

DPhil Thesis in History

Trinity Term 2011

Reassessing Civil Conflicts in Genoa, 1160-1220

Agostino Inguscio

Hertford College, University of Oxford

Reassessing Civil Conflicts in Genoa, 1160-1220

Agostino Inguscio, Hertford College

DPhil, Trinity Term, 2012

Short Abstract

This thesis examines the phenomenon of civil violence in Genoa (1160-1220). Genoese civil conflicts in the period are victim to a historiographical paradox. While their importance for the survival of communal institutions has been frequently underlined, they have often been misrepresented in the historiography. Our current understanding of civil conflicts in Genoa is in need of a reassessment if we want to deepen our comprehension of the history of a city that is considered a key centre and fundamental building bloc in the rise of the European continent to economic prominence.

This thesis studies civil violence from a perspective that takes into account the shifting form of Genoese conflicts and their protagonists. The civil conflicts in Genoa saw constant development in their intricacy, nature and participants (*Chapter one*). I distance myself from the issue of motives and causation, a pursuit which has misled scholars. Instead I focus my attention on the underlying patterns that made conflicts in Genoa possible -- the web of relationships among the families of the Genoese elite -- in order to study how the individuals and families that were involved in civil violence made their decisions (*Chapter two*). The understanding of these links and of the development of conflict in Genoa is an important thread to follow in order to reassess several aspects of the political history of the city between the twelfth and the thirteenth century (*Chapter three*). In light of my findings, the institutional transition of the city from a commune led by consuls to one led by a foreign *podestà* (*Chapter four*) and the Genoese involvement in the Mediterranean scenario (*Conclusion*), appear shaped by the maturing phenomenon of civil violence. This thesis aims to fill the current gap in academic studies on civil conflict in Genoa and to turn the phenomenon from a footnote to the current historiography into a rich vein of historical understanding of the fundamental dynamics of the city and its development.

Reassessing Civil Conflicts in Genoa, 1160-1220

Agostino Inguscio, Hertford College

DPhil, Trinity Term, 2012

Long Abstract

This thesis examines the phenomenon of civil violence in Genoa between the twelfth and thirteenth century (1160-1220) – a time and place often considered crucial for the development of the modern economy. In the communal context the episodes of internal violence between families of the city elite have often been represented as mere disrupting ground noise that the city inherited from its undocumented pre-communal past. As such these episodes were dismissed as inexplicable; although their importance and the danger they posed for the survival of communal institutions was frequently underlined. Recently Avner Greif, an economist concerned with the importance played by institutions as drivers of economic growth, saw the Genoese conflicts of the central Middle Ages as a fundamental tool in bringing about the commerce enhancing institutional developments he sought to explain. The issues that undermine Greif's work have shown that the time is ripe to reassess the current understanding of civil conflicts in Genoa, if we want to deepen our comprehension of the history of a city that is considered a fundamental building bloc behind the rise of the European continent to economic prominence. The survival in Genoa of a large corpus of contemporary historical evidence makes this city an exceptional case study through which to understand the practice and structure of internal violence in a period all too often overlooked by the available scholarship.

This thesis proposes studying civil violence not in the traditional context of immemorial and well defined lineages opposing each other, but from a perspective which takes into account the shifting form of Genoese conflicts and their participants. In fact, the civil conflicts in Genoa saw a constant development in the individuals that took part in them and in their very nature. In order to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon I distance myself from the issue of motives and causation, a pursuit which has - all too often - made scholars either

despair and give up, in the face of the complexity of the events in Genoa, or excessively simplify the city's reality. Instead I focus my attention on the structures that made conflicts in Genoa possible, that is the web of relationships among the families of the Genoese elite (such as marriage agreements and joint economic operations), and study how the individuals and families who were involved in civil violence took their decisions (such as joining a faction or choosing not to fight). These patterns were affected by the developing phenomenon of conflict and, at the same time, shaped the development of the conflicts. The new understanding of the development of conflict in Genoa is an important thread to follow in order to reassess several aspects of the political and economic history of the city between the twelfth and the thirteenth century. In light of my findings, the institutional transition of the city from a commune led by consuls to one led by a foreign *podestà* and the Genoese involvement in the Mediterranean scenario, appear shaped by the developing phenomenon of civil violence.

Part One: An analytical narrative of the Genoese civil conflicts

In the first part of this thesis I focus on the events that took place in Genoa during the period under consideration and on their protagonists. *Chapter one (Internal peace and war in a Mediterranean city)* analyses the accounts of the contemporary Genoese chroniclers to build a complete factual account of the civil conflicts that took place in the city during the period. First the intensity, typologies and contemporary perceptions of the violent events are considered. The authors of the chronicles confront a phenomenon that escalates from initial isolated *discordia* and *dissensiones* between individuals and families to *odia* and *bella* between groups of families and, at the height of its intensity, to open warfare between well defined factions. At the same time the authors' perception of the legitimacy of the violent episodes also changes and is characterized by increasingly stronger condemnations formulated alongside the narration. The *Annales* of Genoa give the impression of clearly developing internal violence in the city. Secondly, the source contains the names of a number

of the individuals and families who were involved in episodes of civil violence. As such it is possible to use it to build a dataset of the protagonists of civil conflicts in Genoa in the period considered. While the authors of the *Annales* rarely discuss on which side the individuals involved fought, a brief overview of the surviving contemporary evidence allows an understanding of the possible affiliations of the individuals involved. This procedure offers a remarkably ordered image of civil conflicts in Genoa during the period analysed. These initial findings show on one hand that Genoese civil conflicts were relatively ordered and therefore can be studied in a rational way, and on the other hand that the available documentation contains more information on the subject than has been realized so far. Finally, the analyses of chapter one shows that the factional structuring of the conflicts came after a relatively long incubation, stressing the need to avoid assuming that the picture that emerged at the end of the period considered had already been crystallized at the beginning of the period and confirming that in order to deepen our understanding of the Genoese conflicts we must start from a careful analysis of the structures formed by the connections between the individuals and families that were involved in these episodes – about which we can potentially know a lot – rather than starting from the motives behind the violence – about which we know so little that any speculation not grounded in the structures of conflict is often fruitless.

Chapter two (The structure of Genoese violence and factionalism), building on these initial findings, explores in depth the structure of the connections between all the individuals and families that were involved in violent episodes in any way. The chapter is built as a comparative analysis of five successive periods into which the conflicts studied can be divided according to the narrative of chapter one. Decade after decade, thanks to the vast notarial records surviving in the city, the chapter draws the profiles of the economic activities and of the personal connections between the families involved in the episodes of civil conflict, and tracks their development. These records, long considered fundamental for the economic historian of Genoa, have never been used previously so extensively to uncover the

web of connections running through the families of the Genoese elite. The analysis of the rising complexity of the links connecting the families of the Genoese elite - studied also through their representation as cluster networks – deepens the current understanding of civil violence in Genoa. The Genoese conflicts appear to have broken out inside a relatively cohesive elite, and not along lines of immemorial hatred between opposing lineages. As such the violence often forced Genoese families to take difficult decisions regarding which side to fight on. Chapter two demonstrates that conflicts cut across marriage ties and, in that case, the families decided which side to support based on the relative strength of their shared economic interests. The study of the connections among the Genoese that took part in violent episodes shows how one *cataclysmic* event in the 1160s started the long lasting series of violent confrontations that were to shape the history of Genoa, and how the development of these confrontations largely depended on the relative strengths of the connections between the families involved. In this light also the eventual conclusion of the factional violence assumes a dimension completely different from the one traditionally understood. It has been claimed that the factions involved agreed – or were forced to agree – to a power sharing compromise that saw the appointment in Genoa of a *podestà* and the suspension of factional violence. This conclusion was essentially supported by the fact that the mentions of factional violence – not of all internal violence – disappear from the later narrative of the chronicles. However analysing the development of the connections among the families that formed the cores of the fighting factions, a different hypothesis can be formulated. It appears that one of the factions had, towards the end of the period considered, lost all of the cohesiveness between its members. This finding, together with the absence of any mention of factionalism in the contemporary chronicles, suggests that the Genoese conflicts ended not because of a successfully negotiated power sharing agreement between factions, but because one of the faction emerged as the winner from factional warfare.

Part Two: The institutional structures, public officials and external actions of the commune and how they were affected by conflict.

Although the historiography available on the subject has often misrepresented the phenomenon of internal conflict in Genoa by taking it, more often than not, for granted rather than giving it the necessary consideration, the state of tension generated by internal violence has long been considered an important driver behind the development of the history of the commune. Obviously therefore the current misrepresentation of Genoese conflicts risks undermining our understanding of the history of this communal society in general. In the second part of this thesis on one hand, I further expand our understanding of the phenomenon of civil violence in twelfth and thirteenth century Genoa by grounding the events and families studied in the first part of this thesis in the wider economic, political and social reality of the city; and on the other hand I use this renewed image of Genoese civil conflicts as a lens to analyse the developments occurring in Genoa at the time.

In *Chapter three (The consular commune and its officials, 1160-1190)*, the economic profiles and affiliations of all the Genoese families that saw their members elected as consuls of the commune between 1160 and 1190 are reconstructed. The analysis of the connections of the consular families with the families involved in episodes of civil violence (who were in most cases also consular families) evidences how the phenomenon of civil conflict described in the Genoese chronicles was essentially all internal to the Genoese consular elite – making its current misrepresentation even more problematic. The analysis of the composition of the Genoese consular lists year after year shows the growing impact of conflict on the Genoese public sphere. In the 1160s there is hardly any hint of factional competition over the consular seats. In the 1170s following the development of factional structures old and powerful Genoese families that did not take part in the civil violence became protagonists of the communal governments; this might have been due to the fact that these families attempted to prop up the legitimacy of an institution that was been undermined by the infighting among the

Genoese consular elite, or it might have reflected a lack of interest of factional families in the communal government. Finally, in the 1180s, it is evident that the consular appointments had become yet another field of conflict competition for the two factions, one of which controlled most of the seats available. Chapter three therefore shows that the internal political structure of the commune reflected the development of conflict. Furthermore the findings also illustrate another effect of factional conflicts on the internal balance of the commune. Chapter three shows the increasing presence of families with commercial interests among the consular elite. While this was certainly part of a more general enrichment and political rise of a commercial elite in Genoa, it was also due to the fact that these families had the most solid links to the faction that was coming to dominate the Genoese political spectrum. In this light, factional conflicts played a role in the increasing political importance of families with vast commercial interests. By the time that the Genoese commune had begun its transition from a commune governed by consuls to one ruled by a foreign *podestà* in 1190 the influence of civil conflicts on the political structure was undeniable. *Chapter four (From the commune of the consuls to the commune of the podestà, 1191-1216)* discusses how every aspect behind the decision to appoint a *podestà* to govern the city depended on factional logic. The chapter disproves the hypothesis that the *podestà* was a tool to enhance power sharing between factions and illustrates instead how the *podestà* appointments were weapons in factional warfare more often than not. In order to uncover the power struggle behind the appointments of the *podestà* in the absence of the consuls of the commune, who were replaced by *podestà*, the chapter evaluates the composition of the lists of the consuls of the pleas (essentially judges). The lists of these officials have traditionally been considered not very important when it came to understanding factional patterns behind city governments. However chapter four shows the rising level of competition over the control of the consulate of the pleas that, in turn, made it a carrier of more important information than it has hitherto been realised. The analysis shows that from the mid-1190s onwards the image of the political elite of the commune is once again

a cohesive one. The internal political balance of Genoa in that period was not the result of a power sharing agreement, but rather the consequence of the prolonged period of violent conflict that saw one of the two factions opposing one other emerging as a clear winner.

In the *Conclusion (Genoese factionalism and Mediterranean involvement)*, I further expand these findings by evaluating the significance of the phenomenon of conflict for one of the areas that have been traditionally considered fundamental by the scholarship on Genoa; the city's Mediterranean involvement. The findings illustrate that, while at the initial stages of internal conflicts it cannot be argued that Genoese foreign involvement responded to a clear factional logic, this aspect of Genoese history too, as was the case for its domestic development, came to be heavily influenced by factions when the families in opposition pursued opposed foreign policies for the city and constantly tried to undermine their opponents' influence overseas. Genoa therefore appears to have followed a coherent strategy of engagement in the Mediterranean until, during the period of most pronounced factionalism, the two factions pursued different strategies. At the end of the factional period this duality too seems to have ceased when former members of both factions successfully agreed on how to divide the spoils of a major Mediterranean involvement: the Sicilian campaign of emperor Henry VI.

In light of the findings of this thesis, factional conflict emerges as one of the most important driving factors in the history of Genoa between the twelfth and the thirteenth century. There has often been a tendency not to consider the details of civil conflict in Genoa, taking them both for granted and as inexplicable – the result of an overreliance on outdated interpretation. This thesis aims to fill that gap and to offer the future scholar of Genoa an additional, and perhaps vital, key with which to unlock a greater understanding of the intricate history of this city.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations	xi
List of Tables	xii
List of Figures	xiii
INTRODUCTION	1
PART ONE: An analytical narrative of the Genoese civil conflicts.	
Chapter one: <i>Internal peace and war in a Mediterranean city</i>	32
Chapter two: <i>The structure of Genoese violence and factionalism</i>	66
PART TWO: The institutional structures, public officials and external actions of the commune and how they were affected by conflict.	
Chapter three: <i>The consular commune and its officials</i>	169
Chapter four: <i>From the commune of the consuls to the commune of the podestà</i>	236
CONCLUSION: <i>Genoese factionalism and Mediterranean involvement</i>	282
Bibliography	294

Abbreviations

Annales

Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII, BELGRANO, L.T. and IMPERIALE, C., (eds.), (Roma, 1890-1901).

ASG

Archivio di Stato di Genova

ASLI

Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria

Bonvillano

Il Cartolare di Bonvillano, JOYCE, E., KRUGER, H., and REYNOLDS, R.,(eds.), (Torino, 1939)

Cassinese

Il Cartolare di Guglielmo Cassinese 1190-1192, HALL, M., HILMAR and L., REYNOLDS (eds.), (Genova, 1938).

CGD

Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova, C., Imperiale di Sant'Angelo (ed.), (Roma, 1936-1938)

Giovanni Scriba

Il Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, M., CHIAUDANO and M., MORESCO, (eds.), (Roma, 1935).

Guiberto

Il Cartolare di Giovanni di Guiberto (1200-1211), HALL, M., KRUEGER, H., REINERT, R.,and REYNOLDS, R., (eds.), (Genova,1939-1940)

Lanfranco

Il Cartolare di Lanfranco Scriba (1202-1226), KRUEGER, H., and REYNOLDS, R., (eds.), (Genova, 1951-1953).

Oberto 1186

Oberto Scriba de Mercato, 1186, CHIAUDANO, M., (ed.) (Genova, 1940).

Oberto 1190

Oberto Scriba de Mercato, 1190, CHIAUDANO, M., MOROZZO, R., (eds.) (Torino, 1938).

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Caffaro	p.31
Table 1.2 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Oberto Cancelliere	p.31
Table 1.3 Individuals involved in the 1160s civil conflicts	p.33
Table 1.4 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Ottobono	p.39
Table 1.5 Individuals involved in civil conflicts (1178-1194)	p.41
Table 1.6 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Ogerio Pane	p.57
Table 2.1 Families involved in episodes of civil conflicts in Genoa in period one	p.70
Table 2.2 Families involved in period two	p.101
Table 2.3 Families involved in period three	p.105
Table 2.8 Activities of families associated with the faction de Volta	p.108
Table 2.9 Activities of families associated with the faction de Curia	p.113
Table 2.11 Families involved in period five	p.134
Table 2.12 Summary of Doria activities 1186-1192	p.138
Table 2.14 Families involved in period five	p.147
Table 3.1 List of consular families and appointments, 1160-1190	p.181
Table 3.2 Ranking of consular families and number of consulates held 1190-1190	p.182
Table 4.1 Consuls of the pleas in 1191	p.239
Table 4.2 Consuls of the commune, 1192-1194	p.243
Table 4.3 Consuls of the pleas, 1192-1194	p.246
Table 4.4 Consuls of the pleas, 1195-1200	p.253
Table 4.5 <i>Rectores</i> appointed in 1196 and 1199	p.255
Table 4.6 Consuls of the commune in 1201	p.259
Table 4.7 Consuls of the pleas in 1201	p.259
Table 4.8 Consuls of the pleas, 1202-1206	p.261
Table 4.9 List of the <i>rectores</i> , 1202, 1203, 1205	p.263
Table 4.10 Consuls of the commune, 1207-1210	p.268
Table 4.11 Consuls of the pleas, 1207-1210	p.271
Table 4.12 Consuls of the pleas in 1211	p.272
Table 4.13 <i>Rectores</i> in 1211	p.272
Table 4.14 Consuls of the commune, 1212-1216	p.273
Table 4.15 Consuls of the pleas, 1212-1215	p.275

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa (1160-1220)	p.67
Figure 2.2 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period one	p.70
Figure 2.3 Cluster Map One	p.71
Figure 2.4 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period two	p.101
Table 2.5 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period three	p.104
Figure 2.6 Cluster Map Two	p.107
Figure 2.7 Cluster Map Three	p.110
Figure 2.8 Cluster Map Four	p.116
Figure 2.9 Cluster Map Five	p.126
Figure 2.10 Cluster Map Six	p.128
Figure 2.11 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period four	p.134
Figure 2.12 Cluster Map Seven	p.140
Figure 2.13 Cluster Map Eight	p.143
Figure 2.14 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period five	p.146
Figure 2.15 Cluster Map Nine	p.149
Figure 2.16 Cluster Map Ten	p.151
Table 2.17 Cluster Map Eleven	p.154
Figure 2.18 Cluster Map Twelve	p.161

Introduction

In 1163 Caffaro di Rustico of Caschifellone, the original author and father of the *Annales Ianuenses*, was so disheartened by the rising internal tensions in the city of Genoa that he broke off his duties as city chronicler.¹ Caffaro, who lived from 1080 to 1166, had a brilliant political career as a Genoese consul and, in 1152, showed the consuls the manuscript of the history of Genoa he had written on the basis of the notes he had taken since his youth.² The story of the city, which Caffaro had been recording since he was a young man, was one of triumphs. Then, something changed. In 1160-1 Caffaro made reference, for the first time, to an internal violent conflict between Genoese families, writing of the consuls' attempts to control 'citizens in fierce antagonism with one another'.³ This state of affairs, which in the early 1160s was considered so unusual as to bring to despair and eventually silence the most passionate narrator of Genoese history, had by the time that Ottobono Scriba took over as the official city chronicler in 1174 (1174-96), escalated to the point that, in 1193, the latter recorded that '*Sicut validissimus ignis inter copiosissimum lignorum gongeriem ventorum flamine copiosissime augmentatur, ita et odia, seditiones, proelia et mala omnia fuerunt presenti anni in urbe*' – Genoa, like a forest devoured by a huge fire fuelled by strong winds, was engulfed in internal violence.⁴ From Caffaro's initial disbelief to Ottobono's acknowledgement of a state of civil war, the phenomenon of civil violence in Genoa comes to dominate the pages of the chronicles: Gabriella Airaldi, for instance, in her introduction to the recent Italian translation of the *Annales* of Oberto Cancelliere, writes of 'the violent connotations of the passage of power from a group to another', stating that 'the history is

¹ *Annales*, vol. I, p.155.

² On Caffaro see Petti Balbi, G., 'Caffaro', in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, vol.16, 1973.

³ *Annales*, vol.I, pp.122-123.

⁴ *Annales*, vol. II, p.43.

always the one of large family consortia'; she refers to the existence in Genoa of 'a sort of party formed by clans' and of 'certain people, linked in general to blocks of forces'.⁵

The frequency and seemingly undifferentiated use of these terms indicates two things: firstly that civil violence in Genoa was an important and widespread phenomenon; and secondly that, strangely, it has been largely avoided or only briefly considered in rather unsystematic ways by the available scholarship, as will become clear by the end of this introduction. This paradox must be remedied if we are to deepen our understanding of the history of this city during a period – known as the commercial revolution – that was to bring it 'from a small town...that lagged behind its counterparts' to 'an economic archetype among the city-states of the Renaissance'.⁶

Overview

I chose Genoa as the subject of my dissertation for two important reasons. This city has, for a long time, captured the attention of economic historians interested in uncovering the reasons behind its economic success. Genoa has been considered, repeatedly, the birthplace of capitalism, of finance and one of the Italian cities that led the way for western European worldwide economic dominance. The traces of the foundation of the city walls built in 1155 provide a fairly solid estimate of the size of the Genoese population at the time -- between 30,000 and 40,000 – probably then surpassed by several other Italian cities like Venice, Milan, Bologna and Naples.⁷ However, by the beginning of the fourteenth century 'Genoa might well have been the wealthiest city in the wealthiest part of Europe'.⁸

⁵ Airal di, G., 'Introduzione', in Airal di, G., (ed.), *Annali di Oberto Cancelliere* (Genova, 2003).

