The Formation of International Relations: Ideas, Practices, Institutions, 1914-1940

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Short Abstract

The study of International Relations (IR) emerged in the context of transnational networks of scholars, politicians, and philanthropists who sought to devise a peaceful world order in the face of international conflict. Prompted by the Great War, the pioneers of IR argued that international politics should be subject to public and academic investigation. In order to generate the required expertise, they established a range of university-based as well as policy-oriented institutions during the 1910s and 20s. Rather than studying political theory or advancing scientific methodology, however, early IR scholars focused on current affairs and became involved in foreign politics themselves. Throughout the formative period of IR, from 1914 to 1940, its protagonists oscillated between understanding and making international politics.

This dissertation examines the formation of IR from about 1914 to the Second World War, with particular emphasis on the range of international actors and institutions that shaped the discipline. Based on multi-archival research in Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, it explores the key venues for the study of IR. In particular, the dissertation reflects how IR scholars used transnational forms of exchange, such as the organs of intellectual cooperation at the League of Nations. It also incorporates women and feminist approaches to IR.

Contrary to conventional historiography, the dissertation argues that IR was neither founded in 1919, nor dominated by coherent schools of thought during the inter-war period. Instead, it demonstrates how the discipline was formed by an eclectic group of scholars and practitioners, men and women, English-speaking and international. By building on recent revisionist literature and by re-integrating neglected actors, the dissertation reveals the complex and sometimes inconsistent ways in which issues of international politics became the subject of academic study.

Long Abstract

The study of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline emerged in the context of transnational networks of academics, politicians, diplomats, journalists, and philanthropists. In the face of international conflict, the protagonists of IR argued that issues of war and peace should be subject to public and academic investigation. In order to generate the required expertise, they established a range of university-based as well as policy-oriented institutions during the 1910s and 20s. Throughout the inter-war period, IR scholars focused on current affairs and worked as quasi-diplomats, rather than producing a coherent set of theoretical scholarship. This approach became particularly problematic during the crises of the 1930s, and has since left disciplinary historians puzzled over the ideas, practices, and institutions that shaped the formation of IR.

Contrary to traditional historiography, IR as an academic discipline was not created *ex nihilo* in 1919, nor was it dominated during the inter-war period by a homogenous group of Anglo-American 'idealist' thinkers. Instead, this dissertation argues that the genesis of IR was subject to longer and more complex processes involving a wider range of actors and generating policy proposals rather than strictly theoretical scholarship. It builds on recent revisionist accounts which have offered more nuanced interpretations of inter-war IR scholarship. Crucially, it integrates women and non-English speaking authors whose contributions have been underestimated in the literature.

By drawing on extensive and previously unexplored archival sources in six countries—Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States—the dissertation highlights neglected actors and discourses, representing their diverging interests and motives. It argues that early IR scholarship was the product of vested interests rather than rigorous analysis. Many IR scholars, such as Philip Noel-Baker, Ernst Jäckh, and William Rappard, occupied political or diplomatic positions during their careers. They advised governments, worked at the League of Nations, and drafted international treaties. Influential philanthropists sponsored professorships and departments at Aberystwyth, London, Oxford, Berlin, Hamburg, Paris, and Geneva. Despite the claim to engage in scientific and objective studies, early IR scholars often pursued practical goals and quickly adopted policy-oriented standpoints in response to political events. This made early IR scholarship a convoluted field, inspired by ideas on peace and security, articulated in constant exchange with practical events.

Conventional historiography has ingrained a simplistic and biased story of the origins of IR. In line with E. H. Carr's classic *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939), inter-war IR scholarship has usually been degraded as a camp of so-called 'idealists' who were overly confident in the role of legal and moral norms in sustaining international peace. The response by self-declared 'realists', such as Carr, was to emphasise military power and national self-interest as the principle determinants of international politics. They deliberately misconstrued early IR scholarship as a naïve pseudo-science and an intellectual bandwagon of the League of Nations. This whiggish interpretation of disciplinary history produced the misleading image of a 'first great debate' between 'idealists' and 'realists', and conveniently assumed 1919 to be the field's 'birthday'. Generations of post-1945 IR scholars reiterated this story, entrenching a flawed disciplinary history that partly persists until today.

More recently, political scientists such as Lucian M. Ashworth, David Long, Brian C. Schmidt, Robert Vitalis, and Peter Wilson have reconsidered the origins of their discipline and developed a more nuanced revisionist history of IR. Thanks to their work, inter-war IR is no longer framed in terms of a 'great debate', and authors once dismissed as 'idealists' have been interpreted more accurately. In particular, they have demonstrated the ideological diversity of inter-war scholarship, and shed light on forgotten discourses such as imperialism, race, and international anarchy. Yet, by focusing on theoretical reconstructions of inter-war IR, the revisionists have maintained the problematic assumption that theoretical expression of international relations was the core goal for early IR authors. They have also, by and large, failed to include non-English speaking scholarship, pre-1919 works, and the contributions of women.

This dissertation seeks to complement the revisionist history of IR by re-integrating a number of neglected actors and discourses. Firstly, it recovers important institutions and individuals who engaged in the study and teaching of IR since at least the beginning of the First World War, thus shifting back the common chronology by five crucial years. Second, it shows that IR scholars always collaborated across borders, using the League of Nation's institutions for intellectual cooperation as a platform for exchange. Third, it demonstrates that women and feminist political thought played a prominent role in

the formation of IR. Fourth, it articulates how the study of IR was shaped by a constant and profound dialogue between thinkers and practitioners of international politics. Finally, it argues that the early history of IR cannot be framed in terms of coherent schools of thought. In fact, the discipline was characterised by diverse and sometimes inconsistent works which were usually intended for immediate application, rather than exercises in political theory.

In order to address these issues, the dissertation examines the formation of IR in five chapters, covering, in turn, the origins of the discipline, intellectual cooperation, the interaction between scholars and practitioners, the debate about 'collective security', and the demise of IR at the beginning of the Second World War.

The first chapter recounts the pre-1919 origins of IR scholarship through the lens of individuals, such as Alfred Zimmern and Ernst Jäckh, as well as organisations, such as the Union of Democratic Control and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. One immediate motive for the study of IR during its early phase were the horrors of the war. This gave rise to a set of studies on peace and international order which, for the first time in history, formed a coherent body of IR scholarship. In particular, these studies envisioned the details of a new diplomatic system, based on international governance and law. Underlying these plans was the conviction that foreign policy should be subject to democratic control. Effective control of foreign policy, however, required better information and education in international affairs. Proponents of democratic control also demanded access for women who had previously been excluded. In order to learn from each others' work, the protagonists of IR collaborated across national borders, even during the war. Its members came from various academic backgrounds, including history, law, economics, classics, geography, and anthropology. Building on informal networks established during the 1910s, IR pioneers began to establish the discipline at a range of universities and non-academic institutes from 1919 onwards. In particular, the chapter covers professorial chairs, departments, and research institutes at Aberystwyth, London, Oxford, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg, Vienna, Geneva, and the US East Coast.

The second chapter shows how the study of IR was, from the outset, embedded in networks of transnational intellectual cooperation. Having maintained informal relationships during the war, the protagonists of IR pressed governments to establish a more formal infrastructure after the war. Although initially not part of the Covenant, the League of Nations installed in 1922 an International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation in Geneva, complemented in 1926 by an executive branch, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, based in Paris—together they were the predecessor of UNESCO. The Paris Institute sponsored the first academic conference in the field of IR—the International Studies Conference. It held annual plenary sessions in various European cities from 1928 until 1939 and provided a platform for leading public intellectuals, such as classicist Gilbert Murray and historian Arnold Toynbee. Collaborating across borders allowed IR to quickly become a well-integrated scholarly community, featuring student exchanges, guest lectureships, international academic journals, and a fairly coherent research agenda. However, intellectual cooperation was not only important in providing an infrastructure for scholars, but it was also regarded as an exercise in international cooperation in its own right. It is impossible, the chapter argues, to understand the academic and practical program of IR without appreciating these transnational connections.

The proximity between academia and practice is addressed in more detail in the third chapter, covering a range of IR scholars, from the early 1920s to the early 30s, who both studied and practiced foreign affairs. On the one hand, they built a disciplinary identity for IR by establishing university courses, summer schools and exchange programs. At the same time, however, they prepared policy drafts, advised governments, and imitated the rhetoric of diplomatic negotiations. Since 1914 they had worked on plans for a post-war order, contributing significantly to the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations Covenant. Over the course of the inter-war period, professors continued to draft treaties, provide expert advice, and campaign for political goals. Besides their role as teachers and researchers, IR scholars acted as quasi-diplomats, such as Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy at the Dawes Plan negotiations or James T. Shotwell in the preparation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. At the same time, non-academic actors had an impact on the scientific study of IR. Philanthropic organisations, such as the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation, provided targeted funding for programs that suited their agenda. Diplomats and politicians gave lectures for university students. Finally, political circumstances determined university curricula and the freedom of academics.

A complicated symbiosis thus emerged between academics who sought to influence foreign policy and, vice versa, non-academic actors who took an interest in research and teaching of IR.

The fourth chapter zooms in on one of the key debates of inter-war IR. It reviews the history of 'collective security' as a political concept and an instrument of international governance during the first half of the 1930s. If nation-states committed to disarmament, so the idea, their security would have to be guaranteed by an international institution that could impose sanctions against defectors. 'Collective security' became the principle instrument which the international community tried to employ sanctions against aggressors such as Japan, Italy, and Germany, and it was heatedly debated among IR scholars. The chapter takes into account a broad spectrum of voices on the constituent elements feeding into 'collective security', including questions about national sovereignty, disarmament, the nature of sanctions, the selection of member-states, and the feminist critique of sanctions. It concludes that neither the abstract model nor the political institutions were set in stone at any point during the inter-war period. This ambiguity was reflected in the ineffective response of the League to the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises. The failure of 'collective security', the chapter argues, was characteristic for the formation of IR in terms of its intellectual defects and inflated practical ambitions.

Finally, the fifth chapter explores how IR scholars responded to Nazi Germany, both in terms of academic analysis and practical consequences. After taking office in January 1933, Hitler's government almost immediately nationalised institutions for the study of IR and put them under the control of the propaganda ministry. Colleagues and philanthropies helped academic refugees, such as Mendelssohn Bartholdy, to continue their work in Britain, Switzerland, and the US. At the same time, however, IR scholars struggled to find a cogent explanation for the rise of Nazism and its foreign policy goals. In particular, they underestimated the extent to which dictators could disregard international law and turn diplomacy into an unpredictable gamble, far beyond the modest analytical tools of IR. On several occasions, IR scholars invited Nazis and Fascists to participate at academic conferences. These overtures towards dictatorships reflected versions of 'peaceful change', the idea that international conflict may be averted by giving in to the grievances of revisionist governments. The chapter traces 'peaceful change' as an IR concept and political instrument, and takes into account its critics, especially female IR authors and anti-imperialists. Inter-war IR scholarship came to a complete end when European hostilities forced research institutions to close or relocate in the spring of 1940.

Over the course of a quarter of a century, from 1914 to 1940, the conduct of international relations became one of the most contentious fields of academic research and political debate. Scholars of various backgrounds devised new ideas for international governance. Politicians campaigned for peaceful means to settle international disputes. Philanthropists sponsored a range of university-based and policy-oriented institutions. The general public demanded better information and education. Their concern was with international politics broadly conceived, covering economic, political, and cultural aspects of international life, and, crucially, with the way in which these affairs were governed.

Unlike traditional or revisionist historiography, this dissertation concludes that inter-war IR scholarship was neither dominated by 'idealists', nor by any other consistent strand of theory. Instead, it shows that the vast majority of IR writing was concerned with foreign policy questions of immediate interest to decision-makers. Rather than retrospectively fitting authors in the Procrustean beds of 'idealism', 'realism', or other theoretical schools, the dissertation demonstrates the widespread disinterest in abstract theories or analytical models, let alone methodologies. To be sure, there were exceptions and some noteworthy theoretical reflections on topics, such as 'sovereignty' or 'international governance', but the focus of debate was almost always on more practical questions. This aspect underscores that the founding parents of IR sought not only to understand but to make international relations.

Throughout all five chapters, the dissertation takes into account women who, despite widespread marginalisation, contributed significantly to the intellectual and institutional formation of the discipline. As journalists, political activists, and academics they encouraged a wide audience to study the causes of war and peace. They organised summer schools, lectures, and evening courses. They also contributed substantially to IR scholarship, developing what one might call a genuinely feminist approach to the discipline. For example, they emphasised the rights of women and children in war, they argued that women were inherently more peaceful than men and, perhaps most importantly, they linked the struggle for female enfranchisement with the demand for democratic control of foreign policy. Their group included academics, such as Lucy Mair and Margery Perham, political activists, such as Lida

Gustava Heymann and Helena Swanwick, and diplomatic officials such as Rachel Crowdy and Rosika Schwimmer.

The dissertation provides the first international history of the formation of IR. Drawing on personal papers, university records, and state archives in English, French and German, it expands on and corrects existing historiography in terms of neglected ideas, practices, and institutions. While making no claim to be exhaustive, it adds important actors and strands of thought that have been obscured in what has hitherto been presented as a predominantly male, Anglo-American, theory-heavy discipline. Besides revising disciplinary history, the dissertation also aims to inform other research fields more broadly, including diplomacy, security studies, political science, and the history of social sciences. In particular, it addresses issues arising at the intersection of academia and diplomacy, between the study and conduct of foreign affairs, and between theory and practice. In this sense, the dissertation also seeks to contribute to contemporary debates about the role of academics in international politics and, ultimately, about international politics itself.

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When I decided three years ago to study the history of International Relations for a doctoral degree, I suspected that this project would require a lot of endurance, friendly support, and good fortune. I was right. But I did not expect to complete the thesis under such favourable conditions.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 9

Table of Contents 11

Abbreviations and Notes 12

Introduction: Understanding International Relations 13

1. Genesis of a Discipline: the Great War, the Paris Peace Conference, and the Institutionalisation of International Relations 30

2. Peace in the Minds of Men and Women: Intellectual Cooperation and International Relations at the League of Nations 70

3. Scholars in Action: Professors, Diplomats, and Internationalists in the Field of International Relations 110

4. Internationalising Security: Debates on a Global Sanctions System 150

5. The End of World Affairs: Nazism, Peaceful Change, and the Demise of Inter-War International Relations 191

Conclusion: Making International Relations 233

Bibliography 250

Abbreviations and Notes

AAC	Academic Assistance Council
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CODP	Central Organisation for a Durable Peace
CSIR	Council for the Study of International Relations, London
DHfP	Deutsche Hochschule für Politik
IAP	Institut für Auswärtige Politik
ICIC	International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICW	International Council of Women
IIIC	International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation
IHEI	Institut des Hautes Études Internationales, Paris
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPR	Institute of Pacific Relations
IR	International Relations
ISC	International Studies Conference
FPA	Foreign Policy Association
RF	Rockefeller Foundation
SPLS	Society for the Protection of Science and Learning [today known as Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA)]
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
US	United States of America
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

In the interest of readability, I have translated most quotations into English, providing the original only where the wording seemed noteworthy. All translations from non-English authors and sources are my own, unless otherwise indicated. I have used 'single' quotation marks to refer to certain terms and concepts—such as 'collective security'—in order to highlight them as technical terms within International Relations, as distinct from their general meaning. Direct quotations are in "double" quotation marks. To keep footnotes concise, I have shortened some archival descriptions as well as the titles of publications after their first citation. The full details are given in the bibliography.

Introduction: Understanding International Relations

"*The problem of international relations has been recognised [as] the master-problem of the present age.*"
(Arnold Toynbee, 1934)[1]

There is a simple story about the origins of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline. In the aftermath of the First World War, so that story goes, a group of so called 'idealist' thinkers founded a number of professorships and research centres in Britain and the United States. Their idea was to underpin the newly established League of Nations with an intellectual program based on international law and cosmopolitan ideals. When the project of peaceful cooperation failed in the 1930s, a generation of self-described 'realist' scholars argued that the founding 'fathers' of IR had erred, and that international relations were actually shaped by power and national self-interest. This story has dominated disciplinary memory ever since, despite recent revisionist accounts, and despite wide-ranging evidence for a more complex history.

Rather than at a mythical moment in 1919, the first IR institutions and ideas emerged during the First World War, and the first "general text-book" was published in 1916.[2] From the outset, the discipline was an international endeavour, not limited to the Anglo-American sphere, but including scholars from across Europe and soon other parts of the world. Their intellectual output was more diverse, and often incoherent, than theoretical reconstructions have suggested. In many cases, their scholarship was inspired by interactions with political actors and by a desire to change the world, rather than to merely understand it. Crucially, there was a number of founding 'mothers' who, despite deep-rooted gender stereotypes, contributed intellectually and practically to the formation of IR.

Over the course of 26 years from 1914 to the Second World War, the conduct of international relations became one of the most contentious fields of academic research and political debate—it was the "master-problem" of the time, as the historian and IR expert Arnold Toynbee put it.[3] Scholars devised new ideas on governing the world. Politicians campaigned for peaceful methods to settle international disputes. Wealthy philanthropists sponsored a range of university-based as well as policy-oriented institutions for the study IR. Their motives and approaches varied widely depending on political circumstances, while rigorous analysis and scientific standards were given less attention. The pioneers of IR were often torn between "disinterested pursuit of objective truth" on the one hand, and their role as "imitation statesmen" on the other.[4] They were united, however, in their belief that questions of international politics should be subject to academic inspection in order to "enlighten public opinion", to foster "international understanding", and to bring about "constructive peace".[5] That was the decisive momentum for the formation of IR.

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[1] Arnold Toynbee to G. G. Kullmann, 3 May 1934, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 117.

[2] A. L. Grant et al., *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, 1916), p. v.

[3] Arnold Toynbee to G. G. Kullmann, 3 May 1934, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 117.

This dissertation examines the formation of IR with particular emphasis on the multiplicity of ideas, practices, and institutions involved. Contrary to traditional historiography, it traces the origins of the discipline from the start of the First World War, rather than 1919. It takes into account a range of international authors and institutions, including women, who have previously been neglected. By combining intellectual and international history approaches, the dissertation reinterprets disciplinary developments in the context of various non-academic influences. It agrees with recent revisionist literature that IR did not evolve in the form of a 'great debate' between so called 'idealist' and 'realist' thinkers. However, it goes beyond theoretical reconstructions from within political science, and argues from an historian's perspective that the formation of IR was the result of practical activities by a range of scholars and non-academic actors, men and women, English-speaking and international. The remainder of this introduction provides an historiographical overview and a synopsis of the contribution of this dissertation.

Writing the History of a Discipline

For most of the twentieth century there was near consensus about the history of IR as an academic discipline. According to the established story, IR was founded in 1919 by a group of so called 'idealist' thinkers who believed in the capacity of moral and legal norms in securing international peace. In the 1930s and 40s, the story continues, a so called 'realist' school challenged earlier scholarship by insisting that military power and national self-interest were the dominating forces in international politics—

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[4] International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), pp. xiii, 60.

[5] Central Organisation for a Durable Peace, circular, 30 September 1915, Box 1, CODP Records; Oxford Society for Promoting International Understanding and Friendship, letter, 26 August 1919, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 181; and Gilbert Murray to Philip Noel-Baker, 4 November 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

resulting in what has since been dubbed the 'first great debate' in IR.[6] Authors usually associated with the 'idealist' camp include Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, and Alfred Zimmern, whereas 'realism' was championed by E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Most notably, Carr's 1939 classic *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* helped to ingrain a version of disciplinary identity that assumed 1919 as its founding moment and regarded inter-war scholarship as naïve "utopianism".[7]

With few exceptions, subsequent generations of IR scholars reiterated Carr's critique of the alleged inter-war 'idealists', and thus fostered a widely shared conception of the origins of the discipline.[8] They also implied that IR was an Anglo-American enterprise pioneered by white men.[9] Contemporary textbooks have continued to spread clichés about the early study of IR, especially that it was dominated by "utopian liberalism", and that the essential ideas were formulated in 1919 by Anglo-American men, notably by Woodrow Wilson himself.[10] They have also ignored the origins of IR during the First World War by claiming that the field came about "after the end of the First World War" or even later.[11]

It was not until the second half of the 1980s that IR scholars began to re-consider the history of their field. The revisionist turn was inspired by the feeling that 'realists' had constructed a disciplinary memory that suited their theory, especially in the context of Cold War power politics, and that they had denounced unduly inter-war scholars as naïve believers in the League of Nations.[12] What is more, IR scholars became increasingly uncomfortable with the idea that their discipline evolved in the form of waves or 'great debates'.[13] Drawing on the original works of inter-war authors, the revisionists found that Carr's account had grossly overstated the alleged dichotomy between 'idealism' and 'realism'. In fact, neither side of the so called 'great debate' had defined their theory as clearly as subsequently claimed—'idealists' turned out to be less 'idealist', and the self-declared 'realists' had actually incorporated more 'idealist' thinking than commonly thought.[14] Given the lack of well-defined intellectual schools, there was even reason to doubt whether there had been any real scholarly debate at all.[15]

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[6] Rainer Baumann et al. (eds.), *International Relations: The Great Debates* (Cheltenham, 2011), esp. Vol. 1. For a critical evaluation, see Brian C. Schmidt, *International Relations and the First Great Debate* (London, 2012).

[7] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London, 1939), p. 9.

[8] See, for example, Frederick S. Dunn, 'The Scope of International Relations', *World Politics* 1:1 (1948); John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics* 2:2 (1950); P. A. Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations* (New York, 1971), pp. 4-5; Hedley Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969', in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969* (Oxford, 1972); p. 31; Alan Sked, 'The Study of International Relations: A Historian's View', *Millennium* 16:2 (1987). For an exception, see Kenneth W. Thompson, 'Idealism and realism: beyond the great debate', *British Journal of International Studies* 3 (1977).

[9] Stanley Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', *Daedalus* 106:3 (1977); Ekkehart Krippendorf, 'The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations', *Millenium* 16:2 (1987); Christopher Hill, 'The Study of International Relations in the United Kingdom', *Millenium* 16:2 (1987); Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (eds.), *The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art* (London, 1989); Ole Wæver, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations', *International Organization* 52:4 (1998).

[10] Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 6th edn. (Oxford, 2016), pp. 32-4. See also Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, 'International Relations and Social Science', in Tim Dunne et al. (eds.), *International Relations Theories*, 3rd edn. (Oxford, 2013), pp. 16-7. For a critique, see Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, 'The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919', *Millenium* 39:3 (2011).

[11] William A. Callahan, 'International Relations: An Introduction', *YouTube Channel of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)*, (20 October 2014) [accessed 21-03-2017]; Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, John Baylis, 'Introduction', in Smith et al. (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, 6th edn. (Oxford, 2014), p. 3; Peter Wilson, 'The myth of the 'First Great Debate'', *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998), p. 8.

Recent political science literature has suggested various alternative ways to frame the evolution of international thought. David Long and Brian C. Schmidt have argued that the "dual themes of imperialism and internationalism" shaped the beginnings of the discipline during the early twentieth century.[16] Robert Vitalis has provided a similar argument about the origins of IR in the United States in terms of "imperial relations" and "race development".[17] Cameron G. Thies has proposed to regard the field in terms of a "multiplicity of discourses" running alongside each other.[18] Andreas Osiander has claimed that the alleged 'idealist-realist' divide was actually a disagreement about philosophy of history and the notion of "historical process".[19] Peter Wilson has shown that, given the diversity within theoretical schools, there were also internal "utopian-utopian" and "realist-realist" debates.[20] There have been so many re-interpretations of inter-war IR over the last two decades that the revisionists themselves seem somewhat disoriented.[21] In response to the convolutions of the inter-war period, Nicolas Guilhot has rightly argued that IR theory in a reasonably narrow sense emerged only after 1945.[22]

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[12] William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations then and now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London, 1991); Steve Smith, 'The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations', *Millenium* 21:3 (1992); David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995); Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (New York, 2014).

[13] Roger Coate and Craig Murphy, 'A critical science of global relations', *International Interactions* 12:2 (1985), p. 111; Steve Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millenium* 16:2 (1987).

[14] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where are the idealists in inter-war IR?', *Review of International Studies* 32:2 (2006).

[15] Peter Wilson, 'The myth of the 'First Great Debate'', *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998); Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? a Revisionist History of International Relations', *International Relations* 16:1 (2002).

[16] David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Introduction', in Long and Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 1. Imperialism and the reform of empire had an influence on IR via the *Round Table* movement and its leading figures Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr. See Alexander C. May, *The Round Table 1910-66* (Oxford, DPhil thesis, 1995).

[17] Robert Vitalis, 'The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and Its Laws of Race Development', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52:4 (2010); Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, 2015). See also John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (Cambridge, 2012).

In order to better understand the actor categories in early IR, it is important to consider the intellectual biographies of IR pioneers. There is now a good coverage of British and US figures in early IR scholarship, including Norman Angell, Raymond Leslie Buell, John Burgess, E. H. Carr, Philip Noel-Baker, Paul Reinsch, James T. Shotwell, Arnold Toynbee, Leonhard Woolf, and Alfred Zimmern.[23] Seminal publications, such as Angell's *The Great Illusion* (1910) or Carr's *The Twenty Years'*

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[18] Cameron G. Thies (2002), 'Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate', *European Journal of International Relations* 8:2 (2002), p. 147.

[19] Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998), p. 418.

[20] Peter Wilson, 'The myth of the 'First Great Debate'', *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998), p. 7.

[21] Peter Wilson, 'Where Are We Now in the Debate about the First Great Debate?', in Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), *International Relations and the First Great Debate* (New York, 2012). In fact, the exercise of writing disciplinary history in itself is non-trivial and subject to debate. See, Peter Marcus Kristensen, 'Discipline admonished: On International Relations fragmentation and the disciplinary politics of stocktaking', *European Journal of International Relations* 22:2 (2016).

[22] Nicolas Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011).

[23] Martin Ceadel, *Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1872-1967* (Oxford, 2009); Michael Cox (ed.), *E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (London, 2000); Lorna Lloyd, 'Philip Noel-Baker and Peace Through Law', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995); Harold Josepheson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (London, 1975); Christopher Brewin, 'Arnold Toynbee, Chatham House, and Research in a Global Context', in Long and Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995); Peter Wilson, 'Leonard Woolf, the League of Nations and peace between the wars', *The Political Quarterly* 86:4 (2015); Paul Rich, 'Alfred Zimmern's cautious idealism: the League of Nations, international education and the commonwealth', in Long and Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995); Robert Vitalis, 'Birth of a Discipline', in David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005).

Crisis (1939) have received particular attention.[24] Increasingly, historians have also reviewed the work of non-English authors, such as Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Fritz Berber, and William Rappard.[25] There are also insightful autobiographies by, among others, David Mitrany and Arnold Toynbee.[26] What these accounts help to emphasise is the fact that IR was not the product of isolated ideas but of human beings, driven by personal and political motives, fallible and inconsistent.

Having been neglected for decades, the role of women and feminist political thought in the formation of IR is now beginning to be recognised among historians and IR scholars. As one of the first, Lucian M. Ashworth has interpreted Helena Swanwick's work on 'collective security' and the League of Nations in terms of its feminist perspective.[27] Julie V. Gottlieb, too, has rediscovered women of the inter-war period as "theorists and practitioners" in the emerging field of IR.[28] Meanwhile, Catia Cecilia Confortini's *Intelligent Compassion* (2012) has focused on feminist political thought at the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) from 1945 to 1975.[29] Mainstream accounts, however, still ignore the role of female authors in the formation of IR. They claim that feminism in IR only appeared in the late 1980s.[30] While the practical efforts of women have been captured well in the works of Laura Beers, Lela B. Costin, Madeleine Herren, Helen McCarthy, Leila J. Rupp, and Ingrid Sharp, historians have tended to ignore the substance of female political thought during the first half of the twentieth century.[31] However, as Mary Sheepshanks knew in 1914, women used not only "their hands [….] but their brains" to understand the causes of war and peace.[32]

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[24] Cornelia Navari, 'The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell', *Review of International Studies* 15:4 (1989); Martin Ceadel, 'The founding text of International Relations? Norman Angell's seminal yet flawed The Great Illusion (1909-1938)', *Review of International Studies* 37:4 (2011); Peter Wilson, 'Power, morality and the remaking of international order: E.H. Carr's the The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939', in Henrik Bliddal et al. (eds.), *Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation* (Abingdon, 2013).

[25] Rainer Nicolaysen, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1874-1936): Jurist, Friedensforscher, Künstler', *Rabels Zeitschrift* 75 (2011); Gisela Gantzel-Kress, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy: Ein Bürgerhumanist und Versöhnungsdiplomat im Aufbruch der Demokratie in Deutschland', *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte* 71 (1985); Katharina Rietzler, 'Counter-Imperial Orientalism: Friedrich Berber and the Politics of International Law in Germany and India, 1920s-1960s', *Journal of Global History* 11:1 (2016); Victor Monnier, *William E. Rappard: Défenseur des libertés, serviteur de son pays et de la Communauté internationale* (Geneva, 1995).

[26] David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London, 1975); Arnold Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (Oxford, 1967).

[27] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Feminism, War and the Prospect of International Government: Helena Swanwick and the Lost Feminists of Interwar International Relations', *Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration* 2 (2008).

[28] Julie V. Gottlieb, *'Guilty Women', Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter-War Britain* (New York, 2015), p. 55.

[29] Catia Cecilia Confortini, *Intelligent Compassion: Feminist Critical Methodology in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (Oxford, 2012).

[30] See, for example, J. Ann Tickner, 'Gender in World Politics', in Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, John Baylis (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, 6th edn. (Oxford, 2014), p. 259; J. Ann Tickner and Laura Sjoberg, 'Introduction', in Tickner and Sjoberg (eds.), *Feminism and International Relations: Conversations about the past, present and future* (New York, 2011); Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 'Feminist methodologies for International Relations', in Ackerly, Stern, and True (eds.), *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations* (Cambridge, 2006); Vivienne Jabri and Eleanor O'Gorman (eds.), *Women, Culture, and International Relations* (London, 1999); Betty A. Reardon, *Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security* (New York, 1993). For an exception, see Jill Steans, *Gender and International Relations*, 3rd edn., (Cambridge, 2013).

Contrary to what political science literature has suggested about IR history, the institutional context of research and learning was crucial for intellectual developments. The international networks of universities, private societies and public institutions were particularly important for IR because the world of ideas was so closely connected to the world of practice. Apart from the well-known institutions in the English-speaking world, research centres and university courses were established in Paris (1920), Berlin (1920), Hamburg (1923), Vienna (1754, 1919), Geneva (1927), and many other places in Europe and beyond.[33] Besides formally academic institutions, there was a range of research institutes, clubs, and less formal groups that contributed to the formation of IR through events and publications, including the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), the Geneva Summer Schools, and the Williamstown Lectures.[34]

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[31] Laura Beers, 'Advocating for a feminist internationalism between the wars', in Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (eds.), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500* (New York, 2016); Catia Cecilia Confortini, 'Links between Women, Peace, and Disarmament: Snapshots from the WILPF', Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via (eds.), *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives* (Santa Barbara, 2010); Lela B. Costin, 'Feminism, Pacifism, Internationalism and the 1915 International Congress of Women', Women's Studies International Forum 5:3/4 (1982); Madeleine Herren, 'Gender and International Relations Through the Lens of the League of Nations, 1919–1945', in Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (eds.), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500* (New York, 2016); Helen McCarthy, 'Gendering Diplomatic History: Women in the British diplomatic service, circa 1919–1972', in Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (eds.), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500* (New York, 2016); Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, 1997); Ingrid Sharp and Matthew Stibbe (eds.), *Aftermaths of War: Women's Movements and Female Activists*, 1918–1923 (Leiden, 2011).

[32] Mary Sheepshanks, 'Patriotism or Internationalism', *Jus Suffragii* 9:2 (1915), p. 184.

[33] E. L. Ellis, *The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1872-1972* (Cardiff, 1972); H. Bauer and E. Brighi, *International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years* (London, 2003); Martin Ceadel, 'The Academic Normalization of International Relations at Oxford, 1920–2012: Structures Transcended', in Christopher Hood et al. (eds.), *Forging a Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Oxford's Development of the Study of Politics and International Relations in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, 2014); Institut des Hautes Études Internationales, *[Booklet]: Institut des Hautes Études Internationales* (Paris, 1946); Étienne Dennery, 'The Publications of the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Paris', *International Affairs* 18:1 (1939); Steven D. Korenblat, 'A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule Für Politik, 1920–1933', *Central European History* 39:3 (2006); Antonio Missiroli, *Die Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (Sankt-Augustin, 1988); Katharina Rietzler, 'Philanthropy, Peace Research, and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany', *GHI Bulletin Supplement* 5 (2008); M. K. Grindrod, 'The Institut für Auswärtige Politik, Poststrasse 19, Hamburg', *International Affairs* 10:2 (1931); Pitman B. Potter, 'The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva', *The American Journal of International Law* 62:3 (1968); Heinrich Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein, *A Short History of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna* (Vienna, 2008).

The most important platform for exchange between IR thinkers and practitioners was the International Studies Conference (ISC).[35] It was founded in 1928 as a joint venture of Austrian, British, French, German, Italian, US, and international research institutes, organised by the League of Nations' bodies for intellectual cooperation, and supported by US philanthropists Rockefeller and Carnegie as well as various governments. Academics and practitioners alike valued the ISC as a forum for informal debate on current affairs. As the ISC developed from an academic gathering into quasi-diplomatic conference, its participants produced an enormous range of policy-oriented research.[36] The conference secretariat, based at the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in Paris, published voluminous conference proceedings, commissioned special issue studies, and edited handbooks.[37] National committees which coordinated delegations to the ISC were very productive in themselves.[38] Besides published primary sources, there has been a growing body of historical research on the ISC which helps to contextualise and evaluate its intellectual output.[39]

Intellectual cooperation at the League of Nations not only provided an infrastructure for the ISC but was an important site of international society in its own right. The IIIC launched programs for artists, museums, and libraries, it fostered international exchange between students, and drafted a resolution on intellectual property. It also published a series of conversations between eminent public intellectuals, among them the celebrated 1933 correspondence between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, entitled *Why War?*.[40] The IIIC was a showcase of international cooperation on behalf of the League of Nations. From 1926 to 1930, the IIIC's deputy director was Alfred Zimmern, who drew on his background as IR professor and regarded intellectual cooperation as a means to further integrate the IR community.[41] The ways in which technical organs complemented and interacted with political actors have for a long time been underestimated in the historiography of the League of Nations.[42] More recent scholarship by, among others, Patricia Clavin, Daniel Laqua, Susan Pedersen, and Davide Rodogno has helped to recover the intellectual and practical contributions by the League of Nations to the emergence of global society.[43] One of the goals of this thesis is to complement what these international historians have shown in the fields of economics, humanitarianism, and culture, by shedding light on the various ventures in IR.

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[34] Peter Grose, *Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1921 to 1996* (New York, 1996, 2006); Donald Philips Dennis, *Foreign Policy in a Democracy: The Role of the Foreign Policy Association* (New York, 2003); Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari (eds.), *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919-1945* (London, 1994).

[35] As an academic-political conference, it was modelled after the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), founded in 1925 in Honolulu. See IPR, *Honolulu Session, June 30-July 14, 1925. History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses* (Honolulu, 1925).

[36] The ISC even edited its own series of "special studies". See, for instance, Emmanuel Moresco, *Colonial Questions and Peace* (Paris, 1939).

[37] UNESCO, *Publications de l'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1945).

[38] See, for example, memo by British Coordinating Committee for International Studies, *Population and Migration* (London, 1935), K.IV.30h, IIIC Records.

[39] David Long, 'Who killed the International Studies Conference?', *Review of International Studies* 32:4 (2006); Katharina Rietzler, 'Philanthropy, Peace Research, and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany', *GHI Bulletin Supplement* 5 (2008); Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011).

Inter-governmental organisation, however, was only one branch of the larger internationalist movement during the first half of the twentieth century. Building on nineteenth century precursors of international society, such as the Universal Postal Union or the Red Cross movement, advocates of various causes used the new means of communication and travel for international cooperation. Even before the First World War, there were more than 600 organisations devoted to the sciences and humanities alone.[44] Throughout the inter-war period, non-governmental institutions continued to shape academic, social, and political life.[45] Their causes ranged from humanitarian interventions and pacifism to European federalism. The study of IR in particular benefitted from this internationalism since many of its protagonists were members of international clubs, societies, or religious groups, such as the League of Nations societies or the Quaker movement, and because the internationalist 'spirit' encouraged scholars to engage with foreign affairs. However, their identity was neither limited to "good" internationalism, nor clearly separated from nationalist currents.[46]

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[40] IIIC, *Pourquoi la guerre? Corréspondance entre MM. Albert Einstein et Sigmund Freud* (Paris, 1933).

[41] League of Nations, 'The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1927', in *Brochures de Propagande, 1926–1927* (Paris, 1927), p. 14.

[42] The works of F. S. Northedge are a notable exception. See F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946* (Leicester, 1986); and F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations: Its conceptual basis and lessons for the present* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953).

[43] Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations* (Oxford, 2013); Daniel Laqua, 'Transnational intellectual cooperation, the League of Nations, and the problem of order', *Journal of Global History* 6:2 (2011); Susan Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', *The American Historical Review* 112:4 (2007); Davide Rodogno et al. (eds.), *The League of Nations' Work on Social Issues: Visions, Endeavours and Experiments* (New York, 2016).

[44] P. H. Eijkman, *L'Internationalisme Scientifique* (The Hague, 1911).

[45] Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012); Daniel Laqua (ed.), *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars* (New York, 2011).

None of the academic or political ways to engage with the study of IR would have been feasible without the commitment of wealthy philanthropists. Three of the first professorships in Britain were endowed respectively by the industrialist heir David Davies, the merchant banker Ernest Cassel, and the textile magnate Montague Burton. Both German institutes for the study of IR enjoyed the support of wealthy industrialists. Academic institutions readily accepted private money because they valued IR as a timely subject that had to be established more quickly than public funds would allow. Even state-funded projects, such as the IIIC, were co-sponsored by private donors. The most important non-governmental sponsors of IR scholarship were the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Katharina Rietzler has explored the ways in which both philanthropies donated large amounts of money and logistical support to a range of institutions and individuals over the course of several decades.[47] The Carnegie Endowment entertained a European Center, based in Paris, which provided assistance to several IR endeavours, notably the ISC. Meanwhile, the Rockefeller Foundation funded virtually every major IR project around the globe, including university programs at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Chicago, the London School of Economics, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) in Berlin.[48] In most cases, as Rietzler has shown, US foundations tended to give grants to education-focused institutes and individuals.[49] Yet, the involvement of private sponsors also opened avenues for non-academic influence in the study of IR.

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[46] Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, 'Introduction: Rethinking the History of Internationalism', in Sluga and Clavin (eds.), *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge, 2016), p. 10; Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013).

[47] Katharina Rietzler, 'Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American Philanthropy and Cultural Diplomacy in the Interwar Years', *Historical Research*, 84:223 (2011); Katharina Rietzler, *American foundations and the 'scientific study' of international relations in Europe, 1910-1940* (PhD thesis, UCL, London, 2009).

[48] Recipients included individuals and institutions in Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the US, and Yugoslavia. The Rockefeller Foundation, *The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report for 1933* (New York, 1933), pp. 6-13.

Even though IR scholars operated across borders, national background did have an impact on their approach to IR.[50] Generally speaking, influences from political science were stronger in the US, whereas lawyers dominated the field in France, and historians in Britain. The situation in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland was more diverse, including economists, sociologists, and geographers alongside the main constituents of IR. The designation 'International Relations' was far from ubiquitous—the discipline went under 'International Affairs', 'International Studies', 'International Politics', 'Foreign Relations', or 'Diplomacy'. In some cases, it bore more openly partisan labels, such as 'Peace Studies' or 'League of Nations Studies'. Again, in other cases, scholars were formally associated with departments other than IR, although their research focused on international politics.[51]

Fuzzy definitions were the result of the multiple influences from other social sciences—a concept that itself was still in the making.[52] It is difficult to compare the formation of IR to neighbouring disciplines, given their various thematic and personal overlaps. Notably, International History emerged in response to the First World War, for similar reasons as IR and partly involving the same protagonists.[53] What is particular about IR, however, is the relationship between the student and the object of study. Unlike historians, economists or sociologists, in the early days of the subject IR scholars were less interested in describing social phenomena from an ivory tower perspective and more committed to actively engaging with and even changing the parameters of the international order. This explains why early IR scholarship featured a relatively weak methodological apparatus and little coherent theory.[54] The goal was to form both International Relations, as a discipline, *and* international relations, as a reality.

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[49] Katharina Rietzler, 'Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations for Philanthropic Internationalism in the Interwar Years', in Daniel Laqua (ed.), *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars.* (London, 2011), p. 47.

[50] See, for example, James Cotton, 'Early international relations teaching and teachers in Australia: institutional and disciplinary origins', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 67:1 (2013); and Jan Stöckmann, 'Studying the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany, 1912-33', *The International History Review* 38:5 (2016).

[51] On the relationship between international law and IR, for example, see Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 440–5.

[52] Roger E. Backhouse et al. (eds.), *A Historiography of the Modern Social Sciences* (Cambridge, 2014); Peter Wagner, *A History and Theory of the Social Sciences: Not All That Is Solid Melts into Air* (London, 2001).

[53] Joe Maiolo, 'Systems and Boundaries in International History', *The International History Review* (online, 25 August 2016).

A New History of International Relations

Despite the growing historiography on early IR scholarship, especially on theoretical developments, relatively little is known about the actors involved—their background, motivations, and methods.[55] However, it is important to understand the 'who' and 'how' of disciplinary formation in addition to the 'what'. IR was created by individuals with fallible minds, it was supported by sponsors with political goals, and shaped by an institutional environment with non-academic interests. David Long and Brian C. Schmidt have rightly lamented that "very little research has been done on the actual institutional history of this field [IR]."[56] Regrettably, the vast majority of disciplinary history has been produced by political scientists and IR scholars themselves, who tend to work with published sources rather than archival evidence. Self-reflective accounts also bear the problem that they might spin stories so that they fit the authors' own theoretical approach within IR, whereas an historian is more likely to be neutral about this.[57]

This dissertation challenges several assumptions about the history of IR. Drawing on archival sources from six countries, it argues that the formation of IR was a distinctly international process, involving private, academic, and state actors beyond the English-speaking world. It takes into account elements of IR research from 1914 until 1940, thus re-adjusting the conventional inter-war chronology according to the actual episodes of IR activities rather than declarations of war and peace. It emphasises the interaction between thinkers and practitioners of IR, arguing that the majority of early IR scholarship was shaped by practical goals rather than by theoretical abstractions or rigorous methodology.[58] Finally, the dissertation demonstrates, women were involved in thinking and practicing IR, contrary to what is still being remembered about the discipline.[59] By incorporating forgotten actors and discourses, the dissertation seeks to enrich our understanding of IR history.

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[54] Milja Kurki and Colin Wight have argued that the absence of a "clear account of science" was understandable given that philosophy of science itself was still in its infancy. See Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, 'International Relations and Social Science', in Tim Dunne et al. (eds.), *International Relations Theories*, 3rd edn. (Oxford, 2013), p. 17.

[55] "[W]e do not possess an adequate understanding of how the field has developed." See Brian C. Schmidt, 'On the History and Historiography of International Relations', in Walter Carlsnaes et al., *Handbook of International Relations* (London, 2002), p. 4.

[56] David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Introduction', in Long and Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 6.

[57] Richard Neb Lebow, 'Vorwort', in Jens Steffek and Leonie Holthaus (ed.), *Jenseits der Anarchie: Weltordnungsentwürfe im frühen 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2014), p. 10.

First, it argues, that new approaches in foreign policy were inspired by the close interaction between thinkers and practitioners. From planning the international order after the Great War to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the World Disarmament Conference, as well as various efforts in 'collective security' and 'peaceful change'—IR scholars were almost always involved as advisors, networkers, or diplomats in their own right. At the 1937 ISC meeting, for example, Austrian lawyer and diplomat Alfred Verdross proposed to form *ad hoc* committees of IR scholars in order to "exert an influence on the governments".[60] It was often hard to distinguish between an author's stance within IR as a research field and their personal political opinion because their roles usually blurred, overlapped or even contradicted each other. In many cases, IR pioneers deliberately confused actor categories, evading both scientific standards and political correctness. IR was a mix of "science, pacifism, and politics", as the founder of the DHfP in Berlin put it."[61]

As a result of these overlaps, the vast majority of early IR scholarship focused on issues of immediate political significance, rather than theoretical reflections or abstractions. It was driven by the speed of events and by the fact that international politics had become "the staple of general conversation".[62] As feminist-pacifist writer Helena Swanwick remarked, her work was inspired "from experience, not from abstract theory".[63] This style of research often resulted in ambiguous and inconsistent positions. Alfred Zimmern, for example, declared himself a supporter of the League of

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[58] For the conventional interpretation, see, for example, Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainly, *Understanding International Relations*, 4th edn. (New York, 2009), p. 18.

[59] In 2015, the conference of the European International Studies Association (EISA) caused some uproar by naming all of the 18 seminar rooms after male IR scholars. Cai Wilkinson, *Continuing the 'all-male' theme at EISA,* 13 September 2015, available at http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/continuing-the-all-male-theme-at-eisa.html#more-27819 [accessed 26-01-2017].

[60] Alfred Verdross, in IIIC (ed.), *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 562; see also Victor Bulwer-Lytton, ibid., p. 580.

[61] Ernst Jäckh, *Die Politik Deutschlands im Völkerbund* (Geneva, 1932), p. 18.

[62] Alfred Zimmern, *Modern Political Doctrines* (Oxford, 1939), p. ix.

[63] Helena Swanwick, *Pooled Security: What does it mean?* (London, 1934), p. 5.

Nations only to admit in the next sentence that this could "mean almost anything".[64] Such statements not only refute the long-standing myth of a 'great debate' between so called 'idealist' and 'realist' thinkers in IR during the inter-war period, but they beg the question whether there was any coherent attempt at devising theory at all. To be sure, political theory did inform IR scholarship, for example through concepts such as 'sovereignty' or 'nationalism'. But IR scholars themselves were primarily concerned with policy, and did not associate themselves with schools of thought, such as 'liberal internationalism' or other theories of international politics.

Throughout the formative period of IR, the field benefitted enormously from, indeed was the very product of extensive international cooperation. Collaborating across national borders was both a practical instrument for building an academic infrastructure as well as a symbol for the universalist idea that scientific truth was supra-national. For these purposes, IR pioneers coordinated with colleagues via interest groups such as the Central Organisation for a Durable Peace (CODP). They also used personal networks and official bodies, especially the League of Nations' bodies for intellectual cooperation—the predecessors of UNESCO. Akin to the League itself, these networks spanned primarily Europe and the English-speaking world but also included actors from Africa, Asia, and South America. Globalising the study of IR was an ambitious and controversial venture, but even committed internationalists were cautious not to drift "into the land of Utopia."[65]

In all of these ways, women contributed to the formation of the discipline. Despite their marginalisation in academia and politics—the "founding fathers"-narrative is still alive[66]—female authors and activists managed to gradually establish themselves in male-dominated professions and, crucially, generated a significant body of feminist political thought. For example, some argued that women were by nature more peaceful than men,[67] others that peace required democratic control of foreign policy which, in turn, required the inclusion of women in politics.[68] Owing to the lack of formal academic institutions in the 1910s, the founders of IR, and women in particular, often resorted to less conventional means, such as pamphlets, newspaper articles, evening lectures, and political clubs.

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[64] Alfred Zimmern, 'British Foreign Policy since the war', 1933[?], Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 140.

[65] Paul Mantoux, 'Foreword', in John Eugene Harley, *International Understanding* (Stanford, 1931), p. xiv.

[66] The Authors, 'Editors' Introduction', *Millennium* 38:3 (2010), p. 499.

[67] Agnes Maude Royden, 'War and the Women's Movement', in Charles Roden Buxton (ed.), *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (London, 1915), p. 134.

[68] Margaret Hills, *Foreign Policy and the People* (London, 1917).

If one accepts these forms of quasi-academic output as contributions to the formation of IR scholarship, then the origins of the discipline need to be backdated to at least 1914, instead of the common 1919. Most of the themes that dominated inter-war political thought, from disarmament to international governance, were addressed in a reasonably integrated fashion from about 1914. Among the influential strands of thought were the idea that increasing global interdependence had made wars economically pointless even for the victorious power—a thought pioneered by Norman Angell—and the demand that foreign policy should be controlled by the people.[69] By 1916, the London-based Council on the Study of International Relations had published the first text book, intended to "to encourage and assist the study of international relations".[70]

So rather than in the minds of male Anglo-American 'idealists', the formation of IR occurred at the intersection of academia and diplomacy, involving a range of international men and women who promoted the study of war and peace in the context of tumultuous political circumstances. Growing out of academic-political networks formed after the outbreak of the First World War, IR took shape at universities during the 1920s. Its formation enjoyed support from private philanthropists, governments, and international organisations. The crises of the 1930s made the study of IR increasingly contentious before the Second World War eventually put an end to research activities. Over the course of a quarter of a century, IR had become "the master-problem" of the time.[71] But why did international phenomena become subject to academic inquiry? What were the principle methods of study? And who distributed authority and resources?

In order to address such questions, the dissertation examines the formation of IR in five chapters, which follow a chronological order and have thematic emphases. The first chapter recounts the genesis of the discipline from about 1914 to the 1920s, emphasising wartime networks which prepared the more formal, university-based establishment of IR after the end of the Great War. The second chapter shows how IR benefitted from international cooperation, particularly from the League of Nations bodies for intellectual cooperation, and how the ethos of a universal scientific community inspired the study of IR. By merging these threads, the third chapter illustrates how IR pioneers worked as researchers, teachers, diplomats, and politicians, often simultaneously, and how this overlap impacted the intellectual development of the discipline. The fourth chapter zooms in on one of most important policy debates of the 1930s, the international provision of sanctions known as 'collective security', and reveals how ambiguous many IR scholars treated the topic in theory and practice. Finally, the fifth chapter examines how Nazi Germany influenced IR scholarship at home and abroad, how the international community attempted to curb Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, and how the study of IR came to an end within the first year of the Second World War. The conclusion provides a summary of the key features of early IR scholarship as well as an outlook to post-1940 developments.

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[69] Vernon Lee, 'The Democratic Principle and International Relations', in Charles Roden Buxton (ed.), *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (London, 1916), p. 209.

[70] It covered many of the constituent elements of IR, including historical, legal, economic, and imperial perspectives. A. L. Grant et al., *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, 1916), p. v.

[71] Arnold Tonybee to G. G. Kullmann, 3 May 1934, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 117.

In addition to the secondary literature by historians and political scientists, there are rich primary sources to explore the history of IR. For one, early IR authors left an enormous amount of published material, both in academic books and journals as well as in popular pamphlets and newspapers circulated in Europe and the US. Their public output was complemented by a wealth of unpublished memoranda, diaries, and correspondence, now stored in various private paper collections, such as those of Alfred Zimmern in Oxford or Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy in Berlin. Many universities have kept records of their departments and chairs, including the Graduate Institute in Geneva and the Konsularakademie in Vienna. The context of IR research is well reflected in the archives of non-governmental institutions, such as the Rockefeller Foundation or WILPF. Finally, state archives, such as the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office or the IIIC records, demonstrate the links to official policy. By incorporating previously neglected sources, this dissertation seeks to provide a more comprehensive account of IR that combines intellectual history with the study of institutions and individuals on an international level.

No book, and certainly no doctoral thesis, can tell the entire story. There were significant contributions to the formation of IR that are outside the scope of this dissertation, chronologically, geographically, and thematically. For example, some historians have cited the 1899 Peace Conference in

The Hague as well as early publications, such as Paul Reinsch's *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1900), as the first instances of IR scholarship.[72] Despite widespread European dominance in the field, there were non-Western authors who worked on IR subjects, such as the Chinese foreign affairs specialist Shuhsi Hsü or the Indian social scientist Benoy Kumar Sarkar.[73] What is more, early IR research dealt with a range of topics that deserve historical analyses of their own, including migration, refugees, population control, raw materials, and colonial reform.

The intention of this thesis, however, is not to provide an exhaustive account of all authors, ideas, and institutions, but to emphasise the interaction between thinkers and practitioners from various backgrounds in forming IR. If it manages to highlight some previously neglected authors and strands of thought, and if it raises challenging questions about the way in which people began to study war and peace, then it has achieved its purpose. Understanding international relations was not merely an intellectual exercise but a practical venture. At every moment of this history scholars, politicians, diplomats, and philanthropists sought to *make* international relations. The first step in 1914 was to understand the reasons of war and to establish conditions for peace.

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[72] Robert Vitalis, 'Birth of a Discipline', in David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 161.

[73] Shuhsi Hsü, *China and Her Political Entity: a Study of China's Foreign Relations with Reference to Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia* (New York, 1926), p. ix.; Benoy Kumar Sarkar, 'Hindu Theory of International Relations', *American Political Science Review* 13 (1919).

1. Genesis of a Discipline: the Great War, the Paris Peace Conference, and the Institutionalisation of International Relations

"Educated persons will not from differences of opinions fight with and kill each other."
(Lida Gustava Heymann, 1914)[74]

Introduction

In the spring of 1919, while the governments were still negotiating in Paris, the classicist Alfred Zimmern was appointed to become the inaugural Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics [sic!] at the University of Aberystwyth, Wales.[75] It was the first university chair of its kind, endowed by the Liberal politician and public benefactor David Davies. The idea of the Wilson professorship was, as its name suggested, to promote the academic study of international affairs in a Wilsonian spirit, proclaiming a new diplomatic order in contrast to balance-of-power thinking which, as many believed, had caused the First World War.[76] When Davies announced his endowment in December 1918, he knew that he wanted a supporter of the League of Nations on the chair, and someone who was willing to spread its message in the classroom and beyond.[77] Zimmern was Davies' ideal candidate. The historian immediately resigned from his previous post at the Foreign Office, and moved to the Welsh coastal town.[78] The university discipline of International Relations (IR) was born.

Thus goes the traditional founding tale of IR—established in 1919 by English-speaking men with an 'idealist' view on world affairs. The actual origins, however, were older, its founders more diverse, and the intellectual output less ideologically homogenous than commonly assumed. In fact, as the epigraph to this chapter suggests, the idea to educate people in foreign politics arose shortly after the outbreak of the First World War in the context of transnational networks of men and women who argued that peace required democratic governance, and that democratic governance in turn required appropriate forms of education. This was the key motivation for the study of IR, and it was during the war that many of the early IR debates on international organisation, disarmament, sanctions, and peaceful cooperation emerged. It was also during the war that the first publications appeared, study circles were formed, and academic meetings held. Women were part of this process, as were collaborators from around Europe, the United States, and further afield. Only some of them were full-time academics, many worked as governmental advisors, diplomats, journalists, political activists, or philanthropists. And, since IR was not yet a university subject, they were educated in history, law, economics, philosophy, classics, geography, anthropology, colonial administration, and other fields. It is important to explore these networks in order to understand the discipline's history, both institutionally and intellectually.

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[74] Lida Gustava Heymann, 'What Women Say about the War', *Jus Suffragii* 9:3 (1914), p. 207.

[75] Council Meeting, 25 April 1919, Council & Court of Governors Minutes, University College Wales Archives.

[76] E. L. Ellis, *The University College Wales, Aberystwyth, 1872-1972* (Aberystwyth, 1972), p. 187.

[77] David Davies to Sir John Williams, 5 December 1918, Lord Davies of Llandinam Papers, D4/1, U.C.W., Aberystwyth.

[78] Resignation Confirmation, 10 May 1919, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 16.

That said, Zimmern's career did capture important elements of the formation of IR. Educated at New College, Oxford, he became a classics tutor in 1904 and served as an inspector at the Board of Education from 1912 to 1915.[79] During this time, he developed an interest for international affairs and popular education, and began to publish in journals such as *The Economic Review*, the *Sociological Review*, and *The New Republic*.[80] After the outbreak of the war, he became active at the League of Nations Society (later Union) and drafted a memo on international organisation which Lord Cecil used during the Paris Peace Conference. Zimmern himself served as an advisor to the intelligence department at the foreign office from August 1918 to May 1919, and participated at the negotiations in Paris.[81] While there, he was involved in the formation of the British Institute of International Affairs (later prefixed 'Royal', or simply Chatham House), and established relationships with colleagues from the US and Europe. Zimmern's biography, even prior to his appointment at Aberystwyth, was characteristic for many IR pioneers in that he transcended professional and national boundaries, and in the way he combined the study and practice of foreign politics. The same could be said about the German international lawyer Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, the Romanian political theorist David Mitrany, the US historian James T. Shotwell, or the British feminist-pacifist Helena Swanwick.

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[79] D. J. Markwell, 'Zimmern, Sir Alfred Eckhard (1879–1957)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available at: http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2167/view/article/37088 [accessed 01-02-2017].

[80] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Alien's Act: a Challenge', *The Economic Review* 11:2 (1911); Alfred Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', paper presented at the Sociological Society, 30 November 1915, published in *Sociological Review* (1916).

[81] Appointment notification, 12 August 1918, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 15.

Conventional histories of IR have at best paid peripheral attention to the practical conditions of the discipline's creation, and focused instead on re-interpreting the works of well-known authors.[82] Most contemporary IR textbooks routinely refer to 1919 as the 'birthday' of IR and list a few English and American names, such as Norman Angell, Woodrow Wilson, or Alfred Zimmern, as representatives of a so called 'idealist' school of IR who believed that international cooperation and law could prevent war.[83] In those accounts, IR scholarship is often depicted as the intellectual bandwagon of the League of Nations. Its protagonists are associated with an allegedly homogenous project of internationalism, whereas their motivations and individual backgrounds remain somewhat obscure. Revisionist histories have corrected that picture to some extent by challenging common assumptions about the first generation of IR scholarship.[84] But while it is no longer common to frame the origins of IR in terms of a 'great debate' between 'idealists' and 'realists', there has not been a coherent counter-narrative, nor a thorough investigation of research outside the familiar set of authors and institutions.

By contrast, this chapter argues that the discipline emerged from about 1914 via intellectual, political, and philanthropic efforts by a range of international actors. The first section recounts in some detail how disciplinary identity in IR was originally formed and how revisionist authors have challenged the simplified story of inter-war 'idealism'. Building on this historiography, the remainder of the chapter examines the origins of IR in three episodes. First, it considers a range of international authors and activists who began to work systematically on questions of peace and war from about 1914. Second, it revisits the 1919 Peace Conference as a platform of international exchange. Finally, it shows how professors and philanthropists established the field's first professorships, departments, and research centres in Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the US. By covering a wider set of actors and by shifting the 'birth' of the discipline back before 1919, the chapter seeks to present a more comprehensive founding history of the study of IR.

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[82] Ashworth acknowledges the same problem. Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (New York, 2014), p. 7.

[83] See, for example, Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics* (New York, 2011), p. 4. For a more detailed historiography, see the next section.

[84] For an introduction, see William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations then and now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London, 1991), p. 56. For a detailed historiography, see the next section.

Origin Myths and Revisions

For a long time, political scientists have referred to the end of the First World War and the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth in 1919 as the 'birthday' of IR.[85] This conventional story was largely created by contemporary authors themselves who claimed to be establishing a new academic discipline in the course of their political-academic efforts after the Great War. A 1919 draft report on what later became known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs explicitly described this process as a "by-product of the Congress of Paris" and proclaimed that "at Paris, in the first eight months of 1919, was laid the foundation of a better understanding between the nations."[86] Among the signatories of this booklet were the League of Nations architect Lord Robert Cecil, *Round Table*-founder Lionel Curtis, and Philip Noel-Baker who later became one the first professors of IR. These men, along with the chairs, departments, and research institutes which were founded in the immediate aftermath of the war, created the basis of a disciplinary identity that was associated with the 1919 moment.

The realisation that a new academic subject was emerging became widespread during the 1920s and 30s. In 1928, at the first international conference for the study of IR, the delegates decided that international politics "constitute a field for scientific study and that this field [...] needs appropriate forms of organisation."[87] In 1939, the publication of E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-39* contributed decisively to the standard memory of IR history.[88] Carr popularised the idea that IR was founded as a direct result of the First World War by the advocates of a new liberal international order. While he correctly identified the rationalisation and democratisation of foreign politics as stimulators of the discipline, Carr oversimplified the work of his colleagues by collectively denouncing them as 'utopian' believers in the League of Nations. 'Utopianism', according to Carr, failed to take into account the reality of military power and national self-interest. 'Utopian' thinkers (or 'idealists') mistakenly put ethics before politics, and believed that law and morals could control international affairs. They misinterpreted the inception of international institutions, such as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, as the elimination of power from international affairs, a "wholly uncritical attitude towards political problems", Carr argued.[89] His response, dubbed 'realism' by himself, was to shift the analytical focus back to power, arguing that 'utopian' principles had failed both in theory and practice. He claimed that the pursuit of power could not be eliminated from the human psyche, nor from political institutions, and that a theory of international politics would have to acknowledge these realities.[90]

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[85] See, for example, Pitman B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organisation*, 3rd edn. (London, 1928), p. 3; Rudolf Blühdorn, *Internationale Beziehungen: Einführung in die Grundlagen der Aussenpolitik* (Vienna, 1956), p. iii; P. A. Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations* (London, 1971), p. v; Alan Sked, 'The Study of International Relations: A Historian's View', *Millennium* 16:2 (1987), p. 253; Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, 'Introduction', in Burchill et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations,* 4th edn. (New York, 2009), p. 6. The year 1919 is also still regarded as the chief turning point in the history of transnationalism. See Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, Jakob Vogel, 'Introduction', in Rodogno et al. (eds.), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks, Issues* (New York, 2015), p. 10.

[86] 'Draft Report for consideration by the Provisional Committee appointed to prepare a Constitution, and select the original members of the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs', James T. Shotwell Papers, Box 43. Originally called the *British* Institute of International Affairs, it was known from 1926 as the *Royal* Institute of International Affairs or simply by its location at Number 10 St James's Square, as Chatham House.

[87] Report submitted by Alfred Zimmern, 11 July 1928, League of Nations Archives, Box 2224, Dossier 5B.6178.2423.

[88] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (London, 1939).

Carr's classification naturally favoured the view that IR scholarship evolved in waves, starting with the 'utopian' (or 'idealist') school during the inter-war period and followed by the 'realist' turn in the late 1930s and 1940s.[91] By denouncing an entire generation of inter-war scholars such as Angell and Zimmern as 'utopian', Carr oversimplified the disciplinary past in order to make his own 'realist' critique more effective.[92] Subsequent IR writers tended to adopt Carr's simplistic distinction, which in the process manifested the crude periodisation.

Thus, by the 1940s, two stories about early IR scholarship had become orthodoxy. First, 1919 was commonly assumed to be the founding moment of the discipline.[93] Second, Carr's followers firmly believed in his assertion that the inter-war period had been dominated by 'utopian' scholarship.[94] They assumed that Carr's realist response was such an important intellectual turn—a Kuhnian paradigm shift, as some claimed—that it constituted a major academic debate and consequently labelled it the 'first great debate'.[95] This classification, however crude it was, proved to be a powerful way to imagine the discipline's past as it conveniently paralleled the historical context—optimistic enthusiasm after the First World War versus cynic power realism after renewed international conflict in the late 1930s. Moreover, Anglo-American leadership in the field led to the gradual neglect of non-English scholarship.[96] Whereas in the 1950s, IR authors still conceived of the field as a genuinely global endeavour, spanning across continental Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America, US scholarship rose to overwhelming dominance during the following decades.[97] Needless to say that female authors had no place in that narrative.

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[89] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (London, 1939), p. 103.

[90] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (London, 1939), pp. 97-103.

[91] He called it the "antithesis of utopia and reality". E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (London, 1939), p. 11.

[92] Peter Wilson, 'The myth of the 'First Great Debate'', *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998), p. 1.

[93] See, for example, UNESCO, *The Organization of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (Paris, 1950), p. 372; Agnes Headlam-Morley et al., *Bibliography in Politics for the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (Oxford, 1949).

[94] Frederick S. Dunn, 'The Scope of International Relations', *World Politics* 1:1 (1948), p. 145; John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics* 2:2 (1950). Frederick H. Hartmann, *Readings in International Relations* (New York, 1952), pp. 7-14. See also Peter Wilson, 'Introduction', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 4.

This standard account prevailed during the post-war period well into the 1980s. In a major self-reflective study of the field, published as *The Aberystwyth Papers* in 1972, Hedley Bull distinguished three waves of scholarship, starting with 'idealist' or 'progressive' doctrines that dominated the 1920s and early 30s.[98] Still in 1987 scholars such as Christopher Hill left the beginnings of IR largely unquestioned.[99] Alan Sked repeated the old wisdom with astonishing confidence: "As everyone knows it [IR] grew out of the liberal reaction to the First World War."[100] Even recent disciplinary retrospectives have reproduced some of that conventional wisdom.[101] Textbooks, too, adopted the conventional history of IR and many of them continue to spread the rumours of the 1919 'birthday' as well as inter-war 'utopianism' until today.[102]

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[95] Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran, 'The construction of an edifice: the story of a First Great Debate', *Review of International Studies* 31:1 (2005).

[96] Paul Guggenheim and Pitman B. Potter asserted in 1940 that IR was "more popular in Anglo-Saxon countries than in Continental Europe". Guggenheim and Potter, *The Science of International Relations, Law and Organisation* (Geneva, 1940), pp. 30-1.

[97] C. A. W. Manning, *The University Teaching of Social Sciences: International Relations* (Paris, 1954), p. 5; Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955), p. 26; Ole Wæver, 'The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations', *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), pp. 698-9.

[98] Hedley Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969', in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969* (Oxford, 1972), p. 33.

[99] Christopher Hill, 'The Study of International Relations in the United Kingdom', *Millennium* 16:2 (1987), pp. 301-3.

[100] Alan Sked, 'The Study of International Relations: A Historian's View', *Millennium* 16:2 (1987), p. 253.

