Journal article icon

Journal article

Two notions of intentional action? Solving a puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention

Abstract:

The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her (1957) Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characteriza...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1080/09608788.2017.1396959

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Oxford college:
Exeter College, St Peters College
ORCID:
0000-0001-8778-524X
University of Cambridge More from this funder
Analysis Trust More from this funder
Publisher:
Routledge Publisher's website
Journal:
British Journal for the History of Philosophy Journal website
Volume:
26
Issue:
3
Pages:
578-602
Publication date:
2017-11-21
Acceptance date:
2017-10-23
DOI:
EISSN:
1469-3526
ISSN:
0960-8788
Pubs id:
pubs:819856
URN:
uri:e1286bf9-c5ef-4928-a34e-a974d7e15d3d
UUID:
uuid:e1286bf9-c5ef-4928-a34e-a974d7e15d3d
Local pid:
pubs:819856

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP