Towards Religious Polarisation in Post-Industrial Societies?

Mutations and Effects of Religious Commitment in North America, Europe and Oceania

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Abstract

For over a century, many have been predicting the demise of religion within Western societies. However, while individual religiosity has mutated since the Victorian era, many studies since the 1960s have shown that the contemporary social realities of religion are complex and varied. More recently, evidence has been pointing towards a new development: one of a growing divide between the religious and the secular, or in other words of religious polarisation. The present research explores the logistics of how, where, when and why this polarisation has been developing in post-industrialised countries. In so doing, we thoroughly test a hypothesis that has long been an afterthought to many a secularisation theory. Analysing repeated cross-sectional data from a variety of national and regional contexts, we find examples of non-Nordic, mainly Protestant areas with higher initial rates of non-affiliation being characterised by a form of religious polarisation. These areas have seen a shrinking of their middle-ground group of nominally affiliated individuals, their populations splitting more and more into two camps: a larger group severed from institutional religion contrasts a small but proportionally steady core of affiliated individuals frequently attending religious services. Additionally, in areas with more advanced secularisation, average differences between these unaffiliated and religiously committed individuals regarding many attitudes, beliefs and personal practices are greater. Yet, these polarisation configurations and trends are not universally found across post-industrialised nations. Even within polarised contexts, social distance between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated has not necessarily grown. For example, levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation have not changed beyond the constraints of the marriage market. With these findings, we begin to establish the degree to which religious polarisation is becoming a new reality, and to what extent policy makers will have to contend with a new social cleavage along secular/religious lines.

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INTRODUCTION

For many decades now, the most common way of thinking about and discussing religion in various Western societies, either in an academic setting or not, has undoubtedly been to associate the notion with some form of decline. The abandonment of non-scientific worldviews, the questioning of traditional religious beliefs, churches loosing influence, size and resources as well as religious knowledge not being passed on to younger generations, all are signs that times have changed since the pre-World War hay-days of the Christian churches. Survey data as well as church statistics have indicated that religious service attendance has dropped dramatically in most post-industrialised nations in the last half-century. The rise in the number of people declaring 'no religion' when asked their denominational affiliation has equally become almost a universal phenomenon in Europe, and to a lesser extent in North America.

This being said, many sociological studies since the 1960s have shown that the social reality of religion and the trends that accompany it are much more complex than following

a simple linear decline of all things religious. It is clear that various religious institutions and groups still have very influential roles to play in many non-Western countries, roles that have become more apparent to Westerners through heightened global communication and movement. Even within North American and European nations, the traditional Judeo-Christian churches are far from dead. Although not necessarily the same as those before the 1960s, the roles that these institutions fill today are still many, spanning from offering individual spiritual guidance and community-level support to international aid in times of disaster and need. Certain events in recent years led by church ministers, such as the British Royal Wedding in Westminster Abbey and the collective mourning of those lost in the 2011 Norway attacks, are examples demonstrating that, at times, churches remain milieus of strong national symbolism and gathering. Vocal conservative Christian groups can also be heard lobbying their respective governments in an attempt to actively shape social policy. Additionally, acts of religious extremism in Western and non-Western nations alike regularly feature prominently in media reports worldwide.

With regards to individual attitudes and behaviour, some aspects of religion remain salient among a large portion of Western populations. Although not actively practising their religion for the most part, many are still reluctant to abandon their religious affiliation completely, most still retain religious or spiritual beliefs of some form and many still assign importance to the moral and Christian heritage of their countries (Campiche 2010; Davie 2000a). Moreover, alongside the many modern-day developed nations that have seen some form of religious decline, there lingers some strongholds for religion, most notably the United States of America. This country's indicators of religious practice have remained relatively high and steady in a seemingly flourishing market of religious organisations (Berger, Davie and Fokas 2008).

So although not the same as it was a century ago, religion, in its various contemporary forms, can still in many ways be considered an important aspect of any society, and thus

still very worthy of study. To this effect, religious measures, such as church attendance, affiliation, beliefs, religious upbringing and personal prayer, continue to be included in research in a multitude of fields in both the social and health sciences. These measures have been shown in many cases to have strong associations for example with physical and mental health (Koenig, King and Carson 2012), choice of educational track (Beyerlein 2004; Loury 2004; Mayrl and Oeur 2009), volunteering (Bowen 2004; Lim and MacGregor 2012; Monsma 2007), family formation (Eggebeen and Dew 2009; Village, Williams and Francis 2010) and vote choice (Broughton and Napel 2000; Elff and Rossteutscher 2011; Evans and de Graaf 2013).

As well as affecting other aspects of social life, religion and religious practices are themselves changing and evolving dynamics in contemporary societies. The field of sociology of religion is more specifically dedicated to studying these phenomena in order to better understand and predict their influence. Much debate still surrounds the exact nature of religion's role in society and where it is headed in the coming years. From tenants who still adamantly defend classic secularisation theories of overall religious decline to more American style supply-side market models regarding religious needs, with a multitude of more nuanced theories somewhere between the two, all are charged with the difficult task of discerning and explaining a wide variety of religious trends in contemporary Europe, North America and Oceania.

Among these many empirical tendencies and theoretical debates, one term has begun to appear to describe certain Western religious trends observed with more recent data: *polarisation* (Achterberg et al. 2009; Bibby 2011; Kaufmann, Goujon and Skirbekk 2012; Martin 2005; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Roy 2008). In areas where the link between Church and other parts of culture has mostly dissolved, where religion has become distinct from other social spheres, some scholars and researchers are predicting societies cleaving in two: one part very secular, one part very religious. According to this framework, once

religious identification and participation are no longer the social norm, the birthright membership of the majority slowly transforms into the voluntary adhesion of smaller, more committed communities of individuals (Hervieu-Léger 1999; 2003; Martin 2005; Roy 2008). At the macro-level, populations would be forming into large proportions of individuals with no religious ties and smaller, core groups of remaining affiliates, with a decline in the religious middle ground of individuals retaining only some aspects of religion. There would be a hardening of extremes of sorts in which all aspects of religiosity would become concentrated among actively religious individuals, and the unaffiliated would become entirely removed from all forms of religion.

This being said, religious polarisation in the sense of a developing divide between secular and religious individuals remains for the most part a vague prediction, proposed in most cases as an afterthought at the end of books and articles, rather than a distinct hypothesis. Little is written on the subject and even less research has been undertaken to systematically test such an idea. If this polarisation trend is developing in certain Western regions, it could have important implications for social relations and policy. If social cleavages that use to exist between individuals of different Christian denominations are currently reforming along a more secular/religious divide that appears to be able to endure for the foreseeable future, that divide could extend to other aspects of social life that religious behaviour is known to affect. It could also harbour the potential for social conflict.

This dissertation aims then to push the sociological debate further by testing this polarisation hypothesis in a variety of Western and post-industrialised contexts. Religious polarisation can be conceived and measured in a number of ways on a number of different levels in society: for example, there can be polarisation regarding religion in the media, or in the discourse produced by religious organisations or political actors. However, in this dissertation we study the phenomenon at its most basic level, i.e. through the actions and

attitudes of individuals. How do the social environments in modern-day post-industrial societies influence individual religious behaviour? In turn, to what extent does the accumulation of these behaviours result in a phenomenon of polarisation?

More specifically, over the past two and a half decades, to what extent have two opposite groups been developing, one completely severed from all forms of religion and religiosity and the other completely integrated into religious life? In which post-industrialised regions can we observe such a polarisation trend and why is it particular to those regions? Is religious polarisation specific to certain denominations? Does this polarisation concern only institutional indicators of religion (i.e. church affiliation and attendance), or also more personal religious attitudes, beliefs and practices? Is there greater social distance between the religious and the secular in polarised contexts, these two groups intermarrying and intercohabiting less for example?

In order to address this line of questioning, we focus our empirical analyses first on a novel in-depth interregional comparison between areas in the US, the UK and Canada, seeking out trends of religious polarisation across general populations and within specific denominations. Although obviously not representative of the West as a whole, these three countries offer a good starting point, as they have differing contemporary religious trends (Berger et al. 2008; Bibby 2011; Bruce 2011a), have shown evidence of religious polarisation in previous studies (Bibby 2011; Kauffmann et al. 2012; Putnam and Campbell 2010), and have produced similar datasets with near identical religiosity indicators. Then, with a larger number of region- and country-level cases as well as more extensive religious data, we test for the hardening of religious and secular groups (the religious becoming more religious, and the secular more secular) as well as a growing social distance between these two categories of individuals.

Before arriving at the findings of these analyses, however, this introduction will explore in more detail the existing research in the field, focusing on theoretical models

built mainly for understanding the contemporary evolution of Christian religions in North America and Europe. We will explore how different definitions of the concept of religion and differing national and regional contexts have influenced the measurement of trends as well as the construction of theories regarding the social mechanisms behind religious mutation. Informed by this literature and these debates in the field, our research's line of questioning, theoretical framework and corresponding hypotheses regarding religious polarisation will then be elaborated.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FIELD OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

From American-style rational choice approaches based on diversified religious markets to European-influenced secularisation frameworks, with an array of other theories in between, there presently exists a multitude of theoretical models in the field of sociology of religion. These models attempt to account for religion's modern-day forms and to predict where they are headed in the near future. Although many of these theories argue that they could potentially be applicable worldwide, more practically most were originally developed within Christian and specific national (most notably US and British) contexts. Consequently, the various definitions of religion as well as religious trends which characterise these specific contexts have influenced to a certain extent the assumptions and outlooks of many of these social theories of contemporary religion. In the following sections, we will review the most widely applied of these theories before arriving at certain questions which remain unanswered in the existing literature.

Religious Market Models

Confronted at home with an ongoing and dynamic religious landscape, many American sociologists employ supply-side religious market models. These sociologists

argue that the plural and competitive religious market in the US, which has a large variety of religious organisations to meet the different spiritual 'needs' of the individual, is keeping religiosity indicators relatively high. This is meant to be especially apparent when compared with Canada and Europe which are generally characterised by a lack of religious competition and consequently by lower quality spiritual products (Bibby 2011; Iannaccone 1988; 1994; Olson and Perl 2005; Stark 1999; Stark and Finke 2000). At the core of this theoretical model is the assumption that humans have an inherent and unchanging need for knowledge and answers in the face of life's big questions, such as questions about fundamental purpose and meaning, good and evil, as well as life after death. According to this framework, this need must be fulfilled and thus creates a constant market demand for spiritual products that the individual seeks to consume in a rational, costs/benefits manner (de Graaf 2013; Iannaccone 1988; 1994; Olson and Perl 2005; Stark and Finke 2000). As with any other economic market, an open religious market is characterised by various niches of differing sizes. Distinct types of churches should thus be specialising and targeting their own specific niche of consumers. More conservative religious groups, who preach more traditional morals, gender roles and a literal view of the Bible for example, do better at reproducing their numbers and expanding than the larger liberal churches (Iannaccone 1988; 1994; Stark and Finke 2000). According to supply-side rational choice theorists, these conservative, more evangelical groups would seem to offer specialised spiritual goods not readily available in wider, more liberal society. Consequently, they would be able to demand a higher cost from the individual, i.e. attending church services more regularly and being more implicated in the religious community.

Although this type of supply-side theory has been mainly developed in the US by American scholars, tenants of this theoretical framework argue that it is applicable to religious circumstances elsewhere. Bibby (2002; 2011), for example, has attempted to

translate such a theory for the Canadian context. Bibby is convinced that, because of a historically less open religious market in Canada, meaning fewer churches, religious innovation in the country will still have to come from the main Christian churches and not from newer or more evangelical religious groups. Despite observing the decline of some religiosity indicators since the 1960s through his national Project Canada surveys,[1] Bibby has emphasised signs of continued religious vitality, such as relatively high rates of Christian affiliation, monthly attendance, religious beliefs and practice of rites of passage. According to Bibby, there thus seems to be a form of *religion à la carte* being practised, where individuals, always characterised by spiritual needs, pick and choose certain aspects of the major Christian denominations according to a costs/benefits calculation. Consequently, the religiosity indicators that remain high are those that offer enough perceived benefit for the individual at a relatively low cost. In this case, decline of religion in Canada is seen mainly as a problem of supply by the churches, rather than of demand by the individuals.

Nuanced Secularisation and the Large 'Middle Ground'

According to religious market models, when one religious group declines, another should take its place, due to a constant and fundamental demand for spiritual products by the individual. Thus, a steady rise in the rates of individuals professing 'no religion' in the US since the 1990s and in Canada since the 1970s, present even when affiliation measures can account for hundreds of different religious groups, has led many scholars on both sides of the border to openly criticise these religious market models. These scholars prefer to adopt more nuanced secularisation theories, especially with regards to religious institutional decline (Argue, Johnson and White 1999; Bowen 2004; Hout and Fisher

[1] Most notably declines of weekly church attendance in general and religious affiliation among the mainline Protestant churches. These mainline churches in Canada include the Anglican, United, Presbyterian and Lutheran Churches (Bibby 2002). Bowen (2004: 24) provides the following definition: "Mainline Protestants are members of the historically dominant Protestant denominations in English-speaking Canada, which are now portrayed as 'liberal' in their outlook."

2002), also known as religious individualisation or dualisation of religion theory (Campiche 2010; Stolz 2010). Influenced by the works of Dobbelaere (1981; 2002) and Hervieu-Léger (1993; 1999), these models contend that secularisation is a non-linear process that affects various aspects of religion differently, and that Modernity can lead to new forms of religiosity as well as the decline of the old.

Despite the fact that individual religiosity remains relatively high in the US, there seems to be a decline in the authority of, confidence towards and affiliation to traditional religious institutions (Baker and Smith 2009a; Chaves and Cavendish 1994; Glenn 1987; Hadaway and Marler 2005; Hoffmann 1998; Hout and Fisher 2002; Marwell and Demerath 2003; Presser and Stinson 1998; Smith and Sikkink 2003). Campiche (2010), based on his empirical work in Switzerland and more widely in Europe, makes the same distinction between the decline of religious institutional indicators and the relative stability of more personal and 'universal' aspects of religion since the 1960s.

Canadian sociologists Seljak (2001), O'Toole (1996; 2000) and Bowen (2004) are also of a similar mind, arguing that Canadians do remain individually religious in many respects, but do so more and more outside the doors of traditional churches. Theirs is a postmodern perspective of general institutional decline, including that of religious institutions, and changing individual religiosity, much like British sociologist Davie's *Believing without Belonging* framework. Although acknowledging the waning of religious institutions, Davie (1990; 2000b; 2002; 2010) tends to focus her attention on the large segments of the population who practise various forms of religiosity either away from or completely outside of traditional churches. Similar to the nuanced secularisation theories in the US as well as Campiche's framework, Davie emphasises that different components of religion decline at different rates. In the British and European cases, Davie argues that beliefs and the cultural importance of Christianity tend to last much longer for the

majority of the population than church affiliation and attendance, creating phenomena of believing without belonging and vicarious religion.[2]

For her part, Hervieu-Léger (1999) understands the contemporary transformation of religion and religiosity as a passage between regimes. Gone is what she names a societal-wide institutional regime, characterised mainly by a qualified religious institutional authority and a widespread will to conform among the general population. Rather, modern-day Western societies are characterised more and more by the coexistence of a community regime and a mutual regime. The first of these two more recent configurations refers to small groups of 'pure' believers who seek the internal coherence of the community's belief system; the second refers to those individuals who seek their own unique and authentic belief system separate from those professed by religious groups. In this larger mutual regime, there is an individualisation of religious practices and beliefs in the sense that individuals pick and choose those that fill their spiritual needs and give them a sense of personal fulfilment and meaning. However, unlike with religious market models, this picking and choosing would happen away from religious organisations. For Hervieu-Léger (2003), this contemporary transformation of religion represents the passage from natural, or given communities to those that can be qualified as voluntary, a passage that in most Western countries was triggered, or at least became apparent, in the 1960s.

Stages of Religious Decline

Other researchers, pointing to more recent European statistics on declining religious beliefs, have proposed that this large middle ground of religious individualisation and believing without belonging is simply an intermediate phase in Western societies (Aarts et

[2] Vicarious religion is defined by Davie as "[…] the notion of religion performed by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of what the minority is doing" (Davie 2006, cited in 2010: 262). Davie has some qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence supporting her claim of a large believing-without-belonging middle ground in Europe, and many other researchers have subsequently adopted this framework (see for example Inglis 2007). This is not necessarily the case for her theory of vicarious religion, which has received heavy criticism and has little empirical backing (Bruce and Voas 2010).

al. 2008; Voas 2009; Voas and Crockett 2005). They argue that not only institutional religion, but also individual religiosity and spirituality seem to be disappearing, albeit in stages rather than all at once. In the British context, this middle ground is thus perceived by sociologists such as Bruce (1996; 2001) and Voas (2006; 2009) as simply another phase in the decline of religiosity indicators in England since the 19th century, and in the whole of the United Kingdom since the 1960s. Influenced most notably by the works of British sociologist Wilson (1966), these researchers argue that modern social transformations, such as rationalisation and individualisation, have led and will continue to lead to the general decline of religious institutions and personal religiosity. Inglehart (1990) would add to this list of modern transformations the advent of post-materialism, and Stolz (2010) would add the growing competition from secular institutions.

According to this framework, religion, taken as the belief in and the worship of the sacred and supernatural,[3] can but only go the way of the dodo bird in modern and plentiful societies that encourage scientific thought. Although the timing of the beginning of religious decline is still debated,[4] what is not is the fact that younger cohorts are less and less religious (Crockett and Voas 2006; Tilley 2003; Voas and Crockett 2005). More and more children no longer receive any religious socialisation, and so move completely away not only from religious service attendance, but also eventually from religious identity, beliefs and personal religious practices. Although evidence for this shrinking of the middle ground and overall decline of religion is strongest in countries such as Great

[3] More specifically, Bruce (2011b: 112) provides the following definition of religion: "Religion, then, *consists of beliefs, actions and institutions which assume the existence of supernatural entities with powers of action, or impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral purpose*." This meaning varies to a certain extent from that used by Davie (2000a: 24-37), who is strongly influenced in this regard by Hervieu-Léger's definition of religion: "We will say, in this perspective, that a 'religion' is an ideological, practical and symbolic system by which the conscious (individual and collective) of belonging to a particular tradition of belief is constituted, maintained, developed and controlled" (Hervieu-Léger 1993: 119: translation by present author). For a more recent overview of the multiple definitions of religion used in the field of sociology, see Woodhead's *Five Concepts of Religion* (2011).

[4] Bruce (2001), following Wilson (1966), generally places the beginning of religious decline around the mid 19th century in Britain, whereas historian Brown (2001), who emphasises religion as a certain form of discourse, has proposed that it only truly began to decline in response to the moral and cultural revolution of the 1960s.

Britain, the Netherlands and Germany, many scholars showing findings of religious decline argue that their framework is applicable if not worldwide, than at least to the whole of Europe.[5]

The religious middle ground can not only refer to beliefs and personal religiosity away from institutional religiosity, but also to nominal affiliation, or in other words individuals who identify with a religion without any regular religious practice. In this sense, the retracting of the middle ground has also recently been observed to a certain extent in the Canadian context, most notably in the Catholic and Francophone province of Quebec. Even though characterised by a sharp decline in church attendance and Catholic marriages following the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the vast majority of Francophones continued to identify themselves as Catholic, baptise their children and practise religious funerals well into the 1990s (Lemieux 1990; Meunier, Laniel and Demers 2010; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011). Sociologist Lemieux (1990) named this particular phenomenon 'cultural religion': contrary to Bibby's *religion à la carte*, it implies that Francophones do not pick and choose aspects of their religion as consumers in accordance with their religious needs, but rather as a way of maintaining a certain link with their cultural past and with an aspect of their identity which distinguishes them from the perceived Anglo-Protestant majority in the rest of North America.

> When the fragmented experience of culture is lacking in significance and is in rupture with history, cultural Catholicism provides a transhistorical vision of the world. It continues to integrate Québécois personality in a sort of common reference that, even though removed from the norms and constraints of daily life, remains available in case of need (Lemieux 1990: 163: translation by present author).

However, in updating this theory, Meunier et al. (2010) put forward the notion that this cultural religion seems to be particular most notably to the Boomer generation. Members of the younger Y generation (born after 1975) seem less and less inclined to call

[5] See, for example, Bruce (2011a).

themselves Catholic, opting more for the 'no religion' label, and baptise their newborns at much lower rates than previous cohorts. Meunier et al. borrow French sociologist Hervieu-Léger's (2003) concept of *exculturation* to explain this trend, arguing that whereas a majority of the Boomer generation considers identifying themselves as Catholic while not practising regularly as rational due to the perception of a link, however vague, between their national Québécois and religious Catholic identities, a large part of Generation Y does not.

Quebec is one example among many showing that religious decline can take various forms depending on the historical and social circumstances of a region. Additionally, even within that same region, decline is not necessarily linear and often proceeds at different speeds for differing aspects of religion, aspects such as affiliation, weekly church attendance, the practice of rites of passage, beliefs and personal religiosity. Called 'cultural religion' by scholars such as Lemieux (1990; 1996), Demerath (2000) and Hervieu-Léger (2003), 'large middle ground' by Davie (2010) and 'fuzzy middle' by Voas (2009) as well as Storm (2009), few deny that some religiosity indicators do not show the same rates of decline as others. One of the principal debates lies rather with whether or not this large middle ground is a relatively short-lived phenomenon in the North American and European contexts.

Possibility of a Polarisation Trend

If the persistence of some religiosity indicators among the majority of individuals is only a transitory phase, towards what then is it transitioning? Rather than predicting an overall general decline and disappearance of all forms of individual religious attitudes and behaviour, many historians and sociologists of religion have hinted at the possibility that the end product of secularisation is a polarisation between a non-religious majority on the one hand and an active core minority on the other:

> Let me summarize the case for a secular Britain. [...] A Christian society was replaced by a society with *some highly committed Christians* (Bruce 1995: 426: italic by present author).
>
> What these data do, however, is give evidence that the religious belief picture is changing and in that process, British respondents *are increasingly divided* in assent (or dissent) to traditional religious beliefs (Gill, Hadaway and Marler 1998: 514: italic by present author).
>
> This supports the thesis [...] that Christianity is more widely spread in the population than is commonly supposed, but also indicates that *the divide between Christian and non-Christian is becoming sharper* (Brierley 2000: 662: italic by present author).
>
> The 'religious life' in which individuals imagined themselves, and which gave them the narrative structure for gendered discourses on religiosity to be located in their personal testimony, seems to have vanished. This is not the death of churches, for despite their dramatic decline, they will continue to exist in some skeletal form *with increasing commitment from decreasing numbers of adherents* (Brown 2001: 197-198: italic by present author).
>
> Over the past 50 years, Canada has been transformed into a predominantly post-Christian, secular society where active adherents of religion have become a clear minority, though a sizable one, of all Canadians (Bowen 2004: 30).

To date, these statements have tended to come at the end of books and articles, proposed more as venues for future research and hypotheses. Nevertheless, the term *polarisation* has begun to appear in certain works related to religion. The first to use the term, or those related to it (divide, hewing, cleavage, etc.), in relation to religion were those scholars studying the polarisation of social attitudes in America (Hunter 1991; McConkey 2001; Wuthnow 1988). Some, led most notably by Hunter (1991; 2006), argue that a Culture War has been brewing in the US over the last few decades between conservatives, defined by more orthodox values and attitudes, right-wing political ideologies and evangelical religious practices, and liberals, defined by more progressive values and attitudes, left-wing political ideologies and either mainline protestant affiliations or no religious affiliation.[6]

[6] This theory equally has many opponents who emphasise that there is little or no empirical evidence to support such a claim of division (DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996; Mouw and Sobel 2001; Wolfe 2006).

More recently, the term *polarisation* has come to refer less to the divide between conservatives and liberals and more to that between the religious and the secular in both the US and elsewhere. Putnam and Campbell (2010), employing a mixture of historical analysis, descriptive statistics and congregational comparisons, focus on the religious/secular divide in the US. These authors designate this divide as one of the fundamental changes of the US religious landscape since the 1950s. Bibby (2006), in analysing religious trends among younger generations in Canada, found that more and more adolescents are either completely cut off from religion or, to the contrary, very involved with a religious group. He even argues that Canada is experiencing a polarisation of its religious landscape (Bibby 2011). However, a clear definition and measure of what this author is referring to by using the term *polarisation* is difficult to discern. Bibby uses it sometimes to distinguish between individuals completely removed from religion and those highly involved in it. Yet, Bibby also uses polarisation to refer to the distinction between the decline of institutional religiosity indicators and the relative stability of more personal indicators of religion, similar to individualisation theorists such as Bowen (2004), Campiche (2010), Davie (1990; 2000b; 2010), and Hout and Fisher (2002). Bibby equally uses the term *polarisation* at points to separate the relative success of the conservative Protestant churches from the declines of mainline liberal ones in Canada and the US, in line with supply-side religious market theories. Finally, Bibby also uses it when discussing the rise of individuals declaring 'no religion' and the decline of individuals believing unquestionably in God, trends that others, such as Bruce (1996; 2001) and Voas (2006; 2009), have taken as signs of overall decline, rather than of polarisation.

In the European context, Kaufmann et al. (2012) use *polarisation* to refer to the fact that, in those European countries where secularisation began early, religious decline is beginning to stagnate and even reverse in some cases. The religious segment of the population is gaining demographically from higher rates of fertility and immigration, as

well as from slowing religious apostasy. Achterberg et al. (2009), inspired by Casanova's religious deprivatisation theory (1994) and using 1998 ISSP data spanning a number of countries in North America and Europe, have shown that, as the number of Christians is reduced in Western countries, in many cases the remaining ones become more favourable to the public involvement of religion.

Consequently, polarisation can refer to the phenomenon of populations splitting more and more into two distinctive groups: one more secular who mainly professes 'no religion' in surveys and generally scores low on religiosity scales, and one more committed who attends religious services regularly and generally scores high on religiosity scales. In this sense, some additional empirical evidence has appeared that supports the existence of a polarisation trend, even though the term *polarisation* is not necessarily used by the researchers in question to describe it. Voas (2009), in analysing the fuzzy middle ground of individual religiosity without church practice in Europe, found as a sidenote a bottoming-out effect of a remaining, albeit small, committed religious group of individuals in countries where decline had been underway for decades. While studying the seasonality of church attendance in the US since the 1940s by means of in-depth analyses of two separate sets of congregational statistics, Olson and Beckworth (2011) uncovered that:

> The ranks of the 'nones' may have swelled in the 1990s and 2000s because the infrequent attenders of the 1950s do not come to church at all anymore. Left behind is a group of church members who now form a committed core of attenders who show up regularly throughout the year (2011: 395).

In the Canadian context, Bowen (2004: 30) has briefly pointed out that, among the remaining religiously affiliated, church attendance seems to have stabilised, if not rebounded to a certain extent since the 1990s.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

The evidence directly and indirectly provided by Achterberg et al. (2009), Bibby (2006; 2011), Bowen (2004), Kaufmann et al. (2012), Olson and Beckworth (2011), Putnam and Campbell (2010) and Voas (2009) notwithstanding, religious polarisation remains for the most part a vague prediction within Western societies, especially with regard to individual behaviour. It is proposed more often as an afterthought rather than a separate hypothesis. Additionally, as is commonly the case in the social sciences, as soon as this term appeared in the field various scholars began using it in different ways for different purposes, either explicitly or implicitly. Little is written on the subject and even less research has been undertaken to systematically clarify and test the notion of religious polarisation with regard to general populations.

How have religious trends evolved in recent decades in North American, European and Oceania countries? To what extent has a polarisation between non-religious individuals on the one hand and highly committed individuals on the other been developing in post-industrial contexts? In other words, is the large middle ground of nominal affiliation giving way more and more to two separate groups: one completely severed from all forms of religion and religiosity, and the other completely integrated into religious life? Is religious polarisation only present among certain denominational traditions? To what extent are personal religious attitudes, beliefs and practices becoming more and more concentrated among only those who score high on institutional indicators of religion (i.e. church affiliation and attendance)? Is there a greater social distance between the religious and the secular in polarised contexts, the two groups intermarrying and intercohabiting less for example?

Theoretical Framework

Despite empirical testing being limited, and definitions being sometimes vague, more recently the idea of religious polarisation has been somewhat developed on a theoretical level. In the aforementioned line of questioning, religious polarisation is proposed as a further possible development within a more general process of secularisation. That form of secularisation is defined by Martin (1978; 2005) as the social differentiation between religion and other societal spheres. Religion is taking here in its substantive and exclusive sense, referring to "[...] a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to a supra-empirical transcendent reality that unites all those who adhere to it into a single moral community" (Dobbelaere 1981: 38). Tracing its sociological roots back to the works of Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, Martin's definition of secularisation refers to the dissolution of ties between Church and State as well as, at a more individual level, between religious identity and other social identities (such as national and ethnic identities).[7] This dissolution, or laicisation as Dobbelaere (1981) names it, is seen as a product of Modernity that occurs within Western societies at differing rates and, once underway, leads to differing types of religious decline and transformation (Martin 2005). According to Martin (1978; 1995), the beginning and unfolding of this process depend greatly on the historical and social circumstances within regions and countries, most notably the type of historically dominant Christian Church (Protestant or Catholic), the level of monopoly such a Church holds in society and the perception of a nearby hostile culture or government.[8]

[7] This definition is very similar to Dobbelaere's definition of secularisation as functional differentiation: "[…] religion becomes a sub-system alongside other subsystems and in this process the religious organizations lose their overarching claims over the autonomous secular sub-systems. Consequently, we may define secularization as the process by which religious authorities lost control over the secular sub-systems" (Dobbelaere 2011: 199).

[8] Influenced by Weber's work in the field of sociology of religion, Martin perceives the individualistic and fragmented nature of Protestantism as quickening the dissolution between national and religious identities (1978). On the other hand, a religious monopoly, like those often found in Catholic societies, tends to create a strong secular counter-reaction at the moment of secularisation, a phenomenon that is sometimes mitigated when a threatening alien culture is nearby. Religion is then perceived as a trait that allows the individual to distinguish himself or herself from the 'Other'. This is the case, it would seem, with religious affiliation in

What then happens in those areas where religion is no longer a given trait of cultural identity and religious decline and transformation are underway? In his *Revised General Theory*, Martin (2005) attempts to answer this question on a theoretical level. In his view, once religion loses its polity, its territoriality and is no longer an obligation, those who remain religious do so more on a voluntary basis. The individual no longer perceives it as a necessity to remain even partially linked to a religious institution for cultural or family reasons. Consequently, those who remain religious do so more on a choice basis because it is perceived as spiritually worthwhile, and are thus more likely to participate fully. Religious groups thus become smaller and more associative, either within existing denominations or as newer religious communities: "[…] the idea of becoming Christian comes to refer to a subcultural lifestyle not a whole society" (Martin 2005: 5).

This development would explain why more conservative and evangelical Protestant denominations seem to be doing better than their mainline liberal counterparts in many post-industrialised countries:

> Of course, evangelicalism seeks to Christianize society, […] But in logic and in practice it *jettisons birthright membership* in the community or neighbourhood *for a second birth within the voluntary religious group* […] Evangelicalism as a faith based on choice and mobility *stands in contrast with socially comprehensive faiths based on birthright membership and territorial location* […] (Martin 2005: 134-135: italic by present author).

Based on findings from his country-level comparisons, Martin thus forecasts the development of a form of polarisation in which, opposite a large secular group of individuals, remaining religious groups take more and more the form of small sects, to borrow from the typology of Troeltsch (1931), emphasising the respect of group norms such as active participation and specific beliefs. As Wilson mentioned: "[...] 'from Church to sect' would appear to be the order of the day for religious organizations in secular society" (Wilson 1966: 225). This view of the actions and attitudes of individuals within

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Francophone Quebec which retained its vitality, until at least very recently, as a measure to oppose Québécois culture to an outside Anglo-Protestant majority.

associative religious groups is similar to that of Merton's (1967: 225-386) with regard to voluntary membership in general. According to Merton's reference group theory, if membership in a group is voluntary, rather than given, the member will generally be more conforming to group norms in order to prove that he or she is worthy of belonging. Therefore, in the case of post-secularisation religion, only a certain amount of individuals would adhere, or maintain their adherence, voluntarily to religious groups, and would do so in a more committed manner.

Not all researchers agree with Martin that religious commitment is entirely voluntary in contemporary Western societies. Even when individuals perceive religious involvement as worthwhile, the reasons for this can be multiple. Other scholars have shown that individual preference for religious involvement is not a simple costs/benefits calculation detached from the surrounding social context, but rather is strongly influenced by religious socialisation, life course factors and normative constraints from family and community (Baker and Smith 2009a; 2009b; Bibby 2011; Need and de Graaf 1996; Sherkat and Wilson 1995; Stolz 2009; Vaidyanathan 2011; Wilson and Sherkat 1994). However, whereas community-wide normative constraints may still exist among certain ethnic subgroups in Western countries, according to Martin the process of secularisation is the disappearance of these constraints in wider, majority society.

In a similar vein, Putnam and Campbell (2010) contend that the fluidity of the American religious market has also favoured the development of a polarisation trend. Individuals free from the state and social regulation of religion are able to move to groups of like-minded people, the religious moving more towards the religious and the secular moving more towards the secular. In the case of the US, these scholars argue that this polarisation began and developed dialectically as series of shocks and counter-shocks of Evangelicals reacting in the 1970s and 1980s to the decline of traditional sexual morals

during the 1960s. Non-Evangelicals then reacted in turn to the rise of the Religious Right by declaring having no religion in increasing numbers since the 1990s.

Putnam and Campbell restrict their analysis to the US, considering the peculiar relationship that religion has with politics in that country. Yet, their idea that religious polarisation develops as a series of shocks and counter-shocks triggered by an initially very visible secular movement or religious group could be applied more broadly to other secularised contexts where religion has lost its obligatory nature. The same process may be underway in Great Britain and other European nations where, for example, a very visible Muslim presence in the last few decades has sparked strong and often secular reactions, such as attempts to ban the wearing of headscarves and other religious dress and symbols in schools and in public, the building of mosques in certain communities and the use of Sharia law (Cesari 2005; Hervieu-Léger 2003; Husbands 1995).

Roy (2008) has also theorised a similar religious polarisation trend developing on the world stage. Although he uses many case examples from the Muslim world, Roy develops a framework meant to be applicable to all religions. He argues that once the break between religion and culture occurs in society, once religious identity is detached from national and ethnic identities, religious groups become more fundamentalist and less territorially based. As religion becomes autonomous from other social spheres, only the 'purely' religious, those who 'have faith' may be considered part of the group which sees itself as distant and detached from larger secular society,[9] even if in fact the group may not form a minority as such. Like Martin, Roy sees the worldwide expansion of Pentecostalism, Mormonism and certain forms of Islam, religions that emphasise the break between the religious community and the rest of society, as evidence towards this polarisation trend.

[9] However, Vargas and Loveland (2011) have shown that, at least in the US, it is very common for religious individuals to have a certain number of non-religious friends among their social networks.

Combining and summarising these scholars' works into a general polarisation framework, we can say that, faced with loosening social norms regarding religious practice in majority society, those individuals who choose to remain religious under such circumstances would be those who perceive the endeavour as worthwhile. This being said, it is conceivable that, as this trend develops, the two extreme groups would begin to have an 'Us vs. Them' mentality: as one group becomes less fuzzy and more defined as either religious or secular, the opposing group then begins to purposefully move away and define themselves in a contrasting manner. This in turn makes the religious extreme even more religious and the secular extreme even more secular. This religious polarisation can be either a state, defining a region in which individuals are more divided at a given time, or a process which certain areas undergo as a later stage of secularisation.

From what Martin, Putnam and Campbell as well as Roy explicitly say, or from what can be logically inferred from their framework, we can begin to form an idea of what religious polarisation exactly is, and the different forms it could take:

1. As a *state*, religious polarisation refers to a particular distribution of the population in which the two extreme groups of secular and actively religious individuals are proportionally large. This compared with the religious middle ground of individuals retaining certain aspects of religiosity while distancing themselves from others, a middle ground which is proportionally small.
2. As a *process*, religious polarisation is the proportional decline over time of the religious middle ground, and the stability and rise, respectfully, of the two extreme groups of the actively religious and the secular. In this sense, society would be more and more divided between these two extreme groups.
3. All religiosity indicators, institutional and personal, would be included in this larger or growing divide between the actively religious and the secular. The

actively religious would become more religious in all respects, and the secular more devoid of religion.

4. A context of religious polarisation implies a certain freedom of choice on the part of the individual for being religious or secular, but also implies that there is a growing social distance between those who are religious and those who are secular.

The concept of religious polarisation as put forward by the polarisation framework differs to a certain extent with Davie's concept of vicarious religion: associative groups, as perceived by Martin, Putnam and Campbell as well as Roy, would not necessarily have the majority in mind when practising religious rites. In turn, the non-religious majority would not necessarily be linked to these fewer committed individuals. This polarisation view of smaller, voluntary and highly committed religious groups standing opposite a large non-religious one does share certain commonalities with supply-side religious market theories. As a reminder, these theories stipulate that only in a liberalised and competing religious market can individuals find the spiritual products they want and need, favouring in many cases more conservative churches that seek out niche markets (Iannaccone 1988; 1994; Stark and Finke 2000). However, the polarisation framework does not make the fundamental assumption, common and often necessary to many supply-side religious market theories, that all individuals share basic spiritual needs in the face of life's big questions, needs that in many cases can only be filled by products offered by religious groups. In a polarised religious landscape, some feel the need to commit themselves to religious groups, either because they were raised that way or because life circumstances lead them to this conclusion, but many others do not, and do not feel the obligation to be members of those same religious groups due to widespread social or cultural pressures.

There are also resemblances between the polarisation framework and the stages of decline/secularisation framework in sociology of religion. Polarisation can be seen as referring to the second phase of secularisation in the Martin sense of the term. A first stage of secularisation would be an initial decline of once proportionally high levels of religiously committed individuals. A second stage would be stabilising lower levels of committed individuals and a decline in the religious middle ground. This would happen across years as a societal-wide effect and across younger birth cohorts as a more pronounced generational shift. The nuance here though is that this second stage is not necessarily perceived as paving the way for further religious decline once the middle ground has shrunk.

Hypotheses

The polarisation framework we put together based on the works of Martin, Putnam and Campbell as well as Roy can therefore provide a certain direction in the attempt to shed some light on the previously stated research questions.

> *Q_1: To what extent has a polarisation between non-religious individuals on the one hand and highly committed individuals on the other been developing in post-industrialised contexts?*

Martin theorises that religious polarisation will begin to develop in areas where the split between religion and other societal spheres has been underway for many decades. Over time, the need to retain certain links to religious institutions when not attending services regularly will diminish more and more, and younger generations raised in such a context will be even more inclined to abandon the religious middle ground. Consequently, after an initial drop in commitment levels and a rise in non-affiliation in such areas, levels of active religiosity can then be expected to stabilise while the middle ground group of individuals retaining only certain aspects of religious life will begin to diminish.

H_{1a}: Only mid-level religious commitment will decline with the progression of years in regions with more advanced secularisation, i.e. with initially higher levels of non-affiliation.

H_{1b}: Only mid-level religious commitment will decline with the progression of birth cohorts in regions with more advanced secularisation, i.e. with initially higher levels of non-affiliation.

Yet, where this polarisation phenomenon is observable, is it region-wide or is it specific to certain religious denominations in those areas? Indeed, the theoretical argument has been made in existing research, to be detailed in Chapter Two, that religious polarisation is a phenomenon more commonly found among the more individualistic-natured Protestant denominations, compared with Catholicism for example (Hervieu-Léger 1999; Martin 1978). This framework also puts forward that, in contexts where Protestantism was historically the dominant religion in society and created a certain societal structure, polarisation will affect all religions, not only Protestants. Thus, the following questions and hypotheses:

Q_{2a}: To what extent have particular denominational categories of religion experienced a greater decline of their nominal affiliates?

Q_{2b}: To what extent are areas characterised by a configuration of religious polarisation at a given time also those where specific religions have been historically dominant?

H_{2a}: Once other socio-demographic differences are controlled for, the proportional decline of nominal affiliates will be higher among Protestants than among individuals belonging to other religious groups.

H_{2b}: Once other socio-demographic differences are controlled for, traditionally Protestant and mixed countries will have lower levels of nominal affiliation and average or higher levels of both non-affiliation and religious commitment at a given time.

There is also the question of if religious polarisation affects personal religiosity indicators as well as institutional ones. Are facets of and related to religion such as conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religion in public life, religious beliefs and personal religiosity more the sole domain of the actively religious, and even less common among the unaffiliated in contexts of advanced secularisation?

Q_{3a}: To what extent do average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity vary between post-industrial nations and regions?

$Q_{3a.1}$: More specifically, to what extent do levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity vary between post-industrial nations and regions among both the unaffiliated and the committed?

Q_{3b}: What contextual factors account for some of this between-country and between-region variation?

Is this a trend that has been developing over the last few decades in post-industrialised nations?

Q_{4a}: To what extent have average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity changed over time in post-industrialised nations?

$Q_{4a.1}$: More specifically, how have levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity changed over time in post-industrialised nations among both the unaffiliated and the religiously committed?

