'Friends' and 'Patriots': A Comparative Study of Indigenous Force Cooperation in the Second World War

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Abstract

From the deployment of Roger's Rangers in the Seven Years War to the Sunni Awakening in the Second Gulf War, indigenous force cooperation has been a hallmark of significant armed conflicts in modern history. Indigenous forces are, by definition, recruited locally and are paramilitary in nature, as, for the most part, are their activities. They are not regular police, gendarme, or military forces. Rather, they represent a subset of a broader category of force that includes paramilitaries, unconventional forces, guerrillas, some militias, and auxiliaries. The focus of this dissertation is indigenous force cooperation. Indigenous force cooperation occurs when a metropolitan power (be it imperial or expeditionary) collaborates with one or more indigenous forces.

Despite recurring employment, indigenous force cooperation remains largely ignored in historical literature and there has been no comprehensive study of the nature, structure, function, or experience of these forces. Using comparative case studies of indigenous force cooperation in Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia during the Second World War, this project seeks to identify whether successful indigenous force cooperation in war exists as a unified historical phenomenon and whether it was instrumental to theatres of operation in which it took place. The research supporting this dissertation includes personally conducted interviews with veterans of the indigenous forces and examinations of recently declassified documents. The comparative framework allows the project to determine what, if any, underlying patterns connect cases of indigenous force employment and govern the success or failure of cooperation.

This dissertation consists of a comparative examination of four questions: why cooperation occurred, how cooperation was structured, what happened during cooperation, and whether cooperation was effective. Each chapter of this dissertation addresses one of the questions. Answering these questions will support a number of areas of study, including imperial history and contemporary strategic studies, by providing a theoretical framework by which to understand other cases of indigenous force cooperation.

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Glossary of Terms

AHTA: Archives of the Haganah, Tel Aviv, Israel

Arbagnoch: (aka 'Patriots') Ethiopian irregular forces who fought the Italians within IEA

Banda: Italian colonial formations in the Horn of Africa

British Army: Collective term used for the conventional forces of the British Empire

CID: British Criminal Investigation Division

CO: British Colonial Office

FO: British Foreign Office

GHQ: General Headquarters

Gideon Force: Augmented Op Centre and HQ of Op Centres under Orde Wingate

GOC-in-C: General Officer Commanding in Chief

Haganah: Primary paramilitary of the *Yishuv* under the Jewish Agency

HISH: *Haganah* Standing Field Force

IEA: Italian East Africa

IZL: *Irgun Tzvai Leumi* (aka *Irgun*, dissident paramilitary broke from *Haganah* in the 1930s)

Jewish Agency: Semi-official government of the *Yishuv*

JPS ME: Joint Planning Staff Middle East (the planning arm of MEC)

JSP: Jewish Settlement Police (Police auxiliary created to protect Jewish settlements in Palestine Mandate during the Arab Revolt, used synonymously with TAP, *Notrim/Ghaffirs*)

KAR: King's African Rifles

Kibbutz/Kibbutzim: Collective settlement, primarily rural and *Haganah* affiliated

LEHI: *Lohamei Herut Israel* (aka Stern Gang) dissident paramilitary that broke from IZL in 1940

LOC: Line of Communication

MEC: British Middle East Command

Mesafint: Titled echelons of Ethiopian nobility

MI2: British geographical intelligence

MI5: British Secret Service

MI9: British intelligence agency tasked with escape and evasion

MI(R): British Military Intelligence Research (tasked with special operations & guerrilla warfare, absorbed into SOE)

Notrim/Ghaffir: A police auxiliary created to patrol rural areas in Palestine Mandate during the Arab Revolt, used synonymously with JSP, TAP

OC: Officer Commanding

Operation Exporter: British invasion of Syria and Lebanon, June-July 1941

Palestine Scheme: British plan using indigenous forces for the defence of Palestine, 1942

Palmach: *Plugot Machatz* (Elite forces within the *Haganah*)

PPF: Palestine Police Force

Saison de Chasse: Period from 1944-1945 wherein *Haganah* cooperated with British to suppress an IZL revolt

SDF: Sudan Defence Force

Section D: Arm of SIS tasked with special operations & guerrilla warfare, absorbed into SOE

SHAI: *Sherut Yediot* (*Haganah* Intelligence Service)

Shifta: General term describing irregular forces, rebels, and bandits in Ethiopia

SIME: British Security Intelligence Middle East

SIS: British Secret Intelligence Service (aka 'C' or 'MI6')

SNS: Special Night Squads, Palestine

SOE: Special Operations Executive

SOS Colonies: Secretary of State for Colonies

Special Services: Collective name for agencies including: Section D, MI(R), Special Operations Executive, and Political Warfare Executive

TAP: Temporary Auxiliary Constable (A police auxiliary created to protect Jewish urban areas in Palestine Mandate during the Arab Revolt, used synonymously with JSP, *Notrim/Ghaffirs*)

TFF: Transjordan Frontier Force

TNA: UK National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey

White Paper or 1939 White Paper: British government document effectively ending, Jewish immigration to Palestine Mandate

WO: British War Office

W/T: Wireless Telegraphy (at the time frequently used to mean any form of wireless communication)

Yekatit 12: 19th February 1937 (beginning of period of Italian massacres of Ethiopians)

Yishuv: Organised Jewish community of Palestine Mandate

Introduction

From the deployment of Roger's Rangers in the Seven Years War to the Sunni Awakening in the Second Gulf War, indigenous force cooperation has been a hallmark of significant armed conflicts in modern history. Indigenous forces differ from institutional forces in their temporary and sometimes *ad hoc* nature. They are recruited by metropolitan powers in response to a specific emergency, sometimes to supplement conventional forces, other times out of a desire to intervene militarily without committing to large deployments. Indigenous forces are, by definition, recruited locally and are paramilitary in nature, as, for the most part, are their activities. They are not regular police, gendarme, or military forces. Rather, they represent a subset of a broader category of force that includes paramilitaries, unconventional forces, guerrillas, some militias, and auxiliaries. The focus of this dissertation is indigenous force cooperation. Indigenous force cooperation occurs when a metropolitan power (be it imperial or expeditionary) collaborates with one or more indigenous forces.

Despite recurring employment, indigenous force cooperation remains largely ignored in historical literature and there has been no comprehensive study of the nature, structure, function, or experience of these forces. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of pages have been written about the Second World War. There have been investigations of the utmost detail into battles such as the Normandy landings and El-Alamein, which have been analysed and studied from the tactical to grand strategic perspective. Set-piece operations, defined by the clash of large conventional national armies, were far from the only significant mode of military activity. From the ice of Greenland to the jungles of the Philippines and from southern France to the Horn of Africa, indigenous forces played a role in campaigns. Across all the western allied theatres of operation, both American and British special services and armed forces cooperated with indigenous forces to fulfil objectives of regional and global significance. Yet academic study has relegated these forces to the shadows, barely mentioning their existence, and they are all but

forgotten in British and American public history. This dissertation will begin the process of revising this dominant interpretation.

Using comparative case studies of indigenous force cooperation in Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia during the Second World War, this project seeks to identify whether successful indigenous force cooperation in war exists as a unified historical phenomenon and whether it was instrumental to theatres of operation in which it took place. Applying a comparative framework allows the project to determine what, if any, underlying patterns connect cases of indigenous force employment and govern the success or failure of cooperation. This dissertation consists of a comparative examination of four questions: why cooperation occurred, how cooperation was structured, what happened during cooperation, and whether cooperation was effective. Answering these questions will support a number of areas of study, including imperial history and contemporary strategic studies, by providing a theoretical framework by which to understand other cases of indigenous force cooperation.

Literature Review

This project interacts with a wide variety of literatures, including imperial history (especially colonial security), military history (particularly of the Second World War), and special operations and irregular warfare. In answering its broader questions, this project also contributes to the literature surrounding narrower histories of the organisations, campaigns, and regions included within the case studies. That this study can address such a wide variety of fields demonstrates the large gap left by the lack of a literature on indigenous force cooperation and the necessity of the emergence of a new literature.

As indigenous force cooperation has taken place both within and outside the colonial context, this study is not part of the literature of imperial history and colonial security, but it has significance to that field. The focus of colonial security studies has remained on conventional

forces such as police, gendarmes, colonial regiments, and formal security forces. The works of David Killingray, John Darwin, David Omissi, Rob Johnson, and V.G. Kiernan, among others epitomise the studies on conventional imperial security and mobilisation.[1] In particular, David Killingray and David Omissi's edited volume *Guardians of Empire* stands out through its examination of conventional military and security organisations in the imperial context.[2]

Some of the discussions in this study have parallels within imperial history. The discussion on the effect of manpower shortages in the recruitment of the indigenous personnel has parallels in the discussions on imperial mobilisation that appear in works such as Ashley Jackson's *The British Empire in the Second World War* and *Distant Drums: The Role of Colonies in British Imperial Warfare*.[3] This dissertation's consideration of the ability of indigenous actors to co-opt the imperial security structures echoes elements of studies on imperial history. For example, Martin Thomas's *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers, and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940*, recognises that colonial security operations 'could be appropriated by local communities to advance their own interests.'[4] This, along with the blurring of the lines between government and local allies (also discussed in Thomas's work), is a major facet of the phenomenon of indigenous force cooperation considered here.

While works on colonial security recognise the existence of indigenous forces and, at times, their importance, they do not discuss them in depth.[5] Given the focus of these works on more

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[1] For examples see: *David Killingray*, *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War* (Woodbridge, Surrey, 2010).; John Darwin, 'The Central African Emergency, 1959' in *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21:3 (1993), pp. 217-234; Robert Johnson, 'Small Wars and Internal Security: The Army in India, 1936-1946' in Alan Jeffery and Patrick Rose eds. *The Indian Army, 1939-47* (Farnham, Surrey, 2012) pp. 215-240.; V.G. Kiernan, *Colonial Empires and Armies: 1815-1960* (Gurnsey, Channel Islands, 1998).

[2] David Killingray & David Omissi, *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964*, (Manchester, 1990).

[3] Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire in the Second World War* (London, 2006).; Ashley Jackson, *Distant Drums: The Role of Colonies in British Imperial Warfare* (Eastbourne, 2010).; Ashley Jackson, 'The Empire/Commonwealth and the Second World War', *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 100:412 (2011), pp. 65-78.

[4] Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers, and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940*, (Cambridge, 2012), p. 19

[5] For example in *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914*, Martin Thomas notes that the security forces in Palestine Mandate were reliant on Jewish auxiliaries and that the scope and scale of auxiliary

conventional security forces, it is unsurprising that they do not provide much insight into the indigenous forces. This dissertation adds another dimension to the already robust literature of imperial history. The added element of indigenous force cooperation is particularly important to studies considering colonial security on imperial frontiers or in emergencies.

Second World War literature exists in two categories: works that cover the whole war and commentaries that cover specific campaigns or events. In the first case, there is rarely more than passing reference to the existence of indigenous forces other than to the *Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (FFI) and their predecessors in France or, in some cases, the partisans of Yugoslavia.[6] Even in these cases, there is little exploration into the dynamics of indigenous force cooperation; rather, the works tend to be narrative. This is problematic when considering the areas of operation that had heavy indigenous force presence. Stephen Ambrose's *New History of World War II* gives one sentence in the entirety of the 628-page tome to Axis forces or intrigues in the whole of the Middle East.[7] John Keegan devotes two pages of his *The Second World War* to the campaigns in Iraq and Syria, which he includes as part of his chapter on the campaigns in Africa.[8] In this chapter, he fails to mention local forces. Keegan provides slightly more coverage in his one-page summary of the East African Campaign, including mention of Gideon Force.[9]

Histories that take a strategic approach to the whole war tend to be even less useful. For example, Richard Overy's *Why the Allies Won*, makes no mention of indigenous forces in any context.[10] Michael Howard's *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War* has a similar lack of

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activity was significant but does not go into detail on the auxiliaries. – see Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914*, (London, 2008) p. 254

[6] On France in particular there is a myriad of writing and it tends to be the subject of most works written involving indigenous forces in the Second World War – see: M.R.D. Foot, *Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism 1940-1945*, (London, 1976) or H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942-1944*, (Oxford, 2003).; For a recent volume which seems to spread the focus beyond metropolitan France see: Eric Jennings, *La France Libre fut Africaine*, (Paris, 2014).

[7] Stephen Ambrose, *New History of World War II*, (New York, 1997), p. 107.

[8] John Keegan, *The Second World War* (London, 1989), pp. 325-327.

[9] *Ibid*

[10] Richard, Overy, Why The Allies Won, (London, 1995).

coverage.[11] B.H. Liddell Hart's *History of the Second World War* provides more coverage than most sources on the East African theatre and mentions the importance of indigenous forces in that context.[12] This pattern repeats in the official histories of the various branches of the British military that provide limited coverage of the use of indigenous forces in the Horn of Africa but pay scant attention elsewhere. Recent literature, such as Antony Beevor's *The Second World War* and Martin Gilbert's *The Second World War: A Complete History,* continues in the same vein. Campaign specific histories of the Levant and East Africa are few and far between.

Several campaign or organisationally specific sources, such as Duncan McNabb's *Mission 101* or Charles Fraiser-Smith and Kevin Logan's *Secret Warriors: Hidden Heroes of MI6, OSS, MI9, SOE & SAS,* mention indigenous forces but are written as something of a cross between adventure novels and histories and do not provide significant insights.[13] Even more academically written works, such as Robert Woollcombe's *The Campaigns of Wavell: 1939-1943,* which mention indigenous forces, do not explore the dynamics of indigenous cooperation.[14] By exploring the dynamics of indigenous force cooperation in the Second World War this study will support the development of a more complete literature, bringing indigenous forces back into the narrative of the Second World War. It will also depart from the majority of the studies of the Second World War by incorporating the perspectives of the indigenous forces themselves into a literature dominated by Eurocentric research.

Regional histories similarly overlook indigenous forces. Many good histories of the Palestine Mandate, such as Naomi Shepherd's *Ploughing the Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917-1948*, Norman and Helen Bentwich's *Mandate Memories: 1914-1948,* and Christopher Sykes' *Cross Roads*

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[11] Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London, 1996).
[12] B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, (1970), p. 125.
[13] Charles Fraser-Smith & Kevin Logan, *Secret Warriors: Hidden Heroes of MI6, OSS, MI9, SOE & SAS* (Exeter, 1984).
[14] Robert Woollcombe, *The Campaign of Wavell: 1939-1943* (London, 1959).

to Israel: Palestine from Balfour to Bevin, pay scant attention to irregular forces.[15] General Middle East histories tend to overlook them entirely.[16] Although several sources cover the Middle East during the Second World War, few deal with its military aspects and fewer with paramilitary aspects. James Barr's *A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* discusses operations during Exporter, in which the *Haganah* took part, without mentioning their presence or existence.[17] One notable exception is Anthony Mockler's *Haile Selassie's War,* which provides significant narrative, though not analytic, coverage to the *arbagnoch* in IEA. Unfortunately, there is very little indication as to the sources that contributed to Mockler's narrative, limiting its value, other than when it can be confirmed, at least in principle, by other sources.

Given the role of special operations forces in the relationship with indigenous forces, it might be expected that histories of the special services would be more relevant to the question at hand. However, even M. R. D. Foot's detailed histories of the SOE give indigenous cooperation only limited mention. Foot goes into some detail about cooperation with local forces in East Africa and mentions Jewish Agency (the legal front of the *Yishuv*) cooperation with Section D.[18] He provides more detail on this and the nature, make up, and activities of Mission 101 in his *SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946*.[19] W.J.M. Mackenzie's *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1945* expands on both the cooperation with the *Yishuv* and the origins of Mission 101. He clarifies some of the activities allegedly undertaken by the *Yishuv* for the SOE and delves into Mission 101's establishment under MI(R), which

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[15] Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing the Sand: British Rule in Palestine 1917-1949,* (London, 1991).; Norman Bentwich and Helen Bentwich, *Mandate Memories: 1914-1948,* (London: Hogarth Press, 1965); Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel: Palestine from Balfour to Bevin,* (London, 1965)
[16] For examples of this see: Peter Mansfield, *A History of the Middle East,* (New York, 2004) or Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East*, (Oxford, 2002)
[17] The only mention of the *Haganah* during this phase of the war is in reference to an FFI transmitter maintained by the *Haganah*. See: James Barr, *A Line in the Sand. Britain, France and the Struggle that shaped the Middle East* (London, 2011), p. 254
[18] Foot (1976) p. 163
[19] M.R.D. Foot, *SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-46* (London, 1984), p. 77, Foot (1984) pp. 214-217

predated the SOE.[20] These sources help paint a picture of the conditions under which the organisations that managed some of the indigenous forces operated, but go no further in attempting to understand indigenous force cooperation, its dynamics, or the role it played in the cases they mention. Recent literature in the field of special operations, including *One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare* by Linda Robinson and Troy Sacquety's *The OSS in Burma: Jungle War against the Japanese*, pay more narrative attention to indigenous forces but again do not seek to understand indigenous force cooperation. By providing an understanding of indigenous force cooperation, this dissertation will help develop a more complete picture of the activities of such special forces.

It is worth noting that there is a significant literature on British-*Yishuv* cooperation in the Palestine Mandate. Several excellent works deal with *Haganah*-British cooperation in a more conventional military, intelligence, and security sense, but not in the realm of irregular warfare. Clive Jones' article 'Good Friends in Low Places: The British Secret Intelligence Service and the Jewish Agency, 1939-45' provides a good survey of the dynamics of the relationship between the *Haganah* and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) but, given his subject, he naturally pays only cursory attention to the irregular force aspects of cooperation. As Jones himself states, 'despite having an intelligence function, the primary role of the SOE was sabotage and subversion', and is therefore outside of the brief of his article.[21] Yoav Gelber has produced numerous works on Mandatory Palestine during the Second World War. Perhaps the most significant for this study are those related to the book *Massada - The Defense of Palestine in the Second World War*, published in Hebrew in 1990.[22] These include 'The Defense of Palestine in World War II', published in *Studies in Zionism* in 1987, and his four-volume history of *Jewish Palestinian Volunteering in the British Army*

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[20] W.J.M. Mackenzie, *The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1945* (London, 2000), pp. 170-171

[21] Clive Jones, 'Good Friends in Low Places? The British Secret Intelligence Service and the Jewish Agency, 1939-45', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48 (2012) p. 414.

[22] Yoav Gelber, *Massada - The Defence of Palestine in the Second World War* (Ramat Gan, 1990).

during the Second World War.[23] Gelber's works, while significant for understanding the background and broader themes of security and defence in Mandatory Palestine during the War, have some limitations in terms of this study. While Gelber notes the irregular force cooperation that existed, his primary focus is conventional military cooperation and recruitment. The conventional military and intelligence focus of works, such as Gelber and Jones, does not describe or address indigenous force cooperation.

The literature so far discussed has not attempted to explore indigenous force cooperation and its dynamics, nor has such a study occurred in the more theoretical literature of counter-insurgency and military doctrine. The case studies presented in this dissertation interact positively with the literature on the histories of the regions in which each took place. The case examinations reintroduce an account of the cooperation between the indigenous forces and the British. They add to the established narratives, from which the indigenous forces are largely absent, and restore the voice of the indigenous personnel. In as much as this dissertation is the first attempt to do so, it adds to the studies of all cases in which indigenous force cooperation was a factor.

One complicating factor facing research on indigenous forces is the paucity of literature on the campaigns. For both Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia, this dissertation is in the uncomfortable position of establishing the basic level of historical narrative, determining what happened, where, when, and who was involved while also performing a more advanced analysis of indigenous force cooperation as a phenomenon. This dissertation does not present a comprehensive account of the activities and experiences of the case studies. Room remains for a comprehensive history of each case individually; even restricting the consideration to aspects of the cases relevant to indigenous cooperation, it is impossible to conduct here an exhaustive examination of

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[23] Yoav Gelber, 'The Defence of Palestine in World War II', *Studies in Zionism: Politics, Society, Culture*, 8, (1987), pp. 51-81.; Yoav Gelber, *Jewish Palestinian Volunteering in the British Army during the Second World War,* Vol. I-IV, (Jerusalem, 1979-1984).

cooperation both in the Horn of Africa and in Palestine Mandate. Therefore, this paper deals with several examples within each case that appear to reflect the whole.

Other cases were initially included in this work but did not make it into the final version due to limitations of word count. In the Horn of Africa, research was conducted into indigenous force cooperation in Somaliland (the Illalos), Southern Sudan (SDF tribal auxiliaries and allies), the Blue Nile Campaign (auxiliaries of the Mounted Police and local *arbagnoch*), and the Southern Front of IEA ('scouts' and 'irregulars' in Northern Kenya, Somalia, Somaliland, and Southern IEA). These cases will form the basis for future work. In Palestine Mandate, research into IZL-British cooperation was conducted. Several cases of cooperation were excluded due to lack of available material. These included Circassian-British cooperation in Palestine Mandate and Druze-British Cooperation in Operation Exporter. The cases that remained, British-*Haganah* cooperation in Palestine Mandate and the Levant and *Arbagnoch*-British cooperation in IEA were selected because they were the largest in scale and scope in their respective regions and they generated sufficient accessible primary source material to form the basis of a comparison.

Methodology

This dissertation is a phenomenological study in which the analysis of the Second World War cases serves as a particular experiment to answer a larger series of questions about indigenous force cooperation. The argument of this dissertation is that there were commonalities in the use of local forces by the British Empire throughout the Second World War. However, the study is designed to maximise the testing of the null hypothesis. The dissertation employs a comparative methodology to analyse indigenous force cooperation. The comparative methodology emphasises an inductive process. Each chapter examines each of the two cases, without reference to the other. Only after the individual examinations are completed are the cases

compared to identify similarities reducing the extent to which a desire to locate commonalities could affect the study.

The two areas of operation examined have enough points in common to be comparable, yet have enough differences that any commonalities observed are not likely to have resulted from accidents of geography or the tactical natures of the areas. Chief among the similarities are that many of the participants viewed cooperation with indigenous forces in Ethiopia and Palestine Mandate as successful, the foreign force in both cases was the British Empire, both areas were at least loosely under MEC, and both were at their most active during the early phases of the Second World War.[24] Moreover, the campaigns form separate axes within a broader arc of operations protecting the supply routes and flanks of North Africa and the Suez Canal. This study also maintains temporal consistency. To account for the different variables inherent in conducting a study across time periods would be beyond the scope possible in the limited space of this dissertation and is left for a future study.

There were more differences than similarities between the two campaigns. The differences between the cases increase the likelihood that any observed commonality between them is not an accident of operational reality or geography. The Ethiopian case involved tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of indigenous fighters spread over a large area who had been engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Italians for years before the Second World War. In Palestine, cooperation primarily took place between a well-organised, highly ideological paramilitary within a British colony in a very concentrated area. Other key differences were the nature of the societies and organisations from which local forces were drawn and the character of the combat operations. The use of these two widely different case studies in effect controls for the majority of the possible variables which could serve to obfuscate the line between simple correlation and causality. Thus, the cases selected and the comparative method employed render it likely that any

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[24] James Barr, *A Line in the Sand. Britain, France and the Struggle that shaped the Middle East* (London, 2011)

findings of this dissertation are independent rather than dependent variables and inherent to the phenomenon of indigenous force cooperation.

Cooperation took place in several significant and simultaneous contexts, each of which helped determine the path and outcome of the cooperation. The first and most obviously relevant context is that of the Second World War. Events such as the Siege of Tobruk (April–November 1941), the Fall of France (June 1940), and the Battles of El Alamein (July-November 1942) profoundly affected indigenous cooperation and especially British decision-making. Each cooperation also took place within the British Imperial context. This context affected the British decision making process, with arguments about the future of the Empire frequently playing a counterpoint to operational expediency. Prior to the First World War, there had been a tradition of working with indigenous forces within the British Empire. With the consolidation of the colonial system, that tradition of working with indigenous forces in an irregular or locally traditional structure had all but ceased in the Middle East and East Africa in favour of standing colonial forces such as the Transjordan Frontier Force, the Arab Legion, the Somaliland Camel Corps, and the Sudan Defence Force. In the Second World War, the British Empire reinvented the tradition of indigenous force cooperation based on its recent experiences trying to contain insurgencies in Ireland, Palestine, and India.[25] Having realised the level of resources that the Empire had to expend in controlling these situations, Britain wished to harness the power of insurgents, guerrilla fighters, and irregulars against its Axis enemies during the Second World War.[26]

The final two contexts are organisational and local. As much as global factors such as the war and the Empire determined aspects of cooperation, the bureaucratic realities of the different organisations involved also played a significant role. For example, the internecine warfare among

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[25] TNA, HS 3/5 (FO Telegram, Abyssinian Revolt: Obstruction from Local Authorities, 11.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940)
[26] *Ibid*

the various Special Services in Cairo was especially severe and affected every aspect of cooperation. Lastly, for the indigenous forces themselves, the local context was of paramount importance. For example, the relationship between the *Yishuv* and Palestine Government over the previous twenty years made cooperation during the Second World War more difficult and affected the structure of cooperation as well.

The scarcity of literature on the subject of indigenous forces, and especially on their use in the cases considered, results in part from difficulties in obtaining sources. Many documents employed in this examination were declassified only recently. Additionally, the secrecy and organisational complexity of the Special Services means that many events, decisions, and discussions went unrecorded, and many records were lost, misplaced, or not filed logically.[27] There are significant and particular difficulties regarding documentary evidence in the Middle East, where the Empire guaranteed that it would not reveal the cooperation of certain groups.[28] The lack of directly relevant secondary literature determined that research for this dissertation came largely from primary sources including archival documents and oral history.

Most of the archival documents employed come from two archives, the UK National Archives in Kew Gardens and the *Haganah* Archives in Tel Aviv. Together, the two archives contain the vast majority of the operational reports and relevant war diaries from the two cases. The personal papers examined largely replicated the information in the operational documents. As a result, the project research focus remained on the documents that cooperation generated, such as meeting minutes, telegrams, financial documents, and reports from the field. Others, such as the PPF CID, files, are best accessed in Israel. Overall, the documents came largely, but not exclusively, from the WO, CO, and SOE sections responsible for cooperation. Collectively, they provide both a bird's eye and ground level view of cooperation. The recent declassification and

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[27] Foot (1984) p. 8
[28] TNA, HS 7/86 (AW/100, Telegram to RWW, On SOE History, 19.9.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

remote location of many documents means that other researchers have not examined many of the documents employed in this dissertation.

Far more documents are available from the Horn of Africa than from the Middle East. Among other things, the cooperation in the Middle East was more clandestine in nature. With the more politicised nature of subsequent British involvement in the Middle East, many potentially relevant files such as HS 3/208 (SOE Palestine) remain classified. The organisational culture in the Special Services also apparently discouraged the maintenance of detailed records and at various times, officers received orders to 'destroy all incriminating documents,' which meant that many documents and details were forever lost.[29] Finally, even where documents exist, there is a question as to their veracity. There is evidence that the politics of special operations and the internecine bureaucratic warfare within the special operations and intelligence community were such that personnel were willing to falsify the war diary, which indicates a general willingness to write misleading official documents and reports.[30] This necessitates handling any official documents with care and a healthy dose of scepticism.

Largely missing from this collection of sources are documents authored from the indigenous force perspective. In the case of the *Haganah*, this stems from two factors. As an illegal paramilitary force, the *Haganah* seems not to have generated significant amounts of operational documents.[31] Additionally, most existing operational documents remain classified along with most other Israeli military documents. The Ethiopian case is more complex. It is probable that three archives in particular contain relevant documents. Each proved impossible to access. The Ethiopian National Archives, which contain the records of the Emperor's correspondence, was not well catalogued and generated many bureaucratic obstacles to research. The other two

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[29] TNA, HS 7/86 (AW/100, Telegram to RWW, On SOE History, 9.9.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

[30] Leo Marks, *Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War, 1941-1945*, (London, 1998) p. 588

[31] As part of this dissertation material from Kibbutz archives and individual members personal collections were viewed but could not be referenced

potentially useful archives belong to the Ethiopian Church. No researchers from outside the ranks of the church have ever accessed them. During the course of the research for this dissertation, repeated attempts were made to access the material. These attempts culminated in repeated meetings with an Ethiopian Archbishop responsible for one of the archives. Unfortunately, these efforts were to no avail. Additionally, the Ethiopian Church documents exist only in Ge'ez – a rare and difficult language. The exploration of these documents must await a future project.

To compensate for this missing material, this paper employs oral history, which allows the inclusion of new indigenous perspectives and information on those aspects of cooperation unobserved by official British sources.[32] Potential interviewees were identified through their participation in formal and informal social networks. In the case of the Palestine Mandate, the primary formal networks were veterans groups such as the *Notrim*, the *Haganah*, and Jewish Brigade veterans associations. Informal networks included the veterans of the German Unit, who had kept contact with each other, as well as a regional cluster of kibbutzim. For the East African case study, the *arbagnoch* veterans associations of Gondar, Addis, and Nazrit provided the formal social networks and a loose ethno-linguistic affiliation among Oromo veterans constituted the primary informal network. Although this method raises the spectre of selection bias, the diversity of networks and interviews minimises the danger.

The interview process was designed to identify inconsistencies. In most cases, the interview began with general narrative questions before switching to interrogative questioning in order to expose discrepancies. When possible, the interviews occurred over multiple hours with a break between the forms of interview. In some cases, this process was repeated with the same interviewee on several occasions in order to incorporate information gained from other sources. Beyond approaching the interviewees through trusted networks, non-targeted questioning such

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[32] All Interviews Conducted by Author

as questions about unit marching songs helped build trust and make for productive sessions. There were differences in the interview process in the two areas. In the Horn of Africa, a translator was necessary. This, combined with greater time restraints, meant that the interview process did not function as well in the Horn of Africa. Although it was not always possible to employ the full interview method in the Horn of Africa, the balance between narrative and interrogative questioning remained.

Oral history is not a perfect medium and there is margin for error and problems with memory.[33] To counteract these weaknesses, the methods employed are those recommended for critical analysis of any source: independent cross corroboration as verification and close critical analysis in the same manner as one would engage with a written source. Moreover, for this project, the interview process was developed to expose memory-based discrepancies, as much as possible. In many ways, this is superior to the verification available to the researcher who engages solely with official sources, as there tend to be very few ways to determine whether official report suffers from an author's lapses in memory or intentional obfuscation. Whether the origin of information was documentary or oral, information critical to the analysis was considered substantiated only if it was possible to verify the information, at least in principle, through cross corroboration.

In both cases, the research encountered strongly held narratives and myths. In Ethiopia, the prevalent narrative is a clear-cut tale of heroic resistance and auto-liberation against impossible odds. It is a narrative of on-going resistance to the Italians that begins with the Battle of Adwa in 1896 and ends wherever convenient. In the narrative, Ethiopia was united against the Italian oppressor and fought heroically for years before achieving a great victory. Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to find anyone who will admit that they or an ancestor were a collaborator. Only one

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[33] For more on this issue see: L. Abrams, *Oral History Theory,* (New York, 2010); A. Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different?', *History Workshop,* 12 (1981), pp. 96-107; A. Thomson, 'Unreliable Memories? The Use and Abuse of Oral History', in W. Lamont (ed.), *Historical Controversies and Historians* (1998), 23-34.; p. Thompson, *The Voice of the Past* (2000).

individual came forward and indicated that an ancestor had been in the *bande*. This was admitted off the record and in an informal conversation. In Israel, the traditional narrative is more complex, affected strongly by the post-war hostilities between the UK and *Yishuv*. It plays down cooperation even while acknowledging it. It recalls the 23 *Palmach* members who died on Operation Boatswain. The German Unit is mentioned, as well as the fact that Moshe Dayan lost his eye doing something with the British. In most cases, including the last example, the narrative becomes hazy, with authors such as Antony Beevor misplacing the Dayan incident and altering its cause.[34] The narrative also has become intertwined with the politicised historiography of the *Yishuv*.[35]

Both case studies also exist in regions marked by contested language. Nomenclature, especially when it comes to place names and names of peoples, carries significance in the struggle over historical narrative. To avoid becoming overly involved in the regional politics of narrative, ownership, and belonging, this dissertation in most cases employs the nomenclature (though not always the spelling choices) of the British records. In Ethiopia, this means on the whole employing the Ge'ez or Amharic terminology. The text refers to *Debre Zeyit* (Ge'ez) instead of *Bishoftu* (Oromo). The choice to use the Ge'ez terminology should not be taken to imply either an affirmation or denial of any claims on the territory or attachment to the location, neither does it stem from a lack of recognition of the existence of an alternative nomenclature. Rather, it comes from the necessity to maintain consistency and clarity within this document. The only exceptions come where the name in the archival documents is considered highly offensive. Two examples of this are relevant to the dissertation, the use of the words *Galla* and *Falasha*. The British records often used the name *Galla* to describe the Oromo people of central and southern Ethiopia. The Oromo consider this term highly offensive. Similarly, the records at the time often

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[34] Antony Beevor, *Crete: The Battle and the Resistance,* (London, 2005), p. 27
[35] For Example See: Tom Segev 'The Makings of History: Masada of the North' in *Haaretz* (20 January 2012) http://www.haaretz.com/beta/the-makings-of-history-masada-of-the-north-1.408308, Accessed 6.10.2015

employed the term *Falasha* to refer to the Jewish communities of Ethiopia, which many consider a highly offensive derogatory term for the community more properly known as the *Beta Israel*. This dissertation will employ the term *Galla* or *Falasha* only when quoting directly from a source. The rest of the time, it employs the non-pejorative Oromo and *Beta Israel*.

When dealing with Palestine Mandate, the dissertation again uses British records as the guide. Throughout, this dissertation uses the term Palestine to describe the territory in question. This does not imply any legitimacy to any given claim or historical attachment to the territory. It is shorthand for The British Mandate for Palestine, which was the full legal description of the territory at the time. The dissertation employs a similar logic for other, more specific place names, such as the use of Lydda instead of Lod or Sarafand instead of Tzrifin. When referring to peoples, this dissertation attempts to achieve as much clarity and consistency as possible. The term Palestinian is a highly contentious one. In the British records encountered in the course of the research, Palestinian refers almost exclusively to the Jewish population residing in the Mandate. Usually, the Arab population was referred to as Arab. While a distinction was made between Bedouin and Arab, no distinction was made ascribing a particular peoplehood to those Arabs residing in Palestine. This dissertation does not endorse or deny the narrative of Arab peoplehood within the territory that was Palestine Mandate. To refer to the Arab communities of Palestine as Palestinians would be anachronistic and bring this dissertation into historiographical debates well beyond its scope. Except in direct quotations from sources, this dissertation refers to the Arab population of Palestine as the British records do and the Jewish population as the *Yishuv*. *Yishuv* was one of several words used during the mandate period to describe the organised Jewish community in Palestine. The choice of this particular term does not reflect any ideological, philosophical, or historiographical choice. Rather, the *Yishuv* was the most widely employed term for the community of this period and seems to have been in most common use in official statements and publications.

This dissertation consists of four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter explores the forces that motivated the British to enter cooperation. The second discusses why the indigenous forces participated in cooperation with the British. The third chapter examines how cooperation was structured and the final chapter considers what took place during cooperation and whether cooperation was effective. In keeping with the analytical focus of the dissertation, it has a thematic rather than chronological structure. This structure frames the discussion of each case within the context of key questions. Each chapter is divided into three sub chapters. The chapters consider the topic in Palestine Mandate and then the Horn of Africa before finally engaging in a discussion of comparative findings. This preserves the autonomy of each case in consideration, reducing the potential for bias in the comparative results. Ultimately, the dissertation demonstrates, for the first time, that not only can indigenous force cooperation be effective but also that the underlying conditions that determine its efficacy are inherent to the phenomenon of indigenous force cooperation. Along the way, this dissertation does what no academic work has done before. It catalogues the activities and realities of the indigenous forces.

Reaching Out: Why the Empire Sought Cooperation

When considering why the British recruited indigenous forces during the Second World War, two questions must be asked: why use indigenous forces at all and why display a preference for particular organisations, tribes, or ethnicities? The rationale for the initial decision to recruit these forces in a given portion of the global conflict set the tone for all subsequent relations between the indigenous forces and the Imperial authorities. In understanding the rationale behind the recruitment of indigenous forces, it is worth noting that perception was its own form of reality. If the Imperial authorities believed an organisation was trustworthy and efficient, they treated it as if it were. Personal preferences and the pre-existing biases of Imperial officers also had a role to play. If an officer preferred a particular "race" or group or found them easier to work with, the group or race would then receive more imperial work.[36]

If the authorities believed a "race" had special attributes, the authorities were more likely to approach members of that population for jobs requiring these qualities. In terms of military utilisation, such perceived attributes often formed part of an established theory of martial race. Martial race theories originated in India and were not purely a British invention; rather, they had several points of origin, within both Indian society and traditions and in British experiences and biases.[37] Over time, however, the theories lost their original context and eventually, outside of this context, concretised into a universal pattern of thinking. By the Second World War, British Imperial officers from the Indian service were well schooled in dividing the peoples of the world into martial and non-martial races. The history, real or imagined, and cultural traditions of a given ethnic group were examined and conclusions drawn as to its military abilities.[38] For operations in the Horn of Africa, Indian Army personnel were recruited for their expertise in

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[36] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 8.1.2010; TNA, HS 7/86 (Excerpt from Letter by Glubb, 30.12.1940, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World 1944-1945)

[37] William Arthur, 'The Martial Episteme: Re-thinking Theories of Martial Race and the Modernisation of the British-Indian Army during the Second World War', *Mars and Clio,* 25 (2012)

[38] *Ibid*

working with 'native' forces, which meant that their ideas of martial race came with them and influenced the campaigns.[39]

It would be wrong to neglect the possibility of intellectual inertia in decisions to cooperate. Once the authorities made the decision to cooperate with indigenous forces in a given eventuality, cooperation became something of a standard procedure for similar circumstances. When the suggestion came to the SOE that it should scale back its involvement with the *Haganah* in favour of an organisation more compatible with British long term political interests, the SOE officer on whom the decision fell responded that 'I do not believe in using sticks to threaten people on whom one depends, unless the stick is likely to be as good as the people one is threatening!'[40] The officer was not willing to consider even disciplining the *Haganah* without being absolutely sure that another organisation could fill the job equally well.

Palestine Mandate

The tense situation in Palestine worsened as the war progressed. By the end of 1940, Palestine Government had introduced restrictions on the sale or transfer of land to Jews.[41] Despite security, defence, and intelligence cooperation, the relationship between Jewish Palestinians and British authorities continued to deteriorate throughout the war.[42] This led Palestine Government, among others, to object repeatedly to the employment of indigenous forces from Palestine, and especially from the *Yishuv*.

As late as June 1942, SIME Cairo was concerned that allowing the *Haganah* to form a home guard would endanger the security and stability of Palestine, especially after the war, and considered that perhaps this danger was so great as to outweigh the benefits of having additional

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[39] TNA, HS 7/5 (Section D History, 1940-1969)
[39] *Ibid*
[40] TNA, HS 3/207 (G, Telegram to DSO(A), 10.12.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[41] Bentwich (1965) pp. 165-166
[42] *Ibid*

forces to resist Axis invasion.[43] The discussions of the War Cabinet in London in August of the same year reflected this sentiment.[44] The HC Palestine was particularly concerned about this issue, terming the *Haganah* 'a menace to security'.[45] This concern filtered into 1942 orders for the new SOE field commander for Palestine, which banned cooperation with the *Haganah*.[46] There were those, including senior SOE officials in Cairo, who shared Palestine Government's views.[47] As a result, the SOE received the recommendation that it should seek to employ alternative means of raising indigenous forces or not raise them at all.[48]

Some of Palestine Government's objections to the use of indigenous forces by special operations and the military may have had more to do with inter-organisational politics than with real concerns. In a meeting with the local heads of the SOE, Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, noted that he 'failed to see why authorities which themselves employed tens of thousands of men supplied by the JA should develop an obsession with the sinister purpose when a handful of similar men were employed by SOE.'[49] From the *Haganah* perspective, the JSP was its overt and legal arm.[50] Prior to the Second World War, the number of members of the *Yishuv* authorised by Palestine Government to carry weapons reached about 23,000, the bulk of whom were *Haganah* members.[51] While the Palestine Government may have had some discomfort with the employment of the *Haganah* by the Special Services, they employed large numbers of *Haganah* members themselves. It would appear, then, that either this

[43] TNA, KV 5/34 (Extract from Security Summary, SIME Cairo, M.E. No. 51, 4.6.42, Irgun Zvi Le-umt B'eretz Israel – National Military Organisation in the Land of Israel)
[44] TNA, CAB 66/27/12 (Grigg & Cranborne, War Cabinet Memorandum, Palestinians in the Forces and Local Defence and Police Services, 1.8.1942)
[45] TNA, CO 733/448/15, (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 1.4.1942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)
[46] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HV to SOE Cairo, 29.8.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[47] HS 3/207 (D/HX, Memorandum to D/HV, 6.11.1942, SOE Palestine, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[48] *Ibid*; TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H226, Memorandum on Events in Palestine and Syria, 28.9.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[49] TNA, HS 3/207 (Minutes of Conference of Palestine Scheme, 9.11.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[50] Chief Education Officer, Office of Information and Training, Israeli Defence Forces, *Ha'Haganah*, Mordechi Naor, ed. (Tel Aviv, 1985), p. 98
[51] TNA, HS 3/146 (Lt. Col. Pollock, Memorandum on Jewish Settlement Police, 9.5.1941, Reorganization of SOE Middle East 1941)

was a case of the right hand not knowing what the left was doing on the part of Palestine Government or that, given the antagonism between Palestine Government and the Special Services, the objections to the employment of indigenous forces were, for the most part, a way to assert Palestine Government's authority.

The ease with which the arguments for employing indigenous forces were able to overcome resistance varied from organisation to organisation. The Special Services had perhaps the easiest time in overcoming their unease. According to the noted historian of the SOE, M.R.D. Foot, it was in the SOE's initial mandate and organisational culture to be 'ready to work with any man or institution, Roman Catholic or masonic, Trotskyist or liberal, syndicalist or capitalist, rationalist or chauvinist, radical or conservative, Stalinist or anarchist, gentile or Jew, that would help it beat the Nazis down.'[52] Foot also stated that Churchill specifically instructed the SOE not to consider post-war political situations when planning and conducting operations.[53] It follows that the Special Services would be the first organisation to reach out where good reasons to employ indigenous forces existed. As noted earlier, it was not only the Special Services who made use of indigenous personnel in Palestine; as the situation grew graver, both the army and eventually Palestine Government came to rely heavily on the *Yishuv*. By the end of 1942, thousands of members of the *Yishuv*, primarily from the *Haganah*, received training in the increasingly paramilitary JSP under the joint auspices of the Palestine Government and the GOC Palestine.[54]

For the British, the choice of with which indigenous force to cooperate centred on whether the force or organisation could best deliver on the general requirements of cooperation. These general reasons for cooperation included force augmentation (providing additional forces to support conventional forces), financial cost reduction, special knowledge (knowledge not commonly found in the expeditionary force of the local area, conditions, languages, or similar),

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[52] Foot (1984) p. 48
[53] Foot (1984) p. 155
[54] TNA, CO 733/448/15, (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 1.4.1942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)

special abilities (an ability not commonly found in the expeditionary force to conduct a given activity), deniability, and desperation. Additionally, it seems possible that in expeditionary warfare, indigenous forces experience higher morale in defending a given area because they are defending their home territory rather than an area far from home.[55] In effect, the strongest motivations for indigenous force cooperation come from the autonomy of the forces. In theory, the forces could receive tasks that they then completed without additional resources, oversight, or complications; in Palestine Mandate, such tasks included geographic reconnaissance. This autonomous relationship was woven into the fabric of the cooperation between the *Haganah* and the SOE in their first meetings, the minutes of which stated that 'the approach on the part of the Friends should be to say…"We can do so and so, do you want it done" or "we can prepare for doing so and so. Do you wish us to make such preparations"… the military authorities will approach D/H and say "We want such and such done. Can you do it?" and D Palestine should be able to answer (on behalf of the *Haganah*).'[56]

In addition to these more general reasons for indigenous force employment, there were also rationales specific to given forces. In Palestine Mandate, these included previous experience of cooperation and trustworthiness, willingness to cooperate, racial biases, and organisational and domestic politics. The central dynamic of the security situation also had an impact on the indigenous force cooperation that developed. The British repeatedly sought to achieve cost and manpower savings, resulting in the reduction of the garrison of Palestine Mandate. When threats such as riots or revolts threatened the reduced garrison or the civilians it could not protect, the British needed to employ locals.[57] The more the British turned to the local population, the more they needed to develop indigenous force schemes, and the more they became willing to use

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[55] This possibility can also go the other way with indigenous forces deserting to their homes but this was not so much a problem with the forces of the *Yishuv* in Palestine Mandate
[56] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/12 (Memoranda Covering Subjects of Discussion at Meeting Held at Haifa, 13.7.1940)
[57] This trend began immediately after the end of the First World War and included innovative attempts such as air policing designed to create security without large manpower commitments.

indigenous forces for a variety of additional tasks. These factors and the central security dynamic in Palestine Mandate, coupled with the fact that, overall, the *Haganah* could best fulfil the general requirements of an indigenous force, led the Imperial organisations in the Mandate to cooperate with the *Yishuv* in general, and, with the *Haganah* specifically.

Despite the impression given by the many complaints and concerns about the employment of indigenous forces that surfaced during the war, such employment was by no means a wartime innovation within the Mandate territory. The Palestine Government had recruited indigenous forces in the interwar years largely for the same reasons it employed indigenous forces during the Second World War.

In the pre-war period, the most often cited reason for employing indigenous forces was to supplement manpower. As various revolts, riots, and problems with banditry rocked the mandate territory, Palestine Government found it necessary to raise large indigenous forces to augment the garrison. This pattern began with the formation of the Trans-Jordan Mobile Reserve in 1921 and the Palestine Gendarme in 1923.[58] Palestine Government eventually disbanded both these forces and replaced them with standing, regular, locally recruited forces in the form of the Arab Legion and Trans-Jordan Frontier Force.[59] When the Arab revolt began in 1936, these forces proved insufficient and again Palestine Government turned to indigenous forces to augment the available garrison. As the rebellion continued and the situation in Europe deteriorated, the British believed it necessary to transfer forces back to Europe. As a result, the already-stretched garrison relied increasingly on the newly created JSP and *Ghaffir/Notrim* schemes to take the pressure off.[60] Eventually, Palestine Government considered the possibility of authorising and

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[58] James Lunt, *Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century* (London, 1981), p. 51
[59] Lunt (1981) pp. 52-53
[60] Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010

distributing arms to up to 53,000 Jewish personnel.[61] Palestine Government primarily employed these forces to guard bases and infrastructure to free the primary garrison for more combat focused operations.[62]

During the 1936 revolt, Palestine Government and the Imperial Military realised additional benefits of employing indigenous forces. These included the ability to maintain the indigenous forces for less than the cost of regular forces and their possession of local knowledge – such as familiarity with the customs and language of local people and terrain. Additionally, indigenous forces were perhaps more invested than British forces in the security of Palestine. These trends culminated in the creation of the mobile patrols and the Special Night Squads, as well as the dispersion of the JSP among the Jewish settlements.[63] Palestine Government also found that by working with the *Haganah*, it could add the additional paramilitary forces of the *Haganah* to its resources with no further financial expenditure.[64]

In many ways, the situation at the outbreak of the Second World War resembled that of the Arab Revolt. The garrison of the Mandate territory lacked sufficient numbers and capabilities to undertake the full range of its required duties successfully, let alone provide the new types of forces the war required. The manpower shortage grew infinitely more acute as the spectre of Axis invasion loomed larger. It is unsurprising that the Imperial authorities turned to indigenous forces in this security environment.

Already in 1940, the HC and GOC of Palestine hoped it was possible to reduce the garrison of Palestine through the use of indigenous forces, allowing garrison forces to be used elsewhere, as long as 'no provocation is offered to Arab sentiment by the creation of a Jewish Armed Force

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[61] TNA, HS 3/146 (Lt. Col. Pollock, Memorandum on Jewish Settlement Police, 9.5.1941, Reorganization of SOE Middle East 1941)
[62] Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010
[63] Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (London, 1976), p. 25, Interview Shlomo Tivishi, 8.8.2010
[64] Chief Education Officer (1985) p. 101

for internal security purposes.'[65] Soon thereafter, GOC Palestine decided to use indigenous persons, 'unfits', and reserve police for watching jobs, to free more forces for other duties.[66] This continued as the JSP/*Notrim* were re-expanded to fulfil their previous internal security roles. In late 1941, most British governmental organisations recognised the need to free conventional forces from security duties and some senior personnel even were willing to consider 'any proposal to help the manpower question.'[67] In all cases, the question of manpower formed a prominent rationale for the employment of indigenous forces. Some documents suggest that, as during the Arab Revolt, Palestine Government also recruited indigenous forces for their local knowledge and skills, including their knowledge of local terrain, ability to blend in with the local population, and to speak local languages.[68] The usefulness of indigenous forces, both in terms of manpower augmentation and special abilities, was so great that it overcame fears that the forces would eventually turn against the British Empire. As a security summary written by SIME Cairo in early June 1942 noted, the *Haganah* would:

> ...also no doubt act as a home-guard in the event of an Axis invasion. For the present, therefore, their activity may be regarded as helpful to the war effort. It remains to be seen, however, how they will react if after the war the Government declares its intention (sic) of carrying into effect the 1939 White Paper...it is necessary, therefore, to weigh the immediate advantage of having an armed and trained cadre of young Jews, who would

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[65] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (Note on Jewish Agency Request for a Local Jewish Defence Force in Palestine 16.4.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)

[66] TNA, WO 169/148 (Notes on GOC Conference Held at Sarafand, 12.7.1940, G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940)

[67] TNA, WO 201/746 (Group Captain P. Domville, Commentary on Proposal to Create Circassian Force for Persia, 5.10.1942, Proposed use of Circassians in Middle East Operational Policy, 14.10.1942)

[68] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

help to resist an Arab rising or an Axis invasion against the possibility that this force may be used against us in a few years' time.[69]

By the crisis of 1942, despite their fears, Palestine Government employed tens of thousands of members of the *Haganah* and other indigenous forces in order to fulfil internal security roles and to provide auxiliaries in the event of an invasion.[70]

The British Army in many ways behaved similarly to the Palestine Government. Throughout the war, their motivations for employing indigenous forces in Palestine were similar to their pre-war rationale and mainly centred on acquiring manpower. Either through Palestine Government's schemes or through their own schemes, the British Army employed indigenous forces to take over roles that could free garrison forces for the front. Like the Palestine Government, the Army looked towards indigenous forces to supply local knowledge and augment the more conventional capabilities of the military.

The practice of recruiting forces to augment the army and free forces for combat service was by no means unique to Palestine. In other areas of operation, the Army was able to rely on pre-existing, uniformed gendarmes and local service regiments. In nearby Transjordan, the military called upon the Arab Legion to fulfil many civil defence functions.[71] In Palestine, organisations such as the PPF and TFF were already overtaxed and relied on the indigenous forces to augment their strength. The military therefore followed Palestine Government's lead and came to rely on indigenous forces for force supplementation, replacement, and civil defence. Palestine Government and the British Army had a more complicated relationship with indigenous forces in general, as well as a more complicated relationship with the *Yishuv* and particularly the

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[69] TNA, KV 5/34 (Extract from Security Summary, SIME Cairo, M.E. No. 51, 4.6.42, Irgun Zvi Le-umt B'eretz Israel – National Military Organisation in the Land of Israel)
[70] TNA, HS 3/207 (Minutes of Conference of Palestine Scheme, 9.11.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[71] TNA, CO 968/72/10 (British Resident in Transjordan, Letter to HC Palestine, 2.5.1942, Civil Defence Palestine Progress Reports, 1942)

Haganah. Their decision to cooperate with the *Haganah* was not as simple as that of the Special Services but many of the same rationales underlay their decisions.

Of all the Imperial organisations, the various special service organisations in general - and the SOE and its precursors in particular - were the most strongly motivated to cooperate with indigenous forces. This eagerness was integral to their initial conceptual framework. The British government tasked the special services that became the SOE to foment guerrilla warfare against the Axis and to work with anyone to achieve this, regardless of long-term political considerations.[72] In the Middle East, the primary tools with which the special services could fulfil their varied missions were indigenous forces. Although in a technical way, it is possible to see SOE's use of indigenous forces as manpower related, their need was very different from the manpower based rationale of Palestine Government and the British Army. The SOE needed forces to undertake sabotage and other covert operations in Axis occupied areas, reconnoitre terrain and guide the army, establish contacts with other local groups, engage in clandestine manufacturing, and prepare for pre-occupation infrastructure demolition and post-occupation harassment operations. In short, as the SOE's mandate was to employ indigenous forces to fulfil all missions involving irregular operations that might assist the war effort, in Palestine and elsewhere, the SOE and its sister organisations sought to employ indigenous forces.

As the SOE was not concerned with the long-term political issues of working with an indigenous force, it was able to select organisations with whom to cooperate based on effectiveness and efficiency. However, two reasons that the SOE chose to work with the *Haganah* had less to do with effectiveness and more to do with expediency. The Palestine Mandate was not the first region in which the SOE and *Haganah* cooperated. By the time it became necessary to create infrastructure for special operations in the area around Palestine, the SOE and the *Haganah* had a proven track record of cooperation in Europe. Throughout 1940-41, the Jewish Agency and its

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[72] Foot (1984) p. 48, 155

subordinate paramilitary, the *Haganah*, worked with the SOE on a number of projects. In the Balkans, the SOE and Jewish Agency cooperated on sabotage projects as well as intelligence gathering and the *Haganah* also provided the crew of reconnaissance vessels in the Dodecanese for MI9 and Section D.[73] Additionally, the *Haganah* had, by the time of the establishment of cooperation in Palestine, apparently engaged in successful cooperative efforts with the SIS. Unfortunately, all records of the SIS operations are still closed. It is possible to know only that the SIS worked with Jewish elements in south-eastern Europe, that these elements were likely related to the Jewish Agency, and that when the SOE was in the throes of a crisis as to whether to employ the *Haganah* in Palestine, the SIS indicated to the SOE that it considered 'employing Jews advantageous.'[74] The SOE also considered the *Haganah*'s previous cooperation with Palestine Government and the British Army as part of its decision to employ the *Haganah*.[75] For SOE the reasons that the *Haganah* was willing to cooperate were less important than the fact that the *Haganah* actively pursued cooperation and had a proven record of cooperation.[76]

There was another factor, unrelated to performance that led to the SOE's preference for working with the *Haganah* in Palestine - willingness. The notes on the SOE's internal *History of SOE in the Arab World* emphasised the important role of the help of the Jewish organisations in 1939-1940, stating that 'they (the Jews) were about the only people to offer their resources and pledge themselves to help and were most enthusiastic. This was a feature of that period.'[77] In other words, the Jewish organisations in general and the Jewish Agency in particular were the sole organisations in the region that actively approached the special services with offers of

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[73] TNA, HS 3/207 (Notes on Activities in Palestine, Autumn 1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 7/172 (Report on MI9 Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, Part D, Page 5, MI9 Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1941-1945)

[74] TNA, HS 3/207 (SO2, Telegram to High Commissioner of Palestine, 17.1.1941, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Alpha Cipher 816, 21.1.1943, 21-Jan-1943, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[75] TNA, HS 3/207 (Minutes of Conference of Palestine Scheme, 9.11.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[76] The Haganah's motivation for cooperation is considered in the next chapter

[77] TNA, HS 7/86 (Col G.F. Taylor, Note on the History, 28.12.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

assistance. They proposed cooperation in the Middle East, as well as in Europe, in any way the SOE or its precursors desired and were especially anxious to supply men for both irregular and more conventional warfare.[78] For the relatively new SOE, anxious to get to the business of irregular warfare and faced with an expanding war in the Middle East, the Jewish Agency and *Haganah*'s willingness and proven track record of cooperation constituted an offer that was hard to refuse. When it came to decisions as to with which indigenous force to cooperate in Palestine, the SOE was predisposed towards the *Haganah*.

It is impossible to isolate a single overall reason why any Imperial organisation was willing to cooperate with a given force. This discussion instead highlights some of the more significant factors in this decision process. The choice to cooperate with a given indigenous force was, at times, on the surface, a simple calculation. On closer examination, a variety of concurrent motivations and preconditioning affected their choice. None of the motivations were mutually exclusive and many operated simultaneously. In the decision of with which groups to cooperate, two paths ultimately led to the *Haganah*. The first was the question: which group could most effectively offer solutions to problems which the Imperial organisations in Palestine wanted to solve through the employment of indigenous forces? The second question was: did a given group uniquely offer desirable characteristics that provided additional benefit? In both instances, even when the *Haganah* was not the best choice in a specific category of desired activity and qualities, the *Haganah* was the only choice which offered value in all the desired areas of cooperation.

The British imperial organisations believed that they suffered from critical shortages of manpower. The concerns about manpower appear both in the official British Army *History of the*

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[78] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/H, Letter to D, 29.5.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)

Second World War and the notes that form the *History of the SOE in the Arab World*.[79] Indigenous

forces provided one answer to repeated manpower shortages. In some cases, the manpower

shortages that indigenous forces solved in Palestine were not caused by a lack of recruits but by a

lack of suitable recruits. In either instance, perceived manpower shortages appear to have been a

significant motivation for the British to turn to indigenous forces and, as the *Haganah* could best

answer the demand for suitable manpower, a significant motivation to rely on the *Haganah*. The

History of the SOE in the Arab World attests to the shortage of suitable recruits, noting that the

'SOE was certainly wise to harness the knowledge of Palestinian Jews in their undertakings. In

fact this was to some extent necessitated through the lack of suitable personnel to undertake

their requirements.'[80] However, even more than the SOE, Palestine Government and the British

Army relied on the *Haganah* to make up for perceived shortages in manpower.

For the Palestine Government and the British Army, turning to the *Haganah* as a manpower

supplement had possibly become a part of their standard crisis response by 1940. The *Haganah*

had an unrivalled ability to mobilise manpower, be it for the British Army, Palestine

Government, or the SOE. When it wanted to, it could order settlements or subordinate units to

provide manpower to the various imperial organisations and they would comply.[81] This was an

invaluable asset to a resource and personnel hungry government.

