Migrant Remittances and Democracy

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Abstract

How do migrant remittances affect the prospects for democracy in receiving states? In this thesis, I use a range of methods including statistical analysis of macro-economic and micro-level survey data and qualitative interviews to investigate this question. I use cross-national data, barometer surveys from the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and post-Communist countries and 63 interviews conducted with remittance recipients in Jordan and Tunisia.

I find that remittances from migrants in democratic states are associated with political liberalisation and the downfall of authoritarian regimes, but that remittances from migrants in non-democratic states are not. An important causal mechanism is that of protests: remittances from democratic countries fuel protests in authoritarian regimes. On the individual level, I show that remittances are associated with greater non-electoral political participation because recipients perceive themselves to have higher levels of economic security. I also find that financial remittances from democratic countries are accompanied by and reinforce the transmission of social remittances in the form of pro-democratic political norms.

In addition to the main findings, I present the first evidence for electoral remittance cycles in authoritarian regimes, clarify our knowledge about how and why remittances affect different forms of political participation and add to our understanding of the political dimensions of social remittances.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The Political Effects of Remittances

Migrant workers collectively sent more than $550 billion to their families and communities in 2015. This sum was more than double the total of international remittances a decade earlier and three times the value of global aid budgets. How does this huge and growing financial flow reshape politics in migrants' homelands? Building on insights from recent studies of the political effects of remittance flows, this thesis will investigate how remittances affect the prospects for democracy in receiving countries. Using a range of methods including statistical analysis of macro-economic and micro-level survey data and qualitative interviews, the following chapters will examine how the effects of remittances are conditioned by political institutions in migrants' destinations. Remittances from migrants in countries with broadly democratic political institutions increase the likelihood of democratisation. Remittances from countries with largely undemocratic institutions do not have the same effect, however, and can, in some circumstances, strengthen authoritarian regimes.

Scholars of development have long been interested in the economic effects of remittances in less-developed countries (Russell, 1985; Arnold, 1992; Russell, 1992). In the late 1990s, the international financial institutions (IFIs) took note of this research alongside data showing two decades of rapidly increasing remittances, resulting in a plethora of conferences and publications hailing the developmental impacts of remittances in what has been described as 'the new development mantra' (Kapur, 2005).[1] Compared with the rich history and large volume of academic and IFI literature on the developmental effects of remittances, research on their political effects is only just emerging. In the past five years, political scientists have begun to systematically investigate the effects of remittances on a range of political phenomena, including economic policy choices, corruption, voting behaviour, civil war and authoritarian regime stability.[2] This thesis contributes to the new literature on the political effects of remittances, and suggests a way to resolve the seemingly contradictory results that remittances can both bolster authoritarian regimes by allowing them to increase spending on patronage goods at the expense of public goods (Ahmed, 2012) while also undermining authoritarian regimes by reducing the effectiveness of patronage networks (Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright, 2015).

This introductory chapter sets the stage for the thesis, raising issues that will be returned to in the chapters to come. The next section defines remittances and briefly explores their growing significance in the global economy. The third section defines the dependent variable of 'prospects for democracy' and situates the contribution of the thesis in the democratisation literature. I then consider the mechanisms by which remittances can affect the prospects for democracy in receiving countries. A final section provides a plan of the thesis.

[1] For a critical account of the development of interest in remittances and development by the IFI community, see Kunz (2011, Chapter 3).

[2] Singer (2010) explores the effects of remittances on exchange rate regime choices, and Doyle (2015) investigates how remittance influence social welfare spending. Abdih, Chami, Dagher and Montiel (2012), Tyburski (2012; 2014) and Ahmed (2013) all study the role of remittances in changing incentives for corrupt behaviour. Germano (2013) and Ahmed (2017) analyse the implications of remittances for voting and elections. Regan and Frank (2014) find that remittances can help prevent the outbreak of civil conflict during economic crises. Finally, Ahmed (2012) and Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015) investigate the impact of remittances on authoritarian regime stability.

1.2 What are Remittances?

1.2.1 Defining Remittances

In order to set the bounds of the investigation, we must first define the central explanatory variable. Remittances are transfers of money and/or goods from migrants to family members, friends or communities in another country without expectation of a defined return. This definition is both simple and draws out the key characteristics of remittances that are important in considering their effects on political phenomena. The international nature of remittances (those derived from in-country migration are not included in the definition) means that they remain largely outside the control of the government of the recipient country, which can only gain access through taxation (Abdih, Barajas, Chami and Ebeke, 2012). Furthermore, political and economic conditions in the recipient country can only affect the flow of remittances indirectly by influencing the number of migrants and their choices to remit.[3] Remittances can thus be seen as largely exogenous inputs into the political economic systems of recipient countries.

The exogeneity of remittances has led some to describe them as a 'rent' alongside other international flows such as oil sales and foreign aid in the literatures on the 'rentier state' and the 'resource curse' (Beblawi, 1987; Brynen, 1992; Tyburski, 2012). The inclusion of remittances in these literatures is problematic, however, because they are neither rents nor natural resources.[4] The most important difference that sets remittances apart from rentier revenues (from sources such as aid and transit fees in addition to resource exports) is that they accumulate to individuals rather than governments. The causal mechanisms that have been found to underpin theories of (for example) the regime-stabilising effects of oil wealth and foreign aid are predicated on government control of revenues derived from sources other than taxation (Ross, 2012; Morrison, 2015). While the resource

[3] At least in the short-term. Some governments, most notably that of the Phillipines, have made the export of labour a key long-term political economic strategy (Rodriguez, 2010).

[4] The concept of 'rent' has already been stretched in the rentier state literature far from its original definition (the residual component of market price over production cost where all factors of production are paid at market rates) to encompass most exogenously-derived non-tax government revenues. It is nevertheless difficult to fit remittances into either conceptualisation of rent.

curse and rentier state literatures may contain some useful insights into the political effects of remittances, we must be careful not to assume that they have similar effects to other international financial flows.

1.2.2 Trends in Remittances



Figure 1.1: Global Remittance and Aid Flows, 1970-2015

Remittance flows have grown significantly in size since at least the 1970s. In Figure 1.1, total global remittances are plotted alongside aid for the years 1970-2015 in constant 2012 US dollars. While global aid flows were significantly greater than global remittance flows for most of the 1970s, remittances became more important than aid as a source of revenue in 1980 and have never been smaller than aid flows in any year since despite a decline in total remittance flows in the first half of the 1980s. Since the mid-1980s, remittances have grown strongly, picking up pace at the turn of the millennium with a three-year downturn in 2007-9 that was a consequence of the global financial crisis (Mohapatra and Ratha, 2012). While total aid flows increased by a modest 29% between 1980 and 2012, remittance flows more than quadrupled in size. As a percentage of GDP, the difference is even starker. Aid has declined as a percentage of global GDP over the last three decades, from 0.26% to 0.20%. Remittances, on the other hand, have increased from less than 0.10% of global GDP in 1970 to 0.78% in 2015. Remittances are likely to continue to increase faster than global economic growth; Dilip Ratha (2016) predicts an annual growth rate for global remittance flows of 7-8% over the next decade. This is likely to increase still further now that a reduction in remittance transaction fees has been adopted as one of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals.[5]

1.3 Democracy and Democratisation

The main dependent variable in this thesis is prospects for democracy. The study of democratisation is a significant sub-field within comparative politics and its definition is both contested and often left implicit.[6] Democratisation is the process of getting to democracy, the meaning of which has long been been debated. The following discussion will serve as the working definition to set the scope of the study.

Scholars of democratisation often split the concept into two key processes: transition and consolidation. Democratic transition is the process by which countries change from having largely authoritarian ruling institutions to having broadly democratic ruling institutions. Consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes the "only game in town" and a return to authoritarian rule becomes unthinkable due to changes in structures, institutions and culture (Schedler, 1998, 91). The breakdown of authoritarian regimes, political liberalisation in non-democratic and semi-democratic regimes and strengthening of mass support for democratic institutions will all be construed as improving the prospects for democracy.

[5] Sustainable Development Goal 10.C reads: "By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent."

[6] See Coppedge (2012) for a book-length overview of the literature on democratisation.

By examining the influence of remittances on the prospects for democracy, this thesis will contribute to the literature on the international dimensions of democratisation. Schmitter (1986, 5) famously dismissed international factors as “indirect and usually marginal” in democratisation. Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been increased interest in the international context of democratisation led by Whitehead (2001) and, more recently, Levitsky and Way (2006, 2010). Levitsky and Way use the concepts of ‘linkage’ and ‘leverage’ to explain the impact of international factors on the likelihood of democratisation in ‘competitive authoritarian’ regimes. Linkage refers to the depth and breadth or economic, social and political ties between Western states and those with competitive authoritarian regimes, and leverage refers to the extent to which governments are vulnerable to Western pressure. While Levitsky and Way include migratory flows as part of their conceptualisation of linkage, they do not analyse in much detail how these could influence democratisation. This thesis can thus improve our knowledge of one of the mechanisms behind linkage.

Much research on the international dimensions of democratisation focuses on how democracy has ‘diffused’ over time in different regions of the world (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Wejnert, 2014). These studies have provided evidence that diffusion occurs and that states are heavily influenced by their neighbours and ties to Western states. Where this research is lacking is in the identification of causal mechanisms. While a number of factors that might influence democratic diffusion, including the media, migration, trade, travel and education, have been suggested by studies in the diffusion tradition, none have been focused on these mechanisms to the extent required to develop robust theories and evidence. Remittances could be an important mechanism of democratic diffusion. This thesis can therefore help to fill a gap in the diffusion literature by closely investigating one particular avenue of diffusion.

1.4 How Can Remittances Influence Prospects for Democracy?

In the extant literature, two studies explicitly investigate the relationship between remittances and democratisation, positing two different causal mechanisms that we might call the ‘patronage effect,’ and the ‘substitution effect.’ In this thesis, I will provide additional evidence for the patronage effect and explore the ‘social remittance’ effect of norm diffusion accompanying and being reinforced by financial remittances which can help to account for the differences between the effects of remittances sent by migrants in democratic countries and those sent by migrants in authoritarian countries.

1.4.1 The Patronage Effect

The distribution of patronage, whether in the form of money, government jobs or access to state welfare services, is one of the most important strategies that authoritarian regimes use to maintain their power. This is particularly true in single- or dominant-party regimes which use party organisations to distribute these patronage goods and services (Greene, 2010). Patronage strengthens authoritarian regimes through both co-option (those receiving patronage have a more positive view of the regime) and coercion (regimes can threaten to withdraw patronage from groups that either oppose or fail to actively support them). Remittances help to reduce the reliance of citizens on patronage, which in turn lessens both the cooptive and coercive capacity of regimes that rely in patronage because remittance recipients are less likely to trade votes for patronage goods and services and are more likely to engage in anti-government political activism at the cost of losing access to this patronage. This argument is made by Escriba-Folch et al (2015), who find that remittances decrease the vote shares of authoritarian incumbents and increase the likelihood of collapse of single-party regimes (but not other types of authoritarian regimes) and further evidenced by Pfutze’s (2012) and Tyburski’s (2012) studies which show that migration and remittances undermine patronage networks in Mexico.

To date, there have been no tests of this causal mechanism at the micro-level. In Chapters 6 and 7, I will present evidence of some implications of the patronage effect: recipients of remittances are more likely to participate in political activities including anti-government protests and rate their economic situation more positively than non-recipients, suggesting that they are less fearful of the withdrawal of any patronage they might receive. At the macro-level, I also show in Chapter 3 that remittance flows are associated with higher numbers of anti-government protests.

1.4.2 The Substitution Effect

While the patronage effect can lead to remittances positively influencing the prospects for democratisation, the substitution effect suggests that remittances may, in fact, help to stabilise authoritarian regimes and thereby limit the potential for democratisation. The causal story of the substitution effect is that remittances allow regimes to reduce spending on general public welfare (because remittance recipients can afford to buy welfare goods on the private market) and increase spending on narrower clientelist networks which help to entrench their rule. The idea of the substitution effect builds on a long tradition of research in economics that finds that recipients use remittances primarily to buy investment welfare goods such as education and healthcare.[7] The 'substitution effect' is central to Ahmed's (2012) model of the positive effect of remittances on authoritarian regime durability and is further evidenced by Abdih et al's (2012, 657) finding that higher levels of remittances are associated with an "increase in the share of funds diverted by the government for its own purposes."

1.4.3 The Social Remittance Effect

The patronage and substitution effects suggest that remittances can have both positive and negative effects on the prospects for democratisation. In current research on the topic, the role of domestic institutions is highlighted as a potential intervening variable;

[7] For a review of this literature, see Adams Jr. (2006*a*).

single-party regimes that rely more heavily on patronage as a legitimating strategy are more vulnerable to the patronage effect than regimes that rely to a greater extent on non-patronage strategies such as violent coercion or ideological legitimation (Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright, 2015). The central argument of this thesis is that the relationship between remittances and democratisation is also conditional on political institutions in sending countries.

The term 'social remittances' was coined by Peggy Levitt in an influential 1998 paper and the concept was developed further in Levitt's 2001 book *The Transnational Villagers*. Both the article and the book are based primarily on an ethnography of a single town in the Dominican Republic and migrants from that town living in a neighbourhood of Boston in the United States. Such a study would not usually garner significant interest from the wider academic community, but the concept of social remittances Levitt developed has proven so useful that they are amongst the most widely-cited publications in migration studies over the last two decades.[8] Social remittances are defined as "migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion" of normative structures, systems of practice and social capital (Levitt, 1998, 926). They are related to financial remittances because the sending of money reinforces the norm diffusion and changes the relationship between remittance sender and recipient such that the sender is in a more dominant social position (Levitt, 1998; Perez-Armendariz, 2014).

I argue that social remittances involve the transmission of pro-democratic norms from migrants in democratic states to recipients in non-democratic states. Levitt (2001, 61) suggested that social remittances included "values about how organizations should work, incorporating ideas about good government." Most of her treatment of the political dimensions of social remittances, however, focused on the transnationalisation of Dominican politics rather than diffusion of democratic values (Levitt, 2001, Chapter 5), a focus which has continued in work building on Levitt's original concept (Piper, 2009). To date, most research on the potential for democratic norm diffusion as a consequence of

[8]As of 22nd December 2015, "Social Remittances" (Levitt, 1998) has been cited 811 times and *The Transnational Villagers* has been cited 1971 times according to Google Scholar.

migration and remittances has focused on political participation in Latin America and Africa (Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Waddell, 2014; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Cordova and Hiskey, 2015) and there have been no studies of the political dimension of social remittances in authoritarian regimes. The most important work on migration and democratic diffusion is that of Rother (2009) and Kessler and Rother (2016), who find that migration leads to reduced support for democratic institutions amongst return migrants in the Philippines due to a negative comparison of political institutions in the Philippines compared with political institutions in migrant destination countries. The implications of Rother and Kessler's work will be explored more fully in Chapters 8 and 9.

How might pro-democratic norm diffusion work in practice? I argue for the importance of comparisons between migrants' destinations and their homelands which are reinforced by the receipt of financial remittances. Comparisons will be made between the procedural fairness and economic outcomes which are likely to be greater and more positive when the remittance sender has migrated to a democratic country. Those who have migrated for work and been able to earn enough to send extra money to family and communities in their home country are likely to have a) migrated because there were fewer economic opportunities in their home country and b) have been successful at obtaining economic opportunities in the country they have migrated to. This will shape both the remittance senders' and recipients' perceptions of the relative economic success of their home country and their destination country.

When the migrants' destination country has a democratic government and their home country has an autocratic government, the relative economic success of the destination country will be, at least in part, ascribed to the political institutions of the destination country, which will increase the support of those on both sides of the remittance relationship for democratic government to improve economic opportunities in the home country. Those who send remittances from destination countries with authoritarian governments are less likely to hear about greater levels of procedural fairness in the country from which they receive remittances. They may also be less likely to ascribe the greater economic success of the destination country to political institutions because there are usually other readily accessible explanations for economic differences. This is clear in the case of migration from labour-rich to oil-rich Arab countries; oil wealth is a much more obvious cause of economic difference than alternative forms of autocratic institutions.

The above discussion suggests that the social remittance mechanism leads to greater support for democracy when remittances are sent from democratic countries but not when they are sent from an autocratic country. In Chapter 8, I will provide evidence that recipients of remittances in countries that receive the majority of their remittances from democratic countries show greater support for democracy than non-recipients, but that there is no relationship between remittances and democratic values in countries that receive the majority of their remittances from autocratic countries. In Part III, I will use interview evidence to demonstrate that remittance recipients in Jordan and Tunisia tend to look positively on political institutions in migrant destinations when those destinations are democratic but not when the migrant destinations are autocratic and that the economic success of authoritarian regimes in the Gulf is mainly ascribed to the presence of oil rather than institutions.

The social remittance and patronage effects may interact to combine motive and opportunity for political activism amongst remittance recipients. Remittances increase the opportunity of recipients for political action by making them less dependent on patronage networks. A more democratic ideology engendered by remittances from democratic countries will provide a motive for recipients to partake in specifically pro-democratic political action. Thus, the social remittance effect can enhance the effectiveness of the patronage effect in undermining authoritarian regimes when remittances are sent from countries with democratic political institutions. In this way, remittances sent from democratic countries are more likely to promote anti-government protests in receiving countries, evidence for which will be shown in Chapter 3.

1.5 Plan of the Thesis

The following chapters are divided into three parts. In the first part, I will demonstrate that remittance flows differ in their effects at the aggregate level depending on where they are sent from and provide evidence that protests operate as an intervening mechanism. Specifically, I will show that remittances from democratic countries are associated with higher levels of democracy, a greater likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown and more protests in authoritarian regimes, while remittances from countries with authoritarian regimes are associated with lower democracy scores and have no effect on the numbers of protests. Part I will thus help to reconcile the opposing findings of Ahmed (2012) and Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015) about the effects of remittances in the prospects for democratisation and provide the first evidence about the macro-level effects of remittances on political protest. I will also give an example in Chapter 4 of how increased political participation amongst recipients of remittances from migrants in authoritarian countries may take place through government-approved channels rather than through protests. I will show that remittances tend to increase when local elections are held in Jordan and Egypt, two countries that receive most of their remittances from countries with authoritarian regimes.

In Part II, I will use survey data from the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and post-Communist countries to investigate the micro-level causal mechanisms linking remittances with democratisation and protest. In Chapter 5, I will describe the data and discuss trends in the receipt of remittances in the three regions. In Chapters 6 and 7, I will provide evidence that remittances are associated with a greater likelihood of protesting and taking part in other non-electoral political activities and that the causal mechanism is the greater economic security felt by remittance recipients compared with non-recipients. In Chapter 8, I will show that remittance recipients support democracy more than non-recipients in those countries which receive remittances mostly from democratic countries. Taken together, the findings of the chapters in Part II provide evidence for the micro-level causal channel through which remittances from democratic countries can positively influence the prospects for democratisation in authoritarian regimes: they create a group of remittance recipients who both have a pro-democratic ideology and are more willing to engage in protests and other contentious actions against authoritarian regimes. When remittances come from migrants in authoritarian countries, however, the positive effect of remittances on political participation does not necessarily lead to anti-government protest because remittance recipients have no more ideological opposition to the regime than non-recipients.

Part III focuses on social remittances and their relationship and interaction with financial remittances on the individual level, based on interviews with remittance recipients in Jordan and Tunisia. While Part II will present comparisons between those who receive remittances and those who do not, Part III will compare those who receive remittances from migrants in authoritarian countries with those who receive remittances from migrants in democratic countries. The choice of Jordan and Tunisia also allows comparisons of the effects of remittances in an authoritarian monarchy and a country in the midst of a transition to democracy. Part III will provide evidence as to how remittances influence political participation, focusing on the role of extra resources, economic security and a sense of civic responsibility. It will also show that 'democratic remittances' do indeed flow from migrants in democratic countries to remittance recipients and that this occurs through comparison of migrants' destinations with their homelands. There are no equivalent 'authoritarian remittances' accompanying financial flows from the autocratic countries of the Gulf, however, because the wealth compared with remittance recipients' home countries is attributed primarily to the presence of oil rather than political institutions. Part III thus provides evidence for the social remittance effect that underpins the conditional relationship of remittances on the prospects for democratisation.

By investigating the effects of remittances at different levels of analysis, I will show how they should not be seen as having simply pro- or anti-democratic qualities. As with other international financial flow, the effects that remittances have on political phenomena are mediated by the structures and institutions in sending and receiving states. This thesis will contribute to our understanding of democratisation by exploring the conditions under which remittances affect democracy in receiving states. It will also further our knowledge of the political effects of remittances at the individual level beyond the current focus of remittance research on the region of Latin America.

Part I

Insights from Macro-Level Data

Chapter 2

Remittances and Democratisation

Introduction

Part I explores the macro-level relationship between remittances and democracy. This chapter focuses on the effect that remittances have on political liberalisation and the likelihood of authoritarian regime change. As discussed in the Introduction, one prominent study has found evidence for remittances increasing the likelihood of democratic transition (Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright, 2015) while another has found evidence for the opposite relationship (Ahmed, 2012). This chapter offers a simple theory to account for these contradictory results: the effects of remittances vary depending on the countries from which they are sent. I test this theory using analysis of a time-series cross-sectional dataset. I include novel proxy variables for remittances from migrants in countries with democratic institutions and remittances from migrants in countries with authoritarian political institutions. We will find that remittances from democratic states are associated with higher democracy scores and an increased likelihood of authoritarian regime change, while the opposite is true for remittances from authoritarian states.

In the next section, I briefly review the work that has been previously carried out on the relationship between remittances and democratisation. I then consider a theory to account for the apparently contradictory results found in the current literature and suggest hypotheses to test in the empirical analysis. The third section proposes the development of proxy variables for remittances which differentiate between those originating from democratic and authoritarian states and describes the operationalisation of the dependent variables (liberalisation and regime change) and the set of control variables. The fourth section outlines the empirical strategy, including linear, GMM and logit models. The results are presented in the fifth section followed by a conclusion that relates the findings to the rest of the thesis.

2.1 What do We Already Know about the Relationship between Remittances and Democratisation?

The idea that remittances may have a significant effect on authoritarian regime stability arises from a wider research tradition investigating the relationship between a variety of international financial flows and democratisation and authoritarian regime stability. A number of causal mechanisms have been suggested to underlie this relationship, including:

- the greater spending power of authoritarian governments with access to external finance (Ross, 2001; Therkildsen, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010).
- the lack of taxation required to finance generous government spending (Ross, 2001; Morrison, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010).
- the increase in costs of defection from authoritarian regime coalitions if such a defection hindered the financial flow (Bak and Moon, 2016; Escriba-Folch, 2017)[1]

One thing that all these mechanisms have in common is that they assume that the government and/or the economic elite is the main beneficiary of the oil sales, aid or foreign direct investment. While remittances can affect government revenue through increasing

[1] In addition to the main causal mechanisms, many recent studies have concentrated on the factors (such as inequality, social cleavages and aid donor intent) which mediate their impact (Dunning, 2010; Morrison, 2011; Bermeo, 2011).

the amount of consumption taxes paid (Abdih, Barajas, Chami and Ebeke, 2012), the main effect of remittances is to put money in the hands of a broader section of the public than any of the other international financial flows discussed in the literature.[2] Remittances do not fit into the concepts of 'free resources' (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010) and 'non-tax revenue' (Morrison, 2015) that underpin studies of rentier states and the resource curse. We thus cannot apply the causal mechanisms proposed in these literatures to the relationship between remittances and democratisation and regime stability. As discussed in the Introduction, there are three potential causal mechanisms that could explain this relationship:

1. The patronage effect: Remittances weaken patronage networks used to maintain authoritarian regimes.

2. The social remittance effect: Migrants remit democratic (or authoritarian) values and political interest along with money to communities in their home country.

3. The substitution effect: Remittances allow private citizens to buy welfare goods on the private market, thereby enabling the government to reduce welfare spending and increase patronage spending.

Evidence for patronage effect was initially found in studies of Mexico: Pfutze (2012) and Tyburski (2012) both found that remittances helped to undermine the patronage networks of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional regime and showed that greater remittance-receiving municipalities gave higher vote shares to opposition parties. Put together, these studies suggest that remittances help to reduce the reliance of citizens on patronage which in turn lessens the fear of losing such patronage if they support opposition forces. Escriba-Folch et al (2015) test a version of this causal mechanism in a global analysis, finding that party-based dictatorships (which are more likely to rely on patronage as a key pillar of

[2] One causal mechanism discussed in early research on the oil curse that did not rely on government receipt of income from oil sales was the "modernization effect, in which the failure of the population to move into industrial and service sector jobs renders them less likely to push for democracy" (Ross 2001, 357, see also Herb 2005). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that this mechanism could be applied to remittances because it is unclear how remittances could hinder the development of the industrial and service sectors.

stability) are more likely to fall when remittances are high. They also find that incumbents gain lower vote shares in autocratic elections when remittance receipts are high, suggesting that remittance recipients are less likely to support autocratic incumbents. In democratic Latin American states, too, remittance recipients are more likely to vote for opposition candidates; Ahmed (2017) finds that this is because they are less dependent on patronage from incumbents. In addition to influencing voting behaviour, remittances may also affect other forms of political participation through the patronage effect. In Chapters 3 and 6, I will explore how remittances increase protests at the macro-level and the propensity to protest, strike, sign petitions, attend political meetings and join civil society organisations at the individual level.

Early arguments for the social remittance effect came from case studies and historical observations that such non-economic remittances from migrants to economically advanced and democratic countries could aid in the transition to and consolidation of democracy (Levitt, 1998). This has recently been offered empirical support by Kapur's (2010) case study of Indian migration, Waddell's studies of Mexican municipalities (Waddell, 2014, 2015; Waddell and Fontenla, 2015) and Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow's (2010) analysis of Mexican survey data showing that migration is linked with greater levels of political engagement in sending communities.[3] Migration to France and Portugal from those countries' former colonies also appears to spread democratic political values: Chauvet and Mercier (2014) show that return migrants to Mali tend to promote political participation, Dedieu et al. (2013) demonstrate that this begins while migrants are abroad through a study of Senegalese migrants in France and the USA and Batista and Vicente (2011) present evidence that people living in high-migration regions of Cape Verde tend to demand greater political accountability. Social remittances can also have the opposite effect: Rother (2009) and Kessler and Rother (2016) show that migrants returning to the Phillipines from autocratic countries tend to be more distrustful of democracy, and they may remit such feelings while they are away.

[3] It should be noted that Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow find that financial remittances are not an important driver in this ideational diffusion.

Many of these studies consider migration in general rather than remittances in particular, but the sending of financial remittances is likely to increase the effect of social remittances. As Levitt (1998, 941) argues, social "remittances have a stronger effect because they travel with other remittances. When one remittance is accepted, it heightens receptivity to the other." Those who receive financial remittances are also likely to receive social remittances, and any change in their attitudes engendered by these social remittances will be reinforced in its macro-level effect by the fact that those who receive them will also be more financially empowered by the money they receive.

The influence of the substitution effect is demonstrated by Abdih, Chami, Dagher and Montiel (2012) and Ahmed (2012; 2013). Abdih et al demonstrate that remittances "increase ... the share of funds diverted by the government for its own purposes," (2012, 657)which leads to a decline in institutional quality and government effectiveness. Ahmed (2013) shows a similar diversion of funds and relates it to increased corruption in remittance-receiving states. In another paper, Ahmed (2012) links the substitution effect directly to authoritarian regime stability. In both a global study using standard measures of remittances and an instrumental variable based on oil prices and distance from Mecca to estimate remittances accruing to Muslim-majority countries, he demonstrates that remittances bolster authoritarian regimes by allowing them to reduce spending on general public welfare and increase spending on narrower clientelist networks which help to entrench their rule.

Through these three causal mechanisms, remittances can both promote and undermine the stability of authoritarian regimes. This has led to the seemingly contradictory results of Ahmed and Escriba-Folch et al, both of which conduct global studies and find that remittances are, respectively, positive for authoritarian regimes and negative for party-based dictatorships (and not relevant for other types of authoritarian regime). It is instructive, however, to compare the instrumental variable designs that the two studies use. Ahmed's study instruments for remittances from oil-rich autocratic states in the Persian Gulf region, while Escriba-Folch et al's study uses an instrument for remittances from economically developed and democratic OECD states. Rather than contradicting each other, therefore, these two studies may be picking up different aspects of the 'social remittances' causal mechanism in addition to the spending and patronage mechanisms; remittances from democratic countries make the recipients more likely to push for democratisation, while remittances from authoritarian countries do not. This interpretation would fit with the other studies described above. Studies of Mexico, India and Francophone Africa have focused on migration to and remittances from the USA, UK and France, all firmly democratic countries, as the main sending countries (Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Kapur, 2010; Dedieu et al., 2013; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014). The only other studies that focus on the authoritarian effect of migration and remittances are Rother (2009) and Kessler and Rother (2016) which explicitly investigate return migration from authoritarian countries to the Philippines.

The development of scholarship on the political effects of remittances in some ways mirrors that of scholarship on aid and FDI. While initially a preserve of economists and scholars of development, a decade ago political scientists began to question whether aid flows and FDI were positive or negative for democracy and institutional development (Therkildsen, 2002; Knack, 2004). In recent years, the sources of aid and FDI have come to be seen as vital to understanding this relationship (Bermeo, 2011; Demir, 2016).

2.2 Theory and Hypotheses

In this chapter, we are interested in two related phenomena: democratisation and the likelihood of the fall of an authoritarian regime. As discussed in the Introduction, these are two separate, but related, phenomena; the fall of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily lead to the establishment of a democratic political system (for example, the 1994 coup in The Gambia that replaced the autocratic Dawda Jawara as president with the similarly authoritarian Yahya Jammeh). Similarly, minor political liberalisation in a stable autocratic regime could be classed as democratisation without signifying the fall of the regime (for example, the political liberalisation in Jordan in the early 1990s when multiparty elections were allowed but executive powers remained with the authoritarian monarchy).

How could remittances from authoritarian and democratic countries affect democratisation and regime stability? Of the mechanisms noted above, the patronage effect should contribute to lower regime stability and the substitution effect should lead to greater regime stability no matter where the remittances come from by bolstering or enhancing the ruling stategies of regimes related to patronage and welfare spending. Through these mechanisms, remittances may also effect democratisation. If regimes are strengthened by remittances through the substitution effect, they may have greater freedom to curb political rights. Indeed this may be demanded by those who receive extra patronage spending in order to maintain their privileged position against opposition forces who might try to limit this clientelistic spending. Similarly, regimes which are weakened by remittances through the patronage effect might offer limited democratisation as a way of shoring up support and forestalling potential revolution.

In considering whether the regime-strengthening or -weakening effects of remittances will be stronger, we can turn to the social remittance effect. If we assume that remittances from democratic states are accompanied by ideational diffusion of preferences from democracy, then we would expect that remittances from democratic countries enhance the regime-weakening and democratisation-enhancing mechanism at the expense of the regime-strengthening and democratisation-harmful mechanism. This is because, when patronage networks are weakened and citizens no longer rely on the state for welfare goods, ideological preferences for democracy may play a greater role in the calculus of the citizen's support for or opposition to the regime. These preferences for democracy also make it more likely that a regime will use limited democratisation as a tactic to prevent possible revolution. While authoritarianism is rarely conceived of as an ideology in itself in the same way as democracy, remittances from authoritarian countries may nevertheless lead to an enhancement of the anti-democratic and regime-supporting mechanisms. To the extent that remittance recipients have a higher income than non-recipients, they may fear the redistributive consequences of democracy, especially if they have no experience (either directly or indirectly through social remittances) of democracy. This will make them less likely to support opposition movements even if patronage institutions are weakened and may create an additional base of support in addition to those constituencies that the regime directs clientelistic spending towards.

Many assumptions have been made in this theoretical sketch. The issue of social remittances and the micro-level effects of remittances from democratic and authoritarian countries on ideology and political participation will be explored further in Part II, and the effect of remittances on protests will be explored in Chapter 3. In the remainder of this chapter, I will test the key macro-level hypotheses arising from this theory:

H2.1: Remittance flows from authoritarian countries are associated with less democratic political systems.

H2.2: Remittance flows from democratic countries are associated with more democratic political systems.

H2.3: Remittance flows from authoritarian countries are associated with a lower likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown.

H2.4: Remittance flows from democratic countries are associated with a greater likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown.

In the next section, we will explore the data that can be used to test these hypotheses.

2.3 Data

The best data on remittances are available from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* (WDI), which provides data on the US$ amount of remittances sent from and received by an economy in any given year (as reported by individual countries to the IMF) since 1970. While useful, this measure has limitations in terms of data availability and reliability: there are many missing observations in the WDI dataset and only remittances sent through formal channels are recorded. Remittances in the form of cash brought home in a suitcase, in-kind goods or money sent through *hawala* or other non-bank networks are unlikely to be counted in the official figures. The amount sent through informal networks has been estimated to be between 10% and 50% of remittances in different countries (Ratha, 2003, 171), and is likely to vary systematically as a result of such factors as capital restrictions, taxation and religion.[4] Furthermore, remittances sent through formal channels may be misattributed if they flow through international banks. While there are a number of issues with the reliability with this data, they are nevertheless the best that currently exist and have been used in a number of recent studies of the political effects of remittances.[5]

2.3.1 Estimating Remittances

The World Bank data only capture the total value of remittances entering a country in a given year; there is no way of telling where the remittances originated from. For the purposes of this chapter, we need to estimate the amount of remittances flowing from democratic and from authoritarian states. Comparable international bilateral remittance data that would allow us to construct these variables do not exist. A number of methods for estimating such data have, however, been proposed by Ratha and Shaw (2007) which they have used to construct bilateral remittance matrices for a number of years to investigate the increasing level of South-South remittance flows (World World Bank 2011). The most robust estimation strategy they suggest uses data on bilateral migrant stocks, per capita income in destination countries and per capita income in the source countries. We can use a modified version of this method to generate estimates of remittances originating from authoritarian and democratic states arriving in any country in a given year.

To begin, I model the average annual amount that a single migrant in country j remits

[4]For example, *hawala* networks are most common in the Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East and South-East Asia (Schramm and Taube, 2003).

[5]For example, Singer (2010); Ahmed (2012, 2013); Tyburski (2014); Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015).

to his or her home country i in any given year as a function of the average per capita incomes of their home country ($\bar{Y}_i$) and their host country (Y_j) as expressed in formula 1 below:

$$r_{ij} = f(\bar{Y}_i Y_j) = \begin{cases} \bar{Y}_i & Y_j <= \bar{Y}_i \\ \bar{Y}_i + (Y_j - \bar{Y}_i)^{\beta} & Y_j > \bar{Y}_i \end{cases} \tag{2.1}$$

The amount remitted by a migrant to his or her home country is assumed to be at least the amount of the average income of that country, even if the destination country is poorer on average than the home country on the rationale that "migration occurs in the expectation of earning a higher level of income for the dependent household than what the migrant would earn in her home country" (Ratha and Shaw, 2007, 45). The amount remitted home by a migrant in a wealthier destination country is assumed to be greater the larger the difference between the average per capital incomes of the home and destination countries but at a decreasing rate which is given by parameter β which has a value between 0 and 1.

The total amount remitted from the destination country to the home country can then be calculated simply by multiplying the estimated annual remittance of each migrant by the total stock of migrants from country i in country j as follows (in which R is total remittances received and M is migration stock):

$$R_{ij} = r_{ij} M_{ij} \tag{2.2}$$

In order to be able to estimate formula 2, we need to know the value of β so that we can calculate r_{ij} in formula 1. The value of β can be estimated by ensuring that the total remittances recorded in available data is equal to R_i in formula 3 below:

$$R_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} r_{ij} M_{ij} \tag{2.3}$$

Ratha and Shaw (2007, 45) have estimated β for many bilateral remittance channels over time and have found it to be "remarkably stable" around an average value of 0.75. This value for β is used in the World Bank bilateral remittances estimates which have been produced for 2012 and 2013, a practice that I will follow.

At this stage, we have a method to estimate bilateral remittances between any two given countries in any given year if we have data on average per capita incomes and migration stocks. This allows us to estimate the total remittances received from authoritarian countries (*AR*) or from democratic countries (*DR*) by using formula 3 but including either *a* for authoritarian countries or *d* for democratic countries in place of the *j* for all countries:

$$AR_i = \sum_{a=1}^{n} r_{ia} M_{ia} \tag{2.4}$$

$$DR_i = \sum_{d=1}^{n} r_{id} M_{id} \tag{2.5}$$

There are a number of problems with this approach to estimating remittance receipts. Firstly, it assumes that data on national income and migration stocks are reliable and valid; as with any macro-economic or -demographic data this is questionable, especially in less economically developed countries with underdeveloped statistical infrastructure for collecting such data.[6] Secondly, it assumes that all migrants have the same propensity to remit across time and space. In reality, the likelihood of remitting is likely to systematically vary with such factors as the age structure of the migrant stock (students and retirees are less likely to remit than those of working age).[7] While these are important caveats, this method improves upon earlier estimates of remittances that treated them as proportional to migrant stocks, assuming that all migrants sent the same amount regardless of the origin and destination countries (Harrison, Britton and Swanson, 2003, World Bank 2005). Furthermore, recent research on the determinants of remittance flows has shown that remittances tend to increase with migration and do not change significantly when

[6] For a critique of macroeconomic statistics in African countries in particular, see Jerven (2013).

[7] Although some studies have shown there to be "general belief in nonmigrants' entitlement to the achievements of those who migrate regardless of their status abroad," and that students frequently send money home to family members. (Tazanu, 2015, 20)

there are negative income shocks in migrants' home countries (Lim and Morshed, 2015).

2.3.2 Data for Estimating Remittances

Now that we have a method for producing estimates of remittances received from either democratic or authoritarian countries we need data on bilateral migration stocks, the democratic or authoritarian nature of political regimes and national income. The first is available from the World Bank's *Global Bilateral Migration Database* which initially included data for nearly all countries from 1970 to 2000 and has been subsequently been updated to 2010.[8]

There are many competing measures of democracy, including the Democracy/Dictatorship (DD) dataset (Cheibub, Ghandhi and Vreeland, 2010), Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, n.d.), Freedom House (2015) and the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) (Pemstein, Meserve and Melton, 2010). While the UDS and Polity IV are the most commonly-used measures, they are both continuous and the point at which countries become democratic is unclear or decided by convention (for example, over 0, 6 or 7 in the Polity score). Freedom House also offers continuous measures of different aspects of democracy but they have fallen out of favour in the political science literature due to its perceived bias in favour of higher democracy scores for allies of the United States (Giannone, 2010). The DD dataset, by contrast, offers a clear and parsimonious dichotomous measure of democracy (with broader country coverage than Polity IV) that can be easily used in equations 2.4 and 2.5, so this is the data used.

For average incomes, the best option would be data drawn from household surveys or tax records. Unfortunately comparative data of this type are not readily available for a large number of countries. GDP per capita reported in the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* (WDI) does, however, give us comparable data for most countries since 1970 and should be a reasonable proxy for average incomes.

[8]See Ozden et al. (2011) for a description of the data for 1960-2000. Updated data to 2010 was produced for the Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 (World Bank 2011). The only countries missing are very small island states whose omission is unlikely to have a large impact on the validity of the estimates.



Figure 2.1: Remittances Per Capita in Jordan and Tunisia, 1970-2008

In order to generate the separate estimates for remittances from democratic countries and those from authoritarian countries, therefore, equations 2.4 and 2.5 are used with bilateral migration and GDP data from the World Bank and democracy ratings from the DD dataset. The estimates are expressed in per capita terms in constant 2000 US$. How well do these estimates fit with what we know about the receipt of remittances? In Figure 2.1, the total remittances estimated per capita for Jordan and Tunisia are plotted alongside remittance receipts per capita reported by the World Bank. The estimates do not perfectly track the reported values: they are higher in most country years and changes in the estimated series appear to lag the WDI series by several years. They clearly follow a very similar pattern, however, giving us confidence that the estimates can be used in statistical models of democratisation. One of the benefits of using the estimates is that they can be derived for more country-years than the WDI has remittance data for; the estimated time series for Tunisia goes back six years further than the WDI data.



Figure 2.2: Estimated Remittances from Authoritarian and Democratic Countries Received by Jordan and Tunisia, 1970-2008

The other advantage in using the estimates is that they can be disaggregated into remittances from authoritarian states and remittances from democratic states. In Figure 2.2, these disaggregated remittance estimates are plotted for Jordan and Tunisia. As we would expect, Jordan has received the majority of its remittance flows from other authoritarian regimes (primarily those of the Gulf oil-exporters). The slump in remittances in the late 1980s was driven by a fall in remittances from the Gulf while remittances from democratic countries remained constant. Tunisia, on the other hand, has received the majority of its remittance flows from democratic countries; France has been by far the biggest destination for Tunisian migrants since independence. Less well-known trends in both countries can also be detected in this figure. Firstly, remittances from democratic countries have been more important in Jordan since the turn of the century as they have increased while remittances from the Gulf have decreased. Secondly, Tunisia has seen a significant increase in remittances from both democratic and authoritarian countries since the late 1990s. Indeed, remittances from authoritarian countries to Tunisia have increased very significantly in percentage terms over the past fifteen years (albeit from a very low base).[9]

2.3.3 Dependent Variable

There are many different conceptualisations and operationalisations of the dependent variable 'democratisation.' The two extant cross-national studies of the relationship between remittances and democratisation use different dependent variables. Ahmed (2012) codes a democratic transition as taking place if there is +3 change in the amalgamated Polity score (the Polity IV dataset's index of institutionalised autocracy subtracted from its index of institutionalised democracy) over a two-year period. This is a common method for coding democratisation in econometric studies of democratisation and captures a significant short-term move towards more democratic political institutions whether or not the leaders of the state remain in power or whether the resulting regime can be called 'democratic' or not.[10] Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015) use a newer dataset of transitions: the *Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions* (ABRT) dataset (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). This codes a transition as occuring if the authoritarian regime falls, whether or not the result is autocratic regime, a democracy, a period of anarchy or a foreign occupation. It defines a regime as "the rules that identify the group from which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and policy" (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014, 314).

It is important when considering which dependent variables to choose that they fit well with the theory proposed. There are two key dependent variables noted in the hypotheses: levels of democracy and regime change. For the former, I will use the Polity2 variable

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[9] Chapters 9 and 10 explore trends in remittances to Jordan and Tunisia in more detail.

[10] For example, a country that goes from -10 in the combined Polity score (the most authoritarian score possible) to a -7 (still considered a strongly authoritarian regime) with the same leaders in charge would be considered as having undergone a democratic transition and would be coded the same as a country which undergoes a democratic revolution that involves a swing from -10 to +10 (coded the most democratic regime possible).

from the Polity IV dataset. This is a 21-point aggregate score of a range of indices for democracy and autocracy that ranges from -10 to +10. It is one of the most commonly used measures of democracy in political science and so using this data will help to provide comparability with other research. For robustness purposes, I also use the UDS which have become increasingly popular since their introduction in 2010.

For regime change, I will use the ABRT dataset. This mostly closely operationationalises 'regime change,' rather than 'democratic transition' which is the concept best suited for measurement by the Polity and DD transition measures. It also provides comparability with Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015); comparability with Ahmed (2012) is difficult to achieve because the independent variable in his study is an interaction between remittances and foreign aid.

2.3.4 Control Variables

A whole host of factors can influence democratisation and regime stability/change and a vast literature has explored these in cross-national econometric studies (Coppedge, 2012, Chapter 9). The following control variables will be included in the models:

GDP per capita. The relationship between economic development and democratisation is a subject of long-running debate in democratisation studies. Both are likely to influence each other but the relative weight of the causal arrows is a subject of considerable disagreement in the literature.[11] In line with recent studies of democratisation, GDP per capita is included as a proxy for the level of wealth and economic development of a country.

GDP growth. In addition to the level of wealth, changes in wealth are also important. Regimes are more likely to be stable if they are producing good economic outcomes because people will be less likely to want to challenge a regime that is performing well economically. I include a measure of change in GDP per capita to capture this effect.

Population. Larger populations may have a greater chance of mounting effective op-

[11] For a review of this debate, see Robinson (2006).

position to authoritarian political systems because it is more difficult to maintain restrictions on a large population. I therefore include a log population as a control variable.

Migration: It is possible that any effects found for remittances are, in fact, capturing the influence of migration. Migration offers an exit option for those disconnected with a regime, so greater migration may be associated with fewer challenges for the regime and will also be correlated with increased remittances. I therefore include a measure of net migration as a percentage of population calculated from the WDI dataset as a control.

Social globalisation: Remittances could also be a proxy for the global flow of ideas and 'social remittances' could be part of the wider process of 'social globalisation.' In order to ensure that broader ideational diffusion is not driving the results, I include the KOF Index of Globalisation's sub-index of social globalisation which measures how connected countries are to the outside world, for example through accessing the internet and making and receiving international phone calls (Dreher, 2006).

Other overseas rents: The literature on remittances and democratisation literature grew out of research on the effects of other international rent flows. I therefore include two of the most important of these flows: foreign aid and hydrocarbon revenue. As is now common practice in the literature, I operationalise these in per capita terms calculated from the WDI.

Duration of regime: The early years of an authoritarian regime are often when it is at its most vulnerable; long-running regimes can make more credible commitments based on their past actions. In the regime stability models, therefore, it is important to include a measure of regime duration. I take this from the ABRT dataset as the length of time since the establishment of the current regime.

Authoritarian institutions: Recent research has highlighted the importance of institutions in the survival of authoritarian regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Wright and Escriba-Folch, 2012). Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015) find that remittances have an impact on regime stability only in party-based regimes. The ABRT dataset distinguishes between personal, party, military and monarchical regimes. In the regime stability models, I include dummy variables for the different types of regime and run separate models for party- and non-party-based regimes.

Table 2.1 summarises the variables in the dataset, including all countries for which data is available between 1970 and 2008. The time bounds are given by the earliest year for which bilateral migration data is available and the latest year available from the DD dataset.

		Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variables	Polity score	5567	0.71	7.48	-10	10
	Geddes et al transition	5081	0.04	0.19	0	1
Key independent variables	Remittances from authoritarian countries (constant 2000 US$)	5696	52.27	144.90	0.00	2570.00
	Remittances from democratic countries (constant 2000 US$)	5696	542.49	1190.75	0.21	19000.00
Control variables	GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)	5664	6533.34	10964.82	62.24	117493.60
	GDP growth (%)	5697	3.94	6.73	-64.045	149.97
	Population (1000s)	6316	30500	114000	16744	1300000
	Net migration	6380	-970.16	582675	-3570954	8469347
	Social globalisation index	6253	38.95	20.96	2.63	93.54
	Foreign aid per capita (constant 2000 US$)	5170	86.78	271.76	-97.32	12792.64
	Oil and gas rents per capita (constant 2000 US$)	5333	466.19	2131.50	0.00	33888.78
	Age of regime (years)	5081	29.02	34.67	1	267

Table 2.1: Remittances and Democratisation: Summary of Variables

2.4 Empirical Strategy

2.4.1 Remittances and Democratisation

The two dependent variables require different statistical models. I will first test the effect of remittances on the level of democracy measured by Polity scores. In order to do so, I will use a Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) model using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). The basic form of this model is expressed in equation 2.6 below

$$DEM_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 DEM_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 DR_{t-1,i} + \beta_3 AR_{t-1,i} + \beta_4 X_{t-1,i} \tag{2.6}$$

In this equation, *DEM* represents democracy as measured by the Polity score, *DR* represents remittances from democratic states, *AR* represents remittances from authoritarian states and *X* represents a vector of control variables. Panel-corrected standard errors are used as per Beck and Katz's (1995; 2011) advice. The independent variables are lagged by one year. The LDV PCSE approach is the 'workhorse' model for panel data in political science, but it is important to check whether results are robust to alternative specifications (Wilson and Butler, 2007). I therefore also estimate the models using Fixed Effects and Generalised Least Squares estimators.

2.4.2 Instrumental Variables: System GMM

Endogeneity is a potential problem in many quantitative analyses of democratisation, and investigating the role of remittances in democratisation is no exception. Many studies of the political and economic effects of remittances have used instruments based on geography or GDP of migrant sending countries (Adams Jr. and Page, 2005; Aggarwal, Demirgi-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2011; Ahmed, 2012; Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright, 2015). Unfortunately, a strategy based on geographic instruments for remittances that also disaggregated remittances by their source would be difficult to implement effectively due to the nature of the proxy variables. A second instrumental variables approach deployed by studies of remittances is the use of the System GMM estimator (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). This estimator was developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) as an improvement (in terms of the production of more consistent and efficient estimates) on the Difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). While commonly used in economics, System GMM has only recently begun to be used by political scientists (Arriola and Johnson, 2014; Costalli, 2014; Menaldo, 2016). System GMM regressions are dynamic panel models that address time-invariant omitted variable bias by differencing the variables and instrumenting for the LDV with available lags in levels such that it is uncorrelated with the error term.

2.4.3 Remittances and Regime Turnover

For the models investigating regime turnover, we need to use a different strategy to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable (1 for regime turnover in a given year, otherwise 0). The most common strategy for binary time-series cross-section analysis is the use of a logit regression with fixed effects including a strategy for modelling time dynamics (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998). The reduced form equation is:

$$Pr(Y_{i,t} = 1 | Y_{i,t-1} = 0) = \beta_1 DR_{t-1,i} + \beta_2 AR_{t-1,i} + \beta_3 X_{t-1,i} + \beta_4 \sigma_t + \alpha_i \tag{2.7}$$

In this specification, the left side represents the probability of a regime change in a given country in a given year and fixed effects are represented by an α being estimated for each country individually. σ represents a vector of time polynomials to control for temporal dependence in the data. Until recently it was common to use time dummies or splines to control for time dependence in models for binary data as per Beck at el's (1998) advice, but Monte Carlo experiments by Carter and Signorino (2010, 271) have shown that "polynomial approximation always outperforms time dummies and generally performs as well as splines." A probit estimator is used in an alternative specification.

2.5 Results

2.5.1 Remittances and Democratisation: Dynamic Panel Models

Table 2.2 displays the results of the models taking the aggregated Polity 2 score as the dependent variable. Model 1.1 includes only the lagged dependent variable and the remittance variables. As expected, the coefficient on the variable capturing remittances from authoritarian regimes has a negative sign, indicating a negative association with democracy, while the opposite is true for the variable capturing remittances from democratic regimes. Both of these coefficients are significantly significant at the 99% level. The coefficient signs and statistical significance remain the same for the two remittance variables when the control variables are added in Model 1.2. Model 1.3 restricts the sample by removing those countries that are generally considered democratic (with a Polity score of 7 or more). Limiting the sample in this way makes little difference to the results.

To ensure that these results were not driven by the statistical method chosen, models 1.4 and 1.5 use alternative estimation strategies: Generalised Least Squares in model 1.4 and a fixed effects linear regression with standard errors clustered by country in model 1.5. Again, these changes make little difference to the results, although the authoritarian remittances variable is only significant at the 90% level when using these estimators. An additional robustness test is reported in model 1.6 in which Unified Democracy Scores (rescaled to vary between 0 and 20 to provide comparability between coefficients) are used as the dependent variable instead of Polity scores. While the substantive effects are smaller for both remittance variables when using UDS, the statistical significance for both remains above the 90% level.

	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6
Dependent variable: Polity score (except (1.6))	All countries	All countries	Countries with Polity<7	Countries with Polity<7	Countries with Polity<7	UDS scores, all countries
Estimation method	PCSE	PCSE	PCSE	GLS	Fixed Effects	PCSE
Lagged DV	0.9364	0.9260	0.9234	0.9348	0.8440	0.9585
	(0.0109)***	(0.0128)***	(0.0181)***	(0.0082)***	(0.0157)***	(0.0080)***
Authoritarian remittances	-0.0006	-0.0009	-0.0007	-0.0006	-0.0005	-0.0002
	(0.0001)***	(0.0003)***	(0.0002)***	(0.0004)*	(0.0004)	(0.0001)*
Democratic remittances	0.0004	0.0003	0.0004	0.0004	0.0009	0.0001
	(0.0001)***	(0.0001)**	(0.0002)*	(0.0002)**	(0.0003)***	(0.0000)***
GDP per capita	-	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000
	-	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)**
GDP growth	-	-0.0060	-0.0086	-0.0135	-0.0079	-0.0023
	-	(0.0047)	(0.0051)*	(0.0051)***	(0.0062)	(0.0020)
Net migration (% of population)	-	0.0037	-0.0005	0.0076	0.0265	0.0000
	-	(0.0116)	(0.0126)	(0.0109)	(0.0135)*	(0.0001)
Social globalisation	-	0.0077	0.0034	0.0047	-0.0204	0.0015
	-	(0.0046)*	(0.0056)	(0.0043)	(0.0092)**	(0.0014)
Log of population	-	0.0483	0.0970	0.0677	2.1813	0.0008
	-	(0.0351)	(0.0519)*	(0.0329)**	(0.2888)***	(0.0092)
Oil and gas rents per capita	-	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0001	-0.0000
	-	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***
Foreign aid per capita	-	-0.0005	-0.0009	-0.0007	0.0007	0.0000
	-	(0.0005)	(0.0005)*	(0.0004)*	(0.0005)	(0.0001)
Constant	0.1538	-0.7872	-1.4661	-0.9466	-34.1099	0.4030
	(0.0690)**	(0.6249)	(0.9319)	(0.5630)*	(4.4954)***	(0.1861)**
Countries (country-years)	157 (4890)	130 (3559)	112 (2562)	111 (2561)	112 (2562)	150 (4015)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets (clustered by country in models (4) and (5))

Table 2.2: Remittances and Democracy Scores: Dynamic Panel Models

	Effect on democracy (21 point Polity scale) of a change of			
	+$500 per capita	1 Std. Dev.	2 Std. Dev.	Lowest to highest
Remittances from authoritarian states	-0.45	-0.39	-0.78	-2.31
Remittances from democratic states	+0.15	+0.36	+0.72	+5.70

Table 2.3: Substantive Effects of Remittances on Democracy Scores

While establishing statistical significance is important in rejecting the null hypotheses of no relationship between the remittance variables and democracy, we also need to investigate the substantive significance. Do these results imply that remittances have an important substantive affect on democracy? Taking model 1.2 as our baseline, an increase by two standard deviations in remittances from authoritarian countries would be expected to reduce Polity scores (which are on a 21-point scale) by 0.78 points, while a similar increase in remittances from democratic countries would have the effect of increasing Polity scores by 0.72 points. Table 2.3 reports the effect that a variety of changes in remittances would have on Polity scores according to model 1.2. They reveal that, while remittances are unlikely to be a primary cause of changes in levels of democracy, they are nevertheless an important influence on the level of democracy in a country. We can therefore take these results as providing initial evidence for H2.1 and H2.2.

2.5.2 Remittances and Democratisation: System GMM Models

Table 2.4 reports the results of the GMM estimations including only the remittance variables at various lag lengths and collapsing the instrument count. The coefficients for the remittance variables retain the same sign and are statistically significant in all the models. The p-values for the Hansen tests in models 2.8 through 2.11 are improbably high which is probably because there are too many instruments. The conventional advice is for there to be fewer instruments than panel groups (Roodman, 2009). Only in model 2.7, which collapses the instruments, is this the case. In Table 2.5, therefore, I show the results of models using collapsed instruments and including the control variables used in the models in Table 2.1. In both models, remittances from democratic countries were positively

	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5
Dependent variable: Polity score	GMM, Instruments Collapsed	GMM, Lag Length (1, 2)	GMM, Lag Length (2, 3)	GMM, Lag Length (3, 4)	GMM, Lag Length (4, 5)
Lagged DV	0.9728	0.9818	0.9479	0.9458	0.9659
	(0.0010)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0002)***	(0.0000)***
Authoritarian remittances	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0002
	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***
Democratic remittances	0.0001	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***
Constant	0.1502	0.1652	0.1803	0.1756	0.1655
	(0.0081)***	(0.0004)***	(0.0033)***	(0.0015)***	(0.0008)***
Countries (country-years)	157 (4890)	157 (4890)	157 (4890)	157 (4890)	157 (4890)
Number of Instruments	115	331	322	313	304
AR(2) Arellano Bond z-score (p-value)	-0.66 (0.511)	-0.66 (0.510)	-0.66 (0.512)	-0.66 (0.512)	-0.66 (0.511)
Hansen test chi-square (p-value)	124.41 (0.18)	154.57 (1.00)	154.38 (1.00)	154.32 (1.00)	154.84 (1.00)

$^*p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.05$, $^{***}p<0.01$. Standard errors in brackets (clustered by country in models (4) and (5))

Table 2.4: Remittances and Democracy Scores: GMM Estimations

associated with democracy scores while remittances from authoritarian countries were negatively associated with democracy scores; both coefficients were significant at the 99% level. Finding the same relationships using GMM models as the linear models reported above increases our confidence in the results.

	3.1	3.2
Dependent variable: Polity score	Economic control variables	All controls
Estimation method	GMM, instruments collapsed	GMM, instruments collapsed
Lagged DV	0.9769	0.9722
	(0.0004)***	(0.0007)***
Authoritarian remittances	-0.0005	-0.0003
	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***
Democratic remittances	0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***
GDP per capita	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)***
GDP growth	-0.0032	-0.0040
	(0.0002)***	(0.0002)***
Net migration (% of population)	-	0.0025
	-	(0.0004)***
Social globalisation	-	-0.0004
	-	(0.0002)**
Log of population	-	-0.0065
	-	(0.0047)
Oil and gas rents per capita	-	-0.0000
	-	(0.0000)***
Foreign aid per capita	-	-0.0004
	-	(0.0000)***
Constant	0.1743	0.2950
	(0.0040)***	(0.0761)***
Countries (country-years)	154 (4713)	130 (3559)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets.

Table 2.5: Remittances and Democracy Scores: GMM Estimations with Control Variables

	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6
Dependent variable: Regime change	All regimes	All regimes	Party regimes	Non-party regimes	All regimes	All regimes
Estimation method	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Probit
Authoritarian remittances	0.9970	0.9941	1.0081	0.9855	0.9929	-0.0032
	(0.0044)	(0.0064)	(0.0599)	(0.0079)*	(0.0066)	(0.0034)
Democratic remittances	1.0077	1.0098	1.0499	1.0258	1.0102	0.0056
	(0.0031)**	(0.0049)**	(0.0253)**	(0.0108)**	(0.0052)**	(0.0026)**
GDP per capita	-	0.9988	0.9956	0.9990	0.9986	-0.0006
	-	(0.0008)	(0.0047)	(0.0010)	(0.0008)*	(0.0004)
GDP growth	-	0.9555	0.9583	0.9665	0.9515	-0.0257
	-	(0.0159)***	(0.0411)	(0.0180)*	(0.0171)***	(0.0088)***
Net migration (% of population)	-	0.8990	0.5532	0.9348	0.9283	-0.0571
	-	(0.0458)**	(0.1837)*	(0.0604)	(0.0489)	(0.0273)**
Social globalisation	-	0.9542	1.4365	0.9564	0.9578	-0.0232
	-	(0.0394)	(0.3824)	(0.0446)	(0.0448)	(0.0215)
Log of population	-	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0000	-4.2304
	-	(0.0004)***	(0.0004)***	(0.0006)**	(0.0001)***	(1.4504)***
Oil and gas rents per capita	-	1.0005	1.0063	1.0002	1.0003	0.0002
	-	(0.0019)	(0.0053)	(0.0030)	(0.0021)	(0.0009)
Foreign aid per capita	-	0.9936	0.9961	0.9947	0.9908	-0.0028
	-	(0.0068)	(0.0177)	(0.0082)	(0.0076)	(0.0029)
Party regimes	-	8.0968	-	-	9.8516	1.0285
	-	(4.8021)***	-	-	(6.1328)***	(0.2829)***
Military regimes	-	4.7937	-	3.9916	5.2709	0.6857
	-	(2.7137)***	-	(2.8344)*	(3.1005)***	(0.2544)***
Regime duration	-	1.1229	1.1579	1.1154	1.1219	0.0552
	-	(0.0239)***	(0.0534)***	(0.0332)***	(0.0241)***	(0.0094)***
Time modelling	Time polynomials	Time polynomials	Time polynomials	Time polynomials	Year FE	Time polynomials
Countries (country-years)	70 (1565)	59 (1239)	26 (420)	43 (705)	59 (1239)	59 (1239)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Results reported are odds ratios (coefficients in (6)) with standard errors in brackets.

Table 2.6: Remittances and Regime Change

2.5.3 Remittances and Regime Change

Table 2.6 displays the results of the models taking probability of the fall of an authoritarian regime as the dependent variable. In model 4.1, which includes only the remittance variables, remittances from democratic states have a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of regime change, but those from authoritarian regimes have a negative effect (although it is not statistically significant at conventional levels). The same results are found in model 4.2 with the full set of control variables included. In models 4.3 and 4.4 the sample is split into party and non-party authoritarian regimes to assess whether the effect of remittances varies by regime type. In party regimes, remittances from democratic countries have substantially higher positive effects on the likelihood of regime change than in the complete sample of all regimes. Remittances from authoritarian countries also have positive effects, although they are again not statistically significant. In non-party regimes, however, authoritarian regimes have a statistically significant negative effect on regime change. The reason for the insignificant result in the first two models may, therefore, be that remittances from authoritarian countries have a mixed effect in party-based regimes. Models 4.5 and 4.6 use alternative modelling strategies to ensure that the results are not dependent on model choice. Model 4.5 includes year fixed effects instead of time polynomials and model 4.6 uses a fixed-effect probit estimator instead of logit. Both of these give similar results for the remittances variables. In additional models, these two robustness estimators were employed on the non-party regimes sub-sample and confirmed that remittances from authoritarian countries have a significant negative effect on the likelihood of regime change.[12]

What is the substantive significance of these results? Increasing remittances from democratic countries by the standard deviation in the dataset would result in an increase in the odds of regime failure by a factor of 12, all else being equal (according to the estimates in model 4.2). In non-party-based authoritarian regimes, a decrease in remittances from authoritarian countries by the standard deviation would increase the odds of regime

[12]These results of these models are not reported due to space constraints but are available on request.

failure by a factor of 12. These results suggest that remittances have a strong effect on the durability of authoritarian regimes. Remittances from democratic countrues help to undermine authoritarian regimes, giving us evidence for H2.3. The evidence for H2.4 is mixed: remittances from authoritarian countries appear to have positive effects on the durability of non-party authoritarian regimes, but they do not have a significant effect (and possibly even a negative effect) on party-based authoritarian regimes.

2.6 Conclusion

The headline finding of this thesis is that not all migrant remittance flows are the same when it comes to their influence on the prospects for democracy. In this chapter, we have seen that remittances from democratic states are associated with an increase in both democracy scores and the probability of the breakdown of an authoritarian regime. Remittances from authoritarian states, however, are associated with the opposite outcomes: a decrease in democracy scores and a decreased likelihood of the failure of an authoritarian regime (in non-party regimes). These findings help to reconcile the findings of two recent studies by Ahmed (2012) and Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015) that reach opposite conclusions about the relationship between remittances and democratisation. We have also seen that there may be different causal mechanisms working to different degrees; remittances from democratic countries have a more significant impact in party regimes and remittances from authoritarian countries only have a supportive effect for the regime when it is not based on a single party. This finding offers initial support for the patronage effect while also suggesting that it may be tempered by the other causal mechanisms.

These findings provoke a number of questions. How do remittances from democratic states influence political liberalisation and regime change? Why do remittances from authoritarian states not have the same effects? Why do remittances from authoritarian states decrease the prospects for democratisation? The remaining chapters of Part I explore these questions at the macro level. In the next chapter, I investigate one possible causal mechanism linking remittances with democratisation: the fuelling of political protests. In Chapter 4, I show how authoritarian regimes can channel remittances through facade democratic structures, but that this only works in the case of local elections. Parts II and III explore the causal mechanisms linking remittances and political change at the micro level through the use of survey and interview data.

Chapter 3

Remittances and Protest in Authoritarian Regimes

Introduction

In this short chapter, I will explore one macro-level causal mechanism that could help to account for the relationship between remittances from democratic countries and democratisation: the fuelling of anti-government protests against authoritarian regimes. I will show that remittances from democratic countries are associated with higher numbers of protests in recipient countries, but that remittances from authoritarian countries are not. In Chapters 6, 9 and 10, I will explore this relationship further at the individual level using survey data and interviews.

This chapter represents the first empirical investigation of the relationship between remittances and protests. Scholars have found evidence for causal mechanisms linking remittances and democratisation including the effect of remittances on declines in vote shares for authoritarian incumbents (Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright, 2015) and increases in patronage spending (Ahmed, 2012). Protests could be another important causal mechanism. While not all regime transitions and political liberalisations are accompanied by significant mobilisation, anti-government protests play an important role in many such events (Haggard and Kaufman, 2012; Beaulieu, 2014; Brancati, 2014). If remittances increase the likelihood of political protests, then they are likely to also increase the likelihood of political liberalisation and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes.

3.1 Theory and Hypotheses

Remittances could increase the likelihood of antigovernment protests in authoritarian regimes in two ways: reducing the individual economic risks of protest and raising the perceived potential rewards of successful protest.

How might remittances affect the risks to individuals in deciding whether or not to protest? As discussed in the previous chapter, remittances make recipients less dependent on government patronage for their livelihood. Citizens who receive remittances have less to fear from the potential withdrawal of government patronage to themselves and their communities if they take part in protests. Economic autonomy from authoritarian governments has been shown to increase anti-government political action (McMann, 2006; Radnitz, 2010). While this discussion is usually in the context of privatisation and government control over the economy, the same logic applies to remittances. Those dependent on income from a government job or government welfare payments are less likely to protest than whose income is mostly derived from remittances from outside the country, which are difficult for authoritarian governments to control. While there are other potential costs which may influence protest decisions that are not affected by remittance receipt, such as threats to physical integrity by government security forces, economic considerations will nevertheless play an important role in the calculus of whether or not to join a protest.

Remittances may also alter the potential benefits that recipients see from protesting against authoritarian regimes in a number of ways. Firstly, there may be the diffusion of pro-democratic norms accompanying the financial remittances, as discussed in the previous chapter. Beyond these social remittances, the receipt of financial remittances, which in most cases come from more economically developed countries, is a powerful demonstration that there are alternative ways of running a country which lead to better economic outcomes. Through these mechanisms, which will be explored more fully in Parts II and III using survey data and interviews, we would expect remittances to increase recipients' perceptions of the benefits of political change and thus be more likely to try to bring such change about through protest.

By decreasing the costs and increasing the perceived benefits of protesting for political change, remittances should increase the likelihood of protest on an individual level. There is an alternative causal story, however, that could link remittances with a reduced likelihood of protest. The greater wealth and economic security of remittance recipients may reduce their economic grievances and make them less likely to desire political change. Increasing the number of remittance recipients and the amount of remittances they receive may therefore lessen their likelihood of political protest. This is the argument of Germano (2013), who shows that remittances increase perceptions of economic security and decrease the likelihood of political participation in democratic Mexico. Regan and Frank (2014) also show that remittances can reduce the potential for civil war by mitigating the effects of economic downturns.

We will explore the micro-level implications of these ideas in Chapter 6. In this chapter, we will focus on the macro-level question: are greater remittance flows associated with higher or lower numbers of protests in non-democratic regimes? We have seen that there are plausible ideas linking remittances with both outcomes, just as there were with the relationship between remittances and the prospects for democratisation discussed in the previous chapter. Should we expect any differences between remittances from migrants in democratic countries and those from authoritarian countries in their effect on protests? No matter where they are sent from, remittances reduce the potential economic costs of engaging in protest while decreasing economic grievances. The social remittance and comparison effects are more likely to be found with remittances from democratic countries because good economic outcomes are more obviously attibutable to a democratic political system than to an alternative authoritarian political system. Part III will investigate this idea through interviews with those who receive remittances from family members in democratic and authoritarian countries. We might therefore expect the multiple mechanisms linking remittances from democratic countries with greater protests to outweigh the mechanism leading to fewer protests and so can state the following hypothesis:

H3.1.: Remittances from democratic countries are associated with greater levels of anti-government protest in authoritarian regimes.

It is difficult to know what we should expect the overall effect of remittances from authoritarian countries to be on protest, as the mechanisms promoting more or fewer protests may be finely balanced. We would expect any positive effect to be less pronounced that remittances from democratic regimes, however, so I will test the following hypothesis:

H3.2: Remittances from authoritarian countries are associated with greater levels of anti-government protest in authoritarian regimes, but to less of an extent than remittances from democratic countries.

3.2 Data

3.2.1 Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable of interest in this chapter is anti-government protest. While there are a number of datasets available which include various types of protest variables, there is ongoing debate about their validity and reliability (Ortiz et al., 2005; Nam, 2006). The most prominent datasets are large international event datasets that code protest events from the international sections of American newspapers: the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983) and the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) dataset (Banks and Wilson, 2014). These both include annual country-level data on various categories of protests coded from the New York Times. While they are frequently used in quantitative studies, their drawbacks are well-known: they are heavily biased towards certain regions, "disproportionately cover large urban areas or areas with wire service offices, and report events with large numbers rather than small" (Woolley, 2000, 158). While the codings are generally regarded as reliable, these biases come from the source itself: the editorial decisions of the New York Times from which both datasets are coded. Nam (2006) has suggested a greater role for local media in generating datasets to take advantage of their greater local knowledge, but no large cross-national dataset has yet done so beyond Europe. This is possibly due to the difficulty in comparing the reliability of media outlets between countries with differering media environments; authoritarian states in particular have varying levels of media freedom which affect the likelihood of strikes being reported in the press.[1]

Despite these problems, CNTS is the best available dataset with broad country and time coverage of protests and is often used in research on the causes of protest (Barry et al., 2014; Ruijgrok, 2017). I will therefore use it as one of the main dependent variables. Protests in the CNTS are defined as "any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature."

In order to have greater confidence that the results are not driven by the vagaries of the data source, I will also use the Social Conflict in Africa dataset (SCAD) which provides a promising alternative to other large cross-national datasets (Salehyan et al., 2012). This dataset includes event data on social conflict in African countries with populations of over one million from 1990 to 2012 coded from news agency reports. News agencies have significantly more coverage of African countries, particularly those with smaller populations, than any individual newspaper. As the focus of this chapter is on anti-government action, I use the events in the dataset that are coded as

1. some form of protest against central or regional governments that

2. was not instigated by factions within or closely aligned with the government (events coded "Pro-Government Violence (Repression)," "Extra-government Violence" and

[1] Decisions about the media sources to use can also significantly affect the counts of different events, even in countries with free media environments (Myers and Caniglia, 2004)

"Intra-government Violence" were excluded) and

3. were not wars

5165 events fitted these three criteria; these were aggregated to create country-year counts of anti-government protests to be used as a dependent variable.

While SCAD contains the most comprehensive data on protests, it is far from perfect; there is a bias in news agency source material towards greater coverage of events in larger countries such as South Africa and Nigeria, very small countries are excluded and it is difficult to know how representative the sample is of the underlying population of protests. The inclusion of control variables including population size and GDP per capita as well as estimating models with country fixed effects should help to mitigate the first problem. Small countries are underserved by most datasets for the simple reason that small and medium protests in small countries do not get much attention from the media and so are less likely to be recorded.

Neither SCAD nor the CNTS datasets are perfect, but if significant effects are found using dependent variables derived from both, we can have greater confidence in the findings than if we rely on models using just one dataset.

3.2.2 Independent Variables

The main independent variables in the macro-level analysis are remittances. I use estimates of remittances from authoritarian countries and from democratic countries generated by the method described in the previous chapter. This helps us to disentangle the effects of remittances from democratic and authoritarian countries.

One control variable that is very important to include is migration. Emigration can act as a 'safety valve;' those who are disgruntled in authoritarian regimes could choose to migrate to seek better opportunities rather than protesting to bring change in their own country (Hirschman, 1970; Pfaff, 2006; Gehlbach, 2006; Barry et al., 2014). Remittances and migration are likely to be strongly correlated because the latter is required for the former. If we do not control for migration, we run the risk that any effects found for remittances are, in fact, caused by migration itself. I therefore include a measure of net migration as a percentage of the population from the WDI as a control variable.

A number of other control variables are also included in the models. Remittances may be a proxy for a broader form of cultural globalisation in which pro-democratic norms are transmitted through international news media and globalised entertainment. To account for this, I include the KOF social globalisation index which captures how connected countries are with the outside world. Economic challenges are one of the key drivers of anti-government and pro-democracy protests (Brancati, 2014), so I include both GDP per capita and GDP growth to capture long- and short-term economic conditions. Countries with large populations may be more likely to be covered in the two datasets of protests, so I include a log of population as another control. Finally, the level of democracy may influence both how repressive a regime is and how far people are willing to protest against it. I therefore include a measure of democracy, the combined Polity score, as a control variable.

3.3 Empirical Strategy

Statistical models for count data, such as the number of protests in a given country in a given year, must usually account for overdispersion and the potential for positive contagion. Protest data from both datasets are indeed overdispersed: the means/standard deviations of the CNTS and SCAD variables are 0.42/1.26 and 3.44/4.77. A well-developed method for dealing with this issue is to use a negative binomial estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) which is often used for cross-national research on the determinants of protest (Barry et al., 2014; Ruijgrok, 2017). I use robust standard errors clustered by country in the main models and lag the independent variables by one year. To capture country-specific variation in levels of protest, I run additional models including country fixed effects.

The models are all run on those states with a Polity combined score lower than 7. Scores of 7 or higher indicate that the political system is a consolidated democracy. As we are interested in the effect of remittances in promoting democratisation through protests, we are not interested in protests in generally democratic countries. There may be a different relationship between remittances and protests under democratic regimes. While this would be an interesting subject for future research, the inclusion of democratic countries in the sample might influence the results we obtain, so they are not included.

3.4 Results

Table 3.1 reports the results for the models using both the CNTS and SCAD protest data. Models 1.1 and 1.2 include only the remittance variables. We find that remittances from democratic countries are associated with greater numbers of protests in both datasets; the relationship is statistically significant at the 99% level. Remittances from authoritarian countries have a positive relationship with protests recorded by CNTS but are negatively associated with protests in the SCAD dataset, although neither of these relationships is statistically significant at conventional levels.

In models 1.3 and 1.4, I add the full set of control variables. Social globalisation has a strong and significant positive association with both measures of protest, indicating a possible social remittance effect on protest. Migration appears to be a safety valve in Africa; greater net migration is associated with lower levels of protest in the SCAD data. Surprisingly, there is a positive coefficient for migration on the model using CNTS data, although this is not significant at conventional levels. Less surprising is the strong negative association between long- and short-term economic conditions, proxied by GDP per capita and GDP growth, and numbers of protests. Consistent with other research, protests are more likely when economic conditions are poor (Brancati, 2014). Most importantly, the coefficient for the democratic remittances variable remains positive and statistically significant in the models using both the CNTS and SCAD measures of protest.

	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6
Dependent variable	CNTS Protests	SCAD Protests	CNTS Protests	SCAD Protests	CNTS Protests	SCAD Protests
Estimation method	Negative binomial	Negative binomial	Negative binomial	Negative binomial	Negative binomial	Negative binomial
Authoritarian Remittances	0.0005	-0.0007	0.0004	-0.0006	0.0002	-0.0002
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0009)
Democratic Remittances	0.0002	0.0003	0.0004	0.0004	0.0006	0.0004
	(0.0001)***	(0.0001)***	(0.0002)**	(0.0001)***	(0.0003)**	(0.0002)**
GDP per capita	-	-	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001
	-	-	(0.0000)***	(0.0000)*	(0.0000)	(0.0000)*
GDP growth	-	-	-0.0100	-0.0048	-0.0143	-0.0077
	-	-	(0.0010)***	(0.0023)**	(0.0016)***	(0.0021)***
Population (log)	-	-	0.0211	-0.0226	1.3599	1.4400
	-	-	(0.0361)	(0.0438)	(0.3420)***	(0.5491)**
Net migration	-	-	0.0198	-0.0549	-0.0220	0.0310
	-	-	(0.0166)	(0.0164)***	(0.0207)	(0.0274)
Social globalisation	-	-	0.0153	0.0170	0.0102	-0.0020
	-	-	(0.0047)**	(0.0047)***	(0.0099)	(0.0114)
Democracy (Polity)	-	-	0.0033	0.0020	0.0008	-0.0057
	-	-	(0.0038)	(0.0029)	(0.0045)	(0.0035)
Constant	-1.216	1.054	-1.998	0.910	-21.497	-18.799
	(0.1102)***	(0.1139)***	(1.1346)*	(1.2675)	(5.5333)***	(12.4616)
Country FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	2,591	655	2,234	567	2,234	567

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.

Table 3.1: Remittances and Protests

Models 1.5 and 1.6 include country-fixed effects to account for time-invariant country-specific differences in the level of protest. Adding fixed effects changes the relationship between some of the control variables and protest; for example the population variable has a positive and significant association in these models which is not present in the models without fixed effects. The democratic remittance variable, however, remains statistically significant at the 95% level. The association between remittances from democratic countries and protest therefore appears to be robust to multiple specifications.



Figure 3.1: Predicted Number of Protests at Different Levels of Remittance Inflows

We have established the statistical significance of the relationship between remittances from democratic countries and protests, but is this association substantively interesting? In Figure 3.1, I plot the predicted number of protests (from the CNTS dataset) in a country at different levels of remittance inflows from democratic countries based on model 1.3 with the control variables set at their means. Increasing remittances per capita from democratic countries from their mean of $542.49 by one standard deviation would increase the number of predicted protests by 38% (from 0.37 to 0.51). This is a not insubstantial increase and suggests that remittances from democratic countries can indeed play an important role in fuelling protests.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the relationship between remittances and anti-government protest, which could be one mechanism by which remittances can threaten the survival of authoritarian regimes or pressure them to offer democratising reforms. We have found that remittances from democratic countries are associated with greater numbers of protests in recipient countries. Remittances from authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, are associated with neither greater nor lesser numbers of protests. This suggests that there is an important difference between the macro-level effects of remittances from democratic and authoritarian countries and may help to account for the differing effects remittances have on the prospects for democratisation.

We still have many questions left to answer. By what mechanisms do remittances increase protest? How do authoritarian regimes try to mitigate the potential undermining effect of remittances? To what extent are the protests fuelled by remittances pro-democratic in their aims? Parts II and III of this thesis will attempt to offer answers to these questions. In Part II, we will explore the micro-level effects of remittances, showing that remittance recipients are more likely to engage in protest than non-recipients because they feel more economically secure and that remittance recipients in countries which receive most of their remittances from democratic countries are more supportive of democracy than non-recipients. In Part III, I will use evidence from interviews to investigate remittance recipients' perspectives on the role of remittances in political participation and norm diffusion. In the next chapter, I will show that authoritarian regimes can try to channel political engagement generated by remittances into political channels that they control.

Chapter 4

Political Remittance Cycles in Non-democratic States

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I investigated protests as a potentially important causal mechanism linking remittance flows with prospects for democracy in a cross-national context. In this chapter, I use country-specific data to explore one way in which regimes can mitigate the potential democratising impact of remittances: the inclusion of migrants in regime-controlled political processes. A number of recent studies have found that migrants increase the amount of remittances they send home around election times in their home countries. Evidence of these 'political remittance cycles' has been uncovered in a large global sample of countries with competitive elections using annual data (O'Mahony, 2013) and in a smaller group of democracies using monthly data (Nyblade and O'Mahony, 2014). To date, no study has investigated whether such remittance cycles exist in authoritarian regimes. Do they exist at all? If they do, how do they compare with remittance cycles in democratic countries?

In this chapter, I will investigate how remittance inflows vary systematically with elections in Jordan and Egypt. The holding of national parliamentary elections has no effect on the level of remittances in either case, but the holding of local municipal elections significantly increases remittance receipts. This result can be viewed as consistent with studies of elections in the Middle East and authoritarian regimes elsewhere which conclude that elections are mechanisms for the distribution of patronage (Lust-Okar, 2006).

In the next section, I introduce the theory and hypotheses to be investigated. I then move on to the cases of Jordan and Egypt, which were chosen for the availability of reliable data on remittances reported quarterly for a long time period. In each country, I analyse the importance of remittances and the nature of national and local elections before describing the data on remittances, the empirical strategy used to model them and the results of the estimations. A final section concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the relationship between remittances and the prospects for democracy.

4.1 Theory and Hypothesis

Previous research has shown that, in truly uncompetitive elections where there is no legal opposition and no opponent on the ballot, political remittance cycles do not exist (O'Mahony, 2013). This makes intuitive sense; a migrant is unlikely to attempt to influence an election by remitting extra funds when the result is predetermined. We might want to go further and say that, in authoritarian regimes where elections are free but not fair, and where there is little or no possibility of the opposition coming to power, there is no incentive to remit extra money because the ultimate outcome in terms of who rules after the election is not in doubt.

Most authoritarian regimes that allow somewhat competitive elections do so for a purpose, however, usually related to regime survival strategies (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Studies of elections in Egypt, Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries with competitive elections have concluded that regimes hold elections to allow the elite to compete over access to rents (Lust-Okar, 2006; Blaydes, 2011). Those who win seats may not have much influence on policy-making but may instead be able to affect the distribution of rents, thereby producing a system of "competitive clientelism" as described by Lust-Okar (2009). If this is the case, we might posit the opposite hypothesis; winning elections is valuable, so remittance flows increase when elections are held in order to help fund campaigns. The causal mechanism here is simple: migrants seek to influence the election by financing campaigns so that favoured candidates gain leverage over political positions which allow them to distribute rents to the migrant's family or provide services to their community. Although electoral institutions are often designed to disfavour opposition candidates, it is possible that migrants may also seek to support opposition candidates financially where they have at least a possibility of winning an election in an attempt to bring about political change. While these are very different motives, they both have the possibility to bolster authoritarian regimes because migrants are either complicit in competitive clientelism or focusing their oppositional efforts on elections which are carefully controlled by the regime.

So far, I have referred to 'elections' as a general category without disagreggation. While most focus on elections in authoritarian regimes has been on those for the national parliament (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), many regimes also allow competitive elections for local government.[1] Elections for national parliaments require significant investment on the part of candidates, who are often wealthy individuals financing their own campaigns (Lust-Okar, 2009). Remittances would have to be very substantial in order to influence elections in these cases, which may lower the likelihood of a migrant opting to send extra money during national elections; while the rewards are higher, the amount of money needed to influence the elections is high enough to be out of reach of most migrants. Local elections require significantly less investment to influence, which will make sending home extra money around elections more worthwhile, and thus increase the chances of the existence of a political remittance cycle. Furthermore, Cordova and Hiskey

[1]A small number of studies of local elections in non-democratic countries do exist. For example, see Ross (2010) on Russia, Tuastad (2008) on Gaza and the literature on subnational authoritarianism in the Americas (Gibson, 2012). Nyblade and O'Mahony (2014) have shown remittance cycles to be present for local elections in democratic Mexico.

(2015) have shown that, in Latin America, migration tends to lead to greater local-level political engagement but not with national-level political engagement amongst those left behind, also making it more likely that remittances will be used in local political election campaigns rather than national ones. We can thus posit a hypothesis to test as follows:

H4.1: In authoritarian regimes with competitive elections, remittances increase around local elections but not around national elections.

4.2 Political Remittance Cycles in Jordan

4.2.1 Remittances and Elections in Jordan



Figure 4.1: Remittances to Jordan, 1975-2013

Jordan is heavily dependent on remittances and was labelled a 'semi-rentier state,' exhibiting rentier state-like qualities despite lacking oil resources, by the classic rentier state literature (Beblawi, 1987; Brynen, 1992; Brand, 1992). These remittances come primarily from Jordanian workers, both skilled and unskilled, who have migrated temporarily or permanently to the oil-rich but labour-poor Gulf countries, connecting Jordan to the wider Arab oil economy. Remittances have become even more important since Jordan was first labelled a semi-rentier state because other rents, including those from aid and the export of natural resources, have declined over the past quarter century (Knowles, 2005; Jenkins et al., 2011).

Figure 4.1 shows remittances as to Jordan as a percentage of GDP in annual data from 1975 until 2013.[2] In the late 1970s and early 1980s remittances made up over 20% of Jordanian GDP, before declining with the falling oil price and the resultant shock to the economies of the Gulf, reaching a low of just over 10% of GDP in 1991. Remittance receipts recovered with the rise in oil prices in the early 1990s, returning to make up over 20% of GDP in 1996. Remittance receipts remained high until the global financial crisis of 2008; since then remittances have fallen again towards 10% of GDP.



Figure 4.2: Remittances to Jordan and Elections, 1994-2014

[2]The data for this graph is drawn from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.

Figure 4.2 uses quarterly data from the Central Bank of Jordan to plot remittance flows to Jordan from 1994 to 2014 in constant 2006 Jordanian dinars and includes the dates of national elections (denoted by a solid line) and local municipal elections (dashed lines). This shows that absolute remittances grew strongly though the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, more than doubling in the ten years from 1994 before declining after 2007. In absolute terms remittances have not declined as sharply as a percentage of GDP, which grew even through the peak of the financial crisis. It is noticeable from this plot that remittances appear to peak in quarters in which there is a local election; in every such quarter remittances are higher than in the preceding or following quarter. No such pattern is easily discernible with regards to national elections.

The majority of remittances into Jordan originate from workers in the oil-rich but labour-poor Gulf states. The flow of remittances is thus heavily influenced by the price of oil. When oil prices are high, the Gulf states boom economically and import more labour; when oil prices fall, economic conditions worsen and less migrant labour tends to be employed. This fact has been leveraged by a number of studies which have used oil prices as part of an instrumental variables estimation for remittances (Ahmed, 2012, 2013). Oil prices can thus be used as an exogenous proxy for economic conditions and should be controlled for due to their likely influence on remittance flows into Jordan.

Regular competitive local and national elections have been held in Jordan since the restoration of parliament in 1989, but Jordan remains an authoritarian monarchy headed by King Abdullah II, who inherited his position from his father in 1999. The results of elections are not pre-determined, but gerrymandering ensures that an opposition coalition for political reform can never threaten royal power (Buttorff, 2015). Instead, the elections are used to distribute patronage in one of the prototypical cases of elections being used as a strategy to bolster authoritarian regimes. As Lust-Okar (2006, 456) describes it, elections "are an important arena for competition, but one over patronage, not policy." This 'competitive clientelism,' as Lust-Okar terms it, is a key way to mediate between demands for patronage from the regime's core constitutencies.

Before 1989, Jordan followed the path of full rentier authoritarianism, using the direct rents offered by large aid flows and natural resource receipts to distribute patronage to tribal leaders and the business community and sustain high levels of social spending and public employment without significant levels of taxation (Brynen, 1992; Brand, 1992; Greenwood, 2003). By these means, both the elite and the general population were held in a social contract of 'no taxation, no representation' that underpins rentier authoritarianism (Luciani, 1988). The decline in world oil prices in the late 1980s ended this flow of 'easy money' as intra-Arab aid receipts declined (as Gulf states cut back external support due to their more limited means), and the rentier system of rule became unsustainable. Cuts in state spending and the reduction of indirect rents such as remittances caused a profound economic crisis. In order to maintain power in the face of growing protests over economic conditions, the regime engaged in 'defensive democratisation,' reinstating parliament in 1989 and allowing political parties to operate legally and contest elections while retaining control in most policy areas (Brynen, 1992; Robinson, 1998).

The regime also changed its political economic strategy in response to the crisis: it attempted to increase aid from the West by making peace with Israel, focused state spending on specific core constituencies while allowing general services to decline and permitted greater levels of corruption that could be competed over by the rent-seeking elite (Brand, 1994; Greenwood, 2003; Knowles, 2005; Peters and Moore, 2009). As part of this new strategy, elections came to be used to mediate between competing demands for patronage. Elected parliamentarians have very little policy impact, a view that Lust-Okar (2006, 459) has shown to be held by both parliamentarians themselves and their constituents. Instead, they attempt to secure contracts and state jobs for their relatives and clients. Parliamentarians receive discretionary funds which they can distribute to constituents in any way they deem appropriate, and the Jordanian journalists Sa'eda Kilani and Basem Sakijha (2014, 68) have reported that "most government institutions, including Jordan Television, Amman Municipality and the different ministries have allocated an unofficial quota for parliamentarians' relatives and acquaintances to avoid friction with deputies."

Jordan has two levels of subnational government: governorates and municipalities. There are no elections for governorates, which have been described as "simply regional 'antennae' and executives of central powers mainly focusing on security issues" (EuropeAid, 2011, 4). Local elections for municipal councils are held simultaneously around the country every 4-5 years. While the majority of municipal government revenues come from local taxation, and locally-levied fees and fines are also important sources of revenue,[3] in most respects governance is highly centralised. Even the apparent fiscal decentralisation is largely illusory; since 2001 local taxes have been collected by the central government and then distributed indirectly to the municipalities they were collected from. Funding has become more formally centralised in recent years; as part of the 2007 Municipalities Law, 6% of the profits of the Jordan Petrol Refinery Company have been reserved for funding municipal governments (raised to 8% in 2010) and the amount of central funding has increased steadily in an attempt to prevent the bankruptcy of the many councils with high levels of debt.[4] While they are still fiscally dependent on the local area, municipal governments have little voice in spending decisions. The administrative framework of municipalities has been frequently changed at the whim of the central government. Major reforms of municipalities took place in 1994, 2001 and 2007, changing both their financial base and the number of municipalities, which were consolidated from 300 in the mid-1990s to 93 by 2010 before being split into 179 again in 2012. Municipal governments were never particularly powerful, but the 2007 reforms effectively made them responsible only for service provision reducing them "to little more than garbage collectors" (Clark, 2012, 363).

While municipalities have little discretion over policy or spending priorities (all budgets must be approved by the central Ministry of Municipality Affairs), they do have influence over how services are delivered. Clark has argued that competitive clientelism is active at the municipal level as well as the national level: local tribal elites compete

[3] The exact proportions vary: the municipality of Mafraq gets 55% of its revenue from local taxation, while Rusaifa gets 80% of its revenue from this source (IDEA, 2010, 54).

[4] This need for municipality funding reform became clear in 2000 when a fiscal crisis led to a remarkable 80% of municipalities claiming insolvency which required required bailouts from the central government.

“for access to municipal councils and the consequent opportunity to develop and expand patronage networks” (Clark, 2012, 361). Municipal government resources are small but still worth competing over: elected municipal council members “can have roads paved, propose opening new roads, have lighting installed ... and grant construction permits” (ibid, 366), all of which can be used to maintain patronage networks. Members can also influence who is considered for employment by the municipal government which may lead to the favouring of family and tribal members; a World Bank report from 2007 noted a 30% increase in public employment in municipal governments since the turn of the century without any noticeable improvement in services. The implication of this is that the extra employment was more about the distribution of patronage in the form of public sector wages rather than any operational need for more employees.

National and local elections in Jordan are both sites of competition over state resources rather than over programmatic sets of policies. To run for office at either tier of government requires significant funding to organise campaigns and engage in vote-buying practices. Many members of the national parliament are personally wealthy and can fund their own campaigns. While this is somewhat true of members of municipal councils, there is also greater involvement of tribes at the local level. Tribes often hold unofficial primary-style elections to choose candidate(s) for the municipal council (Buttorff, 2015). Tribes have an interest in financially backing ‘their’ candidates (or, for smaller tribes, the candidate of an allied group) who will, if elected, direct state resources in the direction of the tribe through public employment, services or contracts. It is here that remittances have the greatest potential to make an impact; tribal elites may call upon members of the tribe who have migrated for work to send money during election times to help fund campaigns.

4.2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy

Data for the remittances into Jordan is drawn from the Central Bank of Jordan’s (CBJ) *Monthly Statistical Bulletin.* This provides quarterly data on remittance inflows into the country since January 1994. The most recent data comes from the second quarter of

2014, so this sets the temporal boundaries of the study. The data is provided in current Jordanian dinars (JD), which have been converted to constant 2006 dinars using the CBJ's Consumer Price Index which sets 2006 as its base year.

Dates for national elections for the House of Representatives (Majlis Al-Nuwaab) are taken from the International Parliamentary Union's PARLINE database. No single data source includes dates of all municipal elections, so these were collated from local and international media reports and the secondary academic literature. During the 1994-2014 period, five national and four municipal elections were held.

Before going further, we can compare the mean quarterly remittance receipts in quarters with and without elections. In quarters without elections, the mean remittance inflow is 380 million JD. In quarters with national or local elections, the mean remittance inflow is 405 and 433 million JD respectively. This gives preliminary evidence for an association between elections being held and an increase in remittance flows into Jordan.

Three control variables were included in the models: oil prices, GDP growth and whether Eid al-Fitr took place in the quarter. Oil prices and GDP growth capture economic conditions that may affect remittances. Oil prices will affect the demand for labour in the oil-exporting states from which most Jordanians emigrants send remittances home. Quarterly GDP growth is a proxy for economic conditions in Jordan. Eid al-Fitr is the Islamic holiday most closely associated with gift-giving practices; migrants may send extra money home during this time as an additional gift along with any regular remittances.

Data on oil prices are drawn from the Federal Reserve of St Louis and are the average daily spot prices for Brent crude during the quarter in constant 2006 US$ per barrel. It is possible that there may be a lag in the effect of oil prices on remittances due to the time it takes for changes in oil prices to affect the economy so as to influence the employment of migrant workers. Correlating the current oil price and three of its lags separately with remittances, however, revealed that the closest association is between current oil prices and current remittances (r=0.641, significant at the 1% level) so current oil prices are used in the models. GDP growth is calculated from the CBJ's figures.

AR terms	MA terms	Seasonal AR terms	Seasonal MA terms	BIC
1	0	0	0	875.324
2	0	0	0	875.200
3	0	0	0	852.668
4	0	0	0	844.929
5	0	0	0	847.059
1	1	0	0	859.728
4	1	0	0	848.379
0	1	0	0	907.011
4	0	1	0	833.205
4	0	2	0	834.857
4	0	1	1	829.899
4	0	1	2	833.835
3	0	1	0	837.912
3	0	2	0	834.809
3	**0**	**1**	**1**	**827.263**
3	0	1	2	831.666
3	0	2	1	831.667

Table 4.1: Model-fitting Results for Jordanian Remittances Data

In order to effectively estimate the impact of elections on remittances, we need to investigate the time series data of remittances to Jordan to develop an appropriate modelling strategy. A Dickey-Fuller test suggests that the data are stationary so we do not need to deal with non-stationarity. Plotting the auto-correlation and partial auto-correlation functions for the time series, as per the classic Box-Jenkins time series methodology (Box, Jenkins and Reinsel, 2008), suggests that a number of autoregressive (AR) terms may be required and that there is likely to be seasonality in the series that requires modelling. A number of models with different (standard and seasonal) AR and moving average (MA) functions were estimated using an iterative process to find the model with the lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC); the results of this are noted in Table 4.1. The model with the best fit according to this measure (displayed in bold in the table) included three standard AR terms, one seasonal AR term and one seasonal MA term, so this will be used as the baseline model for the Jordanian remittances data.

4.2.3 Results and Analysis

	1.1	1.2	1.3
Dependent variable: monthly remittances	Baseline	Elections	Local and National Elections
Estimation method	Seasonal ARIMA	Seasonal ARIMA	Seasonal ARIMA
Elections	-	14.710	-
	-	(8.383)*	-
National elections	-	-	1.322
	-	-	(10.422)
Local elections	-	-	28.282
	-	-	(12.185)**
Oil price	-	0.409	0.429
	-	(0.207)**	(0.221)*
GDP growth	-	0.676	0.220
	-	(1.601)	(1.559)
Eid al-Fitr	-	9.476	9.042
	-	(5.937)	(5.587)
AR1	0.289	0.238	0.267
	(0.123)**	(0.134)*	(0.132)**
AR2	0.262	0.241	0.216
	(0.118)**	(0.127)*	(0.121)*
AR3	0.356	0.420	0.422
	(0.133)***	(0.135)***	(0.131)***
Seasonal AR1	0.977	0.973	0.971
	(0.031)***	(0.036)***	(0.038)***
Seasonal MA	-0.753	-0.728	-0.742
	(0.118)***	(0.141)***	(0.131)***
Constant	314.011	283.167	285.088
	(91.274)***	(83.186)***	(83.542)***
Observations	82	82	82

Dependent variable is remittances in constant 2006 Jordanian dinars. Robust standard errors in brackets.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. n=82

Table 4.2: Remittances and Elections in Jordan, 1994-2014

Table 4.2 reports the results of three models of quarterly remittance inflows into Jordan using the model described above. Model 1.1 is a baseline model including only the AR and MA terms. In model 1.2, oil prices and the holding of elections are added as explanatory variables. Both are statistically significant at the 10% level. This offers some evidence that there is a relationship between elections and remittances in authoritarian regimes. In model 1.3, elections are disaggregated into local and national contests. Local elections are positively associated with remittance receipts in a relationship that is statistically significant at the 5% level. National elections have a small positive coefficient, but this is not statistically significant at coventional levels of significance; it seems likely that the relationship between remittances and elections found in model 1.2 was driven primarily by local elections. Further models were estimated in which lags of elections are included to capture remittances that might increase in the months leading up to an election. Only quarters in which an election takes place are associated with increased remittance inflows; preceding quarters are not. The oil price remains significant in all models at least at the 10% level, but GDP growth does not have a significant effect. Eid al-Fitr does not have a statistically significant association with remittance receipts, although it does have a positive coefficient that is close to conventional levels of significance.

These results suggest that remittances increase around the time of local elections but not around the time of national elections in the authoritarian context of Jordan. How substantively significant is the effect of local elections on remittance receipts? In 2014, there were no elections and the mean quarterly remittance inflow was 402 million JD (around US$570m). If a local election were to have taken place in one quarter, we would have expected an increase of 7% in remittances in that quarter to 430 million JD (around US$610m). In order to have a similar effect, oil prices would need to have increased by $67 a barrel. Furthermore, local elections have more than three times the effect on remittances as Eid al-Fitr, the most important festival in the Jordanian calendar. Thus the effect of local elections on remittance inflows appears to be both statistically and substantively significant.

4.3 Political Remittance Cycles in Egypt

4.3.1 Remittances and Elections in Egypt



Figure 4.3: Remittances to Egypt, 1975-2012

Egypt is another country often described as a semi-rentier state due to its receipt of significant levels of indirect rents, including remittances.[5] While remittances do not play as large a role in the Egyptian economy as in the Jordanian economy, they are nevertheless important; Egypt is a major source of migrant labour in the Gulf and the rest of the region.

Figure 4.3 shows remittances to Egypt as a percentage of GDP between 1975 and 2012. Remittance receipts made up between 6% and 15% of GDP between 1975 and the early 1990s, reaching a high of 14.6% in 1992. Iraq was the destination for more than half of Egypt's migrant workers in the 1980s (Wahba, 2015, 201), and the Gulf War led to the return of many, causing a slump in remittances in the early 1990s which continued

[5] Indeed, Beblawi (1987) included Egypt as one of his original "semi-rentiers without oil."

until 2000 when remittances reached a low of 2.6% of GDP. Since then rising oil prices have led to greater opportunities for migrant workers in the Gulf and Libya, leading to a gradual rise in remittances (aside from a small decrease in the first two years of the financial crisis) to 7.3% of GDP in 2012.



Figure 4.4: Private Transfers to Egypt and Elections, 1995-2010

Figure 4.4 plots quarterly remittances into Egypt based on data from the Central Bank of Egypt and the dates of national and municipal elections. The remittances data is non-stationary trended upward, so the deviation from the trend is plotted rather than absolute values. National elections are denoted by solid vertical lines, while municipal elections are denoted by dashed lines. Similarly to Figure 4.2 of quarterly remittances into Jordan, remittance receipts are higher in every quarter with a local election compared with the preceding and following quarters, but there is no clear pattern to the quarters with national elections.

While Egypt under Mubarak was a dominant party-based regime rather than an authoritarian monarchy, elections operated in a similar manner as in Jordan. Instead of being a site of genuine political competition, they acted as a mechanism for the "redistribution of economic resources to the regime's vast pyramid of minions and their respective lower-level clients" (El-Ghobashy, 2012, 134).

Egypt has never achieved full rentier status, but it did experience a similar rentier decline to Jordan in the 1980s and 1990s which led to severe fiscal pressure on the regime (Adly, 2011; Soliman, 2011). The Egyptian regime had moved towards an alternative political economic model before these fiscal pressures; President Sadat's Intifah (economic liberalisation) policies saw the establishment of a crony capitalist class as a supportive constituency of the regime from the 1970s onwards (Moore, 1986; Hinnebusch, 1988). This political economic change was accompanied by the establishment of multi-party elections in 1976, a move designed to be a "strictly limited liberalisation confined to elite levels which would not result in the pluralisation of the mass political arena" (Hinnebusch, 1988, 119). Electoral rules were designed and frequently updated to ensure that the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) suffered no significant challenges and gained at least a two-thirds majority in parliament in every election which gave it powers to change the constitution. The law regulating political parties was a particularly effective tool which ensured that no parties that could mount a credible challenge (such as those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) were allowed to compete. The two elected chambers of parliament gained little in the way of legislative power; while on paper these powers were significant, in practice they acted as a rubber stamp for government policies.

Rather than a genuine attempt to promote democratisation or political liberalisation, the establishment of competitive elections was used to create a mechanism for mediating between competing claims for patronage (Blaydes, 2011). Members of parliament could benefit from "selling favors, including jobs, licenses, access to government land at below market price" and parliamentary immunity which "allow(ed) some parliamentarians to engage in all sorts of extra and sometimes illegal practices and business ventures, making significant sums of money in the process" (Shehata, 2008, 100-101). In order to win access to such opportunities, candidates for parliament spent significant sums of money on election campaigns; hundreds of millions of US dollars were collectively spent during election campaigns (Blaydes, 2011, 56). The NDP did not contribute funds to its candidates' campaigns, requiring them to spend or raise their own campaign finance.

Municipal elections "operate(d) in largely the same manner (as national elections), although primarily within the NDP ... (V)oting decisions (were) made on a clientelistic basis rather than based on programmatic concerns" (Blaydes, 2011, 104). As in Jordan, Egyptian municipal councils had very little policy-making power. The councils were bicameral with an elected popular council and an appointed executive council which diluted the influence of elected representatives. On fiscal matters, a World Bank study concluded that "local budgets are annual by-products of central or regional budgets, and are tools for imposing and tightly controlling sub-national budgetary decisions" (World Bank 2007, iv). Budgets were effectively imposed on municipal councils by unelected governors. Elected members did, however, have influence over the tendering of public contracts and the appointment of municipal government employees. This latter power is a particularly potent source of patronage due to the size of the municipal government payroll: just under 5% of the Egyptian population was employed by municipal governments in 2007, the highest proportion in the MENA region (World Bank 2007, 44). This power over patronage came with a cost; in a similar manner to elections for the national parliament, money played "a major role in bringing electoral victory" in local elections (IDEA, 2010, 106). As in Jordan, this is where remittances could make a difference by helping to fund the campaigns of municipal council candidates who can then dole out patronage once they are in office.

4.3.2 Data and Empirical Strategy

The Central Bank of Egypt's *Monthly Statistical Bulletin* has recorded quarterly remittance receipts since 2001 as a sub-component of its time series of Net Private Transfers (for which quarterly data is available from the third quarter of 1995). Remittances make up the vast majority of private transfers and the remittance and private transfer series correlate strongly in the time during which they overlap (r=0.999, significant at the 1% level). Private transfers appear therefore to be a good proxy for remittance receipts and using this series will increase the number of observations of the dependent variable and the number of elections held during the time period for which data is available. Models estimated using the shorter remittance series will also be reported as a robustness check.

The private transfer and remittance series are available until the most recent reporting period (usually six months after the quarter being reported). In order to estimate the effect of elections in authoritarian regimes on remittances, however, we can only use data until the final quarter 2010. Protests led to the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak in January 2011 and ushered in a brief period of reasonably free and fair elections. After the coup of 2013 it is not clear whether we should classifly elections as democratic, but there is no doubt that the events of 2011-13 had a profound effect on elections in Egypt, and it would be a better test of the hypotheses to limit the analysis to a period of stable authoritarian rule.

Dates of elections for the People's Assembly (Majlis Al-chaab) and Shura Assembly (Majlis Al-shura) are taken from the IPU's PARLINE database. As with Jordan, there is no single data source that includes the dates of all municipal elections (or elections for the Majlis Al-shura before 2007), so these dates were taken from media reports and the academic literature on elections in Egypt. Dates of national and local elections can be seen in Figure 4.4 above.

The first step in testing whether remittances tend to increase during elections is to calculate the mean level of remittances in quarters with and without elections. Mean private transfers during non-election quarters are \$1355m in constant 2010 US dollars. In quarters with national and local elections, the mean remittance inflows are \$1507m and \$1630m respectively, providing prime facie evidence for a relationship between elections and remittances.

A Dickey-Fuller test of the time series of quarterly remittances in Egypt suggests

Data transformation	AR terms	MA terms	Seasonal AR terms	Seasonal MA terms	BIC
Detrended	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**858.5589**
	2	0	0	0	862.6601
	1	1	0	0	866.193
	0	1	0	0	862.667
	1	0	1	0	862.234
	1	0	0	1	862.203
Differenced	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**854.871**
	1	0	0	0	856.425
	0	1	0	0	856.143
	0	0	1	0	858.657
	0	0	0	1	858.648

Table 4.3: Model-fitting Results for Egyptian Remittances Data

that it is non-stationary, so we cannot use the same model as for the stationary data from Jordan which could lead to spurious correlations with trended regressors if applied to non-stationary data. The simplest way to make the series stationary is to detrend it, but this is only possible if the series is stationary around a trend. A KPSS test suggests that it is likely to be so, and the series appears to experience exponential growth, so we can detrend the series by regressing it on linear and quadratic time variables and using the residuals (both time variables are statistically significant at the 1% level) as a detrended time series. The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions suggest either an AR1 or AR2 process in the detrended time series. Remittances are also likely to be seasonal in Egypt as they are in Jordan, so seasonal AR and/or MA terms may also be needed. Using an iterative process to find the baseline model for modelling remittances with the lowest BIC suggested that using a single AR term would best fit the data. Adding seasonal AR and MA terms increased the BIC of the model, but only by a small amount in the case of a single MA term. As elections are generally held in the same quarter each election year, the use of the seasonal MA term is still worthwhile to ensure that estimates of the impact of elections on remittances is not a spurious reflection of seasonality.

The other common method for modelling non-stationary data effectively is to difference the time series. Differencing private transfers once creates a series that a Dickey-Fuller test suggests to be stationary, and the auto-correlation function reveals that neither

AR nor MA terms are required (confirmed by calculating the BIC for the set of models with various combinations of AR and MA terms). As with the detrended data series, seasonal AR and MA terms increased the BIC relative to models without them; an MA term was nevertheless included to model seasonality in remittance receipts (estimating the model without the seasonal MA term makes little difference to the statistical or substantive significance of the election variables).

In order to ensure that the results are not driven by model or data choice, we can use both the detrended and differenced series of private transfers (1995-2010) and remittances (2001-2010) to estimate the effect that holding elections has on remittance receipts. If both models produce similar results, we can be more confident that they are a result of a genuine relationship and not a quirk of modelling.

As in the models for the Jordanian data, oil prices, GDP growth and Eid al-Fitr are included as control variables. Unfortunately no quarterly growth rate date is available for Egypt, so annual figures are used instead.

4.3.3 Results and Analysis

Table 4.4 displays the results of the models described above. Models 2.1 and 2.2 have private transfers from 1995 to 2010 as the dependent variable, while models 2.3 and 2.4 have remittances from 2001 to 2010 as the dependent variable. Models 2.1 and 2.3 deal with non-stationarity by using detrended data (the residuals after regressing the time series on linear and quadratric time functions). Models 2.2 and 2.4 do so by using differenced data.

In all four models, the coefficient of local elections variable (a binary variable with a 1 indicating that a municipal election took place in that quarter) is positive and statistically significant at the 99% level. The coefficient of the national elections variable is also positive but only reaches conventional levels of significance in the models using the pure remittances data. We therefore have some evidence that remittances increase during national elections in Egypt, but because we only find this result in the shorter time series we should not accept this result uncritically. The oil price variable is not significant in any of models, the GDP growth variable is only significant at the 90% level in model 2.2 and Eid al-Fitr is only significant (at the 90%) level in models 2.1 and 2.2.

	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4
Dependent variable	Private transfers	Private transfers	Remittances	Remittances
Estimation method	ARIMA with detrended data	ARIMA with differenced data	ARIMA with detrended data	ARIMA with differenced data
National elections	66.111	59.130	128.739	135.332
	(46.891)	(42.400)	(63.192)**	(47.898)***
Local elections	235.126	225.715	330.295	262.016
	(75.677)***	(65.939)***	(102.130)***	(72.409)***
Oil price	-0.618	1.365	0.152	3.120
	(2.164)	(3.842)	(3.550)	(3.434)
GDP growth	64.111	68.541	31.121	88.022
	(33.757)*	(52.700)	(39.666)	(67.211)
Eid al-Fitr	55.109	56.913	-9.527	14.518
	(31.103)*	(32.182)*	(25.705)	(27.982)
AR1	0.616	-	0.545	-
	(0.148)***	-	(0.272)**	-
Seasonal MA1	-0.200	-0.216	-1.000	-1.000
	(0.256)	(0.340)	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Constant	-329.878	28.253	-206.324	41.056
	(153.299)***	(22.315)	(118.297)*	(12.649)***
Observations	62	61	39	38

Dependent variable is remittances or private transfers in constant 2010 US dollars. Robust standard errors in brackets. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 4.4: Remittances and Elections in Egypt, 1995-2010

The results for Egypt suggest a similar conclusion to that for Jordan: local elections are associated with increased remittances receipts in the quarter in which they are held. How substantively significant is this result? Using Model 2.2 as our baseline, quarters with local elections were estimated to have US$226m higher remittance receipts than if there had not been a local election. In 2010, the mean quarterly remittance inflow was US$3113mn, so holding an election in one quarter would have increased remittances by 7.3%. Thus we can see that in both Egypt and Jordan there is a statistically and substantively significant positive relationship between local elections and remittances.

4.4 Conclusion

Remittances tend to increase around election times. That is the conclusion of recent studies focused primarily on democratic countries for national and local elections. In this chapter, we have seen that political remittance cycles also exist in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, but only for local elections. While this is the clear finding, two important caveats must be noted. Firstly, we cannot know that the extra remittances sent are for the purpose of influencing the election process by funding certain candidates, political parties or interest groups. It does, however, seem to be a likely explanation. One possible alternative explanation for political remittance cycles is that increased reminders of their home country related to elections, for example the receipt of postal ballots or increased media coverage of their home country, prompt migrants to send extra money home to their family. If this were the case, we would expect remittances to increase more during national elections which receive greater coverage in the national and international media. While this suggests we can draw the inference that migrants try to influence elections through remittances, we do not know whether they fund opposition parties in an attempt to bring about political change or fund regime insiders in the hope of directing rents towards their families or communities. Either way, however, migrants are being drawn into the political system on the terms of the regime.

The second caveat is that we do not know whether the increased remittances are a result of more migrants remitting money or migrants who already remit sending more money home. Future research could focus on individual migrants and investigate their remitting behaviour and incentives to remit around election times in their home countries.

Despite these caveats, the finding of political remittance cycles around local elections in authoritarian states in the Middle East is nonetheless significant. This finding makes contributions to a number of ongoing research programmes in political science and migration studies. Firstly, it suggests that subnational elections may be a fertile ground for future work on authoritarian elections. To date, most research on subnational elections in non-democratic regimes has focused on authoritarian enclaves in otherwise democratic states or democratic enclaves in otherwise authoritarian states.[6] Migrants appear to view influencing subnational elections as worthwhile, and are willing to spend money in an attempt to do so, so these elections might be important sites of clientelism or contestation that are worthy of further research.

Secondly, taken together with other recent studies of political remittance cycles, the findings of this chapter suggest that scholars need to take political factors into account when they investigate the determinants of remittances. The literature on this topic tends to focus on economic factors which are related to both altruism and self-interest in the part of the migrants (Carling, 2008). Political factors could be related to both of these; funding of opposition parties could come from an altruistic desire to see political change take place, or self-interested migrants could try to influence the distribution of rents to their communities through the funding of campaigns of regime candidates.

So far in this thesis, we have seen that remittances can promote democratisation and increase the likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown (when remittances are received from democratic countries) but can also have the opposite effect. We have also found two potential causal mechanisms by which remittances can affect regimes. Remittances increase levels of anti-government protest which can be a significant challenge to incumbent authoritarian regimes. Regimes can also draw migrants into their own facade democratic structures in an attempt to neutralise their activism by holding competitive local elections which draw in remittances. While the protests mechanism is a more obvious link between remittances and the prospects for democracy, the findings in this chapter show that regimes are not passive in the face of remittance flows. In Part II, we will move to the individual level and explore how remittances affect the political ideas and participation of recipients.

[6]See, for example, Gervasoni (2010) and Gibson (2012) on authoritarian enclaves and Gilley (2010) on democratic enclaves.

Part II

Insights from Survey Data

Chapter 5

Remittances in the Middle East, Africa and Post-Communist States

Introduction

In Part I, we found that remittances from democratic countries are associated with greater potential for democratisation in recipient states but that remittances from countries with authoritarian political institutions do not have the same effect. We also saw evidence for a causal mechanism: remittances from democratic countries are associated with greater levels of anti-government protest. Authoritarian regimes are not passive victims of democratising forces, however: we discovered that they can channel the political activism engendered by remittances through electoral institutions. These findings are interesting and suggestive of an important macro-level relationship between remittances and democratisation. In Part II, our attention turns to the micro-level as we further investigate the causal mechanisms using survey data from three regions in the world: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), sub-Saharan Africa and former Communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Most previous research on the micro-level political effects of remittances has used data from Latin America (Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Perez-Armendariz, 2014; Doyle, 2015; Cordova and Hiskey, 2015; Meseguer, Lavezzolo and Aparicio, 2016; Ahmed, 2017). Part II will therefore help to both shed light on the relationship between remittances and democratisation and move the literature beyond its current regional focus.

In this chapter, I will provide the context for the three empirical chapters that follow in Part II. I will begin by introducing the three datasets that will be analysed: Arab Barometer, Afrobarometer and Life in Transition. I will then examine each region in turn to offer an overview of the current state of remittances and how remittance flows have changed over time and a discussion of extant region-specific research on the relationship between remittances and political outcomes.

The three empirical chapters in Part II use survey data to investigate the micro-level effects of remittances on political participation, economic assessments and support for democracy. In Chapter 6, I find that receipt of remittances is associated with greater propensity to protest and engage in other forms of non-electoral participation, but that remittances have no effect on the likelihood of recipients voting in elections. This finding, combined with the macro-level evidence presented in Chapter 3, suggests that remittances can promote democratisation by fuelling protests in non-democratic states. In Chapter 7, I explore the causal mechanism underpinning this relationship and show that remittance recipients are less likely to be affected by domestic economic conditions than non-recipients and so give more positive pocketbook (personal) and sociotropic (national) economic assessments. Finally, in Chapter 8, I provide evidence that receipt of remittances from migrants in democratic countries (but not from those in authoritarian countries) is associated with greater support for democratic political systems. This provides evidence for the social remittance effect in which ideological diffusion accompanies and is enhanced by financial remittances. Taken together, the micro-level results in Part II suggest that remittances do not play a simple role in either promoting or preventing democratisation. Remittances from democratic countries promote both support for democracy and greater political participation. Remittances from non-democratic countries may increase political participation, but they do not affect support for democracy. These results thus provide the micro-foundations for the findings in Chapter 2 that remittances from migrants in democratic countries promote democratisation, but that remittances from migrants in non-democratic countries play a more ambiguous role.

5.1 Survey Data on Remittances

5.1.1 Data on Remittances in the MENA Region: Arab Barometer

The data for the analyses of the Middle East in Part II are sourced from the second wave of the Arab Barometer survey. Arab Barometer is a regional barometer survey that asks representative samples of the adult populations of various Arab states a series of questions related to social, political and religious values and opinions in addition to a battery of questions related to personal characteristics including employment and sources of income. The first wave of the survey was conducted between 2006 and 2008 in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen. Two further waves were conducted in 2010-11 and 2012-14.

As with any values survey purporting to survey a representative sample of a national population, we must be aware of the difficulties inherent in conducting such surveys and obtaining good data. Arab Barometer surveys roughly 1000 people in each country selected by cluster random sampling. Probability weights based on the most recent national censuses are provided in the dataset. The reliability of these censuses is open to question, particularly in the poorer countries of the MENA region with limited statistical infrastructure and those with authoritarian regimes that may interfere with the collection and publication of statistics for political reasons. Indeed, in some countries, Arab Barometer has been unable to gain permission to run its surveys. Of the Gulf Arab states, only Saudi Arabia (in Wave 2) and Kuwait (in Wave 3) have been surveyed. Nevertheless, the Arab Barometer project is well-respected within the political science discipline (it was awarded the 2010 Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Prize by the American Political Science Association) and covers the main labour-exporting states of the region, so we can be reasonably confident that the data is robust enough to support the analyses in this thesis.

The second wave of Arab Barometer was the first to include a question specifically focused on remittances: respondents were asked "Does your family receive remittances from someone living abroad?" and could answer from the options "Yes, monthly," "Yes, a few times a year," "Yes, once a year" or "We do not receive anything." In the analyses that follow in the next three chapters, receipt of remittances is treated as a dichotomous variable; respondents who answered in the affirmative to the remittance question are coded 1 and those who answered "We do not receive anything" are coded 0.[1] While it would be interesting to explore how the effect of remittances varies according to frequency of receipt, there are not enough respondents in each category to carry out meaningful statistical analysis.[2]

The results of estimations presented in Part II using Arab Barometer were generated using pooled data from all countries in the second wave of surveys except Saudi Arabia. This survey was excluded because only 1.2% of respondents reported receiving remittances and including the large number of Saudi Arabian non-recipients would skew the sample on variables such as income (which is, on average, much higher than in the other countries surveyed).[3] Given the different sample sizes across countries, probability weights were generated using the formula $combinedweight = withincountryweight(1000\frac{1}{n})$ where *withincountryweight* is the weight provided by the Arab Barometer project for likelihood of being selected in each individual country survey and n represents the sample size of the survey. This follows common recent practice in studies using regional barometer survey data including those from Arab Barometer (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010; de Miguel, Jamal and Tessler, 2015).

[1] Those who did not answer or indicated that they did not know are coded as missing.

[2] Most other recent studies in the micro-level effects of remittances have also treated remittances as dichotomous, reflecting the limitations of the survey data currently available (Bravo, n.d.; Doyle, 2015; Fransen, 2015). Germano (2013, 877) is an exception; his study uses data from a survey including questions "to measure the extent to which remittances are a substantial, reliable, and enduring source of income to the household." More such surveys including specific questions to capture the relative importance of remittances to individuals and households should be a priority for future data collection on the remittances.

[3] Including the data from Saudi Arabia makes little difference to the statistical or substantive significance of the results presented in Part II.

5.1.2 Data on Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa: Afrobarometer

The data for Africa used in Part II is sourced from the fourth wave of the Afrobarometer survey project. Afrobarometer has asked questions about remittances in even survey waves; of the five waves completed, respondents were asked about remittances in waves 2 and 4. Wave 4 includes surveys of 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa carried out in 2008-2010.[4] The variable on remittances was coded from responses to a question which asked "How often, if at all, do you receive money remittances from friends or relatives outside of the country?" As with the Arab Barometer data, this was dichotomised because there are too few respondents in each category in each country to carry out meaningful comparisons between those who receive remittances at different frequencies.

As with the Arab Barometer data, probability weights are available in the Afrobarometer dataset. I generate weights using the within-country weights provided and the number of repondents in each country using the same procedure described for the Arab Barometer data above.

5.1.3 Data on Remittances in Post-Communist States: The Life in Transition Survey

Data for former communist states used in the next few chapters is drawn from the Life in Transition survey project conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in twenty-nine post-communist countries.[5] Life in Transition is a regional survey that asks representative samples of adults in each country a battery of questions relating to their experience of the transition from Communism, political attitudes and

[4]The countries surveyed were Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[5]The countries surveyed were Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The only post-Communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia not included were Kosovo and Turkmenistan. The figures and tables shown above used data from all surveyed countries except for Turkey which is a rather odd inclusion into the survey becuse it is neither post-Communist nor in Eastern Europe or Central Asia.

participation. It also includes demographic data on all respondents and their households. The data used is from the first wave of the survey conducted in 2006. Second and third waves were conducted in 2010 and 2016; unfortunately, the only question asked about remittances in the second wave was one about whether there had been change in the level of remittances received since the financial crisis of 2008-09 and the data from the third wave has not yet been publically released.

In the Life in Transition survey instrument, respondents were asked to chose from a set of options indicating the "sources of livelihood (which) apply to your household." The remittance variable is coded as 1 if the respondents chose the option "Help from relatives or friends living abroad," as one of their sources of livelihood. Since respondents could choose between 14 different kinds of income, there is likely to be some underreporting of remittance receipt compared with the data from the other two surveys which both have questions dedicated solely to remittances. Probability weights are not provided in the Life in Transition dataset, and the sample size of 1000 respondents was the same in each country surveyed, so no weights are used in the statistical models using the Life in Transition data.

5.2 Remittances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

5.2.1 The State of Remittances in MENA

The MENA region is both an important source of and a significant destination for migrant remittances. Figure 5.1 plots total remittances sent from and received in MENA countries between 1980 and 2015. The majority of remittance flows are intra-regional, sent from the oil-rich Gulf states to other labour-rich Arab states. We thus see some similarities in the trends in remittances sent and received over the period; peaks and troughs tend to occur around the same time even though remittance ourflows have increased at a faster rate than remittances inflows. Between 1980 and the mid-1990s, aggregate remittance inflows and outflows both trended upwards. In 1980, remittance inflows to countries in the region were double outflows, but by 1988 more remittances were being sent than received. This reflects the greater flow of remittances from Gulf states to non-MENA states (particularly in South and Southeast Asia) than remittances from other regions (primarily Europe) to countries in MENA. From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000, the trend in remittances sent and received was fairly flat. Since 2005 both have increased, except for a brief downtick during the financial crisis of 2007-8, and the rise in remittance outflows has significantly outpaced that of remittance inflows. In the decade after 2005, aggregate remittance outflows more than doubled, while aggregate remittances inflows increased by a more modest 15%. Between 1980 and 2015, total remittances paid increased more than eight-fold and total remittances received have roughly doubled.



Figure 5.1: Remittances Sent from and Received in MENA Countries, 1980-2015

As discussed in the Introduction, we must be wary of official remittance statistics published by the World Bank. They do not include remittances sent through informal channels (such as *hawala* networks) and data is missing for some country-years. Most importantly for the MENA region, there is no available data on remittances from the United Arab Emirates, which is a significant source of remittances to other Arab countries. While the general trends captured in this data should reflect the underlying reality to some degree, the totals are likely to significantly underestimate actual remittance flows.



Figure 5.2: Remittances Sent from and Received in MENA Countries (% of GDP), 2005-2015

Since the oil boom of the 1970s, the regional economy has been divided between primarily labour-exporting/remittance-receiving states and labour-importing/remittance-sending states. These categories are strongly related to the distinction between the hydrocarbon-poor and hydrocarbon-rich states in the region. In Figure 5.2, mean annual remittances paid and received between 2005-2015 are plotted as a percentage of GDP ranked in descending order by remittances paid. Lebanon stands out as having an economy that is both dependent on remittances and a significant source of remittances for other countries, reflecting the large size of the Lebanese diaspora, its relative wealth compared to neighbouring countries and its large stock of Palestinian migrants. Other than Lebanon, the countries at the top of the figure are, unsurprisingly, the classic 'rentier states' of Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Libya that combine small populations with large oil deposits. The lower half of the figure is made up of countries that are primarily labour-exporting, led by Jordan for which remittances make up more than 17% of GDP and including Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Egypt. Algeria and Iraq fall into a separate category of countries rich in both labour and hydrocarbons which pay and receive few remittances. Syria is often included this category, although it does receive more than 2% of GDP annually in remittances.[6] Israel and Turkey have relatively advanced and diversified economies that receive and send few remittances.



Figure 5.3: Remittances Received in Labour-Exporting MENA Countries, 1980-2015

In Figure 5.3, we can see the annual remittances received per capita in a selection of labour-exporting Arab states between 1980 and 2015. It is noticeable that Morocco and Tunisia follow a very similar pattern, which is likely a result of both countries re-

[6]These statistics relate to the period before Syria's civil war, which is likely to have had a significant effect on remittances to and from the country.

ceiving the majority of their remittances from France and so being closely tied to the economic fortunes of that country. The other countries receive most of their remittances from oil-exporting Arab states, resulting in greater volatility associated with the effect of fluctuating oil prices on demand for migrant labour.



Figure 5.4: Remittances Received in Jordan and Lebanon, 1980-2015

Jordan and Lebanon have long been the most remittance-dependent countries in the region. Remittances received in these two countries are plotted separately in Figure 5.4 because they are an order of magnitude greater than in the countries included in Figure 5.3. Remittances to Jordan increased significantly during the oil boom of the 1970s, rising to over $US800 per capita per year in the early 1980s. The decline in oil prices in the 1980s had a significant effect on remittances in Jordan; receipts fell sharply and precipitated a wider economic collapse (Brynen, 1992; Knowles, 2005). In the 1990s, aggregate remittances receipts recovered, but never returned to their 1985 peak. The trend in remittances remained flat in the early 2000s but fell sharply again from the financial crisis years of 2007/8 until 2011.[7] Data for Lebanon is only available since 2002, showing again the limitations in data availability. Remittance receipts in Lebanon have fluctuated wildly between a low of $871 per capita in 2002 to a high of $1934 per capita in 2008.



Figure 5.5: Proportion of Population Receiving Remittances in MENA Countries

In Figure 5.5, I plot the number of respondents who reported receiving remittances in the Arab Barometer survey by country. Interestingly, Sudan and Algeria have the highest proportion of remittance recipients, more than 10% of the population in both countries, despite receiving relatively small aggregate remittance flows. Possible explanations for this surprising result are that each recipient in these countries receives, on average, a smaller amount of money or that informal, unrecorded transfers make up a higher proportion of remittances in these countries. Unfortunately, it is difficult to know which of these explanations accounts for the apparent incongruity between aggregate remittance flows and the percentage of people who receive remittances. Another surprising result is that

[7]Trends in remittances in Jordan will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

so few Egyptians (3.3%) and Tunisians (4.4%) report receiving remittances despite these countries receiving large aggregate flows of remittances. It seems likely that respondents in these countries either underreported their receipt of remittances or that recipients were undersampled, which will bias estimates of the effects of remittances downwards in the statistical analyses presented in the following three chapters. Less surprising are the relatively large proportions of recipients (around 10%) in the populations of Lebanon, Yemen and Jordan. Also expected is the low proportion of remittance recipients (1.2%) in the Saudi Arabian population.

	Non-recipient (n=11,421)	Remittance recipient (n=1,070)	Difference
Female	0.47	0.53	+0.06***
Urban	0.66	0.66	0
Unmarried	0.30	0.33	+0.03
Unemployed	0.08	0.05	-0.03***
Post-secondary education	0.34	0.39	+0.05***
Age	37	39	+2***
Household Income (US$)	798	701	-97

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z-tests (binary variables) or t-tests (continous variables)

Table 5.1: Comparison of the Characteristics of Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in MENA

Who receives remittances in the MENA region? In Table 5.1, I present a comparison of the characteristics of remittance recipients and non-recipients in all countries surveyed in the second wave of Arab Barometer except Saudi Arabia. On average, those who receive remittances are older, more educated, more likely to be female and less likely to be unemployed than those who do not receive remittances. The gender and age differences are what we would expect; younger adults and husbands are more likely to migrate and remit money home to their parents and wives than vice versa. The greater levels of education and lower levels of unemployment amongst recipients are less obviously explainable, although this may be a result of families with more education being more internationally mobile due to greater demand for their skills in the global economy. The differences in the receipt of remittances between residents of urban and rural areas and between married and unmarried people are statistically insignificant. Remittances also appear to be unrelated to household income in this sample. It should be noted that these comparisons are based on the region as a whole, and the differences in characteristics between remittance recipients and non-recipients may vary by country. In Part III, I compare these characteristics in Tunisia and Jordan. Similar differences can be seen between those who do and do not receive remittances in those two countries as in the wider region, although remittance recipients in Tunisia and Jordan are more likely to live in urban areas and have higher average incomes.

5.2.2 Previous Research on the Impact of Remittances in the MENA Region

The field of Middle Eastern political economy was the first to include significant investigations of the political effects of remittances. The oil boom of the 1970s led to a huge increase in external rents accruing to hydrocarbon-producing states from the export of oil and gas. This was accompanied by an increase in intra-Arab aid and by remittance-generating labour migration from oil-poor but labour-rich states (such as Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan) to oil-rich but labour-poor states (including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait). Scholars analysing the oil boom developed the concept of the rentier state to explain the unique pattern of political economy found in a region dominated by such rents (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). An important distinction in this scholarship was made between rentier and semi-rentier states, with the former receiving significant revenue from oil and aid and the latter receiving significant revenue from remittances (Beblawi, 1987; Brynen, 1992). The reasoning behind this typology was that remittances accrue to individual citizens rather than governments as other external rents do. The fiscal impact on government finances from remittances comes from an increased tax base (Abdih, Barajas, Chami and Ebeke, 2012), which prevents remittances being classed as non-tax revenues or 'free resources' which underpin studies of the rentier state and political resource and aid 'curses' (Luciani, 1988; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Morrison, 2015).

The most thorough treatment of the effects of remittances in the Middle Eastern political economy literature was Kiren Aziz Chaudhry's 1997 *The Price of Wealth*, which compared oil-reliant Saudi Arabia with remittance-reliant Yemen and demonstrated that, while both types of rent flow influenced institutional development, remittances contributed more to the Yemeni state's autonomy and ability to implement reform than oil did in Saudi Arabia. Aside from Chaudhry's work, however, the rentier state literature has not provided us with many useful insights into the political effects of remittances, often going no further than labeling them as quasi-rents with political effects similar to those of oil and aid (Beblawi, 1987; Brynen, 1992).

There has been little investigation of social remittances in MENA, although two studies deserve mention. Ibrahim (1982) argued that remittances and migration between Arab states during the oil boom in the 1970s led to a heightened feeling of pan-Arab unity. Interestingly, his views were mixed about the effect of this intra-Arab migration on the stability of regimes. While migration could have a "political venting function," whereby dissatisfied young men could focus on making money abroad rather than causing political trouble at home, remittances could also be used to fund opposition groups (ibid, 93-94). Karakoc, Kose and Ozcan (2017) found that what they term 'religious remittances' have been transferred from the Gulf to Egypt through migration. Individuals who received remittances from family members in Saudi Arabia were more likely to vote for Salafist parties in the 2012 parliamentary elections, suggesting that conservative politico-religious norms were transferred from Saudi Arabia to Egypt through migration and remittances.

Given the importance of remittances to the economies of many MENA countries, it is surprising that recent studies of the political effects of remittances have largely ignored the region.[8] Most of the extant micro-level work on the influence of migration and remit-

[8] One exception is the work of Ahmed (2012, 2013), who constructs an instrumental variable for remittances using a distance from Mecca and oil prices, making use of the large remittance outflows from the Gulf region.

tances on political attitudes and participation has focused on Latin America, particularly Mexico, with a smaller number of studies using data from Africa. The political institutions in these regions are very different from those in the MENA region; democratic institutions are firmly entrenched in most Latin American countries and many African states are (often unconsolidated) new democracies. These political contexts contrast strongly with the continued authoritarianism, defective democracy or transitional status that characterise MENA political systems.

5.3 Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa

5.3.1 The State of Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa



Figure 5.6: Remittances Sent from and Received in Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2015



Figure 5.7: Remittances Sent from and Received in Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (% of GDP), 2005-2015

Sub-Saharan Africa is primarily a remittance-receiving region, although some of the more economically developed countries do send remittances to poorer countries within the region. Figure 5.6 plots aggregate remittances sent from and received in sub-Saharan Africa from 2005-2015 in constant 2012 US$bn. The figure has a shorter time range than the one above for the MENA region because the data on remittances is even more patchy in sub-Saharan Africa; many missing country-years make it difficult to consistently estimate aggregate remittance flows. This has been less of a problem since 2005: data points exist for most country-years, although there are some significant omissions such as data from remittance-dependent Somalia. In this figure, we can see that the flow of remittances into African countries is substantially higher than the outflow. Even in the lowest point of aggregate remittances sent in 2010, inflows were more than five times aggregate outflows. Aggregate inflows also appear to be less consistent than outflows. The highest level of remittance inflows was \$44.8bn (in 2009) against a low point of \$28.4bn (in 2010). Annual outflows, on the other hand, ranged less widely from \$4.4bn (in 2014) to \$5.7bn (in 2015).

Figure 5.7 plots mean annual remittances paid and received by African states between 2005-2015 as a percentage of GDP. Lesotho has the most remittance-dependent economy in sub-Saharan Africa, receiving remittances worth more than 30% of its GDP every year. The majority of Leostho's remittances come from South Africa, where a significant number of Lesothons work either as long- or short-term migrants. Comoros, Libera, The Gambia, Senegal and Cabo Verde and Togo also receive substantial remittance inflows worth around 10% of GDP each year. The most significant outflow of remittances is found in Liberia, which sends on average more than 7% of its GDP out in remittances each year, although it receives more than double that proportion in remittance inflows. Other significant remittance-sending countries include the Seychelles, Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon, but the remittance outflows from these countries are relatively small compared with the Middle Eastern oil exporters seen above.



Figure 5.8: Remittances Received per Capita in Lesotho and Cabo Verde, 1980-2015

Figure 5.8 plots remittances for the two countries with the highest per capita inflows with consistent time series data from 1980 to 2015: Cabo Verde and Lesotho. Over this period, remittance receipts have trended upwards in Cabo Verde and more than doubled from just under \$200 per capita in 1980 to more than \$420 per capita in 2015. Remittances have been highly variable from year to year in Lesotho, largely reflecting changes in the South African economy which is the primary migration destination for the people of Lesotho. Figure 5.9 plots remittance inflows for four countries that receive moderate amounts of remittance income and for which the data is available for the 1980-2015 period: Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Mali. Comparing how remittance flows have changed over time in these four countries, we can see that there are no clear continent-wide trends until 2010. Between 2010 and 2015, however, there has been a noticeable increase in remittances received in all four countries. We can also see that remittances are generally less important as a source of income for most countries in sub-Saharan Africa compared with Middle Eastern countries. Indeed, the mean annual remittance inflow per capita in sub-Saharan African countries is $42 compared with $180 in MENA countries.



Figure 5.9: Remittances Received per Capita in Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Mali, 1980-2015

18.7% of respondents to the Afrobarometer Wave 4 survey reported receiving remittances. The proportion of each country's households receiving remittances is plotted in Figure 5.10. The highest proportion was in Cape Verde, where just under half of respondents reported that their households received remittances from abroad. Cape Verde (or Cabo Verde as it is rendered in the World Bank data plotted in the figures on aggregate remittance flows above) is a small country of significant emigration (particularly to Portugal) where the diaspora outnumbers the resident population (Carling, 2002). At least 30% of households report receiving remittances in Senegal, Zimbabwe and Lesotho. This accords with the aggregate figures on remittances shown above: Senegal and Lesotho were shown to receive high volumes of remittances as a percentage of GDP (31% and 11% respectively), while no data on aggregate remittances was available for Zimbabwe.

In only three countries did less than 10% of respondents report receiving remittances: Zambia, Tanzania and Madagascar. While remittance flows to African countries appear to be lower in per capita terms and as a percentage of GDP compared with most Middle East labour-exporting countries, greater proportions of Africans report receiving remittances. We might conclude from this that African remittance recipients tend to receive remittances with smaller financial values. While we should be wary about asserting such conclusions because of the problem of underreporting described above, the difference is so stark that it is unlikely to be purely a statistical artefact.



Figure 5.10: Proportion of Population Receiving Remittances in Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

	Non-recipient (n=22,269)	Remittance recipient (n=5,130)	Difference
Female	0.50	0.48	-0.02**
Urban	0.35	0.50	+0.15***
Employed	0.33	0.36	+0.03***
Secondary education	0.36	0.40	+0.04***
Post-secondary education	0.09	0.19	+0.10***
Age	36	36	0
Own television	0.46	0.49	+0.03***
Own car	0.14	0.23	+0.09***
Have internal plumbling	0.14	0.27	+0.13***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-value from z-tests (binary variables) or t-tests (continuous variables).

Table 5.2: Comparison of the Characteristics of Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 5.2 displays comparisons of key characteristics between remittance recipients and non-recipients in twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa surveyed in Afrobarometer Wave 4 in 2008-2010. On some demographic variables, the recipient/non-recipient comparison is similar in Africa to the same comparison in MENA reported in Table 5.1. Recipients are more likely to be employed, more likely to have a higher level of education and, on average, slightly older. There are, however, some notable differences. Most significantly, African recipients appear to have comparatively high levels of wealth. While there was no significant difference in income between Arab recipients and non-recipients, greater proportions of African recipients own televisions and car and have internal plumbing than non-recipients. Furthermore, fewer African women receive remittances compared with African men (the opposite of the comparison in MENA) and African recipients are much more likely to live in an urban area (while there was no difference in MENA).

It is unclear whether the differences between the comparisons of recipients and non-recipients in the Middle East and Africa indicate genuine differences or whether they are a result of the different survey data sources. For example, it appeared that respondents to

Afrobarometer who received remittances were wealthier than non-recipients, while this was not the case for respondents to Arab Barometer. The questions on Afrobarometer indicate wealth (in terms of ownership of assets), however, while the questions on Arab Barometer ask about income. While we would expect income and wealth to be correlated, it is unclear whether there is a difference between remittance recipients in Africa and those in MENA or whether remittances increase wealth but not income. Furthermore, the gender difference in remittance receipt in Africa is the reverse of that in the MENA region, which is likely due to an important difference between the remittance questions asked in the two surveys. The Arab Barometer survey instrument asks whether the respondents' *family* has received remittances, while the Afrobarometer instruments asks respondents whether they *themselves* have received remittances. In male-headed households (the majority in both regions) in which remittances are received, women responding to the Afrobarometer question would be less likely to report receiving remittances which are sent to their husbands or fathers but intended for the whole family than women responding to the Arab Barometer question. This points to a greater potential for under-reporting of remittance receipt in the African data than in the Arab Barometer data, which will bias any regression estimates of the effect of remittances on any political values or participation downwards.

5.3.2 Previous Research on the Effects of Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa

The majority of research on remittances to Africa has focused on issues of economic development and poverty. There is a broad consensus that remittances reduce most measures of poverty and contribute to financial development (Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2009; Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2010). The effect of remittances on economic growth is more contentious. Fayissa and Nsiah (2010, 92) find that remittances contributed to economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa "by providing an alternative way to finance investment and helping to overcome liquidity constraints." Nyamongo et al. (2012) largely agree with this finding but warn that volatility in remittance receipts could be detrimental for long-term growth. A number of other studies find that the positive effect of remittances on growth in Africa is conditional on other factors. Adams and Klobodu (2016) demonstrate that remittances are associated with greater economic growth only in the context of stable and democratic government, while Lartey (2013) shows that a certain level of financial development is required for remittances to positively affect growth. While nearly all of the macro-level research on the effects of remittances in Africa has focused on economic outcomes, a recent study by Williams (2017) has found that remittance flows also improve democratic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa by improving education and reducing poverty.

Until recently, there had been surprisingly little research on the micro-level political effects of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa. A number of studies have investigated this issue in recent years, but they have reached contradictory conclusions. Fransen (2015) found remittances to be positively associated with civic participation in urban Burundi and suggests that they can help to heal divisions within society by bringing people of different communities together, while Caarls, Fransen and Rube (2013) reported the opposite finding in the neighbouring and similarly-divided country of Rwanda. While migratory contacts were positively associated with civic participation and desire for reconciliation in their study of the Huye District region of southern Rwanda, Caarls, Fransen and Rube (2013) found that remittances were negatively associated with these outcomes. Another study of remittances and participation is reported in an early working paper by Dionne, Inman and Montinola (2014) which found that remittances are positively associated with most measures of political participation, such as protests and contacting officials, but negatively associated with voting.

A glance at the publication years of the studies of the effects of remittances in Africa discussed above shows that remittances have only recently become a topic of significant research. While a consensus has formed around the positive impact of remittances in reducing poverty, most other conclusions remain contentious or rest on single studies.

The next few chapters will thus contribute to the growing literature on the micro-level effects of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa and will intervene in some of the key debates highlighted above, for example whether remittances increase or decrease political participation.

5.4 Remittances in Post-Communist States

5.4.1 The State of Remittances in Post-Communist States

The final region from which I will analyse micro-level data in this thesis is Eastern Europe and Central Asia. While this is not a clear geographical region in the same way as MENA or sub-Saharan Africa, the countries do share a legacy of Communist rule. This region includes one significant source of remittance flows, Russia, and many remittance-dependent economies. Central Asian and Caucasian countries receive the majority of their remittances from migrants in Russia, while Eastern European countries receive significant remittance flows from both Russia and Western European states.

Aggregate remittance inflows and outflows in post-Communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia between 1995 and 2015 are plotted in Figure 5.11. At the start of the period, more remittances were received by countries in the region (US$11.4bn) than were sent (US$10.5). This was reversed from 1996 onwards, and by 2015 aggregate remittance inflows were 83% greater than aggregate outflows. Since 2000, the trends in remittance outflows and inflows have closely tracked each other, reflecting the importance of Russia as the most significant source of remittances for countries in the region. In 2015, 64.9% of remittance outflows originated in Russia.



Figure 5.11: Remittances Sent from and Received in Post-Communist States, 2005-2015

Figure 5.12 plots mean annual remittances paid and received by post-Communist states between 2005-2015 as a percentage of GDP. Tajikistan had the most remittance-dependent economy in the world over the time period, receiving just under 40% of its GDP in remittance inflows. It also had the largest remittance outflow relative to the size of its GDP, although this probably reflects monies paid to sustain Tajik migrants when they first migrate rather than migrant workers sending remittances home from Tajikistan. Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, Bosnia and Albania also received substantial remittance inflows worth more than 10% of GDP. The only countries to send more remittances than they receive are Kazahktan and Russia. As in the MENA region, these remittance-sending countries are large oil- and gas-exporters which import significant amounts of labour (though not on the scale of the Gulf oil exporters). Indeed, there is a very large divide in the Central Asia region between the resource-poor, labour-rich countries that receive significant remittance flows (Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Mongolia) and the resource-rich countries that receive few remittances (Turkmenistan and Kazahkstan).



Figure 5.12: Remittances Sent from and Received in post-Communist States (% of GDP), 2005-2015

Remittance inflows per capita from 1995 to 2015 for the four most remittance-dependent countries are plotted in Figure 5.13. While Tajikistan and Moldova have the highest remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP, Armenia is the country with the highest remittance inflows per capita in most years in the time period. Remittance inflows underwent strong growth in all four countries from 2000 to 2007/8 when receipts dropped across the board, likely due to the effects of the global financial crisis at the time. All four countries have also seen remittance receipts fall in 2015 compared to the previous few years. This fall was most pronounced in Tajikistan, which saw a 38% drop in remittances from 2013 to 2015. This is likely due to the fall in the value of the Russian rouble, which lost half its value against the American dollar between 2013 and 2015, and more restrictive Russian immigration laws passed in 2014.



Figure 5.13: Remittances Received per Capita in Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Tajikistan, 1995-2015

In the Life in Transition survey, 6.8% of respondents reported receiving remittances from family members abroad. The highest proportion of recipients was found in Albania, where more than a third of respondents to the survey received remittances. The remaining top five countries on this chart are the four countries that receive the largest proportion of their GDP in remittance receipts: Tajikistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Along with Bosnia, at least 10% of those surveyed reported receiving remittances. The bottom of the chart is made up of countries which either have more advanced economies (such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia) or significant oil and gas resources (Kazahkstan and Azerbaijan). While the focus of much migration scholarship is on the flow of workers from Eastern to Western European members of the European Union, the

Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia have far greater populations dependent on money from their family members who migrate to work abroad, primarily in Russia.



Figure 5.14: Proportion of Population Receiving Remittances in Post-Communist States

What are the characteristics of those who receive remittances in post-Communist states? The overall region is too varied for a meaningful comparison, so Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 compare a number of characteristics between remittance recipients and non-recipients in three sub-regions: Eastern Europe and Russia, the Balkans and Central Asia and the Caucasus.[9] The data is taken from the Life in Transition Wave 1 survey which was

[9]The countries included in in Eastern Europe are Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. The countries include in the Balkans are Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The countries included in Central Asia and the Caucasus are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and Tajikistan.

conducted in 2006. Women appear to have been under-sampled, but a smaller proportion of women than men reported receiving remittances in each sub-region. This is similar to the African data displayed above but the opposite of the data from the Middle East. In the Balkans and the Causcasus and Central Asia regions, significantly more rural dwellers received remittances, which was the opposite of the comparison in Africa. There was no significant difference in rural/urban dwelling in Russia and Eastern Europe which was the same as in the Middle East. In stark contrast with the Middle East and Africa, remittance recipients had substantially less education in the Balkans and the Causcasus and Central Asia while there was no difference in education between recipients and non-recipients in Russia and Eastern Europe. One similarity between all three sub-regions was that remittance recipients were, on average, located in a richer income decile than non-recipients, although this was statistically insignificant in the Balkan countries.

	Non-recipient (n=6,413)	Remittance recipient (n=588)	Difference
Female	0.46	0.42	-0.04**
Urban	0.57	0.41	-0.16***
Employed	0.60	0.33	-0.27***
Highest education: secondary	0.21	0.23	+0.02
Highest education: post-secondary	0.50	0.29	-0.21***
Age	46	45	-1
Income decile (10=highest)	5.50	5.51	+0.01

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-value from z tests (binary variables) or t-tests (continuous variables).

Table 5.3: Comparison of the Characteristics of Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Balkan Countries

	Non-recipient (n=12,567)	Remittance recipient (n=434)	Difference
Female	0.40	0.36	-0.04*
Urban	0.63	0.61	-0.02
Employed	0.62	0.53	-0.09***
Highest education: secondary	0.22	0.19	-0.03
Highest education: post-secondary	0.55	0.56	+0.01
Age	50	53	+3***
Income decile (10=highest)	5.57	6.31	+0.74***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z tests (binary variables) or t-tests (continuous variables).

Table 5.4: Comparison of the Characteristics of Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Russia and Eastern European Countries

	Non-recipient (n=6,182)	Remittance recipient (n=818)	Difference
Female	0.40	0.35	-0.05**
Urban	0.51	0.44	-0.07***
Employed	0.55	0.43	-0.12***
Highest education: secondary	0.40	0.46	+0.06***
Highest education: post-secondary	0.44	0.42	-0.02
Age	43	42	-1
Income decile (10=highest)	5.42	6.13	+0.71***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z tests (binary variables) or t-tests (continuous variables).

Table 5.5: Comparison of the Characteristics of Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Caucasian and Central Asian countries

Comparing these tables with those above that use data from Africa and the Middle East, it is clear that there are significant regional differences in the characteristics of remittance recipients. While some of the differences in characteristics may be an artefact caused by the different survey questions and methodologies, it is unlikely that these could account for all the differences seen. A more plausible explanation is that the three regions have different patterns of migration which is the ultimate driver of remittance flows.

While these variations are interesting and deserve future research, this thesis does not consider why there are regional differences in who received remittances. Nevertheless, if we find similar relationships between remittances and political ideas and participation in all three regions despite differences in the composition of recipient populations, it will add strength to causal claims about the political effects of remittances.

5.4.2 Previous Research on Remittances in Post-Communist States

Of the three regions analysed in the micro-level chapters of this thesis, post-Communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia has seen the least research on the political or economic impact of remittances. This is somewhat surprising as the region contains some of the remittance-dependent countries in the world as described above. Only a couple of studies have investigated the macro-economic effects of remittances: Leon-Ledesma and Piracha (2004) found that remittances improved measures of productivity and employment through increasing investment in eleven transitional countries in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, while Giannetti, Federici and Raitano (2009) showed that remittances contribute to poverty reduction in Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. This accords with studies of the effect of remittances on poverty in Africa discussed earlier. On the micro-level, there has been debate over whether or not remittances have beneficial effects. Nakamuro (2010) demonstrated that households receiving remittances in Albania and Tajikistan are more likely to send their children to school and Betti and Lundgren (2012) found that remittances reduce the poverty of households in Tajikistan, but Buckley and Hofmann (2012, 1121) reported that "households receiving remittances are not more economically stable, wealthier, or entrepreneurial than non-remittance households" in Tajikistan. Kroeger and Anderson (2014) found mixed effects in Kyrgyzstan: families that received remittances had better-nourished girls but spent less on education for boys.

In reviewing the literature, I could find no extant studies of the political impact of remittances at the macro- or micro-levels in Eastern Europe and Central Asia beyond Ostrowski's (2011) brief discussions of some Central Asian states as 'semi-rentier' in part due to high remittance inflows.[10] The following chapters will thus help to fill a significant gap in the literature on a region that contains a number of heavily remittance-dependent countries.

5.5 Summary

In this chapter, we have surveyed the state of remittances in three regions of the world: the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In contrast to Latin America, there has been a dearth of research on the political effects of remittances in these regions despite the existence of survey data for investigating the effect of remittances on individuals' political behaviour in all three regions. The data available have a number of problems: they only give us a simple binary indication of whether recipients receive remittances or not and the remittance questions are asked differently in each survey. Nevertheless, these are the best data available, and if we can find the same results in multiple regions we can have a measure of confidence that any correlations speak to an underlying relationship between remittances and individual political behaviour. In the following chapters, separate analyses will be performed on the three different datasets.

The remaining chapters in Part II will probe the micro-level effects of remittances in an attempt to better explain the macro-level findings discussed in Part I that remittances from democratic countries promote democratisation while remittances from authoritarian countries do not (and may even hinder democratisation). We will see in Chapter 6 how remittances can promote non-electoral political participation such as protest. Thus, remittances can create a group of recipients who are both more independent of government patronage networks and more empowered to protest and hold the government to account. Chapter 7 presents evidence for a causal mechanism underpinning this relationship: re-

[10]The rentier state concept has been applied in the Central Asian context by a number of scholars due to the high levels of aid, oil receipts and remittances that flow into the region (Kuru, 2002; Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov, 2009; Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013).

mittances promote greater feelings of economic security. Under what circumstances will the democratising micro-level effects of remittances promoting protest and other forms of political participation outweigh the stability-promoting effects of remittances? Chapter 8 provides us with a possible answer: recipients of remittances from democratic countries are more likely to support democracy, while there is no such effect for remittances from non-democratic countries. Taken together with the macro-level results discussed in Part I, this suggests that the source of remittances is vital to understanding whether they will have democracy-enhancing or stability-enhancing effects.

Chapter 6

Remittances and Political Participation

Introduction

We saw in Chapter 3 that greater remittance flows are associated with higher numbers of protests at the aggregate level. Does the relationship between remittances and political action hold at the individual level? In this chapter, I will use the survey data described in the previous chapter to explore the effect of receiving remittances on the likelihood of attending political protests and other forms of political participation, including voting, signing petitions, attending political meetings and joining civil society organisations. I will show that remittances are associated with higher levels of non-electoral participation but not with voting. A similar relationship is found across three very different regions of the world - Africa, the Middle East and post-Communist countries - and across multiple types of political participation. The results are robust to alternative empirical specifications including the use of matched data using the Coarsened Exact Matching technique.

In the first section, I will review what the extant literature has to say about the relationship between remittances and political participation, showing that previous studies have reached contradictory results. In the second section, I provide a theory as to why we would expect the receipt of remittances to have a positive effect on the likelihood of engaging in political activities other than voting through three channels: the income channel, the independence channel and the security channel. In the third section, I will explore the data available on political participation in the Arab Barometer, Afrobarometer and Life in Transition survey datasets, describe the variables used and provide initial analyses of the differences in political participation between remittance recipients and non-recipients. I will then describe the empirical strategy and present the results of the main analyses of the three survey datasets. A final section concludes, relates the findings to the wider thesis and briefly explores the implications for the gender gap in political participation and the determinants of participation in new and non-democracies.

6.1 What Do We Already Know About Remittances and Political Participation?

A number of studies have investigated the relationship between migration, remittances and political participation, most of them focused on Latin America. Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) found that Mexicans with family ties to migrants abroad, or even those who happened to live in high-migration areas, demonstrated higher levels of social and political engagement. Other studies contest this finding, however: Goodman and Hiskey (2008) reported lower rates of voting participation in Mexican municipalities with high levels of migration and Cordova and Hiskey (2015) found that 'cross-border social ties' have positive effects on local-level political engagement, but not national-level political engagement. These studies focus on the migration of family members rather than remittances (although they are likely to be strongly correlated). Both Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) and Cordova and Hiskey (2015) included a measure of remittance receipt in their models and found them to have no effect on political participation (which may have been due to issues of colinearity with the family migration variables). Focusing specifically on remittances, Germano (2013) presented evidence that recipients in rural communities in Michoacan, a region of Mexico, were less likely to mobilise against the incumbent political party because they were more satistifed with their economic situation than non-recipients. Goodman and Hiskey (2008) and Lopez Garcia (2016) both found that remittances reduced electoral participation across Mexico.

Outside of Latin America, Dionne, Inman and Montinola (2014, 3) demonstrated that African remittance recipients were "less likely to vote but more likely to participate in politics by contacting government officials directly as well as joining demonstrations and protest marches." Furthermore, Fransen (2015) reported that urban Burundians who received remittances were more likely to be involved in civic organisations. The opposite finding was reported in a study of Rwanda by Caarls, Fransen and Rube (2013) which found that remittances had a negative effect on membership in civil society organisations.

No clear story emerges from the existing literature about the relationship between remittances and political participation. Previous studies have found positive, negative and null effects of remittances on various measures of political participation. This chapter will help to reconcile the conflicting findings in the literature.

6.2 Theory: The Importance of Economic Security

Those who receive remittances have access to a source of material support independent of both government and domestic economic conditions. Remittances not only increase the income of recipients but also increase the perceived security of that income and reduce the dependence of recipients on the government for material prosperity. There are thus three causal mechanisms through which remittances may affect the propensity to engage in political activities:

1. Remittances increase the resources available to recipients (the income channel)

2. Remittances reduce the dependence of recipients on the government for material prosperity (the independence channel)

3. Remittances increase the security of income of recipients (the security channel)

The income channel is the simplest: those with greater resources are able to devote more resources (both in terms of material support and time) to political activities. To the extent that remittances increase the resources available to recipients, they will have a greater ability to participate politically. Since remittances can be thought of as 'unearned income,' they may free up the time recipients would otherwise spend working for income; this extra time may be used to participate in political activities. We might expect the effect of remittances through this mechanism to be greater on non-electoral participation than voting, especially in less economically developed countries. While income is a key component of 'socio-economic status' which is strongly associated with all kinds of participation in Western democracies (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Solt, 2008), studies on other regions have found that only the education component of socio-economic status is correlated with electoral participation. Krishna (2002) finds no effect of wealth but a positive effect of education on various measures of participation in India. Using data from countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kuenzi and Lambright (2010) and Bratton (2008) find education to be positively related to voting but also that poorer individuals are more likely to vote. This may be due to party strategies of vote- and turnout-buying, which are focused on less economically-secure individuals (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Carkoglu and Aytac, 2015).[1] Through the income channel, therefore, we would expect remittances to increase the likelihood of recipients engaging in non-electoral political activities but to have a negative or no effect on the likelihood of voting.

The idea that remittances reduce the dependence of recipients on the government for material prosperity (the independence channel) underpins Ahmed's (2012) argument that governments lower welfare spending when remittances increase (because remittances can be used to buy welfare goods on the private market). While this benefits incumbent regimes by making it possible for them to divert welfare spending towards the provision of narrower clientelistic goods instead (Abdih, Chami, Dagher and Montiel, 2012;

[1] Tambe (2017) dissents, finding that income is not associated with voting. His measure of income is coded from an answer to a question about how often the respondents' family goes hungry, which may be capturing factors other than income.

Ahmed, 2013), it can also prove problematic for incumbents that rely on patronage to shore up their rule. Pfutze (2012) and Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2015) show that greater migration and remittances are associated with reduced vote shares for incumbent parties in authoritarian regimes, which both studies ascribe to the reduction in the effectiveness of patronage networks.[2] The implication of these studies is that individuals who receive remittances are emboldened by their exogenous source of income such that they do not fear losing patronage if they vote against the incumbent authoritarian regime. This same logic could well apply to other forms of political participation, for example protesting against government politicies, corruption or election rigging or attending meetings held by opposition groups. There is little reason to expect this effect of remittances be limited to authoritarian regimes; remittances should have similar effects in democratic states that have more clientelistic than programmatic party competition.[3]

The final causal mechanism that could link remittances with political participation - the security channel - is related to the other two: remittances promote feelings of economic security in recipients that allow them to pay more attention to non-material concerns. Research on both the micro- and macro-economic effects of remittances has stressed the use of remittances as 'insurance': aggregate remittances tend to increase during economic downturns (Yang and Choi, 2007) and individuals' remittances increase when recipients receive a negative shock to their income (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). Backed by such insurance, remittance recipients may thus feel emboldened to engage in political activities even if they must sacrifice time, money and the potential for government patronage (which connects economic security with the other two causal mechanisms). A number of studies have explored the economic security effect of remittances on political behaviour and ideas. Germano (2013) finds that remittance recipients are more likely to vote for the incumbent party in democratic Mexico because they have

[2]Germano (2013) challenges this idea with his finding that remittane recipients are more likely to vote for incumbents in Mexico. His study examines the democratic period, however, while the other studies focus on authoritarian regimes. This may point to a reduction or change in the form of clientelism in democratic states in comparison with authoritarian states.

[3]Indeed, McMann (2006) suggests that economic autonomy of citizens relative to the state is vital in driving further democratic consolidation in hybrid regimes.

fewer economic concerns. Doyle (2015) argues that the economic security provided by remittances leads to lower support for taxation and social insurance amongst recipients in Latin America. Thus remittances appear to make economic matters seem less important to recipients and could potentially free up their time and energy to engage more in civil society and to participate politically beyond the electoral process. While Germano and Doyle show that remittances can affect individuals' vote choice through the economic security mechanism, it is not clear whether remittances would effect the propensity to vote through this mechanism. Voting is less costly than other forms of political participation (and may even be materially beneficial where vote-buying is common) and thus is less likely to be affected by economic security.

Based on the discussion above, we can state two hypotheses to test:

H6.1: Remittance recipients are more likely to engage in political activities than non-recipients.

H6.2: The positive effect of remittances on political participation is greater for non-electoral participation than for voting.

6.3 Data and Empirical Strategy

As discussed in Chapter 5, the three surveys used in the different regions do not contain the same questions, and so they cannot be pooled into a single dataset for analysis. Instead, I analyse each dataset separately, while trying to keep the control variables as similar as possible given the different question formulations. One worry with survey data on political participation is that social desirability bias leads to overreporting of involvement of political activities. There is, unfortunately, no way of dealing with this issue using any of the barometer surveys, although we can find reassurance from a recent experimental study by Persson and Solevid (2014, 104), which found that "overreporting does not affect the correlations with other variables and probably does not bias analyses of causal effects on political participation."

6.3.1 Dependent Variables

6.3.1.1 Arab Barometer

The three surveys offer a variety of questions about different kinds of political participation. In the Arab Barometer survey, respondents were asked if they had "attend(ed) a meeting to learn about a subject or sign(ed) a petition" or "participate(d) in a protest, march or sit-in" in the past three years. They could answer "once," "more than once" or "I have never participated." From these answers, two dichotomous variables were coded: "Attended Meeting/Signed Petition" and "Protested." Values of 1 were given to those respondents who answered that they had participated once or more in the activity. Those who refused to answer or indicated that they could not remember were recorded as missing values.

In a later section of the survey, respondents were asked "Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections that were held on (date of the last elections in each country)?" followed by "During the last parliamentary elections held on (date of the last elections in each country), did you attend any meetings or activities related to any electoral campaign?" These were simple yes/no questions and the variables "Voted" and "Attended Election Meeting" were coded as 1 if the respondent answered affirmatively. Responses of "I don't know" and refusals to answer were again coded as missing data.

Respondents were also asked about their membership of various civil society organisations. They were given a list of six types of organisations (seven in Iraq), including trade unions, political parties, charitable societies and family/tribal associations. A variable called "Member of Civil Society Organisation" was coded as 1 if a respondent indicated that they were a member of any of these organisations.

In Table 6.1, I compare the proportions of remittance recipients and non-recipients who report taking part in the different kinds of political activities. A greater proportion of remittance recipients than non-recipients reported having voted in the last national election, protested, attended a political meeting/signed a petition, attended an election

	Non-recipient (n=11,421)	Remittance recipient (n=1,070)	Difference
Voted	55%	57%	+2
Protested	22%	26%	+4***
Attended Meeting/Signed Petition	22%	31%	+9***
Attended Election Meeting	20%	27%	+7***
Member of Civil Society Organisation	27%	41%	+14***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z-tests.

Table 6.1: Comparison of Political Participation between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in MENA

meeting and being a member of civil society organisation. These differences in proportions are statistically significant for all the variables except for voting. The largest difference in proportions is in that of membership of civil society organisations: 41% of remittance recipients are members of at least one civil society organisation but only 27% of non-recipients are. In order to check that this is not driven by membership in one particular type of civil society organisation, Table 6.2 shows the participation of recipients and non-recipients in different kinds of organisations. Remarkably, remittance recipients are significantly more likely to be members of every category of civil society organisation than non-recipients.

Member of	Non-recipient (n=11,421)	Remittance recipient (n=1,070)	Difference
Political Party	9%	14%	+5***
Charitable Society	8%	14%	+6***
Trade Union or Professional Association	8%	11%	+3***
Youth/Cultural/Sports Organisation	9%	16%	+7***
Family/Tribal Association	9%	14%	+5***
Local Development/Cooperative Association	5%	12%	+7***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z-tests.

Table 6.2: Comparison of Civil Society Participation between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in MENA

6.3.1.2 Afrobarometer

In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were given a list of "actions that people sometimes take as citizens" and asked which of them they had done in the last year.[4] Amongst the actions listed were "Join others to raise an issue," and "Attend a demonstration or protest march." The potential answers were "No, would never do this," "No, but would do if had the chance," "Yes, once or twice," "Yes, several times" or "Yes, often." The variables Protested and Raised Issue Collectively were coded from this question; those who indicated that they had participated in this activity were coded as 1 while those who indicated they had not participated were coded as a 0. Responses of "Don't know" were coded as missing.

The variable of Voted was coded 1 if the respondent responded affirmatively to a question which asked whether they had voted in the last national election. The last national elections were in 2008 in Madagascar and Zimbabwe, 2007 in Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, 2006 in Uganda and Zambia, 2005 in Cape Verde, Liberia and Tanzania and 2004 in Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa.

Two further participation variables are Contacted National Representative and Member of Civil Society Organisation. The former was coded from a question which asked how many times a respondent had contacted a member of the national parliament in the past year; a response of one or more times was coded as 1. The latter variable was coded from a question which asked whether the respondent was a member of a "voluntary association or community group." If they answered that they were an "Active member" or "Official leader," they were coded as 1. If they answered that they were an "Inactive member," or that they were not a member of such a group, they were coded as 0. This variable thus captures whether a respondent considers themself to be an active member of a civil society group.

[4]This is different from the Arab Barometer survey, which asks about actions taken in the past three years.

	Non-recipient (n=22,269)	Remittance recipient (n=5,130)	Difference
Voted	71%	69%	-2***
Protested	12%	16%	+4***
Raised Issue Collectively	54%	55%	+1
Contacted National Representative	12%	17%	+5***
Member of Civil Society Organisation	23%	27%	+4***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z-tests.

Table 6.3: Comparison of Political Participation between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 6.3 compares the reported political and civic participation of remittance recipients and non-recipients in sub-Saharan Africa. Recipients were significantly more likely to report that they had engaged in protest, contacted a national representative and been active in a civil society organisation. While the mean was slightly higher for the recipient sample's reporting of raising issues collectively, there was no statistically difference from the mean of the non-recipient sample. Interestingly, fewer remittance recipients reported that they had voted in the last national election than the non-recipients: 71% against 69%. While substantively small, this difference is statistically significant. From this early analysis, we have initial evidence that remittances are associated differently with electoral and non-electoral political participation.

6.3.1.3 Life in Transition

The Vote variable used in the analyses of the Life in Transition survey dataset was coded from a question which asked respondents: "Did you vote in the last parliamentary or presidential elections?" Respondents to the survey were also asked whether they were a member of a political party and/or an "Other civic/voluntary organization (club, association)." Those who responded affirmatively to either were coded as 1 in the Member of Civil Society Organisation variable.

Regarding political actions, respondents were asked how likely they were to "Attend lawful demonstrations," "Participate in strikes" and "Sign petitions." The potential answers were "Have done," "Might do" and "Would never do." Three dichotomous variables were created from these responses (Attended Demonstration, Attended Strike, Signed Petition) with a 1 recorded for responses of "Have done," and a 0 recorded for the other responses. The survey instrument does not specify a timescale in which the action needed to have taken place to be recorded unlike the Arab Barometer and Afrobarometer surveys.

Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 compare the reported political and civic participation of remittance recipients and non-recipients in the three sub-regions of post-Communist states surveyed by Life in Transition. Two points are immediately obvious when comparing these tables to Tables 6.1 and 6.3 above which report the difference in participation in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, with the exception of voting, reported rates of political participation are significantly lower in the post-Communist world. Only 5% of the total post-Communist sample reported being members of a civil society organisation, compared with 24% of the African sample and 30% of the Arab sample. Similarly, only 6% of respondents in the Life in Transitions survey reported attending a protest or demonstration, compared with 13% of the Afrobarometer respondents and 20% in the Arab Barometer respondents.[5] Interestingly, more respondents reported that they had voted in the most recent election in the post-Communist sample (77%) than in both the African (71%) and Middle Eastern (55%) samples.

The second striking thing to note is that the differences between remittance recipients and non-recipients are not so clear-cut in the Life in Transitions data. Those who receive remittances were more likely to report attending demonstrations and strikes in the Caucasus and Central Asia and Russia and Eastern Europe sub-regions, but not in the Balkan

[5] It is difficult to directly compare these figures because they come from different surveys. The questions asked, however, would have actually made it *more* likely that the Life in Transitions respondents would respond affirmatively to the questions on protest and civil society involvement. In Afrobarometer, they were asked if they had attended a protest in the last year, while in Arab Barometer they were asked if they had done so in the past three years. The Life in Transition survey instrument, by contrast, did not set any time limit. In the Afrobarometer survey, only those respondents who called themselves "active members" of a "voluntary association or community group" were coded as being members, while the Life in Transition instrument did not ask about level of active participation such that inactive members would also be coded as members of a civil society organisation. On the relative weakness of civil society in post-communist states due to the social legacy of communist rule, see Howard (2003).

	Non-recipient (n=6,182)	Remittance recipient (n=818)	Difference
Voted	80%	80%	0
Attended Demonstration	3%	6%	+3***
Attended Strike	2%	3%	+1**
Signed Petition	3%	6%	+3***
Member of Civil Society Organisation	1%	1%	0

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z-tests.

Table 6.4: Comparison of Political Participation between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in the Caucasus and Central Asia

	Non-recipient (n=12,567)	Remittance recipient (n=434)	Difference
Voted	76%	70%	-6***
Attended Demonstration	7%	9%	+2*
Attended Strike	4%	7%	+3***
Signed Petition	10%	8%	-2
Member of Civil Society Organisation	5%	6%	+1

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z-tests.

Table 6.5: Comparison of Political Participation between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Russia and Eastern Europe

	Non-recipient (n=6,413)	Remittance recipient (n=588)	Difference
Voted	78%	76%	-2
Attended Demonstration	7%	9%	+2
Attended Strike	6%	6%	0
Signed Petition	14%	9%	-5***
Member of Civil Society Organisation	9%	4%	-5***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z-tests.

Table 6.6: Comparison of Political Participation between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in the Balkans

sub-region. Recipients were more likely to have signed petitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but no more likely to have done so in Russia and Eastern Europe and less likely to have done so in the Balkans. Balkan remittance recipients were also less likely to be a member of a civil society organisation than non-recipients; there was no difference in civil society members between recipients and non-recipients in the other two sub-regions. While the cursory analysis of the Middle Eastern and African data strongly suggested that remittances have a positive effect on non-electoral political participation, the picture is more mixed in the three sub-regions surveyed in Life in Transition. After describing the control variables in the next section, I will move on to more in-depth analysis to test the hypotheses stated above.

6.3.2 Control Variables

Demographic variables can play an important role in influencing decisions to participate politically and also the likelihood of receiving remittances, so it is important to control for these in the statistical models. There are significant gender gaps in participation in many regions of the world (Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman, 2014; Coffe and Dilli, 2015), so gender (coded as a male/female dichotomy with a value of 1 indicating female) is included in all models. Age is another potential predictor of both receipt of remittances and political participation (Hoffman and Jamal, 2012) and is recorded in all three surveys. Age and a square of age (to capture non-linear effects) are thus included in all models.

Rural-urban distinctions are particularly important in the MENA region and sub-Saharan Africa as rural areas tend to be significantly poorer than urban areas (Sahn and Stifel, 2003; Hassine, 2015). I therefore include a variable of Urban in all models coded 1 if the respondent was recorded as living in an urban area.[6]

As discussed above, socio-economic status is an important component of many models of political participation. Income and education are the two main components dis-

[6]For the LITS survey, those who were noted as living in “metropolitan” areas in a trichotomous schema were also coded as urban.

cussed in the literature (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995). In the Arab Barometer models, I include a log of household income (in US$ for comparison across countries) and variables for secondary and post-secondary education (the reference category being those with less than secondary education). The Afrobarometer survey does not have any question asking about a financial value of income. To capture living standards, I include variables indicating whether the respondent owns a television, owns a car or has internal plumbing. For education, I include whether Afrobarometer respondents had been educated to primary, secondary or post-secondary levels with a reference category of no education. While the Life in Transition survey also does not provide the financial value of income, it does include the income decile of each respondent within their country. For education, I include variables for secondary and post-secondary education against a reference category of less than secondary education. A dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents are employed was also added to the models estimated on the three different datasets.[7]

Families that receive remittances may be systematically different from non-recipient families in their openness or willingness to push boundaries. In an attempt to account for this potential source of endogeneity, we can include proxy variables for migration and travel to capture at least some aspect of this. In the Arab Barometer survey, a question is asked about migration intentions. Respondents who answered that they were planning to migrate themselves for either economic or political reasons were coded as 1, and those who did not intend to migrate were coded as 0. In the Afrobarometer data, a variable was created based on whether respondents reported travelling more than 10km at least monthly. For the Life in Transition models, I included a variable about international travel: respondents were coded 1 if they had travelled outside their home country since 1989.

Finally, religiosity may be an important driver of participation while also influencing

[7] Arab Barometer and Afrobarometer ask directly about employment. Life in Transition includes employment as one of the potential sources of income that respondents could have and so individuals were coded as employed if they reported receiving income from employment.

decisions to migrate (Falco and Rotondi, 2016). To measure religiosity, an index was constructed using seven questions in the Arab Barometer survey measuring religious observance. These asked how often respondents prayed daily, fasted during Ramadan or Lent, watched or listened to religious programmes, attended religious lessons in mosques or churches, attended Friday or Saturday prayers, listened to or read the Qu'ran or Bible and read other religious books. Potential responses were "always" (coded 5), "most of the time" (coded 4), "sometimes" (coded 3), "rarely" (coded 2) or "never" (coded 1). An exploratory factor analysis suggested that all seven variables load onto a single factor, so a simple index was constructed by summing the responses to these questions. The Cronbach's Alpha of this index (measuring internal consistency) is 0.774, above the value of 0.7 generally viewed as sufficiently reliable for use as an index in social science research.

In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked how important religion was in their life. They could answer "not at all important," "not very important," "somewhat important," or "very important." This was converted into a four-point scale with higher values indicating greater religiosity. The LITS survey did not ask about religiosity but did record the religion of respondents. Variables were coded indicating whether respondents described themselves as Christian, Muslim or Other Religion against a reference category of "Atheistic/Agnostic/None."

6.3.3 Empirical Strategy

As the political participation variables described above are all dichotomous, I use logit regression models. A common problem with analyses of survey data is that of 'selection on observables.' For example, political entrepreneurs might attempt to mobilise individuals on observable characteristics that also correlate with greater likelihood of remittance receipt, such as those with higher education levels. An increasingly popular method to mitigate this problem is the use of matching techniques which match individual respondents on pre-treatment observables so as to compare similar individuals who either do or do not receive remittances. While matching methods reduce the sample sizes used in estimations (as non-matched observations are discarded), they do improve the reliability of causal inferences (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).

I use the coarsened exact matching (CEM) technique developed by Iacus, King and Porro (2012). CEM is a monotonic matching method which reduces the imbalance of covariances between groups receiving the treatment (in our case, remittances) and non-treated groups (non-recipients). In the estimations using CEM reported below, I generate sample weights by matching on observable characteristics that are likely to have preceded the receipt of remittances (age, gender, rural/urban location and education) and then use these weights to estimate causal effects in logit models. I include country fixed effects to account for country-specific differences in political participation.

To ensure that the results are not driven by model choice and matching method, I also estimate all the models using hierarchical random effects logit on the full, unmatched dataset. Hierarchical random effects logit is well-suited to cross-national survey data because it models two levels: the country and the individual. While it is not possible to combine these models with matching methods, we can be fairly confident of the results if they are similar when estimating hierarchical random effects logit on unmatched data and fixed effects logit on matched data.

In order to assess the influence of remittances on the prospects for democratisation, we are mainly interested in the micro-level effects of remittances in those states which are not fully democratic. I therefore estimate the models both on the full survey datasets and subsets using only data from countries with a Polity IV combined score (ranging from -10 to +10) lower than +7 and only those with a Polity combined score lower than +1 in the year of the survey. States with Polity combined scores of +7 or higher are generally considered to be consolidated democracies, while states with Polity scores lower than 1 have more authoritarian than democratic elements. None of the countries in the Arab Barometer Wave II dataset had a Polity score higher than +7 when the surveys were carried out in 2010 and 2011 (Lebanon had the highest score of +6). The countries surveyed in Arab

Barometer with a Polity lower than +1 in 2011 were Jordan, Egypt, Sudan and Yemen.[8] The countries in Afrobarometer with a combined Polity score lower than +1 in the year of the survey were Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The countries with a Polity combined score between +1 and +6 were Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Nigeria. There were few countries between +1 and +6 in the Life in Transition dataset, separate models were run on the full dataset and on the data from those countries with a Polity combined score lower than +1: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazahzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

6.4 Results

6.4.1 Remittances and Political Participation in the Middle East

Table 6.7 reports the results of the estimations made using matched data from the Arab Barometer dataset. The coefficients are expressed as odds ratios so that we can see the relationship between receipt of remittances and a range of political and civic participation variables. Remittances had a positive and statistically significant (at the 95% level or higher) association with protesting, attending election meetings, signing petitions and being a member of a civil society organisation. Figure 6.1 shows the strength of association between remittances and each of the political participation variables. The strongest association was between remittances and civil society membership: recipients were 61% more likely to report being members of an organisation than non-recipients. The only dependent variable with which remittances did not have a significant relationship was voting. While there was a small positive association, this was not significant at conventional levels.

[8] Saudi Arabia was also surveyed in Arab Barometer and had a Polity score of -10 in 2011, but there were very few remittance recipients in the sample (1.2%) so the Saudi Arabian data is excluded.

	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5
Dependent variable	Voted in Last Election	Attended Protest	Attended Election Meeting	Attended Political Meeting	Member of a Civil Society Organisation
Estimation method	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit
Remittance recipient	1.005	1.280	1.301	1.448	1.609
	(0.095)	(0.144)**	(0.132)***	(0.157)***	(0.166)***
Female	0.752	0.644	0.609	0.702	0.579
	(0.048)***	(0.055)***	(0.045)***	(0.059)***	(0.042)***
Age	1.127	1.109	1.093	1.088	1.060
	(0.014)***	(0.022)***	(0.017)***	(0.020)***	(0.016)***
Age^2	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.999
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Urban	0.831	0.989	0.874	1.060	0.874
	(0.054)***	(0.088)	(0.066)*	(0.094)	(0.066)*
Log Household Income	0.871	1.001	1.013	1.020	1.294
	(0.034)***	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.057)***
Employed	1.166	1.081	0.947	1.167	1.662
	(0.079)**	(0.099)	(0.075)	(0.106)*	(0.130)***
Secondary Education	1.078	0.958	1.249	1.091	1.674
	(0.082)	(0.100)	(0.111)**	(0.114)	(0.152)***
Post-secondary Education	1.546	1.249	1.511	1.694	2.723
	(0.112)***	(0.117)**	(0.125)***	(0.159)***	(0.228)***
Migration Intention	0.609	1.949	1.109	1.660	1.380
	(0.038)***	(0.150)***	(0.078)	(0.127)***	(0.096)***
Religiosity Index	1.032	1.026	1.036	1.024	1.025
	(0.006)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.009)***	(0.007)***
Constant	-2.587	-3.859	-4.633	-4.222	-6.207
	(0.364)***	(0.506)***	(0.458)***	(0.510)***	(0.467)***
N	6,809	5,156	6,748	5,149	6,630

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 6.7: Remittances and Political Participation in MENA



Figure 6.1: Remittances and Political Participation in MENA

One of the channels by which remittances might affect political participation is by increasing household income. Interestingly, however, household income only has a statistically significant relationship with voting (which is affected negatively) and being a member of a civil society organisation (which is affected positively). In contrast to the expectations of the classic SES model, therefore, higher incomes do not translate into greater political participation in the MENA region, so it is unlikely that remittances have an effect through this channel. Another prediction of the SES model is that those with high levels of education are more likely to participate in political life. This prediction holds for the MENA region; those with secondary or post-secondary education are more likely to report attendance at election/political meetings, signing a petition and being a member of civil society organisations compared with those who have less than secondary education. In addition, those with post-secondary education are more likely to have voted in the most recent national election or protested within the last year compared with those with less than secondary education.

