

Do mainstream parties adopt more populist language when challenger parties using it are successful? The impact of UKIP's electoral success, culminating in the 2014 European elections, on the language of UK mainstream parties in the 2010-2015 period.



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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	4
PART 1 METHODOLOGY	17
PART 1 RESULTS	29
PART 2 METHODOLOGY	38
PART 2 RESULTS	46
PART 3	52
CONCLUSION	73
BIBLIOGRAPHY	78
APPENDICES	95

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is motivated by the recent rise of populist radical right parties in Western Europe. It looks at the impact of their success on the mainstream parties in their respective political systems, and asks do mainstream parties adopt populist language when challenger parties using it are successful? More specifically, did mainstream parties in the UK become more populist in their language as a result of UKIP's increased electoral success using it, culminating in the 2014 European elections?

Mudde's ideational definition of populism will be used: populism:

'considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and...argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté generale* (general will) of the people.'¹

A pure, good people, a united whole, are contrasted with an evil, corrupt elite who are betrayers of the people. Mudde calls populism 'thin-centred'²: it does not have the complexity of a full ideology. It is an 'an argumentative frame that awaits specific content'³; the people and elites in question depend on the fuller ideology accompanying a specific manifestation of populism. In taking an ideational approach, other definitional approaches are rejected, particularly economic⁴ and 'political strategy'⁵ or organizational definitions. These cannot capture the variety of manifestations of populism: the economic definition limits populism to 'leftist or inclusionary forms'⁶, and politically, populist movements vary from the leaderless Tea Party in the USA to well-developed parties with populist leaders, like the French National Front⁷.

The research question fits into the broader question of the impact of populist or challenger parties on mainstream parties, but where much focus so far has been on the changing *policy* positions of mainstream parties on issues like immigration, here the focus is on changes in *language*. Language responses are of great importance: the language used by parties frames political debate, shaping the way individuals think about others, and ultimately shaping behaviour. For example, might increased verbal

¹ Cas Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), (2004), 541-563 (p.543)

² 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.544

³ Michael J. Lee, 'The Populist Chameleon: The People's Party, Huey Long, George Wallace, and the Populist Argumentative Frame,' *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 92(4), (2006), 355-378 (p.362)

⁴ Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, 'Macroeconomic Populism,' *Journal of Development Economics*, 32(2), (1990), 247-277

⁵ Kurt Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,' *Comparative Politics*, 34(1), (2001), 1-22

⁶ Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et. al, 'Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) (p.14)

⁷ Cas Mudde, 'Populism: An Ideational Approach,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. by Rovira Kaltwasser, (2017) (p.40)

and physical abuse of MPs in recent years⁸ be linked to increased criticism of political elites in party politics, which is legitimizing such behaviour? Additionally, populist language, in its identification and exultation of 'the people' and the will of the majority, excludes those who are not part of this imagined group of 'insiders', leading to a dismissal of the wills and voices of minorities. Populist language is also inherently antagonistic, which could lead to a general 'coarsening'⁹ of politics if political debate is reframed by its use. Such antagonism could have interesting and problematic implications for democratic societies, especially where politics has traditionally been consensual.

Changes in language are often subtler than changes in policy: politicians can present the same policies using different language or framing, so existing studies, in focusing primarily on policy impact, may have underestimated the impact of populist challenger parties. Thus, language responses by mainstream parties are worth studying in their own right.

More broadly, particularly given the current rise of populism in Western Europe, it is important to know how mainstream parties have been responding to populist challengers. The answers matter on multiple levels: at the party level, have electoral and rhetorical strategies of mainstream parties changed? At the party-system level, have strategies of party competition and interaction become more antagonistic? And at the system level, what are the implications of increased populism for democracy? Findings here will also help to better assess the influence of populist parties, specifically, whether they are able to alter political systems even if not elected in large enough numbers to gain power.

Whether and how mainstream parties have responded to successful populist challenger parties has puzzled scholars. Mudde's theory of a 'Populist Zeitgeist' is well-established: populism has become more common in mainstream parties in Western Europe since the 1990s, a change mainly in response to 'populist challengers'.¹⁰ Others have explored a 'contagion effect'¹¹ of populism: other parties in a political system copy the use of populism by populist parties. Yet, as is explained shortly, while empirical evidence shows mainstream parties have responded to populism in terms of *policy positions*, it is less supportive of a response in terms of *language*. In addition to the puzzle of whether mainstream parties *do* respond with more populist language, there is also a question as to how far they really *can*: central to populism is an anti-elitist, anti-establishment attitude, which is difficult for mainstream parties to emulate, since to a greater or lesser extent they *are* the elites or establishment.

⁸ Brian Wheeler, and Alison Carter, 'MPs tell of death threats and abuse at 2017 election,' *BBC News*, 18 September 2017

⁹ Jon Cruddas interview, 10 September 2018

¹⁰ Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.551

¹¹ Joost Van Spanje, 'Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and their Impact on Other Parties' Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe,' *Party Politics*, 16(5), (2010), 563-586 (p.563)

This thesis uses a mixed-methods approach involving qualitative content analysis, process tracing and elite interviewing to examine the impact of UKIP's increased electoral success on UK mainstream political parties in the 2010-2015 period. It attempts to ascertain whether mainstream parties increased their own use of populist language in the 2015 general election period, and if they did, whether this language change was a response to the increased electoral success of UKIP, a populist threat. It finds that populist language did increase in party conference speeches given by all three of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in the 2015 election period compared to 2010. Evidence for these language changes being a response to the populist threat of UKIP is less conclusive: while sufficient evidence is found to support this causal connection in the Liberal Democrat case, only partial success is achieved in the Conservative and Labour cases.

The remainder of this introductory section will situate the research question in the existing literature and outline theory, hypotheses, and case selection. The methodological approaches and structure of the project will also be explained.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been much discussion of the response of mainstream parties to challenger parties in general. Harmel and Janda argue parties are conservative bodies, only likely to change (or 'crack') if a shock occurs. Such shocks include the birth of relevant new parties, and sharp changes in the proportion of votes and seats won by the party.¹² This research question concerns the latter.

Four broad types of mainstream party response to challenger parties are discussed in the literature: ignoring¹³, accommodating and/or incorporating¹⁴, challenging¹⁵, and 'fighting fire with fire'¹⁶. Fighting fire with fire (adopting the tactics and methods of one's opponents) is the response closest to my hypotheses. Do mainstream parties 'adopt' the language of their populist challengers when threatened by their electoral success?

The impact of radical right (populist) parties on the *policy platforms* and *issue positions* of mainstream parties has been studied; especially on immigration and

¹² Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, 'An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change,' *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6(3), (1994), 259-287 (p.267)

¹³ William Downs, 'Pariahs in their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties react to Extremist Threats,' *West European Politics*, 24(3), (2001), 23-42

¹⁴ Downs, 2001

¹⁵ Giovanni Capoccia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe* (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2007)

¹⁶ Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Populism and the Question of How to Respond to It,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, ed. by Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) (p.500)

integration¹⁷. Do left parties¹⁸ and right parties¹⁹ change their policy stances in response to populist radical right parties? A key idea is that populist parties affect the political system without actually winning power, by altering other parties' behaviour: a populist party influences major players 'while itself remaining in a minor league'²⁰. Empirical evidence supports two kinds of 'contagion effect:' mainstream parties moved rightwards in their own policy positions in response to the populist radical right challengers, and coopted their restrictive immigration policies²¹.

However, little work has been done on the response of mainstream parties to populist challenger parties in terms of *the populism itself*, defined here ideationally in line with Mudde, and captured in terms of *language*. Currently one key theoretical piece, and two empirical studies are relevant to this. The key theoretical idea comes from Mudde's work on a 'Populist Zeitgeist.'

'At least since the early 1990s populism has become a regular feature of politics in western democracies. While populism is still mostly used by outsider or challenger parties, mainstream politicians, both in government and in opposition, have been using it as well – generally in an attempt to counter the populist challengers.'²²

Mudde is clear that 'populism' here is to be interpreted as 'populist discourse' or 'rhetoric,' commenting that while the populist 'Zeitgeist' may involve mainstream parties making some calls for 'populist amendments' to the liberal democratic system (i.e. *policy* changes), 'most mainstream parties mainly use populist *rhetoric*' (his emphasis)²³. Discourse and rhetoric, though each have specific meanings, will be interpreted here as relating closely enough to *language*. He is also clear that the populist 'Zeitgeist' is a response to populist challengers: it results from 'parts of the establishment' reacting when 'explicitly populist outsider groups gain prominence' by 'includ[ing] populist themes and rhetoric to fight off the challenge'²⁴.

Mudde's theory thus raises two empirical questions. First, *has* populist language increased in recent years among mainstream parties? Second, is any increase a *response* to the presence and/or success of challenger parties using populist language? One study addresses both questions directly; another addresses the first question.

¹⁷ Van Spanje, 'Contagious Parties'

¹⁸ Tim Bale, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Andre Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter, 'If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe,' *Political Studies*, 58(3), (2010), 410-426

¹⁹ Robert Harmel and Lars Svasand, 'The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms: The Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway,' *Party Politics*, 3(3), (1997), 315-340; Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

²⁰ Harmel and Svasand, p.316

²¹ Van Spanje, p.563

²² 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.551

²³ 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.562

²⁴ 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.563

Rooduijn, de Lange and Van der Brug explore whether populism is ‘contagious’²⁵. They perform a cross-national comparison of the changing levels of populism in mainstream and populist parties in five Western European countries from the 1990s to 2000s. This study does not focus perfectly on populist *language*: the hypotheses relate to the *programmes* of mainstream parties in election manifestos, and they are clear that their analysis focuses not just on changes in the way mainstream parties *speak* about people/elites but also how they *think* about them, in terms of ideas laid down in manifestos. Nonetheless, Mudde’s same definition of populism is used, and they code paragraphs for levels of populism using a codebook designed to measure ‘people-centrism’ and ‘anti-elitism.’ The study is thus focused more on language changes than policy changes, and the operationalization of ‘people-centrism’ and ‘anti-elitism’ asks the questions ‘Do the authors of the manifesto refer to the people?’ and ‘Do the authors of the manifesto criticize elites?’ respectively.²⁶ Three hypotheses are presented, two relevant here:

‘The programmes of mainstream parties in Western Europe have become more populist since the late 1980s.’

‘The more successful populist parties, the more populist the programmes of mainstream parties become.’²⁷

The authors reject all three hypotheses: ‘the manifestos of mainstream parties in Western Europe have not become more populist in the past two decades’²⁸, and parties did not respond to populist party success by increasing their own levels of populism.

However, a ‘British exception’²⁹ is discussed: there are higher average levels of populism in the programmes of UK mainstream parties, and a much larger increase in levels of populism in the UK in from the 1990s to the 2000s, relative to other countries. Due to the regression analysis method, one cannot tell whether the populist increases in UK mainstream parties were in response to populist party success – only the overall result of the effect of populist party success, a statistically insignificant coefficient, is presented.

A second study by Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn codes ‘anti-establishment’ language in election manifestos in 6 European countries between 1995 and 2012³⁰. Their measure of populism thus includes only one ‘half’ of the populism definition: the measurement of language references to ‘the people’ are judged too ambiguous and complex to be captured effectively by a quantitative content analysis approach. They

²⁵ Matthijs Rooduijn, Sarah De Lange, and Wouter Van Der Brug, ‘A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe,’ *Party Politics*, 20(4), (2014), 563-575 (p.563)

²⁶ Rooduijn, De Lange and Van Der Brug, p.567

²⁷ Rooduijn et al, p.565

²⁸ Rooduijn et al, p.569

²⁹ Rooduijn et al, p.568

³⁰ Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah De Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn, *Radical Right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: into the mainstream?* (New York: Routledge, 2016) (p.37)

conclude: 'since 2005... centre parties have slightly moderated their critique towards the elite'³¹. Again, the UK exhibits large increases in levels of populism, and is the only country besides Austria in which the level of populism in mainstream parties has increased since 1995 (see graphs in their Appendix). There is no discussion of the causes of changing levels of populist language.

In addition, one recent study looks directly at the 'fighting fire with fire' response of mainstream politicians to the use of populism, but defined as *political style*. Bossetta compares Nick Clegg's performance in two televised debates against Farage in 2014, and argues that Clegg 'adopts a populist style from the first to the second Europe debate in an attempt to "fight fire with fire" against a populist politician.'³² 'Populist style' is here defined as 'political communication privileging conflict and crises at the expense of consensus and substantive facts.'³³ While not evidence of adoption of populist *language* necessarily, the study does focus on the copying of populism itself, as opposed to the policy positions of populist parties.

This research will respond to the existing literature, adding to a somewhat neglected area of the field on populism and its effects. Firstly, both the 2014 and 2016 pieces above are quantitative, cross-national, and therefore less in-depth in terms of measurement of populism and sources referred to. A more qualitative and in-depth study of individual cases is needed to test their (largely negative) findings in relation to the theories of populist 'Zeitgeist' and contagion. The 2016 piece expresses this need explicitly:

'Apart from official documents such as election manifestos or secondary estimates by experts, we also need direct analysis of alternative sources such as party websites, press releases, election debates, campaign material, interviews with politicians, parliamentary behaviour, voting patterns and so on. Case studies are required to provide a more complete and accurate picture.'³⁴

A qualitative method allows more detailed and nuanced assessment of populist language. A more in-depth study will allow analysis of a wider variety of sources. A single country focus makes a more qualitative and in-depth study feasible for this project.

Secondly, both studies highlight the UK as an exception: a potential positive case for Mudde's theory of populist contagion, where other cases are negative. The UK will be focused on as a case where there is reason to suppose mainstream parties may have adopted populist language, and will attempt to address both questions raised by Mudde's theory. Have UK mainstream parties become more populist in their

³¹ Akkerman, De Lange and Rooduijn, p.46

³² Michael Bossetta, 'Fighting fire with fire: mainstream adoption of the populist political style in the 2014 Europe debates between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage,' *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 19(4), (2017), 715-734 (p.732)

³³ Bossetta, p.730

³⁴ Akkerman et al, p.48

language, and if so, was this a response to the electoral success of a populist challenger (UKIP) using populist language?

Thirdly, this research focuses on the period 2010 to 2015, later than the periods of existing studies. Since populist parties have grown hugely in influence and electoral success in Europe in the past 10 years, studies focused before 2010 may not fully capture its effects.

THEORY AND ARGUMENT

Theory and hypotheses here build on Mudde's theory of 'Populist Zeitgeist' and Rooduijn et al.'s third hypothesis: the more successful populist parties, the more populist the programmes of mainstream parties become³⁵. The dependent variable is the level of populist language used by mainstream parties. The independent variable is the electoral success of a challenger party using populist language. This is a dummy variable – the 2015 election period is 'treated' with the electoral success of UKIP, the 2010 election period is not. The key actors of the theory are the three mainstream parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) and a challenger party using populist ideas/rhetoric (UKIP). The mainstream parties are assumed to be vote and/or office-seeking; the challenger party seeks votes too, but is more policy-seeking, wishing to challenge the mainstream consensus by promoting new issues³⁶. Actors meet in the political sphere through elections, campaigning and media debates, to compete for votes and government.

Four hypotheses are presented, the first being the key theoretical argument mirroring that of Mudde³⁷ and Rooduijn et al.³⁸, but with a causal chain more explicitly theorized. The others are more specific predictions about changes in levels of populism, adding nuance to the first key argument, and going beyond the theories of the above authors.

H1: When challenger parties using populist language are electorally successful, mainstream parties become more populist in their own language.

For the UK case:

When UKIP, using populist language, became more electorally successful, culminating in the 2014 European elections, UK mainstream parties responded by becoming more populist in their own language.

Vote- and office-seeking mainstream parties are threatened by the electoral success of a challenger party. It can no longer be 'ignored'. If mainstream parties believe the party succeeded by using populist language, they may react by strategically changing their own language, making it more populist. This hypothesis assumes that the

³⁵ Rooduijn et al., p.565

³⁶ Sara Hobolt, and Catherine De Vries, 'Challenging the Mainstream' Paper presented at *European University Institute workshop, "Rejected Europe. Beloved Europe. Cleavage Europe?"*, May 2017 (p.2)

³⁷ 'The Populist Zeitgeist'

³⁸ 'A Populist Zeitgeist?'

electoral success of the populist party is significant enough for mainstream parties to feel threatened, and that they believe the *populism* of the challengers significantly explains their electoral success. Populism need not be the *sole* explanation: for example, attributing the electoral success of UKIP partially to their stance on the EU or immigration does not invalidate the theory, provided UKIP's populism was at least identified as a significant reason for their success.

H2a: Any increased populist language of mainstream parties will be more evident in increased reference to the people, and less evident in increased anti-elite references.

H2b: Any increased populist language of mainstream parties will be more evident in increased praising of the people, and less evident in increased anti-elite references.

Populism involves praising a 'pure people' and deriding a 'corrupt elite'³⁹. Since mainstream parties to a significant extent *are* the political elite or establishment which populist parties attack, anti-elite references may not be a coherent strategy for them. However, mainstream parties can respond by increasing their appeal to the people: through either increased reference to the people (H2a), or increased praise of the people (H2b). Hence, it is expected that one 'half' of the populist language will be easier for mainstream parties to adopt.

H3: In the UK case, anti-elite language among mainstream parties will increase more in terms of *anti-EU* elite references compared to *anti-UK* elite references.

The populist language of UKIP targets two types of elites: UK political elites, and EU ones. Do the mainstream parties respond to UKIP with more anti-elite language of one kind, or with equal amounts of both? It is suggested that UK mainstream parties are more able to take an anti-elite attitude towards the EU than towards the UK elites; they are less connected with the EU political elite themselves, so such references are less likely to seem incoherent.

CASE SELECTION AND SCOPE

The UK is highlighted in existing literature as a case where increasing levels of populism have been found for the 1990s – 2010 period, in contrast to most other Western European countries⁴⁰. It is an exception, a potential positive case for Mudde's theory of populist contagion, when other supporting evidence is somewhat lacking. Here the UK is focused on to confirm, through a more in-depth study, whether it is in fact a positive case.

The project is designed to fit into the existing literature, and to be highly internally valid. External validity is less of a concern – existing work already focuses on cross-

³⁹ Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.543

⁴⁰ Rooduijn et al; Akkerman et al

national comparisons and testing the theory of populist contagion in multiple countries. The in-depth study, looking at multiple textual sources and using process tracing to test the causal link between increased populism in mainstream parties and populist party success, could however be repeated in other countries. Indeed, it is shown here that a more detailed analysis of language changes reveals populist impact which might be missed in studies with cruder measures of populism, showing a need to repeat more qualitative and detailed studies elsewhere. The scope of the theory extends to the mainstream parties of other European countries.

UKIP's electoral success in 2014 is a suitable event for the independent variable. First, it can be demonstrated through content analysis of UKIP texts that populist language was indeed used by them. Secondly, the 2014 result was dramatic: UKIP came first, with 27% of votes, pushing Labour and the Conservatives into second and third place respectively⁴¹. The 2014 result was arguably a culmination of the rapidly increasing success of UKIP after 2010; in the 2010 general election they were of little consequence.

The two general election periods of 2010 and 2015 will be examined as the before and after points for assessing the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable. A general election produces a wealth of textual sources, and the use of election resources helps to make comparison, both between the three mainstream parties and the 2010 and 2015 time periods, as fair as possible. Party conference speeches and election leaflets should be relatively comparable between elections and mainstream parties: all parties produce them, with similar structure and aims in all cases.

Another benefit of the 2010-2015 period is a lack of other significant political upheavals which could present rival explanations for any change in levels of mainstream party populism. The MPs' expenses scandal (2009), and the economic crisis (2007/8) may have impacted levels of populism, but the impact should, if anything, create bias towards more populism in 2010 compared to 2015, as the events were more recent then. Also, two of the three main party leaders remained the same between the 2010 and 2015 general elections (Cameron and Clegg). This helps diminish the leadership or personal style of different leaders as a potential confounding factor.

Three mainstream parties in the UK are examined here: the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats are considered to be a mainstream party based on Meguid's definition: mainstream parties fit into the traditional class-based orientation of politics, focus more on economic issues than new issues like environmental protection, and have a stance on all key policy questions.⁴² Other parties such as the SNP and Plaid Cymru, which could arguably be described as

⁴¹ European Parliament website: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-2014.html> [accessed 1 March 2019]

⁴² Bonnie Meguid, 'Competition between Unequals: the role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success,' *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), (2005), 347-359 (p.347)

mainstream too, were excluded due to their presence in only parts of the UK, which would have made selecting a representative sample of election leaflets later on more difficult.

METHOD: DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

The research question comprises two separate questions, and the method and analysis will be split into corresponding sections:

1. *Was there an increase in levels of populist language and rhetoric used by mainstream parties from 2010 to 2015?*
2. *If there was an increase, was this *due* to the electoral success of UKIP?*

The first of these questions is descriptive, the second causal.

The first question requires a careful definition, operationalization, measurement and documentation of levels of populist language in textual sources of mainstream parties in 2010 and 2015. The chosen method is qualitative content analysis. Party conference speeches from the two general election periods of 2010 and 2015 will be coded and compared for levels of populist language using a coding frame (Part 1).

Two different methodological approaches will be used to address the second question. First, qualitative content analysis will be performed on a second sample of mainstream party texts: election leaflets from local constituencies (Part 2). A difference in differences design will be used to compare the relative changes in levels of populist language in the leaflets from two groups of parliamentary constituencies: those where UKIP was a high threat, and those where it was low or non-existent. A related but different coding frame will be employed here to reflect the different type of textual source, but the method remains qualitative content analysis.

Second, process tracing will be employed to explore the causal mechanism linking UKIP's increased electoral success to increased levels of populist language in mainstream party texts (Part 3). The key sources of evidence for this will be elite interviews, political and scholarly accounts of the 2010-2015 period, and newspaper articles.

The three methodological approaches will now be discussed in turn.

Qualitative Content Analysis

Key advantages of content analysis are its unobtrusive nature, its use of a wealth of information contained within existing texts, and the unstructured nature of this data⁴³. Using existing textual sources means data collection can be relatively inexpensive: all the texts used here were freely available online. Potential biases of an obtrusive technique are avoided: texts and speeches were not affected by their authors' knowledge that they would be investigated for populism. Unstructured data increases the likelihood of observing real opinions and attitudes; they are not forced

⁴³ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: an introduction to its methodology*, 2nd edn (Thousand, CA; London: Sage, 2004) (pp.40-41)

into specific interview responses. Content analysis is especially suitable for studying ideational concepts like populism, which are generally best captured by looking at what people say or write⁴⁴.

A disadvantage of content analysis is that dealing with unstructured data can be time-consuming. While computers help, textual data may still be harder to handle, organize and interpret than statistical data. Another difficulty is ensuring that the dependent and independent variables are truly independent; there are often connections between different texts or sampling units⁴⁵, such as consecutive speeches given at a party conference. Finally, unitizing can be complex: units to be sampled, recorded and coded, and used for context can vary⁴⁶. Breaking texts down into sampling and recording units can be difficult. For example, using sentences as coding units may miss meanings only captured at paragraph level. However, clear specification of the units should ensure the method is rigorous and replicable.

Both main types of content analysis, 'classic content analysis' and 'computerized' or quantitative content analysis⁴⁷, have been used to study populism before. Classical content analysis involves use of a codebook by human coders to systematically analyze texts. Rooduijn and Pauwels create a codebook to code two specific measures related to populism: people-centrism and anti-elitism, coded with the questions 'Do the authors of the manifesto refer to the people?' and 'Do the authors of the manifesto criticize elites?'⁴⁸. Rooduijn, de Lange and Van der Brug's article⁴⁹ uses the classical method, as does Hawkins' 'holistic grading' of speeches⁵⁰, which assigns an entire speech a single grade according to its level of populism.

Quantitative content analysis involves coding by a computer, programmed to use a specific dictionary. Examples include Rooduijn and Pauwel's article⁵¹, and Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn's book⁵² – both use a populist dictionary based on anti-elitist language. Jagers and Walgrave use a quantitative approach too⁵³, counting the references to the 'people' in Belgian parties' political broadcasts.

The classical, qualitative approach will be employed here. Its relative advantage is increased validity: greater truth in analysis and conclusions, and greater certainty that

⁴⁴ Krippendorff, p.76-77

⁴⁵ Krippendorff, p.99

⁴⁶ Krippendorff, p.99

⁴⁷ Matthijs Rooduijn, and Teun Pauwels, 'Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis, *West European Politics*, 34(6), (2011), 1272-1283 (p.1272)

⁴⁸ Rooduijn and Pauwels, p.1275

⁴⁹ Rooduijn et al, 'A Populist Zeitgeist?'

⁵⁰ Kirk Hawkins, 'Is Chavez Populist?: Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective,' *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(8), (2009), 1040-1067 (p.1040)

⁵¹ 'Measuring Populism'

⁵² 'Into the Mainstream?'

⁵³ Jan Jagers, and Stefan Walgrave, 'Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium,' *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), (2007), 319-345

one is accurately measuring the outcome of interest. It will allow a more accurate capture of the whole of the populism definition: both references to the people and anti-elite references. A number of previous studies of populism using the quantitative approach have relied on only anti-elite words for their populist dictionaries, arguing that 'people' and associated words are too ambiguous to be included⁵⁴. There are many instances of 'people' which are not populist in meaning, and terms like 'we' and 'our' can be contextually varied in reference. Whereas a computer cannot deal with such nuances and context, a human coder can, meaning references can be more accurately coded.

A potential disadvantage of the classical method is reduced consistency and repeatability of results. Arguably a computer is the ideal for achieving consistency and repeatability – '100% reliable' according to Laver and Gary⁵⁵. It can repeat tasks with much lower chance of errors compared to a human coder using a codebook. However, using the classical method, reliability can be improved by testing the codebook to ensure different coders make sufficiently similar coding decisions. Clear specification of the characteristics, background and qualifications of the coders, and information about any training they received, can help to make a study replicable.

Process Tracing

Process tracing outlines a causal process which links the independent variable (UKIP's increased electoral success by 2014) to the dependent variable (increased levels of populist language used by mainstream parties) through specifying a causal chain, and the comparison of this chain with alternative explanations.⁵⁶

The key advantage of the process tracing method is its high internal validity⁵⁷: if evidence of high probative value can be found to support each step in the chain, the causal link for the case is established. However, finding CPOs (causal process observations)⁵⁸ to support each step of the chain may be problematic, and a failure to prove one step means the causal argument as a whole fails. Another advantage is the detailed within-case knowledge⁵⁹ that the method produces: when successful, not only is a connection between X and Y established, but *the way* in which they are connected, the causal mechanism, is also understood in detail.⁶⁰

A disadvantage of the method is reduced generalizability of findings: while internal validity of any conclusions is high, external validity is lower. It cannot be assumed that the causal process and mechanisms at work in one case will be common across other

⁵⁴ Rooduijn and Pauwels; Akkerman et al

⁵⁵ Michael Laver, and John Garry, 'Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts,' *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(3), (2000), 619-634 (p.625)

⁵⁶ Alexander George, and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Mass; London: MIT Press, 2005) (p.206)

⁵⁷ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) (p.43)

⁵⁸ Gary Goertz, and James Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) (p.90)

⁵⁹ Goertz and Mahoney, p.90

⁶⁰ Gerring, p.44

cases.⁶¹ However, this study seeks to determine whether the UK provides a positive case for Mudde's theory of populist contagion, and therefore a method which prizes internal over external validity is apposite.

