# Diaspora Return to Politics

## From State Collapse to a New Federal Somalia and Somaliland, 1985–2018

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**Abstract**

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African governments and their political structures are now increasingly constituted of returning diaspora. The thesis explores the international and domestic political processes through which diaspora return to politics and influence the Somali-speaking subnational and national administrations of the Republic of Somaliland, Puntland Member State of Somalia, and the Federal Government of Somalia from 1985 until 2018. These processes are traced across the three contexts and chronologically from the irredentist fight of the 1980s, through state formation and reconstruction processes after 1991, and up to contemporary politics. In each context, different historical and conflict legacies, state formation processes (including relationships with the international system) and internal elite pacts shape the opportunity structures for diaspora politicians to contest and influence politics. Divergences emerge in trends in leadership succession, including the rise and fall of diaspora administrations, as well as in the forms of alliance building and local resistance that emerge against periods of diaspora rule. This thesis is particularly concerned with how international actors and statebuilding agendas may confer undue legitimacy on diaspora politicians and empower them to challenge existing political arrangements and systems of clan governance. As such, this thesis contributes to key academic debates about clan politics and limited stateness, the symbolic valence of expertise, and the politics of state formation.

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**Acronyms**

| | |
|---|---|
| ADP | Africa Development Programme |
| APD | Academy for Peace and Development |
| ANACOZA | All North American Conference on Zaire |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ARS | Alliance for the Re–liberation of Somalia |
| ASWJ | Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama |
| CIP | Capacity Injection Programme |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| EU | European Union |
| GAM | *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement) |
| HIPS | Heritage Institute of Peace and Security |
| ICU | Islamic Courts Union |
| IFI | International Financial Institution |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| ISRAACA | *Ummadda Soomaaliyeed* (Pan–Somali Council for Peace and Stability) |
| LTTE | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| MIDA | Migration for Development in Africa |
| NPP | New Patriotic Party |
| NRC | National Reconciliation Congress |
| OPM | Office of the Prime Minister |
| PDA | Puntland Diaspora Agency |
| PDP | People's Democratic Party |
| PDRC | Puntland Development Research Centre |
| RDR | Rally of Republicans party |
| RPF | Rwandan Patriotic Front |
| SCG | Somali Concern Group |
| SNM | Somaliland National Movement |
| SNUP | Somali National Democratic Party |
| SSDF | Somali Salvation Democratic Front |
| SSF | Somali Stability Fund |
| SSS | Somali Student Society |
| SYL | Somali Youth League |
| TNG | Transitional National Government |
| TFG | Transitional Federal Government |
| UCID | For Justice and Development Party |
| UDUB | United People's Democratic Party |
| UNDP | United National Development Programme |
| UPD | Union for Peace and Development |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USC | United Somali Congress |
| WB | World Bank |

**Note on Somali language**

The Somali language has a rich oral tradition, but did not gain an orthography until 1972 (Orwin 1995). Therefore, and due to the fact that Somalia was colonised by different imperial powers, Somali spelling is varied. I will use the Somali spelling whenever possible, but use the commonly known spelling for most names and locations. When referring to Somali individuals, I will frequently refer to them by using their 'official' nickname, marked by guillemets the first time mentioned. And when referring to Somali sub–clans and lineages, I will frequently situate them in the greater clan genealogy, so as to facilitate tracking (e.g. Isaaq/Habar Awal/Saad Muse).

| | |
|---|---|
| *beesha shanaad* | 'fifth clan', or the .5 within the 4.5 quota system |
| *calan cas* | also known as the 'red flag', it refers to the military wing of the Somaliland National Movement (SNM) |
| *diya* | a main principle of *xeer*, which denotes 'blood compensation' paid by one *diya* group to another, usually in the form of livestock. |
| *diya* group | small social units that take collective responsibility for their own security, as well as undertaking an obligation to compensate other groups for any harm committed by one of its members. |
| *fadhi ku dirir* | 'armchair or table fighting', as a mode of politics practiced by diaspora |
| *gabyo* | used locally to refer to Damul Jadiid, but more broadly translated as 'unfinished business' |
| *kutala* | parliamentary caucus, in particular reference to opposition groups within Sheikh Sharif's government (2009-2012) |
| *manacasir* | 'those who drink tea' to refer to the Saudi Group within the SNM |
| *qabiil or beesha* | clan |
| *Qurbajoog* | a term coined in the 1990s to refer to those who reside in foreign land, is the Somali equivalent of diaspora. *Qurbe* is a term of Arabic origin meaning 'foreign land', while *joog* is a Somali verb meaning 'to settle' |
| *siyasi* | clan political representative |
| *squilovido* | a training exercise, or having a drivers' permit |

| | |
|---|---|
| *suldaan*/*ugaas* | traditional elder |
| *xalaal* | clean or ritually pure for Moslems, including the correct slaughter of animals for food. The opposite of Haraam |
| *xeer* | Somali customary law |

**Map 1: Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland (Mosley 2015)**



## Chapter 1: Introduction

In August 2019, President Farmajo of the Federal Government of Somalia renounced his US citizenship in what many would call a last-ditch effort to win a re-election campaign.[1] This political decision was a reaction to growing challenges made about the influence and value of diaspora politicians within the Somali political complex. The questions around diaspora return and political influence are linked by scholars and local Somalis to broader concerns about citizenship and political eligibility, the legacies of foreign interventions, and conceptions of just deserves, ownership and accountability. For the particular Somali context, diaspora return to politics is part of broader internal struggles around the colonial legacy, boundary demarcation, state formation and determinations of who has the right to contest political seats where. Scholars including Clapham (2015) demonstrate how regional boundaries in the Horn of Africa fail to correspond clearly to colonial demarcations or clan communities (what he refers to as 'non-colonial Africa'). Rather, ethnic Somalis move fluidly across the borders in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, where boundaries have been the subject of civil wars and have characterised certain transborder features of Somali politics. In this context, Somali Kenyans, Ethiopians and Djiboutians mobilise political and kinship networks across borders, and through the governments of regional countries, in defining a fluid politics that resides outside state boundaries. Linked to broader transregional features of politics in Somalia is a transnational dimension characterised by a large Somali diaspora population which also returns mainly from the West (see 2.3) to contest political office. This segment of the political diaspora is the particular focus of this thesis.

Certainly, Somalia is not an exception in the return and influence of diaspora returnees from the West participating in post-independence African politics (see Lyons 2007, Brinkerhoff 2008, 2012). Across Africa, Western-educated diaspora returnees are increasingly overrepresented and influential in governments – as parliamentarians, ministers and prime ministers. For instance, in the cases of Liberia, Benin and Cote d'Ivoire, the countries have seen the rise of diaspora leaders and their cabinets, as well as their fall from power.[2] For

[1] Mohammed Omar Ahmed, 'Somalia Leader Renounces U.S. Citizenship Amid Trump's Rhetoric', *Washington Examiner*, 1 August 2019.
[2] "Benin's landmark elections: An experiment in political transitions", *Brookings: Africa in Focus*, 22 March 2016, accessed at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/03/22/benins-landmark-elections-an-experiment-in-political-transitions/.

instance, in cases like the 2016 Benin elections, the frontrunning and expected diaspora candidate, economist and former Prime Minister Lionel Zinsou, lost out to local businessman and bigwig Patrice Talon. In the cases where diaspora candidates have won – namely, Liberia in 2006 and Cote d'Ivoire in 2010 – their tenures have been fraught by corruption allegations, nepotism and they have been unable to secure second terms. What is unique about the politics of diaspora return in the Somali context is the legacies of prolonged and ongoing conflict, foreign interventions and the deep insecurity of its governments and its populations vis-à-vis their territorial sovereignty and elites. One of the key outcomes of sustained conflict and ongoing state weakness is the high volume of migrants and returnees. Yet, the specific factors that shape diaspora return to politics are the incentive structures around state reconstruction, that include the 'diaspora option' (1.1), the desire to give back and survivors guilt, but also the nature of sectarian and ethnopolitical forms of competition. The latter may require outside or compromise candidates within the systems of clan-based representative politics, but these groups also seek competitive advantage (through diaspora politicians) vis-à-vis each other and the state (see 4.2).

As is also the case in other contexts where diaspora politicians have become influential, the socio-legal restrictions are poor. Constitutional provisions on issues of citizenship and dual nationalities are routinely introduced but weakly enforced, in part due to the influence of diaspora within parliaments in these contexts.[3] In addition, these leaders are viewed favourably by international actors who legitimise their authority and support their rapid return and the formation of a diaspora ruling class. Within the international system, since the 1990s, diaspora have played a particular role within persistent conceptions of peacebuilding, technocratic reform and depoliticised transformation. Diaspora are seen as trusted partners and saviours, who are a tethered to Western values, experience and incentives (Turner and Kleist 2013). Yet, the emergence of a ruling class of diaspora politicians is contested locally in ways that are not properly understood. Within the specific legacies of colonialism, civil war and poor institutionalisation, their return and influence may aggravate subnational anxieties about

[3] In Somalia, the 2012 Federal Constitution currently says that a 'Somali president will be a Somali national' which critically does not deal with the issue of citizenship. In the Somali Republic of 1960-91 citizenship was primarily based on patrilineal descent. Article 1 of the Somali citizenship law of 1962 grants citizenship to any person whose father is Somali. Somalis who live abroad and renounce any other citizenship are also included, with a Somali defined as any person who by origin, language and tradition belongs to the Somali nation (article 3) (Hoehne 2010). In the Somaliland Citizenship Law of 2002, patrilineal descent was reaffirmed as the basis of citizenship. The Somaliland constitution provides a bit more clarity on the issue – that the President/Vice President 'must be a citizen of Somaliland by birth and must not hold any other citizenship' although it is rarely applied as will be discussed in further detail.

territorial boundaries, the legacies of foreign interventions (in state formation and political transitions) and centralised power structures. Domestic actors (including clans and local elites) may see diaspora politicians as offering new and advantageous economic and political alliances that can be used to renegotiate existing power structures. Yet, they may lose out in the broader 'international' orientation of the diaspora option around state logics based on social and economic exclusion. This 'state logic' is centred on the control of clearly demarcated territory and exclusive claims to resources and people within it, through regulating property and citizenship (Lund 2017). As Markus Hoehne conceptualises, 'state logics' refer to the focus and orientation around fixed territories, boundaries and social and economic exclusion that are at odds with clan governance (2016).

This thesis explores this contestation, and the ways in which diaspora politicians and leaders accumulate and project power through shifting international and domestic political opportunity structures. These include the diaspora option, open systems of participatory practices, the rise of transnational political multi-party politics, new development networks and globalised financial markets (Bell 2013; Pellerin and Mullings 2013). Diaspora politicians and leaders are both included and excluded for their links to the international system in ways that are necessary for understanding political outcomes in post-conflict contexts (Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Koinova 2018). The question of diaspora return to politics is particularly important as its increase occurs amidst growing trends across Africa in democratic stagnation, rising authoritarianism and the persistence of fragile states (Cheeseman 2018). This thesis analyses at close-range how diaspora elites are differentiated political actors that build alliances and project power in distinct ways to local elites, and are enshrined within certain international and domestic political opportunity structures. Such processes of return and influence are examined within the Somali political territories (the Republic of Somaliland, Puntland Member State, and Federal Government of Somalia[4]) from 1985 until 2018.

The primary research question is how domestic and international actors negotiate the 'diaspora option', as a broad policy orientation and academic discourse, through different political processes and across different historical, institutional and political contexts of the Somali territories. The secondary research question is how the diaspora option, as it unfolds through these political processes, shapes dynamics of leadership succession, the centralisation of power

[4] Hereafter referred to as Puntland, Somalia and Somaliland.

and new forms of local political resistance. Thus, the levels of analysis are the international, subnational/national administration and the local level. The 'diaspora option' exists within the international system, but is implemented through different statebuilding agendas, institutional arrangements and elite pacts, and in accordance with divergent politics and strategies of scale (1.4). The political processes include political parties, technocratic assistance and clan-based proportional representation. The politics of scale approach (see 1.5; Jessop 2008; Hameiri and Scarpello 2018) offers an analytical framework for understanding the forces of contestation and the politics or strategies of scale that shape political outcomes around the diaspora option. Original empirics are provided from fieldwork conducted during 2016 and 2017 to elucidate these contextual divergences. They demonstrate how diaspora politicians and groupings rose to prominence within the liberation movements of the 1980s; and how diaspora politicians negotiated different political transitions, power and authority after 1991 but particularly after 2009.

Given the distinct nature of the doctoral inquiry and the limited scholarship on diaspora return to politics, this thesis engages with a diverse scholarship from comparative politics, international relations and international development. In particular, it interrogates key debates on: the politics of state formation and statebuilding (1.2); limited stateness, centre-periphery relationships and the role of brokers (1.4 and 1.5); and on how elites acquire, project and legitimise their authority and build consensus (2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). The discussion of diaspora return to politics and its impact is strongly embedded within the context of limited statehood which is characterised by the strength but also the anxiety of subnational actors, the over-presence of international actors and foreign interventions, and the illegitimacy of the states and elites that lead it. The latter touches on debates about elite change – how elites rise, fall or persist – and what the implications of such change may be for political stability and transformation. This Introduction and Chapter 2 further develops the conceptual and analytical apparatus, as well as methodology, for evaluating diaspora return to politics and influence, before proceeding to the key empirical chapters.

Section 1.1 provides an account of trends in diaspora migration and return in the Somali context as it relates to questions about size, scope, networks and donor 'activation'. Section 1.2 provides background on the 'diaspora option' as a policy orientation within international statebuilding agendas and academic discourse. The third and fourth sections (1.3 and 1.4) outline the critical debates around brokers and weak states that underpin the sources of

contestation, negotiation and influence. These sections also introduce a politics of scale approach for analysing, comparatively, variation in the broader orientations of subnational and national administrations towards the diaspora option. In addition, this approach outlines variation in the forces of contestation and strategies and opportunity structures available to diaspora, domestic actors and international actors within the political landscape, that together elicit certain outcomes. It provides a multi–pronged, relational approach for understanding internal power structures and strategies against the backdrop of the global political economy and entangled global and local political processes. Finally, Sections 1.5 and 1.6 discuss the qualitative and comparative methodological approach and provide a chapter outline of the thesis.

### 1.1 Diaspora migration and return

The issue of migration is at the heart of Somali nomadic culture, which is characterised by a subsistence economy, trade to procure necessities not domestically produced and transhumance to adapt to cycles of climate in search of 'green pastures' (Gundel 2002). Yet, migration is also a dimension of a political structure that is segmented, horizontal, and very loosely connected, which is tied to segmentary kinship networks (Marchal 1996: 11). Migration trends are also connected to how Somalis were dispersed by colonisation into five areas: British, Italian and French Somaliland respectively, as well as the Northern Frontier District of the British Kenyan Crown Colony and the Ogaden region of the Ethiopian Empire. In 1960, the independent Somali Republic, formed as British and Italian Somaliland, decided to merge as a first step toward uniting all the Somali peoples. The Northern Frontier District, however, remained in independent Kenya and the Ogaden region remained part of Ethiopia. French Somaliland eventually gained independence in 1977 as the Republic of Djibouti. The marriage of convenience and national unity in 1960 was not a happy one as it was characterised by high expectations and inequality, particularly felt by British Somaliland.

The colonial experience in British Somaliland created a relatively well-educated and privileged class of migrants[5], which was not the case in *Somalia Italiana,* who mobilised first for greater equality and later for secession. This disparity in regional and colonial experience would be

[5] During the period of British colonialism, early Somali diaspora emerged as seamen from British Somaliland who worked in the Merchant Navy and settled in ports such as Cardiff and London – others received bureaucratic and skills training in the UK (see 2.1).

important for understanding the different roles played by diaspora around the liberation movements of the 1980s (see 3.3). After independence and during the short period of unity (1960-1991), many disappointed supporters of the ruling Somali Youth League (SYL), especially from the north-western Isaaq clan and Majeerteen in the north-east, migrated abroad (mainly to Canada and the US). Beginning in 1973, as a major labour exporter to the Arabic oil producing countries, a number of migrant workers went to the Gulf states – approximately 375,000 by 1987 (Ahmed 2000). These migrants were often relatively well-educated people looking for better employment than they could find in Somalia (Marchal 1996: 23). By 1988, many Somalis were fleeing Barre's repressive divide-and-rule strategies and, with the eruption of the Somali civil war in 1991, more than 1 million are estimated to have fled fighting in southern Somalia to countries in the region and outside Africa.

From 1991, the better-off refugees went further abroad to Western countries such as Canada, US, UK, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Australia. Existing networks of the limited number of Somalis who had migrated before the conflict to Italy, UK and other places in Western Europe, and the US from 1960 to 1980, were important in shaping who, how and where the later and much larger numbers of refugees went (Gundel 2002). Most of the refugees, and significantly the poorest, fled to the neighbouring countries, Kenya and Ethiopia, or elsewhere within Somalia as internally displaced persons (IDPs). These flows were estimated to be between 1 and 2 million throughout the 1990s. The largest war-related internal displacements from central and southern Somalia took place between 1991 and 1993. Between 1990 and 2015, the total number of people born in Somalia but living outside the country more than doubled, from about 850,000 to 2 million (growing by 136% between 1990 and 2015, according to United Nations estimates).[6] The top eight countries with the largest Somali populations (documented)[7] are listed below:

**Table 1: Countries with largest Somali populations**

| | |
|---|---|
| United States | 135, 266 |
| United Kingdom | 98, 000 |
| UAE | 90, 900 |
| Sweden | 66, 369 |

[6] https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.asp
[7] Yemen would fall in fourth place with approximately 75,000 although these numbers are not verifiable.

| | |
|---|---|
| Canada | 62, 550 |
| Norway | 43, 196 |
| South Africa | 40, 000 |
| Netherlands | 39, 465 |

*Sources: Sheikh and Healy 2009; Connor and Krogstad 2016.*

There are no documented figures on the return of Somali diaspora to the region, as it is a highly politicised topic with many actors benefitting from relative obscurity. Few statistical studies have documented return (whether by country or volume), either by the UN or any other international organisations. IOM-funded diaspora agencies in the respective regions are currently undertaking the task in informal ways at port and airport entries with the assistance of immigration officials but concerns are raised about how governments will use this information.[8] What is important in the above table is not only continuity (by country) in migration flows during this period from 1991 to 2018, but also the influence of large-recipient countries in strategies around the diaspora option and activation of different diaspora communities after 2000s. These trends will be further highlighted in the following empirical chapters. This thesis is particularly concerned not with broader trends in return, but the return of diaspora to political office and the types of relationships that shape their power and authority within the home country. The broader literature on African diaspora and their return to politics is still relatively minimal, but certain trends in political involvement are broadly comparable.

For instance, diaspora initially played a relatively minor role in the politics of post-independence. They provided some of the political elites (namely, a class of colonial era-educated elites), but these individuals were for the most part not considered 'diaspora'[9] by locals. Key individuals received education abroad (namely, in the UK and Italy throughout the colonial period), but few remained behind permanently. Rather, the successes of colonial-era educated elites (even if educated in the West) were tied to their legacy in the liberation fight from the colonial occupiers in 1960, or to more traditional conceptions of political leadership and ideology (Samatar 1988). In Somalia, as will be described in further detail in Chapter 3, the axis of political power (in terms of the qualities of political leadership and acumen on which

[8] Focus group discussions, PDA, ADP, SDA, Hargeisa, Garowe, and Mogadishu, December 2016, May 2017, and September 2017.
[9] This will be defined in further detail in Chapter 2, but refers to a specific set of politically-active and capital rich migrants who can draw on social, political and international capital, and does not just refer to economic migrants.

elites depended, as well as their socio-political profiles) began to shift around the emergence of socio-political military organisations in the early 1980s. These opposition factions to Siad Barre's military rule were financially and ideologically powered by diaspora groups (although to varying extents). Thus, the more covert support provided in the 1980s became more overt political activity by the 1990s. These movements, and the disparate state formation processes that followed, empowered the diaspora to engage in politics in greater numbers, but with varying successes.

After the 1990s, and through the divergent processes of state-making (see following section), the representation of diaspora in the governments[10] of subnational and national administrations increased. Yet, this occurred to varying degrees and reflected different domestic and international opportunity structures and constraints. Table 2 presents preliminary figures from 2001 until 2011, drawing on figures collected by Ibrahim Ismail (2011). Original data is provided in Table 3 regarding the distribution of ministerial/cabinet seats and the top positions as of May 2017. This data was collected through careful triangulation with government legers, officials and respondents. Although it is certainly not a definitive measurement, due to the frequency of government reshuffles (see 4.3), these figures nonetheless provide an indication of variation across the three contexts in terms of periods of increases and reductions following specific elections, and the contemporary surge in the localisation or rescaling of diaspora by domestic actors. The figures for the period 2001 until 2011, presented in Table 2, demonstrate a general increase in diaspora representation after 2001.

**Table 2.** *Diaspora in governments, 2001 and 2011.*

| | 2001 | 2011 |
|---|---|---|
| TNG/TFG | 51.6 | 67.86 |
| Somaliland | 3.8 | 31.8 |
| Puntland | 22.2 | 53.85 |

*Source: Ismail 2011*

Yet, a few dimensions are particularly interesting. For instance, Somaliland presents the lowest representation overall of diaspora politicians in government during this period, which is at odds

[10] This figure includes ministers and vice-ministers, other figures are provided in Chapter 6 in terms of technocratic assistance programmes.

with prevailing assumptions about the Somaliland state as a diasporic–led agenda[11] (see Bradbury 2008; Renders 2012; Phillips 2016). As will be demonstrated further in Chapter 3, the very low representation in 2001 is in line with the post-war political settlement and the referendum on the diaspora question after the 1991 Burco conference. At this conference, clan elders asserted control over the Somaliland state project and sidelined diaspora actors who were associated with the divisive legacy of the Somaliland National Movement (SNM). By contrast, in Puntland and Somalia, the high number in 2011 was a product of internationally-led statemaking processes (in Somalia) and the election of diaspora candidates (in Puntland with the election of Mohamed Faroole in 2009). In addition, the legacies of direct diaspora involvement within the liberation movements differed and were less decisive, and Puntland and Somalia had weaker institutions and internal legitimacy requirements and were beholden to the broader demands and conditionalities of statebuilding agenda. The figures by May 2017 are provided below:

**Table 3.** *Diaspora in Governments, 2017.*

| | 2017 |
|---|---|
| SFG | 55.0 |
| Somaliland | 18.0 |
| Puntland | 45.0 |

*Source: Rates collected as of May 2017*

By 2017, the figures of diaspora representation stagnated or reduced in the SFG and Puntland, and increased only slightly in Somaliland. Contemporary trends do not follow what may be expected in terms of the advancing maturity of diaspora, open participatory politics, neoliberal assumptions about elite change (as the state modernises, it requires new skills), or the political marketplace (de Waal 2015). It could be argued that poor security environments, troubled political times and bad economic periods may mean diaspora are loath to return and diaspora chose to stay away. These may certainly be contributing factors, but this thesis lays out other international and domestic factors which are perhaps more convincing in explaining fluctuation, variation and reduction. This thesis highlights particular features of state formation processes (relationships with the international system), clan politics and elite pacts that define

[11] These assumptions included that diaspora represented a larger total percentage of population when compared to the other contexts and that diaspora contributed more to societal income than in any other major region of the Somali space.

certain conceptualisations of diaspora as allies, resources or political threats, as well as the political opportunities for diaspora returnees seeking political office. As will be outlined in the following chapter, the process of state formation shapes, on the one hand, the domestic conditions and pressures around diaspora return. Thus, more closed institutional arrangements, aspects of societal responsive and internal legitimacy requirements, and stronger elite pacts, as is the case in Somaliland, may discourage diaspora political engagement. On the other hand, international opportunity structures (around statebuilding relationships and conditionalities) affect the rise and fall of diaspora politicians. Such relationships are characterised by direct international interventions, aid conditionalities, or more discrete diaspora-donor partnerships.

The political developments that emerged post-2009 surrounding the rise and fall of diaspora leaders reflected such characteristics around variation as well as comparable trends. What would occur in Somaliland in 2010, Puntland in 2014 and Somalia in 2009 and again in 2017 was the election of diaspora candidates, the quick rise of a majority diaspora cabinet and their dissolution with a discernible political backlash in the form of a 'local' turn. The political backlash that occurred in Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland in 2012, 2016 and 2018 transpired with different intensity. These elections each saw a return to more 'local' politicians, who were perceived as more accountable, transparent and nationally committed leaders, with a significant reduction of diaspora at the cabinet level. The election models varied from popular elections in Somaliland to selection procedures in Somalia and Puntland, but across the cases the 'local' turn exposed a shift in popular opinion away from forms of international intervention and a distaste for the particular actions of diaspora leaders. They failed to balance external and internal demands and constituency, and transparency in networks and objectives was a source of concern. In each case, these leaders aggravated forms of identity politics – popular anxiety about issues of citizenship and ownership of the state project, but also where processes of 'diasporisation' are rooted in conditions of colonial-era subjugation, inequity within the global capitalist system and prolonged processes of social stratification (Brand 2016).

### 1.2 Post-colonial state-making, variation and the diaspora question

One of the primary arguments of this thesis is that the ways in which the politics of diaspora return unfold across the three cases is closely tied to processes of state formation and international recognition that transpired after the collapse of the Somali Federal Republic in 1991. These processes are not concluded but persist. In terms of state formation, embryonic

governments emerged in the northwest and northeast out of the liberation movements of the 1980s that rose and opposed the regime of Siad Barre. These include in the northwest, the Republic of Somaliland which still seeks international recognition as a sovereign state. In the northeast, since 1998, the Puntland State of Somalia seeks semi-autonomous status in a federal Somalia. Unlike Somaliland, which seeks independence, Puntland only seeks greater autonomy and power (even dominance) within a federal structure. Puntland never enjoyed a distinct legal identity in international law, unlike Somaliland's colonial experience as a separate administration from the south (Reno 2003). Puntland is a clan rather than a state project (Reno 2003). Its 'national' borders do not correlate to colonial ones, and are hotly disputed with Somaliland and the federal member states. These state and non-state claims are tied to certain features of clan politics and historical legacies of struggles for power and supremacy and are an indication of the relative presence or absence of forms of internal elite pacts, that also include forms of internal leadership requirements. They also shape the pull factors for diaspora to return to politics, as well as the external pressures around the 'diaspora option'.

The often imprecise debate on internal and external sovereignty does not quite capture these nuances. The reality of many African states is that they often lack internal sovereignty but hold external sovereignty, i.e. international recognition, which offers commercial and political advantages to a wide range of outsiders (Reno 2001: 119). What is important to the formal granting of international recognition of territorial sovereignty are the attendant perks – it 1) grants a state's sovereign control over a territory; 2) offers material and political advantages that exceed the resources that come with *de facto* control over a specific territory; 3) opens up diplomatic missions and brings foreign investment, access to private contracts, international aid and regional infrastructure projects; and 4) brings external legitimacy for a state to pursue certain domestic policies (that may include reclaiming natural resources) (Reno 2001). International recognition provides the impetus for ruling elites 'to seal new political bargains … [giving] private actors access to credit, a place in international forums, legitimation of wholesale privatisation of state assets, immunity from serious outside scrutiny, access to internal aid, and capacity to offer more convincing contracts to foreign firms' (Reno 1998: 222). Rather, internal sovereignty refers to the domination or authority of a state over its claimed territory and people, and the degree to which the state can expect voluntary compliance with its rulers' edicts, or need to resort to coercion (Migdal 2000: 110). In other words, internal sovereignty refers to the extent and evenness of a state's capacity to control and implement policies; the ability to project power spatially and socially (Skocpol 1995); its capacity to

maintain a monopoly on violence, control its populace, regulate institutions, extract resources and provide public goods (Geddes 1994; Herbst 2000; Soifer and vom Hau 2008: 200). In this debate, Somaliland is more internally sovereign, operating as a more of de facto autonomous state with a functioning judiciary, army and electoral system (Bradbury 2008; Renders 2012). always contained greater internal sovereignty than Puntland or Somalia, but lacks forms of international recognition (ICG). As such, it begs the comparative question of how international recognition and forms of international interventions may spoil or disrupt forms of internal cohesion, elite pacts and alternative forms of workable governance. Scholars argue the absence of global recognition of its sovereignty and diminished access to foreign aid has made it easier for Somaliland to forge internal consensus. More specifically, it has forced its government to look internally and to make deals with powerful groups, especially elders and transnational business actors, who hold the key to accessing overseas resources (Phillips 2016; Hagmann and Hoehne 2009; Hammond et al. 2011; Leonard and Samantar 2011; Menkhaus 2008).

Markus Hoehne proposes that the relative absence of internationally-led state-making processes in Somaliland and Puntland (as occurred at the federal level after 2000) made their state processes more representative and consensual (2014, 2016). Yet, the politics of non-recognition and sovereign uncertainty in both Somaliland and Puntland, and particularly in terms of diaspora return to politics, has represented the characteristics of 'non-recognition political stasis' (Johnson and Smaker 2014). Internal elite pacts (their holding power, interests and objectives) persist, isolated from external interventions or shocks, and they diminished access to resources (that include the incentive structures around the diaspora option). Even between Somaliland and Puntland, the contexts differ, whereby Puntland's uncertain sovereign status and ambiguity over where the ultimate centre of power lies (at the regional or federal level) has complicated, what Reno calls, the development of sustainable clan elder-business-government arrangements as has arisen with greater success in Somaliland (2003). In Puntland, local strongmen have always played a dual game of seeking power, when the opportunity presents itself, both in Mogadishu and in Garowe. Importantly, the Mogadishu-facing orientation of Puntland's top elites has often prevented the formation of stable elite pacts, reduced internal legitimacy requirements for its regional leaders and, at least initially, and diminished critical support from diaspora and businesses.

Puntland's non-state status has also affected broader progress towards democratisation (Johnson and Smaker 2014; Hoehne 2009)[12]. International donors have less leverage in enforcing reform agendas, which also may apply to technocracy and the value of diaspora politicians in top positions. Rather, the internal legitimacy requirements come less from civic or democratic institutions, or elite pacts (between political and economic elites), than from within the Majerteen traditional clan hierarchy. As Will Reno describes, Puntland represents a 'success of institutionalizing a "clandestine" economy under the social control of clan elders to create order and fend off political entrepreneurs who would otherwise have incentives to prey upon local communities' (2003). In such cases authority is heavily mediated by clan elders to manage risk, where they serve as credible mediators and guarantors (Reno 2003: 36). After 2004, Puntland's special status within the building blocks framework and its position within large counterterrorism and security missions (first piracy and then Islamic extremism) would provide the necessary political opportunity structures for diaspora return to politics amidst greater access to aid and statebuilding rents (Menkhaus 2008; ICG 2013; Reno 1997, 2003). Thus, from 2004 until 2018, Puntland's unique position within international statebuilding circles provided important political opportunity structures for diaspora return to politics in Puntland and dominate the top positions.

By contrast, Somaliland has stronger internal elite pacts (including rent relationships between political and economic elites) and legitimacy requirements for its leaders tied also to the threats it faces from non-Isaaq clans in its territorial boundaries (Hoehne 2009; ICG 2015). These include, in the east, the Diir/Isse communities and, in the west, from the Harti Darood. The nature of such clan rivalry, and the internal civil wars that were fought after 1991, strengthened key elite pacts, internal legitimacy requirements and even a 'peaceocracy' that has operated against the ambitions of political entrepreneurs. Somaliland also has the legacy of the failure of diaspora politicians to lead the state and facilitate recognition in the past. The former president Dahir Riyale was reported as saying in 2005: 'the issue has always been that diaspora go seeking international recognition and return saying, "I couldn't find it", and we are then left with their unfulfilled promises'[13]. In addition, the politics of non-recognition also meant diminished statebuilding rents and its relative immunity from international incentive structures

[12] A strong sense and commitment among the Majeerteen that they control the aspirations of Somali statehood (and the Hawiye) dating as far back to the Kingdom of Hobyo, entrenched their dominance in the colonial and post-colonial government since the 1960s, that has also driven diaspora political debates on statehood since 1998. Interview 35 and 36, Garowe, 18 April 2017.
[13] Interview 1, Hargeisa, 19 November 2016.

around the diaspora option. As a result, in Somaliland, also due to the existence of strong elite pacts, leaders face greater domestic pressure and internal legitimacy requirements to justify de facto statehood and their own claims to leadership. This partially explains why diaspora never became financiers of armed groups (Reno 2003) and how their political actions have been more closely regulated and even curtailed vis-à-vis the state project. This was certainly the case after 1991, and while a diaspora candidate was successful in 2005, Ahmed Mohamed 'Silanyo' also represented an old echelon of the Somaliland National Movement (SNM) leadership (having served as chairman from 1984 until 1989, see 3.3).

By contrast, in Somalia, there are fewer markers of internal sovereignty, weaker institutional safeguards, no elite pact and highly divided clan politics. Forms of international recognition and interventions since 2000 (support to transitional administrations from 2000 until 2012, and then to the first permanent government in 2012) have played a strong role in bringing diaspora groupings in and out of power both directly and indirectly, where diaspora politicians also pursued competing state projects (see Hoehne 2009, on 'mini-states'). In Somalia, the diaspora option (see 1.3) is in full effect which exacerbates forms of rent-seeking in clan-based political competition, where they are accommodated, coopted and competed over, while other vested interests and groups make competing claims to recognition and state resources. As a result, the politics of diaspora return emerged relatively less moderated and tied to a multilevel competition for power and recognition. They became gatekeepers of recognition tied to their performance of conditionality and stateness, and capacity to distribute resources. The diaspora option as was implemented in the Somali context since 2000 was a critical component of what Harrison calls the 'complex internal politics of extreme donor dependence' (2001: 65). Yet, as early as 2012, the legitimacy of diaspora leaders was questioned on the grounds of being disingenuous, outward-facing, and corrosive of systems of clan governance. As Nina Caspersen (2009) argues, reliance on external support creates serious dilemmas for authorities and may detract from the overall substance of recognition or their claims to it.

Across the three contexts, diaspora leaders faced particularly stark challenges in demonstrating how they balanced external and internal demands (Voller 2015; Caspersen 2013; Johnson and Smaker 2014). In both Somaliland and Puntland, diaspora leaders faced even stronger barriers given the institutionalised role of traditional institutions, the presence of economic elites guarantors and insecurity vis-à-vis its people and territorial and external sovereignty. There were also fewer international incentives for the election of diaspora politicians, and in

Somaliland, leaders also faced popular elections. In Puntland, the election of diaspora leaders after 2004, relatively unchallenged, was linked closely to a power vacuum from the old liberation movement, political distractions in Mogadishu, and new regional and international aspirations within the federal system. In this way, the three contexts provide different opportunity structures for diaspora contestation, for how diaspora politicians may rise and fall from power, given different historical junctures, internal politics and shifts within the global system (in particular, in terms of statebuilding and recognition). Across the three cases, diaspora politicians have played important and revered roles as moral and political guarantors of state formation processes, and as brokers of international recognition and state authority, but have faced internal challenges for different reasons (whether local responsiveness, failure to deliver on recognition, or overall challenges to their utility). The following section turns to how the 'diaspora option' is understood in the academic scholarship and international policy circles.

### 1.3 The diaspora option and the fallacy of modernisation theory

By the early 2000s, as scholars have suggested, the African continent became the primary testing ground for the 'diaspora option' (Pellerin and Mullings 2013). As early as the 1990s, the 'diaspora option' emerged within international policy circles as it captured a changing political economy of new development and a major intellectual shift that was occurring within both migration studies and development studies. A bulk of literature on the diaspora-development nexus suggested the developmental possibilities offered by diasporic transnational exchanges, which presented states and international aid institutions like the World Bank with new ways to revise and restructure their own programmes of official development assistance (Guarnizo and Smith 1999; Schiller and Faist 2009). The idea was that 'diasporas' are suited to generating new flows of human and economic capital to poor, crisis-stricken countries in the global South (Pellerin and Mullings 2013). It was based on erroneous assumptions within modernisation and political development theory about the symbolic valence of expertise and about state failure. The latter was fixated on structural analysis and was uncomfortable with African idiosyncrasies and difference within the global development of the capitalist world (Berman 1997). As such, the diaspora option was tied to a selective and narrow neoliberal orientation that was wedded to the principles of free market and private sector-led development about the nature of diasporic engagement and the types of migrants best suited to be partners in state development agendas. The diaspora option was also driven

by a deep mistrust of the African state but practical acknowledgement that forms of 'local' ownership were necessary for the state project.

In this way, theories emerging from new development studies informed policy orientations were tied to broader macro-economic and political shifts in how economic development was conceived during the 1990s. The most important of these was the realisation that growth-oriented policies of the 1980s had not produced the levels of investment and growth that had been anticipated, which highlighted failures in management and knowledge production (Mohan 2008; Gamlen 2010). The failure of the Washington Consensus led many development scholars, and ultimately the Bretton Woods institutions themselves, to advocate for a new strategy of development that was oriented towards reducing poverty and building institutions capable of supporting liberalised markets (World Bank 2005; Mohan 2008; Gamlen 2010). New conceptions pointed to the complementary role that knowledge played in the accumulation of capital, where migrant communities came to be seen as crucial actors in post-Washington Consensus strategies, as a solution to failed economic development initiatives. As a result, the 'diaspora option' became more clearly articulated in the policy orientation and development strategy pursued by donors (IOM 2005; World Bank 2011), particularly in countries with large migrant populations across Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Eastern Europe.

As early as 1997, Jean-Baptiste Meyer and colleagues used the term 'diaspora option' to describe the emergence of policies to remotely mobilise intellectuals abroad to contribute to scientific and cultural programmes at home. By the early 2000s, the diaspora option focused more on an institutionalised strategy that saw diaspora as critical 'bridges' between investors and market opportunities in their home countries, and as building broader democratic regimes and knowledge economies (Ionescu 2006; Kuznetsov 2006; Pellerin and Mulling 2013: 98). The 2003 Maputo Summit of the African Union laid out a broader set of partnerships and donor strategies which sought to harness diaspora skills for institutional building, good governance demands and bridging diaspora communities and the state (Africa Union 2005). The term was

officially adopted within core programming of the World Bank by 2004,[14] and associated with a set of policy orientations aimed at utilising, not only the human and social capital, but importantly, the economic capital of migrant populations to revitalise levels of investment, skill and development in the places where they maintain ancestral ties (Pellerin and Mullings 2013: 113).

In its early conceptions, the diaspora option only sought to formalise the economic activities of diasporic populations that were already occurring around remittances. The initial intention was perceived as a win-win solution that reconciled desires of a maturing diaspora population to support their homelands with the financial and human capital needs of these states (Pellerin and Mullings 2013: 93). It was an alternative option to aid within broader structural adjustment programmes and post-war reconstruction[15]. By September 2007, the World Bank proposed the critical involvement of diaspora consultants within the Africa Development Programme (ADP) to 'enable the Bank to develop good working relationship with the African Diaspora who can utilise their expertise to strengthen the performance of Bank-assisted operations in Africa'[16]. By this point, the World Bank began to employ this term to describe its overall strategy to engage diaspora and explicitly for increasing the efficiency of its programming around public financial management and institution-building (World Bank 2007a). Thereafter, it was institutionalised as a critical component of statebuilding and economic development efforts by the United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Union (AU) across the African continent. In 2012, the African Development Bank Group's 10-year Strategy for Africa slated African diaspora as constituting a critical development partner, offering solutions for fiscal and core market concerns that could support economic liberalisation, but also as partners in building 'knowledge economies' and accountable states. Thus, diaspora were perceived as critical not just to economic outcomes but also to good governance and the building of institutions that could support liberalised markets

[14] In 2004, the World Bank and the Belgian Government hosted over 200 representatives from African community organizations in Belgium, nongovernmental organisations and academics at an event entitled 'Dialogue Day on "Africa and Globalization": The Role of Diasporas in the Development of SubSaharan Africa'. At the conference both the Belgian Minister of Development Cooperation and Jean-Baptiste Meyer (who convened a workshop) utilized the term 'diaspora option' to describe the process of creating strategic policies for encouraging highly skilled diaspora to participate in development programs in their home countries.

[15] Thus, in its earliest phase, the World Bank presented diaspora partnerships as the main instrument of investment potential that sought to replace aid (World Bank 2005). States would benefit from the economic, human and social capital of migrant groups in their diaspora and migrant groups benefit from becoming development partners in the places where they maintain affective ties.

[16] 'Concept Note: Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Development', World Bank, September 7, 2007, p. 5, at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDIASPORA/General/21686696/conceptnote.pdf.

and political systems (World Bank 2011: 11; Pellerin and Mullings 2013: 11–13; Stieglitz 1989).

It is important to understand that the diaspora option was being employed in other ways outside the World Bank framework, even if not referred to by name. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, international donors and diplomatic missions frequently and indirectly evoked the diaspora option pursuant explicitly to peace and statebuilding goals (as unfolded in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Somalia). These diaspora interlocutors had the advantage of having the ear of key donors abroad, who saw them as more reasonable actors capable of change. As a result, they were 'activated' partners in forging power-sharing arrangements. In such contexts, the UN, international diplomats and third–party mediators brought in interim administrations and sought to replace warlords or ethnic and ideological leaders with diaspora 'technocrats' (Harling 2012; Dodge 2005; Giustozzi 2013; Zintl 2017, see also Chapter 2). In each case, a more diverse and educated, diaspora class — comprised of more pragmatic and Western–leaning elites — was put in place. The underpinning assumptions of such practices were that Western-educated elites (with their exposure to liberal values) were best-placed to overcome issues of institutional weakness, corruption and the 'big man' politics endemic to post-conflict weak states, and that, through certain donor-diaspora tethering, Western actors could enforce such agreements by proxy.

As is demonstrated in this thesis, the orientation is less than coherent in terms of objectives, collective action or impact, but is nonetheless streamlined in donor orientations around all matters of statebuilding (civil service reform, bureaucratisation and policy formation and implementation). It comprises a broad orientation with underlying assumptions and strategies that involve technocratic assistance and return programmes, and other forms of conditionalities and donor–diaspora partnerships that become core components of statebuilding and peacebuilding processes. These policy orientations are not consistently implementing across the Somali territories, by are influenced by: different colonial legacies (and guilt); the orientations and size of respective diaspora communities; as well as state formation processes and ongoing politics of recognition (that include the geopolitical interests and discretion of donors). Given this understanding, the scope of the overall diaspora option (before rescaling) in Somaliland is still less than in Somalia and Puntland. Despite Somaliland's special status and close working relationship with the international system (namely UK and EU), the politics of non-recognition and its diaspora lobbying capacity is considerably less compared to

Puntland and Somalia. Thus, while Somaliland retains its de facto statehood since the 1990s, its state-building development has occurred with considerably less donor involvement than in Puntland or Somalia. With no formal recognition, Somaliland is also not subject to the same forms of conditionalities or international pressures around statebuilding (and thus the forms of programmatic implementation, both formal and informal, that would also affect bureaucratic and political reform agendas communicated through the diaspora option). By contrast, in the Puntland and Somalia, the 'diaspora option' was implemented in full force through international peace-building and statebuilding processes from the 2000 Arta process, and thereafter have constituted more complicated statebuilding agendas around federalism, recognition and reform agendas.

European donors also hold different relationships with the diaspora option given different geopolitical interest and domestic pressures that include the impact of immigration on welfare systems and societal cohesion, as well as economic and security concerns[17]. Such relationships between donors and diaspora may be characterised as quid-pro-quo relationships of reciprocity and exchanges of favours that include provision of exit arrangements, payments of salary, or even through the implicit threat of legal action or security for those diaspora politicians holding two nationalities. In addition, there are divisions on whether to support temporary skills transfer or permanent return, where voluntary return is frequently hijacked for other strategic or particularist purposes. Diaspora are activated by international donors as part of new 'best practice' paradigms of international interventions, for instance, inserted into the state through technocratic assistance programmes to influence good behaviour and adherence to reform agendas. Diaspora participate in such processes of activation and lobby for forms of authority, legitimacy and interventions, thus facilitating their role as brokers of the international system as well as state authority. Domestic actors, like diaspora returnees, are well-versed in navigating and repurposing policy agendas but may still be weakened by structural imbalances within the international and domestic political systems, specifically at the subnational level.

### 1.4 Diaspora return, brokers and public authority

[17] Interview 81 and 94, Nairobi and Oslo, July and December 2017.

There is a large bulk of literature on how brokers[18] and intermediators – such as government officials, heads of NGOs, neo-traditional authorities, experts and corporate actors – strategically negotiate flows of resources and political support between local, national and international levels, particularly in areas of limited statehood where governments are unwilling or unable to exercise authority. This scholarship looks at the prominent 'rule of intermediaries' (Migdal and Schlichte 2005) throughout (post)colonial societies. Scholars outline how they play a critical role in negotiated political power (Hagmann and Péclard 2010, and in the related dispersion of violence and fragmentation of sovereignty (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). In the case of post-colonial Africa, the structural emergence of brokers was linked to the lasting impact of colonialism and related patterns of state formation that were marked by internal centre-periphery dynamics. In these contexts, political power radiated 'outward from the core political areas' and diminished in the peripheries (Herbst 2000: 252). These gaps within 'new states' created a political opportunity structure where the reach of the state was structurally limited and brought attention to brokers as actors capable of 'bridging' between the national and the local, and between the modern and the traditional. Brokers also bridged gaps in social structure through 'helping goods, information, opportunities, or knowledge to flow across those gaps' (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 213).

In the study of politics in modern Africa, scholars highlight how 'brokerage' underpins many of the functions of new states – for instance, how elites outsource central state functions to influential broker figures (especially when the latter is militarily powerful) to integrate social groups into the decision-making process. In addition, it captures how elites rely on brokers to: distribute money, food, employment; rally political loyalties and supporters; extract resources from local communities; gather information about possible security threats; and facilitate economic investments (Christensen and Utas 2008). The assumptions of much of this post-colonial literature is that brokers produce 'state effects' by extending the reach of the otherwise absent state and producing state-related expectations, hopes and ideas (Hönke and Müller 2018). In other words, far from simply undermining the state, brokered state governance, in fact, positively contributes to the symbolic reproduction of the state. Yet, other emerging research conceives of brokers differently: as actors that operate in confrontation or even opposition to the consolidation of state authority, and which may prevent its realisation.

[18] In anthropological perspective of international development (e.g. Olivier de Sardan 2005), brokers are social actors who 'specialize in the acquisition, control, and redistribution of development "revenue"' (Mosse and Lewis 2006: 12).

According to this research, the relative power of brokers depends upon their capacity to identify and monopolise access to resources – from goods to contacts, knowledge and information – that are desired by one actor or set of actors. Thus, 'the broker gains power from the fact that without her cooperation neither group will get what it wants or needs' (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 149). In this way, brokers 'provide selective access to goods and opportunities and place themselves or their supporters in positions from which they can divert resources and services in their favor' (Roniger 2004: 354). As brokers depend upon their exclusive gatekeeping function for legitimacy and utility, they may resort to violence or intimidation to maintain their status as they are often interested in maintaining and accumulating power (Hönke and Müller 2018: 334). Such an outward-facing focus on monopolising access to external donors and resources, on which their political power relies, has implications for their ability to be trusted or representative patrons (Mosse and Lewis 2006; Olivier de Sardan 2005). The state will always seek to control such brokerage, even where brokerage becomes a form of 'institutionalised social coordination' (Hönke and Müller 2018: 332).

In terms of state control, it manifests in different ways. One strategy is where brokers as 'proxies' are incorporated into political and economic projects pursued by state elites and bureaucrats in order to enhance the reach of the state in the absence of functioning state institutions (Hönke and Müller 2018: 341). A second strategy consists of the selective engagement with certain brokers, as well as their privileged incorporation through 'power-sharing arrangements' (Boone 2003). Through these efforts, state elites not only foster competition between brokers, they also make institutional choices that aim to bind 'loyal' brokers to particular state resources, thereby enhancing the broker's dependency on access to particular institutions, while simultaneously weakening the broker's negotiation of power vis-à-vis the state (Hönke and Müller 2018). If successful, brokers lose some of their autonomy and become clients of the state. A third strategy that state actors resort to in order to undermine the power of brokers is the intentional bypassing of resources, or the channelling of resources to competing brokers, including the intentional de-institutionalisation of state structures that are tied to particular brokers (Reno 1998). Competing brokers, such as different national political and/or bureaucratic elites, can use their access to other external actors or other resources in competition in order to counter their influence (Reno 1997: 166). From the broker's point of view, the response to such state efforts, particularly those aimed at undermining the broker's power, are met with resistance.

The role of gatekeepers and brokers is frequently cited in the Somali context for understanding local governance and forms of patronage politics in Somalia (see Hagmann 2016; Renders 2012: 53). Within the context of the civil war economy, scholars describe how a class of 'gatekeepers' (known by Somalis as 'black cats') taxed and diverted humanitarian aid to target populations, comprising deeply corrupt government officials who thrive in an 'accountability-free zone', warlords and other leaders whose power base rests on their ability to exploit fear and insecurity (Menkhaus 2014a). In contributing to theorising around diaspora return and impact, this thesis positions diaspora politicians as important brokers within the international system and of international resources, foreign policy agendas, and even of recognition and state authority/legitimacy. The proposition is that while brokers effectively serve to push countries like Somalia further up the value chain and onto the international stage, they may be unable to fulfil local expectations of representatives and may even disrupt the foundations of participatory politics. In this conception, diaspora are not just 'development' brokers, 'cultural and social brokers, or intermediaries between a global discourse promoted by development agencies and local practices' (Galipo 2018: 117). Rather, they are influential political actors that broker 'capitalist practices and policy negotiations around the control and access to revenues and opportunities that "harvest" revenue from key gates between the internal and the external world' (Hönke and Müller 2018; Beresford 2015).

Their role as brokers within the international and state system may disincentivise cooperation and characterise new trends in elite fragmentation and discoordination, or at least 'bad rules' that are characterised by the selective placement of diaspora friends and networks that are part of the same brokerage logics. Similarly, such structures of brokerage may rival or undermine patron-client relationships that underpin notions of social coordination, social obligation and mutual vulnerability. Thus, diaspora brokers may operate in ways that distort lines of social cleavages and the mechanisms in place for reconciling differences and balancing interests. A critical contradiction emerges where diaspora, as gatekeepers, may struggle to be representatives or trusted patrons, despite ongoing conceptualisations and programmes that position them as such. In investing these implications and trends, this thesis examines the different contexts, international political configurations and opportunity structures for understanding how the diaspora option is wielded, by whom and for what purpose/whose interests.

### 1.5 Politics of scale and assessing diaspora impact in fragile states

The politics around the diaspora option and brokerage is deeply embedded in the crisis of the state itself — poorly institutionalised, internationalised and limited state systems — and the illegitimacy of the state and the elites that lead it. The absence of state control is important in terms of the lack of a coherent diaspora strategy to regulate forms of brokerage, whether through force, political ideology or institutionalised hybrid systems. All three contexts represent various crises of 'stateness', whether due to non-recognition (in the case of Somaliland and Puntland) or limited statehood and poor institutionalisation. Somaliland perhaps represents the strongest de facto state in terms of control over the security and economic arena. It has a hybrid institutionalised structure, professionalised bureaucracy, with a party system in place along with one-person-one vote elections[19], where there are stronger internal legitimacy requirements on leaders. Puntland has a weaker state by virtue of its porous territorial boundaries, the existence of multiple security actors and the nature of its clan rather than state project, and it lacks party structures or popular elections[20]. In Somalia, the state is even more limited, largely confined to Mogadishu, and heavily contested across territorial boundaries and through systems of clan governance. Popular elections are not held,[21] its bureaucracy is characterised by deep incompetence and spoils politics and leaders face strong threats to their authority from business actors, Islamists and regional parties. None of the political entities are secure vis-à-vis its political opponents or territorial sovereignty.

In each context, subnational actors still hold considerable authority in defining the legitimacy of the state. Thus, in such 'poorly integrated political systems, with weak aggregation institutions, ethnic divisions, and underperforming economies', clans and local elites, but also

[19] In Somaliland, although parliamentary elections have not been held since 2005, popular elections have included one referendum (in 2001), three presidential (in 2003, 2010 and 2017), one parliamentary (in 2005) and two local/municipal councils since 2001 (in 2002 and 2012).

[20] Puntland and Somalia both have held elections by selection. Within the current system, titled traditional elders chose the Members of Parliament (MPs) through inter-clan negotiation. The new MPs then elect the president, vice president, and speaker of parliament. In this way clans held considerable sway over the election procedures (see Chapter 4 for further detail). This system was slightly reformed in the 2016 and 2017 presidential elections in Somalia where MPs were selected through 51 delegates rather than directly through elders (see 4.3).

[21] As will be explored in Chapter 5, all three contexts under study – Somaliland, Puntland and the SFG – constitute weak, clientelistic party systems which are not ideologically-driven and lack party structures or cross-clan systems of grassroots mobilization. Puntland relaunched multi-party politics in 2017, ahead of the 2018 elections, but no-one ran as part of a party. Somaliland's party system is more advanced - having formed and persisted since 2003 – but it is not 'strong' per se as it remains mainly clan-based, revolves around personality cults rather than party institutions, with low levels grassroots mobilisation and high fluidity across coalitions and party lines. Somalia's party system dates back to 1969 but collapsed under Barre – only to be resurrected in 2018 – and offers the most formidable lines of opposition rhetoric and mobilisation.

international donors, may be more significant in shaping relations to emigrants (Koinova 2018).[22] Scholars argue that the prevailing existence of ethnopolitical or sectarian competition in such contexts position diaspora as primarily resources within the competition for advantage, where they may contribute to divisive forms of politics, around identity rather than political pluralism. Wendy Pearlman (2014) demonstrates in Lebanon how diaspora become 'bargaining chips, and turf [that domestic actors] utilize in their struggles between each other for power and standing' and in competition with the state (Pearlman 2014: 36; see also Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Lafleur 2013). In such 'divided societies', on the basis of ethnic, religious, or linguistic difference, she argues, little may prevent competition over (and through) diaspora from becoming intense, consuming and unwieldy (see Chapter 4). Partially explaining this mutually reinforcing relationship between sectarianism and rivalrous diaspora return politics is logics around rent-seeking through which different groups seek transnational attachments and access to international resources for competitive advantage in local political contests. As Leonard and Samatar (2011) argues in the Somali context, the diaspora (in a similar way to the power of businessmen and warlords) were critical in shifting the formerly egalitarian dynamic of sub-clan institutions into patron–client ones where 'patronage really depends only on inequalities in the distribution of life-sustaining resources and the need of elites for some kind of support from the less advantaged in return' (23).

Such patronage claims continue to dominate how subnational elites and authorities are able to secure their political and economic interests in contexts where there are an endless struggle between social forces over how resources are to be distributed, who is to benefit and where power resides (Van der Walle 2001: 264). In such contexts, 'the extractive and regulatory capacities of states … remain low, and the disaggregated extractive activity through rent-seeking behaviour by individuals within the state and outside remain diffuse' (Beissinger and Young 2002: 10–11). In this way, elites and subnational actors rely on their ties to those in political office for patronage and protection, where political representatives become critical gatekeepers (Markowitz 2013). Such networks of patron-client relationships — patterns of networks, politics and norms of reciprocity — expand across borders based on social closeness, belonging and relations (Lyons 2011). Such patron-client relationships (and forms of rent-seeking) become a form of social contract. Across the three contexts, the extent to which rent-

[22] This conception is also supported by Midgal's theory of strong societies in weak states (1988) despite its assumptions about the dichotomous nature of certain interactions – namely, state elites wanting to penetrate and reshape societies and societal resistance.

seeking prevails, and dominates interactions between the clan system and the state, depends on the relative level of spoils politics and the strategies available to these actors. The dynamics of these relationships are explored through this thesis by looking at systems of representative politics (Chapter 4), party politics (Chapter 5), and processes of bureaucratisation or technocratic assistance (Chapter 6). Rent-seeking and clientelism are not the only logics defining the relationship between diaspora politicians and domestic actors but they become an important component for understanding contestation, misaligned expectations and election strategies. Thus, while this thesis is an exploration of elite-level politics and change, subnational actors are principal actors in negotiating diaspora return, which unfold in ways not captured by theories around extraversion (Bayart 2000; Pfeiffer and Engelbert 2012), political marketplace theory (de Waal 2015) or strong societies (Midgal 2000).

The theory of extraversion has sought to understand how African elites and subnational actors, despite their weakened position, are able to extract material and financial benefit from policies within the international system (Soares de Oliveira and Verhoeven 2018; Clapham 1996; Bayart 2000; Pfeiffer and Engelbert 2012). Yet, within this theory, the role and power of subnational actors vis-à-vis elites is not the specific subject of focus. Political marketplace theory understands the interconnected global financial and political world in which diaspora may emerge as dominant within a marketised political system. Yet, it is not good at explaining the acceptability of such processes to local communities and how local actors may contest such imposed systems or logics. Another framework is provided by political economists who have sought to more systematically analyse negotiations around statebuilding interventions within the global political economy. They present a politics of scale approach to analyse: 1) the scope of broader programmatic agenda; 2) the forces of contestation; 3) the strategies or politics of scale; and, ultimately, 4) analytical outcomes. They evoke concepts of 'selective adoption', 'strategic selectivity' or 'rescaling' to capture the relationships of negotiations that occur at the boundaries between 'local', 'national' and 'global' (Olivier de Sardan 2006; Jessop 2008; Larner 2007; Ragazzi 2009).

For example, Hameiri and Scarpello (2018) analyse how statebuilding agendas (namely, the Aceh 'government transformation programme') are contested and rescaled within local contexts that account for different outcomes. This framework seeks to understand the interests and powers of different group (and the strategies available to them) to 'rescale' resources — thus, how certain resources may be 'rescaled' and by whom, and in whose interests these

resources may ultimately serve (Smith 2010; Hameiri and Scarpello 2018; Jessop 2008).[23] The politics of scale approach captures the 'power structures prevailing in given states and societies in particular historical moments, the main socio-political conflict faultlines, and state institutions that shape strategy of selectivity and the power of different social forces' access to state power' (Hameiri and Scarpello 2018: 151). The approach is characterised by investigations into how the quest for power and wealth is supported or resisted by other actors, and unfolds within 'historical processes of contested structural change' and the globalised political places (Swyngedouw 2004: 132). It places conflicts and compromises at the centre of the analysis (each denoting 'the arena and moment, both discursively and materially, where socio-spatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated') (Swyngedouw 1997: 140; see also Hutchison et al. 2014: 78; Jessop 2008). It highlights 'shifting organisational, strategic, discursive and symbolic relationships' (Brenner 2001: 600).

Although by no means the only analytical perspective or framework for examining contestation and outcomes around diaspora return to politics, this approach offers an interesting conceptual exercise for beginning to interrogate this new field of academic inquiry around diaspora return. This approach directly responds to Maria Koinova's request for breaking down normative boundaries and neoliberal understandings of values and transformation around the study of diaspora return and impact. She argues for the need to better understand the 'causal pathways of return, understanding politics of brokerage, coalition-building and "scale shift"' (2018; see also Adamson and Koinova 2013; Godwin 2018). Within this framework, power elites, key subnational actors (like clans) and international donors exist as 'scale managers' (Peck 2002: 340) who have different interests. For instance, elites may perceive the diaspora option to be reinforcing or undermining of their position relative to rivals. By contrast, weaker groups (whether clans in conflict with elite representatives or minority clans) may attempt to harness the pressure that international intervention places upon dominant elites (whether conditionalities or reform agendas) to attempt 'localisation' — rescaling such resources downwards to subnational scales. International donors as well may seek to take advantage of institutional weakness to assert greater control over how statebuilding agendas unfold, and over

[23] Hameiri and Scarpello (2018) use this approach to examine the uneven results of the Aceh Government Transformation Programme, financed by the World Bank and managed by Multi Donor Trust Fund, following the 2005 peace agreement and implemented by the UNDP and the Aceh provincial government. They demonstrate how predominant international statebuilding interventions take the shape of 'good governance' programmes focused on public administration reform and 'capacity development' where donors have attempted to limit their leaders' and populations' political choices through the strategic rescaling of public administrations (see also Brinkerhoff et al. 2012: 274).

the autonomy of diaspora returnees in the political and state apparatus. Within the different institutional, political and historical contexts of the Somali context, different domestic actors are unevenly allocated power, resources and political opportunities in such negotiations (Smith 2010), and how this internal configuration of power unfolds around the diaspora option (and to what end) is applied to the doctoral inquiry. Certain initial hypotheses and findings are outlined in the following section.

### *1.5.1 Scalar shift and impact*

Across all three cases, post-2009, the subnational and national administrations underwent transitions to diaspora-led administrations but also experienced periods of political backlash (in Somaliland post-1991 and again in 2016, in Puntland in 2017, and in Somalia in 2012). Puntland experienced a quick succession of diaspora candidates — from Adde Muse in 2005 to Mohamed Faroole in 2009 and then to Abdiweli Gaas in 2014 — that reflected Puntland's own internal power configuration and politics of recognition. In Puntland, there were fewer internal legitimacy requirements or safeguards for curtailing this trend than in Somaliland and each candidate served particular purposes for recognition within the international and state systems and for the broader clan project. Even so, a similar trend emerged in 2018 surrounding Puntland's regional insecurity within the federalist project. Sacad Deni represented local business networks and even minority politics over the 'international' (see 3.3). In Somaliland, the election of Mohamed Silanyo, a British Somali diaspora, in 2009 was an uphill battle from the start as he struggled to gain legitimacy (particularly given his divisive role within the SNM, see 3.3). He faced strong internal opposition from elites, clans and party structures, even prior to his election. His tenure was tainted by similar claims and he was succeeded by a notably 'local' candidate and former military commander in Musabixi Abdi. Similarly, in Somalia, the extended mandate of the TFG in 2009, brokered by international and diaspora actors, saw a local turn in Hassan Sheikh in 2012 but the return of a new diaspora group to power in 2017.

While questions of leadership succession are linked to the nature of popular elections, even where popular elections are not held (Puntland and Somalia), such shifts are not arbitrary. Rather, such transitions reflect popular waves of sentiment, clan politics and elite strategy about the value of different diaspora groupings and how to consolidate power. The 'local' shift reflects broader concerns about features of diaspora governance tied to anti-conciliatory

politics and extraverted policy agendas (7.2) and to obscured international capital and networks (see 2.3). Yet, the turn back to diaspora leadership in Somalia in 2017 indicates the complexities of balancing external and internal demands in contexts where the state system is outward-facing, particularly given its low capacity and capital environments. In Puntland and Somaliland, diaspora leaders faced larger internal legitimacy requirements and institutional constraints (including the paradoxes of non-recognition). The thesis proposes two primary hypotheses relating to the processes of diaspora return to politics and their influence, although additional arguments are proposed in the course of this thesis.

The first hypothesis regards the paradoxical relationship between the politics of statebuilding, diaspora return to politics and legitimacy claims. This hypothesis suggests that the politics of state formation and recognition (or non-recognition) create a crisis of legitimacy for diaspora candidates. Diaspora politicians, as brokers of international recognition and state authority, have to balance external and internal demands, where recognition (or the persistence of non-recognition) may delegitimise their authority. As well as shaping certain internal political configurations, such processes of state formation determine the extent to which diaspora politicians are seen as puppets of international interests, or as incompetent and unable to deliver on international recognition. Empirical findings elucidate the ways in which sovereign status and access to statebuilding rents may affect the political opportunity structures for diaspora to return to (and influence) politics across the national and subnational administrations. For example, in Puntland, the combination of low levels of 'internal sovereignty' (Reno 2001) and the existence of special donor arrangements has given diaspora candidates (and their cabinets) more influence since 2004. By contrast, Somaliland, despite its strong state claims, lacks recognition, which has often been blamed on the misplaced ambitions of diaspora politicians, also given the formative experiences with diaspora leadership (during the SNM leadership) (see also page 22). As a result, after 1991, diaspora candidates struggled to acquire authority amidst the uncertainties of non-recognition and diminished pressure for technocratic reform or the diaspora option. In Somalia, forms of international recognition bestowed on subsequent administrations since the 2000 Arta process have been explicitly tied to the power and negotiations of different diaspora groupings. The authority of these individuals and groups is challenged on the basis of failing to balance external and internal demands, particularly where competing claims are made to recognition and access to state resources.

The second hypothesis regards the political trajectories of diaspora-led administrations once in power. It posits that diaspora-led administrations, and the convergence of international policy orientations around the diaspora option, may support more centralised systems of allocating power and resources. This thesis demonstrates the ways in which the diaspora option is implemented by international donors and new elites that support the consolidation of new forms of authority and power around 'state logics' where resources and power are concentrated closer to the centre. This is evidenced, for instance, in Chapter 6, which details how technocratic assistance programmes are coopted by these new administrations to pay out political dividends, and to renegotiate the systems of representative politics and existing political arrangements. Such programmes provide opportunities to increase the efficiency of patronage distribution alongside new optics of progress tied to new public management (Henman and Cable 2018), isomorphic mimicry (Andrews et al. 2017) and technocratic reform (Thurston 2018). In addition, new strategies through economic and security policy aim to exclude and deliberately hinder the political development of key actors, including political opponents, and systems like clan governance (in line with Reno's theory on 'elite predation', 2015). In addition, through clientelistic party politics, these administrations distance diaspora politicians, their global networks and international capital from traditional patron-client relationships. Furthermore, the positionality of diaspora as brokers and gatekeepers of international recognition, resources and authority support more externally-facing and centralised rather than local agendas (Hönke and Müller 2018, see 1.4). Finally, trends in urbanisation and the concentration of international capital around 'state logics' reinforce such processes of centralisation that occur around a diaspora ruling class (see page 66 and 67).

### 1.6 Methodological approach to the study of diaspora return to politics

The above section outlines the theoretical and analytical framework for the doctoral inquiry. Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia are treated as separate political entities for purposes of analysis, because of their divergent systems of state formation and politics of recognition, as well as different conflict legacies and internal political configurations. Thus, the three contexts are bonded by Somali ethnicity and traditional kinship networks but face different political trajectories as a result of divergent colonial legacies, state formation processes and institutional contexts. These facilitate different challenges and relationships within the international system (including aid and transnational business) and also between domestic actors, diaspora and

international actors. The interstate comparisons (between Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia) are methodologically enhanced by an additional focus on carefully comparing different strategies around clan-based recruitment, party politics and technocratic assistance programmes that unfold within each context. Subnational units of analysis play an increasingly important role in comparative politics in theorising the 'multilevel' nature of political space and in better equipping researchers to handle the spatially uneven nature of major processes of political and economic transformation (Snyder 2001).

This comparative approach facilitates the disentanglement of Somali 'diaspora' (often interconnected in the transnational realm) by rooting them in the local politics of each region, divergent processes of state formation and ongoing relationships with the international system. Within diaspora studies, such interstate comparative approaches also avoid the traps of 'methodological nationalism' or 'essentialising groupism' that often overstate the group impact as well as the nationalist orientations of diaspora groups which have been often associated with larger comparative projects (Higley and Burton 2006; Bauböck and Faist 2010). Given the subject matter and the limited data available on diaspora return, the study is primarily qualitative – such approaches are needed to expand knowledge of 'illiberal' or 'nondemocratic' systems and their varieties and variants (Ahram and Goode 2016: 839; Gentile 2013; Koch 2013). Quantitative studies on such illiberal contexts have tended to overstate causal relationships, draw conclusions that may be possible in advanced democracies but not in such illiberal contexts (Ahram and Goode 2016; Glasius 2018), while also ascribing neutral values to the data that emerges from such contexts. These may include observation and inference, homogenously-valued data, the use of public opinion surveys and quantitative studies, as well as the application of rational choice theory (Ahram and Goode 2016; Glasius 2018).

Rather, rigorous qualitative approaches provide flexibility in navigating issues of access, as well as differently-valued and liberal assumptions underpinning research methodologies (Tansey 2014). Similar to research challenges in authoritarian contexts, weak states are regimes of 'structural opacity [in which] all estimation of institutional uncertainty takes place under conditions of informational uncertainty' (Schedler 2013: 5). In such contexts, the challenges differ. The state does not seek to: impede, conceal or diminish efforts to accumulate information; present one-sided data drawn from opposition figures; unintentionally replicate agendas of state agencies and nongovernmental organisations; or to stymie, through bureaucratic obstruction, disinformation or coercion. Instead, weak states provide issues of

restricted access, poor information environments and the prevalence of rumour-mongering and includes citizens' uncertainty about the state and the role of international researchers. In such illiberal contexts, exploring nondemocratic political rule, including its varieties, variants, logics and defining attributes, qualitative field-research research is needed. Yet, deep knowledge of the context and formation of strong local trust networks are required, as well as utilising repeat engagements.

This thesis is also deeply conscious of how international researchers constitute a 'network of influence' in conflict affected and weak state contexts like Somalia and comprise the world diaspora returnees and development workers inhabit. Academic research in such conflict-affected areas is often criticised for focusing on 'bureaucratic battles' that fail to understand logics operating beyond the compound and secure zone (Koch 2013; Shore and Nugent 2002; Gentile 2013).[24] The subject of the politics of diaspora return, on the one hand, acknowledges limitations of access the researcher may have in such contexts. On the other hand, this topic critically aims to interrogate, at its core, key relationships and assumptions around power, access and knowledge production within policy communities. In fragile state or conflict contexts, as Wendy Shaw writes, the 'adventure/danger impulse' often drives research engagement, which is preoccupied with gathering interesting stories (of danger and excitement), that often leads to insufficient attention to the 'embodied intervention' of the researcher (Koch 2013). This thesis goes 'beyond the wire' to reconcile domestic political logics, international policy agendas and the everyday politics of diaspora return.

Having also previously worked for the International Crisis Group for three years in the region, the researcher had built important bridges of communications and trust that enabled her to discern biases and to maximise understanding of such political landscapes (Koch 2013; Shore and Nugent 2002; Gentile 2013).[25] Grounded in broader understanding of the context, the comparative approach is used as a device to provoke and question, and contribute to theory construction but not to theorising itself (Levy 2008: 5). Rather, it gets inside the 'black box' of

[24] Scholars have also found that restricted access leads to 'embedded researchers' that produce important and high-quality work but which is often limited to a focus on bureaucratic battles that showed scant knowledge of anything going on 'beyond the wire'. In the context of Iraq, scholars have indicated how limited social scientific research had been conducted beyond the perimeters of American power that ultimately weakened the study of Iraq's transition since 2003 (Ahram and Goode 2016: 856).

[25] As scholars have noted, conflicts highlight broader societal imbalances that disaggregate power differentials between researchers and interviewee (see, e.g., Cramer et al. 2016; Ford et al. 2009; Gentile 2013). Even after the resolution of conflict, intergroup relations can be defined by an atmosphere of fear and distrust making the prospect of conducting research difficult and daunting (Bar-Tal 2000).

decision-making and explores the perceptions, expectations and strategies of different actors vis-à-vis the politics of diaspora return, through which it seeks to explain a particular set of relations and political outcomes. The empirical evidence for this thesis draws on extensive interviews, discrete observations and triangulation and observations undertaken from 2016 until 2018, with additional insights gathered before and after.

### *1.6.1 Interviews and source base*

In particular, this thesis draws on 95 semi-structured interviews with political officials (diaspora and local), government ministers, parliamentarians, academics and private sector actors, as well as traditional leaders, international donors and diplomats and diaspora organisations and activists. These interviews were held in Oslo, London, Hargeisa (Somaliland), Garowe (Puntland) and Mogadishu (Somalia) during two site visits in Hargeisa and Garowe, and three in Mogadishu. The period of empirical investigation included two important electoral cycles (parliamentary and presidential elections in Mogadishu in December and January 2016 and presidential elections in Hargeisa in November 2017). Additional interviews (beyond the 95) were conducted that contributed to the overall thinking and narrative but do not feature for a number of reasons (please see the attached appendix for a full list of interview recipients). In addition, three key focus group discussions were conducted in each context, and were held by local partner institutions — Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeisa, the Puntland Diaspora Affairs Agency in Garowe and the Somalia Diaspora Affairs Agency in Mogadishu. The aim of the latter was to convene diaspora returnees and locals in discussion about the key sources of contestation and resentment, and raise awareness of these issues and possible solutions for these institutions which lack capacity, training or understanding of the broader dynamics at play. Each focus group discussion included approximately 20 individuals, with diaspora and locals, more or less equally

represented, and which lasted 1.5 hours. Additional source material includes primary documentation[26] and secondary literature[27].

This thesis is acutely interested in the inter-personal, relational and the process-oriented dimensions of political and policy development, which highlights the importance of interviews for the inquiry. Due diligence was ensured at every level: findings were triangulated through interviews, secondary literature and news reports to avoid potential risks associated with elite distortions and self-interested biases. Political elites[28] (comprising both diaspora and local elites) comprise a key group of interviewees as they provide original insights for understanding: elite strategy, how elites are elected (or selected) and contested, and how elites, once elected (or selected), construct power and build political networks. Despite the strong criticism of elite-focused interviews, there is still broad consensus within elite studies that such interviews provide an 'invaluable resource for analysing complex processes of decision-making, the evolution of specific policies, the political debates and deliberations preceding decision-making and action-taking, and elite behaviour more broadly' (Tansey 2007: 767; also Levy 2008). As other scholars have indicated, elite interviews are critical 'for the study of recent historical change, process-tracing studies of policy enactment or implementation, the role of memory and perception in political or social activity, and the role of elites (broadly defined) in a political, social, or economic process' (Hochschild 2009). At each turn, elite narratives were triangulated with responses from activists, academics and bureaucrats, particularly for understanding the logics of the clan system (where there was often a stark

[26] These include published and unpublished statements and speeches, and analyses that included government documents and commentary, statements from Somali action groups in the diaspora (including mission statements), as well as other speeches from public figures.

[27] Secondary sources included consultations with local Somali and international media sources, United Nations (UN) and World Bank (WB) grey material, as well as private analysis outfits (*Africa Confidential* and *Indian Ocean Newsletter*) that provide up-to-date information about political developments, sequencing of events, the rise and fall of key political elites, and which often confirmed certain political narratives about diaspora. The major international newspapers and news agencies cited – *Reuters*, *The Guardian*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post* – have solid reporting on developments in the region, as do analyses from *International Crisis Group* reporting. Within the Somali cyberspace, with its more than 700 websites, political commentaries increasingly constitute an important public space for bringing together narratives. The author was selective in triangulating and verifying sources. For this research, the following Web sites were proven most useful: www.wardheer.com, www.garoweonline.com, as well as www.horseedmedia.com.

[28] See 2.2 for how elites are discussed within this thesis, as pertaining to 'politically relevant elites' that constitute members of the ruling party, and top government, administrative and political leaders 'who actually exercise political power', drawing attention to the blurred lines in distinguishing these categories in developing contexts (Kelsall 2002; Bottomore 1993: 7). It may include those that currently hold or compete for political leaderships, residing within the ruling elite, and others that may influence political agendas and define the themes of national discourse but reside outside the ruling coalition (Perthes 2004: 25). I use the term 'government' to refer to both a set of ruling politicians who are policy makers and bureaucrats as 'the higher, nonelective officialdom of government' (Kohn 1971).

difference in elite and local conceptions). Important interviews with donors and diplomats highlight the intricate relationships and power dynamics that emerged around diaspora option, which elucidated their intentions and objectives and certain policy outcomes.

## Chapter 2: Unpacking diaspora return to politics in weak states

The question of diaspora return and impact is central to broader queries within elite studies about why certain systems or elite structures change and, if they do, how such processes of change may affect fragile political contexts and economies. In the African context, for understanding the periods of elite change that occurred in the 1990s during the third wave of democratisation, economic explanations have largely dominated. The argument is that, in the 1990s, economic liberalisation and diversification expanded the technical and political expertise required to handle trade negotiations, policy formation and licensing (Daloz 2018: 532).[29] The rise of multiparty politics in the 1990s also contributed to the fracturing of old hierarchies and shifting the 'psychosocial make-ups and governing styles' of top leaders (Higley and Pakulski 2012). Yet, there was still significant continuity in elite structures, given the importance of patronage and private wealth accumulation for accessing political power which 'consistently gave older leaders the edge over younger ones' (Daloz 2018: 250, 542). The change of rhetoric by younger leaders did not always make them credible patrons. Here, Daloz (2018) presents a tension within ethno-political African states between the legitimacy and authority of 'strongmen' versus 'new elites', based on their capacity to accumulate wealth and power, and the requirements of leaders to be trusted patrons. He does not offer any definitive answers for why certain countries in Africa undergo processes of elite change better than others, or what the impact may be.

Within the discipline of politics and political economy, the prevailing framework for understanding socio-political and institutional change in emerging economies has been political settlement theory. This theory is not great at explaining elite change – why elites lose out or others win at particular transitions. Rather, it helps to explain how and why elites come together or fail to do so, and the holding power of elites. Political settlement theorists acknowledge a reciprocal relationship between economic shifts, systems of distributive politics and shifts in elite pacts (and, thus, the composition of elites) (Phillips 2015; Phillips and Hunt 2017; Whitfield 2015; Mohan and Asante 2015). As a result, political settlement theorists propose a primarily economic perspective for understanding elite change. In their interpretation, the availability of new economic resources and market opportunities affect the holding coalition's ability to control its flows and distribution and sustain political

[29] The broader study of elite politics and elite change was relatively dormant during the 1970s and 1980s given dominant authoritarianism and the political longevity of post-liberation African leaders (Daloz 2018: 242).

arrangements through local politics of clientelism, which may in turn affect a shift in forms of elite composition (see Khan 2010; Whitfield 2015; Chandhoke 2010). Nonetheless, critics and new research within the field of political economy challenge its omission of other factors that affect the legitimisation of political settlements or elite pacts, and their holding power. These include, for instance, the role of discourses and narrative (Behuria et al 2017; Gray 2018; Whitfield 2018). Other factors include the direct role of international actors and bureaucracies in instigating shifts in elite structures. In one study, Francis (2011) argues that structures of elite turnover in KwaZulu-Natal legislature in South Africa followed distinct features of intra-party political culture and a history of party fracture lines, rather than suggesting any link to critical shocks or economic shifts (287).

The other critical question within elite studies pertaining to elite change regards the 'healthy standard' or 'optimal rate' of elite turnover or 'strategic selectivity' necessary to maintain elite coherence and political stability (see Jessop 2008, 2013; Best and Higley 2018; Cotta 2018: 646–47)[30]. The underpinning assumption of democratisation theory has been that elite change is healthy, but also that the incorporation of elite survivors of the old regimes has a positive effect on political stability and on avoiding economic collapse, civil strife, and other calamities. More recently, scholars have begun to suggest that greater elite continuity may be needed for political consolidation, building consensus and forestalling limitless fragmentation (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009; Phillips 2016; Hamidu 2015). In a few key studies, including one on Somaliland (Phillips 2016), development outcomes were found to be better guaranteed by relatively high levels of continuity in their formally, or informally, defined membership as this meant they could reach consensus, implement policy agendas and establish greater popular legitimacy[31]. It is this interpretation that has underpinned World Bank theorising around greater bureaucratic and political elite continuity, as part of an effort to reduce patronage appointments

[30] Furthermore, such processes are 'dictated by the need to acquire new competences required by a particular situation, by the necessity to co-opt external elements that threaten the hegemony of an existing elite, and by the need to defend its legitimacy by demonstrating its openness to new experiences' (Cotta 2018: 566).

[31] Common characteristics of elites (around shared experience of conflict, common socio–political profile or education) prove indispensable for consensus-building (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009; Phillips 2016; Hamidu 2015). Thus, Botswana national elites' common educational background was viewed as forming the backbone of a successful 'grand coalition' (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009: 5–6) that allowed it to retain party dominance against any opposition and to implement key development agendas. Sarah Phillips similarly proposes that in Somaliland the common educational experience of core elites at Sheekh and Amoud secondary schools – cross–clan and merit-based institutions – was critical for facilitating consensus-building and alliance-building across party lines for a small group of elites that have dominated the political scene since (2016). Ghana's macro-economic growth and development outcomes were similarly linked to a common educational background of key reformist leaders at Achimota (Hamidu 2015).

characterised by frequent government reshuffles and volatility in elite and state turnover in personnel (see Chapter 6). Thus, the diaspora option emerged as a key element in the convergence of academic and policy directions about the positive contributions of diaspora to economic development, but also about how to streamline elite continuity, under the guise of technocratic reform, bureaucratic efficiency and antipatronage politics (World Bank 2015). Yet, the risk is clear: continuity can also indicate an amassing of patronage, or a closed political system, as may be the case in Somaliland. In Somaliland, institutionalised clan structures and homogeneity provide minimal political space for outsiders. The diaspora option, however, also provides a broader political orientation supportive of continuity and the accumulation of economic and political power in Puntland and Somalia.

Thus, academic and policy debates have become focused on questions of elite change — about how to minimise volatility and to build cohesion in already fractured contexts. These concerns also coincide with rising elite differentiation due to increased heterogeneity in the socio-political profiles of politicians and bureaucrats globally. Elite theorists have linked growing elite fragmentation globally to: participatory politics; the influx of a heterogeneous and professionalised class of political elites; the demise of social class consciousness; pluralisation of recruitment patterns; volatile electoral behaviour; reduced acceptance of elite autonomy amongst the population; and 'party cartelization, mistrust of democratic institutions and politicians … the emergence of the strong personalisation of party leaderships' (Best and Vogel 2018: 356–357, see also Best 2007). Others link this trend to the 'personal powers' of the chief executives vis-à-vis the party's apparatuses and to the increasingly complex policy expertise required to cover most of the positions at the core-executive level (Verzichelli 2018: 583). As to the latter point, Best and Cotta (2007, 2009) argue that high turnover in MP selection in the EU parliament resulted from the contradictory co-evolution of participatory democracy and political professionalism. According to Best and Cotta, the inability of a representative democracy to produce efficient and accountable political elites contributes to establishing an 'autonomous field of political action with a wide insider/outsider gap' (2009: 16–18) which engenders increasing factionalisation and a crisis of leadership legitimacy (Best 2011; Marshall 2010; Higley and Pakulski 2012).

These questions and trends within the comparative politics literature and elite studies are highly relevant to the study of diaspora return politics – the conditions for systems to absorb elites and to what end. Diaspora return to politics, in contexts like Somalia, is also tied closely to global

trends in political professionalism, diversification in the elite class, the crisis of representative systems, and cartelisation and personalisations of party systems. Particularly relevant to the doctoral inquiry, is what Best and Cotta propose are the 'autonomous field of political action' and 'insider/outsider gap' that emerges in modern day political life (2009: 16–18). As is explored in this thesis, both perceptions of the autonomy of elite action and a widening insider/outsider gap are key aspects of contestation around diaspora return to politics. Strong demarcations of the 'local' and 'foreign' are tied to specific features of clan politics, moralised narratives around the legacies of 'international' and foreign interventions, and hardened boundaries about who belongs, questions of citizenship and who has the capacity to govern. In such contexts, the insider/outsider debate may come to determine key issues around bureaucratic representation, political party platforms and a candidate's legitimacy, and foment resistance and alliances against new elites. The ways in which this occurs is tied to the distinct historical, institutional and political contexts of the three cases.

This chapter examines the theoretical and conceptual building blocks of this thesis. Section 2.1 examines the contested meanings of 'clan' as a political unit of analysis. Section 2.2 explores how diaspora are differentiated from a broader transnational elite class and amongst each other within the political landscape (Section 2.3). Theorising on international capital (Section 2.4) highlights the forces of contestation around how power is accumulated and legitimised by a new class of global elites in ways that also incite popular anxieties about inequalities, foreign occupation and hegemonic forms of power. Section 2.5 then examines the politics of diaspora return within the strength of different clientelist relationships that emerge between diaspora politicians, clans, donors and local elites within the context of multiparty politics, technocratic assistance and clan-based recruitment. These three key spaces of contestation and negotiation underpin the empirical investigations of Chapter 4, 5 and 6. The final section (2.7) then looks comparatively at authoritarian and weak state contexts. This highlights initial patterns in how elites may seek to govern and control forms of diaspora capital and how the legacies of international interventions and aid relationships, institutional arrangements and elite pacts shape what is possible in terms of incorporating diaspora returnees into the state and political complex.

## 2.1 Clan identity, politics and the diaspora question

The use and definition of 'clan' is very contested in the existing Somali studies scholarship, as part of broader academic debates about how to avoid attributing simple agency to the phenomenon of ethnic group. The struggle is to not take it for granted as a unit of analysis, while also trying to explain how ethnicity and clanship nevertheless become powerful political realities with meaning and power as tools and resources in a wide range of political activities surrounding grievance and ambitions (Berman and Lonsdale 1992; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Mamdani 1996). Within Somali scholarship, while where there is general agreement on the basic principles of clan identity[32], the focus on clan as a political unit has often been associated with a reductive understanding of Somali politics (that ignores the fluidity, even multiplicity, of clan identity and other interests that include class, religion and individual agency). The focus on clans as political units is criticised for uncritically regurgitating clan-hate narratives or for reproducing quick snapshots of political realities aimed to make Somalia's diverse social structures legible to the political community (comprised of elite and international actors) (Kapteijns 2013)[33]. It is confusion about the nature and structures of clan politics that have simultaneously led to political solutions around clan balancing, power-sharing and representative system. In this debate, Besteman (1998) insists that analyses of race and class combined with competition over resources better captures the nature of the conflict and the subsequent collapse of the Somali state. Others argue that, in addition to challenges in distilling the multiplicity of identities (the extent to which identity may contract or expand) into clear units of analysis (Elmi 2010: 47), the diminished locality of clan, or the vigour of *xeer* and the authority of elders, combined with the dispersal and the globalisation of Somalis, has undermined the collective actions and structures of clan.

Yet, and importantly, Markus Hoehne (2016) demonstrates a fundamental shift in the structure of political organisation based on the territorialisation of clan identity as linked to the emergence of 'state logics'. He defines these state logics as the focus on asserting control over people and resources in geographically bounded space that do not correlate to traditional

[32] There is general agreement that most Somalis are homogeneous in terms of religion, culture (oral literary tradition and pastoral or agro-pastoral customs), language, and are divided along clan families and sub-clans, based on 'patrilineal segmentary lineage (Adam 2008).

[33] In theorising about the civil war, Lidwien Kapteijns challenges the notion of clans as corporate actors, arguing that the clan cleansing of 1990–1991, as well as other episodes of large-scale violence in Somalia, were perpetuated primarily by individuals and groups acting 'on a particular construction of clan identities or responding to narratives of clan identities'.

concepts of belonging or the 'network logic'[34] underpinning Somali sociality or clan governance. Rather, the new political 'clan' units tied to new forms of territoriality binds descent groups more strongly to certain locations and landed resources. Such territorialisation of clan identity does not constitute the re-emergence of clan governance as Leonard and Samatar suggest (2011: 567), as clan governance always involved cross-cutting ties (e.g., for establishing inter-clan alliances). Instead, processes of segmentary mini-state formation, now closely tied to 'state logics', are based on new hierarchies within lineage structures and focus on fixed territories, boundaries and social and economic exclusion (Hoehne 2016). Hoehne closely links such processes of territorialisation to the aspirations of diaspora leadership and politics of recognition within the international system that had emerged by 2000[35]. Diasporic actors of a particular patrilineal descent group lobby for and financially support the emerging politico-territorial entities through investments in clan homelands, international incentives around statehood, and the politics of recognition. In this way, diaspora contribute to the sharpening of authority structures where the motivation by diaspora and local actors is to establish territorial control in order to manage local citizens and the resources available, including humanitarian aid. This push toward territorialisation is rooted in the realities of the overlap between clan and state expansion (also other forms of hegemonic power tied to international interventions) that aggravates what Hussein Adam (1992, 2008) refers to as the 'obsession with inequality and recognition' within clan politics.

Adam argues that these two factors are critical to understanding collective action, and the stratification of Somali masses along clan lines. These factors may partially explain why Somalis voluntarily follow elites, not only during electoral politics but also during armed conflict; why they coordinate among themselves in vocalising grievances, making claims to

[34] In his estimation, it serves a cohesive force that until recently prevailed largely in disregard of territoriality traditionally underpinning pastoral nomadism and agro-pastoralism. Groups unite and separate according to situation and interest and, therefore, no clear-cut 'borders' between groups can be established based on descent alone. Traditions of clan exogamy, which prevailed until recently (and are still relevant, although less than in the past) also make it very difficult to delineate the borders of separate clans. Within several of these entities, new fissions or attempts to 'secede' have occurred in recent years (Hoehne 2016: 53).

[35] The Warsangeli in the borderlands between Somaliland and Puntland established the short-lived Maakhir state between 2007 and 2009. Just south of the Warsangeli, the Dhulbahante set up the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) administration in 2009. This was succeeded by the Khaatumo State of Somalia, founded in the Dhulbahante territories in January 2012. Some diaspora hardliners belonging to the Gadabuursi clan declared the 'Awdal Republic' in the far west of Somaliland in 2009. Also, in Puntland, east of Bosaso, the Siwaqroon lineage of the Majeerteen clan sought briefly to create its own fiefdom called Ras Caseyr state (Mohamed Beerdhige 2012). Finally, the 'state' called Ximan iyo Xeeb was carved out of southern Galmudug around the coastal town Hobiyo, dominated by Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Saleebaan. It is notable that most of these political projects are driven by a dominant agnatic group.

resource, and mobilising politically around the nomination of candidates. He argues, on the one hand, how 'clan' is a critical shield in the struggle against a lack of proportionality and uneven development, where capitalist penetration is relatively weak and distorted. In a similar way to how Fanon links the 'demands for social justice' and 'tribalism', collective action through clan is defensive politics in a struggle against uneven class formation and clan hegemony (Adam 1992, 2008: 125). This may take the shape of clan resistance to forms of hegemonic power linked to clan and state expansionism. On the other hand, clan serves as a 'positive group solidarity' in a quest for recognition, restitution and prestige (Adam 1992, 2008)[36]. Following from both conceptualisations, clan is more than a 'source of nominal *collectivity*, flexible identification, or a global network' (Gaas 2018), or a technology of power[37] or social abstraction. In terms of the latter, Lidwien Kapteijns conceptualises clan as 'a mind-set of the ruled as they interpret and experience the state and, through the state, each other' (2013: 76). Clans are, rather, also a source of political power and security that provides both the space and limitations for what is possible in politics. This is evidenced by clan conferences devising common strategies and their capacity to enforce norms of collective responsibility and punishment, social obligation and mutual vulnerability on political candidates.

These debates within Somali scholarship feed into broader comparative politics on how sub-national groups like 'clans' coordinate action and have an existence beyond the lives of particular members. For 'clan politics' to be defined as 'corporate groups', Helmke and Levitsky propose a number of questions: 1) What are the actors' shared expectations about the constraints they face?; 2) What is the community to which the informal rules apply?; and 3) How are the informal rules enforced? (2004: 727). In their estimation, the lack of enforcement mechanisms at hand for clan elders to sanction certain behaviour can be taken as a sign of the weakening of 'clan politics' or that they may not function as corporate actors. Such systematic inquiry of the extent to which clans function as corporate actors requires a more dedicated analysis of the Somali clan system and its politics, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this thesis does offer some initial insights for understanding how variation in internal clan structures shape projections of power and how clan elders still hold the capacity to sanction

[36] In terms of the latter, struggles for 'recognition' – historical quests for reciprocal recognition – on the part of individuals, families, sub-dans, clans and clan families revolve around the issue of pride, 'name', prestige and status, and where there is a solid material basis behind struggles for recognition (Adam 1992).
[37] As a technology of power, clan is a 'tool of the government in ruling its subjects (and of other political entrepreneurs competing with the government)' (Kapteijns 2013: 25).

and enforce decisions, including through candidate selection (Chapter 4). In addition, negotiations around party politics indicate how clans mediate the behaviour of elites through public forum and convening of clan custodians, in ways that engage actively in devising common political agendas and strategy around elections (Chapter 5).[38]

Thus, in this conception, clans operate as more than culturally important categories, but as organisations, i.e. groups 'conceived of as entities and cast as actors' (Brubaker 2005: 4; Migdal 2000). Rather than fixed or stagnate, they are dynamic power structures created and transformed in dialogue between the local, national and international. Yet, they constitute more than a 'contradictory mixture of lived experience and analytical and political misrepresentation and indoctrination' (Kapteijns 2013: 211). Somali politics, given the dominance of an oral society, has always rotated around negotiations and manoeuvring based on perceptions, misinformation or production of false truths that co-constitute a dynamic political reality between the local, national and international. The emergence of state logics territorialises clan identity, sharpens the boundaries around clans and the importance of internal clan structures (and cohesion), given systems of political organising within the federal and representative system. As respondents repeated, it is important to understand how clans and sub-clans differ numerically, in terms of wealth and certain historical legacies, and their needs and aspirations – whether reputation, money or recognition – that shape different calculus and tactics. Around the 2017 elections, clan leaders and local activists discussed the calculations being made at a clan level regarding whether an outside candidate was necessary (or risky) for political aspirations, whether they were required for reaching sub-clan negotiation, and how they would benefit (or be disadvantaged) by their candidacy vis-à-vis other sub-clans in competing for a given seat.

Thus, and importantly, the rising power of clan units is less a response to the creation of a 'globalized nation' (see e.g., Laitin and Samatar 1987) than to the territorialisation of politics amidst state logics. As the next sections (2.2 and 2.3) explore, diaspora (or *qurbajoog*) are critical allies, resources and threats in the competition for advantage within this systems of territorialised clan identity politics around recognition and resources. The following section explores how diaspora are differentiated from local elites and a broader transnational elite class

[38] This includes how the Habar Gedir convened repeatedly around the federal and national election processes in 2016/2017 in order to seek to overcome conflict legacies and internal divisions that had prevented them from establishing the necessary internal cohesion in order to project political power and compete for advantages.

by Somalis. They are differentiated as a result of donor 'activation' and due to local conceptions of their orientations, values and access to international capital (see 2.3). This empirical section contributes to a new scholarship agenda for understanding how diaspora are differentiated once they return, and how they shape local politics (Koinova 2018).

### 2.2 Differentiating amongst 'transnational elites' and the diaspora

This thesis principally focuses on 'ruling elites' rather than 'the government' or simply 'the state'. In the Somali context, the existence of fully-constituted 'states' or formal structures is a subject of much debate (Menkhaus 2006), where public authority actually resides in more informal power networks (Reno 2003, 2004). Scholars have also cited difficulty in demarcating a well-defined 'political class' in the Somali context, on the basis of any real cohesion, sustainability or common objectives and interests, and with any nation-wide support (Marchal 1996; Hagmann 2016). There have been efforts to delineate the early nationalist leaders who inherited the new-born state from the colonial rulers, and the military commanders and even warlords who succeeded them in power (Abukar 1995). Nonetheless, the study of elite structures represents an important 'way of conceiving power in society and attributing responsibility to persons rather than to impersonal processes' (Nugent and Shore 2002: 4). Relying analytically on a broader categorisation of 'the inner core of political power' (Lindemann 2010) and on 'political networks' (Knocke 1990)[39], this thesis demonstrates considerable continuity in private and public sector actors amongst a class of transnational elites who have retained a hold on power, and constitute key vested interests involved dispute resolution, compromise, and conflictual outcomes.

This thesis looks at a broad group of 'politically relevant elites' — those top government, administrative and political leaders 'who actually exercise political power' (Bottomore 1993: 7) — who constitute the superstructure of favors owed, friendships, and enmities and which define how political orders are created and perpetuated. The concept of 'elites' constitute those individuals who have influenced political agendas, carried out decision-making, and defined the themes of national discourse and what is possible politically for decades (Perthes 2004:

[39] This research project also refers frequently to "political networks" as a way of denoting political organization and connections between the political system and elites (Knocke 1990). This does not position the research project within "social network analysis" — the discussion of weak and strong ties — that is often criticised for not discerning clear boundaries between different networks, where the boundaries from one social network ends and another begins, that may inadequately reflect patterns of alliance-building (Knoke 2015).

25). Scholars such as Theda Skocpol (1995) have emphasised how the behaviour of political actors are shaped not just by rational self-interest but also by previous experience, societal expectations and historical trends. Drawing on original empirics, this thesis differentiates amongst a class of 'transnational elites', particularly the *qurbajoog* from transnational business elites, and also a class of 'diaspora elites' from 'local elites'. Before proceeding to explain how this differentiation occurs, it is important to explain how these terms and concepts are used within this thesis.

It is now undisputed that diaspora constitute a 'distinct political group' in homeland political systems on the basis of their collective (or disagreggated) orientation, personal experience and networks (Li 2008). These returning diaspora to politics are by no means a monolithic group, as the rest of this section describes in depth. This thesis refers to a heterogeneous and fractured group of 'diaspora elites' who constitute politicians holding parliamentary and cabinet office but also bureaucratic officials and advisors who have climbed the ladders of power or remained impermanent and transient members of 'policy communities' or 'advisors'. The thesis employs 'diaspora politicians' to refer specifically to those who hold or have held political office or lead political parties. The term 'diaspora' is used to denote social collectivities while 'diaspora group' refers to specific factions or political movements.

This thesis argues that critical to broader debates about elite change, the absorption of new elites and political rivalry is differentiating diaspora from a transnational elite class, and disaggregating amongst diaspora at particular points in time. Elite differentiation often denotes the absence of an agreed set of rules and the multiplicity of conflicting factions that prevents the formation of consensual settlements and can lead to divisive ethnopolitical competition. Differentiation sees the formation and functioning of 'elites' as a social process. It captures: the functional and organisational diversity of various elite segments, their relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state and each other (Frye 2001); the superstructure of favours owed, friendships, enmities (Victor et al 2018); and networks of influence and consensus. High levels of elite differentiation may engender fragmented elite systems and, thus, the formation of unstable representative regimes based on 'negative partisanship' (Way 2002; Frye 2001). Importantly, ethnicity (and ethnic mobilisation) serves as an important rallying influence for otherwise differentiated elites who cannot rely on alternative forms of intra-elite pacts (on Kenya, see Bedasso 2018). Thus, elite divisions can be deeply divisive and momentous for forms of identity politics and ethnopolitical competition. One of the underlying arguments of this thesis

is that diaspora returnees to politics may be more fragmented than local elites by virtue of different experience, exposure and donor-diaspora partnerships and which may increase forms of negative partisanship or identity politics.

In the Somali context, differentiating diaspora from a broader 'transnational' elite class exposes important internal elite factions, networks and legitimising narratives that have shaped political conflict, as well as prospects for negotiations and consensus-building[40]. Scholars often refer to a 'transnational elite' as constituting a fluid group of economic and political elites who are linked in distinct ways to 'global networks of trade and aid and also critically to the flows of ideas, education and diaspora experience' (Hagmann 2016: 27; see also Little 2003: 47). Yet, more recently, scholars differentiate a group of *qurbajoog* as returnees from the West engaged in politics (Galipo 2018). Notably, returnees from the Gulf, Sudan, Yemen or even regionally in Ethiopia and Kenya were not considered *qurbajoog*.[41] Most importantly, transnational economic actors were excluded from this categorisation because they had different mentalities, interests and motivations. Respondents explained how the 'local' knowledge required to do business in Somalia included a specific orientation to local security and economic arrangements that differentiated them from *qurbajoog*[42]. As one local activist explained, 'the business actors build business, hotels, import/export companies and, because of commerce, he is driven by security interests, not politics. He may be from abroad but thinks in a Somali way because of how business is done and what knowledge is required of owning and doing business'[43].

By contrast, being *qurbajoog* was linked specifically to outward-facing orientations, impermanence and detachment from local realities and perspectives. This conceptualisation was closely tied to the Western experience (specific Western values, support networks and orientations that included donors' agendas) and to specific familiarisation with how 'diaspora' do politics. The latter referred to past socialisation with diaspora political leadership around the civil war and statebuilding processes. This close association between *qurbajoog* and a group of returnees from the West was also reinforced by the dominance of transnational

[40] The 'globalised' elite class actually comprises four distinct groups: transnational capital class; the state fraction such as globalizing politicians and bureaucrats; the technical fraction of professionals; and consumer fraction (business and media) (Sklair 1998).
[41] The latter is understood within the literature as those who own or control the means of production (Sklair 1998).
[42] Interviews 77, 53, 54, former lawyer and professor, Mogadishu, 15 December 2016 and 7 September 2017.
[43] Interview 77, former lawyer and political analyst, Mogadishu, 7 September 2017.

business actors from the East in the private sector and their notable absence from politics. Thompson (2016) found a positive association between those that remitted more of their annual income and involvement in politics — i.e. that the same group of Somali diaspora (from the US and Europe) dominating politics were also less financially endowed and sent upwards of 40 percent of their monthly income back to families in Somalia. Gulf 'diaspora', by contrast, were wealthier, remitted more (although less of their overall income), but sought to return and contested political office less frequently. Such remittance expenditure has been seen elsewhere to shape a negative interest in returning to engage in politics around 'collecting a debt' that is also eligible to the population (Thompson 2016; Leblang 2015; Sagmo 2011)[44].

Thus, as was evident throughout fieldwork across the three contexts, the concept of *qurbajoog* captures a complex, value-latent relationship of meaning, ownership and power in dialogue between the public, returning diaspora and the international system. *Qurbajoog* captures the specific links they have to an elite international community of leaders, state-builders and policy makers – what has been referred to as a new form of international professionalism constituting globalised elites in emerging economies and which constitute a distinct subset of the transnational class (Jackson 2005). In Somalia, these diaspora politicians followed a typical route to power – progressing through leadership positions in host-country parties or diaspora organisations, international NGOs, or technocratic assistance programmes before seeking higher political office. They had established close relationships of influence with donors, international financial institutions and multinational companies that positioned them as important gatekeepers of international legitimacy and recognition. Yet, the fact that they constituted often nebulous networks and accumulation trends towards wealth and power, agitated class resentments, claims of inequality and challenges about accountability and responsibility (see Section 2.2 on 'international capital').

In his recent book, *Africa's First Democrats (2018)*, Professor Abdi Samatar distinguishes a group of Western-educated diaspora elites from the post-independence elites that led the independence charge. He sees the current dominance of Western-educated or 'tethered'

[44] Giving greater credence to the self–interest model (Gallina 2006), research also shows, that in contexts where the investment returns in private sector were low, more diasporic elites may pursue political careers with real chances of seeking such returns (Sagmo 2011: 109). Interview 73, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mogadishu, 16 May 2017.

diaspora elites as undoing the democratic gains and values imparted by the traditional class of post-independence elites. In his estimation, these independent elites reflect:

> A high degree of intellectual independence from Western education and thus untethered to pro-Western ideology (and indispensability). Informed instead by an amalgam of pride in the best of Somali mores, belief in the soundness of generous Islamic piety, equality amongst human beings, confidence in their own capacity to compete with others, and a strong attachment to the Somali cause (2018: 225).

Here, Samatar raises important concerns around issues of Western indispensability, insecurity to govern and commitment to the Somali cause that would be repeated in fieldwork discussions held around the politics of diaspora return. His brother, Professor Ahmed Samatar[45] describes the current class of diaspora elites as 'political street vendors', denouncing their low maturity compared to the civicness of the Somali population. He suggests that diaspora politicians out of intellectual laziness revert back to the clan factor as the unit of analysis for all Somalia's ills, but that they also consciously choose the clan factor as an effective way to seize power. For returning diaspora like himself, the political role they play is the source of deep internal struggle. He perceives diaspora politicians as both the solution and the curse of Somalia, despairing over the current practices of diaspora political engagement as without direction or moderation[46]. The tendency to perceive diaspora as a collective is at odds with how they are actually differentiated within local politics. Rather, diaspora politicians are differentiated generationally and according to their geographic links which, although highly subject, are no less important for understanding acceptable political practices and alliance-building.

In this way, domestic actors differentiate diaspora from each other in terms of how 'diaspora' are constructed within the clan system, and in line with how they are 'activated' within the international political sphere (Brubaker 2005; Alonso and Mylonas 2019). A broader debate within diaspora studies proposes the need to disaggregate amongst diaspora, which challenges theoretical assumptions on the existence of neatly matched diasporas and homelands. Group-level variation across recognised co-ethnic communities rests uneasily within the literature on

[45] Interview 24 and 25, US Somali professor Ahmed Samatar, 30 November 2016 and 3 November 2017. He is a prominent public intellectual and aspiring politician (having run for president under Hill Quran, although lost the elections in 2012 and became Kulmiye's chief political advisor in 2016).
[46] Ibid.

nationalism, as well as for the 'embracing' perspective in diaspora studies (Gamlen 2010, 2014; Koinova 2018). Yet, scholars highlight the need to see the unequal economic utility amongst different diaspora groups as it corresponds to the agency of subnational and state actors (Dickinson and Baily 2007; Larner 2007; Ho 2011). For example, Mylonas and Žilović (2019) examine how states in Eastern Europe choose to engage certain segments of a country's diaspora and not others depending on geostrategic interests and the 'activation' that occurs within the international system. In this way, a mutually reinforcing process of activation occurs whereby domestic actors differentiate amongst diaspora based on economic utility and 'activation' within the international system. This is evident in the Somali context, as such activation, which occurs across the regions, are tied to different geopolitical interests as well as aspirations around state formation and recognition.

At the state level, certain configurations of power developed between donors, activated diaspora and domestic actors. The most recent example being President Farmajo's election in 2016, as a US Somali diaspora, with his attendant incorporation of US Somali diaspora that responded to decades long activation of US Somali diaspora by US donors, embassy officials and other returning diaspora. This mutually reinforcing process of activation facilitated closer US foreign policy interests towards Somalia (see 3.3). The US Somali diaspora experienced a rebirth following challenges to their legitimacy for supporting the TNG in 2000 and a pivoting (of public opinion and economic utility) away from the European diaspora by the end of Sheikh Sharif's regime in 2009. By contrast, Somaliland and Puntland have seen a clearer and more stagnate process of activation where the UK and Somaliland maintain close reciprocal relationships vis-à-vis their UK Somalia diaspora based on a special agreement and Somaliland's high hopes for recognition. An implicit division of donor labour by the US and UK in respect to the two subnational administration has meant that Puntland appreciate an influx of US security and aid assistance. The election of Abdiweli Gaas saw greater representation of US Somali diaspora as a nod to a politically activated US Somali diaspora constituency and an increase in US security assistance after 2011 (ICG 2013). Yet, such processes of activation were also accompanied by rapid processes of deactivation or delegitimisation that were tied to political transition and other geopolitical shifts, embedded within crises of legitimacy of the state itself, subjugation within the international system and broader power imbalances within the clan system.

As a result, alongside such processes of activation, recognition and differentiation, there emerged strong, moralised conceptions of 'good' and 'bad' diaspora. These were highly subjective categories that nonetheless shaped what was possible or acceptable for diaspora politicians at various points in time — and thus, practices of alliance–building, and strategies of elite 'strategic selectivity'. Such processes of differentiation also became part of a self-conscious exercise amongst groups of returning diaspora who were responding to shifting opportunities structures within the international and domestic system. As Giulia Liberatore reports in the Somali context, a younger generation has en-masse presented itself as the 'good' diaspora in order to distinguish itself from diaspora groups and politicians who preceded them. These younger diaspora present themselves as explicitly apolitical, as being less fragmented than the previous generations, as 'impartial, neutral and unified' (Horst 2013: 229) and as a community of 'professionals' and global players who emphasise their Western education, mobility and transnational connections (Liberatore 2018: 154). Somalis conceptualise this group of 'good' diaspora as referring to a group of returnees who had left in the 1990s as children or were born abroad and came back after 2012[47]. This group claims authority and legitimacy on the basis of 'technical' and professional qualifications, their impartiality and indispensability to domestic and international actors as 'state-builders'. Yet, on the ground, respondents voiced many concerns around conceptualisations of these new elites as 'good' leaders.

As one respondent explains, 'those who had left in the early-to-late 1980s/1990s when they were kids, have only the clan mentality of its older generation who had left without seeing resolution to the conflict, and they have experienced deep existential segregation in the host–country and embitterment, they are broken when they return'[48]. Another respondent indicates, 'Even if these younger generation have less "skin in the game", locals fought, and fighting makes you humble; the realisation that without compromise and negotiation, you can't win … these diaspora return but never felt the anger/despair, instead they still believe that my clan has to rule'[49]. An academic reiterates a popular Somali saying, 'You never win without your brother', referring to the legacies of peacebuilding and consensus that he believes have been lost on this younger generation[50]. Such conscious rebranding by this new generation of diaspora

[47] Focus group discussions, Hargeisa and Garowe, May 2017.
[48] Interview 53, professor, Mogadishu, 10 December 2016.
[49] Interview 91, political attaché at the US embassy, 5 August 2017.
[50] Interview 53, professor, Mogadishu, 10 December 2016.

is tied closely to policy orientations around the diaspora option and to legitimisation that occurs under the umbrella of technocratic governance. Others raised concerns about their indispensability to donors and their lack of concern for norms of social obligation.

Nonetheless, such processes of differentiation, reinvention and categorisation exposed important understandings of diaspora political groupings and configurations that rose and fell from power at different political junctures. This first group of diaspora constitutes intellectuals and former politicians who worked for the post-independence government (1960–69) and Siad Barre's military regime (1969–1991), and who left prior to state collapse or in the latter years of Barre's regime, and went largely to Canada and the US[51]. They constituted a higher class and returned to government throughout the post-1991 period (until around 2000 and up until 2004). They were perceived as nostalgic for the post-independence order and the reconstitution of central governance but also differential to foreign policy agendas[52]. Second, was a generation of 'junior' intellectuals who started to return and engage politically from 2000 (although more vigorously after 2004) from the UK and Europe who did not have any formal government experience, who represented new diaspora professionals, councillors and managers of charity organisations, and who challenged the authority and legitimacy of the first generation of diaspora returnees (see 3.2). In order to differentiate themselves, this group presented themselves within the domestic and international arena as 'mediators' that also reflected new orientations around peacebuilding, statemaking and the 'bridging' capital of diaspora.

Such processes of generational and geographic differentiation (and social stratification) were less evident in Somaliland. Rather, it was evident that such processes of activation were tied to statebuidling agendas and discourse in Somalia and Puntland. Nonetheless, even in Somaliland, respondents cited disparate understandings of diaspora groupings, their objectives and intentions. As was explained by one local activist: 'All diaspora come back with different approaches to politics: Arab diaspora is economically powerful; UK diaspora has strong NGO and government involvement; Dutch diaspora has a very liberal, direct and straightforward approach that can be risky'[53]. This conceptualisation aligned with a frequently reiterated

[51] Interview 83, former political advisor to the US Embassy, 5 August 2017.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Interview 16, intellectual, local activist, and advisor of the Academy for Peace and Development, Hargiesa, 15 November 2016.

distinction made across the three contexts between the European diaspora on the one hand, and the UK and US diaspora on the other hand. Local activists across the three cases agreed that the UK and US diaspora have greater political acumen given their access to education and exposure to political organisation and civicness. They were seen to have more political or government experience, but were also enshrined in narratives around being the change actors (specifically the US 'American dream'), with high ideas of reform and transformation[54]. This understanding came with high hopes (back in 2017) of how Farmajo's administration (comprised of mainly US and Canadian diaspora) would perform. Yet, for others, the US and UK experience created arrogant politicians who were seen to 'come for the money, power and women', while those returning from Europe were humble and more focused on community — characteristics of leadership important for Somalis[55]. As one Somali political representative of Dutch origin argued:

> … they have a stronger value system that comes with humility that makes them more manageable and civilised. They tend to avoid attention seeking issues, even those that have ministries, and this is linked to mobilisation historically (they were always focused more on service delivery than political organisation)[56].

For other diaspora, part of the negative association was tied to the damaging 'ghettoism' of European Somali diaspora. The argument was that hierarchy is steeper in Europe which encourages insularity and clannism amongst these diaspora politicians in government. Locals argued that welfare support systems in such countries is an indictment against how these diaspora would engage in Somali politics. Thus, some locals differentiated US diaspora, who had worked hard for their money, from European diaspora, who were welfare recipients. As one respondent argued, 'The locals are not dumb and can tell the ones who come from America versus the European ones … Americans understand that money doesn't fall from the sky and that is important'[57]. Locals were active participants in the construction and disaggregation of diaspora, as they astutely perceived the policies of donors and variation in the available support systems. For instance, diaspora in Europe (particularly in the UK, Denmark and other

[54] Interviews 43, 44, 92 and 93, diaspora recruits and local activists, Garowe, Oslo and Mogadishu, May and September 2017.
[55] Interview 51, Dutch-Somali diaspora and current national security advisor to President Farmajo, 28 May 2017; Interview 59, Swedish Somali diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.
[56] Interview 51, Dutch-Somali diaspora and current national security advisor to President Farmajo, 28 May 2017.
[57] Interviews 37, discussions at the PDRC and the Somali Affairs Agency, May and June 2017.

Scandinavian countries) were able to access social support and other opportunities for their associational activities and political involvement in ways that were not available in contexts like the US (Anderson 2008: 92)[58]. In the case of Norway, the politics around return were critically shaped by important support structures that included a specific closeness of diaspora-donor relationships vis-à-vis development communities and foreign lobby efforts (see Horst and Tellander 2017, Chapter 6).

This underpinning argument for disaggregation is based on how domestic actors perceive their different economic utility and the divergent processes of activation that occur within the international-state system. Some donors engage in more active processes of activations than others (see 6.6). Such conceptions and differentiations are closely tied to demonstrated and perceived forms of international capital, tied closely to donor agendas and support structures, as well as past socialisation. The following section explores the current theorising around international capital — the forms of 'international' capital diaspora hold, how it is converted (by whom), and how it is accumulated and to what end. It contributes to an important theoretical debate for understanding the politics of diaspora return that highlights rent-seeking practices but also broader identity politics. Critical to the discussion on international capital are trends in accumulation, its obscurity in terms of convertibility and eligibility, and its deference to outward-facing, network-based power structures. As the following section outlines, scholars collectively agree that dependence on forms of 'international' capital shape new forms of power that may aggravate insider/outsider distinctions and forms of class resistance or 'rescaling'.

### 2.3 International 'capital', diaspora returnees and new class conflicts

The academic debate around international capital brings together scholarship from different disciplines including political sociology and elite studies. It is undisputed within diaspora studies literature that diaspora are important resources in political competition (Pearlman 2014;

[58] Interviews 82, 92 and 93, Norwegian embassy, councillor and Somali political activist in Oslo, 11 July 2017 and 17 December 2017. Norwegian dignitaries emphasised how highly they valued a sense of civic participation and political organisation, with financial support tied to forms of political organisation. A local councillor in Norway recounts how in the early 2000s there was the formation of at least 200 organisations started by diaspora that received money from Norwegian Church Relief (not political parties at this point)—'even I had started the Norwegian Somali Council with Hassan Khayre and Abdirahman Mohamed, but there was too much conflict between different organisations, everyone wanted to start their own organisation'.

Koinova 2010, 2018), but such forms of diaspora 'capital' have been under-theorised. In recent references to diaspora capital, Basaran and Olsson (2018) describe 'bridging capital' — the ability of diaspora 'to import knowledge and know-how from (mainly) Western countries and hence to act as brokers, simultaneously connecting the Western professionals of the international to "local" settings and using these connections to advance their own "local" agendas'. Similarly, Pellerin and Mullings (2013) propose how diaspora politicians facilitate linkages between diaspora associations and leaders in the homeland. These include by providing access to potential investors, donors, and trade partners, constituents for political parties. They also mobilise other forms of collective action that bring financial, reputational and relational capital. Yet, the focus on bridging capital is not value neutral but embedded within neoliberal understandings of diaspora contributions. In the Somali context, such bridging capital was seen as largely insubstantial, superficial and performative. As one respondent explained — 'they are privileged because they could speak English, the language of the international system, they dress well and can come to donor meetings and perform the role they are tasked with'[59]. As another indicated, '[what] they had critically learnt is to say the right things, at the right time to the right people'[60]. The questions emerging from these accounts harken to Bourdieu's theory of social fields, and the ways in which power is accumulated and contested.

Bourdieu is criticised for his understandings of power as a zero-sum struggle, and for his rudimentary understanding of the state, 'where a relatively strong state guarantees the existence of a unified market in cultural and economic capital and has the power to preserve certain domains of activity from subordination to external hierarchies such as that of the economic market' (Swartz 2013: 54). In addition, he is criticised for his limited view of political contestation that occurs only within bureaucratic and political fields of power, rather than also across political parties, electoral coalitions, and through social movements (Swartz 2013). In this way Bourdieu is not able to explain institutional transformation or social change, where and why opposition emerges in the political field, and what accounts for successes and failures (Swartz 2013). Yet, preoccupied with the dynamic interplay of state and society, how to think relationally and to perceive oppression and violence from the material to the symbolic, he motivated scholars to think about multi-layered power configurations which may also

[59] Interview 77, former lawyer and member of the ICU, political analyst with ICG, 7 September 2017.
[60] Ibid.

transcend national boundaries. Although not an explicit focus of his work, as he was actually preoccupied with 'isolated societies' (Hilgers and Mangez 2015: 269), scholars have since applied theories of social field to globalisation, Hilgers and Mangez (2015: 268) suggest how international institutions are playing an historically unprecedented role in 'constructing and disseminating international evaluations or standards which, in many fields, increasingly function as principles of ranking, imposing a specific form of capital and so unifying cultural hierarchies beyond regional or national frontiers'.

In his initial conceptualisations of the 'international', Bourdieu raises concerns for how a form of 'international' capital — harboured by knowledge elites who had gone to an international school, worked at an international organisation, had expertise or networks with international credibility — endowed them with the power to legitimise or discredit existing power relations (1991: 170)[61]. He demonstrates how the 'international' adds a surplus of 'symbolic' power to a form of social capital that is socially perceived and recognised as important. The fact that certain aspects of 'international' capital are *symbolic* — dependent upon subjective recognition — makes the logic of attribution and valuation highly heterogeneous, discontinuous and unstable (Bourdieu 2002). What might be a symbolic resource in one place, might be a liability in another. Bourdieu sees symbolic power as a mode of domination where authoritarianism is linked to emergent patterns of international capital accumulation and globalisation. He alludes to certain attributes of 'symbolic capital', in line with Weber's idea of 'charismatic authority', that accentuate personal qualities of elites as supposedly superior and that may transform into deeply personalistic and exclusionary forms of power projection (Bourdieu 1986; Weber 1968). As Bourdieu (2002) suggests, the struggle for symbolic power manifests itself in terms of identity conflict, as identity comes out of the struggle for recognition, stratifying ethnopolitical competition that generates divisions.

Yet, a weakness within Bourdeiu's theory is also the question of legitimacy (of symbolic power/violence), and the nature and dynamics of legitimation. As Hilgers and Mangez (2013) argue, the 'struggle in any field is a struggle to impose a definition of legitimate recognition,

[61] Bourdieu conceptualises the 'international' as harbouring distinct forms of social and cultural capital. Social capital refers to the 'aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition' (1986; 248). Bourdieu is also principally interested in how different forms of capital are converted and accumulated – thus, 'the various ways power aggregates, concentrates and circulates' (1986).

in which victory leads to more or less monopolistic control of the definition of the forms of legitimacy prevailing in the field' (6). Even Swartz (2013) seems to imply that as long as there is a kind of 'pragmatic acceptance' of the social order, then power relations are relatively safe and stable. The absence of proper focus around legitimisation has left many to theorise about how international capital and power is accumulated. For instance, Buhlmann et al. (2013) and Prieur and Savage (2013) demonstrate how accumulation of such capital foments important distinctions and political reactions, and excludes other forms of capital. Buhlmann et al. (2013) reflects on the Swiss context and argues how a new class of global entrepreneurs has emerged as political managers, through relying on their capacity to communicate with a foreign culture, their access to international networks and other forms of international experience. In his conception, 'cosmopolitan' capital becomes one of the most powerful resources which increasingly outstrips national forms of capital (2013: 215–6). Buhlmann et al. (2013) highlight important differentiation that occurs within national fields, between elites endowed with larger columns of this capital and elites that are more nationally enshrined, which creates certain externalities, inequalities and insider-outsider distinctions (215–6). Agitation that may accompany such processes of differentiation are exacerbated by the illegibility and lack of consensus about any globally valid form of 'international capital'. Such theorising on international capital challenges assumptions within the diaspora option about the 'international' as a social resource that breaks down territorial boundaries and class distinctions. Instead it may actually accentuate visible modes of symbolic and material domination, in particular as the international system remains the principal converter.

Elites who rely on international capital build political networks and careers that traverse fields of power beyond the state, rules of law and conceptions of leadership and authority. They are outward looking and stand outside any one national frame (Prieur and Savage 2013). How they seek to establish vested interest in 'national/local' contexts in order to maintain power may include overcompensating on performance of the 'local'. Links to Western education, diplomas and perspectives may undermine the substance of their political objectives and create contradictions around their legitimacy claims (Basaran and Olsson 2018). They also may find themselves at loggerheads with local institutions and in opposition to structures of local governance, authority and relations. In addition, 'international' reputation and networks also may replace local conceptions of trust as the forerunner to resource acquisition and knowledge exchange (Liao and Welsch 2005). This conception is clearly evident in debates and policy agendas that emerge in political narratives and party platforms, particularly how the rise of

diaspora politicians sparks a return to more national and symbolically trustworthy patrons (see Chapter 5). As was described by one local clan elder, diaspora return symbolised a deep existential conflict – 'Now it is no longer an external group that's breaking down our countries, it is an internal issue, how the diaspora members are acting. We cannot blame external actors even if that is technically what they are, so now we are left with an internal existential crisis'[62]. The hardened political insider/outsider distinction indicates subnational and even class anxieties about inequality, recognition and existing norms around patron-client relationships.

### *2.3.1 Class conflicts and the diaspora question*

Thus, critical to the debate on international capital, is how such accumulation practices by diaspora politicians reinforce or disrupt existing power balances and social stratification. It has long been argued that processes of diasporisation and diaspora themselves harbour complex sets of adversarial interactions, majority/minority statuses, embedded structures of hegemony and politics of exclusion (see Pearlman 2014 on Lebanon; Koinova 2018). As Leonard and Samatar argued as early as 1988 in Somalia, diaspora politicians transformed the formerly egalitarian dynamic of sub-clan institutions into patron–client ones, where 'patronage really depends only on inequalities in the distribution of life-sustaining resources and the need of elites for some kind of support from the less advantaged in return' (21). Issues of class and the uneven development of capitalist penetration have always divided clans and underpinned important political fights during the colonial era, Siad Barre's divide–and–rule tactics and including during the civil war (Luling 1997: 290; Besteman and Cassanelli 1996; Samatar 1988)[63]. The class dimension becomes a more pronounced source of societal distress where strategies of clan–balancing or clan separation are unable to remedy nationwide and long–term social problems associated with historical injustices, arbitrary redistributions and the role of pioneering individuals (Kapteijns 2015).

[62] Interview 78, Clan elder and local activist (anonymised by request), 5 September 2017.

[63] In Somalia, under Barre, there were clear winners and losers in the battle for private appropriation of state resources and competitive clannism (Lyons and Samatar 1995:14). References in the literature are made to the 'political aristocracy' that enriched itself at the expense of rural producers, which used ethnic clannism to reach its particularistic goals (Touati 1997) and was tied to the allocation of foreign aid, forms of colonial strategies of divide and rule and land appropriation. The extent to which Somalia's best farmland has historically been held by 'minority' clans reveals important elements of ethnic and class conflict that go well beyond the standard of clan-based analyses (Cassanelli 2003).

In the Somali context, the discussion of international capital and politics of diaspora return closely link to broader debates about class resentments. This was particularly the case as diaspora return to politics was contested on the basis of unrecognisable, nonsubstantive or unjustifiable distinctions (given either their lower-class status, lack of qualifications or the lack of other class identifying qualities)[64]. Thus, two somewhat contradictory trends emerged. On the one hand, processes of 'diasporisation' were seen to reinforce historical inequities and trends of social stratification and accumulation. Certain higher classes or more organised clans benefitted from migration and the harnessing of forms of international capital. On the other hand, there was a perception that new forms of accumulation broke down existing class boundaries but not in a way that was discernible or more inclusive. In both ways, there was an indication that 'international' capital accumulation around returning diaspora elites reinforced dominant power structures. This occurred through reinforcing factors that included clan organisation and uneven historical trends in migration, but also through new practices of centralised power and resources around state logics, new clientelist networks, and urbanisation. Certain factors relating to demographics determined how class resentments took shape against 'diaspora', and in what ways.

For instance, it was widely perceived that Somaliland's harsh response to the diaspora question in 1991 and again in 2017 was partially determined by the centralisation of international capital (the political and economic activity of diaspora) in Hargeisa[65]. Thus, the same factors that underpinned salient support and the explicit 'national' focus of diaspora around the state project also shaped the intensity of resentment against their dominance and the socio-legal infrastructure that moderated and controlled their influence. By contrast, historically, in Puntland and Somalia, there was a greater diffusion of political and economic centres that diminished the salience of collective action (around a national and state project), as well as the class issue linked to diaspora politics[66]. This meant that in Puntland, diaspora returned and invested in Bosasso, Garowe and Galkacyo, and did not converge around a primary economic

[64] As Professor Samatar argued, 'it is an issue that the majority are ill-qualified and get the high paying jobs, for those diaspora that are well-qualified and get the job, no one resents you, but the widespread perception is that the majority of diaspora in positions of power do not deserve to be there.' Interview 25, Professor Ahmed Samatar, 30 October 2017. One activist recounted a discussion with the President Dahir Riyale who explained his frustration: 'We just realised the difference in the diaspora. All of these people coming back, now we know, they are the flunkies, they dust themselves off, go to Dubai and buy cheap suits, briefcases and walk into my office. All ministers now are the debris of the diaspora. We have realised that the people we need are not interested in coming back.' Interview 2, former member of the UFFO group, 30 October 2017

[65] Focus group discussion, SDA, Hargeisa, May 2017.

[66] Interviews 37, 41 and 43, PDRC officials and diaspora recruits, Garowe, May 2017.

and political hub like in Hargeisa. Further south, similarly, such return and investment correlated with new clan homelands and the formation of mini-states (Hoehne 2018). Yet, important for both Somalia and Puntland have been the 'state logics' that focus donor and diaspora resources increasingly around federal (and regional) capitals. Such trends exacerbate forms of class resentment targeting diaspora for everything from market inflation, to perpetuating economic mismanagement, inequality and broader social injustices at the centre[67]. As the former Minister of Foreign Affairs reflects on the Mogadishu context:

> There's a new tribal war between diaspora folks and locals that's brewing in Somalia. Locals accuse the other of many things including but not limited to inflation/making everything from daily expenses to weddings prohibitively expensive ... It is a multidimensional war that affects everything from politics to business – they are all cab drivers coming back demanding political office. It is the first time you are now actually hearing in the media hostility towards the diaspora because there are a good number of Somali diaspora incapable of doing anything. They know how to speak, can put on a tie, Swedish donors are comfortable with them, but they can't drink tea like a local[68].

This had important consequences for regions like Puntland, where the new state logics and the alignment of politics of diaspora return and accumulation of international capital reinforced the expanding authority of the Isse Mahmoud over other Harti-Darod Mohamed Salebaan subclans (now represented by President Deni, see Chapter 3.6). This was closely linked to the reterritorialisation of clan identity. The Isse Mahmoud traditionally resided in the land surrounding the capital, but were historically less powerful than other Majeerteen sub-clans linked to the coast and important trade routes. Similar arguments were made about the expanding power of Habar Jeclo and Habar Awal in Somaliland, and the Abgaal in Mogadishu, as these clan units benefitted from their proximity to the capital and the concentration of transnational business opportunities, allocation of contracts, infrastructure development and investment, as well as everyday practices of state brokerage (including investments, housing and political activities) that increased their respective political power and expansion of authority[69]. The politics of diaspora return, and its acceptability, was critically linked to these

[67] Reflected in informal discussions with diaspora returnees and focus group discussions, Garowe and Mogadishu, May and August 2017.
[68] Interview 73, former governor of central bank and Minister of Foreign Affairs (2015-2017), 16 May 2017.
[69] Ibid.

broader trends and shifts. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs also explains how the optics of class distinction, tied to their network-based political practice, exacerbates class resentments:

> We as diaspora definitely rely on diaspora networks ... Thus, those bad feelings actually come from us. We are in a position of authority, more comfortable with diaspora than locals, and often it's fear for the unknown, five people were around me when I was MoFA, all diaspora. This causes resentment because nothing is free, education is expensive, fees for every service, and parents want their children to get jobs[70].

Closely linked to such class distinctions, and debates on international capital, are subnational anxieties surrounding patron-client relationships and threats to existing norms of security and order. The following section outlines how new forms of clientelism — introduced through party politics and donor partnerships — may undermine existing relationships between clans, political representatives and the state (further explored in Chapter 4). It begins to lay the theoretical foundation for understanding how such new clientelistic networks reinforce accumulation and state logics around diaspora politicians and the centre. This may include the centralisation of remittances and party support around dominant clientelist networks as channelled through diaspora support and networks and around urban centres, as well as through the programmatic focus of diaspora option and partnerships on statebuilding and investment at the political and state level. The argument is that different institutional arrangements and political opportunity structures moderate certain outcomes. Thus, the strength and authority of traditional institutions, elite pacts or even electoral models shape the extent to which the orientation towards the diaspora option reinforces state logics and centralised accumulation and erodes patron-client relationships. The following section lays the foundation for this inquiry — how patron-client links emerge between diaspora returnees and domestic and international actors vis-à-vis party politics, traditional recruitment and forms of international partnerships — and how different political configurations and authority structures benefit.

### 2.4 New clientelist interactions and diaspora politicians

[70] Ibid.

Clientelism is an informal institution (i.e. a practice), not an identity or an organisation like 'clan'. The literature on clientelism is not always conceptually clear on this. It is largely an economic phenomenon (transaction), not an identity bearer in itself (like ethnicity, caste, tribe, or 'clan'). According to a prominent scholar on patron-client relationships, Chubb (1982), clientelism is defined as a 'strategic response by individuals to state or market inadequacies' (see also Stokes 2011). Thus, clientelism is a form of non-programmatic politics in which rewards are provided over repeated interactions to individuals or groups in return for political or social loyalties (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). It has often referred to as 'the use of state resources to maintain and create state legitimacy, informal processes of capitalist accumulation, and political violence that place certain key actors that can facilitate such processes at the centre' (Behuria et al. 2017: 520). Diaspora as brokers and new state clients renegotiate existing forms of patron-client relationships, where the latter may be important sources of social cohesion and stability (including around norms of representation, social obligation and mutual vulnerability, see Adam 1992, 2008). In terms of relationships between domestic actors and diaspora, Leonard and Samatar (2011) argue how diaspora fundamentally transformed more egalitarian clan governance into patron-client relations around aspirations of prestige, wealth and power. In this interpretation, clientelism constitutes relationships of security, and serves as a mechanism for balancing and maintaining social cohesion and justice. Critical also to how relationships with elites and donors affect the authority and representative capacity of diaspora politicians is the paradox of gatekeeper politics (see 1.3) that skews relationships of reciprocity, while conferring undue power upon elites and donors in reconstituting power at the centre.

Current research on transnational political practice and clientelistic parties has highlighted predominant trends in network-based engagement and recruitment that both insulate diaspora recruits from subnational demands and reinforce dominant networks of power. For instance, Paarlberg's doctoral research (2017b) conducted in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Mexico found a strong association between weak party structure, past socialisation and strong partisan skews, and high clientelistic expectations between diaspora supporters and the party apparatus. Paarlberg (2017b) demonstrates how key diaspora individuals serve as important 'elite preference signallers' and 'gatekeepers' and are in turn guaranteed a political position or other perks in exchange for the role they play in lobbying and fundraising (176, 231). He found that weak party systems — often ill-defined ideologically and functioning as ad hoc personalised vehicles invented by candidates to run for office or as 'parties for rent' with no

consistent platform from election to election — relied more heavily on network-based systems and on more explicit, elite-focused and clientelist relationships, as opposed to grassroots mobilisation (Paarlberg 2017b: 49, 53)[71]. This is confirmed by Pearlman (2014) who explores how issues of partisanship and sectarian lines of ethnopolitical competition exacerbated certain clientelistic promises exchanged with diaspora constituents. By contrast, in line with political science research in the African context, stronger institutionalised parties create clearer chains of communication and are able to operate through more grassroots mobilisation (also amongst the diaspora), which may minimise the forms of clientelist relationship (tied to expectation of returns, like contracts, financial perks or protection) between parties and diaspora communities (Driscoll 2017: 18; see also Riedl 2014). All three contexts under study — Somaliland, Puntland and the SFG — constitute weak, clientelistic party systems which are not ideologically-driven and lack party structures or cross-clan systems of grassroots mobilisation (this will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5).

Furthermore, scholars argue how such network-based interactions and clientelistic party systems reinforce power differentials and dominant party politics, rather than encourage oppositional sentiment, political pluralism or free competition (Ambrosius and Meseguer 2018; Morgan et al. 2011; Ahmed 2011). Challenging the prevailing 'democratic diffusion hypothesis'[72] associated with diaspora return and their impact on politics, new research findings highlight how dominant and incumbent parties prove more effective in harnessing diaspora capital and support. Incumbent parties can also distribute pork more efficiently (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2013; Alonso and Mylonas 2019; Paarlberg 2017b). Diaspora supporters are also perceived to be risk adverse, supportive of a stronger state and the status quo in order to protect economic and political interests. For example, Ambrosius and Meseguer (2018) found that return migrants actually contributed more votes for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and that economic remittances were increasingly channelled through the party rather than to livelihoods that would perhaps affect more diffuse voting patterns. Similarly, Morgan et al. (2011) and Ahmed (2011) found in the Dominican Republic

[71] For example, in Mexico and El Salvador, diaspora supporters were found content with benefits that included general political rights and voice in government rather than necessarily public sector jobs or political appointments. By contrast, in more advanced electoral systems like the Dominican Republic they expected more tangible goods given past socialisation and expectations tied to forms of patronage politics (Magaloni 2006; Calvo and Murillo 2010).

[72] The 'democratic diffusion' hypothesis suggests that diaspora have a positive influence on enhancing popular demand for political accountability and better governance, supporting wider participation in local politics, sympathy for political parties and high voter turnout (Omar Mahmoud et al 2013; Chauvet and Mercier 2014).

that recipients of remittances and their senders were more likely than non-recipients to be affiliated with one of the two dominant parties. They looked at key demographic factors around the construction of power networks — at how remittance households (and their migrant relatives) resided in predominantly urban centres, had more well-developed political networks and were more successfully integrated into clientelistic party networks than non-migrant families. In these cases, diaspora political engagement vis-à-vis clientelistic parties benefitted often dominant or incumbent parties, rather than the opposition or political pluralism that are similarly reflected in the Somali contexts, although less formalised (see Chapter 5).

Such new forms of horizontal, clientelistic linkages formed through political parties (see Laitin 1986; Posner 2005) explicitly seek to insulate diaspora returnees from stronger expectations within the clan system (see Le Ferrara and Bates 2001). Recent studies demonstrate how local actors may prefer outsider (non-political identity) and higher quality candidates from whom they can extract more (Reno 1997, 1999; Bermeo and Bhatia 2017; Banerjee and Pande 2007; Posner 2005 on the quality of subnational preference)[73]. These findings challenge assumptions about 'parochial politics'[74] — that locals often prefer strongmen candidates who retain a significant degree of public support due to their personal appeal and the fact that they prove more effective than state institutions in the delivery of public goods and services to local populations, not least in security (Reno 2003). In La Ferrara and Bates's theorisation of political competition in weak states (2001), they propose that communities can expect to gain more from individuals unconnected to cultural or political identity movements, and, thus, may actually be more (rather than less) likely to vote for such external (or non-political identity) candidates (like diaspora candidates). The flipside is that these diaspora candidates have to expend more resources in order to elicit individual loyalty and broader political constituencies compared to political identity candidates (La Ferrara and Bates 2001: 25; see also Sarangi 2016). In the Somali context, as will be explored in further detail, outsider, compromise candidates served a particular purpose within intra-clan negotiations where, not just a matter of rent-seeking, diaspora politicians were also supported as a solution for reaching consensus, or pursuant to other clan ambitions including recognition, prestige or state access (Adam 1998).

[73] In their study conducted on the elections of governors in Afghanistan, they found that local populations increasingly preferred younger, highly–educated leaders over strongmen candidates (defined by religious or military profiles), as long as these candidates still held certain ethnic similarities (Bermeo and Bhatia 2017: 2).
[74] In systems of parochial politics, leaders seek to leverage ethnic and social loyalty in ways that both allow them to reach the patronage demands of their constituents and personal wealth accumulation, while rendering institutions weak and ineffectual (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2008; Padro i Miquel 2007).

This clash of competing clientelistic practices (between clans and parties) was compounded by new clientelistic relationships that formed between donors, international institutions and diaspora returnees. These relationships aim to keep diaspora above the fray and to counter patronage relationships offered by both parties and the clan-system, which are seen as inefficient and destabilising. Scholars have suggested how international donors, through the promises of exit arrangements or other incentives and financial inducements, encourage 'best practice' by Western-educated diaspora when in office or ensure a smooth departure in the event of an electoral loss (see Pellerin and Mullings 2013; Cheeseman 2018). In a recent large-scale quantitative study, Gift and Krcmaric (2017) found that 'soft landing' agreements (or other financial and symbolic inducements) made between donors and Western-educated leaders in emerging economies, particularly through IFIs, were disproportionately likely to incentivise good behaviour and democratic reform agendas (particularly on economic reform and political liberalisation) (678)[75]. These 'soft landings' included the facilitation of lucrative jobs in multilateral bodies for leaders, or the return to jobs that leaders had held previously, as well as awards and global recognition[76]. Other scholars have made similar points although less-performance oriented.