Most in the field of sociology of religion agree that there are a large variety of dimensions that can be measured when it comes to religion. However, neither Martin, Putnam and Campbell nor Roy define exactly which aspects of religion they are referring to when they explore the concept of polarisation. They do imply, however, that those who remain committed at an institutional level in religiously polarised regions would also be those who are committed at a personal level. Those who would remain actively religious in a polarising context would be those with more conservative attitudes, favourable views towards the authority of religious leaders, strong religious beliefs and high levels of personal religiosity. These aspects would in turn be reinforced by the religious community. At the other extreme, as younger cohorts are born to unaffiliated parents, these individuals receive less and less religious socialisation, and become completely removed from all aspects of religion. In other words, in a polarised context all religiosity indicators would be more concentrated among the remaining core group of individuals

attending religious services regularly, and less present among the unaffiliated. This would be the case in regions and countries with more advanced secularisation:

> *H_{3a}: Average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity will vary significantly between post-industrial nations and regions.*
>
> > *$H_{3a.1}$: Levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity among both the religiously committed and the unaffiliated will vary significantly between post-industrial nations and regions.*
>
> *$H_{3b.1}$: Those countries and regions characterised by greater average differences will be those with more advanced processes of secularisation, i.e. those with higher proportions of unaffiliated individuals in 2008.*
>
> *$H_{3b.2}$: Those countries and regions with more advanced processes of secularisation, i.e. with higher proportions of unaffiliated individuals in 2008, will be characterised by higher levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity among the remaining religiously committed, and lower levels among the unaffiliated.*

The concentration of all religiosity indicators among the same individuals would also be a trend developing over time:

> *H_{4a}: Those countries and regions with more advanced processes of secularisation, i.e. with higher proportions of unaffiliated individuals, will have seen an increase in average differences between 1991 and 2008, and 1998 and 2008.*
>
> > *$H_{4a.1}$: In those countries and regions that do show an increase in average differences between 1991 and 2008 and between 1998 and 2008, these greater differences will be due to an increase in levels of the four more personal religiosity indicators among the remaining religiously committed, and a decrease among the unaffiliated.*

As a final series of research questions, we ask if greater differences between the actively religious and the secular in polarised contexts affect the social distance between the two groups, or in other words if there are still relationships between members of both groups in the form of marriages and cohabitation.

> *Q_5: To what extent do levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated vary between more and less religiously polarised contexts?*

Although not an issue addressed directly by the scholars of the polarisation framework, we do expect there to be a growing social distance and animosity developing between the two extreme groups of the secular and religious. With growing differences regarding such fundamental attitudes, beliefs and values on how individuals understand and perceive their world, close relationships will be more and more difficult to form and maintain between members of both groups.

> *H_{5a}: Regions and countries with greater differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in conservative attitudes, religious beliefs and personal religiosity will also be characterised by lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation.*
>
> *H_{5b}: Younger birth cohorts raised in a more polarised context will be characterised by lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation.*

There is a total of five empirical chapters in this dissertation, each tackling in turn one of the series of research questions and testing their corresponding hypotheses with repeated cross-sectional data from the US, the UK, Canada, and more generally from Europe, North America and Oceania. The layout of these chapters will be fairly constant: they will begin with a summary of the findings from the previous chapter, then move on to what research questions and hypotheses remain to be addressed, and a more detailed review of the relevant existing literature. The methods for the analyses of the chapter, including the data, variables and statistical models used will then be specified. This will be followed by a presentation of the results these analyses produced and a discussion of their implications. A conclusion follows from these five empirical chapters in which the results will be summarised and their overall implications for the measurement of religious polarisation and for theory in the field of sociology of religion will be discussed, along with the limitations of the study and potential avenues for future research.

In summary, although debates have been raging for many decades regarding the social realities of religion and where they are headed, little has been said about a new development that seems to be appearing in certain Western contexts: one of religious

polarisation. Many questions still remain concerning the exact nature of this development, where it can be found and what factors come into play in explaining it. Chapter One takes on the first of these research questions by looking at the extent to which a religious polarisation trend has been developing over the past two and a half decades in a variety of distinct regional contexts in the US, the UK and Canada.

CHAPTER ONE

Decline of the Nominal Middle Ground in the US, the UK and Canada?

The literature review in the Introduction discussed a number of theories and definitions of religion as well as measures and trends of religiosity in varying national and regional contexts. Many unanswered questions still remain in the field of sociology of religion, some of which have to do with the possible polarisation between the actively religious and the secular. There exists some recent empirical evidence supporting the existence of this phenomenon, but little systematic testing has been done to this effect. Most scholars are still focused on potential religious revivals developing, a remaining large religious middle ground or continued religious decline in the West.

This first empirical chapter begins to fill this gap in the existing literature by studying how religiosity has changed since the mid-1980s in a variety of Western contexts. More specifically, we search for signs of population-wide religious polarisation trends

developing in the sense of a decline of the nominally affiliated religious middle ground coupled with no decline (stability or rise) from the two poles of actively religious and secular individuals. The research question that this chapter aims to address is as follows:

> *Q_1: To what extent has a polarisation between non-religious individuals on the one hand and highly committed individuals on the other been developing in post-industrialised contexts?*

Based on the polarisation framework seen in the Introduction, we hypothesise that a process of religious polarisation will begin to develop in contexts where the split between religion and other societal spheres and the rise in non-affiliation have been underway for many decades (advanced secularisation). Over time, an individual's need to retain links to religious institutions when not attending services regularly will diminish more and more. Consequently, after an initial drop in commitment levels in such areas, these levels can then be expected to stabilise over time while the middle-ground group of individuals retaining only some aspects of religious life will begin to diminish.

> *H_1: Only mid-level religious commitment will decline with the progression of time in regions that have higher overall levels of non-affiliation at the beginning of the period at study.*

It is important to note at this stage that social change over time can take two broad forms. Firstly, there are societal-wide developments that affect all or most individuals in the same social context, albeit to different degrees. These developments are referred to as period effects. They modify the composition of the social environment in which an individual finds himself/herself, which in turn can influence his/her choices and actions (Coleman 1990; Hedström and Bearman 2011). In the case of religion, one example would be the series of religious revivals that took place over the course of the first half of the 19th century in the US and Canada:[10] although these revivals were at their core led by individual action, mediated in many cases by religious institutions, the sum of these actions modified the social environment, and thus in turn influenced other individual

[10] For histories of such revivals, see Christie and Gauvreau (2002), Noll (1992) and Stark and Finke (1992).

actions, for example making it more of a social obligation to be an active member of a parish.

Secondly, changes over time can also be the result of generational shifts. Mannheim's classic work on generations states that:

> Individuals who belong to the same generation, who share the same year of birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process (Mannheim 1952: 290).

Not unrelated to the societal-wide changes discussed previously, differences between locations in the social process thus create differences between members of different birth cohorts, important most notably during the formative years of the individual. Put into other words, specific birth cohorts, being socialised in a certain social environment, will have shared experiences that differ from those cohorts born before and after them. For example, a generation taught at secular state-run schools will not have the same relationship with religion as a previous generation for which certain churches were very involved in the educational system.

In the case of religious polarisation then, we can expect on the one hand individuals moving to one extreme (religious) or the other (secular) over the years as secularisation advances. On the other hand, we can also expect younger cohorts to be more distinctly split between the two poles, with fewer adhering to the nominally affiliated middle ground. With this period/cohort distinction in mind, we can further specify our hypotheses:

> *H_{1a}: Only mid-level religious commitment will decline with the progression of years in regions with more advanced secularisation, i.e. with higher levels of non-affiliation in 1985.*

> *H_{1b}: Only mid-level religious commitment will decline with the progression of birth cohorts in regions with more advanced secularisation, i.e. with higher levels of non-affiliation in 1985.*

METHODS

In order to test these hypotheses, trends since the mid-1980s in different levels of religious commitment were analysed and compared in 13 regions from the US, the UK and Canada: the four US Census regions (Northeastern, Midwestern, Southern and Western US), Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland for the UK, and the five Canadian regions (Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia). With regional variations known to be important with regard to religion in the US, the UK and Canada (Bowen 2004; Eagle 2011a; Iannaccone and Makowsky 2007; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011; Mitchell 2004; Voas 2006), these regions provide a wide variety of cultural and religious landscapes with which to test for religious polarisation: from the larger Catholic groups found in the nationalist contexts of Quebec (majority Catholic) as well as Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent Atlantic Canada (Catholics form substantial minorities), to the greatly-declined state church contexts of Scotland and England, to declined religion in Wales, to the more pluralist Christian and stable US, to immigration-heavy Ontario and British Columbia, and finally to the Canadian Prairie provinces and their recent history of a declining liberal United Church. Certain researchers in the US, the UK and Canada have also shown results of some form of religious polarisation taking place in recent years (Bibby 2011; Bowen 2004; Kaufmann et al. 2012; Olson and Beckworth 2011; Putnam and Campbell 2010), which makes these three countries and the regions within them ideal for comparison. Although they consist of a more restricted number of macro-level cases than countries in Europe and North America as a whole, focusing on these specific cases will allow us to explore changes over time in detail.

Data

In order to study religious trends since the mid-1980s in regional contexts in the US, the UK and Canada, we used repeated cross-sectional data from 1985 until 2009/2010 from the Canadian and US General Social Surveys, the British, Scottish and Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Surveys as well as the Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys (Davis, Smith and Marsden 2011; National Centre for Social Research 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; Statistics Canada 2011). These very similar and in many respects comparable datasets contain a large amount of individual-level cases that allowed for the detailed study of religious commitment at a regional level. Although not dating back to the 1960s when most agree that religious decline began in many Western countries, the 24-25 year period from 1985 until 2009/2010 covered by these surveys is ideal for analysing trends in what could be called the second phase of secularisation according to the polarisation framework: a period when the break between religion and culture becomes almost taken for granted and the attitudes and conduct of new generations raised in such a context become measurable.

Regarding the Canadian General Social Surveys (CAN GSSs), 22 of the 23 cycles, from 1985 to 2009,[11] were utilised. Each survey year contains a national randomised sample between 9,300 and 27,600 respondents of 15 years of age or older, the combined dataset containing a total of 400,343 respondents over the 24 year period. These large sample sizes allowed for detailed analyses and comparisons within and between each of the five Canadian regions: Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia.

In the case of the United States, the American General Social Surveys (US GSSs) from 1985-2010 were employed by the present research. The US GSSs contain annual national randomised samples of 1,400-1,800 respondents, 18 years of age or older, from

[11] There are no CAN GSSs for 1987 and 1997. Cycle 3 (1988) lacks certain fundamental variables (mainly province of residence) that were employed in the analyses, and so was excluded from the models.

1985 to 1994 and biannual national randomised samples of 2,000-4,500 respondents from 1996 to 2010.[12] These sample sizes allowed enough cases in each of the four American Census regions (the Northeast, Midwest, South and West) for a regional comparison within the US as well as with results from the Canadian regions.

A comparison with the four United Kingdom countries, Northern Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales, was equally possible using the British Social Attitudes Surveys (1985-2009),[13] the Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (1999-2009), the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Surveys (1989-1996)[14] and the Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys (1998-2009). Due to the similarity of methodologies and questionnaires in these four series of surveys, a pooled dataset covering the span of 1985 until 2009 was derived from them, containing a total of 118,244 respondents aged 17 years or older.

Measuring Religious Commitment: Constructing a Three-Point Typology

To determine if religious polarisation has been occurring since the mid-1980s, a dependent variable of religious commitment would need to contain a minimum of three general categories: one for each extreme of the scale and one to represent the middle ground between the two. Although some of the more recent cycles of the CAN GSSs, US GSSs, BSAs, SSAs, NISAs and NILTs contain a larger variety of religiosity indicators, there are only two indicators that can be found in every cycle of every survey at use since 1985: religious affiliation and frequency of service attendance. Religious affiliation refers to the religion that the respondent says to belong to or identify with; frequency of religious service attendance refers in turn to how often the respondent claims to attend a religious service, either within a church or at any other location where such a service could be performed.

[12] For the 25 year period, the total number of respondents amounts to 38,035 within the cumulative dataset.
[13] There are no BSAs for 1988 and 1992.
[14] There is no NISA for 1992.

What makes these US, UK and Canadian surveys particularly beneficial for comparison is the similarity of these two religious variables present in each cycle since 1985. For the CAN GSSs, religious affiliation has always been asked under the format of "What, if any, is your religion?". With regard to the wording of the religious service attendance variable, it has varied only slightly over the 24 year period, and since 1996 has been asked as: "Other than on special occasions, (such as weddings, funerals or baptisms), how often did you attend religious services or meetings in the last 12 months?". For the US GSSs, religious affiliation is asked as "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?", and church attendance as "How often do you attend religious services?". Similar to the Canadian and US religious variables, the four UK survey series ask "Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?" and "Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?".[15]

There is little evidence of construct bias between the regions and countries as well as over the course of the period at study regarding these two religiosity indicators. In other words, how respondents interpret the content and meaning of the questions of religious affiliation and service attendance appears to be very similar across Canada, the US and the UK, and seems not to have changed all that much since 1985. The only minor differences can potentially be found in the US, where denominational specifics tend to be more important regarding religious affiliation, compared with Britain for example where declaring oneself as simply Christian has become more common (Voas and Bruce 2004). There is also evidence pointing towards the fact that weekly attendance at religious services still has a very positive social connotation, especially in the US, and thus can

[15] It is worth noting that there does appear to be a certain item bias between the religious service attendance variable in the US and those in Canada and the UK. More specifically, the US GSS variable does not explicitly exclude special occasions, or rites of passage, such as baptisms, marriages or funerals, which usually include a religious service and thus could be included in the respondent's tally. This being said, for the purposes of the present study, the difference is minimal.

have a social desirability bias in which certain individuals will claim to attend weekly when in reality they do not (Brenner 2011; Hadaway, Marler and Chaves 1993). Steps have been taken to reduce this bias in survey data in the US (Smith 1998) and the extent of its impact on the service attendance variable is still debated (Brenner 2011). Brenner (2011) has even demonstrated that, between those who actually go to church weekly and those who simply claim they do when asked, there is little difference regarding the importance these two groups assign to religion and religious identity in their lives. This social desirability effect on weekly church attendance is also not without meaning in itself, indicating that there is still a fair amount of social pressure regarding religious service attendance in the US. All things considered, the effects of these differences between respondents' interpretations of religious affiliation and service attendance appear to be minimal for the present study.

It must equally be taken into account that these two measures of identification to a specific religion and attendance at services provided by a religious group, although including religions other than Christianity, are known to be more suited to the realities of members of Christian denominations (Woodhead 2011). This issue must be considered when interpreting findings. Even though individuals identifying with a Christian faith or declaring no religion[16] still form the large majority of populations in the countries at study,[17] many of these countries are also characterised by historically non-Christian minorities and immigration that has diversified over the last few decades. Although trends with regards to non-Christian religions will be tested when possible in Chapter Two, the nature of the data implies that the main focus of the present study on religious polarisation will inevitably remain on the Christian and religiously unaffiliated majorities.

[16] Individuals declaring no religion in Western countries have been shown to come mainly from families that once identified with a Christian faith (Bibby 2002; Breen and Hayes 1996).

[17] For example, in 2009-2010 Christian and unaffiliated individuals made up 88.9% of the Canadian population, 94.4% of the American population and 94.5% of the British population (Davis et al. 2011; National Centre for Social Research 2011a; Statistics Canada 2011).

A typology of religious commitment, composed of three categories, was assembled by recoding and merging these two indicators of religious affiliation and service attendance.[18] This new construct acted as the dependent variable for the analyses, the findings of which will be detailed subsequently in this chapter. The first category of this new variable groups together respondents declaring no religious affiliation, or being of no religion. Consequently, this category represents the pole of secular individuals devoid of religious commitment and severed from religion in general. Since the religious service attendance question was only asked of those respondents who declared a religious affiliation for many of the cycles of the CAN GSSs, BSAs and SSAs,[19] the assumption will have to be made here that those declaring no religion also attend religious services less than once a month.[20]

The second category in the religious commitment typology groups together those respondents who identify with a religion, but who attend religious services less than once a month. These respondents will be referred to as those who are nominally affiliated. As measured by the present study, this category does contain some internal diversity regarding religious composition and frequency of attendance at religious services.[21] Despite this certain amount of plurality, these individuals do share in common the fact that they are rarely if ever actively religious, but still feel the need to identify with a church or a religion. In other words, they still assign a certain importance to their religious identity in its own right, and potentially still perceive it as being linked with their other social

[18] Respondents are classified as missing for this new variable if they did not answer the religious affiliation question, or if they claimed to be affiliated but did not answer the religious service attendance question. Including all the years of study, the rate of missing values for the religious commitment typology is 4.9% in Canada, 1.3% in the US and 0.9% in the UK. These missing values are generally random, with few specific patterns emerging regarding the characteristics of the respondents concerned. This being said, for the CAN GSSs, missing values for the religious commitment typology increase in a statistically significant manner in the 1990s and 2000s, compared with 1985. For the US GSSs, missing values are higher for older respondents, and for the UK Social Attitudes they are higher for ethnic minorities.

[19] More specifically, cycles 1 through 19 for the CAN GSSs, and from 1985 until 1989 for the BSAs and SSAs. The UK surveys then began asking the religious service attendance question of respondents who were affiliated at age 16, even if unaffiliated as adults.

[20] Some studies have shown that this may not be the case for a minority of unaffiliated individuals, especially in the US (Hout and Fisher 2002).

[21] See Table A.1 in Appendix A.

identities, such as family or national identities. According to the polarisation framework detailed in the previous chapter, this middle-ground category should begin to shrink over time in contexts where belonging to a religion is no longer the social norm. Once religion and religious identity become fully separated from other social spheres, there remains no reason for an individual to identify with a religion if not actually religious and practising himself/herself.

The final category in the typology contains all respondents who are affiliated and who do attend religious services at least once a month, or in other words who are religiously committed. Monthly religious service attendance is taken here as the baseline in distinguishing between those who are committed and those in the middle-ground category of nominal affiliation, following the works of such researchers as Bowen (2004), Ribberink, Achterberg and Houtman (2013) as well as Voas and Crockett (2005).[22] It has been shown time and time again in studies on religion and secularisation that this committed category saw a proportional decline in most Western countries after the 1960s. Many would probably assume that it continues to decline in our ever more individualistic and scientifically advanced societies. However, if a religious polarisation trend is developing, one would expect this category to have stabilised proportionally in recent decades and across younger cohorts, especially in those regions that have initially higher levels of non-affiliation at the beginning of the period of study.

Figure A.1 in Appendix A contains the proportions of unaffiliated in each of the 13 regions at study in 1985. This Figure shows that, in relation to the hypotheses stated earlier, it is in Great Britain (Scotland, England and Wales) and British Columbia that we find the highest proportions of the unaffiliated in 1985 (above 20%). Consequently, it is in

[22] This baseline is preferred to that of weekly church attendance, due to it better portraying commitment for both Protestants and Catholics. Like those classified in the category of nominally affiliated, those who are committed do not necessarily form an entirely homogenous group when it comes to matters of religion (see Table A.1 in Appendix A).

these regions especially that we will expect to see a rise or a stability of both the no religion and committed groups, and a decline of the nominal affiliates.

From a more statistical viewpoint, some could perceive this three-category religious commitment typology as being ordered in a certain sense, measuring a latent continuous variable of level of religiosity (ranging from a less to a more religious category). However, for the purposes of this study, this typology will be employed as a nominal dependent variable, which implies that each of the three categories are distinct and lack a logical progression. This is so for two main reasons; firstly, when used in statistical models, this typology violates the parallel regression assumption fundamental to ordered models (Long and Freese 2006);[23] also, according to the polarisation framework, time variables should affect the middle-ground category differently from the two extremes, rather than in a progressive manner, thus making a comparison between separate categories more logical for the present research.

From a more theoretical standpoint, being constructed from the variables of religious affiliation and service attendance, this three-point typology measures mainly institutional aspects of religious commitment, meaning the nature of the relationship that a respondent has or does not have with a church or religious group. The results in this chapter, detailed in the following sections, will thus determine if there is religious polarisation in the institutional sense of the concept within regions in the US, the UK and Canada. Chapters Three and Four will measure religious polarisation with a larger variety of religious aspects which include more personal indicators of religious beliefs and practices. For now, religious polarisation will be seen as present over years and across cohorts if there is a declining proportion of nominal affiliates, and a steady or rising proportion of committed and unaffiliated respondents.

[23] This was determined by running post-estimation Lr and Wald tests on a series of basic ordered logit models with the typology as the dependent variable in all three countries at study.

Models

With the religious commitment typology acting as the dependent variable, an initial series of Multinomial Logit Models (MNLMs) were generated for the Northeastern, Midwestern, Western and Southern US, Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as for Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie provinces and British Columbia. The only independent variables for these models were dummies for the year of study (one-year intervals), in order to get a better overall sense of trends since 1985.[24]

In areas that do show initial signs of religious polarisation with a decline of only nominal affiliation, a second series of more detailed logistic regression models were generated. In these models, dichotomous variables for each of the religious commitment typology categories act as the dependent variables.[25] The main independent variables include dummies for both year of study (one-year intervals) and birth cohort (5-year intervals), and controls were included for gender, foreign born/ethnic minority,[26] mother tongue (CAN), level of education and sub-region.[27] These controls were included on the theoretical basis of which variables have been repeatedly shown to be of importance regarding religious behaviour in previous research:

- *Gender*: Studies have shown that Western women tend to score higher on religiosity scales than their male counterparts (Bibby 2011; Bowen 2004; Bradshaw and Ellison 2009; Cnaan Gelles and Sinha 2004; Collett and Lizardo 2009; Francis and Wilcox 1998; Freese 2004; Hoffman 2009; Miller and Hoffmann 1995; Sullins 2006; Voas 2011; Walter and Davie 1998).

[24] These models were all weighted to be representative of the adult populations at study. Since these initial models do not control for age, cycles 11, 16 and 21 (1996, 2002 and 2007) were excluded from the CAN GSS data, due to these cycles only containing data from respondents aged 45 years and older.

[25] Logistic regression models were employed here so that respondents of each category could be compared with all others, not only those of one specific category.

[26] The UK Social Attitudes only include ethnic origin, rather than place of birth, in each cycle for Scotland, England and Wales. Consequently, for models with UK data, it is used as the closest available proxy for being foreign born. No such variable can consistently be found in the NISAs or the NILTs for Northern Ireland.

[27] They were equally chosen and shaped on the more practical basis of minimising missing values as well as achieving comparability between all survey cycles and between the 13 regions at study. Descriptive statistics of all the variables used for the US, the UK and Canada can be found in Table A.2 of Appendix A.

- *Foreign born/ethnic minority*: First and second generation immigrants, especially those from non-Western countries, generally have higher probabilities of being religiously committed (Beyer 2006; Bowen 2004; Crockett and Voas 2006; Eid 2009; Turbergen 2006; Turbergen and Sindradóttir 2011).
- *Mother tongue*: In the Canadian context, French-speaking Canadians outside of Quebec have higher rates of religiosity than the general population (Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011; Meunier, Wilkins-Laflamme and Grenier 2014).
- *Level of education*: Regarding schooling, the general perception is that the higher educated a person is, the less religious they tend to be, due to a more developed critical sense of thinking, and in many cases being exposed for a lengthy period to secular academic environments. However, many studies in the US paint a much more nuanced portrait of the effects of education on religious participation.[28] Empirical evidence suggests that students decreasing, retaining or increasing their religious activities throughout their time at college depends greatly on denominational and macro-environmental (campus) factors (Hill 2009; Mcfarland, Wright and Weakliem 2011; Small and Bowman 2011).[29]

This second series of models allows us to determine if, in what initially appears to be polarising areas, the religious trends initially observed remain once other socio-demographic effects are controlled for. This second series of models also begins to unravel and distinguish what specific types of change or lack thereof have been driving trends in these areas since the mid-1980s: once isolated from other effects, is a decline across years or generations observable and simply being mitigated overall, or have these time effects stabilised in the recent past?

[28] See Mayrl and Oeur (2009) for a summary of such studies in the US.
[29] It is important to note here that, although we do control for these socio-demographic traits, we also make the assumption that polarisation would affect these various social groups equally (since we are not analysing separate trends for each group).

Distinguishing what change over time is due to age effects (changes as an individual ages), period effects (societal-wide changes affecting everyone), or cohort effects (intergenerational change), has always been difficult for those studying social phenomena. This is especially the case when using repeated cross-sectional data as the present study does. Statistically, these three effects cannot all be included in conventional regression models, due to their linear dependency: period = age + cohort (Glenn 1977; Mason et al. 1973). More complex age-period-cohort (APC) models, such as APC intrinsic estimator and cross-classified mixed effects models have been gaining in popularity in recent years as a potential solution to this problem (Schwadel 2010; 2011; Yang and Land 2006; 2008; Yang et al. 2008). However, these types of models have also garnered a large amount of criticism surrounding the validity of their substantive results, especially when it comes to producing valid trendlines for each effect (Bell and Jones 2013; O'Brien 2011; Voas 2013). Most notably, these models, although artificially solving the identification problem that arises from age, period and cohort effects being linearly dependent, are criticised for not solving it substantively, generating an artificial trendline for at least one of the effects that may not fit the actual data.

Consequently, Voas (2013) proposes a simplified yet convincing graphical method of showing trendlines for each cohort and how they vary across years. This method does have the drawback of masking age effects to a certain extent which we must keep in mind when interpreting results, especially if period changes are important within cohorts. This being said, we consider this method the best way at the present time to gain a better sense of how the period and cohort effects have evolved since the mid-1980s while isolating them from other socio-demographic effects. Consequently, we will employ this graphical method for our second series of models by graphing the generated predicted probabilities for the three categories of religious commitment for each year and each birth cohort in areas showing signs of religious polarisation.

RESULTS

A Look at Trends

Figures 1.1-1.3 illustrate the percentage of respondents falling into one of the three categories of no religion, nominally affiliated or religiously committed throughout the period from 1985 until 2009/2010 in the 13 regions at study. These proportions were generated in the form of predicted probabilities from the first series of MNLMs looking at overall trends.[30]

The percentages in Figure 1.1 show that the Western US had the highest overall proportion of individuals declaring no religion (25.5%) in 2010, and the Southern US had the lowest (15.3%) for that same year. The Western US also had the lowest proportion of religiously committed individuals (36.1%) in 2010, and the Southern US had the highest (51.2%). This being said, all four US Census regions are characterised by relatively similar trends between 1985 and 2010. All four regions have seen a rise in their proportions of unaffiliated and no change outside of the 95% confidence intervals (CI) in their proportions of nominally affiliated. Additionally, although all four regions show a slight downward trend in their proportions of religiously committed, this change only falls outside of the 95% CI between the start and the end of the period at study in the Midwestern US.

[30] Since there are no controls in the first series of MNLMs, the predicted probabilities can be interpreted as population proportions. For example, an English respondent has an estimated 50.1% probability of declaring no religion in 2009. Equally, an estimated 50.1% of the English population declared having no religion in 2009.

Figure 1.1: Percentage of Unaffiliated, Nominally Affiliated and Religiously Committed, US Census Regions, 1985-2010, with CI (95%)




Figure 1.2: Percentage of Unaffiliated, Nominally Affiliated and Religiously Committed, UK Countries, 1985-2009, with CI (95%)





Figure 1.3: Percentage of Unaffiliated, Nominally Affiliated and Religiously Committed, Canadian Regions, 1985-2009, with CI (95%)



These changes are somewhat small in magnitude compared with others we will see in the UK and Canada. Nevertheless, it remains important to note that the US, long-time perceived as the bastion of religious stability compared with a declining Europe (Berger et al. 2008), has seen a modest rise in its rates of unaffiliated since the early 1990s.[31] For the overall period at study, the four US Census regions do appear to be characterised by a *state* of polarisation in the sense that their overall levels of nominal affiliates remain relatively low compared with those in the other regions at study, and both the unaffiliated and the religiously committed groups remain non-negligible in size. Nevertheless, with a relative stability of their proportions of nominally affiliated, none of the four US Census regions are showing signs of undergoing a process of polarisation as we define it over the two and a half decades at study.

This is not the case in Scotland, England and Wales, as the results in Figure 1.2 indicate. As in the US Census regions, these three areas have seen a rise in their rates of religious nones. However, that trend is coupled with a decline in the proportion of nominally affiliated individuals, and relatively low but stable rates of religiously committed ones across the years at study.[32] In England, the proportion of religiously committed individuals has remained relatively stable for the entire period at study, whereas the proportion of nominally affiliated began to decline in 1987 (with a plateau between 1998 and 2005). In Scotland, the proportion of nominally affiliated individuals declined from 1985 to 1998, rose between 1999 and 2001, and then declined once more between 2002 and 2009 (with 2008 showing a slight rise), for an overall statistically significant decline between 1985 and 2009. In Wales, the decline of the same proportion took place most notably between 1991 and 1997. Despite some fluctuations between 1985 and 2000 in Scotland, and between both 1985-1994 and 1999-2009 in Wales, there is no

[31] This rise has been garnering the attention of more and more scholars in recent years. See for example Baker and Smith (2009a; 2009b), Hout and Fisher (2002), Lim, MacGregor and Putnam (2010), Marwell and Demerath (2003), and Putnam and Campbell (2010).

[32] These trends are very similar if weekly, rather than monthly, service attendance is taken as the baseline for distinguishing between those who are nominally affiliated and those who are committed.

statistically significant difference in the 1985 and 2009 rates of religiously committed individuals in these two areas.

This conforms to our definition of a process of polarisation: after seeing religious decline over many decades, if not centuries, it would appear that Great Britain's rate of religiously committed has stabilised at lower levels and that decline is now coming from the middle ground of nominal affiliation.[33] Overall then, the British population is splitting more and more into two distinct groups: a larger secular group, and a smaller but also proportionally stable religious one.

By contrast, Northern Ireland is characterised by another pattern: its proportion of non-affiliation remains low and unchanging, its proportion of nominal affiliation has been on the rise and its proportion of religious commitment has been on the decline between 1989 and 2009. Although rates of regular service attendance are still very high compared with other regions, those among the Northern Irish who are moving away from this activity appear still to be unwilling to give up their religious identities altogether. These identities, through years of conflict between the Protestant majority and substantial Catholic minority, have become highly politicised and linked with their other social and group identities (Demerath 2000; Mitchell 2004).

The results illustrated in Figure 1.3 show us that Canada contains a mix of the three patterns we have seen so far in the US, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Atlantic provinces as well as the majority French-speaking and Catholic province of Quebec have seen a modest increase in their low levels of non-affiliation between the early 1990s and 2009. This trend is in tandem with an increase in their rates of nominal affiliates (especially in Quebec), and an important decline in their initially high rates of religiously committed individuals. Although not sharing Northern Ireland's recent violent history,

[33] This is in line with British Census data showing a drop in those labelling themselves as non-denominational Christians and a rise in those declaring no religion between 2001 and 2011 (Office for National Statistics 2013).

individuals within these provinces of 'Old Canada', like those in Northern Ireland, appear to be more reluctant to give up religious identities that have long been group markers and heavily linked to their national and regional identities (Hayes 2004; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011; Noll 1992). It is also worth noting that these areas have much higher proportions of Catholics than many of the other regions at study. With its strong institutional character and birthright membership, modern-day Catholicism in itself may promote a distancing of regular church practice coupled with the retention of nominal affiliation. Additionally, in areas where Catholics historically stood opposite Protestants, such a context may have instilled a stronger sense of religious identities as being important group markers (Lemieux 1990; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011).[34]

In turn, Ontario more closely resembles the US Census regions in its religious trends: an increase in non-affiliation, a relative stability of nominal affiliation and a certain decrease in religious commitment, although not as severe as in Northern Ireland, the Atlantic provinces and Quebec. It is only in the more Western Canadian provinces, to a lesser extent in the Prairie provinces (mainly from the early 1990s onwards) and to a greater extent in British Columbia, that we again see a polarisation trend developing similar to that in Great Britain: a rise in the proportion of religious nones, a decline in the proportion of nominal affiliates and a lower but relatively stable proportion of religiously committed individuals. With models at the provincial level (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A), we further uncover that the religious trends of Manitoba and Saskatchewan more closely resemble those of Ontario and the US, and that it is Alberta that shares British Columbia's and Great Britain's religious polarisation trends.

Consequently, according to these initial results, we do find areas where the religiously committed group, after presumably undergoing severe declines before the period at study in this dissertation, has stabilised proportionally at lower levels between the mid-1980s

[34] Chapter Two explores this dynamic in more detail.

and end of the 2000s. Rather than heading now towards zero religion, Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia appear to be losing their nominal middle ground and seeing their religious landscapes becoming more and more divided in two between a large secular group and a non-negligible religiously committed one (sized at 16.4% of the British population and 27.1% of the Albertan and British Columbian population in 2009). Yet, what dynamics are at play in keeping the religiously committed group relatively small and stable between 1985 and 2009 in Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia, when this same group has seen decline for the same period elsewhere? Does this stability across years remain once period is isolated from certain socio-demographic effects such as gender, immigration and ethnic origin, mother tongue and level of education? How has cohort change, known to be extremely important in religious phenomena and mutation (Bibby 2007; Bruce 2011a; Crockett and Voas 2006; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011; Putnam and Campbell 2010), affected different levels of religious commitment in areas showing initial signs of religious polarisation?

Year and Cohort Effects on Levels of Religious Commitment in Polarising Contexts


Figures 1.4-1.6 contain the predicted probabilities for being of no religion, nominally affiliated and religiously committed, generated for each year and 5-year birth cohort from the second series of logistic regression models controlling for gender, foreign born (Alb. and BC)/ethnic minority (GB), mother tongue (Alb. and BC), level of education and sub-region.[35] For efficiency purposes and due to their similar religious commitment trends, we have grouped Scotland, England and Wales into one region (Great Britain), and Alberta and British Columbia into another.

[35] Figures 1.4-1.6 do not contain the 95% confidence intervals for each cohort, since the figures would then become unreadable. Nevertheless, these confidence intervals are mentioned when important in the text. See Table A.3 in Appendix A for the other coefficients from these models.

What we see from the results in Figure 1.4 is that not quite the same processes of change are at play in Great Britain, compared with Alberta and British Columbia, when it comes to declaring no religion, even if these two areas show similar trends of religious polarisation. In Great Britain, almost all increases happen between birth cohorts, with younger cohorts being characterised by higher predicted probabilities of declaring no religion: each cohort on its own shows little variation in these same predicted probabilities over the years at study. This is not necessarily the case in Alberta and British Columbia where the spread between cohorts is much narrower and there is an increase over the years that falls outside of the 95% CI for each cohort's predicted probabilities of declaring no religion. There remains a significant difference between older and younger cohorts at any given time in Alberta and British Columbia, but it is not as wide as in Great Britain, and it is accompanied by a period increase as well.

Some authors, especially in the US, have shown evidence for an age effect of a decrease in levels of religiosity during early adulthood, and then a subsequent increase in later adulthood (Argue, Johnson and White 1999; Cnaan et al. 2004; Firebaugh and Harley 1991; Miller and Nakamura 1996; Schwadel 2010; Vaidyanathan 2011). By contrast, in the case of Great Britain Crockett and Voas (2006), Tilley (2003) and Voas (2009) indicate that there is no such age effect. If there is an age effect of a decrease in the probabilities of declaring no religion among cohorts in the later years of their life, it is not strong enough among our findings to counteract the period effect of relative stability in Great Britain and of increase in Alberta and British Columbia.

Figure 1.4: Predicted Probabilities for Being Unaffiliated, Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia, by Birth Cohort (5-Year Intervals), 1985-2009






Figure 1.5: Predicted Probabilities for Being Nominally Affiliated, Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia, by Birth Cohort (5-Year Intervals), 1985-2009






Figure 1.6: Predicted Probabilities for Being Religiously Committed, Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia, by Birth Cohort (5-Year Intervals), 1985-2009





Both Great Britain as well as Alberta and British Columbia show a decline across the years for all birth cohorts in Figure 1.5 regarding the predicted probabilities of being nominally affiliated, as well as a decline between older and younger birth cohorts. Yet, what is striking once again is that the difference in the size of the predicted probabilities between cohorts is much smaller in Alberta and British Columbia than in Great Britain, and the decline across years much greater. Indeed, it is only members of cohorts born from 1970 onwards whose probabilities of being nominally affiliated at any one point in time are lower and fall outside of the 95% CI of those of older cohorts in Alberta and British Columbia.

What is striking in turn from the results in Figure 1.6 is that, even when isolated from the potentially mitigating factor of more recent increases in diverse and in many cases very religious immigrants,[36] there remains no period effect of decline regarding the religiously committed group in Alberta and British Columbia as well as in Great Britain: all variations within each 5-year birth cohort do not exceed the 95% CI of the others. What is also striking is that there appears to be few visible signs of an age effect raising the predicted probabilities of being affiliated and attending religious services regularly in the later years of each birth cohort's lives.[37] For example, for an average individual in Alberta and British Columbia born between 1965 and 1969, her/his probability of being religiously committed is 23.5% when s/he is aged 20-24 years (1985), and is not significantly different at 22.4% 24 years later (2009). This is in line with what Crockett and Voas (2006) found with British data. It could be that the effects of an overall decline

[36] As shown in Table A.3 in Appendix A, ethnic group/immigration has a strong positive association with being religiously committed in Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia. This is a well-known fact in Great Britain with its relatively large Muslim population (Brierley 2000; Hamid 2011; Husbands 1995). However, it is more of a surprise in Alberta and British Columbia, since a large portion of immigration there originates from Asia, and many Asian groups have traditionally more commonly declared having no religion in Western surveys (Beyer 2006; Bramadat and Seljak 2005; 2008). Yet, this fact does not appear to outweigh the overall statistically significant positive association for the period of 1985-2009.

[37] It is worth noting here that the surveys at use do not follow the same individuals over time, hence panel data would have to be analysed to confirm this finding.

of religious commitment over the years and a rise as individuals age are cancelling each other out, but in order to do so these two effects would have to be virtually equal in size, which seems unlikely.

Figure 1.6 shows us that what differences there are concerning being religiously committed over time can be found mainly between birth cohorts, or in other words are intergenerational differences. In line with much previous research (see for example Bibby 2007; Crockett and Voas 2006), members of older cohorts generally have higher probabilities of being religiously committed in Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia throughout the period at study. In Great Britain, the highest probabilities of being religiously committed can be found among individuals born from 1900-1924 (between 25.8% and 39.9% when 95% CI are taken into account), with those born between 1895 and 1899 having lower probabilities but also much wider 95% CI. There is then a series of measured drops for each cohort born between 1925 and 1959. The lowest probabilities of being religiously committed can be found among individuals born after this period, meaning between 1960 and 1989 (between 8.3% and 14.4%). The differences in probabilities of being religiously committed among members of these younger cohorts are not significant (all fall within each others' 95% CI), meaning they have stabilised somewhat for this Post-Boomer group. Additionally, members of the 1990-1994 cohort have slightly higher probabilities of being religiously committed, which may be one sign of an age effect in that this cohort is young enough not to have left their original households and may still be directly influenced by the religious practices of their parents and grandparents.

In Alberta and British Columbia, it is much the same story: an individual born between 1910 and 1939 has a significantly higher probability of being religiously committed (between 29.6% and 48.8%) compared with one born between 1960 and 1979 (between 20.1% and 29.3%), with those born between 1940 and 1959 acting as the

transition cohorts of sorts between the two. Although there are some differences between the predicted probabilities of respondents born between 1960 and 1979, none of these fall outside of each other's 95% CI. This indicates that, after initially falling from Pre-Boomer rates, the probabilities of being religiously committed have now stabilised somewhat among these younger cohorts. It is also worth mentioning that, like in Great Britain, members of the very young cohorts, in this case born between 1980 and 1994, have at times higher probabilities of being religiously committed than those born between 1960 and 1979.[38]

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The main goal of this chapter was to uncover if there have been regions in the US, the UK or Canada where a religious polarisation trend, in the strict sense of a proportional decline of only the nominally affiliated middle ground, had been developing between the mid-1980s and the end of the 2000s. We hypothesised that this would be the case in areas with more advanced secularisation, measured here by initially higher rates of non-affiliation in 1985. Our results show that there does appear to be areas where a religious polarisation trend has been underway. Rather than declining into nothing, in Scotland, England, Wales, Alberta and British Columbia the religiously committed group appears to have remained smaller but relatively stable between 1985 and 2009 and among younger (Post-Boomer) birth cohorts, with proportional decline coming from the nominally affiliated group instead. These results then confirm hypothesis H_{1a}: Great Britain, Alberta

[38] Cross-classified mixed effects models were also run with the same data from Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia for being religiously committed, in order to see if they produce similar findings to the graphical method. Table A.4 and Figures A.3-A.4 of Appendix A contain the results from these models. They produce very similar cohort effects as those in Figure 1.6. Yet, they also produce statistically significant age effects (odds of being religiously committed increase with age) and year effects (mean intercept of being religiously committed declines with the progression of years) in Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia. When put in relation to the results in Figure 1.6, this would imply that statistically significant opposing age and year effects of the same size are cancelling each other out. However, this is also the type of result that these models have received criticism for (Bell and Jones 2013; O'Brien 2011; Voas 2013).

and British Columbia begun the period of study with some of the highest rates of no religion[39] in 1985, and were also those areas which, even once other socio-demographic factors were controlled for, showed signs of undergoing a process of polarisation across the years at study. As for hypothesis H_{1b}, it can be confirmed especially for birth cohorts born in the 1960s or later. With the progression of these younger cohorts in Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia, the predicted probabilities of declaring no religion have increased somewhat, those of being committed have remained relatively stable (all fall within each other's 95% confidence intervals), while those of being nominally affiliated have seen some decline.