With the dawn of the war in Europe, the British needed to reduce the military garrison of

Palestine Mandate. Despite Palestine Government's attempts to suppress the JSP/*Notrim* in the

lead up to the Second World War, during 1939 Palestine Government continued to rely on the

Haganah to provide security for military facilities and infrastructure rather than returning these

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[79] Playfair, et al. (1954); TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[80] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[81] For more on this see the next chapter

duties to the decreasing garrison.[82] By May 1940, HC Palestine and GOC Palestine had decided

that it was possible to further reduce the garrison of Palestine and therefore free up manpower

for active service, provided 'no provocation is offered to Arab sentiment by the creation of a

Jewish Armed Force for internal security purposes.'[83] Within a couple of months, GOC Palestine

was more explicit in his suggestion that local defence volunteers and reserve police replace

soldiers in several duties, including watching jobs.[84] The calls to employ Jewish indigenous forces

to replace the garrison and supplement manpower did not end there. Lord Lloyd, the Secretary

of State for Colonies, noted that it would be possible to reduce the garrison by re-enrolling

JSP/*Notrim* into service.[85] By 1941, the Government of Palestine followed such suggestions and

recruited tens of thousands of JSP/*Notrim* to fortify positions and replace garrison forces at

vulnerable locations such as Haifa harbour, the Haifa oil refinery, bridges, airfields, and military

depots.[86] The SOE had perhaps an even more acute crisis of manpower as it needed personnel

suitable for its combat and special warfare activities. At various times, the military was hesitant

about seconding its best personnel for special operations duties. As a result, the SOE had a thirst

for manpower which it attempted to quench with indigenous personnel, especially the *Haganah*.[87]

Not only could the *Haganah* efficiently provide manpower to the imperial organisations, the

forces it provided were cheaper than British or Imperial forces would be in the same roles. As

Lt. Col. Pollock of the SOE noted, 'only a very limited number of officers and N.C.O.'s would

be required for training purposes, as Jews already trained can themselves undertake a good deal

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[82] Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010

[83] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (Note on Jewish Agency Request for a Local Jewish Defence Force in Palestine 16.4.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)

[84] TNA, WO 169/148 (Notes on GOC Conference Held at Sarafand, 12.7.1940, G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940)

[85] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (Note on Jewish Agency Request for a Local Jewish Defence Force in Palestine 16.4.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)

[86] Edward Horne, *A Job Well Done: Being a History of the Palestine Police Force 1920-1948* (Tiptree, Essex, 1982), p. 251

[87] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HP, Letter to AD, 6.11.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

of training.'[88] It soon became clear that this was the case. The *Haganah* provided high quality training to the forces that cooperated with the SOE. To some extent, the fact that the recruits from the *Haganah* had either already received some training or were living in paramilitary conditions and discipline facilitated this. Thus, as SOE noted, Haganah recruits were more amenable to the training.[89] The *Haganah* also provided additional high-level training to combat veterans. Several experienced members of the German Unit, which had been created as part of the Palestine Scheme, recalled receiving excellent training from the *Haganah*. In particular, some interviewees, including Oreon Yoseph, a fighter from the German Unit, recalled receiving training in all forms of demolition and sabotage from the *Haganah*, as well as advanced weapons courses.

It seems that the *Haganah*, and not the SOE, paid for the additional training, greatly reducing the training cost to the SOE.[90] The *Haganah* also undertook standard weapons and basic combat skills training for those units that cooperated with the SOE.[91] As a result, a small number of SOE trainers could work on refining skills at a sophisticated level. After initial training with the SOE and the *Haganah* was complete, the forces of the Palestine Scheme 'dispersed' to regional bases.[92] There, the forces continued training as part of the *Palmach* under the guidance of the *Haganah*. From that point, the units only received fourteen days' additional training per annum from the SOE.[93] This schedule, while cost-effective, would have rapidly degraded the elite nature of the units had the *Haganah* not been able to continue and reinforce training at its own expense. This alone represented a significant reduction in the per capita cost.

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[88] TNA, HS 3/146 (Lt. Col. Pollock, Memorandum on Jewish Settlement Police, 9.5.1941, Reorganization of SOE Middle East 1941)

[89] TNA, HS 3/207 (Notes on Activities in Palestine, Autumn 1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[90] Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010

[91] *Ibid*

[92] TNA, HS 3/207 (Revised Palestine Scheme, 15.7.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[93] *Ibid*

The *Haganah*'s financial contribution was not limited to training. The *Haganah* paid for the cost of the maintenance and upkeep of the various units that cooperated with both the SOE and the British Army.[94] For example, all of the units of the Palestine and Friends Schemes were based on kibbutzim and Jewish Agency facilities around Palestine Mandate.[95] There is no record of any financial support coming from the SOE to these units, nor is there any memory of units in these areas that were distinct from the local *Palmach* units that were created at the same time. For this reason, it appears that units referred to in the Palestine Scheme were the *Palmach* units, and the *Yishuv* certainly funded the *Palmach*.

The various Imperial organisations did notice the savings; indeed, some of their plans were feasible only because of these savings, which were at the very least a happy bonus of, and most likely a contributing factor in, the decision to cooperate with the *Haganah*. Given the British perception of the acute nature of the manpower shortages, it is likely that the financial and resource savings that resulted from supplementing and replacing Imperial manpower with indigenous manpower were critical considerations, but not the primary reason that the Imperial authorities sought manpower augmentation from the *Haganah*.

In Palestine Mandate, along with their local knowledge and ability to provide solutions to manpower problems, indigenous forces were sought for their special attributes, in particular their abilities to blend in with the other peoples of the region and local hostile forces' paramilitaries. The SOE reported that it was able to insert Egyptian Jews into Egypt and other members of the *Haganah* into cover in Syria.[96] In both cases, this insertion was a precaution to ensure that the SOE would have agents in place following a successful Axis invasion. The ability of these

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[94] Chief Education Officer (1985) p. 142
[95] TNA, HS 3/207 (Revised Palestine Scheme, 15.7.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[96] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H121, Report to D/HV, 17.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Palestine Representative, Report to D Section Cairo, 5.8.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

individuals to blend into their surroundings was crucial and it was an ability the *Haganah* could provide.[97]

In the period leading up to the *Saison*, Palestine Government had failed to significantly penetrate, or stymie the activities of the IZL. Unlike Palestine Government, the *Haganah* was able to infiltrate the IZL and LEHI.[98] According to one IZL member, the *Haganah*'s success in doing so was in part because it could fit into the fabric of society - 'anyone could be *Haganah*.'[99] The *Haganah's* ability to penetrate these organisations when Palestine Government could not was, at least according to MI5 files, a primary reason that the mandatory authorities continued to cooperate with the *Haganah* and helped to determine the structure of the relationship between the two parties during the *Saison*.[100]

One reason the SOE and the British Army chose to work with indigenous forces and preferred the *Haganah* was that each organisation, at some point in the course of their operations, required contacts and networks among the local population of Palestine Mandate and the surrounding area. The *Haganah*, more so than any other organisation, could readily provide these. Given the nature of their work, the necessity to establish local contacts and networks was especially pressing for the SOE and it was they who most often approached the *Haganah* for this reason, although there is some evidence that British Army intelligence also employed the *Haganah* in this manner. In general, it seems that the Army only sought the *Haganah*'s local networks when it came to the preparations for Operation Exporter.[101]

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[97] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H121, Report to D/HV, 17.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); HS 3/207 (Palestine Representative, Report to D Section Cairo, 5.8.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[98] Interview with Anonymous 1, 23.8.2010

[99] Interview with Yehuda Lapidot, 2.9.2010

[100] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

[101] TNA, HS 3/207 (SO2, Telegram to Mr Clauson, 25.11.40, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

The utility of the *Haganah*'s local contacts was present in the minds of the SOE from the latter's entry into Palestine as Section D. In the initial meetings between D and the *Haganah*, D implied that it saw that one advantage of cooperation with the *Haganah* was the *Haganah's* closer relationships with Emir Abdallah in Transjordan, the Druze in Palestine and Syria, the Arab groups in northern Palestine, and the *Shahbandar* group in Damascus.[102] In September of 1940, planners favourably remarked on the *Haganah*'s good contacts in Syria, especially with the Druze.[103] In the same document, the SOE stated that it encouraged the *Haganah* to use its contacts to make exploratory arrangements in the Balkans, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, 'to establish whatever contacts they thought might be necessary for possible sabotage work, without getting involved in Arab politics.'[104] The perceived ability of the *Haganah* to make these arrangements, along with its superior contacts, set it up from the beginning as an asset that could fill the SOE's requirements for the ability to develop networks for later exploitation. The formation of such networks was an essential aspect of the SOE's mission, and the *Haganah's* ability to do so seems a critical factor in the SOE's decision to employ the *Haganah* as an indigenous force.

During the lead up to Operation Exporter, the *Haganah*'s local contacts motivated the SOE and the British Army to employ it. Prior to planning the invasion, Palestine Government, the SOE, and the British Army recognised that the *Haganah* had cross-border links with the populations of Lebanon and Syria.[105] Before the emergence of the threat from Syria and Lebanon, these relationships had worried the various Imperial authorities (with the exception of the SOE) to the extent that Palestine Government ordered raids on Jewish border settlements.[106] Although the origin of the recruitment of the *Haganah* to provide guides for Operation Exporter is somewhat unclear, it is evident that the *Haganah* used its regional links to recruit additional guides from the

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[102] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/11 (Minutes of Meeting Held Between D/H Organisation and Friends, 29.7.1940)
[103] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HP, Report to A/D, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)
[104] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HP, Report to A/D, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)
[105] TNA, WO 169/148 (Summary of Intelligence Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 14.12.1940, G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940)
[106] *Ibid*

local populations around the border. These guides then integrated with *Haganah* units attached to army reconnaissance elements, which efficiently guided the army to its initial objectives.[107] As all relevant parties knew of these links, it is likely that the *Haganah's* contacts provided at least a part of the motivation for recruiting the *Haganah* for Exporter.

In reference to preparing a response to the potential Axis invasion of Palestine Mandate, the *Haganah's* local contacts may have again formed one of the reasons for its continued employment by the SOE. In the SOE's initial meetings with the *Haganah*, the SOE showed its interest in exploiting the *Haganah*'s clandestine regional arms, personnel, and supply networks well before the invasion scare.[108] During the invasion scare, the SOE employed these networks as a source for the clandestine import and stockpiling of arms and the prepositioning of agents and saboteurs (both from the *Haganah* and possibly their own) in order to prepare post-occupation resistance.[109]

For both the Special Services and Palestine Government there was a further factor, desperation. There were several periods where operational necessity and fear of invasion drove Palestine Government and the Special Services to any available option for additional support. As the *Haganah* was consistently willing and able to provide aid, the British institutions came to rely on the *Haganah*. The ebb and flow of cooperation corresponded to the ebb and flow of desperation.

The first instance of desperation occurred in spring 1941. By the end of April 1941, many believed that an Axis invasion through Lebanon and Syria was imminent. The fall of Greece and the Axis conquest of Crete magnified these fears and Palestine Government became instantly more willing to collaborate with the *Haganah*. The GOC Palestine made a number of

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[107] Dayan (1976) pp. 46-48
[108] AHTA, 80/563(ה)/12 (Memoranda Covering Subjects of Discussion at Meeting Held at Haifa, 13.7.1940)
[109] AHTA, 80/563(ה)/11 (Minutes of Meeting Held Between D/H Organisation and Friends, 29.7.1940); TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from Fortnightly Situation Report Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, No. 12, 12.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

recommendations to the HC Palestine during the invasion scare that previously would have been unthinkable and certainly opposed. Included in these recommendations were that the Arab-Jewish parity restrictions on territorial defence, a hallmark of Palestine Government's policy, be relaxed – a proposal to which HC Palestine now agreed.[110] GOC also supported a far greater level of paramilitarisation of the *Haganah*-controlled JSP than even at the height of the Arab Revolt. GOC proposed converting Jewish settlements into strong points and training the JSP for anti-paratrooper work, to engage in tank hunting, to adopt guerrilla tactics, and to protect settlements against Arab attack, without British assistance.[111] Furthermore, he suggested overlooking the possession of illegal arms by members of the Jewish community.[112] HC Palestine agreed in principle to all of these proposals; in his initial response on the question of arms, he wrote, 'in view of urgent need for additional equipment for defence purposes I am prepared to acquiesce in this procedure.'[113] This is most telling in that it highlights the direct causal relationship between the precarious situation of Palestine and HC's willingness to overlook his previous objections to the *Haganah*.

The second instance of desperation came almost as a direct result of the first. Although the threat of invasion prompted MEC to take action in the form of Operation Exporter (1942), MEC lacked both men and material for such an undertaking.[114] Cooperation with the *Haganah* alleviated the manpower shortage to some extent as the continued expansion of the JSP freed up more forces to be sent to the front and the provision of scouts from the *Palmach* augmented the strength and capabilities of the reconnaissance elements of the Imperial force. The conventional forces of the British Empire were not the only organisations lacking sufficient forces for the operations around Exporter; the Special Services also found themselves short of personnel. The

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[110] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 2.5.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)
[111] *Ibid*
[112] *Ibid*
[113] *Ibid*
[114] Playfair et. al, (1954)

SOE's unpublished official history mentions that cooperation with the *Haganah* during 1939-1941 was 'to some extent necessitated through the lack of suitable personnel to undertake their requirements.'[115] The weakness of the Army and Special Services in preparations for the invasion of Syria led those in the Special Services who favoured cooperation to comment that the situation might be 'for the first time, a real opportunity to use Friends Organization', partially because now the various Imperial stakeholders would finally countenance their employment.[116]

Desperation returned as the crisis of 1942 developed, and so too did British willingness to work with the *Haganah*. The subsequent upsurge in the level of cooperation was similarly motivated, at least in part, by desperation in the face of imminent invasion. In April 1942, HC Palestine wrote that he recognised 'that circumstances may arise in which the training in arms and discipline given to individuals by these organisations may be capable of utilisation in the country's defence.'[117] He noted that it was unnecessary to recognise or cooperate directly with the *Haganah* as he 'believed that some thousands of their members (particularly of Hagana) are already serving in the Jewish Settlement Police and other police formations.'[118] In July 1942, when reports began to filter back to London of the possibility that Palestine might be overrun in a matter of weeks, HC Palestine acceded to greater and greater militarisation of both the PPF and JSP until eventually both were militarised and placed under military command.[119]

The final major period of cooperation with the *Haganah* occurred during another period of desperation. In the *Saison*, the Government of Palestine had no choice but to turn to the *Haganah*, a fact that did not escape the notice of any of the participants in the cooperation. The Security Service noted that 'the (*Jewish*) Agency are only too well aware that the Police have

[115] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

[116] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HP, Report to A/D, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)

[117] TNA, CO 733/448/15, (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 1.4.1942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)

[118] *Ibid*

[119] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H271, Telegram to AD/H, 12.07.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); Horne (1982) p. 249

signally failed to penetrate these two organisations (*IZL and LEHI*) and that the C.I.D. are now to a very large extent dependent on the Agency's Security Officers for most of the evidence upon which the arrests of terrorists can be effected.'[120] In short, having utterly failed to penetrate the rebelling revisionist organisations, the Government in Palestine had to rely totally on the *Haganah* for security in Palestine.

From this chronology, the motivational role of desperation is clear. The *Haganah* was always present, willing, and able and the British authorities needed immediate assistance. As the *Haganah* was able to provide the required assistance on demand, through a combination of its manpower and abilities, it is no accident that when the Imperial Authorities sought the proverbial port in a storm, they found harbour in the *Haganah*.

The Palestine Government repeatedly took advantage of the benefits of deniability derived from cooperating with an indigenous force. During the *Saison,* the Palestine Government cooperated closely with the *Haganah* to suppress the IZL, but, internally and externally, it seems to have wished to maintain distance from the less savoury aspects of the *Haganah*'s activities. Cooperating with the *Haganah* as a separate indigenous force rather than as a uniformed local auxiliary offered a solution. The police took transfers of prisoners, and, at times, orders from members of the *Haganah* and benefited from practices such as secret incarceration and torture, carried out by the *Haganah* with the knowledge of the Palestine Government.[121]

Palestine Government perceived that there were several extra benefits yielded by cooperation with the *Haganah*. Some of these were based in experience, some in hope, some in the unique

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[120] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

[121] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946); TNA, KV 5/29 (S.I.M.E. Cairo, Extract from Middle East Security Summary No. 230, 25.5.45, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946); Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010; Interview with Anonymous 1, 23.8.2010; Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010; Interview with Yaacov Sika Ahroni, 29.8.2010; Interview with Joseph (Yoskeh) Nachmias, 26.8.2010; TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

pseudo-state capabilities of the Jewish Agency and some in the fiction of beliefs about race. Taken together, they constituted additional incentive and powerful inducement to cooperate with the *Haganah* over its rivals.

One aspect of the rationale for cooperation with the *Haganah* was not necessarily present from the start of cooperation, although personnel of Palestine Government had observed it during the Arab Revolt, namely the high morale of *Haganah* fighters. By 1942, some SOE officers noticed the high morale, especially of those sent to SOE training. In April 1942, situation reports from the SOE officers monitoring the *Haganah*'s preparations to institute scorched earth demolitions across Palestine mentioned that 'their (the *Haganah* demolition teams) morale is strangely high.'[122] This view was also reflected in the report of the SOE field commander for Palestine (who would become one of the most vocal proponents of continued cooperation) with the *Haganah*'s visit to the *Haganah*-SOE joint training camps later the same year, which stated that he was 'much impressed by their bearing and obvious determination.'[123]

From its initial contacts with the Jewish Agency, it is clear that the SOE hoped to take advantage of the pseudo-state nature of the Jewish Agency and the *Haganah*. Not only could cooperation bring fighters from the *Haganah*, it could also bring resources, both industrial and financial, from the Jewish Agency. By September 1940, the SOE stated explicitly that one of its hopes for cooperation with the 'Friends', was that the *Haganah* might manufacture supplies and devices for both the SOE and the local authorities.[124] Some in SOE headquarters believed the Jewish Agency production capabilities were in great demand and of the highest utility. Those supporting cooperation with the *Haganah*, such as the SOE Field Commander in Palestine, Pollock, reported in defence of such cooperation that at least in terms of W/T, 'the forty suitcase sets which the

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[122] TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from Weekly Situation Report, Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, No. 1, 19.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[123] TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for October 1942, 24.10.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[124] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HS, Letter to D/H1, 3.9.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

Friends are producing, are in great demand, not only for our own purpose, but also for G(R), and more particularly C's people. The R.A.F. has also taken at least one.'[125] On the other hand, those who argued against close cooperation felt compelled to argue that the manufacture of these W/T sets was of inferior quality in order to negate this rationale for cooperation.[126] This demonstrates the importance of the question of the Jewish Agency's ability to manufacture resources to the SOE's consideration of cooperation. The case of the W/T sets was one of several cases of resource production cited by defenders of cooperation. Others included the fact that the Jewish Agency was 'responsible for the construction and maintenance of the Free French Broadcasting Station, which, in spite of jamming' was 'a great success.'[127] The financial resources the Jewish Agency was able to provide were also much referred to by proponents of cooperation. The Jewish Agency could expend its own money on operations run for the SOE, which in a time of resource-based and financial competition among services was a valuable asset and a powerful inducement for continued cooperation.[128]

Given the tense relationship that existed between the British Empire and the *Haganah* at the start of the Second World War, it might be expected that, despite all of the positive reasons for cooperation, the Imperial Authorities would have looked to other groups within the Palestine Mandate for support. The reasons the Imperial Authorities did not work with other minority groups have, to some extent, already been discussed. They include the fact that such groups could not provide solutions for manpower problems and were not sufficiently organised for collective recruitment, and therefore, according to the SOE, 'more specific direction was required from the military authorities before individual agents could be appointed.'[129] This still

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[125] TNA, HS 3/146 (D/HP, Report to CD, 19.5.1941, Reorganisation of SOE ME, 1941)
[126] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HV to SOE Cairo, 29.8.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[127] TNA, HS 3/146 (D/HP, Report to CD, 19.5.1941, Reorganisation of SOE ME, 1941)
[128] TNA, HS 3/210 (Correspondence to SO2, 18.4.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)
[129] TNA, HS 3/207 (Notes on Activities in Palestine, Autumn 1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

left the possibility of cooperating with the major Arab population groups in Palestine Mandate. However, there were disincentives to such cooperation, which were inversely related to a motivation for cooperation with the *Haganah*. Where the Imperial Authorities felt they could not rely on the Arab population, the *Haganah* was more than willing to cooperate and had a history of cooperation to demonstrate their reliability.

While there recently had been tension with the *Yishuv*, including the *Haganah*, the relationship with the Arab population was more fraught as the Arab Revolt was still dying down when the war began. The politically organised sectors of the Arab community were not pro-British. The SOE considered that there was not much hope of swaying either the leadership of the community or its political organisations from their pro-Axis stance.[130] The *History of the SOE in the Arab World* also noted that it was likely that there would be another conflict between the British Empire and the Arab population of Palestine in the near future.[131] As far as the SOE was concerned, the primary reason for not seeking the recruitment of indigenous forces from the Arab population in Palestine Mandate was an issue of trust and willingness. Even in cases of recruitment of individuals from the Arab population, SOE believed that such agents could not be trusted. The Transjordanian section of the *History of the SOE* recorded that given the political situation within Arab world individually recruited agents were:

> …probably unscrupulous persons, or they would not be acting as spies, and they usually think that they must produce some sensational information or else they will lose their jobs. Thus they always tend to exaggerate and if there is nothing to exaggerate they will even invent. Everybody usually knows that they are spies, and so they never really get any

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[130] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H121, Report to D/HV, 17.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.5, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

[131] TNA, HS7/86 (Section on Transjordan, History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

secret information but at times they do not hesitate to blackmail the civil population by telling them that, unless they are bribed, they will denounce them.[132]

Taken together, these two quotations clearly demonstrate that the SOE perceived that the Arab population of Palestine were neither individually nor collectively truly willing to cooperate (at least not on an ideological level) and in any case could not be trusted. As both Palestine Government and the British Army cooperated with the *Yishuv*, Circassians, and Druze as indigenous forces and made no real attempt to cooperate with the organised Arab population of Palestine Mandate, it is likely that they held a similar view to the SOE.

Whereas the Arab population was perceived as unwilling to cooperate and untrustworthy, the *Haganah*, despite the tensions, was generally perceived as highly willing, and trustworthy, in the sense that it would accomplish a given task. Under the auspices of the Jewish Agency, the *Haganah* volunteered individuals for dangerous service in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.[133] SOE files indicate that it was not simply a case of the *Haganah* volunteering personnel when needed. Rather, it recorded that the *Haganah* was 'anxious' to provide volunteers for indigenous forces and cooperation.[134] Those in both the SOE and War Office who wished to defend cooperation with the *Haganah* referred to this willingness to cooperate in their defence. In a note defending cooperation, a senior SOE officer in the Middle East stated that the *Haganah* 'are really doing their best to help us.'[135] The MI2a *Military Handbook on Palestine* noted that the members of the *Yishuv* supported the British Empire by stating, 'the Jews have almost throughout supported the British forces in the territory…the Jews see in the British soldier the only certain guarantee of their survival in Palestine.'[136] The SOE repeatedly noted this support and willingness. In the notes on the *SOE History*, it mentions that in the early period of SOE

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[132] *Ibid*
[133] Foot (1976) p. 163
[134] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/H, Letter to D, 29.5.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)
[135] TNA, HS 3/210 (D/H0, Note to D/H1, 27.1.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)
[136] TNA, WO 252/826 (MI2a, Military Handbook on Palestine, 11.1941)

activity in the Middle East, the *Yishuv* 'were about the only people to offer their resources and pledge themselves to help and were most enthusiastic.'[137] Elsewhere, the SOE history continued on this theme in stating, 'the Jewish Agency has always been a valuable and willing collaborator with SOE.'[138]

Imperial Authorities not only found the *Haganah* most willing to cooperate; they also perceived the *Haganah* to be the least likely to betray them to the Axis or turn against them during the war.[139] While not explicitly stated in any documents, this trust is clearly implied by the consistent choice of the *Haganah* as the indigenous force with whom to cooperate across the almost decade of conflict encompassing the Arab Revolt and Second World War. The success of the cooperation reinforced this trust. The SOE found that the recruits provided by the *Haganah* were of high quality and generally successful in their training and endeavours, so much so that SOE continued to desire to work with the *Haganah* even after the threat to Palestine had passed.[140] This demonstrates that the trust was not solely a result of desperation. This trust then created the distinction that led to the choice of cooperation with the *Yishuv* and *Haganah*. The Arab population of Palestine was perceived to be unwilling, pro-Axis, and untrustworthy, while the *Yishuv* and *Haganah* had a record of successful cooperation with the Empire and were perceived to be enthusiastically willing, loyal, naturally anti-Axis, and trustworthy. This difference in perception led to a difference in treatment and a strong preference for recruitment from the *Yishuv* and *Haganah* over recruitment from the Arab population.

The importance of racial biases and beliefs in Imperial decision-making cannot be overlooked, especially in the context of indigenous forces. Martial race theories and other racial beliefs were

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[137] TNA, HS 7/86 (Col G.F. Taylor, Note on the History, 28.12.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

[138] TNA, HS 7/85 (Memorandum on SOE Activities in Arab Countries, pp.1-30, SOE History 52, SOE Activities in Arab Countries, 1941-1943)

[139] Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010

[140] Foot (1984) p. 77; TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from Weekly Situation Report, Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, No. 1, 19.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/206 (Report to D.S.O.(a) from Jerusalem, 12.12.1942, SOE Alternative Projects, SOE Palestine 1, Planning, 3.1941-12.1942)

still prevalent in Imperial thinking across the world at the time of the Second World War and affected aspects of decision making in many areas of policy, including military and civil service recruitment, political policy, deployment planning, force structure, and strategy. The MI2a Military Handbook for Palestine provides an example of such racial beliefs as the authors assess the suitability of each 'race' for military service. It includes statements such as:

> ...the Arab makes a good guerrilla fighter, but he has no idea of cohesion, and being unamenable to discipline and an indifferent shot with a rifle he does not make a good soldier by European standards…the 9000 Druzes form a warlike and truculent race…the 900 Circassians come from a virile fighting race and make good soldiers, especially cavalry…when properly trained, the Jew can make a good soldier, as he has powers of organisation...the Jew's military ideas are of the European type.[141]

These kinds of sentiments affected the recruitment of indigenous forces, as well as what type of cooperation might be sought from indigenous forces. In the above case, there was a bias towards the employment of Jews, Druze, and Circassians.

Not all the stereotypes that led to cooperation between the *Yishuv* and the British Empire were positive. One SOE history suggested that Jews were especially desirable for SOE type work because of 'a natural Jewish proclivity for subversive activities.'[142] Some who were not in favour of working with the *Haganah*, especially within Palestine Government, also showed a racial undertone in some of their objections. Anti-Jewish trials took place across Palestine Mandate and elsewhere and there were anti-Semitic officers within the PPF structure.[143]

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[141] TNA, WO 252/826 (MI2a, Military Handbook on Palestine, 11.1941)
[142] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.1, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[143] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010; Ronald Zweig, *Britain and Palestine during the Second World War,* (London, 1986)

The specific consistency of one Palestine Government officer's willingness to believe the worst about Jews, that of Major Hunloke, smacked of anti-Semitism.[144] Hunloke's objections to the use of indigenous Jewish forces eventually became such a problem that he received an official reprimand for them. Even when not explicitly stated, it is axiomatic that the prevalence of racial biases affects all aspects of any relationship. In the case of the SOE, the ability to employ the perceived 'Jewish proclivity' for subversion was certainly a perceived added benefit that the *Haganah* could offer the SOE. The racial lines in SOE thinking helped lead the SOE to cooperation with the *Yishuv*, and ultimately, the *Haganah*. For the Palestine Government, the situation was more complex. The Palestine Government did recruit Druze and Circassians for their perceived martial virtues. However, in the end it was also recognised that Jews could be made into soldiers and, despite other problems with employing the *Yishuv*, this was a valuable asset that Palestine Government could not afford to overlook in a crisis.

The review of the factors that contributed to, the cooperation between Palestine Mandate and the *Haganah* strongly suggests that the primary reason the security, military, and intelligence organisations within Palestine Mandate chose to cooperate with the *Haganah* stemmed from the conviction that the *Haganah* was the organisation best able to fulfil the goals of indigenous force cooperation and provide added value. The SOE Commander explained his feelings on the overall value of the *Haganah* members by noting:

> The men selected for training speak a number of different local and European languages
> and their different occupations and technical ability are such that we shall be able to draw
> suitable men from the pool for almost every conceivable sort of project which may come
> our way. No better human material could exist for our purpose; these are honourable

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144 TNA, WO 259/83 (Report on Palestine Jewry: Service and Recruiting, Palestine Policy and Hagana, 1944); TNA, HS 3/210 (Col. Maunsell, Draft Letter to DSO Palestine, 17.1.1943, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)

fanatics who will stick [sic] at nothing, physically and mentally tough, highly disciplined and used to guerrilla warfare.[145]

According to the SOE, the *Haganah* was the only organisation coherent enough, either in the *Yishuv* or elsewhere, to satisfy its requirements in a collective manner whilst being trustworthy and willing.[146] The *Haganah* was also in many ways the least costly option. SOE believed that working with other organisations and populations would cost more money in bribes to keep them loyal and that recruitment would take longer and be more difficult because of the incoherence of the organisations.[147] It was also politically cheaper as unlike cooperating closely with the IZL which might irritate the *Haganah*, continued close cooperation with the *Haganah* would not cause significant problems with anyone with whom the Empire was already cooperating. Moreover, there was some thought at various times that cooperation with the *Haganah* might have benefits in the unceasing bureaucratic war among various Imperial organisations in the Middle East.[148] Some among the British also thought that cooperation with the Jewish Agency, and therefore the *Haganah*, would benefit the relationship between the British Empire and the *Yishuv*.[149] In Palestine, therefore, the *Haganah* became the primary indigenous force employed in a number of different contexts because it best met all the general reasons for the employment of an indigenous force with the lowest immediate costs and provided added value.

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[145] TNA, HS 3/207 (Palestine Representative, Report to D Section Cairo, 5.8.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[146] *Ibid;* TNA, HS7/86 (Section on Transjordan, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World,1944-1945)

[147] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H121, Report to D/HV, 17.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Palestine Representative, Report to D Section Cairo, 5.8.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[148] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/H, Letter to D, 29.5.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)

[149] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (SOS Colonies, Cypher Telegram to HC Palestine, 9.5.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941); TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H271, Telegram to AD/H, 12.07.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

Horn of Africa

As in Palestine, the decision to work with indigenous forces in Abyssinia was an evolving conversation. The British discussed cooperation with indigenous forces in possible war plans as part of a continuous reassessment of whether to work with indigenous forces generally and with which specific indigenous forces. For a time the discussion took the form of a series of proposals and responses by those in favour and those against any form of cooperation.

As early as April 1939, the Foreign Office ordered its representatives in Cairo to examine the possibility of dispatching agents to raise a rebellion in Abyssinia in the event of a war.[150] The Anglo-French Aden Conference of May 1939 decided that both parties would endeavour to gain more contacts in Abyssinia to support a local rebellion. In July 1939, General Archibald Wavell (GOC-in-C MEC) instructed MEC to study the issue.[151] In October, weeks after the outbreak of the Second World War but before the advent of war with Italy, MEC prepared plans to raise a rebellion in East Africa and 'determine which would be the best leaders to exploit' with the hope of raising the tribes in Italian East Africa in event of war.[152] Some senior officials did 'not like this scheme' and barred any moves that might upset the Italians. Further, they ordered that no support could be given to the rebels until war was declared and sufficient regular forces were available.[153] Absent from this discussion was any reference to why MEC should cooperate with the indigenous forces or how to decide with which forces they ought to cooperate.

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[150] TNA, CO 323/1670/4 (Cypher Telegram to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo) Foreign Office, No. 341, 26.4.1939, Abyssinia Co-ordination of Arrangements to Foster Rebellion)

[151] Playfair, et al. (1954) pp. 182-83

[152] TNA, WO 201/254 (Military HQ Middle East, Cairo, Preparation of Plans for Raising Tribes, 12.10.1939, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-1940)

[153] TNA, WO 201/254 (A.P. Wavell, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-1940); TNA, WO 201/254 (Military HQ Middle East, Cairo, Preparation of Plans for Raising Tribes, 12.10.1939, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-1940); TNA, WO 201/254 (W. Elphinston, Note on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and I.E.A, 30.8.1939, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-1940)

By May 1940, the British had identified eleven Ethiopian leaders to support in the event of war with Italy and on 11 June 1940 - the day after Italy's declaration of war, cooperation began.[154] As in Palestine Mandate, pragmatic necessity, racial beliefs, imperial considerations, bureaucratic politics, and the human and physical terrain drove the British to cooperation. The decision process regarding with which indigenous force to cooperate in Abyssinia was more coherent than in Palestine Mandate. For the most part, it is not necessary to consider in turn each organisation that cooperated with indigenous forces.

It is worth considering for a moment the opposition to cooperating with indigenous forces in Ethiopia, especially given the similarity between this opposition and the opposition to cooperation in Palestine Mandate. The opposition to cooperation surfaced at times in the War Cabinet but more commonly stemmed from the local colonial authorities: in this case, those in Kenya and Sudan. The opposition of these officials is telling. The local colonial authorities were tasked primarily with thinking about the maintenance of the Empire and they had the closest relationship with the Italian imperial authorities. At times, it seems that they may have viewed that it would be preferable to have an Italian enemy ruling East Africa than a friendly Ethiopian native regime. The opposition to cooperation included attempts by the Colonial Office to ban the incorporation of Ethiopian refugees into the war effort or at least into anything that resembled a regular military unit.[155] From the Government and Kaid of Sudan came arguments doubting the practicality of employing guerrillas to any effect without the aid of thousands of regular soldiers and significant air assets.[156] The Governor General of Sudan, G.S. Symes, wrote:

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[154] Playfair, et al. (1954) pp. 182-83

[155] TNA, CO 323/1670/4 (Governor of Kenya to SOS Colonies, Cypher Telegram, No. 101, 6.5.1939, Abyssinia Co-ordination of Arrangements to Foster Rebellion); TNA, CO 323/1670/4 (Letter to Major John D. Chalmers, 23.6.1939, Abyssinia Co-ordination of Arrangements to Foster Rebellion)

[156] TNA, HS 3/5 (FO Telegram, Abyssinian Revolt: Obstruction from Local Authorities, 11.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); Christopher Sykes, *Orde Wingate* (London, 1959), p. 240

...competent opinions … are unanimous that to incite a levee en masse is not a feasible proposition until we are able to afford support by air and in a measure obviously much beyond the capacity of our local military' and that 'we considered a scheme for using Abyssinian "patriots" to hamper the Italian communications…but it seems very unlikely that anything would come of it.[157]

Symes made this assertion despite the fact that British experience during the interwar years had demonstrated the contrary – unsupported guerrilla forces were able consistently to tie down significant British military resources, something Symes would have witnessed in his own service in South Africa and Palestine.

Other arguments against employing indigenous forces in Ethiopia were couched in the language of paternalism. The Governor of Kenya, Robert Brooke-Popham, expressed concern that it would be unfair to arm Ethiopians because, if captured, they might be killed as well as a belief that should Britain cooperate with the Ethiopians it would have to become responsible for their governance and wellbeing after the war.[158] The latter point perhaps hints at some of the underlying reasons for the opposition. The vehemence of the opposition combined with the seeming weakness of opposition arguments suggests another level of rationale for the opposition to cooperation. After all, at least in the case of Symes, his stated reasons for opposing arming Ethiopians run contrary to his own experience.

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[157] WO 201/2677 (G.S. Symes, Letter to Sir Miles Lampson, 29.9.1939, Organisation of Guerrilla Force for Operations in Sudan and Abyssinia); It is worth noting that Symes was replaced in late 1940
[158] CO 323/1670/4 (Governor of Kenya to SOS Colonies, Cypher Telegram, No. 101, 6.5.1939, Abyssinia Co-ordination of Arrangements to Foster Rebellion); The Foreign Office response to this was cutting enough in its language to be worth including in full - 'Our view on this subject is that if, in the event of war, Ethiopian refugees volunteer to return to Ethiopia and to carry on guerilla warfare against the Italians, we should facilitate their doing so and provide them with rifles, bandoliers and ammunition. If the Italians capture them they will doubtless shoot them, of which the Ethiopian refugees are certainly well aware. However, if the authorities in Kenya wish to have consciences as white as driven snow they could, when handing out rifles, bandoliers and ammunition to the refugees, warn them with due solemnity of the perils which they will run.' – TNA, CO 323/1670/4 (Cavendish-Bentink, Letter to F.J. Pedler, 2.6.1939, Abyssinia Co-ordination of Arrangements to Foster Rebellion)

Brooke-Popham's assertion that the British Empire would have to become responsible for the post-war futures of Ethiopian irregulars implies there were underlying concerns about the future governance of Ethiopia if it were liberated from the Italians – either with the help of indigenous forces or without. Both these concerns and those regarding the feasibility of cooperation may have stemmed in part from misinformation about the situation in Ethiopia. The Italians excelled at managing the flow of information out of IEA. Journalists and 'informed circles' widely accepted the Italian message that the Italian regime had control of a stable situation and enjoyed popular support in IEA.[159] Intelligence analysis seemingly confirmed this impression of IEA. In May 1939 Brooke-Popham reported that 'intelligence indicates that Italian East Africa is fairly quiet.'[160] A document in the War Office files, of undetermined provenance, entitled 'Some Brief Observations on the Subject of Anglo-Italian Relations in East Africa' written at roughly the same time went far further. The document affirmed Brooke-Popham's view of the pacification of IEA by stating that 'Italy is virtually master of the whole of Ethiopia…the occasional reports of brigandage cannot be taken as indicative of any fundamental weakening in the hold of the established Government.'[161] It also commented as evidence that 'Native opinion regarding the Italian Government is of three kinds: that which welcomes the new regime and regards it as salvation from the former Amhara tyranny; that which displays the fatalistic aspect of the African mind and submits, of necessity, to a new and better order and that which outwardly submits but retains a strong inward reservation of opinion.'[162]

The document, together with reports from Brooke-Popham and others, argued that cooperation with a rebellion was unfeasible as there was no support in IEA. The document also argued that supporting a rebellion based on guerilla warfare would fail in IEA because 'authorities' said that

[159] Sykes (1959) p. 239
[160] TNA, CO 323/1670/4 (Governor of Kenya to SOS Colonies, Cypher Telegram, No. 101, 6.5.1939, Abyssinia Co-ordination of Arrangements to Foster Rebellion)
[161] WO 201/2677 (Some Brief Observations on the Subject of Anglo-Italian Relations in East Africa, Organisation of Guerrilla Force for Operations in Sudan and Abyssinia)
[162] Ibid

'that the Ethiopian neither has been nor is an exponent of this art of warfare.'[163] Finally, the document also noted that Britain would have to become responsible for governing Ethiopia should it remove the Italians stating that 'any change in the status quo of Abyssinia with a view to restoring the Monarchy would prove fatal to the country. The day of self-government in Ethiopia must be regarded as a thing of the past. The welfare and security of every individual in the country depends on the presence of a strong European government.'[164] It is possible the claims put forward by the document, Brooke-Popham, Symes, and other opponents of cooperation resulted from an Italian propaganda effort that succeeded, despite contradictory information available from multiple credible sources. Among these sources were refugees leaving IEA for Sudan and Kenya as well as messengers from *arbagnoch* and a French Intelligence mission which reported to the British and was, at the very least, known to the Government of Sudan.[165] It appears that those who opposed cooperation chose to believe a narrative that reinforced their views while discounting information which challenged their views. If, as it seems, this was the case than it appears that opposition to cooperation with the *arbagnoch* either developed simultaneously with the misinformation about IEA or predated it. In either case, the information coming out of IEA was not the cause of the opposition.

Those opposed to cooperation with indigenous forces in East Africa was lost to bureaucratic inertia as much as reasoned critique. Those organisations that believed cooperation was necessary, namely the FO and WO, reached an agreement to take steps to prepare for aiding a rebellion in Abyssinia and received support in the Cabinet for this.[166] Thus, the Foreign Office was able to note that it should remove any local British authorities who did not cease their

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[163] *Ibid*
[164] *Ibid*
[165] TNA, WO 201/2677 (Troopers, Copy of Cablegram to Mideast, 25.9.39, Organisation of Guerrilla Force for Operations in Sudan and Abyssinia); Sykes (1959) p. 240; TNA, WO 201/2677 (Troopers, Copy of Cablegram to Mideast, 27.9.39, Organisation of Guerrilla Force for Operations in Sudan and Abyssinia)
[166] TNA, HS 3/5 (MI(R), British Co-Operation with Rebellion in Abyssinia, 6.8.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); TNA, CAB 65/7/66 (War Cabinet Meeting, 18.6.1940)

obstruction to cooperation.[167] Given this, understanding the rational for cooperation is largely an exercise in understanding why the Foreign Office, War Office, and to a lesser extent the special services chose employ indigenous forces.

Racially based thinking influenced not only the decision to cooperate with indigenous forces in the Horn of Africa, but also its presentation in the archive and post-war literature. The racially based thinking reflected classical British martial race theories and broader 'scientific' and eugenic racial theories based on physical characteristics, in addition to traditional racial prejudices related to Africa in general or skin colour. Such considerations affected every aspect of the discussions in Africa from whether to cooperate with indigenous forces to defence planning for entire colonies. For example, in discussions about the defence of Somaliland, one major topic of consideration was the British perception that Somalis were temperamentally unsuitable for defensive operations, along with a belief in the 'general instability of the Somali as soldiers.'[168] Both considerations influenced the initial decision not to plan for the defence of Somaliland in the case of Italian hostilities. These particular beliefs about Somalis proved so pervasive that even after the well fought defensive operation in Somaliland, undertaken by the Somaliland Camel Corps, it was remarked with surprise that the 'Somalis who are even less fitted by temperament for defence under such conditions also fought well.'[169]

In the Horn of Africa, recognisable patterns of martial race theories presented, especially in those areas where the British had previous experience in recruiting from the local populations. The most direct way race affected the relationship between indigenous forces and the British was in both the decisions to recruit indigenous forces in the Horn of Africa and the choice of which forces to recruit. A corollary to martial race theory, the belief that different races were better

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[167] TNA, HS 3/5 (FO Telegram, Abyssinian Revolt: Obstruction from Local Authorities, 11.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940)
[168] TNA, WO 201/270 (Mideast, Message to Troopers, 6.9.1940); TNA, WO 201/256, (Memorandum on the Political Defects of the Present Defence Scheme, 11.1939)
[169] TNA, WO 201/270 (Mideast, Message to Troopers, 6.9.1940)

suited to certain climates and topographies, helped drive the decisions around indigenous force employment in the Horn of Africa.[170] According to M.R.D. Foot, the tendency during the Abyssinia campaign to recruit indigenous forces based on beliefs about inherent racial qualities reached a point of ridiculousness with the British recruiting urban Arabs from Sudan to run the camel convoys to support the *arbagnoch*.[171] As Foot noted many of those recruited had no more experience with camels than the British and some significantly less.[172] This type of thinking led to operational biases as to which perceived ethnic groups were preferred.

In addition to martial race theory, other types of thinking affected recruitment, employment and treatment of local forces with both physical anthropology and broader preconceived racial notions playing a significant role. Some memoirs, including that written by Wilfred Thesiger, explain recruitment decisions based on the classic physical anthropological characterizations of head shape and hair type as well as skin colour.[173] These beliefs included assumptions about whether certain races were more virile and therefore better suited for war – an observation often accompanied by descriptions of the relative mop-like qualities of hair.[174] These anthropological consideration together with martial race thinking deeply affected perceptions of the desirability of recruiting or cooperating with various indigenous groups. For example within the war diary of Mission 101 there is an entry which states 'I find these Tigreans are an insubordinate lot and they do not even compensate for it by a display of courage.'[175]

In addition to its direct effects on recruitment, racial thinking had a number of indirect effects on recruitment and employment. One indirect effect was that racial thinking fostered the appearance of the 'native specialist' in the Horn of Africa. Major Claude Melville Browne was

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[170] TNA, WO 169/3 (Minutes of the 96th Meeting of the Joint Planning Staff held at GHQ ME, 18.8.1940, Joint Planning Middle East, Joint Planning Staff Middle East 1939 – 1940)
[171] Foot (1984) p. 185; For other examples of racially based thinking see: TNA, WO 201/309 (El Miralai & Cave Bey, Account of the Events Concerning the Equatorial Corps in Abyssinia, 6.1940-7.1941)
[172] Foot (1984) p. 185
[173] Thesiger, Wilfred, *The Life of My Choice* (London, 1987), p. 312
[174] Thesiger (1987) p. 314
[175] TNA, WO 178/36 (6.3.1941 Mahna, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section, War Diary, 9.1940- 10.4.1941)

selected to be the Q officer (logistics) for Mission 101 in no small part because he was one such 'native specialist.' Despite complete ignorance of Abyssinia and its population, he had a good general knowledge of Africa and 'understands natives and their ways.'[176] Given the widespread variation in culture across Africa, this is at best a dubious recommendation.

The records of the 2nd Ethiopian Irregulars provides a particularly striking example of the role of racial thinking in all aspects of interaction with indigenous forces in the Horn of Africa. The records include the impression of the officer commanding 2nd Ethiopians about the failure of 3rd Ethiopian Irregulars. Here the officer states that 'with the lack of a strong hand at the head the various Ethiopians started to intrigue and think they could run the unit as well as the C.O.' and once they were transferred to 2nd Ethiopians whose officers were white west Africans with experience of handling black natives 'they rendered splendid service.'[177] The white Africans' racial views were based more on assumptions about skin colour and were more negative. These racial views also received wider acceptance in the Imperial administration and became part of the prevailing narrative for much of the campaign, in which most local native forces were classified simply as *shifta* (bandits and criminals) and many of their contributions overlooked.[178] The OC 2nd Ethiopians suggested that his success came from the discipline that he was able to instil in his African forces. This he did by instituting only one punishment for the indigenous forces under his command: whipping. He justified this by stating:

> 25 lashes may sound a somewhat brutal and excessive retribution but the Ethiopian is an
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> independent individual and strict discipline was not only necessary in a unit raised and
>
> trained at short notice, but essential with a people who love intrigue and only respect a

[176] TNA, WO 201/2677 (Recommendation for Major Claude Melville Browne to be Q Officer, Organisation of Guerrilla Force for Operations in Sudan and Abyssinia)

[177] TNA, WO 201/291 (The 2nd Ethiopian Irregulars, Patriot Activities in Southern Abyssinia, 1941, Part II)

[178] TNA, WO 106/2351 (Impressions of an Officer of the West African Rifles, 1.9.1941)

firm hand…There had to be no doubt whatever that the Commanding officer and the British Officers were the masters.[179]

In his report, he went on to explain that only under such discipline could the Ethiopians be brave, disciplined, and hardworking, not to mention good fighters. This is a very different standard than was applied within in the King's African Rifles, the Sudan Defence Force or any number of other colonial formations. This might stem from the perception that Ethiopians exemplified the unrefined, bestial black soldier, with no experience of colonisation to refine them. Thus, despite significant evidence and reports of the effectiveness of the Ethiopian guerrillas known as Patriots, the South African government's official opinion of the *arbagnoch* was based on that of an officer who wrote that 'for the Abyssinian "patriots" he had nothing but dislike.[180] He said that they had been useless whenever fighting had to be done and had only been prominent in occasional brutal massacres of Italian prisoners.'[181] This is a particularly interesting observation, as there seems to be no evidence of such massacres taking place. Other reports from white African officers suggest the hyper-sexual and bestial stereotypes of un-colonised Africans. These became the basis for the British Army, and War Cabinet's official policy towards Ethiopians. For example, the War Cabinet decided that it would not be appropriate to recognise Abyssinia as an equal ally or to play the Abyssinian anthem with allied national anthems on the BBC.[182] The view effected the question of the recruitment of indigenous forces.

These same fears led to the decision not to employ indigenous forces for the occupation of Addis or for security within the allied occupied territories in Abyssinia. General Cunningham (OC 12th African Division) chose not to let patriot forces secure Addis. Instead, he decided to

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[179] TNA, TNA, WO 201/291 (The 2nd Ethiopian Irregulars, Patriot Activities in Southern Abyssinia, 1941, Part II)
[180] TNA, WO 106/2351 (Impressions of an Officer of the West African Rifles, 1.9.1941)
[181] *Ibid*
[182] TNA, CAB 65/17/12 (War Cabinet Meeting, 3.2.1941)

bar the armed Ethiopian patriots from entering the city and left the Italians armed in situ. The reason given for this was that 'there are 100,000 Ethiopians there and 40,000 Italians and we don't want a massacre or incidents as the Ethiopians will all go mad at the triumphal entry.'[183] Lt. Gen Cunningham as commander of the forces in the area later conceded that this was a mistake by writing that:

> It was satisfactory to find that my fears of lawless elements amongst the Ethiopians getting out of hand were ungrounded. The Ethiopians behaved with admirable restraint, and except for minor instances of looting, no major incidents on their part took place. Not so with the Italians, who, civilians and police alike, were in a highly nervous condition. Within the first forty-eight hours of entering the town two shooting incidents on the part of the Italians occurred; one in the prison was particularly senseless and inhuman. Here sixty-four prisoners were killed or wounded by their Italian guards without, as far as could be judged, any justification whatever.[184]

In this case, General Cunningham admitted his belief that, unlike European soldiers, Ethiopians would not be able to control themselves when capturing and that because of this mistaken belief Ethiopian civilians were murdered.

There is some evidence that reaction to Imperial racially based thinking may have influenced the decisions of the indigenous forces to cooperate. Anthony Mockler suggested that there was chaos in the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion which made them reluctant to cooperate in part because they felt maltreated by their white officers and because white officers had struck soldiers. [185] He further noted that the Ethiopian irregulars on the Kenya border had a low opinion of the South

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[183] Anthony Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War* (Oxford, 1984), p.372
[184] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)
[185] Mockler (1984) p.356

African whites, judging them 'unwilling to close'.[186] Together all of these examples demonstrate a clear pattern as to the importance of racial thinking to all aspects of indigenous-metropolitan cooperation in the Horn of Africa. In particular, this evidence confirms that racially based thinking helped determine which British officers would be involved in the decisions about cooperation creating a preference for the 'African' or 'native' expert. This had a significant impact on decisions to cooperate with indigenous forces and with which particular indigenous forces to cooperate.

Race also influenced the subsequent literature and the narrative of the campaign. According to narratives present in much of the literature, black forces drawn from colonised areas could not wait to serve the white soldiers; volunteering to carry weapons for white soldiers and volunteering to make their camps and light their fires.[187] Generalizations about ethnicity featured prominently in memoirs of those involved in the campaign, including descriptions of the decision to recruit indigenous forces in Abyssinia as well as the discussions of their effectiveness. For example, W.E.D. Allen, who was involved in the Op Centres, wrote in this regard that 'the black men have the manly stride of a young people; unspoiled by the fatigue of sophisticated generations.'[188] Later narratives also employed pseudo-anthropological explanations for the cooperation of indigenous forces in the Horn of Africa. Anthony Mockler's history of the Ethiopian campaign published in 1984, employed similar racist generalisations in describing the Gash and the indigenous forces in Ethiopia as inherently lazy when it came to war fighting.[189] Together all of this convincingly demonstrates the significant role racial and ethnically based

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[186] *Ibid* p. 325

[187] TNA, WO 106/2351 (Impressions of an Officer of the West African Rifles, 1.9.1941) – It is worth noting that this document effectively contrasts the good qualities of colonised black Africans with the generally negative impression of the uncolonised Africans for whom the author 'had nothing but dislike' and were lazy, insolent, prone to banditry, and a number of other negative qualities

[188] W.E.D. Allen, *Guerrilla War in Abyssinia* (London, 1943), p.13; For other examples see: William Platt, *The Campaign Against Italian East Africa 1940/1941: The Less Knowles Lectures Given at Cambridge University 1951*, Lecture 1, (London, 1962), p. 15

[189] Mockler (1984) p.314; For further examples see: Lunt (1981) p. 256

thinking, whether underlying or explicit, played in the thought process of the British in both the campaign in the Horn of Africa and in the secondary literature it generated.

In addition to underlying racial thinking affecting the decision to cooperate with indigenous forces in the Abyssinian campaign there were underlying imperial considerations. In particular, the question of potential embarrassment to imperial prestige was present as an undercurrent in several discussions. For Foreign Office, comparative imperial prestige was one of the primary rationales for overcoming their and Colonial Office's discomfort with supporting the rebellion in Abyssinia.[190] The personnel crisis in East Africa was acute. When Italy entered the Second World War in June 1940, the British had retreated from Dunkirk; were fighting a campaign in the western desert; and had few forces to spare for East Africa.[191] On the eve of the Second World War, the Italian Army in Abyssinia was around 300,000 strong and by July 1940, it had crossed the border into Sudan.[192] Italian war plans called for an expansion of this offensive towards the British supply centres of Gedaref and Port Sudan.[193] The SDF were the primary force opposing the Italian incursion, and they were outmanned and outgunned.[194] Across all of Sudan the crisis was acute and the British were in a desperate situation. In Eastern Sudan, Wilfred Thesiger's platoon of the SDF was 150 miles away from its nearest support which was also only of platoon strength.[195] The situation was worse in other areas of the border.[196]

As a result of the lack of personnel, the British saw cooperation with indigenous forces across the border in Abyssinia as a way to mitigate a potentially catastrophic situation. During the early

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[190] For examples of the role of Imperial considerations see: TNA, HS 3/5 (FO Telegram, Abyssinian Revolt: Obstruction from Local Authorities, 11.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); TNA, WO 169/3 (JPS Paper No. 15, British Somaliland, 6.7.1940, Joint Planning Middle East, Joint Planning Staff Middle East 1939 – 1940)

[191] Mockler (1984) p.231

[192] *Ibid* p.183; G.N.I. Morrison, *The Upper Nile and the War: 1940-1941*, (Khartoum, 1944), p. 4

[193] TNA, WO 201/258 (Plans for Operations beyond Kassala, 7.1940)

[194] Playfair, et al. (1954) p. 170

[195] TNA, WO 201/277 (War History of No. 3 Idara, Eastern Arab Corps, Sudan Defence Force, 17.5.1940-2.12.1940)

[196] See: Morrison (1944) p. 3

period of fighting in the Horn of Africa, the British looked to indigenous forces to tie down

enough Italian forces to fully occupy the enemy and prevent them from advancing on

Khartoum.[197] For MI(R) this was the primary goal of initial cooperation with the Abyssinian

indigenous forces. As MI(R)'s war diary states, the goal was to 'handicap the Italians in any

armed incursions into British territory they might contemplate.'[198] If vigorous support of

indigenous forces tied down sufficient Italian capability, the manpower crisis would be alleviated.

Additionally, the British military hoped that the indigenous forces could augment the British by

providing additional screening forces to operate as part of British formations.[199]

The manpower crisis in the Horn of Africa did not end when the British Empire went onto the

offensive. The British hoped that cooperation with indigenous forces in Abyssinia would

continue to help alleviate the lack of personnel by weakening and possibly eliminating the Italian

position without additional British military operations.[200] War Office documents and telegrams

make it clear that the lack of manpower motivated vigorous support of the rebellion in IEA.[201]

For the British another advantage of indigenous force cooperation in IEA was that casualties

among indigenous personnel in Abyssinia would not detract from the manpower available for

the global war effort. It was not only that the British forces in the Horn of Africa lacked

manpower; they lacked resources as well. As a result, in the early days of the campaign they

lacked the ability to take initiative against the enemy. General Wavell specifically cited this

shortage in his rationale for cooperating with indigenous forces, stating in a dispatch that 'the

ruling idea in my mind…was that the fomentation of the rebel movement in Abyssinia offered

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[197] TNA, HS 3/5 (FO Telegram, Abyssinian Revolt: Obstruction from Local Authorities, 11.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); TNA, HS 3/5 (Letter of Warning Re Abyssinian Situation, 1.8.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940)
[198] TNA, HS 8/263 (MI(R), MI(R) Unit War Diary, 1.1.1939-31.12.1940)
[199] TNA, WO 201/309 (El Miralai & Cave Bey, Account of the Events Concerning the Equatorial Corps in Abyssinia, 6.1940-7.1941)
[200] TNA, CO 323/1670/4 (Cypher Telegram to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo) Foreign Office, No. 341, 26.4.1939, Abyssinia Co-ordination of Arrangements to Foster Rebellion)
[201] TNA, WO 201/309 (El Miralai & Cave Bey, Account of the Events Concerning the Equatorial Corps in Abyssinia, 6.1940-7.1941)

with the resources available the best prospect of making the Italian position impossible and eventually reconquering the country.'[202] The scale and danger of the manpower and resource crisis were such that the British Empire found itself in a situation of desperation where it had little choice but to seek alternatives and the only alternative available cooperation with the indigenous forces.

The British expected that cooperation with indigenous forces would enable them to begin attacks against the Italians immediately, even when they lacked the resources to carry out the combat operations themselves.[203] The widespread area against which the indigenous forces could operate was an additional attraction. Whereas British forces could only attack Italian positions near the border, all the discussions for the use of indigenous forces implied a broader geographic intent.[204]

In Northern Ethiopia, geography dictated an additional reason to seek indigenous force cooperation. The planners of the campaign recognised that the Ethiopian escarpment largely ruled out invasion by mechanised or in some places even mounted forces.[205] Moreover, the infrastructure of Sudan could not support a major build-up of conventional forces.[206] There was little infrastructure in the Horn of Africa to support large scale troop movement for an invading army and what did exist was rendered useless during poor weather.[207] JPS ME noted that:

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[202] TNA, WO 201/311 (Wavell Dispatch on East Africa Operations, pp. 2-3, 21.5.1942); For more examples of discussion of resource availability and indigenous force cooperation see: TNA, HS 3/5 (Telegram 534, 21.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); TNA, WO 201/309 (El Miralai & Cave Bey, Account of the Events Concerning the Equatorial Corps in Abyssinia, 6.1940-7.1941); TNA, WO 201/254 (Rebel Operations in Abyssinia, 12.10.39, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-40)

[203] It is worth noting that this is roughly what occurred during March of 1940 particular 'chieftains' were selected and the day after Italy entered the war Britain began coordination with the rebels in Abyssinia. This was the realization of contingency discussed as early as the Anglo-French conference of May 1939 - Playfair, et al. (1954) pp. 182-83

[204] TNA, WO 201/254 (Rebel Operations in Abyssinia, 12.10.39, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-40)

[205] Platt (1962), Lecture 1, p. 4

[206] *Ibid* pp. 6-7

[207] *Ibid*

The JPS consider that the general policy for dealing with Italian East Africa should be one of "nibbling" and guerilla warfare assisted by air operations and small columns. It is considered uneconomical to stage large scale land operations against an enemy occupying, in considerable force, a country particularly for defensive operations owing to the difficult nature of the ground.[208]

The JPS ME understood that the very terrain factors that restricted British operations in Italian East Africa gave advantage to those engaged in guerilla warfare.[209] When combined with the inability to supply large British concentrations on the border this meant that at least on the Northern Ethiopian front, there was little choice but to cooperate with indigenous forces.

Necessity is not only the mother of invention, in the Horn of Africa it was the mother of cooperation. All of the motivations underlying the decision discussed, other than race, imperial prestige, and experience with guerrilla warfare, were functions of necessity. From the British perspective, the manpower crises and lack of resources meant that the way forward in East Africa involved deploying indigenous forces. The terrain of Northern Ethiopia reinforced this thinking. Eventually Britain might have been able to build up enough force to conquer IEA without the cooperation of indigenous forces, but the strategic situation made this extremely risky. Thus, despite some opposition to indigenous force cooperation, the cost of not cooperating would have been too high. In this way necessity acted as a negative inducement that prevented non-cooperation. Therefore as both a positive and negative inducement, necessity was the key motivator.

One additional compelling argument advanced by those wishing to cooperate with indigenous forces in the Horn of Africa was that guerrilla warfare had been effective in the past. Guerrilla

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[208] TNA, WO 169/3 (Minutes from the 69th Meeting of the Joint Planning Staff held at GHQ ME, 17.6.1940, Joint Planning Middle East, Joint Planning Staff Middle East, 1939 – 1940)
[209] Allen, (1943), p. 19

warfare without the support of regular armies had tied down significant numbers of conventional forces in years preceding the campaign in places like Ireland, the Palestine Mandate, and Kurdistan.[210] The desire to employ an operational style and tactic that had so troubled the British Empire against its enemies would have been compelling to those who had experienced the rebellions or knew of their effects. The organisational mission of some organisations, such MI(R), included cooperation with indigenous forces; thus, when the potential of a campaign in East Africa emerged they looked towards indigenous forces as solutions.[211] Their motivation for cooperation was built into their organisational DNA and was part of their *weltanschauung*.