Anna Minaysan (2018) found that US educated aid recipient country leaders received more US aid, especially if they shared both the cultural values and economic ideology of the US. At a more systematic level, in the state-building and peace-building literature, scholars have alluded to the privileged position of diaspora in relationships with donors in negotiating aid dividends (Brinkerhoff 2016, 2017). A recent study by Tellander and Horst (2017) details the close relationships that form within the development nexus in Sweden and Norway between top foreign policy officials and diaspora appointed to lead development organisations in the home country on the basis of good behaviour and close relationships of mutual benefit. Emerging from these findings, and critical to the broader debates within this thesis on relations and impact, is the extent to which close donor-diaspora networks, and performances around partnerships and 'good behaviour' (7.3), are taken as progress and disproportionately increase

[75] They also found that authoritarian regimes were just as likely as democratic regimes to elect Western-educated leaders (see also Section 2.6).

[76] Amongst others, Gift and Krcmaric (2017) provide the example of the current president of Cote d'Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara, who had worked previously for the IMF, returned to replace the former strongman Laurent Gbagbo, and pushed through key structural adjustment reforms under pressure from 'friends in high places in international organisations'.

and legitimise their authority claims. Of additional interest is how such strong incentives for diaspora-donor partnerships impact local politics in contexts of fractured and poorly institutionalised safeguards. It could be argued that the strength of these relationships between donor and diaspora returnees (whether facilitated through past socialisation or current demands) orient them more strongly towards state logics of territorialised control, and political, economic and social exclusion, in order to consolidate authority. This may particularly be the case in contexts of weak and largely clientelistic parties and poorly institutionalised safeguards.

Threats to stability come with distorted, vertical clientelistic relationships, but also the paradox of gatekeeper and brokerage politics that fracture existing norms around representation, consensus and cooperation. Such new relationships may break existing relationships of security, while also disincentivising cooperation, encouraging elite fragmentation and pushing diaspora candidates closer towards alternative international relationships (with transnational economic elites or donors). When compared to Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland have stronger internal legitimacy requirements for their leaders, institutional safeguards (stronger societal cohesion and traditional structures), as well as reduced statebuilding agendas that decrease the lustre of the 'diaspora option', the strength of brokerage relationships, and ensure greater accountability and responsiveness. Nonetheless, even in these cases, diaspora politicians — how they form and project authority — are tied to state logics, the centralisation of power and are more representative of external rather than local constituencies (see 7.6). Thus, institutional frameworks and elite pacts matter for how the politics of diaspora return are moderated.

The following section (2.7) looks comparatively at authoritarian and weak state contexts to elucidate how institutional arrangements (including regime type), the politics of statebuilding (exposure or insulation from the international system and degree of aid dependency), the existence of sectarian politics, and certain conflict legacies may inform certain patterns in the politics of diaspora return and contestation. More specifically, this brief snapshot highlights key patterns in how elites have evoked (or not) the diaspora option in authoritarian and weak state contexts to consolidate power. These strategies include, in authoritarian contexts, the exclusion of diaspora (whether immune from international pressures and flattery, or their perceptions as political threat) or their neutralisation through absorption into the bureaucracy. In post-conflict contexts, such strategies are rather more chaotic and driven by internationally-led statebuilding agendas and legitimising technocratic narratives around the replacement of

old guard politicians. Initial reflections and patterns elucidate a politics of diaspora return in weak states associated with worsening forms of identity politics, fragmentation and a crisis of leadership legitimacy as diaspora politicians claim authority over political and state structures.

### 2.5 Comparative patterns in political process and impact

Two cases in the African context – namely, Rwanda and Ethiopia – are particularly interesting as different administrations have used diaspora as part of developmental state strategies to consolidate and expand state power. In both cases, these processes have been heavily controlled to prevent their emergence as a political threat. In many cases across Africa, given the systemic formation of state and ruling coalitions, the civil service has become a playground for states to distribute patronage and unroll political agendas. This has made it difficult for African states to neutralise their diaspora vis-à-vis bureacratisation processes, while also harnessing their power for building the capacity of the state (Cammack and Kelsall 2011; Kelsall 2011, 2013). Yet, Rwanda managed this process of reintegration successfully, following the legacies of the genocide. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) undertook an explicit strategy to depoliticise the conflict-affected diaspora by absorbing 'desirable diaspora'[77] back into the state as technocrats and as part of a national reconciliation agenda under the scrutiny of the international community and aid relationships. As the bureaucracy was already professionalised – having predated party formation and consolidation and was, thus, distinct from party politics – the RPR could absorb diaspora into the state, while neutralising them and restricting their political advancement. Thus, through absorption into the state apparatus, the RPF did not engage diaspora as political clients or opponents and, in turn, disempowered them as political agents (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012).

Ethiopia differed in the extent to which bureaucratisation was deeply embedded in party expansion and, thus, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) could not neutralise diaspora as part of a statebuilding agenda to the same extent. For the EPRDF, the state constituted carefully selected party loyalists where the threat posed by absorbing

[77] The inclusion of diaspora technocrats was restricted according to certain 'desirable diaspora' criteria—those that had left prior to the 1994 genocide (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012).

diaspora was higher[78]. In Ethiopia, the EPRDF was also not under the same pressure from domestic or international partners to integrate diaspora – as was the case in Rwanda – whether as a matter of national reconciliation or a key condition of trade partnerships (Vaughan 2011, 2015; Abegaz 2015). Furthermore, the contested legacies around the Derg exiles of 1974[79] had also made diaspora into disloyal allies for such developmental state strategies. Thus, rather than looking to diaspora as state or political allies, Ethiopia prioritised bolstering tertiary education and skills in-country for the training of civil servants, only absorbing Western-educated children of well-established political elites or loyalists[80]. Discussions in Ethiopia on participation in technocratic assistance programmes led by IOM's Quest Mida and other donors only re-emerged as a result of greater participation in global financial markets and trade partnerships after 2015, and particularly under the leadership of Abiy Ahmed[81] (Mangela 2017: 235).

Thus, both Rwanda and Ethiopia sought to manage and control diaspora return in different ways within the context of dominant party systems. For Ethiopia, diaspora inclusion was seen as more of a threat to political stability than as necessary for domestic economic development, statebuilding or in the performance of certain relationships. In Rwanda, it was a critical condition of proving national commitment to reconciliation efforts and served as a strategy to prop up development statism while continuing to limit socio-political reform. In Ethiopia, periodic strategies to include diaspora have been tightly-controlled and suspended at different historical junctures, reflecting similar trends in other authoritarian systems where leaders weigh the political risks for inclusion against the discursive, economic and human potential. A similar process occurred in Syria whereby, from 2000 until 2005, Bashar al-Asad and the first lady (both Western–educated and seen as 'diaspora', see Zintl 2013) pursued a policy that sought to appoint foreign–educated technocrats (mainly from the US and UK) to key economic positions. Similar to Ethiopia, this strategy emerged outside the international system (oil or aid

[78] The EPRDF built a strongly institutionalised party around heavily nationalistic movements and the intensification of statebuilding initiatives in the periphery aligned with EPRDF's socialist aspirations (Vaughan 2011: 633). Key ministerial advisors were appointed as senior party members (Vaughan 2011: 628–629); the government was under tighter direct party control as a 'political enterprise' (2011: 629–630).

[79] The Derg had overthrown emperor Haile Selassie in a coup d'état on 12 September 1974, establishing Ethiopia as a Marxist-Leninist communist state with itself as a military junta and provisional government, and remained in power until 1991.

[80] Interview 95, Sarah Vaughan, Oxford, June 2018.

[81] Interview 95, Sarah Vaughan, Oxford, June 2018. IOM MIDA had been implemented in 1995, but terminated sometime between 1995 and 1999 (albeit vague on termination, and perhaps for obvious reasons). Discussions about reopening, however, were floated in 2015.

relations and key trade partnerships), having not undertaken structural adjustment programmes from the World Bank or IMF during the 1990s (Zintl 2013: 121).

Yet, by 2005, the diaspora 'technocrats' were all dismissed and not reinstated following the collapse of the Ba'th Party. Such technocratic governance was irreconcilable with the socialist party agenda and the interests of key groups that attacked them as 'foreign' conspirators. As Tina Zintl (2013) argues, for the period in power, such new recruits gave the regime the tool of 'international education to transform themselves into "new guard" reformers' — that helped to bolster authoritarian politics and, especially, legitimise a discourse around Bashar al-Asad as a moderniser struggling against 'old guard' hardliners (132). These technocrats were only appointed to temporary positions and limited policy arenas, not in 'critical political aspects of policy changes' (Zintl 2013: 125). For other authoritarian regimes like Qaboos bin Said Al Said's Oman, that lacked the same sectarian and ethnopolitical divisions present in Syria and Ethiopia but was similarly outside western-informed agendas and pressures around the diaspora option, the ruling monarchy systematically absorbed a class of diaspora which they could control and neutralise, as an explicit strategy to professionalise the bureaucracy and as part of a national narrative of cohesion.

This group of diaspora (mainly returning from Zanzibar in the 1990s) dominated the middle and upper-level positions within the Omani bureaucracy[82], and contributed to strengthening the statebuilding agenda and the unitary state while never competing for political power. As Sarah Phillips and Jennifer Hunt argue, this group of returnees offered the regime a distinct advantage in negotiating international deals and easier integration into crucial industries such as banking, petrol and telecommunications, while never challenging Qaboos' power (2017: 57). These diaspora returnees importantly never became clients of the state and remained distinct from the tribal, religious and commercial elites who were the beneficiaries of state patronage. In a similar way to Rwanda, diaspora return and integration into the state contributed towards Qaboos' renaissance narrative of national cohesion (that all Omanis were significant contributors to the state–building process) (Phillips and Hunt 2017: 54). It was Qaboos' strong hand in controlling the process of diaspora return and ensuring it occurred outside traditional

[82] The highly-educated Zanzibari diaspora (under the British regime) responded to the call and returned in large numbers (10,000 out of a reported 1 million abroad). They staffed key state institutions in the administration, banking and other technical fields and operated as advisors in building social services, military units, telecommunications and other economic infrastructure presiding over Muscat's ports, airports, and banks, as well as telecommunications and defence. (Phillips 2017: 53).

clientelistic networks, that secured diaspora's contribution to the statebuilding agenda and meant he could centralise political control over Oman quickly through the administration of complex state–building projects and developmental growth, while not fearing any political threat coming from within the state.

The argument emerging from the Rwandan and Omani cases suggest that diaspora return into the state structure is effective when the state is already professionalised and independent of party politics or traditional clientelistic networks. In such cases, diaspora are neutralised and they contribute to statebuilding agendas (whether in support of authoritarian tendencies or not). Yet, when absorbed as part of clientelistic interactions, as is the case in certain authoritarian contexts (like Ethiopia) and as is the default in weak states — whether through clan-based recruitment, party politics or technocratic assistance programmes — diaspora returnees are embedded within traditional clientelistic networks and state patronage in a way that renders their contributions to statebuilding marginal. Instead of contributing to narratives or strategies of national cohesion, diaspora become key actors within clientelistic networks but in ways that also skew traditional practice (i.e. around international capital, networks and practices) that foment class resentments, internal dysfunction and locals forms of resistance within the state, and increases the likelihood that diaspora will seek refuge within or aspire to politics. Before turning to the weak state cases, which is the main subject of the comparative inquiry for the Somalia case, it is worth briefly highlighting the scholarship that has come out of the study of China, the CCP and diaspora return.

Like in Rwanda and Oman, the CCP has, for the most part, moderated and streamlined such processes to offset the potential political threat posed by these returnees, even if ultimately unable to forestall internal political challengers from diaspora technocrats (Bell 2013). As Chinese scholars argue, the CCP initially made only very strategic selections for appointing diaspora as close advisors in functional areas of education, science and technology, foreign trade and foreign affairs, with clear restrictions on political advancement (Li 2006, 2009). Strong incentives also existed, at least initially, for contending elite groups to co–operate behind an underpinning socialist ideology (Li 2009: 53; see also Li 2006, 2011; Bell 2009). Yet, it was documented how key Western–educated advisors — who assisted in terms of ideological evolution, legal issues related to WTO accession and geostrategic tensions in the Taiwan Strait - increasingly also assumed top leadership positions within the Politburo and Secretariat of the CCP (Li 2009: 23–24). Deep contestation emerged over issues including the

domestic redistribution of resources, the establishment of a public healthcare system and financial reforms that plagued the party with concerns about maintaining intra–party cohesion and factionalism (Li 2009: 15; see also Bell 2013). Stephen Bell argues how these new diaspora returnees have set out to create a more efficient institutional support mechanism as an avenue for state and political control, as they lack other forms of political legitimacy. Thus, they placed greater emphasis on controlling the apparatuses and orientation of statebuilding than their predecessors because they could not rely on alternative political loyalties. As Bell explains:

> The older generation of party leaders, such as Mao and Deng, were able to legitimize and sustain their personal authority through past revolutionary legacies, popular charisma, and extensive networks in the party, government, and military. These assets are now somewhat scarce for their successors [diaspora returnees], most of whom have only a technocratic background with a much narrower career path. This has made it imperative for the new breed of party leaders to enlarge their power bases by expanding networks of supporters and clients (including those in the bureaucracy) and elevating the formal or informal status of the institutions under their spheres of influence, exchanging institutional authority for political support (Bell 2013: 125–26).

This is an important insight and provides indications of how new elites, vis-à-vis statebuilding and technocratic governance, seek to remake systems of political loyalties, and how they project new forms of political authority and legitimacy. The cases of authoritarian contexts, including China, Ethiopia and Rwanda, are examples of authoritarian regimes that place a high premium on loyalty and exclusion, rather than on meritocracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013) which has allowed these administrations to resist the forces of technocratic or diaspora integration to a greater extent. Such contexts have (on the whole) been less dependent on the will of the people and less susceptible to international pressures around technocratic governance. By contrast, weak states are more dependent on aid, foreign investment and other forms of international capital (including offered by diaspora) that shape the forms of domestic and international pressure around the diaspora option. In addition, as has been the case in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, international actors also played a critical role in activating diaspora communities as political guarantors of international peacebuilding and statemaking processes, where their return to the political stage has coincided with the inception or institutionalisation of sectarian politics and quotas.

By explicitly tying the return of new elites to clan or sectarian interests, such strategies shaped the perceptions and expectations of these leaders, as well as defined tactics of political mobilisation. In this way new forms of 'international' capital and activation tied to these new diaspora recruits reinforced rent-seeking practices by domestic actors. The economic utility of different diaspora groups defined by their access to donors' foreign policy agendas or diaspora populations, also made them vulnerable to accusations of being 'traitors', 'occupiers' or 'conspirators'. In each context, the politics of diaspora return and political engagement were deeply enshrined in sectarian politics, as well as the fallacies of 'technocratic governance'. In terms of the latter, diaspora politicians struggled to be apolitical as they were gatekeepers, state clients (tied to sectarian interests) and with their own networks and aspirations. As people would suggest in both contexts, these new diaspora technocrats ended up being more political than those that had preceded them in the 1980s and 1990s. In a similar way to which occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, diaspora were mobilised within two contracting political processes — that of technocracy and sectarianism. The remainder of this section turns to the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan as constituting highly fraught processes of return politics that continue to unfold.

In terms of Iraq, Harling argues how, in 2003, an extended exercise of 'socio-political engineering' (Harling 2012) replaced the old Ba'athist ruling elite with formerly exiled politicians (mainly US diaspora) under the guise of 'technocracy' through the *Majlis el A'mar wa al tatweer el Iraqi* or the Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council, based on misconceptions by the US of the extent to which exiled elites were 'apolitical' (Dodge 2005). These technocrats — comprised of key members of former opposition parties (and former US allies) — replaced the four most senior ranks of the Ba'ath party (73.2 percent of the government) in accordance with a new sectarian quota system for inclusion[83]. As Harling argues, after 2003 'sectarianism emerged as a resource offering nominal representativeness to figures void of social backing and thus cabinet seats and accompanying ministries were tied more closely to the ballot successes of sectarian parties, and as a machinery for funding party political patronage' (2012: 8). The association made between sectarianism and diaspora inclusion had disastrous implications for political stability, administration coherence and national identity in Iraq (Dodge 2013; Faraq 2007; Harling 2012). By 2003, only 15 percent of

[83] The figures were 13 Shias, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, a Turk and a Christian, and an expansion of the number of cabinet portfolios to 25.

the cabinet were independent, in stark contrast to the Saddam era, where many ministries were occupied by technocrats who, competent in their fields, were devoid of any political ambitions (Marr 2006; Haddad 2011: 9). In this context, the office of the prime minister became the bastion of dispensing patronage, using discretionary powers, bolstered by donor confidence, to orchestrate sectarianism and play the technocratic card to depose old networks (Dodge 2013)[84]. Hampering progress and development of the oil industry was, in turn, used as a political instrument by political elites to eliminate or restrict competitive technocrats (Mazeel 2010: 87–88).

Political developments unfolded similarly in Afghanistan. International interventions sought to marry two groups of returnees — diaspora modernisers (or technocrats) and 'tribal aristocrats' (or pre–war elites, the 'Rome Group' or royalist alliance, which included Hamid Kharzai) — with a few warlords under the 2001 Bonn Agreement (Giustozzi 2013: 249). The pre–war elites held the political power and legitimacy, even though they had not been directly involved in the fighting, when compared to the modernisers (or Western-educated technocrats mainly from the US) (2013: 249). These modernisers or technocrats included Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, as well as other individuals who held the posts of head of national security, interior minister, minister of education and rural reconstruction. They would win the election in 2015 because they could sell international legitimacy. Donors could trust them 'to be relatively capable of spending their money effectively', and Karzai also thought would be more supportive of centralised authority (Giustozzi 2013: 250). Thus, Karzai was given the impetus to gradually replace pre-war elites with more diaspora technocrats while broadly being supportive of a pro-reform, pro-Western agenda. This rise of new elites did not radically transform the rules of the game. Ghani and Karzai, amongst others, had to acquire a local political base that was facilitated through close patronage relations. As Giustozzi explains, 'the technocrats relied on their control over international funding to weaken the regional power holders and subjugate them, by attracting some of their subordinate commanders' and directing this strategy toward the cause of centralisation (2004: 8). Such technocratic inclusion was seen in practice as being aimed at a 'Pashtun' restoration in Afghanistan, given the belief that Pashtuns represent a disproportionate share of Afghans educated in the West (Giustozzi 2004: 7).

[84] Saif Hameed and Stephen Kalin, 'Iraq's parliament to block PM's technocrat cabinet: MPs', *Reuters*, accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/us–mideast–crisis–iraq–politics–idUSKCN0X81VJ.

Thus, in Afghanistan as in Iraq, diaspora were deeply embedded within clientelistic networks and even more clearly defined sectarian systems, which created a highly complex landscape of janusian politics where diaspora technocrats performed international partnerships while further segmenting society along discrete factions. They lacked the clearly defined ideological platforms, political strategy or professionalised bureaucracies to neutralise and ensure the contributions of diaspora to statebuilding. In addition to feeding ethnopolitical or sectarian power imbalances, their authority was rooted in contradictions of sovereignty, nationalism and their own credentials and links to the Western hegemony. They reinforced notions of inequality, systematic subjugation within the international system and the legacies of protracted conflict and foreign interventions. Distinctions between the 'foreign' and 'local' shaped political and bureaucratic efficiency but also the forms of alliances emerging (whether based on Islamic extremism, or forms of autochthonous and populist discourse)[85]. The authoritarian contexts (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Syria and China) fared better in how they were able to neutralise diaspora to serve the needs of statebuilding, at least in the short term, by leaving them outside traditional patronage networks, preventing forms of contestation and minimising the internal political threat they would pose.

In this way, diaspora strategising is always a preoccupation of new, emerging or established states as diaspora symbolise resources and sovereign threats. The Somali context provides similar conflict legacies and forms of foreign interventions around the diaspora option that would be later prescribed for Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 and 2001. The 2000 Arta process proved a critical juncture for the links between wealth, diaspora and clan politics that would continue to shape political competition, tied to rising popular anxieties about uneven development and accumulation, broken relationships between the state and ordinary people, and fears of hegemonic power (clan dominance, elite pacts and the 'international') (see Chapter 4). The combination of statebuilding agendas and rents, fractured clan and societal context and diaspora return to politics was a hard to sell as a solution to precarity. By contrast, in Somaliland, and to a certain extent in Puntland, the politics of diaspora return were neutralised by the institutional and social structures that had emerged out of the 1991 Burco conference and the politics of non-recognition or non-statehood.

[85] This research has shown how aid — just like revenue from state–owned oil and gas enterprises — decreases the likelihood of regime transition by entrenching elites in power due to certain regulatory and budget allocation systems, and supplementary and extra–budgetary funding for personal enrichment (Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016). Aid, like oil, was found to reduce the likelihood of government turnover, regime collapse, and outbreaks of major political discontent.

## 2.6 Conclusion

This chapter outlines an interdisciplinary and integrated approach towards understanding the rise and fall of new elites – i.e. how ruling coalitions (within different institutional contexts) make decisions around the return of diaspora to politics, and the implications of such processes for the governance and authority of weak state systems. It outlines the conceptual apparatus of this thesis, which includes clan politics as a unit of analysis and the contested meanings and practices surrounding diaspora return within a clan-based, weak state system like Somalia. Thus, Section 2.2 lays out the processes of differentiation, activation and claims-making that surrounding the construction of diaspora within the Somali context. The following sections then reconcile a disparate and limited literature within diaspora studies, political science and international relations on theorising about 'international' capital, transnational political practice and new forms of clientelism to understand structures of power, agency and brokerage that exist within the politics of diaspora return. Through this analytical framework and relational approach, it contributes to theoretical framing of the study of diaspora return and political engagement through a more systematic analysis of 'causal pathways, such as brokerage, coalition-building, and scale shift' (Koinova 2018).

The theoretical and conceptual framework outlined in this chapter provides the bases for claims about the nature and implications of the diaspora option in such contexts. The overarching argument is that diaspora politicians are oriented towards centralising state logics in the Somalia and Puntland cases given weak institutional safeguards and the dominance of external, statebuilding agendas and diaspora-donor partnerships. New elite also seek to consolidate power in ways that differ from their predecessors. The following chapter first looks back historically at how the politics of diaspora return constitutes a long process of state-making and recognition rooted in civil war liberation movements and post-civil war state formation processes. It provides an account of the evolution of Somali national and subnational administrations through a prism of their changing leaders and leadership networks on top of them (which include diaspora and important processes of differentiation, reinvention and contestation). Emerging out of this chapter is an understanding of the diaspora individuals and groupings contesting authority, the narratives and factions around diaspora politics, as well as the institutional and social arrangements that moderate their influence and the directionality of power.

## Chapter 3: Leadership and succession through state collapse, (re)formation and the politics of recognition

This chapter looks at the evolution of Somali national and subnational administrations — namely, Somaliland, Puntland and the Federal Government of Somalia — through a prism of their changing leaders and leadership networks. It examines how divergent colonial experiences, state formation processes and ongoing politics of recognition affect forms of leadership contestation and, specifically, the legitimacy of claims-making and political involvement of returning diaspora at the helm of government. This chapter demonstrates that certain colonial legacies laid the foundations for collective action, state consciousness and the political involvement of diaspora politicians, but divergent trajectories towards statehood affected the domestic legitimacy claims diaspora politicians could hope to make or sustain. State formation processes diverged (see section 3.2) in aims and objectives that included diverse exposure to external demands, internal legitimacy requirements and structures of accountability, as well as other institutional safeguards. The processes of state formation and the ongoing politics of recognition in Somalia, when contrasted to the non-recognition status of Somaliland and Puntland, shaped different challenges and opportunities for diaspora politicians to legitimise authority, that included different socio-legal parameters around their engagement.

Section (3.1) begins by examining how different colonial practices under British and Italian rule across the former Somali Republic affected the migratory and economic structures for forming political consciousness abroad and collective action around the postcolonial state projects. In particular, skills training and education initiatives, as well as structures of economic autonomy for the formation of a business class in Somaliland, contributed to collective diaspora action around the state project but also economic arrangements that would moderate political volatility and forestall their future involvement. Political economy literature on developing states has long argued that when the business community can carry the cost of the patronage system and the financial costs of elections in exchange for preferential treatment and provision of contracts, ruling elites are less likely to look elsewhere for political alliances or even reform (Whitfield 2015; Khan 2010). This was certainly the case in Somaliland, where the influence of external actors and patrons (including diaspora politicians) was checked by the economic dominance of its business actors and created a closed system. By contrast, in Puntland and Somalia, Italian colonial legacies had not created the same structures of transnational power –

whether intellectual or economic, or cohesively tied to territorial boundaries. Instead, migration was tied to social stratification within the clan system and a more rivalrous competition between economic and political elites, which failed to standardise practices of political patronage or prevent the autonomous action and rent-seeking of elites. The following sections examine how collective action around the liberation movements and through the state formation processes created different dilemmas for leadership succession and legitimacy.

Section 3.3 briefly outlines the comparative literature on diaspora-led nationalist movements — the challenges they face and how they establish legitimacy — before moving to the case study sections that move chronologically from the liberation movements to the 2016 and 2017 election periods in each case. It demonstrates how the diaspora-led nationalist movements of the Somaliland National Movement (SNM) and United Somali Courts (USC) factionalised, legitimised authority internationally, and engendered forms of identity politics with holding power in shaping the narratives and claims made by future diaspora politicians. As this section demonstrates, such socialisation and formative experiences with diaspora groups establish certain socio-political and juridical parameters for future contests by diaspora politicians, but also — as the state projects advanced or did not — how diaspora politicians would continue to legitimise their authority and claims to the state project. Somaliland demonstrated the harshest response — denouncing the diaspora leadership at the 1991 Burco conference and by 1993 implementing laws to prevent their return and political contestation. For Somalia, a clear association was made between diaspora groups, external patrons and the capacity to spark arbitrary power shifts that shaped understandings of the relationships around diaspora return and their economic utility.

For Puntland, the legacy of the militarised SSDF, fervent Islamic ideologues and an internally intact or coherent Majeerteen clan created certain parameters around diaspora engagement during the irredentist fight and thereafter. The state formation process in 1998 became an important vehicle for the recognition of federalism as the only political solution to Somalia political volatility, which also gave diaspora politicians value in negotiating the federal structure (and Puntland's placement within it) on the international stage. As the in-depth case studies outline, each case faced a strong backlash or the emergence of a large alliance against diaspora-led administrations that was characterised by a 'local' turn to local networks, strong domestic capitalists and local interests, although this is not to be misinterpreted as the interests of the weak (see also Chapter 7). It was an attempt to serve domestic interest groups not being

served on the international stage, whether Islamic or financial, and to make a claim against the fallacies of technocratic and diaspora governance. Also characteristic of political transitions and competitions were fights that emerged between different returning politicians and groupings — from the West and East — who competed through discrete networks of influence and vis-à-vis divergent brokerage strategies (including ideology) for recognition and competitive advantage.

### 3.1 Colonial legacy and the formation of transnational networks of influence

Somaliland's current relationship with its diaspora has foundations in its colonial past. Certain British colonial policies and migration trends, namely around education and technical training, as well as support to the autonomy of an economic class, shaped the prospects for transnational political mobilisation. In former British Somaliland, strategies by British colonialists in the 1940s and 1950s supported the migration of bureaucrats, army officers and students, who were colonial clients, benefitting from key education and employment opportunities (Horst 2011). In addition, the colonialists supported the growth and autonomy of a commercially-oriented livestock export economy that would continue to expand trade networks in the Arabian Peninsula, starting from as early as the 1960s and 1970s (Little 2003). What was a strategy to sustain colonialism in this region, had created a class of educated and wealthy diaspora that would later mobilise around the SNM and the state project in 1981. Such mobilisation occurred around a narrative of economic and political marginalisation (having experienced under Siad Barre) and in defence of a national identity and state[86]. As the following section describes, secessionism was not on the agenda of these first nationalists but leadership struggles (amongst diaspora and with the military wing) would underpin the turn towards secessionism and the group's eventual dissolution. A referendum was ultimately made on the diaspora question, whereby the business community (in the financial, telecommunications and import/export) became the primary patronage benefactors. Their patronage shaped a politically and economically closed system that excluded political as well as economic competitors or

[86] Traders, mainly Issaq (namely Sacad Muse, Habar Jeclo and Arab) based in Djibouti, assumed an instrumental role in backing the creation and building of the Somaliland state through the formation of the rebel SNM in the 1980s (Marchal 1996: 28). Marchal referred to the 'profit-sharing agreement among the dominant livestock traders, with a constitution appended' (de Waal 2007). They stepped in in 1993 when the tides turned against certain leadership during the 1993 Borama conference (Bradbury 2008). They also provided major loans to President Egal's administration at a critical moment of Somaliland's state formation trajectory in the mid–1990s (Balthasar 2013: 223–224).

entrepreneurs (Phillips 2016). Certainly, other factors shaped the exclusion of diaspora – including the role of traditional institutions – but the strength of the business community vis-à-vis the state project had standardised the political patronage regime, thereby reducing the political space for alternative patron-client relationships.

In contrast to the Somaliland experience, Italian colonial patrons in *Somalia Italiana* (current day Puntland and Somalia) undermined, rather than supported, the autonomy of the business community and did not support migration for economic opportunities or technical capacity (Besteman 1999; Marchal 1996). Southerners were generally excluded from amassing wealth through government and overseas employment (Besteman 1999:197). Rather, Italian colonial strategies fractured wealth dispersion and class consciousness (see also Ahmed 2000; Lewis 1994; Gundel 2002; Marchal 1996). In addition, the slow emergence of the export-oriented livestock trade class (only after the 1960s) was deliberately stifled, as the export-oriented plantation sector funnelled profits into Italian rather than Somali hands (Little 2003). By the 1950s, a 'collaborative Italian–Somali elite governed affairs' based around highly racialised stratification and patron-client based bureaucratisation defined power by proximity to state resources (Menkhaus 1989: 312). An inextricably state-linked class system emerged that was contingent upon 'remaining within the orbit of established political authority' (Elmi 2010: 65) and that left minimal space for the development of class consciousness. Instead, the formation of an 'excessive clan or group consciousness' developed among Somalis (Ahmed 2014; Zoppi 2018) that was reflected in both fractured outmigration trends and how they would in turn participate in the state project. This was clearly evident in the formation of the socio-political military organisations that emerged in the 1980s and included the USC in Mogadishu and the SSDF in Puntland.

Scholars argue that it was the legacies of Barre's patronage and manipulation of clan politics, having fought for power within the post–colonial states, that formed the foundations for the regional rather than national claims made by diaspora in the civil part and post-war period (Affi 2012: 123)[87]. In Somalia, Barre's 'militarised rentierism', failed nationalisation programmes of the early 1970s and divide-and-rule tactics certainly fed a deep antagonism, distrust and

[87] Interview 3, diaspora affairs director, Hargeisa, 20 November 2016.

hatred between clans (Hagmann 2016; de Waal 2015)[88]. It was also the inability of non-state actors to control political entrepreneurs' access to resources that continued to undermine the ability of any single authority to concentrate and control the exercise of coercion (Reno 2003: 38; Phillips 2016). Yet, colonial legacies had also not created the right environment for the creation of a collective diaspora consciousness beyond the clan, having not experience the same training, professionalisation or autonomy as had occurred in Somalia. The business community never became guarantors of the political and state process — they were instead rather detached in both Puntland and Somalia — which affected a more rivalrous and uncontrolled system of patronage politics. Even in Puntland, where the state project emerged around similar narratives of economic and political marginalisation (like in Somaliland), the authoritarian and military leadership dominated the SSDF. The political project remained in the dominant hands of old military leaders within the SSDF — namely, Harti-Darood Majeerteen or Mohamoud Salebaan and old military generals that served under Siad Barre. The business community, who largely constituted more marginal Majeerteen subclans like the Ali Salebaan (a sub-clan of the Majeerteen), deliberately remained outside politics (Marchal 1996: 15; Reno 2003)[89]. This meant that elites and clans were always looking for patrons and advantage, while diaspora politicians could operate relatively unhindered.

Before proceeding to the case sections, which detail how such leadership succession unfolded and how the relationships between the state project and diaspora returnees evolve, the following comparative overview briefly highlights how the formative experiences with diaspora-led movements may shape structures of power and factionalisation, as well as important narratives around diaspora return and political impact. Thus, Section 3.3 begins with a broader comparative inquiry for understanding how relationships and decisions made by diaspora leaders, within national or liberation movements, over power allocation and ownerships affect long durée political process. It provides some initial insights for understanding the rise and fall of the socio-political organisations of the 1980s that emerged

[88] As a result, when the state collapsed in 1991, businessmen became quickly entangled in the military politics of territorial control, both of farmland and of export routes. By 1999, the 'business class had become an independent political force', as leading businesspeople stopped paying protection money to militia leaders of their clans, and instead started funding their own security forces and, later on, turned to local Shari'a courts for protection (Ahmad 2011). The extent to which business elites contested the civilian leadership of the TFG for power through the ICU made them controverted leaders as they sought to expel rival business groups as well as competing warlords and their militias (ICG 2009).

[89] Smaller sub–clans, mostly settled on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean side, had little say though they often represented a majority within the business community and were often inclined to endorse Islamism and Salafism (although al-Islaah had a strong constituency among educated people). See ICG 2002; Hagmann 2016: 34.

across the Somali territories — namely, Somaliland National Movement (SNM), the Somalia Salvation Defense Forces (SSDF) and United Somali Congress (USC) — and how these organisations (and their diaspora wings) would affect political and state developments thereafter.

### 3.2 Diaspora-led national movements, structures and legitimacy claims

The decisive role of diaspora politicians and wings in the formation of liberation movements (their success and dissolution) is not a new assertion in the scholarship. Scholars highlight the authoritarian tendencies that emerge in movements that are dominated by diaspora leaders and factions, and the often hostile relationships that develop between returning diaspora, local elites and military factions in the organisation and leadership of such nationalist or liberation movements. For instance, scholars in African Studies have demonstrated how, within the Africa National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda (Ansoms 2009, 2012; Riedl 2018), distinct hierarchies and authoritarian tendencies emerged. Diaspora legitimated their authority, controlled dissidents and projected authority in ways that stratified power. In addition, there was consistent continuity in the structure, agenda and legitimising narratives of the liberation movements, the first nationalist parties and current party politics. Other scholars argue how such movements have often squelched the nascent democratic movements happening internally (this was certainly the case with the SNM and the Uffo Group) (Missbach 2011). As leaders of nationalist movements, diaspora face particular challenges to their authority based on their divergences in political visions, ownership claims, absence or physical detachment from the fight and loyalty. Political concessions are often required (to local elites and military fighters) either during the fight or directly after to maintain their authority, internal cohesion and prevent collapse.

Being able to claim a military victory may secure the legitimacy of diaspora leaders for a longer period by postponing such concessions that could bring political threats to the ruling establishment. In contexts where a military defeat of the enemy has not occurred, or in instances of negotiated settlement where no outcome was made on the issue of independence, diaspora leaders will be under pressure to hand over authority. For instance, this was the case with the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (or Free Aceh Movement) in Indonesia, where diaspora leaders effectively conceded political power to locals in the management of the nationalist fight

following the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) — the peace deal between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed on 15 August 2005. As Anne Missbach argues, this was important because these diaspora leaders did not carry the 'real political responsibility for local legislation of government policy and therefore could not make mistakes' and could protect their authority as political and moral guarantors of the process (Missbach 2011). The 2011 gubernatorial elections finally challenged their authority. A younger generation 'wished to take matters into their own hands rather than be 'reigned' by the senior GAM-elites from abroad and their aides' (Missbach 2011: 199). Missbach importantly highlights the struggles that underpin the claims of diaspora leaders to power and the leadership decisions that must be made to forestall broader implications on what is possible by diaspora politicians.

The case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka differs as they could not claim a military defeat, having suffered a defeat in 2009, but the diaspora leaders within the LTTE also failed to defer to local Tamils over how to proceed with the Tamil State. As a result, the LTTE quickly fragmented. The diaspora contingent pursued divergent, parallel political streams that ultimately undermined its national appeal and performance in local elections (Wayland 2004; Pande 2017). The context of Cambodia provides another example where the royalist *Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique Et Cooperatif* (Funcinpec), which started off as a resistance movement against the People's Republic of Kampuchea government in the post-1993 civil war period, in turn failed to establish political dominance against the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) (Um 2006). The CPP successfully raised distrust among the populace towards Funcinpec for being opportunists and fleetingly and culturally disconnected from the homeland (Hughes 2009; Missbach 2011). As a result, Funcinpec ultimately failed to counter the CPP, whose leaders had run local government since overthrowing the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and held significant local legitimacy. Thus, the debates and struggles for understanding how diaspora leaders establish, or fail to establish, and project authority over national movements is not a new subject. Yet, the question of how they assume power thereafter, and the forms of resistance and struggle that occurs within the state-making process, has received less attention within the scholarship.

The cases of the SNM and USC are particularly important as both claimed military defeat over Barre in 1991 and made the transition from the leaders of national movements to state authorities. A nominal change to the leadership emerged following the announcement of

independence in Burco in 1991, but key diaspora politicians still dominated cabinet positions until 1993 Borama conference (Renders 2012). Further south, Ali Mahdi fared better, holding on to de facto power under Italian tutelage. Italian Ambassador Mario Sica reportedly urged businessman Ali Mahdi, leader of one wing of the USC, to proclaim himself President before the entrance into Mogadishu of General Aideed and his armed volunteers. As conflicts continued within the USC, Italy sponsored the Djibouti I (June 1991) and Djibouti II (July 1991) Conferences, ostensibly to mediate Somali conflicts but in reality to legitimise Ali Mahdi. He hung loosely onto power until 1997, when he lost out in the Cairo Conference and at the 2000 Arta process, where Italian tutelage had been replaced by wider international interventions (vis-à-vis their diaspora).

The following sections (3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) provide original empirics and a detailed account of the internal dynamics that emerged within these organisations and subsequent state projects from the 1980s onwards. At the level of the socio-political organisations, these sections highlight the inter-personal fights and power struggles that emerged between the military and diaspora wings, as well as within the diaspora wings, linked to external patrons and financial resources that shaped power balances. The analysis is tied to broader debates about de facto statehood and statebuilding discourse and how diaspora choose to lead the national cause, allocate power and legitimise their authority and ownership after the post-irredentist fight. The forms of popular resentment that may emerge around questions of diaspora leadership are not only tied to loyalty and commitment, but also the fallacies of recognition, conceptions of class and privilege that structure political opportunities and senses of injustice. Through this chronological inquiry, a few claims are made: first, that the forms diaspora leadership in the 1980s in the SNM and USC intensified autonomous military action and failed to take seriously opportunities for negotiation and compromise or head the power of armed insurrection. The second claim is that their failure to transfer power to local elites, with the rise of the state project, critically removed their role as political and moral guarantors. Instead, they positioned themselves as political actors to either be controlled (Somaliland) or, where that was not possible, as rivalrous actors in perpetual competition with local interest groups (Somalia). The diaspora wings of the USC and SNM rose and fell, but key diaspora individuals and factions emerged. Growing popular resistance mounted in the form of party politics, as well as other popular movements (that included religious extremism), to contest their claims to legitimacy, sovereignty and state logics.

### 3.3 Somaliland: diaspora dominance, contestation and exclusion

For the duration of its irredentist struggle and through to the initial years of independence until its dissolution (1981-1993), the SNM was reportedly 'more representative of Somaliland's exile communities than of its local population' (Renders 2012: 69; ION 11/07/1981). However, the suggestion that the SNM was a 'private army of the Isaaq diaspora' (see Affi 2012) overlooks critical sources of contestation that emerged within the SNM from the onset (amongst the diaspora groups and from within the Uffo Group and the military fighters)[90]. In terms of the first cleavage, scholars tend to understate the divisions that emerged between the London[91] and Saudi[92] diaspora groups (over the role of Islam, and the objectives and key underlying principles of the national movement). From the onset, the Saudi group quickly came to dominate all movement matters, having benefited from being more organised and more homogenous in terms of socio-political and occupational profile (Renders 2012), but also due to its access to financial wealth and international capital from its transnational business and migrant class. The Saudi Group's dominance over financial contributions defined its political dominance and organisational strategies[93]. Scholars have recounted how the Saudi group reached out to the London group because of the UK's relative political freedoms (compared to Saudi Arabia) and to ensure a clan balance in its top leadership. Critically, the key members of the Saudi Group by 1981 — Hassan Adan Wadaadiid, Mohamed Hashi Elmi, Abdisalam Yasin and Ismail Buba[94] — did not represent Habar Jeclo or Arab. They sought alliances with the London group to fill these gaps, but it was these key actors that would remain critical

[90] This included the strength of the group UFFO that gained traction locally and formed a largely parallel armed resistance that also spurred support in the diaspora. Interviews 1 and 2, former member of the UFFO group, 19 November 2016 and 30 October 2017.

[91] The London Group emerged out of the Somali Student Society (SSS) in London in 1972 and was mainly constituted of Somali students who came to the UK for scholarships from late 1960s to early 1970s. By 1979, some five intellectuals in London (Lewis 1994: 185) had formed the Somali National Democratic Party (SNUP) and commenced more political activities. These included Omar Ilmi Dihoud (Arab), Hassan 'Isa Jamaa (Arab), Ismail Mahmud Samatar (Habar Jeclo), Ahmed Mohamed Sufi (Habar Yunis) and 'Abd al–Rahman 'Abd al–Qadir Farah (Habar Yunis), who had formed the Somali National Democratic Party (SNUP).

[92] The Saudi Group included: Mohamed Hash Ilmi, from the Habar Awal/Isaaq clan; Osman Ahmed Hassan (Habar Jeclo/Isaaq); Mohamed 'Ali Farah (also Habar Jeclo/Isaaq). Also included were Hassan Aadan Wadaadiid, Ismail Bubba, Ahmed Ismail Abdi, and Saeed Ahmed Egal (all Garhajis).

[93] Interview 7, former member of the Saudi Group and university professor at University of Hargeisa, 29 November 2016. For information on how much was being remitted and how this was occurring see Lindley 2010; Reno 2003.

[94] Mohamed Hashi was an engineer, Abdisalam Yassin and Ismail Buuba were professors at the universities, and Hassan Adan Wadaadiid was a former Ambassador. These men were full–time and the community was paying them a monthly salary so that they could support their families and dedicate themselves to the cause. Interview 8, former of Uffo group and local activist, Hargeisa, June 2017.

forefathers and guarantors of the state project (up until the present day)[95]. The Saudi Group faced challenges from the London 'Liberals' on clan balancing and representation as a fundamental organisation principle of the movement, which the Saudi Group saw as necessary for collecting donations in the Gulf[96].

This representative and rotational logic at play in the early stages was reported as indicative of the group's democratic logic. Yet, it was evident from the onset that certain clans who contributed more financially, and were represented by the Saudi Group, benefitted disproportionately. This was a feature of internal clan dynamics and networks, and the effect of stronger personalities, that would aid the rise of the Habar Jeclo and Habar Awal and the marginalisation of the Garhajis (see Chapter 4)[97]. As a result of these factors, the Habar Jeclo and Habar Awal would increasingly gain the lion's share of positions within the movement and thereafter, establishing economic and political dominance through the state project (Renders 2012)[98]. The Garhajis leaders (Habar Yonis and Idigaale) importantly saw themselves has having lost out despite its disproportionate contributions to the fighting and financial support, but also as former clients of the colonial state. As one former member of the SNM recounted: the 'Garhajis lost all of their camels and the current political elites are riding on their losses'[99]. The Habar Yonis, in particular, were seen as numerically larger. They had access to more land, having benefited under British colonisation, and had stronger regional allies with the regions (with Ethiopia and Somalia). They were also more educated, and served as top soldiers and judges in Mogadishu[100]. Yet, through access to international capital — where personality, networks and organisation matters — diaspora leaders within the SNM were able to renegotiate some pre-existing hierarchies and relationships[101]. In this way, whether intentional or not, and through the collection of financial contributions and subsequent claims making, the diaspora leadership, and particularly the Saudi Group (known as the *manacasir* or 'those who drink tea'), were blamed for shifting power within Somaliland and overturning preexisting arrangements, while also stratifying (even if unintentionally) political power along clan lines.

[95] From the London group, Hassan Essa Jama would represent Arab and Ismail Mohamud Habar Jeclo.
[96] Among these Liberals there was a degree of pragmatism that 'Isaaqism' would not be able to dismantle Siad Barre alone (Lewis 1994: 200; and see also Renders 2010: 68).
[97] Interviews 2, 4, 28 and 29, local activists and current civil servants, November 2016 and October 2017.
[98] This included the Dahabshiil remittance company (the manager of SNM remittances) that had turned forces of social and organisational capital into political.
[99] Interview 19, former member of the Saudi Group and advisor for Waddani, 20 October 2017.
[100] Interview 29, federal parliamentarian, Oxford, 15 May 2018.
[101] Interview 7, former member of the Saudi Group and professor at University of Hargeisa, May 2017.

Competition emerged between the Saudi and London Group initially, and then between these groups, the military wing, and the Mogadishu group. Contestation over leadership was tied to conceptions of loyalty, accountability and ownership, but also were frequently reduced to highly personalised fights and hurt pride. Many locals linked the inception of divisive clan politics within the SNM to the election in 1984 of Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo (a member of what would be called the *Mogadishu wing*) as Chairman[102]. Silanyo had importantly emerged as a compromise candidate in 1984 between the *manacasir* and *calan cas* (the latter is used to refer to the military wing, translated as 'red flag'). During its exile in Ethiopia, the Saudi Group had fallen out of favour by 1983 as Ethiopia's Chairman of the Derg Mengistu Haile Mariam (then President of Ethiopia) was deeply suspicious of the diaspora leadership. The dominance of the Saudi Group had raised concerns about their religious associations — the Saudi Group's then leader was Sheikh Yusuf Madar. There was also a sense that the group's access to external funds would make them less controllable[103]. As a result, Ethiopia emboldened the military wing against the Saudi Group by supporting the selection of Abdikadir Koosaar and Mohamed Kahin as the secretary and general secretary in 1983. When this military-led administration failed, the SNM executive committee brought in Silanyo as a compromise candidate. In 1984, after waiting out his two years in the UK to qualify for the chairmanship according to the SNM constitution[104], Silanyo successfully secured the chairmanship but he faced internal challengers, not least from the Saudi Group [105].

The Saudi Group did not trust the political intentions of the *Mogadishu* wing (comprising mainly political insiders, ministers, governors or civil servants from the previous Barre regime), as they saw them as opportunists and unionists, especially as Silanyo himself was initially hostile to the SNM fight (Renders 2012). As members of the Saudi Group indicated,

[102] Interview, Somali politician and former minister, Hargeisa, 25 October 2017. As one recounted, Silanyo had transformed the war 'into tribal disagreements that negatively affected the Diaspora – each sub-clan was mobilised and conveyed their contribution separately through their respective trusted brokers'.
[103] Ibid. The group that led the SNM when it moved to Ethiopia was comprised of the religious clerics and included Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Madar (as the Chairman), Hasan Adan Wadadiid and Mohamed Haashi.
[104] Under the SNM constitution an ex–regime official could not hold a position in SNM until he or she had stayed in opposition for at least two years. This was reflected in Article 82 of the Constitution (The conditions for eligibility for election as President or Vice–President) that states that candidate '…must be apprised of the realities of the country, having been resident in the country for a period of at least two years before the date when the election is scheduled to take place'. And that 'to be elected as President or Vice–President… 'The candidate must also '…be a citizen of Somaliland by birth, and, notwithstanding residence as a refugee in another country, must not hold any other citizenship'.
[105] As Lewis argues, the election of Silanyo as chairman was also in line with the SNM's well-established and pragmatic approach to politics associated with the Saudi group – the Habar Jeclo's turn had come, and Silanyo's support from the Isse Muse (due to marriage ties) and Arab were critical (Lewis 1994: 212).

'they had done nothing to help the struggle except to say that they attended separate meetings and had shouted at Siyaad Barre, but we funded from our own pockets'[106]. By the mid-1980s the question of independence was still not on the table for the Saudi Group but Silanyo's appointment as chairman, and the inundation of other politicians defecting from Mogadishu to the SNM, fuelled, not only growing incoherence within the organisation around its policy objectives and visions, but also support from the Saudi Group for secessionism in order to distinguish itself from the Mogadishu wing. The latter had maintained a commitment to negotiation and reportedly its power centres in Mogadishu[107]. Others explained the fight at this time as one between 'the religious-minded, western-style intellectuals, die-hard nationalists and some turncoat unionists'[108]. By 1987, the diaspora wing was working with the military wing to escalate the fight and coordinate with the USC and SSDF (Bradbury 2008)[109]. Silanyo retaliated to what he saw as hostile acts by undertaking an extensive purge within the SNM's ranks; clan elders ultimately stepped in to resolve what they saw as a leadership conflict that would bring the country to the brink of war.

In the 1987, during discussions to solve the leadership dispute, clan elders sought to explicitly exclude diaspora from participating. They stipulated that 'rather Somali society, including community leaders and sheikhs, will contribute to the running of the movement' (ION 25/04/1987). The intellectuals from the Saudi and London groups resisted, at least initially, the interventions from the elders, as they saw clannism as primitive and divisive. Yet, the elders further seized hold after Silanyo's removal of Ali Mohamed Ossobleh (Hawiye/Habar Gedir) from the vice-chairman post. Elders accused Silanyo of escalating a personal squabble to a national fight (Bradbury 2008). This disagreement would prove critical as the departure of Hawiye supporters to the USC gave the USC the momentum to mobilise and overthrow Barre in January 1991 and for SNM to retaliate with independence and claims of military victory (Compagnon 1992; Lewis 1994: 213). As some observers have reported, it was SNM leadership chauvinism that was blamed for the ill-advised 'impromptu' secessionist movement that came shortly thereafter (Bryden 1996). The *calan cas* had pursued independent action in the final military assaults against Barre's regime, while also accusing 'the SNM leadership, especially the intellectuals, [and] in particular Mohamed Silanyo, of having plunged the North

[106] Interview 6, former member of the Saudi Group and minister, Hargeisa, 30 November 2016.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Interview 8, 25 October 2017, member of UFFO, SNM and now local activist, August 2017.
[109] Numerous factors included ongoing atrocities perpetrated by the central government in the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burco, and against Isaaq communities in Mogadishu, which brought more decisive for the SNM.

into desolation and chaos, while they themselves were living comfortably abroad without being able to offer any alternative to the Barre regime' (Renders 2012: 81).

Nonetheless, within two months of Barre's fall, the SNM also claimed a 'liberation' legacy and a military defeat of Barre forces, prompting northern clans and even the *calan cas* to agree to accept the political leadership of the current SNM executive committee for a period of two years (Bryden 1996; Bradbury 2008; Renders 2012). By this point, the initial leaders of the London and Saudi Group had been deposed of by the chairmanship. The 1991 Burco conference conferred the presidency to the current chairman of the SNM, Abdirahman Tuur[110] (Habar Yonis), who was strategically unaffiliated with any SNM wing, to preside over the newly-independent Somaliland state[111]. Importantly, Silanyo opposed the new government and even used his power to mobilise against international recognition of Somaliland. As one participant at the time reported:

> At the congress in Burco in 1991, it was Mr. Silanyo and Saleban Gaal (both Habar Jeclo) who were against the new government, and always calling for international community not to recognise Somaliland and to be given any aid. Saying that Somaliland was in conflict amongst its people … the government of Abdirahman Tuur challenged the sub-clans of Habar Jeclo, Harti and some of Sacad Muse sub-clans … had it not been for this infighting I think we could have gained recognition from France and the UK at this time, but our leaders were plotting against each other[112].

In this way, diaspora leaders within the SNM made claims for and against recognition to disempower competitors and, thereafter, these politicians set about competing for the support of the military wing in order to outnumber the other groups, which further fragmented Somaliland society into militarised clan units[113]. Tuur was ultimately unable to forestall the eruption of civil war from 1991 until 1994 and he took a decision that was expected of him – formally renouncing the separatist platform in 1994. This decision by Tuur would continue to

[110] Abdurrahman Tuur was SNM secretary of foreign affairs based in London as a representative for SNM. When he came to the SNM congress, held at Baligubadle in 1990, Abdurrahman was elected as the chairman of SNM.
[111] He was accompanied by the vice president was Hassan Isse (formerly from the London Group, Arab).
[112] Interview 8, former member of the Uffo group and local activist, Hargeisa, 25 October 2017.
[113] The SNM constitution states that 'Central committees of the organisation will also automatically become the legislative body of the interim government, the executive secretaries will automatically become ministries, and the chairman and his deputy will also become the president and vice–president respectively'. See Bradbury et al. 2003.

haunt Garhajis' claims to political power, as he was seen as a traitor and a unionist – an association that would weigh heavy on the political ambitions of other Garhajis candidates (now comprising both diaspora-led opposition parties). In the 1993 Borama conference, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (Sacad Muse) was introduced as the first antidote to the SNM leadership debacle. Egal had never been involved in the SNM but he was a strong leader and was seen as a concession to *calan cas* interests, even though he set about dismantling the authority of the SNM and denying power to the military commanders[114]. He also formally restricted the political influence of diaspora returnees seeking office. In 1997, in response to the political threat posed by influential diaspora returnees, Saleban Mohamud Adan and Abdillahi Omar, Egal introduced a number of conditions under the National Charter (enacted in the 1993 Borama conference) that restricted and eventually disqualified diaspora candidates from participating in the presidential election (Abdille 2010: 13). These rules and conditions were later incorporated into the National Constitution. This formal and informal consensus on diaspora political participation operated unchallenged between 1993 until 2009, as diaspora leadership had been associated with divisive politics, authoritarian tendencies and a politics of exclusion.

### *3.3.1 Reinventing the SNM legacy and the second backlash*

Following Egal's premature death in 1993, Vice President Dahir Riyale came to power, sparking an opening of the political space during the first multiparty elections in 2003. Many diaspora politicians from within the SNM and outside contested the presidency. Nonetheless, Riyale won in 2003, which reflected popular hesitancy towards the legacy of the SNM and diaspora leadership. During Riyale's term in office, the Peace, Unity and Development Party (Kulmiye or UNITY), under Silanyo's leadership, would gain momentum and mobilise a campaign narrative that Riyale was unfit to govern because he was not a member of the dominant Isaaq clan and had been accused of committing military atrocities in the 1980s in Berbera (Affi 2012: 189). By way of reinvention, mainly from his residency in the UK, Silanyo offered a wave of hope, which appealed to both diaspora and locals (Jhazbhay 2003: 168), by

[114] 'They adopted the strategy of each one neutralising the colonels from his own clan, for example, Tuur was getting rid of the HY colonels, such as, Ahmed Mire and Jama Ali Elmi, while Egal did the same with the HA colonels, such as, Ibrahim Dhegaweyne and later Muse Bihi and other Calan Cas members. Silanyo is doing the same to Mohamed Kaahin and others currently'. Interview 11, clan elder involved in 1991 Burco conference, Hargeisa, August 2017.

drawing on fatigue with militarised governance and the lack of progress towards development. He launched a campaign that promised to deliver on international recognition and foreign investment. He lobbied, fundraised and increased party membership among a largely 'absent but active constituency' (Hammond 2010: 157). His claims to power were emboldened by Riyale's attempts to secure an extension in 2008 on the grounds of insecurity and drought, that placed Silanyo on a collision course with the incumbent. The Guurti ultimately supported Silanyo's ambitions.

Silanyo both drew on his legitimacy as a former SNM member while also providing a new political narrative of change. In a replay of an old competition, ahead of the 2009 elections, Silanyo faced fierce competition from other SNM founders from the Saudi Group, including Abdi' al-Rahman 'Abd al-Qadir Farah, who had challenged his legitimacy to govern from the outset (including while he was Chairman of the SNM in 1984). Others from the Saudi Group also contested Silanyo and Kulmiye for the presidency, including Professor Abdisalan Yassin, Mohamed Hashi Elmi, Ibrahim Dhagaweyne (a prominent SNM Colonel from the Berbera region) and Hassan Gure (former member of the SNM executive committee), who all founded *Horyaal*. By the time of the 2005 parliamentary elections, Silanyo (and his Kulmiye party) had strategically absorbed many of the former SNM political groupings under one umbrella — including ASAD (Alliance for Salvation and Democracy), as well as ex-UFFO members and politicians from SAHAN associated with *calan cas*. As it was becoming evident that Silanyo would win, Dahir Riyale reportedly told Silanyo, 'I'm giving you a united country, please preserve it'[115]. Thus, despite the change campaign, real concerns still existed about the legacy of the SNM struggle and about his capacity as a leader, especially amongst non-Isaaq communities.

As Riyale predicted, Silanyo struggled to mend social cleavages and was accused of abandoning consultative action and antagonising the border areas. The deterioration of Somaliland's relationship with its borderlands — the Isse/Dir in the West and Harti-Darood in the East — would result in the formation of Awdal State in 2009 and Khaatumo State in 2012 as autonomous states[116]. The two-track state solution proposed by the US administration in September 2010 under Jonny Carson had excited many mini-state efforts led by diaspora

[115] Interview 19, former Uffo Member and local civil society activist, 19 November 2016.
[116] Interview 13, former FCO representative to Somaliland, Hargeisa, 20 November 2016.

politicians (Hoehne 2018).[117] Khaatumo State emerged in 2012 under the close leadership of Somali-American Ali Khalif Galayd. He was a former member of the Mogadishu wing who had fallen out with Silanyo after failing to be adequately compensated for the support he provided to his campaign[118]. Ali Khalif used his US networks to make claims against Somaliland's recognition on the basis of political interest, and donors leveraged pressure for good behaviour. In other works, the UK put pressure on the US to bring Ali Khalif into discussions with Somaliland — just as the US had played a role in 2013 in brokering a ceasefire between Silanyo and Minister Salebaan Hagaltosie (for health since 2013)[119]. By 2017, Ali Khalif was abandoning ambitions of 'liberating' the Dhulbahante clan homeland (Hoehne 2018), especially as a new group of Dhulbahante diaspora were reportedly challenging his authority and formulating a new political agenda.

Silanyo faced challenges from other diaspora politicians and internally given the legacy of the SNM and his leadership within in. He cherry picked reform agendas and made nominal commitments to elections but also weaponised recognition against the international community. He sought new allies and recognition in the Gulf, where the prospects for new international partnerships raised more questions and internal conflict, than solutions, in a low capital environment. He was ultimately accused of selling off state resources and of forming a kleptocratic state around his close familial networks (because he rewarded close diaspora supporters and family members with political positions and contracts for business and port development). As such, he disproportionately benefitted transnational business interests and sidelined domestic capitalists from key opportunities and expansion. He also used the few institutions of the state (including security) to coerce compliance (see Chapter 7). Where diaspora political engagement was low and restricted, diaspora opposition figures were able to play the politics of recognition to denounce and discredit Silanyo. Within his party, Kulmiye, a large alliance formed against his leadership and one which explicitly sought a 'local' turn.

Thus, by the 2016 elections, the Kulmiye Party faced internal opposition against Silanyo's incumbency by Musabixi Abdi (an old member of the *calan cas* and then current chairman of the party). He had joined Silanyo in a marriage of convenience in 2009 in order to present a

[117] The first track involved supporting the TFG, which had been reformed at a conference in Djibouti in 2009 and now also included 'moderate' Islamists. The second track entailed engagement with Somaliland and Puntland, but also with local authorities in South-Central, in order to end two decades of instability and violence in Somalia.
[118] Interviews 26 and 27, Ali Khalif Galayd, August and September 2017.
[119] Interview 13, former FCO representative to Somaliland, Hargeisa, 20 November 2016.

united front of resolution amongst the old SNM leadership squabbles, but he had opposed Silanyo and what was seen as extraverted power structures. Musabixi presented himself as a notably 'local' candidate, and was able to discredit the other opposition parties. Both of the opposition parties were diaspora-led and were also unable to galvinise the same diaspora support Kulmiye had under Silanyo. Musabixi campaigned on his capacity to protect national interests (both territorially and politically) as tensions around independence and recognition mounted with Somalia under the new federal structure. Thus, the election of Musabixi was still tightly linked to deeply insecure politics which were tied to the precarity of sovereign borders and international recognition and a mistrust of leaders and their loyalties. It was a popular cry against the unfulfilled promises of the West, but also demonstrated new legitimacy requirements in terms of citizenship and orientation. This was especially the case as the attachments of diaspora politicians to international networks, passports, partnerships and policy agendas outside or beyond the state — including with the Somalia administration — caused great anxiety for subnational actors. In this way, Musabixi's election in 2017 was a second referendum on the diaspora question which had occurred first at the 1993 Borama conference with the ousting of the SNM leadership from power.

This trajectory of leadership succession differed in the Puntland context, where the absence of a secessionist fight, compounded by the dominance of a military wing, had minimised the political engagement of diaspora (i.e. their mobilisation and interventions around the Puntland state project). Diaspora politicians would start to assert dominance over the state project after 2001 and, particularly by 2004, the political vacuum left by Abdullahi Yusuf's departure to Mogadishu. By 2012, Puntland had also become a critical component of the building blocks solution and federal system (garnering a special arrangement). This positioning created a domestic appeal for diaspora politicians within the international and federal system but not necessarily accompanied by the same conditionalities or internal legitimacy requirements[120]. Thus, even though Puntland's state objectives were not secessionist, diaspora increasingly were attached to discrete state-building agendas through which Puntland sought to mobilise international and state resources in competition with and against Mogadishu's claims for security, progress and capital liquidity. As with the SNM, similar concerns emerged in Puntland about the commitments of diaspora leaders to the Puntland cause, which was tied to the politics of recognition, their alternative international loyalties and the Mogadishu allure, but also to

[120] Informal discussions with World Bank consultants and officials in Garowe, May and August 2017.

their claims to ownership and capacity to know what is best for the collective at the clan and 'national' level.

### 3.4 Puntland: SSDF military dominance and the ambiguities of state-making

The SSDF was the first major armed opposition movement to challenge Siad Barre's repressive regime and, like the SNM, it had contact with diaspora groups surrounding its formation in 1979. The SSDF sought, at least initially, to accommodate ideologically diverse groups that included Shaqilla[121] (Somali Workers Democratic Party) and the Somali Democratic Liberation Front (SDLF). They had merged in South Yemen to constitute the SSDF and similar military and political wings[122]. As former Shaqilla members indicated, 'the SSDF was never good at absorbing [different groups], Abdullahi Yusuf was a very notorious dictator. He became very powerful and he arrested whoever he wanted. He became a king in the region … and we had no access to any of their resources'[123]. Shaqilla members indicated certain concerns that the SDLF was being used for its 'relationship with the Socialist countries but that its role and contribution would be heavily restricted'[124]. It was evident that Libya (1980–1985) and Ethiopia preferred the military rule of SSDF and sought to directly cut off the political wings emerging in the diaspora and Yemen[125]. By 1984, as party members report, Abdullahi Yusuf, in collaboration with the intelligence of Qadafi and Mengistu, started the physical elimination of the heads of the Shaqilla and SDLF factions[126]. As a result, the diaspora wings never gained dominance in the same way they had in the SNM (and the USC), and the SSDF comprised mainly dissident politicians and senior military officers from the Barre regime (Samatar 1992:

[121] There were also divergent opinions among the Shaqilla members as to the wisdom of joining these military types. They left the SSDF in the end for protection when Yusuf was imprisoned by Mengistu. As one member of Shaqilla indicated, right from the beginning, 'we had differences with Abdullahi Yusuf; he, like Siad Barre, believed in a coup and overthrowing the government of Siad Barre with the ambition of ruling the country'. Interview, Saeed Ahmed and Adan Muse Jibril, Garowe, May 2017.
[122] Interviews 30 and 34, former member of the SSDF, November and May 2017.
[123] Interview 11, MP Abdirahman Dheere, Garowe, 23 October 2017.
[124] Interview 34, former SSDF military commander, Garowe, 15 May 2017.
[125] As Jutta Bakonyi suggests, the SSDF published in 1983 a political programme that was coloured by Marxist rhetoric and seemed to be oriented more towards its main donors – Ethiopia, Libya and potentially the Soviet Union – than towards the Somali population (2015: 249).
[126] In 1984, Abdirahman Aideed, the head of the communist party faction, was the first who was assassinated by Abdullahi Yusuf. Iker H. Hussein and his colleague Abdirahman were next. Interview 30, Amb Adan Muse Jibril, Hargeisa, 10 November 2017.

62). Thereafter, it was Abdullahi Yusuf's prominence and internal disputes within the SSDF that deterred Somali intellectuals from joining the opposition (Farah 2001: 7)[127].

There were certainly other factors that also dissuaded diaspora from participating to the same extent as had occurred in the SNM during the same period. The SSDF remained militarily weak throughout the mid-1980s, which meant that the region avoided the extensive government bombings and other attacks that had galvanised diaspora support for the SNM (Affi 2012). In addition, as has already been suggested (3.1), the government's dual commitments to building up the Puntland state, while also participating in federal–level processes, limited its ability to rally businesspeople and professionals around the statebuilding project and to secure diaspora support to the same extent that occurred in Somaliland (Johnson and Smaker 2014: 16). The diaspora affiliated with the Majeerteen clan were also deeply opposed to Ethiopia's support for the SSDF under Abdullahi Yusuf. Anti–Ethiopian sentiment was an important unifying and rallying call for the diaspora across Puntland and Somalia during this period. In turn, the restricted political space for diaspora allowed the SSDF to build relatively cohesive structures, closely tied to the personality of its leader, Abdullahi Yusuf (Samatar 1988). Thus, rather than disintegrating, the SSDF formed an administration post-1991, but Yusuf's imprisonment from 1985 until 1991 in Ethiopia also left a critical political vacuum within the SSDF[128].

An internal competitor for power came from General Mohamed Abshir, who was a former member of the USC and the 'Manifesto Group' in Mogadishu (Interpeace 2009: 38). Abshir garnered a level of respect particularly among intellectuals, the emerging civil society and the diaspora who resented Abdullahi Yusuf's role as a military dictator (Farah 2001). The fight formed a predictable route and one similar to the SNM – 'From that point, leadership [had become] not about consent, but about who could muster the force to claim it and use coercive instruments to maintain it' (ICG 2009: 23). As had occurred with the SNM in 1987, when fighting intensified between General Abshir and Abdullahi Yusuf, the Majeerten elders (or *boqor*) stepped in and, in 1998, established a new regional administration under the council of lineage elders, although with the SSDF leaders still at its helm (Compagnon 1990: 83).

[127] The leadership struggle was characterised mainly by a difference in approach between the military wing of the SSDF allied with former ministers from the Barre regime and politicians and officials from the former civilian government of the 1960s. Former high–ranking officials from the Barre regime included Hassan Abshir (formerly mayor of Mogadishu), General Jibril (former head of the National Security Service), Colonel Abshir Muse, General Ali Ismail and others.

[128] Although the SSDF continued to exist as an opposition movement, it was largely neutralised as an effective threat against Barre (Issa-Salwe 1996; Lewis 1989: 575).

Abdullahi Yusuf was still popularised as a strong Darood leader who could match Aideed's military might in the South, which swayed popular and diaspora opinion against General Mohamed Abshir. In addition, locals (and even diaspora) were increasingly sceptical of Abshir who was preoccupied with Mogadishu politics and support for other Manifesto Group members, that included organising national level peace conferences[129]. The final straw came at the 1997 and 1998 national reconciliation initiatives in Sodere and Cairo (WSP 1998; Helander 1998; Interpeace 2009: 25), where Abshir was seen as deferential to the USC agenda in Mogadishu which minimised the influence of the northeast in Somali national affairs. It prompted prominent figures from the diaspora to intervene and urge the formation of a single, unified State of North East Regions (Interpeace 2009: 38).

Even after the Garowe Constitutional Conference and the declaration of the Puntland State in 1998, Abdullahi Yusuf did not reward the diaspora for their support and did not give any diaspora cabinet seats from 1998 until 2001[130]. When Abdullahi Yusuf tried to cling to power unconstitutionally in 2001, he was replaced by a caretaker president under Jama Ali Jama (from rival Osman Mohamoud Saleban/Majeerteen sub-clans) in November. Although diaspora resisted his unconstitutional move to stay in power in 2001, under the caretaker government, Abullahi Yusuf was able to galvanise support from the diaspora by claiming he had been illegally removed and that the clan elders were overstepping, which was an easy sell to diaspora already sensitive about the role of elders within the state (Affi 2012: 194)[131]. Thus, when Abdullahi Yusuf seized power in clear defiance of the *Isimada*, who had anointed Jama[132] as president, he explicitly placed diaspora against the clan system in deciding what was best for the new state. Diaspora politicians would frequently find themselves at loggerheads with clan elders, as well as local governance. In this case, against the views of the diaspora, locals supported the decision of the elders and held a general desire to see Abdullahi Yusuf leave, having lived under his ruthless form of leadership. Under threat from the *Isimada*, he was isolated politically, propped up by diaspora support from a narrow base of Omar Mohamoud, and ruled with an iron fist until he was finally transferred to the presidency in Mogadishu.