⁶ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa*, (Cambridge, 2009) p.2. See in general Lopez, R. S., *The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350* (Cambridge, 1976). In my analysis I only consider violent civil conflicts; obviously these were not the only manifestations of urban conflict in twelfth and thirteenth century Genoa, but they are the only ones that are captured by the available sources, see Maire Vigueur, J. C. *Cavalieri e cittadini* (Firenze, 2004) pp.399-425, for a discussion on communal practices of conflict.

⁷ Ginatempo, M. and Sandri, L., *L'Italia delle città: Il popolamento urbano tra Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Firenze, 1990), pp.68-72.

⁸ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements...*, p.62; see also Heyd, W., *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Age* (Leipzig, 1973), pp.60-64 for several indications of relative wealth.

As noted by several scholars and most recently by Avner Greif, Genoa was, at the same time as this breathtaking economic growth, the theatre of ‘frequent intracity political violence’.⁹ This places it in opposition to its potential rivals such as Venice, whose internal stability eventually earned it the title of ‘Most Serene Republic’, or Pisa, where political power was essentially controlled by a well-defined ruling coalition. I decided, therefore, that Genoese civil conflicts could constitute a key vein to follow in order to understand the unique history of the city, a thread that has been largely ignored by the scholarship so far.

As I shall discuss in greater detail shortly, these conflicts have never received the necessary attention from historians. So far, the available interpretations have dealt both with the structures and motives of conflicts, but not on adequate grounds. Regarding the structures behind this violence, there is a wide consensus in the historical literature on the fact that twelfth- and early thirteenth-century conflicts in Genoa broke out between different clans or lineages that had operated in the city since periods preceding the available documentation.¹⁰ These clans originated in divisions in the families of the viscounts that had ruled Genoa during the Carolingian period, leading to a view that opposing sides were composed of people that ‘claimed to descend from a single stock’.¹¹ Given these origins, it is largely agreed, the conflicts repeated themselves generation after generation along similar dividing lines. On the basis of this interpretation, a variety of hypotheses have been formulated regarding the motivations for such conflicts. For most scholars, the conflicts were simply a futile – or at least impossible to comprehend - heritage of the past; although Gerald Day saw in them the competition over opposing visions on Genoese Mediterranean expansion; and Avner Greif claimed that they were animated by a fierce competition over the control of the city’s resources.¹² Finally, there is a wide consensus among these interpretations on what was

⁹ Greif, A., *Institutions and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade*, (Cambridge, 2006) p.217.

¹⁰ Epstein, S., *Genoa & the Genoese, 958-1528* (Chapel Hill & London, 1996).

¹¹ Heers, J., *Family Clans in the Middle Ages: a study of political and social structures in urban areas*, (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1977) p.99.

¹² Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.222.

ultimately the political consequence of these conflicts, the transition from a commune ruled by consuls to a commune ruled by a foreign *podestà* who guaranteed the balance of power among clans.

All of the above, as we shall see in a moment, is essentially based on very little evidence. Giovanna Petti Balbi speaks of a paradox in the twelfth and thirteenth century historiography of the city, namely that the abundant twelfth and thirteenth century evidence available in Genoa is still largely to be analysed in order to understand the reality of its urban organization.¹³ In 1940, Mattia Moresco had already warned of the complete reliance on nineteenth century genealogical reconstructions for Genoa.¹⁴ However, every scholar that approached the history of conflict in Genoa took the clan structures that emerged from these studies for granted. Most recently, Luca Filangieri reassessed the sources forming the bases of these reconstructions, dismissing them in most cases as guesswork.¹⁵ The current interpretations of the reasons behind conflicts are therefore thwarted by a complete reliance on a genealogical interpretation of the structures behind conflicts. The recent works of Avner Greif on the institutional development of medieval Genoa have shown, once again, that if we are to go deeper into an understanding of this society, we cannot afford to rely on a misrepresentation of civil conflicts inside the city.¹⁶ The time is ripe for a reassessment of this phenomenon.

As a result of my research I found solid bases for the following hypotheses. First, the image of internal conflicts as largely unchanging is incorrect. In my dissertation I will show how these conflicts clearly changed during the period considered and – definitively -- had a beginning, a development and an end. Second, the thesis of a conflict structure based on two

¹³ Petti Balbi, G., *Governare la città. Pratiche sociali e linguaggi politici a Genova in età medievale*, (Firenze, 2007) pp.7-18.

¹⁴ Moresco, M., 'Parentele e guerre civili in Genova nel secolo XII' (Milano 1959)

¹⁵ Filangieri, L., 'Famiglie e gruppi dirigenti a Genova (secoli XII-metà XIII)', (Firenze, 2010) p.38.

¹⁶ Greif, A., *Institutions...*; see also Greif, A., 'On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa during the XII and XIII Centuries', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 151, 4, 1995; and Bates, R., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton, 1998)

clans perennially in conflict with one another is misleading. I will demonstrate that the conflicts erupted between families that were not opposed through enduring clan-based hatred. While, subsequently, most of the families organized themselves into factions – by which I simply mean groups of families – these did not rely exclusively on family ties, but largely on economic links. Thirdly, a reconstruction of the motivations for the civil violence based on the observation that different policies – regarding foreign involvement or the communal institutional framework for example - were apparently pursued by the factions at the height of conflict reads history backward. The construction of the factions predates any of the policies they pursued and not vice-versa.¹⁷ Finally, the misrepresentation of these violent episodes means that our understanding of the institutional transition from a consular commune to a *podestarial* system in Genoa requires reconsideration. The *podestà* ultimately was not an external guarantor of a balance among opposing factions, because, by the time of the full entrenchment of the new system, one faction had essentially ceased to exist as a coherent political actor.

This explicable image of Genoese civil conflicts emerged on the basis of the information contained in the notarial cartularies. These have not previously been analysed properly for a study such as this. One reason for this is to be found in the nature and the large quantity of material contained in the cartularies. As I shall discuss in a moment, the mostly economic information recorded by the notaries has traditionally been considered of little use for an analysis of conflict relations that were considered to be based on immemorial political alliances. Instead, in this dissertation, I demonstrate the fundamental role played by the economic links in the development of conflicts. In order to show this I used the tools of social network analysis, which has been extremely valuable in allowing me to evaluate the large quantity of data and in uncovering the diverse typologies of links connecting the families of the Genoese elite.

¹⁷ As John Padgett puts it describing the rise to power of the family de' Medici in Florence: 'Contra Machiavelli, even Cosimo [de' Medici] himself did not set out with a grand design to take over the state'. Padgett, J., 'Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 6, 1993, p.1264.

Literature on Genoese conflict

Surprisingly, the phenomenon of internal violence in twelfth and thirteenth century Genoa has, so far, been largely ignored by the Italian literature and, partly as a consequence, misrepresented outside Italy by scholars who had to rely on outdated reconstructions.¹⁸ For instance, let us consider the options available to a scholar interested in the political and institutional aspects of the formation and development of the commune of Genoa; she/he would probably start her/his exploration with the 1955 *Breviario della storia di Genova*, Vito Vitale's last work, the 1968 *Storia di Genova* of Teofilo Ossian de Negri and the 1996 *Genoa and the Genoese*, by Steven Epstein, essentially a modern rendition in English of the previous two.¹⁹ In all these works, aiming to draw as complete and clear a picture as possible of the intricate history of this city, the authors briefly refer to the civil conflicts that raged in the city, respectively as a 'chaos of clashes', 'facts that repeat themselves in never ending and ever changing patterns', and 'bouts of self destruction'.²⁰ Vitale justifies his brevity by stressing that '[e]very attempt of giving order to the chaos of clashes ...appears as a desperate endeavour'.²¹ Vitale's decision to essentially leave out of his study an analysis of twelfth century conflict gravely undermines his own work because stating that 'the *podestarial* government, almost unconsciously, had risen to put an end to those *risse nobiliari* – aristocratic brawls', he seems to admit that these brawls are deserving of further attention.²² De Negri, following in Vitale's footsteps, warns that 'an attempt to uncover the origins and

¹⁸ Moresco, M., 'Parentele e guerre...', pp.431-440.

¹⁹ Paola Guglielmotti refers to the work of Epstein as the '1996 contribution of an American author...who nonetheless remains decisively faithful to the interpretative lines traced before him and that proceeds by anchoring his work to the sequence of events', Guglielmotti, 'La storia medievale. Parte II (1960-2007)', in Puncuh, D. (ed.), *La Società Ligure di Storia Patria nella storiografia italiana. 1857-2007* (Genova, 2010), p.157. Guglielmotti also published a review of Epstein's work in *Studi medievali*. However it must also be acknowledged, to use the words of David Abulafia on the back cover of the book, that '[t]his book fills a gaping hole in the literature...at long last giving its due to a city-state that played a central role in the political and economic history of the Mediterranean'. The importance of the works of Vitale and De Negri as a starting point is recognized by Puncuh in his preface to the Puncuh, D. (ed.), *La Società Ligure ...* Paola Guglielmotti, speaking of the lack of recent attempts to write a much needed renewed comprehensive history of the city refers to 'a carefulness to formulate comprehensive visions on behalf of the Genoese academic community', 'La storia medievale. Parte II (1960-2007)', p.157, in Puncuh, D. (ed.) *La Società Ligure...*

²⁰ Vitale, V., *Breviario della storia di Genova. Lineamenti storici e orientamenti storiografici*, p.29; De Negri, T., *Storia di Genova*, (Firenze 2003) p.304; Epstein, S., *Genoa & the Genoese....* p.80.

²¹ Vitale, V., *Breviario della storia di Genova...*, p.29.

²² Vitale, V., *Il comune del Podestà a Genova*, (Milano, 1951) pp.9-10.

reconstruct the events of these contrasts would be a vain effort, mostly because of the scarcity of the sources. [People] [w]ho attempted to shed more light on these events...eventually renounced the endeavor...'.²³ Epstein largely overlooks this phenomenon on the basis that '[p]erhaps all sorts of people were knifing each other on the streets; the chronicle records assaults on and by important people because of the stir such events caused, not because they reflected deep political disputes among the elite'. However he concedes that 'the increasing role of factionalism in Genoese politics is uncontestable' and reflects on the fact that the 'faction-plagued elite [was] discredited by its pointless violence', clearly acknowledging, in contrast to Vitale or de Negri, that the disputes did have deep political and social consequences and were therefore, I believe, probably deserving of more attention.²⁴ The recent and impressive effort led by Dino Puncuh to provide a detailed framework of the available Genoese historiography again underlines the failure of historiography to fill this lacuna, confirming the need for a reinterpretation of Genoese conflicts.²⁵ Giovanna Petti Balbi in her contribution to Puncuh's *Storia di Genova* in fact complains about the lack of a study offering a key to the internal conflicts.²⁶ In practice, even today the only reference to an analysis of twelfth and thirteenth century civil conflicts is contained in the work of Mattia Moresco. This scholar, in his short article 'Parentele e guerre civili in Genova nel secolo XII' argued, as early as 1940, for the necessity of 'underlin[ing] the peculiarities of the antagonisms between aristocratic families recorded by the annalists', since 'the understanding of several aspects of the Genoese society in the twelfth century must be based essentially on the structure of the aristocracy – 'l'organizzazione gentilizia' .²⁷ While deciding to focus

²³ De Negri, T., *Storia di Genova...*, p.304. The aim of the work of De Negri is 'to fill the lacuna left by Vitale', Puncuh, *Storia di Genova. Mediterraneo, Europa, Atlantico* (Genova, 2003), p.6.

²⁴ Epstein, S. *Genoa & the Genoese...*, p.108, p.75 and p.138.

²⁵ Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova...*, p.161, for a summary of the violent events that took place in the 1160s. A failure that is both a reflection of the current state of the literature, since the only work on twelfth century violent conflicts mentioned is Moresco's, but also a lack of openness towards contribution coming from abroad, since the works of Day and Greif are not considered.

²⁶ Petti Balbi, G., 'Tra dogato e principato: il Tre e il Quattrocento', in Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova...*, pp.233-324.

²⁷ Moresco, M., 'Parentele e guerre...', p.431.

solely on the legal aspects of these violent episodes, he suggested that these conflicts could probably tell us a lot regarding social and political developments in Genoa during the crucial transition from the twelfth to thirteenth century, rather than simply being considered the heritage of the pre-communal era of the city and he regretted that the contemporary scholars still had to rely on outdated genealogical analyses to explore the conflicting relations among the aristocratic families of Genoa.²⁸ So far, Italian historians of the city have unfortunately done little to follow in Moresco's initial footsteps. Instead, they have largely followed Vitale's warning and remained clear of the specific details of the early episodes of Genoese civil violence; rather, they have treated them as background noise in the twelfth and early thirteenth history of the city, leaving scholars to focus on much later periods the systematic analysis of what was by then a very different phenomenon.²⁹ Outside Genoa too, historians largely followed a similar pattern and avoided an in-depth synthesis of the phenomenon of conflict in Genoa. In his collection of essays on the issue of violence in late medieval Italian cities, Lauro Martines complains that 'the absence of a paper on Genoa...the collection's major lacuna' is due to the impossibility of 'find[ing] an expert prepared to write an essay on the subject'.³⁰

Partly as a consequence of this gap in the historiography, recent attempts to uncover the dominant motives behind Genoese civil conflicts in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries are plagued by a misrepresentation of the often conflictual relations between the families forming the city's elite. I am referring here to the works of Gerald Day and Avner Greif, which had to rely on the traditional reconstruction of the twelfth century consular elite in Genoa. In this view, the violent episodes in Genoa had their origins in a contraposition

²⁸ The approach of the author, who was a professor of canon law at the University of Genoa (1911-1946) and rector of the University between 1925 and 1943, is typical of a certain Genoese erudition. In this article he refers mostly to the work of Canale, M. G., *Storia civile, commerciale e letteraria dei Genovesi* (Genova, 1844), pp.199-210, which anachronistically speaks of Guelf and Guibellines in relations to the first mentions of civil violence.

²⁹ I am referring here to the works of Grendi, E., *Profilo storico degli alberghi genovesi* (Roma, 1975) and Raggio, O., *Faide e Parentele* (Torino, 1990) among others. The value of such studies for the interpretation of the conflicts occurring in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is limited by the fact that by then such phenomenon had undergone a process of institutionalization.

³⁰ Martines, L., (ed.), *Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200-1500* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1972), p.18.

between two well-defined clans opposing one another. These clans developed, it is believed, from the division of the family of the viscounts that ruled over Genoa in the Carolingian period. In the words of Steven Epstein: ‘The family of the viscounts of Genoa had split into three main branches: the de Caramandino, de Insulis (delle Isole), and Manessano lines’.³¹ Accepting this assumption, Day and Greif focused on the potential motives that animated this contraposition.³² The genealogical reconstructions at the base of the interpretations of Day and Greif were proposed for the first time by the scholar Tommaso Belgrano in his ‘Tavole genealogiche a corredo della illustrazione del registro arcivescovile’.³³ These nineteenth-century reconstructions are still widely believed, or at least used. While in chapter three I consider the validity of such reconstructions more carefully, here I would like to stress that building on the doubts arose by Giovanna Petti Balbi, Luca Filangieri, in his recent dissertation ‘Famiglie e Gruppi Dirigenti’, has attempted to evaluate critically the genealogical reconstructions of Belgrano at the basis of this supposed division of the city in two well defined factions.³⁴ Filangieri’s brilliant contribution – in my opinion – must radically change the use that has been made of the works of Belgrano, which appear seriously undermined by their reliance on very little historical evidence.

Gerald Day in his *Genoa’s Response to Byzantium* hypothesizes that the families of the Manessano branch were expansionist in policy, and were opposed by the families of the Caramandino branch who were in contrast conservative.³⁵ Epstein concedes that the hypothesis of Day ‘makes sense’, and underlines that Day’s ‘complicated argument sometimes depends on tenuous evidence...[b]ut it is the best explanation for factions in

³¹ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.75. I quote from Epstein because I want to stress the fact that these nineteenth century reconstructions are still widely believed.

³² Between Caramandino and Manasseno, for in this interpretation the ‘clan d’Isola was not politically active’; see e.g. Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.224.

³³ Belgrano, L., ‘Tavole genealogiche a corredo della illustrazione del registro arcivescovile’, tables (from now on tav.) 19-38.

³⁴ Petti Balbi, G., *I Visconti...*; Filangeri, L., ‘Famiglie...’, pp.8-37.

³⁵ Day, G. W., *Genoa’s Response to Byzantium, 1155-1204: Commercial Expansion and Factionalism in a Medieval City* (Urbana, 1988), p.10. Day investigates Genoese conflicts by focusing on how Genoa’s relations with Byzantium played a role in the emergence of factionalism in Genoa; and, vice-versa, how internal politics in Genoa would sometimes profoundly affect the diplomatic situation, pp.70-107.

Genoa'. On the other hand, Epstein stresses that '[p]ersonal and familial rivalries, based on envy rather than policy differences, cannot be excluded as an impetus to factionalism; nor can a crass desire for power'.³⁶ Precisely the latter motivation, 'a crass desire for power', can be essentially considered as the basis of Avner Greif's interpretation of civil conflict in Genoa in the twelfth and thirteenth century. The scholar – again relying on preexisting interpretations – argues that 'there are two clans – in Genoa – with infinite life-spans'. Each one of them can decide 'whether to attack the other' in order to become 'a "controlling clan", which receives all future income...' or to cooperate in the joint administration of the city.³⁷ According to the author, internal peace would be maintained as long as the gains received from becoming a controlling clan remained sufficiently low; and in turn those were to remain low as long as the threat of internal war was consistent. Therefore, Greif believes, 'under a mutual-deterrence equilibrium, peace comes at the price of economic prosperity'.³⁸ Although trapped in this equilibrium, the clans eventually started to cooperate because of 'an unexpected parametric change' which appeared in the figure of the external threat from the German emperor Frederick I Barbarossa.³⁹ Thanks to this external threat, the Genoese cooperated and the city grew richer; as a consequence 'controlling the consulate was more profitable' and 'theory predicts that Genoa's clans were more likely to challenge each other militarily'. A civil war ensued and it was stopped only by an institutional development that 'enabled the Genoese to end the civil war, further mobilize their resources, and attain a new level of economic prosperity'. Greif identifies this development in the transition from the consular commune to the *podestarial* one.⁴⁰ In order to do so Greif theorizes that the *podestà* in Genoa fostered inter-clan cooperation by creating a balance of power.

³⁶ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese*..., pp.75, 76 and p.336, n. 61.

³⁷ Greif, A., *Institutions*..., pp.224-225.

³⁸ Greif, A., *Institutions*..., p.225.

³⁹ Greif, A., *Institutions*..., p.233.

⁴⁰ Greif, A., *Institutions*..., pp.234-236.

Greif's economic reductionist approach has been criticized from many sides.⁴¹ Avner Offer, commenting on Greif's work, warns us that 'the marriage of model and narrative is not easy'.⁴² In a sense Avner Greif's work demonstrates the pressing necessity for an interpretation of Genoese civil conflicts solidly grounded in the vast evidence available. Indeed, as I shall demonstrate, his theory of Genoese state building is flawed in two principal ways. Firstly, it relies on a misleading reconstruction of the phenomenon of conflict in twelfth and thirteenth century Genoa; and, most importantly, it results in a loss of any distinction between evidence and hypothesis. Once the scholar has decided how conflicts were structured and what their motives were, the theory risks becoming all-dominant and the history of Genoa is reduced to a mine from which to extract facts supporting the theory, discarding anything else.

The absence of conflict from the wider Genoese literature

Acknowledging the contribution of the works of Day and Greif, it could nonetheless be said that civil conflicts were as present in the history of Genoa, as they have been absent from its historiography. From the point of view of the Italian historiography's engagement with this phenomenon, it is telling that both Day and Greif are absent from a recent and extremely detailed study on the current state of medieval Genoese bibliography.⁴³ In order to understand the origins of this absence of analysis of the phenomenon of civil violence, I shall now turn to the wider picture of medieval historiography on Genoa. The study of the history of Genoa has been linked for more than a hundred and fifty years to the Società Ligure di Storia Patria, founded in 1858 to 'recuperate its own history, dispersed for too long by the foreign

⁴¹ Elster, J., 'Review: Rational Choice History: a Case of Excessive Ambition', *The American Political Science Review*, 94, 3, 2000, p.692.

⁴² Offer, A., 'Review' in *The Journal of Economic History*, 60, 1, 2000, p.313.