[101] Andrew J. Williams, Amelia Hadfield, J. Simon Rofe, *International History and International Relations* (New York, 2012), p. 2; Howard Le Roy Malchow, *History and International Relations: From the Ancient World to the 21st Century* (New York, 2016), pp. 22-3.

It was not before the late 1980s that this story received a major reappraisal in the works of Lucian M. Ashworth, David Long, Cornelia Navari, Andreas Osiander, Brian C. Schmidt, Robert Vitalis, Peter Wilson, and others.[103] Their work has acknowledged the subtleties of inter-war IR thought and questioned whether 1919 served as an appropriate starting point. According to their revisionist critique of the early history of IR, the 'first great debate' was invented by 'realists' in order to distinguish themselves from other scholars. Peter Wilson has called the 'first great debate' a "myth", arguing that there never was a scholarly debate in a reasonably strict sense of the term.[104] In fact, revisionists have argued, the alleged 'idealists' had been less 'idealist' and the self-proclaimed 'realists' less 'realist' than commonly assumed.[105] It is not a coincidence that the de-mystification of the 'idealist-realist' debate coincided with the end of the Cold War, an event that triggered new concern with normative theory in IR and led scholars to reconsider past paradigm shifts.[106] In a multi-polar world without obvious power blocks, the strand of thought dismissed as 'idealism' regained new relevance and inspired renewed interest in the intellectual origins of IR scholarship as a whole.

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[102] See, for example, Xuewu Gu, *Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen* (Munich, 2000), p. 19; Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, 4th edn. (2005), pp. 19-27; Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, 'Introduction', in Burchill et al. (eds.), *Theories of International Relations,* 4th edn. (New York, 2009), pp. 6-9; Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 6th edn. (Oxford, 2016), pp. 31-40.

[103] Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (New York, 2014); David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations,* (New York, 2005); David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995); Cornelia Navari, 'The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell', *Review of International Studies* 15:4 (1989); Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998); Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Historiography of International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 20:4 (1994); Peter Wilson, 'Where are we now in the debate about the first great debate?', in Brian C. Schmidt (ed.) *International Relations and the First Great Debate: New International Relations*, (New York, 2012).

[104] Peter Wilson, 'The myth of the 'First Great Debate', *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998).

[105] For revisions of 'realism', see Duncan Bell (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme* (Oxford, 2009).

[106] Steve Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millenium* 16:2 (1987); Steve Smith, 'The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations', *Millenium* 21:3 (1992); Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Historiography of Academic International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 20:4 (1994).

The revisionist critique comprises several arguments. One claim asserts that conventional IR history was whiggish.[107] That is, it interpreted the past only in terms of and to the advantage of present scholarship. By denouncing earlier authors as unscientific fools—"the metaphysicians of Geneva"[108]—Carr unduly parodied his colleagues without actually engaging in their thinking. Other 'realists', including Hans Morgenthau, Robert Keohane, and Hedley Bull, misrepresented inter-war scholars in an attempt to promote their own theories. They associated the political failures of the inter-war years with intellectual shortcomings—"their blindness to the realities of international affairs".[109] What is more, their idea that IR evolved in the form of waves, or paradigms or schools, allowed for wild simplifications in disciplinary memory and the convenient disposal of an entire generation of authors.[110]

A second problem with conventional IR historiography is the usage of the label 'idealism'. As revisionists have shown, there was not a single author, let alone a set of scholars, who identified as 'idealist'.[111] Nor did those who constructed the label provide a clear definition of what or whom they meant. While names such as Angell, Toynbee, and Zimmern were frequently invoked, Carr failed to show how they formed a coherent school of 'utopianism'. Given the difficulty at identifying 'idealist' thinkers, revisionists have begged the question whether the 'first great debate' had occurred at all.[112] This helps to explain why so few authors felt addressed by the 'realist' attack.[113] In other words, the lack of published evidence was obscured by retrospectively applying crude collective labels.

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[107] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where are the idealists in interwar International Relations?', *Review of International Studies* 32:2 (2006), p. 291.

[108] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (London, 1939), p. 30.

[109] Hans Morgenthau, 'The Political Science of E. H. Carr', *World Politics* 1:1 (1948), p. 127.

[110] Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Historiography of International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 20:4 (1994), p. 351; Peter Marcus Kristensen, 'Discipline admonished: On International Relations fragmentation and the disciplinary politics of stocktaking', *European Journal of International Relations* 22:2 (2016).

[111] Jeremy Weiss, 'E. H. Carr, Norman Angell, and Reassessing the Realist–Utopian Debate', *The International History Review* 35:5 (2013), p. 1158; Peter Wilson, 'Introduction', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 12.

[112] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? a Revisionist History of International Relations', *International Relations* 16:1 (2002), p. 33.

[113] A notable exception was Leonard Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality', *The Political Quarterly* (April 1940).

Since the dismantling of the 'idealist-realist' myth, there has been a wealth of alternative narratives. Long and Schmidt have suggested imperialism and internationalism as the key concepts for reconstructing early IR.[114] According to them, it was the "dynamic interaction" between imperialism and internationalism which coined early twentieth century international thought, pervading even those debates that did not appear to be about empire or international governance at first glance.[115] Cameron G. Thies, by contrast, has proposed that early IR scholarship was actually divided into a "multiplicity of discourses" running alongside each other.[116] He has identified eight different areas of research, ranging from anarchy and national sovereignty to commerce and world federalism. Besides, Thies has argued, the problem about the alleged 'idealist-realist' antagonism was that the self-proclaimed 'realists' actually borrowed substantially from their imagined opponents. Many of the early 'realists', such as Carr, Quincy Wright or John Herz, did not in fact reject 'utopian' thought as rigorously as commonly held—Thies has called them 'utopian realists'.[117] Vice versa, Andreas Osiander has argued that 'realist' thinking was present in the writings of alleged 'idealists', such as G. Lowes Dickinson, Leonard Woolf, Alfred Zimmern and even Norman Angell, especially in their use of the concept 'international anarchy'.[118] In other words, neither camp of the so called 'great debate' actually believed in what was retrospectively ascribed to them.

Robert Vitalis has provided one of the most elaborate counter-narratives of early IR. His argument is that the American science of IR was created in the 1900s essentially as 'race relations', providing intellectual substance for white supremacist and imperialist politics.[119] By revisiting the works of George Hubbard Blakeslee, Raymond Leslie Buell, John Burgess, Herbert Baxter Adams, and Paul

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[114] David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Introduction', in Long and Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 10.

[115] David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Introduction' (New York, 2005), p. 14.

[116] Cameron G. Thies, 'Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate', *European Journal of International Relations* 8:2 (2002), p. 147. For examples of such discourses see, for example, Lucy Mair, 'The Machinery of Minority Protection', *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 7:4 (1928); Arthur Greenwood, 'International Economic Relations', in Grant, A. J. et al., *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, 1916); H. R. G. Greaves, *Raw Materials and International Control* (London, 1936).

[117] Cameron G. Thies, 'Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory', pp. 162-7.

[118] Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998), pp. 412-14.

[119] Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, 2015).

Reinsch, Vitalis has shed light on an underrepresented body of literature that anticipated many themes of the inter-war period. Crucially, he has pointed out the racist lens through which foreign politics was studied at US campuses.[120] Many of the discipline's early courses, journals, and professional associations in the US were developed with the intention to control the world, at best ignoring people of colour, at worst deliberately suppressing them. Colonial administration, race relations, and imperialism dominated the research agenda. The *Journal of Race Development*, founded in 1910 (later *Foreign Affairs,* the house journal of the Council on Foreign Relations), covered issues of race and imperial relations. Vitalis has contrasted this literature with a group of intellectuals at Howard University, including Ralph Bunche, Alain Locke, Rayford Logan, and E. Franklin Frazier, who challenged this inherent racism, yet whose work has been almost entirely forgotten in today's IR community. By exposing the racism in early IR scholarship Vitalis has disentangled the discipline from its mythical 'idealist' founding moment in 1919. However, his claim that no white IR scholar wrote in favour of self-governance or independence during the inter-war period does not hold if women are granted the label 'scholar'.[121] For example, during the Abyssinian crisis Margery Perham pointed out the moral and political inconsistency of bombing a people about whom it is then claimed that they need help from the "civilised world".[122]

Another charge against the standard history of IR has been that it assumed contextual events to have an impact on theory. Schmidt has challenged the widespread belief—known as 'contextualism'—that real world changes bring about transformations in the academic study of IR. "There is a strong conviction", he laments, "that significant developments in international politics such as wars or abrupt changes in American foreign policy have, more fundamentally than any other set of factors, shaped the development of IR."[123] Duncan Bell, on the other hand, has taken a slightly different angle on this question, arguing that external events are interlinked with theoretical developments. In fact, he claims that one of the principle reasons to study the history of the social sciences is the "interweaving of knowledge, power and institutions."[124]

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[120] Robert Vitalis, 'Birth of a Discipline', in David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany, 2006).

[121] Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics*: *The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, 2015), p. 11.

[122] Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, 5 October 1935 and 22 November 1935, Margery Perham Papers.

[123] Brian C. Schmidt, 'On the History and Historiography of IR', in Walter Carlsnaes, et al. (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (2002), p. 10. However, Schmidt is not consistent on this issue. In 2005, he and David Long called for "more attention to the historical context". See David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Introduction', in Long and Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 20.

A final issue of contention has been the question of periodising the 'birth' of IR. On the one hand, some disciplinary historians have made the case that IR, in a reasonably narrow definition, only reached 'scientific' status after the Second World War.[125] Their argument is that inter-war scholarship lacked the analytical rigour and theoretical basis which was achieved by Cold War strategists. A more common approach, however, has been to push the origins of IR back before 1919. As Long and Schmidt have argued, "it is simply a myth that a full-blown field or discipline of IR came into existence in 1919 and that nothing of the kind had previously existed."[126] Most disciplinary historians now acknowledge the pre-1919 precursors of IR by referring to the works of political philosophers, lawyers, or geographers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[127] In his study of political science in the US, Robert Vitalis has claimed that IR evolved during the 1900s and 10s in the context of race studies and the global interdependence that later became known as globalisation.[128]

Despite significant developments over the last thirty years there are still blind spots in the history of IR. Most studies have tended to focus on the re-reading of published works rather than to investigate the authors' lives or the formation of institutions. Nor has the revisionist literature covered the full range of international actors. So far, there are only a few articles that examine the contributions by non-English writing and female IR authors.[129] It is here where the key lies to a more comprehensive understanding of the origins of IR. We need to recognise the distinctly transnational setup of early IR scholarship as well as its institutional and political background. By incorporating forgotten actors, the following sections seek to broaden the spectrum and reconsider the origins of IR scholarship from around 1914.

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[124] Duncan Bell, 'Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond', *International Affairs* 85:1 (2009), p. 9.

[125] Nicolas Guilhot, 'Introduction: One Discipline, Many Histories', in Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011), pp. 7-9; Peter Wilson, 'The myth of the First Great Debate', *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998), p. 8.

[126] David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Introduction', in Long and Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 6.

[127] Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (New York, 2014). For an even longer history, from antiquity to the present, see Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory*, 2nd edn. (Manchester, 1997).

[128] Robert Vitalis, 'Birth of a Discipline', in David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 163.

Wartime Roots

Writings on international affairs existed, there is no doubt, long before the twentieth century.[130] But there is little value in citing Thucydides, Machiavelli, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Immanuel Kant or other 'great' thinkers if their works share no features of modern IR.[131] The philosophers, historians, and geographers who wrote on international affairs before the twentieth century did so from their own isolated perspectives. They did not position themselves within an academic community devoted to a reasonably well-defined and common branch of study. Nor did subsequent generations of scholars engage with their work beyond rare references.

What we are really looking for in determining the origins of IR as an academic discipline, however, is a minimum level of academic-style and internationally integrated scholarship that sufficiently separated itself from other subjects. This moment occurred at some point during the first two decades of the twentieth century, but it can most plausibly be pinned down to 1914, just after the outbreak of the Great War. It was at this point that authors, politicians, and activists began to conceive of their work on international politics as a common field, that they collaborated internationally, published in academic fashion, gathered at conferences and, perhaps most significantly, suggested that the subject should be taught at schools and universities.

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[129] Leonie Holthaus, 'Treitschke, Hitler und der Realismus—Deutschlandbezüge in den britischen Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen Anfang und Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts', in Jens Steffek and Leonie Holthaus (eds.), *Jenseits der Anarchie: Weltordnungsentwürfe im frühen 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2014); Katharina Rietzler, 'Philanthropy, Peace Research and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 5 (2008); Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Feminism, War and the Prospect of International Government: Helena Swanwick and the Lost Feminists of Interwar International Relations', *Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration* 2 (2008).

[130] Even twentieth century IR pioneers occasionally referenced earlier works of what seemed to them like IR. See Alfred Zimmern, 'The University Teaching of International Relations', 5 March 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 86.

[131] There have been attempts at such connections. See Gilberte Derocque, *Le Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre comparé au Pacte de la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1929). Lucian M. Ashworth has argued that international political thought emerged from the 1880s in the form of two main discourses, one on the nature of the state and one on the development of a transnational economy. Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought* (New York, 2014), pp. 96-7.

Several factors motivated the study of IR at that moment—the effects of war and violence, the demands for democratic control of foreign policy as well as for political education, the interdependence of the global economy, and the changing fabric of inter-state and imperial relations more broadly. The most immediate and obvious motive was the war itself. Reaching unprecedented levels of spacial scope, civilian affection, and geo-political transformation, the First World War was a watershed moment in the way foreign affairs were handled, and thought. It put a definite end to the Concert of Europe logic, which had shaped international relations for almost a century since the Congress of Vienna. The Congress system had been based on a complex network of bi- and multilateral treaties, some open and others secret, which were supposed to maintain the European 'balance of power', interpreted in terms of military and territorial strength. Although the Congress system had kept nineteenth century Europe relatively peaceful, war had still been a normal mode of diplomacy—as in Clausewitz' famous aphorism.[132] Now, in light of the horrors of the Great War, foreign policy thinkers questioned this logic.

The experience of war and violence was essential to the formation of IR. Besides its practical consequences—many academics were drawn into the war effort—the war had a profound impact on political thought.[133] For scholars such as David Mitrany and Alfred Zimmern the war was *the* decisive moment for their interest in international politics.[134] Rather than indulging in abstract ideas, however, these authors worked on immediate policy responses—in Mitrany's case on the role of small states in a League of Nations.[135] In fact, they explicitly rejected theory, arguing that the cause for war were

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[132] "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, transl. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1987 [1832]) p. 87.

[133] References to the 1914-8 war appeared in many works. See, for example, Fannie Fern Andrews, 'The World Plan of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace', *The Advocate of Peace* 78:8 (1916), p. 237; A. J. Grant et al., *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, 1916), p. 1; E. D. Morel, 'The Union of Democratic Control', *The Contemporary Review* (July 1915), p. 46.

[134] David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London, 1975), p. 4; Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935* (London, 1936), p. 137.

[135] David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London, 1975), p. 6.

"abstractions" and their abuse by governments.[136] The close connection between events and thoughts was characteristic for IR and neighbouring social sciences. Some of the most famous works of the time were intended as reactions to the state of affairs or as policy interventions.[137] It is impossible, therefore, to understand the intellectual origins of IR without appreciating their relationship to actual events, especially the First World War.

What is more, the effects of armed conflict were universal, and therefore a common motive for the study of IR. Trench warfare in Western Europe was only the most spectacular pinnacle of the global experience of violence. Women in particular referenced this universal experience of human suffering as a reason to study the problem of peace. Swanwick's critique of "Prussianism" was based precisely on that conviction.[138] Women sent their husbands and sons to war, often without seeing them return, they looked after widows and orphans, treated the wounded, cared for refugees and POWs, all the while replacing men in their regular jobs to earn a sufficient income for the household. In short, British suffragist-pacifist Agnes Maude Royden summarised, "women know the sufferings of war without its glory."[139] In order to address their concerns, they formed international groups of likeminded women who taught, wrote, and debated on international affairs. The most influential one of theses groups, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), was founded on the demand to stop the war immediately and to work for a negotiated peace.[140]

For men, too, the loss of human lives, regardless of their nationality, signalled that the conduct of international politics had to be fundamentally reformed. Several institutions for the study of IR were dedicated to the victims of the Great War. David Davies, the benefactor of the IR chair in Aberystwyth, famously made his endowment in memory of students killed in WWI.[141] Similarly, the co-founder and president of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) in Berlin, Ernst Jäckh, declared that he "founded the Hochschule in memory of his only son who fell in France as a young boy."[142] Jäckh's dedication was linked to a positive agenda rather than just a form of remembrance: "this memorial meant an act of service to his young generation to help them to overcome the chaos of the world as it was by the creation of a new order."[143] It was not only the common experience of war and personal loss, therefore, but the simultaneous search for peace that connected the early generation of IR scholars.

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[136] G. Lowes Dickinson, 'The Holy War', *The Nation*, 8 August (1914), p. 3.

[137] Important examples include Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (London, 1910) and John Maynard Keynes, *Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London, 1919).

[138] Helena Swanwick, *Women and the War* (London, 1915), p. 5.

[139] Agnes Maude Royden, 'War and the Woman's Movement', in Dickinson, G. L. and Buxton, C. R. (eds.), *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (London, 1915), p. 134.

[140] WILPF, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915–1938: a Venture in Internationalism* (Geneva, 1938), p. 6.

[141] E. L. Ellis, *The University College Wales, Aberystwyth, 1872-1972* (Aberystwyth, 1972), p. 188.

The war helped to organise a set of previously unconnected ideas, and gave rise to the first coherent body of IR literature. As Zimmern noted, "the war is being waged about ideas, and the settlement at its close will be determined by ideas."[144] Most notably, there was a growing body of works on international governance and the future League of Nations. Examples of this included G. Lowes Dickinson's *After the War* (1915), Charles Roden Buxton's *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (1915), H. N. Brailsford's *The Origins of the Great War* (1914), Randolph S. Bourne's *Towards an Enduring Peace* (1916), Charles W. Eliot's, *The Road Toward Peace* (1915), Paul Fauchille, *La guerre de 1914* [The War of 1914] (1916), C. Ernest Fayle's *The Great Settlement* (1915), Alfred Hermann Fried's, *Europäische Wiederherstellung* [European Reconstruction] (1915), J. A. Hobson's *Towards International Government* (1915), Oliver Lodge's *The War and After* (1915), A. Lawrence Lowell's *League to Enforce Peace* (1915), Raymond Unwin's, *The War and What After* (1915), Leonard Woolf's *International Government* (1916), Alfred Zimmern's *Nationality & Government* (1918), as well as *The International Review* (previously known as *War & Peace*), a journal published by the Garton Foundation from 1913 to 1919 which featured articles on international politics and the League of Nations. Besides this sub-set of works concerned with international governance, there was an even larger body of literature on other IR subjects, including E. D. Morel's *Truth and the War* (1916), Arnold Toynbee's *Nationality and the War* (1915), Helena Swanwick's *Women and War* (1915), F. von Wrangel's *Internationale Anarchie oder Verfassung?* [International Anarchy or Constitution] (1915), or J. J. Ruedorffer's *Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart* [Basics of Contemporary World Politics] (1914). These were no longer isolated publications but formed a distinct body of scholarship—soon reflected in extensive bibliographies, such as Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy's compendium in the journal *Europäische Gespräche* [European Conversations] (1923–33), or Parker Thomas Moon's *Syllabus on International Relations* (1925).[145] The authors of these works referenced each others's publications and often shared drafts for comments, creating a sense of disciplinary self-awareness.[146]

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[142] Speech by Ernst Jäckh, delivered at the International Studies Conference, London, 1 June 1933, IIIC Records, Box 317, Folder 3.

[143] Speech by Ernst Jäckh, 1 June 1933, IIIC Records, Box 317, Folder 3.

[144] Alfred Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', *Sociological Review* (1916), p. 213.

A second, though related factor in motivating the study of IR during the First World War was the idea that foreign policy should no longer be in the hands of unaccountable governments and unelected diplomats but be subject to democratic control. British politician and writer Arthur Ponsonby, one of the principle advocates of this argument, explained in 1915:

> "When a small number of statesmen, conducting the intercourse of nations in secrecy, have to confess their inability to preserve good relations, it is not an extravagant proposal to suggest that their isolated action should be supplemented and reinforced by the intelligent and well-informed assistance of the people themselves."[147]

Ponsonby was a leading member of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), a progressive, anti-militarist pressure group who opposed the British war policy. Specifically, the UDC demanded that no treaty or international arrangement should enter into force without the consent of parliament.[148] The UDC published a journal called *Foreign Affairs: A Journal of International Understanding* since June 1919, three years before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York launched its house journal under the same name.[149] The UDC's objectives were shared by likeminded groups abroad, including the Dutch Anti-War Council, the Swiss Committee for the Study of the Foundations of Durable Peace as well as the German and Austro-Hungarian Socialists.[150] Meetings in The Hague in 1915 and in Stockholm in 1916 provided a platform for exchange between these organisations and underlined the transnational dimension of this movement. Their program was linked to, but not identical with the Wilsonian rejection of secret treaties. 'Open diplomacy' was a necessary requirement for peace, but once government documents were available to the public, people needed to have control over foreign policy decisions.

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[145] See also later bibliographies, such as Agnes Headlam-Morley et al., *Bibliography in Politics for the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (Oxford, 1949).

[146] See, for example, Alfred Zimmern to Philip Kerr, 4 October 1915, Lionel Curtis Papers, c.817. Charles Roden Buxton's 1916 *A Practical, Permanent, and Honourable Settlement of the War* referenced G. Lowes Dickinson, J. A. Hobson, H. N. Brailsford as well as German and French sources.

[147] Arthur Ponsonby, *Democracy and Diplomacy: A Plea for Popular Control of Foreign Policy* (London, 1915), p. 7.

[148] Mission Statement of the Union of Democratic Control, 10 June 1918, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 178.

[149] E. D. Morel to Gilbert Murray, 26 June 1919, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 39. From 1925 to 1928, *Foreign Affairs* was edited by Helena Swanwick.

[150] Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, *Twenty-two Constructive Programs for Peace and World Organisation* (Stockholm, 1916).

A crucial pre-condition for exercising democratic control was, as Ponsonby had argued, that the public be well-informed about foreign affairs. Leonard Woolf echoed this point in a 1918 memo to Murray: "If the people are to exercise an effective control of foreign affairs," he argued, "we must have an educated and informed public opinion on these subjects."[151] In other words, there was a need for education in IR. Women were among the first and most outspoken proponents of teaching international politics to a wider audience, such as Margaret Hills in *Foreign Policy and the People* (1917).[152] Mary Sheepshanks called upon fellow feminist-pacifists to "use their brains" in the struggle for peace.[153] Their arguments were underpinned by Lida Gustava Heymann's conviction that "educated persons" would not go to war with one another.[154] The British section of WILPF argued in 1916 that "teaching and liberating" the minds of a new generations was key to the goal of international peace.[155] One year later, they demanded that education programs be adapted to the "higher ideals that are necessary for successful reconstruction after the war."[156]

Perhaps the most visible indicator of the 'birth' of IR during the mid-1910s was the network of institutions that emerged at the intersection of academia, politics, and civic activism. One of these was the London-based Council for the Study of International Relations (CSIR), founded in 1915 by the historian A. J. Grant, the economist and Labour politician Arthur Greenwood, the lawyer J. D. I. Hughes, the Balliol don F. F. Urquhart, and the *Round Table* editor Philip Kerr. Viscount Bryce, the lawyer, diplomat and Liberal politician, acted as President. The goal of the CSIR was "to encourage and assist the study of international relations from all points of view."[157] In doing so the CSIR responded to the increasing demand by "men and women" to study IR.[158] It published a series of foreign policy articles as well as so called "aids to study". It also helped to form study circles which used the CSIR's material—including pamphlets on *International Relations: A Scheme of Study*, *Outline Syllabuses of some Problems of the War*, and *The Causes of the War: What to Read.* In 1916 the CSIR published the discipline's first textbook, called *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,* which was complemented by an *Introductory Atlas of International Relations*, covering contemporary IR issues such as economic relations, international law, imperialism, and European unity.[159]

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[151] Leonard Wolf to Gilbert Murray, 28 September 1918, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 178.

[152] Margaret Hills, *Foreign Policy and the People* (London, 1917), p. 5.

[153] Mary Sheepshanks, 'Patriotism or Internationalism', *Jus Suffragii* 9:2 (1915), p. 184.

[154] Lida Gustava Heymann, 'What Women Say about the War', *Jus Suffragii* 9:3 (1914), p. 207.

[155] WILPF (British Section), *First Yearly Report: October 1915–October 1916* (London, 1916), p. 3.

[156] WILPF (British Section), *Second Yearly Report: October 1916–October 1917* (London, 1917), p. 10.

[157] R. W. Seton-Watson et al., *Foreign Series: The Council for the Study of International Relations* (London, 1915).

The CSIR's work was echoed by a wide range of interest groups, including the League of Nations Societies in various countries, women's societies, such as WILPF or the International Council of Women (ICW), pacifist societies, such as the Bureau international de la paix or the World Peace Foundation, religious groups, especially the Society of Friends (Quakers), legal associations, such as the Institut de Droit international, philanthropists, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), as well as groups devoted to the study of a new international order, notably the Central Organisation for a Durable Peace (CODP).[160] These bodies did not work in national isolation but collaborated, from the outset, across borders and often across political or religious dividing lines. The British League of Nations Union, for example, sought to make their campaign more effective by drawing on "a body of enlightened opinion in all countries", and started sounding out collaborators in France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, and Germany.[161] But international political thought was not just exported from Anglo-American actors to the rest of the world. French pacifist movements were already considering 'Wilsonian ideals' long before the President arrived in Paris.[162]

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[158] Percy Alden and George Peverett, 'Council for the Study of International Relations, Letter to the Editor', *The Spectator* (London, 6 March 1915).

[159] A. L. Grant et al., *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, 1916).

[160] On the role of interest groups, see, for example, Helen McCarthy, *The British people and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism c.1918-45* (Manchester, 2011).

[161] Memorandum by the Education Committee of the League of Nations Union and List of Foreign Scholars, December 1918[?], Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 179.

[162] Sandi Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe, 1815-1914* (Oxford, 1991).

In April 1915, the CODP hosted an international conference in The Hague with delegates from ten countries, the result of which was a *Minimum Program* for the post-war order.[163] The CODP understood itself as an umbrella organisation for various transnational associations concerned with the problem of peace.[164] Among the participants in 1915 were the Scottish suffragist Chrystal Macmillan, the English political scientist G. Lowes Dickinson, and the US educationalist Fannie Fern Andrews, as well as the German pacifists Ludwig Quidde and Walther Schücking. By March 1916, the CODP had close to 200 members, including eminent scholars and pacifists, such as Jane Addams, Emily G. Balch, Albert Einstein, Henri La Fontaine, J. A. Hobson, Christian Lous Lange, Paul Otlet, Charles M. Trevelyan, and Hans Wehberg.[165] Several advocates for the study of IR were associated with the CODP, such as Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, the founder of the Hamburg Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP).[166] It was directed by the Dutch liberal politician Hendrik Coenraad Dresselhuijs and the pacifist lawyer Benjamin de Jong van Beek en Donk.

According to the CODP, the principle causes of the war were secret diplomacy, inflated nationalism, imperialism, an overly sensational press, and private industry interests in armament. In response to these problems, they formulated five key demands as part of the *Minimum Program*: i) no transfer of territories against the will of the people, ii) equal access to colonial raw materials, iii) further development of arbitration and international governance, iv) disarmament and freedom of the seas, and v) democratic control of foreign policy.[167] These themes were further elaborated at subsequent meetings in Berne and by 1916, there were several "permanent committees of research", entrusted with research projects.[168] The goal of the CODP was to discuss, research, and spread solutions to international conflicts. However, like other early IR institutions, its members were also keen to influence official policy. A November 1917 memo by the US section considered how they could "assist the government".[169] While the CODP never provided any formal education, it perfectly reflected the style of early IR—shaped by current events, transnationally coordinated, and policy-oriented.

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[163] CODP, *A Durable Peace: Official Commentary on the Minimum-Program* (The Hague, 1915).

[164] Manifesto, 1915, CODP Records, Box 1.

[165] Liste des Members, 1 March 1916, CODP Records, Box 1.

[166] Program leaflet, September 1915, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy Papers, 2,24,139.

[167] Manifesto, 1915, CODP Records, Box 1.

[168] Among the results of these studies were Halvden Koht and Mikael H. Lie, *Parliamentary Control of Foreign Politics* (The Hague, 1916); Carl Lindhagen, *Der Parlamentarismus: seine Kontrolle der Auslandspolitik und über sich selbst* (The Hague, 1917).

At the same time as the CODP event, several hundred women from a dozen countries met in The Hague, too, and founded what later became known as WILPF, providing an institutional home for women who worked on problems of war and peace.[170] Organised by Dutch physician and suffragist Aletta Jacobs, the 1915 meeting gathered prominent feminist-pacifists, including Helena Swanwick, Jane Addams, and Rosika Schwimmer. Observing the war from the perspective of women, they adopted a distinctly feminist approach to the problem of peace, emphasising the rights of women and children in war, humanitarian concerns, the value of education, and the democratic control of foreign policy. Some argued that women were inherently more peaceful than men and that, had they been included in foreign policy decisions, the world war would never have started.[171] Building on these considerations, WILPF compiled a peace program, not dissimilar from the CODP, including both feminist points as well as general ones: i) no transfer of territory without approval by the men and women concerned, ii) governments to settle disputes by arbitration and imposition of social, moral and economic sanctions if necessary, iii) democratic control of foreign policy, iv) equal political rights for women, v) disarmament and control of arms traffic, vi) free and equal trade, and vii) abolishment of secret treaties.[172] Wartime membership of WILPF increased to several thousand women from 23 countries—by 1918, the British section alone counted 3,687 members.[173] The collaboration of women on questions of IR during the

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[169] Memo, November 1917, CODP Records, Box 3.

[170] Ingrid Sharp, 'The Women's Peace Congress of 1915 and the envisioning of women's rights as human rights', in Helen McCarthy et al., *Women, peace and transnational activism, a century on History & Policy*, 30 March 2015, available at http://www.historyandpolicy.org/dialogues/discussions/women-peace-and-transnational-activism-a-century-on [accessed 28-02-2016].

[171] Agnes Maude Royden, 'War and the Women's Movement', in Charles Roden Buxton (ed.), *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (London, 1915), p. 134; Olive Schreiner, quoted in C. K. Ogden, *Militarism versus Feminism* (London, 1915), p. 59.

[172] WILPF, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915–1938: a Venture in Internationalism* (Geneva, 1938), LSE Archives, WILPF/20/5, folder 1.

[173] Women's International League (British Section)*, Second Yearly Report: October 1916 – October 1917* (1917), LSE Archives, WILPF/2/1.

Great War was a significant contribution to the formation of the discipline, soon complemented by more formal projects, including summer schools, lectures, and publications.[174]

It is true that there were pre-1914 attempts at formulating international political thought from a variety of authors and underlying intentions. In 1909, for example, Andrew Carnegie published a pamphlet on how to limit armament among the eight great naval powers (Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Britain, and the US), a remarkable programme coming from America's wealthiest steel magnate.[175] In 1912, the chemist and brewer Richard Garton established the Garton Foundation to promote the study of IR in the spirit of Norman Angell's emphasis on the economic interdependence and the futility of war.[176] The Scottish writer William Archer, too, published his "plea for a rational world-order" prior to the Great War.[177]

But these pre-1914 examples failed to demonstrate a reasonable level of disciplinary coherence at approaching problems of war and peace. That moment occurred during the First World War. While it was not yet recognised as a university discipline, a rapidly increasing number of authors, scholars, and practitioners wrote about contemporary problems of international affairs, often covering precisely the same topics that remained on the agenda during the inter-war period. The rise of IR was from the outset intertwined with politics and diplomacy, it benefitted from transnational cooperation, and it included women who aspired to contribute to academic thought and diplomatic practice.

The Paris Peace Conference

It comes as no surprise that, when the Peace Conference opened in January 1919, the delegations in Paris included a number of scholars who were pioneering the study of IR. Among this group were Fannie Fern Andrews, Philip Noel-Baker, E. H. Carr, Lionel Curtis, Alfred Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Arnold J. Toynbee, James T. Shotwell, C. K. Webster, and Alfred Zimmern—despite tireless campaigning, women had been largely neglected to participate.[178] The presence of experts must be seen in the context of precisely those networks of academics and politicians that had shaped the intellectual precursors of IR during the war. Zimmern, for instance, having been involved at the League of Nations Society and the Round Table Movement, was appointed a temporary clerk at the Foreign Office in August 1918. The role of academics at the peace conference is well documented—for instance, the historian James Headlam-Morley "played a major part in the drafting of the minorities protection treaties", as Zara Steiner has pointed out.[179] The Peace Conference gave them a unique chance to exchange academic views and to gain first-hand experience at making peace.

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[174] The first summer schools were held in 1922 at Geneva, Burg Lauenstein (Frankenwald), Lugano, and Varese. WILPF, *Bulletin of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (Geneva, 1922), LSE Archives, WILPF/5/9.

[175] Andrew Carnegie, *Armaments and their Results* (New York, 1909), p. 6.

[176] Fiona Wood, 'Garton, Sir Richard Charles (1857–1934)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available at http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2167/view/article/47512 [accessed 13-02-2017].

[177] William Archer, *The Great Analysis* (New York, 1912).

Meetings at the Peace Conference reflected some of the key features of early IR scholarship. Academics interacted closely with political decision makers. Their work was subject to time pressure and frequent changes. It was based on (more ore less explicit) normative convictions. And, although the conference was international, it largely excluded non-Western actors, women, and nationals of those countries that were politically out of favour. Nonetheless, Paris provided an unprecedented opportunity for testing the ideas that had been conceived during the war. Delegations of several hundred advisors, including experts on law, economics, and history, came together for a period of six months in one city to discuss the future organisation of world peace. This created a unique atmosphere of high hopes, and disappointments, as contemporaries and historians have described.[180] Their agenda included, besides the peace terms for Germany, a whole range of questions that had played a role in early IR writings, such as the reform of empire, nationalism, minorities, migration, disarmament, sanctions, or world government.

The Conference itself was instrumental in several ways. It enabled international encounters among the Allies, it gave birth to institutions, it created an awareness for IR as a discipline—"diplomacy was coming down among the people"[181]—and it set the stage, ideologically and politically, for the inter-war period. President Wilson's historic decision to sail to Europe was widely received as a sign for the importance he assigned to international reconciliation, and it stimulated hope for a liberal reform of international order in many parts of the world.[182] The distinctly international atmosphere in Paris served as a showcase for how world governance might work, but it also provided a chance for all kinds of activists to sound out potential collaborators. The international 'feel' of the Peace Conference is well captured in the report of a group of IR experts who met in Paris:

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[178] Instead of Paris, WILPF met at Zurich in 1919. See WILPF, *Report of the International Congress of Women*, Zurich, 12-17 May 1919. LSE Archives, WILPF/20/5, folder 2.

[179] Zara Steiner, 'The historian and the Foreign Office', in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff (eds.), *Two worlds of international relations: Academics, practitioners and the trade in ideas* (London, 1994), p. 42. See Tomás Irish, 'Scholarly identities in war and peace: the Paris Peace Conference and the mobilization of intellect', *Journal of Global History* 11:3 (2016).

[180] Arnold Toynbee wrote to his father-in-law Gilbert Murray: "The Conference has rather suddenly passed from an overwhelming sense of its own power to a probably equally exaggerated sense of helplessness.", Toynbee to Murray, 26 March 1919, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72. On the general atmosphere of the conference, see Margaret Macmillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London, 2001).

> "Here were congregated under one roof trained diplomatists, soldiers, sailors, airmen, civil administrators, jurists, financial and economic experts, captains of industry and spokesmen of labour, members of cabinets and parliaments, journalists and publicists of all sorts and kinds. […] At meals, and when off duty, there was no convention against 'talking shop' […] A unique opportunity was thus given to every specialist of grasping the relation of his own particular question to all the others involved."[183]

It was this transnational, primarily transatlantic, encounter that gave rise to two influential think tanks —the British Institute of International Affairs in London and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. The idea arose during several unofficial meetings between members of the British and US delegations who thought that the working atmosphere in Paris was worth preserving in a more permanent form. The decisive meeting took place on 30 May 1919.[184] It was attended by American historians George Louis Beer and James Shotwell, lawyer James Brown Scott, diplomat Stanley Hornbeck, General Tasker Bliss, as well as British statesmen and diplomats Lord Cecil, Lionel Curtis, Eyre Crowe, Eustace Percy, historians James Headlam-Morley and Harold Temperley.[185] Their goal was "to keep its members in touch with the international situation and enable them to study the relation between national policies and the interests of society as a whole."[186]

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[181] David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London, 1975), p. 7.

[182] See Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007).

[183] Draft Report on the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs, James T. Shotwell Papers, Box 43.

[184] Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011), p. 913. However, there is evidence that preparations began as early as February 1919 and involved Lionel Curtis, Philip Noel-Baker, and Alfred Zimmern. Albert Mansbridge to Alfred Zimmern, 1 March 1919, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 16.

[185] Personal Diary, James T. Shotwell Papers, Box 41, Folder 1.

[186] Draft Report on the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs, p. 4, James T. Shotwell Papers, Box 43.

The Anglo-American initiative at the Peace Conference inspired a whole range of IR research institutes across Europe. Several members of the German delegation—including the sociologist Max Weber, the soon-to-be foreign minister Walter Simons, the banker Carl Melchior, and the legal scholar Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy—helped to establish the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP, Institute for Foreign Policy) in Hamburg. The founders of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, the Swiss diplomat William Rappard and the French historian Paul Mantoux, had both attended the Peace Conference. Having participated in active diplomacy themselves, they shared the idea that international affairs should (and could) be subject to rational investigation. The Conference also allowed academics to interact with neighbouring disciplines. The report of the British Institute of International Affairs recalled: "Men [sic!] who never imagined they had anything in common began to discover how much in common they really had."[187] In this sense, the conference led its participants to realise that neither economics, law or history really covered what they were talking about.

Apart from these elite-level networks, the Peace Conference also attracted popular attention to the conduct of foreign affairs. President Wilson's case for open diplomacy—"open covenants of peace, openly arrived at"—had triggered new levels of popular interest in international affairs. Previously, as Labour politician Philip Snowden pointed out, no more than a hundred men knew what was at stake in international conflicts.[188] Now, there was a viable chance that people might be better informed about the causes for war and the making of peace. Zimmern had actually favoured the "representation of peoples rather than governments" at the Peace Conference.[189] Female IR writers, though not invited to Paris, were the most progressive advocates of popular involvement in international affairs. In a 1919 essay entitled *Democracy and the League of Nations*, Swanwick explained the goal of WILPF was "to rouse the great mass of people in every country to take an interest in these great matters."[190] Democratic control of foreign policy required appropriate forms of information and education, motives that were propelled by the Peace Conference.

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[187] Draft Report on the British Branch of the Institute of International Affairs, p. 1, James T. Shotwell Papers, Box 43.

[188] Philip Snowden, 'Democracy and Publicity in Foreign Affairs', in Charles Roden Buxton (ed.), *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (London, 1915), p. 182.

[189] Raymond [?] to Alfred Zimmern, 4 February 1918, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 15.

[190] Helena Swanwick, 'Democracy and the League of Nations', in WILPF, *Towards Peace and Freedom* (August 1919), p. 15, LSE Archives, WILPF/2009/15/6/2.

Besides forming institutions, IR scholars engaged in substantial debates in Paris, particularly on the peace with Germany and the Covenant of the League of Nations. Despite their role as academic advisors, they did not hesitate to express political opinions. Several authors voiced their concern with the Versailles Treaty, arguing that it was unfair towards Germany and that it would not serve international peace at large. "I think the country ought to be told in planer language", wrote Zimmern to Toynbee in August 1919, "that the break of the armistice agreement of Nov. 5 1918 is as great a crime against the Law of nations as the break of the Belgian Treaty, and far less excusable."[191] Toynbee agreed. He suggested to admit Germany to the League of Nations straight away—"I think we shall get Germany in pretty soon"—and he was willing to widen the break with Russia and Hungary for this cause.[192] Part of their reasoning was that they regarded Germany as a bulwark against Bolshevism, but their pro-German attitude also derived from their vision for an inclusive post-war system of international cooperation. This approach was related to the Keynesian critique of the peace terms as well as some journalists who argued that "the Allied Governments have proposed such terms as no nation would accept."[193] Many IR scholars in the allied countries believed that not the entire German people should be held accountable for the poor decisions made by an outdated apparatus of diplomatic governance. Consequently, they began in August 1919 to reach out to German scholars, for example via the Oxford Society for Promoting International Understanding and Friendship.[194]

The Peace Conference created the hope—in many respects an illusion—that foreign politics could be controlled by the public and studied by academics. This should not be mis-interpreted as 'idealism', however. There were "doubts" about the League.[195] "I want to speak of the League of Nations not as an ideal or a dream", Gilbert Murray declared in November 1918, "but as a piece of practical political business."[196] Rather, what the pioneers of IR underestimated was that foreign affairs remained first and foremost *political* affairs, and that partisan interests torpedoed the idea of 'objective' international conditions. There were no unbiased conclusions to be drawn, no scientific laws to be discovered, no objective truth to be found. For IR as a social science, the Peace Conference was an instructive experience, albeit a problematic one. From a historical point of view, the Conference was equally discouraging. The American withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1920 terminated their war-time alliance with France and Britain. US isolationism as well as the exclusion of Japan, Soviet-Russia and Germany put an end to wartime visions of global governance. Nonetheless, the end of the First World War was primarily an optimistic moment for the advocates of a liberal world order, and the academic study of it. "There is nothing that I am so anxious to devote my time to as the enlightenment of public opinion about the League", declared Conservative politician and educationalist Eustace Percy in May 1919.[197]

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[191] Alfred Zimmern to Arnold Toynbee, 10 August 1919, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 86.

[192] Arnold Toynbee to Gilbert Murray, 27 July 1919, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[193] *The Daily News*, Saturday 24 May 1919, press clipping, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 181.

[194] Oxford Society for Promoting International Understanding and Friendship, 26 August 1919, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 181.

[195] R. W. Postgate, *Doubts Concerning a League of Nations* (London, 1919).

A Discipline Takes Shape

While there were important intellectual and institutional foundations of IR from about 1914, it was during the early 1920s that IR became a fully recognised university discipline. To be embedded at university level was important both because it bolstered disciplinary identity among researchers, and because it allowed students to take IR classes for a degree, thus producing the first generation of IR graduates. Thanks to the university chairs, departments, and degrees established during the immediate aftermath of the war, IR was able to achieve a more solid professional standing vis-à-vis neighbouring disciplines. During this phase, again, the protagonists of IR collaborated with non-academic actors and with likeminded colleagues abroad.[198]

The Woodrow Wilson professorship at Aberystwyth was the first of its kind and a characteristic example of how non-academic interests played into disciplinary formation—a 1918 newspaper report celebrated it as the "brain of the League of Nations".[199] The initial idea for a chair had occurred to industrialist and Liberal politician David Davies in November 1918. Born into a wealthy Welsh family, Davies was an avid supporter of the League of Nations. Among other things he financed the LNU where he worked alongside Lord Cecil and Gilbert Murray.[200] Davies' original idea was to install two professorships, one at Oxford and one at Strasbourg, but he was eventually convinced to have it based in his home country.[201] In a letter to several friends, later published in *The Times*, Davies outlined his motivation, which was clearly inspired by the peace process and the democratic reform of foreign politics:

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[196] Speech delivered at the Liberal Jewish Synagogue, 17 November 1918, entitled "Problems of the League of Nations", Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 179.

[197] Eustace Percy to Gilbert Murray, 26 May 1919, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 181.

[198] See, for example, Ernst Jäckh's efforts to liaise with foreign League of Nations societies. Ernst Jäckh to Gilbert Murray, 17 March 1921, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

> "The Plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference can lay the foundations of the League of Free Peoples, but they cannot rear the Temple of Peace; that is the task of the coming generation, and for its achievement we shall need consecrated energy, good will, knowledge, and enlightened public opinion in all countries."[202]

Davies considered it a service to civilisation to care for the academic underpinning of the League of Nations.[203] He believed in the power of universities in educating a new generation of diplomats, politicians and civil servants who were committed to the cause of the League of Nations. He formulated these goals, it is important to note, more than a year before the League of Nations formally came into being. While his motives were clear, the appointment procedure for the chair was somewhat obscure. Neither the official endowment letter nor the university council minutes specified any academic requirements for the holder of the chair. Davies merely devoted it to

> "the study of those related problems of law and politics, of ethics and economics, which are raised by the project of a League of Nations, and for the encouragement of a truer understanding of civilisations other than our own."[204]

It was obvious what kind of candidate Davies had in mind. There was no formal selection procedure and Zimmern was swiftly appointed inaugural Woodrow Wilson professor in the spring of 1919.[205] The classicist accepted without hesitation and began to draw up a curriculum for the newborn university subject. He interpreted it as a genuinely international endeavour, and immediately sought to attract foreign students.[206] Zimmern was granted generous freedoms in terms of research assistance, travel allowance and opportunities to do non-academic work. In particular, he was only required to reside two out of three terms at Aberystwyth so that he could engage in "general public service in connexion with the ideas mentioned in the donor's letter."[207] Zimmern's successors in the Wilson Chair, Charles K. Webster and Jerome Greene, continued this tradition and compiled detailed annual reports, imitating the style of diplomatic reports and taking pride in their semi-political missions to Europe, the US, Japan, India and elsewhere.[208]

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[199] 'A New Science', by William Archer, dated December 1918, press clipping, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12.

[200] "Financially the Union has hitherto been to an altogether excessive degree dependent on the liberality of one man, Major David Davies MP.", memo by Gilbert Murray, 25 April 1919, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 181.

[201] Thomas Jones was able to convince him to put it at Aberystwyth rather than Oxford. Jones to Watkins, 30 November 1918, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12.

[202] *The Times*, 7 December 1918, press clipping, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12.

[203] E. L. Ellis, *The University College Wales, Aberystwyth, 1872-1972* (Aberystwyth, 1972), p. 187.

[204] *The Times*, 7 December 1918, press clipping, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12.

[205] Jones to Watkins, 30 November 1918, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12.

Five years after Aberystwyth, in December 1923, the banker and philanthropist Ernest Cassel made an endowment to the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) for a professorship in International Affairs.[209] The LSE, then directed by William Beveridge, was convinced that the subject would be an important addition to the spectrum of social sciences taught at the school, including economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology.[210] Founded just over 30 years earlier by a group of Fabians, the LSE was a progressive institution committed to educating a new generation of students for public service. Initially without departmental affiliation, the history faculty welcomed the new chair, pointing to the overwhelming role that the League of Nations had come to play in recent times, but also warned that "special care must be taken to prevent the Chair from becoming identified with propaganda for or against the League."[211] The LSE was wary to give the new chair an ideological branding, like the Wilson chair at Aberystwyth, and warned not to confuse scientific investigation with political propaganda. Yet, it was understood that the professor to be elected would not simply observe and explain international politics, but make normative claims about it. Like most early IR professorships, the Cassel chair was installed with the aim of preventing future conflicts by teaching a certain type of diplomacy.[212]

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[206] "One effect of the foundation of the Chair would be, I hope, to attract foreign students. I would make it my particular object not merely to see that they derived benefit from their residence, but also that they contributed out of their own experience to the life of the college." Zimmern to Davies, 24 March 1919, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12, National Library of Wales.

[207] Zimmern to Thomas Jones, 8 December 1918, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12.

[208] The report's section "Visits to Foreign Countries" was by far the longest. See Report for Year 1923-24 by Charles Webster, David Davies of Llandinam Papers, D4/1 (Wilson Chair).

[209] Deller to Beveridge, 21 December 1923, LSE Archives, Central Filing Registry, Box 252: 134/8/A,B.

[210] Ralf Dahrendorf, *A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895-1995* (Oxford, 1995), p. 199.

[211] Reports of Boards of Studies in History and Economics, 6 February 1924, LSE Archives, Central Filing Registry, Box 252: 134/8/A,B.

Half a dozen candidates applied for the LSE Professorship, including Zimmern who had stepped down from the Aberystwyth chair, but the successful candidate was Philip Noel-Baker, a gifted young scholar and politician who had previously worked at the Foreign Office, served as Cecil's principal assistant at the Peace Conference, and then worked for Eric Drummond in Geneva.[213] His public profile appealed to the committee and he was elected to start in the 1924-5 academic year.[214] Noel-Baker's lectures dealt with increasing global interdependence and the resulting forms of international organisation, focusing especially on the League of Nations and disarmament.[215] LSE-historian F. S. Northedge argued that Noel-Baker's program was biased towards questions of "peaceful settlement of international disputes", yet considered his appointment a "breakthrough" for the study of IR.[216]

Thanks to the popularity of Noel-Baker's classes, such as "International Relations" and "International Politics", the subject became a fully fledged university discipline in 1927 when the LSE received a Rockefeller grant and opened the Department of International Relations.[217] From the outset, the department entertained relationships to other institutions for the study of IR, notable the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Geneva Graduate Institute. In 1928, Beveridge offered a prize for the best student in the department to visit Geneva.[218] Emphasis was also put on encounters with the policy world "outside the classroom."[219] Arnold Toynbee was particularly helpful in this respect.

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[212] F. S. Northedge, *Department of International History: A Brief History, 1924-1971*, LSE Archives, School History, Box 12.

[213] Noel-Baker's application included letters of reference from Cecil, Drummond, Arthur Pigou, and Fridtjof Nansen. See application letter, 23 April 1924, Philip Noel-Baker Papers, NBKR 8/8/1.

[214] Edwin Deller to William Beveridge, 5 May 1924, Central Filing Registry, Box 252: 134/8/A,B, LSE Archives, London.

[215] Lecture notes, 1927-8 and 1928-9, Philip Noel-Baker Papers, NBKR 8/ 12/3.

[216] F. S. Northedge, *Department of International History: A Brief History, 1924-1971*, LSE Archives, School History, Box 12.

[217] Nicholas Sims, *Foundation and History of the International Relations Department* (London, 2003), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/aboutthedepartment/historyofdept.aspx [accessed 12-12-2014].

[218] Nicholas Sims, *Foundation and History of the International Relations Department* (London, 2003), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/aboutthedepartment/historyofdept.aspx [accessed 12-12-2014].

[219] LSE Brochure, Session 1928-9, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

Appointed professor of International History at LSE in 1925, he simultaneously served as director of studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and maintained relationships with senior political figures.

It took until the end of the 1920s for Oxford to establish its first IR professorship. However, it was not exclusively due to the "historic peculiarities" of the medieval university that it lagged behind Aberystwyth and London.[220] In fact, if the political networker Thomas Jones had not convinced Davies to endow the Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, it would probably have been located at Oxford.[221] Nor was there a lack of academic interest at Oxford. The Master of Balliol College, Arthur Lionel Smith, called the Aberystwyth professorship in 1919 "an extraordinarily interesting and valuable new departure in our educational system."[222] It is true, however, as Martin Ceadel has pointed out, that the collegiate system hindered changes in the curriculum and complicated the introduction of new modules or degrees.[223] IR topics had been taught at Oxford since the early 1920s—the Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) degree was established in 1921, including an optional paper on "The Development of International Relations since 1815". However, it took time to appoint tutors—C. A. W. Manning was one of the first—and to install professorships at the university level.

In November 1929 then, a professorship was endowed by the Lithuanian-born textile merchant Montague Burton who, like other IR philanthropists, had a clear conception of what the discipline should focus on. "His real interest is in the League of Nations and constructive peace", explained Gilbert Murray who mediated between Burton and the university authorities.[224] It was to be "a League of Nations Chair in fact".[225] When Burton approached Murray with the formal offer to donate shares of his company to the amount of a full professorship, he intended to call it "The Montague Burton Chair of International Peace [sic!]".[226] Murray was positively inclined but wanted to sound the opinion of colleagues in the field. Noel-Baker replied that he was in principle satisfied with the idea but urged the chair to be called "International Relations" rather than "International Peace".[227] After further deliberations at the university council, Murray told Burton that Oxford would be honoured to instal the chair but that there were concerns about its ideological tendency:

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[220] Martin Ceadel, 'The Academic Normalisation of IR at Oxford', in Christopher Hood (et al.), *Forging a Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Oxford's Development of the Study of Politics and International Relations in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, 2014), p. 186.

[221] Davies' original idea to install chairs at Oxford and Strasbourg was countered by Jones: "I [Jones] fought with all my might for putting the former [the Chair] at Aberystwyth and was well backed by Miss Davies and ultimately I succeeded." Jones to Watkins, 30 November 1918, Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12.

[222] Arthur Lionel Smith to Thomas Jones, 16 March 1919, Dr Thomas Jones Papers, Vol. 12, National Library of Wales.

[223] Martin Ceadel, 'The Academic Normalisation of IR at Oxford', in Christopher Hood (et al.), *Forging a Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Oxford's Development of the Study of Politics and International Relations in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, 2014), p. 185.

[224] Murray to Fisher, 4 November 1929, 7 November 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[225] Murray to Philip Noel-Baker, 4 November 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

> "They have a difficulty in the title. A Professorship of Peace might seem to suggest propaganda rather than education, and they would prefer some such title as "'The Montague Burton Chair of International Relations'."[228]

Apart from the name of the chair, there was also debate about the composition of the appointment committee. Burton insisted that besides members of the law, history, and politics faculties, Lord Cecil and Gilbert Murray should be on the panel, both of whom he was certain would follow his agenda. Furthermore, he asked the committee to keep in mind that:

> "the under-lying motive of the Donor is the furtherance of International Peace in accordance with the deliberations and decisions of the League of Nations at Geneva."[229]

Eventually, the official call for applications required the future professor to teach:

> "the theory of International Relations and on methods of international cooperation with particular reference to the work and aims of the League of Nations."[230]

Others thought that these conditions meant to ideologically pre-determine the chair and a debate ensued in the *Manchester Guardian* over the extent to which a university position could endorse a political stance.[231] In the end, the selection committee complied with the donor's request and appointed Zimmern to the chair in August 1930. To everyone's satisfaction, Zimmern managed to generate a lot of interest in his lectures. By 1934, the social studies department reported that the chair had become "not only a valuable but an essential factor in the work of the University", and it became a permanent institution.[232] While Oxford's 'rival' Cambridge did not have a professorship until much later, there was interest in the field, too. Arnold McNair, Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge, lamented the absence of an IR chair in his university and took the liberty to "stray a little across the frontier which divides law from politics."[233]

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[226] Montague Burton to Murray, 7 November 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[227] Noel-Baker to Murray, 9 November 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[228] Murray to Burton, 27 December 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[229] Montague Burton to S. Craig, 15 January 1930, Oxford University Archives, UR6/MB/1, file 1.

[230] Call for applications, dated 17 June 1930, Oxford University Archives, UR6/MB/1, file 1.

[231] Hugh Richardson to Murray, 27 May 1930, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

The first American institutions for the study of IR shared some similarities, although the political context was different. US political scientists, historians, and lawyers studied international affairs from at least the early 1900s, as Vitalis has pointed out.[234] Building on the field of race studies as well as the pre-war work of pioneering scholars, such as John Burgess or Herbert Baxter Adams, IR in a narrow sense developed during the inter-war period. Georgetown's School of Foreign Service was founded in 1919. Princeton's School of Public and International Affairs followed in 1930, Tufts' Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1933, and Harvard's Graduate School of Public Administration in 1936.[235] Besides these universities, however, there were important non-academic institutions that promoted the study of IR. A notable example was Andrew Carnegie's Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), founded in 1910.[236] The CEIP became influential through its extensive overseas funding program as well as its own staff.[237] From 1917, James T. Shotwell, professor of international history at Columbia University, served as director of research at the CEIP. Like so many other IR pioneers, Shotwell had attended the Paris Peace Conference. Along with his colleague Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia and, from 1925, of the CEIP, Shotwell became one of the leading figures of American cultural diplomacy. Since the US was not officially represented on the international stage, actors such as the CEIP, represented by Butler and Shotwell, became enormously influential in stimulating intellectual interest in IR.[238] Funds from the CEIP allowed for the publication and circulation of IR books, meetings of scholars, and professorships. Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial sponsored research institutes for the study of IR throughout the 1920s.[239] It was obvious that these philanthropies did not pursue exclusively academic goals—as its officers admitted[240]—and that their influence would further complicate the conglomerate of interests within the young discipline.

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[232] Martin Ceadel, 'The Academic Normalisation of IR at Oxford', in Christopher Hood (et al.), *Forging a Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Oxford's Development of the Study of Politics and International Relations in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, 2014), p. 189.

[233] Arnold McNair, 'Collective Security', *British Year Book of International Law* 17 (1936), p. 150.

[234] Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, 2015).

[235] They were later renamed and are today known as Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and John F. Kennedy School of Government.

[236] William T. R. Fox, 'Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience', *World Politics* 2:1 (1949), pp. 68-9.

[237] Katharina Rietzler, 'Philanthropy, Peace Research and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 5 (2008).

Besides these well-known Anglo-American research institutions, the 1920s saw the rise of IR scholarship outside the English-speaking world, particularly in continental Europe. In 1920, the journalist Ernst Jäckh co-founded the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik [German Academy for Politics (DHfP)] in Berlin, a graduate school that offered short-term courses in domestic and foreign politics, sociology, as well as cultural and social policy.[241] A national liberal politician and confidant of Friedrich Naumann, Jäckh wanted the DHfP to educate a new generation of diplomats and public servants in the spirit of a "new Germany".[242] It grew out of Naumann's *Staatsbürgerschule*, a 'school of citizenship' for the Weimar Republic founded in 1918. Jäckh also drew on the argument formulated during the war by orientalist and education reformer Carl Heinrich Becker that Germany required institutions for the "study of IR [*Auslandsstudien*]" in the face of increasing globalisation.[243] Jäckh received prominent support from historians Hans Delbrück, Friedrich Meinecke, and Otto Hoetzsch as well as representatives from politics, diplomacy, and industry, such as Richard von Kühlmann or Walter

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[238] Katharina Rietzler, 'Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American Philanthropy and Cultural Diplomacy in the Interwar Years', *Historical Research* 84:223 (2011).

[239] Grant Report, RF 33009, Folder 952, Box 105, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF; Grant Report, RF 32130, 13 April 1932, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717, RG 1.1, RF; Beardsley Ruml to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 16 November 1925, Folder 561, Box 52, Series 3.06, LSRM, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[240] "This, of course, is *not* research." Selskar M. Gunn to Edmund E. Day, 31 December 1931, Folder 60, Box 7, Series 910, RG 3, RR, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[241] See Steven D. Korenblat, 'A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule Für Politik, 1920-1933', *Central European History*, xxxix:3 (2006); Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt: Deutsche Politikwissenschaft 1920-1945*, 2nd edn. (Baden-Baden, 2013); Manfred Gangl, 'Die Gründung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik', in Manfred Gangl (ed.), *Das Politische. Zur Entstehung der Politikwissenschaft während Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt, 2008).

[242] Ernst Jäckh, *The New Germany: Three Lectures by Ernst Jäckh* (Oxford, 1927), p. 64.

[243] C. H. Becker, 'Die Denkschrift des preußischen Kultusministeriums über die Förderung der Auslandsstudien', *Drucksachen des Preußischen Abgeordnetenhauses*, 22. Legislaturperiode. VI. Session (1916/17.), Nr. 388, 24.1.1917.

Simons.[244] Its political stance was predominantly liberal, favourable to the Weimar Republic and to German accession to the League of Nations, though affiliated scholars came from a wide range of political backgrounds, including socialists, pacifists, Catholics, and nationalists. As its British and US counterparts, the DHfP enjoyed the support of wealthy philanthropists—a Carnegie Chair for Foreign Policy and History was installed at DHfP in 1926.[245] From the outset, the DHfP drew on academic and practical expertise in the teaching of IR, employing several dozen lecturers, such as Gertrud Bäumer, Moritz Julius Bonn, Hans Delbrück, Theodor Heuss, Hajo Holborn, and, as visiting speakers, Butler and Shotwell.[246] The DHfP quickly rose to international prominence and was sometimes referred to as the counterpart to LSE or Sciences Po in Paris.[247]

While the DHfP focused on education and professional training, the Institut für Auswärtige Politik [Institute for Foreign Policy (IAP)] in Hamburg served primarily as a research centre and library. The IAP was the joint product of a group of statesmen, academics, and businessmen, including Max von Baden, Lujo Brentano, Hans Delbrück, Carl Melchior, Max Montgelas, Max Warburg, Max Weber, and Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy.[248] This informal foreign-policy circle, sometimes known as *Heidelberger Vereinigung*, wanted to furnish an "independent study on the responsibility for the war"—essentially an academic justification for the German war policy.[249] A preliminary bureau was set up in February 1921 with Mendelssohn Bartholdy as inaugural director, before becoming a formal research institute at the University of Hamburg in January 1923.[250] Initially more of an information and archive centre, the IAP soon evolved into a full-blown research institute with regular lectures, guest speakers, and its own periodical, suitably called *Europäische Gespräche* [European Conversations]. As Mendelssohn Bartholdy liked to stress, it was modelled after British and American institutions for the study of IR, and there was regular exchange with foreign colleagues since the early 1920s.[251] The IAP became a well-respected IR institute and featured a library that was "almost identical with that of Chatham House".[252] Among the handful of affiliated scholars were liberal political scientists, lawyers and historians, including Hans von Dohnányi, Theodor Haubach, Magdalene Schoch, and Alfred Vagts. The director Mendelssohn Bartholdy himself was a widely respected international lawyer who gained experience in academia and practical diplomacy, at home and abroad, and who would later become a target of the Nazis.[253]

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[244] 'Zur Hochschule für Politik', by E. Jäckh, *Deutsche Politik*, 12 November 1920, Heft 46, Ernst Jäckh Papers, Box 15.

[245] GStAPK, HA Rep. 303 (neu) Nr. 51. See also Katharina Rietzler, 'Philanthropy, Peace Research and Revisionist Politics', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 5 (2008); Antonio Missiroli, *Die Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (Sankt Augustin, 1988), pp. 21-3, 36.

[246] Ernst Jäckh, 'Zur Hochschule für Politik', *Deutsche Politik* Heft 46, 12 November 1920, Ernst Jäckh Papers, Box 15. In 1920-1, the DHfP had 60 lecturers. Erich Nickel, *Politik und Politikwissenschaft in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, 2004), p. 81.

[247] Radio documentary on Arnold Toynbee's visit to Germany in 1936, broadcasted on 13 April 1967, Bayerischer Rundfunk, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 13.

[248] Gisela Gantzel-Kress and Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, 'The Development of International Relations Studies in West Germany', in Ekkehart Krippendorff and Volker Rittberger (eds.) *The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents* (London, 1980); Gisela Ganzel-Kress, 'Das Institut für Auswärtige Politik im Übergang von der Weimarer Republik zum Nationalsozialismus (1933 bis 1937)', in Eckart Krause, Ludwig Huber, Holger Fischer (Hg.) *Hochschulalltag im 'Dritten Reich': Die Hamburger Universität 1933–1945, Teil II: Philosophische Fakultät Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät* (Berlin, 1991).

[249] Max Warburg to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 12 January 1920, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholy Papers, SPK MA Nachl. AMB, 2,27,9.

In Paris, the lawyers Paul Fauchille and Albert Geouffre de Lapradelle founded the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales (IHEI) in 1920. Co-funded by government funds and student fees, the IHEI offered programs in international law and diplomacy as well as free-standing courses to non-degree readers. Among the classes offered were "La morale internationale [The International Spirit]", "La Société des Nations (SDN) [The League of Nations]", and "L'europe centrale et le droit des gens [Central Europe and Human Rights]".[254] According to its statutes, it was not only supposed to educate the next generation of diplomats but also to take a stance on current affairs and promote the ideas of justice and morality in international affairs.[255] To this end, the IHEI hosted public lectures and featured a prominently staffed advisory board, including Arthur Balfour, Edvard Beneš, Léon Bourgeois, Paul

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[250] Muriel K. Grindrod, 'The Institut für Auswärtige Politik, Poststrasse 19, Hamburg', *International Affairs* 10:2 (1931). pp. 223-4.

[251] Memo by the Trustees of the Anglo-American University Library for Central Europe, signed by Gilbert Murray, Arnold S. Rowntree, and William Temple, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy Papers, SPK MA Nachl. AMB, 2,27,49.

[252] Muriel K. Grindrod, 'The Institut für Auswärtige Politik, Poststrasse 19, Hamburg', *International Affairs* 10:2 (1931), p. 227.

[253] Rainer Nicolaysen, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1874-1936): Jurist, Friedensforscher, Künstler', *Rabels Zeitschrift* 75 (2011).

[254] Opening Announcement, 1921, IHEI Records, Boîte 1.

[255] Statutes, 1921[?], IHEI Records, Boîte 1.

Hymans, Raymond Poincaré, and James Brown Scott.[256] Like in Berlin, the CEIP sponsored a Carnegie Chair along with a lecture series from the mid-1920s.[257] The IHEI also maintained close ties to other IR research institutes abroad and employed international staff. As early as 1921, the IHEI counted 40 students from Europe, Russia, and America, three of whom were women.[258] In short, the IHEI served the same purpose and employed the same means as other IR institutions at the time.

The Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, too, enjoyed close connections to politics and diplomacy from its origins in 1927.[259] Founded by the Swiss diplomat William Rappard and the French historian Paul Mantoux, its purpose was to educate future diplomats for the League of Nations system, the headquarters of which were located just a few hundred meters away. Though not officially affiliated with the League, it was interpreted by some as a "League of Nations University [*Völkerbunduniversität*]" at the centre of international life.[260] Like other founders of university-based IR, Rappard and Mantoux were driven on the one hand by the hope "to contribute to the promotion of international understanding", while emphasising at the same time that their Graduate Institute did not subscribe to any preconceived doctrine or propaganda, and only conducted "impartial and scientific observation, teaching and research."[261] Focusing on political, legal, economic and social subjects "of an international character", the Geneva Graduate Institute provided a new environment for the study of international affairs, radically different from a traditional university.[262] Only two years after its inception, some 80 students from 19 countries read for postgraduate diplomas or followed short-term courses.[263] Up to half of them were women.[264] This concept attracted an impressive range of renown scholars to the Institute, including political scientists such as Harold Laski, Eric Voegelin or Quincy Wright, economists Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich August von Hayek and Gunnar Myrdal, and lawyers Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpacht, and Albert de Geouffre de Lapradelle. Visiting lecturers also included genuine IR specialists, such as C. A. W. Manning, Philip Noel-Baker, Charles K. Webster, and Alfred Zimmern, as well as representatives from the League apparatus, such as Rachel Crowdy, Salvador de Madariaga and Åke Hammarskjöld. The Graduate Institute was co-financed by the Canton of Geneva, the Swiss state, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.[265] The Rockefeller Foundation continued to support the Graduate Institute throughout the inter-war period, arguing that the importance of its program could hardly be exaggerated and that a strong centre for the study of IR at Geneva was "indispensable".[266]

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[256] Press Statement, 1921[?], IHEI Records, Boîte 1.

[257] Poster by CEIP, 1934, IHEI Records, Boîte 1.

[258] List of students, February - May 1921, IHEI Records, Boîte 2.

[259] Originally known as the Postgraduate Institute of International Studies (French: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes), it is today called Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, or simply The Graduate Institute. It is not to be confused with the Geneva Institute of International Relations, a summer school program that grew out of the British LNU summer school in 1924. Nor was it identical with the Geneva Research Center, a kind of US embassy for international affairs circles in Geneva, directed by Malcolm W. Davis, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, and editor of *A Monthly Review of International Affairs*. Yet another body was the Institute of World Affairs, founded in 1924 in Geneva. See Program leaflet of the "Geneva Institute of International Relations", 7th year, 27 July to 1 August 1930, Graduate Institute Archives, HEI [uncatalogued]; [unkown author], 'The Geneva Research Center', *World Affairs* 96:4 (1933); The Rockefeller Foundation, *The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report for 1933* (New York, 1933), p. 262.

[260] Hans Wehberg to Paul Mantoux, 21 September 1927, HEI 168/4/1, Graduate Institute Archives.

[261] Brochure *Announcement for 1928–1929* (Geneva, 1928), HEI A/1 (1928/1929–1940/1941), Graduate Institute Archives.

[262] Brochure *Announcement for 1928–1929* (Geneva, 1928), HEI A/1 (1928/1929–1940/1941), Graduate Institute Archives.

In Austria, the foremost institution for the study of IR was the Vienna Konsularakademie [Consular Academy], founded in 1754 by Maria Theresa as a school for Oriental languages. During the late nineteenth century, the Konsularakademie shifted its focus to the training of young diplomats and by the eve of the First World War, it boasted a curriculum which resembled post-1919 IR programs, including classes in law, history, politics, economics, geography, military studies and nine different languages.[267] At that point, the faculty already counted 20 professors and 10 lecturers, teaching an average of 50 students.[268] After the Great War, the Konsularakademie was transformed into a republican institution, accepting up to 60 students per year from more than two dozen countries. From

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[263] Rapport de l'Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales pour l'année académique 1928-29, dated 31 October 1929, HEI RA 1928/30–1939, Graduate Institute Archives.

[264] Memo on course attendance, Pitman B. Potter, 14 January 1931, HEI 163/4–6; and memo on seminar attendance, Maurice Bourquin, HEI 149/4–5, Graduate Institute Archives.

[265] Pitman B. Potter, 'The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva', *American Journal of International Law* 62:3 (1968), p. 740.

[266] Memo, 13 November 1929, Folder 915, Box 101, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[267] *Progamm der K. und K. Konsular-Akademie*, June 1915, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 33.

[268] Overview leaflet, 1919, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 35.

1926, about a quarter of them were women.[269] Some foreign ministries, notably the German and US, directly sent their trainees to the Konsularakademie on specially designed professional programs.[270] About half of the student population lived on the premises of the Konsularakademie under boarding school conditions, which was meant to foster the strong international atmosphere—a press report called it a "college of the League of Nations".[271] Like at other institutions for the study of IR, the faculty consisted of both university professors and lecturers with practical diplomatic experience. The director was Anton Winter, himself a graduate of the Konsularakademie and formerly a senior diplomat at the foreign office. They taught a two-year post-graduate degree which prepared students for diplomatic careers in their respective home countries as well as for positions in trade and business. Classes ranged from international law, diplomatic history, economics and trade to geography, foreign languages and physical exercises.[272] Throughout the inter-war period, the Konsularakademie maintained relationships with other institutions for the study of IR, such as the DHfP, the IAP, LSE, Sciences Po, the Geneva Graduate Institute and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, with whom the Austrians exchanged publications, lecturers and students. Konsularakademie faculty also attended international conferences, notably the ones devoted to the teaching of IR.[273]

Across all these locations early institutions for the study of IR shared similar motivations, organisational forms, and intellectual agenda. What is more, they were connected through a network of transnational cooperation. Building on pre-1919 studies in IR, the 1920s saw the decisive breakthrough in terms of professorial chairs and lectureships at universities, departments, academic journals and conferences, a number of key publications and debates, as well as an increasing level of public interest.

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[269] *Jahrbuch der Konsularakademie,* January 1931, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 41.

[270] Cooperation with the German government ended after a dispute about payments during the currency disruptions of 1923. The US consulate in Vienna arranged for two diplomatic trainees to study at the Konsularakademie. See Memo, 14 June 1923, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 36; and Ernest L Harris to Anton Winter, 9 August 1932, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 42.

[271] G. E. R. Gedye, 'International College Flourishes in Austria: Consular Academy at Vienna teaches Students From Many Lands the Rules of World Relationships', *New York Times*, 3 August 1931, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 41.

[272] *Questionnaire pour les universités* with answers by Konsularakademie, December 1922, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 35.

[273] Werner Picht to Anton Winter, 23 June 1931, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, box 41.

By the second half of the 1920s, IR was a reasonably well defined field of study, recognised in most major academic centres around Europe and the US.

Conclusion

The period from the mid-1910s to the late 1920s was a formative time for the study of IR. It saw not only the institutional birth of IR as an academic discipline and popularised interest in the subject, but it also shaped the ideological strands upon which subsequent IR debates were based. Visions about global order, economic interdependence, and arbitration courts had been developed prior to the First World War. But it were the experiences of the war and the demand for democratic control of foreign policy that sparked a more sophisticated academic interest in the subject, and which brought together a range of transnational interest groups, writers, politicians, and donors who subsequently built the first IR institutions. Their primary concern was to work out a peaceful international order, based on the distribution of political authority between nation-states and the League of Nations, but their research also covered questions of imperial reform, self-determination, minorities, disarmament, reparations, economic cooperation, and international life more broadly.

Yet, as this chapter has argued, the intellectual roots of IR cannot be reduced to 'idealist' post-war planning. To devise plans for a League of Nations was not in itself 'idealist'. Quite the contrary, early IR authors were well aware of the distribution of power—in terms of armies and navies, territorial expansion, alliances and secret treaties, the exclusion of women in politics, and the non-democratic conduct of foreign policy. In their writings and speeches, IR scholars accounted for these implications of power. Their conclusions were perplexingly eclectic and by no means categorised into well-defined theories. It is true, as Schmidt and other revisionists have argued, that early IR scholarship was by no means as trivially 'utopian' as Carr had asserted. Authors who had traditionally been written off as 'idealists' were in fact much more critical. Even during the formative phase of IR, a prosperous time for political visionaries, there were elements of 'realism' in their work. Subsequent interpretations of early IR scholarship have mistaken its normative character either for naïve 'idealism' or for expressions of some general theory about the world, whereas it was actually a result of the practical activities pursued by the pioneers of IR.

What this first episode of IR history shows is the impact of transnational networks of scholars and practitioners who, in the context of global war and the struggle for peace and democracy, established a new academic discipline at the intersection of diplomacy, history, economics, law and politics. The origins of this body of thought lay in wartime works by writers, professors, and political activists, men and women, across various countries. Their works were bundled and integrated into an academic field thanks to various interest groups formed during the mid-1910s. Their significance was reinforced by the 1919 Peace Conference, and manifested in the institutions formed in the 1920s. This context played a vital role for intellectual developments in the discipline.

In particular, the protagonists of IR believed that issues of war and peace could and should be subject to rational investigation. They argued that education in IR was essential in order to make foreign politics more accountable and, as a result, the world more peaceful. This argument was motivated by the experience of the war, the demand for a more democratic global order, and the growing public interests in foreign affairs. It was tied to the women's campaign for peace and equal rights as well as to the demand for improvements in political education. The foundation of IR was a fundamentally *political* process, influenced by various academic, public and private interests—a phenomenon that was seldom acknowledged and that left the disciplinary propositions somewhat unclear. What was certain, however, was that the study of IR could only flourish within a transnational setting, supported by institutions of intellectual cooperation. This often underestimated aspect of early IR scholarship will be addressed in the next chapter.

2. Peace in the Minds of Men and Women: Intellectual Cooperation and International Relations at the League of Nations

"One of the fields in which intellectual cooperation seems to us most urgently needed is that of the scientific study of international relations […] Nothing is more essentially international than these investigations."
(Alfredo Rocco, 1932)[274]

Introduction

The study of International Relations (IR) did not evolve in national isolation. It was embedded from the outset in a network of transnational intellectual cooperation between academics, diplomats, politicians, and journalists. This network, organised from the early 1920s by the League of Nations, served both as an infrastructure to facilitate collaborative research and as a normative goal in itself. For many IR scholars, peaceful international cooperation was a means *and* an end. The underlying rationale was to build peace in the minds of men (and women!) in order to build peace in general—the same *leitmotiv* that UNESCO continues to use until today.

Among the earliest to realise this connection between IR and intellectual cooperation was a group of feminist pacifists who later formed the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF). At their 1915 conference in The Hague, attended by hundreds of women from twelve countries, they issued a resolution which called for "International Conferences convened for the scientific study and elaboration of the principles and conditions of permanent peace."[275] They suggested that studying peace in theory was essential to achieving peace in practice, thus anticipating the major premise of inter-war intellectual cooperation in the field of IR.

WILPF's proposals were largely ignored and the 1919 League of Nations Covenant did not establish a technical body for scientific and cultural exchange. Only in 1922, after further campaigning by Belgian internationalists Henri La Fontaine and Paul Otlet as well as from French academics Paul Appell and Julien Luchaire, the League decided to instal an International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) at Geneva. The ICIC comprised of a prominent board, including Albert Einstein and Marie Curie, and was charged with a number of projects, ranging from bibliographic cooperation to university exchanges and intellectual property rights. Due to its chronic lack of funding, the ICIC was complemented in 1926 by the Paris-based International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), an institution controlled by the League but financed by the French state. The IIIC essentially became the executive branch of intellectual cooperation at the League and was particularly invested in the field of IR. The IIIC sponsored conferences, issued handbooks and monographs. Several advocates for the study of IR, including Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern, served in senior positions at the ICIC and IIIC. It was this overlap of academia, diplomacy and technical cooperation which shaped much of inter-war IR scholarship.

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[274] International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, *A Record of a First International Study Conference on The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), p. 4.

[275] WILPF, *Extract from the Forthcoming Report of the International Congress of Women: held at Zurich, May 12–17, 1919* (Geneva, 1919), quoting 'Resolutions adopted at the Congress at the Hague, 1915', resolution xiv.

This chapter regards intellectual cooperation at the League of Nations both in terms of its institutional setup and as an ideological project which reflected the general political challenges of the time. On the one hand, its founders believed in the universality of scientific truths and advocated for a global network of "disinterested" scholarly exchange.[276] On the other hand, political events soon made it hard to distinguish scientific exchange from propaganda, and proved that academic cooperation, particularly in the field of IR, was by no means unpolitical. As a consequence, intellectual cooperation became a controversial venture and the IIIC struggled to find responses to growing political extremism in the 1930s.[277] Yet, the emergence of IR as an academic subject cannot be understood without its links to the ICIC and IIIC—the predecessors of UNESCO. Studying this history highlights the inexorable links between ideas and practice in diplomacy, between understanding and making the inter-war political order.

The chapter begins with a brief history of intellectual cooperation. It then traces the origins of the ICIC at Geneva. The third section deals with the IIIC in Paris, the fourth with activities in the field of IR research. The last section discusses the underlying motives of inter-war intellectual cooperation and its wider implications for the study of IR.

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[276] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), pp. xxii-xxiii.

[277] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 209.

History and Historiography of Intellectual Cooperation

The idea of transnational academic collaboration was not invented in the twentieth century. This history is much older, indeed as old as as scientific inquiry itself. Most historians would trace it back to the seventeenth century Republic of Letters, others to scholasticism and the medieval universities or even to Plato's dialogues.[278] Intellectual elites have always looked beyond borders, learned foreign languages and shared cosmopolitan ideals, often underpinned by religious claims to universal truth. Up until the eighteenth century, intellectual life was a universalist enterprise and Latin was the only vehicle of scientific communication—the *unitas intellectus*.[279] Only the advent of the modern nation-state in Europe, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, together with advances in science and technology reshaped the framework of scholarly collaboration. National academies and learned societies increasingly segregated a community that used to conceive of itself as universal. National universities drew up national curricula. By the mid-nineteenth century new scientific fields and the increase in student numbers turned small intellectual circles into education systems, often subject to state regulation. The role of the intellectual was then, as Tony Judt observed, "almost by definition, the representative, spokesperson, theorist of a nation [...] In the most extreme cases (i.e. the Czechs or the Croats) the intellectuals *were* the nation."[280] Nationalism in academia culminated in 1914 when ninety-three German intellectuals signed the infamous manifesto in support of German war aims.[281]

In response to these developments, the first explicitly transnational organisations were founded during the second half of the nineteenth century. It was the conscious creation of border-crossing movements from the 1840s that constituted what we today understand as internationalism—the same term was used by contemporaries.[282] They included meetings, such as the Congress of Authors and Artists, held at Brussels in 1858, scholarly societies, such as the Chemical Society, founded in 1841 in London, or technical organisations, such as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, created at Sèvres in 1875. According to calculations by the Union of International Associations (UIA), the total number of international congresses increased from only nine between 1840 and 1849 to more than 1,000 during the first decade of the twentieth century.[283] The UIA, itself an organisation for transnational intellectual cooperation, was founded in 1907 by Belgian internationalists Henri La Fontaine and Paul Otlet in order to keep track of the growing number of like-minded institutions. In 1911, another statistic counted some 614 organisations in the sciences and humanities alone, ranging from the International Rubber Testing Committee to the International Commission for the Study of Clouds.[284] Some of these organisations were specifically aimed at transnationalising education and science. One example was the plan proposed by Dutch lawyer and teacher Hermann Molkenboer in 1888 to form a "permanent council on education", establishing universal standards for schools.[285] There was also the International Association of Academies, which gathered 17 national academies from three continents for regular conferences since 1899 until the Allies withdrew at the start of the First World War.

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[278] Alfred Zimmern, *The Study of International Relations: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford on 20 February 1931* (Oxford, 1931); Joseph Needham, *Science and International Relations* (Oxford, 1948), p. 6; Anthony Grafton, *Worlds Made by Words: Scholarship and Community in the Modern World* (Cambridge, MA, 2009); Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *Global Intellectual History* (New York, 2013). See also, David Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge, 2013).

[279] Alfred Zimmern, *Internationale Politik als Wissenschaft* (Berlin, 1933), p. 3.

[280] Tony Judt, 'Nineteen eighty-nine: the end of *which* European era', in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.) *The Revolutions of 1989* (New York, 1999), p. 174 (emphasis in the original).

[281] *An die Kulturwelt,* 4 October 1914, Archiv der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bestand Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, II-XII-31, Bl. 41-42, available at http://planck.bbaw.de/onlinetexte/Aufruf_An_die_Kulturwelt.pdf [accessed 28-10-2015]; see also Max Planck, 'German Scholars Explain Their Manifesto', *Current History* 4:5 (1916), p. 876. Among the signatories were Lujo Brentano, Max Liebermann, and Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen.

Most, but not all of these organisations, had a private or unofficial character. Governmental internationalism, too, expanded during the late nineteenth century in the form of technical cooperation, such as the Universal Postal Union, founded in Berne in 1874. But bureaucratic officials did not only interact with one another. They also attended academic conferences and cultural events, thereby opening a new sphere of quasi–diplomacy or, as Madeleine Herren has called it, "a back door to power."[286] This intersection of diplomacy, academia and culture was precisely the niche that was occupied by the League of Nations' specialised agencies during the inter-war period. Pre-1914 achievements were important not only as a practical fundament for what came after the war, but also as institutional models and ideological stimuli. In fact, the protagonists of intellectual cooperation in the 1920s explicitly referenced their predecessors, recognising their preparatory function and justifying their own mission.[287] Late nineteenth- and early twentieth century internationalism was certainly a "casualty of World War I", as Elizabeth Crawford called it, but its ideas lived on.[288]

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[282] Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, 'Introduction', in Geyer and Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001), p. 2; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: the History of an Idea* (New York, 2012), pp. 95-104; Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, Jakob Vogel, 'Introduction', in Rodogno et al. (eds.), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks, Issues* (New York, 2015), p. 7.

[283] Union of International Associations, *Conceptions et programmes de l'internationalisme: organismes internationaux et UAI,* pub nr. 98 (Brussels, 1921).

[284] P. H. Eijkman, *L'Internationalisme Scientifique* (The Hague, 1911).

[285] Hermann Molkenboer, 'Aufruf des Vereins für Einsetzung eines bleibenden Internationalen Erziehungsrates', *Schweizerisches Schularchiv* 9:11 (1888), pp. 189-90.

It is not true therefore that internationalism only emerged after 1919, as is sometimes suggested.[289] Nor was intellectual cooperation at the League limited to an abstract pattern of interaction between technocrats and pacifists. The standard historiography of intellectual cooperation, scarce as it is, has usually regarded the League's specialised agencies as stand-alone bodies, conceived in the aftermath of the war, devoid of funding and hampered by an ill-defined internal structure. Emphasis has often been placed on the novelty and singularity of the project, while the roles of longer intellectual trajectories and networks have been underestimated. Nor has there been an investigation of the links between intellectual cooperation and the study of IR, despite their close connection.

The accounts by former IIIC directors Henri Bonnet and Jean-Jacques Mayoux, written during and immediately after the Second World War, are careful to stress the exceptionally difficult situation for their agency during the 1930s and show a certain pride in the "neutrality" of their "pioneering" work.[290] Similar accounts with obvious biases were presented by other contemporaries.[291] Their view of intellectual cooperation as a revolutionary yet neglected invention by a well-intended European intelligentsia was corrected by F. S. Northedge in his (unpublished) 1953 doctoral thesis, which uncovers a range of organisational mistakes and methodological shortcomings, and attests inter-war cooperators an inflated sense of self-importance.[292] His analysis also provides a good survey of various strands of influence, including pre-1919 organisations as well as a more general overview of the struggle between idealist planning and disillusionment with political realities. Jan Kolasa's 1962 book has added valuable case studies and assessments in the light of then-emerging UNESCO operations.[293] Later studies have tended to focus on the institutional structure of intellectual cooperation rather than the ideological dynamics at play—most notably Jean-Jacques Renoliet's *UNESCO oubliée* (1999) and Daniel Laqua's study of the "problem of order".[294] The key issue, however, to be addressed in the next sections, was how the League's framework provided an institutional *and* an intellectual home to thinkers of IR at the same time. In other words, how was the idea of intellectual cooperation related to studying IR? And what were the resulting mutual influences?

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[286] Madeleine Herren, 'Governmental Internationalism and the Beginning of a New World Order in the Late Nineteenth Century', in Geyer and Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001), p. 123.

[287] League of Nations, 'The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation', *Brochures de Propagande, 1926-1927* (Paris, 1926), p. 2.

[288] Elizabeth Crawford, *Nationalism and internationalism in science, 1880-1939: Four studies of the Nobel population* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 49.

[289] Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 3.

[290] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942); Jean-Jacques Mayoux et al., *L'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1946).

[291] H. R. G. Greaves, *The League Committees and World Order* (London, 1931), pp. 111-39; John Eugene Harley, *International Understanding* (Stanford, 1931); Robert Richter, *Die internationale geistige Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des Völkerbundes* (Würzburg, Ph.D. thesis, 1930); Margarete Rothbarth, *Geistige Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des Völkerbundes* (Münster, 1931).

Origins at Geneva: the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC)

In 1919, UIA founders La Fontaine and Otlet, via Belgian foreign minister Paul Hymans, were the first to submit an official proposal at the Paris Peace Conference to create an organisation of intellectual cooperation as part of the League of Nations.[295] Their *Commission internationale de relations intellectuelles* [International Committee of Intellectual Relations] was to build moral, scientific and artistic relationships between the peoples of different countries. Its goal was to develop "an international mentality."[296] It rested on the assumption that the League would be a suitable environment not only to provide the means of cooperation and a platform for exchange, but more importantly that the ideals of the League would be congruent with the intentions of intellectual cooperation. That same motive was reflected in La Fontaine and Otlet's project of an *Université Internationale* [International University] in Brussels.[297] To the disappointment of the Belgians, none of their proposals was welcomed or even discussed in Paris. A similar proposal by the International Council of Women (ICW), asking to instal a permanent bureau of education, was equally turned down with the argument that the League could not care for all the affairs of mankind.[298] It is interesting to note that both initiatives came from private, non-governmental, pre-war bodies. Rather than relying on governments, the pioneers of collaborative IR often worked with universities, pressure groups, private individuals, or philanthropists.[299]

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[292] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations: Its conceptual basis and lessons for the present* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953).

[293] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation: The League Experience and the Beginnings of UNESCO* (Wroclaw, 1962).

[294] Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée: La Société des Nations et la coopération intellectuelle, 1919-1946* (Paris, 1999); Jimena Canales, 'Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment that Failed: Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations', *MLN* 120 (2005); Daniel Laqua, 'Transnational intellectual cooperation, the League of Nations, and the problem of order', *Journal of Global History* 6:2 (2011); Jo-Anne Pemberton, 'The Changing Shape of Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO', *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 58:1 (2012).

[295] Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée: La Société des Nations et la coopération intellectuelle, 1919–1946* (Paris, 1999), p. 12. There were also informal discussions between members of the American Board on Education and their British counterparts in May 1919. Stephen T. Duggan to Gilbert Murray, 2 May 1919, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 39.

Women were among the first and most outspoken proponents of intellectual cooperation.[300] After the 1915 conference in The Hague, WILPF sent envoys to various governments to spread their mission.[301] Once the League of Nations was installed, WILPF member Emily Greene Balch demanded that women be represented on the newly formed committees and reiterated previous WILPF proposals on scientific cooperation.[302] Needless to say that these proposals remained largely unheard. Throughout the inter-war period, women's concerns continued to be marginalised at the League and their requests were often regarded as a burden. For example, when the Chilean Women's League for Suffrage and

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[296] David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenan*t (New York, 1928), p. 350.

[297] Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine to Eric Drummond, 8 May 1920, Dossier 4646, Box R1008, League of Nations Archives. A similar scheme was proposed by H. C. Andersen whose "University of the Nations" was to specialise in International Law, IR, and World Government. See Brochure *The University of the Nations*, 13 October 1920, Dossier 7480, Box R1028, League of Nations Archives.

[298] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 270.

[299] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 274.

[300] Joyce Goodman, 'Women and international intellectual co-operation', *Paedagogica Historica* 48:3 (2012).

[301] Harriet Hyman Alonso (ed.), *Women at The Hague: the International Congress of Women and its Results* (Chicago, 2013), p. vii.

[302] Emily Greene Balch via League of Nations Secretariat to delegates of the Assembly, 2 December 1920, Dossier 9176, Box R1008, League of Nations Archives.

Peace approached the Secretariat in 1931 about a formal association with the League of Nations they were bluntly rejected and put off with a pile of information leaflets.[303]

Meanwhile, in July 1920, the Rector of the University of Paris, Paul Appell sent a letter to the newly elected Secretary General of the League, Eric Drummond, in which he suggested to form an "Office for Intellectual Intercourse and Education."[304] Appell's letter was endorsed by the French League of Nations Association and contained a detailed program worked out by Julien Luchaire, then chief of staff to the French Education Minister.[305] Similar to the Belgian plan, Luchaire and Appell argued that intellectual cooperation was a necessary prerequisite for solving political disputes. Their tone strongly resembled the moral objectives of the Covenant.[306] Basically, it put 'peace in mind' before political peace.[307] More detailed than any previous plans, Luchaire and Appell outlined a feasible project at an inter-governmental level. Their program outlined a governance structure and departmental specifications which by and large foresaw the structure and mission of the future institutions. It included an educational branch for the exchange of teachers and students, book translations and conferences, a scientific branch intended to create laboratory and documentary centres for cost-intensive research, and a literary and cultural branch which would care for the circulation of books, art publications, mediate in art disputes, and help to safeguard precious works of art valued for their importance in the history of mankind.[308]

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[303] Letter by Celinda Arregui de Rodicio to Secretary General, 18 May 1931, with internal comments by League Secretariat, Dossier 28350, Box R2185, League of Nations Archives. See also Werner Picht's comment on a letter from the Pan-Pacific's Women Conference: "I do not think it would add to the prestige of the Institute if it would mechanically answer questions of this kind." Picht to Hallsten-Kallia, 25 January 1929, Dossier 9658, Box R2243, League of Nations Archives.

[304] Letter by Paul Appell, dated 8 July 1920, published as 'Institution of an International Bureau for Intellectual Intercourse and Education', *League of Nations Official Journal*, Vol. 1 (October 1920), p. 445.

[305] Margarete Rothbarth, *Geistige Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des Völkerbundes* (Münster, 1931), p. 31.

[306] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 276.

[307] Appell's letter read: "A moral union of hearts and consciences is an essential preliminary to an agreement of interests, a juridical settlement of conflicts and political organisation for peace." It strongly resembles UNESCO's preamble which reads: "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." UNESCO, *Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, 16 November 1946 (London), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [accessed 30-05-2017].

[308] Letter by Paul Appell, dated 8 July 1920, published as 'Institution of an International Bureau for Intellectual Intercourse and Education', *League of Nations Official Journal*, Vol. 1 (October 1920), pp. 447-50.

Appell's letter was picked up in the League Assembly in December 1920, where it received mixed responses. Despite their doubts, the delegates of the Assembly did not altogether reject Appell's approach but asked the Council to revise it and to "report on the advisability of forming a Technical Organisation attached to the League."[309] The reception in the Council was ambivalent, too. Some members declared that such ideas were premature and should be left to private actors.[310] By its hesitance, the League leadership indicated that, although it appreciated the underlying idea of intellectual cooperation, it felt unprepared to accommodate such wide-ranging tasks in an organisation that was itself still in an infant stage. There was little political need or money to establish a new League body that, in the eyes of some diplomats, seemed fairly remote from urgent tasks, such as reparations, borders or minorities.[311] On the other hand, the Council members could not deny the general significance of intellectual cooperation.

After overcoming some opposition in the Council, notably from the British delegate George Barnes, a revised report was written up under the direction of Léon Bourgeois, one of the most prominent French supporters of the League of Nations, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, and sometime President of the Council of the League.[312] His authority lent crucial support to the plan and after preliminary approval by the fifth committee of the Assembly, fellow internationalist Gilbert Murray was asked to present the draft in front of the plenary session of the Assembly where it was accepted on 21 September 1921.[313] The motion provided for a committee of twelve experts, both men and women, to be installed at the League in order to investigate potential fields of international intellectual cooperation. After the decision had been confirmed by the Council in January 1922, the twelve members of the new committee were appointed by the Council in May, among them two from non-member states (Germany and US) to emphasise the universal character of the new committee.[314] Their first meeting was held in August 1922.[315]

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[309] Oliver Brett (ed.), *The First Assembly: A Study of the Proceedings of the First Assembly of the League of Nations* (London, 1921), p. 259.

[310] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), p. 21.

[311] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), pp. 190-1; Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée* (Paris, 1999), pp. 15, 18.

[312] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), pp. 279-80.

[313] Jean-Jacques Mayoux et al., *L'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1946), p. 15.

This was a crucial moment and arguably the 'birth' of what was henceforth called the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) or Commission internationale de coopération intellectuelle (CICI) in French. Among the members of the ICIC were a range of well-known academics, most notably the physicists Albert Einstein and Marie Curie as well as the philosopher Henri Bergson who served as the ICIC's inaugural President.[316] Gilbert Murray, the classical scholar and public intellectual, was also a member of the ICIC. He became one of its most loyal supporters, and from 1927 until 1939 its president. Two women were among the board members, the Norwegian biologist Kristine Bonnevie and the Polish-French physicist Marie Curie. However, to the regret of the Council for the Representation of Women in the League of Nations, their other nominee, Scottish geologist Maria Ogilvie Gordon, was not elected.[317] Besides an array of progressive intellectuals, the ICIC also consisted of more right-wing, nationalist or even Fascist scholars. The conservative Swiss literature and history professor Gonzague de Reynold was a case in point. He was later joined by the Italian Fascists Alfredo Rocco and Balbino Giuliano as well as the nationalist historian Heinrich von Srbik.[318] Despite persistent claims that the ICIC was a technical organisation committed to disinterested and neutral goals, it was clear from the outset that political power would have a significant impact on the organisation's fate. Already the selection of members resembled patterns used in high-politics.[319]

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[314] The German and US members were physicists Albert Einstein and Robert Millikan. The idea to invite a German representative was probably advocated by Gilbert Murray who was a long time advocate of German accession to the League of Nations. Letter by Nitobé to Murray, 19 December 1921, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 265.

[315] Léon Bourgeois, *L'Œvre de la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1923), pp. 406-10.

[316] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), pp. 167-68.

[317] L. de Alberti to Nitobe Inazō, 20 June 1922, Dossier 14297, Box R1029, League of Nations Archives.

[318] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), pp. 169-71.

[319] "I am sounding the French as to whether they would object to having a German." Nitobe Inazō to Gilbert Murray, 19 December 1921, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 265.

While receiving enthusiastic responses from many sides, notably from Secretary General Drummond, the ICIC suffered financial hardship almost from the moment it was installed.[320] The League Secretariat provided only a single office assistant and very limited financial support.[321] In addition to that, the ICIC was denied previously promised funding just shortly after its inception.[322] This left the young committee in an awkward position torn between grand tasks and low support. At their first meetings, ICIC members therefore repeatedly stressed the preliminary nature of intellectual cooperation.[323] Soon later, the ICIC had to rely on external donors, a situation that intensified over the years and moved the centre of activity away from Geneva.

For the time being, the ICIC established a provisional working order. Meetings were held once a year in either Geneva or Paris lasting for five days each. All decisions, proposals, and results were presented at these annual meetings, while the actual work was assigned to sub-committees which operated on the basis of external expertise. The Polish historian Oskar Halecki was in charge of the ICIC secretariat.[324] He reported to the Council and the Assembly, which authorised the ICIC's program, and also entertained ties with the League Secretariat where the Japanese diplomat Nitobe Inazō (in the rank of under secretary general) was in charge of the International Bureaux section. Hierarchically speaking, the ICIC was on the same level as other permanent advisory commissions of the League, such as the Mandates Commission or the Financial and Economic Committees.[325] Soon after this basic setup, when the ICIC launched its first inquiries, some countries responded by spontaneously forming national commissions of intellectual cooperation in order to bundle their interaction with Geneva. By July 1923, eleven such national commissions were in contact with the ICIC.[326]

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[320] Pham Thi-Thu, *La Coopération Intellectuelle sous la Société des Nations* (1962, Geneva), p. 27.

[321] Jean-Jacques Mayoux et al., *L'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1946), p. 16; Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée* (Paris, 1999), p. 18.

[322] Margarete Rothbarth, *Geistige Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des Völkerbundes* (Münster, 1931), p. 35.

[323] ICIC, *Minutes of the First Session, Geneva, 1-5 August 1922* (Geneva, 1922), p. 3.

[324] Andrzej M. Brzezinski, 'Oskar Halicki – Sekretarz Komisji Miedzynarodowej Wspólpracy Intelektualnej Ligii Narodów (1922-1924)', *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki* 55:1 (2010).

[325] Formally this was only recognised in 1926 in a resolution by the League Assembly. See Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), pp. 193-5.

Subsequent changes to the original structure (and the bi-lingual administration) have led to confusion among contemporaries and historians, who have referred to the ICIC under a variety of names, sometimes not even consistently in their own work.[327] Some also thought that "*coopération intellectuelle*" was an ill-chosen name, as it sounded pretentious and misleading in its English and German translations.[328] Others felt that the entire purpose of intellectual cooperation was unclear, which, again, led to misinterpretations and ignorance.[329] As hard as it may seem to appreciate the subtleties of institutional arrangements, they do inform our historical understanding of how technical cooperation, for the first time in history, was integrated into a large inter-governmental framework. Daniel Laqua has captured the significance of organisational layers and has argued that the ICIC developed an influence on how international cooperation was understood at the time. As concepts of a peaceful global order circulated among intellectuals, so Laqua, the ICIC became "a tool for transforming the international order."[330] Northedge made a similar point, arguing that the true achievements of intellectual cooperation at the League lay in the bureaucratic machinery that it established, not so much in fulfilling its goals.[331] Both authors have drawn attention to the framework, as opposed to the substance of intellectual cooperation, which indicates the lack of substance in many cases. It is as important, however, to see the connections between actual projects, often loaded with lofty expectations, and the institutional fabric that surrounded them.

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[326] Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée* (Paris, 1999), p. 32.

[327] Among the erroneous variations are 'International Commission for Intellectual Cooperation', 'International Commission on Intellectual Cooperation', 'Intellectual Committee', 'CIC', and 'International organization of intellectual cooperation'. See Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 195; Jimena Canales, 'Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment that Failed: Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations', *MLN* 120 (2005); Jo-Anne Pemberton, 'The Changing Shape of Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO', *Australian Journal of Politics and History* (2012); and Alexandra Pita González, 'A Case Study: México and the International Intellectual Cooperation in the Interwar Period', *Relationes Internationales* 6:2 (2014).

[328] Margarete Rothbarth, *Geistige Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des Völkerbundes* (Münster, 1931), pp. 25-7.

[329] Jean-Jacques Mayoux et al., *L'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1946), pp. 16-7.

[330] Daniel Laqua, 'Transnational intellectual cooperation, the League of Nations, and the problem of order', *Journal of Global History* 6:2 (2011), p. 226.

[331] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 687.

Although constraint by its financial means, the ICIC took on a relatively ambitious program in the fall of 1922. The first project was a survey on the conditions of intellectual workers across various countries, a concern that remained a priority for the ICIC throughout the inter-war period. The goal was essentially to compare and improve the working environment for academics, artists, journalists, and similar professions—in other words, a type of International Labour Organisation (ILO) for intellectuals.[332] In addition to this project, several sub-committees were established, one concerned with bibliographical questions, one responsible for organising an international congress of universities, and a third one on intellectual property rights.[333]

All of these projects began with extensive surveys, delegated to experts and national representatives, which often took years to be completed. In many cases the only service that the ICIC ever provided was to create links between existing organisations or publish overviews of existing works. This doubtful productivity was parodied in Bernard Shaw's play *Geneva* (1938), where the fictional ICIC typist mockingly says, "we all do a lot of writing to oneanother."[334] The most common reflex of ICIC officers when confronted with an inquiry was to redirect them to others. In one rather odd case, for example, Gonzague de Reynold suggested for student exchanges to "be organised by the students themselves".[335] On the same topic, the ICIC ignored well-intended offers from the International Federation of University Women.[336] Clearly the ICIC lacked an efficient administration. Some projects took up to a decade or more. The bibliographical study, for instance, resulted in a guidebook on abbreviations of periodical titles as well as a handbook of educational literature, published in 1930 and

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[332] Daniel Gorman has noted this analogy, too, but has mistakenly reduced the ICIC's range of activities to working conditions for intellectuals and intellectual property. See Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 203-5.

[333] Léon Bourgeois, *L'Œvre de la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1923), p. 410.

[334] Rather than intellectual cooperation, "it is mere compilation", the visitor responds. Bernard Shaw, *Geneva: a Fancied Page of History in Three Acts* (London, 1938, 1946), p. 31.

[335] Report on the Exchange of Students, by Professor de Reynold, 21 July 1923, Dossier 28306, Box R1055, League of Nations Archives.

[336] Theodora Bosanquet to Oskar Halecki, 12 October 1923, Dossier 28306, Box R1055, League of Nations Archives.

1935 respectively.[337] Results of the study on intellectual property, meagre as they were, appeared no earlier than 1938.[338]

One job that the ICIC was exceptionally good at, however, was propaganda—a term that did not yet have the negative connotation that the Nazis gave it.[339] Immediately after its inception, the ICIC began to promote its own cause and that of the League of Nations in general. This included the education of children in the aims and ideals of the League of Nations as well as to send elementary school pupils on exchanges.[340] A flagship project in this respect was the revision of text books. To counter chauvinist propaganda, internationalists thought, one should revise school books so that they complied with what was imagined to be a global educational consensus, a master narrative of internationalism. Related to this enterprise was a proposal for an international teachers' college and a teacher's handbook on *The Aims and Organisation of the League of Nations.*[341] They, too, would promote education from a neutral international perspective.

Of particular concern was the representation of the Great War in history books. In September 1920, even before the ICIC was founded, the Japanese teachers' association submitted an according proposal to the League. The idea was picked up two years later by the US physicist and ICIC member Robert Millikan, who suggested "to encourage, on the primary and secondary school level, the teaching of history from an international point of view."[342] His French colleague Luchaire went as far as proposing a common textbook edited under auspices of the League.[343] At first, these hopes received little sympathy and threatened to vanish in sub-committees. A preliminary report spanning 15 countries resulted in nothing more than endless reports on national particularities.[344] Eventually a four-stage procedure was proposed: (i) national committees had the right to express concern about a foreign textbook and ask for alterations; (ii) the national committee addressed in the complaint had to either accept the amendment or explain why it did not; (iii) complaints had to be based on objective facts, not moral, political or religious values; (iv) national committees were invited to recommend specific textbooks as the most suitable for teaching their history. While this procedure remained entirely voluntary and was only rarely used, it did at least offer a room for debate.[345] It also served as a vehicle for the internationalist agenda more generally, by piloting a model for educational cooperation. And it speaks for the advocates of the scheme that today, almost a century later, historians still argue about the national character of history curricula.[346]

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[337] IIIC, *Code international d'abréviations des titres de périodique* (Paris, 1930); IIIC, *Bibliographie pédagogique internationale* (Paris, 1935).

[338] IIIC, *Le dépot légal: son organisation et son fonctionnement dans les divers pays* (Paris, 1938). See Draft Convention on Protection of Scientific Property, Dossier 31393, Box R1061, League of Nations Archives.

[339] See, for example, "the publication of popular handbooks, the production of propaganda films and lantern slides on the League of Nations", ICIC minutes, 10-11 July 1935, Dossier 19930, Box R4062, League of Nations Archives.

[340] 4th Assembly, Resolutions adopted on 27 September, 1923, Dossier 30862, Box R1059; and ICIC minutes, 10 July 1933, Dossier 5625, Box 4060, League of Nations Archives. Unsurprisingly, the response from national governments was in both cases reluctant.

[341] Walther Gimmi to Eric Drummond, 1 September 1922, 'Vorschlag zur Schaffung & Einrichtung einer internationalen Lehrerbildungsanstalt', Dossier 23074, Box R1712; and annotated copy of 'The Aims and Organisation of the League of Nations', Dossier 5286, Box R4059, League of Nations Archives.

[342] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), pp. 68-9.

[343] ICIC, *Minutes of the Second Session* (Geneva, 1923), p. 35.

As farsighted as such projects may appear in retrospect, the ICIC did not invent them. The revision of text books, for example, had been pioneered by Hermann Molkenboer and his campaign for an international education council in the 1880s.[347] Other projects, such as the work on bibliographies or intellectual property, had also been conceived elsewhere.[348]

What was original about the ICIC was its institutional framework within the League of Nations. For the first time in history, there was an inter-governmental organisation devoted to scientific and cultural exchange. Providing an apparatus for intellectual cooperation, so the idea, would translate into better political cooperation. But this was precisely where the ICIC struggled. "The twelve apostles of 1922", as Northedge called the original set of ICIC members, were academics and public intellectuals, not technocratic managers.[349] They had little experience in directing an inter-governmental organisation, and almost no administrative help. The ICIC resembled "an international Senior

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[344] Report by International Historical Institute, 1932[?], Dossier 319, Box R4049, League of Nations Archives.

[345] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), pp. 71-2.

[346] David D'Avray et al., 'Plan for history curriculum is too focused on Britain', *The Observer,* 16 February 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2013/feb/16/history-curriculum-letters [accessed 08-10-2015].

[347] Hermann Molkenboer, 'Aufruf des Vereins für Einsetzung eines bleibenden Internationalen Erziehungsrates', *Schweizerisches Schularchiv* 9:11 (1888), pp. 189-90.

[348] See Isabella Löhr, *Die Globalisierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte: neue Strukturen internationaler Zusammenarbeit, 1886–1952* (Göttingen, 2010).

[349] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 291.

Common Room in Geneva" more than an inter-governmental agency.[350] Crucially, they had to deal with national interests—for instance, the French vehement rejection of Esperanto in favour of French as the main working language.[351] Although ICIC members were deliberately not labelled 'national delegates', there were dynamics to this effect. Einstein considered several times to resign, as he felt that the ICIC was too anti-German but also because he, "as an Israelite" and anti-chauvinist, would not adequately represent German interests. In 1923 he explained that he no longer had any confidence in the ICIC and was only convinced to stay by the combined effort of Bergson and Murray.[352]

Revival at Paris: the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC)

By far the most restraining problem during the first half of the 1920s, however, was the lack of funding. Since it was considered too costly to gather the twelve ICIC members more regularly, let alone to employ a standing committee, there was virtually no continuous work. The sub-committees had to rely on the goodwill of external experts and occasional government grants. Having suffered financial hardship for two years, the ICIC decided to look for external funding and issued an official appeal in September 1923.[353] Only a few months later, the French government responded with a generous offer to establish in Paris an "*Institut international de coopération intellectuelle*" along with an annual grant of two million francs. The preliminary proposal, conveyed in a letter by French Education Minister François Albert to ICIC President Bergson, was quickly adopted by the ICIC and then passed the League Council and Assembly.[354] By August 1925, approvals had been received from all League organs as well as the French parliament for what was, somewhat confusingly, called the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC).[355]

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[350] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. vi.

[351] Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée* (Paris, 1999), pp. 21, 25, 33-4.

[352] After having re-joined, Einstein confessed to Murray: "Whatever the failures of the League of Nations in the past, it must be regarded as the one institution which holds out the best prospect of beneficent action in these sad times." Letter by Einstein to Murray, 20 May 1924, Dossier 14297, Box R1029, League of Nations Archives. See also letter by Gilbert Murray to Albert Einstein, 20 April 1923, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 265; Jimena Canales, 'Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment that Failed: Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations', *MLN* 120 (2005), pp. 1174-5.

[353] Approval was granted by the fourth Assembly in September 1923. Jean-Jacques Mayoux et al., *L'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1946), p. 21.

[354] Communiqué to the Council and the delegates of the Assembly, document A.64.1924.XII, dated 12 September 1924, A.I. 9, IIIC Records.

Formally an institution under French law, the IIIC was put at the disposal of the League of Nations as an executive agency for intellectual cooperation. The ICIC simultaneously served as the IIIC's governing body, appointed its director and chiefs of section, drew up a budget and approved its program. To overcome the problem of infrequent meetings, a sub-group of the ICIC, the so called committee of directors, met every two months and passed lower level decisions. There were six sections in the original IIIC setup: a university relations section, one on bibliography and scientific relations, an artistic and literary relations section, a legal section, an information section, and a general section intended for taking up new questions.[356] By December 1928, the IIIC employed 89 people from 20 nationalities.[357] It was housed in the west wing of the majestic *Palais Royal* in Paris, a residence that reflected much of the perceived grandeur of the IIIC.[358]

At the time of the official inauguration in 1926, the IIIC was already in full operation. Julien Luchaire, author of the 1920 report that had contributed to the founding of the ICIC, was elected as the IIIC's first director for a term of seven years—after which a non-French person was to take over. An education specialist and experienced political functionary, Luchaire was an ambitious, though at times unpredictable visionary who sought to turn the IIIC into an "advertising agency for intellectual co-operation."[359] He was eager to attract additional funding by selling tailored IIIC services to individual governments. In 1926 alone, the IIIC received 100,000 francs from the Polish government for "a special study of assistance to universities."[360] Luchaire's 1926 report on the IIIC's first year, suitably called *Brochure de Propagande*, read more like a marketing strategy than an intellectual magazine. He also installed a press section responsible for the publication of a bulletin and for keeping in contact with press associations. At the same time, however, he reassured his colleagues that the IIIC would not be a competitor to existing international organisations. Rather he envisaged the IIIC as a global umbrella association where intellectuals would meet diplomats and politicians under the veil of international cooperation, enjoying the comfort of gala diners at the *Palais Royal.*

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[355] Journal Officiel, 9 August 1925, A.II.1, IIIC Records. Taken together, the ICIC, IIIC, and the Intellectual Cooperation Section of the League Secretariat were sometimes referred to as the Organisation of Intellectual Cooperation (OIC). Eric Drummond, 'Message' in: IIIC (ed.), *Information Bulletin* 1:1 (Paris, 1932), p. 4.

[356] 'Internal Regulations of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation', dated 12 August 1925, C.432.1925.XII, IIIC Records.

[357] John Eugene Harley, *International Understanding* (Stanford, 1931), p. 152.

[358] At the inaugural ceremony on 16 January 1926, League Secretary-General Drummond jokingly commented that the League Secretariat in Geneva would for ever be inferior to the grand residence of the IIIC. Program leaflet '*Inauguration de l'IICI*', 16 January 1926, A.I.6, IIIC Records.

[359] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), pp. 355-6.

In practice this meant that the IIIC first and foremost adopted ICIC projects on a larger scale and with a more permanent character. Study groups were created, for example, on bibliographies and scientific nomenclatures, the circulation of books, cooperation between libraries and museums, the exchange of professor and students, the equivalence of degrees, property rights and laws protecting the work of artists, archeological work and the protection of historic buildings. Most of these studies resulted in the publication of lengthy reports, handbooks or periodicals. The press section published lists of "remarkable books"—essentially a literary review. The university relations section compiled a handbook on student exchanges in Europe.[361] And from 1927, the journal *Mouseion* was published under the auspices of the IIIC. By 1946, there were half a million copies of IIIC publications in circulation around the world.[362]

Apart from written work, the IIIC regularly invited experts for conferences, luncheons, and dinners. Among the meetings were the first International Congress of Dramatic and Musical Critics, a congress of the International Federation of Journalism, the annual session of the International Academy of Comparative Law, and the International Cinema Congress.[363] The IIIC also housed in its offices a number of representatives from independent international organisations, such as the World Youth Organization, and entertained close connections to related specialised agencies, such as the

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[360] League of Nations, 'The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation', in *Brochures de Propagande*, 1926–1927 (Paris, 1926), p. 6. See also negotiations with other governments for additional funding, A.II.7-30, IIIC Records.

[361] IIIC, *University Exchanges in Europe: a Handbook* (Paris, 1928).

[362] Jean-Jacques Mayoux et al., *L'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1946), p. 599.

[363] IIIC, 'The First Six Months of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation', *Bulletin of the Information Section* No. 1 (Paris, 1926), pp. 3-4.

International Educational Cinematographic Institute in Rome.[364] It also suggested the establishment of "travelling scholarships for university students" to visit the League headquarters in Geneva.[365]

Women gained an influence on intellectual cooperation in several ways. For one, they served on the board as well as on the workforce of the IIIC, including among others Chilean poet Gabriela Mistral and German historian Margarethe Rothbarth who wrote the first official history of the IIIC.[366] Female ICIC members included Marie Curie, Kristine Bonnevie, Ellen Gleditsch, and Cécile Tormay—the election of whom feminist organisations heavily campaigned for.[367] Besides mere representation, however, women actively campaigned for a number of issues to be put on the agenda, such as compulsory continuation schools, educational cinematography, and a "convention for the suppression of obscene publications."[368]

Despite persistent pressure from feminist groups to appoint women to senior positions at the League of Nations, Rachel Crowdy remained the only woman to head a section—in line with gender stereotypes, it was the section on Social Questions and Opium Traffic.[369] As feminist-pacifist Helena Swanwick discovered when she went to Geneva as a British delegate to the fifth Assembly in 1924, women were assumed to be well informed only about "opium, refugees, protection of children, relief after earthquakes, prison reform, municipal cooperation, alcoholism, traffic in women."[370] But, unlike gender clichés would have it, women contributed substantially to classic security questions, such as disarmament and sanctions, and commented on conferences which they were unable to attend.[371] Their universalist perspective on foreign affairs also led them to take an anti-colonialist stance. In 1931, the International Cooperative Women's Guild brought to the attention of the ICIC "the struggle for freedom of the extra-European nations."[372]

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[364] Report on IIIC premises covering 1927–1946, A.IV.22, IIIC Records. The latter was conceived, supervised and administered by the ICIC in Geneva. See James Marchant, 'Cinema in Education', *The Times* 11 June 1924; letter to Eric Drummond, Dossier 37604, Box R1069, League of Nations Archives; and http://atom.archives.unesco.org/international-educational-cinematographic-institute-ieci [accessed 19-04-2016].

[365] 'Report by Sub-Committee of Experts for the Instruction of Children Youth in the Existence and Aims of the League of Nations', 21 March 1927, Dossier 54891, Box R1025, League of Nations Archives.

[366] U. Lemke, '"La femme, la clandestine de l'histoire" Margarete Rothbarth – ein Engagement für den Völkerbund', *Lendemains* 146:7 (2012), pp. 51-3; Margarete Rothbarth, *Geistige Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des Völkerbundes* (Münster, 1931).

[367] See, for instance, Margery Corbett Ashby (International Woman Suffrage Alliance) to Eric Drummond, 1 March 1922, Dossier 14297, Box R1029, League of Nations Archives.

[368] President's Memorandum Regarding the Business Transacted by the ICW Executive held at Geneva, 7-17 June 1927; and Gertrud M. Günther (ed.), *Bulletin International Council of Women,* special number (1927); Dossier 43088, Box R1022, League of Nations Archives.

[369] President's Memorandum Regarding the Business Transacted by the ICW Executive held at Geneva, 7–17 June 1927, Dossier 43088, Box R1022, League of Nations Archives.

[370] Helena Swanwick, *I Have Been Young* (London, 1935), p. 385.

In the masculine world of diplomacy, intellectual cooperation offered an access point for marginalised actors and ideas. Through this channel women were able to contribute to political education and practice. Their conferences and summer schools were advertised in IIIC bulletins. Their publications were circulated amongst the League universe. For example, a 1930 booklet by the ICW, titled *How Women can Promote Good International Understanding*, outlined a plan to educate the public about the causes for war and strategies for prevention of conflict.[373] A 1929 ICW meeting on intellectual cooperation even found positive echo in the press—"Brilliant Women meet in London".[374] While women and feminist thought were still considerably underrepresented, they managed to attract the attention of of male thinkers and diplomats who, in return, showed an increasing interest in women's campaigns, conferences and publications.[375]

Cooperation in the Field of IR

The study of IR became a primary concern for the IIIC. More than any other project, collaboration in the field of IR embodied the core purpose of international cooperation—a symbiosis between understanding and making the international order. Proposals for the League of Nations to become involved in IR education—to set aside funds "for the establishments of chairs in international relations"—had been circulated since the early 1920s by, among others, the Carnegie Endowment for

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[371] E. Horscroft to Drummond, 11 March 1931, Dossier 11078, Box R2182, League of Nations Archives.

[372] Statutes of the International Cooperative Women's Guild, 1930, Dossier 21115, Box R2184, League of Nations Archives.

[373] ICW, 'How Women can Promote Good International Understanding Between the Nations', public meeting, 2 June 1930, Dossier 10659, Box R2182, League of Nations Archives.

[374] *Paris Times,* 2 May 1929, Dossier 11078, Box R2182, League of Nations Archives.

[375] Final Program for the Meetings of the Executive and Standing Committees of the ICW, 7-17 June 1927, Dossier 43088, Box R1022, League of Nations Archives.

International Peace and by Harold Temperley, in-house historian at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.[376] A 1925 memorandum by feminist-pacifist Maude Miner Hadden captured the basic idea:

> "[t]he establishment of an International Institute in Geneva under supervision of the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation [sic!], for study and research concerning international questions, would promote in an effective way the ideals of the League of Nations and the extension of world peace."[377]

At that point, IR scholars were already cooperating transnationally via unofficial means. Professors exchanged journal articles. Students attended summer schools gathering up to 30 nationalities.[378] The demand for intellectual cooperation in the field of IR was unmistakable.

It was thanks to Alfred Zimmern that these activities received the formal endorsement of the IIIC. Having previously worked as IR professor and government advisor, Zimmern served as deputy director of the IIIC in Paris from 1926 to 1930. In this position he co-organised in March 1928 the first international conference for the study of IR, hosted by the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) in Berlin and sponsored by the IIIC. It was attended by fifteen IR experts from Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the US, as well as representatives of international institutions, such as the Academy of International Law. The participants agreed on a number of cooperative programs in the field of IR, such as the equivalence of degrees and diplomas, the exchange of teaching staff, the establishment of reference centres, and collaboration in research projects. Crucially, they emphasised that international politics "constitute a field for scientific study and that this field […] needs appropriate forms of organisation."[379] Participants and organisers agreed that this was a much-needed platform and turned the Berlin gathering in to a series of meetings, later known as the International Studies Conference

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[376] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 274; Eleanor M. Cargin to Henri Hoffer, 6 April 1921, Dossier 295, Box R1004, League of Nations Archives. Other proposals for the study of IR and diplomacy were received from Frank S. Hacket, founder of Riverdale Country School, New York, and from A. Frangulis, founder of the Académie Diplomatique Internationale, Paris. See Frank S. Hacket to ICIC members, 25 July 1922, Dossier 22137, Box R1012; and A. Frangulis to Eric Drummond, 25 May 1927, Dossier 59663, Box R1025 League of Nations Archives.

[377] Memorandum by Maude Miner Hadden, 26 July 1925, Dossier 45478, Box, R1080, League of Nations Archives.

[378] Alfred Zimmern, 'General Introduction', in Ernst Jäckh, *The New Germany: Three Lectures by Ernst Jäckh* (Oxford, 1927), p. 7.

[379] Report submitted by Alfred Zimmern, 11 July 1928, Dossier 5B.6178.2423, Box R2224, League of Nations Archives.

(ISC).[380] Over the following years, the ISC became a well-known conference in the wider field of IR, coordinating research activities across more than 30 countries, gathering the most eminent scholars and diplomats, and financed by the most potent philanthropists.[381]

Out of all IIIC projects it was the ISC that best reflected the mélange of scholarly exchange and policy relevance which Zimmern advocated in the field of IR—documents associated with the ISC constitute the bulk of the IIIC's archives. However, the history of the ISC also demonstrated how external actors increasingly determined the IIIC agenda and how the ICIC, in turn, lost control over its activities. In one case, Canadian Prime Minister R. B. Bennett filed a complaint with League Secretary-General Joseph Avenol when the former heard about the criticism of the 1932 Ottawa Agreement expressed by members of the ISC. Avenol had to reassure Bennet that "the opinions expressed at the Conference [ISC] do not receive the endorsement of the Institute [IIIC], of the Secretariat of the League of Nations or, of course, of the League itself."[382] Backpedalling on statements of the ISC exposed the awkward institutional position of the IIIC, which aspired to be simultaneously a specialised agency administered by the League and an independent think tank with a taste for interfering in high-level diplomacy. The more the IIIC engaged in spin-off projects, financed by private donors or national governments, the more it became exposed to external influence and, inevitably, lost faith from Geneva.[383]

Intellectual Cooperation in the field of IR provided a gateway for the politicisation of the IIIC as a whole. Underfunded and neglected by the League, yet eager to have an impact on international affairs, the IIIC became a playground for all sorts of political ventures. Defects in the IIIC's administration and mission had been criticised almost from the outset, and its leadership was rumoured to have an inflated sense of self-importance.[384] After further internal criticism and the resignation of Zimmern in 1929, the ICIC formed a committee of enquiry in order to fundamentally re-structure the system of intellectual cooperation at the League. From April to May 1930, the committee compiled a list of shortcomings and solutions.[385] The report introduced a new governing organ, called the executive committee, which would follow more closely the IIIC's activities. It also re-defined the role of the director to that of a more administrative position. Luchaire had fallen out of favour with the ICIC because he had run the IIIC too independently, and consequently had to step down.[386] He was replaced by the French diplomat Henri Bonnet, who had previously worked for the League Secretariat.[387] Staff and scope were to be limited to programs of "immediate interest or undoubted importance within the financial resources available" the report urged.[388]

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[380] David Long, 'Who killed the International Studies Conference?', *Review of International Studies* 32:4 (2006); and Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011).

[381] See Enquiry on institutions for the scientific study of IR, Dossier 631, Box R4051, League of Nations Archives.

[382] Letter by Joseph Avenol to R. B. Bennett, 22 Aguust 1932, Dossier 2381, Box R4007, League of Nations Archives.

[383] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 291.

[384] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 360.

Yet, after 1930, the IIIC faced even more controversy. Dutch foreign minister, Frans Beelaerts van Blokland, was frustrated that the ICIC had appointed another French director despite the provision in the statutes for national rotation. "This re-organisation", Blokland complained, "will not contribute to the realisation of the lofty aims of the Institute."[389] Like his predecessor, Director Bonnet struggled to develop an agenda that met the IIIC's high expectations, yet avoided national confrontation. His hands were tied by low funding coupled with the recurring accusation that the IIIC was "a body of internationalists prepared to manipulate national interests to serve their own utopian ideas."[390] What the IIIC was missing was a flagship product—such as the UNESCO world heritage program—a tangible project which would attract sufficient interest from politicians, donors, and the people, yet that would not risk political antagonism.[391]

During the 1930s, the IIIC continued to run a mixed portfolio of technical cooperation and exhibitions of intellectual life. If anything, its focus shifted to projects that were less ambitious in terms of practical goals and inspired more by what Paul Valéry called a "league of minds".[392] Two publication series, the *Entretiens* and the *Correspondances*, highlighted this tendency towards less tangible outcomes.[393] *Entretiens* were essentially proceedings of conversations of up to 60 intellectuals on wide-ranging topics, such as realism in the arts or the future of European identity. As *Correspondances* the IIIC published collections of letters between eminent intellectuals, including the diplomat Salvador de Madariaga and the philosopher Rabindranath Tagore, on such monumental subjects as *L'esprit, l'éthique et la guerre*. It was an intellectual catwalk, showing off the latest trends in universalist thinking.

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[385] Report by the Committee on the work of its twelfth plenary session (submitted to the Council and to the Assembly), dated 11 August 1930, session held on 23-29 July 1930, Offical No.: A.21.1930.XII., IIIC Records.

[386] See, for instance, Oprescu to Luchaire, confidential, 25 Oct 1928, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[387] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 379.

[388] Report by the Committee on the work of its twelfth plenary session (submitted to the Council and to the Assembly), 11 August 1930, session held on 23-29 July 1930 [Offical No.: A.21.1930.XII.], IIIC Records.

[389] Letter by Frans Beelaerts van Blokland to Eric Drummond, 24 December 1930, Documents du CICI A. Documents du Conseil de la Société des Nations (Box 499), IIIC Records.

[390] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 197.

[391] National sovereignty had to be respected in a very narrow sense as governments wanted to stay in control of 'their' culture, interpretations of history, folk art, and education systems.

What could the intelligentsia contribute to a field where politicians and diplomats had proven their impotence? That was Einstein's question in his 1932 *Correspondance* with Sigmund Freud. Since nation-states were unwilling, as Einstein observed, to surrender any sovereignty in favour of 'collective security', there had to be another way to prevent war at a deeper, mental level. Was there a way, he asked the psychoanalyst, to control the hate and destructiveness of the human psyche? As much as Freud enjoyed Einstein's intellectual stimulation, he had to disappoint him. "There is no likelihood of our being able to suppress humanity's aggressive tendencies […] better it were to tackle each successive crisis with means that we have ready to our hands."[394] In other words, Freud admitted that the international community could at best find make-shift policies to prevent inevitable human aggression from turning into full-blown wars.

Ignoring Freud's comments, Bonnet placed increasing emphasis on ideological measures. 'Moral disarmament' became one of the key programs in preparation of the World Disarmament Conference during the first half of the 1930s.[395] Again, the idea was that political peace required mental peace or, as Valéry put it, that "a League of Nations implies a league of minds".[396] A 1931 memorandum by the

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[392] IIIC, *A League of minds: letters of Henri Focillon, Salvador de Madariaga, Gilbert Murray, Miguel Ozorio de Almeida, Alfonso Reyes, Tsai Yuan Pei, Paul Valéry* (Paris, 1933).

[393] UNESCO, *Publications de l'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle* (Paris, 1945), pp. 2-3.

[394] Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, *Why War* (Paris, 1933), pp. 16-7. See also, Seyom Brown, *The causes and prevention of war* , 2nd edn. (New York, 1994), pp. 10-1.

[395] IIIC, *Information Bulletin* 1:1 (Paris, 1932), p. 12.

[396] IIIC, *A League of minds: letters of Henri Focillon, Salvador de Madariaga, Gilbert Murray, Miguel Ozorio de Almeida, Alfonso Reyes, Tsai Yuan Pei, Paul Valéry* (Paris, 1933).

Polish government, entitled *Moral Disarmament*, spelt out the details of this line of thought.[397] If politicians were unwilling to agree on arms reductions, then soft diplomacy would have to accompany their effort and enshrine peaceful thinking, via cultural policies, into the minds of people. School teachers should be forbidden to arouse ill-will towards other nations, school books would have to be examined, and the press had to refrain from chauvinistic propaganda. Drawing on recommendations by the ICIC and IIIC, the Polish memorandum also suggested to make the work of the League of Nations a compulsory school subject and to install special League of Nations chairs at university law faculties. In short, the campaign for moral disarmament demanded states to stop breeding new generations of nationalist aggressors. The goal was nothing less than the "moral education of mankind."[398]

In very few cases, moral disarmament resulted in actual policies or international agreements. A notable exception was the 1936 Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, which was ratified by 18 countries.[399] It demanded that signatories prohibited the spread of any broadcast transmission in their country that included propaganda, war-mongering, or false news. The convention also asked the signatories to cooperate and provide each other with accurate factual information if requested. In the spirit of moral disarmament, the convention aimed to outlaw nationalist aggression and make the world ready for physical disarmament. A Soviet *addendum* of October 1936 pointed out the obvious shortcoming that the convention was only obligatory between countries that maintained diplomatic relationships.[400] Since it was never ratified by Germany, Italy, or Japan, however, it was hardly effective at achieving its goals.

Pressure on the IIIC increased during the second half of the 1930s as the political situation aggravated. In the attempt to help refugee scholars, for example, the IIIC did little more than refer to other organisations, even though it had access to a large academic network. The German botanist Theodor Philipp Haas, for instance, was told that nothing could be done for him. He was told to contact the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars, or the Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland—all three of which were relatively young, small and spontaneous creations.[401] At no point did the IIIC set up a special bureau or even a standardised procedure for these cases, presumably due to a lack of resources. Having failed to establish, even to a minimal degree, the equivalence of diplomas and degrees—the project had stalled in 1924 following reluctant responses from governments[402]—proved to be a hurdle when trying to accommodate refugee scholars during the 1930s. It seems strange, however, that at a time when refugee scholars, such as Haas, were appealing to the IIIC in increasing numbers, the IIIC proceeded to publish *Entretiens* on the latest literary trends. This practice was continued even during the war. In January 1940 the IIIC devoted no more than half a page to "the fate of the Polish intellectuals", and acted, at best, as an information centre.[403]

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[397] League of Nations, *Moral Disarmament,* Memorandum from the Polish Government, 17 September 1931, Official No. C. 602. M. 240. 1931. IX.

[398] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), p. 42.

[399] Final act of the conference, 17-23 September 1936, E.X.5 (Box 191), IIIC Records.

[400] 'International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace', 23 September 1936, Dosier 1658, Box R3398, League of Nations Archives.

Once again, the IIIC placed more emphasis on broad, lofty subjects than on building a capable machinery to solve the pressing issues of the time. None of the high expectations for a student exchange scheme were fulfilled, not to mention inclusive education programs, improving literacy rates or women's access to higher education. There is no evidence that the IIIC improved conditions for intellectual workers. Regulations on intellectual property, one of the first projects and most clearly defined goals, failed to materialise.[404] Most of the technical collaboration fizzled out during the 1930s while elite-level projects, such as the ISC, continued up until the Second World War.

With few exceptions, the projects that continued to operate until the war were the ones that afforded nothing but a brain and a typewriter, rather than those that could be expected to have a measurable impact on people's lives. To be sure, there was value in them. The spread of non-European works of art, various periodicals, translations, conferences, and handbooks helped to create an awareness for the role of culture in international affairs. Moreover, the insistence on a universal intellectual community and the dedication to peaceful cooperation resonated with the goals of the

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[401] Letter by J. Belime (interim director IIIC) to Theodor Philipp Haas, 6 March 1937, B.IV.44, IIIC Records.

[402] See resolutions regarding the ICIC, adopted by the 5th Assembly, Dossier 27880, Box R1055, League of Nations Archives.

[403] IIIC, *Intellectual Cooperation Bulletin*, No. 1-8 (Paris, 1940), p. 40.

[404] F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946* (Leicester, 1986), p. 187.