At the beginning of the cooperation, the British goal for the indigenous forces was to raise a general rebellion. This was, therefore, also the primary objective for Mission 101. As the *arbagnoch* were already attempting to do just that, the question was not whether to cooperate with the *arbagnoch* but with which leaders to cooperate. If necessity was responsible for the decision to employ indigenous forces, then availability drove the choice of partners, at least in early phases of the campaign and planning. Before cooperation began, the British created a list of 'chiefs' and leaders to approach.[212] What is striking about this list is that it is less a list arranged by desirability - there are no such comments within the document – and more a list that contained all the major *arbagnoch* leaders in the areas proximate to the Sudanese border.[213] This is not to say that the British had not planned to identify the most desirable leaders – it is entirely possible that the proximate major leaders (those with the most influence) were also the most desirable.[214] If this were the case, then it suggests that for the British and Mission 101 a combination of availability

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[210] TNA, HS 3/5 (FO Telegram, Abyssinian Revolt: Obstruction from Local Authorities, 11.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940)

[211] MI(R) and their French counterparts in the 2éme Bureau shared plans for this contingency well before Italy had entered the war – TNA, HS 8/263 (MI(R), MI(R) Unit War Diary, 1.1.1939-31.12.1940)

[212] TNA, WO 201/271 (G.H.Q. Middle East Operation Instruction, No. 1, 10.6.1940, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, Plan X Correspondence, 9.1939 -9.1940)

[213] TNA, WO 201/271 (Plan X, Plan for Assistance to the Rebels in Abyssinia on an Outbreak of War with Italy, Plan X correspondence 9.1939-9.1940)

[214] TNA, WO 201/254 (Military HQ Middle East, Cairo, Preparation of Plans for Raising Tribes, 12.10.1939, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-1940)

and influence was desirable. Even when later attempts were made to identify *arbagnoch* leaders

with whom to cooperate elsewhere in the country, the only recorded selection criteria was

whether they were active.[215]

These selection criteria suggest that Mission 101, and the War Office and special services

planners that preceded Mission 101, sought to cooperate with those who could best help them

achieve their operational goal. This goal--to raise as much rebellion as possible, keep the Italians

busy and distracted--was general. It did not require the indigenous forces to possess specific

skills or resources. All it required was that the indigenous forces were available for cooperation

and active opposition to the Italians. In this early period, British selection criteria for cooperation

reflected this reality. Although the British initially contacted particular *arbagnoch* leaders, it seems

any major or minor leaders who came for supplies and liaison were well received and aided.[216]

Despite this Mission 101 was not able to cooperate with all the *arbagnoch*. There was an additional

determination. Cooperation with some indigenous forces ruled out cooperation with others. In

the first instance by siding with Emperor Haile Selassie and the Amhara ethnic group, Mission

101 made cooperation with the Emperor's enemies and the Oromo significantly less likely. Pro-

Oromo British officers had attempted to stand in the way of cooperation with the Amhara and

the Emperor. However, the establishment of Mission 101 cemented the relationship between the

British and the Amhara.[217] The question is to why the Mission 101 chose to back one faction of

an ethnic group as opposed to another. A simple explanation can be found in that, the *arbagnoch*

near the Sudanese border were in many cases Amhara or Tigre as were those most active in

opposing the Italians in the North and Central areas of Abyssinia. As a feudal noble class, the

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[215] TNA, WO 201/254 (Notes on the Abyssinian Rising to be Brought About in the Event of a War with Italy, 13.3.40, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa 1939-40)

[216] TNA, HS 3/5 (M.I.(R), Summary of Present Position with regard to Abyssinia, 6.8.1940, SOE Abyssinia, No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); TNA, WO 201/277 (War History of No. 3 Idara, Eastern Arab Corps, Sudan Defence Force, 17.5.1940-2.12.1940); TNA, CO 847/22/20 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, 21.11.1941, Situation Report, 12-18.11.1941, OETA Abyssinia II); TNA, WO 178/36 (101 Abyssinia Northern Section, War Diary 9.1940-10.4.1941)

[217] Mockler (1984) p.163

Amhara and those associated with the Emperor had the ability to mobilise resources and people through their followers and tenants.[218] However, there is more to the story. Some of those involved in Mission 101 and the later Op Centres, who insisted on the participation of Haile Selassie, had personal connections to the Emperor.[219] In the case of Sandford especially, his relationship with the Emperor may have contributed to his decision to disregard those who said that the Ethiopians opposed Selasie's return, leading to the alignment of the British and Haile Selasie. This alignment of the British and the Emperor served as an additional *de facto* mechanism for identifying indigenous forces with which the British cooperated.

As a result of the British alliances, some locals were not only non-cooperative but openly hostile and aided the Italians.[220] This also happened among the *arbagnoch*. At times *arbagnoch* leaders refused to cooperate if the British also cooperated with a rival leader.[221] Thus choosing one leader could greatly diminish the possibility of working with another. Neither case was one of active selection by the British. Mission 101 would not refuse to work with a given leader; rather if an *arbagnoch* leader was hostile to the Emperor or felt the British were allied to a rival, the leader might rebuff British approaches.

With the advent of the Op Centres in November 1940, the goal of the operation evolved and changed. It was no longer simply trying to promote rebellion. There was an additional operational goal of aiding in the land invasion by the British Empire. During the Op Centre period, the British would accept help from any who offered but would only provide backing for those they deemed effective in carrying out their desired operational activities.[222] In effect, this added a new selection criterion; the British began to choose partners based on an established

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[218] For discussion of the feudal system in Ethiopia see: Gene Ellis, 'The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14:2, (1976), pp. 275-295
[219] Mockler (1984) pp.13-14
[220] TNA, WO 201/291 (Maj. R.D. Neville, Royal Artillery, Report Part II, Patriot Activities in Southern Abyssinia, 1941, Part II)
[221] TNA, WO 178/36 (101 Abyssinia Northern Section, War Diary, 9.1940-10.4.1941)
[222] Sykes (1959) p. 291; Foot (1984) p. 216

track record of success. Whether operating under the more specific criteria of the Op Centre system or the more general approach of Mission 101, the British continuously chose to cooperate with those forces that they believed could fulfil the operational requirements that spurred indigenous force cooperation in the first place. However, as always, these decisions were coloured by the understandings and assumptions that the British officers brought with them.

A lack of suitable imperial manpower and local knowledge necessitated that the British employ indigenous forces in IEA. These needs and the imperative of necessity were the primary reasons that British cooperated with indigenous forces in the region. The reasons for cooperation with specific groups reflected this primary motivation. However, the prior assumptions, especially surrounding race, of the officers in charge of indigenous force arrangements, coloured the determination as to which groups could best achieve operational objectives. In the end, necessity proved paramount and although it may have been possible to select additional groups for cooperation, those selected were chosen for their perceived ability to answer the requirements that drove the decision to cooperate in the first place.

Comparative Findings

There were clearly a number of differences between the particulars of the Imperial situation and rationales for cooperation with indigenous forces in the two cases. However, a comparison of Imperial motivations for indigenous force cooperation reveals some underlying factors. In both cases, pre-existing ideas, based on beliefs about race and physical anthropology had a profound effect on the decisions surrounding the employment of indigenous forces. It affected the decision to cooperate with indigenous forces and the choice of indigenous forces with which the British would cooperate. This type of thinking was a hallmark of the Imperial-indigenous relationship. The metropole projected an image of the indigene onto the indigene and then understood the indigene through the lens of this projection. The British imperial personnel used

such projections as a way to understand the situation in which they found themselves and as a basis for their decisions.

At the most basic level, the reasons that the Imperial authorities decided to cooperate with indigenous forces were the same in both cases. In both Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa, the various Imperial actors were primarily driven to cooperation by necessity and the need for the manpower augmentation. What the British needed in each case differed in each case and changed overtime within each case. Moreover, the specifics of the necessity, determined the form that cooperation took. In both cases, desperation and necessity muted the opposition to cooperation; when the British feelings of desperation and necessity dampened, the drive to cooperate similarly quieted.

The British also favoured cooperation because of the financial and resource savings, special knowledge, and special abilities the indigenous forces offered. In some regards, what constituted special knowledge, such as familiarity with the local terrain (or in the case of the *Saison* the human terrain), was the same in both cases. In a sense, the idea of special abilities was also the same in both cases. In both cases special abilities were the capabilities held by the indigenous forces that were beneficial to the operations envisioned by the British and were not otherwise readily available. In Palestine Mandate, this meant capabilities such as the ability to blend into the local population or the perceived natural talents for subversion. In the Horn of Africa, special abilities included what the British perceived to be an innate suitability for guerrilla warfare and a tolerance of hot climates. In both cases, the British faced a critical manpower and resource shortage when they began cooperation. In both, indigenous forces provided a ready solution.

There were some differences in the makeup and arguments of those in opposition to cooperation in the respective cases. For example, the openly racially based opposition to cooperation present in the Horn of Africa was all but absent in Palestine Mandate (though some of the political opposition there had more than a whiff of anti-Semitism about it). However, as

much as there were differences, there were similarities. In both cases, organisational affiliation affected receptiveness to cooperation. Those organisations whose mandate included cooperation, such as the Special Services, were - overall - more willing to cooperate. Those in organisations less focused on the war and more traditionally tasked with the long-term viability and stability of the British Empire tended to be more resistant. In addition, it seems that, with the exception of some of those from 12 African Division, those who operated in close proximity to the cooperative structures viewed cooperation more favourably than those who worked at a middle distance in the various regional headquarters.

It was not only in the decision to cooperate with indigenous forces that there were commonalities among the cases. There were commonalities in the decisions as to with which indigenous forces to cooperate. Both cases centred on a cost-benefit analysis. This analysis centred not on overall cost and benefit, but on the gauging the relative cost of working with a given indigenous force against whether the force could fulfil the requirement that brought the British into cooperation in the first place. Once the British made this decision, the additional benefits of cooperation reinforced it. These additional benefits served as bonus incentives, motivating further cooperation. However, in both cases the decision to cooperate was not solely a simple cost-benefit analysis. There were other factors at play, such as previous experience with the indigenous forces, the indigenous forces' willingness to cooperate, and the proximity or availability of the indigenous forces. In both cases, there was the added aspect of personal opinion. In both Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa there was a strong movement to turn to so called local experts – each of whom had factions or local political objectives they supported.

In both cases, once the decision to cooperate with a given indigenous force was made, it ruled out cooperation with some of their rivals. Thus, after the commencement of cooperation British were unlikely to switch from cooperating with the *Haganah* to its rivals or from the Amhara to

the Oromo. This in part reflected local politics but also reflected growing trust. The more the British cooperated with a given indigenous force, the more they trusted its ability to fulfil British objectives. This helped motivate the British to continue to maintain cooperation with the particular indigenous forces. Overall, the case comparison suggests that the motivations for cooperation were complex with many contributing factors. However, among the various factors, necessity and desperation were the prime drivers for cooperation, although the decisions were deeply influenced by British perceptions about the populations from which the indigenous forces were drawn.

Signing On: Why Indigenous Forces Cooperated

Palestine Mandate

The *Haganah*'s cooperation with the British does not resemble that of the colonial forces considered in the vast majority of studies. In the indigenous force schemes, the British did not recruit the members of the *Haganah* into conventional imperial forces formations nor did they recruit the members of the *Haganah* into the schemes as individuals. Rather, the *Haganah* entered into the schemes as a whole, autonomous organisation, more as an ally than a colonised people. Without either the coercive force or the financial incentives of an actual government organisation, the *Haganah* relied on its membership to either accept discipline or volunteer for cooperative schemes when ordered into them. Therefore, to understand the participation of the *Haganah* in the indigenous force schemes, it is necessary to investigate both parts of the equation. Once it made the organisational decision to cooperate, the *Haganah* also faced the decision of which British Imperial organisation to engage. Each stage in the process reflected *Haganah's* independent agency and motivations. Thus, not only must the decision to cooperate be considered, but the discrimination among organisations must also be addressed in order to consider the broader question of the paramilitaries' motivations in serving as an irregular indigenous force.

The *Haganah* was a broad organisation that encompassed several political factions, each with its own motivations and goals. Despite the multiplicity of factions, actual decision-making was often effectively limited to a few individuals. An old Israeli joke illustrates this: when Ben Gurion wanted to consult his cabinet, he looked between his left and right ear. In the case of the *Haganah*, despite cumbersome decision-making structures and deliberative councils, a few

individuals who often occupied no significant formal position held actual authority. This authority manifested in informal power arrangements and secondary structures.[223]

There seems to have been a tendency within many levels of the *Haganah* leadership to develop similar arrangements, which by-passed the various formal decision bodies in favour of informal relationships.[224] The tremendous influence wielded by Eliyahu Golomb provides an example of effective authority outside of the *Haganah* structure. Golomb, one of the founding members of the *Haganah*, lacked a formal position in its command structure. Nevertheless, most field commanders regarded him as the ultimate authority on policy, circumventing or ignoring national command entirely.[225] Familial, political, and community ties among much of the senior leadership worsened this tendency.[226] Yet many of those who were to lead in the cooperative units, especially of the *Palmach*, fell outside these networks and instead worked within other informal networks. To understand the motivations of the *Haganah* in the decision to enter irregular cooperation is thus to attempt to understand the thinking of these diverse and difficult individuals. Scholars of the *Yishuv* generally explain the cooperation through one of several narrative tropes.

The first and perhaps most popular narrative emphasises the agency of the *Haganah* in the relationship and the benefits the organisation hoped to achieve by working with Imperial forces. The narrative centres on the idea that, for the *Haganah*, the primary motivation for cooperation was the benefits cooperation could convey. Within this narrative there are two subcategories of explanation: those that emphasise the direct benefits – training, material, official sanction, etc. – and those that identify more indirect benefits, such as positively influencing British public

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[223] Yehuda Bauer, 'From Cooperation to Resistance: the Haganah 1938–1946', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 3 (1966), pp. 188-191

[224] *Ibid*

[225] *Ibid*

[226] *Ibid*

opinion against the White Paper.[227] A document that appears to have been authored by the Jewish Agency and sent to the British Government late in the war supports this second subcategory, to a limited extent. The document states:

> …the nationally conscious Jews, and in particular Palestine Jewry, expected to go through this war as a people, in close and active collaboration with Great Britain. Had they "ulterior motives" of their own? Most certainly – like every people which fights: they were thinking of their national future…They hoped that their readiness to fight on any front on which Great Britain was engaged would count in their favour – as it would in the case of any other nation.[228]

The same document also suggests that this was not the primary motive for the leadership of the Jewish Agency. It implies that the primary goal of cooperation was 'to serve the common cause.'[229] In a document intended for the British Government, the more high-minded references to a 'common cause' simply might be propaganda to benefit the 'national future.' This explanation also might apply to the *Haganah*'s activities during the *Saison*. Yehuda Bauer proffered such an explanation, stating that the 'realization that the slender political gains of the two previous years might easily be swept away undoubtedly contributed to decisions by both Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Ben Gurion to co-operate with the British police in fighting the Irgun.'[230]

There are problems in applying this explanation to the *Haganah*'s search for opportunities to engage in irregular warfare cooperation with the British. Cooperating as an irregular force could not achieve the same level of publicity as public demonstrations of cooperation, such as providing recruits for the British military. Cooperation with the SOE, by definition, could be neither in the public eye nor known to the majority of policy makers. By 1939, working through

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[227] For example of this narrative see: Bauer (1966) p. 192
[228] TNA, WO 259/83 (Report on Palestine Jewry: Service and Recruiting, Palestine Policy and Hagana, 1944)
[229] *Ibid*
[230] Bauer (1966) p. 203

the JSP/*Notrim* scheme had proven non-remunerative towards this end. It also seems somewhat unlikely that irregular warfare cooperation, at least with the SOE, was a natural outgrowth of the broader policy of cooperation. The *Haganah*'s enthusiastic approach to the SOE was separate from the *Haganah*'s attempts to volunteer its members for the British military. All this seems to indicate that while indirect political benefits were potentially a motivation for entering irregular cooperation, it is unlikely that political benefits were the primary motivation.

The subcategory of the benefit based motivational explanation that centres on direct benefits is more compelling. According to this explanation, the *Haganah* entered indigenous force cooperation, to receive material benefits and training. This view matches the view of some quarters of the British administration at the time.[231] As Yehuda Bauer noted in his history of the *Haganah*, even late in the war, 'the idea that the future Jewish State should remain part of the British Empire was widely held, except in extreme left-wing circles.'[232] Three interviewees referred to capability increases as the reason they entered into the units in which they served. One who served in the Royal Navy stated that he was ordered to volunteer for that particular branch because 'one day we'll have a state, which has an enormous length of shore, and the obvious way to guard this shore is to have an aircraft carrier patrolling up and down, you don't need airports you have everything on the ship.'[233] Significantly, none of these interviewees entered into units from Palestine until post-1943 and none of them served in a local capacity.[234] The units in which they served were destined for service abroad.[235]

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[231] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H224, Report to A/D3, 28.9.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for September 1942, 6.10.42, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943)

[232] Bauer (1966) p.206

[233] Interview with Sarah Bravermen Schpachner (Surikah), 11.1.2010; Interview with Zvi Avidror, 4.8.2010

[234] Interview with Sarah Bravermen Schpachner (Surikah), 11.1.2010; Interview with Zvi Avidror, 4.8.2010; Interview with Anton Terkovsky, 20.9.2010

[235] Interview with Sarah Bravermen Schpachner (Surikah), 11.1.2010; Interview with Zvi Avidror, 4.8.2010; Interview with Anton Terkovsky, 20.9.2010

There is no doubt that the *Haganah* received such benefits from its participation in irregular indigenous force schemes. Those who participated in cooperative units received training and arms from the British.[236] In the case of the special units, such as the German Unit, the training was quite high level.[237] Units, such as the Arab Unit, established as part of the cooperation, continued to operate through the 1948 War. During cooperation, the *Haganah* was also encouraged to carry out detailed reconnaissance of Palestine Mandate and was able to use the JSP/*Notrim* to augment this mission. Most importantly, the various cooperative schemes included training instructors who could spread the knowledge gained from the cooperative units throughout the cadres of the *Haganah*. Cooperation resulted in official cover for *Haganah* training and material build-up. All of these benefits were important to the post-war development of the *Haganah* and had an impact on its post-war activities.[238] The narrative of direct benefit can also explain cooperation during the *Saison* as it allowed the *Haganah* to bring the IZL to heel. After the *Saison*, the *Haganah* was unquestionably the dominant paramilitary in Palestine Mandate with an effective capability of either functionally destroying its rivals or allowing them to run rampant. As a result of the *Saison* and the JSP/*Notrim* scheme, as well as other schemes, the *Haganah* thoroughly infiltrated the British security establishment.[239] This is both a compelling narrative and in light of post-war realities, a convenient narrative.

Within six months of the end of the war in Europe, the *Yishuv* and the British Empire were in a state of open war in which the *Haganah* employed the training, tactics, and some of the equipment gained from its cooperation. The warfare confirmed the worst fears of those in the British Empire who had opposed cooperation and likely was something of an embarrassment for

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[236] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010 – although Horowitz stated this explicitly in was referred to in principle by all interviewees

[237] Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010; Interview with Hayim Miller, 3.9.2010

[238] Several interviewees referred to or implied the utility in the post-Second World War period of skill sets gained in sabotage and infiltration

[239] TNA, WO 259/83 (ULTRA Intelligence: Jewish Military Organizations in Palestine, 25.1.1944, Palestine Policy and Hagana, 1944)

those who had supported it. The development of a narrative in which the *Haganah* was particularly devious and clever and took advantage of honest British attempts at cooperation, a narrative which was in concert with British racial stereotypes of Jews, is then certainly understandable. For the Jewish Agency and leadership of the *Haganah*, the development of this narrative also made political sense. Given the antipathy that developed between the *Yishuv* and the British at the end of the war, a history of open and close cooperation might have proven as embarrassing for the *Haganah* as for the British.

Yoav Gelber, an Israeli historian who has conducted extensive research into the *Yishuv* during the Second World War, suggests another plausible motivation quite distinct from the benefit driven narrative: fear. For Gelber, the fear originated in concerns about facing renewed Arab revolts without sufficient British protection.[240] Several shocks gave the *Yishuv* a fresh motivation for cooperation following this initial fear. The first air raids against Palestine immediately followed the fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war. These air raids, at least from the *Yishuv*'s perspective, caused considerable damage to Haifa and Tel Aviv and created a feeling of imminent threat among the population.[241] According to Gelber, 'the reverse on the fronts (1941) took the *Yishuv* by surprise', especially when combined with news of the coup d'état in Iraq and reports of Axis propaganda spreading among the Arab population of Palestine.[242] Gelber suggested that each event contributed to an atmosphere of concern among all levels of the *Yishuv*, from the general population to the top leadership.[243] Almost as soon as the crises of 1941 passed, the more acute crises of 1942 began. Ronald Zweig explained that:

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[240] Yoav Gelber, 'The Defense of Palestine in World War II', *Studies in Zionism: Politics, Society, Culture*, no. 1 (1987), p.52

[241] Nir Arielli, "Haifa is still Burning': Italian, German and French Air Raids on Palestine during the Second World War', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 3 (2010), pp. 331-347, 331

[242] Yoav Gelber, 'The Defense of Palestine in World War II', *Studies in Zionism: Politics, Society, Culture*, no. 1 (1987), p.58

[243] *Ibid*

Elaborate military withdrawal plans were also drawn up in the event of the collapse of

the British defense of Egypt and Palestine, and in Palestine extensive arrangements were

made, in full cooperation with the Jewish Agency, for a scorched-earth policy which

would have destroyed *everything* other than essential water supplies and stocks of food.

These plans, developed in the crisis of mid-1942, have an aura of seriousness and

immediacy about them which the plans of 1941 lacked. The Palestine Government began

preparing dumps of food, water and petrol along the desert route to Basra for the use of

the British civilians leaving Palestine…[244]

The highly visible nature of these plans would have increased the level of anxiety within the

Yishuv. Each increase in fear corresponded with an increase in the level of indigenous force

cooperation. The correlation between the level of cooperation and crises could have as much to

do with British fears as with those of the *Yishuv*. As previously established, the British were more

likely to cooperate with the *Yishuv* during perceived emergencies. However, the narrative of fear-

driven motivation fails to provide sufficient explanation for later cooperation, especially the

Saison.

There is one other recurring explanation for the *Haganah*'s decision to take part in indigenous

force cooperation--a strong desire to win the war. Yehuda Bauer quoted a British officer in

describing this motivation by stating the *Yishuv* 'could scarcely do otherwise than give immediate

support to the enemies of their German persecutors, and hope for better things in the future.'[245]

The *Yishuv* had a large population of German and Austrian Jews who had emigrated because of

Nazi persecutions and had already lost family members at the hands of the Nazis. By 1942,

reports of the genocide circulated among the general population of the *Yishuv* and by November

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[244] Ronald Zweig, 'British Plans for the Evacuation of Palestine in 1941–1942', *Studies in Zionism: Politics, Society, Culture*, 2 (1983), pp. 296-297
[245] Bauer (1966) p. 191

of that year, eyewitnesses had returned from Poland and Germany and filled in even more horrific details.[246] For some members of the *Haganah* the desire to fight the Nazis was an important aspect of their motivation for volunteering.[247] It is hard to imagine a situation in which the membership of either paramilitary would not allow them to cooperate in the war effort, especially after the reality of the Holocaust became widely known among the *Yishuv*. This is reflected in the fact that, even at the height of its rebellion, the political organisation with which the IZL was associated continued to encourage supporters to join the British Army and many did.[248] These facts lend themselves to two lines of reasoning. First, the *Haganah* leadership felt it was critical to contribute to the defeat of Germany in any way possible, or second, the membership of the paramilitaries wanted to fight the Nazis and would not tolerate perceived opposition to the war effort. Such logic also indicates why the IZL revolt justified its revolt as part of an effort to aid the remnants of European Jewry.[249] These lines of reasoning all come to the same point – that there was a strong desire to get into the war. This could explain why the *Haganah* entered into indigenous force cooperation. Such cooperation was all that was on offer. If this were the case, then cooperation stemmed from an overlap of opportunity and proximity. The British were local and fighting the Nazis locally and indigenous force schemes represented an easy road into the war.

None of the narratives completely account for the organisational decision to enter cooperation as an indigenous force across the entirety of the war. It is more likely that all the narratives are to some extent correct. All the motivations played a part in the decision. It seems likely that the relative importance of the various motivations shifted throughout the course of the war.

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[246] Yoav Gelber, 'The Mission of the Jewish Parachutists from Palestine in Europe in World War II', *Studies in Zionism: Politics, Society, Culture*, 1 (1986), p. 51
[247] Also see: Yoav Gelber, 'Central European Jews from Palestine in the British Forces', *Leo Beck Institute Yearbook,* (1990), pp. 321-332
[248] TNA, WO 33/2401 (GSO2 MI2(a), Who's Who of Palestine: Jewish Politicians and Personalities, 9.1944)
[249] Interview with Joseph (Yoskeh) Nachmias, 26.8.2010

However, motivations, such as the desire to fight Germany, either due to internal pressure or out of sense that it was right, were always of consequence.

The question of with which organisations the *Haganah* would cooperate and in what fashion is a linked but separate question. The desire for additional benefits from cooperation did not determine whether the *Haganah* entered cooperation, but it may have shaped how it cooperated and with whom. Serving as an indigenous force in cooperation with the SOE conveyed many benefits to the *Haganah*. Cooperation provided training, arms, finances, and sanction, while at the same time minimising the exposure of the *Haganah* – something that greatly concerned the *Haganah* in all cooperative agreements.[250] An incident in 1942, when the SOE could not provide promised financial resources in a timely manner, illustrates the importance of receiving additional benefit. At the time, the *Haganah* indicated that it was willing to pull out of the indigenous force cooperation and shift their personnel into other defence-related work – a credible threat.[251] Cooperation in the JSP/*Notrim* schemes provided similar benefits in terms of training (though not at so high a level) and official cover of paramilitary activities. It also had the previously mentioned benefit of allowing infiltration of the security establishment. Additionally, both the JSP/*Notrim* schemes and the various SOE schemes allowed the paramilitaries to take part in the war effort while keeping a significant percentage of their forces in the region.

For the *Haganah*, the JSP/*Notrim* (and related Coast/Air Watch) scheme, as well the guide scheme, were already known to the paramilitaries from pre-war experience - they had previously calculated the risks and benefits and found them favourable. It was as much a part of standard crisis response for the *Haganah* to take part in these schemes as it was for the Palestine Government to expand them. The SOE and its precursors also had a special appeal for the

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[250] TNA, HS 3/207 (Notes on Activities in Palestine, Autumn 1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); Interview Shlomo Tivishi, 8.8.2010

[251] TNA, HS 3/207 (Telegram from Cairo, 11.7.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H271, Telegram to AD/H, 12.07.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

Haganah; they shared a similar way of thinking and a focus on combat as well as an emphasis on informal processes. By 1942, the *Haganah* and SOE had developed a good working relationship and the SOE had shown itself willing to help the *Haganah* and the Jewish Agency in other matters.[252] Such activity would have made the *Haganah* more willing to continue to cooperate with the SOE in its schemes, most of which, due to the nature of the SOE, centred on the *Haganah* acting as an indigenous force. For the *Haganah* the organisational motivations for cooperating as an indigenous force with the British were similar to the reasons the various Imperial organisations chose to cooperate with the paramilitaries; they were able to fulfil their primary objectives within the context of the war and offer additional benefits for the organisations involved. Unlike the British organisations, the *Haganah* lacked coercive or remunerative abilities towards their membership. Therefore, the reasons their members chose to enter such cooperative arrangements is equally significant as members always had the ability to refuse. The reasons for cooperation did not result only from organisational agency but were a product of an aggregate of individual agencies influenced by factors such as culture, experience, and identity

It is almost impossible to map the specific motivations for individual decisions, especially in as large and diverse a population as the *Yishuv*. The narratives of the reasons and processes by which interviewees came to be in cooperative units share a number of revealing commonalities made all the more interesting as they were to a large extent shared by a control group of those who did not join such units. Individuals fell into two categories – those who were ordered into cooperative units and those who volunteered for them. In the first category, the recruits perceived entering into such units as an extension of their paramilitary service. Although this was to some extent true for those in the second category, additional factors were often involved in unit selection. In both categories, the process was quite similar for those who went into the

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[252] HS 3/210 (A/D3, Cipher to D/HV, 6.12.1942, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)

regular British forces. For those who fell into the first group, a further level of explanation is required. Why was paramilitary discipline so effective, especially when there is little evidence that paramilitaries had any track record of enforcement at that historical juncture?[253]

In the case of some interviewees, there is an added linguistic complexity in determining to which group they belonged. In Hebrew, there are two words which can mean 'to volunteer'. The first is להתנדב which directly translated means 'to volunteer'. This word was rarely used by the interviewees and does not seem to have been in common usage during the Second World War period, nor is it commonly used in a military context. The word להתגייס has the multiple meanings of 'to enlist', 'to recruit', 'to draft', 'to volunteer' in a military context, or 'to conscript'. The common use of this word lends a certain amount of ambiguity to the question of whether the interviewees perceived that they were ordered into a given unit. In some cases, it was not possible to achieve further clarification through the interview. The fact that in most cases Hebrew was not the interviewees' first language further complicated the situation. In many cases, the events the interviewees described took place in close proximity to their arrival in Palestine, so it is entirely possible that they translated the Hebrew into a more specific word in their original language. Whatever the original speaker may have intended may not have been what the interviewee received. Therefore, this section employs a higher standard of evidence and only considers testimony when the interviewee provided additional clarification or employed no ambiguous language. Such a standard is essential as this section relies on individual impressions and testimonies can rarely be corroborated even in principle, by archival and secondary source documents.

Those who received orders to enlist in units fell into two categories – those who fulfilled general orders as part of a quota and those who were specifically ordered into a given unit. Avraham Rabinov is one of those who fell into the second category. A member of the *Haganah*, Rabinov

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[253] Except perhaps in the case of switching to a rival paramilitary

received orders to join the HISH.[254] He requested permission to join the British Army but instead was ordered to join a company of the HISH based at the Technion Institute of Technology preparing for the defence of Palestine in the case of an Axis invasion.[255] After El Alamein, the unit collectively enlisted in the British Army. However, Rabinov received orders from his commanders to enlist in the JSP instead.[256] Significantly, he could have enlisted in the British Army without the *Haganah*'s authorisation and in defiance of orders, but for Rabinov, the orders were binding. The *Haganah* did not always deny permission. Several interviewees, such as Alex Ziloni, were not only granted leave from their units but also approved to leave the country altogether.[257] That the petitioners deemed such approval necessary demonstrates the seriousness with which they approached paramilitary discipline. This is not to say that it was impossible to refuse such orders. Yonah Hatzor was the only interviewee who did so. Hatzor refused several direct orders not to enlist in the British Army and, as a result of his continued refusal to obey, finally received permission.[258] In a similar vein, Mordechai Ayalon found the *Palmach* a bad fit and left, without orders or permission, to join the British Army.[259] Ayalon testified that this was not uncommon for those who were unhappy in their units. That in neither case was there any form of sanction nor negative consequence for those who disobeyed orders or left their units reinforces the point that adherence to paramilitary orders was fundamentally a personal decision.

While many responded to direct orders, more seem to have responded to quota orders. Those who were members of the Kibbutz movement found themselves subject to an evolving series of quotas. By 1942, the Kibbutz movement established mandatory quotas for each kibbutz to fill

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[254] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010
[255] *Ibid*
[256] *Ibid*
[257] Interview with Alex Zielony, 24.8.2010
[258] Interview with Yonah Hatzor, 3.8.2010
[259] Interview with Mordechi Ayalon, 12.9.2010

for the British (or for US citizens, American) Army, the *Palmach*, and the JSP/*Notrim*.[260] The movement repeated such drafts throughout the War. Universities and other Jewish Agency affiliated associations had similar quotas. Those who entered units through this pathway maybe seen as volunteers, yet most interviewees from this category perceived themselves as conscripts.[261] In this manner, because they viewed themselves as conscripts, those who responded to quotas were also acting under paramilitary discipline.

In addition to those ordered into units, many volunteered. Some had personal reasons for volunteering, while others were responding to what they viewed as an organised societal imperative. Undoubtedly, in each case, there were complex motivations for joining and most individuals likely had a variety of motivations operating at different levels of consciousness, including those basic motivations identified by Richard Holmes in seminal work *Acts of War*, such as self-testing and testing one's courage and masculinity.[262] Many of those who volunteered for personal reasons had family in Nazi occupied Europe and in some cases had themselves suffered under the Nazis. Avraham Benyoseph had already lost a brother and 'knew what the war was about' when he volunteered. Both Yonah Hatzor's parents had been murdered by the Nazis immediately before he arrived in Palestine in 1939.[263]

The marching song of the German Unit reflects personal identification with the war. The song, a mixture of humour and seriousness, concludes with the line 'צוררינו את גרמניה', which translated means 'Germany you are our enemy.'[264] In Hebrew there are two words commonly translated as enemy, צר and אויב. However, there are differences between the two. Whereas אויב refers more

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[260] Interview with Avraham Benyoseph, 19.8.2010; Interview with Jackie Nachlieli, 19.8.2010; Interview with Sarah Bravermen Schpachner (Surikah), 11.1.2010; Interview with Yonah Hatzor, 3.8.2010; Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010

[261] Interview with Avraham Benyoseph, 19.8.2010; Interview with Jackie Nachlieli, 19.8.2010; Interview with Sarah Bravermen Schpachner (Surikah), 11.1.2010; Interview with Yonah Hatzor, 3.8.2010; Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010

[262] For more on this see: Richard Holmes, *Acts of War* (London, 1985).

[263] Interview with Avraham Benyoseph, 19.8.2010; Interview with Yonah Hatzor, 3.8.2010; Avraham Silverstein 'wanted to kill Nazis' - Interview with Avraham Silverstein, 4.1.2010

[264] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010

directly to 'enemy' in a general context, in this context צר (צוררינו) implies a more personal

enemy, one who wishes the destruction of each Jewish person.[265] Such an individualised

characterisation in a unit marching song both reflects and reinforces the sentiments expressed by

some of the interviewees. The war was personal. Their motivation for volunteering for the war in

general and cooperative units in particular stemmed in part from such feelings.

No interviewees expressed a personal imperative as a primary motivation. Pressure to volunteer

came from the Jewish Agency and, given the paramilitarised nature of the *Yishuv*, it could exert

this pressure through a variety of means. The interviewees perceived that the Jewish Agency had

made the decision as to when it was time to enlist and put effective pressure on the population

to carry out this decision.[266] This created a general culture of volunteering in some capacity for

the war effort and a situation in which it was 'very hard to get a date' if you did not.[267] The

pressure was eventually self-perpetuating; as more of the population volunteered, it became less

acceptable and lonelier not to enlist in something.[268] The overall societal pressure to volunteer

motivated members of the *Yishuv* into diverse patterns of service, including cooperative units.[269]

Basic motivations explain, to some extent, why individuals ended up in various military or

cooperative units but (with the exception of following orders) fail to explain how individuals

came to the specific units in which they served. Members of the German Unit received

notification of its existence while part of the *Haganah* or *Palmach* and were recruited into it from

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[265] צר comes from a root word meaning to besiege it then seems to have developed the implication to destroy entirely. צר is used in a classical rabbinic to refer an attacking enemy serious enough to justify holy war, it is also worth noting that among the interviewees צר was used to refer to the Germans but not the Arabs either in the context of the Arab Revolt or the 1948 War, in these cases אויב was employed.
[266] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 19.9.2010
[267] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 8.1.2010; Interview with Avraham Benyoseph, 19.8.2010
[268] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010
[269] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 8.1.2010; Interview with Avraham Benyoseph, 19.8.2010; Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010; There was only one interviewee whose state reasons for joining did not fall into the categorisation, but he joined the JSP/Notrim well before the war and was referring to the pre-war period in his response - Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010

there.[270] It was an outgrowth of their previous paramilitary service. For them, it seems to have been a fairly straightforward decision to enter the unit, despite it being effectively a 'suicide' unit.[271] According to Avigdor Cohen, this was because upon volunteering they did not think of the unit's potential future employment.[272]

For the majority of volunteers interviewed who came into the JSP/*Notrim* or cooperative organisations of the *Palmach*, the process was, on the whole, also an evolution of their previous paramilitary service but personal preference also played a role. Avraham 'Bren' Adan, for example, went into the *Palmach*, rather than joining any other service option because he wanted to serve in a 'Hebrew (*meaning Jewish*) Force'.[273] For others, their *Haganah* membership had a more direct influence on their entrance into cooperative units. Oreon Yosef entered the JSP/*Notrim* through the decision of his commune, all of which was part of the *Haganah*.[274] In most cases, entrance into cooperative units resulted from prior paramilitary affiliation.[275] At this basic level, those who volunteered for the cooperative units were no different from those ordered into them. In both cases, entrance into units was a function of their decisions to volunteer for the paramilitary of their choice and accept its discipline. This focus on discipline was even more evident among those who took part in the *Saison*, in that many of the interviewees explicitly referenced it.[276] To understand the final part of the equation, which resulted in membership in cooperative units, it is necessary to understand why members of the *Yishuv* chose to enter a paramilitary and continue to accept its discipline.

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[270] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010; Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010; Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010

[271] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010; Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010; Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010

[272] Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010

[273] Interview with Avraham 'Bren' Adan, 6.9.2010

[274] Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010; It is worth noting that for the those kibbutzim, communes, and pioneering groups that were part of the Haganah it is difficult to determine the line between the decision making of the collective and that of the Haganah

[275] All interviewees mentioned this

[276] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010; Interview with Anonymous 1, 23.8.2010

In his seminal work on morale and discipline, *Bayonets of the Republic*, John Lynn identified three reasons for the acceptance of military discipline: remunerative, coercive, and normative. [277] These could similarly serve to categorise the inducements to recruitment. The paramilitaries lacked direct coercive or remunerative abilities to enforce discipline or encourage recruitment, which leaves only the normative explanation among Lynn's troika. The normative explanation is itself problematic. Lynn explained his concept:

> the soldier's concept of his interest determines the type of motivation and control that will be most effective…citizen-soldiers of the French Revolution identified their interests with those of the nation; consequently, obedience within the army rested primarily on the soldier's willing agreement rather than on force or material reward. [278]

By framing the discussion as one of interest, Lynn's explanation, while important, fails to take into account a variety of other ideology and identity based factors. [279] In Lynn's three categories, neither emotionally driven irrational behaviour (which does not consider interest), nor ideologically driven behaviour played a role. This oversight is clear in Lynn's statement that when a 'soldier has nothing material to gain from risking his life in battle, to justify following a dangerous order, the soldier must value the interests or the approval of some collective beyond himself.'[280] Although it is possible that those who took part in the indigenous forces joined paramilitaries and followed paramilitary discipline because at some level they valued the interests of the nation over their own, there seems to be more to the picture than such a binary explanation allows.

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[277] John A Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France: 1791-94*, (Boulder, CO, 1996), p. 24

[278] Lynn (1996) p. 21

[279] Other studies such as Ayelet Gneezy and Daniel M. T. Fessler's study of punishment and reward during wartime while different in many regards similarly frames the discussion in terms of interest through leaves more room for the role of societal cohesion. - Ayelet Gneezy & Daniel Fessler, 'Conflict, Sticks and Carrots: War Increases Prosocial Punishments and Rewards', *Proc. R. Soc. B*, 279 (2012), pp. 219–223

[280] Lynn (1996) p. 24

A broader definition of normative, closer to that employed by social science, has more explanatory value in this case in that it is possible to argue that in some communities within the *Yishuv*, paramilitary service was a societal norm. The actual percentage of the *Yishuv* who were paramilitary members during the Second World War period is difficult to ascertain. Benny Morris cites an MI6 report from 1942 to arrive at the number of roughly 31,000.[281] This would mean that roughly one in sixteen of the overall population of the *Yishuv* were in the primary paramilitaries. This is a lower estimate than some but still enough to suggest that service was a societal norm.

Many of the *Haganah* interviewees described the process of joining as 'automatic' supporting the idea that volunteering for paramilitary service constituted a norm.[282] For Zvika Hirshler, effective membership in the *Haganah* was simply an aspect of his participation in his youth movement.[283] Fifteen or sixteen years seems to have been a common age to enlist.[284] Those who came from more *Haganah* oriented communities or from deeply involved families joined younger.[285] The *Haganah* recruited many, such as Emmanuel Goodman and Avraham Rabinov, in schools where, in some cases, the *Haganah* also held swearing in ceremonies.[286] This suggests that enlisting in the *Haganah* was something of an open secret – a normal part of society. Even the children of members of the British administration, such as Ranan Sivan, joined in a similar manner and took an active role.[287]

At Kibbutz Kfar Giladi, a kibbutz founded by members of the *Haganah*'s predecessor organisation and closely affiliated to the *Haganah* and later the *Palmach*, joining the *Haganah* was

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[281] Benny Morris, *1948,* (London, 2008), p. 28
[282] Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010 – most interviewees used similar language to describe entering the Haganah
[283] Interview with Zvi (Zvika) Hirshler, 7.9.2010
[284] See for example: Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010; Interview with Emmanuel Goodman, 21.9.2010; Interview with Shlomo Tivishi, 8.8.2010
[285] See for example: Interview with Anton Terkovsky, 20.9.2010; Interview with Ami Linetsky, 23.8.2010
[286] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010; Interview with Emmanuel Goodman, 21.9.2010
[287] Interview with Ranan Sivan, 13.1.2010

part of becoming Bar Mitzvah (the Jewish ritual of entering adulthood at the age of thirteen).[288] Once in the *Haganah*, the teenagers could either volunteer or be ordered to enter special units. Most personnel came into the standing units that cooperated with the British during the Second World War by this route.[289]

Those interviewees who immigrated to Palestine as teenagers, such as Zvi Avidror and Oreon Yoseph (Lux), joined the *Haganah* as part of their reception into the country – generally through the kibbutz that received them.[290] This seems to have occurred within their first weeks in Palestine. This is not surprising as in many cases their receptions were organised and run by *Haganah* members specifically tasked to this role.[291] Thus across much of the *Yishuv*, at least for those who came into the *Haganah*, it seems that enlisting was perceived as common, only semi-clandestine, and automatic.

Although there have been no studies of late adolescent paramilitary volunteering in Mandatory Palestine, this phenomenon has been studied in other contexts, including a useful study from Northern Ireland. In 'Adolescents' Explanations for Paramilitary Involvement' published in the *Journal of Peace Research*, Orla Muldoon, Katrina McLaughlin, Nathalie Rougier, and Karen Trew noted that among the motivations was 'perceived social status associated with paramilitary involvement.'[292] These findings seem relevant in the case of Palestine Mandate. The question of social status from membership might not apply given the large percentage of the youth

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[288] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[289] An example of this progression is the case of Alex Ziloni who joined the Haganah in seventh grade as a messenger before volunteering for the field forces and then being ordered into the standing units in Hebron and then Jerusalem during the Arab Revolt - Interview with Alex Zielony, 24.8.2010
[290] Interview with Zvi Avidror, 4.8.2010; Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010
[291] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 8.1.2010
[292] Orla Muldoon, et al., 'Adolescents' Explanations for Paramilitary Involvement', *Journal of Peace Research*, 5 (2008), p. 688; The study examined the explanations of motivations for paramilitary activity offered in 74 essays written by 14 to 16 year olds residing in border regions of Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland. The study made use of a ground theory approach and identified four categories of motivations'(1) group identification explanations, (2) explanations relating to issues commonly viewed as particularly relevant during adolescence (i.e. 'developmental factors'), (3) familial or environmental explanations and (4) a final category explaining involvement by reference to 'badness' or 'madness'.' –for more on the categories see: Muldoon, et al. (2008) p. 687

population involved in paramilitaries. It seems more likely that an inverse social status motivation applied where non-participation was socially harmful.

In the Northern Ireland study, 'familial explanations' refers to prior familial involvement with a paramilitary. In a broader sense, the importance of family (specifically parents) in military and paramilitary recruitment has been noted elsewhere. One such study, entitled 'Parental Influence on Youth Propensity to Join the Military' by Jennifer Gibson, Brian Griepentrog, and Sean M. Marsh, published in the *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 'found that parent attitudes were positively related to youth subjective norms and that parent beliefs about the child's efficacy were positively related to the child's self-efficacy belief.'[293] It 'also found that parent intention to recommend military service and the frequency of communication about enlistment were positively related to youth intention to enlist.'[294] Among the paramilitary volunteers of the *Yishuv*, both kinds of familial explanation likely existed. Almost all the interviewees referenced other members of their family who had served in the paramilitaries before them and, given the *zeitgeist* in the *Yishuv*, it is likely that family members positively reinforced the norms of service.

Gibson, Griepentrog, and Marsh's study on parental influence and military volunteering noted that, in addition to parents, teachers have an important role in encouraging volunteering while Bert Schreurs, Eva Derous, Karel De Witte, Karin Proost, Maarten Andriessen, and Kathia Glabeke's study 'Attracting Potential Applicants to the Military: The Effects of Initial Face-to-Face Contacts', published in *Human Performance*, noted the importance of the initial recruitment contact with the military organisation.[295] In terms of recruiter efficacy, the study noted that one of the primary factors in successful recruitment was perception of recruiter warmth or

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[293] Jennifer Gibson, et al., 'Parental Influence on Youth Propensity to Join the Military', *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 3 (2007), p.537
[294] *Ibid*
[295] Bert Schreurs, et al., 'Attracting Potential Applicants to the Military: The Effects of Initial Face-to-Face Contacts', *Human Performance*, 2 (2005), p. 106

friendliness.[296] For potential volunteers for the paramilitaries of the *Yishuv*, recruitment came at

the hands of friends, family, or community leaders, all but guaranteeing a perception of recruiter

warmth. As for the role of teachers in the *Yishuv*, neither the interviewees nor the supplemental

documents, such as memoirs, letters, or journal extracts, referred to the influence of teachers.

That it is not to say that the education system, both in and out of schools, did not influence

decisions to enlist. Children's periodicals not only encouraged paramilitary volunteering but also,

once the Second World War started, encouraged volunteering for war service as a means to

defend family and home.[297] Together with familial involvement and inbuilt recruiter warmth,

positive encouragement through various educational institutions created an almost ideal

environment for recruitment. The same periodicals, together with popular songs and other forms

of cultural production, provided role models and heroes that would have further encouraged

paramilitary volunteering. While these factors can explain the enlistment in paramilitaries which

lead to participation in indigenous force schemes, it does not satisfactorily explain the adherence

to discipline in the absence of coercive or remunerative enforcement.

Two other important factors might have encouraged the personal acceptance of discipline

among members of the *Yishuv*, helping to explain why the decision to enlist may have seemed

automatic; ideology and historical contingency.[298] Historical contingency influenced ideology and

became a means through which history was interpreted in a reinforcing cycle that led individuals

to volunteer for the paramilitaries and accept or, more accurately, self-enforce discipline.

As Meir Chazan noted in a study of Kibbutz women and guard duty, by the late 1930s, even the

most strident pacifists of the *Yishuv* believed ideologically in the necessity of armed self-

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[296] *Ibid* p. 106

[297] Yael Darr, 'Nation Building and War Narratives for Children: War and Militarism in Hebrew 1940s and 1950s Children's Literature', *Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education*, 4 (2012), pp. 604-605

[298] Historical contingency is an often overused phrase with a plethora of meanings – in this dissertation it refers to collective memory and experience of past events

defence.[299] For those more ideologically associated with labour Zionism, armed self-defence was a means to an end, a means to throw off the taint of the old world and become 'a new Jew'. Taking part in defence and security was, especially in the kibbutzim, part of the revolutionary nature of the Zionist project to make the individual worthy and overcome their Diaspora background.[300] An explanation for accepting paramilitary discipline lies within this ideological belief system. The society of the kibbutz and its ideological youth movements, did not see taking a role in self-defence as an act of bravery as much as failing to do so was an act of cowardice.[301] Further, taking part in self-defence was integral to building a socialist utopia.[302]

Being part of an ideological organisation was one thing, accepting the ideology another. That individuals accepted the ideology was based at least in part on historical contingency, which the ideological organisations selectively interpreted and presented to members. The widespread belief in the necessity of participation in Jewish self-defence organisations has its origins in the reactions to the Kishinev Pogrom of 1903.[303] While ideas around self-defence predated the pogrom, their widespread adoption, which was integral to the motivations of those who participated in the indigenous force schemes, dates from 1903.

Kishinev and the pogroms that followed renewed a sense of collective identity and isolation.[304] According to Inna Shtakser's study of the relationship between working class Jewish militants in revolutionary Russia and the pogroms of the early twentieth century, the pogroms had a profound effect on not only the those who were adults at the time, but also on those who were

[299] Meir Chazan, 'The Struggle of Kibbutz Women to Participate in Guard Duties During the Arab Revolt, 1936–1939', *Journal of Israeli History: Politics, Society, Culture*, 1 (2012) p. 92
[300] *Ibid* p. 98, 87
[301] *Ibid* p. 90
[302] *Ibid*
[303] Monty Penkower, 'The Kishnev Pogrom of 1903: A Turning Point in Jewish History', *Modern Judaism,* 3 (2004)*,* p. 193
[304] Inna Shtakser, 'Self-Defence as an Emotional Experience: The Anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1905-07 and Working Class Jewish Militants', *Revolutionary Russia*, no. 2 (2009), p. 164

very young.[305] For the generation that formed the leadership of the *Yishuv* during the Second World War, the experience of the pogroms formed the key formative experiences of their youth.[306] Not only did the pogrom cycle beginning with Kishinev stimulate an interest in self-defence among those who were teenagers and adults at the time, the experience of Kishinev continued in those who were children at the time and went on to shape the ideas of the *Yishuv,* including the *Yishuv*'s relations with the British and Arabs.[307] Members of the *Yishuv* interpreted the British failure to intervene in the 1920 *Nebi Musa* anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem in a timely manner as a pogrom in which the authorities failed to intervene – just like Kishinev.[308] The mandatory authorities' failure to provide an aggressive response to the 1921, 1929, and 1936 anti-Jewish riots reinforced this understanding of the anti-Jewish riots in Palestine through the lens of Kishinev and therefore the calls to self-defence.[309]

The Kishinev pogrom might have had less of an impact on those who went into the indigenous forces had it not been for the inclusion of two poems, *City of Slaughter* by Hayim Nahman Bialik and *He Told Her* by Yosef Haim Brenner, on the compulsory reading list of all labour Zionist affiliated educational organisations during the period.[310] The ideological movements used the poems as a lens through which the youth were to understand the collective experience of the pogroms and their current reality. Bialik's work is accusatory, attacking those who did not rise to take part in self-defence and implies that, because they failed to take part in defence, their deaths,

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[305] *Ibid*
[306] *Ibid* p.158
[307] It is worth noting that similar process of self-defence organization genesis occurred in Germany during the interwar period when Jewish First World Veterans banded together to create the RjF which fought to protect Jewish property, people and honour the Kapp Putsch (1920) and the riots of November 1923. (See: Derek Penslar, 'The German-Jewish Soldier From Participant to Victim', *German History,* 3 (2011), p. 439) Of those who served in the German Unit many had fathers who were First World veterans in the areas where RjF was active while others had parents who had participated in workers' risings as leftist militants
[308] Morris (2008) p. 11
[309] *Ibid* p. 12
[310] Anita Shapira, "In the City of Slaughter" versus "He Told Her", *Prooftexts*, 1-2 (2005), p. 86

like their lives, were pointless.[311] Anita Shapira, one of the foremost scholars of the Yishuv, noted that Brenner actively argued for self-defence but with an emphasis on revenge.[312] The marching song of the German Unit echoes Brenner's call for vengeance. Brenner argued that 'the desire for revenge demarcates the young New Jews from their forebears. Vengeance is part of the healthy emotional fibre of a nation in renewal, whereas to shrink from vengeance is a symptom of disease, not a lofty moral quality.'[313] Were vengeance to be substituted for taking part in self-defence organisations, this statement would almost perfectly mirror the ideology of those who served in the *Haganah* affiliated indigenous forces and would help to explain why they felt such service to be automatic.

As Shapira noted, Brenner's poem both established and reflected the *Yishuv*'s understanding of the role of self-defence:

> A worthy versus a pointless death became a cardinal question for the crystallizing Zionist-national ethos. It found expression in the distinction between dying in defense of Jewish life, honor, and property in the Land of Israel and dying in a pogrom in exile. And note: not only Jewish life and property, but Jewish honor as well. Honor was an important element of the new national ethos: it was pivotal to the distinction between the New Jew and the Old.[314]

Such a sentiment also provided the answer to Bialik's challenge of how to imbue life and death with meaning. For the majority of those from the *Yishuv* who took part in the indigenous force schemes of the Second World War, the censure of non-participation was enough to demand adherence to a paramilitary. This explains the frequent descriptions of the whole process as

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[311] Hayim Bialik, "The City of Slaughter" in Complete Poetic Works of Hayyim Nahman Bialik, Israel Efros, ed. (New York, 1948), pp. 129-43
[312] Shapira (2005) p. 101
[313] *Ibid* p. 99
[314] *Ibid* p. 95

automatic.[315] For many, all-important revenge additionally flavoured this already potent cocktail. Together these motivations suggest a slightly modified version of the model of push and pull factors identified by Nir Arielli in his work on transnational military recruitment. [316]

A variety of mutually reinforcing factors such as historical contingency (including collective experience) and ideology, which itself resulted in part from historical contingency, went into the formation of motivations to volunteer. Thanks to these motivations, the members of the *Yishuv* who came to serve in the various indigenous force schemes did so as a direct result of the paramilitaries' decision to cooperate. While a desire to get into the war motivated some members who participated in the indigenous irregular forces, service ultimately resulted from paramilitary participation. The paramilitaries brought their membership into the irregular indigenous force schemes because the schemes both helped to fulfil their primary objectives, victory in the war and the defence of the *Yishuv*, and conveyed secondary benefits. The evidence suggests that those who took part in the cooperative schemes also did so because cooperation helped fulfil both the *Haganah*'s primary objectives and provided added value to the *Haganah*.

Horn of Africa

As the case of Palestine Mandate demonstrates any discussion of the motivation of indigenous forces in the *arbagnoch* is necessarily multi-layered, with each level at which an actor's motivations are analysed requiring the exploration of a further level. In East Africa the layers of explanation carry through from the *arbagnoch* leadership to the groups that followed them and eventually, as with Palestine, to the individuals that composed these groups. In IEA, no large political organisation acted as a motivational aggregator, rather each leader made their choices

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[315] Leftist nationalism, which was common in the *Yishuv*, ideologically reinforced this – see 'Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets' in Joshua Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics 1920-1925* (DeKalb, Illinois, 2003), p. 45

[316] For detailed discussion of push-pull see: Nir Arielli & Bruce Collins, *Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era* (Basingstoke, UK, 2013)

individually. Given the diversity and disunity of the *arbagnoch*, explanations of *arbagnoch* motivation are an aggregation demonstrating key strands in the motivations. The diversity of *arbagnoch* and lack of sources mean that it is likely that no study could be truly exhaustive.

Much of the motivation that drew both individuals and groups into cooperation with the British was deeply rooted in structures and traditions of Ethiopian society. The traditions of becoming *shifta*, the importance of firearms in status, and the Ethiopian feudal and imperial system were key elements. Within Ethiopia, there was a long tradition of becoming *shifta* and cooperating with the enemies of the metropole.[317] This is responsible for some confusion among the sources. The idea of becoming *shifta* is so common in Ethiopian history that there is a linguistic way to differentiate between *shifta* who were bandits and shifta who were fighting the metropole. In the first case they were referred to in Amharic as *t'era-shifta* and in the second simply *shifta*.[318] The short form of both is *shifta*. As a result, many sources identify all *shifta* (including the *arbagnoch*) as bandits. The long tradition of engaging in armed banditry against the metropole and siding with its enemies was well established by the Second World War. As a result, the idea of cooperating with the British against the Italians would have seemed natural. This tradition of becoming *shifta* created a fertile ground for cooperation. The feudal structure that went in hand in hand with the tradition of becoming *shifta* was also significant in motivating cooperation.

Firearms played a significant role at all levels of Ethiopian society. As Richard Pankhurst noted in his article on guns in Ethiopia, firearms were a symbol of status.[319] The better and more modern a firearm the more it was valued. Pankhurst illustrated this citing a poem related to him by the Ethiopian scholar Ato Alemayehu Mogos:

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[317] Aregawi Berhe, 'Revisiting resistance in Italian-occupied Ethiopia: The Patriots' Movement and the Redefinition of Post-war Ethiopia', in John Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn, Klaas van Walraven (eds.), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History (*Leiden, 2003), pp. 95-96
[318] *Ibid*
[319] Richard Pankhurst, 'Guns in Ethiopia', *Transition*, 20 (1965), p. 33

A person carrying a moskob (i.e. Russian gun) should not pass by my door; You will be destroyed in my hands like dried leaves in a fire. A person carrying a wechifo let him make his voice heard to me. A person carrying a minishir let him come himself. A person carrying an albin let-him be my lover. Should he want to be my husband let him buy a mauser.[320]

The poem conveys an idea of the hierarchy of weapons and their relation to a hierarchy of individuals. Russian firearms were considered inferior in status to *wechifo* or Winchester rifles, which were inferior to the French, and so on until the German Mauser. The status of the person carrying the weapon was directly linked to the status of the weapon. At all levels of Ethiopian society the chance to receive modern and better firearms from cooperation with the British would have been a powerful inducement to cooperation.

The variable of geography was especially important in facilitating cooperation. Those *arbagnoch* who did not operate in areas where the British penetrated were not able to cooperate with the British. In geographic areas where cooperation was possible, the major leadership of the *arbagnoch* generally decided whether or not to cooperate with the British. Lesser leadership, local groups, and individuals decided whether to stay affiliated to the major leaders. In most cases, group and individual decisions to cooperate were secondary decisions, made after the major leader had chosen. Therefore, the analysis begins by looking at the major leaders.

There were major leadership who became active *arbagnoch* but chose not to enter cooperation.[321] Among the primary reasons for cooperation with the British was the ability of the British to provide resources. The supplies the British could provide had benefits to the *arbagnoch* leaders in terms of relative power and status. This provided additional motivation for cooperation. The

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[320] *Ibid*

[321] Major leadership were those who could act autonomously and were subordinate to no other leadership. Midlevel leadership were subordinate to major leadership but had other *arbagnoch* subordinate. Minor leadership only commanded their own forces and had no other forces subordinate.

attention the provision of resources received in the considerations of the various British missions in Ethiopia as well as the recurrent requests from the field for more evidence their importance as rationale for cooperation.[322]

The fact that despite receiving arms from the British, many *arbagnoch* leaders chose to abandon the field and go to Sudan where they could receive additional weaponry demonstrates that they wanted more from their guns than simply being allowed to conduct operations against the Italians.[323] Their behaviour stemmed from the attempt to make relative gains. The Ethiopian imperial and feudal system encouraged rivalry among the nobility and military leadership.[324] One of the challenges faced by the British in Ethiopia was the necessity to navigate the treacherous waters of rivalry. Many leaders would only agree to cooperation if their rivals were not involved or if they did not have to work with their rivals.[325] For rivals engaged in such bitter competition maintaining an edge was critically important and cooperation with the British could give them that edge or at least prevent them from losing ground to those who were actively in cooperation.