[129] Although Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf and his allies were active in the national peace talks, they also emphasised the military defence of the northeast regions.
[130] Interview 36 and 40, PDRC and Gaas chief of staff, Garowe, 18 and 25 April 2017.
[131] Interview 37, PDRC, Garowe, 18 April 2017.
[132] With an easy ticket out, Jama Ali Jama left Puntland to join the IGAD-led national reconciliation conference in Kenya and subsequently became an MP in the Transitional Federal Parliament in 2004.

The space for diaspora to contest political authority was opened by the Mbgathi negotiations and national reconciliation talks in Kenya that saw Abdullahi Yusuf elected as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004. His selection to the post was the result of the eruption of an intra-Hawiye fight alongside civil war faultlines and the failure of diaspora-led mediation around the 2000 Arta process. In 2004, into the vacuum left by Abdullahi Yusuf, Former Vice President Mohamed Abdi Hashi emerged as interim president of Puntland until legislators chose General Adde Muse for the next four-year term[133]. Adde Muse (from Yusuf's rival Osman Mohamud sub-clan) was a former General in the Somali Armed Forces under Mohamed Siad Barre. Yet, he was also a member of the Somali–Canadian diaspora and followed a predictable route towards political power, as he worked previously for UNDP. According to an interview with a former Puntland politician — 'Muse, unlike Abdullahi Yusuf, had very little knowledge of the culture of this region and especially of clan obligations. Muse surrounded himself with other members of the diaspora, particularly from Canada, where they were disproportionately represented at the ministerial level'[134]. Not unsurprisingly, widespread accusations followed Muse's tenure regarding his deference to foreign extractors and alleged bribery surrounding the 2005 local council elections, which together formed the basis for an emerging threat from Islamist extremists and pirates (ICG 2005)[135]. His forceful implementation of a concession agreement with Range Resources brought him into conflict with the Warsengeli in the Galgala region (ICG 2013).

Many in hindsight would link worsening security risks to misguided policies under his leadership, his outward-facing political agendas and the new identity politics that followed[136]. Such practices and leadership under Adde Muse also pushed the Majeerteen towards more extreme secessionist claims, which marked a major change from the unionist position officially adopted in 1998[137]. After the 1997 Cairo Conference, Puntland leaders were primarily concerned with the necessity of a local Puntland administration to provide stability, order and

[133] 'New Puntland President Faces Stiff Challenges', VOA News, 2 November 2009, available at https://www.voanews.com/a/a–13–2009–01–15–voa51–68809987/412716.html.
[134] Interview 40, former chief of staff, Garowe, 25 April 2017.
[135] These included strong relations with UAE to grant mineral exploration rights to foreign companies in 2005 rather than focusing on internal reconciliation and the volatility of the Sool and Sanaag Regions (the area that is disputed between Somaliland and Puntland). These aspects of his tenure were blamed for the emergence of Islamic militancy in the Al–Shabaab–linked militants in the Golis mountains and the rise of piracy by 2008 (as a way of expressing discontent and seeking alternative means of political leverage) (ICG 2005).
[136] Focus group discussion, PDA, Garowe, May 2017.
[137] Puntland emerged from the building block approach originally proposed by Ethiopia for southern Somalia in the mid–1990s (Bryden 1999).

protection from armed incursions in the absence of a central government. By 2005, it seemed that Puntland leaders were principally concerned with bolstering economic and political power in order to renegotiate their power at the centre. Thus, they were worried less about internal legitimacy requirements, or the legacy of military leaders, than the broader state logics and the critical role diaspora politicians could play. Certainly, strengthening recognition in the south affected more hardline positions in Puntland and affected the politics of recognition at play thereafter, that included the selection of two other diaspora politicians before the return to traditional networks.

### *3.4.1 Federal aspirations, the diaspora turn, and the reversal*

Adde Muse's successor Abdirahman Faroole (Isse Mohamoud) won largely based on the unpopularity of his predecessor but he was also the first civilian president. Faroole was a Majeerteen from the Isse Mohamoud sub-clan dominant in Garowe. It was thought Somalis from Europe and North America, in particular, could help improve Puntland's international relations but Faroole was from Australia (Hoehne 2012). He was a 'farewell diaspora' who had not lived away from the country for very long, having completed university in Australia but who — critically — had two sons back in Somalia at the time of his election. This was important for elders and the population to distinguish him from Adde Muse[138]. He was also, importantly, not a military leader but a technocrat, having served as Finance Minister under Presidents Yusuf and Hashi (from 2003–04) and as Planning and International Cooperation Minister under President Muse (Hoehne 2015: 74). Yet, like Muse, Faroole reportedly lacked the 'gutsy and decisive style of Yusuf', an attribute that would become characteristic of Gaas' leadership. Faroole also assumed a deliberately cautious approach towards the incorporation of other returnees in his administration and, according to reports, by 2011, had largely abandoned practices of accommodating diaspora due to popular pressure (see also Affi 2012)[139]. Instead, Faroole concentrated on security and economic development at Puntland's core, the Majeerteen territory between Bosaaso, Garoowe and northern Gaalkacyo, and looked to external partners in order to push back against demands from Mogadishu (Hoehne 2012). An obscure but nonetheless distinct group within the Somali political consciousness was seen to emerge around Faroole, known as the Aaran Jaan, which constituted an inner-core of economic and political elites (including his sons) who misappropriated public funds from 2009

[138] Interviews 36 and 37, PDRC team and local activists, Garowe, April 2017.
[139] PDA discussion group, Garowe, May 2017.

until 2014[140]. This group symbolises the accumulation of authority, capital and recognition around Garowe and Bosasso. It thus constitutes an important alliance between Isse Mahmoud and Osman Mahmoud economic and political interests, which challenges the militarised and political hegemony of the Omar Mahmoud under the SSDF tied to Galkacyo[141].

The shifts towards more network-based politics, which had transpired from Muse to Faroole, was captured by an Amina Arts cartoon. The first image shows Abdullahi Yusuf sharing camel milk (national wealth) with many people. The second one shows Adde Muse sharing the milk only with his ministers and the final image is of Abdirahman Faroole drinking the milk with his son[142]. This association between diaspora leaders and increasingly nepotistic forms of politics occurred across the Somali territories and was linked to multiple dimensions of transnational political parties, which included their insecurity vis-à-vis people, and was also evidenced by their diminished commitment to consultative politics and extraverted policies (see Chapter 7). By the end, Faroole's administration was associated with a kleptocratic state where security assistance from the UAE and international partners had been used to pay patronage to his family and close confidants and to crackdown on political opponents (ICG 2013).

In the 2014 elections, which Faroole lost, Abdiweli Gaas won on a presidential campaign where he 'promised the moon'.[143] Among his promises was: a democratic and transparent governance system; an impregnable security apparatus; robust economic infrastructures and institutions; and universal suffrage (one-person-one-vote electoral system)[144]. He was an internationally-acclaimed technocrat[145] — as part of the 'technocratic' revival promulgated by PM Gheedi of

[140] They received significant cuts from antipiracy and counter-terrorism rents, government deals with multinational companies, and also reportedly from some pirate deals.
[141] Interviews 48 and 49, researcher and businessman, Garowe, May 2017 and May 2018.
[142] PDA discussion group, Garowe, May 2017. There were many cultural references that respondents highlighted. One includes an Amina Arts cartoon. The first image shows Abdullahi Yusuf sharing camel milk (national wealth) with many people. The second one shows Adde Muse sharing the milk only with his ministers and the final image is of Abdirahman Faroole, the current Somali-Australian president of Puntland, drinking the milk with his son.
[143] Interviews 36 and 37, PDRC Team, Garowe, April 2017.
[144] See Faisal Rooble, 'The Floundering Presidency of Dr. Abdiweli Gaas: Part II', Wardheer News, 18 November 2017, https://wardheernews.com/the-floundering-presidency-of-dr-abdiweli-gaas-part-ii/.
[145] See Jeffrey Gettleman, 'Harvard–Educated Technocrat Chosen as Somalia Premier', New York Times Review, 23 June 2011, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/world/africa/24somalia.html. See also Faisal Roble, 'Gaas and the Floundered Presidency', 23 August 2017. In 2014 the UN special envoy to Somalia, Nicholas Kay, welcomed Mr. Gaas' victory, saying Puntland was 'leading the way on the development of a federal Somalia' and that Gaas was bringing the necessary technocratic credentials, having been a key ally in crafting the roadmap. This sentiment was, however, at odds with the reception from locals that described how Gaas was 'parachuted into the TFG in Mogadishu and parachuted out to Puntland'.

the Transitional Federal Government in 2010 — and an 'anti-corruption czar'[146]. He represented a more pragmatic shift in Puntland's strategising within the federal system to work within the state logics in the hopes of negotiating a bigger share of state resources, also by presenting the image of a reformer and diaspora technocrat to the international community. During his term as PM, under Sheikh Sharif (2011-2012), Gaas helped devise the formal 'roadmap' that led to the official conclusion of Somalia's 'transition' and culminated in the establishment of today's Federal Government of Somalia. The fact that he was American was an effective nod to an 'activated' and politically-prominent Majeerteen constituency in the US and aligned with the uptick in US security assistance around piracy and armed resistance that had started to come through under Faroole.

Certainly, Gaas had the credentials to project a technocratic agenda — he held a MA degree from Harvard, Vanderbilt and a Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University. He had also worked in 2007 and 2008 as a technical advisor for the Minister of Finance on an IOM contract after volunteering at PSU for a period of time. His election was lauded even by local think tanks as an indication of political maturity in Puntland and they expected a number of things of him: 'To bring Garowe and Villa Somalia closer; to promote federalism that is built on the concept of regions; to usher good governance that is free from maleficence and corruption; and to move toward democratization in Puntland's electoral process'[147]. International optimism over Puntland's peaceful election and the rise of Gaas gave him a boost in future negotiations with Somalia from a position of considerable strength. Yet, Gaas was not subtle about his disdain for Puntland politics[148]. Gaas was repeatedly cited as having called his predecessors criminals, thieves, goons, abusers of the beautiful Puntland and rank opportunists[149]. His fitness for office, or any role in authority, was challenged early on, back in 2001, when Abdullahi Yusuf made clear his views on Abdiweli Gaas (and other diaspora politicians). In reference to an agreement being forged between USC factions at the time, Abdullahi Yusuf told Gaas: 'your kids are in America and you have milk in their fridge, we have none, your opinion means nothing to us'[150].

[146] See Faisal Rooble, 'The Floundering Presidency of Dr. Abdiweli Gaas: Part II', Wardheer News, 18 November 2017, https://wardheernews.com/the-floundering-presidency-of-dr-abdiweli-gaas-part-ii/.
[147] Reading and citing of shared PDRC overview statement of the elections, PDRC, Garowe, May 2017.
[148] Faisal Roble, 'The Floundering Presidency of Dr. Abdiweli Gaas: Part 1 and 2'.
[149] Recounted by PDA discussion group, Garowe, May 2017. It did not stop once in office, as one participant and government advisor discussed, about Abdiweli Gaas – 'he complained about how he had a very easy life in Xamar [Mogadishu], sleeping in hotels, no one bothering him at all, but since he became the head of Puntland there is a long line of queue of people that never ends, with demands no one can ever fulfil, which stresses him out'.
[150] Interview 54, diaspora returnee and government advisor, Garowe, April 2017.

Following his election, Gaas significantly increased the number of diaspora in his 19 ministries (11 ministers, 6/7 vice ministers, 5 state ministers) – which included his chief of staff, finance, security, planning, and fisheries – and all new staff came from US and Canada networks (see Chapter 7)[151]. He appointed his chief of staff (Abdinasir Soofe) to lead the Puntland Marine Police Force (the most politically important branch of the security apparatus) and his minister of public works projects (airports, road constructions and port development) served as chief liaison to World Bank and other donors, often accompanying him on the president's overseas trips. His widespread appeals for diaspora to return included relying more acutely on technocratic assistance programmes for recruiting political allies, rather than political parties which were not in existence[152]. By the end of his tenure, Gaas faced fierce opposition for failing to deliver on any of his promises. He was seen as weak in federal negotiations, unable to protect Puntland's special constitutional arrangement, and as having worsened Puntland's security crisis and divisive internal clan politics (see 7.3). Gaas relied heavily on external legitimacy and partnerships, and the instruments of the state, but had failed to take Puntland 'to the next level', which was blamed on his personal political ambitions, lack of knowledge of local politics or commitment to the Puntland state agenda[153]. By the 2018 elections in Puntland, Gaas reportedly faced a technocratic revolt from within his cabinet, exposed for being a 'fictive' technocrat[154]. In a similar way to Somaliland, Puntland followed a rotational logic. As one respondent indicated in Puntland: 'we had two diaspora technocrats (Faroole and Gaas), and before them two soldiers (Abdullahi Yusuf and Adde Muse). I think the loop is back to a soldier'[155]. The 2018 elections stayed in line with the clan rotation scheme, but did not turn back to a solider, although Gaas was succeeded by a more acceptably local candidate, Saciid Abullahi Deni.

Deni could also be seen as a technocrat. He had served as a member of Somalia's parliament in 2012 and as the former Minister of Planning from 2014-2016 (under PM Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed) but unlike Gaas never proclaimed himself to be a technocrat[156]. He has a masters

[151] Interviews 36 and 37, PDRC team, Garowe, May 2017.
[152] PDA discussion group, Garowe, August 2017.
[153] Interviews 35, 36, and 37, PDRC staff members, Garowe, 18 April 2017.
[154] This was described as a 'technocratic revolt' by Ministers, Deputy Ministers, the State Minister and the VP. Phone interviews 49 and 50, researcher and local businessmen, Garowe, June 2018.
[155] Interview 37, PDRC consultant, Garowe, 18 April 2017. There was another dimension exemplified by the years 1998, 2005, 2008, 2014 and 2019: two Galka'yo-affiliated Presidents; two Qardho-based Presidents and one Garowe-born President linked to particular clan resentments that emerged within the SSDF, and informal divisions of power.
[156] Interviews 48 and 49, local businessman and government advisor, Garowe, 8 October 2017.

degree from the UK, but is first and foremost a businessman, having been the chief executive of one of Puntland's biggest import/export companies, Tawfiq. He represents an obscure group known as the Aaran Jaan that garnered significant power under Faroole (associated with Isse and Osman Mahmoud) and represents key business interests (see 7.4)[157]. As such, he could project the image of being a political insider with important relevance to the federal government but also with deep knowledge and commitment to the Puntland state. He was one of the founders of the Puntland State project in 1998 and, ahead of the 2018 elections, was a key member of a short-lived alliance of domestic and diaspora 'guarantors' of the state project, known as the Puntland Focus Group, that formed around common concerns about the direction of the country under Gaas[158]. Yet, importantly, Deni's election was seen as a return to the more hardline regional politics of the Faroole era, in the face of projected centralised authority from Mogadishu and repeated political interventions in the affairs of member states. Yet, his associations with the Aaran Jaan give rise to internal challengers from within Puntland (from other regions, including Bosasso, from his own Osman Mahmoud clan (where he represents a minority sub-clan, bah Dhulbahante), and from where there are concerns about his relations with the Aaran Jan)[159]. The fact that Asad Diano was favoured against Saed Dani amongst Osman Mohamud proves the extent of internal divides[160].

Current dynamics within Puntland's leadership dynamics demonstrate how the politics of non-recognition may shape the value and utility of diaspora politicians. After 2004, military leaders were largely replaced by diaspora politicians and 'technocrats', but current politics of uncertainty has returned to leaders who can wield force, coercion and hardline positions vis-à-vis the international community and the Somalia federal government. This rotation occurred also in Somaliland, even if the profiles of leaders differed. Yet, the Puntland case demonstrates initial trends in how diaspora politicians were leveraged by domestic actors within the international system around statebuilding, but also then concerns around diaspora politicians in positions of leadership linked to the power of state logics and the fallacies of technocracy.

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[157] Ibid.
[158] PDA discussion group, Garowe, May 2017. It included Abdullahi Ahmed Jama (Ilka-Jir), Abdi Farah Sa'eed (Juha), Ali Haji Warsame, Dr. Mohamed Salad Ali amongst others. The group was active ahead of the Puntland elections in January 2019 although dissolved shortly thereafter. 'Puntland Focus Group concerned about current situation in the state, warns election day', *Garowe Online*, 25 February 2018, available at https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/press–releases/somalia–puntland–focus–group–concerned–about–current–situation–in–the–state–warns–election–delay.
[159] Mohamed Olad Hassan, 'Somalia's Puntland Region Elects New President', Voice of America, 8 January 2019, see at https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalias-puntland-region-elects-new-president;
[160] Interviews 49 and 50, researcher and government advisor, 15 June 2018.

Gaas struggled to demonstrate national commitment, knowledge of local politics or internal legitimacy required by Puntland's more cohesive clan project and institutional framework. As a result, 'local' candidates represented important local economic and political interests. Despite fewer pressures internally to democratise, or be seen to deliver on good governance or socio-political reform, in Puntland, there were greater internal legitimacy requirements which were less coherent in Somalia.

The context of Somalia differs as the rotation schemes are less clearly defined. In Somalia, diaspora candidates and technocratic narratives were first imposed through processes of state formation in 2000. Thereafter the rise of diaspora politicians continued to symbolise the dominance of rivalrous state projects, as well as the primary orientation of the state and state actors in performing international conditions. What emerges is, rather, a complex political landscape where different diaspora political groupings compete for recognition against or on behalf of the Somali state. Thus, different diaspora groupings, which are 'activated' in accordance with shifting geostrategic and donor interest, become key political actors within political parties and the state in waging international opinion and recognition for and against other political groups, and as the legitimate political authorities. With fewer domestic or institutional safeguards, the Somalia context represents a rather more arbitrary transference of power but also where forms of external legitimacy and access to international capital provide important sources of authority and power.

### 3.5 Somalia: the USC divide, international recognition and competition for advantage

Within the rise of the USC against Barre, it was evident how access to 'international' capital and the positionality of key diaspora officials skewed the power structures within the armed insurrection as well as affected prospects for negotiating a settlement. By 1989, top officials within the 'Manifesto Group'[161] — those who had signed the Manifesto statement suggesting that Siad Barre resign, along with politicians, elders and businessmen — were largely residing in Rome (known as the 'Rome' faction). Initially the Rome faction was seen as heavily dominated by Abgaal, and Ali Mohamed Ossobleh Wardigley (who was Mursade/Hawiye) was

[161] The group was comprised mainly of 114 or so political leaders of the pre-Barre era of civilian administration (1960–69), as well as businessmen and intellectuals diaspora (and mainly Hawiye migrant workers) from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

appointed to counter this stigma[162]. Following the death of the two critical leaders (Wardigley and Dr. Ismail Jimcale (Abgaal)) within a short and critical period in 1989, the group lost its identity, its ideological motivations and internal consensus. As was mentioned in Section 3.3, Ambassador Sica empowered his close confidant and friend Ali Mahdi to the disadvantage of the other groups. The USC-Mogadishu contingent had emerged as more representative of business interests from the Abgal and Murusde clans who had close links to the two former leaders of the Rome faction, namely Wardigley and Jimcale. The military faction (USC, Aideed, also known as the 'Addis' faction) was comprised mainly of Habar Gedir, headed by Mohamed Farah Aideed, who had been Somalia's ambassador to India under Siad Barre[163].

The Italian diplomats (and dominant patrons at the time) made a clear decision that they preferred the moderate, reasonable and less clan-based 'Rome faction' over the USC-Mogadishu which was seen as less reasonable, and the military wing (led by Aideed) as intransigent and hardline (Kapteijns 2013: 115). As Lidwien Kapteijns argues, they were 'cut from the same cloth', as administrators and politicians during the Italian Trusteeship, and Ali Mahdi was a particularly close personal friend of the then Italian Ambassador (2013: 117). The diplomatic and financial support provided to the Rome faction, would critically polarise the fight on the ground in Mogadishu and across Somalia (particularly between the Abgaal and Habar Gedir, both Hawiye sub-clans). The financial and diplomatic leverage given to Ali Mahdi by the Italians critically pushed Aideed more towards militarised confrontation, given both his diminished bargaining power and strengthening moral convictions about the injustices of ongoing Italian interventions. The prevailing assumption at the time was also that 'Abgaal owned Mogadishu and would easily win any fight with the support of Italians, and thus could not be trusted with such support'[164]. In addition, the support overlooked what Egal would later caution the Manifesto Group about, namely the importance and power of armed insurrection[165]. As Kapteijns argues, the Rome faction and its Italian supporters 'overestimated their own political relevance and underestimated the brutality of the struggle for the state that was already underway' (2013: 113).

[162] Yet, the faction was never able to completely get rid of this association, as Wardigley's mother was Abgaal and he grew up in an Abgaal community. Those who registered with the USC in Italy at the beginning were all Abgaals. The top figures included Engineer Abdulkadir Madaxey, Dr. Galaguul, Mr. Bana, and others from mainly the Warsangali Abgaal clan, at a time when Hawiye clans on the ground could not risk yet opposing Siad Barre. Interview 53, university professor, Mogadishu, 10 December 2016.
[163] Aideed had received military training in Italy, was imprisoned for seven years after Barre's coup, but then was rehabilitated and nominated by Barre to be his aide de camp and then ambassador to India.
[164] Interview 79, businessman, Mogadishu, 8 September 2017.
[165] Interview 54, professor, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017.

By empowering the Rome faction and side-lining, even demonising, Aideed as a 'subversive figure' (Sica 1994:86), Ali Mahdi and his Italian supporters laid the foundations for a deeply militarised and highly personalised power struggle between Ali Mahdi and Aideed (Kapteijns 2013: 115). This also undermined room for negotiation among the contesting USC factions, as well as between the SNM and the USC. For instance, a last-ditch effort at negotiation between the USC and Siad Barre was missed when Aideed (deeply suspicious of Italy's role and support for Ali Mahdi) firmly refused to participate in a reconciliation conference in Cairo under Italy's mediation in October 1990. Due to the extent of the personal grievances, Ali Mahdi was unable and unwilling to honour negotiations that were being facilitated by Aideed and Abdirahman Tuur (SNM) and aimed to coordinate efforts as early as 1990 (Bryden 1996). In an attempt to level the playing field with external patrons, Aideed started tapping the Habar Gedir diaspora (mainly from the US and Jeddah) to support a final military assault on Mogadishu with a highly moralised argument around clan identity protection. Through this narrative and certain territorial claims, and benefitting from a fight occurring between UNISOM and the Italians, by 1993, he would eventually become the sole benefactors of UN contracting and achieve recognition and territorial dominance to rival Ali Mahdi's authority (see Elder, forthcoming).

Nonetheless, it was widely perceived that support provided by Italians to the Rome faction had strategically reinforced important colonial power networks that had preceded and existed throughout the Siad Barre regime — namely, the clan alliance and hegemonic power relations between the Abgaal and Majeerteen that emerged within the Somali Youth League (SYL). Adding insult to injury, when Ali Mahdi was parachuted to power post-1991, he 'recycled in tribal key' the central pillars of the Barre regime (Kapteijns 2013). He set out as one of his most important tasks the opening up of the government to non-MPs to allow for the accommodation of his Manifesto allies — a tactic he explained as the selection of more 'technocratic' ministers from the outside[166]. In this way, he used the technocratic narrative to accommodate close confidants who had aided his fight, while also explicitly excluding factional leaders, locals and businesspeople. These practices underpinned the first 1991 Djibouti conference[167]. Djibouti conference II responded to the weak leadership of the

[166] This was explained by Ali Mahdi to the US political office, as the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) was closing, see 'Somalia–NRC Closing and next steps', 28 August 2007, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NAIROBI3463_a.html.

[167] There is a differentiation between the courts that emerged in early 1991 and the Islamic Courts Union that emerged in 2003 and came to dominate the politics of Mogadishu that has been under–appreciated in the scholarship.

'intellectuals' by critically sidelining them from participating — instead representing only faction leaders of the various wings. This second conference was critical because the explicit sidelining of diaspora intellectuals forced them to align with clans and armed factions or risk not being represented at the talks. As one respondent indicated, 'there was not any diaspora organisation or group at this point, they were just individuals jostling for a seat at the table, and here they traded loyalties with different military factions'[168].

The 2000 Arta conference, led by the president of Djibouti, Ismael Omar Guelleh, was organised with a particular focus on clan leaders and civil society[169]. Despite this, diaspora converged as clan representatives, de facto members of a transnational civil society and financiers. As was documented at the time, diaspora representatives 'were members of their respective clans, but not necessarily representatives legitimised through clan assemblies' (Anonymous 2002, see Chapter 4). In addition, the diaspora group represented in 2000 largely comprised US/Canadian former Barre elites or intellectuals — members of diaspora organisations that included Ergo[170] and ISRAACA[171]. They sought to reflect the aspirations of the Somali Youth League (SYL) on national unity and consciousness, and many held high hopes that this group could help heal the wounds of civil war and unite a badly beaten Somali society[172]. They received critical support from the UN and the Swedish governments, including support for advising the 1991 reconciliation conference in Djibouti, but the authority of this group would not recover from the financial and diplomatic support given to the TNG in

[168] Interview 54, professor, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017.
[169] It deliberately sidelined the faction leaders, who were held responsible for perpetuating a low-key civil war and considered incapable of achieving national reconciliation.
[170] 'It had at least initial links to the former Mennonite missionaries and was comprised of mainly intellectuals who had taught in Jowhar and had shared experiences, critical of clannism and clannish–based violence. No cohesive political agenda though, very few from the north.' Interview 54, professor, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017.
[171] ISRAACA *Ummadda Soomaaliyeed* (IUS, also known as the Pan–Somali Council for Peace and Stability) was comprised mostly of those that could afford to resettle in Canada and the US. Ibid. Interview, professor, Mogadishu, May 2017. Key figures included initially Mohamed Saeed Togane (Abgaal/Waesli), Ahmed Hayley Islay and Faysal Abdi Rooble and later other notables that included Dr. Ali Khalif Galydh, Dr. Mohmed Mukhtar, Professor Amina Adan, Dr. Mohamed Tani, Dr. Ahmed Issa Hussein, Fadumo Omar Hashi, Professor Ali Jimale, Mohamud Hamud, Professor Nuur Hussien and others. ISRAACA would emerge formally out of the African Studies Association in Columbus in 1997 with explicit ambitions for forming a political party (Bashir Ali et al. 2012: 22).
[172] Interview 27, Ali Khalif, Hargeisa, 3 November 2017. They had also absorbed a disillusioned educated class that had belonged to the SSDF and the SNM, as well as Mogadishu–based dissidents. They advised on the role of 1960s post-colonial SYL leaders that included Adan Abdule Osman, Abdirazak Haji Hussien and Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. See Faisal Roble, 'Somalia: A Nation without an Elite-based Movement, Challenges and Opportunities', 11 February 2006, https://www.somaliaonline.com/community/topic/47552–somalia–a–nation–without–an–elite–based–movement–challenges–and–opportunities/.

2000[173]. Not only was the TNG quickly revealed as a redistributive clan agenda to rectify the legacies of the civil war and the ICU, but Ethiopian support for the TNG was damaging for its legitimacy and any diaspora group which supported it[174]. A prominent member of the group, Somali-American Ali Khalif Galaydh, would be elected as Prime Minister in 2000 and he would subsequently award many diaspora positions in the cabinet and the parliament (Bashir Ali et al. 2012).

As a response to the diaspora politics of the TNG era, a group of 'junior' intellectuals (mainly from the UK and Europe) became critical political actors from 2003 and challenged the authority and capacity of the old Barre politicians (of which the Rome faction was a part) to solve the political impasse or to heal the civil war. Diaspora in the US and Canada would re-emerge as important political spheres again after 2012. Former members of Ergo and ISRAACA argue that the relative unity amongst the diaspora intellectuals during the 1980s and 1990s in North America was largely a missed opportunity to organise a non-clan based political organisation, not necessarily to lead the country, but to provide an alternative political model. The activation and political engagement of European Somali diaspora from 2003 also reflected shifting points of donor engagement. US focused its attention increasingly towards counter-terrorism, while the UK, Sweden and Netherlands became champions of political reconciliation and activating key groups. These groups, that included most prominently the Somali Concern Group (SCG), critically opposed internationally-led interventions and the resulting administrations inaugurated in Arta in 2000 and Mbgathi in 2004 (seen as concessions, firstly, to Barre's regime and, secondly, to warlordism and Ethiopian hegemony). Yet, they were by no means unified — some had joined the TFG, led by then Interim President Abdullahi Yusuf (Majeerteen) and PM Ali Gheedi (Abgaal), and the ICU as a rival and more effective political entity (Gaas and Horst 2008)[175]. These allegiances largely followed clan lines, and by 2006, the SCG was committed to a new negotiated settlement between the TFG and the Alliance for

[173] The Swedes had become critical intermediaries between the diaspora and the international diplomatic platforms globally. They supported ISRAACA in North America through the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) and would become critical allies of the SCG during the ARS (Bashir et al 2012).
[174] They advised on the role of 1960s post-colonial SYL leaders that included Adan Abdule Osman, Abdirazak Haji Hussien and Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. The group's thinking was that these leaders, owing to their earlier national standing, could help heal the wounds of civil war and unite a badly beaten Somali society, but this was not the case. See Faisal Roble, 'Somalia: A Nation without an Elite-based Movement, Challenges and Opportunities', 11 February 2006.
[175] Interview, MP Jubaland, Mogadishu, August 2017. Faisal Rooble, 'Somalia: A Nation without an Elite–based Movement', 17 February 2006.

the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).[176] Like the TNG that had preceded it, locals denounced the TFG because it was 'a government out of Somalia, with delegates living abroad for many years and second, and because of the general incompetence of the new ministers to rule; they are simply unfit' (Warnecke 2010: 29). The SCG sought to broker a more acceptable and locally-supported agreement.

### *3.5.1 Somali Concern Group and the diaspora-mediated political transition*

By 2007, the SCG had emerged mainly out of the UK and Europe, and included mainly individuals from the Habar Gedir and Abgaal that sought to rectify the legacies of the civil war and infighting amongst the largest Hawiye clans. Notably, the group included Abdishakur Warsame (Habar Gedir), Abdirahman Yarisow (Abgaal), Tarzan Nuur (Mudhoodle), Mohamed Gurey (Abgaal), and Abdullahi Kabeweyne (Habar Gedir) who would all become important political actors in subsequent administrations[177]. According to key members of the SCG, it was the first diaspora organisation that 1) returned with a view to reconcile the warring factions and 2) had a degree of unity/coherence. As the late Mayor of Mogadishu Yarisow (and former Minister of Information at the time of interviewing) argues, 'this was the beginning of the realisation about the importance of the Diaspora community. It is only really since 2003 that we saw Somali diaspora groups taking key parts in the political debates in Somalia'[178]. These individuals were well-resourced, local councillors or individuals who had led charities in their host-countries; they represented a stark departure from the profiles of the previous generation of intellectuals and former bureaucrats associated with Barre. Given their access to donor resources and lobbying structures, they also became indispensable allies for domestic actors contesting power at the centre, given their links to host countries and domestic political actors

[176] The ARS was a coalition that also included representatives from Islamic Courts and former parliamentarians of transitional institutions which opposed President Abdullahi Yusuf. The 'Free Parliament' and the diaspora groups favoured a wider power–sharing agreement involving the TFG as long as the Ethiopians withdrew from Somalia. The nationalists, who backed out of participating, favoured a strong non–theocratic state, transcending clan divisions (that was comprised of some diaspora and Islamists).

[177] Interviews 58, 59, 61, 67, members of the SCG, December 2016, May 2017 and September 2017. For instance, Abdullahi and General Bashir Gurey became key opinion-makers within the Somalia parliament until their deaths in a terrorist attack in 2015. Yarisow and Tarzan Nuur would circulate amongst key ministerial positions, particularly the Mayor of Mogadishu and ambassadorships (see Chapter 5). Abdishakur Warsame would re-emerge as an ardent opposition figure and presidential candidate to contest Hassan Sheikh and Farmajo; Abdirisak Aden would hold various positions under Sheikh Sharif and be motivated to run for Galmudug President in 2019. Importantly, and particularly in the contexts of Yarisow and Nuur (who represented the Abgaal and Habar Gedir), they were always safe candidates but 'were never a clan's first choice'. See Chapter 4.

[178] Interview 61, Minister Yarisow, Mogadishu, 17 September 2017. See also his piece, 'Valuable Contributions Made by Somali Diaspora in UK', 13 July 2008, https://hiiraan.com/op2/2008/july/valuable_contributions_made_by_somali_diaspora_in_uk.aspx.

back home. This group lobbied donor support around its explicit role as neutral 'mediator' that exemplified the role of diaspora as brokers of international opinion. Their rise also represented a critical shift in the specific profiles of diaspora politicians now seeking to gain political influence. These 'change' actors presented new solutions to political reconciliation with the explicit aim to forge a new balance of power, break dominant clan alliances and power imbalances, and to negate or renegotiate political hierarchies.

Abdirisak Adan recounts how this manifested itself in very practical ways — when key members of the ARS (Yassin Beyna and Omar Shukri) were imprisoned by the Swedish Police for money-laundering, Sharif Hassan pushed Aden to negotiate their release. This was followed by a similar request for the Swedish release of Abdi Awale Keybdid (former warlord at the time of the civil war). Key Majerteen officials had reported to Swedish police Keybdid for committing crimes against humanity. Sharif Hassan, then head of the ARS, asked for assistance in appealing for his release — Keybdid was chief police commissioner at that time. As Aden explains, 'I had to hire a lawyer to get him out, and I said to the Swedes "we either bring all the warlords to Sweden, or we send him back and let the Somalis deal with him"'[179]. Thus, and as will be argued later in Chapter 4, at this point and up until 2012, diaspora were important, less for politics back home per se, in navigating donor relationships and state logics of post-war political reconciliation. By 2007, the SCG would become critical actors in negotiating international support for a negotiated settlement between the ARS and TFG and in championing Sheikh Sharif as the appropriate leader to lead the transition, as he was a compromise candidate and coalition-builder and in the bush at the time, following the defeat of the ICU in 2006 (Haji-Abdi 2013: 38; Ahmed 2015; Marchal 2000)[180]. The SCG had important forces of power and backing from political parties, foreign embassies and different stakeholders back home which allowed them to dictate policy. A quick change had seemingly happened overnight from support for the TFG to condemnation (see Tellander and Horst 2017 on Norway's support)[181]. As one respondent indicated, 'the SCG, by delegitimising the TFG

[179] Ibid.
[180] In 2003, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, frustrated with the lack of security amongst his Abgaal sub–clan, but also encroaching Habar Gedir expansion in traditional Abgaal territories, and revived the Islamic Courts system in north Mogadishu. By the end of 2004, he was elected as the Chairman of all Islamic Courts operating across north and south Mogadishu (Barnes and Hassan 2007).
[181] Tellander and Horst (2017) bring to light a shift in policy from Oslo towards the TFG that happened despite highly personal disagreements between diplomatic staff working at the embassy in Nairobi, politicians and civil servants in Oslo and diaspora advice.

on grounds of imposed leadership and an Ethiopian puppet, had demanded that the US deal with the SCG/ARS as a credible national political organisation'[182].

The first meetings were organised between the UK and Sweden diaspora groups, through which they succeeded in mobilising, first, the Swedes for political engagement and, then, UN and US backing (from Djibouti), to support the meeting between TFG and the ARS in 2008[183]. SCG brokerage ultimately would prove critical in 2009 in convincing top US officials to support government[184]. Even as early as 2006, it was reported that US congressmen were using ISRAACA to make connections with SCG, who were seen as important players in the region[185]. SCG leaders described how they made a concerted effort to break down divisions in meetings with donors and present a united clan front. In one example, Abdirisak Aden explains how he had reached across the divide to a Majeerteen, who was also from the conservative party in Sweden, in order to present to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) a unified position and present themselves as Somali Swedes who had transcended local clan alliances. They wanted to demonstrate how they would break down barriers in the homeland. He recounted his argument that he had presented to the MoFA: 'we are against Ethiopia and Somalis need to talk to each other, and since we are together, we could lead this process. I may have lost credibility within ARS though because I was perceived as working with the TNG given the Majeerteen were with them, but we were trying to be progressive'[186]. Yet, the legitimacy and capacity of SCG to lead the mediation was highly contested by both the TFG and locals. As one current parliamentarian commented of their role: 'there was nothing reconciliatory about their action beyond forging a fragile power–sharing arrangement by paying foreign lip service'[187]. As another respondent indicated, it was a problem of both donor approach and diaspora personal ambitions:

> By 2006, everyone was disgusted with the disagreement amongst clans, both the local people and the outside Somalis were involved to solve their problem, but it was the fact that it was seen as a diaspora-driven solution and their specific political approach to

[182] Interview 58, former SCG member, Mogadishu, 7 December 2016.
[183] Included were exiled ICU leaders (namely Sheikh Sharif and Hassan Dahir Aweys) and a group of disaffected MPs from the TFG. See 'ARS on Al Shabaab, Somali Reconciliation', 24 March 2008, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ASMARA155_a.html.
[184] Gheedi who resigned in 2007 was replaced with Nur 'Adde, also of the Abgaal sub–clan and a diaspora from the UK but a less divisive figure than Gheedi.
[185] Interview 58, form SCG member, Mogadishu, 7 December 2016.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Interview 68, parliamentarian and former local activist, Mogadishu, 9 December 2016.

seek political positions that was problematic. It was also a tactic supported by international community that rather than brought genuine reconciliation continuously divided the people further[188].

The TFG had voiced concerns early on when this group had sought to change the tide in US support for the SCG ahead of the September 2007 Asmara conference. Prime Minister Geedi noted how the SCG 'represented neither Somalia's political leadership (consisting of representatives of all clans serving in parliament) nor Somali traditional leadership (clan elders or leaders, such as imams, ougazes, or sultans), both of which were committed to "pacification" of Somalia and peaceful development'[189]. For PM Gheedi, they did not represent any of the stakeholders in the conflict and he saw them as divisive actors and sought to limit their involvement, stressing the need for a 'social' rather than a 'political' reconciliation. He raised pointed concerns about their disproportionate influence and the legitimacy of their leadership to resolve issues on the ground. In the National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) in July 2007, Gheedi argued that diaspora could only participate if appointed by traditional Somali elders in accordance with the 4.5 clan-based formula. He rejected proposals to allow TFG ministers to be selected from outside parliament in an effort to minimise diaspora hijacking of the process. Diaspora would, thus, be welcome to attend but only if appointed by traditional Somali clan structures and if the 200 diaspora seats would also be subject to the 4.5 formula (Affi 2012: 213). In this way, Gheedi was raising valid concerns about what role diaspora should play in state formation and political reconciliation, and challenging their disproportionate power in international policy circles – and many of Gheedi's concerns were headed.

There were critical divisions within the ARS on whether to remain outside the negotiation process, whether they should form a formal opposition movement and whether they should 'return' to power at the end of the Transitional Federal Charter mandate or contest it now (Rashid et al 2012). Members of the SCG would admit that 'the SCG had made critical errors in overestimating their capacity to enforce agreements and in underestimating the power of certain groups, not least Al Shabaab'[190]. It was not the first time the Italian-support Ali Mahdi

[188] Interview 55, professor, Mogadishu, 7 September 2017.
[189] 'Somali PM Ghedi discusses power–sharing and reconciliation conference plans', 6 June 2007, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA1771_a.html.
[190] Interview, Jubaland MP, August 2017. See Ahmed Abdisalan Adan, 'Fixing the Transitional Process for Somalia (2000–2011)', 27 March 2011, available at https://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2011/jun/fixing_the_transitional_process_for_somalia_2000_2011.aspx.

faction of the USC era had underestimated armed insurrection. The paradox was that the people the international community clearly wanted to do the job, and were legitimised to do so, could not broker or enforce agreements, nor did they have the public authority to bring communities together. As a member of the SCG explained further, 'in 2006 I met senior Al Shabaab members, they tried to implement harsh doctrine, and we should have foreseen this, Al Qaeda saw room for a bigger foot, but we didn't care who they were at that time. The Ethiopians were still there, and it was enough that US supported us, and we could deal with them later'[191]. This was a critical admission of their role as gatekeeper and their inability or unwillingness to represent or understand the power of the armed insurrection at this time. The international community vis-à-vis certain proxies were guilty of visibly supporting a parallel process that ultimately bludgeoned the TFG into submission. By September 2007, it was evident that the international community endorsed the SCG-brokered negotiated settlement — known as the Djibouti Peace Agreement — between the TFG and ARS. From May 2008 to January 2009, the diaspora's role was formalised in the context of the newly enlarged parliament under their preferred leader, Sheikh Sharif.

### *3.5.2 Political competition, competing recognition claims and diaspora brokers*

The SCG that brought Sheikh Sharif to power also made it impossible for him to consolidate power and control his administration. A leader of a feeble government, with little territorial control and without an effective army, Sheikh Sharif was left with his own personnel crisis of having to appease contesting factions and interest groups. These factions consisted of a close contingent of diaspora supporters — the SCG but also Ala Sheikh (see Chapter 5) — and local commercial brokers and entrepreneurs, namely then Speaker of the Parliament, Sharif Hasan, and former associates such as Mohamed Abdirizak Osman 'Jurille' and Abdurahman Haji Ibrahim Aden 'Ibbi', who were well-established businessmen. The latter represented a clique of business elites who had lost significantly from the civil war and ICU period and were looking to recoup losses and benefit from the new state rents[192]. They maintained that they were the only legitimate authorities able to resolve the Al Shabaab crisis. By the end of his term, Sheikh Sharif would be denounced by the SCG, who constituted a parliamentary caucus (*kutla*), for being clannist and parochial. For instance, Abdirahman Abdishakur broke with the Sharif camp

[191] Interview 58, SCG member, Nairobi, 7 December 2016.
[192] 'Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support', *Crisis Group Africa Report* N°170, 21 February 2011.

and resigned from the cabinet in early 2010 — *kutla* maintained a cross-clan, issue-oriented and centrist place in the new, polarised political landscape[193]. Yet, Sharif's strategy was explicitly local in orientation to appeal to noble sentiments and values of Islamic brotherhood, peace, forgiveness and *Somalinimo* (Somaliness). Yet, he was ultimately discredited by locals as an 'international sell-out', interested in expensive flights to the UK and the US and corrupted by aid and extraversion[194].

Sheikh Sharif in 2017 candidly explained his failures as largely down to his inability to speak English. As he explained, 'when I was president I was weak because I could not speak English'[195]. In his estimation, this meant he could not control his advisors (including those from the diaspora and SCG) and he could not play the international politics of recognition well. Ultimately, as many would argue, Sharif was ultimately unable to control the capital available in the market (from new diaspora returnees, aid rents and transnational business interests) that empowered both the SCG, Ala Sheikh and new Islamic interest groups to mobilise against him. In the 2012 elections, Hassan Sheikh won, which represented the first permanent government. He was hailed for leading a 'constructive elite coalition' and a popular party under the People's Democratic Party (PDP). He was, importantly, a non-diaspora, a political outsider (although also Abgaal, like Sheikh Sharif, but Waesli), and he initiated a decisive 'local turn' in an effort to control the brokerage politics and interest groups that had deposed of Sheikh Sharif. In order to do this, Hassan ran explicitly on a local party platform, reduced the number of diaspora in his cabinet, introduced customary and legal restrictions on contracts and revenue flows, and courted more explicitly big business interests, as well as Islamists who he thought were indispensable to security reform. Yet, despite his efforts, Hassan Sheikh's administration was mired in allegations of elite capture, corruption and cronyism, especially as his family and close political confidants benefitted from certain new business arrangements[196]. Hassan Sheikh was unseated by the same diaspora now in parliament, as well as by new members of the Gurmaad platform (in the US) who championed a member of their US constituency, Mohamed Farmajo (former PM under Sheikh Sharif), for president[197].

[193] Interview 66, former SCG member, Mogadishu, 15 December 2016.
[194] Interview 78, local activist, Mogadishu, 8 September 2016.
[195] Interview 52, Sheikh Sharif, Mogadishu, 10 September 2017.
[196] See 'Hassan Sheikh keeps it in the family', *Africa Confidential* 53 (23), 16 November 2012.
[197] Interviews 55 and 59, professor and former SCG representatives, Mogadishu, 7 September 2017 and 18 May 2017.

Farmajo's election was lauded by the donor community as an indication of political maturity, despite claims that the election win involved large sums of money changing hands. His rise to the presidency was both an indication of the strong and active diaspora communities from the US exerting financial and discursive influence over the elections (also strongly represented in the parliament), but also was a nod to US foreign policy consideration and a reorientation of the state project away from the meddling of European donors (and their diaspora groups) to more direct and pragmatic US engagement. Farmajo backed US priorities and security commitments, and aligned with stronger US interests in Somalia under Trump's policy to designate parts of Somalia as a 'temporary battlefield'. The US Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, stated: 'In President Farmajo, we now have a leader who's willing to put personal comfort aside and carry the responsibilities and danger of leadership … I welcome President Farmajo's pledge to establish security not by arms alone, but by pledging to root out corruption, pursue good governance, and bring about reconciliation'[198]. Yamamoto was quickly appointed as US Ambassador to Somalia, who was from Seattle and had connections with the Somali community, having worked as the Under-Secretary for African Affairs and as Ambassadors to Ethiopia and Djibouti. He offset any allegations of extraverted authority with a combative nationalistic platform to build domestic legitimacy, and through a tightly-controlled state (see 7.3). Key elements within his administration also sought to control and minimise the independent actions of diaspora by selecting those who hailed from minority clans and could be more easily controlled and by strategically eliminating those who were too outspoken (see 4.4)[199]. The *waddinismo* supported by top FGS leaders was also based on state logics of territorial control and social and economic exclusion rather than inclusion.

As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5, diaspora political groupings became important actors in mobilising for and against the recognition of consecutive administrations in Somalia vis-à-vis discrete donor connections and highly moralised narratives around clannism, corruption and control. As one local activist suggested of the diaspora groups behind Farmajo's administration:

[198] 'Remarks by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis at the London Somalia Conference in London, England', US Dept of Defense, 11 May 2017 https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1180319/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-jim-mattis-at-the-london-somalia-conference-in/.

[199] Others (with carry-over from ISRAACA) included Dr. Said Sheikh Samatar, Dr. Abdi Kusow, Dr. Hassan Mahadallah, Dr. Alinur Mohamed, Ambassador Mohamed Osman, Dr. Jamil Mubarak, Shamsa Bashir Ali, Said Awad Muse, Ladan Affi, Abdalla Hirad, Abdiwahab Tarey, Dr. Alinur Mohamed, Ahmed Hamud, Dr. Hassan Mahaddalh, Said Salah, and Dr. Hussein Ahmed Warsame, among others.

> they mislead foreigners telling them that they have influence inside Somalia, which is not the case, but they are clever enough, so they plan a way to get funds from donors, and to report to them false information, collected from media 'of warlords', but are nonetheless given the authority to hold political positions[200].

As became evident within Farmajo's administration, diaspora politicians at the highest bureaucratic and politicial levels struggled to balance the external demands of brokerage with the internal demands of governing. Diaspora leaders were largely unable to contain or control relationships of reciprocity and brokerage that defined power structures and existed at the margins of state authority. As brokers of international resources and opinion, state authority and discrete policy agendas, his administration was characterised by incoherence and internal rivalry. They struggled to accommodate the numerous diaspora returning for political positions, and where the orientations of diaspora brokers may prove fundamentally at odds with the consolidation of state authority (see 1.3). Thus, the ways in which the politics of recognition continued to play out vis-à-vis the diaspora option in Somalia undermined state authority at the centre and its peripheries. A local intellectual and academic explained *ilaMeerayso* as a new Somali word created to capture what he called 'the drama, failure, barefaced incompetence, and delusion of diaspora politicians in power'[201].

### 3.6 Conclusion

This chapter raises critical questions about the evolution of the Somali subnational and national administrations and leadership succession. In particular reference to return of diaspora elites to politics and their authority, it raises three key questions: what happens to the moral and political authority of diaspora politicians when they transition from liberation movements to administrations and assume responsibility for the state project as political guarantors? How does their role as brokers within the international system shape the policy decisions of administrations and their capacity to build local alliances and respond to local policy concerns? What are the forms of local resistance and the ways in which large alliances may form against diaspora politicians and their administrations? These are large questions that the thesis does not seek to answer in full, but it provides certain indications about relationships, political

[200] Interview 55, professor, Mogadishu, 7 September 2017.
[201] Interview 80, director of Mogadishu think tank, Mogadishu, 15 October 2018.

trajectories and outcomes that are further explored in the subsequent empirical chapters. These chapters investigate the divergent relationships that form, in terms of the state project and around different institutional arrangements, through systems of representative and party politics (Chapter 4 and 5), bureaucratic shifts (Chapter 6) and broader governance agendas (Chapter 7).

For this multi-level inquiry, this initial historical chapter raises some important points that will re-emerge at different points in the subsequent chapters. The first is how the UN and other donors, at different points in the formation of state power, activated and empowered diaspora groups and individuals in ways that swayed the balance of power in negotiations and shaped the strategies of domestic actors. This chapter demonstrates how the access to forms of recognition and external patronage diaspora leaders (in the SNM, USC and later in SSDF) had affected the internal decisions they made and had implications for political factionalisation, power imbalances amongst clans and prevailing conceptions about the role of diaspora politicians within the politics of recognition. As a result of these relationships, throughout the late 1980s, diaspora leaders and factions were found to be associated with more hard-line policies on secessionism and military confrontation (based on the inability to reach consensus even with local fighters, and deep suspicions about the actions of other elites). By 1991, the claims of military victory which diaspora leaders within the USC and SNM could make, in turn legitimised their authority over defining the post-war political order but created untenable political environments. The subsequent civil wars that erupted in Somaliland and Somalia were focused largely around these leadership struggles and the legitimacy of diaspora politicians in defining the post-Barre political order. Diaspora politicians and local elites competed over different forms of statehood and recognition in ways that exacerbated notions of insider/outsider and clan power balances, and created resentment and a deeply insecure form of nationalist politics.

The second important argument is that different diaspora groups (and leaders) rose and fell from power across the three territories in ways that were intricately linked to the politics of recognition, the internal demands placed on leaders and shifting geopolitical interests and foreign policy agendas. This chapter also looks at the forms of local resistance that emerged to contest these authority structures. In Somaliland, the ‘local’ turn that occurred first in 1991 and then again in 2016 was embedded in the politics of non-recognition — the internal civil wars of the 1990s and the unfulfilled promises of diaspora politicians. Diaspora politicians, despite

their promises, failed to deliver on international recognition. In Puntland, greater cohesion amongst the clan project and claims of authority vis-à-vis the federal state project had defined both their initial utility but also concerns regarding accountability and loyalty. By contrast, in Somalia, the backlash that came in 2004 and then again in 2012 emerged as an attack against the conceit of diaspora politicians, the fallacies of technocracy, and displaced accountability and authority structures, as logics of brokerage defined political and state institutions.

In each case, at the point where the 'local' turn emerged, these 'local' candidates drew more strongly on autochthonous narratives, the importance of clan and consultative politics, social rather than political reconciliation, and control over brokerage politics. The following chapters explore how domestic actors negotiated the influence of diaspora politicians (their power and presence) at the subnational and national state level within the different historical, political and institutional contexts. This thesis is principally concerned with how the diaspora option — as a de facto, uncritical policy agenda of international donors — is amended and changed, or 'rescaled', by domestic actors. Chapter 4 looks in greater detail at the relationships between clans and elite representatives, exploring how clans sought to rescale the diaspora question through candidate selection procedures and the relationships with MPs. Rivalrous relationships were particularly evident in the Somali context which are, in turn, explored in detail. Chapter 5 then examines how their power expanded or retreated through the rise and fall of party politics and political movements — looking at specific party strategies, platforms and broader discourse that emerged particularly after 2009 across the three contexts.

## Chapter 4: Clan-based recruitment, candidate selection and 'rescaling' the diaspora option

Across the African context, challenges around systems of representative politics and participatory democracies are well-documented. The decay of representative democracies is attributed to: the individualisation and the spread of globalised capitalism; the weakening of institutions outside the executive in favour of personalised presidential power, like parliament; and the outsourcing of political decisions to corporate and cross-border bodies (Riedl 2018). The misalignment in expectations of constituencies and what representatives can deliver, the performative practices that characterise relationships between representatives and their real or imagined constituencies,[202] as well as the contested nature of citizenship, all contribute to volatility in representative systems across the African context (Kapteijns 2013; Bøås 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013).

In the Somali society, representation is a particularly complex issue given the multitude of clan identities that do not easily correspond to such clan-based proportional representative systems. Afyare Elmi outlines this challenge, and the implications for representation politics, the legitimacy of the government and the institutions these representatives represent:

> clan identity strongly affects the legitimacy of governments as it has a strong impact on the perception of representation of the general public. An individual Somali is not often a citizen of a geographical district, town or region, but is a member of a social group — clan or a sub-clan … In other words, the common person feels represented when a fellow clan member is in the government. This is further complicated by the fact that clan identity is very fluid and relative – a person who shares many identities with a given member of parliament might still believe his sub-sub-sub-clan is not represented.

[202] Even as far back as the 1940s – 'during the hearings of 1948, local Somali elders and party leaders vied for recognition as legitimate spokespersons for districts…. as the processes had been made more volatile by the presence of international delegations' (Cassanelli 2001: 40). The focus on representation as a form of power and performative action is based on the assumption that representation includes the formal *empowerment* of someone – that is, their recognition as agents who advocate and act in the interests of others – whether conferred from constituencies to representatives by explicit authorisation (for example, election), or simply through tacit consent of the constituency, or simply assumed by those representing is important. Rather the boundaries which are drawn between legitimate and illegitimate constituencies, between citizens who are capable of conferring representative authority and non-citizens who are not – and the legitimacy of the authority assumed by the representative – are drawn into question (Sarward 2006).

> This is a very difficult problem, as the legitimacy of any governmental institution is extremely sensitive for Somalis (Elmi 2010: 38).

Other factors that strain such systems include the legacies of civil war which severed horizontal links within kinships, structures and hierarchies; and displacement (and massive urbanisation since 1991) that has strengthened notions of territoriality, 'belonging to a place' and forms of identity politics (Hoehne 2014). Roland Marchal argues how elite representatives also suffer from conflicting interests and claims — including from 'international actors, Islamist supporters and new regional administrations' — that have prevented the realisation of such representative function (1996: 58). Representatives often wear different 'hats', transferring affiliation as appropriate to whichever role suits their personal interests or those of their patrons (Hoehne 2010; Menkhaus 2014b). In addition, Lidwien Kapteijns highlights the illusive nature of clientelistic kickbacks that has meant that a few have always benefitted from such connections to state power but, for the majority, the 'trickle-down remains largely an illusion' (2013: 77). This concept of illusiveness strains relationships between clans and their elite representatives around norms of social obligation and accountability. Other factors include the fluid value of different postings[203] and the emphasis on the role of representation in resolving sub-clan disputes (expectations of redress for clan grievances) that make the practices and selection of representation fraught.

Given the complexities around questions of representation, political conflicts have often been fought around claims of non-inclusivity or unjust representation. The late Mogadishu warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed first coined the expression *looma dhamma* — 'not inclusive' — to denounce Barre's regime in 1989. This phrase has been used time and again to dismiss peace agreements and justify a continuation of conflict, but which often means little more than the absence of certain individuals from the negotiating table (Menkhaus 2014a: 10). After the civil war, and in the process of Somali state-making, the question of 'political representation' and 'participation' was highly politicised by externally-supported peace talks — as to how best incorporate a mixture of clan, military and financial power military actors. In particular, the

[203] For instance, as to the Minister of Interior, Majeerteen supporters had remarked how this was a poor portfolio, calculated on the basis of aid flows and overlap with the Minister of Defense and Internal Security. Interview 35, programme officer at PDRC, Garowe, 18 April 2017.

2000 Arta process in Somalia institutionalised a controversial ethnic quota — the 4.5 system[204]. The international community and advisors were accused of freezing a dynamic reality into the factional politics of the United Somali Congress (USC). The quota system was devised principally for representing equally the Hawiye and Darood to prevent further fighting (see de Waal 2018b: 33–34; Hoehne 2011, 2014; Menkhaus 2014b; Mohamed 2007)[205]. Similar and no less binding, although less formalised, quota systems operate in Somaliland and Puntland. They are similarly tied to systems of clan distribution and rotation, having emerged out of the 1991 Burco conference and 1998 Garowe conference respectively, and which have reportedly achieved a greater level of representation (Hoehne 2003)[206]. At least the path towards representative politics was more organic as clan authorities and the population had a greater role in defining the quota system at the national level, unlike in Somalia. In Somaliland, such systems have continued to advance along with one-man-one vote elections (where the people elect, rather than the clan, representatives from councillor to MPs). In Somalia and Puntland, where one-person-one votes do not occur,[207] representatives are still selected through elders and delegates, where questions are raised repeatedly about elite manipulation, and the authority or legitimacy of elders.

[204] In Somalia, the clan-based quota was used to appoint the 275 seats of the Lower House of parliament: 61 seats for the four major clans, and the minority clans shared the remaining 31. See also 'The Rotation Convention: the real scandal of Somalia's 4.5 power sharing system', Somali Newsroom Op–ed, 22 January 2016, accessed at https://somalianewsroom.com/the–rotation–convention–the–real–scandal–of–somalias–4–5–power–sharing–system/. Yet, it is also applied to the cabinet. In terms of the cabinet, the two top posts are divided between Darood and Hawiye, which notably excludes .5 (or the *beesha shanaad* or 'fifth clan') and the other two clans (Dir, Digil and Mirifle) from ever seeking the office of president or prime minister. The Speaker of Parliament goes to Rahaweyn and Chairman of Supreme Court to Diir/Isaaq. This also pertains to the allocation of posts in the security sector (commander of intelligence, custodial corps, military and police), where Dir/Isaaq cannot be in charge of security. Points of controversy include the fact that a tiny sub-clan of the minority or the .5 can be awarded more ministers and MPs than a larger Hawiye sub-clan like Hiraab or Habar Gedir. For instance, the Majeerteen only received 12 MPs while Digil and Mirfle were awarded 61. This was also the case, for example, for the Isse (also Dir, that reside in the North West of Somaliland) who have 9 MPs in parliament.

[205] Its intention was to counter a trend that emerged during the civil war whereby prominent lineage groups (based on political legacies rather than size), such as the Habar Gidir in Hawiye or Majeerteen in Darood, sought to dominate other smaller clans. It was preferable as a form of conflict prevention, as a guarantee (or so they hoped) that the transitional government would constitute a government of national unity, and as the only mechanism imaginable for resolving endless disputes. But even its advocates recognised that it was only a temporary measure, to be replaced in due course with direct elections, which have been forestalled by ongoing security concerns (Menkhaus 2014a).

[206] In Somaliland and Puntland, this system of representative politics meant a balancing of political posts amongst the Isaaq and the Majeerteen, respectively. In Somaliland, within the cabinet, key ministerial posts (including Minister of International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Finance) are distributed equally amongst the largest and most dominant Isaaq sub–clans (Habar Awal, Garhajis, Habar Jeclo and Arab), and the Dhulbahante and Gadabursi.

[207] In Somalia MPs in the lower house of parliament are voted for by an extended number of delegates representing Somalia's clans, while regional states will select the members of a newly formed upper house (where aspirations for one-person-one vote elections in 2020 is far out).

The strong extent to which the diaspora question was linked to a broader system of unjust representative politics around the 2000 Arta process was significant in shaping distinct politics around diaspora return in Somalia, and specifically Mogadishu. In terms of institutional transformation in Somalia, the Arta process, along with institutionalising the 4.5 system, also parachuted in diaspora candidates, making a close association between the politics of diaspora return and the inception of sectarian or clan arithmetic that would continue to shape the aspirations and politics of diaspora politicians, as well as expectations of them. In 2000, and again in 2004 and finally in 2009, these new diaspora elites were, each time, given the primary role in determining the 'legitimate' elders, thus reconstructing the state and the custodians of clan authority (Interpeace 2018). These newly-selected clan elders would, in turn, select MPs, who were responsible for selecting the president[208]. As has been argued elsewhere, the Arta process also refocused the question of leadership and representation around 'the visible coalitions at the elite level with little popular support, that also paradoxically opened these leaders who did rely on external support to charges of betrayal' (Cassanelli 2001: 40). Each time, the elites sought to balance competing demands (at one time from warlords, and later from Islamists) while selecting representatives that would be more loyal to the administration than to clan (Reno 2003). For their role in reconstituting the hierarchies around clan selection, first in 2000 but then again in 2004 and 2009, diaspora elites became a critical feature of a system of unjust representative politics[209]. For instance, even in the selection process for Members of Parliament in 2012, it was widely perceived as flawed and corrupt, as 'many of the current legislators cannot credibly claim to speak for their putative constituents'[210].

Thus, from the early days of statebuilding, diaspora were critical to transforming power and relationships between clan and representatives, but there was another factor that impacted their capacity to be acceptable representatives, namely the gatekeeper paradox (1.3). While both gatekeepers and representatives are brokers, the gatekeeper is situated on the other side of the brokerage continuum from representatives (Hönke and Müller 2018: 14). The gatekeeper selectively grants access to resources and contacts to an outsider, and may be relationally, socially or informally closer to those outside actors (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 142). By contrast,

[208] Muno Mohamed Gedi, 'Rich Clan, Poor Clan', *Zam Magazine*, 29 April 2014, accessed at https://www.zammagazine.com/chronicle/chronicle–7/66–rich–clan–poor–clan. As one parliamentarian in the federal government explained, 'my father wrote himself in, the guy after him was appointed by two elders, and I was elected by 51 delegates, elders still hold the power but often you may not know who that elder is or where his loyalties lie'.
[209] Interviews 29 and 55, professor and parliamentarian, Mogadishu and Oxford, September 2017 and May 2018.
[210] 'Somalia: New president, new laws and old enemies', *Africa Confidential* 53 (19), 21 September 2012.

brokers as representatives (whether in bureaucratic or MP seats) means that they are delegates of a subgroup with the group's 'mandate' to negotiate contacts with outsiders in the group's interest, governed by some cohesion at the level of internal solidarity or among sets of actors linked by the broker (Hönke and Müller 2018: 14). The thinking is that: 'If the group to which brokers provide access is cohesive and the (representative) broker has strong ties, such as ethnical or ideological, to this group, the broker is less likely to act in a purely self-interested way as would be the case if the broker were only weakly integrated in the group' (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 144). In other words, brokers tend to divert a lesser amount of resources and goods to themselves and serve the broader collective good if they are embedded in inclusive societal institutions of those they represent (see also Hönke and Müller 2018: 24). The less cohesive the group or, rather, the less inclusive societal institutions are, the more brokerage tends to favour the broker (or the outside actor) over the group.

This theorisation about gatekeeping and representative brokers is important for understanding the politics of diaspora return, as a diaspora politician's capacity to fulfil his or her role as representative, and constitute a broader system of representative politics, is partially based on societal cohesion or the cohesion of specific groups. This may pertain to institutional arrangements as well as the strength of kinship bonds or norms of social obligation. The emerging argument within this comparative inquiry is that diaspora politicians may be less acceptable as representatives in Somaliland and Puntland, where traditional institutions have more power, and where clans are more internally cohesive (greater unity and homogeneity as a defining feature of political competition around the national project). In the South, the gatekeeper paradox is a strong factor in increasing volatility around the system, given the highly fractured clan system and increased incentives around their role as brokers. Section 4.4 explores in more detail how their brokerage role as MPs and bureaucrats may be a critical component of rent-seeking but may prevent them from being trusted patrons, or representative actors, which creates tensions and further contradictions within the system.

Before proceeding to the key empirical sections Section 4.1 outlines the challenges within systems of clan-based proportional representation as they differ across the three cases. The institutional and historical contexts of these political processes underpin different configurations of power and volatility in the relationships between clans, elite representatives and the state that affect the politics of diaspora return (section 4.2). Section 4.3 details a broader shift in the relationship between the clan system and diaspora returnees that occurs after 2012

(particularly in Somalia) around new incentives and partnerships between diaspora MPs and international actors. Section 4.4 and 4.5 then provide empirics from the 2016 and 2017 federal parliamentary and presidential elections to elucidate the ways in which diaspora politicians sought to renegotiate the terms of clan obligation and representative politics. Section 4.6 looks at the elite level at how local and national elites have sought to strategically harness diaspora politicians in order to check dominant traditional power structures and secure greater access to state power and international resources.

### 4.1 Clan-based systems of representative politics – variations, elders and expectations

Scholars have long sought to understand the inherent tension between the allegedly horizontal/democratic logic of lineage systems and the vertical processes of political representation[211]. Alex de Waal (2018b) argues how the volatility in the Somali context is rooted in pressures to generate forms of political identity compatible with state formation. Importantly, clan contractual law (or *xeer*) never 'govern[ed] the selection of political representatives where leadership lies with the elders of the group concerned' (Lewis 1961: 185)[212]. Clan leaders were rather those 'who were best able to make use of *xeer*[213] to mobilise a power base', and those 'that responded best to external challenges, such as external attack or colonial penetration' (Mohamed 2007: 32). In the post-independence era in the 1960s, in the absence of reliable census of the country and clans, criteria of proportional representation were based on the whimsical assumptions of the dominant clan families of the Hawiye and Darood but tied, from the onset, to conceptions of political manipulation, domination and inequalities rather than inclusivity or consensus (Baadiyow 2014: 141). Such conceptions of unjust representation had its roots in colonial rule, which had created 'competition among the

[211] Scholars caution against overly praising *xeer* as a democratic system as it is often based on unequal power relations that benefit the demographically, economically and politically stronger groups (for example, with minorities paying but never receiving *diya*, Schlee 2013).
[212] In 1961, Ioan Lewis detailed the requirements for leadership – 'though all men were politicians by right, men had difference in status determined by wealth, poetic gift, political ability, talent for oratory, knowledge, piety, wisdom, hospitality, courage, tactical acumen in war and personal strength' (Lewis 1961: 196, 198; also Mohamed 2007: 228).
[213] It refers to the 'system of mutual assistance amongst patrilineal kin, organised for the purposes of paying or obtaining blood money (*dia*) [and comprised of] often limited networks around this group to a relatively restricted span of kin—four to eight generations, a few hundred to a few thousand men—who are within a geographical range' (Lewis 1961: 6).

lineages, thereby damaging the integrity of the clan and, with it, the office of the clan leaders' (Issa-Salwe 1996: 5; see also Affi 2012: 80)[214].

In Somalia, Barre's military regime and his patronage system further undermined the role of proportional representation, as conceived in the post-colonial state, which damaged the role of traditional leadership, kinship ties and horizontal linkages amongst clans and systems of dispute reconciliation. By inserting the state into the lineage system, he sought to focus patronage politics closer to the centre through an era of rule not by clans, but 'by using elites chosen to represent clans, embedded in elite and state power' where he could orchestrate or contain the actual power that clans were able to secure (de Waal 2018b)[215]. Barre animated such patronage networks and elevated the role of elite representatives in order to neutralise the potential subversive impact of clans, making sure that some representatives of each clan or sub-clan (including elders) had a position in the government and army. He played clans, but more importantly, elites off against each other, including the militarisation of some clans to subjugate others (de Waal 2018b: 20; Compagnon 1998: 178). As such, Barre had critically eroded the legitimacy of clan elders in their role in selecting representatives or communicating the general will of the clan, even if they still held a primary role in mobilising financial resources and lobbying for representation at the regional and state level. Even during the 2016 parliamentary elections, candidates explained how the elders engage actively in rent-seeking, lobbying and making promises of political posts, even dissuading candidates from contesting in exchange for certain compensation and promises[216].

[214] During the colonial era, state authorities intervened in the selection of clan elders, made them salaried employees of the state, which weakened their autonomous authority over constituencies. Faction leaders, often supported by outside influences, divided sub-clan groupings 'into sub-sub-clans to force the selection of a new elder that would be loyal to the given faction leader' (Gundel 2007: 35). Colonial policies both supported or disrupted *xeer* (with the British more lenient than the Italians), followed by harsher strategies by the post-independent military regime to suppress what was seen as an expensive and backward system opposed to the nationalist movement and socialist ideology (Compagnon 1992; Samatar 1992).

[215] Siad Barre's attempts to undermine the *xeer* system ultimately failed and were largely abandoned by 1974. His Law No. 67 (1 November 1970) failed to outlaw collective responsibility as part of its doctrine of scientific socialism. PDRC, Somali Customary Law, p. 29.

[216]This occurred in relation to intra-clan negotiations of women seats, where the minority clans were saddled with such reported lower quality representation, 'I was first encouraged by my elders to run for the seat of women; yet when I went to Adaado my seat was no longer allocated to women. Harti–Abgaal has 3 seats, one was supposed to be women, the elder refused to allocate. He wasted my time…I said I'm sorry to realise now, that you were cheating me the whole time. The elder even promised that he would compensate me if I don't want to run. I'll give you an ambassador plus a package'. Interview, female aspirant (anonymised), Galmudug, Mogadishu, December 2016.