It is worth noting here that there exists little evidence in Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia of a U-shaped trend over the period at study, or in other words of a certain rebound of the probabilities of being religiously committed in later years and with younger cohorts. This raises the issue of if *polarisation* is the most appropriate term to use to describe the current situation, rather than *secularisation, slowed decline* or *bottoming-out*. There is polarisation in the sense that the British, Albertan and British Columbian populations are split more and more between the two extreme groups of the unaffiliated and the religiously committed. However, only one of these groups appears to be gaining from the decline of the nominally affiliated middle ground, while, although non-negligible in size, the other remains relatively stable. Future research and discussion will have to have the final word on this issue.

In other areas where secularisation was not as advanced, or in other words that were characterised by lower rates of non-affiliation at the beginning of the period at study, the religiously committed group remained on the decline: to a lesser extent in the four US Census regions, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and to a greater extent in Northern Ireland, the Canadian Atlantic provinces and Quebec. In this latter group of regions, those

[39] Although the Canadian province of Alberta did not quite have a rate of no religion above 20% in 1985, it was not far off at 17.6%.

with some of the lowest initial rates of non-affiliation, patterns of a cultural religion, as others have named it before (Demerath 2000; Lemieux 1990; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011), were apparent: in Northern Ireland, the Canadian Atlantic provinces and Quebec, it is the nominally affiliated middle-ground group that has grown.

One cannot help but notice at this stage that these cultural religion regions contain, both historically and presently, much larger proportions of Catholics, whereas in those polarising areas there have been and still are Protestant majorities among the affiliated, either in the form of a State Church (Scotland and England) or an oligopoly of Churches (Wales, Alberta and British Columbia) with some dissent and evangelicalism. The question thus arises if polarisation is a trend specific to Protestants, and if those regions showing signs of religious polarisation do so due to their larger Protestant populations. Chapter Two explores if certain religious groups, i.e. Protestants, have seen more polarisation over time than others within a given region.

CHAPTER TWO

Religious Polarisation: A Protestant Phenomenon

In the previous chapter, we explored religious polarisation as a population-wide phenomenon. The findings showed that, as a *process* of proportional decline of the religious middle ground, of increase in non-affiliation and of stability of religious commitment, polarisation has been developing in certain areas between the mid-1980s and the late 2000s, areas including Great Britain as well as Alberta and British Columbia. In turn, this chapter addresses the question of whether this type of religious polarisation is developing more within particular groups in society over time, specifically within certain religions and denominations. We also test if particular religions which have been traditionally dominant in society have created a general environment more conducive to the development of a *state* of religious polarisation at the end of the 2000s.

THEORY

The measure of religious commitment used in the previous chapter subsumes all denominational identities into a single category of 'affiliated'. All those classified in this one category do share in common a willingness to identify with a specific religion, and in many cases a religious institution. Yet, much existing research has shown the importance of differences between religious categories and denominations within Christianity and non-Christian religions when it comes to monthly attendance at religious services. Researchers such as Aarts et al. (2010), Argue et al. (1999), Bibby (2011), Bowen (2004), Campiche (2010), Chaves (1991), Chaves and Cavendish (1994), Eagle (2011b), Firebaugh and Harley (1991), Hadaway and Marler (2005), Hadaway et al. (1993), Hout and Greeley (1998), Iannaccone (1988; 1994), Mcfarland et al. (2011), Mockabee, Monson and Grant (2001), Olson and Perl (2005), Ploch and Hastings (1998), Putnam and Campbell (2010) as well as Vaidyanathan (2011) have shown, either directly or indirectly, significant differences in rates of church attendance between different denominations and religious groups in a variety of national contexts.

Although the data that these scholars use constrain the extent of the denominational comparisons possible for each study, one of the more common categorisations of religious groups used in the field of sociology of religion is the RELTRAD typology developed by Steensland et al. (2000). Used mainly in the US, but also valid for other Western nations, RELTRAD contains the following categories: mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, Black Protestant (US), Roman Catholic, Jewish, other affiliations, and no affiliation.[40] Mainline Protestant denominations refer to those historically dominant Protestant groups which are presently more liberal (leftwing) when it comes to religious norms and values. In turn, evangelical Protestant denominations often profess a more literal interpretation of

[40] See Steensland et al. (2000) for a detailed list of which US denominations fall into which categories of the RELTRAD typology.

the Bible and are considered much more conservative (rightwing) in nature. Black Protestant denominations are particular to the US in that they are the Christian churches that African Americans, historically and presently, frequent in much larger numbers. Evangelical and Black Protestants, as well as Roman Catholics, generally have higher overall rates of frequent religious service attendance, compared with mainline Protestants and Jewish individuals in the US and in other Western nations (Bibby 2011; Putnam and Campbell 2010).

It is conceivable then that institutional religious polarisation trends, or in other words the decline of the middle ground of identifying with a religion or religious institution without regular service attendance, could be particular to certain religions groups. Yet, little research has been done on the tendencies of certain denominations and religions to polarise more over time, or in other words to lose only those individuals who did not practise regularly in the past, with the remaining affiliated becoming a smaller but more active group.

Returning to our polarisation framework detailed in the Introduction, according to the writings of Martin we could perceive Protestantism as being more susceptible to modern-day polarisation in the West.[41] Following his numerous European and North American comparisons, one of the main distinctions Martin (1978; 2005) establishes in his general theory of secularisation is between countries in which the principal churches are Protestant and those which are characterised by a Catholic or Orthodox monopoly. Martin attributes the differences in religious trends between these two types of countries to the particular relationship Protestantism had with the Enlightenment. Rather than establishing itself as a pillar of resistance, Protestantism was the vehicle by which modernisation was introduced in many Western countries:

[41] Martin (2005) and Roy (2008) also perceive certain forms of Islam and Pentecostalism as encouraging religious polarisation. However, since the data used by the present research does not include regions or countries where such religions are important in numbers, the focus here will be on Protestantism.

> The prime historical circumstance was the difference between those countries, mainly Protestant, where Enlightenment and religion overlapped and even fused, and those countries, mainly Catholic, where Enlightenment and religion clashed (Martin 2000: 298).

According to Martin, this fusion between Enlightenment and Protestantism made the latter much more susceptible to modern religious transformations, or in other words secularisation, understood here as institutional differentiation and religious pluralisation. As seen in the Introduction, this institutional differentiation and religious pluralisation contributed in turn to the dissolution of the privileged link certain churches held with the State and with national culture.

Hervieu-Léger also considers Protestantism to be more fragile regarding transformations brought on by the phenomenon she names *modern religious individualism*:[42]

> The churches of the Reformation who assimilated the logic of religious individualism implicated by the Protestant problematic of salvation and who are accustomed since their beginnings in managing the diversity of ideological and theological currents within themselves, are they more apt to face such a situation? For Protestants, the regulation of belief is assured by the theologian, in charge of an ideological *magistère* which manages, in principal, the diversity of individual interpretations in possible communities of Scripture. However, the suppleness of this regulation system is also what makes the institutional fragility of Protestantism. Because the ideological discourse shatters into a multitude of currents which all contend to provide the authentic version of Christianity. This structural tendency towards pluralisation is likely to reinforce itself until atomisation, when no theological current manages to impose its hegemony and to incarnate, by controlling most notably the authorised reference to History, the fidelity to the doctrinal heritage of the Reformation (Hervieu-Léger 1999: 207-208, translated by present author).

In other words, by its very nature, Protestantism is characterised by an innate structural tendency towards religious fragmentation in national contexts. Although it

[42] Hervieu-Léger describes this phenomenon of modern religious individualism in the following manner:

> The salvation sought after by this autoperfectioning work exclusively concerns everyday life. The goal is to achieve by oneself, in the most complete manner possible, the objectives that modern society offers as a horizon for all: health, well-being, vitality, beauty […] The spirituality of the Enlightenment is established between two poles that we can define, in an ideal typical manner, one by the discovery of the intimate and amicable proximity of Man with God, knowable by means of the heart, the other by the establishment of an indifferent coexistence between Man and God, coexistence which assures Man the possibility of affirming his autonomy. […] A new figure of religious individualism is inaugurated here: that of *modern religious individualism*, which blossoms in the most contemporary forms of religiosity" (Hervieu-Léger, 1999: 163-174, translated by present author).

varies between denominations, Protestantism has always been a more individualistic religion, compared with Catholicism for example. It is primarily based on the individual interpretation of the Bible, rather than on the sacred character of a religious institution: contrary to Catholics, such an institution does not hold the same importance. The church becomes a tool to facilitate and to share individual interpretations, rather than a mandatory road of mediation, making schisms within Protestant groups much more common (Hayes 2004; Martin 1978). Thus, the pluralisation of religious institutions is often, but not always, greater in countries characterised by a Protestant majority, compared with Catholic ones. In such contexts of pluralisation, it becomes more difficult for the State to maintain its privileged link with one church, and the severing of such a link is the initial condition for a religious polarisation trend to develop according to our polarisation framework. With belonging and practice within a particular religious group no longer being the social and cultural norm within majority society, individuals would see no need to be affiliated in name only and the religious landscape would become cleaved between the unaffiliated and the remaining actively religious.

At a more individual level, this framework then implies that general social norms surrounding religion and religious practice are quicker to fall for Protestants due to the comparative weakness of the Protestant religious institution. In this developing environment, only those individuals who perceive religion as being genuinely worthwhile and who practise various aspects of religiosity remain within the religious group, while others who once had only a tenuous link leave entirely.

More specifically, certain Protestant groups, such as Evangelicals and some Black Protestant groups, have long emphasised, either officially or at the very least practically, the ‘born again’ experience: the religious group only catering to very devoted individuals, the ‘pure’ believers, rather than trying to encompass all of society. Consequently, these groups should have fewer nominal affiliates to lose in the first place. By contrast, it is

mainline Protestant affiliation that should be declining at a faster pace, but religious practice among those who do remain part of this group should be stabilising, if not rising in certain cases. This compared with Catholic individuals for example, whose institutional pillar and birthright membership grounds them, however distantly, to a certain international community. As seen with the case of Quebec in Chapter One for example, Catholics are more loath to give up this communal identity, even if they practise their religion only rarely, if at all.

A similar mechanism could also be at play at the macro-level. In areas where Protestants have been historically dominant, the more fractured religious landscape created in society could influence the decisions and practices of individuals of all religions, creating a more fluid religious environment conducive to polarisation. One could also expect this to be the case in mixed areas where one religion has not been strongly linked with national identity. For example, in contact with more individuals who deny any link with religion if they are not actively religious themselves, Catholics in a traditionally Protestant-dominant or mixed context may also make similar choices.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

These dimensions of the polarisation framework have been theorised to a certain extent, but not empirically tested. For the purposes of this chapter then, our research questions and hypotheses can be detailed as follows:

> *Q_{2a}: To what extent have particular denominational categories of religion experienced a greater decline of their nominal affiliates?*
>
> *Q_{2b}: To what extent are areas characterised by a configuration of religious polarisation at a given time also those where specific religions have been historically dominant?*
>
> *H_{2a}: Once other socio-demographic differences are controlled for, the proportional decline of nominal affiliates will be higher among Protestants than among individuals belonging to other religious groups.*

$H_{2a.1}$: Once other socio-demographic differences are controlled for, it will be mainly among mainline Protestants that we will see a decline of affiliation twinned with a rise of monthly practice among those individuals who remain affiliated.

H_{2b}: Once other socio-demographic differences are controlled for, traditionally Protestant and mixed countries will have lower levels of nominal affiliation and average or higher levels of both non-affiliation and religious commitment at a given time.

METHODS

As in Chapter One when we concentrated on certain national contexts in order to study them in more detail over time, in order to test H_{2a} and $H_{2a.1}$ we used US and Canadian General Social Survey data as well as British Social Attitudes, Northern Ireland Social Attitudes and Northern Ireland Life and Times data from 1985 until 2009/2010. In order to run the analyses more efficiently and to save on presentation space, the 13 regions in the US, the UK and Canada studied in the previous chapter were grouped together into larger regions according to the overall trends they shared regarding the religious commitment typology: these larger regional divides include the US as a whole (Northeastern, Midwestern, Southern and Western US), Great Britain (Scotland, England and Wales), Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada (Newfoundland & Labrador, PEI, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia), Quebec, Central Canada (Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan) and Western Canada (Alberta and British Columbia).

With these data and regional divides, a number of logistic regression models were generated. A first series has specific categories of religious affiliation in dichotomous form acting as the dependent variables: Protestant, Catholic, mainline Protestant, United Church of Canada,[43] evangelical Protestant, Black Protestant and Muslim. The main

[43] Since the CAN GSSs do not distinguish between mainline and evangelical Protestants for most of the survey cycles, affiliation to the United Church of Canada, Canada's largest Protestant church considered very mainline and liberal in nature, is taken here as the closest available proxy.

independent variable in these models was year of study, in order to get a sense of how religious affiliation has changed over time in various regions. A second series of binary logistic regression models estimated the effects of year of study on monthly religious service attendance (dichotomous dependent variable) among samples of each of the religious affiliation categories. This was done in order to estimate how regular attendance has changed among each religious group over time. A third series of logistic regression models were also generated for Protestant and Catholic respondents only, with the dependent variable being a dichotomous one for monthly (or more frequent) religious service attendance. The main independent variables for these models were the two different categories of religious affiliation as well as year of study, interacted in order to see if monthly attendance has increased, remained stable or decreased over time among Protestants as compared with Catholics.

All of these models also include a series of socio-demographic controls, similar to those used in the previous chapter: gender, foreign born (US and CAN), ethnic minority (GB), mother tongue (CAN), Black (US), marital status, level of education and sub-region/province.[44] The socio-demographic controls were added to the models so we could focus as much as possible on change over time in religious affiliation and attendance due to factors other than demographic and educational change in the population.[45] Additionally, we did not include a control for age, since we wanted the year of study variable to capture both period and cohort change over time. This means that the year of study variable also captures any potential age effects, although findings from the previous chapter suggest that these are smaller or even non-existent in comparison to the period and cohort effects.

[44] Descriptive statistics of all the variables used can be found in Table B.1 of Appendix B. Although the results detailed in this chapter stem from models measuring year of study in linear form, models were also run with five-year dummies. The findings from this latter group of models were very similar to the initial ones, year generally showing linear effects on affiliation and attendance. Results for these models can be found in Tables B.2 to B.15 in Appendix B.

[45] All findings in this chapter are very similar if the models are run with no socio-demographic controls.

In order to test H_{2b}, we needed a larger amount of country cases at one recent time point. Consequently, we used the 2008 to 2010 waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Containing annual randomised samples of approximately 800 to 3,000 respondents per country from a wide range of nations spanning the globe, the international coverage of the ISSPs allowed us to include 30 North American, European and Oceanic countries for this section of the analyses (ISSP Research Group 2010).[46] The 2008-2010 ISSPs contain both religiosity indicators needed to construct the religious commitment typology (religious affiliation and service attendance), as well as a series of relevant socio-demographic variables. Data was used from three waves (2008-2010) in order to include samples from as many countries as possible with minimal time effects: the samples from those countries in the 2010 wave formed the basis of the dataset, and a sample from countries not in the 2010 wave but in the 2008 or 2009 ones were also added (for countries with samples in both waves, the 2009 data was selected).

With these data, three binary multilevel models were generated, one with each of the three categories of the religious commitment typology acting as the dependent variable (no religion, nominally affiliated and religiously committed, in dichotomous form). The individual-level fixed effects of these models include age (non-linear),[47] generation (Pre-Boomer, Boomer and Post-Boomer),[48] gender, marital status, years of education, ISSP wave, and specific category of religious affiliation (for nominally affiliated and committed

[46] These 30 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the US. The selection of these countries was based on their inclusion in at least one cycle of the 2008-2010 ISSPs, their relatively low rates of missing values for certain key variables, and their Western and European cultural character. Table B.16 of Appendix B contains each country's sample size and year.

[47] Many studies that have shown an age effect on religious affiliation and behaviour have pointed to this effect being non-linear: especially in the US, rates of religiosity tend to be higher among adolescents, then decline during early adulthood, then increase again in later adulthood (Argue et al. 1999; Cnaan et al. 2004; Miller and Nakamura 1996).

[48] In this dataset, Pre-Boomers were born between 1911 and 1945, Boomers between 1946 and 1965, and Post-Boomers between 1966 and 1995. This generational divide has been shown to be of importance in previous studies on religion (Bibby 2007; Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011), and follows many of the between-cohort differences observed in the previous chapter.

models). The main country-level fixed effects of these models include traditionally Catholic religious structure, traditionally Protestant religious structure, traditionally mixed religious structure, and traditionally Orthodox religious structure. Table 2.1 shows which countries fall into these categories.

Table 2.1: Country Classification, Traditionally Catholic, Protestant, Mixed (Principal Religion Accounts for Less than 70% of Affiliation) or Orthodox

Traditionally Catholic	Austria Croatia Flanders France	Hungary Ireland Italy Poland	Portugal Slovenia Spain
Traditionally Protestant	Australia Denmark Finland	Great Britain Iceland New Zealand	Norway Sweden USA
Traditionally mixed	Canada Czech Republic Estonia	Germany Latvia	Netherlands Switzerland
Traditionally Orthodox	Bulgaria	Russia	Ukraine

The full formal model for being nominally affiliated can be stated as follows:

$$NOMAFF_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AGEC_{ij} + \beta_2 AGELOG_{ij} + \beta_3 PREBOOMER_{ij} + \beta_4 POSTBOOMER_{ij} + \beta_5 FEMALE_{ij} + \beta_6 MARRIED_{ij} + \beta_7 WIDOWED_{ij} + \beta_8 SEPDIV_{ij} + \beta_9 DEGREE_{ij} + \beta_{10} 2008ISSP_{ij} + \beta_{11} 2009ISSP_{ij} + \beta_{12} PROTESTANT_{ij} + \beta_{13} CATHOLIC_{ij} + \beta_{14} ORTHODOX_{ij} + \beta_{15} TRADMIX_j + \beta_{16} TRADCATHO_j + \beta_{17} TRADORTHO_j + u_j + e_{ij}$$

where i = individuals within country j
j = countries

The goal of these multilevel models is to isolate differences in declaring no religion, being nominally affiliated and being committed that are specific to country differences, rather than differences between affiliation, demographic and educational groups. With these between-country differences isolated, we can measure if specific country traits account for a significant amount of this variation. More specifically, we want to see if traditional religious structure, on top of present-day differences in the affiliation makeup of a population at the individual-level, affects the size of the three categories of the religious commitment typology in a way that implies a polarised configuration. In other words, we want to see if Protestant and mixed structures decrease the odds of an

individual being nominally affiliated to a greater extent than declaring no religion or being religiously committed at a given time.

RESULTS


Affiliation Trends

We first look at how the affiliation of each religious group has fared between the mid-1980s and the late 2000s in those regions that we are studying in more detail in this chapter: the US, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada. Figure 2.1 contains descriptive statistics on the religious composition of each region at the beginning and end of the period of study, generated from cross-tabulation.

The proportions in Figure 2.1 show that Protestants in general still form the largest group in 2009 in many regions, including the US (2010), Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada and Central Canada. Whereas Protestants also used to form the largest group in 1985 in Great Britain and Western Canada, in 2009 it was the proportion of individuals declaring no religion that was largest. Quebec remains the one Catholic-majority region at study in this section of the analyses. Nevertheless, the proportions of Catholics in Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada and Central Canada are very similar to those of Protestants in these regions. Finally, out of the seven regions at study, Central Canada claims the highest proportion of individuals identifying with a non-Christian religion in 2009.[49]

[49] It is difficult to get a sense of the changes over time for the proportions of non-Christian religions, due in many cases to the 'other religion' category including in 1985 smaller and more radical denominations which have since been reclassified as Protestant. This may also explain in part why Atlantic Canada and Quebec have seen a small increase in their shares of Protestants since 1985.

Figure 2.1: Religious Composition (Protestant, Catholic, Other Religion, No Religion), US, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada, 1985 (1989 for NI) – 2009 (2010 for US)



Although the proportions of Catholics have declined overall between 1985/1989 and 2009/2010 in almost all regions, with the exceptions of the US and Northern Ireland, these declines have not matched those seen by Protestants for the same period in almost all regions, with the exceptions of Atlantic Canada and Quebec. Table 2.2 summarises this fact, containing the odds ratios for the effect of year of study on each religious group in each region at study, generated from the first series of logistic regression models.

Table 2.2: Effect of Year of Study (Standardised) on Religious Affiliations (in Odds Ratios), US, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada, 1985 (1989 for NI) – 2009 (2010 for US)

	Protestant	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	United Church of Canada	Evangelical Protestant	Black Protestant	Muslim
US	0.860***	0.986	0.838***		0.894***	0.836***	
N = 36 176	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)		(0.019)	(0.019)	
Great Britain	0.856***	0.951***	0.782***		0.848***		1.226***
N = 73 034	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.015)		(0.023)		(0.050)
Northern Ireland	0.952*	1.056**					
N = 25 933	(0.021)	(0.020)					
Atlantic Canada	0.968	0.968***		0.907***			
N = 70 741	(0.030)	(0.007)		(0.013)			
Quebec	1.111**	0.770***		0.809**			
N = 72 921	(0.039)	(0.031)		(0.064)			
Central Canada	0.918***	0.965***		0.823***			
N = 135 498	(0.024)	(0.009)		(0.024)			
Western Canada	0.896***	0.958**		0.783***			
N = 75 719	(0.031)	(0.014)		(0.020)			

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Models weighted to be representative of each region's adult population. Covariates included in the models, but not in the table, include gender, foreign born (US and CAN), ethnic minority (GB), mother tongue (CAN), Black (US), marital status, level of education and region/province. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis in the Canadian regional models. † = $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Keeping in mind that the year of study variable in Table 2.2 encompasses change due to period, cohort and age effects, from the results we can see that, with the progression of time, almost all regions are characterised by statistically significant lower odds of having Protestants in general (odds ratios below 1). For example, it is estimated that in the US the odds of an average respondent being Protestant decrease each year by a factor of 0.86 between 1985 and 2010, holding all other variables constant. The exceptions in this case are Atlantic Canada where there is no statistically significant change across the years, and Quebec where its small proportion of Protestants has increased in size (odds ratios above 1). Many regions are also characterised by similar statistically significant odds of having fewer Catholic individuals over time, including Great Britain and the four Canadian regions. In Great Britain for example, each increase in one year between 1985 and 2009 decreases an average respondent's odds of being Catholic by an estimated factor of 0.951. It is only in Northern Ireland where the odds of being Catholic have increased over the years. This being said, wherever both types of affiliation are on the decline since the mid-1980s, Protestant decline is always more severe (lower odds ratios).

When we break Protestant affiliation down into more detail where possible, we can see from the results in Table 2.2 that mainline Protestants, including those of the United Church of Canada, have seen even steeper declines than Protestants in general (lower odds ratios) with the progression of time in all seven regions at study. Somewhat surprisingly, even though not seeing as important declines as the mainline Protestants, evangelical and Black Protestants[50] are also characterised by statistically significant declines in the US and Great Britain. Apart from Catholics in Northern Ireland and Protestants in Quebec, Muslims in Great Britain are the only other

[50] A reminder that these declines are present in the models when fixing the Black population in the US at the same proportional size between 1985 and 2010.


religious group measured here that has seen a statistically significant increase over the years.[51] With each passing year between 1985 and 2009, it is estimated that the odds of an average respondent being Muslim (as compared with not being Muslim) in Great Britain are 1.226 times larger.

Attendance Trends

To briefly summarise so far, Protestants, especially mainline Protestants, have seen steeper losses in the past two and a half decades, compared with Catholics, in all regions at study except Atlantic Canada and Quebec. Let us now see if the second criterion of polarisation is fulfilled by attendance levels having rebounded among those who do remain affiliated. Figure 2.2 contains the proportions of individuals attending religious services at least once a month for Protestants and for Catholics in the seven regions at study in both 1985 (1989 for Northern Ireland) and 2009 (2010 for US). It is important to keep in mind that, as we saw in the previous section, Protestant and Catholic groups are smaller in many of the regions in 2009/2010 as compared with 1985/1989.

[51] Although we do control for some socio-demographic factors in the models, it is worth noting that these proportional changes in the categories of religious affiliation can not only be the consequence of rising religious apostasy or denominational switching, but also of differences in natural reproduction/demographic gains.

Figure 2.2: Monthly Religious Service Attendance, for Protestants and Catholics, US, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada, 1985 (1989 for NI) – 2009 (2010 for US)



The descriptive proportions in Figure 2.2 show that rates of monthly attendance among Protestants were lower than those among Catholics in 1985 (1989 for NI) in all seven regions at study. However, rates of monthly attendance among remaining Protestants in 2009 (2010 for US) have generally declined less since 1985/1989, seeing even an increase in the US, Great Britain, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada. By contrast, monthly attendance among remaining Catholics has declined in almost all regions at study between 1985/1989 and 2009/2010, with the exception of Western Canada where it has remained at virtually the same level. In some cases, such as in the US, Quebec and Western Canada, the rates of monthly attendance among Protestants has equalled or even surpassed those of Catholics in 2009/2010.

Do these trends hold when controlling for socio-demographic factors? Similar to what was done in the previous section of results, a series of logistic regression models were run with year of study as the main independent variable and a series of socio-demographic controls, but this time with monthly attendance as the dependent variable

and restricting the samples to only those who belong to the religious category in question. Table 2.3 contains the results of these models.

The results in Table 2.3 show that, for those retaining any form of Protestant identity over the years, there has been a statistically significant decline in the odds of attending religious services at least once a month in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and Atlantic Canada. For example, with each increase of one year between 1985 and 2009, the odds of attending monthly for an average British Protestant respondent decrease by an estimated factor of 0.936. These same odds for Protestants have seen no significant change over the years in the US, Quebec and Central Canada. Finally, in Western Canada the declining Protestant population has seen its individuals' odds of attending monthly increase over time (by a factor of 1.18 each year between 1985 and 2009). For Catholics, the decline in odds of attending monthly is more universal, only not statistically significant in Western Canada.

As for the more specific categories of affiliation, the US has seen no statistically significant change in the odds of attending monthly for individuals in any Protestant group, including mainline, evangelical or Black Protestants. By contrast, Great Britain, Atlantic Canada and Central Canada have seen a decline in these same odds for individuals belonging to mainline Protestantism (GB) and the United Church of Canada (Atlantic and Central Canada). There is no statistically significant change for Evangelicals or Muslims in Great Britain. Finally, individuals belonging to the United Church have not seen the same increase in their odds of attending monthly as Protestants in general have in Western Canada.

Table 2.3: Effect of Year of Study (Standardised) on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (in Odds Ratios), by Religious Affiliation Category, US, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada, 1985 (1989 for NI) – 2009 (2010 for US)

	Protestant	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	United Church of Canada	Evangelical Protestant	Black Protestant	Muslim
US	1.014	0.864***	0.953		1.004	1.053	
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.039)		(0.022)	(0.044)	
Great Britain	0.936***	0.848***	0.924***		0.991		1.063
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.067)		(0.104)
Northern Ireland	0.856***	0.638**					
	(0.022)	(0.027)					
Atlantic Canada	0.929**	0.727***		0.852***			
	(0.022)	(0.027)		(0.024)			
Quebec	1.026	0.693***		0.872			
	(0.048)	(0.024)		(0.074)			
Central Canada	1.034	0.854***		0.905**			
	(0.022)	(0.018)		(0.030)			
Western Canada	1.180***	0.998		1.065			
	(0.034)	(0.038)		(0.043)			

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Models weighted to be representative of each region's adult population. Covariates included in the models, but not the table, include gender, foreign born (US and CAN), ethnic minority (GB), mother tongue (CAN), Black (US), marital status, level of education and region/province. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis in the Canadian regional models. † = $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

At first glance, it would appear that the declines in monthly attendance that Catholics are seeing are more severe than those experienced by the remaining Protestants. When combined with the results from Table 2.2, this would imply that Protestants are losing more of their nominal affiliates than Catholics are. However, since the coefficients in Table 2.3 were generated from models run with different samples, they are not necessarily comparable, most notably because the mean that all the other socio-demographic controls are kept at when reading these coefficients may vary between religious categories and regions. Consequently, we confirm these apparent lesser decreases (and in the case of Western Canada, increase) among Protestants compared with Catholics with the results in Table 2.4. These results were generated from a series of logistic regression models run with only the Protestant and Catholic samples of the datasets. These models have monthly attendance as the dependent variable, an interaction term for being Protestant and year of study in order to get a cumulative time effect as the main independent variable, as well as the usual series of socio-demographic controls. Separate models were also run with interaction terms for being Protestant and year of study when controlling for birth cohort, and for being Protestant and birth cohort when controlling for year of study, in order to get a sense of the weight of period and cohort effects[52] in change over time.

[52] A reminder that, since we do not control for age, birth cohort here also contains any potential age effects.

Table 2.4: Effect of Protestant and Year, Protestant and Cohort as well as Protestant and Cumulative Time Interaction Terms on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (in Odds Ratios), Protestant and Catholic populations only, US, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada, 1985 (1989 for NI) – 2009 (2010 for US)

	Protestant* year	Protestant* cohort	Protestant* cumulative time
US	1.012**	1.013***	1.023***
N = 29,610	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Great Britain	1.008*	1.016***	1.021***
N = 40,656	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Northern Ireland	1.053***	1.016***	1.060***
N = 22,860	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Atlantic Canada	1.035***	1.012***	1.039***
N = 63,425	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Quebec	1.054***	1.056***	1.097***
N = 63,699	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Central Canada	1.021***	1.016***	1.028***
N = 100,183	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.008)
Western Canada	0.981***	1.019***	1.024*
N = 47,841	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.010)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Covariates included in the models, but not the table, include year, birth cohort, Protestant, gender, foreign born (US and CAN), ethnic minority (GB), mother tongue (CAN), Black (US), marital status, level of education and region/province. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis in the Canadian regional models. † = $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

The results in Table 2.4 do show that Protestants' odds of attending religious services at least once a month have increased in a statistically significant manner over time when compared with only those of Catholics in all seven regions. In the US for example, an average Protestant's odds of attending monthly increase by an estimated factor of 1.012 each year between 1985 and 2010 when compared with an average Catholic's odds. This type of change appears to be present both over the years and between birth cohorts, except in the case of Western Canada. In this region, Protestants' odds of attending religious services monthly have declined over the years at study when compared with those of

Catholics (by an estimated factor of 0.981 for each year between 1985 and 2009). However, these declines are offset by increases across birth cohorts, which still result in overall increases of Protestants' odds of attending monthly when compared with Catholics' over time in Western Canada.

Traditional Religious Structure

The results so far indicate that, as a process developing over time, religious polarisation is more commonly found among Protestants than among other religious groups in the regions at study. Does this imply then that the current size of religious groups accounts for all inter-region and inter-country variation in the population distribution of the religious commitment typology? Or do certain differences remain in this regard between regions and countries, explained by specific contextual factors? Does a more fractured religious structure found more often in traditionally Protestant-dominant or mixed societies have repercussions in this regard among individuals of all religions?

Before detailing the results from the more complex models, Table 2.5 classifies the countries from the 2008-2010 ISSP data into configurations, to use Martin's term (1978; 2005), or religiosity regimes (Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme 2011) to use another vocabulary. These religious configurations or regimes can be seen almost as ideal types in the Weberian sense, acknowledging a wide amount of pluralism within, but also accentuating the fact that certain regions have shared religious patterns at a given time. Configurations are measured in this section as a *state* at a given time, rather than as a *process* developing over time. This rough classification is based on the proportions that these countries had in 2008-2010 of unaffiliated, nominally affiliated and religiously committed individuals:

- *Actively religious* countries: proportion of religiously committed individuals above 50%.

- *Culturally religious* countries: proportion of nominally affiliated individuals above 50%.
- *Secularised* countries: proportion of unaffiliated individuals above 50%.
- *Polarised* countries: proportion of nominally affiliated individuals below 50%, and proportions of both unaffiliated and religiously committed individuals above 10%.

Table 2.5: Proportion of Unaffiliated, Nominally Affiliated and Committed, by Religious Configuration, 30 Countries, ISSP 2008-2010

	Active Religion (Committed 50% or Higher)		
	No Religion	Nominally Affiliated	**Committed**
Poland	12.2%	24.8%	63.0%
Republic of Ireland	7.0%	32.1%	60.8%

	Cultural Religion (Nominally Affiliated 50% or higher)		
	No Religion	**Nominally Affiliated**	Committed
Iceland	9.1%	81.0%	9.9%
Denmark	14.2%	78.6%	7.2%
Bulgaria	7.7%	75.2%	17.1%
Russia	13.7%	75.2%	11.1%
Hungary	11.2%	74.7%	14.1%
Finland	18.6%	73.0%	8.5%
Norway	19.3%	72.6%	8.1%
Ukraine	8.8%	67.2%	24.9%
Switzerland	17.4%	63.6%	19.0%
Sweden	30.1%	63.1%	6.8%
Flanders	25.7%	60.7%	13.6%
Austria	16.3%	59.3%	24.4%
Spain	18.4%	57.2%	24.4%
Croatia	4.1%	56.9%	39.0%
Latvia	27.7%	56.4%	15.9%
Portugal	8.0%	53.8%	38.2%
Germany	32.1%	51.5%	16.5%

	Secularised (Unaffiliated 50% or Higher)		
	No Religion	Nominally Affiliated	Committed
Estonia	65.7%	27.1%	7.2%
Czech Republic	64.8%	26.9%	8.3%
Great Britain	52.3%	30.8%	16.8%

Table 2.5 (cont.):

	Polarised (Nominally Affiliated Lower than 50% and Both Unaffiliated and Committed 10% or Higher)		
	No Religion	Nominally Affiliated	Committed
Canada	25.4%	35.0%	39.6%
USA	18.6%	36.3%	45.1%
Italy	10.2%	41.4%	48.5%
Netherlands	43.1%	45.5%	11.4%
New Zealand	34.1%	47.3%	18.6%
France	39.1%	47.5%	13.5%
Australia	33.4%	48.9%	17.6%
Slovenia	26.4%	49.8%	23.7%

We can see by this classification that there are traditionally Protestant (mainly Nordic), mixed and Catholic countries among the cultural religion configuration. Additionally, there are some traditionally Catholic countries classified as polarised, including Italy, France and Slovenia (although Slovenia is on the edge of being classified as a cultural religion country). Consequently, from the descriptive statistics there is not much evidence of traditional religious structure playing a role in configurations of religious polarisation. Let us see if this is also the case with the multivariate analyses.

As detailed previously in the Methods section, two-level binary random intercept models were generated with the 2008-2010 ISSP data. These models measure the effects of a country's traditional religious structure on the three different categories of the religious commitment typology in more recent years, once controlling for relevant individual-level factors. If traditionally Protestant-dominant and mixed countries are more likely to be characterised by a configuration of polarisation, respondents in these types of countries should have lower odds of being nominally affiliated, and statistically non-significant or higher odds of being both of no religion and religiously committed. For a configuration of polarisation to be present, the odds of a respondent being either of no religion and religiously committed could also have declined, but to a lesser extent than those of being nominally affiliated. Tables 2.6 to 2.8 contain the results of these models.

Table 2.6: Fixed Effects (Odds Ratios) on Declaring No Religion, with Random Intercepts for 30 Countries, 2008-2010 ISSP

		Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects (odds ratios)	***Individual variables***		
	Age (centered)	0.981**	0.981**
		(0.007)	(0.007)
	Age (natural log)	1.482	1.490
		(0.385)	(0.389)
	Pre-Boomer (ref. cat.: Boomer)	0.760***	0.757***
		(0.052)	(0.052)
	Post-Boomer (ref. cat.: Boomer)	1.036	1.050
		(0.056)	(0.057)
	Female	0.663***	0.661***
		(0.018)	(0.018)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.647***	0.649***
		(0.025)	(0.025)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.675***	0.683***
		(0.047)	(0.048)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.974	0.983
		(0.052)	(0.052)
	Years of Education	1.041***	1.041***
		(0.004)	(0.004)
	Year 2008 (ref. cat.: year 2010)	0.670	1.435
		(0.394)	(1.209)
	Year 2009 (ref. cat.: year 2010)	0.837	1.057
		(0.334)	(0.601)
	Country variables		
	Traditionally mixed (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		0.103***
			(0.015)
	Traditionally Catholic (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		0.142***
			(0.077)
	Traditionally Orthodox (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		0.114**
			(0.095)
	Constant	0.065**	0.231
		(0.064)	(0.240)
Between-country variance (constant)		0.890***	1.712***
		(0.232)	(0.457)

N = 36,477. N. of gr. = 30. Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. † = $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 2.7: Fixed Effects (Odds Ratios) on Being Nominally Affiliated, with Random Intercepts for 30 Countries, 2008-2010 ISSP

		Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects (odds ratios)	***Individual variables***		
	Age (centered)	0.978***	0.978***
		(0.006)	(0.006)
	Age (natural log)	2.048**	2.049**
		(0.474)	(0.475)
	Pre-Boomer (ref. cat.: Boomer)	0.963	0.962
		(0.055)	(0.055)
	Post-Boomer (ref. cat.: Boomer)	0.924	0.921†
		(0.045)	(0.045)
	Female	0.840***	0.840***
		(0.021)	(0.021)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)	1.018	1.017
		(0.037)	(0.037)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.885*	0.883*
		(0.052)	(0.052)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)	1.194***	1.191***
		(0.061)	(0.061)
	Years of Education	0.996	0.996
		(0.003)	(0.003)
	Year 2008 (ref. cat.: year 2010)	0.296†	0.338†
		(0.197)	(0.223)
	Year 2009 (ref. cat.: year 2010)	0.644	0.872
		(0.291)	(0.387)
	Catholic (ref. cat.: Protestant)	8.270***	8.182***
		(0.302)	(0.300)
	Orthodox (ref. cat.: Protestant)	34.603***	34.831***
		(2.954)	(2.991)
	Jewish (ref. cat.: Protestant)	9.824***	9.775***
		(2.913)	(2.899)
	Muslim (ref. cat.: Protestant)	7.050***	6.992***
		(0.809)	(0.805)
	Other religion (ref. cat.: Protestant)	5.203***	5.172***
		(0.622)	(0.618)
	Country variables		
	Traditionally mixed (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		2.022***
			(0.290)
	Traditionally Catholic (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		0.447†
			(0.190)
	Traditionally Orthodox (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		0.275†
			(0.180)
	Constant	0.038***	0.046***
		(0.034)	(0.042)
Between-country variance (constant)		1.146***	1.046***
		(0.298)	(0.280)

N = 36,477. N. of gr.: 30. Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. † = $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 2.8: Fixed Effects (Odds Ratios) on Being Religiously Committed, with Random Intercepts for 30 Countries, 2008-2010 ISSP

		Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects (odds ratios)	*Individual variables*		
	Age (centered)	1.042***	1.042***
		(0.007)	(0.007)
	Age (natural log)	0.297***	0.297***
		(0.081)	(0.081)
	Pre-Boomer (ref. cat.: Boomer)	1.279***	1.280***
		(0.082)	(0.082)
	Post-Boomer (ref. cat.: Boomer)	1.017	1.016
		(0.060)	(0.060)
	Female	1.631***	1.632***
		(0.049)	(0.049)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)	1.478***	1.477***
		(0.068)	(0.068)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)	1.369***	1.366***
		(0.091)	(0.090)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.892†	0.891†
		(0.058)	(0.058)
	Years of Education	0.999	0.999
		(0.004)	(0.004)
	Year 2008 (ref. cat.: year 2010)	1.831	1.602
		(0.763)	(0.728)
	Year 2009 (ref. cat.: year 2010)	1.058	1.030
		(0.300)	(0.316)
	Catholic (ref. cat.: Protestant)	4.279***	4.228***
		(0.179)	(0.179)
	Orthodox (ref. cat.: Protestant)	1.490***	1.480***
		(0.128)	(0.129)
	Jewish (ref. cat.: Protestant)	1.463	1.455
		(0.471)	(0.468)
	Muslim (ref. cat.: Protestant)	5.593***	5.532***
		(0.636)	(0.630)
	Other religion (ref. cat.: Protestant)	3.457***	3.443***
		(0.431)	(0.429)
	Country variables		
	Traditionally mixed (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		1.468*
			(0.282)
	Traditionally Catholic (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		1.368
			(0.416)
	Traditionally Orthodox (ref. cat.: traditionally Protestant)		1.207
			(0.554)
	Constant	5.442†	4.448
		(5.597)	(4.615)
Between-country variance (constant)		0.445***	0.492***
		(0.117)	(0.133)

N = 36,477. N. of gr.: 30. Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. † = $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

At the individual level, the results from the previous sections on affiliation and attendance can be confirmed to a certain extent among a larger number of countries: Catholics, the Orthodox, the Jewish, Muslims and individuals identifying with other non-Christian religions all have higher odds, when compared with Protestants, of being nominally affiliated (Table 2.7), and to a lesser extent of being committed in some cases (Table 2.8). Nevertheless, even when controlling for specific religious affiliation at the individual level for the nominally affiliated and religiously committed models (Tables 2.7 and 2.8), between-country variation for these outcome variables remains statistically significant.