Switching leaders and even sides of conflicts in exchange for better status and material wealth was an established tradition in Ethiopia.[326] For the *arbagnoch* leadership losing followers and local support to a rival was a real danger. British resources could help prevent this. In most cases, the *arbagnoch* leadership gave the money and guns received from the British to their supporters or to the families of their supporters in order to boost loyalty and secure obedience.[327] Further evidence of this function lies in cases when major leaders handed out weaponry directly to minor

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[322] TNA, WO 178/36 (101 Abyssinia Northern Section, War Diary, 9.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (101 Abyssinia Northern Section, War Diary, 9.1940-10.4.1941)

[323] TNA, WO 178/36 (26.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[324] Some suggest rivalry among the nobility was such that the nobility cared more about the rivalry than defeating the Italians in 1936 - see: Pietro Badoglio, *The War in Abyssinia* (London, 1937), p. 67

[325] TNA, WO 178/36 (101 Abyssinia Northern Section, War Diary, 9.1940-10.4.1941)

[326] Mockler (1984) p. 8

[327] Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013; Interview with Alamna-Balaï, 15.3.2013; Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013; Mockler (1984) p. 266

leaders bypassing the mid-rank entirely, which caused the minor leaders to form groups independent of the middle ranks.[328]

Cooperation with the British could improve the position of *arbagnoch* leaders through means other than material goods. The promise of perceived proximity to the emperor and imperial favour played a critical role in bringing leaders into cooperation. *Arbagnoch* leaders believed that gaining imperial favour could be achieved through cooperation with the British.[329] The case of the chief of Tumha, Iasu Zaleka, is particularly illustrative as to how the promised favor of the Emperor could motivate cooperation. Iasu Zaleka was hesitant about cooperation as *arbagnoch* already working with the British had raided his cattle and he was nervous about his prospects if he too cooperated.[330] The British had tried and failed to gain his cooperation until they 'laid stress on the Emperor's pleasure when knew of the Tumha's loyalty and on the rich rewards which would be forthcoming when he was reinstated in his capital.'[331]

For other leaders imperial favour remained a primary motivation for cooperation but their participation was not material reward focused. For these leaders, cooperation meant gaining a relationship with a government by whom they felt ignored or abandoned. Jagama Kello, an Oromo *arbagnoch* leader with no regional rivals and a member of a powerful Oromo family had no inherent connection to the Emperor.[332] However once the Emperor invited Kello to the imperial court to pay homage to him and thereby established a relationship, Kello accepted cooperation.[333] Relationship and Imperial favour were the primary ways in which the feudal system affected the motivation to cooperate among the major leaders. Ethiopian feudal politics engendered a system of rivalry among the prominent nobility. In many cases, the desire for

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[328] TNA, WO 178/36 (12.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[329] Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013; Allen, *(*1943) p. 43
[330] TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam, pp. 21-22)
[331] TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam, p. 23)
[332] Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013
[333] *Ibid*

advantage and a relationship with the crown contributed to a positive decision to cooperate among the major *arbagnoch* leaders.

The importance of the imperial relationship and the idea that in cooperating with the British the *arbagnoch* were working for the Emperor led to a misunderstanding of the overall situation which itself contributed to cooperation. An interesting reversal of order appears in several narratives in the Ethiopian collective memory, as well as in interviews conducted for this research project. According to these sources, cooperation with British was possible because, like the *arbagnoch,* the British served the Emperor and followed his orders.[334] The idea that the British were in effect representatives of the Emperor incorporated them into the feudal hierarchy in Ethiopia and gave the major *arbagnoch* leaders a way to accept cooperation – even if it meant subordination.

Feudal politics and the link between cooperation and imperial service also created complications. *Ras* Hailu (Hailu Tekle Haymanot) allied himself with the Italians and proved something of a thorn in the side of the British in Gojjam. His hostility stemmed less from a love of the Italians than from opposition to the Emperor. *Ras* Hailu was both a competitor for the Ethiopian imperial throne and descended from the regional kings (*Negus*) who ruled under the Emperor and he expected that Haile Selassie would make him a king.[335] Instead, Haile Selassie imprisoned and exiled Hailu, who was liberated only after the Italian invasion.[336] In short, feudal politics meant that Hailu and others in conflict with the Emperor were at best hesitant to cooperate with the British and at worst openly hostile.

Despite the importance of relative status and power, for some major *arbagnoch* leaders the desire to fight the Italians was the critical motivation for taking up arms. Some, with whom the British cooperated, had been fighting since the Italian invasion, while others had fought since the

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[334] Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru,14.3.2013; Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013
[335] Mockler (1984) p. 9
[336] *Ibid* p. 139

Yekatit 12 massacres in 1937. The principle that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' made as much sense to the *arbagnoch* as it did to the British. Successful Italian offensives against the major *arbagnoch* leaders had created a certain degree of desperation among the major *arbagnoch* leadership that helped motivate cooperation.[337] In some areas the *arbagnoch* were approaching critical shortages of food, ammunition, and weaponry.[338] The British offer of resources to improve the position of the *arbagnoch* was an offer too good for most to refuse.

Imperial favour was enough to push those still on the fence into cooperation. Few could afford to refuse cooperation. Non-cooperation not only risked a loss of relative power and prestige to rivals, which might culminate in a loss of followers, it risked alienation from an emperor on his way to restoring his throne. In some cases given the poor state of physical resources among the *arbagnoch* and the successful Italian operations, non-cooperation could have eventually resulted in defeat and ultimately death for the major leadership. It was a rare leader who could afford to ignore the resource benefits of cooperation and risk the perils of non-cooperation. It is therefore likely that many would have cooperated even without the intervention of the Emperor. However the additional incentive the Emperor provided created the cocktail of motivation that led to the cooperation of all but a very few major *arbagnoch* leaders within the relevant geographic areas.

The mid-level and minor *arbagnoch* leadership were more diverse than the major leadership. This diversity, coupled with small amount of available data, makes it more difficult to generalise their motivations for cooperation. Nevertheless, their narratives share certain common themes. As previously mentioned, for most leaders cooperation was a function of participation. Some mid-level leaders, while technically subordinate to a major leader, were effectively autonomous and developed their own direct relationships with the British. These mid-level leaders often had

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[337] *Ibid* p. 265

[338] Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855 – 1974* (London, 1991), p. 172; TNA, WO 201/293 (Policy Regarding Future Commitments, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28); All interviewees referred to the short supply of ammunition and weaponry

significant independent resources and forces. From the evidence available it seems that these leaders acted more like the major leaders and were motivated by similar considerations as the major leadership.[339] For most, however, co-operation was not a decision that belonged to them; it came from the major leaders they served. Yet, these subordinate leaders were not without agency. If they disagreed with the policies of a major leader or considered them unfit, then the subordinate leaders could and did abandon one major leader in favour of another. To consider why the subordinate leaders cooperated is to consider why they chose a particular major leader.

Minor and mid-level leaders chose to serve major leaders who cooperated in part because of the provision of resources. Minor and mid-level leaders had to keep their fighters loyal and used guns and resources to do so. Additionally, a major leader could appoint a subordinate leader to a position resembling something in between a governor and tax farmer able to draw resources directly from the local population.[340] While resources may have been a motivation for loyalty to the major leaders there were other motivations imbedded within the structure of Ethiopian society.

The feudal structure of society helped determine subordinate leaders' choice of a major leader. The choice as to which leader to follow centred on the power of the leader. Interviewees reported that minor leaders did not always choose to follow a major leader; rather major leaders exercised their strength and enforced their leadership on their subordinates. In other instances groups simply picked the most powerful regional leader to follow.[341] In cases where the military power of the major leader determined minor and midlevel loyalty, the question of entering cooperation hinged on whether cooperation increased the major leader's strength.

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[339] Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013
[340] Interview with Agafari Ayabe Ayelle, 12.3.2013
[341] Interview with Alemno Ayelo, 28.2.2013; Interview with Asmaro Wolde Selassie, 13.3.2013

With strength came a related reason that mid-level and minor leaders chose to serve a particular major leader – shelter.[342] In a fragmented regional situation, a group of *arbagnoch* without the succour of a major leader could find themselves raided by more powerful rivals or without a line of retreat when faced with Italian offensives. This created something of a stereotypical feudal relationship where in exchange for shelter and protection the subordinate leaders contributed loyalty and service. This exchange was a recognised part of the feudal system that led to cooperation. Minor and mid-level leaders chose to serve a major leader who was the highest regional feudal authority – generally either a *Dejazmach* or a *Ras* (the second highest and highest non-royal ranks of the *mesafint* or Ethiopian hereditary nobility).[343] In all cases, the minor and mid-level leaders served a major leader of a superior feudal rank. For the mid-level and minor leadership the feudal relationship provided the reason for cooperation. When the major leaders decided to cooperate, the subordinate leaders had to follow suit or find a new leader.

The reasons typically cited for leaving the service of a major leader increased the likelihood that the low-level leadership would follow an overlord cooperating with the British. Subordinate leadership abandoned overlords if the subordinates felt that the overlord was not able to fulfil the feudal bargain.[344] Additionally, if the lower level leaders perceived an overlord as not bringing victories they might switch to another regional leader in whom they had confidence.[345] The British provided resources that made major leaders appear more victorious and the defection of mid-level and minor leaders less likely. Similarly, titles and status entitled mid-level and minor leaders to a certain degree of respect from overlords. If the subordinates felt disrespected they could leave for a different commander or – if powerful enough themselves – go it alone.[346] This too could facilitate cooperation with the British. Newly independent leaders needed the

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[342] Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013
[343] Platt (1962), Lecture 1, p. 17; Interview with Agafari Ayabe Ayelle, 12.3.2013
[344] Interview with Brahanu Mengust, 14.3.2013
[345] *Ibid*
[346] Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013

resources, protection, and legitimacy that cooperation could provide. For minor or mid-level leaders, as long as their major leader was cooperating with the British, all roads led to cooperation.

Regional and familial background played a significant role in terms of personal motivation. Feudal considerations were less likely to affect those who lived in urban areas before they became *arbagnoch*. Those with family ties to the *arbagnoch* were more likely to join at a young age. In general, individual *arbagnoch* entered into cooperation because their leaders were in cooperation. Leaders in cooperation were more likely to attract followers.[347] Since for individuals cooperation was a by-product of *arbagnoch* service, understanding why they joined the *arbagnoch* should explain why they entered cooperation with the British.

In IEA, leadership exercised both remunerative and coercive power. The motivations for these individuals joining the *arbagnoch* line up with the model of push and pull factors identified by Nir Arielli.[348] The model of push-pull is a theory of transnational military recruitment, but applies well in this case. The theory suggests that the reasons for entering transnational service stemmed from push factors at home and inducements or pull factors from the service. The same is broadly applicable to the *arbagnoch*, especially if the concept is somewhat stretched to include such motivations as feudal politics, patriotic ideology, family ties, religious encouragement, the desire for resources, status and wealth, and masculine identity

Family background was the dominant motivation for some who became *arbagnoch*. For young men from prominent families who were unhappy with life at home, switching life style or running away was not on option but becoming *shifta* and *arbagnoch* were acceptable and even encouraged alternatives.[349] For most, family background played a different role. In certain

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[347] Mockler (1984) p. 264
[348] For detailed discussion of push-pull see: Arielli & Collins, (2013)
[349] Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013

cultures within Ethiopia – especially among some of the Amhara populations - it was traditional to start preparing boys for war as they became teenagers.[350] In many cases younger *arbagnoch* had fathers or uncles who were already serving by the time they joined.[351] When the older men became *arbagnoch* they took their sons with them, bringing them into the *arbagnoch* and cooperation with the British.[352] Even in cases where close family members were not in the *arbagnoch,* some prominent families were happy to encourage children to become *arbagnoch* leaders*,* even going so far as to equip them and to use the family position to gain followers.[353] These familial factors, even when not solely responsible for the decision to become *arbagnoch,* created a fertile ground and permissive environment for enlistment. This is especially significant in light of the previously discussed research demonstrating the important position that parental and familial views have on military enlistment.[354] In IEA parental activity as both enablers and recruiters obviously increased the likelihood of *arbagnoch* service. Family ties to local *arbagnoch* also constituted a motivation to stay with a group as it entered into cooperation. Family background contributed to cooperation with the British in two ways. First, it led individuals to the *arbagnoch* and into a position to enter cooperation. Second, family background provided motivation to remain with a given group if that group entered cooperation.

One of the earliest push factors that led individuals into the *arbagnoch* was fear. As the Italians sent forces into various corners of Ethiopia, people fleeing into the hills with their weapons preceded the arrival of Italian forces.[355] Those who fled their villages formed the nucleus of several *arbagnoch* groups. Fear of the Italians was justified and many were pushed into the *arbagnoch* by the effects of the Italian invasion and occupation. The Italian repressions following

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[350] Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013
[351] Interview with Alemno Ayelo, 28.2.2013; Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013; Interview with Brahanu Mengust, 14.3.2013; Interview with Agafari Ayabe Ayelle, 12.3.2013; Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013
[352] Interview with Brahanu Mengust, 14.3.2013; Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013; Interview with Agafari Ayabe Ayelle, 12.3.2013; Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013
[353] Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013
[354] See discussion in: Gibson (2007), pp. 525–541; Schreurs, et al., (2005) pp. 105-122 in section on Palestine Mandate
[355] Mockler (1984) p. 143

Yekatit 12 provided additional factors which drove people into the arms of the *arbagnoch*. The massacres in Addis Ababa and other major cities led to people to flee for the countryside and the more remote areas of the country.[356] Where there were massacres in villages the same flight happened.[357] People seeking to protect their property and their livestock drove their herds into the hills.

Those who pushed into remote areas had to protect themselves from raids.[358] They needed the protection that being part of an *arbagnoch* group could offer.[359] This led the refugees into the feudal bargain of protection in return for loyalty and service, which led to cooperation with the British. The loss of property and livelihood provided a further powerful individual motivation for cooperation. The only way for those who had fled to recoup their losses was from the Italians and their allies. British support could help them achieve this goal. Finally witnessing and in some cases losing family during the massacres, led to a desire for revenge, which could be met best through cooperation with the British.

Pull factors formed part of the package of remuneration and coercion. The pull factors that formed the remunerative incentives included the possibility of receiving financial reward, receiving firearms, and taking part in plundering. The last of these was also a coercive disincentive to non-participation, as those subject to plundering were those who were not *arbagnoch*. Financial compensation helped pull individuals into those groups cooperating with the British as the British distributed money to the leadership.[360] The distribution of firearms provided a similar incentive for individuals to join the *arbagnoch* and especially those leaders who cooperated.[361] Given the cultural importance of firearms, this represented a powerful incentive

[356] Interview with Demise Haille, 27.2.2013
[357] Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013
[358] Interview with Alemno Ayelo, 28.2.2013; Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013
[359] Interview with Alemno Ayelo, 28.2.2013; Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013
[360] Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013; Interview with Alamna-Balaï, 15.3.2013; Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013
[361] Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013; Interview with Alamna-Balaï, 15.3.2013

for loyalty and cooperation. Once it became known that those cooperating with British were distributing firearms, those who had stayed on the sidelines of the conflict volunteered in large numbers.[362]

Both the British and the Ethiopian leadership found that plunder provided a major incentive for loyalty and combat performance, both in and out of the cooperative arrangements. The British found that giving the *arbagnoch* the opportunity to keep what they had captured from Italian resupply convoys heading towards Gondar made them 'most enthusiastic in the performance of their duties.'[363] This speaks to the role of plunder as a potential secondary motivation or retention tool as those who were 'enthusiastic' were already taking part in cooperation. The records of large numbers of individuals joining the *arbagnoch* immediately before the fall of Italian positions that were likely to yield plunder and then not taking part in further cooperation, suggests that for some the opportunity for plunder formed a primary motivation.[364] Being part of the *arbagnoch* meant access to loot from these raids. Being uninvolved meant being vulnerable.[365] Cooperation with the British resulted in the fall of Italian garrisons and in more opportunities for loot, which in turn provided more motivation for cooperation. Victories by cooperative forces also encouraged more volunteers to cooperate. Once the British distributed leaflets from the Emperor announcing the impending invasion, those not already part of the *arbagnoch* sought out *arbagnoch* groups in order to play a role in the victory.[366] This tendency is hardly unique to Ethiopia and has been noted in works on the resistance in France and elsewhere.[367]

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[362] Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013
[363] TNA, WO 201/303 (Captain W.O.H. Collins, Note to OC Troops, Dessie, Field Security, Gondar, 13.10.1941, Sudan & Eritrea Intelligence Summary)
[364] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)
[365] Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013; Mockler (1984) p. 188
[366] Interview with Anonymous 3, 18.3.2013
[367] For discussions of this phenomenon Antony Beevor, *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy* (London: 2009) p. 505 or Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains*, (New York, 2002)

Ideology, religion, and questions of masculinity also helped motivate individuals into the *arbagnoch* and from there into cooperation with the British. *Arbagnoch* leaders encouraged their followers to engage in *fukara* or ceremonial boasting to motivate forces and keep them loyal.[368] The pattern of boasting was not employed to motivate the boaster, but to motivate the audience of *arbagnoch* who could not offer such boasts by belittling them by comparison. This played into a larger cultural milieu of encouragement where those who did not participate in the *arbagnoch* found their self-worth questioned. Common poems and sayings at the time included lines such as '*bälew attilim woy! Tekur anbesa aydellehim woy*' which translates as 'get him! Aren't you a black lion?'[369] In this case, 'him' referred to the Italians and the point of questioning whether the individual was a 'black lion' served to imply a lack of masculinity on the part of the audience. Other instances where resistance was attached to masculinity support this understanding.[370] Masculine identity served as both an incentive to enter and remain in the *arbagnoch* and a disincentive against staying out. This meant that the reasons of masculine identity which led individuals into the *arbagnoch* also led them to cooperation with the British.

Ideology in the form of nationalism and patriotism together with religion accompanied masculinity as a motivation. Many interviewees cited love of country and a desire to fight the enemy as their primary reason for becoming *arbagnoch*.[371] There were a number of poems and mottos in popular circulation at the time, which called for individuals to join the *arbagnoch* for patriotic reasons. An example of such poems included '*Ne'Merebey*' which reads:

> *Adi tefiu, adi'do yewaal'ye,*
>
> *Beti Hatsur akiblini meneshiraye,*

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[368] Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013

[369] Aregawi Berhe, 'Revisiting resistance in Italian-occupied Ethiopia: The Patriots' Movement (1936-1941) and the redefinition of post-war Ethiopia', in John Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn, Klaas van Walraven (eds.), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History (*Leiden, 2003), pp. 87-113, p. 95

[370] Mockler (1984) p. 167, 185

[371] Almost all interviewees suggested this motivation, however Asmaro Wolde Selassie stated it explicitly - Interview with Asmaro Wolde Selassie, 13.3.2013

Ne'merebey iye ne'merebey![372]

In translation:

In a lost country, you cannot stay a day,

Through the fence, throw me the gun,

I should go to Merebe, oh my Merebe![373]

The explicit use of patriotic motifs in this poem demonstrates an appeal beyond material and individual gain. The prevalence of these and similar mottos and poems during the Italian occupation lends credibility to those interviewees who listed patriotism among their primary motivations both for participation in the *arbagnoch* and cooperation with the British. For many Ethiopians religion and country corresponded. The Ethiopian church was a powerful institution closely associated with the state and Emperor. It was also one of the primary means for youth education.[374] The Ethiopian church played a major role in broadening the rebellion.[375] In as much as the Ethiopian church and the perception that the Italian occupation threatened the church encouraged volunteers for the *arbagnoch*, it also provided a motivation for cooperation.

For those from rural areas feudal mobilization was the dominant reason for *arbagnoch* participation. These *arbagnoch* answered the call of those to whom they owed feudal service and followed minor leaders who came from locally prominent families.[376] Major leaders tended to come from the prominent feudal families who called on their subordinates. The subordinates were themselves mid-level nobles who could call upon their tenants' service and so forth down to the level of individual.

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[372] Berhe (2003) p. 96
[373] *Ibid*
[374] *Ibid* p. 98; Interview with Anonymous 3, 18.3.2013; Interview with Agafari Ayabe Ayelle, 12.3.2013
[375] Berhe (2003) p. 98 - One interviewee cited defence of the church specifically as a motivation for joining the *arbagnoch*. He referred to the rumour that the Italians wished to change the religion of Ethiopia to Catholicism however it is telling that he cited that not as separate motivation but within the list of patriotic motivations. - Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013
[376] Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013

The discussion, so far, suggests that, in Ethiopia, individual motivation resulted from a tangled web of primary and secondary motivations. When put in the context of the question as to why the *arbagnoch* engaged in indigenous force cooperation a pattern emerges. In almost every case, *arbagnoch* chose to follow a leader that fulfilled their reason for joining the *arbagnoch*. For some, such as those who joined to fight for the country or religion or to answer the call of feudal mobilisation, cooperation was a relatively simple affair. Those choosing a leader for shelter and protection had in some cases a slightly more complicated choice. Where there were multiple leaders, they had to choose which offered them the best chance of shelter in exchange for their service, but they could switch if they chose poorly. Those who joined for wealth or status had similarly flexible loyalty. It is unlikely that many joined for a single reason. Those who joined for patriotic reasons would not eschew the chance for status or wealth. Those who joined in part for material reasons were unlikely to lack entirely in patriotic sentiment. It is important to note that the Italians also offered wealth and status for service. Even those who served through feudal mobilisation were not beyond being moved by wealth, title, or firearms. In Ethiopia, it was traditional to bribe an army away from a commander. That the Italians were generally unsuccessful in their attempts to do so during the period of indigenous force cooperation may indicate the presence of strong patriotic sentiments or at the very least a desire to defeat the Italians among most *arbagnoch*. The contrast of British success with Italian failure thus helps clarify the motivations for entering indigenous force cooperation.

The cooperative arrangements with the British offered aid in the primary objective of defeating the Italians while addressing the web of motivations that kept the *arbagnoch* loyal to a particular leader – money, plunder, firearms, and protection. In the end the choice presented to the individual was whether to follow or abandon a leader who had joined the British indigenous force schemes not whether or not to cooperate with the British. It seems unlikely that many individuals would have deserted cooperation. Abandoning a leader brought risk, while staying

with a leader who was in cooperation with the British brought the possibility of extra benefits. The major leaders were the actors who determined whether indigenous force cooperation went ahead. Their reasons for cooperation are the most significant for the purposes of this study. The major leaders cooperated because participation in the indigenous force schemes helped them achieve their primary goals of defeating the Italians – a goal that might not be realised without British help. They were further motivated because the indigenous force cooperation allowed these leaders to maintain or gain status, resources, and power relative to their rivals. Once a critical mass of leaders was in cooperation, only the most powerful could afford non-cooperation.

Comparative Findings

On the surface, it seems there were a significant number of differences between the reasons indigenous forces entered into cooperation with the British in Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa. A push-pull model of motivation fairly neatly applies to the Horn of Africa, while heavy modification is required to fit such theories to Palestine Mandate. Whereas the *Haganah*'s only form of coercive power was a form of social sanction through exclusion from paramilitary service, the *arbagnoch* leadership could exert coercive influence through raiding and 'taxation.' The *Haganah* had few remunerative powers while the *arbagnoch* leadership had the ability to issue firearms and money to followers. In Palestine Mandate, the indigenous forces could choose with which British imperial organisation to cooperate, whereas in the Horn of Africa, the various organs of the British Empire presented a relatively united front. These differences are revealing. The mechanisms for encouraging cooperation are not universal. Cultural and organisational priorities determine them. Gaining training was important for the *Haganah* and provided an additional incentive for cooperation. For the *arbagnoch* and in Ethiopian society more generally, money and weaponry were important and provided additional incentives for *arbagnoch* cooperation. These differences betray an underlying similarity – the fact that the value of British

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activities was determined not by the British, but by the indigenous forces. The British distributed firearms to both the *Haganah* and the *arbagnoch*, but it was only critical in the case of *arbagnoch* cooperation.

A comparison of the two cases reveals other findings. Both narratives demonstrate that the agency of the indigenous forces was a crucial part of the indigenous force cooperation equation. It is not enough to understand why the British cooperated with the indigenous forces; cooperation was clearly a mutual enterprise and it is equally important to understand the motivations of the indigenous forces. In both Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa, the indigenous decision to cooperate reflected the structure of the pre-existing indigenous forces. The indigenous forces were outgrowths of the society from which they came and reflected its priorities. Both case studies revealed complex organisational motivations for cooperation. They show that there were multiple levels of interest at work. In both cases, the indigenous forces had a first-degree interest in joining an indigenous force cooperation scheme. In the case of Palestine Mandate, this was initially protecting the territory from invasion and defeating the Nazis. In the Horn of Africa, it was defeating the Italians. The cases show that these motivations held primacy. There were additional second-degree motivations in both cases tied to local political developments, which helped motivate cooperation. In each case, the situation was such that the indigenous forces needed to cooperate in order to achieve their first-degree priorities. Like the British, the indigenous forces were driven into cooperation by necessity, while the extra benefits helped determine how the cooperative schemes operated and the extent to which the indigenous forces were willing to cooperate.

The prioritisation of first-degree motivations over the second degree is clear in both cases. When the British approached the indigenous forces about cooperation, the indigenous forces were already involved in carrying out the tasks demanded by the first-degree motivations. Yet they immediately agreed to some form of cooperation. The model of first and second-degree

motivations that the cases suggest has further utility as it explains why the *Haganah* and some *arbagnoch* ceased cooperation with the British. Although they were still in a position to receive second-degree benefits from the British, further cooperation with the British threatened their first-degree interests.[377] For some of the *arbagnoch*, this interest was the ability to maintain themselves as armed powers; for the *Haganah*, the re-imposition of the White Paper threatened its basic organisational goals. These created 'red flag' moments for the indigenous forces.[378] No matter the second-degree inducements the British could offer, cooperation had to cease immediately.

On the surface, the decision for cooperation seems to be a rational decision based on the order of priorities, but in both cases, understanding the organisational motivation for cooperation is necessary but not sufficient to explain cooperation. In each case, the leadership made the decision to cooperate but that decision reflected the aggregate decisions of their subordinates as individuals. The leadership could only go as far into cooperation as their subordinates would follow. If their subordinates were not willing to maintain organisational loyalty, there could be no indigenous force cooperation. In short, the cases demonstrate that both the expression of the collective agency of the indigenous forces and the individual agency of the members were critical to the creation and nature of indigenous force cooperation. For individuals who took part in cooperation, there was a panoply of motivations. Many were common to both cases and stemmed from a variety of roots, including social and familial pressure, conceptions of masculinity, identity, historical contingency, societal structure, and a desire to fight the enemy and 'get in the war'. In both cases some of these motivations reflect the existing theoretical literature on military and paramilitary recruitment while others are distinct. The leadership of the indigenous forces had to consider these motivations as they made their decisions about

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[377] For more on this process see: Jacob Stoil, 'Beyond Traffic Lights: Towards a More Complex Human Terrain', *Journal of Military Operations*, 2:4 (2014), pp. 19-20
[378] For more on Red Flags see: *Ibid*

cooperation. Any decision that would have alienated the individuals who made up the indigenous forces would have been a 'red flag' moment. To an extent, then, the comparison of the two cases shows that on one hand, the decision of the indigenous forces to cooperate with the British was based on a hierarchy of interests while on the other hand, it stemmed from a cocktail of individual motivations, including identity, societal structure, and historical contingency.

Structure

The structure of any relationship consists of the physical and organisational pathways through which the intent of those involved in relationships becomes reality. Relationship structure incorporates the processes through which actors make command decisions and take action as well as the process by which the allocation of personnel, information exchange, and resource transfer take place. Structure also refers to the level of integration between any two given actors. It is the physical actualisation of the relationship. It determines much of what actors involved in a relationship are able to accomplish and the means through which they can act.

Palestine Mandate

In Palestine, as elsewhere, the relationship structure between Imperial and local actors strongly influenced the nature and employment of indigenous forces. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to focus on a single relationship or relationship structure between the Empire and indigenous forces. It is more accurate to speak of multiple overlapping and evolving relationship structures. The interactions among the various Imperial actors in Palestine also affected the structures of relationships with indigenous forces and the integration of those forces into the Imperial order of battle. Each Imperial actor maintained a separate relationship with the *Haganah*. At times, the various Imperial organisations went to great lengths to hide the fact and nature of their cooperation with the Zionist undergrounds from other Imperial actors.[379] The structures of the various relationships had little reference to each other.

On the Imperial side, the key actors in relationships with the *Haganah* were the Special Services, Palestine Government, and the British Army. A plethora of secondary Imperial actors, including SIS, MI5, the Foreign Office, and a dizzying array of branches of Military Intelligence also

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[379] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/11 (A.W. Lawerence, Letter to David, .8.1940)

maintained cooperative relationship with the *Haganah*, although several did not seek to employ them in the Levant.

The key Imperial-Zionist relationships that defined the nature and use of indigenous forces were those between the Special Services and the *Haganah,* Palestine Government and the *Haganah*, and the British Army, and the *Haganah*. In some cases, the structures of cooperation evolved while for others, they remained constant. As the relationships among the Imperial actors changed, their relationships with the *Haganah* became tangled. This was particularly true for the relationships between Palestine Government and the *Haganah* and between the British Army and the *Haganah*.[380] The line between the Special Services-*Haganah* relationship and that of the British Army and the *Haganah* was sometimes similarly blurred.

The Palestine Government conducted the most durable cooperation between the *Haganah* and the British Empire. This relationship was the main form of cooperation experienced by members of the Yishuv. Tens of thousands of underground members were either directly involved in this cooperation or received training because of it. The relationship ostensibly commenced in 1936 with the outbreak of the Arab revolt and continued briefly beyond the cessation of the Second World War. The Arab Riots of 1936 increasingly forced the Mandate to rely on the Yishuv to augment security capabilities. In an attempt to counter unfamiliarity with local terrain and customs, the British created a structure to work with indigenous forces. In this structure, which can be termed the "guides scheme," the British recruited individual Yishuv guides on an individual basis and fully integrated them into British regiments.[381] Guides served in regimental uniform, lived with the regiment, and apparently were solely subject to the regimental command

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[380] Dayan (1976) p. 25; Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010
[381] Dayan (1976) p. 25

structure.[382] When the unit redeployed elsewhere, the "guide" would remain and integrate into the next unit to arrive.[383]

The Palestine Government seems to have deemed the guides scheme a success, as it rapidly expanded and formalised the scheme until, by the end of 1936, it matured into the JSP and *Notrim/Ghaffir* scheme. While the JSP existed to patrol settlements and their immediate environs, the *Notrim* consisted of mobile forces primarily tasked with infrastructure protection.[384] In the memory of individual veterans and in much of the documentation, the names were largely interchangeable; in a practical sense, there was no distinction between the *Notrim/Ghaffirs* and the JSP, other than uniforms. The JSP and *Notrim* both resulted from cooperation between the *Haganah* and Palestine Government. Members of the JSP and *Notrim* had Palestine Police ranks and regular uniforms provided by Palestine Government.[385] The *Haganah* and PPF instructed the training for both.[386] During this period, the JSP and *Notrim* had structures that suited both of their key stakeholders. The *Haganah* ran recruitment. Individuals joined the JSP through the Jewish Agency, generally at the encouragement of a *Haganah* (or in some cases IZL) officer.[387] Palestine Government appears to have had little to no role in recruit selection. This arrangement relieved Palestine Government of much of the weight and expense of the JSP/*Notrim*, while enabling the *Haganah* to control membership. The *Haganah* benefited from the training and arming of many of its own cadres. While operating within Palestine Government's command structure, the JSP and *Notrim* had a high degree of autonomy. Autonomy allowed the JSP/*Notrim* to participate in large-scale *Haganah* operations, some of which had objectives concurrent with those of Palestine Government.[388] Palestine Government made use of the *Haganah*'s resources

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382 *Ibid*
383 *Ibid*
384 Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010
385 Dayan (1976) p. 26
386 *Ibid*
387 Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010
388 Dayan (1976) p. 27

and provided the *Haganah* with legitimate cover for its armed cadres. As Palestine Government and the *Haganah* often had corresponding objectives during this period, this structure allowed them to cooperate while remaining officially distinct.

Orde Wingate's SNS grew out of the JSP/*Notrim* schemes but increased integration between Palestine Government and the *Haganah* to unprecedented levels. The SNS consisted of Yishuv and Imperial forces in mixed platoons and, while technically part of the police, functioned as part of the military.[389] *Haganah* command selected members from *Haganah* ranks and sent them to train with the SNS.[390] Hebrew was typically the language of instruction and Wingate, who was directly involved in the training, received a translator from the *Haganah*.[391] The course took place at a jointly operated *Haganah*-Palestine Government camp at Kibbutz Ein Hod and the Deputy Course Commander was a senior *Haganah* officer.[392] Thus, the SNS represented the highest level of structural integration achieved both prior to and during the Second World War. It operated under a joint command structure with the ability to call on support from either the Imperial or indigenous stakeholders.[393]

This level of joint structure did not last. In 1939, as the situation calmed in Palestine, Palestine Government disbanded the SNS. The reason is telling: authorities "were apprehensive of the lines on which the S.N.S. organisation was developing." In particular, Palestine Government, in the form of GOC Palestine, believed that it was "undesirable to have…Jews in SNS detachments."[394] The mood of Palestine Government had changed. It was no longer comfortable with the high level of integration of the *Haganah* into its security services and was concerned with the growing power and efficacy of the Zionist paramilitaries. From this point on, the Palestine Government was wary of appearing to have extensive cooperation with the Zionists.

[389] Chief Education Officer (1985) p. 102
[390] Interview with Avraham Silverstein, 4.1.2010
[391] Interview with Shlomo Tivishi, 8.8.2010; Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009
[392] Interview with Shlomo Tivishi, 8.8.2010
[393] Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010
[394] Sykes (1959) pp.194-195

One final structure of Imperial-Zionist cooperation appeared during the Arab Revolt. Best termed a structure of alliance, its basis was direct cooperation and joint operations. The joint operations surrounding the construction of a barrier across the Lebanese border provides the most prominent example of the functioning of this structure. The *Haganah* brought Jewish workers to the locations, constructed and guarded camps for the workers, and patrolled some of the area.[395] They received support from several British detachments in the same area. Each partner operated under an independent command structure and within its own logistics network. However, they functioned for a common objective. The British disbanded this structure at the end of the Arab revolt but returned to it towards the end of the Second World War.

During the Second World War, the structure of the relationship between Palestine Government and the *Haganah* continued and reaffirmed pre-war structures. With the transfer of British forces to Europe (1938-39), the JSP gradually assumed responsibility for many military functions.[396] The JSP/*Notrim* grew in strength to around 19,000, a number that independent *Haganah* formations could reinforce.[397] The PPF's CID became nervous about the jointly structured organisation, pointing out in an intelligence summary that the majority of JSP members held allegiance to the *Haganah*.[398] With the outbreak of war, a major feature of security policy in Palestine became the disarming of forces participating in the structures of cooperation.[399] This shift in policy had a lasting impact on the structures created later during the war. The *Haganah* insisted that the design of any structure of cooperation preserve the *Haganah*'s security against British intelligence.

France fell to the Nazis in June 1940 and Lebanon and Syria came under Vichy control. This brought the war close to the Mandate and changed Palestine Government's behaviour regarding cooperation with the Yishuv. One of the first issues addressed by increased cooperation with the

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[395] Chief Education Officer (1985) p. 101
[396] Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010
[397] Marcel Roubicek, *Echo of the Bugle: Extinct Military and Constabulary Forces in Palestine and Transjordan 1915-1967,* (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 40
[398] AHTA, 47/78 (CID, CID Intelligence Summery, No 19/39, 17.3.1939, p. 4)
[399] TNA, WO 169/148 (G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940)

Haganah was the possibility of German and Italian submarines and aircraft reaching Palestine. This threat demanded the creation of forces to watch for signs of their approach.[400] The Palestine Government raised two indigenous forces to fulfil this vital function: the Coast Watch and the Air Watch. The forces consisted of small units deployed throughout the length and breadth of the territory and were primarily drawn from the reserve force of the *Haganah*.[401] A British commanding officer led each unit; all other personnel were local recruits from the Yishuv.[402] For Palestine Government, this was a relatively comfortable reliance on indigenous forces in which the watchmen received rifles but minimal combat training.[403]

As the military situation in Palestine became more precarious throughout the summer and autumn of 1940, Palestine Government returned to a tried and true method of augmenting its defence capacity; the JSP/*Notrim*. In late 1939 and early 1940, Palestine Government had steadily scaled back the programme, but by late 1940, the JSP was again expanding. JSP training took on an increasingly paramilitary character, though at this point it still concentrated only on the use of small arms.[404] The *Haganah* oversaw most of the JSP structure, including much of the training and command decision making and some of the logistics.[405] JSP members reportedly received their deployment orders and postings from the *Haganah*.[406] Recruits joined the JSP/*Notrim*, not through an Imperial authority, but through the local office of the Jewish Agency or on the recommendation of a *Haganah* officer.[407] In other words, by late 1940, although the JSP was still technically under British authority, in reality the *Haganah* ran the JSP autonomously.

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[400] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 8.1.2010
[401] *Ibid*
[402] *Ibid*
[403] *Ibid*
[404] Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010
[405] *Ibid*
[406] *Ibid*
[407] *Ibid*

This form of delegation by the Imperial authorities increased when the invasion of Palestine appeared an imminent threat in 1941-42.[408] The threat prompted a change in Palestine Government's policy towards the forces of the Yishuv. The government started employing the JSP to guard vulnerable locations and bases to free up combat soldiers for other functions.[409] The cooperative structure remained roughly the same. The Palestine Government was nominally in control, while operational power rested with the *Haganah*. In this period, a debate emerged within the Palestine Government. The GOC Palestine supported further militarisation of the JSP programme, while the office of the High Commissioner vehemently disagreed.[410] As the threat of invasion receded, further militarisation proved unnecessary and the JSP's structure and nature did not change. The Palestine Government was at best unhappy with the structure of its relationship with the JSP and most reluctant to grant it any additional capabilities. As Palestine Government later noted, it was aware that much of the JSP came from the *Haganah*, which Palestine Government perceived as 'a menace to security since there can be no guarantee that under the stress of politics, they will not be used against us.'[411]

The invasion scare of 1941 also led to the creation of a home guard in Palestine, modelled on the one operating concurrently in Britain.[412] In structural terms, the home guard was virtually identical to its British cousin with one main difference: it seems to have had dual allegiances to GOC Palestine and HC Palestine.[413] This unusual civil-military allegiance is representative of many of the problems inherent in the structure of the relationship between indigenous forces and the Empire in Palestine. There was no unity between the government and the military authorities in Palestine and the two groups did not necessarily share a similar set of aims. This

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[408] For more on the history of these events see: James Barr, *A Line in the Sand. Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* (London, 2011)
[409] Horne (1982) p. 251
[410] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 2.5.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)
[411] TNA, CO 733/448/15, (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 1.4.1942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)
[412] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)
[413] *Ibid*

resulted, in part, from Palestine Government's attempts to retain as much control as possible over all aspects of power in Palestine. Sometimes, as in the case of the home guard, this effort came at the risk of muddling operational structures.

With Rommel's advance to the borders of Egypt in 1942, Palestine Government was willing to surrender power. Both indigenous and regular security forces came under the sole authority of GOC Palestine.[414] The PPF and JSP officially became military organisations with police functions rather than police organisations with paramilitary functions.

There is enough evidence from this period and from early 1943 to provide a detailed understanding of the internal structure of the JSP/*Notrim* and the structure of the cooperative relationship between the *Haganah* and Palestine Government that it epitomised. The recruitment and deployment of Yitzhak Verdanon, a member of the *Haganah,* who joined the JSP during this period, seems indicative of the common pattern. Verdanon approached a *Haganah* manpower officer and indicated his desire to enter uniformed service but not the British Army.[415] The officer placed him in the JSP and sent him to a *Haganah*-JSP liaison officer. The liaison officer took him to a PPF post and told the British NCO that Verdanon was to be in the JSP at Kefar Giladi (a kibbutz on the Lebanese border) and to 'enlist him as a pickup truck driver.' That is exactly what happened.[416] This anecdote describes the typical path many recruits took into the JSP. It also demonstrates the integration of the structures of the JSP and *Haganah*. In terms of recruitment and manpower allocation, it is difficult to see where the *Haganah* ended and the JSP began. In many ways, this structure benefitted both parties. It allowed the *Haganah* to control its resource allocation and maintain effective control of the JSP, while Palestine Government did not have to go through the effort and expense of recruitment.

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[414] Horne (1982) p. 249
[415] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010
[416] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010

The JSP/*Notrim* were organised in several regional battalions spread across the territory.[417]

Within each battalion, the individual units were widely dispersed. For example, in 12th Battalion (Northern Palestine), every kibbutz or Jewish settlement had a garrison of roughly 3-5 JSP, with mobile patrols of *Notrim* operating from larger bases and police stations.[418] Each company had a British commanding officer of the rank of captain and a deputy commander of the rank of lieutenant. The British officers were often stationed dozens of kilometres from the operational stations.[419] *Haganah* officers filled all subordinate positions.[420] The JSP members interviewed in the course of this research all indicated that their only contact with Imperial command came during training and on payday. The rest of the time, the JSP operated solely under the authority of the *Haganah*.[421] Moreover, on those occasions when instructions came through the Imperial chain of command, JSP units would not act on them until they received approval from the *Haganah*.[422] The British officers apparently knew this was the case.[423] Official oversight existed in the form of a logbook at every post, which recorded all movements and patrols of personnel. This proved easy to circumvent.[424] JSP/*Notrim* members often amended it to cover up activities outside official sanction.[425]

The training and logistics structure of the JSP involved even closer cooperation between the Imperial authorities and the *Haganah*. For example, the JSP and the *Haganah* in the Galil region shared a primary base and regional headquarters at Ayelet HaShachar.[426] Training was also a joint enterprise. In Ein Hashofet, there was a joint training course. The British knew it as Corporals'

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[417] Mentioned in most interviews of JSP members
[418] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010
[419] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010
[420] *Ibid*
[421] Mentioned in most interviews of JSP members
[422] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010
[423] Mentioned in most interviews with JSP members
[424] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010
[425] *Ibid*
[426] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010

Course and the *Haganah* as Squad Commanders' Course.[427] The instructors on the course came

from the ranks of both the *Haganah* and Imperial forces.[428] This clearly demonstrates that,

despite official statements to the contrary, the relationship between Palestine Government and

the *Haganah* was conceived and built upon a structure of mutual benefit and coordination.

One further form of cooperation existed between Palestine Government and the *Haganah*.

During the *Saison de Chasse* the Jewish Agency ordered the *Haganah* to assist Palestine

Government in the suppression of the IZL rebellion.[429] The complete structure of the

relationship has proven difficult to pin down given the available time and resources for this body

of research. During the *Saison,* local cooperation with the British seems to have taken place at a

high level. Rarely does it seem there was any direct coordination between British and *Haganah*

operational units.[430] The structures of cooperation were such that this was not a case of the

Haganah acting either as a local auxiliary or as a pseudo-gang working at the behest of an imperial

master. It was, perhaps, the reverse.

An incident related by Hayim Miller, an officer in one of the *Haganah* intelligence units, best

illustrates the structural arrangements during the *Saison*. According to Miller, his team located a

suspect in a cinema in Tel Aviv. Miller contacted Ephraim Dekel, a senior *Haganah* intelligence

officer who was Miller's commanding officer.[431] Imperial forces quickly surrounded the cinema

and began detaining all patrons who matched the description that Miller had given to Dekel.[432]

This case demonstrates the regular operating structure of the cooperation: the *Haganah* provided

forces to augment British capabilities, but the forces were entirely independent of the British

command and logistics structure. Despite the separate structures, the units of the *Saison* could

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[427] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010
[428] *Ibid*
[429] AHTA, 47/20 (CID, Jewish Re-action to Terrorism, 3.11.1944)
[430] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010
[431] *Ibid*
[432] *Ibid*

coordinate at a lower level with the British when necessary, though this was primarily to provide time sensitive information regarding unfolding operations.[433]

The dual nature of the organisational structure was a hallmark of all forms of cooperation between the *Haganah* and Palestine Government. The level of autonomy the *Haganah* enjoyed varied during the Second World War. However, the autonomy never disappeared entirely. In this way, the structure of the relationship between Palestine Government and the indigenous forces resembled an alliance of two independent actors rather than a hierarchical relationship between a government and the governed. The autonomy of the *Haganah* was a consistent feature of all cooperative structures established between the *Haganah* and Imperial Forces.

One such cooperative structure was that between the British Army and the *Haganah*. The British Army employed indigenous forces in Palestine for three purposes: recruitment, skilled labour, and force augmentation. Each objective required a different structure but only the third, force augmentation, comes directly under the brief of this project. This structure was essentially an extension of the guides scheme, though under army direction. In providing force augmentation, individual members of the Yishuv volunteered to serve as scouts and guides embedded in regiments deployed to Palestine following the Arab riots of 1936.[434] This created a fully organic structure where a guide would stay with the same battalion until it cycled out of Palestine. Beyond this structure, there is evidence that the guides were also able to use their status as members of the *Haganah* to call on *Haganah* reinforcements for the battalions with whom they served.[435]

In 1941, Operation Exporter required a new type of scout familiar with the terrain across the border, and not embedded in Imperial units. The scouts guided Imperial forces to the start line

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[433] *Ibid*
[434] Interview with Hayim Kravi, 11.8.2010
[435] *Ibid*

for the campaign and to initial objectives across the border. In some cases, they participated in operations to secure these objectives.[436] The *Palmach* recruited the scouts under order from the *Haganah*. The basis of this order was a request for assistance by the Imperial forces.[437] In this arrangement, the scouts came into the British command structure as fully formed units, supplied by both British and *Haganah* logistics.[438] The units had latitude in their size, in some cases reaching up to three times the size authorised by Imperial command.[439] The scouting units of the *Haganah* recruited irregular guides of their own from among the Arab, Circassian, and Druze residents of the border regions.[440] In this arrangement, the individual scouting units did not liaise with the Imperial divisions. Instead, they operated under *Haganah* operations command in Haifa, which liaised with the overall Imperial command.[441] Once the campaign commenced, the *Haganah* units integrated with the divisional reconnaissance elements before demobilising upon gaining the initial objectives.[442]

In addition to the British Army, a plethora of intelligence and special service organisations operated in the Middle East, each of whom formed their own relationships with the indigenous forces when it suited their purposes. According to the noted historian of the Special Services, M.R.D. Foot, the SOE, SIS, and PWE, as well as each service department's intelligence branch, the Foreign Office, several governments in exile, the Security Service, proto-governments, and others, all had presences and ran their own operations in Palestine Mandate.[443] The largest special service organisations in the Middle East were the SOE and its predecessors. The SOE seems to have been the one of the few to employ indigenous forces as opposed to individual agents. The first of the SOE precursors to make its presence felt in Palestine Mandate was Section D, which

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[436] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[437] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010; Dayan (1976) p. 45
[438] Dayan (1976) pp. 45-46
[439] *Ibid*
[440] *Ibid*
[441] Dayan (1976) p. 47
[442] *Ibid*, Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[443] Foot (1976) p. 158

immediately began arrangements with the Jewish Agency. The initial negotiations took place between senior field officers in Section D and senior *Haganah* officials.[444] At their first meeting, the parties agreed that the method of arriving at all future policy decisions would be equal input from the *Haganah* officers and the SOE field commander for Palestine (D/H).[445] This set the tone for the structure that was to develop; separate, but roughly equal.

The *Haganah*'s semi-clandestine nature and its previous experience with the policy changes of Palestine Government determined much of the structure of the relationship between the *Haganah* and Special Services. According to SOE records, the Jewish Agency did not want to work through official channels out of fear of damage to their 'political ambitions'.[446] As a result, the initial design of the structure meant that in order to preserve the separation of the SOE and the *Haganah*, liaison would take place only at the senior levels.[447] To keep some form of plausible deniability, the structure was entirely secret from both the Palestine Government and the military.[448] This compartmentalisation was to cause a number of problems, culminating in the temporary withdrawal of the Section D mission in mid-1940.[449]

Despite this general structure, the Special Services went to great lengths to ensure that the *Haganah* received the cover of official sanction.[450] This sanction took the form of a document that prevented local authorities from interfering with any of the *Haganah*'s clandestine work for the Special Services.[451] In practice, this gave the *Haganah* carte blanche to stockpile weapons and conduct training with impunity. Through the realities of this sanction, and despite the best-intentioned agreements in principle, the Special Services and the *Haganah* entwined.

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[444] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/L, Document to D/H, 21.3.40, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)
[445] *Ibid*
[446] TNA, HS 3/207 (Notes on Activities in Palestine, Autumn 1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[447] *Ibid*; AHTA, 80/563(פ)/12 (Memoranda Covering Subjects of Discussion at Meeting Held at Haifa, 13.7.1940)
[448] AHTA, 80/563(פ)/11 (A.W. Lawerence, Letter to David, 31.8.1940)
[449] *Ibid*
[450] AHTA, 80/563(פ)/12 (Memoranda Covering Subjects of Discussion at Meeting Held at Haifa, 13.7.1940)
[451] *Ibid*

Another result of these early negotiations was the establishment of the command and liaison structure, which remained largely unchanged throughout the course of the cooperation. In these early days of cooperation, the command structure preserved the principle of separation. The *Haganah* suggested projects that were within its capabilities and when D received operational requirements from the army it considered the *Haganah*'s capabilities.[452]

The *Haganah* and the SOE established a joint planning structure, which remained the cornerstone of all their future efforts. The structure consisted of two appointed liaisons, a senior officer of *Haganah* and a senior field officer from Section D/SOE.[453] The SOE field commander in Palestine retained the ultimate authority to approve operations, but would delegate to the liaisons in most cases, according to the structure.[454]

In 1940, the overall structure of the relationship manifested in two organisational structures: logistics and operations. The realm of logistics best maintained the principle of separation. Section D procured supplies and then delivered them to the *Haganah*.[455] The *Haganah* maintained them in secret stores outside the control of D.[456] The *Haganah* kept records of the supplies and made both the supplies procured by D and those already held by the *Haganah* available for D's use.[457] Section D established its own arms dumps, solely under British control, which were to be made available to the *Haganah* should the need arise.[458] The arrangements placed the SOE in the position of smuggling weapons and explosives into Palestine Mandate for the use of an illegal

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[452] *Ibid*
[453] *Ibid*
[454] *Ibid*
[455] *Ibid*
[456] *Ibid*
[457] *Ibid*
[458] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HP, Report to A/D, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940); W/T had a similar arrangement - AHTA, 80/563(ס)/11 (Minutes of Meeting Held Between D/H Organisation and Friends, 29.7.1940)

clandestine militant organisation.[459] This later became one of the key arguments employed by Palestine Government in its attempt to disband the SOE in Palestine.

Provision of supplies was not entirely one sided as Section D and later the SOE found that the Jewish Agency's ability to manufacture explosives was both significant and relatively inexpensive.[460] In the Middle East theatre, the Jewish Agency and *Haganah* became the primary sources for explosives purchased by the Special Services.[461] The principle of separation was again preserved in that D, and later SOE, paid for the delivery of the explosives from sources that were, at least in theory, legitimate manufacturers.

The principle of separation became muddled when it came to operational matters. The *Haganah* maintained autonomy in regional operations, within reason. The SOE encouraged the *Haganah* to make exploratory arrangements in the Balkans, Iraq, Iran, and Syria 'to establish whatever contacts they thought might be necessary for possible sabotage work, without getting involved in Arab politics.'[462] As training was an area of joint responsibility and significant contact it was one of areas in which the principle of separation eroded. Integration in the area of training increased throughout the war. In 1940, it was restricted to training courses in sabotage. While Section D provided the instructors and legal protection, the *Haganah* provided the personnel and facilities.[463] In the late summer and early autumn of 1940, some of the contradictions inherent in the structure--especially its secrecy from the rest of the Imperial services--led to a conflict with the GOC Palestine.[464] As a result, Section D withdrew from Palestine.[465] Its head of mission, A.W. Lawerence, travelled to London 'bent on making a stink'.[466] He was successful in this effort and, by 1941, the SOE had returned to Palestine with a new mandate for further cooperation.

[459] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/11 (Minutes of Meeting Held Between D/H Organisation and Friends, 29.7.1940)
[460] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/12 (Memoranda Covering Subjects of Discussion at Meeting Held at Haifa, 13.7.1940)
[461] *Ibid*
[462] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HP, Report to A/D, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)
[463] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/12 (Memoranda Covering Subjects of Discussion at Meeting Held at Haifa, 13.7.1940)
[464] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/11 (A.W. Lawerence, Letter to David, 31.8.1940)
[465] *Ibid*
[466] *Ibid*

This mandate eliminated the earlier need to hide the relationship from the other Imperial authorities. The new openness allowed for a more integrated structure.

Through 1941, the structure of the relationship between the Special Services and the *Haganah* changed on the operational level. The 'Friends Scheme' was primarily responsible for this change. The 'Friends Scheme' grew out of the new openness of the relationship and the need to begin running operations in the neighbouring Vichy-controlled territories. The 'Friends Scheme' expanded the training programmes created in 1940 and allowed Imperial Officers to command newly created *Palmach* units.[467] Whether the officers were actually in command has proven impossible to verify. At the very least, this scheme resulted in operational and tactical level liaison in addition to the previously existing command level liaisons.

Despite these changes, the SOE and *Haganah* preserved their separation in operations in the Vichy territories. In the operations to liberate Free French personnel in Vichy custody, the Jewish Agency acted independently, with only the merest oversight from the SOE.[468] In this instance, the Jewish Agency was in charge of all active operations, including the logistics.[469] The SOE says as much in its report on the situation, stating that 'it would appear that the whole matter, both of arranging payments (*to bribe Vichy officials*) and for the active work involved were in the hands of Friends.'[470] If the SOE required information on the progress or nature of the operations, it had to request them from the Jewish Agency.[471]

By 1942, the integration of the Special Services and *Haganah* and, conversely, the *Haganah*'s ability to act autonomously had increased. Several schemes reflected this increased autonomy.

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[467] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.5, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[468] TNA, HS 3/210 (D/H19, Report to D/HB, 3.2.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)
[469] *Ibid*
[470] *Ibid*
[471] *Ibid*

While the Friends Scheme and the special units of the *Palmach* were formed in 1941, they were more a feature of 1942. The Palestine Scheme seems to have been a new arrival in 1942. Despite the addition of new schemes, the cooperation's general structure remained unchanged; a specially appointed Imperial officer maintained liaison with a *Haganah* liaison.[472] One of the evolutionary changes of 1942 was in the integration of the two organisations' logistics structures. According to Uri Horowitz, a *Palmach* member who first received training at the Ben Shemen training facility that was likely a part of the Friends Scheme, the *Palmach* received everything they needed, including weapons, materials, ammunition, explosives, and training instructors, from British Intelligence.[473] From what Horowitz saw, the direction of the supplies was under a British colonel with whom they closely cooperated.[474] This is particularly interesting as it contradicts the initial plans drawn up by the SOE for the logistics of the scheme, which guaranteed that the supplies for the scheme would remain under Imperial control.[475]

Later, in the Mishmar HaEmek training camp, the *Palmach* units received training from *Palmach* instructors who had attended an SOE run instructors' course.[476] The SOE still directly ran special courses, such as explosives course.[477] An SOE officer, at least in theory, had the responsibility not just for running the course, but maintaining camp discipline.[478] The SOE and *Haganah* jointly wrote the syllabus at the training camps for both the Palestine Scheme and the Friends Scheme.[479]

A crisis in early July 1942 provides an unusually clear illustration of the level of logistical and financial integration of the Palestine Scheme. By July 1942, the monthly payment to the Jewish

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[472] TNA, HS 3/207 (Telegram, Local 305, 10.6.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[473] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[474] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[475] TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from 4.4.1942 Note from Cairo to London, 11.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[476] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[477] TNA, HS 3/207 (Telegram, Local 305, 10.6.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[478] *Ibid*
[479] TNA, HS 3/207 (Minutes from Meeting about Friends Scheme Syria, 14.11.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

Agency for the resources of the Palestine Scheme was 'considerably overdue' and this was causing serious problems with the scheme.[480] The SOE believed that without the payment, the organisation created by the *Haganah* for sabotage and intelligence would fall apart.[481] Without the payments to the Jewish Agency, the SOE felt its ability to function was in jeopardy, as it was fully reliant on the ability of the *Haganah* provided personnel and the Jewish Agency to provide supplies and was concerned that these organisations would abandon the SOE.[482]

The *Haganah* implemented the operational structures of these schemes with relatively little oversight from the Imperial authorities. The SOE determined that the Palestine and Friends Scheme forces would operate in six small regional units around the country.[483] The structure of the *Palmach* mirrored this, with six regional companies located in roughly the same locations.[484] Although, theoretically, the regional units were under the control of the SOE, Hebrew was the language of the records and reports of the regional cells.[485] As the SOE in Palestine seems to have had few, if any, members with advanced comprehension of Hebrew, in practice the SOE could exercise little oversight.

As the immediate threat to Palestine receded, the SOE, among others, grew nervous of the autonomy allowed under these structures and tried to rein in their *Haganah* allies. In 1943 all direct cooperation ceased but the channels of communication and liaison established at the highest levels remained open and relations between the two organisations remained positive.[486]

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[480] TNA, HS3/207 HS 3/207 (Telegram from Cairo, 11.7.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H271, Telegram to AD/H, 12.07.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[481] *Ibid*
[482] *Ibid*
[483] TNA, HS 3/207 (Revised Palestine Scheme, 15.7.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[484] *Ibid*
[485] *Ibid*); TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H226, Memorandum on Events in Palestine and Syria, 28.9.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for September 1942, 6.10.42, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943)
[486] TNA, HS 7/85 (Memorandum on SOE Activities in Arab Countries, pp.1-30, SOE History 52, SOE Activities in Arab Countries, 1941-1943, p. 12)

The German Unit of the *Palmach* provides an additional, well-documented illustration of the structure of cooperation between the *Haganah* and SOE on the levels of operations and training. In some ways, it is microcosm of the whole. At least at first, both the *Haganah* and British Intelligence provided the logistics for the unit.[487] The British provided weapons, explosives, and German uniforms for the unit.[488] The unit's training was entirely a joint operation. The unit received training in close quarters combat and assassination from Hector Grant-Taylor (reputed to be one of the SOE's better instructors in the subject) and weapons courses, explosives courses, sabotage courses, and naval courses from the *Haganah*'s best instructors.[489] The *Haganah* also provided the facilities to undertake the training, while the SOE provided cover to allow the facility to operate without too much interference from the local authorities.[490] Other than one review by a British intelligence officer, the *Haganah* was free to run the camp under SOE cover as it saw fit.[491] Several members deployed on behalf of British intelligence to infiltrate POWs held in an Imperial prison and gain intelligence.[492] In this operation, the German Unit members functioned as an organic unit of the intelligence service under solely Imperial command.[493]

When the SOE and *Haganah* began to part ways towards the end of 1942, the unit continued for some time outside the support of the SOE.[494] It cached arms and supplies in various 'slics' (underground arms dumps) and continued its training clandestinely.[495] British intelligence sought to bring the unit formally under Imperial control.[496] The *Haganah* would not condone this and

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[487] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010, Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010
[488] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010, Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010
[489] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010, Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010, Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010
[490] Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010
[491] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010
[492] Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010
[493] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010
[494] Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010
[495] *Ibid*; Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010
[496] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010; Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010

eventually they disbanded the German unit.[497] The commander of German unit stayed in contact with the SOE through late 1944 but nothing ever came of this.[498]

In Palestine, the structures of the relationships between the Imperial authorities and the local organisations with whom they cooperated, partially determined the nature and employment of the indigenous forces. The various structures had certain points of commonality and were affected by the long-term goals of the various actors. The Palestine Government's wish to maintain its authority affected its relationships and as a result – with the exception of periods of emergency – led it to prefer a structure that attempted to minimise the capabilities granted to indigenous forces while maximising the contribution of these forces. On the other hand, organisations such as the SOE were more focused on the immediate war effort and more open to structures which allowed the indigenous forces to gain capabilities and maximise operational effectiveness. In all cases, the structures allowed for a large degree of freedom of action on the part of the indigenous forces. The structures were such that they served the interests of both the Imperial authorities and their local partners. The *Haganah* also had agency and was able to fulfil its own goals of acquiring training and resources while at the same time providing tactical assets and manpower for the Imperial authorities.