League of Nations. As Northedge has argued, the League's efforts in intellectual cooperation may at least have had an effect on the way in which national conflict was thought and fought during the second half of the twentieth century.[405] Nevertheless, the IIIC remained largely ineffective in its practical goals and unconvincing in its intellectual agenda—peace in mind did not lead to peace in practice. Crucially, for the study of IR, this experiment showed that even the most modest 'scientific' cooperation was permeated by political interests.

Universalism, Politics, and the Demise of an Experiment

Intellectual cooperation in the field of IR rested on two conflicting motivations. On the one hand, there was the old idea to unify scientific standards and academic communities. This was rooted in traditional philosophical universalism that had existed for centuries and that was reinforced by modern internationalism. At the same time, however, there was the explicit goal to serve as supporters of, or proxies for *political* cooperation—this was a new motivation, linked to the specific context in which IR emerged.

The first motivation, traditional universalism, was based on the idea that certain standards and truths were applicable regardless of national borders—due to either religious belief, scientific principles, or practical reasons. The campaign for the protection of copyright law since the 1850s, for example, rested on the assumptions that intellectual property inevitably and increasingly crossed borders and that property rights could only be protected by international agreements. It also implied that intellectual property had a certain universal value, like a global currency that could only be administered globally. That same argument was true for scientific societies, such as the London Chemical Society, which from its beginnings in the 1840s admitted "foreign members" in the pursuit of objective truth.[406] The rejection of national borders also inspired Wilhelm Ostwald's 1911 institute for the organisation of intellectual work, called *Die Brücke*, which was essentially a world repository of scientific knowledge and industry standards.[407] Ostwald wanted *Die Brücke* to be the world's first "enquiry desk" and advocated open access to its services for anyone from anywhere. While *Die Brücke* failed to survive the First World War, its underlying ideology did not.

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[405] F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920–1946* (Leicester, 1986), p. 189.

[406] Chemical Society of London, *Memoirs & Proceedings of the Chemical Society of London, 1841-1842 and 1842-1843* Vol. 1 (London, 1843), p. 9.

This same motivation that inspired pre-1914 associations and movements was picked up by the protagonists of IR and intellectual cooperation under the auspices of the League of Nations. It was to foster "ties of intellectual solidarity" and to form a "spiritual union" among thinkers from different nations.[408] Their common motivation was the universalist conviction that sciences and arts had the same value regardless of national origin, and hence should be subject to common organisation. As French Education Minister Daladier put it in his opening speech for the IIIC in 1926, the goal of intellectual cooperation was to form a "*conscience universelle […] cette grande fête de l'Humanité* [universal consciousness […] that great celebration of humanity]".[409] By applying the universalism immanent in natural sciences and religions to a social science, the pioneers of IR underestimated that unlike physical or metaphysical truths, political facts were a much more controversial matter.[410]

The second motivation was different. After the First World War, intellectual cooperation was thought in the context of the League of Nations, an inter-governmental organisation devoted to political ends. Exchange between academics on this platform gained a political dimension as it was forced into the framework of nation-states.[411] Luchaire's 1920 appeal pointed precisely to this symbiosis of academia and diplomacy. An institution of intellectual cooperation at the League would, he argued, "serve purposes intimately related to the more general objectives of the League Covenant."[412] Unlike earlier associations, the League's bodies were explicitly committed to political ends. And not only that, they were considered "an essential preliminary to an agreement of interests, a juridical settlement of conflicts and political organisation for peace."[413]

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[407] *Die Brücke* became obsessed with establishing standards for anything from the size of office stationary to hotel brochures and street posters. Die Brücke, *Die Brücke: Internationales Institut zur Organisierung der Geistigen Arbeit: Satzung* (München, 1912), p. 4.

[408] IIIC, *Intellectual Cooperation Bulletin*, No. 1-8 (1940), pp. 2-4.

[409] Address by Édouard Daladier, 16 January 1926, A.I.6, IIIC Records.

[410] It is interesting to note the internal mismatch between the science-heaviness of the ICIC—30 out of 48 total members worked in the exact sciences—and the humanities-focused output of the IIIC, preoccupied with politics, literature and the arts. One of the few scholars who critiqued the "scientific" nature of IR was the international lawyer and Nazi sympathiser Fritz Berber. See Berber, *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit* (Berlin, 1934), pp. 33-41.

[411] See Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, Jakob Vogel, 'Introduction', in Rodogno et al. (eds.), *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks, Issues* (New York, 2015), p. 3.

[412] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 276.

These expectations presupposed that science, or representatives thereof, could have an effect on the world of politicians and diplomats. "Friends of reason" could decipher the "abstractions" of power.[414] Indeed there was a widespread assumption that intellectuals were in a position to contribute "by their example, by their teaching, by their good will and by their spirit of disinterested research in all fields, to the maintenance of peace."[415] This assumption regarded the intellectual as a good-natured ambassador of their respective country who helped to overcome prejudices, identified common interests, and cleared the ground for the actual ambassador. This function of the IIIC was manifested, for example, in the work on moral disarmament, which was an intellectual and educational exercise in preparation of a political conference. It was also present in the *Entretiens* and *Correspondances* as they dwelled upon the meaning of a culture for peace. Above all, it was true for intellectual cooperation in the field of IR where academics worked on questions directly concerned with international politics.

The new relationship between academia and diplomacy reflected the idea that science had something substantial to say about the world of politics.[416] With the advent of IR as an academic subject, scholars made war and peace objects of rational, scientific enquiry. In doing so, they implied that the virtues of diplomacy could be studied (and taught), that peace could be achieved through the application of reason, and that the practitioners of foreign politics had something to learn from the thinkers of IR. In the words of a contemporary observer, IR was not only "a new science", it became the "brain of the League of Nations."[417] This meant, in turn, that diplomats and clerks should consult academics, and that it would be worthwhile for the League to employ something like a scientific advisory board. This is precisely what the IIIC did by organising meetings for IR scholars—the ISC series from 1928 until 1939.

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[413] Letter by Paul Appell, dated 8 July 1920, published as 'Institution of an International Bureau for Intellectual Intercourse and Education', *League of Nations Official Journal*, Vol. 1 (October 1920). p. 445.

[414] G. Lowes Dickinson, 'The Holy War', *The Nation*, 8 August (1914), p. 3.

[415] Miguel Ozorio de Almeida, 'Open Letter', in IIIC (ed.), *Intellectual Cooperation Bulletin*, No. 1-8 (Paris, 1940), pp. 4-5.

[416] Jan-Stefan Fritz, 'Internationalism and the Promise of Science', in David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 142.

[417] William Archer, *A New Science*, December 1918, newspaper clipping, Vol. 12, Dr Thomas Jones CH Papers, National Library of Wales.

The ISC became a venue for scholars, diplomats and politicians, a sphere of political negotiation parallel to and connected with official bodies. Their goal was to study topics of immediate interest to decision makers at the League, such as disarmament, minorities, or trade regimes, and to prepare an academic basis for practical policies. Intellectual enquiry and cooperation were now situated closer to and more systematically linked with high politics. The driving factor for intellectual cooperation was no longer simply the ideal of universal scientific truth but the intention to have an impact beyond science. With every international crisis of the inter-war period, the political dimension of intellectual cooperation became more visible. In 1937, a skeptical participant of the ISC observed "that members of the conference were unable to think themselves as individuals and scientists, but were exercising unwarranted diplomacy."[418]

The inclination to contribute substantially to political ends accompanied the IIIC's history throughout the inter-war period. This tactic helped to justify its cause and to attract sponsors, such as governments and private donors. Above all, the IIIC's expedition into politics underscored their common mission to work for international peace. Whether radio broadcasting or cinema, museums or scientific congresses, schools or universities—every domaine was transformed into an instrument for peaceful cooperation. 'Peace' dominated the IIIC's rhetoric and decorated its publications. By joining the movement for peace, the IIIC built a network of academic, political, and civil society organisations, a blend of influence spheres that obscured actual outcomes. For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace funded publication projects, conferences, receptions, and provided funds for the ISC.[419] In Germany, a Peace Academy in memory of former foreign minister Gustav Stresemann was devoted to the same goals: peace through research and education, international conferences and lecture tours, publications and translations. Like their Anglo-American colleagues, the German political elite promoted the study of IR or, as they simply put it, "a science of peace."[420]

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[418] Letter by J. B. Condliffe to Tracy Kittredge, 18 September 1937, K.I.4b, IIIC Records.

[419] Katharina Rietzler, 'Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of Philanthropic Internationalism in the Interwar Years', in Daniel Laqua (ed.) *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars* (London, 2011).

Ironically, it were exactly these political aspirations for peace and cooperation that eventually led the IIIC into contradictions and tensions. How could one be 'neutral' in any scientific sense and at the same time serve the League of Nations which, *per definitionem*, stood for a particular concept of global order? How to be 'universal' while excluding a significant part of the world? How to be 'disinterested' when the IIIC leadership themselves were opinionated political functionaries? These tensions arose not only because intellectual cooperation in the social sciences was complicated, but because the IIIC willingly extended its mission into practical politics. The original agenda—university exchanges, bibliographies, and the condition of intellectual workers—shifted into the background, whereas those with more than a technical character—the ISC, *Entretiens, Correspondances*, and the spread of League of Nations ideals—gained prominence. While this became particularly visible towards the 1930s, a ceratin political mission was present from the beginning. As Daladier argued in 1926, the idea of the IIIC was to spread the "spirit of collaboration for peace, for the progress of peoples, living in equality and solidarity, which assures the *grandeur* of the League of Nations."[421]

On paper, the IIIC was a technical organ under the control of senior bodies in Geneva—the ICIC as well as the League Council and Assembly. The directors were eager to stress their "autonomous" and "disinterested" approach.[422] In the case of the World Disarmament Conference, for example, the IIIC assured to not engage in "propaganda for or against the ideal of disarmament […] but scientific exposition" of the facts.[423] In reality, the IIIC was far from being neutral. The exclusion of non-member states led to a strong bias in favour of pro-League opinions. Even within this group the IIIC collaborated more closely with some governments than others, usually allowing those more attention who payed more money. In practice, this meant almost always French dominance, as was reflected in the repeated election of French directors despite violating the statutes. External funding further complicated the structure of interests. During the 1930s, the Rockefeller Foundation appropriated up to 50,000 US Dollars per annum to the IIIC, with the specific purpose of promoting the study of IR.[424] In 1932, for example, its trustees decided that the ISC was "a type of international scientific research of great promise", and gave an additional 1,500 US Dollars to an ISC working group on state intervention and economic life.[425] Private donors did not necessarily pursue 'bad' interests, but their contribution was a statement in itself, and their specific targets set an agenda which could have turned out differently.

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[420] Julius Curtius, 'Memorial to Gustav Stresemann', *International Conciliation* No. 263 (1930), p. 15.

[421] Address by Édouard Daladier, 16 January 1926, A.I.6, IIIC Records.

[422] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 195; Miguel Ozorio de Almeida, 'Open Letter', in IIIC (ed.), *Intellectual Cooperation Bulletin*, No. 1-8 (Paris, 1940), p. 5.

[423] Letter by Arnold J. Toynbee to Henri Bonnet, 18 March 1931; response by Bonnet to Toynbee, 26 March 1931, K.I.1b, IIIC Records.

Throughout the 1930s then, Murray and Bonnet struggled to stick to their mission of universalist, "disinterested" study whilst accommodating increasing pressure from a range of outside actors.[426] Germany withdrew their support after 1933, Italy replaced internationalists with Fascists, and a growing share of the costs had to be covered by US philanthropists instead of member states. This made the IIIC's financial situation less reliable, decreased its geographical range, and diverted its political stance. As Bonnet revealed in 1942, the IIIC was sometimes

> "prevented by censorship from publishing some truthful statements about fascism because too many people, in the belligerent as well as the neutral countries, maintained incredible illusions about Mussolini's policy."[427]

Towards the late 1930s, the IIIC operated in a bubble of international bureaucrats who either failed to see the challenges facing peaceful cooperation or willingly ignored them. There was no way for the IIIC to escape the dynamics of political and national partisanship. It was only in 1942, that Bonnet conceded that "certain projects of the Intellectual Organization did not please all governments."[428]

But instead of retreating into truly neutral and technical activities, the ICIC and IIIC actively reached out to governments and private organisations to maintain an ever more political mission. "I am still trying to interest the British Government in Intellectual Cooperation", lamented Murray in 1934, "but of course we have to interest the Foreign Office and they have to struggle with the Treasury."[429] No less effort was made to receive funds from the Carnegie Endowment. In every possible scenario the IIIC asked for money. At one point in 1932, the European director of the Carnegie Endowment was so irritated that he had to clarify the nature of their contribution: they could not provide general funds, only project-specific funding on a case-by-case basis where activities "fell within its own program of work"—that was, within the interests of the Carnegie Endowment.[430] A similar approach was taken by the Rockefeller Foundation who funded projects and individuals at the IIIC throughout the 1930s and indeed into the war.[431] It was evident that during a period of crisis and war, public and private donors would make careful decisions about whom to fund, and the IIIC developed a certain skill in presenting itself as the primary guarantor of peace.

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[424] Resolution RF 37117, 1 Dec 1937, Folder 952, Box 105, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[425] Resolution RF 32047, 5 July 1932, Folder 952, Box 105, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[426] On the notion of "disinterested" or "neutral" work, see for instance IIIC, *A Record of a First International Study Conference on The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), pp. xxii-xxiii.

[427] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 209.

[428] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 197.

In some ways, the IIIC succeeded in achieving what Luchaire had envisioned. Started in 1926 as a nucleus of scientific and cultural cooperation for peace, the IIIC became an illustrious venue for scholars and peace activists, and a phalanx of supporters of the League of Nations. It is not surprising that Bonnet thought that the IIIC was "one of the most fruitful branches of League activity."[432] But unbiased accounts, too, have argued that inter-war internationalists were not "necessarily naïve or nearsighted."[433] It is also true, as Northedge remarked, that the IIIC cannot be held responsible for the general difficulties of the time—political extremism or the Great Depression—nor for the spineless attitude of member states in backing the League's mission.[434] Moreover, it is important to remember that the ICIC and IIIC were, despite their predecessors, essentially something new. Unprecedented in their spatial scope and organisational sophistication, they were among the first experiments at official international cooperation.[435] As experiments, one could expect them to fall short in some ways. It would be wrong therefore to declare the ICIC and IIIC outright failures. They did, after all, establish the idea of intellectual cooperation at the world's first global inter-governmental organisation.

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[429] Letter by Gilbert Murray to Henri Bonnet, 27 October 1934, A.I.71, IIIC Records.

[430] Letter by Earle B. Babcock to Werner Picht, 13 July 1932, K.V.1-5, IIIC Records.

[431] Letter by Tracy Kittredge to Henri Bonnet, 30 September 1939, K.I.26a, IIIC Records.

[432] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 191.

[433] Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 310.

[434] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), pp. 666–77.

In many respects, however, the IIIC failed to become effective and make real changes in the lives of intellectuals, let alone the general public. To some extent, this ineffectiveness can be blamed on the limited reach of activities and, in turn, on limited financial support. This was particularly true for the early phase when the ICIC struggled to launch projects of a permanent character due to financial constraints. However, many projects, such as the agreement on intellectual property, would have required more willingness, not money, to succeed. In those cases, stronger backing from national governments would have been necessary. Other projects, such as the peaceful usage of broadcasting, were simply too ambitious. It is hard therefore, to identify singular explanations for the IIIC's failures. In the end, of course, it was the Second World War which confirmed its ultimate fate.

One of the problematic features was the inherent eurocentrism in most of what the IIIC did. Not only were most of its employees European and most of its projects designed for a European audience, it seemed as if the IIIC was completely out of touch with other parts of the world. For regions with less than 20 percent literacy rate, such as in India, the focus on 'intellectual life' was a grotesque misinterpretation of actual needs. What is more, non-Europeans did not have the same stakes in the political crises that shaped much of the IIIC's work. A 1940 survey on the conditions of "intellectual life" revealed that Indians, Mexicans, and Australians saw no adverse effects of the war on their situation, except that they were "finding it difficult to obtain various journals and other publications."[436] In terms of logistics alone, the physical distance to Geneva and Paris made it hard for non-Europeans to attend meetings. Another crucial absentee was Soviet Russia (until the 1933), which precluded interaction with red internationalism.[437] To be sure, the IIIC did maintain relations with a range of non-European countries, especially in South America and Asia, including Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru as well as Turkey, Iran, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.[438] But none of these places were ever at the core of what was being decided at Paris. It is true therefore, as historians have pointed out, to consider inter-war intellectual cooperation as a European initiative, akin to the League of Nations being European itself.[439]

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[435] Along with the League's Health Organisation and the ILO. See, Iris Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: the League of Nations Health Organization, 1921-1946* (Frankfurt, 2009).

[436] 'Enquête sur les conditions de la vie intellectuelle dans les différents pays'; letters by John Sargent, Luis Sanchez Ponton, and the Librarian of the Australian Parliament to Henri Bonnet, dated 22, 9, and 15 February 1940 respectively, A.XIII.1 (Box 69), IIIC Records.

[437] Soviet delegates were invited in 1933 to join the ISC. Werner Picht to Marcel Rosenberg, 1 April 1933, K.I.1i, IIIC Records.

The regional bias of inter-war intellectual cooperation was particularly noticeable in the field of IR. Whenever colonies were mentioned at the ISC, discussions almost always circled around raw materials, ethnicity, or the mandate system, rather than regarding the people in those places as actors in their own right.[440] Only in few cases did members of the ISC speak of the "eventual development of self-government and the gradual disappearance of outside domination."[441] Women were particularly outspoken against colonialism. "Subject nations must be freed", Marie Johnson demanded at a 1924 congress of WILPF.[442] For the overwhelming majority, however, self-determination was not a concern. Given the colonial interests of most major powers represented at the IIIC, this is not surprising. However, the European condescension among the IIIC leadership ran counter to their foundational myth of working in the name of a universal intellectual community. To promote a *civitas mundi* was incompatible with euro-centric practices.[443] In other words, internationalist ideals were out of sync with political realities.

Another limitation of both the ICIC and the IIIC was their elitism. The people running the organisation—eminent scientists, public intellectuals, and technocratic elites—operated at a considerable distance to the population. This rendered their mission problematic in several ways. An obvious problem was that the IIIC attracted limited public notice. Many activities were deliberately tailored to educated minorities, such as journalists, professors, or museum directors. They were never intended to provoke a mass movement, but targeted the higher ranks of intellectual life.[444] More inclusive projects, such as the idea of "workers' libraries" raised in 1932, remained in planning stage and resulted in no more than well-intentioned reports.[445] Generally speaking, the exclusion of vast parts of the population conflicted with the IIIC's self-ascribed mission "to render universally accessible the contributions to the welfare of mankind which men of talent and of genius, in all countries and in all races, have to offer."[446] There was a good deal of irony in advocating peaceful cooperation among the peoples of the world via science and culture, but at the same time to deny the majority of these peoples access to better education or cultural life, let alone enter the exclusive realm of decision-making.

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[438] See K.IV.9–36, IIIC Records.

[439] Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 4-5; Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, 'Introduction', in Geyer and Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001), p. 10; David Long, 'Who Killed the International Studies Conference?', *Review of International Studies* 32:4 (2006), pp. 604-5.

[440] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (Paris, 1938), pp. 79, 132.

[441] Report by the British Coordinating Committee, dated 18 July 1936, K.IV.30h, IIIC Records.

[442] Marie Johnson, in WILPF, *Report of the Fourth Congress of the WILPF* (Geneva, 1924), p. 54.

[443] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), pp. 57-9.

Despite their intellectual distinction, the protagonists of the ICIC and IIIC were often powerless in political decision-making. They did not, as Northedge argued, "have much that was significant for international affairs to show."[447] Even the most widely respected ICIC members, such as Einstein, could at best make public appeals and were never able to exert real force in foreign policy, or even in the cultural sector for that matter. They did not enjoy any democratic legitimacy and were too weak to exercise any influence at the legislative or diplomatic level. Moreover, many of them were not robust enough for a world of lies and deceit. In Northedge's reading they were "too tolerant for the intolerant world they lived in."[448]

Perhaps more problematic than its composition and administration, however, was the way in which intellectual cooperation was politicised throughout the inter-war period. Partisan actors interfered in increasingly obvious ways with what was meant to be a technical institution. By the late 1930s, the IIIC had, in a style not dissimilar to high-politics, developed a strategy of downplaying and ignoring the obvious dangers to peace, whilst allowing Fascists and nationalists to voice their opinions at ICIC governor meetings and IIIC events. This culminated in the German demand to disentangle intellectual cooperation from the League of Nations as a condition for any further collaboration.[449] The German representative to the ISC, Fritz Berber, remarked in 1937 that a "systematic German treatment" of ISC topics was no longer possible.[450] Bonnet was outraged at the totalitarian approach to academic work and noted in 1942:

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[444] Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation* (Wroclaw, 1962), p. 54.

[445] IIIC, *Information Bulletin* 1:2–3 (Paris, 1932), pp. 76-7.

[446] Miguel Ozorio de Almeida, 'Open Letter', in IIIC (ed.), *Intellectual Cooperation Bulletin*, No. 1-8 (Paris, 1940), p. 4.

[447] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 693.

[448] F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946* (Leicester, 1986), p. 189.

> "there is supposedly a German system of physics founded on the gift of the Aryan spirit to understand what is moving, living, and changing—as distinguished from […] Frenchmen or Jews."[451]

Hitler's interpretation of evolutionary biology was incompatible with the project of international cooperation between equals. It was an "attack on rationalism".[452] The influx of extreme political opinions and international conflict in 1939-40 dramatically exposed the long-standing inherent problems of inter-war international cooperation, and marked the end of the ICIC and IIIC.

Conclusion

Intellectual cooperation at the League of Nations served as an important infrastructure as well as an ideological setting for the formation of IR. The leadership of the ICIC and IIIC, some of whom were the same people as the pioneers of IR, believed that international politics should be subject to academic investigation. More precisely, they argued that it was possible to study IR, in theory and in practice, under the auspices of an inter-governmental organisation. The arising institutions and projects, especially the ISC, shaped IR as an academic discipline during the inter-war period by demarcating a room for the discipline—in terms of research centres, conferences, publications, and thematic scope. Crucially, intellectual cooperation expressed the claim that IR could be studied from a neutral point of view and that it could deliver meaningful insights for political practice.

Despite their good intentions, the approach taken by Luchaire and Bonnet fell prey to political controversies, undermining the credibility of the IIIC and ultimately the League itself. Part of the problem was rooted in financial constraints and, in turn, the limited capability to launch large-scale projects to win the trust of governments and the general public. Meanwhile, the governance structure of the ICIC and IIIC was in experimental stage and the administration lacked expertise. This was an unprecedented type of inter-governmental agency, run by philosophers and physicists who were unexperienced in managing political processes. The IIIC's extraordinarily ambitious, yet broad mission—to spread peace in the minds of people—led to considerable confusion about the actual goals of intellectual cooperation. The result was an incoherent compilation of projects, some of which went on to live existences of their own. Insufficient control over the IIIC's output, in turn, led to internal quarrels and dissatisfaction among member states.

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[449] Note on the current state of the IIIC, undated, mid-1940s[?], A.I.144/2, IIIC Records.

[450] Fritz Berber, 'Vorbemerkung', in Diedrich Westermann, *Beiträge zur deutschen Kolonialfrage* (Berlin, 1937), p. 7.

[451] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 189.

[452] J. Walter Jones, 'The Nazi Conception of Law', *Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs* 21 (1939), p. 28.

Besides administrative difficulties, however, the more fundamental problem about inter-war intellectual cooperation was the assumption that scholars and artists could contribute to international peace without antagonising national governments. The IIIC sought to be regarded as a moral authority whose judgements were superior to the claims of national governments. An interesting example of this attitude is how the term 'propaganda' was simultaneously studied and employed by IIIC officials. On the one hand, the IIIC actively used propaganda in its own work—its periodical was called *Brochures de Propagande.*[453] On the other hand, they argued that there was a bad type of propaganda that had to be banned, as the 1936 convention concerning the peaceful use of broadcasting declared.[454] This almost schizophrenic argument was echoed by the British League of Nations Union which, having issued some 400 leaflets themselves, declared in 1935 that "the League of Nations Union, for example, is not engaged in propaganda."[455] What the advocates of international cooperation were doing was of course just another kind of propaganda. The IIIC as an officially neutral body struggled to stay neutral and at the same time to contribute something meaningful to international life.

The divide between the claim to neutrality and the actual output of intellectual cooperation was particularly significant for IR. In this field, it was impossible for the IIIC to remain neutral. By investing in the study of IR under its auspices, the IIIC promoted the cause of the League of Nations as a whole. It also created an awkward self-referential dynamic because a lot of early IR research was concerned with the League and its impact on international politics. The object of research was the same organisation from which that research emerged. In other words, IR scholars studied the very world that they constituted themselves—international cooperation. As a result, categories of agency and objectivity seemed to fade.

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[453] League of Nations, 'The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation', in *Brochures de Propagande*, 1926–1927 (Paris, 1926); see also Robert Jones and Stanley Simon Sherman, *The League of Nations school book* (London, 1928 and 1934)

[454] 'International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace', 23 September 1936, Dossier 1658, Box R3998, League of Nations Archives.

[455] J. C. Maxwell Garnett, 'Propaganda'*, The Contemporary Review* May (1935), p. 8. By contrast, E. H. Carr argued that both totalitarian governments and democracies engaged in propaganda, and that the contrast between them was often "less clear-cut". E. H. Carr, 'Propaganda in International Politics', *Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs* 16 (1939).

The advent of UNESCO in the wake of the Second World War confirmed this impression of inter-war intellectual cooperation. Operations were de-politicised and focused for the most part on technical cooperation and education programs, including a focus on literacy rates and basic schooling.[456] If the experiment were to work better this time, one had to set clear boundaries for UNESCO's programme to prevent it from engaging in unwarranted diplomacy again. The central lesson to be learned from the inter-war experience was that intellectual cooperation, in an inter-governmental framework, had to refrain from political debates and focus on providing the means rather than the content of international cooperation. The League bodies were, as Northedge rightly observed, "a pioneer not so much in intellectual co-operation itself as in its native procedure."[457] As a result, UNESCO actually copied the ICIC and IIIC in their governance structures and even took over some employees, whereas almost all of their programs were dropped and replaced by less elitist and less ideology-driven ones.[458] UNESCO also withdrew from the study of IR at an official level and stopped endorsing the ISC, thus putting an end to one of most productive yet controversial symbioses of inter-war diplomacy.

Despite these shortcomings, the formation of IR benefitted crucially from intellectual cooperation. The technical bodies of the League, the ICIC and the IIIC, provided an infrastructure for international exchange and helped to construct a disciplinary identity by organising conferences, issuing handbooks, and setting a research agenda.[459] For almost two decades, this framework connected IR scholars and practitioners from around the world. In the process, they generated ideas and policies with long-standing political implications—to be studied in the following chapter. IIIC activities further debunk the myth of the League as nothing more than a weak political apparatus, and, by contrast, demonstrate the League's contributions to international life more broadly.[460] This history also shows that it was a mistake by the so called 'realists' to denounce international cooperation as a utopian dream. The League, including the ICIC and IIIC, did not suffer from a divergence between idea and reality.[461] If anything, they were troubled by the divergence of different ideas—internationalism, nationalism, imperialism, liberalism, socialism, Fascism, Nazism, Christianity, etc. These divergences shaped the formation of IR scholarship, as the next chapter shows, both in research and practice.

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[456] UNESCO, *Twenty years of service to peace, 1956–1966* (Paris, 1966), pp. 19, 90-93.

[457] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 687.

[458] Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée* (Paris, 1999), p. 325.

[459] IIIC, *Handbook of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations* (Paris, 1929).

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[460] Susan Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', *The American Historical Review* 112:4 (2007).

[461] Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 320.

3. Scholars in Action: Professors, Diplomats, and Internationalists in the Field of International Relations

"Anyone who is to teach contemporary affairs should have some practical connection with them."
(Arnold Toynbee, 1929)[462]

Introduction

During the mid-1920s the study of International Relations (IR) began to flourish in several ways. Not only was the discipline now recognised at an increasing number of universities, but the political context allowed for researchers to test their ideas in practice. IR scholars were in demand both as professors and as policy advisors, they worked as journalists, lobbyists or politicians. Meanwhile, constitutional and educational reforms enabled an increasing part of the population to participate in the study and practice of international affairs. Thanks to financial support from philanthropists, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation, IR scholars further developed their networks of intellectual cooperation, spanning Europe, North America and soon the entire globe. The League of Nations provided for them both an object of research as well as a venue to voice their opinions and, in several cases, to submit policy proposals. In fact, the study and teaching of IR were so closely and deliberately linked to practical activities that this dual purpose became a major, if not the decisive characteristic of inter-war IR scholarship.

IR came of age not in isolated research laboratories but in a mélange of education, international cooperation and policy debate. Most early IR scholars pursued careers at the intersection of academia and diplomacy. Philip Noel-Baker, for example, who was appointed Ernest Cassel Professor of IR at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 1924, had previously served as a personal assistant to Fridtjof Nansen, Eric Drummond, and Lord Cecil, as well as having attended the Paris Peace Conference on behalf of the British Foreign Office. In 1924, the same year that he assumed his LSE professorship, he stood as a Labour candidate in the general election.[463] For the next five years, he worked as a professor of IR, which he thought was "no doubt a splendid field" to be taught at university.[464] In 1929, he returned to practical politics, sitting in the House of Commons as a Labour member and serving as assistant to Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson. Like many of his colleagues, Noel-Baker managed to combine university-based IR with various appointments in 'real-world' international relations and politics.

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[462] Arnold Toynbee to Gilbert Murray, 9 May 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[463] LSE reserved "freedom of action in the event of his being elected a Member of Parliament during the tenure of his Chair", which did not happen until 1929. Edwin Daller (LSE registrar) to Noel-Baker, 22 May 1924, NBKR 8/8/1, Philip Noel-Baker Papers. Noel-Baker eventually resigned in 1929 upon his election to the House of Commons and becoming personal assistant to Arthur Henderson. Memo, [1929], Box 252, Central Filing 134/8/A,B, LSE Archives.

When revisiting the disciplinary history of IR, political scientists have tended to trace and explain theoretical developments. Specifically, there has been a long discussion about whether the traditional founding story of IR—the so called 'first great debate' between 'idealist' and 'realist' IR scholars—is an accurate reflection of actual discourses. While most revisionists would now deny that the 'first great debate' really occurred, there is still widespread confusion about what actually constituted IR during this period. Various explanations have been offered, from alternative debates to meta-theoretical reconstructions, while the consensus still seems to suggest that there was an IR theory of some sort.[465]

The search for inter-war IR theory becomes problematic, however, when taking into account the biographies of IR pioneers, their semi-political networks and non-academic interests. Many of them did not even attempt to formulate theoretical abstractions. Rather than devoting their intellectual energy to theory-building—in the sense of definitions, axioms, models, abstractions, methodologies, etc.—IR scholars were almost exclusively concerned with either descriptive, history-like studies or policy proposals, fuelled by partisan interests. Raymond Leslie Buell, research director of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, admitted in 1931 that "we have erected none of the elaborate statistical paraphernalia which mark so many research activities", and that it was "largely a matter of opinion" if IR was a proper science.[466] Indeed, inter-war IR was characterised by the "absence of a general theory of international politics", as the political scientist Brian C. Schmidt has noted.[467] An astonishing number of lectures, conferences, and publications enjoyed the endorsement of non-academic actors who took an interest in IR, ranging from individual politicians to large philanthropic trusts. Even in their role as teachers, IR scholars seemed to be primarily motivated by practical goals, such as the training of future diplomats—"to fit them for educated leadership"[468]—and the spread of internationalism. As Ernst Jäckh acknowledged, there was an overlap of "scientific, pacifist, and governmental" agency in their field.[469]

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[464] Philip Noel-Baker, *Draft Proposal for Department 1927*, NBKR 8/12/2, Philip Noel-Baker Papers.

[465] See previous chapters for a detailed historiography. A notable exception is Nicolas Guilhot, 'Introduction: One Discipline, Many Histories', in Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011), p. 7.

[466] Raymond Leslie Buell, 'What is Research?', *Foreign Policy Association Pamphlet* No. 75 (New York, 1931), p. 2.

[467] Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Rockefeller Foundation Conference and the Long Road to a Theory of International Relations', in Nicolas Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011), p. 79.

This chapter traces some of the most influential individuals, institutions, and discourses of inter-war IR scholarship. It argues that the discipline was shaped during the 1920s and early 1930s by networks of academics, politicians, and diplomats who were concerned with IR education as well as with a range of political debates, including disarmament, sanctions, and free trade. By putting emphasis on the way in which these questions were studied, taught and discussed, the chapter reveals how little attention was given to theory and, by contrast, how political debate became the preferred mode of IR scholarship. Disguised as 'impartial' professors, the protagonists of IR served on government committees and represented national interests abroad, blurring the demarcation line between scientific inquiry and political partisanship.[470] Although historically neglected, women were part of this history, both in academic and political positions. Rediscovering their role helps to re-integrate a forgotten body of feminist political thought and sheds light on male dominance in inter-war academia.

The chapter is divided in six parts. The first section introduces a number of summer schools and exchange programs which popularised the study of IR and established a bridge between education and the policy world. In the second section, the development of IR education is linked to the demand for democratic control of foreign policy and its implications for the general public. The third section shows how academics, notably the American historian James T. Shotwell and the German lawyer Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, interacted with national governments in the preparation of international treaties, specifically the 1924 Geneva Protocol and the 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact. The fifth section introduces the working mode of the International Studies Conference (ISC) and its proximity to high-politics. Finally, the sixth part reviews the debates at the 1931 and 1932 ISC sessions on economic policy and free trade. To understand the evolution of inter-war IR scholarship, this chapter argues, it is essential to consider the various activities outside 'normal' university contexts. It concludes that there was little coherence in inter-war IR thought and certainly no clear-cut theoretical debates.

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[468] Memo on 'Federation Universitaire Internationale', April 1925, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 88.

[469] Ernst Jäckh, *Die Politik Deutschlands im Völkerbund* (Geneva, 1932), p.18.

[470] William Wallace, 'Truth and power, monks and technocrats: theory and practice in international relations', *Review of International Studies* 22:3 (1996), p. 302.

Summer Schools and Exchange Programs

By the mid-1920s, the League of Nations machinery had attained a certain working routine and enjoyed the respect of a growing number of decision makers.[471] Increasingly, national governments accepted the League's role in hosting diplomatic debates and thereby helped to create a new atmosphere of international politics, inspired by the goal of international governance. Many of these debates were open to the public and received unprecedented levels of media attention and public scrutiny. Geneva thus became a world capital, being home not only to the League itself but also to a range of non-governmental associations, conferences, and private meetings. Some people began to speak of "the spirit of Geneva", an "optimistic, almost mystical" atmosphere which surrounded those who worked for world peace from the vantage point of a cosmopolitan city.[472]

Among the various groups that used Geneva as a platform for their work were students of IR who wanted to benefit from the proximity of, and interaction with, the new institutions. In 1924, the IR professor and internationalist Alfred Zimmern received a student request from the Fédération Universitaire Internationale, asking if he would lecture for a group of international students on foreign affairs.[473] Zimmern agreed and set up a summer school in Geneva at the occasion of the Fifth League Assembly in September that year. The idea was to gather students from various national and disciplinary backgrounds and have them taught by academics as well as political, diplomatic, and military experts.[474]

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[471] See Alfred Zimmern, *The League and the Old Diplomacy* (London, 1929), p. 198 (originally published in the *Contemporary Review,* February, 1924); F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946* (Leicester, 1986), p. 119.

[472] See Ethel L. Jones, *The Spirit of Geneva* (London, 1929); Robert de Traz, *L'Esprit de Genève* (Paris, 1929); Otto Hoetzsch, *Germany's Domestic and Foreign Policies* (New Haven, 1919), p. 76.

[473] Brochure of the Geneva School of International Studies, 1927, p. 13, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 87/1-21.

[474] See Daniel Laqua, 'Activism in the "Students' League of Nations": International Student Politics and the *Confédération Internationale des Étudiants*, 1919–1939', *The English Historical Review*, forthcoming.

The format proved so popular that Zimmern turned the summer school into a regular event—the Geneva School of International Studies.[475] For the 1925 edition, held from July to September at the city's Conservatory of Music, he was able to attract prominent lecturers and more funding. A total of 579 students from 44 countries came to attend classes by scholars, such as C. A. W. Manning, James T. Shotwell or Zimmern himself. Among the lecturers were many non-English speaking nationals, including a German, as well as politicians and diplomats, such as the Irish Foreign Minister Desmond FitzGerald or the Spanish diplomat Salvador de Madariaga.[476] The daily routine consisted of lectures in the morning and afternoon, followed by discussions in the evening, as well as occasional talks by external speakers or visits to the League of Nations headquarters. The courses covered general introductions to IR, international law, and economic relations but also touched upon philosophical, cultural, and regional subjects. During the first week of September, when the Assembly met, Zimmern would hold special sessions commenting on the proceedings. For him, Geneva was "a laboratory of realistic political science."[477]

Over the following years, the Geneva summer schools became a must-go for anyone interested in the study of IR, or indeed its practice. Scholars such as Louis Eisenmann, Ernst Jäckh, Paul Mantoux, and Arnold J. Toynbee taught alongside a variety of 'public men' such as Edvard Beneš, Lord Cecil, Paul Hymans, Fridtjof Nansen, and Arthur Salter. An American board of governors was formed, consisting of David Hunter Miller, John Foster Dulles, Charles P. Howland, Thomas W. Lamont, and Edwin F. Gay.[478] From the early 1930s, William Rappard and Paul Mantoux offered the premises of their newly founded Graduate Institute of International Studies to Zimmern's students over the summer months.[479] Besides assembling prominent participants, however, the Geneva Schools achieved a reputation for their underlying mission: Zimmern wanted to invite the most capable and promising young students—including up to 80 women[480]—to educate them, in the best possible setting, for careers in government and diplomacy. He called for scholarships to support students without the necessary financial means and asked colleagues around the world to handpick the most suitable candidates.[481] If there was one remedy for international conflict, Zimmern argued, it was travelling and building contacts.[482] His profound commitment to education was also reflected in his students' comments who valued the international atmosphere, eminent lecturers, and pressing topics.[483] Classical scholar and internationalist Gilbert Murray, too, lauded Zimmern's Geneva summer schools: "I […] cannot speak too highly of the work done and of the spirit that pervades it."[484]

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[475] It went under various names, most commonly "Geneva summer schools" or "Geneva schools". See brochure of the "Geneva School of International Studies", 1927, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 87.

[476] List of Lecturers, 1925, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 88.

[477] Memo for *Fédération Universitaire Internationale* Oct 1924 to April 1925, by Zimmern, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 88.

[478] Brochure, *Bureau d'Etudes internationales de Genève*, by Daniel Lagache, 1927[?], Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 87/1–21.

[479] Brochure entitled *The Postgraduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva: Announcement for 1931–1932*, HEI A/1 (1928/1929–1940/1941), Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

Zimmern's initiative was not the only one of its kind. From 1926, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) entertained a section for student exchanges.[485] Its idea was to generate an internationalist spirit among the next generation of decision-makers. The IIIC listed and coordinated existing exchange programs and sought to facilitate further collaboration, although it was unable to provide sufficient funding. In 1928, LSE director William Beveridge announced a scholarship for the best IR student to travel to Geneva and also planned for a general cooperation between the LSE and the Graduate Institute.[486] As many of the field's champions had themselves benefitted from international experience during their education, going abroad and collaborating with foreigners became an essential component of the study of IR. It allowed students to interact with international peers and to be exposed to different political cultures, to learn foreign languages or even to find employment abroad.

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[480] Student list, 1927, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 95.

[481] Memo for *Fédération Universitaire Internationale* Oct 1924 to April 1925, by Zimmern, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 88.

[482] Alfred Zimmern, *Learning and Leadership: A Study of the Needs and Possibilities of International Intellectual Cooperation* (Oxford, 1928), p. 47; Alfred Zimmern, *Education and International Goodwill* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 13-4.

[483] See, for example, Corlies Lamont to J. K. Newman, 3 August 1925: "I can report without exaggeration that I have never seen a student project of this kind go so well. Zimmern *gets* the students and holds them.", Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 18. See also Paul Rich, 'Alfred Zimmern's Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 85.

[484] Gilbert Murray to Montague Burton, undated 1930-2[?], Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[485] League of Nations, 'The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation', in *Brochures de Propagande, 1926–1927* (Paris, 1926), pp. 6-8.

[486] Nicholas Sims, 'Foundation and History of the International Relations Department', in Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, *International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years* (London, 2003), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/aboutthedepartment/historyofdept.aspx [accessed 04-02-2016].

Despite their underrepresentation in academia, women began to organise similar educational exchanges during the first half of the 1920s. A 1923 report by Kristine Bonnevie, the Norwegian biologist and member of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), listed vacation courses with up to 600 students from all over the world and drew attention to the particular value of teaching IR in this context.[487] Women featured more prominently in this endeavour than acknowledged by contemporaries and historians. Their proposals for international cooperation often predated male initiatives and pioneered new modes of diplomacy. In 1922, for instance, the International Federation of University Women called for student exchanges, arguing that "nothing will contribute more to international peace and goodwill than the constant interchange of the professors and graduate students of the universities of the world."[488] Women's associations were founded to bypass the diplomatic establishment dominated by a white, male, upperclass elite. Summer schools were also a way for women to penetrate the masculine world of diplomacy. As early as 1922, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) held a summer school in Lugano attended by some 100 women and men.[489] Over the following years, WILPF summer schools continued to host female teachers and students, providing a space for women who were otherwise underrepresented in academia. Via IR education they sought to enter diplomatic circles and, in line with their struggle for universal suffrage and democracy, to make foreign policy more democratically accountable.

Another common form of exchange was for professors to go abroad to lecture, research or meet up with like-minded colleagues.[490] Among the first institutionalised visiting programs was the Carnegie Chair at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) in Berlin, installed in 1926 upon a proposal by Nicholas Murray Butler.[491] The chair was sponsored, as its name suggests, by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as well as by the German foreign office.[492] It was occupied by a scholar of international acclaim, in the first year by James T. Shotwell, who also delivered public addresses and was put in touch, via the foreign office, with "leading personalities" in Berlin.[493] Over the following years, the Carnegie lectures never failed to attract attention among diplomatic circles and the press, becoming a well-known institution in IR discourse.[494]

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[487] "Report on Intellectual Vacation Courses", by Kristine Bonnevie, 17 July 1923, Dossier 27944, Box R1055, League of Nations Archives.

[488] Theodora Bosanquet to Nitobe Inazō, 24 July 1922, Dossier 7759, Box R1008, League of Nations Archives.

[489] Program Leaflet, 1922, WILPF/5/7, LSE Archives.

[490] For an overview, see IIIC, *University Exchanges in Europe: a handbook* (Paris, 1928).

[491] The first holder, James T. Shotwell, assumed the chair in February 1927. GStA PK HA Rep. 303 (neu), Nr. 51 (Carnegie Lehrstuhl).

A similar regular event was the lecture series at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Massachusetts, given during the 1920s by, among others, Otto Hoetzsch, Philip Kerr, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Carlo Sforza, Walter Simons, and William Rappard.[495] The Williamstown lectures, a set of usually six talks at Williams College and subsequently published by Yale University Press, were given by European scholars on topics of contemporary political interest. The speakers focused on Central European affairs, international cooperation, arbitration, and the peace treaties. Emphasis was put on discussing changes in the *status quo* of international relations, rather than explaining it in a strictly scientific way. For example, in the summer of 1923, the German author and diplomat Harry Kessler criticised the Versailles settlement for its "paralysing" effect on the German economy and suggested that French security concerns would have to be put aside in order for Germany to be able to join the League of Nations on equal terms.[496] Kessler spoke "from a German point of view."[497] Though by no means an extremist, Kessler represented a typical example of a dual-minded defence of German interests coupled with a commitment to higher international goals such as human rights and the regulation of world trade.[498]

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[492] Minutes of a DHfP meeting, 13 May 1930, PA AA, RZ507, R64152.

[493] Adolf Georg von Maltzan to the German Foreign Office in Berlin, 5 January 1927, PA AA, RZ507, R64152.

[494] Reports suggest that the auditorium was "crowded" and that a press photographer from the New York Times was present, 5 February 1931, GStA PK HA Rep. 303 (neu), Nr. 51 (Carnegie Lehrstuhl).

[495] See Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, *The European Situation* (New Haven, 1927).

[496] Harry Kessler, *Germany and Europe* (New Haven, 1923), p. 73.

[497] Harry Kessler, *Germany and Europe* (New Haven, 1923), p. v.

[498] Harry Kessler, 'Plan zu einem Völkerbunde auf Grund einer Organisation der Organisationen (Weltorganisation)', in Harry Kessler, *Tagebuch eines Weltmannes* (Marbach am Neckar, 1988).

Advertised as university lectures and published by an academic press, this kind of public events confirmed the impression that IR was about designing rather than analysing the world.[499] Many speakers identified as something like academic spokespeople for their governments' foreign policy. "The scholar in public affairs, however detached and philosophic in outlook", Zimmern declared, "is before all things a patriot."[500] It would not be exaggerated therefore to call events such as the Williamstown lectures quasi-diplomatic conferences. Like the Geneva summer schools, they became a well-known regular event for scholars and students of IR. Their success indicated the growing market for exchanges of quasi-diplomatic speakers on foreign affairs.

For students and scholars alike, these were profound and influential experiences. International encounters had an impact on how IR experts thought and behaved. Being exposed to the 'spirit of Geneva' changed opinions on the prospects, and challenges, of supra-national governance, just as national research communities tended to reflect domestic interests. At Geneva, Zimmern felt like a "national mind" with an "international attitude."[501] The lives of IR pioneers were shaped by the internationalisation of their professional environment and the elitist milieu of diplomacy in Geneva. Few scholars reflected on potential biases in their work as a result of their international work.[502] Academic scholarship was subject to the lifestyle of authors and sometimes even personal feelings—Toynbee once described the Paris Peace Conference as a "soul–destroying affair" and said it made him feel "depressed".[503] While it may not be surprising to find such personal remarks, they were at odds with the claim to pursue an objective science.

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[499] Other examples included the annual Montague Burton lectures at Nottingham and the lecture series at the Geneva Institute of International Relations (not to be confused with the Graduate Institute).

[500] Alfred Zimmern, *The Scholar in Public Affairs* (London, 1929), p. 14 (originally appeared in *George Louis Beer, a Tribute to his Life and Work in the Making of History and the Moulding of Public Opinion* (New York, 1924).

[501] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Development of the International Mind', Geneva Institute of International Relations (ed.), *The Problems of Peace* (1927), p. 1.

[502] One exception was William Rappard. He argued that authors who were directly employed with the League would be biased in its favour, and those who were not connected to the League would be biased against it. Only those formerly employed were in a neutral position. See William Rappard, *Uniting Europe* (New Haven, 1930), p. xiv.

[503] Arnold Toynbee to Rob[?], 13 April and 21 May 1919, Arnold J. Toynbee Papers, Box 80.

Education, Democracy, and Open Diplomacy

Why, one might ask, was so much effort spent on an embryonic discipline that rested on vague assumptions about an equally unclear object of study? One reason for the appearance of many IR programmes was a commitment to education as such. Popularising secondary and tertiary education was a general concern of the time and particularly in the social sciences. This was inspired by the liberal democratic conviction that (political) education should be accessible to an audience as wide as possible. IR scholars wrote for "the ordinary man and woman".[504] The founder of the DHfP, Ernst Jäckh, always took pride in the diversity of its student body, coming from all sorts of social, professional, and political backgrounds.[505] The Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales (IHEI) in Paris, invited non-degree students to public lectures.[506] In Britain, the Council for the Study of International Relations (CSIR) produced material for reading groups and adult education.[507] The fact that IR education was not restricted to traditional university environments was well reflected in a 1932 survey.[508] This development was paralleled by rapidly growing faculties in neighbouring social sciences, such as economics and sociology, for example at the LSE.[509]

Education in IR was an important objective for academic institutions and think tanks across various European countries. The Hungarian Society of Foreign Politics, founded in 1920, offered lectures and publications in various languages in the hope to "foster the interest for IR education."[510] The Secretary of the British Universities Bureau announced an annual "Cecil Peace Prize" worth £100 for an essay on varying IR topics.[511] The surge in IR education also coincided with a general worldwide increase in the university student population. From the beginning of the twentieth century until the Second World War, global university enrolment figures grew almost twentyfold.[512] Meanwhile, institutions for the study of IR kept popping up like mushrooms—the 1929 *Handbook of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations* listed 41 institutions in 12 countries.[513]

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[504] Leonard Woolf (ed.), *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War by Lord Cecil, Gilbert Murray, W. Arnold-Forster, C. M. Lloyd, Sir Norman Angell, H. J. Laski, C. R. Buxton* (London, 1933), dust jacket.

[505] Pamphlet on the founding of DHfP, undated [1921?], p.9–10, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 303 (neu), Nr. 1. See also Antonio Missiroli, *Die Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (Sankt Augustin, 1988), p. 30.

[506] Declaration IHEI, undated [1921?], Boîte 1, Archives Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales (IHEI).

[507] A. J. Grant et al., *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, 1916), p. v.

[508] Memorandum Concerning an Enquiry into the various activities of the Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations, 14 January 1932, Dossier 24210, Box R2275, League of Nations Archives.

[509] See Ralf Dahrendorf, *LSE: a history of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895-1995* (Oxford, 1995).

[510] Memo on *Ungarische Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik,* undated, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 303, Nr. 2116.

[511] Program leaflet, 'Cecil Peace Prize', 1926, asking for "an essay on some subject connected with the maintenance of International Peace, and having some bearing on the principles or work of the League of Nations", Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 236.

It was not just the merit of education *per se*, however, that inspired initiatives such as Zimmern's Geneva summer schools. It was the belief in democratic control of foreign policy that substantiated the need for instruction in IR. "If democratic government is to continue under modern conditions", Zimmern explained in 1927, "it must be provided with leaders adequately trained to deal with problems of international relations, and a public opinion well enough informed to support and control an enlightened foreign policy."[514] The case for democratic control was related to the international campaign started at the outbreak of the First World War—championed by the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) and its allies—who argued that decisions over war and peace should be made by an educated public rather than a small unelected elite.[515] In light of the recent changes in European constitutions as well as the establishment of the League of Nations, the demand for democratic control of foreign policy gained new relevance. This was the right time, argued Zimmern, to train the future experts of a democratic foreign policy, and Geneva provided the logical setting for this exercise.

Democratic changes in Europe set the stage for the study of IR. The liberalisation of society made the study of IR accessible to a wider range of students. Political science was "a child of democracy [*ein Kind der Demokratie*]".[516] Elitist clubs were now supplemented by reading groups, special interest societies, and mass movements. League of Nations societies, for example, played an important role in spreading information and encouraging citizens to follow foreign policy debates.[517] Political societies for students provided a space for debate. Universities accepted more students and from more diverse backgrounds. In fact, the very premise of the DHfP as an academic institution was "to meet the educational needs of an emerging democracy."[518] The LSE cited the creation of the League of Nations as "one of the foremost reasons" for establishing a chair in IR.[519] In other words, the political context had an impact on the development of IR as a university course.

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[512] In 1900, approximately 500,000 students were enrolled in higher education worldwide. Evan Schofer and John W. Meyer, 'The Worldwide Expansion of Higher Education in the Twentieth Century', *American Sociological Review* 70 (2005), pp. 897-9.

[513] IIIC, *Handbook of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations* (Paris, 1929).

[514] Brochure of the Geneva School of International Studies, 1927, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 87/1–21.

[515] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939* (London, 1957), see chap. five: 'The Great War: The Triumph of E. D. Morel'; Harry Hanak, 'The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War', *Historical Research* 36:94 (1963); Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (Oxford, 1971); Sally Harris, *Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic Control, 1914-1918* (Hull, 1996).

[516] Hans Simons and Paul Marc, 'Vorwort', in Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, *Diplomatie* (Berlin, 1927).

Women were particularly devoted to widen access to IR education. British politician Eleanor Rathbone, for example, wrote for "ordinary citizens" on international affairs.[520] Despite the well-known obstacles, women gained access to IR education, both as students and teachers. During the late 1920s, there were up to 80 women taking Zimmern's Geneva School courses.[521] In 1930, LSE's IR department listed anthropologist Lucy Mair as one of its lecturers alongside S. H. Bailey and C. A. W. Manning.[522] Mair's principle work in the field of IR was on national minorities and the League. Her 1928 book *The Protection of Minorities*, bearing a foreword by Gilbert Murray, provided an exhaustive treatment of all major cases of dispute, and showed a particular sensitivity to the rights of stateless people, thus emphasising a human aspect of IR.[523] Other female researchers included Agnes Headlam-Morley, tutor in history and politics at St Hugh's College, Oxford, and Margery Perham, a specialist in colonial administration and first female professor at Nuffield College, Oxford.[524] On occasion, women entered male-dominated venues. In 1930, for example, French feminist journalist Louise Weiss gave a talk at the Royal Institute of International Affairs introducing her journal *L'Europe Nouvelle* which was an important vehicle for liberal international political thought in France.[525] The writer and political activist Violet Paget, better known under her pen name Vernon Lee, actually made a case against "women acting as a separate political unit."[526]

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[517] The British League of Nations Union published several hundred *Pamphlets* during the 1920s and 30s. See Helen McCarthy, *The British people and the League of Nations: Democracy, citizenship and internationalism, c.1918–45* (Manchester, 2011).

[518] Steven D. Korenblat, 'A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule Für Politik, 1920-1933', *Central European History* 39:3 (2006), p. 394.

[519] Reports of Boards of Studies in History and Economics, 6 February 1924, Box 252: 134/8/A,B, LSE Archives.

[520] Eleanor Rathbone, *War Can Be Averted: the Achievability of Collective Security* (London, 1938).

[521] Student list, 1927, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 95.

[522] Memo "Study of International Relations in the University of London", 1930, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[523] Lucy Mair, *The Protection of Minorities: the Working and Scope of the Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations* (London, 1928), p. 221.

[524] SHG/S/2/2/11, Agnes Headlam-Morley Papers; Patricia Pugh, *A Catalogue of the Papers of Dame Margery Perham 1895-1982* (Oxford, 1989).

Indeed, the argument for education in IR was not limited by gender or region. Colleagues from the US and elsewhere echoed the call to instruct young people in problems of international relations, arguing that "international understanding is a proper concern and responsibility of all citizens" which could only be achieved by teaching it at universities and schools.[527] In Germany, Otto Hoetzsch promoted the teaching of a "sense of foreign policy [*außenpolitischer Sinn*]".[528] In France, the IHEI intended to spread the knowledge of international law and prepare students for careers in diplomacy.[529] In Austria, the Konsularakademie claimed to offer "universal education [*universale Bildung*]".[530] And in 1927, the first university institution devoted entirely to the study of IR was founded in Geneva—the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

The concurrent creation of these schools was not a coincidence. Political education and training for diplomatic services were the *raison d'être* for early IR scholarship. Contrary to what has commonly been assumed, the goal for IR scholars was not primarily to collect empirical findings or to come up with theories about the world, but to develop approaches for changing it and to prepare students for an active role in diplomacy. To be sure, many works rested on facts, but their value did not arise from the discovery of facts alone. They provided partisan interpretations of current affairs based on the ambition to master international relations in practice. For this purpose, both the German DHfP and the French IHEI offered special courses for members of the respective foreign offices.[531] Rather than withdrawing into remote study, IR specialists constantly interacted with the world they researched—similar to the self-referential dynamics at the IIIC. Education, research, and advocacy merged into an obscure blend devoid of any scientific standards. This was not an accident. Zimmern, for example, saw the League of Nations as an instrument of cooperation, as a forum for discussion and a source of influence.[532] As a side-effect of these activities, the study of IR gained in popularity at universities, in the media and the general public.

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[525] Louise Weiss, 'L'Europe Nouvelle', *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 9:3 (1930), p. 384.

[526] Violet Paget to Gilbert Murray, 5 June 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 217.

[527] Memo by Dr Zock (American Council on Education), 'The Teaching of International Understanding through the Schools', 13 July 1937, Folder 1, Box 34, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Centre Européen Records.

[528] Otto Hoetzsch, *Die weltpolitische Kräfteverteilung nach den Pariser Friedensschlüssen* (Berlin, 1925), p. 36.

[529] Statutes, 1921[?], Boîte 1, Archives Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales (IHEI).

[530] Erich Halpern, 'Ein Völkerbund im Kleinen', *Fremden-Presse: Wochenblatt für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur,* 9 April 1932, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 42-15.

[531] Hans Freytag to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 8 November 1919, MA Nachl., 2,26,159; and Statutes, 1921[?], Boîte 1, Archives Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales (IHEI).

There were several factors that favoured this development. One important prerequisite related to the first of Woodrow Wilson's Forteen Points—"open covenants of peace, openly arrived at".[533] It promised to shift the conduct of foreign policy into the public sphere where scholars and journalists could investigate and comment. This was something novel, Zimmern argued. While there were conferences before the war, they were held infrequently and the public did not follow them very closely.[534] The gradual opening up of government officialdom correlated with an unprecedented level of political enlightenment, "an awakening […] of the self-consciousness of the masses due to popular education", as Kessler put it.[535] Another author noted: "most of the world's keenest minds are constantly watching, and many of its most active pens are, from day to day, describing the flow of current events."[536] Although the ideals of open diplomacy had by no means been achieved, the prospect of more transparency in foreign policy certainly encouraged people to take an interest in IR.

The push for open diplomacy also motivated a new genre of writing. Toynbee's *Surveys of International Affairs*, annual editions of up to three volumes, reflected in their extent and detail how much better informed observers of foreign policy were in the mid-1920s compared to pre-war times. Drawing on official documents and reports, Toynbee and his team of collaborators created must-reads for anyone interested in international politics. For example, the 1925 *Survey* managed to minutely recount every step in the advent of the Locarno negotiations from December 1924 to February 1925, referring even to the secret German note to Austen Chamberlain on 20 January.[537] The growing availability of primary and secondary sources allowed almost real-time study of foreign affairs. Collections of government documents, official letters, and international treaties were printed in pamphlet-style for wide distribution, supplemented by an increasing body of textbook literature.[538] Newspapers, too, devoted more space to foreign affairs and covered diplomatic conferences that were hitherto closed to the eyes of the public.[539] The study of politics even featured in high-school curricula. Germany had introduced "*Staatsbürgerkunde* [citizenry education]" as a compulsory subject, according to §148(3) of the Weimar constitution. These developments contributed to an awareness among the general public that government decisions in foreign policy did not have to be taken for granted but could be subject to popular and academic debate.

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[532] Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York, 1998), p. 65.

[533] Woodrow Wilson, 8 January, 1918, transcript available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp [accessed 17-05-2017].

[534] Address by Alfred Zimmern, meeting of the New York Branch, League of Nations Association, 24 March 1930, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 140.

[535] Harry Kessler, *Germany and Europe* (New Haven, 1923), p. 2.

[536] William Rappard, *Uniting Europe* (New Haven, 1930), p. xiii.

Another indicator for the increasing popularity of IR was the amount of high-level endorsement that the discipline received from politicians, diplomats, and other public figures. Contemporary newspaper articles announced academic conferences and summer schools.[540] Public lectures, even by little known IR scholars from abroad, such as Mendelssohn Bartholdy, were regularly announced in national newspapers.[541] In 1921, Zimmern was voted "the ideal Prime Minister" by the *London Magazine*.[542] The media and general public increasingly placed confidence in what academic experts had to say about political subjects. Their statements were deemed expert judgements and found their way into political circles. Connections between academia and politics were often fostered by public intellectuals, such as Beatrice and Sidney Webb, or political pressure groups, such as the Fabian

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[537] C. A. Macartney et. al., *Survey of International Affairs 1925* (London, 1928), p. 19.

[538] See, for instance, G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1934* (Oxford, 1934), esp. p. ix; Otto Hoetzsch and W. Betram, *Dokumente zur Weltpolitik der Nachkriegszeit* (Berlin, 1932/3).

[539] For an illustrative introduction to the world of journalism and high-politics during the inter-war period, see Emery Kelen, *Peace in Their Time* (London, 1964).

[540] See, for example, reports on Zimmern's Geneva summer schools: "A Geneva School for Peace: Students from Many Lands to Gather in Capital of the League of Nations to Hear Lectures by Eminent Scholars", *New York Times*, 21 April 1929, section 10, p. 5.

[541] See, for instance, 'Germany Wants a Treaty: Prof. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (sic!) Tells of Hope to Outlaw War', *New York Times*, 17 June 1927, page 26.

[542] See newspaper clipping, *The Times,* 19 Feb 1921, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 179.

Society.[543] In Germany, the DHfP enjoyed the support of a whole range of high-ranking state representatives even before it officially opened.[544] Recognition from the influential ranks for society allowed not only for growing awareness of the discipline as such, but also opened up professional avenues for students and researchers of IR. Above all, it reflected the view that IR did actually have something meaningful to say about international politics or, in other words, that rational, scientific enquiry could inform political debates.

Meanwhile, it is important to remember that the study of IR remained essentially an elitist project, made possible by the wealthy and influential for the next generation of decision makers. Many IR scholars descended from *haute bourgeoisie* or aristocratic families. They were educated at elitist institutions and socialised in the exclusive clubs of European capitals. When on research journeys, they travelled first class and lodged at grand locations, such as the *Hôtel Lutetia* in Paris.[545] These luxuries made IR research accessible only to an extremely limited circle of people who, in some cases, were even personally related to one another.[546]

Since the early 1920s, US philanthropists Carnegie and Rockefeller provided targeted funding, based on the decisions of their officers and trustees. They sponsored publications, individual scholars, conferences, and entire research centres according to *their* vision for the European social science landscape. Katharina Rietzler has called this a type of cultural diplomacy, a precursor to Cold War strategies.[547] Philanthropic projects allowed private American internationalists not only to enter European academic networks but to interact on one level with official European diplomats and statesmen.[548] This approach seems to have provided private Americans an *entrée* to European decision-making circles and opened a field for many more partnerships between private donors, academia and politics. As internal documents indicate, the objective of the Rockefeller Foundation was not just to advance scholarship in IR but to address "government departments in Washington and abroad."[549] In at least one case, towards the late 1930s, the Foundation even facilitated the recruitment of League officials, as the following report reveals:

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[543] See correspondence between Beatrice Webb and Alfred Zimmern, e.g. Beatrice Webb to Alfred Zimmern, 17 May 1924, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 18.

[544] Erich Nickel, *Politik und Politikwissenschaft in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, 2004), p. 80.

[545] 'Résumé des délibérations de la IXième réunion du comité exécutif', 13 February 1937, K / 73-80, IIIC Records;

[546] Consider, for example, Arnold Toynbee who married Gilbert Murray's daughter, the writer Rosalind Murray.

[547] See Katharina Rietzler, 'Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the inter-war years', *Historical Research* 84:223 (2011); Katharina Rietzler, 'Philantrophy, Peace Research, and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany', *GHI Bulletin Supplement* 5 (2008); Katharina Rietzler, 'Experts for Peace: Structures and Motives for Philanthropic Internationalism in the Interwar Years', in Daniel Laqua, *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars* (London, 2011); Katharina Rietzler, 'Of Highways, Turntables, and Mirror Mazes: Metaphors of Americanisation in the History of American Philanthropy', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 24:1 (2013).

> "a representative of the League of Nations consulted an officer of the Foundation with reference to candidates for places on the League secretariat […] he and his associates agreed that the best material for staff positions ought to be found among former fellows of the Rockefeller Foundation. He was provided with a selected list of former fellows."[550]

As a result, the demarcation lines between philanthropy, education, and official diplomacy became so blurry that it is hard in retrospect to decipher the actors' underlying motivations, let alone any consistent IR theories.

Scholars as Diplomats

Even before IR was an established university discipline its protagonists enjoyed access to high-diplomacy and were actively involved in the drafting of major international treaties. At the end of the First World War, they accompanied national delegations as government advisors or worked as diplomats and politicians in their own right. Despite considerable obstacles, female IR authors also entered the policy world—British feminist Helena Swanwick, for example, served as a delegate to the League Assembly and as *rapporteur* on refugee questions.[551] The transfer of political ideas into political practice was an essential part of the formative period of IR.

A well-known example of the involvement of academic experts was the Paris Peace Conference and the drafting of the League of Nations Covenant. During the negotiations, dozens of professors exchanged memoranda and interacted with senior decision makers. In 1918, Zimmern wrote an outline of a future "league of nations" for the British Foreign Office which Lord Cecil adopted and took to

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[548] Katharina Rietzler, 'Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the inter-war years', *Historical Research* 84:223 (2011), p. 161.

[549] Report, 14 December 1932, Folder 871, Box 96, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[550] The Rockefeller Foundation, *Confidential Monthly Report* No. 11 (March, 1938), p. 2.

[551] Helena Swanwick, *I Have Been Young* (London, 1935), pp. 383–94.

Paris as a basis for the peace negotiations.[552] Zimmern's draft had an impact even though not all of his proposals were adopted.[553] On the US side, President Wilson's group of advisors, called 'The Inquiry', gathered expertise on various international issues and boasted, among many other well-known academics, James T. Shotwell as a senior historical consultant.[554] Even the German government, although not admitted to the negotiations themselves, sent an expert delegation, one member of which was the international lawyer and founder of the Hamburg Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy. The founder of the DHfP, Ernst Jäckh, was a member of German delegations to Versailles, Genoa, Locarno and Geneva.[555]

The proximity of academia and diplomacy became a characteristic feature for inter-war IR scholarship. Having scholars draft and comment upon policy memos was not radically new but rose to unprecedented levels after the First World War. As Davide Rodogno and his colleagues have noted, experts acting as "representatives of specific nation-states" were increasingly common since the late nineteenth century.[556] But the new international order after the Great War provided opportunities for expert involvement to an unprecedented degree. Zimmern, Shotwell, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and their colleagues systematically used their access to diplomatic circles throughout the inter-war period. On numerous occasions they deviated from their role as professors. In 1924, Zimmern was involved in discussions of Lord Cecil's Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.[557] Mendelssohn Bartholdy was charged in 1925 by the German government to negotiate the interpretation of the Dawes Plan at The Hague.[558] In 1929, Mendelssohn Bartholdy was asked to do the same for the Young Plan, and in 1931 he represented Germany at the League of Nations Assembly.[559] In the preparation of the 1925 Locarno treaties, James Headlam-Morley was asked several times by Berlin ambassador Lord D'Abernon as well as Austen Chamberlain to comment upon draft versions of the multi-lateral pact.[560] DHfP co-founder Jäckh later claimed that the Austrian ambassador to Berlin had worked out a first draft of the Locarno treaties while on a research visit at the DHfP.[561]

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[552] Paul Rich, 'Alfred Zimmern's Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 84. Zimmern claimed that his draft was inspired by the Hague Conferences, British imperial politics as well as Leonard Woolf's and Karl Renner's work on international organisation. See Alfred Zimmern, *The League and the Old Diplomacy* (London, 1929), p. 200 (originally published in the *Contemporary Review,* February, 1924).

[553] Shotwell picked up on it fifteen years later, suggesting that if Zimmern's views on treaty revision had been implemented it might have been easier for the US to join the League. Shotwell to Zimmern, 7 February 1934, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box Adds. 1.

[554] Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (London, 1975), p. 10; Peter Grosse, *Continuing The Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996* (New York, 2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/inquiry.html [accessed on 03-01-2016].

[555] 'The Spirit of the New Germany', undated article, Ernst Jäckh Papers, Box 6.

[556] Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, Jakob Vogel, 'Introduction', in Rodogno et al., *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks, Issues* (New York, 2015), p. 2.

[557] Arthur Balfour et al., *The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance: Record of Discussion at a Meeting of the British Institute of International Affairs, held on February 18, 1924* (London, 1924).

In 1924, a memo written by Shotwell and a group of American experts served as the basis for negotiations on the Geneva Protocol.[562] In "amateur diplomacy" style, the group drew up a "Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security" and sent it via Arthur Sweetser at the League Secretariat to Eric Drummond. The secretary general placed it before the Council which, in turn, voted to have the proposal circulated as an official League document.[563] Shotwell's American group was supported by other scholars from abroad, including David Mitrany from Britain.[564] When it became clear that the Protocol would not come into force, Shotwell continued his activism for a general treaty through various high-level academic and political acquaintances in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. With the help of his friends Mendelssohn Bartholdy and the director of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Albert Thomas, he set up committees who were meant to stay in touch with one another in order to plan for future policy work in the field of arbitration and security.[565] These circles operated, Shotwell described, "as a research agency of the Government."[566]

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[558] Rainer Nicolaysen, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1874–1936): Jurist, Friedensforscher, Künstler', *Babels Zeitschrift* 75 (2011), p. 24.

[559] Rainer Nicolaysen, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1874–1936): Jurist, Friedensforscher, Künstler', *Babels Zeitschrift* 75 (2011), p. 24.

[560] Angela Kaiser, *Lord D'Abernon und die englische Deutschlandpolitik, 1920-1926* (Frankfurt, a. M., 1989), p. 335; and Sibyl Eyre Crowe, 'Sir Eyre Crowe and the Locarno Pact', *The English Historical Review* 87:342 (1972), pp. 55-6.

[561] Ernst Jäckh, address delivered on 1 June 1933 at ISC meeting in London, Folder 3, Box 317, IIIC Records.

[562] Among the co-authors were General Tasker H. Bliss, Joseph P. Chamberlain, and David Hunter Miller. James T. Shotwell et al., 'Text of the Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security', *Foreign Policy Association Pamphlet* No. 28 (New York, 1924). See Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (London, 1975), p. 121-8.

[563] James T. Shotwell, *Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), pp. 181-3.

[564] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. v.

In the spring of 1927, Shotwell launched an attempt at building what he called a "world Locarno", an all-encompassing treaty that renounced war as an instrument of politics. Having assumed the Berlin Carnegie Chair of International Relations in February 1927, he found himself among leading parliamentarians, journalists, and professors in Germany. Among many others, Shotwell was proud to report, he also met Chancellor Wilhelm Marx and President Paul von Hindenburg. More significant, however, was his inaugural lecture at the DHfP on 1 March 1927 which dealt with the futility of war in an interconnected world with modern weapons and complex power relationships.[567] In such a world war had to be outlawed altogether. What was needed, he argued, were new measures to identify aggressors and protect neutrals—in other words, the type of guaranties that a global security treaty entailed. If his analysis was correct, Shotwell majestically concluded, "we are at the greatest turning point in human history."[568] The lecture provoked a sympathetic response among the high-profile audience and the international press, encouraging Shotwell to deliver the same talk again the following week in Cologne and to bring the topic up in Geneva where he came together with foreign minister Gustav Stresemann.

Shotwell planned to spread his idea of a global pact outlawing war among senior European decision makers. Travelling on to Paris, he arranged for a meeting with Aristide Briand via his friend, Albert Thomas, which he was granted on 22 March.[569] In their conversation, according to Shotwell, Briand immediately understood Shotwell's plan and asked him to draw up a memorandum that the foreign minister could use as the basis of a public statement.[570] Shotwell agreed and suggested for

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[565] The German committee consisted of Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Wilhelm Cuno, Walter Simons, Konrad Adenauer, Carl Wilhelm Petersen, Theodor Niemeyer, and Otto Hoetzsch, while on the French there were Arthur Fontaine, Albert Thomas, Paul Boncour, Charles Rist, Henri Chardon, Henri Lichtenberger, Léon Jouhaux, and René Massigli. James T. Shotwell, *Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), p. 197.

[566] James T. Shotwell, *Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), p. 198.

[567] Robert H. Ferrell, *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact* (New York, 1952), p. 67.

[568] James T. Shotwell, *Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), p. 203 (quoted from the original manuscript).

[569] Patrick O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1931* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 451-2.

[570] Eva Buchheit, *Der Briand-Kellogg-Pakt von 1928 – Machtpolitik oder Friedensstreben?* (Münster, 1998), pp. 28-9.

Briand to publish it on the occasion of the upcoming tenth anniversary of the US entry into the First World War.[571] A few days later, on 6 April, Briand indeed sent out a message to the American people, containing almost verbatim quotes from Shotwell's memo. Crucially, it suggested that "France would be willing to enter into an engagement with America mutually outlawing war."[572] When Briand's message threatened to go unnoticed, Shotwell intervened again, now back in New York, with the editor of the *New York Times*, John Finley, who agreed that the French overture should be picked up by a powerful voice in the US. Nicholas Murray Butler was easily won for this purpose and it was only after his letter to the editor appeared on 25 April that the general discussion took off on what would become the Kellogg-Briand Pact.[573]

By cleverly using his academic and political contacts, Shotwell initiated a public debate that led to a major international treaty—the title of which misleadingly emphasises Kellogg's name, and which earned Kellogg a Nobel Peace Prize. While Shotwell's personal impact on the final result was small, his campaign did make an impression in foreign policy circles and earned him Kellogg's personal gratitude.[574] More importantly, his intervention underscored his role as an "intellectual who aspired to make policy."[575] By the late 1920s, the self-concept of an IR scholar was to be an "activist-intellectual", to engage in teaching and academic scholarship, but also to become involved in popular movements and exercise political influence.[576] This attitude ran counter to what was traditionally expected of university professors. By interfering in the object of their research, IR scholars undermined their claim to scientific objectivity. As unelected experts, they also contradicted their own ambition to make foreign policy more democratically accountable.

While these interferences are not altogether surprising, they do reveal something about the quality of IR scholarship during that time. In some cases, the problematic nature of transgressing professional boundaries was recognised by contemporaries themselves. For example, the Italian diplomat-politician Carlo Sforza, when addressing an academic audience in 1928, confessed that to speak about politics from the perspective of his own professional background "here in this highly intellectual atmosphere" would be "more than indiscrete, almost disrespectful to you."[577] Zimmern, too, reflected upon the role of the scholar in public affairs, but he concluded that it was almost a duty to leave the ivory tower and engage with political affairs. Politics, he argued, could not be studied "from behind Common Room curtains".[578] It was the responsibility of scholars as "patriots" to apply their intellectual powers in practice. On another occasion, he described the role of IR scholars at Geneva as "representatives of [their] countries."[579] Belgian lawyer Maurice Bourquin, who taught at the Geneva Graduate Institute in the early 1930s, suggested that universities should deliberately exploit their connections to the "*réalité vivante* [lived reality]", and argued that professors with practical experience in diplomacy would be better equipped for the study of IR.[580] The international lawyer Fritz Berber, who became a controversial IR spokesperson for Germany in the 1930s, was remembered in a 1973 *Festschrift* as a "teacher, researcher, and practitioner".[581] These examples show that, far from being limited to objective theoretical enquiry, IR experts were actively involved in contemporary debates and sought to exercise an influence on foreign policy in the style of public intellectuals or unofficial diplomats.

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[571] Robert H. Ferrell, *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact* (New York, 1952), p. 72.

[572] 'Briand Sends Message to America On Anniversary of Entering the War', *New York Times*, 6 April 1927, p. 5.

[573] Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (London, 1975), pp. 158-61; James T. Shotwell, *Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), pp. 204-13; James T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy and its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris* (London, 1929), pp. 39-42.

[574] James T. Shotwell, *Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), pp. 218-9.

[575] Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (London, 1975), p. 159.

[576] Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (London, 1975), p. 9.

Building the International Studies Conference

In 1927, a group of IR specialists established the field's first academic conference. Initially intended as a small academic gathering on university-related questions, the International Studies Conference (ISC) turned into the most important annual meeting for professors, diplomats, politicians, philanthropists, and journalists who engaged in some way with the study of IR.[582] The ISC became a venue for substantial debate on pressing issues of the inter-war period—disarmament, economic cooperation, collective security, and peaceful change—essentially creating a sphere of quasi-diplomatic negotiation parallel to and connected with official decision-making bodies. In doing so, the ISC combined the major driving forces behind early IR scholarship: a commitment to education, transnational collaboration and political interference.

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[577] Carlo Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles* (New Haven, 1928), p. 1.

[578] See Alfred Zimmern, *The Scholar in Public Affairs* (London, 1929), pp. 4, 14.

[579] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Development of the International Mind', Geneva Institute of International Relations (ed.), *The Problems of Peace* (1927), p. 2.

[580] Memo by Maurice Bourquin, entitled "Suggestions relatives aux travaux de recherches que l'Institut pourrait entreprendre dans le domaine des relations internationales [Suggestions concerning potential research projects for the Institute in the field of IR]", 24 February 1938, HEI 149/4–5, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[581] Dieter Blumenwitz and Albrecht Randelzhofer (eds.), *Festschrift für Friedrich Berber zum 75. Geburtstag* (Munich, 1973), p. 5.

The plan for the ISC arose at the intersection of academics, technocrats, and politicians. Alfred Zimmern, then deputy director of the IIIC, circulated the idea among his academic colleagues.[583] Julien Luchaire, director of the IIIC, and Oskar Halecki, head of the university relations section at the IIIC, cared for the logistics and secretarial support.[584] German scholars Ernst Jäckh and Otto Hoetzsch offered to host the first meeting at the DHfP in Berlin, while carefully planning for leading politicians to be present.[585] Jäckh attached "highest value to close contact with relevant figures at the Foreign Office".[586] Albert Dufour von Féronce, a senior German diplomat and under-secretary at the League of Nations, believed the ISC to be "extraordinarily interesting."[587] Gustav Stresemann, despite being unable to attend himself, gave permission to address the ISC on his behalf.[588] The press reported about the ISC as a movement that "captured the spirit of the time."[589] This astonishing level of public interest in the proceedings of a small academic meeting, organised under the auspices of the League of Nations, foreshadowed the potential of the ISC to contribute to foreign policy debate over the next decade.

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[582] The conference was originally called 'Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations', but changed its name in 1933. The French title was 'Conférence Permanente des Hautes Études Internationales'. It is hereafter referred to as ISC. See report submitted by Alfred Zimmern, 11 July 1928, Dossier 5B.6178.2423, Box R2224, League of Nations Archives. See also David Long, 'Who killed the International Studies Conference?', *Review of International Studies* 32:4 (2006); and Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011).

[583] League of Nations, 'The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation', in *Brochures de Propagande, 1926–1927* (Paris, 1926), p. 14.

[584] Otto Hoetzch to Julien Luchaire, 5 December 1927, GStA PK, I. HA. Rep. 303, Nr. 2116.

[585] The date for the Berlin ISC meeting was postponed because Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and key members of the Foreign Office were scheduled to be in Geneva for a summit until 15 March 1928. See Minutes of a meeting at the DHP, 26 January 1928, PA AA, RZ507, R64152.

[586] Members of the Foreign Office were henceforth invited to preparatory meetings for the ISC. See Deutsche Hochschule für Politik to Freytag, 23 November 1927, PA AA, RZ507, R64152; and Jäckh to Freytag, 6 January 1928, PA AA, RZ507, R64152.

[587] Albert Dufour to Hans Freytag, 21 January 1928, PA AA, RZ507, R64152.

[588] Memorandum by Hans Freytag, 20 March 1928, PA AA, RZ507, R64152.

[589] 'Internationale geistige Zusammenarbeit', *Berliner Tageblatt*, 23 March 1928 (Morgen-Ausgabe), p. 3.

Formally speaking, the ISC was the product of the League of Nations' bodies for intellectual cooperation—the Geneva-based ICIC and the IIIC in Paris. On 26 July 1927, the ICIC accepted a plan for the ISC, which had been drawn up by Zimmern, and passed a resolution approving "the co-ordination of international studies in the various countries", and granting the IIIC permission to "convene a Committee of Experts in the course of the year."[590] This allowed the IIIC to establish a basic framework. The main organ of the ISC were annual plenary sessions (later divided into administrative and study meetings) which were held in rotation at different places around Europe.[591] Each year, an executive committee was elected to ensure a certain continuity between the annual conferences and to keep in touch with the IIIC in Paris. Meanwhile, the IIIC provided a secretariat based in Paris which cared for logistics, edited and published ISC proceedings, and provided some funding.[592] Membership of the ISC was confined to scientific institutions concerned with the study of IR. Wherever possible, the ISC encouraged individual scholars to form so called "national coordinating committees" to bundle all institutions from one country and send joint delegations to ISC sessions.[593] Despite these organisational guidelines, the ISC allowed many exceptions and it was basically up to the executive committee to invite individuals who would otherwise have been prevented to participate—from 1933 this was particularly relevant for German delegates.

On 22 March 1928 then, at around 11am, Jäckh opened the inaugural ISC meeting in Berlin in the presence of Prussian minister for culture, Carl Heinrich Becker.[594] Among the participants were scholars from Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, members of the Royal Institute of

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[590] Alfred Zimmern, *Learning and Leadership: A Study of the Needs and Possibilities of International Intellectual Co-operation* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 64-65; and Report of the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, 20-26 July 1927, Dossier 2423, Box R2224, League of Nations Archives.

[591] 1928: Berlin, 1929: London, 1930: Paris, 1931: Copenhagen, 1932: Milan, 1933: London, 1934: Paris, 1935: London, 1936: Madrid, 1937: Paris, 1938: Prague, 1939: Bergen, Norway.

[592] IIIC, *The International Studies Conference: Origins, Functions, Organisation* (Paris, 1937), pp. 21-9.

[593] IIIC, *The International Studies Conference: Origins, Functions, Organisation* (Paris, 1937), pp. 30-1.

[594] Minutes of DHfP meeting, 17 March 1928, PA AA, RZ507, R64152.

International Affairs (London), the Institute of Politics (Williamstown, MA), and the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), as well as representatives of the Academy of International Law (The Hague) and the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Paris).[595] Besides Zimmern, the most prominent participants were French historians Louis Eisenmann and Paul Mantoux as well as British IR specialist Arnold Toynbee. The delegates spent the first day introducing each other and presenting their various IR research institutions, followed by a banquet the same evening. The next two days were devoted to detailed technical discussions which resulted in a number of suggestions for future cooperation: equivalence of degrees and diplomas, exchange of teaching staff and students, establishment of reference centres, sharing of surplus books, and collaboration in research projects.[596] The official conference report concluded that there was "a very real corporate consciousness among its members."[597] In other words, the ISC confirmed the status of IR as a widely accepted academic discipline.

During the first three years, the ISC focused on technical cooperation and largely refrained from substantial debate. Promoting IR as a university discipline was the primary goal. The British delegation offered to host the 1929 edition in London, and national committees from Poland and Czechoslovakia joined the ISC.[598] Among the first projects was the compilation of a list of universities and reference centres relevant for the study of IR.[599] Another project, which seemed equally obvious and simple at first, was an internationally co-authored handbook of political terms. "Misunderstandings and disappointments between nations", so the idea behind it, "occur when they use the same terms and mean different things."[600] It was thus suggested to draw up a trilingual dictionary in English, French, and German compiling the most common terms of political practice, selected and evaluated by a committee of three representatives from each country. Among the proposed terms were words such as "*Recht, Moral, Freiheit, Satzung*" [law, morality, freedom, statutes]".[601] The Carnegie Endowment generously offered 30,000 francs towards the handbook.[602] The project, however admirable its underlying idea, proved to be an almost complete failure. It dragged on for years and never reached the publication stage.[603] Even a relatively basic collaborative exercise, agreeing on a common terminology, turned out to be controversial and impractical.

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[595] Minutes of the tenth session of the ICIC, 25–20 July 1928, Annex 6, p. 83, Dossier 5B.6178.2423, Box R2224, League of Nations Archives.

[596] Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011), p. 917.

[597] Report, "Second Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations", 7 June 1929, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[598] Report by M. de Halecki, Minutes of the tenth session of the ICIC, 25–20 July 1928, Annex 6, p. 71–2, Dossier 5B. 6178.2423, Box R2224, League of Nations Archives.

[599] IIIC, *Handbook of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations* (Paris, 1929).

[600] Wilhelm Haas, 'Memorandum Concerning a Comparative Handbook of Political and Politico-Philosophical Terms', 20 February 1929, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

Disciplinary historians have only recently taken notice of the ISC as a space of inter-war IR debates. As one of the first, David Long has explained the ISC's demise and its implications for post-1945 IR associations, arguing that the conference became outdated in style and scholarly standards.[604] Michael Riemens, on the other hand, has largely concentrated on the making of collaborative IR during the 1920s and 30s at a range of international institutions that used the ISC as a common platform of exchange.[605] This setting and the institutional dynamics of intellectual cooperation, Riemens has claimed, had an important impact on the theoretical development of IR, although he remains less clear on the actual substance of this impact. Katharina Rietzler has shown how US philanthropists, by gaining access to European diplomatic discourses, shaped the history of inter-war IR scholarship.[606] However, historians still struggle to make sense of the ISC as a hybrid platform between research and practice. Why did academics, diplomats, and philanthropists invest so much in a conference that hardly produced tangible results for any of these audience groups? Surely, the ISC did not bring about a breakthrough in IR theory. It was more than a "seed-bed" of new ideas.[607] It was precisely the blurring of professional categories that made the ISC so attractive. In this sense, it reflected the core characteristic of early IR scholarship: a certain desire for public attention, political influence, a commitment to education, transnational cooperation, and a very limited interest for theory.

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[601] Wilhelm Haas to Werner Picht, 16 April 1931, K.I.1d, IIIC Records..

[602] Earle B. Babcock to Werner Picht, 24 June 1931, K.V.1-5, IIIC Records.

[603] Four years later, the committee under the direction of Wilhelm Haas, who was director of studies at DHfP, still had not decided on a list of terms. See Summary of the Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting of the Executive Committee, 28–29 January 1933, Dossier 2381, Box R4006, League of Nations Archives.

[604] David Long, 'Who Killed the International Studies Conference?', *Review of International Studies* 32:4 (2006), p. 618.

[605] Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011), p. 912.

[606] Katharina Rietzler, 'Before the Cultural Cold Wars: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the inter-war years', *Historical Research* 84:223 (2011), pp. 162-3.

Rather than by grand works of theory, IR experts who met at the ISC built a reputation as narrators, teachers, and advisors of foreign policy. According to the founding fathers and mothers of the discipline, the primary objective was to alleviate the staggering lack of knowledge about international politics, not of theoretical interpretation. In the same sense, the ISC understood itself primarily as a body of technical cooperation for education and research, making resources—libraries, government documents, current affairs commentary, educational material, etc.—available to a larger community. In the second stage, it became a platform for substantial political debate and real-world influence. The ISC agenda was quite openly directed at "relations between universities and extra-university institutions."[608] It never made any claim to host profound theoretical debates, let alone any showdowns between 'idealists' and 'realists'. The word 'theory' was almost entirely absent from ISC proceedings. In a rare case of theorising, Zimmern felt he had to justify it by arguing that "[t]heory is not an escape from reality, but an attempt to interpret reality."[609] Rather than to host theoretical debates, the goal of the ISC was to establish links, to gather expertise, and to exchange opinions on specific questions. This might explain why historians of IR have been so unsuccessful in identifying and agreeing on prevalent theoretical schools.

Although the ISC did not produce any academic scholarship, strictly speaking, its participants were anxious to stress their impartiality. Being independent and non-partisan had been an important label for many early IR institutions.[610] "To promote the objective and dispassionate study of International politics" was among the core beliefs of IR scholars, precisely because it was so easy to drift into partisan propaganda.[611] In Zimmern's view, for example, the study of IR had to be "lifted from the sphere of propaganda"[612]—failing to acknowledge how ambiguous that term was. The ISC, as an international congress, was thus regarded as the ultimate guarantor of trustworthiness.[613] This was a delicate claim, given the participation of non-academic actors at the ISC.

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[607] F. S. Northedge, *International Intellectual Co-operation within the League of Nations: Its conceptual basis and lessons for the present* (London, LSE, Ph.D. thesis, 1953), p. 652.

[608] Agenda for London ISC meeting, 11-14 March 1929, Dossier 2072, Box R222, League of Nations Archives.

[609] Lecture Notes by Alfred Zimmern, 1932, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 141.

[610] Pamphlet on the founding of DHfP, undated 1921[?], p. 8, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 303 (neu), Nr. 1.

Despite the ISC's claims to impartiality, non-academic and partisan actors started to interfere with the conference on a regular basis from its first meeting in 1928. At the London meeting, one year later, the British government sponsored a dinner attended among others by Lord Eustace Percy, then President of the Board of Education. In his address to the delegates, Percy affirmed that the government was "greatly interested in the progress and success" of the ISC, arguing that their studies were very instrumental in narrowing the gap between opposing diplomatic positions.[614] In response to Percy, Jäckh spoke on behalf of the ISC delegates and confirmed that their ambition was to replace old balance-of-power thinking by "a new system based on scientific research."[615] Clearly, the goals of the ISC went beyond the academic realm and technical cooperation. This was a platform for intellectual-political activists who strove to change the world, not to interpret it. For the same reasons of influence and publicity, the ISC offered press tickets to all major newspapers and later even appointed a press officer to deal with inquiries.[616] The Carnegie Endowment offered a luncheon in London for all participants in 1929.[617] In similar fashion the French government kept an eye on ISC proceedings, generously inviting all ISC delegates for lunch during the 1930 plenary session in Paris.[618] This is remarkable because the agenda in Paris was still largely filled with technical items and academic projects which would hardly catch the interest of politicians.

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[611] Memo by Alfred Zimmern, October 1924 to April 1925, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 88.

[612] Alfred Zimmern, 'The relations between peoples at the present time', inaugural lecture at Oxford, 1930, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 140.

[613] IIIC, *The International Studies Conference: Origins, Functions, Organisation* (Paris, 1937), pp. 11-3.

[614] Newspaper cutting, *The Times*, 12 March 1929, Folder 3, Box 28, CEIP Records.

[615] Newspaper cutting, *The Times*, 12 March 1929, Folder 3, Box 28, CEIP Records.

[616] Memorandum, 30 March 1933, Folder 2, S. H. Bailey Papers.

[617] Programme of Conference, Folder 3, Box 28, CEIDP Records.

[618] Julien Luchaire to Arnold Toynbee, 3 June 1930, Folder 1, Box 283, IIIC Records.

Evidently, the ISC served more as a platform to public intellectuals and policy makers than to strictly scientific researchers. Within less than two years, the conference was transformed from a small, seemingly academic gathering into a quasi-diplomatic summit. Despite these practical ambitions, recent political science scholarship on the history of inter-war IR has looked for "theoretical insights".[619] The implicit assumption in this literature has been that there was an inter-war theory and that it can be found by re-reading the discipline's early works. It has taken for granted the self-proclaimed status of IR as "a branch of scientific enquiry."[620] While there is merit in reinterpreting early IR discourses, this approach has underestimated practical political aspirations as an impulse for the study of IR, or indeed other social sciences.[621] Prior to the mid-1930s there was very little theoretical work by those who have traditionally been identified as the founders of IR. It is telling that even a professor of political *theory*, such as Arthur Salter, was recruited from the ranks of practitioners—his background at the League of Nations was reflected well in his contributions to IR debates.[622]

At times, IR scholars justified their role as public intellectuals and policy advisors. "Too often", Salter lamented, scientists withdrew "to a closed world of theory, like an anchorite to his cell, sometimes inclined even to think that his professional integrity is violated by any close contact with practical affairs."[623] The ideal role of a professor of IR during the 1920s and 30s was that of a public intellectual, someone who could not only teach international affairs to a wide audience but also draw up strategies, policy memos, and draft treaties. At the same time, professional diplomats demanded help from academics, creating a relationship of mutual respect and influence. It was well-known, argued Toynbee in 1931, that successful diplomatic conferences required expert preparation. He was convinced "that unofficial preparation of the kind which non-governmental bodies like our Institutes can provide" was crucial to high-politics.[624] Toynbee's ambitious program envisaged for participants of the

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[619] Brian C. Schmidt, 'Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998), p. 433.

[620] Report of Berlin ISC meeting, 22-24 March 1928, Dossier 2071, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[621] Duncan Bell, 'Writing the world: disciplinary history and beyond', *International Affairs* 85:1 (2009), p. 4.

[622] Arthur Salter in Arnold J. Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War? The Next Stage in the International Crisis', *International Affairs* 19:1 (1936), p. 51.

[623] Arthur Salter et al., *The World's Economic Crisis and the Way of Escape* (London, 1932), p. 18.

[624] Arnold J. Toynbee to Henri Bonnet, 18 March 1931, K.I.1b, IIIC Records.

ISC to take a stance on political questions and essentially act as government advisors. Inviting "national representatives" to academic conferences was not limited to the ISC. The same practice was employed at the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) during the late 1920s, a similar platform though restricted to the Pacific area.[625]

There is also no evidence that theory featured prominently in early IR teaching. According to Philip Noel-Baker's personal notes, his lectures at LSE covered history, contemporary institutions, psychology, and even sports as an element of international society, but made almost no reference to major works of theory.[626] As one of the earliest IR professors, Noel-Baker had no blue-print for syllabi or bibliographies, but he made no effort to impose theoretical texts, neither classical nor modern, on his students. Instead, he often referenced his practical experiences at the League of Nations and did not hide his own political stance, which was obvious from his Labour candidacy for the House of Commons in 1924.[627] Referring to practical diplomatic experience was by no means an exception. IR departments in Paris, Berlin, and Geneva were equally staffed with former diplomats and politicians. Lecturers, such as the German diplomat-politician Kurt Riezler, drew on their experience in the foreign office and taught on practical questions. Riezler was skeptical whether theoretical analysis of "power equations, formula, and causal relationships" was even possible.[628] Publications, too, reflected the orientation towards policy and were often intended as "aides to statesmen" rather than comprehensive treatises.[629]

Debates on the State and Economic Life

After the 1930 plenary session in Paris, the ISC shifted its focus from academic technicalities to actual problems of international relations. In doing so, it adopted the conference style that had been practiced by the Institute for Pacific Relations (IPR) since 1925. Its research secretary, the New Zealand economist and consultant for the League's Economic and Financial Organisation J. B. Condliffe, presented a report on the IPR's style of work, suggesting that the ISC, too, should discuss specific topics in IR "which are of greatest importance at the time of the meeting."[630] The idea was to use the ISC as a platform for diplomatic debate on current affairs, a forum that would allow for the exchange of national opinions without governmental commitments.[631] Condliffe's suggestion was at once warmly welcomed. The Paris secretariat agreed that the ISC had unexploited opportunities and encouraged Sir William Beveridge, then chairman of the ISC executive committee, to put the study of specific problems of international affairs on the agenda for 1931.[632] Even without Condliffe's report, however, it was obvious that majority of ISC delegates already engaged in questions of immediate political concern, and it was only a matter of time until political debates would replace academic matters as the ISC's principle purpose.

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[625] The Rockefeller Foundation, *The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report for 1929* (New York, 1929), p. 251.

[626] Lecture notes on International Relations, 1927-8 and 1928-9, NBKR 8/ 12/3, Philip Noel-Baker Papers.

[627] Philip Noel–Baker to Academic Registrar, 23 April 1924, NBKR 8/8/1, Philip Noel-Baker Papers.

[628] Kurt Riezler (as J. J. Ruedorffer), *Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart* (Berlin, 1915), p. x.

[629] Eduard Fueter, 'Review of Survey of International Affairs 1920-23 and 1923', *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte* vii:2 (1925).

By 1931, a suitable subject had been selected. In light of the Great Depression and the amount of global suffering caused by unemployment, financial instability and the collapse of trade, it seemed obvious that IR had to find answers to economic questions of international affairs. The executive committee consequently chose "The State and Economic Life" as the first theme for the biennial study cycle 1932-3, the new format now adopted by the ISC.[633] Given the educational background of ISC participants, the subject choice itself was problematic. Some were trained economists, whereas many had at best practical experience. Since the discussions required detailed technical knowledge, however, economic vocabulary was imported into IR and mixed with political terminology. Coupled with input from historians, international lawyers, and geographers, their approach resulted in methodological disarray. Notwithstanding their wide interests on unknown territory, however, they vigorously denied to be dilettantes.[634]

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[630] Report submitted by J. B. Condliffe, 12 June 1930, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[631] "Unlike official diplomats conferences those of the Institute are not burdened and restricted by fear of committing their governments and peoples", Report submitted by J. B. Condliffe, p. 14, 12 June 1930, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[632] Werner Picht to Sir William Beveridge, 12 December 1930, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[633] ICIC memorandum, 24 July 1931, Dossier 2072, Box R2222, League of Nations Archives.

[634] See reflections by Alfred Zimmern, *Internationale Politik als Wissenschaft* (Berlin, 1933), p. 3.

The first study session, intended as a preparatory meeting for the following year, was held from 23 to 27 May 1932 in Milan, co-hosted by the IIIC and Alfredo Rocco, Italian Minister of Justice and a member of the Geneva ICIC.[635] Discussions started from the basic assumption that an increasingly interconnected world economy needed appropriate forms of political organisation. As governments were simultaneously driven by economic and political constraints, the opening speaker Moritz Julius Bonn lamented, their decisions were seldom determined by economic sense but more often by protectionist nationalism or monopoly power.[636] So which level of state intervention was right? Which tariff system would guarantee the highest benefits to all trading partners without risking antagonism from the excluded? The fundamental problem, as Bonn summed up, was "where to draw the limits of intervention."[637] These questions were all the more relevant as protectionism was creeping up after a period of relative openness during the 1920s. Particularly those countries that remained on the gold standard, such as Britain, hence unable to depreciate their currencies, resorted to tariff walls and thereby fuelled the upward spiral of protectionism.[638] This development ran counter, of course, to the promise of free and equal trade in Wilson's Fourteen Points.[639] A lively, at times heated debate ensued over the course of four days in Milan, giving voice to both free traders and those in favour of a planned, more restrictive system.

The first part of the discussions dealt with the origins of the economic crisis. Two Italian economists, the neoclassicist Luigi Amoroso and the ex-minister of finance Alberto De Stefani, launched an attack against liberal economic systems, the "automatic powers" of which "having failed" to make necessary adjustments in the crisis.[640] Italy's corporative system prompted considerable skepticism, as did Russian planning. But some, such as German economist Herbert von Beckerath, agreed that there was a need for government control, if possible at an international level.[641] This led to a second discussion on a more general supranational institution to supersede the fragmented and complex system of trade, still dominated by bilateral agreements and the 'most favoured nation' clause. Most representatives, with the notable exception of the British, agreed that a reduction in tariffs would go hand in hand with international cooperation and disarmament. Internationalism thus found its way into economic policy, and the Romanian economist-politician Virgil Madgearu even spoke of a "European Customs Union."[642] More international cooperation would also allow representatives of national economic councils to regularly meet and reconcile diverging approaches. Zimmern bluntly suggested to have "the representatives of the Fascist Council meet the representatives of the Manchester School Council."[643]

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[635] Cable by Alfredo Rocco to IIIC, 29 February 1932, K.I.1d, IIIC Records.

[636] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), pp. 10-2.

[637] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), p. 109.

[638] Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin, 'The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?', *The Journal of Economic History* 70:4 (2010), p. 873.

[639] "The increasing burden of Tariffs is a serious factor in creating unsatisfactory international relations." E. Horscroft to Eric Drummond, 11 March 1931, Dossier 11078, Box R2182, League of Nations Archives.

[640] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), pp. 31-8.

As significant as the substance of their debates was the way in which the various positions were presented at Milan. On the one hand, participants insisted that the conference should not pass resolutions or take any votes.[644] On the other hand, they were anxious about reactions in the press and sought to have an influence beyond the conference room. To this end, the Italian hosts took every opportunity at taking the lead and dominating the agenda with lengthy memos. They presented corporatism like spokespeople of the Italian government. According to the preface of the conference volume, the ISC's goal at Milan was to "influence others, whose proper function it is to take international action", yet based on "the results of this objective and disinterested work of research."[645] In other words, the ISC regarded itself as an objective authority on questions of economics and IR, and intended for its proceedings to inform decision makers. Once again scholars transcended the boundaries of politics and vice-versa. Another example was Labour economist Hugh Dalton, who found it difficult in the debates to refrain from recalling his time in government as under-secretary of state for foreign affairs.[646] Increasingly, ISC participants regarded themselves as national delegates in an international conference setting. For others, identity became more nuanced. Zimmern thought of himself as "both a national man and an international body at the same time."[647]

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[641] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), p. 51.

[642] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), p.85.

[643] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), p. 91.

[644] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), p. 98.

[645] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), pp. xxii–xxiii.

[646] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), pp. 19-20.

One year later, from 29 May to 2 June 1933, the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the LSE welcomed some 50 experts in London for the second study session on "The State and Economic Life". The focus of this meeting was on past experiences with various trade regimes—imperial preference, the 'open door' policy, and the 'most favoured nation' clause—as well as on opportunities for reform. For this exercise, economists joined the lawyers, historians, and political scientists at the ISC in a combined interdisciplinary endeavour, although their methodology and theory remained largely obscure. Economics was mostly regarded as distinct from and complementary to IR but, given the increasingly obvious dependency of world politics on world economics, a certain cross-disciplinary understanding was required from participants. In a way, this development anticipated the role that International Political Economy (IPE) would later play within IR, by integrating economic relations into the analysis of political institutions.

The 1933 ISC in London gathered just a few days before, on 12 June, dozens of governments would meet for the London Economic Conference to discuss the restoration of the world economy. Confident in their role as experts, participants of the ISC sought to provide advice to the heads of state. This was the atmosphere that shaped discussions at the 1933 ISC. A key point of disagreement were tariff walls. The Canadian economist Jacob Viner warned that regional tariff systems would be a source for political danger, whereas Arthur Salter defended partial agreements such as British 'imperial preference' which had emerged from the 1932 Ottawa Conference.[648] Viner's view found support from smaller countries who feared to be excluded from preferential treatment as well as from Zimmern who agreed that any tariff bloc would cause political objections.[649] On the other hand, S. H. Bailey and J. Coatman sided with Salter, arguing that regional agreements were necessary as a preliminary step towards more general trade partnerships.[650] By and large, ISC delegates defended their respective government positions and actually welcomed the opportunity to discuss with "representative thinkers from other countries".[651]

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[647] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1932), pp. 19, 89. It is interesting to note that feminist-pacifist Jane Addams felt the same dual identity, refusing to sacrifice the love of her country for the devotion to international goals. See Jane Addams, in WILPF, *Report of the Fourth Congress of the WILPF* (Geneva, 1924), p. 2.

[648] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), pp. 48-55.

[649] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), p. 61.

William Rappard noted that the delegates were "no longer discussing a matter of scientific insight into reality" but political realities themselves.[652] The delegates struggled to live up to their promise of "disinterested pursuit of objective truth" in a "scientific spirit", rather than to be "imitation statesmen."[653] Instead, professors interpreted their role at the ISC as policy advisors, sometimes beyond their own area of expertise. The objective was not just to "to build bridges" between academic and practical experts, as Salter had announced in his introductory remarks, but actually to merge the two into a blurry synthesis of intellectual and political argument. As a result, little room was left for theoretical debate.

Eventually, the 1933 ISC meeting even caused irritation among the highest diplomatic ranks. In a pamphlet that had quickly been put together in time for the London Economic Conference, ISC participants criticised the Ottawa trade agreement for its discrimination against non-members.[654] Canada's prime minister R. B. Bennett, having learned about the pamphlet, interpreted the statements as an undue interference in national politics and wrote a furious letter to League secretary-general Joseph Avenol.[655] How could the League take such a partisan stance on the question of international trade? Avenol responded that the "the opinions expressed at the Conference [ISC] do not receive the endorsement of the Institute [IIIC], of the Secretariat of the League of Nations or, of course, of the League itself."[656] Secretly, however, Avenol's secretary admitted that one could not reasonably regard

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[650] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), pp. 64, 69-78.

[651] Hugh Dalton, in IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), p. 20.

[652] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), p. 84. Viner agreed that "our differences are rather those which confront statesmen than those which confront scholars." Ibid., p. 85.

[653] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), pp. xiii, 4, 60.

[654] That is, any country outside the British empire and the dominions. The Ottowa system of 'imperial preference' was particularly controversial as it excluded by definition any country that was not part of the British world. IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1933).

[655] Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011), p. 919.

[656] Joseph Avenol to R. B. Bennett, 22 August 1933, Dossier 2381, Box R4007, League of Nations Archives.

ISC delegates, such as Viner or Salter, as pure seekers of scientific truth. It should have been possible, he remarked, to foresee the delicacy of the matter and to be more careful about endorsing the work of an independent conference.[657]

It is hard to estimate the ultimate impact of ISC pamphlets. But, regardless of their actual influence on government decisions, it was obvious that political change was what IR scholars had in mind. Their self-understanding was that of public intellectuals who were qualified to teach, discuss, and practice foreign affairs.

Conclusion

As a result of these non-academic side-tracks, elitist policy networks, and quasi-diplomatic activities, IR scholars payed less attention to ordinary academic work. When they did lecture and publish, it was usually about issues of immediate practical relevance. IR scholarship of the 1920s and 30s was shaped by political events, and by the way in which IR scholars interacted with foreign policy actors. This entanglement was problematic in several ways. First, it created a potential bias in the work of IR authors. Second, it meant that their research agenda was determined by events, rather than by independent thoughts. Third, as a result, IR scholars struggled to keep up with the speed of world affairs and their studies remained superficial. As Zimmern later acknowledged, "from 1931, events moved faster than the minds of most of the members of the Conference [the ISC]."[658] Finally, IR debates rarely went beyond abstract "catchwords", and contributed little to what is commonly considered as political theory.[659]

To be sure, some authors did consider political theory in their work.[660] One example was David Mitrany. In his discussion of disarmament and security in the mid-1920s, Mitrany argued for the primacy of sanctions as a presupposition of international peace. Mitrany's underlying logic was that neither disarmament nor arbitration would work without the credible threat of internationally imposed sanctions. National governments did not have strong enough incentives to comply with laws and treaties, unless they faced severe and definite punishment. To illustrate the psychological effects of sanctions, he also drew parallels between domestic and international law. Once he had outlined this basic framework, however, Mitrany, too, focused on actual institutions and countries, criticising "from [a] purely 'realistic' angle" the League Covenant for leaving crucial passages vague.[661]

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[657] H. H. Cummings to Joseph Avenol, 3 August 1933, Dossier 2381, Box R4007, League of Nations Archives.

[658] 'Note by Sir Alfred Zimmern on the Future of the International Studies Conference', 1946[?], Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 102.

[659] Alfred Zimmern, *Modern Political Doctrines* (Oxford, 1939), p. ix.

[660] See, for example, Charles Webster, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (London, 1933).

It is also true that, as Michael Riemens has claimed, "traces of the First Great Debate" can be found at ISC sessions during the 1930s, specifically in the statements by Italian delegates but also in a conference report by Zimmern in which he distinguished between 'idealist' planning and 'realist' practice of international affairs.[662] In fact, Zimmern sometimes made references to two opposing "policies" or "schools" when he spoke about ways to control armament and aggression.[663] But he also mixed the two allegedly contrasting views into a puzzling blend, calling the League an "organised balance of power."[664] Again elsewhere, Zimmern seems to have had an entirely different terminology in mind: any political plan was necessarily 'idealist', because it derived from an 'idea', whereas its application was 'realist' because it referred to political realities.[665] These terminological inconsistencies have caused considerable confusion among contemporaries and historians. Zimmern himself confessed in a 1929 lecture that "much of what is known in academic circles as 'political science' is mere planning with words."[666] Given the lack of evidence of any coherent schools of thought, it is problematic to retrospectively theorise inter-war IR and to assign labels to scholars who vigorously rejected them.[667]

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[661] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. 18.

[662] Michael Riemens, 'International academic cooperation on international relations in the interwar period: the International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies* 37:2 (2011), p. 921.

[663] Address by Alfred Zimmern, Meeting of the New York Branch of the US League of Nations Association, 24 March 1930, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 140; and Alfred Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', paper presented at the Sociological Society, 30 November 1915, published in *Sociological Review*, October 1915-January 1916, p.216, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 166.

[664] Alfred Zimmern, untitled lecture notes, dated 1932, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 141.

[665] Alfred Zimmern, "League of Nations", in *Manchester Guardian*, 31 October 1918, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 179.

[666] Alfred Zimmern, "The Prospects of Democracy", lecture delivered at RIIA, 8 November 1929, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 140.

[667] As one of the few exceptions, Leonard Woolf responded to Carr's assertions in 1940 and adopted the latter's categorisation—yet, evidently only in order to refute Carr's argument. See Leonard Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality', *Political Quarterly* (1940).

The vast majority of inter-war IR scholars did not produce any works of theory at all. Their style varied between historical narratives and political polemics. Almost no author cared to provide systematic axioms, methodologies, or even definitions of key terms. Their work was not intended to survive scientific tests. In fact, it lacked models or predictions that could be verified or falsified. For example, Toynbee's *Surveys of International Affairs*, considered essential IR literature at the time, presented factual events rather than theoretical interpretations of them. In the preface to the 1924 volume, H. A. L. Fisher called Toynbee's *Survey* a work of "contemporary history", yet one that did not refrain from political commentary and that could be of service to politicians.[668] In essence, the *Surveys* were exactly that: historically informed summaries of current political affairs, spiced with political remarks. Similar to Toynbee, Rappard commented on international politics with an emphasis on policy change, rather than theoretical interpretation. His book *Uniting Europe* (1930)—bearing a normative momentum even in the title—drew heavily on his practical experiences as a former diplomat.[669] The combination of events history and partisan political remarks became a common style of writing during the 1920s and early 1930s, employed, besides Toynbee and Rappard, by Zimmern, Noel-Baker, Otto Hoetzsch, Hajo Holborn, Ernst Jäckh, and Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy. To claim that their works amounted to political theory would be an overstatement.

Recent accounts of inter-war IR have nonetheless attempted to reconstruct debates and to stick new labels on old works.[670] The fundamental problem with these *ex–post* reconstructions is that they are imposing analytical categories on authors who never subscribed to such categories. This leaves us with what Nicolas Guilhot has called an "artificial coherence" in the history of the discipline.[671] The truth is, however, that inter-war IR scholars struggled to define what they were doing. Was it "current history",

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[668] H. A. L. Fisher, 'Preface', in Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1924* (Oxford, 1926), pp. v-vi.

[669] Rappard had served as a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference and as a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. William Rappard, *Uniting Europe* (New Haven, 1930), pp. 107-9.

[670] See, for instance, Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998); or Cameron G. Thies, 'Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate', *European Journal of International Relations* 8:147 (2002).

[671] Nicolas Guilhot, 'Introduction: One Discipline, Many Histories', in Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011), p. 3.

"political science" or a "comparative study of national institutions"?[672] Depending on the setting, IR authors stylised themselves as impartial observers, experts with inside knowledge, or simply as representatives of nation-states.[673] While it is possible to identify some of their convictions at certain times—e.g. 'in favour of Germany joining the League in 1926'—it seems undue to categorise inter-war IR writers into general theoretical camps. If anything, there were loose thematic groups with particular goals, such as the free traders at the ISC, Noel-Baker's work on disarmament, or Shotwell's campaign for what became the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

So what do we mean when we speak of inter-war IR scholarship? This chapter has confirmed recent revisionist literature, in that E. H. Carr's allegations of inter-war 'idealism' rested on a straw man fallacy and that inter-war IR scholars were less of a homogeneous group than commonly assumed. Taking their various educational and quasi-diplomatic activities into account, however, it seems doubtful whether there was any concerted attempt at writing IR theory at all. Only in exceptional cases did authors make general claims. The vast majority of their publications and practical interventions dealt with specific cases and one-off policies, paying little attention to general theory. This was *ad hoc* political commentary at best, polemic journalism at worst. The hesitation to engage in more profound theoretical research may in part have been due to the disillusionment with how other early twentieth century concepts, such as 'self-determination' or 'open diplomacy', had been watered down. The political context called for improvisations and deal-making. Deviating from international norms was opportune. In other words, there was no culture for universally valid, theoretically backed concepts in foreign policy.

Instead, three characteristics about inter-war IR stand out: first, a demand for (popular) education in IR, allowing for a more professional and more democratic management of foreign politics; second, a high level of transnational cooperation in research, teaching, and policy making; third, a tendency for mutual interference between scholars and non-academic actors.

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[672] Arnold Toynbee, *Economics & Politics in International Life* (Nottingham, 1930), p. 1; Hans Simons and Paul Marc, 'Vorwort' in Albrecht Mendelssohn Barholdy, *Diplomatie* (Berlin, 1927), p. v; Ernst Jäckh, *The New Germany* (Oxford, 1927), p. 8.

[673] See, for instance, Otto Hoetzsch, *Germany's Domestic and Foreign Policies* (New Haven, 1929), esp. conclusion; or Harry Kessler, *Germany and Europe* (New Haven, 1923), p. v.

IR education, international cooperation, and policy-making were driven by the same people and overlapped in various ways, blurring the boundaries of academia and politics to an extent that makes it hard to view them as distinct histories. Those who occupied the first university chairs in IR—Zimmern, Noel-Baker, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Jäckh, Shotwell—were precisely the ones who built collaborative networks and lent their advice to governments. The Geneva summer schools, Carnegie-sponsored lectures, and the ISC were sites of exchange between representatives from all relevant professions and various countries. Their impact on individual academics and diplomats as well as for IR as a discipline should not be underestimated. While many IR pioneers were committed teachers—indeed, education was a major motivation for them—the ultimate goal was to have an influence on 'real world' events via an international network of experts at the intersection of academia and diplomacy. As a result, their work catered for the needs of practitioners, while theoretical rigour suffered. The next chapter will address one of the key IR issues of the inter-war period—the debate on sanctions and what became known as 'collective security'—in order to show in more detail how opinions were formed, and how ideas were applied to practice.

4. Internationalising Security: Debates on a Global Sanctions System

"*How men do love thunder […] they will call their war 'sanctions'; and their armies will be 'police'; and quite a number of people, women as well as men, will be persuaded that, regrettable as this array of force may be, it is the only way of attaining law and order, security and peace.*"
(Helena Swanwick, 1934)[674]

Introduction

If the 1920s were about erecting a system of international cooperation and *preventing* conflict, the 1930s were about dealing with its imperfections and *reacting* to aggression. In the face of diplomatic turmoil, notably during the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises, IR scholars devised plans for an international order based on mutual security guarantees which became known as 'collective security'. The point of internationalising security was to collectively guarantee the protection of a country's territorial integrity and political independence, by means other than that country's own national army. Advocates of 'collective security' wanted to expand on and operationalise the League of Nations' sanctions system in order to effectively curb governments who defected from international law. This required an enormous amount of diplomatic skill and political will, as well as genuinely international cooperation. More than ever before, national security was embedded in multilateral alliances, and foreign policy was subject to international rules. Security shifted from being the exclusive concern of individuals—monarchs, ambassadors, nation-states—to collectives—democracies, international organisations, and academia.[675] However, 'collective security' was not universally welcome and caused extensive debate about legitimacy, practicality, and about what it actually meant.

Scholars and practitioners of IR, men and women, from Britain, continental Europe, the United States and further afield, all contributed in various ways to the concept of 'collective security'. They wrote articles, drafted treaties, discussed countless memoranda, organised conferences, and launched popular campaigns to gauge the potential of a universal alliance for peace. Meanwhile, the international order, established by the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was under attack from revisionist governments in Japan, Germany, and Italy, as well as the upswing of economic protectionism in the wake of the Great Depression. The idea that peace could be secured by a set of mutual guarantees was attacked by those who thought that the power of national self-interest was stronger than the cohesive forces of international cooperation, and by those who cynically applied this opinion to 'real-world' politics. This led to puzzling challenges, both practical and intellectual, for the proponents of international cooperation. For IR as an academic discipline this was a crucial period. As political tension increased, people turned to IR specialists for explanations and advice, both of which the discipline struggled to provide. Key concepts remained vague. Academic debates employed political rhetoric without substantiating catchwords with definitions, methodologies, or theory. By the mid-1930s, the discipline was in a deep crisis, and 'collective security' was one of its causes.

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[674] Helena Swanwick, *Pooled Security: What does it mean?* (London, 1934), p. 11.

[675] Maurice Bourquin and Arnold Toynbee, in International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), *Collective Security: A record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences* (Paris, 1936), pp. 161-2. On the "democratic notion" of collective security, see Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), p. 4.

Contrary to traditional historiography, however, the debate on 'collective security' was not simply divided into proponents and critics. It remained essentially the same blurry concept throughout the inter-war period, failing to be consistently applied in thought or practice. Ideas for multilateral security guarantees circulated since at least the 1910s. After the First World War, article XVI of the League of Nations Covenant, the so called 'sanctions article', set the basic, if vague conditions for mutual action against potential aggressors. IR scholars of the 1920s, such as David Mitrany, treated the topic as one of the key issues of international peace.[676] By the beginning of the 1930s, 'collective security' was a widely discussed concept. However, it was not a unified body of thought with clear foreign policy implications but an amorphous collection of individual wisdoms and big power interests. Why was it so complicated to coordinate international security? What were the origins of the concept in theory and in practice? And how did the challenges of the 1930s, notably the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises, affect the concept?

This chapter re-visits interpretations of 'collective security', especially during the first half of the 1930s, stressing its contested and multi-faceted nature coined by a range of international authors and institutions. Following a brief historiographical overview, the second section reviews the evolution of 'collective security' as an idea and as a political project, covering various constituent debates on sovereignty, sanctions, disarmament, membership, the Covenant, the idea of an international police force, and the feminist critique of sanctions. It argues that neither the concept nor the institutions were set in stone at any point during the inter-war period—stressing the contingent nature of IR concepts. The third section examines how IR scholars and institutions responded to the Manchurian and Abyssinian disputes, revealing their difficulty in forming a consistent approach towards aggressive foreign policy. The last section takes account of the state of IR as an academic discipline during the mid-1930s. Within the dissertation as a whole, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how IR scholars dealt with the first serious test of their ideas, practices, and institutions. It argues that inter-war IR was based on loose discourses and interests rather than on coherent theoretical approaches.

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[676] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925).

Historical Perspectives

From about 1931 until 1939, 'collective security' was one of the most widespread concepts in the field of IR. It was employed by scholars and politicians to refer to various plans for an international security alliance. Like 'moral disarmament' or 'peaceful change', 'collective security' was common jargon in the 1930s. It was used by leading academics and politicians, as well as in public discourse.[677] After 1940, its significance was downplayed by 'realist' IR thinkers, and its institutions were replaced by partial military alliances during the Cold War. The rejection of 'collective security' by subsequent generations of IR scholars, and its apparent 'failure' in inter-war Europe, have left the concept with a somewhat obscure historical legacy.

Historically speaking, the idea of 'collective security' departed from the old nineteenth century style of diplomacy which rested on imperial or national sovereigns, coordinated by only a minimal set of international laws and almost no permanent cooperation. 'Old diplomacy' provided only customary legal procedures for *ad hoc* arbitration and negotiation. It largely relied on self-help, bi-lateral alliances, and war. This system of individual security fell out of favour not only because it was unable to prevent recurrent war but also because it only served the interests of the military strong. While achieving relative stability between the Great Powers, claims for independence and a more equal global order were consistently ignored.[678] Most importantly, the 'old' system was blamed for the outbreak of the

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[677] Hersch Lauterpacht, *Neutrality and Collective Security* (London, 1936); Eleanor Rathbone, *War Can Be Averted: the Achievability of Collective Security* (London, 1938); Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936); T. P. Conwell-Evans, 'Collective Security and Germany', *The Times* (London, 5 April 1935), p. 12.

[678] Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 100.

Great War due to its secret and unreliable treaties. As a response, it seemed logical to establish an international institution in order to conclude, administer and enforce general security treaties—the first detailed proposals of which appeared together with drafts for the League in 1915.[679]

The invention of 'collective security' ended a longstanding episode in the history of violent conflict. Previously, war itself was not illegal. It might have breached a specific contract or agreement. But apart from a few rudimentary rules, such as the 1864 Geneva Convention, war itself was not regulated at all. In fact, waging war was regarded as a normal policy instrument and as a fundamental right of any sovereign state. As the British international lawyer Arnold McNair put it, war was "extra-legal rather than illegal."[680] Norman Angell placed the codification of international security arrangements within the *longue durée* evolution from international anarchy to political order.[681] Now, humankind was in a position to manage international disputes by means other than offensive war. In this sense, 'collective security' was actually more about controlling the offensive intentions of governments—if necessary by military means—rather than about denying them, as Angell has traditionally been accused of.

Notwithstanding its historical significance, 'collective security' was rejected in the late 1930s as a 'utopian' dream which was doomed to fail. In *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, E. H. Carr famously ridiculed believers in 'collective security' by pointing out that it described an admirable state of the world that could be achieved if everyone supported it[682]—which evidently was not the case. Carr's aversion to "naïve experiments in international pacifism" became a building block of the so called 'realist' turn in IR.[683] In 1939 Hans Morgenthau, too, proclaimed the death of 'collective security' and welcomed the "resurrection of neutrality" in Europe which, so his argument, allowed smaller states to withdraw from a system that did not work in their best interest.[684] After the Second World War, Carr's and Morgenthau's apostles popularised the view that security could not be internationalised, and instead supplied the theoretical groundwork for Cold War antagonism. In a bipolar world, security could only be shared among power blocs, not universally, rendering the internationalist concept incompatible with political realities. The apparent contradiction between internationalist ambitions, inspired by moral aims, and power politics, driven by selfish interests, was reflected *inter alia* in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, John H. Herz, or Kenneth Waltz.[685]

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[679] Program Leaflet, *Internationale Zentralorganisation für einen dauerhaften Frieden*, September 1915, SPK MA Nachl. AMB, 2,24,139.

[680] Arnold McNair, 'Collective Security', *British Year Book of International Law* 17 (1936), p. 152.

[681] J. D. B. Miller, 'Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 112.

[682] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (London, 1939), p. 9.

[683] E. H. Carr, 'The League of Peace and Freedom: An Episode in the Quest for Collective Security', *International Affairs* 14:4 (1935), p. 837.

Thanks to more recent research on the history of IR we now know that the outright rejection of inter-war concepts of 'collective security' by the self-proclaimed 'realists' was based on a heavily simplified, if not mistaken, reading of the original authors.[686] Revisionist histories found that inter-war authors never assumed that states would behave morally and cooperatively, as Carr and Morgenthau had asserted, but on the contrary that international organisations were created as an insurance against defectors. In fact, security mattered precisely *because* governments were expected to deviate from peaceful cooperation and arbitration. The re-discovery of these authors—including the various protagonists of this dissertation: Ernst Jäckh, Lucy Mair, David Mitrany, William Rappard, James Shotwell, Helena Swanwick, Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Zimmern, etc.—begs the question of what precisely they meant when writing on and trying to establish 'collective security'. Even among revisionists, writing since the 1990s, no consensus has been established on the defining features of inter-war IR scholarship.[687] The revisionist literature has also largely ignored non-English speaking scholars, women, and authors outside a strictly academic context, thereby ignoring important contributions to a concept which by definition reached beyond Anglo-American academia. A more comprehensive history of 'collective security', as an idea and as a policy, therefore helps to better understand the study of IR during this period.

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[684] Hans Morgenthau, 'International Affairs: The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe', *The American Political Science Review* 33:3 (1939), p. 478. It is ironic how the interests of small states have often been cited to support new security architectures, only to then sideline their concerns.

[685] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The children of light and the children of darkness: a vindication of democracy and a critique of its traditional defenders* (London, 1945); John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics* 2:2 (1950); Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York, 1959).

[686] See, for example, David Long and Peter Wilson, *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995).

[687] Peter Wilson, 'Where are we now in the debate about the first great debate?', in Brian C. Schmidt, *International Relations and the First Great Debate: New International Relations* (London, 2012), p. 1, available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41819/1/Where%20are%20we%20now%20(LSERO).pdf [accessed 10-07-2016]; Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where are the idealists in interwar International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 32:2 (2006), p. 293.

Upon closer examination of the original works, unpublished memoranda, correspondence and institutional records, the history of 'collective security' offers a much broader set of ideas and actors than conventionally claimed. Throughout the inter-war period, internationalising security was not a singular concept, worked out by a homogenous group of scholars, but evolved in the context of transnational networks of men and women, scholars and diplomats, politicians and activists, both English-speaking and international. It would be inaccurate to cluster these thinkers into theoretical categories, such as 'idealists' or 'realists', although they certainly approached the problem of international security in different ways. Some, such as Mitrany or Zimmern, were primarily concerned with how the League of Nations could provide a framework for guarantees. Others, such as the politician and philanthropist David Davies, promoted the campaign for an international police force. Again others, such as Helena Swanwick, were opposed to military sanctions altogether, pointing out the potential abuse of "preventive" interventions as well as their detrimental effect on society at large.[688] Bearing in mind that the attempt at 'collective security' was an unprecedented experiment in the history of international politics, and that the study of IR was itself still a young discipline, it was perhaps understandable to encounter challenging, confusing, or contradictory positions.[689]

Primarily, this chapter surveys a range of open questions about the concept of 'collective security' and, building on the revisionist historiography, further disproves the legend of a homogenous group of inter-war 'idealists'. It shows how features that were later associated with 'realism' actually originated in earlier discourses and within the group of authors traditionally labelled as 'idealists'. For example, it was Zimmern himself who blamed "sentimental idealism" for putting the League of Nations at risk.[690] They anticipated that governments would *not* always comply with international agreements and developed 'collective security' in response to that assumption.

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[688] Helena Swanwick, *Pooled Security: What does it mean?* (London, 1934), p. 14.

[689] John Fischer Williams, *Sanctions under the Covenant* (Oxford, 1936), p. 130; Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 99.

[690] 'Memorandum for Discussion at Sub-Committee on the British Commonwealth and the Collective System', Alfred Zimmern, 25 June 1934, Chatham House, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 97.

The guiding principle seems to have been to minimise inevitable harm, *ex negativo*, rather than to fantasise about a 'utopian' future of peace and harmony. This was particularly true for female authors who had long emphasised the effects of war on the civilian population.[691] Since universities and diplomatic professions were by and large male-dominated, women often used other channels, such as the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) or independent publications in order to voice their analyses, which were by no means inferior to their male counterparts. Women and men both continued to collaborate extensively across borders, and the International Studies Conference (ISC) remained the principle venue for exchange between delegates from more than 40 countries.

Thinkers of IR also continued to interact closely with practitioners, or transgressed the boundary of academia and diplomacy themselves. Their ambition was to simultaneously act as teachers, researchers, and quasi-diplomats. One of the seminal works on 'collective security', David Mitrany's *The Problem of International Sanctions* (1925), grew out of a collaboration with James T. Shotwell on a draft for the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.[692] During the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises, scholars of IR campaigned extensively with politicians and the press, though their success was limited. Conversely, politicians and diplomats took part in academic debate.[693] Proceedings at the ISC were shaped by 'real-world' events, and in 1936 the American lawyer Philip Jessup noted, without regret, that while theory had "not been excluded from consideration, […] the guiding principle has been the realistic one."[694] So rather than retrospectively reading a particular IR theory into 1930s debates, this chapter draws attention to the contingency of 'collective security', to practical activities, and *ad hoc* reactions to 'real-world' events.[695]

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[691] Olive Schreiner, 'Women and War', in Uys Krige (ed.), *Olive Schreiner: A Selection* (Cape Town, 1968, originally published in 1911), p. 70.

[692] Shotwell's *Draft of a Treaty of Security and Disarmament* was adopted by the League as an official document but never materialised. See David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. v.

[693] See, for example, 'Military Force or Air Police', by Pierre Cot, March 1935, Dossier 2381, Box R4010, League of Nations Archives.

[694] Philip Jessup, *International Security: The American Role in Collective Action for Peace* (New York, 1935), p. viii.

[695] Lucian M. Ashworth, for example, has claimed that inter-war authors constructed "a concept of global order based on the interrelationship of arbitration, sanctions, and disarmament", yet then admits himself that it were the "gaps" which actually characterised this concept. See Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Rethinking a Socialist Foreign Policy: The British Labour Party and International Relations Experts, 1918–1931', *International Labor and Working-Class History* 75:1 (2009), pp. 38-9.

The Many Faces of Collective Security

The distinctive feature about inter-war discourses on security was the idea that it was possible to internationalise the protection of individual states. In principle, 'collective security' was meant to incorporate *all* states of the world—akin to the membership of the League of Nations.[696] Cooperation among multiple powers against a common enemy was nothing new of course, nor was the idea of a universal polity.[697] In fact such constructs may have been *de facto* larger than the project of international organisation during the inter-war period.[698] But the League of Nations Covenant was the first treaty that invited states to join a "potentially universal" alliance, intended as a general safeguard against any aggressor, rather than against a specific belligerent.[699] The new system did not impose security 'from above'—like Roman 'pacification'—but it arose from a joint effort of, theoretically, equals. Through their signature, member states agreed to relinquish the right to resort to war in return for international guarantees. 'Collective security' meant, to borrow Zimmern's words, "the safety of all by all."[700]

However evident the basic idea, 'collective security' raised a number of pressing questions about the practicability and legitimacy of international interventions. Who to include? How to convince states to sacrifice national sovereignty? How to determine the aggressor? What to do in cases of dispute? Which types of sanctions to employ? How to avoid harming civilians? And, crucially, how to integrate 'collective security' in the more general efforts of the League to outlaw war and to disarm the world? IR scholars shaped the political discourse on these questions and had an impact on practical decisions from the 1910s through to the crises of the 1930s which undermined and eventually wrecked the League apparatus. Views on these questions diverged widely and it was effectively unclear what either 'collective' or 'security' really meant.

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[696] Alfred Verdross, *Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft* (Vienna, 1926), p. 112.

[697] Quincy Wright traced the idea of "universal polity" to the sixteenth century. However, the political organisations he had in mind were based on the universal imposition of one system, rather than the pluralistic co-existence of different ones. See Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 100.

[698] Consider the Allies during the First World War or the Mongol Empire.

[699] 'Memorandum for Discussion at Sub-Committee on the British Commonwealth and the Collective System', Alfred Zimmern, 25 June 1934, Chatham House, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 97.

[700] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), p. 4.

Membership

One immediate set of questions was concerned with the 'who' of the collective system. Lacking membership from key international powers, notably the US, the Soviet Union, and Germany, the League initially represented an all but universal family of nations. The absence of those who were denied accession, rather than having opted out themselves, was particularly problematic because it made a universal union *de jure* impossible. Without a large enough number of states, the Swiss jurist Dietrich Schindler warned, 'collective security' might degenerate into a simple alliance of states, resembling pre-1919 conditions.[701] Or, worse even, the League might turn into a supranational autocrat that legitimises "Holy Wars" on behalf of 'international justice', as British feminist-pacifist Helena Swanwick cautioned.[702] What is more, the Covenant did not even define what 'collective' meant or specify a minimal number of states to consider it as such.[703] Mitrany found this to be a "great obstacle" that threatened the entire system.[704]

Hence one of the foremost goals was to enlarge the number of signatories to the Covenant and, where League membership was not an option, to devise alternative arrangements. British internationalists were particularly eager to enlarge the international community. The ink had hardly dried on the Versailles Treaty when Arnold Toynbee privately told his father-in-law Gilbert Murray that "we shall get Germany in pretty soon".[705] In this sense, Germany's re-admission to the international scene six years later marked not just a political turn but, more abstractly, also solidified the basis for collective foreign policy measures. The same was true in 1928 for the Kellogg-Brian Pact which extended the reach of 'collective security' beyond the League's membership, most importantly to the US and the Soviet Union. Widespread participation was crucial, as Zimmern argued, because 'collective security' was a "democratic" exercise that required "common effort".[706] By the beginning of the 1930s, most of the free world was part of some collective agreement, though membership was often neither permanent nor meaningful—Japan, Germany, Italy, and later the Soviet Union being the most infamous defectors. Moreover, non-universal treaties continued to shape international relations. Between 1920 and 1927 alone, the League's *Systematic Survey of the Arbitration Conventions and Treaties of Mutual Security* listed 31 bi- and multi-lateral agreements.[707]

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[701] Dietrich Schindler, 'The Notion of Neutrality in a System including repression of resort to war', in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 9.