Elite Interviewing

Interviewing individuals involved in events of interest can provide a rich source of original data, which makes a study unique⁶². It also contributes to deep knowledge of the specific case. Interviews are particularly useful when the causal processes of interest involve feelings and motivations behind an action or decision, as in this project⁶³. Questions can also be tailored towards the research questions in a way that use of existing data does not allow.

However, a significant weakness of elite interviewing is the likelihood of low response rates: elite figures such as politicians are hard to engage. The method can thus be time consuming and inefficient, and result in evidence gaps. This is addressed here by collecting a variety of sources as evidence for process tracing, not interviews exclusively. Other sources such as newspaper articles and political accounts are easier and cheaper to access. The quality of data from interviews is also uncertain: will actors be open and honest or will elements of social desirability bias or personal/political agenda mean that responses are not fully truthful?⁶⁴ Using interviews to shed light on past events also requires an awareness of potential temporal effects on responses: individuals might forget details of events, or their opinions might be affected by discussion or other more recent events.⁶⁵ Here, the temporal effects are likely to be minimal, since the 2010-2015 period is recent. Newspaper articles from the time will also be used to check the reliability of interview statements.

The use of both process tracing and elite interviewing for data collection are unusual at present in the study of populism and its language effects. At the time of writing, no existing literature could be found on this topic which uses these methods. The approach is thus methodologically innovative.

⁶¹ Derek Beach, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013) (p.93)

⁶² Oisn Tansey, 'Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,' *Political Science Politics*, 40(4), (2007), 765-772 (p.767)

⁶³ Tansey, p.766

⁶⁴ Brian Rathbun, 'Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, ed. by Janet Box-Steffensmeier, (Oxford; New York: OUP, 2008) (p.694)

⁶⁵ Tansey, p.767

PART 1 METHODOLOGY

CHOICE OF TEXTS

Party conference speeches were chosen as texts for analysis in Part 1. These speeches have the advantage of being delivered every year in a similar setting to a similar group of people, for the same electoral purpose, making them very comparable. Party conferences, for Labour and the Conservatives at least, are also similar in the structure of speeches given each year – speeches in department areas and from the party leader. Conference speeches are also easy to access: most can be found online, in either transcript or audio form.

The choice of party conference speeches represents purposive sampling – they hold specific relevance for the research question. The focus is *scripted* texts; the intentional language choices of parties is explored, to see whether there was a strategic change in response to UKIP. Scripted texts do have drawbacks: more guarded language and possibly ‘toned-down’ statements. However, they are also carefully thought-through, so a good place to look for changes in language strategy or usage: such strategy is likely to be more obvious here than in language crafted on the spot.

Other texts considered, but not selected, for analysis were election manifestos and televised general election debates in 2010 and 2015.

General election televised debates were excluded because only the initial responses to a given question by the party leaders were scripted or close to being so; free debate, challenges and arguing followed this. Though still intentionally chosen speech, this is more difficult to compare fairly between different debates and speakers, due to its more unpredictable structure and dependence on the interviewer/ other participants. A further problem was uneven sample sizes: three 90-minute debates between Cameron, Clegg and Brown in 2010, compared to just one 120-minute debate in 2015 involving seven party leaders. Analysis of only the pre-prepared initial responses to questions also amounted to only a small data sample.

Election manifestos were also considered, and would have been particularly useful in linking with existing research: they are a common text source in analyses of populism. Manifestos are clearly carefully scripted, like political speeches, and their language is a key concern and likely to be at its most intentional. They were excluded here because of limited time and resources – election manifestos are long and the coding frame designed for this project is complex and time-consuming to apply sentence by sentence. With more time and resources, extension of the analysis to include election manifestos would be a valuable addition.

Exclusion of these other texts leaves open the possibility that parties decided to adopt populist language in one type of text and not others. Such a strategic decision is possible, and conclusions drawn must be suitably limited. However, use of process

tracing in Part 3 to explore the causal process of any strategic language decisions should highlight if such a differentiated approach to different types of text was taken.

The structure of comparison is as follows. Four years of party conferences were chosen: 2009 and 2010, providing the data for mainstream party language *before* the electoral success of UKIP; and 2014 and 2015, providing the data *after* this UKIP success. Two years are chosen for each time period to add more data points, while still allowing the comparison to be structured around two general election periods in 2010 and 2015. For the Conservative and Labour parties, 8 speeches from each party conference were selected, in 8 topic areas: Party Leader, Chancellor/Economy, Foreign Affairs, Education, Health, Home Affairs, Work and Pensions, and Communities and Local Government.

These were 8 topic areas where the relevant speech was available in all four years of the party conference for both the Labour and Conservative parties. They also cover a range of government areas and should provide a more balanced and informed judgement about the language of mainstream parties than a simple comparison of the speeches given by party leaders. Ensuring the speeches were given in the same topic areas for each year and for each party is important in case the subject matter of a speech affects levels of populist language. There may, for example, be more calls for 'power to the people' in a speech about local government than in one on education or healthcare. 8 speeches per conference year for each party amounts to 64 party conference speeches, 32 each for Labour and the Conservatives.

The structure of comparison for the Liberal Democrats is different, due to limitations of available texts. Liberal Democrat party conference speeches, apart from the party leader's speech, were harder to get hold of; only one or two speeches were found for 2015. It was also harder to distinguish the topic areas of specific speeches compared with those of Labour and the Conservatives where the ministers and shadow-ministers each spoke about their particular departments. Extensive searching produced 4 topic areas where there was a speech for *one* of the 2009 and 2010 years and *one* of the 2014 and 2015 years, in addition to the Party Leader speech, for which all four years were available. The topic areas differ from those in the Labour and Conservative comparison: Party Leader, Chancellor, Justice, Business and Education.

Cross-time comparisons can be made between the language usage of each political party in the 2009/10 and 2014/15 time periods. The mean value of each Measure in the coding frame will be calculated for each party in the two time-periods, and the difference in means found and analyzed for substantive and statistical significance. Comparison can also be meaningfully made between the levels and sizes of any changes in the Labour and Conservative cases, since the sample of speeches for these two parties is balanced and similar. This is not the case for the Liberal Democrats: given the much smaller sample of speeches (12 in total, 6 for 2009/10 and 6 for 2014/15), and different topic areas, only a cross-time comparison will be made.

DEVELOPMENT OF CODING FRAME

Key elements of Mudde's populism definition⁶⁶ were considered in the creation of the coding frame. Firstly, there is clear reference to two groups, 'the people' and 'the elite,' and creation of an antagonism between them. Secondly, there is a moral aspect: the people are good and pure, while the elites are evil and corrupt. Thirdly, the people-elites antagonism is an instance of an 'us versus them'-type framing. Through preliminary reading of mainstream party texts, an idea of contrasting a 'populist' framing with a 'partisan' one was developed. A frame is a mental structure which shapes the way we see the world⁶⁷. It allows a few words to bring to mind whole worldviews or ideas⁶⁸, giving a passage of text or speech an overall meaning which may go beyond the specific words shared. Below, populist and partisan framings are defined.

A populist framing of political speech or debate has as its central idea a division between a 'pure' people and an 'evil' elite, in line with Mudde's definition. The main 'line' drawn by political actors or parties invoking this frame is 'we the people' versus 'them the evil elite.' The party presents itself as of the people, or the only party representing the people; criticism of other parties is aimed at all of these parties *together*, lumping them into a single category of 'corrupt elites' or representatives of the establishment.

A partisan framing has as its overarching idea the competition between one party and other individual parties. The main 'line' drawn by political actors invoking this frame is 'we the party' versus 'them the other parties.' Here criticism of other parties may be targeted at multiple parties together, but is more generally targeted at one other specific party, and focused on policy actions or performance. Competition resembles that between *teams* fighting for government, a 'red team vs blue team' focus, with voters deciding which team they prefer. Criticism is not targeted at *elites*, or at the *system* as a whole.

CODING FRAME MEASURES

The seven Measures are summarized in the table below. The full coding frame, with explanation and examples, is displayed in Appendix A.

CODING FRAME – SUMMARY OF MEASURES
<p>Populist Framing</p> <p>Measure 1: The People</p> <p>a) Is a reference made to the people? <i>If yes, code the following:</i></p> <p>b) Is the reference meaningful (in terms of populism)? <i>Level 1:</i> clearly populist references e.g. 'the people,' 'the British people.' <i>Level 1.5:</i> 'working people,' 'ordinary people,' 'local people.' <i>Level 2:</i> more regular references e.g. 'our country,' 'Britain,' 'people.'</p>

⁶⁶ 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.543

⁶⁷ Lakoff, p.4

⁶⁸ Lakoff, p.24

Level 3: reference not meaningful e.g. 'Britain' referring to the place not the people.

- c) Is the reference to the people positive, negative or neutral?

Explicitly positive

Implicitly positive/neutral

Negative

Measure 2: British Political Elites

- a) Is a reference made to British political elites?

If yes, code the following:

- b) Is the reference meaningful (in terms of populism)?

Level 1: refers to British political elites specifically e.g. 'politicians.'

Level 2: refers to British political system more generally e.g. 'British politics.'

Level 3: reference not meaningful e.g. 'Westminster' to describe geographical location.

- c) Is the reference to British political elites positive, negative or neutral?

Explicitly negative

Implicitly negative

Neutral

Positive

Measure 3: EU Political Elites

Identical to Measure 2, except for **EU** political elites.

Measure 7: Counterpoint Framings⁶⁹

Is there evidence of any of Counterpoint's five populist framings?

Ruled from Above

The Bearers of Truth

Paradise Lost

Reinstating Common Sense

Order versus Chaos

Partisan Framing

Measure 5: Partisan Reference

Does a piece of text draw a clear distinction between the individual's own party and that of another party/parties, but not *all* parties lumped together, or the *system* as a whole?

Partisan Reference

Alignment with the People

Measure 4: We Our Us

Do any references to 'we,' 'our' and 'us' in a given sentence refer to 'we the people' or 'we the party'?

We the People

We the Party

⁶⁹ Counterpoint, *Responding to Populist Rhetoric*, 2014

Ambiguous

Measure 6: Particular Groups

Does a piece of text refer to particular groups or individuals in the ordinary populace with whom the speaker has met/talked?

Distinct group

Unnamed Individual

Named Individual

Populist Framing

Together, Measures 1 (the people), 2 (British political elites) and 3 (EU political elites) form the main populist framing. Individually, they show how many references are made to the people or to elites within a text, the level of meaningfulness of these references, and how many are positive, negative or neutral. Collectively, Measures 1 to 3 can show how often references to both the people and political elites occur in the same sentence, creating a more direct antagonism than when these two populist elements are both present in a text, but in separate places.

For Measure 1, a level 1.5 category is added for some specific references to the people which seemed to be interesting cases – not explicitly populist enough to fit in level 1, but warranting a higher category than level 2. For example, the phrase ‘working people’ was used much by all mainstream parties in the 2015 election campaign, and though not technically referring to the British people as a whole, it was used in ways to suggest this.

For Measures 2 and 3, a value judgement is made that references to political *elites* specifically is more populist than references to the political *system* generally, since the political class themselves are under attack in the former, whereas criticism of elites is more indirect in the latter.

The justification for different ‘levels’ within each Measure is an expectation that if they copy UKIP’s populist language at all, mainstream parties will go for milder or subtler populist language or framing. This may involve more use of terms relating to people, even if not all have explicitly populist flavour, and more criticism of the political *system* than of politicians or elites themselves. One cannot entirely avoid using terms like ‘people’ and ‘Britain,’ but how much they are used in the average text varies hugely. The number of such references, even when functional, is a language choice. It is important that the coding frame identifies both milder and stronger language responses, and does not simply pick out the most blatantly populist statements.

The same justification applies for the positive/negative judgement for Measures 1 to 3. Again, this categorization is to pick up any subtle changes mainstream parties may make – for example, they may not make more explicitly negative comments about the political system or elites, but instead more implicitly negative ones, or fewer positive or neutral ones.

Measure 7 contains coding categories copied directly from a study by Counterpoint⁷⁰ on the language and rhetoric of populist parties within the European Parliament. It specifies five narratives or framings that are typically used by populist parties, UKIP included. For example, the ‘ruled from above’ framing states:

‘The rulers who represent the elites have gained too much power over those they rule, the hard-working ordinary people. The ruled no longer have control over their own affairs and are at the mercy of the unaccountable rulers.’⁷¹

Coding for Measure 7 is a qualitative judgement about whether a piece of text contains the narrative or framing in question. The percentage of text containing such narrative is calculated. These populist framings are a secondary element to the analysis since few such references are expected in mainstream party texts; they are more extreme than basic criticism of elites or praising of the people, and so mainstream parties are probably less likely to adopt them.

Partisan Framing

Testing and redrafting of Measure 5 led to a focus here on only negative comments and criticism about the other party, and not praise of one’s own party – the latter is a feature common to all parties, and of populist and partisan framings alike. Only where a comment about the author’s party was made to contrast with the criticized party, and immediately followed that criticism, was it coded under Measure 5. This Measure is designed to capture the focus on the competition between parties – a partisan rather than populist focus.

Alignment with the People

Finally, Measures 4 and 6 consider ways in which parties could show themselves to be aligned with, or ‘of,’ the people. Such alignment techniques could be an alternative, subtler, response to UKIP’s populism than increased use of explicitly populist language. Measure 4 examines a speaker’s alignment with the people as a whole rather than with members of the party.

Measure 6 looks for instances of speakers referring to particular groups or individuals of the populace they have met or talked to. Recounting a conversation with a named individual, or a visit to a specific group in a specific town is a technique for showing oneself to be ‘in touch’ with ordinary people, or ‘of’ the people.

CODING AND CONTEXT UNITS

For Measures 1 to 4, the coding unit is the sentence. The context unit is the three sentences either side of the coding unit. Results will give the number of references (sentences) coded in a category, and the average number for each party and time period. The difference in means will be calculated. Concerns that speeches vary in length are addressed by the way speeches were chosen in groups for each time period

⁷⁰ *Responding to Populist Rhetoric*, 2014

⁷¹ Counterpoint, p.15

and party: while speeches within a given group may vary, differences in average length across groups should be minimal.

For Measures 5 to 7, the coding unit is not necessarily the sentence; a relevant reference could be a single sentence, a paragraph or a series of two or three paragraphs. For example, a recount of a meeting with an individual could extend beyond a single paragraph. Results will not look at the number of references, since they will differ in length and judgement about coding a section as one or more references may not be consistent. Instead results will look at the percentage of a given text that is coded in a particular category. The context unit is the entire text; understanding of its tone and focus may be necessary to make these more qualitative judgements.

Differing coding and context units for Measures 1-4 and Measures 5-7 were decided during testing and redrafting the coding frame, when a coding unit of a sentence did not work well for the latter. A larger coding unit of a paragraph was tested for Measures 1-4, but this introduced more variation in units: some paragraphs consisted of a single word and others were four or five sentences long. There were also issues with different presentation styles of text transcripts, and concerns about consistency of paragraphing judgements when transcribing audio files. The main disadvantage of the sentence as coding unit for Measures 1-4 is that some instances of direct people-elite antagonism are missed, where references to the people and to a political elite are present right next to each other, but fall in consecutive sentences. Overall, though, the sentence-level coding breaks the texts down in the most reliable and consistent way.

USE OF NVIVO AND COMPUTER AIDS

NVivo was used for coding due to the complexity of having seven different measures, and Measures 1-3 with multiple coding decisions to make for each unit coded. NVivo allowed all these different judgements about a single sentence to be saved and organized easily. The analysis of the populist framing (Measure 1-3) is made much simpler – the three layers of initial coding, meaningfulness judgement and positive/negative decision can all be stored in separate nodes but compared and cross-analyzed with ease, removing the need for multiplication of categories within categories.

A word search in Microsoft Word was used to highlight the words and phrases specified in the initial stage one categories for Measures 1 to 3 (phrases like ‘the British people’ and ‘Westminster’). The highlighted words helped speed up the coding process and ensure these likely references to people and elites were not missed. It was of course necessary for the coder to look for words and phrases which fitted in the ‘other references’ category.

RELIABILITY

To ensure consistency and repeatability of results, a number of actions were taken. Firstly, inter-coder reliability⁷² was tested. Just over 10% (8 speeches) of the texts were coded by a second coder for comparison, following discussion with two other coders in which each measure was explained and examples given. Some changes were made to the coding frame during these discussions, such as the decision not to distinguish between neutral and implicitly positive references to the people in Measure 1 – in initial testing, this distinction proved difficult to make consistently. The final coding frame was then given to the second coder and the coding process on NVivo explained. The second coder was a British citizen like myself, with background knowledge of the British political system. This may be important for noticing subtle references to the political system, or phrases about ‘the people.’

The results of the inter-coder reliability test are displayed in Appendix B. The simple percentage agreement and Kappa coefficient were calculated. The simple percentage agreement calculates the proportion of units coded by two coders upon which they agree: do they assign the same precise value to a given variable?⁷³ Cohen’s Kappa coefficient addresses one drawback of the simple percentage agreement, namely its failure to account for chance agreement⁷⁴. The weighted Kappa coefficient used here takes into account the chance component, and also the differing importance of disagreements or ‘misses’⁷⁵. There is no clear consensus on what constitutes an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability, as explained by Neuendorf, but generally a ‘more liberal criterion’ is afforded to ‘beyond-chance statistics’ such as Cohen’s Kappa coefficient, which can be tough in the case of extreme distributions where one coding category has an overly strong influence on the statistic⁷⁶. For the simple percentage agreement, 90% agreement is set as a target – Neuendorf concludes that reliability coefficients of 0.9 or greater ‘would be acceptable to all’⁷⁷. For Cohen’s Kappa, the criteria of Banerjee et al. is adopted: 0.75+ indicating ‘excellent agreement beyond chance,’ 0.40 to 0.75 indicating ‘fair agreement beyond chance,’ and below 0.40 indicating ‘poor agreement beyond chance’⁷⁸.

For the simple percentage agreement, all variables and categories within each variable have agreement exceeding 90%. For Cohen’s weighted Kappa coefficient, there is more variation, but the majority of the coefficients are well above the lower limit value of 0.4 for fair agreement. Lower coefficients for Measure 7’s counterpoint references are unsurprising, since this is the Measure that requires the most qualitative judgement, and actual instances of such references are expected to be

⁷² Kimberly Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, (Thousand Oaks, California; London: Sage, 2002) (p.141)

⁷³ Neuendorf, p.149

⁷⁴ Neuendorf, p.150

⁷⁵ Neuendorf, p.149

⁷⁶ Neuendorf, p.151

⁷⁷ Neuendorf, p.143

⁷⁸ Mousumi Banerjee, Michelle Capozzoli, Laura McSweeney, and Debajyoti Sinha, ‘Beyond Kappa: A Review of Interrater Agreement Measures,’ *Canadian Journal of Statistics*, 27(1), (1999), 3-23 (p.6)

very low in mainstream party texts (to ensure there were some positive cases to code, a speech by Nigel Farage in 2013 was included as one of the 8 speeches). A few of the categories, particularly 'Bearers of Truth' and 'Reinstating Common Sense,'⁷⁹ could include very similar passages. Coefficients for the positive/negative judgement about references to the people are also generally lower although not worryingly so. The few '0' coefficients for some coding categories under Measure 1, references to the people, are not concerning – given the high percentage agreement for these categories, they probably mean one single reference was coded in that category by one coder, and not coded there by the other. Overall, the Measures in the coding frame are reliable enough when employed independently by a second coder.

Intra-coder reliability⁸⁰ was also tested – the consistency of my own judgements over time. Here 10 speeches (over 10% of the text sample) were coded initially, and then re-coded two weeks later. Each wave of coding was performed under a different user profile in the same NVivo project, allowing comparison of the results via a 'coding comparison,' as was done for the inter-reliability test above. Results are displayed in Appendix C, again with simple percentage agreement values and weighted Kappa coefficients. All of the variables and coding categories have percentage agreement of over 90%, the majority in the high nineties. There is more variation with the Kappa coefficients as with the inter-coder test, but none is low enough to be a concern. As before, the counterpoint reference variables for Measure 7, and the 'Ambiguous' category under Measure 4 have generally lower coefficients, but they all fall above the threshold for fair agreement beyond chance.

In addition to inter- and intra-coder reliability testing, steps were taken while coding to minimize the impact of any inconsistencies of judgement on the results. Coding was done in chunks of 8 speeches per day and no more, in order to avoid coder fatigue. All coding of Conservative and Labour samples was done in the space of 10 days, two working weeks; in each week, half of each time-period sample (2009/2010 and 2014/2015) was coded for each party. This was to ensure that if judgements did alter at all over the two weeks, the effects would be evenly spread between the results of both time periods and both parties, hopefully minimizing any inconsistency in time-comparison. Notes were made throughout the coding process in order to check back at previous judgements in tricky cases. Coding of the Liberal Democrat speeches was done later, in the space of three days. This was due to difficulty in finding texts and creating a comparable sample.

VALIDITY

Is the coding frame accurately measuring changes in levels of populist language? By using a well-established definition by Mudde⁸¹, populism is being defined here in a legitimate way, and one that would be accepted by scholars. The populist framing is

⁷⁹ Counterpoint, 2014

⁸⁰ Neuendorf, p.163

⁸¹ 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p. 543

focused on the two antagonistic aspects of the people and the elites present in Mudde’s definition.

The validity of the coding frame and operationalization of populist language was tested by applying the frame to a UKIP speech, a party which uses populist language more than mainstream parties, and whose successful use of populist language is the potential trigger for mainstream party language changes being explored. For the UKIP speech, its average scores on the majority of the populist framing measures should be higher than those of mainstream parties, and its average score on partisan framing measures should be lower. It may not necessarily score highly on the subtler categories of populism, since UKIP is not expected to be subtle. Below are the results from coding Nigel Farage’s 2013 speech to the UKIP party conference.⁸² Columns showing the average percentage of text coded at each category in the 2009/2010 samples for the Conservative and Labour parties are included, for aid of comparison.

The UKIP conference speech does indeed score higher on the most obvious cases of populist framing (highlighted yellow) and lower in categories corresponding to a greater partisan framing (highlighted green).

UKIP 2013 CONFERENCE SPEECH – NIGEL FARAGE				
	Number of references	Percentage of text containing references	2009/10 average percentage of text containing references – Conservatives comparison	2009/10 average percentage of text containing references – Labour comparison
MEASURE 1 – THE PEOPLE				
Level 1 and explicitly positive	3	1.74	0.8	0.56
Level 1 and implicitly positive/neutral	4	2.25	3.09	3.89
Level 1.5 and explicitly positive	0	0	0.2	0.77
Level 1.5 and implicitly positive/neutral	1	0.65	0.04	0
Level 2 and explicitly positive	3	0.72	1.99	1.82

⁸² Nigel Farage, UKIP Party Conference Speech, 2013 <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/nigel-farage-2013-speech-to-ukip-conference/> [accessed 6 April 2019]

Level 2 and implicitly positive/neutral	16	7.26	9.03	12.51
MEASURE 2 – BRITISH POLITICAL ELITES				
Level 1 and explicitly negative	11	3.18	0.24	0.17
Level 1 and implicitly negative	2	0.72	0.56	0.05
Level 2 and explicitly negative	0	0	0.29	0.16
Level 2 and implicitly negative	4	1.95	0.31	0.39
MEASURE 3 – EU POLITICAL ELITES				
Level 1 and explicitly negative	11	5.79	0.06	0
Level 1 and implicitly negative	0	0	0.02	0
Level 2 and explicitly negative	2	0.83	0.07	0
Level 2 and implicitly negative	4	1.94	0.14	0.02
MEASURE 4 – WE OUR US				
We the party	-	11.69	26.56	28.16
We the people	-	20.96	11.8	9.84
MEASURE 5 – PARTISAN REFERENCE				
Partisan reference	-	2.05	18.92	29.17
MEASURE 6 – PARTICULAR GROUPS REFERENCE				
Particular group	0	0	0.64	1.34
Particular unnamed individual	0	0	0.65	0.32

Particular named individual	0	0	0.6	0.77
MEASURE 7 – COUNTERPOINT REFERENCES				
Total counterpoint references	-	33.92	1.16	0.09
Bearers of truth	-	5.26	0	0
Order vs. chaos	-	8.33	0.36	0
Paradise lost	-	14.22	0.09	0
Reinstating common sense	-	3.57	0	0
Ruled from above	-	14.19	0.71	0.09

PART 1 RESULTS

The key findings for each measure will first be reported and discussed. A more explicit analysis of the findings in relation to the hypotheses will follow.

The change in the average number of references coded at a given category (the difference in means) is reported for each party, in percentage form for ease of understanding and comparison. In addition, the sum of references coded at a given category across all speeches by a given party in each time period is reported for Measures 1-3, since in some cases large percentage changes actually represent only small changes in numbers of actual references. Full results tables are displayed in Appendix M.

POPULIST FRAMING

Measure 1 – The People

MEASURE 1 – THE PEOPLE						
Percentage change in mean number of references per speech coded at each category, between 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 periods.						
Sums of all references coded at each category in 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 samples (n=16 for Conservatives and Labour, n=6 for Liberal Democrats).						
Party	Explicitly Positive			Implicitly Positive/Neutral		
	% change (difference in means)	Sum 2009/2010	Sum 2014/2015	% change (difference in means)	Sum 2009/2010	Sum 2014/2015
Level 1: References to ‘the people,’ ‘the British people’ or similar phrases.						
Conservatives	+30%	17	22	+27%	59	75
Labour	+13%	15	17	-28%	71	51
Liberal Democrats	-48%	2	1	+21%	28	34
Level 1.5: References to ‘working people’; more than functional references.						
Conservatives	+329%*	6	26	-	1	0
Labour	+248%	10	35	-	0	0
Liberal Democrats	+782%	1	9	-	1	0
Level 2: References to the people that are more moderate and functional.						
Conservatives	+130%*	42	97	+53%	223	342
Labour	+9%	44	48	+15%	221	255
Liberal Democrats	+33%	9	12	+21%	104	126
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances						
* significant at 90% level (p<0.1)						
** significant at 95% level (p<0.05)						
*** significant at 99% level (p<0.01)						
<i>This key applies to all future tables.</i>						

Measure 1 provides support for H1: average references to the people increase in 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010. Greater positive change in Level 2 references compared to Level 1 references fits with the expectation that mainstream parties may make subtler changes to language (Level 2) rather than more explicitly populist changes as are captured by Level 1.

1.1: Most substantively and statistically significant change in more moderate and functional references to the people (Level 2). Increases for all three parties in moderate references: more reference to the people in general. Change particularly significant for the Conservatives.

1.2: Explicitly populist references to the people (Level 1) increased for Conservative speeches at both levels of positivity, and at one level of positivity for Labour and Liberal Democrat speeches.

1.3: Average number of references to the people coded at Level 1.5 increased for speeches of all parties in 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010.

1.4: Levels of positive level 2 references roughly equal for average Conservative and Labour speeches in 2009/2010. By 2014/15, Conservative levels increased much more than Labour levels.