⁴³ Puncuh, D. (ed.), *La Società Ligure ...*, which although mostly concerned with the works of the scholars that cooperated with the Società Ligure di Storia Patria, also aims to give a complete image of the available historiography on medieval Genoa. As previously noticed, the work mentions for instance the works of Steven Epstein.

invaders'.⁴⁴ The Middle Ages constituted a large gap in historiographical studies produced by the society because, as was the case in several other Italian cities, of the desire to look to that period for a study of the heroic origins of the Genoese maritime republic. It is not surprising therefore that Genoese historiography began with a marked interest in the external history of the city, its maritime and commercial expansion and its colonial past. Nor is the omission of internal violence from the historical discourse particularly shocking. After all, it was hardly a heroic characteristic of the city.⁴⁵ The most important scholars behind the ambitious project to position the history of Genoa onto a Mediterranean and European stage were Agostino Olivieri, Cornelio Desimoni and Luigi Tommaso Belgrano. Olivieri conducted an extensive contribution to the institutional history of the city by collating the succession of the communal governments.⁴⁶ Desimoni mostly dealt with the issue of Ligurian origins.⁴⁷ Belgrano, in contrast to Olivieri and Desimoni, developed a critical exposition of historical events, founded on a deep prosopographical knowledge.⁴⁸ The following decades were profoundly influenced by the 'erudite-positivist method' imposed by Desimoni and Belgrano, and attention to the medieval period was markedly reduced.⁴⁹ The crisis was such that Francesco Poggi laments the limits of the scholarship on Genoa published in the *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* between 1890 and 1917, characterized 'by a lack of an organic approach both in the analysis of the facts and of the concepts'.⁵⁰ From a thematic point of view, Vito Vitale - in the words of David Abulafia, 'for many years the presiding genius of Genoese history' - placed himself in an ideal continuity to the erudite tradition of the

⁴⁴ Olivieri, A., 'Prefazione', in *ASLI*, I/I, 1858, pp. V-XI in Puncuh, D., 'La fondazione della Società Ligure di Storia Patria', in Lo Basso, L., (ed.) *Politica e Cultura nel Risorgimento* (Genova, 2008), p.24.

⁴⁵ Petti Balbi, G., 'La storia medievale. Parte I (1858-1957)', in Puncuh, D., (ed.), *La Società Ligure ...*, pp.82-83.

⁴⁶ Olivieri, A., 'Serie dei consoli del comune di Genova', in *ASLI*, I/III, (Genova, 1860), pp.155-626.

⁴⁷ Desimoni, C., 'Sul frammento di Breve genovese scoperto a Nizza', in *ASLI*, I/II, 1859, pp.91-154; 'Sulla tavola di bronzo della Polcevera e sul modo di studiare le antichità linguistiche. Lettere tre al professor canonico Angiolo Sanguineti', in *ASLI*, III/III, 1865, pp. 529-744; 'Sulle marche d'Italia e sulle loro diramazioni in marchesati. Lettere cinque al commendator Domenico Promis', in *ASLI*, XXVIII/I, 1896, pp.1-338.

⁴⁸ (e.g.) Belgrano, L. T., 'Della vita privata dei genovesi', in *ASLI*, IV/II, 1866, pp.79-274.

⁴⁹ Petti Balbi, G., 'La storia medievale. Parte I', p.100.

⁵⁰ Poggi, F., *La Società ligure di storia patria dal 1908 al 1917* (Genoa, 1917), pp.XXXI-XXXII.

Genoese historiography, returning to the myth of the primacy of the city of Genoa and of its external projections.⁵¹ This impasse in Genoese historiography was to be broken by the publication of the twelfth-century Genoese cartularies, tellingly, by a ‘fruitful collaboration’ between Italian and American scholars of the Wisconsin School of medievalists, to which I will return shortly.⁵²

Contemporary to the appearance of these fundamental editions, Roberto Sabatino Lopez started fruitfully to use the information contained in the notarial cartularies, beginning with the biography of Benedetto Zaccaria.⁵³ The works of Lopez had a lasting impact by turning the attention of economic historians from ‘treaties, partisan chronicles and travellers’ tales as sole indices of economic developments’, to ‘sources that provide a day-by-day picture of commercial development...’.⁵⁴

With the works of Roberto Sabatino Lopez there was a profound renewal of another of the traditional themes that shaped Genoese history.⁵⁵ This was in fact part of a general interest in Genoese economic history which had started with the works of Heyd on Genoese commerce with the Levant, Schaube’s ‘encyclopedia study of the trade of the Latins in the Mediterranean’ and Sieverking’s study on the Genoese communal finances; it then continued, at a more developed level, with Lopez, who became the central figure in the study of medieval Genoese medieval economic history.⁵⁶ From that point onwards the influence of Lopez and the editing and publication of a growing number of Genoese cartularies created fertile ground for the growth of the historiography of the medieval economy of Genoa. This

⁵¹ Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies* (Cambridge, 1977), p.5; Petti Balbi, G., ‘La storia medievale. Parte I’, pp.114-116.

⁵² Puncuh, D., ‘I centodieci anni della Società’, p.416. These records are described in detail in Moresco and Bognetti, *Per l’edizione dei notai liguri del secolo XII*, (Torino 1938). Epstein, S., *Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 1150-1250* (Cambridge, 1984), p.2.

⁵³ Epstein, S., *Wills and Wealth...*, p.3; Lopez, R.S., *Genova marinara nel Duecento: Benedetto Zaccaria, ammiraglio e mercante* (Milano, 1933).

⁵⁴ Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies...*, pp.7-8.

⁵⁵ Lopez, R.S., *Studi sull’economia genovese nel medio evo* (Torino, 1936); Lopez, R. S., *Storia delle colonie genovesi del Mediterraneo* (Bologna, 1938).

⁵⁶ Heyd, W. *Histoire du commerce ...*; Schaube, A., *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge*, (Munich-Berlin, 1906). The quote is Abulafia’s, Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies...*, p.6.

becomes clear, for instance with the works of Erik Bach, *La cité de Gênes au XII siècle*; David Abulafia, *The Two Italies*; Hilmar Krueger, *Navi e proprietà navale a Genova*; and Geo Pistarino, *La capitale del Mediterraneo*.⁵⁷ The interest in the economic dimension of Genoese history, however, was translated into a careful evaluation of the participation of Genoese merchants in the foreign markets, rather than into an analysis of the web of relations within Genoa itself, therefore leaving out the potentially conflictual structure of the relations among Genoese families. This state of affairs was radically changed by the recent work by Quentin Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa*, which successfully links external trade and internal economic connections; but this work, too, leaves out the role played by internal conflict in the construction of these relations.⁵⁸ Giovanna Petti Balbi stresses that the scholars who analysed Genoese history usually did so by focusing on the city's institutions and juridical structures rather than on its social structure, 'partly because of their legal academic background during this time'.⁵⁹ On the other hand, she also noted that the myth of the Genoese merchant, represented by the saying '*Januensis ergo mercator*', has also prevented an understanding of the 'global history' of the city.⁶⁰ It has also been noted by the eminent early modern historian of Genoa, Eduardo Grendi, that the lack of focus on the dynamics internal to the Genoese elite, including their violent ones, results from the traditional focus of the historiography on juridical, political or economic issues, in comparison to social ones.⁶¹ At the same time, however, an interest in the economic and social aspects of Genoese society developed, thanks to the influence of French scholarship. Starting in the 1960s, the works of Jacques Heers on Genoese society in the fifteenth century, and

⁵⁷ Bach, E., *La cite de Genes au XII siècle* (Copenhagen, 1955); Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes*; Krueger, H., *Navi e proprietà navale a Genova* (Genova, 1955). *Seconda metà del sec. XII*; Pistarino, G., *La capitale del Mediterraneo: Genova nel medioevo* (Bordighera, 1993).

⁵⁸ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements*...

⁵⁹ Petti Balbi, G., 'Genesi e composizione di un ceto dirigente: i "populares" a Genova nei secoli XIII e XIV' in *Una città e il suo mare. Genova nel medioevo*, 1991, p. 116. Petti Balbi defines the work of Grendi, E., *Profilo storico*..., 'an exception to this rule'.

⁶⁰ Petti Balbi, G., *Governare la città. Pratiche sociali e linguaggi politici a Genova in età medievale*, p. 7. The scholar defines this paradigm a 'trite formula'.

⁶¹ Grendi, E., *Storia di una storia locale. L'esperienza ligure 1792 - 1992* (Venezia, 1996).

those of Michel Balard on the social and economic organization of the Genoese settlements in the Byzantine Empire, changed the approach to the study of Genoa by showing the necessity of evaluating all aspects of the city together.⁶² Heers further developed his research on the composition of family clans and their often conflict-ridden relations inside late medieval cities in his books *Le clan familial au Moyen Âge* and *Parties and Political Life in the Medieval West*.⁶³ These works are animated by a desire to negate the existence of anything like a class struggle in medieval cities, affirming that contemporary scholars wanted to apply that interpretative approach to medieval social dynamics ‘as if the use of such words went without saying, but without properly justifying them’.⁶⁴ In respect to my analysis of the period between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Heers’ studies are valuable because they evidence the fact – already noticed by Moresco – that indeed the civil violence of the period occurred among elite families, sometimes coalesced around actual factions, and that therefore an interpretation based on a model of relative equals appears more useful than one of class struggle, and that these violent episodes, even in the closing centuries of the Middle Ages, had a fundamental role in the political confrontations within the ruling elite.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Heers merely concluded that the motives behind violent episodes are buried in the ‘simple age-old opposition between family factions’.⁶⁶ Heers has the merit of bringing civil violence to the forefront of communal history, but he does so in a polemical way.⁶⁷ Dismissing the interpretations provided by scholars who had written on medieval politics as ‘erroneous’,

⁶² Heers, J., *Genes au XVe siècle* (Paris, 1961); Balard, M., *La Romanie génoise* (Roma, 1978).

⁶³ Heers, J., *Le clan familial au Moyen Âge...*

⁶⁴ Heers, J., *Family Clans...*, p.3, where the author complains that: ‘very many authors speak readily of social classes and...class struggles...often a question of linguistic facility...’. Heers’ polemic was directed to large sections of French academia ‘often united under the colours of Porchnev’ (ibid.); see Porchnev, B., *Les soulèvements populaires en France au XVII siècle* (Paris, 1972).

⁶⁵ The influence of the work of Heers is fully evident in the work of Edoardo Grendi, *Profilo storico...*, published in Rome by the École française.

⁶⁶ Heers, J., *Family Clans...*, p.113.

⁶⁷ Zorzi, A., ‘La cultura della vendetta nel conflitto politico in età comunale’ in Delle Donne, R., and Zorzi, A., *Le storie e la memoria* (Firenze, 2002), p.16.

'puerile' and 'useless';⁶⁸ and in an attempt to attack the authors he labelled 'economic determinists', Heers concludes with a tautological explanation of events, saying that violent behaviour originated in the inherently violent context of the era.⁶⁹ The great influence of these approaches is evident for the central medieval period in the works of Diane Owen Hughes.⁷⁰ This scholar attempted to change the historiographical debate on the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by focusing on the social and economic dimensions of the families of Genoa. Relying on notarial documentation to study the structure of the aristocratic Genoese family, she arrived at insights on the profound connections between the developing structures of the city and those of the families inhabiting it, which form an important basis for any future analyses of the twelfth-and-thirteenth century urban society. Her characterization of the violent confrontations among the families of the Genoese elite, however, still appears conditioned by an overall reliance on the nineteenth-century Genoese genealogical tradition. In her conclusion regarding the phenomenon of conflicts therefore, these were – again - a consequence of the age-old confrontation of two opposed factions which originated in the largely undocumented history of pre-communal Genoa, whose 'seemingly pointless' motives remained mysterious because, again in the words of Hughes, they are 'buried in the past'.⁷¹

Giovanna Petti Balbi developed further the scholarship of Diane Owen Hughes by studying similar family structures at a Ligurian level and also by focusing on the social history of Genoese craftsmen. She stresses a need, as already noted, to overcome a 'Genoese paradox', namely the fact that the city's vast documentary base for the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is

⁶⁸ Heers, J., *Le clan*, p.16, Molho, A., 'Review: Parties and Political Life in The Medieval West', *The American Historical Review*, 84, 1, 1979, p.134.

⁶⁹ An additional weakness is outlined in Dean, T., 'Marriage and Mutilation: Vendetta in Late Medieval Italy' in *Past and Present*, 157, 1, 1997 p.7, who underlines how Heers draws heavily on Florentine examples and laws to sustain his generalization.

⁷⁰ Hughes, D.O., 'Urban Growth and Family Structure in Medieval Genoa', in *Past and Present*, 66, 1, 1975; 'Ideali domestici e comportamento sociale: testimonianze della Genova medievale, in Rosenberg (ed.), *Comportamenti sociali e ideali domestici* (Torino 1975), pp.147-183; 'Kinsmen and neighbours in medieval Genoa', in Miskimin, H., (ed.) *The medieval city. Essays in honour of R. S. Lopez* (New Haven, 1977), pp. 95-111. Themes that had already been briefly discussed, for a later period, by Heers, J., *Urbanisme et structure sociale à Gênes au Moyen-Age*, pp.373-377.

⁷¹ Hughes, D.O., 'Urban Growth...', p.16.

still largely to be analysed in order to illustrate the urban reality that is still in place today.⁷²

She is right. But she has not done it herself, and her later work focuses on the social organization of Genoese craftsmen in later periods and their political participation.⁷³

The reason for this is that, in fact, the efforts of Hughes and Petti Balbi have been largely omitted from the most recent Genoese historiography. While it is certainly true that analyses of specific practices – most noticeably the studies *Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa* by Steven Epstein, on wills, and “*Consentirono l’un l’altro*”: *il matrimonio in Liguria tra XI e XIV secolo* by Valeria Polonio, on marriages – or of specific families – for example Origone’s *Gli Embriaci a Genova fra XII e XIII secolo* – have deepened our understanding of twelfth and thirteenth century society, they did not, however, lead to an effort to reconstruct as a whole the social organization of Genoa or to uncover its often violent internal dynamics.⁷⁴ In the words of Luca Filangieri, ‘Genoese society in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries remains to this day a largely unknown historiographical object’, and so too – it could be added – with the society, the violent conflicts that often characterized it.⁷⁵ Our understanding of the communal history of Genoa has been seriously undermined by the lack of consideration that the phenomenon of civil conflict as such has received. Therefore, with my dissertation, I want to set right this lacuna in the city historiography, by analyzing the relations between the families involved, and between them and the other families of the Genoese elite. I have done so using all the sources available, rather than relying on reconstructions that – although they have been considered obsolete for at least fifty years – are still widely resorted to as we have

⁷² The scholar started doing so, most noticeably in, Petti Balbi, G., ‘I signori di Vezzano in Lunigiana (secoli XI-XIII)’ (La Spezia, 1982), ‘I Fieschi e il loro territorio nella Liguria orientale’ (Genova, 1983) and ‘I “conti” e la “contea” di Lavagna’.

⁷³ Petti Balbi, G., ‘Apprendisti e artigiani Genova nel 1257’ in «ASLI», n. s., XX (1980), ‘Genesi e composizione di un ceto dirigente’, and ‘Magnati e Popolani in area ligure’, in Magnati e Popolani nell’Italia comunale, *Atti del XV convegno di studi del Centro Italiano di studi di storia e d’arte*, Pistoia 1997 pp.101-125.

⁷⁴ Epstein, S., *Wills and Wealth...*; Polonio V., ‘Consentirono l’un l’altro: il matrimonio in Liguria tra XI e XIV secolo’ in *Serta antiqua et medievalia*, V, 2001; Origone, S., ‘Gli Embriaci a Genova fra XII e XIII secolo’ in *Serta antiqua et medievalia*, V, 2001.

⁷⁵ Filangieri, L., ‘Famiglie...’, p.XII. As for instance has happened – thanks to the work of Renato Bordone – for the lack of an updated and precise study of institutional history. Bordone R., ‘La città comunale’, ‘Le città in età carolingia’, ‘Le origini del comune di Genova’. See also Petti Balbi, G., ‘Genova e il Mediterraneo occidentale nei secoli XI-XII’ on the Genoese presence in the western Mediterranean and Guglielmotti, P., ‘Definizioni di territorio e protagonisti politici e sociali a Genova nei secoli X-XI’, on the relations between Genoa and its territory.

seen. Keeping track of the episodes of violence that characterized some of the relations between members of the city elite, I have sought to reconstruct the profiles of these families and to study the ways in which they were interconnected. As such I would argue that the study of conflicts between elite families proves to be a useful tool in providing a much needed new picture of the Genoese elite.

Sources

The twelfth and early thirteenth century in Genoa is an extremely well documented period compared to other cities at the same time. The fact that communal society was essentially shaped by the practices of civil conflict is reflected by the structure of the sources. Indeed, our whole documentation is permeated by references to these conflicts. This is obvious for the Genoese chronicles, but it is also present in the sources produced by the public powers – statutes, council decisions, judicial and fiscal acts – and also notarial and other documentary sources. Our starting point has to be the *Annales* begun by the first of the city's chroniclers: Caffaro di Rustico of Caschifellone.⁷⁶ The consuls decided to make that history official and ordered it to be copied into the cartularies of the commune, so that from then on 'for all time the victories of the city of Genoa be known to future men'.⁷⁷ Indeed, Caffaro mostly wrote about the alterations to the communal constitution and the victories of the city without allowing rhetorical excesses or anecdotes to divert his narrative.⁷⁸ He started the chronicle of the city in 1099 when: 'At the time of the expedition to Caesarea, just before it, in the city of the Genoese a compagna of three years duration and of six consuls was begun. Their names

⁷⁶ Belgrano, L., (ed.), *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII*, vol.I, Genova 1890; Belgrano et al. (ed.), *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MCLXXIV al MCCXXIV*, vol. II, Genova 1901; for the years 1099-1224, it is now available an Italian translation: Airal di, G., (ed.), *Gli Annali di Caffaro (1099-1163)*, Genova 2002; Airal di, G., (ed.) *Gli Annali di Oberto Cancelliere (1164-1173)*, Genova 2004; Musarra, A., (ed.), *Gli Annali di Ottobono Scriba (1174-1196)*, Genova 2010; Musarra et al. (ed.) *Gli Annali di Ogerio Pane (1197-1219) e Marchisio Scriba (1220-1224)*, Genova 2010. For the purpose of this research I relied almost exclusively on the Latin editions of Belgrano. See also, Airal di, G., 'Elogio della diversità', in *Gli Annali di Caffaro (1099-1163)*, p.17.

⁷⁷ *Annali di Caffaro*, p.61.

⁷⁸ Wickham, C., 'The Sense of the Past In Italian Communal Narratives', in Wickham, C., *Land and Power* (Roma, 1994) p.295-296.

were these...'.⁷⁹ Such straightforward narrative is maintained thorough the *Annali*, which were based on the framework of the communal constitution. Each year of the chronicle begins with a list of the consuls. 'Time itself – notes Chris Wickham – is closely related to the consular lists'; and for the period up to 1122, when consuls usually held their offices for four years, Caffaro's narrative proceeds in four-years block as well.⁸⁰ Caffaro's narrative proceeds smoothly in a long list of wars fought, urban defences built, coinage reformed and relations with popes and emperors kept, until something changed the tone of the narrative and 'exhausted the forces (of Caffaro) because there was not a moment of peace left'.⁸¹ The 'rising tensions' among the Genoese citizens, in the words of Caffaro's successor Oberto Cancelliere, were the reasons why Caffaro stopped writing his chronicles shortly thereafter, in 1163, 'although his mind was still lively'. Wickham stresses that episodes of internal violence must have occurred before this time and certainly the condemnation of the carrying and use of weapons within the city walls contained in the surviving *brevi* – sets of laws - of the commune and of the Consuls for 1157 and 1163 point to that conclusion.⁸² After Caffaro interrupted his activity as the official chronicler of the city, three further authors compiled them in the period covered by my dissertation: the aforementioned Oberto Cancelliere, Ottobono Scriba and Ogerio Pane. With Oberto Cancelliere and Ottobono Scriba the Genoese annalist tradition develops alongside a pattern of progressive institutionalisation. While Caffaro and Oberto were eminent members of the city elite, Ottobono – as revealed by his own appellation – was a simple official, directly dependent on the communal institutions.⁸³ The Annals provide an immensely valuable representation of the day-to-day events of the city. As such, it is possible to use them to build a chronological account of the phenomenon of

⁷⁹ *Annali di Caffaro*, p.63.

⁸⁰ Wickham, C., 'The Sense of the Past...', p.296. The Genoese chroniclers also used the *anno domini* date, along to the officers' list.

⁸¹ *Annali di Oberto*, p.48.

⁸² Wickham, C., 'Sense of the Past...', p.296. For the Genoese 'Brevi', see Niccolai, F., *Contributo allo studio dei più antichi brevi genovesi*. (Milano, 1939).