[702] Helena Swanwick and W. Arnold-Forster, *Sanctions of the League of Nations Covenant* (London, 1928), p.22.

[703] John Fischer Williams, *Sanctions under the Covenant* (Oxford, 1936), p. 134.

[704] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. 75.

[705] Toynbee to Murray, 27 July 1919, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

Determining the 'who' also had important implications for the leadership structure in the League. Having Germany or other major powers join would upset the level of relative influence that the founding members were afraid to lose. Having major powers outside, on the other hand, risked collective action to turn into "offensive alliances".[708] The solution was to find a middle way—to integrate as many members as possible while gently shifting national defensive capacities to the international level. Perhaps more than physical protection even, the goal was to spread the feeling of safety. Security was "a state of consciousness", as French politician Léon Blum put it.[709] In the wake of the Great War, making the population feel safe was a powerful political asset. This is why the inter-war period saw a turn in political language, away from aggressive nationalism towards a conciliatory universalism, creating the illusion that the entire world was united in the pursuit of peace. In reality, however, 'collective security' was less secure, and less collective, than proclaimed by its architects.

Membership excluded those territories that were still under colonial control, mandates, and parts of South America, notably Argentina and Brazil. The US hesitated to commit and Japan was often sidelined. This made 'collective security' *de facto* a European-dominated enterprise, mostly disinterested in conflicts outside the great powers' realm—for example the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia. In many ways, it helped to transform nineteenth century imperialism into a new style of eurocentric world domination, disguised as universal collaboration. In reality, 'collective security' was a European project, just as the League was "a regional system, the region being Europe", as F. S. Northedge put it.[710] Limited membership was not just a moral fault, it directly impacted the acceptance and practicality of a global security system.

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[706] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), p. 4.

[707] League of Nations, *Arbitration and Security: Systematic Survey of the Arbitration Conventions and Treaties of Mutual Security Deposited with the League of Nations,* 2nd edn. (Geneva, 1927), p. 353.

[708] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. 28. See also Helena Swanwick and W. Arnold-Forster, *Sanctions of the League of Nations Covenant* (London, 1928), p. 19.

[709] Léon Blum, *Les Problèmes de la Paix* (Paris, 1931), p. 97. The Austro-Hungarian lawyer and diplomat Stefan Osusky also employed the notion of a "*conscience collective* [collective consciousness]". See Stefan Osusky, 'L'Europe centrale et l'avenir du système collectif', *Politique étrangère* 5 (1936), p. 9.

Sovereignty

A second discourse among IR authors centred on concerns about national sovereignty within a system of 'collective security'.[711] Nationalists argued that collective guarantees threatened to deprive individual states of essential rights, including their right to declare war.[712] There were fears of a potential superstate before the League even existed. A superstate, or world-state, would force states to give up legislative sovereignty on issues such as "tariff or immigration laws", and besides, it might not even be able to fulfil its original function, to prevent war.[713] Neither institutionally nor ideologically, the world was ready for a super-state.[714] Some thought that increasing supra-national integration would automatically deprive nation-states of sovereignty—like in a zero-sum game. Nation-states would loose as the international authority gained. Even internationalist authors, such as Toynbee, argued that "collective security means a diminution of local sovereignty."[715] The belief that the League of Nations resembled at least a "rudimentary superstate" was widespread above all in the US, and made collective guarantees beyond the American continent difficult.[716] "Supranational tendencies" were also an obstacle to those who sought to circumnavigate the watchful eye of the international community in order to change the *status quo* in their favour, as German historian Otto Hoetzsch recognised as early as

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[710] F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946* (Leicester, 1986), p. 137.

[711] The reason for discussing 'collective security' at the 1934-5 ISC was that participants were interested in "sovereignty" and "sanctions". Henri Bonnet to William Rappard, 27 June 1933, HEI [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[712] F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946* (Leicester, 1986), p. 34.

[713] Albert J. Beverdige, 'Pitfalls of a "League of Nations"', *The North American Review* 209:760 (1919), pp. 305-7.

[714] Jerome D. Greene, *Idealism and Realism in Efforts Toward Peace* (Aberystwyth, 1933), p. 15.

[715] Arnold Toynbee, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 164.

[716] Edward A. Harriman, 'The League of Nations: a Rudimentary Superstate', *American Political Science Review* 21:1 (1927), p. 137; see also J. M. Spaight, *Pseudo-Security* (London, 1928), p. 1.

1925.[717] Fritz Berber even spoke of the "totalitarian character" of the post-1919 international legal framework.[718]

Contesting interpretations of sovereignty determined diverging attitudes to internationalising security. Almost every IR scholar and international lawyer commented on the subject.[719] Their analyses were based on the observation that the population desired peace but was not ready to give up traditional concepts of sovereignty.[720] Nobody trusted inexperienced international institutions to handle what had traditionally been the dearest national task—providing security to citizens. From a legal perspective, concerns about sovereignty also informed the debate on the primacy of international versus state law and, more generally, the interpretation of positive law in a global context.[721] Which legal canon was superior? Who determined the highest international laws and ensured their application? There was more divergence than certainty on these questions. Non-Western authors, too, discussed the tension between sovereignty and external dependence, drawing on their own intellectual traditions.[722] The international legal setting of the 'collective security' apparatus was unclear, and the fear of a super-state added to the general reluctance.

Other authors were committed to disperse this fear and advocated a 'family of nations' as a middle path between a world-state and national isolation. If every member-state voluntarily sacrificed an equal portion of sovereignty, so the German teacher and internationalist Anna B. Eckstein argued, then it was possible to collectively gain in security *and* liberty.[723] She regarded sovereignty not as an absolute national good but as a fluid variable of international negotiation. Contrary to the zero-sum assumption by the sceptics, Polish lawyer Ludwik Ehrlich argued, 'collective security' created something greater than the sum of individual securities—similar to a market economy where the interplay of subjective interests translates into greater welfare for the whole community.[724] Even proponents of centralised systems, such as an international police force, argued that national sovereignty would not necessarily suffer but rather be transformed into new kinds of sovereignty.[725] There was no need for any nation to sacrifice itself. Supranational coordination was just a logical consequence of increasing interdependence, not an attempt to impose a super-state.

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[717] Otto Hoetzsch, *Die weltpolitische Kräfteverteilung nach den Pariser Friedensschlüssen* (Berlin, 1925), p. 34.

[718] Fritz Berber, *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit* (Berlin, 1934), p. 32.

[719] See, for example, James W. Garner, 'Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations', *American Political Science Review* 19:1 (1925); Albert Geouffre de Lapradelle, *Principes généraux du droit international* (Paris, 1930); Hans Kelsen, *Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts* (Tübingen, 1920); Hans Wehberg, *Grundprobleme des Völkerbundes* (Berlin, 1926).

[720] J. D. B. Miller, 'Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 108.

[721] Alfred Verdross, *Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes* (Tübingen, 1923), pp. 76-7. See also his attempt to separate modern international law from legal positivism and to establish a natural legal basis for the League of Nations. Alfred Verdross, *Völkerrecht* (Berlin, 1937).

[722] Such as the Hindu doctrine of *mandala*. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, 'Hindu Theory of International Relations', *American Political Science Review* 13 (1919), p. 401.

[723] Anna B. Eckstein, *Staatenschutzvertrag zur Sicherung des Weltfriedens* (München, 1919), pp. 27-9. See also, Salvador de Madariaga, *The Price of Peace* (London, 1935), p. 14.

The debate about sovereignty inspired IR scholars to invent new narratives about international politics. Although addressing common challenges with collective instruments was unfamiliar to policy makers, so argued Jäckh, it was "the historical mission of our age" to find new forms of sovereignty—a "new universalism [that] acknowledges the individuality of the nation, but at the same time understands the community of a family of nations."[726] French jurist Louis Le Fur invoked the same notion of a "*famille de nations*" which he regarded merely as the continuation of a longer historical process. He rejected the idea of a "*super-état*" as impossible and dangerous, but welcomed the League of Nations as a new moral and legal authority.[727]

In any case, real and complete sovereignty was an illusion, especially given the level of economic interdependence reached in the early twentieth century.[728] Some authors, such as Swanwick, went as far as to proclaim the end of the nation-state altogether, arguing that "the idea of a nation-state is, at this stage of European history, not only impossible of realisation, but meaningless."[729] National sovereignty was *always* subject to the "collective will" of those who controlled the physical force of mankind, as Robert Lansing put it.[730] Or, in the words of anthropologist Lucy Mair, sovereignty "is nothing but the residuum of rights left to a State after all the matters in which it is bound by international agreements are substracted."[731] Individual states had no other choice but to accept their inferiority to the rest of the world and look for ways to reconcile their own security interests with their neighbours. Quincy Wright suggested a similar theory of sovereignty in which states were intermediates between international and municipal law. A sovereign state, in his view, was in control of municipal law but subject to international law. Sanctions, then, existed to protect weaker states from being subjected to the municipal law of a stronger state—in other words, sanctions *preserved* sovereignty rather than undermining it.[732] The only restriction that 'collective security' implied for national sovereignty was the right to 'private war', but that right, as was increasingly recognised, ranked lower than world peace. Wright summarised his argument in a simple formula: "Legal sovereignty can exist with collective security; military sovereignty cannot."[733] It proved to be hard, however, to translate these theoretical insights into political realities. Like the question of membership, therefore, concerns about sovereignty prevented a more workable basis for collective action.

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[724] Ludwik Ehrlich, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 177.

[725] David Davies, *The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A Study in International Relationships* (London, 1930), p. 202.

[726] Ernst Jäckh, *The New Germany: Three Lectures by Ernst Jäckh* (Oxford, 1927), p. 95.

[727] Louis Le Fur, *Nationalisme et Internationalisme* (Lyon, 1926), pp. 18-21.

[728] David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (London, 1933), pp. 67-8.

[729] Helena Swanwick, *I Have Been Young* (London, 1935), p. 393.

[730] Robert Lansing, 'Notes on World Sovereignty', *American Journal of International Law* 15 (1921), p. 17.

The League of Nations Covenant

Possibly the most lamented shortcomings of 'collective security' were the imprecisions in the League of Nations Covenant and the lack of authority in Geneva. The Council was inexperienced in large-scale cooperation and it was based on a vague legal framework. It faced the dual challenge of managing ongoing international quarrels and re-designing its bureaucracy into a more effective authority. Many passages in the Covenant, drafted in 1919, left enormous room for interpretation.[734] The basic framework rested on four articles, none of which specified the procedure or nature of imposing sanctions to a reasonably narrow degree. Article X provided for guarantees against aggression, protecting the "territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the

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[731] Lucy Mair, *The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of the Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations* (London, 1923), p. 23.

[732] Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 102.

[733] Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 102.

[734] See Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935* (London, 1936), p. 398.

League."[735] Having established this basic assurance, article XI introduced the condition that an attack against any one member constituted "a matter of concern to the whole League" and entrusted the League with "any action that may be deemed wise" to re-establish peace. If grievances could not be satisfied by the arbitration procedure, outlined in articles XII to XV, and an international intervention was inevitable, then article XVI mentioned potential sanctions, both economic and military, and the way in which they may be used against the aggressor.

No one knew, however, how "immediately" sanctions should be implemented, nor were the measures themselves clearly defined. Zimmern regarded the guarantees promised in article X as "limited", and suspected article XV to be no more than a "loophole for war".[736] According to Mitrany, article XVI, the infamous 'sanctions article', was "worded so vaguely that extraordinary things could be read into it."[737] The 'sanctions article' curiously banned "personal intercourse" between the nationals of a Covenant-breaking state and foreigners—an "awkward phrase", as C. A. W. Manning noted.[738] Furthermore, the sanctions described in article XVI were only to be applied in order to "prevent or stop illegal war", leaving a legal gap for cases in which a government broke treaties without waging war.[739] There was a good case, however, as French jurist Georges Scelle pointed out, to punish not only war but "any form of armed coercion."[740] The imprecise and ambivalent language of the Covenant left many scholars puzzled. On the other hand, the vagueness of the Covenant, as the writer and air ministry official J. M. Spaight argued, may not actually have been a lapse but an intentional way to keep international law "fluid and undefined", primarily by the British whose legal tradition and imperial interests did not lend themselves to fixed commitments.[741] Neither explanation, however, made 'collective security' any easier.

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[735] League of Nations Covenant, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp [accessed 22-05-2017]. All subsequent quotations of the Covenant are taken from this source.

[736] 'A Historical Note on Collective Security', Alfred Zimmern, prepared for ISC, April 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 86.

[737] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. 9.

[738] C. A. W. Manning, *Sanctions under the Covenant: Montague Burton International Relations Lectures* (Nottingham, 1936), p. 13.

[739] Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 101.

[740] Georges Scelle, 'Theory of International Government', in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 11.

Besides nebulous language, the Covenant also failed to prescribe a speedy and transparent procedure for the implementation of collective action. As British feminist-pacifist Ethel Williams pointed out, it was impossible to identify and punish an aggressor within a few days, which was often the critical time frame.[742] Bureaucratic efficiency was not a strength of the League, as even its British fan club admitted.[743] What many analysts demanded were fast executive decisions by a strong Council and a less consensual voting system. The unanimity requirement in the Council and the absence of an effective court, so their concern, hampered quick and effective decisions on sanctions.[744] At the 1935 meeting of the ISC in London, American diplomat Allen Dulles came up with an innovative proposal for improving the determination of aggressors. He suggested a League of Nations "reporter" to investigate on the spot immediately in the case of a dispute.[745] The Council would thus have quick and impartial information available. If executive functions were transferred from the national to the international level, so Dulles' rationale, the respective authorities had to be equipped with the same powers. On the other hand, argued Jäckh, it was a positive achievement of 'new diplomacy' that decisions to go to war now took months rather than minutes, creating a buffer against jingoism.[746] In practice, however, League sanctions took months to implement while national attacks could be launched at each government's convenience. What 'collective security' required therefore was a means for rapid response—in other words: an international police.

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[741] J. M. Spaight, *Pseudo-Security* (London, 1928), p. 4.

[742] She cited France's occupation of the Ruhr and the Corfu incident. See Ethel Williams, WILPF, *Report of the Fourth Congress* (Geneva, 1924), p. 59.

[743] League of Nations Union, *World Defence* No. 348 (1933), pp. 26-8.

[744] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. 6.

[745] Allen Dulles, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 276.

[746] Ernst Jäckh, *The New Germany: Three Lectures by Ernst Jäckh* (Oxford, 1927), p. 92.

The Idea of an International Police Force

The idea of an international police force gained popularity in the early 1930s, although the original idea was older. The cause was primarily promoted by the New Commonwealth Institute, a think tank co-founded and financed by the liberal philanthropist David Davies who had already endowed the Wilson professorship at Aberystwyth and who was a key supporter of the League of Nations Union. Having witnessed the failure of the 1924 Geneva Protocol and the Disarmament Conference, Davies suggested to go beyond verbal assurances and to form a common international military force.[747] In this endeavour he was able to count on the support of influential public figures, including Winston Churchill as president of the British section of the New Commonwealth Institute, as well as Clement Attlee, Norman Angell, Lord Cecil, Philip Noel-Baker, Montague Burton, Arthur Salter and Harold Temperley as vice-presidents.[748] Interestingly, the New Commonwealth Institute also boasted a range of prominent international members, including the former director of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP), Ernst Jäckh, who emigrated to London in 1934.[749] On the French side, air minister Pierre Cot was a prominent supporter, as was the historian and co-founder of the Geneva Graduate Institute Paul Mantoux.[750] The Vienna Konsularakademie also expressed its sympathies, although it felt unable to officially affiliate itself with a partisan movement.[751] The idea of an international air police was also discussed by the women at the 1932 WILPF Congress in Grenoble.[752] From its headquarters at Smith Square in Westminster—currently home to the UK representation of the European Commission—the New Commonwealth Institute oversaw members in more than 40 countries, published a monthly periodical and launched public campaigns.[753]

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[747] David Davies, *The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A Study in International Relationships* (London, 1930), pp. 361–8.

[748] Winston Churchil, *Speech delivered at a Luncheon at the Dorchester Hotel, London, on November 25th, 1936* (London, 1936), p. 14.

[749] Index of New Commonwealth Institute Memoranda, 1935, Dossier 2381, Box R4010, League of Nations Archives.

[750] Memo, 'Military Force or Air Police', by Pierre Cot, March 1935; and Brochure, *The New Commonwealth Institute*, 22 March 1935, Dossier 2381, Box R4010, League of Nations Archives.

[751] Friedrich Hlavac to Ernst Jäckh, 12 April 1934, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 44.

[752] Swedish aviator Tord Ångström had argued for the abolishment of air forces and for the re-allocation of air budgets to civil causes in aviation. See 'Aviation in the Service of International Life', in WILPF, *Report of the Seventh Congress* (Geneva, 1932), pp. 41-5.

[753] Winston Churchil, *Speech delivered at a Luncheon at the Dorchester Hotel, London, on November 25th, 1936* (London, 1936), p. 13.

At the core of Davies' project was the idea that an international police guard, including especially all aerial forces, would help to generate respect for the League of Nations. The international police would be commanded and controlled by a common international body and serve to enforce the League's decisions. It would have to be superior, in number and armament, to national forces—which would continue to exist as domestic police services. If every state contributed to the cost of a united force, so Davies argued, the national burden could be lowered and budgets would benefit. The international police would essentially replace the League's "vague and nebulous" sanctions system, said Davies.[754] By centralising executive authority it would also improve the speed of (re-)action and make it easier to determine the aggressor. Most importantly, it defined more clearly than any other proposal what 'collective *security*' meant.

On the other hand, critics such as Quincy Wright argued, a supranational police force would undermine national sovereignty far more than inter-state collaboration.[755] What is more, a world police would only re-locate, not abolish, the problem of militarism. Helena Swanwick, one of its most prolific critics, accused men of disguising their militarist temper by calling their war "sanctions", and their armies "police".[756] She attacked Norman Angell for supporting the New Commonwealth Institute's plan and for overlooking the fact that "defensive" or "preventive" wars could never be clearly defined and had caused much suffering in the past. This would just lead to "new wars for old".[757] Or, as her colleague Kathleen Courtney put it, "Satan cannot cast out Satan".[758] Swanwick feared that an international police would in fact be used as an instrument of alliances that were "not yet civilised enough" to embody a genuine force of justice.[759] Moreover, she argued, the analogy between domestic and international police forces was flawed, because domestic police forces were organised and legitimate authorities dealing with unarmed civilians whereas an international police had to deal with armed states and lacked organisational authority.[760] Swanwick's reluctance was shared by Murray and Cecil.[761]

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[754] David Davies, *The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A Study in International Relationships* (London, 1930), p. 143.

[755] Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 101.

[756] Helena Swanwick, *Pooled Security: What does it mean?* (London, 1934), p. 11.

[757] Helena Swanwick, *New Wars for Old* (London, 1934).

[758] Kathleen Courtney, 'Preface', in Swanwick, *New Wars for Old* (London, 1934), p. iii.

[759] Helena Swanwick, *Pooled Security: What does it mean?* (London, 1934), p. 20.

Disarmament

A separate discourse that informed the concept of 'collective security' centred on disarmament. In theory, disarmament and 'collective security' were considered complements in the pursuit of world peace because both intended to reduce the risk of unilateral aggression. Article VIII of the Covenant actually combined in one paragraph "the reduction of national armaments" with "enforcement by common action". On the one side, this program aimed to restrict arms production, naval strength, and troop size in order to restrain unilateral military capacity. At the same time, the League guaranteed to protect victims of aggression who, once the level of armament was lowered, were incapable of doing so themselves. Historian C. K. Webster even proposed merging the two concepts into "a system of collective disarmament".[762] A 1932 German handbook on disarmament and security [*Abrüstung und Sicherheit*] made the same argument.[763] Historically, the focus between 'collective security' and disarmament oscillated according to political trends. General disarmament started out as a primary objective of the 1919 Peace Conference, supported by enthusiastic pacifists, but soon turned into more modest bi- or multi-lateral agreements, notably the Washington and London Naval Treaties. It finally collapsed after Germany's withdrawal from the World Disarmament Conference in 1933. The failure of disarmament meant the return to military strategy. Now international security alliances had to be all the more prepared for interventions in a world of well-armed potential aggressors. However, the inverse effect was also at play. Military aggression caused the collapse of disarmament. The League's failure in Manchuria, as Eleanor Rathbone argued, directly led to a sense of futility at the Disarmament Conference.[764]

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[760] Helena Swanwick and W. Arnold-Forster, *Sanctions of the League of Nations Covenant* (London, 1928), p. 21.

[761] Gilbert Murray to Toynbee, 2 March 1934, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[762] IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 389.

[763] K. Schwendemann, *Abrüstung und Sicherheit: Handbuch der Sicherheitsfrage* (Leipzig, 1932), p. vi.

[764] Eleanor Rathbone, *War Can Be Averted: the Achievability of Collective Security* (London, 1938), p. 35.

Besides political tensions, the principle problem about disarmament was the lack of precise terms mutually agreed on, and committed to, by all governments. The infamous formulation in article VIII of the Covenant—"reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety"—left actual limitations open to diplomatic negotiations, and hence to political will. The entire struggle of the League was constantly disturbed by attempts to evade 'collective security' rather than to make it more comprehensive. René Cassin, a lawyer and French representative to the Disarmament Conference, urged in vain to include a 'collective security' provision in the accords.[765] He perfectly realised that a working 'collective security' system relied on the "altruistic" behaviour of member states, and that this altruism had to be turned into codified, enforceable law. Instead, the international community relied on make-shift solutions until it was too late and armaments spun out of control. In September 1935, at the same time when the League effectively abandoned its security commitments to Ethiopia, Samuel Hoare admitted that "limitation and reduction of armaments by certain countries, particularly by my own, have not been followed."[766]

A popular yet futile strategy to increase the chances of disarmament was to launch propaganda campaigns—often called 'moral disarmament'.[767] The logic behind 'moral disarmament' was to de-militarise the mindset of society and to encourage peaceful international exchange. "One of the main causes of war", as Polish lawyer Ludwik Ehrlich pointed out, "is the mentality which makes it possible to think of war."[768] For this purpose the League's bodies for intellectual cooperation devised a comprehensive propaganda plan, including "the publication of popular handbooks, the production of propaganda films and lantern slides on the League of Nations."[769] They used the educational institutions established during the 1920s and expanded on public outreach activities, trying to win as many people as possible for the internationalist campaign. Another popular channel were educational pamphlets with self-assessment exercises, written by prominent authors for mass audiences.[770] IR scholars also published in newspapers and featured on radio broadcasts, such as Toynbee's lecture series *World Order or Downfall* for the BBC in 1930.[771]

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[765] René Cassin, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 439.

[766] Samuel Hoare, 'Collective Action for Security Demanded', address delivered on 11 September 1935, published in Carnegie Endowment (ed.), *Italy and Ethiopia* (New York, 1935), p. 9.

[767] Heidi J. S. Tworek, 'Peace through Truth? The Press and Moral Disarmament through the League of Nations', *Medien & Zeit* 25:4 (2010).

[768] IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 273.

[769] Minutes of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), 10-11 July 1935, Dossier 19930, Box R4062, League of Nations Archives.

Women's voices were particularly noteworthy in the context of disarmament. Many female authors rejected more radically and absolutely all forms of militarism and unnecessary armament.[772] From its beginnings in 1915, WILPF opposed private arms production and trade.[773] Swanwick, although not a pacifist-at-all-costs, made powerful arguments against the use of violence in foreign policy. She opposed military sanctions both because of her critique of war *per se* as well as because she distrusted the decision-making structures for imposing international sanctions.[774] Pooled security did not solve the fundamental risks of anarchic violence, she argued. Even if the League succeeded in building a system of genuine 'collective security'—which, by the 1930s, was unlikely given its track record in Europe, Asia and South America—it would still risk abusing its force, and thereby cause unnecessary human suffering as well as undermine the project of international cooperation as a whole.[775] The only solution was radical and complete disarmament.

To the extent that it was possible, women tried to spread their policy proposals into male-dominated institutions. Only in exceptional cases did they occupy positions in academia, such as Lucy Mair at LSE, or in diplomacy, such as Rachel Crowdy at the League's Social Section. Most of the intellectual output was channelled by pressure groups. During the early 1930s, WILPF forwarded their resolutions—general budgetary limits on armaments, no warships over 10,000 tons, Germany's terms to be universally applied—to League Secretary General Eric Drummond. They also uttered their concern repeatedly over the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference.[776] To the great disappointment of many female and male authors of IR, none of these demands were put into practice. So instead of making war a physical impossibility, attention shifted to finding ways to limit its negative impact.

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[770] Gilbert Murray, *The League and its Guarantees* (London, 1920). Other contributors in this series included Norman Angell, G. Lowes Dickinson, Leonard Woolf, Arnold Toynbee and C. Delisle Burns.

[771] Arnold Toynbee, six broadcast talks on *World Order or Downfall?*, BBC, 10 November to 15 December 1930, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 80.

[772] Catia Cecilia Confortini, 'Links between Women, Peace, and Disarmament: Snapshots from the WILPF', Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via (eds.), *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives* (Santa Barbara, 2010), pp. 158-60.

[773] Women's International League (British Section), First Yearly Report: October 1915–October 1916, WILPF/2/1, LSE Archives.

[774] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Feminism, War and the Prospect of International Government: Helena Swanwick and the Lost Feminists of Interwar International Relations', *Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration* 2 (2008), pp. 9–10.

[775] Helena Swanwick, *Pooled Security: What does it mean?* (London, 1934), p. 18.

Sanctions

It was clear since the drafting of the Covenant in 1919 that some form of sanctions would have to be integrated into a system of collective guarantees. If disarmament and arbitration—the new normal mode of settling international disputes—failed, there had to be a safeguard for abnormal cases. This logic occurred to all pioneers of international cooperation. The US pressure group founded in 1915 in favour of an inter-governmental organisation was called the League to En*force* Peace. Jan Smuts' League of Nations plan identified sanctions as "the most important question of all".[777] Women were generally more reluctant with regard to sanctions, particularly military ones, as they feared that they would be ineffective and harm the population at large. The 1915 congress in The Hague was actually split over war as a last resort, but nevertheless included "social, moral and economic sanctions" in their resolutions.[778] However, even non-military sanctions, as the Wilson professor of International Politics Jerome D. Greene pointed out, could lead to the paralysis of entire industries and thereby cause great harm to innocent civilians.[779] There was also the question of costs. Even if countries could agree on the nature of sanctions, 'collective security' still required that all members paid their fair share for the maintenance of the scheme. This was akin to the tax paid by citizens to fund domestic police services, as Norman Angell argued.[780] In any case, there was anything but clarity on what sanctions should be, and less even on how they should work.

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[776] E. Horscroft to Eric Drummond, 25 March 1929, 11 April 1930, and 11 March 1931, Dossier 11078, Box R2182, League of Nations Archives.

[777] Jan Smuts, *The League of Nations: a practical suggestion* (London, 1918), p. 60.

[778] Brochure, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915–1938: a Venture in Internationalism*, (Geneva: Maison Internationale, 1938), WILPF/20/5, folder 1, LSE Archives; Harriet Hyman Alonson (ed.), *Women at The Hague: the International Congress of Women and its Results* (Chicago, 2013), pp. xviii-xix.

[779] Jerome D. Greene, *Idealism and Realism in Efforts Toward Peace* (Aberystwyth, 1933), p. 16.

[780] Norman Angell, 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 33.

Legally speaking, the Covenant left room for speculation on sanctions, despite its grand promises—or precisely because of them. In fact, legal fuzziness was sometimes a deliberate strategy to control international commitments. The 1924 Geneva Protocol was an attempt to alleviate some of these "defects" of the Covenant in terms of refining the nature of sanctions. Specifically, it spelled out the procedure by which member states could contribute by "military, naval and air forces" to international interventions. Mitrany felt that the Protocol was "much more complete and war-tight than the Covenant."[781] By introducing binding arbitration and automatic sanctions, however, the Protocol went too far for the taste of the Conservative British government and failed to be ratified. This highlighted a problem on the other end on the spectrum: this time, sanctions were too strongly prescribed, intimidating governments who did not want to commit to military operations outside their own sphere of interest. While one side feared that League sanctions were not deterrent enough, others worried that they would overburden military capacities. Repeated failures at defining an agreeable yet effective sanctions mechanism increasingly disillusioned IR scholars.

The Feminist View on 'Collective Security'

Feminist IR literature reflected the need for sanctions, too, though with a particular twist in support of democratic control of foreign policy. Most delegates at the 1915 congress at The Hague thought that sanctions could work only if they were implemented by democratically controlled institutions, including female representatives—many of the delegates were leading representatives of the fight for universal franchise. A world in which women were unable to vote, while men waged war, was dually unjust. This created a link between suffragists and pacifists, united in their alliance against male-dominated militarist society. WILPF supporters therefore demanded to make sanctions conditional on democratic standards. A minority opposed violent interventions altogether.[782] It is interesting to note how WILPF members bundled these demands—sanctions, democratic control of foreign policy, plebiscite-based transfer of territories, and female franchise—all in a single resolution of their 20-points program.[783] This proves that feminist IR literature was genuinely feminist, not simply IR written by women. Swanwick's work on sanctions eloquently captured her sensitivity to gender roles in foreign and defence policy: "I have often reflected how much safer women would be if men left off protecting them."[784]

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[781] David Mitrany, *The Problem of International Sanctions* (Oxford, 1925), p. 10.

[782] Harriet Hayman Alonso, *Women at The Hague* (Chicago, 2013), pp. xviii-xix.

[783] WILPF, *Extract from the Forthcoming Report of the International Congress of Women: held at Zurich, May 12–17, 1919* (Geneva, 1919[?]), WILPF/5/7, LSE Archives.

However, women's scholarship did not fulfil clichés of being vague and effeminate. Eckstein, for example, in her essay on a "*Staatenschutzvertrag* [states security pact]" outlined the details of an executive power as well as sanctions to enforce compliance with international law.[785] She had drafted the booklet after her disappointment with the Second Hague Conference in 1907, circulated it in pacifist circles, promoted it on lecture tours in the US and Europe, and re-published it in 1919 upon the encouragement of international lawyer Theodor Niemeyer. The *Staatenschutzvertrag* specified various types of sanctions, ranging from the suspension of diplomatic relationships and the exclusion from the Universal Postal Union to penalty tariffs, embargoes, denial of loans, outright international boycott or, as a last resort, international military coercion.[786] Like other female IR authors, Eckstein emphasised that foreign policy had to be controlled by democratic institutions. Eckstein lectured on IR in more than a dozen countries, she received a Nobel Peace Prize nomination and built a global network of supporters over the 1910s to 1930s—there is now even a memorial to her in her hometown, Coburg in Upper Franconia, Germany.[787] Lacking access to senior diplomacy, however, her work remained unheard and has since been largely forgotten. Eckstein's fate is but one of a whole range of neglected female authors of inter-war IR authors, including LSE lecturer Lucy Mair, Hungarian pacifist-feminist Rosika Schwimmer, or *L'Europe Nouvelle* editor Louise Weiss. Unveiling their forgotten contributions to international political thought shows that inter-war IR scholarship cannot be reduced to a set of English-speaking, male, naïve 'idealists'.

As these discussions indicate, 'collective security' was an ambiguous and contested concept even before applying it to practice. IR experts spent considerable effort on devising a compelling system of 'collective security', but often struggled to agree on even the most basic assumptions. Membership, sovereignty, sanctions, disarmament, international police forces, and feminist concerns about legitimacy and effectiveness remained contested issues, preventing a common understanding of the concept. At no point during the inter-war period, there was a coherent plan for 'collective security', let alone anything amounting to an IR theory.

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[784] Helena Swanwick and W. Arnold-Forster, *Sanctions of the League of Nations Covenant* (London, 1928), p. 25.

[785] Anna B. Eckstein, *Staatenschutzvertrag zur Sicherung des Weltfriedens* (München, 1919).

[786] Anna B. Eckstein, *Staatenschutzvertrag zur Sicherung des Weltfriedens* (München, 1919), p. 26.

[787] See Rüdiger Spenlen, *Anna B. Eckstein: Coburger Pazifistin und Vordenkerin für den Völkerbund* (Coburg, 1985), Box 2, Anna B. Eckstein Collected Papers, Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.

The full problem of internationalising security, however, surfaced only at the governmental level. Here, each state arrived with special interests on the nature of collective guarantees—based respectively on Germany's 'exceptional geographical situation', American isolationist reluctance, or British imperialism. Supposedly universal alliances were restricted to Europe. Agreed sanctions were never imposed. In short, every government interpreted 'collective security' according to its best interest.

Challenges to International Security: Manchuria and Abyssinia

Territorial disputes with involvement of the League of Nations were not exclusive to the 1930s. Born out of conflict and resented by the defeated powers, the world of the League was never static. IR authors discussed both successful interventions, such as the determination of the national status of the Åland Islands in 1921 or the settlement of the Graeco-Bulgarian dispute in 1925, and less successful ones, such as the failure of a Polish-Lithuanian solution or the escalation of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay.[788] But, as Toynbee observed in the *Survey of International Affairs* of 1931, the Manchurian crisis was the first test of the security system by a major power since the 1923 Corfu incident.[789] It exceeded previous disputes both in the scope of the claims and the level of international reactions. This conflict had "global implications".[790] Italy's assault on Ethiopia and Germany's aggression against Czechoslovakia and Poland continued this trend. Most importantly, these cases demonstrated the effect of militarist and dictatorial regimes on the League of Nations system. Their "evil spirit" undermined the logic of international cooperation so profoundly that it became doubtful whether the League's limited arsenal was suited at all for protecting peace in a world of authoritative leaders.[791] Was it possible to fight the enemies of democracy by democratic means? Could law-breaking aggressors be stopped by diplomacy and sanctions?

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[788] Georges Lechartier, 'The Useless League', *The North American Review* 213:785 (1921), pp. 457-8; Hamilton Holt, 'The League of Nations Effective', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 96 (1921), p. 3; Arthur Sweetser, 'The First Year and a Half of the League of Nations', *The Annals of the American Academy* 96 (1921), p. 28; Edward Mead Earle, 'Problems of Eastern and Southeastern Europe', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York* 12:1 (1926), p. 268; David Mitrany, 'The Possibility of a Balkan Locarno', *International Conciliation* 11 (1926), p. 168; George de Fiedorowicz, 'Historical Survey of the Application of Sanctions', *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 22 (1936), p. 118; Robert H. Lord, 'Lithuania and Poland', *Foreign Affairs* 1:4 (1923); N. Andrew N. Cleven, 'The Dispute Between Bolivia and Paraguay', *Current History* 29:4 (1929); William L. Schurz, 'The Chaco Dispute Between Bolivia and Paraguay', *Foreign Affairs* 7:4 (1929). For a comprehensive survey of the more than 40 security disputes put before the Council, see James T. Shotwell, *Lessons on Security and Disarmament: From the History of the League of Nations* (New York, 1949), pp. 45-80.

[789] Arnold Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1931* (Oxford, 1932), p. 475.

[790] F. W. Mohr, 'Die Grundlagen des Mandschureikonflikts', *Europäische Gespräche* 11 (1931), p. 540.

IR experts grappled with these questions throughout the 1930s as they watched the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises unfold. The majority of them correctly identified the aggressors, they understood the shortcomings of 'collective security' and campaigned relentlessly for improvements. Yet most remained ultimately optimistic about the general prospects of the League and collective guarantees—authors, such as Charles Webster, Lucy Zimmern, or Charles Saroléa all affirmed their "belief" in the League.[792] Some of the most vigilant IR observers also noted the "imperialist" elements of the two crises and framed their solutions in the context of "de-colonisation".[793] At the same time, Japanese and Italian scholars presented 'scientific' justifications for the respective attacks. Academic settings served as venues for quasi-diplomatic debate. Again, developments in IR were shaped by men and women, scholars and non-academics, who sought to influence the ways in which 'collective security' was studied and put into practice.

Japan's invasion of Manchuria, following the staged assault on the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden on 18 September 1931, shocked the IR community and initiated, more than previous disputes, a discussion on the effectiveness of the League's machinery of 'collective security'. News from the incident reached Geneva in the midst of preparations for the World Disarmament Conference. Despite the presence of numerous government representatives, however, a quick resolution was not reached. One British delegate was so unprepared that he confused the Four and Nine Power Washington Treaties.[794] The Lytton commission took more than a year to produce its report.[795] Rather than launching quick investigations and strongly endorsed international sanctions, the League lost crucial time and passed a most rudimentary resolution, as Toynbee lamented.[796] The League's reluctance rested, in turn, on that of individual governments who were either indifferent or outspokenly pro-Japanese. The British ambassador in Tokyo thought that it was "impossible [for Japan] to withdraw before negotiating."[797]

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[791] Alfred Zimmern, 'The League's Handling of the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute', *International Affairs* 14:6 (1935), p. 759.

[792] C. K. Webster, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (London, 1933); Lucy Zimmern, *Must the League Fail?* (London, 1932), p. 10; Charles Sarolea, *The Policy of Sanctions and the Failure of the League of Nations* (London, 1936), p. 7.

[793] Moritz Bonn, 'The Age of Counter-Colonisation', *International Affairs* 13:6 (1934), p. 845.

[794] Alfred Zimmern, 'Note by the Chairman', 11 March 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[795] League of Nations, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry*, Official No. C.663M.320 (October, 1932).

Amongst IR scholars, there were no illusions about Japan's responsibility for the dispute in Manchuria. The invasion was a "clear and unmistakable" breach of the Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, as Zimmern pointed out in a 1932 article prepared for *Headway,* the League of Nations Union's (LNU) house magazine.[798] The article was, however, withdrawn at the request of LNU president Cecil, probably because Zimmern's analysis was too openly critical of the League—Cecil himself defended the Council and put the blame on "Japanese militarism" and "Chinese anarchy".[799] Not only did Zimmern argue that "the moral authority of the Council had been greatly weakened", he explained that the circumstances had actually been favourable for a League-coordinated solution. The Assembly was in full session on 18 September 1931. Mukden was not as remote, nor were Eastern politics as abnormal as sometimes claimed. A peaceful solution was certainly not impossible. Instead, consultations in Geneva adopted the character of old fashioned diplomacy, reflecting the lack of will of the Great Powers, while the public was conveniently left in the dark about the course of events. By the time of the final Council meeting on 10 December, the Japanese army had advanced far into Manchuria, with casualties in the thousands.

A memorandum prepared by the New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in collaboration with Secretariat member Nitobe Inazō came to similar conclusions: Japan had violated major international treaties by occupying Manchuria "beyond any defensive necessity".[800] It had proven its aggressive aims by refusing to arbitrate, and thus the international community was obliged to recover

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[796] Arnold Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1931* (Oxford, 1932), p. 486.

[797] British Embassy Tokyo, 27 October 1931, The National Archives, FO/262/1774 Japan.China, Papers 313–354.

[798] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Action of the Council in the Manchurian Dispute', written for *Headway* but withdrawn, 1932, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[799] Viscount Cecil, in League of Nations Union, *The League, Manchuria and Disarmament* (London, 1931), pp. 24, 29.

[800] Memorandum and letter by Quincy Wright to Arnold Toynbee, 20 September 1932, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

China's rights. As a solution, the memo suggested that Manchuria be put under international control as a mandate, similar to the Saar or Gdańsk, and that its status be decided in a referendum after ten years. The East Asia expert F. W. Mohr also condemned Japan for having created facts by violent means, and advocated an international economic zone in Manchuria.[801] WILPF launched an international campaign against arms shipments to Japan.[802] Voices from elsewhere largely agreed with the view that Japan had inflicted undue harm on China and thereby damaged the "spirit of the League of Nations".[803]

IR scholars were also alert to the wider implications of the Manchurian crisis. In particular, they recognised the risk of creating a precedence. If Japan's occupation of Manchuria remained unanswered, future infringements of international law would be all the more difficult to punish. The most important thing to be lost in Manchuria was "confidence", as one author put it.[804] Hence, Western reactions to Manchuria received at least as much criticism as the behaviour of Japan itself—contradicting Carr's allegation of naïve 'idealism'. Murray called the British government's line "unwise and dishonourable", as it both harmed the League's reputation and actively made war possible.[805] Zimmern also blamed the "inertia of public opinion" in Britain for ruining the League's achievements of the 1920s.[806] Noel-Baker heavily criticised the British government for its half-hearted opposition to Japan's foreign policy. He submitted a paper to Chatham House calling for faster enquiries, an impartial report, and a strong British-led resolution at the League Council.[807] In terms of sanctions, he demanded restrictions on loans, an arms embargo, and more diplomatic pressure by withdrawing ambassadors from Tokyo. He also lamented the lax position of the press.

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[801] F. W. Mohr, 'Die Grundlagen des Mandschureikonflikts', *Europäische Gespräche* 11 (1931), pp. 541, 553.

[802] Camille Drevent, in WILPF, *Report of the Seventh Congress* (Geneva, 1932), p. 25.

[803] Hans Wehberg, 'Hat Japan durch die Besetzung der Mandschurei das Völkerrecht verletzt?', *Die Friedens-Warte* 32:1 (1932), p. 11. See also, H. C. Yung, 'Les Causes Profondes du Conflit Sino-Japonais', *L'Esprit International* 7 (1932); Guglielmo Ferrero, 'L'Europe, l'Extreme Orient et la Société des Nations', *L'Esprit International* 6 (1932).

[804] Victor Frêne, *The Meaning of the Manchurian Crisis* (Shanghai, 1931), p. 16.

[805] Murray to Wignall Hodson, 9 January 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 216.

[806] Alfred Zimmern, 'Note by the Chairman', 11 March 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[807] Philip Noel-Baker, 'Note on the Breakdown of the Collective System over the Manchurian Dispute', 26 Feb 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98. See also Kingsley Martin, 'British Opinion and the Abyssinian Dispute: A Survey of the Daily Papers During the Second Half of August, 1935', *The Political Quarterly* 6:4 (1935).

Accusations against individual governments turned into a more general critique of the League of Nations. The German pacifist lawyer Hans Wehberg argued that the League of Nations bore at least as much responsibility as Japan for the escalation of the Manchurian conflict because Geneva had failed to define a clear directive on military occupations and civil war.[808] One of the reasons for the crises of 'collective security' during the 1930s was its relative negligence during the 1920s. As collective guarantees remained a vague concept, the incentive for potential aggressors to comply with international law decreased. By 1930, the League had settled into a comfortable *modus vivendi* which postponed pressing questions about a universal security alliance, creating an illusion of security or, as Spaight labelled it, "pseudo-security".[809]

Every Council meeting without tangible results made the League increasingly look like a facade and its protagonists like puppets. The once praised "spirit of Geneva" now took the form of "Secretariat camaraderie", preventing rigorous decisions in favour of easily agreeable but toothless resolutions.[810] Zimmern was outraged that "the Japanese delegation gave an evening party in the week following the occupation of Mukden and all the world and his wife attended it."[811] Japanese propaganda did its best to hinder international responses. Pamphlets giving one-sided accounts were much sooner and more easily available than official reports.[812] Some observers concluded from these shortcomings the "futility of the League of Nations" as soon as 1931, but the majority remained in favour of international cooperation.[813]

Manchuria was a disappointment to the advocates of 'collective security'. But rather than leading into complete despair, it inspired a new wave of scholarship and policy proposals to fix the problem. Zimmern, who had warned from the outset that the League would not work without the willingness of its members, was distressed about the weak response to Japan's aggression but still confident that

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[808] Hans Wehberg, 'Hat Japan durch die Besetzung der Mandschurei das Völkerrecht verletzt?', *Die Friedens-Warte* 32:1 (1932), p. 12.

[809] J. M. Spaight, *Pseudo-Security* (London, 1928).

[810] Alfred Zimmern, 'Note by the Chairman', 11 March 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[811] Alfred Zimmern, 'Note by the Chairman', 11 March 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[812] See, for example, Manchuria Young Men's Federation, *An Appeal by Japanese People Concerning the Manchurian People* (Dairen, 1931); The Servants' Society of the South Manchuria Railway Company, *Declaration on Sino-Japanese Clashes* (Dairen, 1931).

[813] See League of Nations Union, *The League, Manchuria and Disarmament* (London, 1931), p. 2.

'collective security' could work.[814] Despite his devastating critique of the Council's performance in the Manchurian crisis, he was convinced that the Covenant was not yet "dead"—it was just "sleeping".[815] Noel-Baker, equally outraged at the fact that Britain had "sabotaged the League and refused to carry out our pledges under the Covenant in Manchuria", announced in March 1933 that he would devote the following two years of his life to the campaign for stronger sanctions, using his role in the Labour Party.[816] That same month, Japan withdrew from the League as the first of the future Axis powers, foreshadowing the long demise of the experiment of 'collective security'.

Four years after the Mukden incident at the South Manchurian Railway, another border friction disrupted the Geneva idyl and prompted extensive debate among IR scholars. The clash between Ethiopian and Italo-Somali forces at the Walwal oasis in December 1934 initiated a series of complaints and negotiations at the League of Nations which resulted in a prohibition of arms sales to the region but failed to produce a general agreement. Mussolini's full-scale attack on Ethiopia in October 1935, followed by the Franco-British betrayal of Ethiopia in the infamous Hoare-Laval Pact of December 1935, caused an outrage among politicians, scholars and the population at large. As tension grew on the European continent, particularly after Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, Britain and France were willing to contain Hitler at almost any price and essentially gave Italy a blank cheque in East Africa. Once again, 'collective security' was re-interpreted according to big power interests and sanctions failed to have the desired effect.[817] Was this outcome inevitable? How, if at all, could collective guarantees credibly deter aggressors and protect smaller states?

Like many other conflicts of the inter-war period, the Abyssinian crisis did not come without warning. Nor did its European implications. In February 1933, Kathleen Courtney had warned Gilbert Murray of the growing tension between France, Italy, and Germany.[818] Mussolini's imperial aspirations, too, had long been known.[819] The relapse into nationalist muscle-flexing was well noted by contemporary IR authors. As in the Manchurian crisis, there were few illusions about the intentions of the aggressor. In June 1935, Gilbert Murray confined to Montague Burton, the sponsor of Oxford's IR chair, that if Mussolini was allowed to wage war on Abyssinia, "the League will have lost practically all its authority."[820] Institutions for the study of IR, such as Chatham House, quickly picked up the topic and hosted expert debates on the issue. Zimmern made it undoubtedly clear in an October 1935 paper that the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was a case of "power-politics" and "imperialism", highlighting the dominance of metropolitan interests.[821] But studies on the subject also included perspectives from the periphery.[822]

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[814] Paul Rich, 'Alfred Zimmern's Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 85.

[815] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Action of the Council in the Manchurian Dispute', written for *Headway* but withdrawn, 1932, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[816] Noel-Baker to Gilbert Murray, 28 March 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 217.

[817] See George W. Baer, *Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations* (Stanford, 1967).

[818] Kathleen Courtney to Murray, 13 Feb 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 216.

Once the crisis was in full swing, IR authors continued to follow the course of events and commented upon proposed solutions. They were well-informed and critically minded, yet ultimately failed to grasp the root of the problem. In a 1936 study of the state of 'collective security', international lawyer Arnold McNair surveyed the measures taken against Italy—including an arms embargo, the prohibition of loans to Italian government, the prohibition of imports from Italy to cooperating countries, and restrictions on exports to Italy for major goods.[823] He argued that collective action on that level was entirely unprecedented and required time to work. A series of Chatham House papers made the same apologetic argument that the Abyssinian conflict marked the first time for the League to apply Article XVI and that it therefore deserved leniency.[824]

As in the case of Manchuria, defendants of Mussolini's policy quickly spread justifying 'evidence' for Italy's righteousness and denounced the League's intervention as illegitimate. Such propaganda did not only circulate in the press but received attention from renown academics, for example at Chatham House where the diplomat and historian Luigi Villari depicted Italy as the victim of East African turmoil and "xenophobia" (sic!).[825] Villari presented Italian foreign policy in the style of an ambassador, and answered questions as if on behalf of the *Duce*. Academic endorsement of official foreign policy was also a common practice at the International Studies Conference (ISC). A 1935 memo submitted by two Italian Fascists, the lawyer Roberto Forges Davanzati and the journalist Francesco Coppola, provided the "scientific" backing of Mussolini's policies, demanding the revision of treaties and attacking the concept of 'collective security' in its essence.[826] Their argument was that peace required a "real equilibrium of forces and of needs", and that strong powers, if given enough room, would ensure stability and security for all states—precisely the revival of the *Pax Romana* under Fascist leadership that Mussolini envisioned.[827] This vision received warmhearted support from the German ISC delegate, the international lawyer and political advisor Fritz Berber, who himself translated Nazi foreign policy for an academic audience.[828] Meanwhile, British and French delegates quarrelled over the extent to which 'collective security' had collapsed and what could be done to re-build it. Right-wing extremism entered the realm of IR scholarship largely without compelling responses from liberals.

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[819] Robert Gale Woolbert, 'Italian Colonial Expansion in Africa', *The Journal of Modern History* 4:3 (1932); Kenneth Scott, 'Mussolini and the Roman Empire', *The Classical Journey* 27:9 (1932).

[820] Murray to Burton, 29 June 1935, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[821] Alfred Zimmern, 'The League's Handling of the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute', *International Affairs* 14:6 (1935), p. 751.

[822] John M. Melly, 'Ethiopia and the War from the Ethiopian Point of View', *International Affairs* XV:1 (1936).

[823] Arnold McNair, 'Collective Security', *British Year Book of International Law* 17 (1936), p. 153.

[824] Royal Institute of International Affairs, 'Sanctions: The Character of International Sanctions and their Application', *Information Department Papers* 17 (1935), p. 10.

More than previous inter-war crises, the Italo-Abyssinian conflict underscored the eurocentrism of League diplomacy. Peace in Europe ranked more highly than peace elsewhere. Few pointed this out as vocally as Christine Sandford, wife of Colonel Daniel Sandford and advisor to Haile Selassie. In an address at Chatham House on 30 January 1936, she explained how Ethiopia was able to reform "from within" and protested heavily against European countries violating its independence—she also revealed that Ethiopians greatly preferred to be called Ethiopians, not Abyssinians.[829] Oxford colonial studies lecturer Margery Perham also presented an African perspective on international relations and drew attention to the "interests of natives".[830] In several letters to the editor of *The Times*, she pointed out the moral and political inconsistency of bombing a people about whom it is then claimed that they need help from the "civilised world".[831] Another anti-imperialist author was the Dutch international lawyer Jan Hendrik Willem Verzijl who attacked "that fatal illusion of the superiority of our Western civilisation from the moral point of view!"[832]

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[825] Luigi Villari, 'Italian Foreign Policy', *International Affairs* 14:3 (1935), pp. 337–9.

[826] Maurice Bourquin, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 7.

[827] Francesco Coppola, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 166.

[828] Fritz Berber, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 277. See next chapter for more details of Berber's role.

[829] [Christine] D. A. Sandford, 'Ethiopia: Reforms from within versus Foreign Control', *International Affairs* XV:2 (1936), p. 192.

[830] Margery Perham, "African criticisms of International Relations", given to the West African Student Union (WASU), London 17 March 1936, Margery Perham Papers, Box 230.

However, eurocentrism was not just racist and narrow-minded, but rested on the geo-strategic assumption that peace in Europe was a prerequisite for all other foreign policy. Even a liberal anti-fascist like Czech foreign minister Eduard Beneš argued during the Abyssinian crisis that his country had a "special mission of peace in Central Europe", rather than for international justice.[833] If the Abyssinian crisis could be settled without a European war, he claimed, this would mark "the beginning of a new and more tranquil phase of European politics."[834] As German IR scholar Ernst Jäckh had noted in the late 1920s, Franco-German rapprochement was the key to European reconciliation and in turn global peace. To be "a good German" meant to be "a good European", not a world citizen or an advocate of colonised people.[835] For imperial powers, such as Britain, the spectrum of interests was yet more complicated, having to account for the Dominions and other parts of the empire. IR was always studied from particular angles, mostly from a national one, sometimes from an imperial or European one, but certainly not from an 'objective' global one.

Despite the ugly outcomes of the first test, Quincy Wright argued, the world might learn from the Manchurian and Abyssinian experiences. Unless all great powers thoroughly supported 'collective security', it would be premature to conclude that it had failed completely.[836] One solution was therefore to strengthen the League by enlarging its membership, although there was little hope after Japan's and Germany's withdrawals in 1933. An alternative response was to withdraw into a more modest collective alliance and, while maintaining the League as a vehicle for international pressure, only to cooperate with those member states who were genuinely prepared to uphold guarantees in the case of infringement.[837] A less ambitious League would ensure that treaties were actually honoured while commitments stayed manageable. This version was endorsed, interestingly, by Austen Chamberlain in his inaugural address to the 1935 ISC, three years before his half-brother Neville defied 'collective security' altogether.[838]

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[831] Martgery Perham, 'Letters to the Editor', *The Times*, 5 October 1935 and 22 November 1935.

[832] Jan Hendrik Willem Verzijl, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 180.

[833] Eduard Beneš, *The Struggle for Collective Security in Europe and the Italo-Abyssinian War* (Prague, 1935), p. 58.

[834] Eduard Beneš, *The Struggle for Collective Security in Europe and the Italo-Abyssinian War* (Prague, 1935), p. 58.

[835] Ernst Jäckh, *The New Germany: Three Lectures by Ernst Jäckh* (Oxford, 1927), p. 96.

[836] Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 103.

However, the most prominent response to the failure of 'collective security' in the wake of the Abyssinian crisis was the demand for 'peaceful change'.[839] This generally referred to a policy of making concessions to those powers—the so called 'have-nots'—who grieved for a revision of treaties and who demanded certain territories in order to preempt violent transfers of territory or outright war. Since the international community had failed in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute to achieve either peace or territorial stability, the new plan was to secure at least the former.[840]

'Peaceful change' has traditionally been regarded as the ill-fated attempt to deal with Mussolini's and Hitler's expansionist ambitions, a catastrophic foreign policy that reflected the surrender of Western democracies to fascism—later called appeasement. However, as contemporary IR scholarship showed, 'peaceful change' was not so much a desperate policy of surrender but a pro-active policy intended to stay in control of defecting powers. It was designed as a complement to 'collective security', as McNair argued, not in opposition to it. 'Collective security' required "collective and peaceful revision of treaties."[841] What is more, the practice of making peaceful changes to the *status quo* had already been in use since 1919, Zimmern argued. It is also true, as Quincy Wright pointed out, that the Covenant favoured peace over static borders and that in this sense, the League had from the outset been a project of 'peaceful change'.[842] In other words, 'peaceful change' was employed as a regular foreign policy instrument long before the eleventh hour at Munich.

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[837] Henry Rowan-Robinson, *Sanctions Begone! A Plea and a Plan for the Reform of the League* (London, 1936), p. 204.

[838] Austen Chamberlain in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), pp. 36-7.

[839] See, for instance, G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, 'Territorial Revision and Article 19 of the League Covenant', *International Affairs* 14:6 (1935).

[840] George W. Baer, *Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations* (Stanford, 1967), pp. 303-4.

[841] Arnold McNair, 'Collective Security', *British Year Book of International Law* 17 (1936), p. 158.

[842] Quincy Wright, 'National Sovereignty and Collective Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (1936), p. 101.

Manchuria and Abyssinia have become standard milestones in inter-war diplomatic history as they exemplify the struggle to curb aggressive foreign policy. Along with the Spanish Civil War, the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, the re-militarisation of the Rhineland, and Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy at Munich in 1938, they chronicle the downfall of liberal international order. Contemporary authors themselves quickly realised that Manchuria was a "crucial test of [the League's] authority"[843], and that the Italo-Abyssinian conflict would become a "classic" in the history of failures of the inter-war period.[844] IR scholars saw the imminent danger of these disputes as well as their broader implications for the international system. Their works covered the immediate course of events, mid-term power shifts, and long-term implications for the prospects of 'collective security'.[845] In the end, sanctions failed, as most IR scholars agreed, mainly because they were not rigorously applied. Collective action either took too long to have a deterring effect—as in the Manchurian case—or lacked willingness on the side of major powers to implement the sanctions agreed upon—as in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.[846]

The State of the Discipline

The Manchurian and Abyssinian disputes were test cases for the intellectual development of 'collective security' within the discipline of IR. They were also notable for the style in which a range of IR authors—academics and diplomats, journalists and activists, men and women—approached some of the key questions of the inter-war period. It is important to take their non-academic activism into account, especially because of the increasing role of public interest which IR scholars themselves often stressed.[847]

IR authors seized the crises of the 1930s as an opportunity to exercise political influence and to present their solutions to a wider audience. Like in the 1920s, they operated in quasi-diplomatic circles, political clubs and societies which served their need for public recognition more than disinterested scholarship. For example, after official sanctions on Japan failed to be implemented, Toynbee suggested using LNU branches to call for a general boycott of Japanese goods.[848] Meanwhile Murray used his contacts to advocate the LNU's goals in *The Times*.[849] His correspondence with other IR experts and politicians, as well as his candidacy for parliament—he stood six times between 1918 and 1929—leave no doubt about the political aspirations that he pursued beside his academic career.[850]

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[843] Lucie A. Zimmern, *Must the League Fail?* (London, 1932), p. 9.

[844] Eduard Beneš, *The Struggle for Collective Security in Europe and the Italo-Abyssinian War* (Prague, 1935), p. 16.

[845] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), pp. 3-9.

[846] John Fischer Williams, *Sanctions under the Covenant* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 140-6; Albert E. Highley, 'The First Sanctions Experiment', *Geneva Studies* IX:4, p. 122.

[847] See, for example, C. K. Webster, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (London, 1933), p. 170.

In the Abyssinian crisis, too, IR scholars played a significant role in shaping public debate as well as in influencing official diplomacy. Noel-Baker discussed the possibility of sanctions against Italy on a private mission to the *Quai d'Orsay* and French left wing parties.[851] The influential Greek law professor Nikolaos Politis served as president of the Italo-Abyssinian Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration.[852] And Norman Angell was part of the group that welcomed Haile Selassie in London in 1936 after the latter was refused by Stanley Baldwin's government.[853] Their private diplomatic missions reflected the high international profile that many IR thinkers maintained, but also showed their readiness to react to current events rather than to engage in abstract studies.

As academics entered the political arena, so did philanthropists express their opinions. The founder of the Aberystwyth chair and LNU supporter, David Davies, urged Murray in 1933 to employ all means to exert pressure on the government for a tougher policy on 'collective security', including, a "deputation to the Prime Minister […] mass meetings […] debates in both Houses of Parliament [and an] invite [to] the Churches to devote a Sunday to Prayer and Intercession on behalf of the League."[854]

Women were just as sharp in their analysis of the League's failures. Zimmern's wife Lucie Zimmern frequently accompanied her husband to academic conferences and published IR literature in her own right. Her book *Must the League Fail?* (1932) reflected her disappointment with the Council's ineffectiveness in the Manchurian dispute and suggested a number of concrete remedies: (i) controversial international disputes should be discussed by Prime Ministers in the Council to ensure high-level attention; (ii) the agenda should not mix technical cooperation and trivial items with violent conflicts in order to "eliminate comfortable meetings without results"; and (iii) senior positions at the Secretariat should not be filled by Great Power nationals.[855] Eleanor Rathbone's *War Can Be Averted* (1938) eloquently exposed the cynicism that pervaded governments in their handling of the Manchurian and Abyssinian disputes.[856] She attacked the British government for its shameless "sympathy with Japan's desire to expand" and argued that business interests as well as geo-political strategy—"Japan as a bulwark against Communism"—dictated foreign policy, rather than a commitment to international law.[857] What was worse, Rathbone argued, Japan's move into Manchuria had created a precedent for other aggressors to play offensively.

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[848] Toynbee to Murray, 22 February 1932, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[849] Gilbert Murray, 'Letter to the editor', *The Times*, 9 September 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 217.

[850] Christopher Stray, 'Murray, (George) Gilbert Aimé (1866–1957)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available at: http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2167/view/article/35159?docPos=1 [accessed 01-06-2017].

[851] Murray to Toynbee, 20 September 1935, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[852] H. Lauterpacht (ed.), *Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, 1935–1937* (London,1945), p. 268.

[853] J. D. B. Miller, 'Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995), p. 102.

[854] David Davies to Murray, 11 January 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 216.

The Manchurian and Abyssinian crises revealed the profoundly uncertain and ambiguous nature of inter-war IR scholarship. Contrary to what has retrospectively been asserted about inter-war 'idealists', there were no clearcut strategies in dealing with international disputes, let alone theoretical schools. Neatly designed arbitration procedures were overridden by old-fashioned bi-lateral agreements. International bodies were replaced by *ad hoc* committees. In 1933, Gilbert Murray acknowledged to Kathleen Courtney that the real weakness of the League was that it had "no plan at all for exerting pressure on the nations that break their Covenant."[858] The uncertainty of inter-war diplomacy was mirrored in IR scholarship, and outrightly admitted by its protagonists. There was "a great deal of confusion of thought" on how to deal with Italy's attack on Ethiopia, Zimmern admitted in October 1935.[859] A few years later, in 1939, Zimmern concluded that the state of IR as a discipline was "confusion rather than enlightenment".[860] At the CFR, experts were "in a good deal of doubt" about how to deal with Japan, as Quincy Wright privately told Arnold Toynbee.[861] These were not just occasional utterances of perplexity but elements of the complex mosaic of contradictory attempts at explaining the struggle for international peace.[862]

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[855] Lucie A. Zimmern, *Must the League Fail?* (London, 1932), pp. 68-76.

[856] Eleanor Rathbone, *War Can Be Averted: the Achievability of Collective Security* (London, 1938).

[857] Eleanor Rathbone, *War Can Be Averted: the Achievability of Collective Security* (London, 1938), p. 33–4.

[858] Murray to Courtney, 14 January 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 216.

[859] Alfred Zimmern, 'The League's Handling of the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute', *International Affairs* 14:6 (1935), p. 759.

[860] Alfred Zimmern, *Modern Political Doctrines* (Oxford, 1939), p. ix.

The inability of IR scholars to provide a consistent explanation for the recent crises, coupled with continuously high expectations for their research, put the discipline in an awkward position. Within two decades, IR had achieved a reputation as a scientific and moral authority. Scholars were increasingly confident that their discipline constituted a science and was capable of deriving objective conclusions. At the same time, they continued to comment on and interfere with political events. In their inaugural address to the 1935 ISC, French historian Louis Eisenmann and US diplomat Allen W. Dulles reinforced the triple mission of their work: to conduct "scientific and analytical" scholarship, to promote "rapprochement through mutual understanding", and to give advise to "those in responsible positions of government."[863] In other words, they wanted to simultaneously be professors, internationalist activists, and government advisors.

Conclusion

"If the universities cannot remain bulwarks of liberalism and disinterestedness during these troublous times", a worried Quincy Wright wrote to William Rappard in 1936, "it is hard to know what can."[864] By their efforts for 'collective security' students of IR entered heated political debates and became actively involved in international affairs, the very object of their research. Not everyone appreciated this mélange of academia and diplomacy. Rappard complained about the lack of tangible results at the ISC in favour of diplomatic talking shop. He urged "to make these conferences as scientific and unpolitical as possible."[865] But 'collective security' was all about politics. It was a political instrument, designed by political actors in order to resolve political conflicts. As a result of their preoccupation with practical politics, IR scholars struggled to formulate plain analysis which, in turn, has made it difficult for subsequent generations of political scientists to decipher any theoretical patterns in their work. What this episode reveals about inter-war IR scholarship is rather an intensified exchange of loose ideas and policy proposals.

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[861] Quincy Wright to Toynbee, 30 September 1932, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[862] Confusion was also widespread in other areas of international politics during the inter-war period, such as anti-slavery provisions. See Amalia Ribi Forclaz, *Humanitarian Imperialism. The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880-1940* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 190-201.

[863] Louis Eisenmann and Allen W. Dulles, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), pp. 38-41.

[864] Quincy Wright to William Rappard, 31 December 1936, HEI 169/2, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[865] William Rappard to Chalmers Wright, 7 February 1935, HEI [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

To be sure, there were occasional references to opposing ideologies, a divergence between a "system of alliances" and a "system of obligatory conference", as Charles Webster called them.[866] But these arguments appeared much earlier than the alleged 'realist' turn in 1939 and from within the group of so called 'idealists' themselves. WILPF knew in 1931 that it was an "illusion" to count on "fine words about moral disarmament" and a vague desire for peace.[867] In Jerome D. Greene's 1933 inaugural lecture as Wilson Professor at Aberystwyth, he spoke on *Idealism and Realism in Efforts Toward Peace*, interpreting 'idealism' as the inquiry into the "desirable", and 'realism' as the study of the "attainable".[868] Greene criticised 'idealists' for ignoring "material facts", but he also exposed the flawed 'realist' dictum that "war has always been and always must be".[869] His predecessor on the Wilson chair, Charles Webster, readily described the League's handling of the Manchurian situation as the "greatest of all the failures", and was critical of the return of "secret meetings" between the Great Powers.[870] Zimmern, too, was fully aware of the "survival of the spirit and methods of power politics."[871] In 1936, he consequently suggested to form a sub-group of democratic states which were ready for a genuine cooperation—a coalition of "welfare states" as he called it.[872] But Zimmern knew that even such a coalition relied on "power policies", just as the dictatorships did. Earlier than the self-proclaimed

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[866] C. K. Webster, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (London, 1933), p. 178.

[867] Camille Drevet, 'Report on Activities Since Prague', in WILPF (ed.), *Report of the Seventh Congress* (Geneva, 1931), p. 24.

[868] Jerome D. Greene, *Idealism and Realism in Efforts Toward Peace* (Aberystwyth, 1933), p. 5.