In an attempt to explain some of this between-country variation, variables for country-level religious structure were added to the models (Models 2). The results show that respondents in traditionally mixed, Catholic and Orthodox countries have lower odds of being unaffiliated compared with those in traditionally Protestant countries (Table 2.6). The odds of respondents in traditionally Protestant countries being unaffiliated are an estimated 1.897 times those of respondents in traditionally mixed nations, 1.858 times those of respondents in traditionally Catholic nations, and 1.886 times those of respondents in traditionally Orthodox nations when all other variables are kept constant. Yet, for being nominally affiliated (Table 2.7) or religiously committed (Table 2.8) the only statistically significant country effects are that respondents in traditionally mixed countries have higher odds of scoring one on these two outcome variables than those in traditionally Protestant countries. All other country effects are not significant at the 95% level. This means that a configuration of religious polarisation as measured here is not more commonly found in traditionally Protestant or mixed societies as a whole. Additionally, even with the country controls for traditional religious structure, variation in the dependent variables between nations is still statistically significant, meaning there are more contextual factors at play that the present study does not capture.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Hypothesis H_{2a}, put forward at the start of this chapter, can be confirmed: the phenomenon of institutional religious polarisation does seem to be more of a Protestant one. Since 1985, there has been a greater decline of Protestant affiliation, but among those remaining affiliates there have been lesser declines, and even relative stability in many regions, of monthly religious service attendance. In Western Canada, we even observe an increase in the odds of attending at least monthly among remaining Protestants. By contrast, among Catholics there has been more stability regarding affiliation since 1985, but more decline of monthly attendance among those affiliated, making nominal affiliation or belonging to the religious middle ground much more common for Catholics. As for our non-Christian example, among Muslims in Great Britain there have been few signs of institutional religious polarisation, only a rise in Muslim affiliation and a stability of their rates of monthly service attendance.

As for $H_{2a.1}$, affiliation decline has been more severe for mainline Protestant groups, and there has also been a decline of monthly attendance among these same groups in Great Britain, Atlantic Canada and Central Canada. Consequently, especially in the case of Great Britain there are signs of inter- or between-denomination polarisation taking place among Protestants and among religions in general: rates of affiliates, both nominal and practising, are declining mostly from mainline Protestantism, and there is more stability from the more practising Evangelicals and Muslims. However, in other areas we can observe intra- or within-denomination polarisation among Protestants: monthly attendance of mainline Protestants is relatively stable in the US, Quebec and Western Canada for example.

Yet, despite these denominational differences in institutional religious polarisation, the regional effects that were observed in the previous chapter are still visible. Indicative of their cultural religion configuration, there appears to be less decline of both Protestant and

Catholic affiliations in Atlantic Canada and Northern Ireland, twinned with more decline of monthly attendance levels among both religious groups. Protestants in Western Canada are showing signs of polarisation, but Catholics there also show a stability of attendance trends with a decline of affiliation. Once again, the US has seen only slight declines in Protestant affiliation and Catholic monthly attendance.

By studying a larger number of countries in more recent time points, we can confirm that respondents of religions other than Protestantism have higher odds of being nominal affiliates, and also to a lesser extent of being committed. Overall then, current states of religious polarisation where nominal affiliation is lowest appear to be present most among Protestants. The results in Table 2.5 would suggest that Protestants in Nordic countries are the exception to this rule: nominal affiliation is still very high in these contexts of monopolistic Protestant churches with strong links to the State. Large numbers of individuals in these nations may remain linked in name only to the State Churches in order to gain certain social benefits not available to unaffiliates. However, even with these differences between religions there remains statistically significant variation of declaring no religion, being nominally affiliated and being religiously committed between countries. Traditional religious structure does not seem to play much of a role in this variation, especially when it comes to configurations of religious polarisation (small middle ground and average or large extremes).

Consequently, there remains a significant amount of variation between countries which is not accounted for by the variables included in the models of this chapter, and thus future research is needed to tease out all of the factors at play. What we can conclude at this stage though is that, rather than eclipsing it, the denominational dimension can be added to the regional/national one of religious polarisation as a further aspect of this dynamic process. Yet, so far we have only measured religious polarisation through the two indicators of affiliation and attendance, either as a process of a declining middle ground of nominal

affiliation over time, or as a state of lower levels of nominal affiliation and non-negligible levels of both non-affiliation and religious commitment in a certain place at a certain time. The next two chapters introduce more religiosity indicators into the analysis, including conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, favourable views regarding religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity. This is done in order to see if these indicators are more concentrated among the religiously active in advanced secularised areas, and if levels of this concentration have been increasing over time.

CHAPTER THREE

Greater Differences between the Religious and the Secular with Advanced Secularisation

To date, the findings from Chapter One have shown us that, as a *process* of declining proportions of nominal affiliates, rising proportions of religious nones and stable proportions of religiously committed, polarisation can be found in Great Britain as well as in Alberta and British Columbia from the mid-1980s until the end of the 2000s. In turn, the findings from Chapter Two indicate that this process of religious polarisation is more commonly found among Protestants than among any other religious group in US, UK and Canadian regions. The findings from Chapter Two also demonstrate that, for 30 North American, European and Oceanic nations, being a Protestant reduces an individual's odds of being in the religious middle ground of nominal affiliation at the end of the 2000s (especially in Non-Nordic countries).

Yet, so far our focus has remained on a combination of the religiosity indicators of affiliation and frequency of service attendance as the measures of polarisation, more

institutional aspects of religion that relate to the relationship an individual has with a church or other religious group. To what extent can polarisation be found when studying other aspects related to religion, such as expressing conservative attitudes towards sexuality and gender roles, being favourable towards religious leaders influencing politics, holding religious beliefs and having a higher level of personal religiosity (life being meaningful with God, high frequency of prayer and self-description as religious)? To what extent is there a hardening of extremes in the sense that, in contexts with more advanced processes of secularisation, what religiosity and other related features there are become the sole domain of a more restricted but also a more fervent group of individuals in society?

There has been much talk about a growing social divide between the religious and the secular, about these two groups becoming more distinct and fervent in their separate and often opposing ways. Religious fanaticism features prominently in the minds of contemporary Westerners. This fanaticism includes the multiple terrorist acts carried out by specific Islamic movements over the last few decades. It also includes Christian Right groups denying scientific facts, forming or influencing extreme right political parties or sub-factions of existing parties (such as the Tea Party in the US), and carrying out terrorist acts of their own by attacking abortion clinics, gay bars and other public targets. At the opposing end, humanist movements have in many cases stepped up their conversion attempts to atheism in the last few decades. These movements have been holding prominent debates on the issue of the existence of God and paying for advertisements in public places in many Western nations, such as their infamous international bus ad campaigns in the late 2000s. Although restricting his analysis to the US, Hunter (1991; 2006) famously refers to events like these as being part of a larger Culture War fought between religious conservatives and secular liberals.

These case examples are easily memorable for their violent nature, sensationalism or extreme doctrine, and are fed to us on a regular basis by the world's media. Yet, there has

been little systematic cross-national and cross-temporal empirical testing of the idea that a growing social divide between the religious and the secular cuts across all individuals in contemporary Western culture. This chapter and the following one fill this gap by measuring exactly how religious are the religious, how secular are the secular, and if there is a growing trend of hardening extremes at the individual level within Christian populations in post-industrial societies. The present chapter focuses on a cross-national and cross-regional comparison in this regard, seeing if there are greater differences in all aspects related to religion between the actively religious and the unaffiliated in countries and regions where secularisation has been underway for many decades. The next chapter will test if this has been a growing trend since the 1990s.

THEORY

As seen in the Introduction, when it comes to trends of increase, stability or decline, many researchers have shown that religion is a multi-faceted phenomenon and that different aspects of religion can be characterised by these varying trends over time and between areas (Campiche 2010; Davie 1990; 2000a; Dobbelaere 1981; 2002; Hout and Fisher 2002; Lim et al. 2010; Storm 2009; Voas 2009). When it comes to individual religiosity, the principal distinction made is that between the more institutional aspects related to religious communities and the more personal aspects related to how an individual experiences and practises religion in her/his everyday life. Davie (1990; 2000a) has argued for many decades now that Britons, and Europeans in general, have to a large extent retained many religious beliefs while abandoning their links to religious institutions and groups. Campiche (2010) provides evidence in Europe for the decline of institutional aspects of religion, in other words all aspects linking an individual to a specific religious organisation or institution (affiliation, service attendance, favourable views towards religion in public life, belief in a

specific God, etc.). Yet, he also shows the persistence of what he calls 'universal' aspects such as belief in a higher power, prayer, etc.

Hervieu-Léger (1999) similarly predicts a process of religious individualisation developing among the unaffiliated. This author sees contemporary society as being divided into distinct regimes: a community and a mutual regime. The community regime refers to those smaller groups of religious individuals among whom all features of religion (including institutional affiliation and practice, beliefs, prayer, etc.) align. The mutual regime refers to the other segments of society who distance themselves from religious groups but who still seek their own unique and authentic spiritual system, and thus may borrow and maintain certain personal aspects of religiosity while still being completely removed from institutional religion. In this case, personal religiosity indicators such as religious beliefs and personal religiosity would be found not only among the religiously active, but also among the unaffiliated, and so average differences of these indicators should not be greater in areas with more advanced secularisation. Like with supply-side religious market models, spiritual 'seeking' would still remain a fundamental aspect of human nature according to the individualisation framework.

Others have shown in both the US and European contexts that the unaffiliated do not form one homogenous and very secular group, but rather that a sizeable proportion of these religious 'nones' retain certain beliefs and religious practices (Lim et al. 2010; Storm 2009; Voas 2009). In the US, Hout and Fisher (2002) argue that the decline in feelings of confidence towards religious institutions and the rise in non-affiliation seen since the 1990s have their root cause in religion's larger involvement in US politics since the 1980s: many individuals react negatively to this involvement by retaining religious beliefs without wanting to be attached to a religious institution.

Nevertheless, many scholars are not convinced that this *believing without belonging* phenomenon, or religious individualism, is here to stay in Western societies. Although it is

widely accepted that some aspects of religion decline at different rates than others, some researchers have shown that the more personal aspects, most notably traditional religious beliefs, are most definitely not immune to decline (Aarts et al. 2008; Bruce 2011a; Voas and Crockett 2005). These studies, however, generally limit themselves to demonstrating decline and do not go further by seeing if this decline of beliefs is a uniform affair blanketing individuals of all types, or rather if beliefs are becoming more and more concentrated, even increasing in levels, among actively religious and practising individuals, and disappearing altogether among the unaffiliated.

More generally, when it comes to religious polarisation very little research has been done on distinguishing which features of religion are involved and which ones are not. This is not to say, however, that no one has broached the subject. Inspired by Casanova's theory of religious deprivatisation (1994) and using 1998 ISSP data, Achterberg et al. (2009) found that, in Western countries where Christians had become numerically marginal in 1998, favourable attitudes towards religion playing a larger role in public life were more concentrated among those who remained affiliated to Christianity, and less among those who were unaffiliated. With more detailed Dutch data, this study also showed that this trend had been developing between 1970 and 1996 in the Netherlands.

Achterberg et al. are some of the few researchers who have attempted to systematically test for religious polarisation by studying the concentration of religiosity indicators within the same individuals between countries and over time. They are also some of the few to measure for potential contextual factors at play: in this case, lower levels of Christian affiliation were associated with greater differences between the affiliated and unaffiliated. In so doing, their study is very informative, especially for the purposes of the present research. However, this study does only focus on attitudes towards religion in public life, one of many aspects surrounding and characterising the religious. It also only distinguishes between the affiliated and unaffiliated, not considering the actively religious as potentially different from

the nominally affiliated middle ground. It may be that favourable attitudes towards religion in public life have actually become more concentrated only among the religiously committed in areas where this group is smaller in size, and Achterberg et al.'s study would not have captured this.

Although systematic empirical testing is scarce, other scholars have theorised the concentration of multiple facets of religion among the actively religious. As mentioned previously, some scholars in the US, led most notably by Hunter (1991; 2006), put forward that conservative attitudes and values, rightwing political ideology and evangelical practices are becoming more and more concentrated among those who are religious, leading to a major social divide and a 'Culture War' in America. Martin (2005), Putnam and Campbell (2010) and Roy (2008), when elaborating their general religious polarisation frameworks (which we reviewed in the Introduction), do not explicitly mention exactly which religiosity indicators they are referring to. However, we can gather from their work that they would include both personal and institutional aspects of religion: in more secularised social contexts where religion and religious practice are no longer a normative obligation, those who remain voluntarily attached to religious groups do so based on personal reasons, which one can imagine relate most notably to religious beliefs, perceiving oneself as religious, etc. Faced with secular society, these groups would become more defensive and hardened in their views and beliefs.

Those at the other extreme, who are removed from religious institutions, are also going to be distanced from all aspects of religion, either due to active decision-making on their part to become secular, or for later generations simply because they were not religiously socialised in any way. Since polarisation in this framework is seen as a later stage of secularisation, the concentration of all aspects surrounding religion among a more restricted group of individuals is theorised to be found especially in areas with more advanced

processes of secularisation, and to develop over time in areas where secularisation is underway.

In other words, according to the polarisation framework, average differences in all religiosity indicators should be greater between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in areas with larger unaffiliated groups, i.e. where secularisation is more advanced. Additionally, average levels of all religiosity indicators should be higher among the remaining religiously committed in contexts with more advanced secularisation, as compared with the religiously committed in contexts with less advanced secularisation. Finally, average levels of all religiosity indicators should be lower among the unaffiliated in contexts with more advanced secularisation, as compared with the unaffiliated in contexts with less advanced secularisation.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Since there is little to no systematic cross-national or cross-regional empirical testing of the polarisation framework regarding the trending of differences between the religious and the secular, the research questions which the present chapter aims to answer are as follows:

> *Q_{3a}: To what extent do average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity vary between post-industrial nations and regions?*
>
> > *$Q_{3a.1}$: More specifically, to what extent do levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity vary between post-industrial nations and regions among both the unaffiliated and the committed?*
>
> *Q_{3b}: What contextual factors account for some of this between-country and between-region variation?*

The present chapter will limit itself to cross-national and cross-regional comparisons for one more recent time point. The next chapter, Chapter Four, will address related research questions regarding the temporal evolution of these average differences. Based on the


polarisation theory seen in the previous sections, the hypotheses for this chapter are as follows:

> *H_{3a}: Average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity will vary significantly between post-industrial nations and regions.*
>
> > *$H_{3a.1}$: Levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity among both the religiously committed and the unaffiliated will vary significantly between post-industrial nations and regions.*
>
> *$H_{3b.1}$: Those countries and regions characterised by greater average differences will be those with more advanced processes of secularisation, i.e. those with higher proportions of unaffiliated individuals in 2008.*
>
> *$H_{3b.2}$: Those countries and regions with more advanced processes of secularisation, i.e. with higher proportions of unaffiliated individuals in 2008, will be characterised by higher levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity among the remaining religiously committed, and lower levels among the unaffiliated.*

METHODS

In order to test these hypotheses, we transformed our religious commitment typology that acted as a dependent variable in the previous two chapters into our main independent variable for the analyses in this and the following chapter. Figure 3.1 contains the proportions of each of the three categories (no religion, nominally affiliated and religiously committed) for each of the countries at study in 2008.

Figure 3.1: Proportion of Unaffiliated, Nominally Affiliated and Religiously Committed, by Country, 2008 ISSP



The first part of the analyses focused on measuring the association of being religiously committed (affiliated and attending religious services at least once a month) with other religiosity indicators as compared with being unaffiliated in the various countries at study: the larger the coefficient, the more difference between the committed and the unaffiliated.[53] We focus our comparisons specifically between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated, since it is the potentially larger differences between these two groups that interest us the most here. Nevertheless, findings for the nominally affiliated group will be mentioned when relevant. Additional to measuring these average differences, we restricted the second part of our analyses respectively to the committed, nominally affiliated and unaffiliated samples, in order to estimate the difference between countries in mean levels of the religiosity indicators for each of these three groups. With these estimations, we can see if levels of religiosity indicators are higher among the committed and lower among the unaffiliated in areas with more advanced secularisation.

It is important to note that, although we use religious commitment as the independent variable in the analyses and the other religiosity indicators as the dependent variables, we do so to estimate average differences, not causality. It is very possible that aspects such as religious beliefs, personal religiosity or conservative attitudes affect an individual's decision to be affiliated to a religion and regularly attend religious services. In turn, being affiliated and regularly attending may shape beliefs, certain behaviours and attitudes. Although few studies in sociology of religion have specifically tested the direction of causality for many of these associations, what we are interested in here is the strength of the associations as a measure for average differences, and the mean levels of the various aspects of religion among the committed, nominally affiliated and unaffiliated.

[53] The models of this chapter were also run with the frequency of religious service attendance scale as the main independent variable, and produced very similar findings. However, for continuity throughout the dissertation and because we wanted to clearly demark the committed from the nominally affiliated and unaffiliated, we used the religious commitment typology in the main models.

Data

A more detailed and extensive set of religiosity indicators needed to test the hypotheses of this chapter is not as commonly found in social surveys as the two indicators of affiliation and attendance. Nevertheless, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) does have a religion module which has been run three times since its beginnings: in 1991, 1998 and 2008. These cycles of the ISSP contain a wide array of measures of various aspects of religion spanning dozens of countries. For the purposes of the present research, we focus once again on the available North American, European and Oceanic countries to which the polarisation framework may best apply due to their historical and in many cases present-day Christian character.[54] The 2008 ISSP also distinguishes between regions (provinces, states or counties) in the dataset, which allows us to generate hierarchical models not only with individual and country levels, but also with a regional level: over 180 regions within the 23 countries at study.[55] In other words, we can not only measure average differences across countries, but also across smaller regions within these countries, better accounting for the more precise nature of the social environment within which individuals interact.[56]

Following the works of researchers such as Roos (2012) and Sullins (2006). and based on the available variables in the 1991, 1998 and 2008 ISSPs for the countries and regions at study, four general indicators of or related to religion were selected in order to test the hypotheses: expression of conservative attitudes regarding gender roles and sexuality, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity. There is ample evidence of religiously committed individuals scoring higher on all of these features of religion (Achterberg et al. 2009; Bibby 2011; McAndrew 2010). Nevertheless, the four indicators are measured separately here since they do

[54] The countries at study include Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. For sample sizes in each country in 2008, see Table C.1 in Appendix C.

[55] Only those regions with 50 cases or more for our sample in 2008 were included in the analyses, in order to get a sufficiently robust estimate for the contextual-level variable (mean size of the unaffiliated group).

[56] In line with what Lim and MacGregor (2010) suggest for contextual-level analyses.

represent different attitudes and behaviour that may not necessarily be shared by all individuals who are affiliated and attend religious services regularly.

Each of the four indicators are represented in the dataset by a continuous scale: higher scores indicate more adherence to conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, more favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, holding more religious beliefs and having a higher level of personal religiosity. These scales were generated from an initial series of ordinal variables and four separate principal components factor analyses. Table 3.1 contains the list of these variables as well as the factor loadings, Eigen value and Cronbach's Alpha score for each of the four groups.

Although taken into account when initially selecting the ordinal variables to form each of the scales, some of the variables used do have relatively high levels of missing values: ranging from 1.2% for belief in God to 12.2% for attitudes towards sexual relations between two adults of the same sex. When factor analyses were run with the original variables, these missing values cumulated to 15.7% for conservative attitudes, 4.3% for views towards religious leaders influencing politics, 19.6% for religious beliefs and 9.6% for personal religiosity. In many cases, these missing values are not randomly distributed: older individuals, women, the unemployed and the lower educated for example have higher odds of not answering some of the relevant questions. Consequently, in order to avoid any potential bias, the missing values from the 12 original ordinal variables were imputed using multiple imputation techniques, running 10 imputations based on chained ordinal logistic regression. The independent variables included in the imputation models were those used in the main analyses.[57] The factor analyses were then run with the imputed variables.[58]


[57] These include age, gender, marital status, employment status, level of education (highest degree obtained), religious commitment typology, specific religious affiliation, ISSP wave and country.

[58] We also ran the factor analyses and subsequent models with the original variables (with missing values), and obtained very similar findings. When generating descriptive statistics or models with the imputed data, we either averaged the estimates from each of the 10 imputations ourselves according to Rubin's Rule or employed the *mi estimate* command in Stata.

Table 3.1: Variables Included in the Scales for Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, with Factor Loadings, Eigen Values, Cronbach's Alpha Scores and Range, 1991, 1998 and 2008 ISSP

	Original ordinal variables	Factor loadings	Eigen values	Cronbach's Alpha scores	Range of scales
Conservative attitudes	Sexual relations before marriage (not wrong at all - always wrong)	0.751	1.756	0.644	-1.366 to 2.144
	Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex (not wrong at all - always wrong)	0.814			
	Husband earns money/wife's job is family (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.728			
Religious leaders in politics	Religious leaders should influence vote (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.917	1.681	0.810	-0.958 to 2.835
	Religious leaders should influence government (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.917			
Religious beliefs	In God (I don't believe in God - I know God really exists and have no doubt)	0.848	2.838	0.863	-1.722 to 1.552
	In life after death (no, definitely not - yes, definitely)	0.822			
	In religious miracles (no, definitely not - yes, definitely)	0.830			
	God concerns himself with human beings (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.869			
Personal religiosity	Life is meaningful because God exists (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.852	2.279	0.842	-1.595 to 2.094
	Frequency of prayer (never - several times a day)	0.887			
	Self-description as religious (extremely non-religious - extremely religious)	0.875			

Figure 3.2: Mean Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, by Country, 2008 ISSP



For each of the four groups of variables, only one underlying dimension is generated when a principal components factor analysis is run, and it is the scales representing these four dimensions that become the dependent variables for the models in our main analysis. As we can see from the contents in Table 3.1, the reliability of each of these scales is acceptable (especially when considering the low number of variables in each scale), with the Cronbach's Alpha scores all being over 0.60: the religious beliefs group scoring the highest at 0.863 and the conservative attitudes group scoring the lowest at 0.644. Table C.2 in Appendix C contains the correlation coefficients between these four scales: these coefficients range between 0.212 (conservative attitudes and religious leaders influencing politics) and 0.468 (conservative attitudes and personal religiosity), with the exception of the coefficient between religious beliefs and personal religiosity which reaches 0.831. Although this indicates that beliefs and personal religiosity are highly correlated, we still prefer to study them separately in this and the following chapter because they do theoretically refer to different facets of religion. What is also apparent from the contents of Table 3.1 is that many of the variables used to generate these scales, most notably those of religious beliefs, are somewhat Christian-specific. Consequently, those identifying with a non-Christian/other religion were excluded from the analyses of this and the following chapter. Figure 3.2 contains the mean values for each of the four scales by country for the 2008 sample at use in this chapter.[59]

In the models, a larger average difference will be indicated by a stronger positive association between being religiously committed and expressing conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, high levels of religious beliefs as well as personal religiosity. If and when variation in these average differences is present between countries and regions, we will measure if size of the unaffiliated group can account for some of this variation. This contextual variable

[59] The four scales are standardised: each of their overall means corresponds to 0, and each of their standard deviations corresponds to 1.

is used here as a proxy for how secularised an area is: areas with more advanced secularisation have larger unaffiliated groups. The proportional size of the unaffiliated group is preferred here to that of the committed group (more secularised areas have smaller committed groups), since we saw in the previous two chapters that cultural religion areas (large religious middle ground) can have small committed groups as well as small unaffiliated ones. What we aim to test here then is that, although secularisation may come at different times in different areas, once underway the fundamental process in each Western region is characterised by the polarisation dynamic in the sense of an increased concentration of religiosity indicators among a more restricted group of individuals.

Models

With the 2008 ISSP data only, two main sets of three-level hierarchical linear models were generated in which individuals are nested within regions and regions are nested within countries: one set to measure average differences between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed, and another set to measure differences in mean levels among either the religiously committed, the nominally affiliated or the unaffiliated. The goal of these models is to determine the extent to which these differences vary between the 23 countries at study and their regions for the four religiosity indicators, and if the size of the unaffiliated group in each region can account for some of this variation.

The first set of multilevel models contains the four religiosity indicators as separate dependent variables. Being religiously committed (as compared with being unaffiliated) is the main independent variable in these models both as a fixed and random effect (varies between regions) in order to grasp its between-region differences: in other words, if the average differences between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed regarding the four indicators are greater in certain regions, as compared with others. A region-level variable for the mean size of the unaffiliated group as well as a cross-level interaction term

with this variable and being religiously committed were also added to these models. This was done in order to see if the average differences between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed regarding the four religiosity indicators are greater in regions with larger proportions of unaffiliated individuals, a measure in this case for areas with more advanced secularisation. A series of control variables were also included in these models at the individual level: being nominally affiliated, age, gender, marital status, level of education and employment status.[60] As an example, the conservative attitudes formal model can be stated as follows:

$$CONSATT_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 COMMITTED_{ijk} + \beta_2 NOMAFF_{ijk} + \beta_3 AGEC_{ijk} + \beta_4 AGELOG_{ijk} + \beta_5 FEMALE_{ijk} + \beta_6 MARRIED_{ijk} + \beta_7 WIDOWED_{ijk} + \beta_8 SEPDIV_{ijk} + \beta_9 EMPLOYED_{ijk} + \beta_{10} DEGREE_{ijk} + \beta_{11} MEANNOREL_{jk} + \beta_{12} COMMITTED_{ijk} * MEANNOREL_{jk} + \beta_{13} NOMAFF_{ijk} * MEANNOREL_{jk} + u_{1j} COMMITTED_{ijk} + u_{2j} NOMAFF_{ijk} + v_k + u_{jk} + e_{ijk}$$

where i = individuals within region j
j = regions within country k
k = countries

A second set of multilevel models were then generated with either the religiously committed, nominally affiliated or unaffiliated cases only to see if the intercept of each of the four indicators varies in a significant way between countries and regions for these groups of individuals. As well as the controls, an independent variable for mean size of the unaffiliated group in each region was added to these models. This was done in order to see if the levels of the four religiosity indicators increase among the committed and decrease among the unaffiliated in areas where the unaffiliated group is larger. For example, the formal model for conservative attitudes among the religiously committed is as follows:

$$CONSATTCOMM_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PROTESTANT_{ijk} + \beta_2 ORTHODOX_{ijk} + \beta_3 AGEC_{ijk} + \beta_4 AGELOG_{ijk} + \beta_5 FEMALE_{ijk} + \beta_6 MARRIED_{ijk} + \beta_7 WIDOWED_{ijk} + \beta_8 SEPDIV_{ijk} + \beta_9 EMPLOYED_{ijk} + \beta_{10} DEGREE_{ijk} + \beta_{11} MEANNOREL_{jk} + v_k + u_{jk} + e_{ijk}$$

where i = religiously committed individuals within region j
j = regions within country k
k = countries


[60] Descriptive statistics for all the variables at use in this chapter can be found in Table C.3 of Appendix C.

RESULTS

Average Differences between Religious Commitment Types

Before detailing the results of the hierarchical models, standardised coefficients for the effect of being religiously committed, compared with declaring no religion, on the four personal religiosity indicators were generated for each country in 2008 from a series of single-level OLS regression models (one for each country and each indicator). These coefficients are illustrated in Figure 3.3. The OLS models have the four religiosity indicators as dependent variables, and the religious commitment typology category dummies (with declaring no religion as the reference category) as the only independent variables. This was done in order to get an overall sense of the average differences between the unaffiliated and religiously committed in each country when no socio-demographic factors are controlled for. In these instances, a larger positive coefficient indicates that what levels of the personal religiosity indicators there are in a country in 2008 can be found more among the religiously committed than among the unaffiliated.

Figure 3.3: Standardised Committed Coefficients (as Compared with Declaring No Religion) on Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, by Country, with CI (95%), 2008 ISSP



What we can generally see from all four graphs in Figure 3.3 is that the committed coefficients are statistically significant (95% CI do not include 0) and positive for all four indicators in every country at study,[61] with the exception of Russia for conservative attitudes. In almost every instance, religiously committed individuals are more likely to score significantly higher on the scales of conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity, when compared with the unaffiliated. Nevertheless, for each of the four scales there are also statistically significant differences between countries in the strength of those positive effects. For example, being committed (as compared with being unaffiliated) in the Netherlands increases a respondent's average score on the beliefs scale by 1.238, whereas in Norway being committed increases it by 2.367.

We can also see from the results in Figure 3.3 that many countries have among the strongest committed effects for more than one personal religiosity indicator. In countries such as Australia, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway and the Slovak Republic, the differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated for many of the personal religiosity indicators are at their largest. These countries generally, but not always, have lower overall levels of the religiosity indicators in question among their general populations (see Figure 3.2). Some of these countries, including the Czech Republic and France, also have high levels of declaring no religion among their general populations (see Figure 3.1). Yet, others do not, most notably Norway, Italy and the Slovak Republic.

Many countries also repeatedly come up as having some of the weakest committed effects for the four scales, including Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia and the US. Although committed individuals are still more likely to score higher on the four scales than the unaffiliated in these countries (except for conservative attitudes in Russia),

[61] The nominally affiliated coefficients (effect of being nominally affiliated compared with being unaffiliated) are weaker than the committed coefficients for all four scales in every country at study.

the differences in levels of the various aspects of religion between these two groups are not as large. These countries generally, but not always, have higher levels of the religiosity indicator in question among their general populations (see Figure 3.2), and lower overall levels of non-affiliation (see Figure 3.1), especially Ireland, Poland, Russia and the US. However, also among this group is the Netherlands, which has relatively high levels of non-affiliation among its general population (see Figure 3.1).

The similarities in countries showing strong or weak committed effects can be confirmed for all four religiosity indicators by the fact that the correlation coefficients between the four sets of committed coefficients in Figure 3.3 are statistically significant and positive.[62] We also estimated the correlation coefficients between the various sets of committed coefficients at the regional level, rather than at the country level (see Table 3.2). They were also all statistically significant and positive. This indicates that many of the regions showing stronger committed effects for one religiosity indicator also show them for another, and likewise that many of the regions showing weaker committed effects for one religiosity indicator also show them for another.

Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix, Aggregate (Regional) Level, 2008 ISSP

	Comm. coeff. for cons. attitudes	**Comm. coeff. for religious leaders in politics**	**Comm. coeff. for religious beliefs**	**Comm. coeff. for personal religiosity**
Comm. coeff. for cons. attitudes	1.000			
Comm. coeff. for relig. lead. in pol.	0.327***	1.000		
Comm. coeff. for religious beliefs	0.420***	0.383***	1.000	
Comm. coeff. for pers. religiosity	0.488***	0.354***	0.858***	1.000
Mean no religion	0.060	0.101	0.175*	0.172*


N = 189. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.


[62] The complete set of correlation coefficients can be found in Table C.4 in Appendix C.


It is not clear, however, from simply comparing country results in Figures 3.1 and 3.3 if those countries showing strong committed effects are more often those with higher means of non-affiliation and thus more advanced processes of secularisation. In order to begin testing this quantitatively, correlation coefficients were generated between the committed coefficients in Figure 3.3 and the mean rates of the unaffiliated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.4 contains these coefficients as well as the scatter plots between the committed coefficients and the mean ratio of unaffiliated (ranging 0 to 1) for the four religiosity indicators and each country.


We can see from the results in Figure 3.4 that the correlation coefficients between the four sets of committed coefficients and mean size of the unaffiliated group in a given country are positive but not statistically significant. The sole exception in this case is the correlation coefficient for religious leaders influencing politics which is statistically significant at the 90% level and positive. This indicates that a larger unaffiliated group in a country is associated with a stronger committed effect on favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics (larger difference between the committed and unaffiliated for favourable views). However, 23 country-level cases may not be enough to measure these associations meaningfully, due to both a lack of statistical power and a context that may be too broad to affect the individual. To solve these issues, the same coefficients and mean rates were generated, but this time for 189 regions within the countries at study. The correlation matrix containing these variables can be found in Table 3.2.

Figure 3.4: Committed Coefficients for Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity (Y), by Mean Ratio of Unaffiliated (X), with Correlation Coefficient, by Country, 2008 ISSP









We can see from the results in Table 3.2 that, at a regional level, the correlation coefficients from Figure 3.4 keep their initial direction but become statistically significant at the 95% level between the committed coefficients of religious beliefs as well as of personal religiosity and the mean regional size of the unaffiliated group (positive associations). This indicates that a strong committed effect on religious beliefs and personal religiosity is more common in areas where more individuals declare having no religion. This being said, the correlations are still relatively weak (below 0.2) in strength for both religiosity indicators.

Let us see then if these associations hold when controlling for a series of individual-level factors with multilevel modelling, better isolating the effect of the size of the unaffiliated group on the strength of the relationship between being religiously committed and the four more personal religiosity indicators. Selected results[63] from the three-level hierarchical linear models can be found in Tables 3.3 to 3.6.

From the results in Models 1 and 2 of Tables 3.3 to 3.6, we can see once again that the committed fixed effect is statistically significant and positive for all four scales: religiously committed individuals are more likely overall to score higher on conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity than unaffiliated individuals. The results in Models 1 and 2 also show that the committed effects on all four religiosity indicators do vary in a statistically significant manner between regions when the effects are randomised. It is worth noting here that the intraclass correlation is lower between regions than it is between countries for all four scales. In other words, the between-region variation represents a lower proportion of the total variation of all four religiosity indicators than the between-country variation.

[63] Complete results can be found in Tables C.5 to C.8 in Appendix C.

Table 3.3: Fixed and Random Effects on Conservative Attitudes, Estimating Average Differences between the Religiously Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty model	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		0.754*** (0.026)	0.641*** (0.046)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.172* (0.074)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.401** (0.142)
	Constant	-0.161† (0.082)	3.671*** (0.272)	3.718*** (0.272)
Variance between regions	**Committed**		0.070*** (0.011)	0.066*** (0.011)
	Constant	0.018*** (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
	Intraclass correlation	1.9%	0.5%	0.3%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.153*** (0.046)	0.133*** (0.040)	0.132*** (0.040)
	Intraclass correlation	16.3%	19.9%	19.8%
Residual variance		0.770*** (0.006)	0.534*** (0.005)	0.534*** (0.005)

Table 3.4: Fixed and Random Effects on Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Estimating Average Differences between the Religiously Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty model	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		0.599*** (0.024)	0.399*** (0.041)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.089 (0.089)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.735*** (0.128)
	Constant	-0.117*** (0.032)	0.918** (0.319)	0.922** (0.320)
Variance between regions	**Committed**		0.036*** (0.009)	0.023*** (0.007)
	Constant	0.009*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	1.0%	0.5%	0.6%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.022** (0.007)	0.027** (0.009)	0.025** (0.008)
	Intraclass correlation	2.4%	3.1%	2.9%
Residual variance		0.886*** (0.007)	0.838*** (0.007)	0.838*** (0.007)

N = 30,055. N. of region gr. = 184. N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. Fixed effects included in the models, but not in the Table include nominally affiliated, age, gender, marital status, employment status and level of education (Models 1 and 2). Random effects included in the models, but not in the Table include nominally affiliated (region level, Models 1 and 2). †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 3.5: Fixed and Random Effects on Religious Beliefs, Estimating Average Differences Between the Religiously Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty model	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		1.609*** (0.026)	1.366*** (0.046)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.606*** (0.090)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.829*** (0.139)
	Constant	-0.044 (0.079)	-0.469† (0.255)	-0.302 (0.256)
Variance between regions	**Committed**		0.077*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.011)
	Constant	0.037*** (0.005)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	3.7%	1.8%	1.0%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.137** (0.042)	0.057** (0.018)	0.053*** (0.016)
	Intraclass correlation	13.7%	9.6%	9.0%
Residual variance		0.826*** (0.007)	0.529*** (0.005)	0.529*** (0.005)

Table 3.6: Fixed and Random Effects on Personal Religiosity, Estimating Average Differences Between the Religiously Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty model	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		1.737*** (0.023)	1.537*** (0.039)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.545*** (0.081)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.682*** (0.119)
	Constant	-0.054 (0.080)	-0.564** (0.223)	-0.411† (0.224)
Variance between regions	**Committed**		0.054*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.007)
	Constant	0.040*** (0.005)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	4.1%	2.0%	1.3%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.140** (0.043)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.013)
	Intraclass correlation	14.4%	10.0%	9.5%
Residual variance		0.790*** (0.006)	0.406*** (0.003)	0.406*** (0.003)

N = 30,055. N. of region gr. = 184. N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. Fixed effects included in the models, but not in the Table include nominally affiliated, age, gender, marital status, employment status and level of education (Models 1 and 2). Random effects included in the models, but not in the Table include nominally affiliated (region level, Models 1 and 2). †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.


From the results in Models 2 we can also see that lower overall levels of conservative attitudes, religious beliefs and personal religiosity can be found in regions that are characterised by a larger number of unaffiliated individuals. For example, holding all other variables at 0, respondents in regions where 60% of the adult population declares no religious affiliation have an estimated average score of -0.833 on the beliefs scale, compared with an average score of -0.530 on the same scale in areas where non-affiliation is only at 10%. Since the unaffiliated tend to score lower on these three scales, it comes as no surprise that in regions with more unaffiliated individuals we find lower levels of these three indicators. This is not the case, however, for favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, where the effect of the mean size of the unaffiliated group is not statistically significant.

The cross-level interaction terms in Models 2 indicate that, in regions with higher rates of non-affiliation, we also more commonly find stronger committed effects on all four scales (cross-level interaction term is positive when committed coefficient is positive). This means that, for conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity, the larger the unaffiliated group in a region, the greater the difference in the levels of these indicators between the committed and the unaffiliated.[64] We can also see from the results in Tables 3.3 to 3.6 that the variation in the committed effect between regions declines when we account for the mean regional size of the unaffiliated group in Models 2: to a lesser extent for conservative attitudes and to a greater extent for religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity. Figure 3.5 illustrates how the estimated effect of being committed (as compared with being unaffiliated) increases with higher mean

[64] The only cross-level interaction term between being nominally affiliated (compared with being unaffiliated) and mean size of the unaffiliated group that is statistically significant in the 3-level models is the one in the model for favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics. In this case, the cross-level interaction term is significant at the 95% level and positive, but weaker than the one between being committed and mean size of the unaffiliated group. These results can be found in Tables C.5 to C.8 in Appendix C.

regional rates of non-affiliation for each of the four scales, when all other variables in the Models 2 are kept constant.

Figure 3.5: Estimated Committed Effects on Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, by Mean Regional Rate of Non-Affiliation, 2008.ISSP



To summarise so far then, greater mean regional sizes of unaffiliated groups are associated with greater average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding the four personal religiosity indicators. In areas with larger unaffiliated groups, implying more advanced secularisation, the positive associations between being religiously committed (as compared with being unaffiliated) and declaring conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, having favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity are stronger.

Levels among Religious Commitment Types

Now we move on to see if the size of the unaffiliated group similarly affects the levels of each of the four personal religiosity indicators among the categories of religious commitment. Figure 3.6 contains the mean levels of each of the four religiosity indicators among the religiously committed in each country at study in 2008, and Figure 3.7 contains these levels among the unaffiliated.

Figure 3.6: Mean Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, Religiously Committed Sample, by Country, 2008 ISSP





Figure 3.7: Mean Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, Unaffiliated Sample, by Country, 2008 ISSP



From the results illustrated in Figure 3.6, we can see that mean levels of all four scales are above average among the religiously committed (above 0) in almost every country, with the exceptions of Denmark for conservative attitudes and Austria, Denmark and Poland for views on religious leaders influencing politics. From the opposing angle, we see in Figure 3.7 that mean levels of all four scales are below average among the unaffiliated (below 0) in almost every country, with the exceptions of Hungary, Latvia and Russia for conservative attitudes. Yet, we can also see between-country differences in mean levels of the four scales both among the religiously committed (Figure 3.6) and among the unaffiliated (Figure 3.7).

In order to see if these differences in mean levels of the four more personal religiosity indicators among the religious commitment categories are associated with the mean size of the unaffiliated group in a region, three-level hierarchical linear models were generated for the religiously committed sample (Models 1), the nominally affiliated sample (Models 2) and the unaffiliated sample (Models 3). The four religiosity indicators act as separate dependent variables, mean size of the unaffiliated group is included as the main independent variable and a series of individual-level controls are also included. Selected results[65] can be found in Tables 3.7 to 3.10.

[65] Complete results can be found in Tables C.9 to C.12 in Appendix C.