Measure 2 – British Political Elites

MEASURE 2 – BRITISH POLITICAL ELITES						
Percentage change in mean number of references per speech coded at each category, between 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 periods.						
Sums of all references coded at each category in 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 samples (n=16 for Conservatives and Labour, n=6 for Liberal Democrats).						
Party	Explicitly Negative			Implicitly Negative		
	% change (difference in means)	Sum 2009/2010	Sum 2014/2015	% change (difference in means)	Sum 2009/2010	Sum 2014/2015
Level 1: References to British political elites, e.g. ‘politicians.’						
Conservatives	+42%	5	7	-24%	8	6
Labour	+27%	7	9	+46%	2	3
Liberal Democrats	+1270%*	1	14	+194%	1	3
Level 2: References to the British political system more generally, e.g. ‘British politics.’						
Conservatives	-30%	7	5	-66%	9	3
Labour	+79%	10	18	+40%	13	18
Liberal Democrats	-55%	9	4	-80%	10	2

Measure 2 provides support for H1: there is more explicitly negative reference to British political elites in 2014/2015. The increase is particularly dramatic for the

Liberal Democrats. Not only have explicitly negative references to British political elites increased here, but positive references, though scarce in 2009/2010, completely disappeared by 2014/2015.

2.1: All parties increased explicitly negative references to British political elites specifically (Level 1), the most explicitly populist language option. Liberal Democrat increase is particularly large.

2.2: Labour party increased negative references to the British political system.

2.3: Positive references to both British elites specifically and the British political system in general scarce in both time periods. Positive references to the former non-existent for all parties by 2014/2015. No positive level 1 references at all by any party in 2014/2015, compared to 2, 1 and 0 references for Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats respectively in 2009/2010 speeches.

Measure 3 – EU Political Elites

MEASURE 3 – EU POLITICAL ELITES						
Percentage change in mean number of references per speech coded at each category, between 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 periods.						
Sums of all references coded at each category in 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 samples (n=16 for Conservatives and Labour, n=6 for Liberal Democrats).						
Party	Explicitly Negative			Implicitly Negative		
	% change (difference in means)	Sum 2009/2010	Sum 2014/2015	% change (difference in means)	Sum 2009/2010	Sum 2014/2015
Level 1: References to EU political elites, e.g. ‘Brussels.’						
Conservatives	+317%	1	4	+833%*	1	9
Labour	-	0	4	0%	0	0
Liberal Democrats	0%	0	0	0%	0	0
Level 2: References to the EU political system more generally, e.g. ‘Europe.’						
Conservatives	+163%	3	8	+385%	2	10
Labour	0%	0	0	+417%	1	5
Liberal Democrats	0%	0	0	0%	0	0

There is support for H1’s prediction of increased levels of populist language (anti-EU political elite language here) in 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010 for the Conservative and Labour parties only. The Liberal Democrats did not increase negative language towards EU political elites, in contrast to their significantly increased negative language towards British political elites found in Measure 2.

3.1: Liberal Democrats make no meaningful negative references, explicit or implicit, to EU political elites, in either time period. 1270% increase in *neutral* level 2 references made to the EU political system (from 1 to 14 total references across all speeches):

Liberal Democrats discussing the EU political system a lot more by 2014/2015, but not with negative language. Commensurate with their pro-European stance.

3.2: Conservatives increased negative references to EU political elites and political system specifically, and Labour to a lesser extent. Positive references non-existent for both by 2014/2015.

3.3: Conservatives had equal or higher levels of explicitly and implicitly negative level 1 and 2 references compared to Labour in both time periods, and saw equal or larger increases by 2015. Anti-EU political elite language more common for Conservatives than Labour in both 2009/2010 and 2014/2015.

3.4: Positive level 2 references increased for all parties. Change for Labour is statistically significant at the 95% level. Interesting, given that negative level 2 references also increased for Conservatives and Labour.

Measure 7 – Counterpoint References

MEASURE 7 – COUNTERPOINT REFERENCES						
Mean percentage of text containing references in a given speech in 2009/2010 and 2014/2015, and the difference in means in percentage form.						
Party	Total References (All Types)			'Ruled from Above'		
	Mean % 2009/10 (2d.p.)	Mean % 2014/15 (2d.p.)	% change (diff. in means)	Mean % 2009/10 (2d.p.)	Mean % 2014/15 (2d.p.)	% change (diff. in means)
Conservatives	1.16	1.09	-6%	0.71	1.09	+53%
Labour	0.09	2.76	+2966%**	0.09	2.21	+2356%*
Liberal Democrats	0	0.27	-	0	0.27	-

Unsurprisingly the percentages of text of mainstream party speeches which are coded under a Counterpoint category are very small, in both time periods. The Counterpoint references are the more extreme populist framings or narratives, so little change was expected in these; other, more subtle changes in reference towards the people or elites were expected from mainstream parties. Nonetheless, the increased use of 'ruled from above' references by all three parties provides some support for H1, that levels of populist language and rhetoric increased in 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010. Indeed, this framing is arguably the most explicit of the five in creating an antagonism between the people and elites: rulers have gained too much power over the 'hard-working ordinary people', and are unaccountable⁸³.

7.1: Total references (of all five different Counterpoint categories combined) increased for Labour and Liberal Democrats. Labour increase huge in percentage terms and statistically significant at the 95% level.

⁸³ Counterpoint, p.15

7.2: Most significant changes in levels of references occurred in ‘Ruled from Above’ category: all parties saw an increase in average percentage of text coded. Labour speeches overtook Conservative ones in ‘ruled from above’ references by 2014/2015.

PARTISAN FRAMING

Measure 5 – Partisan Reference

MEASURE 5 – PARTISAN REFERENCE			
Mean percentage of text containing references in a given speech in 2009/2010 and 2014/2015, and the difference in means in percentage form.			
Party	Partisan Reference		
	Mean % 2009/2010 (2d.p.)	Mean % 2014/2015 (2d.p.)	% change (difference in means)
Conservatives	18.92	15.48	-18%
Labour	29.17	23.58	-19%
Liberal Democrats	19.67	20.3	+3%

Finding 5.1 does not provide direct support to H1, since partisan and populist references are not necessarily zero-sum. Reduced partisan focus of debate and criticism may mean language and rhetoric is more focused on criticism of elites or the political system as a whole rather than individual parties, but not necessarily. Reduced partisan references does however provide evidence for a reduced partisan framing of language.

5.1: Average percentage of text coded as partisan reference reduced for both Labour and Conservative party speeches. Small increase in percentage for Liberal Democrats.

5.2: Level of average partisan reference higher for Labour than for Conservative speeches, in both periods.

ALIGNMENT WITH THE PEOPLE

Measure 4 – We Our Us

MEASURE 4 – WE OUR US						
Mean percentage of text containing references in a given speech in 2009/2010 and 2014/2015, and the difference in means in percentage form.						
Party	'We the Party'			'We the People'		
	Mean % 2009/10 (2d.p.)	Mean % 2014/15 (2d.p.)	% change (difference in means)	Mean % 2009/10 (2d.p.)	Mean % 2014/15 (2d.p.)	% change (difference in means)
Conservatives	26.56	25.8	-3%	11.8	14.66	+24%
Labour	28.16	20.08	-29%**	9.84	14.16	+44%
Liberal Democrats	20.77	28.09	+35%*	11.65	12.76	+9%

Increased 'we the people' mean percentages of all parties, and the reduced 'we the party'/'we the people' percentage gap for Labour and the Conservatives, lends support to H1's prediction of increased populist language: there is greater alignment of the party or politician with the people as a whole rather than with the party exclusively. 'We the party' percentages remaining higher overall is unsurprising, given these are mainstream parties, and the speeches being explored are party conference speeches.

4.1: Increases for all three parties in mean percentage of text coded at 'we the people,' where uses of 'we,' 'our' and 'us' refer to the people rather than the party or party members exclusively. Difference in means greatest for Labour speeches.

4.2: Mean percentages for 'we the party' references remain considerably higher for all three parties than mean percentages for 'we the people' references. Difference between 'we the party' and 'we the people' mean percentages smaller for Labour and the Conservatives by 2014/2015.

Measure 6 – Particular Groups Reference

There are no particularly significant results here.

PEOPLE AND ELITES CROSSOVERS

Measures 1 to 3 capture the prevalence of references to the people and to British or EU political elites separately. While increased prevalence of each of these individually contribute to increased populist framing of a text, the strongest instances of populist language are likely to be where both positive references to the people and negative references to political elites occur in the same sentence – here the 'antagonism' of Mudde's definition will be most explicit. Such strong cases were expected to be very few in number in mainstream party texts.

PEOPLE AND ELITES CROSSOVER				
Total number of sentences across all party conference speeches where both a meaningful positive reference to the people AND a meaningful negative reference to political elites is made.				
(Party conference speech 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 samples: n=16 for Conservatives and Labour, n=6 for Liberal Democrats).				
Party	The people and British political elites/British political system (Measures 1 and 2)		The people and EU political elites/EU political system (Measures 1 and 3)	
	2009/2010	2014/2015	2009/2010	2014/2015
Conservatives	2	1	0	0
Labour	6	7	0	0
Liberal Democrats	2	1	0	0

In general, a cross-comparison of Measures 1 to 3 reveals that these instances are rare (in fact, non-existent in the case of EU political elites) and did not increase significantly for any party. Crossover references to the people and British political elites are lower for the Conservatives than for Labour and the Liberal Democrats (which differ little given the smaller sample size of speeches for the latter).

RELATION TO HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1

H1 states that when a populist party is electorally successful, mainstream parties increase their own use of populist language. The Part 1 analysis has been purely descriptive, ascertaining whether populist language increased for mainstream political parties in 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010, and cannot offer any evidence to support a proposed *cause* for this change. However, the results do support the expected change in levels of populist language.

Features of the increased populist language vary for each of the three parties, for example, the Liberal Democrats only engaged in anti-British political elite language, not anti-EU political elite language, and the Conservatives increased references to the people more than the other two parties. However, *the Hypothesis is confirmed for all three parties despite these variations: in all cases, positive references to the people and negative references towards political elites increased, and populist framing of language increased.*

Hypotheses 2a and 2b

H2 stated that any increased use of populist language by mainstream parties will be more evident in increased reference to (H2a), and increased praising of (H2b), the people, and less evident in increased anti-elite language.

Firstly, consider changes in the raw number of references made for each category. *For all parties in terms of raw numbers, H2a and H2b are confirmed: increases in*

references to the people, both overall and in terms of positive references, outweigh the increases in references to both British and EU political elites.

Difference in sums of total references in each category, 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010.				
Party	References to the people (Levels 1, 1.5 and 2 combined)	Explicitly positive references to the people (Levels 1, 1.5 and 2 combined)	Explicitly and implicitly negative references to British political elites (Levels 1 and 2 combined)	Explicitly and implicitly negative references to EU political elites (Levels 1 and 2 combined)
Conservatives	+222	+80	-8	+24
Labour	+47	+31	+16	+8
Liberal Democrats	+35	+10	+2	0

Raw numbers for the Liberal Democrats will be lower on average as there are only 6 speeches in each time period compared to 16 for Labour and the Conservatives.

However, findings differ if the percentage changes are considered, since there were unsurprisingly more references to the people overall.

Percentage changes in references in each category, 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010.				
Party	References to the people	Explicitly positive references to the people	Negative references to British political elites (explicitly negative; implicitly negative)	Negative references to EU political elites (explicitly negative; implicitly negative)
Conservatives	Level 1: +26% 1.5: +270% 2: +65%	Level 1: +30% 1.5: +329% 2: +130%	Level 1: +42%; -24% Level 2: -30%; -66%	Level 1: +317%; +833% Level 2: +163%; +385%
Labour	Level 1: -21% 1.5: +248% 2: +15%	Level 1: +13% 1.5: +248% 2: +9%	Level 1: +27%; +46% Level 2: +79%; +40%	Level 1: +~%; 0% Level 2: 0%; +417%
Liberal Democrats	Level 1: +17% 1.5: +355% 2: +20%	Level 1: -48% 1.5: +782% 2: +33%	Level 1: +1270%; +194% Level 2: -55%; -80%	Level 1: 0%; 0% Level 2: 0%; 0%

While increases in a) reference to, and b) praising of, the people, were greater in raw numbers terms than increases in negative elite references, in percentage changes, negative reference to political elites actually increased more in some cases. This is particularly the case for EU political elite references for the Conservatives, and for British political elite references for Labour and the Liberal Democrats. *While H2a and H2b are confirmed in raw numbers terms, they are not in percentage change terms, and in general there was greater adoption of anti-political elite references by mainstream parties than was expected.*

Hypothesis 3

H3 stated that greater increases were expected in anti- EU political elite compared to anti- British political elite references. *This is clearly not the case for Liberal Democrat speeches:* here there were no negative EU political elite references in either time period, and significant increases in negative British political elite references. *H3 is not confirmed for Labour either in terms of raw numbers of references,* although again, the EU elite reference percentage increases are greater due to almost none occurring in 2009/2010 speeches.

H3 is only confirmed for the Conservative case: in raw numbers and percentages, anti- EU political elite references increased more.

Expectations that criticism of EU political elites would be more appealing to mainstream parties than criticism of British political elites are not supported by the evidence here for both Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Negative references to British politicians and the British political system seem to be adopted by British politicians themselves to a greater extent than expected.

CONCLUSION

Evidence from analysis of party conference speeches for the three mainstream parties in 2009/2010 and 2014/2015 supports H1: mainstream parties adopted more populist language in the latter period. This conclusion is made only hesitantly, since many of these findings are not statistically significant at the level of 95%. However, it was anticipated that achieving such statistical significance might be unlikely, given the small sample sizes and large variances in length of speeches within each sample group. The sample groups were the largest possible given the speeches available and concerns over the comparability of topics. In many cases the increases in populist references are substantively significant. Therefore, analysis will proceed to the second stage, finding support for a causal link between the increased electoral success of UKIP and increased use of populist language by mainstream parties, while acknowledging that the evidence for the outcome is not conclusive.

PART 2 METHODOLOGY

DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENCES DESIGN

The structure of Part 2's analysis aims to build on Part 1's purely descriptive conclusions. Here evidence to support a *causal* argument about these populist language changes is sought, namely can any changes in mainstream party language be attributed to the electoral success of UKIP between 2010 and 2015?

A difference in differences⁸⁴ design is employed to compare changes in levels of populist language for two distinct groups of UK constituencies: those in which UKIP was a bigger electoral threat running up to the 2015 election ('high threat group') and those in which the threat was small ('low threat group'). If the electoral threat of UKIP were the cause of any changes in levels of populist language among mainstream parties, one would expect to see greater change in the high threat group compared to the low threat group.

The dependent variable is the level of populist language used by mainstream political parties; the independent variable is the electoral success of UKIP running up to the 2015 general elections, particularly their win in the 2014 European elections. The two sample groups differ in their values on the independent variable: the 'high threat group' of constituencies are 'treated' with the independent variable (UKIP's electoral success); the 'low threat group' are the untreated or 'control' group. How these constituency groups were created will be explained shortly.

The difference in differences eliminates many potential confounding variables from the analysis. The two sample groups are compared over time with themselves. There is little concern that factors such as constituency location or demographics interfere with the result, under the reasonable assumption that these factors do not change for a specific constituency between the 2010 and 2015 time periods. A five-year period is reasonably small for there to be any serious changes in factors such as the wealth of constituencies, or their demographic make-up.

The crucial assumption required for the difference-in-differences design to yield valid estimates is a parallel-time trend: in the absence of treatment, the dependent variable would follow a parallel trend in each of the sample groups⁸⁵. In other words, in the absence of UKIP's electoral success between 2010 and 2015, the 'high threat' and 'low threat' groups of constituencies would have followed the same pattern in terms of the levels of populist language used by mainstream parties. This does not necessarily mean there would have been *no* change in levels of populist language without UKIP, but only that any changes would have been the *same* in both groups. The assumption ensures that the 'low threat group' of constituencies can be treated as a counterfactual for the 'high threat group.' Any change experienced in the high

⁸⁴ Kosuke Imai, *Quantitative Social Science: An Introduction*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017) (p.61)

⁸⁵ Imai, p.61

threat group that is not also experienced in the low threat group could be attributed to the independent variable, UKIP's electoral success and threat.

The best way to check the validity of the parallel-time trend assumption would be to test whether levels of populist language used by mainstream parties (the dependent variable) ran parallel to each other in the two sample groups *before* the 2010-2015 period of interest⁸⁶. However, this is not possible: the data source for election leaflets did not begin until 2009. Instead, factors which might endanger the assumption have been addressed in sampling for the high and low threat groups.

Firstly, Scottish constituencies were excluded as potential constituencies. The Scottish referendum in 2014 concerned matters of devolution and democracy. The referendum campaign may have led to increased levels of populist language in Scottish constituencies: more calls for returning power to the (Scottish) people, and criticism of the current British political system or elites. If so, a parallel time trend between Scottish and other UK constituencies would be unlikely. Secondly, Dagenham and Rainham appeared in the initial high threat group of constituencies, but was excluded due to the reasonably strong presence of the BNP there in the 2010 general election. Electoral success or threat of another populist party besides UKIP might interfere with the parallel time trend: if the BNP were a threat in 2010, populist language among mainstream parties may have been higher then anyway. Levels of populist language may not have changed in the same way as in other places. Furthermore, the design of this analysis is based on the 'treatment' of successful use of populist language coming *after* 2010. Finally, sample *groups* should help mitigate any other factors endangering the parallel time trend assumption. Even if a few constituencies do not fit with the assumption, the average trend of the two groups should be parallel. Given that the parallel time trend assumption cannot conclusively be proved, any conclusions about a potential causal effect will be appropriately hesitant here.

CHOICE OF TEXTS

Texts chosen are election leaflets received by members of the public during the 2010 and 2015 general election campaigns. These are sourced from a website, electionleaflets.org, which invites members of the public to upload photographs of election leaflets they receive through their doors. Leaflets are organized by political party and constituency. Electionleaflets.org describe themselves as 'an online archive of political leaflets,' engaging in 'people-powered election monitoring'⁸⁷. The website began in April 2009, run by a group of volunteers. It is currently supported by 'Unlock Democracy,' a campaign for democracy, rights and freedoms, and 'Democracy Club.' The website is not affiliated with any political party.

The website provides a valuable source of data on political party language at the constituency level; finding such textual data at the constituency level is 'notoriously

⁸⁶ Imai, p.63

⁸⁷ Electionleaflets.org, <https://electionleaflets.org/> [accessed 12 March 2019]

difficult⁸⁸ online, and the use of archives was not possible because the time period 2010-2015 is very recent.

There are potential problems with constituency leaflets. The public nature of the website means that anyone can upload a leaflet. It would be possible for individuals to upload 'fake' leaflets – leaflets that they have deliberately altered, or entirely made up. Similarly, while the website requires individuals to state which constituency they belong to, it would be possible for individuals to lie: leaflets which were not actually delivered in a given constituency may appear in that constituency grouping nonetheless. While these are both possibilities, neither is likely to be a serious problem. The website has a page for people to report problems with specific leaflets, 'report[ing] abuse' such as images uploaded that are not in fact leaflets, or 'maliciously altering the text of a leaflet'⁸⁹. Uploads are monitored, and fake leaflets are unlikely to go unchallenged. Election leaflets uploaded under the wrong constituency are also unlikely to go unnoticed; by their very nature such leaflets refer in detail to their particular area and candidates. Malicious lying about the constituency origin of a leaflet seems unlikely anyway, leaving only human error as a concern. In this analysis of over 600 leaflets, just one was suspected to have been altered or fake. None appeared to be uploaded under the wrong constituency.

SAMPLING

Sample groups were necessary due to data constraints: no constituencies had enough leaflets for all three mainstream parties in the 2010 and 2015 elections to make a meaningful comparison. Pooling leaflets from a number of constituencies for each group increased the sample size and made numbers of leaflets for different parties more even.

Two measurements of the independent variable were used to sample the constituency groups: the UKIP results for the 2014 European elections⁹⁰, and UKIP results from constituency-level polls between November 2013 and the 2015 general election⁹¹. Most polls were carried out by Ashcroft, a few by Survation. UKIP's win in the European elections was a key moment: the first time in 'modern history'⁹² that Labour or the Conservatives have not come first in a national election. Polling results

⁸⁸ Bodleian Social Science Librarian and Subject Consultant, email reply to query about finding texts, 21 February 2018.

⁸⁹ <https://electionleaflets.org/report/12108/> [accessed 12 March 2019]

⁹⁰ House of Commons Report on European Parliament Elections, 2014, available here: <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP14-32> [accessed 12 March 2019]

⁹¹ Polls summarized here, with links to polling documents: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_in_United_Kingdom_constituencies,_2010-15 [accessed 12 March 2019]

⁹² Patrick Wintour, and Nicholas Watt, 'UKIP wins European elections with ease to set off political earthquake,' *The Guardian*, 26 May 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/26/ukip-european-elections-political-earthquake> [accessed 12 March 2019]

are used because they reflect the strength of support for UKIP compared to mainstream parties, and indicate how big a threat UKIP might be to them in the next election. Polls were not carried out in every constituency, and they occurred at different time points, so the measurement of UKIP threat here is imperfect. Where multiple polls were available for the same constituency, the poll done at the latest date in 2014 was chosen, or at the earliest date in 2015. The level of UKIP electoral success or support varies considerably between constituencies based on the polling data, which means sufficiently different high and low threat groups can be created even if not all constituencies are considered.

The European election results and polling data were compiled onto a single spreadsheet, by constituency. Since the European elections take place using different electoral boundaries, the election result had to be copied across from the European electoral region, via the Local Authority District, to the Parliamentary Constituency, to be lined up with the polling results. This was done by hand using comparison tables from the Office for National Statistics⁹³. This could have been done more scientifically: local authority districts and parliamentary constituencies do not line up exactly. However, the process was performed consistently, and was the most appropriate given constraints of time and expertise.

High threat group constituencies were selected by compiling 2 lists, repeats removed: the top 20 constituencies for high UKIP support in 2014 European elections, and in 2014/15 polls. A similar process selected the low threat group. Some constituencies were then removed to ensure that the high and low threat groups differed considerably in levels of UKIP success on *both* measures.

Leaflets for each of the selected constituencies were explored and downloaded from electionleaflets.org. A number of the selected constituencies were then removed for having either no available leaflets, or too many of them: 5 had none, and 9 had over 100. This was to prevent any one constituency's leaflets representing too large a proportion of the overall sample and potentially biasing the results. Dagenham and Rainham was also excluded, as already discussed. The final high threat and low threat groups contain 26 and 22 constituencies respectively (Appendix D).

For each sample constituency, every leaflet available for the 2010 and 2015 general election periods was analyzed. The general election period is defined as the 1st January of the election year until the day of the general election (6th May for 2010; 7th May for 2015). No leaflets with an upload date after the general election date were included. No repeats were permitted within a single constituency, and any leaflet whose uploaded picture was too small or blurred to read was excluded. Any leaflets not sent by the local political party were also excluded, since they are not the words of the party itself. This process yielded 189 leaflets in the high threat group (74 from

⁹³ Office for National Statistics, table aligning Parliamentary Constituencies with Local Authority Districts:
<https://ons.maps.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=c3d24dd629a64233af0658a054526bc1#data> [accessed 12 March 2019]

2010 and 115 from 2015), and 438 leaflets in the low threat group (221 from 2010 and 217 from 2015), a total of 627 leaflets.

The sample groups differ markedly in size: there are over twice the number of leaflets in the low threat group, even though it contains 4 fewer constituencies. Such a large difference raises suspicions about possible other factors affecting the number of leaflets uploaded in a given constituency which might introduce bias. An obvious factor would be the level of political engagement of voters, those more politically engaged being more likely to upload leaflets. They are more likely to believe in the importance of monitoring elections and increasing transparency and voter knowledge. This would suggest that voters in constituencies in the high threat group are less politically engaged than those in the low threat group – which might make populist appeals by mainstream parties more likely in these areas regardless of the level of success/threat of UKIP. That said, the differences in sample sizes occur in both the 2010 and 2015 periods, suggesting that this effect is to an extent held constant over the time period. If so, then the difference in differences design should eliminate any confounding effect of voter political engagement. In another sense, these varying sample sizes confirm the sampling of areas facing high and low UKIP threat: it is arguable that UKIP gained more support from those who were less engaged and content with UK politics.

In order to mitigate effects of the considerable variation in sample sizes, analysis was repeated with a random sample of leaflets from each threat group and time period, in addition to the analysis using all available leaflets.

A DIFFERENT STYLE OF QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

The coding frame used in Part 2 differs from Part 1. This is for a combination of theoretical and practical reasons. Practically, there are constraints with regard to leaflets as a data source. They are uploaded as photographs, meaning it is not possible to extract the text of a leaflet except by manually typing it out: this would have been time-consuming and fewer leaflets could have been considered. Length, format and content of leaflets also varies, as does the amount of text. Party conference speeches are more standard and predictable than election leaflets. The complex coding frame used for Part 1 was thus impractical, and the coding unit of the sentence used for some of the Measures would not make sense – even deciding what constituted a sentence would be difficult with some leaflets. Theoretically, an election leaflet is designed to get a message across to a voter quickly: text and pictures aim to attract attention, and the average voter probably doesn't spend long looking at it, and may not read all the text. Therefore, a style of coding and analysis that reflected this is preferable to an in-depth analysis of individual sentences: a judgement that is more face-value and speedy, taking account of the impression made by the leaflet at a relatively swift glance.

DEVELOPMENT OF CODING FRAME

As such, the coding frame used for Part 2 is simpler than the seven Measures involved in Part 1. Here a single Measure is used, a numerical scale ranging from 0 to 4 which captures the level of populist language present in a leaflet. In addition, there is a distinction made about which type of political elites are mentioned, British or EU, captured in an alphabetical score attached to the numerical score. Coding and context units are both the election leaflet: each leaflet is given a single score.

PART 2 CODING FRAME SUMMARY
Numerical score and <i>Full Score</i> coded for each leaflet: 0 – No populist framing
1 – Meaningful reference to the people only.
2 – Meaningful reference to political elites only. 2a – British political elites 2b – EU political elites 2c – both British and EU political elites
3 – Meaningful reference to both the people and political elites . 3a – the people and British political elites 3b – the people and EU political elites 3c – the people, and both British and EU political elites
4 – Strong and directly antagonistic reference to both the people and political elites . 4a – the people and British political elites 4b – the people and EU political elites 4c – the people, and both British and EU political elites

This coding frame captures only the most explicitly populist language. ‘Meaningful’ here includes only references which would have been coded at the highest levels in Part 1 (Level 1 for the people, and Levels 1 and 2 for British and EU political elites). Only positive references to the people and negative references to political elites are included. The aim is for a simpler judgement and to avoid the need for multiple measures.

The numerical scale makes a value judgement that negative references to political elites are ‘more populist’ than positive references to the people: where just one of these is present, reference to the people scores a 1 and reference to elites a 2. This is contestable: one could argue that ‘the people’ are really the central aspect of populism. However, the definition of populism used here focuses on the antagonism created between the people and the elites, so both groups are important. Reference to elites was made ‘more’ important in the numerical scale because it is arguably the element of populism less likely to be adopted by mainstream parties. Reference to

and exultation of the people are techniques that all politicians and parties use to some extent. It is the negative reference to elites, and then this combined with references to the people, that distinguish populist parties or populist language from the mainstream (see comparison of Farage's 2013 party conference speech with average Labour and Conservative party conference speeches for the purpose of testing validity in Part 1 above).

The numerical score makes it possible to work out the average level of populist language as a single number for different constituency groups and across the time periods. A basic numerical scale was desirable to make a difference in differences estimate simple. The full score allows further insight into which type of elites are targeted in anti-elite language, helping to shed light on H3: whether anti-*EU* political elite language is adopted more readily than anti-*British* political elite language by mainstream parties.

