ostensible exception is constituted by the tradition of exegesis which I analyse in chapter 2). It is the aim of this thesis to combat this attitude by examining the significance of personal jokes both as an element in Aristophanes' comic repertoire and as evidence which can illuminate the relationship between the Athenian satirist and his public. I hope to demonstrate not only that they are a rich source for the understanding of the genre, but also that the humour of many of them is not as impenetrable as has often been supposed.

The material can be divided at the simplest level into two large
categories: jokes contained within formal choral utterances which are clearly separated from the episodic presentation of the drama; and those found in the dialogue scenes themselves (only a handful occur in true soliloquy), uttered by a variety of characters. In general satirical terms these two types have much in common, and the first three chapters of the thesis deal with issues that concern both equally. But there are also some significant differences between them, especially in the area of comic form and technique: chapter 5 has more to say about these aspects of dialogue jokes than about choral satire, while chapter 4 is given over entirely to the latter. Two major interests, although concentrated on in particular sections, ought to be discernible throughout the work. The first, developed in the final two chapters as just indicated, is in the form and technique of jokes: this should not be a matter of empty philological classification, but is intended to give some substantiation to the belief that the way in which a joke is put together may be just as revealing of the effect the poet is aiming at as any piece of information about the subject. The design of a joke may, indeed, be not only an important clue to its meaning but actually part of that meaning, in the sense of the comic satisfaction which it is intended to provide. A further purpose of my attention to the form of jokes is to try to discover how far Aristophanes was concerned to integrate them into dramatic contexts and combine them with other dramatic elements, how far he was prepared to let them stand as incidental entertainment. My second major interest is in understanding the satirical operation of the jokes in the conditions of publicity obtaining in fifth-century Athens. Most Aristophanic scholars have made no effort of historical reconstruction or imagination in this area. Chapter 2 contains a critique of the naïve approach to personal references which has been widely inherited from the scholia, and chapter 3 should complement this with some positive suggestions for the appreciation of the satirical character of these jokes in their original setting.

I shall return specifically to my two main themes in the later parts
of this introduction, but I want first to draw on the combined evidence of the extant plays and the fragments of Old Comedy in order to construct a broad and preliminary survey of the use made of personal jokes in the genre as a whole. Of the some one-hundred-and-sixty individuals who are the targets of jokes in the extant plays of Aristophanes approximately seventy are not mentioned in the remains of any other Old Comedian, and of this latter group about half are found only once in Aristophanes himself. Given the proportion of what survives to what has been lost, these figures are surely no higher than we would have expected, and they demonstrate strikingly that there was a considerable overlap between Aristophanes' choice of targets and that of other comic poets, though we must remember that many fragments have been preserved precisely as parallels to Aristophanic jokes and we are in no position to calculate how many individuals were the subject of jokes in other poets but not in Aristophanes. Nonetheless, the overlap is impressive. A hasty conclusion might be drawn, notwithstanding the partial nature of the evidence, that the poets of Old Comedy simply shared the same pool of notorious and easy victims; and specious support might be lent to this conclusion by the fact that of the seventy butts unique to Aristophanes only just over half are not known at all from any other source: even this group, it might be presumed, must have been less exceptional than they seem, and we would no doubt find their names far more often if we had more complete plays. But inferences from such evidence must be drawn with appropriate caution. What does seem reasonably likely is that a large proportion, probably a majority, of targets will have been, over a period of time at least, familiar names to the original audiences, especially when we consider that because of multiple jokes against the same individuals the quarter who turn up only once in Aristophanes account for far less than a quarter of the total number of jokes. But it is not legitimate to deduce from these figures that Old Comedy singled out only those who were well-known or notorious in public life, for what the evidence of the plays and fragments points to above all is the familiarity of most targets within
comedy itself, and this should prompt a consideration of how far comic poets themselves created or contributed to the publicity which their jokes were able to exploit (see ch. 3). Moreover, it is essential to insist on a distinction between the mere familiarity of a target's name or his established associations and the particular question of what the contents of individual jokes, whether facts, insinuations or abusive allegations, might have meant to Aristophanes' first audiences: even where we are sure about the former, no answer to the given question automatically follows.

When we turn from the larger patterns which it may be possible to discern in our material to some of the finer details, the dangers of facile interpretation are even more apparent. The overlap between Aristophanes' and his rivals' choice of satirical targets can be emphasised by a comparison between Birds and the fragments of Phrynichus's Monotropos, produced at the same festival, the Dionysia of 414. The fragments of Monotropos contain evidence for jokes about eight identifiable individuals, and seven of these people are also the subject of jokes in Birds. A similar comparison between Peace and Eupolis's Kolakes, however, both produced at the Dionysia of 421, yields a rather different result: of the nine targets who appear in the fragments of Kolakes only one also turns up in Peace. The moral is surely that the tendency towards a community of subjects among comic poets cannot be used presumptively where positive evidence is lacking, even though we may be inclined on account of the imperfect transmission through the scholia of the work of the Ἀριστοφάνης to make the general assumption that the ratio of Aristophanic butts mentioned in other comic poets to those not mentioned would increase if our evidence were greater. These issues are acute in the case of some major Aristophanic targets, Lamachus, Agathon and Cratinus, who scarcely appear elsewhere in Old Comedy. The facts about Clesychus underline the need for caution. One of Aristophanes' favourite subjects over a long period, and perhaps a political figure of some prominence, we might yet have believed that he was completely avoided by other comic poets were it not for a reference to him
in a papyrus fragment of Eupolis. Yet it is still open to us, and I think in fact most plausible, to suppose that the particular comic reputation of Cleonymus in the extant plays was largely a creation of Aristophanes' own, and one not much imitated or developed by his rivals. If Cleonymus was an associate of Cleon's, this might help to explain his prominence in Aristophanes; and it is worth adding that the concrete evidence for the satirical treatment of Cleon himself by other comic poets is surprisingly meagre when we reflect how obvious a target he provided, and this confirms the internal indications of the plays themselves that Aristophanes waged a special vendetta against the politician and his collaborators. It is almost as difficult in Lamachus's case as in Cleon's to account for the shortage of satirical material from the work of other dramatists (none whatsoever for Lamachus) simply in terms of the vagaries of the scholia and the traditions behind them, given the figure's public importance over a long period of time: here too, then, there is no good reason to shirk the conclusion that we have to deal with an Aristophanic peculiarity or speciality.

To return to more general patterns in the surviving evidence, I should indicate that well over half those targets of Aristophanic jokes who occur in the fragments of other poets are to be found in at least two other comedians, and it is also the case that many of the group as a whole were the subject of jokes in more than one play by a particular dramatist. The individuals who appear as targets in Aristophanes are between them the subjects of over seven hundred references in the plays and fragments of Old Comedy. A definite impression suggests itself in these figures: that it was not the usual practice of comic poets to use butts for single jokes, though this must sometimes have happened, or to look for a constantly fresh supply of personal satirical material; instead they regularly returned to the characters they had ridiculed previously, or possibly picked on people already made familiar by their rivals' plays. The fragments as a whole therefore confirm what we might anyway have inferred from the extant plays of Aristophanes alone. Of some twenty targets in Peace, for example, we
find that only five (including Sophocles and Pheidias) had not been referred to in earlier plays, and only three do not occur again in a later play; moreover, only one person, Pheidias, belongs in both these groups. Aristophanes himself acknowledges the recurring use of the same targets not only in his well-known criticism of his rivals at Nu. 551ff., a passage which concerns the subjects of whole plays rather than individual jokes, but also in the comic \( \pi\omega\alpha\nu\lambda\nu\varphi \) at Kn. 1264ff., where the implication, underlined by the following introduction of Ariphrades, is that comic poets normally deal with known targets.

If we are receptive to the possibility that the subjects of personal satire could develop reputations within comedy itself, even within the work of a particular playwright, as well as in public life generally, it is pertinent to ponder some information about the time-span of jokes about individual butts. Consistent precision is obviously not attainable in this area because of the difficulty of dating better than roughly many of the comedies of which we now have only scanty fragments. It is unfortunate in view of the intricacies of this subject, and of the potential chronological relevance of personal references, that Geissler's Chronologie der altattischen Komödie did not take sufficient account of the uncertainties of trying to date works on the basis of the proper names which turn up in them. Geissler, like various scholars before him, frequently relied on personal jokes, and understandably, in his attempts to date lost plays. But many of our Old Comic fragments contain little more than the information that an individual was named in such-and-such a play, and even where we have a reliable quotation its contents will not always allow us to tie down the reference with any certainty to a particular date or narrow period. The extant plays alone are sufficient to prove that an individual comic reputation could be long-lasting: Pauson, for instance, is the subject of jokes in both Acharnians and Plutus. Geissler was insufficiently willing to make allowance for this factor. Thus he dates Plato's Festivals to shortly after 415 solely on the grounds of fr. 31, a joke about Dieitrephes: but
while this is arguably the most likely date for this play (Dieitrephes was
general in 414/13 and 412/11) we are not in a position to rule out a date
say five years earlier. Aristophanes' joke about him at Birds 798-800
suggests that he has risen from a humble origin through a series of milit-
ary ranks to his present prominence: had his audience really not heard
before of this man whom they were about to elect general? Geissler's dating
of Aristophanes' Heroes to the same period, on the same grounds, a joke
about Dieitrephes in fr. 307, may therefore also be too precise. Similarly,
it is rash to date Pherecrates' Petale later than 425 simply because of a
joke about Cleisthenes (fr. 135). Despite these and many other question-
able uses of personal jokes for dating purposes by Geissler, the typical
effect of which is to put together references to the same individual some-
what closer in time than they need have been, calculations of the time-
span of comic reputations based mainly on Geissler's dates yield interesting
results. It is possible that more than twenty of our one-hundred-and-sixty
targets had comic reputations which lasted for twenty years or more. If
we were to arrange the remainder along a scale divided into five-year inter-
vals, we would find a more or less even distribution along most of the
scale, with a heavier concentration at the bottom, below five years (incl-
uding here that substantial number, almost a quarter of the total, who are
mentioned only once). Given that no target could last indefinitely (unless
he become proverbial), and that repeated gibes at an individual would have
to justify themselves comically, these figures, even allowing a sizeable
margin of error, corroborate the tendency of comic satire to perpetuate
its own material. Not many fewer than half the targets, in fact, appear
to have been current in comedy for a period of ten or more years. This
pattern adds some chronological substance to the figures given earlier, and
it serves to strengthen my contention that in seeking to understand how the
original audiences will have appreciated personal jokes we should consider
one important factor to have been a familiarity with the targets derived
from the output of comic poets themselves. It is germane to add here that, though many individual jokes are brief and would not necessarily stick in the mind in a performance, a cumulative impact could be made—a comic image or reputation gradually created—by the inclusion within a single play of more than one joke against the same person. A salient instance is that of Cleonymus. Aristophanes does not simply keep coming back to him in play after play (he is in seven of the extant eleven) but reinforces his satire by repetition within plays: Cleonymus is the subject of three jokes in each of four plays. All the extant plays contain individuals who are the target of more than one joke, and most of them have several: both Wasps and Birds have more than a dozen each. Some individuals become standing targets, and standing targets offer the satirist special possibilities.

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Although much of chapter 5 is devoted to specialised analysis of some of the more important formal aspects of jokes, one question of form deserves brief discussion in this introduction. The term 'joke' may tend to suggest a self-contained and complete verbal structure, even though the word is acceptably used to cover a wide range of comic phenomena. But how far is it possible to demarcate the formal extent of a joke in a dramatic context? (I leave choral sections out of consideration here) Is it possible to determine where a joke begins and where it ends? My aim in raising this issue, I should insist at once, is not to manufacture a definition which can be dogmatically employed to decide whether any particular passage does or does not constitute a joke. I see it rather as one way of trying to sharpen our sense of how Aristophanes writes with a deliberate view to creating comic effects which can be shaped with specific force by actors and perceived as coherent units by an audience. The ends of personal jokes in Aristophanes are in fact much easier to locate than the beginnings. In
most cases there is a resemblance to the anecdotal jokes of conversation in that we can easily identify a climax or the point which is the main element in the joke, and this point almost always comes at or very near the end of the joke: indeed, almost by definition, when the point of a joke has been reached, the joke is over. Some Aristophanic jokes may have more than one raison d'être or punch-line. This is the case, for instance, at Wasps 15 ff., where there are two principal comic hits at Cleonymus, at lines 19 and 27, divided by a further reinforcement of the same satirical point at 22 f. But this structural fact makes it no harder to see that the compound joke ends decisively at 27, and that we move on to a new subject immediately after it. Cleonymus is also the target of a similarly complex and extended joke at Nu. 670-80, and again the definition of the end of the joke is sharpened by the fact that the final punch-line is followed by a change of subject. In these two passages it happens to be equally clear where the jokes begin; this is because each joke constitutes a readily discernible segment in the composition of its scene: an issue is raised and left behind at fixed points. Many dramatic jokes, however, differ significantly from told jokes in that the way in which they start is not so clear-cut. It will be useful as a preliminary to ch. 5 to spend a little space examining the extent of this difference. Jokes can be said to have punch-lines or climaxes or surprise endings, but, important though such features are, they do not in themselves make whole jokes, and a climax or surprise depends for its humorous effect partly on what precedes it. Since my later analyses of joking techniques will embrace observations both on punch-lines and on ways in which preparation can be laid for them, it is in order here to consider further the question of how far a joke located in a dramatic context can be seen and felt to have a beginning.

A handful of jokes can easily be coped with at once precisely because they do approximate to told jokes and are correspondingly well marked out as 'Einzelwitze'. It is a striking fact that such jokes tend to come in groups
or series, and in one case at least, at Nu. 144 ff., Aristophanes seems to me deliberately to put the stories told by the pupil in a framework which resembles the discourse of a teller of ἄποθέσεις. The pupil purports to be telling μνηστήρες, and Strepsiades appears to be impressed by what he hears (153, 165-8, 180): as elsewhere in Clouds, the comedy is directed simultaneously against both ends of the intellectual scale, the sophistic and the naïve. But the effect is dramatically ironic, for both men behave in a way which the audience can perceive as the telling and reception of jokes: note in particular the pupil’s eagerness to tell another one (154 f.: he takes it for granted thereafter), and Strepsiades’ amusement at 174, indistinguishable from the satisfaction of hearing a good joke. At any rate, we have here a series of clearly separated anecdotes, each of which amounts to an obviously coherent joke against Cheirephon and/or Socrates. One might compare Wasps 15 ff. (and 31 ff.), cited above, where, however, the slaves behave more like deliberate joke-tellers. In both cases the audience’s reaction to what is being said is partly controlled by the formal characteristics of the dialogue, and entailed in this is the fact that we feel clearly the point at which each section containing a punch-line begins. A more compressed series of personal jokes occurs at Nu. 348-55, but each element in the series is equally clear. Other series, of differing sizes and complexity, in which the beginnings of individual sections are explicitly marked are: Ach. 5-16, Kn. 128 ff., W. 73 ff., 1224 ff., Peace 665 ff., Ay. 1292 ff., Pl. 174-9. The boundaries of a single joke inserted into a series of some other kind are identifiable on the same principle: Trygaeus’s gibe at Cleonymus, for example, at Peace 446 is one in a chain of prayers which all follow the same formula, and an audience would inevitably be aware of the unit (444-6) to which it belongs. Such simple forms, easily apprehensible in performance, carry in themselves part of the pleasure of a joke, and we can derive from them a clue as to how to analyse less sharply cut structures. In a series of the kind just instanced, the individual formal ele-


ment (anecdote, illustration, prayer etc.) raises the subject which the joke capitalises on, and holds together in a manner which can be felt as being satisfyingly coherent the parts which are related within the joke, a verbal equivalent to the manner in which cartoons usually draw together features and details which can be grasped in a single act of comprehension. How far can most personal jokes in Aristophanes be seen to be units of this sort?

My way of approaching this issue is meant to emphasise, as my later comments on comic technique will try to do, kinds of appreciation and understanding which are possible for an audience in the flow of a performance. Spectators can be both encouraged and helped to perceive a portion of dialogue as a unified joke by a number of means, and in identifying some of these we go as far as it is possible to go in judging where jokes begin. Among the most convincing means of supplying coherence is the framework provided by a piece of action or a visible element in the play. The reference to Cleon's death at P. 269 f. is the climax of a joke which really begins at 261, where Polemos orders Kydoimos to fetch a nestle from Athens. The episode is the dramatically realised equivalent of a riddle or similar verbal joke: Polemos's order creates a specific and special interest, which Trygaeus turns into suspense (263 ff.), about what the venture will lead to, and the punch-line gets part of its force, affords part of its satisfaction, from the fact that it dispels or resolves the tension engendered by the preceding lines (and brought to a pitch by the antilabe in 268: cf. ch. 5 for this device). If this is not purely a matter of form, the form is at any rate indispensable for the intended effect. The following joke about the corresponding Spartan side of the war (274 ff.) has the same pattern as the first one, and is a unity in the same dramatic sense, though its comic character is different for the precise reason that it reuses a form that the audience now understand: there is no surprise in the second case, for most of the audience at least; anticipation, rather, is invited and rewarded. The repeated pattern yields a modified kind of comedy. Kn. 947 ff.
also illustrates how a formal unity can be visually strengthened. Demos's request for the return of the seal-ring of his Ταφείς starts a piece of stage-business (with the ring passing from the Paphlagonian to Demos at 948 and from Demos to the Sausage-seller at 953) which culminates in the last word of 958 (and notice again the use of anitlōbe to structure the comic progression). The short episode is a sort of building-brick in the construction of the dialogue (cf. Νυ. 670-80 and Λ. 15 ff., cited above, for the same compositional feature without the support of action): the joke gives a point to it which satisfies the interest aroused by the action, and thereby justifies dramatically the movement to a new subject. The visible element in such scenes helps to hold together the context in which the joke has its force, but in simpler cases the verbal and comic unity of the joke may be anyway patent. At Θesm. 234 ff. the movements of the two actors accompany an exchange which would be still self-contained if just heard, for what really matters in the operation of this joke is the combination of a pointedly neat form (brisk question-and-answer) with the idea of the buffoonish Mnesilochus being invited to admire the effeminate appearance that Euripides has given him. In performance Mnesilochus's appearance is of course essential to the whole scene, but this particular joke depends rather on his own reaction to his appearance, and therefore begins when Euripides asks him if he would like to see himself (a peculiarly feminine activity): it makes good sense to see this as a comic moment in its own right, for that is the sort of effectiveness it would be given in performance.

This last example shows that a decision about where a joke begins may involve a combination of formal with wider dramatic considerations. Although it is not possible to prescribe precise criteria which will yield a certain answer in every case, we can, I think, formulate a practical guideline which will help us to see faithfully the kind of comic impact that a joke might make in performance. It can be generally taken that a personal joke (in dialogue) is contained within the utterance which makes the personal reference (eg. the series of rhetorical questions at Πλ. 174 ff.), except
where that utterance is necessarily or formally tied up with one or more other utterances. Thus a personal reference in the answer to a question, as at Thesm. 235, makes a joke out of the combination, and in this case it seems appropriate, given the full dramatic setting, to count the preceding question and answer (234) as part of the same unit: the logical structure and the humour of the exchange combine to give the joke a clarity of definition that could be felt or appreciated as such by an audience. The comic unity of question-and-answer is equally obvious at Kn. 1357-63, Nu. 501-3, Av. 10 f., 149-51, Frogs 86 etc.; indeed, the satisfying character of the joke-form in these and similar cases makes it tempting to talk of the questions as feed-lines, though there is a danger in the use of this term of obscuring the degree of dramatic integration which may still exist between a joke and its context (see ch. 5). In contrast to closely connected utterances of this kind, or to the interlocking dialogue of an extended sequence such as Kn. 947 ff., stand jokes like Frogs 1036-8, where Dionysus's gibe at Pantacles is really self-contained, although it picks up the subject of Homer the teacher which Aeschylus has just mentioned: but Aeschylus's subject is not there simply for the sake of the joke, and it is continued after it, unlike, say, the subject of Demos's ring at Kn. 947 ff., which is restricted to the structure of words and action that culminates in the reference to Cleonymus. Metrical considerations aside (though the antithete helps to give edge to Dionysus's remark), the comment on Pantacles at Frogs 1036-8 could be cut out almost without affecting Aeschylus's argument (he acknowledges that he has heard it at 1039): what precedes the comment does not need completing, and I think it is important to observe that there is more of a sense of an intruding witticism (a disrespectful retort to a rhetorical question), carrying all its comic force in itself, than at Thesm. 235, where comically as well as logically the two utterances operate in harness. A contrast to the joke which forms an unnecessary and intrusive contribution to an argument is supplied by e.g. Euelpides' remarks at Av. 125 f. and 153 f.: these belong in the main flow of the conversation at the points at
which they occur, and in the delivery of performance it would be hard not to hear the personal references as formal and comical completions of the suggestions which precede them (at Av. 153 f. the form is practically the whole joke: the personal content is weak). Eumolpus' points emerge, however ludicrously, from the conversation itself, and are used to create comic units which carry the dialogue along; Dionysus' contribution at Frogs 1036-8 momentarily breaks into the argument, and this difference affects what can be perceived as the form and shape of the jokes. Birds 125 f. and 153 f. are comparable to the question-and-answer jokes cited above, while Frogs 1036-8 has more in common, I would suggest, with Ach. 139 f. (note the elision), Kn. 1372, and W. 786-95.

To return to the implications of the distinction drawn for the beginnings of jokes, we can see that both the main types illustrated in the preceding paragraph are likely to produce jokes that form more or less definite units in a dialogue. Both types, in fact, have something in common with kinds of verbal humour familiar outside drama. The question-and-answer joke, as representative of the type involving more than one utterance, resembles, for example, the genre of riddle in which an answer has to be supplied to a question ('What is....?'). Those, on the other hand, which I have suggested are likely to be heard as self-contained within a single utterance come closer to the witticisms and humorous interjections of conversation, and it is not therefore surprising that in many such cases (e.g. Ach. 139 f., Kn. 1372, Av. 521, Frogs 1036-8) it is natural to treat the remark as an intentional joke on the speaker's part. In both kinds, the product is a clearly delimited comic moment. In many other cases the boundaries of the joke are less sharply definable. Where a personal reference is localised within the larger structure of a single utterance, the guide-line which I earlier proposed ceases to be informative. Sometimes a reference of this sort is neatly enough confined by the stages of the narrative or argument to which it belongs, and hence will be an apprehensible unit within the utterance analogous to the units of dialogue described above: such are e.g. the
jokes about Pericles and Aspasia at Ach. 526 ff., about Cleon at Peace 647 f., and about Neocleides at Pl. 665 f. and 716-25. Paradoxically, however, some of the apparently shortest of jokes pose the most difficult problems of formal definition. These include some where a name is substituted surprisingly for an object, substance, place etc., such as Lys. 103 and Eccl. 97, where the highly localised satirical impact nonetheless depends on a relation with the preceding context. It is impossible to circumscribe such jokes simply, but what matters, as everywhere, is to try to do full justice both to the main moment of comic impact and to the details of composition which pave the way for it.

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The character and distribution of personal jokes within individual plays does not in most cases yield a pattern of any significance. The only play in which anything more than a casual correlation occurs between the main themes of the drama and the subjects of personal jokes is Peace. Here more than half the jokes are aimed at military or political figures associated with war; they run through the play like a delicate thread, contributing decoration to the central dramatic presentation of the recovery of Peace, and together they amount to a selective but pointed survey of the 'Establishment' names who can be considered responsible for having kept the city at war for so long. Most of them are mentioned more than once. The list stretches as far back as Pericles himself, who is accused of having fanned the flames of war out of self-interest (605 ff.). Although Pericles is exposed in some detail in Hermes' speech, Cleon is attacked more often: dead but not forgotten, he is the target that the audience might expect still to be in Aristophanes' sights (43-8), and he fulfills their expectations by coming into view at several prominent points (270, 313-15, 648 ff., 752 ff.), including the climax of Hermes' indictment of those hostile to the
goddess. Hyperbolus, as the new ἀρρητός, but perhaps also as an old associate of Cleon, can be picked out as a hindrance to the success of Peace (681 ff., 921b, 1319), as can the familiar military representatives Lamachus (304, 473 f., 1270 ff.) and Peisander (395). For good measure Cleonymus the supposed ἐξαρκής (446, 673 ff., 1295 ff.), but also another political figure who may have had connections with Cleon (and note that the ἐξαρκής were in a position to make others fight the war: 1186), and the Spartan corollary of Cleon, Brasidax (274 ff., 670), complete the list. It is a gallery of familiar faces: Aristophanes had made jokes about them all before, and many of his audience in 421 will have heard them. Peace is an illustration of how far Aristophanes could integrate a group of jokes into the themes of a play, but the playwright practises the technique only with smaller groups in the other plays: with the series of jokes against Cleon in the first half of Acharnians, culminating in the defiant gesture in the πνῖγος of the parabasis (6, 300, 377 ff., 502 ff., 659 ff.); with the jokes about Lamachus in the same play that fill out the satirical image of him created by his appearances (270, 959 ff., 1174 ff.); with the jokes about Chairephon in Clouds, perhaps the relics of a larger role in the original version for the companion of Socrates (104, 144–6, 156, 503 f., 831 etc.); or with the series of jokes against Cleon (35 f., 62, 197, 242, 596, 759 etc.) and his associate Theorus (42 ff., 418, 599, 1220, 1236) in Wasps, which help to keep in the audience's mind the alleged political exploitation of the dicastic system. Personal jokes can highlight the character of an episode or scene. Those in the first scene of Eccles., for example, are used to give satirical realisation to the complementary themes of the women's mock-masculinity and the men's inadequate and false virility. The satire is meant for male ears, of course, and the standards are male; but the jokes would allow most of the audience to feel that it was particular members of the citizen body, not all Athenian males collectively, who were the real cause of the women's irritation. Epicrates' beard is a joke for its size,
and in any case is outstripped by the woman's false specimen (71). Phormisius's hairiness makes him comparable to a κυρτός (97) (a piquant instance of the inversion of normal sexual standards). Agyrrius, who ought to be the epitome of virility, as a major political figure, is in fact not only παλιός (185) but actually effeminate (102-4), like Epigonus (167). The whole political system is such as to produce effeminate (112 ff.), and Praxagora can be confident of reducing to size the best speakers that the present assembly has to offer (248 ff.).

Despite these partial correlations between groups of satirical references and dominant dramatic themes, no helpfully neat categorisation of the topics of personal jokes is either possible or desirable. Even a rough division of targets into the broad groups of political, artistic, social and private subjects would obscure the fact that many butts are ridiculed in ways which would necessarily put them into more than one of these categories, sometimes within the same joke. The attempt at [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.18 to argue that the vast majority of the objects of Old Comedy's satire were ἡ πλασίος ἡ γενναῖος ἡ συνάγωνος is too simple to fit the jokes with which we are dealing, though as a generalisation the Old Oligarch's claim comes closer to the truth than the assertion of the young Gilbert Murray that Aristophanes "as a rule...only attacks the poor, and the leaders of the poor." In fact, any subject, from the details of private sexual behaviour (e.g. Kn. 1284 ff.) to major political acts such as the proposal of the Sicilian expedition (Lys. 391 ff.), could be made material for a personal joke in Old Comedy. Sexual subjects were particularly attractive not only because of natural interest in them but also because it was only in the context of festival comedy that such matters could be dealt with publicly and in completely frank detail; and jokes about passive homosexuality had a special appeal for a popular and almost exclusively male audience. Another very common topic of jokes has its roots in the cultural nature of the Dionysiac festivals themselves. Approximately one quarter of the targets of personal jokes in the extant plays are known to have had an involvement
with the artistic performances for which the festivals provided major settings: comic poets, tragedians, dithyrambists, flute-players, actors, choregoi, dancers, surrogate ἄδειακαλών, even the archons who granted chorus
e− the list of names (with some uncertain or doubtful cases bracketed) is
a tellingly long one: Acestor, Aeschylus, Agathon, Ameipsias, Antimachus,
(Antisthenes), Ariphrades, Callimachus, (Callipides), Carkinus, (Ceceides),
Cephisophon, Choris, Cinesias, (Cleidemides), (Cleocritus), Connus, Crates,
Crotinus, (Dercylus), (Echphantides), Eupolis, Euripides, (Execestides),
Hegelochus, Hermippus, Hieronymus, Ion, Iophon, Leotrophides, Lycis, Magnes,
Melanthius, Meletus, Molon, Morsimus, (Morychus), Oiagrus, (Pantacles),
Patrocles, Philocles, (Philoxenus), (Phyromachus), Phrynichus Com., Pythagelsus, Sophocles, Spintharus, Sthenelus, Theognis, Xenocrates. The collection
of jokes about theatrical and related figures might be taken to reflect
Aristophanes' own interests and acquaintances, but while there is no doubt
an authorial factor to be reckoned with here the extent of this brand of
satire must also owe something to the festival atmosphere, in which the
spectators of Aristophanes' plays would also be the spectators of his riv-
als' work, of tragedy and of dithyramb, would develop an appreciation of
the musical and histrionic arts involved in them, and would naturally relish
not just the competitive derogation of one another issuing from comic poets
but also any ridicule directed at the allegedly bad versions of the various
entertainments on which their pleasure at the festival partly depended. On
such occasions the gathering of a considerable portion of the citizen body
made political humour another particularly suitable part of the comic poet's
repertoire. At the Lenaia in particular the spectators' sense of their
native identity and political status could be exploited (cf. Ach. 504−8),
and this is one reason for the popularity with Old Comedians of jokes which
impute or insinuate foreign or non-citizen origins against named individ-
uals. In ordinary public life such allegations would be either grave matt-
ers to be held back only for the most unscrupulous kind of political invest-
ive, but the Comedian could make them with immunity, drawing both on his licence for παραφυσία and on the readily available feeling of privileged solidarity among most of his audience. It is not surprising that in the pseudo-γεφυρίσις of Frogs 416 ff. (see ch. 4) the chorus’s unfettered δεξιότητα finds expression in an irreverent suggestion of non-citizen origins against the politician Archedemus, as well as in the frank obscenities against the son of Cleisthenes and Callias.

These preliminary observations on some of the more common subject areas have relevance to the issue which underlies chapters 2 and 3, namely the relationship between the satirical contents of personal jokes and the reality which they purport to refer to. I try to show in chapter 2 that the orthodox assumption in both ancient and much modern scholarship has been that this relationship is normally straightforward one; that most personal jokes get at the truth, even if they attach some ornamentation to it.

Among the weaknesses of this assumption is an imaginative failure to realise that there is in many satirical topics themselves a kind of popular comic intelligibility which can be independent of the truth about any individual at whom a joke may be aimed. I argue in ch. 3 that this intelligibility can be understood in terms of the operations of a range of stereotypes of undesirable characteristics, including the simpler forms of abuse, virtually universal (imputations of ugliness, stupidity, greed etc.), combinations of these simple categories with particular groups (dishonest rhetores or peculating officials, cowardly generals, greedy rich etc.), and further combinations which are closely tied to the society’s special institutions or customs (illicit citizens, passive homosexuals, tradesmen—become—demagogues). There is not a fixed, single set of these stereotypes (I use the word ‘stereotype’ because of the tendency to deal in readily available and reductively simple terms) though some are more basic and persistent than others. We cannot say, either, that they contain a definite blend of so-much fact with so-much fiction. Some may believe in or rely on them more than others, depending partly on the individual’s own background.
and status; and some stereotypes may embody a more accurate crystallisation of life than others. Amusement, cynicism or fear may be dominant in the employment of them. But what matters above all for Old Comedy's explicit and implicit use of them is that they are, in an objective sense, popularly intelligible and enjoyable: that is, for any given category, a majority will be invulnerable to the same charge, and so will be capable of freely appreciating the application of it to someone else; for ridiculing and abusive stereotypes tend to confirm the values and behaviour of the majority, proscribing the aberrations of minorities. On top of the normal difficulties of judging how seriously someone is using a category, Old Comedy's personal jokes need especially careful attention before we can take them as informative about their butts because they were offered on occasions of licensed entertainment, a fact which increases the satirist's scope for distortion or invention as much as it allows him the opportunity to expose disreputable truths. In any particular case, of course, it remains possible that a joke will in fact exploit the truth about a person's parentage, flute-playing or sexual habits, and it is certainly in general clear that jokes on any one subject are not directed at random targets: there will usually be a correlation between the contents of the joke and the identity of the target (though this need not be true for some virulent forms of abuse). But that correlation may vary greatly, and it is important to realise, if we are not to give up jokes as necessarily unintelligible where our knowledge of the subject is slight, that the impetus behind an allegation or comic image may sometimes come more from the humorous potential of the topic of the joke than from the character of the target. In short, the number of jokes about non-citizen origins in Old Comedy may be less a reflection of the statistics of illicit citizenship in late fifth-century Athens than a natural comic exploitation, for the pleasure of those who could afford to feel immune to suspicion, of the power of such allegations in a society where citizenship was the fundamental privilege that it was, but where, in the absence of bureaucratic record-keeping, doubt about the legitimacy of it in
particular cases would not be easily refutable.

To give these issues a concrete application, I shall end this chapter by looking briefly at two sets of personal jokes against individuals about whom we have no evidence outside Old Comedy, but for whose satirical treatment we can perhaps still discern some of the raison d'être. Acestor belongs to the group of targets whose popularity with comic poets lasted for more than twenty years. He is mentioned in Cratinus fr. 85 and Callias fr. 13, both dating from some years before Wasps 1221, his first appearance in Aristophanes; also at Birds 31 and in Metagenes fr. 13 and Theopompus fr. 60, which take us into the last decade of the century, and in Eupolis fr. 159, which belongs to Kolakes of 421. The projected image of him is remarkably consistent: the suggestion that he is not an Athenian citizen is presented in some form in all the comic references to him, and this was crystallised in what Birds 31 suggests was a familiar nickname, Σκάκης. Yet it is equally clear from Birds 31 ff. (cf. Metagenes fr. 13) that Acestor was in possession of citizenship. Why, then, should the comic poets have returned so often to the allegation against him? Part of the answer, I would suggest, must lie in the fact that Acestor was a performing tragic poet and must have been primarily familiar to theatre audiences in this role. The claim of non-citizen birth against him must have had a different force from the same claim against a political figure, for it will have been impossible to dissociate it from knowledge of Acestor's profession: the comic poets' jokes are likely to have been felt as being specifically related to the festivals at which Acestor had produced plays, and the sense of citizen solidarity implicitly drawn on by the jokes will have been more cultural than political, though we know of at least one non-Athenian, Ion of Chios, who competed at the dramatic festivals in the fifth century. Of course, how seriously the jokes were taken would depend partly on how firm a basis there was for them in the facts of Acestor's life. We cannot get at the truth at this point, but it is obviously more important for our
understanding of the jokes to ask whether the theatre audiences who heard them will necessarily have been better informed. It will not do to assert "Acestor... was evidently another foreigner..." This has often been taken for granted, but if Acestor was evidently a foreigner, how could he hold on to citizenship? But why otherwise should most Athenians have known whether Acestor's citizenship was legitimate? Perhaps there had been a scandal such as a court-case, but it would be tendentious to assume one. If we could rely on the scholiast on Birds 31, who claims that Theopompus had called Acestor's father Ξάκως, we might be dealing with an old charge: how could many of those who heard Metagenes' and Theopompus's jokes on the subject after 410 be expected to know or remember the source of all this? The tradition was partly transmitted by comedy itself, I would suggest, but to acknowledge this is to recognise that many of Aristophanes' audience may have been no more able to disentangle facts from allegations than we are, and that their appreciation of jokes against Acestor cannot have been a matter of matching up the satire with a reality independently known to them. If we read Ἀκήθητος at Wasps 1221 we can see that the possibility existed of the theme simply turning into a standard joke against the family: cf. the joke against Cleisthenes' son at Frogs 422. Once the theme was established in comedy, and so long as Acestor was active enough to keep him a familiar name with clear associations, the gibe of foreign origins, whatever its origin, would have all the comic justification it needed, though we should not overlook the possibility that Wasps 1220 f. preserves a genuine hint of a connection with Cleon which may have been an implicit factor in the jokes against him.

Another long-lasting butt was the flute-player Chairis, who appears to have become a byword for incompetence on the instrument. If we take his comic reputation to be an accurate reflection of his capabilities, however, an oddity immediately suggests itself: if Chairis was so bad, why was he ever employed to play the flute, or how did he become notorious? Ach. 15
f. seems, in context, to refer to a performance by Chairis at one of the main State festivals. We should note, moreover, that most of the jokes about him suggest that he still practises his instrument and is likely to turn up unexpectedly; it would be strange, therefore, if the reputation could be simply traced back to a single notorious occasion in the past. We cannot hope to penetrate to the truth in such a case, but in addition to doubting whether Chairis was simply a bad player I would like to point to one factor which may have played a part in giving the references to him, and the development of his reputation, some comic intelligibility. Although flute-players had an important enough role in dramatic productions and on other occasions, they do not seem to have been highly valued. If the λόγος παλαίωσε preserved by Athenaeus (8.837 E) encapsulates an attitude that existed in the fifth century, Chairis might have been picked on to represent the epitome of his profession:

άνδρι μὲν αὐλητὴς ἦτοι νόει ἐμὲ ἐνέφυων
ἀλλ' ἵππα τῷ φωσὶν χῦ νοσ εὑπετησαί.

A passage in Aristotle's Politics (VIII. vi. 1340b-41b) refers to the view that an instrumental accomplishment in music was βάναυσις. Although Aristotle himself is not prepared to give unqualified assent to this attitude, he does pick out flute-playing as being particularly vulnerable to this kind of criticism and praises ἐκ παρότινον for forbidding the practice of the flute by τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἀλεεκέρων. Part of the objection to the advanced playing of an instrument might be that it was a professional activity: the performer, like the tradesman, offered a service for which he required payment. We cannot simply project such attitudes onto Aristophanes' audiences, but it is worth noticing that the joke about Chairis at Peace 950-55 suggests not just that he turns up ἀκλήτως and forces one to listen to his bad playing, but that he requires and pesters for payment (προσδεόμενον ἀγαθοῦ, 955). A further element in the comic treatment of Chairis may also be less of a response to one man's peculiarities than a satirical crystallisation of what might be light-heartedly treated as general characteristics
of the profession. The flute-player's art may have sometimes seemed physically ludicrous: the reduction of his activity to φοσαν implies this (Ach. 863, 868, Birds 954); and by Aristotle's day at least (Poetics 1461b 30-32) χυλητιει sometimes engaged in physical antics as well as playing the instrument. If such behaviour goes back further, it could well be referred to in the gibe at Chairis at Ach. 15 f.: διεστρακην, whether it refers to the neck or the eyes, shows that παρέκκλισι should here mean something more than 'peeped out' (it prepares for the paradox of χρειον); Dicæopolis could make the point clear by a piece of mimicry. We should at least be open to the possibility that Chairis was paying the comic penalty for characteristics that were not peculiar to him.
Notes

1. I should make it clear at the start that I do not intend by my use of the word 'joke' to imply anything precise about the intention or tone of particular passages. I mean by my application of the word to a section of a speech, dialogue or song only that it involves some kind of comic criticism, abuse, ridicule or insinuation against a person: whether, and to what degree, a given passage has the capacity to do more than arouse laughter, by provoking serious reflection, evoking strong feelings or influencing attitudes and maybe even behaviour, is too delicate and complex a subject in most cases to be given consideration in this thesis. I do, however, in general object to the common assumption that we can automatically infer the poet's attitudes from his choice of satirical material.

2. See Steinhausen (1910).

3. Quite a lot of the material was put into sets of categories by Halbertsma (1855), Harwardt (1883), Fröhde (1898), esp. ch. 2, van Hook (1927-8), and Schmid (1946) pp. 16ff., but all of these omit much. Moreover, apart from Schmid, who is only offering an outline of the subject, all these scholars were much too uncritical and tended to take jokes at face value. Even Harwardt, who was following the lead of Müller-Strübing (1873) and who showed some sensitivity to comic distortion and invention, too often goes along with scholiastic inferences.

4. Quaest. Conv. 711f - 12a. It is odd that Plutarch's examples - Cinesias, Laispodias and Lampon - are far from obscure targets.

5. These figures, and others in this section which are not substantiated in notes, can be checked against the material collected in the Index of Names.

6. Fr. 18 (Timon: but cf. pp.57f.), fr. 20 (Lyceas, not mentioned in Birds, Teleas, Peisander and Execestides), fr. 21 (Meton), fr. 22 (Nicias), fr. 26 (Syracosius).

7. Melanthius: Eupolis fr. 164. It happens that Melanthius is mentioned also in Leucon fr. 2, from the third play (Phrastorcs) at Dionysia 421.

8. Note, at the most rudimentary level, the inconsistency of cross-reference to other jokes against the same targets within the plays of Aristophanes. It has to be admitted, of course, that we do not know how systematic or careful the Kluge~Lewy actually were, so some of the blame might lie with them. Cf. ch. 2 n. 13.

9. See pp. 91f., and the refs. in ch. 3 n. 46.

10. CGF 100. There is also the claim of Nu. 353 and 675 (and cf. C.
adesp. 64), though no details are given and we need to beware of such vagueness in the scholia. Cf. Steinhäusen (1910) p. 31.

11. Cf. ch. 3 n. 48.
14. Note the comments of Dover (1972) p. 211.
15. Note the example discussed by Gomme HCT i. p. 374 n.1.
16. Geissler (1925) p. 53; he denies that Cretinus fr. 233 refers to the same man (p. 20), but it might well do.
17. Geissler loc. cit.
18. op. cit. p. 34.
19. Geissler, it should be noted, ignores the evidence of personal references where he has other criteria to employ: e.g. in dating Eupolis's Chrysoum Genos to the 420's (p. 35) he does not consider the reference to Pantacles, mentioned elsewhere only at Frogs 1036-8, in fr. 296.
20. See the Index of Names and References under: Acestor, Alcibiades, Callias, Cinesias, Cleisthenes, Cleon, Cretinus, (?) Dieitrophes (cf. n. 16 above), (?) Euathlus, Euripides, Hippocrates, Hyperbolus, Lamachus, Leonon, (?) Leucolophides, (?) Lycon, (?) Lysicrates, Melanthius, Pamphilus, Pericles, (?) Philocles, Phrynichus Comm., Socrates.
21. Analysis of jokes sometimes fails by ignoring this relation. Freud quotes a question-and-answer joke ("Have you taken a bath?", "What? Is there one missing?") : Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, Engl. trans. by J. Strachey, The Pelican Freud Library vol. 6, p. 85): he points out himself that the expression 'taken a bath' is crucial, yet asserts that "the joke lies not in the question but in the answer"; but in fact the joke must lie in the combination.
22. The Greeks did 'tell jokes', comic λογασ or μοικ̃α that had affinities with the Aesopic fable and the apophthegm: cf. Wasps 1176 ff., 1382 ff., 1401 ff., 1410 f., 1427 ff. For the Hellenistic period we have the χρεια of Machon and the sayings of Stratonicus, and, later still, the joke-book Philogelos.
23. Compare Plautus Aul. 297-320, where Anthrax's anecdotes about Euclio are in effect a series of jokes told to a keen audience.
26. Plautauer's view ad loc., following Herwerden, that line 270 is "tasteless" and "silly-clever" and (therefore, note) not by Aristophanes, is
stated without argumentation and would leave an elaborately prepared joke with a peculiar resolution, for ἁρράλης ἄλτερ ἕξιος is not necessarily a statement about a person, yet Trygaeus’s ἄριστος .... ὅτι ἡ ἀρράλη ἕξιος so evidently is. Peace 270 in fact provides the desirable satirical fullness: the explicitness of identification, and an elaboration of the point of the imagery (cf. Newiger (1957) pp. 27–30). Note that at 282 f., an equivalent elucidation is given of the identity of the Spartan ἄλτερ ἕξιος, even though the repetition of the joke pattern makes this less essential. For the pattern of Peace 269 f. cf. Birds 13 f. and Cratinus fr. 71 (where Cobet, see Kock’s note, wanted to remove Pericles’ name). Marzullo (1970–72) p. 87 also argues for excision of 270.

27. Cf. Dover (1972) pp. 60 f., though note that No. 501 f. is not necessarily ‘artificial’: it suits an eager but naïve pupil who idolises his teachers.


29. See Dover’s edn. pp. xcv f.

30. The joke at 167 f. might be taken to involve the whole audience: see p. 217.

31. The sterility of such classifications is well demonstrated by the efforts of Haltertsma (1855) and Fröhde (1898) ch. 2.


33. For homosexual jokes see Dover (1978) pp. 135 ff. The audience: the only fifth-century evidence which might suggest that women attended the theatre, Peace 962–7, can just as easily be taken to imply the opposite, or at any rate that hardly any women were there; and on the other side we have Peace 50 ff., Birds 793–6, Thesm. 395–7, Eccl. 1144–8 and other passages (not given proper consideration by Navarre (1900) pp. 53 ff. or by many more recent treatments of the issue). Perhaps most important is the argument from silence, which has never been given its full weight: if there had been a sizeable number of women in the audience, would Aristophanes have let the female choruses of Lys. (648 ff.) and Thesm. (785 ff.) address the audience and make comparisons between the sexes without giving any indication whatsoever that they were talking to both men and women?

34. For jokes outside Aristophanes about rivals see: Cratinus frs. 200, 307, Hermippus fr. 64, Eupolis fr. 78, Plato fr. 70, Strattis frs. 20, 54. Cratinus fr. 15 is a joke about an archon, and Eupolis fr. 124 may have been one (a Cleocritus was archon the year that Demosthenes pro-
duced). Eupolis fr. 306 is about a choregos (cf. Aristophanes fr. 551), and for hits at διδακτάκαλος see Cratinus frs. 15 and 256, CGF 56.55 f.  
36. See Lewis (1970)  
37. See Dover on Nu. 985.  
38. Cf. p. 44 below.  
40. See MacDowell on W. 78 and p. 37 below.  
41. Supposing Καπνίας at W. 151 to refer to him, but this is far from certain.  
42. See p. 66 below.  
43. See p. 41 below.  
44. Assuming him to be the dithyrambic poet, for whom cf. DTC pp. 320f.  
45. As the object of parody at Pl. 290 ff. To be distinguished from the Philoxenus in the Index of Names.  
46. See Ussher on Eccl. 21-3.  
48. Müller-Strübing’s discussion (p.550-55) of Acestor's family is badly vitiated by the fact that in Σ Αυ. 31 we should read ποτήρηρέους Τικαμένον, not Τικαμένον, so there is no evidence that Acestor and Tisamenus were related: cf. Theopomous Com. fr. 60. The same flaw is to be found in, e.g., Starkie’s and Rennie’s notes on Ach. 603.  
50. Cf. also the jokes against three generations of Callias’s family (see Cratinus fr. 11 and Metagenes fr. 13), and for jokes against father and son see the cases of e.g. Cephisodemus and Euathlus, Leucolophides and Adeimantus, Lycon and Autolycus.  
51. Some ξύληται were slaves: e.g. the Hicesius mentioned at Andoc. 1.12.  
52. 'Squint' seems the best sense with ημαν: cf. Miller, TAPA 76 (1945) p. 76, with Kn. 175 and Av. 177. For the remote possibility of a sexual meaning see Henderson (1975) pp. 180f.
Apart from the intrinsic general interest which the Aristophanic scholia have for us as documents of and evidence for the history of Classical scholarship, those scholia which bear on personal jokes are worth attention for two closely related reasons. In the first place, among their ultimate sources were works on the orosography of Attic Comedy, the Κωμῳδογενετ, and, starting further back, the monographs and commentaries of Hellenistic scholars, and all these works were compiled by writers who had access to a large amount of Old Comedy now lost to us, as well as to a variety of other kinds of literary and some documentary evidence potentially relevant to the understanding and appreciation of the jokes. Despite the multiple processes of selection, compilation and, no doubt in some cases, traduction to which the findings and opinions of Hellenistic scholars were subjected over the period of centuries that intervened between their work and the incorporation of some of its contents in our scholia, and despite the consequent difficulty of tracing back any particular interpretation to its source, even when a scholar is named in part of a note, it remains worthwhile to examine and assess the scholia on individual jokes as a potential source of valuable information or ideas not available elsewhere. In particular, as this thesis should amply demonstrate, we often depend on the fragments from and testimonies to lost plays preserved in the scholia, even if their form is sometimes more tantalising than informative. But there is a second reason for a thorough evaluation of what the scholia offer us on the jokes, which lies in the use made of them by a majority of modern commentators. Many of these commentators have often seemed unable or unwilling to do more than reproduce or paraphrase the scholiasts' annotations on the jokes. They have been generally content to depend on scholastic assertions as evidence independent of the text, without sufficiently scrutinising these assertions themselves; and this has
involved a correlative failure to probe the contexts, substance and comic mechanisms of the jokes. By this process a whole set of assumptions implicit in the scholiastic treatment of the jokes have, I believe, been taken over unthinkingly by modern scholars. It is paradoxical that while, as Süss said of the Aristophenic scholia, 'am schwächsten sind die Bemerkungen über die sogennanten Κημυδούμενον', yet modern scholars have tended to make more use, and more uncritical use, of this section of the scholia than of any other. My twin aims in what follows are, therefore, to try to throw into relief the distinctive features, and especially weaknesses, of the attitude to the jokes which the scholia represent, and at the same time to furnish some illustration of the ways in which the approaches of modern commentators have been influenced by the scholia. In order to avoid being both invidious and tiresomely long-winded, I have not attempted to fulfil the second of these aims as systematically as I might have done. I am concerned to highlight a tendency, not a universal practice, and have thought it more appropriate to cite modern commentators selectively in connection with individual cases. My selections could easily be supplemented, though as it is there are probably more than enough for most tastes. I have tried to strike a balance between leaving general indictments unsubstantiated and offering a string of names (with inevitable repetitions) in every other note.

Before I begin the detailed analysis of the scholia, I want to discuss briefly a point in the history of ancient study of the jokes. Valuable though Steinhausen's Κομμωτομένοι remains, I believe that he may have underestimated the importance of the monographs and commentaries written earlier than the Κυμυδούμενοι for the later understanding of the jokes and for what we find in the scholia, and exaggerated the ease with which material could be attributed to the Κυμυδούμενοι. Although there seems to have been no systematic interest in Κυμυδούμενοι before Ammonius, pupil of Aristarchus, Steinhausen overlooked one apparent link between Ammonius's work and that of earlier scholars. We know that both Aristophanes of
Dyzantium and his pupil Callistratus wrote monographs Περί Ἐξαρπών, and Ammonius himself wrote a work Περί Πλω Αδηνησι Ἐξαρπῶν. These works will not have had much to say about Old Comedy, though they will have used material from Middle and New. But it is easy to see that a similar kind of scholarly interest lies behind these and the Κωμῳδόμενοι: we should remember that Herodicus (and perhaps the same was true of others) probably arranged his Κωμῳδόμενοι according to categories or types of person. It seems to me very plausible that in Σμ. Παιδ. 1032 (≈ Σμ. Peace 755), in the reference to Eratosthenes' failure to recognize Cynna the Εὐαγγελιστής, we have a note which goes back to one of the authors of works Περί Ἐξαρπῶν. More generally, Steinhausen was rather unfair to the earlier Hellenistic scholars whose interpretations of jokes are occasionally recorded in the scholia. Quite apart from the possibility of an individual scholar being misrepresented, we must keep in mind the tendency of the scholia and some of their sources to cite an author by name only when disagreement with him is being expressed. If we were likewise to judge the compilers of Κωμῳδόμενοι simply on the basis of those scholia where they are explicitly mentioned (e.g. Σμ. Παιδ. 1238: see below), we should not easily arrive at a high opinion of them. But my point here concerns the merits of particular interpretations or prosopographical comments but the general nature of the ancient scholarly activity that lies behind our scholia on personal jokes, and it seems to me improper to attribute virtually all of the material in these scholia to the Κωμῳδόμενοι, as Steinhausen does, when the scholia themselves suggest much more of a mixed tradition of the work of commentators and the authors of Κωμῳδόμενοι. This can be seen clearly from Σμ. Λυκ. 231, where we find alongside one another references to ομηροκράτης and to Κωμῳδόμενοι: ἢν ἐνίας ὀμηροκράτης... ἀλλ' οὐδαμοῦ κεκριμένηται. There are also a number of scholia in which important interpretations are attributed to scholars earlier than the Κωμῳδόμενοι, but where no obvious reference to the latter is found: see e.g. Σμ. Λυκ. 440, Π. 675 (both
discussed below). In what follows I shall only very occasionally have anything to say about the origins of scholastic assertions or claims, but it is as well to be clear from the start that the tradition behind an unattributed statement may often go back to early Hellenistic scholarship. We certainly cannot pretend that the presuppositions about Old Comedy's satire which underlie the scholia's treatment of jokes were a peculiarity of scholarship in the imperial and early medieval periods.

It might be said that the scholiasts' treatment of the jokes is permeated by an assumption, discernible behind Plutarch's well-known statement of the difficulty of understanding Old Comedy's jokes at dinner (Quaest. Conv. vii. 8 (712 a)), that comprehension of a joke will necessarily involve matching it up with a factual background independent of the joke. This is an only partially justified assumption, but the damage that it has done to the scholia's approach is due to the fact that it has been coupled with an unreadiness to admit ignorance of the supposedly requisite facts. Despite the antiquity of some of the views which we find in the scholia, it has to be said that the general standard of intellection in their interpretation of jokes is low, and this fact needs to be given full weight when the reliability of their information in particular cases is being assessed. At their worst the scholia commit flagrant factual errors of chronology or identification, so rudimentary that it would be pointless to dwell too long on them. No-one is likely to be impressed by Σv Ἐ. 61's attempt to find a reference in that line to Θεασμοφοριαζουσες. The chronological relation between Knights and Cratinus's Putine, recognised in Σv Κn. 400, is overlooked in Σv Κn. 526 (compare Callimachus's error over the relation between Μαρικες and the two versions of Clouds in Σε Νυ. 553: cf. Σε Νυ. 549, 581, Σκ 591). Σv Κn. 794 tries to understand the reference to
Archeptolemus there in terms of events later than the first performance of the play. None of these notes has influenced modern interpretations of the jokes, but such has been the general reliance among commentators on scholiastic assertions that in at least one case a mistake as bad as any of those just cited has, though recognised, not prevented some modern scholars from accepting the interpretation for which the factual error is the only basis. Σv W. 1025 explains the line and its context as an allusion to Eupolis, and a quotation from Autolycus (= fr. 57), produced two years later than Wasps, is supplied as support for the explanation. The chronology is incoherent, the reasoning feeble, for Eupolis cannot be the subject in the quotation, and there is in any case no need to understand the given passage of Wasps as having a recognisable application to a particular rival, though the scholiastic dissatisfaction with this latter suggestion can be gauged from the notes on the equivalent passage in Peace (Σv 740, Σv 741, 763). Yet modern adherence to the scholiast's interpretation of W. 1025 has been considerable, and the wording of the note has been accordingly altered to eliminate the nonsense.

Moving beyond the most obvious mistakes of fact, we find the scholia's treatment of personal jokes characterised by a general superficiality, by a failure to try to understand anything other than their ostensible satirical content. At its plainest this superficiality reveals itself in the practice of providing uninformative paraphrases of the comic imputations which the jokes carry. Σk Ach. 843 offers καταπιπτεὼν...καπνῷδηται as a comment on the chorus's allegation of ἐφυπρακτικά against Prepis (likewise Σk Ach. 716 on Alcibiades). If Didymus really claimed that Philocles and Theagenes were ὀψνυθόντες, a valueless annotation on Birds 1295 (Σv), then this practice evidently goes back beyond the compilation of the scholia in the form in which we have them. It is no help to be told that Ach. 852 is a joke about Cretinus's malodorousness (Σk), and the epitome of redundancy is to be found in Σv Ren. 966, where σκληρυγολογυπηνοφάσαλ is glossed:
... Multinlication of examples is unnecessary; but it is worth recording these literal-minded comments as one trivial manifestation of an attitude to Aristophanic satire whose more serious forms and deeper implications I shall shortly try to expose. The attitude is characterised, I shall argue, by an underlying inclination to treat satirical statements and allegations as though they were simple statements of fact. Another facet of the same attitude is the scholiast's fidelity to the satirist's own moral terms and judgements, and this too deserves some explicit demonstration. It is most easily illustrated by the scholiast's common use of Πνηκείς. So far as I can see, they do not exhibit any fine discrimination in their application of it; in their hands it does not reflect nuances of political or social criticism, but the mere fact that an individual is the target of abusive jokes. It is true that occurrences of the word may sometimes reproduce an element from an original joke: this can be seen to be the case in Σε Αχ. 710, where the commentator applies the adjective to Euathlus and quotes from Aristophanes' Halkodes, where it is used of the same man. This might also explain the oddity at the end of Συ Αη. 1294: διαφάλλει δε ωτών ἢ ὁς ἰνόν ἢ ὁς Πνηκείς. But it will hardly do to justify in this way all the many cases where the scholiast uninformatively wields Πνηκείς as a crude way of implying faith in the satirical imputation or judgement made against a character (naturally, a comic poet can also use Πνηκείς and similar words uninformatively, but that is a different matter). Συ Αη. 766 begins with a rare admission of ignorance (see below), in this case about δ Πεισίου; but goes on to state that Cratinus mentioned him in three of his plays in such a way as to show that he was one of τῶν λίαν Πνηκείων. Nothing is hereby added to our knowledge; we are given a vague moral characterisation which does not help us to decide the important and necessary question whether the son of Peisias was a convicted criminal, a man only suspected or rumoured to have committed some traitorous deed, or the target of perhaps fictitious allegations with,
sey, a political motive behind them. A more precise account of the Cretian references might have helped us to decide. It is similarly frustrating to be told in Στ. Av. 1298 that Meidias διαβάλλεται.....εις τα πονηρίων, ἄς Πλάτων ἐν Νίκαις: even if Plato Comicus used πονηρός or πονηρόν in the context to which the scholiast refers (= fr. 80), which is a possibility, we are none the wiser than we would be if we were told just that Meidias was the object of a joke in Nikei. πονηρός if often slipped in with other more informative terms, adding not information but an imprecise derogatory colour: e.g. πονηρός καὶ ἀμετρος (Στ. Pence 803), ἄρτις καὶ πονηρός καὶ πολυπράγμων (Στ. Av. 798), ἄνδρης καὶ φθονερός καὶ πονηρός (Στ. Av. 1295). Empty fidelity to the standpoint of the satirist himself could hardly be carried beyond the point to which Στ. Eccl. 185 takes it, where οὔτε πονηρός ἐστι is the scholiast's only comment on τῶν γ᾽ Αγύρρειον / πονηρῶν κλ. I might just add that reproduction of the satirist's moral judgements (or what are taken to be such) is a practice not confined to ancient commentators. Many examples might be supplied: see e.g. Neil on Kn. 1276, "Ariphrades was a disgrace (though a pupil of Anaxagoras)".

The literal-minded superficiality and moral naiveté of the scholia are in fact only two symptoms of a much more serious and extensive weakness in their approach to personal references in Aristophanes. This weakness consists in the tendency to take all comic assertions, imputations and innuendo at face-value. This radical naiveté is consistently ready to treat the contents of Aristophanic jokes as propositions of historical fact—whether about political events, personal appearance, individual character or behaviour. The satirist is implicitly conceived of as a purveyor or revealer of truth, and his personal images can be transformed from their colourful or oblique comic mode into plain factual statements, though wherever possible the terms of the original image should be preserved. This attitude, and the practical procedures of translation or paraphrase which embody it, so pervades the scholia that it has seeped into a majority of mod-
ern commentaries on the plays and has given rise to the general prejudice that Aristophanic personal jokes must all have had a rather straightforward factual background to which they refer or allude. The task of interpretation seems to be conceived of as being to reconstruct, with the help of the scholia, what that background amounted to in each case. An analysis of the scholia cannot alone remove that prejudice, but it may act as a valuable prelude to the attempt to define a positive alternative by showing up the artificial and tendentious nature of the old approach and its working assumptions.

The scholiastic inclination to take jokes at face-value is everywhere apparent. Σ² Ach. 11's principal comment of the joke about Theognis in that line is: Θέγχης... ἐντέ τῇ ἡμερᾶς τοιμῆς τίνου ψυχρός. A very similar note is to be found in Σ² Ach. 140 and in the papyrus scholion on the same line (cf. e.g. "le froid Theognis", van Daele on Ach. 11; Rogers on Thesm. 170). The comic image or reputation is turned into fact about the man; there is no attempt to separate the two things. Another relatively harmless instance of this practice is Σ² Ach. 16, where Chairis is described as κλοθορίζως καὶ σύλπος φρύδας; the judgement is repeated in Σ² Av. 858, and taken over by some moderns (e.g. van Daele on Ach. 16, Platnauer on Peace 951) - no questions are asked about how or why a particular auletes should be so well-known as a bad player. It may seem pedantic to quibble over these and other similarly brief notes, which after all might reasonably be defended in themselves as convenient ways of expressing what is sometimes put in a slightly fuller and more precise formula employing κυματείπται, εκωμοδείπται, διωβλήτεται, σκύπτεται or the like. But this fluctuation between formulae may seem more significant when we consider, for example, the scholia on the three references to Execestides in Birds, where we move from τούτον ἐὰν ξένων δισφάλλωσι (Σ² 11) to πολλακοὶ προείπομεν ὡτι ξένος εἴτε (Σ² 764) and ὡτι βαρβαρῆς ἑβηκοστιάς προείπομεν (Σ² 1527). The difference in kind between say an allegation of incompetence
and one of ἡνίκα is also germane: we make a larger and more definite assumption in accepting the latter. The general attitude to the jokes is such that the slide from neutral paraphrase to translation into fact seems natural. Further, when we encounter Σέκχ Αεχ. 270 (cf. Σε 566), where it is said of Lemachus ἡν... φιλερτάξας ἀμφαμ, or find the scholiast asserting of Cleisthenes, ἀμφαμ... ἢ τέ γενειον ἐσφυράτο πρὸς τέ ἀει φαίνετο χώρος (Σέκχ Αεχ. 118), we have unquestionably gone beyond the range of convenient formulae into the area of exegesis where satirical personae are treated as necessarily faithful images of the people they represent, and where the scholiast is prepared to make purportedly factual claims about even the motivation of a target. Modern comments sometimes slip into this mould even without scholiastic help. "The incontinent Kinesies" is apparently a description that can be recovered from Aristophanic evidence on the undeclared assumption that Frogs 366 and Eccl. 330 refer to simple facts. "Gods and men had laughed to see him [Cleonymus] running from the battle of Delium" was the concrete form which Gilbert Murray's imagination gave to a comically imprecise allegation. In this light the relatively innocent characterizations of Theognis and Chairis may seem more significant. When Σέκχ Κν. 1374 describes Cleisthenes and Straton as γόννεῖς... καὶ πιτούμεναι τέ γενεικ, what we are being offered in the guise of a simple note of identification is of course a definite interpretation of a satirical picture, an interpretation which takes the truth of the picture for granted and fills it out with fictive explanatory detail. In the absence of evidence about Cleisthenes outside Old Comedy it is fatuous and dangerous to try to find facts in the Aristophanic treatment of the men, yet the scholiast's shallow attempts can be easily paralleled in the commentaries of more recent scholars. The conviction with which the comic persona of Cleisthenes could be accepted by some ancient commentators is strikingly shown by Σέκχ Βισάνθα 1187: ὁ δὲ Κλεισθένης ἐπὶ μαλακία γνωριμώτατος, ἐτέρες δὲ γενναίες ἣ λυπηρός Κλεισθένης οὖ πάνυ ἡνίκα; In view of the frequency with which the alleg-
edly pathetic Cleisthenes is joked about in Aristophanes both before and after *Wasps*, and given that the name was not a common one, the reference at *V.* 1187 can hardly be to anyone else, yet the scholiast here, or one of his sources, was evidently reluctant to believe that a man ridiculed so persistently for μαλακία (and therefore, of course, a man who was μαλακός: cf. *Σκ* *Ran.* 427) could possibly be imagined as holding the respectable position of a sacred θεορέω.

We cannot begin to understand or assess Aristophanic satire if we do not recognise and work with the fundamental distinction between an allegation or insinuation and a fact, between a comic image or reputation and the real man. Yet the scholia consistently confuse the two categories by automatically translating the first of them into the second, and to a large extent modern commentators have perpetuated the confusion by their credulous reliance on the scholia and on the jokes which so often are their only source. It has been accepted on the basis of *Λυ.*, 521 by both *Σκ* *ad loc.*, and some modern scholars that Lampon did use the oath by a goose in real life. *Σκ* *Peace* 1293 (cf. e.g. *Σκ* *Peace* 673) crystallises the Aristophanic treatment of Cleonymus: Δείλος καὶ ἐψάκτης ὁ Κλεώνυμος. The majority of modern commentators have been just as ready to believe the terms of the satire. Two scholia, *Σκ* *Nu.* 673 and *W* 822, show that there was some recognition among ancient scholars of the fact that Cleonymus was active in political life, yet the implications of this for our understanding of his satirical image are nowhere touched on. Cleonymus's case is not exceptional. We might compare Peisander (στις Δείλος ἤν, *Σκ* *Av.* 1556; "Peisandros... Feigling" Kock/Schroeder, cf. Rogers *ad loc.*), or Euripides (μοσχόνης γὰρ ὁ Ἑρμιόνης, *Σκ* *Lys.* 283, cf. 368; and his mother was a λακκανωτικής, e.g. *Σκ* *Ach.* 457, *Thesm.* 910), or Diopeithes (ὑπομακανάς ἤν, *Σκ* *Av.* 988). Though biographical detail is in short supply, we know enough about Peisander, Euripides and Diopeithes to be able to make allowances for the distortions in the comic images and for the naïveté of the scholastic comments. With less well-
known characters it is tempting to rely on the scholia as though they supplied independent corroboration of the contents of jokes, when in fact they are likely, and can often be shown, to be doing no more than paraphrasing jokes or embellishing their satirical implications. \(\Sigma^5\) \(\nu\). 75, φιλόκωπος οὐδές, is a plain inference from the joke, and though the construction of these lines provides a good reason for not taking the imputation at face-value, the inference has been automatic in modern commentaries. 27 \(\Sigma^5\) \(\nu\). 78 asserts that Dercylus was a comic actor, \(\Sigma^v\) that he was a κώμηλος ἡ μεθοδιάς. We know absolutely nothing about the man: both these assertions are no more than inferences from the text, yet they have had modern adherents. Ancient and modern commentators are also in agreement in the quite gratuitous inference from \(\nu\). 81 f. that Nicostratus himself was φιλοθύτης. \(\Sigma^5\) \(\nu\). 103, κωμίδηταν δε ὡς δωρεάκως καὶ πρεδώνις καὶ ἐνεμος, looks at first glance as though it might preserve some independent information about Eucretes, or at least about other jokes against him, and has been sometimes so relied on, but I believe that the whole note has probably been derived from the text itself: δωρεάκως and πρεδώνις are alternative speculations about the nature of the putative suspicion against Eucretes, while even ἐνεμος may be an obtuse inference from ἔνι θρεκτής. \(\Sigma^v\) on the very similar joke against Lysicrates at Birds 512 produces the same kind of general inference of corruption, together with the bizarre notion (though it is at least imaginative, and probably based on a reminiscence of Peace) that Lysicrates was a ταραγκόν...κλέφτης, which at least suggests that no independent evidence of a suspicion against Lysicrates had survived: yet no modern commentator has gone beyond this scholion. \(\Sigma^v\) \(\alpha\nu\). 151 asserts that Melanthius suffered from ἀντριφαν (cf. \(\Sigma^v\) Peace 803), but the claim is very improbable (it is nowhere hinted at in the other jokes about Melanthius) and almost certainly drawn from this one passage. \(\Sigma^v\) \(\epsilon\alpha\nu\). 55 provides two possible identifications for the Molon mentioned in that line. Is it just coincidence that the one candidate is μεγαλόσωμος, the other μικρός το
These are, of course, not independently known facts, but masquerading interpretation.