Table 3.7: Fixed and Random Effects on Conservative Attitudes, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	-0.114 (0.167)	-0.159† (0.085)	-0.160* (0.077)
	Constant	2.796*** (0.598)	4.604*** (0.367)	2.903*** (0.453)
Variance between regions	**Constant**	0.020*** (0.005)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	2.2%	1.1%	0.7%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.133** (0.043)	0.144*** (0.043)	0.130*** (0.039)
	Intraclass correlation	14.9%	22.3%	23.2%
Residual variance		0.738*** (0.012)	0.494*** (0.006)	0.427*** (0.007)

Table 3.8: Fixed and Random Effects on Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	0.319* (0.153)	0.240* (0.103)	0.030 (0.098)
	Constant	1.207† (0.767)	1.760*** (0.455)	-0.154 (0.599)
Variance between regions	**Constant**	0.009* (0.004)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
	Intraclass correlation	0.9%	1.4%	1.0%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.052** (0.019)	0.022** (0.008)	0.026** (0.009)
	Intraclass correlation	5.7%	2.5%	3.2%
Residual variance		0.916*** (0.015)	0.831*** (0.010)	0.772*** (0.012)

N = 7,653 (Model 1). N = 14,748 (Model 2). N = 8,103 (Model 3). N. of region gr. = 183 (Model 1). N. of region gr. = 184 (Models 2 and 3). N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. Fixed effects included in the models, but not in the Table include age, gender, marital status, employment status, level of education and specific religious affiliation (Models 1 and 2). †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 3.9: Fixed and Random Effects on Religious Beliefs, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	0.150 (0.120)	-0.312*** (0.089)	-0.591*** (0.098)
	Constant	0.886* (0.413)	0.390 (0.401)	-1.472** (0.502)
Variance between regions	**Constant**	0.012*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)
	Intraclass correlation	2.9%	1.0%	1.7%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.038** (0.013)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.081** (0.025)
	Intraclass correlation	9.3%	10.6%	12.7%
Residual variance		0.359*** (0.006)	0.606*** (0.007)	0.548*** (0.009)


Table 3.10: Fixed and Random Effects on Personal Religiosity, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	0.095 (0.100)	-0.259** (0.086)	-0.468*** (0.087)
	Constant	0.777* (0.361)	0.358 (0.347)	-1.267** (0.432)
Variance between regions	**Constant**	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	2.6%	1.4%	1.9%
Variance between countries	**Constant**	0.019** (0.007)	0.070*** (0.021)	0.064*** (0.020)
	Intraclass correlation	6.2%	12.6%	13.4%
Residual variance		0.280*** (0.005)	0.476*** (0.006)	0.405*** (0.007)

N = 7,653 (Model 1). N = 14,748 (Model 2). N = 8,103 (Model 3). N. of region gr. = 183 (Model 1). N. of region gr. = 184 (Models 2 and 3). N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. Fixed effects included in the models, but not in the Table include age, gender, marital status, employment status, level of education and specific religious affiliation (Models 1 and 2). †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

The results in Tables 3.7 to 3.10 indicate first of all that mean levels of all four scales among the committed, the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated vary in a statistically significant manner between regions (statistically significant constant for variance between-regions). As with the levels of the four religiosity indicators among the general populations, between-region variation accounts for less of the total variation of these levels than between-country variation among the committed, the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated respectively (intraclass correlation). The fixed effects show us that, among the religiously committed, regional size of the unaffiliated group only affects levels of favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics in a significant manner: the more unaffiliated individuals there are in a region, the higher the levels of these favourable views among the committed. This translates to an estimated score of 1.398 on the favourable views scale for committed respondents in areas with 60% non-affiliation, compared with 1.239 for committed respondents in areas with 10% non-affiliation. These higher levels are also the case to a lesser extent among the nominally affiliated. Among the unaffiliated, regional size of the unaffiliated group affects levels of conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, religious beliefs and personal religiosity in a significant manner: the more unaffiliated there are in a region, the lower these levels are among the unaffiliated. Figure 3.8 illustrates how levels of all four scales vary among unaffiliated respondents according to mean regional size of the unaffiliated group, when all other variables are kept constant.

Figure 3.8: Mean Levels of Conservative Attitudes, Views Towards Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity among Unaffiliated Respondents, by Mean Regional Rate of Non-Affiliation, 2008 ISSP



These lower levels are also present among the nominally affiliated: the higher the mean rate of unaffiliated in a region, the lower the levels of conservative attitudes, religious beliefs and personal religiosity among the nominally affiliated. However, these significant negative coefficients for the nominally affiliated are not as strong as for the unaffiliated, especially for religious beliefs and personal religiosity.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The first thing to note from the results in this chapter is that there are significant differences between the countries and regions at study in 2008 for average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated, and for mean levels among the categories of the religious commitment typology, regarding all four more personal indicators of religion. Consequently, we can confirm both H_{3a} and $H_{3a.1}$. Additionally, this variation points to religious polarisation in the sense of greater differences between the actively religious and the unaffiliated in areas with more advanced secularisation. In areas where the unaffiliated group was larger in 2008, the differences between the religiously

committed and the unaffiliated were also greater for all four personal religiosity indicators at study. This in turn confirms $H_{3b.1}$.

However, these greater differences were not due to both higher levels of indicators among the remaining committed and lower levels among the larger group of unaffiliated individuals, but rather due to one or the other. In regions with higher rates of non-affiliation and thus more advanced secularisation, levels of conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, religious beliefs and personal religiosity were lower among the unaffiliated, to a lesser extent lower among the nominally affiliated, and no different among the committed. This indicates that the phenomenon of religious polarisation in the sense of greater differences between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed in areas with more advanced secularisation is only present because the unaffiliated are more liberal and secular regarding attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, religious beliefs and personal religiosity.

The dynamic differs to a certain extent for the indicator of favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics. In regions with more advanced secularisation, levels of these views were higher among the religiously committed, to a lesser extent higher among the nominally affiliated, and no different among the unaffiliated. This in line with Achterberg et al. (2009) findings for 1998 regarding attitudes towards religion in public life in general, but points to the concentration of this indicator being found to a greater extent between the committed and the unaffiliated, and to a lesser extent between the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated.

Consequently, we can reject $H_{3b.2.}$ Like in Chapter One where we only found proportional stability among the religiously committed, we also did not find an extreme pattern in this chapter of both the religious being more religious and the secular being more secular at the same time in regions with more advanced secularisation. Yet, these groups are

more different from one another, because one or the other is more hardened in its views and behaviour.

The next chapter will continue testing for religious polarisation in the sense of a concentration of all aspects of religion among a restricted group of individuals. However, the comparison will shift from one between countries and regions at one given time point to one over time in a variety of post-industrialised nations. Are average differences between the actively religious and the unaffiliated not only greater in 2008 in areas with more advanced secularisation, but have also grown in these same areas since the 1990s? Have mean levels of the religiosity indicators increased among the committed between the 1990s and late 2000s, and decreased among the unaffiliated?

CHAPTER FOUR

Are the Religious Becoming More Religious, and the Secular More Secular?

The findings from the cross-national comparison in the previous chapter indicate that we do find greater differences between the committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity in 2008 in regions with more advanced secularisation. This appears to be the case mainly because the unaffiliated are more secular in such regions, or in other words score lower on the indicators at study. Favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics is the exception in this case. Greater differences regarding this indicator can be found in areas with more advanced secularisation, but this is due mainly to higher levels of these favourable views among the religiously committed.

In this chapter, we will test to what extent those more secularised countries that are showing the greatest differences between the committed and the unaffiliated in 2008 have

only recently developed this trend, potentially seeing their committed effects on the four personal religiosity indicators strengthen since the 1990s. We will also test if other countries, although not ranked as having the largest differences in 2008, have nevertheless seen these differences grow over the course of the last two decades. For countries showing increasing average differences between the committed and the unaffiliated over time, we will then test the extent to which the religious have become more religious, and the secular more secular, between the 1990s and the late 2000s.

THEORY

The theory for the temporal changes of average differences between the actively religious and the secular is much the same as for the national differences seen in the previous chapter. As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter Three, Martin (2005), Putnam and Campbell (2010) and Roy (2008) do not explicitly state exactly which religiosity indicators should be involved in religious polarisation. What they do put forward is that, in more secularised social contexts where religion and religious practice are no longer a normative obligation, those who remain attached to a religious group do so voluntarily based more on personal reasons. We could consider that these reasons relate most notably to holding religious beliefs, perceiving oneself as religious, thinking that life is only meaningful with the presence of God in it, and so on. Individuals attending religious services solely because it was a normative obligation would stop doing so, leaving behind a core or a more 'pure' group of believers. Attending religious services regularly would in turn strengthen these personal aspects of religion among committed individuals. Those at the other extreme, removed from religious groups and institutions, would also be distanced from all aspects of religion, either due to active decision-making on their part, or for later generations because they were not religiously socialised in any way. This would imply that

not only would there be growing differences between the committed and the unaffiliated regarding religiosity indicators, but mean levels of these indicators would increase over time among the committed, and decrease over time among the unaffiliated.

We should then expect the concentration of all aspects of religion among a more restricted group of individuals not only to be stronger in more secularised areas, but also to be increasing over time in areas where secularisation is underway. Achterberg et al. (2009) showed with Dutch data that increasing levels of favourable attitudes towards religion in public life could be found among a decreasing group of Christians between 1970 and 1996, and that decreasing levels could be found among the growing unaffiliated group. Yet, systematic empirical testing of the polarisation hypothesis remains scarce: Achterberg et al. (2009) only focus on favourable views towards religion playing a larger role in public life, restrict their temporal analyses to one country, only compare the unaffiliated to the affiliated (and not to the religiously committed), and do not cover the more recent period of the late 1990s and 2000s.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The research questions and hypotheses that the analyses of this chapter will address can be stated as follows:

> *Q_{4a}: To what extent have average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity changed over time in post-industrialised nations?*
>
> > *$Q_{4a.1}$: More specifically, how have levels of conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity changed over time in post-industrialised nations among both the unaffiliated and the religiously committed?*
>
> *H_{4a}: Those countries and regions with more advanced processes of secularisation, i.e. with higher proportions of unaffiliated individuals, will have seen an increase in average differences between 1991 and 2008, and 1998 and 2008.*

$H_{4a.1}$: In those countries and regions that do show an increase in average differences between 1991 and 2008 and between 1998 and 2008, these greater differences will be due to an increase in levels of the four more personal religiosity indicators among the remaining religiously committed, and a decrease among the unaffiliated.

METHODS

The methodology for the analyses in this chapter is very similar to that in Chapter Three, but rather than comparing average differences and mean levels only between countries and regions, we will also compare them over time. The religious commitment typology will once again be our main independent variable. In order to estimate average differences, we will focus on measuring the associations between being religiously committed and the four other religiosity indicators in the various countries and years at study: the larger the committed coefficient, the greater differences can be found between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated. Then, in areas where we do find increasing average differences over time (stronger committed coefficient in 2008 as compared with 1991 and 1998), we will estimate how levels of the four more personal religiosity indicators have changed respectively among the committed, the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated.

Data

For these analyses, rather than using only data from 2008, we employed all three religion module waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Our dependent variables are the same four religiosity indicators of conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity. These four indicators are once again represented by standardised scales created from a set of multiple imputed ordinal variables by means of

four principal component factor analyses.[66] Due to the specific nature of some of the ordinal variables included in the four scales, individuals of non-Christian religions were excluded from the analyses.[67]

The 23 countries at study will also be the same ones as in the previous chapter.[68] However, not all of these countries were included in the 1991 wave of the ISSP. Table 4.1 contains the list of countries with their respective samples for each of the three waves at use in this chapter. Since only 14[69] of the 23 countries were included in the 1991 wave, separate comparisons were undertaken between 1991 and 2008 (longer period with fewer countries), and between 1998 and 2008 (shorter period with all countries).

Table 4.1: Frequency Distribution, by Country and Year, 1991, 1998 and 2008 ISSP

	1991	1998	2008		1991	1998	2008
Australia	2,203	1,310	1,718	**Norway**	1,506	1,532	1,072
Austria	984	1,002	1,020	**Poland**	1,063	1,147	1,263
Czech Republic	0	1,224	1,512	**Portugal**	0	1,201	1,000
Denmark	0	1,114	2,004	**Russia**	2,964	1,703	1,015
France	0	1,133	2,454	**Slovak Republic**	0	1,284	1,138
Germany	2,832	2,006	1,706	**Slovenia**	2,080	1,006	1,065
Hungary	1,000	1,000	1,010	**Spain**	0	2,488	2,373
Ireland	1,005	1,010	2,049	**Sweden**	0	1,189	1,235
Italy	983	1,008	1,078	**Switzerland**	0	1,204	1,229
Latvia	0	1,200	1,069	**UK**	2,095	1,616	3,075
Netherlands	1,635	2,020	1,951	**USA**	1,359	1,284	1,365
New Zealand	1,070	998	1,027				

[66] The ordinal variables used and the results of the factor analyses can be found in Table 3.1 on p.102 (Chapter Three).
[67] For descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this chapter, see Table D.1 in Appendix D.
[68] These include Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Unites States.
[69] Of these 14 countries, Slovenia was excluded from the analyses because it has no religiously committed individuals in 1991.

Models

A series of OLS regression models, one for each religiosity indicator and each country, were generated using either the 1991 and 2008 ISSP data (13 countries) or the 1998 and 2008 ISSP data (23 countries). These models contain interaction terms between being committed and year 2008, as well as between being nominally affiliated and year 2008, in order to see how the committed effect has changed over time (compared with being unaffiliated). As an example, the formal model for conservative attitudes in Australia can be stated as follows:

$$CONSATTAUS_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 COMMITTED_i + \beta_2 NOMAFF_i + \beta_3 COMMITTED*2008_i + \beta_4 NOMAFF*2008_i + \beta_5 YEAR2008_i + e_i$$

where i = individuals within Australia

These OLS regression models do not include socio-demographic controls, since we are interested in overall change over time. A series of single-level regression models was preferred here to multilevel modelling, since there are only 13 countries that have data for 1991, which we judge as too few group-level cases to generate valid and robust estimates in a multilevel model.

This being said, as mentioned in the previous chapter the ISSP data also allow us to run models at the regional level: just under 100 regions for the 1991-2008 analyses, and just under 200 for the 1998-2008 analyses.[70] Consequently, using a two-step process, we initially generated the interaction term between being religiously committed and year 2008 for each region (change in committed effect over time). We included controls for age, gender, marital status, employment status and level of education (highest degree) in order to isolate contextual (regional) differences as much as possible. These estimates for the interaction term then became the dependent variable in the second step in which an OLS regression model was run at the aggregate level. Mean size of the unaffiliated group in each

[70] Only those regions included in the 1991 wave (for the 1991-2008 analyses) and the 1998 wave (for the 1998-2008 analyses) with 50 cases or more in 2008 were included in the analyses, in order to get a sufficiently robust estimate for mean size of the unaffiliated group.

region in 2008 acted as the independent variable for these models, in order to test if greater average differences in 2008, compared with 1991 and 1998 (positive coefficient for the interaction term), are more commonly found in areas with more unaffiliated individuals and thus more advanced secularisation. A two-step process was preferred here to multilevel modeling in order to avoid including in one model a three-way interaction term between being committed, year 2008 and mean size of the unaffiliated group.

Then, for those countries where average differences between the committed and the unaffiliated have increased between 1991 and 2008 or 1998 and 2008, another series of OLS regression models were generated for each of the religiously committed, nominally affiliated and unaffiliated samples. These models have the four religiosity indicators as their dependent variables and year 2008 as the independent variable. These models were generated in order to see how the levels of each of the four religiosity indicators have changed over time among the three categories of the religious commitment typology. Once again, these OLS regression models did not include socio-demographic controls, since we are interested in overall change over time.

RESULTS

Average Differences between Religious Commitment Types


The mean levels of each of the four religiosity indicators for each of the 23 countries in 2008 can be found in Figure 3.2 on p. 103 of Chapter Three. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 contain the effect of being in the 2008 wave (as compared with 1991 for Figure 4.1 and with 1998 for Figure 4.2) on levels of each of the four religiosity indicators in the countries at study. These coefficients were generated from OLS regression models with no other predictors but year of study, and measure how mean levels of each of the four religiosity indicators have changed over time: a statistically significant positive coefficient (CI 95% above 0) indicates that these levels have increased between 1991 and 2008 (Figure 4.1), or between 1998 and


2008 (Figure 4.2), and a statistically significant negative coefficient (CI 95% below 0) indicates that these levels have decreased for the same periods.


The year effects in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that in many cases the four religiosity indicators have seen either no change or decline between both 1991 and 2008 and 1998 and 2008. For example, it is estimated that an average respondent in the UK scored 0.011 on the belief scale in 2008, as compared with 0.286 in 1991. The countries and indicators that are the exceptions to this rule, having seen an increase in levels, are Germany and Russia for religious beliefs and personal religiosity for both periods, Hungary for religious beliefs between 1991 and 2008, Austria, Ireland and Portugal for favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics between 1998 and 2008, Slovenia for religious beliefs between 1998 and 2008, and the Slovak Republic for personal religiosity between 1998 and 2008.

Figure 3.3 of Chapter Three (p.108) contains the strength of the effect of being religiously committed (compared with declaring no religion) on the four religiosity indicators in 2008. Now we see in Figure 4.3 if this effect has weakened, strengthened or stayed the same between 1991 and 2008. The coefficients in Figure 4.3 are those of the interaction terms between being religiously committed and year of study (2008), obtained from OLS regression models run for each country and each of the four personal religiosity indicators. Since all the committed effects on the four religiosity indicators are positive in 2008, statistically significant positive (CI 95% above 0) coefficients for committed*2008 indicate a stronger effect, or greater average differences, in 2008 than in 1991. This would indicate, at least in part, a polarisation trend in the sense of increasing differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated over time. By contrast, a statistically significant negative (CI 95% below 0) coefficient for committed*2008 indicates a weaker effect or smaller average differences in 2008 than in 1991.

Figure 4.1: Effect of Year 2008 (Compared with Year 1991) on Conservative Attitudes, Views Towards Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, 13 Countries, with CI (95%), 1991 and 2008 ISSP










Figure 4.2: Effect of Year 2008 (Compared with Year 1998) on Conservative Attitudes, Views Towards Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, 23 Countries, with CI (95%), 1998 and 2008 ISSP





Figure 4.3: Effect of Committed*2008 (Compared with Committed*1991) on Conservative Attitudes, Views Towards Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, 13 Countries, with CI (95%), 1991 and 2008 ISSP



The overall coefficients for the four religiosity indicators show that, when respondents from all 13 countries are included in a single OLS regression model with the committed*2008 interaction term, the strength of the committed effect generally increased in 2008 compared with 1991 for both conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality as well as favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics. By contrast, the committed effect was generally weaker in 2008 for religious beliefs and personal religiosity.

When we generate the committed*2008 coefficients for each country with separate OLS regression models, we can see from the results in Figure 4.3 that there is a stronger committed effect in 2008 (compared with 1991) in Australia for conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, and a weaker committed effect in 2008 for the same indicator in Ireland. Whereas being committed (as compared with being unaffiliated) increased an Australian respondent's score on the conservative attitudes scale by an estimated 1.171 in 1991, it increased it by 1.425 in 2008. In Ireland, being committed increased a respondent's score on the conservative attitudes scale by an estimated 1.594 in 1991, but only by 0.890 in 2008. In all the other countries the change is not statistically significant (CI 95% include 0). For favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, there is a stronger committed effect in 2008 in Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the US, and a weaker one in Italy. For religious beliefs, there are no countries that have a statistically significant and stronger committed effect in 2008, but Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland do have weaker effects. For personal religiosity, there is a stronger committed effect in New Zealand and the UK in 2008, and a weaker one in Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia and the US.

In order to see if the committed effects have gained in strength in areas with higher levels of non-affiliation in 2008 (with more advanced secularisation as the polarisation framework would suggest), we generated the committed*2008 coefficient for each region

while controlling for a series of individual-level predictors. We then ran a second series of OLS regression models at the aggregate level with these coefficients as the dependent variables and the mean regional size of the unaffiliated group in 2008 as the only independent variable. The results of these models can be found in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Effect of Mean Regional Size of Unaffiliated Group on Committed*2008 (as compared with 1991), Aggregate (Regional) Level, 1991 and 2008 ISSP

	Conservative attitudes	**Views on Religious Leaders Influencing Politics**	**Religious Beliefs**	**Personal Religiosity**
	N = 98	***N=93***	***N=98***	***N=98***
Mean regional size of unaffiliated group in 2008	0.699*	0.436	0.515	0.561†
	(0.285)	(0.354)	(0.334)	(0.300)
Constant	-0.195*	-0.102	-0.222*	-0.246**
	(0.086)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.091)

Coefficients (with robust standard errors). Regional cases with no committed, nominally affiliated or unaffiliated individuals for 1991 or 2008 were excluded from the analyses. Also excluded were regions showing negative committed effects on the religiosity indicators in question. Individual-level predictors included in the first step OLS regression models when calculating the interaction term between the committed and year effects include: committed, nominally affiliated, committed* 2008, nominally affiliated*2008, year 2008, age, gender, marital status, employment status, and level of education. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

The results in Table 4.2 show that mean regional size of the unaffiliated group in 2008 is significantly associated with larger differences between the committed and the unaffiliated in 2008 compared with 1991 when it comes to conservative attitudes. Whereas the committed effect on conservative attitudes in 2008 decreases overall by an estimated 0.125 compared with the coefficient in 1991 in areas with 10% non-affiliation, it actually increases by an estimated 0.224 in areas with 60% non-affiliation. However, mean regional size of the unaffiliated group in 2008 is not associated with significant change at the 95% level in the strength of the committed effect between 1991 and 2008 for the other three religiosity indicators.

It would seem then that, although we saw in the previous chapter that areas with more advanced secularisation were associated with greater average differences between the

religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding the four religiosity indicators in 2008, these same areas have only seen a significant increase in these differences between 1991 and 2008 for conservative attitudes. Let us see if this is also the case for the larger amount of countries and regions where data was available for the shorter period of 1998 to 2008. Figure 4.4 contains the committed*2008 coefficients for each country and each religiosity indicator, but this time to be compared with 1998 rather than 1991.


The overall coefficients in Figure 4.4 indicate that, for all respondents, the strength of the committed effect has generally weakened in a statistically significant manner between 1998 and 2008 for both conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality and personal religiosity. It has not changed in a significant way for favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics and religious beliefs. When we break these coefficients down by country, average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated regarding conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality have become greater in 2008, compared with 1998, in both Australia and Latvia, and smaller in Denmark, France and Ireland. For example, whereas being committed (as compared with being unaffiliated) increased an Australian respondent's score on the conservative attitudes scale by an estimated 1.077 in 1998, it increased it by an estimated 1.425 in 2008.

For favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, differences between the committed and unaffiliated have become greater in Australia and Spain between 1998 and 2008, and weaker in Latvia and the Netherlands. For religious beliefs, the committed effect has strengthened between 1998 and 2008 in the Czech Republic, Norway and the UK, and weakened in the Netherlands. Finally, average differences for personal religiosity have increased between 1998 and 2008 in Australia, the Czech

Republic, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland and the UK, and decreased in the Netherlands, Portugal and Russia.[71]

[71] Ordinal logit regression models were run with each variable composing the scales of conservative attitudes, views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity, for the countries that showed increased average differences between both 1991 and 2008, and 1998 and 2008. All variables showed the same trend.

Figure 4.4: Effect of Committed*2008 (Compared with Committed*1998) on Conservative Attitudes, Views Towards Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, by Country, with CI (95%), 1998 and 2008 ISSP



With the 1998 and 2008 ISSP data, we once again generated the committed*2008 coefficient for each region while controlling for a series of individual-level predictors. We then ran a second series of OLS regression models at the aggregate level with these coefficients as the dependent variables and the mean regional size of the unaffiliated group as the only independent variable. The results of these models can be found in Table 4.3. In this case, there are no significant associations between the mean size of the unaffiliated group and how the committed effect on the four religiosity indicators has changed between 1998 and 2008.

Table 4.3: Effect of Mean Regional Size of Unaffiliated Group on Committed*2008 (as compared with 1998), Aggregate (Regional) Level, 1998 and 2008 ISSP

	Conservative attitudes	**Views on Religious Leaders Influencing Politics**	**Religious Beliefs**	**Personal Religiosity**
	N=187	***N=182***	***N=188***	***N=188***
Mean regional size of unaffiliated group in 2008	0.146	0.224	0.100	0.112
	(0.201)	(0.236)	(0.245)	(0.248)
Constant	-0.004	-0.021	0.145†	0.134
	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.083)

Coefficients (with robust standard errors). Regional cases with no committed, nominally affiliated or unaffiliated individuals for 1998 or 2008 were excluded from the analyses. Also excluded were regions showing negative committed effects on the religiosity indicators in question. Individual-level predictors included in the first step OLS regression models when calculating the interaction term between the committed and year effects include: committed, nominally affiliated, committed* 2008, nominally affiliated*2008, year 2008, age, gender, marital status, employment status, and level of education. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Consequently, a stronger committed effect in 2008, as compared with 1991 and 1998, is present for some countries and some indicators, but is by no means universal. It is also not associated in a significant way with areas with more advanced secularisation, with the exception of stronger committed effects on conservative attitudes in 2008 compared with 1991. Some countries with higher levels of non-affiliation in 2008 do show signs of growing average differences for certain indicators, countries such as Australia, the Czech

Republic, Latvia, New Zealand and the UK, but it is generally not an association that is significant when all countries and regions are analysed.

Levels among Religious Commitment Types

Now that we have determined where average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated have increased between the 1990s and 2008, let us see how levels of the four religiosity indicators have changed among the religiously committed, the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated for the same period. Is it a case of both extreme groups of the committed and the unaffiliated hardening in their ways, or like in the previous chapter is only one of the two extreme groups experiencing significant change?

Table 4.4 contains the committed*2008 effects, nominally affiliated*2008 effects, and the year 2008 effects among the committed, nominally affiliated and unaffiliated for those countries that showed increased average differences between 1991 and 2008, in order to study the dynamic in more detail. A weaker nominally affiliated*2008 (compared with being unaffiliated) coefficient indicates a weaker change in the nominally affiliated effect on the religiosity indicators between 1991 and 2008 than the change in the committed effect for the same period. This would indicate greater average differences specifically between the committed and the unaffiliated, rather than between the affiliated in general and the unaffiliated. A statistically significant positive year 2008 coefficient indicates an increase in levels of the religiosity indicators among either the committed, the nominally affiliated or the unaffiliated, and a statistically significant negative coefficient indicates a decrease.

Table 4.4: Average Differences and Mean Levels between 1991 and 2008, Conservative Attitudes, Views Towards Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, 1991 and 2008 ISSP

		Committed *2008	Nominally affiliated* 2008	2008 effect among committed	2008 effect among nominally affiliated	2008 effect among unaffiliated
Conservative attitudes	**Australia**	0.271** (0.088)	0.022 (0.070)	-0.080 (0.077)	-0.328*** (0.048)	-0.350*** (0.046)
Views on religious leaders influencing politics	**Australia**	0.325** (0.103)	0.121 (0.082)	-0.303*** (0.087)	-0.506*** (0.053)	-0.628*** (0.062)
	New Zealand	0.381* (0.162)	0.109 (0.134)	0.025 (0.136)	-0.247** (0.090)	-0.356*** (0.096)
	Norway	0.414* (0.196)	0.230† (0.136)	-0.227 (0.149)	-0.411*** (0.045)	-0.641*** (0.124)
	US	0.314* (0.137)	0.201 (0.140)	-0.172** (0.057)	-0.285*** (0.061)	- 0.486*** (0.120)
Personal religiosity	**New Zealand**	0.333*** (0.098)	0.151† (0.081)	0.202** (0.067)	0.020 (0.061)	-0.131* (0.057)
	UK	0.117* (0.052)	0.063 (0.049)	-0.091** (0.029)	-0.146*** (0.034)	-0.208*** (0.040)

Coefficients (with standard errors). Multiple imputation estimation. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

The results in Table 4.4 show that, for those countries showing a stronger committed effect in 2008 compared with 1991, the strength of the nominally affiliated effect (as compared with declaring no religion) has not changed in a statistically significant manner (95% level) for the same period for any of the indicators. The results also show that there are significantly lower levels of all the religiosity indicators among the unaffiliated in all the countries showing greater average differences in 2008, compared with 1991. For example, an average unaffiliated Australian's score on the conservative attitudes scale is lower by 0.350 in 2008 than that same score in 1991. This is also the case among nominally affiliated respondents, except for those in New Zealand when it comes to personal religiosity. However, these declines between 1991 and 2008 among the nominally affiliated are not as severe as those among the unaffiliated. These significant declines between 1991 and 2008 even extend to religiously committed respondents

(although lesser declines than among the nominally affiliated and unaffiliated) in Australia and the US for favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, and the UK for personal religiosity. The only instance of the committed showing significantly higher levels of an indicator in 2008 compared with 1991 is in New Zealand for personal religiosity.

Table 4.5 contains the same coefficients as Table 4.4, except this time for the countries that showed increased average differences between 1998 and 2008, rather than between 1991 and 2008. The results in Table 4.5 show first of all that the nominally affiliated effect on the four religiosity indicators has in most cases not changed significantly or has strengthened less between 1998 and 2008 than the committed effect for most of the countries in the table. The exceptions are the Czech Republic for religious beliefs and personal religiosity as well as the Slovak Republic and Switzerland for personal religiosity: in these instances, differences in levels of religiosity among the nominally affiliated and unaffiliated have intensified more than those between the committed and the unaffiliated between 1998 and 2008.

As with the 1991-2008 comparison, there are lower levels of all four religiosity indicators in 2008 compared with 1998 among unaffiliated respondents for countries showing signs of greater average differences, with the exceptions of Australia and Switzerland for personal religiosity. Among the nominally affiliated, there are lower levels between 1998 and 2008 of conservative attitudes and favourable views on religious leaders influencing politics in Australia, and of religious beliefs in the UK, yet these declines are smaller than the ones seen among the unaffiliated respondents. There are also higher levels among the nominally affiliated in 2008 for personal religiosity in Australia, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland. In the Slovak Republic and Switzerland, these increases are even more important than those seen among religiously committed respondents. Finally, there are statistically significant (95% level) higher levels of

personal religiosity among the religiously committed in 2008, compared with 1998, in both Australia and the UK.

Table 4.5: Average Differences and Mean Levels between 1998 and 2008, Conservative Attitudes, Religious Leaders in Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, 1998 and 2008 ISSP

		Committed *2008	Nominally affiliated* 2008	2008 effect among committed	2008 effect among nominally affiliated	2008 effect among unaffiliated
Conservative attitudes	**Australia**	0.347*** (0.097)	0.049 (0.079)	0.021 (0.086)	-0.277*** (0.053)	-0.326*** (0.052)
	Latvia	0.222* (0.096)	0.178* (0.071)	0.008 (0.080)	-0.036 (0.050)	-0.214*** (0.049)
Views on religious leaders influencing politics	**Australia**	0.392*** (0.115)	0.138 (0.092)	0.030 (0.096)	-0.224*** (0.060)	-0.362*** (0.069)
	Spain	0.283*** (0.084)	0.160* (0.077)	0.066 (0.057)	-0.057 (0.039)	-0.217*** (0.057)
Religious Beliefs	**Czech Republic**	0.272*** (0.080)	0.371*** (0.061)	-0.059 (0.064)	0.040 (0.058)	-0.331*** (0.033)
	Norway	0.408** (0.158)	0.225* (0.104)	0.138† (0.073)	-0.046 (0.041)	-0.271** (0.096)
	United Kingdom	0.250*** (0.060)	0.115† (0.060)	0.018 (0.035)	-0.117** (0.043)	-0.232*** (0.046)
Personal religiosity	**Australia**	0.190** (0.071)	0.079 (0.058)	0.196*** (0.048)	0.085* (0.042)	0.007 (0.040)
	Czech Republic	0.145* (0.064)	0.181*** (0.048)	-0.009 (0.058)	0.027 (0.046)	-0.154*** (0.025)
	Slovak Republic	0.151* (0.073)	0.351*** (0.074)	0.060† (0.033)	0.260*** (0.048)	-0.091* (0.046)
	Switzerland	0.229* (0.113)	0.399*** (0.098)	0.105† (0.058)	0.275*** (0.045)	-0.124 (0.094)
	United Kingdom	0.318*** (0.055)	0.196*** (0.054)	0.084* (0.034)	-0.038 (0.040)	-0.234*** (0.040)

Coefficients (with standard errors). Multiple imputation estimation. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

With the results from the previous sections, we can generally reject hypothesis H_{4a}. Some countries are showing an increase in average differences between the religiously

committed and the unaffiliated for some of the more personal religiosity indicators at study, countries including Australia, New Zealand, Norway, the UK and the US for 1991-2008 and Australia, Latvia, Norway, Spain and the UK for 1998-2008. Yet, this trend is not associated in a significant way with rates of non-affiliation at the regional level. The only exception is with stronger committed effects on conservative attitudes in 2008 compared with 1991, for which there is a significant association with areas characterised by larger unaffiliated groups in 2008. For this specific indicator and period then, H_{4a} is confirmed. We can also reject $H_{4a.1}$ in most cases: where average differences do increase between the 1990s and 2008, this is usually only due to a decline in levels of the four more personal religiosity indicators among the unaffiliated. There are a few exceptions, however, where levels among the religiously committed also increased in a significant way: in Australia and the UK between 1998 and 2008 for personal religiosity, and in New Zealand between 1991 and 2008 for personal religiosity. In the cases of the UK and New Zealand, these increases among the committed accompanied declines among the unaffiliated: consequently, for these specific instances $H_{4a.1}$ is confirmed.

So we can find increasing religious polarisation in the sense of growing differences between the committed and the unaffiliated when it comes to conservative attitudes, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity in certain areas. However, this increasing divide is resulting in many cases from the unaffiliated becoming more secular, rather than the committed also becoming more religious, with the exceptions of Australia, New Zealand and the UK for personal religiosity. Additionally, these increasing divides are not a universal phenomenon across post-industrialised nations, and are generally not found in a significant way in more advanced secularised regions, at least not over the periods at study in this chapter. This points most notably to the possibility that the processes that lead to more important differences between the committed and the unaffiliated being present in

regions with more advanced secularisation, as found in Chapter Three, have developed over longer periods than only the last two decades.

There are countries that also showed smaller average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in 2008 compared with 1991 and 1998 for certain indicators, a type of religious diffusion in which the committed and the unaffiliated are becoming more alike. For the period of 1991-2008, these countries include Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia and the US. For the period of 1998-2008, these countries include Denmark, France, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Russia. There are many instances in which the Netherlands showed signs of this religious diffusion between the committed and the unaffiliated, including for religious beliefs and personal religiosity between both 1991 and 2008, and 1998 and 2008, and for favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics between 1998 and 2008. Especially for favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, this is not in line with the Dutch trends that Achterberg et al. (2009) found between 1976 and 1996 of increased concentration. However, they did find these trends of increasing polarisation between the affiliated and the unaffiliated, rather than between the committed and the unaffiliated, and for a period before the ones at study in this chapter.

Results from the previous chapter showed similar processes at play regarding average differences for all four religiosity indicators at study: in more advanced secularised regions, differences between the committed and the unaffiliated were more important regarding conservative attitudes on gender roles and sexuality, favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity. There were especially strong correlations between and similar effects for religious beliefs and personal religiosity. There were, however, some differences when it came to mean levels of the four indicators among the religiously committed, the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated respectively. Most notably, levels of favourable views towards religious

leaders influencing politics were higher among the remaining religiously committed in areas with advanced secularisation, whereas for the other indicators levels were mainly lower among the unaffiliated in these same areas.

In this chapter, there were often differences in the countries that showed changes over time in average differences and mean levels for each of the four more personal religiosity indicators, especially between 1998 and 2008. This indicates that distinguishing between the four different religiosity indicators adds at times important nuance and detail to findings. If researchers are looking for a way to reduce the number of these indicators, the two most similar ones that could be combined would be religious beliefs and personal religiosity. Although for the purposes of this and the previous chapter the two aspects were kept separate, they showed fewer differences throughout the results, and could be combined in most cases without losing too much important distinction.

The findings in this and the previous chapter also justify measuring religious polarisation as a concentration of all aspects of religion among the same individuals separately from religious polarisation as a specific population distribution of different levels of institutional religiosity (as was done in Chapters One and Two). By comparing the results from Chapters Three and Four with the countries that are classified in a configuration of polarisation in Chapter Two (Table 2.5 on pp. 81-82), we can see that, although some countries are at times characterised by both types of polarisation (concentration and population distribution), many others are only characterised by one or the other. In other words, although they can be present at the same time in a same area, a population state of a smaller religious middle ground and a non-negligible group of actively religious in the institutional sense does not necessarily go hand in hand with a high level of concentration of all aspects of religion, both personal and institutional, within the same individuals. We consider both these dynamics, which we will name Population-Distribution Polarisation (PDP) and Concentration Polarisation (CP), as

different facets of a larger phenomenon of religious polarisation. The findings in this and the previous chapter show that it is vital to distinguish the two facets when considering both theory and methodology, something that has not been done so far in the main polarisation frameworks of Martin, Putnam and Campbell and Roy, or when scholars discuss religious polarisation more generally.

The next chapter explores how individuals finding themselves in the two extreme groups of the religious and the secular relate to each other when it comes to forming and maintaining close relationships. In polarised contexts, do committed individuals perceive their religiosity as a fundamental aspect of their identity, so fundamental that they choose their social ties accordingly? Likewise, are the secular more and more averse to being close to religious individuals? Chapter Five, the final empirical chapter of this dissertation, begins to tackle these issues at the very core of the phenomenon of religious polarisation.

CHAPTER FIVE

Intermarriage and Intercohabitation between the Religious and the Secular

The results from Chapter Three indicate that the divide in certain attitudes and religious behaviour is generally greater between the religiously active and the unaffiliated in areas with advanced secularisation. The findings from Chapter Four show in turn that, although not a universal trend, this cleavage has become more important in some instances over the last couple of decades. Faced with these results, one begins to wonder to what extent members of the two groups interact with each other and form significant relationships, especially in polarised contexts where differences are greater between them. In this last empirical chapter, we will explore if, in areas and among birth cohorts that have shown signs of religious polarisation in previous chapters, the growing divide between the religious and the secular in attitudes and behaviour also entails a growing social distance between the two groups. To what extent are religion and religiosity, or the lack thereof, such fundamental aspects of an individual's identity and worldview that

those close to her/him must also share them? One of the most intimate relationships an individual can have is with her/his spouse. Consequently, are there indications of lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the religious and the secular in polarised contexts? Or rather are differences between the religious and the secular not important enough to influence spouse selection?

THEORY

There is mixed evidence regarding the levels of contact and animosity between those who are very involved with religion and those who are not in society. Some would have us believe that no less than a veritable war has been brewing in contemporary societies between those who adhere to the side of religion and mysticism and those who champion science, secularity and reason. Bruce (2002) and Roy (2008) often imply that the gloves are off and that there is much dislike and hostility between the two groups, although case examples (such as the humanist movement in Great Britain) are more often provided to support this statement rather than systematic empirical evidence. Hunter (1991; 2006) famously refers to the divide in the US as a Culture War, implying much antagonism. Again, this concept has received much criticism for its lack of empirical support (DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996; Mouw and Sobel 2001; Wolfe 2006). Ribberink et al. (2013) indicate that there is anti-religious sentiment among disbelievers in Western countries. However, this type of sentiment is highest not in places with more advanced secularisation with higher rates of non-affiliation, but rather in areas with higher overall rates of church attendance where Churches still have more social influence. Putnam and Campbell (2010) highlight the fact that, although the religious and the secular have been reacting to each other dialectically in a series of shocks and counter-shocks in the US since the 1950s, the religious of all denominations and the secular still manage to live in

relative harmony. Vargas' and Loveland's (2011) social networks research demonstrates that it is common for religious individuals to have non-religious friends in the US.

One window into the true nature of social relations between religious and secular individuals is intermarriage and intercohabitation. If there is meant to be much social distance and antagonism between the two groups, then one would expect intermarriage and intercohabitation to be the exception rather than the rule. There has been much study of homogamy when it comes to religious affiliation in Europe and North America: individuals tend to date, form long-term relationships and marry others of the same denomination and religion as themselves, either according to the preferences of the individual, the involvement of religious institutions and doctrine in the selection process, or the constraints of the marriage market (Bisin, Topa and Verdier 2004; Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Gordon 1964; Johnson 1980; Lehrer 2004). Although other characteristics come into play regarding spousal selection, such as selecting someone within proximity and also with a similar educational, class or ethnic background, religion still appears to be an important factor in this regard (Kalmijn 1998; Lehrer 2004; McCutcheon 1988; O'Leary 2001). Religious homogamy has also been shown to be positively correlated with marital stability: once married, religiously homogamous couples have a higher likelihood of staying married (Curtis and Ellison 2002; Landis 1949; Lehrer 2004; Myers 2006).

Yet while still present, this type of homogamy also became less common over the course of the 20th century in many parts of North America, Europe and Oceania: marrying only from within one's own specific faith is becoming less and less common, especially among Catholics, liberal Protestants and Jews (Glenn 1982; Heard, Khoo and Birrell 2009; Heer and Hubay 1976; Hendrickx, Lammers and Ultee 1991; Jansen 1982; Kalmijn 1991; 1998; Lehrer 1998; McCutcheon 1988; Rosenfeld 2008; Rosenthal 1965; Schoen and Thomas 1990; Thomas 1951). This being said, in contexts where denominational differences are no longer as important and principal cleavages have been reforming along

religious/secular lines, long-term partner selection and couple stability may no longer factor in denominational belonging, but rather overall level of religiosity.

With at least part of a religiously committed individual's social life being linked to her/his religious group, it makes sense that this individual would have a higher chance of selecting a partner who was also religiously committed among the same group. However, in a polarised context the chances of a religiously committed individual having a religious spouse should also increase according to more explicit selection criteria. If we take Putnam and Campbell's (2010) scenario of religious and secular groups reacting and counter-reacting to each other over the years, the religious becoming more religious and the secular more secular, we could deduce from this that, although living in relative harmony, members of each group would also wish to distance themselves from members of the other, and this in turn would reinforce polarisation. However, it remains unclear from Putnam and Campbell's existing work if an individual's stance towards religion would be enough to exclude potential partners who share opposite views on the issue.