Nonetheless, emerging out of the legacy of the civil war and consecutive internationally-led peace processes, was a proliferation of *koofi yed bacle*, literally meaning 'plastic hat elders' (Interpeace 2009). After the civil war, traditional leaders both regained their importance as political actors in sharing resources, distributing resources and dispute resolution but there was a change in the role of tribal leaders away from lineage solidarity towards seeking individual or factional advantage (Gundel et al. 2016: 8). Thus, the war and post-war peace processes had both eroded the authority of hereditary clan elders, but elevated the utility of elite representatives of the clan. There is no direct causal relationship between kinship and an individual elder's electoral preferences, as clan elders would not always vote in accordance with conceptions of traditional leadership or always in line with the preference of the clan (en-masse). Yet, an elder could also not be seen to be overtly disloyal to a clan, especially amongst competitor clan custodians (religious figures as well as political representatives) (Marchal 2010). After 2000, the issue that emerged was around who had the authority to select political representatives and how these representatives actually represented local clan interests. As Afyare Elmi argues of this period, 'most of the traditional leaders have the respect and support of clan members, but new elites control the militia groups, money and guns … and they have the outside backers … who have perpetuated conflict but do not have the culture of compromise' (2010: 44).

Stated in other words, there was an important distinction and rivalry that emerged between traditional/hereditary elders (known as *ugaas/suldaan*) and political representatives (or *siyasi*). The extent to which the *suldaan* is separate from the *siyasi* has been seen as important for communicating the needs of the clan[217]. As such, the *siyasi* often refers to well-known and respected politicians who represent clan interests through politics[218]. In Somaliland, such competition between these clan representatives was reduced by the process of hybridity and

[217] This distinction, initially made by a professor at Mogadishu University in Mogadishu, was confirmed by respondents in Mogadishu and Garowe as important to understand forms of competition around candidate selection, although it has not been subject to academic inquiry. In this contestation, the *suldaan/ugaas* traditionally only has a role of mediation in clan conflicts, as a spokesperson that articulates the position of the *beesha* (or clan) but is not supposed to take a political position. By contrast, the *siyasi* holds political positions and makes decisions on behalf of the clan at the regional or national level. Somaliland had also always practiced a much more institutionalised system of state–led and elite–driven selection of allies to political positions.

[218] This argument contributes to challenging prevailing assumptions about the preservation of democratic logics within the lineage system as instead entrenching elite interests (Hoehne 2013; Walls 2010; Hagmann and Peclard 2010). In Somaliland, this trend was demonstrated when political elites like Faisal Abdi Warabe often made decisions unchecked on behalf of Idigale/Gharhajis/Isaaq and in the legible collusion between the former President Mohamed Silanyo and Suleiman Gaal when it came to representation of interests for the Habar Jeclo/Isaaq.

institutionalised traditional authorities (i.e the Guurti), and where traditional structures were kept closer to patronage and clientelist networks at the centre, and where elite representatives (or *siyasi*) have always had a stronger role in selecting clan representatives (Leonard 2009; Abokor and Kibble 2006: 9–21). By contrast, in Puntland, the elder council (or *issimo*) has preferred to remain outside of the political establishment, where they remain active participants within selection procedures in contesting and moderating the authority of Majeerteen elite representatives (Affi 2012: 194). This competition is moderated or contained within broader structures and security offered by the clan project. By contrast, in the South, on the whole greater rivalry exists between the *suldaan* and *siyasi* due to the conflict legacies and poorly institutionalised systems of authority, which has both solidified the utility of diaspora within systems of rivalrous clan politics but also created tension between clans and elite representatives. In addition to this broader rivalry amongst clan custodians, another issue around representative politics, are the value and expectations tied to positions of political office within clan politics.

Within Barre's divided rule tactics, he had also positioned the state (and elite representation) as an important object to be mediated over where government positions became key resources for securing and protecting a clan's interests and taking power away from others, with perceived implications (real or perceived) on clan survival. Yet, the eruption of civil war had also, importantly, severed cross-cutting ties and placed a heavy-burden on the *diya*-paying system[219] which was financially unable to meet the demands of the clan system and reconciliation (Thomas 2016; Le Sage 2005: 37). As a result, through the peacemaking and statemaking processes that followed, and vis-à-vis political representation, clans and their custodians looked towards the 'state' for redress of clan dispute, to adjudicate political grievance and even *diya*-payments (Gundel et al. 2016). By inserting the lineage system and societal notions of justice back into the state, clans and their representatives were tied to notions of collective responsibility, with high expectations regarding redress, resolving political grievances and eradicating past histories of political marginalisation. The implications are clear. On the one hand, clan-based *diya* — namely, based on short-term calculations of security arrangements — clash with the broader tenets of representative politics and state-making

[219] 'Diya–paying groups' refers to the payment of blood compensation. Such groups have historically consisted of clans or subclans, but members are always contractually bound to pay or receive damages collectively. Diya shapes the group's solidarity and reciprocity network (Zoppi 2018: 58). The clan as a whole has a collective obligation in backing its members with regard to political and juridical responsibilities that guarantees its members less risk in certain activities (Mohamed 2007).

(around establishing trust relationships and security through alternative horizontal linkages) (Zoppi 2018: 60). On the other hand, the expectations placed on representatives to carry out restitutive justice, as well as deliver on patron-client relationships, also created untenable and volatile relationships characterised by risk aversion and a fear of further revenge attacks. Collective responsibility was tied to the actions of individual representatives[220]. Collective responsibility meant that a crime committed by an individual of the 'state', or an institution of the state was interpreted as a crime, by one clan against another and demands for compensation could be elicited (monetary or other)[221].

It is within this context, that the selection of diaspora became a critical component of clan politics tied to the segmentary nature of the clan system, and high expectations and aspirations around recognition and restitution (Adam 1998, 2008). In terms of the former, outsider candidates (diaspora) became a critical component of internal clan competition around representative politics. Across the three cases, the issue of representation and contestation was devolved to the sub-clan level where calculations of representation occurred through rotation schemes and highly moralised notions of political grievance, historical legacies and issues of reputation and recognition (Samatar 1988: 108; Gundel et al. 2016: 67; Mohamed 2007). Internal clan negotiations and practices of risk aversion meant that sub–clans often compromised on outsider candidates as less combative and partial, and who would bring less negative attention or potential blowbacks, with hopes that they would also bring positive, future gains. As one respondent reported: 'although certain diaspora candidates were not necessarily beneficial representatives, they would not bring offense and there was always a hope that they would offer something different'[222]. In this scheme, a dominant clan may bring in a diaspora candidate to sell to other clans (where strongman candidates would not be accepted by other sub-clans), or a smaller or minority clan may seek to increase its share of power by supporting a diaspora candidate.

[220] Interviews 54 and 69, professor and government advisor, Mogadishu, December 2016. Moursade MPs raised concerns of revenge attacks in the extent to which Hassan Khayre is antagonising other clans within the Hawiye (namely Habar Gedir and Abgaal). 'MPs blame Farmajo for violating power–sharing arrangement', *Garowe Online*, 1 September 2018, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia–mps–blame–farmajo–for–violating–power–sharing–system.

[221] In one critical example, also see Chapter 7, the government was expected to pay *diya* as a result of security raids in Barire that were seen as targeting the Habar Gedir by NISA (government intelligence wing associated with the Moursade clan). See also 'Somalia to pay blood money for killings', Hiiraan, 1 September 2017, available at https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2017/Sept/143954/somalia_to_pay_blood_money_for_killings.aspx.

[222] Interview 11, Salebaan (anonymised), clan elder involved in 1991 Burco conference, Hargeisa, 30 November 2016.

Thus, contrary to conventional theories about political representation, greater heterogeneity or factionalisation does not always reinforce the selection of political identity candidates (Munish and Rozenweig 2008: 563)[223]. Instead, it was the more homogeneous and institutionalised hybrid systems in Somaliland that resisted the advances of diaspora politicians, also given the reduced incentives around their utility, and presented a system that constituted a greater trend of elite continuity, symbolising entrenched authority of the SNM old guard and its legacy (see Chapter 3). By contrast, in Somalia, the selection of outsider diaspora candidates was a way in which clans dealt with high heterogeneity and rivalry, but these relationships were volatile given the legacies of civil war (high demands for restitution) and the gatekeeper paradox. The following section looks in more detail at the dynamics of these volatile relationships between clans and diaspora as they are characterised by: the paradox of being a gatekeeper and representative; the translation of a multitude of clan identities; and misalignments regarding the convertibility of forms of international capital into economic gains to sustain patron-client links.

### 4.2 Volatile relationships and diaspora political representatives

Within the context of representative politics, the frequency of government reshuffles became a defining feature of Somali patronage politics and volatility, whereby the government, in dialogue with parliament, sought to appease clan agitation by renegotiating alliances. Somali scholars have interpreted this volatility and frequent government reshuffles in different ways — as due to the lack of distillation given imposed electoral timeframes, as an indication of poor elite maturity and parochialism[224] or due to marketisation and political precarity (de Waal 2015). It is evident that these reshuffles are characterised by an arbitrary and often low threshold of political removal that is uncompromising in its implications for a political career. Politicians are removed 'for being personally corrupt, overtly loyal to clan or not loyal enough' (Hagmann 2005: 82). They are judged on how they divert public money to pay back their

[223] Munish and Rozenweig (2008) found that higher quality candidates were less likely to be elected in the case of mixed–caste systems that accentuated the political prominence of strongmen candidates. They found that in regional or national level government competitions, lower quality leaders were more frequently elected. Thus, greater factionalism was found to diminish the quality of leaders' characteristics, where a greater emphasis was placed on loyalties and political identity at such national level contestation (563).

[224] Interview 24, Professor Ahmed Samatar, 13 May 2017. As he argues, the 'issue with political representation is the high enthusiasm (the yearning for something different, how are we going to get out of this) and then quick disappointment with no distillation process (6 months and the government is over)'.

'clients' and 'defend kinship interests … to engage in schemes aimed at increasing benefits for their genealogical group' (see Hagmann 2005; Webersik et al. 2018 on expectations of spoils from representatives). The extent to which clan leaders expected more from diaspora candidates (as non-political identity candidates) in terms of kickbacks and future gains is supported by findings from La Ferrara and Bates (2001)[225]. It was evident that clan elders were critical players in the elections who expected more financial payouts from diaspora candidates ahead of the election, but also evident that these elders could not be bought. As was demonstrated during the 2016/2017 elections, diaspora candidates felt a strong sense of embitterment or '*qarbo*' (unfinished business), hurt pride and resentment for paying out but not being guaranteed a seat.

During the 2016 and 2017 electoral process, the high cost of election seats, contested by diaspora, in Somalia and Puntland was undeniable[226]. A few respondents explained this inflation as due to the eagerness of diaspora politicians to amass wealth in a short time before they went back to their host country. In a frank discussion with one diaspora MP in Mogadishu, when asked what he was going to do over the next four years in office, he said that 'he paid $20,000 in 2012 to buy out his competitor, and that his principle aim as MP was to recoup costs and to score 20 times more'[227]. Yet, it was not merely an issue of self-interest and opportunism as it was also tied to a complex financial contract and relationships of reciprocity negotiated

[225] Constituencies can expect to gain more from them than political identity candidates. Research into political competition in weak states has suggested how within the particular contexts of weak states, outside candidates rather political identity candidates (the latter referring to local candidates, warlords and old guard politicians) may offer higher short-term and immediate gains for constituencies (Ferrara and Bates 2001).

[226] In two of the most contested seats in the elections where diaspora were involved, the respective winners (both non–diaspora) paid US$1.3 million each at the senate and parliament levels, and they received more than 80 percent of the votes from the 51 delegates. 'Somalia Elections Not Credible, Country's Auditor General Says', 20 November 2016, *Hiiraan*; Somalia: UN envoy reaches Jowhar for discussions over violence at election centre, *VOA News*, 20 November 2016, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia–elections–lack–credibility–auditor–general–says/3603878.html; 'Graft, threats as Somalia faces historic presidential vote', *AP News*, 7 February 2017, https://www.apnews.com/7a872c5d0ea14cf6871c0e5c190ef6a3; Conor Gaffey, 'Somalia: Electoral seats selling for up to $1.3 million each, says Auditor General', *Newsweek*, 21 November 2016. This inflation resulted also from increased influx of rents from the Gulf. See 'Somalia Elections Not Credible, Country's Auditor General Says', VOA, 19 November 2016, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia–elections–lack–credibility–auditor–general–says/3603878.html; Jeffrey Gettleman, *Fueled by Bribes, Somalia's Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption*, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia–election–corruption.html. The high cost included money spent to the electoral commission and elders to create a favourable delegates' list ($100,000 – $150,000 USD) (Menkhaus 2017: 140) and the payment of $500–$1000 to MPs to sign the required 20 MPs for each presidential candidate to contest, with votes varying from $50K–$100K depending on the perceived influence of the MP. See also, '2016 State of Accountability in Somalia', Marqaati Corruption bureau, February 2017, https://marqaati.org/wp–content/uploads/2017/02/Marqaati–2016–Corruption–Report.pdf, p. 5. See also 'The endless election: Bombs, bribery, and dirty deals have delayed the selection of the president. See 'The electoral process has lost credibility', *Africa Confidential*, 3 February 2017; 'Electoral process stumbles but stays on track', *Africa Confidential*, 2 December 2017.

[227] Interview, parliamentarian (anonymised), Mogadishu, May and September 2017.

between clans and diaspora representatives, which were tied to conceptions of international capital. The reality was that, despite high local expectations that inflated the costs of elections, many diaspora candidates did not have the personal financial resources to pay election costs upfront and buy the loyalties of clan elders. Even where they could secure handouts from other patrons (which could be other clans or business patrons), they were not guaranteed a seat. The two worrying trends that emerged around the 2016/2017 elections was that those who won were entering office with high debts (and likely looking to recoup costs), and those diaspora politicians left outside the system were feeling short-changed and clamouring for other types of accommodation[228]. As one respondent explained of the highly-inflated electoral politics:

> People are used to hand-outs … and it's gotten worse with the diaspora. Wealthy locals understand diaspora are poor and run away from diaspora because they know they want their money. Clans assume diaspora are wealthy so they flock to them[229].

As such, diaspora candidacy shifted the competition and price of a political seat, but also the terms of patron-client relationships. Respondents in Somalia described the idea of an 'idealised return' which captures the misalignment between the personal ambitions of diaspora returnees and what was expected of them by clans in terms of contributions (both monetary, as well as to the prestige and recognition of a clan). As one diaspora returnee and government advisor in Mogadishu explained:

> Being accepted back into society is conditional on you having brought something with you (aid money/jobs/charity projects), remittances was not the only obligation to your community, only part of the story, you need to give beyond that to earn your right to be fully part of the community again (to pay for your absence during the conflict and earn your right as a representative)[230].

At the core of the patron-client relationship was a misalignment based on the misconception of the wealth of diaspora (personal wealth and the convertibility of international capital to economic. Will Reno had, early on in 2003, highlighted the political implications of practices

[228] The extent to which pre–election costs will be recovered through public resources has been reported as systemic and a mainstay of political competition in both Somaliland and Somalia at a personal and structural level (Bradbury 2008; ICG 2012).
[229] Interview 62, manager director of business and local female activist, 6 December 2016.
[230] Interview 69, government advisor, Mogadishu, 10 December 2016.

of selecting outsider candidates as a feature of Somali politics. He remarked how 'enterprising strongmen … [had] always found that cultivating a personal following among … alternative new candidates, provide[d] better prospects for personal gain than does loyalty to old patrons' (1997: 494). Yet, he also cautioned how such practices were counterproductive in achieving political stability or consensus, suggesting that conflict and fragmentation were greatly reduced when 'formal and informal institutional frameworks favoured old informal patronage networks and clandestine economic channels over the interests of new or outsider elites … that the risk of fragmentation and violence [was] lower' (2003: 6). His argument, following the aftermath of Arta, was that new elites came with new resources, through new institutional frameworks, that provoked destabilising rent-seeking practice, particularly in contexts where non-state actors (clan units) were unable to control political entrepreneurs' access to resources. Thus, such relationships in Puntland and Somalia continued to undermine the ability of any single authority to concentrate and control the exercise of coercion (2003: 38). In his estimation, the reason that Somaliland's diaspora did not become financiers of armed groups (and later chief representatives), as they did in the south, was that legitimate local authorities exercised social control over connections between wealth and coercion (2003: 31).

Evidence of this is the less frequent government reshuffles in Puntland and Somaliland, where there was greater institutionalised and societal cohesion, as well as fewer pressures on systems of representative politics for redress and expectations of spoils politics[231]. The following section looks specifically at shifting relationships between clans and MPs in Somalia and Puntland after the 2012 elections and draws on original empirical data from the 2016 and 2017 parliamentary elections. It argues how a shift occurred in the extent to which clans were more likely to support diaspora candidates, as they became critical 'gatekeepers' to state and international resources in parliament and government. Diaspora recruits also tested the boundaries of what was possible and permissible in altering the recruitment procedures and the rules of patron–client relations, given their alternative relationships and networks. Given the gatekeeper paradox, diaspora candidates saw clans as a loci of negotiation, rather than

[231] This distinction in government reshuffles and patronage politics as shaping donor understandings of local politics was repeated by the former UN SRSG Keating in an informal donor discussion in Nairobi in November 2016. Even in Somaliland, the provision of kickbacks and 'small gifts' during elections is well–documented – a study conducted in Somaliland indicated the high cost of local council and MP seats 2012 due to pre–election 'small gifts' (that reportedly increased surrounding drought) with three–quarters of the money spent on direct benefits, mainly through khat (Bradbury 2014: 10).

obligation, where they also sought to bypass traditional recruitment procedures and insulation within elite networks, political parties and donor partnerships.

### 4.3 Turning tides in clan support for diaspora MPs

The changing face of African legislatures (in terms of capacity, mandate and socio-political profiles) is not a new feature of African politics (Tripp 2003). For example, scholars note how the costs of campaigning has meant that old elites are not able to compete with business individuals, who have their own sources of finance and could enter parliament more easily, and because voters increasingly demand that candidates link them into development resources (Hornsby 1989; Scarrow 2007). In the Somali context, in addition to businessmen, diaspora representation increased within clan politics, which was tied to shifting incentive structures around parliamentary institutionalisation and brokerage politics. As of 2011, diaspora representation in parliament was less than 8 percent in Puntland, 24 percent in Somaliland, and 50 percent in the TFG (Ismail 2011). By September 2017, this representation increased and approximate figures stood at: 44 percent in Somalia, 55 percent in Puntland and 35 percent in Somaliland[232]. The decreased levels in Somalia was tied to state permanence and political concessions given to former military leaders and warlords. Even in 2012, there were fewer diaspora MPs than in the previous parliament but 43 of them were British passport-holders who were actively engaged in courting British diplomats[233]. In Somalia, in 2016, diaspora successfully secured 125 of the newly–elected Federal Government's 283 MPs, where 38 percent of Somali Federal Members of Parliament (105 out of 275) had dual citizenship, and where 165 MPs and senators were under 35 years of age. Interestingly, at the federal level, Jubbaland had the highest diaspora MPs — 23 out of 43, or 53 percent[234].

Importantly, in Somalia, after 2012, respondents reported a noticeable 'localisation' of diaspora recruitment that had not existed prior, as clan leaders were able to engage in more direct ways in contesting the selection of representatives. Before 2012, diaspora mobilisation was targeted and largely confined to elite-driven strategies around deeply personal interactions that emerged around international forums, host-country organisation and other lobbying activities, where

[232] Figures compiled in coordination with ADP, PDRC and SDA, December, May and September 2016 and 2017.
[233] 'Somalia: New president, new laws and old enemies', *Africa Confidential* 53 (19), 21 September 2012.
[234] 'The Regional Risks to Somalia's Moment of Hope', *International Crisis Group Commentary*, 22 February 2017, see also https://wakiil.org/news/somali-mps-dual-citizenship.

diaspora candidates were tied to top-down peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and networks. As one interviewee explained in the context of President Farmajo's return in 2009, it was all about personal networks:

> Farmajo had worked in the Buffalo county government; he met his brother–in–law in Minnesota and an elderly uncle of his wife that was very close to Sheikh Sharif, then president. The uncle connected Sheikh Sharif and Farmajo. It was evident that in the case of Farmajo, his clan encouraged him to come and his uncle facilitated it[235].

In another case, Abdirisak Adan of the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), before serving as advisor to Sheikh Sharif (2008–2009) and then PS for the Ministry of Information (2009–2010), described how he was mobilised by Sharif Hassan (Rahaweyn) to become part of the ARS given the critical role he played as councillor in dealing with some issues regarding arrests in Sweden[236]. As he further explains, 'there was few of us [diaspora] at this time that were influential in any way, or were of value to Somali politicians, and it was through such personal relationships that we returned, but now things have changed, it is influence being sold on every street corner'[237]. During this period of the early 2000s, the clan routes through which diaspora sought to return to politics were also restricted as diaspora were seen as political threats to the authority of both the TFG and ICU. They were also closely associated with sponsorship from road-map signatories for favoured candidates (including to representatives of the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, albeit to a lesser extent than in 2004)[238]. As one respondent reports, receiving a foreign salary during this time was dangerous, being associated with donors posed a risk for political legitimacy (see 6.2). Critical was the fact diaspora politicians at this point were engaged with because of their foreign lobbying capacity but less explicitly because of their added value at home – thus, not as a resource for securing competitive advantage at home[239]. By 2012, but more clearly by 2016, the domestic opportunity structures shifted within the system of federalism and renewed statebuilding agendas, causing a recalculation of risk within the clan systems.

[235] Interview 43, diaspora returnee and government advisor, 3 October 2017.
[236] Interview 58, former member of SCG, Mogadishu, 7 December 2016.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.
[239] In one case, Hassan Sheikh took them on, lambasting diaspora–based social media mischief makers — 'Reality in Somalia bears no relation to what you post on your timeline ...' Speech by President Hassan Sheikh, translated 4 December 2016, reposted https://twitter.com/MA_Cagey/status/805385258912845828.

A UK diaspora and former chief political advisor to the UN SRSG describes this shift from 2012. She returned in 2012 to Mogadishu (ahead of the (s)election process) but was chased out by powerful members of her own sub-clan. Her sub-clan assumed she had come back with plans to run for its allotted seat in the new parliament and was deeply hostile to this because she was a woman but more so because she was a diaspora[240]. Her intentions were not to run for office at this point and she left as a result of the harassment she received. When she did return in 2016 with the hopes of actually running for the MP, not only were the elders on board but they were very supportive. She ultimately decided against running given the high cost of political office but, as she suggests, contesting elections post–2012 had certainly become less dangerous for diaspora. As she indicated, 'I'd spoken to the elders in her sub-clan and patched things up'[241]. It was also evident that 'support was not guaranteed just because you are a diaspora and offer experience, money and key skills — they would not guarantee your seat but would happily take your money'. As such, she explains how it is 'still a game for insiders, and you have to prove you're an insider, even if the rules are shifting'[242]. Proving to be an insider meant getting your hands dirty (paying the money) but also understanding certain norms of reputation and social obligation. In her mind, the incentives around elected and represented office were also beginning to shift from defensive to offensive in the fight for competitive advantage, where clan leaders saw the prospective gains in selecting diaspora candidates who had access to international and sate resources, even if it could spark revenge attacks.

By 2016, the incentive structures for diaspora MPs also notably increased. Donors saw value in having diaspora MPs as interlocutors on projects and in facilitating checks against the government. This meant clans increasingly began to demand that diaspora candidates link them into development resources. For diaspora returnees, MP seats were coveted as low-effort, safe seats with easy access to advancing political careers, where they could be relatively mobile and politically immune (see Chapter 6)[243]. Also, for local and federal elites, they undertook evident strategies to select diaspora politicians in order to renegotiate power relationships. For instance, in South West and Jubaland, diaspora MPs were used by regional executives as part of a strategy to secure loyalty and a larger stake at the national level (as was the case in South West),

[240] Andrew Harding, 'Somalia's Diaspora are slowly returning to Mogadishu', 10 January 2017, see also https://www.hurstpublishers.com/somalias–diaspora–slowly–returning–mogadishu/.
[241] Interview 72, former advisor to UN SRSG and government advisor, Mogadishu, 10 September 2017.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Interview 63, MP Mohamed Said, Mogadishu, 5 December 2016. As he recounted, 'it is easy to be a diaspora and an MP, we have 2 sessions per year, and to keep your seat you only have to show up for 1, so once a year— not that difficult'.

or to undermine the authority of regional leaders (as was the case in Jubaland)[244]. Hassan Sheikh had also sought to replace former MPs with younger ones, in order to secure his re-election. Yet, as an indication of brokerage politics in such highly contested contexts, MPs could not be bought, and strategies by Hassan Sheikh and Sharif Hassan backfired. Sharif Hassan had sought to ensure a large number of young diaspora recruits (largely political amateurs) became parliamentarians at the national level, in order to enforce his stake of the national pie[245]. Sharif Hassan thought they would be less likely to challenge him for power, be more amenable and could increase the hold of the Rahaweyn at the centre[246]. Yet, the existence and execution of such strategies were closely tied to regional and international dynamics and pressures (Jubbaland), internal clan dynamics and the persona and acumen of key political actors. For Sharif Hassan, it was an indication of internal clan cohesion within the Rahaweyn, his undisputed authority as a powerbroker, and membership of the Ashraaf that allowed him to assert control over the federal election process.

As Hellander argues, the Rahaweyn pay *diya* collectively at a much higher level in their lineage structure, but also constitute a 'melting of lineage plus adopting minority and occupational group … [that included] their heterogeneous character and high proportion of immigrant members' (1996: 195)[247]. As will be discussed in Section 4.5 in more detail, politically under-represented clans like Rahaweyn, but also Reer aw Hassan, have been able to capitalise on transnational politics and resources, adapting greater internal cohesion and resilient strategies of network and alliance-building to renegotiate their political positions at home. Support for diaspora candidates has been one way in which this is done, which requires further theorising. Yet, as the example of Sharif Hassan demonstrates, such strategy may not be in line with the broader aspirations of diaspora politicians, or structures around international brokerage relationships where their loyalties are not easily secured. In terms of the role of MPs as

[244] Interview 68, MP Jubaland, Mogadishu, 9 December 2016. She explained how she had come from three generations of public servants, and was running for the same seat as her father, and against the commissioner, the Minister of Finance, and the wife of the wealthiest man in Somalia. She did not have the support of the Jubaland government, but she met with different interest groups included youth, female, civil society. 'My father never made money, and they knew that, perceptions of personal wealth affects how much they expect. And I think that ultimately helped me. I didn't want to buy that seat, and ultimately I think they decided to give me the seat understanding that I would respect them and this position'.
[245] Interview 28, Federal MP for Somaliland, Mogadishu, 22 November 2017.
[246] Interview 63, MP South West State, Mogadishu, 5 December 2016. 'The South–West Annals of Corruption', *Wardheer News*, http://www.wardheernews.com/south–west–state–annals–corruption/; 'South West President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Blocks Members of Parliament To Avoid Impeachment', *Radio Dalsan*, 25 September 2017, http://somaliamediamonitoring.org/september–26–2017–morning–headlines.
[247] See Gundel 2006: 30 on the structures of the Rahaweyn.

'gatekeepers'[248], the financial stakes around these positions had risen after 2012 because of strategies by certain donors to engage MPs as negotiators on programmes.

For instance, as was reported by MPs, it was common practice that UK and Swedish diaspora MPs were appointed as focal points on donor aid agendas[249]. UK and Scandinavian tactics towards engaging their diaspora were generally in line with a more hands–on approach to political interventions that differed from the strategies employed by the US[250]. The US was more hesitant in using diaspora returnees as explicit brokers, evidenced by its resistance to support technocratic assistance programmes through IOM (see Chapter 6). This was explained partially by criticism historically of these tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, officially, the US embassy maintained a clear line with the US Somali diaspora caucus within the federal parliament — 'we don't want to sway the political settlement here'. Nonetheless, it was clear that the US Embassy relied on key diaspora advisors within the OPM's office (and particularly the office of the president) to secure access to forms of political communication and leverage which of these diaspora politicians would, in turn, campaign for political representatives, and to guarantee the legitimising support of foreign parties[251]. The US Somali diaspora caucus in the Somali federal parliament would frequently reach out to the US embassy to either propose candidates for the ambassadorship posts or to form institutional partnerships with the US senate, seeking forms of international recognition that was tied to their identity as 'diaspora' rather than clan[252].

Another US Somali MP bemoaned the fact that USAID did not offer more perks to MPs. As he detailed, 'Qatar is paying, and the US needs to compete, it is a dirty fight and needs to be fought appropriately. US needs to invest in the people that can do the job'[253]. Particular

[248] Interview 68, MP for Jubaland, Mogadishu, 9 December 2016. As she indicated, 'MPs hold the hands of clan, the clan can go to the ministry, and say "you have to hire this person"… As an MP people come to you all the time saying, "we want jobs", and you are supposed to provide links, and tangible outcomes, jobs being the most commonly cited'.

[249]UK and Swedish diaspora also played prominent roles within the IOM MIDA technocratic assistance programmes (see Chapter 6). Interview 85, IOM manager, Nairobi, 11 July 2017. As one IOM beneficiary recounted — 'We tease the UK diaspora because they are overrepresented in the return programs, which corresponds to their lobbying at the host country level. Ironic though since the UK government doesn't support the program—we tell them, the first purpose of this program is the skills transfer, but such UK diaspora can also be cultural ambassadors, can bring ideals, values'. Interview 43, Garowe, 3 October 2017.

[250] Interview 85, USAID team lead, Nairobi, 30 June 2017.

[251] Interviews 41 and 42, US Somali diaspora returnees, Garowe, 18 April 2017. As one diaspora returnee in Garowe indicated, 'It is a weird policy of USAID, no programs specifically targeting diaspora, EU diaspora receive loans from Amal, but USAID is definitely the least supportive. US are forced to voluntarily repatriate'.

[252] Interview 63, MP for Southwest, Mogadishu, 19 May 2017.

[253] Interview 63, MP South West State, Mogadishu, 5 December 2016.

emphasis in Somalia was placed on the activities of UK and Scandinavian donors vis-à-vis their diaspora with clearly legible incentives placed on these diaspora representatives which contributed to processes of internal differentiation that occurred at the elite and clan level. It perhaps accounted for why UK and Sweden diaspora were overall overrepresented in parliament. In terms of UK engagement, as one MP described of the relationship between UK diaspora MPs, British embassies and DFID:

> UK has the most MPs for sure and the rest of us are envious of the engagement they have with DFID. DFID makes them focal points on contracts and at meetings especially when [it] relates to projects in their constituency and these MPs in turn offer certain access and information useful for their projects[254].

Another respondent confirmed the links between the British embassy and UK MPs - 'when any change happens, the British call the UK MPs in, and vice versa — it is a multidirectional exchange of information and advantage'[255]. As one former politician indicated, '43 MPs take direct orders from the British embassy. Ahead of the 2012 elections they were all invited to the embassy in Mogadishu and given some indirect guidelines to vote in accordance with donor agendas, and in 2012 this was to not support HSM'[256]. It was a trend that was highly noticeable in Somalia given the orientations of donor funding, but also given the logics of rent-seeking and performative practices around representation and recognition.

The following section provides empirics from the 2016/2017 federal elections to outline a few key examples of how diaspora returnees negotiated relationships of reciprocity and social obligation within the clan system, seeing clan as a loci of negotiation rather than obligation. In some cases they sought to bypass traditional recruitment procedures altogether, and sought insulation within elite networks, political parties or donors. In other cases, they misinterpreted features of clan politics and notably failed to secure clan support in ministerial positions or as MPs.

### *4.3.1 Renegotiating clan authority – diaspora candidates in 2016 and 2017 elections*

[254] Ibid.
[255] Interview 68, MP for Jubaland, Mogadishu, 9 December 2016.
[256] Interview 50, government advisor, Mogadishu, 15 December 2016.

A survey of fifteen federal electoral contests in Somalia of diaspora returnees contesting political seats indicated that diaspora MPs undertook more heavy-lifting in securing clan support for parliamentary seats than for cabinet seats. Both parliament and cabinet seats are allocated along clan lines, but elites (or *siyasi*) have a larger say in choosing representatives at the parliamentary level. Across both cabinet and MP seats, there was general consensus that diaspora recruits in Somalia who returned voluntarily (outside the networks of influence, either through clan or political elites), or who sought to bypass traditional recruitment mechanisms, were not successful[257]. Such findings demonstrate the active authority of elders, as well as prevailing norms of social obligation (or survivor's guilt), that enforced certain customary relationships of kinship, even amidst the commercialisation and marketisation of power in parliament. In addition, it was often the case that diaspora candidates thought they were appeasing the clan but they frequently misgauged expectations. In one case of a Jubaland MP, she explains how twelve people were running for her seat (including then police commissioner, the Minister of Finance and the wife of the wealthiest man in Somalia). It was clear that she was not supported at Jubaland regional state level but that she did have strong backing from the federal government. Yet, money was not the defining point here as her opponent's wealth worked against her. As she says:

> I went to the grassroots, I met with different interest groups – youth, female, civil society and of course I had to pay something small, but such money was drought relief … but I never paid money to the electoral college (my father never made money and they knew that – perceptions of personal wealth affects how much they expect). And I think that ultimately helped me I didn't want to buy that seat, and ultimately I think they decided to give me the seat understanding that I would respect them and this position[258].

In another example, a US diaspora candidate running for a senate seat, explained how he had over-relied on a strong family reputation and name, but had failed to lobby clan leaders in the regions (including through monetary inducements) that cost him his senatorial seat (Habar Gedir, Dhusamreeb senate seat). The senate seat was hotly contested by other strongmen and his ambitions for a ministerial post were thwarted as his current MP who was also a competitor

[257] Interviews 57 and SDA focus group, Mogadishu, December 2016.
[258] Interview 68, MP Jubaland, Mogadishu, 9 December 2016.

for the post[259]. Yet, he also made the political mistake of aligning himself too closely with Hassan Sheikh and then changing tactics quickly as the elections were turning in Farmajo's favour which had the consequence of exposing him as a political opportunist by his clan, as untrustworthy, and by some even as an agent of the CIA[260]. He describes how he pursued first a position at the Ministry of Immigration and then Defense by setting about mobilising key political elites by 'going through the advisors, the weak persons that can make those connections for you'. As he reports, his strategy was to mobilise Mogadishu Governor Thabit, in order to gain access to PM Hassan Khayre and Fahad Yassin, and about four or five MPs loyal to this group. Ultimately, he undertook an elitist route to political office that would preclude him from successfully assuming political office. As he recounted of his challenges navigating the political process as a diaspora:

> being foreign is a threat to them, I risked exposing how the dark networks work. The government, no matter how they push the aim is to make money, to make rich. I refused to pay and ultimately could not harness clan support. So difficult being a diaspora, I'm not here because I want to be, I'm here because I need to be and there's a difference, I see room for change, I admit I may be idealist that way. They label you so quick[261].

In another example, the current MP for South West State[262] describes how he mobilised significantly in the US and elsewhere through clan and familial networks in order to secure the seat. Having left Mogadishu in 1991, he then served as a contractor for the US government as a linguist. He described a process of mobilisation that consisted of making one available and trusted. He had nurtured critical networks in Cairo, particularly through Mohamed Mader (brother of Sharif Hassan) back in the 1990s when he was in university there. As he indicated, he 'came back end of 2014 to be part of the South West State formation process in the inner circle. He volunteered for a year and a half, first, and then took up an IOM Sweden contract (for only one year) as presidential advisor to Sharif Hassan. He then decided to transition to MP, but re–iterated the point, 'you only do this as a diaspora if someone can lobby for you'[263]. Critical to his success was the role of his father who came from Dallas and returned to help

[259] Constitutional articles 59(E) and 97(3) allow for the appointment of members of the federal parliament to Cabinet positions (but not to technical posts, although this is frequently bypassed).
[260] Interview 56 and 57, aspiring candidate and minister, Mogadishu, 7 December 2016 and 18 May 2017.
[261] Ibid.
[262] 'South West State to Complete Lower House elections next week', 25 November 2016, https://unsom.unmissions.org/south–west–state–complete–lower–house–elections–next–week–0.
[263] Interview 63, MP South West State, Mogadishu, 5 December 2016.

him 'reconnect with the community', which he explained was an expensive and exhausting process. In clear details, he explains the role he was able to play and sell as a broker for Sharif Hassan (then president of South West state) — 'back in the US I was active in the diaspora circle, played a critical role in the Gurmad platform that had supported Farmajo's election, so I offered critical connections at the national level as a US diaspora, but my allegiance is with Sharif Hassan'[264].

Others had fewer connections or inroads into the political system or did not know quite how to leverage them. In another case of an MP with South West State, a female parliamentarian married a local businessman (with close links to Sharif Hassan) in order to mobilise support for her campaign, who then mobilised locally for her and provided her with the money for registration[265]. In each of these cases, key diaspora candidates sought to renegotiate the terms of clan support in an effort to redefine boundaries of political competition and representation as well as social obligation in their favour. Such renegotiation was made easier by the influx of new elites as a force to be reckoned with, and an influx of international aid and foreign diplomatic presence that gave these returning diaspora greater autonomy but also influence to wield. The paradox of diaspora return, in terms of expectations surrounding the 'idealised return' and their absorption into clientelistic networks, was captured by a Somali saying that was often repeated, 'Diaspora jump like a lion, fall like a cat'. It was explained by Liban Obsiye:

> The Somali Diaspora despite their disproportionate political presence in different regions of Somalia are still appointed along tribal lines to their posts … the Diaspora member's tribal family and its position in Somali society will determine what they become and how and to what extent they contribute[266].

The nature of this relationship between the tribal family and the diaspora representative — how it was defined and could restrain the action of diaspora politicians — was a source of some debate. What one local bureaucrat described as 'new warlordism' was emerging around the diaspora question where 'rents came to matter more, bought you legitimacy, and the importance

[264] Ibid.
[265] Recounted by close friend, Interview 72, former advisor to the UNSRSG, 10 September 2017.
[266] See Liban Obsiye, 'The Diaspora question', 15 November 2014, accessed at http://harowo.com/archives/4577.

of reputation mattered less than the rents and influence one could secure'[267]. Another indicated how the monetisation of politics had come with shifting conceptions of leadership:

> now very few diaspora come from strong political families, many clans didn't know the existence of these individuals, mobilised instead around networks, who are then proposed to clans … not based on family status per se, introduced often through friends of friends at conferences, networking events, same physical areas, also internet communications although less important than physical spaces[268].

Likewise, as the former Minister of National Planning in 2012 indicated, money and the level of external support and political network meant more than base support, name-recognition and, especially, presence in Somalia[269]. Many of the government officials and MPs came with certain notorieties or status linked not to government experience but to participation in diaspora or student associations, even NGOs, where their economic utility within the international system was clearer[270]. It was how diaspora recruits successfully performed their networks of influence, and the local needs, aspirations and power of clans, that defined these relationships. Such shifts were less noticeable in Somaliland, where it was reported that family names and reputation continued to carry important weight, even if willingness to shell out money, and to demonstrate networks of influence, were also important factors[271].

The reality of the political marketplace in Somalia meant that local authorities do not exercise absolute social control over connections between wealth and coercion (Reno 2003: 31), but are nonetheless central in regulating 'who is prestigious, who gets resources, who is considered legitimate, and most important, who exercises coercion' (Reno 2003: 6). Clans could still successfully enforce some demands and norms around social obligation even if these new arrangements and economic opportunities empowered state logics and the centralisation of diaspora politicians around new elite projects and accumulation of international capital. Such enforcement took different shapes, but an interesting tactic emerged by 2016 where key minority clans/groupings sought to use their power as clan brokers to facilitate, but also control,

[267] Interview 59, former PS at Ministry of Information, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017.
[268] Interview 36, director of PDRC and local activist, 18 April 2017.
[269] Aynte, Abdi, 'Somali Presidential Elections: six ways to win power', *African Arguments*, 3 July 2012, http://africanarguments.org/2012/07/03/somali–presidential–elections–six–ways–to–win–power–by–abdi–aynte/.
[270] Focus group discussions, Garowe and Mogadishu, May 2017 and December 2016.
[271] Focus group discussions at ADP, Hargeisa, December 2016.

the political power of diaspora politicians as a more targeted strategy to check dominant power structures while consolidating power. The following section looks at how minority clans and their elite representatives (namely from the Reer aw Haasan) were able to use the diaspora option to subvert a system of dominant politics in Somalia surrounding the 2016/2017 elections.

### 4.4 Reshaping representation – old rules, new strategies, and diaspora brokers

By his election in 2016, Farmajo continued Hassan Sheikh's strategy to court the parliament through heavy lobbying, securing personal alliances through contracts and appealing to diaspora's values and commitments to democratisation (see Chapter 5 and 7). In his appointment of cabinet officials, he undertook a careful policy of appointing largely diaspora officials from his personal diaspora networks and other activated groups. Having begun under Hassan Sheikh, key to Farmajo's project of state power was the role of key members of the .5 (*beeshda sanada*)[272] — particularly the Reer aw Hassan[273] — as the second in command, as they represented the principal (and natural) clan brokers. It was well-known that the Reer aw Hassan 'can go to any clan and ask for favours'.[274] The Reer aw Hassan notably often ally themselves with Ashraf but distinguish themselves from the Sheikhal and the Hawiye hegemony, and instead critically maintain their status as .5[275]. Like the Rahaweyn, the Reer aw Hassan and the Sheikhal have turned towards transnational political practice in a precise and targeted way in order to renegotiate the terms of political representation. For instance, as locals

[272] It is important to emphasise that this is the exception – minority groups are by in large disadvantaged within the political system. Besteman, Catherine, 'Conflict over Resources and the Victimization of the Minorities in the South of Somalia', World Peace Foundation, 31 October 2013, https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/31/conflict–over–resources–and–the–victimization–of–the–minorities–in–the–south–of–somalia/. During the 1970s, minority groups benefited initially from the military regime, gaining considerable standing as close supporters of the regime, but by the end of Barre's military regime, their fortunes had turned and their sources of protection were eliminated as cross-cutting ties were replaced with new vertical forms of ties and elite patronage networks (Hoehne 2016: 30 Lewis 1994: 165). During the civil war, their political power deteriorated further as they were never firmly integrated into the state apparatus and lacked their own militias, which left them powerless against the dominant political-military clan organisations that emerged in the 1990s, particularly when facing the large Hawiye and the Darood clan-families (Prunier 1995; Hoehne 2014: 797). During this period, these minority groups lost considerable land and political recognition under controversial and internationally-sanctioned agreements, like the 1993 Jubaland agreement (Besteman 2013; Hoehne 2014: 798). Their subjugation during the civil war was not relieved under the ICU in the early 2000s despite its Islamist ideology, as the organisation was still based on military might and the councils acted as overlords in riverine areas by demanding heavy taxes (Besteman 2013: 26).

[273] This new kind of contract (*gashaanbuur*) denoted a coalition of small lineages to resist the power of a bigger one (Compagnon 1998: 84).

[274] Interview 79, researcher, diaspora intellectual and Reer aw Hassan member, September 2017.

[275] An example of genealogical adjustment (Luling 2006: 479), the Sheikhal group of clans, in order to increase the size of their constituency, has often claimed that the Reer Aw Hassan were part of it (Platt 2009).

report, the Sheikhal have become a 'cocktail clan or elite club', a second identity, comprising 'an important group of businessmen and religious elites (aligned with Al Islah) who are transnational in orientation (from Somalia to Djibouti to Kenya). They are also 'strongly represented amongst security institutions, and see their future strength in a supra-clan identity, where diaspora or new elites are seen as better partners and more amenable to key cross-clan religious or strategic agendas'[276].

Similarly, although in a different way, Reer aw Hassan has long been seen as the undisputable clan broker and, through that image, they have increasingly acquired significant political and financial authority. Straddling regional boundaries, which raise some concern about their capacity to hold political office and make decisions on behalf of the country, they maintain their power through political skill and historical strategies of alliance-building. The Reer aw Hassan have been revered for their resilience strategies — cross–cutting ties that included matrilineal identities and blood-marriage relations necessary for insurance, protection and securing access to resources during the civil war and thereafter (Luling 2006; Gundel 2009). Through these structures, they were also able to access certain peace dividends (for instance, as mediators during the war between the Hawadle/Hawiye back in 1993) and they received considerable money, from mainly Qatari charities, for distribution amongst families and the clan. Such brokerage (or *simsaar*) and alliance-building allowed them to benefit (financially and transnationally) from certain liberal peace processes and access to external funding streams and transnational networks, while assuming highly adaptable structures of 'genealogical adjustment' or structural resilience (Luling 2006; Menkhaus 1999: 28)[277].

Within the current political context, this has meant, as one respondent reported, that while 'they would never be president, big clans go to them for the money and they, in turn, can invest in

[276] Interviews, professor and two businessmen associated with Sheikhal, Mogadishu, August 2017. According to local reports at least 10 MPs from other clans are also 'Sheikhals'. Sheikhal have 3 seats in the Hawiye section of parliament but also 2 seats in the minority that were distributed during Arta. As Virginia Luling (2009) argues, after the civil war the Sheekhal from mogadishu to kismayo pursued two main strategies of gaining influence, 'one was through their emphasis in developing and dominating the educational sector in mogadishu mainly through the non-violent islamic organization al islah the other was to seek association with the hawiye and general aided'.

[277] Marriage was a key tool in forging cross–cutting ties, 'The men were encouraged to marry from other clans as a 'political device' to create 'connections' with the other clans; this was a 'common' practice for all Somalis. One of the uses of the cultivation of such connections, for instance, was to 'entitle the subject to immunity from the blood-feud' (see Hoehne 2014: 787). For instance, clans like Reer Xamar entered into protection arrangements through their in-laws belonging to majority clans (Gundel 2009: 17–18; Ingiriis and Hoehne 2013: 315). Many of these minority groups had been critical to political brokering historically – six out of thirteen of the founding members of the Somali Youth League were Reer Xamar (Gundel 2009: 17–18).

political actors either in big clans or outside to serve their interests'[278]. As a result, there is a long history of presidents using members of the Reer aw Hassan both to check to the premier (who often represents one of the major clans) and renegotiate power-sharing arrangements in informal ways. Even the Derwish resistance from 1900 until 1921 was heavily fortified by the Reer aw Haasan, and Abdirahman Guulwade (also Reer aw Hassan) had been the long-time head of Siad Barre's *Guulwadayaal* (Ingiriis 2016: 212)[279]. Nonetheless, before 2012, key minority groups (including Reer aw Hassan and Sheekhal) did not have any MPs at the federal level. In 2012 Hassan Sheikh appointed two Reer aw Hassan to his cabinet of ten ministers, which was a significant shift in strategy[280]. This included the selection of Fahad Yassin Haji Dahir, named Minister of Ports and Marine Transport (Reer-Aw Mahdi, sub-clan of Reer Aw Hassan) and Farah Sh. Abdulkadir Mohamed, as Minister of Justice. Farah Abdulqadir (not coincidentally) was the cousin of Abdirahman Guulwade (also Reer aw Hassan). Under Hassan Sheikh, Farah Abdulkadir, in particular, would play a clear political role in facilitating the federal agenda and securing buy-in at the regional level (as occurred in both the South West State and Galmudug processes). He carried out the state agenda and was capable of overseeing certain negotiations that other officials could not. In 2016, Farmajo appointed chief of staff, Fahad Yassin[281], who is seen as playing an even more powerful and public role. He is also tied in marriage networks of political immunity to the Marehan power structure (married to a Marehan/rer Siyaad).

As a political strategy it was Fahad Yassin who activated and managed the diaspora strategy and accommodation around Farmajo's administration. On the one hand, as a Somali intellectual explains, Yassin sought to 'suppress the majority which he sees as the nightmare of Somalia,

[278] Interview 54, professor, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017.
[279] *Guulwadayaal* was a popular militia group called Pioneers of the Revolution under Siad Barre that created chapters in almost every village of the country (Abdullahi 2001). Abdirahman Guulwade was married to one of Siyad Barre's daughters and played a critical role in trying to mediate between the Manifesto Group (later the USC) and Siad Barre, and he was Reer aw Hassan.
[280] See Proxies, powers, and presidents', *Africa Confidential*, 8 May 2018, https://www.africa–confidential.com/whos–who–profile/id/3802/Fahad_Yasin_Haji_Dahir; 'Person of the Year: Fahad Yassin', 6 January 2018 https://wardheernews.com/wardheernews–person–of–the–year–2017–fahad–yasin/.
[281] Fahad Yassin also initially supported Hassan Sheikh, but fell out over the dismissal of Prime Minister Saacid Shirdoon. Both Fahad Yassin and Farah reportedly have strong connections with Qatar (Fahad Yassin had previously worked for Al Jazeera in Qatar and Farah had headed the Africa Muslim Agency in Somalia). Farah Abdulkadir had also served as Somali State Minister until January 2014, where Farah Abdulkadir personally oversaw and approved the majority of government policies, raising allegations that he was the *de facto* president of Somalia. Abdulkadir's removal as Justice and Constitution Minister in 2014 by Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke at the behest of the new cabinet caused tension between Farah and Hassan Sheikh. In August 2016 the addition by Hassan Sheikh of an elder – Mohamed Ahmed Hussein (Shukri) – to the official elders list secured Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir's return to the next Parliament, to the detriment of his closest rival, Fahad Yasin. See UNMGSE (2014), paragraph 174.

so he subverted the 4.5 system, and placed value on personal loyalty above all else through the careful cultivation of selected diaspora candidates and allies from minority groups'[282]. In his argument, diaspora were recruited in a way that appeased the 4.5 quota scheme, but which also ensured loyalty through their minority status and marriage relationships. Importantly, Yassin checked the power of close confidants of Farmajo, particularly from US diaspora networks, who were one-by-one discharged or outsourced to ambassadorships and other symbolic posts[283]. At a broad level, the selection of Farmajo as a US diaspora (Marehan/Darood) and Hassan Khayre[284] as a Norwegian diaspora (Moursade/Hawiye) symbolised a broader re-orientation around diaspora and new economic opportunities to check majority politics. Both represented minority clans within two of the four dominant clans, and both were not representative of Mogadishu clans. In other ways, the strategy included greater representation of minority clans, like the Leelkase (minority sub–clan of the Darood)[285], and the reliance on personal and familial relations or marriage as a way to repurpose customary relationships to solidify political immunity, in a way that was unprecedented. Even PM Khayre is critically related to the presidential family by marriage (NUPI 2018: 9)[286].

The emphasis on these marriage networks was predicated on the formation of certain traditional institutions of protection and insurance — namely, the 'mobilisation of blood–marriage relations' — and symbolised both the importance of tying down the ambitions and loyalties of diaspora politicians, as brokers, but also an admission of their weakness in the face of broader

[282] Interview 59, former member of the SCG, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017. A strategy confirmed by many respondents immediately around the election, and during subsequent trips.
[283] 'Generally opposed to the Western influence of the new diaspora. Within 1 1/2 months, he clashed with Ballo, sent him to be Ambassador to the UN in New York and replaced him as chief of staff. He was the right hand of Farmajo, and of Taiyo party (at odds with the interests of the financiers, the Qataris and FY). Wasn't just Ballo, Ballo brought Kulane, and other senior guys from the diaspora, strong network that supported FY in the initial weeks but lost out politically. Western versus Middle East diaspora here. Ballo was the one that had established the legacy of Farmajo as PM, and after'.
[284] Partially, the outcome of a rivalry between the Habar Gedir and Abgal sub–clans of the Hawiye, Khayre from the Murosade clan was an easier sell and seen by many as a compromise candidate of the two clans that could be sold to the Darood and Digil.
[285] Fahad's mother was Leelkase, and these appointments include top people appointed to the security, constitutional minister, and vice chief of staff.
[286] His second wife is Marehan, just as Farmajo's wife is Moursade. Interview, Professor, Mogadishu, May 2017. See also 'Somalia exploiting family links to bring down Al–Shabaab', *The East African*, September 2017, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Family–links–to–bring–down–Al–Shabaab/2558–4086854–vl74qo/index.html. Under the same auspice, failing to understand or abide by certain tactics of the diaspora has cost key diaspora positions. Thabit (Abgaal/Waesli, of Farmajo's clan) notably had married the daughter of HSM's sister, then divorced her because of this connection. Others have made weak matches and have lost their positions accordingly – for instance, the Auditor General (HG, same sub–sub clan as the previous) married the daughter of Mohamed Ali Samatar (Tumal, minority weak clan), clan will disown him for this move that has been associated with diaspora politicians.

power networks[287]. Within this broader strategy, other tactics were employed, including ensuring that 80 percent of the cabinet was also in parliament (40–50 people in a 275–member parliament)[288]. The aim was to create a silent opposition and tongue-tied parliament on the assumption that political leaders may be unwilling or unable to denounce minorities who are seen as critical to security arrangements[289]. In another way, they carefully altered certain norms of representative politics. For instance, some complained the seats, which their clan had traditionally occupied, were taken away from them and in return they were allotted different ones. For example, the foreign affairs docket, which has always been reserved for Dir, went to the Habar Gedir, while the finance portfolio (often occupied by Habar Gedir, given their dominance within the finance sector) notably went to Dir, who have no economic or political interests[290]. Such moves were justified under anti-corruption and technocratic agendas, an acknowledgement that certain strategic and high value posts could be not trusted in the hands of certain clans, but which broke with political practice.

Following his election, the media described such moves as part and parcel of a 'populist' backlash against forms of dominant politics and structures — as levelling the playing field of Hawiye dominance (mainly Habar Gedir and Abgaal) (see 7.3). Yet, concerns were quickly raised that it was an elitist agenda which championed redistributive or even defensive politics based on the highly legible replacement of old guard politicians with party loyalists and the crippling of the strength of subnational authorities under state logics[291]. Farmajo's strategy was unable to address the anxieties of subnational actors over state power and their own control over their representatives — 'they think they satisfied the clan, but they did not'[292]. The reality was that these diaspora were still perceived as strangers by local society, also given their lack of social knowledge. Nonetheless, their diaspora strategy included external legitimacy and extraverted state structures, control over revenue and aid budgets, as well the institutions of the state. He was perhaps able to impose a somewhat more coherent agenda than Hassan Sheikh

[287] As one respondent described, 'the change was not political, but individual—the new governor Thabit, commander of army, and police are all Moursade either directly or through mother or wife. There was a deference to personal and clan networks. Yusuf Garaad (MoFA) Moursade, Abdikharim Gambe (Habar Gedir/Moursade) — mothers are sisters — and Gambe is very close to Hassan Khayre and Farmajo'. Interview 59, former member of the SCG, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017.
[288] 'February 2018 Monthly Roundup', *Wakiil,* accessed at https://wakiil.org/news/february–2018–monthly–roundup.
[289] Ibid.
[290] Interview 54 and 55, professor, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017 and 7 September 2017.
[291] Interview 59, Abdirisak Aden, 18 May 2017.
[292] Interview 90, Somali political advisor to the British High Commission, 28 June 2017.

or his predecessor and more clearly through the threat of force, financial inducements and crackdowns on freedom of speech. He also reinforced the notion of a diaspora ruling class, which led to the formation of large alliances against them (see 7.4).

The trajectory differed in Puntland and Somaliland where internal legitimacy requirements and institutionalised clan structures regulated the existence of such elite strategy. In Somaliland, as Markus Hoehne argues, the 'network logic' that existed in Somalia and informed much of the politics in the centre as well as at the peripheries of the post–colonial period, had lost appeal around contentions over state formation and the national agenda. Boundaries around clan units were more sharpened, as well as notions about citizenship and belonging, and traditional authority structures (Hoehne 2016: 1406). It made it harder for outsiders to be recruited into the political system in Somaliland, and where even the close confidants around Silanyo had to demonstrate contributions to the local Somaliland cause (see Chapter 5). Thus, in Somaliland, clan elders still asserted important control over role candidate selection. As Mark Bradbury explains, 'clans vote in blocks, they may shift party if that suits them best, but clans infrequently split' (2008). In Puntland, Gaas's strategy was similarly constrained, even with some latitude, due to the preoccupation of clans and local elites with power distribution at the centre. He still struggled to get certain people elected given the strength of clan representation and power within parliament (see 5.5). Respondents discussed the challenges Gaas faced from clan elders as a result of 'internal cohesion and intact leadership of the Majeerteen', the legacies of the military logics of the SSDF, and more radical religious elements that restricted network logics.

In addition, the absence of internal clan wars (as plagued the Isaaq in Somaliland and Hawiye in the South) had preserved the authority of clan institutions over candidate selection and representative structures. There was an admission that 'the Majeerteen, as a more cohesive and advanced political society, constituting many well-educated diaspora and learned in Islam saw a new political orientation towards younger generation of diaspora as a way to renegotiate the terms of power at the centre'[293]. In this way, Puntland retained some control over brokerage and the representativeness of diaspora politicians, even if the politics of semi-recognition gave them more leeway within the political system. Yet, the lack of recognition (of the state project,

[293] Interviews 89 and 71, former political analyst and UK-diaspora businessman and political activist, Mogadishu, 15 May 2017.

and Puntland's role within the federal structure more broadly) may have created different issues for collective strategy and coherence, including sustaining clan elder-government-and transnational arrangements (Reno 2003). In this way, internal clan politics (shaped by conflict legacies, historical genesis and features of clan hierarchies) interacted with the state logics of subnational and national administrations and affected relationships between domestic actors and diaspora politicians. For instance, *diya*-payments, internal clan hierarchies and centralised decision-making affected the capacity of certain clans to mobilise key posts as well as access to transnational resources, and may account for why certain clan groups remain on the outside of politics despite their economic might and power (see also Luling 2006 and Gundel 2009).

Throughout the fieldwork, frequent discussions with local activists, political analysts and advisors regarded notions of clan variation (in aspirations, and internal capacity and structures) that defined the authority of leaders and their capacity to capture or hold onto power. Such notions were tied to historical junctures, conflict legacies and practices of inequality and uneven development, as well as demographics, but had resonance for how Somalis understood political developments. Characteristics of clan organisation may include questions of territorial control, demographic size (as it pertains to territorialised control versus dispersion), a range of contextual factors including geography and conflict legacies, as well as the personalities of the leaders[294]. Such 'organisation' is communicated through the capacity to project political authority, ability to occupy government posts and to mobilise various types of capital. As one respondent argued, consensus amongst clan custodians was crucial — 'when elders of sub-clans unite, they can serve as a pressure group and will likely get their seat (like what happened between the Habar Gedir/Ayr for the Auditor General)'[295]. Gundel (2009) explains how more fractured clans, with more *diya*–paying groups, faced greater infighting and diminished power at the national and regional levels. It also holds particular relevance for the broader debate on diaspora brokers, as greater internal cohesion may ensure that diaspora politicians serve their role as representatives.

Briefly highlighting a few key political narratives that emerged, respondents indicated how conflict legacies and internally factionalised clan structures (mutually reinforcing) within the

[294] As Ioan Lewis argues, such structures and degree of centralisation were affected by size, the structural context of opposition, the geographical location of component segments and members, the distribution and strength of leadership within the group, and the balance or lack of balance within a group (1961: 65).
[295] Interview 56, Hussein Nuur, Mogadishu, 7 December 2016.

Habar Gedir prevented them from attaining the same political power as Abgaal (both Hawiye subclans), despite their relative wealth and allocation of seats (i.e. Habar Gedir have not held the PM or Presidency since 2001)[296]. Similar arguments were presented in Somaliland for understanding how the Habar Yonis (Garhajis/Isaaq) in Somaliland lost out to Habar Jeclo within the SNM, and thereafter, despite the former's economic and political dominance within the former colonial regime[297]. Further theorising is required about the ways in which internal clan structures and conflict legacies affect the capacity of certain clans to benefit from 'diasporisation' and project power vis-à-vis the diaspora option in renegotiating existing elite pacts or power dynamics.

## 4.5 Conclusion

This chapter sought to understand how domestic actors (in particular, local subnational and national elites as well as clans) negotiate diaspora return to politics within systems of representative politics across the three cases. Within clan-based systems of proportional representation, diaspora candidates serve a particular role in intra-clan negotiations and compromise, but also feature in rent-seeking politics. This relationship is unstable given the gatekeeper paradox, misperceptions around the convertibility of international to economic capital, as well as around the illusive kickbacks that are characteristic of patron-client relationships. In terms of gatekeeper paradox, diaspora parliamentarians play a critical role as 'gatekeepers' to international resources but may be unable to unwilling to fulfill the role as representative. The greater societal and internal clan cohesion, and stronger institutionalised arrangements, that exist in Somaliland and Puntland may ensure diaspora politicians are representative and may reduce volatility. In these contexts, diaspora politicians also play a diminished role as 'gatekeepers' in the absence of recognition or access to statebuilding resources.

[296] Interviews 59 and 57, both Habar Gedir businessmen and politicians, Mogadishu, May 2017. In terms of the Hawiye, deep infighting and political grievances have meant that sub-clans are renowned for not listening to their elders, not least as their clan leaders regularly call for war (like the Habar Gedir and Murusade). Key was how they had numerous contesting warlords when Abgaal did not that spoke to internal structures of power. Abgaal is also perceived as highly centralised, whereby local elders have a lot of authority that they have mobilised to their advantage against the Habar Gedir.

[297] Interview 29, parliamentarian and political activist, Oxford, September 2017. The Habar Jeclo constitute four different clans which separated would make them a minority. This has necessitated strong unity and accounts for their alignment with Habar Awal.

By contrast, in Somalia, diaspora politicians (as MPs and cabinet representatives) contribute to greater volatility where they are critical components of political negotiations and decision-making, but as 'gatekeepers' raise anxieties about whose interests diaspora politicians serve and about illusive kickbacks. The combined effect of strong diaspora-donor partnerships and alternative new horizontal linkages (i.e. clientelistic party politics) serve to distance diaspora elite representatives from traditional patron-client relationships which may be burdensome or viewed as regressive. As the following chapter outlines in further detail, political party systems have become particular vehicles for the ambitions of diaspora politicians, particularly in Somaliland and Somalia, where local and diaspora elites at the national and subnational level compete for diaspora support and favours. Through political parties, diaspora politicians make promises of political office and, if successful, accommodate diaspora politicians to large degrees and in a way that insulates candidates from clan demands and renegotiates the terms of representative politics. Transnational election campaigns increasingly serve primarily as vehicles to court transnational rather than local interests, through highly personalised and clientelistic networks.

## Chapter 5: Diaspora-led parties, anti-party politics and the 'local' turn

Transnational political campaigns are an increasing feature of modern political competition globally, particularly in countries that have large diaspora communities (Paarlberg 2017a; Pearlman 2014). In weak states, where political parties are still largely nascent and clientelistic, diaspora are both the targets of political mobilisation — a resource to be wielded by competing clans and interest groups against competitors — but also active agents in the creation of political parties and factions. Across the Somali context, as will be discussed in further detail in this chapter, political parties and transnational political campaigns have largely become vehicles of power for ambitious diaspora politicians who seek to gain an audience from the international community, secure finance (whether abroad or domestically) and affect popular opinion. As Chapter 4 alludes, for diaspora seeking to return and engage in politics of the homeland, political parties are increasingly a preferred route to clan-based recruitment as parties can insulate diaspora returnees from high clan requests. As such, political parties have emerged in ways to rival or renegotiate the terms of representative politics vis-à-vis new horizontal linkages and alternative networks. The largely diaspora-led political parties that dominate political contestation across the Somali territories are characterised as 'clientelistic parties' that revolve around personality cults, rather than party institutions, with low levels grassroots mobilisation and high fluidity across coalitions and party lines. They also have strong orientations towards external rather than internal constituencies.

The three cases differ in the degree of formalised multi–party political competition. Puntland relaunched multi-party politics in 2017, ahead of the 2018 elections, but no one ran as part of a party. Thus, Puntland is not included in the following evidence of multi-party contests. By comparison, Somaliland's party system is more advanced as it was formed in 2003, but it is not 'strong' per se as parties remain mainly clan-based. Somalia's party system dates back to 1969 but collapsed under Barre, only to be resurrected in 2017. Opposition forces now emerge through political parties and across clan interest groups and factions, but which are still strongly tied to different groups of diaspora elites. In both Somaliland and Somalia, while both represent weak party contexts, transnational campaigns have become an important and common feature of political and financial mobilisation. Yet, the cases vary in the degree to which spoils politics shape the relationships of expectations and forms of accommodation, in addition to other constraints that exist on party behaviour, whether informal or formal. In each context, political parties and their diaspora leaders or members reported the exchange of financial support as

often contingent on promises of political office or other perks (whether land or tax exemptions). Strong demands for accommodation by diaspora whether residing inside or outside the country, as well as broader outward-facing party orientations, pose challenges for how parties seek to legitimise their power and authority within the Somali context and for how diaspora in turn seek political ascension. As the specific examples of UDUB and Kulmiye in Somaliland, and Ala Sheekh, People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Tayo in Somalia, suggest, diaspora-led or -fronted parties struggle to balance the demands from diaspora supporters for political inclusion with pressures from local constituents for representation. In addition, they were unable to build cohesive party structures or administrations of cohesion, with personnel crises at the bureaucratic and political level prominent characteristics of their parties' tenure in power.

In each case, a political backlash, in the form of a 'local' turn, emerged in response to periods of diaspora-led government. In Somalia's 'local' turn, in 2012, Hassan Sheikh and his PDP party replaced Sheikh Sharif's Ala Sheekh as the first permanent government, with Sharif having come to power under extended mandate for the internationally-brokered Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In Somaliland, in 2016, Musabixi Abdi succeeded Silanyo as a military leader and as part of a concession to the old military wing of the SNM. The argument emerging from this chapter is that the Somalia and Somaliland cases present similar, although perhaps exceptional, examples on the African continent of how diaspora return politics shape political parties, the legitimacy of institutions, and electoral outcomes. As the Somali context demonstrates, issues of 'foreignness' and bureaucratic 'representativeness' become determining factors in a ruling party's legitimacy, their policy implementation and in the political survival of key diaspora politicians in ways that may not be the case in other contexts. In addition, respondents remarked on how forms of transnational political practice (both the leadership of diaspora politicians and strategies of accommodation) undermined the legitimacy and strengthening of party systems, by both preventing forms of elite cohesion or consensus and by reinforcing the conception that parties are imposed by external actors, rather than vehicles for civic engagement and empowerment.

The first section (5.1) outlines the dimensions of weak party systems in Somalia and Somaliland within a broader history of party politics post-independence in 1960. The second section (5.2) presents strategies of accommodation as key components of diaspora-led parties, drawing on comparative examples, and as strategies that are linked to broader trends in the dissolution of diaspora-led parties and organisations. The third and fourth sections (5.3 and

5.4) examine at close-range how diaspora-led parties post-2009 respectively competed within political contests, how they legitimised their authority and how they galvanised popular support once elected. These final sections elucidate patterns in how diaspora-led parties structured their alliances, the challenges they faced to their legitimacy and authority, and how diaspora-led parties failed to repeatedly consolidate power around change narratives, nationalism or technocracy. In each cases, forms of backlash emerged that reflected old lines of political disputes but were also tied to a return to the 'local', which included traditions of consultative decision-making and debate.

### 5.1 Weak party systems in Somalia and Somaliland

In Somaliland and Somalia, reference to 'political parties' may be overstating what are better understood as 'movements' (Hyden and Bratton 1992) that still play an important role in garnering international legitimacy and visibility in the domestic audience. 'Factions' may more descriptively capture entities that are in reality 'political power bloc[s], often around particular individuals, that are not rooted in ideology, but based on differences in policy goals, interests and patronage' (Bob–Miller 2012: 120). Such factionalism is characterised by high fluidity that fluctuates between cooperative and competitive phases which often lack a comprehensive framework or ideology, and do little more than benefit autonomous social cliques or key individuals. Even more specifically, these parties may be best described as 'clientelistic parties', where their principal function is 'to coordinate the individual campaign efforts of notables, usually indirectly or loosely, for the purpose of securing power at the national level … [and are] based on hierarchical chains of interpersonal relationships, in which relatively durable patterns of loyalty are linked with the exchange of services and obligations' (Quimpo 2007: 52). Far from being stable organisations, these 'clientelistic parties' prove to be nebulous entities that can be set up, merged with others, split, resurrected, renamed, repackaged and recycled.

Such 'clientelistic parties' — rather than being associated with old guard elites or forms of neopatrimonialism — may actually be more commonly linked to a newly emerging liberal, professional, economic or oligarchic elite class that differs from those of the post-colonial era (Quimpo 2007). Rather, elites use them more explicitly for the predation of the state and its resources, each with their own geographic orientation and personalistic ally-based support.