⁸³ Airaldi, G., 'Oberto, "qui in cancellis primus est"', in Airaldi, G., (ed.), *Gli Annali di Oberto...* pp. 9-28; and Musarra, A., 'Ottobono, lo scriba del comune', in Musarra, A., (ed.), *Gli Annali di Ottobono Scriba (1174-1196)*.

conflict in the city.⁸⁴ As Samuel Cohn warns us '[c]hronicles have come under attack from historians: these sources, some have argued, are biased, inaccurate, and contradictory, and are best studied for questions of mentality rather than for the "facts" they purpose to relate.'⁸⁵ I am well aware that chronicles alone should not be taken as impartial and factual sources while exploring the phenomenon of civil conflict in medieval Genoa.⁸⁶ However as late as the mid-thirteenth-century chronicles remain the best instrument available – and often the only one – for the understanding of the intensity and nature of civil conflicts.⁸⁷ While certainly we should not accept uncritically the judgements given by the contemporary chroniclers on the episodes of civil conflict, the information contained in the chronicles – once accounted for the possible biases – provide irreplaceable data regarding the individuals and families involved, and regarding the typologies, dates and locations of the violent episodes. Crucially, in the case of Genoa, as I shall show the interpretation of the events recorded in the chronicles can be amplified thanks to the evidence survived in a plurality of independent sources.

In order to interpret the conflicts mentioned in the *Annales*, in fact, I relied mostly on notarial documents. These documents are priceless for the economic historian, but they have never been used extensively to analyse the dramatic aspects of the city's political life.⁸⁸ The Genoese notarial contracts are a more important source of information on this subject than has hitherto been realised.⁸⁹ Indeed they seem, in the words of Vitale, 'to ignore the conflicts'.⁹⁰ It is true that other historians, most importantly Hughes, do use these sources for information on

⁸⁴ For the most recent critical discussion on the *Annales* see Musarra, 'I professionisti della memoria' in Montesano (ed.) *Gli Annali di Ogerio Pane (1197-1219) e Marchisio Scriba (1220-1224)*. Genova 2010. On the peculiarities of the composition of the Annals see Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Caffaro e i suoi tempi*, Torino-Roma 1894; Arnaldi, 'Uno sguardo agli annali genovesi', in Airoldi, G., *Studi sui cronisti della Marca Trevigiana nell'età di Ezzelino da Romano*, p. 234; Petti Balbi, G., *Caffaro e la cronachistica genovese*, pp. 18-23; and Petti Balbi, 'La cultura storica in età medievale', in Puncuh, D., (ed.), *Storia della cultura ligure*, Genova 2005.

⁸⁵ Cohn, S., *Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200-1425* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), p.14. On those who have recently formulated such a worry see for example Harriet, M.H., 'The Peasants Revolts of 1381 and the Chronicles', *Journal of Medieval History*, 6, 1980, pp.393-415.

⁸⁶ No source can stand alone, see for instance the dangers hidden in relying only on non-narrative records outlined in Hatcher, J., 'England in the Aftermath of the Black Death', *Past & Present*, 144, 1994, pp.3-35.

⁸⁷ Maire Vigueur, J.C., *Cavalieri e Cittadini*... p.109.

⁸⁸ Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies*..., p. 60.

⁸⁹ On the editions of the twelfth century Genoese documents see also: Moresco, *L'edizione dei notai liguri*. McGovern, 'The Documentary Language of Medieval Business, A.D. 1150-1250', *The Classical Journal*, 67, 3, 1972, p.227.

⁹⁰ Vitale, V., *Breviario*..., p.29.

family structures. However, regarding the phenomenon of civil conflict, Hughes merely concludes that they are useless for such a study.⁹¹ These documents are complete business documents, the contents of which were enforceable in courts of law. The people involved in these contracts (and their witnesses), would agree on a deal in front of a notary who would then write an *imbreviatura*, a summary of the actual contract, in his book, or *cartulare*. This summary usually reported the date of the registration in front of the notary, the place in which it was registered, the people involved and the details of the commercial agreements, real estate transactions, marriage contracts or wills that were registered.⁹² The history of the editing and publication of the Genoese cartularies began with the work of Arturo Ferretto in 1906.⁹³ In 1935 Mario Chiaudano and Mattia Moresco published an edition of the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba, the earliest surviving cartulary that included documents from 1154 to 1166.⁹⁴ From 1938 American and Italian scholars collaborated on the editing and publishing of all the Genoese cartularies surviving for the twelfth and the early thirteenth century, which appeared in a series entitled *Notai liguri del secolo XII*.⁹⁵ In total through these efforts six cartularies were published: Giovanni Scriba (1154-1166); Oberto da Mercato (1186 and 1190); Guglielmo Cassinese (1190-1192); Giovanni de Guiberto (1200-1211); and Lanfranco Scriba (1202-1226).⁹⁶ The curia of the archbishop and four urban monasteries have also produced documentation relative to the period under consideration. Since the nineteenth century these have been published in various collections.⁹⁷ These documents are of various

⁹¹ Hughes, D.O., 'Urban Growth...', p.7.

⁹² Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies...*, p.6.

⁹³ Epstein, S., *Wills and Wealth...*, p.8.

⁹⁴ On the methodological issues of these editions see Bognetti and Moresco, *Per l'edizione dei notai liguri del secolo XII*; and Puncuh, D., 'Sul metodo editoriale dei testi notarili italiani', in *All'ombra della Lanterna. Cinquant'anni tra archivi e biblioteche: 1956-2006*, pp.593-610.

⁹⁵ *Il Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba*, Chiaudano, M., and Moresco, M., (eds.), (Roma, 1935)

⁹⁶ *Il Cartolare di Giovanni...*, *Oberto Scriba de Mercato (1190)*, Chiaudano M., and della Rocca, M., (eds.), (Torino, 1938), *Oberto scriba de Mercato (1186)* Chiaudano, M., (ed.), (Genova, 1940), *Guglielmo Cassinese (1190-1192)*, Hall, M., Krueger, H., and Reynolds, R.L., (Genova, 1938); *Giovanni di Guiberto (1200-1211)*, Hall, M., Cole, C., Krueger, H., Reinert, R.G., and Reynolds R.L., (eds.), (Torino, 1939-1940), *Lanfranco (1202-1226)*, Krueger H., and Reynolds, R.L.(Genova 1951-1953).

⁹⁷ Belgrano, L., 'Cartario genovese ed illustrazione del Registro arcivescovile', in *ASLI, III/I, 1870*; 'Il Registro della Curia arcivescovile di Genova', in *ASLI, II, 1862-1873*; Beretta, L., 'Il secondo Registro della Curia arcivescovile di Genova', in

kinds: real estate transactions; judicial sentences; papal letters; elections of abbots; absolutions; excommunications; and wills. They are similar from every point of view to the documents contained in the notarial cartularies, except that they much more regularly concern real estate issues.⁹⁸ Only a minority of the legal documents surviving from the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries derive from these churches however; all the rest are in the notarial cartularies. The Genoese *Annales* and notarial cartularies are exceptional sources, but, in the words of David Abulafia: ‘The Genoese not merely kept an archive of notarial cartularies, and not merely commissioned their self-glorifying *Annales*; early in the thirteenth century, the consuls authorised the compilation of a *Liber Iurium*, a book of public acts’; from these it is possible to capture an image of the institutional functioning of the city government and of the Genoese treaties with foreign powers.⁹⁹ This source survives in several editions. Originally edited as *Liber Iurium Republicae Genuensis* in the early twentieth century, it was superseded for the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by Imperiale di Sant’Angelo’s *Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova*.¹⁰⁰ A new edition of the *Liber Iurium* now provides a complete and scientifically rigorous rendition of this important source.¹⁰¹ For the purpose of this dissertation, I have mostly utilised the *Liber Iurium* to understand the factional characteristics of major Genoese involvements in the Mediterranean. I usually relied on the edition contained in the *Codice Diplomatico*, because it is more immediately usable – not least because of its chronological organisation.¹⁰²

ASLI, XVIII, 1887; Basili, A., (ed.) *Le carte del monastero di San Siro di Genova (952-1224)*, (Genova, 1997); Airal di, G., (ed.) *Le carte del monastero di Santa Maria delle Vigne di Genova (1103-1392)*, (Genova, 1969); Calleri, M., (ed.) *Codice diplomatico del monastero di Santo Stefano di Genova (965-1200)*, (Genova, 2008); Ciarlo, D., (ed.), *Codice diplomatico del monastero di Santo Stefano di Genova (1201-1257)*, (Genova, 2008); Soave, C., (ed.) *Le carte del monastero di Sant’Andrea della Porta di Genova (1109-1370)*, (Genova, 2002).

⁹⁸ See ‘Introduzione’ in Soave, C., *Le carte del monastero di Sant’Andrea della Porta*.

⁹⁹ Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies*..., p.12.

¹⁰⁰ *Monumenta Historiae Patriae edita iussu Regis Caroli Alberto*, Vol. 6-7, Torino 1853; Imperiale di Sant’Angelo (ed.), *Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova*, 3 vols. (Roma, 1936-42).

¹⁰¹ Bibolini, M., (ed.), *I libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova*, (Genova-Roma, 1992-2002).

¹⁰² ‘Avvertenza’ in *Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova*, pp. XII-XV.

Potential Source Bias

The Genoese notary archives are an invaluable contemporary source, but obviously not a complete one. To consider effectively the social and economic relationships that this dissertation seeks to explore as a means to deepen our understanding of the phenomenon of civil conflict in Medieval Genoa, the economic and social context of the time should always be taken into account. To rely primarily on the collections of Genoese notaries (by far the largest corpus of contemporary evidence available) means that the representation of Genoese society offered in any analysis is going to be biased. One of the main distortions of the image of the Genoese economy and society that is generated by the use of the notaries' records is the overrepresentation of commercial activities. The matter is simple enough; the circulation of capital and goods inherent in trading activities generated a wealth of documentation in the city much larger than agricultural or artisanal activities. The agricultural base of the economy is represented in these sources (for instance when a real estate transaction or a donation occurred, when a will was recorded, a rental agreement was negotiated or, rarely, when two partners formed a society to join forces to improve their properties). However, the number of such agreements is much lower than the number of contracts concerning commercial activities. This is the opposite of the situation in every other twelfth-century Italian city, where real estate transactions are as misleadingly dominant as they are misleadingly under-represented here. The reader should be warned that, while most of the families taken into consideration relied on land as their fundamental source of wealth and prestige, often the information available only records their commercial transactions. As a consequence of this bias we also have much more information on the activities and connections of some of the families in the sample than others. The existence of records contained in the *Registro della Curia Vescovile* and in the archives of the main Genoese monasteries – not affected by the same biases as the notary sources – allows us to take this distortion into consideration as far as possible in our analysis. These documents certainly have their own biases. They recorded almost exclusively land transactions and only transactions with a link to the Church, but the

combination of these sources, as well as a research approach that takes into consideration not only the general image of the links between families but also the details of the individual links, largely overcomes this challenge.¹⁰³

Methodology

Between the twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries Genoa became the theatre of so many episodes of internal struggles between families of the city elite that for several years the city chronicles seem to record very little else.¹⁰⁴ The period covered specifically by my dissertation starts in 1160 and terminates in 1220. The reason I decided to focus on these six decades is threefold. Firstly, the match between the *Annales* and the notarial cartularies in these years allow for as detailed an analysis as possible. Secondly, in a pursuit of origins, I decided to start my analysis with the earliest mentions of episodes of civil violence in the chronicles of Genoa. Thirdly, I decided to end my research with the first quarter of the thirteenth century due to the large gap in the notarial sources (there are none between 1226 and 1258) and the completely changed political scenario that emerged thereafter.¹⁰⁵ From a methodological point of view my dissertation relies ultimately on the comparison of successive periods of Genoese history and I believe that the conditions of the later decades of the thirteenth century were too different to study meaningfully in such a manner. Finally, my work relies on an in-depth analysis of Genoese society. A timeframe of sixty years allows me to study the development and articulation of civil conflicts while also maintaining the necessary depth. As I discussed earlier, many of the scholars who analyzed the history of the city concluded that the available evidence was not sufficient to understand the structures of the phenomenon of civil conflict. In particular, the information contained in the *Annales* was defined as ‘too chaotic’, while the Genoese cartularies were considered as ‘unaffected by the

¹⁰³ An issue that weakens the conclusions of Van Doosselaere on Genoese social dynamics, as noticed by Paul McLean in his review of Van Doosselaere’s recent book (McLean, P.D., ‘Book Review of Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa’ in *American Journal of Sociology*, 116, 1, July 2010, pp. 307-309.

¹⁰⁴ Airaldi, G., *Annali...*

¹⁰⁵ Pistarino, G., (ed.), *Le carte portoveneresi di Tealdo de Sigestro (1258-59)*.

phenomenon' and 'useless' for its understanding.¹⁰⁶ In order to solve this impasse in the historiography I proceeded in the following manner. Firstly, I scanned and ordered all information on civil conflict contained in the *Annales*. Then I divided the sixty years under consideration into five main periods. Following this I extracted all the available evidence regarding the activities and connections of the families that played a role in the civil conflicts. I studied those combining a careful micro-historical reconstruction of family profiles along with the use of methods derived from social network analysis, as I shall discuss in a moment, in order to present a large quantity of data. In this way I preserved the historical value of the single document, while also organizing the presentation of my material in a manner comprehensible to the reader. As a consequence, civil conflict in Genoa emerges as a remarkably coherent phenomenon, the structure and development of which can be uncovered historically. In the second part of my thesis I expand this approach to a much larger sample, aiming to include the majority of the politically active Genoese elite, in order to understand whether or not civil conflicts could be considered mainly as tools to achieve political supremacy in the city or to impose particular policies. I analysed the families of all the consuls of the city throughout. Furthermore, in order to do this for the period starting with the appointment of the first *podestà* in 1191, I looked not only at the *podestà* but also at those who helped him administer the city – consuls of the pleas and *rectores*. This allowed me to analyse the factional shifts within the city governments at a time when other historians deemed this impossible because the *podestà* rule of the city meant that he cast a huge shadow over the documentation, obscuring any traces of the factions themselves. Actually, by analyzing the lower ranks of the government, it is possible to see how the strength and composition of the two factions changed even under the *podestà*.

The methodology I used depended on a careful consideration of the issues faced by scholars who had previously attempted to untangle the phenomenon of civil conflict in Genoa during

¹⁰⁶ Vitale, V., *Breviario...*, p.122.

the period considered. The breaking down of the violent episodes into several periods allowed me to overcome the impression of chaos that traditionally prevented many scholars, as discussed, from engaging with these episodes.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, I wanted to avoid the excessive simplification of a complex scenario that characterized the work of Day and Greif, who see the Genoese as rigidly divided in two factions.¹⁰⁸ In order to do so I decided to start my analysis from the structures behind the factions that eventually opposed each other in Genoa. The cartularies, as already discussed, contain the necessary information to understand the web of links between Genoese families that constituted the structures from which factionalism developed. Consequently, they allow for a proper display and evaluation of the economic interests that played a central role in the definition of factions and in the development of conflict. A methodology derived from social network analysis allows for the proper display and analysis of these links. In illustrating the emergence and the shifting boundaries of Genoese factions I make use of cluster maps I constructed using graph theoretic methods similar to the ones used by Quentin Van Doosselaere.¹⁰⁹ Given the importance I attach to all the individual links available, however, the works of Padgett on factional development in Renaissance Florence have guided more of my methodological choices.¹¹⁰ In fact, the exclusive reliance on commercial agreements by Van Doosselaere limits the value of his approach in understanding what typologies of links mattered at a time of civil conflict. Genoese factions and their connections and influence over the wider Genoese elite were a product of a plurality of overlapping ties. The strength of each one is understandable only by taking into account the others.

Marriage, family and commercial links – acting as someone's agent or having joint investments - all constituted strong ties in Granovetter's sense of the 'amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which

¹⁰⁷ (E.g.) Vitale, V., *Breviario...*; Heers, J., *Family Clans...*

¹⁰⁸ Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...*; Greif, A., *Institutions...*

¹⁰⁹ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements...*, p.13.

¹¹⁰ Padgett, J., 'Robust Action...'

characterize the tie'.¹¹¹ Alternatively, weak ties could be considered. For instance, playing a part in each other's economic activities as witnesses, or being present in the household of someone at a time of intense civil conflict. In my research I found that such a differentiation was not really important to understand the mechanisms of civil conflict and faction building in medieval Genoa. What really did matter was the way in which this plurality of connections interacted between each others. These interactions shaped the factional structure of the city. Failing to consider fully the importance of such multiplex connections undermines our capacity to fully understand Genoese realities. Let us look at a couple of examples of such a risk. When Gabriella Airaldi states that in Genoa, in our period, the role of a wife and of a wedding were closely linked with the economic role of the dowry, but once this 'matrimonial-patrimonial' operation was secured, 'the role of a wife was secondary and could have influenced political decisions only with difficulty', she essentially describes a conflict structure where intermarriage is no guarantee for peaceful relations.¹¹² Similarly, Diane Hughes describes a world in which '[t]he marriage bond could not compete with the lineage tie', when faced by the reality that marriage agreements did not necessarily prevent violence.¹¹³ In this dissertation, when analyzing these episodes and the links connecting the families involved, I will argue that marriage links on their own (for instance between the Pevere and de Volta families: below, pp.197-199) were indeed an extremely important connection when it came to faction-building. However, they could not compete with a connection constituted of a marriage link reinforced by deep economic interests in common as well (as with the link between de Volta and Castello families, for instance: below, pp.81-88) if violent episodes forced the families involved to take sides.

In the same manner, a strong lineage/family tie (such as that between the Avvocato, Pevere and Turca families: below, pp.112-116), certainly played a fundamental role in the definition

¹¹¹ Granovetter, M., 'The Strength of Weak Ties', *The American Journal of Sociology* 78, 6, 1973, p.1361

¹¹² Airaldi, G., *Genova e la Liguria nel Medioevo*, p.467.

¹¹³ Hughes, D. O., 'Urban Growth...', p.12.

of a faction (the de Curia faction in this case); but did not necessarily maintain itself when the reinforcing link – in this case common economic interest – was strained by conflict. As was the case between the Avvocato, Pevere and Turca families, which at the end of the period taken into consideration fought each other (below, p.139).

These two examples elucidate why I decided to follow a methodology that derives from social network analysis in its desire to explain social and political outcomes, but that also seeks to avoid an excessive simplification by observing the networks so constructed as a totality, and not simply through the optic of single sets of relationships.

A model of Genoese conflict

With a clear understanding of the structure underlying Genoese conflicts I was able to build a model to explore the logic behind the violent episodes. Before the 1160s the relations among the families of the Genoese elite appear to have been relatively peaceful. During the 1160s a cataclysm – a large confrontation involving several powerful families and costing several high profile lives – interrupted this state of affairs. From that time on the city of Genoa experienced a progressive polarization around two well-defined factions that characterised the history of the city during the entire period considered by this dissertation.

The key to understanding this phenomenon is hidden in factionalism that developed within the city elite. The early 1160s consular elite was remarkably cohesive judging by the patterns of intermarriages and by participation in the communal government. Therefore it is wrong to argue that violence broke out along well-established and ancient lineage ties. However, from the study of the commercial transactions of the families involved in the conflicts, it appears that at the time of the first occurrences of internal violence the economic activities of the families of the Genoese elite were already quite divergent, with several families participating actively, and jointly, in the commercial opportunities created by the process of market expansion, and others that did not seem to exploit the same possibilities. After the mid-1160s cataclysm, the families that coalesced into two factions around the initial opponents did so

according to their pre-existing economic connections. The growing diversification of the city economy was therefore a fundamental driver of the violent confrontation within the Genoese elite. We could therefore speak of a primacy of the economy at the basis of Genoese conflicts. This primacy is not undermined by the – most probable – reason that unleashed the violence which proved to be a turning point in the history of Genoa. In 1162 the consuls of Genoa confirmed to the inhabitants of Recco, following insistent requests that had started in 1147, that they were absolved of any feudal obligations towards Rolando Avvocato. The same Rolando broke the apparent cohesiveness of the Genoese consular elite by unleashing a *'bellum plus quam civili'* in 1164.¹¹⁴ This explanation for the start of civil conflict may seem a very political one. All the same, wounded honour and economic calculations must subsequently have mixed in order to create the violent outcome. Once the conflicts had started, the economy was shaped by the necessity to continue the fighting. In the following period, therefore, the factional divisions shaped both the economic connections among the families and the Mediterranean involvements in which the same families decided to take part. This remained the case until the conflicts escalated, with the victory of one of the factions involved. Following this outcome the balance was reversed again and economic interests once again shaped the internal political structure of the *commune*. The defeated faction lost all its cohesiveness, but the winning one was also weakened. Many families that had been on opposing sides started to build economic connections among each other. Moreover, wider support was built to jointly exploit the possible economic returns of an expansion of the Genoese influence over Sicily.

In conclusion, the conflicts that took place in Genoa during the period considered by this dissertation were not simply episodes in an immemorial opposition among family lineages. In truth, they were contingent to the particular political, economic and social characteristics of

¹¹⁴ *Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova*, docs. 172, 302.

the families involved at the time. As such, they are explicable if available evidence is analysed with appropriate methodologies.