The process of translation from joke to fact is not, however, always as immediately discernible as in these cases. *Σ* *Ach.* 710 describes the orator Euathlus as έφυσμέρικτος καὶ λάλος. As both adjectives are standard terms of abuse in *Comedy*, it is obvious enough that the scholion does not derive from an independent source. Euathlus himself is called λάλος in *Ach.* 705, but I suspect that the phrase έφυσμέρικτος καὶ λάλος has in fact been taken from *Ach.* 716, where it is applied to Alcibiades, who is bracketed in this passage with Euathlus in the category of slick and ruthless young advocates. (A parallel is perhaps to be found in *Σ* *V.* 466, where μισόθυμος must have found its way into the note from line 474). The scholion's terms belong at any rate to a stereotyped satirical characterization of a particular social and political class, but the scholiast offers us the description of Euathlus not as an index of a satirical theme but as a specific portrait of the individual. *Σ* *Ran.* 944 describes Cephisophon as a έσωλες of Euripides (cf. οἰκογενείς μέφρακιον, Vita Euripides 6), and if we had only this one joke about Cephisophon there might be some temptation to believe the scholiast (though the name, of course, is hardly a slave's). But it is clear from the MSS. of *Ach.* 395 ff. and from *Σ* *Ach.* 395 and 400 that this notion was the result of an identification of Euripides' slave in *Ach.* with Cephisophon, an identification which there is no reason to entertain, though it has received some support in more recent times. The origin of an interpretation may be even less apparent than this. *Σ* *Av.* 279 surprisingly asserts: διαβάλλει... τὸν Φιλεκλέα ὡς ὀξυκέφαλον. Given the unmistakable literary allusion at *Av.* 280-82, it is evident that Philocles' association here and at 1295 with two crested birds is coincidental; the hoopoe in the first passage is not Philocles but belongs to him, and its crest is not specially pertinent. Yet closer inspection reveals that what we have in *Σ* 279 is a projection from the inter-
pretation of κορυδές Φιλικλέους at Άρ. 1295, where its speculative nature is clear: μῆπτε δεξικέχως ἢν (ΣΑυ.). And that interpretation of κορυδές in turn is interlocked with the belief that the joke about Philocles at Θέσμ. 168 proves particular physical ugliness, which is to take too much for granted. Readings of these two passages are made to buttress one another, as Θέσμ. 168 demonstrates, though neither is very strong.

In their eagerness to recreate the factual background of Aristophanic jokes, the scholia frequently draw false, unsound or unnecessary inferences from the text, and this habit can only reduce even further the trust which we may place in apparent information whose source or reasoning is no longer discoverable. ΣΕΑχ. 866 calls Chairis Θηβαίας, and this has been repeated by some modern scholars, but it is a quite unjustified deduction from the nationality of Dicaeopolis's visitor and his pipers in this scene. ΣΕ Αχ. 887 calls Morychus a tragic poet, which no other scholion or evidence about the man suggests. The source is probably the context of this joke itself, where Morychus is parallel to Τρυγωδικός χορές (886) (I doubt whether the proximity of Morychus and Melanthius at Πέιτα 1008f. is germane, but it might just be). Morychus is also involved in ΣΕ Αχ. 61, where the ambassadors returning from Persia are identified as οἱ πιέλ τῶν Μούρχων. This presents an instance of something I shall say more about below, the assimilation of the unknown to the known. The scholion rests on the most specious of connections, between the luxury which the ambassadors enjoyed in Persia and the reputation of Morychus for sybaritic indulgence (e.g. Αχ. 887). ΣΑυ. Άρ. 877 contains a number of statements which we can see to be founded on doubtful inference: that Cleocritus is being ridiculed as στρογγυλώστης; that he was perhaps an actor (Symmachus: an inference from Ρύγκα 1437? cf. on Ρύγκα 791 below); that he was στρογγυλώστης; and that the joke contains a reference to Κύικαίων (Didymus). This last claim reveals the tortuousness with which 'information' could be extracted from jokes. Didymus arrived at it, so the scholion explains, by construing a connection
between this joke and the use made of μαλκοί in Asiatic mystery religion—but what should we have made of the plain assertion, e.g., ὡς κίναρις διεβάλλετο ὁ Κλέόκερτος? Σκ Ath. 1167 preserves, alongside the correct understanding of μαλκοί, the rationalisation that Orestes the robber προσποιούμενος Μονίαν τοὺς παριόντας ἀπέδωσεν, and this assertion is repeated, in very similar language, in ΣκΛ. 712. Στ Nu. 1001 bases a characterisation of Hippocrates' sons on a putative word-play between υξίναν and υξίναν, and almost every commentator in modern times has followed; but the pun is unlikely, and the perception of it has been motivated by a preconception about the targets. ΣκΛ. 822 regards Σίλλος as the real name of Aeschines' father (cf. Στ W. 1267), though it is not elsewhere than in Wasps attested as a proper name; and Σκ Thesm. 861 reports that some ancient scholars believed Phrynondas actually to be the father of Euripides' kinsman. Στ Wasps 822 describes Cleonymus as ugly, but this is nowhere else apparent, and the wording of the note shows that we are dealing with an inference from χαλέον. That Phaiax is being ridiculed at Κθ. 1375 ff. ὡς παρακράτων ἐν μεσάρβας (Στ 1377) is an illegitimate embellishment on the theme of the passage. Much less obvious is the assertion in Στ Κθ. 1103 that Thouphanes was a ὑπογραμματεύς, which has not been challenged by a single modern commentator and has been explicitly accepted by most. While we cannot with certainty rule out the possibility that independent information about Thouphanes had been somewhere preserved, the office here assigned to him may well be no more than an extension of the interpretation of Κθ. 1256 to be found in Στ there. That later scholion is certainly wrong to call Phanus a ὑπογραμματεύς; whatever we make of ὑπογραφεῖς δικών in that line, it cannot signify a kind of γραμματέας. It is no doubt conceivable that ὑπογραμματεύς has found its way into Στ 1256 from Στ 1103, but that the borrowing was in the opposite direction is made much more likely by the probability that in Στ 1256 ὑπογραμματεύς is a gloss on ὑπογραφεῖς; and that a borrowing should have occurred at all
seems plausibly accounted for by the similarity between the two jokes. In both jokes a close associate of Cleon is named, with the general satirical intention of insinuating that the politician depends on adjutants. One of the two associates is given what ancient scholars readily took to be an official title; here was motivation for dubbing the other with a similar title. If Cleon had possessed a γεμυμνώκος, which he will not have done, the scribe would probably have been a slave and his name would hardly have been known. The names of Thousphanes and Phanus did mean something to at least some in Aristophanes' audience, for these were a different kind of men. I might end this paragraph by observing that in the game of drawing factual inferences where the text does not warrant them, modern scholars can sometimes outplay the scholia. Swoboda, for example, felt confident that Wasp 959 could be taken to yield a biographical insight about Laches: "musische Bildung war ihm.... fremd." Presumably Swoboda would not have been prepared to evaluate Plato Laches 188d, where Laches uses an elaborate musical metaphor, by the same criterion.

Admissions of ignorance or doubt in the scholia are very rare (e.g. Συ W. 1178, 1285, Av. 766, 1379, Ran. 791), yet we can be sure that scholiasts and their sources, including the κωμοσκόματη, must often have been largely ignorant about the many targets of Aristophanic jokes who had left no obvious traces in other literature; and they sometimes cannot have been much better informed about even some of those targets who appeared regularly in both Aristophanes and other Old Comedians. As the next chapter should make clear, I do not accept that such biographical ignorance is always an obstacle in the way of a full understanding of personal jokes, but it certainly poses a fundamental problem for anyone who believes that these jokes deal usually and essentially in hard facts. This belief is implicit in the scholia's treatment of personal references, yet difficulties of interpretation are so rarely acknowledged. It is of some importance to ask how the scholiast coped, and I think that scrutiny of individual cases
will lead us to the conclusion that where necessary detail was lacking they either guessed or invented it. Συν Ran. 791 reports that Callistratus claimed Cleidemides as a son of Sophocles, while Apollonius thought him an actor; one of them at least is guessing, and in the absence of reasons or documentation (a fact which the scholiast himself here comments on sceptically) it is quite likely that both of them are. The story in Συν Wasps 1312 about Sthenelus's senary and his consequent need to sell his tragic δραματικὰ looks to me very like an invention: it posits a highly improbable theatrical situation in which an individual dramatist owns his own stage-properties, and there are in any case reasons in the nature of the ἐκκαθήμορος for supposing that the reference is to an imagined not an actual state of affairs. Συν Wasps 599 describes Euphemius as one of τῶν θυσίων ἐπὶ κολακείας δίαρρομένων, but this is surely a thinly disguised and inept guess, deriving from the theme of the joke against Theorus. Συν Av. 1379 reports that Euphroniou claimed that Cinesias the dithyrambist was ξιολός, but this is an unsubtle and literal-minded rationalisation of ποδό... κολλάνων, and gets criticised within the same scholion. The inferences about the physical characteristics of Diopeithes in Συν Kn. 1085 (cf. Συν Av. 988) and of Aesimous in Συν Eccl. 208 are no more secure. Συν Av. 1293 explains Menippus's bird-name of χελιδών as due to his ἑπιμετροφίη and the use of a swallow as a branding-mark: this is inherently much too recherché to be a likely object of the joke, and it may well be that someone has simply spun the story out of the ὑποτροχος part of the man's name. This suggestion may seem less speculative when we notice Συν Kn. 1268, where Thoumantis is described as a μύνης (the image of him supplicating Apollo, as well as his name, no doubt helped to encourage this fancy). The relation of Cleainetus to Cleon was evidently unknown to the sources of Συν Kn. 574 (Cleon's father is called Cleonymus in Συν Kn. 44!), one of which suggested that Cleainetus had been responsible for a ψηφίσμα μὴ δὲν δεδυνάτας δυσφατηρείς διήτησιν.

The boldness of the conjecture, the character of which is relevant to a
group of scholia which I shall shortly discuss, is underpinned by the belief that the joke must involve a reference to a determinate factual background; but the hypothesis of a φήμη is not just conjectural; it is unnecessary, and indeed it makes poor sense of the joke. Σν Kn. 877 is equally revealing: δὲ Κλέων δημωγοὺς θεάνατο λύτω (sc. Γρύττω) ἐπέθηκε τὴν φήμιαν. The technical meaning of Kn. 877 has been misunderstood, but the result is a confident, purportedly factual exegesis. Σρ on Nu. 676, admittedly a controversial joke, asserts as the basis of its interpretation that Cleonymus was poor; but this is nowhere else suggested in the many extent jokes about the man (if anything, it goes against the theme of his voracity) and it is not claimed in any of the other scholia which deal with him: it is not a fact, although it is presented as if it were, but a hypothesis invented to make some sense of this one context. The scholiastic tendency to assume or assert convenient 'facts' can be clearly discerned in cases where it is doubtful whether a name designates a real individual. Marpsias in Σε Ach. 702, Ctesias in Σκ Ach. 839 and Pyrrandrus in Σν Kn. 901 are treated as real people, and Marpsias is given a colourful characterisation; but in all three cases there are reasons for doubting the existence of contemporaries behind the jokes (see below). Σν W. 1250 creates a persona for Philoctemophanes, but it looks like a construction put on this one passage, and it remains more likely that here too the joke (if there is one at all) lies in the etymology of the name.

A related feature of the scholia, another symptom of their inclination to construct a concrete background for every personal reference, is their occasional habit of assimilating the unknown to the known. There are cases where interpretation rests on a known fact even though it is necessarily irrelevant to the joke. Such is Σκ Peace 697, where a suggested explanation of the gibe at Sophocles links it with the poet's στρατηγία at Samos in 441/0, though, as Σν ib. ad fin. seems to be aware (ὁφάτε ποτέ), the context (see esp. 694) demands that the reference be to an event or state of aff-
airs belonging to the period since the start of the war, when Peace left Athens. More often, however, we find the scholia gratuitously discerning allusions to known facts or themes, or committing themselves to firm identifications, where none is possible or necessary. $\Sigma E$ Nu. 582 discovers in the mention of the chorus's eyebrows a gibe at Cleon's facial appearance.

$\Sigma E$ Nu. 922 takes the mere mention of Telaphus as sufficient grounds for asserting $\delta i a p e l l e i E f i K a t a t h e n v$. Aristocrates' name alone accounts for the joke about him at Birds 125, but $\Sigma E$ ad loc., followed by some modern scholars, extrapolates back from the man's later behaviour and thereby perceives a political point here. $\Sigma E$ Lys. 62 automatically identifies the Theagenes there named with the man satirised as a $k o m p o s t h$ elsewhere, but I doubt whether probable comic sense could be made of this identification. The same is true in the case of Myrrhine's husband Cinesias, whom $\Sigma E$ Lys. 838 calls a $\delta i o x y k o p o i o s$, and the Araphrades of Eccl. 129, whom $\Sigma E$ there labels a $\phi o v i k i s t h$$\ddagger$. These identifications at any rate cannot simply be assumed, yet all of them have been taken over without argument by some modern scholars. Few scholia allow us to see the different stages in the development of an interpretation as clearly as $\Sigma E$ Av. 997, which cites Philochorus, Euphranorius and Callistratus by name and gives us some idea of how later scholars manipulated the information and suggestions inherited from their predecessors. The starting-point of the issue was Philochorus's assertion, which carries an archon date with it and has more entitlement to be believed than anything else in this scholion, that Meton had erected a sun-dial on the Pnyx. Later writers, perhaps including Callistratus, attempted to reconcile this fact with the reference to Colonus in Birds 997, by arguing both that $k o l o n v o s$ here meant $k o l o n v o s$ $A y n o s$ and that the Pnyx fell within this latter region. The first of these claims is, of course, motivated by the second, which itself seems to have been motivated by the preconceived desire to discover in the line of Birds an allusion to something which happened to be independently known from Philochorus. The
whole case is factitious, and none the less so for having found modern subscribers. The scholiast himself is sceptical about the attempt to bring the Pnyx within Κολωνος Ἀγοραῖος, so the Τίνες who were responsible for it presumably produced no evidence, and what evidence there is elsewhere for the location of Κολωνος Ἀγοραῖος indicates, as the name itself would have led us to believe, that it was some distance from the Pnyx. The interpretations of Euphronius and Callistratus reported in the Σ practically prove that if Meton had a connection with one of the Attic places called Colonos, it was forgotten not long after his death; and in such a matter it would be historically irrational to put any store by later ancient conjecture (n.b. μητροτέ) motivated by the tendentious assumption that Birds 997 must tell us something about Meton. The joke in this line operates by a simple bathos, and the most striking feature of all the guess-work found in the scholion is its redundancy.

Many of the examples of unreliability, naïveté and tendentiousness which I have so far produced concern personal characteristics – character, appearance or behaviour. But the performance of the scholia is of a similar kind and standard even where putative historical facts and events of some consequence are involved. Σε Αρχ. 524 imaginatively alleges that Alcibiades was the moving force behind the ludicrous theft of Megarian prostitutes (an episode to which several modern scholars have given some credence). Σε Αρχ. 527 misreads the same context, and purports to inform us that one of Aspasia’s two Πόρνες was for the use of Pericles. In instances where the naïveté is less blatant than this the scholia sometimes initiate interpretations which have been widely perpetuated in modern times. Perhaps the most striking illustration is afforded by Σε Μ. 240, where we find belief first expressed in a real trial of Laches some time before 422 (it is curious that Σε Μ. 836 rejects the equation between Labes and Laches in the domestic trial-scene). The scholion suggests a trial in 425, after Laches’ recall from Sicily, though it must be noted
that this is offered as an explicit surmise (ξικος γςν ντλ). In modern
times the belief in a historical trial was for long orthodox, and the
conviction involved is such that though powerful arguments against one
have been carefully put by Jacoby, the thesis continues to be asserted as
if it were unquestionable. The fundamental issue is a simple chronological
one, and I do not think that faith in the historicity of the trial can be
sustained unless this difficulty is resolved. Whenever the substance of
the case against Laches (/Labes) it mentioned in Wasps, either financial
corruption is involved (240-2, 837, 896, 911, 925, 933 etc.) or activities
in Sicily are referred to (838, 897, 911): both elements are in the γραφή
itself (894-7). This allows no other conclusion than that Laches, if he
was tried at all, was tried in connection with his Sicilian δημαρχία,51
that is not later than 424. Yet Wasps unmistakably represents the trial
as though it were contemporary (cf. 240-2, the whole trial-scene, and
αι., δημαρχία, 836). There is no other case in Aristophanes of the redram-
atisation of a historical event as though it were contemporary, and I do
not find it easy to imagine the motivation for such a comic procedure.
I cannot see any possible resolution of this contradiction which would be
consistent with belief in a real trial of Laches. A rather similar issue of
interpretation is raised by Σ' Ach. 6, which gives several explanations of
the reference to Cleon and the five talents, all resting on the assumption
that a determinate historical background must have existed.52 The assumption
has been shared by many modern scholars who have used the scholion as the
basis of their own interpretations, but there are a number of good reasons
for believing that what we have at Ach. 6-8 is an allusion to a scene or
event in Aristophanes' previous play, from the previous Dionysia, Baby-
lonians.54 On top of other pertinent arguments, if Cleon had actually
clashed with the Knights in 426 in the way superficially suggested by
Dicaeopolis's remark, I find it virtually impossible to believe that Aris-
tophanes would not have made more of it, particularly in Knights.55 The
theatrical nature of the rest of Dicaeopolis's anecdotes lends support to
the case, and ἱςολυμ (5) is suggestive (cf. 15), though not conclusive (cf.
Ach. 706). If the theatrical interpretation is right, it may seem a little
surprising that no trace of it survives in the scholia here, given the
presumable availability of Babyloniania to at least early Hellenistic schol-
ars, but this factor can hardly be given much importance when we reflect
that in the scholia on the three passages of Ach. where there are unquest-
ionable references to Babyloniania (377 ff., 502 ff., 630 ff.) we find not
a shred of information about the play which could not have been inferred
from the text of Ach. itself. (I take the controversial assertion,
Ach. 378, that Cleon prosecuted Aristophanes with a γρήγορη ἱςενος, to be
a fiction derived from the combination of Ach. 379-82 and 652-4.)

I shall round off this section with some observations on a group of
scholia in which jokes are explained by reference to the proposal of a
ψεκασμα not mentioned in the text but attributed by the scholiast to the
subject of the joke. I mentioned earlier Συ Km. 574, where a muddled
note makes Cleainetus the author of a ψεκασμα restricting δίηνος in the
prytaneion. An even less likely ψεκασμα, supposedly stipulating separate
seating for men and women in the assembly (?), is attributed by Σκ Eccl.
22 to one Sphyromachus, and in a modified form has even had some modern
support. The extraordinary nature of these scholia needs to be kept in
mind when we consider Σκ Ach. 1150 and Συ Av. 1297. In these two notes
we are offered interpretations based on belief in ψεκασμα restricting the
freedom of speech of comic poets, and proposed by the targets of the two
jokes, Antimachus and Syracosius. In neither place does the Aristophanic
text itself lend any support to the interpretation or even seem an app-
propriate joke for the proposer of such a decree, and in the case of Ach.
1150 ff. the scholion actually runs against the contents of the joke.
Further, the examples cited above prove that the invention of a ψεκασμα to
explain a joke was not a licence beyond the inclination of ancient comment-
ators; so it will not do to assume that Antimachus or Syracosius must have been authors of \( \psi\varphi\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \) simply on the grounds that the scholia on them are not inferences from the text. The scholia were familiar with at least one genuine fifth-century measure to curb the \( \pi\varphi\varphi\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha \) of comic poets (\( \Sigma K \) Ach. 67), and their habit of assimilating the unknown to the known will have been sufficient motivation for them to hypothesise such a measure in cases like those under consideration. This view may have been propagated by Roman writers who, as Cicero does at de rep. IV. 114., considered the freedoms of Old Comedy in the light of their own legal restrictions, going back to the Twelve Tables, on libel and slander. We must also notice the admittedly conjectural character of both our scholia: Ach. 1150, \( \delta\omega\kappa\varepsilon\iota \) (\( \Sigma \E \)), \( \varphi\alpha\kappa\varepsilon\iota \) (\( \Sigma \E \)); Av. 1297, \( \delta\kappa\varepsilon\iota \) (\( \Sigma \V \)). These various considerations seem to me to tilt the balance heavily against both \( \psi\varphi\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \), though for a final judgement the two cases must be treated separately. \( \Sigma K \) Ach. 1150 is by far the weaker. The \( \psi\varphi\sigma\mu\alpha \) takes different forms within the scholion, one of them (\( \tau\omega\varsigma \chi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\upsilon \mu\nu\delta\epsilon\varphi \varphi \epsilon \kappa \tau\omicron \nu \chi\rho\omicron\nu\nu\nu \lambda\alpha\mu\mu\beta\alpha\nu\nu\nu \)) palpably and crassly a misconstruction on the text. No independent evidence is even hinted at, and it would be bizarre to attack a man for his behaviour as \( \chi\omicron\nu\gamma\nu\omicron\nu \) if the real aim is to complain about his censorship of Comedy. A majority of modern scholars have refused to believe in Antimachus's decree, but support has been general and firm for Syracosius's, which indeed is less implausible. But we ought only to accept \( \Sigma \V \) Av. 1297 if it contains satisfactory evidence, yet in fact what we are offered amounts to precisely one very corrupt fragment of Phrynichus (= fr. 26). This fragment, whatever it should say, cannot have referred in unmistakable terms to a \( \psi\varphi\sigma\mu\alpha \) of the relevant kind, otherwise the scholion's \( \delta\kappa\varepsilon\iota \) would be redundant. Besides, it has often been remarked that there are no traces in Birds of any restriction on \( \pi\varphi\varphi\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha \), though this does not worry some believers. The question therefore facing us is whether on a point of some importance we can afford to trust a scholastic interpret-
ation of a comic passage which we no longer have intact, and I hope I have supplied sufficient evidence of scholastic unreliability in the preceding pages to sustain my contention that such trust is dangerous.

As soon as we decide to go beneath the surface of a personal joke, and in some cases before we can reach any understanding at all of a joke, we may find that we are confronted by fundamental difficulties or uncertainties of identification. One reason for this is that many of the targets of jokes have not left, and could hardly have been expected to leave, any clear traces in historical evidence other than the texts of Old Comedy itself. Another is that a proper name need not designate a historical individual but may belong to a legendary character or even to a person (I think Orestes the ἠμιδώτης is an example: see below) whose reputation was a mixture of the real and the legendary which even an Athenian in Aristophanes' own day might have found hard to disentangle; and where a name is that of a real person, he need not have been contemporary with the jokes about him. A third reason for some problems of identification is that one or more real and/or fictitious people may share the same name (ομώνυμος) What is so important about facing up to the challenge of these difficulties, and in particular those posed by the first and third factors just mentioned, is that we are forced to attempt answers not just to individually troublesome cases but also to broader questions about the relation between the satirist and his audience - about the kinds and means of publicity existing in the society, about the degree of familiarity of theatrical spectators with facts, personalities and rumours, and the consequent possibilities for the original audiences of understanding personal references. One useful way of starting to broach some of these questions, which are the theme of my next chapter, is to consider the ways in which the scholia cope with
problems of identification.

We cannot always be sure in Aristophanes whether a proper name designates a characterisable person (real or fictitious), or simply adds a touch of local realism to an utterance. A nice illustration of this issue is provided by the two passages in *Clouds* where the name Amynias occurs. Nu. 31 in itself would seem to offer no difficulty, for there is no incentive to see a personal joke here, yet at 686–91 the same name without much doubt refers to an identifiable contemporary, probably the same man as the target of jokes in *Wasps*. The critical difference lies in the extent and character of the two contexts, though I would hypothesise that at 686 ff. the full realisation of the joke is not intended to come until the punch-line. How any individual member of the audience will react to the mention of a name is not wholly within the control of the dramatist, but the possibility of private or eccentric responses does not prevent us from asking in any particular instance what the poet is likely to have intended and how most of an audience is likely to have taken a personal reference, for as far as the factual point of identity is concerned (the same is not necessarily true for other aspects of a joke) the poet must give positive indications of whom he is aiming at, or else rely on factors (the uniqueness of a name, great notoriety, topical familiarity etc.) which will with sufficient certainty allow him to dispense with his own indications. If we cannot supply a reason for supposing such factors to be in operation, it ceases to make any sense to claim that we have a personal reference or joke, but it is, naturally, for the most part passages in which he may be employing the second of the given alternatives that pose difficulties for us. Consider three cases: *Lys.* 63, where Calonice mentions 'the wife of Theagenes'; *Thesm.* 605, where one of the women interrogated by Cleisthenes identifies herself as Κλεωνύμοιο γυνή; and *Lys.* 1105, where the Spartan exasperatedly replies to the Prytanis's suggestion that Lysistrata be summoned, οὐ τῷ στό, καὶ λήιε, τὸν Λυσιστράτου. To decide whether each of these masculine names was
intended to make the original audience think of a particular individual who possessed it has to involve an attempt to place these passages in relation to the undoubted references in Aristophanes to real people called Theagenes, Lysistratus and Cleonymus; in none of these instances is there a patent pointer to identity in the context. It can hardly come as a surprise that the scholia on two of the three passages (there is no schol. vet. on Thesm. 605) offer, without discussion, an interpretation containing the assumption that the name represents a real person, though they choose not to identify Lysistratus with the target of that name joked about elsewhere. Consideration of these and other instances suggests to me that the scholia are far more inclined to assume that a name denotes an identifiable individual than to make the opposite assumption or leave a case open; there is an appetite in their concern with ὅντως καὶ καμινίδειν. Whether they will identify two Ἵμπωνος is much less predictable, as they operate with a view only to the surface of a joke, and all therefore depends on whether there happens to be a close enough match or compatibility between details (see below). What they offer is mostly, therefore, naïve opinion, so they can rarely add anything to our apprehension of the text. We need to puzzle out the issues for ourselves. In the first place, we should be prepared to allow the possibility that a comic poet might occasionally use a name which he knew might make some of his audience think of a particular person, but without himself intending a special personal reference to be taken. There is also the possibility that a joke might be understood differently by different members of an audience, as is implied in a remark of Aeschines¹ (1.157) which I discuss at the start of the next chapter. But both these possibilities are of limited applicability in practice, and in the majority of cases we need to focus the question more closely and deal in terms of the potent external circumstances which largely determine the audience's understanding. We must principally satisfy ourselves that there is a real comic gain to be derived from making a given identification; that it would be worthwhile,
and mean something, to make it; that we could then make an intelligible connection between the resulting joke and our other knowledge of the subject. The relative commonness of the name must be estimated, especially in cases where positive pointers from the dramatist are lacking; and we must rationally accept that the more common a name, the greater the need for clues in the text to make a personal reference effective. At Lys. 1105 we have a very common Athenian name, Lysistratus, and no obvious pointer to identity at all, notwithstanding that the scholia (Σεφ. 787) treat the homosexual innuendo as one. The Spartan's implication is that anyone, even a male, will do to satisfy the frustrated men, and the primary mechanism of the joke operates in the mere change from female name to male equivalent. This element of word-play is crucial, for it makes the joke complete without a personal aspect and thereby crystallises the issue into the question whether there are any positive reasons for believing that the audience will have discerned a specific reference in the name. Naturally, it might be entertaining to think of a particular contemporary being used as a sexual outlet by frustrated men: that is the humour of both Lys. 1092 and Thesm. 35. But, leaving other factors aside, neither of these other jokes has the verbal point of Lys. 1105: they need, therefore, to be taken personally, and would otherwise be pointless. Those commentators who have followed the Σ in finding an individual behind the Lysistratus of Lys. 1105 have given no reason for doing so; and I cannot see what reason could be given, though a preference might be felt for the additional comic element. Here is a case where Aristophanes may have been content to leave the joke open, dependent partly on his audience's quickness perhaps. At Thesm. 605, Κλαμωνοῦ γυνή, on the other hand, the critical factor, which no commentator has mentioned, is the rarity of the name Cleonymus, and it is, besides, an attractive identification to make, on account of the possibility of comic irony which it opens up. Little hesitation has been shown by modern scholars in identifying Theagenes at Lys. 63 with the known butt of earlier plays, but
I have yet to find any justification in terms of the comic sense of the passage. Unless we are happy with a circular argument involving the assumption that there must have been something well-known about Theagenes which gave point to the lines for the original audience, we should admit that the name was common enough (this would be even truer if we emended to Theogenes) for no personal reference to be felt as necessary, and that a positive identification would be comically superfluous. If there were reason to suppose that Theagenes was one of the best known men in Athens, the case would be somewhat different: we should then have one of the potent external factors which I mentioned earlier, and some slight humour might be seen in the involvement of the wife of such an important person in a mysterious female gathering. As it is, the main comic point of the lines certainly lies elsewhere, in the glimpse it gives of feminine superstition.

A more basic difficulty is posed by jokes where we are in no doubt that a real person is referred to, but are uncertain who he is. Τὸν Σίνατῆνον at Nu. 349 is identified as Cleitus by Σκ 348 and as Hieronymus by Σκ 349 (it is perhaps surprising that some ancient scholars did not add Lamachus to the list: Σκ Thesm. 840 calls his father Xenophantus). Both identifications appear to be based on no more than the fact that these two men are ridiculed elsewhere for hairiness, and the accident that has preserved for us such a joke about Hieronymus (Ach. 389) but failed to do the same for Cleitus does not in itself constitute an argument for preferring the former. It would be out of place to make a confident choice in this case, though modern commentators have found it easy; but later inscrip-tional evidence for the existence of the names Hieronymus and Xenophantus in the same family may tilt the balance in Hieronymus's favour. Σκ Ay. 17 preserves for us Symmachus's identification of the son of Tharreleides with one Asopodorus, who was ridiculed for smallness by Telecleides. Yet within the same scholion doubt is twice expressed about Symmachus's suggestion, and there seems to be a realisation that the metaphorical and abusive
application of the 'son of...' formula may mean that no actual son of Tharreleides was meant. This scepticism tends to confirm what would anyway have looked probable, that Symmachus had identified the targets of two jokes simply on account of what he took, very questionably, to be similarity of satirical content. Commentators are happy to follow Symmachus. The case of _Wasps_ 325 f. is much less clear-cut. At _W._ 459 Aeschines is dubbed τὸν Ἡλλατίου, and at _W._ 1242 ὁ Ἡλλοὺ; the mock-patronymic ὁ Ἡλλοὺ is also applied to Amynias, at _W._ 1267. Philocleon's reference to τὸν Ἡλλοὺ πεῦτον (325 f.) is earlier in the play than any of the passages just cited, a fact which commentators have not remarked on in choosing whether to see Aeschines or Amynias behind it. Further, what the later jokes prove is that the patronymic was not the preserve or special comic persona of one person, and so in accordance with the principles sketched earlier in this section we need to find a positive indication of identity at 325.\textsuperscript{74} I can see only one, the deictic πεῦτον, which has been used to support the case for a reference to Amynias. πεῦτον does not quite prove that Philocleon pointed or gestured: cf. e.g. ὁ Ἡλλος Κελωνικός at 592; _Nu._ 349 and _Lys._ 577. However, a gesture seems likely, and since an actor could not have pointed clearly from a skene window to a particular member of the audience, I think we have here an abusive glance at Philocleon's own son, who is asleep in front of the house (cf. 394 ff.), and not a personal joke, in the given sense, at all.

Finally in this section, a few words about the scholia's treatment of some cases of 'redende Namen'. It should be remembered that 'redende Namen' and personal jokes are not naturally exclusive categories, as the Aristophanic Lamachus is sufficient to prove (see _Ach._ 269 f., 1071, 1080, 1206). Where, however, a name provides an etymological joke, the rational presumption is that we do not need to understand it as also belonging to a real person unless there are positive reasons for doing so. This presumption often fails to operate in the scholia and in the modern commentaries.
which follow them. Marpsias at Ach. 702 is taken by Σε ad loc. to be a contemporary ἀρχαῖος, though the description given of him looks like nothing more than an imaginative embellishment on the text itself. Given both the extreme rarity of the name and its generic force in the phrase τις...

Μαρπσίας, it is possible that we do not have here a personal reference: we might have expected to hear more about someone whose name could lend itself to this economical use as a marker of a type. The same attitude is manifested in Σν Kn. 901, where Pyrrandrus is given a stereotyped characterisation: πονηρός καὶ σκοφάντας. The passage in which the name occurs has been constructed for the sake of the etymological joke, and as at Lys. 1105 it is satisfactorily intelligible without the hypothesis of a personal point: again a comparison, with Eccl. 329 f., can bring out the difference between the joke which needs and and the joke which does not need to be taken personally. Kn. 901 has, of course, been taken as a reference to Cleon's hair, or his complexion, for neither of which there is any evidence.

It is worth noticing that the scholia and their sources were not wholly insensitive to the possibility that apparent personal jokes might be no more than etymological contrivances. Σν W. 1191 expresses doubt about the pancratist Askondas on the grounds that his name seems to be the vehicle of an 'athletic' pun. Ironically, this caution is probably unnecessary. Ephoudion, with whom Askondas is paired, is an attested athlete, and Askondas is a good Greek name, though probably non-Athenian. The combination of real with fictitious athlete would serve no obvious purpose here, and for an analogous case where a personal reference conveniently incorporates an etymological joke we can compare the context in which Aristophanes produces the name of Euathlus at Ach. 710.

In almost all the cases where we are faced by a choice between a contemporary or a mythical status for the character designated by a name, the views of ancient scholars inclined to the former, though it is fair to point out that disagreements are sometimes recorded on such issues. Plutarch
inferred from the references to the misanthrope Timon in Old Comedy that he was alive in the later fifth century, and Lucian supplies a patronymic and deme for him, though the context does not require us to accept them; but the strongly proverbial force of his story at Av. 1549, Lys. 809 ff. (set in the past) and in Phrynichus fr. 18 makes this picture implausible. It is not that in principle a real Timon living around this time, or not long before it, can be ruled out of the question, but that a figure who only ever appears in a proverbial role, and to whom a life of intense isolation is attributed, is by his very nature insusceptible to historical rationalisation.

Συμμ. 1178 has preserved for us Didymus's remarkable failure to apprehend the mythical character of the reference to Cardopion in that line: the coupling with Lamia (1177) and Bdelucleon's response in 1179 f. could hardly make the matter plainer. Didymus failed to find Cardopion in the Κωμῳδόμενον, but found someone else, Ancylian, with a metrically equivalent name, who was ridiculed for doing something to his mother (Διατίθεον Κατάτιθεθα τι?), and presumably wished to connect the two. It is an extreme instance of the tendency to reduce the unknown to the known. Συμμ. 1238 records another case of confusion of the mythical with the real: Ammonius, and possibly Herodicus, compilers of Κωμῳδόμενον, mistook Admetus for a contemporary poet. We may not always be so fortunately able to detect aberrant interpretation as in these two examples. Σκυμμ. Nu. 924, regarded as informative by a number of modern commentators, describes Pandeletus as a sycophantes, φιλοδίκας καὶ γράφων ψηφίσματα: the presumption is that he is not only a real figure but also contemporary or at least recent. But can we trust this description? To me it looks like a mere set of assumptions or guesses; it is a stock scholiastic description, very like e.g. Συμμ. Αχ. 702, 705, Σκυμμ. 846, Συμμ. 592, except for the detail of ψηφίσματα, which I suggest is a misconstruction of γνώμας (‘motions, proposals’): that the ψηφίσματα did not come from Crat-
inus (fr. 242) seems intimated by the wording in Σφην after the reference to Cheirones, ὁὸτος καὶ ψηφίσματα ἐγγράφει. There are a number of aspects of the passage which do not fit the scholia's interpretation but favour the view than Pandeletus was a legendary and proverbial figure, and belonged, if at all real, to an earlier age than Aristophanes'. The uniqueness of the name, for one thing, better suits someone of legendary status. So does the connection with γνώμαι, which must mean 'maxims' or 'sayings': this is not a likely association for a contemporary or very recent figure, certainly not one of the kind envisaged in the scholia here. More obvious, but also more telling, is the fact that Pandeletus is introduced into an explicit reference to an earlier time, before the flourishing of sophistry and immoral rhetoric. Finally, the citation of Cratinus's Cheirones does not rule out a legendary character for Pandeletus: we happen to know that it was a play which had things to say about the distant (and imaginary) past (see frs. 228, 231, 238, 240).

Σφην Αὐ. 440 records a radical division of opinion among ancient scholars about the referent of ὁ πίθηκος... ὁ μαχαιροπόσος (440 f.). Callistratus and Symmachus both favoured a non-personal interpretation, taking the reference to be to a fable, though it is clear that neither of them had independent evidence of such a λόγος (n.b. λόγου ἡ παράνομώς τίνος ἐστι... διηγηματίου τίνος). Didymus may have sided with these scholars, or he may have been a subscriber to the alternative explanation found in the scholion, that we have a joke about a contemporary called Panaetius. This interpretation too is conjectural (ἐστιν), and if we do assign it to Didymus then we must suppose that he had not produced evidence for it which could convince Symmachus. It has, however, been found convincing by a number of modern scholars. Fortunately the scholion allows us to glimpse the reasoning behind the interpretation. It amounts to a combination of the fact that Panaetius was called Πίθηκος in Islands, a play attributed to Aristophanes (αφ. 394), with the suggestion that μαχαιροπόσος at
Av. 441 be understood as equivalent to ἀγάπητος, the alleged profession of either Panaetius or his father in the same passage of Islands. This is not impressive. τίθυκες was a common term of abuse (e.g. Ιερ. 120, with Archilochus fr. 137 West; Πρόκλα 707, Phrynichus fr. 20, Dem. 18.242), and the explanation of μᾶχησησίς is a specious fancy. The possibility that Islands was not of Aristophanic authorship, perhaps even was a fourth-century play, enfeebles the interpretation further. More fundamentally, we need to ask what sort of ἔστηκα between a contemporary husband and wife could Aristophanes' audience possibly have been familiar with? Av. 441-3 need not precisely reproduce the terms of a fable, but it can hardly be even a grotesque travesty of a domestic arrangement in a known contemporary family. It is the character of the ἔστηκα itself which constitutes the best reason for returning to the reading of Callistratus and Symmachus.

It is likewise the intrinsic character of Κόνναυ ἡγησάται at Π. 675 which affords the strongest argument for taking the phrase to be a variation on a proverb, again the interpretation of Callistratus (Ζυ'), who in this case plausibly supplies the original, Κόνναυ Ἐρίσαν. Euphranius, a couple of generations earlier than Callistratus, had produced what I take to be an explanation not of the joke itself but of the proverb: ἐλλεπῆς ἠκά τὸ ἡγόν τινὲς τῶν Κόνναυ ἔγνω. The scholion contains other apparent attempts to account for the phrase, all of which are probably guesswork, but also records the view of some ancient scholars that Connus here designates the contemporary Athenian who taught Socrates music (τῶν Κιόσιστρων). This identification has been happily accepted by a number of modern commentators, but unless we abandon the proverbial interpretation altogether it seems very unlikely that this could be right: a proverb well enough established to be travestied will surely have been older than the citharode. Connus was a very rare name, and the temptation to assimilate the unknown to the known has some potency in this case; but unless positive reasons for doing so are produced, we should resist it here as elsewhere.
Many of the passages I have been discussing in the last few pages have involved issues of ὀμονυμία, but the possibility not just of ὀμονυμία but of ἀχελωνεύματι ὀμονυμία throws up a special set of problems in the scholia's and in our own understanding of Aristophanic satire. In Frogs three different men called Phrynichus are mentioned (13, 689, 910), and all of them are the object of a joke of some sort (though the tragedian is too remote to fall within my circumscribed area of satire). Eucrates is not the same person at Kn. 254 and Lvs. 103, and Pamphilus may not be at Ploutos 174 f. and 385. These examples alone are sufficient to show that an Old Comedian could sometimes expect his audience to distinguish even within a single play references to different possessors of the same name without necessarily furnishing elaborate pointers to identity. The compilers of ancient commentaries on Aristophanes and the ἀχελωνεύματι were certainly aware of the implications of this fact for the interpretation of personal jokes. I suspect that it is to the ἀχελωνεύματι that we owe the occasional inclusion in a scholion of information on an ὀμονυμία of a target, but one whom we could hardly have confused with the referent of the joke. Thus Σ' Ar. 822 and Peace 928 distinguish Theagenes of Rhegium, sixth-century Homeric interpreter, from the contemporary of Aristophanes whose satirical image was that of a κοινοκτονὴς. The ἀχελωνεύματι may also be responsible for firm identifications of comic butts with ὀμονυμία known from other historical sources, as in the case of Theognis the tragedian, whom Σ* Ach. 11 (~ Σ* 140) identifies with the Theognis who was later one of the Thirty, though without giving a reason. But that earlier scholars too interested themselves in such matters is proved by the reference to οἱ Περί Ἀριστοκρατος at Σ* Thesm. 31, and by the report in Σ' H. 157 of Callistratus's uncertainty about the relation between the Dracontides of that line and the oligarch Dracontides of Xen. Hell. 2.3.2. (and Aristotle Ath. Pol. 34.3). There is no special method for solving uncertainties of this kind, but I shall indicate briefly some considerations that need to
be kept in mind. The passage of Aeschines which I discuss at the start of chapter 3 clearly implies that the original Athenian audiences of Comedy need not always have been able to distinguish between ὄμωνυμος, and this implication should not disturb us unduly. In most cases, the poet could make the distinction for them, if it needed to be made, by a patronymic, demotic or some other signal. If a joke was left open in its reference, as I have suggested is the case at Lvs. 1105, we are near the boundary of the area of personal jokes in the given sense, but we do not necessarily cross it, for the dramatist might be aware that some spectators would be likely to think of a particular person. Such vagueness cannot be calculated, but it is still a perfectly intelligible comic procedure. Usually, however, we have to suppose that if a joke does not in itself rule out alternative identifications, that must be because there was not a real possibility of misunderstanding. Aeschines was one of the commonest Athenian names, but we cannot doubt that Cleon's associate of that name was so familiar that, at any rate in Aristophanes' plays, a fifth-century audience did not need much help in identifying him in jokes. There is always a prima facie case for identifying a target with an otherwise well-known ὄμωνυμος, because the original audience would tend to think immediately of the most familiar person; this is a primary reason for rejecting, for instance, attempts to posit a Cratinus other than the comic poet as the target of Ach. 848 ff. But we must be sure that the person was widely known at the time, which we cannot always safely infer from, say, an appearance in a Platonic scene, or from evidence of considerable wealth and oligarchic associations. The relative frequency of a particular name can be helpful, even decisive (see Appendix I on Cleonymus at Th. 605). But we must not just run together the strict issue of ὄμωνυμος (where alternative targets or identifications might reasonably be thought to exist) with the broader questions of the audience's familiarity with comic targets. My argument in the following chapter is intended to shore up the belief that some jokes
could be appreciated (as, for example, entertaining abuse) without much or any personal knowledge on the part of at least a significant minority of the original audience; but if one is ignorant of a certain target one does not necessarily think instead of someone else with the same name: it depends on the character of the individual joke. Although I suspect that it may have arisen for the first audiences more often than we can now realise, our understanding of the issue of ὀμωμοίω is must be restricted to cases where we can specify alternatives or uncertainties.

The sometimes intricate difficulties to which ὀμωμοίω gives rise are apparent in confusions and inconsistencies to be found in the scholia. 

Σκωτόμενος οἰς κινδύνοις. Though contradictory, these two statements must be interpretations of the same material, Lys. 1105 (where there is no relevant Σ); and, as my earlier discussion of this line should have established, neither of them may be true. In Συστ. 988 Phrynichus fr. 9 is rightly cited as a joke against Diopeithes analogous to the one in the text, yet in Συστ. 380, where Diopeithes is also mentioned, we find uncertainty: μὴ ποιήσει δὲ καί ἐπὶ μισέει Πρύνεων, and we are here not given the quotation to help us choose. Συστ. 822 distinguishes, apart from Theagenes of Rhegium, two other men called Theagenes: one the subject of the joke commented on, the other ὁ ἤτοι μαλακίας σκωτόμενος. In Συστ. Peace 928, however, (though there are said to be ἄλλοι πάλλοι) only one Theagenes, who corresponds to the subject of Συστ. 822 and Peace 928, is mentioned alongside the Homeric scholar, and both these men are said to have been targets of jokes about μαλακία. There can be little doubt that the separation made in the former scholion is unnecessary. No evidence for it is cited, but it is probably derived from the sort of material to be found at Eupolis fr. 92.1 (Austin), where a Theogenes, who is probably to be identified with the Aristophanic Thea-/Theogenes, is portrayed in a scene
of sybaritic and probably sexual indulgence. \( \Sigma^\text{Av.} \) 1302 records the fact that Symmachus thought a tragic actor called Phrynichus was referred to in this line, but the same note also includes an identification with \( \Phi\nu\nu\chi\sigma\varsigma \) \( \tau\omicron\rho\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\varsigma \) (whether tragic or comic is not clear). Both identifications are false, and it would be interesting to know where the \( \Kappa\omicron\mu\iota\iota\varepsilon\omicron\nu\varepsilon\omicron \) stood in all this. \( \Sigma^\text{Av.} \) 750 and \text{Ran.} 13 separate out the identities of four different Phrynichi, though some suspicion surrounds the tragic actor. These lists are probably based on the work of Ammonius and others, yet in the application of the scheme to particular jokes the \( \Kappa\omicron\mu\iota\iota\varepsilon\omicron\nu\varepsilon\omicron \) have been disregarded - not just at \( \text{Av.} \) 1302, but also in \( \Sigma^\text{Ran.} \) 689, where a joke about the oligarch is twisted into one about the tragedian (could \( \varepsilon\iota\theta\iota\varepsilon\kappa\alpha\lambda\iota\varepsilon\delta\iota\pi\alpha\kappa\iota\lambda\iota\varepsilon\sigma\chi\nu\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma \) here be a derivation from \text{Wasps} 1490 ff.?). \( \Sigma^\text{Ach.} \) 850 runs together the identities of Anacreon's Artemon, who is the one meant in the text, and the engineer who was reputed to have helped Pericles at Samos: Plutarch \text{Pericles} 27 shows that the confusion was older than the scholia.

The scholiastic treatment of \( \varepsilon\iota\theta\iota\varepsilon\kappa\alpha\lambda\iota\varepsilon\delta\iota\pi\alpha\kappa\iota\lambda\iota\varepsilon\sigma\chi\nu\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma \) is characterised by a readiness to posit the existence of as many different people with the same name as a joke or group of jokes is capable of yielding - a fact which may be traceable back to their dominant belief that individual jokes provide accurate, characterful miniature portraits. Two simple cases will demonstrate the typical mentality behind the approach. \( \Sigma^\text{Av.} \) 1556 cites Eupolis fr. 182 as proof of the existence of a second Peisander (\( \Sigma^\text{Lys.} \) 490 separates \( \delta\iota\omega\kappa\kappa\omicron\nu\lambda\omicron\varsigma \), the politician in Eupolis 182, from Peisander the politician). Eupolis fr. 182 is reminiscent of \text{Thesm.} 29–34, the scholia on which report that \( \zeta\iota \pi\varepsilon\iota \alpha\varepsilon\iota\omicron\omicron\chi\omicron\sigma\varepsilon \kappa\alpha\iota\chi\omicron\nu \) believed the passage to be evidence for a real Agathon other than the tragedian (\( \Sigma^\text{F} \): but why only one other, if one wants to play this game, when the kinsman refers to two, at 31 and 33?). In both these cases the inference drawn by some ancient scholars is very unsafe: a famous man is mentioned, but someone in the
conversation does not know him (or at least, in Eupolis 182, does not immediately think of him); this is the rationale of the humour, and might be spoilt if the interlocutor's misidentification happened to involve a real person, who would in any case have to be himself quite well-known for his name to mean anything to a large, popular audience. At Thesm. 31, moreover, we are helped by the firm expression of scepticism recorded by the scholiast about the two-Agathons interpretation (€υω δε σωξ ἡμεῦμει κτλ.), for this makes it virtually certain that the earlier scholars cited had provided any supporting evidence for their assertions, but were merely guessing.

The scholia are sometimes prepared to hypothesise the existence of an ὅμωνυμος to a well-known person without any good reason. Σν Ἀσπας 566 absurdly takes the Aesop of that line to be a tragic actor, and Σν. ΑΠ. 1479 inexplicably refuses to accept that the Thespis there named is the tragic poet. Less obviously wrong is the conjectural separation made by Σν Ἀν. 877, presumably on the grounds of a difference in the contents of the jokes, between the Cleocritus of this line and the subject of Eupolis frs. 124 and 167. The second of the Eupolidean references comes from Δημος, which was produced in the archonship of a Cleocritus (413/12), and the archon is likely, though of course not certain, to have been the target of it. At any rate, the joke in Birds falls in between the two from Eupolis and is unqualified in a way which suggests that there was only one obvious candidate at the time: it is therefore more economical to suppose that all these jokes were directed at the same prominent citizen. The unnecessary hypothesising of ὅμωνυμος more often results from either a misunderstanding or the desire to save the superficial coherence of the satirical picture of a particular character. Σν Ἀν. 858 contains two attempts to reconcile the Aristophanic (and Cratinean) references to an auletes called Choiris with the joke in Pherecrates fr. 6 to a Κιθαρώτης of the same name: the one posits a single musician who changed instruments, the other asserts the existence of two musicians. These explanations are found, presented in factual
form, in other scholia (one musician: Συν. Αρι. 16; two musicians: Εν. 
Pence 951). There is no reason why one man should not have played two in-
struments, though the majority of jokes about Chairis treat him as an aul-
etes, and there may have been a special joke in Pherecrates fr. 6. It is
certainly improbable, especially when we take the rarity of the name into
consideration, that two musicians called Chairis were both ridiculed by
contemporary poets for being the worst on their instruments. Behind one
half of the scholia's comments on Chairis we can discern, I think, that
naive concern for the 'facts' behind the jokes which I discussed in detail
earlier. The important factors can be better focussed on if we contrast
this case with that of Execestides. The scholia on Αρ. 11 refer to a
καθαροφύλωτος of the name (= Ar. fr. 671; cf. also Com. odesp. 24) and separ-
ate him from the Aristophanic target of that name. In this case there is no
positive reason to question the separation: the name does not seem to have
been especially rare, and there is not the slightest hint in Birds or
Phrynichus fr. 20 of a musical background. Besides, the separation of
identities in the scholion seems to have had the backing of Polemon, the
credible Hellenistic antiquarian and perhaps the first serious Greek
epigraphist, who is known to have attacked Eratosthenes's Περί τῆς Αρχικῆς
καθαροφύλωτος in his own Περί τῆς Αθηναίων Ερατοσθένους ἐπιθημίως. The fact
that the reference to Polemon's work has found its way at some point into
Aristophanic scholarship strongly implies that he had reasons for insist-
ing on the separation in question, and these are likely to have been conn-
ected with the dates of the festival victories which Execestides the
καθαροφύλωτος had won (Σ. loc. cit.). The explanation of Συν. Κν. 608, where a
Theorus who is given two of the attributes predicated of Cleon's associate
of that name elsewhere is also called a poet, seems at first to lie less
close to the surface, but I think it may be essentially the same. I find it
very hard, in view of the political nature of the play's parabasis and of
the immediate context, to doubt that the Theorus of Κν. 608 is the assoc.
iate of Cleon, and hence, satirically, someone who would like to be able to escape from the ubiquitously patriotic Knights. But there is not the slightest indication elsewhere in Aristophanes or the scholia that this Theorus was a poet. I do not think we need to hypothesise a lost joke as the source of Σβ's assertion here, for there is a real possibility that it is derived from Kn. 608-10 itself. Theorus is here made to speak through a pseudo-skolion which, also in skolion fashion, he attributes to a crab. He uses his skolion narratively as a cryptic way of expressing his own annoyance, but it seems likely to me that ancient scholars tried to rationalise ξη... ἐπειεῖν (608) by assigning to Theorus a profession in which he might have had normal cause to attribute words to others. It is also possible, I suppose, that the claim owes something, perversely, to the view that the poet Carcinus is referred to in line 608.

Wilful invention of an ειςωνυμος as a means of preserving a preconceived image intact can be found at Σκ Αch. 1173, where it is suggested implicitly that the desiderated fate of Cratinus must be morally deserved and that Cratinus must therefore be, unlike the comic poet of that name, the sort of disreputable person who might be wandering about drunk late at night. I am not sure as some have been that Σκ Αch. 849, εύτε μελων παναθεισ, signifies that Cratinus here too was not thought to be the comic poet, but if the identification was rejected it will have been on the same grounds as at 1173, and it is certainly curious to find a modern commentator offering this on Ach. 848 ff.: "The Cratinus of this play is an utter rascal... fit only to be pelted with dung. This is not the way in which one great poet would satirize another." The approach is the scholia's; only the explicitness differentiates them. Σβ Β. 1187, where a γενναίος but not so well-known Cleisthenes is supplied to be the referent of what is naively taken to be too complimentary a mention for the man elsewhere characterised as μαλακός, was mentioned earlier, and here too the motivation is potent. At least one ancient scholar, Panaetius (the Stoic?), had difficulty in believ-
ing that Socrates the philosopher was the target of *Frogs* 1491 ff. (*Sv* 1491): it is a reasonable surmise that his reason will have been a desire to avoid the moral offence which making the identification would afford, and that he will have defended his alternative interpretation, as τών φιλ. φιλοσοφών intimates, by a literal-minded rationalisation of the joke in the light of the theatrical themes of the ode.

I shall end by extending my general claim that the scholia and their sources were too ready to separate jokes, and thereby δμόνυμοι, which might be taken together to a kind of note, which almost certainly represents the work of the compilers of *Κυριλεγμένη*, in which a number of δμόνυμοι are carefully listed and identified. One such note, *Σv* *Av*. 750 (v. *Ran*. 13), was mentioned above; another, which we are not in a position to scrutinise, is *Sv* *Peace* 347. One note of this kind which can, I think, yield some information is *Σv* *Nu*. 1022. It lists five men called Antimachus (*Σv* contains an abbreviated list of two; *Σr* *Ach*. 1150, such are the vagaries of the scholia, does not raise the issue of δμόνυμοι): 1. the object of the joke at *Nu*. 1022; 2. ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ πανηγύρι τοῦ κυριλεγμένου; 3. ὁ Παῦλος; 4. ὁ τραπεζίτης; 5. ὁ ἰδιομορφός. The scholiast himself expresses doubt about the independent existence of 5, who may be identical with 1. One doubt or uncertainty may easily generate others in such a context. We cannot show conclusively that 5 does not represent a separate individual, but if we are open, as we need to be, to the possibility that he is the illegitimate offspring of a joke, it should be noticed that at *Ach*. 1150 Antimachus (3) is described as ὅ ἵππος τιγγανικός, one of the meanings of which is ἰδιομορφός (v. *LSJ* s.v.). I suggest, therefore, that it is very likely that 3 and 5 in the scholion's list are the same person, and have become separated in the confused transmission of material that led up to our scholia. If we were also to accept the identification of 1 and 5, we would be left with only two Antimachi. The existence of 2 is also precarious; it is hardly guaranteed by τοπηρία alone. The details of this note need not be questioned any
further; my aim is not to arrive at a true proposition about one or more persons called Antimachus, and the issue is really of no importance to our understanding of either Ach. 1150 ff. or Nu. 1022. But I hope I have succeeded in casting some suspicion on the neat prosopographical scheme of Nu. 1022, and have managed to show the need, here as elsewhere, for fresh scrutiny of what the scholia offer on personal jokes. Without such scrutiny, set within the framework of an independent attempt to appreciate the character of Aristophanic personal satire, we shall be cheated by the false and simplified reality which they so often purport to discern and will be unable to make use of the genuine assistance which they can sometimes give us in our own interpretation of the plays.
Notes

1. Throughout this chapter 'scholia' and Σ signify scholia vetera. I have not noticed any instance where the scholia recentiora offer anything of value which is not in the older scholia. Some of the processes of corruption and misunderstanding have simply been carried a stage further in the later notes: e.g. Σ¹⁵ shows Menander for the use of the adjective υφίστατος, but in Σ¹ he this has become a claim that Menander seems to have mentioned the sons of Carcinus! I employ index letters to indicate whether a given note is in R and/or V, or, where in neither of these, one other MS. in which it is found (usually E.). In general 'the scholiast et sim. represent unattributed interpretations, without implying anything about the origins of the material concerned.

2. Cf. White (1914) pp. xxvii ff. Notice that in P. Oxy. xv. 1801 (= CGF 343) recto col. ii 40f. an opinion is attributed to ένοκολ which in Σ¹⁵ W. 1530 is specified as that of Euphronius.

3. And not just commentators. Ehrenberg (1951) contains much compiled from paraphrases of jokes (cf. the review of Dover (1951-2) ), as do articles such as that of Hose (1940).


5. Süss (1911) p. 16.

6. There is no evidence that Aristarchus himself compiled a work on Κωλικάσυμενα, though this is asserted by Roberts on P. Oxy. xviii. 2192, 28f., and repeated by Austin in his note on CGF 344.28. Cf. Steinhausen (1910) pp. 17f.

7. Steinhausen mentions Callistratus' monograph on p. 47, but ignores the link with Ammonius' work.


10. But notice that Aristophanes of Byzantium discussed Lais (= F 1 Jacoby) and therefore may have dealt with Pl. 179. See also the reference to Σ¹⁵ W. 1032 in the text.

11. The connection between the two groups of works is noticed by Cohn loc. cit. and Jacoby FGrH IIIB (text) p. 113.


13. Steinhausen pp. 15ff. In so far as Steinhausen believes he can distinguish qualitatively between the work of commentators and that of compilers of Κωλικάσυμενα (see e.g. his comments on Callistratus on p. 17), I regard his arguments as circular.

14. In view of the contrast drawn I think the second clause must mean 'is
not to be found in the ἱστορίασ, rather than simply 'does not appear in comedy', though of course the former might imply the latter. Cf. Didymus's ἄνωθεν ᾿λατινόγεια in Λ. 1178. For other references to hypomnemata in the scholia see index III in White (1914) s.v. 'Anonymous Commentators', and Dübner's index for individual authors.

15. It is a fault in Rutherford (1905) that he attributes the aberrancies of the scholia (of which he was, it should be said, properly aware; see pp. 381-8) entirely to post-Hellenistic times: see esp. p. 431.

16. The scholia's approach to jokes in comedy reflects some widespread ancient tendencies of historiography and biography: see e.g. Gomme HCT i, pp. 69f., on Plutarch's use of comedy, and Lefkowitz (1979), esp. p. 194, for comedy's contribution to Euripidean biography.

17. I should note, however, that there are some scholia (e.g. Σ' Αριστ. 17, 997, Σ' θεσμ. 31) where we get hints of an intelligent criticism asserting itself amid confusion.

18. The case seems to have rested on a similarity between passages: note τοιῶτα and see Koster's note on the scholion. Compare Pohlenz's convincing explanation of the claim (Σ' Κν. 1288) that Eupolis helped Aristophanes to write the second parabasis of Knights: Pohlenz (1912), restated in Pohlenz (1952) pp. 120ff. Cf. Sommerstein (1980) pp. 51-3.


20. Other terms, e.g. ταυτόγεια (Σ' Αριστ. 512) or μεταθεσία (Σ' Ραν. 87), are similarly used. This habit is a symptom of a moralistic justification of Old Comedy which may have been common in the ancient world: cf. e.g. Horace Sat. 1.4.1ff. ('si quis erat dignus describi...'), 1.4.3, Anth.Pal. ix.186, Quint. 10.165 ('antiqua comoedia...in insectandis vitiis praecipua'), Pliny Epist. 6.21.5.

21. P. Oxy. vi.856 fr.(a) line 12: see the Dutch edn. of the scholia, ed. N.G.Wilson, p.vii. The handful of papyrus scholia that we have of Ar. contribute very little to the understanding of personal references, but it is clear that their comments are on the same lines as the later MSS. scholia: in addition to the example in the text see the pap. note on Ach. 386, Wilson loc.cit., and CGF 63.45f.

22. Ussher (1979) p. 23 n. 3.

23. Murray (1933) p. 157. I deal with Cleonymus in more detail in the next chapter.


25. If the Ἕρας is the sixth-century politician, presumably a different supplement is needed; cf. Koster ad loc.
26. See van Leeuwen, Rogers, Merry and Kakridis ad loc.
27. See Rogers, Starkie and MacDowell ad loc.
28. Starkie seems to think there might be "authority" for \( \Sigma' \), van Leeuwen and Merry follow \( \Sigma'^v \). MacDowell gives the correct explanation of \( \Sigma' \), but faultily transfers \( \Sigma'^v \)’s inference to Sosias.
29. \( \Sigma' \) ad loc., followed by Rogers, Starkie and MacDowell.
30. See e.g. van Daele ad loc. and Davies APF p. 404.
31. E.g. Süvern (1835) p. 45, Rennie and Elliott in their edns. of Ach. The principles on which it should be rejected were set out by Müller (1874), esp. pp. 446f.
32. Kock’s attempt to introduce \( \alpha\sigma\chi\rho\delta\sigma \) by emendation into Telecleides fr. 14 is tendentious and unnecessary: see his note ad loc.
33. E.g. Rogers and Platnauer on Peace 951, Sommerstein (1973) p. 239 n.3.
34. Yet it is accepted by e.g. Leo (1873) pp. 4ff., Müller-Strübing (1873) pp. 699f., Diehl RE XVI 326, and Starkie ad loc., who denies that it is an inference from the text.
35. The only exception seems to be Dover, who does not mention the idea.
36. Cf. the equivalent Latin terms subscriptor and subscribere.
38. RE XII 336. Similarly Murray (1933) p. 77.
39. It is true that Euripides in Ach. and Agathon in Thesm. are shown composing at home with their \( \delta\kappa\omega\lambda\iota\alpha\) around them, but since the basic comic idea in both cases is that the tragedians practically live in the world of their plays I doubt whether we can trust the practical details of the two scenes.
40. Accepted by Swoboda RE V 1047, Kock, van Leeuwen and Neil ad loc.
41. See Appendix I.
42. Cf. the horror vacui displayed by a note like \( \Sigma' \kappa\nu \) 541, where personal targets are supplied for what Aristophanes evidently intended to be the characterisation of a general style of comedy (Geissler (1925) p. 45 unwisely uses this note as a clue to the date of Eupolis's Prosaltiosis). Even more absurdly, \( \Sigma' \kappa\nu \) 149 records different attempts to identify the Sausage-Seller with contemporaries - including Cleonymus and Hyperbolus!
43. This scholion should be related to Cratinus fr. 217a (Edmonds). It is overlooked by Welsh (1979), who seems to believe that most Athenians would be able to recognise Cleon's eyebrows!
44. See Kirchner under PA 1904, and Davies APF p. 57. The commentators mostly show more sense here.
45. On Theagenes see n. 63 below; on Ariphrades e.g. Bleydes and van Daele *ad loc*.; on Cinesias Murray (1933) p. 160 (ctr. p. 173 n. 1?).


47. See Honigmann RE XI 1112f., Kock/Schroeder and Rogers *ad loc*., and Cassio (1977) pp. 72–3. Pace Honigmann and Cassio, Daitaleis fr. 26 (Cassio) sheds no light on the problem: why read Κολανως and not Κολανως ?


49. Most lately Fornara JHS 91 (1971) p. 28: "Surely we have no right to doubt that some scandal of the sort occurred." What sort of principle of credibility is implicit in this 'surely'? He overlooks the sense made by the passage as a comic elaboration of Aspasia's satirical reputation. For older believers see Cornford Thucydides Mythistoricus (1907) p. 31, and the works cited in Starkie's suitably sceptical note on Ach. 524ff. This is a case where the colourful rhetoric of Müller-Strübing (1873) pp. 40ff. can still be regarded as necessary.

50. See Jacoby FGrH IIIB Suppl. i. pp. 500f. (on p. 501 read 422 for 423), ii. pp. 405f. For unargued repetition of the old orthodoxy see e.g. Newiger (1957) p. 128, Landfester *Menn.* 29 (1976) pp. 31f., Reckford *TAPA* 107 (1977) p. 296 n. 13. Both MacDowell on W. 240–42 and Mastromarco (1974) pp. 55–64 propose interpretations which would put the trial in the future at the time when *Wasps* was produced, but their views come up against the same chronological dilemma.

51. Mastromarco (1974) p. 64 shows some embarrassment at the strong Sicilian colouring of the trial-scene.

52. Todd's article on dramatic time in Aristophanes, *HSCP* 26 (1915) 1ff., does not mention the temporal issue raised by the trial in *Wasps*, and on p. 22 he overlooks the fact that the trial gives a surprising fulfilment to the prospect mentioned at 240–42.

53. Cf. also Hypothesis I to Knights, lines 57f. (Coulon).

54. See Starkie *ad loc*., and his Excursus I. A historical background is still, however, widely believed in: e.g. Connor Theonompos and Fifth-Century Athens (1968) pp. 53ff. (he mistakenly believes there are Venetus scholia to Ach.), Sommerstein (1973) p. 239 n. 1, Ussher (1979) p. 24 n. 12.

55. I cannot agree with Rennie on Ach. 6–8, who, accepting the theatrical interpretation, also thinks that Kn. 404 and 1147–50 allude to the same scene.

56. Hypothesis II to Peace provides probable evidence that Crates of Mallos
could still read Bab, in the second century, though the same hypothesis gives us a glimpse of the uncertainties of survival in the Hellenistic period: while Eratosthenes, librarian at Alexandria, had no access to a copy of the second Peace, Crates seems to have had a copy there in the following century.

57. See Rennie's edn. of Ach., pp. 14-18, for a good treatment of this point.

58. The scholion does not refer explicitly to the assembly, but in view of Praxagora's intentions it is reasonable to assume this: cf. Ussher ad loc.

59. Navarre (1900) pp. 60-62 imagines that a decree about theatre seating is meant, but quite apart from the doubtfulness of whether more than a very small number of women attended the theatre in the fifth century (see ch. 1, n. 33) it seems implausible that the Athenians would have needed statutory regulation of where women could sit if they did attend.

60. This is the reasoning of e.g. Starkie on Ach. 1150. The decree of Syracosius may in fact just have been a faulty inference from Phrynichus: cf. Ἐράτ. 404, where Χερόκτονος in Strattis fr. 15 is made the basis of some historical guesswork (see DFA² p. 87 n. 2), or Ἐλπιδών, where a law about long hair is inferred from the text (Neil ad loc. seems to accept the possibility that there is something in this).

61. Horace AP 282ff. may reflect a Roman or a wider Hellenistic view that Old Comedy's decline was due to legal measures taken against it.