As discussed above, one potential problem with attributing causal power to remittances based on these models is that remittances and political participation may both be driven by a family's openness or willingness to push boundaries. In order to proxy this, the variable of migration intention was included in all the models. It had a positive and significant association with attending protests, attending political meetings and being a member of a civil society organisation and a negative and significant relationship with voting. Even with this variable in the models, however, the remittance variables remained significant. While we cannot rule out omitted variable bias and endogeneity, the inclusion of the migration intention variable and the use of matched data should make these problems less likely.



Figure 6.2: Remittances and Political Participation in MENA 2

The other control variables' associations with political participation are largely what we might expect. For example, women in the MENA region are significantly less likely to participate in any of the political activities, reflecting the large gender gap in the region (Coffe and Dilli, 2015). There is a non-linear effect of age that is similar on all the political participation variables; the likelihood of participation increases with age until a certain threshold when it starts to decline. Higher levels of religiosity are correlated with a greater likelihood of political participation.

Figure 6.2 compares the associations between different independent variables and the likelihood of reporting different forms of political participation. It is based on slightly different models to those reported in Table 6.7; all variables were dichotomised in order to more easily compare the associations. We can see from this figure that remittances have a relatively strong relationship with non-electoral political participation compared with other demographic and socio-economic variables. While remittances do not have as strong an effect on political participation as gender, post-secondary education and migration intention, they do have a stronger relationship than religiosity, youth, income and secondary education.

			2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5
Model	Data matched?	Countries	Vote	Protest	Attend election meeting	Attend meet-ing/sign petition	Member of civil society organisation
FE Logit	Y	All	1.005 (-0.095)	1.280 (0.144)**	1.301 (0.132)***	1.448 (0.157)***	1.609 (0.166)***
Multilevel RE Logit	N	All	1.025 (0.097)	1.259 (0.141)**	1.310 (0.132)***	1.419 (0.154)***	1.627 (0.165)***
FE Logit	Y	Polity<1	0.948 (0.118)	1.475 (0.229)**	1.269 (0.166)*	1.423 (0.208)**	1.539 (0.223)***
Multilevel RE Logit	N	Polity<1	0.965 (0.120)	1.470 (0.229)**	1.324 (0.173)**	1.370 (0.201)**	1.592 (0.226)***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.
Models estimated with all control variables described above.

Table 6.8: Remittances and Political Participation in MENA: Remittance Coefficients Using Alternative Specifications

Table 6.8 reports the coefficients (expressed as odds ratios) for the remittance variables in estimations with alternative models (the results using the main model are also reported for easy comparison). When using hierarchichal random effects logit with unmatched data, remittances have the same positive and significant relationship with the non-electoral participation variables as in the models using matched data with fixed effects logit models. The coefficients are very similar to those estimated using fixed effects logit on matched data. When dropping countries with a Polity combined score greater than 0, the coefficients for non-electoral participation all remain significant at least at the 90% level. The coefficients (expressed as odds ratios) did changed little when using data from only non-democratic countries, except when the dependent variable was protest attendance. In the complete Arab Barometer dataset, remittances were associated with a 28% greater likelihood of participating in protests (using the fixed effects model on matched data). In the authoritarian subset, however, remittance recipients were 48% more likely to engage in protests. These results suggest that remittances are even more likely to contribute to protests in authoritarian regimes than in democratic or quasi-democratic regimes.

To ensure that the results were not driven by specific countries, I also ran a series of models using both matched and unmatched data dropping each country one at a time and dropping each control variable one at a time. None of these estimations had substantively different results, so we can be reasonably assured that the results for the relationship between remittances and political participation were not driven by outliers.

6.4.2 Remittances and Political Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 6.9 reports the results of the models of political participation using Afrobarometer data. The results are similar to those seen above in the MENA region: there is a statistically significant (at the 99%) positive association between remittances and non-electoral forms of political participation, but no significant association between remittances and voting. The relationships are also substantively interesting. Figure 6.3 presents the results graphically and shows that the strongest relationship is between remittances and contacting a national representative: recipients were 43% more likely to have reported doing so in the past three years than non-recipients. Recipients were also around 19% more likely to report being a member of a civil society organisation or having attended protests. The association between remittances and raising an issue collectively was smaller but still substantively significant.

	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5
Dependent variable	Voted	Raised Issue	Protested	Contacted Nat. Rep.	Member of CSO
Estimation method	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit
Remittance	0.937	1.118	1.190	1.430	1.193
Receipt	(0.038)	(0.040)***	(0.056)***	(0.068)***	(0.047)***
Female	0.839	0.664	0.782	0.709	0.831
	(0.026)***	(0.018)***	(0.030)***	(0.028)***	(0.026)***
Age	1.235	1.070	1.004	1.053	1.078
	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.007)	(0.007)***	(0.006)***
Age^2	0.998	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.999
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Urban	0.779	0.660	1.074	0.633	0.640
	(0.027)***	(0.020)***	(0.046)*	(0.029)***	(0.023)***
Primary	1.042	1.263	1.365	1.205	1.375
Education	(0.060)	(0.059)***	(0.101)***	(0.083)***	(0.074)***
Secondary	0.937	1.528	1.769	1.295	1.609
Education	(0.054)	(0.074)***	(0.130)***	(0.092)***	(0.090)***
Post-secondary	0.982	2.239	2.255	1.758	2.290
Education	(0.065)	(0.127)***	(0.182)***	(0.139)***	(0.145)***
Employed	1.294	1.101	1.187	1.201	1.150
	(0.046)***	(0.034)***	(0.051)***	(0.053)***	(0.041)***
Television	1.112	1.071	1.109	1.216	1.022
Owner	(0.043)***	(0.037)**	(0.052)**	(0.060)***	(0.041)
Car Owner	1.088	1.056	1.012	1.235	1.222
	(0.049)*	(0.041)	(0.052)	(0.066)***	(0.053)***
Internal	0.829	0.708	0.731	0.875	0.815
Plumbing	(0.038)***	(0.029)***	(0.040)***	(0.053)**	(0.040)***
Religiosity	1.136	1.145	1.020	1.033	1.158
	(0.026)***	(0.024)***	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)***
Travel	1.079	1.235	1.069	1.109	1.136
	(0.034)**	(0.035)***	(0.043)*	(0.046)**	(0.037)***
Constant	0.079	0.210	0.145	0.026	0.027
	(0.014)***	(0.030)***	(0.029)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)***
N	25,759	25,673	25,100	25,715	25,696

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 6.9: Remittances and Political Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa



Figure 6.3: Remittances and Political Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa



Figure 6.4: Remittances and Political Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa 2

Figure 6.4 compares the coefficients of the remittances variable with those of the other control variables in a model using dichotomised versions of the control variables. There is a similarly-sized positive relationship between receiving remittances and being employed or owning a car, two variables indicating higher socio-economic status. While we do find (as in the MENA region results discussed above) a significant relationship between higher levels of education and greater likelihood of all the participation variables except for voting, the other SES variables had mixed results. Owning a car was positively associated with non-electoral participation at conventional levels of statistical significance, owning a television had little relationship with the participation variables and internal plumbing was negatively associated with voting, protesting and raising issues collectively. It seems likely that these variables capture more than just the wealth of respondents; for example, internal plumbing may be related to inter-regional inequality in access to mains sewerage. Interestingly, Dionne et al's (2014) finding that remittances were significantly negatively associated with electoral participation in Africa was replicated in models which aggregated these three variables into a 'wealth index,' which may account for the differing results in their study.[9]

To ensure that the results are not driven by data from democratic states when we are primarily interested in authoritarian or transitional/hybrid regimes, Table 6.10 displays the coefficients of the remittances variable from regressions run on data from only those countries with a combined Polity score lower than +7 or lower than +1. The table also displays the results of the hierarchical random effects models estimated with unmatched data. While the effects of remittances on raising issues collectively and being a member of a civil society organisation lose statistical significance when focusing only on non-fully consolidated democracies, the strong and positive relationships between remittance receipt and protesting and contacting national representatives remain. Similarly to the Arab Barometer models, the association between remittances and protests increases as

[9]A number of different models with various recoded and removed control variables were estimated using the Afrobarometer data. While a negative relationship between remittances and voting was found in some models, the vast majority of constellations of control variables showed no statistically significant relationship.

more democratic countries are dropped from the survey dataset. Remittances recipients are 19% more likely to protest in the full sample, 26% more likely to protest in countries with a combined Polity score lower than +7 and 37% more likely to protest in countries with a combined Polity score lower than +1. Protesting is the most contentious of the political activities asked about in the Afrobarometer. While remittances are not associated with the full range of political activities in non-democratic regimes in the sub-Saharan Africa as they are in the MENA region, they are associated with the activity that is most dangerous for such regimes.

			4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5
Model	Data matched?	Countries	Voted	Raised Issue	Protested	Contacted Nat. Rep.	Member of CSO
FE Logit	Y	All	0.937	1.118	1.190	1.430	1.193
			-0.038	(0.040)***	(0.056)***	(0.068)***	(0.047)***
Multilevel RE Logit	N	All	0.953	1.132	1.227	1.458	1.236
			(0.039)	(0.041)***	(0.060)***	(0.070)***	(0.050)***
FE Logit	Y	Polity<7	0.879	1.024	1.235	1.438	1.004
			(0.050)**	(0.053)	(0.086)***	(0.098)***	(0.058)
Multilevel RE Logit	N	Polity<7	0.895	1.042	1.255	1.462	1.048
			(0.052)*	(0.055)	(0.090)***	(0.102)***	(0.062)
FE Logit	Y	Polity<1	1.000	1.019	1.356	1.302	0.998
			(0.089)	(0.081)	(0.151)***	(0.129)***	(0.090)
Multilevel RE Logit	N	Polity<1	0.999	1.037	1.368	1.292	1.013
			(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.154)***	(0.128)**	(0.092)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.
Models estimated with all control variables described above.

Table 6.10: Remittances and Political Participation in sub-Saharan Africa: Remittance Coefficients Using Alternative Specifications

As with the models estimated using the Arab Barometer data, I also ran a series of models on the Afrobarometer dataset dropping countries and control variables one at a time. None of the estimations produced results that were substantively different from those presented above.

6.4.3 Remittances and Political Participation in Post-Communist States

Table 6.11 reports the results of the fixed effects logit models of political participation using the matched data from the Life in Transition survey, and Figure 6.5 graphically displays the results for remittances.



Figure 6.5: Remittances and Political Participation in Post-Communist States

There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between receiving remittances and attending demonstrations and strikes and signing petitions. These results are similar to those obtained in the analysis of the data from the MENA region and Africa: those who receive remittances are significantly more likely to report having attended a demonstration or strike and to have signed a petition. Where the results differ is in the models in which the dependent variable is voting and being a member of a civil society organisation. There is a strong and significant negative relationship between remittance receipt and voting. While there is a positive association between remittances and civil society membership, this is not significant at convention levels.

Surprisingly, the coefficients for gender in the Life in Transition models are the opposite of those for the models using data from the other two regions: women are more likely

	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5
Dependent variable	Voted	Attended Demonstration	Attended Strike	Signed Petition	Member of CSO
Estimation method	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit
Remittance	0.771	1.260	1.374	1.442	1.169
	(0.048)***	(0.139)**	(0.181)**	(0.160)***	(0.174)
Urban	0.641	1.427	1.349	1.054	1.013
	(0.022)***	(0.090)***	(0.101)***	(0.055)	(0.068)
Age	1.146	1.021	1.108	1.015	0.996
	(0.005)***	(0.010)**	(0.015)***	(0.009)*	(0.011)
Age^2	0.999	1.000	0.999	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)***	(0.000)	(0.000)***	(0.000)*	(0.000)
Female	1.068	1.573	1.231	1.099	1.417
	(0.034)**	(0.090)***	(0.086)***	(0.056)*	(0.089)***
Income Decile	1.026	1.090	1.034	1.075	1.058
	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.014)**	(0.010)***	(0.013)***
Employed	1.015	1.195	1.268	1.177	1.099
	(0.037)	(0.084)**	(0.107)***	(0.073)***	(0.087)
Secondary	1.353	1.279	1.145	2.089	1.350
Education	(0.059)***	(0.127)**	(0.137)	(0.181)***	(0.145)***
Post-Secondary	1.872	1.939	1.829	2.437	1.860
Education	(0.084)***	(0.179)***	(0.195)***	(0.200)***	(0.186)***
Travelled	1.058	1.478	1.332	1.480	2.032
Abroad	(0.042)	(0.098)***	(0.105)***	(0.084)***	(0.151)***
Christian	1.330	0.831	1.172	0.895	0.910
	(0.077)***	(0.081)*	(0.149)	(0.070)	(0.086)
Muslim	1.857	1.263	1.326	0.891	0.926
	(0.148)***	(0.192)	(0.249)	(0.120)	(0.159)
Other	1.011	0.848	1.041	0.897	1.186
Religion	(0.106)	(0.163)	(0.275)	(0.130)	(0.220)
Constant	0.104	0.008	0.001	0.009	0.008
	(0.016)***	(0.002)***	(0.000)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***
N	28,105	26,141	25,147	26,133	28,069

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 6.11: Remittances and Political Participation in Post-Communist States

to be involved in each of the political activities asked about in the survey. The results for the socio-economic status variables are clearer than those for sub-Saharan Africa or the MENA region. Income, education and employment are all positively associated with political participation. This accords with the effect we would expect from SES variables in models of political participation in Western European and North American contexts and may be related to the greater average level of economic development in post-Communist states (particularly in Eastern Europe) compared with countries in sub-Saharan African or the MENA region. The variable proxying for greater openness or willingness to push boundaries - international travel since 1989 - is strongly associated with all types of non-electoral political participation.



Figure 6.6: Remittances and Political Participation in Post-Communist States 2

Figure 6.6 compares the coefficients of the remittances variable with those of the other control variables in a model using dichotomised versions of the control variables. Similarly to the models using Arab Baromter and Afrobarometer data, post-secondary education has the strongest positive association with all kinds of political participation. Receiving remittances has roughly the same effect on political participation as being in the top income quintile or having secondary education.

			6.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5
Model	Data matched?	Countries	Voted	Attended Demonstration	Attended Strike	Signed Petition	Member of CSO
FE Logit	Y	All	0.771	1.260	1.374	1.442	1.169
			(0.048)***	(0.139)**	(0.181)**	(0.160)***	-0.174
Multilevel RE Logit	N	All	0.792	1.241	1.410	1.467	1.157
			(0.050)***	(0.136)**	(0.185)***	(0.161)***	(0.172)
FE Logit	Y	Polity<7	0.908	1.164	1.318	1.617	1.231
			(0.087)	(0.081)**	(0.142)***	(0.237)***	(0.330)
Multilevel RE Logit	N	Polity<7	0.897	1.134	1.312	1.643	1.215
			(0.087)	(0.082)*	(0.146)**	(0.238)***	(0.324)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.
Models estimated with all control variables described above.

Table 6.12: Remittances and Political Participation in Post-Communist States: Remittance Coefficients Using Alternative Specifications

Table 6.12 reports the odds ratios of the remittances coefficients using alternative specifications and estimations using only data from those countries which are not consolidated democracies. Using random effects logit models on unmatched data does not change the substantive or statistical significance of the results. When respondents in consolidated democracies are dropped from the dataset, the remittance variable loses its significant negative association with voting which indicates that this relationship is driven by remittance recipients in more democratic countries. The size of the remittances coefficient increases for being a member of a civil society organisation in less democratic countries, but this relationship remains statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The association between remittances and attending strikes and demonstrations remains positive and significant, but the size of the coefficient is reduced: remittance recipients are 26% more likely to demonstrate and 37% more likely to strike in the full sample but only 16% and 32% more likely to do so in countries which are not fully democratic. On the other hand, the association between remittances and signing petitions became stronger. These results differed from those found in sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region where the association between remittances and contentious political action increased as more democratic countries were removed from the analysis. This may be in part due to data constraints: the questions on demonstrations, strikes and petitions were not asked in the most strongly authoritarian states (Belarus and Tajikistan) due to political sensitivies. Nevertheless, it is important that remittances are positively associated with individual participation in protests across the three different regions.

As with the models estimated using the Arab Barometer and Afrobarometer data, I also ran a series of models on the Life in Transition dataset dropping countries one at a time to ensure that the results were not driven by specific countries. Once again, there were no substantive changes to the results in any of these estimations.

6.5 Conclusion

Before considering the implications of the findings presented in this chapter, a number of caveats should be acknowledged. Firstly, the three surveys analysed in this paper were cross-sectional. Panel data would allow us to more successfully isolate the causal effect of remittances, but there is a lack of panel surveys that include questions on both remittances and political beliefs and activities. Secondly, we could well imagine that those families who send members overseas to work possess certain unmeasured attributes (for example, open-mindedness or a willingness to push boundaries) that also affect their likelihood to engage in political activities. The coarsened exact matching approach helps to alleviate some endogeneity concerns and reverse causality is more likely to manifest in analyses of the effect of migration itself (rather than remittance receipt) on political participation. The inclusion of proxy variables about migration intentions and travel which were positively associated with most forms of political participations in all three regions and should have captured some aspect of this relationship. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the potential for the results to be biased by these unobserved attributes.

These caveats notwithstanding, an interesting pattern has been found across three different regions of the world: remittance recipients are more likely to engage in non-electoral political activities such as protesting, contacting elected officials, signing petitions and joining civic organisations. While not as conclusive as analysis data from panel surveys which would ask respondents about their political participation before and after receiving remittances, the finding of a positive relationship between remittances and multiple forms of political participation in separate survey datasets from Africa, the Middle East and post-Communist countries strongly suggests that we need to account for the influence of remittances in choices about participation in political activities. The findings also offer individual-level support for the positive relationship found in Chapter 1.2 between remittances and protest at the country level. Protests and other forms of contention are one of the key means by which populations can create pressure for democratic change (Brancati, 2014), so an increase in remittances may positively affect the likelihood of democratisation by increasing the number of people willing to take action against authoritarian regimes (so long as the increased remittances reach a wider proportion of the population).

We are still left with the questions of how and why remittances lead to greater non-electoral participation. In the theory section of this chapter, I suggested that the reason why remittance recipients are more likely to be involved in political activities is that they have greater resources, independence from patronage networks and greater economic security. In the next chapter, I will test the hypothesis that remittances engender feelings of greater economic security and, in Part III, I will draw on interview evidence from Jordan and Tunisia to investigate how recipients themselves conceive of the relationship between remittances and political participation.

As an aside, the findings on remittances and political participation presented in this chapter also have implications for the gender gap in political participation. Large gender gaps have recently been examined in the Middle East (Coffe and Dilli, 2015) and Africa (Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman, 2014), and the gender variables in the models presented in this chapter had strong negative associations with all forms of political participation in those regions.[10] As women are more likely to receive remittances, and remittances appear to promote greater participation, an increase in the number of remittance recipients may have the potential to reduce the gender participation gap.[11]

Finally, these findings contribute to our knowledge about the determinants of political participation outside Western countries. Previous research has found that income and wealth have different effects in more and less developed countries: they increase political participation in the former while reducing it in the latter. While remittances are an extra form of income which might be expected to reduce participation in certain contexts, they actually increase levels of non-electoral participation. This suggests that security of income may be just as important as income itself in influencing individual decisions to participate in non-electoral political activities.

[10] Interestingly, this was reversed in the analyses of the Life in Transition data: women were more likely to attend demonstrations and strikes and be members of civil society organisations than men. This is a potential avenue for future research.

[11] In additional models, an interaction term between remittances and gender was added to investigate whether remittances had more of an effect on female political participation than male political participation. The results were inconclusive; although most of the interaction terms had positive coefficients (indicating that remittances are more positively associated with participation amongst women), few of them met conventional levels of statistical significance.

Chapter 7

Remittances and Economic Assessments

Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we found that remittances can increase political participation, including protesting and holding the government to account. In this chapter, I will explore the causal mechanism underlying this relationship. I will show that remittances provide recipients with economic security that leads them to evaluate the economy more positively, meaning that they are able to focus more on non-economic issues including involvement in political activities.

While there has been a large amount of research on the extent to which remittances affect the poverty and material well-being of recipients (Adams Jr., 2006*a*,*b*; Nakamuro, 2010; Betti and Lundgren, 2012; Kroeger and Anderson, 2014), there has been significantly less research on how remittances affect recipients' perception of their economic well-being. The three extant studies which investigate the relationship between remittances and economic evaluations all focus on Latin America. Germano (2013) used data from a survey of high-migration Mexican municipalities and found that remittance recipients reported more positive pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations. Bravo (n.d.) and Ahmed (2017) both confirmed this finding using larger survey datasets drawn from across the Latin American region. This chapter thus contributes further evidence from beyond Latin America on the effect of remittances on economic evaluations.

In the first section, I will suggest a theory as to why we would expect remittances to improve recipients' economic evaluations. I will then describe the data and empirical strategy, before presenting and analysing the results. A final section concludes by relating the findings to the broader thesis.

7.1 Theory: Economic Security and Economic Evaluations

There are two mechanisms that could link the receipt of remittances with more positive economic evaluations. Firstly, and most obviously, remittances increase the income of recipients and those with a higher income are more likely to rate their own personal economic situation (and, by extension, the wider economy) more positively. Thus, someone who begins receiving remittances (and keeps receiving the same level of income from other sources) should give more positive pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations than before they received remittances. If this was the only mechanism, however, we could only imply its effect through the impact of income.

A second mechanism through which remittances could affect economic evaluations implies that remittances act in a different way to other forms of income: remittance income increases perceptions of economic security to a greater extent than other forms of income. Why might this be? We have good evidence that remittances fulfil an insurance function: aggregate remittance flows are counter-cyclical and individual remittance transfers smooth the income of recipients in difficult times (Yang and Choi 2007; Frankel 2011; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006, 2011). Recipients are thus less likely to worry about their own economic situation because they know that they can rely on remittances to increase if they face a decline in other forms of income; this should lead to more positive pocketbook economic evaluations. Furthermore, remittance recipients should rate sociotropic economic conditions in their home country more positively because they do not have as important an effect on their well-being as they do for non-recipients.

The reasoning that remittances provide receipients with feelings of greater economic security underpins Doyle's (2015) finding that those who receive remittances in Latin America are less likely to support redistribution. Doyle's study is another using data from Latin America. While all the previous research on this topic has focused on that region, there is little reason to believe that the relationship between remittances and economic evaluations should be different in Africa, the Middle East or post-Communist countries. We can thus state the following hypotheses to test using micro-level data from those three regions:

H7.1: Remittance recipients are more likely to report positive pocketbook economic assessments than non-recipients.

H7.2: Remittance recipients are more likely to report positive sociotropic economic assessments than non-recipients.

7.2 Data and Empirical Strategy

7.2.1 Dependent Variables

7.2.1.1 Arab Barometer

For pocketbook economic assessments, there is a question in the Arab Barometer survey instrument that closely matches the underlying concept: "Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?" The answers given to this question were coded so that more positive assessments are signalled by higher values on a four-point scale:

- Our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save (coded 4)
- Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties (coded 3)
- Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs (coded 2)

- Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs (coded 1)

The Arab Barometer survey asks two questions about sociotropic economic evaluations. For current assessments, a variable was coded from a question which asked "How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?" with the answers coded on an ordinal 1 ("Very Bad") to 4 ("Very Good") scale. The question used to code prospective economic evaluations was: "What do you think will be the economic situation in your country during the next few years (3-5 years) compared to the current situation?" This was a coded on an ordinal five-point scale from "Much Worse" (coded 1) to "Much Better" (coded 5).

A final dependent variable from Arab Barometer captures the importance of the economy to respondents. The survey asks respondents to name the most important issues facing their country. If respondents reported an economic issue as the most important facing their country, they were coded as 1; any non-economic issues recorded as the most important were coded as 0.

	Scale	Non-recipient (n=11,421)	Remittance recipient (n=1,070)	Difference
Pocketbook Assessment	1-4	2.08	2.46	+0.38***
Sociotropic Assessment	1-4	2.02	2.18	+0.16***
Prospective Sociotropic Assessment	1-5	3.03	3.16	+0.13***
Perceived Importance of Economy	0-1	0.66	0.59	-0.07***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from t test (1-4 scales) or z-test (binary variables).

Table 7.1: Comparison of Economic Evaluations between Remittance Recipients and Non-Recipients in MENA

Table 7.1 compares the means of the economic evaluation variables between remittance recipients and non-recipients in the Arab Barometer survey dataset. On average, recipients give more positive pocketbook, sociotropic and prospective sociotropic economic evaluations. The most substantial difference is in pocketbook assessments, which remittance recipients rated 0.38 points higher on a four-point scale. Those who received remittances were also less likely to say that the economy was the most important issue facing the country: 59% of recipients thought an economic issue should be the national priority against 66% of non-recipients. All these comparisons were statistically significant at the 99% level in z-tests, offering prime facie evidence for an important relationship between remittances and economic evaluations.

7.2.1.2 Afrobarometer

Afrobarometer includes a range of questions asking about economic evaluations, from which I code five variables on five-point scales ranging from "Very Bad"/"Much Worse" (coded 1) to "Very Good"/"Much Better" (coded 5):

- Pocketbook economic evaluation: "In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?"
- Comparative pocketbook economic evaluation: "In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [Ghanaians/Kenyans/etc.]?"
- Prospective pocketbook economic evaluation: "Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your living conditions in twelve months time?"
- Sociotropic economic evaluation: "In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this country?"
- Prospective sociotropic economic evaluation: "Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time?"

In a similar manner to the Arab Barometer data, I coded a variable from Afrobarometer to capture the importance of the economy to respondents. A question on national priorities asked "If you had to choose, which one of the following things is most important?" Respondents could select from five options. Those that selected "Improving economic conditions for the poor" were coded as 1. The other selections were about non-economic issues such as democracy and order and were coded 0.

Table 7.2 compares the means for the five economic assessment variables between remittance recipients and non-recipients amongst the Afrobarometer respondents. For each of the variables, the mean for remittance recipients is higher than that for non-recipients. The differences in means are substantial, ranging from 0.11 points higher for prospective sociotropic assessments to 0.32 points higher for prospective pocketbook assessments on five-point scales. Table 7.2 also shows that 3 percentage points fewer remittance recipients believe the economy to be the most important issue facing their country. The initial analyses of the both the Arab Barometer and the Afrobarometer data suggest the same conclusion: remittance recipients perceive themselves and their countries to be doing better economically and see the economy as less of a national priority than non-recipients.

	Scale	Non-recipient (n=22,269)	Remittance recipient (n=5,130)	Difference
Pocketbook Evaluation	1-5	2.58	2.82	+0.24***
Comparative Pocketbook Evaluation	1-5	2.73	2.99	+0.26***
Prospective Pocketbook Evaluation	1-5	3.46	3.78	+0.32***
Sociotropic Evaluation	1-5	2.51	2.62	+0.11***
Prospective Sociotropic Evaluation	1-5	3.36	3.63	+0.27***
Perceived Importance of Economy	0-1	0.59	0.56	-0.03***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from t-test (1-5 scales) or z-test (binary variables)

Table 7.2: Comparison of Economic Evaluations between Remittance Recipients and Non-Recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa

7.2.1.3 Life in Transition

The Life in Transition dataset also includes a variety of questions asking about economic evaluations. While the surveys from MENA and sub-Saharan Africa ask about current and prospective evaluations, the LITS data also includes questions asking respondents to compare their own and their countries' current economic situation with that of 1989. Four of the variables were coded from a series of questions which asked to what extent respondents agreed with different statements from "Strongly disagree" (coded 1) to "Strongly agree" (coded 5):

- Sociotropic Economic Evaluation: "On the whole, I am satisfied with the present state of the economy."
- Sociotropic Economic Evaluation With Respect To 1989: "The economic situation in this country is better today than around 1989."
- Pocketbook Economic Evaluation With Respect To 1989: "My household lives better nowadays than around 1989."
- Prospective Sociotropic Economic Evaluation: "Children who are born now will have a better life than my generation."

There was no question that directly asked about current pocketbook economic evaluations in the LITS survey. Respondents were, however, asked which income decile they believed themselves to be in. This was recoded to fall on a five-point scale (for comparability with the other evaluation variables) from 1, indicating the respondent believed themselves to be in the poorest quintile, to 5, the richest perceived quintile.

Unfortunately, there were no questions asking about national priorities that could be used to generate a variable capturing how important respondents believed economic issues to be as there were in the Arab Barometer and Afrobarometer datasets. Nevertheless, we have a good range of economic evaluation variables for post-Communist states from the LITS survey dataset.

	Scale	Non-recipient (n=27,092)	Remittance recipient (n=1,910)	Difference
Subjective Income Quintile	1-5	2.42	2.53	+0.11***
Sociotropic Evaluation	1-5	2.62	2.74	+0.12***
Sociotropic Evaluation WRT 1989	1-5	2.73	2.82	+0.09**
Pocketbook Evaluation WRT 1989	1-5	2.79	2.88	+0.09***
Prospective Sociotropic Evaluation	1-5	3.41	3.70	+0.29***

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from t tests.

Table 7.3: Comparison of Economic Evaluations between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Post-Communist countries

Table 7.3 compares the economic evaluations of remittance recipients and non-recipients. As we have come to expect from the data from MENA and sub-Saharan Africa, the mean of all the pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluation variables is higher for remittance recipients than for non-recipients in post-Communist countries. The differences are not quite as substantively large as in the other regions for most of the variables; remittance recipients evaluated their subjective income quintile, country's economy and changes in pocketbook and sociotropic outlook since 1989 between 0.09 and 0.12 points higher on a five-point scale compared with non-recipients. For prospective sociotropic evaluations, the gap between the means for remittance recipients (3.41) and non-recipients (3.70) was more pronounced.

So far we have seen that remittance recipients rate their own and their countries' current and prospective sociotropic and pocketbook economic situations more positively than non-recipients in all three regions. After describing the control variables, we will move on to more in-depth analysis of this relationship.

7.2.2 Control Variables

A number of demographic control variables are included in the models using each of the datasets. Gender was included because women are less likely to have direct experience of the formal economy. Age and a square of age were included on the assumption that the young and old are likely to be poorer than those in middle age. Whether the respondent lived in an urban or rural area was included to account for the greater poverty found in rural areas in all three regions.

Household income and wealth are likely to have a strong influence on perceptions of the economy. The Arab Barometer records income in both local currency and US dollars; the log of the latter is used as a control variable because it is comparable across the different countries in the sample. For the Afrobarometer models, I included the wealth variables of owning a television or a car and having internal plumbing. In the estimations using the Life in Transition dataset, I used the income decile of the respondent which indicated their income level relative to others in their country.

Education is also likely to exert a strong effect on economic evaluations by increasing the earning potential of respondents with higher levels of education (and thus improving pocketbook assessments) and improving knowledge of the economic situation in the respondents' country in comparison with other countries (and thus influencing sociotropic evaluations). Education variables are included in the models using data from each of the three regions: the reference categories are primary education in MENA, no education in sub-Saharan Africa and lower than secondary education in post-Communist states.

Employment and professional status may also play a role in economic assessments. Employment status was included in models with data from each region. Both Arab Barometer and Life in Transition include questions that indicate whether or not a respondent works in a professional or highly-skilled occupation, a dichotomous variable indicating this is included in models using data from these regions (there is, unfortunately, no equivalent in the Afrobarometer data).

Finally, respondents' evaluations of their personal economic situation may be influenced by their perception of wider economic conditions in their country and vice versa. I therefore include other relevant economic evaluation measures as controls in all of the models.

7.2.3 Empirical Strategy

Most of the economic evaluation variables described above are measured on ordinal four- or five-point scales with higher values indicating more positive economic evaluations. For these variables, I use ordered logit regression models. For the dichotomous variables indicating whether respondents thought that economic issues should be a national priority, I use logit regression models. As in the previous two chapters, I match the observations on age, gender, rural/urban location and education using Coarsened Exact Matching to generate sample weights and use these in estimations with country fixed effects to control for country-specific factors which may influence economic evaluations. Additional estimations (for which the remittance variable coefficients will be reported) are made using hierarchical random effects models on unmatched data. While we would not expect there to be a difference in the relationship between remittances and economic evaluations in authoritarian regimes, I report the results of models including only non-democratic regimes to ensure that no such difference exists.

7.3 Results

7.3.1 Remittances and Economic Assessments in the MENA Region

Table 7.4 reports the results of four models estimating economic assessments and the perceived importance of the economy as a function of remittances and the control variables described above. As discussed, the dependent variables for current sociotropic and pocketbook economic assessments (used in models 1.1 and 1.2) take values on an ordinal 1-4 scale, and the odds ratios of the coefficients of significant independent variables are displayed in Figure 7.1. Prospective sociotropic economic evaluations (the dependent variable in model 1.3) take a value between 1 and 5, while the perceived importance of the economy is a dichotomous variable. The odds ratios of the coefficients are plotted in Figures 7.2 and 7.3.[1]

[1] The coefficient plots are based on slightly different models; the control variables are all dichotomised to facilitate comparison between coefficients.

	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4
Dependent variable	Sociotropic Evaluation	Pocketbook Evaluation	Prospective Sociotropic Evaluation	Perceived Importance of Economy
Estimation method	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit	FE Logit
Remittance	1.968	1.379	1.544	0.822
	(0.156)***	(0.112)***	(0.125)***	(0.074)**
Female	1.051	1.081	1.125	1.132
	(0.049)	(0.051)*	(0.053)**	(0.062)**
Age	0.965	0.980	0.986	1.008
	(0.009)***	(0.009)**	(0.009)	(0.002)***
Age^2	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)***	(0.000)**	(0.000)*	(0.000)*
Urban	1.069	1.040	1.103	0.896
	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.061)*	(0.058)*
Log Household Income	2.641	1.116	0.991	0.887
	(0.101)***	(0.034)***	(0.031)	(0.034)***
Secondary Education	1.331	0.882	0.878	0.726
	(0.084)***	(0.056)**	(0.056)**	(0.054)***
Post-Secondary Education	1.726	0.857	0.933	0.595
	(0.106)***	(0.052)**	(0.058)	(0.043)***
Unemployed	0.534	0.871	1.088	1.165
	(0.051)***	(0.081)	(0.102)	(0.135)
Professional	1.143	1.001	1.053	1.082
	(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.116)
Sociotropic Evaluation	-	1.360	3.630	0.824
	-	(0.039)***	(0.124)***	(0.029)***
Pocketbook Evaluation	1.381	-	1.073	0.939
	(0.042)***	-	(0.031)**	(0.031)*
Cut 1/Constant	4.221	-0.691	0.520	9.860
	(0.308)	(0.269)	(0.282)	(2.724)***
Cut 2	6.128	1.277	1.591	-
	(0.313)	(0.270)	(0.282)	-
Cut 3	8.276	4.253	2.929	-
	(0.320)	(0.279)	(0.284)	-
Cut 4	-	-	5.331	-
	-	-	(0.290)	-
N	7,140	7,140	6,810	7,083

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 7.4: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in MENA



Dichotomous independent variables included in models: remittances, young (18-35), old (65+), gender, urban/rural, secondary education, post-secondary education, unemployed, professional, top income quintile, bottom income quintile, relevant economic evaluations

Figure 7.1: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in MENA

What do the results reported in Table 7.4 and displayed visually in Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 tell us? There is a positive and statistically significant (at the 99% level) effect of remittances on both pocketbook and current and prospective sociotropic economic evaluations. The positive effect of remittances on pocketbook evaluations is the highest of any variable in the model except for being in the top income quartile. Remittance receipt has a similar association with sociotropic economic evaluations as being in the top income quartile. If remittance recipients have a more positive view of their own economic circumstances and those of their country, do they rate economic issues as less important? Model 1.4, plotted in Figure 7.3, shows that remittance recipients are significantly less likely to label economic issues as the most important facing their country.



Positive sociotropic evaluation coefficient not displayed for ease of interpretation.

Figure 7.2: Remittances and Prospective Economic Evaluations in MENA

The control variables are not the focus of interest in this chapter, but a few points are worthy of mention. Firstly, higher levels of income are associated with more positive current pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations and a lower likelihood of viewing the economy as a national priority, as we might expect. Remittances may, therefore, have an additional effect on economic evaluations by increasing income which is not captured in these models which include both remittances and income. The effects of the remittances that we see thus reflect the security channel rather than the income channel. Secondly, a couple of the control variables show interesting results worthy of further research: higher levels of education are associated with better pocketbook economic assessments but worse sociotropic assessments, being a professional does not appear to influence economic evaluations and being unemployed is only significantly associated with more negative sociotropic economic evaluations.



Figure 7.3: Remittances and Perceived Importance of the Economy in MENA

			2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4
Model	Data matched?	Countries	Sociotropic Evaluation	Pocketbook Evaluation	Prospective Sociotropic Evaluation	Perceived Importance of Economy
FE Logit	Y	All	1.968	1.379	1.544	0.822
			(0.156)***	(0.112)***	(0.125)***	(0.074)**
Multilevel	N	All	2.013	1.419	1.494	0.846
RE Logit			(0.160)***	(0.115)***	(0.121)***	(0.076)*
FE Logit	Y	Polity<1	2.441	1.387	1.364	1.045
			(0.271)***	(0.155)***	(0.152)***	(0.140)
Multilevel	N	Polity<1	2.546	1.388	1.341	1.001
RE Logit			(0.283)***	(0.154)***	(0.150)***	(0.133)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.
Models estimated with all control variables described above.

Table 7.5: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in MENA: Remittance Coefficients Using Alternative Specifications

Table 7.5 reports the odds ratios of the remittance variable coefficients in alternative models using different estimation techniques and samples limited to authoritarian countries. Using hierarchical random effects models on unmatched data makes little difference to the association between remittances and economic evaluations, although it does reduce the statistical significance of the relationship between remittances and perceived importance of the economy from the 95% to the 90% level. Removing observations from respondents living in more democratic regimes increases the remittance coefficients in the models predicting sociotropic evaluations while slightly reducing them in the models of prospective economic evaluations. Most importantly, there is no significant association between remittances and the perceived importance of the economy in authoritarian regimes, indicating that the effect suggested by the main models is driven by data from more democratic countries. While we can be fairly confident that remittances have an important impact on economic evaluations, this does not necessarily translate into a lower priority being placed on economic issues, particularly in authoritarian regimes.

7.3.2 Remittances and Economic Assessments in Sub-Saharan Africa

	3.1	3.2	3.3
Dependent variable	Pocketbook Evaluation	Comparative PB Evaluation	Prospective PB Evaluation
Estimation method	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit
Remittance	1.103	1.182	1.233
	(0.034)***	(0.036)***	(0.040)***
Female	1.136	1.079	0.941
	(0.027)***	(0.026)***	(0.024)**
Age	0.957	0.977	0.979
	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Age^2	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)**
Urban	1.073	1.176	1.097
	(0.029)***	(0.032)***	(0.032)***
Primary Education	1.042	1.130	0.963
	(0.042)	(0.046)***	(0.043)
Secondary Education	1.201	1.472	0.988
	(0.050)***	(0.062)***	(0.045)
Post Secondary Education	1.686	2.099	1.075
	(0.082)***	(0.103)***	(0.056)
Employed	1.151	1.093	1.066
	(0.031)***	(0.029)***	(0.031)**
Own Television	1.265	1.350	1.015
	(0.037)***	(0.040)***	(0.032)
Own Car	1.261	1.175	0.898
	(0.042)***	(0.040)***	(0.032)***
Internal Plumbing	1.483	1.386	0.914
	(0.051)***	(0.048)***	(0.034)**
Sociotropic Evaluation	3.142	1.545	1.175
	(0.039)***	(0.016)***	(0.015)***
Pocketbook Evaluation	-	-	1.445
	-	-	(0.020)***
Cut 1	0.704	-1.158	-1.976
	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.120)
Cut 2	2.499	0.668	-0.777
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.119)
Cut 3	3.953	2.377	0.149
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.119)
Cut 4	6.672	4.806	2.504
	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.120)
N	25,929	25,141	22,398

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 7.6: Remittances and Pocketbook Economic Evaluations in Sub-Saharan Africa

	4.4	43.5	4.6
Dependent variable	Sociotropic Evaluation	Prospective ST Evaluation	Perceived Importance of Economy
Estimation method	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit	FE Logit
Remittance	1.131	1.212	0.910
	(0.035)***	(0.039)***	(0.031)***
Female	0.849	0.941	1.127
	(0.020)***	(0.024)**	(0.030)***
Age	1.006	0.989	0.992
	(0.004)	(0.005)**	(0.005)
Age^2	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)**
Urban	0.855	0.999	0.988
	(0.023)***	(0.029)	(0.030)
Primary Education	0.987	0.930	0.937
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Secondary Education	0.950	0.858	0.831
	(0.040)	(0.039)***	(0.039)***
Post Secondary Education	0.851	0.782	0.825
	(0.042)***	(0.041)***	(0.045)***
Employed	0.984	1.011	0.977
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Own Television	0.871	0.983	0.971
	(0.026)***	(0.031)	(0.032)
Own Car	0.816	0.938	0.857
	(0.028)***	(0.033)*	(0.032)***
Internal Plumbing	0.862	0.820	0.910
	(0.030)***	(0.030)***	(0.035)**
Sociotropic Evaluation	-	1.456	0.981
	-	(0.019)***	(0.013)
Pocketbook Evaluation	3.363	1.145	0.904
	(0.044)***	(0.015)***	(0.012)***
Cut 1/Constant	1.541	-1.769	4.999
	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.637)
Cut 2	3.153	-0.537	-
	(0.112)	(0.119)	-
Cut 3	4.334	0.226	-
	(0.114)	(0.119)	-
Cut 4	6.996	2.516	-
	(0.120)	(0.120)	-
N	25,929	22,390	25,807

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 7.7: Remittance and Sociotropic Economic Evaluations in Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 7.6 reports the results of the models estimating pocketbook economic assessments using the Afrobarometer data, and Table 7.7 displays the results for sociotropic assessments and the perceived importance of the economy. Figure 7.4 plots the coefficients for the remittance variables in each of the economic evaluation models. Remittances are positively associated with more positive current and prospective pocketbook and sociotropic economic assessments and comparative pocketbook assessments. Likely as a result of these positive economic evaluations, remittance recipients are also less likely to believe that the economy is the most important issue facing their country. The results are both statistically significant (at the 99% level in every model) and substantively interesting. Remittances have a greater influence on economic evaluations than employment, living in a rural or urban area or owning a house or a car. Remittances also have a remarkably consistent effect; remittance receipt is the only variable that has a positive effect on all five economic evaluation variables.



Coefficients from models reported in Tables 7.6 and 7.7.

Figure 7.4: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in Sub-Saharan Africa 1



Dichotomous independent variables included in models: remittances, young (18-35), old (65+), gender, urban/rural, primary education, secondary education, post-secondary education, employed, television owner, car owner, internal plumbing, relevant economic evaluations. Only those variables with three or more statistically significant coefficients are displayed. Economic evaluations excluded for ease of interpretation.

Figure 7.5: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in Sub-Saharan Africa 2

Interestingly, the wealth variables were not consistently associated with more positive economic assessments. Indeed, being a car owner had a statistically significant negative effect on sociotropic economic evaluations and having internal plumbing was similarly negatively associated with prospective sociotropic evaluations. As was mentioned in earlier chapters, this may be because the wealth variables are likely to also capture other underlying factors.



All independent variable coefficients displayed.

Figure 7.6: Remittances and Perceived Importance of the Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa

The results for remittances in alternative models using different estimation techniques and samples limited to countries with Polity scores lower than 7 or lower than 1 are displayed in Table 7.8. The size and significance of the coefficients change little for most of the variables. The only important difference is that remittances do not appear to have an effect on current sociotropic evaluations in authoritarian regimes (with a Polity combined score lower than 1), although they do have a positive effect on every other type of economic evaluation, including prospective sociotropic assessments. We can thus be fairly confident that remittances affect most kinds of economic evaluations in all types of regime.