Chapter One: Internal peace and war in a Mediterranean city 1160-1220

This chapter relates the episodes of civil conflicts and internal violence that took place in Genoa between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the individuals and families that took part in them. Usually described by the Genoese chroniclers in the – lighter or darker – tones of failure and evil folly, the Genoese civil conflicts, however, deserve to be analysed for what they were: one of the city's principal characteristic rather than a mere civic failure.¹¹⁵ I shall attempt to bring order to the 'chaos of clashes' that occurred in the city, an ambition that the eminent Genoese historian Vito Vitale once defined as 'desperate'.¹¹⁶ In this first chapter I will proceed by constructing a factual account of the incidences of civil violence in the city. Any such analysis must start from the Genoese chroniclers who record a large number of violent episodes. The chapter, therefore, follows the developing narrative of conflict in the chronicles, and provides a guideline for the analyses conducted in the following chapters of the dissertation..

Caffaro di Rustico Caschifellone (1099 – 1163)

Any analysis of the phenomenon of civil conflict in twelfth and thirteenth century Genoa must start from the first of the city's chroniclers. In 1160-61, for the first time, Caffaro made a reference to internal discord, writing of the attempts of the consuls to control the citizens in fierce opposition to one another – *discordes enim qui in civitate erant*.¹¹⁷ In 1162 the consuls' efforts calmed – *concordes stare fecerunt* - the mortal war raging between the Piccamilio and the sons of Oberto Usodimare – *mortali Guerra que erat inter Picamilios et Oberti quondam Ususmaris filios* - and led it to a secure peace secured by a oath – *ad firmam pacem et concordiam sub sacramento pacifice quiescere fecerunt*.¹¹⁸ This is the first case in which the

¹¹⁵ Roberts, S., warns to 'not let the arguments be colored by our own values and preconceptions and not to look at conflicts exclusively 'in terms of failure'; *Order and Dispute, An Introduction to Legal Anthropology* (London, 1979), p.177.

¹¹⁶ Vitale, V., *Breviario...*, p.29.

¹¹⁷ *Annales*, vol.I, p.71.

¹¹⁸ *Annales*, vol.I, pp.72-73.

chronicle names the individuals and families involved in civil confrontations. It is also the first time that the term *guerra* – war - is utilised in the Genoese chronicle to describe an internal dispute. The rising tensions among the Genoese citizens were, in the words of Caffaro’s successor Oberto Cancelliere, the reasons why Caffaro stopped writing his chronicles shortly thereafter, in 1163.¹¹⁹ For the purpose of my reconstruction of the Genoese civil conflicts, I decided, in line with Frederic Lane’s advice to ‘pursue origins wherever one could’, and to start from the first piece of evidence available, allowing a thorough interpretation of the events that were to play a major role in the history of Genoa.¹²⁰ The inclusion of these episodes of internal violence in the chronicle from here on demonstrates a development in contemporaries’ perception of such episodes and of their importance to the Genoese commune. At the same time the inclusion of the individuals’ involved family names, for the first time allows one to carefully follow their actions.¹²¹

Year and reference	Typology of conflict	Side one	Side two
1160 <i>Annales</i> , Vol.I, p.71.	<i>discordes</i>		
1161 <i>Ibid.</i> p.72.	‘the consuls called for the swearing <i>firimam pacem et concordiam sub sacramento</i>		
1162 <i>Ibid.</i> p.73.	the efforts of the consuls calmed <i>mortali guerra</i>	Piccamilio	Usodimare

Table 1.1 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Caffaro¹²²

¹¹⁹ *Annales*, vol. I, p.155.

¹²⁰ Bullard, M.M., ‘Where History and Theory Interact: Frederic Lane on the Emergence of Capitalism’ *Speculum*, 79, 01, 2004, pp. 88-119, p.89.

¹²¹ Grendi, E., *Profilo storico...*, p.247. Describes the slow establishing of surnames in Genoa. Although *cognominatio* is, for the period under consideration and in Genoa, firmly established, as we shall see in this dissertation, for instance in the case of de Frexia and Burone, sometimes the identification of individuals and families through surnames can still be problematic, with brothers bearing different surnames for instance.

¹²² The columns Side one and Side two simply indicate the contrapositions between individuals and families involved, when these are specified in the chronicles, not the existence at the time of two opposing sides.

Oberto Cancelliere (1164-1173)

From its very prologue, the chronicle of Oberto Cancelliere, chronicler of the commune for the years 1164-1173, is imbued with civil conflict, violence and internal tensions. Oberto Cancelliere begun writing his section of the city chronicles in 1169 after having being asked ‘with love and prayers’ by the consuls to do so.¹²³ Oberto is, therefore, a new type of chronicler. Unlike Caffaro he was a chancellor of the commune and was commissioned to write the Chronicle of the city by the commune’s authorities.¹²⁴ Oberto resumed the chronicle of the city where a disillusioned Caffaro had left in 1164. Oberto’s statement that Caffaro was tired of the tensions growing in Genoa is reinforced by the fact that the account of Oberto for the period 1164-1169, the one left unwritten by Caffaro, is largely a sequence of violent actions that took place within Genoese families.

Year and reference	Typology of conflict	Side One	Side Two	Casualties/Notes
1164 <i>Annales</i> , Vol.I, p.160.	<i>Durissimum prelium</i> - great battle	Fulcone de Castello	Rolando Avvocato	<i>Archatores</i> – bowmen - killed Baldovino Guercio and Gandolfo Usodimare. Sardo Avvocato died <i>percussus lapide</i> – hit by a stone.
1164 <i>Ibid.</i> p.164.	<i>Inauditum scelus</i> - a crime unheard of	<i>Vilissimis personis</i> – by most miserable people		Marchese de Volta (Consul) – <i>occisus in villa</i> – killed in his farm
1166 <i>Ibid.</i> p.188.	<i>Sicut ignis crescit...ita in civitate nostra civilian bella acriums exarserunt</i> - Like the flames of a big fire...conflicts spread			Rubaldo Baraterio, Sigismondo, Iuscello, Scoto
1166	<i>Sicut odium erat infra</i>	Captains		Both captains captured by the Pisans

¹²³ *Annales*, vol.I, p.156.

¹²⁴ Franco Cardini defines this new type of twelfth-century writer a public intellectual in Dean, T., and Wickham, C., (eds.) *City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy*.

<i>Ibid.</i> p.192.	<i>urbem, sic in galeis</i> - Infighting in Genoese fleet	Guercio and Galeta		because of infighting
1168 <i>Ibid.</i> p.207.	<i>Mixto prelio</i> - battle in the city after casual encounter	Cendato and his followers	Berfolio and his followers	Cendato, Igone Berfolio
1169 <i>Ibid.</i> pp.216- 220.	Archbishop Ugo asks the parties: <i>ad pacem</i> <i>componendam et</i> <i>iurandam, tum causa Dei,</i> <i>tum honore civitatis</i> – to make peace	Rolando Avvocato	Fulcone de Castello, Ingone de Volta	<i>Non possum, nisi soceris mei Ingonis</i> <i>de Volta primitus data mihi licentia</i> <i>precedat</i> - Fulcone states that he cannot swear an oath of peace without the permission of his father- in-law Ingone de Volta

Table 1.2 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Oberto Cancelliere

In 1169, after five years of violence, internal peace was restored in the city. The Archbishop Ugone led a procession of the consuls, the clergy and the people of Genoa, and, after much negotiation, succeeded in having the parties – Rolando Avvocato on one side and Fulcone de Castello and Ingone de Volta on the other – swear an oath of peace. To celebrate, the Archbishop and all of the clergy sang the *Te Deum*, while the city was filled with the sounds of bells ringing. Following the pacification, the consuls set out to restore order in the *contado* of Genoa where the situation was dramatic.¹²⁵ During the civil conflict, according to Oberto Cancelliere, most of the agricultural activities had stopped because the landowners preferred to lose money rather than risk their lives by adventuring outside the city walls; while peasants obviously still cultivated fields, it is doubtless that profits for city dwellers were down. The chronicler was not surprised about these severe consequences, claiming that when the ‘head suffers...it is normal for the limbs and the whole body to suffer as a consequence’ – *corporis membra patiuntur, cum caput pati sentitur*.¹²⁶ According to Oberto Cancelliere, the intervention of the consuls restored order. Liguria once again became a safe place and travellers could move safely in and out of the city once again.

¹²⁵ *Annales*, vol.I, p.219.

¹²⁶ *Annales*, vol.I, p.220.

The truce of 1169, involving the same individuals as the initial battle of 1164– *durissimum prelium* - indicates that the events that occurred between the two dates should be analysed as closely linked. From the annalist's words, between the war of 1164 and the pacification of 1169, it emerges that there were two feuding groups of families: the ones supporting Avvocato on one side and the ones supporting de Castello on the other. The conflicts that took place between 1164 and 1169 can be untangled, as illustrated in the following table using the commercial agreements contained in the Genoese cartularies – as I will show in chapter two.

Year	Side One	Side Two	Other/No Evidence
1162	Piccamilio	Usodimare	
1164	Castello, Guercio	Usodimare, Avvocato	
	Volta		
1166	Scoto, Baraterio		
	Guercio, Galeta		
1168			Cendato, Bertfolio
1169	Castello, Volta	Avvocato	

Table 1.3 Individuals involved in the 1160s civil conflicts

The connections among the individuals involved in the 1164-69 episodes suggest that most of the events that started in the 1160s should be interpreted using the logic of factional conflict between two opposing sides that – as we shall see shortly – formed the bases of long lasting factions that were – by the 1180s – identified as de Volta and de Curia. The families that participated in these conflicts on the side of the de Volta were: Piccamilio, Castello, Volta, Guercio, Scoto and Galeta. On the de Curia side in contrast we can identify the families Avvocato and Usodimare.

1160-1162, Initial mentions of civil violence

As we have seen, in 1162 Caffaro writes of a war between the families Usodimare and Piccamilio. As we shall discuss in chapter two, some evidence points to the fact that the Usodimare family could have been closer to the families that joined the de Curia faction, while the family Piccamilio seemed closer to the ones that coalesced around the de Volta family. In 1163, for instance, Giovanni Scriba recorded a document stating that Cassicio de Volta, the son of Ingone, promised to marry the daughter of Ardizo Piccamilio.¹²⁷ The Piccamilio family was therefore close to the de Volta. However, given the lack of extensive proof of economic connections between the families Usodimare and Piccamilio and the families that were to be involved in factional warfare, it can be concluded that, probably, the 1162 conflict does not relate to the factional wars. By contrast, the family connection between the de Castello and de Volta families emerges clearly from the *Annales*. In 1169 Fulcone de Castello declares that Ingone de Volta is his father-in-law. This would not be sufficient on its own to build a factional affiliation, as the Piccamilio family case implies but the economic relationship between the families was extremely solid as well, as documented in numerous agreements involving them. Although this will be discussed further later in the thesis, at this stage I shall concentrate on the way in which links by marriage between them continued to characterize their relations. For example, a document dated March 31, 1191 tells us that Bellobruno de Castello sold the Abbey of San Quirico the land that he has received from Rosso de Volta as a dowry for her daughter.¹²⁸

1164-1169, First occurrences of factional conflict

Factional war, therefore, broke out with the violence of 1164. I have discussed how Oberto Cancelliere, the author of the chronicle, offers important indications that allow us to understand which families were in conflict. On the other hand the annalist's description of the

¹²⁷ Giovanni Scriba, doc. 1144.

¹²⁸ Cassinese, docs. 399, 400.

events that took place in 1166 are far less accurate, simply mentioning the individuals involved. I shall now attempt to use the evidence available to understand these individuals' positions in the wider framework of conflict.

In 1166 the annalist reports that four individuals, Rubaldo Baraterio, Sigismondo, Iuscello and Scoto, died in violent episodes. The chronicle does not contain any useful information regarding the affiliations of those individuals.¹²⁹ However, the surviving documentation partially fills this gap. The fact that the Scoto family fought on the side of the families de Castello and de Volta and that its members were going to be part of the faction de Volta is demonstrated by a number of documents that connect the family with the de Castello, de Frexia and de Volta.¹³⁰ Particularly interesting is a document recording a real estate transaction that took place in 1191, when the sons of Girardo Scoto sold a house with the permission of Opizone de Castello and Adalasia, daughter of Girardo. The latter referred to Guglielmo and Opizone de Castello as her family; implying that she had married into the de Castello family.¹³¹ In the same year, Ogerio Scoto completed a land transaction 'with the suggestion and under the authority' of Guglielmo de Castello.¹³² This document shows further the nature of the alliance – which will be further analysed in chapter two - between the families Scoto and de Castello; a close family relationship reinforced by deep common economic interests. On the other hand, the Baraterio did not leave nearly as much evidence of their affairs in the Genoese cartularies, where they figure exclusively as witnesses. However, in several of these documents dating back to the early 1160s, they witnessed agreements of the family Curia, suggesting that the Baraterio might have been closer to the families that eventually coalesced in the faction de Curia.¹³³ It is therefore possible that Baraterio and

¹²⁹ Furthermore, in the case of Iuscello and Sigismondo, the fact that the annalist only used their first names makes their identification uncertain, and therefore not analyzable.

¹³⁰ *Cassinese*, for de Frexia, docs. 385, 60; for de Volta, doc. 1426.

¹³¹ *Cassinese*, doc. 61. Furthermore when Adalasia Scoto registered her will, the witnesses included two members of the de Castello family, (*Cassinese*, doc. 65).

¹³² *Cassinese*, doc. 692.

¹³³ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 84, 735.

Scoto died while fighting on opposing sides of a factional conflict. In 1166, with the capture of Guercio and Galeta by Pisan galleys as a consequence of the divisions in the Genoese fleet, the significance of internal tensions emerged in a wider framework of political importance. From a factional point of view, as will be discussed in detail shortly (see below, pp.90-93), this episode is not of great use since the annalist does not specify which Genoese captain decided to abandon Guercio and Galeta to their destiny. Nevertheless, the event deserves a closer look because of its contribution to the understanding of Genoese conflicts.

For the first time, the infighting between Genoese did not take place on the streets or in the countryside of Genoa, but at sea, in the Genoese element par excellence. Oberto writes that the Pisans sent five galleys to Provence and the Genoese, responded by sending six galleys under the command of Baldovino Guercio.¹³⁴ After a chase across the Western Mediterranean, from Corsica to Elba, the Genoese and the Pisans met at Vado (South of Pisa). An ‘extremely violent battle begun...the galleys of Baldovino Guercio and Giovanni Galeta fought bravely, hoping that the others would do the same’. However, ‘when the Pisans were ready to run away...their galleys were captured’ for lack of support.¹³⁵ This episode has several implications.¹³⁶ Firstly of course, it demonstrates that infighting among Genoese citizens could have very costly consequences; the loss of two galleys and the failure to capture enemy’s galleys was a major economic blow and could not be considered mere background noise.¹³⁷ It also shows that while Avner Greif’s claim that ‘Italians of the late medieval period recognized that an external threat could foster cooperation’ might be true, they certainly did not automatically react to external threats by setting ‘a united front to the outside world’ as

¹³⁴ *Annales*, Vol.I, p.192.

¹³⁵ *Annales*, Vol.I, pp.193-195.

¹³⁶ It is important to stress here that although the Genoese chroniclers obviously tend to exalt the military value of the Genoese, as opposed to the Pisans, it is not likely that such divisions in the fleet were only an excuse on behalf of the chroniclers. In numerous occasions set-backs suffered are ascribed to the treacherousness of the Pisans or the inclemency of the climate at sea, much more normal examples of an attempt made to diminish Pisan victories.

¹³⁷ Heers writing of a later period notices how: ‘...in the year 1481, leaving the port to fight the Turks, the Genoese are led by enormous vessels, each bearing the colours of the family responsible for its commission, in addition to those of the admiral and the commune’. Indeed the commission and command of warships and the recruitment of crews were often left to the Genoese families, confirming their persistent military role; thus it is not surprising that infighting between families in the city reverberated at sea. (Heers, J., *Family Clans...*, pp.170-171.)

Stephen Epstein claims. After all, they did not do so when a threat was as imminent as during a naval confrontation with Genoa's most hated enemy.¹³⁸ Rather, this sea battle episode seems to support the findings of Otterbein that in societies characterized by the presence of family interest groups 'war and feuding go hand-in-hand'.¹³⁹ To sum up the 1160s, the Genoese notarial records already show themselves to be a more important source of information on the issue of civil conflicts than has been realized so far.¹⁴⁰ I largely agree with the view that the notarial records seem untouched by the violence taking place in the city (although I will show how some documents seem to take it clearly into account), but they can be used effectively to lay out the connections between fighting families.¹⁴¹ Some families had strong economic interests in common, such as repeated joint operations or land transactions. Others had less marked 'connections of trust'. For instance, two families could have been confident enough to register their contracts in presence of members of each other, while not investing in common operations.¹⁴² While the economic and social connections between the individuals and families involved in the episodes of civil violence are what I am looking for in the records, what is not found in the archives is also important. It is telling that in almost no document do the names of two individuals identified as factional adversaries in the chronicles appear together, either as commercial partners or witnesses. Such a state of affairs shows that the presence of an economic relationship between two parties reflected at least political neutrality. As Chris Wickham states when analyzing the eleventh-century land transactions in the Casentino, 'the *absence* of relationship - in well-documented periods and areas - indicates

¹³⁸ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.233; Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.76.

¹³⁹ Otterbein, K., 'Internal War: A Cross-Cultural Study' in *American Anthropologist, New Series*, 70, 2, 1968, p.280.

¹⁴⁰ Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies...*, p.60, comments that these 'priceless' documents they have never been used extensively to analyse the dramatic aspects of the Genoese political life. Hughes, D. O., 'Urban Growth...', p.7, as discussed in the introduction, sees little use for these documents in deepening our understanding of conflict.

¹⁴¹ The risks incurred by certain individuals to go and witness an agreement in the house of a non friendly family for instance is openly stated in one document contained in the San Siro collection. (*Le Carte del Monastero di San Siro*, doc. 139.)

¹⁴² Granovetter, M., 'The Strength of Weak Ties...', p.1361. Violence did have an impact on the Genoese notaries' activities and it is important, in a study of violence in Genoa, to take into account the mere presence of particular individuals at the time of the registration of a contract, as well as their active involvement in a transaction. For example Avner Greif rightly underlines how 88% of the business transactions recorded by Giovanni Scriba (1154-64) took place in public spaces, while 90% of the ones recorded by Oberto Scriba (1186) were recorded in private houses. The link between this development and the rising tensions and wars of the 1160s seems likely (Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.245).

hostility at a much more serious level: friends do not act in this way'.¹⁴³ These preliminary observations will be developed in much more details in later chapters.

Ottobono Scriba (1174-1196)

The 1169 pacification appears to have been at least partially successful and in 1170-77 the Genoese chronicle, from 1174 onwards written by Ottobono Scriba, makes no reference to violent episodes occurring within the city. Indeed, in 1177 Ottobono stated that the city was living 'in peace and fertility'.¹⁴⁴ From the beginning of 1178, however, he began to record rising levels of tension within the city. Once again a table is helpful to synthesize the complex information emerging from the chronicles.

Year and reference	Typology of conflict	Side One	Side Two	Casualties\Notes
1178 <i>Annales</i> , Vol.II, p.10.	<i>Discordia fuit inter Mazanellos et Navarros, et bellum inde fuit semel</i>	Mazanello	Navarro	<i>Consules pacem et concordiam inter eos composuerunt</i>
1179 <i>Ibid.</i> p.12.	<i>Discordia fuit inter Ventos et Grillos; et bellum inde fuit</i>	Vento	Grillo	
1180 <i>Ibid.</i> p.15.	<i>Odium maximum et guerra creuit</i>	Rubaldo Porcello and brothers	Girardo Scoto and family	Consuls mediated but Scoto refused the peace and left the city – <i>pacem recusando, extra Ianua abiit</i>
1183 <i>Ibid.</i> p.19.	<i>Multa odia atque dissensions fuerunt in civitate</i> – followed by – <i>bellum maximum</i>	Fulcone de Castello and the Vento family	Bulbunoso and <i>illi de Curia</i>	It is the first time that the <i>Annales</i> record the existence of a faction de Curia
1185 <i>Ibid.</i> p.20.	<i>Consules pacificaverunt omnia discordias quae errant in civitate</i> - consuls brought back peace in Genoa'			
1187 <i>Ibid.</i> p.22.	<i>Caput extulit Sathanas</i>	Lanfranco de Turca	Anglerio de Mari (consul)	Lanfranco, possessed by a diabolic spirit – <i>diabolicus arreptus spiritu</i> –

¹⁴³ Wickham, C., *Land and Power...*, p.268.