[869] Jerome D. Greene, *Idealism and Realism in Efforts Toward Peace* (Aberystwyth, 1933), p. 21.

[870] C. K. Webster, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (London, 1933), pp. 166-7.

[871] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), p. 31.

[872] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), p. 59.

'realists', he warned to ignore "the powerful forces" that determined change in history.[873] If at all 'idealist', this made him a "cautious idealist".[874]

If it was not an 'idealist-realist' split, how can IR during this period best be described? One problem was that there was still no common set of methodologies, definitions, or scientific standards. Scholars had no analytical tools for comparing or testing their work, if it included any falsifiable hypotheses in the first place. Rather than agreeing on unmistakable 'currencies' of international politics, such as quantitative geo-political data or assumptions about the behaviour of states, IR scholars often relied on fuzzy concepts and ambiguous language. Rathbone, for example, believed in the "spiritual conditions" for world peace and promoted the use of propaganda, almost defiantly imitating the dictators' methods—"Nazi and Fascist propaganda […] should be countered by a steady infiltration of published material, lecturers, broadcasts and personal contacts."[875] Murray, too, spoke of the "weapon of moral pressure".[876] For Zimmern, the principle reason for the breakdown of cooperative diplomacy was the lack of a "sense of social solidarity" between countries.[877] Nowhere did he specify, however, what this "sense" meant or how it could be measured.

Some of the confusion about the theoretical affiliation of inter-war scholars can be reduced to mere terminology. For example, the IR lecturer and Quaker Karlin Capper-Johnson, proudly confessed "I hope I am an idealist", by which he meant to identify as a normative political scientist who nevertheless "examine[d] the world realistically."[878] Others did not subscribe to a binary 'idealist' vs. 'realist' distinction at all. J. M. Spaight classified approaches to inter-war diplomacy into three categories: a "progressive school" who were League enthusiasts, a "conservative school" who represented a Laodicean attitude towards international cooperation, and outright "nationalists" who put militarism and national self-interest above all else.[879] Zimmern, too, conceived of multiple "schools of thought", rather than a two-sided debate.[880]

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[873] 'A Historical Note on Collective Security', Alfred Zimmern, prepared for ISC, April 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 86.

[874] Paul Rich, 'Alfred Zimmern's Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995).

[875] Eleanor Rathbone, *War Can Be Averted: the Achievability of Collective Security* (London, 1938), p. 182.

[876] Gilbert Murray, in League of Nations Union (ed.), *The League, Manchuria and Disarmament* (London, 1931), p. 17.

[877] Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935* (London, 1936), p. 418.

[878] Karlin Capper-Johnson, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), p. 401.

The rhetoric employed in 1930s IR debates should therefore not be mistaken for what Carr labelled 'utopianism'. Yes, many authors argued that a working system of international politics required a minimum "willingness to cooperate"—whatever this meant—but they did not naïvely assume that this willingness existed.[881] Nor did the collapse of 'collective security' invariably slide into appeasement. Rathbone, for example, stressed the "uselessness of offering [concessions] to avert war, so long as the aggressors know that they can get more by grabbing it."[882] The truth is that most concepts employed by IR scholars were very blurry. Rather than retrospectively labelling inter-war scholars, it would be more accurate therefore to expose their diversity, fuzziness, and inconsistency. The debate about 'collective security' signalled the fragility of inter-war IR. The debate about Nazism and 'peaceful change'—covered in the next chapter—sealed its fate.

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[879] J. M. Spaight, *Pseudo-Security* (London, 1928), p. 4. See also Lucie A. Zimmern, *Must the League Fail?* (London, 1932), pp. 14-9.

[880] Alfred Zimmern, *Modern Political Doctrines* (Oxford, 1939), p. xii.

[881] Edward Grey, in League of Nations Union (ed.), *The League, Manchuria and Disarmament* (London, 1931), p. 3.

[882] Eleanor Rathbone, *War Can Be Averted: the Achievability of Collective Security* (London, 1938), p. 171.

5. The End of World Affairs: Nazism, Peaceful Change, and the Demise of Inter-War International Relations

"Obviously one cannot but gamble about the future, in as much as almost everything depends on the unforeseeable decisions of the gamblers who are in authority in at least two European neighbour States."
(William Rappard, 1938)[883]

Introduction

On 1 June 1933, the director of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP), Ernst Jäckh, addressed his colleagues at the International Studies Conference (ISC) in London.[884] In an emotive speech he recounted the history of the DHfP as a school of liberal democracy and international reconciliation, and lamented its fate under the Nazi regime. Since its foundation in 1920, Jäckh proudly remembered, the DHfP had provided a site for teaching, intellectual exchange, and the drafting of major international treaties. It had always been liberal in its approach and was open to scholars from the entire political spectrum, as Jäckh liked to stress. Now in 1933, under the new government, these values were in danger. The DHfP was put under the control of the propaganda ministry, which ended any hopes for academic freedom and international cooperation. For students of International Relations (IR), from Germany and abroad, this was a critical situation.

Hitler's entry into office in January 1933 marked the beginning of the end of inter-war IR. Within a few months, his administration had taken control of institutions for the study of IR in order to contain liberal political thought. There was no room for internationalist thinkers in a totalitarian regime based on *völkisch* ideology. Research centres came under the control of bogus academics, such as the international lawyer Fritz Berber or the propagandist Franz Alfred Six, who either openly sympathised with the regime or at least failed to resist. The result was an exodus of persecuted and oppositional scholars to Britain, Switzerland, and the United States. Meanwhile, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and proceeded to break international law in increasingly blunt ways, culminating in the assault on Poland in September 1939. What, if anything, could IR scholars have done to oppose this course of events? How did they interpret the breakdown of liberal institutions? And how did they interact with political actors?

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[883] William Rappard to Alfred Zimmern, 16 March 1938, HEI [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[884] Address by Ernst Jäckh, 1 June 1933, K.IV.2, IIIC Records.

While the international IR community provided notable assistance to refugee scholars, their intellectual response was less convincing. Many IR experts struggled to come to terms with Nazi foreign policy, let alone interpret it as part of a comprehensive theoretical approach. For some, such as Arnold Toynbee, the primary goal was not to analyse Nazi foreign policy from an outside perspective, but to interact with it—"to get a reasonable discussion with the Nazis".[885] The most common reaction, however, was to be puzzled or uncertain, such as Swiss diplomat-academic William Rappard who thought that "one cannot but gamble about the future".[886] Only a few authors, many of whom women, recognised the effect of totalitarianism and militarism on the international order. The historian Elizabeth Wiskemann, later Montague Burton Professor of IR at Edinburgh, was one of the most outspoken critics of the Nazi regime which she called "anti-Semitic", "anti-democratic", "racialist and Pan-German".[887] By and large, however, Hitler's aggressive expansionism sparked only insular debates about security, sanctions, disarmament, and the revision of treaties.

One of the most important IR debates of the second half of the 1930s centred on the concept of 'peaceful change'—the attempt to modify the international order and to revise disputed territorial borders in order to prevent violent conflict. The basic premise of 'peaceful change' was that the world's interest in peace ranked higher than the claims of any individual state to its territory.[888] In the face of Germany's revisionist claims, 'peaceful change' became a way to erode the international *status quo*, and it has subsequently been linked to 'appeasement'.[889] Indeed, several IR scholars, most prominently Toynbee, embarked upon semi-diplomatic missions to Germany in order to win allegedly modest Germans for some version of peaceful transfer of (colonial) territories.[890] However, IR scholars did not universally surrender to Nazi foreign policy. Nor did they naïvely believe in the moral and legal capacities of the League of Nations to oppose the dictatorships. If anything, they understood 'peaceful change' as a "flexible system" to manage international relations in the interest of peace, often well aware how dysfunctional it was.[891] Rather than a 'great debate' between so called 'idealist' and 'realist' thinkers, the 1930s saw a convoluted set of IR research, political commentary, and policy proposals, void of any consistent theoretical approaches.

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[885] Arnold Toynbee to Frederick Lugard, 23 June 1936, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 76.

[886] William Rappard to Alfred Zimmern, 16 March 1938, HEI [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[887] Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs & Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia* (London, 1938), p. 135.

[888] Quincy Wright, in International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, *Peaceful Change: Procedures, Population, Raw Materials, Colonies: Proceedings of the Tenth International Studies Conference* (Paris, 1938), p. 532.

[889] Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, 2006), pp. 69-70; Gerhard L. Weinberg, 'Germany, Munich, and Appeasement', Melvin Small and Otto Feinstein (eds.), *Appeasing Fascism* (London, 1991), p. 9.

[890] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London, 1967), pp. 276-85.

The final episode of inter-war IR underscores some of the principle features of inter-war IR scholarship. It shows how the architects of the discipline continued to engage in academic research alongside and intersecting with public policy, despite political circumstances. It shows how essential international networks of intellectual cooperation were, especially for refugee scholars and wartime collaboration. It shows how women, despite considerable struggle, continued to press for more influence in foreign policy and contributed substantially to the development of IR thought. Finally, it disproves crude theoretical reconstructions of IR scholarship. Inter-war authors never subscribed to 'idealism', 'realism', or any other reasonably coherent theoretical school. If there was one defining feature about these writers it was their failure to interpret the implications of dictatorial foreign policy on the international community. What most IR scholars failed to understand was that the dictators were not simply opposed to specific treaties or institutions but that they fundamentally sabotaged any system of international relations.

This chapter covers the final episode of inter-war IR scholarship. It starts by showing how the Nazi government nationalised research centres from 1933 and forced scholars into exile, essentially eliminating the independent study of IR. The second section reviews how Hitler's rise to power was perceived abroad and, in particular, how IR scholars struggled to make sense of his foreign policy agenda. The third section traces 'peaceful change' as a political idea, emphasising its multiple facets beyond territorial deals. The fourth section examines how IR scholars applied 'peaceful change' to Germany and how they tried to make sense of Hitler's foreign policy by engaging in quasi-diplomatic interactions with the regime. The final section then follows the slow demise of IR scholarship, from financial and political difficulties in the 1930s to the complete suspension of most IR activities within the first year of the Second World War.

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[891] Maurice Bourquin, in IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (Paris, 1938), p. 586.

Nazism and International Relations in Germany

One week after the Enabling Act had passed the *Reichstag*, on 1 April 1933, Jäckh was summoned to see Adolf Hitler.[892] At this point, the DHfP was the pre-eminent German school for political science and IR, comprising several hundred students, and an internationally well-known research institute.[893] It was, by and large, a centre for liberal political thought and counted many outspoken anti-Nazis among its faculty and students.[894] Hitler mistrusted the DHfP's political tolerance and its friendly relationships to the international research community. He was especially suspicious of the influence that foreign scholars might develop on public opinion in Germany. Consequently he demanded that the DHfP be put under state control, supervised by the propaganda ministry under the control of Joseph Goebbels. Two weeks later, on 14 April, Goebbels confirmed this decision, insisting that his ministry would gain control of all DHfP-related activities. Subjecting the school under Nazi rule had obvious implications in terms of academic freedom and effects on the curriculum. It also meant that unwelcome professors could be easily dismissed according to the 'Aryan paragraph', decreed in April 1933.

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[892] Memo by John Van Sickle, 22 April 1933, Folder 178, Box 19, Series 717, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[893] Steven D. Korenblat, 'A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 1920-1933', *Central European History* 39:3 (2006), p. 422.

[894] Siegfried Mielke (ed.), *Einzigartig: Dozenten, Studierende und Repräsentanten der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920–1933) im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin, 2008).

Jäckh's response to the Nazis' demand has been subject to extensive historical debate.[895] Like many of his colleagues, he took an ambiguous stance towards National Socialism and its consequences for the study of IR. Specifically, Jäckh's original reputation as a liberal democrat has been challenged by historians who have claimed that he portrayed the course of events in his favour.[896] His initial response was to maintain control over the research section of the DHfP, whilst allowing the teaching branch to be taken over by Goebbels. The idea was to secure employment and academic freedom at least for some faculty members while effectively selling out the rest of the DHfP to the Nazis. To facilitate this plan he appealed for support from the Rockefeller Foundation which had been a longtime sponsor of the DHfP.[897] However, when the deal failed to materialise, Jäckh gave the impression of having followed moral principles rather than an instinct of survival. The account he presented in London in June 1933, suggested that he fought for the freedom of the DHfP and resigned in protest of Hitler's demands:

> "I feel it necessary to say farewell to the old Hochschule […] the Hochschule is now taken over by the state [which implies] the application of the new regulations for civil servants […] it would have meant my dismissing those of my tried and valued friends and fellow workers who came under those regulations. I could not bring myself to do that, and therefore resigned."[898]

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[895] Detlef Lehnert, '"Politik als Wissenschaft": Beiträge zur Institutionalisierung einer Fachdisziplin in Forschung und Lehre der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920–1933)', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* No.3 (1989); Rainer Eisfeld, '"Nationale" Politikwissenschaft von der Weimarer Republik zum Dritten Reich', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* No.2 (1990); Detlef Lehnert, '"Schule der Demokratie" oder "politische Fachhochschule"? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit einer praxisorientierten Ausbildung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik 1920–1933', in Göhler and Zeuner (eds.), *Kontinutitäten und Brüche in der Politikwissenschaft* (Baden-Baden, 1991); Alfons Söllner, 'Gruppenbild mit Jäckh: Anmerkungen zur "Verwissenschaftlichung" der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik während der Weimarer Republik', in Göhler and Zeuner (eds.), *Kontinutitäten und Brüche in der Politikwissenschaft* (Baden-Baden, 1991); Ernst Haiger, 'Politikwissenschaft und Auslandswissenschaft im "Dritten Reich": (Deutsche) Hochschule für Politik 1933–1939 und Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Berliner Universität 1940–1945, in Göhler and Zeuner (eds.), *Kontinutitäten und Brüche in der Politikwissenschaft* (Baden-Baden, 1991); Manfred Gangl, 'Die Gründung der "Deutschen Hochschule für Politik"', in Gangl (ed.) *Das Politische: Zur Entstehung der Politikwissenschaft während der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt a. M., 2008); Siegfried Mielke, *Einzigartig: Dozenten, Studierende und Repräsentanten der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920–1933) im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin, 2008); Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt: Deutsche Politikwissenschaft 1920-1945*, 2nd edn. (Baden-Baden, 2013).

[896] Roswitha Wollkopf has claimed that Jäckh forged his resignation letter. See Wollkopf, *Zur politischen Konzeption und Wirksamkeit der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik*, (Berlin, Ph.D. diss., 1983); Detlef Lehnert, "Schule der Demokratie' oder 'politische Fachhochschule'?: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit einer praxisorientierten Ausbildung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, 1920-1933', in Göhler and Zeuner (eds.), *Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft* (Baden-Baden, 1991), p. 72.

[897] Cable by Ernst Jäckh to John Van Sickle, 1 May 1933: "Please do everything your power make continuation researchwork possible through our Institute of International Relations Stop outstanding scholars expect this Institute becoming central research institute International Relations and Political Science and are most Anxious Cooperate Sincerely Jaeckh", Folder 178, Box 19, Series 717, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[898] Address by Ernst Jäckh, 1 June 1933, K.IV.2, IIIC Records.

Apart from the claims he made in London, there is evidence that he might have been put under pressure for having a Jewish wife. It was for this reason that the Rockefeller Foundation decided to help him flee the Nazi regime, though his actual situation remains unclear.[899] When Jäckh emigrated, first to London in 1934, then to Geneva, and finally to New York in 1940, he depicted himself as a victim of Nazism and described the DHfP as "liberal democratic school of politics"—an image that remained widely accepted until challenged by Rainer Eisfeld in the 1990s.[900] As Eisfeld has shown, the DHfP's pre-1933 program had been less liberal and Jäckh's personal role less heroic than the latter had alleged. In fact, a considerable number of faculty members, including the political scientists Adolf Grabowsky and Arnold Bergstraesser, represented a 'functionalist' rather than 'liberal democratic' approach to politics. About half of the faculty stayed in their posts under Nazi rule, thus discrediting the DHfP's reputation as a liberal democratic institution. Some of the professors, such as the sociologist Max Hildebert Boehm or the lawyer Fritz Berber, actually benefitted from the Nazi take-over.[901] Meanwhile, Jäckh revealed his ambiguous stance towards the Nazi regime in a newspaper article in *Berliner Tageblatt* on 13 April 1933, shortly before the fate of the DHfP had been decided:

> "In my extensive conversation with *Reichskanzler* Hitler last week I reassured him that I have remained the same National Social [*Nationalsozialer*] […] I was also able to repeat the conviction that I had stated at the inauguration of the DHfP: that all my life and work for Germany […] followed the guiding principle of my Swabian friend Friedrich List: 'Behind all my plans lies Germany'."[902]

Once it became clear that the DHfP rescue plan had failed, Jäckh tried to establish a second career outside Germany. From 1934 to 1937 he served as vice-president at the New Commonwealth Institute in London, David Davies' pressure group for an international police force. Jäckh continued to attend ISC meetings and worked on a study commissioned by the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies. In July 1940, he crossed the Atlantic together with economist Ludwig von Mises, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, to seek refuge in the US, and to became a visiting professor at Columbia University in New York.[903]

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[899] Memo by JHW [Joseph H. Willits], 14 August 1940, Folder 3793, Box 319, Series 200, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[900] Ernst Jäckh, *Der Goldene Pflug: Lebensernte eines Weltbürgers* (Stuttgart, 1954), p. 64. Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt: Deutsche Politikwissenschaft 1920 – 1945* (Baden-Baden, 1991), p. 13.

[901] Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt* (Baden-Baden, 1991), p. 31.

[902] Ernst Jäckh, *Berliner Tageblatt*, clxxvii, 16 April (1933), newspaper cutting, Ernst Jäckh Papers, Box 16. Detlef Lehnert has quoted a similar statement by Jäckh on 27 March 1933 in which he affirms "his agreement with Hitler's [...] synthesis of all national-political forces of life". See Detlef Lehnert, '"Schule der Demokratie" oder "politische Fachhochschule"? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit einer praxisorientierten Ausbildung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik 19201933' in G. Göhler and B. Zeuner (eds), *Kontinutitäten und Brüche in der Politikwissenschaft* (Baden-Baden, 1991), p. 71.

Jäckh's story is not uncommon. Rather than clearly siding with political camps or distinct schools of thought, many IR scholars remained ambiguous and vague in their response to extreme nationalism. Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, director of the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) in Hamburg and a descendent of the accomplished Jewish family, was a free-thinking intellectual who maintained a high international profile. A lawyer by training, an authority on international affairs, a passionate writer and musician, he had travelled and lectured widely, established a large network of friends in Europe and the US, earning him honorary doctorates from Harvard and Chicago.[904] His tendency to go beyond professorial duties and to intervene in political debates, however, seemed too risky for the Nazis. As a result, he was pressured out of his professorship in 1933, officially on the grounds of his Jewish heritage.[905] Nazi reports denounced the IAP as "the personal work of Mendelssohn Bartholdy […] a Western, pacifist, cosmopolitan propaganda institute of foreign policy […] exercising a bad influence abroad, especially in the English-speaking world."[906] In 1934, Mendelssohn Bartholdy emigrated to England where he took up a senior fellowship at Balliol College, Oxford, with the support of William Beveridge, the Society for the Protection of Learning and Science (SPLS) and the Rockefeller Foundation.[907] He continued to teach classes on IR and International Law at Oxford but unexpectedly died two years later, unable to publish his latest manuscript—it was edited by James T. Shotwell and appeared posthumously as *The War and German Society: The Testament of a Liberal* (1937).[908]

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[903] Memo by Tracy B. Kittredge, 12 July 1940, Folder 3793, Box 319, Series 200, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[904] Rainer Nicolaysen, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1874-1936): Jurist, Friedensforscher, Künstler', *Rabels Zeitschrift* 75 (2011), p. 24.

[905] Report on IAP, 19 July 1933, StA HH, HW II, 361-5 II, Ad 22/1, Bd. 2.

[906] Report on IAP, addressed to Staatssekretär Ahrens, 19 July 1933, StA HH HW II, 361-5 II, Ad 22/1, Bd. 2, p. 9; and report on IAP by Dr. Ing. H. Grothe (Verbindungsstelle des Aussenpolitischen Amtes der NSDAP), 28 July 1933, StA HH, HW II, 361-5 II, Ad 22/1, Bd. 2, p. 18.

[907] William Beveridge to Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 28 September 1933, 525/3, S.P.S.L. Records; and Grant report, RF 33077, 20 June 1934, Folder 863, Box 65, Series 401, RG 1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[908] Report by Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 18 Feb 1936, Folder 863, Box 65, Series 401, RG 1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

Despite Mendelssohn Bartholdy's remarkable record as a liberal scholar and a "conciliatory diplomat",[909] his relationship to nationalist ideology was problematic. Having served as a legal expert on the German delegation to Versailles, he became a staunch critic of the Peace Treaty and a supporter of the revisionist campaign. After the First World War, he edited the 40-volume document collection *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914,* commissioned by the German government.[910] In the 1920s, he fought for a German-friendly interpretation of the Dawes and Young Plans as a delegate to both tribunals. Mendelssohn Bartholdy felt first and foremost as a servant of his country.[911] His work was motivated by his love of Germany—"*Deutschland voran*! [Germany ahead!]"[912]—not by a commitment to international peace. When confronted with the Nazis' accusations in 1933, a good friend and senior official at the foreign office defended Mendelssohn Bartholdy, arguing that he had done "good service for the German cause."[913] Most surprising for someone who was widely respected as an internationalist was a polemic article written in 1930 which suggested that Germany should leave the League of Nations.[914] If managed cleverly and in conjuncture with Italy, Mendelssohn Bartholdy argued, a German withdrawal could effectively dissolve the League system and facilitate the revision of Versailles. At the same time, this would shift power to the Permanent Court of Arbitration—"as Geneva loses […] The Hague gains."[915] In doing so, Mendelssohn Bartholdy advocated a different type of international order based on law rather than cooperation, and on national sovereignty rather than supra-national governance.

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[909] Gisela Gantzel-Kress, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy: Ein Bürgerhumanist und Versönungsdiplomat im Aufbruch der Demokratie in Deutschland', *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte*, Bd. 71 (1985).

[910] Rainer Nicolaysen, 'Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1874-1936): Jurist, Friedensforscher, Künstler', *Rabels Zeitschrift* 75 (2011), p. 19.

[911] See Jan Stöckmann, 'Studying the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany, 1912–33', *The International History Review* 38:5 (2016).

[912] These were his concluding words of a speech to international lawyers on 6 October 1917. See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht*, Heft 1 (Berlin, 1918), p. 34.

[913] Memo by Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow to Auswärtiges Amt, 9 October 1933, StA HH, HW II, 361-5 II, Ad 22/1, Bd. 2: 5253.

[914] Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 'Soll Deutschland kündigen?', *Europäische Gespräche* 12 (1930). Compare, for example, his argument in favour of the League of Nations based on the "interdependence and entanglement [Interdependenz und Verschlungenheit]" of European states. Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 'Pakt und Protokoll', *Der Neue Merkur* 8:8 (1925), p. 605.

[915] Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 'Soll Deutschland kündigen?', *Europäische Gespräche* 12 (1930), p. 599.

This peculiar dialectic between internationalism and nationalism shaped much of 1930s IR scholarship. On the one hand, Jäckh and Mendelssohn Bartholdy were at the forefront of Germany's liberal academic elite, deeply committed to intellectual cooperation and fond of their high-profile friends abroad. At the same time, their interpretation of international politics—that is, their analytical framework as well as their personal way of navigating the diplomatic stage—remained fundamentally national.[916] The interplay of internationalism and nationalism, as Glenda Sluga has argued, shaped the twentieth century world but, unlike one might assume, both forces operated alongside, rather than opposing, each other.[917] What is more, there was not just one "good" internationalism but a variety of political constructions advocating different forms of international order.[918] In the case of IR scholarship, this was reflected in the way authors employed the 'international' and the 'national' as analytical categories, and in the respective importance that they assigned to them. However, even the most progressive visionaries did not disregard the nation-state altogether. Zimmern saw himself as "a national man and an international body at the same time."[919]

After 1933, German centres for the study of IR were left with those academics who were not prosecuted on racial or political grounds, or who skilfully disguised their views in less controversial technical studies, such as the international economist Carl Brinkmann.[920] Historian Otto Hoetzsch managed to stay at the DHfP for a little longer before retiring into private life.[921] Others, such as the nationalist historian Martin Spahn—who had directed the *Politisches Kolleg* in Berlin since 1920, a right-wing political school founded in opposition to the DHfP—now turned from conservatism to outright

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[916] See Jan Stöckmann, 'Studying the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany, 1912–33', *The International History Review* 38:5 (2016).

[917] Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013), p. 152.

[918] Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, 'Introduction: Rethinking the History of Internationalism', in Sluga and Clavin (eds.), *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge, 2016), p. 10.

[919] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (1932), p. 89.

[920] See, for example, Carl Brinkmann, *Die Bedeutung der Allmenden im Neuen Deutschland* (Heidelberg, 1935).

[921] A national conservative politician, Hoetzsch had advocated a 'greater Germany' united with Austria but later fell out of favour with the Nazis because of his interest in Soviet Russia. See, Otto Hoetzsch to Werner Picht, 18 May 1933, K.I.1i, IIIC; Otto Hoetzsch, *Die weltpolitische Kräfteverteilung nach den Pariser Friedensschlüssen* (Berlin, 1925), p. 37; and Fritz T. Epstein, 'Hoetzsch, Otto', in *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 9 (1972), p. 371, available at https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd118838180.html#ndbcontent [accessed 03-10-2016].

National Socialism.[922] Mendelssohn Bartholdy's IAP was taken over by the historian and Nazi educationalist Adolf Rein. At the DHfP, the loyal party member Paul Meier-Benneckenstein became acting director after Jäckh's departure, although he kept a rather low profile and was not as influential as his predecessor. Hitler's government also bundled research centres under new umbrella organisations to facilitate better control—first, in 1935, the so called Department for the Scientific Study of International Relations [*Abteilung für das wissenschaftliche Studium der Internationalen Beziehungen*], then, in 1940, the German Institute for Foreign Studies [*Deutsche Auslandswissenschaftliche Institut*], both directed by loyal scholars.[923]

Lecturers and staff were now selected according to the *Führerprinzip* and the school offered courses such as "race studies".[924] The once proudly diverse student body came under pressure from NS youth organisations. Yet, the academic study of IR was not hijacked or steered by the Nazi government to the extent that one might expect, primarily because it was not considered important enough. After all, political elites were recruited from party circles, not from universities. Foreign policy strategies were developed by Hitler himself, not by a team of academic advisors.

Most remarkable, perhaps, was the role played by the jurist Friedrich ("Fritz") Berber.[925] A specialist on public international law and international affairs, Berber directed the DHfP's research branch since 1932 and continued to do so after the school's *Gleichschaltung* until 1940. From the mid-1930s, he served as special advisor to Joachim von Ribbentrop who valued Berber's expertise on international affairs and sent him on various semi-diplomatic missions—Ribbentrop called Berber "my encyclopaedia".[926] Ribbentrop realised that Berber was the ideal scholar-diplomat to gauge sentiments abroad at events such as the ISC.[927] The foreign office hence payed for Berber's travel expenses and arranged for him to meet with German and foreign ambassadors.[928] This practice skilfully exploited the non-official diplomatic channels cultivated by IR experts during a time when Nazi Germany was no longer at represented the League of Nations. Berber's objective was to legalise Hitler's empire while coming across as a moderate academic and maintaining friendly contacts abroad.[929] Internal documents confirm the Nazis' command of cultural diplomacy. "It is obvious that we will have to deal with ideological opponents", a Foreign Office report contemplated, "but it would be immensely beneficial to attack the enemy in his own camp."[930] Berber's reports were read by the head of the cultural division at the foreign office, Friedrich Stieve, as well as by Hitler's Minister of Culture, Bernhard Rust, although their impact remains unclear.[931]

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[922] Steven D. Korenblat, 'A School for the Republic?', *Central European History* 39:3 (2006), p. 405.

[923] Fritz Berber to IIIC, 4 May 1935, Folder 10010, Box 111, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center. See also Gisela Gantzel-Kress and Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, 'The Development of International Relations Studies in West Germany', in Ekkehart Krippendorff and Volker Rittberger (eds.), *The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents* (London, 1980), p. 200.

[924] Lecture broschure, winter term 1934/35, R64153, PA AA, Berlin.

[925] Katharina Rietzler, 'Counter-Imperial Orientalism: Friedrich Berber and the politics of international law in Germany and India, 1920s-1960s', *Journal of Global History* 11:1 (2016).

[926] Leonhard Reinisch to Arnold Toynbee, 21 June 1967, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 13.

As Hitler's empire spread across Europe, its propaganda machinery engulfed other institutions for the study of IR, such as the Konsularakademie in Vienna. Its inter-war directors, Anton Winter and Friedrich Hlavac, both held German nationalist views and did little to protect the school from right-wing influence.[932] At first, during the 1933-4 academic year, the curriculum remained largely unchanged and the leadership even expressed concerns to have German or Italian professors lecture "under current conditions".[933] But only days after Austria's *Anschluss* in March 1938, Hlavac signed a statement on behalf of the faculty that confirmed their loyalty to Hitler.[934] In private letters he expressed the hope to safeguard the Konsularakademie in some form, similar to what Jäckh had tried five years earlier in Berlin, although the true face of the regime was now much clearer.[935] At the same time, Hlavac did not have any illusions about Berlin's power in directing the future research agenda and selection of faculty members. By 20 April 1938, Hitler's birthday, the Nazis were firmly in control of the Konsularakademie and hosted a celebration in honour of the *Führer* which only "Aryan students" were invited to.[936] The event turned into a propaganda show, interpreting the annexation as a "great fortune" for Austria and as the reverse of the "injustices" of Versailles.[937] Soon after that, Hlavac announced a major re-structuring of the school and urged his students to finish their degrees before the changes would take effect.[938] In due course, all students had to be registered members of the National Socialist Party, and the curriculum listed courses on "race theory", the history of the German *Volk,* and Nazi economic policy.[939]

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[927] After the Second World War, Berber admitted that he had worked as a research assistant for Ribbentrop. Berber to Toynbee, 13 May 1967, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 13.

[928] Fritz Berber to Oberregierungsrat Böttger, 9 November 1937, BArch R 4901/2994, fol. 1, pag. 17.

[929] Katharina Rietzler, 'Counter-Imperial Orientalism', *Journal of Global History* 11:1 (2016), pp. 120-7.

[930] Report by German Foreign Ministry, January 1939, R61221, PA AA.

[931] Draft Letter by Bernhard Rust, 31 December 1937, BArch R 4901/2994, fol. 1, pag. 22.

[932] Heinrich Pfusterschmidt-Hardtenstein, *A Short History of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna* (2008), p. 28.

[933] Lecture plan 1933/4, Akte 44-4; and Memo, 30 December 1935, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 45.

[934] Memo, 19 March 1938, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 48.

[935] Friedrich Hlavac to Müller[?], 18 March 1938, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 48-1.

Thus came to an end the brief period of liberal political science in German-speaking countries. The very premise of Nazi ideology, a *völkisch*-inspired expansionist foreign policy, ran counter to the rational study of IR. Research in politics and IR rested on the assumption that government policies could be criticised and changed by democratic vote, a condition that could no longer be taken for granted. Instead, the Nazis nationalised, downsized and curbed the study of IR to ensure as little noise as possible from potential dissidents.

International Reactions

For many German scholars the only solution was to seek refuge abroad. Over the following years, a considerable number of German academics in the broader field of IR emigrated to Britain and the US. Besides Jäckh and Mendelssohn Bartholdy, this group included Herbert von Beckerath, Arnold Bergstraesser, Hajo Holborn, Hans Kelsen, Hans Morgenthau, Georg Schwarzenberger, Alfred Vagts, Erich Voegelin and Arnold Wolfers. Historians have counted 58 Central European scholars of international law or IR who emigrated to the US during the 1930s.[940] For several scholars among this group, emigration propelled their careers as they established themselves at universities in the US where the study of IR soon received more attention than in war-torn Europe. In many cases, the Rockefeller Foundation provided funds for refugee scholars and helped to arrange temporary academic positions. Another notable host institution was the New Commonwealth Institute in London, which employed Ernst Jäckh as director and published the works of Hans Kelsen, Walther Schücking, Georg Schwarzenberger (who taught IR in London from 1938 throughout the war),[941] Gustav Radbruch, Wolfgang Friedmann, Hans Wehberg, and Herbert Kraus.[942] To some extent even university students managed to continue their studies abroad. In 1937, the London School of Economics counted some 21 German students.[943] By the mid-1930s, the Nazi government had largely succeeded in suppressing the study of IR and forcing liberal scholars into exile. Now the distinctly international setup of IR became significant in that refugee academics were able to draw on extensive networks of foreign colleagues, sponsors, and academic institutions.

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[936] Circular to professors and students, 12 April 1938, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 48-1.

[937] Circular to professors and students, 12 April 1938, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 48-1.

[938] Circular, 6 May 1938, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 48-1.

[939] Circulars of 10 January and 26 February 1940, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 49-18.

[940] Alfons Söllner, 'From International Law to International Relations: Emigré Scholars in American Political Science and International Relations', in Felix Rösch (ed.), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations: A European Discipline in America?* (New York, 2014), p. 198.

Advocates of IR research were especially committed to helping refugee scholars because they regarded Hitler's policies both as a personal affront against their colleagues as well as undermining the inherent mission of their discipline.[944] Peaceful cooperation and the free flow of ideas could no longer be taken for granted. In April 1933, LSE director William Beveridge, who was a frequent participant at ISC meetings, set up a scheme for refugee scholars which became known as the Academic Assistance Council. One of the first scholars whom Beveridge invited to England was the economist Moritz Julius Bonn, himself a former ISC delegate, who accepted an offer to teach at LSE.[945] Along with the vice-chancellors of Oxford and Cambridge, Beveridge published an open letter on 13 May 1933 disapproving of the forced resignation of teaching staff at German universities.[946] Among the signatories was Oxford classicist Gilbert Murray, one of the champions of the collaborative study of IR and an outspoken friend of Germany—Murray had served on the Anglo-German Academic Board since the mid-1920s.[947] Both Beveridge and Murray realised the implications of the Nazi regime for social scientists in Germany and tried to set up a relief scheme. Although they won the support of Montague Burton, the sponsor of the IR chair at Oxford, they were powerless in the face of vast refugee numbers and the limited cooperation from overseas universities.[948]

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[941] F. S. Northedge, *Department of International History: A Brief History, 1924-1971*, p. 11, Box 12, School History, LSE Archives, London.

[942] Index of New Commonwealth Institute Memoranda, 1935, Dossier 2381, Box R4010, League of Nations Archives, Geneva.

[943] The Rockefeller Foundation, *Confidential Monthly Report* No. 12 (April, 1938).

[944] Philip Noel-Baker, Violet Bonham Carter, Victor Cazalet, Joan Mary Fry, George Barker Jeffery, Gilbert Murray, 'German Refugees', *The Times* (29 June 1937), p. 12.

[945] William Beveridge to Moritz Julius Bonn, 1 May 1933,. S.P.S.L. Records 229/2 (file 1933–49). See Patricia Clavin, "A Wandering Scholar' in Britain and the USA, 1933-45: The Life and Work of Moritz Bonn', in Anthony Grenville (ed.), *Refugees from the Third Reich in Britain* (Amsterdam, 2002), p. 32.

[946] Open letter, 12 May 1933, BArch R43-II/1431, pp. 34-5.

Although many IR authors, such as the delegates of the ISC, quickly noticed the domestic implications of Hitler's rise to power and cared for refugee scholars, they struggled to interpret Nazi foreign policy in terms of its impact on global peace. The key challenge which only few IR scholars understood was how to deal with non-democratic regimes in the framework of a democratic world order. Nazi Germany was not just another member of the international community. Its government undermined the most basic rules of diplomacy and deliberately torpedoed the League system. However, rather than addressing this problem with analytical clarity, most authors reacted with speculation, uncertainty, or even indifference. They often struggled to answer key questions: What were the implications of dictatorial governance internationally? How would the League of Nations work without Germany? How could countries be disarmed and borders redrawn peacefully?

To be fair, Nazism confronted the international community at an unfavourable moment. In 1931, the League of Nations had missed its opportunity to handle the Manchurian crisis. In 1932, disarmament had failed. The world economy was still in recovery mode after the Great Depression. And support for 'new diplomacy' was plummeting. In January 1933, Gilbert Murray, confessed that the League of Nations Union had exhausted both the "funds and the energy of [their] supporters over the disarmament question."[949] Moreover, it seemed difficult to decipher Hitler's peculiar foreign policy agenda after an era of relative stability under Gustav Stresemann. Historians still discuss the extent to which Hitler pursued any coherent strategy at all.[950] So for contemporary observers this was an extremely difficult task.

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[947] Minutes, 12 August 1926, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 386.

[948] Montague Burton to Beveridge, 22 January 1935, Beveridge/9A/45/7, LSE Archives.

[949] Gilbert Murray to David Davies, 13 January 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 216.

Yet, it is remarkable how late and lax many IR scholars reacted as the Nazi regime unfolded its program. Both ISC study cycles—the 1932-3 conference on the "State and Economic Life" and the 1934-5 edition on "Collective Security"—largely refrained from discussing Germany. Still in 1937, a WILPF conference panel on "strong political tensions" dealt with Spain and China-Japan but omitted Nazi Germany.[951] None of the major publications during the mid-1930s provided a thorough analysis of Nazi foreign policy, nor did many stress its significance in the first place. Correspondence between IR scholars often read like there was an elephant in the room—in May 1933, for example, the German ISC delegation reported that it might not be able to attend the next session due to "circumstances".[952] Yet, of course, IR scholars were very much aware of the "circumstances". They knew that Germany, even if no longer a member of the League, was an obligatory factor in European politics, although they were less clear about what this would imply.[953]

IR scholars not only struggled to predict and describe political developments. Some actively steered in the wrong direction. One year into Hitler's rule, Toynbee recruited Fritz Berber as a German delegate to the ISC (at a time when there was no longer a full German delegation). He argued that Berber was "more representative and more effective […] in the present circumstances" than other scholars to convey a German point of view.[954] Henri Bonnet, then director of the IIIC, assured Toynbee that "[t]he presence of Dr. Berber […] will certainly be most valuable", and thanked Toynbee for his initiative.[955] Neither Toynbee nor Bonnet saw the futility of inviting a representative whose sole mission was to attack international cooperation and to spread propaganda on behalf of the German government.[956] Nor did they make much effort at countering Berber's campaign, and the latter felt warmly integrated at ISC meetings. Their activities even went beyond the academic sphere. In June 1934, Toynbee was in direct correspondence with Nazi Party leaders and had an exchange with chief-ideologue Alfred Rosenberg.[957] This German-friendly attitude continued to persist throughout the 1930s among several IR authors. T. P. Conwell-Evans, who spent considerable time in Germany as an IR lecturer during the mid-1930s, reported not without pride about his personal interactions with leading German officials.[958] Vice versa, politicians spoke on academic platforms. For example, the head of the Sudeten German Party, Konrad Henlein, gave a paper at Chatham House in December 1935.[959]

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[950] See, for example, Jochen Thies, *Hitler's Plans for Global Domination: Nazi Architecture and Ultimate War Aims* (New York, 2012); or Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II,* 3rd edn. (New York, 2010).

[951] WILPF, *Report of the Ninth Congress* (Geneva, 1937), p. 11.

[952] Otto Hoetzsch to Werner Picht, 2 May 1933, K.I.1i, IIIC Records.

[953] The Round Table, 'German Foreign Policy', *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 26:101 (1935), p. 98.

[954] Arnold Toynbee to Henri Bonnet, 27 June 1934, K.I.1m, IIIC Records.

[955] Henri Bonnet to Arnold Toynbee, 9 April 1935, K.I.1q, IIIC Records.

If the dangerous nature of Germany's new government was discussed at all, then often confidentially. In November 1933, William Rappard sent a private letter to Zimmern in which he deplored the international "mess", and warned that "one must be stricken with absolute blindness if one does not see the imminent menace of Germany's present policies."[960] Noel-Baker wrote to Conservative politician Leo Amery about the connection between Nazism and the breakdown of disarmament. "The Germans' attitude is now beyond reproach", he commented in June 1933.[961] He understood that Hitler was merely "playing [the] disarmament game".[962] Now, Noel-Baker argued, the League's failure at curbing aggression in Manchuria and in the Chaco backfired on Europe where no one believed in collective security anymore.[963]

Women were among the sharpest and most critical observers of Nazism, presumably because they were alert to non-democratic governance in general—this is were the suffragist cause and the demand for democratic control of foreign policy overlapped. Just days after Hitler's rise to power

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[956] Toynbee later recalled that Berber shocked everyone at the ISC "by putting to us the case for Nazi Realpolitik", note on letter by Berber to Toynbee, 13 May 1967, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 13.

[957] Horst Obermüller to Arnold Toynbee, 22 June 1934, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 76.

[958] T. P. Conwell-Evans, in 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 41.

[959] Konrad Henlein, 'The German Minority in Czechoslovakia', *International Affairs* 15:4 (1936) [talk delivered on 9 December 1935].

[960] Rappard to Zimmern, 14 November 1933, HEI [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[961] Noel-Baker to Leo Amery[?], 1 June 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 217.

[962] Noel-Baker to Leo Amery[?], 1 June 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 217.

[963] Philip Noel-Baker to Gilbert Murray, 28 March 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 217.

Kathleen Courtney alerted Murray about the "only too apparent" tensions between Germany, Italy, and France.[964] At a 1936 debate at Chatham House, Eleanor Rathbone warned of perceiving Germany as an underdog, pointing out that Hitler had spent twice the sum on armaments allowed in 1935 alone.[965] If unchallenged, Hitler posed a serious threat for the outbreak of another war, Rathbone argued. Agnes Headlam-Morley's discussion of totalitarianism, published in 1937, explained how democratic institutions surrendered to authoritarian regimes.[966] In particular, she blamed Germany's parliamentary party system as well as the personality cult of Hitler and Mussolini. As one of only few writers she thus combined an attack on totalitarian governance with a self-critical approach to liberal democracy. Despite their valuable contributions, however, women's voices were by and large only spread within their own circles.

IR authors did not uniformly misconceive the intentions of Nazism and blindly endorse a liberal internationalist agenda. Even alleged 'idealists', such as Zimmern, saw the dangers of Hitler's regime. In November 1933, he called for a tough security policy on Germany and a global arms embargo.[967] By 1934 Zimmern had grown disillusioned with formal assurances of mutual peacefulness, rejecting treaties such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact as "sentimental [and] misguided idealism".[968] It would be too simple therefore to cluster IR scholarship into pro- and anti-German camps, or into 'idealist' and 'realist' for that matter. The truth is that they struggled to devise a reasonably consistent response to Nazi foreign policy and continued to think in terms of spontaneous policy proposals.

The Idea of Peaceful Change

The perplexities of Germany's foreign policy fuelled the debate about how to deal with governments that refused to cooperate with the international community. Broadly speaking, the idea was to find peaceful ways to satisfy the grievances of the so called 'have-not' powers, those revisionist countries, including Germany, that felt unjustly treated, particularly by their lack of overseas territories. Yet 'peaceful change', as the policy was dubbed, did not lead directly into outright appeasement but comprised of a multi-layered and prolonged discourse about the type and extent of changes. While the principle goal was to complement the League's porous sanctions system, advocates of 'peaceful change' discussed a range of related issues, such as access to raw materials or population control. The traditional story of 'peaceful change'—centred around Hitler's claims in Czechoslovakia and the September 1938 Munich agreement—erroneously equates 'peaceful change' with appeasement, Neville Chamberlain's infamous decision to make concessions to Germany at almost any cost. That story erroneously implies that the idea of adjusting borders led almost inevitably to the Second World War.[969]

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[964] Kathleen Courtney to Gilbert Murray, 13 Feb 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 216.

[965] Eleanor Rathbone, 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 41.

[966] Agnes Headlam-Morley, 'The Totalitarian State', in Reginald Coupland and Margery Perham (eds.), *Oxford University Summer School on Colonial Administration* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 31-3.

[967] Alfred Zimmern, "Mesures préventive contre l'Allemagne", *La Presse*, Montreal, November 1933, newspaper clipping, HEI [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[968] Alfred Zimmern, 'Memorandum for Discussion at Sub-Committee on the British Commonwealth and the Collective System', 25 June 1934, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 97.

By looking at IR debates in the background, however, we begin to discern a longer and more nuanced history. For one, the idea of 'peaceful change' emerged much earlier than the mystical Munich moment in 1938. Some traced it back to pre-twentieth-century traditions of royal marriages, leases, annexations, exchanges of territories or population, gifts, or uncontested secession.[970] At the very latest, it was conceived during the drafting of the League Covenant.[971] President Wilson's draft of January 1919 put much more emphasis on the 'adjustment' article XIX than the final version, specifying reasons, procedure, and compensation for territorial change.[972] Academic advisors pushed in the same direction. As the papers of historian and government advisor James Headlam-Morley reveal, he hoped in May 1919 "that an opportunity will be made for modification" in the Covenant.[973] During the 1920s, scholars discussed "methods for change" in the context of League interventions, such as in the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru or with regard to Denmark's expulsion of Norwegians in East

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[969] See, for example, P. M. H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, 3rd edn. (New York, 2007), pp. 261-84; Igur Lukes and Erik Goldstein (eds.), *The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II* (London, 1999); or Zara Steiner, *Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933-1939* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 552-670.

[970] C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 1-18.

[971] 'A Historical Note on Collective Security', by Alfred Zimmern, April 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 86.

[972] G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, 'Territorial Revision and Article 19 of the League Covenant', *International Affairs* 14:6 (1935), pp. 820-1.

[973] Headlam-Morley to Alfred Zimmern, 26 May 1919, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box Adds. 1.

Greenland. For advocates of 'peaceful change', the basic premise throughout the inter-war period was that "the map of the world is not static."[974]

Once Hitler's government was in place in February 1933, Toynbee privately told Murray that the British government should make up its mind about border revision between Germany and Poland.[975] This was at a time when, despite having been a Nazi demand for years, there were no official diplomatic negotiations about border revisions in Central Europe. 'Peaceful change' scenarios were discussed in IR circles years before they became politically viable. Crucially, these IR discussions emerged when it was not yet foreseeable that adjusting borders in favour of the 'have-nots' would stimulate their appetite for more expansion. In fact, David Mitrany regretted in 1935 that work on 'peaceful change' had not started earlier.[976] Skeptics of the concept, who argued that 'peaceful' changes of frontiers risked violent rebellion, also expressed their opinion before the Nazis came to power.[977] To be sure, the mid-1930s became the high tide of 'peaceful change' thinking—as reflected in numerous publications, at conferences, lectures and university courses[978]—but earlier discourses contributed to the development of what is often lumped together as 'appeasement'.[979]

Second, 'peaceful change' as a political concept was more complex than is usually acknowledged. Rather than merely using it as a proxy for concessions to Germany, IR scholars discussed a whole range of policy options under the term 'peaceful change'. A common interpretation used at the ISC defined the term as "the peaceful settlement of international difficulties arising out of the aspirations of non-satisfied peoples."[980] It thus left enough room for speculation, by introducing "satisfaction" as a category in international politics and by failing to specify types and mechanisms of "peaceful settlement". Nor was there a consensus on what constituted a legitimate reason for change. Lord Lugard, the British representative on the Mandates Commission, differentiated three common arguments: (i) population pressure, (ii) access to raw materials, and (iii) national prestige.[981] Obviously, governments were reluctant to commit themselves to a fixed combination of these reasons. In any case, 'peaceful change' remained an underdetermined concept.

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[974] Manley O. Hudson, 'Recent Territorial Disputes before the League of Nations', *The Problem of Peace: Second Series: Lectures Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations* (Oxford, 1928), p. 100.

[975] Arnold Toynbee to Gilbert Murray, 20 February 1933, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[976] 'Notes by Professor Mitrany on Professor Zimmern's Memorandum', 3 October 1935, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 98.

[977] Gilbert Murray, 'Introduction', in Lucy Mair, *The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of the Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations* (London, 1928), p. viii.

[978] The ISC's 1936-1937 study cycle was themed 'Peaceful Change'. For university courses on 'peaceful change', see F. S. Northedge, *Department of International History: A Brief History, 1924-1971*, Box 12, School History, LSE Archives.

[979] See, for example, Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 109.

[980] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1937), p. 19.

Crucially, 'peaceful change' was not limited to what one might consider 'hard' politics but included issues of population control, migration, colonial reform, markets, and raw materials. In the case of raw materials, for instance, the French ISC delegate and founder of the Centre d'études de politique étrangère [Centre for Foreign Policy Studies] in Paris, Etienne Dennery, presented a detailed study of resources that he considered essential.[982] He outlined their spread across the various countries, and the extent to which unequal access to them could be mitigated. Dennery concluded that colonial revision would do little to satisfy the 'have-nots' demands, pointing by way of example to the fact that the total exports of Germany's former colonies amounted to no more than 3.5% of Germany's imports. The president of the International University Federation for the League of Nations, Ewan P. Wallis-Jones, presented a similar analysis at their 1936 meeting in Geneva.[983] The demand for transfer of territories, he argued, sprang from a desire for control over land, not access to it. Conceding to territorial demands would allow the 'have-nots' to pursue essentially warlike policies without having to fight.

The fear of 'overpopulation' played an important role in justifying the call for change. Underlying this discourse was a twofold assumption: first, that there were natural limits to how many people could live in a given country, and second, that one could re-arrange borders such that optimum levels were achieved. In the words of New Zealand historian Guy H. Scholefield, "congested" countries such as Japan needed "breathing space".[984] Leonard J. Cromie, a Carnegie research fellow in IR and rapporteur for the ISC, was convinced that there was "serious overcrowding" in the Far East, notably in India, China, Japan, Korea and the Netherlands Indies.[985] Other memoranda asserted that Italy, too, was "manifestly overpopulated".[986] As a consequence, delegates at the ISC suggested, one should draw up an international population policy targeted at a "synthetic optimum".[987] Germany, on the other hand, struggled to reproduce itself, even with the help of Nazi measures to increase the birth rate, and it was thus difficult to appreciate Hitler's claim for *Lebensraum*.[988] This analysis was significant not only in its criticism towards Germany but also because it introduced new phenomena to the scientific study of IR. 'Peaceful change' referred not simply to under-the-counter diplomatic deals between the 'have-nots' and the 'haves', but it was based on studies in a range of sub-fields—some of which have since become academic subjects in their own right.

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[981] Lord Lugard, 'The Basis of the Claim for Colonies', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 3.

[982] Etienne Dennery, in IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 103.

[983] Ewan P. Wallis-Jones, 'Redistribution of Raw Materials', in Fédération Universitaire Interntionale pour la Société des Nations, *Problèmes Du 'Peaceful Change': Rapport Du XIIIe Congrès* (Geneva, 1936), p. 34.

[984] Guy H. Scholefield, 'Peace in the Far East and the Collective System', *Tenth Series: Lectures Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations* (Geneva, 1936), p. 98.

The most common way to interpret 'peaceful change', however, was as a corollary of 'collective security' and within the context of international cooperation at large.[989] This idea went back to the drafting of the Covenant. Wilson had intended article XIX to have an authoritative rather than an advisory character, including sanctions if necessary.[990] If arbitration and sanctions were coordinated by an international authority, so the argument, then that authority should possess non-violent powers to adjust the international order. In other words, arbitration was to be the juridical power, sanctions represented the executive power, and 'peaceful change' was to become the legislative branch of international governance. In line with this analysis, C. K. Webster described 'peaceful change' and 'collective security' as two sides of the same coin of international relations.[991]

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[985] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (Paris, 1938), p. 132.

[986] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (Paris, 1938), p. 134.

[987] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (Paris, 1938), p. 495.

[988] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (Paris, 1938), p. 135

[989] See especially Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War? The Next Stage in the International Crisis', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 28. See also, Jaroslav Zourek, 'La sécurité collective et la définition de l'aggresseur', in Fédération Universitaire Interntionale pour la Société des Nations, *Problèmes Du 'Peaceful Change': Rapport Du XIIIe Congrès* (Geneva, 1936); Philip C. Jessup, *International Security: The American Role in Collective Action for Peace* (New York, 1935), p. 148.

[990] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), pp. 531, 539. Article XIX read: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." The Covenant of the League of Nations, *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy,* available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art19 [accessed 13-10-2016].

Inter-war IR scholars spent a lot of time emphasising this connection between securing and changing the international order. David Mitrany, for example, thought that a machinery for change had to be an inherent part of the League's collective system.[992] French lawyer Albert Geouffre de La Pradelle suggested to instal an "advisory board" attached to the League Council to study questions of 'peaceful change'.[993] Pitman B. Potter, an American IR scholar working at the Geneva Graduate Institute, suggested that the League's static-oriented approach should make at least some room for revisionist preferences of the 'have-nots'.[994] In all these writings, there was a strong association between security and change. Toynbee concluded that there had to be some constitutional means for both revising the law and for enforcing it. Or, to borrow his own words: "Collective security without peaceful change would be like a boiler without a safety-valve."[995]

In this sense, 'peaceful change' was regarded as an upgrade to the Covenant. US lawyer and diplomat John Foster Dulles suggested to develop the potential for 'peaceful change' contained in article XIX to overcome undue attachment to the *status quo*.[996] The same argument was also made by IR scholars William T. Stone and Clark M. Eichelberger and, somewhat surprisingly by the British delegation to the ISC—who would normally have had an interest in preserving the *status quo*.[997] The ineffectiveness of article XIX was lamented, too, by French historian Henri Hauser who argued that if it could be made to work effectively it would constitute "the most important step forward ever made by humanity."[998] The success of such changes depended, however, on who was considered part of "humanity".

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[991] Charles K. Webster, 'What is the Problem of Peaceful Change?', in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: an International Problem* (London, 1937), p. 3.

[992] 'Notes by Professor Mitrany on Professor Zimmern's Memorandum', 3 October 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[993] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 545.

[994] Pitman B. Potter, 'Reform of the League', in *The Problem of Peace: Eleventh Series: Lectures Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations* (Oxford, 1937), p. 205.

[995] Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War? The Next Stage in the International Crisis', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 27.

[996] John Foster Dulles, *War, Peace and Change* (London, 1939), p. ix.

[997] William T. Stone and Clark M. Eichelberger, *Peaceful Change: The Alternative to War* (New York, 1937), p. 42; and Memo, 4 June 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 86.

The potential implications of 'peaceful change' for colonial populations generated particular controversy. Female IR authors were among the principle critics of territorial transfers, arguing that the trade of colonial possessions would be politics at the expense of native peoples. In her 1937 study on 'Colonial Policy and Peaceful Change', LSE lecturer Lucy Mair delivered a thorough critique of the cynical and immoral game played by the Great Powers.[999] She first debunked the economic myth that overseas territories brought economic advantages to the metropolis, a claim which did not stand the test of serious investigation. For example, the territories that Germany claimed were not the ones that it was seeking raw materials from. Nor did colonial possessions guarantee Great Power status, as was obvious from the cases of Belgium and Holland or, vice-versa, the US. If for whichever reasons governments were still considering the transfer of colonial territories, Mair argued, the interests of native populations had to be at the centre of the debate because they represented the vast majority of those affected. In light of the National Socialist ideology of racial superiority, it would be difficult to believe that returning colonies to Germany would comply with the interests of people in Tanganyika, Mair concluded. Freda White delivered a similar argument at a 1936 Chatham House meeting. The application of the terms 'haves' and 'have-nots' was "very silly", she argued, because if one considered poverty and overpopulation consistently, then India and China would have to be the 'have-nots', not Italy and Germany.[1000]

Concern for native populations was not entirely absent from male IR discourse but was usually no more than a footnote and failed to result in any policy commitments.[1001] ISC delegates assured that the rights and interests of the "absent" will be taken into account, but their discussions rarely touched upon the well-being of native people.[1002] Even when they did, economic access for European powers usually ranked higher in the discussion about the transfer of sovereignty titles.[1003] A rare exception was French political science professor Henri Labouret who called for greater stress on the lives of native people.[1004] Or British lawyer Arnold McNair who opposed the transfer of colonies on the grounds that colonial powers should rather encourage self-government.[1005] Typically, though, anti-imperialist voices in the context of 'peaceful change' only came from the most progressive authors, such as the participants at the 1936 Geneva conference of the International University Federation for the League of Nations, who called for the "definite emancipation of colonies [*l'émancipation définitive des colonies*]".[1006] To the disappointment of the anti-colonial avant-garde, none of their concerns were manifested in a principled approach to IR, let alone political practice.

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[998] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 265.

[999] Lucy Mair, 'Colonial Policy and Peaceful Change', in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: an International Problem* (London, 1937).

[1000] Freda White, in 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 40.

[1001] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 192.

[1002] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 418.

'Peaceful change' grew out of the dissatisfaction with the world order as it was—the *status quo*—and out of the desire to devise a diplomatic instrument for modifying it. In that sense, 'peaceful change' was primarily a reaction to contemporary political events and an attempt at practical reforms. IR thinkers took advantage of the contingent nature of 'peaceful change' and the vague formulations in the Covenant. Thus, 'peaceful change' remained a playground for IR thinkers with an interest in practical diplomacy.

Making Sense of Hitler

In December 1935, Arnold Toynbee presented a paper at Chatham House, London, in which he presented 'peaceful change' as the only alternative to war.[1007] Specifically, he suggested to re-allocate territories currently controlled by the 'haves', so that the grievances of the 'have-nots' might be resolved. The 'have-nots' or 'dissatisfied' powers included Italy, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Bolivia, but it was clear that Germany was the principle problem. Toynbee's idea was to adjust the

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[1003] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 198.

[1004] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 436.

[1005] Arnold McNair, 'Collective Security', *British Year Book of International Law* 17 (1936), p. 159.

[1006] Fédération Universitaire Interntionale pour la Société des Nations, *Problèmes Du 'Peaceful Change': Rapport Du XIIIe Congrès* (Geneva, 1936), p. 85.

[1007] Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War? The Next Stage in the International Crisis', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936) [paper written on 8 December 1935, presented on 17 December 1935].

"dangerous inequality" between the British and French empires and post-Versailles Germany.[1008] To this end, he was prepared to give up British colonial possessions—"peaceful change at our own expense".[1009] Clinging to a quarter of the world's land surface, he argued, was difficult to justify without making a serious effort for security and peace. Toynbee's proposal was also a reaction to Samuel Hoare's plan to grant non-colonial powers access to raw materials, which the foreign minister had raised that September at the League Assembly and which was being discussed in the British public.[1010] If the idea worked, British sacrifices could serve as a model for a more general system for territorial revision. In any case, unless the 'haves' offered concessions to the 'have-nots', so Toynbee argued, the world would soon be at war anyway.[1011]

Towards the end of his talk Toynbee presented a plan that he granted might seem "utopian or revolutionary".[1012] He suggested that 'peaceful change' might be achieved by granting the 'have-nots' comprehensive access to colonial territories, such that these colonies would essentially be internationalised. In practice, this meant to extend the League's Mandate system to all European colonial holdings and to collaborate internationally on the administration of these territories. Toynbee imagined that they would fly the League of Nations flag and be administered by League of Nations staff.[1013] Internationalising colonies would not only ensure that the dissatisfied powers received their fair *economic* share but also participated *politically* in the administration of non-European territories. More importantly perhaps, it would enhance the spirit of international cooperation among European powers.[1014] Besides, there were few other options left. It was either "peaceful change or war". His reasoning reflected several key aspects of the 'peaceful change' discourse:

[1008] Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 30.

[1009] Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 32.

[1010] See, for example, 'Reorganisation of World Resources', *The Manchester Guardian*, 3 October 1935, p. 8.

[1011] On the movement for 'colonial appeasement', see Andrew J. Crozier, *Appeasement and Germany's Last Bid for Colonies* (London, 1988); and Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 327-30.

[1012] Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 48.

[1013] This proposal was echoed by Ewan P. Wallis-Jones, 'Redistribution of Raw Materials', in Fédération Universitaire Interntionale pour la Société des Nations, *Problèmes Du 'Peaceful Change': Rapport Du XIIIe Congrès* (Geneva, 1936), p. 39.

[1014] Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 47.

> "What terrifies Europe today is the fear that these forcibly imposed territorial arrangements will soon be changed violently in the traditional manner unless, at this eleventh hour, we can rise to the almost unprecedented moral achievement of carrying out peaceful change in the territorial sphere."[1015]

First, he claimed that the Versailles treaty had been unduly and "forcibly" imposed on Germany, and thus created a legitimate reason for revision. Second, he warned of the return to "traditional" means of international politics, by which he meant offensive war. Third, he stressed the urgency of the matter by calling it "the eleventh hour". Fourth, the solution would require "moral" effort—an important word because this became E. H. Carr's main criticism against his inter-war colleagues. Finally, he called for "territorial" revision including the change of sovereign rights, which was a significant novelty in inter-war foreign policy towards Germany.

To be sure, Toynbee's German-friendly stance did not result in outright appeasement at all costs. He was reluctant, for instance, to grant sovereign territorial rights to Germany in Bohemia because he feared it would endanger Czech independence. He also had reservations against simply handing over territories to another colonial power. Nor was Toynbee alone in endorsing colonial revision. Labour politician Charles Buxton applauded his paper and urged the British government to come up with responses to the "obvious injustices" prevailing between the 'haves' and 'have-nots'.[1016] Buxton had previously made a case for "concessions" to dissatisfied powers "whatever the form of government".[1017] In their 1935 book *The Price of Peace*, historian Frank H. Simonds and IR expert Brooks Emeny argued that neither Germany nor Italy possessed the natural resources necessary to support their populations, and that consequently some form of 'peaceful change' might be necessary for maintaining peace.[1018] Otherwise, so Simonds and Emeny concluded, these countries had no other peaceful means of altering the *status quo* which was upheld by public international law.

Yet there were also critics, such as the former head of the League's Economic and Financial Section, Arthur Salter, who argued that making concessions to Hitler at this stage "would whet rather than satisfy the aggressor's appetite."[1019] Another anonymous member of Chatham House doubted whether dictatorial regimes would be adequate partners in the administration of colonies, and questioned that the League would be able to set up a qualified and accountable staff.[1020] In particular, they wondered how Hitler's earlier stance, to have no interest in colonies, fitted his new interest in non-European lands.

[1015] Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 34.

[1016] Charles Buxton, in Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 48.

[1017] Charles Roden Buxton, 'The Dissatisfied Powers and the World's Resources', *The Contemporary Review*, November (1935), p. 4.

[1018] Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Price of Peace: the Challenge of Economic Nationalism* (London, 1935), pp. 334–5.

During the 1936-7 study cycle, the ISC picked up the problem of 'peaceful change', arguing that it would not only complement 'collective security' but actually be a prerequisite for international cooperation to work.[1021] Their fundamental assumption was that, as ISC chairman John Foster Dulles specified, there *were* "illegitimate" situations which required peaceful mechanisms for change. One of the debates at the plenary discussions centred on colonial revisionism as a tool to satisfy the 'have-nots'—the essence of Toynbee's Chatham House paper. The ISC was open to this idea. As Norwegian historian H. O. Christophersen outlined in his introductory report, colony-owning states would have to be prepared to transfer certain territories to other states in the interest of international peace.[1022] He identified Germany as the principle beneficiary of this practice. The delegates also discussed the technicalities of peaceful revision. Most advocated for some way of "gradually extending the mandate system".[1023]

The most controversial speaker was the lawyer Fritz Berber who attended the ISC on behalf of the German government. Berber was convinced that Nazi Germany in particular required scholars to interfere in practical politics.[1024] In his address Berber directly referred to Hitler's speech of 30 January 1937 in which the latter had made the claim for the return of German colonies.[1025] Drawing on official Nazi doctrine, the lawyer argued that the reasons for Germany not to have colonies in 1919 were no longer valid. Germany was now again a fully respected member of the international community that had proven its peacefulness. However, Berber then back-paddled and, rather than calling for a general scheme of colonial revision, favoured a practice of individual political bargaining—again, very much in line with what Hitler intended.

[1019] Arthur Salter, in Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 51.

[1020] Anonymous, in Arnold Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', *International Affairs* 15:1 (1936), p. 50.

[1021] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (Paris, 1938), p. 11.

[1022] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 208.

[1023] Quincy Wright, in IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 459.

[1024] Fritz Berber, *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit* (Berlin, 1934), p. 159.

[1025] Max Domarus, *Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945*, vol. 2 (London, 1992), pp. 861-74; IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 465.

In this respect Berber received unlikely support from Romanian political theorist David Mitrany and Norwegian lawyer Frede Castberg who also favoured a political rather than a juridical authority to be in charge of territorial adjustments.[1026] G. M. Gathorne-Hardy went even further and argued that negotiations about territorial revision should be conducted in private, not at the League of Nations because the public arena would invite all sorts of "propagandistic" influence.[1027] Lord Lytton, by contrast, was less amused and remarked that Berber had "skated over some very thin ice".[1028] Eugene Staley from the Council on Foreign Relations agreed with Lytton. He criticised Berber for portraying the question of colonial revision as a matter of existential concern to Germany.[1029] Scottish Labour politician and colonial expert Drummond Shiels protested that Berber's way of reasoning had "disorganised" the debate.[1030] After a heated exchange, Berber felt it necessary to reassure his colleagues that Germany did not intend to wage war over the question of colonies.[1031]

ISC delegates became so absorbed in and enthusiastic about playing world politics that Lord Lytton felt he had to remind them that their task was not to redistribute colonies or mandates.[1032] Shotwell reiterated Lytton's point, insisting on the scientific character of the ISC.[1033] But by this point there was little point in trying to disguise the political nature of scientific conferences. At another conference in 1937 in Geneva, Berber insisted that he was providing a "scientific treatment" and speaking as an "unofficial individual", yet proceeded to defend government policies, using verbatim quotes from official documents and Hitler's speeches.[1034] He made no effort to hide his political intentions, and accused his colleagues of misrepresenting the nature of National Socialist foreign policy.[1035] While the connection between thinkers and practitioners of IR had shaped the discipline since its origins, the second half of the 1930s saw a new dimension of this relationship. IR scholars now saw themselves as protectors of peace in a world of growing political antagonism. 'Peaceful change' was little more than a fuzzy catchword employed by academics and politicians at their respective convenience.