			5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6
Model	Data matched?	Countries	Pocketbook Evaluation	Comparative PB Evaluation	Prospective PB Evaluation	Sociotropic Evaluation	Prospective ST Evaluation	Perceived Importance of Economy
FE Logit	Y	All	1.103	1.182	1.233	1.131	1.212	0.910
			(0.034)***	(0.036)***	(0.040)***	(0.035)***	(0.039)***	(0.031)***
Multilevel	N	All	1.132	1.180	1.218	1.108	1.195	0.907
RE Logit			(0.035)***	(0.037)***	(0.041)***	(0.035)***	(0.039)***	(0.033)***
FE Logit	Y	Polity<7	1.091	1.199	1.142	1.084	1.128	0.891
			(0.038)**	(0.053)***	(0.055)***	(0.049)*	(0.053)**	(0.044)**
Multilevel	N	Polity<7	1.104	1.216	1.140	1.083	1.113	0.901
RE Logit			(0.051)**	(0.056)***	(0.056)***	(0.050)*	(0.054)**	(0.048)**
FE Logit	Y	Polity<1	1.100	1.163	1.233	1.047	1.229	0.829
			(0.052)**	(0.079)**	(0.091)***	(0.073)	(0.090)***	(0.062)**
Multilevel	N	Polity<1	1.105	1.234	1.231	1.021	1.200	0.857
RE Logit			(0.045)*	(0.087)***	(0.093)***	(0.073)	(0.090)**	(0.070)*

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.
Models estimated with all control variables described above.

Table 7.8: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in Sub-Saharan Africa: Remittance Coefficients Using Alternative Specifications

7.3.3 Remittances and Economic Assessments in Post-Communist States

	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5
Dependent variable	Subjective Quintile	Sociotropic Evaluation	Sociotropic Evaluation WRT 1989	Pocketbook Evaluation WRT 1989	Prospective Sociotropic Evaluation
Estimation method	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit	FE Ordered Logit
Remittance	1.211	1.125	1.118	1.114	1.550
	(0.054)***	(0.050)***	(0.053)**	(0.054)**	(0.073)***
Urban	0.860	0.816	0.949	0.893	0.855
	(0.021)***	(0.019)***	(0.023)**	(0.022)***	(0.021)***
Age	0.966	0.957	0.964	0.976	0.950
	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Age^2	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Female	1.020	0.960	0.940	1.000	1.046
	(0.024)	(0.022)*	(0.022)***	(0.024)	(0.025)*
Income Decile	1.160	1.040	1.039	1.093	1.042
	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***
Employment Income	1.298	1.109	1.130	1.253	0.982
	(0.034)***	(0.028)***	(0.030)***	(0.034)***	(0.026)
Secondary Education	1.670	1.429	1.372	1.129	1.158
	(0.052)***	(0.043)***	(0.044)***	(0.036)***	(0.037)***
Post-secondary	1.658	1.114	1.141	1.013	1.070
Education	(0.052)***	(0.035)***	(0.037)***	(0.033)	(0.035)**
Professional	1.361	1.385	1.487	1.313	1.219
	(0.064)***	(0.063)***	(0.071)***	(0.064)***	(0.058)***
Sociotropic	1.529	-	-	2.583	2.130
Evaluation	(0.016)***	-	-	(0.032)***	(0.026)***
Subjective Quintile	-	1.722	1.541	-	1.098
	-	(0.023)***	(0.021)***	-	(0.016)***
Cut 1	-1.353	-2.239	-1.923	-1.816	-3.423
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.091)
Cut 2	0.482	-0.672	-0.532	-0.240	-2.072
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.089)
Cut 3	2.832	0.352	0.116	0.668	-1.160
	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.088)
Cut 4	5.133	2.474	2.036	2.434	0.656
	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.088)
N	27,911	26,919	25,043	24,305	24,614

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 7.9: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in Post-Communist States

Table 7.9 reports the results from the analysis of the Life in Transition dataset, Figure 7.7 graphically plots the remittance odds ratio coefficients, and Figure 7.8 compares the remittance coefficients with those of other dichotomised independent variables. Once again, we find that remittances are positively associated with all the different kinds of pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluation. The relationship is not as strong as in the other regions and remittances are amongst the weakest (though still statistically significant) predictors in the models for most of the evaluation variables. The exception is sociotropic economic evaluations with respect to 1989, for which remittance receipt is the single most important predictor of more positive assessments.



Coefficients from model reported in Table 7.9.

Figure 7.7: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in Post-Communist States 1

The income variables display an association with economic evaluations closer to what we would expect in these models. While the results for the wealth variables in the Afrobarometer models were inconsistent, and the income variable had a weak relationship with economic evaluations in the Arab Barometer models, greater income is a strong predictor of economic evaluations in the Life in Transition models. Interestingly, however, it is those with a secondary education who have the most positive evaluations of any education level, while in Arab Barometer and Afrobarometer it was those with post-secondary education.



Dichotomous independent variables included in models: remittances, young (18-35), old (65+), gender, urban/rural, primary education, secondary education, post-secondary education, employed, professional, top income quintile, bottom income quintile, relevant economic evaluations. Only those variables with two or more statistically significant coefficients are displayed. Economic evaluations excluded for ease of interpretation.

Figure 7.8: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in Post-Communist States 2

The odds ratios of coefficients from alternative models are displayed in Table 7.10. Estimating hierarchical random effects logit models gives results with the same statistical and substantive significance of remittances on economic evaluations. Restricting the sample by removing consolidated democracies (with a Polity combined score of +7 or higher) gives us models in which remittances are no longer a significant predictor of prospective sociotropic economic evaluations, but remittances remain a significant predictor for all the other evaluation variables. Indeed the associations between remittances and sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations with respect to 1989 increase when the sample is restricted to non-democratic regimes. Once again, these results suggest that remittances exert a strong positive effect on economic evaluations across different regime types.

			7.1	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.5
Model	Data matched?	Countries	Subjective Quintile	Sociotropic Evaluation	Sociotropic Evaluation WRT 1989	Pocketbook Evaluation WRT 1989	Prospective Sociotropic Evaluation
FE Logit	Y	All	1.211	1.125	1.118	1.114	1.550
			(0.054)***	(0.050)***	(0.053)**	(0.054)**	(0.073)***
Multilevel RE Logit	N	All	1.183	1.081	1.117	1.104	1.401
			(0.051)**	(0.051)*	(0.051)**	(0.047)**	(0.060)***
FE Logit	Y	Polity<7	1.227	1.150	1.214	1.205	1.113
			(0.082)***	(0.060)**	(0.064)***	(0.062)***	(0.080)
Multilevel RE Logit	N	Polity<7	1.181	1.141	1.225	1.188	1.079
			(0.074)**	(0.057)**	(0.069)***	(0.065)**	(0.083)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.
Models estimated with all control variables described above.

Table 7.10: Remittances and Economic Evaluations in Post-Communist States: Remittance Coefficients Using Alternative Specifications

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the causal mechanism connecting remittances with greater political participation. We have seen that remittances are strongly associated with more positive pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations. This association holds in three different regions, across multiple measures of economic evaluation, in democratic and authoritarian countries and is robust to alternative estimation techniques. While we cannot prove causality given the cross-sectional nature of the data used, the results in this chapter strongly suggest that remittances influence recipients' view of their own economic situation and that of their country. Becoming more economically secure is likely to make remittance recipients less concerned about the potential of losing government patronage if they take part in contentious political activities. We now have evidence that remittances increase protests at the macro-level and the likelihood of protest at the micro-level. Through this mechanism, remittances can bolster the prospects for democracy.

A number of questions still remain. The most important is: why do remittances vary in their effects according to where they are sent from? We saw in Chapters 2 and 3 that remittances from democratic countries are associated with higher democracy scores, more protests and a greater likelihood of authoritarian regime failure, while remittances from authoritairan countries are not. In the next chapter, we will explore the differing micro-level effects of remittances from democratic and authoritarian countries. In Part III, we will investigate the causal mechanisms using evidence from interviews with remittance recipients.

Chapter 8

Remittances and Support for Democracy

Introduction

What could account for the differences in the effects of remittances from migrants in democratic countries compared with those from migrants in authoritarian countries? At the macro-level, we saw that remittances from democratic countries were associated with higher democracy scores, a greater likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown and more protests, while remittances from authoritarian countries were not and may even have a mildly stabilising impact on authoritarian regimes. In Part II so far, we have found that remittances are associated with protests and other forms of non-electoral political participation at the individual level, which appears to be caused by feelings of greater economic security. These effects should be the same wherever remittances are received from. In Chapter 2, I suggested that a social remittance mechanism may help us to understand why remittances from different sources have different effects. In this chapter, I will test this proposition by exploring how remittances might change recipients' attitudes towards democracy. I will show that remittances in countries which receive the majority of their remittances from democratic countries have a positive effect on support for democracy.

In countries which receive most of the remittances from authoritarian countries, however, remittances have a weak or null effect on democratic attitudes.

8.1 How Might Remittances Affect Democratic Attitudes?

The most influential account of the effect of migration on ideational diffusion is Peggy Levitt's (1998; 2001) seminal work on 'social remittances,' which she defined as "migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion." (Levitt, 1998, 926) Drawing on interviews with migrants from Dominica in the United States and their families back home, she found that democratic attitudes (amongst others) were transmitted by migrants to their home communities. Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) and Kapur (2010) have found this to be the case in Mexico and India respectively. Batista and Vicente (2011) and Pfutze (2012) suggest that those with family members abroad may hold more pro-democratic values which lead them to demand greater accountability in their governments and vote for democratic challengers against authoritarian incumbents. In a similar vein, Chauvet and Mercier (2014) find that electoral participation and competitiveness are higher in those areas of Mali with greater numbers of returned migrants. These three studies all suggest that migration may influence political beliefs in a pro-democratic direction, although they are by no means a definitive proof of a causal relationship. The countries studied in this research, India, Mexico, Cape Verde and Mali, all send the majority of their migrants to democratic countries, namely the United Kingdom, the United States, Portugal and France. The possibility for the diffusion of non-democratic norm diffusion has been explored by Rother (2009) and Kessler and Rother (2016), who found 'undemocratic remittances' in a study of return migrants in the Phillipines. Those who had migrated to authoritarian countries such as Saudi Arabia and Singapore viewed democracy less positively than those who had not migrated or who had migrated to non-authoritarian countries, and there was little pro-democratic change in the views of migrants who had returned from democratic countries like Japan and Taiwan.

So far we have seen how out- and return migration may lead to the transmission of democratic (or undemocratic) political norms. How might this be related to remittances? Two main causal mechanism could link remittances and democratic attitudes. Firstly, financial remittances may reinforce social remittances; receiving money may make people more receptive to political ideas that accompany it, as Levitt (1998) herself has suggested. Furthermore, there may be a demonstration effect related to the relative economic success of the country from which people receive remittances. If a family member migrates to a democratic country, enthuses about both the economic opportunities and the political openness in their new home and proves the existence of greater economic opportunities through the remittance of money, it is not difficult to imagine that the recipient may associate democracy with greater economic success and therefore support the establishment of more open and democratic political institutions in their own country.

Could there also be an authoritarian effect in which remittance recipients see the relative economic success of authoritarian migration destinations and seek to emulate authoritarian political systems in their home countries? On the one hand, authoritarianism is a less clearly-defined ideology than democracy, which would seem to make it less exportable. On the other hand, remittance recipients may associate certain qualities such as strong leadership with authoritarian rule which could make them less supportive of democracy. As discussed above, Kessler and Rother (2016) find that return migrants from authoritarian regimes in the Philippines are less supportive of democratic principles.

In Part III, I will use evidence from interviews with remittance recipients in Tunisia and Jordan to interrogate the causal mechanisms linking remittances with political norm diffusion. In this chapter, I will use survey data to test two hypotheses:

H8.1: Recipients of remittances from migrants in democratic countries are more likely to support democracy than non-recipients

H8.2: Recipients of remittances from migrants in authoritarian countries are less likely to support democracy than non-recipients

8.2 Data

8.2.1 Where are Remittances Sent From?

In this chapter, we are interested in comparing the effects of remittances from migrants in democratic countries with the effects of remittances from migrants in authoritarian countries. Unfortunately, none of the three datasets we have been using in Part II include data about the source of remittances on the level of individual respondents. There are distinct divides within the MENA and post-Communist regions, however, between those countries which receive the majority of their remittances from democratic countries and those which receive most of their remittances from authoritarian countries.

Country	Remittances from Democratic Countries (% of GDP)	Remittances from Authoritarian Countries (% of GDP)
Algeria	**0.05**	0.00
Egypt	0.03	**0.08**
Iraq	0.00	**0.02**
Jordan	0.03	**0.10**
Lebanon	0.03	**0.18**
Morocco	**0.12**	0.00
Sudan	0.01	**0.03**
Tunisia	**0.08**	0.01
Yemen	0.03	**0.10**

Table 8.1: Remittances Received from Democratic and Authoritarian Countries in MENA

In the MENA region, the North African former French colonies, receive the vast majority of their remittances from France and southern Europe. Other labour-exporting states in the region receive most of their remittances from the Gulf states and Libya. This is confirmed by the remittance estimates produced in Chapter 2. The estimated remittances from both democratic and authoritarian countries as a percentage of GDP in 2011 (the year of the Arab Barometer survey) are reported in Table 8.1. As we can see, the North African countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia receive the majority of their remittances from democratic countries; the opposite is true for the other countries in the region. We can therefore split the survey dataset in two and test the effects of remittances on both a democratic remittance-receiving sample and an authoritarian remittance-receiving sample.

Country	Democratic Remittances (% of GDP)	Authoritarian Remittances (% of GDP)
Albania	**0.17**	0.00
Armenia	0.06	**0.24**
Azerbaijan	0.07	0.13
Belarus	0.08	**0.12**
Bosnia and Herzegovina	**0.17**	0.00
Bulgaria	**0.16**	0.00
Croatia	**0.08**	0.00
Czech Republic	**0.06**	0.00
Estonia	**0.10**	0.05
Georgia	0.13	**0.21**
Hungary	**0.05**	0.00
Kazakhstan	0.01	**0.09**
Kyrgyz Republic	0.05	**0.23**
Latvia	**0.10**	0.05
Lithuania	**0.13**	0.03
Macedonia, FYR	**0.23**	0.00
Moldova	**0.23**	0.14
Mongolia	**0.02**	0.00
Poland	**0.11**	0.01
Romania	**0.14**	0.00
Russian Federation	**0.05**	0.02
Serbia	**0.09**	0.00
Slovak Republic	**0.10**	0.00
Slovenia	**0.06**	0.00
Tajikistan	0.03	**0.19**
Turkey	**0.07**	0.00
Ukraine	0.07	**0.11**
Uzbekistan	0.01	**0.09**

Table 8.2: Remittances Received from Democratic and Authoritarian Countries in Post-Communist States

Amongst post-Communist countries, certain sub-regions tend to receive more remittances from non-democratic Russia (such as the Central Asian and Caucasian states), while others receive remittances mostly from democratic Western Europe (such as the Balkans and Eastern Europe). The sub-regional split is not as clear as in the MENA region because some countries, such as Moldova and Ukraine, are well-known to receive remittances from both Russia and Western Europe. We can therefore turn again to the remittance estimates generated in Chapter 2 to divide the Life in Transition dataset into two samples, one including countries which receive most of their remittances from democratic countries and the other including countries which receive most of their remittances from authoritarian countries. Remittances from both kinds of countries as a percentage of GDP in 2006 (the year of the Life in Transition survey) are displayed in Table 8.2.

8.2.2 Dependent Variables

From the Arab Barometer dataset, I use a variable derived from a question that asks respondents to rate how appropriate democracy is for their country on a 1 (absolutely inappropriate) to 10 (completely appropriate) scale. This variable captures the underlying concept of interest more fully than other questions related to democracy included in the Arab Barometer survey instrument. Many of the other questions relate to abstract ideas of the attractiveness of democracy or refer to specific elements of democratic political systems. The appropriateness question more closely captures the respondents' support for implementing democracy in their own country.

Most remittances received from:	Non-recipient	Remittance recipient	Difference
Democratic countries	5.9	6.2	+0.3***
Authoritarian countries	5.9	5.9	0

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z tests.

Table 8.3: Differences in Support for Democracy between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in MENA

Table 8.3 reports the differences in the means of the democracy support variable between remittance recipients and non-recipients in the two samples of MENA countries described above from the Arab Barometer survey dataset. Remittance recipients in North African countries which receive the majority of their remittances from France and southern Europe report a higher level of support for democracy than non-recipients. In other countries, there is no difference between recipient and non-recipients in their support for democracy. We therefore have some support for H8.1, that remittances from democratic countries increase support for democracy, but no support for H8.2 that remittances from authoritarian countries decrease support for democracy.

The Life in Transition dataset includes only one question about support for democracy: "With which one of the following statements do you agree most..." Potential responses were:

- Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system
- Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one
- For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian

Those who choose democracy being preferable to any other system were coded as 1; other responses were coded as 0. Table 8.4 compares support for democracy between those who receive remittances and those who do not in countries that receive mostly democractic remittances and those that receive most of their remittances from authoritarian countries. Interestingly, in both sets of countries, remittance recipients report higher support for democracy, although only in the democratic remittance receiving countries was this difference statistically significant (and then only at the 90% level).

Most remittances received from:	Non-recipient	Remittance recipient	Difference
Authoritarian countries	0.56	0.58	+0.02
Democratic countries	0.58	0.62	+0.04*

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. p-values from z tests.

Table 8.4: Differences in Support for Democracy between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Post-Communist States

8.2.3 Control Variables

I include the standard demographic controls of gender, age, education and urban/rural location because, as we saw in Chapter 5, these are correlated with remittance receipt and so could bias the results of remittances if they are not included. Gender is particularly important to include because of evidence of a gender gap in support for democracy (Garcia-Penalosa and Konte, 2014).

The role of religion and religiosity in determining support for democracy has been much debated, particularly the role of Islam in the MENA region (Hofmann, 2004; Ciftci, 2010; Fish, 2011; Tessler, Jamal and Robbins, 2012), while religiosity can also influence migration decisions (Falco and Rotondi, 2016). I therefore include the index of religiosity described in Chapter 6 as a control variable in the Arab Barometer models. I also include the reported religious denomination of respondents in the Life in Transition survey; unfortunately the survey did not asked any questions about religiosity.

Income may play a role in support for democracy. As much of the recent democratisation literature has stressed, the wealthy should have reasons to dislike democracy if they perceive that it is likely to be accompanied by greater levels of redistribution (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). In the Arab Barometer models, I include a log of household income in US$. In the Life in Transition models, I include the income decile of the respondent and also their perceived income decile.

Norm diffusion may also occur more directly through respondents' own international travel, and those with family members abroad are more likely to travel themselves. I therefore include a dichotomous variables for travelling abroad since 1989 in the Life in Transition models and for visiting a Western country in the previous five years in the Arab Barometer models.

Being a member of an ethnic minority may affect support for democracy if minorities fear the majority rule that democracy implies or if an authoritarian regime engages in ethnic exclusion (Belge and Karakoc, 2015). Ethnicity is recorded in the Life in Transition survey, so I include a binary variable indicating whether a respondent is part of a minority community.

Finally, in the Arab Barometer models, I include a variable capturing political interest. This is coded from a question which asks "In general, to what extent are you interested in politics?" I code this on a four point scale from "Not interested" (coded 1) to "Very interested" (coded 4).

8.2.4 Empirical Strategy

Following the strategy described in the previous chapters, I match the data on gender, age, education and rural/urban location using Coarsened Exact Matching. The democracy support variable for the Life in Transition models is dichotomous, so I use a logit estimator. The democracy support variable for the Arab Barometer model is on a 10 point scale, so I use both OLS and ordered logit estimators. In the main models, I use country fixed effects to control for country-specific factors influencing support for democracy. In alternative specifications, I use hierarchical random effects models with unmatched data.

8.3 Results

8.3.1 Remittances and Support for Democracy in MENA

Table 8.5 reports the results of models estimating respondents' assessment of the appropriateness of democracy for their country. Models 4.1 and 4.2 include basic demographic controls and show that remittances have a strong, positive effect on the recipients' reported belief in the appropriateness of democracy in North Africa. All else being equal, those who receive remittances rate the appropriateness of democracy in their country as 0.6 points higher on a ten-point scale compared with those who do not receive remittances. We thus have evidence for H8.1. It appears that we can reject H8.2 in the MENA region; remittances in countries that mostly receive remittances from authoritarian countries in fact report *higher* support for democracy, although the coefficient is smaller than that for North African countries and the result is only significant at the 90% level. It is difficult to know whether this means that remittances from migrants in authoritarian countries increase support for democracy, or whether remittances from authoritarian countries have no effect and that the models have picked up the influence of the small number of respondents who receive remittances from migrants in democratic countries.

	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4
Countries	North Africa	Other countries	North Africa	Other countries
Model	OLS with country FE	OLS with country FE	OLS with country FE	OLS with country FE
Remittance	0.619	0.187	0.623	0.231
	(0.278)**	(0.112)*	(0.305)**	(0.119)*
Female	0.185	-0.026	0.322	-0.080
	(0.137)	(0.067)	(0.145)**	(0.072)
Age	0.003	-0.011	0.013	-0.012
	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Age^2	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban	-0.130	-0.049	-0.221	0.078
	(0.161)	(0.079)	(0.170)	(0.086)
Household income (log)	0.085	0.144	0.093	0.144
	(0.091)	(0.042)***	(0.104)	(0.046)***
Secondary Education	-	-	-0.084	-0.032
	-	-	(0.199)	(0.098)
Post-Secondary Education	-	-	-0.098	-0.029
	-	-	(0.200)	(0.092)
Political Interest	-	-	0.286	0.247
	-	-	(0.087)***	(0.039)***
Religiosity Index	-	-	-0.048	0.024
	-	-	(0.015)***	(0.008)***
Visit to a Western Country	-	-	-0.042	-0.219
	-	-	(0.230)	(0.126)*
Constant	6.242	6.540	4.784	6.315
	(0.769)***	(0.352)***	(0.841)***	(0.420)***
Observations	1,192	6,044	1,083	5,357

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets.

Table 8.5: Remittances and Support for Democracy in MENA

In models 4.3 and 4.4, I include the complete set of control variables. The results for remittances in North Africa change very little, while the coefficient for remittances in other countries increases, although it is still only significant at the 90% level. The results of models including only dichotomous variables for easy comparison of coefficients are plotted in Figure 8.1. As we can see, remittance receipt has the strongest association of any variable in the model on support for democracy in North Africa. Additionally, in other countries, the association between remittances and support for democracy is stronger than most of the other variables.



Figure 8.1: Remittances and Support for Democracy in MENA

The control variables are not the key points of interest, but two surprising findings are worthy of discussion. Firstly, religiosity has a negative and significant association with support for democracy in North Africa, but a positive and significant relationship with support for democracy in other countries in the MENA region. This constrasts with recent findings that religiosity does not tend to have a strong effect on democratic support in the MENA region (Ciftci, 2010; Tessler, 2010). While beyond the scope of this thesis, further investigation of this result would be worthwhile. The second point of interest is that visits to Western countries are associated with lower support for democracy, although these results are only significant outside North Africa and then only at the 10% level. This result suggests that receiving remittances from democratic countries plays a greater role in ideational diffusion than short-term travel to democratic countries.

		2.1	2.2
Model	Data matched?	North Africa	Other Countries
Hierarchical linear model	Y	0.623	0.231
with fixed effects		(0.305)**	(0.119)*
Hierarchical ordered logit	N	0.569	0.173
with random effects		(0.225)**	(0.091)*
Hierarchical linear model	N	0.853	0.162
with random effects		(0.313)***	(0.120)
Ordered logit	Y	0.473	0.170
with fixed effects		(0.222)**	(0.092)*

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Odds ratios reported for ordered logit model. Standard errors in brackets.

Models estimated with all control variables described above.

Table 8.6: Remittances and Support for Democracy in MENA: Remittance Coefficients Using Alternative Specifications

Table 8.6 reports remittance variable coefficients in alternative models using different estimation techniques. Similar results for the effect of remittances on support for democracy are found in all the different models as in the main models reported in Table 8.5 above, although remittances lose their significant association with democracy support when using a hierarchical linear model with random effects and unmatched data.

8.3.2 Remittances and Support for Democracy in Post-Communist States

Table 8.7 reports the results of the logit models using data from the Life in Transition survey. Models 3.1 and 3.2 include basic demographic controls. In countries which receive remittances mostly from democratic countries, remittances are associated with a 22% greater likelihood of believing that democracy is preferable to any other form of political system. Similarly to the results from the MENA region reported above, remittances also appear to have a positive effect on support for democracy in countries which receive most of their remittances from authoritarian countries, although this is not significant at

	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6
Majority of remittances from:	Democratic countries	Authoritarian countries	Democratic countries	Authoritarian countries	Democratic countries	Authoritarian countries
Model	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	RE Logit	RE Logit
Remittance	1.221	1.034	1.179	1.036	1.178	1.042
	(0.098)**	(0.082)	(0.096)**	(0.084)	(0.096)**	(0.084)
Female	1.188	1.181	1.149	1.159	1.150	1.161
	(0.040)***	(0.056)***	(0.040)***	(0.056)***	(0.040)***	(0.056)***
Urban	1.131	0.891	1.050	0.876	1.052	0.870
	(0.039)***	(0.045)**	(0.038)	(0.046)**	(0.038)	(0.045)***
Age	0.994	0.988	0.997	0.989	0.997	0.989
	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)**	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
Age^2	1.002	0.999	1.001	1.000	1.001	1.000
	(0.001)*	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Income Decile	1.091	1.070	1.052	1.057	1.051	1.057
	(0.007)***	(0.009)***	(0.007)***	(0.010)***	(0.007)***	(0.010)***
Subjective	-	-	1.096	1.023	1.096	1.025
Decile	-	-	(0.012)***	(0.016)	(0.012)***	(0.016)
Secondary	-	-	1.175	1.389	1.174	1.389
Education	-	-	(0.061)***	(0.114)***	(0.061)***	(0.114)***
Post-Secondary	-	-	1.323	1.904	1.317	1.906
Education	-	-	(0.061)***	(0.159)***	(0.060)***	(0.159)***
Travelled	-	-	1.377	1.007	1.376	1.005
Abroad	-	-	(0.055)***	(0.073)	(0.055)***	(0.073)
Ethnic	-	-	0.742	0.869	0.741	0.872
Minority	-	-	(0.040)***	(0.072)*	(0.040)***	(0.072)*
Christian	-	-	0.995	1.392	0.982	1.405
	-	-	(0.062)	(0.187)**	(0.060)	(0.188)**
Muslim	-	-	1.311	1.939	1.332	1.897
	-	-	(0.122)***	(0.280)***	(0.121)***	(0.270)***
Other	-	-	0.864	2.262	0.885	2.279
Religion	-	-	(0.088)	(0.740)**	(0.090)	(0.745)**
Constant	1.312	1.562	0.739	0.614	0.573	0.576
	(0.135)***	(0.190)***	(0.101)***	(0.125)***	(0.076)***	(0.119)***
N	16,230	8,068	15,961	7,913	16,051	7,952

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Odds ratios reported with standard errors in brackets.

Table 8.7: Remittances and Support for Democracy in Post-Communist States

conventional levels. Models 3.3 and 3.4 add the full set of control variables and models 3.5 and 3.6 use random effects logit regressions on unmatched data to ensure that the results are not driven by model choice. The results for remittances remain largely the same; the positive coefficient for remittances in countries receiving most of their remittances from democratic countries is reduced slightly when the extra controls are introduced but remains significant at the 95% level.



Models estimated using full set of control variables, dichotomised for ease of interpretation. Only significant results displayed.

Figure 8.2: Remittances and Support for Democracy in Post-Communist States

In Figure 8.2, the results of a similar model using dichotomous control variables are displayed graphically for easy comparison. The largest positive associations with democratic support are education and being Muslim, while being old, part of an ethnic minority group and in the bottom income quintile have a negative relationship with support for democracy. The effect of remittances is rather small compared with these other variables, although we should bear in mind that the coefficients for remittances are likely to be biased downwards because not all remittances are received from only democratic or only authoritarian countries.

8.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have found that remittances are associated with greater support for democracy in countries which receive the majority of their remittances from migrants in democratic countries. We thus have evidence for a social remittance effect by which democratic norms are sent from migrants in countries with democratic political institutions to family members in their homeland. Somewhat surprisingly, there appears to be a mildly pro-democratic effect of remittances received in countries with greater remittance linkages with authoritarian countries. This could be for one of two reasons. It may be that the receipt of remittances is associated with greater support for democracy, no matter where they are from. Alternatively, it may be that remittances from authoritarian countries have no effect, and the small effects seen in this chapter are a result of those few respondents who received their remittances from migrants in democratic countries. Unfortunately, without better data about where remittances are received from on an individual level, we cannot test these explanations. In the next two chapters, however, I will explore the impact of remittances on support for democracy using interview data, which will give us some insights into the social remittance causal mechanism.

Part III

Insights from Interviews

Chapter 9

Remittances and Politics in Jordan

Introduction

In Part III, I turn to evidence from two MENA countries to explore the individual-level effects of remittances on political ideology and participation. I use data collected from interviews with recipients of remittances in Jordan and Tunisia to further investigate the statistical relationships found in cross-country and survey data reported in Parts I and II. How do recipients themselves perceive the effect of remittances on their ability to engage in political activities? In what ways are social remittances transmitted and received by migrants and their families, and how do they interact with financial remittances? To what extent does the migration destination condition the political effects of remittances? While there has been a significant amount of research on social remittances using interviews with current and returned migrants and their families, there has been little research that has focused on interviews with those who receive financial remittances or that has investigated the diffusion of political norms. The chapters in Part III therefore contribute to the literature on social remittances by adding a political dimension to the concept and shedding light on the interaction between financial and social remittances.

The evidence in Part III comes from 63 interviews held with remittance recipients in Jordan and Tunisia in 2014, 2015 and 2016. Resources did not permit the survey of a representative sample of the population of remittance recipients in either country, nor were interviews held with a 'control group' of those who do not receive remittances. The purpose of Chapters 9 and 10 is thus not to test a set of hypotheses as was the case in the first two Parts of the thesis. Rather, these two chapters attempt to contextualise the findings of the rest of the thesis and investigate the relationships found in aggregate responses to survey questions at the individual level.

Jordan and Tunisia are two countries with long histories of migration and receipt of remittances, but they differ in the primary destination for their migrants and thus the main source of remittances. Jordanian migration is primarily to oil-rich states in the MENA region, while Tunisian migration is centred on France and southern European countries. In both countries, I interviewed people who received remittances from family members in either authoritarian Gulf or democratic Western countries. In this chapter, I will focus on Jordan. I will begin by discussing the context of migration and remittances in Jordan, before describing the data collection and summarising the main details of those interviewed. I will then analyse the responses of the interviewees to investigate the effect of remittances on political participation and the transmission of social remittances alongside the transfer of money. I will also explore what influenced migrants in their decision to migrate to particular destinations. In Chapter 10, I will revisit the same themes in the case of Tunisia.

9.1 What Do We Already Know about Remittances and Political Change from Interview Research?

In the preceding quantitative chapters, we saw that there has been remarkably little previous research using similar methods that has investigated the political effects of remittances at the macro- and micro-levels. There is an even smaller literature using interview-based qualitative research to explore these questions. The most influential qualitative work on the non-economic implications of remittances has been the research of Peggy

Levitt (1998; 2001) who developed the concept of social remittances. Levitt used social remittances as a lens through which to view the diffusion of social and cultural norms from migration destinations to migrant homelands at the individual level. Levitt's discussion of social remittances mostly focused on the diffusion of cultural rather than political norms and subsequent research using the concept of social remittances has mostly continued in this vein by nvestigating the role of social remittances in changing ideas about, for example, social hierarchy (Zotova and Cohen, 2016), family and gender roles (Gruntz and Pagès-El Karoui, 2013; Vianello, 2013) and legal consciousness (Kubal, 2015). While Levitt (1998) did discuss some of the political implications of social remittances, for example the transfer of norms about the rule of law, her focus on migration between one democracy (the United States) and another (Dominica) means that the implications of her work may not be applicable to the present discussion about remittances and democratisation. Furthermore, while Levitt discussed the potential for financial remittances to reinforce social remittances, the latter concept was in part developed to move beyond research privileging the former (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2010). Some scholars have called for a distinction to be made between the impacts of social and financial remittances or have shown that the social meanings of financial transfers can mean they have contradictory effects, for example on norms of reciprocity in kinship networks (Boccagni and Decimo, 2013; Gallo, 2013).

Much of the broader research on political remittances has been about the political engagement of migrants and diaspora communities. Indeed, Piper (2009, 215) defines the term 'political remittances' as "political activism via collective organisations that operate across borders." Summarising early work on this topic, Ruland, Kessler and Rother (2009, 175) argued that "democratisation effects tend to emerge where migrants are able to organise themselves and struggle for their rights." The experience of mobilising for their rights during periods of migration may make migrants more willing and able to mobilise politically when they return (Conway, Potter and Bernard, 2012; Kessler and Rother, 2016).

The most important interview-based research into migration and democratization has been the work of Stefan Rother (2009) and Christl Kessler and Rother (2016). These two studies investigated the changes in attitudes towards democracy and political participation of return migrants to the Phillipines. Rother (2009) found that Filipinos who had returned from working in Saudi Arabia were impressed by the greater state capacity to implement the law, however illiberal in nature, and the equality between Saudi Arabian citizens which contrasted positively with their experiences in the Phillipines. Kessler and Rother (2016) found that return migrants were less supportive of democracy than those who planned soon to migrate and that many return migrants who were supportive of democracy were frustrated with the poor functioning of the political system in the Phillipines. Furthermore, there was little difference between those who migrated to democratic countries and those who migrated to authoritarian countries; what mattered more was the specific experiences of migration, for example their treatment by authorities in the destination country. While we can draw useful insights from this work, the focus on return migrants in their broadly democratic homeland of the Phillipines is very different from Part III's investigation of remittance recipients in authoritarian (Jordan) or transitional (Tunisia) regimes.

Drawing on survey research in Mexico, Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) argue that "migrants are agents of democratic diffusion" who "absorb attributes of democracy in the host country and transfer them to people in their home countries." After conducting more nuanced interview research, Kessler and Rother (2016, 9) urge us to "avoid an over-simplified view of migrants moving from backward authoritarian countries to model democracies, where they experience the blessings of democracy and share those after their return back home." The reasons they give for this are that migrants often work in undemocratic countries (for example Filipino migrants in Saudi Arabia) and that "(e)ven in 'full democracies' human rights of migrants are often violated" (ibid). As we will see in this chapter and the next, we should go even further in rejecting a simplistic view of migrants to democratic countries converting to a democratic ideology that they then transmit to families and communities back home. The diffusion of democratic values is based more on comparisons made between migrants' destinations and homelands, and the idea of 'democracy' is rarely conceptualised by remittance recipients.

Some of the difference of the findings in these chapters from earlier research may be due to the focus on those who receive remittances rather than those who migrate themselves. Indeed, remittance recipients have not been the primary subject of any previous interview-based research on political change. These chapters thus contribute to the literature by adding to our knowledge of how migration can influence mass-level political value change and the role financial remittances can play in this relationship.

9.2 Remittances in Jordan



Figure 9.1: Remittances received in Jordan, 1980-2015

As we saw in Chapter 5, Jordan is the second most remittance-dependent country in the Middle East after Lebanon. Recorded remittances made up 10.4% of GDP in 2014 and amounted to \$565 per head of population. These are comparatively large figures: the world mean remittance/GDP ratio in 2014 was 4.9% and the average per capita figure was \$229. Nevertheless, these are historically low numbers for Jordan. In every year between 1974 and 1985, Jordan was one of the top three recipients of remittances measured by both remittances as a percentage of GDP and remittances received per capita; in most of these years, remittances made up more than 20% of GDP.[1] A discussion of trends in Jordanian remittance receipts can be found in Chapter 4.

Destination	Number of Migrants
Arab World	**531,788**
Saudi Arabia	182,152
United Arab Emirates	167,585
Kuwait	50,399
Other Regions	**167,931**
United States	64,868
Total	***699,719***

Table 9.1: Number of Jordanians Living Abroad by Region and Country, 2015 Estimate

Where are the Jordanian migrants who send remittances to their home country? Table 9.1 shows the number of Jordanians abroad by region and country in 2015 estimated by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. While the figures are likely to be an underestimate of the total number of Jordanians resident abroad, they do give an idea of where Jordanians tend to migrate to. The majority of Jordanians resident abroad are in other Arab countries (76%), with the top destinations being Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Outside the MENA region, the only substantial Jordanian population is to be found in the United States, which is the destination for just over 9% of Jordanian migrants.

Table 9.2 compares the characteristics of Jordanians who do and do not receive remittances based on the Arab Barometer survey. Remittance recipients made up 9.3%

[1] In many of these years, Jordan was second only to Lesotho, a country whose economy at the time was almost completely dependent on exporting labour to South Africa.

of Jordanian sample in the survey. The biggest differences between recipients and non-recipients were in education and income. 56% of Jordanians who received remittances had post-secondary education while only 40% who did not receive remittances had such education. The income of remittance recipients was 57% higher than non-recipients. We cannot tell whether these differences were caused by the receipt of remittances. Receiving extra income from relatives overseas would be likely to raise total income and could be used on education, but those families with greater income and education may have more opportunities to migrate.

	Non-recipients	Remittance recipients	Difference
Female	49%	52%	+3
Urban	83%	88%	+6
Unmarried	27%	30%	+3
Unemployed	7%	7%	0
Post-secondary education	40%	56%	+16
Age	38	39	+1
Household income (US$)	686	1075	+389
Member of civil society organisation	15%	22%	+7

Table 9.2: Comparison of Characteristics between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Jordan

Those who received remittances were also more likely to be female, living in an urban area, unmarried, older and a member of a civil society organisation. This accords with the regional-level differences between remittance recipients and non-recipients shown in Chapter 5. The only difference from the regional comparison relates to employment. There is no difference in unemployment rates between recipients and non-recipients in Jordan but, in the MENA region as a whole, recipients have a lower unemployment rate.

9.3 Data Collection

In total, 30 interviews were held with remittance recipients in Jordan during fieldwork in September 2014, January 2015 and August 2016. The interviewees were found using the networks of two key informants (a marriage matchmaker and the manager of a branch of a money transfer agency) and additional snowball sampling. The majority of interviewees were based in Amman. Table 9.3 summarises the main information of the interviewees and those who sent remittances to them: the relationship between remittance sender and recipient, the frequency of remittances, the destination country and work of the migrant remitter and whether the interviewee mentioned any other family members who lived abroad.[2]

The mean age of interviewees was 46, older than the mean of remittance recipients in the Arab Barometer sample. The interview sample also contained substantially more women (63%) than men (37%). Although more women do receive remittances than men in Jordan according to more representative samples (52% in Arab Barometer Wave II), this does represent an significant over-sampling of women. This is a very rare occurrence for non-elite interview-based research by a male researcher in an Arab country and was a result of the use of the network of a marriage matchmaker and subsequent snowball sampling from this network which was overwhelmingly female.

The majority of the interviewees (63%) were sent remittances by relatives in other Arab countries. The United Arab Emirates was the single biggest destination (seven remitters), followed by Saudi Arabia (six remitters). Other Arab destination countries included Kuwait (three), Qatar, Lebanon and Iraq (one each). Outside the Arab world, the most important destination country was the United States from which four interviewees received remittances. Other non-Arab destination countries included Australia (two remitters), the United Kingdom (two), Germany (two) and Sweden (one). The top three countries represented in the interview sample was thus the same as the top three countries of Jordanian migration, although in a different order (Saudi Arabia is the top destination for Jordanian migrats, rather than the United Arab Emirates).

[2]Interviewees' names have been changed to preserve their anonymity.

Name	Age	Relationship with remittance sender	Destination of remittance sender	Length of time abroad	Work of remittance sender	Remittance frequency	Other family abroad?
Abbas	62	Father	Germany	8 years	Not working (she is married)	Occasional	-
Ahmed	60	Father	UK (3 children)	24 years (eldest son), 1.5 years (youngest)	Barber, hairdresser, waiter	Formerly regular, now occasional	-
Aisha	49	Mother	UAE	7-8 years	Telecommunications	Every two months	-
Akilah	42	Brother	Lebanon	20 years	Tourist guide	Quarterly	Daughter in Saudi Arabia
Asma	22	Daughter	Saudi Arabia	30 years	Construction	Monthly	-
Bahira	57	Mother	Australia	16 years	Retail	Monthly	Daughter and youngest son also in Australia
Fatima	39	Wife	Saudi Arabia	13 or 14 years	Retail manager	Monthly	-
Fatinah	46	Wife	UAE	4 years	Manufacturing	Monthly	Two sons in Australia

Hamid	58	Father	Kuwait	11 years	Engineer	Monthly	Brother in UAE
Hassan	57	Father	UK	13 years	Taxi driver	Every two months	Nephews in the UK
Laila	57	Sister	USA	30 years	Retail (business owner)	Occasional	-
Maha	49	Wife	USA	6 years	Retail	Fortnightly	-
Mahmoud	63	Father	Kuwait and UAE (2 children)	3 years and 1.5 years	Software developer	Monthly	-
Manara	34	Sister	Sweden	7 years	Mechanic	Quarterly	-
Muhammed	29	Nephew	USA	3 years	Retail	Biannually	-
Mukhtar	23	Son	Saudi Arabia	6 years	Manufacturing	Quarterly	Uncle in Saudi Arabia
Muna	37	Daughter	UAE	40 years	Business	Every two months	Two sisters in Qatar and Saudi Arabia
Musa	44	Son	UAE	15 years	Retail	Monthly	-
Nura	56	Wife	Germany	20 years	Business	Monthly	Brother in UAE
Rana	28	Wife	Iraq	5 years	Pilot	Monthly	-
Rasheed	25	Cousin	USA	3 years	Retail	Monthly	

Reem	51	Mother	Australia	10 years and 3 years	Retail (both of them)	Monthly	-
Sabirah	55	Sister	Kuwait	7 years	Teacher	Monthly	Four other siblings in UAE and Kuwait
Saleha	73	Mother	Saudi Arabia	6 years	Retail	Monthly	Daughter and son in the USA
Sameh	52	Mother	UAE	12 years	Management	Biannually	-
Samira	33	Wife	Qatar	5 years	Television producer	Monthly	-
Tahirah	63	Wife	Saudi Arabia	44 years	Finance manager (now retired)	Monthly	-
Wajd	38	Brother	UAE	10 years	Teacher	Monthly	-
Zayna	33	Niece	Saudi Arabia	15 years	Not working (she is married)	Triannually	Two uncles also in Saudi Arabia
Zulema	36	Sister	UAE	10 years	Engineer	Monthly	-

Table 9.4: Interviewees in Jordan



Figure 9.2: Interviewees by Gender in Jordan

A third of the interviewees were parents of the migrants who sent them remittances. The second largest relationship category was that of spouses, all of whom were female. This helps to confirm the suspected reason why the average age of remittance recipients was older than that of non-recipients and why more recipients were female than male in the Arab Barometer data: migrants are more likely to be husbands and children that send remittances back to wives and parents rather than the other way around. Some interviewees (13%) did receive remittances from their parents, but far fewer than received remittances from their children. The vast majority (90%) of interviewees received remittances from immediate family members; the interviewees who did not fall into this category were a niece, a nephew and a cousin of the person who sent them remittances. Twelve interviewees (40%) reported having relatives abroad other than the family member who sent them remittances; a few of these received occasional remittances from other family members, but all interviewees had one primary remittance sender.



Figure 9.3: Destination of Primary Remittance Senders in Jordan

The majority of interviewees (60%) received remittances at least monthly, indicating that the transfers from abroad were a major component of their income. Remittances were received every 2 to 6 months by a further 30%; many of these interviewees also indicated that remittances contributed a significant income stream. The remaining 10% of interviewees received remittances only occasionally and these transfers were often sent around festivals such as Eid or for specific purchases.



Figure 9.4: Relationship of Interviewees with Remittance Senders in Jordan



Figure 9.5: Frequency of Remittance Receipt amongst Interviewees in Jordan

9.4 Remittances and Political Participation in Jordan

In Chapter 6, we saw that remittances were associated with greater levels of civic and political participation in the MENA region, and I suggested in Chapter 8 that one causal mechanism was recipients' perceptions of greater economic security. In this section, I explore more deeply why remittances might increase participation based on the perspectives of remittance recipients themselves. In the interviews, I asked respondents whether they took part in any civic or political activities. Some did not, although this was sometimes a result of personal circumstances. For example, Mahmoud had a disabled son who needed constant care. Remittances from his other two sons who worked in Kuwait and UAE helped him to pay for a daycare centre, but his free time was taken up by care duties. The eight interviewees who did report some form of participation were asked about their reasons for their engagement and what role, if any, they thought that remittances played in their ability or desire to be involved.