RELIABILITY

Tests of inter- and intra- reliability were carried out. For the inter-reliability test, leaflets from 10 constituencies were coded by a second coder, and results compared. This was preceded by an explanation of the coding frame and aims, and some practice coding together. The second coder was involved in discussions about the coding frame for Part 1 too, and in its testing and redrafting, so had knowledge of the project that might be important for replication.

Simple agreement and Cohen's Kappa coefficient were both calculated by hand, since NVivo was not used for the coding. The simple agreement percentage is 81.4%, and Cohen's Kappa coefficient is 0.73. While 81.4% is below the 90% target set for Part 1, the simple percentage agreement is particularly harsh on measures of numerical scale, with no consideration as to how 'close' a disagreement came to being an agreement⁹⁴ – for example, a disagreement of 0 for coder A and 4a for coder B would be counted just the same as a disagreement of 4a for coder A and 3a for coder B. Nearly all the cases of disagreement between the two coders here were of the latter kind, where judgements differed by 1. In addition, the Kappa coefficient suggests fair to high agreement beyond chance. One can therefore be confident that the coding frame would produce consistent results on replication.

Secondly, an intra-reliability test was performed on leaflets from 10 constituencies. The leaflets were coded twice, with a three-week gap between the coding sessions. Here the simple agreement percentage was 90.12%, and the Kappa coefficient was 0.85, indicating excellent agreement beyond chance.

VALIDITY

As in Part 1, the validity of the coding frame can be tested by comparing scores achieved by leaflets produced by UKIP compared with those of mainstream political

⁹⁴ Neuendorf, p.149

parties. If the coding frame successfully captures varying levels of populist language, one would expect UKIP's average populism score to be much higher than the average scores for the mainstream parties. This is indeed the case.

PART 2 VALIDITY TEST		
Average populism scores, taking all leaflets coded in both low and high UKIP threat groups (Scale of 0-4)		
Party	2010	2015
UKIP	2.48	1.49
Conservatives	0.99	0.63
Labour	0.47	0.33
Liberal Democrats	1.11	0.38

PART 2 RESULTS

First, consider changes in levels of populist language between the 2010 and 2015 groups, with high and low threat samples combined and undifferentiated: how did levels of populist language change overall for each party?

LOCAL LEAFLETS RESULTS – HIGH AND LOW THREAT SAMPLES UNDIFFERENTIATED			
	Populism score of the average leaflet (Numerical scale 0-4)		
	2010	2015	Difference in means
ALL LEAFLETS			
Conservatives	0.99	0.63	-0.36**
Labour	0.47	0.33	-0.14
Liberal Democrats	1.11	0.38	-0.73***
RANDOM SAMPLE			
Conservatives	1.21	0.63	-0.58*
Labour	0.63	0.58	-0.05
Liberal Democrats	1.08	0.46	-0.62*

9.1: Examining all leaflets collected for each party from both groups, the difference in means is negative for all parties. The difference is smallest for Labour, and Labour's populism score is also considerably lower than the Conservative score, in both periods. The Liberal Democrat leaflets saw the largest decline in the average populism score: the difference in means is statistically significant at the 99% level. The random samples selected for each party and time period confirm these patterns: again, all the mainstream parties have negative difference in means.

This, contrary to expectations, suggests that the average populism score of an election leaflet for all parties was lower in 2015 than in 2010, the opposite result to that predicted by H1. It also contrasts with results from the analysis of party conference speeches in Part 1, where levels of populist language and rhetoric did increase in 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010.

These apparently contradictory results might be explained by a stronger and more sustained impact of the MPs' parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 at the local level compared to the national level. In leaflets coded, there was frequent reference to the expenses scandal in 2010 leaflets; a particularly common comment was something to the effect of "I am not a career politician." This in the majority of cases was coded as a negative reference to British political elites: since criticism of other existing corrupt and self-interested politicians was made explicit or implied. Prevalent concern with the expenses scandal was not so evident at the national level. This

difference should perhaps be expected: individual politicians and MPs received criticism from 2009, so it is understandable if they and other prospective candidates were concerned to stress their opinions and actions in relation to the expenses scandal, perhaps more so than leaders in speeches at the national level. While the expenses scandal would likely be discussed in the party leaders' conference speeches in 2010, it is less likely to be mentioned in a speech about policy areas, even if the overall tone of language is affected. This may explain why there is an unexpected negative change in populist language levels found here, despite the positive change found in the party conference speeches at the national level.

In addition, the coding frame for local leaflets focuses only on the more explicit cases of populist language, whereas the coding frame in Part 1 is designed to capture more subtle changes as well. It may therefore be that increases in more subtle forms of populist language are being missed here, even if more explicit cases are indeed reducing.

DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES

The difference in differences design will remove any influence of the parliamentary expenses scandal in terms of the examination of a causal effect of UKIP; both the high and low threat sample groups should be equally affected by it, leaving the difference in differences result free from its effects. Is there any evidence that could support an argument for a causal effect of UKIP's electoral success on any mainstream party changes in levels of populist language? Even if average levels of populism reduce in the cross-time comparison, a potential causal effect of the success/threat of UKIP could be found if such reductions were smaller in the high UKIP threat group. Changes in average populism scores must be compared, now differentiating between the high and low UKIP threat samples.

LOCAL LEAFLETS – HIGH AND LOW THREAT SAMPLES DIFFERENTIATED							
	Populism score of the average leaflet (Numerical scale 0-4)						
	High threat sample			Low threat sample			Difference in differences
	2010	2015	Difference in means	2010	2015	Difference in means	
ALL LEAFLETS							
Conservatives	1.23	0.7	-0.53*	0.89	0.59	-0.3	-0.23
Labour	0.69	0.64	-0.05	0.4	0.25	-0.15	0.1
Liberal Democrats	0.85	0.41	-0.44	1.15	0.36	-0.79***	0.35
RANDOM SAMPLE							
Conservatives	1.08	0.92	-0.16	1.33	0.33	-1**	0.84
Labour	1	0.75	-0.25	0.25	0.42	0.17	-0.42
Liberal Democrats	0.67	0.58	-0.09	1.5	0.33	-0.17**	0.08

9.2: Considering all leaflets coded and separating high and low threat groups, the difference in means scores for all parties are once again negative: in both high and low threat samples of leaflets, and for each mainstream party, the average populism score reduced in 2015 compared to 2010. This finding fits with *Finding 9.1* for the full sample with high and low threat groups undifferentiated.

In terms of difference in differences scores, there are mixed results:

9.3: For Conservative party leaflets, the difference in differences is negative. The reduction in the average populism score seen in the high threat group was 0.23 points larger than the reduction in the low threat group.

This is the opposite to what would be expected if populist language was being increased in response to the threat of UKIP, and suggests that populist language may be reduced more where UKIP presents more of a threat.

9.4: In contrast, Labour and Liberal Democrat leaflets have difference in differences scores that are positive: the reduction in the average populism score of a leaflet was smaller in the high threat group than in the low threat group. The difference in differences for the Liberal Democrats was the largest (0.35), a reasonable number given the numerical scale only runs from 0 to 4. The Labour differences in differences, though positive, is small (0.1) and therefore not substantively significant.

Finding 9.4 would fit with the causal element of H1: while populist language did reduce in both groups on average (a result that is likely explained at least in part by the effects of the parliamentary expenses scandal on the 2010 sample), it reduced less in groups where UKIP was a higher threat.

The difference in differences comparison is repeated using the random samples of leaflets for each party, threat group and time period.

9.5: The Liberal Democrat difference in differences score is still positive, though smaller: the reduction in average populism scores was only 0.08 points smaller in the high threat group compared to the low threat group.

9.6: In the Conservative and Labour cases, though, the direction of the effects changes in the random sample group compared to the results using all available leaflets. For Conservative leaflets, the difference in differences is positive where it was negative, and for Labour it is negative where it was positive.

These variations between the random sample and full leaflet sample results makes it difficult to conclude that there is support for a causal effect of UKIP electoral success/threat level on populist language for the Labour and Conservative parties. In the Liberal Democrat case, the reinforcing results provides some evidence that could support a causal link: populist language seems to have been reduced less in areas where UKIP was a higher threat.

FULL SCORE COMPARISONS

Examination of changes in the percentages of election leaflets coded at each specific value of the numerical scale also yields some interesting insights. Use of the full score means reference to British and EU political elites can be distinguished.

LOCAL LEAFLETS RESULTS – FULL SCORE COMPARISON									
Percentage of total leaflets in each sample coded at each level of populism									
	Conservatives			Labour			Liberal Democrats		
Full Score	High Threat % change 2010-2015	Low Threat % change 2010-2015	Diff. in % changes	High Threat % change 2010-2015	Low Threat % change 2010-2015	Diff. in % changes	High Threat % change 2010-2015	Low Threat % change 2010-2015	Diff. in % changes
0	35.75	11.15	24.6	14.34	3.26	11.08	20.81	31.35	-10.54
1	-1.96	8.82	-10.78	-20.98	7.24	-28.22	-7.69	-1.41	-6.28
2a (British elites)	-40.91	-21.46	-19.45	9.09	-9.29	18.38	-3.62	-15.85	12.23
2b (EU elites)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2c (Both)	-4.55	0	-4.55	0	0	0	0	0	0
3a (British elites)	3.56	1.59	1.97	-6.99	-1.2	-5.79	-9.5	-9.86	0.36
3b (EU elites)	2.7	0	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
3c (Both)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4a (British elites)	5.41	-0.1	5.51	4.55	0	4.55	0	-4.23	4.23
4b (EU elites)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4c (Both)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

A number of findings are contrary to the expectations of H1:

9.7: For all three parties, the percentage of election leaflets containing no populist references increased, in both high and low threat groups. In the Conservative and Labour cases, the increase was larger in the high threat group.

9.8: For both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, no leaflet contained anti-EU political elite references, either before or after UKIP became electorally successful (and so 0 percentage changes in the table above). This challenges H1's anticipation of increased anti-elite language, but fits with findings of Part 1 for the Liberal Democrats, where no negative references to EU political elites were found.

9.9: The percentage of leaflets coded at '2a' (negative reference to British political elites but no positive reference to the people) reduced for both Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, in both the high and low threat groups. For Conservative leaflets, the reduction was larger in the high threat group.

However, a few findings do lend support to H1:

9.10: Labour and the Conservatives saw increases in the percentage of leaflets coded at the highest populist level ('4a') in the high UKIP threat group, but *not* in the low threat group. The Liberal Democrats saw a reduction in the percentage of such leaflets in the low threat group, but *not* in the high threat group. The difference in percentage changes between high and low threat groups is thus positive and quite substantively significant, at around 4-5%, for all three parties.

9.11: For Labour, the increase in leaflets containing negative reference to British political elites ('2a') in 2015 was 18.38% higher in Labour leaflets in the high threat group compared to the low threat group.

There is therefore some evidence to support a potential causal effect of UKIP's electoral success/threat on levels of mainstream party usage of populist language, despite an increase in the percentage of leaflets containing no populist language whatsoever for all parties. *Finding 9.10* particularly suggests that there was greater increase in the most explicitly populist leaflets in areas where UKIP was a high threat, evidence for a language change in response to the that threat. However, for Labour and the Liberal Democrats at least, this increased populist language targets only British political elites, not EU ones.

CONCLUSION

Findings from the difference in differences test contradict those findings from Part 1 in terms of mainstream party use of populist language: here there is *less* populist language in mainstream party leaflets in 2015 compared to 2010. As already discussed, such a finding could be explained by a greater impact of the MP's expenses scandal at the local level compared to the national level in 2010, and the use of a coding frame which captures only more explicit cases of populist language.

Despite the overall decline in levels of populist language, there is limited support for a causal effect of UKIP's electoral success/threat on populist language choices for the Liberal Democrats. Here populist language reduced less in areas where UKIP was a high threat compared to low threat areas. For Labour and the Conservatives, however, this causal effect is not clear.

Finally, the full score comparisons provide some evidence to support H1, since the percentage of leaflets coded at the most extreme levels of populist language did increase by 2015, to a greater extent in areas where UKIP was a high threat. However, for the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, this populist language only included anti-elite language aimed at British political elites, not EU political elites.

PART 3

Part 3 of this project is a second approach to providing evidence for the *causal* element of the research question, and an explanation for the increases in populist language found in Part 1. Process tracing is the method of choice: the causal process which might link the increased electoral success of UKIP (independent variable) to increased levels of populist language (dependent variable) will be explored by laying out a proposed causal chain. Evidence from interviews, articles and other texts will be used to test the existence of each step in the causal chain. Two alternative explanations for the dependent variable will also be considered.

ELITE INTERVIEWS

Elite interviews are the primary source of evidence for Part 3. The time period of interest is recent, meaning little can be obtained from archives, and much party or government information is still confidential. Elite interviews can elicit more detailed information about feelings and motivations of key players, and capture informal discussions which might not have been officially reported. The recent memories of interviewees should be strong, so the key reliability consideration is the extent to which they tell the truth. The negative connotations many voters hold with regard to UKIP may be a deterrent to showing similarity in language or strategy, and politicians shy away from admitting a sense of threat or weakness.

Purposive sampling was applied in the selection of prospective interviewees: some voices are more valuable for the language-choice focus of the research question. Sampling was performed in three groups. Firstly, key figures involved in drafting the mainstream party manifestos in preparation for the 2015 general election. Secondly, speechwriters, special advisers and policy unit members - individuals likely to be involved at the highest levels of the parties and thus exposed to the feelings, thought processes and decisions of key figures. Speechwriters are particularly relevant, responsible for implementing any changes in strategy over use of language. Thirdly, MPs in areas where UKIP was a relatively higher threat, and thus most likely to be party to discussions about sense of threat and the need for response. In addition, a few referrals were pursued, including one political action group formed to combat the rise of 'politics of hate' (Hope Not Hate).

Interviews were requested by email, with the options of both face-to-face and telephone interviews. Ethics approval was obtained for the research (displayed in Appendix G).

Details of the responses and the interviews conducted are displayed in Appendix H. In total, 33 interviews were sought (31 from the sample frame, and 2 referrals). Seven responses were received, and 4 interviews successfully conducted, two by telephone and two in person in Westminster. This amounts to a response rate of 21% (automatic replies excluded), and a successful interview rate of just 12%. These figures are disappointingly low, but reflect another common problem with elite

interviews as a method: politicians and public figures are busy and arranging meetings with them is difficult.

The successfully conducted interviews, however, were highly informative. They were semi-structured (Appendix L), with three sections of questions designed to provide evidence for Steps 2, 3 and 4 of the causal chain below. Interviews lasted 20-30 minutes and were audio recorded. Evidence gained was undoubtedly strongest for the Liberal Democrats, from two interviews with senior figures within the party at the time: Stephen Lotinga was Director of Communications while in Coalition and during the 2015 general election campaign, and Tim Farron MP was President of the party until 2015, when he became Party Leader. Their responses could be compared and contrasted, along with valuable insights from David Laws' political account *Coalition*⁹⁵. Interview evidence for the Conservative party was weakest, with only one interview with an MP (Sir Roger Gale), albeit in a constituency where UKIP was a high threat. There were a number of accounts by scholars that helped to fill gaps here. For Labour, the single interview conducted was with Jon Cruddas, MP for Dagenham and Rainham, who oversaw the policy review of the party and within the Shadow Cabinet, leading up to the publication of the manifesto in 2015. However, the absence of other voices means conclusions here can only be tentative.


ALTERNATIVE SOURCES

Anticipation of low interview response rates led to use of other forms of evidence, particularly political accounts and books written by key figures within the mainstream parties, and while not tailored to the research question they still give valuable insights. Similarly, some accounts written by scholars are based on interviews with key figures, so while secondary sources, these nevertheless provide valuable additional information. Newspaper articles from the 2010-2015 period were also used from a variety of different papers, of both left and right political leanings. These alternative sources were found using simple internet searches, and those deemed most likely to be relevant were examined (purposive sampling).

CAUSAL CHAIN

Below is the causal chain designed to show how increased electoral success of UKIP could have led to increased use of populist language by mainstream parties in party conference speeches in the 2010-2015 period. It attempts to illuminate the *causal* element of H1:

⁹⁵ David Laws, *Coalition: the inside story of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government*, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2017)



ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Before presenting evidence to support each link of the causal chain, there are some alternative explanations to consider for increased levels of populist language in mainstream party texts, and the most plausible or important alternative will be addressed for each mainstream party.

Liberal Democrats

AE1: The Liberal Democrats used increased levels of populist language in 2015 compared to 2010 due to concerns about being viewed as part of the establishment, following their new position in government as part of the Coalition.

While a mainstream party (as justified by Meguid⁹⁶), the Liberal Democrats have arguably held a position as more of an ‘outsider’ party, less part of the establishment than Labour or the Conservatives. Entry into government for the first time in many years could have led to a concern about losing this ‘outsider’ identity and appeal, and increased populist, anti-elite language as an attempt to counter this.

Expected evidence for AE1 would be discussion of the Liberal Democrat position as a coalition partner, its effect on the party’s appeal or identity, and consequent need to maintain an ‘outsider’ position or focus and an adequate distance from the Conservatives. Finding support for H1 which rules out AE1 would occur mostly at Steps 2 and 4 in the causal chain. A sense of threat and a populist language response to it is expected for both; support for H1 requires that the threat identified and responded to is *UKIP specifically*, rather than their government position. Reference to UKIP by name in relation to threat and language response is crucial.

Conservatives

AE2: The Conservative Party used increased levels of populist language in 2015 compared to 2010 due to concerns about loss of votes and members over the reawakening of the issue of Europe.

AE2 is closely linked to H1 but importantly different. The Conservative increase in populist language was a response to the return of Britain’s relationship with Europe to the centre of political debate. An issue that has divided the Conservative party for many years, this created a concern about losing votes and party members to other parties, notably UKIP, and resulted in an attempt to appeal to potential defectors

⁹⁶ Meguid, p.347

through increased use of populist language, as used by UKIP. Here the increase in populist language is related to UKIP: they were largely the reason for the reawakening of the issue of Europe, and represented the key party for defection concerns. However, the motivation for the adoption of populist language by the Conservatives is not so much a recognition that UKIP were a *populist threat*, but rather a threat because of their stance on Europe. This differs from H1 because there the successful use of populist language is the trigger for the copying response, not the threat of the challenger party in another area.

A 'Europe threat' and a 'populist threat' of UKIP may be difficult to distinguish. In both cases, discussion of and concern over UKIP is expected, in terms of threat felt and responses considered. Step 3 in the causal chain will be crucial in the attempt to distinguish the two explanations: was UKIP identified as a *populist threat*, or as some other kind of threat? The *relative* importance of the types of threat presented by UKIP is key – it is unlikely that UKIP's populist language won't be considered a factor in their success, but how important is this relative to their stance on Europe?

Labour

AE3: The Labour party used increased levels of populist language in 2015 compared to 2010 due to a feeling of distance over the New Labour project, and a loss of connection with and support from the traditional voter base.

Labour's loss of power in 2010, and the end of the New Labour project with economic crisis and the parliamentary expenses scandal, may have led the party to feel they had lost the trust of voters. After a focus on the middle classes by New Labour, they may have felt disconnected from their traditional voters from the working class. An attempt to reconnect with the people and to criticize/distance themselves from the ruling elites or establishment could mean the adoption of more populist language.

If AE3 is correct, one would expect discussion within the Labour party about their voter base, and perhaps reflections on the connection of the party with ordinary people. Less discussion of UKIP is expected, with more focus on the positions and failings of Labour themselves. UKIP may be considered a threat by Labour (Step 2), but there should be evidence of UKIP's success being viewed as a symptom of a *deeper problem* for which Labour's increased populist language is the outcome: loss of connection with the people, and the crisis of New Labour. This evidence is considered at Step 3 of the H1 causal chain; its absence would provide support for H1.

Evidence for each step of the causal chain is considered with these alternative explanations in mind. There is no presentation of evidence for Step 5, the outcome, as this was presented in Part 1 of the project. Unless otherwise stated, references to Lotinga, Farron, Cruddas and Gale refer to comments made in interviews performed for this thesis.

Step 1: UKIP Electoral Success by 2014

The first step in the causal chain is the independent variable, the electoral success of UKIP in the period 2010 to 2015, most obviously in the 2014 European elections. There is sufficient evidence to support this statement of electoral success, and to show that this was success on a scale not before seen for a populist challenger party.

The 2014 European election result is clear: UKIP came first, winning 26.77% of the vote and 24 seats. Labour came 2nd (24.74%), the Conservatives 3rd (23.31%), and the Liberal Democrats 5th (6.69%). Support for UKIP increased considerably compared to the 2009 European election, where they won 16.09% of the vote.⁹⁷

Reporting in UK newspapers provides evidence that the UKIP win was considered an electoral success by most. The *Independent* described the win as a ‘stunning victory’,⁹⁸ and a *Guardian* headline on 26th May read ‘UKIP wins European elections with ease to set off political earthquake’⁹⁹. This was the first British national election ‘in modern history’ where neither Labour nor the Conservatives won, and the *Guardian* argued all three mainstream parties would acknowledge that this was a ‘powerful symbolic moment.’¹⁰⁰ According to the *Independent*, this ‘last nationwide test of public opinion’ before the 2015 general election confirmed that ‘the country has entered an era of “four-party politics”.’¹⁰¹

There is also evidence of increasing UKIP electoral success preceding the 2014 European elections – importantly, beginning *after* the 2010 general election. Ford and Goodwin comment that from 2011 on, UKIP gained serious momentum.¹⁰² In the Eastleigh and South Shields by-elections (early 2013), UKIP came 2nd, with 27.8% and 24.2% of the vote respectively. In Eastleigh, they finished only 4% behind the Liberal Democrat winners.¹⁰³ Compare this to their performance in the first 10 years of their existence, from 1993, where they put themselves forward at 25 parliamentary by-elections and averaged just 1.7% of the vote.¹⁰⁴ UKIP also saw large increases in support in the 2013 local elections, winning 22% of the vote and 147 seats, an increase of 139 seats.¹⁰⁵ Finally, UKIP achieved two by-election victories in Clacton and Rochester and Strood in 2014, following Conservative Party defections. There is

⁹⁷ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-2014.html> [accessed 1 March 2019]

⁹⁸ Andrew Grice, and Nigel Morris, ‘European Elections results 2014: Farage and UKIP top poll as Europe swings to the right,’ *The Independent*, 26 May 2014
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/european-elections-results-2014-sweeping-gains-for-nigel-farages-ukip-deal-further-body-blow-to-main-9434042.html>

⁹⁹ Wintour and Watt, *The Guardian*

¹⁰⁰ Wintour and Watt, *The Guardian*

¹⁰¹ Grice and Morris, *The Independent*

¹⁰² Robert Ford, and Matthew Goodwin, *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain*, (London: Routledge, 2014) (p.3)

¹⁰³ Anthony Seldon, and Peter Snowdon, *Cameron at 10: the inside story, 2010-2015*, (London: William Collins, 2016) (pp.383-384)

¹⁰⁴ Ford and Goodwin, p.2

¹⁰⁵ Seldon and Snowdon, p.385

therefore sufficient evidence to support the claim that UKIP achieved far greater electoral success in the few years running up to the 2015 general election than the party, or any other populist party in the UK, had seen before (at its peak in 2010, the BNP won just 1.9% of the vote)¹⁰⁶.

Step 2: Mainstream Parties feel threatened by UKIP's increasing electoral success

The response of UK mainstream parties to UKIP's increased electoral success, it is suggested, is to feel threatened. Political parties seek the support of voters, and if a previously electorally inconsequential challenger party begins to gain more votes, mainstream parties inevitably lose out. Both of Harmel and Janda's¹⁰⁷ two types of shock likely to overcome parties' resistance to change are relevant here: UKIP became a new party of electoral consequence after 2010 (birth of relevant new party), and mainstream parties saw reduced electoral success as a result (changes in the proportion of votes and seats won by the party), as shown above.

Liberal Democrats

Step 2 is crucial for confirming H1 in light of the possibility of AE1: the effect of Coalition position. It must be shown that any sense of threat felt by the Liberal Democrats in this period *directly relates to UKIP*, rather than to other potential causes of reduced electoral success, such as their Coalition position. Two tests are presented here.

Firstly, a hoop test: did the Liberal Democrats feel threatened in the 2010-2015 period? Three pieces of evidence to support H1 here.

Firstly, responses of senior Liberal Democrat figures to the 2014 European election results suggest the party felt not just threatened but crushed. Such feelings were expressed both at the time in newspaper articles, and in hindsight, in books or interviews. David Laws, Minister of State in the Cabinet Office from September 2012, comments in *Coalition* that the 2014 European Elections were 'little short of catastrophic' for the Liberal Democrats, who lost all but one of their twelve MEP seats, and were left 'shell-shocked.'¹⁰⁸ In our interview, Stephen Lotinga, Director of Communications for the Liberal Democrats during their time in Coalition, said his party was 'wholeheartedly defeated' in 2014, which 'pretty much shocked people to their core.'¹⁰⁹ Similarly, in a *Telegraph* article published just after the election, Tim Farron, then President of the Liberal Democrats, commented the party had experienced 'shattering losses.'¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ BBC, 2010 General Election results: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/election2010/results/> [accessed 13 March 2019]

¹⁰⁷ 'An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change', p.267

¹⁰⁸ Laws, p.413

¹⁰⁹ Stephen Lotinga interview, 4 September 2018

¹¹⁰ James Kirkup, and Steven Swinford, 'UKIP storms European Elections,' *The Telegraph*, 25 May 2014 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10855972/Ukip-storms-European-elections.html> [accessed 13 March 2019]

Secondly, both Laws and Lotinga were clear that Nick Clegg considered resigning as party leader in response to the 2014 election: Lotinga commented he thinks it is 'public knowledge that Nick considered standing down... despite my best attempts to claim to everyone that he didn't.'

Thirdly, there is evidence of a sense of threat to the Liberal Democrats' position in UK politics – in Lotinga's words, to their 'placement on the political spectrum.' Both Lotinga and Tim Farron, in interviews conducted for this thesis, expressed a belief that UKIP presented a threat to the Liberal Democrats because it took their position as the main 'anti-establishment party'¹¹¹ in UK politics, the party of choice for those unhappy with the current political system. Farron comments: 'suddenly the Lib Dems were not none of the above, we were one of the above,' one of the established, ruling parties.

But this threat felt could have been a response to the Liberal Democrats' position in government just as much as to UKIP's electoral success. Farron's comment about the Liberal Democrats becoming 'one of the above' is intimately connected with the fact that, having entered government in 2010, they were more *at risk* of being viewed as part of the establishment or ruling class, providing some support for AE1. Farron also comments that UKIP 'had a significant impact on [the Liberal Democrats] in I guess underlining our decline,' suggesting UKIP exacerbated rather than *caused* the party's decline, for which the Coalition could instead have been a cause. The evidence above therefore allows passage of H1 through the hoop test but is not sufficient to rule out AE1.