Bruce (2002) and Roy (2008) do refer to a strong dislike, even a certain level of hatred, between religious and secular individuals: each side representing and propagating a worldview that is considered fundamentally wrong, and in many cases harmful, by the other side. When it comes to selecting a spouse, a person with whom the most time is spent and the most intimate details shared, we could think of these feelings of dislike or at the very least of disconnect between the religious and the secular as being strong enough to discourage an individual from selecting someone from the 'other side'. Consequently, in contexts of religious polarisation, such as in more polarised areas or among younger birth cohorts that have experienced more polarisation, the instances of religiously committed individuals having secular spouses, and vice versa, should be fewer. In other words, group closure, i.e. the association between being religiously committed and having

a religious spouse, or being unaffiliated and having an unaffiliated spouse, should be stronger.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

As with much of the existing theory in previous chapters, there has been no systematic empirical testing of the idea that the religious and the secular are intermarrying and intercohabiting less in polarised contexts. We are thus confronted with our last research question and related hypotheses for this dissertation, which can be formulated as follows:

> *Q_5: To what extent do levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated vary between more and less religiously polarised contexts?*
>
> *H_{5a}: Regions and countries with greater differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in conservative attitudes, religious beliefs and personal religiosity will also be characterised by lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation.*
>
> *H_{5b}: In Great Britain, younger birth cohorts raised in a more polarised context will be characterised by lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation.*

METHODS

Cross-National Comparison: Data and Variables

As well as containing a series of other religiosity indicators, data from the 2008 wave (most recent religion module) of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) contain a variable for the religious affiliation of the respondent's spouse if the respondent is married or living as married. With this variable, we can determine if the spouse is affiliated or unaffiliated, according to the respondent, and measure the extent to which unaffiliated, nominally affiliated and religiously committed respondents marry or cohabit

with the unaffiliated.[72] Using this data from the 2008 ISSP allows for a comparison between multiple countries and regions, as was done in Chapter Three, but the compromise is that time trends will not be studied in this case. The assumption once again then will be that different Western or westernised countries and regions are at different stages in a larger process of secularisation, and that religious polarisation is one of these later stages. It is also important to mention some of the other limits of the data at this stage. The 2008 ISSP wave does not include questions on other relevant spousal characteristics, such as education level, social class or ethnic background. This means that we will not be able to control for such characteristics. We are also not able to identify marriage cohorts (when a respondent was married/began living as married with her/his current spouse) with the 2008 ISSP data. Consequently, although we will control for a respondent's age, we are not able to control for the fact that earlier marriage cohorts are general larger in Western countries (marriage rates were generally higher for earlier generations), nor how partner selection according to a spouse's religious affiliation (or lack thereof) may vary between these marriage cohorts.

From the 2008 ISSP wave, we created a dataset of married or living as married respondents from 23 North American, European and Oceanic countries, subdivided into over 180 regions.[73] This dataset contains a total of 18,165 individual observations. Within this dataset, 3.9% of the values are classified as missing for spouse's religious affiliation, and these values are not randomly distributed: unaffiliated, older, lower educated and non-Catholic respondents are less likely to answer the question of their spouse's affiliation. Consequently, in order to avoid introducing any potential bias into the analyses, we imputed the missing values of spouse's affiliation from 10 chained logistic regression

[72] The descriptive statistics for all the variables at use in this chapter can be found in Tables E.1 and E.2 in Appendix E.

[73] As in Chapter Three, these 23 countries include Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Unites States.

imputations, with the other variables of the study[74] acting as the independent variables for these imputations.

In order to measure the extent to which the religiously committed and the unaffiliated are intermarrying and intercohabiting, the religious commitment typology (respondents being unaffiliated, nominally affiliated or religiously committed) acts as an independent variable. The main focus regarding the religious commitment typology will be to estimate the strength of the association between declaring no religion, as compared with being religiously committed, and having an unaffiliated spouse. A series of individual-level controls, including gender, employment status and level of education (highest degree) were also included in the ISSP models.

Additionally, it was important to control for the size of the marriage market. An individual cannot marry or cohabit with another that simply is not there. In areas where general rates of non-affiliation are higher, one would also expect more unaffiliated spouses. The goal here is to see if spouse selection and stability processes for the religious and the unaffiliated have changed beyond that, reflecting larger social distances and differences between the two groups. Consequently, we added a control to the ISSP models for the mean size of the unaffiliated group within countries, and also within 10-year birth cohorts.[75] Although individuals can and sometimes do marry outside of their own 10-year cohort, they usually do not marry too distantly from it (much older or much younger individuals). Controlling for the mean size of the unaffiliated group not only within a country but also within a birth cohort is not perfect in the sense that the actual proportion of potential unaffiliated partners available to the individual may vary slightly from this mean. This being said, it is a more precise estimate than simply the mean for the country, and the most precise one we can obtain.

[74] These variables include the religious commitment typology, age, gender, year of study, level of education, specific religious affiliation, employment status and country.

[75] These means were drawn from the entire 2008 ISSP sample, not just from among the married respondents. Means for the 10-year birth cohorts were preferred here to those for the 5-year cohorts, to better reflect the actual marriage market and to provide more robust estimates (larger samples).

Also added to the ISSP models was a contextual indicator for average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in conservative attitudes, religious beliefs and personal religiosity, in order to account for level of religious polarisation. Inspired by the findings in Chapter Three, the values of this indicator reflect the strength of the association between being religiously committed and an overall religiosity scale.[76] This overall religiosity scale in turn is made up of the ordinal variables of conservative attitudes, religious beliefs and personal religiosity used in Chapters Three and Four, combined into one dimension by means of a principal components factor analysis.[77] The results of this factor analysis can be found in Table 5.1, and the means of the contextual religious polarisation indicator for each of the 23 countries can be found in Figure 5.1. A larger value for the religious polarisation index indicates more concentration polarisation (CP). In our dataset, this indicator has a range of 0.330 (being committed increases a respondent's average score on the overall religiosity scale by 0.330 compared with being unaffiliated) to 3.155 (being committed increases a respondent's average score on the overall religiosity scale by 3.155 compared with being unaffiliated). Figure 5.2 contains the distribution of the standardised values of the polarisation indicator at the regional level, or in other words the number of regions that deviate from the mean by specific values. This distribution is not too far removed from a normal curve, with only a slight negative (left) skew.

Since many of the ordinal variables used to create the overall religiosity scale are somewhat Christian specific, respondents affiliated to other non-Christian religions were excluded from all the ISSP analyses in this chapter. We did not include the two variables of views towards religious leaders influencing politics in the overall religiosity scale, since

[76] Only the religious commitment typology was included as an independent variable in the single-level OLS regression models estimating the strength of the effect of being religiously committed (as compared with unaffiliated) on the overall religiosity scale, in order to create the polarisation indicator. These coefficients were generated for each region with 50 cases or more in the 2008 ISSP dataset.

[77] The missing values for the original ordinal variables were imputed using the same techniques as in Chapters Three and Four. The polarisation indicator was calculated using the entire Christian and unaffiliated 2008 ISSP sample, rather than only the married respondents.

their trends differed to a certain extent from the others in Chapter Three, and they had Eigen values below 0.3 for the first dimension in this chapter's principal components factor analysis (and thus were excluded from the final factor analysis).

Table 5.1: Variables Included in the Overall Religiosity Scale, with Factor Loadings, Eigen Value, Cronbach's Alpha Score and Range, 2008 ISSP

Original ordinal variables	Factor loadings	Eigen value	Cronbach's Alpha score	Range of scale
Sexual relations before marriage (not wrong at all - always wrong)	0.544	5.187	0.887	-1.742 to 2.250
Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex (not wrong at all - always wrong)	0.456			
Husband earns money/wife's job is family (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.354			
Belief in God (I don't believe in God - I know God really exists and have no doubt)	0.841			
Belief in life after death (no, definitely not - yes, definitely)	0.710			
Belief in religious miracles (no, definitely not - yes, definitely)	0.775			
God concerns himself with human beings (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.854			
Life is meaningful because God exists (strongly disagree - strongly agree)	0.817			
Frequency of prayer (never - several times a day)	0.819			
Self-description as religious (extremely non-religious - extremely religious)	0.825			

Figure 5.1: Mean of Religious Polarisation Indicator, by Country, 2008 ISSP





Figure 5.2: Frequency of Distribution of Standardised Values of Religious Polarisation Indicator, Aggregate Level (Regions), 2008 ISSP



British Data and Variables

We also wanted to explore in more detail change across birth cohorts in levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in a national context that had shown signs of religious polarisation in previous chapters of this dissertation. Consequently, we employed data from the 2008 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA). The findings in Chapter One showed that proportional decline mainly came from the nominally affiliated middle ground between 1985 and 2009 in Scotland,

England and Wales. Results from Chapter Four indicated in turn an increase of average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in personal religiosity between the 1990s and 2008 in the UK, an increase due not only to declining levels among the unaffiliated, but also to increasing levels among the committed.

Roughly half of the 4,486 respondents of the 2008 BSA wave were asked questions in line with the 2008 ISSP religion module, and the other half with the Faith Matters module.[78] Thus, this cycle of the BSA contains a great deal more religiosity indicators than other recent cycles, many of which cannot be found in the religion module of the ISSP, including spouse's religious service attendance. From this data, a dataset of 1,183 married/living as married respondents was created from versions C and D of the 2008 BSA questionnaire, respondents of which we know their spouse's affiliation and frequency of religious service attendance, as reported by the respondent. In this dataset, we can identify spouses as not only being affiliated or not, but being religiously committed (affiliated and attending at least once a month) or not. The missing values for the religious commitment typology of the respondent's spouse rose to 12.6% of the total amount of cases, and are not randomly distributed: religiously committed, nominally affiliated, older, less educated and Catholic respondents are less likely to answer questions on their spouse's affiliation and religious service attendance. Consequently, these missing values were imputed using multiple imputation techniques (10 imputations).[79]

As with the 2008 ISSP data, there are limits to the BSA 2008 data for the purposes of this chapter's analyses. Once again, the cross-sectional data is for only one time point, and so we will have to restrict our analysis of trends to differences between birth cohorts. The 2008 BSA also does not contain information on other relevant spousal characteristics, nor on marriage cohorts. Additionally, with the 2008 BSA data, we are analysing a much

[78] Replicating the US Faith Matters Survey, begun in 2006 (Faith Matters Survey 2011).
[79] The independent variables used in the logistic regression models for the multiple imputations include the religious commitment typology, gender, having at least one child in the household, level of education, specific religious affiliation, ethnic minority, rural residence and country.

smaller sample than with the 2008 ISSP, and so the issue of small cell size must be taken into account when interpreting results. In order to keep some continuity with regards to the data used in this dissertation as well as to focus on the British context which has shown signs of religious polarisation in previous chapters, these limits to the BSA 2008 data were some of the compromises we chose to make for the analyses of this chapter (rather than using data from other sources such as the British Household Panel Survey or from the Pew Research Center).

As with the ISSP models, for the BSA models the main independent variable was the religious commitment typology of the respondent. Individual-level controls include birth cohort (5-year cohorts), gender, presence of at least one child in the household, ethnic minority, level of education, rural residence and country. We also controlled for the size of the marriage market by including the means of either the unaffiliated or the religiously committed group for each 10-year birth cohort and country (Scotland, England and Wales).

We also included an independent variable for overall level of religious polarisation among each 5-year birth cohort. Separate models were run with two forms of this variable. The first was similar to the indicator used in the ISSP models: an indicator of polarisation based on the strength of the effect between being religiously committed and an overall scale of religiosity. This overall scale of religiosity was constructed from five available ordinal variables (from the Faith Matters module of the 2008 BSA), using principal components factor analysis and retaining one (the first) dimension (only dimension with an Eigen value over 1).[80] It is important to mention here that, as with the ISSP models,

[80] The missing values for the original ordinal variables were imputed using chained ordinal regression imputation techniques (10 imputations). The independent variables included in the imputations are: religious commitment typology, gender, having at least one child in the household, level of education, specific religious affiliation, ethnic minority, rural residence, country and birth cohort. The polarisation indicator was calculated using the entire Christian and unaffiliated 2008 BSA sample, rather than only the married respondents. Only the religious commitment typology was included as an independent variable in the single-level OLS regression models estimating the strength of the effect of being religiously committed (as

respondents affiliated to non-Christian religions were excluded from all the BSA analyses in this chapter. The results of the factor analysis can be found in Table 5.2. The mean levels of this first indicator of religious polarisation for each 5-year birth cohort are illustrated in Figure 5.3. A larger value indicates more concentration polarisation (CP).

From these means in Figure 5.3, we can see that this indicator ranges from 1.787 (being committed increases a respondent's average score on the overall religiosity scale by 1.787 compared with being unaffiliated) to 2.160 in value (being committed increases a respondent's average score on the overall religiosity scale by 2.160 compared with being unaffiliated). What we can conclude from this limited range is that this polarisation indicator does not vary a great deal between birth cohorts in Great Britain. Consequently, we also generated a second polarisation indicator, the values this time reflecting the mean size of the nominally affiliated middle ground group among cohorts, or population distribution polarisation (PDP). In Figure 5.4, we can see that it is especially the mean size of the middle religious commitment typology category that declines across cohorts, younger cohorts being more and more split between the actively religious and the unaffiliated.

compared with unaffiliated) on the overall religiosity scale, in order to create the CP (polarisation) indicator. These coefficients were generated for each 5-year birth cohort.

Figure 5.3: Mean of CP Religious Polarisation Indicator, by 5-Year Birth Cohort, 2008 BSA





Table 5.2: Variables Included in the Overall Religiosity Scale, with Factor Loadings, Eigen Value, Cronbach's Alpha Score and Range, 2008 BSA

Original ordinal variables	Factor loadings	Eigen value	Cronbach's Alpha score	Range of scale
How important is religion in your daily life? (not at all important – extremely important)	0.862			
Are you sure that you believe in life after death or not? (sure do not believe – absolutely sure do believe)	0.749			
Are you sure that you believe in God or not? (sure do not believe – absolutely sure do believe)	0.836	3.378	0.880	-1.311 to 2.321
How frequently do you pray outside religious services? (never – several times a day)	0.840			
Do you consider yourself as spiritual or not? (not spiritual at all – very spiritual)	0.818			

Figure 5.4: Proportion of Individuals Being of No Religion, Nominally Affiliated or Religiously Committed, by 5-Year Birth Cohort, Great Britain, 2008 BSA



Questions of Causality with Spouse Non-Affiliation and Spouse Religious Commitment Typology Variables

Estimating the level of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed as we do with the 2008 ISSP and BSA data does have its limits. First of all, since spouse's affiliation and spouse's religious commitment are based on the respondent's report of this characteristic, rather than on information coming from the spouses themselves, these variables are to a certain extent measuring a respondent's perception of these traits. This perception may not be entirely accurate or up to date with changes experienced by the spouse. This being said, it is arguably this perception that matters more when it comes to a respondent's selection of a partner, and thus may be more appropriate to measure when studying these phenomena in the context of religious polarisation.

Secondly, the causal direction of any possible association between being unaffiliated and having an unaffiliated spouse, or being committed and having a committed spouse would not be possible to determine here. It may be that an individual initially chooses a partner with a similar level of religious commitment, or that one partner influences the other's level of religious commitment so that they become more similar to each other in this respect, or that both dynamics come into play. Nevertheless, whether active decision-making in the selection process is present, or one's own religious stance is flexible enough to bend to the spouse's stance, both phenomena are important for the purposes of this chapter. They would both indicate that respondents have chosen and maintain serious relationships with partners either initially similar to themselves when it comes to levels of religious commitment, or that will be similar with a willingness to change.

Thirdly, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, previous studies have shown that religious homogamy is often positively correlated with marital stability (Curtis and Ellison 2002; Landis 1949; Lehrer 2004; Myers 2006). Consequently, it is worth keeping in mind when interpreting results that, as well as a potential reflection of the partner

selection process, lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed at one time point could also be the reflection of a lower survival rate of such unions.

Fourthly, if level of religious commitment does come into play during the initial partner selection process, different social mechanisms could be at work. Lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation may be a reflection of the fact that individuals come into more contact with members of their own group with similar characteristics, or that they more often choose partners with similar fundamental values and practices, or both. On the one hand, homogamy may be a product of social proximity. On the other hand, there may be active-decision making involved. Although we cannot distinguish between the two in this study, it still remains important to determine if there is more or less intermarriage happening in the first place between the committed and the unaffiliated, and how these dynamics have evolved across areas and birth cohorts with differing levels of religious polarisation.

Fifthly, regarding a potential association between a religiously polarised context and lower levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated, we would not be able to pinpoint the direction of causality. A context of polarisation may negatively influence levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation, and levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation may in turn negatively influence levels of religious polarisation in society. Once again, it is estimating the overall association, or lack thereof, that the present chapter will be limited to and will focus on.

Models

With the 2008 married ISSP data, three-level binary regression models, with an individual, regional and country level, were generated with a dichotomous dependent variable for a respondent's spouse being unaffiliated. The fixed effects included in these

models were being unaffiliated and nominally affiliated (as compared with being religiously committed), a control for mean size of the unaffiliated group in each country and each 10-year birth cohort, contextual level of religious polarisation (CP), and the socio-demographic controls. The effects of being unaffiliated and being nominally affiliated (as compared with being religiously committed) on having an unaffiliated spouse were also randomised in order to see how they vary across regions. Finally, cross-level interaction terms between contextual religious polarisation and being unaffiliated or being nominally affiliated (as compared with being religiously committed) were added to the models. This was done in order to see if the association between being unaffiliated or being nominally affiliated (as compared with being religiously committed) and having an unaffiliated spouse strengthened in areas with higher levels of religious polarisation. The complete formal model can be stated as follows:

$$\text{SPOUSEUNAFF}_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{NOREL}_{ijk} + \beta_2\text{NOMAFF}_{ijk} + \beta_3\text{AGEC}_{ijk} + \beta_4\text{LOGAGE}_{ijk} + \beta_5\text{FEMALE}_{ijk} + \beta_6\text{EMPLOYED}_{ijk} + \beta_7\text{DEGREE}_{ijk} + \beta_8\text{MEANUNAFF}_{ijk} + \beta_9\text{POL}_{jk} + \beta_{10}\text{NOREL}_{ijk}*\text{POL}_{jk} + \beta_{11}\text{NOMAFF}_{ijk}*\text{POL}_{jk} + u_{1j}\text{NOREL}_{ijk} + u_{2j}\text{NOMAFF}_{ijk} + v_k + u_{jk} + e_{ijk}$$

where i = individuals within region j
j = regions within country k
k = countries

With the 2008 married BSA data, single-level logistic regression models were generated with a dichotomous variable for spouse being unaffiliated as the dependent variable, the respondent being unaffiliated or nominally affiliated (as compared with being religiously committed), birth cohort and the polarisation indicators (CP and PDP) as the main independent variables, the marriage market and other individual-level controls, as well as an interaction term between being unaffiliated or nominally affiliated and contextual religious polarisation. Single-level regression models were preferred here to multilevel ones, since there are only 14 5-year birth cohorts in the 2008 BSA data, which we consider as too few group level cases to produce robust estimates at the second level. We were also able to estimate intermarriage and intercohabitation from the opposite

direction with the BSA data: single-level logistic regression models were also generated with a dichotomous variable for spouse being religiously committed as the dependent variable, and the respondent being religiously committed or nominally affiliated (as compared with being unaffiliated) as the main independent variables.

RESULTS

Spouse Non-Affiliation: Cross-National Comparison

Figures 5.5 and 5.6 contain a series of descriptive statistics from the 2008 ISSP data. Figure 5.5 contains the proportions of unaffiliated spouses among married/living as married respondents in general, and among both committed married/living as married respondents and unaffiliated married/living as married respondents for each country. In turn, Figure 5.6 contains these same rates of unaffiliated spouses, but normalised by the size of the unaffiliated group in each country to roughly account for size of the marriage market.[81]

[81] For the proportions of unaffiliated, nominally affiliated and religiously committed individuals in each of the 23 countries at study, see Figure 3.1 on p. 98 in Chapter Three.

Figure 5.5: Proportion of Unaffiliated Spouses, Among the General Married/Living as Married Population, Committed Married/Living as Married Respondents and Unaffiliated Married/Living as Married Respondents, by Country, 2008 ISSP





Figure 5.6: Ratio of Unaffiliated Spouses/Rate of Unaffiliated in Country, Among the General Married/Living as Married Population, Committed Married/Living as Married Respondents and Unaffiliated Married/Living as Married Respondents, by Country, 2008 ISSP



When we compare the proportions of unaffiliated spouses in Figure 5.5 among the general married/living as married populations to those among the committed married/living as married and unaffiliated married/living as married sub-populations, we can see important differences. Committed respondents in each country have much lower rates of unaffiliated spouses than the overall married/living as married populations. In Denmark, Hungary, Norway and Sweden no spouses of committed respondents are unaffiliated. By contrast, unaffiliated respondents have much higher rates of unaffiliated spouses than average. We can also see indications of the influence of the size of the marriage market: for example, the Czech Republic had the highest proportion of unaffiliated individuals in 2008 (see Figure 3.1 on p. 98 in Chapter Three), and also had one of the highest proportions of unaffiliated spouses among its general, committed and unaffiliated married/living as married populations.

In an attempt to account for this marriage market characteristic, the proportions of unaffiliated spouses were normalised by the size of the unaffiliated group in each country, and Figure 5.6 contains these ratios. A ratio of 1 would indicate that married/living as married respondents have exactly the same proportion of unaffiliated spouses as the proportion of unaffiliated individuals in the country in question at that time. A ratio below 1 indicates proportionally less unaffiliated spouses than the mean, and a ratio above 1 indicates proportionally more. The results in Figure 5.6 indicate that most of the countries at study have ratios of below 1 among their general married/living as married populations, with the exceptions of Norway and Russia. This may reflect in part the fact that many of the spouses in question were chosen in earlier years when there were in most cases (most notably in non ex-Soviet countries) lower overall proportions of non-affiliation in Western societies. As for the committed married/living as married respondents, in each country they have a ratio below 1, and the unaffiliated married/living as married respondents have ratios above 1, with the exceptions of France and Switzerland.

So at first glance being unaffiliated one's self does appear to be positively associated with having an unaffiliated spouse, and being religiously committed to be negatively associated with having an unaffiliated spouse. In order to see if this relationship holds when controlling for other individual-level factors and if it varies according to level of religious polarisation in a given region, three-level binary regression models were generated. The results of these models can be found in Table 5.3.

The statistically significant between-region and between-country variance (constants) found for each model in Table 5.3 indicates that levels of unaffiliated spouses do vary in a significant manner between countries. The individual-level predictors added in Model 2 do reduce the amount of between-region and between-country variance from the empty model, but this variance still remains significant. Among the fixed effects, the fact that unaffiliated respondents, as compared with religiously committed ones, are significantly much more likely to have an unaffiliated spouse is confirmed by the results in Table 5.3. An unaffiliated respondent's odds of having an unaffiliated spouse are an estimated 31.175 times higher than a committed respondent's same odds, when the other variables are controlled for (Model 2). Nominally affiliated respondents are also more likely to have an unaffiliated spouse, compared with religiously committed respondents, but the difference is not as wide as between the committed and the unaffiliated. However, when these effects are randomised at the regional level in Models 1-3, we find that they do not vary in a statistically significant manner (at the 95% level or higher) between regions.[82]

[82] These effects also do not vary between countries if a two-level binary regression model is run with individual and country levels only. No exceptions were found in this regard when separate analyses were run for each country.

Table 5.3: Fixed and Random Effects on Spouse's Non-Affiliation, 2008 ISSP

		Empty	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Fixed effects (odds ratios)	**No religion (ref. cat.: committed)**		27.356*** (3.006)	31.175*** (3.539)	14.078*** (7.511)
	Nominally affiliated (ref. cat.: committed)		2.648*** (0.300)	2.829*** (0.322)	1.281 (0.680)
	Age (centered)			1.019 (0.015)	1.019 (0.015)
	Age (natural log)			0.347† (0.219)	0.344† (0.218)
	Female			2.034*** (0.116)	2.036*** (0.116)
	Employed			1.036 (0.071)	1.036 (0.071)
	Highest degree			1.131*** (0.024)	1.131*** (0.024)
	Mean rate of unaffiliated (by country and 10-year cohort)			7.311*** (3.397)	7.366*** (3.430)
	Polarisation indicator (by region)			1.347* (0.179)	0.908 (0.254)
	No religion*polarisation				1.533 (0.431)
	Nominally affiliated* polarisation				1.533 (0.431)
	Constant	0.141*** (0.031)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.232 (0.551)	0.497 (1.199)
Between-region variance	**No religion**		0.087 (0.054)	0.098† (0.056)	0.095† (0.056)
	Nominally affiliated		0.085 (0.055)	0.072 (0.051)	0.071 (0.051)
	Constant	0.418*** (0.065)	0.103** (0.035)	0.088* (0.035)	0.092** (0.035)
Between-country variance	**Constant**	1.029** (0.332)	0.536** (0.176)	0.244* (0.096)	0.247* (0.098)

N = 16,569. N. of region gr. = 184. N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Additionally, the results in Models 2 and 3 show that, as expected, higher mean rates of non-affiliation among respondents in the same country and 10-year birth cohort increase a respondent's odds of having an unaffiliated spouse. Between countries and

cohorts with 0% non-affiliation and 100% non-affiliation, it is estimated that the odds of having an unaffiliated spouse increase by a factor of 7.311 when all other variables are controlled for. Other significant fixed effects include women having higher odds of having an unaffiliated spouse, most likely a reflection of the fact that men are characterised by higher rates of non-affiliation (Bowen 2004; Bradshaw and Ellison 2009; Cnaan et al. 2004; Collett and Lizardo 2009; Francis and Wilcox 1998; Hoffman 2009; Walter and Davie 1998). More educated respondents also have higher odds of having an unaffiliated spouse. The results in Model 2 also indicate that the odds of having an unaffiliated spouse increase with an increase in the level of religious polarisation in a region: a one unit increase in the polarisation index increases the odds of having an unaffiliated spouse by a factor of 1.347. This may be a reflection of the findings in Chapter Three that areas with higher rates of non-affiliation also have greater differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated. Yet, when the polarisation indicator is interacted with the religious commitment typology, these interaction terms are not statistically significant. This implies that the higher odds of having an unaffiliated spouse if a respondent is unaffiliated, or to a lesser degree if s/he is nominally affiliated, do not vary according to level of regional religious polarisation.[83]

Spouse Non-Affiliation and Religious Commitment in Great Britain

With the 2008 BSA data, it is possible to measure the association between a spouse's and a respondent's level of religious commitment not only from the direction of a spouse being unaffiliated or not, but also from that of a spouse being religiously committed or not. Great Britain is an excellent national context to measure this in, because it has shown signs in previous chapters of developing religious polarisation in its various forms. We can also see if the relationship between a respondent's and a spouse's level of religious

[83] Very similar results are obtained if the multilevel models are run without the imputed missing values for spouse non-affiliation.

commitment varies between birth cohorts, cohorts which can be more or less religiously polarised.

We begin by looking again at the associations with having an unaffiliated spouse, but this time in the British context only. Figure 5.7 contains similar descriptive statistics to those in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, except that the mean levels vary between birth cohorts, rather than between countries. As with the descriptive statistics for the ISSP data in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, we can see from the proportions and ratios in Figure 5.7 that religiously committed respondents generally have below average levels of unaffiliated spouses, and unaffiliated respondents have above average levels. Among the religiously committed and married/living as married respondents, members of all birth cohorts have ratios of unaffiliated spouses below 1, indicating that their proportions of unaffiliated spouses are lower than the proportion of unaffiliated respondents among their respective cohorts in general. The numbers are so low that, for many birth cohorts, none of the spouses of committed respondents are unaffiliated, including for those respondents born between 1917 and 1939, and between 1955 and 1959. For the unaffiliated and married/living as married respondents, many of the cohorts have a ratio above 1.

Figure 5.7: Proportion of Unaffiliated Spouses, Among the General Married/Living as Married Population, Committed Married/Living as Married Respondents and Unaffiliated Married/Living as Married Respondents, with Normalisation by Rate of Unaffiliated Respondents, by 5-Year Birth Cohort, Great Britain, 2008




Table 5.4: Effects on Having an Unaffiliated Spouse (Odds Ratios), Great Britain, 2008

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
No Religion (ref. cat.: committed)	6.973***	7.802***	36.115	7.801***	0.009	7.833***	3.156
	(1.842)	(2.355)	(1315.068)	(2.359)	(0.048)	(2.365)	(5.488)
Nominally affiliated (ref. cat.: committed)	1.582	1.630	0.005	1.630	0.050	1.633	1.437
	(0.447)	(0.505)	(0.175)	(0.505)	(0.274)	(0.506)	(2.610)
Birth cohort (5-year intervals)		1.039***	1.038†	1.039***	1.040***	1.045**	1.044**
		(0.12)	(0.020)	(0.12)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mean rate of unaffiliated (by country and 10-year cohort)		0.245	0.241	0.246	0.251	0.640	0.564
		(0.447)	(0.441)	(0.449)	(0.460)	(1.556)	(1.394)
No religion*birth cohort (5-year)			0.999				
			(0.019)				
Nominally affiliated*birth cohort (5-year)			1.003				
			(0.019)				
CP indicator (by 5-year cohort)				1.025	0.072		
				(0.759)	(0.185)		
PDP indicator (by 5-year cohort)						16.912	3.350
						(77.671)	(20.596)
No religion*CP (Model 4) / No religion*PDP (Model 6)					34.095		9.998
					(95.997)		(44.058)
Nominally affiliated*CP (Model 4) / Nominally affiliated*PDP (Model 6)					6.200		1.341
					(17.929)		(6.163)
Constant	0.124***	0.000***	0.000*	0.000***	0.000***	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.031)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)

N=990. Multiple imputation estimation. Odds ratios (with standard errors). Variables included in Models 2 to 7, but not in Table 5.4: gender, child in household, ethnic minority, level of education, rural residence and country. For these effects, see Table E.3 in Appendix E. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

This association of unaffiliated respondents being more likely to have unaffiliated spouses is confirmed by the results in Models 1 and 2 of Table 5.4, a table which contains the coefficients from the series of single-level logistic regression models with spouse being unaffiliated as the dependent variable. Respondents declaring no religion have statistically significant higher odds of having an unaffiliated spouse than religiously committed respondents, even when individual-level and marriage market controls are added in Model 2. More specifically, an unaffiliated respondent's odds of having an unaffiliated spouse are 7.8 times higher than those of a committed respondent. This being said, unlike the results with the ISSP data, in Great Britain nominally affiliated respondents do not have significantly higher odds (at the 95% level or higher) of having an unaffiliated spouse, as compared with religiously committed respondents.

There are some similar results in Model 2 of Table 5.4 to those of the ISSP models. Women and respondents with higher levels of education have significantly higher odds of having an unaffiliated spouse.[84] Yet, whereas age was not statistically significant in the ISSP models, younger birth cohorts in Great Britain have higher odds of having an unaffiliated spouse, even when mean size of the unaffiliated marriage market in each 10-year birth cohort and country (Scotland, England and Wales) is controlled for. Surprisingly, size of the unaffiliated marriage market as measured in these models does not have a statistically significant effect on having an unaffiliated spouse in Great Britain.

When the respondent's religious commitment typology is interacted with birth cohort (Model 3), the CP indicator (Model 5) and the PDP indicator (Model 7), none of the coefficients are statistically significant. In other words, the association between being unaffiliated and having an unaffiliated spouse, or being nominally affiliated and having an unaffiliated spouse, does not vary in a significant way across birth cohorts or according to levels of religious polarisation among a 5-year birth cohort (whether that polarisation be

[84] For these results, see Table E.3 in Annex E.

measured as average differences between the unaffiliated and the committed or as a lower proportion of the nominally affiliated middle ground among members of a cohort). It is important to note here though that many of the coefficients in Models 3 to 7 vary somewhat erratically, meaning that extremely small cell sizes appear to be an issue in these cases.

Let us now see if we get similar results when measuring intermarriage and intercohabitation from the other direction, meaning the association between a respondent being religiously committed (as compared with being unaffiliated) and having a religiously committed spouse. Figure 5.8 contains descriptive statistics similar to those in Figure 5.7, but with proportions and ratios for having a religiously committed spouse, rather than an unaffiliated one, in Great Britain between 5-year birth cohorts. Table 5.5 contains the coefficients from the second series of single-level logistic regressions with the 2008 BSA data (having a religiously committed spouse as the dependent variable).

Among the general married/living as married population in Figure 5.8, there is a certain decrease in the proportions of religiously committed spouses across cohorts. There is also a hint of the same decrease among the unaffiliated. But these trends are less evident when these proportions are normalised by the size of the religiously committed group in each 5-year birth cohort. Similar to the ratios for unaffiliated spouses in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, the normalised ratios for committed spouses are generally below 1 among the opposing group, in this case unaffiliated respondents, and above 1 for their own group, in this case religiously committed respondents. The numbers of unaffiliated respondents having a committed spouse are so low that, for many birth cohorts, the phenomenon is simply not present, including those respondents born between 1917 and 1924, as well as between 1975 and 1989.

Figure 5.8: Proportion of Committed Spouses, Among the General Married/Living as Married Population, Committed Married/Living as Married Respondents and Unaffiliated Married/Living as Married Respondents, with Normalisation by Ratio of Committed Respondents, by 5-Year Birth Cohort, Great Britain, 2008




Table 5.5: Effects on Having a Committed Spouse (Odds Ratios), Great Britain, 2008

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)	21.375***	24.633***	0.000	24.832***	2.001	25.017***	252.139**
	(5.834)	(8.156)	(0.000)	(8.240)	(10.604)	(8.302)	(496.009)
Nominally affiliated (ref. cat.: no religion)	0.667	0.582	0.000	0.588	0.062	0.589	3.730
	(0.239)	(0.237)	(0.000)	(0.240)	(0.429)	(0.241)	(9.257)
Birth cohort (5-year intervals)		0.987	0.965*	0.987	0.987	0.971	0.971
		(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Mean rate of committed (by country and 10-year cohort)		37.139	76.215	36.378	30.518	78.061	117.931
		(141.366)	(294.748)	(138.614)	(116.641)	(302.356)	(459.627)
Committed*birth cohort (5-year)			1.035				
			(0.023)				
Nominally affiliated*birth cohort (5-year)			1.033				
			(0.027)				
CP indicator (by 5-year cohort)				1.764	0.736		
				(1.978)	(1.555)		
PDP indicator (by 5-year cohort)						0.010	0.397
						(0.059)	(2.608)
Committed*CP (Model 4) / Committed*PDP (Model 6)					3.689		0.004
					(10.120)		(0.016)
Nominally affiliated*CP (Model 4) / Nominally affiliated*PDP (Model 6)					3.195		0.010
					(11.343)		(0.058)
Constant	0.054***	2.24E+09	9.1E+28*	8.62E+08	1.48E+10	1.30E+24	3.01E+23
	(0.012)	(5.77E+10)	(3.07E+30)	(2.22E+10)	(3.91E+11)	(6.56E+25)	(1.54E+25)

N=990. Multiple imputation estimation. Odds ratios (with standard errors). Variables included in Models 2 to 7, but not in Table 5.5: gender, child in household, ethnic minority, level of education, rural residence and country. For these effects, see Table E.4 in Appendix E. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

The results in Models 1 and 2 of Table 5.5 show us that committed respondents have much higher odds of having a religiously committed spouse, compared with unaffiliated respondents. More specifically, a religiously committed respondent's odds of having a committed spouse are 24.6 times higher than those of an unaffiliated respondent (Model 2). These same odds, however, are not significantly different between the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated. Model 2 also shows no statistically significant effect for birth cohort on having a religiously committed spouse.[85] Women do have significantly lower odds of having a religiously committed spouse, once again most likely a reflection of the fact that men are less likely to be religiously committed in general. In turn, ethnic minorities have significantly higher odds of having a religiously committed spouse.[86]

As with the results in Table 5.4 for unaffiliated spouses in Great Britain, the size of the religiously committed marriage market does not have a significant effect on having a religiously committed spouse. Additionally, none of the interaction terms between the religious commitment typology and birth cohort, the CP indicator as well as the PDP indicator are statistically significant. Once again then, the association between being religiously committed and having a religiously committed spouse does not vary across birth cohorts or according to levels of religious polarisation among birth cohorts. Additionally, extremely small cell size again appears to be an issue in Models 3 to 7, since many of the coefficients in these models vary somewhat erratically.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

From these results, we can reject both hypotheses H_{5a} and H_{5b}: there is no sign of a change in the odds of unaffiliated individuals having unaffiliated spouses when compared

[85] These findings as well as those in Table 5.4 are very similar if 5-year birth cohort dummies are included in the models rather than a continuous variable.
[86] These results can be found in Table E.4 in Annexe E.

with religiously committed individuals, nor of religiously committed individuals having religiously committed spouses as compared with unaffiliated individuals, according to the contextual level of religious polarisation in a region or birth cohort. There is also no change when nominally affiliated respondents are compared with those who declare having no religion or who are religiously committed. Levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed do not appear to decrease with greater differences in conservative attitudes, beliefs and personal religiosity between the religiously active and the secular. As we saw with the British models, they also do not decrease with a greater population split between the religiously active and the secular among younger cohorts.

However, it must be said that the analyses leading to these conclusions do have many limits, indicating that future research with more robust data on this topic may still be fruitful. In both datasets, especially the 2008 BSA, we were dealing in some cases with extremely small numbers when it came to either unaffiliated or committed respondents having a spouse of the opposing group. We could also not account for differences between marriage cohorts, nor explore cross-temporal trends. As reviewed at the start of the chapter, there were also many issues of causality that further limited the conclusions we could draw from the results.

Nevertheless, our initial null results are somewhat interesting in themselves, even with the methodological issues. Most existing research has focused only on endogamy and exogamy regarding denominational affiliation. We found very weak levels of existing intermarriage and intercohabitation when it comes to the actively religious and the secular: when comparing the two extreme groups, unaffiliated respondents have much higher odds than the religiously committed of having an unaffiliated spouse, and religiously committed respondents have much higher odds than the unaffiliated of having a religiously committed spouse. Furthermore, results from the nominally affiliated group

indicate that, in Great Britain, it is especially a case of homogamy: there were no statistically significant differences at the 95% level between the nominally affiliated and the committed regarding the odds of having an unaffiliated spouse, and between the nominally affiliated and the unaffiliated for having a religiously committed spouse. When the 23 countries and their regions from the 2008 ISSP are pooled together, however, there are significant differences between the nominally affiliated and the committed when it comes to having an unaffiliated spouse.

Additionally, these low levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed are surprisingly stable, both across post-industrial regions and countries, and between birth cohorts in Great Britain. Unlike interfaith marriages that have become more common over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries (Glenn 1982; Heard, Khoo and Birrell 2009; Heer and Hubay 1976; Hendrickx, Lammers and Ultee 1991; Jansen 1982; Kalmijn 1991; 1998; Lehrer 1998; McCutcheon 1988; Rosenfeld 2008; Rosenthal 1965; Schoen and Thomas 1990; Thomas 1951), levels of intermarriage between the unaffiliated and the Christian committed, although affected by the size of the marriage market in the case of the ISSP data, do not seem to vary according to any other pattern measured in this chapter.

So rather than seeing a growing distance between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated in polarised contexts, in the sense of a decline in levels of intermarriages and intercohabitations, the only significant change that we could capture appears to be an overall increase in unaffiliated spouses, due most notably to the change in the size of the marriage market, and only with the cross-national ISSP data (not in Great Britain). Religiously committed respondents have more unaffiliated spouses in countries where there are more of them, but still at much lower rates than their unaffiliated counterparts. There is no evidence then from our analyses for growing antagonism between the two groups in this sense. Nevertheless, there is also no evidence of this divide shrinking, of a

coming together of the religious and the secular beyond the constraints of the marriage market. Differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated appear to have remained as important as they ever were when it comes to marriage and cohabitation.

The results detailed in this chapter thus add to our knowledge acquired throughout this dissertation regarding the conditions within contexts of religious polarisation: what they are, what they are not, and the different forms they can take. The following and final chapter concludes by summarising these findings on religious polarisation, as well as discussing the means to measure this phenomenon, the theoretical implications of the findings, the limitations of this study and potential avenues for future research.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this dissertation, we determined from a review of the existing literature that, although many have begun to use the term, definitions and empirical evidence for religious polarisation remain vague and scarce in the field of sociology of religion. Consequently, we set out to uncover the different forms this phenomenon can take through individual attitudes and behaviour in contemporary North American, European and Oceanic countries and country sub-regions. As a starting point, we understood polarisation as a further step in the secularisation process, potentially developing when countries and regions are less characterised by societal-wide social norms and sanctions regarding the practice of religion. In such a context, individuals would see the adherence to religion as a more voluntary action and only participate if they personally felt it was worthwhile, but would do so in a more complete manner. In turn, others would move entirely away from religion in all its forms. Religious decline would thus come mainly from the middle ground of holding to certain religious traits while not to others. This would translate to the macro-level where populations would split into two extremes: one very religious and one very secular. As these extremes became better

defined, individuals would react and counter-react to them, feeling the need to distance themselves from one group by joining the other, further reinforcing polarisation.

Yet, after establishing this theory, we were left with many questions. Can this process of religious polarisation, meaning the decline of the religious middle ground accompanied by non-declining or increasing extremes of the very religious and the secular, actually be found in certain Western contexts, and where? In areas where it can be found, is it solely the domain of one religion (Protestantism for example), or characteristic of all? Is there a wider gap between the religious and the secular in their religious attitudes and behaviours in areas with advanced secularisation? Has this same gap been widening over the past two decades? Are the religious and the secular growing more socially distant, for example intermarrying and intercohabiting less in polarised contexts and among younger birth cohorts?


SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Each chapter of this dissertation addressed one of these questions, attempting to shed some light on the empirical realities of the phenomenon of religious polarisation by studying its various facets: the evolving size of groups with different levels of religious commitment among general populations and among specific religions, the differences in religiosity indicators that can be found between these groups in various national and regional contexts as well as over time, and relationships between the religious and the secular.