These clientelistic parties are still characterised by traditional notions of reciprocity and patterns of exchange between individual party politicians and voters (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), but horizontal (and transnational) linkages replace vertical (and local) ones. Paarlberg (2017) argues that, for weak party systems and high spoils contexts, transnational political campaigns may often exacerbate the worst forms of networked-based and clientelistic tendencies when compared to more institutionalised and broad-based political parties that implement grassroots mobilisation (see also Pearlman 2014). This fact diminishes the authority and legitimacy of such structures by reinforcing a less transparent forms of political practice and politics of exclusion. It also increases a competing and delegitimising relationship between diaspora return and elite structures based on diaspora expectations of pork or political office in exchange for financial and political support. Such relationships undermine traditional patron-client relationships while also seemingly emboldening incumbency (see 2.3). Other factors that shape the relationships between such clientelistic parties and diaspora include past socialisation, degree of competitiveness and partisan skew (Paarlberg 2017b).

In the Somali Republic, from 1960 until 1969, relatively strong parties had formed during a brief union following the separation from British and Italian colonial rule. They were relatively strong, coherent and ideology-based parties — the rise of weak and highly-personalistic clientelistic parties associated with diaspora leadership only came later. For the political parties of the post–independence era, ideology played an important part in galvanising broad-based popular support (see Kapteijns 2013: 76). The Somali Youth League (SYL), and its nationalist momentum, formed in 1943 out of the Somali Youth Club and led the country until it was abolished in 1969 by Siad Barre. It represented almost all government personnel, entrepreneurs and skilled and quasi–skilled workers of the southern area, formerly Italian Somalia. In the first national elections after independence, held on 30 March 1964, the SYL won an absolute majority of 69 of the 123 parliamentary seats. The remaining seats were divided among 11 competing parties. Yet, by the general elections held in March 1969, a total of 64 political parties contested the elections which reflected a fracturing of political alliances into lineages and sub–lineages in the genealogical system (Samatar 1992: 71). The Somaliland National League (SNL) was notably cross-Isaaq, led by Mohamed Egal, which had high expectations of the rewards of union, but quickly felt underrepresented — achieving neither the post of president nor prime minister and only 33 out of 123 seats allocated to Somalilanders (Marchal 1996). Thus, it was the unequal representation of post-independence national parties within the unity that fomented the cause of separation.

In October 1969, after General Siad Barre seized power in a coup d'etat, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) prohibited all political parties. In 1976 the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), led by Siad Barre, became the sole legal party until his overthrow in January 1991[298]. The legacy of the SRSP instilled, particularly in Somalia, suspicion and fear of forms of hegemonic power tied to party politics. During the civil war, the nearly thirteen, largely clan-based political organisations, that emerged and divided the country were neither 'traditional' clan structures (most of them had appeared only after 1990) nor 'modern' political organisations. Largely elite in nature, despite trying to pass themselves off as 'popular organisations', they mainly formed around clan recruitment, even if various entities, including diaspora movements, claimed the legitimacy of the SYL (Kusow 1994). When compared to the parties of the independence era, these parties struggled to find coherence in their political vision and largely fell back on clan. This was especially reported in Somaliland after the inception of party politics in 2003. As one local activist in Somaliland argued, 'many diaspora started coming back in 2010, and they are the cause of weakness, political parties were stronger in 1960, but now are loose clan alliances formed around personal relationships or bargains amongst these returnees'[299].

In Somalia, the reintroduction of multiparty politics only came in 2017 — the first time Somalia began to register political parties since 1960 — but forms of party politics and transnational political campaigns (to influence election results) were emerging as early as 2009 when a flurry of diaspora–led political parties emerged to contest the parliamentary and presidential elections. In 2012, these included, notably, the Democratic Party of Somalia (headed by Maslah Siad Barre, the son of the former president, with many of its members being drawn from high-ranking officials from the Barre-era). Others, including Ha Noolaato, Tayo and Hiil Qaran[300],

[298] Greater Somalia League was a political party in Somalia. The party was led by Haaji Mahammad Husseen. It was formed by dissidents of the Somali Youth League. The party was fiercely nationalist and called for the unification of all Somali areas into one state.
[299] Interview 16, local activist, Hargeisa, 16 November 2017.
[300] Hiil–Qaran came out of a meeting held in Djibouti in December 2010, and in February 2011 was announced as a new political party in London. Seventy–five percent of the participants were from the diaspora which had no local presence and it was spearheaded by the two brother professors Ahmed Samatar of Macalester College and Abdi Samatar of the University of Minnesota.

were all created outside of Somalia, mainly in the US and UK[301], with little or no presence inside Somalia. As one commentator noted of the 'diaspora–led' political parties that boomed around the 2012 elections:

> What is consistent about all of these organisations is that they are led from the comfort of the Western world and they are spearheaded by ambitious but out of touch individuals. These individuals, while hiding behind the facade of collective leadership and responsibility, are the faces and brains of the Party and they surround themselves with many yes men who are equally as out of touch[302].

These concerns by locals that these parties were disengaged and externally oriented were also present around the 2016/2017 electoral contests. As was explained by one local activist: 'all are religious or working for foreign powers, influenced and directed by non–Somalis, and not based on any ideology'[303]. Donor requirements that all parliamentarians be part of a political party by 2018, ahead of the 2021 parliamentary and presidential elections, had only furthered this trend[304]. By November 2018, Somalia had 22 registered parties, with 19 led by diaspora politicians. Diaspora party leaders explained the rise of party politics as the only way to fight the injustice of clan politics. In their estimation political parties and modern electoral campaigns served as explicit avenues to overcome tribal politics but they also became important platforms for performing international partnerships and building alternative alliances that would support their election as they could not rely on local bases to the same extent (see Gibson et al. 2015: 5 on Afghanistan). As one diaspora leader of a political party highlighted: 'political parties are the only way to bring people together so as not to be based on regional/clan identities'[305]. Yet, locals would argue how the rise of political parties eroded the social fabric

[301] The spectacle around this party chaos received widespread criticism. As one observer reported of the Ha Noolato Party conference held in Bristol in 2010, when the then leader was asked how he would bring peace to Somalia: 'His reply was he would send an army of educated Party members to every city in Somalia and then people would hear them speak; lay down their weapons and from there a government will be formed. Clearly this is where the United Nations, European Union and African Union policy makers and negotiators have gone wrong'. Liban Obsiye, 'Diaspora political parties: Daydreaming in distant lands', 2 September 2012, available at https://smgbristol.com/2012/06/02/diaspora–political–parties–daydreaming–in–distant–lands/.
[302] Ibid.
[303] Interview 54, professor, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017.
[304] See 'Somalia formally registers first political parties in 50 years', *Goobjoog News*, 4 December 2017, accessed at http://goobjoog.com/english/somalia–formally–registers–first–political–parties–in–50–years/; 'Seven more parties get the nod to contest Somali poll', *The East African*, 27 August 2018, accessed at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/More–parties–get–the–nod–to–contest–Somali–poll/4552908–4731216–quwlw2z/index.html.
[305] Interview 29, Somali parliamentarian, Oxford, 16 May 2018.

of Somali society. This was explained in a number of ways. On the one hand, divisions of parties according to diaspora groupings, geographical factions and links to host-country government and funding opportunities obscured transparency and delegitimised the potential power of parties (Brinkerhoff 2017; Liberatore 2018: 157). On the other hand, there were other sources of concern — namely, how these parties affected a clan's position or bargaining capacity in national level politics. When too many 'one–time' candidates from the same clan contested presidential elections, or even regional elections under a party banner, it divided the clan. Where this may push for more issue-based voting, the immediate reality was diminished power in national bargaining, which would have immediate bearing on a clan's access to political power. The next section looks briefly at the diaspora-party networks and the strategies of accommodation.

### 5.2 Strategies of diaspora accommodation and fragmentation

Globally, diaspora constituencies have increasingly been courted by homeland elites through party campaigns as a way to harness external resources — and political accommodation has become a common form of in-kind repayment. This certainly occurred in Liberia around Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's successful campaign which was funded by at least $2 million in donations from the US-based Liberian diaspora and corresponded to the dominance of US–based returnees during her administration after 2005 (Gerdes 2013). In Ghana, the successes of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) — with its stronger links and ties with the diaspora during the years of opposition in the 1990s — pushed President Kufuor in 2001 to appoint predominantly diaspora as ministers and advisers during his administration between 2001–2008 (Hamidu 2015). In 2010, in Cote d'Ivoire, the controversial election of diaspora candidate Alasanne Ouattara (against incumbent Laurent Ngabo) was accompanied by the dominance of key northern diaspora figures, including Amadou Gon Coulibaly, a close adviser and senior figure in his Rally of Republicans (RDR) party, who Ouattara appointed as prime minister in 2015 (Hack–Poley 2018: 93–95). In each case, such strategies of accommodation raised concerns about how power was constructed and projected, by whom and for whose interests. In the context of Ghana, scholars highlight the importance of the moderating influence of ideology and institutional structure against the diaspora influence. Jamilla Hamidu highlights how diasporas:

> …were also cautioned by members of their parties to tread carefully by not being too forceful with their 'Western' style of communication, by which they meant (being too assertive), as that could affect their parties' campaign. Instead, they were advised to focus on the old-fashioned method of campaigning through the radio and at political rallies rather than using the internet, for example, as a means of reaching out to the electorate (2015: 149).

In the weak party Somali context, there was no moderating influence — no ideology, party organisation or common political vision — and parties became quickly beholden to their diaspora supporters and practices of accommodation. Brinkerhoff explains how such factionalisation and organisational disunity is a mainstay of diaspora political engagement that follows a predictable trend that is marked by the rise of diaspora political organisations, their dissolution, but the persistence of key individuals (2016: 96). As she contends, forming an organisation often serves an important purpose in garnering international legitimacy and galvanising domestic and transnational support but it often does not reflect internal group cohesion. She provides the example of the US-based All North American Conference on Zaire (ANACOZA) as a critical vessel for accruing wider legitimacy, and financial and political backing, which key diaspora individuals could not have commanded on their own given international hesitancy towards dealing with African 'strongmen' (2016: 94). Yet, ANACOZA ultimately could not cohere around a common political vision or strategy, instead containing a 'bewildering array of personal and professional experiences' that 'precluded any possible idea of teamwork' (Brinkerhoff 2016: 95). As Brinkerhoff (2016) suggests, 'their motivations, personal histories, and associated social networks impacted their potential efficacy as well as public orientation of their contributions', that contributed to the group's disintegration (85).

Brinkerhoff's account of the ANACOZA provides similarities for how things unfolded for the Somali Concern Group (SCG) in Somalia in terms of the group's pivotal role in leading a political transition, its absorption into subsequent administrations, and its ultimate dissolution but the continuing prominence of key individuals. In 2009, the SCG brought Sheikh Sharif back from the bush to succeed Abdullahi Yusuf (selling him to the international community as the best-placed leader to carry on the political transition), just as ANACOZA similarly brought Joseph Kabila back from the bush as Mobutu Seko Seso's successor. In both cases, these diaspora groups expected political positions for their efforts, and were included accordingly (within Kabila's 1997 cabinet and within Sharif's 2009 cabinet, respectively). Yet, in both

cases, their political authority became mired in the wrongdoings of the administration. Anne Missbach (2011) cautions against diaspora returnees assuming the responsibility of state administrations. Key members of ANACOZA were associated with plundering Congo's gold and mineral wealth and were excluded from office by 2005 (Brinkerhoff 2016: 96–97). In a similar way, SCG's affiliation with the corruption and mismanagement of Sheikh Sharif's regime tainted their political reputation, although not insurmountably. The SCG's association with pioneering diaspora influence — as the liberators of the Ethiopian-driven interim administrations — gave them forms of political immunity. Subsequent political parties and administrations in Somalia, as well as in Somaliland, would face the same struggles of having to accommodate diaspora supporters while also consolidating power that may require a broader base.

The next sections (5.3 and 5.4) scrutinise how diaspora politicians have sought to form political parties, lead transnational campaign efforts, and then to reconcile such efforts with the rules around building political alliances and representative politics in the Somalia and Somaliland contexts since 2009. This chapter looks at how diaspora politicians built alliances and projected power, and how subsequent diaspora politicians or local elites had to grapple with pioneering campaigns around galvanising change narratives and nationalism, and sought to challenge, negotiate or reinvent these narratives. Section 5.3 examines the evolution of parties, factionalisation and succession in Somaliland, followed by Section 5.4 which examines Somalia's party politics post-2009. As this chapter argues, what is exceptional to the Somali context is how diaspora become the principal targets of political mobilisation — a resource to be wielded by competing clans and interest groups against competitors — and the primary agents of their creation in ways that significantly reshaped the orientations of political power.

### 5.3 Somaliland: the SNM, Kulmiye's reinvention and Waddani's uphill battle

When President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal's United People's Democratic Party (UDUB) emerged in 2001, it was frequently seen as Somaliland's most successful party, as all clans and sub-clans had some membership (Bradbury 2008; Renders 2012). Egal had also, notably, prevented diaspora from contesting for political seats. When his successor, Dahir Riyale, rose to power in 2003, and unexpectedly held onto political power until 2010, Kulmiye, under the leadership of Ahmed Mohamed Mahmoud 'Silanyo', undertook a rapid transnational election

campaign. As a party strategy, Kulmiye had started strong at the grassroots in its first wave, but quickly became absorbed in a critical transnational political campaign, becoming known as the 'undisputed fundraising champions' (Lindley 2010: 82). Acknowledging the terms of political support and reciprocity, Silanyo set about accommodating the critical skeleton of his transnational election in the US and UK — appointing his principle party advisors, financiers and campaigners in the diaspora to political office[306]. A few represented the transnational business community, having worked for telecommunication and banking sectors (particularly Dahabshiil), but he drew almost entirely from the UK. Thirteen of the 26 cabinet posts were held by the diaspora, and all of the top portfolios went to diaspora.[307] His commitment to incorporating diaspora was evident in his campaign and post–election platforms — 'We need to move much better in the way of development, in the way of pushing democratisation forward, in the way of giving opportunity for the Somali Diaspora to invest in Somaliland and to have much more faith in the government instead of corruption'[308]. Yet, his strategy to remove the entire UDUB government and recruit only political outsiders would backfire, and within two years Silanyo was forced to make concessions to the former UDUB, particularly as the party brought critical support from the east which Silanyo was unable to secure otherwise[309]. This accommodation strategy was also meant to connect with UK lobbying networks back in the UK in hopes of acquiring recognition from the British government[310].

As one Somaliland parliamentarian indicated, 'the unfortunate thing when Kulmiye won [in 2010], was that Silanyo filled the political vacuum with his family and diaspora mobilisers — groups that were outside the party — rather than, as it should have been, from the grassroots'[311]. The perception was that Silanyo, once elected, had abandoned the real Kulmiye party that had been formed at the grassroots as early as 2005 and instead relied on the diaspora to keep him in power. In response, and following pressure from local elders and sheikhs, Silanyo reduced

[306] Interviews 1, 15, and 17, local activists and pary members, Hargeisa, November 2016 and 2017. Mohamed Abdullahi Omar was the former UK-based Kulmiye policy advisor and became Minister of Foreign Affairs; key diaspora fundraisers (Mohamoud Hashi and Huessein Dualeh, who mobilised mainly Habar Jeclo support for Kulmiye in the UK and US respectively, became Minister of Aviation and Minister of Minerals and Petroleum); Dr. Saad Ali Shire (who had worked for UK-based Dahabshiil money transfer company and was also a key advisor) became Ministry of Planning; Ahmed Adare appointed Minister of Justice was a close confidant and also UK diaspora.
[307] Records from the Academy for Peace in Hargeisa, May 2017.
[308] 'New Somaliland President Looking for Recognition and Investment', allAfrica, 3 July 2010, accessed at https://allafrica.com/stories/201007030091.html.
[309] Interview 22, chief spokesperson Waddani, 30 November 2016.
[310] Interview 13, UK political representative, Hargeisa, 30 November 2016. They thought he could facilitate dialogue with Somalia, viewing him as more pragmatic and as projecting courage.
[311] Interview 20, MP Sanaag, Hargeisa, 18 November 2016.

the ‘celebrations’ of diaspora that had accompanied his elections, and, by 2013, had closed the diaspora affairs agency within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, he had also turned inward and relied critically on brokers like Musabixi Abdi and Hersi Ali Hassan — who were notably seen as locals and indigenous, and had the reported charisma — to facilitate the local grafting[312]. Silanyo appointed Musabixi as the chairman of the party and Hersi as the Minister of Presidency. Yet, at the top, the party was largely reduced to an inner core of close confidants and family influencers — with his wife Amina Weris Sheikh Mohamed Jirde and son-in-law Bashir Ali brokering trade deals and foreign investment on the international stage (most notably, the DP World deal, where Bashir was strategically placed as the ambassador to the UAE) (ICG 2015, see Chapter 7). Having been the compromise candidate back in 1984, during the intra-SNM leadership squabble, because he was an outsider to the conflict, now as President he proved himself unable to achieve cooperation and was quickly revealed as weak and divisive. His leadership style had not changed when he was elected in 2010 as he had never actually been good at consensus-building (Renders 2012).

While the Kulmiye party survived the 2016 elections, Musabixi Abdi (the party’s then chairman in 2015) was selected as Silanyo’s successor. Musabixi Abdi was, critically, a non–diaspora candidate, a former liberation fighter (member of the *calan cas*) and had been Egal’s former Minister of Interior. Musabixi had denied Silanyo the chance to contest another election on the basis of an informal arrangement between the two candidates that had been made back in 2010. This agreement represented a larger political settlement between the different SNM factions and clans (namely, it represented the terms of an alliance between the Habar Jeclo and Habar Awal/Sacad, see Chapter 3). Within Kulmiye, and in competition with the other opposition parties (both diaspora-led), Musabixi was successfully able to depict himself as the only legitimate and formidable opposition figure. He presented himself as the corrector against Silanyo’s leadership, campaigning on territorial integrity, hardline policies towards Somalia and a return to consensual politics. In one explicit rhetorical line, he denounced the opposition harkening back to the opposition’s absence from the SNM fight — ‘We won’t accept a candidate who has never fired a gun, and is afraid to hold one’[313]. Musabixi repeatedly referenced the diaspora portfolios of both opposition political parties — For Justice and

[312] Interviews 17 and 20, two Kulmiye members, Nairobi and Hargeisa, November 2016.
[313]Twitter statement from the Kulmiye rally on 12 September 2017, see https://twitter.com/MoHussein/status/907530407771561984.

Development Party (UCID)[314] and Waddani[315] — to discredit them. These parties struggled to present policy platforms that could establish any local legitimacy, or could trump Silanyo's galvanising influence in the diaspora, and instead turned towards challenging the institutional legitimacy of the electoral process.

In the opposition, Waddani had split from UCID in 2009 over deeply personal issues among the two competing Finnish diaspora candidates (Faysal Warabi and Abdirahman Ciiro), which was also politically damaging to both parties. In addition, and critically, they divided the Garhajis (Idigale and Habar Yonis), accentuating longstanding grievances surrounding SNM legacies, but also popular suspicions of the broader commitment of the Garhajis to the national agenda following Tuur's split. It did not help that many of the party's top diaspora advisors and leaders had worked for the unity cause or represented already discredited figures from the Saudi Group[316]. The rhetoric between Kulmiye and Waddani (the main opposition contender of the two) returned to the same battlegrounds of the SNM in terms of the legitimacy of top individuals, ownership of the liberation cause and state projects, and loyalty to the national cause. In contrast to Musabixi's nationalist and local turn, Waddani's main mantra was to 'unearth SNM entrenched power', which aimed to discredit Kulmiye and Musabixi on the lines that they were symbolic of a return to Siad Barre authoritarianism and securitised governance[317].

Waddani faced an uphill battle — suffering the financial malaise of being an opposition party in Africa and not having access to state coffers, and struggling to trump Kulmiye's pioneering mobilisation among the diaspora. As party members reported, Waddani overestimated the extent to which the diaspora would be easily swayed by the new 'reformers'. This became evident in how the Habar Jeclo still voted for Kulmiye, even though they had lost the

[314] Led by Faisal Ali 'Waraabe, Faisal was a 'Diaspora Somalilander' from Finland, who had also worked as an engineer and became vice-mayor of Mogadishu.
[315] Waddani was led by Abdirahman Irro (also a Finnish diaspora), and Waddani also reproduced certain social and occupational networks. For instance, in Somaliland's ruling Kulmiye party, the bond between President Musabixi and his deputy chairman, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Kahin, dated back to Sheekh and the SNM. Even before joining the SNM they had both trained in military service in the USSR. Waddani also mobilised around diaspora but perhaps more importantly USSR networks, with Abdirahman Irro and Mohamed Haji Ali Abdi, as consular and ambassador, and Abdiqadir Jirde, military attache to Moscow. Faysal Warabe had also been an Engineer in Moscow at the same time.
[316] The defection of the first president Abdirahman Tuur to the unity cause had tainted popular opinion about their commitment as a clan even though they had constituted the largest contingent of liberation fighters during the SNM fight.
[317] Interviews 17 and 20, Kulmiye party members and local activists, November 2016 and 2017.

presidency[318]. As Waddani party leaders recount, to their disappointment, the Somaliland diaspora proved to be less risk-takers and more supportive of the Kulmiye incumbents, who had the state resources but also the monopoly on nationalism[319]. Kulmiye had another strong advantage — Egal was from Berbera, his powerbase was Sacad Muse and Musabixi had inherited this politically and economically powerful base[320]. In the second component of his comment, the party leader was referring to how difficult it was for Waddani to reuse the nationalistic and galvanising rhetoric that Kulmiye had capitalised on. As one Waddani party officials described:

> we had to follow where Kulmiye left off, mobilising and fund–raising in the diaspora, and we no longer benefited directly from the nationalism which galvanised unprecedented numbers of cross-clan support. In its absence we have had to fall back more on clan, that is the reality.[321]

Waddani even reused Kulmiye's mobilisation speeches, 'You women used to sell your gold and assets for Kulmiye, we need you to do the same'[322]. Nonetheless, Waddani faced both watered-down national momentum and diaspora fatigue, even where they expanded the transnational election campaign to new diaspora constituencies outside of the UK where Kulmiye had not spent much time (including Norway, Sweden and Canada). As they described, they also struggled with certain features of clan politics — namely that the Garhajis were also less organised than the Habar Jeclo which worked against Waddani (see Chapter 4). The Chair of Waddani explained their electoral strategy towards the diaspora as driven by three components: 1) the financial need to offset Kulmiye's access to state resources and financial support from the big companies (including Dahabshiil, Omar Company, Maydi); 2) discursive support to lobby the international community; and 3) technical support whereby diaspora would serve as observers and political party agents during the elections[323]. Waddani's political machine included certain performative elements that included employing a 'roaming' diaspora

[318] Interview 23, chief spokesperson of Waddani, Hargeisa, 30 October 2017.
[319] Ibid.
[320] Interview 20, MP Ibrahim Jama, Hargeisa, 18 November 2016.
[321] Interview 23, chief spokesperson of Waddani, Hargeisa, 30 October 2017.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Interviews 23 and 19, chief spokesperson of Waddani and political advisor, Hargeisa, 30 October 2017. They viewed their financial support coming from Indhadeero, Dahabshiil, and Mohamed aw Said, claiming to have less big business support (Mohamed Said allegedly proved quite effective at buying off MPs for Kulmiye). Waddani struggled to galvanise financial support from the business community that indicated the highly factional lines that existed among the top diaspora leadership (from the SNM to recent).

unit and diaspora as political party agents where diaspora returned on their own dime to support the party activities[324].

In direct confrontation with Waddan's transnational focus and even Silanyo's campaign in 2010, Musabixi did not engage in any formal transnational campaigning, in line with his conscious 'local' turn. This was evidenced clearly by public press releases and how the party spokesman briefed the international electoral observers by repeatedly telling them, 'I don't speak English well. Somali is the language of our party unlike the others'. The party made it clear that international actors were not the principal constituency of the party. Yet, active campaigning was also not required of the incumbents to the same extent. The choice to not engage the diaspora was not a privilege that could be appreciated by the opposition. Nonetheless, Waddani's obsession with outdoing Kulmiye on the international stage had also clearly diminished their attention in garnering the local vote. As one local activist reported, they did not deal with each group separately on the basis of different interests as Kulmiye had in 2012 – i.e. they did not engage with business, religious and traditional elders separately[325]. As a former Kulmiye party loyalist, turned Waddani supporter before defecting, suggests — 'The important steps of grassroots mobilisation were all lost under Waddani, everything was turned upside down and clan became the default but losing tactic in the absence of others. Waddani failed to follow traditional channels, didn't put in the effort, should have done better, but the issue was one of ownership, owning rather than leading the party'[326]. Cirro was criticised for always 'surrounding himself with too many photographers, [being] all about the public image'[327].

Rather, Waddani made widespread promises of positions to diaspora supporters if they won and pre-emptively 'appointed secretaries of everything within the party'. This policy had implications for party coherence and legitimacy — the two primary factions was a group of the old *mancasir* (or Saudi Group, who had, by election day, given their tentative support to Waddani, see Chapter 7) and Kulmiye party defectors. Many powerful MPs and cabinet members that stuck their neck out within their clan and joined in 2015, had all rescinded party

[324] Political party agents were mobilised in 2010 to check the government from rigging. In the past parties typically employed university students (can get expensive for 100 dollars a day for 2000). This way diaspora can engage politically and give back a bit, they can contribute and not be bribed, but diaspora often expect something in return. Interview, Ismail Bubba, Hargeisa, September 2016.
[325] Interview 16 and 21, parliamentarians and local activists, November 2017.
[326] Interview 21, MP Ibrahim Jama, Hargeisa, 5 November 2017.
[327] Interview 16, local activist, 15 November 2016.

membership by early 2017[328]. By election time, as one parliamentarian argued, 'loyalty in Waddani was fluid and highly personal, in it to win it, with an unprecedented aversion to concession'[329]. By the elections, Waddani had largely fractured. This was evident when the Kulmiye defectors (known as the 'Nuulstanbeyd') made announcements on behalf of the party which often contradicted statements coming from the top leadership[330]. When the party pre-emptively claimed widespread rigging and electoral malfeasance, challenging the legitimacy of the electoral commission in the month before the election, no one claimed responsibility[331]. Top party leaders blamed diaspora political pressure from abroad as 'being seemingly unfamiliar with the political arrangements in place or electoral procedures'[332]. Others indicated, however, that it was top diaspora officials in the party leadership who were to blame and that critical figures like Ismail Bubba had first suggested brinkmanship party rhetoric — 'we have to win these elections and if [it] doesn't happen, we need to do something about it'[333]. The NEC also blamed diaspora members within Waddani for bringing the country to the brink at key points ahead of the election[334].

Such direct threats to peace were unprecedented and were attributed to the recklessness of these diaspora who saw these parties as vehicles for power which they could also quickly abandon. Back in 2003, Silanyo had lost by 80 votes to Dahir Riyale but had peacefully conceded defeat in line with the peace compact[335]. The electoral stakes had increased pushed diaspora opposition figures towards more hardline, uncompromising and sensationalist claims that were tailored for international audiences but which had local implications. Ultimately, it was the interventions from this class of politicians' teachers (from the schools that all of these politicians had attended together) that de-escalated party rhetoric and pushed both sides to reconfirm commitment to peace and stability (also see Phillips 2016 on political elite formation

[328] Interviews 95 and 94, Norway diaspora community, Oslo, May 2017. See Claire Elder, 'Somaliland after the elections: old traps, new challenges', *The Conversation*, 4 December 2017, available at https://theconversation.com/somaliland–after–the–elections–old–traps–new–challenges–87871.
[329] Interview 28, Bihi Egeh, Hargeisa, 22 November 2016.
[330] Direct observation of elections, Hargeisa, October and November 2017.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Interviews 22 and 17, Waddani spokesperson and party member, Hargeisa, October 2017. This was confirmed by a statement from NEC: 'NEC also voiced equal concern about the diaspora members of the political parties who they believe come to the country with more clannish attitudes and extreme views'. (Adan Omar, NEC, 13 October 2017).
[333] Interview 19, Ismail Bubba, Nairobi, 5 November 2017.
[334] Informal discussion with NEC commissioner, Hargeisa, November 2017.
[335] Interview, Kalton Hassan, Nairobi, February 2017. See also, Paul Schemm, 'Somaliland votes next week. Its biggest challenges come after the election', *Washington Post*, 10 November 2017, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey–cage/wp/2017/11/10/somalilands–presidential–elections–take–place–oct–13–after–many–delays/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.70dd90ef0f3f.

and the Amoud and Sheekh schools)[336]. As one local activist indicated, Waddani had miscalculated popular opinion and had overplayed its hand — 'Waddani saw internationals as allies, and Kulmiye clearly saw internationals as opposition constituency, and it worked to Kulmiye's advantage because they had gone with popular opinion that had also turned on the international community'[337]. By challenging the impartiality of the electoral commission, Waddani was calling explicitly for international intervention at a time when the population at large was fatigued by Western demands. Popular concerns were also raised about why Waddani was 'airing our dirty laundry, when we prefer to handle things internally'[338].

Even the UK representative confirmed that Waddani was 'definitely hedging its bets and got it wrong … the system is very limited, process simpler and easier to manage, and they overplayed their hand here'[339]. Yet, they also lauded Waddani for their anti-corruption platform, for being more focused on debate, consensus and manifesto, for being transparent with greater party coherence, and for having consistent confidence in the institutions. By contrast, Kulmiye was seen as more centrist[340]. In this way, Waddani's political campaign had effectively performed certain relationships, rhetoric and policy agendas well for an international audience. Ultimately, Waddani's loss also represented the referendum on diaspora leaders made in 1991 and the entrenchment of SNM authority structures — 'It is still alarming that people of the SNM are the ones still running the country, and that the SNM is still a ticket to political legitimacy'[341].

Unlike Waddani, Musabixi did not promise any positions throughout his campaign which allowed him to establish more internal consensus within his party and administration upon his election[342]. As one interviewee indicated, 'when Musabixi was elected under Kulmiye in 2017 there was a deal made within the party and with the people — in the first Kulmiye, 70 percent

[336] Direct observation of elections, Hargeisa, October and November 2017.
[337] Interview 16, local activist Bubbe, 15 November 2017.
[338] Interview 21, MP Sanaag, Hargeisa, 5 November 2016. See also 'Waddani presidential candidate merges own clan strategies to superficial national vision prophesying doom if he fails', *Somaliland Press*, 23 September 2017, available at http://www.somalilandpress.com/waddani–presidential–candidate–merges–own–clan–strategies–to–superficial–national–vision–prophesying–doom–if–he–fails/. Interviews, local activist and civil servant, Hargeisa, May 2017. See also, 'Somaliland's new president has work to do', *Daily Maverick*, 10 January 2018, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018–01–10–iss–today–somalilands–new–president–has–work–to–do/.
[339] Interview 14, UK representative, Hargeisa, 15 November 2017.
[340] Ibid.
[341] Interview 17, Kalton Hassan, diaspora and former IFC employee, Hargeisa, 15 November 2017.
[342] Interview 25, Professor Samatar, Hargeisa, 30 October 2017.

of first appointments were diaspora, and we understand the implications of this, so we agreed that 80 percent will be local contributions. Need to be accountable to voters, not to the diaspora'[343]. Nonetheless, diaspora politicians still flocked around Musabixi in order to provide policy advice, especially as his administration would carry through important political and economic trade arrangements. In a notable example, Professor Ahmed Samatar became Musabixi's chief political advisor, before he resigned, citing an irreconcilable clash in views and agendas and a frustration with the rate of politics. Musabixi would face significant legitimacy challenges from other forms of diaspora authority that challenged him for being militarily minded, antagonistic and committed to a regressive form of conciliatory politics[344]. This included through the emergence of the *Madasha* political platform (that included key members of the *manacasir*, as remnant Saudi Group and SNM founders, and former members of Horyaal party defeated in 2005) as well as Abdulkadir Jirde's conflict initiative[345].

Even before the elections, the *Madasha* platform criticised Kulmiye's national commitment, called them the 'engineers of corruption', proponents of self–sufficiency and accused of them of being against international aid, and stressed the importance of discussion and open debate as foundational elements of the SNM that should be carried forward[346]. Thus, in the case of the *Madasha,* it was heavily nostalgic of democratic progress under the SNM and demarcated the enduring lines of competition amongst different diaspora groupings vis-à-vis recognition and ownership. Around the 2017 elections, it was the role of the business community and the politicians' teachers that stepped in and prevented what many saw as the end of the peace compact. Thus, for Somaliland, it was broader institutional and traditional structures that brought elites back from the brink and held firm the elite pact. In Somalia, after 2009, the trajectory was very different — elites similarly became beholden to and dependent on different diaspora groupings for accommodation, ideological platforms and financial resources, but party politics were characterised by higher volatility and fragmentation where there were no trusted institutions to check the power of elites. Yet, similar issues emerged as diaspora leaders sought to balance the external demands (including from competing diaspora interests) and the interests of local factions. Despite the fluidity and messiness of Somali politics, the diaspora

[343] Ibid.
[344] Interviews 1 and 6, Mohamed Hashi Elmi and Adan Abokor, November 2016 and 2017.
[345] Interviews 6 and 7, members of Madasha, Hargeisa, June 2017. Although the *Madasha* would tentatively support Waddani in 2016, they had withdrawn support after Abdirahman Cirro was appointed as Waddani's chairman and presidential hopeful in 2016.
[346] Ibid.

question similarly defined features of political party platforms and mobilised strategies that informed electoral outcomes.

### 5.4 Somalia: contesting diaspora groupings, struggles to accommodate and backlash

Contemporary political analysis of Somali political competition and factionalisation has largely interpreted current political divides and competition in terms of bitter power struggles between political elites, clan units and Islamic interest groups in Somalia (Menkhaus 2009; ICG 2015; Ingiriis 2016). Thus, the transition from the Ala-Sheikh regime (2009–2012, under Sheikh Sharif) to Damul Jadiid (2012–2017, under Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud) has largely been presented as a clash between Sufi and Al Islah interests respectively. Yet, as this section demonstrates, at the heart of political competition between these primary factions surrounding the 2012 and 2016 electoral processes, were also questions about shifting sovereignty structures, how to reconstruct state and elite power and which type of leader was best placed to restore peace, stability and security. In many ways, the political conflicts and succession questions that emerged were less about clan politics than about groups of local and diaspora elites defining the terms of recognition, political reconciliation and the consolidation of political power. Since the 2000 Arta process, a prevailing concern within the Somali consciousness and political life has been the legitimacy of diaspora politicians to preside over political reconciliation and the state, given the requirements for local knowledge and loyalty (Menkhaus 2014a). The 2004 Mbagathi process had explicitly sidelined diaspora leaders from contesting but, by 2009, key diaspora influencers claimed responsibility and authority for the 2009 brokered extension to the transitional mandate (see 3.3.3).

Sheikh Sharif rose to power as chairman of the Islamic Courts Union in 2003 with strong support from both cross-clan, business and Islamic elements (Barnes and Hassan 2007). The Somali Concern Group (SCG), as part of the ARS, claimed responsibility for his political ascension to the presidency in 2009 and made certain demands for being accommodated (see 3.3.3). As a result, once placed at the helm of the TFG under an extended mandate in 2009, Sharif set about accommodating key members of the SCG as advisors and ministers (see also Menkhaus 2008)[347]. As one member of the SCG recounted of the motivations for his return, ‘None of us requested this job … We were drafted. The prime minister asked us to serve. We

[347] Interviews 59 and 61, former SCG members, Mogadishu, May and September 2017.

were not doing it for the glamour of the job'[348]. Yet, others detailed how they expected accommodation in exchange for their support, saw themselves as political guarantors of the newly-brokered agreement, and thought that they should be part of any implementation. Sharif, like subsequent leaders, was weak in the face of broader policy agendas around the diaspora option that included their own desires to return and be part of the state reconstruction process. He would describe his own weakness at the time: that he could not speak English or prevent new strategies towards political reconciliation that would never work to fight terrorism[349]. He had sought to sideline former USC members and Al Islah groups and replaced key strongmen with weaker diaspora politicians that still satisfied the quota — this was a strategy that would be routinely utilised by subsequent administrations as a perversion of traditional selection procedures[350].

As Ladan Affi highlights, in 2008, 70 percent of government ministers (including the prime minister) were from western countries, but by 2010 this was 90 percent. By 2012, all the TFG ministers were from the diaspora (including in senior level civil service positions as well as in embassies and consulates) (2012: 65). His allure as a coalition-builder lost its lustre quickly, and he was criticised for a focus on harnessing foreign aid rather than restoring security, which gave him the nickname of 'diaspora Sharif' or 'first class Sharif' (Menkhaus 2008). Importantly, it was not just the return of SCG, but other diaspora groupings that had also quickly returned and overwhelmed his administration. Most notable amongst them was an intellectual movement, formed loosely in the US, Canada and Qatar, which was spearheaded by Professor Afyare Elmi (Hawadle) and Abdullahi Bariise (Mururšade-HSE) (both in Qatar), together with others in Somalia (including former minister Abdirahman Hashi, current director of HIPS, Leelkase) under the umbrella Ala Sheikh[351].

Their US-branch became known as the Gurmaad movement, that had emerged out of Israaca and Ergo (3.3.3) and claimed the selection of Farmajo and Gaas as PMs in 2010 and 2011

[348] Quote be Abdirashid Hashi, now head of HIPs, see at 'Somali Canadian helps to rebuild besieged nation', *The Globe and Mail*, 22 May 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/somali–canadian–helps–to–rebuild–besieged–nation/article580641/.
[349] Interview 52, Sheikh Sharif, Mogadishu, 10 September 2017.
[350] Similarly, Sharif's administration excluded members of the Islah movement who had been sidelined during the Mbgathi peace conference and expelled during the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union from 2003 until 2007 (Menkhaus 2008).
[351] See 'Response to Monitoring Group Allegations', *HIPS*, July 2013.

respectively[352]. Key officials of Gurmaad included Abukar Arman (Banadiri, would become Sheikh Sharif's envoy to the US), Abukar Ballo (Hawadle/Adan Warsame, who had also been the chairman of Isaraaca), Abdi Omar and Abdinasir Nuur (both Hawadle), and Abdi Aynte (Murorsade), among others. Like the SCG, this group represented primarily interests of a cross-Hawiye coalition, motivated by a desire to challenge the system of divisive politics and renegotiate the dominant clan alliances governing politics. They came to define key legitimising ideological support for Sheikh Sharif, under Ala Sheekh, but then later would also constitute the most virulent opposition forces (in a heavily factionalised form)[353]. Deep divisions emerged quickly within Sharif's administration, including over the role and value of 'technocrats'. The intellectual branch of Ala Sheikh was reportedly concerned about the self-serving attitude of these technocrats (i.e. Farmajo and Gaas) as undermining a broader political vision for 'expanding intellectuals' presence in the political and international arena that should come about when the government is less corrupt and risky[354].

Immediately following the election of Gaas as PM in 2009, a debate was sparked about whether Somalia could have a 'technocratic politician' in the top PM or President posts. The perception was that a technocrat could be a minister, or even a regional president, but that appointing a technocrat as PM or president was risky given that those positions' primary role—and particularly that of the PM—as mediator between clans and as political broker between the state and clans[355]. Increasing infighting within Ala Sheikh aligned with rising pressures from the international community to be more responsive to security and local issues (Menkhaus 2012) that motivated Sheikh Sharif to sideline key diaspora influencers[356]. This included replacing Abukar Arman (then Somali envoy to the US) and Abdirashid Hashi (Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction) in 2011. Key members of the SCG (mainly Habar Gedir)

[352] See also 'Gurmad Political Agenda For 2016 Road Map', Qaranimo, 17 September 2015, accessed at http://www.qaranimo.com/2015/09/17/gurmad–political–agenda–for–2016–roadmap/.
[353] These included the former interior minister Sheikh Abdulqadir Saleeban, as well as Sheikh Mohamed Macalin and Sheikh Yousuf Caynte (the father of Abdi Aynte, spiritual leader, not political), and the intellectuals Afyare Elmi (Hawadle, Qatar University) and Abdullahi Bariise (Murusade-USE).
[354] Interviews 50 and 7, diaspora and political activists, 7 and 15 December 2016. In an example of this, Abdi Aynte was offered the position of Ambassador to the UK but declined and accepted a job with the UN in Palestine.
[355] Interviews 50 and 7, diaspora and political activists, 7 and 15 December 2016.
[356] Ibid.

were also rotated out, with concessions made to Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ)[357]. By the 2012 elections, locals characterised Ala Sheikh as lacking coherence or transparency:

> They had developed this attitude of speaking for everyone and against everyone which makes people suspicious. I would very much like to know who exactly they represent. Somalia is a clan state and having this secret group spoils the clan balance which is a dangerous development and threatens to restart the old clan hostilities and conflicts[358].

Nonetheless, Ala Sheikh remained important pioneers of diaspora consciousness and state reconstitution. In terms of the latter, Ala Sheikh captured critical economic, cultural and political authority — taking over universities, media outlets, control of institutions and hearts and minds — and, importantly, secured important representation in parliament. Around the 2012 elections, two powerful factions emerged out of Ala Sheikh's ashes — the Daljir Party[359] and Gurmaad — that constituted important factions within parliament and public discourse. Around 2012, Sheikh Sharif lost both international and diaspora support. Farmajo (a registered Republican in the US) also ran for president in 2012, having established a new political party with his former cabinet members when he was Prime Minister from 2009 until 2011, called Tayo. Tayo means 'quality' in Somali. Yet, he won barely 5 percent of the vote. Instead, Hassan Sheikh unexpectedly won largely as a protest vote against Sharif's tenure and what were seen as the wrongdoings 'of ambitious diaspora politicians'[360]. It symbolised a 'local' turn that was less a reflection of popular opinion and more that of prevailing interest groups within parliament at the time.

Hassan Sheikh was, however, a political outsider. He was not from the diaspora and had stayed in the country throughout the conflict, working as an academic and civil society activist[361]. He

[357] Interview 54, professor, Mogadishu, 18 May 2017. Notable among his chief allies were Abdulqadir Ali Omar (Habar Gedir, former deputy chairman of the ICU) and Sheikh Yusuf Ali Aynte (moderate cleric, father of Abdirahman Aynte, current Minister of Planning, Hawiye/Moursade). Even his former close allies from his time as president – including former Minister of Information, and current Ambassador to Saudi, Dahir Mogamed Geele—who belonged to the President's Abgaal/Waesli sub-clan—supported Hassan Sheikh's Damul Jadid party.
[358] Interview 63, diaspora parliamentarian, 7 September 2017.
[359] Their leader is Hassan Moallim Mohamud, current MP and former State Minister of the Office of the President Sheikh Sharif in 2009 and 2010. Includes key actors like the director of the National Security and Intelligence Agency (Ahmed Moallim Fiqi) and senator Ahmed Bukare, who sought to bring in a new candidate in former Prime Minister Farmajo (Darood/Marehan, although his wife is Hawiye/Moursade).
[360] Interviews 80, director of think tank, Mogadishu, 17 November 2017.
[361] 'New president, new laws and old enemies', *Africa Confidential*, 21 September 2012. Having worked as a consultant for DFID, he was also able to draw on diplomatic links with the UK that at least initially garnered him personal legitimacy.

reportedly turned to politics after years of 'frustratingly trying to shift the mind-set of Somalia's politicians'[362]. He was vocal for having found Farmajo's populist rhetoric as PM from 2010-2011 'nauseating and disingenuous'.[363] His political party, People's Democratic Party (PDP), was based on grassroots mobilisation rather than outward-facing courting of international opinion[364]. Thus, the strategies behind PDP were notably at odds with the tactics employed by other parties during this time — including: Hiil Qaran led by Professor Samatar; Gurmad Qaran led by Tarzan Nuur, former Mayor and member of the SCG; and Madasha led by former PM Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed from Canada. As a parliamentarian and former PDP member argued, 'within the PDP platform, Hassan Sheikh lobbied for enough is enough, many people were outside the system at this time and he lobbied for them'[365]. As she details, the PDP was 'not a platform for diasporic politicians to lobby diaspora communities and the international community, it was rooted through a membership scheme and through local campaigning'[366].

Upon his election he was lauded as the head of a 'constructive elite' coalition (one that built universities, hospitals, charities and businesses in the country during the long civil war) and which defeated a 'parasitic elite coalition' of 'warlords and moneylords'[367]. As one local activist indicated, 'he won because the people hated diaspora like they do now [referencing Farmajo's administration in 2017]'[368]. Yet, he also abandoned his party politics given the reality of poor party institutionalisation and popular fears of forms of hegemonic power – that any inkling of party expansion over power would be construed as clan authoritarian expansionism (associated with Barre's tenure). As one former member and parliamentarian explains, Hassan Sheikh was very clear to us within PDP — 'the country is not my political party, we would take our share but can't give all positions to PDP, the opposition also has a right, but this pissed off a lot of PDP members'[369]. Rather, his aim was to build a close-knit and loyal administration of carefully vetted cabinet ministers — technocrats from the diaspora would be permitted (particularly from the UK with which he championed stronger relationships) but at a lower rate. In addition, diaspora were notoriously not engaged to the

[362] Interview 76, head of the diaspora affairs agency, Mogadishu, 9 September 2017.
[363] Interview 59, Swedish diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.
[364] Interview 68, MP and former PDP member, 9 December 2016.
[365] Ibid.
[366] Ibid.
[367] Ken Menkhaus, 'The Somali Spring: Is the poster child of failed states finally getting its act together?', *Foreign Policy blog*, 24 September 2012.
[368] Interview 55, professor, Mogadishu, 7 September 2017.
[369] Interview 68, MP and former PDP member, 9 December 2016.

same degree in political and policy decisions (but their economic investment and skills would be supported in other ways).

Instead, his administration was largely a nod to important and powerful brokers as part of a critical strategy around inclusivity and state reconstruction. His pledge for 'autochthony' was reinforced by selecting Abdi Farah Shirdon 'Said' as his first Prime Minister — a Somali businessman, economist and activist educated in Somalia — although this was a controversial decision given that Shirdon was seen as a beneficiary from Siad Barre's patronage. His 'local' agenda was risky as it included political concessions to Al–Islah[370] elements (having been dean of Simad University) and dominant business interests (including Habar Gedir[371]) in finance, telecommunications and extractives. His administration was quickly discredited on the grounds of spearheading Islamist interests. It was known as Damul Jadid (new blood), which refers to a breakaway group from the larger Islamic network of businesspeople and civic leaders known as Al-Islah, and later '*gabyo*' (translated as unfinished business)[372]. This narrative was formed first and foremost amongst his chief critics from the diaspora within parliament and those who had been excluded, but which had an almost immediate effect of discrediting Hassan Sheikh, his administration and his progress towards reform agendas[373]. As one businessman argued:

> Hassan Sheikh had set the best steps to control contracting and revenue collection, he was a good partner for the international community, but the Diaspora jointly began to criticise him, and they were mostly false accusations to get new Diaspora group in power.[374]

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[370] This was a dissident faction of al–Islah which joined the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. See also 'Dissension in the Al Islah group', *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 26 April 2013, reprinted on http://www.biyokulule.com/view_content.php?articleid=5953.

[371] These included Ahmed Adan Fiqi, Mahad Salad, Abshir Bukhaari, and Abdirahman Odowa among others.

[372] Abdirizak Omar is a founding member of *Damul Jadiid* and the Manager of the Somali Institute of Management and Administration (Simad University), which was set up by Hassan Sheikh in the late 1990s. See 'Hassan Sheikh keeps it in the family', *Africa Confidential* 53 (23), 16 November 2012. It also includes: Farah Sheikh Abdiqadir Mohamed (Justice; Hawiye/ Reer Aw Hassan); Abdikarim Hussein Guled (Interior and Federal Affairs; Hawiye/Habr Gidir/Saad); Hussein Abdi Halane (Finance; Darod/Ogaden); Abdullahi Mohamed Ali 'Sanbalolshe' (Internal Security; Hawiye/Hawadle); Abdullahi Abyan Nur (Justice and Religious Affairs Minister, Dir/Bimal), who worked with Islamic charities in the 1990s and was also a founding member of SIMAD. See also, 'Hassan Sheikh keeps it in the family', Africa Confidential, 16 November 2012.

[373] See IFC 2017 internal report, *Somali's business elites*. His strategic alliances with Minister of Finance Mohamed Adan Ibrahim 'Farketi', Minister of Internal Security (Hawadle/Hawiye) Abdirisak Omar, Mohamed 'Odawa', Minister of Interior and Federal Affairs Abdirahman Mohamed Husen, and key Habar Gedir figures (who have strong links to the finance and telecommunications sectors in Mogadishu) —former Minister of Interior and Security Abdikarim Guled (now President of Galmudug State) and former Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir—won him the election.

[374] Interview 79, contractor and businessman, 15 September 2017.

Importantly, these influencers included Ala Sheikh factions who had been able to push through a limited power–sharing arrangement[375], but who now resided in the opposition and in parliament, and who had a loud voice and easily swayed international opinion against HSM's regime[376]. They launched a social media campaign against Hassan Sheikh on the basis of his corruption and nepotism. In a last-ditch effort to secure his re-election, Hassan Sheikh, with Hassan Khayre as his chief campaign manager or 'chief trouble-shooter', tried to get rid of the oppositional MPs with a new group of diaspora who he thought he could control through clientelistic networks, but which would ultimately benefit Farmajo. Of the 92 who wanted to impeach him, fewer than 10 were re–elected, but many of these new elects were from the diaspora who had already turned against Hassan Sheikh, and his patronage was not enough to buy their loyalty[377]. As one respondent reported, 'Hassan Sheikh tried to own these people and that was a mistake'[378].

In contrast to HSM's campaign strategy, ahead of the 2016 elections, Farmajo positioned himself well, having undertaken a comprehensive campaign and building on some of his party's groundwork around the 2012 elections. He made trips to Somali communities around the world throughout 2015 and 2016 — including Minneapolis and Columbus in the US and Oslo in Norway, which all contributed handsomely[379]. As one Tayo member indicated, they had registered 700,000 members before the election (including in Hargeisa and Djibouti) which was unprecedented and the party had placed particular emphasis on garnering support from minority clans, youth and women [380]. Other elements included Farmajo's reliance on a strong social media campaign. Known as the 'Government of Facebook', he used around 500 Twitter/Facebook accounts to disseminate his campaign agenda rather than going on national

[375] A caucus (*kutala*) emerged in Parliament in February 2015 that resulted in the integration of Jazeera journalist Abdirahman Yusuf Ali Aynte (aka Abdi Aynte; Hawiye/Murasade) at Planning and International Cooperation, and Ahmed Hassan Gabobe (Dir/Gadsan), who was also part of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 and later the Alliance for the Re–liberation of Somalia in Asmara. 'New Political Party Formed to Counter Sharif', *Somalia Report*, February 2012. Other key figures within this movement at this point to counter Sheikh Sharif included Hassan Moallin Mohamud Sheikh Ali (Moursade, MP), former Minister of Defence Abdi Mohamed Abdtidoon and former Religion Minister, Mohmaed Abdi Ibrahim Garweyne.
[376] Interviews 73 and 79, former statesmen, contractor and businessman, 15 September 2017. In one account, a parliamentarian explains how ahead of the 2016 elections even Hassan Sheikh's own private security personnel were actively campaigning against him and for Farmajo. Interview 29, parliamentarian, Oxford, 15 May 2018,
[377] Interviews 29 and 68, parliamentarians, Mogadishu, September 2017.
[378] Interview 29, parliamentarian, Mogadishu, September 2017.
[379] Taylor Gee, 'How an American Bureaucrat Became President of Somalia', *Politico*, 19 February 2017, available at https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/how–an–american–bureaucrat–became–president–of–somalia–214798.
[380] Interview 68, parliamentarian, Mogadishu, 6 December 2016.

radio[381]. At the local level, it was less comprehensive: Tayo was criticised for mobilising principally amongst internally–displaced persons (IDPs) through payments of 5 to 10 dollars to publicly demonstrate in favour of Farmajo[382]. Farmajo had also certainly benefited from general resistance against an Abgaal being elected for the third time as president — 'No More Abgaal' — but he also had an 'era of unity' discourse/party platform that proved particularly effective[383]. A small group of Daljir also defected from Sharif the night before the election when it was clear that Sharif 'had nothing, no chance at winning, and didn't have the votes', which changed the wave of opinion within parliament[384].

When in office, and in line with the strategies pursued by Hassan Sheikh towards PDP, Farmajo did not rely solely on Tayo party constituents, or adhere to any informal promises to other parties. He drew on close loyal confidants[385] from when he was PM, mainly US and Canadian diaspora (see Chapter 7) — 17 of 27 of initial appointments were diaspora, and this increased through subsequent reshuffles[386]. There were, however, reported conflicts between Western diaspora and political entrepreneurs from the East. As one respondent reported, 'there was a fight emerging between the Western and Eastern diaspora, where Fahad Yassin from Qatar [the President's Chief of Staff] did not trust the Western diaspora close to Farmajo and pushed many into far-flung ambassadorships or politically irrelevant or weak positions'[387]. For Yassin, it was a matter of managing loyalty and brokerage, drawing carefully from Western diaspora that only came from minority clans and thus could be managed while checking the system of dominant politics in line with the clan quota (4.4). These included a group of diaspora 'technocrats' and party loyalists[388] carried over from previous administrations who could prove to the administration that they staunchly opposed Hassan Sheikh. There was no strategy — only flattery and performance of loyalties.

[381] Interviews 54 and 77, professor and political analyst, Mogadishu and Nairobi, September 2017.
[382] Interview 77, former ICG political analyst, Mogadishu, September 2017. He reportedly 'gave IDPs 5 to 10 dollars to come out and demonstrate in favour of Farmajo, changed public opinion and potential spoilers, it was a social movement'. Estimates are that many of first round supporters were mainly youth and women in parliament.
[383] Interview 71, diaspora businessman and political activist Mogadishu, 15 May 2017.
[384] Interviews 29 and 68, parliamentarians, Mogadishu, September 2017.
[385] Tayo was seen as a coalition of ex–ministers from the Farmajo cabinet that included Abdi Hosh and Maryan Qasim as old Ala Sheikh figures. An argument was also made that there was no one Ala Sheikh candidate on the level of Khaire.
[386] Interviews 69 and 76, minister and parliamentarian, Mogadishu, September 2017.
[387] Interview 54, professor, Mogadishu, 7 September 2017.
[388] Interview 65, Tarzan Nuur, Mogadishu, 19 May 2017. As Tarzan Nuur contended, 'when I contested for an MP seat this time around, I refused to pay and got 2 of the 51 delegate votes, and Hassan Sheikh had made sure I was left out … Hassan Sheikh stopped me from being an MP as I was very vocal against him from the beginning. He bribed Ugaas/manipulated with $100,000 to write a letter that I could not compete for that clan'.

These cabinet appointments included older diaspora who had been vocal opponents of HSM, including Tarzan and Yarisow who were previously allied with President Sheikh Sharif. His cabinet amalgamated different interest groups, like Waddani's coalition ahead of the 2017 elections in Somaliland. They represented strong personalities, conceptions and platforms for seeking recognition, but lacked internal cohesion — emblematic of political parties founded on diaspora brokers — where the incentives for cooperation never seemed to improve[389]. For instance, some of Farmajo's harshest criticism came from within his own US Gurmaad constituency who had initially brought him into the PM seat. The former head, Abukar Arman, denounced both Farmajo and Khayre as 'fictive technocrats' and as savvy political elites orchestrating clans for opportunistic reasons. His motives were somewhat transparent as he would later be appointed as Somali Ambassador to the UN[390]. In line with Brinkerhoff's predications of diaspora-led political organisations, Gurmaad political platform had largely dissolved by 2016 as different members had contested Farmajo in the 2016 elections and after individuals sought political positions[391].

After his election, and as an outcome of his strategies towards accommodation, Farmajo required a significantly expanded civil service that included a cabinet of 70 ministers (with more than 50 diaspora). He used this expanded civil service, as well as technocratic assistance programmes, to fill patronage appointments (see Chapter 6)[392]. Furthermore, he also sought to replace senior government officials, including the mayor and deputy of mayor of Mogadishu, and the heads of intelligence and security with diaspora — a move that was unprecedented and

[389] This was a widespread perception by opposition figures as well as supporters. Interviews 54, 62, 59 and 67, Mogadishu, May and September 2017.
[390] Abukar Arman, 'Blue skies over Somalia', Al Jazeera, 13 February 2017, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/blue–skies–somalia–170212083445301.html; Abukar Arman, 'Circling The Square In Somalia', *Foreign Policy Blogs*, available at https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2017/03/12/circling–the–square–in–somalia/; see also 'Abshir Bukhari turns opposition against President Farmajo,', Garowe Online, 12 September 2017, available at https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia–abshir–bukhar–turns–opposition–against–president–farmajo.
[391] Arman left Gurmaad just as other figures had, including Abdinasir, who had contested Farmajo for the presidency in 2016. Some formed the Coalition for Change that seemingly comprised Daljir and Gurmaad politicians dissatisfied with not getting political positions (or their fair share of political representation). 'Somalia: Uniting all opposition for collective political action for 2016', *Geeska Africa*, 13 August 2016, available at http://www.geeskaafrika.com/22914/somaliauniting–opposition–collective–political–action–2016/.
[392] Interview, Jubbaland MP, Mogadishu, September 2017. The steady increase in the influx of advisors coincided with the rapid expansion of the civil service from 3800 in 2014 to 6500 in 2016, with 40% redundancy and ghost workers. Civil service reform account for a large percentage of World Bank reconstruction efforts (World Bank, 2003). 'Somalia: Economic Update and Public Expenditure', *World Bank*, December 2016, p. 15.

risky (see 7.3)[393]. In addition to his policy of remaking systems of representative politics, he spearheaded a nationalist and populistic platform by adopting the persona as a new statebuilder.[394] As one interview respondent indicated, he assumed 'a man of the people, a populist, social media person, man of the street' persona that was both contradictory and potentially dangerous[395].

The conflation of nationalism and populism has often been seen as dangerous as the latter seeks to represent 'the people' against (some) illegitimate 'elite' and discursively constructs 'the people' through an antagonism between 'the people' and 'the elite' (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Caiani and della Porta 2011)[396]. Thus, populism seeks to promote majoritarianism and rejects institutions (and the establishment) that restrain the supposed will of the majority (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017: 6). In the contemporary African context, but also globally, populist demands have often been used, more often than not, to denounce a 'corrupt elite' (often a minority accused of holding political or economic power) or when the elite is accused of being beholden to foreign interests (Bieber 2018). Thus, these new populists fiercely criticise 'leaders of other countries and supranational organisations as illegitimate elites, for their multiculturalist and globalist policies, for their breaches of the nation's sovereignty over its state, and for their sheer membership of an international, cosmopolitan elite' (see Kaltwasser et al. 2019). The question is then: What happens when new cosmopolitan elites (party of these supra-national systems) use nationalist and populist narratives to establish local bases?

In the context of Farmajo, his populist and nationalist appeal was a direct response to the failed narratives of his predecessors and the association between diaspora leaders and weakness (whether technocratic or as conflict mediators). Yet, through such a narrative, he had enshrined his administration in contradiction and visible hypocrisy. This narrative was galvanising of a large movement against him in the form of strong opposition coalitions led by Sheikh Sharif,

[393] 'The Somali diaspora: Options for post–conflict reconstruction', *ISS*, 5 November 2012, available at https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep2012_5Nov.pdf.
[394] Mohamed Omar Ahmed, 'Somalia Leader Renounces U.S. Citizenship Amid Trump's Rhetoric', Bloomberg, 1 Aug 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-01/somalia-leader-renounces-u-s-citizenship-amid-trump-s-rhetoric.
[395] Interview 59, Swedish diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.
[396] As Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) argue, the distinction between "the people" and foreigners is a nationalist in/out distinction, not a populist down/up distinction. The in/out distinction between the nation and its outsides does sometimes have a vertical dimension in the sense of racial, national, or cultural superiority. But this is subordinate to the in/out distinction, and of a different nature than the populist distinction between powerless and powerful.

Hassan Sheikh and Abdishakur Warsame (former presidents and diaspora that founded their legitimacy as moral and political guarantors). His *squilovido* administration (an Italian term that refers to a training exercise) was embroiled in accusations of being beholden to US security and geopolitical interests and as leading an elitist agenda in aggressive confrontation with systems of representative politics (see Chapter 7)[397]. As one respondent argued:

> Farmajo was the right leader at the wrong time, he is now only stirring excitement among the populace and connecting purely based on emotion. If he really wants to win support and make progress, he needs to either get dirty or build coherence. He needs some alliances and make fewer promises to western powers, and work to get the finances and political support necessary[398].

The new opposition coalition started to galvanise support against his regime around a return to consultative politics and the people, and around protecting the sanctity of the federal structure.

## 5.5 Conclusion

In both the Somaliland and Somalia cases discussed above, after 2009, diaspora support and party leadership caused significant challenges for party institutionalisation and the legitimacy of the party structure, and prompted the formation of stronger opposition alliances with a leaning towards more local networks and attachments. Thus, in both cases, the tenures of Sheikh Sharif (2009–2012) and Mohamed Silanyo (2010–2016) were followed by a notably 'local' turn (Hassan Sheikh in 2012 in Somalia, and Musabixi Abdi in 2016 in Somaliland). The local turn may have been more evident and entrenched in Somaliland, where popular elections take place and where popular opinion is better reflected in electoral outcomes. Yet, even in 2012, in Somalia, with Hassan Sheikh (as also occurred in Puntland in 2018 with the election of Saed Dini, see 3.3.3), a local turn occurred in line with a wave of popular sentiment against diaspora leadership. Hassan Sheikh, like Saed Dini, would make a more concerted effort to incorporate local interest groups, including Islamists and powerbrokers (including warlords and businesspeople). The cycle continued. In Somalia, following Hassan Sheikh's tenure from 2012 until 2017, a diaspora group found empowerment through parliament and

[397] Interviews 57 and 59, development agent and aspiring presidential candidate, Mogadishu, December 2017.
[398] Interview 60, diaspora returnee and government advisor, Mogadishu, 19 May 2017.

brought Farmajo into power in 2017. Under Farmajo, the ‘diaspora’ turn occurred more fully and pervasively than it had under Sheikh Sharif.

The Somalia and Somaliland cases present similar, but perhaps exceptional, examples from the African continent about how the politics of diaspora return define strategies and electoral outcomes, which requires further theorising. This chapter offers a brief snapshot of how leadership and succession seemed to follow a rotation from ‘local’ to ‘diaspora’ candidate after 2009. It also explores the distinct ways in which diaspora-led parties and diaspora-led administrations sought to consolidate power. It makes a few initial arguments about why diaspora–led administrations rose and fell in the Somaliland and Somalia contexts, and about the challenges that diaspora candidates face in building political alliances, projecting power and dealing with opponents. One key argument is made about how diaspora leaders — as was the case with Presidents Silanyo, Gaas and Farmajo — struggled to accommodate external and internal constituencies and balance their competing demands. They often favoured certain diaspora constituencies that noticeably sidelined old guard politicians, in addition to islamist groups and business people. Another argument is made about the lack of cohesion within coalitions tied to the diversity of different ambitions, interests and objectives of diaspora politicians, and to the paradox of diaspora brokerage and disparate claims for recognition. A final argument is proposed about how successful diaspora parties (and supporters) serve the status quo rather than opposition politics or political pluralism.

## Chapter 6: Technocratic assistance programmes, bureaucratic integration and political ascension

Chapters 4 and 5 explored how domestic actors (local national and subnational elites as well as clans) negotiate the politics of diaspora return within the context of clan-based recruitment and political party strategies. This chapter examines how diaspora elites become 'brokers' of state and political authority and international statebuilding agendas particularly through vis technocratic assistance programmes in weak and emerging states. Known also as diaspora return programmes or advisor scheme, these forms of technocratic assistance programmes constitute a large majority of funding around orientations towards new public management (Henman and Gable 2018) and the building up of institutions. They constitute the placements of diaspora within top ministries (including finance, national development, foreign affairs and security) either to serve as policy advisors in direct programmatic oversight or as ministerial coordinators. Only minimal research to-date has looked at these return programmes in any depth and how they contribute to technocratic governance and new forms of public authority (Shindo 2012; Brinkerhoff 2016, 2017). Rather, scholars have focused mainly on the sustainability of such programmes and their influence on overall institutional coordination and efficiency — and they were certainly notable in the Somali context for not increasing internal and cross-ministerial coherence or coordination[399]. Looking beyond the institutionalist and public administration perspective, this chapter is interested in how such programmes, which visibly prioritise diaspora recruits, affect configurations of power and authority.

The underpinning assumptions of technocratic assistance programmes is to build professionalised and independent bureaucracies as an essential component towards creating democratic accountability, for reducing patronage politics and for ensuring impartiality as well as responsiveness and efficiency. Certainly, the underlying assumptions of technocratic governance are fraught in the African context, where 'technopols' rather than 'technocrats' have been found to be often more effective in implementing reform agendas because they hold

[399] As scholars report, in East Timor, the absorption of diaspora technocrats created institutions divided by language, regional affiliations and diaspora networks, that in turn struggled to communicate, not least to coordinate or cohere around a common national development policy (Patrick 2001; for the Kosovo case, Herrero 2005). In Somalia, there were definitely practical linguistic issues in how diaspora advisors misinterpreted the constitution with implications for how duties, for instance, the attorney and prosecutorial generals were understood and performed. As one parliamentarian reports, 'the prosecutorial general is supposed to defend the government, but instead he thinks he is part of the judiciary'. Interview 68, parliamentarian, Mogadishu, 6 December 2016.

the necessary trust relations with political elites and have the ability to build consensus (Abdullai 2018, see Chapter 7). Assumptions around diaspora as default technocrats with the capacity or willingness to function as apolitical actors within bureaucratic contexts overlooks aspects of patronage arrangements and expectations, and the extent to which such processes became de facto routes for political advancement. A close-range investigation of how these programmes unfolded in the Somali context demonstrates how they were hijacked for political purposes relative to 1) the relative size of the programmes and donor-driven discretion; and 2) the degree of spoils politics (professionalisation and bureaucratic autonomy) that accounted for different patronage claims made on such technocratic advisors. As this chapter demonstrates, in Somalia and to a lesser extent in Puntland, these programmes became de facto routes to power, hijacked by consecutive administrations as a political tool. In Somaliland, where technocratic assistance programmes were smaller and where bureaucracies were relatively more professionalised and independent from spoils politics, these programmes did not serve as explicitly a political purpose.

In 2018, the World Bank accepted defeat in its Capacity Injection Programmes (CIP) for failing to harmonise technocratic assistance programmes, for not aligning with broader civil service reform, for creating an unsustainable system, and for being hijacked for political use. Not only did these programmes increase the size of the candidate pool, they also contributed to a form of brokerage politics that worked against traditional governance institutions and the building up of institutions. Advisors became both more efficient patronage distributers and brokers of international legitimacy for the state. Through such advisor schemes donors could exert control over the state to a greater extent, and specifically over discrete programmes. Such relationships distanced advisors (in terms of recruitment, actions and accountability) from the terms of representative politics, including norms of social obligation and kinship. Instead, the programmes provided the opportunities for diaspora recruits to shop around for the best deal, lobbying embassies and donors to renegotiate their contracts and ministers for the best positions (even across administrations). Around the 2016/2017 elections, in Somalia, the advisor debacle sparked a personnel crisis. This was less the case in Puntland where these programmes served as a more discrete form of political advancement. In Somaliland it was more heavily restricted as a mode of political advancement.

This chapter first outlines technocratic assistance programming as it developed more broadly in state-building and economic reconstruction efforts across Africa (in Section 6.1), and then

specifically as it unfolded in the Somali context (Section 6.2). Section 6.3 then outlines the structural and patronage constraints surrounding the role of advisors within weak bureaucratic and strong patronage systems, as well as how they relate to forms of post-colonial administration and new roles under international guidance. The next section (6.4) outlines shifts in programming post-2015 that shaped certain responses, which were rescaled by elites and diaspora recruits. Finally, sections 6.5 and 6.6 outline the varied experiences of Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland post-2015 as they relate, on a broad level, to a distinct set of bureaucratic-elite relations, aid relationships and shifts in donor policies and assertiveness, as well as forms of political competition. The major external shock (the harmonising payscale) was felt across the three regions but had different implications when paired with different levels of enforcement, donor discoordination and incentives around forms of diaspora alliances and partnerships. As a result of such programming shifts, advisors in all regions were given the advantage of shopping around for the best deal, often securing repeat and often overlapping contracts and appreciating a form of political immunity often not offered by participation in politics. Only in Somalia and Puntland did the contestation become pronounced and across regional lines.