A second test, a smoking gun test, asks whether the sense of threat is *directly related* to UKIP. This provides support for H1 sufficient to differentiate it from AE1. Lotinga clearly links the poor European Election results in 2014 to UKIP, commenting on Clegg's 'bruising encounter' with Farage in the pre-election TV debates. It is suggested the results were a shock particularly because the Liberal Democrats believed they had been the only party who stood up to UKIP, and were expecting an 'electoral reward'¹¹² for this. Instead, they appeared to be punished. Lotinga also refers later to 'the challenge that UKIP was successfully posing to mainstream politics.' In addition, it is clear from the European Election results that UKIP were the main beneficiaries as the Liberal Democrats declined, and in terms of the threat to the Liberal Democrats' position in UK politics, the party didn't just move positions, but were *replaced* by UKIP. Any threat felt due to the Liberal Democrats' new position in government was heightened by the fact that a new 'anti-establishment' party was becoming electorally successful, and providing a challenge for the 'anti-politics'¹¹³ vote. The two potential explanations for sense of threat are quite interconnected in this way: the direct threat of UKIP is a key factor in explaining why the new governing position of the party was a threat. There is therefore sufficient evidence to support Step 2 for the Liberal Democrats.

¹¹¹ Tim Farron interview, 12 November 2018

¹¹² Lotinga interview

¹¹³ Farron interview

Conservatives

For the Conservatives, there is smoking gun evidence for the party feeling threatened by UKIP's increasing success in the period 2010-2015. Here the sense of threat is clearly and directly linked to UKIP.

Firstly, David Cameron himself made comments, both in public and in private, about the threat posed by UKIP. Laws reports a conversation between Cameron and Clegg in November 2012 which Clegg shared with him, where Cameron commented: 'UKIP are breathing down my neck.'¹¹⁴ Another conversation between Clegg and Cameron is reported in early 2013, where Cameron again mentions his 'nervousness over the rise of UKIP.'¹¹⁵ And in early 2014, Seldon and Snowden report Cameron saying 'UKIP has certainly been an unwelcome and unexpected factor, with much higher support than we expected.'¹¹⁶

Secondly, there are reports of actions within the Conservative party which support the hypothesis of feeling threatened. In the 2010-2015 period, UKIP was 'a regular item of discussion at the 8.30am and 4pm meetings in Cameron's Office,' according to Seldon and Snowden, whose findings are based on conversations with senior Conservative figures.¹¹⁷ There was also friction in Cabinet Committee meetings on immigration issues, which Clegg attributed to a sense of panic over UKIP.¹¹⁸

Ross¹¹⁹ also reports on a Conservative strategy to spread 'dirt' on rival parties in the run-up to the 2015 general election, with one press officer dedicated to doing this for UKIP. He comments that stories supplied to the press via third parties were seen as 'evidence that the Tories were shaken by the threat UKIP posed to their hopes of winning a majority.'¹²⁰

Thirdly, the defections of Conservative MPs Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless to UKIP are about the clearest sign of threat to the Conservatives: the loss of one's own people to another side. These defections have been described as a 'sinister development' which 'changes everything,'¹²¹ and creates an 'atmosphere of panic'¹²² among Conservative MPs, particularly at the start of the 2014 Conservative party conference.

It is clear that UKIP's increasing electoral success presented a threat to the Conservative party, but in importantly different ways to the threat posed to the Liberal Democrats. Both parties were threatened by a potential loss of votes and

¹¹⁴ David Cameron, quoted in Laws, p.237

¹¹⁵ Cameron, quoted in Laws, p.243

¹¹⁶ Cameron, quoted in Seldon and Snowden, p.382

¹¹⁷ *Cameron at 10*, p.383

¹¹⁸ Laws, p.354-355

¹¹⁹ Tim Ross, *Why the Tories won: the inside story of the 2015 election*, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2015) (p.46)

¹²⁰ Ross, p.46

¹²¹ Seldon and Snowden, p.388

¹²² Ross, p.15

seats. But whereas the Liberal Democrats were concerned about a loss of position as the main 'anti-establishment party,' the Conservatives faced the threat of UKIP pulling their party apart in terms of stealing their own people, and dividing those that remained over key issues, particularly Europe.

The evidence presented here strongly supports Step 2 in the causal chain for H1 for the Conservatives. The majority of the evidence refers to UKIP explicitly in expressing a sense of threat. However, this evidence does not distinguish H1 from AE2: the 'Europe threat' alternative to the 'populist threat' is completely consistent with the Conservatives feeling threatened by UKIP. It is at Step 3 of the causal chain where the differentiation of these two alternatives will occur.

Labour

For Labour, evidence for feeling threatened by UKIP's increased electoral success is less clear. There was uncertainty within the party about what UKIP and its increased success really meant. In an interview for this thesis, Jon Cruddas, Labour MP for Dagenham and Rainham, commented that there was an 'ongoing debate in and around Labour' about UKIP and 'what it was all about.'¹²³

Cruddas explained why major elements of the Labour party did not see UKIP as a serious threat, describing 'the movement of what was assumed to be primarily Conservative voters to UKIP, which disproportionately breaks away from our opponents.'

Cruddas comments on a 'dangerous territory you get into of almost seeing the coarsening of politics acting in your favour,' and having a 'benign effect' for Labour. This account fits with reports of criticism of Ed Miliband and others at the time, for not taking the threat of UKIP seriously enough. A *Telegraph* article in May 2014 stated: 'Labour MPs including members of the shadow front bench believe that [Miliband] has failed to accept that UKIP presents a political threat to Labour.'¹²⁴ Similarly, a *Guardian* article on 26 May 2014, usually pro-Labour, said 'the Labour belief that UKIP is causing disproportionate damage to the Conservatives looks increasingly dubious.'¹²⁵

However, there were members within the Labour party who did feel threatened by UKIP, and sensed more dangerous underlying effects for Labour beyond the immediate electoral calculations. The May 2014 *Telegraph* article quotes Frank Field, MP and former Labour minister, who warned before the 2014 European Elections that UKIP posed 'the greatest threat' to his party, with a danger of 'part of [the Labour] vote moving over permanently.'¹²⁶ Cruddas too said he 'personally had a sense of foreboding in terms of the shifting class allegiances, and the fact that this was not a simple break from Conservatism to UKIP, this was a much more fundamental question of class realignment within the country as a whole.' Cruddas' view is particularly

¹²³ Jon Cruddas interview, 10 September 2018

¹²⁴ Kirkup and Swinford, *The Telegraph*

¹²⁵ Wintour and Watt, *The Guardian*

¹²⁶ Frank Field, quoted in Kirkup and Swinford, *The Telegraph*

valuable given his previous experience of right-wing populist parties through his fight with the BNP in his own constituency in the 2010 general election. The Labour leadership did begin to feel the threat of UKIP in the later stages of the 2010-2015 period. A *Guardian* article on 26 May 2014 reported that Miliband 'will move to show that he acknowledges the threat posed by UKIP on Tuesday when he visits the marginal constituency of Thurrock where his party lost control of the council after a strong showing of UKIP.'¹²⁷

Evidence for Step 2 of the causal chain is weaker for the Labour party. There is evidence that some elements of the Labour party felt threatened, including former front bench members. However, the evidence here does not include voices from the very top of the Labour party, and reports of the views of Miliband suggest he did not recognize the threat of UKIP until quite late. These findings might suggest a more piecemeal response in terms of use of populist language: individuals who recognized the threat more may respond more, with less response from the top of the party, and the leader himself. This weak support for H1 at Step 2 does not rule out AE3 either: being threatened by UKIP, a populist party working hard at appealing to the people, would fit with a Labour sense that they had lost connection with the voter base.

General Political Threat

Finally for Step 2, there is evidence of recognition by politicians of a more general political threat posed by UKIP. Cruddas discussed 'malign effects on the broader political landscape' of UKIP, and reports the 'ongoing debate' within Labour over whether they should 'confront [UKIP] more systematically because of this, despite net political effects.' Farron described UKIP as the new 'anti-politics valve' during this period, but not a 'safe' one like the Liberal Democrats had been before 2010. The *Telegraph* reported on 25 May 2014 that UKIP's European Election win was 'the biggest challenge to Britain's main parties for decades.'¹²⁸

Step 3: UKIP's use of populist language identified by mainstream parties as a cause/reason for their success

Three hoop tests can be conducted here, the passage of all three of them required to support Step 3. Firstly, it is necessary that UKIP's language was in fact populist: the theory presented posits that mainstream parties *copy* the language of UKIP as a successful challenger party using populist language.

UKIP language is populist according to the definition of Mudde adopted in this thesis. Nigel Farage's speech from the 2013 UKIP party conference was coded using the coding frame designed in Part 1, and the speech scores highly in the more populist categories, compared with the Conservative and Labour averages for the 2009/2010 sample texts.

¹²⁷ Wintour and Watt, *The Guardian*

¹²⁸ Kirkup and Swinford, *The Telegraph*

UKIP 2013 PARTY CONFERENCE SPEECH COMPARISON			
	Percentage of text containing references – UKIP speech	2009/10 average percentage of text containing references – Conservatives comparison	2009/10 average percentage of text containing references – Labour comparison
The People – Level 1 explicitly positive (Measure 1)	1.74	0.8	0.56
British political elites – Level 1 explicitly negative (Measure 2)	3.18	0.24	0.17
EU political elites – Level 1 explicitly negative (Measure 3)	5.79	0.06	0
‘We the people’ references (Measure 4)	20.96	11.8	9.84
Partisan reference (Measure 5)	2.05	18.92	29.17
Total Counterpoint references (Measure 7)	33.92	1.16	0.09

UKIP’s language being populist is not however sufficient to prove this step. A second hoop test for H1 requires that the populist language is *recognized* as such by the mainstream parties themselves, and noted as a cause for UKIP’s increased success. This is more difficult, since both interviews and published books have the benefit of hindsight. There are myriad references to UKIP as a populist party using populist language *after* 2015. For example, Nick Clegg refers in *Politics Between the Extremes* to the ‘man-down-the-pub populism of Nigel Farage.’¹²⁹ From the time, Seldon and Snowden quote an insider at Number 10 who refers to the ‘we-hate-the-establishment appeal’ of UKIP.¹³⁰ Similarly, Laws recounts David Cameron’s opposition to taking part in any televised election debates in 2015: ‘it wasn’t possible for government parties to safely take on the “anti-politics movement” in election debates’,¹³¹ referring to UKIP and the Green Party. Finally, there are multiple party conference speeches in the 2014/2015 period which refer disparagingly to ‘us-versus-

¹²⁹ Nick Clegg, *Politics: Between the Extremes*, (London: The Bodley Head, 2016) (p.224)

¹³⁰ Seldon and Snowden, p.383

¹³¹ Laws, p.488-489

them' politics (e.g. Kirsty Williams,¹³² Nick Clegg¹³³), or the politics of 'division' (Yvette Cooper¹³⁴). Although not referring to populism by name, these are all descriptions of populist language and its specific features.

In addition to reference to UKIP's populism by the mainstream parties themselves, there are plenty of articles from the 2010-2015 period which describe UKIP as a populist party or using populist language¹³⁵.

This is not to deny that perceptions of UKIP varied, and also changed over time. Cruddas commented that while UKIP certainly had a populist reputation in the latter stages of the 2010-2015 period, earlier on they were viewed as 'cranks' or 'golf-club Tory bore[s].' But it is clear that UKIP did receive the label 'populist' from politicians and mainstream media on a regular basis in the 2010-2015 period, and therefore the claim of H1 that they were recognized as a *populist* threat seems sound.

Finally, a third hoop test requires proof that UKIP's populist language was viewed by mainstream parties as a reason for its increased electoral success. It is not necessary that UKIP's populism be viewed as the *only* reason for their success, but it must be viewed as *part* of the reason for success, if it is to be considered worth copying by mainstream parties. Since this is a fairly uncontroversial suggestion, a few pieces of evidence will suffice. In an opinion piece for the Guardian in May 2014, Farron referred to UKIP's 'crowd-pleasing populism,'¹³⁶ and as already mentioned, a quote from an insider from the Conservative party at Number 10 referred to the 'we-hate-the-establishment appeal' of UKIP¹³⁷. Ford and Goodwin have since described UKIP

¹³² Kirsty Williams, Liberal Democrat Party Conference Speech, 2014 https://www.libdems.org.uk/kirsty_williams_speech_to_autumn_conference_2014 [accessed 13 March 2019]

¹³³ Nick Clegg, Liberal Democrat Party Conference Speech, 2014 <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=357#banner> [accessed 13 March 2019]

¹³⁴ Yvette Cooper, Labour Party Conference, 2014 https://www.yvettecooper.com/yvette_cooper_mp_speech_to_labour_party_conference_2014 [accessed 13 March 2019]

¹³⁵ George Parker, Kiran Stacey, Hugh Carnegy, and James Fontanella-Khan, 'UKIP and National Front lead Populist Earthquake,' *Financial Times*, 26 May 2014 <https://www.ft.com/content/aad578e8-e463-11e3-a73a-00144feabdc0> [accessed 13 March 2019].

Katherine Butler, 'Farage and Le Pen: the sanitised faces of extreme populism,' *The Independent*, 14 October 2013 <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/farage-and-le-pen-the-sanitised-faces-of-extreme-populism-8879710.html> [accessed 13 March 2019].

Observer Editorial, 'Beware this populism sweeping across Europe,' *The Guardian*, 29 December 2013 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/29/europe-british-politicians-stand-up-anti-eu-populism> [accessed 13 March 2019].

¹³⁶ Tim Farron, 'Nick Clegg took the fight to Ukip – Liberal Democrats should feel proud,' *The Guardian*, 25 May 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/25/nick-clegg-ukip-liberal-democrats-european-election-campaign-british-politics> [accessed 13 March 2019]

¹³⁷ Seldon and Snowden, p.383

supporters as 'Brussels Plus' voters who said 'no' three times: no to Europe, no to immigration and *no to political elites in Westminster*.¹³⁸ It can safely be concluded that populist language was viewed as at least part of the reason for UKIP's success by mainstream parties in the 2010-2015 period. Hence there is evidence to suggest UKIP's language was populist, it was regarded as so by mainstream parties, and it was viewed as a cause of UKIP's increased electoral success.

Conservatives

Step 3 is crucial for distinguishing between H1 and AE2 for the Conservatives. Indeed, although the above shows that UKIP's language was populist, recognized as such, and considered a factor in their success, collected evidence provides strong support for AE2, that Europe was perceived as an equal, if not more, significant reason for UKIP's success, and therefore threat to the party.

Laws reports a discussion with George Osborne in 2012, where Osborne commented: I'm "getting a bit worried about Europe and our backbenchers." The Conservatives could no longer argue Europe was just a big distraction: "The public are more sceptical so we could lose votes to UKIP."¹³⁹ Similarly, Laws reports a discussion between Cameron and Clegg in November 2012, where Clegg expressed concern about the EU referendum plan, arguing it is "hugely risky and could easily backfire." Cameron's reply was "You may be right. But what else can I do? My backbenchers are unbelievably Eurosceptic and UKIP are breathing down my neck."¹⁴⁰

Members of the other mainstream parties also suggested the UKIP threat the Conservatives faced was mainly to do with Europe. Ed Balls, in his book *Speaking Out*, comments that there was pressure on Cameron to announce a referendum on the EU, 'to calm the mutinous feeling on his own backbenches and to ward off the threat from UKIP.'¹⁴¹ Similarly, Farron commented that the argument used by many in the Conservative party against Cameron was 'we're losing all these votes to UKIP, therefore we need to be as right-wing or more right-wing than they are, particularly on issues to do with Europe or migration.'

The above evidence does not necessarily disprove H1 for the Conservatives; there was evidence of recognition of UKIP's populism as a reason for their success (and threat) by the party above. However, evidence collected here suggests that AE2 cannot be eliminated, and that evidence for a 'Europe threat' of UKIP, as opposed to a 'populist threat,' may be relatively stronger for the Conservatives.

Labour

For the Labour party, there is evidence to suggest that while UKIP were viewed as a populist party, and successful at least in part due to its populism, that success may have been considered a symptom of a deeper cause of loss of connection with voters

¹³⁸ Ford and Goodwin, p.198

¹³⁹ Laws, p.234

¹⁴⁰ Laws, p.237

¹⁴¹ Edward Balls, *Speaking Out: Lessons in Life and Politics*, (London: Arrow Books, 2016), (p.188)

for the Labour party. This, rather than UKIP's populism, may be the ultimate cause of any increased populist language by Labour (AE3). Jon Cruddas commented about a more underlying cause behind UKIP's threat towards the 'traditional white working-class base'¹⁴² of Labour:

'My view is that it's [the populist movement] partly accounted for by the failure of social democracy, which became somewhat of a remote technocratic concern that lost its ethical or moral purchase....'

That said, this diagnosis is made in 2018, with hindsight and greater understanding of the impact UKIP was having on the Labour voter base. Cruddas himself suggests that during the 2010-2015 period, the Labour party didn't really know what to make of UKIP: 'we were never suitably nuanced in terms of our diagnosis of what was happening with UKIP, especially amongst working class, traditional Labour voters,' and the political class as a whole were 'bewildered by the whole phenomenon.' This fits with evidence presented at Step 2, where sense of threat from UKIP was less clear for Labour than for the other mainstream parties, and there was more uncertainty about what UKIP's electoral success really meant for them. Hence the evidence collected here is not sufficient to favour AE3 over H1 for Labour: a simpler cause of UKIP populist threat seems likely, even if deeper reasons and effects were perhaps later discussed.

Step 4: Mainstream parties strategically change their own language to try to maintain/win back support

This step is the most crucial in the causal chain. To uphold it, one would expect to find evidence of discussion within the parties about how to respond to UKIP. This would be necessary but not sufficient evidence for proving the step (hoop test), since parties could discuss the UKIP threat and decide not to alter their own language, or they could decide to respond in some other way, perhaps through policy. Smoking gun evidence, sufficient to prove the step, would be evidence of language decisions being made, or individuals within the parties admitting they copied populist language.

Liberal Democrats

Firstly, there is evidence to pass a hoop test that a response to UKIP and their populist language was discussed within the party. Lotinga made multiple comments throughout the interview which confirmed this, for example 'there was a lot of disagreement about how to respond to what UKIP stood for,' and discussion of 'how [the Liberal Democrats] should frame a response to UKIP in 2015.'

Laws recounts a conference call¹⁴³ in the run up to the 2015 election, where Clegg's and Cameron's separate visits to the Queen to end the parliament are discussed, and Lotinga referred to this conference call in our interview: Paddy Ashdown thought Clegg shouldn't travel in a car 'because it was seen as too elitist,' and walking to the palace on foot, 'was some statement of being part of the people.' He also comments

¹⁴² Clegg, p.181

¹⁴³ Laws, p.539

that the core of the Liberal Democrats' problem at the 2015 election was 'the sense that we were now part of the elite,' and that the election was moving towards the rejection of elites, something 'UKIP definitely had a hand in.' Both greater connection with the people *and* the pulling down of elites, the two key elements of the populism definition, appear to be discussed by senior Liberal Democrat figures.

Given that a response was discussed, is there evidence sufficient to prove that the outcome of such discussion was the adoption of more populist language, a decision to *copy* UKIP? Evidence suggests different views on what the Liberal Democrats did in response. Lotinga argued that while the Liberal Democrats faced a 'temptation' to adopt populist language, particularly due to a changed voter base, they did not.

'After the 2010 election, we had a larger number of voters who read the Daily Mail than the Guardian or the Independent or whatever... So of course you are then tempted to try and see whether you can use more populist language or harden your language on immigration. But I don't think the party did that. There was a temptation and discussion about whether we should try and respond to the UKIP threat.'

Lotinga's explanation for why the Liberal Democrats did not adopt populist language was that they could not do so, given the ideology and policy positions of the party:

'... there's no way that the party could adopt the language of UKIP even if it wanted to. It identified itself as being the opposite of UKIP. We were the most pro-European party, we were the most internationalist party, we were the biggest advocates for the human rights legislation... everything that was the core of the identity of our politicians and our membership base would mean that it was never going to be possible to do that.'

The implication that populist language is not appropriate for delivering the Liberal Democrats' core messages or political ideology is debatable: populist language, the exultation of the people and the pulling down of political elites, can be used to present a pro-European message, or one that welcomes immigrants. The separation of UKIP's populist language from their policy positions may be important here. Lotinga also comments in the interview that the Liberal Democrats' platform at the 2010 election of 'it's time for a change' was 'populism of a sort,' casting some doubt on whether the language of populism is really incompatible with Liberal Democrat ideology or policy.

In contrast, Farron's view in interview was that there *was* a strategic decision to copy UKIP's language and style. When asked to summarize the party's overall response to UKIP, and offered suggestions of challenging, copying, ignoring, or something else, he responded:

'Well, I guess you could argue it's to challenge and to copy. To challenge policy by policy, and value side of things, and to a degree to copy the spikiness, and to try and, in a very failed way I have to say.... to come up with a language of populist liberalism, to try to be emotional about refugees, about Europe, in ways which I think... probably

stopped the party going into oblivion. So... I don't think we ignored them, I think we challenged them and in style tried to learn something from them....'

Other comments of his back this idea of 'a language of populist liberalism' up: 'within the Liberal Democrats there was definitely a real feel that we need to be, sort of, liberal populists,' and 'I was in part behind the party saying "right, we're right down here, let's be the liberal UKIP."'

These comments together provide smoking gun evidence for Step 4 for the Liberal Democrats: Farron's comments explicitly refer to the adoption of populist *language*, in response to UKIP (a copying response), and in an attempt to win back support (prevent the party 'going into oblivion'). Farron's position as President of the Liberal Democrats at the time, and then party leader soon after the 2015 election, gives his voice high probative value for the argument. It is also somewhat unexpected, given the negativity with which UKIP, and to some extent populism, are generally discussed and portrayed: a distancing of oneself from both, more like Lotinga's comments, may arguably be more common.

Farron's interview comments are backed up by his 2015 party conference speech as party leader where he draws a distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders,' mirroring a distinction between the ordinary people and elites.

'Liberal Democrats are outsiders. Even when we are on the inside we are outsiders: taking the side of the outsider.... Liberalism's roots are buried deep in anti-establishment politics, opposing privilege. We speak for the outsiders, for the governed not the governors. The voiceless and the voteless.'¹⁴⁴

This is an interesting contrast to other Liberal Democrat speeches, for example, those of Kirsty Williams and Nick Clegg at the 2014 party conference, where they attack the rise of 'us versus them' politics, arguably a reference to the people-elites antagonism involved in populist language. This highlights variation in the individual responses of the party's MPs and ministers. Nevertheless, Farron's comments are sufficient to prove Step 4: there was an attempt by at least some senior Liberal Democrat figures to develop a 'language of populist liberalism'¹⁴⁵ in response to UKIP. This fits with findings from Part 1 which show large increases in anti-British-political elite references by the Liberal Democrats in 2014/2015 compared to 2009/2010, and more modest increases in references to the people.

Most of the evidence presented here is confirmatory of H1 at the expense of AE1: it shows discussion about, and a direct populist language response to, *UKIP specifically*. Farron's comments in his 2015 party conference speech do use the language of 'insiders' and 'outsiders,' and the phrase 'even on the inside we are outsiders' would provide support for AE1. It could be an attempt to respond with language to the

¹⁴⁴ Tim Farron, Liberal Democrat Party Conference Speech, 2015
<http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=361#banner> [accessed 13 March 2019]

¹⁴⁵ Farron interview

Liberal Democrats' new position in government. However, use of this language does not necessarily provide evidence for the motivation of AE1 (new governing position) over H1 (UKIP's populist success), and there is much other evidence here for a motivation related to UKIP's electoral success.

Conservatives

For the Conservatives, there is evidence necessary to pass the hoop test for Step 4: there was discussion of a response to UKIP within the party.

Seldon and Snowdon provide evidence of Conservative discussion about UKIP, and a sense that the party needed to find a response. UKIP was a 'regular item of discussion at the 8.30am and 4pm meetings in Cameron's Office'¹⁴⁶ during the 2010-2015 period, and Cameron's response to the 'UKIP challenge' goes through 'a number of stages,' but 'he never finds an effective response to it.'¹⁴⁷ Graham Brady, chairman of the 1922 Committee is quoted: Number 10's response to UKIP is 'always behind the curve and never established consistency on how to deal with UKIP.'¹⁴⁸

A timeline of the party's responses is presented, moving through stages of ignoring UKIP (2010-late 2012), 'neutraliz[ing] the negatives' after the 2013 by-elections (not saying anything that is patronizing or dismissive about UKIP members), and adopting a more accommodating tone after the 2014 European Elections ('warm' rhetoric towards UKIP voters and turning attacks on Farage personally). Finally, in early 2015, Lynton Crosby is in control of the Conservative response, and 'helps yank the Conservative case back in a more populist direction.'¹⁴⁹ Although this is secondary evidence, it is well-supported with facts, and shows a response to UKIP was very much in the mind of the Conservative party.

However, only weak evidence has been found to support the hypothesis that the response decided upon was a copying of populist language. Crosby's actions to pull the Conservatives 'back in a more populist direction'¹⁵⁰ provides the most support, but it does not specify populist *language* was adopted, as opposed to other elements like policy. Admittedly, this is a fine distinction and one politicians are perhaps unlikely to make explicitly. Seldon and Snowdon also quote an insider who comments that Crosby thought Conservative politicians were 'out of touch... privileged and divorced from the lives of ordinary people,' and it is noted that Crosby's polling after the 2014 European elections led him to conclude 'there is a sense of disillusion and frustration that none of the current parties properly are understanding.'¹⁵¹ Both of these statements are quite populist in their language, creating a separation between ordinary people and out-of-touch elites. This might suggest language was an element of the new 'populist direction' pursued by the Conservatives from early 2015. Moreover, it may favour H1 rather than AE2 as the explanation for increased populist

¹⁴⁶ Seldon and Snowdon, p.383

¹⁴⁷ Seldon and Snowdon, p.382

¹⁴⁸ Seldon and Snowdon, p.382

¹⁴⁹ Seldon and Snowdon, pp.382-391

¹⁵⁰ Seldon and Snowdon, p.391

¹⁵¹ Seldon and Snowdon, p.391

language: it shows a consideration of the appeal of populism within the electorate, from which UKIP are likely to benefit, rather than a particular stance about Europe.

In an interview conducted for this thesis, Sir Roger Gale, MP for North Thanet, commented that certain elements of the Conservative party had been using populist language even before UKIP's rise, but that a 'UKIP legacy' has been increases in such language within the party.¹⁵² However, his comments did not necessarily refer to populism as defined here, and focused on the more extreme elements such as racism. For example, he referred to Boris Johnson's comments about the burkha as 'racist populism,' and abhorrent. This is only weak evidence to support the hypothesis of populist language, to do with people and elites, being adopted.

The clearest response to UKIP by the Conservatives is an electoral strategy of warning about a Labour-SNP coalition after 2015 if people vote UKIP. This was prevalent in 2015 Conservative election leaflets examined for Part 2 of this thesis. A clear example is a letter written by Cameron, received by a constituent in Ealing Central and Acton: the 'only way' to stop the SNP 'hold[ing] Miliband to ransom' and 'Alex Salmond pulling the strings for the next five years' is to 'vote Conservative.'¹⁵³

Ross argues this was an attempt by the Conservatives to beat UKIP by turning UKIP's most potent weapon on itself: they turned to the root of the motive for many UKIP supporters in English seats, a deep sense of national identity and fear that it was under threat from the SNP – from 'a powerful foreigner from the North.'¹⁵⁴ Strategic electoral campaign messages are more obvious as a response to UKIP than adoption of populist language in the evidence found here; only weak evidence supports the latter for the Conservatives.

In terms of AE2, the evidence here does not eliminate this alternative explanation: only one piece of evidence about polling undertaken by Crosby favours H1 over AE2. The other evidence is again discussing a response to UKIP, and not specifying whether the threat being responded to is populist language or the Europe issue.