One of the major themes was the greater resources that remittances gave recipients which allowed them to be involved in a variety of activities they would not otherwise be able to do. Samira engaged in volunteering and activism over hunger issues in urban areas outside of Amman. This was a cause she believed in passionately, but she claimed that she had not been able to help before her husband had migrated to Dubai because they had been too poor and had struggled to pay for the basic necessities of accommodation, food and school fees for their son. It was only after she began receiving remittances that she could afford to engage in civil society. Her "life totally changed when we started receiving money from abroad;" she now felt wealthy and therefore had a duty to help those who were less well-off. Samira's idea of having a duty to help others was related to her receipt of remittances; she had greater wealth and security from remittances that others did not have and so felt that she should help those who had access to fewer and less secure resources. Tahirah, whose husband supported her by sending her remittances from Saudi Arabia, related similar sentiments of social responsibility. While considering herself poor, she volunteered for a charity that provided support for economically disadvantaged people. Reflecting on the role of remittances, she "suppose(d) that remittances have helped me to participate in this, because without the money I would not be able to help at all. I would have to work more and would not be able to spend any time on helping others, just helping myself." Notably she also believed that she should help because there are "many worse off than me." Fatinah, who received regular remittances from her husband who worked in a factory in the UAE, was another female contributor to charitable organisations. She explained that "if people get extra from remittances, then they can contribute" to civil society organisations, although this was no different from receiving greater income from within Jordan. Thus, in Fatinah's view, remittances were important in promoting civic participation purely through the greater resources available to the recipient rather than there being anything specific to remittance income that made people more likely to participate in civic associations.

While Samira, Tahirah, Fatinah and most other interviewees felt that migration had increased their personal wealth, for Maha migration was associated with a loss of wealth and status. Her husband had previously owned a small chain of clothing shops that had closed down after increasing competition from malls in Amman and the malicious actions of a rival businessman in collusion with a corrupt government official (as Maha described it). He had been forced to move to the United States to provide money for the family to keep their house, but found the downgrade in status from business owner to employee difficult. Nevertheless, Maha was still engaged with volunteering for a civil society organisation that provided food and other essential supplies to poor Jordanians during Eid and Ramadan, and noted that "without remittances, I could not afford to help like this." Again we have a statement here that links the receipt of remittances to greater resources which in turn increase the ability for civic engagement.

In addition to increasing financial resources, remittances can also free up time for recipients to be politically engaged. Muhammed linked his organising role in an independent day labourers' union to the receipt of remittances from his uncle in Chicago.[3] Muhammed's mother had been sick for an extended period of time, and he had previously spent a significant amount of time caring for her. Since his uncle had begun sending remittances to help pay for her treatment and care, however, he had been freed to contribute to his union including the organisation of protests. This is an interesting case because Muhammed did not receive financial remittances directly; they were sent to his mother but still had the effect of allowing him to participate politically.

Not all the interviewees who engaged in political activities believed there to be a link between their participation and the remittances they received. Wajd, whose brother worked as a teacher in Dubai, was one of two interviewees to have reported taking part in protests and demonstrations as part of the Arab Spring in 2011 (although he added that he did not seek the toppling of the king).[4] He did not see a relationship, however, between his receipt of remittances and his decision to take part in protests. As he stated:

> "My family is doing well compared to most other families, and my brother sends money home to us, which helps. I mean, we are not wealthy, but we are not the poorest. But I know many others who are in a worse position, who go to the streets (to protest) because they cannot live any more. I marched because I believe in change, and I believe things should get better, can get better, and in solidarity with those who have nothing."

In Wajd's conception, it is the poor who should take part in protests because they have the most to gain (or least to lose). Remittances had made Wajd's family relatively wealthy and so should reduce their desire to protest. It is interesting to note that the analysis of the Arab Barometer data reported in Chapter 6 showed there to be little relationship

[3]Jordan has seen a recent rise in the organisational activities of independent trade unions, including those representing day labourers, which formed a new umbrella federation (the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Jordan) in 2013 to challenge the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions. See Adely (2012) for more information on labour activism in Jordan.

[4]For an analysis of the limited and largely pro-monarchy Arab spring protests in Jordan, see Tobin (2012).

between income and political participation, which suggests that poorer people do not, in fact, protest more. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Wajd pointed to poverty as a key driver of protest. Despite denying that remittances played any role in his activism, Wajd did note that family migration had played a role; if his brother had still been a teacher in Jordan, Wajd would have been worried that he could have lost his job due to family participation in protests.

Another interviewee whose broader experience of family migration mattered more for their activism than the receipt of remittances was Rasheed, who had taken part in explicitly political protests about corruption in government. While he did not draw a direct association between remittances and his attendance at these protests, he identified corruption as the reason that Jordan could not provide the same level of social welfare benefits as the USA, where he had family. This points to a potential social remittance causal mechanism linking remittances with increased political participation.

Musa, whose father worked in the UAE, also participated in the 2011 protests, although he was initially tentative about ascribing this and his political activism in the Islamic Action Front (IAF) to remittances. He had joined the IAF after his experience of protesting (which he described as a "political awakening") because they appeared to be the most effective opposition force in the country. His initial account of the reasons for his participation focused on the catalyst of his first involvement in political protest and did not afford a role to remittances. When asked to reflect on whether he could be as politically active if his father did not send money home earned in his job as the manager of a clothing shop in Dubai, Musa suggested that he would have to take greater care of his mother. His fathers' remittances allowed his mother to live a comfortable lifestyle, including the employment of a domestic servant from the Phillipines. Without this, Musa believed that he would have to spend more time helping his mother and therefore less time on his political activism. He thus concluded,

> "It might be fair to say, although I did not think like this before, that remittances did help me with the IAF, I mean to be involved. But I do not support

> the IAF because of remittances, I would do so even if my father was still here (in Jordan). So they help, but they are not the main reason."

Musa's story shows us that there is no simplistic relationship between remittances and political participation; receiving money from abroad does not instantly create a politically engaged citizen ready to protest against an autocratic regime in the cause of democracy. Rather, remittances can provide extra impetus to an already-existing desire to participate politically. Remittances are not the primary reason for a recipient to engage in protests, union organising or charity work,[5] but they can make it more likely by providing extra resources, income security and feelings of duty to help those who are worse off. We have also seen that social remittances may help to foster political participation, and it is to this issue that we now turn our attention.

9.5 Social Remittances in Jordan

The simplest form of a social remittance related to political norms would be direct communication by a migrant with a family member in their home country about political structures in the country to which they had migrated. As we might expect, however, migrants did not directly transmit political norms in praise of democratic or authoritarian political systems through direct communication in this way. While nearly all of the interviewees reported regular communication with the family member who sent them remittances, none of them said that they had discussed the political systems of the migration destination. Instead, political remittances were sent through comparisons of migrant family members' experiences of life and interactions with communities and institutions in the country to which they had migrated with Jordan, reinforced by the demonstration effect of receiving financial remittances.

[5] There was a strong gender dimension to the civic and political engagement of the interviewees: the female interviewees who reported participation all discussed volunteering for charitable organisations, while the male interviewees' engagement was more explicitly political, involving trade unions, political parties and protests.

9.5.1 Social Remittances from Remitters in Western Countries

The interviewees were each asked about their impressions of the countries from which they received remittances, what they approved and disapproved of and whether they thought that Jordan could emulate anything from them. None of the interviewees mentioned the concept of 'democracy' or elections as a key positive or negative factor about the country from which they received remittances. The vast majority of accounts of Western institutions were positive, however, with particular praise for the quality of public services, equality of treatment and lack of corruption.

Manara spoke in glowing terms of Sweden: "The Swedes are wonderful people, and their country works so well. In Jordan, nothing works, the government is corrupt and does not help the people." Manara particularly praised the Swedish welfare state and unemployment support. Her brother worked as a mechanic and had not needed to access these particular welfare services in the seven years since he had migrated to the country, although he had been provided with free language and integration classes. It is notable that Manara contrasted the positive aspects of Sweden with her negative impression of the Jordanian government's provision of social services in Jordan.

Positive opinions of Sweden's system of welfare support are not too surprising, but less expected was Rasheed's positive impression of the "social insurance" that was found in the USA but not Jordan or Yemen (where his family originated). Rasheed had three cousins in the USA who sent him regular remittances to help pay for his education. He believed that "You don't have to worry about being destitute there (in the USA). In Yemen and Jordan, your family will help you but if they can't, what can you do? In America, it does not matter who you are, you will get help if you need it." While praise of the USA's social safety net seems surprising to European ears, it was considered by Rasheed to be an important attribute.

Many of the interviewees with remitters in Western democratic countries held negative opinions of life and institutions in Jordan compared with those interviewees who received remittances from other Arab countries. As Laila said, "Life in the USA is much better.

Do you think people in the USA would rather come back here (to Jordan)? I don't think so ... People who are here are miserable." Specific services were compared between Jordan and migration destinations. Abbas saw German schools (where his grandchildren were taught) as providing reliably good education unlike the uneven nature of Jordanian education where "(y)ou might have a good teacher, but not all the teachers are good," particularly in government-run schools. He attributed the poor quality of the Jordanian education system to underinvestment and cronyism endemic in the hiring of teachers. Germany did not have these problems, resulting in much better schools.

In addition to the quality of public services, some interviewees discussed what they perceived as a greater equality of treatment received by those in Western democratic states. Rasheed, discussed above, liked the fact that social insurance was available to anybody who needed it in the USA. Reem praised Australia's police system, referring to an incident in which her son's business was targeted in a robbery. She noted that, in Jordan, "you can only get help if you have connections." In Australia, by contrast, "the police were very helpful ... they help everyone" regardless of their social position. Hassan likewise praised the British police who had helped his taxi driver son on a number of occasions with drunk and disorderly passengers. He spoke highly of the impartiality of the British police, which he considered to be very different from the corrupt practices of the Jordanian police.

Similar ideas about equality of treatment in democratic countries was articulated more generally by Muhammed, who had an uncle in Chicago and held a very positive view of the United States. In comparison with Jordan, where "you must have connections to make something of yourself," the United States "is an open society and you are appreciated for your work." He compared the rather negative view of the US that he had previously held based on what he had seen on TV and in movies with what he 'knew' now that he had family there; his new view was far more positive than before. This provides evidence that a change in norms can occur through the migration of family members.

Negative political social remittances could be transmitted through migrants' experiences of discrimination. If a migrant tells stories of poor treatment at the hand of governments or people in a certain region, this could negatively effect the assessment of that country's culture and political system amongst remittance recipients in their homeland. There were surprising few negative stories told by interviewees about the experience of their family members in Western democracies. The only overall negative report of life in a democratic country was that of Maha, whose husband worked in a clothes shop in the United States. The negative impressions she gave were, however, mostly related to a downgrade in her husband's social status, from business owner in Jordan to employee abroad, rather than a dislike for the country itself.

Another negative account was Abbas' daughter's experience of discrimation in Berlin, where "(l)ately, after all the terrorist attacks and ISIS, she has encountered some more problems because she is veiled. People point at her and it makes her self-conscious. They are annoying her because of the veil." But Abbas went on to explain that "this is only a recent thing because of ISIS" and that, overall, Germans are "good-natured" and that his daughter "is really happy in Germany." Remarkably, this was the only mention any of the interviewees in Jordan made of discrimination in a Western country, and Abbas understood it as a short-term reaction to current world events rather than something regularly faced by Jordanian migrants. His broadly positive view of German culture and political institutions did not appear to be affected by his daughter's experience of being picked out on the street due to her wearing of the veil.

The relative lack of negative stories told by migrants to Western countries was surprising, and may reflect a desire not to dwell on negative experiences by discussing them with family members. Nevertheless, this reflects something about the nature of social remittances sent by migrants in democratic countries to Jordan: they are overwhelmingly positive about institutions in democratic states. While 'democracy' as a concept was never articulated as the cause of the differences between Western countries and Jordan, there was a clear desire amongst the interviewees for non-corrupt, equal access and high quality institutions they believed to exist in Western democratic states.

9.5.2 Social Remittances from Remitters in the Gulf

The social remittances received by interviewees with family members in Gulf countries were very different. The positive aspects of life in the Gulf were mostly described as financial. As Mahmoud, whose two sons worked in Kuwait and Dubai, stated, "It is all about the money; maybe they don't have the social life they would have if they were here (in Jordan), but if they were here they wouldn't have any job or any money." Tahirah, whose husband had settled permanently in Saudi Arabia, noted that "people in the Gulf get paid a lot more than they would get paid for the same job here in Jordan." The large number and wide range of employment opportunities for Jordanians in the Gulf was also described by a number of other respondents, including Aisha and Hamid who had relatives in the UAE and Kuwait.

The Gulf states' wealth was often explained as a result of oil. As Fatima stated, "they have the oil money to spend and so they have a lot of projects and the people are wealthy." This makes it hard for Gulf states to be models of development for Jordan; Fatima said simply that "Jordan can't be rich like Saudi Arabia because we do not have the oil." Mukhtar was equally clear that the reason for Saudi Arabia's relative prosperity compared with Jordan was a result of the presence of natural resources and not due to government policies: "Everything there (in Saudi Arabia) comes from oil. The money, the jobs, the buildings, they all come because of oil. And the migrants go there because of the oil ... Without oil, they would be nothing." Recipients whose family members had been abroad for a long time could also make inter-temporal comparisons. Tahirah noted that, while Saudi Arabia is certainly richer than Jordan, life there "is not as easy as it used to be," during the oil boom years when her husband had first migrated. Tahirah believed that it was still possible for Jordanians to migrate to Saudi Arabia for better salaries but that it was more difficult than in earlier time periods.

Mukhtar described Saudis as "lazy" because they could live a comfortable life as a result of the oil wealth. His description of Saudis echoed the arguments of Beblawi (1987) who coined the term "rentier mentality" to describe the effect of oil rents on entrepeneurialism and innovation in rentier states:

> "They (the Saudis) don't have to work for money. They have an easy life, a good life, without trying. In Jordan, we must struggle to survive, but it is not like that in Saudi. When a Jordanian goes to Saudi, he will work relentlessly to earn money for his family. But if you are born in Saudi, you have an easy life, and you never understand the need to work hard."

A number of other negative views of Gulf states were expressed by the interviewees. On social issues, Tahirah described Saudis as "backward and very conservative; they have a different mentality (from Jordanians), they are very close-minded." Zayna expressed similar sentiments: "they (Saudis) are very religious, very conservative, too much I think. In Jordan, we are more open-minded, not everyone but most people. It can be difficult for Jordanians who move to Saudi because they have a different mindset," although she thought it was easier once you had lived for a longer amount of time in another country. Aisha also felt that Saudi Arabia, where her son had initially migrated to, was "too strict, especially for women," and did not want Jordan to adopt similar attitudes. She considered the UAE, where her son now worked, to be comparatively liberal in addition to being economically prosperous, and she expressed that she would be happy for Jordan to develop along Emirati lines. Musa, however, disliked the political oppression that he saw in the UAE (where his father worked) where "it is not possible to speak your mind ... They do not permit opposition." While the Jordanian political system was not free "we can at least express ourselves, make ourselves heard, for example in elections and in other ways too." This was likely related to his activism in the IAF, which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The MB's affiliate in the UAE, al-Islah, is proscribed by the Emirati government and has been the target of a crackdown in recent years (Freer, 2017).

Interviewees who related particularly bad experiences for their relatives abroad included Rana, whose husband worked as a pilot in Iraq. Iraq was so unsafe that Rana's husband had to live in a fortified compound within the airport. In her view, "the country (Iraq) is a mess." In Rana's case, Jordan was a comparatively good place to live, unlike the country in which her husband resided. This was unusual; most interviewees saw other countries as having higher standards of living than Jordan and can be explained by the uncommon migration destination. Iraq is home to only 8,000 Jordanians despite being a richer and neighbouring country to Jordan and Jordan's high emigration rate. It is important to note, however, that Rana's husband had not chosen to migrate to Iraq; it was where he had been posted by his employer.

Wajd compared Jordan's political institutions positively with the United Arab Emirates, where his brother worked as a teacher. Emiratis, in his view, had very little freedom to make their voices heard by their government. In Jordan, by contrast, "we can speak out. We can go to the streets. We can vote. It is very different from the Emirates." On the other hand, Wajd did not see any reason why most Emiratis would want to be politically active because they were all "very wealthy ... because of the oil" and had good public services. As discussed earlier, Wajd believed that it was the poor who had the most reason to protest against their government; it was therefore unlikely, in his eyes, that Emiratis would have cause to take part in political action.

Comparing the interviews of those with family members in authoritarian Gulf countries with those who receive remittances from Western democratic countries reveals very different themes. While there was respect for the institutions of democratic states, the main positive aspect of authoritarian countries identified by the interviewees was their greater wealth, which was largely attributed to the impact of oil. There was little desire amongst the interviewees for Jordan to emulate aspects of Gulf culture or political systems which were thought by many to be overly conservative.[6] While there was no detectable authoritarian norm diffusion in which anti-democratic views were transmitted from authoritarian states by migrants, the generally negative attitudes expressed by the interviewees about political institutions in the Gulf made the Jordanian political system seem comparably better. This was most fully articulated by Wajd who contrasted the freedoms in Jordan with the lack of political voice of Emiratis.

[6]This contrasts with the findings of Karakoc, Kose and Ozcan (2017) that Egyptian migrants transmit conservative religious and political norms back home from Gulf states.

9.5.3 Social Remittances from Multiple Remitters

Particularly interesting comparisons could be heard from those who had relatives in both Western countries and the Gulf. Saleha had a son in Saudi Arabia and a son and daughter in the United States. In her view:

> "You can't compare Saudi with the USA. There is much more liberty in the States, you have your own life. But in Saudi, you don't have your own life, it's very conservative. Women do not have freedom. The only good thing about Saudi is the money. It's only money and good salaries, but there is zero life. It doesn't even matter if you live in a palace, there is no life."

In Saleha's view, Jordan was "more free than Saudi but not as free as the United States." While Saleha preferred the life in United States, she considered herself too old to move, but hoped that Jordan would become freer in the future. Saleha's views appear to have been influenced by the experiences of her relatives: "they treat us (Jordanians) as foreigners in Saudi ... (we) don't have rights there." This contrasted strongly with her positive view of the United States, where her daughter was living. Saleha saw the United States as a country in which everyone had the same rights, no matter their national or ethnic background. The difference that Saleha perceived between the treatment of Jordanian migrants in Saudi Arabia and the United States surprised her; Jordanians were Arabs, just as Saudis were, while they were clearly part of an ethnic minority group in the United States. Nevertheless, her daughter had not discussed any instances of discrimination related to her status as a member of a migrant and minority community. This is not to say that Saleha's daughter had not experienced any form of discrimination, but the important thing to note is that Saleha was not aware of any such instances while she was aware of poor treatment of her son as a migrant in Saudi Arabia.

Fatinah's immediate family had moved to both the UAE (her husband) and Australia (her two sons). She had much more positive view of Australia than the UAE in terms of both how well-run the country was and the attitude of the people towards migrants. The

Australian government treated "everyone the same" such that there are "opportunities for everyone," while the Emiratis "just use the migrants." While both countries were clearly more prosperous than Jordan, leading to the migration of all of her close family, the reasons were very different. The UAE's wealth was a result of oil, while Australia's prosperity was a result of "hard work" and "organisation." The UAE was not a model of development for Jordan: "I don't think Jordan could ever be like the Emirates because there is no oil here." But, while it was unlikely to happen in her lifetime, Fatinah hoped that "we could become more like Australia."

Saleha's and Fatinah's comparisons of democratic and authoritarian countries from which they had received social remittances reinforce many of the narratives told by remittance recipients about the countries to which their family members had migrated. Western democratic countries are viewed positively as having greater freedom and social equality, while authoritarian Gulf countries are considered too conservative.

9.6 Jordanian Migrants' Choice of Destination

One potential confounding issue in discussions of the role of migration and remittances in both political participation and ideational change is that of the self-selection of migration destinations. More liberal and democratic migrants may choose to live, work and send remittances from countries with democratic institutions and vice versa, which could make any findings about differences between those who receive remittances from authoritarian and democratic countries less of a story about the impact of remittances and more about a selection effect. Indeed, Kessler and Rother (2016) identify some selection effects while comparing return migrants to the Phillipines from both authoritarian countries like Saudi Arabia and democratic countries such as Taiwan and Japan. While this is likely to be more of a problem when discussing migrants themselves, as Kessler and Rother do, migrants' political outlook may be shaped in part by their families who receive remittances. To investigate the extent of self-selection in Middle East migration, I asked the interviewees why they believed family members had decided to migrate to the particular country they had moved to.

Selection effects did not appear to play much of a role in those cases of women who migrated to different countries because they married a Jordanian migrant to the Gulf or Europe. This was the case for Abbas' daughter, who married an Arab German who she had met while he was visiting Jordan, and Zayna's aunt whose husband had been a Jordanian migrant to Saudi Arabia. Other cases in which selection effects to not appear to be much of a problem were those in which the migrants did not have a particular country in mind to go to when they decided to work abroad. Mahmoud described how his two sons both trained as software developers and then looked for opportunities around the world. While both ended up in the Gulf region (one in Kuwait and one in Dubai), this had been a result of where there happened to be good job opportunities in their particular fields. Reem put her sons' migration to Australia down to "luck ... They just had an opportunity." They had not sought out a particular country, whether in the Arab world or the West. They had applied for jobs in multiple regions and took the best offers that they were made.

Reem's sons had moved together, and pre-existing family networks played an important role in many of the migration stories. For example, all three of Ahmed's children now live in London. The first to move was his daughter, who had married a London-based Lebanese man. She then persuaded one of her brothers to move to the same city to study; he later dropped out but stayed in London because he found that he could easily make money as a barber. When her younger brother was considering migration two decades later, London was the natural choice because it was where his two siblings already were. Similarly, Hassan's son decided to move to the UK because he had cousins who had already established themselves in Birmingham. Hassan's son had considered migrating to a country in the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia or the UAE, but ultimately believed that the UK would be an easier destination to get established in because of his family connections and proficiency in English. Bahira's three children were all in Australia. The first to migrate was her daughter, who married a distant cousin who already lived in Australia; they met on one of his return trips. When her eldest son was planning to migrate in order to help the family financially, Australia was the natural place to go because his sister was already established there.

These stories about the importance of family connections are all related to remittances sent from Western countries. While the lack of a representative sample means that we cannot make firm conclusions based on the interview evidence, it does suggest that family networks may be more important in Jordanian migrants' decisions to move to Western countries rather than other Arab countries. It is also possible that moving to a Western country appears more difficult to those who have no experience of the West and that the perceived similarity in culture in other Arab countries makes them appear comparatively easier migration destinations. Alternatively, it may be a result of more 'cosmopolitan' families being more comfortable moving to countries with different cultures. Nevertheless, there is no clear evidence of a selection effect; none of the interviewees described political institutions as playing any role in migration decisions, althought this is an area that could benefit from further research.

Migrants' skills played a role in many of the interviewees' accounts of why their family member had chosen to migrate. Wajd's brother was a teacher and was recruited through a well-established scheme that sent Jordanian teachers to Gulf countries after they had accrued a certain number of years of experience teaching in Jordan (the number of years varies according to the subject taught). Samira's husband worked as a producer for a Jordanian TV station. A move to the Gulf was a natural progression in his career due to the development of an increasing number of satellite channels there. He first moved to Dubai to work for a newly-established station, before being offered his "dream" job at al-Jazeera in Doha. Rana's husband worked in Iraq, and had previously worked in Dubai because that was where he had been posted by the airline for which he worked. Before that, he had worked for a Jordanian airline, but he had been recruited by an Emirati airline that paid a significantly higher salary but gave him little choice in where he was posted. Aisha's son had moved to Saudi Arabia eight years before when an opportunity arose which was related to his work in business development for a Jordanian telecommunications firm. Similarly, he had moved on from Saudi Arabia to UAE when an even better opportunity arose.

Many of these stories appear to be cases of businesses and governments in the Gulf states explicity recruiting Jordanians with skills that they need.[7] Mukhtar's father followed a similar trajectory. He worked for an international firm that manufactured packaged food in Jordan. The firm had an opening for an experienced factory supervisor in a newly-opened facility in Saudi Arabia with a significantly higher wage than the equivalent position in Jordan; Mukhtar's father applied and was offered the position. While occupations may influence migration opportunities in addition to playing a role in political preference formation (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014), it is nevertheless difficult to see a causal path through occupation to political preferences to migration to social remittances that could confound the main findings on social remittances in this thesis.

Some migrants moved for a combination of reasons. Maha's husband had both a family network including cousins in the United States along with skills in retail management that would be useful in his cousins' clothes business. He had considered moving to the Gulf after hearing reports of high salaries, but Maha believed that it was difficult for older people to find opportunities in the Gulf. The idea that the Gulf countries were better for younger people was echoed by Fatinah. Her husband had moved there in late middle-age and found it difficult to adapt to the very different life while being away from his family.

A few migrants did make explicit migration choices based on what they already thought of their destination country. Manara's brother was attracted to Sweden by reports of their generous welfare system. When he arrived, he found that he did not need to access it himself because job opportunities were plentiful, which further increased his (and his family's) esteem for Sweden. When Fatinah's sons decided to migrate, they were

[7] In addition to occupational skills, language abilities also played a role in some migration decisions. Musa described how his father chose to migrate to another Arabic-speaking country because he could believed that he could more easily integrate and find work in countries in which he could speak the language.

so focused on Australia, “they didn’t even look elsewhere.” Fatinah was not sure why they were attracted to Australia, but thought that they had “seen about life in Australia on TV and decided it was the place for them.” In these cases, both of them to Western countries, it was clear that the migration destination was driven by pre-existing attitudes.

While some selection effects were found amongst the stories of migrants’ destination choices, the most important factors were pre-existing family networks and occupational skills. The country from which a remittance recipient is sent money is clearly not chosen at random. The main reasons for a remitter choosing a country, however, do not appear to be pre-existing political ideas. We can therefore tentatively accept the conclusions about social remittances found above and in Part II as being driven by the causal effect of remittances rather than selection effects. The non-random sampling of the interviewees in Jordan does mean, however, that future research is required on this topic.

9.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored how remittances affect the individuals and families who receive them. While the quantitative results presented in Part II give us an idea about the average effect of remittances on support for democracy, political participation, support for incumbent governments and economic assessments, the coefficients on the different variables tell us very little about the lived experience of receiving remittances and the precise causal mechanisms that link remittance receipt with various political phenomena.

While the lack of a representative sample should make us tentative about drawing definitive conclusions about the impact of migration and remittances at the individual level, we have nevertheless uncovered some useful nuance to the findings in the previous chapters. One key problem with studying the impact of remittances is untangling their effect from the more general impact of the migration of family members and the relationship between social and economic remittances. In the interviews with Jordanian remittance recipients, it became clear that remittances were the key to explaining increased political participation amongst recipients but that the transfer of norms was more due to the migration experience of family members. While financial remittances may increase the power of the norm diffusion of social remittances, this is not something that could be probed thoroughly with the interview research design. What is important, however, is that social and financial remittances had different effects which could reinforce each other. Those who received remittances from Western democratic countries had both positive views of government institutions in those countries (and could conceptualise change in their own country) through the social remittance channel and were more likely to engage in political participation through the income and economic security channels. Those who received remittances from Gulf countries, on the other hand, mostly had a neutral or negative views of institutions in the migration destination; the social remittances did not lead them to conceptualise better institutions for Jordan and some even compared Jordan's institutions positively compared with those of the migration destination. While they may also have been more likely to engage politically through the income and security channels, this was less likely to be done with the aim of pushing for political change. This reinforces the evidence that we have seen at the aggregate level in Part I and the individual level in Part II. Remittances from democratic countries create more politically engaged populations likely to push for political change and thus threaten authoritarian leaders. Remittances from authoritarian countries only have the effect of making recipients more likely to participate, which on its own is not enough to challenge incumbent authoritarian regimes. In the next chapter we will explore the case of Tunisia to see if similar patterns can be found.

Chapter 10

Remittances and Politics in Tunisia

Introduction

In this chapter, I turn to the case of remittances in Tunisia. Unlike Jordan, which has sent the majority of its emigrant workers to other Arab countries, Tunisia has traditionally looked to France and southern European countries as the main destinations for migration, although there has been an increase in migration to the Gulf since the turn of the millennium. Furthermore, while Jordan is a fully authoritarian regimes (even if carefully gerrymandered elections are held), Tunisia is in the midst of a democratic transition following the revolution of 2011 that saw mass protests toppling the long-term dictator Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali

This chapter will follow the same structure as the discussion of remittances in Jordan. I will begin by giving a brief overview of recent trends in remittance receipts in Tunisia, and in the second section I will describe the data collection and key information about the interviewees. In sections 3, 4 and 5, I will explore the effects of remittances on political participation and norm diffusion and explore what influenced migrants in their decision to migrate to particular destinations.

10.1 Remittances in Tunisia

The Tunisian economy has never been as dependent on remittances as that of Jordan, but migrants' financial transfers have nevertheless been an important source of foreign currency in Tunisia since the 1960s. By 1975, remittances were third only to tourist revenues and oil exports as a source of foreign capital inflow into Tunisia (Gildas, 1979). Migration was seen by the government as a useful 'safety valve' to reduce unemployment in the 1960s and 1970s, and in the Sixth Plan for Social and Economic Development (1982-1986) the government began to acknowledge remittances as a key resource for development.[1]



Figure 10.1: Remittances Received in Tunisia, 1980-2015

[1] See Brand (2006, 93-107) for a discussion of the development of the Tunisian government's emigration policy since independence.

Figure 10.1 plots migrant remittance receipts per capita into Tunisia from 1980 to 2015. Remittance inflows were largely flat from 1980-2000, but since the turn of the millennium they have increased rapidly. Remittances received more than doubled between 2000 and 2015.

Destination	Number of Tunisian Migrants
Europe	**1,032,412**
France	668,668
Italy	189,092
Arab World	**151,200**
Libya	68,952
Saudi Arabia	20,017
United Arab Emirates	19,361
Other Regions	**39,601**
Canada	20,350
Total	***1,223,213***

Table 10.1: Number of Tunisians Living Abroad by Region and Country, 2012

From which countries do remittances to Tunisia come? Table 10.1 shows the number of Tunisians resident abroad by migration destination. The majority of Tunisian migrants (55%) live in France, the former colonial power. Other European countries are the destination for a further 29% of Tunisians, with Italy being the most important European country other than France. Italy became more popular as a destination for Tunisians in the 1980s due to its geographical closeness and easier immigration procedures compared with France. Only 12% of the Tunisian diaspora lives in other Middle Eastern countries, although this is the fastest-growing region for Tunisian migration. The largest destinations in the MENA region are Libya, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, although it is likely that the number of Tunisians in Libya has declined following the post-revolutionary violence since the ouster of Muammar Ghaddafi in 2011. The only significant population of Tunisian migrants outside Europe and MENA is in Canada, likely due to its French-speaking provinces.

Table 10.2 reports the differences in characteristics between Tunisians who do and do not receive remittances drawn from the Arab Barometer survey, in which 4% of Tunisian respondents reported receiving remittances. The largest differences are in income, education level and living in an urban or rural area. The average income of remittance recipients was 86% higher than non-recipients, and 38% of recipients had completed post-secondary education against 16% of non-recipients. The rural/urban divide in remittances is most likely caused by the greater propensity of urbanites to migrate compared with those who live in rural areas.

	Non-recipients	Remittance recipients	Difference
Female	49%	54%	+6
Urban	65%	79%	+14
Unmarried	35%	44%	+9
Unemployed	18%	17%	-1
Post-secondary education	16%	38%	+22
Age	40	42	+2
Household income (US$)	$426	$791	+$365
Member of civil society organisation	9%	17%	+8

Table 10.2: Comparison of Characteristics between Remittance Recipients and Non-recipients in Tunisia

Tunisian remittance recipients are also more likely to be female, unmarried, older and a member of a civil society organisation and slightly less likely to be unemployed compared with non-recipients. The comparison of characteristics between recipients and non-recipients in Tunisia shows similar patterns to the MENA region as a whole as discussed in Chapter 5.

How has the 2011 revolution affected migration and remittances in Tunisia? Natter (2015) argues that migration and political change in Tunisia were strongly related:

> "The economic crisis in Europe, resulting in lower tourism and declining exports, as well as the tightening of immigration and border controls, reduced both job prospects at home and migration opportunities for Tunisians. This reinforced the discontent of the country's educated youth. At the same time, the underlying causes of the revolution - rising unemployment, spreading poverty, and political repression - fueled Tunisians' emigration aspirations."

After the fall of the Ben Ali regime in 2011, there was a spike in irregular migration across the Mediterranean due to the temporary collapse of border security. The worsening political situation in Libya meant that many Tunisians were forced to return home, however, so the overall impact of the Arab uprisings is unclear, although we do know that remittances per capita increased in every year between 2012 and 2015 following a drop in 2011.

10.2 Data Collection

In total, 33 interviews were held with remittance recipients in Tunisia during fieldwork in March-April 2015 and August 2016. As with the interviews in Jordan, all interviewees were offered anonymity and their names have been changed. The interviewees were found using the networks of a local journalist and an official in the Office for Tunisians Abroad, along with additional snowball sampling. The majority of interviewees were based in Tunis due to resource constraints that prevented the collection of a more geographically representative sample. Five interviews were also held with Tunisian governmental officials with responsibility for migration issues during the same periods of fieldwork. Table 10.3 summarises key information about the interviewees and the remittances they receive.

The mean age of interviewees was 41, only one year younger than the mean age of remittance recipients recorded in the Arab Barometer data. The interview sample included more men (58%) than women (42%), the opposite of the gender split in the wider Tunisian population. This was largely because men in Tunisia are more likely to be willing to be interviewed by a foreign male researcher than Tunisian women.

The majority of the interviewees (67%) received remittances from family members in democratic European countries, while the remaining 33% of interviewees received remittances from Gulf countries. The top migration destination was France, from where thirteen of the interviewees received money. The other countries from which remittances were received were: Italy (five), Saudi Arabia (four), the United Arab Emirates (four), Qatar (three), the UK (two), Switzerland and Germany (one each).

Name	Age	Relationship with remittance sender	Destination of remittance sender	Length of time abroad	Work of remittance sender	Remittance frequency	Other family abroad?
Abdullah	48	Brother	Italy	18 years	Circus owner	Quarterly	Nephew in the United States
Abdulwahab	24	Grandson	France	56 years	Construction	Monthly	-
Abia	45	Mother	France	8 years	Finance	Occasional	-
Fadil	25	Nephew	Italy	15 years	Factory worker	Occasional	-
Fadilah	29	Daughter	France	18 years	Factory worker	Monthly	-
Farid	23	Nephew	UK	12 years	Taxi driver	Monthly	-
Hadya	58	Mother	France	9 years	Retail	Monthly	Daughter in UAE
Hakim	34	Nephew	Italy	16 years	Factory worker	Every 4-6 months	Two uncles also in Italy
Haroun	27	Cousin	France	10 years	Factory worker	Annually	-
Hasna	31	Daughter	France	15 years	Factory worker	Quarterly	-
Houcem	20	Brother	France	6 years	Engineer	Quarterly	Sister in Belgium

Jabbar	29	Cousin	Qatar	10 years	Finance	Monthly	Other cousins in Singapore, France, Canada and Germany
Jamahl	48	Brother	Italy	26 years	Journalist	Occasional	Sister in France
Jamila	61	Mother	UAE	5 years	Retail	Monthly	Daughter in Qatar
Kalila	44	Wife	UAE	4 years	Taxi driver	Monthly	-
Kamal	25	Cousin	UK	4 years	Hotel manager	Quarterly	Uncle in UK, cousin in Qatar
Khalidah	62	Mother	France	18 years	Construction	Monthly	-
Lina	56	Mother	Saudi Arabia	6 years	Teacher	Occasional	Brother in UAE
Mahir	45	Cousin	Qatar	5 years	Teacher	Quarterly	Sister in France
Marid	60	Father	Saudi Arabia	5 years	Office worker	Monthly	-
Maysa	37	Wife	Saudi Arabia	4 years	Factory worker	Monthly	-
Muriel	42	Wife	France	8 years	Office worker	Monthly	Brother in Saudi Arabia
Nada	65	Mother	UAE	10 years	Nurse	Monthly	Two other daughters in UAE and Qatar, sister-in-law in France

Nasim	19	Brother	Germany	3 years	IT engineer	Occasional	-
Nowa	54	Mother	Italy	16 years	Factory worker	Occasional	-
Omaira	49	Mother	UAE	7 years	Nurse	Quarterly	-
Omar	63	Father	France	10 years	Factory worker	Quarterly	Brother also in France
Qaseem	28	Son	Saudi Arabia	15 years	Office worker	Monthly	-
Rahimat	29	Brother	France	4 years	Engineer	Occasional	-
Wasim	23	Son	Qatar	3 years	Doctor	Quarterly	-
Zahir	58	Father	Switzerland	5 years	Teacher	Quarterly	Other sons in Switzerland and UAE
Zahrah	38	Daughter-in-law	France	30 years	Construction	Monthly	Cousins in Canada and Qatar
Zaki	68	Cousin	France	55 years	Construction	Monthly	-

Table 10.3: Interviewees in Tunisia



Figure 10.2: Interviewees by Gender in Tunisia

A notable difference between those remitters in European countries compared to those in other Arab countries was the length of time they had been away. Those who had migrated to a European country had a mean length of stay of sixteen years, while those who had migrated to an Arab country had stayed on average for seven years. This reflects the greater likelihood of permanent settlement of Tunisian migrants in European countries which usually offer a path to citizenship to migrants. Those Tunisians who migrate to the Gulf usually do so on short-term labour contracts of up to five years with the intention of returning to Tunisia at the end of the contract; there are few paths to citizenship in the Gulf other than marriage. The difference in length of time abroad may also be partly a result of the relatively new trend for Tunisians to seek migration to the Gulf; only since the turn of the millennium have significant numbers of Tunisians migrated to Gulf countries.



Figure 10.3: Destination of Primary Remittance Senders in Tunisia



Figure 10.4: Relationship of Interviewees with Remittance Senders in Tunisia



Figure 10.5: Frequency of Remittance Receipt amongst Interviewees in Tunisia

None of the interviewees received remittances or had any family members living in Libya, despite this being the primary destination in the Arab world for Tunisians according to the data presented above. Those data are from 2012, however, so it may be that there are substantially fewer Tunisians in Libya after the recent political tensions there.

A third of the Tunisian interviewees received remittances from their children, the same proportion as the interviewees in Jordan. Other interviewees received remittances from their parents (five), siblings (five), cousins (five), spouses (three, all husbands), uncles (three) and grandparents (one). A majority (73%) of the interviewees received remittances either monthly or quarterly, indicating that remittances were a regular source of income. For the remaining 27%, remittances were received less often and were not a primary source of income.

10.3 Remittances and Political Participation in Tunisia

In Chapter 6, we found that remittances increased political participation, and in the previous chapter we saw that remittances influence Jordanian recipients' political participation through extra resources (both money and time), income security and feelings of civic responsibility to help those less fortunate. Similar themes came through in the interviews with Tunisian remittance recipients.

Abdullah, who received money from his brother in Italy, was clear about the effect of remittances on his capacity for civic participation: "the money I received allowed me to do more." He described himself as someone who was very keen to contribute to civil society, and discussed his volunteer work in community and sports organisations and a "dialogue organisation" which brought "people together from across political divides, across religious divides." His participation in the latter organisation began after the 2011 revolution which brought down the long-standing authoritarian ruler Ben Ali and meant that Tunisians "have more ability now to be involved in this kind of civil society, which I think is good even if can be a bit noisy. I mean there are a lot of people with different ideas who want to make themselves heard." Abdullah's was a clear-cut case of an interviewee who identified remittances as allowing him to be more involved in civic and political life, although it is important to note that he appeared to have an underlying desire to participate.

Abdulwahab similarly expressed that remittances have helped him to be involved with an organisation called Jasmine (named after the 'Jasmine Revolution' of 2011) which promotes Tunisians "living in harmony with each other and nature." He believed that the work of Jasmine was important to combat a problem he perceives of a "lack of communication between the government and people ... We make sure there is a line of communication," and he regularly attended meetings and did volunteer advocacy work for the organisation. Abdulwahab suggested that "if I did not receive the money from my grandfather, I would have to work more and I would not have the time to be involved, but I think that it is very important." Thus remittances provided Abdulwahab with the resources (extra time) that he needed to be involved with a political NGO.

Zahir was an active member of Ennahda (Renaissance), joining the party when it held power after the first post-revolution elections. He attributed his political participation both to resources and to the opening up of the political system after the 2011 revolution: "I do well because I work and my wife works and I receive money from my sons, so I have time to be involved with politics. I love politics, especially now we have freedom after the revolution." In his mind, it is those who have greater resources who can devote themselves more to political activities. Remittances were one of his sources of income, alongside his and his wife's work, and so could be seen as contributing to the resources that allowed him to be active in the political party he supported.

Wasim was not involved in any political organisations, but he did mention that "because (my father) sends money, we have more than we need, so we can use this money to do extra things that other people can't do." He gave the example of a sports club that he and his brother would not have been able to participate in if they had not received money from their father who worked in Qatar. Abdullah, Abdulwahab and Zahir clearly had an underlying desire to be involved in political organisations, while Wasim was much more interested in sport than politics. Remittances had allowed all four of them to devote extra time to their interests; remittances did not change their willingness to be involved with different organisations, but did change their ability to do so.

The four interviewees discussed above conceived of the economic benefits of remittances as increasing their resources of time and money. Farid, whose family received remittances from his uncle who worked as a taxi driver in Birmingham, discussed remittances as a form of insurance:

> "It is a comfort to know that there is someone to support you whenever you are in need. You just have this feeling of insurance, it's like an insurance policy. When you don't have to worry about some issues, you have free time to think about ... doing things other than ensuring you have enough money to live."

He gave the example of his mother who had suffered "an accident and we didn't have enough money to pay the hospital so we were trapped. If we didn't have him (my uncle, sending remittances from) there, I don't know how it would go because the surgery fees are so high." Farid was involved in student politics and had been involved in numerous demonstrations against the influence of salafists in universities.[2] He claimed that remittances had allowed him to both continue his education and to be involved in student political organisations. Without remittances, he would have had to find work in order to support his family and ensure that they could cope financially with future emergencies. He would not have the time or energy to be involved in civic or political life. This is an illustration of how the economic security provided by remittances can help to increase the political participation of recipients.

An interesting example of the effects of changes in the amount of money received through remittances was the story of Jamahl, who wanted to be involved with civic organisations and political activity and had been active in the trade union movement in the past. Jamahl and his family had long received remittances from his brother, a journalist in Italy. A few years previously, however, his brother had lost his job at a newspaper and was now earning significantly less as a freelancer; the amount of money he sent back to his family in Tunisia was correspondingly reduced. Jamahl no longer had time to be involved in his trade union because he had to "make sure my family is provided for" now that they could not rely on remittances for their income. Jamahl's story offers a perspective on how a reduction in remittances can lead to a lower likelihood of being involved in political activities.

The greater income and security provided by remittances can help recipients to be involved in civic and political activities directly by increasing the resources they have available. The greater income can also have an indirect effect by fostering the sense that recipients have gained an advantage and so have a duty to help those less well off. Khalidah, whose son sent regular remittances from Marseille, was involved in a charity that helped the poor during Eid and other festivals. She attributed her involvement in

[2]For accounts of the rise and fall of the salafist movement in post-revolutionary Tunisia, see Cavatorta (2015) and Merone (2017).

part to a feeling that the remittances had helped her to live “a good life, a better life than many people who are struggling.” Farid made similar remarks, stating that “those who receive remittances are more concerned about improving other people’s lives like their life has improved.” Khalidah and Farid both felt comparatively better off than others in society due to their receipt of remittances and so were both more willing and more able to contribute to civic organisations.

While the role of increased resources in linking remittances with political participation was prominent in many of the interviews, other interviewees suggested a social remittance effect. Kamal, whose family received money from his cousin who worked as a hotel manager in London, argued that:

> “Having money from abroad doesn’t necessarily imply you will be involved in civic organisations or that you are going to be democratic or whatever. But people who have family abroad tend to be more open-minded ... because they are influenced by their lifestyle abroad, and these people are very close to you and they become more open-minded, more European style, you are going to be interested in that and you are going to try to see differently.”

Kamal himself was active in an environmentalist organisation, which he put down to a “personal commitment” to the cause rather than any money received from family abroad.

Omar, whose son and brother were both working in France, was a member of Ennahda’s most important political opponent, Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia), a secularist party that won a plurality of seats in the legislature in the 2014 parliamentary elections. While he attributed his political activism primarily to a desire to defend Tunisia’s secularist tradition against Ennahda and other Islamist forces, Omar nevertheless saw a role for both social and financial remittances:

> “Those who have family in France think more like French people. The Tunisians have a history of being close to the French people. We believe in secularism (laicite), we believe in social progress ... Those who receive

money also have the means to make a change in the country. We want to help our country develop."