62. For another possible factor cf. n. 101 below.

63. The bibliography on this subject is excessive but insufficiently critical: see e.g. Leo (1873) ch. 2, esp. pp. 21ff., Köre RE XI 1234ff., Geissler (1925) p. 17, Radin (1927) pp. 223ff., Moder (1938) pp. 20ff., Carriere (1979) pp. 43ff. Croiset (1909) pp. 118f. is exceptional in doubting the authenticity of Syracosius's decree.

64. P. Maxwell-Stuart, Historia 22(1973) pp. 400 and 401 n. 17, is typical of many in believing in Syracosius's decree while admitting that it seems to have been ignored!

65. For the form of the name see Molitor (1973).

66. There is no pertinent scholion on Lvs. 1105 itself, but it is obvious that the son of Makareus mentioned in Συμφωνεῖν 787 is an identification of the subject of Lvs. 1105: I do not understand MacDowell on W. 787 when he indicates that Lvs. 1105 shows that the Lysistratus mentioned in Wasps and elsewhere was the son of Makareus.

67. See Appendix I.

68. See the commentators with MacDowell on W. 1183 and Sommerstein (1977a) pp. 273ff. Does the connection between Theagenes and Acharnae, found in the scholia and accepted by modern scholars, rest on anything other than Lvs. 62f. itself? In view of the size of Acharnae, I doubt, pace
Andrewes and Lewis, JHSt 77 (1957) pp. 178f., whether the existence in
the fourth century of an Idiotes son of Theagenes from Acharnae (Pa
7445) makes much difference to lys. 61-4. Even if we could be sure
that Aristophanes had a real person in mind here, I would remain
sceptical whether he intended most of his audience to find anything
amusing in the fact.

69. I would read δοκεύειν ἡμιτον at 64. I take the point to be that
the woman was asking a specific question at the shrine (and on a trivial
matter: should she leave the house?), rather as Strepsiades does with
the herm at nu. 1481ff. This was not a normal Greek way of praying
(in contrast to some later Christian practice), at least where ordinary
statues or way-side shrines were concerned: the speed of response at
nu. 1483 underlines the artificiality of Strepsiades' behaviour.

70. In fact his name was Xenophanes: see Thuc. 6.8.2, 2^ Ach. 270.
71. See under Pa 7556.
72. For the form of name cf. Pa 6582.
73. I infer this from the hypothesis that Tharreleides himself may be the
target.

74. A straightforwardly physical reference would be hard to sustain; a much
vaguer innuendo of mischievousness is probably intended: cf. av. 571.
75. See MacDowell ad loc., who differs from most earlier commentators in
taking the reference to Amynias.
76. MacDowell overlooks this simple fact in suggesting that Philocleon
was meant to point to Amynias in the front row.

77. Marpsias is attested elsewhere as a human name (or nickname?) only in
Eupolis fr. 166, a very uncertain fragment indeed. Müller-Strübing's
identification, (1873) pp. 325ff., of Marpsias with Ctesias of Ach. 839,
an equally nebulous character, is groundless guesswork.

78. See Rogers ad loc. and Henderson (1975) p. 190.
79. There is a late Athenian instance of it: see NPA s.v. Δημιουργός.
80. See Plut. Ant. 70 and Lucian Timon 7, 50: in the latter the politician
Demeas is flattering Timon with a tissue of fictions, and the patronymic
may be part of this. On Timon see Lienau, KE V (1899) 129-130.
81. I infer 'contemporary' from the mere fact that Admetus was included in
such compilations, and that he was taken to be a poet seems deducible
82. It is quoted without comment by e.g. Starkie and Forman, and expressly
accepted by Rogers; cf. also Geissler (1925) p. 21. The name Pandeletus
presumably means 'all-enticing' or 'all-baiting': perhaps P. was
reputed for sayings that caught everyone out.
83. White (1914) p. xxviii attributes the Panætius interpretation to
Didymus, but the sketch of the mise en scène taken from Didymus better suits a fable than the life of a fifth-century Athenian.

84. See e.g. van Leeuwen, Rogers and Merry ad loc., and White (1914) loc. cit. and in his annotation to the scholion.


86. White (1914), n. on Σ 440, thinks it 'reveals an excellent Aristophanic pun'. But μᾶρκεττονείς suggests a μᾶρκερ no more readily than it does, say, a barber.

87. See Geissler (1925) p. 80.

88. Starkie on Ψ. 675 is wrong to think that the weakness of Euphronius's explanation in itself casts doubt on the proverbial nature of the reference.

89. See Blaydes and Starkie ad loc.; Rogers' interpretation is confused by his refusal to make the obvious connection between the Connas of Kn. 534 and the musician Connus.

90. See the Index of Names s.n.

91. Followed by e.g. Kirchner under ΠΑ 6736 and Holden (1902) s.n.


94. This presumably has something to do with the Roman actor Aesop who was a friend of Cicero's; cf. O'Connor (1908) p. 17 nos. 17-18. Probably an original distinction between the two people has been lost.

95. See SEG XII 84.96, with Hereward ABSA 47 (1952) p. 116.

96. Kock, in his note to fr. 671, and White (1914), on Σ Av. 11, have tried to alter the part of the scholion which makes the separation, solely, so far as I can see, to suit their preconceptions. The formula ςτι ἐκ ἔκεινες ἐκτείνοβαίνει is found elsewhere (e.g. in Σ Νυ. 1022) and is unobjectionable. J. Davison, JHS 78 (1958) p. 40, gives no reason for rejecting the prosopographical separation.


98. See my discussion of the parabasis of Knights in chapter 4.

99. Ribbeck and Neil accept the assertion that Theorus was a poet.

100. Rogers on Ach. 849.

101. ἐφικτός may well be a corruption (Platnauer ΚΟ 2 (1951) pp. 167ff.) but it may be an early one: cf. Σε Ach. 1150. It is possible that taken in the sense of 'proposer of a motion' ἐφικτός may also have helped to create the belief in Antimachus's ψήφισμα.

In chapter 157 of his speech *Against Timarchus* Aeschines refers the jury to a recent performance of a comedy at the rural Dionysia in the deme of Collytus, in the course of which a satirical allusion had been made to ἔρως μεγάλος Τιμαρχώδεις. Aeschines is trying at this point in his speech to draw a distinction between youths who prostitute themselves, ἄρεται καὶ φανερῶ, and those who, though they have known many homosexual erastai, live ἐλευθερίως καὶ καλῶ. Timarchus the defendant falls into the first category, it is of course alleged, but Aeschines adds that there happened at the same time to be living in Athens a beautiful youth also by the name of Timarchus who exemplified the proffered ideal of the life of an ἐρωμένος, and the purpose of the reference to the recent comedy is to enable Aeschines to claim that on that occasion no-one in the audience had any doubt which Timarchus was the butt of the allusion. The anecdote seems at first sight only an insignificant piece of tendentious denigration; how could Aeschines have known so surely that everyone had taken the joke the same way? But the rhetorical design of the passage should not be allowed to obscure a very important implication of the way in which the orator makes his point. Aeschines is describing two purportedly exceptional reputations, and his point is a colourful variation on the oratorical cliché, 'everybody knows'. But if the possibility of alternative identifications of the targets of personal jokes never arose his anecdote would be flat and uninteresting to the jury. The passage must in fact imply, and Aeschines must have been able to assume that his audience would understand, that passing personal references in comedies were sometimes ambivalent, or that the targets of them were not always so well-known that a succinct allusion to their reputation could not fail to be universally taken. This general implication about the intelligibility of personal jokes is of great value as a pointer to the conditions of publicity in classical Athens and to
the character of the relationship between comedy and its public, and although Aeschines cannot have known what he asserts of this one particular audience we have to recognise that the underlying implication is taken for granted. Moreover, it is pertinent to remember that this speech was delivered at a time when personal references to contemporaries in comedy were far rarer than they had been in the days of Old Comedy.

In my examination in ch. 2 of the ways in which the scholia vetera, often followed by modern scholars, treat personal jokes in Aristophanes, I have tried to object to the presupposition that these jokes must have a definable factual content (even where we cannot be sure of it) which the satirist could take as given. What really lies behind this presupposition is the belief that in his satire Aristophanes was essentially a reflector of current reputations, of public opinion and gossip, of established and prevalent notorieties. To be satirised by Aristophanes was, it has been suggested, "in itself a certificate of notoriety". The passage of Aeschines which I have just cited helps us to focus on the implausibility of this generally accepted axiom, for while it allows us a first-hand glimpse in a particular case of the relationship between the theatrical foreground of personal jokes and the social background of public knowledge and the dissemination of reputations, it gives some grounds for supposing that this relationship was variable. My aim in this chapter is to carry further the case for this supposition, and to pursue in some detail, as a positive complement to chapter 2, its significance for the understanding of personal jokes in Aristophanes. I am not attempting to deny that in many cases Old Comedy drew on or reflected existing reputations that were independent of the theatre; I wish rather to challenge the inflexible use of this as a model of all personal satire, and to propose in particular that far more account needs to be taken of two rather different factors: the possibility that a joke may contain within itself sufficient information for the appreciation of it, whether
by actually supplying relevant facts or allegations, or simply, but just as importantly, by depending not so much on specific details concerning the individual as on popularly familiar and accepted stereotypes of disapproved attributes or ways of life; and, secondly, the capacity of a joke or a set of jokes to create or contribute to a reputation, and so to provide material which other jokes may make use of, perhaps quite independently of what is known or commonly believed outside the theatre. There are other factors too which will emerge in the course of the chapter and which have been insufficiently considered by commentators and critics in the past. These cannot be combined into a simple key for the interpretation of any personal joke, and I do not pretend that I can demystify all those jokes which have previously been found baffling or too allusive. My overriding intention is to argue that we should dispense with the assumption that all jokes involve the same factual mechanisms, and that those which do not yield immediate and familiar sense are to be put on one side as secrets intelligible only to those who know more than we now do about their subjects.

Yet it is easy to see the main reason for the attitude to personal jokes in Aristophanes that has prevailed since exegesis of the author began. The very notion of a personal joke might seem to entail that the audience of it should know the target well, should understand what is being got at, as though the object were simply to supply an έίκων, the sort of μάθημα Aristotle mentions at Poetics 48b 15 ff. (though notice that Aristotle understands that the pleasure of recognition may not be the only reason for looking even at a copy: an analogy with personal jokes could be sustained); and the typical scholiastic reading of an Aristophanic joke is certainly motivated not just by a naïveté about the contents but also by a desire to see the joke as authentically personal (which is itself tied up with a moralistic predisposition to believe that the target deserves the ridicule). It consequently becomes tempting, and for some automatic, to assume that the original context was one in
which author and audience had a shared body of knowledge, a familiarity with both the person and his reputation, which made the joke a sort of coded communication between them. But all that is necessarily real or personal about our kind of joke, it has to insisted, is the identity of the individual who is the target. There are, moreover, problems in the way of the usual approach. Consider the fact that some of the butts of Old Comedy were not individuals of a kind we can expect to have left any clear traces in the records of the period outside comedy itself. This ought, on reflection, to seem a fact not just symptomatic of our ignorance but also indicative of the original nature of some of the genre's choice of targets. If an Athenian happened, say, to have an extraordinary complexion or head of hair, to lead a sexually unusual life, or to sell birds, but did not play a part of any prominence in the political or military life of the city, did not get involved at any time in a major lawsuit, did not perform in an individual capacity at a state festival, did not have any contact with circles that might earn him a mention in Plato or Xenophon, and did not have his name inscribed on any durable monument or public record (and a majority of citizens did not do any of these things), then there is no good reason why we should expect to hear about him from anyone but a comic poet. But leaving aside the publicity of comedy itself, such an individual is no more likely to have been well-known to a majority of an Aristophanic audience either, as I hope my comments below on the general conditions of publicity in Athens will help to confirm. There is, in other words, despite gaps in our evidence, a broad correlation between figures identifiable by us and figures conspicuous in some way in their own lifetime. It might of course be objected, and I think it is true, that only a minority of Aristophanic targets were not at all well-known in their time; most had some political, cultural or aristocratic standing, or had a topical significance around the time of particular plays, and so were more or less familiar names outside the
theatre. Yet if the principle that the audience of a personal joke needs to know the target is to be maintained, it ought to be extended, and usually is, to the specific details of the individual with which the joke purports to deal — his appearance, private habits, family background or whatever. But this extension would mean that the sort of problem mentioned above would have to be faced in the case of many jokes where there was no doubt about the general familiarity of the subject to the original audience. The audience of Ach., for instance, must have known who Cratinus was (he was competing at the same festival), but how many of them knew what sort of hairstyle he had at the time (cf. Ach. 849), even if they had attended the proagon, and how does this affect our understanding of this detail of the gibe at him? The problem is in fact a double one, for we cannot decide how many are likely to have appreciated the joke until we make up our minds what appreciation of it would entail (relating the joke to a memory of Cratinus's appearance or simply relishing, as I would suggest in this case, the degrading implications of the supplied image).

The example of Cratinus's hairstyle serves to emphasise a further weakness in an inflexible approach to personal satire, which is that it makes no allowance for the possible presence within the same audience of different groups or individuals who were in possession of varying degrees of familiarity with the target or background details of a joke. Although we are certainly never in a position to quantify or to make at all precise estimates of such variation, that it must have existed seems to me obvious (it is acknowledged by implicit contrast in the passage of Aeschines discussed at the start of the chapter) and its relevance to the understanding of many particular cases is considerable. The argument is sometimes offered or assumed that because the audience of Old Comedy was a large popular one, and because presumably no poet's work would be successful or even acceptable if it consistently catered for the taste of only a portion of that audience, therefore comic poets must always have provided
entertainment which was equally congenial to all the spectators and we cannot for certain purposes posit the possibility of different responses from different kinds of spectator. Yet Aristophanes himself draws distinctions between types of spectator and levels of appreciation, and we cannot explain them away completely in terms of the poet’s polemical, apologetic and competitive purposes, though these do play a part in the formulation of some of the passages concerned. In the area of personal satire, with its frequent references to or allegations about details of appearance, specific incidents and items of private life or family background, it is inconceivable that many jokes should not have made a varying impact on different members of an audience, some of whom might be neighbours or fellow demesmen of the subject, while others would be reliant on gossip or comedy itself for their knowledge about him. The inevitability of this variation can only be confirmed by consideration of the general conditions of publicity in classical Athens, to which I now turn.

How well informed were the Athenian public? Where did they get their information from, and how was it transmitted? This broad subject has a historical interest independent of Old Comedy, though it seems to have been little studied and we cannot attempt a proper treatment of it without drawing heavily on the evidence of Aristophanes. The main result of the failure to give serious attention to this issue has been, I think, the spread of a gratifying but unrealistic image of the nature of Athenian society. M.I. Finley has described “direct democracy” in the ancient world, which presumably includes fifth-century Athens, as operating in “small communities where everyone knew everyone else”. The same historian has elsewhere labelled Athens a “face-to-face society.” This model is commonly found. A leading Aristophanic scholar characterises what he calls the ‘Selbsbewusstein’ of the Athenian citizen-body by claiming that its members “sich...gegenseitig weitgehend persönlich kannten.” The Athenians, we are told, felt themselves to be an “einander wohlbekannte Gesellschaft”. It is of course vital for our historical imaginations that
we should appreciate the scale of Athenian society, but we do not achieve this appreciation simple by telling ourselves how small Athens was in comparison to modern industrial towns and cities, "as if Athens were a village and Attica a parish". The tendency to imagine Athens as a sort of village society can be particularly prejudicial when specifically applied. In presenting the case for identifying the Amphitheus of Ach. with Hermogenes the companion of Socrates, Rennie asserts that "His [Socrates'] mother Phaenarete and her vocation must have been well-known to the Athenian public." This is an especially striking instance in that it ignores the peculiar limitations on public knowledge about citizen-women in Athens, but the whole model which underlies it and which I have illustrated above will not in fact stand up to scrutiny, even if we wish to posit an inordinate amount of Πολιτεία of the average citizen. 

For the duration of Aristophanes' career we have to reckon with a citizen-body of at least 20,000, and probably a higher number than this for part of the period. It should not take much reflection to see that general personal familiarity within a group of this size is out of the question. In Aristotle's ideal polis the citizens would all need to know one another, but in Aristotle's own Athens this would have defied the physical facts of social life. When the defendant in Lysias I, Euphiletus, denies that he had ever set eyes on the man who he claims was his wife's adulterer before the night on which he killed him, there is nothing inherently implausible in his claim, whether or not he was actually being truthful.

At the beginning of Plato's Euthyphro Socrates explains to Euthyphro that he does not know Meletus, the man who has recently brought a lawsuit against him - and again we must separate the particular question of historical accuracy from the fact that the claim was a plausible and unremarkable one for classical Athens. The situation in which one citizen is ignorant of another is made the basis of a joke at Thesm. 29 ff., where Euripides and his kinsman are standing outside the door of
Agathon Ó κλεινός. It is significant for the Athenian system of personal names, and hence for the understanding of personal jokes in comedy, that Mnesilochus is portrayed as not simply ignorant about Agathon: he knows more than one person called Agathon but is not sure which one is meant. But we need to recognise that the humour does not lie in the mere fact that Mnesilochus has never seen Agathon, though that does produce the comedy of his guesses, and it is also insisted on to permit the gibe at 35; it lies rather in the way he ignores Ó κλεινός and Ó τρα γυμοποίος (29 f.) and tries to identify Agathon by his own memories of people of that name. There is a confusion, in other words, between the way one recognises the well-known (Mnesilochus should have heard of him: cf. 164, τοῦτον γὰρ οὖν ἀκήκωκας), whether or not one has seen them, and the way one identifies any individual whom one has personally encountered; ignorance makes him absurdly replace the first by the second. This confusion is the chief comic point, and we therefore cannot infer that it would have been absurd for an Athenian not to know what Agathon the poet looked like. A similar situation seems to be involved in Eupolis fr. 182:

A. ἄκουε νῦν Πεισγνυρὸς ὡς ἄπολλυτε.  
B. ὃ στε βλέπε;  A. οὐκ ἂλλ' ὃ μέγας, οὖν κοίνδιος.

Here too it looks as though the joke depends on a confusion between the well-known and the ordinary citizen, but not necessarily on any special familiarity with the former.

The main ways in which Athenians would acquire information about other citizens outside their own circle of acquaintances are clear enough. "Information about public affairs was chiefly disseminated by the herald, the notice-board, gossip and rumour, verbal reports and discussions in the various commissions and assemblies that made up their governmental machinery" — in other words, necessarily by predominantly oral means; and if we shift the emphasis slightly from public meetings to informal and private gatherings, this picture is valid as a description of the way
information in general, not just political information, was collected and transmitted. The important feature of this system for my purposes is not so much its small scale as its irregularity and uncertainty. Modern means of broadcasting do not just spread information quickly and widely, they intrude consistently into the lives of most people in such a way as to make it difficult to avoid the proffered information or report. The only regular means (other than comedy itself) of anything like broadcasting in Athens, assemblies, the courts and the notice-board, cannot normally have provided an outlet for the sort of personal details in which many jokes deal. Gossip and allegations concerning such matters we would expect to circulate more informally, and this inevitably means a more limited circulation. A man might be expected to know a good deal about his neighbours, and to be reasonably familiar with many of the members of his own deme, in both its topographical and its technical post-Cleisthenic sense. The defendant in Lysias VII cynically comments that one’s neighbours know even what one tries to hide from them, though of course it suits his case to subscribe to this particular generalisation. The speaker of Lysias XXIII explains how in order to check the claim of one Pancleon to belong to the deme of Decelea he decided to go and ask known Deceleans in a barber’s shop, and there is no doubt that, as in eighteenth-century London, these were places where much gossip and report changed hands. The cripple defendant of Lysias XXIV tells the members of the boule what he must believe they are prepared to accept on this subject: ἕκαστος γὰρ ὁμῶν εἶδοταὶ προσφοιτῶν ὅ μὲν πρὸς μορφώλιον, ὁ δὲ πρὸς κουφεῖον, ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοθηκεῖον, ὁ δὲ ὁποι ἄν τόχη... ἐπιντείς γὰρ εἶδοσθε προσφοιτῶν καὶ διατρίβειν ὁμοῦ γέ του (24.20). Someone in Eupolis’s Marikas, perhaps Hyperbolus himself, learnt a lot in barbers’ shops. For the majority of Athenians, however, especially those who lived outside the city and had a livelihood to think about, opportunities for sitting in such places cannot ever, and particularly during the war, have been quite as frequent as the last quotation from Lysias would
seem to imply, and it would in any case be fanciful to imagine that informal gossip systematically transmitted a body of report which coincided with the material drawn on by comic poets. We have here, in other words, a means by which a variety of rumour might circulate rather erratically, and by which occasionally a widespread notoriety might be created or at least filled out, but we cannot equate the efficiency of such oral communication with that of, say, modern popular newspapers, or hypothesise an amount and consistency of gossip sufficient to explain the supposed familiarity of Aristophanes' audience with the range of subjects and details covered by his personal jokes.

Within any given comic audience we must assume that there will have been some exceptionally well-informed citizens, a few who lived the life of the man described in Aristophanes' Νους, ἐπαλλαγέντα τῶν κατ' ἀγείραν ὑπομυκτῶν, and a majority who fell somewhere between the two extremes but who might find themselves understanding some personal references and allusions better than others. Most will certainly have been up-to-date with the major figures and events of politics—knowing what they needed to exercise their democratic ability τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδίκον γνώναι. But even in this area we need to distinguish between political familiarity as such and more intimate knowledge of the individuals concerned. The subject of physical appearance may be taken as fairly representing the sort of issues involved. We cannot doubt that many Athenians could have recognised Cleon or Peisander in the street (though they would probably be helped by other things than simple physical appearance) but can we really suppose that they were able or intended to understand Cratinus fr. 217a (Edmonds) or Peace 395 as identifiable references to the real appearance of these politicians? It is in fact striking how little can be learnt from Old Comedy about the physical appearance of prominent citizens, and although a cursory reading of some of Aristophanes' plays might leave one with the impression that the original audiences were expected to be familiar with the features of a large number of not necessarily eminent
contemporaries, it is important to realise just what the comic character
is of the jokes which give rise to this impression, and what can and can-
not be legitimately inferred from them about the knowledge of most spec-
tators. In many cases the joke contains everything needed for its app-
reciation. This is so, for example, with the comparison of Meidias to a
stunned quail at **Av.** 1297-9, where it is impossible to tell, and
unnecessary to know, whether the εἰκόνα ὠφείσε hints at the man's real app-
pearance or simply teases him for his sporting pastimes, rather as at
**Av.** 284-6 Callias, the aristocratic gamester, is given the attributes
which provide him with his sport (though in neither case, note, would one
need to know the sporting penchant in advance). The success of the joke
against Meidias could hardly depend on the audience's capacity to remem-
ber the shape of his head. The Lysicrates whose nose and hair are mention-
ed at **Eccl.** 630 and 736 is no longer known to us, but the succinctness of
the gibe at him gives us, I think, a clear pair of alternatives: either he
was actually notorious for the oddity of the features in question, or he
was familiar to many of the audience for some other reason. The first of
these options I find incredible, unless we add the speculative supposition
that Lysicrates had been given much comic exposure in earlier plays. If
we prefer the second, the truth-to-life of the jokes ceases to matter, from
the audience's point of view at least, for the abusive suggestiveness of
each could provide its own satisfaction. This is similarly true of **Eccl.**
71, though without the help of Plato **Com.** fr. 122 we might have been
uncertain whether the gibe was aimed at the largeness or the smallness of
Epicrates' beard. Epicrates' political importance makes it likely that a
large number in Aristophanes' audience would have some familiarity with
his face, but even in this instance the joke is not merely designed to
draw on such familiarity: the woman's boast makes sufficient comic sense
in the context if we know only who Epicrates is. The references to the
politician Phormisius at **Frogs** 965f., and **Eccl.** 98 are analogous: in both
passages an extra pleasure might be derived from the allusion to hairiness, but neither depends solely on this. On a different level, apparent descriptions of appearance can carry a special comic momentum which makes any relationship to the reality redundant: this is evidently true of the fantastic image of Cleon at W. 1031 ff., even though some of the details might have meant something to anyone who knew Cleon well; or of the virtuoso accumulation of Peace 789f. and 810-14, where the colourful abuse would make any attempt to extract a real portrait perverse. In just a handful of cases, I believe, is it necessary to possess independent knowledge about a target's appearance for appreciation of a joke: such are Ach. 389f. and Frogs 55, where it would require instant ingenuity otherwise to see the point in time. But these are much rarer than jokes which involve physical details that can be fully understood in their context as ridiculing or degrading; note, for instance, the phrase ὀ μυκές at Frogs 709, one comic stroke in a richly painted satirical picture, or Archedemus's nickname ὅ γλαύμων, which was used, whatever its origin, outside comedy, and which clearly could not have depended for its humorous effect on the ability of everyone who spoke or heard it to check its accuracy for himself. A case which crystallises these issues nicely is that of the son of Chaireas at W. 687-90. The use of this form of appellation probably intimates that the father and family were reasonably familiar, but Bdelucleon's language as he mimics the advocate's swagger and pretentious posture strongly suggests that his act is meant to be received as a caricature of a type of behaviour rather than the identifiable peculiarity of the named individual. It would surely have been beyond the appreciation of most of the audience if it had been otherwise.

What has been said so far in this chapter has been directed to the understanding of how the general conditions of publicity in Athens affected the knowledge of Aristophanes' audiences and their appreciation of personal
jokes, and it is obvious that such an enquiry is one route towards the comprehension of the dramatist's intentions, for those intentions were necessarily limited and in part shaped by the character and expectations of those to whom they were offered in entertainment. But before I try to carry further my analysis of the relation between the satirist and his public it is proper to attempt to see the issues from the poet's own point of view. How did the poets of Old Comedy choose the targets of their jokes, and for what kinds of reason? We cannot, of course, pretend to give a complete answer to this question, even in Aristophanes' case, but I think we can discern several of the main elements which would constitute an answer. The first and most general thing to be said is that the considerable overlap between the jokes of different dramatists, on which I commented in my introductory chapter, points principally towards the tendency of the genre to concentrate on targets of some prominence, most often of a political or cultural nature. Two important and related cautions, however, are in place here. Because it is very often difficult for us to be sure just how well-known a particular individual was, we are in danger of slipping into uncertain, and possibly even circular, assumptions if we automatically infer from the mention of an individual in more than one comic poet or in both comedy and other sources that he was familiar to the number of citizens present in a theatre audience. Each case needs careful consideration. The second caution, about which I shall say more later, is that there are good grounds for believing that comedy itself was a major agent of certain kinds of publicity in classical Athens, and consistency of exposure in comedy cannot therefore be reliably taken as an index of a person's independent reputation. But that a large number of those targets common to two or more comic poets owed their popularity in the genre to their established standing or fame in the city is beyond question. Aristophanes' comments on the comic treatment of Hyperbolus by his rivals (Nu. 551ff.), though somewhat disingenuous in their implications about his own
practice, acknowledge this fact: note especially the phrase τιμεῖται λαβὼν. The whole context of those remarks in the parabasis of Clouds suggests an important point which puts another qualification on the above generalisation about the sharing of material by dramatists, for Aristophanes is claiming both that Cleon was a special target of his and that comic poets could choose whether to be repetitive and familiar or to aim for originality. We are fortunate that the fairly full, if sometimes sketchy, record preserved in the scholia from the Κυμάδομίνον of the occurrence of Aristophanic targets in the work of other comic poets enables us to spot some interesting cases in which Aristophanes seems to have picked on individuals made little of by his rivals. Perhaps the most surprising instance is that of Lamachus. Although this general was a military figure of importance from the 430's onwards and occurs in four of the extant plays as well as in a fragment from the Georpoι, no trace survives of any mention or satire of him in other contemporary comic poets. It would take quite extraordinary carelessness on the part of the scholia or the earlier work out of which they grew to explain this away as an accident of survival; the compilations of the Κυμάδομίνον have left their mark on so many notes on much lesser figures that it would be unreasonable to shirk the inference that Lamachus cannot have been at any rate a prominent or regular target outside Aristophanes. While we cannot be sure of the reasons for either Aristophanes' concentration on or his rivals' avoidance of Lamachus, the explanation may be quite simple. Aristophanes saw the happy coincidence between the man's profession and his name, and he seized on him early in his own career, though possibly at a time when Lamachus was not especially in the foreground of military affairs, turning him through his appearances in Ach. into a caricature of the blustering and vainglorious commander. This was such a substantial piece of satire that for other poets to make Lamachus a target might then have seemed too blatantly plagiaristic. Nothing in the Aristophanic picture of the general suggests any personal
or private motivation behind the satire, and indeed that picture can itself be regarded as less a portrait than a slightly individualised mockery of an exaggerated type. The case of Agathon in Old Comedy has similar features to those of Lomachus. No evidence of any treatment of him outside Aristophanes survives, and again this may be at least partly due to the way that Aristophanes himself had used him, giving him a prominent appearance in *Theaem*, which may well have been the first play in which he made him a butt, and exploiting it to fix for him a sharply defined comic persona which he sustained in later plays: other comic poets may have felt preempted. Causes or motives are much less easy to impute in the case of Lysistratus, another target peculiar to Aristophanes, but never involved in anything more than an incidental joke. An element of inscrutable whim cannot safely be ruled out, though where the choice of targets was a large one and Aristophanes came back repeatedly to an individual I prefer to suppose a more concrete reason for the satire. The one thing I think we can be sure of in Lysistratus's case is that there was a considerable disparity between the man's real life and the surface impression of the jokes about him. The possible working of a motivation which may not come through explicitly in the jokes themselves is illustrated by the perhaps best known of Aristophanes' lesser targets, Cleonymus the so-called *φυσανις*. We have only one certain comic reference to this man outside Aristophanes (*Eupolis CGF* 100); this does involve *φυσανις*, but is unfortunately undateable. We know that Cleonymus was politically prominent around the mid-420's and again at the time of the scandal of the Hermocopidae; *W.* 592 portrays him as a forensic orator, and it is not unlikely that he was conspicuous in the political world for much of the period during which Aristophanes was naming him in his plays. But while such prominence would help to justify his inclusion in so many plays, there may have been a further motive. At *Kn.* 951-8 Cleonymus and Cleon are linked closely together by the device of the Paphlegonian's ring, and
the passage seems to intimate that both men are δημιουργοί. In the line of Wasps cited just above Cleonymus is indeed envisaged in the part of a demos-flattering leader of the dicasa, and he is titled ἱκλοκλύνυμος. Κολάκες are especially associated in Aristophanes with Cleon, and the hypothesis strongly suggests itself that there was in fact some connection between the two men, and that this association was part of the reason for the comic poet's repeated gibes at Cleonymus.

Any attempt to estimate the extent to which Aristophanes might have allowed personal or private motivation to influence his choice of targets must take account of two passages in the parabases of Wasps and Peace where he purports to contrast his own practice in this respect with that of other comic poets, though I think it is significant that in neither case does he name, or intimate that he has in mind, particular rivals. At W. 1025ff. he explains that in his career to date he has used his success and position modestly and responsibly, refusing to exploit it for personal gain outside the theatre or to put his resources of satirical publicity at the disposal of private individuals. These avoided activities are sketched, I would suggest, with a deliberate ingenuousness which is meant to act as a foil to the hyperbolical description that follows of Aristophanes as a Herculean ἀλέξανδρος locked in battle with the enemy of Athens, the many-headed Cleon: what the poet might have, but has supposedly not, become is a cheap publiciser - as a service to clients - of people's private affairs. But exaggerated though the details of both halves of the contrast may be, there ought to be in the first option mentioned, as there is in the account of the feud with Cleon, some reference to actual practice and real possibilities. Underlying Aristophanes' disclaimer is the sense that festival comedy is a communal affair in which everyone is entitled to take pleasure. The poet has a responsibility to his citizen audience; for him to use his plays as vehicles for private attacks and jokes would invoke neglect of his cultural duty. But this implicit principle should not be automatically accredited as a guide to practice, if only because private
motivations and special meanings need not prevent simultaneous catering for the general appreciation of the audience. When we turn to the slightly altered version of the argument which Aristophanes included in the parabasis of Peace, the kind of activity that he claims not to have engaged in is seen in a significantly plainer way. The previous sexual colouring of the argument, with the poet acting both as pederast himself and as a pimp for others' pederasty, has been removed, and we are now offered the simple assertion that he has eschewed satirising ordinary men and women (\(\text{οὐκ ἐσώτας ἀθηραινώποις} \)... \(\text{οὐδὲ γυναῖκας} \), 750) and has assailed the monster Cleon instead. The combination of the two passages presents an essentially plausible picture, I believe, of one possible dimension of the satire featured in Old Comedy, and once we have made allowance for a disingenuousness which is reminiscent of the claims made in the famous passage at Nu. 537ff., we are left with a revealing glimpse of part of the background which may sometimes be hidden behind personal jokes. There is, after all, no a priori reason for doubting the possibility that a comic poet might have used the publicity of his plays to pursue personal enmities, expose information or allegations which he had gathered privately, or even include jokes that were motivated by the wishes or feelings of others, provided they could be turned into entertaining material. A curious parallel to \(\text{W. 1025ff.} \) is to be found at Machon 272ff., where the courtesan Gnathaena is afraid that the comic poet Diphilus will give her adverse publicity in one of his plays. Whether they were dealing with fact or just with slander and rumour, comic poets must have obtained a good deal of their satirical material from private and individual sources, and Aristophanes' rather misleading contrast between his large-scale treatment of Cleon and incidental jokes about ordinary citizens should not be allowed to obscure the probability that he too depended on such channels of supply. If there is a tinge of unrealistic colour at \(\text{W. 1025-7} \), we should not be lulled into thinking that we are being given a mere fiction.
When we consider the role of other kinds of publicity employable in the relationship between ἐκλογή and ποιήσις, and remember the obvious appeal of this subject to poets and audiences who could enjoy the special festival licence for frank treatment of sexual matters, we should be able to see that the area in which Aristophanes chooses to illustrate a poet's possible service to a 'client' is a particularly credible one. Moreover, the likely implications for Aristophanes himself, behind the assurance of the disavowal, come more sharply into focus if we disentangle the two related but distinct issues of satirical practice which, in the version of the argument found in Wasps at any rate, his explanation confuses: whom, what sort of people Old Comedy picked out as its targets; and the sources or motivations of the jokes about them.

On the first of these issues our evidence shows that Aristophanes did not differ much in kind from his rivals, and there are good grounds for believing that he was no more individual in relation to the second. Indeed, an apparently straightforward demonstration of a kind of motivation akin to that disowned in the parabases cited is presented by Ach. 1150ff., where the chorus delivers a curse on Antimachus, the Lenaean choregus for Aristophanes in the preceding year. The explicitness of the given reason for the curse should not seduce us into assuming that this is necessarily a quite straightforward reference to part of Antimachus' choregia: ἀπέλυσεν, ἄδεξενον might be an exaggeratedly simple cover for a more complex complaint, or may even be altogether much less grave than it appears. Nonetheless, Aristophanes is here certainly prepared to give the impression of airing some sort of private grievance, and this is at least as telling for his general practice as the rhetorically structured arguments in Wasps and Peace. It is just as important for my larger argument, however, to observe that Aristophanes' motivation in the first place, whatever it was, for composing this ode need not be identical with his comic purpose. Although I take Ach. 1152 to be at least an implicit acknowledgement of
how the satirist might sometimes conceive of using his powers of publicity, the ode as it stands does not communicate much information; the motivation has been turned into an elaborately entertaining joke, which an audience could satisfactorily follow and appreciate for its intrinsic humour, and it is remarkable how far from the starting point the chorus's imaginative train of thought has travelled by the end of the ode. We start with Antinachus, but we finish with a wish for Cratinus, and in that shift we can discern Aristophanes' mind moving from one of last year's festivals to the present Lenaia.

A more complicated blending of original motivation and final satirical entertainment is involved in the attack on Ariphrades in the second paragraph of *Knights*, at 1274ff. The manner of Ariphrades' introduction is unique; nowhere else does an Aristophanic chorus show any self-consciousness about indulging in personal satire, and this fact has to be accommodated in any interpretation of this passage. It is equally striking, though, that the remarks with which the chorus preface their description of Ariphrades are not really defensive or apologetic. We should note in particular the clause ὅν ἐχθαλί ἄκυκλος καὶ κακό (1276), which is a sentiment that points, whatever the tone of the context, to the general acceptance in Athenian society of the role of bad reputation, and the concomitant practices of ridicule and frank condemnation, in giving expression to popular moral feeling and judgement — a reflection of the emphasis on public estimation in Greek moral thinking, and a corollary of the fact that "goodness divorced from a reputation for goodness was of limited interest." The chorus purport, then, to represent the comic poet in his function as exposers of private immorality, on the grounds that such behaviour is of justified public interest. An illuminating parallel of unquestionable seriousness is to be found at Lysias 6.6, where the speaker asserts that the impiety of Andocides is familiar to everyone in the city, and for good
reason: ἀναγκαῖος γάρ ἐξεῖ ὀπίσθ' τῶν πολύ διαφερόντων ἢ κακῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν ἔργων ποὺς ποιήσαντες γνωσκεθάλει. ἀναγκαῖος... ἐξεῖ is not intended, I think, simply to describe the way things happen to be ("you can't stop people talking") but also to express approval of this state of affairs, intimating that reputations ought to exist as reliable indicators of the truth about people. It is to be noted further about the chorus's exposure of Ariphrades that it contradicts, on the face of things at any rate, Aristophanes' disclaimers at Αξ. 1025ff. and Peace 750, for the Knights here admit that they are picking out someone who is not ἔνδηκος; and, as at Ach. 1150ff., the surface pose is as revealing in its implications as what we may finally judge to be the reality (see below). The whole preparation for the specific indictment against Ariphrades seems calculated to highlight it as something of exceptional interest; even the comic 'praeteritio' of the preceding ode is partly intended to prepare the ground for the graver material of the epirrhema, lending to the transition at 1274 a sense of passing from the merely pathetic inadequacies of Lysistratus and Thoumantis to a subject of genuine depravity; and the contrast between established comic butts and a person supposedly not yet known to the audience also reinforces the apparent darkening of the tone. All this would seem to bespeak an intention of unusual satirical intensity on Aristophanes' part, and one can certainly understand the grounds for the verdict that the attack on Ariphrades is "savage" or that it shows explicit "hatred and disgust". But are these judgements secure? There must in the nature of the case be room for differing assessments of tone, but I want to indicate some reasons for regarding the passage as only mock-serious. In the first place, the careful build-up to the main revelation at 1284 could be felt to be more of an attempt to arouse curiosity and accumulate an aura of the sensational than a serious moral preface; copious analogies could be located in titillating yet purportedly responsible forms of modern journalism, though I am suggesting that Aristophanes need not have expected anyone in his audience to take his posture seriously. It is not that Aristophanes could not be serious;
We can see that he might be from an analogous passage of rhetoric such as Andocides 1.95, where Epichares is called ὁ πάντων πονηρότατος καὶ βουλόμενος εἶναι πονηρότατος, and the idea of wanting to be wicked might have been an established way of suggesting extreme corruption: cf. Philocleon's mischievousness at W. 320-22, the wilful sycophantes at Av. 1450, and Phrynichus fr. 58.3. But several other features of the attack do not harmonise well with a serious intention. The chorus spend more time prefacing their revelation than they do on the revelation itself, and the description of cunnilinctus is certainly coloured more by prurient detail than by moral outrage. It is followed, moreover, by a final couplet (1288ff.) which turns the subject into a wry joke. And despite the fact that our evidence gives ground for believing that cunnilinctus was a rarely practised and generally disapproved form of sexual behaviour for Athenian males, it remains open to doubt whether it would have aroused genuine outrage.

There might even, in other words, have been a kind comic bathos in the exposure of extreme ἰονική which turns out to be a private sexual peculiarity, especially since ἰονική and its cognates tend to be used of behaviour with more easily calculable practical consequences, real or potential. I am not trying to eliminate all sense of disgust from the passage of Knights, or to turn it into completely light-hearted terms, but to point out that the presentation of Ariphrades' alleged perversion can be seen as an effective comic design rather than an earnest moral one, providing more of an entertaining relish than a sense of righteous indignation. Whatever Aristophanes' own feelings, he has composed the passage chiefly with a view to giving his audience a particular kind of pleasure.

But a final judgement on the case of Ariphrades needs to take more into account than the apparent content of Kn. 1274ff. Two other factors in particular are germane, the identity of Ariphrades and the treatment of him in later plays. Both of these seem to me to point towards the same conclusion. Ariphrades was not a common Athenian name, and there is there—
fore a prima facie case for considering whether we should identify the
Aristophanic Ariphrades and the person of that name mentioned by Aristotle
Poetics 1458b 31ff. The possibility of this identification is strengthen­
ened somewhat by the likelihood that the Aristotelian Ariphrades was a
comic poet, coupled with the evidently artistic leanings of the family of
the Aristophanic target. It has also been pointed out that γλαύκοταιν
at W. 1283 would make a nice joke as a pointed substitution for γελαύ­
τοταιν, and I would add that at Kn. 1287 we have a reference to a kind of poetry
or song which sits rather oddly in a description of cunnilingus in a
brothel, but would take on a clearer comic meaning if Ariphrades were him­
self a poet (and note τοικῶν). When we examine the two certain later ref­
erences to Ariphrades in Aristophanes, we encounter an obviously lighter
tone than in the second parabasis of Knights, quite free of any moral
colour, and we receive the impression that the target and his supposed
behaviour are familiar to the audience: this is evidently true at P.
883–5, though the joke would not be completely without interest for anyone
who had not heard the subject before, and even at W. 1280–83 the heavy
irony of the makarismos suggests that Aristophanes is counting on his
audience's ability to relish the mockingly delicate and allusive handling
of a coarse matter. Firm inferences from this would be out of place, as
we cannot know how much exposure Ariphrades had had between Knights and
Wasps, but I think it is reasonable to say that these later jokes cast
further doubt on the ingenuousness of the attack in Knights, and are at
least consistent with the supposition that Ariphrades was not as unknown
to the Athenian public as the original revelation might have made us think.
Even if Ariphrades was a comic poet, however, we are left with a question
about the jokes against him which takes us back to the way in which poets
prepared their satirical material. Did Aristophanes actually know that the
man practised cunnilingus, and if so how? As the allegation does not
appear to have been a standard or common one, it is probable that there
was a particular reason for it, though this is not tantamount to saying that the jokes necessarily contain biographical truth. For a subject of such personal intimacy Aristophanes must have had a specific source of information, and it is tempting to relate this to the fact that in two places he pays compliments to Ariphrades' brother, Arignotus. There may lie here a trace of a connection with the family of the sort which could have given the satirist sufficient personal information for him to work out into full comic form his picture of the target's private life.

Two issues of some general importance which have been involved in my discussion of Ariphrades deserve to be picked out briefly for special emphasis. One is the distinction which needs to be drawn between what the satirist presents to his public and actually expects them to get out of a joke, and, on the other hand, the possible layers of private motivation which lie beneath the surface of the final satirical product. We saw earlier that such a separation may have to be made in cases like those of Cleonymus and Antimachus, though the precise degree of the separation is bound to vary: in Antimachus's case the poet makes at least part of his motivation public, in others it would obviously be possible for some spectators to appreciate the special relish of, say, Aristophanic concentration on associates of Cleon. It is worth remembering in this context the very large number of targets in the extant plays with a theatrical connection (see ch. 1); yet when we look through the jokes against these figures, many of them are not at all related to the theatre, and the status of the people involved could often not be guessed from them. If our ignorance were smaller, we would probably discover many more jokes with a tacit dimension of this sort. In some we can expect the first audiences to have been capable of appreciating the implicit, but not by any means in all. The suggestion made by Sterling Dow that the Amphitheus of Ach., the Simon of Kn. 242 and possibly certain other individuals mentioned by Aristophanes were real friends of the poet's should be brought into relation with the
kinds of motivations that may lie hidden behind some personal jokes, for there is certainly no obvious reason to believe that these identifications were meant to be recognised by most of the original audiences: they are to be taken, rather, as private communication between poet and friends, the complimentary converse of the sort of practice envisaged at Π. 1025ff.

The second general issue to be emphasised goes closely with the first; it is the use of particular private sources in the gathering of satirical material. Wasps 1174ff. shows that Athenians might recount personal anecdotes at dinner-parties, and one imagines that it was on such occasions that comic poets would be particularly able to acquire the personal information or gossip which they, if not their audiences, needed for the creation of good jokes. Aristophanic choruses sometimes connect their gibes with current rumour by words such as φάστω or ἀκρωτίς; this represents them dramatically as ordinary gossippers but can also be seen as an indication both of the broadcasting role of comedy and of the nature of some of its sources. We may treat Kn. 983ff. as a fiction, which it evidently is, but it can still serve to remind us that Aristophanes could have found ways of talking to those who had known Cleon well as a younger man or who had interesting things of other kinds to tell about him, and in their case, to connect the two practices which Aristophanes separates at Π. 1025ff., he might well have been prepared to put his satirical Muses at their disposal.

I have been trying in the last few pages to offer tentative ideas about some of the processes that may have led to the production of personal jokes. I went now to return to an aspect of satire which will enable us to stand on slightly firmer ground and to reunite the poet's intentions with the sort of appreciation of which his audience was capable. How far did the personal jokes of Old Comedy depend on topical issues, events and reputations? It does not need to be demonstrated that recent or current affairs have the advantage that the poet can count on them being fresh in the minds of his audience, but there are no a priori reasons for assuming
that this is always an advantage to be exploited in personal satire, and to
the degree that we accept my contention that many Aristophanic jokes do
not presuppose or require a full familiarity with the subject-matter, the
importance of topical humour to the genre will be correspondingly dimin­
ished. A highly relevant factor is, naturally, the relative infrequency
of performances of comedies in Athens, even allowing for those at local
festivals such as the Rural Dionysia, together with the lengthy period tak­
en up by the preparation of individual productions, though it has to be
remembered that incidental jokes, especially in dialogue, are the sort of
things that could where necessary be emended or changed even at a late
stage in the preparations. The time-scale of productions means that we
ought to apply a looser conception of topicality than would be appropr­
iate for more regular and quickly composed types of entertainment. When
we encounter references to actually current events, however, a set of
interpretative problems opens itself up. A concise illustration of this
is provided by Lys. 102f., where Calonice tells Lysistrata that her husband
is on service in Thrace, φυλάττων Ευκράτην. The joke is ταξίδι Περσοκοκλήν
in the very last word, and rather similar to the one found at Av. 513. 69
That Eucrates was a general at this time is certainly a fair inference
from this passage, which would otherwise be pointlessly flat. But the
same principle does not apply to the implication that Eucrates is corrupt,
yet it is remarkable how easily and automatically commentators and his­
torians have been prepared to believe that the joke is evidence for at
least a suspicion of "some improper practices", "Unzuverlässigkeit",
"corruption", or even, and quite absurdly, cowardice. While we cannot
with certainty rule out the possibility of a current suspicion or even of
the grounds for one, two things need to be emphasised in the face of this
uniformity of interpretation. One is that the joke implies that Eucrates
is still serving as general at this time, and that in itself should qualify
any keenness to believe that thousands of Athenians had doubts about his
reliability. Equally important is the fundamental comic fact that the joke need not be relatable to any actual state of affairs: in this case we can properly say that the technique is the joke, and for the humour to be effective the only prerequisites are that Eucrates should be a known military officer and that we should understand what it would mean to φυλάττειν a general. What matters is the implicit cynicism about official honesty in general (the corrupt official is one of comedy’s commonest stereotypes); Eucrates may be no more than a convenient representative of his profession. To claim that "the fact that he [Eucrates] would apparently have been acceptable as one of the Thirty... raises doubts as to how strong his democratic loyalties really were" is to ignore the response that he actually gave on that occasion, and in any case we can hardly use evidence from a later and very turbulent period to make sense of the joke in Lysistrata. If there was any connection between the joke and Eucrates’ reputation at the time of the play, I would be inclined to suppose that the accusation made against him in 415 over the affair of the Hermocopidai (Andoc. 1. 47), though inconclusive, left a stain on his name which the satirists were able to exploit.

The moral of Eucrates’ case is that we cannot safely treat jokes whose apparent reference is to a present state of affairs as reliable evidence for topical scandal, not, at any rate, unless they contain a different kind of satirical material than at Lys. 102f. A contrast with the reference to Thorycion at Frogs 362-4 may be useful. Here we have an explicit allegation, and it occurs in a context of topically patriotic sentiment. An outright and specific imputation of treason requires to be taken seriously in a way which need not obtain for a passing and vaguely cynical insinuation about a commander in office (and in the mouth of a light-hearted woman, not a chorus-leader, it should be added): it would be much harder in Thorycion’s case not to relate the joke to a known reality, and it is plausible to hypothesise something like a recent court case as background. A
rather different sort of problem can be posed in cases where we know
independently of the historical background, and are tempted to read allus-
ions to it into the text. A well-known instance of this kind is Lys.
490-92, where the coincidence between the phrase \( \delta\iota\tau\omega\nu\sigma\iota\ \alpha\phi\chi\alpha\iota\sigma\ \varepsilon\pi\iota\kappa\alpha\nu\pi\iota\varsigma \)
and Thucydides' description of the clubs on which the oligarchic coup of
411 was based as existing \( \varepsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\phi\chi\alpha\iota\ \tau\iota\nu\)
remains a very strong one. If the interpretation of Lys. 490-92 is chiefly
a matter of keeping apart two independent sets of facts, the long involve-
ment of Peisander in democratic politics (cf. Andoc. 1.36) and his shift
to an oligarchic position in 411, the understanding of the two jokes about
Nicias in Birds, at 362f. and 639, has generally foundered, I believe, on
the tendency to try to make the references more precise than they need have
been for the original audiences. Av. 362f. is in fact not uncomplimentary
to Nicias; it qualifies as a mild joke by virtue of the ridiculous context
in which the comparison is made, and possibly also because of an ambiguity
in the word \( \mu\nu\chi\alpha\nu\mu\iota\varsigma \). \( \mu\nu\chi\alpha\nu\mu\iota \) in general are apposite to the activities of
a general: Xenophon's Socrates includes it among the essential qualities
of strategia that a man should be \( \mu\nu\chi\alpha\nu\mu\iota \). We cannot rule out the
possibility that some of Aristophanes' audience would have been induced
by the word at Av. 363 to think specifically of siege-engines, especially
perhaps given the use of \( \varepsilon\pi\iota\kappa\alpha\nu\kappa\omicron\tau\iota\varepsilon\varsigma \) in the same context, though it is
not to be forgotten that Peisetaurus is being admired for exercising in-
genuity in defence. But the error of all those who have pinned their col--
ours on a specific interpretation of Eupides' remark is simply to have ignored the fact that the original spectators necessarily could have taken the joke in slightly different ways, and that for Aristophanes to have made such an open reference to a general who had been involved in many well-known actions over the years could hardly have been intended by him as anything other than an invitation to a popular audience to make what they would of it. Here is a perfect demonstration of the principle that the satirist's intention can sometimes only be understood in terms of the responses available to his audience. The point becomes clearer if we consider this joke in conjunction with the later one in the play and admit the possibility that at 363 may have suggested delaying tactics, thus making the first joke similar to the second. The inclination to attach one specific reference to the coinage at 639 has been just as automatic for most scholars from ancient times onwards as it was in the case of the earlier Nicias joke, and the fallacy thus entailed is precisely the same. Of course, we may speculate that Aristophanes had a particular event in mind when he conceived of both jokes, and if this was a topical event it is likely that it will have sprung to the mind of a majority of spectators at the first performance. But the fact remains that both jokes are open-ended and ill-suited to make everyone in a large audience think of just one thing. This is particularly true of the coinage , for most if not all Athenian citizens at this time could surely have remembered several episodes in Nicias's career which had involved some sort of hesitation or delay - and indeed the very formation of the verb seems to indicate that a supposedly habitual disposition or characteristic is the target. Topical allusiveness there no doubt is in both these jokes, but not a straightforward topical reference; and the desire to narrow down the comic scope of either passage implies above all a faulty conception of the relationship between the satirist and his public which it is the main purpose of this chapter to illuminate.
The business of relating personal jokes to the events of the period around the time of the production of a given play is, then, a delicate matter, and against what may sometimes seem to us in our rather neatly arranged historical perspective to be an unmistakable connection we have to balance the precise details of each joke, its comic character in context, and all the possibilities of understanding available to the original audiences. In some cases, however, the central problem is our ignorance, and the danger is simply that of reading too much into a reference. I suggested in the last chapter that, for example, such a faulty method of interpretation may have led to the use by the scholia of certain jokes as evidence for fictitious psephismata restricting the freedom of comedy. In a similar way, *Av*. 1071ff. has almost always been accepted as a reliable description of a very recent proscription of Diagoras (note ἐκ...ἐμφατο), but legitimate doubts can be raised. That Aristophanes could distort or exaggerate contemporary reality is shown clearly, I believe, by the trial of Laches in *Wasps*, which 240–42 implies was a topical event but which, if it happened at all or was even threatened, which I doubt, cannot have been concerned with a Sicilian charge, though the play's trial-scene is based on the notion of one. We ought to consider more seriously than most scholars have been prepared to do the possibility that Aristophanes is here turning a current political enmity into a graphic but fantastic dramatic allegory; and if Cleon had been trying to rake through Laches' past career to find material for διόξεια against him, the original audience will easily have interpreted an allusion to this which we are now in danger of treating too literally. But individual problems and uncertainties still do not obscure the fact that many jokes had some sort of topical element in them. At the most fundamental level, figures who were prominent around the time of a play would be more likely to suggest themselves to the composing poet, though jokes against them would not necessarily be related to the reason for their prominence. One of the implications of *Wasps* 62 is
germane here. The satire of Cratinus in *Ach.*, and *Kn.* acquires an extra
nuance when we remember that he was actually competing against both these
plays. Similarly, Aristophanes introduces a gibe against Phrynichus
Comicus, a competitor at the Lenaia of 405, very early on in *Frogs* (13),
in a passage which uniquely dramatise the satire of rivals' work that is
customarily found in the parabasis. Laispodias was elected strategos for
414/13 around the time of *Birds*, and so may have been particularly in the
public eye during the period of the play's preparation. Charminus had
been general in the year leading up to *These*, and the joke against him at
804 evidently owes something to his recent naval defeat. More pointedly,
*Frogs* 1196 is an unambiguous allusion to Erasinides' condemnation after
Arginusae, while Adeimantus, a replacement general in 406/5, seems to be
picked out at *Frogs* 1512 as little more than a topical name. The topical-
ity of the jokes about Cleon's and Brasidas's deaths at *Peace* 267ff. needs
no explication, but the reference to a ἰδαῖοι βιβλίον / Τελέους at *Aγ.
1024f. is a rather more discreet allusion to Teleas's status as secretary
to Athena's treasurers in this year. Many other more or less certainly
topical jokes could of course be mentioned, but I want to round off my
observations on this subject by noticing two cases which illustrate, at
least suggestively, very different kinds of topical interest. We have
four references to Excecestides in Old Comedy, all from plays produced at
the Lenaea of 414, and all concerning his entitlement to citizenship.
Other references may naturally have been lost, but a plausible hypothesis
is simply that the man had been involved in a fairly recent courtcase.
Cleonmys is the target of two jokes in *Birds*, and both rest essentially
on the comic portrait of him built up in earlier plays, but at 1479
Aristophanes slips in the word ἵκοφαντες, which may well have been
capable of carrying an allusion to the man's involvement in the reaction
to the affair of the Hermocopidae. This detail is part of an elaborate
treatment of Cleonmys as an exotic tree, and the comic spirit of the
passage could be well followed without this particular point being taken: it is there for the appreciation only of those who are sharp enough to spot it.

Although the issue of topicality sometimes gives rise to rather special problems and considerations, the interpretation of jokes which are affected by it confronts us with essentially the same challenge as do other personal jokes, and in their own way the cases that I have discussed in the last few paragraphs should have helped to sharpen the definition of my general thesis about the variable relationship between the satirical contents of jokes and the network of facts, rumours and attitudes in the world of the audience. I want now to try to crystallise this thesis somewhat more positively. Underlying all the material in this chapter, as well as the observations made in ch. 2, is the conviction that personal jokes should be understood and analysed as the varying product of two main factors: on the one hand, the real personality, life and attributes of the individual target; on the other, certain depreciatory categories and stereotypes (including, for example, the corrupt politician or official, the non-Athenian masquerading as citizen, the pretentious intellectual, the promiscuous pathic, the fat coward, the fawning parasite, the loud-mouthed charlatan) which embody popular values and prejudices and therefore carry, even when they are only implicit in a piece of ridicule or denigration, an immediate intelligibility and appeal. The interplay between these factors has been recognised to some extent in discussions of the role played by major contemporaries who appear in the plays (though I think it is an interesting cultural reflection on many commentators and critics that they have been far more prepared to see the functioning of the stereotype, and to distinguish this from reality, in the portrayal of the Aristophanic Euripides and Socrates than in that of, say, Cleon or Lamachus). But interpretation of individual jokes has strongly tended to ignore the importance of stereotypes as an independent factor, with their own comic rationale, notwithstanding the irony that the tradition of interpretation
which the scholia represent effectively picks up the typical terms of much personal humour yet treats them as nonetheless true to reality. The range of variability produced by the two factors indicated is a wide one. Toward one extreme the reality is dominant, and where this is the case jokes can provide a true picture of an individual or a reliable impression of a state of affairs. Towards the other, the stereotypes are the main determinant of the way in which personal references are constituted, and the effect of them is to belie or distort the reality, or, closer to the middle of the range, to give a reductive or comically simplified version of the truth. In arguing for a full range of satirical possibilities I intend to contest, among other things, a commonly invoked but highly misleading principle according to which every joke that purports to convey something about real people or affairs ‘must have something in it’. The principle is misleading simply because of the way it gets used as a tendentious means of bringing into operation the disposition to regard a joke as more or less factually accurate, a use which implicitly denies the possibility of one extreme of my range of satirical variability; as a principle it does not help us to know how to approach jokes, but merely makes a presupposition about what we can find in them. On Wasps 579f., where Philocleon claims that the actor Oiagros would not be acquitted in court before he gave the jurors a recitation, MacDowell suggests that the claim "would have little point if it did not have some sort of basis in fact", and, in a manner which justifies my belief that the use of this principle is tendentious, continues: "It may therefore be assumed that he [Oiagros] had recently been accused of some offence, that in the course of his speech in his own defence he quoted some lines from Niobe, and that he was acquitted." What we have here is a preference, stated as though it were made inevitable by the lines themselves, for treating the joke as historically accurate. But what is to be opposed to this is not merely a different preference or a straightforward rejection of this reading, but a recognition that the joke need not be taken this way, and could make satisfactory comic sense in oth-
er ways. Provided we know who Oiagros is (and that he was an actor is an inference, but a fair one) and appreciate the humorous irrelevance of Philocleon's criteria of acquittal, the lines yield an adequate joke. Whether there was in fact more to it for the original audience we may wonder, but we cannot deduce it from the text. This case can be compared to that of Eucrates at Lys. 102f., which I commented on earlier, proposing that in this instance the technique of the joke does not warrant an assumption that anything more than the popular stereotype of official corruption is in play. I quoted in a footnote to the last chapter Fornara's approach to Ach.523ff.: "Surely we have no right to doubt that some scandal of the sort occurred". 94 Here the principle in question arrogates an even greater authority to itself, even though there are several hypotheses (an absurd Herodotean fantasy, an exploitation of popular cynicism about Pericles, a fanciful extension of the satirical idea that Aspasia was herself a prostitute) on which we can make perfectly good sense of the passage without supposing that it contains some historical truth. 95 It may be in the interests of historians, but this is not a sufficient or good reason to give an a priori favour to the interpretation of a joke which will secure the maximum reference to actual circumstances and facts.

If we recognise the comic poet's licence and willingness to distort, manipulate and even invent, then we are committed to seeing his satirical role in relation to his audience as a much more positive one than the notion of a reflector of current affairs and reputations would allow. Instead of simply and consistently catering for the known quantities of established public knowledge and report, dressing up the familiar in a comic presentation, he can sometimes be far more creative in the composition of his jokes, inviting and leading his audience to enjoy and to understand in the festival spirit of the occasion the satirical allegations and insinuations that he makes, fitting individuals and ridiculing images together with a plausibility which may owe more to comic logic or the intrinsic force of
a passage than to what the spectators know or believe to be the case. One
simple factor to be considered here is that much personal humour has
essentially the character of abuse, and the mechanisms of abuse are such
that it does not need to be justified to be funny or appealing. The nature
of a wide range of Greek ridicule and abuse of the kind that many Aristoph-
anic jokes exploit can be seen in a crystallised form in a group of words
with a specialised meaning which has become worn down, though not necessarily
erased, leaving them serviceable as general terms of reproach: these in-
clude ἀνέγρωπος, ἰδιεύρωπος, δηομέλος, ἐνεργωμέλος, ἱερόσυλος, καταπάγων, λατεινοῦσα, χαῖτρος, πτησιμωνικός. Even where a term is not att-
ested in an evidently metaphorical or loose sense, an abusive application
by its very nature does not need to be understood as a strict description;
and individual terms are in this respect only concise versions of what may
be conveyed by fuller means. The satirist's own creative or distorting
role can be seen clearly in outline in a case like that of Androcles.
Although we do not know very much about the man, he was obviously a pol-
itical figure of some importance for quite a long period, and Aristotle
was able to quote from one of his speeches in the later fourth-century.
If we believed the comic poets, we would suppose that he was of slave
origin but obtained citizenship deceitfully, that he prostituted himself,
that he spent part of his life as a πτωχός and ἡκάλαττος, and that
he indulged in διακομήτης. Of course, even if we balk at swallowing all
this literally, we might still make more or less reasonable attempts to
translate each of these allegations into real terms that we would be pre-
pared to believe, working on the presupposition that each 'must contain
some truth'. Without the original comic contexts it is not actually worth
trying to work out a judgement on this case, though the bearing of my arg-
ument is that it would be extreme naivete to accept the comic picture at
anything like face value, and that to do so would be to exercise a pre-
judice about the truthfulness of personal humour in Old Comedy and to ig-
nore the simple satirical potential of alleging deeply disreputable activities against an important citizen. The 'basis of fact' which some find it so difficult to do without was probably solid enough in some of these jokes (e.g. σκοτντικα as a cynical interpretation of political activities in the courts), but it is at least as likely that in others it was immaterial.

The same issue can be explored in more profitable detail in connection with the Aristophanic treatment of Cleonymus, to whom the poet may have been attracted, I suggested earlier, by an association with Cleon. The first observation to be made about Cleonymus is that a repeated joke or allegation in Comedy is, strictly speaking, no more likely to be historically or biographically reliable than a single assertion of the same thing. It is also to be noticed that Cleonymus is the butt of two jokes about his size in Ach., and so was probably familiar as a political figure before Aristophanes' first gibe of ἀργος against him. This probability is strengthened by the references at Kn. 953 and 1293, neither of which has any military implications. It is only in the third joke against him in Knights that military matters come into the picture, and it has been insufficiently emphasised that in this first instance the immediate background is not cowardice in battle but evasion of service at an earlier stage, in the composition of the registers of hoplites. While it is naturally tempting to connect the specific detail of τῶν ποταμείῳ (Kn. 1372) with the image of ἂργος found in later plays, to do so would reduce the logic of the context. If we assume that Cleonymus had actually been involved in an act or accusation of military desertion sometime between Ach. and Kn., I find it odd that Aristophanes should have introduced two jokes in Kn. which leave out this fact before making an allusion to it in a third. There is at any rate a prima facie case here for questioning whether the ἂργος image found at Nu. 353 and later accurately corres-
ponded to anything Cleonymus had actually done. We should also beware of assuming that an apparently oblique joke like Kn. 1369-72 necessarily implies a preexisting familiarity among the audience with what is insinuated. This joke in fact explains itself, and it is therefore conceivable that Aristophanes is here feeding out a suggestion which was new to most of his audience. Two more relevant points, mentioned earlier in this chapter, should be reiterated: that Cleonymus seems to have been a special target of Aristophanes*, and that all the signs are that he was politically active for much of the period during which he is ridiculed in comedy. My aim in juxtaposing these different factors is to try to indicate the plausibility of the suggestion that Aristophanes was creating in Cleonymus the διάσοδος a comic persona which was only tenuously related to the truth about the man, and that his audiences' appreciation of the jokes based on it may have depended more on the contents themselves than on anything they had learned outside the theatre. It is still legitimate, however, to ask why Aristophanes should have wanted to develop this particular image for his target, and to this question I think we can offer an interesting if speculative answer. Xenophon includes in his Memorabilia (III.xii.1ff.) an occasion on which Socrates reproached his companion Epigenes for being in poor physical condition. Socrates regards a fit body as being above all valuable because of the advantage it gives one in warfare, and κακέφλιξ or ἀδυναμία of body as disgraceful because of the inability of those in such a state to fight well for themselves or their city. Particularly pertinent to the comic treatment of Cleonymus is the assertion that πολλαί ... δέξαν ὁμοίως κατάλαβεν ἡν τοῦ σώματος ἀδυναμίαν διεκείμενες ἀντιδειλαίαν, and the general suspicion of cowardice is closely tied to the claim that in actuality the unfit find it difficult to fight well. The nature of fighting in a hoplite phalanx makes Socrates' remarks easy to understand, and it could well be that Cleonymus's fatness, safely inferable from Ach. 88, Kn. 1290ff. and other passages, helped to make alleg-
ations of ἀδικηματικῶσα against him comically intelligible, especially in view of the probable ease with which by their very nature general charges of cowardice could be trumped up (cf. Kn. 368). More than one person in the Athens of the Archidamian War might have had occasion to notice that Cleonymus had not been seen to go out and fight for the city — and no wonder why! Whether fatness was all there was to it we cannot know, but Aristophanes may have picked up some other information about the man which motivated him to pursue this particular satirical line. That we should not, at least, be too literal-minded about the jokes which developed out of this is confirmed by Peace 1172-86, which proves that ἀδικηματικῶσα falls at least marginally into the category of terms which I mentioned above and could be used abusively of a wider range of behaviour than the strict desertion of the battlefield. This last fact should be considered in conjunction with the observation I made above on the precise insinuation at Kn.1369-72; and the whole argument can be concluded with the important point, overlooked by the many who take it for granted that an "occasion" lies behind the comic reputation, that not a single one of the jokes against Cleonymus does specify a particular event or even remotely hint at a time or place — a curious consistency in such a sustained image, if it is taken to reflect biographical reality.