Labour

It is important to remember that the evidence for Step 2 was not particularly strong for Labour: it was not clear that the party in general felt so threatened by UKIP's increasing electoral success, at least not until later on in the 2010-2015 period. Therefore, it is unsurprising that evidence to support a strategic change of language in response to that threat is weak. Evidence found suggests the response was quite confused, with no overall party strategy. Even evidence for the hoop test of a response to UKIP being discussed is only weak.

¹⁵² Sir Roger Gale interview, 14 September 2018

¹⁵³ David Cameron, leaflet posted in Ealing Central and Acton, April 2015
<https://electionleaflets.org/leaflets/9448/> [accessed 13 March 2019]

¹⁵⁴ Ross, p.179

Jon Cruddas' response to a question asking about the overall Labour response to UKIP (with suggestions of ignoring, copying, challenging, or something else) was insightful:

'Well I don't think we ignored it. I think we tacitly, we sort of tacitly accepted it and didn't talk about it. Partly because we didn't really know how to talk about some of the issues involved because we were sort of conflicted within... There was an element of ignoring it, there was also an element of not being unhappy with it, and sort of tacitly egging it on... It was sort of a curious response, and not a worked-out one. Partly because I think we were lazy assuming that it wasn't entirely bad for us that this thing was happening.'

Again, Cruddas refers to the perceived electoral benefits of UKIP's rise for Labour in terms of damaging their opponents: 'all the pollsters said we were going to win,' and 'to do that we had to sort of hunker down a bit' and let the Conservatives be damaged by UKIP.

When pressed on language responses to UKIP specifically, Cruddas commented that there was some discussion. John Healey MP set up a group to look at it and 'there were the beginnings of a polling operation in the head office to look at UKIP itself.' However, he concludes:

'... it was never fully accepted. It was more of a minority sport really, which certain people picked up on partly dependent on their local constituency issues.'

Examination of election leaflets in varying constituencies in 2015 confirmed this diagnosis of the response to UKIP as a 'minority sport.' The Labour leaflet most explicit in its use of populist language in 2015 was found in South Thanet, Nigel Farage's constituency, where the UKIP threat was certainly a 'local constituency issue.' Will Scoble, the Labour candidate, accuses Farage of being an 'establishment candidate,' living in 'the Westminster bubble,' who 'hasn't worked a real job for 16 years.' In addition:

'We have an incredible opportunity to set the agenda for British politics. We can say 'no' to UKIP's negativity and 'yes' to a brighter future. We can say 'no' to career politicians parachuting into seats like ours and 'yes' to making politics local again. And we can say 'no' to figures like Farage moving straight from the City of London to the Palace of Westminster (via Brussels) – and 'yes' to something more authentic.'¹⁵⁵

Anti-elite language and criticism of the establishment is turned on Farage himself: Scoble seems to attack the man while adopting his very language to do it.

Finally, Cruddas suggests part of the reason why 'out-UKIPing UKIP' was not a 'systematic strategy' for Labour was because the use of populist language was not 'within the personality of Miliband.' While 'there were those that were arguing for a more sort of populist language,' and who 'campaign-wise... could see the purchase that could be established from it,' 'Miliband wouldn't be the carrier of that sort of

¹⁵⁵ Will Scoble, leaflet posted in South Thanet, April 2015
<https://electionleaflets.org/leaflets/10221/> [accessed 13 March 2019]

stuff.’ It was not within Miliband’s character ‘to be more of an outsider... using the language of elites.’

Therefore, evidence for a strategic adoption of populist language by Labour as a whole has not been found, and even evidence of discussion about a response to UKIP is weak. This weak evidence for H1 at Step 4 for Labour does not particularly strengthen AE3 though, since it suggests any strategic language decision was unlikely, regardless of its motivation or cause.

However, there is strong support for Cruddas’ assertion that the response to UKIP was a ‘minority sport’ for Labour, dependent on local constituency issues of individual MPs. It seems unlikely that the most explicitly populist Labour election leaflet of those studied from 2015 was found in South Thanet, Farage’s constituency, purely by chance. It therefore provides strong support to the general hypothesis that mainstream parties copy populist language when challenger parties using it are successful/become a threat to them: greater threat from a populist party leads to more adoption of populist language by other parties.

CONCLUSION

The causal chain of H1 is confirmed most successfully for the Liberal Democrats. Here all Steps are confirmed satisfactorily. AE1’s proposed cause, the effect of being in government for the first time in many years, undoubtedly played some role in the sense of threat felt by the Liberal Democrats in the 2010-2015 period (Step 2). It is also clear that the UKIP’s electoral success is tied up with this potential effect of Coalition, since the fear of losing their position as an outsider, anti-establishment party in British politics was worsened by the fact there was another party ready to replace them. However, there is sufficient evidence at both Steps 2 and 4 to show that the threat felt, and the populist language response discussed and taken, was a response to *UKIP specifically*. This is sufficient to confirm H1, while not denying the presence of AE1.

For the Conservatives, supporting evidence is found at Steps 1-3; at Step 4, there is evidence to show that a response to UKIP was discussed and that some responses were made, but not sufficient evidence to show that increased populist language was one of these responses. Importantly, AE2, UKIP representing a ‘Europe threat’ to the Conservatives rather than a ‘populist threat,’ cannot be ruled out in favour of H1. Evidence in Steps 2 and 4 about the threat of UKIP and the Conservative response to it both support AE2 and H1 equally well, except one piece of evidence in H1’s favour in Step 4. The evidence refers to the threat faced from UKIP in general, not giving specifics as to its nature. In Step 3, moreover, the evidence for AE2 and a ‘Europe threat’ is arguably stronger than for H1: there are a number of pieces of evidence where the threat posed by UKIP refers specifically to the question of Europe. It is therefore not clear that the Conservatives were threatened by, and responding to, the *populist* threat, as opposed to a ‘Europe threat,’ of UKIP. And in any case, evidence that this response involved increased populist language is weak.

The causal chain for H1 is confirmed least well for the Labour party. Evidence of sense of threat at Step 2 is weaker than for the other parties, and evidence at Step 4 suggests that response to UKIP, including increased populist language, was more piecemeal and a 'minority sport,' rather than a centrally coordinated strategy. For AE3, the crisis of New Labour and loss of connection with traditional Labour voters as the deeper cause of increased populist language, evidence here is not sufficient to favour this explanation over the simpler cause, UKIP's electoral success and threat, of H1. While recognition of these underlying issues is made by Cruddas in hindsight, it is not sufficiently clear that these thoughts were present and formed in the 2010-2015 period, making it difficult to posit them as a cause for language changes in 2015. Neither H1 nor AE3 are satisfactorily confirmed for Labour here.

CONCLUSION

FINDINGS

This thesis has assessed the UK between 2010 and 2015 as a potential positive case for Mudde's theory of 'Populist Zeitgeist' and notions of 'populist contagion.' Did mainstream parties in the UK respond to the electoral success of UKIP, a challenger party using populist language, by adopting more populist language themselves? H1, an affirmative hypothesis, has been assessed first in its descriptive element (did populist language used by mainstream parties increase in 2015 compared to 2010?) and secondly in its causal element (was any change in levels of populist language caused by, or a response to, UKIP?).

Part 1 confirms the descriptive element of H1: comparison of party conference speeches for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in 2010 and 2015 revealed increased use of populist language in 2015. This was the case for all three parties: increased positive reference to the people and negative reference to political elites. The most notable change for the Conservatives was increased use of more moderate and subtle references to the people, for the Liberal Democrats a large increase in explicitly negative references to British political elites, and for Labour the increased use of the populist 'ruled from above' framing.

Parts 2 and 3 provide mixed evidence in terms of the causal element of H1. Part 3's causal chain is most successfully supported for the Liberal Democrats: there is good evidence that UKIP were perceived as a populist threat by the party, and that a strategic decision to increase use of populist language was discussed and adopted by at least some senior members of the party. For Labour and the Conservatives, the causal chain for H1 is less well supported. The Conservatives felt threatened by UKIP, however it is not possible to conclude that this threat was perceived as relating specifically to *populism* rather than to the issue of Europe, nor is there enough evidence for a response to language specifically. For Labour, it seems that UKIP was not initially recognized as a threat by many, meaning any response was more piecemeal and lacked coherent central strategy.

Part 2's findings of reduced use of populist language in constituency leaflets in 2015 compared to 2010 seem somewhat contradictory to H1 and Part 1's findings. Nonetheless, the difference in differences design provides some support for the causal claim of H1 for the Liberal Democrats: the reduction in average populism score was smaller in areas where UKIP was a high threat compared to low threat areas. Findings for Labour and the Conservatives here are less conclusive.

Part 1 also provides evidence in relation to H2a, H2b and H3. In general, mainstream parties adopted anti-elite language aimed at British elites much more than expected. In percentage terms reference to and praise of the people often increased less than references to British and EU political elites (disconfirming H2a and H2b). And H3 is only confirmed for the Conservative party: in the Labour and Liberal Democrat cases, anti-elite references aimed at British political elites increased more than those aimed at EU political elites.

Overall, evidence here suggests that mainstream parties did increase their use of populist language in 2015 compared to 2010, and for the Liberal Democrats at least there is support for the claim that this was a ‘copying’ response to UKIP’s electoral success using such populist language within the 2010-2015 period. This study has partially succeeded in presenting evidence to support the UK as a positive case for the theory of Populist Zeitgeist and populist contagion, specifically in terms of populist *language*.

IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The most important theoretical insight this thesis offers is that there is variation in responses of mainstream political parties to the successful use of populist language by a challenger party. Any generalization about ‘what mainstream parties do’ overlooks this fact. Some specific considerations follow.

How does one define ‘mainstream’?

The strongest results were found for the Liberal Democrats, a party defined here as mainstream, but arguably less ‘mainstream’ than the Conservative or Labour parties: they had not been in government before 2010, and were described by both Farron and Loting as more of an ‘outsider’ party. Since results were less conclusive for the Labour and Conservative parties, it might be suggested that the more ‘mainstream’ a party is, the less likely, or perhaps less able, it is to adopt populist language in response to a populist challenger: criticism of elites and the political system would amount to criticism of oneself. This would fit with Mudde’s theory, which maintains that populist language is still used more by ‘challenger’ or ‘outsider’ parties,¹⁵⁶ even if mainstream parties are also using it. Findings in relation to H2a, H2b and H3 showed that all three mainstream parties adopted anti-elite language aimed at British political elites more than anticipated. However, there may be important differences in party approaches depending on how ‘mainstream’ they perceive themselves to be.

Do mainstream parties’ responses to populist challenger parties vary depending on whether they are in government or opposition, and where the challenger party is on the Left/Right divide relative to them?

Mudde’s theory states that mainstream politicians ‘both in government and in opposition’¹⁵⁷ have increasingly used populist language. The findings here suggest that those parties in government at the time of the rising populist challenge (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) increased populist language more than those in opposition (Labour). This seems counterintuitive: it might be expected that a party in opposition would find anti-establishment, populist language easier to adopt since they are not the ruling body, even if a member of the ruling ‘class.’ However, a governing party may have a greater incentive to respond to a populist challenge in order to protect its position.

¹⁵⁶ ‘The Populist Zeitgeist,’ p.551

¹⁵⁷ ‘The Populist Zeitgeist,’ p.551

Were the findings for the Conservative party's response stronger than those of Labour because UKIP were a populist party on the right of the political spectrum, and therefore less of a threat to Labour? (Evidence has not been presented here to confirm that UKIP are a party of the right, but much existing literature would support this¹⁵⁸). Cruddas highlighted how the Labour party saw electoral benefits since the UKIP threat was (initially at least) perceived to be much greater for the Conservatives. If so, one would expect greater increases in populist language among mainstream parties on the *right* in the majority of Western European countries: it is predominantly radical right populist parties that are currently on the rise. More research which breaks down the category of 'mainstream parties', like Rooduijn et al.'s article¹⁵⁹, would be beneficial: the varying effects of government/ opposition and Left/ Right could then be examined.

What is the relationship between *language* and *policy* responses to populism?

The Liberal Democrats, for whom evidence of a copying of populist *language* is strongest, are arguably the *furthest* from UKIP's *policy* positions on key issues like Europe and immigration. While this study has not systematically examined policy changes by the mainstream parties, evidence from interviews and political accounts upholds the belief that the Conservatives did respond to UKIP in terms of policy, moving rightwards on immigration and Europe. David Laws recounts a 'steadily more Eurosceptic drift of Conservative party policy' within the Coalition government, to the extent that British allies outside Europe were noticing and 'express[ing] concerns.'¹⁶⁰ While the Conservatives did increase populist language according to evidence here, it was in subtler ways, and the causal connection to the threat of UKIP is not as strong.

Was a populist language change easier/more appealing to the Liberal Democrats because there was no chance that they could be confused with UKIP, or accused of copying them, on policy grounds? Or was it a reflection of feeling a need to respond or copy in some way, but being unable to do so in policy terms? Perhaps each mainstream party responded to UKIP in the aspect which posed greatest threat to them. For the Conservatives this was primarily policy: the 'Europe threat' alternative explanation. For the Liberal Democrats, in contrast, UKIP was more of a threat in terms of language and the 'anti-politics' position in British politics. For Labour, there was confusion over whether UKIP posed a threat to the party at all. Future study could usefully combine study of language responses to populist challengers with those of policy responses in a more systematic way.

What factors influence the perception of a populist threat, and timing of response?

The fact that UKIP was present and strong in the 'high UKIP threat' constituency cases does not mean all three mainstream parties in these areas felt threatened, equally or even at all. Considerations like the current incumbent, the size of their vote margin, or whether one of the three parties is in a very insignificant 3rd place are all relevant.

¹⁵⁸ e.g. Paul Webb, and Tim Bale, 'Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative Party Members and the Temptations of the Populist Radical Right,' *Political Studies*, 62(4), (2014) 961-970 (p.963)

¹⁵⁹ 'A Populist Contagion?'

¹⁶⁰ Laws, p.241

Additionally, the level of populist threat not only varies between constituencies, but at the national party level too. A 'grading' of level of UKIP threat could be considered at the national level as well as at the local constituency level.

Linked to this is the possibility of a lag effect, as evidenced by Labour's response to UKIP. It may take time for a populist threat to be recognized, and response made. Perhaps the Labour party's response to UKIP came predominantly after the 2015 election period. Explanations as to why a lag effect might occur for some mainstream parties and not others could be explored, for example, whether the Left/Right positioning of a populist party might lull those on the opposite side of the divide into a false sense of security, unaware that a populist threat could be a threat to a political system as a whole.

Is the fact that populist language is effective for a challenger party enough of itself to provoke a language response?

The process tracing element of this project highlighted that the decision over use of populist language is more complex. Mainstream parties consider a variety of other factors. Examples might include: the individuals within the party (Cruddas' comments on Miliband); political ideology or sense of party identity (Lotinga's suggestion); and the previous stance of a party or individual on populist language (statements challenging such approaches in the past might make a copying response now very contradictory). If Lotinga is correct and some political ideologies are less capable of using populist language coherently, this has interesting implications for Mudde's description of populism as a 'thin-centred' ideology¹⁶¹, which can be attached to many fuller ideologies, determining the specific 'people' and 'elites' defined.

Consideration of other types of response besides 'fighting fire with fire,' the sole focus of this research question, would be beneficial. Specifically, what would it look like for a party to 'challenge' the populism of a challenger party, in the specific area of language? In Part 2, the average level of populist language of Conservative party leaflets reduced *more* in *high* UKIP threat areas than low threat ones. Does this finding simply suggest the absence of a 'copy' response, or also the presence of a 'challenge'¹⁶² response? Or would a challenge response use a different kind of language entirely? 'Ignore'¹⁶³ and 'accommodate'¹⁶⁴ responses could also be theorized and operationalized in more detail.

What factors influence differences in language responses at national and local levels?

It was suggested in Part 2 that the parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 may have had a greater effect on language in local constituency leaflets than in national party conference speeches. Likewise, a successful populist challenger may not be viewed or responded to in the same way at local and national levels. Analysis of party language

¹⁶¹ 'The Populist Zeitgeist,' p.544

¹⁶² Capoccia, 2005

¹⁶³ Downs, 2001

¹⁶⁴ Downs, 2001

responses to populist challengers, and other events or 'shocks', might benefit from a multi-level approach.

Finally, some methodological insights from this project. The value of a coding approach which captures subtle changes in populist language has been demonstrated. For example, the most significant change in language for the Conservatives was increased moderate references to the people, which would not have been coded at all with a frame searching only for the most explicit populist references. The measurement of references to the people and to elites separately has been done before, but further separation of elite references into those aimed at British and EU political elites yielded important insights, as did consideration of the disappearance of positive as well as the increase in negative references. The application of this coding approach would be highly beneficial for the study of 'populist contagion' and Mudde's theory in other cases in Western Europe.

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APPENDICES

CONTENTS:

A: PART 1 CODING FRAME	96
B: PART 1 INTER-CODER RELIABILITY TESTING	107
C: PART 1 INTRA-CODER RELIABILITY TESTING	110
D: PART 2 HIGH AND LOW UKIP THREAT SAMPLE GROUPS	113
E: PART 2 CODING FRAME	115
F: PART 2 INTER- AND INTRA- CODER RELIABILITY TESTING	116
G: ETHICS APPROVAL FOR INTERVIEWS	119
H: PART 3 INTERVIEWS SUMMARY TABLE	120
I: INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS	123
J: CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS	127
K: INTERVIEW REQUEST EMAIL	129
L: INTERVIEWS SCRIPT	130
M: PART 1 FULL RESULTS TABLES	132

A. PART 1 CODING FRAME

POPULISM DEFINED

I follow Mudde (2004) in defining populism ideationally: populism:

‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and ... argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté generale* (general will) of the people.’ (Mudde 2004, p.543).

A pure, good people, a united whole, are contrasted with an evil, corrupt elite who are betrayers of the people. Mudde (2004, p.544) calls populism ‘thin-centred’: it does not have the complexity of a full ideology. It is an ‘an argumentative frame that awaits specific content’ (Lee 2006, p.362); the people and elites in question depend on the fuller ideology accompanying a specific manifestation of populism.

POPULIST AND PARTISAN FRAMINGS

Frames are mental structures which shape the way we see the world (Lakoff 2004, p.4). They allow a few words to bring to mind whole worldviews or ideas (Lakoff 2004, p.24), giving a passage of text or speech an overall meaning which may go beyond the specific words shared. Here I will define and operationalize a populist framing and a partisan framing, in the context of political competition.

A populist framing of political speech or debate has as its central idea a division between a ‘pure’ people and an ‘evil’ elite, in line with Mudde’s (2004) definition. The main ‘line’ drawn by political actors or parties invoking this frame is ‘we the people’ versus ‘them the evil elite.’ The party presents itself as of the people, or the only party representing the people; criticism of other parties is aimed at all of these parties *together*, lumping them into a single category of ‘corrupt elites’ or representatives of the establishment.

A partisan framing of political speech or debate has as its overarching idea the competition between one party and other individual parties. The main ‘line’ drawn by political actors invoking this frame is ‘we the party’ versus ‘them the other parties.’ Here criticism of other parties may be targeted at multiple parties together, but is more generally targeted at one other specific party, and focused on policy actions or performance. The sense is of competition between teams fighting for government, a ‘red team vs blue team’ focus, with voters deciding which ‘team’ they prefer. Criticism is not targeted at *all* parties together, or at the *system* as a whole that they might represent.

These frames are operationalized using a coding frame, currently with seven measures focusing on different aspects of language used. Measures 1 to 3 are key for the populist framing: are people and elites referred to, and how? Measure 4 addresses uses of the terms ‘we,’ ‘our’ and ‘us;’ are parties or political actors here referring to their party or to themselves as part of the people? The former would fit in a partisan framing, the latter is potentially more populist. Measure 5 explicitly looks for instances of partisan distinctions, such as comments about the policy failings of a rival party, or strategic claims about party competition. Measure 6 considers other ways that politicians or parties could present themselves as ‘of’ the people besides explicitly mentioning ‘the people’ or equivalent, specifically by referring to individuals or groups they have personally met, perhaps even by name. Finally, Measure 7 outlines five framings identified by Counterpoint (2014) in an

analysis of the language of populist parties in the European Parliament. These are specific narratives often employed by populist parties as they draw the line between themselves as in touch with the 'pure people' and all other parties of the establishment, evil and corrupt. I include examples for these seven measures within the coding frame below.

CODING FRAME

(Examples taken from political party conference speeches analyzed in Part 1).

Measures 1-4

Coding Unit: sentence

Context Unit: three sentences either side of coding unit

Coding frame categories are in blue.

If a sentence does not contain the reference of interest, leave it uncoded.

Measures:

1. IS THERE A REFERENCE MADE TO THE PEOPLE?

In a given sentence...

a. Do any words/phrases that could refer to the people occur?

- the people
- the British people
- British people, Britons
- Britain/ Great Britain/UK/United Kingdom
- the many
- the majority
- country/nation
- people
- people with adjectives
 - working people
 - ordinary/everyday people
 - local people
 - old people
 - young people
 - other adjectives
- other instances

b. How 'populist' is the phrase?

- **Level 1** – high populism – most instances of 'the people,' 'the British people,' 'the country,' 'the many,' 'the majority.' Also any uses of 'people' which are clearly populist e.g. returning power to people.
- **Level 1.5** – 'working people,' 'local people,' 'ordinary people.' Particular instances that I think are interesting in terms of populism.
- **Level 2** -- mid populism – most instances of 'Britain/Great Britain,' 'people,' 'old people,' 'young people,' 'British people,' other people adjectives. Our country common here; also functional uses of people.

- Level 3 – low/no populism. Include any instances of people/Britain/country etc. that clearly do not relate to the British people. If people in general, assume it refers to British people and include in Level 2. ‘In Britain,’ ‘in the country’ included here.

Key question for distinguishing Levels 2 and 3 is could ‘the country’/‘Britain’ etc. be replaced with ‘the people’ and the sentence make sense? People or place? Which makes most sense? If people, code in Level 2; if place, in Level 3.

Where multiple instances of reference to the people occur in the same sentence, code the ‘most populist’ one – i.e. the one that will be placed in the highest-level category.

e.g. ‘Labour’s plan for Britain’s future, our common endeavor to build an economy that works for the many not the few, for all working people in every part of our United Kingdom.’
4 coding possibilities... here go for ‘the many’ as this places the sentence in Level 1.

Other examples:

‘Give us our country back.’ – Level 3 – place, power referred to rather than people.

‘Bring wealth back to this country’ – Level 2 – could refer to the people, bring wealth back to them.

‘Bringing goods into this country.’ – Level 3 – place, can’t bring goods into the people.

‘Scheme rolled out across the country.’ – Level 3 – place, not people.

c. Is the reference negative, neutral/implicitly positive or explicitly positive?

- explicitly positive

- neutral/implicitly positive

- negative

EXAMPLES

1. ‘And to the British people: when you put your cross in the Conservative box, you were putting your faith in us.’ (David Cameron, 2015)

The British People; Level 1; implicitly positive.

2. ‘To back working people.’ (David Cameron, 2015)

Working people; Level 1.5; explicitly positive.

3. ‘More than 150 people a day are moving in thanks to our Help to Buy scheme.’ (David Cameron, 2015)

People; Level 2; neutral.

4. ‘I love Britain.’ (David Cameron, 2015)

Britain; Level 2; explicitly positive.

5. ‘We are not going to allow that to happen to our country again.’ (George Osborne, 2010)

Country; Level 2; neutral.

2. IS REFERENCE MADE TO THE BRITISH POLITICAL SYSTEM/POLITICAL ELITES/THE ESTABLISHMENT?

a. Do any words/phrases that could refer to the British political system/British political elites occur?

Also code any instances of 'they' which follow an initial mention of any of these – in the same category as whatever 'they' refers to.

- establishment
- elite(s)
- British politics, politics
- British politician(s), politician(s)
- Westminster
- Parliament
- other references

b. Is the word/phrase meaningful in terms of referring to British political elites/the political system?

- **Level 1** – Refers to political elites. References to politicians, elites, the establishment, others where it is specifically political elites referred to rather than the British political system.
- **Level 2** – Refers to the British political system. References to politics, British politics, Westminster mostly in here. The system not the political elites specifically.
- **Level 3** – The reference is not actually referring to the political elites/system in any meaningful sense. Examples include referring to 'parliament' but in context of talking about policies planned for the next parliament, or referring to Westminster as a geographical location rather than as a part of the political system.

c. If the sentence does contain a meaningful reference, is the reference positive, neutral/implicitly negative or explicitly negative?

- positive
- neutral
- implicitly negative
- explicitly negative

EXAMPLES

1. 'And let's get on with bringing values back into politics.' (Jeremy Corbyn, 2015)
Politics; Level 2; implicitly negative.
2. 'The media commentariat don't get it.' (Jeremy Corbyn, 2015)
No coding – not political elites referred to here.
3. 'But the establishment has been closing down the immigration debate for 20 years.' (Nigel Farage, 2013)
Establishment; Level 1; explicitly negative.
4. '16 per cent up, second place, you have no idea what that did to them in Westminster!' (Nigel Farage, 2013)

Other references (refers to ‘them’, the elites); Level 1; implicitly negative.

5. ‘That may not be achievable in one Parliament.’ (Theresa May, 2009)
Parliament; Level 3; neutral.

3. IS REFERENCE MADE TO THE EU POLITICAL ELITE/INSTITUTIONS?

- a. Do any words/phrases that could refer to the EU political system/EU political elites occur?**

- the EU/European Union
- European Parliament
- the European Commission
- Europe
- Brussels/Strasbourg
- other references

- b. Is the word/phrase meaningful in terms of referring to EU political elites/the political system?**

- **Level 1** – Refers to EU political elites rather than the EU political system. References to the Commission, Brussels etc. mostly go here – bodies of political elites are referred to. Other instances may be references to ‘Europe’ but where use of ‘they’ implies comment about the elites more than the system.
- **Level 2** – Refers to EU political system rather than elites specifically. References to the European Union and Europe mostly go here.
- **Level 3** – Reference to Europe or the EU where it is clearly not the political system that is being referred to. If in doubt place such references in Level 2; Level 3 is for uses of Europe etc. for other functional or descriptive purposes, unrelated to comment about the political system. Examples include figures about the crime rate in Europe, or Europe used as a geographical location.

- c. If the sentence does contain a meaningful reference, is the reference positive, neutral/implicitly negative or explicitly negative?**

- positive
- neutral
- implicitly negative
- explicitly negative

EXAMPLES

1. ‘The Commission has hijacked the institutions of Europe by adopting a flag, an anthem, a president, and through their mad euro project they have driven tens of millions into poverty.’ (Nigel Farage, 2013)
Commission; Level 1; explicitly negative.

2. 'Our laws have come from Brussels – and what laws!' (Nigel Farage, 2013)
Brussels; Level 1; implicitly negative.
3. 'We all know what's wrong with the EU – it's got too big, too bossy, too interfering.'
(David Cameron, 2015)
EU/European Union; Level 2; explicitly negative.
4. 'And neither will we allow our NATO allies in Eastern Europe to be bullied.'
(Philip Hammond, 2014)
Europe; Level 3; neutral.

4. WHO DO ANY USES OF THE TERMS 'WE', 'OUR' AND 'US' REFER TO – WE THE PEOPLE/ THE BRITISH PUBLIC, OR WE THE PARTY?

If instances of both 'we the party' and 'we the people' occur in the same sentence, code as ambiguous. If we, our, or us are used in ways that fit in neither the party or people category, code as ambiguous, e.g. a politician is telling a story about something he did with his children and we refers to 'me and my children.'