For the Imperial authorities, the relationship structures also fulfilled political objectives. The JSP, the structure allowed Palestine Government to claim authority where none existed. The SOE-*Haganah* relationship structure allowed the SOE to keep the *Haganah* officially at arm's length while in practical terms, collaborating very closely. Under the pressure of the two invasion scares, first the threat from Syria and Lebanon (1941 and 1942), these political goals became secondary to military necessity and the structures changed to take full advantage of the contributions the indigenous forces could make. The Imperial authorities granted more autonomy to the

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[497] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010; Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010
[498] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010

indigenous forces and allocated more resources and support to them. The structures took into account that the indigenous forces were more suited to roles such as scouting, which took advantage of the region-specific knowledge that the forces possessed, rather than conventional combat. The structure of the *Saison de Chasse* also took advantage of indigenous force knowledge and granted the indigenous forces autonomy and freedom of action.

Throughout the war, the structures of the relationships in Palestine Mandate served the interests of both the British and indigenous forces. They optimised the role of the indigenous forces in regional defence. Only objections within the Imperial government to the employment of the forces and the occasional need of the Imperial authorities to present an outward veneer of either control or distance in relation to their local partners tempered cooperation.

Horn of Africa

In the Horn of Africa there was no single structure of cooperation. Several structures existed simultaneously. Unlike Palestine Mandate, the existence of multiple fronts meant that structures not only varied according to the British organisation involved, but by front as well. The structures on the northern front, the southern front, and the Nile valley front differed significantly from each other. The cooperation on all those fronts is also divisible into cooperation between the British and *arbagnoch*, and the British and other more traditional indigenous forces with their colonies. While the research for this dissertation included these more traditional indigenous forces in its consideration, the limits of this project necessitated a more singular focus on one indigenous force. Given that cooperation with the *arbagnoch* was the largest in scale and scope, it made sense to retain a focus on it.

The structures in the Horn of Africa evolved over time. As the purpose of cooperation shifted, so too did the structures. Despite some pre-war planning and preparation, when hostilities commenced, there was no structure for cooperation with indigenous forces within IEA. During

the initial period of cooperation, the structure was concentrated on strategic defence. As the balance of resources and initiative changed, the British began operations with the purpose of a strategic offensive. This shift began around November 1940 and continued through the entry of Imperial forces into Addis in April 1941. The period between April and June represented a transition as primary offensive operations wound down and much needed forces were transferred to the Western desert to support the preparations for Operation Battleaxe and the relief of the siege of Tobruk. During this period, the primary command in East Africa transitioned from the various Sudan based commands to 12th African Division. Primary responsibility for coordination with the *arbagnoch* transitioned from the Special Services to the British Army. The final period began in June 1941, when command of the irregular forces switched solely to the conventional Imperial forces. At this point, the operation transitioned from an offensive operation to an operation concerned with neutralising the last pockets of Italian resistance and stabilising Ethiopia under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie.

The initial British plan for *arbagnoch* cooperation called for the indigenous forces to operate largely independently in order to distract the Italians and force them to expend resources on security. As the possibility of a significant offensive into IEA became reality, the British began to revisit structure and adapt it to achieve new operational objectives. Although there is no clear causal link between changing objectives and the changing structure, there is a strong correlation. Resource availability was also partially responsible for the alterations in structure. As more resources became available, more options were possible.

Before mid-August 1940, the British ran cooperation through facilities in Sudan. By travelling to depots in Sudan *arbagnoch* could secure money, weaponry, and eventually imperial favour. Even when Mission 101 crossed the border into IEA and the second phase of cooperation began, aspects of the previous structure remained, undercutting 101's capacity to induce cooperation. The intention behind Mission 101 was never to command the *arbagnoch* for specific missions.

The goal was to promulgate the rebellion and increase its efficiency as much as possible through facilitating supply and gaining influence. The structures that developed reflected this. The *arbagnoch* remained entirely autonomous, forcing Mission 101 to rely on persuasion. The transition to the new structures under Mission 101 was far from smooth. Rather than developing a joint structure for cooperation as a synthesis between the two structures, the structure of cooperation between the *arbagnoch* and 101 formed through the interaction between the two entirely separate structures. While this interaction exacerbated the weaknesses in Mission 101's internal structure, it began mitigating the weaknesses within the *arbagnoch* structures.

The primary objective of Mission 101 was to support the defence of Sudan through spreading the rebellion across IEA. It was hoped that this would isolate the Italian position and inhibit the Italian ability to move forces in the border regions during a period when Sudan was in crisis. To this end, the original operational orders for the mission emphasised the need to maintain economy of resource.[499] 101 and the *arbagnoch* could also receive technical specialists as and when needed, but not on a permanent basis.[500] The primary operational mission was to both encourage and unify the rebellion. Mission 101 was to select priorities and objectives for the *arbagnoch* and influence the indigenous forces by means of 'advice, supplies, and general encouragement.'[501] The ideas enshrined in the instructions became the governing principles of the structure of Mission 101.

Initially, there were three 'columns' to Mission 101, the third of which never arrived at the rendezvous.[502] In design, each column could function independently, with its own W/T facilities

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[499] TNA, HS 8/261 (GHQ Middle East Operations Instruction No.1, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, 10.6.1940, MI(R) Operational Reports)
[500] *Ibid*
[501] *Ibid*
[502] Mockler (1984) p. 259; David Shinn & Thomas Ofcansky, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia 2nd Edition* (Plymouth, UK, 2013) p. 293; For more on Wienholt and the disappearance of his column albeit from a somewhat Australiocentric adventure novel perspective see: Duncan McNab, *Mission 101: The Untold Story of the SOE and the Second World War in Ethiopia* (Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK, 2012).

and ciphers.[503] The internal structures of each of the three to some extent resembled each other. Sandford's column, as the headquarters column, had the largest staff, including two signallers, another special services officer, a medical orderly, a doctor, and a representative from the Emperor, as well as around 50 Ethiopian and Sudanese personnel, including mule drivers and servants/porters.[504] The concept behind the structure was that 101 could penetrate the border and carry with it sufficient weapons to distribute while maintaining its mobility. Having penetrated into IEA, Mission 101 moved among areas under *arbagnoch* control, relying on the *arbagnoch* for security and support.[505] In this way, successfully building cooperation with the *arbagnoch* was both necessary for Mission 101 to fulfil its operational objectives, and its survival.

The continued existence of the pre-101 pathway hampered the development of Mission 101's structure and its effectiveness. The presence of both the Emperor and the supply depots in Sudan created dual centres of gravity within the indigenous-British relationship during the Mission 101 period. All of the means by which the relationship functioned were present in both centres. Sudan, which had more supplies to distribute in addition to the presence of Haile Selasie but Sudan was not set up to create coordination or exert influence on the *arbagnoch*. Sudan was not supposed to have continued as a centre of cooperation at all. According to the plans for cooperation, Mission 101 was supposed to have been the source for supplies and influence. Instead, the dual centres of gravity meant that 101 found the *arbagnoch* more interested in what Sudan could offer than in coordinating with Mission 101.[506] When the *arbagnoch* leadership went to Sudan, they frequently took their followers with them, further undercutting the intended structure of Mission 101-*arbagnoch* cooperation.[507] Having received weapons from 101 in

[503] Mockler (1984) p. 229
[504] Allen (1943) p. 34; Platt (1962), Lecture 2, pp. 6-7; Thesiger (1987) p.326
[505] Thesiger (1987) p.324; Allen (1943) p. 34; TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam, p. 37); Mockler (1984) p. 259
[506] TNA, WO 178/36 (26.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (17.9.1940 South of Khor Dadalub, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (6.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[507] *Ibid*

exchange for promises of assistance, the *arbagnoch* could freely ignore their commitments and go to Sudan, where they could gain imperial favour and receive still more weapons and funds. This created a cycle wherein some leaders constantly requested more and more weapons without delivering on promises.[508] The British forces in Sudan were not passive actors in this problematic structure. Officers within the structure that predated 101 corresponded directly with *arbagnoch* leaders and invited them to Sudan.[509] Despite requests, the Sudan based officers refused to curb these activities and support Mission 101.[510] The existence of the dual structures added a level of dysfunction into the relationship structure. This eventually culminated in a situation in which 101 had difficulty in achieving even relatively basic local objectives due to the sheer number of fighters and leadership travelling to Sudan.[511][512]

Mission 101 cooperated with the *arbagnoch* in three distinct but interconnected pathways: direct cooperation, logistics, and coordination and planning. There were two forms of structure for direct cooperation. The first was in joint operations, where the *arbagnoch* and the forces of Mission 101 acted in concert against the enemy, and the second was the provision of bodyguards and scouts from among the *arbagnoch* to accompany Mission 101. Within the category of joint operations, the most successful of the structures established were those which provided intelligence for 101 and communications between Mission 101 and the *arbagnoch*. In this form of cooperation, the *arbagnoch* gave 101 access to their intelligence assets, as well as messengers to provide Mission 101 with the ability to stay in communication with many of the arbagnoch leaders across western Gojjam.[513] The other form of joint operations involved British officers planning and carrying out assaults together with *arbagnoch* forces. This structure was, at least at first, problematic. The British had no way to guarantee that the *arbagnoch* understood the

[508] TNA, WO 178/36 (10.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[509] TNA, WO 178/36 (12.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[510] TNA, WO 178/36 (30.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[511] TNA, WO 178/36 (31.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[512] Sykes (1959) p. 243
[513] Mockler (1984) p.266

directions and no means by which to influence the *arbagnoch* towards a given activity.[514] This structure, like the more successful structures which followed it, was based on the integration of British into the *arbagnoch* structure. The governing principle of the structure was that the British provided higher-level coordination and planning, which the *arbagnoch* lacked, and the *arbagnoch* provided the manpower the British sorely needed. Without a way to exert influence and control the *arbagnoch* and without a means by which to successfully communicate, this particular structure was inadequate.

The provision of escorts and bodyguards similarly relied on the *arbagnoch* for manpower. As Mission 101 moved from safe area to safe area, the *arbagnoch* provided scouts to cross potentially hostile areas. In this way, Mission 101 moved through a 'ladder' of *arbagnoch*.[515] In each area, they cooperated with the local leadership. In some cases, this system worked well and the *arbagnoch* scouted ahead and provided security.[516] The weakness of the structure for this type of cooperation was that 101 could not exert either coercive or remunerative pressure on the *arbagnoch* in a consistent manner. As a result, the *arbagnoch* were not always reliable in the face of superior opportunities and pressure. The case of Fit'awrari Fanta is illustrative of the manner in which this manifested. On 14th September 1940, Fit'awrari Fanta promised that he and an escort of twenty-four fighters would accompany the movement of Mission 101 the following day.[517] On the 15th, Fanta brought with him only nine fighters – the rest had instead gone to Sudan where they could procure more rifles.[518] This left 101 potentially exposed and in a dangerous situation.

The logistical structures by which the British distributed weaponry, money, and supplies in exchange for services were a major feature of the relationship between the British and the

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[514] *Ibid* p. 227

[515] One example of this means is that in Aossa, the Gojjami escorts of Mission 101 left after 101 was handed over to Aossan arbagnoch - WO 178/36 – 101 Abyssinia Northern Section – War Diary 09-1940 through 10.4.1941; 17.9.1940, WO 178/36 – 101 Abyssinia Northern Section – War Diary 09-1940 through 10.4.1941

[516] TNA, WO 178/36 (19.9.1940 Khor Zinghir, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[517] TNA, WO 178/36 (14.9.1940, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[518] TNA, WO 178/36 (15.9.1940, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

arbagnoch during the period of Mission 101. These were the structures for which the British had best prepared. The British stockpiled Maria Theresa Dollars (the only universally recognised currency in IEA) and weaponry before the outbreak of war in IEA.[519] During the period of Mission 101 two distinct logistics structure for cooperation which competed and undermined each other's effectiveness. Thus, while by August, when Mission 101 crossed the border, there were one million Maria Theresa Dollars available, for 101 acquiring money to pay locals was a constant problem.[520] The dual poles of these structures were the depots of Sudan and the camps of Mission 101. On a basic level, the structure in both cases operated in a similar manner. As and when *arbagnoch* came to the depot in Sudan or to Mission 101, the British issued them with rifles and money. Mission 101 traded money, weaponry, and ammunition for local logistical necessities such as mules.[521] Part of the difficulties in the structure actually came from its success. As more *arbagnoch* approached Mission 101, 101 required more supplies, which took a long time to arrive. Thus, for 101, logistics were a constant concern and there were never enough rifles, ammunition, or food for all who came to the camp seeking them.[522] On the other hand, in Sudan, despite some concerns about distributing rifles to all comers without the ability to monitor their subsequent fates, the distribution of weaponry to the *arbagnoch* continued at a rapid pace.[523]

For Mission 101, the competing logistics structures created problems. 101 identified the importance of logistics in relation to influence and found that without a more functional logistics structure, their ability to achieve their objective – encouraging and spreading the rebellion - was precarious.[524] As Mission 101 recognised, there was a nexus between logistics and influence. While so far this section has dealt with logistics as its own pathway for cooperation with its own structure, it was also a subordinate facet of the structures of influence. When the logistics

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[519] Platt (1962), Lecture 2, p. 10

[521] TNA, WO 178/36 (12.9.1940 Near River Atbara, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[522] TNA, WO 178/36 (101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[523] Mockler (1984) p. 266, 263
[524] TNA, WO 178/36 (26.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

structure functioned, the pathways of influence operated. Without them, their functionality was significantly lessened.[525]

The primary structure of British-*arbagnoch* cooperation during the 101 period took place through the structure of the *arbagnoch* themselves. Logistics helped the British gain influence in the same way as it helped *arbagnoch* leaders within the relatively decentralised *arbagnoch* system. By distributing weaponry and money to the leadership, the British stepped into the role previously occupied by the Emperor within in the feudal structure. However, this only worked as long as Mission 101 could provide supplies.[526]

The British gained and exerted influence by acting as the missing level of superior coordination, planning, and command body. This was the level once held by the Emperor and his representatives. The major British activities within the structure were coordinating among the various levels of leadership, settling disputes and rivalries, and planning operations. When the British arrived in IEA, they found cooperation greatly hampered by rivalry among the various leaders. At times these leaders refused to collaborate with each other.[527] The British integrated into the *arbagnoch* as an arbitrator. This helped increase British influence as it established them as a body above the major leadership. It put them in a position to begin to coordinate and plan operations. In one case, two of the most powerful rival Gojjami leaders, *Dejazmach* Mangasha and *Dejazmach* Negash Bezibeh, found it in their mutual interest to cooperate but could not bring themselves to work together independently.[528] Mission 101 was able to facilitate the negotiations for their reconciliation and alliance because of its status as a body outside the system of feudal

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[525] TNA, WO 178/36 (13.12.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[526] *Ibid*
[527] There a number of cases of this such as recorded in a Mission 101 report - TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 20.11.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)
[528] Mockler (1984) p. 265; TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 1.11.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)

politics.[529] Much of Mission 101's efforts were devoted to this form of activity as part of efforts to gain influence within the *arbagnoch* structure.[530] Once Mission 101 gained influence over the *arbagnoch* leadership in a region and united them, even temporarily, it then stepped into the *arbagnoch* structure as a coordinating body. It provided information which became immediately actionable orders in the hands of *arbagnoch* leaders.[531] There were other attempts during the Mission 101 period to unite rival *arbagnoch* leaders by other means, such as attempting to persuade them to take part in direct operations with Mission 101 personnel, but these were significantly less successful.[532]

The structure of the British-*arbagnoch* relationship during the period of Mission 101 was primarily an extension of the *arbagnoch* structure. Through logistics and their role as an additional layer above the structures of feudal politics, while perceived as operating with the imprimatur of Haile Selassie, the British gained influence and were thereby able to act to coordinate and plan for the *arbagnoch*. This in turn put them in a position to gain more influence. This does not mean that the structure was without severe limitations and problems. These came in two primary forms: the dilution of influence stemming from the existence of two centres of gravity within the British structure and, problems in communication.

The effective implementation of the planned Mission 101- *arbagnoch* relationship structure was also hampered by problems in communication. One problem was the speed of communication. Without sufficient W/T, all messages between the *arbagnoch* and Mission 101 and many of the messages between 101 and Sudan were transmitted as letters carried by messengers.[533] This led to

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[529] Mockler (1984) p. 265; TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 1.11.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)

[530] TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 20.11.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)

[531] Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013; Mockler (1984) p. 220; TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 1.11.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)

[532] TNA, WO 201/277 (War History of No. 3 Idara, Eastern Arab Corps, Sudan Defence Force, 17.5.1940-2.12.1940)

[533] TNA, HS 3/5 (M.I.(R), Summary of Present Position with regard to Abyssinia, 6.8.1940, SOE Abyssinia, No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); WO 178/36 – 101 Abyssinia Northern Section –

a significant time lag, which in turn affected the ability to coordinate actions. In the absence of rapid reply, there was no way to guarantee that messages had been received. This, however, was not the only communication problem within the Mission 101-*arbagnoch* structure. There was also a problem of language. Few officers attached to 101 had the linguistic ability to speak with members of the *arbagnoch*.[534] Those lacking fluency were dependent on local translators. This particularly affected the coordination of joint direct action operations. The communications coordinating action were often unintelligible which resulted in a loss of cohesion and disjointed (not to mention unsuccessful) operations.[535]

The structure of the British-*arbagnoch* relationship allowed for the distribution of weaponry and created the beginnings of coordination with the *arbagnoch*. The structure preserved and relied on the autonomy and agency of the *arbagnoch*. The functional basis of the structure lay in Mission 101's ability to assume the role once occupied by the Emperor and integrate into the structure of the *arbagnoch*. 101 attempted to bring order and achieve objectives through working the levers of influence, including logistics, rather than exercising command to achieve these objectives. In a general sense, the structure operated smoothly, but with several inherent flaws impaired its functionality. Its concentration in only a few teams meant that large parts of the area of operations were outside its purview. The limited means by which 101 could communicate with the *arbagnoch* made this problem more severe. More serious than the problems of concentration and communication were logistics problems and the existence of a second centre in Sudan. Together, these factors meant that, as the situation in IEA evolved, the structure for cooperation established by Mission 101 became increasingly less suitable. In the period when the British

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War Diary 09-1940 through 10.4.1941; TNA, WO 178/36 (12.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (30.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[534] Too late to affect the feasibility of the planned structure during the Mission 101 period, the British established a language school in Khartoum (taught in part by a Czech butcher) to instruct in Amharic. – Allen (1943) p. 14

[535] TNA, WO 201/277 (War History of No. 3 Idara, Eastern Arab Corps, Sudan Defence Force, 17.5.1940-2.12.1940); Mockler (1984) p. 227

planned offensive operations against the Italians, 101's inability to coordinate with the *arbagnoch* to achieve specific operational objectives in a discreet timeframe was unacceptable. The structure needed to evolve, and evolve it did. In the new structures of the Op Centre period, British preserved the best of Mission 101 while correcting some of its structural weaknesses.

November 1940 marked the establishment of the Op Centre period. The changes which defined it structurally both preceded and followed that date.[536] The British began recruitment for the British personnel that would populate the Op Centres relatively early, under the guise of expanding Mission 101.[537] The changes which made a difference in the structure were only actualised in November. These changes helped address the problem of the dual centres of gravity which had so plagued Mission 101 and included the creation of a battalion to support the MI(R) mission in IEA.[538]

The Op Centres were the planned replacement for Mission 101. However, Mission 101 continued to function in spite of casualties and depletion of its strength.[539] There was no clear indication of how the Mission 101 and the Op Centres should handle the relationship.[540] Even Mission 101 changed during the Op Centre period. At the most basic level, the Op Centre period saw alteration of the mission of MI(R) in IEA. Under 101, the goal of cooperation had been primarily defensive.[541] During the Op Centre period, the mission was offensive in nature with a new aim of driving the Italians from Gojjam and assist in the invasion of IEA.[542] The offensive focus and increased availability of supply and personnel gave the Op Centres options

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[536] Mockler (1984) p. 280; Allen (1943) p. 36
[537] It is perhaps possible to overstate the importance of Wingate's role. However, as with other iconic and controversial figures that loomed large in historical memory, Wingate strides across source material. The formation of the Op Centres themselves predated Wingate, with seven formed by the end of September. – TNA, HS 8/261 (MI(R) Report to MO5, Quasi-Military Organization and Activities, Adjunct to Political and Military Strategy, 19.9.1940, MI(R) Operational Reports)
[538] TNA, HS 3/5 (M.I.(R), Summary of Present Position with regard to Abyssinia, 6.8.1940, SOE Abyssinia, No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940); Sykes (1959) p. 246
[539] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009; Foot (1984) p. 188
[540] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009; Foot (1984) p. 188
[541] Sykes (1959) p. 282
[542] *Ibid*

unavailable to Mission 101. This in itself positively affected the feasibility of the planned

relationship structure.[543]

This change in strategic objective necessitated changes in the structure of the British-*arbagnoch*

relationship. At the most basic level, the structure was the same. The *arbagnoch* continued as

wholly autonomous forces with the ability to exercise their agency. The British brought the

arbagnoch into cooperation through influence, not command. Even the way the British were

integrated into the *arbagnoch* structure was similar. The British used coordination and the

provision of material as the primary means of influence. However, despite the continuities there

were changes. Both the Op Centres themselves and the establishment of the unity of effort with

Sudan were forms of rupture. There were two other major changes in the structure of the

relationship: the creation of a more effective system to gain influence through logistics and the

advent of joint direct action operations as a primary feature of the relationship.

From the advent of the Op Centre period, SOE was placed in charge of two offensives, one in

Gojjam and the other in Gondar.[544] The two prongs of the offensive had slight internal

differences. However, there were more commonalities than differences. In both, the command

structure was informal at best, with Op Centres functioning largely autonomously but with

support from Sudan.[545] Rather than having a single central mission responsible for coordination

across a wide swath of IEA, there were a number of Op Centres throughout the area of

operations, each responsible for *arbagnoch* activity in their region.[546] This gave the British more

direct influence on events by bringing the British into direct contact with more of the *arbagnoch*.

During the Mission 101 period, the British were remote from the majority of the *arbagnoch* with

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[543] By the end of the Op Centre period the total number of imperial personnel involved had grown from a little over a dozen under Mission 101 to 1800. - Foot (1984) p. 187, 220
[544] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009; Foot (1984) p. 185; TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 21.02.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); Sykes (1959) p. 269; Allen (1943) p.123
[545] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009
[546] By the dose of operations there were ten Op Centres in the primary areas of operations - Mockler (1984) p. 350; Allen (1943) p.36

whom they cooperated. The Op Centres were present, at least in areas that were the focus of operational activity, which allowed for direct contact with more *arbagnoch* and therefore a greater ability to exert influence. This was a major change in the structure of the relationship between the *arbagnoch* and the British.

The emphasis on physical presence was a governing principle behind the Op Centres. Presence allowed for better coordination and in this way compensate for at least one of the weaknesses of the 101 structure.[547] Each Op Centre consisted of one imperial officer, five non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and 80-200 other personnel.[548] Whereas Mission 101 was entirely reliant on the *arbagnoch* to fulfil its objectives and provide for its security, the Op Centres could protect themselves and carry out basic operations alone. This represented a fundamental change in the relationship which allowed the British more autonomy and the ability to develop more influence.

Another change in capabilities and internal structure which directly affected the *arbagnoch*-British structure was the establishment of a unity of operation between the forces in Sudan and IEA. Rather than providing an alternative centre, the forces in Sudan supported the forces in IEA. There are many examples of the unity of effort. While the British had always intended the Sudanese Frontier Battalions to escort logistics convoys into IEA, only in the Op Centre period it began to fulfil its original function.[549] Whereas 101 had to infiltrate across the border and cross through hostile terrain, Sudan provided personnel to keep the Italians at bay while Gideon Force crossed. Once Gideon crossed the border, the Frontier Battalion from Sudan established a headquarters in IEA to better coordinate the logistics and support effort.[550] The Frontier Battalion established the base in November and the first convoys arrived by the end of

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[547] Allen (1943) p.36
[548] *Ibid* pp. 36-37; Playfair, et al. (1954) p. 404; Thesiger (1987) p. 319; Mockler (1984) p. 285; Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009
[549] Mockler (1984) p. 283
[550] Sykes (1959) p. 258; Allen (1943) p. 39

December.[551] The change in Sudan had a further effect on boosting logistics. Before the Op Centre period, Mission 101 was under-resourced – the money allocated in theory was in practice inaccessible.[552] The provision and receipt of greater resources further boosted the military capabilities of the Op Centres and better ensured their safety in entering IEA. It also increased the British ability to influence the *arbagnoch* through the distribution of supplies.

The end of the competition for resources between Sudan and the IEA mission meant that the supply crises that had so badly affected Mission 101's ability to influence the *arbagnoch* had effectively ceased. That said, the Op Centres could not be fully supplied from Sudan and were still fully dependent on the indigenous forces for provisions. The supplies from Sudan included weaponry and money but took a significant amount of time to arrive.[553] It was still necessary to procure food locally.[554] This meant that the Op Centres were still dependent on the indigenous forces for basic survival. This is another point of continuity in the structure of the relationship between the British and the *arbagnoch* from the Mission 101 period through the Op Centre period.

The basis of Op Centre lines of supply in Sudan was camels. However, they were unsuitable for moving supplies in northern IEA - this required mules.[555] The *arbagnoch* also required mules, the procurement of which was fundamentally different from the procurement of food. In the case of food, the *arbagnoch* provided the food to the British in exchange for British assistance. In the case of mules, the British and *arbagnoch* were competitors. This meant that the British had to purchase

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[551] Allen (1943) pp. 39-40

[552] Of the roughly 2 million pounds which were to be allocated over the course of the campaign, only several hundred appear to have been spent by November 1940 - Foot (1984) p.217; Allen (1943) p. 36

[553] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009; Interview with Dessie Yalley, 14.3.2013;

[554] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 19.02.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009; TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam p. 4)

[555] TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam, p. 4); Allen (1943) p.81; *Successes against Italy*, in J.R.M. Butler *History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series* (London: HMSO) p. 405; Platt (1962), Lecture 1, p. 4

and negotiate for mules.[556] This shows that logistically, there were three simultaneous structures in operation. In one (weapons and money), resources flowed from the British to the indigenous forces. In the second (food), the pattern was the reverse, and in the third (mules), both the indigenous forces and the British were equal competitors for a scarce resource.

The increased availability of resources and altered objectives changed the way in which the British employed logistics in exchange for influence. Whereas before, the British distributed weaponry and money to all comers, during the Op Centre period they only gave weaponry and ammunition to those *arbagnoch* with a proven track record of combat participation and effective cooperation.[557] The British also improved the quality of weaponry distributed. Together, these changes subtly but critically altered the structure of the relationship between the parties.

Given the importance of weaponry in Ethiopian society, British weapon distribution linked relative status to cooperation. Under the Op Centres, the cooperation itself went from a passive act of resisting Italian occupation to an active decision to take part in joint combat operations. Failure to impress the British sufficiently could mean an end to further supply. This change gave the British a better means of influencing the *arbagnoch*. The change in objective necessitated this structural change. The offensive nature of the operations and the new goal of clearing Northern Abyssinia required the coordination of large scale actions by the *arbagnoch* and the achievement of precise objectives within particular time frames. The result of the change in logistics structure was a change in the British ability to exercise influence. With the new structure, they more fully took the role of the Emperor within the feudal system, not only arbitrating disputes and coordinating major leaders, but rewarding loyal actions with weaponry and money.

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[556] TNA, WO 178/36 (12.9.1940 Near River Atbara, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[557] Sykes (1959) p. 291

The British still could not exercise command. They could not force the *arbagnoch* to conduct a given activity or order them to carry out an operation.[558] On the one hand, the British planned operations for the *arbagnoch* leadership effectively subordinating themselves as technical consultants to the *arbagnoch* while on the other hand they used the mechanisms of the logistic-influence nexus to maintain a superior position.[559] Through the twin structures of planning and logistics, the British cooperated with the *arbagnoch* leadership, but not the individual fighters or subordinate commanders. It remained for the leadership with whom the British cooperated to command their forces.[560] In this way, the British acted within the established patterns of the *arbagnoch* feudal structures.

The relationship structure between the *arbagnoch* and the British during the Op Centre was not wholly new. It was an evolution of that which existed under Mission 101. There was only one truly new structure of cooperation created under Op Centres — the structure which functioned during joint direct actions. Although there were several attempts to conduct joint direct actions under Mission 101, they had little impact and constituted isolated occurrences rather than an established structure. The Op Centre period saw the establishment of a permanent structure for this form of cooperation — one which, unlike the structures of logistics, influence, and coordination, was wholly new and not an incorporation of the British into the pre-existent feudal structure of the *arbagnoch*.

The structures for joint direct operations consisted of two forms of interaction, which often existed simultaneously. In the first, the British used the Op Centre forces to form an independent nucleus of action which could stimulate *arbagnoch* activity or keep the *arbagnoch* in check. In this structure, the Op Centres and their associated forces engaged the Italians with the

[558] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009
[559] Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013
[560] Interview with Alemno Ayelo, 28.2.2013; Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013

hope that *arbagnoch* would then join in.[561] The Op Centre would start attacking an enemy position or begin ambushes in area and encourage the *arbagnoch* to take over or continue the operation, which at times they would. The possibility for independent action allowed the Op Centres to act as a control on *arbagnoch* activity. When a fort or position fell to the *arbagnoch*, they had a tendency to loot. Moving the Op Centre into the newly captured location ended these activities and therefore serve to refocus *arbagnoch* activities onto the campaign itself.[562]

In addition to providing operational stimulus through independent action, the Op Centres served to provide aid to *arbagnoch* action. The Op Centres served as the infantry and combat support elements of the *arbagnoch* formations. In the role of infantry support, they operated support weapons such as mortars and machine guns, while the *arbagnoch* served as infantry.[563] As combat support, the British maintained the tactical headquarters, adjusting tactics, assigning forces to positions, and maintaining communication among the various parts of the overall force.[564] This is the closest the British came to establishing a combined structure with the *arbagnoch*. With the establishment of tactical headquarters, the British were able to exercise command – albeit by consent. The introduction of a coordinating tactical headquarters and infantry support troops also adjusted the *arbagnoch* structure. Previously, once the *arbagnoch* identified an enemy formation or position, the whole of the *arbagnoch* force would assault en masse. Under the combined system, the British brought together the various *arbagnoch* leaders and allocated them specific positions and tasks, functioning more like a conventional force. The changed function, together with the Op Centres' ability to provide a tactical headquarters and

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[561] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 25-26.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 05.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[562] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 04.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[563] Interview with Dessie Yalley, 14.3.2013; Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013; Interview with Asmaro Wolde Selassie, 13.3.2013
[564] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 03.04.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013; Interview with Dessie Yalley, 14.3.2013; Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013

support munitions, allowed for operations of greater complexity. The combined forces were able to undertake operations such as the investiture of garrisons which neither the Op Centres nor the *arbagnoch* could have accomplished on their own.

This structure did not always function properly. The higher degree of integration meant that there was more room for miscommunication and confusion. For example, operating in such close coordination required recognition signals. This in itself might not have been a problem, but the British tended to use whistled Morse and the *arbagnoch*, even if they understood Morse on the whole, generally did not know how to whistle.[565] At other times, coordination between the British operated support weapons and the *arbagnoch* collapsed, leading to severe friendly fire incidents.[566] This in turn led to a breakdown of the overall integration of the structure, with the British and *arbagnoch* returning to a more separate existence.[567] This was worsened by the fact that it still remained a situation of command by consent. If a British plan hinged on *arbagnoch* action and the *arbagnoch* were unwilling, there was little the British could do and the plan failed.[568] This demonstrates that even at the height of integration, the balance of power in the relationship structure remained with the *arbagnoch*. As with Mission 101 and the less integrated aspects of the Op Centre structures, the British were required to exercise influence in place of command. For this reason, the Op Centres' ability to act as the genesis of action was important in the structure. Successful operations encouraged the local *arbagnoch* to join in an advantageous situation. Furthermore, perceived British aggressiveness in engaging the Italians encouraged emulation by the local *arbagnoch* due to the importance of courage in the regional culture. Together with the new selectivity in the distribution of resources, this constituted a powerful means by which to exert necessary influence.

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[565] TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam, p. 42)
[566] Mockler (1984) pp. 345-346
[567] TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam, p. 49)
[568] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009; TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 31.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

The improved structure of the Op Centre period was not without its challenges. Problems persisted in three areas: the limits of influence, logistics, and communications. Although the new systems of the Op Centre structure allowed for a superior exercise of influence, there were still limits inherent to the nature of the relationship. Influence to cooperate was only effective as far as the *arbagnoch* leadership were willing to take part in the campaign in general. If the local *arbagnoch* had achieved all of their objectives and were secure in their position relative to rivals, there was little the British could do to induce further cooperation.[569] This resulted not from a failure of the relationship structure but instead from the structure of the *arbagnoch*. Regionally based and with a responsibility for securing and holding their local area not just against the Italians, but against their rivals, the *arbagnoch*, with some exceptions, were disinclined to continue to fight beyond their territories. This constitutes further proof of the importance of *arbagnoch* agency in the relationship structure. When the *arbagnoch* had achieved their objectives and were no longer interested in cooperation, cooperation ceased.

While the continued logistics problems, were caused by the extremely difficult terrain and a scarcity of supporting resources which might have allowed for alternative solutions.[570] On the other hand persistent weaknesses in communication and coordination had more to do with the Op Centre structure. The Op Centres were not able to provide personnel to all the *arbagnoch* with whom they were, at least theoretically, in cooperation. The British had little ability to influence or coordinate with *arbagnoch* forces with which they did not have regular communication.[571] Communication still relied on messengers, meaning that even where liaison officers were attached to an *arbagnoch* force, they had trouble reporting back to their Op Centres and headquarters.[572] The nature of the terrain and the dispersion of the *arbagnoch* were such that there would always be *arbagnoch* beyond reach. With the exception of these weaknesses, which were as

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[569] Mockler (1984) pp. 340-341, 346; Allen (1943) p. 84
[570] Allen (1943) p. 38
[571] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009
[572] *Ibid*

much a result of the nature of operations in IEA as the structure, the relationship between the *arbagnoch* and British reached the high point of functionality during the Op Centre period. On the tactical level, the relationship structures during the period allowed for an integration and unity of effort between the *arbagnoch* and British impossible in the previous structures. The evolution from Mission 101, the end of the dual centres of gravity with Sudan, and the increase in resources meant that the British could also better exercise influence with the *arbagnoch*. Given the centrality of *arbagnoch* agency in the campaign, the ability to exercise influence was all important to the British in the structures of cooperation.

After the allied capture of Addis, the structure of the British-*arbagnoch* relationship again evolved in line with changing British objectives and a changing strategic situation. During this period, the structure was in a state of flux. In many ways, the actual structure of the relationship was unchanged from that which existed during the Op Centre period. On 27th April 1941, the remaining Op Centres, Gideon Force, Begemder Force, and Mission 101 all ceased to function under the SOE and came under the command of the South and East African Forces of the 12th African Division.[573] The primary focus of the campaign also shifted from an invasion of IEA to extinguishing retreating Italian forces and isolated force concentrations.

In many places, structural change was not immediate. Where the Op Centre system continued to function, the relationship structure was largely unchanged. The Op Centres continued to provide a focal point for action and centres for coordination and influence, as well as an infantry support force.[574] However, for the most part, the Op Centres and associated forces, such as Gideon, increasingly acted not as nuclei for *arbagnoch* activity but as flying columns chasing and engaging the Italians. In this context, the structure of the indigenous force relationship was a hybrid

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[573] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 27.04.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

[574] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 25.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); Further report see: TNA, WO 201/313B (SO 2(1), Reports to East African Force HQ, 29.8.1941 & 8.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

between the Op Centre structure and the conventional force structure. The columns contained combinations of conventional forces, Op Centres, and permanently attached *arbagnoch*.[575] The *arbagnoch* were no longer the sole infantry. They provided reconnaissance and harassing forces, and yet still took the vast majority of casualties.[576] The fact that the *arbagnoch* took significantly more casualties than the British might suggest that they played a more central combat role, but there is no proof for this. There are other plausible explanations, such as a difference in tactics and training.

In some ways, the structure remained the same. *Arbagnoch* leaders commanded the *arbagnoch* and brought them into the cooperation. With the return of the Emperor, members of the imperial court rather than regional leaders led the *arbagnoch*.[577] The British were still reliant on the *arbagnoch* for their combat power, but now the British channelled influence through Haile Selassie. These changes also stemmed in part from the change in objective. The British no longer required *arbagnoch* action across the entirety of the country. Instead, they required large-scale actions in specific places and the ability to engage in continuous actions across long distances, with a high operational tempo, as the Italian forces retreated. Such actions better suited conventional forces, who could act more rapidly and in a more coordinated manner than the *arbagnoch* had. The new column–like structure of the Op Centres allowed the *arbagnoch* to continue to provide the manpower British needed but in a way more suitable to the changed objectives. However, this added a new dimension to cooperation. The accompanying *arbagnoch* were not always local to the area of the operations and the British therefore needed to enter cooperation with more local

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[575] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 17.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

[576] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 18.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 28.02.-2.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); Sykes (1959) p. 307

[577] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 17.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

arbagnoch.[578] In these cases, the Op Centre structure for cooperation seems to have been the template.

This period saw the development of an additional structure of cooperation not based on an evolution of the Op Centres or Mission 101. The imperial forces which took part in these structures were not from the Special Services and did not have the benefit of prior planning or experience. The conventional forces found two ways to interact with the *arbagnoch*. They either tried to absorb them into the conventional force structure or put them under the intelligence branch. Both options had precedent in British Imperial history. In the first structure, there existed a spectrum of integration. When the structure worked well, the *arbagnoch* were integrated into the British order of battle. They operated in conjunction with British conventional forces, protecting their flanks and providing reconnaissance as well as harassing the Italians and engaging in primary assaults.[579] The record of the 22nd East African Brigade Operations details such an occasion, in which 'a company of 5th King's African Rifles was now detached and sent down a side track in the direction of Mount Mugo with 200 Patriots to investigate the situation at Gogetti and Butagira…the patriots were instructed to patrol parallel to the main road of advance and to give timely warning of any threat of flank attack.'[580] In instances such as this, the *arbagnoch* still functioned as an autonomous force, but acted in conjunction, coordination, and close communication with the British. This resembled the cooperative structure of the Op Centres in this period.

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[578] TNA, WO 201/313A (Report from Major Douglas, 16.8.41, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command); TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 18.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

[579] Platt (1962) p. 11; Mockler (1984) p. 381; It is worth noting that the South African history of the war disputes this description of the system at Amba Alagi essentially declaring that there was no coordination between the *arbagnoch* and the conventional forces – something Platt among others dispute, furthermore the strong racial undertones in Orpen's book make it of questionable value, however for Orpen's narrative see: Neil Orpen, *South African Forces World War II (Volume I): East African and Abyssinian Campaigns*, (Johannesburg, 1968), pp. 307-312

[580] TNA, WO 201/292 (22nd East African Brigade Operations, 21.4.1941)

In the alternative scenario in which the British placed the *arbagnoch* under the intelligence branch, the British dispatched individual agents to contact *arbagnoch* forces. They provided the *arbagnoch* with supplies and gave them instructions.[581] This was an attempt to develop a unidirectional structure, in which arbagnoch agency was not a factor. Yet *arbagnoch* agency remained. The *arbagnoch* could freely disregard the instructions of the intelligence officers with little consequence. The distribution of weaponry before operations in order to encourage the *arbagnoch* into activity was a return to the influence structures of Mission 101, with all the difficulties that entailed. Together, these two structures were a sign of things to come and the basis of the structures of cooperation which developed in the late period.

The final period of operations in the Horn of Africa included the transition from combat against the Italians to stabilising the territory and supporting the newly reinstated government of Emperor Haile Selassie. The structures in this period were affected by the British need to affect a drawdown of their military commitment, especially in light of the ongoing attempts to relieve the British forces besieged in Tobruk. By 19th May 1941, it was clear that the primary combat phase of the campaign had concluded.[582] This brought a number of changes in the forces that affected the British-*arbagnoch* relationship structures. The British Army transferred two out of the five imperial divisions present in the Horn of Africa to other theatres before the end of May.[583] The British soon disbanded Gideon Force and the vast majority of the Op Centres and the Frontier Force of the SDF previously tasked with *arbagnoch* coordination withdrew to Sudan.[584] Most of those personnel who did remain from these organisations worked to train the newly re-established Ethiopian Army.[585] At the same time, many of the *arbagnoch* who were previously

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[581] TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Intelligence Summary No. 23, 26.4.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command); TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Intelligence Summary No. 26, 15.6.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)
[582] The Italians still remained a localised threat in isolated areas – TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28)
[583] Platt (1962), Lecture 3, p. 12
[584] Allen (1943) p.122
[585] *Ibid*

farmers returned to their farms for the summer agricultural season.[586] Even as these changes indicated an apparent quieting of operations, a new type of threat emerged. While not an existential threat to the British strategic position, the appearance of widespread banditry and rebellion required the commitment of more than a brigade of British forces and SDF through 1947.[587]

There were two types of new structure created during this period. The first integrated the *arbagnoch* into the conventional forces that remained in the Horn of Africa, while the second attempted to deal with the problems of banditry and lawlessness around the country. The first structure was consciously based on the Op Centres. General Cunningham, the commander of East Africa Force, explained that the structure was 'for each division to direct Patriot activities in their areas, a special Staff Officer being attached to each Division for that purpose' and that the Emperor instructed 'selected Ethiopian leaders to provide the desired numbers of Ethiopian soldiery.'[588] In practice, the structure maintained the Ethiopians' autonomy, with Cunningham commenting, 'it had been found that patriot activities proved most successful under the general direction, and in some cases, the personal leadership, of selected British Officers, though the men remained under the immediate control of their own leaders.'[589]

During this final phase of warfare in former IEA, there were five ways in which the British interacted with the *arbagnoch*: the *arbagnoch* acted autonomously under British guidance, the *arbagnoch* acted as scouts, the *arbagnoch* acted as flank support forces, the *arbagnoch* harassed retreating Italians, and at times there were integrated joint operations. As a scouting force, the *arbagnoch* moved ahead of the British, serving as a reconnaissance force and screen for British

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[586] TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28)
[587] Lunt (1981) p. 290
[588] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)
[589] *Ibid*

movements. Little detailed information exists about the structure through which this occurred.[590]

The joint operations tended to take the form of patrols, with British and *arbagnoch* acting together as a reconnaissance force probing Italian positions.[591] There also is little evidence as to how this structure worked.

As a harassing force, the *arbagnoch* acted in only vague coordination with the British, moving ahead of the British force and keeping pressure on the Italians. This type of operation did not require integration. The *arbagnoch* acted autonomously. At those times when the *arbagnoch* integrated as an autonomous force, the British gave the *arbagnoch* leadership general objectives, such as investing a particular city, and left the rest to the *arbagnoch*.[592] The activities of the *arbagnoch* as a flanking force followed the same basic structure as under the Op Centre-conventional force hybrid structure of the post-Addis period. The British provided the push on the Italian centre of gravity while the *arbagnoch* assaulted the flanks and LOCs.[593] In this type of operation, coordination with the *arbagnoch* happened either through the *mesafint* sent by Haile Selassie or, in more remote areas, through the local leadership.[594]

In the operations opposing this lawlessness, the British cooperated with major *arbagnoch* leadership loyal to Haile Selassie who were dispatched with their forces to suppress the rebellions.[595] It appears that, at least in some of the cases, there was a reversal of integration, with the British acting on behalf of Haile Selassie to support his representatives and not the other way

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[590] *The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden) p. 558

[591] TNA, CO 847/22/19 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, Situation Report 15-21.10.1941, 23-10-1941, OETA Abyssinia)

[592] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

[593] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941); TNA, CO 847/22/20 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, 21.11.1941, Situation Report, 12-18.11.1941, OETA Abyssinia II); TNA, WO 201/313A (Capt. Wybergh, Report on Patriot Activity in the Lechemti Jubdo District, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

[594] TNA, WO 201/313A (Capt. Wybergh, Report on Patriot Activity in the Lechemti Jubdo District, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

[595] TNA, CO 847/22/20 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, 21.11.1941, Situation Report, 12-18.11.1941, OETA Abyssinia II)

around. If this were the case, it would reflect the change in objective from capturing the territory to bolstering its government and ability to maintain internal security autonomously.

Throughout the operations in the Horn of Africa, Mission 101 and the Op Centres presented novel, distinct structures of cooperation outside the traditional established pathways of organisations such as the PPF. They reversed the existing dynamic, integrating the British within the indigenous structure rather than the other way around. Eventually, through the Op Centres, they created a hybrid system, mitigating the problems inherent in this reversal of structural integration. In these novel structures, the precise nature of the structure was determined not only by the conditions, but by the objectives of the cooperations. This partially explains why Mission 101 and the Op Centres developed a distinct structure. Their objectives differed greatly from those of the other forces in the region and therefore required a different structure for cooperating with the indigenous forces. Unlike the other forces, their mandate came from the Special Services, which were not part of the traditional patterns of imperial crisis response and therefore did not have the same background on which to draw. This may have freed their thinking to allow for the different structures.

There were a number of aspects in common across all the structures of the campaign. Organisationally, transitions were not smooth. The previous structures of cooperation remained even as new ones came into effect. Operational realities and organisational inertia ensured that this pattern continued from the first time the British contemplated cooperation through the late period cooperations. All of the structures reflected the agency of the indigenous forces. The indigenous personnel were the driving factor of cooperation. They choose when it occurred and when it did not. Without the ability to command or directly impose their will on the indigenous forces, the application of influence was the central mechanism by which the structures functioned. This may have contributed to the reason why, unlike in Palestine Mandate, the indigenous forces were not fully integrated with the conventional forces in any of the structures.

When operating in conjunction with conventional units, the indigenous force units maintained autonomy, acting in roles such as flanking forces, reconnaissance, or skirmishers.

The use of the forces in these roles highlights another commonality among the structures – the indigenous forces operated in modes of operation in which they were comfortable. None of the indigenous forces had significant experience with, or training in, large-scale conventional warfare. The forces, some of whom had extensive experience in raiding and guerrilla warfare, served in alternative capacities. This allowed the British to benefit from the skills of the indigenous forces and did not necessitate extensive retraining. Where retraining happened, it was in terms of tactical development, to allow the indigenous forces to improve on activities in which they were already veteran. The structures in the Horn of Africa operated in these ways resulted from a combination of the objectives that brought the British into cooperation and local conditions. The structures evolved for the objectives. When the objectives changed, so, too, did the structures.

Comparative Findings

In both Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa, the local conditions and political realities shaped the structures of cooperation between the British and indigenous forces. In Horn of Africa, once the campaign began the dominance of the Special Services in cooperation in the Horn of Africa diminished the effects of bureaucratic competition while in Palestine Mandate inter-service rivalries had a significant influence. The lack of competition among indigenous forces in Palestine Mandate meant that unlike in the Horn of Africa the British did not have to play the role of peacemaker. There were differences in the way in which the indigenous forces and the British structurally integrated. In most cases in Palestine Mandate the British and the *Haganah* maintained parallel structures with coordination occurring only at the highest levels. Even when units were integrated at a lower level such as in the Scouts scheme the parallel

structures remained. In cooperation with the *arbagnoch* the predominant structure was a structure of integration in which the British became part of the indigenous structure. Underlying these differences were factors common to both cases which allowed the structures to succeed.

Central to both structures was the preservation of indigenous agency. In both cases, the British depended on the indigenous forces whereas the indigenous forces preferred to cooperate with the British. As a result, the indigenous forces had a significant level of autonomy of action which both preserved and reflected indigenous agency. Given this, the structures functioned best when they represented a fulfilment of motivational alignment.[596] In both cases the structures also allowed the British to take advantage of the specialist skills, resources, and knowledge possessed by the indigenous forces. In both cases, this meant that the indigenous forces served primarily in an irregular capacity. This kept indigenous forces within a form of action to which they were accustomed which minimised the cost of cooperation and the need for retraining. When training did occur it sought to maximise the effectiveness of indigenous forces in the operational modes with which they already had experience. In neither case did the structures remain constant. They evolved depending on operational needs and the political situation. Operationally, the structures of cooperation in both cases improved throughout the course of the campaigns allowing the British to take best advantage of specific realities of the indigenous forces in each area of operations. The cooperations were at their most efficient when broader political goals took a back seat to the military objectives of cooperation.

In the end, both *arbagnoch* cooperation and the cooperation in Palestine Mandate relied on a mechanism by which the British provided resources desired by the indigenous forces in exchange for influence on the operations of the indigenous forces. This created a dichotomy within the system in which the British sought increased influence over the indigenous forces while indigenous forces tried to preserve agency. Despite their differences, the structures

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[596] For more on motivational alignment see: Stoil (2014) pp. 19-20

functioned the best when the British goals in cooperation matched those of the indigenous forces and the support provided allowed the indigenous forces to pursue their own goals in a manner that also benefited the British goals. The structures ceased to function either when the goals that each sought to achieve in cooperation fell out of alignment or when the British failed to achieve influence.

Expectations, Employment, Efficacy

Measuring military effectiveness is a task that has bedevilled commentators, politicians, scholars, and the military for decades. An informal *vox populi* survey might establish some form of a metric based on the deceptively simple question of whether they win. Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt in their article on coup-proofing and military effectiveness define military effectiveness as the extent to which forces 'destroy the enemy's military' while preserving their strength with all other variables being a theoretical constant.[597] However, they noted that there are a plethora of reasons a given operation may result in success or failure other than the effectiveness of a given military or unit.[598] There may fore be conditions under which superior numbers or random chance overcome a given unit no matter how effective – a possibility recognised by Clausewitz and, at least apocryphally, by Napoleon in his belief in the importance of personal luck. Beyond this there is an additional problem in that such metrics fail to account for units whose primary role is non-active mission related – for example units engaged in deterrence or policing roles. This oversight is particularly problematic in the case of indigenous force cooperation in Palestine Mandate.

Other attempts to define military effectiveness have encountered similar problems. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray edited an extensive three-volume discussion on military effectiveness and defined it as 'the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available.'[599] The emphasis of their definition is clearly conventional combat focused – this definition of effectiveness is built around the idea of combat power, which Murray and Millett define as 'ability to inflict damage upon the enemy while limiting the

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[597] Ulrich Pilster & Tobias Böhmelt, 'Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-99', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*), 28 (2011), p .333

[598] *Ibid*

[599] Allan R. Millett, et al, 'The Effectiveness of Military Organizations', *International Security*, 1 (1986), p. 37

damage that he can inflict in return.'[600] At the most essential level there is little difference between Millett and Murray's definition and a simple metric based on military success. In this regard, it is similar to the Pilster and Böhmelt definition with similar weaknesses.

Arguably, creating universal measures of military effectiveness, while difficult in the case of conventional war, is all the more the complex when considering the many functions other than direct combat in which military organisations engage.[601] Given the complexity and diversity of the tasks assumed by the indigenous forces in Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia and the problems with the metrics employed in the literature, it has proven especially difficult to measure military effectiveness of the units discussed in this paper.

In order to discuss effectiveness this chapter analyses each case according to multiple measures rather than relying on a single metric. This chapter assesses each case of indigenous force cooperation against internal metrics of effectiveness, external measures of effectiveness, absolute effectiveness, and relative effectiveness. Internal metrics assess whether the organisation with which the indigenous forces cooperated considered them effective. External metrics analyse the evaluations of third parties including those of the enemy and non-involved parties. Absolute effectiveness centres on whether the forces achieved the objectives of the cooperation, and relative effectiveness measures indigenous force cooperation against other possible means to fulfil the same objectives. Relative effectiveness also includes the issue of cost. Each evaluation consists of a discreet operation or scheme of cooperation differentiated by actor, structure, objective, and time.

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[600] *Ibid*

[601] Counterinsurgency, also provides a particular problem – see: Gregory A. Daddis, *No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam* War, (Oxford, 2011).

Palestine Mandate[602]

Objectively determining the effectiveness of indigenous forces in Palestine Mandate would be a difficult endeavour without the consideration of additional issues related to the motives of the sources that document effectiveness or the lack thereof. The political nature of the discussion and the effect of the bureaucratic warfare within the Special Warfare world around cooperation with Zionist paramilitaries complicate matters.

The controversy over the anti-SO2 dossier, which among its various charges suggested that pre-campaign sabotages in Syria undertaken by the *Haganah* never actually occurred, reflects the internecine conflict within SOE on the effectiveness of Palestine operations. Without evaluating the dossier and its claims, it is impossible to examine the effectiveness of any related cooperation. If the SOE lied about *Haganah* successes in this case, there is no reason to believe their reports on other cases. Bill Stirling and Peter Fleming, who worked on General Wavell's behalf, were the primary authors of the dossier.[603] Wavell's interest apparently stemmed from his desire to bring SO2 (at that point the only truly autonomous section of SOE remaining in the Middle East) under GHQ Middle East's command.[604] General Arthur Smith, Wavell's Chief of Staff compiled the dossier.[605]

The compilers of the dossier claimed that they had travelled to alleged sites of SO2 sabotage in Syria and found no evidence that the sabotage had taken place or was successful.[606] Most of the interviews they allegedly conducted seem to have been with Free French forces that arrived in the area after the conclusion of the campaign. The other major accusation, relevant to evaluating cooperation between the *Haganah* and the SOE, mentioned directly in the dossier is the incident

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[602] For a table detailing the effectiveness of each case of cooperation in the Palestine Mandate see: Appendix 1, Table 1
[603] Saul Kelly, 'A Succession of Crises: SOE in the Middle East, 1940–45', *Intelligence and National Security*, 1 (2005), pp. 126-128
[604] *Ibid*
[605] *Ibid*
[606] TNA, HS 3/192 (Major GS Fergusson, Report to CGS, 30.6.1941, Anti-SO2 Dossier, 1941)

of the SS Darien. The Darien was a ship purchased by the Jewish Agency and sold to the SOE, but remaining under Jewish Agency command. From the SOE perspective, the ship was to establish cover as a neutral cargo ship running a route to the Balkans. The Jewish Agency used it to help Jewish refugees escape occupied Europe.[607] To this point, the dossier is accurate.[608] The dossier then suggests the C-in-C ME would require SO2 to sever all cooperation with the 'Friends' should the Darien reach Palestine and that the SOE officer in command of Palestine concurred.[609] The SS Darien reached Palestine on 19 March and, at least in the relevant Colonial Office and War Office files, there is no mention of any connection to the SOE. There is no demand that the SOE cease cooperation with the *Haganah*. No such minute seems to exist within the relevant SOE files.[610] The incident had concluded without further comment well before the dossier was turned over to the head of SOE for action and yet was included as part of the attempt to discredit SO2. This suggests that the compilers of the dossier were more interested in discrediting SO2 than in accurately reporting evidence.

The Director of SOE (CD/Sir Frank Nelson) investigated the dossier. CD found that 'having conducted a thorough investigation including interviewing all those who were involved in compiling the dossier it was found that the charges it contained were without any proof either in the legal or semi-legal sense.'[611] Throughout the SOE file dealing with the dossier, the SOE noted that many reports had basic factual errors and were of unknown provenance.[612] CD concluded that the report stemmed at least in part from the 'bloodthirsty internecine warfare...between SO1 and SO2 who should have of course been SOE' in Cairo.[613] The generally anti-SO2 atmosphere among the institutions of Cairo worsened the effect of this bureaucratic

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[607] It was the last refugee ship to reach safety until 1944
[608] TNA, HS 3/192 (Telegrams about SS Darien, 24.2.1941-13.3.1941, Anti-SO2 Dossier, 1941)
[609] *Ibid*
[610] TNA, CO 733/446 (Colonial Office Correspondence, 1941)
[611] TNA, HS 3/193 (CD, Report to SO, 21.8.1941, CD's Visit to the Mid/East, 7.1941-8.1941)
[612] TNA, HS 3/192 (Anti-SO2 Dossier, 1941)
[613] TNA, HS 3/193 (CD, Report to SO, 21.8.1941, CD's Visit to the Mid/East, 7.1941-8.1941)

fight.[614] None of these observations conclusively documents that the charges the dossier raised about Syria are untrue. CD and the SOE had good reason to fight the dossier. A finding that part of the organisation had been so unsuccessful would have hurt the whole and may have encouraged GHQ Middle East to bring SOE under GHQ control. On the other hand CD's investigation cast significant doubt on the dossier's content, especially when considered together with the differences between the dossier's report on the outcome of the SS Darien affair and the reality. The question of how to treat the dossier remained.

CD did not accept the dossier's charges. Its very existence indicated to him a leadership problem justifying major personnel changes.[615] The SOE's internal history of its activities in the Middle East began a trend of splitting the difference between the dossier and the initial SO2 reports of success by stating, in reference to Syria sabotage, that 'in these undertakings they were partially successful.'[616] Later historians have treated the situation similarly. W.J.M. Mackenzie's history of the SOE states that there were only 'vague' reports of what the Friends did in Syria and Iraq.[617] By accepting that the Friends accomplished something, MacKenzie implicitly reflects the anti-SO2 dossier's suggestion that reports of their success were exaggerated and that the 'Friends' only worked for their own interests. In doing so, he created a compromise between the two perspectives, rejecting the dossier's assertion that the 'Friends' achieved nothing but accepting that reports of the 'Friends' accomplishments were exaggerated. Saul Kelly took a similar tack in his history of the SOE in the Middle East by stating:

> …although it was later well established that some of the claims of sabotage of Vichy
>
> installations in Syria were false, there is no doubt that Palestinian Jews and Arabs

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[614] Mackenzie (2000) p.172
[615] TNA, HS 3/193 (CD, Report to SO, 21.8.1941, CD's Visit to the Mid/East, 7.1941-8.1941)
[616] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[617] Mackenzie (2000) p. 171

conducted reconnaissance missions, cut communications and disseminated propaganda and proclamations in the run-up to the Anglo-Free French invasion in June 1941.[618]

His evidence for the falsehood of the claims of sabotage comes from the anti-SO2 dossier.[619] Kelly therefore accepts the validity of the charges of the dossier while compromising by noting that Palestinian Jews did accomplish something. This is a problematic path of analysis. The dossier claimed that the *Haganah* achieved nothing. SOE claimed the *Haganah* accomplished its tasks. Both of these are absolute claims and neither presents any evidence to support a compromise. Not only is splitting the difference analytically problematic, with no supporting evidence, it is not remotely useful for evaluating effectiveness.

This chapter counts those operations for which evidence exists beyond SOE's internal records as likely enough to be beyond the suspicion cast by the dossier. The evaluation considers those operations which the dossier calls into question, but which are supported by no evidence other than internal records and suggestive external evidence, according to the evidence. However, conclusions about effectiveness in these cases are considered in light of the dossier. Finally, those operations covered by the dossier for which there is no evidence other than internal evidence are considered in both contexts - as if the dossier is accurate and as if it is not.