The passage cited in the last paragraph from the second parabasis of Peace illuminates not only the comic treatment of Cleonymus but also that of Lamachus and Peisander, both of whom are portrayed as blustering officers with formidable paraphernalia, the trappings of status, but without real qualities of authority or leadership. The appeal of this sort of caricature to audiences containing large numbers of men with military experience needs no special comment; analogies could be furnished from popular humour about commanding officers in other periods. Peace 395 furnishes a miniature image of Peisander of the kind that is worked out in detail for Lamachus in Ach. The concentration in both cases, as in
the description of the taxiarch in *Peace*, on the apparel and accoutrements of office encourages the supposition that these targets are being picked out as representative of their profession, and not as unique individuals. We should beware, yet again, of taking the comic presentation for the truth. The technique seems to me close to that of the visual cartoonist, relying above all on striking images and exaggerated details, and the content is correspondingly limited. To say that "Lamachus, with his crests and Gorgon shield and fiery talk, was an obvious choice" for a comic poet who wished to characterise the "pro-war party" is to measure a satirical creation against a supposed reality drawn largely from the satire itself, as well as to give the picture a political dimension which I find it by no means easy to discern in Aristophanes. Even where we have independent information to make such a comparison possible, we do not by performing it necessarily simulate the sort of appreciation which Aristophanes expected or which his audiences would be inclined to give, for in the special circumstances of festival productions of comedy we have to allow for a mentality which would enable an audience to keep separate, when appropriate, its response to personal jokes and its serious knowledge and opinion of their targets outside the theatre. To put it another way, one of the implications of the important principle that "the tacit assumptions necessary to understand a joke may not be assumptions about real life at all, but assumptions within a field of convention and myth" is the very fact that an audience accustomed and attuned to the character of the genre would not expect a joke to necessarily accurate or fair to the target. I believe that such appreciation is just as possible where elaborate or repeated jokes are concerned, as in Cleonymus's case, and may even be facilitated by a sense of familiarity with the comic picture. With brief individual references, which allow an audience little time for reflection, the intrinsic humour of an abusive gibe or the intimation of a recognisable satirical stereotype can easily dominate over any concern with the
truthfulness of the joke. At 521, for instance, is not intended to constitute evidence about the real behaviour of Lampon. Its comic effect derives simply from the irreverence of Euelpides' allegation against such a well-known seer. Lampon cannot have been popularly thought of as a quack. His association with Pericles and Thurii, and his involvement in the signing of the Peace of Nicias, show that he held the status of a major representative of an important department of Greek religion. But the Athenians could be sceptical enough about the honesty of seers to appreciate such a joke, just as they might enjoy cynical suggestions about the trustworthiness of men whom they nonetheless elected as generals. This joke momentarily exploits the potential of these feelings, and it does so with a sharp effect of surprise, for Euelpides' remark seems to be in tune with the preceding lines until the last three words of 521: a slight pause at this point would heighten the impression that the sentence is confirming the piety of bird-oaths. I would say that the joke actually seems to evoke Lampon's respectability in order to undermine it comically, and to understand Aristophanes' intention we need to apprehend the particular technique employed as well as the conceptual content of the implied stereotype. Something not dissimilar to this may be in play at Wasps 74-6, where it is again quite unnecessary to take the personal suggestion seriously. The joke is compounded of the disreputable associations of gambling and the projected embarrassment of imagining Amynias giving himself away. The satirical relish depends as much as anything on the simple act of picking out and mocking an important person. I suspect that there is little more to the two scatological jokes about Antisthenes at Eccl. 366-8 and 806-8, though we cannot be sure of the familiarity of this target. But whoever he was, both jokes supply all that is needed to appreciate them, and the construction of each, whereby the target's name comes at or near the start, and the scatological point is held back as a climax, makes it even harder than it would anyway be to believe that Aristophanes was exploiting an
established reputation. Whatever motivated the poet's choice of comic motif, and as in many other cases this is not to be necessarily equated with what the audience are intended to see in the joke, the intrinsic force of the crude defecatory words, καλάς and καλες, gives the references all the abusive justification that they require, especially if Antisthenes were reasonably familiar as just a wealthy man. No-one inclined to read more than this into these jokes has ever supplied a reason for regarding them as less inconsequential than, say, Ploutos 176.

A corollary of the use in many personal jokes of popular and stereotyped categories of humour is the general tendency of the genre to fix individuals as representatives or types, the epitome of a particular vice, weakness or discreditable activity. In individual jokes the two satirical processes may sometimes be identical, though where a series of jokes are concerned they can be related as cause or means and effect; and it is opportune to remember here that with more popular targets the operation of these processes is to be calculated not just within the work of the individual comedian but as something to which two or more poets can contribute. This general tendency in Old Comedy, which is reflected in the techniques whereby names are applied with metaphorical force to someone other than their owner or are employed as if they were ordinary nouns,\(^6\) presents us in some cases with the difficulty of distinguishing between real contemporaries with very familiar and sharply defined comic images and the names of notorious characters from the past or even perhaps from popular oral fiction. The two most troublesome cases of this kind, which I discuss elsewhere, are those of Orestes and Phrynondas; and in neither can we attain to certainty. But the point that I wish to make here is that we cannot lightly assume that Aristophanes' first audiences would have been better off in this respect, for once a name is popularly established as a 'Gattungsname' or acquires an unavoidable and automatic set of connotations, the origins of the use can easily become forgotten, or the
mixture of truth and legend can become inextricable. Attempts to rescue
the real Faust from the myth can perhaps never fully succeed, for the
conditions in which the myth develops are inimical to objective enquiry.
The important difference between such figures and the regular contemporary
targets of comedy is that the former would be familiar purely and simply
for their standard connotations, while at least some of the latter had
reputations outside the theatre that were independent of what comic poets
said about them.

It is much easier to show, as I have tried to do in this chapter,
that comic poets were free to some extent to make their personal jokes
satirically creative, inventing and shaping the images of their targets
as well as giving expression to ready-made rumours or reputations, than to
estimate how far the creations of the poets in turn impinged on or coloured
public opinion. While it should be evident that the comic stage had a
special licence for frank abuse, intimate denigration and general
αἰσχολογία, and that comedies were watched by larger numbers of citizens
than ever gathered together for a political assembly or any other occasion
on which they could be addressed en masse, a licence for speech does not
necessarily imply or lead to a corresponding practical or ideological in­
fluence, though it has often apparently been taken for granted in assess­
ments of Aristophanes's political purposes that the influence could have
matched the freedom. It is certainly wildly question-begging to bracket
comic satire and ostracism together as institutions in which "the power
of public opinion is deliberately harnessed as a force of social control":
we can point to ostracised individuals, but no-one has discovered a single
instance in which comedy can be shown to have damaged a target (though
Plato thought he knew of one). Where we should most expect to be able to
observe the influence of personal jokes, in connection with standing
targets such as Cleonymus and Lamachus, there is none easily discernible;
indeed, it is more plausible in such cases to suppose that the continuing
political importance of the targets just helped to provide a basis for the continuing satire: some jokes are themselves implicitly an index of their incapacity to make a serious impact. I suggested earlier that we need to reckon with a mentality which would allow the denigration even of leading politicians and military to be enjoyed but would be capable of keeping that enjoyment separate from attitudes and behaviour outside the theatre. Indeed, it is virtually inescapable that such a mentality should have existed, given the scope of satire in Old Comedy. Appropriate comparisons from other societies are not easy to find. The application of modern analogies needs particular caution. One could point, for example, to the influence in sixteenth-century Italy of perhaps the earliest satirical journalist, Pietro Aretino, or to attempts in late eighteenth-century England to stifle the political freedom of cartoonists. But the critical factor which differentiates from Old Comedy these and other similar instances of formidable and apparently influential satire is the frequency of publication: a regular output of material, permanently available, is obviously far more capable of insinuating its criticisms or allegations into the minds of a public than special performances of plays, not easily consulted afterwards, on only a handful of occasions each year. It would therefore be dangerous to employ analogies to support an inference from the political interference known to have been sometimes made with Old Comedy's freedom of speech. It is not worthwhile to venture into this overworked subject yet again, but I have to insist that none of the scanty evidence on it provides a firm indication of any general worries about the potential influence of comedy on public opinion. This is not to rule out the possibility of less tangible kinds of influence in some cases. A fragment of Lysias (53 Thalheim) is worth some consideration in this context. The speaker refers to the poet Cinesias as follows: ὃς ὥστε ἐστι ἄφοιτα περὶ θεοὺς ἐξαμικράταιν ὡς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀδεχρήν ἐστι καὶ λέγειν τῶν καμισσοῦσκάλων (<δ' ἅκούετε καθ' ἐκαστῶν ἐνιαυτῶν ;
We certainly have here testimony to the special ἐπιφανεία of Old Comedy, and also to the power of the genre to broadcast its material: it is not quite clear, though, how far the speaker is suggesting that the jury only knows about Cinesias's misdemeanours from comedy, or whether they hear in the theatre what they already know (I think the former might be implied). The fragment might also seem to be evidence for a close relation between the satirical contents of comedy and the serious activities of the courts, but we have to make a liberal allowance for the tendentiousness of the prosecution, in whose interests it obviously is to treat Cinesias's persona in comedy as an accurate reflection of his life and of public feeling about him, which is similar to Aeschines' purpose in the passage cited at the start of this chapter. It is not that the claim is necessarily false, but we can infer from it very little about the general relation between Old Comedy and its society, especially if we bear in mind the wide range of variability that I have tried to demonstrate among the different elements that constitute personal jokes.

I shall complete this chapter with a few observations on the satirical treatment of individual women in Old Comedy. It has been claimed that "in politics and comedy alike an opponent's mother was not spared slander and ridicule", but in practice this was a rather rare line of attack, and the total number of identifiable women involved in Aristophanic jokes is very small. The claim, which I cited earlier, at Peace 751 that Aristophanes did not attack ordinary citizens ἱστυρευόμενοι ought to be interpreted with a greater stress on the second part, for women of any sort in Athens were naturally less accessible butts than men, their lives being so much more private and less political, and consequently somewhat less interesting. But the social condition of women could in some circumstances be an advantage to the satirist, as we can see by examining the references in the extant plays to Euripides' mother. In addition to Thesm. 387, which is the most explicit of them, there are two other references to Euripides' mother
which undoubtedly rest on the same satirical base (Ach. 478, Frogs 840) and two more jokes about Euripides which it is plausible to interpret within the same framework (Thesm. 456, Frogs 947). They are thus spread out over a long stretch of Aristophanes' career, and it is to be borne in mind that the woman may well have been dead even at the time of Ach., and very likely by the time of Thesm.: on a conservative estimate, she must have been at least seventy in 425. Many of Aristophanes' audience can have known practically nothing about Euripides' mother: perhaps her name and one or two other details. It could be highly significant that Ach. 478 seems to rely on a familiarity with the object of the joke, and in view of the age of both the tragedian and his mother it would not be surprising if Aristophanes were taking up an existing comic theme. Very few reliable facts about Euripides' life have survived; nothing at all which can help us to unravel the jokes about his mother and τὰ λαχανίνα. But the satirical rationale of the jokes themselves is clear enough. Euripides' mother is portrayed as a common saleswoman, a person whose occupation was socially and economically incompatible with the status and way of life of an upper-class family. The λαχανόπωλις, as Lysistrata's great compound call for help to the ordinary women of Athens reveals (Lys. 457f.), belongs with other disreputable and stock figures of fun like the τακνόκεκλητης and the ἄρτωπωλις in the day-to-day world of the agora from which women of wealthier families were carefully excluded. All that appreciation of the jokes therefore presupposes is acceptance of the degrading force of this putative profession in the case of the mother of someone as prominent and culturally important as Euripides. When at Ach. 478 Dicaeopolis requests some skandix, supplied by Euripides' mother, the poet is deeply offended: ἀνηρ ἀμφιμβετάω (479). The contempt conveyed by Thesm. 387 is also evident: the tragedian slanders decent women when his own mother is the commonest market tradeswoman. At Thesm. 456 the social stigma is explicitly transferred to Euripides himself, though here the satire is ironically highlighted by the
fact that the speaker, unlike most of the other women in the play (cf. esp. 330), is herself of low status. The two gibes in Frogs, 840 and 947, likewise concentrate on the shame for Euripides himself; if the medieval compilers are to be believed, Aristophanes may have carried the process even further by calling Euripides a δικανεικοποιημένοι.

But the mechanics of the satirical theme do not tell us why Aristophanes should have chosen this particular insult, or how much truth there was in it. Two obvious hypotheses present themselves: Euripides' family may actually have had a connection with market-gardening, and if so it is certainly conceivable that his mother played a part in the control of it, an aspect of her ποιητικός; alternatively, Euripides' mother may have been of foreign origin (the poet was born, of course, well before Pericles' citizenship law) and the λαχανεπωλή image may have developed out of this fact through comedy. The former of these is more likely, I think, but either way two points of general importance emerge from this set of jokes. One is that they are essentially a means of getting at Euripides himself, and may have continued after his mother's death. The references are never introduced simply for incidental amusement; they always come in where thought is anyway focussed on the tragedian. The other is that the rationale of the jokes is a simple one and intrinsic to them, and not many of Aristophanes' audience can have known much independently about Euripides' mother. I have discussed this set of jokes in some detail because they provide a model for the other cases in which a well-known figure's mother was ridiculed in comedy, particularly those of Hyperbolus, Lamachus and Cleophon. Hyperbolus' mother seems to have had the unique distinction of being made a character in two comedies, Eupolis' Μαρικας and Hermippus' Αρτοπολίδης; in both cases the main target must have been Hyperbolus himself, though it could be that the mother gave more scope herself for satire than did Euripides'. A remarkable feature of the references to Hyperbolus' and Lamachus' mothers at Thesm. 839ff. is that both men were dead by this
date; but even here we do not have a gibe at citizen women for their own sake, for the jokes would hardly have been possible without the background of their sons' comic reputations. The line of attack through the mothers is determined simply by the sex and point-of-view of the chorus, but the audience's probable ignorance about the two women would not affect their appreciation of the implicit gibes at the male side of the families. The suggestion that the two mothers operate as money-lenders in the agora has something in common with the debasement of Euripides' mother, but as money-lending was not a normal female occupation, and certainly not for the lower classes, the satirical point cannot be exactly the same. In the few cases where citizen wives are mentioned or involved in comedy, the aim seems to have been to embarrass a male target, whether of the same family or not. It would be interesting to know more about the attacks on the wife of Menippus reported in Plutarch's Life of Pericles, 13.15, which he claims were a means of getting at Pericles himself; we are reminded of the comic treatment of Aspasia, none of which, it should be noted, betrays any detailed familiarity with the woman herself. The most notorious Athenian woman in comedy during Aristophanes' career appears to have been Rhodia, wife of Lycon and mother Autolycus. The reference at Lys. 270 implies that the male audience knew who she was, and Eupolis's Autolycus had no doubt helped to ensure that, but nothing more can be deduced from it; and it is difficult to suppose that the comic ridicule of her can really have been independent of the reputations of husband and son: it would be unwise to draw biographical inferences from it. In the case of Coisyra, at Ach. 614 and Nu. 48 and 800, the name looks like a ready-made way of evoking the luxury and pretensions of the Alcmeonidae: even if a specific woman is meant, which is far from certain, she is less an individual than a representative of the associations of her family. Unless a citizen woman committed some misdemeanour that scandalised general feelings, she was unlikely to become at all
well-known to the mass of Athenians. It is therefore fanciful to try to attach specific significance to the references to the wives of Theagenes and Cleonymus at Lys. 63 and Thesm. 605, though I think it is probable in the latter case that Aristophanes intended his audience to see a mild joke against the husband. But all in all, comic poets did not regularly draw citizen women into their plays. An inhibiting propriety may have operated in this area, despite the genre’s freedom in other respects. If the argument of this chapter is correct, lack of information alone could not account for the general avoidance of female targets; but to subject individual women even to the satire of stereotyped ridicule might have touched on a sensitivity in the Athenian male that had not been dulled by the traditions of the festival.
Notes

1. Aeschin. 1.157 = C. adesp. 298.

2. It is germane to add that there were other Athenians alive at the time called Timarchus. We know at least two more, PA 13627 and 13635, the second of these a possible son of Praxiteles the sculptor: see Davies APF p. 283.

3. I assume this means that uncertainty should have arisen less often; with a steadier flow of personal references it would be more acceptable for a poet to include some obscure or open-ended ones.

4. J. Burnet, note on Plat Euthyphro 2b 9. It is clear in the context that Burnet means a certificate of pre-existing notoriety.

5. Cf. ch. 2, n. 20.

6. This seems to me to be the argument of Walcot (1971), esp. pp. 36-9. He dismisses (pp. 40, 46ff.) the distinctions drawn by Ar. himself.


8. Note e.g. Ach. 855, which might give a special pleasure to members of this deme.

9. We should not forget the presence of boys and, at the Dionysia, visiting foreigners. The theory, which I do not subscribe to, that Ar. adapted his plays to the different audiences and circumstances of the two major festivals is certainly not borne out by the pattern of personal jokes in the extant plays: Peace and Birds especially are peppered with references to contemporary Athenians.

10. p. 16 in 'Crisis in the Classics', in Crisis in the Humanities, ed. J.H. Plumb (Penguin edn., 1964). It is interesting that Finley's reference to ancient democracy is linked to a suggestion that the study of the ancient world can provide us, who are "reared in the romantic tradition", with a view of a profoundly different society; but the exaggeration of the face-to-face nature of Athenian society has itself romantic overtones of the organic community and similar concepts.

11. Finley (1973) p. 17 and n. 22, where Finley refers us to an article by P. Laslett which contains the seriously erroneous statement that no Greek polis had a citizen-body larger than 10,000 (cf. on this figure H. Schaefer, Historia 10 (1961) pp. 292f.).

12. An early instance: Schlegel (1846) p. 157 talks of Athenian citizens' acquaintances "with the personal circumstance of all their contemporaries of any note or consequence".

15. Dover, edn. of Clouds p. 1: the whole context is relevant to my argument.
17. Note on Ach. 30. Plato Theaet. 149a hardly supplies the support required for Rennie's assertion. Plato's dialogues usually centre on a small section of Athenian society in which connections of family and friendship tie everyone into a single network. A passage such as Lysis 204e needs to be read in the light of this fact.
19. Lysis 1.45.
20. Euthyphro 2b 7ff. Cf. also Charm. 153a and Laches 180cff.
21. The passage is constructed to lead up to the punch-line in 35, and it is a way of introducing the ironic allusions to Agathon's nature in 31 and 33. But this last aspect of the humour would not necessarily strike everyone, and Mnesilochus's ignorance would be sufficiently funny without it; the joke does not, therefore, show that everyone in Athens knew what Agathon looked like (Euripides' assertion at 189, which makes good sense of a celebrity of seventy or more, seems to imply the opposite). There may be a further nuance in that Agathon's rise was relatively recent; perhaps Mnesilochus is meant to be out of touch.
22. If ἄπεισωλαυξεί refers to Peisander's death, which is far from certain, then the joke is a fiction, for the fragment comes from Marikas of 421. Compare Peace 700ff., which is not reliable evidence for Cratinus's death, though often taken as such.
24. Comedy's powers of publicity were of course limited by the infrequency of production: cf. n. 123 below.
25. Dem. 57.10 shows that the two senses, on which cf. J. Traill Hesperia Suppl. XIV, pp. 73f., did not always coincide.
26. Lys. 7.18.
27. Lys. 23.3.
29. Cf. Theophrastus's κακολεγος (Char. 28.2), who practically learns genealogies: it is not coincidence that this gossip's insinuations are similar to those of comic poets.
30. Ar. fr. 387.3.
31. Thuc. 2. 40.2.
32. It is easy to imagine that Cleon's 'hundred heads of flatterers' (W. 1033) will have been something that any Athenian could see for himself.
33. Cf. ch. 4 on Peace 395 and see ch. 5 n. 91.
34. Note the case of Chairephon: the jokes about his pallor make sense in
themselves, since they draw on a stereotype of the ascetic indoor life; familiarity with his pallor (if it was real at all) was probably only spread by comedy itself.

35. Merry, for example, on Arv. 1297 seems to take it for granted that M.'s appearance is alluded to, but then his note reveals that he takes comic ridicule in general to involve faithful exposure of the disreputable.


37. Ussher's notes on both passages suggest that he takes it for granted that the jokes give an impression of L.'s appearance.

38. Lysias 14.25.


40. For Lamachus's early career see Plut. Per. 20.1-2 with Gomme HCT iii pp. 536f.

41. Fr. 106.

42. See the Index of Names for the very remote possibility of an exception.

43. See frs. 169 and 326.

44. Kn. 1267 need not imply anything about jokes in other comedians' work.

45. See my discussion under Ach. 836ff. in ch. 4.

46. See Meiggs and Lewis (1969) p. 188, and Andoc. 1.27 with MacDowell's n.

47. See esp. W. 45f., 418f., 1033f.

48. I note that Phanus, Theorus, Thouphanes and probably Aeschines, all associates of Cleon, are mentioned only in Ar.

49. Hyp. V to Clouds contains the wildly imaginative suggestion that Ar. wrote this play on the orders of Anytus and Meletus!

50. I mention as a suggestive parallel the part played by amateurs in contributing hints, sketches and information for political cartoons in eighteenth-century London. These contributions were sometimes acknowledged on prints, anonymously, and publishers might even invite them: see M. Dorothy George, English Political Caricature (1959), vol. 1 pp. 147f., and Draper Hill, ed., The Satirical Etchings of James Gillray (1976), p. xv.


52. Cf. my discussion of this ode in ch. 4.

53. See Degani (1960) for a detailed but too speculative treatment of Ariphrades and Ar.'s reasons for attacking him.


58. See Dover (1978) pp. 101f. Henderson (1975) p. 52 (cf. pp. 185f.) makes several wild assertions on this subject, for which he does not
produce proper documentation, and in particular I fail to see how or why such a difference in attitudes as he alleges (between "no feelings of disgust or obloquy" in ordinary cases, p. 52, and savage condemnation in that of Ariphrades, pp. 52 and 185) should have been produced by how exclusively one practised cunnilingus.

59. See PA s.n. D.W. Lucas overlooks this important fact in his note on Poetics 58b 31, where he resists the identification that I argue for.

60. Lucas loc. cit. denies this a little hesitantly, but ἐκωμισθένει is hard to take otherwise in this context, and in any case the verb's usual meaning at this date is 'to make fun of in comedy'.

61. See Kn. 1278 and W. 1275ff. Pace D. Nervyn Jones, CO 50 (1956) p. 158, the misconstruction of ἔσος in Kn. 1279 by ed loc. (though the scholia here also contain the correct understanding) does not affect the identification of Ariphrades' brother as Arignotus at W. 1278, unless we doubt that Kn. 1279 implies that Arignotus is a musician.


63. See the schol. ad loc. (= Cratinus fr. 305, with Kock's note).

64. Kn. 1278-80 (where 1278 plays on the etymology of Arignotus's name) and W. 1277f., which I see no reason to suppose with MacDowell ad loc. to be "sarcastic".


66. It would not be surprising if comic poets themselves were sometimes expected to entertain at dinner parties: note Aristophanes' part in the Symposium, together with the role of Philippus (the name of one of Aristophanes' sons) in Xen.'s Symposium. Socrates is quoted at Plut. de lib. educ. 10c as saying that he had been made fun of in Clouds "as at a big symposium".


68. Ruppel (1913) is concerned for the most part with larger elements than personal jokes. Mastromarco (1974) makes some use of jokes in arguing, unconvincingly to my mind, for revisions in W asps in the course of preparation: see e.g. pp. 20ff., 55ff., 97ff. Cf. also Dover (1972) pp. 170-72 and 180ff.

69. Here too the scholiast and some later scholars have taken the joke as an infallible pointer to actual corruption; but the implicit pun makes such an interpretation unnecessary.

70. See Rogers, Wilamowitz and van Daele ad loc., Davies APF p. 404, and MacDowell on Andoc. 1.47. They are in different ways following Σκρ here. Van Leeuwen's naivete on this passage, when he observes that the scholion "bene congruit cum verbis mulierculae nostrae", is astonishing.

72. Davies APF p. 404.
73. 8.54.4.
74. A majority of scholars have denied that Lys. 490-92 has a topical point; e.g. Woodhead AJP 75 (1954) p. 138, Raubitschek AJP 80 (1959) p. 87, and Sommerstein (1977b) p. 114 (the source of the quotation). But the strength of the temptation can be gauged by the fact that even Sommerstein, art. cit. pp. 114ff., tries by a very artificial hypothesis to accommodate his reading of the joke to his knowledge of contemporary events. He suggests that the first assembly in the oligarchic plan may have taken place so recently "as not to allow time for any rewriting of this passage beyond necessary changes of tense and mood" (n. 23); but how long did Ar. need to rewrite a few lines? For the sake of a different argument, on p. 119, S. describes Lys. 490-92 as "a passage that... could easily have been cut"! The topical interpretation still lurks: cf. Westlake (1980) pp. 47-9.
75. Here the connection with Thuc. 8.54.4 (and cf. Peisander's words at 8.53.3) is a real one, as συνήθεαμένου intimates (cf. Thuc. 8.48.2-3, 65.2, 66.1-3, and Kn. 862f.). Note especially τοῦτος (577), indicating the topical immediacy of the reference. I take Lys. 577f. to be a symptom of public rumour and unease at Athens in the period immediately before the oligarchic movement got under way.
76. The numbering of line 640 is misplaced in the Budé edn.
77. Mem. III.1.6.
79. See ζηώς ad loc., with Suda s.v. ὄπερφυκοντιῷς : the siege of Melos; most of the commentators and e.g. Gill (1975) p. 70: the use of siege-engines against Minoa in 427 (cf. Thuc. 3.51.3); Goossens (1946) pp. 50ff. and Taillardat (1965) pp. 305ff.: the surprise landing at Syracuse in the preceding summer (Thuc. 6.64f.).
80. See Plut. Nic. 8.1-2 (Pylos), Suda s.v. μελλοντικόν (Sicilian debate), Rogers and Merry ad loc., Goossens (1946) pp. 56ff., and Taillardat (1965) p. 306. For Nicias's strategy in Sicily, which reports in the assembly will presumably have made familiar, see Thuc. 6.47 and 7.42.3.
82. Phrynichus fr. 22 is remarkably similar to Av. 362f., and comes from the same festival. This helps to suggest that Nicias was very much in the public mind in 414, but the Phrynichus joke itself looks just as open as the two in Birds.
84. Cf. p. 48.
85. Probably not long before the Dionysia, sometime during February: see Aristotle Ath. Pol. 44.4.

86. See Thuc. 8.42.2-4 with Sommerstein (1977b) p. 116.

87. Cf the references to Arginusae at Frogs 33, 48, 190f., (?430) and 693, and the ode on Theramenes at 533ff.

88. Δυσκόμος here, in other words, is equivalent to μελλοντικῶς at Av. 639, in that a suggestion of behaviour over a period of time, but with possible topical overtones, may be meant.

89. In offering this model of two factors I am not forgetting the realm of reputation and rumour, but these can best be understood not so much as an independent factor as a medium in which the other two may be reflected and operate.

90. An early and interesting instance is the claim of Schlegel (1846) p. 149 that historical characters brought onto the stage in Ar. always represent a whole class; likewise Vischer (1877) pp. 463ff.

91. A striking demonstration of this disparity can be found at many points in Murray (1933): see e.g. the contrast drawn on pp. 103f.

92. For some recognition of the tendency of jokes to turn targets into stereotypes see Dover (1972) p. 213, McLeish (1980) pp. 17, 90 and 128.


94. Indeed, the structure of N. 579f., with the name at the start, seems to me to go against the likelihood of a reference to something the audience had previously heard about.

95. Ch. 2, n. 49.

96. See Gomme HCT i. pp. 449f.

97. E.g. Kn. 1030, Thesm. 818.


102. E.g. Nu. 529, 909, with Dover loc. cit.

103. E.g. Thesm. 817.

104. E.g. Thesm. 426 and Men. Sic. 78 with Gomme and Sandbach.


106. For references see MacDowell's note on N. 1187.

107. See Index of Names.

108. It is to be noted that Peisander, who was the subject of gibes about cowardice (Av. 1556f., Eupolis fr. 31), also seems to have been very large: cf. Hermippus fr. 9, Eupolis fr. 182, and the conjunction of Cleonymus and Peisander in C. adesp. 64 (where Kock's uncertainty about identity is unnecessary).
109. It is just possible, in view of Kn. 389f. (and cf. Ach. 664), that something specific about Cleon lies behind the Sausage-seller's threat, but the general comic treatment of Cleon makes this hard to believe (V. 970-72 is another matter).

110. On ἄφθωγος cf. also Mochon 231-51 (Gow), and for a distinction which would have mattered in real life but which Ar. may have dispensed with see Plato Laws 943-4.

111. Sommerstein (1973) p. 43. S. shows some caution in judging the comic picture of Lemachus, but not enough. P. Green, Armoda from Athens (1970) pp. 5f., takes the comic picture at face-value without even admitting that comedy is the source for his description of the general.

112. Apart from a briefly indicated connection with the Acharnians (568) Lemachus is a rather pathetically isolated figure in Ach. (note esp. 620 and the circumstances of his later expedition), a feature of the play which goes right across the grain of any 'war-party' view of L.


114. See Plut. Perp. 6 and Thuc. 5.19.1, 24.2.


116. Henderson (1975) p. 35 is wrong to call κενεύειν a 'proper' word; its virtually invariably comic use (cf. Henderson § 399) gives away its tone: contrast ἀπεναντίαν. Henderson seems unable to make up his mind what the Antisthenes jokes are about: "chronic constipation" (§ 401; likewise Ussher on Eccl. 806-10) or pederasty (!) (p. 102 and § 472, where ἀπεναντία is translated as 'narrow's'). Would Ar.'s audience have found it much easier?

117. On both techniques see ch. 5.

118. See pp. 165f. and 223.


120. S.C.Humphreys, Anthropology and the Greeks (1978) p. 229. She assumes that comedy was aggressively political from the start.


122. See M. Dorothy George op. cit. (n. 50 above) and J. Wardroper, Kings, Lords and Wicked Libellers (1973).

123. Sommerstein overlooks this factor in Barrett and Sommerstein (1978) pp. 9f., where he compares Clouds to a hypothetical "series of satirical shows on television, regularly attacking the same person" (my emphases).
124. For those with unfettered imaginations almost anything can be posited and believed. Stanford, The Sound of Greek (1967) p. 31, claims that the mirth caused by Hegelochus's slip of the tongue "probably helped to drive Euripides into exile soon afterwards" (he had stated the same divination a little more cautiously in his commentary on Frogs 303f.), from which can be inferred the grave moral that "so much could turn on a lapse in the pitch-accent!"

125. Dover on Nu. 552.

126. Pericles' dictum in the funeral speech (Thuc. 2.45.2) is highly relevant to the treatment of women in comedy: its emphasis on the advisable lack of Κιλόσ of any sort is revealing. Also worth mentioning in this connection is the relative scarcity of female names in καλόσ -inscriptions on contemporary vases: see Dover (1978) pp. 114f.

127. I exclude Ach. 457, which I take to be a plainer insult, in paratragic vein.


130. The speaker's vehemence is underlined by the forceful whole-line description of the target (cf. Ach. 705, Av. 14, Lys. 397, and compare the ironic appellations at Soph. Trach. 541, 1105f.), and also by the striking suspension of υπό at the end of 386, which is perhaps meant to suggest an artificial or rhetorical hesitation before the outburst. The closest analogy I can find to this latter feature is Μ. 504f.: compare also Men. Georg. 26, 69, Samia 36, 235, Machon 324f. Prepositions normally occur at line-end in Ar. only in anastrophe: e.g. Lys. 1145, Frogs 1244, Eccl. 4.

131. See Hsch., Phot., Suda s.v.

132. A third interpretation was proposed by Ruck (1975). He rejects the notion that social status is relevant on the grounds that "Athens was an egalitarian society" where jokes about class could not be made (p.15)! His own sexual/religious interpretation is a tissue of too many false arguments to be unravelled here, and his conclusions seem in any case to differ from place to place: compare pp. 16, 29, 31 and 32. I am utterly unconvinced by his article.

133. See Nu. 555 with Eupolis fr. 194, and Nu. 557 with Hermippus frs. 8 and 10.


135. I mention here the astonishingly perverse theory of Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 3 (1969) p. 385 n. 3, that Xanthippus at Nu. 64 is an allusion to Socrates' wife Xanthippe. For one thing, Guthrie
absurdly infers that Xanthippe was well-known from scenes in Plato and Xenophon involving small numbers of acquaintances. And then there is the fact that the name at Nu. 64 is masculine and chosen by Strepsiades' wife — and, one should add, before any mention of Socrates in the play. Guthrie's "One can only guess why Aristophanes did not make her the wife of Socrates himself" speaks for itself.
Choral Satire

At the start of their first ode after reconciliation the combined chorus of the Lysistrata make an emphatic announcement to their audience:

\[ \text{\textit{Ow paraskewasteis de tov pelion eulon, oloiphos, flairophs elpein oude ev. (1043-5)}} \]

A similar proclamation is delivered by the female chorus of Theseus at the height of their celebration of the Nastiades:

\[ \text{\textit{Ei de nis prosdeki kakos elpein ev ierw moulik m'avon xexes, our questh apev}(962-4)} \]

Both plays were written and produced against a background of severe social and political unrest at Athens, and these two passages allow us a glimpse of Aristophanes' recognition of the need in these exceptional conditions to avoid injudicious personal satire or criticism, of which there is indeed less in these two plays than in any of the other extant works except Plutus. Even so, Aristophanes is not being entirely ingenuous in either place; he could simply, in the dangerous circumstances of the time, have chosen his material carefully, so as to avoid topically sensitive areas. The recognition of possible danger must have been real enough, for both plays do seem to bear out the chorus's message; but Aristophanes has signalled it to his audience in a way which was probably meant to be savoured in itself, at least by more knowing spectators, even if it did have a rather bitter tang. What is clear, however, and significant for my purposes is that in both the cited passages the chorus suggest, implicitly in the first and explicitly in the second, that they are disappointing a reasonable expectation. We can discern here a paradoxical testimony to the strength of one of the major functions of the Aristophanic chorus, the provision of entertainment, and sometimes of apparently serious comment, by means of the satirical treatment of individuals. Although there is much material of this kind outside choral passages, it is hardly conceivable
that an Aristophanic protagonist should declare an intention not to indulge in such an activity. It makes sense for choruses to do this not because there is a greater quantity of choral satire than non-choral but because such satire is an essential and characterising feature of the Aristophanic chorus in general (and passages like Ach. 628 and 1150 intimate the sense of a continuity between the choruses of different plays, despite changes in dramatic identity) and also because choral satire tends to be elaborated in more detail, inviting, by the manner of its delivery and the prominence of its exposition in the interstices of the drama, a more direct attention, than does much of the personal satire found in the flow of dialogue. Horace therefore had a point, even if the accompanying historical picture was false, when he chose to crystallise Old Comedy's 'ius nocendi' as a function of the chorus.

I have divided up this chapter by a formal criterion into sections covering particular kinds of choral passage, but in an effort to define something of the essential quality of choral satire I have put my main emphasis on the more extended forms. When the other characters go out of view and the action of the drama moves to a location which the audience cannot see, it is only the chorus which remains to engage and interest the spectators, and it is at these points that they have full scope to provide satirical entertainment and that this entertainment shows its dominant tendency away from the defined world and immediate concerns of the play towards the realms of independent amusement. It was this tendency as much as anything else, I believe, which may have led to the fourth-century separation of drama and chorus in comedy. Some of the Aristophanic odes which I examine later in this chapter may give us the best clue we have to the kind of entertainment which fourth-century choruses supplied at those points where our manuscripts or editors offer XOFoy. Outside the clearly marked sections of interlude, however, the chorus's satirical functions in Aristophanes are much less distinctive, and although some regularities or tendencies can be noted it would yield a spurious satisfaction to pretend
to discern special patterns. In including observations on some of these other passages, therefore, my concern is as much with general features and issues which crop up elsewhere in this thesis as with peculiarly choral aspects, for when the chorus is closely involved with the moving action of the play its jokes about individuals often serve the same purposes as those of other characters.

Parodoi: I consider in this section only jokes which are made by the chorus in the main entrance song or recitation itself, not those which occur later on in what we might still want technically to call the parodos. The value of this approach is that it enables us to focus on a coherent if small group of references, each of which forms an important part of the characterisation of the chorus as it first appears. Because of their position these jokes all have a close connection with the physical action as well as the aim or mood of the entering chorus. The context of purposeful intention and movement has therefore to be kept in mind: unlike most of the other choral satire we shall consider, these passages are not incidental entertainment but stem from the immediate situation of the chorus.

At Kn. 254 the reference to Eucrates is fully integrated into the Knights' vivacious display of animus. By the start of 253 the chorus's movements, recognisable as aggressive equestrian manoeuvres (note 243–6, the war-cries at 247 and 251, and the force of the trochaic rhythm), must have reached the stage where all possible routes of escape for the Paphlagonian are covered, and indeed some physical contact, at least mimetically represented, should occur (τῷ πτομαί, 257). The joke accompanies and gives bite to the completion of the first stage of the attack, but it also expresses a particular political spirit behind the careful strategy. Eucrates is not simply a diverting illustration of how to escape from a tight corner; his case is supposedly that of a political leader who managed to evade the opposition of a group of Knights or similar opponents, and it must make sense to imagine Cleon taking to an equivalent political 'flight'.
I see no value in pursuing speculations about just what sort of event in Eucrates' career is here alluded to, but it is necessary to observe that the joke may be of a tendentious kind. We need not, in other words, posit something to which the situation in Knights would closely correspond; a retirement from politics (Ar. fr. 100 sheds some light on the notion), without any obvious scandal, might have provided a sufficient background for the joke, especially since the nub of the humour seems to lie in ζυγοῦ τῶν καρπίων, and this phrase combines an allusion to the target's commercial connections with a proverbial expression of the sort found at Υ. 1310. It should be noted that a slight pause would be natural and comically effective after ξεκυψα, a fact which reduces even further any need to extract historical facts from the line.

An analogous historical issue is raised by Υ. 240–44, and I have already dealt with it in an earlier chapter. It is the joke's dramatic function which I want to highlight here. These lines help to mark a change in the mood and behaviour of the entering chorus. There has been nothing of the predicted wasp-likeness about their entry up to this point; they are slow and disorganised, old and nostalgic. But with this compound joke (part against the intended target, part ironically mediated through the jurors' reverence for Cleon) there is a new note of urgency and a change in movement, though the latter need be nothing much more than a quickening of step or even just some busy gesturing to that effect from the leader. The comic exploration of the jurors' infirmity is not yet complete, but Aristophanes is making sure that the audience do not forget who these old men are and where they are going. The reference to Laches should be compared with Philocleon's άλλη έκψηνετ' Αρκοντίδης; at 157. Both reveal a wilful disposition to condemn in their phrasing: note especially the presumably colloquial relish of έσκα at 240, and the reliance on pre-trial hearsay in the following line. Cleon's patronage of the jurors has already been signalled at 133f. and 197. The term κυνεκυψα now adds a fresh colour to it, but the intimacy of the word is belied by the spiteful-
ness both of their own attitude to the forthcoming trial and of Cleon's leadership. As well, then, as satirically exaggerating the current antipathy between Cleon and Laches, this joke serves nicely to characterise the underlying temperament of the jurors: as they enter in their pathetic state they hanker after the military strength of their younger days, and when they remind themselves of their destination their imagery gives away the fact that life in the courts, at least when Cleon is involved, is a surrogate military service for them.

The chorus's entry in Peace is much more even in tone, and the gibe at Lamachus at 304 fits perfectly in their mood of joy. Although the chorus is conceived of as Panhellenic at this point (292, 302), this joke is for the appreciation of an audience of Athenians who have fought in the war. The sentiment crystallised in μ.ολαχες, it should be stated, is just as readily intelligible as the disdain of soldiers for those who can no longer command them as it is (what most historians would like it to be) a faithful indication of Lamachus's personal attitude to the war. The preceding lines (302f.), which pick up Trygaeus's words in 293 and are reminiscent of 269f., where Lamachus is also singled out as the symbol of what is detested in the ordinary man's experience of military service, help to confirm that there is no particular political animus against the man himself. For a fuller but more realistically generalised exposition of the kind of satirical feeling hinted at in these passages we need only turn to Peace 1172-90. If, as there is some reason to believe, Lamachus had an independent reputation for military boldness or fierceness, it would be naïve to suppose that this must have been combined with a political inclination to belligerence. The Lamachus of Ach., who does look uncompromising (620-22; but contrast 1077ff.), is to be treated with caution as historical evidence, not least because he is used as the main vehicle for an attitude to war which the play suggests that the city as a whole is committed to.

The personal jokes at Lys. 270 and 283 both occur at emphatic points in the old men's entry song. The first forms the climax of the exhortation
to action delivered by the leader (compare the jokes from Kn. and 
above). It translates the men's feelings of aggression into a personally vindictive form, and its comic force would be bolstered by its prominence at the very end of the long sentence, a rolling iambic section, 266-70. But although the joke is integrated into the chorus's dramatic purpose at this point, it perhaps has a diverting piquancy which is not to be found in the other jokes collected in this section: as well as implying that Rhodia is the most scandalous of Athenian women, the reference suggests that the old men are not properly informed about what is happening on the Acropolis, but are nonetheless quick to run together in their minds two different notions of female misbehaviour (Aristophanes parodies a similar piece of psychological behaviour in the proboulos's opening speech, 387ff.).

The second joke, at 283, coincides with the return of the men's thoughts and attention from their nostalgic and inaccurate reminiscences to the surrounding crisis: it must be accompanied by at least a gesture of emphasis on ταξινομεῖα, if not by a more striking movement. In this case the integration of the subject of the joke into the chorus's sentiment is not conceptual but purely formal, managed with an economy made possible by the familiarity of the phrase into which the name is interpolated. The burlesque effect is of course very similar to Thesm. 337.

Miscellaneous inter-scenic comments: I consider in this section a group of jokes which do not neatly fit into my other, more uniform categories. Two rough but related divisions may be seen, however, within the untidiness of the group: on the one hand, between those jokes which come from a chorus closely involved, sometimes even physically, in the action of the play and those from more detached observers; and, on the other hand, between comments or reflections which are more or less relevant to the dramatic situation and those which constitute a brief distraction from it. The first member in both these pairs of antitheses points in the direction of the parodos jokes discussed above, while the second is closer to the
typically diversionary satire provided in the odes and parabases on which I comment in the later sections of this chapter.

**Ach. 299-301**: This joke presents an unusual combination of features, though not quite of the kind normally imagined. The expression of hatred is dramatically motivated and appropriate, fitting in well with the rest of the Acharnians' display of an uncompromising character. But the orthodox view is that this dramatic point is overridden by a prospective reference to *Knights*, so much so that what we are really being offered is "an unusually clumsy aside." This orthodoxy should be displaced. Whatever Aristophanes himself may have had in mind, he cannot have intended the words to suggest a future play to his audience, and unless we believe that he included lines with an entirely private meaning we need to find some other way of taking the passage. The lack of any historical justification for the choice of Cleon as a target by the Acharnians is not in itself problematic, provided that a different justification can be discerned. I believe that the necessary element is an authorial one, but that it has nothing immediately to do with *Knights*. What is likely to have sprung to the minds of the first audience of *Ach.* was the playwright's own recent clash with Cleon, and the antipathy which had been portrayed between the politician and the Knights in *Babyloniens*, for which our evidence is the well-known passage at *Ach.* 5-8. The controversy that had followed the production of *Babyloniens* must have helped to keep the play in people's memories and to spread familiarity with its details. Aristophanes had deliberately introduced a reference in the opening lines of *Ach.* to the play which had caused all the trouble, and in such a way as to suggest that he was ready to fight back against Cleon. Against this background I feel that *Ach.* 299-301 would be immediately intelligible as a sentiment which combined a relevant dramatic point with an allusion to the poet's own experiences during the past year. There is nothing necessarily clumsy about this, since the brevity of the passage and the maintenance of the dramatic situation allows the authorial significance of the words to be
taken in economically, to be heard as overtones. The technique involved
is akin to the one employed at Kn. 400f., though in this later passage the
chorus speak more from the side-lines, albeit with commitment, and the joke
carries us momentarily further away from the dramatic situation than at
Ach. 299-301. But in both places Aristophanes is to some extent drawing on
the conventional capacity of the chorus to speak from different points of
view and in different identities. At Kn. 400f. a double shift occurs:
firstly from the dramatically pertinent asseveration of hatred to the
self-consciousness of the theatrical chorus; and secondly from the perform­
ance of comedy to that of tragedy, after καὶ διδακτο═κόμην had seemed to prepare
us for a further reference to a rival (Cratinus was competing with Knights).
The economical play with the confusion between the world of the drama and
the theatrical performance is analogous to Xanthias's joke at Frogs 12-14.

Ach. 389f.: A difference of fine shading distinguishes this from 299-301.
The chorus can here easily be understood as unambivalently intending the
whole force of the remark, and it is legitimate to characterise its tone
as sarcastic hyperbole or something similar: note ξυσύνυνάληκλη, 'for all
I care'. This slightly less aggressive attitude goes with the fact that
the Acharnians have since 346 retired somewhat from the immediate confront­
atation with Dicaeopolis into the role of observers (at 299 they are surround­
ning and attacking, by 385ff. they have withdrawn to allow an arena for the
protagonist's chopping-block speech) and their remarks are now more of an
entertaining commentary. Even here, however, the chorus's choice of personal
target may not be entirely free of theatrical overtones: if this
Hieronymus really was a dithyrambic poet (Σ Νμ. 348), it will not have been
for his hair alone that Aristophanes picked him out and expected his
audience to be familiar with him.

σ. 342: The jurors' abusive description of Bdelucleon utilises a technique
about which I shall say more in the final chapter. A degree of dramatic
intelligibility is preserved by the evident indignation, but the choice of appellation is inadvertently self-satirising. There is nothing "over-subtle" about this: when someone says something which goes against the grain of his known affiliations, and irony is out of the question, no fine percipience is required to see the comic point. The possibility that Δημοτικός could mean 'an inferior Cleon' is hardly to be reckoned with. The two halves of Aristophanic compounds of this sort are usually meant to complement one another (e.g. Κν. 18, Β. 466, 592, Άν. 639) and it is almost inconceivable that Cleon's name and Δημοτικός could be felt to pull in opposite directions, given the politician's comic image; whatever the normal force of Δημοτικός, the combination here is surely mutually defining.

¶ 409: It is worth noting briefly how Aristophanes here employs a joke of the type illustrated in my previous section, and how this fact is a symptom of the peculiar character of the chorus. Although I earlier cited ¶ 240-44 as a parodos joke which marks an injection of life and purpose into the chorus's entry, the parodos as a whole in this play exploits an unusual ambiguity in the chorus's nature. Their true nature is at first latent, overlayed by the superficial ineffectufulness of old age. At 404ff. this latent waspishness, with all its χολή, suddenly bursts out, and the joke at 409 functions as a sharp indication of the transformation, picking up the earlier momentary thought of Cleon at 242-4. Aristophanes has avoided one obvious kind of parodos, in which the Wasps would rush in aggressively to rescue Philocleon, and substituted a more complex portrayal of the chorus's dual nature: personal jokes make a marginal but interesting contribution to the unfolding of the portrayal.

¶ 418f., 466, 475: For convenience I consider these three jokes together, since all are contained in vocative or exclamatory expressions of partisan sentiment. Comic elements show up well in grand or emotional exclamations,
prayers etc., because of the large disparity of tone that they create.

Aristophanic choruses are particularly fond of lengthy and elaborate vocative phrases. As a general stylistic feature this no doubt owes something to the conventions of lyric and tragic poetry, but we need always to be on the watch in comedy for an effect of comic inflation rather than actual elevation, and this is evidently what we have to deal with in the three passages of *Wasps* in question. Part of the disparity between the superficial show of grandiosity or vehemence and the resulting tone is due to the dramatic setting: at W. 418f. the old men have just stripped to reveal their wasp costumes and are now gathering to launch an assault on the figure of Bdelucleon, who is clutching the suspended Philocleon; and both 466 and 475 belong to the indignation which follows on their swift and rather humiliating defeat. The language of impassioned political rhetoric grates comically on the bizarre physical facts of the situation. In each case the personal reference heightens the absurdity. At 418f. the effect is pungently blatant; as at 342 the chorus are made to betray their own cause unwittingly, giving away the true nature of the leaders whom they purport to admire and depend on. Even more obviously than at 342 the self-satire is mediated through a disparity between form and content, with the intention to be portentous being ridiculously undermined by the escape of an unfortunate truth, precisely as at Ach. 88f. The comic mode at W. 466 is less bold, and less of the humour is directed against the chorus themselves. Even so, I think that the force of their choice of target is meant to be less compelling than the emphasis of the two compounds would seem to indicate. I doubt whether *κομικόμως* can sustain a precise political point of view, which is what the chorus's argument in the context requires for proper justification. As Amynias is elsewhere satirised for arrogance (W. 1267) and has been the subject earlier in the play of a suggestion of raffishness (W. 74-6), and since Bdelucleon's behaviour smacks to the poor chorus of the haughtiness of the higher social classes,
it is sufficient if Amynias is taken vaguely as a representative of aristocratic wilfulness, though this is certainly the sort of joke which leaves open the possibility of different shades of interpretation for different members of an audience. What I am essentially suggesting, however, is that we should not treat this reference in isolation from the wider comic tone of the passage in which it is set, where the absurd bandying of terms such as τοχούννις, μασσιαντίαι, μονοφαξία reflects comically on the chorus's wild naïveté. There is a similar element in the third of this trio of personal jokes, at \( \pi. \; 475 \). Brasidas is the only contemporary Spartan mentioned in the extant plays of Aristophanes, though some earlier figures are referred to. Jokes against leading enemy personages, a feature of popular war-time satire in other ages, do not seem to have appealed to the authors of Old Comedy, and we certainly cannot explain this fact in terms of ignorance on the audience's part: the names of Spartan kings and military leaders must have been familiar from discussions in the assembly, and will have circulated in the stories told by men who had served abroad. The plain significance of Brasidas's name at \( \pi. \; 475 \) and Peace 640 is patent (Brasidas did not need to be named at Peace 281-4), and Aristophanes inserts it in a context which relies on a popular stereotype of Spartan life. Yet the inappropriate fervour with which the chorus allege this particular set of associations against Bdelucleon (note the reaction in 477f.) cannot be ignored, and as in the preceding cases the joke combines a piece of personal satire with a contribution to the portrayal of the speakers.

Pease 395: Peisander, like Lomachus at Peace 304 or Brasidas at \( \pi. \; 475 \), is here used to give a sharp personal characterisation to a cause which is much larger than him. But this satirical process of concentration is more than a succinct convenience; it is a popular pretence or evasion, shifting responsibility which in fact attaches to many different acts and decisions onto a particular, easily identifiable target. The appeal of this mentality where a war sustained by democratic votes is concerned should be
obvious, though what would be much harder to ascertain is how far the satisfaction derivable from such humour need be correlated with the attitudes held and acknowledged in public life. In Peisander's case, at any rate, the comic character of the miniature portrait does not seem to bespeak any strong animus. \( \chi\alpha\rho\omicron \) are obviously evocative of military pomp and swagger, intimating the special multiple crest of a commander whose outfit may belie his true nature. Lamachus has a triple crest at Ach. 965 and 1109, as does the typical taxarch at Peace 1173. The image of \( \iota\pi\tau\omicron\alpha\kappa\lambda\iota\kappa\tau\omicron\omicron \nu \) applied to military officers in this last passage (1177f.) and at Ay. 800 depends perhaps above all on the cock's crest. Eyebrows are coupled with crests at Frogs 925, in Euripides' description of Aeschylus's \( \epsilon\iota\mu\acute{a}m\pi \chi \ldots \beta\acute{e}i\alpha \). This passage of Frogs is relevant to the discernment of a nuance at Peace 395 which the commentators have overlooked. There is no doubt that the importance of eyebrows in various facial expressions had been exploited in comedy even before Aristophanes for the purpose of portraying the ethos of a personality or a style of behaviour, but it is not easy to see what kind of temperament ought to be suggested by the combination of crests and eyebrows. However, comparison of Peace 395 with Ach. 566ff., Peace 473f. and Frogs 924f. gives some ground for supposing that a connection between a \( \mu\alpha\gamma\omicron\upsilon \) and eyebrows and crests may be involved. The nature of the connection is clearest at Frogs 925, where the \( \mu\alpha\gamma\omicron\upsilon \) is imagined as a creature with large eyebrows and crests (the latter presumably standing for a mass of hair). In the passages where Lamachus is concerned the use of a gorgon or similar bogey as an emblem on his shield is certainly pertinent (see esp. Ach. 574) but \( \gamma\omicron\rho\gamma\omicron\alpha\lambda\omicron\phi\omicron \) (Ach. 567) is sufficient to show that this is not the whole comic picture: Lamachus himself is to some extent presented as a frightening larger-than-life creature, and \( \mu\alpha\gamma\omicron\upsilon \) is sufficient to show that this is not the whole comic picture: Lamachus himself is to some extent presented as a frightening larger-than-life creature, and at Peace 474, where I do not believe there is any explicitly visual reinforcement of the joke, need not be restricted to a reference to the man's shield. If it were possible to specify the appearance of a \( \mu\alpha\gamma\omicron\upsilon \), Frogs 925 suggests that something on the lines of
a gorgon, with huge eyes and therefore huge eyebrows and a striking mass of hair, would give the appropriate picture. The term μαγιουκέων for a type of comic mask is worth a mention here, since the exaggeration of features on the mask is presumably the reason for this use of the word, and the features likely to be exaggerated to produce something that could be considered frightening are the eyes and hair. I think that the group of passages I mentioned above at least supply some evidence for an association of images in Aristophanes' mind, and I would more tentatively propose that at Peace 395 the combination of crests and eyebrows may have overtones of the appearance of a weird bogey such as the μαγιω.'

Peace 950-55: It is simply on account of its brevity that I include this joke here and not with other interlude odes in the final section of the chapter, though in fact it is similar to some of those longer odes in its function. The chorus's reference to Chairis is ostensibly tied to the immediate dramatic situation, but of course it contributes nothing of significance to it. Its function is just to create a brief moment of humour to cover the interval in which the sheep is brought out from the skene. It might therefore be considered as standing in the same relation to its context as, say, Ach. 836ff. does to its. But the critical fact which does distinguish these two passages is that Peace 950ff. does not constitute a complete break in the action of the play. The stage is not emptied, and the preceding exit of the slave to fetch the victim creates the expectation of a speedy reentry. What the chorus say at 950 itself indicates that the action is not really being suspended, and whatever the manner of delivery used for a short strophe such as this it is doubtful whether any substantial choreography would be involved. So despite the comically diversionary function of the joke, the dramatic setting remains too much in view for this passage to be classified with those interlude odes which are precisely characterised by the way in which they distract attention away from the world of the drama. The reference to Chairis at
Av. 858 is in this respect closer to Peace 950ff. than to the longer interlude odes. It too covers a brief gap in the action while something is fetched from the skene, and although I think it is meant to give the cue for a short musical diversion, the link with the movements of the protagonist remains too tight for a proper interlude to be felt.

Lys. 621: This joke is of an incidental kind which could occur anywhere in a play, though it is here reinforced by its position at the end of a phrase which in this lyric context could receive more emphasis than would normally be possible in an iambic passage, and if I am right about the construction of the joke it is likely that a carefully designed delivery would have been used to catch the point. The sentiments of the whole strophe up to this point are political, and until the words εἰς κλεισθὲντος the impression is clearly of a political suspicion. The personal reference need not entirely change this impression, especially if Cleisthenes were known as a political figure, but two factors, the standing comic reputation of the man and the obvious allusion to it in the following mention of women in his house, strongly encourage the belief that Aristophanes intends the joke to cause an unexpected shift in the movement of thought from a political to a sexual line - though it is only a momentary diversion, and the strophe returns at the end to a clear image of conspiracy. By comic logic Cleisthenes would be a natural go-between for the Spartans and the women of Athens, and it might even be legitimate to sense a sexual connection between Cleisthenes and the Spartans, as well as between him and the women. The humourous thought is here rather compressed, but this would not be a difficulty if, as I have suggested, the choral delivery were careful enough to allow time for it to operate. It is interesting and significant that Aristophanes should in 411 have allowed his chorus to develop a reference to conspiracy, only to use it as the basis for a sexual gibe of this sort.

Thesm. 440-42: I include this joke here and not with interlude odes because
it would be tendentious to claim that the personal reference is the raison d'être of the whole strophe, as it certainly is in the somewhat similar ode at Frogs 533ff., where the joke, once we get to it, gives a richer comic meaning to what has preceded. Thesm. 440-42 is, by contrast, only a flourish to give the song an extra bite. But what sort of bite is it?

Some might infer that Xenocles "had a reputation as a clever orator". This would make the reference equivalent to Peace 1032 or Av. 692, so that Xenocles would be a genuine standard of measurement. But a considerable reputation would be necessary to allow this sort of humour to be spun out of it, and the treatment of Xenocles elsewhere in comedy certainly gives no hint of such a rhetorical standing. I believe, rather, that the joke involves a curious irony. Xenocles is not a particularly obvious choice and there may be some humour intended in this comparison itself, but the way the chorus proceed after naming him is unusual:  ἐθνήν ἔχων μὲν ἔτι  ἐνιόρθωσενἥγησαν

is clearly cautious, yet what it thus sets up seems to be an unimaginative punch. If this is not just a case of feeble composition (though could Aristophanes really not have thought of something more incisive?) the point must lie, I think, in the very simplicity of the ultimate dismissal: having picked out Xenocles as an apparently major exponent of the art of rhetoric, the women eventually just brush him aside. It is interesting that the earlier joke about Xenocles in this same play, at 169, also relies on a colloquially simple expression of rejection, though there the bluntness is unqualified by any irony, a difference to which the use of the patronymic in the second but not in the first passage is relevant.

Parabases: As is the case in those interlude odes of incidental satire which I examine in the final section of this chapter, the frequency and prominence of personal jokes in the parabases of the extant plays is essentially tied up with the fact that here the chorus directly address the audience, the action of the drama fades out of view, and contact between the imagined world of the play and the contemporary world of the
audience is at its closest: at these points the sense of comic performance as an event in a general gathering of the community, shared by the actors with the crowd sitting round them, is at its strongest. It makes little difference to the possibilities of a peculiarly direct kind of satire that the chorus sometimes preserves a layer of its dramatic identity, for what matters is the way in which their comments now have to be explicitly related to the real polis of the spectators. In the extant plays personal jokes occur most frequently in the anapaests or parabasis proper, and roughly equally in the other sections; but there is no significant pattern in this distribution, and given the nature of the parabasis we should not expect to find one. A further general factor of some importance is the scope afforded by the parabasis for lengthy and detailed jokes; there is more room for imaginative satirical colour than is usual in dialogue. Personal references are naturally produced by the chorus to support or illustrate the arguments which are conventionally offered in the parabasis, but even where the purpose is supposedly to make a serious point or advance a real cause, the indulgence in extravagant imagery and coarse irreverence often suggests that the primary aim is really racy entertainment in the special spirit of festival ἀπελευθέρωσις. The way in which the chorus may preface a section with talk of dispensing responsible criticism or praise (Ach. 676, Kn. 565, 595, Nu. 576, W. 1016, Thesm. 785, 830) should not be allowed to disguise the frequently flippant or inconsequential nature of what they go on to say, and it has been insufficiently remarked by those who wish to make much of references to the traditional right of the poet, and on his behalf the chorus, to teach and exhort that the finest criterion we have of the tone in which such references are made is the substance of the putative advice itself. The extant plays of Aristophanes, furthermore, lend some plausibility to the hypothesis that the parabasis was becoming a more lightweight entertainment in the later fifth century, before it dropped out of use altogether. One of my main aims in the particular
observations I make below is to show how personal jokes can help us to understand the tone of the parabatic arguments which give them their contexts. Although parabases have received much attention from Aristophanic scholars, the material in them has too often been taken at face-value. I hope to give here some indication of the kind of comic thought which they characteristically contain.

Before proceeding to the individual plays, it may be worthwhile to set out briefly the main categories of joke involved:

(a) Jokes against the poet's rivals, especially in *Kn.* and *Nu.* These are evidently related to the occasions of first performance, and may have been traditional. The references to Carcinus, Morsimus and Melanthius in the strophe and antistrophe of Peace could be regarded as a sub-species of this category.

(b) Jokes against the poet's enemies: a special category for Cleon, who comes into the parabasis of each of the first five plays.

(c) Jokes about the enemies of the chorus in their dramatic role: see especially *Ach.* and *Thesm.,* but cf. also e.g. *Kn.* 608–10 and *Nu.* 586.

(d) Incidental jokes, unrelated to chorus or playwright: see especially *Avt.* 762ff., 790ff., *Frogs* 679ff., 706ff.

*Acharnians:* The satirical material in this parabasis falls neatly into categories (b) and (c) above, but it is relatively unusual in that it is closely related to some prominent themes found in the body of the play. The gibe at Cleon brings to a climax the series of references to the politician and the trouble over *Babylonians* in the first half of the play (5–8, 299–301, 377ff., 502ff.), and the treatment of the class of young forensic orators ties in with the general portrayal of young dishonest Athenian office-holders in the assembly scene and at 599ff. Moreover, these two themes are themselves connected: as the anapaests show, it is for exposing the chicanery of ambassadors, among other things, that Aristophanes has been accused of *κυματιζόν τὴν πόλιν* by Cleon and others. The author has
continued to explore this area in Ach., and the parabasis offers a compound justification by combining a defiant reply to Cleon with a sustained attack on unscrupulous wielders of power. Some detailed points of contact between the parabasis and other scenes may be noted: deception by ambassadors (114 ~ 634-40), gullibility of Athenian audiences (κωντικτοτκος, 104-6, ~ κωνικτικτοτκος, 635), flattery of Athens (144 ~ 370-73 ~ 636ff.). But the intricacy of the pattern of ideas running through the play does not detract from the independently intelligible satirical liveliness of the parabasis.

Cleon is in sight throughout the anapaests of Ach., though Aristophanes perhaps gives the impression deliberately that he is shying away from a direct confrontation, until the pnigos: 630 in particular suggests a wider criticism and hostility than that of Cleon alone, and the whole section is addressed to audience and polis in a manner which implies that the poet is fighting against a general reaction to Babylonians. Although the specific initiative against him may well have been a personal one of Cleon's, 1284ff. makes it likely that Aristophanes felt a little let down by a lack of public support, and I suspect that the rather pointed emphasis of ηχοκιμλοτκος and ματακιμλοτκος, Ach. 630-32, intimates his feelings about a change of attitude between the occasion of performance (when Bab. may have come first) and his arraignment by Cleon. It is safe, at any rate, to assume that the audience were aware throughout the anapaests of Ach. that Aristophanes was defending himself with a particular view to the politician's attack on him, and this adds force to the way in which the direct reference to Cleon is held back for the pnigos. It is not until the extravagantly humorous positive claims have been made for the poet's work that the implicit rebuttal is made explicit. Of all the Aristophanic jokes which occur at the end and climax of a passage few if any carry quite the cumulative weight of this one. The parabatic pnigos usually contains a sharp comic point of some sort, but this is the only one in the extant plays with a personal joke. The crude gesture towards Cleon crowns the preceding
argument, but on top of this the pnigos itself moves from a paratragic opening, through a reiteration of the claim of τὸ δικαίων (see esp. 500f., 645, 655), to an ultimate explosion of abuse. The spirit of ἀκαταπάμμινυν is one of pure indulgence in free vilification and name-calling: although weakened by generalisation, the sexual specificity of κοτφοτμήνυν had not been completely lost (cf. Kn. 639, Thesm. 200) and it is preferable to see some shade of it here. But nowhere else in the extant plays is Cleon subjected to a gibe of homosexual character; so despite the serious implications of the issues on which the anapaests touch, Aristophanes finally resorts to his licensed comic resources to answer Cleon, rather than attempting a coherent defence. Nor does this crude satirical thrust seem to me to be out of tune with the spirit of what has preceded, for behind the discursive lines of the argument there is little more than a mock assertion of comic freedom.

The antepirrhema of Ach. does not simply continue the theme of the epirrhema and antode; it picks up points and ideas that have already been mentioned, but now translates them into a personal and topical form: notice the verbal connections, τοῦτο πῶς ἔκαστο (692) ~ τῷ γὰρ ἔκαστο (703), ἀπολέσω (692) ~ ἔργολεσβω (704), ἀπομομφεσίμενον (695) ~ ἀπομομφεσίμην (706), κυκών (688) ~ κυκύμενον (707). Euathlus is to be taken as the main target of the whole passage, 703–12. This necessitates acceptance of Hamaker's emendation Κήφοσίμημοι in 705; if we keep R's Κήφοςιμήμω we have an unsignalled change of target between 705 and 706. The image of Scythian/Τοῦτος, which is also applied to Euathlus in fr. 411, binds the lines together (704, 707, 711f.). Besides, ἄτροχῳ ἄτῳ πατέρος (712) fits well with a recent use of the patronymic, and it makes obvious sense for the father to be brought into the picture of allegedly foreign and servile origins. But I think that the patronymic at 705 serves another purpose: it allows Euathlus to be referred to without the use of his own name, which can thus be reserved for the sarcastic pun in 710. The joint involvement of father
and son may mean that Aristophanes is perpetuating an old slur on the family analogous to the case of Acestor discussed in chapter one. It is interesting that the scholiast on 705 asserts of Cephisodemus, whom his text makes the main target of the joke, \( \text{\‘Αθηναος εἰς καὶ \text{τύτως} \) . This is a very unusual contradiction of the allegation made in a joke, and it is likely that there was some specific reason for it, most probably a reference preserved in the Καμιδανύκενα or elsewhere showing Cephisodemus involved in a political activity restricted to citizens. The scholia being what they are, it is less likely to rest on the commonsense observation that whoever is meant in 705 is called a \( \text{ξυνήυρος} \) and therefore cannot in reality have been of patently non-Athenian birth.

The brief reference to Alcibiades in 716 adds the coup de grâce to the chorus's portrayal of the city's young advocates and politicians. Part of the punch in the phrase used to describe Alcibiades is due to the abrupt shift from the general and impersonal expression of 715 to a blunt ad hominem completion of the antithesis. Although the abusiveness of the description may look rather arbitrary, it does in fact tie up with comic economy the whole of the preceding argument. \( \lambda\lambda\lambda\lambda\sigma \) in 716, as at 705, is often used in Aristophanes to depict the slick, ruthless world of clever speakers or poets, and in such cases it is inadequate to translate by the conventional 'gabbling' or the like: it is strongly associated with sophistic 'modern' culture and probably has something of the force of 'smooth talking' (cf. e.g. Kn. 1375–81, Nu. 931, 1053, 1394, Frogs 89–91, 1069ff., 1491ff., Eupolis fr. 95). The combination \( \text{ευρύπερκτος καὶ \‘λαλος} \) therefore suggests a stereotype of Athenian satire: the clever young political figure whose career is promoted by passive homosexuality (see esp. Eccl. 112–14 for the popularly cynical association (note \( \lambda\gamma\upsilon\alpha\upsilon\zeta \) between rhetorical ability and buggery).