The findings in Chapter One indicate that there are regional cases, characterised by initially higher rates of non-affiliation, where proportional decline between the mid-1980s and the end of the 2000s came from the religious middle ground of nominal affiliation rather than the religiously active group. However, instead of being accompanied by a

rebound of the religiously committed as well as the unaffiliated (extreme PDP, as seen in Figure 6.1), there appears rather to be a bottoming-out effect with the proportions of religiously committed remaining low and relatively stable (softer PDP, as seen in Figure 6.1).[87] Nevertheless, with a stable religiously committed group, a declining middle ground and growing non-affiliation, post-industrial societies showing this trend are becoming more and more divided in two between the actively religious and the secular. We name this phenomenon one of softer Population Distribution Polarisation (PDP). Although present in certain areas, most notably Great Britain, Alberta and British Columbia among the regions we studied in detail, this combination of trends that forms the softer PDP configuration is not present everywhere in the West. Other configurations were observed as well, including ones of continued active religion, of cultural religion (high levels of/rise in nominal affiliation), pronounced or subdued overall religious decline, and from what we know from other research, desecularisation in some ex-soviet countries (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012).

Figure 6.1: Theoretical Illustration of Examples of Extreme and Softer Population Distribution Polarisation (PDP), as a Process over Time




[87] Although we explore these trends in detail in Chapter One for regions in the US, the UK and Canada, we still cannot find a case of extreme PDP when looking at ISSP trends from 1985 until 2010 for all the countries at study in this dissertation.

The results in Chapter Two show us that this process of religious polarisation in the sense of softer PDP was a phenomenon more often found among Protestants than individuals of other religions, although there also remains distinct regional and national differences in this respect. The findings in Chapter Two also indicate that it is the presence of present-day Protestants, rather than the traditional religious structure found in all Protestant societies, that more often leads countries to be in states of religious polarisation (higher odds of non-affiliation and lower odds of nominal affiliation). The exceptions in this case appear to be the Nordic countries, where the Protestant State Churches, still strongly tied to the State and the public sphere, seem to create a configuration of cultural religion characterised by much higher rates of nominal affiliation.

Findings from Chapter Three show us that there is a wider gap between the actively religious and the unaffiliated when it comes to attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, views on religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity in areas with more advanced secularisation, or in other words where the unaffiliated group is larger. We named this specific facet of religious polarisation Concentration Polarisation (CP). However, this wider divide was not due simultaneously to both higher levels of religiosity indicators among the religiously active and lower levels among the unaffiliated (extreme CP), but rather to one and not the other (softer CP). In the cases of attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, religious beliefs and personal religiosity, it was the unaffiliated that had more liberal attitudes and less religious beliefs and behaviour in areas where they numbered proportionally more, compared with their counterparts in areas where they numbered proportionally less. For views on religious leaders influencing politics, it was the religiously committed that had higher means of favourable views in areas where the unaffiliated formed a larger group, compared with the religiously committed in areas where the unaffiliated formed a smaller group.

In turn, the findings in Chapter Four demonstrate that, although not a universal phenomenon, some countries have seen an increase in their average differences between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed of certain religiosity indicators between the 1990s and 2008. Once again, this was more often, but not always, due to a decline in mean levels of conservative attitudes as well as religious beliefs and behaviour among the unaffiliated, rather than a rise among the committed (softer CP, as seen in Figure 6.2). However, New Zealand (between 1991 and 2008) and the UK (between 1998 and 2008) did show signs of declining levels of personal religiosity among their unaffiliated as well as increasing levels among their committed (extreme CP, as seen in Figure 6.2). This is an indication that, in certain contemporary post-industrial societies, rather than being dispersed among the entire population, religiosity indicators are becoming more and more aligned in the same individuals. However, rather than being aligned in a majority of individuals as we could think was the case in pre-secularising societies, this alignment now only characterises a much smaller portion of the population, the rest of which in many cases are moving completely away from religion and its related aspects.

Figure 6.2: Theoretical Illustration of Examples of Extreme and Softer Concentration Polarisation (CP), as a Process over Time



Finally, in Chapter Five we sought to uncover if there was growing social distance between the religious and the secular in the sense that they were intermarrying and intercohabiting less in polarised contexts. Being religiously committed, as compared with

being unaffiliated, did have a strong negative effect on having an unaffiliated spouse across the post-industrial nations at study. In turn, being unaffiliated, as compared with being committed, also had a strong negative effect on having a religiously committed spouse in Great Britain. However, these relatively low levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation do not vary significantly across regions or countries, nor across birth cohorts in the case of Great Britain: according to our results,[88] they have not strengthened in more polarised contexts, but nor have they weakened.

Which countries in North America, Europe and Oceania were the most religiously polarised then in the late 2000s according to the different facets of the phenomenon that we have studied? Figure 6.3 contains the proportions of unaffiliated, nominally affiliated and committed individuals in the 30 countries at study in Chapter Two for 2008-2010. Those countries that have high levels of PDP for this three-year time point are those with smaller proportions of nominal affiliates (between 35% and 49.1%) coupled with non-negligible levels of both the religiously committed (between 11.4% and 48.5%) and the unaffiliated (between 10.2% and 47.2%): these countries include Canada, Great Britain, the US, Italy, Australia, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Latvia.

Figure 6.4 in turn contains a ranking of the countries studied with the 2008 ISSP: these countries are ranked according to their average differences between the unaffiliated and religiously committed for all four religiosity indicators (conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality, favourable views on religious leaders influencing politics, religious beliefs and personal religiosity). A larger overall coefficient indicates greater differences between the unaffiliated and the religiously committed. These overall coefficients were obtained by averaging the coefficients for the committed effects on all four indicators (found in Figure 3.3 on p.109 in Chapter Three). The countries with the greatest average differences between their committed and unaffiliated (coefficients above

[88] Keeping in mind that the analyses in Chapter Five were fraught with methodological issues.

1.4) include Spain, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, France, Australia, New Zealand and Norway.

Figure 6.3: Proportion of Unaffiliated, Nominal Affiliates and Religiously Committed, 3 Countries, ISSP 2008-2010





Figure 6.4: Average Committed Effect (as Compared with Being Unaffiliated) on Conservative Attitudes Towards Gender Roles and Sexuality, Favourable Views on Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, 23 Countries, 2008 ISSP



From the rankings in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, we can see that some countries are ranked as among the most polarised for both PDP and CP at the recent time points, including Australia, France and New Zealand. Yet, it is also worth noting that some countries are ranked as very polarised for one facet of religious polarisation while not for the other. For example, Norway is ranked as the most polarised according to the CP coefficients in Figure 6.4, but is also characterised by a relatively large proportion of nominally affiliated individuals (low PDP). Consequently, the way in which religious polarisation is measured can be crucial when claiming a context is polarised or not, which leads us to the contributions this dissertation makes regarding the measurement of this phenomenon.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Contributions to Measurement

The theoretical framework and analyses detailed throughout this dissertation have shown firstly that, not only should researchers distinguish between various aspects of religion and religiosity when measuring these phenomena, but in many cases it is also worth distinguishing religious middle grounds from the two extremes of the very secular and the very religious. Religiosity should not necessarily be understood as a linear phenomenon, either as a cause or as an effect: nominal affiliation, for example, may have more to do with the persistent relationship religion has with other societal domains as well as the social and national identities of the individual, rather than simply being an intermediary level of personal religiosity. As indicated by many of the analyses in this dissertation that distinguished nominal affiliation from being unaffiliated or religiously active, the religious middle ground may be declining when the two extremes are not, and may be associated differently with other attitudes and behaviour than the two extremes.

As well as proposing that religion and religiosity should not always be measured as linear phenomena, one of the main contributions to measurement made by this dissertation is detailing various ways to measure religious polarisation at the individual level with survey data. We showed that there are different facets to religious polarisation, and it is important to distinguish between these according to theory or the data available. These facets include Population Distribution Polarisation (PDP), Concentration Polarisation (CP), as well as social distance and differences between the two extremes of the secular and the religious. Researchers interested specifically in religious polarisation can measure these facets as dependent variables. Yet, religious polarisation indicators can also be used as independent contextual variables, in order to measure how contexts of religious polarisation affect other social phenomena. A list of these various indicators developed and used throughout this dissertation can be found in Table 6.1.

An overall indicator for religious polarisation could always be created, quantifying where each region, religious group or social group is ranked when merging all dimensions of polarisation. Yet, with these kinds of overarching scales we tend to lose a great deal of nuance by combining at times very different information. We would suggest that, with empirical studies on religious polarisation only beginning to appear, researchers keep the various indicators and dimensions listed in this dissertation separate from one another. The researcher could either select those that interest her/him in accordance with theory, or run separate tests with all indicators and dimensions.

Table 6.1: Summary of Indicators for Measuring Religious Polarisation

Content	Measure	What is Captured
1. Religious commitment typology (for institutional religiosity).	Three-category variable (individual level): unaffiliated, nominally affiliated, and religiously committed (affiliated and attend services at least once a month).	Allows us to capture non-linear trends regarding the relationship individuals have with religious institutions; the nominally affiliated behaving differently from the two other categories.
3. Concentration Polarisation: conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality.	Aggregate-level scale based on standardised coefficient of religiously committed effect on expressing conservative attitudes towards gender roles and sexuality.	Higher scores indicate greater differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated for expressing conservative attitudes.
4. Concentration Polarisation: favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics	Aggregate-level scale based on standardised coefficient of religiously committed effect on favourable views towards religious leaders influencing politics.	Higher scores indicate greater differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated for favourable views.
5. Concentration Polarisation: religious beliefs	Aggregate-level scale based on standardised coefficient of religiously committed effect on religious beliefs.	Higher scores indicate greater differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated for beliefs.
6. Concentration Polarisation: personal religiosity	Aggregate-level scale based on standardised coefficient of religiously committed effect on personal religiosity.	Higher scores indicate greater differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated for personal religiosity.
7. Social Distance: intermarriage and intercohabitation between the religious and the secular	Aggregate-level scale based on standardised coefficient of religiously committed effect on having an unaffiliated spouse.	Lower (negative) coefficients indicate less intermarriage and intercohabitation between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated.

Contributions to Theory

The findings of this dissertation reveal that the more simplistic forms of both secularisation theory, predicting a total decline of religion in modern-day post-industrialised societies, and of supply-side religious market theory, predicting a rebound in religiosity as soon as complete freedom is introduced into a religious market, are not

very reflective of the social realities of religion. In areas where religion has undergone transformation and decline for many decades, if not centuries, the very religious are not disappearing altogether, but rather becoming a proportionally stable minority in society. It is the religious middle grounds, those groups of individuals characterised by some aspects of religion but not others, which have been declining more recently in these contexts.

Since we found mostly evidence for softer forms of PDP and CP in which the actively religious group was not rebounding but rather staying relatively stable in size and in levels of religiosity, the idea of religious polarisation may best fit into a nuanced version of the stages of decline theory in the field of sociology of religion. In areas with advanced secularisation, there is decline of what Voas names the fuzzy middle of religion. Yet, rather than focusing only on this decline, in this dissertation we chose also to highlight the persistence of an active religious minority in such contexts. Consequently, it may be best to understand that, although religion and religiosity appear to decline in stages in post-industrialised societies, eventually they do not decline into nothing but rather become the sole domain of smaller and more stable groups of individuals.

As for supply-side religious market models, few argue that the last strong social norms surrounding which denominations members of a certain society should belong to and how often a good citizen should attend religious services are fading away in advanced secularised societies. Yet, even with individuals being freed up to a certain extent to browse the available religious market, we found no evidence for an important rebound or revival of religion. This is not to say, however, that aspects of these models are not without their worth. Others have already done theoretical work in order to combine the frameworks of stages of decline/secularisation and religious market models. Both Beyer (1997) and Stolz (2006; 2009; 2010) have argued that secularisation in the sense of the decline of both supply-side regulation (State regulation of churches) and demand-regulation (normative pressures surrounding religion) is a necessary initial condition to

liberalise the religious market. Once liberalised, supply-side models can begin to explain denominational switching and the exchange of some religious goods. There will also be forms of religious individualism, where individuals construct and maintain their own systems of spiritual beliefs and practices away from religious institutions. The detail that we can now add to this unified theory of religion in advanced Modernity is that this religious market does not encompass all of society, but rather a specific (usually minority) group in society. Religion becomes a niche market of sorts, while many (secular) individuals either choose to remain aloof or are socialised away from it.

This active religious niche has particular characteristics in Western post-industrialised societies. Among Christians, it is becoming first and foremost an evangelical milieu, both from within existing denominations and from separate evangelical churches. As discussed in detail in Chapter Two, evangelical Christians are on average much more religiously active than their mainline and liberal Catholic counterparts. These very active evangelical groups generally have higher fertility rates than religious liberals or secular individuals, and are very effective at retaining their members' children by means of strong religious socialisation during youth (Bibby 2011; Kaufmann 2010; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Stolz and Favre 2005). In many cases, Evangelicals are also effective at creating and maintaining strong boundaries between themselves and the rest of what is perceived as liberal and secular society, most notably by sustaining their own social institutions (educational, charitable and political) (Kaufmann 2010; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Stolz and Favre 2005). Although the religiously committed among the mainline religious groups are aging fast, this is generally not the case among evangelical communities (Bibby 2011; Kaufmann 2010).

A similar phenomenon also appears to be present among those of non-Christian religions: those more fundamentalist forms of the Jewish and Muslim faiths for example also have higher fertility and retention rates than their more liberal counterparts, either

among immigrants arriving in Western societies or among minorities that have been in such societies for a generation or more (Kaufmann 2010). These favourable demographics and good retention rates among religious fundamentalists coupled with continued decline among mainline groups seem to be the main reasons behind the religiously committed group remaining low but proportionally stable in areas where non-affiliation has been on the rise for many decades. This may be why we find softer forms of PDP more often among Protestants and in Protestant areas not monopolised by one State Church: in many of these cases evangelical and other religious minority groups already have a better foothold than in many Catholic or Nordic contexts for example.

As many current Christians not in the evangelical milieu continue to move away from religion in stages (either out of disinterest, poor religious socialisation or a reaction to religious fundamentalism) and older active members of these more liberal denominations die off, the remaining religiously committed group in society is composed more and more by individuals belonging to more fundamentalist faith communities with generally more conservative value orientations. Consequently, although the religiously committed group as a whole may remain smaller and proportionally stable in places such as Western Canada and Great Britain, its internal composition is shifting more and more towards members of more conservative Christian and non-Christian religious groups (Kaufmann 2010; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Stolz and Favre 2005). For example, in 1985 mainline Protestants made up 53.8% of the religiously committed group in Great Britain, whereas in 2009 they only made up 33.4% of it.[89]

There were also other socio-demographic characteristics more commonly found among the religiously active when results from the models throughout this dissertation were analysed. Higher rates of women, the less educated, married individuals, rural residents as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities could often be found among the

[89] Proportions taken from the 1985 and 2009 BSA, weighted to be representative of the general population.

religiously committed. The focus of this dissertation was for the most part not on these groups, and we did not explore religious polarisation trends among these specific types of individuals, but this remains an interesting avenue for future research.

As detailed in the Introduction, the theoretical work put forward by Martin (2005), Putnam and Campbell (2010) and Roy (2008) pointed to the possibility of such results on religious polarisation. Yet, their frameworks remained mostly separate, vague and empirically untested. This dissertation brought these ideas on religious polarisation together, deduced hypotheses that we should expect at the individual level if polarisation was occurring, and tested these hypotheses empirically. We now have a much better idea of the reality of religious polarisation, where it can be found and the various forms it does, and does not, take. Rather than disproving the theories put forward by Martin, Putnam and Campbell, and Roy, we have added some much-needed detail and nuance to their general propositions. We argue that, when talking about religious polarisation, one has to be more specific regarding the aspects of religion and the type of polarisation involved. From our own study, we have determined that there are areas, most notably non-Nordic regions and countries with higher rates of Protestants among the affiliated and higher rates of non-affiliation in the general population, that have become more starkly divided between the religious and the secular. This is mainly due to a rise in an unaffiliated group that is becoming more and more secular in all its ways, and a decline of the religious middle ground rather than of the actively religious.

In no region or country at study did we find an extreme pattern where both the secular and the religious increased proportionally, and both became respectively more secular and more religious. Rather, we found more of a bottoming-out effect of the religiously committed group who remains relatively small and stable while the unaffiliated gain in size from the decline of the religious middle ground and become generally more secular in most respects. For the indicators of religious affiliation and religious service attendance,

we studied regional cases in the US, the UK and Canada in more detail in Chapters One and Two. This being said, if we look at the proportional trends of religious commitment in other post-industrialised countries with 1985-2010 ISSP data, we observe other instances of nations having relatively low and stable proportions of religiously committed individuals accompanied by declining proportions of nominal affiliates: this is the case in Hungary, New Zealand and Norway. However, in no country do we observe a decline in the middle ground of nominal affiliation accompanied by a rise in both the proportions of unaffiliated and religiously committed. It is only in the ex-Soviet countries of Russia and the Slovak Republic that we see an increase in the proportions of the religiously committed. As Evans and Northmore-Ball (2012) argue, this is more indicative of a process of desecularisation, rather than of polarisation, developing after enforced secularity under Soviet rule. Additionally, although one's level of religious commitment still appears to be strongly associated with that of one's spouse, according to our findings levels of intermarriage and intercohabitation between the actively religious and the secular have not decreased in contexts of polarisation.

All these findings in turn bring to the fore the issue of if polarisation is the right term to use for this specific configuration characterised by:

1. a rise in non-affiliation, a decline in the religious middle ground and stability of the religiously committed;
2. in many cases lower/declining indicators of religion among the unaffiliated as shown in Chapters Three and Four;
3. and no observable growing social distance between the religious and the secular when it comes to intermarriage and intercohabitation.

Why not use a term such as bottoming-out, slowed decline or even keep using secularisation, just in a more nuanced form? Despite the absence of an extreme pattern of two growing extremes, we prefer to use the term polarisation here because the societies in

question are still seeing their populations divide more and more into two poles, with one (secular) appearing in many cases to be larger than the other (religious). The terms secularisation and stages of decline also have their own issues: they give the initial impression that religion is disappearing entirely either linearly or non-linearly; and they are already used in the existing literature to describe a variety of different trends and phenomena. This dissertation is not meant, however, to be the final word on whether or not polarisation as a term should or should not be used in the field of sociology of religion. Rather, we hope to launch a discussion by clarifying the empirical realities surrounding its potential uses.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Although this study provides many contributions to the measurement of religion and religious phenomena as well as to the theory in the field of sociology of religion, it is not without its limits, limits stemming from the data and measurement techniques that were used as well as the focus that was chosen. Future research is needed to fill these gaps in order to better grasp the phenomenon of religious polarisation in its entirety.

Limitations of the Data

Analysing repeated cross-sectional survey data, as was the case in this study, can establish many associations and trends, but the issue of determining concrete causal direction is always much more difficult and in many cases simply not possible with this type of data. Although panel and event history data with a large number of waves, countries and religiosity indicators is very difficult to find, more specific national panel data that exists could provide the field of sociology of religion with much insight, especially regarding religious changes over the life course of an individual and how this

varies between polarised and non-polarised contexts. How long is an individual religiously committed for in a polarised context: most of her/his life, intermittently, or mostly later in life? What triggers these life course changes? Does an individual's conscious choice of a partner factor in similar levels of religiosity, or is it simply a matter of social proximity? Is this proximity growing between different types of religiously committed individuals in society, and is distance growing between the actively religious and the secular?

Limitations of Measurement

Previous to this dissertation, there have been no real standards set for measuring religious polarisation. Consequently, this study pioneered certain measures of this phenomenon, including three non-linear categories of religious commitment as well as a series of aggregate indicators. Yet, there are no doubt other ways of measuring this phenomenon. With a larger number of religiosity indicators throughout all the data at use, more detail could be added to the religious commitment typologies and scales. Now that we know polarisation is in many cases a bottoming-out trend, future researchers could use continuous scales of religiosity while adjusting for their exponential decay.

Additionally, the obtained values of the aggregate-level indicators of religious polarisation for each country and region were interpreted according to those of the other countries and regions at study. This was done because, with existing empirical research on religious polarisation being so scarce, we did not have a standard reference point with which to say that a country or region was definitely polarised or not. This being said, one could conceive of a polarisation scale with distinct cut-off points: for example, countries and regions could only be considered as having large average differences between the religiously committed and the unaffiliated if they had a positive committed coefficient

above 1.4. The best way to establish these cut-off points would be by developing and referring to new theory.

Limitations of Focus

In this dissertation, we concentrated mainly on post-industrial Western nations and regions, due to the theoretical framework being developed within these contexts and being more suited to Christian and secularising circumstances. This is not to say that there may not be other countries and regions in the world that are showing signs of religious polarisation. Roy (2008) argues for example that certain forms of Islam, just like Protestantism in a way, create more favourable conditions for polarisation. Are religious polarisation trends developing in certain Muslim countries, or Turkey for example? Additionally, with the rise of Pentecostalism in many areas of the world, such as in many Asian, African and South American countries, is this very visible and fervent religion also generating the beginnings of a strong secular counter-reaction?

Even within the post-industrialised contexts at study, due to the data used and the scope of the research, certain questions related to religious polarisation were addressed, but others remain. Has switching between denominations become more common among the religiously committed, and switching between being religiously committed and being nominally affiliated become less so, over the course of one's lifetime in polarised contexts? Does discourse from religious institutions become more focused on the religious few rather than on the whole of society in polarised contexts? Do humanist organisations appear more in polarised contexts, and do they contribute to a religious counter-reaction in society? What reasons do individuals give themselves when directly asked why they are or are not religious, and do these vary between polarised and non-polarised contexts?

The issue of differing fertility rates between religious and secular populations and how this may affect polarisation trends was also not addressed empirically in this dissertation,

although others have previously done so either directly or indirectly (Kaufmann 2010; Kaufmann et al. 2012; de Graaf, Need and Ultee 2004). Does religious apostasy in a more moderate form continue among the initially religiously committed in polarised contexts, masked by very high fertility rates among the actively religious, thus keeping this group proportionally stable rather than seeing it grow?

At both extremes in a polarised area, what level of contact do members from either the religious or secular groups have with other members of their same group? Has social contact increased between very religious Christians and very religious non-Christians for example? Do the geographic distributions of religions matter less now when it comes to the levels of social contact between different types of religious individuals? To what extent do the very religious in rural areas come into contact with those in cities? At the other end, among the secular group do proactive atheists have much to do with agnostics and the personally spiritual?

Is religious polarisation more or less present among different social groups in society? Are women, the less educated and rural residents for example more polarised among themselves than men, the higher educated and urban residents? In turn, how does religious polarisation affect other social domains and aspects of life? Is this phenomenon linked to political polarisation between left and right in a given area? In polarised contexts, does civil society become more one-sided, composed in larger numbers by the religious and by church organisations? Are certain life choices becoming mainly the domain of the secular, such as low fertility, cohabitation and higher education, and others mainly characteristic of the religious, such as high fertility, marriage and lower education? To what extent is being a member of the religious minority in a polarised context good on the whole for mental and physical health (with a strong and tightly-knit support group), or bad for it (being socially isolated from the rest of society)?

There is no doubt that the phenomenon of religious polarisation is a complex process with many dynamics at play, a process which we are only beginning to uncover in the field of sociology of religion. This dissertation is a first step in the detailed and ongoing study of religious polarisation in all its forms, a study that in time will allow researchers to better grasp the wider social repercussions of the existence of such a trend. Religious behaviour and attitudes are known to have direct effects in many cases on other aspects of social life, such as physical and mental health, choice of educational track, volunteering, family formation and voter preferences (Bowen 2004; Elff and Rossteutscher 2011; Evans and de Graaf 2013; Mockabee et al. 2001). Consequently, a trend towards religious polarisation in regions where religious non-affiliation has been on the rise for many decades could have important implications for social relations and policy. As social cleavages that used to exist between individuals of different Christian denominations reform along a more secular/religious divide, that divide could extend to other aspects of society and thus harbour the potential for social conflict. Better understanding these empirical realities of society is a first step in better preparing for and managing their impact on people's daily lives.

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APPENDIX A

Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter One

Table A.1: Religious Composition and Frequency of Religious Service Attendance of Nominally Affiliated and Committed Respondents, Canada (2009), US (2010) and Great Britain (2009)

	Religious Composition					
	Canada (2009)		US (2010)		Great Britain (2009)	
	Nominally Affiliated	Committed	Nominally Affiliated	Committed	Nominally Affiliated	Committed
Roman Catholic	53.9%	44.5%	35.8%	27.3%	14.5%	39.9%
Protestant	35.7%	42.4%	55.7%	68.3%	78.1%	53.3%
Other Religions	10.4%	13.0%	8.6%	4.4%	7.4%	6.7%

Frequency of Religious Service Attendance: Nominally Affiliated					
Canada (2009)		**US (2010)**		**Great Britain (2009)**	
A few times a year	26.10%	**Several times a year**	19.13%	**At least twice a year**	10.89%
At least once a year	15.79%	**Once a year**	26.36%	**At least once a year**	6.27%
Not at all	58.10%	**Less than once a year**	12.49%	**Less than once a year**	8.29%
		Never	42.02%	**Never or practically never**	73.49%
				Varies too much to say	1.06%

Frequency of Religious Service Attendance: Committed					
Canada (2009)		**US (2010)**		**Great Britain (2009)**	
At least once a week	64.17%	**More than once a week**	15.04%	**Once a week or more**	60.96%
At least once a month	35.83%	**Every week**	40.80%	**At least once every two weeks**	10.29%
		Nearly every week	9.55%	**At least once a month**	28.75%
		2 or 3 times a month	18.34%		
		Once a month	16.27%		

Figure A.1: Proportion of Unaffiliated Respondents, 13 US, UK and Canadian Regions, 1985




Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics, US, UK and Canada, 1985 - 2009 (2010 US)

	US			UK			Canada		
	N	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**	***N***	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**	***N***	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**
No Religion	37,545	0.124	0.330	117,188	0.345	0.475	396,293	0.154	0.361
Nominally Affiliated	37,545	0.397	0.489	117,188	0.381	0.486	392,066	0.485	0.500
Committed	37,545	0.479	0.500	117,188	0.275	0.446	392,066	0.359	0.480
Year	38,035	1998	7.532	118,244	2000	6.546	427,431	2000	6.981
Birth Cohort (5-year intervals)	37,915	1949	18.726	117,985	1949	18.807	412,041	1951	18.778
Female	38,035	0.562	0.496	118,244	0.564	0.496	412,041	0.561	0.496
Foreign born (US and CAN)/ Non-European/non-white ethnic origin (GB)	36,390	0.089	0.284	98,683	0.048	0.213	405,363	0.166	0.372
Black (US)	38,035	0.142	0.349						
French mother tongue (CAN)							404,483	0.227	0.419
High school or lower	37,943	0.700	0.458	116,688	0.752	0.432	401,736	0.448	0.497
Higher education, below university	37,943	0.066	0.248	116,688	0.119	0.323	401,736	0.369	0.482
University education	37,943	0.234	0.424	116,688	0.129	0.336	401,736	0.183	0.387
Age (centered)	37,915	0.000	17.378	117,985	0.000	18.089	412,041	0.000	18.626
Age (natural log)	37,915	3.757	0.389	117,985	3.808	0.400	412,041	3.736	0.458

Figure A.2: Predicted Probabilities of Being of No Religion, Nominally Affiliated or Religiously Committed, Canadian Provinces, 1985-2009, with CI (95%)




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


Figure A.2 (cont.):




Table A.3: Logistic Regression Coefficients (in Odds Ratios with Clustered Standard Errors by Year), Great Britain as well as Alberta and British Columbia, 1985 - 2009

	Great Britain *N = 72 887*			Alberta and British Columbia *N = 80 107*		
	No Religion ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.092***	**Nominally affiliated** ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.032***	**Committed** ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.080***	**No Religion** ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.059***	**Nominally affiliated** ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.021***	**Committed** ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.033***
Female	0.580***	1.215***	1.716***	0.673***	1.071***	1.379***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.053)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.035)
Non-European/non-white ethnic origin (GB) / Foreign born (WC)	0.210***	0.919*	6.363***	0.785***	0.700***	1.871***
	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.310)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.060)
French mother tongue (WC)				0.581***	1.206***	1.272***
				(0.031)	(0.071)	(0.067)
Higher education, below university	0.818***	0.838***	1.785***	0.080***	1.017	1.121***
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.048)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.031)
University education	0.910*	0.694***	2.064***	1.041	0.752***	1.350***
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.088)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.029)
Scotland (GB) / Alberta (WC)	0.935	0.764***	1.638***	0.531***	1.166***	1.561***
	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.095)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.032)
Wales (GB)	1.119*	0.838***	1.134*			
	(0.054)	(0.032)	(0.059)			

Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Odds ratios with standard errors (clustered by year) in parentheses. Year (one-year intervals) and birth cohort (five-year intervals) dummies were included in models, but not in Table A.3. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table A.4: HAPC Models, Effects on Being Religiously Committed, Great Britain as well as Alberta and British Columbia, 1985 - 2009

	Great Britain *N=72 887*	Alberta and British Columbia *N=80 107*
Fixed effects (odds ratios)		
Age (centered)	1.029*** (0.004)	1.040*** (0.004)
Age (natural log)	0.681* (0.127)	0.315*** (0.039)
Female	1.797*** (0.037)	1.475*** (0.024)
Ethnic minority (GB) / Foreign born (WC)	5.608*** (0.200)	1.708*** (0.032)
French mother tongue (WC)		1.374*** (0.062)
Higher education below university	1.878*** (0.053)	1.169*** (0.022)
University education	2.130*** (0.063)	1.399*** (0.033)
Scotland (GB) / Alberta (WC)	1.613*** (0.050)	1.648*** (0.027)
Wales (GB)	1.148*** (0.049)	
Random effects (explained variance)		
Birth cohort (5-year intervals)	0.024* (0.012)	0.007* (0.003)
Period (year)	0.026** (0.010)	0.006* (0.003)

Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Figure A.3: Adjusted Intercepts by Birth Cohort for Being Religiously Committed, Great Britain as well as Alberta and British Columbia, Cohorts Born from 1895 until 1995, with CI (95%)





Figure A.4: Adjusted Intercepts by Year of Study for Being Religiously Committed, Great Britain as well as Alberta and British Columbia, 1985-2009, with CI (95%)



APPENDIX B

Supplementary Tables for Chapter Two

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics, US, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Central Canada and Western Canada, 1985 (1989 NI) - 2009 (2010 US)

	US			Great Britain			Northern Ireland		
	N	Mean	Std. dev.	*N*	Mean	Std. dev.	*N*	Mean	Std. dev.
Protestant	37,865	0.583	0.493	75,741	0.465	0.499	26,024	0.524	0.499
Catholic	37,865	0.243	0.429	75,741	0.095	0.293	26,024	0.362	0.481
Other Religions	37,865	0.050	0.217	75,741	0.035	0.183			
No Religion	37,545	0.124	0.330	75,645	0.406	0.491	25,936	0.109	0.311
Mainline Protestant	37,762	0.163	0.370	75,741	0.379	0.485			
Evangelical Protestant	37,762	0.150	0.357	75,741	0.025	0.157			
Black Protestant	37,762	0.081	0.273						
Muslim				75,741	0.015	0.121			
Monthly religious service attendance	37,580	0.488	0.500	74,663	0.196	0.397	25,030	0.589	0.492
Year	38,035	1998	7.532	76,174	1999	7.079	26,377	2000	5.461
Birth Cohort (5-year intervals)	37,914	1949	18.726	76,027	1948	18.972	26,300	1950	18.649
Female	38,035	0.562	0.496	76,174	0.560	0.496	26,377	0.571	0.495
Foreign born (US)/ Non-European/non-white ethnic origin (GB)	36,390	0.089	0.284	74,383	0.057	0.231			
Black (US)	38,035	0.142	0.349						
High school or lower	37,943	0.700	0.458	74,802	0.742	0.438	26,272	0.812	0.391
Higher education, below university	37,943	0.066	0.248	74,802	0.130	0.336	26,272	0.072	0.259
University education	37,943	0.234	0.424	74,802	0.129	0.335	26,272	0.116	0.320

Table B.1 (cont.):

	Atlantic Canada			Quebec			Central Canada			Western Canada		
	N	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**	***N***	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**	***N***	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**	***N***	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**
Protestant	79,132	0.501	0.500	81,113	0.048	0.213	154,334	0.448	0.497	85,031	0.441	0.497
Catholic	79,132	0.404	0.491	81,113	0.845	0.362	154,334	0.303	0.460	85,031	0.200	0.400
Other Religions	79,132	0.015	0.123	81,113	0.036	0.187	154,334	0.079	0.270	85,031	0.069	0.253
No Religion	79,132	0.080	0.271	81,113	0.072	0.258	154,334	0.170	0.375	85,031	0.289	0.453
United Church of Canada	75,915	0.158	0.365	78,841	0.012	0.108	148,332	0.155	0.362	81,723	0.132	0.338
Monthly religious service attendance	74,851	0.484	0.500	76,061	0.324	0.468	135,593	0.425	0.494	80,506	0.353	0.478
Year	81,674	2000	6.889	82,660	2000	6.889	162,217	2000	6.777	89,180	2000	6.655
Birth Cohort (5-year intervals)	78,432	1951	18.965	80,383	1951	18.394	155,870	1951	19.026	85,656	1952	18.602
Female	81,674	0.572	0.495	82,660	0.563	0.496	162,217	0.562	0.496	89,180	0.552	0.497
Foreign born (CAN)	80,808	0.047	0.212	81,717	0.092	0.289	158,915	0.230	0.421	87,295	0.233	0.423
French (English QC) mother tongue (CAN)	80,792	0.122	0.327	81,674	0.071	0.258	158,374	0.062	0.242	87,026	0.030	0.170
High school or lower	80,069	0.477	0.499	80,960	0.485	0.500	157,512	0.430	0.495	86,679	0.394	0.489
Higher education, below university	80,069	0.369	0.482	80,960	0.335	0.472	157,512	0.368	0.482	86,679	0.408	0.491
University education	80,069	0.154	0.361	80,960	0.180	0.384	157,512	0.202	0.401	86,679	0.198	0.399

Table B.1 (cont.)

	2008-2010 ISSP (30 Countries)			
	Variable type	***N***	**Mean**	**Std. dev.**
No religion	Dichotomous	39,501	0.240	0.427
Nominally affiliated	Dichotomous	39,501	0.534	0.499
Committed	Dichotomous	39,501	0.226	0.419
Age (centered)	Continuous	40,762	0.000	17.363
Age (natural log)	Continuous	40,762	3.822	0.395
Pre-Boomer	Dichotomous	40,762	0.223	0.416
Boomer	Dichotomous	40,762	0.373	0.483
Post-Boomer	Dichotomous	40,762	0.404	0.491
Female	Dichotomous	40,825	0.547	0.498
Single/never married	Dichotomous	40,453	0.234	0.423
Married	Dichotomous	40,453	0.568	0.495
Widowed	Dichotomous	40,453	0.094	0.292
Separated/divorced	Dichotomous	40,453	0.104	0.305
Years of Education	Continuous	38,038	12.613	3.927
Year 2008	Dichotomous	40,933	0.124	0.330
Year 2009	Dichotomous	40,933	0.283	0.450
Year 2010	Dichotomous	40,933	0.593	0.491
Traditionally Protestant	Dichotomous	40,933	0.281	0.449
Traditionally mixed	Dichotomous	40,933	0.209	0.407
Traditionally Catholic	Dichotomous	40,933	0.397	0.489
Traditionally Orthodox	Dichotomous	40,933	0.113	0.317
Ex-Soviet	Dichotomous	40,933	0.319	0.466
Non-EU	Dichotomous	40,933	0.296	0.456
Nordic	Dichotomous	40,933	0.147	0.354
GDP (standardised)	Continuous	40,933	0.000	1.000

Table B.2: Effects on Categories of Religious Affiliation (Odds Ratios), US, 1985 – 2010

	Protestant	**Catholic**	**Mainline Protestant**	**Evangelical Protestant**	**Black Protestant**
	N = 36,176 Pseudo R^2 = 0.120	***N = 36,176 Pseudo R^2 = 0.083***	***N = 36,080 Pseudo R^2 = 0.050***	***N = 36,080 Pseudo R^2 = 0.155***	***N = 36,080 Pseudo R^2 = 0.639***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.951 (0.066)	0.983 (0.059)	0.968 (0.046)	1.050 (0.070)	0.847*** (0.043)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.766*** (0.031)	0.938 (0.040)	0.842** (0.046)	1.109*** (0.028)	0.861 (0.071)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.734*** (0.026)	0.932** (0.021)	0.744*** (0.061)	0.848*** (0.043)	0.658*** (0.066)
Period: 2005-2010 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.682*** (0.032)	0.977 (0.032)	0.628*** (0.030)	0.729*** (0.024)	0.630*** (0.042)
Female	1.221*** (0.027)	1.059* (0.026)	1.188*** (0.046)	0.991 (0.026)	1.161* (0.071)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	2.048*** (0.068)	0.814*** (0.029)	1.488*** (0.093)	1.570*** (0.077)	1.165* (0.086)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	2.631*** (0.122)	0.706*** (0.042)	2.106*** (0.148)	1.617*** (0.157)	1.607*** (0.148)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	1.694*** (0.086)	0.757*** (0.030)	1.319*** (0.101)	1.510*** (0.091)	1.156* (0.078)
Foreign born	0.269*** (0.015)	2.562*** (0.183)	0.451*** (0.041)	0.261*** (0.021)	0.236*** (0.034)
Black	3.849*** (0.219)	0.192*** (0.013)	0.242*** (0.022)	0.009*** (0.003)	702.281*** (151.045)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school edu. or lower)	0.907 (0.054)	1.093 (0.059)	1.213*** (0.072)	0.770** (0.073)	1.017 (0.163)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.817*** (0.023)	0.842*** (0.039)	1.686*** (0.059)	0.504*** (0.025)	0.792** (0.066)
Northeastern US (ref. category: Southern US)	0.240*** (0.009)	3.684*** (0.241)	0.824** (0.052)	0.139*** (0.007)	0.603*** (0.047)
Midwestern US (ref. category: Southern US)	0.549*** (0.017)	1.822*** (0.100)	1.176** (0.069)	0.418*** (0.027)	0.750** (0.069)
Western US (ref. category: Southern US)	0.460*** (0.022)	1.513*** (0.086)	0.700*** (0.041)	0.239*** (0.017)	0.551*** (0.066)
Constant	1.602*** (0.081)	0.257*** (0.011)	0.162*** (0.009)	0.415*** (0.023)	0.003*** (0.001)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.3: Effects on Categories of Religious Affiliation (Odds Ratios), Great Britain, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Evangelical Protestant	Muslim
	N = 73,034 Pseudo R^2 = 0.043	***N = 73,034 Pseudo R^2 = 0.006***	***N = 73,034 Pseudo R^2 = 0.067***	***N = 73,034 Pseudo R^2 = 0.023***	***N = 73,034 Pseudo R^2 = 0.458***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.897***	0.932	0.876**	0.892	1.232
	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.078)	(0.146)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.707***	0.857***	0.658***	0.825	1.773***
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.085)	(0.224)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.736***	0.877**	0.672***	0.715**	1.734***
	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.088)	(0.225)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.640***	0.849***	0.488***	0.633***	2.026***
	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.209)
Female	1.467***	1.278***	1.415***	1.513***	0.693***
	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.088)	(0.057)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	2.001***	0.884***	2.522***	0.986	1.520***
	(0.062)	(0.033)	(0.069)	(0.082)	(0.116)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	3.746***	0.983	4.506***	1.609***	0.870
	(0.123)	(0.066)	(0.164)	(0.149)	(0.204)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	1.644***	0.940	2.000***	1.147	1.066
	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.075)	(0.136)	(0.131)
Ethnic minority	0.439***	0.891	0.230***	2.457***	161.002***
	(0.026)	(0.067)	(0.013)	(0.187)	(23.922)
Higher education below university (ref. category: A levels or lower)	1.150***	1.094*	1.018	1.405***	0.336***
	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.100)	(0.058)
University degree (ref. category: A levels or lower)	0.854***	1.075	0.655***	1.275**	0.697***
	(0.021)	(0.048)	(0.017)	(0.107)	(0.060)
Scotland (ref. category: England)	0.943	1.372***	1.024	0.962	1.589
	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.041)	(0.113)	(0.474)
Wales (ref. category: England)	1.118*	0.582***	0.954	2.340***	1.346
	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.268)	(0.346)
Constant	0.507***	0.109***	0.348***	0.019***	0.001***
	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.000)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.4: Effects on Categories of Religious Affiliation (Odds Ratios), Northern Ireland, 1989 – 2009