As a postscript to the issue of the dossier, it is worth noting that another attempt was made in 1942-43 to discredit SOE Palestine's cooperation with the 'Friends'. This attempt involved some of the same actors as the Stirling-Fleming document but was led by DSO Palestine, Major Hunloke, and ended in a more decisive defeat for the opponents of SOE. This attempt to discredit SOE included many of the same hallmarks as the previous one and created tension

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[618] Kelly (2005) p. 126
[619] Kelly (2005) p. 144

between SIME and MO4 (SOE) but ended with a reprimand for Hunloke. As the SOE and the SIME both considered this second assessment report groundless, this chapter will as well. [620]

The dissertation previously addressed the overarching motivations of the various imperial actors who sought indigenous force cooperation.[621] This chapter considers the actors' specific objectives in order to evaluate the effectiveness of cooperation. Most of the cooperation that occurred in Palestine fell under the auspices of SOE or Palestine Government and this chapter focuses on their expectations. For both, their expectations were primarily operational rather than tactical or strategic. These expectations fall into two categories, primary and secondary. Primary expectations consist of those expectations that concerned operations – what the British hoped the units would achieve. Secondary expectations are the non-military effects the British hoped to achieve from the cooperation. The classification of primary and secondary represents a hierarchy of expectations rather than a hierarchy of motivations. For example, the political benefits that the JSP might have conveyed could have been the lynchpin of Palestine Government's true motivation for its creation but its effectiveness as a unit stems from the military objectives.

For the SOE there were several groupings of primary expectations. These were contingency, cross-border operations, mission facilitation, and counter-intelligence. Within the category of contingency, the Special Services had several expectations for the *Haganah* of which one was that they would function a home guard within the Mandate territory. The Special Services supported a scheme to turn the JSP into a home guard prior to an Axis invasion.[622] In this case then the SOE expected that the JSP and by extension the *Haganah* would both prevent rebellion and resist an Axis invasion by serving as an extra defence force for the Palestine Mandate.[623]

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[620] TNA, HS 3/210 (Col. Maunsell, Draft Letter to DSO Palestine, 17.1.1943, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)
[621] See Chapter: 'Reaching Out: Why the Empire Sought Cooperation', pp. 21-72
[622] TNA, HS 3/146 (Lt. Col. Pollock, Memorandum on Jewish Settlement Police, 9.5.1941, Reorganization of SOE Middle East 1941)
[623] *Ibid*

In addition to acting as a home guard, the SOE expected the *Haganah* to carry out other contingency roles in case of invasion; namely, demolition, intelligence gathering, and irregular warfare/sabotage operations. The SOE expected that the *Haganah* would be able to undertake, at short notice, 'a scorched earth' plan for Palestine, 'involving large scale road destruction by cratering.'[624] SOE further expected that the *Haganah* would provide intelligence in the occupation (following a successful Axis invasion) through covert agents and a clandestine radio network. [625] Finally, the SOE expected a significant contribution from the *Haganah* in terms of post-occupation guerrilla warfare and sabotage. Part of the stated goal of the Palestine Scheme was to raise a force of Jews to undertake attacks on enemy communications, headquarters, and personnel post-occupation.[626] The plan called for the establishment of German, Arab, and Italian sections of the Jewish force to infiltrate the advancing Axis forces.[627] That being said not all of SOE shared these expectations of cooperation; one officer noted that their belief that under Axis occupation the members of the Jews 'will be marked men and, even if the Germans fail to discover them, the Arabs will give them away.'[628] Even that officer expected the *Haganah* to carry out the pre-occupation demolition successfully.[629] As part of all contingency planning, the SOE expected the *Haganah* to carry out the plans independently and provide thorough reconnaissance and mapping throughout the Mandate territory.[630]

In addition to the *Haganah*'s contingency role within the Mandate, the SOE had firm expectations for the *Haganah* in cross-border operations. The SOE expected the *Haganah* to undertake sabotage in Syria and Iraq, engage in proxy activities and diplomacy on SOE's behalf,

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[624] TNA, HS 3/206 (Memorandum on SOE preparations in Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan, 6.4.1942, SOE Palestine 1, Planning, 3.1941-12.1942); TNA, HS 3/207 (Plans for Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan, 3.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[625] Dayan (1976) p. 53
[626] TNA, HS 3/207 (Revised Palestine Scheme, 15.7.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[627] TNA, HS 3/207 (SOE Palestine, Telegram to SOE Cairo & London, 7.8.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[628] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H121, Report to D/HV, 17.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[629] *Ibid*
[630] For more on the role of mapping as an important form of imperial intelligence and control see: Thomas (2008)

and provide reconnaissance, scouting, and intelligence from across the border.[631] One of the first agreements between the SOE (at that point Section D) and the Jewish Agency provided that the *Haganah* would make exploratory arrangements in Syria and Iraq, among other places, 'to establish whatever contacts they thought might be necessary for possible sabotage work.'[632] In private reports on the use of the 'Friends' in a sabotage capacity SOE noted that Syria might be 'for the first time, a real opportunity to use Friends Organization.'[633] There is also evidence that in the run up to Exporter, as part of the preparations for sabotage, the SOE expected the *Haganah* to gather a complete list of road and rail targets throughout Syria.[634] In short when it came to cross border sabotage in Syria, the SOE not only expected the *Haganah* to conduct the sabotage but to make the preparations to facilitate the sabotage as well.

The final category of goals that the SOE had for the *Haganah* was mission facilitation. Mission facilitation is distinct from the previous categories of expectation in that it did not demand that the *Haganah* carry out entirely autonomous operations. SOE anticipated that the Jewish Agency would provide resources that would make SOE's operations easier and more likely to succeed. In particular, SOE expected the *Haganah* to provide both material resources in the form of supplies (explosives, W/T, and forged documents) and security, especially counter intelligence.[635] Some in SOE believed that the indigenous force cooperation with the *Haganah* could do more. They believed it could have a positive effect on the general situation in Palestine and on relations between the British Empire and the *Yishuv*.[636] These expectations are worth mentioning in that,

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[631] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HP, Report to A/D, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940); AHTA, 80/563(ס)/11 (Document of Unknown Providence and Date entitled SYRIA); Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010

[632] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HP, Report to A/D, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)

[633] *Ibid*

[634] AHTA, 80/563(ס)/11 (Document of Unknown Providence and Date entitled SYRIA)

[635] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HS, Letter to D/H1, 3.9.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); AHTA, 80/563(ס)/11 (Arrangements for Crossing Frontiers); TNA, HS 3/201 (D/H, Letter to D, 29.5.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)

[636] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H271, Telegram to AD/H, 12.07.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Directive for Field Commander Palestine, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HX, Memorandum to D/HV, 6.11.1942, SOE Palestine, Policy and Directives,

for a time, they had an impact on the SOE in Palestine's assessment of the effectiveness of the indigenous force ventures. They will not factor into the evaluation in this chapter as they did not represent the opinions of the command of the organisation. When senior officers were made aware of these hopes they commented that:

> SOE is not concerned with the future of Palestine or trying to bring about an Arab/Jewish understanding as such. Our business is to endeavour to promote the will to resist invasion during the pre-occupational period, and to unite and direct resistance to the occupying forces when the country has been invaded.[637]

Whatever other political possibilities SOE may have flirted with, this remained its policy. The chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the indigenous forces according to SOE's operational focus.

The *Palmach* was central to all of the SOE's plans for raising indigenous forces from the Zionist paramilitaries of Palestine. By 1941, the *Palmach* was the wellspring from which all cooperative arrangements flowed. The *Palmach* provided most of the recruits for the German and Arab Units and their supportive infrastructure. The *Palmach* provided the scouts for Exporter, the forces for the Palestine and Friends schemes, and the force in place for the SOE's home guard and guerrilla warfare schemes. By 1942, the SOE could count on at least 600 members of the *Palmach*, organised into six companies. The *Palmach* received a high level of training which the SOE could then use.[638] In 1942, a SOE officer on a tour of Palestine reviewed the *Palmach* and pronounced them suitable for all of the SOE's purposes. The officer stated that he was 'much impressed by their bearing and obvious determination no less than by their remarkable efficiency' and quoted George II's remark 'I do not know what the enemy will think of them, but

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5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/210 (Col. Maunsell, Draft Letter to DSO Palestine, 17.1.1943, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)
[637] TNA, HS 3/207 (G, Telegram to DSO(A), 10.12.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[638] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010

by God they frighten me."[639] At least within the SOE the *Palmach* was seen as an effective reservoir of manpower but whether it was effective depends on whether the personnel provided were suitable for the schemes. It might be tempting to try to evaluate the effectiveness of the *Palmach* through its post-Second World War activities but this is ahistorical. In effect, the assessment of the efficacy of the wartime schemes, which depended on the *Palmach,* will answer whether the *Palmach* served as an effective wellspring.

For SOE the primary area of cooperation was contingency preparation for the Axis invasion of Palestine Mandate. Contingency preparation consisted of three distinct conceptual phases, pre-occupation activities in Palestine, preparation for resistance in Palestine, and contingency preparation in Syria. Pre-occupation activities consisted of reconnaissance within the mandate territory and preparation for demolitions and sabotage. Post-occupation preparation included establishing intelligence-gathering networks, creating a provision for guerrilla warfare and, within both these frameworks, building the German and Arab units. The activities in Syria were similar to those in Palestine but occurred in a different operational context.

As part of both the Friends Scheme and the Palestine Scheme, the SOE tasked the units to carry out the reconnaissance.[640] Given the convergent timing, it is likely that the units that the records referred to were those trained and then dispersed to bases across Palestine in regional groups. Their primary remit was to conduct surveys of communications throughout the territory in preparation for sabotage in order to deny them to the Axis in the event of an invasion.[641] The SOE History noted that 'the participants in the Friends Scheme made close surveys of all communications (roads, rail, telegraph, etc.).'

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[639] TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for October 1942, 24.10.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[640] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.5, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[641] *Ibid*

By internal metrics of effectiveness, the *Haganah*, as the indigenous force in this case was highly effective. A situation report from SOE Jerusalem to SOE Cairo and London documents SOE's opinion of the reconnaissance conducted by the *Haganah*. The report stated that 'reconnaissance by the Palestine scheme cells are highly detailed and the ones around the dead sea [sic] will be of interest to Survey Department of Palestine Government and the Army.'[642] A telegram from the SOE in Cairo testified that 'Palestine has been minutely reconnoitred by' the Friends. [643] Unfortunately, in this case there are no available external metrics of effectiveness. If the SOE reports are accurate, and the fact that they come from both Cairo and Palestine suggests that they are, then they may suggest the absolute effectiveness of the operation. Of course, there is no way to tell whether the surveys would have been useful during and after an Axis invasion. Their apparently detailed nature, which exceeded the basic objectives, testifies that in an absolute sense the *Haganah* was effective in this operation. Relative effectiveness cannot be clearly determined in this case. The *Haganah* units were already familiar with the territory and dispersed in cells around Palestine. They could work with the JSP and other *Haganah* forces carrying out similar reconnaissance. All of this suggests that it is at least likely that employing the *Haganah* for these operations was cheaper and possibly more efficient than any alternative.

The preparation for the demolition and sabotage of key infrastructure and resources in the eventuality of an Axis arrival in Palestine also fell to the indigenous forces. The plan called for 'scorched earth' and wide scaled demolition possibly including the 'life blood of the country.'[644] The *Haganah* carried out training in explosives and demolitions at camp near Kibbutz Mishmar

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[642] TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for September 1942, 6.10.42, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943)

[643] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.5, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945); TNA, HS 3/207 (Telegram, Local 304, 10.6.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[644] TNA, HS 3/207 (Plans for Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan, 3.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/206 (Memorandum on SOE preparations in Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan, 6.4.1942, SOE Palestine 1, Planning, 3.1941-12.1942)

HaEmek under an officer of the Royal Engineers.[645] By the summer of 1942, the *Haganah* had largely completed training and built up demolitions stockpiles in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, among other places.[646] The SOE considered that the *Haganah* made such 'satisfactory progress in their demolition schemes' that the SOE expanded the scheme in both scope and size.[647] Under the expanded scheme, the *Haganah* members surveyed infrastructure and facilities around the country and prepared them for demolition.[648] Additionally the teams practiced and trained on demolitions of the targets in their areas.[649]

It is hard to demonstrate the effectiveness of this training. Potentially, the expansion of the programme attests to its perceived effectiveness by the SOE. A contemporary report noted that the *Haganah* made satisfactory progress.[650] Another indicator may point to the effectiveness of these activities. In 1945 and 1946, the *Palmach* carried out a series of spectacular sabotage activities. Examples of the infrastructure and facility sabotage included the 'Night of the Trains' and 'Night of the Bridges.' In the former operation, the *Palmach* simultaneously sabotaged over 153 points on the railway system in Palestine, sank three guard boats, and destroyed rail infrastructure. In the latter operation, the *Palmach* simultaneously destroyed eleven bridges. In both operations, the *Palmach* had to overcome heavy British guard. These were all targets and demolitions that the *Palmach* would have explored and prepared under the wartime schemes. Perhaps the successes of the post-war operations can attest to the potential effectiveness the indigenous forces would have had in the wartime demolition schemes. However, despite some

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[645] TNA, HS 3/207 (Telegram, Local 305, 10.6.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[646] TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from 4.4.1942 Note from Cairo to London, 11.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[647] TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from Weekly Situation Report, Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, No. 1, 19.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Plans for Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan, 3.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[648] TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from 4.4.1942 Note from Cairo to London, 11.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[649] *Ibid*
[650] TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from Weekly Situation Report, Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, No. 1, 19.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

testimony that the sabotage carried out in the post-war period originated with British special operations, no unimpeachable evidence links the two.[651] Even if the plans were the same, destroying infrastructure in advance of Axis invasion in 1942 was substantially different from the operations of 1945 and 1946. Nevertheless, the post-war experience suggested a certain degree of effectiveness in terms of the absorption and dissemination of the training and preparations of the Palestine and Friends schemes.

SOE envisioned conducting guerrilla operations and gathering intelligence to aid British forces roles as a natural area for indigenous forces during Axis occupation. To support this contingency SOE established clandestine arms and explosive dumps across the Mandate territory and provided training for *Palmach* forces.[652] The SOE primarily conducted training and preparation for guerrilla warfare under the auspices of the Palestine Scheme. As part of the scheme, SOE trained two different groups. One would serve within guerrilla warfare units and the other would train additional *Haganah* forces in guerrilla warfare.[653] The latter group was critical in expanding both the quantity of the former and the scope of their training. Both groups received training in 'all parts of guerrilla warfare and W/T use' as well as sabotage, demolitions, and the 'use of all toys' in SOE's catalogue of devices.[654] Training began in a manner similar to the rest of the *Haganah* training, with training expeditions on the Sabbath around agricultural settlements and then changed to something very different.[655] Units of the *Palmach* switched away from the normal pattern, which split time between training and agricultural work, to a new schedule of full time

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[651] Interview with Eli Shitrit, 15.9.2010
[652] Monty Green, *Dual Allegiance: From Punjab to the Jordan* (Tumbridge Wells, 1994), p.70
[653] TNA, HS 3/207 (Telegram, Local 304, 10.6.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[654] TNA, HS 3/207 (Revised Palestine Scheme, 15.7.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Telegram, Local 304, 10.6.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[655] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010

training as standing units, during which they trained according to the British programme with British instructors.[656]

The history of the special services intelligence network is less clear. Moshe Dayan was an officer in the scheme, which was also part of the broader Palestine scheme.[657] According to Dayan, the network was organised in cells and consisted of communications groups and intelligence gathering cells around the country.[658] Although, the SOE records mention training W/T groups, it was not possible to determine whether these were associated with the guerrilla warfare aspect of Palestine Scheme or the intelligence aspects. However, Dayan's description is consistent with SOE practice elsewhere and is not inconsistent with the SOE records for Palestine Mandate.

In this case, the question of effectiveness is twofold; the effectiveness at undertaking the contingency operations and the effectiveness at absorbing the training provided. The first category in this case is perhaps impossible to ascertain. Beyond the Clausewitzian maxim that no plan survives first contact with the enemy, there are very reasonable questions as to how the Axis would have dealt with the Jewish population of Palestine.[659] The second category is more manageable and is approachable using the same means of analysis as the pre-occupation activities. Perhaps the best indication of SOE's impression of the effectiveness of the training comes from the SOE officer who inspected the Mishmar HaEmek Camp who was 'much impressed…by their remarkable efficiency' in training.[660] Additionally, those interviewees who underwent the training implied that they successfully learned the lessons proffered.[661]

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[656] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[657] Dayan (1976) pp. 52-53
[658] *Ibid* p. 53
[659] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H121, Report to D/HV, 17.3.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[660] TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for October 1942, 24.10.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[661] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010

One incident suggests that the *Palmach's* training in base infiltration was not wasted. When the Palestine scheme ended, SOE recalled the weaponry it had issued and brought it into the SOE controlled facility STS 102 in Haifa.[662] Within ten days of being stored in Haifa, all the weaponry was stolen by Yishuv forces.[663] The SOE implied that SOE trained Jews carried out the theft. If the theft occurred as reported, then it is a clear demonstration of the effectiveness of the *Haganah*'s SOE training. Whatever may have happened, the question of relative effectiveness in this case remains elusive. Could the SOE have done better in training agents of its own to stay behind and carry out intelligence and guerrilla warfare operations? The answer, frustratingly, must be possibly. There is simply not sufficient evidence as to what the nature of a German occupation would have been to answer the question one way or another.

In addition to the aforementioned modes of preparation for Axis occupation, the SOE also created several stay behind units. The two primary stay behind units were the German Unit and the Arab Unit.[664] While research for this dissertation uncovered significant evidence of the day-to-day activities of the German Unit, it proved impossible to evaluate effectiveness. The opposite is true for the Arab Unit. Members of the *Haganah* from around the Arab world and those who grew up within Palestine Mandate formed the Arab Unit. They were familiar with local custom, language, and culture. The task of the unit was to infiltrate Arab communities, gather intelligence, and to conduct active operations in the event of an Axis invasion. The Arab Unit continued to function through 1943 when SOE disbanded the Palestine Scheme. After the end of the scheme, the veterans of the Arab Unit, together with those of the Syrian Department, formed the Arab Department of the *Palmach*, a post-cooperative unit of the *Palmach*. The *Palmach* tasked the unit with infiltrating and gathering intelligence as well as conducting operations within

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[662] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[663] *Ibid*
[664] Interview with Hayim Miller, 14.1.2010

the Arab community in Palestine and across the border in Syria and Lebanon.[665] These

operations continued until 1950 when the unit was incorporated into other Israeli intelligence

organisations.[666]

It has not been possible to gain a clear picture of the activities of the Arab Unit during the period

of cooperation. This in part results from the more sensitive nature of the post-cooperation

activities of the unit and its veterans. Unlike the German Unit, the Arab Unit did eventually

undertake its role in a different context. To date, it appears that only one secondary source is

available with a focus on the unit. A book written by Gamliel Cohen and published by the Israeli

Ministry of Defence, while interesting and potentially useful, lacks sufficient corroboration,

either within the secondary literature or in the contemporary evidence. The lack of corroborating

sources means that the information presented fails to meet the standard of proof required for

inclusion within this analysis. It is worth noting that the on-going process of archival

reorganisation and the opening of files, particularly under the auspices of the *Palmach* Museum in

Tel Aviv and Yad Tabenkin in Ramat Efal, may soon rectify this situation.

No matter what its activities might have been, from the SOE perspective, the Arab Unit was a

contingency unit and its effectiveness should be considered in that light. It is impossible to have

a clear picture as to whether the unit would have been able to carry out its mission under Axis

occupation. The subsequent history of the veterans of the unit within the *Palmach*'s Arab

Department suggests that the unit members had significant ability to infiltrate and conduct

operations among the Arab population of Palestine, even in times of open war. The strength of

the Arab Department lay in the ability of its members to blend into the local Arab populations.

This was part of the central requirement for the Arab Unit within the SOE scheme. Although

there is no firm evidence for this, it does seem unlikely that SOE would readily have found a

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[665] מחלקה ערבית "השחר" http://info.palmach.org.il/show_item.asp?levelId=38612&itemId=5525&itemType=0, Accessed 6.10.2015
[666] *Ibid*

similar pool of equally qualified and motivated manpower whose loyalty to the overall mission could be guaranteed elsewhere.[667]

In the Friends Scheme Syria, the SOE again reached out to the *Haganah* for contingency preparation that extended beyond the Palestine Mandate into Syria and Lebanon. From the *Palmach* perspective, the scheme was a continuation of the previous cooperation with SOE that saw *Palmach* members infiltrated into Syria to gather intelligence, disseminate propaganda, and carry out sabotage to support Operation Exporter. 'Friends Scheme Syria' was an apt name as the purpose was largely the same as the 'Friends Scheme' in Palestine.[668] The key difference between the schemes was that the Syrian scheme required more secrecy as the whole scheme would be carried out in a civilian terrain that the British perceived to be pro-Axis. The main effort in the Syrian scheme centred on training the *Haganah* agents and infiltrating them into Syria.

By the end of September 1942 the scheme was well under way, thirty-three *Haganah* members had infiltrated into Syria with seven more scheduled to arrive.[669] Once infiltrated, the primary activity of the *Palmach* members was to maintain their cover.[670] Of the thirty-four male recruits who had successfully infiltrated Syria by November 1942, nineteen had papers sufficient to pass scrutiny and four had papers on the way.[671] The remaining eleven returned to Palestine to await such identity papers.[672] At least six women, prepared under a joint SOE/*Palmach* training syllabus, followed the male agents into Syria.[673] In the event the Axis forces reached northern

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[667] Some members of the IZL also could also have served in this capacity. There were attempts to pass British off as Arab in Iraq which failed - Interview with Yaacov Sika Ahroni, 29.8.2010
[668] TNA, HS 3/207 (Minutes from Meeting about Friends Scheme Syria, 14.11.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from 4.4.1942 Note from Cairo to London, 11.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943);
TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for September 1942, 6.10.42, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943)
[670] TNA, HS 3/207 (Minutes from Meeting about Friends Scheme Syria, 14.11.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[671] *Ibid*
[672] *Ibid*
[673] *Ibid*

Palestine those under cover in Syria would be activated and obtain the needed demolitions from clandestine dumps already established across the region, containing tons of explosives.[674] As it did in similar schemes, the *Palmach* bore part of the cost of the operation, which allowed training and preparation to continue whether the SOE leadership wanted it to or not.[675] Agents in Syria received no direct pay (although their families received a monthly stipend); they also received no expenses or operational finance from the British.[676] From SOE's perspective, this made the units much cheaper to operate than utilising British forces.

The continued expansion of the scheme may suggest that the SOE thought it was effective. There are no external indicators of effectiveness. In an absolute sense, the scheme was, at least in part, effective. According to the narrative of the SOE records, the members of the scheme infiltrated Syria and a significant proportion developed secure cover. As this was one of the central concerns of the scheme, in this regard, the indigenous forces were effective. The later history of the veterans of the scheme within the *Palmach*'s Arab Department, suggests that the ability of the unit members to infiltrate and conduct operations in Syria was significant. This also may speak to relative effectiveness. Within the *Haganah* there were certainly those who were intimately familiar with Syria (and Lebanon), and their culture. Some of the *Haganah* members originated from these territories. In terms of infiltration and maintaining cover, these members would have been a valuable resource. A similar resource, whose loyalty to the anti-Axis cause was guaranteed, would have been difficult for SOE to procure elsewhere. It would therefore seem that, whether or not the Friends Syria Scheme would have ultimately proved effective, it is unlikely that any other arrangement could have been as effective.

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[674] TNA, HS 3/207 (Extract from 4.4.1942 Note from Cairo to London, 11.4.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[675] TNA, HS 3/207 (Situation Report for September 1942, 6.10.42, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, May 1940-March 1943)

[676] Anita Shapira, *Yigal Allon, Native Son: A Biography,* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2008), p. 121

In addition to preparing for an Axis invasion that never occurred, SOE employed indigenous forces in Palestine Mandate for several active operations. The majority of the operations supported Operation Exporter and all belonged to the pre-1942 period. Several of the operations were chronologically and geographically co-located and interacted with each other. For example, the pre-campaign intelligence gathering operations provided intelligence for Operation Boatswain and the escape of the Free French from Syria. The personnel and networks overlapped. One of the heads of the intelligence gathering network also oversaw propaganda distribution.[677] Unlike the previously discussed contingency operations, in these operations the indigenous forces deployed and at least attempted to carry out these operations. As such, the active operations provide a better indication of the effectiveness of the indigenous forces. It is worth noting that because they belonged to an earlier period of the war, the organisations involved were in a less mature developmental stage, which may have coloured operational effectiveness.

MEC indicated that it relied on SOE for operational intelligence in Syria and SOE in turn relied on the *Haganah* for the same.[678] Early on SOE instructed the *Haganah* to find a way to establish intelligence-gathering capabilities in Syria.[679] The intelligence gathering operations served two purposes, gathering intelligence for future sabotage operations and gathering intelligence for the military.[680] Intelligence gathering for sabotage included compiling a list of road and rail targets in Syria.[681] Cross border contacts from *Yishuv* settlements on the border provided part of the

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[677] David HaCohen, *Time to Tell: An Israeli Life, 1898-1984,* Menachem Dagut trans. (New York, 1985), p. 119
[678] TNA, HS 3/207 (SO2, Telegram to Mr Clauson, 25.11.40, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); Bethell (1979) p.104
[679] Chief Education Officer (1985) p. 127; The original plan called for expanding the Hamashbir, a national whole sale cooperative store, to Syria as cover but this was vetoed by Palestine Government; TNA, HS 3/207 (SO2, Telegram to Mr Clauson, 25.11.40, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[680] AHTA, 80/563(כ)/11 (Document of Unknown Providence and Date entitled SYRIA); TNA, HS 3/207 (SO2, Telegram to Mr Clauson, 25.11.40, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[681] AHTA, 80/563(כ)/11 (Document of Unknown Providence and Date entitled SYRIA)

intelligence gathering capability.[682] In late 1940, the *Haganah* dispatched Tuviah Arazi to oversee both intelligence gathering and propaganda distribution.[683] Arazi recruited journalists, local government officials, and others to act as informants.[684] The Arab Department of the Jewish Agency then analysed the intelligence.[685] The network operated effectively for several months before the Vichy discovered it.[686]

According to the memoirs of David HaCohen, the *Haganah* liaison with SOE, after the discovery of the network the *Haganah* put a second system of intelligence gathering in place. This overlapped with the sabotage network established for the preparation for Operation Exporter and a re-established propaganda distribution network.[687] The agents mainly consisted of Syrian Jewish immigrants to Palestine, with fluent Syrian Arabic, who recruited informants among the Syrian police and elite social circles.[688] The teams spread across the territory and had no contact with or knowledge of each other.[689] There was an additional team of signal specialists and messengers.[690] For intelligence gathering, the quality and quantity of the product determine effectiveness. The formula of internal, external, absolute, and relative metrics employed throughout this chapter can be applied, with intelligence product serving as evidence of an absolute metric. Unfortunately, in this case there are no known internal or external indication of effectiveness.

In terms of absolute effectiveness and intelligence product, there are, however, several circumstantial pieces of evidence. The official history of British Intelligence in the Second World

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[682] TNA, WO 169/148 (Summary of Intelligence Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 14.12.1940, G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940)
[683] HaCohen (1985) p. 119
[684] *Ibid*
[685] *Ibid*
[686] Arazi was arrested, interrogated and attempted escape by jumping off the roof of a police facility, was recaptured, tried, sentenced and then rescued and exfiltrated back to Palestine by the Haganah; HaCohen (1985) p. 119
[687] HaCohen (1985) pp. 125-126
[688] *Ibid*
[689] *Ibid*
[690] *Ibid*

War mentioned that the British were able to gain excellent intelligence about roads, tracks, and the Vichy order of battle in Syria, but did not indicate the source.[691] While there were other potential sources for this intelligence, the fact that MEC indicated that it relied on the SOE for intelligence in Syria suggests that it came from the *Haganah*. Additionally, a very detailed Vichy order of battle including the equipment of each Vichy unit appears in the *Haganah* files in Tel Aviv, but with no indication as to its provenance.[692] All of this is circumstantial evidence. Firmer evidence appears in two sources. The autobiography of David HaCohen stated that the *Haganah* intelligence network, established in coordination with the SOE, was responsible, at least in part, for passing the intelligence on the Tripoli (Lebanon) facilities that were the target of Operation Boatswain to the strike team.[693] This however, gives no indication of the quality of the intelligence provided. A better source is a SOE telegram and map from November 1940 that indicates bridges, oil pipelines, railways, and water pipelines to be sabotaged along with good ambush points along the roads in Syria.[694] As the *Haganah* was SOE's primary intelligence gathering arm in Syria and the SOE and the *Haganah* agreed that the *Haganah* would gather the type of intelligence reflected in the map, the map and telegram might indicate the efficacy of the indigenous force in this arrangement. In terms of the quality of the intelligence, after the SOE examined this intelligence they passed it on to the RAF for use in targeting.[695] While this evidence suggests a high level of efficacy in intelligence gathering, it remains circumstantial and is far from conclusive. The preponderance of the circumstantial evidence implies a certain degree of effectiveness even if it is not possible to prove the case.

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[691] F.H. Hinsley, et al, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume I* (London, 1979), p. 425
[692] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/11 (Document of Unknown Providence and Date entitled SYRIA)
[693] HaCohen (1985) p. 134
[694] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HP, Map and Explanatory Telegram to AD, 21.11.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[695] *Ibid*

It is impossible to gauge relative effectiveness for this scheme because of the lack of information. If the intelligence gathering was successful, then indigenous force cooperation provided a cost effective option for gathering intelligence. The ability to use Syrian Jews would have certainly been useful and hard to replicate, making the cooperation very effective in a relative sense. However, if the operation were unsuccessful then this would have meant that the indigenous forces might not have been effective in a relative sense.

Another area in which SOE employed the *Haganah* as an indigenous force across the border was in the dissemination of propaganda through broadcasts and leaflets.[696] To support broadcast based activities, the *Haganah* built, operated, and maintained the Free French Broadcasting station that spread propaganda across the border.[697] The French made their broadcasts from a *Haganah* facility that housed the entire operation.[698] In terms of smuggling and distributing propaganda in written form, the *Haganah* produced the leaflets and hired Arab agents who remained under the direction of the *Haganah* members to distribute it.[699] This, like the intelligence networks, continued in a reengineered form even after the original network was compromised.[700]

This operation generated both internal and external evidence of effectiveness. An internal SOE report from the officer who oversaw Palestine stated that the Free French broadcasting station 'in spite of jamming, has been a great success.'[701] This clearly suggests that at least the SOE officer in charge considered the broadcast a success. There is external evidence as well. An intelligence report from the Staffordshire Yeomanry stationed on the Syria-Palestine Mandate

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[696] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/HO, Letter to D/HB, 11.09.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940); TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)

[697] TNA, HS 3/146 (Lt. Col. Pollock, Memorandum on Jewish Settlement Police, 9.5.1941, Reorganization of SOE Middle East 1941)

[698] HaCohen (1985) p. 115

[699] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945); HaCohen (1985) p. 116, 137

[700] HaCohen (1985) pp. 125-126

[701] TNA, HS 3/146 (D/HP, Report to CD, 19.5.1941, Reorganisation of SOE ME, 1941)

border, immediately prior to Exporter, noted that 'British Propaganda has been spreading in Syria very rapidly.'[702] Since the *Haganah* was in charge of spreading the propaganda on behalf of SOE, this evidence suggests that the *Haganah* fulfilled its mission. This answers the question of absolute effectiveness. The *Haganah,* as an indigenous force, accomplished its mission of producing and spreading propaganda, despite the challenges and the collapse of its initial network. In terms of relative effectiveness, the *Haganah* could provide the broadcasting materials facilities without a bureaucratic process, which was especially useful as GHQ Palestine would 'allow no activity in Syria which might undermine the French High Commissioner's position.'[703] Additionally, as in some of the other operations, the presence of a ready reserve of those familiar with Syria and with cross-border contacts would have been hard for SOE to replicate.

Within the record, one set of operations provides a detailed picture of the nature and effectiveness of the *Haganah's* cross-border proxy efforts on behalf of SOE; the liberation of friendly prisoners held by the Vichy in Lebanon and Syria. At some point in late 1940, SOE approached the *Haganah* to liberate Free French and Free Polish prisoners held across the border. There were two initial aspects to the operation, preventing transfer of the prisoners to Europe and beginning the exfiltration process. The first out were the Polish prisoners arriving, according to SOE records, in Palestine before 27 January 1941.[704] It also seems that by this date, transfer had been prevented and SOE concluded that the *Haganah* organisation was 'an efficient organisation.'[705] For the next stage of exfiltration the *Haganah* made contact with the prisoners and was able to extract the Free French from prison and hide them in Syria.[706] This they

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[702] TNA, WO 169/1402 (Intelligence Report, 21.5.1941, War Diary Staffordshire Yeomanry, 1941)
[703] TNA, HS 3/146 (D/HP, Report to CD, 19.5.1941, Reorganisation of SOE ME, 1941)
[704] TNA, HS 3/210 (D/H0, Note to D/H1, 27.1.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)
[705] *Ibid*
[706] TNA, HS 3/210 (D/H19, Report to D/HB, 3.2.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/210 (D/H19, Report to D/HB, 3.2.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/210 (Correspondence to SO2, 18.4.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)

accomplished through bribery involving, at least in part, significant Jewish Agency funds.[707] By

18 April, the first liberated Free French prisoner arrived in Palestine and the *Haganah* continued

with its arrangements to bring the rest across.[708]

In this case, both absolute and internal metrics of effectiveness are clear. The *Haganah*

accomplished the task and fulfilled the mission set forth by the SOE to the standards SOE

required. The question of relative effectiveness remains worth discussion. To accomplish the

mission the *Haganah* had to infiltrate Syria, identify the relevant officials, navigate the treacherous

waters of bribery, hide the freed prisoners in Syria, and smuggle them across the border. Several

indicators support an assessment of relative effectiveness. First, the operation required haste and

the *Haganah* already had contacts on the ground that it could employ. Any other operational

choice, especially one employing SOE personnel, would have necessitated creating such

networks. Second, in this operation the *Haganah* employed its own funds, lowering the

operational cost to SOE. Finally, the operation carried a high degree of risk for relatively modest

rewards. Given the SOE manpower shortage in the Middle East, having a third party assume the

personnel risk would have been desirable. This operation meets all the standards for assessment

of relative effectiveness. In this case, the *Haganah* was effective as an indigenous force.

Within the realm of pre-campaign sabotage, one operation stands out as distinct and separate

from the others. Unlike in the other incidents of sabotage, in Operation Boatswain (occasionally

known as Operation Sea Lion), the *Palmach* served in a joint force with SOE. An SOE officer

accompanied the operation and some of the most senior *Haganah* officers oversaw the *Palmach*

aspects of the planning, recruit selection, and training.[709] The purpose of the operation was to

approach Tripoli (Lebanon) by sea and sabotage the petrochemical storage and refining facilities

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[707] TNA, HS 3/210 (D/H19, Report to D/HB, 3.2.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian
Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/210 (Correspondence to SO2, 18.4.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous
and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)
[708] TNA, HS 3/210 (Correspondence to SO2, 18.4.1941, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel,
1.1941-3.1943)
[709] HaCohen (1985) p. 134

there.[710] The Boatswain team received detailed intelligence on the facilities and security from both the *Haganah* intelligence network already in place and other British sources.[711] As the SOE was unable to provide sufficient weapons and materials for the operation, the supplies came from the *Haganah*.[712] The SOE procured the ship from the coast guard in Palestine.[713] On 18 May, it left Tel Aviv and disappeared, never obtaining its objective.[714] As this was more of a joint operation than the rest of the Syrian sabotage operations the British military's casualty department paid compensation to the next of kin of those from the *Palmach* who went missing.[715]

That the operation failed to achieve its objectives is clear. The forces cannot be termed effective. The case however displays some of the costs and benefits of an alternative model of joint SOE-*Haganah* operations rather than autonomous operations by the indigenous force. While joint operations had the advantage that the *Haganah* could provide both personnel and supplies to make up SOE shortfalls, the indigenous personnel had only limited training in maritime and amphibious operations. Other operations in Syria made use of the experience and suitable personnel that the *Haganah* could provide and SOE could not. For this operation, SOE and commandos would have had more suitable skills. Further, the joint nature of the operation added to the operational cost as SOE had to procure the vessel and pay compensation for the missing fighters – a factor absent in other operations. Overall, this suggests that this type of joint operations had a reduced relative efficacy.

The subject of the anti-SO2 dossier was the sabotage conducted by the *Haganah* in Syria. The first steps in conducting the sabotage were creating a target list and infiltrating the teams. The

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[710] Bethell (1979) p.104
[711] HaCohen (1985) p. 134
[712] HaCohen (1985) p. 135
[713] HaCohen (1985) p. 135, 136; TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[714] HaCohen (1985) p. 135, 136; TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[715] TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945); HS 3/210 (Telegrams about Compensation for Rothman, SOE/Palestine 5, Miscellaneous and Palestinian Personnel, 1.1941-3.1943)

Haganah apparently achieved both.[716] Teams 'disguised as local Arabs' with 'a fluent command of the Syrian dialect of Arabic' in several units successfully infiltrated across the Vichy controlled territory, each with its own objectives and targets.[717]

Fragmentary evidence points to the fact that these teams consisted of SOE trained *Palmach* members. One SOE report from May 1941 stated 'it is only thanks to the training of Friends' men, which we have carried out, that we are now in a position to attempt any sabotage operations in Syria.'[718] The same report noted that thirty members of the *Haganah* were, at the time of the report, used 'for highly dangerous raids on most difficult military targets in Syria.'[719] This does not count as conclusive evidence that the raids were carried out. The report added that 'it is too early at this moment to say whether the raids are going to be successful or not.'[720] An action order from 25th May 1941 similarly indicated that the teams were able to approach their targets and communicate the status of the security at the targets but did not state whether they were eventually able to carry out the raids.[721] A final piece of evidence comes from an SOE history document which indicated that the *Haganah* carried out sabotage across the border.[722] Although many other rumours exist as to what the *Haganah* accomplished, it proved impossible to locate any surviving documentary evidence. Nothing gives a clear indication as to what the raids accomplished or if they were completed. The lack of evidence might indicate that while in communication with SOE, the *Haganah* enjoyed a relatively free hand in carrying out the raids. This is consistent with the narrative presented in HaCohen's memoirs but lack of evidence is not evidence and this remains pure speculation.

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[716] HaCohen (1985) pp. 125-126; AHTA, 80/563(ב)/11 (Document of Unknown Providence and Date entitled SYRIA); TNA, HS 3/207 (D/HP, Map and Explanatory Telegram to AD, 21.11.1940, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[717] HaCohen (1985) pp. 125-126

[718] TNA, HS 3/146 (D/HP, Report to CD, 19.5.1941, Reorganisation of SOE ME, 1941)

[719] *Ibid*

[720] *Ibid*

[721] TNA, HS 3/207 (Action Order DHP & DHO, 25.5.41, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

[722] TNA, HS 7/86 (History of the SOE in the Arab World, 9.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945, p.2)

In terms of assessing effectiveness, there are severe limits on the extent to which this operation can be of use. The operation adds to the documented evidence that the *Haganah* was effective at infiltrating Syria and placing teams in the right locations. That the *Haganah* was able to gather the required intelligence, place itself in a position to undertake the raids, and provide timely updates on the targets demonstrates that it was at least partially effective. The extent to which the *Haganah* was effective in an absolute sense remains an unanswerable question. It depends whether they were able to carry out all of the objectives.

In a relative sense, the local knowledge and ability to blend in possessed by the *Haganah* would have proven a great asset in the first parts of the operation. Further, as the May 1941 report noted, SOE had no possibility of having other options ready in time.[723] The fact that the *Haganah* was not part of the SOE allowed it more flexibility to prepare for operations and maintain deniability. While in a theoretical sense, other units might have been able to conduct the raids more successfully, (though there is no evidence that the *Haganah* was unsuccessful in conducting the raids) given the realities of the situation in Palestine Mandate no other likely option would have been practical. Even if, at the last moment, when SOE received permission to act it had sufficient personnel available for operations in Syria, it would have taken time to familiarise them with Syria and they would have had a reduced likelihood of blending in to the Syrian population. Thus, whether effective or not in the absolute sense, the *Haganah* was effective as indigenous partner in a relative sense.

Within the realm of active operations one case of SOE-*Haganah* cooperation remains to consider. Prior to and during the first phase of Operation Exporter the British Army required scouts to reconnoitre the border region and to guide the regular forces to the key terrain, which constituted the start line of the campaign. For this, the army looked to the SOE and the SOE

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[723] TNA, HS 3/146 (D/HP, Report to CD, 19.5.1941, Reorganisation of SOE ME, 1941)

looked to the *Haganah*.[724] The SOE tasked the *Haganah* with providing reconnaissance along the invasion routes in advance of guiding the invasion forces.[725] The *Haganah* personnel came from the newly formed *Palmach*.[726] Before the campaign began, the *Haganah* teams reconnoitred the invasion routes.[727] They hired local Arab and Druze guides, some of whom the team leaders knew personally.[728] The initial product of the reconnaissance included maps and alternative routes collected at the *Haganah*'s liaison office in Haifa and then distributed to British intelligence.[729]

At the beginning of Operation Exporter, the *Haganah* augmented their teams with more *Palmach* members and attached them to various advanced contingents of the invasion force. For example, Moshe Dayan's team served with an Australian contingent with the mission of moving to the bridge over the Litani at Iskandaron.[730] Yigal Allon's 'platoon' brought a contingent to the Hardalah Bridge and a team from Kibbutz Kfar Giladi guided the force advancing towards Damascus through Banias on the edge of the Golan Heights.[731] In all three cases, the guide forces encountered resistance and engaged in combat operations.[732]

Consideration of both internal and external evidence reveals evidence of absolute effectiveness. The three *Palmach* teams achieved all their objectives. In the pre-campaign period, they gathered and disseminated reconnaissance. At the beginning of Exporter, they successfully guided the advanced contingents of the British force to the assigned locations. When considering relative effectiveness it is worth noting that, as Anita Shapira mentioned in her biography of Yigal Allon, the *Palmach* members had no experience of scouting Syria. In this way, they were no different

[724] Green (1994) p.47; Bethell (1979) p.104
[725] HaCohen (1985) p. 139; TNA, HS7/86 (History of the SOE in The Arab World, 9.1945, p.2, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945)
[726] Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010; Bethell (1979) p.104
[727] HaCohen (1985) p. 139; Shapira (2008) pp. 112-113
[728] HaCohen (1985) p. 139
[729] *Ibid*; Anita Shapira (2008) pp. 112-113
[730] Dayan (1976) p. 49
[731] *Ibid* p. 45; Shapira (2008) pp. 112-113; Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010
[732] Dayan (1976) p. 45; Shapira (2008) pp. 112-113; Interview with Uri Horowitz, 10.1.2010

from any SOE team. However, many of them did have experience in scouting similar terrain in Palestine Mandate and they had cross border contacts that enabled them to recruit trustworthy local guides. Neither the SOE nor British Army could readily replicate either of these two advantages from within their own ranks. Moreover, in terms of resources, the SOE was able to suggest the operation to the *Haganah* and leave it with them without expending further financial, material, or manpower resources.[733] Thus, it seems the *Haganah* was effective in this context in both an absolute and relative sense.

In addition to contingency and active operations, the SOE employed the *Haganah* as an indigenous force for mission support. The *Haganah* acted in two distinct areas, security and supply. In the arena of security, there is very little evidence of the cooperative activities. From the advent of the relationship between the SOE and the *Haganah* it was intended that the *Haganah* would assist the SOE with counter espionage, however there is little in the files to suggest what actually occurred.[734] The only indication that this means of cooperation occurred is a series of messages from SOE to the *Haganah* from the end of November 1940.[735] In these, the SOE requested that the *Haganah* investigate a potential recruit to SOE service to confirm his background and establish whether he was trustworthy and reliable.[736] According to the messages, the *Haganah* investigated and confirmed not only the background but the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as well.[737] The messages give no indication that this was an extraordinary request or that this was anything other than a typical correspondence. If this was the case, then it is possible to surmise that the *Haganah* was active in the realm of security, at least in the early period of cooperation and that in this instance they were effective in an absolute sense. As the individual in question was a member of the *Yishuv,* it is likely that the *Haganah* was

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[733] Dayan (1976) p. 48
[734] TNA, HS 3/201 (D/H, Letter to D, 29.5.1940, SOE Middle East, Zionists, 2.1940-9.1940)
[735] AHTA, 80/563(ס)/11 (D/HO, Message to F/D, 27.11.1940)
[736] *Ibid*
[737] *Ibid*

in a better position to investigate the person than the SOE. The SOE cooperated with the *Haganah* in this counter espionage activity, making the *Haganah* effective in both an absolute and relative sense.

The other forms of mission support provided by the *Haganah* belonged more to the realm of logistics. The *Haganah* provided logistical support in arranging facilities for the SOE. The *Haganah* found housing for SOE officers and agents in Haifa on short notice.[738] This too the *Haganah* accomplished quickly and without incident. In addition to providing facilities, the *Haganah* provided physical logistics in terms of the production of explosives, W/T, and forged documents. The provision of these resources was part of the initial understanding between the two parties.[739] That the *Yishuv* manufactured is known only thanks to a reference stating that 'efforts to produce locally hand grenades...have had some misunderstandings.'[740] There is no indication as to whether the explosives or their manufacture were effective.

There is more information describing the production of the W/T sets. In addition to the W/T built for the Free French, the *Haganah* produced roughly forty more sets.[741] The effectiveness of the manufacture is subject to debate. A report from 1941 stated that 'the forty suitcase sets which the Friends are producing, are in great demand, not only for our own purpose, but also for G(R), and more particularly C's people. The R.A.F. has also taken at least one.'[742] On the other hand, a report from 1942 indicated that the forty W/T sets built were in reality only twenty sets and were not really used.[743] It is worth noting that the second report uses vague numbers to describe the fate of the W/T sets. It also seems odd that according to the 1942 report, the *Haganah* was not competent at W/T manufacture when their previous efforts with the Free

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[738] HaCohen (1985) p. 113
[739] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/12 (Memoranda Covering Subjects of Discussion at Meeting Held at Haifa, 13.7.1940)
[740] AHTA, 80/563(ב)/11 (A. Kremmer, Letter to David HaCohen, 38.7.1940)
[741] HaCohen (1985) p. 115; TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H218 to D/HV, 30.9.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943); TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H271, Telegram to AD/H, 12.07.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)
[742] TNA, HS 3/146 (D/HP, Report to CD, 19.5.1941, Reorganisation of SOE ME, 1941)
[743] TNA, HS 3/207 (D/H218 to D/HV, 30.9.1942, SOE Palestine 2, Policy and Directives, 5.1940-3.1943)

French were so successful. Overall, it would seem that first report has more of a ring of accuracy in it but it is not possible to know with any certainty. In terms of forgery, this chapter has previously demonstrated that the papers forged by the *Haganah* for its agents in Syria were of a high enough quality to withstand scrutiny.

Generally, it seems the *Haganah* was for SOE an effective purveyor of logistical support in an absolute sense. It located facilities for SOE and it was, at least for a time, able to provide it with certain security services. It manufactured explosives, produced W/T sets, and forged documents. The question of relative effectiveness remains. The lack of resource at SOE's disposal in Palestine suggests that this is somewhat moot – had SOE had the ability to have sufficient supplies for all its purposes in Palestine it would not have needed to turn to the *Haganah*. Hypothetically, the SOE could have found its own facilities and set up its own manufacturing. It did have some of its own forgers; but, if the *Haganah* was able to meet the requirements, it presented a less resource intensive option.

Although there is evidence of operational effectiveness, there were events that detracted from the effectiveness of the relationship and there were inherent risks for SOE. In general, most of the difficulties in the relationship between the two organisations that could have affected operational effectiveness came towards the end of cooperation and centred on the issue of autonomy.[744] After the threat to the Palestine Mandate receded, the SOE wished to curtail the *Haganah*'s autonomy. This was something that the *Haganah* command would not countenance. This tension arose too late in the relationship to have a role on operational effectiveness.

The primary risk that the SOE noted similarly did not affect operational effectiveness. Rather it resulted from the effectiveness of the cooperation. As the SOE turned to the *Haganah* for the bulk of its indigenous force requirement in Palestine, it never developed the capabilities to carry

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[744] Anita Shapira, *Yigal Allon, Native Son: A Biography* (Philidelphia, Pennsylvania, 2008), p. 120

out its function without the *Haganah*. The SOE personnel recognised that SOE had become more dependent on the *Haganah* than the *Haganah* was on the SOE. There was something of a reversal of the balance of agency. It benefited the *Haganah* to continue cooperating with the SOE, but the SOE needed the *Haganah* to continue functioning in Palestine. Each required the other's contribution to the potential defence of Palestine. This meant that SOE felt unable to curtail the *Haganah*'s activities, even when it was potentially in SOE's interest to do so and that, to some extent, the *Haganah* could determine the nature of SOE activities in Palestine. The multidirectional nature of agency in this case was a risk to SOE as it put it firmly in bed with the *Haganah*. It seems unlikely the organisation would have taken such a risk if the *Haganah* had proved ineffective.

When it comes to the particular instances of cooperation between the SOE and the *Haganah* there is frequently inconclusive evidence as to activity and effectiveness. Overall, the cases suggest a general trend towards effectiveness. In every case where evidence is available, the indigenous forces seem to have fulfilled the established objectives. The *Haganah* provided facilities and funds, reconnoitred Palestine Mandate, prepared demolitions, conducted training, raised manpower, established special units, distributed propaganda, exfiltrated the Free French, and guided the British Army. In many of these cases, the *Haganah* not only demonstrated absolute effectiveness but relative effectiveness as well. As most of the personnel for these activities came from the *Palmach*, this finding also speaks to the effectiveness of the *Palmach* as a wellspring for SOE activities. Even in the cases where doubt remains because of the lack of evidence, SOE reports generated after the period of cooperation paint a general picture of all around effectiveness indicating the *Haganah* was a 'valuable and willing collaborator.'[745] The significance of this quotation is the inclusion of the adjective 'valuable' as well as 'willing' to describe the collaboration. Further, the 'History of the SOE in the Arab World' stated that 'in

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[745] TNA, HS 7/85 (Memorandum on SOE Activities in Arab Countries, pp.1-30, SOE History 52, SOE Activities in Arab Countries, 1941-1943, p. 12)

these early days of SOE work in the Arab World SOE was certainly wise to harness the knowledge of Palestinian Jews in their undertakings. In fact this was to some extent necessitated through the lack of suitable personnel to undertake their requirements.'[746] This suggests that in the final analysis SOE considered that in the early period of cooperation the *Haganah* provided an effective answer to SOE's requirements. The post-cooperation assessments taken together with those instances where the efficacy of cooperation is demonstrable and the preponderance of circumstantial evidence paints a picture of generally successful indigenous force collaboration.

In terms of operational expectations, the views of Palestine Government and the British Army were significantly similar. Whatever applied to Palestine Government also was true for the British Army, unless otherwise noted. For Palestine Government there were two primary modes of cooperation. The modes were semi-autonomous cooperation and autonomous cooperation. The JSP/*Notrim* scheme exemplifies the mode of semi-autonomous cooperation. In the context of the JSP/*Notrim* scheme, the Palestine Government anticipated that the *Haganah* would act as an additional home guard reserve in the case of an Axis invasion.[747] The Palestine Government also wanted the JSP/*Notrim* to supplement the garrison of Palestine, freeing regular soldiers for the front by guarding military facilities and key infrastructure. This was a similar role in practice to that undertaken by the JSP/*Notrim* during the Arab revolt.[748] Although the Arab Revolt officially ended in 1939, violence continued into 1941.[749] Small, armed bands continued to launch ambushes in rural areas.[750] Many of the Palestine Government's requirements for the JSP/*Notrim* related to the revolt, the on-going violence, and the possibility of a renewed rebellion. The Palestine Government wanted the JSP/*Notrim* to patrol and protect infrastructure and

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[746] TNA, HS 7/86 (History of the SOE in the Arab World, 9.1945, SOE History 53, History of SOE in the Arab World, 1944-1945, p.2)

[747] TNA, KV 5/34 (Extract from Security Summary, SIME Cairo, M.E. No. 51, 4.6.42, Irgun Zvi Le-umt B'eretz Israel – National Military Organisation in the Land of Israel)

[748] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010

[749] TNA, WO 169/1037 (Summary of Intelligence, 8.1.1941, War Diary of General Staff "Intelligence", British Forces in Palestine And Transjordan, 1.1941-7.1941)

[750] *Ibid*

settlements as well as provide a deterrent to further rebellion. As part of the preparation for a potential revolt, the Palestine Government also expected the JSP/*Notrim* to carry out reconnaissance and intelligence patrols.

Palestine Government also came to hope from cooperation was that the *Haganah* would participate in counter insurgency against the other militant organisations within the *Yishuv*. Whether this was an expectation that Palestine Government had at the beginning of the war is unclear. However, by the time of the *Saison* they certainly relied on the fact that the *Haganah* could independently act as a counter-insurgent force and minimise the threat of Jewish insurgency.

The British Army had one operational expectation of cooperation with indigenous forces that it did not share with the Government of Palestine. The military wanted the *Haganah* to provide scouts and intelligence for Operation Exporter. It seems the British Army hoped that the scouts could bring the military forces across the border to the start lines of the campaign. This task included guiding the regular forces, crossing the border before the campaign, and working with the British reconnaissance elements to seize key terrain and positions near the border in order to clear the way for the regular forces.

As with the special services, the Palestine Government and the military also had a number of secondary expectations. Most significant among them was the use of the JSP/*Notrim* as a tool to stave off political pressure from outside to increase Jewish participation in the defence of Palestine. Pressure on the Palestine Government to include the *Yishuv* in defence arrangements built and in May 1941, the SOS Colonies telegrammed HC Palestine warning that: 'you will appreciate that...there is strong and growing feeling in various corners that Jewish settlements ought to be furnished with some means of self-defence not (repeat not) against Arabs but against

such form of Axis attack as parachute landings etc.'[751] Over the next several years pressure

increased on the SOS Colonies and War Office, particularly from Parliament, to include the

Yishuv as a Home Guard in Palestine.[752] To counter these political thrusts the Palestine

Government fell back on the JSP/*Notrim* with statements such as:

> Jewish Settlement Police (including Special Constables) are in effect Jewish Home
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> Guards...strength of volunteer force open to British and Palestinians is limited to the
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> availability of arms and training facilities (they are very limited). I should be adverse from
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> creation of any new force on Home Guard lines. There are already far too many
>
> unauthorised arms in the hands of both Jews and Arabs, and the Jews of course have
>
> their own illicit defence organisation and large caches of arms (recently swollen as a result
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> of the Syrian campaign).[753]

Together with the panoply of operational expectations, the Palestine Government clearly

expected that the employment of indigenous forces would yield political benefits, especially

when it came to preventing the *Yishuv* from gaining a further role in the security of the Palestine

Mandate.

The JSP/*Notrim* largely provided the mechanism for fulfilling the Palestine Government's

requirements. It was through the JSP scheme that the British undertook the contingency

operations for an Axis invasion or renewed Arab revolt. The JSP were also responsible for a

number of garrison duties, including providing deterrence. How effective they were in these

tasks generally defies conclusive measure.

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[751] TNA, CO9 68/39/5 (Secretary of State For Colonies, Cypher Telegram to HC Palestine, 9.5.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)

[752] TNA, CO 733/448/15 (Proposal for the Formation of a Home Guard in Palestine, Local Defence Forces, 1942) TNA, CO 733/448/15 (Visit of the HC Palestine, Questions for Discussion with War Office, 22.41942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)

[753] TNA, CO 733/448/15 (Proposal for the Formation of a Home Guard in Palestine, Local Defence Forces, 1942)

The most prolific form of indigenous force cooperation between the Palestine Government and the *Haganah* was the JSP scheme. The JSP scheme was one scheme with multiple functions and purposes. The diversity of its tasks and objectives creates some difficulties in determining its effectiveness.

A more active aspect of JSP operations stemmed from the Arab Revolt. Although the Arab Revolt officially ended in 1939, violence continued. Summaries of intelligence as late as 1941 contain many reports of armed bands conducting ambushes in Palestine in a similar manner to latter phases of the Arab Revolt.[754] The British still employed the JSP/*Notrim* to defend Jewish property and settlements as well as patrol roads.[755] Subsequent studies have found that this type of active patrolling in likely event hotspots (such as Arab villages and isolated roads near Jewish settlements) provided a form of direct deterrence.[756] The mobile patrols mounted on horseback and truck thus in part fulfilled a deterrent role.[757] An additional aspect of this activity was reconnaissance and monitoring. The JSP/*Notrim* photographed and mapped Arab villages.[758] These activities served interests of both the *Haganah* and the Palestine Government.[759] For the *Haganah* they provided valuable intelligence for later conflict, for the Palestine Government they provided reconnaissance in case of a further flair up of the Arab Revolt.

For all the Government of Palestine's resistance to establishing a Home Guard and expanding the JSP, the invasion scares of 1941 and 1942 necessitated a response. For the Palestine Government this primarily came through the JSP/*Notrim* scheme. To undertake the required

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[754] TNA, WO 169/1037 (Summary of Intelligence, 8.1.1941, War Diary of General Staff "Intelligence", British Forces in Palestine And Transjordan, 1.1941-7.1941)
[755] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010
[756] Among other sources see: Lawrence Sherman & David Weisburd, 'General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime "Hot Spots": A Randomized, Controlled Trial', *Justice Quarterly*, 4 (1995), p. 625
[757] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010
[758] *Ibid*
[759] *Ibid*

militarisation without violating its policy against large-scale training, the Palestine Government looked to the *Haganah*.[760]

Rather than issuing large caches of rifles to the *Haganah,* Palestine Government decided to overlook the possession and stockpiling of illegal arms.[761] Additionally, thirty men of the JSP were trained as instructors in rifle, lewis gun, tommy gun, mortar, anti-tank rifle, mines, defence construction, camouflage, personal concealment, and 'minor tactics.'[762] Training JSP members as instructors demonstrates the real concept behind the scheme. It was an open secret that the JSP trained each other and non-JSP *Haganah* members. JSP instructors disseminated the lessons learned to create a larger defence capability. In the joint NCO courses established by the British, the British taught drill and field craft and the *Haganah* taught military training in bayonet, machine guns, grenades, and other military operational necessities with the understanding that the NCOs would pass the training on to their units.[763] The JSP provided rifles and training to other members of the *Haganah*.[764]

Together these steps rapidly created a large reserve of personnel with partial or complete military training. The Palestine Government allowed this because it prepared a contingency force for Axis invasion while not directly violating the Government's policy of not training large proportions of the *Haganah*. The freedom allowed to the JSP had two significant downsides for the Palestine Government. First, it meant that the decisions as to who received what training were outside its control and second, it allowed the JSP to engage in activities beyond the scope

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[760] TNA, CO 733/448/15, (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 1.4.1942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)

[761] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 2.5.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)

[762] TNA, CO 733/448/15 (Officer Administering the Government, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 5.5.1942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)

[763] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010; Interview with Oreon Yoseph (Lux), 15.9.2010

[764] Ariel Sharon and David Chanoff, *Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon* (New York, 2001), p. 30; Interview with Ami Linetsky, 23.8.2010

of those envisioned by Palestine Government.[765] Nevertheless, the autonomy was a necessary answer to the Palestine Government's thinking on emergency defence. The Palestine Government's policies prevented it from training too large a cadre of members of the *Yishuv* in military combat tactics and equipment. The threats of 1941 and 1942 required it do just that. The training autonomy the Government granted the JSP allowed it to fulfil both requirements.