- the party
- the people
- ambiguous

EXAMPLES:

1. 'In all the challenges we face, we will be guided by our Conservative values. Our belief in strong defence and sound money. Our belief in an enterprise economy...that if you set free the ambition that burns so deeply within the British people, they will strike out on their own, take on new workers, take on the world.'
(David Cameron, 2015)
The party.
2. 'I say: no. This is Britain. We don't duck fights. We get stuck in. We fix problems.'
(David Cameron, 2015)
The people.
3. 'This week in Manchester we have shown we have the leader, the team and the policies to provide the next government of our country.'
(William Hague, 2009)
Ambiguous – 'we have shown we have the leader' refers to the party, but 'our country' refers to the people.

Measures 5-7

Coding Unit: no longer necessarily the sentence – look for instances of each, which could be a single sentence, or a paragraph or section of text.

Context Unit: three sentences either side of the coding unit.

5. IS THE MAIN DISTINCTION DRAWN BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OWN PARTY AND THAT OF ANOTHER PARTY OR PARTIES, BUT NOT ALL OTHER PARTIES OR THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE?

E.g. Is a Labour politician criticizing the policy/past actions of the Conservatives in contrast to his own policies?

E.g. Is a strategic claim about party competition made e.g. it's either Labour or the Conservatives who will win; if you want to avoid a Conservative MP, vote Labour.

Focus on negative comments about the other 'team'/party, **don't code praise of own party except where it is the phrase(s) following the criticism of the opposing party.** Simply praising one's own party is a feature common to both populist and partisan framings, and therefore not interesting. We are interested in whether criticism of other parties is aimed at the system/parties as a whole, or at a specific alternative team/party. Code criticism of a specific alternative team/party here. If author speaks about their own party in contrast to the opposing team, code the initial comparison statement, but not any details about specific policies that follow, unless the contrast statements continue. Code the section so that the reference as a whole makes sense – this may mean you need to code the preceding sentence before a partisan comparison as well.

Partisan Reference

EXAMPLES

1. 'But whatever the outcome we stand together, united as Labour, to put forward a better way to the misery on offer from the Conservatives.' (Jeremy Corbyn, 2015)
Partisan reference: two options are made clear – either Labour or the Conservatives.
2. 'Mr. Cameron, Clegg and Miliband are you listening?' (Nigel Farage, 2013)
No partisan reference: here all three of the mainstream party leaders are referred to together, representatives of the political elite. More a populist framing than a partisan one.
3. 'Keeping our [Conservative] head as Labour lose theirs.' (David Cameron, 2015)
Partisan reference: contrast between Conservative option or Labour option.
4. 'So Mr. Cameron wants a referendum ... well we've heard it all before with his "cast iron guarantee" and we don't believe that he is sincere. The use of the word renegotiation is no more than a cynical tactic to kick the issue into the long grass after the next election. I have no doubt that Labour and the Lib Dems will do exactly the same thing. They all promise a referendum at every General Election and renege on their promises.' (Nigel Farage, 2013)
No partisan reference – refers to all of the mainstream parties together, and suggests they are untrustworthy. Some populist tones.

5. 'I want to say something to whoever is elected as the next Labour leader.
 You cannot duck difficult choices forever.
 All you have done in the last four months is carp and complain.
 But a decent opposition has to provide a decent alternative.
 Your party let people down in government.
 Until you face up to your responsibility for the state we're in you'll let people down in
 opposition too.
 Labour did some good things, of course they did.
 But just think what they could have done.
 With enormous majorities, 13 years and money to spare.
 The best opportunity for real fairness there has been in my lifetime.
 But imprisoned by timidity they squandered a golden age.
 We must now take up the challenge that Labour ducked.
 We must do more, even though they left us with less.' (Nick Clegg, 2010)
**Partisan reference: the whole section is criticism aimed at Labour. Final sentence
 included because it is the contrast of the author's party with the criticized party.**

**6. IS REFERENCE MADE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON/GROUP IN SOCIETY, WITH A STORY
 OF THE POLITICIAN MEETING THEM, TALKING TO THEM OR EQUIVALENT?**

*An attempt by the party/politician to show themselves to be close to/ in touch with the
 people. Reference to ordinary people, not well-known elites. We are of the people.*

- distinct group
- distinct individual
 - unnamed
 - named

EXAMPLES

1. 'Bernard Harris from Leicester wrote to me before polling day and said this.
 "Aged 82, this is possibly my last election.
 "In my life I have foolishly voted Labour, believing it served the working class
 "How wrong I was. Labour is against all I aspire to.
 "I am 100 per cent for a United Kingdom, a sound economy, free enterprise, a trading
 Europe and a decent standard of living.
 "Only a Conservative Government will achieve this.'" (David Cameron, 2015)
Distinct individual, named.
2. 'When the schoolgirl sits in that classroom, she knows that her studies really can take
 her to the very top.' (David Cameron, 2015)
None – reference is not to a specific schoolgirl the politician met.
3. 'I have huge admiration for human rights defenders all over the world.
 I've met hundreds of these very brave people during my lifetime working on
 international issues.
 I want to say a special mention to one group who've campaigned for the release of
 British resident Shaker Aamer from Guantanamo Bay.

This was a campaign of ordinary people like you and me, standing on cold draughty streets, for many hours over many years.’ (Jeremy Corbyn, 2015)

Distinct group.

4. ‘I remember a care worker I met in Durham. She worked hard and with dedication, looking after our Mums, Dads and grandparents when they couldn't look after themselves anymore. She is doing one of the most important jobs in our society, and if it was my Mum or Dad, I would want anyone who cared for them to be paid a decent wage. But she was barely paid the minimum wage – and barely a few pence extra for higher skills.’ (Ed Miliband, 2010)
Distinct individual, unnamed.

POPULIST FRAMING APPROACH FROM COUNTERPOINT (2014)

7. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF ANY OF THE FIVE POPULIST FRAMES DISCUSSED IN COUNTERPOINT'S RESEARCH ON RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?

‘Ruled from Above’ – ‘the rulers who represent the elites have gained too much power over those they rule, the hard-working ordinary people. The ruled no longer have control over their own affairs and are at the mercy of the unaccountable rulers’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.15).

‘The Bearers of Truth’ – ‘the naïve cowards in power, the fantasists who have put their heads in the sand; vs the “truth-tellers”, the realists who have the nerve to tell it as it is’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.16). ‘The naïve cowards in power have not listened to the truth tellers. As a result, a great disaster looms’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.16).

‘Paradise Lost’ – ‘the representatives of tradition want to bring back the Paradise Lost, while the representatives of modernity are engulfed in what is depicted as a meaningless rush towards a soulless future’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.18). Paradise Lost is generally a ‘stable and confident nation which has been broken down and reimagined by a series of out-of-touch policymakers’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.18). For UKIP, the Paradise Lost is ‘an independent, more homogenous Britain’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.18), and the modern challenges are the EU, increased immigration, multiculturalism and career politicians.

‘Reinstating Common Sense’ – ‘bookish, disconnected, professional politicians vs the down-to-earth, practical, real representatives of the people’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.19). ‘The professional politicians are in charge. Their ideas border on the absurd but are nevertheless being implemented to disastrous effect. They have subverted the natural order of things, because they have no appreciation of nature, “real life” or the heartland’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.19).

‘Order versus Chaos’ – ‘the bringers of chaos [mainstream politicians] have undermined order, destroyed the social fabric, and wreaked havoc on people’s lives’ (Counterpoint 2014, p.20). Mainstream actors have encouraged chaos by ignoring

key grievances like immigration, crime and Islam (Counterpoint 2014, p.20). We need to return to a state of order.

- ruled from above
- bearers of truth
- paradise lost
- reinstating common sense
- order versus chaos

EXAMPLES:

1. 'So I'm speaking here as much as for the settled ethnic minorities as for those who have been here forever.
Half a million new arrivals a year!
It's just not sustainable.
Anyone who looks at it honestly knows it's not sustainable.
UKIP talks about it honestly.
Directly.
We've had a lot of stick for it.
Normal, decent people have been bullied out of the debate.' (Nigel Farage, 2013)
Bearers of Truth framing.
2. 'One thing many have in common: they are fed up to the back teeth with the cardboard cut-out careerists in Westminster.
The spot-the-difference politicians.
Desperate to fight the middle ground, but can't even find it.
Focus groupies.
The triangulators.
The dog whistlers.
The politicians who daren't say what they really mean.' (Nigel Farage, 2013)
Reinstating Common Sense Framing
3. 'When we signed up to government from the Continent, most Britons didn't know what they were letting themselves in for.
Our laws have come from Brussels – and what laws.
What directives.
What a list of instructions.
How this shall be done.
How that shall be regulated.
Process and compliance and inspection and regulation are taking over from production and leadership and enterprise.
Financial services make up 10 per cent of the economy.
It's not just the City of London; it's Southampton as well.
Cardiff.
Birmingham.
Newcastle.
And it's insurance.
Reinsurance.
Stocks and shares.
Futures.

Commodities.

Pension funds.

It is totally irrelevant to this industry whether we have a Labour or a Tory government because their livelihoods are now regulated by a Frenchman who is no friend of ours. Parliament is reduced to the level of a large council.

No one knows for sure exactly how much of our law comes from Brussels.' (Nigel Farage, 2013)

Ruled from Above framing (in relation to EU elites).

B. PART 1 INTER-CODER RELIABILITY TEST

Calculations performed using a 'Coding Comparison Query' in NVivo.

Coder A: Primary Coder

Coder B: Second coder

INTER-CODER RELIABILITY TEST					
		KAPPA (weighted)	AGREEMENT	A AND B	NOT A AND NOT B
MEASURE 1 - THE PEOPLE					
People reference		0.98	99.36	20.21	79.15
	the people	0.98	99.96	0.9	99.06
	the British people	0.6	99.45	0.43	99.02
	British people, Britons	0.77	99.87	0.21	99.66
	Britain, Great Britain, UK, United Kingdom	0.98	99.78	5.08	94.7
	the many	1	100	0.17	99.83
	the majority	0	99.96	0	99.96
	country, nation	0.97	99.7	4.61	95.09
	people	0.96	99.58	5.13	94.45
	working people	0.99	99.96	1.5	98.46
	ordinary/everyday people	0	99.96	0	99.96
	local people	1	100	0.04	99.96
	old people	1	100	0	100
	young people	0.98	99.96	1.2	98.76
	people with other adjectives	0.93	99.96	0.3	99.66
	other instances	0	99.96	0	99.96
People populism level		0.98	99.27	20.12	79.15
	Level 1	0.72	98.67	1.75	96.92
	Level 1.5	0.97	99.92	1.5	98.42
	Level 2	0.88	97.14	12.43	84.71
	Level 3	0.65	98.16	1.75	96.41
People positive or negative		0.97	99.14	19.99	79.15
	explicitly positive	0.5	93.6	3.55	90.05
	neutral/implicitly positive	0.62	91.88	8.07	83.61
	negative	0.61	98.8	0.94	97.86
MEASURE 2 - BRITISH POLITICAL ELITES					
British political elites		0.97	99.83	2.65	97.18
	establishment	1	100	0.04	99.96
	elite(s)	1	100	0.04	99.96
	British politics, politics	1	100	0.56	99.44

	British politician(s), politician(s)	1	100	0.64	99.36
	Westminster	0.91	99.95	0.21	99.74
	Parliament	0.92	99.88	0.73	99.15
	other references	0.86	99.87	0.38	99.49
British elites meaningful		0.97	99.83	2.65	97.18
	Level 1	1	100	1.15	98.85
	Level 2	0.88	99.83	0.64	99.19
	Level 3	0.9	99.83	0.77	99.06
British elites positive or negative		0.96	99.79	2.61	97.18
	positive	0.67	99.95	0.04	99.91
	neutral	0.87	99.7	0.98	98.72
	implicitly negative	0.64	99.49	0.47	99.02
	explicitly negative	0.8	99.7	0.6	99.1
MEASURE 3 - EU POLITICAL ELITES					
EU political elites		0.99	99.96	2.35	97.61
	EU, European Union	0.97	99.96	0.64	99.32
	European Parliament	1	100	0.04	99.96
	European Commission	1	100	0.09	99.91
	Europe	1	100	1.24	98.76
	Brussels/Strasbourg	1	100	0.21	99.79
	other references	1	100	0.13	99.87
EU elites meaningful		1	100	2.39	97.61
	Level 1	0.96	99.95	0.51	99.44
	Level 2	0.93	99.83	1.07	98.76
	Level 3	0.91	99.87	0.64	99.23
EU elites positive or negative		0.99	99.96	2.39	97.57
	positive	0.67	99.92	0.09	99.83
	neutral	0.91	99.79	1.07	98.72
	implicitly negative	0.71	99.66	0.43	99.23
	explicitly negative	0.83	99.83	0.43	99.4
MEASURE 4 - WE OUR US					
We, our, us		0.85	93.04	30.76	62.28
	we the party	0.79	92.99	17.04	75.95
	we the people	0.63	92.43	7.77	84.66
	ambiguous	0.31	96.93	0.73	96.2
MEASURE 5 - PARTISAN REFERENCE					
Partisan reference		0.63	90.47	10.21	80.26
MEASURE 6 - PARTICULAR GROUPS					
Particular groups reference		0.91	99.4	2.99	96.41
	distinct group	0.92	99.88	0.73	99.15

	distinct individual - unnamed	0.86	99.87	0.38	99.49
	distinct individual - named	0.91	99.66	1.88	97.78
MEASURE 7 - COUNTERPOINT REFERENCES					
Counterpoint reference		0.78	97.61	4.44	93.17
	ruled from above	0.66	98.81	1.2	97.61
	bearers of truth	0.54	99.06	0.56	98.5
	paradise lost	0.6	98.72	0.98	97.74
	reinstating common sense	0.5	99.49	0.26	99.23
	order versus chaos	0.76	99.45	0.9	98.55

C. PART 1 INTRA-CODER RELIABILITY TEST

Calculations performed using a 'Coding Comparison Query' in NVivo.

Coder A: Primary Coder

Coder B: Primary Coder 2 weeks later

INTRA-CODER RELIABILITY TEST				
	KAPPA (weighted)	AGREEMENT	A AND B	NOT A AND NOT B
MEASURE 1 - THE PEOPLE				
People reference	1	99.86	19.7	80.16
the people	1	100	0.92	99.08
the British people	1	100	0.85	99.15
British people, Britons	1	100	0.18	99.82
Britain, Great Britain, UK, United Kingdom	0.99	99.93	4.86	95.07
the many	1	100	0.14	99.86
the majority	0	99.96	0	99.96
country, nation	0.97	99.79	4.3	95.49
people	0.98	99.79	5.57	94.22
working people	1	100	1.27	98.73
ordinary/everyday people	1	100	0	100
local people	1	100	0.07	99.93
old people	1	100	0.04	99.96
young people	0.98	99.97	0.99	98.98
people with other adjectives	0.78	99.86	0.25	99.61
other instances	1	100	0	100
People populism level	1	99.89	19.73	80.16
Level 1	0.99	99.96	2.71	97.25
Level 1.5	1	100	1.27	98.73
Level 2	0.97	99.4	12.51	86.89
Level 3	0.92	99.54	2.75	96.79
People positive or negative	0.99	99.75	19.59	80.16
explicitly positive	0.86	99.05	3.1	95.95
neutral/implicitly positive	0.94	98.52	14.09	84.43
negative	0.86	99.65	1.13	98.52
MEASURE 2 - BRITISH POLITICAL ELITES				
British political elites	0.99	99.93	2.75	97.18
establishment	1	100	0.04	99.96
elite(s)	1	100	0.04	99.96
British politics, politics	1	100	0.88	99.12

	British politician(s), politician(s)	1	100	0.53	99.47
	Westminster	0.91	99.97	0.18	99.79
	Parliament	0.97	99.97	0.67	99.3
	other references	0.88	99.9	0.39	99.51
British elites meaningful		0.97	99.86	2.68	97.18
	Level 1	1	100	0.95	99.05
	Level 2	0.93	99.86	0.95	98.91
	Level 3	0.91	99.85	0.7	99.15
British elites positive or negative		0.99	99.93	2.75	97.18
	positive	1	100	0.11	99.89
	neutral	0.89	99.76	1.06	98.7
	implicitly negative	0.68	99.51	0.53	98.98
	explicitly negative	0.82	99.75	0.56	99.19
MEASURE 3 - EU POLITICAL ELITES					
EU political elites		0.96	99.86	1.97	97.89
	EU, European Union	0.87	99.86	0.49	99.37
	European Parliament	1	100	0.04	99.96
	European Commission	1	100	0.07	99.93
	Europe	1	100	1.09	98.91
	Brussels/Strasbourg	1	100	0.18	99.82
	other references	1	100	0.11	99.89
EU elites meaningful		0.96	99.86	1.97	97.89
	Level 1	0.92	99.93	0.42	99.51
	Level 2	0.87	99.76	0.85	98.91
	Level 3	0.97	99.97	0.6	99.37
EU elites positive or negative		0.96	99.86	1.97	97.89
	positive	0.86	99.97	0.11	99.86
	neutral	0.9	99.79	0.99	98.8
	implicitly negative	0.76	99.82	0.28	99.54
	explicitly negative	0.85	99.86	0.39	99.47
MEASURE 4 - WE OUR US					
We, our, us		0.87	94.16	32.14	62.02
	we the party	0.85	94.93	18.29	76.64
	we the people	0.79	95.42	10.29	85.13
	ambiguous	0.45	98.06	0.81	97.25
MEASURE 5 - PARTISAN REFERENCE					
Partisan reference		0.9	97.15	14.8	82.35
MEASURE 6 - PARTICULAR GROUPS					
Particular groups reference		0.96	99.78	2.92	96.86
	distinct group	0.97	99.96	0.63	99.33

	distinct individual - unnamed	0.94	99.93	0.53	99.4
	distinct individual - named	0.97	99.89	1.76	98.13
MEASURE 7 - COUNTERPOINT REFERENCES					
Counterpoint reference		0.83	98.45	3.88	94.57
	ruled from above	0.74	99.08	1.34	97.74
	bearers of truth	0.75	99.65	0.53	9.12
	paradise lost	0.77	99.12	1.55	97.57
	reinstating common sense	0.87	99.93	0.25	99.68
	order versus chaos	0.52	99.22	0.42	98.8

D. PART 2 HIGH AND LOW UKIP THREAT SAMPLE GROUPS

HIGH UKIP THREAT SAMPLE GROUP (26 constituencies)		UKIP Poll result (%)	UKIP EU election result (%)
1	Clacton	48	48.4
2	Boston and Skegness	46	51.6
3	Thurrock	36	45.9
4	Rochester and Strood	35	41.9
5	Dudley North	34	38.4
6	Rother Valley	34	41
7	Great Grimsby	34	41.2
8	Camborne and Redruth	33	36.7
9	Folkestone and Hythe	33	38.9
10	South Thanet	33	39.2
11	North Thanet	32	34.4
12	Eastleigh	32	35
13	Plymouth, Moor View	30	37
14	Cannock Chase	30	38.8
15	South Basildon and East Thurrock	29	45.9
16	Wyre Forest	27	36.6
17	Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	27	42.6
18	South Holland and The Deepings	-	48.5
19	West Suffolk	-	45.8
20	Rayleigh and Wickford	-	44.8
21	Gainsborough	-	44.2
22	Romford	-	43.6
23	Rochford and Southend East	-	43.4
24	Sittingbourne and Sheppey	-	43.3
25	Torbay	21	43.2
26	Totnes	-	43.2

LOW UKIP THREAT SAMPLE GROUP (22 constituencies)		UKIP Poll result (%)	UKIP EU election result (%)
1	Hampstead and Kilburn	2	8.7
2	Hornsey and Wood Green	3	7.1
3	Ealing Central and Acton	6	11.2
4	Finchley and Golders Green	6	15
5	Brent Central	7	8.7
6	Brentford and Isleworth	7	17
7	Brighton, Pavilion	8	18.7

8	Hendon	9	15
9	Kingston and Surbiton	10	19.4
10	Hove	11	18.7
11	Hackney North and Stoke Newington	-	4.9
12	Hackney South and Shoreditch	-	4.9
13	Tottenham	-	7.1
14	Streatham	-	7.9
15	Vauxhall	-	7.9
16	East Ham	-	8.3
17	West Ham	-	8.3
18	Brent North	-	8.7
19	Islington North	-	9.8
20	Battersea	-	10.9
21	Putney	-	10.9
22	Tooting	-	10.9

E. PART 2 CODING FRAME

RANK EACH LEAFLET ON THE SCALE:

0 – no populist framing. Purely partisan discussion, election tactics, basic ‘vote for me not the other parties’ messages.

1 – meaningful reference to **the people** only – level 1 on the previous coding frame, and NOT negative references, only implicitly or explicitly positive.

- Include both references to the British people as a whole AND references to the people of the constituency/area as a whole

e.g. ‘the British people’, ‘the people of Rochester and Strood.’

Needs to be meaningful in sense that it refers to their views, their will, their decision. Sense that the people are important, in charge.

Could include references to local people *e.g. we are putting local people first* – implies the voice of local people is the priority.

2 – meaningful reference to **political elites** only – levels 1 or 2 on the previous coding frame, and NOT positive reference, only implicitly or explicitly negative. No meaningful reference to the people.

2a – British political elites

2b – EU political elites

2c – both British and EU political elites

3 – meaningful reference to **both the people and political elites** – within the leaflet, not necessarily in the same place.

3a – the people and British elites.

3b – the people and EU elites.

3c – the people, British and EU elites.

4 – people and political elite references are right next to each other, or the sense of the rhetoric is **direct antagonism**, us versus them.

4a – people and British elite references

4b – people and the EU elite references

4c – people and British elites, and people and EU elites.

F. PART 2 INTER- AND INTRA- CODER RELIABILITY TESTS

Inter-coder Reliability

Simple agreement calculation

Constituency	Agreement (number of leaflets)	Disagreement (number of leaflets)
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	8	0
Boston and Skegness	2	0
Camborne and Redruth	5	0
Clacton	4	1
Eastleigh	9	1
Folkestone and Hythe	7	1
Great Grimsby	1	2
North Thanet	3	2
Rochester and Strood	21	6
South Thanet	6	2

Total Leaflets coded: 81

Total agreement: 66

Total disagreement: 15

Percent Agreement: $66/81 = 0.814$

Cohen's Kappa Calculation

Code	Coder A total leaflets	Coder B (me) total leaflets	Product of marginals	Sum of marginals
0	40	42	1680	82
1	11	11	121	22
2a	11	11	121	22
2b	1	1	1	2
2c	0	0	0	0
3a	12	11	132	23
3b	2	1	2	3
3c	2	1	2	3
4a	2	3	6	5
4b	0	0	0	0
4c	0	0	0	0

Cohen's Kappa: $\frac{PAo - PAe}{1 - PAe}$ where $PAe = \left(\frac{1}{n^2}\right)(\sum pm_i)$

$$PAe = \left(\frac{1}{81^2}\right)(1680 + 121 + 121 + 1 + 0 + 132 + 2 + 2 + 6 + 0 + 0)$$

$$PAe = \left(\frac{1}{6561}\right)(2065)$$

$$PAe = 0.315$$

$$Kappa = \frac{0.814 - 0.315}{1 - 0.315} = \frac{0.499}{0.68526} = 0.7282$$

Intra-Coder Reliability

Simple agreement calculation

Constituency	Agreement (number of leaflets)	Disagreement (number of leaflets)
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	8	0
Boston and Skegness	2	0
Camborne and Redruth	5	0
Clacton	5	0
Eastleigh	9	1
Folkestone and Hythe	8	0
Great Grimsby	2	1
North Thanet	5	0
Rochester and Strood	22	5
South Thanet	7	1

Total Leaflets coded: 81

Total agreement: 73

Total disagreement: 8

Percent Agreement: 73/81 = 0.9012

Cohen's Kappa calculation

Code	Coder A total leaflets (me 16 Oct)	Coder B total leaflets (me 26 Sept)	Product of marginals	Sum of marginals
0	41	42	1722	83
1	11	11	121	22
2a	13	11	143	24
2b	1	1	1	2
2c	0	0	0	0
3a	11	11	121	22
3b	1	1	1	2
3c	1	1	1	2
4a	2	3	6	5
4b	0	0	0	0
4c	0	0	0	0

Cohen's Kappa: $\frac{PAo - PAe}{1 - PAe}$ where $PAe = \left(\frac{1}{n^2}\right)(\sum pm_i)$

$$PAe = \left(\frac{1}{81^2}\right)(1722 + 121 + 143 + 1 + 121 + 1 + 1 + 6)$$

$$PAe = \left(\frac{1}{6561}\right)(2116)$$

$$PAe = 0.32251$$

$$Kappa = \frac{0.9012 - 0.32251}{1 - 0.32251} = \frac{0.57869}{0.67749} = 0.8542$$

Equations from Kimberly Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, (Thousand Oaks, California; London: Sage, 2002) (pp.154-155)

G. ETHICS APPROVAL FOR INTERVIEWS



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Tel: +44 1865 278700
Fax: +44 1865 278725
Email: enquiries@politics.ox.ac.uk
www.politics.ox.ac.uk



Oxford

22 June 2018

Dear [REDACTED]

Research Ethics Approval: Ref No.: SSH_DPIR_C1A_18_033

Title: Do mainstream parties themselves adopt more populist language and rhetoric when challenger parties using it are successful? The impact of UKIP's electoral success in the 2014 European elections on the language and rhetoric of UK mainstream parties

The above application has been considered on behalf of the DPIR Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University for ethical approval of all research involving human participants.

I am pleased to inform you that, on the basis of the information provided to the DREC, the proposed research has been judged as meeting appropriate ethical standards, and accordingly approval has been granted.

Should there be any subsequent changes to the project, which raise ethical issues not covered in the original application, you should submit details to the DREC for consideration.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'A. Melling'.