### 6.1 Technocratic assistance and the 'diaspora option'

Technocratic assistance emerged from the Washington Consensus as a critical component of structural adjustment programmes in the mid-1990s in Africa, and comprised a considerable share of donor portfolios. Technical assistance was nearly 60 percent of World Bank programming in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2000, with expenditures by the World Bank of $720 million between 1998 and 2008 (see Bretton Woods Update 60: 5). Technical assistance was a way in which donors sought to rectify critical aid mismanagement and government inefficiency that had been revealed globally in the 1990s (Reno 1997). By the late 1990s, the World Bank had stated that technical assistance was a 'key instrument for improving policies and project design, enhancing skills, strengthening implementation capacity, and for institutional development' (World Bank 1996). Such technical assistance focused on introducing a degree of competition into public service provision through agentisation and the tendering of services which provided more 'incentivised' rewards around clearer performance indicators and decompressed pay structures (see World Bank 2000, 2004). Such administrative and civil service reform agendas — driven principally by donor/creditor initiatives and the rising

prominence of governance reform agendas — assimilated the unity of the state and market in the Africa context in ways that affected bureaucratic-elite relations and systems of patronage politics.

Such agendas were married with an explicit focus on diaspora as partners and dominated World Bank programming from the early 2000s (see 1.3). The World Bank also came under increasing pressure within the international system and by recipient countries regarding the use of foreign consultants and advisors. This partnership between IFIs and diaspora was seen as the perfect solution to the 'ownership' question that underpinned broader strategies of building 'knowledge economies' and was seen as a cost-effective measure and a win-win solution for both host and origin countries (European Parliament 2004; IOM 2006; Gibson et al. 2015; World Bank 2005; UNDP 2010)[400]. As it has been reported, for IFI institutions, the Bank preferred to deal with diaspora technocrats (often those that have worked overseas, for other institutions or directly with the IFIs themselves). They served a dual purpose that included their presumed competence and the promotion of national ownership necessary for structural adjustment programmes to work (Thurston 2018: 198). The focus on diaspora had failed to assuage the broader criticism launched at technocratic assistance that it constituted 'little more than a device for the monitoring and enforcement of external conditions' (Helleiner 2000: 84; see also Arndt 2000). Others criticised technocratic assistance for being a neo-imperial tool used on the basis of mistrust of a government's capacity to implement projects or use funds wisely (Berg 2000).

Even in its initial years, international donors reported that such programmes had achieved limited success in bureaucratic transformation (World Bank 2010). This pushed some scholars and practitioners to call upon donors to abandon its repeated technocratic 'conceit' (Carothers and De Gramont 2013)[401]. Rather, studies highlighted how the disproportionate rewards and high-salaried technocratic assistance programmes created class conflict and fomented local resentment (IOM 2005). Part of the issue was the causal mechanism for sustainable reform — that these programmes, which focused on temporary 'champions' or 'change agents' within

[400] See, IOM MIDA, 2006, https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/mida/global_strat_mida.pdf.

[401] Results emerged in 2011 that 'limited fiscal and technical resources in Africa origin countries constrained the effectiveness of such policies and reduced the gains from migration while exposing migrants to severe risks' (World Bank 2011: 11).

the bureaucracy, would 'incentivise' others and lead to sustainable change. Rather, a restricted group of change agents and discourse, underpinned by substantial flows of resources, created pockets of efficiency that rarely had a trickle-down effect and which undermined a larger discourse on governance that supports 'inclusive' and expansive governance based on participation and accountability (Porter and Craig 2004).

This was certainly the case in Somalia where technocratic assistance programmes became a critical component of a political milieu around a shrinking core of political power. Key diaspora advisors, ministers and political elites established areas of political and public management with in-country aid donors and World Bank/IMF 'missions'. Clans and local elites inserted themselves into development discourse and networks by 'scaling' or enforcing counter-reforms by replacing advisors, working around the system or halting processes altogether (see Giustozzi 2013 also on Afghanistan). Such created a new political class, where the 'diaspora option' was often coopted by new elites in building a political base where they could not rely on traditional support networks. They made legitimacy claims under technocratic governance, while also expanding state authority into the peripheries. As outlined in the following section, incoherence and disparate donor objectives created chaos and a market around diaspora advisors that served elite strategy while undermining traditional institutions of representative politics.

### 6.2 Intra-agency programming, World Bank 'bulldozing' and donor discoordination

Discoordination between donors, and between donors and the state, on how to manage or control such programmes was an issue from the inception of programming. It culminated with rise and then collapse of World Bank's CIP initiatives which aimed to streamline but rather 'bulldozed' (Harrison 2001: 672) other diaspora return programmes[402]. By 2018, IOM, WB and different INGOs were all appointing advisors to the ministries in technical capacities that

[402] As early as 2001, IOM MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa) had started implementing temporary return programmes in Somaliland with the aim to derive the concrete benefits 'from the global labour migration flows by tapping, in a systemic way, into the skills, funds and mobility that very often characterise the diaspora' (Weiss 2007: 172). The programme commenced in Puntland and Somaliland in 2004, and then in Somalia in 2006.

reached approximately 415, although a WB HR audit lists the off-payroll staff at 2,117 [403]. Government interference was not surprising. As early as 2007, the IOM cited challenges in getting recruits approved given the orientation of diaspora against the current government that made them less trusted allies for state reconstruction. As a former manager of Quest MIDA explained, during this time there was a constant process of negotiation between ministers and the programme – 'we would provide a CV, and the government would respond, and say "we don't know him, he may be one of them, we can't have him" and then we would start again'[404]. Given that the programmes were recipient- and needs-driven, institutions and political appointments always exerted considerable discretion over who was or was not selected, and this never changed. The dissolution of the joint UNDP/IOM QUEST-MIDA[405] in 2011 was critical as it left ambiguities around how the programme would be governed and about the emphasis on the temporary versus permanent return focus of such programmes[406]. As one former manager of QUEST-MIDA explained, 'the IOM is in the business of moving people, not in implementing sustainable projects', and the feedback loops routinely missed the direct connections between diaspora and beneficiary institutions, and between diaspora and embassies which could be lobbied for influence within IOM structures[407]. The intra-agency and institutional collaboration under QUEST-MIDA is detailed in the diagram below, where IOM played the role of outreach and recruitment, rather than technical partner (see also Rodenburg and van Naerssen 2011).

**Table 5.1 Collaboration partners in the Quests-MIDA project**[408]

[403] For instance, some diaspora reported how diaspora organizations like FSAN had also seconded people to the ministries through direct funding from the Dutch Government, although with recruitment through IOM Netherlands. Interview 54, IOM Quest-MIDA beneficiary, 3 October 2017. That include DFID, FAO, IOM, JPLG, UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNSOM, USAID, WB and WFP also use IOM recruitment procedures but are not formally tracked. These international organisations use the 'services' of IOM MIDA to recruit special consultancy placements within the government (accessing candidate databases for already vetted candidates). Interview 86, USAID technical advisor, Mogadishu, 30 June 2017.

[404] Interview 16, former Quest Mida team lead, Hargeisa, 15 November 2016.

[405] By 2007, UNDP had committed itself to the 'deployment of skilled Somali Diaspora' (UNDP 2007: 5) and openly recruited 'Somali diaspora where possible for technical assistance and as advisors' (UN Country Team Somalia 2007).

[406] 'QUESTS-MIDA (Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support): Project document', 2012, https://diaspora.iom.int/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/quests-mida.pdf. In 2007, the number of placements of diaspora experts in different institutions was 50, while in 2008 the number increased to 82 placements.

[407] Interview 16, former Quest Mida team lead, Hargeisa, 15 November 2016.

[408] Rodenburg and van Naerssen 2011: 79.




Competing programmes emerged around the New Deal in 2012 that included short-term bi-lateral support programmes by DFID, EU and USAID and that specifically placed diaspora advisors in more donor-centric and strategic positions, specifically 'as policy advisors' in supporting the Prime Minister and President's office[409]. The Norwegian-funded Special Financing Facility (SFF), operationalised in September 2013, supported the FGS in financing civil service salaries of federal officials, which further blurred the lines between temporary advisor placements and salaried civil servant positions[410]. Matters were made worse by mid-2014, when the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund[411] steam-rolled its Capacity Injection Programme (CIP) to streamline all technocratic assistance programmes that existed across international organisations but which created confusion amongst donors and recruits. Initial World Bank project documents in 2014 maintained that the Somali diaspora represented a critical resource for addressing capacity gaps in the public sector, but that 'existing institutional arrangements and incentives for harnessing the potential of the Somali Diasporas were weak and limited'[412]. The WB sought not only to standardise such temporary return programmes but

[409] See 'Somalia Capacity Development – Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP)', UNDP, 31 December 2017, http://www.so.undp.org/content/dam/somalia/Reports/Q2_2017/CD-%20SIP%20-%20Second.pdf, p. 16.
[410] The main beneficiaries of assistance have been the ministries of interior, finance and planning, human development and public services, the Central Bank and the Auditor General and Accountant General. 'Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US$40 million to the Federal Government of Somalia for a Somalia Capacity Injection Programme', World Bank, 14 August 2015, p. 6, at http://www.somaliampf.net/files/CIPs.pdf.
[411] Ibid, p. 7.
[412] 'Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US$40 million to the Federal Government of Somalia for a Somalia Capacity Injection Programme', *World Bank*, 14 August 2015, p. 5, at http://www.somaliampf.net/files/CIPs.pdf.

also to increase permanent retention and absorb advisors into civil servant positions as part of broader civil service reform projects[413]. The World Bank here aligned with a new IOM orientation towards more permanent return that aligned with domestic and international opportunity structures but not necessarily with the ambitions and expectations of recruits.

By June 2017, no government or donor data database existed to track the number of diaspora recruits, their placements or even any exit evaluations (as has been reported in similar contexts, see Rodenburg and van Naerssen 2011: 38-39). The informal June 2017 assessment found 418 seconded advisors across the Somalia territories, which was reportedly only half of an expected more than 800[414]. The human resource audit undertaken by the World Bank in April 2018 notably skirted around the issue of the reality of civil service reform — that it was primarily diaspora consultants and advisors representing the institutions of the state. Organisations were unwilling and unable to account for the embedded recruits at national and state level[415]. The government (in particular, the Minister of National Planning and Office of the Prime Minister) maintained a lack of confidence in donors to manage these processes and desired to centralise control under the OPM's office. Somalia's poor experience with the programme, leaving the World Bank reportedly baffled and resigned, has led to the suspension of CIP, which will hurt progress in Puntland and Somaliland[416].

### 6.3 Weak bureaucracies, the ambiguous role of advisors and patronage relations

It is undisputed that in such post-conflict and weak state contexts technical and socio-political processes are often at loggerheads (or mutually reinforcing) and have left the civil service no less politicised than the distribution of political office (Vaughn 2011; Allen 1995). As scholars suggest, in confessional or clan-based systems like Somalia, positions are allocated according to a quota system that create critical lines of expectations between political and bureaucratic

[413] The World Bank's objective to move technocratic diaspora advisors laterally into civil service as PSs would routinely fail given market factors (the reality of a salary cut in this lateral move), and the highly politicised role of permanent secretaries (PSs) (see 6.3).
[414] There were 116 pending positions to be filled by August 2017. 'Addressing priority capacity development', *World Bank internal report*, June 2017. Interviews 74 and 88, UNDP advisor and WB coordination unit, Mogadishu, June 2017.
[415] Ibid. 'Addressing priority capacity development needs in Somalia: Internal IO discussion not based on joint UN and WB brainstorming', *World Bank internal report*, June 2017; see also 'Government launches civil service staff audit', *Goobjoog*, 22 April 2018, http://goobjoog.com/english/government-launches-civil-service-staff-audit/.
[416] Interviews 74 and 88, UNDP advisor and WB coordination unit, Mogadishu, June 2017.

elites for distribution (Chesterman 2004: 58). The primary aims of donor support for diaspora-led technocratic assistance efforts in the first place, and later under reduced wage scales, was to reduce patronage circulation in the civil service and the resulting volatility[417]. The World Bank recognises political patronage as ubiquitous but seeks to reduce its manifestations, such as the volatility of civil service rotation (Grindle 2013). A 2017 World Bank report acknowledged a worrying trend emerging in Somalia — whereby 'the rapid recruitment of a new batch of long-term, embedded advisors, with clan and political affiliations aligned to the newly appointed Cabinet, could accelerate turnover and marginalize civil servants, with long term damage to institutional building and statebuilding efforts'[418]. It was evident that advisors were still being incorporated through the clan quota, but the focus on turnover and wage-scales did not deal with the reality that continuity could indicate the amassing of patronage and authority, or that certain new forms of clientelism would emerge under state-led efforts to dislodge existing networks and form new ones (see Hameiri and Scrapello 2018: 158; Harrison 2001; Hanlon 2002; and see also Reno 2002).

It was evident that Farmajo's administration was by 2017 explicitly using advisor schemes as convenient mechanisms for political accommodation. His administration may have achieved greater overall reduction in circulation and continuity but even the World Bank acknowledged that, rather than just becoming 'unsustainable, parallel systems', they were actively feeding a political apparatus[419]. In Puntland, Gaas similarly sought to recruit loyalists from the advisor schemes where party systems were less institutionalised and clientelist expectations within the bureaucracy were more pronounced[420]. Gaas himself had been a beneficiary of IOM MIDA and was well-acquainted with the loopholes. Thus, how the programmes unfolded in terms of legitimacy and politicisation was linked to both the donors' interests and discretion (also the size of the programme) and the different institutional structures and pre-existing forms of bureaucratic-elite patronage networks.

[417] Email exchange, Naima Mohamed, Pay and Grading reform, 20 September 2019.
[418] 'Addressing priority capacity development needs in Somalia', *World Bank internal report*, June 2017, p. 6. UNDP reports that greater volatility in the federal level has reduced since early 2016. See 'Somalia Capacity Development', p. 18.
[419] These 'islands of efficiency' are formed mainly by extra-budgetary funding and oversight but are seen to produce key policy outcomes without engaging in any significant restructuring within the ministry (Herrero 2005; IOM 2005; Brinkerhoff 2008; Hertog 2007, 2010)
[420] Interviews 41 and 42, IOM beneficiaries, Garowe, 28 April 2017. Gaas first to formally engage diaspora (founder of the Puntland Diaspora Forum), while Faroole refused to organise such a forum.

*6.3.1 Patronage appointments and the bureaucracy*

In terms of the latter, Somalia differed from the Somaliland and Puntland contexts as its bureaucracy was less professionalised and more explicitly tied to patronage and a system of spoils politics. Siad Barre's move from a bureaucratic state-building project to a more complex patronage network by the early 1980s (Reno 2003: 17) had made state-building efforts increasingly an explicit tool for political consolidation and used to support his socialist aspirations (Marchal 1996: 16). This was aided critically by the loss of a disproportionate portion of more educated technocrats (particularly from the north) who Barre regarded as less desirable as political clients (Reno 2003: 17). Even, as early as the mid-1970s, the state was unable to accommodate the three-fold expansion of the civil service (from approximately 20,000 in 1969 to over 56,000 in 1983); and civil servants took a three to four percent cut to their 1975 salaries (Reno 2003: 16). Civil servants, in turn, had to support themselves through corruption, bribes and kickbacks that were closely associated with foreign-financed development projects — engaging in 'project hopping' with aid agencies and obtaining lucrative positions through competitive bidding (Compagnon 2013; Menkhaus 2014b; Menkhaus 2007; de Waal 2015: 110-115).

By contrast, not only had Somaliland's bureaucracy been professionalised prior to broader democratisation efforts, which prevented ministerial posts from becoming discrete patronage streams to the same extent, aid rents were greatly reduced (Marchal 1996; Reno 2003; Renders 2012). As scholars have argued, the bureaucracy in Somaliland has always been comprised of a relatively more well-educated Somalilander class of bureaucrats (many of whom had comprised the civil service in Mogadishu) (Phillips 2007: 35) which had not relied, to the same extent, on outsourced international 'technical assistance' or 'technical expertise'. Lower aid rents affected the extent to which ministers could leverage access and deliverables to either current administrations or donor communities for career survival (Phillips 2016: 641-42) and, by the same measure, how diaspora recruits would be tied to patronage or service delivery. This did not mean, however, that Somaliland was any less reliant on technocratic assistance programmes, as adherence to certain donor guidelines was part of a clear plan to achieve international recognition. But the market for patronage was greatly reduced, and structures of representation differed. Across the cases, the politicisation of these positions was tied to ambiguities in the functions and roles of advisors when compared to permanent secretaries (PSs).

One problem with these advisory placement schemes was the ambiguity about the roles[421] of such positions (Lungu 1988), as they could constitute either deliberately parallel positions or co-opt and renegotiate the role of permanent secretaries (PSs)[422]. Across sub-Saharan Africa, PSs are often functionaries of political patronage in ministries (van de Walle 2001), who face frequent replacement, as part of partisan political appointments, or seek political positions higher up in subsequent administrations (Miller 2005: 38; Montgomery 1986)[423]. In Somalia, these positions were introduced in the post-independence constitution as a way for parties to check certain loyalties within the system of proportional representation. Abolished under the 1994 provisional constitution, PSs were reinstated in 2000 as an explicit mechanism in which the incoming administration could deal with the shortcomings of the proportional system in order to consolidate authority[424]. It was widely reported that President Farmajo and PM Khayre expanded their system of party loyalists by selecting close relatives and clansmen from the ruling clans as PSs and through a careful selection of diaspora advisors to roles with critical oversight over financial flows and aid contracts, as well as ministerial function[425].

Where PSs have traditionally served as critical points of entry for donors (to discuss policy progress, monitor the disbursement of funds and consider further funding options) (Harrison 2001: 669), diaspora advisors now served as the chief agents overseeing financial flows

[421] William Easterly explains well the paradox of such positions and the political autonomy that can be achieved: '… these agents face neither a market test nor a democratic test. If they get the knowledge (including localised feedback) wrong they suffer neither economic nor political penalties. If their solutions should happen to work, they get neither economic nor political rewards. So there is nothing to spur them on to scaling up successes any more than there is anything to motivate them to kill off failures' (2013: 254).

[422] The confusion over roles and practice was captured by one constitutional expert in Somalia, who differentiated the roles of advisors and PSs as 'the Advisor representing the issues related to politics, while the Permanent Secretary represents the technical issues' (Farah 2011: 128). In reality, these lines were blurred. The assumption was that advisors should be technical while the PSs were political in nature.

[423] 'New Permanent Secretary of The Somali Foreign Ministry', *IOFC*, 11 January 2013, https://uk.iofc.org/new-permanent-secretary-somali-foreign-ministry. In East Africa, PSs are usually appointed by the President (see for example, Chapter II, Part 2 of the Kenyan Constitution and Article 174 of the Uganda Constitution), although in Somalia this has come under the purview of Prime Ministers. In other contexts, like Cote d'Ivoire, the move from advisor or PS to minister had been frequent. For instance, under Alassane Ouattara, key advisors were able to politically advance quite quickly, including Thierry Tanoh. He had been an advisor with the presidency (a former banker who was a director-general of Ecobank) and was appointed as energy and petroleum minister. 'Côte d'Ivoire : quand les conseillers du président font (parfois) de l'ombre aux ministres', *Jeune Afrique*, 13 January 2016, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/289623/politique/cote-divoire-conseillers-president-parfois-de-lombre-aux-ministres/.

[424] Interview 77, constitutional expert and political analyst, 7 September 2017.

[425] 'MPs blame Farmajo for violating power-sharing arrangement', Garowe Online, 01 September 2018, accessed at https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-mps-blame-farmajo-for-violating-power-sharing-system. PSs have historically been viewed as 'resource handlers' (Boneo 1986) that both determined their political influence and facilitated their desire to seek top-level political positions (for Zimbabwe, see Zinyama and Tinatawo 2014).

(Gibson et al. 2015: 25)[426]. Thus, they became highly privileged, non-civil servant staff, that served as the critical faces of the state — operating as civil servants, decision-makers and representative functions in government — and also with full command of donor funds which disoriented internal accountability structures and even structures of authority[427]. As one former advisor at the Ministry of Finance disclosed, 'while I was at MoF, we had advisors leading IFIs as civil servants, line managers and ministerial representatives all in one — 90 percent of the people you meet with are diasporic advisors serving in an official capacity'[428]. The World Bank acknowledged that

> When non-civil servants occupy decision-making and representative functions in government, internal responsibility lines as well as representative authority arrangements are blurred. Such a response could lock in unsustainable, parallel systems, where short-term, ad hoc solutions may cement into institutional structures and procedures that stultify emerging country systems (2017: 20).

Yet, the focus on the creation of unsustainable, parallel systems actually obscures the intricacies of power relationships that emerge. Diaspora advisors became both patronage dispensers and politically immune from removal. In terms of the former, it was evident that advisors became brokers of donor money and agendas. As one bureaucrat in Mogadishu explained — 'advisors brought the donor money, served as the formal points of negotiation between donors and local politics, and coordinated with subnational actors to facilitate patronage and certain deliverables'[429]. On the one hand, diaspora advisors reported providing kickbacks and quid-pro-quo exchange of services to maintain intra-ministerial harmony — that included direct financial inducements (from personal salaries) made within the ministries to

[426] In the Somalia context, as the 1988 UNDP industrialisation and revitalisation plan cites, PSs of the Ministries of Planning, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Industry, Commerce, Revenue, Labour and of the Governor of the Central Bank and the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce comprised the ten-member Foreign Investment Board (FIB) and constituted the supreme decision-making authority over all matters concerning foreign investment. 'Somalia: industrial revitalization through privatization', *United Nations Industrial Development Organization; Regional and Country Studies Branch*, p. 59.
[427] Interview 74, UNDP technical advisor, Mogadishu, 12 May 2017. He described how 'two parallel streams exist, one a luxurious salaries system that exists in public, and the other which locals run, predominantly a federal service where 90% do not show up, and with the former doing nothing to incentivise the latter to come in to work'. 'Addressing priority capacity development needs in Somalia: Internal IO discussion not based on joint UN and WB brainstorming', *World Bank internal report*, June 2017.
[428] Interviews 86 and 88, USAID team lead and coordination unit, Nairobi, June 2017. This was especially notable at the federal level – 'you walk into government or ministerial offices at the federal level and these are the sole representatives, we are in theory creating technical staff, but they play political appointees, and these lines are blurred at every turn at the federal level'.
[429] Focus group discussion, Puntland Diaspora Agency, Garowe, May 2017.

line managers, Director Generals (DGs), as well as provision of contracts or other financial incentives (like public contracts) to clan or familial networks[430]. On the other hand, by delegating the job of patronage dispenser to advisors, ministers sought to insulate themselves from political criticism (from clans or ruling party elites)[431]. In Sudan, it was documented how 'far-sighted politicians' used 'such distributional structures resulting from such technocratic placements within a federal system to more efficiently distribute patronage and streamline such practices' (Mohamed 2012: 129). Thus, ministers were often empowered by these relationships. For instance, as one respondent explained, 'by complaining about being understaffed and without the requisite skills, [they] were able to get rid of key individuals and political adversaries and to bring new elites in that left clan and old guard politicians upset and outside the system'[432]. In this way, ministers sought to use advisors to streamline the payment of loyalties and secure their own political futures, and to ensure the successful implementation of donor agendas.

As a result of the close relationships of reciprocity and value that formed, greater continuity did emerge around these high-profile ministries (namely finance and national development ministries). These top diaspora officials often rotated amongst the top foreign affairs and development posts (7.3) and received often the highest number of advisors. The explicit rent concentration critically affected inter-clan competition within the quota system as well as conceptions of the 'exclusivity' of the governance agenda (Dietrich 2013, 2016; Wright and Winters 2010). New forms of political immunity and continuity in personnel (in line with World Bank policy agendas) was noticeably at odds with systems of representative politics. What it had ensured, was a ruling class of diaspora which was insulated from clan and local elite pressure.

Beginning in 2015, Somalia faced an upset within its advisor structures due to structural adjustments within programming (reduction in salaries and a greater focus on temporary rather than permanent positions) and the onset of political transitions (both national and federal

[430] Interviews 41, 42 and 43, diaspora recruits and beneficiaries, Mogadishu and Garowe, April and June 2017. See also Suldaan Nayruus Xaaji Aadan, 'What does the Quest-MIDA project contribute to the country and its people?', 15 April 2015, accessed at https://somaliagenda.com/quests-mida-qualified-expatriate-somali-technical-support/.
[431] Ibid.
[432] Interviews 54 and 77, professor and political analyst, Mogadishu, May and September 2017. See also 'Farmaajo & Kheyre Appoint a Record 40 'Advisors' Since Taking Office', *Radio Dalsan*, 5 August 2017, http://radiodalsan.com/en/farmaajo-kheyre-appoint-a-record-40-advisors-since-taking-office/.

elections). The inception of the World Bank's Capacity Injection Programme (CIP) and a harmonising payscale increased the market pressures on diaspora recruits to more actively enter politics (as MPs) or to enter alternative financial arrangements (including by lobbying other donors for contracts). At the same time that the highly privileged positions for political advancement and immunity were being questioned, there were heightened political pressures for using advisor schemes to allocate patronage appointments. It was evident that the inception of a new administration (diaspora-led), which was unable or unwilling to rely on local networks, saw these programmes as useful for legitimising technocratic governance and the expansion of state authority[433]. Resentment came from both diaspora advisors, currently within the government and other international donors, who would ultimately overwhelm the programme into submission.

### 6.4 Post-2015 shifting incentives and resistance

The World Bank's theories behind the 2015 harmonising payscale was that higher salaries actually provided greater resources for clientelism as well as fomented resentment (between diaspora recruits and locals). Yet, efforts to reduce salaries and streamline positions caused an uproar and were heavily resisted by diaspora recruits as well as other donors (including IOM). The latter saw the World Bank as bulldozing prematurely, rather than offering a smooth transition. The World Bank was also resistant to absorbing current diasporic advisors within CIP directly, which had been an explicit component of CIP's programme initially[434]. In the initial phases of 2015, diaspora recruits accused the World Bank of 'viewing them as corrupt' and trying to get rid of them, and the World Bank openly blamed diasporic recruits for undermining the success of the programme by both hindering recruitment procedures and employing certain work-arounds. There was no doubt that CIP continued to favour diaspora recruits who could meet the criteria of the ToRs and who donors preferred to work with. Diaspora recruits were resistant to the harmonising payscale and the lateral moves expected of

[433] Interviews 43, 60 and 69, diaspora beneficiaries and advisors, Garowe and Mogadishu, May and September 2017. See also 'Standoff emerges as Interior Minister suspends his permanent secretary', Garowe Online, 22 July 2017 https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-standoff-emerges-as-interior-minister-suspends-his-permanent-secretary.

[434] Interviews 45 and 74, former Quest beneficiary and UNDP technical lead, Mogadishu and Garowe, September 2017. A clear policy objective stated by UNDP was an anticipated reduction (by 58 percent) of advisors to be transferred into civil servant positions (through WB CIP) by December 2017. See also 'Somalia Capacity Development – Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP)', UNDP, 31 December 2017, http://www.so.undp.org/content/dam/somalia/Reports/Q2_2017/CD-%20SIP%20-%20Second.pdf.

them to become PSs or move into more permanent civil service positions as they wished to maintain the perks of impermanence. According to an auditing consultant in Puntland who was being pursued by the World Bank to join the Minister of Finance in Mogadishu — 'I'm not going to be humiliated, I applied for the financial management expert position, the World Bank wanted me. I'm not going to be hired according to this harmonised pay scale. The $1500 wages would not work, [there's] no real clear sense of objective or desired impact here, not a sustainable strategy'[435].

As a result, CIP struggled to gain momentum or support from any of the stakeholders, and diaspora recruits and government could still negotiate better deals vis-à-vis alternative mechanisms that included IOM and direct engagement with donors[436]. The World Bank acknowledged this issue in its June 2017 report — 'Donor fragmentation enables government officials to shop around for the best deal (different salary scales, different recruitment procedures) and [this] keeps donors in the dark on potential areas of duplication and redundancy'[437]. This was certainly the case[438]. According to expatriate technical leads from USAID and UNDP, diaspora advisors in the Somali context were able to negotiate significantly higher salaries than in other post-conflict contexts and use the high salaries of international staff (average US$8,000-10,000) as a bargaining chip[439]. As one UK Somali diaspora, who runs an international organisation that operates through IOM MIDA, explained — 'diaspora

[435] He had also worked for UNDP (as international staff) before taking an IOM MIDA contract in 2011/2012 before being appointed as auditor general in Puntland in 2015. Interview 45, former auditor general and beneficiary, 5 October 2017.
[436] As of 2017, the Swedes, Fins and Dutch explicitly targeted interventions for their host diaspora. Interviews 81 and 85, Swedish attache and IOM programme staff, June 2017. The Swedish attaché indicated that the Swedish diaspora are lobbying now for such programmes to only benefit Swedes whereas other programmes are open to diaspora from other nationalities.
[437] 'Addressing priority capacity development needs in Somalia', *World Bank internal report*, June 2017. As one beneficiary indicated, he was on a one-year contract that the US was supporting through UNDP and has since secured additional contracts through EU, FINSOM, Sweden MIDA, and finally the WB focused on the Ministry of Finance (CIP program). Interview 54, diaspora recruit, Garowe, October 2017.
[438] There was considerable variation in the salaries diaspora recruits could acquire for the same job – anywhere from US$3,000 to US$9,000 per monthly. A 2013 USAID assessment of donor-funded technical assistance programmes found that salary scales for externally paid advisors averaged between US$3,000 and US$4,500 a month across organisations, although figures reported by individual programmes diverged on the basis of what diaspora could negotiate. IOM reported the streamlining of salaries as of 2017 that lowered them on average from $5,500 to $3,300, but UNDP reported higher overall salary rates through SIDP of about $7,000. Research Solutions Africa (2013), 'Harmonisation of Technical Assistance for the Government of Somalia,' report prepared for USAID. Reprinted in 'Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US$40 million to the Federal Government of Somalia for a Somalia Capacity Injection Programme', *World Bank*, 14 August 2015, p. 4; SIDP 2015, p. 65. Interview, Former Quest manager, Nairobi, June 2017.
[439] Interview 86, USAID technical advisor, Nairobi, 30 June 2017.

returnees making $9,000 a month as technical advisors won't give you an expert, when they know the UN makes $13,000, so organisations have to pay them more and many of them do'[440].

Diaspora returnees attributed inflated salary prices as required by the market in Somalia where a local could not usually live on less than $500 minimum per month, and where diaspora have to also cover extra-security costs[441]. As a result, those who did accept such CIP positions under reduced payment schemes indicated that they either hoped for a future World Bank job and saw such CIP advisory positions as a stepping stone to political positions or a job in an international organisation, and often offset potential losses by pursuing private sector jobs or starting consulting firms[442]. Others sought to make the lateral move to MP as they were coveted positions that would match the salary of $3300 and provided greater access to an influx of Gulf patronage, closer relationships between donors and diaspora caucuses, and were now an empowered institution in negotiating federal power structures (see 4.3). Given the market considerations, the move to MP was certainly more common than the transition from advisor to permanent secretary, as expected by the WB, because many advisors refused to accept the drastic pay cut[443].

Yet, for many diaspora recruits, who preferred to stay at the boundaries of the international and domestic system, were concerned about the political losses of seeking any such political positions. Many recruits preferred the fluid rotation between advisor positions and placements in international NGOs or transnational experts. For instance, Farmajo's choice of national security advisor in December 2017 had formerly served as: a technical advisor between 2004 and 2005 for President Abdullahi Yusuf, the former country director for the NISF in Mogadishu, and as regional security advisor for EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa until assuming his advisor position within Farmajo's administration but still with a

[440] Interview 70, international organization representative, Mogadishu, 12 December 2016.
[441] Interview 60, diaspora recruits, Mogadishu, 19 May 2017.
[442] Ibid.
[443] This was the case, for instance, with Interior Ministry Juha who had tried to appoint one of his close advisors (from Puntland) as a PS in order to counter the political appointment, but the advisor refused to accept this drastic pay cut and resigned. See also 'Standoff emerges as Interior Minister suspends his Parliament Secretary', *Garowe Online*, 23 July 2017, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-standoff-emerges-as-interior-minister-suspends-his-permanent-secretary; 'Prime Minister appoints ex-Permanent Secretary as advisor', *Garowe Online,* 1 August 2017, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-prime-minister-appoints-ex-permanent-secretary-as-an-advisor.

salary covered by the EU[444]. In other cases, for instance, Tarzan Nuur (former member of the SCG) had been a former councillor in Camden before becoming Mayor of Mogadishu from 2004 until 2010, then senior political advisor for President Farmajo before securing an appointment to a prominent position as Ambassador to Kenya in 2018 (also a less politically controversial post)[445]. Similar to Tarzan Nuur, Abdirahman Osman 'Yarisow', after leaving the UK in October 2008, held various ministerial posts under Sheikh Sharif, before becoming senior advisor and spokesperson for Farmajo when he was Prime Minister. He had also served as senior advisor for Hassan Sheikh's next two PMs. In March 2013, he became the senior advisor/spokesperson for Hassan Sheikh, and then, from April 2014-March 2017, he once again became Minister of Information (what he refers to as the strategic advisor for the whole government), before assuming the position of Mayor of Mogadishu in 2018[446].

In each case, these positions came with prestige and reputation that would often be lost if they pursued ministerial or permanent posts. They saw the advisor positions as acknowledging their critical roles as moral and political guarantors, and demonstrative of their 'international capital', through which they could perform their long-standing personal relationships with donors and diaspora communities[447]. Thus, the role of advisor aligned with strategies of transience, impermanence and presenting as a global citizen that diaspora preferred to retain rather than any permanent return and civil service reform agendas. As Tarzan Nuur explained, his appointment as senior political affairs advisor to President Farmajo in 2016 allowed him to 'critically stay outside the government, before making the transition into more secure political appointments when the system settles', and this would be the Ambassador to Kenya in 2018[448]. On the one hand, advisors served as an important way in which diaspora returnees could

[444] Interview 50 and 51, Dutch-Somali diaspora and national security advisor, Mogadish, 28 May 2017. He was the third security advisor since Farmajo's election in January 2017, a relative of Fahad Yasin's wife. His decision came after careful deliberation for nearly a year. He weighed different options – Farmajo, after careful salary and opportunity negotiations with the government and the international community about security posts, clearly did not see a ministerial post as a viable option (not only due to clan issues). 'Maxaad ka taqaan la-taliyaha cusub ee Madaxweyne Farmaajo u magacaabay dhinaca Amniga..?', *Goobjooge online*, 23 December 2017, https://goobjooge.net/maxaad-ka-taqaan-la-taliyaha-cusub-ee-madaxweyne-farmaajo-u-magacaabay-dhinaca-amniga-akhriso/.

[445] Interview 65, Tarzan Nuur, Mogadishu, 19 May 2017. See 'President Farmajo appoints former mayor as his new political advisor', *Garowe Online*, 02 August 2017, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-president-farmajo-appoints-former-mayor-as-his-new-political-adviser.

[446] Interview 61, Minister Yarisow, Mogadishu, 17 September 2017.

[447] Interviews 54 and 77, political analyst and professor, Mogadishu, September 2017. For one exception, see 'Cabinet endorses Director of Communication's Authority', *Garowe online*, 19 February 2018, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/press-releases/somalia-cabinet-endorses-director-of-communications-authority.

[448] Interview 65, Tarzan Nuur, Mogadishu, 19 May 2017.

perform and serve as brokers of international capital and authority, without the risk that came with political office. On the other hand, for political elites, advisors were brokers of state authority and able to fulfil patronage expectations and secure access to resources. As one respondent explained, 'there was political re–incarnation, people without positions hovering and absorbed within the system (appointed as roving ambassadors or technocratic assistants), and there is a maintenance and protection of these old networks'[449]. The following section looks at how the entry of new donors had coincided with shifts within programmes and heighted political competition and the extent to which technocratic assistance programmes were hijacked by political elites to dispense patronage.

### *6.4.1 Donor complicity in forms of competition and elite strategy*

It was evident that certain new donor entrants — particularly, key Nordic strategic players[450] including Sweden[451] (a long-term support for such programmes) and Norway[452] (a new entrant) — had fewer qualms about engaging in direct ways with their diaspora populations and faced greater domestic political pressures to support more permanent return (see Introduction). Increasing donor discretion over diaspora return programmes was made easy by the extent to which the IOM, unlike the World Bank, did not operate under a trust fund, which meant that donors could exert direct influence and authority over the recruitment and appointment

[449] Interview 43, diaspora recruit, Garowe, 3 October 2017.
[450] See Tellander and Horst 2017. Sweden and Norway now constitute the fourth and fifth largest individual aid donors to Somalia (behind the US and the EU). For Norway, this is linked also to clear geostrategic interests in oil/gas but also the extent to which 75,000 Somali diaspora represent the largest immigrant population. See Thomas L. Weiss (2007), 'The Migration and Development Nexus in Africa: Contributions from the Somali Diaspora and experiences from IOM', in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.)*The Role of Diasporas in Peace, Democracy and Development in the Horn of Africa*, 172.
[451] Somalia was the fourth biggest recipient of aid from SIDA in 2016 with a focus that has been tied to peacebuilding processes. See Nauja Kleist, Somali-Swedish diaspora engagement in the Somali region, *Open Democracy*, 30 May 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/nauja-kleist/somali-swedish-diaspora-engagement-in-somali-regionInterview; Nauja Kleist, 'Somali Diaspora Groups in Sweden Engagement in Development and Relief Work in the Horn of Africa', DELMI policy brief and DIIS working paper series, 18 April 2018. 'Swedish agency's initiative to benefit Somali private sector', *Daily Nation*, 20 April 2018, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/diaspora/Swedish-agency-s-initiative-to-benefit-Somali-businesses-/2107720-4491448-9yebccz/index.html.
[452] In a critical move, Norfund also commenced in June 2018 providing small collateral loans ahead of IFC entrance and application for debt relief. https://norad.no/en/front/about-norad/news/2018/norwegian-development-aid-in-2017/. Interviews also, Norway embassy attaché and UDI, December 2017. 'Now is the time to invest in Somalia', Norfund press release, 23 June 2018 https://www.norfund.no/newsarchive/now-is-the-time-to-invest-in-somalia-article13132-1011.html.

process[453]. According to one diaspora recruit reflecting on the programme post-2015, the programmes became 'more funding driven rather than necessarily needs driven'. Donors were able to drive their own agendas and government ministries and diaspora recruits could shop around for the best deal — often through direct lobbying efforts of embassies[454]. By contrast, the US, Canada and the UK notably did not support such programmes on the whole and significantly higher contributions came from continental European and Nordic countries[455]. Certainly, the US, Canada, and UK engaged in other indirect and direct forms of the 'diaspora option' that included strongly supporting diaspora members to fill senior positions in governments of post-conflict countries (Weiss 2007: 10).

Nonetheless, Norway was a particularly important new entrant in 2017 as a strong supporter of such programmes following the election of Norwegian-Somali diaspora, Hassan Khayre, as Prime Minister. As scholars have indicated, Norway has always supported its diaspora more directly (when compared to other donors) through more direct support for diaspora political organisation and charities in the homeland and then through state-led development programmes. For instance, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Utviklingsfondet provided significant support to the advancement of diaspora, but were also deeply embedded in the nature of network-based and highly personalised state and political relationships. Norwegian officials in the top offices often circulate between top development and foreign affairs posts (see Weiss 2007; Tellander and Horst 2017; Webersik et al. 2018).[456] Such relationships, that are evident at the top levels of Norwegian government, also unfold within the context of return and donor engagement with diaspora[457]. Diaspora returnees, like Kahyre, and the former Speaker of the Parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari, have used these networks to their political

[453] Interview 86, USAID technical advisor, Nairobi, June 2017. The trust fund was by no means a full-proof model. As one USAID technical advisor indicated, donors could still exert influence over the WB trust – 'donors contribute overall to the multi-fund, and although they cannot legally advise where the money goes, there are of course ways around this. We can suggest we want it to be directed towards economic governance or justice reform through Nairobi circles'.
[454] Interview 61, Minister Yarisow, 17 September 2017.
[455] Contributions from the US and Canada were notably sparse due to their hesitancy towards engaging in any diaspora return programming. Interviews 85 and 86, USAID and IOM team leads, Mogadishu and Nairobi, June and August 2017.
[456] Early selections 'Proxies, powers, and presidents', *Africa Confidential,* 8 May 2018. See for resignation, 'Somalia's top military chiefs resign, no reason given', *Reuters*, 12 October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/somalias-top-military-chiefs-resign-no-reason-given-idUSKBN1CH2IA. Khayre's roles as head of NRC commanded certain critical access to and support from the labour party that shaped certain channels of communication between the PM and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway and entry points for political influence.
[457] They circulate between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Nordic International Support Foundation (NISF) and ministerial offices).

advantage in brokering legitimacy, authority and forms of financial contracts. Khayre himself was the former Country Director for NRC in Norway, having been groomed by Jawari who, once in power, appointed other top NRC/NISF staff to his government – including the Minister of Education (Abdirahman Dahir Osman) and Defense Minister (Abdirashid Abdullahi Mohamed).

When it came then to the relationship between the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and these new donors, particularly around the question of staffing in February of 2017, Norway and Sweden rapidly mobilised.[458] They provided recruitment support and direct salaries to civil servants outside the formal parameters of IOM MIDA programming[459]. Concerns were of course raised about how such advisory positions — including for security, political affairs, strategic communications and foreign affairs, as well as a number of untitled positions — were forming a shadow cabinet to circumvent or manage unruly ministerial posts. Even further, as some reported, a group of diaspora advisors (remotely controlled by donors) was fuelling the expansion of a diaspora ruling class. In reality, the PM himself played a marginal role and, instead, recruits (both new and those in former administrations) lobbied donors for high profile positions and threatened to leave — explaining their indispensability and seeking better contracts[460]. In one key example, a PS within the OPM (a civil servant position) had his salary covered by the Swedes but ultimately resigned, citing bad relations with the Prime Minister. He was then, in turn, offered the post of lead policy advisor for the donor-led Somali Stability Fund (SSF)[461]. In the cases where advisors were accommodated for political reasons (to avoid clan disputes), a few key advisors acted with immunity which reinforced the perception, on the one hand, of extraverted state authority and, on the other hand, of incapacity and illegitimacy[462].

[458] The OPM has always enjoyed close relationships with donors given its role in coordinating aid agendas, ministerial appointments and the successful implementation of many donor-driven agendas.
[459] Interviews 69 and 72, diaspora recruits, Mogadishu, May 2017. Khayre had requested 19 or 20 positions but IOM agreed to fill 10 positions. These included Mohamed Abdirisaq as governance advisor (previous head of NDI) and Abdirisaq Duku as democratisation advisor, national security. See also 'Farmaajo & Kheyre Appoint a Record 40 "Advisors" Since Taking Office', Radio Dalsan, 5 August 2017, http://radiodalsan.com/en/farmaajo-kheyre-appoint-a-record-40-advisors-since-taking-office/.
[460] The first contract provided to the PS was justified by one Swedish official – 'if we don't, he'll leave and that would be disastrous, they're all threatening to leave'. He was also able to secure other contracts for two of his close associates (one of which was also a Swedish diaspora). Interview 81, Swedish attache, Nairobi, June 2017.
[461] Interview 72, government advisor, Mogadishu, 10 September 2017.
[462] Interviews 41, 42, 69 and 72, diaspora recruits, Garowe and Mogadishu, May and September 2017. See also, 'Somalia Capacity Development – Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP)', UNDP, 31 December 2017, http://www.so.undp.org/content/dam/somalia/Reports/Q2_2017/CD-%20SIP%20-%20Second.pdf, p.9.

The purpose and objectives of the advisor schemes had clearly shifted — not only did accepting foreign salaries no longer affect advisors' capacity to do their jobs, it was now required [463]. By 2012, what some would call a 'new warlordism' had emerged, whereby 'access to donor resources bought you legitimacy, and the importance of reputation mattered less than the rents and influence one could secure'[464]. A combination of factors had contributed to this trend in Somalia — namely, the increased legibility and 'scalability' of donor resources, low capital environments but high price of loyalty, and the increasing pressures of diaspora returnees for political incorporation. Farmajo's election and campaign processes had increased the number of diaspora voluntarily returning, who were contesting and losing political positions (parliamentary or senate elections). As a result, advisor positions were used as political accommodation. Farmajo used these programmes to reward allegiances but also settle political scores[465]. The issue was less that these mechanisms were becoming ways to vet future politicians but it was more, first, the diminished transparency in the recruitment of diaspora advisors (occurring directly among embassies, ministries and diaspora recruits). Second, it was the complicity, and even active politicking, by donors to achieve a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their returning diaspora, that would have implications for state authority, accountability structures and the authority of the offices they represented. As one local observer noted:

> Previously, individuals from the diaspora would request and apply for positions while they were in their country of residence and after being accepted they would come to work to the regions they applied for. But of late … the diaspora individual will go to a high government office, where they have a relative or close friend and they will request to become a consultant, afterwards either the close friend or relative in the Ministries will send the formal request to the agencies that run the project. Therefore, the government office will facilitate the request of the diaspora individual interested in this

[463] Interview 59, former PS at Ministry of Information, 18 May 2017. Back in 2009, accepting a foreign salary affected their legitimacy and reputation. As one former recruit recounts, of turning down a US salary, 'it gave me a good reputation and I could follow through with my programs. If I was getting paid through them, I wouldn't have been able to say anything, or do anything, no longer have any power'.
[464] Interview 59, Swedish diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.
[465] Interview 51, national security advisor, 28 May 2017. 'Building Trust in Government of Somalia Proposes Eleven Major Solutions', *Horn Observer*, 30 April 2018. http://hornobserver.com/articles/810/Building-Trust-in-Government-of-Somalia-Proposes-Eleven-Major-Solutions.

opportunity, by sending a request letter to the agencies indicating the need for this person to work as a consultant within the ministry and to be offered a contract[466].

The administrations were certainly coping with higher requests for accommodation by diaspora returnees but donors were also supporting their own interests[467]. There was no doubt that donors' objectives were less than altruistic. As one bureaucrat explained, such programmes in Somalia are driven by three main reasons: '1) because of shifts in domestic immigration policies, 2) out of Western conceit, where diaspora show their success and float the international values and system, and 2) Western donors also need to establish good relations with these administrations for their programmatic agendas, with the indication if "he's back he'll be a friend to the USA (because we helped him)'[468]. The broader concerns about such programmes are issues of accountability and responsibility, whether these schemes serve the temporary transference of skills or permanent return (under whose authority or command), and the prospect of professionalising the state and administrative institutions. Scholars have highlighted critical debates around the performative state and about isomorphic mimicry, which occurs where these institutions resemble those expected by aid donors and are even created in their image with 'their people', but lack substance or operate according to different principles and logics (Andrews et al. 2017). Isomorphic mimicry is a key 'technique of successful failure' that perpetuates capability traps in the current third phase of development, conflating *form* and *function*, but are interpreted as successes within the international system (Chapter 7.3).

### 6.5 Regional variation and new elite strategy

The indication was that in Puntland and Somalia, where a multi-party political system was still nascent or nonexistent (as differed from Somaliland), new elites sought to more readily mobilise diaspora advisors to build systems of political loyalties under the banner of technocratic reform agendas. This worked as a strategy for expanding state authority due to a lower professionalisation of bureaucracy, higher degree of aid dependency and higher systems

[466] Quote by Suldaan Nayruus Xaaji Aadan, see 'What does the Quest-MIDA project contribute to the country and its people?', 15 April 2015, accessed at https://somaliagenda.com/quests-mida-qualified-expatriate-somali-technical-support/.
[467] Interview 68, MP Jubaland, Mogadishu, 9 December 2016.
[468] Interview 43, IOM Quest-Mida beneficiary, Garowe, 3 October 2017.

of spoils politics. Higher clientelistic expectations of bureaucratic and political office in Puntland and Somalia affected assumptions about the role of advisors and forms of relationships between diaspora recruits, ministerial officials and donors that embedded them more squarely in spoils politics. By contrast, Somaliland not only had a multi-party system through which to recruit diaspora for political office, but also a more professionalised bureaucracy and decreased access to statebuilding rents that decreased the appeal of such programmes generally and also the prospects for political advancement by such diaspora recruits. As some scholars have argued, diaspora in Somaliland also found politics localised and non-lucrative (Hansen 2008: 135). Many returned home after their brief placements in administrations but did not stay[469].

Looking at the shifts in the numbers of IOM placements across the three territories from 2013 until 2017, the refocusing of programmatic attention to Somalia coincided with an uptick in competition over these positions for political purpose — IOM reported, in 2013, around 75 in Somaliland, 50 in Puntland and 35 in Somalia. By 2017, the Federal Government of Somalia (including four member states) had a reported 235 advisors, while Puntland had 128 and Somaliland only 31. This increase in advisor schemes reflected the refocusing of aid around the federal structure, the extent to which donors required greater oversight over these programmes vis-à-vis seconded advisors, but also to the greater discretionary power of donors over such programmes. Despite the fact that the same external and programmatic shocks (in terms of harmonising payscale) were implemented across the three contexts, the World Bank reported greater successes in Somaliland and Puntland in programmatic gains for CIP. In additional, it could be argued that higher demands for statebuilding returns exacerbated the extent to which diaspora returnees within such programmes contributed to isomorphic mimicry and the perpetuation of systems of form rather than functionality. Such mimicry was characterised by autonomous action, incoherence and lack of cooperation. Thus, not only do these programmes increase the size of the candidate pool, but they also shape new forms of orientation around technocratic governance and statebuilding.

## 6.6 Conclusion

[469] Focus group discussion, Somaliland diaspora agency, Hargeisa, May 2017.

Technical assistance programmes operate as a critical component of the diaspora option at the intersection of shifting host-country pressures, development strategies and needs assessment, and which can trigger both bureaucratic and political transformation. As the Somali context demonstrates, these programmes were frequently hijacked by political elites who saw opportunities for performing statehood while also asserting greater control over key resources. These technocratic assistance programmes ultimately sought to shift the composition, scale and location of power to make the practices that sustained predatory, patronage-based politics more difficult, if not impossible. Yet, instead, such programmes provided new political resources and alliance possibilities; and, particularly in the case of Somalia and Puntland, they created a de facto class of political clients who sought to advances through the rungs of political power. Across the territories (although more so in Somalia and Puntland than in Somaliland), international donors were active participants in shaping and aiding the political ambitions of these recruits. Repeat contracts were easily secured by diaspora recruits where employment security[470] was not provided, where donors were uncoordinated and held competing visions about the diaspora option and the value of advisors within the different administrations. It was evident that donors preferred permanent return and continuity rather than temporary skills transfer.

Thus, in Somalia and Puntland, diaspora advisors became critical gatekeepers for international legitimacy surrounding the 'state', for overseeing and implementing donor contracts, but they also became politicians in their own right, or at the very least served as patronage distributers for political elites. This chapter demonstrates how such programmes contribute towards bolstering new economic and political alliances, by providing structures for political immunity, and for centralising control over critical human and financial capital. This is evidenced by the continuity amongst the key diaspora officials that dominate the top technocratic and development offices across the three cases (7.3). The internal implications were clear, such programmes and new alliances critically distanced ministerial and advisor accountability from systems of representative politics and certain forms of security procured through patron-client networks. These programmes also, importantly, centralised contributions from returning

[470] In other contexts, IOM has secured job security – for instance, in Iraq, where British Telecoms held the positions for engineers, allowing them to resume their former jobs. Interview, former QUEST manager, Nairobi, August 2017.

diaspora away from other forms of peace-building and reconciliation, instead aligning a younger generation of diaspora returnees with new ambitions focused on the 'state'[471].

[471] Interview, Minister Yarisow, Mogadishu, September 2017.

## Chapter 7: Comparative outcomes in Somaliland, Somalia and Puntland

> Once the political elites and diaspora delegates dominate the conference program and committees, the agenda shifts away from the critical issues of security and stabilization, local administrations, institutional building, humanitarian crisis, addressing deep seated grievances, past crimes and impunity, etc. Instead, the deliberations move to superficial reconciliation, political power sharing arrangements and intense campaigning for top seats in the newly formed institutions … Once in office many of these political actors show their limitations in terms of understanding the dynamics on the ground, as well as lack of critical political base and support from local populations. These limitations often force leaders of the respective transitional governments to rely more on external support, rather than seeking local legitimacy and indigenous solutions to the critical challenges on the ground[472].

The previous empirical chapters have demonstrated how in each case, diaspora-led administrations introduced and projected new forms of public authority — post-2009 in Somalia, post-2010 in Somaliland and post-2014 in Puntland. These administrations were characterised by greater elite fragmentation and autonomy, a lack of cohesion in policy and political agendas and negative partisanship that had a destabilising influence on systems of representative politics. They struggled to balance external and internal demands, build stable coalitions or contribute to democratic pluralism. This was due in part to: new clientelistic networks and forms of international partnerships; divisions or diversity of profiles; and clashes between conceptions of an 'idealised return' and local expectations. Their administrations were criticised for being elitist, beholden to international interests and unfolding in confrontation with local consultative decision-making and public debate. This empirical evidence suggests that elite and international agendas around the diaspora option reinforced forms of hegemonic power, social and economic exclusion around dominant policy networks, and confrontations with systems of representative politics. These trends are further explored in this chapter which explains four outcomes: 1) consensus-building, 2) security policy and arrangements, 3) economic policy, and 4) technocratic conceit.

As this chapter demonstrates, similarities emerge across the cases in how these administrations institute anti-conciliatory action, crackdowns on political opponents and policies of economic extraversion. A shrinking inner core of political power around a group of diaspora politicians sought refuge in international partnerships and the institutions of the state to renegotiate

[472] Anonymous. 'Assessing the Structural Limitations that undermine the transitional institutions and proposals for resolving', *Hiiraan Online*, 27 March 2011.

existing power relationships, and to depart from 'consensual politics' and consultative action. They focused on new economic opportunities and political alliances (including around transnational business interests) to consolidate authority. In addition, an alignment of international and new elite strategy around the diaspora option coincided with new forms of elite predation (Reno 2015) around narratives of technocratic governance and the use of 'state logics' (Hoehne 2018). In particular, these new diaspora-led administrations used institutions and reform agendas — namely, public financial management, bureaucratic efficiency and performative stateness — to consolidate power in ways that were socially and economically exclusive. The conceit of technocratic governance under diaspora leadership is that, while the 'diaspora option' effectively legitimises governing administrations in line with broader statebuilding benchmarks (around form rather than function), moving the Somali state up the international stage, it disrupts rather than resolves social tensions and political cleavages.

Sections 7.1 and 7.2 outline certain outcomes relating to elite fragmentation and anti-conciliatory political agendas. Section 7.3 then outlines how 'performative' politics constitute a critical aspect of new forms of public authority tied to diaspora politicians, new public management (Henman and Gabel 2018), and isomorphic mimicry (Andrews et al. 2017). Section 7.4 then looks in-depth at key economic and security policy agendas that expose a misalignment in priorities, top-down agendas (rather than oriented around public debate) and performances around international partnerships. The final section (7.5) contributes to a broader theorisation about the characteristics and conceit of technocratic governance as implemented by diaspora politicians in systems of fragile politics. The technocratic narrative in political discourse has been associated for decades with the legitimising narratives of different diaspora politicians and administrations. The technocratic conceit is linked to the lofty but unfulfilled promises of past diaspora politicians, the symbolic valence of expertise over local knowledge and the local understanding that this class of diaspora technocrats is actually more political than previous generations of non-diaspora technocrats.

### 7.1 Diaspora brokers, elite fragmentation and anti-conciliatory politics

Across the three cases, diaspora-led organisations and administrations faced difficulty in building coalitions — from the national liberation movements through to political parties. Such trends can be attributed, on the one hand, to the diversity of profiles and experience (on the

basis of geographic, generational and occupational diversity). On the other hand, it can refer to the relationships, pressures and interests (from other diaspora, clans and diaspora-donor partnerships) that may disincentivise cooperation. The broader association between diaspora politicians, organisations and fragmentation is not a new finding. For instance, scholars have long highlighted a strong correlation between diaspora liberation movements and dissolution, and the fragmentation of opposition groups in the diaspora (see 3.2, Brinkerhoff 2017; Lyons 2007, 2010)[473]. Scholars have noted a diminished capacity to compromise or build cross-coalitions among diaspora, as well as highly personalistic campaigns tied to forms of symbolic power. As Terrence Lyons argues, fragmentation occurs where the cost of refusing compromise is lower for diaspora, with rewards for demonstrating steadfast commitment higher (2007: 31). Diaspora groups and individuals have been found to be less likely to support reconciliation efforts than local elites because they have less to lose in any interaction and given their impermanent commitment or ability to leave (Lyons 2007: 41). Across Somali history and territories, diaspora-led political movements were associated with a long line of broken negotiation processes or missed opportunities for reconciliation. Diaspora politicians also pushed harder lines on issues of secessionism in line with state logics, by virtue of their access to the international stage and their exit ticket. Such decisions were also driven by a politics of insecurity, perceptions of threats around them and their lack of knowledge of the local context.

This thesis also offers some original insights for understanding how such fragmentation and anti-conciliatory action is linked to the role that diaspora returnees play as political brokers within the international and state system, which has been under-theorised. New clientelistic arrangements between diaspora, donors and political parties diminish responsiveness to local claims, distort structures of accountability, disincentivise cooperation and even contribute to forms of 'negative partisanship' (Way 2002; Frye 2001). The paradox of brokerage and gatekeeper politics is that their power (based on their access to new resources and forms of recognition) may push leaders towards monopolistic, outward-facing and autonomous action that may make them poor patrons, leaders or representatives. Their impermanence and links to new international, economic and political alliances —– whether aid rents, donor-diaspora partnerships and host-country relations — may fracture notions of social obligation and

[473] Lyons contemplates this association with why Ethiopia had 75 opposition parties by 2015 (the large majority of which still resided in the diaspora rather than in country). See also Felix Horne, 'Elections, Ethiopian style', *Al Jazeera English*, 5 May 2015, accessed at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/04/elections–ethiopian–style–150430084220440.html.

kinship. In addition, the 'obscure' networks, capital and objectives associated with the 'international' may further delegitimise the state and the new elites that lead it. The issue of societal unresponsiveness and transparency in networks, objectives and policy was acutely tied to departures from consensus-building, as well as in other policy decisions.

Presidents Silanyo, Farmajo and Gaas were each heavily criticised for their anti–conciliatory and combative temperaments[474]. In the immediate post-war era and throughout the interim administrations, being seen as conciliatory and humble, not arrogant, was a critical aspect of post-war political negotiations. The accumulative trauma of authoritarianism, civil war and warlordism had created motivations around selecting diaspora candidates. The diaspora elites, who dominated Somali politics from 2000–2009, were selected by clans and the international community on the particular basis of being consensus–oriented leaders, or technocrats, who could mediate between warring parties and who had less skin in the game. Being conciliatory is always a highly subjective quality of a leader and is used more effectively as a highly public and tactical ploy and as a signal to the international community. For diaspora politicians, it led to leaders being categorised as weak, that emboldened moves to replace diaspora with strongmen leaders (this occurred in the 2004 Mbagathi conference, where the TFG was seen as a return to warlordism after a dalliance with diaspora leadership). The subsequent generation of diaspora politicians were statebuilders, like Gaas and Farmajo, who made stronger claims to state logics in establishing a base and projecting power by securing territorial boundaries, economic development and developing efficient political process to stay in power.

As such diaspora politicians associated consensus-building with 'regressive' political practice — they saw it as opaque and inefficient but also ultimately unattainable for them politically. In differentiating themselves from their predecessors, these politicians pledged to be doers rather than a talkers, and associated consensus–building with inaction and talking as endemic to Somali politics. As one former member of the Saudi Group and advisor for Waddani party explained, the conciliatory politics offered by the old SNM politicians, including Musabixi, was associated with unpragmatic, outwardly hostile and antagonistic actions, and seen as debilitating ambitions around Somaliland's international recognition, economic development and political maturity. He challenges the conciliatory action associated with the SNM and its

[474] Focus group discussions APD, PDRC, and SDA, Hargeisa, Garowe and Mogadishu, May and September 2017. See also, https://wardheernews.com/wp–content/uploads/2017/08/The–Floundered–Presidency–of–Puntland–By–Faisal–Roble.pdf.

reportedly 'democratic' forms of politics as not rooted in any genuine reconciliation. As he explains:

> For the last 26 years, we [Somaliland] have been stable but no one is going to recognise us as it is, we need to take a larger role, be a bigger player, and thus, be more pragmatic – being democratic was tied to SNM type of leadership from the beginning, but back then we were not pragmatic, but militaristic, we need to move beyond that mentality, we cannot deceive ourselves that this is consensual politics based on any form of reconciliation[475].

His critic of consensus-based politics is part of broader debates around hybrid governance, which have been lauded within international policy and academic circles, but Bubba is also expressing here the specific challenges consensus-building poses for consolidating stability, power and recognition. He challenges how consensual, inclusive and conciliatory forms of politics, associated with the SNM, were referring to systems of representative politics, the roles of traditional institutions and norms about public engagement[476]. Yet, consensus-building is important in the political imaginations of Somalis as it is a transparent, public and commonly-understood political practice (Interpeace 2009, 2018). The ways in which these diaspora leaders (Gaas, Silanyo and Farmajo) actively refused to engage in consensus–building activities occurred at the local, regional and international level. This departure was reflected in how diaspora leaders, when campaigning or undertaking any sort of economic or political deal, failed to reach out to different groups — for instance, religious leaders, clan elders and other political activists on key issues. It also took shape in the absence of public debate on key issues (constitutional issues, security and economic reform agendas, revenue and resource-sharing), and was linked to broader concerns about diminished transparency of agenda, networks and personnel. As explained by one interview respondent in Mogadishu in reference to the early months of Farmajo's administration in 2017:

[475] Interview 19, Ismail Bubba, former member of the Saudi Group, parliamentarian during the TFG, and chief political advisor to Waddani, 20 October 2017.
[476] Interview 16, Bubbe (last name unknown), intellectual and local activist, advisor to the Academy for Peace and Development, 15 November 2016. As he described on Somaliland, 'Consensus is working for fewer and fewer people. Elders fight for more patronage posts, not for the average people, working for themselves, the average person wants to move beyond clan consensus and rules that also work for them … consensus–based politics is slowly starting to work for a smaller, and smaller group of clan elites'.

> No one is talking and saying anything, and it is clear that everyone has their hidden agenda … all we see is *mujamela* (blah blah), nothing is being said openly. Talking to each other but not really talking[477].

This break with conciliatory action was also evidenced by the aversion of Farmajo's administration to the federal agenda. Emerging out of Mbagathi in 2004, the federal agenda was a way to support a transition through a politics of consensus — namely, between warlords, traditional leaders and economic elites (Menkhaus 2008). As one respondent described, 'all diaspora politicians have convinced themselves that the issue behind political instability and insecurity, rather than a crisis of leadership, is the federal system as it emboldens the power of local elites'. As he explains further:

> Diaspora politicians believe the federal is the problem, locals know how to solve their problems and can understand how to work together even if the federal is the model. The FGS led by diaspora will compete with local on a very real level and the concept of federalism will be lost. At the federal government level and even at the level of the federal member states, it is competition between diaspora, it's a deeply personal fight between diaspora and local elites, ignoring each other, no one is talking to each other[478].

In response, new lines of political competition have emerged that include the rise of large political alliances to protect the sanctity of conciliatory politics. These have included movements and platforms outside of formal political party politics to contest the politics of new ambitious diaspora elites, but also where some former diaspora groups have sought to pursue more moderate positions (and to reclaim their political and moral authority over the political agenda). For instance, in Somaliland, this occurred first with the emergence of the *Madasha* political platform to contest Silanyo's candidacy[479]. Abdulkadir Jirdeh's conflict resolution initiative in 2017 served a similar purpose — it worked as a corrective platform to

[477] Interview 67, former member of the SCG and aspiring presidential candidate, 23 May 2017.
[478] Interview 55, former member of the ICU and professor at Mogadishu university, 7 September 2017.
[479] Interview 6, Mohamed Hashi Elmi, former member of the Saudi Group and Minister of Finance (2009 until 2011), and current member of the Madasha platform, 30 November 2016. Serving as a pressure group, as one member recounts, the *Madasha* platform criticises Kulmiye's national commitment, remaining virulently nationalistic (proponents of self–sufficiency, against corruption and international aid that is reportedly at the root of dysfunction, as well as against discussions with Somalia and the military base), and it stresses the importance of discussion and open debate as foundational elements of the SNM that should be carried forward. Although the *Madasha* would tentatively support Waddani in 2016, they had withdrawn support after Abdirahman Cirro was appointed as Waddani's chairman and presidential hopeful in 2008.

policies of the Kulmiye government that maintained the status quo and the failures of Waddani's own party conduct in the 2017 elections[480]. In Somalia, in 2016, groups like *Wadatashi*, headed by a former member of the Somali Concern Group, Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, sought to challenge the current political party formula by pushing forward an agenda of national dialogue. As he described, 'the aim here is debate and negotiation, as no one in this current administration is talking to each other'[481]. The Puntland Focus Group that emerged around 2014 served a similar purpose and became a successful platform through which Abdullahi Said Dini would win the election against the incumbent Gaas in 2018 (in a context where a multiparty system has yet to emerge)[482]. Importantly, each of these national dialogue forums, focus groups or political initiatives preached anti-party politics agenda, a return to consensus politics and sought recognition by the international community on the value of local forms of mediation and interventions in the face of critical shifts occurring at the top level of leadership (see also 8.3).

### 7.2 Performative politics and policy agendas

Diaspora identity construction and the participation of diaspora in debates about nationalism and processes of categorisation are always performative (Seoighe 2015), as are political discourses more broadly. Political discourses often create the reality they describe through 'spectacle, stimulation and state management' (see Butler 2013). The Somali concept of *fadhi ku dirir* (translated as 'fighting while seated') has the connotations of a type of political discourse and practice that refers directly to the performative dimensions of diaspora politics. The concept emerged during the civil war to refer specifically to how diaspora participated in political discourse from afar – i.e. vis-à-vis the gathering of male diaspora in coffee shops and restaurants to debate politics. They were distant from the action but not without influence in shaping the political reality (see also Affi 2012). This concept refers to how political narratives were co-created in international and domestic space, but came to be associated with a particular

[480] See Liban Ahmed, 'Somaliland: Jirdeh's Conflict Resolution Initiative', MENAFN, November 30 2018, accessed at https://menafn.com/1097771159/Somaliland–Jirdehs–Conflict–Resolution–Initiative.
[481] Interview 67, Abdirahman Abdishakur (Warsame), former member of the SCG and aspiring presidential candidate, 23 May 2017. The group is comprised mainly of intellectuals, not currently a part of the administration, that intended to assist the government in setting an agenda at the regional level, which included a reconciliation framework, engaging over key contentious issues among institutions, ministries and local regional parliament.
[482] Interviews 48 and 49, researcher and former local businessman and government advisor, 8 October 2017. See 'Puntland Focus Group concerned about current situation in the State, warns Election delay', Garowe Online, 25 February 2018, accessed at https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/press–releases/somalia–puntland–focus–group–concerned–about–current–situation–in–the–state–warns–election–delay.

form of 'emotional, reductionist clan discourse'[483]. As one respondent explained, it emerged during the civil war 'when taxi drivers took breaks at local coffee shops to roast each other at clan or sub clan level because there wasn't a government to blame … then they continued to roast each other for the ills of regimes or other political elites'[484]. In such contexts, often grouped amongst their clans, 'home and its affective ties are reconstituted, giving some semblance of life before displacement, while at the same time re-creating the fraught conditions of the Somali political present'[485].

Now, *fadhi ku dirir* is used much more widely to refer in the current political environment of diaspora-led governance — to refer to the lack of qualifications of the majority of their leaders and to the political debates that capture political performances (of authority and of stateness). Thus, it refers specifically to how diaspora politicians perform international partnerships and forms of recognition in order to build internal legitimacy. Politics always constitute 'partly real, partly theatre', but which are more pronounced in contexts of 'extreme donor dependence' (Harrison 2001: 676; see also Pellerin and Mullings 2013). Scholars in African Studies have highlighted public enactments of development and statebuilding discourse in how Africa's elites stage elections (Moss 2014), perform peace agreements that are fragile and 'virtual' (Mulaj 2017)[486]. As Chapter 5 also demonstrates, elections are often spectacles or theatres of deep performative action, where diaspora elites perform for international audiences, rather than local constituencies, in the absence of popular elections. As such, understanding and discerning performance and performative actions has become a critical component of political analysis in contemporary Africa.