In Omar's view, those Tunisians who received financial remittances from France also received a particular political viewpoint, secularist and believing in 'social progress,' and were empowered to take action to promote it. Social and economic remittances thus work together to create receipients willing and able to try to bring about political change.

A viewpoint that combined both ideas of social remittances and a civic duty to help those less fortunate was offered by Qaseem, whose father had worked in Saudi Arabia for the past fifteen years:

> "People who receive remittances have knowledge of different types of life because their families are abroad. Also, they feel like their life has changed positively and so you want to help other people to achieve this. If I am going to a better way of life, then I should help others who do not have others working abroad. This is not always about money, sometimes information is more important. This is the aim of much activism and organisations, to be open minded and to disseminate information."

In Qaseem's view, those who received money from abroad were more likely to be open-minded because they had more knowledge about the world. They were also likely to feel wealthier than others who did not receive remittances, an effect shown on the aggregate level in Chapter 8 by the more positive pocketbook economic assessments given by remittance recipients. This led, in Qaseem's view, to an increased interest in helping others who had not been as economically lucky through political activism and voluntary work.

Nowa, whose son had worked in Italy for the past 18 years, offered a similar viewpoint. She claimed that Tunisians who had family members abroad had a "different mentality. We are more open and we want to help others ... We have more money, so we are able to help others." In her view, Tunisians who received remittances had both a greater inclination and a greater ability to contribute to civil society. When asked if this extended to political participation, Nowa said that she did "not like getting involved in politics, but I think others who have family in Italy and in other places might be involved in political parties or in protests or that kind of thing." The reason she gave for this was similar as for civic participation: those Tunisians who received remittances had a greater interest in improving conditions for society and could do more about it because they had access to extra resources.

Some of the interviewees thought that a combination of greater resources and changed political outlook could led remittance recipients to be more engaged in politics and society. Zahra, whose family was supported by her father-in-law's remittances from France, suggested two reasons why remittances increased civic and political participation. Firstly, "those people (who receive remittances) are more open because they have experience, they know what life is like outside Tunisia. This makes you more interested in different people and how they live and makes you want to help other people." Secondly, "people who receive remittances have more access to financial resources. This can allow them to do a lot of activities and to engage more within the civic organisations." She offered both of these reasons while considering how remittances had contributed to her decision to volunteer for charities which supported the poor in Tunisia.

Hasna was not involved in political activities herself but her husband was, and she believed that this was partly due to the remittances sent to her family by her father who lived in France. Hasna's husband had taken part in several protests since the 2011 revolution, firstly against Salafists and later against the Ennahda-led government. She gave two reasons why remittances could be linked to political activism. Firstly, people who receive remittances "have more money, so we are not always worried about working and finding money to pay for our food, our medicine, our living." Secondly, those who receive remittances "want to improve their country. Because we have help from our family in other countries, but most people do not. We feel we need to help our country get better." Similar to many of the other interviewees, Hasna felt that remittance recipients felt an obligation to be involved in political and civic activism because they were relatively well-off.

In Jordan, the majority of interviewees who were involved in political or civil activism or organisations saw remittances as contributing to such engagement through the provision of greater resources. Some also noted that remittance recipients felt a civic duty to help those less fortunate or be more open-minded as a result of the experience of having family members abroad. The same three narratives were offered by the Tunisian interviewees, but none of them emerged to be as dominant as the resources narrative was in Jordan. Neither of the interviewee samples was representative, so it is difficult to know whether this was a country-level difference, but it is nevertheless an interesting distinction that would be worth following up in future research using surveys with questions guided by the findings presented here.

10.4 Social Remittances in Tunisia

The Jordanian interviews described in the previous chapter revealed that social remittances transmitted by Jordanian migrants often comprised of comparisons between Jordan and migration destinations, with these comparisons gaining extra power from the demonstration effect of the receipt of money. Impressions of authoritarian Gulf countries were mostly negative, although this meant that some thought more positively about Jordan's political system as a result. Democratic Western countries were generally seen in a more positive light by remittance recipients who received money from them, and they were seen more as potential models for future social, political and economic development.

In Tunisia, there was a similar distinction between those who received remittances from Gulf countries and those who received money from the West. Unlike in Jordan, some Tunisian interviewees did discuss political democracy as something that they wanted Tunisia to emulate, possibly because this was the subject of greater social discussion in the context of the post-revolutionay democratic development in Tunisia.

10.4.1 Social Remittances from Remitters in Western Countries

Rahimat directly referenced democracy while discussing his brother's experiences in France. His brother had migrated to France in 2012, soon after the Tunisian revolution (although Rahimat insisted that these were not connected). He and his brother had extensively discussed the political situation in Tunisia and France, comparing the experiences of the Constituent Assembly elections in Tunisia in 2011 with the legislative and presidential elections that took place in France in 2012 soon after his brother had arrived to take up a job at a civil engineering firm. In France,

> "they are used to elections, they happen all the time. But for Tunisia it was new. I mean, we had them before under the dictator (Ben Ali), but they were not real. So it was interesting to see how they have elections in France. We (Tunisians) were very excited, it was the first time we could choose, and we did not know what to expect. The French have had their democracy for a long time, so many of them were not so passionate. But this meant that we had a lot of protests after the election, and they continued until the government could not continue ... In France, it is regular to have elections, so they know what to expect and how to behave and respect the winners. We (Tunisians) are learning."

Rahimat was referencing the protests that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali in February 2013 and the resignation of the Ennahda-led government in January 2014 following months of protests.[3] Rahimat seemed to approve of France's more consolidated democracy, in which governments served for the time for which they were elected without major protests. If Rahimat was a supporter of Ennahda, we might understand these ideas as stemming from his dislike at the forcing from power of his preferred party by large-scale protests. Interestingly, Rahimat did not describe himself as an Ennahda supporter (he preferred secularist parties, but was not a strong supporter of any particular

[3]For an account of Tunisian politics since the 2011 revolution, see Alexander (2016, Chapter 4).

party) so this does appear to be a genuine case of a wish to emulate countries with a consolidated democracy based on social remittances received from a family member in such a country.

Haroun also compared the political institutions of a destination country favourably with those of Tunisia. He had a positive impression of France, where he had “seen (his) cousin live a good life.” While he saw short-term economic problems “in France, you know that long-term, it will work out. They invest for the long-term; they have organisations and institutions which will help the people all the time.” This contrasted strongly, in his view, with the political and economic situation in Tunisia. It is interesting that Haroun ascribed long-term stability to institutions in France while alluding to the short-term nature of politics in Tunisia. It appears that the long history of democratic rule in France had made an impression on Haroun that the short period of democratic rule in Tunisia had not yet matched. Nevertheless, it made him supportive of further democratic development in Tunisia using France and other European countries as a model.

Abia also held a positive view of France based on her son’s experiences and her own occasional travels to see him. She stated that she had been “impressed by their (France’s) organisation and systems.” She also approved of the opportunities she believed that France offered to those who were willing to put in effort: “they (the French) treat people well ... They give importance to a man who works, who does his best.” The difference between France and Tunisia was stark for Abra: “Here (in Tunisia) nothing works properly. All Tunisians wish our country could be more like France, it is our model.” Here we have a clear wish for Tunisia to emulate a different country and to follow a European path of development. It is notable that Abra was very positive about French social and political life even though she complained bitterly about the bureaucracy and cost involved with obtaining a visa so that she could visit her son. She held a positive overall view of French culture and institutions even though she was very critical of the primary way in which she had interacted with the French state.

For Houcem, who had sisters in France and Belgium, the future of Tunisia also lay in development towards a European-style state: "The system in Tunisia is French so ... we will follow the European model." He did not approve of the political and economic system in Gulf countries where you could only be successful "through connections" or if you were a member of a royal family. He contrasted this with Europe where "you can achieve more without them (connections) compared to the Gulf." He himself hoped to follow his sisters in migrating to France but hoped that Tunisia would, in time, match the economic and political development of European countries such that Tunisians did not feel the need to migrate.

Omar, the Nidaa Tounes supporter with family in France, claimed that Tunisians with family members working in Europe received political norms from that country, as described above in the section on political participation. When asked about whether different kinds of social remittances were received by Tunisians with family members in the Gulf, he was dismissive. Tunisia had "nothing to learn from the Gulf countries ... They are backward and conservative. Some of our young people go there to work because of the money but they do not want the culture of the Gulf." This may reflect Omar's own point of view that France should be more of a model for Tunisia's future social and political development than the countries of the Gulf. It is notable, however, that Omar did not see social or financial remittances from the Gulf as helping Ennahda and other Islamist forces who he saw as being on the opposite side of the political divide.

As in the Jordanian interviews, few of the Tunisians interviewed mentioned racism or discrimination. Those who did mention these issues did not attribute them to a particular region of the world. Hakim mentioned that "there is racism everywhere in the world. Even in the Gulf some Tunisians face racist attacks." Nevertheless, he did not think it was a major problem. Likewise, Abdulwahab believed that recent terrorist attacks in France had led to a greater suspicion of Tunisians in France, while Kamal suggested that it had become more difficult for Tunisians to find work in Europe as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis. Both Hakim and Kamal still had a positive overall impression of Europe and believed that any recent change was due to short-term factors that would eventually be resolved.

Overall, the interviewees who received remittances from European countries had positive views of their family members' migration destinations, and many saw these democratic countries as models for future economic and social development. The social remittances in favour of strengthening Tunisia's nascent democratic institutions appeared to exert a stronger effect on the Tunisian interviewees than those in Jordan, although it is not clear whether this is because of Tunisia's status as a transitional democracy rather than an authoritarian regime or because of a closer cultural affinity between Tunisia and European countries, especially France.

10.4.2 Social Remittances from Remitters in the Gulf

Few of the Jordanians discussed in Chapter 9 appeared to receive social remittances from Gulf countries that made them see Gulf political systems as models for Jordan's development. Rather, the wealth of the Gulf was mostly attributed to oil, and a number of interviewees believed the Gulf to be too conservative. While this made some compare Jordan's institutions favourably, there did not appear to any clear evidence of authoritarian norm diffusion. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Tunisian interviewees, although the rejection of conservative Gulf social and cultural values was more pronounced.

The positive aspects of Gulf countries that were emphasised by the interviewees tended to revolve around money and the security it offered. Wasim, whose father worked as a doctor in Qatar, said:

> "People don't have to do hard work but just live the day for the day because they don't have to worry about money, because they have enough petrol and money, like they do in Tunisia. If you talk to someone in Tunisia, they will talk a lot about their future here, for example he will say "I don't know from where I will get money" and he will be worrying about this. But in Qatar, they know they will not have money problems, so they are more relaxed in their minds."

Wasim's mention of "petrol" is important. As with the Jordanian interviewees discussed in the previous chapter, many of the Tunisian interviewees mentioned the presence of oil in the Gulf as being the main reason why those countries were richer than Tunisia. Maysa was clear that oil had helped Saudi Arabia, where her husband had worked for the past four years, to achieve high levels of wealth. When asked whether Tunisia could develop in a similar way to Gulf countries, she responded that "the only reason the Saudis have all their wealth is because of the oil they can use. Tunisia must build other economies like factories and tourism." Maysa was looking forward to the return of her husband, who had one year remaining on a five-year contract. While her husband had been paid well during his time in Saudi Arabia, "it is not a good place to live. I could not live there because of the restrictions on women." She expressed disapproval of the conservative gender norms in Saudi Arabia and preferred the more liberal culture of Tunisia.

Omaira's daughter worked as a nurse in Abu Dhabi and was in the middle of her second 5-year contract. Her daughter had taken on a second contract because "the money is so good. When she finishes this contract, she will come home because she has made her money, enough money." While the UAE was a good place to earn money it was "not a good place to live," because Tunisians were not treated very well by Emiratis. Abu Dhabi was not a model for Tunisian's future development in Omaira's view: "Tunisia has a different culture to Abu Dhabi. They do not think like we do, they live for money." Jamila, reflecting on her son's experience in Dubai, went further in her disapproval of the way in which migrants were treated in the UAE: "the life of Tunisians in Dubai is a life of slavery." Kalila also criticised the treatment of Tunisians in UAE. While she appreciated the greater salary that her husband could earn as a taxi driver in Abu Dhabi compared with Tunisia, she felt that Tunisians were not treated with the respect they deserved as a fellow Arabs in an Arab country. She attributed the wealth of the UAE to oil, believing that the Emiratis were "lazy," unlike the hard-working migrants who worked to provide services for them.

Marid's son had worked in Saudi Arabia for the past five years. While Marid had previously seen Tunisia as much closer to other Arab countries than Europe, his son's experience had led him to see Tunisia as more of a middle ground between the Arab world and Europe. While Marid did not believe that Europeans respected the cultural and religious traditions of Tunisians, Arabs in the Gulf "do not know the true Islam. They are lazy and all they think about is money." He saw Tunisia as capable of developing a third way between the Gulf and Europe especially since the revolution had provided Tunisians with greater freedom to make their voices heard. Here we have a case of migration to and remittances from the Gulf leading to the opposite of authoritarian norm diffusion: Marid was more supportive of Tunisia's democratic development as a result of his son's migration to Saudi Arabia.

Some interviewees made comparisons between different Gulf countries to which their family members had migrated. Lina, who had relatives in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, felt that the latter was a much better place to live. In Saudi Arabia, where her son worked, there was nothing to do outside work and the society was very conservative. The UAE, in contrast, was "developing fast. There is so much there now. Before it was more like Saudi, but now it is a fast-rising place." When asked if the UAE could be a model for Tunisia's development, however, Lina was shocked. The UAE might be developing fast economically, but Lina thought that the society was much too conservative, particularly around issues of gender, and that the monarchy was an anachronistic political system. In her view, "you can only have a king if you are very, very rich, so that it doesn't matter." Lina was proud of Tunisia's history of republicanism and relative social freedom, as well as the more recent gains in political freedom since the revolution of 2011. It was clear that there were no pro-authoritarian or anti-democratic norms flowing from the Gulf to Tunisia.

10.4.3 Social Remittances from Multiple Remitters

Interviewees with family members in both Gulf and Western countries made some interesting and telling comparisons. Kamal, who had cousins in the UK and Qatar, was clear about which region he preferred:

> "If you have people in Europe, they make you want to be more European. But if you have people in Gulf, I have to say that Tunisians are not treated well in the Gulf. It's more like slavery; contemporary slavery because they think you are of a lower race. They think Tunisians are not Arabs, so you are just a servant for their rich, wealthy life, which I think is morally wrong. Money doesn't entitle people to have that power over you ... It's better in Europe, the influence is better; it gives you a good idea about these countries. That's why people are open-minded. Even religious people, I know some who have relatives abroad and they are quite open-minded and they can make a difference between government policies and people. But religious people who don't have people abroad, they have this dogma, they don't try to see things differently."

Here we have a clear statement of how social remittances to Tunisia differ by migration destination. Kamal had a clear dislike for the way of life in the Gulf, a region he had never visited but had learned about through his cousin in Qatar. He considered himself "open-minded" and associated this quality with Europe. He appeared to suggest that religiosity was associated with close-mindedness, but that the experience of having a relative in Europe would open up even those with high levels of religiosity. Kamal had definite opinions about the way he wanted Tunisia to develop. Even though he acknowledged that Europe was suffering from economic problems and that there had been an increase in anti-Muslim feeling in recent years, he wanted Tunisia to become more like a secular, democratic European state. One of the reasons he claimed that Qatar treated migrants so badly was that it had a monarchical political system which inculcated a sense of social hierarchy in Qataris with migrant workers at the bottom. He much preferred the European model of politics, which he characterised as one in which "everyone is equal, in society, in politics, in life. Everyone is treated the same by the government, everyone gets a vote, everyone can make their voice heard."

Zahir had sons in both Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates and made a telling comparison between the two countries:

> "(Switzerland) is clean and it is calm, there are no problems. In Switzerland they have freedom, that is why they are rich and their country is calm. Dubai is rich too, but that is because of oil. Tunisia is developing a new political system, we have more freedom now. But it is not complete, there is still corruption and many of the parties do not have the interests of the country in their hearts, only their own interests. I believe it will get better though. I think Tunisia will develop its own way. We will have the freedom of Europeans, but the religion of the Arabs."

It is interesting that Zahir dismissed the wealth of Dubai as a result of oil, even though oil receipts no longer dominate the economy of Dubai to the same extent as they previously did. He may have been referring to earlier oil-led economic growth, or he may have been generalising from the wider experience of the Gulf countries.[4] In comparison, Zahir viewed the comparative wealth of Switzerland as a natural outgrowth of political freedom, which he wanted for Tunisia. He was optimistic that this could be achieved, even though he was an active member of Ennahda, the party which had lost power in the most recent election in 2014.

Qaseem had a negative impression of life in Gulf countries based on the experience of his father, who had lived and worked in Saudi Arabia for fifteen years, and a number of his friends who had migrated to Qatar who had "to deal with disrespect" from the people of the Gulf. This contrasted strongly with his own experience of completing an internship in Hungary as part of his civil engineering qualification. He enthused about "the respect and the professionalism that people show you in Hungary."

These sentiments were echoed by Mahir, who had relatives in both France and Qatar. He claimed that people in the Gulf "don't have the same mindset as Tunisians. The

[4] For an account of the economic diversification of Dubai in the face of declining oil reserves, see Davidson (2009).

Gulf and North Africa are very different in terms of culture. While there is a lot of money in the Gulf, they adopt the slavery system." He felt significantly more attracted to European (and particularly French) culture. He distinguished between different classes of Tunisians who migrated to France: the poor, the middle class and those in business or the professions. While it was difficult for poor Tunisians to settle and work in France, Mahir believed that this was mainly because the poor tended to migrate illegally and that they were justly denied benefits. He characterised France as a place where the rule of law was sacrosanct, unlike Qatar where fast development had been initiated by oil wealth that was unsustainable. He had a clear preference for the former and wanted Tunisia to develop institutions more like those in France than those in the Gulf.

Similar views were expressed by a number of other interviewees. Hadya had a son in France and a daughter in Abu Dhabi, and she was clear about which country she preferred: "France is the place of culture, it is the place that all Tunisians aspire to go to or be like. The Gulf has nothing but money." She believed that Tunisia's history of secularism and openness was a result of its close association with former colonial power and made it distinctive in the Arab world. Asked whether her children's experiences had led her to change her views, it became clear that she was a long-term admirer of France. Her views on the Gulf had, however, been shaped by her daughter's experiences in the Gulf where "they do not treat you like equals. They don't care if you are Arab or Asian or whatever." Muriel's husband sent her remittances from France and her brother lived and worked in Saudi Arabia. Like Mahir and Hadya, she perceived France as much more of a model for Tunisia than Saudi Arabia. She referred to the "equal treatment" and "safety and security" that France offered to all, compared with Saudi Arabia where there were strict divides between migrants and locals and different nationalities of migrants.

Jabbar had relatives in the Gulf, Europe, North America and Asia. He was dismissive of countries in the Gulf, calling them "old-fashioned ... where politics and social norms are unstable and where you are not protected by law. You need to have good contacts to feel secure." Europe was comparatively "stable" even if it was "declining" economically.

Jabbar believed that Tunisia had the potential to develop as a middle ground, more economically dynamic than Europe but more politically and socially free than the Gulf. This point was made by a number of the other interviewees. Khalidah, whose son had lived in France for 18 years, was clear that "Tunisia is not like France. We are Arab and we are Muslim." But she admired the freedom enjoyed by the French and the efficiency of their government. The Gulf, in Khalidah's view, was "too strict, too conservative" and definitely not a model for Tunisia's future development.

The only interviewee who had a substantially positive view of non-economic issues in Gulf countries was Nada, who had three daughters in the Gulf (two in UAE and one in Qatar) in addition to a sister-in-law in France. Her daughters had given her a very positive impression of life and institutions in the Gulf, and this may have been influenced by one daughter gaining Qatari citizenship through marriage to a citizen.[5] Nevertheless, it was not clear that she would prefer a Gulf-style authoritarian system in Tunisia because she also had a positive impression of France through the experiences of her husband's sister. Nada believed that the biggest difference was between Tunisia and other countries: "I have seen bad actions in Tunisia where people's rights were not guaranteed but from my family's experience, people's rights are guaranteed in the Gulf and Europe." The social remittances received from the Gulf and France appear to have made Nada more dissatisfied with Tunisian institutions, but they did not promote any single model for future development.

The Tunisian interviewees who had relatives in both Europe and the Gulf expressed similar sentiments to those who received remittances from just one region. In general, they saw European democratic political systems as positive models for Tunisia to emulate while Gulf countries were seen as backward and conservative. The political implications were much more clearly expressed by the Tunisian interviewees than the Jordanians. It appears that economic remittances from the Europe are accompanied by, and

[5]Nada's daughter had married a senior member of the Qatari military, and Nada described at length the extensive vetting process her family had undergone before the Qatari authorities would sanction the marriage.

may strengthen, social remittances that promote democratic norms. How can we situate these findings with those of Kessler and Rother (2016), who found emigration to be associated with greater dissatisfaction with the Philippines' democratic system? While the answer could lie with Kessler and Rother's survey and interviews being focused on return migrants rather than remittance recipients, another possible explanation is that the Phillippines has had a democratic system for a longer period of time than Tunisia. Most of the interviewees saw Tunisia as being in a transitory state between authoritarianism to more freer political system. While frustration about the current political system in the Philippines would likely reflect on the democratic nature of the institutions in that country, frustration with Tunisia's present situation led remittance recipients to imagine in which direction they would like Tunisia's institutions to develop in the future. The vast majority, even those who received remittances from authoritarian Gulf countries, appeared to prefer a democratic system.

10.5 Tunisian Migrants' Choice of Destination

In the previous chapter, we saw that pre-existing family networks and occupational skills were two of the main influences on the migration choices of Jordanians, although there were a few cases in which destinations were selected based on preexisting political ideas. Similar influences were present in the stories of the Tunisian interviewees. In addition, language skills were often discussed as an important driver of migration destinations. Gulf countries appeared to be gaining in popularity in recent years due to an expansion in the opportunities available there and the raising of immigration barriers and economic problems in the traditional Tunisian migration countries of France and southern Europe.

As with the Jordanian migrants discussed in the previous chapter, skills were often a key driver of migration destination, particularly amongst professionals. Abra's son was offered the opportunity to study in France or Germany after completing a degree at the Institut Préparatoire aux Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques (Preparatory Institute for Scientific and Technical Studies, IPEST), which had agreements with European universities to send a certain percentage of its top-performing students to further study in Europe. After completing a qualification in Paris, Abra's son joined a company in the same city, which was "the best place for his speciality." Abra noted that her other son was also trying to follow the same path by studying at IPEST and earning the requisite grades to be offered a place at a university in Europe. Interestingly, she believed that her second son would prefer to move to a "country which speaks English not French" because he preferred American culture over French culture. She appeared somewhat perplexed by this because "generally in Tunisia we prefer French culture." This reveals the close link between middle class Tunisians and France, which is seen as the 'natural' destination for those with professional skills due to the long history of Tunisian migration to the former colonial power.

Kamal, whose cousin worked in as a hotel manager in the UK, believed that "the more you are educated, the more you know things, you don't want to go to the Gulf," thereby linking higher skill levels with the choice of migration destination. Indeed, he suggested that there was a hierarchy of migration destinations:

> "You wanted to go to America, but you can't go to America so you want to go to the UK, but you can't go to the UK, so you want to go to Europe, but you can't go to Europe so you go to Eastern Europe, but you can't go to Eastern Europe so you go to the Gulf. Some people might disagree and say that Dubai is better than France, but not many, at least not many Tunisians."

It is interesting that Kamal was the second interviewee to mention that the USA was a preferable migration destination to France or the Gulf, even though the USA has never been a key destination for Tunisian migrants. Kamal was one of the younger interviewees at 25, and Abra's son was 19, so it may be that younger Tunisians (at least those with professional skills) are beginning to consider a wider variety of countries as potential migration destinations than older generations of migrants.

Many of the interviewees who received remittances from the Gulf had family members working in healthcare, and it was their skills which had facilitated migration. Wasim's father was a doctor who had migrated to Qatar three years previously. His choice of Qatar as a destination was aided by an inter-governmental agreement to send Tunisian doctors to Qatar on five-year postings. The migrants received significantly higher salaries, from which the Tunisian Ministry of Health received a percentage along with a guarantee that the doctor would return to Tunisia at the end of their posting. Nada's daughter, Omaira's daughter and Zahra's cousin, all nurses, migrated to Qatar and the UAE under similar schemes run by the Ministry of Health. Mahir's cousin followed a related path; he was a teacher who had applied for a position in Qatar through a partnership between the Tunisian Ministry of Education and the Qatari government. Qaseem's father moved to Saudi Arabia as a part of a cooperation agreement between state-owned airline companies Tunisair and Saudi Arabian Airlines. One of Mahir's sons migrated to Dubai "through a partnership between the governments"; his son did the same work as a lorry driver in Dubai as he had done in Tunisia. These cases do not appear to be results of self-sorting based on political preferences. Rather, they are the outcome of the career chosen by the migrants and subsequent path dependent opportunities for migration offered to them. The government-sponsored cases of medical and teaching professionals temporarily migrating to Gulf states pointed to a new development in Tunisia: all those who had relatives in the Gulf through those schemes had migrated in the past few years. Omaira's daughter was the longest-standing migrant to Gulf having lived and worked in Abu Dhabi for seven years.

In addition to professional skills, many of the interviewees highlighted language skills as playing an important role in the choice of migration destination. Abdullah, whose brother worked in Italy, stated this clearly: "Tunisians find it easier in Europe because we learn French and Spanish and Italian and we have more difficulty in English." Interestingly, Abdullah felt that the lack of English language skills amongst Tunisians also prevented them from migrating to Gulf countries: "In the Gulf, there is a language barrier; you have to speak English fluently. In Europe there is more choice because you can speak

Arabic or European languages, but in the Gulf you must speak English." Abdullah did concede that it was now easier to make money by moving to the Gulf, and he suggested that more Tunisians were likely to find the region appealing for this reason. He did, however, see language issues as fundamental to migration decisions. Kamal likewise pointed to proficiency in English being a key skill to have for those wanting service sector jobs in Gulf countries. He described how businesses based in the Gulf "come to Tunisia and conduct interviews with those who have freshly graduated and ... speak English and they take them as managers' assistants and to work in shops because they have English-speaking customers."

Wasim also thought that "language is the first thing they (potential migrants) think about" when they consider moving abroad. In contrast with Abdullah and Kamal, however, Wasim believed it was easier for Tunisians to move to Gulf countries because "they can talk more in Arabic than in other countries; sometimes they are not ready to go to European countries or to another destination. For older people in particular, they will have a problem with the language." Farid, who received remittances from his uncle in the UK, also claimed that for Tunisians who "don't speak French or English ... it is easier for them to go to the Gulf and speak Arabic." He thus saw the Gulf as somewhere that lower-skilled Tunisians were more likely to migrate to.

The role of language skills in the choice of migration destinations thus appears to be more prominent in the Tunisian interviewee sample compared with those interviewed in Jordan. Nevertheless, the role of language and professional skills in determining migration destinations makes it clear that, for many migrants, the choice of which country to migrate to is not related to the pre-existing political viewpoints which could influence their sending of social remittances. There does appear a relationship between education and migration, however, which underscores the importance of matching respondents on education and including education variables in the statistical models in Part II.

In addition to skills, family networks were important to Tunisians as they were for Jordanians. Abdulwahab's grandfather migrated to France in 1960 following his brother-in-law who had migrated several years earlier. His employer asked the brother-in-law to find other Tunisians with the correct skills to work in the factory where he had found employment. Omar's son had moved to France ten years ago to join Omar's brother who had been settled in Marseille for many years. If his uncle had not been a legal resident of France, Omar did not believe that his son would have been able to complete the papers for legal migration. Another benefit was that his son had been able to easily integrate into the community of French-Tunisians due to family connections; he had initially lived with his uncle and gained employment at the same plastics factory where his uncle was a supervisor. Without the family connection, Omar believed that his son would have been more likely to have tried to emigrate to a Gulf country because there were fewer non-family-based legal routes to migrate to Europe than had been available to previous generations of migrants. The Gulf countries were offering comparatively more opportunities, and it was easier to obtain legal migration status. In addition to family networks, community networks played an important role in some migration decisions. Jamahl described how his brother's decision to move to Italy was influenced by the successful migration of a neighbour to that country.

Many of the interviewees expressed sentiments that France (and Europe more generally) had previously been the natural destination for Tunisian migrants, but that the Gulf had risen in popularity in recent years because of the greater number of opportunities now available in Gulf countries and the increase in barriers to migration in European countries. Khalidah's son had lived and worked in France for the past 18 years, initially migrating illegally but later acquiring the correct papers. While she acknowledged that the Gulf was rising in popularity as a migration destination, she said that at the time her son had migrated "if you thought about leaving (Tunisia), you thought about France." She had known other families who had relatives sending remittances from France but not from other countries, so France had seemed like the obvious choice. Nowa, whose son worked in Italy, believed that Tunisia and other North African states were more likely to send migrants to Europe compared with other Arab states partly because of geography: "we

(Tunisians) are very close to Italy, it only takes 10 hours on the ship. In other (Arab) countries, they are closer to Saudi, to UAE, to those countries. But we are close to Europe, so we go there to work." Jamila was sent remittances by her son who worked in Dubai. She believed that "Tunisians used to have a lot of choice in terms of going abroad but now things have changed and in my opinion the Gulf has an easier process." Qaseem agreed that Europe had previously been the natural destination for Tunisian migrants because Tunisians "had close links with those countries and so there was knowledge about the higher salaries there." He beleived that this was changing, however, as Tunisians became aware of the opportunities available in the Gulf.

A number of interviewees mentioned that Europe had become a more difficult destination to emigrate to since the financial crisis of 2008-9. Zaki was blunt: "France is over for Tunisians. It got worse recently. That is for Europe in general." His cousin had emigrated to France in 1969, and so he was in a position to compare across time. He claimed that, in the past, it has been much easier for Tunisians to migrate to France because there had been plenty of work available. These ideas were seen as boosting the numbers of Tunisians choosing to go to Gulf countries instead. Jamahl claimed that Tunisians had begun to "see the Gulf as a better place than Europe in terms of job opportunities." Marid's son had decided to migrate to Saudi Arabia after discovering that it was both easier to migrate there than most European countries and also offered higher salaries for the kind of call-centre jobs for which he had experience.

Kalila mentioned that it was much easier now for Tunisians to migrate to the Gulf than Europe. When her husband was considering where to migrate to, he initially considered France, but found it impossible to find a legal route to migration. Unwilling to migrate illegally, he chose the UAE because he had heard that the process of gaining a work visa was much easier. The application process turned out to be fairly easy, and he had lived in Abu Dhabi for the past four years. Muriel also referred to the greater difficulty in getting into Europe and the comparative ease of migrating to the Gulf. She considered her husband to have been "lucky" to receive a visa to work in France, where he was an office manager. Her brother had not managed to secure a legal migration route to France and so had chosen to migrate to Saudi Arabia. Muriel believed that her brother would have preferred to have moved to France and that the Gulf had been very much a second choice.

For Wasim, the primary attraction of the Gulf was simple: “A lot of Tunisians decide to go to Qatar because they are paid more there than in Tunisia.” He gave the example of his father, a doctor, who had earned 3000 Tunisian dinars a month when he had worked in Tunisia but now earned 15000 Tunisian dinars a month in Qatar. Wasim suggested that another attraction of the Gulf was that Tunisians could migrate there for a short period of time, during which they could earn enough for a comfortable retirement back in Tunisia. Despite the attractive salaries on offer in the Gulf, however, Wasim himself wished to migrate to a European country. As he put it, “I would like to go ... to Europe rather than to Gulf countries. I always say that in the Gulf they have the money but they don’t have the mind for it, but in Europe they have the mind and enough money.” By “mind” Wasim was referring to openness and liberal values, which he perceived as being greater in European countries compared with the countries of the Gulf. This does suggest a degree of self-sorting; Wasim identified himself more with the values he saw as important to Europeans. This self-sorting, while important in migration decisions, does not always extend to remittances, however: Wasim himself received remittances from his father in Qatar.

Did the 2011 revolution influence migration decisions? Kamal suggested that the revolution had made migration less likely. In his view, “before the revolution, it was black. People had no vision, no medium-term vision in their lives and there were no jobs or money.” The first chance Tunisians had to leave the country, they took. Kamal believed that, post-revolution, there were significantly more economic opportunities in Tunisia which made migration less of an attractive option. His was an interesting perspective; Tunisia’s economy has struggled since the revolution with particular damage to the important tourism sector caused by political instability and terrorist attacks on tourist sites.

Based on this interview evidence, it appears that Tunisian's migration destinations are largely determined by the opportunities available, which in turn are influenced by their skills, family networks and the relative ease of migration to different countries. Similarly to the case of Jordan discussed in the last chapter, there is not much evidence of more conservative Tunisians migrating to more authoritarian countries and only a few limited suggestions that more liberal Tunisians prefer to migrate to democratic countries. While not definitive, due to the non-random nature of the sample, this does allow us to have greater confidence that any social remittance effect is driven by migrant's experiences in their destination country and not their pre-migration political ideas.

10.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented the results of the interviews in Tunisia, which makes an interesting comparison with Jordan. While Jordan is a case of a resilient authoritarian state with a democratic facade, Tunisia is in the process of transitioning away from the authoritarian regime that was overthrown in the 2011 revolution. Nevertheless, remittances appeared to have similar effects in both countries. Those who received remittances gained extra resources and income security that allowed them to engage in more political and civil society activism, as well as providing a sense of duty to do so to help those less fortunate.

The social remittances received differed somewhat between Tunisia and Jordan. Remittances from democratic countries were accompanied by social remittances that increased respect for democratic political institutions. In Tunisia, however, this was more explicitly linked to political freedom, while in Jordan the social remittances were more about specific institutions such as control of corruption and rule of law. Jordanians who received remittances from migrants in authoritarian states in the Gulf did not receive any anti-liberal or pro-authoritarian norms from their family members, but some did gain an increased respect for the relatively higher level of political freedom in their own country which could promote the stability of the authoritarian regime. In Tunisia, by contrast, those who received remittances from authoritarian countries generally approved of Tunisia's transition towards democracy, a view reinforced by what they saw as the poor treatment of migrants in the Gulf.

The reasons for choices of migration destination in Jordan and Tunisia were similar; most migrants moved to places where they had the opportunity to go because of certain professional or (particularly in Tunisia) language skills or family networks, rather than choosing destinations based on a prior affinity for democracy or authoritarianism. It is likely that any democratic effect of remittances is therefore due to the impact of remittances combined with migration experiences, therefore, rather than due to selection effects.

The interview evidence discussed in the last two chapters do not provide conclusive proof of the effect of remittances on political views or participation. They are not drawn from random samples and so we cannot be sure how representative the interviewees were of the population of remittance recipients in Jordan and Tunisia. These chapters have, however, helped to nuance our understanding of the political effects of remittances. The macro- and micro-level statistical analyses of Parts I and II gave us an idea of the relationship between remittances and prospects for democracy and mass political attitudes and participation. In these two chapters, however, we have been able to gain a more direct glimpse of how remittances affect recipients' political outlook.

Chapter 11

Conclusion

11.1 Remittances and the Prospects for Democracy in Receiving States

In this thesis, we have explored the effect of migrants' remittances on the prospects for democracy in their home countries. We have found that remittances can have both positive and negative effects on the stability of authoritarian regimes. Remittances can bolster authoritarian regimes by channelling potential opposition by migrants into regime-controlled activities such as local elections. Remittances can also help to increase support for democracy and empower remittance recipients to take part in contentious political actions to challenge authoritarian regimes. We have also discovered that *where* remittances are sent from is crucial to understanding their effect on democratic transition and consolidation. Remittances from migrants in democratic countries promote democracy, but remittances from migrants in authoritarian countries do not.

We began in Chapter 2 with the finding that, at the aggregate level, remittance flows from democratic countries are associated with higher democracy scores and a greater likelihood of authoritarian regime downfall. We also saw that remittance flows from countries with non-democratic political institutions are associated with lower democracy scores and a lower likelihood of the breakdown of non-party authoritarian regimes. What might explain the effect of remittances on democratisation, and what accounts for the difference in the effects between remittances from democratic countries and remittances from authoritarian countries? Earlier literature suggested that the causal mechanisms of the substitution effect, the patronage effect and the social remittance effect played a role in the relationship between remittances and democratisation. In Chapter 3, we found evidence for another causal mechanism: remittances can increase the number of anti-government protests in non-democratic regimes. Again, the origin of remittance flows proved to be vital for understanding their effects: remittances from democratic countries are associated with increased protests, while remittances from authoritarian countries are not. Are authoritarian regimes powerless in the face of remittance flows? In Chapter 4, we found that authoritarian regimes could divert migrants' political activism into regime-controlled activities: migrants appear to increase the flow of remittances to their home countries during local elections.

In Part II, we investigated the effects of remittances on political behaviour and ideas at the individual level to shed more light on the causal mechanisms linking remittances with macro-level prospects of democracy, using survey data from the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and post-Communist countries as described in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we found evidence that remittances increase non-electoral political participation, including the likelihood of engaging in protest, in all three regions. The causal mechanism for this relationship was explored in Chapter 7, where we saw that remittances increase perceptions of economic security as proxied by pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations. Why might the promotion of protests and other forms of political participation by remittances be more challenging to incumbent regimes when the remittances are sent from democratic countries? We found an answer in Chapter 8, which showed that remittances are associated with greater support for democracy in countries which received remittances mostly from democratic countries: a 'democratic remittance effect.' This finding suggests that remittances from democratic countries can create a group of citizens that is both more supportive of democracy and more willing to take part in contentious political actions against authoritarian governments. Part II thus provided a micro-level causal mechanism to help explain the macro-level relationships found in Part I.

In the final two chapters, I used evidence from interviews with remittance recipients in Jordan and Tunisia to add nuance to the quantitative findings and to better understand the lived experience of remittance recipients. We found that remittances increase political participation mainly by increasing the resources and economic security of recipients, but also by inculcating a sense of civic responsibility to help those who have not benefited from remittances and, at least in Tunisia, the transmission of political values from migration destinations. We also found that receiving remittances from democratic countries tended to increase respect for democratic political institutions, but that there was no evidence of a corresponding 'authoritarian remittance' effect. In addition, we explored the reasons for migration destination choices, and found that professional and language skills and family networks were the main drivers of the choice of migration destinations for Jordanians and Tunisians. This goes some way to reassuring us that self-selection in terms of political viewpoints does not drive the democratic remittance effect found in Part III and Chapter 8.

11.2 Future Research

Political scientists have only just begun to explore the political implications of remittances for migrant-sending countries. This thesis has helped to clarify how remittances can affect the prospects for democratisation and account for apparently contradictory results in the existing literature on this question (Ahmed, 2012; Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright, 2015). The findings in this thesis have also expanded our knowledge of the micro-level effects of remittances beyond the regional focus of much of the extant literature on Latin America. There are many questions still left to answer, however, and many cannot be investigated fully until researchers have access to better sources of data.

11.2.1 Future Data Collection

The key problem confronting any scholar interested in the effects of remittances is that of data, and the collection of good-quality macro- and micro-level data is crucial to future work on this topic. On the macro-level, the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* remain the best current data source, but it is far from ideal. While these data can show us broad trends in remittances, it is difficult for us to know how comparable the figures are over time and between countries given variation in the quality of data collection by national governments and differences in the use of informal remittance networks which are not recorded in official statistics. In Chapters 2 and 3, I used remittance estimates based on numbers of migrants and differences in GDP. As is well known, however, these data sources are also plagued by inaccuracies. In Chapter 4, I used data from the central banks of Egypt and Jordan. While we can have a reasonable degree of confidence that these sources reliably reflect cross-temporal variation, it is difficult to compare between countries due to different strategies of measurement. Indeed, very few governments provide remittances data in the same level of detail as Egypt and Jordan, which limited the number of countries that could be examined in Chapter 4. The best way of obtaining more reliable data would be the running of regular standardised migrant remittance surveys that could give us comparable country estimates of the percentage of the population receiving remittances and the size of remittance flows. Unfortunately, such data collection would be very expensive, although the World Bank has recently moved in this direction with projects such as 'The Future of African Remittances' which used standardised surveys to gain fine-grained information about remittances in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia in 2010.

Some good-quality micro-level data on remittances do exist. Unfortunately, most surveys which ask detailed questions about remittances are labour force or migration surveys that do not include any questions related to political participation or ideology, and they are usually specific to one or a few countries.[1] Collection of more fine-grained micro-level

[1] For example, the Labour Force Panel Surveys carried out by the Economic Research Forum in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia contain some of the best data on individuals' receipt of remittances in the MENA region. Unfortunately, these surveys do not include any questions about political ideas or behaviour.

data on remittance receipt in barometer and values surveys is vital to increasing our understanding of the political effects of remittances, and this should be a priority for future research on the topic. One exciting new survey dataset that has recently became available is that of the Life in Kyrgyzstan project, a regionally-representative panel survey which includes extensive questions about the frequency and financial value of remittances received, where remittances are received from and the occupation and migration duration of the remittances sender, in addition to a battery of questions about political opinions and actions.[2] As noted in Chapter 5, Kyrgyzstan is a major remittance-receiving state, so this promises to be a very useful resource. While it became publically available too late for analysis in this thesis, future micro-level work on the political effects of remittances should make use of this dataset.

11.2.2 Future Questions

This thesis has contributed an answer to the question of how remittances can affect the prospects for democracy in receiving states. It has also presented the first evidence for remittance cycles in authoritarian regimes, clarified our knowledge of how and why remittances affect different forms of political participation and added to our knowledge of the political dimensions of social remittances. In doing so, however, it has uncovered a number of relationships and questions that would be interesting to explore further.

One of the most important questions concerns how conditions in sending and receiving states influence the political content of social remittances. The findings presented in Part III complement those of Levitt (1998, 2001) who found that norms of anti-corruption and respect for rule of law can diffuse from wealthy democracies to poorer states through migration. The findings appear to contrast with those of Rother (2009) and Kessler and Rother (2016), however, who found that migration (even to democratic countries) can weaken the support for democratic principles amongst return migrants to the Philippines. The differences may be due to the different focus of analysis: remittance recipients in this

[2] For more information, see http://lifeinkyrgyzstan.org/.

thesis and Levitt's research, return migrants in Kessler and Rother's study. More likely, however, are differing experiences of the political systems in migrants' home countries: a reasonably well-established democracy in the Philippines, an authoritarian monarchy with a pseudo-democratic veneer in Jordan and a transitional democracy in Tunisia. Future research could expand the number of countries in which political social remittances are investigated through interviews and surveys to more clearly distinguish how their content differs depending on the experiences of migrants and remittance recipients in sending and receiving countries with different types of political institutions.

Another interesting question raised by the evidence presented in this thesis is whether and why remittances have stronger effects at the local level than the national level. Research in Latin America has shown the importance of migration and remittances in local development (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012; Duquette-Rury, 2016; Waddell and Fontenla, 2015) and that migration increases local (but not national) political engagement (Cordova and Hiskey, 2015). In Chapter 7, we saw that remittances increase when there are local elections but not national elections in Egypt and Jordan. In Chapter 6, we found that some Tunisian remittance recipients considered themselves to have a duty to improve their local area because they had benefited from migration while their local community had not. Future research could examine whether migration and remittances have a more important relationship with local political engagement in regions other than Latin America and MENA as well as examining why this might be.

Finally, there is a question that can only be answered with better micro-level data: how important is the frequency and amount of remittances received in conditioning the effect of remittances on political behaviour? In Part II, I used a binary measure of remittance receipt as the key explanatory variable in the statistical analyses, but it is not difficult to imagine that remittances would have a greater impact on someone who relies on a close relative abroad for their regular monthly income compared with someone who receives remittances once per year from a distant relative on their birthday. The only study to have investigated how political effects vary with different amounts and frequencies of remittances is Germano (2013) who used data from an original survey conducted in a heavily remittance-dependent region of Mexico designed to capture fine-grained detail about the receipt of remittances.

With more in-depth data, future research could build on the contributions in this thesis to improve our understanding of the political effects of remittances on macro-level political phenomena and individual level political ideas and behaviours. This thesis has contributed to our knowledge of the effect of remittances on democratisation, but there remain many more questions about how remittances impact politics. With the recent strong growth in remittance receipts in many developing regions likely to continue, these questions will only grow in importance.

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