	Protestant ***N = 25,933 Pseudo R^2 = 0.011***	**Catholic** ***N = 25,933 Pseudo R^2 = 0.006***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1989)	1.142** (0.059)	0.947 (0.036)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.012 (0.027)	1.093*** (0.030)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.040 (0.067)	1.044 (0.073)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.941 (0.042)	1.140** (0.051)
Female	0.992 (0.032)	1.174*** (0.040)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.595*** (0.066)	0.722*** (0.034)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	2.198*** (0.117)	0.603*** (0.044)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	1.315*** (0.060)	0.649*** (0.041)
Higher education below university (ref. category: A levels or lower)	1.104 (0.068)	0.835*** (0.044)
University degree (ref. category: A levels or lower)	0.847** (0.048)	0.926 (0.054)
Constant	0.720*** (0.030)	0.708*** (0.035)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.5: Effects on Categories of Religious Affiliation (Odds Ratios), Atlantic Canada, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	**Catholic**	**United Church**
	N = 70.741 Pseudo R^2 = 0.121	***N = 70.741 Pseudo R^2 = 0.129***	***N = 70,598 Pseudo R^2 = 0.052***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.281**	0.964	0.983
	(0.104)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.176*	0.967	0.793***
	(0.097)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.072	0.956**	0.772***
	(0.084)	(0.016)	(0.031)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.041	0.894***	0.774***
	(0.087)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Female	1.115**	1.111***	1.060
	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.749***	0.827***	1.519***
	(0.095)	(0.038)	(0.074)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	2.221***	0.774***	2.087***
	(0.126)	(0.039)	(0.141)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	1.491***	0.840*	1.398***
	(0.121)	(0.074)	(0.087)
Foreign born	0.667***	0.712***	0.503***
	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.031)
French mother tongue	0.037***	20.708***	0.065***
	(0.005)	(1.915)	(0.029)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.893*	1.066	1.212***
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.033)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.747***	1.013	1.301***
	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.041)
Nwfl. and Lab. (ref. category: Nova Scotia)	1.354***	1.010	1.111**
	(0.084)	(0.065)	(0.040)
PEI (ref. category: Nova Scotia)	0.835***	1.505***	1.459***
	(0.024)	(0.053)	(0.070)
New Brunswick (ref. category: Nova Scotia)	1.119***	0.931*	0.911*
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.038)
Constant	0.707***	0.550***	0.146***
	(0.059)	(0.024)	(0.009)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.6: Effects on Categories of Religious Affiliation (Odds Ratios), Quebec, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	Catholic	United Church
	N = 72.921 Pseudo R^2 = 0.230	*N = 72.921 Pseudo R^2 = 0.195*	*N = 72,762 Pseudo R^2 = 0.208*
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.412**	0.962	0.894
	(0.186)	(0.112)	(0.120)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.709***	0.846	2.103
	(0.244)	(0.097)	(1.738)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.466**	0.668***	0.692**
	(0.185)	(0.040)	(0.084)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.626***	0.511***	0.442***
	(0.206)	(0.050)	(0.074)
Female	1.162**	1.237***	1.130
	(0.059)	(0.036)	(0.144)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.057	2.029***	1.774***
	(0.071)	(0.088)	(0.125)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	1.152	2.442***	2.851***
	(0.112)	(0.199)	(0.385)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	0.977	1.820***	1.626***
	(0.057)	(0.129)	(0.144)
Foreign born	3.958***	0.127***	0.962
	(0.248)	(0.006)	(0.119)
English mother tongue	22.170***	0.089***	23.178***
	(1.568)	(0.007)	(15.081)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.895*	0.750***	0.939
	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.082)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.706***	0.523***	1.108
	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.141)
Constant	0.013***	9.338***	0.003***
	(0.002)	(0.580)	(0.001)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.7: Effects on Categories of Religious Affiliation (Odds Ratios), Central Canada, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	**Catholic**	**United Church**
	N = 135,498 Pseudo R^2 = 0.073	***N = 135,498 Pseudo R^2 = 0.059***	***N = 135,268 Pseudo R^2 = 0.094***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.101 (0.073)	0.980 (0.019)	0.880 (0.100)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.953 (0.046)	1.014 (0.037)	0.708*** (0.075)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.872*** (0.033)	0.962 (0.025)	0.616*** (0.065)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.840* (0.061)	0.901*** (0.012)	0.563*** (0.075)
Female	1.203*** (0.023)	1.096*** (0.021)	1.200*** (0.033)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	2.066*** (0.057)	0.881*** (0.027)	2.583*** (0.177)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	3.491*** (0.170)	0.671*** (0.032)	3.911*** (0.351)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	2.142*** (0.066)	0.753*** (0.040)	2.513*** (0.168)
Foreign born	0.396*** (0.009)	1.385*** (0.055)	0.155*** (0.019)
French mother tongue	0.089*** (0.009)	11.243*** (0.851)	0.091*** (0.022)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.031 (0.022)	0.937*** (0.013)	0.981 (0.030)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.856*** (0.025)	0.745*** (0.018)	1.038 (0.027)
Manitoba (ref. category: Ontario)	1.141*** (0.030)	0.737*** (0.019)	1.137*** (0.034)
Saskatchewan (ref. category: Ontario)	1.143*** (0.035)	0.942*** (0.014)	1.329*** (0.044)
Constant	0.525*** (0.022)	0.471*** (0.012)	0.126*** (0.016)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.8: Effects on Categories of Religious Affiliation (Odds Ratios), Western Canada, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	Catholic	United Church
	N = 75,719 Pseudo R^2 = 0.043	*N = 75,719 Pseudo R^2 = 0.038*	*N = 75,551 Pseudo R^2 = 0.075*
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.156 (0.129)	1.038 (0.051)	0.686*** (0.049)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.088 (0.124)	0.940 (0.046)	0.602*** (0.030)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.864 (0.092)	0.934* (0.030)	0.484*** (0.025)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.818 (0.094)	0.904* (0.036)	0.435*** (0.037)
Female	1.253*** (0.023)	1.114*** (0.026)	1.299*** (0.040)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.974*** (0.047)	0.929*** (0.018)	2.563*** (0.128)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	3.633*** (0.156)	0.819*** (0.044)	4.592*** (0.335)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	1.920*** (0.060)	0.798*** (0.034)	2.552*** (0.146)
Foreign born	0.542*** (0.014)	1.377*** (0.042)	0.217*** (0.022)
French mother tongue	0.187*** (0.017)	7.906*** (0.535)	0.199*** (0.032)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.096*** (0.020)	0.987 (0.016)	1.048 (0.030)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.965 (0.031)	0.812*** (0.032)	1.153* (0.070)
Alberta (ref. category: British Columbia)	1.152*** (0.032)	1.599*** (0.056)	1.379*** (0.043)
Constant	0.417*** (0.042)	0.197*** (0.008)	0.097*** (0.008)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.9: Effects on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (Odds Ratios), US, 1985 – 2010

	Protestant	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Evangelical Protestant	Black Protestant
	N = 20,917 Pseudo R^2 = 0.042	***N = 8,765 Pseudo R^2 = 0.053***	***N = 5,875 Pseudo R^2 = 0.045***	***N = 5,379 Pseudo R^2 = 0.041***	***N = 2,885 Pseudo R^2 = 0.055***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.017 (0.072)	0.826** (0.050)	1.039 (0.065)	0.980 (0.075)	1.016 (0.130)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.998 (0.074)	0.693*** (0.032)	0.958 (0.122)	0.967 (0.063)	1.073 (0.060)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.975 (0.047)	0.723*** (0.069)	0.892 (0.128)	0.988 (0.069)	1.056 (0.205)
Period: 2005-2010 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.072 (0.052)	0.622*** (0.030)	0.953 (0.097)	0.997 (0.071)	1.149* (0.073)
Female	1.501*** (0.042)	1.417*** (0.103)	1.516*** (0.067)	1.328*** (0.077)	2.022*** (0.197)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.587*** (0.071)	2.015*** (0.097)	1.581*** (0.114)	1.405*** (0.121)	1.695*** (0.237)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	1.720*** (0.153)	2.879*** (0.231)	2.076*** (0.250)	1.642*** (0.189)	1.925*** (0.293)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	0.885* (0.049)	1.031 (0.074)	0.816* (0.078)	0.704** (0.090)	1.408** (0.159)
Foreign born	1.228** (0.097)	1.568*** (0.132)	1.054 (0.128)	1.062 (0.296)	1.189 (0.339)
Black	2.194*** (0.121)	1.019 (0.142)	1.894*** (0.295)	1.194 (0.795)	1.674 (0.678)
Higher edu. below uni. (ref. cat.: high school education or lower)	1.435*** (0.106)	1.200 (0.123)	1.315*** (0.096)	1.422* (0.247)	2.283*** (0.431)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.749*** (0.058)	1.880*** (0.165)	1.878*** (0.157)	2.729*** (0.240)	1.698*** (0.224)
Northeastern US (ref. category: Southern US)	0.590*** (0.031)	0.855* (0.055)	0.628*** (0.059)	0.549*** (0.049)	0.555*** (0.068)
Midwestern US (ref. category: Southern US)	0.808*** (0.040)	1.366*** (0.114)	0.885 (0.059)	0.855 (0.069)	0.559*** (0.076)
Western US (ref. category: Southern US)	0.700*** (0.033)	0.791** (0.060)	0.509*** (0.044)	0.596*** (0.054)	0.415*** (0.072)
Constant	0.697*** (0.040)	0.667*** (0.049)	0.515*** (0.058)	0.810* (0.080)	0.673 (0.290)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.10: Effects on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (Odds Ratios), Great Britain, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Evangelical Protestant	Muslim
	N = 33,776 Pseudo R^2 = 0.054	***N = 6,948 Pseudo R^2 = 0.040***	***N = 27,563 Pseudo R^2 = 0.051***	***N = 1,838 Pseudo R^2 = 0.029***	***N = 1,086 Pseudo R^2 = 0.126***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.046	0.871	1.068	0.777	2.445
	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.137)	(1.186)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.050**	0.766***	0.998	1.325	2.048
	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.238)	(0.754)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.906***	0.683***	0.879***	1.112	1.898*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.209)	(0.600)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.862**	0.599***	0.838***	0.830	1.915*
	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.152)	(0.618)
Female	1.520***	1.467***	1.600***	1.309*	0.291***
	(0.047)	(0.076)	(0.049)	(0.140)	(0.047)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.025	1.438***	1.069	1.587**	0.904
	(0.043)	(0.098)	(0.059)	(0.268)	(0.202)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	1.578***	2.325***	1.821***	1.437*	0.577
	(0.091)	(0.262)	(0.105)	(0.258)	(0.226)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	0.840**	0.851	0.852*	1.046	0.434
	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.067)	(0.160)	(0.194)
Ethnic minority	5.410***	1.982***	3.739***	2.645***	6.275***
	(0.369)	(0.253)	(0.442)	(0.407)	(1.753)
Higher education below university (ref. category: A levels or lower)	1.909***	1.814***	2.039***	1.215	0.644
	(0.070)	(0.155)	(0.070)	(0.188)	(0.279)
University degree (ref. category: A levels or lower)	2.815***	1.595***	3.114***	1.169	0.569*
	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.155)	(0.172)	(0.127)
Scotland (ref. category: England)	1.688***	1.822***	1.976***	0.748	1.916
	(0.093)	(0.172)	(0.108)	(0.215)	(0.856)
Wales (ref. category: England)	1.420***	0.896	1.444***	0.914	0.838
	(0.108)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.177)	(0.578)
Constant	0.189***	0.568***	0.145***	1.126	0.277**
	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.214)	(0.115)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.11: Effects on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (Odds Ratios), Northern Ireland, 1989 – 2009

	Protestant	**Catholic**
	N = 13,549 ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.038***	***N = 9,378*** ***Pseudo R^2 = 0.064***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1989)	0.799*** (0.044)	0.430*** (0.019)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.634*** (0.050)	0.222*** (0.028)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.548*** (0.033)	0.170*** (0.004)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.562*** (0.035)	0.116*** (0.008)
Female	1.514*** (0.068)	1.335*** (0.061)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.928*** (0.117)	2.212*** (0.172)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	2.034*** (0.170)	2.694*** (0.368)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	0.605*** (0.045)	0.721*** (0.049)
Higher education below university (ref. category: A levels or lower)	1.187* (0.094)	1.215 (0.172)
University degree (ref. category: A levels or lower)	1.647*** (0.128)	1.075 (0.057)
Constant	0.925 (0.048)	10.229*** (0.542)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.12: Effects on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (Odds Ratios), Atlantic Canada, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant ***N = 35,016 Pseudo R^2 = 0.034***	**Catholic** ***N = 28,409 Pseudo R^2 = 0.055***	**United Church** ***N = 10,924 Pseudo R^2 = 0.035***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.811** (0.061)	0.593*** (0.071)	0.774* (0.089)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.818** (0.060)	0.462*** (0.048)	0.775* (0.086)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.834* (0.065)	0.400*** (0.043)	0.692*** (0.070)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.712*** (0.055)	0.322*** (0.039)	0.566*** (0.061)
Female	1.646*** (0.061)	1.468*** (0.055)	1.674*** (0.089)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.595*** (0.083)	1.950*** (0.085)	1.638*** (0.123)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	2.606*** (0.227)	3.562*** (0.360)	2.912*** (0.292)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	1.010 (0.070)	1.149 (0.099)	1.163 (0.114)
Foreign born	1.018 (0.065)	0.956 (0.067)	0.969 (0.120)
French mother tongue	2.236*** (0.463)	1.268*** (0.067)	1.412 (0.533)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.964 (0.039)	0.836*** (0.026)	0.983 (0.041)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.258*** (0.069)	1.166** (0.061)	1.283* (0.129)
Nwfl. and Lab. (ref. category: Nova Scotia)	1.364*** (0.050)	1.261*** (0.050)	1.257** (0.093)
PEI (ref. category: Nova Scotia)	1.787*** (0.067)	2.254*** (0.112)	1.455*** (0.092)
New Brunswick (ref. category: Nova Scotia)	1.520*** (0.056)	1.092 (0.075)	1.343** (0.141)
Constant	0.358*** (0.030)	1.045 (0.115)	0.342*** (0.041)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.13: Effects on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (Odds Ratios), Quebec, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	**Catholic**	**United Church**
	N = 3,426 Pseudo R^2 = 0.093	***N = 60,273 Pseudo R^2 = 0.079***	***N = 855 Pseudo R^2 = 0.057***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.805* (0.078)	0.633*** (0.053)	0.621* (0.116)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.897 (0.148)	0.406*** (0.035)	0.761 (0.175)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.074 (0.146)	0.364*** (0.031)	0.872 (0.205)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	0.907 (0.095)	0.303*** (0.028)	0.414*** (0.085)
Female	1.313* (0.152)	1.168*** (0.034)	1.931*** (0.279)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.394** (0.179)	1.971*** (0.072)	1.333 (0.385)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	1.536** (0.243)	5.575*** (0.331)	3.048*** (0.858)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	1.049 (0.171)	1.293*** (0.097)	1.552 (0.819)
Foreign born	1.330* (0.179)	2.301*** (0.220)	1.489 (0.365)
English mother tongue	0.251*** (0.037)	1.148 (0.088)	0.673 (0.165)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.979 (0.128)	0.562*** (0.024)	0.918 (0.265)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	0.865 (0.102)	0.618*** (0.029)	0.956 (0.263)
Constant	1.289 (0.218)	0.584*** (0.049)	0.337** (0.124)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.14: Effects on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (Odds Ratios), Central Canada, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	Catholic	United Church
	N = 59,264 Pseudo R^2 = 0.020	***N = 40,919 Pseudo R^2 = 0.043***	***N = 20,161 Pseudo R^2 = 0.027***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.081	0.764***	0.811
	(0.087)	(0.058)	(0.111)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.062	0.664***	0.745*
	(0.087)	(0.065)	(0.109)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.190*	0.670***	0.782*
	(0.095)	(0.049)	(0.087)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.091	0.547***	0.660***
	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.073)
Female	1.344***	1.291***	1.328***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.057)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	1.065	1.477***	1.526***
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.106)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	1.287***	2.399***	2.682***
	(0.064)	(0.171)	(0.243)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	0.708***	0.837***	0.994
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.086)
Foreign born	1.750***	2.031***	1.724***
	(0.088)	(0.104)	(0.144)
French mother tongue	1.940***	1.001	1.515
	(0.262)	(0.052)	(0.429)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.073**	0.885***	1.053
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.045)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.385***	1.372***	1.596***
	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.081)
Manitoba (ref. category: Ontario)	1.321***	0.942	0.932
	(0.049)	(0.032)	(0.056)
Saskatchewan (ref. category: Ontario)	1.379***	1.339***	1.054
	(0.048)	(0.070)	(0.060)
Constant	0.386***	0.775**	0.273***
	(0.027)	(0.066)	(0.024)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.15: Effects on Monthly Religious Service Attendance (Odds Ratios), Western Canada, 1985 – 2009

	Protestant	Catholic	United Church
	N = 32,789 Pseudo R^2 = 0.023	***N = 15,052 Pseudo R^2 = 0.043***	***N = 9,598 Pseudo R^2 = 0.024***
Period: 1990-1994 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.439**	0.824	0.753***
	(0.165)	(0.110)	(0.054)
Period: 1995-1999 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.604***	0.760	0.829
	(0.171)	(0.109)	(0.117)
Period: 2000-2004 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.822***	0.861	0.929
	(0.208)	(0.110)	(0.074)
Period: 2005-2009 (ref. category: period 1985-1989)	1.871***	0.875	1.059
	(0.207)	(0.109)	(0.095)
Female	1.166***	1.387***	1.213**
	(0.041)	(0.065)	(0.090)
Married (ref. category: single/never married)	0.941	1.229***	1.128
	(0.040)	(0.078)	(0.115)
Widowed (ref. category: single/never married)	0.956	2.133***	1.712***
	(0.060)	(0.241)	(0.207)
Separated/divorced (ref. category: single/never married)	0.569***	0.831**	0.844
	(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.099)
Foreign born	1.715***	2.173***	2.152***
	(0.061)	(0.133)	(0.267)
French mother tongue	1.646**	0.922	1.392
	(0.294)	(0.062)	(0.649)
Higher education below university (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.100*	1.035	1.113
	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.080)
University degree (ref. category: high school education or lower)	1.474***	1.689***	1.715***
	(0.060)	(0.099)	(0.137)
Alberta (ref. category: British Columbia)	1.216***	1.356***	1.166***
	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Constant	0.274***	0.377***	0.164***
	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.018)

Coefficients are expressed in odds ratios (with standard errors, clustered by year). Missing values were removed using listwise deletion. Due to there being no detailed marital status variable for cycle 16 (2002) of the CAN GSS, the cases for this year of study were excluded from the analysis.* = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table B.16: Frequency Distribution, by Country and Year, 2008-2010 ISSP

	2008	2009	2010		2008	2009	2010
Australia		1,525		**Ireland**	2,049		
Austria			1,019	**Italy**	1,078		
Bulgaria			1,002	**Latvia**			1,000
Canada			985	**Netherlands**	1,951		
Croatia			1,210	**New Zealand**			1,172
Czech Republic			1,428	**Norway**			1,382
Denmark			1,305	**Poland**		1,263	
Estonia		1,005		**Portugal**		1,000	
Finland			1,211	**Russia**			1,619
Flanders			1,142	**Slovenia**			1,082
France		2,817		**Spain**			2,560
Germany			1,407	**Sweden**			1,181
Great Britain			928	**Switzerland**			1,212
Hungary		1,010		**Ukraine**			2,012
Iceland		847		**USA**			1,430

APPENDIX C

Supplementary Tables for Chapter Three

Table C.1: Frequency Distribution, by Country, 2008 ISSP

	2008		2008
Australia	1,718	**Norway**	1,072
Austria	1,020	**Poland**	1,263
Czech Republic	1,512	**Portugal**	1,000
Denmark	2,004	**Russia**	1,015
France	2,454	**Slovak Republic**	1,138
Germany	1,706	**Slovenia**	1,065
Hungary	1,010	**Spain**	2,373
Ireland	2,049	**Sweden**	1,235
Italy	1,078	**Switzerland**	1,229
Latvia	1,069	**UK**	3,075
Netherlands	1,951	**USA**	1,365
New Zealand	1,027		

Table C.2: Correlation Matrix, Scales of Conservative Attitudes, Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Religious Beliefs and Personal Religiosity, 2008 ISSP

	Conservative attitudes	Views on religious leaders influencing politics	Religious beliefs	Personal religiosity
Conservative attitudes	1.000			
Views on religious leaders influencing politics	0.212***	1.000		
Religious beliefs	0.380***	0.231***	1.000	
Personal religiosity	0.468***	0.248***	0.831***	1.000

Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics, 23 Countries, 2008 ISSP

	Variable type	N	Mean	Standard deviation
Conservative attitudes scale	Continuous	35,001	0.000	1.000
Views on religious leaders influencing politics scale	Continuous	35,230	0.000	1.000
Religious beliefs scale	Continuous	34,731	0.000	1.000
Personal religiosity scale	Continuous	34,863	0.000	1.000
Committed	Dichotomous	32,859	0.248	0.432
Nominally affiliated	Dichotomous	32,859	0.476	0.499
No religion	Dichotomous	32,859	0.276	0.447
Age (centered)	Continuous	33,105	0.000	17.331
Age (natural log)	Continuous	33,105	3.822	0.390
Pre-Boomer	Dichotomous	33,105	0.245	0.430
Boomer	Dichotomous	33,105	0.372	0.483
Post-Boomer	Dichotomous	33,105	0.383	0.486
Female	Dichotomous	33,143	0.546	0.498
Never married/single	Dichotomous	32,553	0.255	0.436
Married	Dichotomous	32,553	0.551	0.497
Widowed	Dichotomous	32,553	0.087	0.281
Separated or divorced	Dichotomous	32,553	0.107	0.310
Employed	Dichotomous	33,003	0.566	0.496
Education (lower degree to higher degree)	Continuous	32,777	2.791	1.468
Mean unaffiliated (country)	Continuous	35,428	0.255	0.157
Mean unaffiliated (region)	Continuous	35,428	0.252	0.180

Table C.4: Correlation Matrix, Aggregate (Country) Level, 2008 ISSP

	Comm. coeff. for cons. attitudes	Comm. coeff. for religious leaders in politics	Comm. coeff. for religious beliefs	Comm. coeff. for personal religiosity
Comm. coeff. for cons. attitudes	1.000			
Comm. coeff. for relig. lead. in pol.	0.829***	1.000		
Comm. coeff. for religious beliefs	0.457*	0.684***	1.000	
Comm. coeff. for pers. religiosity	0.420*	0.587**	0.869***	1.000
Mean unaffiliated	0.107	0.357†	0.119	0.153

N = 23. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.5: Fixed and Random Effects on Conservative Attitudes, Estimating Average Differences Between the Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		0.754*** (0.026)	0.641*** (0.046)
	Nominally affiliated (ref. cat.: no religion)		0.184*** (0.015)	0.173*** (0.030)
	Age (centered)		0.034*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.002)
	Age (natural log)		-0.970*** (0.070)	-0.968*** (0.070)
	Female		-0.173*** (0.009)	-0.172*** (0.009)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.105*** (0.013)	0.106*** (0.013)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.108*** (0.021)	0.110*** (0.021)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)		-0.010 (0.018)	-0.011*** (0.018)
	Employed		-0.081*** (0.011)	-0.080*** (0.011)
	Highest degree		-0.115*** (0.003)	-0.115*** (0.003)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.172* (0.074)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.401** (0.142)
	Nominally affiliated*mean no religion			-0.007 (0.084)
	Constant	-0.161† (0.082)	3.671*** (0.272)	3.718*** (0.272)
Between-region variance	**Committed**		0.070*** (0.011)	0.066*** (0.011)
	Nominally affiliated		0.015*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)
	Constant	0.018*** (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
	Intraclass correlation	1.9%	0.5%	0.3%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.153*** (0.046)	0.133*** (0.040)	0.132*** (0.040)
	Intraclass correlation	16.3%	19.9%	19.8%
Residual		0.770*** (0.006)	0.534*** (0.005)	0.534*** (0.005)

N = 30,055. N. of region gr. = 184. N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.6: Fixed and Random Effects on Views on Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Estimating Average Differences Between the Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		0.599***	0.399***
			(0.024)	(0.041)
	Nominally affiliated (ref. cat.: no religion)		0.202***	0.128***
			(0.017)	(0.034)
	Age (centered)		0.008***	0.008***
			(0.002)	(0.002)
	Age (natural log)		-0.325***	-0.315***
			(0.085)	(0.085)
	Female		-0.017	-0.017
			(0.011)	(0.011)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.007	0.008
			(0.016)	(0.016)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.010	0.014
			(0.026)	(0.026)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)		-0.012	-0.014
			(0.022)	(0.022)
	Employed		-0.003	-0.003
			(0.014)	(0.014)
	Highest degree		-0.008†	-0.009*
			(0.004)	(0.004)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.089
				(0.089)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.735***
				(0.128)
	Nominally affiliated*mean no religion			0.213*
				(0.096)
	Constant	-0.117***	0.918**	0.922**
		(0.032)	(0.319)	(0.320)
Between-region variance	**Committed**		0.036***	0.023***
			(0.009)	(0.007)
	Nominally affiliated		0.014***	0.014***
			(0.004)	(0.004)
	Constant	0.009***	0.004*	0.005*
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	1.0%	0.5%	0.6%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.022**	0.027**	0.025**
		(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
	Intraclass correlation	2.4%	3.1%	2.9%
Residual		0.886***	0.838***	0.838***
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)

N = 30,055. N. of region gr. = 184. N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.7: Fixed and Random Effects on Religious Beliefs, Estimating Average Differences Between the Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		1.609***	1.366***
			(0.026)	(0.046)
	Nominally affiliated (ref. cat.: no religion)		0.764***	0.728***
			(0.027)	(0.049)
	Age (centered)		0.001	0.001
			(0.002)	(0.002)
	Age (natural log)		-0.094	-0.091
			(0.067)	(0.067)
	Female		0.217***	0.218***
			(0.009)	(0.009)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.032**	0.033**
			(0.013)	(0.012)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.041*	0.043*
			(0.020)	(0.020)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.071***	0.070***
			(0.018)	(0.018)
	Employed		-0.018†	-0.018†
			(0.011)	(0.011)
	Highest degree		-0.033***	-0.033***
			(0.003)	(0.003)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.606***
				(0.090)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.829***
				(0.139)
	Nominally affiliated*mean no religion			0.042
				(0.143)
	Constant	-0.044	-0.469†	-0.302
		(0.079)	(0.255)	(0.256)
Between-region variance	**Committed**		0.077***	0.062***
			(0.012)	(0.011)
	Nominally affiliated		0.102***	0.100***
			(0.013)	(0.013)
	Constant	0.037***	0.011***	0.006**
		(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	3.7%	1.8%	1.0%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.137**	0.057**	0.053***
		(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.016)
	Intraclass correlation	13.7%	9.6%	9.0%
Residual		0.826***	0.529***	0.529***
		(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)

N = 30,055. N. of region gr. = 184. N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.8: Fixed and Random Effects on Personal Religiosity, Estimating Average Differences Between the Committed and the Unaffiliated, 2008 ISSP

		Empty	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed effects	**Committed (ref. cat.: no religion)**		1.737*** (0.023)	1.537*** (0.039)
	Nominally affiliated (ref. cat.: no religion)		0.747*** (0.027)	0.721*** (0.048)
	Age (centered)		0.008*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
	Age (natural log)		-0.073 (0.059)	-0.071 (0.059)
	Female		0.182*** (0.008)	0.183*** (0.008)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.044*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.011)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.079*** (0.018)	0.080*** (0.018)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)		0.033* (0.015)	0.032* (0.015)
	Employed		-0.042*** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.009)
	Highest degree		-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.032*** (0.003)
	Mean no religion (region)			-0.545*** (0.081)
	Committed*mean no religion			0.682*** (0.119)
	Nominally affiliated*mean no religion			0.021 (0.140)
	Constant	-0.054 (0.080)	-0.564* (0.223)	-0.411† (0.224)
Between-region variance	**Committed**		0.054*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.007)
	Nominally affiliated		0.106*** (0.013)	0.103*** (0.013)
	Constant	0.040*** (0.005)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	4.1%	2.0%	1.3%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.140** (0.043)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.013)
	Intraclass correlation	14.4%	10.0%	9.5%
Residual		0.790*** (0.006)	0.406*** (0.003)	0.406*** (0.003)

N = 30,055. N. of region gr. = 184. N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.9: Fixed and Random Effects on Conservative Attitudes, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	-0.114 (0.167)	-0.159† (0.085)	-0.160* (0.077)
	Age (centered)	0.026*** (0.004)	0.038*** (0.002)	0.026*** (0.003)
	Age (natural log)	-0.566*** (0.159)	-1.148*** (0.096)	-0.770*** (0.119)
	Female	-0.143*** (0.022)	-0.205*** (0.012)	-0.157*** (0.015)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.107*** (0.031)	0.115*** (0.018)	0.118*** (0.020)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.122** (0.044)	0.123*** (0.030)	0.062 (0.040)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)	-0.109* (0.047)	0.028 (0.025)	0.034 (0.028)
	Employed	-0.104*** (0.026)	-0.087*** (0.015)	-0.082*** (0.019)
	Highest degree	-0.121*** (0.008)	-0.115*** (0.005)	-0.109*** (0.006)
	Protestant (ref. cat.: Catholic)	0.379*** (0.033)	-0.036† (0.019)	
	Orthodox (ref. cat.: Catholic)	0.188† (0.110)	0.157*** (0.049)	
	Constant	2.796*** (0.598)	4.604*** (0.367)	2.903*** (0.453)
Between-region variance	**Constant**	0.020*** (0.005)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	2.2%	1.1%	0.7%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.133** (0.043)	0.144*** (0.043)	0.130*** (0.039)
	Intraclass correlation	14.9%	22.3%	23.2%
Residual		0.738*** (0.012)	0.494*** (0.006)	0.427*** (0.007)

N = 7,653 (Model 1). N = 14,748 (Model 2). N = 8,103 (Model 3). N. of region gr. = 183 (Model 1). N. of region gr. = 184 (Models 2 and 3). N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.10: Fixed and Random Effects on Views Regarding Religious Leaders Influencing Politics, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	0.319*	0.240*	0.030
		(0.153)	(0.103)	(0.098)
	Age (centered)	0.005	0.012***	0.002
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
	Age (natural log)	-0.276	-0.511***	-0.020
		(0.177)	(0.121)	(0.160)
	Female	-0.064**	0.001	-0.008
		(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.021)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.006	0.031	-0.031
		(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.028)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.095*	-0.001	-0.021
		(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.053)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)	-0.008	0.024	-0.066†
		(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.037)
	Employed	-0.007	0.009	-0.028
		(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.026)
	Highest degree	0.020*	-0.016**	-0.021***
		(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)
	Protestant (ref. cat.: Catholic)	0.020	0.000	
		(0.036)	(0.024)	
	Orthodox (ref. cat.: Catholic)	-0.050	0.051	
		(0.115)	(0.058)	
	Constant	1.207†	1.760***	-0.154
		(0.767)	(0.455)	(0.599)
Between-region variance	**Constant**	0.009*	0.012***	0.008**
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
	Intraclass correlation	0.9%	1.4%	1.0%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.052**	0.022**	0.026**
		(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.009)
	Intraclass correlation	5.7%	2.5%	3.2%
Residual		0.916***	0.831***	0.772***
		(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.012)

N = 7,653 (Model 1). N = 14,748 (Model 2). N = 8,103 (Model 3). N. of region gr. = 183 (Model 1). N. of region gr. = 184 (Models 2 and 3). N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.11: Fixed and Random Effects on Religious Beliefs, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	0.150 (0.120)	-0.312*** (0.089)	-0.591*** (0.098)
	Age (centered)	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.010** (0.003)
	Age (natural log)	-0.039 (0.110)	-0.095 (0.107)	0.235† (0.133)
	Female	0.083*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.014)	0.224*** (0.017)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.020 (0.022)	0.061** (0.019)	0.026 (0.023)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.022 (0.030)	0.066* (0.033)	0.091* (0.045)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)	-0.012 (0.033)	0.109*** (0.027)	0.098** (0.031)
	Employed	-0.024 (0.018)	-0.030† (0.017)	-0.043* (0.021)
	Highest degree	0.004 (0.006)	-0.031*** (0.005)	-0.065*** (0.006)
	Protestant (ref. cat.: Catholic)	0.022 (0.022)	-0.179*** (0.020)	
	Orthodox (ref. cat.: Catholic)	-0.050 (0.075)	0.068 (0.051)	
	Constant	0.886* (0.413)	0.390 (0.401)	-1.472** (0.502)
Between-region variance	**Constant**	0.012*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)
	Intraclass correlation	2.9%	1.0%	1.7%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.038** (0.013)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.081** (0.025)
	Intraclass correlation	9.3%	10.6%	12.7%
Residual		0.359*** (0.006)	0.606*** (0.007)	0.548*** (0.009)

N = 7,653 (Model 1). N = 14,748 (Model 2). N = 8,103 (Model 3). N. of region gr. = 183 (Model 1). N. of region gr. = 184 (Models 2 and 3). N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.12: Fixed and Random Effects on Personal Religiosity, Estimating Levels Among the Religious Commitment Categories, 2008 ISSP

		Model 1: committed respondents	Model 2: nominally affiliated respondents	Model 3: unaffiliated respondents
Fixed effects	**Mean no religion (region)**	0.095 (0.100)	-0.259** (0.086)	-0.468*** (0.087)
	Age (centered)	0.006** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
	Age (natural log)	0.028 (0.096)	-0.100 (0.092)	0.163 (0.114)
	Female	0.093*** (0.013)	0.239*** (0.012)	0.153*** (0.015)
	Married (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.012 (0.019)	0.073*** (0.017)	0.047* (0.019)
	Widowed (ref. cat.: never married/single)	0.040 (0.026)	0.106*** (0.028)	0.130*** (0.038)
	Separated/divorced (ref. cat.: never married/single)	-0.060* (0.029)	0.066** (0.023)	0.068* (0.027)
	Employed	-0.030† (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.067*** (0.018)
	Highest degree	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.004)	-0.054*** (0.005)
	Protestant (ref. cat.: Catholic)	0.115*** (0.020)	-0.154*** (0.018)	
	Orthodox (ref. cat.: Catholic)	-0.130* (0.065)	0.071 (0.046)	
	Constant	0.777* (0.361)	0.358 (0.347)	-1.267** (0.432)
Between-region variance	**Constant**	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
	Intraclass correlation	2.6%	1.4%	1.9%
Between-country variance	**Constant**	0.019** (0.007)	0.070*** (0.021)	0.064*** (0.020)
	Intraclass correlation	6.2%	12.6%	13.4%
Residual		0.280*** (0.005)	0.476*** (0.006)	0.405*** (0.007)

N = 7,653 (Model 1). N = 14,748 (Model 2). N = 8,103 (Model 3). N. of region gr. = 183 (Model 1). N. of region gr. = 184 (Models 2 and 3). N. of country gr. = 23. Multiple imputation estimates. †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

APPENDIX D

Supplementary Table for Chapter Four

Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics, 23 Countries, 1991, 1998 and 2008 ISSP

	Variable type	*N*	Mean	Standard deviation
Conservative attitudes scale	Continuous	88,111	0.000	1.000
Views on religious leaders influencing politics scale	Continuous	89,158	0.000	1.000
Religious beliefs scale	Continuous	87,721	0.000	1.000
Personal religiosity scale	Continuous	88,369	0.000	1.000
Committed	Dichotomous	82,321	0.271	0.445
Nominally affiliated	Dichotomous	82,321	0.456	0.498
No Religion	Dichotomous	82,321	0.273	0.445
Year (1991)	Dichotomous	84,735	0.258	0.438
Year (1998)	Dichotomous	84,735	0.350	0.477
Year (2008)	Dichotomous	84,735	0.391	0.488
Age (centered)	Continuous	84,560	0.000	17.279
Age (natural log)	Continuous	84,560	3.769	0.401
Pre-Boomer	Dichotomous	84,560	0.335	0.472
Boomer	Dichotomous	84,560	0.385	0.487
Post-Boomer	Dichotomous	84,560	0.280	0.449
Female	Dichotomous	84,682	0.543	0.498
Never married/single	Dichotomous	83,988	0.231	0.422
Married	Dichotomous	83,988	0.595	0.491
Widowed	Dichotomous	83,988	0.087	0.281
Separated or divorced	Dichotomous	83,988	0.087	0.282
Employed	Dichotomous	84,077	0.553	0.497
Education (lower degree to higher degree)	Continuous	84,146	2.613	1.416
Mean unaffiliated (2008 only)	Continuous	89,886	0.264	0.157

APPENDIX E

Supplementary Tables for Chapter Five

Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics, Married or Living as Married Sample, 23 Countries, 2008 ISSP

	Variable type	*N*	Mean	Standard deviation
Unaffiliated spouse	Dichotomous	17,453	0.169	0.375
No religion	Dichotomous	17,798	0.245	0.430
Nominally affiliated	Dichotomous	17.798	0.481	0.500
Religiously committed	Dichotomous	17.798	0.274	0.446
Age (centered)	Continuous	18,145	0.000	14.341
Age (natural log)	Continuous	18,145	3.905	0.293
Female	Dichotomous	18,162	0.513	0.500
Employed	Dichotomous	18,098	0.598	0.490
Level of education (degree)	Continuous	17,990	2.822	1.468
Mean rate of unaff. in country and 10-year birth cohort	Continuous	18,165	0.269	0.170
Polarisation indicator (by region)	Continuous	18,165	1.884	0.299

Table E.2: Descriptive Statistics, Married or Living as Married Sample, BSA 2008

	Variable type	n	Mean	Standard deviation
Unaffiliated spouse	Dichotomous	982	0.292	0.455
Religiously committed spouse	Dichotomous	982	0.129	0.336
No religion	Dichotomous	1,117	0.429	0.495
Nominally affiliated	Dichotomous	1,117	0.394	0.489
Committed	Dichotomous	1,117	0.177	0.382
Birth cohort	Continuous	1,117	1955	15.818
Female	Dichotomous	1,123	0.557	0.497
At least one child in household	Dichotomous	1,123	0.428	0.495
Ethnic minority	Dichotomous	1,118	0.038	0.190
Level of education (highest degree)	Continuous	1,005	2.463	1.827
Rural residence	Dichotomous	1,116	0.269	0.444
England	Dichotomous	1,123	0.849	0.359
Scotland	Dichotomous	1,123	0.095	0.294
Wales	Dichotomous	1,123	0.056	0.230
Mean rate of unaff. by country and 10-year birth cohort	Continuous	1,123	0.426	0.101
Mean rate of committed (by country and 10-year cohort)	Continuous	1,123	0.168	0.037
Polarisation (CP) indicator (by 5-year cohort)	Continuous	1,117	1.925	0.110
Polarisation (PDP) indicator (by 5-year cohort)	Continuous	1,123	0.394	0.076

Table E.3: Effects on Having an Unaffiliated Spouse (Odds Ratios), Great Britain, 2008

	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Female	2.533***	2.524***	2.533***	2.539***	2.529***	2.508***
	(0.438)	(0.438)	(0.438)	(0.440)	(0.437)	(0.435)
At least one child in household	0.753	0.752	0.753	0.744	0.767	0.766
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.152)	(0.151)
Ethnic minority	1.217	1.219	1.216	1.152	1.229	1.186
	(0.543)	(0.554)	(0.543)	(0.519)	(0.547)	(0.531)
Highest degree	1.112*	1.110*	1.112*	1.112*	1.110*	1.108*
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Rural residence	0.957	0.958	0.957	0.949	0.958	0.958
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Scotland (ref. cat.: England)	0.872	0.872	0.871	0.853	0.836	0.839
	(0.276)	(0.276)	(0.277)	(0.275)	(0.276)	(0.278)
Wales (ref. cat.: England)	1.574	1.577	1.574	1.598	1.506	1.524
	(0.605)	(0.608)	(0.605)	(0.615)	(0.595)	(0.609)

N = 990. Multiple imputation estimation. Odds ratios (with standard errors). Variables included in models, but not in Table E.3: religious commitment typology, birth cohort (five-year intervals), mean rate of unaffiliated (by country and ten-year birth cohort), interaction terms between religious commitment typology and birth cohort (Model 3), CP indicator (Models 4 and 5), PDP indicator (Models 6 and 7), and interaction terms between religious commitment typology and polarisation indicators (Models 4 and 6). †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.

Table E.4: Effects on Having a Committed Spouse (Odds Ratios), Great Britain, 2008

	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Female	0.213***	0.209***	0.213***	0.213***	0.212***	0.210***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
At least one child in household	1.107	1.090	1.132	1.129	1.020	1.002
	(0.349)	(0.349)	(0.360)	(0.360)	(0.349)	(0.348)
Ethnic minority	2.843*	2.495†	2.834†	2.884*	2.853*	2.590†
	(1.503)	(1.366)	(1.502)	(1.531)	(1.506)	(1.397)
Highest degree	1.113	1.108	1.114	1.116	1.116	1.115
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Rural residence	0.612	0.634	0.611	0.612	0.606	0.615
	(0.190)	(0.195)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.191)
Scotland (ref. cat.: England)	1.156	1.125	1.156	1.158	1.178	1.167
	(0.477)	(0.465)	(0.478)	(0.480)	(0.490)	(0.486)
Wales (ref. cat.: England)	1.108	1.079	1.119	1.119	1.082	1.065
	(0.599)	(0.580)	(0.606)	(0.605)	(0.591)	(0.576)

N = 990. Multiple imputation estimation. Odds ratios (with standard errors). Variables included in models, but not in Table E.4: religious commitment typology, birth cohort (five-year intervals), mean rate of committed (by country and ten-year birth cohort), interaction terms between religious commitment typology and birth cohort (Model 3), CP indicator (Models 4 and 5), PDP indicator (Models 6 and 7), and interaction terms between religious commitment typology and polarisation indicators (Models 4 and 6). †= $p \leq 0.10$; * = $p \leq 0.05$; ** = $p \leq 0.01$; *** = $p \leq 0.001$.