As scholars suggest, performance can highlight the 'dirtiness' of the neoliberal project that is embattled and combative, underpinned by external interventions (both overt and internalised) but can also capture material fragility of African states and power asymmetries (see Larner 2000). It captures the unequal power relations that exist between IFIs, donors, states and NGOs that are often complex, halting, contested and contradictory (Campbell and Pedersen 2001: 3). In addition, it reflects the limited ability of a select group of core actors (elites and policy

[483] Interview 43, IOM Quest-Mida beneficiary and government advisor, Garowe, 3 October 2017.
[484] Ibid.
[485] See Safia Aided, 'The Cafe Talkers of Somalia Fighting While Seated', Popula, 1 August 2018 https://popula.com/2018/08/01/the-cafe-talkers-of-somalia/.
[486] For instance, in the contexts of Rwanda, scholars refer to the notion of 'modernization as spectacle' to refer to the RPF's policies of 'imposed modernity' and the Potemkin cleaning of rural villages with few sustainable gains (Ansoms 2012).

communities involved in its formulation)[487] to represent the myriad number of policy makers or stakeholders who should be included in debates about macroeconomic, social and political reforms (Harrison 2001). Such 'policy networks' have been shown to be 'a serious threat to democracy because they challenge some of the most fundamental organising principles for the traditional institutions of representative democracy' (Sørensen and Torfing 2004: 21). Furthermore, this concept refers to the instability, contingency and ambiguity in attempts to govern uncertainties embodied in neoliberal development and state–building paradigms. As Bob Jessop argues, participatory forms of governance[488] are always performative — they are 'a self–reflexive means of coping with the failures, contradictions, dilemmas and paradoxes that are an inevitable feature' of the governance complex (2003: 19).

It is indisputable that diaspora leadership was mainly performative, given its links to state logics in contexts of limited stateness, security restrictions and the criteria of 'good behaviour' for which they were assessed by international actors. On the one hand, in Mogadishu and to a lesser extent in Garowe, such performative governance was clearly demonstrated in how, due to insecurity and restrictions on leaving the parameters of Halane or the secured 'green zone', diaspora were often under strict security protocol for movement. On the other hand, such performative governance was captured in how diaspora advisors, technocrats and donors constitute the 'policy community' — widely known as the 'Nairobi Mafia' — where key decisions were made in Nairobi rather than in Garowe or Mogadishu. The 'Nairobi Mafia', as was frequently referenced by respondents in discussing diaspora politicians, constituted a type of 'political marketplace' (de Waal 2015) where diaspora returnees lobby for jobs and sell their political influence and credentials to key international players. Both forms of physical detachment reinforced the perception of a privatised and extraverted public sector under diaspora leadership, which had implications for their legitimacy[489]. Yet, in addition to the performative actions, Pierre Bourdieu (1977) conceives of 'performativity' as an important way to think about 'effects' that supply an alternative to causal frameworks, just as

[487] There is a performative dimension to the role of experts and politicians within what Brock et al. (2002) call 'policy communities' that includes discursive affinity in governance methods, techniques and even donor–funded expatriate advisory personnel in the state (Harrison 2004: 89–90).
[488] Governance refers to 'the commitment on the part of those [key stakeholders] involved to reflexive self–organisation in the face of complex reciprocal interdependence' (Jessop 2003: 101).
[489] This physical detachment was also linked to forms of insular and network-based politics. As the Heritage Institute of Peace (HIPS) reports, 'the lack of meaningful and daily interactions between diaspora and locals notably drove the perception that they are divisive and hold clannish attitudes' (Mohamud 2014). Diaspora returnees reportedly also found it easier—and more advantageous from a professional networking point of view—to socialise disproportionately with other diaspora returnees (Abdile and Pirkkalainen 2011; HIPS 2015).

'partnerships' may indicate a more insidious, covert and subtle expression of donor and IFI power, that may be disingenuous (Mercer 2003: 743)[490]. Reference to performativity counters a kind of positivism around delimited understandings of what the state, or in the case of diaspora return and governance, what the symbolic valence of expertise or technocratic forms of governance may be. This understanding is reflected in new research agendas around the performative state — where the repetitive enactments of activities, or adjustments to form, may be accepted as outcomes and represented as functional change. Thus, performance captures the ways in which international donors increasingly bestow legitimacy and financial resources on the basis of performance–based indicators, measurements and assessments of statebuilding agendas.

Two recent strands of research are particularly worth mentioning – namely, on isomorphic mimicry (Andrews et al. 2017) and new public management (Henman and Gable 2018). Henman and Gable (2018) explain changes in public management as constituting: a shifting focus from inputs and processes towards outputs and outcomes; a shift towards measurement and quantification through the development of performance indicators and performance targets; a preference for more specialised 'lean' or 'flat' and autonomous organisational structures (managerialism); a substitution of formal, hierarchical relationships between or within organisations with contracts and contract-like relationships; the marketisation of delivery of public services; the broadening and blurring the boundaries between the public sector, the market sector and the non-profit sector (mixed economy); and the shifting of value priorities away from universalism, equity, security and resilience towards efficiency and individualism. Each characteristic of this new public management system captures an important dimension of theorising around the diaspora option and technocratic governance — particularly in terms of the turn towards managerialism, new contract relationships, a focus on outputs and outcomes, and efficiency and individualism (see specifically technocratic assistance programmes 6.5).

Linked to this is the scholarship on isomorphic mimicry, which refers to policy agendas focused on mimicry of other governments' successes and replicating processes, systems and

[490] The focus on 'partnerships' recasts a more benign form of intervention that serves to conceal legible conditionalities (and which has become a structural disposition for indebted African states) (Harrison 2001). It refers to the power dynamics and varied interests, intentions and motivations operating within a script of 'good governance' that help to legitimise continued (structural) adjustment that serves both the interests of international and state actors.

even products of the 'best practice' examples. The latter places specific focus on 'agenda conformity'. As Andrew et al. (2017) argue, through isomorphic mimicry, legitimation is acquired from internal and external stakeholders by agreeing upon agendas, inputs and activities, rather than promoting accountability to hard targets or outcomes. Thus, legitimacy is achieved through simply imitating those forms, rather than through functionality or proven performance. What matters for sustained functional success is the *process* of arriving at state capability, not the form. Isomorphic mimicry is consistent with the observation that organisations and leaders are constantly engaged in 'reforms', putatively to improve performance, and yet very little performance is achieved (2017: 21). Various 'inputs' are readily evaluated as 'evidence' that change is in effect. These could include the 'creation of independent agencies, the implementation of procedural rules and the introduction of transparency mechanisms' (2017: 25). Countries are rewarded for producing these inputs with new loans, a clear path to debt forgiveness, and higher 'good governance' indicator scores. What often emerges is a top-down approach to capacity-building through 'which external role players impose themselves on local contexts and crowd out potential contributions local agents might make to change' (2017: 28).

The politics of diaspora return is critical to broader debates around new public management and isomorphic mimicry. Diaspora politicians may be better placed to perform isomorphic mimicry, where there is a predominant focus on form and efficiency rather than functional change. The following sections on policy reform look at how diaspora politicians engage in performative stateness and repurpose statebuilding agendas to serve political interest. It has been well-documented how diaspora politicians may hold policy priorities that may not coincide with the priorities of homeland state policy makers or state actors. Thus, for diaspora politicians, policy agendas may hold 'different priorities, functions and meanings' (Demmers 2007). In each case, security and economic reform agendas were the strong focus areas, rather than socio-political reforms. Each were pursued in ways that subverted public debate, while also undermining local security arrangements and traditional resilience structures. For security reform, measures included the increasing reliance on elite security and intelligence wings to crack down on political opponents, which disrupted local security arrangements. In terms of economic policy, diaspora leaders pursued strategies of greater economic extraversion with deference to new transnational business interests in ways that sought to renegotiate certain existing elite pacts or reinforce state control over the economy. Both policy agendas and

focuses, rather than an indication of economic or security transformation, were closely linked to new state logics around territorial boundaries, control and social and economic exclusion.

### 7.3 Security policy, elite control and local security arrangements

Across the three cases, security was a key policy agenda where local respondents expressed specific concerns about how the diaspora-led administrations addressed the issue. As one respondent described, 'how diaspora politicians think about security is entirely different — they are missing the local context (removed from the physical realities of security) … if the family is outside, they will be focused on other priorities or will have the wrong solutions in mind'[491]. As another explained, 'these diaspora don't really care about security (families aren't here) not the first priority at all … he can run to the airport, but for us security is our first priority every day'[492]. In Garowe, respondents retold a story of a police chief in Bosasso, an American–Somali diaspora who talks to his troops while Bosasso airport was under siege. The diaspora police chief says to his troops — 'you are responsible for security, I put you in charge, if the situation gets out of hand, I will just leave'. The young police officers responded, 'if things get really bad what airport will you use, it is occupied?'. Together, these quotes refer to multiple concerns around security reform agendas which include, on the one hand, how diaspora politicians may under-prioritise security reform, as reflective of their impermanence or lack of commitment. On the one hand, the Bosasso reference captures a critical component of policy agendas that often focused on replacing the top leadership of security institutions with the appointment of diaspora to top security posts. Under Farmajo, such security reform agendas were clearly focused on form (the replacement of personnel), on reaching outputs and donor benchmarks, rather than addressing the underpinning sources of insecurity which were tied to inequality, the lack of clan reconciliation and the heavy presence of security forces.

Indicative of such policy priorities was Farmajo's primary campaign platform of cleaning Mogadishu[493]. His administration aimed to improve security by initially undertaking a comprehensive policy to disarm the city that was critical to his primary policy agendas (as

[491] Interview 55, former member of the ICU and professor at Mogadishu university, 7 September 2017.
[492] Interview 37, diaspora returnee and lead researcher at PDRC, Garowe, 18 April 2017.
[493] As Prime Minister, he got the SNA paid after a gap of several months and always asserted his determination to fight *Al Shabaab* and build an SNA that would make AMISOM redundant. Yet, by the end of his term in 2011, Farmajo was not considered honest as such, only 'less corrupt than the rest'. In 2011, there were several allegations of embezzlement for which he has not been held to account. See 'Cashing in on Chaos', *Africa Confidential*, 53 (5).

former PM), to the reform the Somali National Army (SNA) and to ensure the successful completion of the AU-UN Transitional Security Plan. These efforts to disarm the city failed almost immediately as they were economically costly and politically untenable. Farmajo was a political outsider to Mogadishu politics (given both his clan and diaspora status), and key clans and interest groups within Mogadishu mobilised quickly against the legitimacy of such security reform efforts, with the widespread sentiment being 'you disarm your clan first'[494]. In addition, a dangerous paradox emerged whereby the 'I Will Clean Mogadishu' initiative, which included large amounts of public outreach, increased the security for locals traversing the city. Accompanying Farmajo's administration was approximately 4,000 private security personnel in Mogadishu and, each time top officials moved, it brought the city to a standstill and actually increased the security risks for many local Somalis who had to seek alternative routes[495]. As one local activist explained — 'the PM and President do not understand security, they move too much (3 or 5 visits per day) that closes down all roads and brings the city to a standstill — it increases the risk for locals who have to seek out alternative, less secure routes'[496].

In addition, while it was widely agreed that Farmajo's commitment to the joint AU-UN Transitional Security Plan had made certain inroads in institutionalising and professionalising the offices of the security institutions, his shifts to hierarchies and command structures had aggravated certain clan tensions and overhauled important local security arrangements. Notably excluded from security reform agendas were religious leaders and the business community, and his preoccupation with replacing top security officials with diaspora returnees would backfire in many cases. For instance, within his first five months in government, five directors moved through the top NISA leadership, including Farmajo's first appointment, Mohamed Abdullahi 'Sanbololshe' (Hawadle/Hiraan, US-Somali diaspora and former Somali Ambassador to Turkey under HSM)[497]. Sanbololshe was a key example of a 'recycled' diaspora politician, having been an advisor to Sharif Hassan at ARS in 2007, and he represented strong relationships with local powerbrokers (that included the former president of South West State and Speaker of Parliament). Yet, pressures mounted quickly on the administration to remove Sanbololshe 'for his confrontational and public displays of authority'.[498] As one witness in

[494] Interview 78, clan elder and local activist (anonymised by request), Mogadishu, 5 September 2017.
[495] Each minister employs 10 to 20 security personnel, each MP 5 to 10, and each senior civil servant 5 to 8. These include personal, transport and house/office guards.
[496] Interview 55, former member of the ICU and professor at Mogadishu university, 7 September 2017.
[497] Interview 59, Swedish Somali diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.
[498] Interview 55, former member of the ICU and professor at Mogadishu university, 7 September 2017.

Mogadishu indicated, 'under his leadership NISA had caused conflict with the military in Mogadishu, and Sanbololshe started a superiority fight within the security apparatus — first with the military and then the police (the only trusted institution)'[499]. As another interview respondent explained, 'NISA had forgotten its role in dealing with sovereign threats, not street fights. Sanbololshe acted like a minister, appearing on TV, making speeches, this was not his role and it was a diaspora problem'[500]. Also, in breach of constitutional provisions, he was an MP who had been appointed to a technical position. This would occur again and again, as Farmajo sought to embolden technical positions with political heavy weights under his technocratic agenda and to buy the support of parliamentarians (see 4.5). Farmajo's final appointment to NISA was Fahad Yassin, his second in command and he transformed NISA into a secret weapon against opposition figures and journalists[501]. This occurred alongside the revival of Siad Barre's *guulwade,* now referred to as the *hoogaga wadaniyiinta* (patriotic forces), to demonstrate and perform support for Farmajo.

Another critical aspect of Farmajo's security reform agendas was his overt double-speak to international donors — characterised by public endorsements of US special military operations but then denouncements of forms of political interventions or subversion of policy agendas[502]. In terms of the former, through such public endorsements, he sought to assert domestic sovereignty over security by providing approval and permission while also seeking part of the acclaim for his security portfolio. Such endorsements were, however, unprecedented and implicated the government in any fallout from the operations, as well as gave the perception of the country being occupied[503]. The Barire calamity in 2016 proved one particularly disastrous case[504]. After the attack in 2016, the president (and his clan) were subsequently blamed for providing poor intelligence to the US and for even deliberately targeting a clan opposing the

[499] Interview 59, Swedish Somali diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.
[500] Interview 91, political advisor for the British High Commission, Nairobi, 19 September 2017.
[501] The UN monitoring group hinted at the interlaced suspicious engagement between the Intelligence Unit of Somalia (NISA) and the Islamists group of Al–Shabaab – that 'extensive infiltration of the agency by Al– Shabaab represents a significant threat to regional peace and security'. See UN, SMEG, November 2018.
[502] Other political errors included the impulsive handing over of ONLF and the extradition of Qalbi Dhagah. See Abukar Arman, 'Farmajo's betrayal of the Somali people', *Al Jazeera*, 25 September 2017, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/farmajo–betrayal–somali–people–170925083253104.html.
[503] Interview 67, former member of the SCG and aspiring presidential candidate, 23 May 2017.
[504] In August 2016, a joint U.S.–Somali raid in the town of Bariire killed members of the Habar Gedir clan. The U.S. military said they were Islamist militants but clan elders said they were civilians. Even members of a prominent family in Mogadishu were arrested in the days after. Interviews, Somali lawyer, ICG political analyst and professor, Nairobi and Mogadishu, September 2017. See Africa Research Bulletin, Volume 54, Issue 5, June 2017, also 'Somalia Blasts Expose Security Failings and Possible Shabab Infiltration', *New York Times*, 16 October 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/world/africa/somalia–shabab–bombings.html.

government[505]. The government was tasked with paying compensation, and the backlash against his administration escalated when ministers applauded the US for killing Al Shabaab terrorists. It was later revealed that the majority of those killed were not militants but civilians[506]. This was a test of political skill and acumen. HSM and Sheikh Sharif had played such public discourse and international security operations very carefully. They may have supported such operations, but never said so publicly and left external actors to be blamed, not the government[507].

In a similar way, Sheikh Sharif had balanced external demands and internal legitimacy requirements. He presented himself as moderate and committed to the democratic process, while also at times calling the US an enemy of Islam (Hoehne 2007). Yet, Farmajo's administration would frequently test the boundaries of international partnerships. In one key event, he evicted the UN Special Representative of the Security–General (SRSG) in December 2018 following the SRSG's criticism of the arrest of a presidential candidate in Southwest State by Farmajo's administration[508]. A tweet by the top security advisor of President Farmajo read, 'Do not interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia … this attitude is unwelcome!' In this way, Farmajo was able to perform his nationalist platform while in reality being entirely dependent on external legitimacy. As one respondent explained, Farmajo 'blames external acts, while begging for money and security support, it seems a mixed-up sort of politics'[509]. While Farmajo would adhere to form requirements around security reform agendas (around training and command structures), it was evident that he supported a more central security model that was at odds with the current regionally-based transitional model[510].

[505] It had also resurrected a history of bad relations between the US and the Habar Gedir. This historical grievance goes further back to 1993 and Aideed's fight against the US. The government was accused of feeding a conspiracy that Habar Gedir is trying to sabotage the US — 'Barire clear example of cinema for IC'. The US was made vulnerable to misinformation — chaos of actions, coordination mechanism, cut salary of a whole section of the SNA that targeted the Habar Gedir (on account of lobbying from other clans). Interview 59, Swedish Somali diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.

[506] In response, Khayre came out with a statement indicating that no minister can talk about any political issues without approval of the OPM. See 'Somalia: PM bans Ministers from using social media after Bariire attack', *Garowe Online*, 27 August 2017, accessed at https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia–pm–bans–ministers–from–using–social–media–after–bariire–attack.

[507] Interview 55, former member of the ICU and professor at Mogadishu university, 7 September 2017.

[508] See 'Somalia expels UN envoy Nicholas Haysom', *BBC News*, 2 January 2019, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world–africa–46734994.

[509] Interview 59, Swedish Somali diaspora and former member of the SCG, 18 May 2017.

[510] Interview 67, former member of the SCG and aspiring presidential candidate, 23 May 2017. More broadly, 'the formula for SNA formation is hotly disputed with whether to be based on a regional versus a centralised model. Farmajo reportedly does not trust the regional formula but will not come out and say anything, and the regional one is clearly the model that the US is supporting. The parliament also supports the centralisation of the army'.

In Somaliland and Puntland, similar trends occurred within the security arena in how security reform agendas were repurposed to serve political interest. This include the use of newly-trained and internationally-funded elite forces against political opponents, as well as in the provocation and instigation of military fights at the peripheries (see Hoehne 2014). Both Silanyo's and Gaas' administrations were accused of using security assistance to empower elite wings or paramilitary groups as a special weapon to ensure law and political order. Silanyo's UK-funded Rapid Response Unit (RRU) and Gaas's US-funded PSI (also the latter to challenge the authority of Faroole's aligned Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF)), both led by diaspora technocrats, were implicated in crackdowns on political opponents, and were used to secure territorial boundaries and as de facto private security forces for multinational business interests[511]. For both Somaliland and Puntland, security assistance became important sources of patronage, including where they were able to push back against international benchmarks due to fewer incentives internally to democratise[512]. As locals reported, both administrations assumed more securitised approaches to social and political reconciliation at the boundaries, often overturning or ignoring existing local security arrangements. Even for Farmajo, NISA and SNA forces were deployed to federal states to strong-arm regional leaders and to enforce the will of the federal government around regional elections[513].

In addition to security, similar trends emerged in how these diaspora politicians navigated economic policy and how they sought, in particular, to renegotiate certain political and economic alliances. For Somaliland, engaging transnational business elites, foreign investors and controlling diaspora international capital, was a critical component of Kulmiye's legacy to secure the status quo and dominant networks. By contrast, in Somalia and Puntland, diaspora politicians used such strategies to renegotiate the authority of dominant power brokers or alliances that could threaten their political survival. In each case, the predominant focus on

[511] See Vanda Felbab-Brown, 'Puntland's problems It's not just al–Shabab that threatens Somalia's stability', *Brookings Institution*, 19 June 2017, available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order–from–chaos/2017/06/19/puntlands–problems/; 'Puntland's Failure under Gaas Leadership', *Garowe Online*, 17 March 2018, available at https://www.garoweonline.com/en/opinions/somalia–puntlands–failure–under–gaas–leadership. For Gaas, his divisive policies were blamed for the emergence of a more acute Al Shabaab menace in Galgala, the emergence of ISIL in Bosasso and violent confrontations with the Galmudug region. His predecessor, Faroole, had eradicated illegal fishing and piracy, but both had experienced a resurgence under Gaas.

[512] The deterioration of security was confirmed by UN and DFID reports that their security and justice work was falling apart, with little political will or commitment. Interview 13, former British Representative to Somaliland (based in Addis), 20 November 2016.

[513] Interview 80, Director of think tank (anonymised by request), 10 September 2017.

extraverted economic policy (above other reform agendas) were used to centralise rents closer to the centre and minimise the access of political competitors to new state resources.

### 7.4 Economic policy — extraversion and new alliances

Pellerin and Mullings (2013) argue, regarding the diaspora option, how diaspora-centred development paradigms place an outward focus and prioritisation on economic development agendas over socio-political agendas (see also Ho and Boyle 2015). As they propose, diaspora-oriented paradigms may 'encourage states to trade inward development policies for outward policies aimed at flattering and protecting the entrepreneurial interests of diaspora communities abroad, who may ironically support elite interests that are detrimental to the welfare of the majority' (2013: 113). In this argument, Pellerin and Mullings (2013) highlight two critical points around the diaspora option that are relevant to the Somali context and the policy agendas pursued by diaspora-led administrations. These include, first, the primary focus placed on extraverted economic policy and on new economic alliances (with transnational entrepreneurs and diaspora capital). Second, the admission that such policy agendas and orientations around diaspora capital support elite interests rather than diffusion or the welfare of the majority. Both aspects are discussed with reference to their relevance in each of the three contexts.

It was evident in all three case that diaspora politicians sought to court new diaspora and transnational business interests as well as multinational companies either with the aim to weaken local powerbrokers and the power of domestic capitalists, or to further solidify economic and state authority around the centre. For instance, all three leaders relied on close networks (familial and diaspora) to oversee and implement key contracts, as well as to facilitate trade negotiations around port investment and larger infrastructure projects. This was a departure in policy that eliminated public debate and reduced transactional authority of state assets around discrete networks. As one respondent explained, 'what's in the public eye had diminished, there was no more public debate about economic reform or policy decisions, and all became quite elitist'[514]. For instance, Gaas pursued international networks in the US and Australia (also presented by his predecessor Faroole) to forge links related to the extraction of minerals and oil exploration (Hoehne 2015: 74). Gaas also relied on close confidants within public works and the Office of the President to pursue port development agendas (construction

[514] Interview 36, Ali Farah, current director of PDRC and local activist, 18 April 2017.

of Bosasso and Garowe airport) and was accused of diverting projects to benefit his clan territory (Meester et al. 2018)[515]. Similarly, in Puntland, Silanyo brokered the $400 million DP World port investment deal in Berbera vis-à-vis his close family networks and links with transnational business actors and close supporters of the Kulmiye party. This was a highly controversial deal, given issues of contract transparency, the role of key family members allegedly benefitting from signature bonuses, and Somaliland's depleted sovereignty in the UAE's proxy wars in the region (ICG 2015). In a similar way, Farmajo's administration (and particularly) Khayre would court US and Norwegian business connections to facilitate oil exploration and facilitate loans for debt relief and exploration.

In each case, except for Somaliland, such new economic orientations and the preference for transnational business interests was a deliberate strategy to consolidate political and economic control closer to trusted networks. In both Somalia and Puntland, an explicit preference was made in contracting decisions for transnational, diaspora entrepreneurs who could navigate the international system and who would be more loyal to the respective Gaas and Farmajo administrations.[516] Local domestic capitalists were deliberately sidelined from competing in new aid and public contracting. Gaas and Farmajo bestowed favour on new diaspora entrepreneurs and transnational business interests in an effort to check existing networks and power structures, which were justified through public financial management reforms and anti-corruption and pro-competition narratives. For Farmajo, such practices of courting 'good' businessmen accompanied his stringent taxation policies[517], and the use of juridical authority and procurement reform to sever pre-existing public sector servicing contracts[518]. Such moves were simultaneously performative of international partnerships around economic development,

[515] Interview 38, former Puntland Minister of Education and Somali Minister of Interior, 20 April 2017.
[516] Elder 2019, forthcoming.
[517] He introduced a 5 percent value–added tax at the Port of Mogadishu and started taxing telecommunications companies. Such policies of heavier taxation underpinned the World Bank's PMF agenda and IMF conditions. Interview, advisor within the finance ministry, Mogadishu, September 2017. See also 'Somalia Seeking To Enforce Tax Regime, With Int'l Support', 07 March 2018, available at https://www.tax–news.com/news/Somalia_Seeking_To_Enforce_Tax_Regime_With_Intl_Support____76507.html; Abdi Sheikh, 'Hunted and hated, Somali tax collectors gird for battle', *Reuters*, 16 February 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us–somalia–tax/hunted–and–hated–somali–tax–collectors–gird–for–battle–idUSKCN1G00XW.
[518] In July 2017, Minister Beyle had first annulled contracts with 17 private companies that handled services (i.e. immigration services for visas logistics), with the aim to redirect their function from the private back to public sector. See 'Federal government cancels all agreements with private companies', *Garowe Online*, 03 August 2017, available at http://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia–federal–government–cancels–all–agreement–with–private–companies.

qualifications for debt relief and PFM reform agendas[519]. As one local official reported of Farmajo's strategy:

> Since Mr. Farmajo did not do what he promised, he cannot get local support, and so he began to establish new diaspora contractors, the problem was that they have no facilities and money to start that contract ... Whatever the Diaspora earn from the contract were not re-invested locally, they send it abroad, and they do not care about their reputations as they are 'one time use' contractors[520].

Such a visible presence for new contractors is a risky strategy given that commerce and security have always been deeply intertwined in Somalia and Puntland (see Little 2003; Marchal 2002). Such a strategy, as it was evoked in both Somalia and Puntland, was tied to a rivalrous relationship between economic and political elites over forms of public authority, supremacy and control. Big businesses have often assumed the institutions and authority structures of a state, have stepped up in times of conflict and humanitarian episodes (like drought) to provide social and public services, and thus, have often expected high returns (Marchal 1996; Meester et al. 2018; see also 3.1). By contrast, in Somaliland, the objectives and interests of courting transnational business and diaspora resources differed. New alliances with transnational and diaspora networks were used to expand existing party control over economic development, including by channelling diaspora investment vis-à-vis existing business monopolies (Meester et al 2018). Thus, in Somaliland, where the business community is stronger than the state and are important guarantors of the state project, Silanyo's administration courted diaspora and transnational business interests in ways that were not necessarily intended to check domestic capitalists or opponents but rather to bolster the dominance of the party and ruling elites over the economy. This was evident through other privatisation efforts that had benefited his family and top transnational conglomerates, like Dahabshiil, including the corporatisation of remittances through which Silanyo and his party and close alliances effectively controlled the channels for diaspora financial investment.

A particular comparative dimension regards how each administration addressed pressures around the formation of building diaspora agencies. Under both Gaas and Farmajo, diaspora affairs agencies were empowered where their objective was to create a database of 'useful'

[519] See 'Transnationalism and Somali Business Elites', *Clingendael*, May 2019.
[520] Interview 78, clan elder and local activist (anonymised by request), 7 September 2019.

diaspora and provide investment advice[521]. For Silanyo, the agency was less useful where Kulmiye's control over diaspora investment and contributions was more certain. In Somaliland, the agency was formed in 2010, but then quickly disbanded from 2010 until 2016 and only reinstated close to the 2016 election period, and then quickly disbanded by his successor Musabixi[522]. Around the 2016 electoral period, the agency was reportedly involved in providing a clan mapping of land and real estate in Somaliland to guide diaspora as to where they should invest in accordance with clan–demarcations[523]. Across the three territories, IOM[524] aided the financial and policy support to such agencies, which resided within the foreign ministries — where IOM was also governing all technocratic assistance programmes (see Chapter 6, and Gamlen 2014 on diaspora agencies)[525]. Across all cases, a turf war emerged between bureaucratic offices seeking to harness diaspora investment and the ministry of investment and commerce, the diaspora affairs agency, and chamber of commerce. Scholars have investigated the more nefarious side of diaspora agencies, for instance, where India's Minister was preoccupied with using these agencies to form alliances with offshore business elites (Dickinson and Bailey 2007).

In addition to the extraverted policy orientations around transnational business networks (multinational and diaspora), policy agendas include the centralisation of contracting, recruitment and budgetary/salary support for diaspora returnees through the state (including around diaspora advisor and civil servants). Thus, as will be discussed in the following section, the diaspora option was associated in other ways around the centralisation of forms of international capital which was used to consolidate authority and curtail the power of opponents. This finding is in line with broader research on new public management, technocratic governance and international public sector reform which is preoccupied with efficiency, continuity and inputs. As has been documented in other cases, World Bank programming and loan support to the public sector has allowed states to pursue more privatised

[521] Interview 76, director of Somali Diaspora Affairs Agency, Mogadishu, 9 September 2017.
[522] In Puntland, the diaspora agency only emerged in 2016, whereas in Somalia it was only resuscitated in 2018, given the diffuse and politically-focused nature of diaspora engagement. Interview 39, Head of the Puntland Diaspora Agency (PDA), 23 April 2017.
[523] Interview 5, US-Somali diaspora businessman and managing director of SGS Global, 18 November 2016.
[524] As the Somaliland Diaspora Agency reported, the 'SDA does not accept money from the government (we advocate for the unity of the diaspora as a national entity, but don't advocate the policy of the government (no politics, no discussion), no coordination between ministers towards diaspora (a playground for advantage) and they don't see the value of this office. Trade promotion/investment, I'm not included in such discussions, see diaspora differently'. Interview, Somaliland Diaspora Agency, Hargeisa, May 2017.
[525] See 'Musa Bihi Abdi dismantles his predecessor's legacy', *African Intelligence*, 31 August 2018.

state-led development which has contributed towards directly enriching the central executive and facilitating regime maintenance (Carapico 2006: 203). Both security and economic reform agendas contributed structurally and discursively towards more centrist forms of management and political control over statebuilding agendas.

This thesis proposes that the diaspora option should be considered as an important political tool for regimes which unfolds at multiple levels of state and political authority, which are not well understood. The following section briefly turns to how the diaspora option is embedded within a broader technocratic model of governance supported in African states.

### 7.5 Beyond technocratic governance to new public authorities

In the Somali context, 'technocracy' is a loaded concept that is closely associated with the politics of diaspora return. International donors first deployed it in the aftermath of Arta and Mbagathi in 2000 and 2004 to legitimise support for a newly diaspora-brokered statebuilding process, and it was evoked particularly around the 2009 extended mandate (see 3.3). Diaspora politicians also evoked this narrative to garner support and differentiate themselves from previous groups of diaspora or local elites, and to highlight their distinct 'apolitical' qualities as leaders. Yet, as has been the case elsewhere, the 'technocratic' turn is also an effective way for new elites to remake and build political alliances[526]. The opportunity structures may vary in how, and to what extent, such narratives can be evoked for political purpose. This may depend on different institutional and social contexts, as well as international partnerships. For instance, the 'technocratic turn' was notably not evoked by Silanyo in 2009, in part due to the dominance of the old SNM factions and political bigwigs, but also as it held less weight within the context of non-recognition and with fewer international pressures (and potential payouts for adherence). Thus, technocracy was less of a legitimising tool for diaspora politicians seeking to consolidate power where proximity to the national project was valued more acutely. Perhaps as a result of the absence of the broader international and political contexts, the technocratic qualifications of those diaspora ministers that did return (like foreign affairs minister Sacad Ali Shire) were protected. It was easier for them to remain above the fray. They

[526] For Farmajo, it was clear that, where the 'technocratic' card had largely been synonymous with diaspora political returnees in 2009 and 2011, by his election in 2017 it was no longer sufficient to garner the necessary votes and support. He had to push a dual–pronged technocratic and nationalist approach.

were untethered to international donors, and they resided within a more professionalised bureaucracy that was governed less by spoils politics (Bradbury 2008).

By contrast, in Somalia and Puntland, the rise of technocracy was more clearly associated with the politics of diaspora return and the implementation of state logics (that included territorial control, social and economic exclusion and new public management strategies). Specific structural factors surrounding the politics of diaspora return made depoliticising diaspora 'technocrats' more difficult — namely, past socialisation with diaspora leaders, the politicised nature of donor-diaspora relationships and the realities of their absorption and return through clientelist networks (as differed in Somaliland, and in contexts like Oman, see 2.6). In addition, the emergence of 'technocracy' was associated closely with the inception of the ethnic quota and clan politics (as had similarly been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan that undermined prospect for successful implementation of technocratic reform politics, see 2.6). As would be repeated locally, these new diaspora politicians were less technocratic than the 'local' technocrats who had dominated the post-colonial administrations of the 1960s. Rather, there was little difference from these 'technocrats' and the public intellectuals of the first diaspora returnees (from Ergo and Israaca), who were regarded as being centrist and anti-federalist and dedicated to Somali unity and resurrection.

Rather, in each context, the diaspora-led administrations reporting to be technocratic were described as being partisan, clannist, corrupt and plagued by poor performance. The technocratic turn was used as legitimising narratives to build new alliances and renegotiate systems of representative politics. In both contexts, subnational actors and local elites unveiled and contested the fallacies of the leaders and objectives behind the 'antipolitics' attempts to depoliticise various exercises, from economic development to conflict management to statebuilding (see Ferguson 1990; Easterly 2013; Thomas 2015 on technocracy). They criticised weak international assumptions about their impartiality, local ownership and knowledge as broad-based valorisation of Western experience and exposure. A critical misalignment emerged in the ambitions and interests of diaspora returnees around the 'idealised return' and expectations of them. These expectations were either that they provide an alternative political model based on professionalisation or provide a more particularist advancement of subnational interests. In each case, the internal debate on technocracy

preoccupied political transitions and questions of succession that contributed to a crisis of legitimacy for diaspora politicians[527].

The theatrics around key policy agendas, the visible privatisation of the bureaucracy and the reorientation around priority economic and state-building agendas, collectively failed to address critical subnational anxieties about distributive politics, prevailing power imbalances and reconciliation. Instead, as respondents described, these new forms of political authority were indifferent and arbitrary but, at the same time, also stringent. By 2018 a strong local perception emerged that Farmajo's administration was pushing forward greater authoritarian tendencies. This was evidenced by a crackdown on opposition gatherings and freedom of speech (through the use of elite forces, security and social media), political interference in the federal elections and control over revenue and taxation. Across Africa, scholars have increasingly highlighted how the technocratic model has often been repurposed by authoritarian rulers in an effort to solidify state-led economic development or political consolidation. This was certainly the case for Rwanda's authoritarianism and its route to developmental state where it was used to disempower both political parties and parliamentary oversight while strengthening executive power and creating bias against spending ministries and social policy (Reyntjens 2013; see also Pellerin and Mullings 2013; see Clapp 1997 on Guinea).

Alexander Thurston (2018) also challenges the barometer for economic and democratic progress where technocrats are cast, misleadingly, as 'saviours'. He highlights three critical implications of technocratic orientations in his study of Nigeria and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). First, he demonstrates how local experts who lack international credentials are often excluded from the pool of acceptable 'technocrats', which creates an important inequality in access to political and state employment opportunities (Thurston 2018: 221; Konings 2011). Second, economic decision-making becomes the province of experts (and in this case external experts) rather than a matter of extended public debate. Within the managerial and apolitical vision ascribed to the anti-politics approach, political contestation over policy is treated as ugly and counterproductive. This anti-politics approach views the economic preferences of citizens

[527] Debates about selecting a technocrat in the PM or President post, that had emerged in 2009, re-emerged in Somalia in 2016 as Hassan Khayre (a businessman and former regional head of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)) did not represent either a technocrat or political identity candidate, or this new form of global professionalism. It has been suggested in Afghanistan that locals support public sector and NGO experience over private sector (Bermeo and Bhatia 2017).

as largely ill-informed and reactionary rather than as critical to political debate and even democratic transformation (Zuckerman 2012; Ford 2015). Third, the perceived subservience of technocrats to international financial institutions (IFIs) implicates them in the longstanding mistrust of such institutions among many African citizens. Ultimately, as Thurston argues, in Nigeria, technocrats became trapped in a web of politics 'where informal politics and norms governing decisions about resource allocation and the decision-making process were strongly opposed to the economic policies pursued by technocrats' (2018: 224). The Jonathan administration became more, rather than less, vulnerable to attacks on its economic policies, and key policymakers were deemed partisan rather than technocratic. Thurston does not specifically address the diaspora component which, as this thesis would argue, adds additional complications to negotiations and contestation around policy agendas.

The link between diaspora return and the technocratic turn was also evident in the forms of elite continuity which emerged at the state and political level of both Gaas and Farmajo's administrations. Not only did such trends emerge as at odds with the norms of representative systems in place, but the shrinking core of power around a core of diaspora elites in top bureaucratic portfolios evidenced increasing control over the authority, revenue and legitimacy of the state. What emerged was the rotation of key diaspora loyalists among the top state–building and development posts (namely, MoF, MoNP, and MoD or MoIS) and the foreign affairs portfolios (namely, MoFA or Ambassadorships)[528]. Donors saw such trends as positive moves toward greater elite continuity and as a mark against systems of patronage politics associated with prevailing government reshuffles, but for locals it indicated an amassing of privilege by a new ruling diaspora class (see Section 6.5). The assertion of technocratic control over those key ministries, which serve as 'clearing houses for foreign aid' and by selecting

[528] Perhaps the best example in Somalia is Abdirahman Duale Beyle, now Minister of Finance, who had also previously served as the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Somalia from January 2014 until January 2015. In Somaliland, the former Minister of National Development from 2011–2017, Sa'ad Ali Shire, was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2015 (carried over despite his controversial participation in the 2017 DP World deal). In another example, US diaspora Abdi Farah Saed 'Juha', who had been the former Minister of Education in Puntland, became the Minister of the Interior (an ambassadorship for federalism that saw the largest donor contributions to stabilization in 2015–2016). In other cases, US diaspora Jamale Mohamed Hassan, the former Somali Ambassador to Kenya, was appointed as Minister of National Development in 2017, while his predecessor at the Ministry of National Planning, Abdi Aynte, assumed a post as Somali Ambassador to the UK in February 2017. Minister Shire Haji Farah had been the first Minister of Finance and then Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, and also a shrewd businessman from Dubai/Canada.

friends, has been a common trend in weak state context (like Yemen and Afghanistan) (Carapico 2006; Giustozzi 2013)[529].

## 7.6 Conclusion

In the Somali territories, diaspora-led administrations have for generations structured and restructured public authority, legitimised by their own technocratic credentials and by building up the institutions of the state. Subnational actors (local elites and clans) astutely perceive the symbolic valence of expertise tied to these administration, and have challenged the authority and legitimacy claims that diaspora politicians make, as evidenced through the 'local' turn. As this chapter demonstrates, key policy agendas implemented by these diaspora administrations are seen to represent new forms of elite predation that may be less explicitly extractive of their citizens but include policies to cripple political and commercial actors (Reno 2015). These administrations have aggravated internal political debates about citizenship and the eligibility of dual nationals to contest political office, but also more broadly about sovereignty and aid conditionalities. In Somalia and Puntland, both Gaas and Farmajo succeeded in raising the status of their political agendas on the international stage, acquiring more donor aid and even foreign investment, and they received applause for reducing volatility within their respective government. Yet, their track record for genuine reform agendas, security and human rights was noticeably poor, where they seemed particularly habituated in performing international relationships and stateness but subverting reform agendas for political purpose.

[529] For instance, Carapico (2008: 2001) explains how in Yemen key ministries of planning, water and power corporations, public works and education, and other important central institutions often become sprawling foreign aid dispensers, which were planned, funded and executed by a new class of foreign-educated technocrats, became key bastions for state-led development agendas.

## Chapter 8: Conclusion

*Hal booli ahi nirig xalaal ah ma dhasho* (a stolen camel does not deliver a halal calf)[530] (Interpeace 2018: 36).

This quote directly refers to the potential pitfalls of bestowing the primary responsibility for state reconstruction and social repair in the hands of diaspora politicians. It refers to diaspora politicians as 'stolen camels' who cannot deliver 'halal calves' (to denote positive results or outcomes). This thesis interrogates how the politics of diaspora return have unfolded across the Somali territories since the 1980s within the contexts of state collapse, state (re-)formation and the ongoing politics of recognition. As it has shown, diaspora return to politics has impacted Somali politics for decades in terms of societal relations, institutional development and political possibilities across the regions. Diaspora return to politics is entangled in: broader questions about citizenship, representation and ownership (of Somali unity and the state process); regional, clan and class politics; the self-image and aspirations of leaders; and nostalgia for the past and projections for the future. While the return and influence of 'new elites' is not a new phenomenon across the African context, the diaspora option — as it has emerged and dominated policy orientations and elite strategies — is new. In the Somali Republic certain factors aligned to support the more rapid and contested integration of new elites, particularly in Somalia and Puntland post-2009. These factors included a maturing diaspora community that was keen to engage (whether in the public or private sector); new political opportunities within an opening of political space; and new policy agendas around the diaspora option, international incentives and the value of 'good faith' partnerships.

The colonial and conflict legacies, the politics of state formation, the processes through which diaspora are recruited, how they build alliances and legitimacy, and how they govern are broadly comparable and require further empirical investigation across weak state contexts. The processes of diaspora return to politics in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia differed from each other but also had in common certain trends. For instance, these processes were fraught by misalignments in clientelistic relationships and expectations, rivalrous clan politics and the fallacies of technocratic reform agendas. Certain legacies of the civil war and internal structures

[530] There is a clear religious undertone here that refers to *dhagan celis* and the need for cultural rehabilitation of these elites.

of clan and societal cohesions provided certain restrictions against the involvement of diaspora politicians in Somaliland and Puntland. Nonetheless, all contexts experienced the rise and fall of diaspora-led administrations and forms of local resistance. The latter characterised subnational anxieties about centralised and hegemonic forms of power (and losing out), the ongoing subjugation of the state and its people within the international system, and conceptions of local inequality and recognition (that include the elusive nature of patron-client relations). In this way, diaspora return to politics constitutes an internal and external crisis emerging across Somali society. As outsider candidates, they are conceived of as a political solution to rivalrous and contested clan politics and political transitions, but they also are seen to pose significant political threats to dominant power networks, sovereign boundaries and the recognition clams of subnational and national administrations.

In addition, it was evident that the diaspora option is implemented observably less because of international anxiety about state failure or fragility. Rather, it is strongly driven by self-interested donor objectives that include securing 'good faith' partnerships to streamline statebuilding agendas as well as to safeguard other agendas (including geostrategic interests domestic pressures and anxieties at home). The latter concerns perceptions of the large financial and societal burdens posed by large migrant politics, where diaspora are seen as a threat to social welfare systems and even security. The extent to which the diaspora option is 'scalable' by individual donor interests (characterised by donor discretion, discoordination and incoherence) also left the policy agenda easily vulnerable to rent-seeking or 'rescaling' by other domestic actors in Somalia. This thesis raises broader questions about the legitimacy of international supervision of such processes of state-making, where international actors continue to hold the reigns for orchestrating such processes of elite change — directly and indirectly. Indirect interventions include the direct payment of salaries, the provision of principal oversight capacity given to diaspora advisors and bureaucrats over aid rents, exit arrangements, and close donor-diaspora relationships. New elites habituated with 'post-conditionality politics' co-opt the diaspora option to serve new forms of elite predation and authoritarianism (Reno 2015).

The intention of this concluding chapter is to reflect on the findings of this thesis and to comment on their relevance to broader debates about diaspora return to politics and weak states linked to authority, strategising and local forms of resistance. The first section (8.1) reflects on the new forms of state and public authority that emerge under diaspora-led administrations

linked to their often contradictory roles as brokers, change actors and statebuilders. The second section (8.2) examines the alignment of elite and international strategy agendas around the diaspora option which together may instigate a centralisation of policy agendas and diaspora contributions around the centre rather than peripheries. Section 8.3 comments on the populist forms of resistance that may emerge in response to periods of diaspora-led administrations, which requires further theorising. The rise of autochthony discourse has broader implications for identity politics and forms of virulent and competitive nationalism, as well as religious extremism. The final section (8.4) discusses the specific research agendas for further understanding the politics of diaspora return in the Somali Republic and more broadly in weak state contexts.

### 8.1 New public authorities, diaspora politicians and weak states

The argument is that diaspora politicians (but also non-politician returnees) constitute new public authorities that may exist within, but also outside, the confines of the nation-state. Findings from this thesis suggest that diaspora politicians: exist at the boundaries of the state and international system; support outward-facing policy agendas; acquiesce to new forms of public management and isomorphic mimicry; and are well-equipped and successful in navigating perennial state weakness within international system. In terms of the latter, they are effective in moving the country up the chain of debt relief, international assistance and trade partnerships, regardless of harm caused to the social fabric. Effects include to political pluralism, local security arrangements and forms of consensual politics. These new public authorities are insecure and combative with the local context and seek to overcompensate for their own lack of knowledge of the local context. As such, they rely on external legitimacy and state institutions to assert territorial control more efficiently and forms of social and political exclusion that are attributed less to soldiery professionalism than to new state logics (Hoehne 2018; Reno 2015) They use technocratic reform agendas and alliances with new economic and political actors to streamline patronage networks and mobilise forms of international legitimacy, while renegotiating the terms of internal clan governance and local agreements. All diaspora-led administrations were characterised by diminished social freedoms, the abandonment of consultative decision-making and the absence of public debate, as well as securitised responses to political opponents and communities.

The reform agendas and authority of these new diaspora politicians may lack substance in objectives and even recognisability in terms of traditional trends in accumulation of wealth and power. Their power may be largely symbolic, based on international conversions and endowments (see 2.3 on 'international capital'), and have strong links to more personalised and monopolistic forms of contests. This is linked to their role as brokers, statebuilders and change actors that is a high stakes political game — the implications of which requires further theorising within the academic literature. As brokers or 'network specialists' (1.4), diaspora are privileged in navigating international and regional borders but they may struggle in brokering between national-level politics and local politics, or between different ethnic groups. Often, the academic scholarship on brokerage has looked at brokerage as a form of transnational governance or an expansion of state power. Thus, it has demonstrated how political and military networks, economic resources and ideas and ideology all span international borders. Political settlements in one country are commonly interconnected with those of neighbouring and intervening powers. Instead, this thesis captures an image of diaspora elites as adept at ambiguity, line-blurring, reinventing, adapting and rebranding - who are able to evade accountability, while renegotiating the terms of representation, social obligation and distribution.

Such brokers may be unable or unwilling to position themselves as trusted patrons (Daloz 2018), and their political positions and visions are characterised by their impermanence and desires to maintain the boundaries of the international and state system, where they saw the highest advantages. The 'international' and their diminished transparency (in terms of networks, personnel and policy agendas) are front and centre of how they project power and aggravate subnational anxieties. The collusion of business, public and transnational interests, and the broader omission of popular participation in economic and socio-political reform, takes key debates out of the public debate. Their public authority is rather more bombastic, showy and characterised by spectacle and performance (7.3) which reveal certain fallacies of the symbolic valence of expertise and professionalisation as an alternative to the clan system. Legitimised internationally through the focus on form, inputs and repetitive performative actions, they confront head-on alternative public authorities that include local traditional institutions and norms of social obligation, systems of representative politics, decentralised governance and forms of inclusive politics.

There was no indication that these new actors were any less clannist in understanding or orientation, but nonetheless held strong disapproval and heavily moralised notions around regressive forms of politics. They had the power to affect change but were also heavily fractured by interests, motivations and experiences, including host-country exposures and links, which contributed to political chaos. Such divisions included the lack of access to important foundational forms of commonality (forms of post-war reconciliation, occupational experience or common diaspora experience) to forge common positions or policy agendas amongst diaspora politicians and administrations. The result was often impulsive policy agendas around nationalist troupes of anti-Ethiopianism, Somali unity, or technocratic governance. It was unclear whether their political projects went much beyond resource control, short- or medium-term enrichment and the survival of ruling cliques. There are no unifying ideas of the state or a vision for national political communities.

### 8.2 Diaspora strategising, international policy agendas and elite control

This thesis also contributes to broader debates around diaspora strategising as a tool of regime resilience, which has been underappreciated in the literature (Millers and Peters 2014; Hirt 2015). Developmental states in Africa have increasingly sought to regulate, control and fix boundaries, as well as close identities to an increasing extent in managing statebuilding interventions. This includes how and whether they integrate returning diaspora into the state or political apparatus (Lyons 2010). As Pellerin and Mullings (2013) have cautioned, international policy orientations around the diaspora option may support the prioritisation of outward-facing economic agendas, engage in flattery and deprioritise socio-political reform agendas. Their findings complement other research on diaspora strategising that highlight how international policy agendas consistently fail to support subnational strategies or to recognise how state strategies towards diaspora bear the stamp of a country's colonial history, postcolonial priorities and developmental state apparatus (Ho 2013). In the cases of India, South Africa and China, scholars note how more flexible and multilateral engagement strategies have moved towards greater state centralisation around diaspora strategising. In these cases, elites have sought to exert greater political and state control over processes of migration and their resources (Ho and Boyle 2015: 165; Ng 2012; Meyer 2011; Ho 2009; Li 2013). In each context, agendas around the diaspora option unfold at odds with core tenets of good governance agendas (including inclusion, local ownership and decentralised authority) (Mullings 2011; Mani and Varadarajan 2005; Ho and Boyle 2015).

How diaspora strategising unfolds within weak states, and especially in contexts where the state may lack absolute control over such processes, has not been looked at in any depth. Nonetheless, the Somali context provides initial insights for exploring how the default position of international policy around diaspora strategising supports state institutions as the 'principal strategisers, recruiters and allies' of a new ruling diaspora class (Ho and Boyle 2015; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018). This was evidenced through technocratic assistance programmes, support to diaspora affairs agencies as well as the alignment of common goals of bureaucratic efficiency, economic development and technocratic governance. These new policy agendas both legitimised and gave the impetus to new diaspora-led administrations and policies to court new economic and political alliances (with transnational business and diaspora organisations abroad) in order to consolidate power and exclude political opponents and domestic capitalists under new state logics. New theories around elite predation (Reno 2015) describe strategies of state control and elite predation that, rather than extracting from citizens, seeks to control economic and political resources as part of state-led development agendas, in part by crippling domestic political actors and even commercial entrepreneurs (7.3). These diaspora-led administrations also hijacked voluntary processes of return, as well as locally-driven practices of risk aversion and the selection of outsider candidates, in ways that actually perverted systems of representative politics (4.1).

Such centralisation also occurs in different ways — for instance, by virtue of demographics (or processes of urbanisation within the subnational and national administrations, 2.4), where the concentration of international capital are more easily harnessed by new administrations. These forms of international capital include diaspora investment, contracts, remittances and support for political parties. Where party systems are plagued by clientelism, and where opposition parties are weak, remittances and diaspora support have often benefitted incumbent and diaspora administrations (see 2.5 and 5.2). New clientelistic networks and horizontal linkages disrupt payouts to locals while insulating diaspora and minimising their own expenditure to the clan system. Thus, in the Somali context, where diaspora elites have come to dominate, clientelistic networks continue to shrink around an inner core of diaspora power, while the state's fiscal intake and sources of legitimacy continue to reside in the international system, but where diaspora elites have the principal authority to operate. The combined implications are support for more centralised control over the economy, bureaucracy and territorial boundaries that are linked to new state logics and elite predation.

What this reveals is the need for much more nuanced and flexible strategising[531]. The often institutionalised solution to contestation around diaspora return to politics has been to restrict the eligibility of dual citizens to contest political office. These constitutional provisions are rarely successful (Ho and Boyle 2015), especially as they are ignored or not enforced by parliaments which themselves are constituted of diaspora representatives. This was certainly the case across the Somali territories, and such restrictions also overlook the complexities of issues at play. Diaspora politicians renouncing their second citizenships may reduce some of the issues around impermanence and donor leverage, but it is unlikely to address other issues of how diaspora politicians govern which are linked to sectarian and ethnopolitical competition, poor institutions and uneven development paradigms. Rather, such proposed solutions fail to understand how the diaspora option is embedded within historical and conflict legacies, politics of recognition and statebuilding as well as local authority structures. The following section looks at what forms of local resistance may emerge in response to such diaspora influence in politics and the centralisation of power and authority.

### 8.3 Local resistance and populism

The diaspora option may produce new forms of identity politics, virulent nationalism and competitive clannism, which also require further theorising. Within the precarity and volatility of 'globalism', the politics of diaspora return also expose a deepening faultline between cosmopolitans and nationalists. Many different actors crave recognition — to have their particular national identities recognised and affirmed — and also to ensure that they do not lose out in the disproportionate trends in accumulation of international capital. The populist-nationalist argument used to fight for popular-national sovereignty from larger state structures or foreign rulers in the post-independence period and again in the 1990s (for self-determination) may re-emerge in different or similar forms with the large-scale return of diaspora to politics. The forms of political opposition to diaspora candidates that emerged in Somalia in 2012, Somaliland in 2017 and Puntland in 2018 demonstrated new forms of resistance to the 'international' and influence of supra-national bodies. The risks associated with such populist-national arguments are evident, as they have included often downplaying class and maintained an ambiguous rhetoric appealing to exclusive ethnic identity and broader

[531] Focus group discussions, SDA, PDA and Somali Affairs Agency, Hargeisa, Garowe and Mogadishu, August 2017.

racial interests. A key risk associated with nationalism is the increase in ethnic conflict, as was the case during the nationalist wave in the early 1990s. The articulation between populism and demands for national self-determination has a long history (Canovan 2008), including where populism, authoritarianism and nationalism are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing in the global South (Bieber 2018). Key to this debate is how 'enemies within' are constructed, and how the populism and nationalism debate is wielded, and by whom.

New diaspora elites (like Farmajo) may attempt to establish local bases by conflating nationalism and populism, and as a way to distinguish themselves from other diaspora leaders (see 5.3). Yet, populist demands are often used to denounce a 'corrupt elite' (often a minority accused of holding political or economic power) or where the elite is accused of being beholden to foreign interests (Bieber 2018). Thus, Farmajo's strategy leaves him open to challenges to his authority on the basis of being a corrupt elite, beholden to foreign interests and against the people or the nation (see 5.3). These new populists that may emerge fiercely 'criticise the leaders of supranational organisations as illegitimate elites, for their multiculturalist and globalist policies, for their breaches of the nation's sovereignty over its state, and for their sheer membership of an international, cosmopolitan elite' (see Kaltwasser et al. 2019). Such populist-national initiatives are rarely popular in nature, as was indicated by the movements that emerged across the Somali territories after 2010 in defense of the 'local' and consultative decision-making (see 5.3 and 7.1). In these cases, large alliances may form in opposition to diaspora-led administrations and state orientations, and which may comprise locally-entrenched elites who claim to be the authentic representatives of this homogenous and virtuous 'people' with promises to put their interests first (whether security, public services or economic development). In Somaliland and Puntland, this is symbolised by a return to former military commanders and local businessmen who have a clearer knowledge of local politics and are more committed to certain state projects.

Other forms of local resistance and micro-negotiations occurred within parliament and state institutions regarding dismissals of diaspora officials, as subnational actors (including clans) became active participants in 'rescaling' diaspora (Chapter 4). Ongoing corruption and state failure associated with diaspora leaders easily translates into a general callousness to diaspora in positions of power. Diaspora politicians became collective scapegoats of political wrongdoings and injustices, and of ongoing forms of international interference, and they represented the interests of an obscure globalised elites and international networks. Also, they

directly seek to disrupt the systems of reciprocity on which the patron-client relationships rely and which 'local' leaders seek to protect. African politics has always struggled with situating populism discourse in broader post-independence and ethnopolitical forms of competition. It was evident in this thesis how issues of 'foreignness' and bureaucratic 'representativeness' become determining factors for a ruling party's legitimacy, policy implementation and the political survival of key individuals in ways that had not been the case prior, and in ways that may renegotiate the terms around ethnopolitics. New more flexible thinking is required for understanding new forms of identity politics, class conflicts and processes of social and political stratifications that occur through transnational space and the local.

In its extreme form, in ongoing conflict contexts of limited statehood, the influence of diaspora politicians may empower the political space for Islamic extremists who may resist 'international' forms of governance that link diaspora politicians with foreign powers. Al Shabaab frequently denounces diaspora politicians as puppets of foreign actors and apostates, and shows their capacity to target them disproportionately. An increasing debate has occurred within Farmajo's administration about the direct security implications of the placement of diaspora in key security and political roles. This occurred most recently following the assassination of the Mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Yarisow, by Al Shabaab in July 2019. The administration quickly appointed Omar 'Finnish', as they thought he would provide a stronger force against Abgaal interests/resistance in Mogadishu and Al Shabaab. The assumptions were that he would be able 'to deal with local security issues, even garbage collection, because he cares, these issues are his local reality'[532]. These discussions are important because they highlight some sort of acknowledgement, by diaspora politicians, of their own limitations in governing, and the possible implications of their influence within key positions.

### 8.4 Future research and wider relevance

It is hoped that this thesis makes a strong case for the systematic study of the politics of diaspora return within the complex framework of weak states and emerging economies. Analysis of return and the intricacies of diaspora political engagement to-date has been limited and often either exaggerates diasporas' irrelevance, nuisance and/or security impacts or touts them as a

[532] Interview 91, researcher and political analyst, Mogadishu, 17 September 2019.

panacea (Koinova 2018; Birkenhoff 2017). Increasing diaspora return and influence in the state and politics in such contexts across Africa and the Middle East is becoming a norm rather than an exception, which requires further theorising. For instance, Section 2.6 proposes how the diaspora option has become embedded in sectarian politics in Iraq and Afghanistan. To this end, the findings from this small-scale study of Somali subnational and national administrations is relevant to broader debates on: the role of international actors and statebuilding agendas in influencing processes of elite change; how new elites and domestic actors, from a subordinate position within the international system, harness material benefits and acquire state legitimacy; and how domestic actors grapple with the conflicting demands of securing access to new international resources while protecting domestic and local sovereignty.

There is nothing remarkably new about how international actors have sought to reconstitute political and state authority in weak and fragile states vis-à-vis diaspora 'technocrats', or in how new elites have sought to exert new forms of political and economic control. What is new is the broad-based international and domestic orientation around the diaspora option as a way in which to renegotiate local power networks and as it is linked to new agendas around the performances of stateness and new public management. Further comparative and ethnographic work is needed to look at these relationships of power, at questions of leadership succession and contestation, and how diaspora leaders and their administrations govern. This would include further analysis of elite consumption and the economic and political alliances that underpin the power of these new elites. To this end, this thesis only scratches the surface of what is hoped is a new research agenda for understanding the ways in which diaspora are embedded within the political economy of weak states. More precisely, it offers an important lens through which to investigate how weak states relate and interact within the international system; how domestic actors compete with each other for access to state and international resources; and how diaspora politicians themselves shape the legitimacy of elite pacts, the state and statebuilding interventions.

**Appendix 1 – Interview list**

**Hargeisa, Somaliland**
**(25 October – 1 December 2016 and 15 October – 18 November 2017)**

**Interview 1:** 19 November 2016
**Interview 2:** 30 October 2017

Adan Abokor**,** senior associate at Rift Valley Institute, former member of the UFFO group.

**Interview 3:** 20 November 2016

Abdi Abdullahi Hersi, UK-Somali diaspora returnee and head of the Somaliland Diaspora Agency

**Interview 4:** 21 November 2016

Jama Muse, UK-Somali diaspora returnee and director of the Hargeisa Cultural Centre

**Interview 5:** 18 November 2016

Ahmed N. Amin, US-Somali diaspora and managing director of SGS Global

**Interview 6:** 30 November 2016

Mohamed Hashi Elmi, former member of the Saudi Group and Minister of Finance (2009 until 2011), and current member of the *Madasha* platform

**Interview 7:** 29 November 2016

Abdisalan Yassin, former member of the Saudi Group and university professor at University of Hargeisa

**Interview 8:** 25 October 2017

Arahman Aqaadir, member of Uffo Group and local activist

**Interview 9**: 25 October 2017

Ali Mohamed Yusuf 'Gurey', Somaliland politician and former director at the Ministry of Ports and Fisheries, current party member of Kulmiye Hargiesa

**Interview 10:** 15 November 2016
**Interview 11:** 23 October 2017

MP Abdirahman Osman Alin 'Abdirahman Dheere', chairman of the social services parliamentary committee and local activist

**Interview 11:** 30 November 2016

Salebaan (anonymised), clan elder involved in 1991 Burco conference.

**Interview 12:** 30 November 2016

Michael Higgins, former attache and programme officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Independent Diplomat).

**Interview 13:** 20 November 2016

Lizzie Lovett, former British Representative to Somaliland (based in Addis).

**Interview 14:** 15 November 2017

Rosie Tapper, Lovett's replacement and official UK chief of mission to Somaliland, appointed ahead of elections.

**Interview 15:** 25 November 2016

Sacad Ali Shire, Kulmiye party loyalist and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of interview.

**Interview 16:** 15 November 2016

Bubbe (last name unknown), intellectual and local activist, affiliate of the Academy for Peace and Development

**Interview 17:** 25 November 2017

Kalton Hassan, programme lead at the IFC and Somaliland local activist, and

**Interview 18:** 20 November 2016
**Interview 19:** 20 October 2017

Ismail Bubba, former member of the Saudi Group, parliamentarian during the TFG, and chief political advisor to Waddani

**Interview 20:** 18 November 2016
**Interview 21:** 5 November 2017

MP Ibrahim Jama Ali 'Reyte', MP for Sanaag, Wadani supporter and defector.

**Interview 22:** 30 November 2016
**Interview 23**: 30 October 2017

Dr. Mohamed Osman Fadal, former director of the Academy for Peace and Development, chief spokesperson and strategist for Waddani party

**Interview 24:** 13 May 2017
**Interview 25**: 30 October 2017

Professor Ahmed Samatar, well-established academic and political advisor for Kulmiye after the election of Musabixi in 2017

**Interview 26:** 20 November 2016
**Interview 27**: 3 November 2017

Ali Khalif Galayd, former Prime Minister of TFG (2000 until 2001), parliamentary member in the FGS (since 2012) and president of Khaatumo state from August 2014

**Interview 28**: 22 November 2017
**Interview 29**: 15 May 2018 (Oxford)

Bihi Egeh, former UNDP Quest-Mida beneficiary, and MP Gadabursi in Somali Federal Parliament

**Interview 30:** 10 November 2017

Amb Adan Muse Jibril, former Ambassador to Ethiopia but also former member of the SSDF (hence, insights on Puntland state formation)

**Garowe, Puntland**

**(15 April – 17 May 2017, 2 —15 October 2017)**

**Interview 31:** 10 May 2017
**Interview 32**: 3 October 2017

Ali H. Warsame, World Bank consultant and government attache at the Ministry of Finance

**Interview 33:** 16 May 2017

Ibrahim Saed Ismail, former Shaqilla member and parliamentarian

**Interview 34:** 15 May 2017

Saeed Ahmed, former military commander in the SSDF and local activist

**Interview 35:** 18 April 2017

Fadumo (last name unknown), programme officer at PDRC and the wife of Federal Minister of Interior Minister

**Interview 36:** 18 April 2017

Ali Farah, current director of PDRC and local activist.

**Interview 37:** 18 April 2017

Mukhtar Hassan, diaspora returnee and lead researcher at PDRC

**Interview 38:** 20 April 2017

Minister Abdi Farah Said Juha, former Puntland Minister of Education, and Somali Minister of Interior (2016-2017) at the time of interview

**Interview 39:** 23 April 2017

Omar Shere, Head of the Puntland Diaspora Agency (PDA), who led the PDA discussion group between diaspora returnees and locals.

**Interview 40:** 25 April 2017

Abdinasir Bihi Sofe, Gaas' Chief of Staff and then head of the Puntland Marine Police Force

**Interview 41:** 28 April 2017

Shukri (last name unknown), diaspora beneficiary of the IOM-Quest Mida programme and government advisor

**Interview 42:** 28 April 2017

Ayaan (last name unknown), diaspora beneficiary of the IOM-Quest Mida returnee and government advisor

**Interview 43:** 3 October 2017

Mohamed Jibril, IOM Quest-Mida beneficiary and government advisor

**Interview 44:** 3 October 2017

Mohamed Abdi Farah, IOM Manager and regional head of the Quest-MIDA

**Interview 45:** 5 October 2017

Osman (last name unknown), IOM Quest-Mida beneficiary and advisor to the auditor

**Interview 46:** 7 October 2017

Abdulmalik, IOM Quest-Mida beneficiary and ILO seconded advisor

**Interview 48:** 8 October 2017

Salman Hassan, local businessman and government advisor

**Interview 49:** 5 September 2018

Khalif Abdirahman, research consultant

**Mogadishu, Somalia**

(1 – 17 December 2016, 17 May – 5 June 2017 and 3 – 18 September 2017)

**Interview 50:** 15 December 2016
**Interview 51:** 28 May 2017

Abdisaid Ali**,** Dutch-Somali diaspora and current national security advisor to President Farmajo

**Interview 52:** 10 September 2017

Sheikh Sharif, former chairman of the ICU (2003-2006), former president (2009-2012) and current leader of the opposition

**Interview 53**: 10 December 2016
**Interview 54:** 18 May 2017
**Interview 55**: 7 September 2017

Professor Yayhe, former member of the ICU and professor at Mogadishu university

**Interview 56**: 7 December 2016
**Interview 57:** 20 May 2017

Hussein Nuur Ahmed, US-Somali diaspora and aspiring candidate

**Interview 58:** 7 December 2016
**Interview 59:** 18 May 2017

Abdirisak Aden, Swedish Somali diaspora and former member of the SCG, current director of Farsight Media

**Interview 60**: 19 May 2017

Dahir and Ibrahim, US-diaspora returnees and beneficiaries of IOM Quest Mida

**Interview 61:** 17 September 2017

Minister Yarisow, former member of the SCG, Minister of Information and Mayor of Mogadishu

**Interview 62:** 6 December **2016**

Rahma H. Ahmed, Managing Partner of Asal Consulting and local female activist

**Interview 63:** 5 December 2016
**Interview 64:** 7 September 2017

MP Mohamed Said, US Somali diaspora, former IOM Quest Mida beneficiary and now MP for South West State

**Interview 65:** 19 May 2017

Tarzan Nuur, British Somali diaspora and former member of the SCG, Mayor of Mogadishu and Farmajo's political advisor at the time of interview

**Interview 66:** 15 December 2016
**Interview 67:** 23 May 2017

Abdirahman Abdishakur (Warsame), former member of the SCG and aspiring presidential candidate

**Interview 68:** 9 December 2016

Sagal Bixi, MP Jubaland State, former member of PDP

**Interview 69**: 10 December 2016

Samiya (last name unknown), British Somali diaspora, former advisor for AMISOM and Khayre's security advisor

**Interview 70**: 12 December 2016
**Interview 71:** 15 May 2017

Shirwa Jama, British Somali diaspora and Dhulbahante political activist, director of IDLO

**Interview 72:** 10 September 2017

Hodan Ali, US Somali diaspora returnee and advisor to the Banadir municipality

**Interview 73:** 16 May 2017

Abdusalam Omar, US Somali diaspora politician, former governor of central bank and Minister of Foreign Affairs (2015-2017)

**Interview 74:** 12 May 2017

Albert Soer, chief of UNDP technocratic assistance programme

**Interview 75:** 10 September 2017

Jafar Ahmed, Canadian Somali diaspora, IOM Quest media beneficiary and director of revenue within the Minister of Finance

**Interview 76:** 9 September 2017

Mohamed Bukaro, director of Somali Diaspora Affairs Agency within the Minister of Foreign Affairs

**Interview 77**: 7 September 2017

Zakaria Yusuf, former lawyer and member of the ICU, political analyst with ICG

**Interview 78**:

Clan elder and local activist (anonymised by request)

**Interview 79**:

Contractor and businessman (anonymised by request)

**Interview 80**: 10 September 2017

Director of think tank (anonymised by request)

**Nairobi and Oslo**

**Interview 81:** 26 June 2017

Abdullahi Aress, Swedish Somali diaspora, political attache at the Swedish government, 26 June 2017

**Interview 82:** 11 July 2017

Anita Vardoys, chief of mission at the Norwegian embassy

**Interview 83**: 5 August 2017
Ali Fartaag, former political advisor to the US Embassy

**Interview 84:** 15 July 2017

Toni Sandell, deputy permanent representative for Finish government

**Interview 85:** 11 July 2017

Mirka Hettonen, head of IOM Quest-Mida for UN

**Interview 86:** 30 June 2017
**Interview 87:** 20 September 2017

Nina Bowen, chief technical advisor for USAID, and Aid Coordination Unit, 1 August 2017

**Interview 88:** 27 June 2017
**Interview 89**: 23 September 2017

Sarah Cramer, Team Lead on World Bank-Aid Coordination Unit

**Interview 90**: 28 June 2017
**Interview 91**: 19 September 2019

Omar Hashi, political advisor for the British High Commission

**Interview 92:** 17 December 2017

Luul Kulmiye, Norwegian Somali political activist in Oslo

**Interview 93**: 17 December 2017

Bashe Muse, Oslo city councillor, Medlem

**Interview 94**: 16 December 2017

Knut Holm, Return coordinator, International Unit, Norwegian Directorate of Immigration

**Interview 95:** 16 June 2018

Sarah Vaughan, research consultant and honorary fellow at the University of Edinburgh

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