The Palestine Government also looked to the JSP to take over many of the garrison functions previously undertaken by the army. In the first year of the war, the GOC Palestine repeatedly suggested that the JSP take on increasing garrison duties[766] As a result, the JSP/*Notrim* took over guarding borders, infrastructure, and military facilities.[767] After Lord Lloyd, the former Secretary of State for Colonies suggested in early 1941 that it would be possible to reduce the garrison by re-enrolling JSP members, Palestine Government expanded the JSP and deployed it to guard the vulnerable locations of the Mandate territory.[768] These actions freed up soldiers and police from garrison roles.

The *Haganah*-Palestine Government relationship through the JSP was effective in many of its missions. It provided the supplemental manpower the Palestine Government required and formed the basis of the contingency force Palestine Government wanted. The JSP carried out activities to respond to the continued violence following the Arab Revolt and deter a further general revolt. The foundation of the JSP's efficacy was an alignment of motivation between Palestine Government and the *Haganah*. The cooperation was at its most effective when both fulfilled their immediate needs to the maximum extent. During the invasion scares, Palestine Government overlooked the JSP's illicit activities and supplemental military training as well as

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[765] Interview with Yitzhak Verdanon, 11.8.2010
[766] TNA, WO 169/148 (Notes on GOC's Conference Held at Force HQ, 9.9.1939, G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940); TNA, WO 169/148 (Notes on GOC Conference Held at Sarafand, 12.7.1940, G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940)
[767] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010; Horne (1982) p. 251
[768] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (Note on Jewish Agency Request for a Local Jewish Defence Force in Palestine 16.4.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941); Horne (1982) p. 251; Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010

the widespread smuggling of arms into Palestine Mandate.[769] As long as this was the case, the *Haganah* provided supplemental training, equipment, and manpower, which allowed the Palestine Government access to greater capabilities for no additional material or financial cost. When the Palestine Government tried to bring the JSP to heel, greater problems arose. By making supplemental activities illicit, the Palestine Government degraded its own capability. This was the case in 1940 and resulted in the need for a rapid re-expansion of the JSP scheme in 1941. Without the JSP, or a similar scheme, the Palestine Government would not have been both able simultaneously reduce the garrison and provide domestic deterrence.

Beyond the employment of the JSP to fulfil a home guard function, Palestine Government fully expected that the *Haganah* would cooperate and act as a home guard in the event of an invasion. When absolutely required, the Palestine Government begrudgingly planned for and sanctioned this extra-legal home guard. In a way, the home guard was an extension of the JSP. HC Palestine expressed such sentiments when approached with questions as to the preparedness of Palestine for Axis invasion by stating:

> Nevertheless, I recognise that circumstances may arise in which the training in arms and discipline given to individuals by these organisations may be capable of utilisation in the country's defence. Recognition of either or both of them as such is out of the question but it is believed that some thousands of their members (particularly of Hagana) are already serving in the Jewish Settlement Police and other police formations over which we hope to retain some control.[770]

Still the Imperial Authorities were concerned with this situation. SIME Cairo stated that the *Haganah* would:

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[769] TNA, CO 968/39/5 (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 2.5.1941, Recruitment of Palestinian Jews into Settlement Police, 1941)

[770] TNA, CO 733/448/15, (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 1.4.1942, Local Defence Forces, 1942)

…also no doubt act as a home-guard in the event of an Axis invasion. For the present, therefore, their activity may be regarded as helpful to the war effort. It remains to be seen, however, how they will react if after the war the Government declares its intention (sic) of carrying into effect the 1939 White Paper… It is necessary, therefore, to weigh the immediate advantage of having an armed and trained of young Jews, who would help to resist an Arab rising or an Axis invasion against the possibility that this force may be used against us in a few years' time.[771]

Despite these concerns, for the Palestine Government the existence of this unofficial home guard was better than expanding the recruitment of members of the *Yishuv* into formal defence schemes.[772] Entry into the unofficial home guard was under the control of the *Haganah*. The unofficial guard was organised as a standing force, which the *Haganah* ordered select members to join.[773] For the Palestine Government the drive to stave off the development of a broad home guard or major expansion of the JSP scheme was part of the motivation for allowing an unofficial home guard. From the Government's perspective, the success or failure of the scheme rested in part, on whether it ameliorated such demands.

The question of effectiveness is difficult to address for the unofficial home guard. The extra-legal guard had two distinct purposes, one was to lessen the demand for a sanctioned defence organisation while the other was to prepare for an Axis invasion and to contribute to defence should an invasion come. In the first case, the scheme was somewhat effective. The Palestine Government managed to delay the creation of an official home guard for years using the argument of the existence of an unofficial home guard. Eventually the logic of the war took precedence, forcing not only the creation of an official home guard but the expansion of the JSP

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[771] TNA, KV 5/34 (Extract from Security Summary, SIME Cairo, M.E. No. 51, 4.6.42, Irgun Zvi Le-umt B'eretz Israel – National Military Organisation in the Land of Israel)
[772] TNA, CAB 66/27/12 (Grigg & Cranborne, War Cabinet Memorandum, Palestinians in the Forces and Local Defence and Police Services, 1.8.1942)
[773] Interview with Abraham Rabinov, 21.9.2010

and creation of combat battalions from the ranks of the *Yishuv*. The unofficial home guard could only go so far as a rationale for Palestine Government's intransigence. The second reason for the Palestine Government's acquiescence to the existence of an unofficial home guard was the fear of Axis invasion. That the unofficial home guard mobilised and conducted extensive training in its likely area of operations means that, to some degree, it met the first part of this requirement – providing manpower and training to prepare for the invasion. It is, however, impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of the training. As the British neither supplied nor paid the unofficial home guard, it was cheaper than an official alternative. The absolute effectiveness of the scheme is uncertain because it never had the chance to fulfil its military function but it was able to partially fulfil its political function and possibly partially undertake its military function. In a relative sense, it was both cheaper for the Government and as a standing organisation the *Haganah* had a greater potential capacity for training and rapid employment.

The Coast and Air Watch schemes were distinct but related to each other and to the JSP schemes. The purpose of the schemes was to fulfil GOC Palestine's call to replace soldiers on 'watching jobs' with local defence volunteers and reserve police.[774] The Coast Watch and Air Watch were separate organisations tasked with watching for Axis naval craft and aircraft respectively.[775] To carry this out the two organisations recruited members of the *Yishuv* as TAPs (566 for the Coast Watch and 97 for the Air Watch).[776] These TAPs, like those for the JSP and civil defence schemes, came from the *Haganah* with its blessing.

During their services, the various watches received very little training from the British.[777] Stationed at a number of points along the coast of Palestine Mandate, the Coast Watch

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[774] TNA, WO 169/148 (Notes on GOC Conference Held at Sarafand, 12.7.1940, G Intelligence Palestine and Transjordan, 1939-1940)

[775] TNA, CO 968/8/8 (Report 13.10.1942, Coast and Air Watch Scheme Palestine, 1942)

[776] TNA, CO 968/8/8 (HC Palestine, Telegram to SOS Colonies 20.4.1942, Coast and Air Watch Scheme Palestine, 1942); TNA, CO 968/8/8 (HC Palestine, Report to SOS Colonies, 27.11.1942, Coast and Air Watch Scheme Palestine, 1942)

[777] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 19.9.2010

maintained watchtowers to provide warning and locations of Axis ships and especially submarines.[778] The British provided the members of the watches with communications equipment to call in submarine positions (a task they may have never actually performed) and First World War rifles.[779] Given the narrow scope of the mission and the lack of an indication as to whether the members of the watches fulfilled their mission function, it might at first glance seem impossible to tell whether the indigenous forces were effective in this case. However, there were two purposes to this cooperation. The first purpose was to observe and report Axis submarines and aircraft while the second was to fulfil GOC Palestine's mission of replacing soldiers. In the latter mission, the scheme was a success in an absolute sense. The Coast Watch only required six British personnel to oversee over five hundred members.[780] The Air Watch also seems to have required little oversight.[781] The two schemes freed around eighty percent of the strength of one battalion of infantry for other purposes.[782] Given the lack of training provided to the watches, it would have been far cheaper to employ the indigenous forces for the scheme than to employ soldiers. In this case, indigenous forces were effective in both an absolute and relative sense. They provided the personnel to maintain the watches and were cheaper in terms of manpower and cost than any other likely option.

Civil defence including air raid response represents an additional cooperation between the *Haganah* and Palestine Government. Initially successful, this means of cooperation suffered from its non-military nature. Nir Arielli's history of the air raids inflicted on Palestine Mandate noted that in 'In May 1940…the civil guard in Tel Aviv, which had been established in 1938 to help defend the city in light of the Arab Uprising (1936–39), was re-branded as an 'Air Raid

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[778] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 8.1.2010
[779] Interview with Ariyeh Tamlay, 19.9.2010
[780] TNA, CO 968/8/8 (HC Palestine, Telegram to SOS Colonies 20.4.1942, Coast and Air Watch Scheme Palestine, 1942)
[781] TNA, CO 968/8/8 (HC Palestine, Report to SOS Colonies, 27.11.1942, Coast and Air Watch Scheme Palestine, 1942)
[782] TNA, CO 968/8/8 (HC Palestine, Telegram to SOS Colonies 20.4.1942, Coast and Air Watch Scheme Palestine, 1942); TNA, CO 968/8/8 (HC Palestine, Report to SOS Colonies, 27.11.1942, Coast and Air Watch Scheme Palestine, 1942)

Precautions Organization'.'[783] In short, order the civil defence schemes rapidly expanded with numerous volunteers in the areas of Haifa and Tel Aviv – the two municipalities most subjected to air raids.[784] These volunteers came from the *Yishuv* with the blessing of the Jewish Agency and therefore the *Haganah*. By late 1942, the scheme was in trouble. Through autumn 1942 there had was a 'decrease of 200 Wardens, due to withdrawal of men of military age from Jewish sections.'[785] This trend continued with colonial office noting 'instances have already occurred of serious loss of trained male personnel from civil defence services due...' to pressure 'brought to bear by certain agencies compelling personnel to join H.M. Forces or, in some cases, Settlement Police.'[786]

This development demonstrates the importance of aligned motivation. The threat of air raids had ended by November 1942. For the *Haganah*, sending men to the army or the JSP better served its interests of both winning the Second World War and building its combat capacity. Despite its end, the ARP arrangement and its indigenous forces were effective. Arielli demonstrated this through a War Office report which stated that the "A.R.P. services did fine work."[787] The quote demonstrates that the War Office internally viewed the cooperation as effective. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of additional evidence. However, the War Office was not entirely friendly to the *Yishuv*. The absence of t Palestine Government records noting problems with this cooperation strongly suggests this cooperation was effective.[788]

The *Saison de chasse* is perhaps the clearest documented case by which to assess the nature of indigenous force activities and effectiveness in wartime Palestine Mandate. Despite a lack of

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[783] Arielli (2010) pp. 331-347, 333
[784] TNA, CO 968/72/10 (HC Palestine, Cypher Telegram to SOS Colonies, 16.7.1942, Civil Defence Palestine Progress Reports, 1942)
[785] *Ibid*
[786] TNA, CO 968/72/10, (Survey of Civil Defence Organisation, Civil Defence Palestine Progress Reports, 1942)
[787] Arielli (2010) pp. 331-347, 338
[788] As something of a postscript, Arielli noted that the cooperation was important for the *Yishuv* as it was 'was able to gain valuable military and organizational experience…as well as a taste of the characteristics of total war, an experience which would prove useful during the war of 1948.' - Arielli (2010) pp. 331-347, 338

official records, enough material exists to assess effectiveness. The *Saison* cooperation arose out of a specific problem for Palestine Government, its inability to curb IZL and LEHI uprisings. SIME Cairo noted that 'D.S.O. Palestine remarks on the extreme difficulty of obtaining information on the many secret Jewish organisations, so careful are their security precautions.'[789] A report in the MI5 files further stated 'that that the Police have signally failed to penetrate these two organisations (IZL and LEHI).'[790] The template for this type of security cooperation between the *Haganah* and the British was established in 1940-1941 with the creation of LEHI. At the time both the *Haganah* and IZL were willing to work against the LEHI. The IZL may have formed a special unit to track the emergent LEHI; additionally it seems that the British gained valuable help from informants with a deep knowledge of the LEHI. As the LEHI had been part of the IZL, this suggests that the information came from the IZL. This stands in contrast to Palestine Government's general inability to cultivate informers against the paramilitaries on other occasions.[791] The *Haganah* was more open to cooperation with the Palestine Government. Independently the *Haganah* dispatched units to provide disincentives to the IZL and LEHI by attacking IZL and LEHI membership.[792] The *Haganah* through the Jewish Agency also offered

> …conditions on which they were prepared to co-operate in the rounding-up of Jewish
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> terrorists. They would select 25-50 men to carry out the physical arrest of terrorists, and
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> asked that these men should be issued with fire-arms and permits in blank, so the Police
>
> would not learn their names. The Agency would detain any terrorists so captured in
>
> various settlements and would inform H.Q. Palestine of their names, but not place of
>
> detention. In return they asked for assurances that no settlement found to be harbouring

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[789] TNA, KV 5/29 (S.I.M.E. Cairo, Extract from Summary Middle East No. 2, 5.12.1941, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

[790] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

[791] See: Gil-Har, Yitzhak, 'British Intelligence and the Role of Jewish Informers in Palestine', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39:1, (2003), pp. 117-149

[792] Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010

a wanted person should be punished, and that if the Police learnt the whereabouts of a fugitive they would, while looking for him, search for arms at the same time.[793]

Although the Palestine Government rejected these proposals at the time, the proposals later became the model for the *Haganah* and the Palestine Government cooperation during the *Saison*.[794]

The *Saison* officially began on 18th October 1944 when Golomb announced that the organised *Yishuv* would fight terrorism.[795] From the beginning, the primary spheres of the *Haganah* operation were monitoring, independent arrest and detention, intelligence gathering and dissemination, disincentive operations, joint operations, and protection. Monitoring was the first step in all *Saison* operations and generated the intelligence to carry out the others. Monitoring operations were generally observational and took advantage of the widespread networks of the *Haganah* and their ability to blend into the local environment. According to CID files, the *Haganah* watched all IZL movements in the north of the mandate territory as well as Haifa.[796]To facilitate the mission the *Haganah* established monitoring units. The monitoring units received intelligence on targets and then tracked the target, recording where they went and with whom they met.[797] The monitoring units reported high value target locations to Ephraim Dekel of the SHAI.[798] Dekel could then pass the information to the British and British could take action.[799] The *Haganah* units tasked with capturing targets also received their information from monitoring units and *in extremis*, the monitoring units took part in joint operations with the British.[800]

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[793] TNA, KV 5/29 (S.I.M.E. Cairo, Extract from Security Summary Middle East No. 181, 11.5.1941, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)
[794] *Ibid*
[795] AHTA, 47/20 (CID, Jewish Re-action to Terrorism, 3.11.1944)
[796] AHTA, 47/39 (CID, Note on Informant from IZL Interview, 6.7.1945)
[797] Interview with Hayim Miller, 3.9.2010
[798] *Ibid*
[799] *Ibid*
[800] *Ibid*

As a result of monitoring a target the *Haganah* could independently and openly arrest the target (demonstrating the official sanction of these activities).[801] Following arrest, the *Haganah* detained targets in a series of prisons, generally located in Kibbutzim.[802] Within the prisons, those captured underwent interrogation. MI5 files noted that those captured by the *Haganah* 'are interrogated in Jewish Settlement…by methods openly admitted to me by Edward Kollek…as being on occasion "unorthodox" but fruitful of result.'[803] One of the interviewees who underwent these 'unorthodox' methods referred to them euphemistically as 'cosmetic surgery' while others indicated directly that they had heard of instances of torture.[804] On completion of interrogation, the detainees faced a number of possible fates. MI5 recorded that 'some of these suspects are later released…others are handed over to the police while the remainder continue in Agency custody, largely because they are in a position to supply information which the Agency prefer to vet before passing it to the police or wish to exclude from the latter altogether.'[805]

A related task of the *Saison* activities was to gather and produce intelligence product. The *Haganah* provided some of the intelligence product from the interrogations to the British.[806] It also had specialised intelligence units infiltrating the IZL and LEHI.[807] Having created the intelligence product, the *Haganah* disseminated intelligence to the British in several ways. Monitoring units provided tactical intelligence to enable British operations. Liaison officers

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[801] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

[802] Interview with Anonymous 1, 23.8.2010; Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010; Interview with Joseph (Yoskeh) Nachmias, 26.8.2010; Interview with Eli Shitrit, 15.9.2010; Interview with Yaacov Sika Ahroni, 29.8.2010

[803] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

[804] Interview with Yaacov Sika Ahroni, 29.8.2010; Interview with Joseph (Yoskeh) Nachmias, 26.8.2010; Interview with Eli Shitrit, 15.9.2010

[805] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

[806] *Ibid*

[807] Interview with Anonymous 1, 23.8.2010

provided the majority of evidence on which C.I.D. acted, and the *Haganah* handed the British

lists of names to arrest absent any other information.[808]

Joint operations seem to have been rarer than other forms of cooperation during the *Saison*. In

one representative operation, the *Haganah* (possibly through the *Notrim*) arrested four IZL

members with a large quantity of explosives.[809] The *Haganah* turned over all four captured

fighters to the PPF.[810] In this, operation the *Haganah* acted semi-autonomously, in that it

preformed the arrests but did not hold or interrogate those captured; it acted more as an arm of

the PPF.

In an interview for this dissertation, Hayim Miller, the commander of one of the monitoring

units, described another joint operations situation. Miller's unit identified a target that had

previously evaded the British and was in a car on the way to Jerusalem.[811] Miller took a car from

the *Histadrut* (*Yishuv* Labour Union associated with the *Haganah*), recorded the target's licence

plate number, drove to Beit Dagan police station, and told the police to stop and the search the

car.[812] Although the police stopped the car, they failed to apprehend the target.[813] Miller then

continued to Ramla police station where he told the police to establish a checkpoint and stop the

vehicle.[814] He provided a member of the monitoring unit to accompany the police and identify

the target.[815] The British apprehended the target and deported them to a camp in Africa.[816] If

accurate, this demonstrates some of the aspects of joint operations. Each force operated in its

sphere, the monitoring force did not arrest the target; however they were able to mobilise a

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[808] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)
[809] TNA, KV 5/29 (S.I.M.E. Cairo, Extract from Middle East Security Summary No. 230, 25.5.45, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)
[810] *Ibid*
[811] Interview with Hayim Miller, 3.9.2010
[812] *Ibid*
[813] *Ibid*
[814] *Ibid*
[815] *Ibid*
[816] *Ibid*

British force at short notice to respond to the target, integrate with the arresting force, and identify the target. As in the other case of joint operation, the detention and interrogation of the target were in British hands. In this case, the *Haganah* effectively acted not as an auxiliary to the PPF but as the PPF intelligence arm.

Under the auspices of the *Saison* the *Haganah* conducted two other types of operation, dissuasion and protection. The *Haganah* undertook dissuasion or disincentive operations against low value targets. During these operations, the *Haganah* teams raided the houses of IZL members or ambushed them, damaging their houses and severely beating the IZL members.[817] As younger low value targets often lived with their families, the family would pay part of the price for their teenager's participation in IZL field units.[818] The goal of these operations seems to have been to dissuade the individual from participating further in the IZL. The public results of these operations may have had the further goal of providing examples to disincentivise volunteering for the IZL.

The protection units had a job distinct from the rest of the *Saison*. The *Haganah* feared retaliation. It believed the IZL might target senior *Haganah* figures and Jewish Agency members. Although this never occurred, protection units provided constant protection to select senior figures to the point of living in their houses.[819] Both protection and dissuasion were lower level and lower resourced activities within the panoply of *Saison* operations but they do demonstrate the scale of the activities of the *Saison*. The activities of the *Saison* were able to target all levels of the IZL while protecting the human infrastructure that allowed the *Saison* to function.

The discussion thus far established the scope of the activities of the *Saison* but not its effectiveness. British critiques of the *Saison* tended to concentrate less on the *Saison's*

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[817] Interview with Joseph (Yoskeh) Nachmias, 26.8.2010; Interview with Eli Shitrit, 15.9.2010
[818] Interview with Joseph (Yoskeh) Nachmias, 26.8.2010
[819] Interview with Hayim 2; Interview with Anonymous 1, 23.8.2010; Interview with Avigdor Cohen, 6.9.2010

effectiveness as a counterinsurgency operation and more on perceived downsides of cooperation.[820] One of the critical reports also states that the *Haganah* was 'only too well aware that the Police have signally failed to penetrate these two organisations and that the C.I.D. are now to a very large extent dependent on the Agency's Security Officers for most of the evidence upon which the arrests of terrorists can be effected.'[821] This constitutes internal evidence of effectiveness. The police were not able to penetrate the IZL and LEHI but believed the *Haganah* could.

External observers and sources within the IZL also noted the effectiveness of indigenous force cooperation during the *Saison* in reducing militant activities. One third-party testimony comes from the Polish Security Service which recorded:

> The present lull in terrorist activities can be put down to the widespread measures taken by the British Authorities (widespread arrests and deportations), to the measures described above ("seizing [it is said with the tacit approval of British authorities] the more active members of the terrorist group, and banishing them for a convenient period of time from the arena of political life"), taken by the Jewish Agency, and to the unfavourable comments about the whole terror campaign appearing in the political press organs of Jewish parties.[822]

As the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates, the British activities mentioned in the above quote were only possible because of *Saison* operations. The extent to which British activities were successful is the extent to which the *Saison* was effective. The quote also mentions the importance of another element of the *Saison* which, while not strictly military, would now be

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[820] TNA, KV 5/29 (Extract from Mr A.J. Kellar's Report on his visit to the Mid-East, 02.1945, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)
[821] *Ibid*
[822] TNA, KV 5/29 (Report from Polish Security, Middle East, 17.4.45, Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel 1941-1946)

considered within the realm of information operations - the press campaign against the IZL and LEHI.

Members of the IZL interviewed for this dissertation also mentioned the effectiveness of the *Haganah*'s *Saison* activities. Yehuda Lapidot was one such interviewee. Lapidot stated that 'there was a whole series of precautions which we (the IZL) had to take' specifically because of the *Haganah*.[823] Identification by the *Haganah* forced Lapidot like other operational members of IZL to cease operations and go into hiding.[824] Lapidot further stated that during the *Saison* IZL operations were effectively 'minimised.'[825] In a summation, Lapidot said that the *Haganah* working against them was 'a big problem, a very big problem...it was very effective, very effective.'[826] Lapidot's observations, together with the internal and external indicators of effectiveness, paint a compelling picture of the effectiveness of the *Saison*.

There is a further significant piece of evidence. According to the War Office, when there was no cooperation, 'details of almost every police search, road check or other activity is broadcast to the zones, and thence to the settlements likely to be affected.'[827] Once the *Haganah* moved to cooperation with the IZL and LEHI large-scale attacks against the British resumed.[828] In addition to the spectacular acts, many of the reports in the file indicate that within a year of the end of the *Saison*, mines and ambushes became common.[829] This together with the inability of the Palestine Government to prevent the Night of the Bridges and Night of the Trains and other such operations drives home the conclusion that cooperation with indigenous forces during *Saison* was effective in absolute sense and in a relative sense.

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[823] Interview with Yehuda Lapidot, 2.9.2010
[824] *Ibid*
[825] *Ibid*
[826] *Ibid*
[827] TNA, WO 259/83 (ULTRA Intelligence: Jewish Military Organizations in Palestine, 25.1.1944, Palestine Policy and Hagana, 1944)
[828] TNA, KV5/29 (Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)
[829] TNA, KV5/30 (Stern Group – Irgun Zvi Le-umi B, Israel, 1941-1946)

It was precisely the nature of the *Haganah,* as an indigenous force, that made it effective. Lapidot noted that one of the difficulties with the *Haganah* was the impossibility of identifying a member of the *Saison* in the population.[830] Hayim Miller's testimony noted that the *Haganah* had the advantage of drawing on the broader resources of the *Yishuv*, such as the cars from Histadrut.[831] The *Haganah* could conduct operations that might have been uncomfortable for the British such as the disincentive operations. Critically, the *Haganah*, IZL, and LEHI existed in the same physical, cultural, and ideological space. They shared communities and a similar of way thinking. This gave the *Haganah* several advantages over the British in understanding and operating against IZL and LEHI targets.

The *Saison* was effective in an absolute sense in that it minimised the ability of the IZL and LEHI to conduct operations. The *Saison* was effective in the relative sense. The British had tried other solutions, all of which were unsuccessful. No other solution available at the time would have been as effective. As the *Haganah* was already in place, it was far cheaper for the British to have the *Haganah* conduct counterinsurgency than to import forces to do the same. Additionally, widespread use of the *Haganah* to undertake high-risk undercover and monitoring operations minimised the exposure of the British forces. Once British policy alienated the *Haganah,* the very effectiveness of the cooperation became a liability for Palestine Government.

The effectiveness of the *Saison* contributed to the ineffectiveness of later British counterinsurgency efforts in Palestine Mandate. From the JSP in the Arab Revolt to the *Saison*, Palestine Government came to rely entirely on the *Haganah* for security in Palestine. Palestine Government had not developed sufficient expertise or resources to engage in counterinsurgency against the *Yishuv*. The end of *Saison* not only meant that the Palestine Government had a new, large, and well-trained adversary but also that it lost its previous counterinsurgency capabilities.

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[830] Interview with Yehuda Lapidot, 2.9.2010
[831] Interview with Hayim Miller, 3.9.2010

The Palestine Government's continued reliance on the *Haganah* throughout constitutes powerful testimony to the effectiveness of cooperation.

By combining the analyses of the individual cases of indigenous force cooperation between the Palestine Government and the *Haganah,* it is possible to reach a composite understanding of overall effectiveness. Throughout the various forms of cooperation, the indigenous forces were effective to varying degrees. The Palestine Government also achieved some success when it used the indigenous forces as a political tool against plans with which it disagreed. In more practical terms, the JSP served as a deterrent. It gathered intelligence, and to some extent prepared for an Axis invasion. Similarly, the *Haganah* supplemented and replaced the garrison of Palestine and through the *Saison* minimised the effect of IZL and LEHI insurgency. In a broad sense, the *Haganah* was effective according to absolute metrics as an indigenous force for the Palestine Government. In terms of relative effectiveness in several of the cases, the Government had no other effective option. For example, a bigger garrison might have provided better deterrence but would have done so at a prohibitively high monetary cost.

When it comes to effectiveness, there were certain commonalities among the schemes. In each instance, the indigenous force cooperated effectively when the British and the *Haganah* had aligned motivations. Not only did the indigenous force share at least some of Palestine Government's objectives in the cooperation but each scheme also aided in the fulfilment of a specific separate goal for the indigenous force. For the *Haganah*, both the JSP scheme and the *Saison* represent examples of such cooperation. The JSP allowed for advanced training and the reconnaissance of Arab villages. The *Saison* helped the *Haganah* establish operational primacy over the IZL and LEHI. The schemes that had less benefit for the *Haganah,* such as civil defence, were less successful. Members left for other schemes. A second commonality among the more successful schemes was that they allowed the indigenous force to operate largely autonomously. This not only removed a potential point of friction between the two cooperating

parties, it also allowed the *Haganah* to undertake its responsibilities in ways that maximised its operational effectiveness. A final common facet among the cases of effective Palestine Government cooperation with the *Haganah* was that in each instance of cooperation the Government took advantage of a specific strength of the *Haganah,* be it its ability to rapidly mobilise manpower or blend into the *Yishuv.*

Effectiveness in all these cases therefore resulted from the *Haganah*'s ability to exercise its agency. While this allowed for effective cooperation, it posed a significant risk to the Palestine Government. Not only did Palestine Government become reliant on the *Haganah,* but having granted such extensive freedom of action, the Government could not curb activities such as smuggling. When the Palestine Government attempted to curb *Haganah* activities it lost the capabilities that came with them. Palestine Government knew the long-term implications of this balancing act. When the motivations no longer aligned and cooperation was no longer in the *Haganah*'s interests, Palestine Government found itself without resources on which it had come to rely. Moreover, its new foe had intimate familiarity with British security procedures and had enjoyed years of access to training and resources gained because of effective cooperation. It is unlikely that the Palestine Government would have knowingly risked this eventuality had cooperation been ineffective.

In Palestine Mandate, indigenous forces undertook a broad variety of missions for the British Empire. The *Haganah* satisfied the requirements that drove the SOE and Palestine Government to seek indigenous force cooperation. The *Haganah*'s effectiveness, both absolute and relative, across diverse activities from sabotage to deterrence and scouting to logistics demonstrates the effectiveness of indigenous force cooperation. The indigenous forces were at their most effective when acting with a large degree of autonomy and within the framework of aligned motivation. The existence of aligned motivation demonstrates the multidirectional nature of the agency involved in the cooperation. With both the Imperial forces and the Palestine Government, the

Haganah acted with an equivalent level of agency to that of its British partners. The more oversight the SOE and the Palestine Government attempted, the more strained the relationship was with the indigenous forces and the less effective they were. In both cases, the effectiveness of the indigenous forces coupled with their autonomy led to problems for the British Empire. The effectiveness of the indigenous forces in an absolute sense encouraged cooperation as a solution to difficulties the Empire encountered. The relative efficacy of the indigenous forces discouraged the Empire from seeking other alternatives. While this was generally positive, it created an agency reversal in which the British Empire became dependent on the indigenous forces and could not chastise them too severely without risking a cooperation which had become integral to British operational plans.

Horn of Africa[832]

This section considers the specific operational objectives that British expected the *arbagnoch* to fulfil, which evolved and changed over the life of the campaign in IEA. The British had five primary expectations and two secondary expectations. In terms of primary expectations, the British hoped that the *arbagnoch* would tie down Italian forces, isolate Italian garrisons and sap their morale, and by attacking Italian logistics and infrastructure serve substitute for a lack of airpower. Additionally, they expected that the *arbagnoch* would encourage Italian native forces to desert, support British missions within IEA, and eventually take independent action against large Italian forces. These expectations are divisible into three categories that correspond to the levels of military planning – strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level expectations were those attached to the broader conduct of the war outside the specific campaign context. Expectations on the operational level were connected to the success or failure of the campaign. Tactical level expectations were associated with supporting individual operations or units. If the

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[832] For a table detailing the effectiveness of each case of cooperation in the Horn of Africa see: Appendix 1, Table 2

arbagnoch were effective in delivering on strategic expectations then in this case indigenous cooperation was strategically effective and so on down to the tactical level.

It is worth noting that British expectations were tied directly to the strategic situation. In the pre-offensive period of cooperation, the vast majority of British expectations focused on the means by which the *arbagnoch* could aid in defending British holdings rather than on future offensive operations. The idea that the *arbagnoch* would be able to tie down large numbers of Italian forces formed part of the initial arguments in favour of cooperation.[833] The expectation was that *arbagnoch* activity would force the Italians to spend their resources on internal defence and prevent an Italian advance into Sudan.[834] GHQ's Middle East Operation Instruction No. 1 declared the intention of operations to be 'to spread the revolt over the whole of Italian East Africa and so harass the Italians as to make them expend their resources on Internal Security.'[835] In fact, all of the multi-phase plans drawn for the rebellion included stages designed to force the Italians away from the Sudanese border.[836] The expectation of keeping the Italians at bay was in effect a strategic level expectation in that a major Italian invasion of Sudan could have had profound effects on the overall shape of the war. As the *arbagnoch* were the primary means to prevent an invasion of Sudan, their ability to fulfil this expectation was of strategic significance.

The defensive focus of the operations did not mean that the British only expected the *arbagnoch* to keep the Italians away from Sudan. There were operational level expectations of a more offensive nature. Chief among these were hopes that the *arbagnoch* would isolate Italian forces

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[833] TNA, HS 3/5 (FO Telegram, Abyssinian Revolt: Obstruction from Local Authorities, 11.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940)

[834] TNA, HS 3/5 (Letter of Warning Re Abyssinian Situation, 1.8.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940)

[835] TNA, HS 8/263 (MI(R), MI(R) Unit War Diary, 1.1.1939-31.12.1940); TNA, WO 201/271 (G.H.Q. Middle East Operation Instruction, No. 1, 10.6.1940, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, Plan X Correspondence, 9.1939 - 9.1940)

[836] TNA, HS 8/261 (GHQ Middle East Operations Instruction No.1, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, 10.6.1940, MI(R) Operational Reports); British Co-Operation with Rebellion in Abyssinia by MIR 6.8.1940 HS3/5: SOE Abyssinia No. 2 Subj: Abyssinia & Middle East: Abyssinian Rebellion – Supplies, propaganda etc. Dates: July 1940-August 1940; TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 20.11.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)

and hurt their morale. Attached to hurting morale was a subordinate expectation that increased *arbagnoch* activity would sufficiently damage Italian morale to the point that it would encourage large desertions.[837] These two operational objectives are linked in British documents.[838] Whereas earlier plans include isolating the Italians as a second phase operations, G.H.Q. Middle East Operation Instruction No. 1 from June 1940 emphasises that in the first phase of operations Italian garrisons will be 'isolated by preventing the movement of individuals and small parties over roads and tracks. This will force the Italians to concentrate in their posts and garrison towns.'[839] Regardless of the phases, isolating the Italians and hurting their morale was a primary British expectation in the cooperation.

The British had an additional operationally offensive expectation for *arbagnoch* cooperation. In the Horn of Africa, the British lacked sufficient airpower. They had little ability to strike at Italian positions within IEA or to attack the type of infrastructure and logistics targets which could soften the Italian positions. Instead, the British expected the *arbagnoch* to step into this role. The British did not assume that the *arbagnoch* would immediately carry out such activities but believed the capacity could be developed with British logistical support. The British expected that the *arbagnoch* would eventually strike critical infrastructure, and communications, fulfilling a role that in other theatres of operation was undertaken by the strategic bombing offensives.[840] It was expected that these operations, together with the attempts to isolate Italian garrisons, would evolve and grow to the point where the *arbagnoch* would besiege Italian garrisons, and strike at

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[837] TNA, WO 201/293 (The Fomentation of Rebellion Against Italian Rule in Abyssinia, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28); TNA, WO 201/254 (Notes on the Abyssinian Rising to be Brought About in the Event of a War with Italy, 13.3.40, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa 1939-40)

[838] TNA, HS 3/5 (Telegram 534, 21.7.1940, SOE Abyssinia No. 2, Abyssinia & Middle East, Abyssinian Rebellion, 7.1940-8.1940)

[839] TNA, WO 201/254 (Rebel Operations in Abyssinia, 12.10.39, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-40); TNA, WO 201/271 (G.H.Q. Middle East Operation Instruction, No. 1, 10.6.1940, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, Plan X Correspondence, 9.1939 -9.1940)

[840] TNA, HS 8/261 (GHQ Middle East Operations Instruction No.1, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, 10.6.1940, MI(R) Operational Reports)

better defended targets of ever increasing significance.[841] Nonetheless, the British did not want the *arbagnoch* to engage in large-scale engagements against the Italians, which might have constituted a strategic level offensive.[842]

In addition to distinctly strategic and operational level expectations the British had expectations that were somewhere on the line between the tactical and operational. These consisted of providing support as British forces crossed into IEA, by providing security, supplies, communications, and intelligence for the British missions. The expectation of the delivery of these supports was not operational level expectation. Whether or not the *arbagnoch* were effective in delivering these supports did not affect the overall campaign picture. On the other hand, if the *arbagnoch* had entirely failed to deliver supplies to British, the campaign picture would have been significantly altered making this an operational level expectation.

In the post-invasion period, the British expectations for the *arbagnoch* evolved in two ways. For MI(R) the goal of cooperation in Gojjam was no longer to trap the Italians in Gojjam, rather it was to defeat the Italians there and drive the Italians into retreat.[843] The other difference was that *arbagnoch* were now expected not only to operate alone but additionally to serve as ancillaries to the conventional forces.[844] In practice, the British expected that where conventional forces and *arbagnoch* were collocated, the *arbagnoch* would coordinate or integrate with the British forces.[845] In areas where the British were not active, the expectation was that the *arbagnoch* would act in such a way as to support the British offensive. This brought the expectations of *arbagnoch* cooperation

[841] TNA, WO 201/254 (Rebel Operations in Abyssinia, 12.10.39, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-40); TNA, HS 8/261 (GHQ Middle East Operations Instruction No.1, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, 10.6.1940, MI(R) Operational Reports); British Co-Operation with Rebellion in Abyssinia by MIR 6.8.1940 HS3/5: SOE Abyssinia No. 2 Subj: Abyssinia & Middle East: Abyssinian Rebellion – Supplies, propaganda etc. Dates: July 1940-August 1940
[842] TNA, WO 201/254 (Rebel Operations in Abyssinia, 12.10.39, Notes on Preparation for Tribal Warfare in Libya and Italian East Africa, 1939-40); TNA, HS 8/261 (GHQ Middle East Operations Instruction No.1, Rebel Activity in Italian East Africa, 10.6.1940, MI(R) Operational Reports); British Co-Operation with Rebellion in Abyssinia by MIR 6.8.1940 HS3/5: SOE Abyssinia No. 2 Subj: Abyssinia & Middle East: Abyssinian Rebellion – Supplies, propaganda etc. Dates: July 1940-August 1940
[843] Sykes (1959) p. 282
[844] Allen (1943) p.18
[845] Mockler (1984) p. 355

purely into the operational and tactical spectra. Within IEA the practical change between the pre and post-invasion period did not happen on the date of the invasion, rather as the British forces arrived in a given area it moved from pre to post invasion reality. Those areas in which the British did not operate until late in the campaign did not have a post invasion operational reality until then.

In the Horn of Africa, the norm was that cooperation was expected to affect the operational and tactical levels. The sole exception to this was the early expectation that the *arbagnoch* would tie down the Italians and prevent them from effecting a large scale invasion of Sudan. The specific plans of cooperation do not make good units of analysis, as there were many operations under each arrangement. It is better to consider activities and effectiveness in several representative operations, before creating an aggregate picture of activity and effectiveness. Each case of cooperation gives rise to three related questions: what did the *arbagnoch* do; was this activity 'effective'; and what impact did the cooperative aspects of the relationship have on the outcome of the activity. The various spheres of activity overlap. Isolating the Italians by attacking infrastructure and logistics also tied down Italian forces by forcing them to defend resources and LOCs. There is far more information available about *arbagnoch* activities during the post-invasion period as there was greater interaction between the British and *arbagnoch,* which generated more documentary evidence. In most cases where there was no British penetration, there is little information on *arbagnoch* activity.

During the pre-invasion period, the *arbagnoch* focused on Italian targets of opportunity. Attacks varied significantly in scale and scope and consisted of road blocks, ambushes on Italian patrols and logistics, and assaults on smaller Italian positions.[846] The *arbagnoch* maintained constant

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[846] TNA, WO 178/36 (6.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (25.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

pressure on Italian forces through sniping.[847] These operations inflicted light casualties (there are no reports of over 100 casualties at a given incident) but they goaded the Italians into leaving their fortifications where they could be further ambushed and lose weapons or resources.[848] This pattern continued until the Italians launched a large operation in the area of action forcing the *arbagnoch* to retreat. All *arbagnoch* interviewees' descriptions of their activities during this period reflected this pattern.[849]

Overall, the targets of *arbagnoch* activity were those supports that allowed the Italians to maintain their position in IEA. The *arbagnoch* attacked local resources, supporters, and LOCs. The *arbagnoch* took positions near the water sources and fired on Italian patrols that came to gather water.[850] The most significant form of resource denial came not from attacking the Italians but from attacking 'collaborators'. A large percentage of *arbagnoch* activity targeted collaborators. One interviewee reported that it was the subject of the majority of operations.[851] Such operations tended to involve destroying or seizing the property and land of the followers of local leaders identified as allied to the Italians.[852] Additionally, the *arbagnoch* attacked the families of those in Italian service.[853] The attacks targeting collaborators and their families served several purposes. Some of those identified as collaborators were undoubtedly victims of local score settling and power competition, as often happens in local conflicts. This does not negate the scope or importance of this activity. It was an attempt to lower the morale among those serving and provided a powerful inducement for desertion. The desertions negatively affected the Italians ability to exercise security control, gather intelligence, and procure food in the affected area. It

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[847] TNA, WO 178/36 (6.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (25.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[848] TNA, WO 201/277 (War History of No. 3 Idara, Eastern Arab Corps, Sudan Defence Force, 17.5.1940-2.12.1940); TNA, WO 178/36 (29.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[849] Interview with Alemno Ayelo, 28.2.2013; Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013; Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013

[850] Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013

[851] Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013

[852] Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013; Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013

[853] Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013

also served as a disincentive for feudal leaders to maintain alliances with the Italians. Finally, such attacks enriched the *arbagnoch*, which in turn helped swell *arbagnoch* ranks.[854]

When directly attacking the Italian forces during the pre-invasion period, the *arbagnoch* focused on the Italian LOCs. Like the other forms of *arbagnoch* pre-invasion activity, attacks on LOCs predated British involvement. Unlike the other forms, it became a central facet of cooperative operations.[855] Once Mission 101 crossed into IEA the attacks on LOCs continued with British support and direction. The *arbagnoch* cooperating with 101 ambushed motor transport and animal transport alike.[856] Both British command in Khartoum and 101 explicitly encouraged the *arbagnoch* to focus on cutting roads and ambushing the convoys that served as Italian LOCs.[857] As this was one of the primary operational activities of the *arbagnoch* prior to British involvement in theatre, it is unsurprising that it remained so throughout the pre-invasion period.[858] There is some evidence that these operations increased in tempo or at least scale as cooperation with the British developed. The first reported ambushes by the *arbagnoch* cooperating with 101 netted a fairly low result of one lorry and one mule but by the next report nine days later the score had increased to 12 lorries.[859] These operations were a means by which to attack the Italians during times of relative weakness. They also served as a form of resource denial and isolated Italian positions. They disrupted Italian freedom of movement and tied up Italian forces, all of which likely hurt Italian morale.

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[854] Interview with Anonymous 4, 18.3.2013; Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013

[855] During the opening period of cooperation *arbagnoch* demonstrated their activities through proof of attacks against LOCs, such as collections of driver's licences taken from ambushed Italian lorries - TNA, WO 201/277 (War History of No. 3 Idara, Eastern Arab Corps, Sudan Defence Force, 17.5.1940-2.12.1940)

[856] TNA, WO 178/36 (21.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (30.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[857] TNA, WO 178/36 (31.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (3.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (25.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[858] Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013; TNA, WO 178/36 (25.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

[859] TNA, WO 178/36 (21.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (30.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)

During the pre-invasion period, there were natural limits to *arbagnoch* operational effectiveness. Lack of British penetration into IEA meant that there was little ability to communicate operational desires to the *arbagnoch*. In most areas of *arbagnoch* activity even near the Sudanese border the determination of effectiveness was more a matter of whether pre-existing *arbagnoch* activity happened to fit into British objectives. The primary focus of the British cooperative units during this period was establishing the pathways of cooperation. To an extent, then the nature of activity was akin to a new plant which takes root in its first season before branching in the second – the efficacy of cooperation in the pre-invasion period is best assessed by considering the effectiveness of the operations during subsequent phases of the campaign. Until the establishment of the relationship pathways, the lack of logistics, coordination, coherent command, and communication limited the effectiveness of operations. Nevertheless, there were operations during the pre-invasion period and it is worth considering their efficacy.

The metrics of effectiveness in this case centre on the question of whether the *arbagnoch* fulfilled British operational expectations. As discussed earlier in this chapter, British expectations during the pre-invasion period were primarily defensive in nature, centring on the ability to debase the threat of Italian invasion. There are indications that the British believed that the *arbagnoch* were effective in this regard. A telegram from the British ambassador in Cairo to the Governments of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, sent during the pre-invasion period, reported that the revolt 'is developing more rapidly than was anticipated and is immobilizing at least six Italian brigades.'[860] Although this telegram might be propagandistic, it speaks to British perceptions of the effectiveness of *arbagnoch* activity. During the research for this project no evidence was found to speak to external metrics of effectiveness in this case. The question of absolute effectiveness centres on the issue of threat of Italian invasion.

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[860] TNA, DO 35/1001/14 (Cypher Telegram to the Governments of Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, Union of South Africa, 24.12.1940, Abyssinian Affairs)

Captured Italian documents provide compelling evidence that the Italian plans for an invasion of Sudan were in an advanced state and far exceeded the relatively limited offensives near the border.[861] Similarly, there is significant evidence of a temporal correlation with the immobilization of Italian forces tasked with offensive operations and an uptick in *arbagnoch* activity in the regions proximate to the Sudan border. This correlation was noted by British intelligence in the area, which in mid-October 1940 recorded that 'the past week in I.E.A. has been remarkable for the continued inactivity of the enemy on all fronts and the considerable increase in rebel activity.[862] The strength of the correlation implies a causal relationship, especially considering the lack of any other satisfactory explanation for Italian inactivity. Italian operations crossing into Sudan had been successful and the Italians faced little organised resistance in southern Sudan. By October 1940, Italian operations against the British elsewhere in the region had been successful. The question remains as to why the offensive did not continue to develop along the planned lines. The upsurge in *arbagnoch* activity provides a plausible explanation. If, as the evidence seems to suggest, this was the case then there is little question that *arbagnoch* were effective in fulfilling Britain's defensive expectations in an absolute sense. The lack of British forces in the region renders the question of relative effectiveness moot. The British in Sudan had few other means at their disposal to frustrate Italian designs.

This also speaks to the British expectations that the *arbagnoch* would essentially function as a substitute for strategic air power and that the *arbagnoch* would be able to isolate Italian garrisons. The effectiveness of the *arbagnoch* in tying down Italian forces and preventing the general offensive into Sudan suggests but does not prove effectiveness in these areas. If the focus of *arbagnoch* activity during this period was attacking Italian LOCs and if, as the previous paragraph posits, *arbagnoch* activity was responsible for the halt in Italian offensive operations, then *arbagnoch*

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[861] TNA, WO 201/258 (Plans for Operations beyond Kassala, 7.1940)
[862] TNA, WO 169/19 (Weekly Review of the Military Situation, 14.10.1940, War Diary of General Staff Intelligence, GHQ Middle East, 1.10.1940-31.12.1940)

activity against LOCs was effective. A similar logic should apply to the cases of denying the Italians resources and isolating their garrisons, as all three forms of activity are interlinked.

Another indication of the general effectiveness of *arbagnoch* cooperation in the pre-invasion period can be found in their efficacy at encouraging desertions from the Italian forces, a subordinate British expectation. There is significant evidence that *arbagnoch* activities resulted in desertions in the pre-invasion period, with British records and interviews with *arbagnoch* veterans both pointing to a consistent stream of deserters who were then employed against the Italians.[863] These internal metrics not only demonstrate that the *arbagnoch* were successful in fulfilling the expectation of hurting Italian morale and causing desertion, they also speak to the general effectiveness of *arbagnoch* activity targeting Italian LOCs and isolating and weakening their positions. Forces rarely desert from a side perceived to be winning. Italian desertions might also speak to the *arbagnoch* effectiveness in another realm of expectation namely taking independent action against Italian garrisons and harassing them. A report authored by Sandford of Mission 101 on 1 December 1940, suggested that the *arbagnoch* were taking independent action against Italian garrisons.[864] This mode of operation is mentioned in later secondary sources and interviews.[865] If it can be taken as stipulated that such operations occurred then they may also have contributed to the loss of morale leading to desertions among the Italian ranks.

The final British expectation before the invasion of IEA was that the *arbagnoch* would support British forces, such as Mission 101, operating within IEA. In the pre-invasion period, these operations were limited to Mission 101. The question of *arbagnoch* effectiveness in this sense rests on their effectiveness in supporting 101. Mission 101's mission parameters included the establishment of intelligence networks in IEA. With few personnel and centralised into a single

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[863] TNA, WO 178/36 (21.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); WO 178/36 (22.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); Interview with Alemno Ayelo, 28.2.2013; TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 1.12.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)
[864] TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 1.12.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940)
[865] Sykes (1959) p. 260; Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013

location 101 could not have achieved this without *arbagnoch* support. Reports from 101 on the effectiveness of the *arbagnoch* intelligence network constitute an indication of effectiveness in this regard at least according to internal metrics.[866] It has not proven possible to demonstrate conclusively absolute effectiveness in this case.

British files indicate a significant amount of intelligence product at a time when *arbagnoch* intelligence networks were the primary source for intelligence. In the sense of relative effectiveness, this is one of the cases where it might be useful to consider other options. The British could have tasked the personnel who made up Mission 101 with approaching Italian garrisons and gathering the intelligence personally or attempting to recruit agents individually. This would have limited the scope of intelligence gathered to those few areas that 101 could reach, constraining its effectiveness while at the same time significantly raising the risks to 101. To not employ the *arbagnoch* intelligence networks would have reduced the maximum benefit possible from intelligence gathering while raising the risk. It appears that in this case, cooperation was not only potentially effective in the absolute sense; it was effective in the relative sense. The assessment that applies to the intelligence networks also applies to the communications networks established by Mission101, as these too were entirely *arbagnoch* run.

The *arbagnoch* provided support to Mission 101 in two other significant ways - logistics and security. As mentioned in chapter four, 101 was almost entirely dependent on the *arbagnoch* for basic supplies such as food. In this regard, the survival of 101 constitutes evidence of the effectiveness of cooperation. In terms of security, the *arbagnoch* provided bodyguards or escorts and engaged Italian forces to create corridors of safe movement for both Mission 101 and eventually Gideon Force. Secondary source reports provide evidence of *arbagnoch* engaging

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[866] TNA, WO 201/278 (Sandford to HQ Troops Sudan, 1.11.1940, 101 Mission Reports, 11-12.1940); Mockler (1984) p.266

Italian positions to keep the Italians bottled in as Gideon crossed Italian held territory.[867] The

provision of escorts presents evidence of both effectiveness and the limits thereof. There is no

shortage of reports of the *arbagnoch* providing bodyguard forces, which at times engaged in

combat operations to protect the British. They scouted ahead and identified safe corridors for

British movement and encampment.[868] Given the difficult terrain and numerous Italian positions,

it seems unlikely that British forces operating in IEA would have enjoyed a significant measure

of success without such assistance.

On the other hand, there are a number of reports of *arbagnoch* leaders appearing with significantly

fewer escorts than promised.[869] These reports identify one of the primary limits to the

effectiveness of cooperation in the pre-invasion period – *arbagnoch* reliability and consistency.

Mission 101 did not feel it could rely on the *arbagnoch* to deliver promised resources, naturally

restricting the scope and scale of operations that the British in IEA could plan and execute.

Mission 101's reservations about *arbagnoch* reliability, when tasked with specific assignments, was

further demonstrated by the fact that in the post-invasion period neither 101 nor the Op Centres

relied solely on the *arbagnoch* for their bodyguards and escorts. Rather the British preferred to

maintain a core of security gathered from Sudanese or other imperial forces.

Despite this limitation, *arbagnoch* support for British missions in IEA was generally effective. The

evidence available from *arbagnoch* cooperation with Mission 101 constitutes a clear indication of

effectiveness in the sense of internal and absolute metrics. The successful establishment of

intelligence and communications networks as well as the provision of logistics and security

indicate the effectiveness of cooperation. Given the resources of the period, it is hard to

conceive of another way the British could have achieved the same objectives. Despite the

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[867] Sykes (1959) p. 258

[868] TNA, WO 178/36 (19.9.1940 Khor Zinghir, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (17.9.1940 South of Khor Dadalub, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013

[869] 15.9.1940, WO 178/36 – 101 Abyssinia Northern Section – War Diary 09-1940 through 10.4.1941

challenges previously discussed, *arbagnoch* cooperation was effective in both an absolute and relative sense when it came to supporting British forces within IEA during the pre-invasion period.

The British derived additional benefits from cooperation. The benefits did not match specifically with British expectations but they remain relevant to the overall question of the effectiveness of cooperation. One stands out in the source material: the aid provided by the *arbagnoch* to British forces in Sudan. During the Italian invasion of Sudan the British found themselves both outnumbered and outgunned. The *arbagnoch* and associated refugees in the area formed a force that advanced in front of the SDF in order to delay the Italians so the SDF could retreat to their new defensive lines.[870] The same force of *arbagnoch* and refugees also helped to harass the Italian forces near the border.[871] Providing direct tactical support to the SDF in Sudan was not something the British seemed to expect from the *arbagnoch*. This constituted an added and potentially critical benefit of cooperation which forms part of the overall picture of the efficacy of cooperation in the pre-invasion period.

The question remains whether, in an overall sense, cooperation in the pre-invasion period was effective in either the absolute or the relative sense. *Arbagnoch* effectiveness is more apparent in the broader context. The *arbagnoch* fulfilled British expectations and provided added benefit, as noted in the cited source material. This suggests effectiveness when assessed against a metric of absolute effectiveness. The *arbagnoch* were clearly effective in a relative sense as they largely accomplished the wide variety of tasks the British assigned to them in the pre-invasion period and the British had no available resources to use as an alternative in the region. The British had no real ability to deter or interfere with the Italian invasion of Sudan. The British lacked the regional resources necessary to degrade the Italian position in IEA. In short, the evidence

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[870] TNA, WO 201/277 (War History of No. 3 Idara, Eastern Arab Corps, Sudan Defence Force, 17.5.1940-2.12.1940)
[871] *Ibid*

considered in this section indicates that in the pre-invasion period cooperation with the *arbagnoch* was effective in achieving these objectives, according to both the relative and absolute metrics of effectiveness.

The noted limitations in *arbagnoch* performance in the areas of reliability, resource cost effectiveness, and the ability to achieve specific tasks affected the degree to which the cooperation was effective but not whether it was effective. During the pre-invasion period, British expectations were, overall, more general. British plans required that the *arbagnoch* achieve results, such as hampering Italian efforts across the whole front, rather than isolating specific garrisons or cut roads at specific points. In cases where the British requested specific activities, there is evidence that the *arbagnoch* had difficulty in delivering in a timely manner.[872] There is also evidence of problems in reliability. The British could not rely on the *arbagnoch* to arrive in a given place at a given time or to supply the promised number of resources and men.[873] Finally, there is little evidence of a direct connection between the resources distributed and operational effectiveness. It seems that resources stimulated offers of cooperation and support but not necessarily operational effect.[874] The existence of limitations does not itself detract from the overall *arbagnoch* of effectiveness in the pre-campaign environment. The changes in context brought about by the invasion of IEA changed the British expectations of *arbagnoch* activity and raised these limitations to significant problems.

In the post-invasion period the British expectations of *arbagnoch* activity changed in several ways and with them British evaluations of *arbagnoch* effectiveness. These changes were in reality subordinate to one central change – the shift from a defensive to an offensive outlook. The British no longer attempted to constrain Italian efforts; with the balance of initiative in their

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[872] TNA, WO 178/36 (31.10.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[873] TNA, WO 178/36 (6.10.1940 Chanka, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941); TNA, WO 178/36 (10.11.1940 Jogo Lamba, 101 Abyssinia Northern Section War Diary, 09.1940-10.4.1941)
[874] The origins of these limitations are discussed in the chapter on structure and as cooperation in the post-campaign period demonstrates this problem was not inherent but resulted from the way the British distributed weaponry

favour, the British tried to maximise their offensive potential. Now the British wanted the *arbagnoch* to drive the Italians into retreat and surrender. With more British forces on the ground in IEA the British also expected more from *arbagnoch* cooperation and placed a greater emphasis on tactical level cooperation and integration. This raised the bar on effectiveness. In the pre-invasion period, the British might have considered an *arbagnoch* leader who was able to deny territorial control and freedom of movement to the Italians effective. In the post-invasion reality *arbagnoch* only were effective if such activities had a direct offensive impact and if they provided tactical and operational support to any British forces operating in the area. These expectations manifested within two distinct categories of *arbagnoch* activity, independent actions, and those in direct support of British forces. Within the category of independent actions there were two subsets of operation; those which continued along pre-invasion lines, and those which represented a new and more offensive focus.

Independent actions by *arbagnoch* were widespread during the post-invasion period. British intelligence situation reports from the period contain lists estimating thousands of *arbagnoch* active in locations around the entirety of the territory.[875] The British hoped these activities would shape the political and military realities within IEA in such a way as to benefit the British campaign. By examining these reports of independent *arbagnoch* actions in the post-invasion period and comparing them to those of the pre-invasion period, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that *arbagnoch* activities were far more prevalent and effective in the post-invasion period than beforehand. However, this might not have been the case.

In the pre-invasion period, the British had few personnel in IEA and they were concentrated in only a few areas of the country. As the invasion unfolded, British personnel penetrated deeper into IEA and establish wider networks of communication and information collection. These

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[875] Examples of this include: TNA, WO 201/302 (Situation Report 23.8.1941 to HQ Kaid, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941)

brought more reports of *arbagnoch* activity. On the other hand, it is also possible that changes in the security situation within IEA brought about by the British invasion served to greatly stimulate *arbagnoch* activity. The information available is insufficient to support a definitive conclusion. That said, from anecdotes contained in interviews conducted during the course of research the announcement of the invasion and more particularly the imminent return of the Emperor may have served as a stimulant for increased *arbagnoch* activity and aggression.[876]

In areas where the British had not yet established a significant presence, *arbagnoch* operations changed little from the pre-invasion period.[877] The *arbagnoch* fought in the rural areas against any Italian patrols that entered their zone. When they engaged in offensive operations it was to attack Italian LOCs and hold up convoys.[878] In these areas, the pattern of *arbagnoch* raids and Italian responses continued unabated.[879] There is some evidence in the British records that this pattern continued to drain Italian resources and cost personnel.[880] In one case mentioned specifically in an intelligence summary the Italians raided an *arbagnoch* camp but were driven off with the loss of 41.[881] In the pre-invasion period such an event would have received significant favourable attention while here it simply garners a bland note.[882] The limited coverage of these incidents in British reports reflects the fact such operations did not match the new offensive expectations and were not highly regarded.