¹⁴⁴ *Annales*, vol.II, p.11.

				killed – <i>interfecit</i> - Anglerio
1187 <i>Ibid.</i> p.23.	<i>Nobiles viri...interfecti fuerunt</i>			Rubaldo Porcello Opizone Lecaleio
1188 <i>Ibid.</i> p.26.	<i>Seditiones multe, discordie innumere et prelia fuerunt in civitate</i>			Ingone de Volta was killed by a stone that hit him by chance – <i>casu lapide percussus capite, obiit</i>
1189 <i>Ibid.</i> p.30.	<i>Multe guerre et seditiones; et multa odia regnaverunt</i>	Guglielmo Vento	<i>Illi de Volta</i>	<i>bellum maximum fuit inter Willielmum Ventum et consanguineous, et illos de Volta</i> – It is the first time that the term <i>illi de Volta</i> is used
1190 <i>Ibid.</i> p.37.	<i>Pro dolor</i> - a deep pain - was caused by an <i>immensum facinus</i> – a terrible crime.	Fulcone and Guglielmo de Castello	Lanfranco Pevere	Lanfranco Pevere was killed
1192 <i>Ibid.</i> p.42.	<i>Multe guerre et seditiones</i>	<i>Illos de Volta</i>		
1193 <i>Ibid.</i> p.43.	<i>Sicut validissimus ignis inter copiosissimum lignorum...ita et odia, seditiones, prelia et mala omnia fuerunt</i>			Ingone de Frexia, son of Ingone de Volta was killed – <i>pro dolor; fuit interfectus</i>
1193 <i>Ibid.</i> p.44.	<i>Illi de Volta noctu intraverunt turrem Bulbonosi</i> - a nocturnal assault to the tower of Bulbonoso	<i>Illi de Volta</i>	<i>Illi de Curia Bulbonoso</i>	<i>Rumor maximus et prelium fuit in civitate; recuperaverunt eam illi de Curia</i> – the de Curia fought back and recovered the tower
1194 <i>Ibid.</i> pp.44-47.	Descriptions of siege warfare, with the construction of machines	<i>Illi de Volta</i> , Grimaldo, Spinola	<i>Illi de Curia</i> , Bulbonoso	
1194 <i>Ibid.</i> p.50.	De Curia nominated its own consuls			Giovanni Avvocato Rubaldo de Curia Enrico son of Embrone

Table 1.4 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Ottobono

The wealth of elements contained in the table above indicates that in the chronicle of Ottobono, civil conflicts come to occupy a central role. For several years the annalist does not record much apart from these violent episodes. The growing elements contained in the data relative to civil conflicts allow us to make some general considerations. To start with, Ottobono utilizes a wider terminology than that of his predecessors, Caffaro and Oberto, when describing episodes of civil violence. In 1178 Ottobono describes how ‘Mazanello and

Navarro fought once before peace and concord were restored'.¹⁴⁵ The following year two consular families, Vento and Grillo, fought over growing dissensions. But in 1180 they successfully made peace and concord.¹⁴⁶ In these first descriptions of civil tensions, Ottobono used the dichotomy *concordia* and *discordia*, as his predecessors did. On both occasions the adversaries fought violently against each other but, the author states, those hostilities did not last for long. As an initial comment on the terminology used by the author, I should stress that the 1178-79 conflicts between Genoese families were not depicted as dramatically as the ones occurred in 1164-69, or the ones that were to begin in 1180. Once again, it is evident that the role of the commune's officers was not to prevent the conflicts. Instead they were called merely to manage the conflicts and to reach an agreement between the parties, so as to avoid escalations. There were no negative comments or accusations by the author, just a description of the events as they happened. Tensions inside the city walls were, by then, not uncommon and were not necessarily perceived as a menace to the survival of the commune. We should stress again that when Ottobono was writing he had already seen the consequences of the various events, so perhaps we may consider the lightness of his terminology as dependent on the lack of consequences of these two initial conflicts. This is a very important factor, because it tells us that the civil conflict in itself was not condemned by the commune. What were condemned were the eventual consequences of these conflicts. I will show a much stronger moral condemnation for the other conflicts under consideration. This depended not on their different initial characteristics, but on their much more dangerous effects on the commune's survival. From 1180 Ottobono starts using a noticeably harsher terminology. He does not speak of disagreements and tensions, but of great hatreds and wars and, later on, of the role played by Satan in the unfolding of the Genoese civil conflicts. These years were characterised by the killings of consuls sitting in council in 1187 and 1190, and successively by the escalation of violence into a full blown civil war.

¹⁴⁵ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.10.

¹⁴⁶ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.13.

Although richer in details than his predecessors, the chronicle of Ottobono contains little information regarding the structure of the conflicts raging in the city or the reasons why they were occurring. However, Ottobono uses for the first time the definitions *Illi de Curia* (in 1183) and *Illi de Volta* (in 1189) to describe the protagonists of the violent episodes. Therefore the protagonists of the civil conflicts developed from individuals or individual families, to group of families, and finally to groups organized in two relatively stable factions. Once again the notarial records contained in the Genoese cartularies prove invaluable to understanding the factional affiliations of the families and individuals that took part in violent episodes and whose factional affiliation is not specified in the *Annales*.

Year	De Volta faction	De Curia faction	Other/No Evidence
1178			Mazanello, Navarro
1179			Vento, Grillo
1180	Scoto	Porcello	
1183	Castello, Vento	Bulbunoso, <i>illi de Curia</i>	
1187	Mari	Turca, Porcello, Lecavele	
1188	Volta		
1189	<i>Illi de Volta</i>	Vento	
1190	Castello	Pevere	
1193	Ingone de Frexia (Volta's son)		
	<i>Illi de Volta</i>	Bulbunoso	
	Volta, Grimaldo, Spinola	Bulbunoso, <i>Illi de Curia</i>	
1194		Avvocato, Curia, Embrone	

Table 1.5 Individuals involved in civil conflicts (1178-1194)

The matching of the information contained in the chronicle and in the notarial records brings order to the picture of Genoese civil conflicts, which can be analysed as follows.

1170s, Non factional conflict

The conflicts of 1178-79 involved the Mazanello against the Navarro, and the Vento against the Grillo. Both conflicts effectively ended by 1180. Why? The author did not give any information that could help us understand this. In the Genoese cartularies the family names

Mazanello and Navarro appear three times, in 1190 and 1192: strikingly, they always appear in the same documents as partners in commercial transactions.¹⁴⁷ These findings, together with the fact that the names of Navarro or Mazanello are never linked with the families associated with the factions, suggest that the 1178 battle was disconnected from the chain of murderous events linked with the factional strife. The confrontation between Mazanello and Navarro therefore appears as either a dispute between business partners, or a dispute between families who later become business partners. In any event, this confrontation can not be understood through a factional framework.

The relationship between the Vento and Grillo families appears very similar to this. Their connection is demonstrated in a document recording Pietro Vento's declaration in 1186 that Grillo completed his payment for buying a house.¹⁴⁸ The families also left numerous traces of their economic activities in the later Notarile of Guglielmo Cassinese (1190-1192) where 17% of the documents regarding the activities of the Grillo family connect it to Vento.¹⁴⁹ Clearly the families at that stage were not enemies, and did not fear an attack from one another, especially considering that the majority of these transactions were written in the house of the Vento. Again, the two families, after an initial dispute, established or reestablished a lasting connection. Diane Hughes describes the events of 1178-79 as 'a minor skirmish...part of the constant confrontations between factions'.¹⁵⁰ However, the collocation of this event as part of the confrontation between the two different factions that were defining themselves in those years in Genoa is not satisfactory. As these findings show, these families were economically connected - or soon would be - and their common interests stopped the hostilities at their inception. To sum up the findings relative to the 1170s, it is clear that the few episodes of

¹⁴⁷ *Oberto 1190*, docs. 312, 629; *Cassinese*, doc. 813. In the first two documents Oberto states that the debts had been contracted to buy commercial goods; for the third one the deadline, typical for trade loans, fixed on August 1, indicates that the money was borrowed for a mercantile enterprise. For the dates typical of a sea loan, see Hoover, C.B., 'The Sea Loan in Genoa in the Twelfth Century', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 40, 3 (1926), pp.495-529, p.503. Unfortunately there are no surviving earlier records of these families' activities.

¹⁴⁸ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 230. Again, no earlier records are available.

¹⁴⁹ These are 11 documents out of 63 in total for the Grillo family. (*Cassinese*, docs. 86, 106, 269, 495, 523, 527, 634, 1056, 1205, 1331, 1816).

¹⁵⁰ Hughes, D.O., 'Urban Growth...', p.8.

internal violence that took place were not part of a preexistent factional confrontation. This was reflected in the comparatively mild terminology used by Ottobono Scriba.

1180-85, Factional conflict within boundaries

From 1180 Ottobono's perception of the events, reflected in his style, changed. He wrote of a 'great hatred and war' - *odium maximum et guerra* - growing between Rubaldo Porcello and his brothers, and Girardo Scoto and his family.¹⁵¹ The author states that the consuls mediated to restore the peace between these two eminent members of the Genoese elite, but he also informs us that Girardo refused the peace and left Genoa. At that point the consuls ordered all his properties to be destroyed. From the cartularies we can see that these families never had any kind of connections. Their hostilities, therefore, fit better into the logic of Genoese factional warfare. It is important to notice that these two families were not going to confront one another directly in the narration again, however, so this event did not follow the longer-term vendetta pattern described by Trevor Dean.¹⁵² The struggle was nonetheless, from here onwards, carried forward year by year by different individuals that were members of defined and separate factions. I have already shown which documents allow me to place the Scoto family in the de Volta faction. The Porcello family was closely connected to the Pevere family, one of the main members of the de Curia faction.¹⁵³

Ottobono uses a similar terminology describing the 'many hatreds and divisions that were in the city' - *multa odia...dissensions* - in 1183.¹⁵⁴ The protagonists were Fulconene de Castello, supported by the Vento family - *ex una parte* - on one side, with his adversaries Bulbunoso and - *illi de Curia ex altera* - on the other. The Annalist speaks of a 'great battle' – *bellum maximum* - fought by the two groups outside the city walls. The Bulbunoso family was clearly

¹⁵¹ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.15.

¹⁵² Dean, T., 'Marriage and Vendetta...', p.21.

¹⁵³ Pevere was the patron of Porcello. In a series of documents dating back to the 1150s it is shown how Pevere gave a large loan to Porcello and the use of a workshop in Genoa to start his activities.

¹⁵⁴ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.19.

located in the de Curia faction, since it is mentioned fighting alongside them on the two occasions, in 1183 as we have just noted, and again in 1194. Furthermore, a document dated December 17, 1175 reports a donation of a land to the monastery of San Siro.¹⁵⁵ The donors are listed as Bulbunoso and his brother Angeleto, witnessed by Lanfranco and Guglielmo Pevere, whom I can locate in the de Curia faction thanks to information contained both in the *Annales* and in the *Notarili*.

The Vento in this period were closer to the de Volta faction, but their progressive separation from this faction is visible in the *Notarile*. From a document of 1190 we see that Pietro Vento was married to Maria, daughter of Ottone de Castello.¹⁵⁶ The relationship between the Vento and de Volta families however was of a weaker nature; one of the documents connecting these families shows this trait well. On September 24, 1186 Fulcone son of Fulcone de Castello, accepted £307 from Rufo de Volta to trade in Constantinople, £41 of these was lent by Simone Vento, and witnesses included Simone and Tommaso Vento. Oberto Scriba registered this contract in the house of Bonifacio de Volta.¹⁵⁷ All the documents involving Vento and de Volta members suggest that these two families in 1186 were indeed allied, for most of the Vento documents were registered in the house of a de Volta member. The documents show also that Vento members acted as witnesses for de Volta ones and vice-versa. However their economic ties were not strong. The only transaction in which a Vento invested his money in an operation involving a de Volta was the one already mentioned, significantly to the benefit of a de Castello, to which the Vento family was connected through marriage as we have seen. From the documents we can certainly state that Vento members felt safe in the de Volta properties, but that their economic ties were not particularly strong. These series of violent

¹⁵⁵ Authentic copy of the 1656, in Archivio Durazzo Giustiniani, Genealogie I\7.5, c. 1 (Originally in 'Actis Guglielmi Caligepalii notarii in Sancto Syro').

¹⁵⁶ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 276.

¹⁵⁷ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 26.

events was apparently interrupted in 1185, when the author states that the ‘consuls brought back peace in Genoa’ – *Consules pacificaverunt omnes discordias que errant in civitate.*¹⁵⁸

1187-1190, Murders of consuls in council

From 1187 the internal conflict of Genoa again escalated and reached previously unseen levels. The language utilized by the author changed again. The first few lines of the text are worth quoting to show the ways in which this transition manifested itself: ‘Satan lifted his head. Lanfranco, the son of Giacomo de Turca, possessed by a diabolic spirit, killed the consul Anglerio de Mari’- *In isto consulate, dum civitas nostra in concordia maxima et tranquillitate maneret, caput extulit Sathanas. Lanfrancus namque filius Iacobi de Turca, diabolicus arreptus spiritu, interfecit Anglerium de Mari.*¹⁵⁹ The words of Ottobono had never previously been so strong. The reference to the intervention of the devil in the crimes committed in the city is completely new in his text. A religious and moral commentary became characteristic of Ottobono’s literary style in the following years. Lanfranco (the son of the 1187 consul Giacomo de Turca) killed the consul Anglerio de Mari, one of the city’s most prominent public figures. Anglerio had been consul several times before 1187 and the fact that his murderer was the son of another consul, and an important public figure himself, was extremely important. The author did not have any doubt when he wrote that ‘this homicide will cause infinite hatreds in Genoa’ – *pro supradicto namque homicidio odia innumera et seditiones in civitate Ianue initium susceperunt.*¹⁶⁰ Afterward an unspecified group of people of the city destroyed the tower and the properties of the de Turca family and forced the killer into exile.¹⁶¹ In the same year, two other important members of the city elite

¹⁵⁸ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.20.

¹⁵⁹ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.22.

¹⁶⁰ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.22.

¹⁶¹ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.22.

were killed – *interfecti fuerunt*: Rubaldo Porcello and Opizo Lecaleio.¹⁶² The first had been consul in 1180, when he was the protagonist of a violent confrontation with Girardo Scoto (as we have seen), and also in 1184. The second was consul in 1183. The importance of the double homicide is evident, but the author did not attempt to describe the possible reasons behind these crimes.

All these homicides were again part of the struggle between the de Volta and de Curia factions. Such a conclusion is supported by the documents contained in the cartularies that firmly place the Turca family within the Curia faction and the Mari family in the Volta one. The notary Guglielmo Cassinese recorded six documents dealing with the activities of Giacomo Turca, the father of the killer.¹⁶³ One of them is particularly pertinent. It records how, in 1191, Giovanni Avvocato sold a house that had been owned by Opizo Lecaleio to Mabilia Lecaleio, the mother of Giovanni's wife Adalaxia, doing everything under the auspices of his relatives Guglielmo Pevere and Giacomo Turca (this transaction will be discussed at greater length, see below, pp.112-116). Giovanni, who, as we shall see was to become consul of the Curia in 1194, was the son of Rolando Avvocato, the de Curia protagonist in the civil strife recorded by Oberto Cancelliere, and the brother-in-law of Opizo Lecaleio, killed in 1187. Moreover, he was a relative of the consul Lanfranco Pevere who had been killed in 1190, a year before this contract was registered, and of Giacomo de Turca, the father of Anglerio de Mari's killer.¹⁶⁴ Finally, we learn from another document that Pevere and de Turca, with Enrico Lecaleio, were counsellors and relatives of the above-mentioned widow of Opizo Lecaleio.¹⁶⁵ In all the documents surviving, the name of de Turca appears along with the names Avvocato, Lecaleio and Pevere and the majority of those documents were registered in the house of the de Turca. Thanks to this evidence, the Turca family can undoubtedly be identified as one of the components of the de Curia faction together with

¹⁶² *Annales*, Vol.II, p.23.

¹⁶³ *Cassinense*, docs. 253, 618, 796, 1729, 1784.

¹⁶⁴ *Cassinense*, doc. 253.

¹⁶⁵ *Cassinense*, doc. 618.

Avvocato, Pevere, Porcello and Lecaleio. The evidence that locate the Mari in the de Volta faction is also substantial and it will be considered more fully in the next chapter (see below, p.105). The family appears in numerous documents and never figures in the same texts as the names of members of the de Curia faction. Moreover, they are connected to the Castello, Volta and to Frexia, the main families of the de Volta faction and most of these documents were recorded in the Volta's houses.¹⁶⁶ All the previous scholars dealing with these issues affirm that Mari and Turca were allied families and use these homicides as an evidence of the unpredictability of Genoese civil conflicts. Their supposed proximity derives from their supposed common roots in the Carolingian period. Speaking of the homicide Day concludes that: 'Although the young de Turca was a member of the Caramandino (Curia) lineage, he must have been operating for the della Volta people when he assassinated the consul of de Curia, Anglerio de Mari'.¹⁶⁷ The available documentation demonstrates however that indeed de Turca was part of the de Curia faction, and he was *operating* for his side when he killed Mari, who was on the other hand closely associated to de Volta. Shortly thereafter Porcello and Lecaleio were killed. The chronicle, as usual, does not report any reason for these homicides. But the notarial registers demonstrate that they were both eminent members of the Curia faction.¹⁶⁸ Knowing this, we can conclude that the double homicide was a response to the killing of Anglerio de Mari.¹⁶⁹ The year 1188 is remembered by Ottobono as being characterized by internal violence – *Hoc anno seditions multe, discordie innumere et prelia fuerunt in civitate*.¹⁷⁰ Ingone de Volta, a consul of the commune and a leader of the de Volta faction, was hit on the head and killed by a stone *casu* - 'by chance' – another of the

¹⁶⁶ *Oberto 1186*, docs. 349, 206, 480; *Oberto 1190*, docs. 28, 125, 644, 658, 404, 244.

¹⁶⁷ Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.144.

¹⁶⁸ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 271; *Cassinese*, docs. 47, 70, 94, 183, 202, 272, 284, 310, 673, 824, 877, 993, 996, 1068, 1296, 1276, 1295, 1380, 1630. Even after his death his widow, Mabilia, utilised his name

¹⁶⁹ Day affirms that the assassins were 'perhaps...Doria adherents', this conjecture comes from the mention in the *Annales* that in 1230 peace was made between Doria, Porcellos and Lecavele, (Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.145). Although this hypothesis is consistent with the factional I will illustrate in this dissertation, by 1230 – as I will show – the factional structure of Genoa had changed dramatically.

¹⁷⁰ *Annales*, vol.II, p.26.

numerous casualties suffered by this family in the factional strife - and in 1189 Guglielmo Vento and the de Volta fought on the city streets a great battle – *bellum maximum*.¹⁷¹ The Vento, the reader will recall, fought against the de Curia in 1183, but now against the de Volta, making this the only occasion in which Ottobono reported a change in the factions.¹⁷² As usual, he did not mention any reason behind this event. But the Notarile offer an extremely interesting testimony of the evolution of the relationship between the de Volta faction and the Vento family (see also, below, p.118). The name Volta appears on nine of the twelve documents containing the name Vento for 1186.¹⁷³ In 1190, however, these joint Volta-Vento contracts constitute only three out of fifteen documents. Even then Ventos appear only as witnesses in contracts involving a de Castello.¹⁷⁴ None of the thirty-four documents dated 1191 recording the name Vento link this family with Volta, nor do any of the twelve documents of 1192. This dramatic decrease was not due to a lesser economic activity of the de Volta families. The Voltas appear on an important and relatively constant number of documents in all the mentioned years. For the same crucial years the San Siro documents show the growing connections of the Vento with families closer to the de Curia, specifically with the Pevere family. On May 13 1189 Guglielmo Pevere swore that he would transport Bernardo de Valle, Guglielmo Sanito and Gerardo Clavel, along with their people and goods, on his ship to Barcelona. In case of default Pevere would have to pay a sum guaranteed by Pietro Vento.¹⁷⁵ In October 1191 Guglielmo Pevere sold his share of three mills to the monastery of San Siro. He owned the mills jointly with his brother, his nephew and Guglielmo Vento. From this we can see that the relations between the Vento family and the Pevere were ongoing.¹⁷⁶ This evolution of the relations Vento – de Volta could surprise the reader

¹⁷¹ *Annales*, vol.II, pp.26, 30.

¹⁷² *Annales*, vol.II, pp. 19, 30.

¹⁷³ *Oberto 1186*, docs. 47, 99, 100, 101, 234, 237, 240, 242, 309.

¹⁷⁴ Individuals of the Vento family figure as witnesses in *Oberto 1190*, docs. 198, 337, 424.

¹⁷⁵ Original Archivio Segreto in Archivio Storico di Genova, n. 27137A\20. Registration code: Lisciardelli, n. 134.

¹⁷⁶ *Le Carte del Monastero di San Siro*, doc. 141.

considering the fact that Pietro Vento married a de Castello before 1190. Given the matrimonial mechanisms shown by Diane Hughes and Gabriella Airaldi, the roles of a wife and of a wedding were closely linked with the economic role of the dowry. But once this ‘matrimonial-patrimonial’ operation was secured the families did not necessarily need to maintain political links.¹⁷⁷ This happened only when the families, reinforced the matrimonial link with joint economic operations. In the battle of 1183, the Vento supported the de Castello, showing a closeness in that period which was also demonstrated by the decision to marry a de Castello, and confirmed by the documents showing that Vento members were safe in de Volta houses. However the relationship between the two families was compromised in 1189 already, or at least not strong enough to prevent a change in the alliance system. This event outlines the striking fact that marriage alone did not constitute a link strong enough to ensure peaceful relations, it had to be reinforced by deep economic connections. This passage is extremely important in defining the characteristics of Genoese conflicts and more in particular the role of families unaffiliated to the two factions that still took part in the civil conflicts.¹⁷⁸ But it is also important to stress that Vento are the only family who can be shown to have changed sides before the peace of 1196.