Knights: In this the most overtly political of his plays Aristophanes
makes the parabasis a diversion from the torrid disputes for demagogic supremacy that lie on either side of it, and it is to matters purely theatrical that he devotes most of the anapaests. Cleon cannot be entirely neglected, however, and the one parabatic reference to him (574 alludes to his supposed influence) is placed near the start. Though this is the shortest treatment of the politician in any of the parabases of the 420's plays, it is not the slightest; indeed, it is the only parabasis in which the struggle against Cleon is really represented as anything more than a personal feud, as an opposition that can be related to a wider political context, and it is surely very unlikely that Aristophanes would offer this explicit political justification of his use of a chorus of Knights unless he had a genuine foundation for it. ματια (510) recalls the declarations of hatred for Cleon made by the chorus at 226 and 400; λέγειν τά δίκαια (510) was a recurring theme in the first part of Ach., both in the defence of Dicaeopolis' peace-treaty (317, 373, 500f., 561f.) and in the apologia for the poet in the parabasis (645, 655, 661); γεύσις (511), with combined social and political associations, is the adverb used by the Knights of their own patriotic behaviour later in this same parabasis (577) and by Aristophanes at Nu. 532 for the fitting 'upbringing' which his cultured audience gave to Banqueters (cf. Frogs 356), and in the present line it suggests well-bred courage and political principle in the face of the monstrous uncouthness of Cleon. Yet it has to be said that despite the suggestive terms in which Aristophanes indicates his alignment with the Knights, he chooses to avoid developing his political position in any detail at this point, though it was open to him to do so. When we consider this fact in conjunction with the absence of any specific political characterisation of the chorus elsewhere in the play (it is notable that in the syzygy of the parabasis the points of view of Knights and sailors are run together) we have a clear illustration of what differentiates Aristophanes, for all the hints and implications we may like to discern in his work, from a
seriously committed style of satire. I think it is also the case that the
miniature anticipation in Kn. 511 of the allegorical terms found in a
developed form in the parabases of Wasps and Peace only lends a colour of
inflated comic bravado to this statement of the playwright's purpose and
does not sustain the impression that the joke contains an earnest claim.

The nature of Aristophanes' discussion of the difficulties of
καυμωδοδικαλία in the anapaests of Kn., with its illustrations from
the careers of predecessors in the genre, seems to me to have been imperfectly perceived. It will not do to regard the passage as a sincerely
admiring and sympathetic account of the poets named. The first thing to be observed is that the scrutiny of predecessors does not quite square with
the declared intention, which is to explain why Aristophanes did not apply
for a chorus in his own name during the years 427-5. The explanation offered at 541ff., that the author did not feel competent or experienced
enough to take on the entire production himself, may have some truth in it, but such εἰφεσαίνη is a matter on which nothing said about predecessors in
the main body of the passage has any bearing. Aristophanes had written his
earlier plays without help and presumably composed the music for them.
Getting assistance or support in other areas connected with the productions,
including χαρέων ἀρείν, cannot have affected responsibility for text and
music except perhaps in some fine details. Yet the failure of Magnes and
Cratinus, as Aristophanes describes it here, is presented as a failure to
go on pleasing their audiences in just those departments of dramatic art
where we have no reason to doubt that Aristophanes himself carried full
responsibility from Banqueters onwards: Magnes ceased to produce good
jokes or satire (525), and Cratinus is alleged to have lost all his poetic
and musical coherence (531ff.). The fact that Crates' failure to prove a
consistent success is not accounted for helps to make the transition from
predecessors back to the poet himself (540/541) seem plausible, but we can
see on closer inspection that it is not: while fear of theatrical failure
might make a young dramatist proceed cautiously and use assistance where he
could, the sketch of Aristophanes' career before Knights which we get at 512f. and 541-4 does not make it any easier to understand how he could be sure of avoiding the sort of shortcomings attributed to Magnes and Cratinus or of evading the fickleness of Athenian audiences.

The speciousness of the whole argument of these anapaests seems to me characteristic of Aristophanic parabases. An apparently logical or didactic framework is designed to contain an essentially comic and entertaining train of thought. The clue to what is aimed at in Knights comes in the centre-piece, the portrayal of Cratinus, Κρατίνου μεμνημένος it begins (526), but it required no effort to remember Cratinus, for his career was still an active one: he had competed with Ach. in the preceding year, he was competing against Knights itself, and he was of course to defeat Clouds in the following year. If we simply accept Aristophanes' satirical angle of vision, we may get a very distorted picture. It is usually assumed that Cratinus really was an old man in 424, but we actually have no reason to put his birth much before 470, and it was not customary for Greek poets to be pensioned off once they passed forty. Cratinus was still a leading comic playwright in 424; Aristophanes' audience were well aware of this, and must have taken this comic portrait accordingly. I believe that it is one of the chief aims of the anapaests to provide a setting for this speciously compassionate and admiring treatment of Cratinus, an elaborately ironic way of indulging in the customary denigration of rivals. Far from supplying an ingenuous account of a sincere οὐδεμίαν Aristophanes is seeking to entertain his audience and win a favourable verdict for his own talents (is οὐ γὰρ ἔδω ἡμῖν (524) a hint at Aristophanes' own age?). The mere fact that a young dramatist should reflect in public on the failures of earlier poets ought to alert us to a keenness of purpose. To some extent Aristophanes may be deliberately drawing attention to his age in order to attract approval of his well-developed talents, implicitly setting himself up as the best of a new generation of poets: there is after all something of an emphasis on the age of the playwrights supposedly rejected in the
past (519, 520, 524, 533). But in the case of Cratinus the image of
senility must be tendentiously satirical. The mock-Homeric respect for his
former glory, as though Cratinus belonged to an archaic world of lost
greatness, gives way to a thinly ironic picture of the present decadence,
in which personal details are mixed with a picture of the collapse of
artistry (cf. Ach. 847ff.). Unlike the more oblique condescension regard-
ing Magnes and Crates, this treatment of a rival should be transparently
offensive. It is a striking reminder of the compound nature of the original
productions of Greek plays that in both the reference to earlier repute and
the joke about present debilities it is the choral and musical aspects of
Cratinus' work which are highlighted (as also, apparently, in Magnes'case).
But this musical emphasis is also designed to lead up to the Connas joke.
In the context Connas can only be the well-known musician, and since the
distortion of his name seems to have originated in one of Cratinus' own
plays (fr. 317), Aristophanes is presumably turning one of his own creations
against himself, as Cratinus did to him in fr. 307.

The joke against Theorus at 608-10 not only rounds off the parabasis
but also takes us back to the political statement at 510ff. and at the same
time turns our attention back to the theme of Cleon and the play's demagogic
strife, about to be renewed; for Theorus here is patently to be identified
with the associate of Cleon mentioned a number of times in *Wasps*. What has
always been found puzzling, however, is why Theorus' allegorical despair
about the ubiquity and prowess of the Knights should be attributed either
to a crab or to a person called Carcinus, depending on how one chooses to
print the line. The solution, I believe, is that Aristophanes here parodies
not just one but two skolia, thereby making Theorus express what we take to
be his own despair in the form of a skolion or type of fable. Although
still a little bizarre, this comic technique is one which Aristophanes
certainly employs at W. 1219ff. One of the songs concerned, the skolion of
Timocreon's quoted by the scholiast on *Ach*. 532, had been parodied before
in Dicaeopolis's version of the Megarian decree at Ach, 533f.; in the present joke Aristophanes keeps slightly closer to the original, quoting μὴ γὰρ μὴ τ' ἐν τῇ κληρονομίᾳ directly. The other skolion, and the one which I think clinches the solution, is preserved in the collection at Athenaeus xv. 694c ff. Only one detail of it matters, the fact that it contains the utterance of a crab: ὅ δὲ καρκίνος ἔστι ἐφ' ἐκλήσ. There are a very limited number of circumstances in which one might want to talk about the saying of a crab, even in comedy; and for Greeks the one obvious context would be in a skolion or fable of the type cited. I suggest that at Kn. 608-10 Aristophanes is putting a mock-skolion into Theorus's mouth, compounded out of two existing skolia, as a witty means of portraying his annoyance at the recent Corinthian success of his and Cleon's enemies, the Knights.

Clouds: The personal satire in this parabasis is such as to make a curious but neat fusion of three of the types listed at the start of this section—the disparagement of the poet's rivals and political enemies, and ridicule of the chorus's own bêtes noires. Aristophanes encloses jokes about Cleon and Hyperbolus within the framework of a contrast between himself and his rivals in the eupolideans of the parabasis proper; then, in epirrhema and antepirrhema, when the chorus deliver a reproof to the audience both on their own behalf and on that of the moon, their own imagined hostility is again directed against Cleon and Hyperbolus.

The coalescence of political and theatrical subject-matter in the eupolideans involves a movement of thought from a defence of Clouds itself and its sophistication to the merits of Aristophanic comedy in general, an exemplification of which is the originality and force of the attack on Cleon; then on to the contrasting satirical sterility of other comic poets. The reference to Knights is made something more than a simple boast: it helps to open up the perspective of the playwright's earlier career (these lines are probably of the same date as 551ff.) and it implies a broader
argument about his principles of comedy. Knights itself was a καλινθη ἴση (547) but it is also singled out for the impetus of its personal satire (the imagery alone carries this point), a quality which makes the more compelling Aristophanes' main contention, that he went on to produce other fresh and clever themes - and in particular, it is implied, to compose Clouds: the train of thought still has its bearing on the defence of that play. In saying κακω στάδων, άλθις ἐπιμυθησεσ, άλθις καλαίνω Aristophanes must intend to describe the avoidance after Knights of plays in which Cleon formed the centre of interest (this is confirmed by the later remarks on his rivals' treatment of Hyperbolus); he is not claiming he left Cleon altogether alone. Nonetheless, careful consideration of 549f. suggests two different and rather conflicting emphases. On the one hand the aggressive imagery of the lines seems to imply that Aristophanes regards his political satire, in this case at any rate, as being capable of achieving a practical aim, victory over an opponent, and that the success of the satire involves damage of some kind to the object of it. On the other hand, if we take the direction of the whole argument into account, Aristophanes seems to be declaring that his paramount principle as a comic dramatist is not the fullest exploitation of his power as a satirist but the achievement of creative originality and the constant provision of new and ingenious entertainment. The one is the sentiment of a committed satirist, the other is not; they are not properly reconcilable. But line 550 leaves little doubt about which is truly dominant. The tone of the argument here can be illuminated by the similar combination of ideas to be found at Μ. 62f.:

οδεε: ει Καλέσων γ: ελκαιψε Της τιχνης χρειν, ἥθις τον αλθην ἁκρη μυττωτευσομεν.

In both these passages the attitude to the past attack on Cleon is one of triumph and condescension bred of supposedly easy mastery, but in both it is equally true that the primary or predominant point is the avoidance of repetition and the capacity to continue being original - with the qualification already mentioned, that it is large-scale satire and not just
occasional jokes which Aristophanes has in mind. Moreover, in both the given passages the intrinsically comic point of view ought to be evident: if we ask in what sense Aristophanes had 'made mincemeat' of Cleon or left him 'lying vulnerable' on the ground, the only answer is that these were victories won in the autonomous world of dramatic satire and festival licence, a world in which Cleon himself was as practically defenceless as anyone else. There is perhaps the further nuance that the poet has been able in his own medium to pay the politician amply back for the discomfiture suffered over Babylonians. On closer scrutiny, the aggression of Nu. 549ff. turns out to be illusory; it has something of the mock-heroic, the burlesquing manner of W. 1029ff. (~ Peace 752ff.), as the correspondence of κρείττον at Nu. 549 to τοῦτο κρείττον at W. 1030 helps to show. The boast is deliberately inflated. Cleon was powerful, and Aristophanes could only deflate him on the comic stage. That is itself one reason why it would have been boring to go on attacking him in the same vein.

The final section of this same argument combines contempt for Hyperbolus and for rival poets into a single joke. The two targets reflect on one another: Hyperbolus is a poor and easy subject in comparison to Cleon (τούτον διέλωσιν as opposed to κρείττον εντεκα) and the comedians' treatment of him has been dull and unimaginative (note κολετρώσει (552) which may designate a clumsy trampling, in contrast to the sharp blow or powerful jump of the wrestler (550). Aristophanes mastered his enemy Cleon by his own strength; Hyperbolus παρεδώκεν λυμίτεν (551). διέλωσιν (552), a tragic word found elsewhere in Aristophanes only in first-person exclamations, probably conveys an ironically condescending sympathy, to which the collocation of καὶ ηὐ μπάτεα perhaps emotively adds. Aristophanes thus gets a joke out of an avowedly bad target, rather as the comic 'praeteritio' of Kn. 1264ff. allows him to do with Lysistratus and Thoumantis.

The satire of Cleon in the epirrhema presents little of special interest. The humour of 581-86 lies not in the subject-matter but in the
connection now made between two sets of events that were already familiar.
The vilification is flat, employing in ἑρβοῦζην (581) and λάρον (591) images already used in Knights (44, 956). It is enlivened only by the projection of the author's dislike for Cleon onto divine beings (thereby lending some literal freshness to τὸν θεόσιν ἐξέλον, 581) and by the bluntness of the degrading suggestion (it was probably a slave's punishment) that Cleon should be executed by ἀπομυρωόμενος (592)—a simple desire for the physical discomfiture of one's enemy, the spirit of which I shall discuss in connection with Ach. 1150ff. later in this chapter. Whatever we may take the tone of this suggestion to be, the chorus's advice is not very practical. Indeed the joke nicely illustrates the sort of implications which I tried to draw out of the earlier reference to Cleon in this parabasis, for Aristophanes' chorus are only ostensibly on political ground: their rules are utterly comic ones.

About the ridicule of Hyperbolus which rounds off the parabasis (623–6)
I make only one observation. If the satirist is simply reminding his audience of something they have already heard about, he does little to freshen it up comically. The spreading of the clause ἱστε τῆλι over the line—end of 624 in such a way as to keep the comically critical words for the start of 625, and perhaps allow a momentary pause at the end of 624, helps to encourage the suspicion that whatever exactly is referred to it was not completely familiar to everyone. I do not think we can rule out the possibility that we have here a picturesque fiction.

Wasps: I restrict myself to just a few comments on the well-known allegorical description of Cleon at 1031–35. The picture of Cleon as a Cerberus-like monster forms part of Aristophanes' grand claim to have provided his audience in the past with a very special kind of satirical comedy, something much more impressive and important than the mean, self-interested ridicule of ordinary Athenians which is by implication attributed to other comic
poets at 1025–8. I argued in an earlier chapter that the description of what Aristophanes claims to have eschewed may not be as implausible as it seems at first glance, and that there is in the description a comic distortion, which obscures the relevance of the picture to Aristophanes' own work, due to his focussing entirely on the source and motivation of satirical material rather than the final use made of it. The distortion sharpens the intended contrast. In explaining how he has gone beyond common practice Aristophanes allegorises his attack on Cleon into a Herculean effort to combat a monster who is not just a personal enemy, or the enemy of a 'client', but a threat to humans generally. With grandiose rhetoric and mock-heraics, spiced with harsh alliteration, he carries a stage further the antithesis employed at Nu. 549ff. between Cleon μεγαλος and Hyperbolus δεικαμος. Cleon is still one of τοις μεγαλοις (1030) but the term now takes on a suggestion of a different kind of magnitude, a Gargantuan monstrousness. The allegory is signalled by ουτ... κυθελεος and Ἡμεκλεος ἀφιγην, and begins in earnest at the end of 1031. οαπνω νω καρχωφιδοντι is emphatically placed at clause and line end; it has the additional comic relish of being not just an abusive appellation but the only appellation used to identify the monster: Cleon's real name is avoided, perhaps because it would spoil the tone of the fiction. In the picture which follows two interesting comic techniques are to be observed. The first is the division of the description into phrases and clauses that could be separated deliberately in delivery, to point the effect and allow for impact, without damage to coherence. The second is the use of the series of clauses to create a progression to a climax. With each element in the series the focus changes to a different part of the body (though φωκης Σωμην is indefinite), and in the last three there is a rapid increase in the intimacy and offensiveness of the reference; compare Nu. 711–15 and Lys. 962–4. The pace of the joke consequently accelerates in the last three clauses, which are much shorter and crisper than the preced-
ing three. This shortening of clause length makes a nice contrast to the orator's employment of expanding clauses for the production of an elevated or stirring effect. The result at \( \text{W. 1035} \) is a kind of satirical bathos: after the elaborate descriptions of Grand Guignol we are offered blunter and cruder images which make Cleon sound simply repulsive rather than daunting.

\( \text{W. 1037} \) might seem to run against the grain of the interpretation I gave earlier of Nu. 549ff., but Aristophanes' claim to be sustaining a war against Cleon, it ought to be noted, is part-and-parcel of his burlesque assumption of a Herculean role against monstrous foes, which is maintained down to 1043; and the comic pretense in the term \( \pi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau \) is underlined by 1036, where the poet implies that he had refused bribes from Cleon to silence him, an implication which, quite apart from its obvious implausibility, rests on the humorous assumption that comedy is simply part of the activity of politics. If, indeed, we take the whole argument of the anapæsts of Wasps, we can discern a neat confirmation of the scale of values which I have suggested underlies the relevant passage of Clouds, for at 1043ff. the turn of thought intimates what really matters to Aristophanes. "Although I fight a Herculean effort against the city's enemies, you have betrayed my comic originality." The argument only makes acceptable sense if we have understood the allegory aright - not essentially as a genuine claim to political services but rather as an entertaining reminder of a prize-winning comedy.

Peace: As in Frogs, both the ode and the antode of the parabasis contain personal jokes. In view of the usual seriousness of these songs and the apparent influence of cult-hymns and lyric poetry on them, there is a prima facie case for believing that satirical elements represent a 'secular' development away from an original type of 'Parabasenlied'. At any rate, the ode and antode of Peace certainly exploit a Stesichorean framework.
chiefly as a foil to the exuberant jesting which is contained within it. The incongruity between the two compounds is played up by the specious integration of them. The abuse of Carcinus and sons is the justification for a negative exhortation to the Muse (781ff.) that balances the positive request preceding it (774ff.). Despite the mischievous tone of this abuse the ant ode purports to continue a lyric worthy of Τον σοφων πνηματιν (798) and once again the satirical material which occupies the second part of the strophe is syntactically incorporated into the 'poetic' train of thought. The Muse is invoked at the close as at the start, but this final request to her conclusively erases any vestige of seriousness.

The descriptions of the sons of Carcinus and of Morsimus and Melanthus are formally parallel both in their position in the two strophes and in the extravagant asyndetic accumulation of epithets and appellations; they are also connected by the theme of failure to obtain a chorus (see below). What is most striking about 789f. and 810f. is that the accumulation of derogatory terms is unified not by any underlying image but simply by the delight in elaborate and carefree vilification — so much so, I would suggest, that neither joke can really rely on a pre-existing familiarity with the targets' appearance, nor can they be intended to supply a clear impression of what that appearance was. Coherent visualisation of the given terms is hardly possible. But it is nonetheless probable that the effect of some of the abuse was meant to be completed by expressive gesture or mimicry. This would be particularly appropriate in the strophe, for here we have a chorus ridiculing other dancers (comic ridiculing tragic, moreover) and it is not difficult to imagine the sort of movements that might underlie the point of γυναικες, ωνοφεις, and νηπιονιοσδής. The whole sung section of the parabasis is framed by invitations to the Muse to join in the dance, and it would be odd if the imaginative colour of the two passages in question did not involve a visual element to match the verbal elaborateness.
It has sometimes been thought that Peace 781ff. contains an allusion to the exodus of Wasps, on the grounds that the finale of that play may have been not well received, a cause of the play's 'failure'. Leaving aside the problems of ascertaining just what prize Wasps did win and who the author of Proagon was, there are three considerations which badly undermine this thesis. Firstly, the assumption that the sons of Carcinus appeared in person in the final scene of Wasps is open to question. It seems to me unlikely that Aristophanes would have wanted an "expert" display of tragic dancing to occupy the finale of a comedy, and Carcinus and his sons were probably already Aristophanic targets by 422 (see Nu. 1260f. and Ζ 1264). Secondly, Peace 781ff. makes perfectly adequate sense as an intrinsically abusive reference, providing a contrast to the preceding request from Aristophanes' own chorus. Carcinus' sons are to be regarded as worthless dancers, rejected on simply artistic criteria, as are the two poets in the antode. The final consideration against finding an allusion to Wasps in these verses is that it is tendentious to regard the attainment of a second prize as a failure which requires explanation or apology, and this means that there would be little incentive for the original audience of Peace to recall Wasps at the mention of Carcinus. The earlier part of this strophe takes on a fuller meaning when we reach 791-5, for this last sentence is explanatory of what has preceded. Nicole's suggestion that a dramatic failure is referred to is not likely. It would be very odd to describe a dramatic failure as the work of a γξλγ, whose characteristic activity was stealthy theft: see 1151, W. 363, Thesm. 558f. As this last passage seems to indicate, blaming something on the γξλγ might have been practically proverbial for giving a thin excuse for a suspicious disappearance. Accepting the equation of εξειν ὁ δέπδμακ with εξειν χορέων (cf. 801f., 807) I would hypothesise that Aristophanes is here referring to a failure by Carcinus to supply a play for a festival for which he had obtained a chorus. On this interpretation, 791-5 helps to explain and give humour to the implication at 781ff. that Carcinus might be desperately
trying to find a choral Muse — in other words, to be given a fresh chance — and would also carry a thematic link with the personal joke in the antode.

*Birds:* The reference to Orestes at 712 is the first comic twist in the section of thought that starts at 708. Like the joke about Prodicus at 692 (which can go without comment), 

$$\delta\nu\epsilon\mu\mu\rho\iota\upsilon\upsigma\nu$$ (706) and $$\nu\upsilon\nu$$ (721), it is one of the elements which help to give some comic shape and tone to this long discursive passage. Much of the force of 712 derives from the breaking of an apparently serious pattern established in the preceding lines; we shift suddenly from a generalised picture of typical human activity to the peculiar individual case. The joke obviously also depends on just what we think of Orestes as being. All three references to Orestes in Aristophanes imply that he is a living individual, and in every case the image of a violent $$\lambda\omega\pi\alpha\sigma\delta\upsilon\upsigma\upsilon\varsigma$$ is unmistakable. This is not, of course, to say that the image must have corresponded to a historical reality, but it has to be remembered that the life of a successful brigand would by its very nature give rise to guesswork, suspicion and ornamentation, and therefore that in such a case the layer of fiction and exaggeration may be more important than the basis of truth. Orestes might be comparable to a legendary figure like Procroustes (cf. *Eccl.* 1021) or to the misanthrope Timon; the common reputation is all that we have to deal with. There is a strong possibility that the name Orestes was in origin a sobriquet: Plato *Crat.* 394e may supply some clue to the sort of associations underlying such a use, and it might then be that at *Ach.* 1167 ($$\mu\nu\nu\omega\mu\nu\nu$$) and *Ay.* 1490 ($$\nu\epsilon\omega$$) Aristophanes is exploiting a connection which was already part of the point of applying this name to a $$\lambda\omega\pi\alpha\sigma\delta\upsilon\upsigma\upsilon\varsigma$$. It would not be surprising, given the nature of this material, if Orestes became a 'Gattungsnname' for brigands or related criminal types, and the use of $$\tau\varsigma$$ at *Ach.* 1166 might be taken as a sign of such a tendency, but it does not seem to me possible to suppose that this is the way the name is employed in the three given passages of Aristophanes. Nor is it plausible that Orestes was really a disreputable
aristocrat, a Mohock who spent part of his time in high society; none of the Aristophanic jokes gives any hint of such an identity, and if we place any faith in Eupolis fr. 186, which is the most insecure sort of fragment, it is preferable to believe that Eupolis used him, or referred to him, in an imaginatively comic role in Kolakes. The balance of evidence is in favour of supposing that Orestes was at least popularly thought of as a real ἀθωσιδήτος, and the basis of the joke at Av. 712 is an absurd contradiction of the footpad's activity: I take Orestes to be the subject of ἅπαθεν (parallel with ναυκλήτων in 711), and would translate ὑπερμείνασθαι as 'to stop him feeling the cold when he's stealing others' cloaks'. To understand ἅπαθεν as a causal participle and thereby to make the chorus claim that they prevent Orestes from having recourse to ἀθωσιδήτων is linguistically quite possible but it would involve a pointless negation of the target's comic reputation.

As in Ach., the epirrhema and antepirrhema of Birds are concerned with a single subject, formulated in different terms at the start of the two sections. The superiority of the birds' world over the human is exemplified by a series of eight hypotheses, four of which involve real individuals, and the argument for it is then clinched by a final personal case which blends the ideas of 'rising in the world' politically, or 'through the ranks', with the theme of transforming humans into birds. But the irony of this pièce de résistance consummates the comic paradox of the whole train of thought, for although the programmatic proposition at 753-6 gives the impression that the chorus will deal with desires and pleasures common to all, when they start to illustrate their thesis it turns out that they refer to states or behaviour of a kind with which no-one would want to identify. No real wish-fulfilment is entailed, and when particular targets are picked out it is easy for the audience to distance themselves from them. This is not quite true of the joke against Patrocleides, the only one which calls for special comment. By the addition of τῆς ὑπέρρεως (790) to the name, Patrocleides is imagined as suffering the sort of embarrassment
which might happen to anyone, but as being particularly likely to find himself in this situation. Appreciation of the technique of this joke is important, because it removes the need for the absurdities of biographical speculation to which some of the commentators would no doubt have treated us, if they were not so careful to avoid soiling their hands with the subject. The addition of τις ὑμῶν to the name shows that the point of the joke is meant to be obviously recognisable, and we ought not to suppose that it depends on some relevantly intimate knowledge of Patrocleides himself even on Aristophanes' part, still less on that of his audience.

Whether or not Patrocleides is the same as the political figure mentioned at Andocides 1.73, the joke makes it likely that he was someone whom many of the spectators could be expected to recognise, but hardly that he had a ready-made reputation for ἔνδειξις ὑμῶν ὑπὲρ Ἰτάττενον. It is always potentially relevant to the understanding of a personal joke to observe where the name itself is introduced. In the five personal jokes in this epirrhema and antepirrhema the names twice occur at the end of line and clause (762, 764), where their comic impact is that of a satirical personalisation of a more general idea already indicated; but in the three other cases the names stand very near the beginning of the joke. The design of 790f. suggests to me that Patrocleides is set up in order to be degraded by what follows, and χεῖριταίον ought to spring more of a surprise than would be possible if the man already had some sort of scatological reputation: this could be heightened in delivery by a slight pause after τοῦ ᾿Αριστοφάνης — after hunger, what next? (note the characteristic progression within the section from innocent to risqué).

Thesmophoriazusae: The two personal jokes at 804f. form a chiasmus with a specific comic effect. In the first element the point is made or completed with the naming of the male subject, but in the second with the name of his female opposite. The first establishes a simple formula (in accordance
with what the women have just offered to do, compare names (803) but the second joke derives part of its force from its failure to follow the pattern: καὶ μὲν ἐν Κλεοφῶν χείρων ... invites us momentarily and misleadingly to anticipate a political equivalent to Νωστυμάχη, but the comparison turns out to be more offensive. The similar use of Salabaccho to debase Cleon at Kn. 765 and Cleophon here might encourage the guess that she was reputed to be a high-class hetaira who associated with politicians and the like, but the jokes would perform their function of demeaning eminent males down to a female level if the woman had a reputation closer to that of a vulgar prostitute. It is worth adding that in Cleophon's case the choice of Salabaccho may have been partly motivated by the intention of making her at least Thracian-sounding name carry an allusive gibe at the politician's comically alleged origins (cf. Frogs 679ff.). Although this might seem a little recherché, we should remember that the preceding context would prompt an audience to look for a comic point in the woman's name.

The parahasis ends with a joke introduced like the case of Thucydides at Ach. 703 as a complaint (τὸ γὰρ εἰκότι in both places). The personal example is introduced after the principle on which it is based has been expounded (832-39), and the detail of Hyperbolus's mother's hair, Κόμας καθεῖσθαι, which is perhaps meant to indicate the freedom and gaiety of the festival, has to be referred back to οὐκαρίαν ἀποκεκρημένην (838), the haircut of slaves and implicitly more suitable for this woman. At 842 the joke is given a new turn, for the sake of the punning punch-line, 845. Money-lending does not belong with prohedria at a female festival. It may conceivably have been an activity which Hyperbolus's family was known to engage in, but in any case, as Dem. 37.52-4 shows, it was one which could easily arouse contempt and the suspicion of base greed. The attribution of it to an Athenian woman is unlikely to be more than an offensive comic fiction, saved from arbitrariness by the concluding pun. It would be insufficient to assume that some money-lending was practised between women at female festivals, for at 842 we slide from a festival scene to one
better suited to the agora, as can be clearly seen from the presence of males in the situation envisaged at 842-5. Once this slide is perceived, it is tempting to feel that the chorus really move away from festival prohedria at 839, but without revealing the change explicitly till 842, in which case the place of Lanchus' mother in the scene, taken as a genuine compliment to the deceased general since at least the time of the Ravennas scholion on this passage, may itself acquire a humorous aspect from the second part of the joke.

Interlude Odes: The distinguishing feature of the choral odes which I include in this section is that they provide satirical entertainment that is largely or wholly divorced from the events and themes of the surrounding drama. A corollary of this thematic independence is the general irrelevance to the substance of the odes of the chorus's identity, though in some cases their dramatic identity supplies the starting-point or ostensible justification for their utterances, and in one instance, at Ach. 1150ff., it is their point of view as performers which lends some colour to the material. Together with this independence from the dominant concerns of the drama, and the consequently diversionary and autonomous nature of the amusement offered, what characterises most of the odes examined below is a reliance in their style of humour on very simple interests and feelings. Though not necessarily lacking in verbal subtlety or inventive wit, their comic appeal is for the most part of a primitive or childish kind, permeated by an imaginative manipulation of the world for the gratification of basic urges. Explicitly imaginary situations are conjured up or hoped for (Ach. 836ff., 1150ff., Plutus 302ff.), and tales are told of bizarre and distant places (Av. 1470ff., 1553ff., 1694ff.). Some odes toy in a crude way with the thought of the physical discomfiture of the target (Ach. 840ff., 1150ff., Pl. 305), a rudimentary satirical motivation, or even their death (Ach. 1150ff., En. 973ff.), or with the idea of a society from which enemies and undesirables are excluded (Ach. 836ff., Frogs 354ff., 1491ff.). The spirit
of ridicule and denigration that underlies them is one of a simple but liberal relish of the activity of satire in itself - a spirit epitomised by *Frogs* 416ff., in a setting which significantly evokes the licence of festival υἱοκέολυκ, and by *Pl.* 302ff., where the σκληροτακτικ have no justification other than the pleasure of the participants. This type of humour is not, of course, found only in odes of personal satire; essential elements of it can be sampled at, for example, *Ach.* 1037-46, 1190ff., *Kn.* 927ff., *Peace* 1009-15, *Lys.* 973ff., 1049ff., 1189ff., *Frogs* 542ff., *Eccl.* 906ff.

*Ach.* 836ff.: This ode is in iambics, a particularly appropriate metre for σκληροτακτικ: cf. *Frogs* 416ff. and *Pl.* 302ff., discussed below, the phallic song at *Ach.* 263ff., and the parabatic ode of Eupolis' *Demoi* (*CGF* 92). It starts from the point dramatically established in the preceding scene, that Dicaeopolis's private peace is working and is enabling him to control the world around him, dictating terms to others and living free from the restrictions that obtain in the rest of the city. The ostensible purpose of the ode is to amplify and extend imaginatively our picture of this utopian existence, but in so doing it goes beyond the dramatic circumstances and deals with individuals whom only Dicaeopolis but any ordinary citizen might find it pleasurable to be able to avoid or abuse. With the exception of the sycophantai, the choice of targets has no particular bearing on the remaining scenes of the play; it is determined predominantly by the extradramatic function of the ode, which is to provide the audience with a hypothetical and vicarious escape from some of the disadvantages and the disagreeable aspects of conditions in the polis through the idea of a world like Dicaeopolis's where one's selfish interests would all be catered for. The calculated effect is clearly meant to be popular: that is, to appeal in a direct way to the common experience of all Athenians, by means of stock attitudes (towards sycophantai, passive homosexuals, adulterers) and reference to basic physical unpleasantness (dirtiness, obesity, malodorous—
ness, starvation). Although other kinds of personal or social factor would be emphasised in a more considered statement of disapproval, the chorus's popular mentality reduces the targets to crudely physical terms. Given the familiarity of some of the individuals involved (Hyperbolus, Cratinus) and the unparalleled density of personal references - six, or eight if we include Ctesias and Cratinus's father, in four stanzas - the intended spirit is one of uninhibited disrespect rather than accurate criticism. For a scene of bustle in the agora as the setting for the indulgence of one's own basic pleasures and for the satisfaction of witnessing others' frustration we should compare Trygaeus' lyric prayer at Peace 1005-15, where the naïveté of the joke (ἡκείν υπέρευν εἰς τὴν ἄγοραν, τὰς δὲ πεπενάθεμ) is intended to draw both on commonplace experience and on the most accessible feelings of glee at others' bad luck; in both these passages the targets are men who can normally afford to enjoy themselves better than most. Wüst may have been right to suppose that such Rüpel-Lieder have something of the ethos of γεφυριζόμενος; they are, at any rate, patently popular in the given sense, and the impulse behind them tends not so much to criticise as to compensate for the facts of life.

839-41: The sycophantes and his πολυπλαγμοσίη are rejected from Dicaeopolis's world in the scenes on either side of this ode. There is some reason to believe that it was the wealthy who had most to fear from this menace, yet the portrayal of sycophantai in Ach. and elsewhere in Aristophanes supports the assumption that their activities were not restricted to the rich, and the consistent comic treatment meted out to them shows that their exclusion from the agora can be thought a popular measure. How far at this date general public opinion had crystallised on this issue, or how far Old Comedy itself contributed to the creation of a stereotyped image of the sycophantes, we have no adequate means of determining; but it should be noted that the term σκοφιάντης and its cognates do not appear before Aristophanes. It is reasonable to assume that the notion of a sycophantes
and his characteristic behaviour gained currency gradually with the increa-
sing work of the popular courts and the establishment of certain patterns
of litigation in the fifth century, but Aristophanes' plays demonstrate
that comedy was capable of giving a particularly vivid and personal realis-
tion to what might otherwise have remained a rather vague concern about
self-interested use, or threatened use, of the courts. In practice the
nature of sycophantia must have been such that it was less an objectively
definable or testable form of behaviour than an imputation to be made
prejudicially against an enemy. This is relevant to deciding whether
Ctesias at Ach. 839 is meant to be a particular individual. Although we
may simply be ignorant of a person who would have sprung to mind for the
first audience, I think it is safer, in view of the commonness of the name
and the existence of an adequate etymological joke on it, to suppose that
this is not a personal joke. The use of τίς is not a decisive factor, but
on this interpretation the phrase η̣ συκοφάντης ἀλλος, which looks a
little odd if Ctesias was a well-known individual, works well as an
indication of the fictional and etymological point of the name.

843f.: The distaste for Prepis and Cleonymus is couched in a form which
suits the agora. It is direct physical contact with these characters, of
the sort one might have to tolerate in a crowd, which is imagined to be so
disagreeable. In Prepis's case a number of ideas are run together:
εἰς μόρῳ ἑταλά suggests that a pollution is involved, and at the same time
denotes the leaving of an impression both physical and behavioural. Yet
the clarity of the feeling evoked means that there need be no established
connection between Prepis and εὐρωπώκτικ; a gratuitous sneer, in these
reductive terms, would be comically sufficient. The more concise gibe at
Cleonymus probably banks on a knowledge of his obesity. Both these jokes,
like some others in the ode, would lend themselves attractively to some
visual support in the chorus's movements.

845f.: We might wonder whether possession of a χλαίνων... φανή is some-
thing that the countryman Dicaeopolis would put a high value on, or whether
Hyperbolus was likely to be a particular worry to someone of Dicaeopolis's
social status. But any incongruity here is explicable in terms of two
factors: firstly, the shift away in the second half of the play from the
strictly rural character of the protagonist's aspirations at 32-6 and of
the Rural Dionysia scene towards the portrayal of enjoyment of a selfishly
idealised urban world, focussed on the agora; secondly, the principle of
satirical selection in this diversionary ode, whereby the choice of targets
is intended to characterise some typical menaces to unfettered social life
in the city. One ever-present threat to the stability of any citizen's
life is that of a legal prosecution, and Hyperbolus, as a leading political
figure with perhaps a special reputation for συννομοκικά (cf. Kn. 1358-63),
can be made satirically to represent a class of people, the ἑιρικος
attacked in the parabasis, who are thought to practise the profession of
prosecuting people. The fact that Hyperbolus would normally be involved in
cases of political consequence, not prosecutions of private citizens, adds
a note of hyperbole to the joke; it may be regarded as a corollary of the
way in which Cleon and Hyperbolus are portrayed elsewhere in Aristophanes
as lending their weight to ordinary individuals. Yet even here any strict
social implications are submerged beneath the plain physical imagery used
to express disapproval of Hyperbolus: the δικαια in which he deals become
material, even, as ἀναστηληθέντα probably suggests, a kind of disease or
pollution to be transmitted; and getting into trouble with him is graphic-
ally imagined as a face-to-face encounter.

847-52: For the accumulation of detail in this stanza compare Eupolis fr.
163. As with some other satirical portraits (see esp. Peace 789f., 810f.)
the particulars are not integrated into a single image. Indeed Cratinus
seems here to be the object of two different satirical charges at the same
time, which helps us to see that the force of insult is dominant over
accurate description. As the humour of children sometimes demonstrates,
the public effect of name-calling may be just as successful when it is
gratuitous or outrageous as when it exposes personal facts, and this
principle counts for even more where satire intended to entertain on a
specific occasion is concerned. Cratinus is first given an 'adulterer's
crop', which the phrase μίξ μακαμέξει encourages us to think is a substitute
for a σκάπιον cut, a short rounded style apparently associated with
slaves and athletes. But the following image of the proverbial Artemon
is probably intended to convey an imputation of effeminacy (perhaps also
with an implication of base origins). The two images may have been linked
in Aristophanes' mind by the description of Artemon in Anacreon fr. 43
(Page Figg 388): Κόμην θωνων ατ έκπετιλμένος. The comment on Cratinus'
art, which the scholiast aptly glosses ής επί θεόκασ θοιωντας ομθει
ποιηματα, is patronising rather than denigratory, a foretaste of the
irony and condescension with which Aristophanes was to treat his rival in
the parabasis of Knights. There is no reason to suppose that the presence
in the joke of Cratinus's father, who may well have been dead by this date,
and who may never have been very well-known for anything, is due to anything
other than its convenience as a witty peg for the adjective Τρηγονος,
though it happens to add, for what it is worth, the nuance of a suggestion
of non-Athenian birth. The stanza as a whole is a rich illustration of some
of the satirist's stock themes of ridicule: the victim's personal appearance,
his bodily cleanliness, his moral character, his sexual preferences, his
family origins and his professional art are all purportedly described and
impugned. Yet, with the exception of the latter, none of these subjects
is one of which more than a handful of people in Aristophanes' audience are
likely to have had any independent knowledge, and I think it is equally
ture that not many spectators will have seriously believed that they were
being given information about Cratinus. Moreover, the first audience of
Ach. will certainly not have suffered the difficulties which some modern
scholars have felt about believing that Aristophanes could ridicule a
fellow comic poet in such terms, for they probably had recently heard, or
were soon about to hear, the chorus of Cratinus's $\chi\epsilon\mu\alpha\gamma\omicron\omicron\mu\nu\epsilon\omega\nu$ say similarly rude things about Aristophanes.

853–59: Pauson and Lysistratus seem to have formed a satirist's pair.

Pauson is here presented as someone with a penchant for jokes, just as Lysistratus is at Μ. 787ff., 1308–10 and, possibly, in fr. 198.2. Both can be pictured as starving: Lysistratus here and probably by implication at Κν. 1267–73; Pauson at Θεσμ. 949–53 and Πλ. 602. Yet both are sometimes shown in high social circles: Lysistratus especially at Μ. 1301ff., Pauson in the ode of Eupolis CGF 92. What is the reason for this strange mixture of attributes? I think we can safely rule out the possibility that the two men were actually very poor and always going hungry. Apart from the element in their comic treatment which goes against this, I would doubt whether there was any incentive for Aristophanes or other comic poets to make personal humour out of the circumstances of straightforward poverty.

A gibe at poverty is intrinsically degrading, but it is most likely to be made in comedy against those who can be for some reason felt to deserve their circumstances, or against those in whose case it has piquant implications. One obvious possibility is that Pauson and Lysistratus are ridiculed for being economically not as well-off as the social life they lead would lead one to expect. Although not invariable, there must have been a general correlation between εὐγενεια or social status at Athens and the possession of wealth. Where a disparity existed between the two, there would be an opening for the satirist. Something of this sort may have been involved in the comic treatment of Theagenes, ridiculed as a boaster without wealth yet evidently of some social standing: see esp. the reference to him in Eupolis CGF 92. Likewise, perhaps, with Proxenides, coupled with Theagenes at ΑΥ. 1126: his name does not prompt one to believe that he was of mediocre social origins. But I doubt whether such a hypothesis is sufficient to account for the cases of Pauson and Lysistratus, though one contributory element may have been the embarrassment of relative impecunio-
sity. A preferable explanation, which will accommodate all the factors in
the comic treatment of Pauson and Lysistratus, is to suppose that they are
satirised as men who make a profession of earning their dinner by witty
entertainment, humorists of the kind later crystallised into the stock
comic figure of the parasite. The most illuminating analogy that we have
is the character Philippus in Xenophon's *Symposium*. Philippus is well
enough known in the circles to which Callias the host, Charmides (who, as
it happens, is an impoverished aristocrat) and the others belong to turn up
uninvited at Callias's house for dinner; his 'profession' is γελοτοπεία, and it is for his jesting abilities that he is regularly invited to dinner.
The impression is given, though the seriousness of it is difficult to
d judged, that Philippus himself is not well enough off to be a socialising
host. Yet it is evident from his manner of arrival, and from the fact that
he becomes one of the diners, that Philippus is not strictly a professional
performer or entertainer; the contrast with the Syracusan who provides
entertainment after dinner is a clear-cut and significant one: Philippus is
part of the same social set as the other guests, the Syracusan is not;
Philippus earns a dinner, not money. One of the humorous practices that
Philippus has a particular reputation for (6.8-10) is that of εκθεμένες,
the same game of witty personal comparisons which Lysistratus is shown
indulging in with Philocleon at Ψε. 1308ff. Although this form of humour
seems to have been a common pastime at symposia, and could be practised by
anyone, it may have been cultivated by jesters or wits like Philippus. It
is something of this sort, I suggest, that Pauson and Lysistratus are
imagined as engaged in at *Ach*. 853ff. Why should starving men approach one
in the agora and make jokes (δε δηλοΰται signifies a humorous remark such
as an εικόνα, not a piece of abuse) unless to ingratiate themselves and
earn a dinner? They are parasites looking for work: compare Plautus's
Ergasilus, who approaches the rich young men in the forum and offers them
jokes in the hope of being picked up for a meal (*Capt*. 478ff.). The truth
about Pauson and Lysistratus is now inextricable from the comic presentation
of them, but I think that Aristophanes gives away enough for us to see that his aim is to deflate any social standing that they may appear to have by suggesting that it is not founded on respectable wealth but depends on others' tolerance of their parasitical ways.

Ach. 1150-73: This ode, which covers the passing of dramatic time occupied by Lamachus's disastrous campaign, demonstrates the comic exploitation, similar to that at Kn. 1274ff., of the sort of public exposure, employed as an act of aggression or revenge, which we find in the customs of many societies — the flagitatio, pasquinade, charivari and the like. But, as also at Kn. 1274ff., it would be rash automatically to infer a particular intention or a strong animus from the publicising form and purported tone of the piece. The chorus, speaking on behalf of the poet, deliver a curse, reminding us of the primitive connection of satire with magic through the attempted use of words to effect the desired harm. The apparently simple spirit of spite and revenge, couched in an imaginative hope for the victim's suffering, is very close to that of Hipponax fr. 115 (West), which ends:

ταῦτ' ἐθέλειν, ἀν ἔσειν, ὁσ μὲ ἑδίκησέ, λαξ εἰς ἐπὶ ὁρκίοις ἔβη, Τὸ πεῖν ἔταλησ ἔων.

But for a poet to air a personal grievance in a comedy must involve turning it into a design which his audience can appreciate, and this complicating factor at once raises a doubt about how well preserved the original motivation is in the final product. The curse itself, far from guaranteeing sincerity, might be thought to be comically overdone: compare the mock prescription of the bird-seller Philocrates at Axy. 1077ff. Two other relevant factors are the mundanely idiomatic use of κακῶς ἀπαλλάθη, κακῶς ἀπολογίζων etc. (see e.g. Ach. 865, Thesm. 757, 879, 1006, and cf. Eccl. 187), which makes such curses an outlet for the expression of superficial emotions, and the patently more embarrassing than dreadful character of the sufferings wished on Antimachus in the main part of the ode. The appeal of
the humour in the imagined incidents is recognisably akin to that of Peace 1005-15, which I mentioned above in connection with Ach. 836ff. The wishing of frustration on the target has a childish unsubtlety about it, but this may be less a symptom of fresh spite than a mark of the poet's attempt to give his interlude a plainly entertaining content. It is important to observe that though Antimachus is named and elaborately described at the start, enjoyment of the ode scarcely depends on a knowledge of the man or of the reasons for the ridicule of him. Aristophanes gives some information on both points, but this is to justify the ode, not to add to the pleasure derivable from it. From 1156 it is the internal dramatic interest of the envisaged situation which carries us along, and the way in which the comic surprises are managed (see below). Another pertinent consideration is the possibility that choregoi were established material for jokes. Eupolis fr. 306 reads:

\[\text{ὅδε ἤργῳν πώς τε ἐνατύχειν \;
\]

and since the reference appears to be to the choregos of the play to which the quotation itself belongs, we should hardly in this case assume that the contempt is real, given the competitive interests of the poet in the merits of the whole production. If it is true, as I believe it is, that \(\text{ἔριδω}\) at Ach. 1155 means the chorus of an Aristophanic play produced at the Lenaia of 426, we must also take into account the fact that jokes about choruses and their liking for \(\text{ἐπιθεῖσθαι}\) are made at Ach. 886 and in Cratinus CGF 74. 30-32. If there were a natural association of this kind, it would add a nuance to the effect of bathos which surely accompanies \(\text{ἀπελευσθεῖσθαι}\); a missed meal seems a cause disproportionate to the energy spent on a curse as apparently strong as this one.

Textual uncertainty in 1150 cannot obscure the grand, quasi-official character of the opening of this ode, which may be partly intended as necessary identification, but which also fulfils the function of setting up a seemingly important subject who can then be rather degradingly shot down. Even if we emend the text so as to produce a second offensive appellation
after the comic patronymic, there would remain a humorous jolt in the transition from the elaborateness of the naming to the succinctness of the curse itself. An accumulation of appellations or descriptions is a feature of a number of personal jokes in choral passages (e.g. *Ach.* 704f., 849-51, *Frogs* 708-10), where there is time and scope for dilated ridicule; though an analogous technique, the whole-line description of a target, is sometimes to be found in stichic metres (see *Nu.* 581, *Ay.* 14, *Lys.* 397, *Thest.* 387). It may be relevant to note that 'defixiones' often begin with the victim's name followed by a description or other identification: there is at least an analogy between the curser's desire to hit the mark and the chorus's emphatic desire to publicise.

A further observation on the style of this ode may contribute to an appreciation of its comic character. The whole design is contrived to express a sharp but simple relish, and the narrative of imagined events mirrors the artificial or engineered kind of consequence that the wish needs for its fulfilment. This is particularly highlighted by the rather naive use of εἰτά at 1159, 1166 and 1172, coupled in the second case with the jerky and presumably colloquial anacolouthon. The chorus's imagination, in accordance with a principle shared by routine fantasising and much joke-telling, focuses only on certain moments in a make-believe sequence, and the triple εἰτά conveys the lack of concern with the gaps between them. This use of εἰτά and similar conjunctions can display a mentality; it is not simply a matter of syntax. Instructive paralads are the speciously connected account of the origins of the war given earlier in the play by Dicaeopolis, which makes even clearer use of the loose 'and then... construction (*κατι, 526, καντεμοθέν, 528, ἐντεμοθέν, 530, ἐντεμοθέν, 535, καντεμοθέν, 539) to express a vision of events in a few, quick, apparently inevitable stages; the picture of the downfall of an old man at the hands of a young advocate at *Ach.* 676ff., where the effect is one of pathetic ineluctability (*κατ' 687, 689 ("and the next thing he knows he's leaving court with a fine"), εἰτά 690); or the indications of Philocleon's garbled way of telling
The three main comic moments in the undoing of Antimachus all involve a frustrated intention, which in each case turns out with a twist. The twists are saved for the end of their clauses (1160, 1170, 1173) to spring the surprise with maximum effect. The final twist, in the last word of the ode, shows how far this neat comic design has carried us from the purportedly personal curse with which we started.

Kn. 973-996: Aristophanes chooses this short interlude ode to make the only mention of Cleon's name in the whole play. But despite the considerable freshness which this lends to the blunt wish for the politician's death at 976 (comically increased by the bathos after the poetic flavour of the first clause), the satirical content and technique of the ode are very simple and unremarkable. The distribution of clauses within the stanzaic form is organised to allow the force of surprise to the shorter pherecrat-ean lines at the ends of the first, third and sixth stanzas. The reference to ἐκκλήσια (978) contributes something to the effect of the images at the end of the following stanza: we are to understand that the behaviour of Cleon's that justifies the descriptions ἀπαρχή and τρομάω has its connections with the law-courts. Cleon's aggressive characteristics are a well established part of Aristophanes' portrait of him, but the suggestion of ὑπῆργος in the later part of this ode is more striking. As the chief point of the three antistrophic stanzas is to prepare for the final gibe about venality, it is not immediately clear how serious an allegation of cultural deficiency Aristophanes intends to make against Cleon. Although Cleon is supposed to excel at the demagogy characterised in adverse cultural terms at Kn. 191-3, and though Thucydides 3.37 puts some anti-intellectual sentiments about the political preferability of ἀμφοτέρως to ἐξ οἴκους and ἡ ὁπλεία into Cleon's mouth, it is noticeable that Aristophanes makes nothing specific of this theme outside this one ode, even though it would have been perfectly possible, had there been a personal basis to work on, to get satirical material out of it: it is a fact which distinguishes Old Comedy and the Athenian
demos (the muddle at Xen. Ath.Pol. i.13 is a perverse testimony to this) from popular comedy and its audience in many other societies, that the former presupposes a general subscription to the cultural values of μουσική (cf. e.g. Frogs 1482ff.), though this of course implies nothing about actual attainment. Cleon may well have been less conspicuous for his enjoyment of cultural pursuits than Pericles had been, and he may certainly have used the sort of argument attributed to him by Thucydides, but it would be rash to draw any firm conclusions about his education or cultural attitudes from the contrived joke at Kn. 984ff.

Birds 1470ff., 1553ff., 1694ff.: All three of these odes, interspersed among the later scenes of the play, use a superficially fairy-tale manner to recount the strange and distant places visited by the birds. But the fantastic mode of narrative, which well suits the far-reaching flights of birds (cf. Av. 48 and 1058-61) and the bizarrerie of the whole plot, turns out to be an amusingly ironic way of extending the scope of Ἀφελοκοκκυγία while in fact venturing into the real Athenian world of the audience: in this respect the songs are miniature paradigms of the play as a whole. So all three odes involve another variety of that characteristically Aristophanic bathos, whereby we drop from the level of a lyrical, grandiose or solemn style to a coarse comic or satirical banality. 'Bathos', however, does not quite fit the incongruity embodied in these odes, for the contrasting elements are integrated in the sustained atmosphere of make-believe. Although no detailed comments seem necessary, I would make two points to illustrate how the fictional nature of these passages affects our understanding of their satirical contents. On the one hand, the satirist's scope for the creative treatment of individuals is only increased by the weird and exotic settings here devised for them. It is quite illegitimate, therefore, to infer from 1556ff. that Peisander "seems to have had some dealings with the Socratics". This would in fact be a dangerously naïve way to treat any joke; an equivalent inference from Nu. 876, for example,
would have no greater validity. But the folly of trying to extract information from the imaginative fabric of one of these odes is extreme. On the other hand, the fictions told by the chorus are intended to communicate a satirical meaning of some sort (it is clear enough in Peisander's case, and has nothing to do with his relation to Socrates), and though this may be oblique it may also, because of the interplay between fiction and reality, be a richly suggestive one. This is most important in the third ode. Here there is a concentration of imagery not found in either of the earlier songs. The theme is heavily marked by the fourfold use of ἀλήττος and compounds, but the purpose of this is more than to emphasise the unquenchable babble of rhetoric. ἐγγλαυττογάστερες insinuates the idea of orators who talk to feed themselves, while ἑρίζουσιν καὶ σπείρουσι καὶ θραυσί (cf. ἀποσυνάφεις of Cleon's political prosecutions at Kn. 259) combines a visual suggestion of curious animals possessing long and useful tongues (forensic ant-eaters) with a similar implication of rhetoric used to 'reap rewards'. The picturesqueness of it all does not completely block out a patch of ominous colour. These ἐγγλαυττογάστερες are foreigners, and the distant origin of what is described is a significant detail in this ode in a way which is not true of the other two. Likewise, the shift from a foreign land to the country of the audience is here not just a comic ambivalence as in the earlier passages; it is used to intimate that this foreign tribe is encroaching on Attica itself. We are not really in a position to put a more concrete interpretation than this on the final sentence of the ode, nor to say how seriously it was meant; but it does, after the satirical implications of the preceding description, seem to allegorize a contemporary reality in a manner that calls for an interpretative response.

Frogs 416ff.: It is relevant to my purposes to make a few observations on the relationship between this passage and certain forms of ritual ἀκρολογία, though I cannot discuss in detail the question of precisely
what Aristophanes intended to represent in the whole scene in which this
passage belongs. Fluck, in his study of σκύμματα and scurrility in Greek
religion, came to the conclusion, already reached by Radermacher in his
commentary, that the common understanding of the chorus’s behaviour in
these lines as modelled on Eleusinian γεφυρισμός was ill-founded. I would
make two principal criticisms of Fluck’s case. In the first place, our
evidence for the form that gephyrismos took is extremely thin. Hesychius’
entry under γεφυρισμός is unable to reconcile conflicting testimonies on
whether a man or a woman delivered the σκύμματα; the following entry,
under γεφυριστατί, suggests that more than one person may have been
involved. Fluck ignores the lack of clarity here, and finds the chorus’s
use of κοινή at 416 a decisive refutation of the gephyrismos reading of the
passage. He also finds it incompatible with gephyrismos that the chorus
do not pick on πολιτευόμενοι, but again Hesychius’ evidence wavers
between two types of target, τῶν ζωοοικίσκοι πολίτες and τῶν παριστάντας.
My second criticism of Fluck is that he thinks by ruling out gephyrismos
one rules out all possibility of Frogs 416ff. being a representation of a
ritual practice. But Wasps 1362ff. provides evidence for other forms of
licensed abuse taking place in an Eleusinian context (πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων
is no empty chronological indication), and for my purposes this fact of
more extensive practice of ἀκρολογία is more important than the specific
question of the relation of Frogs 416ff. to gephyrismos. For in the
dramatic context of the whole scene it seems to me inescapable that
Aristophanes is using his chorus of initiates at 416ff. to depict part of
the mood and style of the festive occasion, to dramatise a particular form
of 'Festesfreude'. It is impossible to account for the carnival spirit of
the satire at this point entirely in terms of the established functions of
the comic chorus. When the initiates turn, prompted by the new participa-
tion of Xanthias and Dionysus, to personal abuse of an unfettered kind,
their behaviour grows naturally out of the insistence on παῦσειν (which
includes dance) and σκύπτειν in the preceding songs, and it is impossible
to doubt that what they are doing fulfils part of their prayer to Demeter at 384ff., to produce υέλοια ... τής σῆς ἐορθής ἀψίως. I would suggest that the manner in which the chorus enter into their iambic jests at 416ff. may be intended to catch the style of gephyrismos or some similar form of festival practice. The simple, unexcused directness of the opening is impossible to parallel elsewhere in Aristophanes. The boldness of it suggests the indulgence of a licence to ridicule which requires no justification. This spirit is confirmed by the way in which the targets are named at the beginnings of the stanzas, picked out for public exposure and celebration. A deliberately publicising note is struck by Κκωμ (422) and δάκτιο (428): such touches are found sometimes in other choral passages, but in this dramatic context, with the initiates not addressing the audience but acting out their celebrations, they help to catch the distinctive tone of a traditional festival entertainment.

The joke against Archedemus is three-pronged, and in each case it is the last word of the clause that carries the sting: δράτηρας, νεκρότητα, μοχθηρίας. The rather neat simplicity of the humour is heightened by the twist given to what must have been a familiar proverb at 418. A clue to what may have been behind the allegation of foreign origins against Archedemus (also found in Eupolis fr. 71) perhaps can be found in the description of him at Xen. Mem. II.9.4.: Κκωμ έπικεφαλίζε έν καλ ΤπΦλι, τί προηγευσε. Relatively humble origins may have been sufficient to give the comic poets a basis for jokes about a politician's background. The image of Archedemus as demagogue ἐν τεῖε Ανω νεκρότητα draws the audience into the joke by hinting at the idea of inert political masses (cf. e.g. W. 34) but there seems to be no parallel for a metaphorical or abusive use of νεκρότητα: compare the Latin 'cadaver' at e.g. Cic. in Pis. 9.19.

The overwhelming weight of manuscript evidence at 422 is for the reading Κκωμ. Although the father was still a target at this date (cf. 48) there is no sufficient reason to reject this reading. What we have here, though there may have been further significance now lost, is
a transference of Cleisthenes' comic reputation to his son, a satirical
procedure of which we have examples elsewhere in connection with the
issue of foreign birth. It makes more natural sense for a charge about
origins to be passed down in a family than for a slur on sexual mores, but
even in a case of the latter sort the humour is supported by the available
assumption that sons grow up to resemble their fathers. The comic plausibil-
ity of this particular joke would be increased if Cleisthenes' son was
still in the earlier years of manhood at this date: gibes of \( \mu \lambda \alpha \kappa \iota \lambda \) 
would have most force against those who had not long passed the age at
which it was respectable for them to be \( \varepsilon \varphi \rho \mu \varepsilon \nu \alpha \).

The final joke in this series is much the most difficult, and no
to offer a complete solution, but one comic factor seems to have been
generally overlooked. As the chorus sing and dance this song they are
partnered by Xanthias and Dionysus, the latter himself clothed in a lion-
skin over a woman's dress (46, 108f., 496). Could this visible fact be
ignored when the chorus refer to Callias's lion-skin? Is it, moreover,
fortuitous that Dionysus breaks into the song immediately after this joke,
and so must be reasonably prominent in the dance at 430? I cannot believe
that this connection between the joke and the context is coincidental, and
whatever we take the precise significance of the gibe at Callias to be I
suspect that Dionysus's visible presence as a pseudo-Heracles (and his
inadequacy in this role has already been demonstrated: see 38ff., 280ff.,
307ff.) was meant to reinforce the joke: a gesture from the chorus leader
and some sort of response from Dionysus would be easily manageable within
the choreography. About the intended satirical point I would make only one
suggestion. Editors have been very ready to emend \( \kappa \omicron \sigma \delta \theta \upsilon \nu \) 
thereby turning \( \nu \omega \mu \lambda \alpha \chi e \nu \) into a sexual metaphor. We should, however,
consider the possibility that \( \kappa \omicron \sigma \delta \theta \upsilon \nu \) is in apposition to \( \iota \pi \rho \rho \varepsilon \nu \alpha \); this
is linguistically very straightforward, even if it slightly upsets the
rather neat correlation of phrasing with metrical pattern. An objection to
this interpretation is that κόσμες nowhere else seems to be used as a term of abuse, unlike its counterpart in many other languages, but it could here be justified and made intelligible as a special usage by the preceding travesty of Hipponicus's name as Ἰπποκόσμιος. On this reading the joke would not be essentially sexual but rather a suggestion of a mock-heroic performance by Callias at Arginusae: for the topical reference of νόμιμαξίν in Frogs compare 33, 49, 191, 693. This would at least have the merit of making the satirical point consistent with the background of Dionysus's wearing of a Heraclean costume.

Pag. 302-15: It is appropriate to end this section with a note on the most incidental and frivolously irrelevant choral interlude in Aristophanes, though the personal jokes in it are obviously only one element in its comic character. Although quite without any ritual associations, this song has some interesting points of contact with the iambic stanzas at Frogs 416ff. The chorus are accompanied in their dance by an actor, and in both passages there is a mood of wilful indulgence and improvisation: this is particularly marked by Carion's insouciant ἕποληψομαι (290), which is reminiscent of the apparently arbitrary invitation offered by the chorus at Frogs 416 (ἐφ' ὑμίλεσθε δηναῖ). By introducing contemporary characters into the second half of this mimed recreation of fantastic and legendary events, Aristophanes is also producing a humorous effect kindred to that of the songs in the later part of Birds, where the incongruity of placing familiar individuals in strange fictitious settings is exploited. But what really distinguishes this iambic ode is the absence of irony in the mixing of contemporary and mythical. Carion and the chorus are engaging in a self-conscious game of ludicrous make-believe, working within the framework of a dramatic pretence and yet deliberately manipulating it for their own pleasure. These are giddy ἁσκωμαχτε (316), and despite the superficial formality, marked by the alternations and repetitions (302/309, 307/311, 308/315), the spirit is of improvised zest, and this would be communicated in performance
above all by the visual antics of the dancers, including various scatological movements and gestures in the second pair of stanzas. It should hardly need to be said that amid all this exaggerated miming and physical comedy the references to Philonides and Aristyllus are not intended to carry a very precise satirical point: there is little more than a vague insinuation of indecent sybaritism in Philonides' case; and whatever Aristophanes himself may have known or liked to believe about Aristyllus, I doubt whether his audience would have been inclined to rationalise the jokes about him here and at Eccl, with quite the meticulousness of modern scholars.
Notes


2. AP 283f.

3. The drunkenness of some of these choruses, as well as motivating the exit of those who see them coming, perhaps suggests that the entertainment they provide will be in the spirit of a κώμος: cf. e.g. Alexis fr. 107, Men. Aspis 246-8, Dysc. 230-32, Perik. 71f., with Maidment CO 29 (1935) pp. 22f. Maidment, p. 6, is right to dismiss the idea, implied at e.g. Hor. AP 283f., that the decline in the importance of the chorus was caused by legal restrictions on δρωματική κωμῳδία.

4. It is possible that the chorus enter from both eisodoi; Neil ad loc. thinks they divide on entry.

5. See Neil ad loc. for a concise summary of some alternatives. For what it is worth, Kn. 129-32 does not imply an obvious downfall or an awkward withdrawal from political leadership. I can see no cogent reason for the generally accepted identification of this Eucrates with the one said to have been called Μελιτέω κάπρος in Ar. fr. 143: e.g. Kirchner under PA 5759, Gomme CR 55 (1941) p. 61, Newiger (1957) p. 19 n. 1, Fornara (1971) p. 76.

6. I do not accept, pace MacDowell ad loc., that this reference is necessarily evidence for a forthcoming trial. It would be just as suitable a joke if, for example, Dracontides had recently been in court (Philocleon eager to condemn a defendant already acquitted) or if it were picking up a more general scandal or reputation—something on the lines of the Laches theme, as I see it. There is, at any rate, no reason to exercise an a priori prejudice in favour of the most plainly factual interpretation.


8. See Plut. Alcib. 18 and 21, together with the glimpses of Lamachus that we get at Thuc. 6.49 and 101.6.

9. Murray (1933) p. 178 seems to think that τῆς Λυκώνος may be Lysistrata herself; but he has overlooked the other evidence for Lycon.

10. This has been an orthodoxy since at least Ruppel (1913) p. 9: e.g. Murray (1933) pp. 28 and 39, Pohlenz (1952) p. 103, Newiger (1957) p. 63 n. 1, Sommerstein (1977b) p. 118. But see the caution of Rennie ad loc. and the objection of Wilson CR 19 (1969) p. 156.


12. Cf. pp. 48 f. That Ar. was building on some sort of actual antipathy
between Cleon and the Knights seems likely in view of Cleon's connect-
ions with policies which 'stung' the rich: cf. esp. Kn. 773-6. For one
ingenious possibility see Fornara (1973). However, if there had been
a major political confrontation, we would surely get some hint of it in
Knights, and it would be a stronger one than the oblique and obscure
allusion at 390.

13. MacDowell suggests an analogous interpretation of W. 150f., but it is
not at all certain that Capnias is there the nickname of Ecphantides.

14. MacDowell ad loc.

15. Whether Ar. also intended his audience to realise that the abuse invol-
ves a distortion of Bdeluleon's own name is hard to say.

16. See MacDowell ad loc., but the one Platonic passage cited may not tell
us anything about ordinary fifth-century usage, for which we simply
lack proper evidence. It might be safer to assume, on the analogy of
words of ἰμαγο — root (cf. Kn. 191, 217, Frogs 419, and Thuc. 4.21
with Gomme ad loc.), that such terms depended on context for their
precise colour.

17. Some are catalogued by Wendel (1929) pp. 35ff.

18. The connections with lyric can be seen clearly in Ar. himself: see e.g.
Av. 676ff., 1748ff., Lys. 1143, Frogs 324, 397ff.

19. The case for one is put by MacDowell ad loc. and on 74, and Davies APF
under no. 12250. There is no positive reason for finding a reference to
Amynias in Hermippus fr. 71.

20. Cf. Ar. fr. 108, where τυραννίς, μισοδημικα and oligarchy (μικρον) are
discerned in a Spartan fig.

21. The Spartans are in general treated very lightly in the extant plays;
note that no Spartan turns up at Dicaeopolis's market, despite the
conditions of trade (623-720). This may just be one symptom of the
fact that although Ar. often evokes the background of war, he rarely
focuses on the true details of it: how far would we get if we tried to
reconstruct the Peloponnesian War from his plays alone?

22. See Thuc. 8.1.1 for an example of this collective mentality in real
life.

23. See Taillardat (1965) §§ 14 and 266, but he overlooks the relevance of
the crest, which is particularly obvious at Peace 1177ff.

24. See Taillardat (1965) § 326. For later satirical use of eyebrows see

25. Cf. ἀγαθοτέρον ἀγάμος ἀρχέφων of Heracles' manic visage at Eur.
HF 990.


27. So far as I can ascertain, there is nothing on a Greek vase or in a
sculpture that we can identify as a μαρμῷο. For gorgons, which give
the right sort of idea, see T. Karagiora Ἐφορίες Κηφαλή (Athos 1970).
28. Ar. frs. 31, 131. For masks with grotesque eyebrows cf. Koster's
Prolegomena to the Dutch edn. of the scholia, I 63f. (p. 6).
29. See pp. 269 f.
30. Ach. 117ff. and W. 1187, which is not (ctr. MacDowell ad loc.) evidence
for a real embassy nor an absurd choice of θέωραί, give some reason
for conjecturing that Cl. was a public figure. But there is, of course,
no sign of a connection with oligarchy, and had one existed I doubt
whether Ar. would have made this joke in 411.
31. MacDowell on W. 1501.
32. νοσεῖν / μυστεῖν κατείν seems to vary in precise sense from 'to tell lies'
(e.g. Ar. 66, Thesm. 625, 634), through 'to miss the mark' (W. 74), to
'to talk nonsense' (e.g. Nu. 644, 781, 1095, Ar. 986, W. 1194). Cf. also
the impersonal use at Kn. 334, and the related idiom at Eccl. 144.
32a. I have omitted the jokes in the ode and antode of Frogs, and I do not
discuss second parabases: some of this material is dealt with in detail
elsewhere in the thesis.
35. See DFA2 pp. 112, 118.
36. Henderson (1975) p. 214 no. 20 thinks otherwise, but I do not accept
that any of the passages he cites, least of all Kn. 876ff. (†), has
anything to do with passive homosexuality.
38. So Murray (1933) pp. 16-18, and e.g. Rogers ad loc.
a chorus with Callistratus. Whether or not this is right, I incline to
the belief that it was for the purposes of obtaining a chorus that Ar.
chiefly needed Callistratus's help, and that Ar. may have played a
larger part in the practical production than is usually assumed: see
40. See Taillardat (1965) §§ 504 and 819.
41. There may be a double image in this passage. Taillardat (1965)§ 762
ignores the possibility that Cratinus is being likened to an old bed,
for which see the scholia here and LSJ s.v. Τόβος.
43. It might be preferably less bizarre to accept V's reading χορή, ('Theorus was quicker than a crab to say...'), so that Theorus himself
would be a like an animal in a fable.
44. For the further possibility of καρφίκως being a sobriquet for a
Corinthian see Taillardat (1965) § 835, but there is not a scrap of evidence for this and I do not see much point in it.

45. I prefer MacDowell's punctuation of 62 to Coulon's; on the historical problem cf. Mastromarco (1974) pp. 40f., though I am not convinced that Ar. need have intended a specific reference to be taken.

46. Murray (1933) p. 9 and Taillardat (1965) p. 353 n. 1 I think there is a reference to Cleon's death in ἔξυπνω at Nu. 550, but I think this is against the sense of the passage; the date of composition is not in itself pertinent.

47. Those who find an obscene sense in ἐκπίστων at Nu. 549 (see Henderson: (1975) p. 116 and Stone (1978) p. 428) reveal more about themselves than about Ar. (why not also at Ἡ. 1023?) For the true force of the word see it in context at Ἡ. 1030 and Peace 752.

48. Taillardat (1965) § 611 tries to assimilate ἀλεξίπτων to Ar.'s description of his own attack on Cleon, but a contrast would be more in place.

49. See H. Hengel Crucifixion (Engl. trans. 1977) p. 70 and n. 2, with references to more detailed discussions.

50. Cf. ch. 5 n. 25.

51. Compare the language used at Ach. 657f., with ch. 5 n. 54.


53. Taillardat (1965) § 247 finds a reference to the small stature of the sons in most of the terms of 789f., but I find the effect less clear. Cf. Borthwick CO 18 (1968) p. 50 and Platnauer ad loc. On 810 see Taillardat § 158, but 811 introduces unrelated terms which he does not discuss.

54. See Nicole (1884) (who does not believe that the sons of Carcinus appeared in Wasps, but that the play's finale was a flop), MacDowell on 1501, and Ussher (1979) p. 16.

55. MacDowell on Ἡ. 1516-37. I find his whole reconstruction of the scene tendentious, and it makes to clean a break between choreography and text.

56. See Marzullo (1970-72) pp. 91-3 for a discussion and emendation.


58. Compare the mass of stories about Jack the Ripper in nineteenth-century London, or the reputations/legends of early European alchemists such as Faust in Germany or John Dee in England.


60. E.g. Rennie on Ach. 1166 and Higham (1932) p. 104.
61. Higham's discussion of this line, loc.cit., makes unnecessarily heavy weather of it.

62. Most report the nickname Ἐὔνομος found in ad loc., but if this was actually used of Patrocleides in comedy, and is not simply a later crystallisation of this one joke, it makes little difference to what the first audience of Birds are likely to have known about the man.

63. Although τὸ Ἐὔνομος (803) need not imply 'with a view to etymology', the following line immediately gives it that point.

64. Athenian women normally wore their hair up in some form. If Terence HT 290f. is evidence for Greek practice, loose hair might suggest simple informality, free of any attempt to look attractive, in a private setting; but in a public situation it is more likely to seem careless or unrespectable. The woman's white dress probably denotes festival gaiety: cf. Ach. 1024, Aesch. Eum. 352, Xen. Mem. II.i.22, Plato Crito 44 a-b.

65. Cf. n. 75 below.


67. The only dissenting voice I have noticed is Harwardt (1883) p. 62. Cf. nn.134 to Appendix I.

67a. One of main objections to Moulton (1979) is his largely far-fetched attempt to forge connections between several of the odes I discuss below and the themes of their plays.

68. Cf. the strophe and antistrophe of the parabasis of Frogs: the downfall of both victims is predicted. It is instructive in this context to think of the dramatic suffering that Lamachus in Ach. and Socrates in Clouds are made to experience.

69. The parabatic ode of Eupolis's Demoi, CGF 92, is comparable.

70. Wüst (1921) pp. 40ff., eqq p. 45. Wüst's scheme as a whole is too neat but he highlights some important features.

71. Cf. Menander Georg. fr. 1 (Sandbach) for the ease with which sycophantia could be abusively alleged.

72. Müller-Strübing (1873) pp. 326ff., followed by Rennie on Ach. 839 arbitrarily identifies Ctesias with Marpsias at Ach. 701, but I doubt whether either was a real person: cf. ch. 2 n. 77.

73. See e.g. W. 181, Av. 512, Lvs. 785, 809, Frogs 912 and at Plato Anol. 19c 3.

74. Cf. Thuc. 2.51, Nu. 995 and 1023, with Dover on the former, and Taillar-
dat (1965) § 853.
75. See Nicolson (1891) pp. 46f. and 53–6; Erbse (1954) pp. 81ff. thinks the reference is to baldness.
78. Ehrenberg (1951) pp. 134, 243f. takes Pauson's poverty at face-value, as does Sommerstein (1973) p. 244 n. 70. For Lysistratus's social level see MacDowell's note on W. 787.
79. Cases where a disparity is noticed (e.g. Eur. Elec. 37f., Dem. 59.72) emphasise the point by implication. Cf. Denniston's note on Eur. Elec. 253, and see the irony of Alexis fr. 90.
81. Ἀναμνήσεις 1.11ff.
82. 4.29ff. For a doubt about Xen.'s picture see Davies APF p. 331.
83. See MacDowell ad loc. On 1318 MacDowell makes a speculative comparison of Thourphrastus, a fellow-guest of Lysistratus's, to Xenophon's Philippus. Is Lysistratus also engaged in ξυκεια at W. 794 (not in Monaco (1963))? Lysistratus is called κάκοες in Σφ. Kn. 1267, which may be evidence for other jokes on the parasite theme.
86. See Elliott (1960) passim.
88. Cf. Av. 1406, and the mean choregus in Theophrastus Char. 22.2.
90. Perhaps the best available emendation, which produces responsion with the anistrophe, is that of Platnauer, Co 2 (1951) pp. 167f., Τὸν μελκευν ἔχρεξεν ἡμᾶς ἐποικίαν, treating πολιτικην as a gloss.
91. See e.g. IG III iii nos. 68, 72f., 85.
94. Murray (1933) p. 158.
95. The implication of cowardice would be removed (but what would be left?) by the interpretation of Cavaignac (1959) pp. 246–8, who takes ἐκθυόν (1558) to mean Socrates.
99. Segal (1961) p. 235 n. 40 talks about "true" gephyrismos, but we are not in a position to say what this was.
100. Rusten (1977) convincingly assigns Ἡρ. 1364f. to Philocleon, so that we get the threatened ἀδικελογία. However, Rusten's attempt to infer ideas about ἡθαμέδος from the whole context of these lines, including the flute-girl, is very flimsy. I doubt whether there is any connection between ἡθαμέδος and nudity.
102. The significance of the age of seven in popular belief is well attested: e.g. Hesiod fr. 285 (Merkelbach and West), Solon fr. 27 West, Aristotle Pol. 1335b 32, C. adesp. 572f., Quint. 1.1.15. For another twisted proverb cf. Thesm. 529f.
103. There is no justification for inferring Cleisthenes' death (at Arginusae) from the combination of two fictions, Frogs 48 and 422ff., as do Kock on Frogs 422f. and Holden (1902) s.n. ἔλευσινές.
104. Cf. ch. 1, p. 12 and n. 50.
105. See Taillardat (1965) § 182, Henderson (1975) § 263. W. Verdenius's solution in ΚΩΜΙΔΩΙΔΟΤΡΑΓΗΜΑΤΑ (1967) p. 145 is confident but unsupported by necessary evidence; it also leaves the point of νυμφακεῖν and ξυμπρεπον unclear.
106. I keep the reading of R and V here.
The Functions & Techniques of Personal Jokes

Functions

My aim in this section is to illustrate a few of the main dramatic functions fulfilled by personal jokes beyond their immediate satirical impact and entertainment value. On the occasional contribution of jokes to the main themes of a play, and on the use of jokes as competitive propaganda against the poet's rivals I made some observations in the first chapter. It is not my purpose to produce a complete scheme of functions into which every joke can be fitted, but to comment on some of the more interesting ones. The range of features which I describe as 'functions' comprises both deliberately designed effects and dramatic mechanisms which Aristophanes may not have taken a conscious decision to use but which are built into his processes of composition: the essential criterion is whether the details I pick out could contribute to an audience's appreciation of a scene or even a whole play.

The opening words of *Frogs* provide a cue for the first function I want to observe:

εἰπώ τι τῶν εἰσηγήσων, ἢ δέσποτα,
ἐφ' ἄστι βηλότριν οἱ θεῷενοι; (1-2)

The subtlety of Aristophanes' play with the relationship between actors and audience is remarkably bold, but its main purpose is nonetheless to supply immediate entertainment which will catch the spectators' attention and dispose them favourably. Although Xanthias's εἰσηγήσω are not the sort of jokes you expect to hear only at the start of a play, there is no doubt that the beginning of a work is a comically sensitive area, and a glance through the extant comedies suffices to establish that Aristophanes was aware of the need to exploit it effectively. The part played by personal jokes in the humour offered by opening scenes varies from play to play, though none is without them altogether. Two plays, however, *Acharnians*
and *Wasps* show extensive use of them to 'warm up' the audience and to provide a preliminary sample of racy satire that connects the world of the play with the contemporary world of the audience. In both these introductory scenes the actors' function approximates to that of the chorus in odes of incidental satire, as I tried to analyse it in the last chapter, in that their involvement is rather with the audience than the dramatic situation. The mode of comedy has been less well appreciated in the case of *Ach.* than in that of *Wasps*, where the explicit address to the audience alerts us to the nature of what has preceded it. At the start of *Acharnians*, unless we make what seems to me the unlikely assumption that there are visual indications that Dicaeopolis is on the Pnyx, the audience have no context in which to place the unidentified actor who appears (contrast *Wasps*, where even before the first line is spoken there must be some significant stage-business outside the house, which because of this and because of Bdelycleon's presence on the roof is part of the play from the start). His mask and costume will show that he is old and, probably, that he is a countryman, but that gives us little to go on. If the actor does anything before he starts to speak (cf. 30 f. for retrospective stage instructions), it will not be of the sort which assists us much in understanding what he is about. The drama effectively only starts in line 19 when Dicaeopolis begins to explain the setting. What they hear from the character in the first sixteen lines may help to form the audience's impression of his frank and spirited personality, but Aristophanes has primarily designed this passage to furnish a striking but autonomous period of entertainment that will capture the audience's attention from the beginning. Although it is neatly grafted onto Dicaeopolis's observations on his present situation, this opening is less dramatically necessary than any other in the extant plays; it ties in less significantly with what will follow. All Dicaeopolis's references are to theatrical experiences he has had in the past year; (with an especially piquant comment on a scene from *Babylonians*); indeed, as he unfolds his balance-sheet of pleasures and
pains it is as if he were simply a spotlighted member of the audience waiting with everyone else for the play to start, as he waited last year for Aeschylus. I suspect that the staging of this opening speech may have helped to strengthen this impression: Dicaeopolis should take up a position which will enable him to seem part of the Πλήθος when the Πρωτάνες arrive and sit at the front, presumably in front of the skene, facing the audience; and this means that Dicaeopolis would most conveniently sit (Κόσμος, 29) near the audience's edge of the orchestra, from where, between the officials and the 'city', he will be able to comment towards the audience (see esp. 75ff.) on the ἀλασψεία manifested in the running of the assembly. The whole of this first scene has been carefully conceived and designed, I believe, to emphasise the fact that Dicaeopolis belongs to the Athenian citizenry. The opening lines of the play contribute to this design by presenting Dicaeopolis almost as a joker in the audience, and when at 496ff. he addresses the audience directly, the unusual intimacy will seem less unnatural than it might otherwise do because of the way in which the protagonist had earlier shared his feelings with them. Aristophanes has chosen a group of personal jokes on theatrical figures and topics as the most vigorous way of characterising the old farmer's frankness and of utilising it to furnish some preliminary entertainment.

There is no confusion between actors and audience in the preliminary joking of Ἑσυχ, although the slaves involve the audience at 73ff. in a manner which does make their role close to that of jesters without a dramatic setting — comparable to that of the modern stage comedian, or perhaps to that of the γυναικεία who abused Πέτρος Παριόντας on the way to the celebration of the mysteries at Eleusis. But it is not just at 73ff. that the two slaves play the jester. The accounts which they give one another of their dreams, and the intricate repartee that develops out of each of the accounts, resemble the processes of conversational joke-telling and of banter: in this respect the passage has something in common with the series
of joke-telling anecdotes about Socrates which Strepsiades hears from a member of the school at *Clouds* 143ff. But whereas in *Clouds* the pupil purports to be serious, and Strepsiades is suitably impressed for one listening to *μουσική* (143), the construction of the dialogue in the opening passages of *Wasps* has the quality of a comic routine, designed and rehearsed to unfold the personal jokes with maximum effect. In the case of each of the dreams a short narrative in two stages, the second of which (note *κατασκευή* at 19 and 34) springs the personal details of the dream on us with the main revelation carefully held back (19, 36), is followed by an exchange in which further comic meanings are unlocked by the interlocutor. The result is a series of humorous moments, mainly puns (*ἀστράη*, *ἐφιλα*, *τρόπιν*, *ὄζει... βέθοντας σαφεῖς*, *δυναν... διστάνας*, *κόκκος*), and though we cannot be sure how Aristophanes' actors will have played these lines the use of so many puns suggests to me that the slaves should act as though making amusement for themselves, as impromptu entertainers, self-conscious of their role, as Aristophanes certainly makes them in the other personal jokes of this opening scene, at 58ff.

If the opening passages of a play are important for a dramatist's comic success, the closing lines of major sections of a comedy are equally sensitive, and we can see from the extant plays that Aristophanes found personal jokes, as relatively self-contained moments of humour, a convenient means for bringing a scene or an ode to a close on a high comic note. The technique is the equivalent of the serious dramatist's placing of a foreboding or climactic moment at the end of a scene or act, but whereas a tragedian can employ this effect in relatively few places within a play, the comic poet may want to maintain a high level of humour throughout. Except in very unusual cases silence is alien to the Aristophanic theatre, and very few lines pass in the scenes of dialogue without explicit comedy of some sort. In addition to the ends of major structural sections, Aristophanes seems to have found it particularly desirable to 'cover' shifts or
transitions in the dialogue or action with an obvious joke: in live theatrical terms this means laughter that both gives the actors time for movement or gesture and enforces a pause that makes the change of direction seem less out of place. It is for such reasons, then, that we commonly find a personal joke located at a structurally important point.

This type of function shows up well in choral passages, since these are structurally well defined, and in performance the importance of breaks in, or the ends of, these sections would be clarified by their musical and choreographic settings. The precise effect of the joke varies with context. *Ach.* 659ff. provides the most striking example of a joke positioned as the climax to a whole passage. The change of rhythm at the paigos of the anapaests (accompanied perhaps by a quickening in the speed of delivery) is harnessed to the poet's final satirical dismissal of Cleon in this play; the joke operates as a defiant gesture that rounds off decisively the detailed apologia for the playwright presented in the preceding section: it both crystallises the poet's position (for the claim of τὸ δὲ καλοῦν cf. esp. 500f., 645, 655) and adds a new satirical bite to it, rising to the abuse of the final words, ἔχεις καὶ λακαταταινοῦν. *Ach.* 659ff. derives a degree of earnestness from the preceding context, but jokes in a similar position often have a more light-hearted value. The examples which complete the parabases of *Knights* (608–10) and *Birds* (798–800) are both less integrated with the structure of an argument and less abusive; they are witty tail-pieces, clinching the train of thought that culminates with them more by force of humour than by logic. *Kn.* 608–10 has the further point of bringing attention back round to the main theme of the drama which is about to be resumed, the conflict between the Knights and Cleon. A different nuance of humour again can be achieved by the joke which contains a surprise at the very end of a passage; such are the twists found at *Ach.* 1172 and *Birds* 1564: both complete odes which contain other satirical material, adding an effect which is the verbal equivalent of an unexpected visual
appearance. Comparable, but slightly less piquant, are the flourishes at
the ends of sections within a choral structure at Lys. 270, which adds a
sharp particularity to the old men's expression of misogyny, and at Frogs
382, where καὶ θεοερείων μὴ βουλήτην complements the chorus's earlier attack
on the alleged traitor (362-4). The comically satisfying character of such
flourishes can be gauged from the fact that Aristophanes chose to end his
whole play with one in Frogs (1532f.). These closing words are reminiscent
of the snub to Cleon at Ach. 659ff.; they are more of a satirical appendage,
less the conclusion of a coherent argument, than that pnigos, but they are
analogous to the dismissal of Cleon in that they collect together the
strands of earlier references in the play. Finally, it is sometimes the
case that the end of a choral section crowns a longer joke against an indivi-
dual by either releasing the critical comic point (the name which sums up
the preceding description at Frogs 541; the specification of Ariphrades'
talent, ἅλαττινος, at Ἱ. 1283) or adding a detail that drives home the
attack, as with the reference to Hyperbolus's commercial background at the
end of the second parabasis of Knights (1315).

Similar functions to those illustrated above are sometimes performed
by personal jokes at the end of important sections in the episodic scenes.
At Peace 648, for example, the identification of the chief perpetrator of
the political corruption and warmongering that Hermes has been attacking is
as emphatic as the denunciation of Cleon in the pnigos of Ach. The antilabe
in 648 is the only one in the whole epirrhēma (603-56), and it helps to
give climactic force to the preceding word, ἐρεσοτόλης, which in fact carries
the main impact of the joke and on which Trygaeus's apotropaic warning is
built: here the joke is released just before the pnigos, which is used to
suggest and carry the excitement caused by it. This joke works, then, in
conjunction with the local design of the verse and the structural signif-
icance of this point in the whole episode. Wasps and Clouds both provide
analogous examples in the composition of their agons: Wasps 759 closes the
elaborate σφαγής to the whole agon with a joke that marks an important stage in Philocleon's conversion: it has the power of a surprise, in that Philocleon has so far resisted his son's arguments uncompromisingly, and is meant to represent an almost involuntary weakening of resolve (perhaps accompanied by a physical sign of capitulation); but with a comic economy that would simply be unattainable by a more natural indication of Philocleon's psychology at this point it proves that the agon has yielded a result, and therefore facilitates the progression to a new assault on the father's obsessions. At Clouds 1022 f. the Just Argument completes his half of the contest with a gibe that supplies the coup de grâce to his presentation of the issues in physical terms, and in the light of what has immediately preceded as well as of the drift of an earlier part of the argument (973-83) it would be hard not to feel that κατωπνοσίαν here carries a strong sexual charge. At any rate, this joke is more than a comic decoration: it can be sensed, like the two previous examples, to be in tune with the dramatic content of the section which it brings to a close. The same is true of Wasps 1007, which brings the first half of the play to an end. The gibe at Hyperbolus expresses Bdelucleon's victory in the mock trial scene with the same economy with which 759 expressed Philocleon's reluctant defeat in the agon; but this joke has less of the sharpness of surprise than the earlier one, in that it does not emerge abruptly and against the pressure of the preceding thought, as Philocleon's reference to Cleon does, but adds a brusquely confident complement to Bdelucleon's positive description of his father's future. A more complex case is that of Frogs 588, where Dionysus adds Κωκφίκημες δ' γλαμών to his curse of destruction on himself and his family if his promise is forsworn. The addition of Archedemus is in itself arbitrary, and the joke therefore has some of the pungency of the absurd. While this contributes to the comic force of this scene-ending, it works in conjunction with the dramatic humour of the whole oath. Dionysus's reaction to the latest danger in the Underworld follows
a familiar and predictable pattern established by the earlier episodes of clothes- (and identity-) swapping (494ff., 522ff.), as Xanthias at once senses: ὁ τεκνὸς ἄρα τὸν νεότατον (580). Every volte-face makes the routine more ludicrous and reduces the god's credibility. To match Xanthias's scepticism Dionysus needs to produce a heightened earnestness: οὐδὲν οὐδὲν (584). His oath at the end of the scene is the climax of his earnestness (it is the kind described by Antiphon, 5.11, as μάνικητον καὶ ἀρχιερείατον, suitable for assurances given in a murder trial); and καὶ δεξιομος ἑλκαμνον is the climax of the oath, an indication, albeit absurd, that Dionysus will promise anything. The dramatic requirement of a guarantee and the essential irrelevance of the choice blend together; the rich tone of this high comic note cannot be fully analysed, but it is important to grasp that the function fulfilled by this personal joke is more than frivolously incidental: in closing this scene it should complete the audience's appreciation of the humour of the whole situation.

I hope that the above illustrations have conveyed some idea of the ways in which Aristophanes' subtle comic sense can place a personal joke at the end of a section with a view to more than its isolated satirical impact. I think we can also sometimes discern this comic sense operating in the placing of personal jokes at somewhat less prominent points than the end of an ode, agon or an episode. The effect of a joke which helps to structure or shape the development of a scene or conversation may be less noticeable and more delicate than in the above cases, and to be aware of what might be called the comic rhythm of a scene we need to read through the whole structure, making full use of our imaginative eyes and ears. Personal jokes of the kind with which we are concerned make only a small contribution, of course, to this aspect of the composition of Aristophanes' plays, and a full understanding of it would have to examine other sorts of material too. But since commentators have avoided observing such matters, it may be worth putting forward a few particular illustrations.
Peace 43-8: This joke is the last element in the preliminaries to the explanation of the plot; the slave who speaks it, having given his imitation of sophistication with a coarse twist, enters the skene immediately, helped, it would be hoped, by the audience reaction to both the joke and the gesture accompanying δώσω πεζίν. The opening lines of the play present a deliberately bizarre and puzzling scene, and the joke at 43-8 teasingly exploits the ignorance in which the audience are being kept while also giving the momentary satisfaction of a satirically clever interpretation of the scene. The impression is briefly but deliberately given that the slave is going to explain the situation to the audience, but after the satirical description of Cleon, when we await the true answer, he suddenly exits with a crude joke. One stage in the action is wound up amusingly, and the audience's appetite is whetted for the next.

Peace 146-8: The gibe at Euripides furnishes a satisfying conclusion to the humour of this section of the play because it consummates so concisely the strain of paratragedy that has run through the whole scene from 54 onwards; it picks up in particular both the idea that Trygaeus's behaviour resembles the madness of a Euripidean protagonist and the connection between the planned trip to heaven and the plot (cf. λόγος 148) of the Euripidean Bellerophon. These two comic elements are encapsulated in the ambivalent ἡγεσία (148), which, like ἡγεσίατερος at 136 (and cf. ἡγεσίατοκόν at Ach. 9), blends the dramatic sense of the word with a broader suggestion of suffering: this latter is an unusual meaning, but there are some fourth-century parallels. This is one of Aristophanes' cleverest short exploitations of the confusion between tragedy and comedy generated by paratragedy, and its force is employed to help in the shaping of the scene, for it marks the end of the conversation between father and daughters, and Trygaeus's movements immediately after it, at 149, will probably have indicated that he is about to set off (or, strictly speaking, continue, as his ascent began
earlier: cf. 80, 83, 92).

Birds 10–11: This joke marks a less definite structural point than the preceding cases, but it shows how a personal reference can be used to crystallise a particular element in the development of a scene. The opening eleven lines of dialogue convey the fact that the characters are lost: this emerges cumulatively in the confused behaviour of the birds, is plainly affirmed in line 9, and then comically reinforced by the personal joke. The dialogue can then move on to discussion of where the men were trying to reach in the first place; the joke plays a small part in shaping what Gelzer has demonstrated to be a carefully composed dramatic sequence, and it is reasonable to suppose that delivery would here be correlated with the actors' physical behaviour (they seem to get stuck at 9–11 and then start to move again at 12).

Birds 362f.: The structural function of this joke is part of a rich dramatic context of words and actions, not all of which is immediately obvious on the page. We need to visualise the scene from 352 onwards, where the chorus of birds start to get into battle formation; their preparations continue throughout 352 to 363, and they start to attack at 364. Both the Athenian characters are also in action throughout this passage, Euelpides in a state of panic which is gradually brought under control, Peisetairus trying to check his companion's flight and assemble defensive weapons at the same time: this short scene contributes much to our sense of what distinguishes the two men. Euelpides' comment on Peisetairus's mock-heroic improvisations comes, then, at a critical stage in all this action, with the bird-army on the very point of attacking and Peisetairus's manoeuvres reaching the heights of the ludicrous; it brings out, with a hint of relief in Euelpides' voice, the delicious humour of the situation, directs an ironic glance, perhaps with topical overtones,
at real strategia, and allows (I suspect this was part of Aristophanes' intention) the impact of the birds' onslaught to blend with the audience's response to the joke.

Thesm. 29-35: These lines constitute the end-piece of the opening action of the play; they are immediately followed, as at Birds 363, by a new event, the opening of the skene door and the entry of Agathon's slave (Euripides' anticipation of this, incidentally, looks forward to one of the common conventions of New Comedy: compare e.g. Peace 232f., Lys. 5). It serves, therefore, both to complete the preliminary conversation between Euripides and his relation, in that the latter has been waiting since the beginning of the scene to learn where the poet is taking him, and to arouse comic expectations about what is to follow, intimating in particular, through the irony of μέλας, καρπερός and δαμωνικός, and the frankness of the punch-line (35), what sort of treatment Agathon will receive. The force with which the joke winds up the opening conversation derives much from the contrast between Euripides' obscurely learned speech prior to this point and his sudden utterance of θείηνης at the end.

Frogs 577f.: The reference to Cleon naturally gets some of its edge from 569-70, just as Clouds 680 picks up 673-6. The two inn-keepers were introduced for the humour of the confrontation; they now have to be got off: that is the purpose of the threat which the woman now utters - Aristophanes is no more interested in following it up (though the audience cannot realise that immediately) than he is in following up the threat of the creditor at Nu. 1254f., the reason for the boys' exit at Wasps 414, or the promise of the woman at Thesm. 762-4. Frogs 577f. makes the exit emphatically comic, giving the actor an opportunity to make something of it visually as well, and in addition creates the possibility of the ensuing humour of yet another change of heart by Dionysis; it sharpens the lines of the situation.
I want, finally in this section, to illustrate how personal jokes can perform a preparatory or 'proleptic' function, laying the ground for something later in the play and potentially adding to the audience's satisfaction when that later point is reached. In most cases this function could only be appreciated when the complementary element is supplied, for the joke itself need not seem to point forward. One passage, however, where some anticipation might be aroused is *Wasps* 240-44, which gets fulfilled in the later trial scene. Although Aristophanic characters quite often make references to the future which do not lead to anything (cf. on *Frogs* 577f. above), these are usually made on leaving the stage. For a chorus to look forward to something which they regard as imminent on their very entry would be less easy for an audience to ignore, though by the time that we reach the trial scene the earlier reference has probably been forgotten, and the manner in which it is fulfilled is certainly unpredictable. *Wasps* also furnishes an example of two personal jokes which form a connected pair, at 157 and 438. It is not that the mention of Dracontides at 438 could not stand without the earlier one, but the first does add a nuance to the second which it would not otherwise have: it is as though the intrusion of Dracontides into Philocleon's prayer to Cecrops were some kind of Freudian slip, evincing his obsession with his victims in the courts. Dicaeopolis's two gibes at Theognis at *Ach.* 11 and 139f. offer a similar possibility of our seeing an extra point in the second one because we remember the first: the protagonist, as it were, will not easily forget the shock he had when Theognis's play came on. Both these pairs of jokes are close enough together for an audience to be able to relate them in performance and for us to be reasonably confident that Aristophanes intended a connection to be made between them. In the case of *Ay.* 13ff. and 1076-83 we are probably dealing with a less conscious intention, and it is unlikely that more than a few members of an audience would pick up the nice stroke of humour in the fact that the birds deliver a denunciation of the very bird-seller who had directed Peisetaurus and Euklides to their destination
in the sky. More straightforward is the way in which Ach. 566ff., where
the half-chorus invoke Lamachus, derives some of its comic significance
from Dicaeopolis's earlier gibe at the general in his phallic song (270).
A clearer-cut employment of this technique, and perhaps the most interest­
ing example in the extant plays, is to be found in Thesm. The shaving of
Mnesilochus's beard, painfully performed between lines 221 and 233, visibly
transforms his mask from that of an old man to that of a face which reminds
Mnesilochus himself of Cleisthenes (235); and the mask thus transformed
is in our sight for the rest of the play (cf. αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ τὰς γνάθους
ὑπηρεσίαν , 903). The old man is consequently visible when Cleisthenes
appears at 574, and the first words that this character speaks on his
entry into the Thesmophoria make it clear that his mask must have spoken
for itself: ὅτι μὲν φίλος ἡμῖν ὑμῖν , ἰππίηλος τῷ σ γνάθοις (575).
We need not in this case, in other words, wonder whether the audience would
remember the earlier joke; they could hardly have forgotten it, with
Mnesilochus's face permanently there to remind them, and I think we can be
sure that Aristophanes did not miss the opportunity of reinforcing the point
of the earlier joke by making Cleisthenes' mask recognisably similar,
perhaps even identical, to Mnesilochus's as transformed by Agathon's razor.
Nor, indeed, does this strand of humour finish with the audience's first
sight of Cleisthenes' mask, for both his face (582ff.) and the rumours about
Euripides' shaving of his kinsman (589ff.) are made the subject of jokes
in the ensuing dialogue, and before long Cleisthenes and Mnesilochus are
actually brought, in a special Aristophanic sense, face to face (592ff.).

Techniques

"It remains an uncontradicted fact that if we undo the technique of a joke
it disappears." Freud's emphasis on the technical and formal aspects of
ejokes is such a heavy one as to deny the possibility of the same joke being
structured or technically formed in more than one way, which is simply an
indication of the fact that some jokes are not necessarily tied up with a
technique. The exaggeration is nonetheless a pardonable one, for most jokes
certainly involve deliberate exploitation or manipulation of language of a
kind which it is fair to call technical, and this is equally true of the
conversational or anecdotal jokes with which Freud was concerned end of
jokes integrated into the utterances of characters in a play. Aristophanes' style of comedy as a whole relies heavily on verbally and formally calculat-ed types of humour, and this is one of the things which lie behind his own emphasis on τὰ επιμέ, the words or poetry of his plays, in contrast to what he claims to be the excessively and routinely visual character of his rivals' comedy: Clouds 537-44, Wasps 1046 f., Peace 739-50, (cf. Kn. 39).

Despite these claims and the nature of the plays themselves, Aristophanic criticism has not studied its author's verbal artistry as much as it might have, and much of what criticism of this aspect of his work there has been has consisted of a rather mechanical categorisation of typical word-formations, humorous subject matter, and the more obvious techniques such as παρά προσβολήν jokes or terms of abuse - the kind of categorisation, in fact, which goes back to the ancient analysis of humour into techniques of λέξις and προσβολή, verba and res, as exemplified in the Tractatus Coislinianus or Cicero's de Oratore, ii 216-90. The common and standard tricks of humour do matter, of course, but there is relatively little to be said about them. My concern in this section is rather with technical aspects and problems of the introduction of personal jokes into dramatic dialogue, and of their exploitation of verse-structure, word order and special visual effects, all of which has received very little attention indeed. I do not offer a comprehensive scheme of techniques, but an analysis of some of the more important but neglected ones. I try to keep in mind throughout, moreover, that when Aristophanes conceived what may strike us as verbal or formal jokes on a page he must have had the sound and sight of an actor's
delivery in his imagination. I do not mean by this to subscribe to the insidious assumption that our text is useful only as a set of clues for the reconstruction of what would have been primarily a visual experience for the original audiences; anyone for whom the plays were only secondarily a matter of language will not have been apprehending more than a small part of what Aristophanes had, and claimed, to offer him. But the language of the comedies was meant to be heard dramatically acted, and if our analysis of joke techniques is to recover aspects of humour which were available to the first audiences we need to use our imagination not only to visualise but also to hear what the text can reveal to us of the playwright's intentions.

The Dramatic Integration of Personal Jokes:

A fundamental question which deserves to be considered as part of the technique of personal jokes is how personal references are introduced into a dramatic flow of dialogue and how far Aristophanes tries to give them a natural dramatic justification. Jokes other than those located in purely choral sections of the plays have to be uttered by characters who for most of the time are meant to be individuals in a particular situation. Yet in many cases we feel that the comic raison d'être is artificial, that the joke's fundamental function is the supply of entertainment from the satirist to his audience, rather than the assertion or expression of something which contributes realistically to our perception of the dramatic situation or of the characters in it. If Aristophanic comedy were quite as disregardful of even the minimum requirements of dramatic coherence or plausibility as it often seems to be supposed, there would be no point in pursuing any further the question of how far the poet tries to reconcile these two disparate factors; personal jokes in general could be accepted as one of the elements in Aristophanic drama which puncture the pretence of real human behaviour.
I wish to argue, however, that despite his liberal use of a licence for incongruity, discontinuity and fantasy in the construction of his plays, Aristophanes remains generally aware in the composition of his dialogue of the patterns of ordinary conversation and the habits of behaviour, beyond the purely linguistic, associated with them, and that the study of the chief ways in which personal jokes are introduced into the fabric of his scenes can help us to define more precisely the extent and the limits of his interest in realism.

A distinction needs to be drawn immediately between a superficial or minimal realism which entails that the manner in which the joke is introduced and the nature of the remark(s) containing the joke should bear a resemblance to the character of real speech and should not altogether break the coherence of the conversation, and a stronger degree of realism which would allow us to make full dramatic sense of the speaker's purport in its context. The basis of my argument in this section is that many Aristophanic jokes conform to the first of these standards but not to the second, and that if we think in terms only of the second, which observations on incongruity in Aristophanes tend to invite us to do, we miss an important quality of the dramatic style. To take an example which Süß commented on in his well-known article on 'Inkongruenzen', at Lys. 63-4 we cannot rationalise Calonice's remark to the point of being able to say how she is supposed to know about Theagenes' wife's behaviour that morning; we cannot use the remark as telling us something about Calonice herself. The location of the opening scene of Lysistrata is indeterminate, and in any case Calonice had emerged from a house at line 5. With imagination we could construct a hypothesis that would make sense of all these factors, but the obvious truth is that no such hypothesis would correspond to anything that Aristophanes intended an audience to apprehend. But did Aristophanes intend his audience to notice the incongruity itself? Surely not, for the fact is that the section of dialogue in which the joke occurs is
meant to sound realistic, both in the irregularity which the antilobe of 63 imposes on the verse form and in the appropriateness of Calonice's comment, in which she implicitly accepts Lysistrata's expression of disappointment and yet qualifies it ( γονατί). The audience will perceive a joke here, but part of the pleasure of it lies precisely in the way it emerges from what purports dramatically to be a serious remark. The technique is even more important in passages where an utter absurdity strains realism at a deeper level. Ach. 88f. is as clear an instance as we might find. It is inadequate to point out the absurdity as though that were the whole point; appreciation of the joke entails acknowledgement of the comic effect of the operation of the bizarre within the restrictions of the apparently normal: the discrepancy between form and content is the means whereby the ambassadors can be shown as unintentionally exposing their own impostures. The speaker has to be understood dramatically to be making a serious claim, reemphasising the supposed truth of his narrative in the face of Dicaeopolis's expression of sheer disbelief (86f.). The outlines of the exchange are recognisably familiar enough to allow the comic mechanism to work. Here is one striking, if untypically bold, example of how the incidental satirical function of a personal joke can be synthesised with the maintenance of minimal dramatic realism. The technique stretches to a comic extreme the playwright's capability simultaneously to represent a character and to communicate an attitude to him through his own utterances. Of a related comic kind is the joke at Av. 1126—9, though here the humour, which of course contains a paratragic element, is not turned against the speaker. But the resemblance to Ach. 88f. resides in the fact that the messenger's utterance serves two functions at once: to convey information which in a sense we have to accept as part of the unfolding plot; and to couch this information in a form which provides an independent satirical pleasure. It is almost as if a statement of the marvellous and an expression of cynical amusement at it were being run together. This is a distinctive Aristophanic mode of humour, but not easily
paralleled from other sources.

We have to be prepared in cases such as Ach. 88f. to accept that the speaker means what he says, even though we could hardly rationalise his motives for saying exactly what he does say. If it were questioned whether this response is the one which Aristophanes was looking for, I could only point to the fact that in cases where I see this technique operating Aristophanes has written lines which formally seem to express seriousness of some kind. At Ach. 88f. the ambassador uses the emphasis of earnestness in the face of doubt: καὶ νω ἔδει ἄρ χρῆ. His narrative throughout is formally serious, and that it should be acted this way is necessary if Dicaeopolis's responses are to make sense. In other places where a personal joke is contained in an exposing or self-satirising utterance the same is true. At Frogs 944, where Euripides declares that his treatment of Tragedy has involved using an admixture of Cephisophon, Aristophanes invites us to respond as we might do in life if someone allowed a damaging admission to slip out. Although the paradosis cannot be relied on where attributions are concerned, and although the attribution of Ἐρυπίδης ὑπερεξήγη to Dionysus would be in itself unobjectionable, there is no good reason not to let Euripides speak the words, and the reaction of the commentator who finds it "incredible" that Aristophanes should offer such a joke is based on private preconceptions and not on the poet's own practice. There can be no doubt, for example, about the self-deflating boast of the Paphlegonian at Kn. 764f., or the chorus's invocation of Θείας Ἑθοεξηγή at Wasps 418; and Frogs 1453, the attribution of which to Euripides has never been questioned, furnishes a very close analogy to Frogs 944. In all these cases (and I would add Kn.1069, 1084f., Wasps 342, 599 and Frogs 967) the content of the utterance is implausible but the form is not, and we are required to treat the speaker's purport as serious: the technique exploits, in an exaggerated manner, the fact that what we say sometimes exposes more than we intend, contradicts what we have previously said, or makes us seem
ludicrous in the eyes of our listeners. The size of the discrepancy between form and content in some of the examples cited can be taken not as something which detracts from the plausibility of what in performance would be a whole manner of delivery (reinforced perhaps by behaviour throughout a scene, not just at the point of the individual joke) but rather as something which sharpens the pleasure we may derive from the doubly satirical effect of the utterance.

It is a significant indication of the style of his humour that Aristophanes preferred the piquancy of self-exposing utterances as a vehicle for personal jokes (and, indeed, in general) to the comedy of unintended double entendre. I can locate with any certainty only one case of the latter in the extant plays, at Frogs 48. Heracles has opened his door to Dionysus and humorously assumes that the club and lion-skin in which the latter is dressed signify foreign service as a soldier. If we translate Heracles' question τοι γῆς ἀπειδημέεις; (48) as 'Where were you off to?' or similarly, with an intentional imperfect, we produce a very odd question and an answer that does not fit it. Dionysus's answer proves in fact that the sense of τοι γῆς ἀπειδημέεις must be 'Where on earth were you [i.e. have you been] on service?', and τοι must carry the sense of τιθι, as it does at Birds 9, τοι ἔριεν; and elsewhere. What is the purport of Dionysus's reply, ἐπιπαθήνων Κλεισθένει, which carries the joke? Radermacher (ad loc.) thinks that Dionysus chooses to lie out of embarrassment, and it might be possible for the actor to convey this by his inflection. But although Xanthias's interjection at the end of 51, κατ᾽ ἔνωυ ἑιγηγόμην, implies that Dionysus is lying, that is best taken as referring to the boast in lines 49–50. We cannot, in truth, rationalise ἐπιπαθήνων Κλεισθένει from the speaker's point of view beyond saying that it is seriously meant; all that matters dramatically is that Dionysus is shown as accepting Heracles' humorous assumption that he has been on military service. This does not amount to a very plausible train of thought, if we scrutinise it at leisure, but
Aristophanes has maintained a surface realism and logic in the composition of the dialogue, and the importance of this for the impression that would be made in the speed of performance should not be underestimated. That the poet intended his actor to deliver ἐπεμέλειαν Κλεισθένει in a way which made Dionysus innocent of the obscene meaning which the audience necessarily discern in the phrase seems to me to be clinched by syntax: a dative after ἐπεμέλειαν is much less usual than a genitive (cf. LSJ s.v.), but ἐπεμέλειαν Κλεισθένει would be overtly risqué and incompatible with an innocent meaning, whereas the use of the dative allows us to suppose that Dionysus means he served at Arginusae on Cleisthenes' ship. This is a genuine double entendre, then, and Heracles will taunt Dionysus with the unfortunateness of it at 58, when he asks ἐνδυρέων τῷ Κλεισθένει; The drollery of Heracles at Frogs 58 points to the most obvious way in which the possible tension between the independent satirical impetus and the requirements of the dramatic setting of a personal joke may be resolved, by presenting the joke as an intentional one on the speaker's part and harmonious with his dramatic behaviour in the context. The humour of Heracles' question at Frogs 58 is confirmed by Dionysus' response: μὴ δώρωπή μ' Ἀδηλπή κτλ. Equally flippant are Dionysus' own lines at 152f., where he adds his artistic bête noire to Heracles' list of sinners. A somewhat different kind of case is the pun on Lamachus's name at Ach. 270: the joke is part of a set of Dionysiac iambics sung in honour of Phales, and the relish of the personal reference belongs to the same ethos of freedom and celebration as the obscenity which follows it. But most of the cases where the satirical point of view involved in appreciation of the reference coincides with the speaker's intention occur in dialogue, and the utterance which contains the joke is an emotional or emphatic one expressive of an idea or sentiment pertinent to the addressee and the dramatic situation; the joke is incorporated in a realistic way of speaking, and far from diverting
attention from the facts of the scene it may lend a plausible incisiveness to what is meant. I list a number of examples:

**Ach. 389-91:** A comically extreme hyperbole ("you can even... as far as I'm concerned") which expresses the chorus's determination not to yield to Dicaceopolis. For the use of ἐμένω γ' ἐκεῖ cf. Dem. 20.14 and Menander Disc. 564 f.

**Clouds 1000 f.:** A confident dismissal of the opponent's case and a menacing assurance to Pheidippides of what a traditional education will turn him into. *Peace* 950 ff. is not dissimilar.

**Birds 11:** "Not even so-and-so...." is an obvious form of strong asseveration to which Peisetairus gives a comic twist. Cf. Plato *Laches* 196e, ὁδὲ τὴν Κριμπομονίαν ὅν καλ. (where Socrates notes Πως δὲ λέγουσα παρ' αὐτῶν).

**Birds 1405-7:** Peisetairus's sarcastic dismissal of Cinesias, the tone of which is signalled, as at *Frogs* 58, by the response: καταγιαζμένον μου, ἔδεσσα ἐκ.

**Thesm. 235:** Mnemosilochus's heavily sarcastic retort to Euripides' question. It naturally carries a complaint about what Euripides has done to him, and is less light-hearted than the similar remark at *Thesm.* 97 f. Cf. the sceptical sarcasm at *Th.* 273.

**Frogs 588:** "If I (don't) may I..." A standard way of promising etc.; for the earnestness of it here see pp. 201f., and cf. the similar joke at *Kn.* 400 f. (Cf. also *Av.* 447).

**Eccl. 806-8:** A blusteringly ironic comment on Chremes' trust in the new communism.

**Plutus 602:** Chremylus's wryly dismissive gibe at Poverty.

In the above examples the satirical aim of the joke and the speaker's purport are in harmony; the personal reference helps to convey the tone of what is meant and applicable in the circumstances. Many other jokes are grafted onto the dialogue unremarkably in ways which are consonant with
dramatic relevance and coherence, simply by virtue of being factual or quasi-factual references to characters, events, places, social customs etc. of a kind which any Athenian might make in his own conversation. Even when the locations and characters of Aristophanes' plays are not Athenian, familiarity with the world of Athens is always presupposed: even the Hoopoe has knowledge of Athenian personalities (Birds 281-3) as well as its general character (e.g. 109, 378-80, 443-50); the chorus of Mystai in Frogs are up-to-date in their news of the city (Frogs 354 ff., 416f.); and the gods themselves are naturally interested in contemporary Athens (Peace 261 ff.). Part of the general value of personal jokes to Aristophanes is that they contribute to and reinforce the sense of comfortable familiarity to his audience of the world he offers them, and many of them are sufficiently justified in dramatic terms by being employed by speakers to prove a point, add colour to a contention, emphasise a contrast etc. This ordinary manner of introducing a joke is too common to be susceptible of any useful schematisation; I just note some of the broader types: personal experiences may be drawn on or narrated (e.g. Ach. 1-16, 377 ff., Nu. 876, Wasps 15 ff., 680, 787 ff., 1187, Lys. 102 f., Frogs 930-32); affairs of state remembered or discussed (Ach. 515 ff., Kn. 254, Peace 605 ff., 670 ff., Lys. 391 ff., 490 f., Eccl. 184 f., 823 ff.); recent events reported (Ach. 1174 ff., Nu. 144 ff., Wasps 1301 ff., Peace 268-70, Birds 1292 ff., Ploutos 665 ff.); future possibilities anticipated, recommended, feared etc. (Kn. 969, 1374, Nu. 503, Wasps 157, 240, 1007, Peace 1007 ff., Frogs 577 f., Eccl. 248 ff., 644 ff.). I want now, however, to examine in closer detail a number of specific techniques used to integrate jokes in their immediate contexts; my aim is to show the varying interplay between ordinary ways of speaking and the artificialities of comic design in Aristophanes.

Personal references may be justified as either illustrating or undermining a claim or generalisation. The procedure is natural to serious argument or discussion, though it also gives scope in ordinary conversation
for the exercise of wit and irony. There is nothing essentially undramatic, therefore, about any joke that is contained in an illustration or a counter-example, but an element of comic calculation sometimes enters into the employment of this kind of utterance in Aristophanes. It is in instances of counter-examples produced to attack or undermine an assertion that we most naturally find tidy dramatic integration, for the speaker's tone is likely to be polemical. A straightforward instance is Nu. 398-400, where Socrates, arrogant from his superior enlightenment, abusively rejects Strep-siades' simple faith in the justice of Zeus; we are invited at this point to share Socrates' attitude, at least towards the ζωοκέφαλος of the people he names: his aggressiveness may be amusing, but in appreciating the satire we take his dramatic point; the incisiveness of the personal jokes complements the vigour of Socrates' scorn. Different in tone, but involving just the same synthesis of the speaker's and the satirical aim, are Eccl. 630, where Blepyrus imagines the consequences of Praxagora's scheme for sexual communism, and the two examples chosen by the cynical man at Eccl. 806-8 and 809 f., the first of them ironically, the second frankly, sceptical. I would suggest that both Birds 521 (not actually a counter-example, but it deflates Peisetairus's point) and Frogs 1036-8 belong in this category. It might be preferable to treat both of these as artlessly tactless remarks, less positively intended by their speakers than the preceding examples, but it is nonetheless an objection to the bland application of the adjective 'bomolochic' to the roles of Eupides and Dionysus in the agons of Birds and Frogs that at certain points, of which the two cited are representative, we may be meant to laugh with, not at, the speaker, for it seems to me that appreciation of the humour of such utterances commits us to a degree of scepticism about the supposedly serious arguments with which they are juxtaposed, the educational value of Homer and the archaic piety of animal oaths. The speaker's point may also be closely aligned with the effect of a joke in some cases where a thesis is being supported by illustration.
At Eccles. 102-4 Praxagora's swipe at Agyrrhius's sexual and political credentials is certainly pertinent not just to her immediate point about disguising oneself with a beard but also to the general female assault on the male political system. A more complex humour is in play at Thesm. 168-70, where Mnesilochus produces examples of his own to bear out Agathon's technical claim that $\boxhat$ (167). Agathon's use of this principle is apologetic, but Mnesilochus twists the point in the act of taking it, turning it from a positive to a negative principle which reflects badly on Agathon himself: yet this is only an implication, and Agathon can confirm Mnesilochus's illustrations (171). Wasps 579 f. and 592 f. demonstrate how a paradoxical comic technique can be created out of a combination of the normal uses of illustrations, by making the speaker's references undermine the case he intends; this technique is a particular manifestation of the grotesque way in which Aristophanic characters are sometimes made to produce damning or ridiculous admissions about themselves (see above). Philocleon's illustrations of his privileges as a juryman are, in the one instance, far-fetched (despite the credulity of some modern scholars) and, in the other, couched in terms which ought to make Philocleon himself see through the flattery which gives him pleasure (592, is the description an opponent of Cleonymus's would give). In two passages in the extant plays Aristophanes develops the procedure of illustrating a thesis into something resembling a comic routine. At Clouds 348ff. Strepsiades takes Socrates' point for the only time in the whole play and joins him in furnishing examples of how the Clouds change their appearance in accordance with the things they see on earth; the intellectual disparity between the two men momentarily ceases to matter, and they share the pleasure of picking suitably entertaining illustrations. We might with good reason sense that Socrates and Strepsiades here behave like the players of a party-game, for I strongly suspect that the description of the Clouds' Protean adaptability to the
appearance or character of individuals is meant to remind the audience of the game of ἐικασμός: note in particular σκαπάσας... Ὑκάσαν (350) – a satirical purpose, similar to that of the person who engages in eikasmos, is projected onto the Clouds themselves. The passage in which the technique of supplying illustrations is extended quite beyond the normal limits and exploited for all its comic worth is Pl. 160ff. A generalisation (160f.) is followed by some non-personal examples (162–73) and then some personal ones (174–80, excepting 178). The structured, cumulative force of these lines would depend on the calculated delivery of actors for its full effect, but Aristophanes has given them some details to work with: the mixture of serious with satirical examples, the latter gradually predominating; the use of antilabe for quickening of pace; the division of the list by Plutus's interjection at 169, and the switch to questions after it – all this gives scope for variation of tone, integrated into a purposeful design. From 170 onwards the accumulation becomes relentless, and the personal jokes form the climax of the series; from 170 to 180 the sequence calls for an inflection on the actors' part which suggests a mischievous rivalry between Chremylus and Carion in the selection of striking examples, and how else could Aristophanes end the list, which gives the impression that we could go on in this vein indefinitely, other than by an abrupt interruption (180)?

I move next to personal jokes contained in comparisons, explicit or implicit. As with illustrations, comic exploitation rests on a basis of real speech, and once again there is natural scope for wit or satire. Cf. Andoc. iv. 22, where the speaker accuses Alcibiades of having behaved Παρακατήσας Ἀγίσθεν; or Menander Kolax fr. 2 (Sandbach), where Strouthis says to Bias: Ἀλέξανδρον πλέον/ τῷ βασιλέως πέπωκε. One of the attractions of comic comparisons to the dramatist is that they can easily be kept tightly connected with a speaker's dramatic intention, maintaining the coherence of a dialogue by expressing a boast, insult, compliment or whatever, while economically combining a satirical gibe with it.
general points are worth adding. The first is that comic comparisons highlight the tendency of personal satire both to pick out individuals who can be regarded as representative or typical of a particular characteristic and to help to turn the objects of jokes into representative figures of this kind: it is not always easy to know how far a joke is drawing on a ready-made representativeness, or how far it is offering to create one, and in many cases we should probably allow for an element of both, for both are operations of the same essential process of stereotyping which I argued for in ch. 3. Not all jokes obviously involve this tendency; many narrative ones, for instance, do not manifest it. It is to be seen rather in the succinct references which do not themselves contain the information necessary to appreciate them (not easily, at any rate, in the flow of performance) — e.g. Ach. 887, 1002, Kn. 1372, Nu. 1022, Peace 921, Pl. 602. Many comparisons fall into this latter category; they are short and crisp, and we need to know what the connotations of the object of the comparison are. Without such knowledge we cannot, for example, pick up the point of Strepsiades' ὡστέρ Περικλῆς ἑιτ το δεν ἀπέλευθ (Nu. 859), or ἔιαν βίον γενναίον ὡστέρ Μόρφοις (W. 506), or ταύτα γε ποιοῦν ὡστέρ Κλέινυμος (Peace 446). The second general point is that comic comparisons naturally bring us close to the Athenian fondness for ἐκαστικός. The existence of this game of wit should alert us both to the possibility that some comparisons which may seem rather tortuous to us might be borrowing some charm from the style of eikasmos (e.g. Nu. 501-3, Eccl. 735f.), and to the occasional possibility of an even closer relation between a joke and the game. I would suggest that Aristophanes' audience are very likely to have taken Bdelulceleon to be playing eikasmos at W. 822, and his father to be doing likewise at W. 1141f. 

The range of comic effects obtainable by a personal comparison is wide, and depends on the interplay in each case between speaker, comparison and situation. At Nu. 1000f. the Unjust Argument's intention and the satirical
thrust of the utterance are identical. At *Av*. 362f., however, Eupelides' comparison of Peisetaurus's generalship to that of Nicias is intended by the speaker as a lively compliment, but its effect is deflected by the disparity between real strategia and this mock-military situation, as well as by the ambiguity of τὰς μακανὰς; Nicias himself loses a little in the comparison, as does Pericles at *Nu*. 859, on account of the disingenuous character of ἱμάτιον ἀποδέξα (cf. 857). Τοιπλάσιον Κλεινύμου at *Ach*. 88 combines a gibe at Cleonymus's size with an indication of the preposterous bombast which the ambassadors are offering the assembly. As this last example indicates, a comparison can be comically exploited, as can any other form of speech in Aristophanes, so as to produce a disparity between the speaker's purport, as signalled formally, and the content of what he says. Another clear instance of this mode of humour occurs at *N*. 599, where our ignorance of Euphemius's identity does not prevent us from being able to see that the comparison is meant to undermine Philocleon's intended admiration for Theorus: the joke is a means of intimating that Philocleon has no standards. The technique used at *Peace* 863f. is subtly different. For one thing, this joke is located in a song, not an ordinary conversation; we need to imagine Trygaeus and the chorus as joint revellers or the like. The chorus are enjoying Trygaeus's celebrations, and they do of course think he is going to be happy, as they have just said (856–8, 860–2). At 865ff. the protagonist responds to the chorus's preceding remark as though it had confirmed the confident expectation of bliss which his rhetorical question at 863 expressed (compare *Ach*. 1011 and its context). There can be no doubt dramatically, in other words, what the chorus mean at 864: ἔδαμαμονεστερος φιλεὶ τῶν Καρκίνων στραβλίων. The disparity between the form and the content of what they say is not to be understood as irony (and certainly not of the kind posited in the scholion here: ἔδαμαμονεστερος ἀντὶ τῶν κακοδαμονεστερος) but rather as the coalescence of two ideas: "You'll be very happy" and "How much happier you'll be than Carcinus's
If we wish to rationalise the joke any further, we can see this coalescence as due to a desire on the chorus's part to congratulate Trygaeus both positively and negatively, the latter involving the thought of the celebrant's superiority over others (cf. e.g. Ach. 836ff.).

The next technique for presenting jokes which I want to consider might be regarded as a compressed or crystallised form of comparison. It is the use of a proper name as a kind of metaphor, addressed or attached as a term of abuse (sometimes in compounds: see the end of this ch.) to someone other than the holder of the name from whom its significance or connotations are derived. There are in fact only a small number of jokes of this kind in Aristophanes, even though the phenomenon is commonly found in ordinary speech. Andocides gives an amusing twist to it at 1.129 in discussing Callias's alleged relationships with three related women: in such a situation, he asks, how can one decide to whom Callias's son belongs or what name he should be given - τίς ἂν ἔχῃ ὁ τάτος; Οἰδίππου ἦν Ἀθηναῖος; ἢ τί ἡ Ἐν τὸν ὄνομά μος; Andocides is here ironically running together the literal need to give names to offspring (and the right ones for the family) with the ridiculing device of applying one person's name to another. The technique as usually employed is far more concise and economical, and while this makes for a sharp comic impact it also requires a quick and certain response, which may be the reason why Aristophanes does not use it more often. The fact of satirical economy makes it impossible for us to appreciate this type of joke unless we have some familiarity with the target, as τὸν... ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἔχετε ταύτην at Birds 17 demonstrates: ancient scholars guessed or pretended to know the point, but I suspect they were on the wrong lines. This metaphorical use of the 'son of ...' formula seems to be unique. Λαύασπεδίας ἐν τὴν φωνή at Birds 1569, despite some uncertainty about the sartorial point, is a less puzzling joke, in that it is filled out by Poseidon's exclamation in 1570f. and probably derives at least part of its interest from the topicality of the reference to Laispodias's
strategia. Regular employment of a name as a term of abuse would turn it permanently into one of proverbial value, and this is what happened at some stage to Phrynondas, whose name occurs with a strongly abusive flavour at Thesm. 861 and in fr. 26 (ὢ μισάς και Φρυνούσω καὶ τονηγή δῦ), and seems to have occurred elsewhere in both Aristophanes and Eupolis. Phrynondas also turns up in three fourth-century writers (Isocrates 18.57, Plato Prtg. 327d, Aeschin. 3.137); in each case his name is used to represent an extreme of wickedness or unpleasantness and in a hyperbolic manner which underlines the established nature of his reputation. Aeschines, in 330, describes him as one of τῶν πάλαι πονηγεν, and it is evident that we might here be dealing with a very old figure, already a byword in Aristophanes' day. Indeed it would only be reasonable to doubt whether a real person of this name ever lived. The name itself seems to be unique, and the derivation from φρυνος may not be accidental (though several common Athenian names were similarly derived). We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that Phrynondas was a historical character of some sort and that his proverbial notoriety was partly due to publicity given him by the poets of Old Comedy, whose opportunity to broadcast scandal to a larger number of people than any politician or orator ever addressed gave them unique scope to impress a personal image on the public mind, limited only by the infrequency of their performances. The reference to Peisander's putative cowardice at Xen. Symp. 2.14 (despite its dramatic date, written after the man's death) and the later proverb δειλότερες Πεισάντερες provide a much firmer case of a posthumous proverbiality which must have owed much to publicity originally given in comedy, for it is not otherwise easy to account for the spread of what Peisander's career suggests was certainly not a proven blot on his record: on the contrary, the perpetuation in comedy of Peisander's other image, that of a demagogue and war-monger, makes plausible the hypothesis that the gibe of cowardice was partly a way of trying to turn him into the stereotype elaborated at
Peace 1172ff., the piquancy of which rests on a cynical paradox. To return briefly to the use of a name as a comic metaphor, two other jokes deserve to be mentioned: Kn. 1256, where, although the slave means to flatter the Sausage-seller, the satirical effect is to turn ᾱρος into a synonym for ἀλγίς or the like; and Ach. 117-21, where with visual support Dicaeopolis as it were translates the technique of abusive naming into supposedly literal identification (see below).

If the metaphorical use of a name is apt to make it behave like an ordinary noun, the next technique to be considered has this effect by definition: it is the employment of a name as though it were actually a noun denoting a substance, object or abstract quality. This technique belongs completely, unlike some of the others I have discussed, to the realm of comic artificiality, though I note that Ach. 300 f. shows that the Greeks were familiar with the form of abuse or threat in which a person suggests treating another as an object (cf. Kn. 698-701), which may help to explain jokes such as Ach. 484 and Kn. 1363. But while the technique is an evidently artificial one, it has a severe comic economy which allows it to be employed without causing disruption to the dramatic relevance or continuity of its context. Yet, as with the abusive use of proper names, it is used rather rarely in Aristophanes, and I would again suggest that this may be due to the demands made on an audience's intellect by its economy, as well as to the difficulty of finding suitable opportunities to substitute names for nouns with satirical aptness. Kn. 1363, however, is a case where Aristophanes blends simplicity with economy to produce a readily intelligible joke. Its sharpness can be brought into focus by a comparison with Nu. 1449 f. (or Frogs 1511-13) where μετὰ Σωκράτους simply means that Pheidippides and Socrates deserve the same punishment. At Kn. 1363 Hyperbolus, as well as being a διώκεις himself (cf. Ach. 845-7), and therefore a suitable companion for a βασιλεὺς διώκεις (Kn. 1358), is a substitute for the stone or similar object which might be tied round a
person's neck before he was thrown into the barathrum. The joke at \( \text{W.} \) 324-6 is less simple. Here Aristophanes uses \( \text{ποτε} \), in the sense of 'make/turn into' (cf. \( \text{W.} \) 332), first with an ordinary predicate, \( \text{κατω} \), which ought to remind us of the episode at 143-51, and then with two personal names. I doubt whether it is right simply to say that the two people indicated are 'synonyms' for smoke, even though \( \text{κατω} \) could be used of empty talk. What matters comically at \( \text{W.} \) 324-6 is that we should sense the association of thought rather than recognise a direct equation of noun and name as at \( \text{Kn.} \) 1363. \( \text{τεξωδυκραμμυν} \) in 326 shows that Aristophanes did not expect his audience to think only of a single image, but rather to take \( \text{κατω} \) as a pointer to the elusive, deceptive traits of the targets. The evidence of \( \text{W.} \) 459, where Aeschines is straightforwardly substituted for \( \text{κατω} \) in Bdelucileon's injunction, \( \text{κα\lambda\epsilonι\nu} \) \( \text{προσθες} \) \( \text{Αισχυν} \) \( \text{ντυ 输出} \) \( \text{το} \) \( \text{Σελλαρτιου} \), does not compel us to treat 324-6 as precisely the same joke: at 459 \( \text{ντυ 输出} \) determines the point of the substitution, whereas at 325 Proxenides and \( \text{Σελλα\nu} \) are alternatives to smoke (cf. 328-33). \( \text{Wasps} \) 380 involves another direct substitution: the context suggests at any rate the type of noun expected, if not a particular one, and in this case the name itself intimates the sort of quality appropriate \( \text{Δι\iota \ νι\iota\iota \εισ\iota\iota} \) : cf. the chorus's further advice at 388). At \( \text{Eccl.} \) 97 the technique serves uniquely the purpose of avoiding an expected obscenity (and a gesture from the actor should perhaps also be reckoned with here). There may be a little more to this joke: in view of the fact that four or more other males are attested as having been synonymous in Old Comedy with parts of the anatomy, it is possible that we have here traces of an established form of wit, rather than evidence for a fixed slang use of proper names.

A rather different shade of artificiality belongs to those personal jokes which are introduced as deictic references to individuals who are supposed to be sitting in the audience at the performance itself. The strain which such references impose on the pretence of a dramatic situation
need not be as great as we would logically expect it to be, for the simple reason that although Aristophanes sometimes deliberately undercuts the sense of drama by making someone mention the theatrical conditions as such (cf. the locus classicus at Peace 174f.) he can also engage in the distinguishable practice of enlarging the dramatic situation so as to include or involve the audience but without thereby actually abandoning the dramatic framework; there may, indeed, be more passages in the plays that we have which should be classified in the latter way than in the former. At Clouds 1096ff., for example, the audience is inspected and commented on by Wrong, who then defects to them, accepting defeat in the agon. Even though Wrong may actually go into the audience at 1104, the dramatic situation can still be felt to hold, and the procedure is one of absorbing the spectators into it. There is a similar bending of the audience into the world of the drama at Kn. 162ff. Where, however, an individual appears to be pointed out in the auditorium, to understand the character of the humour we need to keep in mind the structure and dimensions of the theatre in Aristophanes' day. If all the help one has is a gesture from an actor facing the audience but perhaps standing some twenty yards away from the front of it, it is no easy task, and may well be impossible, to spot an individual from behind and in a crowd of considerably more than ten thousand people, particularly when the spectators are seated not along the regular rows of an architectured auditorium but on, for the most part, movable benches laid out on a hillside. One implication of this is that where an actor appears to point out someone without naming or describing him, Aristophanes cannot have wanted or expected his audience to make an identification. It would not be legitimate, for instance, to look for personal jokes in the demonstratives at Nu. 1099-1101: the Just Argument acts here in a style familiar from the stage comedian's repertoire in other ages. But even where the actor names an identifiable individual whom he purports to see, the uncertainty of the direction of his look or gesture,
together with the impracticability for most of the audience of telling whether the person was actually there (not to mention the probability that, except in cases of very familiar public figures, most spectators would not be able to identify targets by sight anyway), makes it obvious enough that Aristophanes will not have needed to know whether the victim of this type of joke was going to be in the audience, nor, a fortiori, where he might be sitting, in order to make the joke acceptable. The nature of this brand of humour, in other words, is not essentially visual, even though there must always have been a visual dimension to the actor's presentation of such jokes. Their general comic rationale lies rather in two facts: they catch the attention of spectators sharply by unexpectedly bringing them within the focus of the play; and they supply the entertainment of satirical rudeness in a popularly satisfying way by seeming to insult or ridicule the target in his presence. I shall now explore the scope of this style of comedy by examining a few cases in more detail.

Wasps 73ff.: It has been claimed that "the passage could hardly have been written or rehearsed if Aristophanes ... had not known in advance that the men named ... would be sitting near the front of the audience." But if the slaves can pretend, as they must do, that the guesses are being made aloud, why should they not simply pretend that Amynias and Nicostratus etc. are sitting near the front, whether or not they were? Given the possibility that two of the targets were generals at this time, and the likelihood that they therefore had προεξέχεια, Aristophanes may well have expected them to be in the theatre in prominent positions, and for some of the audience this might have added an edge to the jokes; but for most spectators it will not have made any difference, for what must have mattered to them was not anything they could actually see but simply the impression that important public figures were making embarrassing suggestions. We need to remember that in performance this passage cannot have been as straightforward a set-piece as it appears on the page: the slave invites the whole audience
to guess at 73, and line 86 seems to have been written in anticipation of a certain amount of random participation by spectators. I doubt whether Aristophanes needed to rely on a claque for the desired effect; one of the purposes of the jokes is to simulate and thereby encourage real contributions from the audience, and the actor who came towards the front of the orchestra must have had to able to adapt the timing of his announcements to the response he was getting.

Peace 883-5: Nowhere else in the extant works is the audience so closely involved as here in the action of one of the later scenes of a play. This is a carefully organised piece of humour. In the first place, it picks up the instruction given to Trygaeus by Hermites at 713ff. Trygaeus remembers his orders at 87lf., and there begins a sequence of words and action, in which the joke about Ariphrades plays a definite role, leading up to the protagonist’s actual approach to the boule seats at 906. The actors must start at least to observe the audience at 877, and probably also to move towards them; certainly Trygaeus moves forwards between 882 and 885. The reference to Ariphrades, as well as supplying the satisfaction of its sexual satire, helps to heighten the impression that the spectators are being drawn into the play. Coming as Trygaeus reaches the edge of the audience, it sharpens the pattern of action: after the response to it at the end of 885, we move on to the next stage of the operation (κυλτικταλ.). Line 883, moreover, is divided by antilabe which must correspond to the visual behaviour of the actors, as the slave and then Trygaeus (with the audience) give their attention to the indicated section of the auditorium.