Andrew Melling,
Secretary to the DPIR DREC

cc. [REDACTED]

H. PART 3 INTERVIEWS SUMMARY TABLE

Interviewee	Status	Source	Saturation	Format	Length	Recording	Consent
Category 1 – Manifesto writers			Low				
Sir Oliver Letwin	Refused 18/7/18	Sample frame					
Jo Johnson	Refused 19/7/18	Sample frame					
John Rutherford	Failed delivery of email	Sample frame					
Marc Stears	No response	Sample frame					
Ryan Coetzee	No contact details available	Sample frame					
David Laws	Not sought	Sample frame					
Category 2 – Speechwriters/ Special Advisors/ Policy Unit			Low				
Ameet Gill	Not sought	Sample frame					
Clare Foges	No response	Sample frame					
Baroness Gabby Bertin	No response	Sample frame					
Jon Cruddas	Conducted in person 10/9/18	Sample frame		Semi-structured	26 mins	Audio recording and notes	Consent given for direct attributable quotations
Angela Eagle	No response	Sample frame					
Jon Trickett	No response	Sample frame					
Lord Spencer Livermore	No response	Sample frame					
Stephen Lotinga	Conducted on telephone 4/9/18	Sample frame		Semi-structured	20 mins	Audio recording and notes	Consent given for direct attributable quotations
Zena Elmahrouki	Accepted 7/8/18, then no further reply	Sample frame					

Tim Farron	Conducted in person 12/11/18	Sample frame		Semi-structured	25 mins	Audio recording	Consent given for direct attributable quotations
Category 3 – MPs from High UKIP Threat areas			Low				
Giles Watling	No response	Sample frame					
Mark Simmonds	Not sought	Sample frame					
Matt Warman	Not sought	Sample frame					
Jackie Doyle-Price	No response	Sample frame					
Kelly Tolhurst	No response	Sample frame					
Melanie Onn	No response	Sample frame					
Ian Austin	No response	Sample frame					
Craig Mackinlay	No response	Sample frame					
Damian Collins	No response	Sample frame					
George Eustice	No response	Sample frame					
Mims Davies	No response	Sample frame					
Sir Roger Gale	Conducted on telephone 14/9/18	Sample frame		Semi-structured	23 mins	Audio recording and notes	Consent given for direct attributable quotations
Rt Hon Brandon Lewis	No response	Sample frame					
Rt Hon Nick Gibb	No response	Sample frame					
Gordon Henderson	No response	Sample frame					
Rebecca Harris	No response	Sample frame					
Rt Hon Sir Kevin Barron	No response	Sample frame					
Stephen Metcalfe	No response	Sample frame					
Mark Garnier	No response	Sample frame					

Referrals							
Rt Hon John Healey	No response	Referred by John Cruddas MP					
Hope Not Hate	No response	Referred by John Cruddas MP					

Total sampled: 35, plus 2 referrals

Total sought: 33

Response rate: 7/33, 21%

Successful interview rate: 4/33, 12%

Interview summary table format copied from Erik Bleich, and Robert Pekkanen, 'Data Access, Research Transparency, and Interviews: The Interview Methods Appendix,' in 'Symposium: Transparency in Qualitative and Mixed-Method Research,' ed. by Tim Buthe, and Alan Jacobs, in *Qualitative and Multi-Method Research*, 13(1), (2015) 1-52 (pp.11-12)

I. INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

Department of Politics and International Relations
Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford
OX1 3UQ



Do mainstream parties themselves adopt more populist language and rhetoric when challenger parties using it are successful? The impact of UKIP's electoral success in the 2014 European elections on the language and rhetoric of UK mainstream parties.

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Ethics Approval Reference: SSH_DPIR_C1A_18_033

1. *What is the purpose of this research?*

My research project concerns the response of mainstream political parties in the UK to the increased electoral success of UKIP running up to the 2015 General Election. UKIP gained more electoral importance between 2010 and 2014, going from a party of little significance in 2010 to winning the 2014 European elections, and gaining support at the local level. I am exploring whether and how mainstream parties responded to UKIP's use of populist language and rhetoric, and whether political debate as a whole was affected in any way. Was the language of mainstream parties more populist during the 2015 General election campaign compared to the 2010 campaign, and was any change in populist language a response to UKIP's successful use of it? Do mainstream parties respond to the successful use of populist language by using more populist language themselves?

2. *Why have I been invited to take part?*

You have been invited to take part because you were in a position of political influence within your party before and during the 2015 General election campaign. You therefore have insight into how your party perceived of and responded to UKIP at that time.

3. *Do I have to take part?*

There is no obligation to take part in this research. You can ask questions about the research before deciding whether or not to participate. If you do agree to participate, you may withdraw yourself from the study at any time, without giving a reason, by advising the researchers of this decision.

4. What will happen to me if I take part in the research?

If you are happy to take part in the research, you will be asked to do a single interview with me, lasting about 15-20 minutes. With your permission, I will audio-tape record the interview; otherwise I will just take notes. Your responses will be anonymized or non-anonymized, as agreed at the beginning of the interview. You will be asked to sign a consent form agreeing to the arrangements discussed. A Skype or telephone interview could be arranged if meeting in person is problematic.

5. Are there any potential risks in taking part?

A risk in taking part in the research is that anonymity cannot be absolutely guaranteed. Given your high-profile position in politics, and the small number of people I will be interviewing, removal of names may not be enough to ensure comments are not identifiable to you. In order to reduce any potential risks, there is an option to name you as a respondent in the research, and have the interview 'on the record,' rather than 'off the record' with names removed.

There is also a risk that you will not agree with the interpretation and analysis of your comments in the final research project. Analysis will be done fairly and thoughtfully, and a copy of the final project can be supplied to you. However, you will not be able to demand changes to the final project.

6. Are there any benefits in taking part?

This project addresses a question that is of importance to political and public life. It is in the public interest to know whether and how the language of UK political debate was affected by UKIP's increased electoral success by 2014. The answer to the research question will help to understand better the impact of challenger parties who use populist language on mainstream parties and the political system. Crucially, are parties like UKIP able to alter politics even when they are not electorally successful enough to win many seats or gain influence in government? Do they bring about change nonetheless through provoking responses in mainstream parties?

7. What happens to the data provided?

The information you provide as part of the study is the **research data**. Any research data from which you can be identified (i.e. your name and audio recording), is **personal data**. It does not include data where the identity has been removed (anonymous data). I will minimise use of personal data in the study as much as possible.

The **research data** will be stored confidentially using an external hard drive, in a password-protected folder.

Your responses will be anonymized or non-anonymized, as agreed at the beginning of the interview.

Personal data will be stored confidentially using an external hard drive, in a password-protected folder.

My supervisor and I will have access to personal/research data.

With your permission, I will use direct quotations.

All research data and records will be stored for 5 years after the end of the study.

8. *Will the research be published?*

The University of Oxford is committed to the dissemination of its research for the benefit of society and the economy and, in support of this commitment, has established an online archive of research materials. This archive includes digital copies of student theses successfully submitted as part of a University of Oxford postgraduate degree programme. Holding the archive online gives easy access for researchers to the full text of freely available theses, thereby increasing the likely impact and use of that research.

The research will be written up as a thesis. On successful submission of the thesis, it will be deposited both in print and online in the University archives, to facilitate its use in future research. The thesis will be openly accessible.

9. *Who is organising and funding the research?*

The research is self-funded, and is being organized through the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford University.

10. *Who has reviewed this study?*

This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee (Reference number: SSH_DPIR_C1A_18_033).

11. *Who do I contact if I have a concern about the study or I wish to complain?*

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please speak to the researcher, who will do their best to answer your query. The researcher should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how they intend to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the relevant chair of the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford who will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner:

Chair, **Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee**

Email: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk

Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD

12. *Data Protection*

The University of Oxford is the data controller with respect to your personal data, and as such will determine how your personal data is used in the study.

The University will process your personal data for the purpose of the research outlined above. Research is a task that we perform in the public interest.

Further information about your rights with respect to your personal data is available from <http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/councilsec/compliance/gdpr/individualrights/>.

13. Further Information and Contact Details

If you would like to discuss the research with someone beforehand (or if you have questions afterwards), please contact:

Department of Politics and International Relations
Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford
OX1 3UQ

J. CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

Department of Politics and International Relations
Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford
OX1 3UQ



PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

CUREC Approval Reference: SSH_DPIR_C1A_18_033

Do mainstream parties themselves adopt more populist language and rhetoric when challenger parties using it are successful? The impact of UKIP's electoral success in the 2014 European elections on the language and rhetoric of UK mainstream parties.

Purpose of Study: To examine whether, and how, UK mainstream parties responded to populist language and rhetoric used by UKIP as it became more electorally successful between 2010 and 2014.

*Please initial
each box*

- | | | |
|---|--|--------------------------|
| 1 | I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2 | I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, and without any adverse consequences or academic penalty. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3 | I understand that research data collected during the study may be looked at by designated individuals from the University of Oxford where it is relevant to my taking part in this study. I give permission for these individuals to access my data. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4 | I understand that this project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5 | I understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data will be stored and what will happen to the data at the end of the project. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6 | I understand how this research will be written up and published. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7 | I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8 | I consent to being audio recorded. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9 | I understand how audio recordings will be used in research outputs. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

- 10 I give permission to be quoted directly in the research publication, anonymously.
- 11 I give permission to be quoted directly in the research publication, by name.
- 12 I agree to take part in the study.

Name of Participant Date Signature

Name of person taking consent Date Signature

K. INTERVIEW REQUEST EMAIL

Department of Politics and International Relations
Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford
OX1 3UQ



Dear

I am writing to ask whether you would consent to taking an interview with me as part of my research for an MPhil Thesis in Comparative Government at Oxford University.

My research project concerns the response of mainstream political parties in the UK to the increased electoral success of UKIP running up to the 2015 General Election. I am exploring whether and how mainstream parties responded to UKIP's use of populist language and rhetoric, and whether political debate as a whole was affected in any way.

The interview would take about 15-20 minutes of your time. I would ask you questions about how your party perceived UKIP following the 2014 European elections, and whether you think your party responded in any way to UKIP's use of populist language and rhetoric. Your responses could be anonymised or not, as you prefer. The interview could take place on Skype or over the telephone if meeting in person is problematic. I would hope to schedule the interview for some time in September or October.

I attach an information sheet which explains my research project in more detail, and a consent form which I would require you to sign at the beginning of an interview.

Please do contact me if you would like any additional information, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,

L. INTERVIEWS SCRIPT

(Used as a guiding structure, but in reality there was much variation depending on responses).

Interviews Script

Thank you so much for agreeing to talk to me...

As I mentioned in my email, this interview will form part of my research for my MPhil thesis into the response of UK mainstream political parties to UKIP across the period 2010 to 2015.

Before we begin, can I just check that you are happy with me recording our conversation? And secondly, would you prefer any direct quotes to be attributable to you, or to be anonymized?

Great. I trust you've seen and completed the consent form which covers all these points, which I need in order to use this conversation.

If you are happy to start, I'll begin recording from now.

SWITCH ON AUDIO RECORDER

I'm going to refer in the questions following to populism and populist language. So, in my research I take populism to be an ideational framing which considers society to be 'separated into two... antagonistic groups': a 'pure people' versus a 'corrupt elite,' and argues that 'politics should be an expression of the general will of the people' (Mudde 2004)

INTRO

For the sake of the recording, can you tell me how you perceived your role in the party during the 2014/2015 period?

SECTION ONE

Was UKIP's European election win a surprise to your party? How did you perceive them between 2010 and 2015?

Was your party/ were mainstream parties concerned about UKIP in 2014/2015?

Did you view UKIP as a threat in 2014/2015?

Did you think UKIP demanded some kind of response from your party in this period?

SECTION TWO

How would you describe the language used by UKIP and its adherents?

Would you say UKIP uses populist language?
(If not, why not?)

Do you think UKIP's use of language had anything to do with their increased electoral success?

I'd like to read you an excerpt from Nigel Farage's party conference speech in 2013:
*'One thing [our supporters] have in common: they are fed up to the back teeth with the cardboard cut-out careerists in Westminster.
The spot-the-difference politicians.
Desperate to fight the middle ground, but can't even find it.
Focus groupies.
The triangulators.
The dog whistlers.
The politicians who daren't say what they really mean.'*

Can you remember your personal reaction to this speech/language, or to similar such statements?

And can you remember what the reactions were of others around you in the party?

SECTION THREE

Do you remember any changes in strategy by your party in response to UKIP? In terms of policy? And language?

How would you summarize your party's response to UKIP? Would it be to ignore their populist language, to challenge it, to copy it, or something else?

In your opinion, would it ever make sense for your party to adopt more populist language? Why/why not?

FINISH

To finish, I am specifically looking at the response of mainstream parties to UKIP's populist language, and whether they started using more populist language themselves. What do you think my findings are likely to be?

Thank you so much for your time.

Do you have any other comments, or questions you'd like to ask?

M: PART 1 FULL RESULTS TABLES

Party Conference Speeches
All numbers rounded to 2dp.

Cons: Conservative Party
Lab: Labour Party
LDs: Liberal Democrats

MEASURE 1 – THE PEOPLE									
	Sum of references		Average references				Average percentage of text containing references		
	2009/10	2014/15	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means	% change	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means
Meaningful level 1									
Cons	77	97	4.81	6.06	1.25	+26%	3.91	4.53	0.62
Lab	86	68	5.38	4.25	-1.13	-21%	4.44	2.9	-1.54
LDs	30	35	5	5.83	0.83	+17%	3.82	2.96	-0.86
Cons Lab average	163	165	5.09	5.16	0.07	+1%	4.18	3.71	-0.47
Level 1 and explicitly positive									
Cons	17	22	1.06	1.38	0.32	+30%	0.8	0.96	0.16
Lab	15	17	0.94	1.06	0.12	+13%	0.56	0.81	0.25
LDs	2	1	0.33	0.17	-0.16	-48%	0.05	0.06	0.01
Cons Lab average	32	39	1	1.22	0.22	+22%	0.68	0.88	0.2
Level 1 and implicitly positive/ neutral									
Cons	59	75	3.69	4.69	1	+27%	3.09	3.59	0.5
Lab	71	51	4.44	3.19	-1.25	-28%	3.89	2.09	-1.8*
LDs	28	34	4.67	5.67	1	+21%	3.77	2.89	-0.88
Cons Lab average	129	126	4.06	3.94	-0.12	-3%	3.49	2.84	-0.65
Meaningful Level 1.5									
Cons	7	26	0.44	1.63	1.19*	+270%	0.24	0.95	0.71
Lab	10	35	0.63	2.19	1.56	+248%	0.77	1.34	0.57

LDs	2	9	0.33	1.5	1.17	+355%	0.08	1.06	0.98
Cons Lab average	17	61	0.53	1.91	1.38**	+260%	0.5	1.15	0.64*
Level 1.5 and explicitly positive									
Cons	6	26	0.38	1.63	1.25*	+329%	0.2	0.95	0.75*
Lab	10	35	0.63	2.19	1.56	+248%	0.77	1.34	0.57
LDs	1	9	0.17	1.5	1.33	+782%	0.05	1.06	1.01
Cons Lab average	16	61	0.5	1.91	1.41**	+282%	0.48	1.15	0.67*
Level 1.5 and implicitly positive/ neutral									
Cons	1	0	0.06	0	-0.06	-	0.04	0	-0.04
Lab	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0
LDs	1	0	0.17	0	-0.17	-	0.03	0	-0.03
Cons Lab average	1	0	0.03	0	-0.03	-	0.02	0	-0.02
Meaningful Level 2									
Cons	283	466	17.69	29.13	11.44	+65%	11.63	19.05	7.42***
Lab	273	313	17.06	19.56	2.5	+15%	14.8	15.8	1
LDs	117	140	19.5	23.33	3.83	+20%	9.47	12.9	3.43
Cons Lab average	556	779	17.38	24.34	6.96	+40%	13.22	17.42	4.2**
Level 2 and explicitly positive									
Cons	42	97	2.63	6.06	3.43*	+130%	1.99	3.78	1.79*
Lab	44	48	2.75	3	0.25	+9%	1.82	2.18	0.36
LDs	9	12	1.5	2	0.5	+33%	0.63	0.82	0.19
Cons Lab average	86	145	2.69	4.53	1.84	+68%	1.9	2.98	1.08*
Level 2 and implicitly positive/ neutral									
Cons	223	342	13.94	21.38	7.44	+53%	9.03	14.39	5.36**
Lab	221	255	13.81	15.94	2.13	+15%	12.51	13.43	0.92

LDs	104	126	17.33	21	3.67	+21%	8.62	11.03	2.41
Cons Lab average	444	597	13.88	18.66	4.78	+34%	10.77	13.91	3.14*
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances * significant at 90% level (p<0.1) ** significant at 95% level (p<0.05) *** significant at 99% level (p<0.01)									

MEASURE 2 – BRITISH POLITICAL ELITES									
	Sum of references		Average references				Average percentage of text containing references		
	2009/10	2014/15	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means	% change	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means
Meaningful level 1									
Cons	20	17	1.25	1.06	-0.19	-15%	1.01	0.52	-0.49
Lab	12	14	0.75	0.88	0.13	+17%	0.36	0.75	0.39
LDs	2	22	0.33	3.67	3.34*	+1012%	0.43	2.57	2.14**
Cons Lab average	32	31	1	0.97	-0.03	-3%	0.68	0.64	-0.04
Level 1 and explicitly negative									
Cons	5	7	0.31	0.44	0.13	+42%	0.24	0.18	-0.06
Lab	7	9	0.44	0.56	0.13	+27%	0.17	0.59	0.42*
LDs	1	14	0.17	2.33	2.16*	+1270%	0.21	1.91	1.7
Cons Lab average	12	16	0.38	0.5	0.13	+32%	0.21	0.39	0.18
Level 1 and implicitly negative									
Cons	8	6	0.5	0.38	-0.12	-24%	0.56	0.23	-0.33
Lab	2	3	0.13	0.19	0.06	+46%	0.05	0.08	0.03
LDs	1	3	0.17	0.5	0.33	+194%	0.22	0.13	-0.09
Cons Lab average	10	9	0.31	0.28	-0.03	-10%	0.3	0.16	-0.14

Level 1 and neutral									
Cons	6	4	0.38	0.25	-0.13	-34%	0.18	0.1	-0.08
Lab	1	2	0.06	0.13	0.06	+116%	0.09	0.08	-0.01
LDs	0	5	0	0.83	0.83*	-	0	0.53	0.53
Cons Lab average	7	6	0.22	0.19	-0.03	-14%	0.14	0.09	-0.05
Level 1 and positive									
Cons	1	0	0.06	0	-0.06	-100%	0.03	0	-0.03
Lab	2	0	0.13	0	-0.13	-100%	0.05	0	-0.05
LDs	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0
Cons Lab average	3	0	0.09	0	-0.09	-100%	0.04	0	-0.04
Meaningful level 2									
Cons	34	16	2.13	1	-1.13	-53%	1.22	0.95	-0.27
Lab	49	49	3.06	3.06	0	0%	1.79	2.74	0.95
LDs	28	21	4.67	3.5	-1.17	-25%	1.98	1.93	-0.05
Cons Lab average	83	65	2.59	2.03	-0.56	-22%	1.51	1.85	0.34
Level 2 and explicitly negative									
Cons	7	5	0.44	0.31	-0.13	-30%	0.28	0.29	0.01
Lab	10	18	0.63	1.13	0.5	+79%	0.16	1.07	0.91*
LDs	9	4	1.5	0.67	-0.83	-55%	0.6	0.46	-0.14
Cons Lab average	17	23	0.53	0.72	0.19	+36%	0.22	0.68	0.46*
Level 2 and implicitly negative									
Cons	9	3	0.56	0.19	-0.37	-66%	0.31	0.17	-0.14
Lab	13	18	0.81	1.13	0.31	+40%	0.39	1.15	0.76
LDs	10	2	1.67	0.33	-1.34	-80%	0.57	0.22	-0.35
Cons Lab average	22	21	0.69	0.66	-0.03	-4%	0.35	0.66	0.31

Level 2 and neutral									
Cons	14	6	0.88	0.38	-0.5	-57%	0.46	0.44	-0.02
Lab	19	9	1.19	0.56	-0.63	-53%	0.94	0.33	-0.61*
LDs	8	13	1.33	2.17	0.84	+63%	0.71	1.13	0.42
Cons Lab average	33	15	1.03	0.47	-0.56*	-54%	0.7	0.39	-0.31
Level 2 and positive									
Cons	4	2	0.25	0.13	-0.13	-48%	0.17	0.06	-0.11
Lab	7	4	0.44	0.25	-0.19	-43%	0.31	0.19	-0.12
LDs	1	2	0.17	0.33	0.16	+94%	0.1	0.13	0.03
Cons Lab average	11	6	0.34	0.19	-0.15	-44%	0.24	0.12	-0.12
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances * significant at 90% level (p<0.1) ** significant at 95% level (p<0.05) *** significant at 99% level (p<0.01)									

MEASURE 3 – EU POLITICAL ELITES									
	Sum of references		Average references				Average percentage of text containing references		
	2009/10	2014/15	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means	% change	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means
Meaningful level 1									
Cons	3	14	0.19	0.88	0.69	+363%	0.2	0.65	0.45
Lab	1	1	0.06	0.06	0	0%	0.15	0.03	-0.12
LDs	1	5	0.17	0.83	0.66	+388%	0.04	0.55	0.51*
Cons Lab average	4	15	0.13	0.47	0.34	+261%	0.18	0.34	0.16
Level 1 and explicitly negative									
Cons	1	4	0.06	0.25	0.19	+317%	0.06	0.3	0.24
Lab	0	4	0	0.06	0.06	-	0	0.03	0.03
LDs	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0

Cons Lab average	1	8	0.03	0.16	0.13	+433%	0.03	0.17	0.14
Level 1 and implicitly negative									
Cons	1	9	0.06	0.56	0.5*	+833%	0.02	0.29	0.27**
Lab	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0
LDs	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0
Cons Lab average	1	9	0.03	0.28	0.25*	+833%	0.01	0.14	0.13*
Level 1 and neutral									
Cons	0	1	0	0.06	0.06	-	0	0.07	0.07
Lab	1	0	0.06	0	-0.06	-100%	0.15	0	-0.15
LDs	1	4	0.17	0.67	0.5	+294%	0.04	0.46	0.42
Cons Lab average	1	1	0.03	0.03	0	0%	0.07	0.03	-0.04
Level 1 and positive									
Cons	1	0	0.06	0	-0.06	-100%	0.12	0	-0.12
Lab	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0
LDs	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0
Cons Lab average	1	0	0.03	0	-0.03	-100%	0.06	0	-0.06
Meaningful level 2									
Cons	24	43	1.5	2.69	1.19	+79%	2.03	1.79	-0.24
Lab	15	23	0.94	1.44	0.5	+53%	0.7	1.61	0.91
LDs	1	16	0.17	2.67	2.5	+1470%	0.06	1.07	1.01
Cons Lab average	39	66	1.22	2.06	0.84	+69%	1.37	1.7	0.33
Level 2 and explicitly negative									
Cons	3	8	0.19	0.5	0.31	+163%	0.07	0.25	0.18
Lab	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0
LDs	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0

Cons Lab average	3	8	0.09	0.25	0.16	+178%	0.04	0.13	0.09
Level 2 and implicitly negative									
Cons	2	10	0.13	0.63	0.5	+385%	0.14	0.52	0.38
Lab	1	5	0.06	0.31	0.25	+417%	0.02	0.28	0.26
LDs	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0
Cons Lab average	3	15	0.09	0.47	0.38*	+422%	0.08	0.4	0.32
Level 2 and neutral									
Cons	16	21	1	1.31	0.31	+31%	1.46	0.92	-0.54
Lab	14	21	0.88	0.69	-0.19	-21%	0.68	0.72	0.04
LDs	1	14	0.17	2.33	2.16	+1270%	0.06	0.96	0.9
Cons Lab average	30	42	0.94	1	0.06	+6%	1.07	0.82	-0.25
Level 2 and positive									
Cons	3	5	0.19	0.31	0.13	+63%	0.36	0.13	-0.23
Lab	0	5	0	0.44	0.44**	-	0	0.61	0.61*
LDs	0	2	0	0.33	0.33	-	0	0.11	0.11
Cons Lab average	3	10	0.09	0.38	0.29*	+322%	0.18	0.37	0.19
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances * significant at 90% level (p<0.1) ** significant at 95% level (p<0.05) *** significant at 99% level (p<0.01)									

MEASURE 4 – WE, OUR, US				
	Average percentage of text containing references			
	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Difference in means	% change
We the Party				
Cons	26.56	25.8	-0.76	-3%
Lab	28.16	20.08	-8.08**	-29%
LDs	20.77	28.09	7.32*	+35%
Cons Lab average	27.36	22.94	-4.42*	-16%
We the people				
Cons	11.8	14.66	2.85	+24%
Lab	9.84	14.16	4.32	+44%
LDs	11.65	12.76	1.11	+9%
Cons Lab average	10.82	14.41	3.58*	+33%
Ambiguous				
Cons	5.68	3.05	-2.63	-46%
Lab	3.93	5.51	1.58	+40%
LDs	1.87	3.26	1.39	+74%
Cons Lab average	4.81	4.28	-0.53	-11%
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances * significant at 90% level (p<0.1) ** significant at 95% level (p<0.05) *** significant at 99% level (p<0.01)				

MEASURE 5 - PARTISAN REFERENCE				
	Average percentage of text containing references			
	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Difference in means	% change
Partisan Reference				
Cons	18.92	15.48	-3.44	-18%
Lab	29.17	23.58	-5.59	-19%
LDs	19.67	20.3	0.63	+3%
Cons Lab average	24.05	19.53	-4.52	-19%
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances * significant at 90% level (p<0.1) ** significant at 95% level (p<0.05) *** significant at 99% level (p<0.01)				

MEASURE 6 – PARTICULAR GROUPS REFERENCE									
	Sum of references		Average references				Average percentage of text containing references		
	2009/10	2014/15	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means	% change	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Diff. in means
Particular group									
Cons	4	3	0.25	0.19	-0.06	-24%	0.64	0.32	-0.32
Lab	8	6	0.5	0.38	-0.13	-26%	1.34	0.67	-0.67
LDs	0	1	0	0.17	0.17	-	0	0.38	0.38
Cons Lab average	12	9	0.38	0.28	-0.1	-26%	0.99	0.49	-0.5
Particular unnamed individual									
Cons	6	5	0.38	0.31	-0.06	-16%	0.65	0.7	0.05
Lab	4	3	0.25	0.19	-0.06	-24%	0.32	0.42	0.1
LDs	0	3	0	0.5	0.5	-	0	0.29	0.29
Cons Lab average	10	8	0.31	0.25	-0.06	-19%	0.48	0.56	0.08

Particular named individual									
Cons	3	4	0.19	0.25	0.06	+32%	0.6	0.52	-0.08
Lab	3	8	0.19	0.5	0.31	+163%	0.77	1.24	0.47
LDs	0	1	0	0.17	0.17	-	0	0.17	0.17
Cons Lab average	6	12	0.19	0.38	0.19	+100%	0.69	0.88	0.19
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances * significant at 90% level (p<0.1) ** significant at 95% level (p<0.95) *** significant at 99% level (p<0.01)									

MEASURE 7 – COUNTERPOINT REFERENCES				
	Average percentage of text containing references			
	2009/10 mean	2014/15 mean	Difference in means	% change
Total counterpoint references				
Cons	1.16	1.09	-0.07	-6%
Lab	0.09	2.76	2.67**	+2966%
LDs	0	0.27	0.27	-
Cons Lab average	0.63	1.93	1.3*	+206%
Bearers of truth				
Cons	0	0	0	0%
Lab	0	0.14	0.14	-
LDs	0	0	0	0%
Cons Lab average	0	0.07	0.07	-
Order vs. chaos				
Cons	0.36	0	-0.36	-100%
Lab	0	0	0	0%
LDs	0	0	0	0%
Cons Lab average	0.18	0	-0.18	-100%

Paradise lost				
Cons	0.09	0.31	0.22	+244%
Lab	0	0	0	0%
LDs	0	0	0	0%
Cons Lab average	0.04	0.16	0.12	+300%
Reinstating common sense				
Cons	0	0	0	0%
Lab	0	0.81	0.81	-
LDs	0	0	0	0%
Cons Lab average	0	0.4	0.4	-
Ruled from above				
Cons	0.71	1.09	0.38	+53%
Lab	0.09	2.21	2.12*	+2356%
LDs	0	0.27	0.27	-
Cons Lab average	0.4	1.65	1.25*	+3125%
Statistical significance: t-test assuming unequal variances * significant at 90% level ($p < 0.1$) ** significant at 95% level ($p < 0.05$) *** significant at 99% level ($p < 0.01$)				