[1026] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 534.

[1027] G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, 'Territorial Revision and Article 19 of the League Covenant', *International Relations* 14:6 (1935), p. 827.

[1028] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 468.

[1029] Eugene Staley, in IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), pp. 470. Berber had made the following statement: "While for academics in most societies 'peaceful change' is but one sober, scientific problem amongst others […], for Germany it constitutes the actual problem of its existence and the future of its foreign policy, which German scholars must not remain silent about." Fritz Berber, 'Vorbemerkung', in Diedrich Westermann, *Beiträge zur deutschen Kolonialfrage* (Berlin, 1937), p. 8.

[1030] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 524.

[1031] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 481.

[1032] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 262.

[1033] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 547.

In February 1936, one week before the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Toynbee embarked upon a semi-diplomatic mission to Germany—as he had done on several previous occasions.[1036] He had been invited by Fritz Berber to address the Nazi Law Society and, as he routinely did, used the occasion to meet up with his friends among the liberal German intelligentsia. When he was welcomed in Berlin by Berber, Toynbee was shocked to learn that Ribbentrop knew about these personal contacts and also about the fact that Toynbee had published an unfavourable comment about Hitler in his *Survey of International Affairs for 1934*.[1037] This put Berber in an uncomfortable position since he had arranged for Toynbee's visit, which to the Nazi leadership now looked like an instance of foreign propaganda. Berber consequently apologised with Ribbentrop who, in turn, passed the news to Hitler. When the latter learned that Berber was in touch with the influential British scholar he decided to meet Toynbee and summoned him to his office.[1038]

[1034] Fritz Berber, 'The Third Reich and the Future of the Collective System', *The Problem of Peace: Eleventh Series: Lectures Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations* (Oxford, 1937), p. 65.

[1035] Fritz Berber, 'The Third Reich and the Future of the Collective System', *The Problem of Peace* (Oxford, 1937), p. 71.

[1036] Toynbee had many friends among the German intelligentsia and diplomatic elites, including Richard Kuenzer and Count Albrecht von Bernstorff. See Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London, 1967).

[1037] Toynbee had compared Hitler's liquidation of the SA to the style of "American gangsters." See Arnold Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs for 1934* (Oxford, 1935), p. 325.

[1038] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London, 1967), pp. 276-85.

On 28 February then, Hitler hosted Toynbee for an almost two hour conversation at the *Reichskanzlei* [Reich Chancellery].[1039] Apart from Toynbee and Berber, there were Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, and Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, a senior diplomat and last inter-war ambassador to the US. The meeting was dominated by a long monologue in which Hitler stylised himself as an all-European "saviour from Communism" and developed a comprehensive plan for Anglo-German friendship. Hitler disclaimed any hostility to Britain and, by contrast, described his vision for their collaboration, specifically offering military support to Britain's post at Singapore. This, so he argued, would create a European alliance against threats from Japan or Russia. He also promised to be open for discussion on Eastern Europe and denied any ambition to launch an attack on Russia, arguing that he did not want an "inferior [*minderwertig*]" population within his realm of power. Besides, he denied Germany's military capabilities to do so. While he did condemn the situation in Lithuania and Danzig, and also claimed that Austria's unification with Germany was only a matter of time, he otherwise showed no signs of aggressive foreign policy. In return, he demanded that Germany's former colonies be returned by the victorious powers since they had been taken away "unjustly and under false pretences" at Versailles.[1040]

Toynbee believed that Hitler was sincere regarding these promises, and drafted a memorandum for Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in which he recommended to respond favourably to the German overtures: "any response from our English side to his overtures for our friendship would produce an enormous counter-response to us from Hitler."[1041] However, Eden did not read the memo until 9 March when German troops had already entered the Rhineland. Nor did Toynbee's expedition bear any serious chances of initiating a European détente. It is true that Hitler was interested in British friendship—he used to call the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935 the "happiest day of his life."[1042] But he was never interested in non-European territories beyond their role as bargaining chips. In *Mein Kampf* he vigorously rejected Germany's pre-war colonial policy, precisely because it risked friction with Britain.[1043] So Toynbee's interview with Hitler was less of a serious avenue for conciliatory diplomacy than a showcase of Hitler's crooked tactics and, above all, the extent to which an internationally respected IR scholar was willing to buy into it.

[1039] Report by Arnold J. Toynbee, 8 March 1936, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 76, Folder 6.

[1040] Report by Arnold J. Toynbee, 8 March 1936, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 76, Folder 6.

[1041] Report by Arnold J. Toynbee, 8 March 1936, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 76, Folder 6.

[1042] See Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris* (London, 1998), p. 558.

Toynbee's escapades into German politics and his failure to decipher Hitler's plans were no exception. At a Chatham House event a few days later, on 18 March 1936, Labour MP and Germany-sympathiser Sydney Arnold argued that Hitler's move was rooted in Versailles injustice and that it did not inflict the slightest danger on France.[1044] Several members agreed, among them businessman and Conservative politician William Astor. Toynbee, who spoke next, repeated his impression of Hitler, insisting that he was sincere about peaceful cooperation with Britain. One should respond to the German overtures to have more control over future foreign policy.[1045]

With few exceptions, IR scholars failed to recognise the fundamentally evil nature of the Nazi regime. A common misconception was that Hitler could simply be explained as the "product of the injustices […] of the Versailles Treaty", and that one could hence counter the appeal of his regime by "the removal of its legitimate grievances."[1046] T. P. Conwell-Evans claimed in 1936 to know something of "the German desire for peace" and that Hitler's character was not as bad as usually portrayed.[1047] He defended Nazi foreign policy as the understandable result of being bullied by the Versailles order. Making concessions to Hitler now would draw Germany back into the League of Nations, Conwell-Evans thought. Toynbee's 1936 visit to Berlin was the just the tip of the iceberg.

So was revisionism the way to peace? Did 'peaceful change' provide the answer to the crises of the 1930s? And how was this reflected in the academic study of IR? For Toynbee at least, territorial change was not a taboo. In an October 1935 note, he compared Italy's campaign in Abyssinia with the option for "Poland to retrocede to Germany the Polish Corridor", concluding that, while the rights of the local population should generally take priority over external conditions, there were exceptions to international law.[1048] Toynbee thus re-introduced sovereign territories as a negotiable factor in diplomacy, but he was neither an ‘at-all-costs appeaser’ nor did he disregard military power as a means in foreign policy.[1049]

[1043] See Bryce Marian Wood, *Peaceful Change and the Colonial Problem* (New York, 1940), p. 81.

[1044] Sydney Arnold, 'Germany and the Rhineland', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 17.

[1045] Arnold Toynbee, 'Germany and the Rhineland', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), pp. 18-9.

[1046] G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920–1938,* 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1938), p. 356.

[1047] T. P. Conwell-Evans, 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 41.

Norman Angell, on the other hand, was entirely opposed to the trade of colonial territories. Drawing on his work on economic interdependence, he argued that colonies would not bring the ‘have-nots’ any advantages.[1050] In fact, so Angell, there were more Germans earning their money in Paris in 1913 than in all German colonies combined. It is interesting that Angell, once considered a model pacifist, was among those who warned against Germany and expressed readiness to resist—in the name of justice.[1051] While still considering himself a “pacifist”, he argued that it would have been an important gesture to France if the British had sent troops after the German violation of the demilitarised zone in March 1936.[1052] Regardless of which side IR authors were sympathising with at different times, their involvement in ‘peaceful change’ added to the politicisation of the discipline.

Subsequent generations of IR scholars found it easy to accuse Toynbee and his colleagues of ‘idealism’ because their responses to Nazi foreign policy seemed lax and out of touch with the imminent dangers. But their actual problem lay less in an overconfidence in international cooperation than in their wavering attitude to any sort of coherent foreign policy approach. The dictators were not behaving according to any of the rational or legal norms envisaged by the pioneers of IR. Rappard eloquently summarised this dilemma:

> “Obviously one cannot but gamble about the future, in as much as almost everything depends on the unforeseeable decisions of the gamblers who are in authority in at least two European neighbour States.”[1053]

[1048] Arnold Toynbee, ‘Note on Mr Bailey’s Draft and Professor Manning’s letter of October 18th, 1935’, 21 October 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[1049] Andrew J. Crozier, ‘Chatham House and Appeasement’, in Bosco and Navari (eds.), *Chatham House and British foreign policy, 1919-1945: the Royal Institute of International Affairs during the inter-war period* (London, 1994), p. 239; and Christopher Brewin, ‘Arnold Toynbee, Chatham House, and Research in a Global Context’, in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the the Twenty Years’ Crisis* (Oxford, 1995), p. 295.

[1050] Norman Angell, ‘Germany and the Rhineland II’, *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 24.

[1051] Norman Angell, ‘Germany and the Rhineland II’, *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936., p. 31.

[1052] Norman Angell, ‘Germany and the Rhineland II’, *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), pp. 36, 44.

[1053] William Rappard to Alfred Zimmern, 16 March 1938, HEI [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

Rappard was not alone in his sense of uncertainty. C. A. W. Manning confessed in a 1937 lecture at LSE that in their turbulent times "we know next to nothing about the future of peaceful change."[1054] Toynbee admitted that he was "really quite in the dark" about Berber's motives and intentions.[1055] And Zimmern confessed that 'peaceful change' in international affairs was "still almost virgin soil".[1056]

The problem was that Hitler was not simply opposed to the goals of the League of Nations, but the entire concept of his regime, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy, was so fundamentally opposed to any democratic or rational standard that it was impossible to do come to terms with it. At the 1937 WILPF congress, Emily G. Balch described the essence of Nazi politics as "an ethic of violence, a cult of tyranny, a narrow nationalism and racism, a scorn of discussion and reasonableness."[1057] By transgressing the frontiers of reason, Hitler's foreign policy seemed undecipherable for IR scholars. The problem was not just *what* Hitler was doing, it was *how* he was doing it. Whereas Germany's re-armament was bad enough in itself, it was "the manner in which that re-armament was made" that truly puzzled and endangered the international community, Webster argued.[1058] The problem was that dictatorships did not follow any coherent plans or patterns, primarily because the dictators did not have to rely on public opinion or the rule of law. As Toynbee thought in March 1936, "the present rulers of Germany were extraordinarily undecided themselves."[1059] But even if there was a strategy, as Andreas Hillgruber's *Stufenplan*-thesis on Hitler's foreign policy has claimed, contemporary observers were unable to decipher them and frame them in terms of IR theory. Dictatorial foreign policy was impenetrable by any IR approach at the time—and possibly has not been understood until today.

[1054] C. A. W. Manning, 'Some Suggested Conclusions', in Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: an International Problem* (London, 1937), p. 190.

[1055] Toynbee to Corder Catchpool, 14 December 1945, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 76.

[1056] 'Memorandum by Professor Zimmern on the Preparation of the next International Studies Conference: Peaceful Change', Alfred Zimmern, 27 July 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[1057] Emily G. Balch, in WILPF, *Report of the Fourth Congress* (Geneva, 1937), p. 8.

[1058] C. K. Webster, 'What is the Problem of Peaceful Change?', in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: an International Problem* (London, 1937), pp. 6-7.

[1059] Arnold Toynbee, 'Germany and the Rhineland', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 19.

The Slow Demise of Inter-War International Relations Scholarship

The demise of inter-war IR scholarship began in the mid-1930s at a time when several research institutions faced financial hardship and political crises. German scholars were pressured out of their jobs, international exchange became more difficult, and governments were less generous in their scientific funding as a result of the Great Depression. By the late 1930s, restrictions on international travel complicated the collaborative study of IR. For its 1937 congress WILPF had trouble finding a meeting location and obtaining passports for delegates.[1060] In 1938, two months after Austria's *Anschluss*, economist J. B. Condliffe reported about being stopped by SS border guards at Bregenz, Austria, while en route to Geneva.[1061] But the basic problem started years earlier. In February 1934, Murray wrote a worried letter to Arnold Toynbee, lamenting the general state of the discipline:

> "Do you realise how much international studies are being threatened? Manning's chair is coming to an end. Jerome Greene has to go back to America; which leaves Aberystwyth for the moment open; and there is the doubt whether the Montague Burton chair will continue here [...] and of course the poor old Hochschule is kaput."[1062]

In most cases, private sponsors helped out to fund professorships and research institutes. Montague Burton continued to fund the Oxford chair as well as endowing the chair originally sponsored by Ernest Cassel at the LSE. At the ISC, the Rockefeller Foundation committed to a two-year $30,000 grant in 1935, complemented by a further $100,000 in 1937.[1063] These endowments provided for continuity during times of political crisis, yet they also had their disadvantages. Philanthropists usually had a political or otherwise ideologically inspired agenda. The problem was not that sponsors pursued evil intentions, quite the contrary. But by investing the way they did, they made deliberate choices to fund a particular kind of IR, rather than other research. In addition to that, there were more obvious cases of cross-sectoral influence. Confidential reports by the Rockefeller Foundation confirm that the trustees were interested in securing top-level government positions for former fellows of the Foundation.[1064]

[1060] WILPF, *Report of the Ninth Congress* (Geneva, 1937), p. 9.

[1061] Condliffe to Rappard, 23 May 1938, HEI 133/1, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1062] Gilbert Murray to Arnold Toynbee, 23 February 1934, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[1063] Resolution RF 35137, 27 Sept 1935, and resolution RF 37117, 1 Dec 1937, Folder 952, Box 105, 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[1064] The Rockefeller Foundation, *Confidential Monthly Report* No. 11 (March, 1938), p. 2.

One noteworthy example of the problematic relationship between philanthropy and academia unfolded around the discipline's first professorial chair. After Jerome Greene had left the Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth vacant in 1934, a controversy ensued over its succession.[1065] The selection committee had recommended to consider E. H. Carr and C. A. Macartney in the final round of the appointment process.[1066] Meanwhile, Davies desperately wanted the League of Nations specialist William Arnold-Forster to assume the professorship, someone he believed was "whole-hearted in his devotion to the cause of international cooperation."[1067] Davies repeatedly appealed with the university authorities to this effect, using all his influence as one of the university's principle donors and gathering authoritative support from figures such as Lord Cecil.[1068] Gilbert Murray, too, joined Davies in insisting that the Wilson professorship should be held by someone who shared the "evangelist spirit" for which he had endowed the chair and who would not "merely [teach] general history".[1069] Davies knew that Arnold-Forster did not match the other candidates' academic credentials but kept challenging the decision of the selection committee, calling its principle a "dictator" in a letter to his confidant Murray.[1070] Despite Davies' strenuous campaign, E. H. Carr was eventually appointed on 10 March 1936, upon which a furious Davies resigned as chairman of the university council.[1071] What this story reveals, apart from Davies' almost neurotic obsession with pro-League IR scholarship, is the extent to which non-academic actors interfered with university affairs, essentially for political reasons.

As research institutions came under pressure and the political climate deteriorated, IR scholars increasingly withdrew into technical, non-politicised subject areas. By about 1938, the focus of publications and conferences was shifting away from the most controversial issues of foreign policy, such as 'collective security' and 'peaceful change'. Instead, scholars used the moment to reflect upon the state of their own discipline, initiating the first major retrospective of IR. Examples of this were books such as S. H. Bailey's *International Studies in Modern Education* (1938) and Alfred Zimmern's *University Teaching of International Relations* (1939).[1072] The ISC now had fewer and less prominent participants. Its 1938-9 study cycle was formally devoted to 'Economic Policies in Relation to World Peace', but was actually concerned with taking account of the state of the discipline. Starting in June 1937, the ISC held special meetings on the 'University Teaching of International Affairs'.[1073] The result were meagre studies into the state of IR in higher education and a most vague choice for the subsequent study session: "International Organisation".[1074]

[1065] E. L Ellis, *The University College Wales, Aberystwyth, 1872-1972* (Cardiff, 1972), pp. 245-7.

[1066] Report of the Wilson Chair of International Politics Joint Selection Committee, p. 75, Council Meeting, 6 March 1936, Council & Court of Governors Minutes, University College Wales, Aberystwyth.

[1067] David Davies to W. Arnold Forster, 27 February 1936, D4/5, David Davies Papers.

[1068] Report by the Right Hon. Lord Davies, p.76, Council Meeting, 6 March 1936, Council & Court of Governors Minutes, University College Wales, Aberystwyth; and Lord Cecil to David Davies, 4 March 1936: "I do hope Arnold-Foster will be appointed. Not only does he thoroughly deserve it, but I am sure he would make a most admirable professor.", Volume: 51138, Cecil of Chelwood Papers.

[1069] Gilbert Murray to David Davies, 30 July 1935, D4/4, David Davies Papers.

[1070] David Davies to Gilbert Murray, 16 February 1936, D4/5, David Davies Papers.

[1071] David Davies to Lisburne, 11 March 1936, D4/5, David Davies Papers.

Yet, this self-reflective element of 1930s IR scholarship did allow for some meaningful insights. For one, it became less accepted to write with strong opinionated undertones. Rappard, for example, was eager to protect the "scholarly spirit" of IR against infiltration by purely journalistic or political works.[1075] Unlike post-1945 allegations against previous IR scholarship popularised, inter-war authors were aware of some of the field's problems. For example, Zimmern concluded with consternation that the discipline neither possessed a coherent body of teaching material, nor an examination syllabus, and that it was thus "a bundle of subjects" rather than a singular one.[1076] He compared the conduct of IR to birds "picking up seeds of wisdom in the most unexpected quarters."[1077] After more than two decades, the discipline's protagonists were still somewhat unsure as to their ultimate goals. Paul Mantoux, for example, asserted that the task was "to understand and to convince", thus combining descriptive and normative functions.[1078] But there was no general debate on these issues, except a vague optimism that peaceful international cooperation will recover.

[1072] See also Paul Guggenheim and Pitman B. Potter, 'The Science of International Relations, Law, and Organisation', *Geneva Studies* XI:2 (1940).

[1073] Agenda of the tenth session, Paris 28 June to 3 July 1937, K/88-100, IIIC Records.

[1074] Report by Alfred Zimmern, 2 June 1939, K.XII.11, IIIC Records.

[1075] William Rappard to Pitman Potter, 18 April 1939: "your article would strike me as more enlightening if it had been written in a more scholarly and in a less controversial spirit", HEI 163/4-6, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1076] Alfred Zimmern, 'The University Teaching of International Relations', 5 March 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 86. See also W. E. C. Harrison, 'The University Teaching of International Affairs', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 2:3 (1936).

[1077] Alfred Zimmern, 'The University Teaching of International Relations', 5 March 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 86.

Unfortunately, by 1938 there was little reason to be optimistic about either international relations or the study thereof. Nevertheless, most IR experts continued to be loyal to both. While not entirely uncritical or 'utopian', their contributions often reflected a peculiar optimism. "This is no time for discouragement", declared Emily G. Balch at the 1937 Congress of WILPF.[1079] Even in May 1938, Murray was convinced that the Czech developments reflected how the League was willing "to stand up for something" and succeeded in "deterring Hitler from open aggression".[1080] He thought that Germany's neighbours still had a chance "to build some system of defence" with the help of League members.[1081]

The most loyal supporters of international cooperation continued to endorse some version of the concept until well into 1939, or even after full-scale hostilities had broken out in Europe.[1082] In March 1939, longtime IR enthusiast David Davies sent a letter to the editor of *The Times* calling for a revised version of 'collective security' which was supposed to bring out its deterrent effect by introducing "absolute certainty and complete efficiency".[1083] Davies' effort was in vain of course, as was his preposterous attempt at replacing cabinet ministers. "Is there no chance of replacing John Simon and Hoare in the Cabinet with Winston and Eden?", he asked Lord Cecil in April 1939.[1084] Even after the war had broken out, some IR experts continued to express their take on official foreign policy. Murray blamed the British government for not having "believe[d] in the League or Collective Security", and instead pursuing a policy of postponement until there was no other choice.[1085] Towards the end of the war, when reflecting on an ideal successor for the Oxford Montague Burton chair in IR, Murray argued that while one should not be "merely a propagandist", it was important to really incorporate the work of the League.[1086]

[1078] IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 572.

[1079] Emily G. Balch, 'Introduction', in WILPF, *Report of the Ninth Congress* (Geneva, 1937), p. 7.

[1080] Gilbert Murray to Clifford Allen, 24 May 1938, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 232.

[1081] Gilbert Murray, 'A Statement of Policy: prepared by Dr. Murray at the invitation of the Administration and Executive Committees [of LNU]', 31 May 1938, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 232. On the other hand, he was also worried that the British were urging the Czechs to concede too much—reflecting the typical ambiguity of inter-war IR. Gilbert Murray to Clifford Allen, 24 May 1938, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 232.

[1082] See, for example, Pitman B. Potter, 'Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations', *Geneva Studies* XIII:2 (1941).

[1083] He was referring to his scheme for an international police force. Copy of a letter to the editor, David Davies to Lord Cecil, 24 March 1939, Volume: 51138, Cecil of Chelwood Papers.

[1084] David Davies to Lord Cecil, 14 April 1939, Volume: 51138, Cecil of Chelwood Papers.

But again, IR scholars cannot unilaterally be blamed for naïvely defending the League. Quincy Wright, one of the most outspoken critics of appeasement, condemned Chamberlain's course in march 1936—"Mr Chamberlain's policies are all wrong"—and blamed the democracies for not standing up against the dictatorships.[1087] Others, such as the Dutch diplomat-professor Emanuel Moresco, realised that the work on 'peaceful change' was "hopelessly out of date" by 1939.[1088] Belgian ISC delegate Maurice Bourquin pointed out the "drawbacks and dangers" of the League system.[1089] There was opposition among IR scholars. They just failed to make sense of the international turmoil, or to influence decision-makers.

After hostilities broke out in September 1939, many institutions for the study of IR initially carried on with their regular activities. Henri Bonnet, director of the Paris International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), informed its members by a circular on 4 September that all activities would continue as normal.[1090] The 1940 ISC was in the planning, academic journals continued to publish, and professors continued to correspond. In April 1940, the IIIC Secretariat still happily reported about the formation of new committees at the ISC.[1091] A few months later, in September 1940, IIIC director Henri Bonnet was optimistic about moving the centre of intellectual cooperation to the US.[1092] It would be wrong therefore to associate the end of inter-war IR with Hitler's assault on Poland.

[1085] Gilbert Murry to S. C. Bartindale, 2 February 1940, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 236.

[1086] Gilbert Murray to E. L. Woodward, 4 April 1944, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[1087] Quincy Wright to William Rappard, 28 March 1938, HEI 169/2, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1088] Emanuel Moresco, *Colonial Questions and Peace* (Paris, 1939), p. 13.

[1089] Maurice Bourquin, 'Dynamism and the Machinery of International Institutions', *Geneva Studies* XI:5 (1940), p. 41.

[1090] Bonnet to Rappard, 4 Septembre 1939, HEI / Classeur, 'Coopération Intellectuelle', de Février 1928 [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1091] Leo Gross to William Rappard, 29 April 1940, HEI / Classeur, 'Coopération Intellectuelle', de Février 1928 [uncatalogued], Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

However, the war had undeniable consequences for the study and teaching of IR. At the start of the fall semester 1939, jurist Hans Wehberg decided to replace a lecture he had planned to hold in German with a French lecture on the "law of war".[1093] A few months later, he complained about decreasing numbers of students.[1094] Eventually, the Geneva Graduate Institute had to cross several staff names off the schedule for the 1940-1 academic year, including those of Hans Kelsen and Ludwig van Mises.[1095] Co-founder Paul Mantoux was on leave until further notice due to "events in France".[1096] In February 1940, the Vienna Konsularakademie began to prepare its staff and students for the war by exercises in air-raid shelters.[1097]

Facing German invasion in June 1940, the IIIC in Paris had to consider relocating. On 9 June 1940 director Bonnet sent the IIIC's personnel and archives to Guérande, a village by the Atlantic coast, as instructed by the *Quai d'Orsay*.[1098] On 19 June, shortly after German troops had occupied Paris, Bonnet left for Geneva and put his colleague Paul Ristorcelli in charge of what remained of the IIIC. Two months later, Fritz Berber arrived in Paris, having been appointed *Reichskommissar für geistige Zusammenarbeit* [Reich Commissioner for Intellectual Cooperation], and tried to take control of the IIIC's remains. To this effect he signed an agreement in September 1940 with former education minister Léon Bérard which specified that the IIIC should remain in Paris under French direction and German funding, though independent of the League of Nations. However, this plan never entered into force and by December 1940 Berber had resigned from his post as *Reichskommissar*. The IIIC thus remained under seal and there is no evidence of any substantial activity in Europe after this point.

[1092] Henri Bonnet to Gilbert Murray, 9 September 1940, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 117.

[1093] Hans Wehberg to William Rappard, 9 September 1939, HEI 168/4/1, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1094] Hans Wehberg to William Rappard, 30 April 1940, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1095] The Postgraduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva: Announcement for 1940–1941, p. 5, A/1 (1940/1941), Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1096] Rapport Administratif, 1940, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1097] Circular, 24 February 1940, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 49-18.

[1098] Etienne Lajti, memo, March 1943, A.I.144/2, IIIC Records.

Attempts to relocate the IIIC to Princeton, New Jersey—where the League's Economic and Financial Organisation had been moved—or to Havana failed in 1940 and 1941 respectively.[1099] And so intellectual cooperation remained dormant until the chords were taken up again in April 1945.[1100]

In the face of yet another large-scale war, women tirelessly repeated their claim for a more peaceful and gender-sensitive foreign policy.[1101] In particular, they reinforced their demand to be included in the forthcoming peace negotiations. Women deserved a "more active part in discussions on world settlement", as Kathleen Courtney argued in a letter to Murray in March 1940.[1102] They continued to speak out for mothers and children during the war, for example in terms of food distributions in Germany, but also claimed their place in high-politics and diplomacy.[1103] Where they could, women continued their effort for peace. The German literary scholar and peace activist Elizabeth Rotten, for example, who had been an avid WILPF supporter and educator withdrew to work "of a spiritual kind."[1104] On the whole, however, the war was probably even more detrimental to female than male scholars of IR who were being subjected, once again, to the violence that they tried so hard to prevent. It was only after the war, in 1948, that Agnes Headlam-Morley was appointed Montague Burton Professor of IR at Oxford, the first and to this day only woman on the chair.

Conclusion

In many ways, the study of IR ended in 1940 as it had started in 1914. The architects of IR operated, despite wartime conditions, through a wide-ranging network of professors and politicians, English-speaking and international, men and women. As in the beginning, the study of IR was closely related to and affected by the course of political events. The same transnational connections that had given rise to the collaborative study of IR during the 1910s now helped to deal with its gradual decline and to master its survival during the war. Refugee scholars took up positions abroad, research centres moved to non-combatant areas, philanthropists helped to fund IR activities that governments were no longer willing or able to maintain. Testing ideas in practice remained the goal for many IR thinkers, albeit being an increasingly difficult and dangerous exercise—in 1942, for example, Toynbee was asked by the Council on Foreign Relations to advise the US government.[1105] Private philanthropists continued to support the study of IR. Most of the pioneering minds stayed loyal to the discipline and the cause of international cooperation, such as Zimmern who continued to work for UNESCO. In 1947, Zimmern was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize—along with two other IR pioneers, the co-founder of Chatham House, Lionel Curtis, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[1106]

[1099] Gilbert Murray to Maude Miner Hadden, 2 August 1940, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 237; Note by Miguel Ozorio de Almeida, 30 March 1941, Dossier 41541, Box R4048, League of Nations Archives.

[1100] J. de Reynolds to LN Secretariat, 20 April 1945, Dossier 41541, Box R4048, League of Nations Archives.

[1101] See, for example, Laura Puffer Morgan, 'A Possible Technique of Disarmament Control', *Geneva Studies* XI:7 (1940).

[1102] Kathleen Courtney to Gilbert Murray, 11 March 1940, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 236.

[1103] Pamphlet, 'Work in Germany Among Women and Little Children', 18 Feb 1940, by Ruth Hanbury[?], Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 236.

[1104] Elisabeth Rotten to Gilbert Murray, July 1940, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 237.

Between the wars, IR was still a young discipline, eclectic and somewhat incoherent in nature. The boundaries to neighbouring disciplines were blurry. Theory was underdeveloped. Scholars seemed more interested in changing the world rather than interpreting or explaining it. Philanthropists threw in their support to gain a seat at the table. Inconsistent theoretical positions and *ad hoc* policy commentary dominated IR scholarship. Many authors adopted varying positions in response to political realities. This became increasingly grotesque during the second half of the 1930s. After the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, G. M. Gathorne-Hardy called for an ultimatum against Germany, whereas two years later he felt that Nazism could be overthrown by giving in to Hitler's grievances and taking away the fundament of his propaganda.[1107] Norman Angell shifted from non-resistance pacifism and disarmament in the 1910s and 20s to 'collective security' and strategies of military deterrence in the 1930s.[1108] Alfred Zimmern's celebration of the League of Nations in his lectures and publications was contrasted by a profound skepticism in private correspondence—"an international authority […] is unrealistic."[1109] Eventually, IR authors were unable to keep up with the speed of political events, and their discipline fell victim to the very actors that they had tried to control by means of international cooperation.

[1105] Arnold Toynbee to N. B. Ronald, 17 June 1942, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 117.

[1106] 'Nomination Database', available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nomination/archive/list.php [accessed 10-11-2016].

[1107] Compare G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, in 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), p. 39; and G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938,* 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1938), p. 356.

[1108] Norman Angell, 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), pp. 21-36, 43; see Martin Ceadel, 'The founding text of International Relations? Norman Angell's seminal yet flawed *The Great Illusion* (1909– 1938), *Review of International Studies* 37:4 (2011), pp. 1679-80.

IR had its undeniable defects which were yet to be addressed. Despite its shortcomings, however, this was a field to be taken seriously by academics and it attracted remarkable levels of attention from politicians, diplomats, philanthropists, journalists, and the general public. After all, IR sought to answer one of the most pressing questions of the twentieth century—how to make the world a more peaceful place.

[1109] Lecture Notes, by Alfred Zimmern, 1935[?], Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 132; and Memorandum by Professor Zimmern on the Preparation of the next International Studies Conference: Peaceful Change', Alfred Zimmern, 27 July 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

Conclusion: Making International Relations

"My zeal for peace caused me to turn a blind eye to ugly facts."
(T. P. Conwell-Evans, 1947)[1110]

Despite wide-ranging efforts to advance the "scientific and analytical" study of International Relations (IR) from the 1910s to 1940, the formative years of IR remained largely a time of practical ventures and political campaigns.[1111] By the end of the inter-war period, the champions of IR were firmly established at policy institutes, foreign offices, and international organisations. They collaborated with colleagues from more than 40 countries and benefitted from philanthropic support as well as increasing public interest. In several cases, they interacted with and worked for national governments. Although IR scholars taught, researched, and published in academic fashion, the majority of their work was directly connected to current political events. Much of it was normative, not descriptive. It was about making rather than understanding international relations.

This dissertation has shown that the formation of IR was a profoundly political endeavour. IR scholars pursued political goals, sponsors followed partisan agendas, politicians interacted with academics, and the very object of study was political. These practical circumstances stood in contrast to the assertion, repeatedly stressed by early IR scholars, that their research was conducted "with the maximum objectivity" and based on "accurate and impartial documentation".[1112] Few scholars worried about the nature of the discipline or cared to specify their approach. Definitions, methodologies, and theories were almost entirely ignored.[1113] Nor did IR scholars question the goals of their field. Was it to advise governments? To analyse the dynamics of international relations? Or to educate students in the art of diplomacy? The evolving *modus vivendi* allowed for IR professors to simultaneously act as diplomats, journalists, and teachers without a consistent point of reference. They became "imitation statesmen."[1114]

[1110] T. P. Conwell-Evans, *None So Blind: A Study of The Crisis Years, 1930-1939* (London, 1947), p. xii.

[1111] On the notion of 'science' and 'objectivity', see Louis Eisenmann and Allen W. Dulles, in IIIC, *Collective Security: A record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences* (Paris, 1936), pp. 38-41.

[1112] Maurice Bourquin, in IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 585.

[1113] Consider, by contrast, the work of contemporary economists. In the preface of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936), John Maynard Keynes stressed that the book's "main purpose is to deal with difficult questions of theory, and only in the second place with the applications of this theory to practice." John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (Cambridge, 1936), p. v.

By 1940, the extent to which IR was politically charged had become unmistakably clear. Italian Fascists presented their case at academic conferences and German lawyers published studies legitimising treaty violations.[1115] IR was a "politicised science [*politisierte Wissenschaft*]", struggling to deal with propaganda, racism, and pseudo-scientific studies.[1116] For too long, liberal scholars defended the idea of peaceful cooperation which was powerless against exploiters of instability. It was only in 1942 when the former director of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), Henri Bonnet, noticed that it was impossible to cooperate with the Nazi regime because its totalitarian nature contradicted the very premise of collaborative IR scholarship.[1117] Hitler denied rational inquiry into foreign politics. Until 1940, however, IR scholars had tried to remain in contact with Nazi sympathisers.[1118] T. P. Conwell-Evans, who had lived in Germany during the 1930s, admitted in 1947 that he was "sadly late in perceiving the real nature of the Nazi German menace."[1119] The founder of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP), Ernst Jäckh, also acknowledged the politicisation of the study of IR, but he thought himself on the right side of history, claiming that he had deciphered the true face of Hitler's regime in 1933—a doubtful claim as recent studies have shown.[1120]

[1114] Jacob Viner, IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), p. 60.

[1115] Fritz Berber, *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit* (Berlin, 1934), pp. 108-10; Fritz Berber, *Diktat von Versailles: Entstehung, Inhalt, Zerfall: eine Darstellung in Dokumenten* (Essen, 1939).

[1116] Fritz Berber, *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit* (Berlin, 1934), p. 35.

[1117] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: A Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 189.

[1118] In March 1940, Pitman B. Potter, then general rapporteur of the International Studies Conference, invited the German lawyer Viktor Bruns to contribute a paper, and offered him a honorarium of $75. Pitman B. Potter to Viktor Bruns, 19 March 1940, K.I.26b., IIIC Records.

[1119] T. P. Conwell-Evans, *None So Blind: A Study of The Crisis Years, 1930-1939* (London, 1947), p. xii; Donald Cameron Watt, 'Chamberlain's ambassadors', in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (eds.), *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1951* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 146.

[1120] Ernst Jäckh, *Der Goldene Pflug: Lebensernte eines Weltbürgers* (Stuttgart, 1954), p. 496; Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt: Deutsche Politikwissenschaft 1920-1945*, 2nd edn. (Baden-Baden, 2013), p. 30.

The political nature of IR was neither a surprise, nor the result of Nazi influence.[1121] It was clear since the 1910s that IR would serve practical goals alongside and perhaps more than academic ones. This was evident at the 1915 meetings of peace activists and political thinkers in The Hague. It was reflected in the commitment of philanthropists to sponsor IR activities in the mid-1910s, as well as in the way that politicians became involved in the establishment of university departments and academic conferences throughout the 1920s. In fact, as French historian Louis Eisenmann and US diplomat Allen W. Dulles declared in 1935, IR pursued the triple mission to conduct "scientific and analytical" scholarship, to promote "rapprochement through mutual understanding", and to give advise to "those in responsible positions of government."[1122] The Second World War raised questions about the feasibility of this trifold agenda. To what extent should scholars be involved in political practice? Was IR about descriptions or prescriptions? The Second World War did not entirely resolve this challenge. In 1944, Gilbert Murray argued that it was necessary for a good IR teacher to have "a strong sense of what *ought* to be done", even if academic committees did not like it.[1123] Zimmern's successor on the Montague Burton chair, E. L. Woodward, agreed. In his 1945 inaugural lecture, he argued that a professor of IR had "every right […] to advocate his views".[1124]

That said, the protagonists of IR were extremely productive and imaginative. Their ideas on peace and security had a long-lasting impact on the international order. IR scholars contributed to the League of Nations Covenant, the Geneva Protocol, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the World Disarmament Conference, and the various attempts to achieve 'peaceful change' during the 1930s. They wrote on disarmament, sanctions, arbitration, international trade, raw materials, migration, and population control. They incorporated modes of thought from history, law, economics, political science, geography, philosophy, psychology, and anthropology. They also demanded reforms in the way foreign policy was governed. Women, in particular, pressed governments to make international politics more accessible, democratically accountable and ultimately more peaceful. In all of these areas, IR scholars broke new ground and experimented with institutions that continue to exist in some form until today.

[1121] Gilbert Murray, commenting on the inevitable fallibility of political minds, noted in 1930 that "human ignorance, and still more human folly, are so far from being removable elements in public affairs." See Gilbert Murray, 'Introduction', in William Archer, *The Great Analysis: a Plea for a Rational World-Order*, 2nd edn. (London, 1931), p. iii.

[1122] Louis Eisenmann and Allen W. Dulles, in IIIC, *Collective Security* (Paris, 1936), pp. 38-41.

[1123] Gilbert Murray to Lord Cecil, 8 February 1944, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[1124] E. L. Woodward, *The Study of International Relations at a University* (Oxford, 1945), p. 9.

These high ambitions conflicted with the modest means of the young discipline. In 1947, Zimmern concluded that the speed of contemporary international affairs made a resumption of inter-war methods "unsatisfactory, if not impracticable", and that the "standards of scholarship" had to be modified.[1125] Similarly, Conwell-Evans advised his colleagues in 1947 "to be more sceptical in their approach, and more scientific in their analysis of questions of foreign affairs than was my generation"[1126] Subsequent generations of IR scholars have significantly advanced and expanded the scope of the subject, including new methods such as quantitative analysis and game theory. Meanwhile, the institutions and research questions formed during the first half of the twentieth century are still among the most important in the field. While it is important to recognise both continuities and cleavages in IR, there is little value in simplifying or glorifying its history.

Beyond Disciplinary Myths

By contextualising the origins of IR within the complex institutional and political setting of the time, and by going beyond traditional geographical and chronological boundaries, this dissertation has tried to offer a more comprehensive history of the discipline. It has incorporated evidence from six countries, numerous research centres, official institutions, and individuals that played significant roles in the making of IR as an academic discipline. Excavating the various personal and institutional entanglements in the formation of IR does not necessarily make it easier to summarise this history—it probably does the opposite. What it offers is a richer account of a troubled political-academic endeavour that occupied a range of influential minds during the age of the World Wars. The following paragraphs briefly recapitulate the most striking features of this history, before the final section takes account of what was left of IR in 1940.

[1125] 'Note by Sir Alfred Zimmern on the Future of the International Studies Conference', 1946[?], Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 102. On the new "standards of objectivity and competence", see 'Draft Statutes of the International Studies Conference', 24 July 1947, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 102.

[1126] T. P. Conwell-Evans, *None So Blind* (London, 1947), p. xii.

The Birth of a Discipline

Contrary to conventional belief, IR scholarship did not appear *ex nihilo* in 1919 but emerged from various strands of thought and institutions formed since at least the beginning of the First World War. Specialised publications, teaching schemes, and professional associations created a sense of disciplinary self-awareness on an international level from about 1914. Among the key motives to study IR at that moment were the horrors of the ongoing war, the search for an effective post-war order, and the realisation that the world had become as interdependent as never before. Disciplinary formation was promoted by groups such as the Council for the Study of International Relations (CSIR) and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Contemporary authors, too, were convinced that IR originated during the war itself, not at the Paris Peace Conference or its aftermath.[1127] To recognise the pre-1919 origins is important because it reveals the involvement of IR scholars in the preparation of the peace, rather than portraying them as intellectual apostles of the League of Nations. However, it would be equally wrong to stretch the argument. The first signs of a reasonably integrated field making a scholarly effort appeared from 1914, whereas earlier contributions to international political thought lacked any kind of disciplinary identity.

Perhaps the most important stimulus to the birth of IR, however, was the demand for democratic control of foreign policy as a safeguard for a more peaceful international order. The idea was that issues of war and peace should be decided by the people rather than by heads of state in backroom diplomacy. Demands for constitutional reform and universal suffrage substantiated this campaign. In order to exercise their democratic power, so the argument went, the population would have to be educated in the field of foreign politics. This idea was championed from 1914 by the Union for Democratic Control (UDC) in Britain and its allies in Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and the US. Despite ongoing hostilities, the advocates of democratic control collaborated across borders and managed to set an agenda that resonated deeply with the debates on 'open diplomacy' at the 1919 Peace Conference, the inter-war period, and indeed the entire twentieth century—a history that still awaits more investigation. IR as a university subject owes a lot to the campaign for democratic control of foreign policy. As James Bryce, one of its principle spokespeople, pointed out in 1919, there was a "need for providing ampler means of instruction in foreign affairs for our people."[1128] By shifting the origins of the discipline back to 1914, it becomes possible to appreciate these motivations, rather than simplifying the 'birth' of IR as a product of the Paris Peace Conference.

[1127] William Rappard, "The Postgraduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva", 1930[?], Graduate Institute Records [uncatalogued]; Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935* (London, 1936), p. 137.

"International to the Core"

It is impossible to understand the formation of IR scholarship without taking into account its distinctly international setup. From the outset, and even during the Great War, there were extensive contacts between professors, politicians, and authors across national borders. A German IR expert such as Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy would commonly entertain correspondence with a wide range of individuals and organisations, such as Belgian legal scholar Maurice Bourquin, Dutch diplomat Eelco van Kleffens, French historian Paul Mantoux, Romanian-British political theorist David Mitrany, English suffragist Ethel Smyth, and the Foreign Policy Association in the US.[1129] Many of these figures could draw on international experiences through their family background or professional biographies. They published in foreign journals, spoke at international conferences, and benefited from the philanthropic efforts of multi-national corporations. The context in which IR developed was "international to the core", as Alfred Zimmern put it.[1130]

Most significantly, IR scholarship prospered within the apparatus of intellectual cooperation, set up by the League of Nations in the 1920s. The International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) in Geneva along with its Paris-based executive branch, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), provided a framework for IR scholars to exchange their work, establish visiting programs, compose handbooks, agree on the equivalence of degrees, and thereby generate a sense of disciplinary identity. Their flagship project, the International Studies Conference (ISC), rose from a small academic gathering in 1928 to a major international conference, attended by scholars, diplomats, and politicians from all over the world—although IR remained a euro-centric subject.

[1128] James Bryce, 'Foreign Policy and the People', *The International Review* 64:1 (1919), p. 11.

[1129] See the catalogue of Mendelssohn Bartholdy's papers. SPK MA Nachl. AMB.

[1130] Alfred Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', *Sociological Review* (1916), p. 215.

That said, intellectual cooperation did not only provide the practical apparatus for a modern social science. It offered moral support to the discipline, underpinning the universalist assumption that IR, like other sciences, could provide objective answers to global problems. The rules and laws of international politics were valid across borders, and therefore could not plausibly be studied in national isolation. If IR were to become a respected social science, its output had to be probed by an international research community.

Academia and Diplomacy

From its origins in the 1910s and throughout the inter-war period, IR scholarship was shaped by the close interaction between scholars and practitioners of foreign policy. Authors such as Philip Noel-Baker, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Helena Swanwick worked as politicians and diplomats alongside their careers as professors and writers. This overlap was not coincidental. Nor was it comparable to the occasional advise that historians, lawyers and philosophers lent their governments prior to the twentieth century. The nature of early IR was shaped by practical issues, not theoretical debates. And this was openly admitted. As Arnold Toynbee argued, "anyone who is to teach contemporary affairs should have some practical connection with them."[1131]

IR scholars engaged in practical activities for specific reasons. They sought to make the world a more peaceful place by subjecting the conduct of international affairs to rational enquiry and public scrutiny. To achieve that, they had to popularise their work and turn it into policies. They had to take up political and diplomatic offices themselves. They had to transfer political ideas into viable treaties and laws. As Christopher Hill acknowledged in 1984, "scholars have often been eager to make their own contribution to policy debates".[1132] Drawing on their extensive networks, professors such as Gilbert Murray and Philip Noel-Baker campaigned "to interest the Foreign Office" and went to "see the *Quai*

[1131] Arnold Toynbee to Gilbert Murray, 9 May 1929, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 415.

[1132] Christopher Hill, 'Academic International Relations: The siren song of policy relevance', in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, *Two worlds of international relations: Academics, practitioners and the trade in ideas* (London, 1994), p. 3.

d'Orsay".[1133] This does not imply that scholars were successful at influencing policy, but they sought to have an influence, or at least worked as if that was the objective of the discipline.

As professors became involved in practical affairs, so did practitioners in academia. Most institutions for the study of IR employed former diplomats and politicians as lecturers or as governors —Léon Bourgeois and Raymond Poincaré at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales (IHEI) in Paris, Rudolf Breitscheid and Walther Rathenau at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) in Berlin, Anton Winter and Alfred Verdross at the Konsularakademie in Vienna, Rachel Crowdy and William Rappard at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Most of the early British and US authors had gained practical experience, too, including Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Philip Noel-Baker, John Foster Dulles, James T. Shotwell, Arnold Toynbee, and Alfred Zimmern. Some programs explicitly catered for aspiring diplomats or offered short-term professional training in collaboration with foreign offices.[1134]

This thesis has demonstrated how the protagonists of the new discipline aspired to form a network of likeminded professionals. A 1938 Rockefeller Foundation report revealed how the trustees valued their grantees' "direct participation in the international activities" in Geneva.[1135] Pitman B. Potter was adviser to the Ethiopian government and a member of the Italo-Ethiopian Arbitration Commission, William Rappard was a member of the Mandates Commission, Maurice Bourquin served on the Preparatory Committee for the Disarmament Conference and was a Belgian delegate to the same Conference, and Carl Jacob Burckhardt was appointed High Commissioner to Danzig. It was only after the outbreak of the Second World War, when the future of the League of Nations seemed doomed, that the Rockefeller Foundation's officers suddenly decided that the Graduate Institute was no longer as valuable. It had been supported "on the assumption that Geneva was to be the world capital".[1136]

[1133] Gilbert Murray to Henri Bonnet, 27 October 1934, IICI A.I.71, IIIC Records; and Murray to Toynbee, 20 September 1935, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 72.

[1134] Freytag (Foreign Office) to Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 8 November 1919, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy Papers, SPK MA Nachl. AMB, 2,26,159; Ernest L Harris to Anton Winter, 9 August 1932, OeStA, Archiv der Konsularakademie, Box 42-15.

[1135] Resolution, 6 April 1938, Folder 922, Box 102, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[1136] Joseph H Willits to Fritz Real, 15 February 1944, Folder 931, Box 103, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

Of course, mutual influence between academia and diplomacy brought about problems. For one, the research agenda was constantly modified according to current events, preventing more profound or abstract studies. Second, there was no coherent theoretical body of literature for students of IR to refer to. Even a fairly modest project, such as the handbook of political terms, edited by the IIIC, petered out. Most importantly perhaps, it left everyone in the dark about the standards of the discipline. Was IR an analytical social science or simply an aide to politicians? As the Canadian-born economist Jacob Viner observed at one of the ISC meetings, the debates were "rather those which confront statesmen than those which confront scholars."[1137]

Theories, Twists and Turns

Recent historiography has successfully disproven the myth of IR originating in the form of a 'great debate' between so called 'idealists' and 'realists'. That debate never occurred, neither in the canonical set of Anglo-American publications, nor in the larger IR community surveyed in this dissertation. However, contrary to recent re-interpretations of inter-war scholarship by political scientists, this historical examination has demonstrated that there was little coherent theory at all. As William Wallace has put it:

> "International Relations as a discipline grew out of reflections on policy, and out of the desire to influence policy, or to improve the practice of policy. The distinction between the academic theorist and the practical policy-maker was a matter of degree".[1138]

Inter-war authors were very ambiguous about their research agenda, but their primary goals were to foster peace through international cooperation, and to provide expert advice to political decision makers. There was no coherent set of methods, definitions, or basic assumptions. It was not even clear if IR served explanatory or normative purposes, as Paul Guggenheim and Pitman B. Potter diagnosed in 1940.[1139] It took until the 1950s for IR scholars to formulate theory based on the "explicit *decision* to carve out a disciplinary space for IR."[1140]

[1137] IIIC, *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), p. 85.

[1138] William Wallace, 'Truth and power, monks and technocrats: theory and practice in international relations', *Review of International Studies* 22:3 (1996), p. 302.

[1139] Paul Guggenheim and Pitman B. Potter, *The Science of International Relations, Law and Organisation* (Geneva, 1940), p. 23.

[1140] Nicolas Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011), p. 8.

Attempts to retrospectively fit IR scholars into specific schools of thought are often unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. For one, the scholars themselves denied to be associated with theoretical camps, let alone with 'idealism'.[1141] Second, applying today's terms and frameworks, and lumping together authors for the convenience of disciplinary memory, risks to misinterpret their work and to conceal the imperfections and incoherences that were so central to early IR. Finally, theoretical reconstructions distract from the fact that the development of theory was not at the centre of attention for the discipline's pioneers. The vast majority of IR scholarship before the 1950s used at best proto-theoretical language, at worst journalistic jargon. Some professors were so preoccupied with practical activities that their universities became skeptical about their research output.[1142] Some, such as South African IR scholar C. A. W. Manning, rejected altogether the prospect of "scientific sincerity" in their field of study.[1143]

Rather than, for example, establishing a theory of the state or supra-national governance, IR scholars mainly worked on questions of immediate practical concern, including peace treaties, sanctions, disarmament, arbitration, free trade, raw materials, migration, population control, and colonial reform. In their responses to these practical challenges, IR authors adopted fluctuating and inconsistent approaches. Zimmern, for instance, argued that the success of the League of Nations depended on the general "willingness to cooperate", but he was uncertain as to the existence of this "will".[1144] In one article in 1936, he argued that the will existed but the means were missing.[1145] In another publication, written in the same year, he claimed the exact opposite.[1146] A 1935 memo confessed that it would be "a waste of time" to discuss 'peaceful change' or treaty revision, and none of the debates since 1920 had been of any use whatsoever.[1147] By 1939, Zimmern concluded that the terminology of IR resembled "cut flowers severed from their roots."[1148] Zimmern's inconsistencies and incoherences were no exceptions in inter-war IR scholarship. Norman Angell, once Britain's foremost pacifist, refused to endorse comprehensive disarmament in the 1930s, well aware of the disastrous humanitarian consequences that this may entail.[1149] Mendelssohn Bartholdy, widely regarded as one of Germany's most important internationalists, suggested that Germany should withdraw from the League of Nations in 1930.[1150] David Mitrany's 1975 memoir revealed that his "functionalist theory" emerged out of his experiences as a political activist, government advisor, and journalist, rather than by "busily stirring a cauldron of contrived 'paradigms' and 'systematic' propositions".[1151]

[1141] See, for example, Manning, in IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 270.

[1142] Consider Agnes Headlam-Morley at St Hugh's College Oxford who was involved in several Conservative election campaigns, sparking the disapproval of her college. Barbara Gwyer to Headlam-Morley, 26 September 1931, SHG/S/2/2/11/4 Agnes Headlam-Morley Staff File, St Hugh's College, Oxford.

[1143] C. A. W. Manning, in IIIC, *Peaceful Change* (1938), p. 269. See also, Fritz Berber, *Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit* (Berlin, 1934), p. 34.

[1144] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), pp. 6-7.

[1145] Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective Security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936), p. 89.

[1146] Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (London, 1936), p. 283.

As these examples show, early IR scholarship was the product of current events and *ad hoc* interpretations thereof. Instead of forcing inter-war authors into the procrustes beds of 'idealism', 'realism' or other fictive theoretical schools, it would be accurate to acknowledge these expressions of uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity as an essential part of inter-war IR scholarship.

Women and Feminist IR Thought

Despite their marginalisation in academia and politics, women contributed significantly to the intellectual and institutional formation of IR. Shortly after the outbreak of the war in 1914, European and American feminist-pacifists began to work on and campaign for a liberal post-war order. Relying initially on methods of political activism, such as rallies and pamphlets, they soon formed study groups and summer schools, published in academic style, and occupied university posts. From the outset, their activities were coordinated internationally through organisations, such as WILPF, and publications, such as *Jus Sufragii* and *L'Europe nouvelle.* In 1924, they explicitly called for "special Departments and Chairs for International Relations".[1152] By the 1930s, women such as Lucy Mair, Margery Perham or Agnes Headlam-Morley taught IR courses at Oxford and the London School of Economics.

[1147] 'Memorandum by Professor Zimmern on the Preparation of the next International Studies Conference: Peaceful Change', Alfred Zimmern, 27 July 1935, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 98.

[1148] Alfred Zimmern, *Modern Political Doctrines* (Oxford, 1939), p. ix.

[1149] His idea was that the deterring effect of "certain and overwhelming" sanctions would ensure that they never had to be applied. Norman Angell, 'Germany and the Rhineland II', *International Affairs* 15:6 (1936), pp. 26, 34.

[1150] Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 'Soll Deutschland kündigen?', *Europäische Gespräche* 12 (1930).

[1151] David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London, 1975), p. 3.

Female involvement in the formation of IR is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it shows the various ways in which women circumnavigated male dominance in academia and diplomacy. Given the underrepresentation of women in high-ranking positions and the masculine rhetoric employed by scholars and politicians, female endeavours into IR scholarship—their conferences, reports, summer schools, political campaigns—must be appreciated as complementary to male mainstream IR. Second, women's efforts underscored the role of democratic change as a motivation for the study of IR. Women spearheaded the campaign for universal suffrage, they became involved with the opposition to the Great War, and then more broadly criticised the way in which international politics was conducted. In a modern democracy, women deserved to be involved in public administration, including especially the foreign policy sector as well as higher education. Having more women in these ranks would not only make for a just society but also for a more peaceful international order.

In addition to their practical work, women contributed intellectually to questions of IR, developing a genuinely feminist body of thought. One common argument was that women were by nature more peaceful than men because as "guardians of life" they were more sensitive to the effects of war.[1153] A related feature of feminist IR was its universalist, religious, and emotional rhetoric which conveyed the internationalist notion that women, regardless of their origin and ideological stance, belonged together. Based on their cosmopolitan spirit, women emphasised the equality of people across the world and pointed out the futility of war. Feminist IR authors were also outspoken against imperialism and racism. At a time when European governments were almost exclusively concerned with their own security, scholars such as Lucy Mair urged to take into account the interests of "native inhabitants".[1154] It is crucial to integrate women in the history of IR in order to capture the full range of international political thought.

[1152] WILPF, *Report of the Fourth Congress* (Geneva, 1924), p. 138.

[1153] Agnes Maude Royden, 'War and the Women's Movement', in Charles Roden Buxton (ed.), *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (London, 1915), p. 134.

[1154] Lucy Mair, 'Colonial Policy and Peaceful Change', in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: an International Problem* (London, 1937), p. 88.

The Ruins of International Relations

The Second World War was a watershed in the history of IR. On the practical side, the war brought research activities in Europe to an almost complete halt, except in neutral Switzerland or at private events.[1155] University courses were suspended as students were conscripted into armies. Travelling for research or conferences became impossible. And censorship made it difficult to share written work.[1156] What remained were the ruins of the international network that had built IR over the previous decades.

At first, US foundations tried to rescue the remains of IR activities in Europe. Malcolm Davis, director of the Centre Européen of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) in Paris, tried to relocate the centre's activities to Geneva. He briefly negotiated with the Nazi chargé for intellectual cooperation, Fritz Berber, but decided to leave for the US in October 1940.[1157] Meanwhile, the Rockefeller Foundation supported persecuted academics in Europe, such as economist Luigi Einaudi who worked at the Geneva Graduate Institute.[1158] The Graduate Institute itself received over $300,000 from 1940 to 1944 due to its "distinguished staff and strategic location".[1159] Networks remained vital. Jäckh was supported by the Rockefeller Foundation to come to the US not because he was regarded as an eminent scholar but because he had been the Foundation's representative in Germany for a while.[1160] Jäckh also enjoyed the support of the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (SPSL) which arranged positions for academic refugees throughout the war, including professors such as Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Moritz Julius Bonn.[1161] In 1942, the

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[1155] Letter by William Rappard and Graduate Institute timetable for the period from 25 Oct 1940 to 22 March 1941, 17 May 1940, Folder 925, Box 102, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center; Montague Burton, *The Middle Path: Talks on Collective Security, Arbitration and Other Aspects of International and Industrial Relations* (Leeds, 1943).

[1156] Henri Bonnet to Edward Mead Earle, 20 April 1940, IIIC Records, K.I.26b.

[1157] Fritz Berber to Malcolm W. Davis, 25 January 1940, CEIP Records, Box 213, Folder 4.

[1158] Grant-in aid to Luigi Einaudi, 21 February 1944, Folder 914, Box 101, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[1159] Resolution, 6 April 1938, Folder 922, Box 102, Series 100.S, RG 1.1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[1160] Memo by JHW [Joseph H. Willits], 14 August 1940, Folder 3793, Box 319, Series 200, RG 1, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[1161] MS. S.P.L.S. 23374 (file 1938–47), SPLS Records.

Rockefeller Foundation was planning to spend up to $660,000 on the study of IR, sponsoring institutions in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England, France, Sweden, and Switzerland.[1162]

Soon, however, the war prohibited any productive scholarship. Most notably, German and Austrian institutions for the study of IR were subject to Nazi control, and were excluded from the international community of scholars. Both the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) in Berlin and the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) in Hamburg were under the control of loyal party members.[1163] IR institutions in occupied territories, too, suffered from the expansion of the Nazi regime. The invasion of Poland, shortly after the last ISC session in August 1939, forced the Polish study committee into exile to Paris[1164] The secretariat of the ISC, based with the IIIC in Paris, continued activities on a limited scale until German invasion in June 1940. When it ceased to operate, the ISC had 32 member institutions from Europe, Asia, America, and Australasia.[1165] The last meeting of the IIIC's executive committee was scheduled for 28 June 1940 in Geneva.[1166] Its director Henri Bonnet was proud to report that the IIIC was not neutral about the war in Europe.[1167] In September, he sounded colleagues in the US for keeping intellectual cooperation alive during war but, despite receiving positive feedback, was ultimately disappointed.[1168] Similar plans in November 1941 to instal a provisional IIIC headquarter in Havanna, Cuba, failed.[1169] As the war expanded outside continental Europe, collaborative IR activities were completely abandoned.

Intellectually speaking, too, the Second World War marked a turning point in the history of IR. It was not, however, a shift from 'idealist' to 'realist' thinking, but a move from practice to theory.

[1162] Budget tables, 1941-2, Folder 60, Box 7, Series 910, RG 3, RF, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[1163] Among the leading personell were Fritz Berber and Alfred Six. Memo by Hellmut Köster, 19 May 1946, StA HH, HW II, 361-5 II, Ad 22/1, Bd. 2, Bl. 142; Gisela Ganzel-Kress, 'Das Institut für Auswärtige Politik im Übergang von der Weimarer Republik zum Nationalsozialismus (1933 bis 1937)', in Eckart Krause et al. (eds.), *Hochschulalltag im 'Dritten Reich': Die Hamburger Universität 1933–1945* (Hamburg, 1991), p. 918.

[1164] Note by Winiarski, February-March 1940, K.I.26b, IIIC Records.

[1165] 'Note by Sir Alfred Zimmern on the Future of the International Studies Conference', 1946[?], Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 102.

[1166] Meeting note, June 1940, IIIC Records, K.I.3.

[1167] Henri Bonnet, 'Intellectual Cooperation', in American Council on Public Affairs (ed.), *World Organization: Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment* (Washington, 1942), p. 209.

[1168] Henri Bonnet to Gilbert Murray (copy to Toynbee), 9 September 1940, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 117.

[1169] Peter Anker to A. Rosenborg, 23 June 1942, League of Nations Archives, Dossier 41541, Box 4048.

Whereas the vast majority of inter-war IR was inspired by political events and policy-making, post-1940 scholarship turned to more abstract questions of power dynamics, applying a more rigorous methodology and focusing on descriptive, rather than normative studies. Post-1940 works emphasised the "structure and dynamics" of international politics, rather than its motives.[1170] The war offered an intellectual room to re-consider international politics. Works written between 1940 and 1945 focused on post-war planning and began to point out shortcomings of 1930s diplomacy, not dissimilar from the wave of scholarship in 1915.[1171] Crucially, they started to treat problems of international politics from a more remote point of view as opposed to inter-war public intellectuals. In this sense, the war led to the realisation that inter-war institutions represented an outdated mode of academic study.[1172] By the 1950s, IR scholars interpreted foreign policy as a "game" with "chips" and "rules".[1173] In 1954, for the first time in its history, IR scholars devoted a conference entirely to the discussion of theory.[1174]

The geopolitical transformations after 1945 and the rise of the US to superpower status were clearly reflected in IR scholarship. After the war, most Anglo-American scholars continued to teach and research, and their interaction with European colleagues declined in favour of US-centred studies of Cold War diplomacy, led by figures such as Hans Morgenthau and George F. Kennan. In 1954, the series of visiting lectures at the Geneva Graduate Institute hosted Hans Morgenthau speaking on "The Conduct of American Foreign Policy".[1175] British scholars, too, were affected by this shift. Toynbee was approached in June 1942 by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rockefeller Foundation to work on post-war problems for the US government.[1176] Zimmern, having served as secretary-general of the constituent conference of UNESCO in 1945, moved to the US to teach IR in Massachusetts and

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[1170] Ieuan G. John, 'Review: Power Politics. A Study of International Society by Georg Schwarzenberger', *The Modern Law Review* 15:4 (1952), p. 529.

[1171] See, for example, 'Suggested Foundations for the Organisation of Peace', 22 April 1940, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 236.

[1172] David Long, 'Who killed the International Studies Conference?', *Review of International Studies* 32:4 (2006).

[1173] Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations in the Age of the Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship* (New York, 1950), p. xi.

[1174] Brian C. Schmidt, 'The Rockefeller Foundation Conference and the Long Road to a Theory of International Relations', in Nicolas Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York, 2011).

[1175] Cours Temporaires 1954, HEI 129/1-8, Archives of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

[1176] Toynbee to N. B. Ronald, 17 June 1942, Arnold Toynbee Papers, Box 117.

Connecticut. The director of the IIIC, Henri Bonnet, went on to serve as French ambassador to the US from 1944 to 1954. It was clear that the centre for the foreign affairs community was no longer London, Paris, Geneva or Berlin, but New York, Washington, and the East coast universities.

Women who had worked on IR questions during the inter-war period continued to campaign for better representation in academia and diplomacy.[1177] Suffragist and WILPF supporter Kathleen Courtney wrote to Gilbert Murray in March 1940 that "the time has come for women's organisations to play a more active part in discussions on world settlement."[1178] They also advanced the body of feminist international thought that they had championed since the 1910s.[1179] After 1945, for the first time in the history of the discipline, women assumed IR professorships—Agnes Headlam-Morley at Oxford (1948) and Elizabeth Wiskemann at Edinburgh (1958). It would not be until the late 1980s, however, that feminist IR was widely recognised as a branch of IR scholarship.[1180]

After the Second World War, IR scholars recovered many of the discipline's early institutions. Aberystwyth, London, Oxford, Paris, Geneva, and the New England universities remained important hubs for IR research throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Many of the early professorships and research centres, such as the Montague Burton chairs or the Council on Foreign Relations are still among the most prestigious in the field. Despite these institutional continuities, subsequent generations of IR scholars have been uncomfortable with their disciplinary history, and have often been at pains to distance themselves from previous generations. This was particularly true in Germany where, unsurprisingly, debates erupted about the "brown" past of political science and its continuities after 1945.[1181]

As these trajectories show, the collaborative study of IR continued to be contingent on external events after 1940. The Second World War and the resulting global order created a new environment for scholars and practitioners. After 1945, universities restarted their IR programs, student numbers grew, curricula were revised, and social science methodology evolved. Post-war IR scholars were still interested in current affairs and some still served as political advisors. But the overwhelming majority of them concentrated on analysis rather than advocacy. They realised the pitfalls of politicising IR and, *vice versa*, of imposing IR concepts on political decision-makers. Thus ended an era in understanding and making international relations.

[1177] Margery Perham, 'Some Preliminary Ideas upon Colonial Research', 18 March 1940, Margery Perham Papers, Box 254, File 3.

[1178] Kathleen Courtney to Gilbert Murray, 11 March 1940, Gilbert Murray Papers, Box 236.

[1179] Catia Cecilia Confortini, *Intelligent Compassion: The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and Feminist Peace* (Oxford, 2012).

[1180] See, for example, Jacqui True, 'Feminism', in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, 5th ed. (New York, 2013), p. 241.

[1181] Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt,* 2nd edn. (Baden-Baden, 2013).

The formation of IR was a convoluted process involving a range of international actors, academics and practitioners, men and women, politicians, career diplomats, journalists, activists, philanthropists, charities, international organisations, and governments. Loaded with their respective interests, they pioneered the study of IR during a time of political crises. The result was shaped to a significant extent by practical activities, political advocacy, international cooperation, teaching, and the drafting of policy recommendations.[1182] The majority of early IR scholarship commented on current affairs and envisioned how the world ought to be, rather than analysing how it was. Subsequent generations of political scientists have struggled to interpret the intellectual achievements of the formative episode of IR scholarship—either degrading it as naïve 'idealism' or retrospectively imposing theoretical categories that none of the original authors would have subscribed to. Inconveniently, the early history of IR was more complicated, and its intellectual output less coherent. The protagonists of IR were motivated by political convictions, particularly by the idea to make the international order more democratic and more peaceful. On many occasions, they were willing to forgo scientific standards—whatever this may have meant in any case—in favour of practical goals. It is precisely this blend of science and politics which made the formation of IR such a fascinating exercise in world order.

[1182] Conditions that today's IR community seems to miss. See Christian Reus-Smit, 'International Relations, Irrelevant? Don't Blame Theory', *Millennium* 40:3 (2012), p. 533.

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