1191-96, Escalation of violence and institutional change

In 1190 internal and external events evidently became correlated. The Kings of France and England met in Genoa in order to reach an agreement for the transportation of their troops on their way East during the Third Crusade.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, many Genoese pilgrims and soldiers left the city to help to defend the Kingdom of Jerusalem. They were led by Guido Spinola, consul of the commune, who was accompanied by Nicola Embriaco, Fulcone de Castello,

¹⁷⁷ Airaldi, G., *Genova e la Liguria...*, p.467.

¹⁷⁸ *Annales*, vol.II, pp.30-32.

¹⁷⁹ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.87.

Simone Doria, Baldovino Guercio, Rosso de Volta, Spezapreda and many others.¹⁸⁰ These are the first and the last references to the participation of Genoese citizens in the Crusade. The events of the following years were closely connected both to the expedition of the individuals mentioned above and to the omission of any further information in their regard. In the same year, Genoa's consuls for the first time elected a *podestà* to rule the city in 1191. The *podestà* was a foreign officer.¹⁸¹ This institutional evolution has been considered a direct answer, by all the city notables, to the inability of the consular regime to prevent the internal strife in the city. Ottobono's text is at the base of such an interpretation. It stated that the consuls of the city elected Manegoldo de Tetocio, from Brescia, as a *podestà* in order to prevent the civil conflicts started in the city arising out of the desire of many for the consular position.¹⁸² In reality, however, the decision did not succeed in preventing further strife. In 1190, the victim was once again one of the consuls, Lanfranco Pevere, who had also held that role in 1183 and 1185. Lanfranco was killed during a communal council by Fulcone de Castello and Guglielmo de Castello who 'committed an atrocious crime' – *immensum facinus perpetrarunt*.¹⁸³ The language utilized by the annalist does not leave any doubt regarding his perception of the homicide –that it caused a deep pain to the city and was committed without 'any causes'.¹⁸⁴ It is precisely the causes of the failure of this institutional reform to prevent conflicts that we must discover. It is most likely that the election of Manegoldo, far from being part of the resolution of conflict, was nothing more than a new element of the civil confrontations themselves. The consuls 'voted' while Guido Spinola, Fulconene Castello, Rosso de Volta and others among the political leaders of the de Volta faction were fighting in front of the walls of Acre, and thus were unable to attend to the election of their successors. The desire of the consuls who remained in Genoa was to exclude the faction led by the

¹⁸⁰ *Annales*, vol.II, p.33.

¹⁸¹ For an analysis of this institution see below, pp.223-227. See also Maire Vigueur, J. C., *Cavalieri e Cittadini...*, pp.423-508.

¹⁸² *Annales*, Vol.II, p.36 ; Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, p.6 ; Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.88

¹⁸³ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.37.

¹⁸⁴ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.37.

notables who had left the city from the governance of the city. The murder of Lanfranco Pevere, of the de Curia faction, was clearly a reaction to this move. I have already discussed some of the elements that point to the adherence of the Pevere family to the de Curia faction. The links between the Pevere, Avvocato and Turca families will be object of careful analysis in the next chapter; at this stage I will simply mention a document indicating that the families Pevere, Avvocato, de Turca and Bulbunoso owned a property collectively. On March 24, 1192 Guglielmo Cassinese registered that Drua sold an eighth of a property to the church of Santa Margherita of Murvallo. The other proprietors of the estate were Avvocato, Pevere, Giacomo de Turca and Bulbunoso.¹⁸⁵ A year before the attack of the de Volta faction on the tower of Bulbunoso, this document seems a manifesto of the de Curia faction.

The first action of the *podestà* Manegoldo was to destroy the ‘precious house’ – *domum preciosissimam* – Fulcone de Castello had in Genoa. The people involved left the city. The violent reaction to the election of Manegoldo also explains why Ottobono did not mention the heroic defence – carefully recorded in the diplomatic collection of the city – of Acre conducted by Fulcone di Castello and Guido Spinola.¹⁸⁶ Most Italian cities in the same period did indeed utilize a *podestà* as a mean to reach an agreement between the fighting factions. However, the transition as it occurred in Genoa was very different. The *podestà* was an imposition of the de Curia faction, which was momentarily in a stronger position because of the distance of its adversaries; it was not an attempt to calm civil conflicts, but a weapon in factional warfare. The de Volta reaction to the institutional reform was suffocated, and in 1191 Genoa was governed by Manegoldo.¹⁸⁷ The dramatic escalation of the internal tensions nevertheless continued, and can be observed in the style used by the author of the *Annales*. From 1192 Ottobono again reports ‘many wars...and assaults’ – *hoc anno etiam multe guerre*

¹⁸⁵ Cassinese, doc. 1784.

¹⁸⁶ CDG, vol. II, docs. 194, 195, 196; CDG, vol. III, docs. 7, 8, 19, 20. In fact in every document relative to the events in the East, the names of these two individuals and the narration of their memorable actions are mentioned, most unusually for legal documents, which makes Ottobono’s omission of the same actions still more striking.

¹⁸⁷ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.38.

et seditions fuerunt in civitate - and the conflicts enter into a phase that can be defined only as a civil war.¹⁸⁸ For 1193 the author described the violence in the city as the flourishing of the seed of Satan – *fronduit, floruit et fructificavit semen Sathane in civitate*.¹⁸⁹ Ingone de Frexia was killed that year. He was consul in 1177, 1182 and 1188. Most importantly he was the son of Ingone de Volta, the father-in-law of Fulcone de Castello; he was one of the most eminent members of the community, and the leader of the de Volta faction.¹⁹⁰ The response this time was not isolated actions. Indeed, the conflict rushed to its climax. The de Volta attacked during the night and conquered the new tower of the Bulbunoso family. Later, the de Curia re-conquered it.¹⁹¹ For 1194 Ottobono's narration becomes more technical. He seems to enjoy the descriptions of the military capabilities of his citizens. The de Volta faction again counterattacked, their aim still being the conquest of the tower of Bulbunoso. To attack it, they built a *bulzonem* - a flying bridge - onto the tower of Oberto Grimaldo and the new tower of Oberto Spinola, in order to allow them to attack the top of the Bulbunoso's tower, which was severely damaged. However, the de Curia faction responded with the construction of a war machine – *illi de Curia paraverunt et instruxerunt machinam unam, cum qua multos traxerunt lapides ad domos et turres Spinolorum et Oberti de Grimaldo* - with which they cast stones against the Grimaldo and Spinola fortifications.¹⁹² The de Volta reacted in the same way, deploying war machines and hurling stones at all the properties of the de Curia - *et illi partier ex altera parte machina plurima erexerunt, et traxerunt multos lapides ad domos et turres illorum de Curia*.¹⁹³ The interpretation of this crucial passage has been thwarted by a mistaken translation that located the de Volta on one side and the de Curia, Bulbunoso,

¹⁸⁸ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.42.

¹⁸⁹ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.43.

¹⁹⁰ Olivieri, A., 'Cronologia dei Consoli del Comune di Genova', in *Atti della Società Ligure* (Genova, 1878), pp.199, 209, 213, demonstrates extensively that Ingo de Frexia was the son of Ingone de Volta.

¹⁹¹ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.44.

¹⁹² *Annales*, Vol.II, p.45.

¹⁹³ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.45.

Grimaldo and Spinola on the opposite.¹⁹⁴ Instead the Grimaldo and Spinola families were allies of the de Volta and launched the attack to the de Curia from their towers.

A translation that correctly locates the de Grimaldo and the de Spinola on the de Volta side is supported by the commercial documents and makes it possible to reinterpret these crucial events. In 1190 Oberto da Mercato mentions Oberto Spinola four times. All the documents concerning him were registered in the house of Bonifacio de Volta; in all these contracts de Volta and de Castello members appear as witnesses along with those of Spinola. The documents were all registered at the beginning of the summer 1190 and they all refer to overseas commerce financing.¹⁹⁵

The fact that Spinola and Grimaldo were closely connected is demonstrated in documents dating from 1188. The two men jointly donated a church to the archbishop of Genoa.¹⁹⁶ Ottobono wrote for 1194 that the whole city did not obey the regularly elected consuls any more – *universus populus factus esset inobediens consulatui* - and because of this the de Curia decided to nominate their own consuls: Giovanni Avvocato; Rubaldo de Curia; and Enrico son of Embrione – *quia illi de Curia fecerant sibi consules*.¹⁹⁷

The very existence of Genoa was at risk. The central role of Giovanni Avvocato inside the de Curia has been described earlier. Enrico Embrone figures on several real estate transactions as witness for the de Curia family. The de Curia faction, after their *podestarial* coup of 1190, were increasing the stakes again. At this point, however, the author referred to how the situation was resolved by the arrival of Markward of Anweiler in Genoa. He was emperor Henry VI's senior representative in Italy, and he stated the promises of the Emperor to Genoa for its help in the conquest of Sicily. At this point, all consuls renounced their positions, and met for a public peace discussion. They agreed to elect a *podestà*; Oberto de Olevano from

¹⁹⁴ 'In 1194...the della Volta...tried to demolish the tower of Bulbonoso and the towers of Spinola and Grimaldo', Moresco, M., 'Note' p. 223; 'The de Volta fought a proper war against the Spinola and Grimaldo', Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, p. 6. The Latin quotes from the Annales I inserted in the text suffice to disprove this translation.

¹⁹⁵ *Oberto 1190*, docs. 528, 642, 647, 655.

¹⁹⁶ *Cassinese*, doc. 1492.

¹⁹⁷ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.45.

Pavia. The newly pacified Genoa hosted Emperor Henry VI later that year on his way to Sicily, an expedition deeply dependent on the support of Genoa's navy.

From the words of Ottobono it seemed that Markward succeeded in reaching a peace between the factions by suggesting the city would benefit from very favourable concessions if it decisively helped the Emperor in Sicily.¹⁹⁸ The Emperor promised the notables of Genoa that 'the submitted Sicilian kingdom was going to be not his, but of Genoa...and not only to them but to every private citizen he gave concessions and made promises'.¹⁹⁹ The rest of the *Annales* of Ottobono, are filled with the events of the conquest of the island, and the internal events of the city lost their centrality.²⁰⁰ The author returned here to an unemotional style that did not identify any reason behind the conflicts that almost destroyed the city. The 'madness' that guided his citizens passed, and under the rule of the *podestà* Giacomo Manerio, in 1195, and Drudo Marcellino, in 1196, the main aim was to destroy or shorten illegal towers (those which exceeded the maximum of eighty feet). Drudo is described by Ottobono as 'the medicine that cured the ills of the city' – *sicut gravibus et desperatis morbis frequenter competens medicina succedit et patientibus prestat beneficium sanitatis, sic et magnanimitatis domini Drudi Marcellini, clara strenuitas fuit morbis Ianuensis urbis succursum*.²⁰¹ Ottobono Scriba's final years as the official historian of the commune were, however, dominated by the bitter disappointment that followed the Sicilian campaign. The annalist described how Genoa assembled a fleet in 1195 and played a fundamental role in the conquest of the Sicilian Kingdom. However, the conclusion of the Sicilian operation saw the victorious emperor, Henry VI, reneging on all of his promises to them.²⁰²

The whole documentary pool suggests the interpretation that the election of *podestà* Manegoldo in 1190 was a move of the de Curia faction to exclude the de Volta from power at

¹⁹⁸ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese*..., p.88.

¹⁹⁹ CDG, Vol.III, doc. 2.

²⁰⁰ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.50.

²⁰¹ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.61.

²⁰² *Annales*, Vol.II, pp.58-59.

a moment of the latter's weakness due to the fact the majority of its important members were fighting in the East. The reaction to this attempt came in two acts. The first was impulsive, with the killing of Pevere in the council room, but the second was carefully planned, doubtless as a reaction to the killing of Ingone de Frexia. On this occasion the leaders of the de Volta opted for a large-scale attack on the towers of their adversaries. They did so with a siege operation, building machines and seriously damaging their adversary's fortifications. This dramatic escalation - from battles outside the city, skirmishes on the city streets and homicides, to full-scale warfare inside the city walls - further confirms Vitale's interpretation that this move was very much the decision of the de Volta faction returning to Genoa after the conclusion of the Crusade in July 1191.²⁰³ Actors tend to fight a war not only in the way the external components suggest it to be fought, but also in the way the actor is best prepared to fight. 'Strategies of action...depend on habits, moods, sensibilities, and views of the world'.²⁰⁴ These were all likely to have been changed by the learning experience of the Crusade, therefore making the sudden escalation in violence in 1193 less surprising.²⁰⁵ The de Volta faction, who in this crucial moment concentrated its strength on the towers of the Spinola and Grimaldo families, fought in an organised way because they called upon the knowledge of warfare that many of their members had learned defending the crusader states in the East. The experience of the Crusade relaxed the de Volta adherence to the unwritten custom that regulated the manifestations of political violence in the city.²⁰⁶ The de Volta escalation paralysed city life and prepared the way for an escalation by the de Curia, with its unparalleled nomination of its own consuls. Then, thanks to an unexpected external intervention a final agreement, negotiated by Markward led to the election of Oberto as a new *podestà*. This time the public officer appears to have been a representative of both factions

²⁰³ Vitale, V., *Breviario*..., p.45.

²⁰⁴ Swidler, A., 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies', *American Sociological Review*, 51, 2, 1986, pp.273-286, p.277.

²⁰⁵ Vitale states that the Genoese expedition astonished friends and enemies with the use of formidable siege machines. Vitale, V., *Breviario*..., pp.44-49.

²⁰⁶ Gluckman, M., 'The Peace in the Feud', *Past & Present*, 8 (1955), pp.1-14, p.1.

and his election interrupted the long years of civil war. It could be argued, thus, that the escalations enacted by both factions, seemed to have realized their goals. By making civil conflicts so destructive, it forced a renegotiation of power in Genoa. However, we shall see from the analysis of the developing structure of violence that by the time of this decision the de Volta faction was clearly predominant in Genoa.

Ogerio Pane (1197-1219)

Ogerio Pane started his career as the official chronicler of Genoa in 1197 and he covered the history of the city until 1219. Therefore, he is a guide to the analysis of the institutional transition from a mostly consular commune to one ruled by individual, mostly foreign, officers called *podestà*. The annalist's interests focused mostly on the external affairs and wars of the commune, which, as I have shown, had often been closely connected with violent episodes happening inside the city. When Ogerio Pane began his stint as Genoese official chronicler from where Ottobono Scriba had left off, the city had just emerged from a full-scale civil war. It does not come as a surprise then that the annalist opens his account of the year 1197 declaring that the city had been governed 'in peace' – *in pace rexit* - by the *podestà* Drudo Marcellino.²⁰⁷

1197-1219, Post-factional conflict

This peaceful state of affairs was not as complete as the annalist tries to imply. Again, as with the escalation of 1192, which started with the return of the crusaders from the East, internal tensions and the external affairs of the city were intertwined. When several eminent Genoese and their galleys returned to Genoa from the Sicilian campaign in 1197, a state of tension developed between them and the *podestà* Drudo Marcellino after he had ordered the destruction of their houses and towers in their absence. Nicolao Doria, the leader of those

²⁰⁷ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.71.

returning from Sicily, almost started a battle with Marcellino assaulting his positions with a ‘wooden bridge’- *pontem lignaminis*.²⁰⁸ In the morning the *podestà* reacted by calling all the people to arms in order to attack Nicolao. However, when the parties were about to start fighting, the family of Nicolao got in the middle and convinced Nicolao to swear a oath of peace.²⁰⁹ Such pacification was apparently successful, and in 1198 the annalist made no mentions of civil strife. Once again the return of a group of Genoese from a war zone meant that they were ready to fight inside the city in a manner similar to the one utilized during their campaigns.

Year and Reference	Typology of conflict	Side one	Side two	Casualties/Notes
1197 <i>Annales</i> , Vol.II, p.71.	Almost fought	Nicolao Doria	<i>Podestà</i>	The family Doria convinced Nicolao to renounce
1203 <i>Ibid.</i> p.87.	Pevere wounded by servants	de Volta	Pevere	Families met and agreed to peace
1210 <i>Ibid.</i> p.117.	Pallo killed by Porcello	Porcello	Pallo	The families were related
1214 <i>Ibid.</i> p.134.	Attack – <i>assaltum</i>	Turca, Camilla	Pevere	
1214 <i>Ibid.</i> p.134.	Mari wounded while defending Pevere	Mari	Turca, Camilla	
1215 <i>Ibid.</i> p.137.	Mari was attacked – <i>assaltum</i>	Polessino, Malocello	Mari	
1217 <i>Ibid.</i> p.144.	Tensions	Richerio	Doria	Relatives appeased them

²⁰⁸ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.71.

²⁰⁹ This episode is analysed in greater detail in chapter two.

1217	Camilla killed	Bellamuto,		
<i>Ibid.</i> p.144.	Bellamuto	Pignoli	Camilla	

Table 1.6 Episodes of internal tensions recorded by Ogerio Pane

The terminology utilised by Ogerio Pane, stressing at every moment the peace and prosperity reigning in the city, indicates a willingness to underplay the role of conflicts between Genoese citizens, after the traumatic events of the first half of the 1190s, but possibly also a changed scenario of internal conflict. The *podestà* rule did not succeed in preventing further violence and in 1203 the factional divisions in the city seemed to re-emerge when two servants of Sorleone Pevero, possibly under the instigation of some members of the de Volta faction – writes Ogerio – wounded Sorleone in his house – *in crepuscolo noctis, in domo sua graviter vulnerarunt*.²¹⁰ While Pevero and Volta could still appear among the protagonists of such factional violence, I shall demonstrate in chapter two that the internal structure of conflict was markedly different. Again, the factional structure evidenced for the 1180s and 1190s seems no longer to have been at the basis of the next episode of civil violence. On the morning of September 23 1210, Porcellino and Corrado Porcello, with the help of three ‘awful lombards’ – *lumbardis nequissimis*, murdered Guillelmo de Pallo in front of his house.²¹¹ The annalist recorded that the assassins, sons of Bartolomeo Porcello, were relatives of the wife of the victim – *consanguineis uxoris sue*.²¹² The annalist’s reference to these family ties seem to indicate that the murder was an exclusively private event, however, it is worth noticing that, here again a marriage alliance had failed to prevent a violent confrontation.²¹³ In 1214 the internal peace of Genoa was again endangered by a violent event. While Sorleone Pevero was coming back from the Valley of Bisagno – just outside Genoa – he was attacked by Bulbunino, Rosso Turca and Nuvelono Camilla – *assaltum in eo fecerunt*. Ansaldo Mari – *qui*

²¹⁰ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.87.

²¹¹ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.117.

²¹² *Annales*, Vol.II, p.116.

²¹³ Hughes, D.O., ‘Urban Growth...’, p.16.

erat in partibus illis, hoc vidisset, secutus est eos in ronchino – witnessing the scene in the distance, rode his horse alone against the attackers armed only with a sword and chased them until he was struck in the arm.²¹⁴ Ogerio Pane concluded the narration of these events by saying that because of this in the city there was some *discordia* but that it lasted only for a short time – *set parum duravit*.²¹⁵ The event is extremely interesting for a study of the development of Genoese factionalism. Sorleone Pevere, who had been a leader of the de Curia faction and who in 1203 narrowly escaped a murder attempt, was attacked in 1214 by Turca, who was linked to the de Curia faction, supported by Camilla. In a further twist Mari, a de Volta associate, was wounded while intervening to help Pevere. It therefore appears that the cohesion of the de Curia faction was weakening, or that at the very least Sorleone Pevere acted in a way that turned him into a target of his former associates. In chapter two I will analyse this development by looking at the associations of these families for the early decades of the thirteenth century. In the following year, 1215, Guidone Polessino and Carbono, son of Ansaldo Malocello attacked – *assaltum fecerunt* - Erode de Mari.²¹⁶ Polessino and Malocello were both new protagonists of Genoese civil conflicts, hardly linked to previous fighting families. This reinforces the image of a changed scenario. The last mentions of civil tensions recorded by Ogerio Pane occurred in 1217 when a state of discord grew – *discordia orta fuit* - between Giovanni and Giordano of the Richerio and Manuele and Percivale of the Doria. However, their families – *mediantibus viris nobilebus propinquis eorum* - worked for mediation and peace was reached on the eve of St. John's Day – *pax et tranquillitas inter eos composite fuit in vigilia sancti Iohannis*.²¹⁷ During the same year, however, Nuvellono de Camilla was stabbed in the throat with a knife – *cultello in gulla* – by Belmusto, son of Rollando Belmusto. It occurred on the day of San Peter close to San Pietro della Porta while

²¹⁴ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.134.