Lys. 957f.: This joke brings the scene to a close, and the humour of it depends partly on what has gone before. As the scholiast on 956 correctly points out, ταυτηνιαία there refers to Cinesias’s ψωλή (979), which he is
treated as though it were a child, like the infant son (878) which he had earlier brought along to arouse his wife's pity. Cinesias has an erect phallus (831f., 845f., 862f., 918, 928, 937, 947), and at 956 he is required to handle it in a way which visually emphasises his pathetic pretence of concern for a child (Cinesias is on the floor: 925, 929f., 948). At 957 he looks definitely, and perhaps moves, towards the audience, as though expecting to see Philostratus the pornoboskos in it, and then issues the order for a TIT$ which again allegorises his sexual needs in the language of child-care. The involvement of the audience is slighter and briefer than in the preceding examples: it puts the suffering husband and Aristophanes' male audience momentarily in the same world. It should be noted that this joke has something in common with a number of passages in which the suggestion of summoning someone is made (W. 409, Frogs 569f., 577f., Eccl. 364ff., 915f., Pl. 602) but it differs from them, as it does from the appeal to Cleon at W. 197, in being designed to allow the actor to address himself directly to the audience in his plea for help, implicitly playing with the comic possibility that Philostratus will emerge from it in response.

Eccl. 167f.: Whether we keep ζεύς or change to Elmsley's ζεύς, the woman's remark has a demonstrative force, as the second clause proves: cf. ζεύς at Eccl. 1030. The theatre audience here merges with the audience of Praxagora's mock assembly (compare Ach. 75f. etc.), and in the context of 165-69 the joke emphasises the two main strands of the whole opening scene: the failure of Athenian males to show enough virility in politics, and the resolve of the women to turn themselves into political men. Hence the extension within the joke from Epigonus to a larger group of spectators—perhaps the boule, but I think it would suit the humour of the situation just as well if the gesture on ζεύς were a vaguer one.
Plutus 800f.: Closely analogous to Peace 883–5, this joke brings the scene to an end by playfully emphasising the audience's exclusion from the forthcoming celebrations (cf. Lys. 1058ff., 1189ff.). Dexinicus is imagined as embarrassing himself in a way that any member of the audience might be capable of, rather like the people mentioned at H. 73ff. The humour depends primarily on the simple fact of supposed exposure; to infer in scholiastic fashion that the target was poor or thin is to presume one kind of comic mechanism where others are possible. The suggestion, also recorded in the scholia here, that Dexinicus was a general may only have been deduced from the premise that \( \nu \tau o s \) (800) indicates someone near the front, but it has a fair chance of being on the right lines: a joke about undignified greed would make a particularly easy gibe at any respectable figure. However, unless Aristophanes had bothered to plant a stooge in the audience, which is not very likely, \( \nu i s t a \) (801) goes to confirm that here as elsewhere in this kind of joke what the spectators could actually see need not have been of much relevance to their pleasure.

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The anecdotal jokes that are told in conversation are self-contained and autonomous: they need stand in no structural relation to anything outside themselves. Some of the personal jokes contained in choral odes in Aristophanes are analogous: Ach. 1150ff. is perhaps the best example. But most of the jokes that occur in the dialogue scenes are not neatly separated off in anything like this way. They are located in a continuous structure, out of which they have to emerge. It is aspects of comic technique involving the implications of this fact for dramatic relevance and coherence that I have so far been examining. The present section can be considered as an enquiry into the consequences of this same fact for compositional form. My concern is with the design of jokes, the manner in which they are put
together to produce comic effect at certain points. Design in this context does not mean simply or essentially a pattern on the page; it is rather a matter of what can be operative in performance. As my attempt in what follows to understand the composition of jokes in terms of structured or calculated delivery depends on some presuppositions about the kind of acting that Aristophanes wrote his plays for, I shall first briefly indicate how I arrive at these presuppositions.

Although we have no explicit and independent information from the fifth century about styles of acting, a number of factors can be identified which suggest that actors were expected to give expressive interpretation to their parts. In the first place, we know that competition for prizes among actors existed at Athens from around the middle of the fifth century — certainly at the Dionysia for tragedy, and at the Lenaia for comedy. Competition of this kind in itself tends to presuppose both the scope and the demand for expressive skill. That differences of histrionic interpretation were possible is, at any rate, entailed, and competition is much less likely to have been instituted if acting were highly stylised and conventional, with the difference between actors being measurable only in terms of, say, clarity of voice or correctness of enunciation. This implication is borne out, secondly, by the well-known anecdote preserved in the Poetics (1461 b 34 ff.) about the actor Callippides, who was dubbed πτυχακος by his older fellow-actor Mynniscus: a significant discrepancy of style is evidently involved, whether we take the nickname to refer to excessive naturalism of detail or, more probably I think, to too extravagant or exaggerated a manner. Unless we wish to posit a truly radical change in the character of Greek acting in the early fourth century, moreover, we can find further and more important evidence in Aristotle for technically expressive styles of acting. Aristotle in the Rhetoric (1403 b, iii.1.3 ff.) links together, as do later rhetorical theorists, the actor's art and the orator's art of delivery: ἰποκριτική covers both.
We know from Aristotle that the study and teaching of rhetorical \( \text{ο̱ποκρίσαις} \) goes back to the fifth century: he specifically mentions the writings on the subject of Thrasymochus (iii.1.7). Nothing follows from this, of course, about theatrical practice, but Aristotle talks as though the importance of \( \text{ο̱ποκρίσαις} \) in the theatre had been recognised at an earlier date (iii.1.3-4, 7-8), and it seems to me not unreasonable to treat his comments on this subject as capable of yielding clues to at least the broad character of earlier practice. Aristotle concentrates on two features of acting and orator's delivery:

(a) he maintains that acting is more a matter of nature than of art: \( \text{καὶ ξένι φύσεως ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ} \) \( \text{εἰνα} \) \( \text{καὶ ἀπειθώτερον} \) (1404a, iii.1.7). The outstanding quality of the actor Theodorus resided in the naturalness of his voice: it was superior to others in that \( \text{ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποὺ λέγεται έξεικέν εἰναι, ας ἔδωροτριω} \) (1404 b, iii.2.4). There is a significant criterion of merit at work here.

(b) \( \text{ὑποκριτικὴ} \) is mainly the art of the voice (1403 b, iii.1.4), concerned with the manipulation of its volume, pitch and rhythm for emotional or expressive effect (ib.). Aristotle may somewhat underplay the use by both actor and orator of gesture and general movement of the body (later rhetoricians made much of this), but this would not diminish the value of what he says about vocal expressiveness. Certain types of writing demand to be acted by their very nature, Aristotle suggests, and \( \text{τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ} \) \( \text{ἀριστημένας} \) \( \text{τῆς ὑποκρίσεως} \) \( \text{ὡς ποιοῦντα} \) \( \text{τὸ αὐτῶν έργον φαίνεται εὐθέω} \) (1413 b, iii.12.2). The detailed examples which he goes on to give will be relevant to a particular joke-technique which I later examine.

Although in the last passage cited Aristotle may have scenes characteristic of tragedy particularly in mind (for it is the 'agonistic' style, he suggests, that actors particularly like), his awareness of the relationship between the character of a piece of writing and the acted delivery
of it derives from a knowledge of the Athenian theatre close enough in time and nature to that of the fifth century to give telling support to the belief that we can best approach the question of how Aristophanes' plays were originally acted through observation of the details of composition of the plays themselves, as well as lending weight to the assumption of an essentially expressive style of acting on which to ground such observation. But two cautionary points should be made at once. Aristotle does not imply, and it cannot often if ever be the case, that a piece of dramatic writing dictates the appropriate delivery to the extent that there is only one way of acting it; but he does seem to subscribe to the view which I would want to adopt on independent grounds, that the playwright builds important indications of what is required into his text, and effectively determines the limits within which a faithful actor will have to work.

Secondly, Aristotle's comments on admirable naturalness of acting suggest a style of delivery recognisably related to ordinary speech and behaviour (and thereby help us to feel that we can make good use of the text in our efforts to gain some appreciation of the kind of acting it was intended for) but they do not necessarily imply a straightforwardly accurate reproduction of them in every respect; and reflection on supposedly naturalistic acting in modern theatres should be sufficient to make us aware that what as a cooperative audience we accept as being natural may in fact contain a significant element of the contrived, exaggerated or conventional. We cannot, therefore, hope to reconstruct the finer details of an original production simply on the basis of the text. But it is my underlying contention in much of what follows, and particularly in the sections on antilabe and lists, that we can foster and refine a sensitivity to certain kinds of dramatic intentions, kinds which especially depend on effective acting, by trying to translate our reading of the text of Aristophanes into the terms of ἐπιφύλαξις. And for this purpose I maintain, to reduce the
above arguments to a more concrete and pertinent formulation, that the intrinsic requirements of the script, supported by external indications of a broadly realistic style of acting in fifth-century Athens, make it reasonable to believe that Aristophanes' actors paid careful attention to the delivery of jokes, expressively exploiting their speed of delivery, the inflections of the voice, and their control of gesture and movement, in order to give dramatic effect to the comic techniques employed by the author.

The Placing of Names

The majority of personal jokes actually name their target, whether by his own name, his patronymic, a distorted form of one of these two, or by some variety of humorous sobriquet. I shall later examine some of the verbal techniques involved in Aristophanes' use of proper names, but my concern at this point is with the introduction and placing of a name as an aspect of the structure and formal effect of a joke. In order to try to achieve a balance between generalisation and close observation of particular cases, I organise my material in the framework of a series of annotations on some of the references to Cleonymus in the trimeter scenes of the surviving plays. I treat proper names in the contexts of personal jokes as representative of Aristophanes' general handling of comically important words: obscenities, for example, would be susceptible to the same kind of scrutiny. In what follows I am examining the effect on the placing of names of the interplay between the following factors or determinants of sentence structure:

(a) the grammatical and syntactical make-up of clauses, and the normal (prosaic) patterns of word-order consequently available.

(b) metrical factors: these most importantly include the increased possibilities of emphasis created by the verse structure, particularly at the ends and, to a lesser extent, the beginnings of lines; and the correlative limitations imposed by the need to
keep to particular rhythms.

c) the requirement of ordering elements in a sentence or joke so as
to produce an effective comic impact. This involves two principal
mechanisms: the arousal of interest or expectation; and the
springing of surprise. These naturally operate in different
parts of the structure of a joke.

d) the need to allow an actor to accommodate the reactions of an
audience without straining or breaking the naturalness of delivery
too much. This particularly affects punch-lines.

Ach. 88: Cleonymus's name sits nicely in the final metron of a trimeter,
and this is where we most often find it. This occurrence serves as a
reminder that the emphasis possible at the line-end was not one which
Aristophanes fell into using invariably, fond though he was of it, for it
would be fanciful to suppose that it could be drawn on here, where the
sentence runs on to the caesura in the following line and no significant
pause could be made at the end of 88 consistently with the sense of the
passage. It is at the pause after ἡμίν in 89, which could if necessary be
a strong one, that any audience reaction would have to be accommodated,
though Aristophanes may have intended the main impact to occur with the
second part of the joke, which does exploit the coincidence of verse and
sentence end on φέναξ. The placing of the name at the end of the line
but without a pause available can be found elsewhere, for instance at Ἡ.
787, Av. 153f. (a peculiarly flat-looking joke, though perhaps it would be
visually elucidated), Frogs 13f. and Eecl. 184f. A contrast might be drawn
with Ἡ. 438, where the syntax of the sentence gives the joke time to
operate at the line-end, or with Pherocrates fr. 135:

Ἀλλ' ἐπεξετέρον ὁμοίων θλιστένει,

πέτου κτλ.

Lines such as Av. 1282f. and Frogs 1408f. are not analogous to Ach. 88f.,
for in these the critical words are set in lists, and lists make a more
contrived delivery possible (see below).

Kn. 958: This is an outstanding illustration of the positioning of the target's name at the very end of the joke, with utilisation of the coincidence of line and sentence end to produce maximum comic emphasis. The name occurs unexpectedly as the climax of the whole episode with the ring, and yet it is prepared for by the design of the tense antilabai in the preceding lines. Part of the value of the end-stopped verse to Aristophanes is that it can lend an appropriate force to what is not normally an emphatic position in prose, the end of a sentence. At Clouds 876, for example, καλύτερος γε ταλάντου πετύμεν ἰμαληκέν ἔφεβολος, the proper name, which carries the emphasis in sense of the line, is at the opposite end of the sentence from where we should expect to find it in prose (cf. Nu. 1065), but the cadence of the verse, combined with the surprise contained in the fact expressed, actually gives it an increased comic effect in this position. Even where the name occurs naturally and without any independent stress at the line-end (e.g. Kn. 1083, 1372), this position is comically the most advantageous.

The potential comic usefulness of the end of the verse is abundantly exemplified in Aristophanes. Its special suitability to contain a surprise was acknowledged by Aristotle, who gives at Rhet. 1412a 29–32 an example of a verse (a hexameter) which deceives the listener into expecting one thing but humorously substitutes another. Plutus 27 provides a representative case of a non-personal kind:

πυροτάταν ὑσοῦμεί σε καὶ κληπτίστατον.

Although there is no way of inferring whether a Greek actor would have done this, it is worth noticing that in this instance, as in some others, the effect of surprise might be sharpened in delivery by a slight preceding pause at the caesura after σε, where the sentence could sound complete.

At Ach. 122 such a pause would in fact be enforced by the syntactical break.
at the caesura:

\[ \delta\epsilon\iota\ \delta\varepsilon\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \pi\omicron\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\omicron\omicron\nu\ ;\ \sigma\omicron\ \delta\nu\iota\pi\omicron\upsilon\ \varepsilon\tau\omicron\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\nu\ ;\]

Here the circumstances are special, however. Dicaeopolis has already claimed to identify one of the Persians as Cleisthenes (117f.), so there is heightened comic interest when he turns his attention to the other, and the pause might help the audience to relish their curiosity (or even, perhaps, to guess what is coming), especially if Dicaeopolis confronts and inspects the man after asking his first question, which seems likely in view of the action he is undoubtedly involved in at 110ff. (and cf. at 123).

The examples of the placing of the name at the very end of a joke and in this verse position can be roughly divided into two categories, which should not be confused. In the first place there are those which effect a \textit{swv }\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\sigma\omicron\delta\epsilon\omicron\kappa\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu \textit{joke}. Two points deserve to be made about the appreciation of these in performance. One is that competent speakers of a language do not need much time to sense intuitively the character and 'direction' of a sentence spoken in that language, and there is therefore nothing problematic about treating certain jokes as actually 'cheating' expectations automatically created in an audience by the first part of a sentence (cf. Aristotle's use of \textit{\epsilon\iota\kappa\pi\alpha\tau\omicron\nu} in the passage of the \textit{Rhetoric} cited above). But it should also be said that what we call a \textit{swv }\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\sigma\omicron\delta\epsilon\omicron\kappa\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu \textit{joke} can usually be appreciated as a completed paradox: so its effect does not necessarily or wholly depend on expectations. In all but one of the personal jokes to be put in this category, \textit{Av.} 877, where \textit{\mu\gamma\tau\omicron\rho} requires a personal genitive, though not the one that we are given, the introduction of the name at the tail in itself turns a non-personal into a personal reference: up to that point we are not expecting to hear the name of a person, but rather of a place, object or the like. See \textit{Kn.} 1363, \textit{W.} 19, 380, 438 (troph. tetr.), \textit{Lys.} 103, \textit{Eccl.} 97. The second category contains jokes of a range of effects of a less sharp kind than \textit{swv }\pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\sigma\omicron\delta\epsilon\omicron\kappa\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu . At one extreme there are cases which come close to contradicting expectation,
and certainly depend on an ironic sense of humour: e.g. Nu 876, where it is amusing to hear that a leading ἐθνικὸς had bought his oratorical gifts, and had been taught them only with difficulty; Peace 446, where μακχρι might be taken to suggest the emotional experience of cowardice, though it is unnecessary to see anything more subtle than the contrast of types (as at Peace 673, which is more clearly παρά προσέκοκλιν, however, since we inevitably anticipate a different kind of answer to Peace's question); or Lys. 1105, where the Spartan's desperate desire for sexual release leads him beyond the Athenian's specific proposal (n.b. μόνη, 1104, which the Spartan implicitly rejects). But in other cases the function of the name's position is not so much to spring the unexpected on us as simply to hold back the critical satirical information to the point where it releases the joke with maximum efficiency: see e.g. Kn. 1085, 1103, E. 157, 822, 1007, Frogs 153. The technique is seen at its best at Frogs 153, where the reference to Cinesias forms the last in a series of categories of sinners, and is built up to by the emphasis with which Dionysus introduces his addition to Heracles' list.

Nu.353 f.: Here, in contrast, the name of the target comes near the beginning of the joke, and the main comic weight is thrown onto a later word (ἐλαφοῖς). The difference in technique is fundamental: in the one case the name makes or completes the joke, and the fact that the joke is personal is saved up for the climax; in the other the name announces a personal joke and arouses certain expectations which the poet may then exploit. By this stage in the elucidation of the Clouds' nature the comic thread is a very obvious one, and the pleasure to be had must lie partly in gradually seeing what is coming (note the supererogatory structure: ἱλεύμον - ἐφαστιν - δεικτιν - ἐλαφοῖς). Although the other jokes in this same passage of Clouds may not all be quite so straightforward, they do all bring the target's name to the front of the reference (349, 351, 353, 355) and follow the natural pattern of the ἐκωγοστype of comparison, in which we have the subject
in our attention to begin with and can relish the amusement of apt descrip-
tion. The early placings of the names in the series at W. 74 ff., however, 
where putative members of the audience are identified before the suggestions 
they are supposed to make, are put to rather different effect, for those 
jokes are unlikely to rely on existing reputations about the persons named, 
except possibly in the case of Nicostratus and Philoxenus, and so there is 
less of an invitation to anticipate; the structure of exchange between the 
two slaves strongly suggests that the announcement of each conjecture is 
simply meant to set up the rejection that follows: this is particularly 
noticeable at 74-6, for if Amymias actually had a reputation for gambling, 
the joke would be made half-way through line 75, and the second slave's 
retort would only spoil the effect (Compare Eccl. 167 f., where there would 
surely be no point in the ensuing elaboration if the naming itself carried 
unmistakeable connotations of effeminacy). A series of jokes later in 
Wasps, at 1224 ff., relies on a similar kind of comic mechanism, as the 
imaginary dinner-guests are in turn set up as the targets for Philocleon's 
irreverence. The pleasure of imagining oneself being outrageously offensive 
to the eminent or powerful underlies the humour of this scene, as it does at 
Eccl. 248 ff. and 254 ff. (and cf. 404-7). The naming procedure in these 
cases is part of the vigorous style of humour, which is such that the sat-
irical effect coincides completely with the speaker's intentions. The same 
is true, though the manner is more innocent, at Frogs 1036-8, where Dion-
ysus picks out Pantacles for his crassness. The relish to be derived from 
the imagined insulting of one's enemies, as in the passages of Wasps and 
Eccl. just cited, has a stronger form, which looks back to the primitive use 
of satire as magic, in the satisfaction to be obtained from wishing and 
imagining the physical discomfiture of an enemy, and anyone seeking this 
satisfaction aloud will name the target at the start, just as the writer of 
a curse is likely to identify his victim at the beginning. Trygaeus en-
gages in this practice in a not particularly malevolent way at Peace 1009 ff. (though observe the frankness of the motive: τὰ ἀνεξεστήμων ἑμὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν (1015), which reminds us of the more calculated spite of Ach. 1150 ff.). It is just as necessary and natural to name the subject of an amusing narrative at the start, as happens at e.g. Ach. 530 ff., W. 737 ff., Eccl. 397 ff., 408 ff. In some passages where the target is named at the start there can be seen to be two main comic elements: the naming itself carries a satirical force or surprise, and it is then followed up or capped by a further gibe. The richest instance of this kind occurs at Peace 47 f., which is itself set within a joke about the δοκηστήρεια of certain sections of the audience. The naming of Cleon mixes the humorous suggestion of "it must be Cleon again" with the instantly, though unspecifically, scurrilous idea of the politician as a dung-beetle, and a slight pause at the end of the line might be used in performance to let these comic senses blend before the putative spectator's interpretation is clinching turned into a judgement on Cleon's fate in the Underworld. Really very similar in technique is Peace 473 f., whatever the visual dimension of this later joke (see below). The sudden apparent identification of Lamachus plays on his established satirical image, and the surprise should turn very quickly into a congruence. Once exposed in this way, the target is vulnerable to direct abuse, which is what Trygaeus immediately follows up with. Eccl. 366-8 and Pl. 665 f. are also to be put in this category of bipartite joke, though I suspect that in the former case the choice of Antisthenes is meant to be puzzling, and only gets elucidated by the comic elaboration which ensues.

In remarkably few jokes does Aristophanes use a name to create an expectation which he then thwarts, but wasps 62 f. qualifies for this category. Aristophanes here employs the claim that he will avoid attacking Cleon as itself a vehicle for a further hit at the politician, analogously to his satirical technique at Nu. 549 f.; he achieves this above all by the
way he structures the two lines, so that what starts as a 'praeteritio' turns in the very last word into a forthright and derisive boast of earlier triumphs. Lysistrata 158 arguably involves a παρα πρεσβειαν, though certainly of a more muted kind than this last one, for the presumption created by τὸ τοῦ Φερέκρατος that Lysistrata will cite a poetic maxim is in a sense fulfilled, especially if, as is possible, Pherecrates had originally used the phrase κύνα Δέρειν Δεδομένην in an innocent meaning.

In many other cases where the target's name comes at or near the start of a joke it would be fanciful, I believe, to suppose that any particular comic determinant existed or that any special effect resulted. Where the name is in the nominative, as it often is, natural word-order, together sometimes with a forcefulness in the speaker's citing of a personal illustration or the like, is a sufficient explanation. This is patent at Peace 681, which is not a comic line at all but is made into the basis of a joke by what follows (visually as well as verbally). Cf. also e.g. Nu. 1065f., W. 579f., 592-6-9, Lys. 490, Eccl. 102f., Pl. 174-7.

To return briefly to the starting-point of this note, Nu. 353f., it is worth observing with respect to the final clause of the sentence how Aristophanes is content to keep the normal word-order, even though this means that the term which releases the joke, ἔλοφον, occurs before the line-end. 353 is in this respect similar to 349 and 352, but different from 355. It may be, of course, that metrical factors are dominant here, for none of the first three lines could be rearranged to throw the important noun to the end, though note Thesm. 605, Κλεωνύμου γυνώ, where the order could be inverted. In any case, ἔλοφον in 354 is sufficiently near to the end of the line and sentence to make little difference to the impact of the joke in performance. Aristophanes' general practice, however, remains as proof of his awareness of the neat and potent comic value of reserving a crucial word for the final position.
Nun. 672-6: All three occurrences of Cleonymus's name in this passage are located at the ends of clauses (and cf. Κλεωνύμη, 680, which sums up the earlier joke), though none of them is so much a focus of humour as a means of emphasising the association between Cleonymus and καπεκτος which the punch-line breaks: the repetition creates a pattern which is then comically upset. Close repetition of a proper name in a joke can serve more than one purpose. At W. 19f. the name is the climax of one joke and is then repeated in the same metrical position both to keep the target in our attention for the next stage and to point up the way that the second takes its cue from the first: we are given the impression of satire propagating itself in the manner of a comic routine. At Peace 697f. the repetition of Συμωνίδης at line-end and the beginning of the following line emphasises the conundrum which the punch-line unlocks. The technique is used to convey first monotony and then the reversal of the earlier pattern at Eccl. 825f. and 829 (for the monotony cf. Nun. 557f.), and at W. 72-4 to allow the personal joke to emerge by a sort of verbal sleight (the equivalent of an enharmonic shift: cf. Aν. 152f.). Frogs 1452f. represents the exposure of the truth about Euripides and Cephisophom despite Euripides' effort to conceal it: the correspondence between the truth and Dionysus's suggestion crystallises unexpectedly in the repetition of the name.

Peace 671-8: This joke falls into a number of sections: a question and answer (671-3) leading to the ironically surprising mention of Cleonymus, with the name placed for maximum effect; a second question and answer (674-6) developing the surprise into a sort of puzzle or riddle (as at W. 20-23), and repeating the target's name to heighten the curiosity about Trygaeus's answer (as at 697f.); and a final couplet (677f.) which pulls together the two jests of the preceding line. The first occurrence of the name, in other words, creates a joke in itself, but it is one which is used to start a more intricate piece of comic thought; Hermes' further question gives the
audience time to savour the irony of Trygaeus's reply. Line 673 furnishes another clear case in which comic design takes priority over normal sentence construction, though without producing anything too strained. Adjective and noun could be simply exchanged in this line, and the resulting word-order would be the likeliest in prose, placing appropriate stress on the person, the nub of the answer to the question; but the comic advantage of holding back the name is obvious, and would lend itself to a delivery which deliberately created some suspense. Analogous to the repetition of Cleonymus's name in this passage is A.v. 289f., where the two occurrences of the name mirror precisely the preceding occurrences of the metricaly identical coinage 

A<i>ραιατος: this fact gives the lines a neatness reminiscent of a fixed joke formula, and this sense of a clever but prepared routine, against the background of the bird's appearance, puts some comic freshness into what would otherwise be a stale conceit.

Antilabe

Greeks may sometimes, as Aristotle noticed, have lapsed into iambics in their everyday speech, and there was obvious truth in the assertion 

\[ \text{μέλισσα... λεκτικών τον μεταφέρειν του \'ισσαρέων \το̂}\] 

But it is also the case that "trimeters and tetrameters cannot be written without the manipulation of language" and that for comedy to contain all individual utterances within complete iambic lines would have imposed a severe restraint on its capacity to reflect and exploit the irregularities and variety of real conversation and argument. That comic poets did feel a pressure to make use of the patterns of ordinary speech in their dialogue is evinced by, among other phenomena, the amount of antilabe to be found in the surviving plays of Aristophanes and Menander, and in the fragments of lost plays; and it is quite simply their different relations to spoken Greek which account for the far greater employment of antilabe in comedy than in tragedy. The breaking of the artificial order of iambic dialogue which antilabe involves can be utilised for a wide range of effects. Before I illustrate some of the
technical exploitations of it in jokes, I shall survey briefly the ways in
which Sophocles and Euripides used it, and indicate the general scope of it
in Aristophanes. It cannot be too strongly emphasised at the start that
antilabe in Greek drama is not merely or primarily a metrical phenomenon:
it is an element in the composition of dialogue which was meant essentially
for effective delivery by actors, and it is therefore legitimate in scrutin­
inising its employment to be prepared to ask how it was intended to be
translated into dramatic performance.

The occurrence of antilabe in the tragedians has been almost as neg­
lected by modern scholarship as has its counterpart in comedy — a fact which
is scarcely to be justified on the grounds of the relatively small amount
of tragic material, for practically every appearance of the device in
Sophocles and Euripides carries dramatic significance with it. The occas­
ional apt observations on antilabe in commentaries on the tragedians are
numerically far outweighed by those places where either no remark is made
or else it is thought sufficient to indicate the Greek technical term for the
device, as though it were purely a metrical oddity. Yet the significance
of antilabe in Sophocles and Euripides can be gauged from the fact that in
many of its occurrences it does not just accompany a moment of verbal drama
but is part of a piece of dramatic action, and its appearance can help us
to imagine, often with some precision, the sort of effect which the dramat­
ist intended to create in the combination of verbal and visual elements.
In most such cases the action is sudden and exciting, even violent. At
Hec. 1125-6 Polymestor, who has just inferred from Agamemnon's words that
Hecabe is standing near him, starts to grope around in order to find and
attack the woman; at 1127 Agamemnon moves to restrain him, and Polymestor,
against
struggling with him (till 1129: ἔχω), pleads for vengeance. The antilabe in
927 occurs more or less at the point at which Agamemnon grabs Polymestor;
it plays a forceful part in highlighting the nature of the action: the
suddenness both of Polymestor's explosion or rage and of Agamemnon's dec-
isive interference. Euripides uses antilabe in only one other place in the 
Hecabe, and that is near the end of this same scene, only a few lines before 
the end of the whole play (1283 f.), in a passage of greater turbulence 
than we normally find in the closing moments of a tragedy. Here the two 
lines containing antilabe come, as in a number of other cases (see below on 
the two Electra plays, and e.g. Soph. Philoct 1248/1254 f., Euripides Alc. 
390 f., 1119, Hipp. 352), at the climax of a passage of stichomythia, in 
which Polymestor unburdens himself of his hatred first for Hecabe herself 
and then for Agamemnon by predicting their deaths in gruesome circumstances. 
At 1280 Agamemnon is stung into a response and, as Polymestor mocks him, 
orders slaves to drag him away. The antilabai at 1283 f. help to give 
dramatic shape to the moment of sharpest confrontation between the two men, 
mirroring the pattern of action as Polymestor cruelly pits his satisfaction 
in knowing and having revealed Agamemnon's fate against the latter's resort 
to physical force to silence him. The lines complement the earlier inter­
ference of Agamemnon on Hecabe's side, emphasising the Greek leader's serious 
protection of his captive; but they also capture an independent conflict of 
human bitterness, adding a final detail to the picture of viciousness which 
the whole play has offered. Both Euripides and Sophocles use antilabe at 
the climax of the recognition scenes of stichomythia in their Electra plays, 
and the device not only helps to convey the released emotion of the language 
but also belongs to the action of physical reunion: antilabe is peculiarly 
suitable to express the 'staccato' exclamations produced by sudden recog­
nition, though the two passages should be compared for the subtle differences 
between the effect which each dramatist is aiming at. In Philoctetes both 
Odysseus's abrupt appearances, at 974 and 1296, are marked by antilabe, as 
is the turning away of Creon at O.T. 676. Many similar passages could be 
cited, but Eur. Alc. 1119 provides an example of a slightly different kind, 
where the action which the antilabe accompanies is not dramatically abrupt 
or incisive but rather the prelude to a further and climactic piece of
action. The effect here is certainly not "a quickening-up"; indeed, the 
antilabe should actually help to slow down the action, as Heracles joins 
the hands of Admetus and the veiled women who is, unbeknown to Admetus, his 
wife Alcestis. As the focus shifts from words to action, the fragmentation 
of the verse pattern, coupled with the simplicity of the language (εν ζεω; 
— Τη ζεω; ξολ'), clarifies the dramatic significance of the moment.

Antilabe in tragedy is not always linked directly to a definable piece 
of action, but its essential function in those cases where it is can be 
regarded as typical of the potency which it generally carries in the genre. 
The infrequency of its occurrence in tragedy in itself lends force to instan­
ces of it; antilabe almost always disrupts a very well established pattern. 
Its effect is consequently almost always dramatically striking and express­
ive. One reason for the fact that the Oedipus Coloneus has more antilabai 
than any other surviving tragedy lies in the unusually extended sense of 
mounting expectancy which runs through the play; they are used consistently 
to catch the moods of pathos, tension, foreboding and crisis: note, for 
example, the part played by antilabe in the sudden excitement caused by 
Ismene's approach at 311, in Antigone's identification of her sister a few 
lines later at 322, in the reunion of Oedipus and Ismene (327 ff.), in 
Creon's violence and the response to it (820 f., 829, 831 f., 856 etc.), 
in Antigone's recognition of the approaching Polyneices (1252). I am not 
convinced that there are any instances of antilabe in tragedy which do not 
carry a sharp effect of some kind, though there are certainly some where it 
helps to represent the simplicity of ordinary speech: see e.g. Soph. O.T. 
1120, Trach. 409, 418; Eur. Elec. 693, Or. 1679, Iph. in A. 739. But in 
most if not all of these passages there remains a dramatic deliberateness 
which puts the use of the device on a higher level of significance than 
the bulk of antilabai to be found in comedy.

It is not appropriate here to go beyond this very selective and rough 
treatment of the tragic material, but the contrast with comedy was worth
briefly. It is true that many examples of antilabe in tragedy could be viewed from one angle as contributing a kind of realism by breaking up the artificial regularity of the verse and making it come closer at moments of emotion to the irregularity of real speech, and I have already indicated that this is the general explanation of antilabe in comedy. The important difference lies, however, in the fact that whereas comedy uses a great deal of split-lines to give an overall approximation to ordinary dialogue, tragedy saves them for special moments, and the element of realism is therefore less significant than the heightened and far from ordinary feeling of drama. The average number of iambic antilabai in an Aristophanic comedy is more or less the same as the total of occurrences in the complete plays of either Sophocles or Euripides. The freedom with which individual lines are divided in comedy is also to be noted. Whereas division into more than two utterances is very rare in tragedy, a comic line may be split between as many as six utterances, and it may be split at any point. It should be apparent from this that antilabai in comedy constitute an almost completely different stylistic and expressive phenomenon from the split-lines of tragedy. The possibility of artful exploitation of the device by the comic poet does exist, and it is this feature of Aristophanic usage which I will shortly analyse in some detail in the composition of personal jokes. But as background to that analysis I now briefly illustrate some of the main ways in which Aristophanes manipulates antilabe to give the impression of the wide range of sentence shapes found in ordinary speech. What follows is a representative set of examples, but the diversity of material is far too great to be forced into a single scheme of categories, and the headings I have used are not all mutually exclusive.

Greetings, entries etc.: The entries of most characters in tragedy are verbally formal, and any greetings involved are normally expressed in a way which either dispenses with the formulae used in real life or at least
sets these in a grander and more measured utterance (see e.g. Aesch. Ag. 503ff., 538, 810ff., Soph. Aj. 71-3, 89-92, Ant. 631ff., Eur. Helen 78ff.). This is a facet of the whole manner of the presentation of behaviour in the genre. Entries in comedy, on the other hand, tend to be lively and informal (exceptions such as Ach. 572ff., Nu. 1259 and Thesm. 574ff. are comic precisely because of their paratragic overtones). Whether they are casual or urgent, antilabe can help to catch their style. Lys. 6 is an instance of the simplest kind, where the split-line simply allows the natural addresses to keep their structure without having to be filled out into whole lines (Eccl. 477 is a good example of the equivalent value of antilabe in containing the formulae of departure). It is instructive to compare say Ach. 395, where antilabe permits Dicaeopolis's knocking at Euripides' door and his exchange with the slave to retain the casual simplicity of ordinary speech, with Aesch. Ch. 653-6, which contains some colloquial elements (簪, δεγγρ; ἕκαστο πολιτικ...) but which as a whole has the rounded, periphrastic phrasing of verse. Many Aristophanic entries are meant to represent unexpected arrivals, and the receiver of the visit often makes it an unwelcome one too. Antilabe can communicate the abruptness and hostility of such encounters. See e.g. Ach. 402 (the servant slams the door in Dicaeopolis's face), 408 and 410 (Dicaeopolis pestering the preoccupied Euripides), 818 (the arrival of a sycophant), Av. 959ff. (the oracle-monger interrupts the foundation ceremony and gets short shrift from Peisetairus), 1495 (Peisetairus's dismay at yet another intruder). It is worth recording that in two passages where a character is calling on another Aristophanes goes even further than the use of antilabe and inserts abbreviated iambic phrases instead of trimeters: at Ach. 404 the dimeter ἑπετήριαν ἑπετήριον stands on its own, after Dicaeopolis has knocked on the door, as a prepossessing invocation, and line 407 consists of only a single metron, ἔρρικτῳ σαλπίγγι, to convey the brusqueness of Euripides' response; Nu. 222 is of a similar mould to Ach. 404.
Interruptions: It requires little explanation that antilabe should frequently be employed in interruptions (for examples without it see e.g. *Nu*. 752f., *W*. 1178f., 1448f., *Peace* 933f.). There are a small number of instances of this kind in tragedy: e.g. *Eur*. *Suppl*. 513, *Iph*. in *A*. 414. Interruptions vary in tone and abruptness, but whatever their purpose antilabe collaborates naturally with their intrinsic grammatical sharpness to suggest the fine edge of active conversation: e.g. *Ach*. 589 (Dicaeopolis's irreverence towards Lasmachus); *W*. 1446 (Bdelucleon's ironic insouciance); *P*. 376 (Trygaeus's anxiety about the contents of Hermes' prayer); *Lys*. 12 (Calonice's tactless comment on Lysistrata's argument); *Thesm*. 622 (Cleisthenes' impatience with Mnlesilochoi's deceitfulness). I shall comment below on some cases of interruption in personal jokes.

Earnestness etc.: Closely related to the preceding category is a wide range of utterances in antilabe which contain a prompt response of some kind to what has just been said, but without actually interrupting it. Whether the tone is confirmatory or contradictory of what it is a response to, the antilabe represents an emphasis which in performance would be marked not just by tone of voice but also sometimes by the speed with which the second utterance would follow on the first: translated into actor's delivery, in other words, the antilabe in such cases gives the impression of both the impetus and the irregularity of the flow of conversation, though the heaviness of emphasis and consequently the precise speed of delivery must depend on context. The material in this category is very extensive, but I shall mention two sub-groups of it. The first is the obvious one of exclamations (some of them accompanying action or gesture), the forceful and pungent character of which is more immediately conveyed by an interruption of the metre: e.g. *P*. 110, *Lys*. 66, *Th*. 245, *Pl*. 374, 417, 706, 734. Less salient perhaps, but just as representative of Aristophanic dialogue, are utterances beginning with ἀλλαζ' , a usage which seems to be far more frequent in
comedy than in other genres, and is very likely to be a mark of colloquial speech. ἀλλα is not by any means always straightforwardly adversative at the beginning of an utterance; its nuance depends closely on individual context. Aristophanes stretches the combination of ἀλλα and antilabe to a comic extreme at Ach. 407–9, where every ἀλλα carries an implicit instruction to the actor about expression:

Εὔρ. ἀλλα αὐτ ἐκολή.
Δι. ἀλλα ἕκκυκλήθητ'.
Εὔρ. ἀλλα ἀδυνάτον.
Δι. ἀλλα ὀμος.
Εὔρ. ἀλλα ἕκκυκλήτωρι. κτλ.

Compare the play with oaths at Kn. 338 (tetrameters). For some individual examples of ἀλλα in antilabe, differing in purport but sharing a show of promptness on the speaker's part which the division of the line accentuates, see Kn. 80, 962, Lys. 15, 59, Th. 216, Frogs 136, 568, 1136.

Action: Given the large number of antilabai in comedy, cases which accompany a piece of action do not stand out as much, or form as neat a class, as do those in tragedy: too many in comedy are coupled with a gesture or movement of some sort. But one striking example of comic antilabe working in elaborate harmony with dramatic action may be noticed. The shaving of Mnesilochus at Th. 213 ff. is heavily patterned by split-lines which can help us to visualise how Aristophanes intended the scene to be staged.

Individual lines serve different purposes: a pause must occur in 214 while Mnesilochus removes his ἰμάτιον; 216 (see above) marks the old man's obliging attitude (about to be cut short) to helping Euripides, and 219 gives a similar tone to Agathon's utterance; 222-4 and 231 add comic edge to the visible evidence of Mnesilochus's discomfiture as the shaving proceeds, the antilabe in 223 coinciding with the point at which he jumps up and tries to escape (I suspect that Aristophanes intended a brief pause after ἄρωμας in 223). The split-lines would be an important part of the effect of the
episode in performance, partly determining the pace of the lines and high¬lighting the details of movement and emotion.

Colloquial speech and intricacy: I mention finally two routine ways in which Aristophanes exploits antilabe to suggest characteristic features of real dialogue. One is by tucking in small questions (τί ἤτοι; τί κρύμα; τί φαίνεται; τί λέει; and the like) which mark the manner of a lively conversation: e.g. Na. 694, 746, 748, 753, 775, Lys. 187, Pl. 117, 388, 465. The other is by extending this technique to produce a multiple exchange of question — and — answer of a kind which calls for racy, rapid delivery. Representative examples are Lys. 21—4, where Calonice's false belief that Lysistrata is scheming some form of sexual satisfaction leads her to fire a series of questions at her, and Th. 95 f., where the conversation between Euripides and Mnesilochus is interrupted and fragmented by the sudden appearance of Agathon: the split-lines point up the interplay between Euripides' alertness and his relative's naïveté.

I have illustrated some general features of Aristophanic antilabe partly in order to indicate that this neglected aspect of the poet's techniques of composition deserves more attention and can yield insights into the dramatic character of a passage, partly to provide a framework for some observations on the employment of the device in the architecture of personal jokes, for in this respect the jokes constitute not so much a separate category of technique as an area in which the given resources of antilabe are exploited and extended for special effect. I divide my observations into two main groups, which correspond to issues of form which have already been broached: firstly, on antilabai which occur in punch-lines; secondly, on those which precede the punch-line but contribute to its effect.

The simplest and sharpest employment of antilabe in a punch-line allows a question and answer to be contained complete within the one line and
produces the effect of a terse and blunt exchange. Thesm. 235 is the easiest example:

\[ \text{Εὐρ. ὁργ. σειστάν; Νῦ. σῦ μὰ Δ' ἄλλα Κλεισθένη.} \]

This form happily and economically combines a release of comic energy with the portrayal of a natural frankness; such a simply efficient joke could not be achieved without antilabe, and it helps to mark incisively a stage in the progress of the detailed action of this scene, the completion of the first part of Mnesilochus's shaving. This basic formula can be applied with a degree of subtlety in an appropriate context, as Kn. 1069 demonstrates:

\[ \text{Ἀλλ. σεθ' ὧ τι ἐστίν πῶς; Δ. ἐλεύθερος ἐκ κοιναλώπης.} \]

The nicety here lies in the continuation for the line of the joke of the hexameters in which the Sausage-seller has just (perhaps with a suitably hierophantic enunciation) delivered his mock-oracle. It is as if the elevated tone of the oracle momentarily mesmerises everyone, but the antilabe helps to give edge to the sudden comic interruption of the seriousness caused by Demos's vulgarity. At Frogs 55,

\[ \text{Ἄρ. πῶς; πῶς τις; Δι. μικρὸς ἤλικος Μέλος.} \]

I favour the supposition that Dionysus's reply is deliberately ironic, an implicit admission of suffering, and if this is so the antilabe serves to mark his emphasis; but there may be other tones that the words could carry, and the antilabe would have a different effect accordingly. The satisfaction afforded by jokes in this form depends on the fact that it incorporates a comic jolt within a clear and simple unit: the punch-line has its sharp point, but also a formal neatness which is desirable in jokes. The value of the form is especially evident where the two utterances in the line are discrepant, as at Frogs 86, where Dionysus impatiently dismisses Heracles' latest suggestion, or at Pl. 180, where Chremylus' interruption actually completes the sentence that Carion had started, though not as we presume Carion would have gone on: the antilabe brings out the clash between the
utterances, and yet the result is felt as a comic unit (compare Ach. 598 for a similar joke without a personal reference). The character of such cases can be illuminated further by contrast with those where the utterance before the antilabe overruns from the preceding line. At Peace 532, which is in fact the start of a longer compound joke, the antilabe strengthens the surprise of hearing ἠευκαλλων ἐφρασα in a list of luxurious pleasures: we can identify and experience a definite comic intrusion here, but there is not the formal simplicity of the examples cited above, and the role of the antilabe is consequently of a slightly different sort. The same is true of the striking instance at Peace 648, where the antilabe has a part to play in supporting the climax of the whole scene as Hermes names his chief target, ἤφεξεμελής. Trygaeus breaks in at this point, and the split-line highlights his reaction as well as the cause of it, but again the release of humorous energy is much less tidy than in the lively responses found at say Thesm. 235 or Pl. 180; it causes a perturbation which runs over into the πνεύμα that follows. Frogs 67 furnishes a very similar case to Peace 648, with the split-line giving an impact not otherwise attainable in verse to both Dionysus's eventual naming of his πόδα and Heracles' immediate shock at hearing it, and the total effect is of course an encouragement to a sharp response from the audience. (These last two examples show that just as the end of a line can be made to carry a comic force by the design of a passage, so the beginning of the line, where antilabe is brought into play, is capable of bearing a comic weight which is not dependent on the normal distribution of stress within a sentence.).

Even at Eccles. 810, where Cremes' παλαι ἄναλλων has a sarcastic terseness that is all the more marked on account of its rhythmically satisfying insertion after the caesura, we get from the form of the joke a sense less of comic neatness than of brevity unbalancing the fuller self-confidence of the other speaker.
The variety of uses of antilabe in the build-up to a joke's climax or punch-line all have one feature in common: they serve to generate an excitement, tension or uncertainty which the joke finally resolves. It is in such cases in particular, though it is worth reiterating the general applicability of this principle, that we need to apprehend the nature of antilabe not as a metrical or formal phenomenon apparent to the reading eye but as an element in the playwright's intentions for the acted performance, an element to be translated into the terms of speed and accentuation of delivery by the skilfully expressive voices of actors. This is the real justification for paying attention to antilabe, and though attention to it cannot always leave us in a state of certainty about how particular lines would have been acted (for there is always, in any case, more than one way) it should make us more aware than we would otherwise be of their essential dramatic quality and should help us to refine the aural imagination with which we need to read the plays. By greatly increasing the flexibility of the verse, antilabe makes available a much wider range of emphasis and affective colour.

The creation of a tone of urgency, or mock-urgency, is a peculiarly powerful way of setting up the punch-line of a joke, for there can be little doubt that many jokes involve a kind of release, psychological as well as in the physical act of laughing, and that such a release may depend partly for its effect on a preceding arousal of intellectual interest or of emotion (though the latter need not be true for some kinds of surprise). The more formally elaborate jokes in Aristophanes exhibit these procedures as much as do the contrived jokes of conversation, but since many of the former consist of utterances by more than one speaker the precise interlocking of the different utterances within them tends to be more important than in 'told' jokes. It is in this connection that antilabe can play a significant role, allowing the interplay between speakers to take a shape, and with it a tone, which will help to make a joke successful. This could be
demonstrated in some detail for the general construction of comic dialogue in Aristophanes. As rather striking illustrations outside the sphere of personal jokes of the potential of antilabe to lead up to a joke's climax I would cite Kn. 142 f., where the audience's curiosity about the Paphlagonian's successor is elicited by the crisp exchange between the two slaves and then satisfied pungently in the first word of 143; Nu. 732-4, where Socrates' questions and Strepsiades' blank responses draw us into the obscenity of 734; and Lys. 122-4 (analogously functional in the structure of the scene to Kn. 142 f.), where Calonice's eagerness breaks into Lysistrata's revelation of her plan, delays the mention of the crucial detail, and thereby adds to the impact of the disclosure when it eventually comes in the very last word of 124 (where the climax, incidentally, is given a visual reinforcement, as 125 ff. indicates). Equivalent antilabai in personal jokes can be usefully distributed into three categories, of increasing complexity. In the first type there is a single antilabe in the line preceding the punch, and the effect is to lend to the utterance after the antilabe the force of an interruption or the promptest of retorts, with a satisfying resolution in the following line. Ach. 138-40 gives a representative illustration:

Although Theorus's sentence could be considered complete (the protasis is in 136), Dicaeopolis's remark is in every other way an interruption (he had grammatically interrupted just before this, at 137), and the speed with which the actor would need to fasten it onto the end of Theorus's sentence it intimated by the elision, which is not at a regular caesura. In all the passages to be put in this category the antilabe represents a cue for the second voice to take over rapidly from the first, though Ach. 139 is admittedly an extreme instance. The technique is particularly suit-
able for catching the abruptness of an exclamatory interrogative used to preface the rejection or correction of a suggestion. This is a pattern familiar in real speech, and it occurs in Aristophanes without necessarily introducing an obviously comic point: see e.g. Kn. 1344, Nu. 723, Frogs 486, 1472. It becomes a joke technique when the note of urgency which it produces is exploited to give extra satisfaction to the subsequent release of humour. Av. 125 f. and 149-51 are clear examples: the Hoopoe’s suggestions are not simply rejected, but made the occasion for aggressive personal references (cf. also 152-4), and the clash of the speakers’ tones is harmonised into an exchange with the formal neatness of a prepared joke. Even in these relatively simple cases I think we can sense something of the dual function which antilabe certainly performs in the complex passages (see below): it allows both the impetus of a strong retort, whereby rhythmical regularity is disturbed, but also the subsequent feeling of satisfaction, as the disturbance justifies and settles itself in the completed pattern.

It is characteristic of Aristophanic dialogue that it tends to fall into small sections organised around specific comic points or moments; jokes crystallise within the progression of a conversation. Antilabe can help to emphasise the close connection between utterances which make up a joke. For further examples of this first type of joke see e.g. Lys. 63 f., Th. 660 f., Frogs 1036 f.

The second type arouses, more sharply than the first, an expectation for the joke to satisfy, by the use of a double break within the penultimate line of the form. The antilabe alerts, often in combination with an exclamation or some other obviously urgent feature. Wasps 36 f. demonstrates the technique nicely:

\[ \text{Σω. τι έστι; ἔλκ. παῦε, παῦε, μὴ λέγε. Οἴσει κάκιστον παντότινον δύνασθαι.} \]

The effect is here the more remarkable because of the preceding six lines of continuous narrative; the antilabai cause an evident disruption, which
calls for resolution: the movement from broken to continuous lines is itself part of the pleasure of the joke. Kn. 957 f., Peace 701 f. and 927 f. also belong in this group.

My third type is larger and less uniform, containing more complex cases of antilabe preceding a punch-line. These range from lines in which there is more than a double break – such as Peace 268-70, where the fragmented exchange reflects the imperiousness and embarrassment of the respective speakers, and is part of the total pattern of Kydoimos's return to the stage – to longer passages with a slower build-up. Them. 29-35 exemplifies the latter. These are the final lines of the opening scene of the play and they perform some important functions. The antilabai in 30 and 33 (and one might add the anacolouthon in 31, which should all be spoken by Mnesilochus, for this has something of the force of a change in speakers) help to portray the confusion between the two speakers and the way in which Mnesilochus's impatience with Euripides gives way to Euripides' impatience with him. Here the prelude to the punch-line is a matter less of speed or urgency than of accumulating curiosity. At Eccl. 250-53 the series of split-lines, and the repeated use of emphatic παγω, produces a sense of crescendo to Praxagora's worst insult; while at Pl. 82-5 Chremylus's disbelief leads by an artificial logic to the unforeseeable joke. Such passages are formally less tidy than the two simpler types illustrated above, though they sometimes include them within a larger framework: Kn. 957 f., for example, cited above, is in fact just the final section of a much longer joke, which really begins at 946, where Demos asks for his ring back, and the sudden excitement of the final two lines depends for support on the curiosity about the ring gradually aroused by the preceding exchanges, visual and verbal, in which the antilabai of 948, 953 and 955 are instrumental (each accompanies a definite piece of action or movement, and each is more urgent than the last); Frogs 55 is the first in a series of heavily divided trim-
ters, 53–7, which progress with relentless rapidity towards the truth about Dionysus’s πόθος (though the joke at the end of 57 only produces a temporary release, before the process starts again); and Av. 299 f. is effectively a double case of the first type described above (notice the similarity of Κατακραγή and Συμφέρεια, similar to κατασκευή/Κλεισμάτικος at 288–90). As a final illustration of the potential of antilabe in shaping and directing a joke it is worth mentioning Wasps 47–51, for this exchange between the two slaves so obviously resembles a contrived riddle (as at 20 ff.): the creation of a mock–problem and the artificial solution could not be given so lively a presentation (and the pun on Ἰ ἐκόμικα needs some formal dressing up) without the moment of repartee through antilabe in line 48.

Lists

More than most comic writers Aristophanes has a liking for the comic potential of lists of words or phrases in asyndeton. As a number of personal jokes are found within the framework of such lists, it is worthwhile briefly suggesting some of the implications of this technique of composition.

As in the case of antilabe it is important to understand passages in this form not as fixed and static structures on the page but rather as designs to be turned by an actor into curiously appreciable delivery. I mentioned earlier the connection made by ancient theorists between theatrical ὑποκρήτικα and the oratorical art of delivery, and it is particularly pertinent here to recall that connection, since we have in Aristotle’s Rhetoric a passage in which asyndeton is picked out for special mention as an aspect of style which calls for careful attention to delivery: according to Aristotle (Rhet. III. xii. 2–4, 1413 b – 14a) asyndeta are especially ὑποκρήτικα, requiring to be spoken with expressive variation of ἔντονος and ἐνότονος. This text gives interesting confirmation to what we should in any case have been able to realise, which is that a spoken list of words or
phrases - in contrast to some kinds of written lists - by its very nature allows unusual scope for varied speed and emphasis of delivery, and although Aristotle's brief discussion of this point focusses on occurrences of this stylistic feature in serious pieces of writing, the point is just as germane to comic asyndeta, especially to ones as elaborate as many of Aristophanes'. Only a little reflection is needed to see that an actor would need to give very painstaking thought indeed to the delivery of a virtuoso passage such as Ach. 546-54 or Nu. 445 ff., in order to ensure both that individual items were given the appropriate force and that the whole list yet carried a proper comic momentum and did not sag or seem too long. Perhaps paradoxically, there are often more ways in which a list of items can be recited than there are ways of speaking many ordinary sentences, and insistently rhetorical examples such as Ach. 531 f. or Kn. 48 (both in set speeches) dictate a different range of possible deliveries from, say, the catalogue of trivialities at Ach. 30 f. or the purportedly random selection of names at Nu. 686. One important determinant of the tone of delivery must be whether the list is ready-made, something the speaker is quite sure of in advance, or a group of items that are supposed only now to be put together for the first time, but at Ach. 546 ff., for instance, it is not clear that only one choice is possible.

The most obvious way in which a list can be employed to create a comic impact is by placing a surprise at the end or climax of it. Some examples not involving personal jokes are Kn. 48 f., 50 f., 93 f., Nu. 718 f. The effect of the final item depends partly on the relationship between the other members of the list. The personal jokes would make the point clear. At Peace 530-32 (continued at 535-8) Trygaeus supplies a list of Theoria's connotations, of the good things connected with festival time. Delivery could be smooth and obvious, suggesting easy and attractive associations, or more 'improvised', as though the individual thoughts were relished. Either way, the effect of ἐνυλλαμίνων ἐντιπνεύσει at the start of 532 is bath-
etive, because not so much of the mention of Euripides after Sophocles as of the contemptuous implication of the term ἔφυλλω itself. Here the list creates a regularity against which the incongruity is then highlighted (and the interruption in entilabē adds to the impact). Another Euripidean joke, Frogs 1408, makes a more subtle use of the list. Here the incongruity or surprise is not so straightforward, for the transition from ἤ γυνὴ to ἄρθρα is meant to intimate satirically that there is a connection between the items, as though the one naturally prompted the thought of the other. We have, in other words, a hint at the comically alleged scandal of Cephisophon's place in the tragedian's household, and the actor could strengthen the innuendo by the manner of his delivery, especially since there is here, unlike at Peace 532, a consonance of an obvious kind between the speaker's intention and the thrust of the joke: Aeschylus is sneering at his opponent. Although not at the end of the sentence ἄρθρα stands at the line-end, where audience reaction could best be accommodated: compare e.g. ἑκατογέντυμα at Nu. 51. A simpler instance of a final item which has a comic congruence with the rest of the list is ἀνίκεκκομενήν at Nu. 48. What we have here, in rather miniature form, is a tricolon expanding in the best rhetorical manner to express the eruption of Strepsiades' disdain for his wife's aristocratic and urbane ways.

The actor's task of delivery is somewhat harder in the case of lists which contain a definite joke before the end. An easy non-personal example is Ach. 30, where περιεγέρεται is obviously intended to be the funniest item in the list: the word is placed at the line-end, though ἀποδίδει at Wasos 1305 shows that the increased scope for pause in an asyndetic series makes this unnecessary. At Ach. 30 the effect is probably meant to be nonchalant, almost random: Dicaeopolis is, after all, actually in the circumstances to which his casual account of boredom applies. The joke against Socrates at Av. 1282 depends on the disruption of the pattern created by the preceding words, in that we do not anticipate a personal reference at all in the con-
text; but appreciation of the joke also depends of course on recognition of an implied set of associations. The other verbs in *Av.* 1282 have their own comic point, relying as they do on standard anti-Spartan stereotypes; but ἐκφηκτικὸς produces the main jolt. At *Frogs* 1302, however, ὁκολικόν Ἐλημένω is part of a uniformly comic series, and there is no reason to suppose that it should be given more prominence than the other items. A genuine problem, which has never interested a commentator on the play, is raised by the list of jokes at *Av.* 1292 ff. This is a uniquely concentrated passage of personal references (*Frogs* 1504-7 comes closest to it in this respect) and there can be little doubt that if the herald were to deliver these lines at normal narrative speed they would be comically baffling to all but the most fortunately well-informed or quick-witted spectators, for the five jokes in 1295-7 are in the most compressed form, with human and bird-names simply juxtaposed. But the extreme brevity of these references, and their consequent density, strongly suggests that Aristophanes expected and required his actor to manipulate the lines by the use of pause (partly for audience reaction), stress and pace of delivery - thus producing not a monotone list but a carefully sprung series of comic revelations. Though it is certainly reasonable to suppose that most spectators will have had a clearer image of the birds mentioned than most people would in a modern urban audience it would be rash, I believe, to imagine that everyone in the audience will have taken precisely the same point in each of these jokes. Take the case of Philocles and the Κοπυέχος (1295). One obvious interpretation, found in the scholia here, is that we have a hit at the shape of Philocles' head (or possibly his hair?); the bird's crest is after all its most distinctive feature. But that Philocles had an unusually shaped head is itself an inference pertly dependent on this passage (cf. p. 32), and even if it were safer than I think it is, it would still be legitimate to doubt whether most people had a clear enough image of it to take the joke this way. Κοπυέχος is found as a parasite's nickname at *Machon* 60 (= Athen.
220 b-c), so we ought to reckon with the possibility of an established slang significance. And, since Philocles is a poet, proverbs such as 

\[ \text{καρυδὸς καρυδὸς ἐν ἀμυγδάλῳ φθορᾶς} \] 

may be alluded to.

There is no solution, in fact, but it is well worth insisting that we should not automatically assume that this or some of the other jokes in the same passage necessarily carry a simple message. Since, however, some of the jokes in this list do seem to have a more or less specific focus, I would be prepared to speculate that Aristophanes intended the herald to illustrate at least some of his references with appropriate mimicry (see below). If we knew how common it was to accompany verbal \( \varepsilon \kappa \alpha \sigma \mu \alpha \nu \sigma \) with gesture we should be better placed to estimate the likelihood of this suggestion, for these lines owe something to that comic game (compare 1297-9 with \( \omicron, 1309 \) ff.): the satirical character of these jokes is the verbal equivalent of the pictorial technique used in 'physiognomical' caricatures in modern times. The hypothesis of visual mimicry is not meant to run counter to my claim that the jokes should not be understood as straightforward depictions which everyone would see in the same way. Aristophanes may have had his reasons for these particular pairs of birds and humans, but the entertainment intended was probably more a matter of bizarre wit and acted presentation.

**Visual Elements in Personal Jokes**

Although the dramatist has less scope for introducing a visual element into a personal reference than he has with individuals whom he actually brings into his plays, there are a number of jokes which fall into my category where a visual accompaniment was certainly employed, and to these we may add a range of cases in which it can be supposed with fair plausibility that Aristophanes' actors would have supplied visual touches which are not necessarily inferable from the text. I leave out of account in this section those jokes which involve reference to individuals supposedly
or actually in the audience, though some of these must have entailed the
two actors' use of entertaining gesture and movement to reinforce the interplay
with the spectators (cf. pp. 215ff).

At the simplest level, we should expect some of the jokes about individ­
uals' appearance or deportment to be spiced with mimicry or physical
caricature by the actors. This is a primitive and immediately appealing
form of humour, and Old Comedy satisfies the desire for it by bringing
caricatured or exaggerated representations of well-known contemporaries onto
the stage. But if there is rather less mimicry of individuals than we might
have anticipated in Aristophanes, one relevant factor may well lie in the
probable fact that, as I suggested in chapter 3, not many spectators in the
original audiences can have been closely familiar with the actual appearan­
ces of more than a few of the poet's personal targets, while personal imita­
tions or caricatures do tend to rely on such a familiarity. Another partial
explanation might be found in the physical conditions of theatre production,
which would probably have been inimical to visual representation of finer
points of detail, and in this connection it is worth reiterating the fact
that very little of a specific nature emerges from Old Comedy about the
appearance even of major public or cultural figures such as Pericles, Cleon,
Euripides or Socrates. For lesser figures, who do not bring an immediate
image to the spectators' mind's-eye, physical details can be mentioned as
amusingly odd, offensive or embarrassing, but it would be difficult and
perhaps in general not worthwhile to try to communicate the joke visually
as well. The few cases where it was certainly done may be revealing. At
Wasps 688 Bdelucleon evidently (ἢφί) performs the described gait of the son
of Chaireas as he speaks the words. But Bdelucleon is putting some personal
flesh on a general claim, and it is legitimate to wonder whether the actor
was intended to supply anything more than a type of walk or posture at this
point, for whatever Aristophanes himself may have known about the men in
question most of his audience cannot have had occasion to notice the alleged
attributes (observation of walk or deportment is a less straightforward matter, in any case, than might be thought). The language of W. 688 does not suggest a very specific imitation, and it is tempting to assimilate this passage to one later in the play, 1169, where Edelucleon seems to have a similarly dandified kind of behaviour in view (τροφευώντεσιν/τροφεύον το), and where he is certainly characterising a type or style, not an individual. At Wasps 1224 Edelucleon assumes the role of Cleon at the rehearsed dinner-party (καὶ δὴ γὰρ ἑμὺν ἡ βουλήν), and though it is hard to imagine the words being delivered by an actor without some accompanying behavioural change, the text does not encourage us to believe that Aristophanes wanted mimicry at this point. Dicaeopolis might be expected to lend some visual reinforcement to his description of Chairis's behaviour at Ach. 16 (παρεκυψε, bringing out the point of δικτιγιαβυν in the preceding line), but this would probably just involve the exaggeration of a posture which any auletes might employ. The slave's imitation of the dung-beetle's antics at Peace 35 f., and Dionysus's reproduction of the wild lamentations of an Aeschylean chorus at Frogs 1029 (the visual accompaniment signalled by ἔξι in both cases), make it sufficiently clear that large and obvious gesture or movements needed to be involved for mimicry to be worth using in Aristophanes' theatre. Yet despite the mainly negative implications of all this, we cannot rule out the possibility of mimicry in places where the text gives no obvious hint of it. I draw attention to two likely cases in Birds. At 152-4 I think it is fair to question whether the shift of meaning in ὄπουντιον/ὄπουντις from the gentile to the personal name would be discernible to an audience without the assistance of a visual indicator (contrast the more intelligibly patterned pun at W. 82-4, including the introduction of the article for the individual), especially if we refuse to assume that Opountius was necessarily very well-known. Whatever the point of this joke, something beyond the words seems to be called for. Opountius is also a target in the series of jokes at Av. 1292 f., where I have already suggest-
ed that mimicry would help to give comic definition to what otherwise looks like much too dense a piece of writing. Not every one of the references would need to be filled out in this way; those to 'Perdix', Opointius and Meidias are sufficiently explained anyway, though they could be amusingly supplemented, most obviously in the case of Perdix. The jokes about Theag- enes and Lycurgus do not apparently allude to visible characteristics, but even in these cases the nature of the birds in the comparisons might provide material for some colourful acting. I am not suggesting that all these jokes depend on clearly imagined connections between the human subjects and the birds; on the contrary I have stated that the passage is one which may have given different degrees of entertainment to different spectators, but it must have been intended to provide most of them with more amusement than the text itself seems to contain, and this is likely to have depended as much on performance as on detailed familiarity with the individuals named.

A visual joke akin to mimicry can be produced by the spoken observation that someone or something in view of the audience resembles a particular individual. Two straightforward examples of this are Thesm. 98, where Agathon's appearance reminds Mnésilochoüs of the hetaira Cyrene, and Thesm. 235, where the old man exercises similar sarcasm in taking his own image in the mirror for that of Cleisthenes. In both cases the audience's attention has been focussed on the immediate object of the observation just a few seconds before the joke is made – by Agathon's eccyclema entry in the one, the shaving of Mnésilochoüs in the other. Wasos 820–23 presents us with a more problematic case, to which the most economical solution, I think, is simply to treat ὥτος at 820 as referring to a plain herm which stands outside the skene door throughout the play, and to which reference is also made at 875. This would be a herm without genitals, for the sake of the joke at 823. On this interpretation, as probably on most others, 822 cannot be rationalised in itself, unless we take the herm to be a very
large one, but it sets up the punch-line that follows and is perhaps meant to have the flavour of a bizarre ἀκασμός. At any rate, we are here only given reason to notice the object which is involved at the point at which the joke is made, and the same is true at Eccl. 71, where the woman produces her false beard as she speaks the line (468 f.). Finally, no special comment is required on the three jokes of this kind in the parados of Birds, at 280–86, 287–90 and 299–300, though the visual element in the first two in particular, which involve special extra-choral birds on the skene roof, must have been given considerable attention.

A personal joke may of course make use of a visual element which is not related to the appearance of the target, and while it is unnecessary to illustrate the possibilities of this at length I shall cite three examples which give an idea of how we need always to visualise jokes in their full dramatic context. At W., 197 Philocleon's appeal to Cleon is delivered as he gets pushed back into the house, hanging beneath the donkey, and line 198 suggests to me that the text and action would be synchronised so that the plea is heard just an instant before the door is slammed shut behind Philocleon. The visible circumstances add to our appreciation of the fatuous nature of the appeal, but perhaps also reinforce the satirical implication that Cleon is so much the jorors' κηδεμόν (242: cf. 731 for contrast) that he would even intervene to help in a petty, private situation such as this. At Peace 681 f., the mention of Hyperbolus, which would not in itself be explicitly amusing, is turned instantly into a joke by the visibly frantic response of the statuesque goddess. To hypothesise that Aristophanes would not have written line 682 unless he had intended his audience to see Peace actually moving at this point is not, I think, to commit the fallacy of projecting modern and inappropriate standards of realism onto the text, for the alternative is to accept that the playwright ineptly created an easily avoidable conflict between what the spectators were told and what they could see, which is certainly not his usual practice (it would be a
false argument to point to passages where what is described cannot have been seen because it was impossible to show it within the resources of the theatre). It should be remembered that we know nothing about the material, form or size of the representation of Peace; we use the term 'statue' conveniently, but we should not therefore slide into the assumption that a standard stone figure was employed. I suggest that Hermes, who was standing next to the goddess (cf. 660 f.), was in a position to simulate her head-movements, and that it was the visual result which made the joke at 681. Likewise at Frogs 1504 ff. the personal jokes are not strictly contained within the text but require the visible production of the objects in question (presumably ropes etc.). The sight of the objects must indeed have mattered more than the particular choice of names: what we are offered here is a suggestive variation on that basic satirical relish which manifests itself in the desire for a person's misfortune.

I shall complete this section with some observations on three passages in which a person already on stage and engaged in the action is suddenly given the identity of a known individual, for in each case our understanding of the dramatic intention is bound up with consideration of visual factors.

Ach. 117-22: There has been much disagreement about the interpretation of this passage. As far as I can see, there is no simple assumption which will yield a straightforward piece of staging and humour, but most attempts to disentangle the problem are too elaborate and entail the supposition of more action than the text gives warrant for. The herald's response at 123 (cf. 59, 64) implies that Dicaeopolis has done no more than verbally interrupt the proceedings yet again: why should we posit the removal of masks or similar disguises? Dicaeopolis has certainly approached the Persians at 110 f., but at 114 his rhetorical use of the first-person plural suggests that he turns to address the audience (as I believe he does at 75 f. also), and I remain unconvinced that if he physically chall-
enges anyone in the following lines it involves more than a gesture or
two. I prefer to understand 120 f. as meaning 'How do you, a beardless
eunuch, dare to come dressed up (i.e. disguised) like this?': in other
words, ὡνχαχος... ἔκκειναμένος does not mean 'dressed as a eunuch' but
'a eunuch dressed up (as something else)'. On this reading the audience
would not actually see anything to make them think the Persians were eun-
uchs; when Dicaeopolis says ἐνοχχεῖν at 117 he is making an abusive cast-
igation. The Persians were presumably bearded and/or swathed, so that
their cheeks were not visible: Dicaeopolis's climactic claim to have ex-
posed the ἄντικενος of the whole show need not receive positive visual
confirmation; we are left unable to decide, if we care to think about it
at all, whether he is right.