Independent offensive operations conducted by *arbagnoch* units during the post-invasion period were more in keeping with the operational tempo desired by the British. One of the hallmarks of these new operations was that they were larger in scale and scope. These operations at times also

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[876] Mentioned in all interviews where the interviewees had received news of the Emperor's return
[877] Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013
[878] TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Intelligence Summary No. 24, 15.5.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)
[879] TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 5, 24.10.41-29.10.41 Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)
[880] TNA, WO 201/301 (HQ Troops in the Sudan, Intelligence Summary No. 161, 29.7-4.8.1941, HQ Troops in Sudan and Eritrea Inter Summaries 157-180, GS1(a), 7-10.1941)
[881] *Ibid*
[882] TNA, WO 201/304 (Engineer Information, 12th (African) Division, 11.1941)

reflected a greater complexity of planning, employing multiple components and avenues of attack.[883] These offensive operations challenged the Italian control of regions and sought to expel Italian garrisons entirely.[884] This seems to be a significant change. Even when not successful these operations caused Italian casualties to rise to more than 100 killed and wounded in some incidents and forced them to rush forces from major garrisons in order to protect more isolated pockets of control.[885] Along with these larger operations came another type of independent operation. Pursuit of the retreating and withdrawing Italians was one type of operation that the British most desired the *arbagnoch* to carry out and were most frustrated when *arbagnoch* failed to demonstrate sufficient vigour in such endeavours.[886] Despite occasional British frustrations, both oral history and archival records confirm that this was a major aspect of *arbagnoch* independent activity during the post invasion period.[887] The final form of independent operation performed by the *arbagnoch* during the post-invasion period, auto-liberation, was a corollary to the larger offensive operations. Reports of the *arbagnoch* capturing larger garrisons, towns, and cities begin to appear in earnest in British intelligence reports in April 1941 and continued at least through August.[888]

Taken together these independent offensive operations served to support the overall British offensive. Operations by *arbagnoch* in the area of Alghe and at a point known as HXE 6476

[883] TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Intelligence Summary No. 23, 26.4.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

[884] *Ibid;* TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941); WO 201/301 (HQ Troops in the Sudan, Intelligence Summary No. 161, 29.7-4.8.1941, HQ Troops in Sudan and Eritrea Inter Summaries 157-180, GS1(a), 7-10.1941

[885] TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Intelligence Summary No. 23, 26.4.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command); TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

[886] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 31.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 201/291 (Major R.D. Neville, Royal Artillery, Report Part II, Patriot Activities in Southern Abyssinia, 1941, Part II)

[887] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 31.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 201/291 (Major R.D. Neville, Royal Artillery, Report Part II, Patriot Activities in Southern Abyssinia, 1941, Part II); Interview with Jagama Kello, 25.2.2013

[888] TNA, WO 201/302 (Situation Report 23.8.1941 to HQ Kaid, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941); TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Intelligence Summary No. 23, 26.4.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command); TNA, WO 201/292 (22nd East African Brigade Operations, 21.4.1941); TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

forced the Italians to rush forces from their garrison at Gimma (Jimma), an objective of the British offensive, to areas over 100 miles away. This reduced the resistance that would face the British on their arrival.[889] Elsewhere the areas that the *arbagnoch* liberated were along the British line of advance allowing the British to move towards their ultimate objectives without encountering significant resistance.[890]

From the British perspective, the extent to which an *arbagnoch* action supported British operations determined its effectiveness. In areas where there was no British operational presence, contemporary assessments tended to ignore the *arbagnoch* operations altogether. Despite this, there are indications that the British considered the *arbagnoch* independent operations effective, at least in a general sense. Gen. Cunningham's Supplementary Report on the East Africa Force operations from April through July 1941 exemplifies this noting that:

> The Patriots proved most successful in harassing enemy lines of communication and in besieging isolated enemy garrisons. By carrying out these tasks, these Ethiopian forces caused the Italians considerable alarm and anxiety and lowered their morale. By this means they contained large numbers of the enemy away from the main scene of operations.[891]

This observation is an indication of the effectiveness of *arbagnoch* activities according to internal metrics. It explains which activities the British considered effective ('harassing enemy lines of communication' and 'besieging isolated enemy garrisons'). It demonstrates the perceived mode through which they were effective ('caused the Italians considerable alarm and anxiety and lowered their morale') and finally attaches them to the objective by which effectiveness was

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[889] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

[890] TNA, WO 201/302 (Situation Report 23.8.1941 to HQ Kaid, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941); Henry Steele Commager, *The History of the Second World War* (Washington, D.C., 2004), p. 98

[891] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

determined ('they contained large numbers of the enemy away from the main scene of operations'). Although this evidence only comes from one person, as the OC East Africa Force, Cunningham was in a position to speak to internal considerations of effectiveness. His evidence is even more compelling given that in previous reports he expressed significant doubt as to the effectiveness of the *arbagnoch*.[892]

The British reports on the fall of Addis Ababa also speak to both internal metrics of effectiveness while additionally providing some indication of external metrics of effectiveness. According to the reports of the 22nd East Africa Brigade, which took Addis, the Italian garrison surrendered out of fear of the possibility of falling to the *arbagnoch*, despite the fact that the garrison was large and well-equipped.[893] Reports from the surrender of Gimma corroborate this account in principle, suggesting that the powerful garrison at Gimma declared itself an open city. It surrendered to the British because of fear of the besieging *arbagnoch*.[894] Even if not true, the fact that the British perceived the surrender of Addis to follow directly from Italian fear of the *arbagnoch* speaks to effectiveness according to internal metrics. If true, the accounts demonstrate that the *arbagnoch* independent operations had an effect on the Italians and shaped their response to the oncoming British offensive. This would constitute effectiveness as measured by both external and objective metrics. When coupled with evidence already presented such as the opening of the British line of advance this suggests that in aggregate *arbagnoch* independent operations were effective in an absolute sense.[895]

Considering relative effectiveness is difficult. It does not centre on whether there was another way to achieve the same results; rather it centres on whether *arbagnoch* activities during the post-

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[892] TNA, WO 201/294 (Lieutenant General Cunningham, Report on Operations 1.11.1940-5.4.1941, 6.6.1941)
[893] TNA, WO 201/292 (22nd East African Brigade Operations, 21.4.1941)
[894] *Ibid*
[895] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941); TNA, WO 201/302 (Situation Report 23.8.1941 to HQ Kaid, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941); Henry Steele Commager, *The History of the Second World War* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc, 2004) p. 98

invasion period were necessary at all. If they were necessary, then the same logic that applies to determining relative effectiveness in the pre-campaign period applies to independent *arbagnoch* operations in the post-invasion period. If no *arbagnoch* operations were necessary in the post-invasion period, then these operations along with all others were not effective in a relative sense. Any resource spent on them was, by definition, a waste.

Beyond independent operations, cooperation took two distinct forms--cooperation between the primary British forces taking part in the invasion and cooperation with the Op Centre forces. On the tactical levels these forms of cooperation blurred as the Op Centres took part in operations with the regular forces and at times took on more conventional campaign styles and objectives. On the operational level, the different natures of the British forces involved shaped the employment of the *arbagnoch* as indigenous forces. For the Op Centres and the remainder of Mission 101 little changed on the operational level from the pre-campaign period. The *arbagnoch* still provided the security, intelligence, and logistics. The effectiveness of this mode of activity remained consistent through the post-invasion period with the local population and *arbagnoch* providing all the primary logistics for the forces.[896]

For both the conventional forces and the Op Centres, a major form of cooperative engagement came in the form of intelligence and field security. The *arbagnoch* maintained intelligence networks that provided information as to Italian strength, movement, and morale.[897] One intelligence document from the siege of Gondar in autumn 1941 exemplifies the British assessment of this activity noting that the 'the various Patriot forces gathered around Gondar regularly sent in men to gather news' and that *arbagnoch* 'had been providing the bulk of the

[896] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 19.02.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[897] Interview with Asmaro Wolde Selassie, 13.3.2013; TNA, WO 201/303 (Captain W.O.H. Collins, Note to OC Troops, Dessie, Field Security, Gondar, 13.10.1941, Sudan & Eritrea Intelligence Summary); TNA, WO 201/313A (Report on Intelligence Work During Gondar Operations, 16.12.41, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

information.'[898] Evidence suggest a pattern of activity with the *ya* west *arbagnoch* (*arbagnoch* intelligence), who had previously served the *arbagnoch* commanders alone, now providing intelligence for the British. There is some suggestion in the reports from East Africa command that the *arbagnoch* were also instrumental in denying the Italians similar intelligence opportunities.[899] The documents evidence the scope of this form of cooperation but not its effectiveness. Unlike in the Palestine case, there is no clear indication of the efficacy of British intelligence in the post-invasion period in IEA. Moreover, most of the documents referring explicitly to intelligence cooperation come from late in the post-invasion period. However, since there is evidence that the *arbagnoch* provided intelligence in the pre-campaign period and no evidence of a break in the post-invasion period it is a reasonable assumption that this form of cooperative activity continued throughout.

The cooperative activities between the British regular forces and the *arbagnoch* relevant to the operational level were not limited to the sphere of intelligence. The British also coordinated with the *arbagnoch* so that the *arbagnoch* could besiege the Italians and cut Italian LOCs in support of advancing British forces, protect British LOCs, and secure lines of advance. In the cases of cutting the Italian LOCs and besieging the Italian garrisons the *arbagnoch* conducted operations in conjunction with British simultaneous offensives against the same positions. For example while the British invested Kolkaber the *arbagnoch* forced the evacuation of Minzero, cutting the sole terrestrial supply route to Kolkaber.[900] At other times the *arbagnoch* prevented relief forces from

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[898] TNA, WO 201/313A (Report on Intelligence Work During Gondar Operations, 16.12.41, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)
[899] *Ibid*
[900] WO 201/301 (HQ Troops in the Sudan, Intelligence Summary No. 161, 29.7-4.8.1941, HQ Troops in Sudan and Eritrea Inter Summaries 157-180, GS1(a), 7-10.1941- Prior to the British assault on Gondar the *arbagnoch* enveloped the city and cut its supply - TNA, WO 201/303 (Captain W.O.H. Collins, Note to OC Troops, Dessie, Field Security, Gondar, 13.10.1941, Sudan & Eritrea Intelligence Summary)

arriving at positions besieged by the British.[901] While not in direct tactical coordination with the British, this sort of action took place in support of local British operations.

In a similar manner, the *arbagnoch* secured territory in which the British established LOCs along the line of advance into IEA.[902] This was undoubtedly an effect of *arbagnoch* cooperation, which was beneficial to British operations and eased the process of their advance. There is little evidence as to whether this was a side effect of the *arbagnoch* securing territory or intentional aspect of the cooperation with the *arbagnoch*. The picture is complicated further by the fact that such an effect could have been a by-product of other *arbagnoch* activities. In some instances, such as where the *arbagnoch* destroyed the bridge over the River Gumara, they effectively cut the Italian LOCs and contained the Italians in their garrisons, which allowed greater British freedom of operation in the area.[903] Through cutting LOCs and keeping pressure on the Italian garrisons in the British areas of operation, the *arbagnoch* tied down large numbers of Italian forces and allowed the British to retain operational initiative and freedom of movement. According to Avraham Akavia, Orde Wingate's deputy, the *arbagnoch* harassment of the Italians was precisely the reason that the British 'could travel at will.'[904] If this was the case then it is impossible to disambiguate the *arbagnoch* activities against the Italian positions and LOCs on the operational level from the securing of British LOCs.

As in the pre-campaign period, another benefit to cooperation surfaced on the operational level. The British hoped that *arbagnoch* operations supported by propaganda would encourage desertion from the *banda*. As in the pre-invasion period there is significant evidence of *arbagnoch* success in this realm. The main change seems to have been the scale of the desertions. Whereas previously

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[901] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 13.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

[902] Platt (1962), Lecture 3, pp. 7-8; Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009; TNA, WO 201/313B (SO 2(1), Reports to East African Force HQ, 29.8.1941 & 8.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

[903] TNA, WO 201/313B (SO 2(1), Reports to East African Force HQ, 29.8.1941 & 8.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

[904] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009

individuals or small units abandoned the Italian cause now members of the *mesafint* switched sides bringing with them their retainers.[905] This in particular seems to have been an effect of British cooperation with the Emperor as those deserting wished to come over on the condition that they could submit to Haile Selasie.[906]

In terms of internal metrics of effectiveness, there are very few indicators other than Akavia's statement that *arbagnoch* harassment of the Italians was responsible for freedom of movement.[907] Similarly, there is a lack of indicators related to external metrics of effectiveness. However, when assessed against the absolute metrics, it seems that the activities involved in cooperation were effective. The *arbagnoch* encouraged desertions and cut Italian LOCs. It is possible that the *arbagnoch* would have engaged in the operations against the Italian LOCs and garrisons in the manner beneficial to the British in the British areas of operation without coordination. However, the presence of Op Centres in the areas and the knowledge that the British had of *arbagnoch* activities, movements, and dispositions in the relevant areas of operation speaks to some level of coordination.[908]

The picture of the employment and efficacy of indigenous force cooperation is most clear at the tactical level. This was the level at which most British encountered indigenous force cooperation and the level about which they wrote the most documents. Unlike the other levels of cooperation, at the tactical level there were British personnel present to record the activities of the *arbagnoch*. For the most part the cooperation on the tactical level was conducted through the auspices of the Op Centres. Even when cooperating with conventional forces the mechanism of cooperation was often the Op Centre. There were differences in employment depending on whether the *arbagnoch* were in cooperation with Op Centres alone or with conventional forces. In

[905] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 19.02.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[906] *Ibid*
[907] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009
[908] TNA, WO 201/313B (SO 2(1), Reports to East African Force HQ, 29.8.1941 & 8.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

both cases there were additional differences depending on whether the employment of *arbagnoch* occurred as part of a mobile operation against a moving Italian force or as part of the assault on a fixed objective.

On the tactical level, the British employed the *arbagnoch* for a full range of operations. At times the *arbagnoch* served as flanking forces, reconnaissance forces, harassing forces, and even primary assault forces. The *arbagnoch* also isolated smaller Italian positions in the combat area. The *arbagnoch* served as a primary assault force both when working with the Op Centres and with the conventional forces.[909] In all of the cases encountered where the *arbagnoch* took a primary assault role, they also were the majority force present. This, for example, occurred at Debre Markos, where Gideon Force besieged and assaulted the Italian garrison.[910] Here the *arbagnoch* were the primary combat force available and repeatedly assaulted fortified Italian positions.[911] It is worth noting that such actions differed from the *arbagnoch* practice when not in joint operations with the British. Alone the *arbagnoch* tended to attack weak targets, not heavily fortified garrisons. The difference in behaviour indicates that these assault operations were a direct result of cooperation. When cooperating as assault forces the *arbagnoch* served an infantry role while the British provided support through indirect fire and crew operated weapons.[912] More commonly, the role of the *arbagnoch* was that traditionally associated with light infantry – flanking, reconnaissance, harassment, and pursuit. In this capacity, they were employed in another way, as a bluff. Using

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[909] Forces under Douglas's command who were to be in position by 20/8/1941 - TNA, WO 201/302 (Douglas, Report to CC Troops or Intelligence Officer Zrema and Maj Ringrose, 12.8.1941, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941); TNA, WO 201/313A (Capt. Wybergh, Report on Patriot Activity in the Lechemti Jubdo District, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command); TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28); TNA, WO 201/303 (10.10.1941, Precis of Information Kulkaber – Feroaber, 14.11.1941, Sudan & Eritrea Intelligence Summery)
[910] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 01-02.04.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 03.04.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[911] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 01-02.04.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 03.04.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[912] Interview with Anonymous 2, 15.3.2013; Interview with Dessie Yalley, 14.3.2013

the *arbagnoch* in as light infantry and bluff allowed the British to give the impression of having a far stronger force then was in fact present.

Flanking took one of several forms. In some instances, the British arrayed the *arbagnoch* on the flanks of the assault on an Italian position. Such was the case in the Battle of Combolcia Pass where the *arbagnoch* made flanking assaults under Italian artillery fire but eventually took the 'outlying features' of the Italian position and harried the Italian flanks in combination with a British assault on the centre.[913] In other cases, the flanking manoeuvres which employed the *arbagnoch* more closely resembled the *arbagnoch* undertakings on the operational level. They targeted the Italian LOCs and smaller outposts around the primary assault objectives.[914] Thus during the action at Socota (part of the Battle of Amba Alagi) the *arbagnoch* severed the roads around the positions as part of the British advance.[915]

In addition to flanking and direct assault, the British employed the *arbagnoch* as the reconnaissance elements of the advancing force. In some cases, the *arbagnoch* and British worked in joint patrols moving ahead of the primary force. In others, the *arbagnoch* alone formed the advanced reconnaissance parties.[916] Combat conditions were such that reconnaissance operations could morph into flanking or direct assault depending on the situation.[917] In at least one case, with Gideon Force, the *arbagnoch* seem to have done all three - they started as reconnaissance, then took part in flanking operation with a British company from Sudan, and ultimately served in

[913] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941) – For another example see, the assault on the Kulkaber position - TNA, CO 847/22/20 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, 21.11.1941, Situation Report, 12-18.11.1941, OETA Abyssinia II)
[914] TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28); TNA, CO 847/22/20 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, 21.11.1941, Situation Report, 12-18.11.1941, OETA Abyssinia II)
[915] TNA, CO 847/22/20 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, 21.11.1941, Situation Report, 12-18.11.1941, OETA Abyssinia II) - For further examples see - TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28)
[916] TNA, CO 847/22/19 (GOC in C East Africa, Cipher Telegram to War Office, Situation Report 15-21.10.1941, 23-10-1941, OETA Abyssinia); TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 18.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[917] It is unclear whether these shifts were planned.

a primary combat capacity for the next two days while harassing the Italians continuously.[918] It seems that this final activity was also the most common purpose for which the British employed the *arbagnoch*. The British employed the *arbagnoch* to harry the Italian retreats, and perhaps most importantly to deceive the Italians as to the size of the force they faced. These operations were in essence a continuation of the primary modes of *arbagnoch* activity prevalent prior to the commencement of relations with the British. The difference now was that they were better coordinated and directed towards discreet tactical and operational objectives.

Harassing operations were the primary means by which the *arbagnoch* forces, cooperating with the British, undertook sieges of Italian positions. In these operations, the *arbagnoch* kept up a constant tempo of fire on the Italian fortified positions.[919] In cases such as the siege of Burye the British propaganda units augmented the demoralising effect this had on the Italians which resulted in desertions from the garrison and eventually the Italian abandonment of the position.[920] This pattern was repeated with minor variations throughout both Op Centre and conventional force cooperations with the *arbagnoch*. At the Mankusa Fort, the *arbagnoch* cooperating with Gideon force provided sustained harassing fire from 28th February through 2nd March, supported by limited mortar fire from Gideon.[921] As more *arbagnoch* arrived in the area the British directed them to positions in order to increase the pressure on the fort.[922] On 2nd March, the propaganda section arrived and rapidly achieved a similar result to that at Burye.[923] Elsewhere there were other variations.[924] Nevertheless, the essential pattern remained constant.

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[918] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 18.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[919] Sykes (1959) p. 276
[920] *Ibid*
[921] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 28.02.-2.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[922] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 01.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[923] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 02.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)
[924] For examples see Sykes (1959) p. 260; and TNA, WO 201/291 (Major R.D. Neville, Royal Artillery, Report Part II, Patriot Activities in Southern Abyssinia, 1941, Part II)

Supported by whatever additional resources the British could bring to bear and under British direction, the *arbagnoch* maintained constant harassing fire on the Italian garrisons until such time as the garrison morale collapsed and its evacuation began.

At the point of Italian retreat the second form of harassing operation began. In this form of harassment the *arbagnoch* subjected exposed Italian formations to constant engagement. During these operations, a standing force would follow the Italian column attacking whenever conditions were favourable, especially at night.[925] The *arbagnoch* continued to pepper the Italians with fire as the Italians manoeuvred through the day.[926] Local *arbagnoch* tended to join the harassment when the retreating Italians moved through an *arbagnoch* held area.[927] This greatly increased the power of the pursuit force.[928] Additionally some elements of the pursuit force went ahead of the retreating Italians in order to cut the Italian retreat. This slowed the Italian columns and exposed the Italians to more sustained fire.[929] This form of harassment caused the Italians significant losses.[930] One example of such an operation was Gideon Force's pursuit of Colonel Maraventano's column retreating after the fall of Dessie. At the start of the pursuit on the 25th of April, Maraventano's column was roughly 13,300 strong and it suffered constant harassment as it retreated until the 18th of May.[931] Having sustained significant losses Maraventano deployed against the pursuit forces and over the next three days repulsed constant assaults before again being compelled to withdraw. By this point, the column had lost approximately 6300 men to

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[925] Thesiger (1987) pp. 342-343, 54; TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam)

[926] TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam)

[927] Thesiger (1987) pp. 342-343

[928] *Ibid*

[929] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); Thesiger (1987) pp.346-348

[930] *Ibid*; TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941); TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 20.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

[931] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

harassing attacks.[932] Two days later, under continuous attack, the column surrendered to Gideon Force.[933]

The events of the retreat demonstrate the dynamics by which harassing actions operated. A core of *arbagnoch* operated in partnership with the British and took part in assaults on the retreating column. The arrival of local *arbagnoch* augmented the core and kept up the tempo of harassment. This resulted in the destruction of the Italian column. For the majority of the column's retreat, the core of *arbagnoch* acted only as a pursuit force. It seems other *arbagnoch* were responsible for much of the harassment. However, when the column took a defensive position it was the pursuit force combined with the local *arbagnoch* that finally broke its will to fight. The dynamic held true not just in the areas where Gideon Force operated but everywhere that the Op Centres were active.[934]

The harassing operations were at their heart operations against Italian morale. They did not destroy the Italian capacity to continue resistance rather they damaged Italian will. In order to do this they relied on bluff. To take the example of the retreat from Dessie, at every point the Italians greatly outnumbered the British and *arbagnoch*. In the end the Italian column of c.7000 surrendered to a force of less than 5000, which contained few British forces.[935] The use of constant harassment by the *arbagnoch* obscured the realities of the weakness of the British position and gave the Italians the impression they faced a much larger regular force.[936] This

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[932] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 20.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

[933] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 20.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

[934] TNA, WO 201/299 (Diary of Bimbashi T. Waters, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 23.12.1940-31.1.1941)- offers a strikingly similar narrative of events in a different region of IEA

[935] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 20.05.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941); TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

[936] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009

impression led directly to the Italian surrender.[937] Given that in the period before the British

entered the war the Italians frequently attacked the *arbagnoch,* it cannot be assumed that such

behaviour resulted from timidity on behalf of the Italian commanders. The retreat of

Maraventano's column and others like it point to a more likely alternative explanation. The

constant harassing fire obscured the weakness of the British forces and led the Italians to believe

that to sally-forth would mean defeat. From the evidence available it seems that harassing

operations were the most consistently effective of the tactical level cooperations.

The efficacy of harassment lay in bluff and the ability of these operations to hurt the Italian

morale to the point that the Italians surrendered. In this, the operations took advantage of the

experience and size of the *arbagnoch*. The operations gave direction to a type of activity with

which the *arbagnoch* were already familiar. Unlike direct assaults, harassing operations did not

force the *arbagnoch* to change their standard mode of operation to resemble that of regular trained

military formations. In these ways, harassing operations also mitigated the problems in

cooperation, such as reliability and timeliness that marred cooperation in the post-invasion

period.

There are few external indications of the effectiveness of tactical level cooperation. However,

absolute indicators abound. If the purpose of tactical cooperation was that the *arbagnoch* would

greatly augment the British manpower or act independently against Italian positions then tactical

level cooperation was successful. The operational reports are filled with statements such as one

from the Wolchefit area in August 1941 that indicated that Maj. Ringrose with a force of

arbagnoch and an Ethiopian battalion successfully attacked the Italian fortified Cianch position.[938]

A report based on General Platt's dispatches repeats this account adding that this attack also

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[937] *Ibid* - The same pattern appeared in the sieges of the forts, see: Mockler (1984) pp. 351-352
[938] TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Intelligence Summary No. 30, 5.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command) – For further corroboration see: TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28); Platt (1962), Lecture 3, p. 11; TNA, WO 201/300 (12th (African) Division South Force, Intelligence Summery, 8.1941)

captured 108 Italian mortars and machine guns.[939] Ringrose's reports alone do not satisfy the

need for evidence of the effectiveness of tactical cooperation. The Ethiopian battalion could

have provided all of the heavy lifting while the *arbagnoch* got in the way. However, the same

report mentions that Bimbashi Shephard achieved similar feats with the *arbagnoch,* with no

mention of an Ethiopian battalion.[940] Taken together, these and other examples indicate that

tactical level cooperation was effective according to internal and absolute metrics.

Significant problems hampered *arbagnoch* cooperation in the post-invasion period. Among these

were the ever-present problems of logistics. Despite improvement, logistics remained difficult in

the post-invasion period, which influenced the efficacy of cooperation. For the Op Centre,

forces resupply could take two months.[941] This meant that they were still largely dependent on

the *arbagnoch* for the majority of their resources. As noted in chapter four this limited the

influence the forces had with the *arbagnoch*. The increased tempo of operations in post-invasion

period made these shortages more acute. Standing forces of *arbagnoch* could not rely on their

reserve system of dispersal to supply food. This meant that they had to purchase food. Without

these supplies, the *arbagnoch* could not function and their utility to the British declined along with

the efficacy of cooperation.[942] The problems in supply also limited the efficacy of sieges and

harassing operations as a lack of ammunition forced the Op Centres to conserve ammunition for

their most effective weaponry.[943] These problems were relatively minor when compared to the

more fundamental problems that plagued the cooperation. The problems with logistics decreased

the efficiency of operations but they did not threaten the overall success of cooperation. Far

more significant were problems with coordination, trust, endurance, and rivalry.

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[939] TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28)
[940] *Ibid*; For a post-war account see: Thesiger (1987) p. 332
[941] Interview with Avraham Akavia, 29.12.2009
[942] TNA, WO 201/303 (10.10.1941, Precis of Information Kulkaber – Feroaber, 14.11.1941, Sudan & Eritrea Intelligence Summery)
[943] TNA, WO 217/37 (Abrahim Akavia, Private War Diary of Abrahim Akavia, 28.02.-2.03.1941, G(R) Branch in Abyssinia, 9.12.1941)

In the pre-campaign period, the British had problems coordinating activity with the *arbagnoch*.

The increased level of coordination demanded during the post-invasion period intensified these

shortcomings. On the tactical level problems of communication abounded. Without

communication and coordination, the *arbagnoch* could be a hindrance rather than a help. At one

point in the operations around Gondar the presence of the *arbagnoch* near Italian lines prevented

effective counter battery fire against the Italian artillery which in turn forced 1/6 KAR to retreat

from an otherwise successful assault.[944] Had there been a good mechanism for communication

and coordination, this sequence of events would not have occurred. In a similar vein, the lack of

'discipline' among the *arbagnoch* was a source of constant frustration. The large number of

arbagnoch who took part in looting captured positions could delay British movements in the battle

space.[945] Both the operational and tactical levels of cooperation were affected by what the British

perceived to be a lack of reliability on the part of the *arbagnoch*. As General Platt stated in a series

of lectures given after the Second World War, the *arbagnoch* could not be relied upon:

> ...to attack from a given place in a given direction at a given hour on a given day. One
>
> never knew whether they would appear for battle or not. Their acceptance of proposals
>
> for battle was no guarantee of their appearance and participation. They did appear some
>
> time, but it might be next afternoon or it might be next week. One could never tell.[946]

The records of the campaign provide strong support for Platt's sentiments. At times thousands

of *arbagnoch* failed to materialise despite promises of support.[947] This lack of reliability quite

naturally decreased the overall efficacy of cooperation. It also reinforced the racially based views

of the British towards the Abyssinians. There was great variance in reliability, even within the

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[944] TNA, WO 201/303 (10.10.1941, Precis of Information Kulkaber – Feroaber, 14.11.1941, Sudan & Eritrea Intelligence Summery)

[945] WO 201/301 (HQ Troops in the Sudan, Intelligence Summary No. 161, 29.7-4.8.1941, HQ Troops in Sudan and Eritrea Inter Summaries 157-180, GS1(a), 7-10.1941

[946] Platt (1962), Lecture 3, p. 12

[947] TNA, WO 201/302 (Douglas, Report to CC Troops or Intelligence Officer Zrema and Maj Ringrose, 12.8.1941, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941)

arbagnoch of a particular region or a particular group. Douglas, in command of Dougforce, estimated that of the local *arbagnoch* (Gondar region) in cooperation with his Op Centre, 25% or less (about 1500 total) were reliable.[948] Of the Shoan *arbagnoch,* who came to cooperate, he estimated 45% were reliable. Douglas estimated that 70% of the *arbagnoch* forces formed from *banda* deserters were reliable.[949] If Douglas is to be believed, his observations demonstrate a wide spectrum of *arbagnoch* reliability even within a relatively small area and indicate that broad statements as to *arbagnoch* unreliability are inaccurate. A more nuanced picture based on reports such as those of Douglas and the events of the campaign suggest that the *arbagnoch* consisted of a reliable core, augmented by much greater numbers that were, by British standards, unreliable.

In addition to problems of reliability, there were at times problems with *arbagnoch* trustworthiness. Chief among such incidents was the escape of *Ras* Hailu. Wingate tasked Lij Belai Zalleka with blocking the retreat of the powerful pro-Italian forces under *Ras* Hailu. Hailu bribed Belai Zalleka with a chance to marry one of Hailu's daughters and so Belai Zalleka allowed Hailu to retreat.[950] Such betrayals, were rare and given the importance of relative status and dynastic politics within the *arbagnoch* leadership perhaps predictable. Nevertheless, they further eroded British confidence in the *arbagnoch* as well as the British perception of *arbagnoch* efficacy. A far more common issue was that of endurance. When the Italians retreated from an area the *arbagnoch* often refused to leave the area and continue the offensive elsewhere.[951]

It seems that the British failed to comprehend fully the localised and territorial nature of the *arbagnoch*. The *arbagnoch* fought when the Italians were present in their territory but rarely ventured elsewhere to fight.[952] Once an area was liberated, the *arbagnoch* would celebrate and then

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[948] TNA, WO 201/313B (SO 2(1), Reports to East African Force HQ, 29.8.1941 & 8.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)
[949] *Ibid*
[950] Playfair, et al. (1954) p. 426; Thesiger (1987) pp. 338-339
[951] Mockler (1984) pp. 340-341, 346
[952] Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013

concentrate on 'score settling'.[953] Even while liberation was still in progress many *arbagnoch*

seemed to have turned towards seeking vengeance against those identified as collaborators.[954]

There were reports that fear of *arbagnoch* retaliation was such that it made those who had been

loyal to the Italians less than eager to surrender to their arms to British forces.[955]

To some extent, the problems of trustworthiness and endurance were connected to a third

problem – local rivalry. As liberation came to regions, the power struggles that had hampered

cooperation in the pre-campaign period re-emerged, at times edging towards outright civil

war.[956]The local power struggles reduced the willingness of *arbagnoch* leaders to cooperate with

each other and the British. As a result, planned cooperative operations failed to materialise.[957] As

various leaders claimed large swathes of territory, others had to hoard their resources to defend

their territorial control.

The underlying factors that contributed to the perceived issues of trustworthiness, endurance,

and rivalry were rooted, to some extent, in the same cause – the structure of Ethiopian society.

The nature of feudal competition and mobilisation among the *arbagnoch* meant that the *arbagnoch*

were rooted to a specific location and valued feudal status. If *arbagnoch* actions are understood in

the context of the feudal structure, then allowing *Ras* Hailu to retreat in return for a gain of

feudal status would not contradict the motivation for fighting, while leaving their territory would.

Moreover, given the structure of the *arbagnoch* logistics, it would be questionable as to how

effective the majority of *arbagnoch* groups might be far outside their perceived territorial

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[953] Allen (1943) p. 84; TNA, WO 201/302 (Douglas, Report to CC Troops or Intelligence Officer Zrema and Maj Ringrose, 12.8.1941, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941)
[954] TNA, WO 201/302 (Douglas, Report to CC Troops or Intelligence Officer Zrema and Maj Ringrose, 12.8.1941, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941); The desire for vengeance against collaborators seems to be common theme among indigenous forces – for a description of similar activities in France during the liberation see: Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains*, (New York, 2002), pp. 323-327.
[955] TNA, WO 201/313B (SO 2(1), Reports to East African Force HQ, 29.8.1941 & 8.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)
[956] TNA, WO 201/302 (Situation Report 23.8.1941 to HQ Kaid, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941); Report by Douglas to CC Troops or Intel Offr Zrema and Maj Ringrose 12/8/1941, WO 201/302 – 12(A) Div Intelligence Gondar Aug-Oct 1941
[957] TNA, WO 201/293 (The Eritrean and Ethiopian Campaigns, 1.12.1940-26.8.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28)

boundaries. A better understanding of the structure of the *arbagnoch* among the British might have prevented issues arising from feudal competition or at least made their advent predictable. There is some evidence that forces such as Gideon, the Op Centres, and Mission 101 (which contained personnel with the best knowledge of Ethiopian societal structure) took steps to minimise the problems of localism and rivalry. These units also tended to be more consistently effective in cooperating with the *arbagnoch* than their conventional military counterparts.

One way to consider overall effectiveness in the post-invasion period is to examine the effectiveness of each level of cooperation (operational and tactical) and create a composite picture.[958] In this case, the combined picture that emerges is one of effectiveness. This chapter has demonstrated that despite the problems, cooperation in the post-invasion period was effective on each of the component levels. While compelling, it fails to distinguish adequately whether the cooperative mechanisms were effective or whether cooperation was effective despite its ineffective systems. Finally, such a methodology fails to investigate the effectiveness of cooperation taken as a unified whole. The analysis will follow the pattern set throughout by looking first at internal and external metrics before moving on to consider absolute and relative effectiveness. The final element of these is especially important, as it will shed light on the issues of relative effectiveness in each of the levels of cooperation previously discussed.

In the case of cooperation with the *arbagnoch* there are two relevant forms of internal evidence, evidence contributed during the period of cooperation (along with its immediate aftermath) and testimony recorded thereafter. In the first category are documents such as the 12th (African) Division Monthly Review of Situation from November. The monthly review reports on the surrender of General Nasi noting 'whilst attributing the main glory to East African troops one

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[958] Given the overall situation of the war there was no strategic level cooperation in the post-invasion period

should not forget the performance of Patriots…'[959] That the report should praise the East African forces which made up 12th (African) Division is expected; however, the mention of the *arbagnoch* shares the laurels of victory with the *arbagnoch*. This is a compelling statement of perceived effectiveness. What makes this document unusual is the direct mention of the *arbagnoch*. Other documents of the period imply *arbagnoch* effectiveness by complimenting the effectiveness of the units tasked with *arbagnoch* cooperation. For example, Wavell's dispatches of May 1942 stated:

> The subsequent operations of the small force which cleared the Gojjam of large
>
> Italian forces was a very remarkable achievement, due largely to the energy and
>
> initiative of Brigadier Sandford, head of Mission 101, Colonel O.C. Wingate, who
>
> commanded the regular forces taking part, the British officers and NCOs who
>
> assisted him, and the fine fighting qualities of the Sudanese battalion.[960]

There is no mention of the *arbagnoch*. Yet, if Wingate and Mission 101 were as effective as this dispatch implies, then it follows that cooperation was effective.[961] Other reports from the same immediate post-campaign period specifically mention the *arbagnoch* and provide a more nuanced evaluation. One example comes from Lt. General Cunningham who wrote:

> The Patriots proved most successful in harassing enemy lines of
>
> communication and in besieging isolated enemy garrisons. By carrying out
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> these tasks, these Ethiopian forces caused the Italians considerable alarm and

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[959] TNA, WO 201/313A (12th (African) Division Monthly Review of Situation No. 3, 11.1941-1.12.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

[960] TNA, WO 201/311 (Wavell Dispatch on East Africa Operations, pp. 2-3, 21.5.1942)

[961] Maj. W.A.B. Harris's *Guerrilla War in Gojjam* written immediately following the campaign has a similar pattern, see: TNA, WO 201/308 (Major W.A.B. Harris, Abyssinia, 1941: Guerilla War in the Gojjam, p.1)

anxiety and lowered their morale. By this means they contained large numbers

of the enemy away from the main scene of operations.[962]

Cunningham's understandings of both the activities of the *arbagnoch* and their effect constitute a powerful indication of the effectiveness of cooperation, especially because he was initially hesitant about *arbagnoch* cooperation. Cunningham and Wavell's dispatches and evidence, such as that found in the 12th (African) Division report, taken together, demonstrate that at the conclusion of the campaign, cooperation as a whole was effective when assessed against internal metrics. Statements recorded in the post-war period, however, complicate the picture.

Undoubtedly, there is evidence of external effectiveness or its absence in Italian archives or the memories of Italian veterans. The ability to access such material was beyond the resources available for this research. Instead, this research relies on captured Italian documents. Few such documents were encountered and none explicitly referred to the *arbagnoch*. Only one document, a January 1941 report by General Baccari in Asmara appeared to refer to the problems caused by the *arbagnoch*. In his report, General Baccari indicated that he was having trouble getting orders to his detachment and that he had to send any important orders by multiple means in order to insure they got through.[963] Alone this provides scant evidence of any form of *arbagnoch* effectiveness. When considered with the previously discussed evidence of *arbagnoch* activities, it seems consistent with the overall pattern and can serve as an external indication of effectiveness.

Having established that the British, and perhaps the Italians, perceived *arbagnoch* cooperation as effective, it remains to understand whether cooperation was effective in the absolute and relative senses. The central question of absolute effectiveness is whether the cooperation achieved the results expected. From the consideration of *arbagnoch* activities and results, it is clear that the

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[962] TNA, WO 201/295 (Lt. Gen. Cunningham, East Africa Force Campaign Supplementary Report, 6.4.1941-11.7.1941)

[963] WO 201/293 (General A Baccari, Report to Asmara, Luigi Frusci - Northern Sector Command, 29.1.1941, Eritrea & Northern Abyssinia Operations, 28)

arbagnoch acted as a force multiplier as well as force augmentation. The *arbagnoch* repeatedly provided the bulk of operational forces across many areas of the campaign. For example, Dougforce consisted of around 200 Op Centre troops but operated in cooperation with around 4,000 *arbagnoch*.[964] This style of cooperation helped lead the Italians consistently to overestimate the number of British personnel they faced.[965] Although the numbers of *arbagnoch* cooperating with a given British unit could fluctuate, in general their participation allowed relatively small British forces to operate effectively and engage significantly larger Italian forces.[966] The fluctuating nature of the forces may have even helped create further confusion among the Italians as to the size and nature of their opposition. Maps of force dispositions north of Lake Tana in summer 1941 show that the *arbagnoch* had taken control of the majority of the area, cut the logistics routes to the Italian garrisons, tied down approximately 14,000 Italian troops, and that one force of *arbagnoch* were providing support to the British Op Centre operating in the area.[967] It is evident that in this region, cooperation fulfilled expectations. As this region is an example of the broader trends already discussed, it is clear that despite the complications, the *arbagnoch* cooperation was effective according to absolute metrics.

The discussion so far has focused on whether the *arbagnoch* were effective when acting in conjunction with the British campaign. It has not addressed the question of whether the mechanism of cooperation was effective. A comparison of the situation before and after British intervention provides evidence of the effectiveness of the cooperative units. As previously noted, in the period before cooperation the *arbagnoch* spent a significant amount of time fighting each other and competing for resources. They did not coordinate, acted in a disorganised manner, and

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[964] TNA, WO 201/302 (Douglas, Report to CC Troops or Intelligence Officer Zrema and Maj Ringrose, 12.8.1941, 12th (African) Division Intelligence, Gondar, 8-10.1941)
[965] Allen (1943) p. 70; Mockler (1984) p. 355
[966] H Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa 1890-1945*, (Aldershot, 1956), p. 556; Allen (1943) p.87
[967] TNA, WO 201/313B (SO 2(1), Reports to East African Force HQ, 29.8.1941 & 8.9.1941, Intelligence Reports East Africa Command)

were restricted to their particular locality. While competition continued after cooperation, the system of cooperation mitigated its severity. By providing resources and channelling Haile Selassie's authority, the British cooperative units were able to reduce the structural causes for competition. That, in turn, allowed the *arbagnoch* to engage more fully against the Italians. Additionally, the provision of headquarters support elements to the *arbagnoch* allowed the *arbagnoch* to engage in complex operations. Operations such as those near Gondar and the pursuit of Maraventano's column would have been impossible before cooperation. The cooperative units played a similar role tactically. The British allowed for the success of complex ambushes by providing a disciplined core of forces. The *arbagnoch* with whom the British cooperated recognised the importance of British support.[968] Given the clear examples of the efficacy of the cooperative mechanisms, it might be possible to argue that if the cooperative units had not been so effective, then *arbagnoch* cooperation in a more general sense and perhaps even the *arbagnoch* themselves would not have been effective. Wavell reflected this sentiment in his dispatch writing that '…his (Wingate's) energy and initiative was an important factor in the means by which the rebel movement gained so great an impetus in the succeeding months.'[969] While Wavell only applied this to Wingate this statement could just as easily apply to the cooperative units in general.

It is possibly more difficult to determine relative effectiveness in the post-invasion period than in the pre-campaign period or in any of the other cases considered throughout this dissertation. On the surface determining relative effectiveness in the post-invasion period seems indistinct from the pre-campaign period. Set against the backdrop of Operation Compass, the Siege of Tobruk, and the Campaign in Greece, the British were still pressed for manpower. They still lacked airpower and were unable to reach many areas of IEA. As before, the British, on their own,

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[968] Interview with Ayelu Desta, 28.2.2013 - Some of the *arbagnoch* interviewed recognizedrecognised the importance of material cooperation referring specifically to the importance of the Mills bombs distributed by the British - Interview with Shifraw Jimbaru, 14.3.2013; Interview with Anonymous 3, 18.3.2013
[969] TNA, WO 201/311 (Wavell Dispatch on East Africa Operations, pp. 2-3, 21.5.1942)

lacked the ability to achieve the effects which cooperation with the *arbagnoch* created. Such an analysis would be over simplistic. The bigger question of the cooperation in the post-campaign period is whether cooperation was necessary at all. In the East African Campaign, British Imperial forces defeated the Italians in a number of battles. On this basis, it might be possible to claim that the *arbagnoch* cooperation was unnecessary. A triumphalist narrative might follow in which the Italians crumbled before the British Empire. Proponents of such a narrative might look to British successes in the Western Desert as evidence. It is impossible to be sure that this narrative is inaccurate, however, given the wide ranging nature of *arbagnoch* cooperation and the effects it had it is equally impossible to uphold the narrative.

If the effects created by the *arbagnoch* were necessary to success in the campaign, then the *arbagnoch* were effective in the relative sense. If not, then they were not. A possible resolution to this question, albeit a partial one, might be found in Somaliland. Here, in August 1940, the same Italian forces, which the British Empire would later defeat in the campaign, defeated British regular forces. It is possible to argue that this defeat occurred in exceptional circumstances and negates the evidence that the Italians in East Africa represented a formidable challenge. However, when considered with the other Italian offensives into Sudan, the events in Somaliland appear to be part of a larger pattern of Italian success in East Africa. If this was the case, then the success of the British within IEA has much to do with the effects achieved by the *arbagnoch*. This being the case, *arbagnoch* cooperation was effective in the relative sense.

Across the Horn of Africa, indigenous forces largely fulfilled the expectations that drove the British into cooperation. The wide spread nature of indigenous force activity and its impact on all aspects of the campaign make it difficult to speak of military operations in IEA without including the *arbagnoch*. While it is impossible to prove that the conventional force campaigns would have been unsuccessful without indigenous force cooperation, indigenous force cooperation was a basic building block of British success both before and after the invasion of

IEA. The constellation of British expectations in the pre- and post-invasion periods was essentially similar. The British demanded that the *arbagnoch* compensate for the lack of resources available to the British. In fulfilling these expectations, the *arbagnoch* continued in the modes of operational activity in which they had engaged prior to cooperation. They acted as irregular forces participating in ambushes and raids especially against Italian supporters. In doing so, they bolstered their own positions. Even on the tactical level, they continued to serve in a more irregular capacity participating in activities such as flanking manoeuvres.

Cooperation was at its most effective when the organisations acted in symbiosis. At these times, such as during the siege of Gondar, the *arbagnoch* compensated for the overall lack of British resources while the British augmented *arbagnoch* capabilities through the provision of specific resources such as command and control or specialist weapons. Cooperation seems to have been effective when the *arbagnoch* could act as they were accustomed but with the benefit of British support. However, the closer the coordination an operation required, the more complications and problems arose in cooperation. The problems that arose in the cooperative activities tended to originate from the physical limitations presented by the geography of IEA or, more often, from the internal structure of the cooperating parties. In particular, the structure of the *arbagnoch* dictated what was possible to achieve especially in terms of command and control. In addition to those problems that existed in reality, differences in understandings of warfare and cultural differences led some of the British to perceive problems in effectiveness where none existed. Despite these limitations, throughout the course of operations in the Horn of Africa, the various activities encapsulated within indigenous force cooperation played a significant role in the British victory, a role that would have been impossible had cooperation proven ineffective.

Comparative Findings

Of all the aspects of cooperation considered in this dissertation, operations and effectiveness were the most difficult to address. Questions of what the indigenous forces actually accomplished and whether they were effective provided ammunition in the bureaucratic battles of the time and in subsequent attempts to establish narratives. Both cases share this problem, whether through the existence of the anti-SO2 dossier in the case of Palestine or the South African narratives in the Horn of Africa. In both cases, narratives of indigenous cooperation are an awkward fit with the dominant narratives of the period. In both cases, bureaucratic infighting and the racial perspectives of the period fostered narratives that neglected or disparaged indigenous activity. Largely devoid of their original context, the narratives have shuffled on zombielike, affecting current understandings of the cases. This chapter departs from such narrative inertia.

In many ways, the cases were different. In Palestine Mandate, a unified indigenous force organisation engaged in a wide variety of activity over the course of the war for a myriad of British organisations. In the Horn of Africa, disparate indigenous forces cooperated with a fairly unified British structure and took part in a narrowly defined set of tasks. Despite these and other differences there were similarities. The expectations for indigenous cooperation were heavily influenced by racially based thinking as well as by immediate operational needs in both cases. Given the wide variety of operational tasks required by the diversity of British actors in Palestine Mandate, the expectations in Palestine were more complex and reflected the higher level of organisational capabilities of the indigenous forces in that theatre. In Horn of Africa, the expectations of cooperation similarly reflected the nature of the indigenous forces in that they focused on widespread, manpower intensive activities. Underlying, these expectations were British beliefs about what types of activity different groups were naturally suited to pursue. That said, in both cases, the key determinant was operational necessity. At the most basic level, the

British cooperating with the indigenous forces expected the forces to make up for the lack of available resources and manpower, as well as to add case specific advantages. In both cases, the British held primary and secondary expectations regarding cooperation. The primary expectations tended towards the fulfilment of operational objective and the secondary expectations tended towards longer term political objectives. In both primary expectations were fulfilled, while secondary expectations (with the notable exception of the restoration of Haile Selassie) languished. Taken together the cases suggest that indigenous forces were not only employed across a wide variety of activities but met a broad spectrum of expectations. These expectations encompassed all levels of warfare (strategic, operational, and tactical). Overall, when measured in terms of both relative and absolute effectiveness, the indigenous forces and indigenous force cooperation succeeded in the majority of operations.

In both Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa the balance of agency eventually rested with the indigenous forces. In Palestine Mandate, this occurred through a reversal of agency as the British became increasingly dependent on the *Haganah* for security, contingency, and support. In the Horn of Africa, from the beginning of the campaign the British depended on the indigenous forces to fulfil basic operational needs. As a result, the British struggled to gain more agency within both relationships throughout the periods of cooperation.

In both cases, the operations in which the indigenous force participated responded to immediate strategic needs. While there were those among the British who desired these particular cooperations, the cooperations themselves were not part of a longer-term strategic plan. The cooperative operations were created on an ad hoc basis to fulfil specific requirements. Throughout all of the operations, the cooperative structure itself played a significant role. The more streamlined and unified the cooperative structures, the more effective the operations tended to be. Overall, cooperative operations were most effective when the indigenous forces operated in mode of action which suited their pre-existing experience and with which they had

some degree of comfort. The role of the British in such cases was to provide added value, such as additional training or resources, which allowed the indigenous forces to achieve greater effectiveness than they would on their own. This aspect of cooperation was the most fraught, especially through the possibility of 'misuse' of the resources provided. Taken together the cases demonstrate that indigenous force cooperation was effective, as measured against a number of metrics and expectations and that the cooperative relationships functioned best when autonomy was preserved but direction provided. The balancing of autonomy, agency, and short and long term objectives for both sides, coupled with the ability to continue in comfortable operational modes, determined whether cooperation occurred. When matched with operational realties and pre-existing beliefs, the factors also governed the type of operations cooperation involved and operational effectiveness.

Conclusion

This dissertation is the first to provide a history of indigenous force cooperation in Second World War Palestine Mandate and Ethiopia and the first to examine indigenous force cooperation as a phenomenon. Its findings provide researchers across the many fields affected by indigenous forces a framework by which to understand this phenomenon. Despite the apparent differences present in the two theatres considered, the comparative findings sections of each chapter demonstrate historical parallels and manifold similarities that prove that indigenous force cooperation exists as a discreet phenomenon.

By considering the similarities between the cases, it is possible to go further and identify key features of indigenous force cooperation as well as some lessons about it as a phenomenon and about those variables which determine the success or failure of cooperation. In both cases, a combination of expediency and resource shortages drove the British to cooperate with indigenous forces. Conversely, questions about the post-war future were one of the primary mitigations that tempered cooperation. In Palestine Mandate, such considerations limited the scope and scale of SOE-*Haganah* cooperation during the pre-1942 period: in IEA the same type of considerations delayed the commencement of cooperation.

Across the cases, the ability of the indigenous forces to assert their agency was central to the structures of cooperation. Indigenous force cooperation occurs where metropolitan control is stretched. In IEA, the lack of metropolitan power resulted from the frontier nature of the region. At first glance, it may seem that lack of control was not the case in the Palestine Mandate. On closer examination, it is clear the manpower shortages and the inability of the British to create and maintain security either during the Arab Revolt or after the *Saison* without the help of indigenous forces demonstrates the weakness of British control.

The cases indicate another underlying truth of cooperation; opportunity is central to cooperation. There can be no cooperation in areas where an indigenous force does not already exist in some form. The form the indigenous forces take can range from a force-in-being through other forms of organisation such as political, familial, or ethnic organisations. However, the process of militarization must happen outside the auspices of cooperation. If no force exists to bring into cooperation, the metropolitan must create a new organisation. Such a created force would follow the patterns of other established forces like the TFF and not of an indigenous force.

The pre-existing nature of the indigenous force also indicates several other key features of cooperation. Indigenous force cooperation more closely resembles an alliance of equals or a relationship among co-belligerents than an instance of recruitment from a subject population. Within the relationship, indigenous forces have significant autonomy. As demonstrated in both cases, the indigenous forces can walk away from cooperation at any time without great consequence to themselves. In IEA, this ability meant that when the *arbagnoch* did not wish to continue campaigning outside of their immediate area of operations there was little the British could do to coax them back. This dynamic creates a different balance of agency from that which exists in more conventional force structures. Should indigenous forces cease cooperation with the metropole, it would not be a case of desertion in which the metropole can use legal levers as coercion. This means that the metropolitan power must work to keep the indigenous force on side.

Indigenous forces have fewer coercive powers than the state and must keep the loyalty of their constituent population. In this regard, indigenous forces can only act within the constraints of the beliefs of their membership. Since the survival of the indigenous force is dependent on local approval, efforts to keep the support of their constituents are a primary interest and more important to the indigenous forces than continued cooperation with the metropolitan forces. For

the indigenous forces, cooperation ultimately stems from the collective expression of an aggregate of individual motivations and beliefs.

One key point drawn from the chapter conclusions is the importance of agency in the relationships. In all cases, the structures of cooperation reflect expressions of indigenous force agency. These structures of cooperation can evolve based on the decisions of either side of the cooperation as well as external stimuli. The metropole does not have sole control over this process. As the pathways of cooperation evolve, the metropolitan and indigenous actors create negotiated structures. In these structures, the metropole seeks to balance control and efficacy while the indigenous force seeks to balance autonomy and benefit.

The negotiated natures of the structures reflect a fundamental truth of cooperation: the two sides in cooperation share some mutual goals but ultimately have different interests. The interplay of these interests determines the extent to which the sides are willing to engage in cooperation. In the case of the *saison* this meant that the *Haganah* was willing to minimise the operational effectiveness of the IZL but not destroy it entirely. When cooperation stems from an alignment of primary interests and it achieves successes in this regard the secondary goals of both actors reassert themselves. The reassertion of the secondary goals can radically alter the dynamics of and even end the cooperation. In Palestine Mandate, for instance, this explains why the British reduced the level of cooperation in late 1942.

In addition to the fundamental principles inherent to cooperation, the conclusions present some important lessons to scholars studying cases which involve cooperation. Foremost among these is that indigenous force cooperation cannot be discounted. Where metropolitan forces chose to enter cooperation with the indigenous forces, the indigenous forces became integral to metropolitan activities. Further, where cooperation exists such cooperation represents a significant form of engagement between the metropolitan force and local population. Given the scope of the various cooperations in the cases studied and the impact they had on British

decision making, it would be difficult to draw an accurate picture of the interaction between the British Empire and the local populations while neglecting the cooperation. The cases also demonstrate that historical contingency including memories and mythologies of experiences of cooperation, racial and ethnic biases, and ideology all are of great consequence in shaping cooperation. Researchers must account for them. In this way, all indigenous force cooperation, both within and outside of the imperial context, resembles many aspects of the colonial experience.

Another important conclusion of use to broader scholarship centres on why the various parties enter and exit cooperation. For the metropolitan force, expediency and necessity determine the decision to enter cooperation. These same factors, along with secondary benefits, drive the continued employment of indigenous forces. For the indigenous forces, a response to an existential threat or the ability to achieve secondary benefits brings about the advent of cooperation. For both sides, cooperation ends when it threatens a primary interest or when a primary interest is no longer at stake and the secondary benefits of cooperation are no longer sufficient motivation.[970]

The methodological approach taken through the course of this dissertation is also an important intervention in the historiography. In considering indigenous force cooperation, it is critical to approach the cooperation from both sides. In the cases considered, the use of interviews was invaluable for understanding the dynamics from the indigenous force perspective. If this project had only engaged with British sources, it would have missed the importance of the Ethiopian feudal structure to the dynamics of cooperation as well as the importance of individual motivation within the indigenous forces. Similarly, with only British sources in hand, this project would have missed much of the operational aspects of the relationship structure in Palestine Mandate. This dissertation demonstrates that as much as it is impossible to ignore the indigenous

[970] Stoil (2014) pp. 19-20

forces in the overall cases in which they were active, it is similarly impossible to create a project examining indigenous forces while at the same time ignoring the sources which convey the indigenous force perspective. Given that many indigenous forces left behind limited sources this may often mean that future studies also require the use of oral history.

The comparison of the employment and effectiveness of the indigenous forces in particular indicates further underlying trends. First, this dissertation reveals that indigenous forces tend to be deployed as irregular forces. This is in keeping with the structures through which cooperation functions, the rationales for employing indigenous, and the nature of the forces. The second important consideration to arise from this aspect of the comparison is one especially important to the broader narratives of the Second World War. This dissertation proves beyond any reasonable doubt that under the right circumstances, indigenous force cooperation can be both important and effective.

By comparing the cooperation in Palestine Mandate and IEA in particular, this dissertation not only draws conclusions about indigenous force cooperation in a general sense, but also about those factors which determined the success or failure of cooperation. These factors are divisible into facilitators, which contribute to success, and barriers which hamper it. Many of the facilitators that contribute to the success of indigenous cooperation relate particularly to structure and employment. Throughout the various cooperations considered, indigenous forces were most effective when the British pursued structures of influence rather than command. In IEA, when the British enhanced the amount of influence they could achieve by linking the benefits of cooperation for the *arbagnoch* with performance the British also maximised the effectiveness of cooperation. The structures of influence preserved indigenous force autonomy and allowed for expression of indigenous force agency. When the British attempted to bring the indigenous forces under British command they harmed a primary level interest of the forces, namely autonomy, and thereby decreased indigenous enthusiasm for cooperation. This was most

starkly clear from the case of the German Unit in which the British attempt to end the unit's autonomy also ended cooperation.

Preserving autonomy maximised the extent to which the indigenous forces could take initiative while minimising the immediate physical and financial costs for the British. Given indigenous force agency and the necessity of autonomy in the cooperative structures, identifying levers of influence or those things which were important to the indigenous force and which the British could provide or deny, proved important to successful cooperation. Influence was most often achieved by aiding the indigenous forces in the fulfilment of primary and secondary interests. In all the cases of successful cooperation, once the levers of influence were identified the metropolitan power needed consistency. Cooperation became difficult when either logistics or policy prevented the continued exercise of influence.

All of the cases of cooperation in both theatres demonstrate the importance of using the indigenous forces in a mode of operation with which they are comfortable. Where there were failures of cooperation among the cases considered, they often came when the forces were forced to operate in manners that required significant retraining. Extensive retraining of the forces also negated many of the benefits of cooperation – especially in terms of cost. In all cases, the indigenous forces added the most additional benefit to the metropole when the metropole employed them for knowledge of the terrain, be it human or geographic.

Most of the barriers to effective cooperation have to do with assumptions about or understanding of cooperation. Poor knowledge of the other, which combined with pre-conceived notions and biases regarding the other involved in cooperation, formed one of the most potent barriers in both areas of operation. This led to the failure to recognise that what is important to one side of cooperation was not necessarily important to the other. Thus, in IEA, the British were concerned with the defeat of the Italians in a global sense while most of the *arbagnoch* were only concerned with local victory. The British did not understand this and were

therefore unpleasantly surprised when *arbagnoch* would not continue to fight beyond victory in their immediate vicinity. In same sense, in Palestine, the British assumed that continued cooperation was a primary interest of the *Haganah* when it was in fact a secondary interest. While these 'barriers' were primarily about perceptions and understandings, one of the largest barriers to cooperation came from very real divergences in end and secondary goals. In both areas of operation considered in the dissertation, these divergences limited the success of cooperation and were ultimately responsible for the breakdown and cessation of cooperation.

This project sought to determine whether successful indigenous force cooperation in war exists as a unified historical phenomenon and whether it was instrumental to theatres of operation in which it took place. It has proven the answer to both is the affirmative. The dissertation clearly demonstrates that there are underlying commonalities among cases of indigenous force cooperation and works to identify them. It creates a framework by which historians and other researchers across a wide variety of disciplines can interact with indigenous force cooperation as it affects their own work. There is still more to do on the topic of indigenous force cooperation. Despite the many variables for which this study controls there are two significant variables outstanding - that of time and metropolitan actor. The lessons learned from this study to instances of cooperation should now be applied in radically different historical realities to probe the extent to which period affects outcomes. Even without these missing variables, the project conclusively proves that the phenomenon of indigenous force cooperation exits, functions according to certain rules, and cannot be ignored.

Appendix 1

Table 1: Cooperation Effectiveness in the Palestine Mandate

CASE	INTERNAL	EXTERNAL	ABSOLUTE	RELATIVE	OVERALL
Palestine Mandate					
SOE - *Haganah*	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Internal Recon	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Demolition of Infrastructure	✓	unk	Unk	unk	unk
Guerilla Warfare & Sabotage	✓	unk	Unk	unk	unk
German Unit	unk	unk	Unk	unk	unk
Arab Unit	unk	unk	✓	✓	unk
Friends Scheme Syria	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Syrian Intelligence Gathering	✓	unk	✓	unk	unk
Cross Border Propaganda	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cross Border Proxy Activities	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Operation Boatswain	x	unk	x	x	X
Syrian Sabotage	unk	unk	unk	✓	unk
Operation Exporter Scouts	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mission Support Security	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Mission Support Logistics	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Palestine Government - *Haganah*	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
JSP/*Notrim* Scheme	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Unofficial Home Guard	unk	unk	unk	✓	unk
Coast & Air Watch	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Civil Defence	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Saison	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Palestine Mandate Overall	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓

Table 2: Cooperation Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa

CASE	INTERNAL	EXTERNAL	ABSOLUTE	RELATIVE	OVERALL
Horn of Africa					
Pre-invasion Period	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Preventing Invasion of Sudan	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Attacking LOCs	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Hurting Italian Morale	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Cause Desertions	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Air Power Alternative	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Intelligence for Mission 101	✓	unk	unk	✓	unk
Logistics for Mission 101	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Security for Mission 101	✓	unk	✓	x	✓
Post-invasion Period	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓
Independent Action	✓	✓	✓	unk	✓
Intelligence Gathering	✓	unk	unk	unk	unk
Operational Level Coordination	✓	unk	✓	unk	✓
Tactical Cooperation	unk	unk	✓	✓	✓
Horn of Africa Overall	✓	unk	✓	✓	✓

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