Peace 473 f.: None of the commentators finds it worthwhile to tell us in
detail what he thinks is going on at this point. There are at least three
possibilities:

(a) a figure is actually driven away, and we are invited (perhaps en-
couraged by his appearance) to identify him as Lamachus.

(b) Trygaeus gestures towards the audience, as if at Lamachus himself —
perhaps towards the generals' seats. Though ἕκπεδεν κεθήκας may well
have been idiomatic (cf. Pherecrates fr. 19), a literal application of it
could be comically striking.

(c) the direction of the address might be left vague, with Trygaeus
shouting either into the air or into the chorus.

I think that (a) is very unlikely: if a figure were visible, he would
surely be costumed to look like Lamachus (the identification would look
flat otherwise), and the evidence of Acharnians makes it difficult to be-
lieve that such a figure could have entered with the chorus without being
conspicuous from the start — yet the joke seems designed to have a sudden,
unanticipated impact. (b) also seems to me unlikely in this context, for
the simple reason that Trygaeus ought to be talking about an impediment to the visible operation of hauling out Peace, and a gesture towards the audience would fit ill with this: note that the contributions of the Argives, Spartans etc. are described in the terms of the action on stage (464-6, 475, 478f, 481). It is simplest, therefore, to take it that Trygaeus purports to see Lamachus hindering the disinterment of the goddess in front of him and invites the audience to suppose momentarily, though they cannot see him, that Lamachus is there among the workers. Given the size of the chorus this would be perfectly feasible, whether Trygaeus stood off or went among the haulers. Here, then, is a joke with a visual dimension of a slight kind; the main work is left to the audience's imagination.

Birds 857-61: The commentators have not considered the staging or humour of these lines closely enough. Peisetaurus must go over to the skene door at 850 and at least await a response to his instructions; but in fact it is very likely that he actually goes inside. The chorus must be accompanied by a flautist when they start to sing at 851. This player has presumably been out of sight since the end of the parabasis (800) for the duration of which he was costumed as Procne (665 ff., 676-84); he must reappear as this scene ends. The interpretation of 857-61 depends partly on how conspicuous we imagine the flautist to be during the strophe preceding. Unfortunately we do not know much about the normal situation or movement of accompanying musicians in fifth-century drama. Our only significant literary evidence is the scholia on Aeschines i.10, where it is stated that in cyclic, that is dithyrambic, dance, μίσις ὑπατω τω διώτως; but it would not be surprising if this were no more than an inference from the shape of the dance itself. The evidence from vase-painting is more substantial but is complicated by the fact that within the technical limits of the art flautists had always to be portrayed side-on. Choreographic scenes on vases are never shown in the setting of a theatre, moreover, and we may
legitimately wonder how much the design of dancers and flautist owes to the independent artistry of the painters. These cautions apart, the vases show us a variety of positions for auletai accompanying choruses: at the centre of a symmetrical pattern; facing a line of dancers; following a line; leading the dancers. This probably reflects a real variability in theatrical practice, depending on the nature of the particular dance. In view of the shortness of the strophe at Av. 851–8 it is safer to assume that the auletes here remained somewhere near the side or corner of the skene, but he must anyway have been visible to the audience. There is no reason to believe that he was meant to be identifiable by his appearance as Chairis, and that would in any case spoil the surprise of the suggestion at 857. But from Peisetairus's first words at 859 it is evident that the flautist goes on playing after the chorus has finished singing, and I think it is a plausible inference from this that the reference to Chairis was musically though not visually reinforced: the auletes' playing at this point, though not during the strophe itself, is meant to be of a quality which would lend satirical credibility to the description of him as Chairis. Peisetairus returns from inside the skene, or his distracted wait by the door, to be greeted by cacophony from the auletes, now in his role as accompanist of the forthcoming sacrifice, and momentarily assuming the identity of Chairis. The joke is soon over and the piper must slip back into an inconspicuous technical role. If we wish to use 860 f. as evidence that the player was dressed as a bird, I would suggest that this only becomes apparent after Peisetairus has approached him and removed his ψυκτήρα (was it the raven's beak or throat feathers that were represented?): if the audience could see from 851 on that the auletes was a raven or crow, lines 860 f. would become rather ponderously redundant. As in the earlier passages discussed, my conclusion is that the visual dimension was probably of a suggestive rather than an explicit kind, and this may have been generally true of personal jokes.
I end this chapter with some brief observations on four familiar aspects of Aristophanes' exploitation for comic purposes of proper names.

I have already commented, in more than one context, on the tendency of personal jokes to turn individuals into comic types, simplifying the particular reality so that it crystallises into a readily intelligible satirical form. Two procedures can be distinguished: the individual may be reduced to nothing more than an obvious stereotype (Cleonymaus is a ρψοδιαγος, Cleisthenes a pathic, etc.), or he may be presented as the representative, the epitome of a certain class of people. Although the two sometimes merge, the technique and character of a joke may definitely point in one direction rather than the other. An occasional technique which implicitly and evidently attributes a representative status to a target is the use of a proper name in the plural. This technique has affinities with two others which I illustrated earlier in this chapter, the metaphorical application of a name and the employment of a name as an ordinary noun: both entail that the name, and therefore of course the person properly or primarily denoted by it, embodies an essence which can be conceived of and manipulated independently of its original attachment. In contrast to satire in which the individual is assimilated to a ready-made type or put into an easily understood category (illicit citizens, dishonest politicians etc.), the technique of a plural name presupposes for its appreciation some familiarity with the individual, or at least his reputation, though apart from this it is a very straightforward kind of humour. We should note that Cratinus seems to have given larger dramatic form to the basic idea, perhaps by way of burlesque rather than satire, in plays such as Ἀκηλλοχος, Χλεοβουλινας and Ὀσυτης (cf. also Telecleides' Ησιοδος), and the technique can naturally be used with any famous name: see e.g. Πφειδες, Eupolis CGF 95.7. The readiness of ancient exegetists to treat comic targets as perfect instantiations of the faults ascribed to them at least meant that they appreciated the satirical thrust of plural
names, and Hesychius's entry under Δημοκρίτων (= C. adesp. 71) gives some grounds for believing that they may even have been prepared to translate other jokes into this form. A plural name is a rhetorical device, a convenient means of blurring or sliding over the relation between the particular and the general in the interests of an argument: its argumentative use can be clearly seen at Αὐ. 558 ff., Φρόγλας 963, 1041 and 1043. Its simplest function is that of filling out a personal into a general idea, exaggerating the size of a category. This is comically exploited at Αὐ. 1701, Γοργίαν καὶ Φίλοππον (cf. 1703). The plurals are here integral to the aim of turning two individuals into representatives of a whole γένος (1696, 1700) of ἀρχαίους, and this is fundamental to the racial colouring of the ode, the implication of which is that Athenian justice is being interfered with by large numbers of foreigners. This identification of individuals with a race is close to the joke in Cratinus fr. 208, and in both these cases we also find the coupling of the plural name with other plural nouns or adjectives, so that the significance of the name is partly conveyed by the context: for such reinforcement cf. also Aristophanes fr. 106 (at least one plural name, and emendation could produce more), Αἰχ. 601 ff., 866. At Αἰχ. 270 and 1071 the coupling of name and nouns is such that Δημοκρίτων appears almost to be a category of things rather than people — of τρεχαντα (269) or πώνες (1071). Εὐάθλος δέκα at Αἰχ. 710 serves a double purpose: it expresses hyperbolically the former capacities of Thucydides, and it reinforces the picture constructed in epirrhema and antepirrhema of a class of young politicians, γενικεῖος φίλοφερ (680), of whom Euathlus is a notorious example.

A second technique which increases the comic potential of a name is playing on its etymology, actual or supposed. There is much evidence to confirm that this was merely a humorous application of a practice which could be exercised in a more serious vein. We are told at Οδύσσεια 19. 407-9 that Autolycus named his grandson by etymological considerations.
Sophocles' Ajax recognises the appropriate connection which his name has turned out to have with Ἀιμή (Ajax 430 f.), and the play's chorus later allude to the same fact (914). We come closer to outright comic etymology at Homer Od. 18.73, where the suitors mockingly observe that Ἄτατρ will be Ἀτπίτς after his fight with Odysseus, or at Plato Rep. 600 b 6 ff., where Glauccon claims that Homer's friend Κέφωνας lived even more ludicrously than his name would suggest by failing to learn anything from the poet during his lifetime. These and other similar examples help to suggest the appeal of etymological jokes to Aristophanes' original audiences. But my main reason for noticing this technique in connection with names is not to elucidate the humour of particular cases, for it is usually of a self-explanatory kind, but to mention the general issues of interpretation raised by the technique, since commentators have often failed to deal with individual passages with any sense of the broader implications of their choices and judgements. The chief problem is to decide how far a play on the etymology of a name affects the name's capacity to denote a particular individual for the hearer. A critical instance is Eccl. 916, Καλτῆς Τὸν ὘ρθάγορα, where the sexual connotations of ὡρα- are unmistakeable; but Orthagoras was not a common name, so can we rule out the possibility that the first audience might have thought of an individual of that name? The two principal factors that we must always take into account are the comic requirements of the context and the commonness and associations of the name. Where the etymological joke is sufficient justification for the name, we need a specific reason for regarding it also as the carrier of a personal joke, and this reason may be supplied by either the context or the name itself. An illustration of how the context can create the necessity of taking a personal reference is provided by Ἀσβός 82-4: the shift from adjective φιλός ἐνος to name with article, and the abusive καταπετυχων, make no other understanding possible. The known associations of the name are the decisive factor at, for example, Ach. 270 (Lamachus) and Eccl.
1021 (Procrustes), though the speaker's meaning in the surrounding context adds confirmation. It is not enough, however, that a name should have belonged to someone well-known at the time. To identify Myrrhine's wife Cinesias with the dithyrambic poet of that name, even if Aristophanes did have a comic predilection for him, would be pointless: the naming at Lys. 852, with the mock-demotic \( \pi\alpha\gamma\eta\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma\varsigma \) underlining the sexual pun, carries no external reference, and nothing else in the scene indicates one. Special factors can sometimes settle the issue. We would not have good grounds for finding a personal joke at \( \text{W. 438} \) were it not for the mention of Dracontides earlier in the play, at 157, also in the mouth of Philocleon, but that previous joke dictates our understanding of the second passage. It is particularly important in this area of interpretation to emphasise the distinction between a marginal or eccentric response from a few members of an audience (any name might bring an individual to mind) and an identification which a passage invites an audience as a whole to make or which it is reasonable to suppose that a majority of spectators would make: these last two possibilities are effectively the same, since we can hardly doubt that a comic poet would necessarily intend his audience to respond in a way in which most of them would be likely to. We cannot speculate profitably about a marginal response, but if we wish to posit an intentional personal joke in a passage involving play on the etymology of a name we must be able to stipulate the factor which indicates or implies the intention. Given the commonness of the name, why should \( \kappa\epsilon\lambda\alpha\nu\mu\pi\iota\sigma\omega\nu \) at \( \text{Nu. 64} \) have been a deliberate reference to the contemporary actor of that name? All that matters here is the etymology and the general suggestiveness of aristocracy, and there is no more reason to go beyond this than at, say, \( \text{Kn. 615 (Nikoubou us), Kn. 901 (Pyrrandrus), or W. 1250 (Philoctemon). There remain, of course, some genuinely uncertain cases, and Eccl. 916, which I mentioned earlier, may be considered one of these, since we are not able to estimate whether any holder of the name Orthagoras would automatically come
to mind; but the chances are against there having been such a person with
suitable associations for the sexual character of the passage.

About a third technique of naming, the coining of words based on
names, I make only one or two brief points. The technique entails a highly
economical kind of humour, and it is for this reason, I suspect, that we
find it both in Aristophanes and in the fragments of other comedians used
only with the names of very well-known targets. Two small categories and
a larger third one can be distinguished. The coinages Αὐραχίςπτίων (Ach.
1206) and μυστικός αχος (Peace 304) exploit the etymology of the name.
Τυχαρχησέγινυ (Nu. 48) and έδωκέας (Av. 1282) rely on the pure assoc­
iations of the name, though in both cases a list of other words fills out
the point: into this category we should also put Περεύρωκατος, and per­
haps the other names with the same prefix, in Com. adesp. 1176—9. But
the largest category comprises compounds which add to the name an element
that itself contributes the satirical colour, though how far this involves
emphasising an association that might anyway go with the name varies from
case to case: see e.g. Κρ. 18 Κομψερυκά, Π. 342 Δημοσιοκλέω, Π.
592 Κολακώνυμοι (cf. Κολακώφωροκλέες, Hermippus fr. 38 = Phrynichus
fr. 17), Av. 639 μελλονικάν. Άνδροκολωνσκής in Cratinus fr. 263 should
be noted as a compound with the name in tmesis, which we never find in
Aristophanes.

Some comments, finally, on the use of patronymics in personal jokes.

In normal circumstances a patronymic may serve as a necessary or effective
means of identification, either in place of or in addition to the son's
own name. At Plato Lysis 204e Hippothales observes that the young men
Lysis is still known by his father's name ( ἔτι πατρότευν επονομάζεται )
rather than his own, because the father is very well-known and Lysis him­
self is not; and indeed Socrates, who thought he did not know Lysis
because his name was not familiar, finds when he hears the father's name
that he does after all know the son in a sense. This passage indicates,
however, that a patronymic had something more than a practical use: the reputation of Lysis's father is a positive reason for calling the son Ὁ Δημητριάντως, since it puts him in his family context and allows him to carry some of the pride of his origins. A patronymic would normally, therefore, add a touch of formality or correctness to an act of naming. It is not surprising, consequently, that we do not find many patronymics in Aristophanes, or that when we do they are often introduced and exploited for ironic or comic effect (compare, e.g., the humorous treatment of prayer-forms). It is occasionally not obvious that a patronymic is there for a specific point, but even in such a case as Frogs 934 it is reasonable to suppose that the identification of the target helps to turn ridicule on both father and son, especially as the father is himself the object of jokes elsewhere. This is clearer, I think, at Thesm. 941, where ἐνκλέψεως Ὀ Κρήνου formally strengthens the impression, which the punch then undercuts, that Xenocles is being picked out as someone special: note that in the blunter, less subtle joke about Xenocles earlier in the play (169) only his own name is given. Av. 766 f. provides the best illustration of how a patronymic can make father and son a pair of targets for a joke (τὸν πατέρας νόττον, 'a chip off the old block'), though if Ὁ Πεισίους was Meles the father of Cinesias the dithyrambist, Peisias must have been dead by 414. Cleinias, father of Alcibiades, was certainly dead long before 425, yet at Ach. 716 Alcibiades is simply called Ὁ Κλείνου (cf. fr. 907). It would be wrong to attempt to attach a precise comic implication to the appellation here, yet it can hardly be denied that to abuse a young man as ἔφυτερωκτὸς καὶ ἀλής and in the same context to call him by his patronymic is to expose not only the individual but also his family background to some attention: what remains hard to estimate is whether this is a means of sneering at the family as well, or of implying that the son is letting down and shaming his origins.

A very striking case of a different kind is that of the sons of Hippocrates, the Athenian general who died at Delium in 424 (Thuc. 4. 101.
2). Of the five extant comic references to Hippocrates's sons only one, fr. 112 from Georgoi, may be earlier than the father's death, yet it seems that the sons continued even years later to be referred to by their patronymic. This is certain for Eupolis fr. 103, which dates from 412, and I suspect that Ἰον Ἰπποκράτους ἔνα τὸν Θεσμ. 273 is an allusion to the affairs of the family after the father's death and not to a particular building. The reason for this continued use of the patronymic must, I think, be practical. Hippocrates himself was probably well-known—a general and a nephew of Pericles—and so remembered after his death. The sons were young when he died and may never have attracted any individual publicity; it was their involvement in the settlement of the estate which brought them attention and, presumably, allowed the comic poets to give them their image of simoletons. It is not easy to suggest any other hypothesis which would explain the fact that all the jokes treat them collectively (ἔνα τὸν Θεσμ. 273 may mean that they, or their families, shared a house). It is doubtful, of course, whether any feelings about Hippocrates himself lie behind the jokes.

At Av. 282ff., where the pedigree of Callias's family, evoking the solid continuity of a succession of famous names, is followed by the portrayal, visual and verbal, of Callias's own shabby failure to maintain his σωφροσύνη, it would be naïve, especially in view of the sexually distorted patronymic at Frogs 429, to imagine that Aristophanes really wished to stir any serious thoughts about the traditions or standards of the family. Frogs 429 itself is a straightforward example of how a joke can be contained within a patronymic, and the force of this technique is due to the way that it destroys or travesties the formality and the associations which normally go with such an appellation. Well-known cases of the same thing are Ἐδρησίου (Ach. 118) and Τεν Γοργάςου (Ach. 1131), and the abusive ὁ Σέλλω/Σέλλαρτός to which Aristophanes for some reason took rather a liking in Wasps (325, 459, 1243, 1267). Mock-
patronymics are not equivalent to aspersions on the target's true parentage but rather a comic way of insinuating something about the person himself, as we can see clearly from the woman's gibe against Mnesilochus at Thesm. 861. It would be interesting to know the reason for the nickname Ὀξός applied to the handsome young Cephisodorus mentioned at Aeschines 1.158, but this at least indicates that mock-patronymics were a form of wit not exclusive to comic poets. However, special comic exploitations can be found. I mention two of a similar type: at Ach. 705 the avoidance of Euathlus's own name enables it to be saved up for the athletic word-play at 710 (though there may be other reasons too for the patronymic: note that Euathlus is representative of the Ἀχαῖοι); and at Ay. 125f. the pun on Aristocrates' name and Ἀριστώκρατος, which would otherwise be feeble (though cf. Ay. 152f.), is lent a degree of comic subtlety by the use of the patronymic to suppress the son's name. This last joke evidently presupposes a knowledge of Scellias's son's name, but beyond that it owes at least as much to comic technique as to the facts of history, as it has been one of the aims of this thesis to show that many other personal jokes do in the extant plays of Aristophanes.
Notes

1. Perhaps the closest thing elsewhere in Aristophanes to the first part of Dicaeopolis's speech is Eccl. 357ff., the musings of the constipated Blepyrus.

2. Dicaeopolis should perhaps seem to have something in common with the Theophrastan ἀδιάλειψης, who will talk to anyone.

3. For some further points see Appendix I.


9. If that is what they both are; on the difficulties of this scene cf. most lately Hooker (1979) p. 245.


11. See the comments of Werner (1969) p. 10, and notice, for example, the omission of the whole area of verbal artistry from the otherwise comprehensive survey of Aristophanic scholarship by Gelzer (1971).

12. Cf. the remarks of Rutherford (1905) pp. 435ff., and for attempts to categorise Aristophanic humour by such schemes see e.g. Sterkie's edn. of Ach., pp. xxxviii ff., and Stanford's of Frogs, pp. xxxiiiff.

13. I call it 'insidious' because it is easy for scholars to slip into it through their efforts to stress the importance of performance. Two examples: Werner (1969) p. 10 talks as though the text were the least important part of the play, even though his own interesting observations on the first scene of Frogs underline the importance of verbal joking in Aristophanes and show how the structure of the text often determines the limits within which lines require to be acted; MacDowell on Wasp 1516-37 confidently asseverates that "the audience will have paid little or no attention" to words and music in this final scene of the play, which leaves one wondering why Aristophanes bothered to write them. Barrett, in Barrett and Sommerstein (1978) p. 24, claims that "Old Comedy was primarily a visual experience". Why primarily?

14. There is an early statement of this attitude in Schlegel (1846) p. 148: "In Old Comedy...the whole poem was one big jest, which again contained within itself a world of separate jests, of which each occupied its own place, without appearing to trouble itself about the rest." Coleridge virtually quotes this sentence, but without reference to Schlegel, in
his Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare (Bohn's Popular Library edn., 1914, p. 188).

15. I use 'licence' deliberately to suggest positive possibilities; Ussher (1979) p. 2 thinks we need "to pardon the many inconsistencies", as though they were an accident of incompetence: cf. the criticisms of Dover, CR 15 (1965) p. 163, on a similar attitude in P. Händel's Formen und Darstellungsweisen in der aristophanischen Komödie (1963).


18. Stanford ad loc.; his premise is suitably refuted by Vahlen's discussion of this passage, Omuscula Academica I (1907) pp. 255ff.

19. McLeish (1980) pp. 102f. talks of "double entendre...in which the performers never make it apparent that they are aware of bawdy meanings." This is a slightly different matter, though I do not think there is much of this either in Aristophanes.

20. See e.g. Rogers and Stanford ad loc., and the translation of van Daele.


22. The interpretation of Lapalus (1934) pp. 8ff. is wholly fanciful.


24. Note the rich comic exploitation of the use of illustrations to bolster an argument at Menander Samia 600ff.

25. This is only one objection to the very unsatisfactory, but still widespread, use of the terms 'bomolochus' and 'bomolochic' in Aristophanic criticism (cf. Boin[p. 87 n.2]). The whole subject of Aristophanic characterisation, and especially the analysis of it in terms of Aristotelian type-categories, needs a fresh and systematic study. From at least the time of Süss (1908) scholars have tended to identify certain roles as bomolochic and then to accommodate individual passages to that judgement, instead of examining without preconception how far and by what criteria Aristophanic characters can be categorised.

26. The combination of AV. 520 and Cratinus fr. 231 suggests that animal oaths may actually have been thought of, whether rightly or not, as an archaic phenomenon. There is nothing intrinsically light-hearted about an animal oath; an asseveration may even be strengthened by the implication that the speaker would swear by anything. There may therefore be something quaint about the examples at AV. 83, Plato Apol. 22a1 and Gorgias 482b5. For examples of emphatic oaths by other things see AV. 194, Telecleides fr. 27, Euripolis frs. 70, 74, 90, and Antiphanes fr. 296.

27. On the technicality of the claim see Handley (1953) p. 133.
28. See MacDowell and loc. cit. and Ehrenberg (1951) p. 346 n. 8.
29. Plato Com. fr. 173.21 provides an analogous interruption at the end of a speech.
30. For some other miscellaneous examples see Cratinus fr. 460, Hermiphus frs. 35, 42, Lysias 6.17, Plato Phaedo 71 c1, Euthyd. 297 c1, Com. adesp. 21, 31, 681.
31. The classic example of an individual with a serious representative status of this kind is Thoies: see e.g. Nu. 180, Av. 1009, with Fraenkel Elementi Plautini in Plauto (1960) p. 205.
32. The later proverbial status of some of Old Comedy's targets is to be noted: cf. e.g. ἡμλότερος Πεισάνδρου (Corb. Poroem. Gr. II pp. 587, 607), Λυσίκρατης ἱτερος (CPC II p. 513), Πέρδικος κατηλείον (Hsch. s.v.).
33. An extreme case is Eccel. 208, which may be proverbial.
34. Neither of these is mentioned by Monaco (1963).
36. Compare Terence Fun. 783 for a similar joke.
37. These abusive uses of proper names are surprisingly omitted by both A. Müller, Philol. 72 (1913) 321ff., and Wendel (1929).
39. Ἀμφετισίως Ὀξως at W. 687 might be indefinite, and Ὅ Κοσφύξας at Ach. 614 may designate a type (so Dover on Nu. 48), but neither would be quite comparable. Places where the 'son of...' formula is used metaphorically but with an abstract or non-human father supply no true analogy: cf. Men. Dysc. 88 with Gomme-Sondbach.
40. The etymology of Laispodias's name (cf. ἧν, ᾿μίστερες' at 1567) may be part of the joke. The usual view that L. was 'crucibus distortis insignis' (Kock on C. adesp. 70) rests on Σ Av. 1568, but in view of Eupolis frs. 100 and 102 I would prefer to believe that L. was notable simply for long, perhaps slightly flamboyant, dress (cf. Dem. 19.314).
41. Cf. Apuleius Apol. 81, Thyrsichus Praenaratio Sophistica s.v. Ἐρωτοὺς, Libanius Erist. 1038 Wolf (1145 Foerster).
42. As Isocrates' coupling perhaps suggests.
43. MacDowell on W. 380; cf. Taillardet (1965) § 519.
44. Cf. Plato Rep. 581d. καττηνίτας covers 'steam', 'hot air' etc.
45. See Cratinus fr. 151, Ar. frs. 231, 367, 703, Eupolis fr. 82; cf. Hsch. s.v. Ἀρβυτόμακας.
46. I note here the possibility that Kn. 242f. (for Simon see Dow (1969)) were visibly addressed towards the section of the audience where the
Knights were seated, for which see *Frogs* 653.

47. So Dover *ad loc.*, but having flung down his cloak Right may run off down an eisodos: running into the audience would not be as effective as in a darkened indoor theatre.

48. Dover's note on 1102 makes this relation clear.


50. I follow MacDowell, not Coulon, on line-attributions in this passage.

51. MacDowell *ad loc.*; cf. his note on 325.

52. See MacDowell on 74 and 81, but the case of Amyntas is very conjectural, dependent as it is on identifying the general of Hermippus fr. 71 as Amyntas, for which there is no strong reason at all.

53. See DFA 2 p. 268.

54. So Mostrom orco, *Rh. Mus.* 121 (1978) p. 28. Ussher (1979) p. 42 n. 1 finds a reference to claquers at *Ach.* 656 (=657, presumably), as does Ghiron-Bistagne (1976) p. 201: but as the argument of the whole section makes abundantly clear, the language is that of political manipulation and corruption (two of the verbs in 657 pick up 634-40).

55. Except possibly at *Lys.* 1216ff.: see Dover (1972) pp. 10-12.


57. See Ussher *ad loc.*

58. I ignore the possibility that there existed differences in acting styles between comedy and tragedy: for actors' specialization see Plato *Rep.* 395a with O'Connor (1908) pp. 39ff. The importance of the impossibility of facial expression seems to me often to be exaggerated (see e.g. Sifakis *BICS* 26 (1979) p. 74): facial expression is not as much used by the modern theatre actor as is sometimes suggested, though films and television naturally make much of it. It is still not uncommon to find ill-informed and negative speculations about fifth-century acting. A recent illustration: "actors were masked, wore high buskins [?] and long robes [?] ....facial acting was impossible and violent gesticulation at least difficult [why?] ...actors had to rely entirely [sic] on their voices." (G.M. Grube, p. 95 in *Lectures in Memory of L.T. Semple, Second Series* 1966-70: Univ. of Cincinnati Classical Studies II, 1973).

59. DFA 2 pp. 93f.

60. *λέκκ ... δύνασθαι* (61 b 34), and the whole context, suggests that something more than mere exact imitation (Lucas *ad loc.*) is behind the story.

61. D. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (1934) p. 16, posits a change in styles, but not of a fundamental kind, so far as I can see.
62. See e.g. Demetrius de eloc 193-5, Dion. of Halic. Dem. 53f., Quintilian (e.g.) 1.11.12-13.

63. The Glaucon mentioned at III.1.3 cannot be safely identified or dated.


65. Cf. Dion. of Halic Dem. 53f.: Demosthenes' style dictates (ἵσασκειν) ἐξ ὁμορρήσεως καθ' ἑκάτην δὲ ἐκ' in every sentence.

66. Cf. the mixture of ars and natura in the style of comic actors described by Quintilian 2.10.13.


68. I am in favour of keeping the line-order and the attributions of R and V in this controversial passage: see the discussions of H. Erbse, Gnomon 28 (1956) 274f., and Dover, ICS 2 (1977) 152f.

69. MacDowell's note ad loc. overlooks the implications of the joke's form. I do not rule out the possibility that Aristophanes knew things which his audience did not.

70. Cf. Appendix I.

71. For the term see Hesych. s.v.: I use it in both singular and plural to designate any division of a line between speakers.


73. Sandbach, p. 113 in Ménandre (Fondation Hordt, Entretiens XVI, 1969).

74. Most of my discussion of Aristophanic antilobe is concerned with iambic trimeters, though one or two relevant examples are taken from other lines. W. Griffith, The Authenticity of the Prometheus Bound (1977) p. 139, is wrong to claim that comic antilobe is commoner in tetrameters than in trimeters.

75. Note, however, the claim of Denniston, CQ 30 (1936) p. 73 n. 2, that it is only in its free use of antilobe, "not in any general blurring of the verse-structure by irregular pauses", that comedy approximates to prose or the spoken language.

76. The only possible Aeschylean antilobe is Prom. 980: see Griffith loc. cit. (n. 74 above). I have been able to trace only two substantial discussions of antilobe in tragedy: W. Köhler, Die Versbrechung bei den griechischen Tragikern (1913), and H. Kitt, AJP 60 (1939) pp. 179-83. Neither exhausts the importance of the material. Both overlook, for example, the connection between antilobe and stage action.

77. Dale on Ate, S|Rfp.


79. See Plutus 393.

80. I give one example of each division point: after element 1, Kn. 10; after 2, Kn. 168; after 3, Kn. 172; after 4, Nu. 202; after 5, Kn. 146; after 6, Ache. 139; after 7, Kn. 142; after 8, Kn. 147; after 9, Kn.
142; after 10, Kn. 163; after 11, Ach. 46.


83. Commentators have been dogmatic about the precise force of ἐπιγλαucus here, but the word's three occurrences in Aristophanes (cf. *Ach.* 398, *Frogs* 942) suggest that it is nothing more than a straightforwardly belittling diminutive of ποίη ( = 'poetry' or 'verse'). The explanation of del Grande (1967) pp. 47–50 is too recherché, and ignores the ordinary festive associations of ψιχακί (e.g. *Ach.* 961, 970 etc., *Nu.* 339, 983, *Peace* 1149, 1195, 1197).

84. Cf. fr. 580.


87. The belief of Wüst (1921) p. 35 that the present joke is evidence for the occurrence of skolia in tragedy misses the point that Aeschylus is alleging improper sources for Euripides' material (ἐπιγλάucus, 1301, = 'from anywhere and everywhere'). Athenaeus 13,605e (= Epocrates fr. 4) indicates that Meletus wrote in other genres than tragedy.

88. Cf. ὡρος at Eur. *Bacch.* 1186, used of the forehead or crest of the hair (?).


90. See e.g. plates x and xii in E.H. Gombrich and E. Kris, *Caricature* (1940). Semonides' famous satire on women is pertinent here.


92. For aural mimicry see *In.* 10 and *Nu.* 872.


94. For Pericles' head see Cretinus frs. 71 (Pericles on stage?) and 240. *Wasps* 1031ff. is too fantastic to betray anything about the real Cleon. On Euripides see *Thesm.* 189ff.

95. As also at e.g. *Peace* 43ff.


97. *Ay.* 1294 would seem to suggest that Opountius was 'heterophthalmic' (for the term see Cretinus fr. 149), but he was probably familiar for
other reasons.

98. It is not clear whether Perdix was the man’s real name (so Σκρ. on Δρ. 1292) or a sobriquet, but the latter is more likely. Cf. Pape (1911) s.n.

99. Χυναλώτας is chosen, I presume, not to supply a precise visual image but vaguely to insinuate ΤΩΝ ΖΩΝ (cf. Χυναλώτας). A connection between Lycurgus and Egypt is proved by Crotinus fr. 30 and Pherecrates fr. 11: cf. W.N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions II (1948) p. 251, Davies APT pp. 349ff.

100. For the possibility that Agathon is meant to resemble the famous Ionian poets of earlier times (cf. lines 159ff.) see J.M. Snyder, Hermes 102 (1974) pp. 244-6, with J. Boardman, Athenian Red-figure Vases: The Archaic Period (1975) p. 219 and plate 131.


102. Some related passages: on Κρ. 54-7 see Dover (1959); on Μ. 1408ff. see MacDowell’s notes; on Σκρ. 45ff. the identification of Amphitheus by Müller-Strübing (1873) pp. 697-9 with Hermogenes (accepted by some: e.g. J.G. Griffith, Hermes 102 (1974) 367-9) cannot stand: see Méautis (1932).

For a more plausible identification of Amphitheus, but one which may not have been meant for the original audience, see Dow (1969).

103. See Dover (1963) pp. 8ff.

104. For the abusive use of Ευντύχας cf. Hipponax fr. 26.3 (West).

105. Dover (1963) p. 10 seems to me too emphatic in calling the identification of the Persians a 'deliberate misunderstanding'. The whole scene is such a curiously grotesque mixture of the plausible and the fantastic that we cannot necessarily rationalise each element in it.

106. Dover (1972) seems to me to favour (a) on p. 137 and (c) on p. 138.

Dearden (1976) p. 160 wavers between (a) and (c). Merry ad loc. mentions the possibility of (b).

107. Κυναλώτας sometimes denotes sluggishness (cf. Gomme HCT ii. p. 306), but that is not quite Lamachus’s putative failing. (γη)

108. Trendall & Webster, Illustrations of Greek Drama I. 8.


110. ib., plate 26.

111. ib., plate 27.

112. The auletes may well be meant to come forward to perform at this point.

113. Perhaps there is also the implication of the unpropitious: cf. Machon 134-6.

114. Τηνδεχεσω is probably derived from Aeschin. 1. 157; for Eurybatos cf. Ar. fr. 184, for Cillicon Peace 363.

115. See Kock’s note ad loc.


118. The thesis of Lewis (1970), who gives no reason to offset the plain character of the context. The actor is mentioned in fr. 474.

119. Coulon, following *LSJ*, prints άλκαλος (van Daele disagrees, not for the only time), but the adjective is not attested elsewhere. For the name Nicoboulos see *PA* 10830ff.

120. There is simply no justification for seeing a reference to Cleon here, as do e.g. Rogers and van Daele *ad loc*.

121. It is not ascertainable to whom the compound in Eupolis fr. 393 refers.

122. For comic patronyms cf. Peppier (1902) pp. 44ff.

123. W. 98 corresponds very closely to the passage of Plato's *Lysis* cited: the outstandingly handsome young man and his famous father. At W. 687 we might take the patronymic to confirm that the son of Chaireas was a μελεφτων, which of course need not be understood too strictly.

124. See Isoc. 16. 28 for Cleinias's death. Of course, it would still be normal, when appropriate, to use the patronymic after the father's death: see e.g. Alcibiades' at Thuc. 6.8.2.


126. See van Leeuwen *ad loc*. But Greek houses seem never to have gone above two storeys, and in any case Mnesilochus's cynicism means that there need be no special connection between Hippocrates' house and the aither: we want an effect of bathos, not a proper match.

127. Davies *APF* p. 456 gives no good reason for doubting that *Thesm.* 273 is a reference to the general; and his inference from Eupolis fr. 103 that the sons were "still very young in 412" is unsafe if my explanation of the patronymic is right.

128. The technique here is an irony akin to what is called 'permutatio ex contrario' at Rhet. *ad Herenn.* IV. 46 — e.g. calling a father-beater 'Aeneas'.

129. To take the joke with Davies *APF* p. 57 to show that Aristocrates' "Theramenean inclinations" were "already obvious in 414" is far too glib: the oblique word-play is sufficient raison d'être, and to seize on a connection with later events is dangerous.
I collect here notes on a handful of individual jokes which raise some interesting points of interpretation.

**Nu. 675f.:** There have been two conflicting sexual interpretations of this joke proposed, one treating it as a reference to active buggery and the other as a metaphor for masturbation. One important objection to both readings is the tense of the two verbs in these lines, which implies that Cleonymus "is being ridiculed not for some general characteristic which he still possesses but for something which he did on an occasion, or during a period" and surely "during a period" makes much the best sense of the imperfects. But why should active buggery or masturbation be alleged about a past period of Cleonymus's life? A second objection, which again applies equally to both the mentioned interpretations, is that the preceding lines as well as the tail-piece to the joke at 680 unmistakably insinuate effeminacy against the target, but neither of the suggested sexual activities harmonises well with this idea. A simpler solution is to take ἄνεμλοτητος as passive (compare βνεσκόμην at Kn. 1242), thus making the image carry an allusion to a period of passive homosexuality: the joke would then be based on a familiar slur against young politicians, and the past reference would cease to be troublesome. Although this alternative does not depend on it, I would tentatively suggest that we should consider reading Κλεώνυμος in 675 (corruption by assimilation to 674 would be easily intelligible): this would make slightly preferable sense, I think, in view of the equivalence just claimed by Socrates between ἀειδος and Κλεώνυμος, and it would make a passive sense for ἄνεμλοτητος a more natural part of Strepsiades's retort (the Θεία is part of Cleonymus).

Although on any sexual reading the imagery of 676 is novel, the use of πὐκλός for καθεύς in the Attic skolion, PMG 905, perhaps gives us a glimpse of the kind of slang association on which our joke may be drawing.

**Peace 47 f.:** As the latest English commentary on this play perpetuates some quite unnecessary uncertainty about the sense of line 48, it may be worth insisting on the obvious interpretation. Despite the ingenuity of van Leeuwen's emendation of ἀνελέως to ἐν ἁλέω, the text shored by R and V can stand unproblematically without this or any other alteration. Κεῖνος must refer to Cleon: when explaining that x is an allegory of y, it is not usual, and would certainly be inane in this particular case, to justify the claim by a simple description of x. But to take Κεῖνος as Cleon does not, pace Platnauer, cause any difficulty over the tense of ἐσθίει — a factitious
chronological worry, for all that it goes back to Eratosthenes (Σείμονι 
Peacé 48). Platonauer goes needlessly wrong when he claims "one cannot be expec-
ted to understand 'in Hades'" (his italics). But since the first audi-
ence of Peace assuredly knew that Cleon was dead, and Aristophanes knew
that they knew it, this claim is the very opposite of the truth: to say of
a person known to be dead "he is doing such—and—such" is to imply a refer-
ence to the other world which cannot but be understood; and no-one in the
first audience of Peace will have needed help in taking line 48 to be a
description of Cleon's fate in the Underworld.

Although this joke is put into the mouth of the sciolistic Ionian
spectator, himself the object of the slave's humour, the fierceness of the
slur on the politician's memory is unmitigated: we have here the severest
treatment of a deceased individual to be found anywhere in Aristophanes,
and this single reference contributes as much as any other evidence to the sup-
position that Aristophanes felt considerable personal animosity towards
Cleon.

Peace 675–8: I believe the commentators have overlooked part of the subt-
lety of this joke. When Trygaeus starts to explain his selection of Cleomy-
mus as Peace's best devotee, we naturally anticipate a reference to
\( \text{φιλασφία, ψυχήν γ' ξέριστος} \) (675) itself implies a qualification, and the
repeated \( \text{γ'} \) in \( \text{πλήν γ' έτι} \), reinforcing the first, suggests that this clause
supplies the required qualification. But by the ordinary interpretation
what follows is in fact quite senseless: what sort of qualification of a
description of someone as \( \text{ψυχήν γ' ξέριστος} \), which can only in reply to
Hermes' question mean 'very courageous' (cf. e.g. Men. Aspis 17, \( \text{μέγας} \)), is it to say that he is illegitimate? Of course, the overtone of
\( \text{υποβολήματος} \) in \( \text{συνοβολήματος} \) (678), strengthened perhaps by appropriate
enunciation, brings the two strands of \( \text{φιλασφία} \) and illegitimacy together
into a neat comic unity, and this may be thought justification for what has
preceded. But 675 f. still stands as momentarily very bizarre, and not,
I would suggest, in a familiar Aristophanic manner. However, if we imagine
how the lines might be delivered by an actor, I think we can discern a more
intelligible comic intention in them. If a pause were made before \( \text{πανειρ} \)
\( \text{ταράξω} \) in 676 (for a pause at this point in the line see, to take examples
from the vicinity, Peace 663, 675, 685.), the sense of the clause might
seem to be: "except that he doesn't belong where he claims to", i.e. on the
hoplite lists, or in the right place in battle. This adverbial use of
\( \text{οὔπω} \) with reference to inclusion in the military registers / place in
battle line-up happens to be found in an earlier joke about Cleonymus, at
Kn. 1371: Demos's new resolve to make each hoplite stay ὀμπείρε ἦν τὸ πρότερον in the lists, or in his regiment, is thought by the Sausage-seller to be likely to irk Cleonymus. Given the familiarity which most of Aristophanes' audience must have had by this time with the image of the politician as ırlpsaspis (six jokes about in Kn., Nu. and Ep., or seven if one includes Nu. 680, and a reference earlier in this play, Peace 446), there is nothing implausible about positing in them a readiness to pick up quickly such an arch allusion to the theme: indeed, it is the audience's expectation, aroused by the preceding lines, which should determine how we take what follows. But the allusion is only momentary — allowed by the slight pause — for when the actor adds τὸ παρός to complete the line the whole meaning is suddenly changed. The incongruity produced by this interpretation, the sudden surprising twist at the end of the line, is much more in keeping with normal Aristophanic techniques of humour than the kind with which we are left by the orthodox understanding of the lines — a bizarre non sequitur.

Unfortunately, my suggestion about the comic design of this passage does not really shed any light on the question of what lay behind the comic image given to Cleonymus by Aristophanes (cf. pp. 111-13). The force of ἔψεκτο νῦν Ἰρρ', as applied both to Cleonymus's parentage and also presumably to his military record, suggests a continuous or continued state of affairs over a period of time, though possibly (certainly in the case of parentage) one linked to a particular event in the past. While this harmonises with my suggestion (pp. 112 ff.) that we should not be too literal-minded about the allegations of ῥίψασπικα, and that something more like privileged evasion of service may have been the truth that Aristophanes got hold of, it would be consistent with other hypotheses too, and does not allow the matter to be settled. Lines 677 ff., of course, suggest a literal case (and a recurring one!) of ῥίψασπικα, but only those who think of Aristophanes as an accurate war-reporter will be content to believe this. It might just be added that ἤρεν (676) could be made to yield the implication that Cleonymus had had to defend himself against criticism or attack, but if we think of the application of the word to the parentage issue it should be obvious that such an implication cannot be counted on.

Peace 695-9: Lines 694 ff. (and note the present tense in 697) make it clear that whatever is referred to belongs to the period after 431, and the unqualified use of the name, together with the paradox of 697, rules out of the question reference to any Sophocles other than the tragic poet. It is odd that this joke seems never to have been brought into relation with the story told in the Life of Sophocles, § 12, according to which
Sophocles was responsible for the discovery of the golden crown stolen from Athena's statue in the Parthenon, and was rewarded with a public gift of a talent. Though we cannot be sure that the two things are connected, this episode, which is probably historical, is the likeliest explanation we have of the joke. Just what the point of the words Κάν ἐπὶ τίνος πλέον is remains unascertainable. The Vita records that Sophocles discovered the whereabouts of the crown in a dream: if we knew the truth, Aristophanes' joke might make much better sense to us. One advantage of taking the joke to be an allusion to the reward for the crown is that there would be no difficulty in understanding how everyone knew about it: this matter would have gone through the assembly, probably more than once (the reward was stipulated in advance), and was of obvious public concern; whereas to suppose, for example, that Sophocles had "been too highly paid for an epinikion for some prominent man" is to pose a problem about how Aristophanes could count, as the oblique character of the joke suggests that he could, on his audience's familiarity with the details.

Thesm. 605: There has always been uncertainty about whether we are to take the Cleonymus of this line to be the famous Ἐκλειπομένος; but no cogent reason for the identification has been given. A good case, though, can be made out. The name Cleonymus appears in three Athenian decrees from the 420's, and there are grounds for believing both that all three references are to the one man and that this Cleonymus is the same person as the Aristophanic butt.12 Outside Aristophanes and these inscriptions, however, we have no evidence for the possession of the name Cleonymus by a fifth-century Athenian.13 There is one possible sixth-century occurrence of the name, and PA gives three from the fourth-century. The name, then, does not seem to have been at all common, and this fact in itself tilts the balance of probability heavily in favor of our taking Thesm. 605 to refer to the earlier Aristophanic target, for it is not only a positive indication of probability but also an obstacle in the way of the alternative interpretations. If the name was not common but happened to belong to a well-known politician who had been the object of jokes in play after play of Aristophanes', as well as those of his rivals,16 could Aristophanes possibly have chosen it as a typical name of the kind found at e.g. 898, Ἦμεος 1396 f., a name which he did not intend or expect his audience to connect with a real Athenian of the day? I fail to see how he could have done. Indeed, if our evidence about the rarity of the name is not accidentally misleading (and we have a considerable amount of evidence for Athenian names), we can be confident that the name Cleonymus could not but mean the politician, the alleged Ἐκλειπομένος,
to most of Aristophanes' audience. Cleonymus may have been dead by this
date, though there is nothing to suggest that he was except Aristophanic
silence about his continuing activity. This joke, at any rate, does not tell
us much, for it depends simply on the man's already existing reputation and
the situation in which the remark is made. The point of the line lies,
I believe, in the way in which the woman's self-important indignation
(note the emphatic ἦμεν) at not being recognised at once, and pride in being
who she is, gets undermined by the disreputableness, whether past or still
present, of her husband. She implies, in other words, that everybody knows
Cleonymus, and she is comparable in status among the women, while the joke
for the audience resides in their being invited to see just this fact from
a very different angle. Conceivably, though this is only guesswork, the
line was buttressed by some visual humour (obesity?) in the speaker's
appearance.

Frogs 1039: It is often claimed that Aristophanes was kinder to some of
the victims of his satire after their deaths, and the two references to
Lamachus at Thesm. 841 and Frogs 1039 are the passages most commonly adduced in support of the claim; these mentions have, at any rate, almost universally been regarded as complimentary. I have already expressed a doubt about this way of taking Thesm. 841 (cf. pp.164ff.) and want here to indicate briefly the reasons for treating Frogs 1039 as a joke, not a compliment.

If Aeschylus's example of Homeric ἀξετή were seriously intended, we
should surely expect it to come from an earlier period, since he has been
talking about the origins of Homer's reputation (1034 ff.): Dionysus's
contemporary reference in 1036-8 is deliberately bathetic, and the humour
is there emphasised by the repeated βεβαίωσεν, as though Homer could in person have done something about Pantacles. It is not that Aeschylus's sights are fixed only on much earlier generations, but rather that in the context of a conflict between old and new the weight of a serious claim for the moral effects of Homeric poetry ought not to devolve upon a recent military figure, of a later generation than Aeschylus himself. The word ἴωσ, moreover, is significant here, though it sets a trap for modern readers, who are apt to translate it into their own 'hero' and to forget the special religious associations of the Greek word. But for fifth-century Greeks ἴωσ still quite definitely denoted a super-human status, usually occupied by distinguished or legendary characters of a much earlier age:
cf. e.g. Ἀγαμ. 389, 392, 438, Ἀτ. 881, 1485. A ἴωσ was invariably entitled
to some degree of religious attention: after discussing the worship of
Heracles, Herodotus prays for goodwill 'from both gods and heroes' (2.45.3).
The granting of some kind of divine status to a recently dead figure is
attested for Brasidas and Sophocles in the fifth-century, but I find it hard to suppose that the suggestion of heroisation for Lamachus could have been treated seriously in 405. Aristophanes had, of course, made Dicceopolis address Lamachus with mocking irony as \(\eta\omega\) at \(\text{Ach.} 579\) (and at 575, if we reject R's ascription, as I think we should), and that earlier passage may have been in his mind when he wrote \(\text{Frogs} 1039\).

If I am right in taking this line as a joke, it is likely that the force of it will have been strengthened by the actor's delivery, perhaps with a moment of \(\chiπ\pi\chi\alpha\) after \(\chiγ\alpha\beta\sigma\). And the old joke on the etymology of Lamachus's name may once more have been put into service here.

Notes

1. An innocent interpretation, taking the reference to greed, is put forward by Fröhde (1898) p. 54. That this was what Aristophanes intended cannot, in fact, be definitely ruled out, though see Dover ad loc.


3. Dover ad loc., but he does not consider this a hindrance to his interpretation.


6. \(\alpha\nu\pi\tau\varepsilon\theta\alpha\) (47) is used at Plato \(\text{Phaedo} 60\) in connection with Orphic doctrine about \(\varepsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\varphi\varepsilon\) in Hades: cf. Graf (1974) pp. 103-7. There may be a hit at contemporary intellectual fashions: cf. N. Richardson \(\text{PCPS} 20\) (1975) pp. 67ff.

7. Eupolis had mentioned Cleon at the preceding Lenaia, also after his death: see \(\Sigma\nu \). 549 and 556 (= Eupolis fr. 196).

8. The joke seems to have been overlooked by de Ste. Croix (1972) p. 371 n. 24. The claim of Henderson (1975) p. 192 that "scatophagous insults are frequently hurled at Cleon" is more than a little wild, as inspection of the evidence he offers will reveal.

9. So Sophocles' \(\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\nu\gamma\nu\chi\) in Samos (cf. \(\Sigma\) ad loc.), for example, is irrelevant.

10. This is the main objection to the interpretation of Drew (1928).

11. Platauuer ad loc.


13. There is a fifth-century Corinthian: see \(\text{SEG} 22.251\) (e).

14. But it is a conjecture: \(\text{SEG} 15.36\).

15. \(\text{PA} 8681-3\).


17. This indignation does not imply that Cleonymus's wife would be recognisible by most Athenian males; although Cleisthenes is asking the questions, he is regarded as one of the women, and it is with reference to them that the woman's feelings are to be understood as operating.


20. My interpretation is not, however, to be taken as implying a belief that Aristophanes seriously disliked or disapproved of Lamachus at any period, as some of those who think Frogs 1039 a joke do: see e.g. Kraus loc. cit.

21. In view of his election for the Sicilian expedition, Lamachus can hardly have been born earlier than c. 470, but a date soon after this seems likely if he served as a general with Pericles in the 430's (Plut. Per. 20.1). Yet note that at Ach. 601 L. is described as a young man! (cf. Gomme HCT III p. 537).

22. See Ussher, Kraus and Westlake, locc. cit. in nn. 18—19 above.


24. See Thuc. 5.11.1.

25. Vita § 17.
This list contains the names of all those individuals whom I consider we can identify as the subjects of personal jokes in the extant plays. It is offered, however, more as a useful guide than as a definitive compilation. I do not include passages of parody within my definition of personal joke. After each name I put the PA number in brackets, if there is one to give, and then list: (a) those places in the extant plays where I think we can find jokes which fall within my definition, including some uncertain or arguable cases; (b) all references or allusions to the person in the fragments of Old Comedy, since it would not be practical to discriminate among these according to my definition.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{\'A}v\acute{o}\theta\acute{w}n & \ (83): \ Thesm. \ 29ff., \ 49f.; \ Aristophanes \ frs. \ 169, \ 326, \ 599 \ (\text{CGF} \ 62.35); \ ? \text{CGF} \ 349.2. \\
\text{\'A}v\acute{α}v\acute{α}v\acute{i}os \ (179): \ Frogs \ 367? \ (cf. \ \text{ad loc.}), \ Eccl. \ 103-4, \ 184f., \ Pl. \ 176; \ Plato \ Com. \ frs. \ 133, \ 185, \ Senneryon \ fr. \ 9. \\
\text{\'A}v\acute{e}m\u0369\acute{a}n\acute{a}t\acute{o}s \ (202): \ Frogs \ 1513; \ Eupolis \ fr. \ 210. \\
\text{\'A}v\acute{v}i\acute{m}os \ (?311): \ Eccl. \ 208. \\
\text{A}i\acute{d}\acute{x}i\acute{v}n\acute{h}s \ (337): \ W. \ 459, \ 1220, \ 1243ff., \ Ar. \ 823; \ ? \ Phrynichus \ fr. \ 10. \\
\text{A}k\acute{e}\acute{d}i\acute{s}\acute{w}p\acute{o}r \ (474): \ W. \ 1221, \ Ar. \ 31f.; \ Cratinus \ fr. \ 85, \ Eupolis \ fr. \ 159, \ Callias \ fr. \ 13, \ Metagenes \ fr. \ 13, \ Theopompus \ fr. \ 60. \\
\text{\'A}l\kappa\acute{i}v\acute{b}i\acute{a}d\acute{h}s \ (600): \ Ach. \ 716, \ W. \ 44ff., \ Frogs \ 1422ff.; \ Ar. \ frs. \ 198, \ 554, \ 907; \ Pherecrates \ fr. \ 155, \ Eupolis \ f. \ 158, \ 351, \ Archippus \ fr. \ 45, \ C. \ adesp. \ 3-5. \\
\text{\'A}m\epsilon\acute{i}f\acute{i}as \ (708): \ Frogs \ 14. \\
\text{\'A}m\u0369\nu\acute{i}as \ (737): \ Nu. \ 686-92, \ W. \ 74-6, \ 466, \ 1267ff.; \ Cratinus \ fr. \ 212, \ ? \ Hermippus \ fr. \ 71; \ Eupolis \ fr. \ 209, \ C. \ adesp. \ 39. \\
\text{\'A}m\u0369\nu\nu: \ Eccl. \ 365. \\
\text{\'A}n\u0369\kappa\acute{a}l\acute{h}s \ (870): \ W. \ 1187; \ Ar. \ fr. \ 570; \ ? \ Ecphantides \ fr. \ 4, \ Cratinus \ frs. \ 208, \ 263, \ 458, \ Telecleides \ fr. \ 15, \ C. \ adesp. \ 48, \ 51. \\
\text{\'A}n\u0369\mu\acute{o}x\acute{i}c\acute{h}s \ (1106): \ Ach. \ 1150, \ ? \ Nu. \ 1022ff., \ ? \ Eupolis \ fr. \ 125. \\
\text{\'A}n\u0369\iota\acute{e}v\acute{e}n\acute{h}s \ (1304): \ W. \ 1270, \ 1301; \ Plato \ Com. \ fr. \ 103, \ C. \ adesp. \ 66. \\
\text{\'A}r\i\acute{t}o\kappa\acute{h}\acute{e}t\acute{i}h}s \ (1904): \ Ar. \ 126; \ C. \ 63.71f. \\
\text{\'A}r\acute{e}t\acute{w}k\acute{h}h\acute{n}os \ (2126): \ Eccl. \ 647ff., \ Pl. \ 314f.; \ cf. \ Ar. \ fr. \ 538. \\
\text{\'A}r\acute{e}f\acute{h}\acute{e}d\acute{h}s \ (2201): \ Kn. \ 1276ff., \ W. \ 1280ff., \ Peace \ 883-5, \ ? \ Eccl. \ 129; \ Ar. \ fr. \ 63; \ cf. \ Eupolis \ fr. \ 522.
\end{align*} \]
Aρχέδημος (2326): Frogs 416ff., 588; Eupolis frs. ? 9, 71.
Aρχένομος (2376): Frogs 1507.
Aσπασία: Ach. 527; Cratinus fr. 241, Eupolis frs. 98, 249, 274, CGF 95.166f.,
Callias fr. 15, C. adesp. 63.
Βρασίδας: W. 475, Peace 274ff., 640.
Γλαυκήτης (2944): Peace 1008, Thesm. 1033; Plato fr. 106.
Γοργίας: W. 421, Av. 1701.
Γρύττος: Kn. 877.
Δεύνικος: Pl. 800.
Δήμος (3573): W. 98; Eupolis frs. 213, CGF 95.80 ?, 98.116 ?
Διμήντατος (3611): Lys. 391ff.; Eupolis frs. 96, 97.
Δυσάρεσ: Nu. 830, Av. 1073, Frogs 320?
Διελεύθης (3755): Av. 798-800, 1442f.; Ar. fr. 307; Cratinus fr. 233 ?,
Plato fr. 31.
Διονυσίδης (4309): Kn. 1085, W. 380, Av. 988; Telecleides fr. 6, Phrynichus
fr. 9, Ameipsis fr. 10.
Δρακοντίδης (4546): W. 157, 438; Plato fr. 139.
'Εξακέντης: Av. 11, 764, 1527; Ar. fr. 671 ?; Phrynichus fr. 20.
'Επίγονος: Eccl. 167.
'Επικράτης (4859): Eccl. 71; Plato frs. 119, ? 120, 122, Strattis fr. 10 ?
'Ερεχθαίος (5021): Frogs 1196.
'Ερμήπος (5112): Nu. 557.
'Ερμίτις (5190): Frogs 934.
Εύαθλος (5238): Ach. 703-12, W. 592; Ar. fr. 411; Cratinus fr. 75, Plato
fr. 102.
Εύκλειν (5253): Eccl. 408.
Εύκρατης (I) (5759): Kn. 129, 254; Ar. frs. ? 143, 696; ? Cratinus fr. 295,
C. adesp. 94 ?
Εύκρατη (II) (5757): Lys. 103.
Εύπολις (5936): Nu. 553; Cratinus fr. 200.
Εύπορίδης (I) (5953): Ach. 484, Kn. 18, Nu. 1371f., W. 61, 1414, Peace 147f.,
532-4, Lys. 283, Thesm. 337, 387, 426, 455f., 847f., Frogs 80f., 91, 771ff.;
Ar. frs. 130, 290, 376, 471, 580, 638; Cratinus fr. 307, Telecleides frs.
39, 40, Eupolis fr. 363, Plato fr. 30, Callias fr. 12, Strattis fr. 1,
Theopompus fr. 34, C. adesp. 16.
Εὐφήμιος: W. 599.
Θυρήλειδης (6583): Av. 16; ? Telecleides fr. 46.
Θεαγενής (cf. 6703): W. 1183, P. 928, Av. 822, 1127, 1295, ? Lys. 63; Ar.
fr. 571; Eupolis frs. 122, CGF 92.
Ach. 11, 140, Thesm. 170.

Kn. 608-10, Nu. 400 ?.

Frogs 540, 967-70; Ar. fr. 549; Eupolis fr. 237, Philonides fr. 6, Polyzelus fr. 3.

Kn. 608-10, Nu. 400 ?, JV. 42-51, 418, 599, 1236-41.

Kn. 1103.

Nu. 400 ?, JV. 42-51, 418, 599, 1236-41.

Kn. 1103.

J. 835-7; CGF 56.24.

Nu. 1261, W. 864, Thesm. 440, Frogs 86; Pherecrates fr. 14 ?, Plato fr. 134, C. adesp. 52 ?

Nu. 985; Cratinus frs. 11, 333, Eupolis frs. 161, 165, 166, CGF 92, Plato fr. 117, Metagenes fr. 13, C. adesp. 68.


Frogs 149, Thesm. 440, Frogs 86; Pherecrates fr. 145,8-13, Plato fr. 184, Strattis frs. 15, 18 (cf. frs. 13-21).

Frogs 706ff.

Frogs 791.


Frogs 967.

Av. 876, Frogs 1437; Eupolis frs. 124, 167 (the same person?).

Thesm. 805, Frogs 678ff. 1504, 1532f.; Plato fr. 60 (cf. frs. 56-63).

Av. 6-8, 300f., 377-82, 502f., 659-64, Kn. 2ff. etc., Nu. 549f., 586-94, W. 62f., 197, 242-4, 342, 409ff., 596f., 759, 894ff. etc., 1031ff., 1210ff., P. 47f., Frogs 569-78; Cratinus frs. 217a-b Edmonds,

Κλεώνυμος (8680): Ach. 88, 844, Kn. 958, 1290ff., 1372, Nu. 353f., 400, 673-80, Ζ. 19-27, 592f., 822f., P. 446, 673-8, 1295ff., Av. 289f., 1475ff., Thesm. 605; Eupolis CGF 100, C. adesp. 64.

Κοσμός: Ach. 614, Nu. 48, 800.


Κράτης (8739): Kn. 537-40; Ar. fr. 333.

Κρατίνος (8755): Ach. 847ff., 1173, Kn. 400, 526ff., P. 700-03, Frogs 357.

Κρησίφιος: Ach. 1002.

Λακιστίας (8963): Av. 1569; Eupolis fr. 102, Phrynichus fr. 16, Strattis fr. 16, Theopompus fr. 39, Philylius fr. 9, C. adesp. 70.

Λαμπρός (8981): Ach. 270, 566f., 722, 960-65, 1174ff., P. 304, 473, 1290, Thesm. 841, Frogs 1039; Ar. fr. 1067


Λάχνης (9019): Ζ. 240-44, 836-8, 894ff. etc.; Ar. fr. 106?


Λεωφόρος (9075): Nu. 109; Eupolis fr. 44, Plato fr. 106.


Λύκις: Frogs 14.


Λυκόφερος (9249): Av. 1296; Cratinus fr. 30, Pherecrates fr. 11.

Λυσικλής (9417): Kn. 132; C. adesp. 62.

Λυσικράτης (9443): Av. 513, Eccl. 630, 736 (the same person?).

Λυσικράτης: Ach. 854ff., Kn. 1287, Ζ. 737-95, 1308ff., ? Lys. 1105; Ar. fr. 198

Λάγιος (9651): Kn. 520-25.

Μεγανίτες: Frogs 965.

Μεδίας (9714): Av. 1297; Phrynichus frs. 4, 41, Plato frs. 80, 108.

Metagenes fr. 11.


Μήλης (9802): Av. 766f.; Pherecrates fr. 6.

Μέληδος (9829): Frogs 1302; Ar. frs. 114, 149-50, 438; cf. Sannyrion fr. 2.


Μελέας (10416): Kn. 401, P. 803, Frogs 151; Ar. fr. 704; Plato fr. 128.
Mércches (10421): Ach. 887, W. 506, 1142, P. 1008; Telecleides fr. 11, Plato fr. 106.

Ἡραίος: Frogs 1506.


Nikóis (I) (10808): Kn. 358, Av. 363, 639; Ar. fr. 100; Cratinus CGF 73.73,
Telecleides fr. 41, Eupolos frs. 91, 181, Phrynichus frs. 22, 59.


Nikómykes (10934): Frogs 1506.

Nikóstrates (11011): W. 81-4.

Λευκλής (11222): W. 1510f., Thesm. 169, 440-42, Frogs 86; Pherocrates fr. 14,
Eupolos CGF 98.84 ?, Plato fr. 134.

Σερφάντης: Nu. 349.

Οίκυρος: W. 579f.; cf. Ar. fr. 918; Plato fr. 184 ?

Ουδηρίας: Av. 153, 1294; Eupolos fr. 260, Strattis fr. 7.

Οφέρων: Ach. 1165f., Av. 712, 1490-93; Eupolos fr. 166.

Οικόλαχος: Lys. 725.


Παυσακής: Frogs 1036-8; Eupolos fr. 296.

Παπροκλείδης (?11685): Av. 790f.

Παπροκλής (11692): Pl. 84f.; Ar. fr. 431.

Περίστων: Ach. 853f., Thesm. 949-52, Pl. 602; Eupolos CGF 92.

Πείσακρες (11770): P. 395, Av. 1556ff., Lys. 490f.; Ar. fr. 81; Hermippus fr. 9,
Eupolos frs. 31, 182, CGF 92, 94.7 ?, Phrynichus fr. 20, Plato fr. 101,
C. adesp. 64.

Πεισίας (11777): Av. 766f.; Cratinus frs. 174, 233, 261, CGF 73.74 ?,
Pherocrates fr. 6.

Πέρεξ: Av. 1292; Ar. fr. 53; Pherocrates fr. 150 ?, Phrynichus fr. 53 ?,
C. adesp. 87.

Πέρεξ (11811): Ach. 530ff., Nu. 859, P. 606ff.; Cratinus frs. 71, 111,
240, 293, 300, CGF 70.45-8, Hermippus frs. 46 ?, 79 ?, Telecleides fr. 17,
43 ?, Eupolos frs. 93, 94, 98, 100, Plato fr. 191, Callias fr. 15, C. adesp.
10, 41, 49 ?, 59, 60, 63, 1178.

Πέρπης (?12184): Ach. 842.

Περόκλης: Av. 692; Ar. fr. 490.

Πρόκλης: Eccl. 102.

Πρόκλης (12257): W. 325, Av. 1126; Telecleides fr. 18 ?

Πρόκλης (12493): W. 98; Eupolos fr. 213, C. adesp. 59.

Πρόκλης (12493): W. 270; Eupolos frs. 53, 215, 273 (cf. 45-7 with Kock).

Σεβήνης: W. 1313; Ar. fr. 151; Plato frs. 70, 128.

Σελευκός (12686): Nu. 351f., 399; Eupolos fr. 218.
Σκελλίας (12727): Av. 126; CGF 63.71.
Σμάνως: Eccl. 846f.
Σεφοκλής (12834): P. 695-9, Av. 100f.; Ar. fr. 581; Cratinus fr. 15, Eupolis CGF 98.7ff., Phrynichus frs. 31, 65.
Σπίνθης: Av. 762.
Στεργύλλος: Av. 300; Plato fr. 135.
Στιλβίδης: P. 1032; Eupolis fr. 211.
Συμακόπολες (13041): Av. 1297; Eupolis frs. 207, CGF 96.72, Phrynichus fr. 26.
Φελίκης (13921): Kn. 1377; Eupolis frs. 7, 95.
Φέανος (14078): Kn. 1256, W. 1220.
Φειδίας (14149): P. 605.
Φεσκέατης (14195): Lys. 158.
Φιλέμος (14256): Pl. 177; Plato fr. 217.
Φιλίστρος: W. 421, Av. 1701; Ar. fr. 113.
Φιλοκράτης: Av. 13ff., 1077ff.
Φιλόσθενος (14707): Nu. 686, W. 84, Frogs 934; Eupolis fr. 235, Phrynichus fr. 47.
Φιλόστρατος: Kn. 1069, Lys. 957f.
Φιλωνίδης (14907): Pl. 179, 303-5; Plato fr. 64, Theopompus frs. 4, 5, Nicocares fr. 3, Philyllius fr. 23.
Φομίσθος (14945): Frogs 965, Eccl. 98; Plato fr. 119, cf. frs. 120f.
Φούνας: Nu. 971; Pherecrates fr. 145.14ff.
Φρύνικος (Com.) (15006): Nu. 555f., Frogs 13; Hermippus fr. 64.
Φρύνικος (Politicus) (15111): W. 1302, Frogs 689.
Φρουάνδας (15033): Thesm. 861; Ar. frs. 26, 468; Eupolis frs. 39, 127.
Φρούμαχος (15054): Eccl. 22.
Χαίρες (15091): W. 687; Eupolis fr. 80.
Χαίρεθαν (15203): Nu. 104, 144-7, 156ff., 503f., 831, W. 1412-14, Av. 1296,
1564; Ar. frs. 291, 539, 573; Cratinus fr. 202, Eupolis frs. 165, 239.
Χαρ. (? 15251): Arch. 16, 866, P. 950-55, Av. 858; Cratinus fr. 118,
Pherocrates fr. 6.
Χαρ.μενος (15517): Thesm. 804.

Notes

1. Holden (1902) is not as reliable as he might be. I have noticed that
   he omits Antisthenes and Aspasia, and his references to fragments are
   not complete.
2. Cf. ch. 5 n. 52.
5. Cf. ch. 1 n. 16.
6. See p. 66.
7. Cf. ch. 4 n. 5.
8. For the form of the name cf. PA 6582.
9. See pp. 54f.
11. For the form of the name see Heiggs and Lewis (1969) no. 79 B 53.
12. See PA 9611 and 9630.
14. To be distinguished, ctr. Lefkowitz (1979) p. 194 n. 22, from the Simon
   of Kn. 242, for whom see Dow (1969).
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