²¹⁵ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.134.

²¹⁶ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.137.

²¹⁷ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.144.

Nuvellono de Camilla was leaving the church – *dum descenderet de ecclesia*.²¹⁸ According to the annalist this was because of the war that the Pignoli had with those of Camilla – *hoc fuit propter guerram quam Pignoli habebant cum illis de Camilla*.²¹⁹ Such a dramatic conclusion leaves the scholar seeking to uncover the mechanisms of Genoese internal violence with the sense that civil violence was still a very present phenomenon in Genoa. Indeed, the last episode narrated by Ogerio Pane is among the strongest described, with a murder occurring on the doorstep of a church. However, something had clearly changed. There are far fewer violent events in the chronicle of Ogerio than in the one of Ottobono. Was this the result of an institutional reform that saw a *podestà* appointed as the ruler of Genoa? The annalist certainly records that the *podestà* worked hard to pacify the opponents, as did the consuls in the earlier period. However, what is most striking of the events recorded by Ogerio Pane is that, most of them do not seem to follow the factional logic of the period 1180-95.

Conclusions

In chapter two I will follow the cohesiveness of the Genoese factions for the whole period covered by medieval data. This study, conducted through the use of network analysis in order to manage the large data set, sheds a much clearer light on the development of the Genoese factional structure in the different periods of conflict. Such a systematic analysis is necessary to respond to the questions left open by this initial chapter. Chapter one offered several important starting points for the development of this research. Essentially all of these can be summarized in a new understanding of civil conflict as a changing phenomenon, as opposed to the traditional model of an immemorial conflict. Following the narrative of the different authors of the chronicles during the years considered, we noticed a development in the typologies of violent conflict, in their intensity, in their perception by the contemporaries and,

²¹⁸ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.144.

²¹⁹ The successor of Ogerio Pane, Marchisio Scriba, records that in 1222 a peace oath was sworn between the Pignolo and Camilla families.

finally, in their structures. These changes developed over what can be considered five isolated periods. In the 1160s, we saw the first occurrences of recorded episodes of civil violence in the city. Caffaro, the first chronicler of the commune, clearly condemned these episodes because he saw in them a grave danger for the communal institutions; the author failed to identify a factional pattern and exclusively characterized the violence as a product of rising tensions and discords between single families. However, Oberto Cancelliere when writing in 1164 describes a conflict whose structures are groups of families fighting each others. The author in his terminology seems to be well aware of the rising intensity of the conflicts and of their weakening effects on the Genoese commune, as well as the increasingly factional nature of the confrontations. In the 1170s with Ottobono Scriba there is an initial return to the lighter terminology of *concordia* versus *discordia*. This is a consequence of the fact that the structure of conflict returned to be one of individual families opposing each other, and reaching agreements thereafter. However, between 1180 and 1194, the tone of Ottobono radically changed. The author not only spoke of *odia* and *guerre*, but also condemned the participants in the violence, suggesting that it was the devil himself guiding their actions. Such terminology reflected a clear escalation in the typology and structures of civil conflicts in Genoa. First of all, the typology of conflict moved from one that saw the opponents facing each other in honorable open confrontations to one which was characterized first by the homicide of opponent's leadership and then to the use of destructive warfare techniques inside the city. This escalation in the typology of conflict was matched by the one of its structures, with the author for the first time admitting to the presence of two opposing and well defined factions in Genoa. After the peak of conflict had passed, the period 1195-1209 was characterized once again by a marked decline in episodes of civil violence. Moreover, the typology and structure of violence reverted to confrontations among individual families and the terminology of the author returned to the moderate tones of *discordia* and *concordia*. Finally, in the 1210s, the last decade studied in this dissertation, we notice a recrudescence of conflict from the point of view of their intensity. However, both the terminology used by the

author Ogerio Pane and the protagonists fighting seem to reflect the fact that the factional division of the 1180s-1190s was not endangering the unity of the commune anymore.

Chapter Two: The structure of Genoese violence and factionalism

This chapter builds on chapter one to complete the first part of the dissertation. Here I examine in greater depth the mechanisms of conflict and violence within which the episodes described in chapter one unfolded. All the available sources concerning the individuals and families involved in the events illustrated will be taken into consideration with a view to tracing their economic and personal connections and to understanding the ways in which such connections affected the phenomenon of internal violence in Genoa. The aim of this chapter will be to shed light on the logic and structure of conflict history in Genoa, understanding it not as a monolithic phenomenon but rather as one where the characteristics and rationale developed and changed considerably during the period under consideration.

So far, most of the emphasis regarding civil wars rests upon the question of ‘why civil conflicts are fought’. It has therefore become the norm to focus on the motivation of warring parties.²²⁰ A similar approach has also characterised the few attempts that have been made to tackle the issue of internal violence in Genoa.²²¹ What resulted from this state of affairs is two approaches, both of them problematic. On the one hand, the construction of ‘rational’ frameworks that attempted a one-approach-fits-all analysis of this issue, more often than not forcing the available sources to fit the models, as discussed in the introduction. On the other hand, scholars more concerned with a historical approach to the surviving evidence – such as Gabriella Airaldi and to a lesser extent Steven Epstein – have largely rejected such interpretative leaps but in doing so have followed a belief that any attempt to contextualize Genoese conflicts was doomed to fail. In the second part of this dissertation I will give further consideration to the question of why civil conflicts occurred in Genoa. However, considering that such attempts have often turned out to be unsatisfactory, it seems to me that a key insight into the issue of violence in Genoa could be achieved by establishing ‘how it happened’ rather

²²⁰ Interestingly such a motives based approach has been followed also in contemporary development literature on civil violence, (Collier, P., *Wars, Guns and Votes*, pp.132-133).

²²¹ Greif, A., *Institutions...* (on Genoese conflicts as electoral competition); Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...* (on conflicts linked to several families' Byzantine commercial strategy).

than ‘why it happened’; chapter two aims to do just this.²²² Studying the web of links between the families – including their economic profiles and social relationships - will allow us to tackle the issue of the structure and logic of internal violence in the city of Genoa. This will be a first in the scholarship of Genoa in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Throughout the chapter I will explore the following: the role played by family relationships in the episodes of civil violence; whether political alliances were at the basis of economic relationships or vice versa; how a coalition was organised and reinforced; what made a coalition fail to maintain cohesiveness; and under what external circumstances individual families decided whether to join a fight or abandon it.

For the introductory analysis conducted in chapter one, I mostly relied on the Genoese chronicles and on a limited use of notarial agreements to untangle the hidden connections between warring families and to give some order to the phenomenon of conflict. In chapter two I exploit more fully the wealth of the Genoese records, which can also show quantitatively the nature and development of the relations between Genoese families.²²³ To do so I utilise descriptive network analysis to illustrate the connections between Genoese families, to show the boundaries of groups of associated families, to deepen our understanding of how these groups were structured, and to understand how the leadership within these groups was secured.²²⁴ As stated by Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘The concepts of “social capital” and “social network” have enjoyed increasing vogue’ in the last twenty-five years or so.²²⁵ Quentin Van Doosselaere, in his recent *Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa* applied the technique of social network analysis to medieval trading

²²² Contemporary approaches to conflict have begun to focus on the issue of the structure of conflict as well; moving away from their immediate motivations. For an example of this development see the 2000 article of Collier, P., ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’ and its 2008 development, Collier, P., ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War’; where the author states that ‘A key distinction among theories of civil war is between those that are built upon motivation and those that are built upon feasibilities...Our results substantiate the ‘feasibility hypothesis’ that where civil war is feasible it will occur without reference to motivation’, p.2.

²²³ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements...*, p.3; for an assessment on how the Genoese sources have been analysed, quantitatively, in the past.

²²⁴ Borgatti, S. P., *Ucine* (Harvard, 2002).

²²⁵ Ogilvie, S., ‘Social Capital, Networks and History’, *University of Cambridge, mimeo, June 2005*.

agreements in order to reconstruct the long-term evolution of Genoese social dynamics.²²⁶

The value of this study for the present research is limited by the fact that the author is concerned with the analysis of Genoese participation in long distance trade as a whole. Individual families are not considered separately, nor is the issue of internal violence addressed.²²⁷ The work of John Padgett and Christopher Ansell on what made possible the rise of the Medici party in Florence, on the other hand, fruitfully integrated the use of network analysis with convincing qualitative evaluations of the emerging links.²²⁸ Therefore, I decided that in order to untangle the phenomenon of conflict, the cluster maps I constructed had to be analysed in the light of the individual families' economic and social profile which emerge from the surviving documents.²²⁹ I decided to use all the available evidence for the families considered in order to produce a macro picture of a large number of micro interactions. I needed to do this because it is precisely the differences among the Genoese families that I wanted to capture, rather than a confirmation of their similarities. Obviously, my analysis does not claim to be a universal representation of Genoese society, but when it comes to the warring families considered here and to the families composing the Genoese consular elite later, I aimed to provide as complete a picture as possible.

The cluster diagrams that, starting with chapter two, will form an essential part of this dissertation were obtained utilizing the information contained in all the surviving Genoese cartularies. I utilized only the information contained in the documents that recorded the transactions in which the Genoese families involved in episodes of civil violence had an active role. Therefore the cluster networks represent the connections between: a principal and an agent, two co-investors, a buyer and a seller, a lender and a debtor or the families of a bride

²²⁶ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements*..., pp.3-8.

²²⁷ Van Doosselaere takes into consideration only *commenda* agreements, a type of contract very pervasive in the city, but only for long distance commercial activities. Therefore a part of the economic picture of Genoa is missing altogether from his analysis.

²²⁸ Padgett, J., 'Robust Action ...'.

²²⁹ The difference of magnitude between the surviving evidence for Genoa in the twelfth century and Florence in the fifteenth, however, reduces the similarities between the methodology used by Padgett and mine.

and a groom; but – on the other hand - do not represent the connections created by the action of witnessing the drafting of an agreement. I omitted this typology of links because of the confusion they would have generated in the cluster diagrams. However, I do consider such information in the analysis of the activities and relationships of each individual family.

Each node in the cluster diagram represents one family that participated in episodes of civil conflict, or was connected to families that participated through the information contained in the cartularies - the families that participated actively in episodes of civil violence are circled in the diagrams. Each line represents the existence of such a connection. For the purpose of this dissertation each link represented in the diagrams carries the same value and it is bilateral. The numbers above the lines representing the links correspond to the total number of connections existing between the families connected by that line. The software *Ucinet* orders the nodes representing the families according to simple criteria of centrality: the families connected through more links are represented more centrally than the ones connected through fewer links.²³⁰ The cluster diagrams offer an immediate representation of the evolving effects of civil conflicts onto commercial relationships and vice-versa. Confronting the successive diagrams while reading commentaries associated to the period represented, the reader will be able to appreciate the fact that factions in Genoa were not immutable, but did evolve following the untangling of civil violence. The family profiles offer further comments on the significance of the particular position of the family within the diagrams by discussing the nature of the links represented. As well as observing the links existing between all the Genoese families that were involved in violent episodes, chapter two also explores the delicate issues of unaffiliated violence and of families switching sides. Thus, it provides an additional contribution to a literature that, as I have discussed in the introduction, has either been plagued by an oversimplifying approach to conflict that sees it as the confrontation of

²³⁰ Borgatti, S.P., *Ucinet*...

two well defined and age-old factions or has been deterred by its complexity from looking closely at the phenomenon of internal violence - '*insormontabile complessità*'.²³¹

The narrative of chapter one raised interesting questions relating to the issue of the mechanics of conflicts and how they unfolded. What typologies of links could, or could not, pave the way to a family's engagement in violent activities? Were there any links that could prevent this from happening? Did the economic strategies of the families involved correspond to the logic of conflict? In order to respond to these and other questions, I use the data available to reconstruct the economic profiles of all the families involved in episodes of violence, taking into consideration the typologies of investments that each family preferred, the destinations of investment, the role played by marriage agreements and other important information contained in the surviving records.²³² This operation shows that while analyses relying solely on synthetic methodologies such as game theory and network analyses have a role in helping in the formulation of useful research questions, they fail to include valuable, and necessary, information that would be fundamental to respond to these questions. The matching of the networks and the family profiles, instead, will allow me to draw several informed conclusions regarding the structures of the phenomenon of conflict in Genoa.

The Genoese economy in the twelfth century has attracted much attention from historians, as we saw in the introduction. It has long been debated when and how the conditions for a revitalisation of trade emerged; however, there is also general agreement on the fact that agriculture played, and was to play for a long time, the most important role in the Genoese economy. This was obviously reflected in the social organisation of its inhabitants, and as Van Doosselaere stresses: 'commercial ties did not appear suddenly and did not change Genoa's social organisations instantaneously'.²³³ Certainly there are several indications that commercial interests were slowly moving up in the perceptions of contemporaries. Indeed,

²³¹ De Negri, T., *Storia di Genova...*, p.45.

²³² Using the information overlooked by previous scholars regarding the locations where the contracts were recorded and the witnesses present, for instance, proves itself to be very valuable.

²³³ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements...*, p.46.

this is well illustrated by a 1157 oath as part of which the Genoese consuls swore to protect the city's trading interests.²³⁴ The families whose activities will be analysed in this chapter were largely members of the same city elite that controlled the highest offices of the commune.²³⁵ These families were protagonists involved in the expansion of Genoese long distance trade, but at the same time they did not consider long distance trade their only objective.²³⁶

Structure and chronology

Chapter one, following the development of civil violence in Genoa in the narrative of the Genoese chroniclers, showed how this phenomenon changed during the sixty years considered.




Figure 2.1 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa, measured by number of episodes and families involved

The figure above summarises how, although violence played a role throughout the period 1160-1220, its nature and level of intensity varied. For instance, most violent episodes

²³⁴ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, pp.24-25.

²³⁵ Discussed at length in chapter three.

²³⁶ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Agreements...*, pp.48-50; De Negri, T., *Storia di Genova...*, pp.120-161.

appeared to be concentrated in the 1160s and in the 1180s-1190s. Other periods, such as the 1170s and the 1200s, were relatively peaceful. I divided chapter one, given its reliance on the work of the Genoese annalists Caffaro, Oberto Cancelliere, Ottobono Scriba, and Ogerio Pane, into four parts corresponding to their chronicles. However, the structure of chapter two is necessarily much more complex and therefore has more divisions. Following the findings in chapter one, illustrating how different periods corresponded to several patterns of civil violence, I have divided the sixty years considered into five sub-periods:

- I) **1160s:** Conflict between individual families; political homicides and first instances of conflicts between groups of families that will later define the 1180s-1190s factional structure of the city.
- II) **1170s:** Suspension of factional violence; some episodes of conflict between friendly families.
- III) **1180-1194:** Development of factional structures; escalation into civil war; political division; institutional reform; opposition to change.
- IV) **1195-1209:** Near suspension of factional violence possibly due to the exhaustion and loss of legitimacy of fifteen-years of conflict; low intensity tensions among families discontented by the post 1194 state of affairs.
- V) **1210s:** Recurrence of conflict; dissolution of previous factional structures behind internal violence; return to less organised violent episodes; emergence of new violent actors.

This subdivision allows for the clearest analysis possible of the developing phenomenon of civil conflict in Genoa and for proper exposition of the vast data available. This division should not, however, be considered a rigid one. For instance, when it came to the networks representing the relationships among families, I necessarily had to follow the particular distribution of the sources available. The largest bodies of surviving data – forming the bulk of the information represented in the networks – were collected in specific years by the Genoese notaries. Therefore (on the following pages) Figure 2.2 relies on the Cartulary of

Giovanni Scriba (1154-1164), which covers period I; Figure 2.3 on Oberto da Mercato (1186, 1190) and Guglielmo Cassinese (1190-1192), which cover period III; and the networks representing the links between the families involved in episodes of civil violence in the 1200s-1210s on Giovanni di Guiberto (1200-1211) and Lanfranco Scriba (1202-1226), for periods IV and V.

Each period will be analysed in the following manner:

- a) Introductory tables will summarise the violent episodes of the period and their protagonists.
- b) Social networks – when the surviving data allow me to do so - will provide an overview of the relations between the families involved.
- c) Mostly following the chronology of the events, I will introduce the economic and social profiles of each one of the families involved to deepen our understanding of the links illustrated in the networks.
- d) A conclusion to each period will illustrate what can be learnt from the individual periods regarding how families acted and how conflicts unfolded.

PERIOD ONE – 1160s

1160s (Conflict between individual families; political homicides and first instances of conflicts between groups of families that will later define the 1180s-1190s factional structure of the city).

Figure 2.2 below summarises the number of violent episodes that took place in Genoa during the 1160s. Their protagonists are shown in Table 2.1.




Figure 2.2 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period one

Year	Side A	Side B	Undefined Side/Casualties
1162	Piccamiglio	Usodimare	
1164	Castello	Avvocato	Guercio, Usodimare
	Volta		
1166			Scoto, Baraterio, Sigismondo
	Guercio, Galeta		
1168	Bertfolio	Cendato	
1169	Castello, Volta	Avvocato	

Table 2.1

involved in

Families

episodes of

civil conflicts in Genoa in period one

An overview of the 1160s

The documents collected in the notarial records of Giovanni Scriba (1154-1164), the earliest of the surviving Genoese notaries, in large part immediately precede the first occurrences of internal violence in Genoa.²³⁸ As such they offer an exceptional insight into the economic activities and the economic and social relationships of the individuals and families that took part in these early incidents of civil conflict. The *imbreviature* recorded by Giovanni Scriba can be used to offer a visual representation of the connections, or lack thereof, between the individuals and families under consideration, thus helping to make some initial observations regarding the phenomenon of civil violence.

Commentary on the cluster map for the first period

Utilising the social network analysis program *Ucinet*, I draw the cluster of connections of the families that were involved in the civil conflicts of the 1160s (circled within Figure 2.3 above). The network illustrated in Cluster Map One is a representation of the economic and social connections of nine of the thirteen families that, from the findings of chapter one, were involved in episodes of civil violence. The program *Ucinet* allows these connections to be drawn. Each one of the nodes represents a family, and each of the lines a transaction. The centrality of each family depends, in this representation, on the number of other families to which it was connected and not from the total number of links. In this analysis, repetition of transactions is not particularly relevant to the assessment of how closely families were connected. Often, the notaries cover short and concentrated periods of economic activities. Consequently, a lack of repetition in connections is usually the norm and does not mean necessarily that the links illustrated were one-off transactions, rather that the networks represented in this chapter are more of a snapshot of the activities of the Genoese families in a particular period than dynamic representations of the activities of these families.

²³⁸ *Giovanni Scriba*. Caffaro recorded the composition of the violent hostilities between the Piccamiglio and Usodimare families in 1160.

Observing Cluster Map One, it emerges that in the 1160s Genoese conflicts individuals connected directly by economic or social interests never fought each other. Also, importantly, pre-existent economic and social links determined whether a family would get involved in a conflict on the side of an economic associate although, of course, this factor alone was by no means a guarantee that that would have happened.²³⁹ It is important to notice that the family Avvocato is not directly connected to its rivals.

In the 1160s the lack of direct economic and social connections between families that opposed each other in conflict did not imply that these families could not have had connections with the same families, as long as these were not involved in conflict. As we shall see, this aspect of the structure of Genoese internal conflict was to change in the following decades. However, for the period 1154-1164 we can point out several families who formed indirect links between what were, or were to become, warring families. This was the case of Maloncello, Doria and Spinola, families that formed a bridge between the Avvocato family and the Volta, Castello and Guercio families, protagonists of the 1164-1169 conflicts. On the other hand the Usodimare family had no direct or indirect link to the Piccamiglio family, its opponent in 1160, and Cendato and Bertfolio, who fought in 1168 had no kind of connection with each other.

This finding is significant. First of all, the fact that even before the first mentions of episodes of civil violence there are no documented direct links between the families that fought each other confirms the potential validity of an analysis of conflict grounded on the economic and political structure of Genoa, since, while it is important to take into account Steven Epstein's advice not to suppose that all violent episodes 'resulted from high-minded differences', the evidence shows that the disputes recorded in the Genoese chronicles were not exclusively

²³⁹ It is clear from observing the cluster that the number of economic and social connections of rival families was much more elevated than the number of the families involved in episodes of civil violence.

‘over honour and status’. In truth, ‘prickly sensibilities found ample scope for offense.’²⁴⁰ At the very least, surviving evidence can be studied to evaluate the effects generated by pre-existing economic and social ties when delicate sensibilities felt hurt. Furthermore, as will become apparent in the analysis of later stages of conflict, an implication of this finding is that the episodes of civil violence that occurred in the city were plausibly only the most visible manifestation of a growing state of tension.

To further evaluate the information summarised in Cluster Map One it is necessary to consider the nature of the observable links and what these tell us about the economic and social strategies of the families. Building on these findings, the relationships of the families involved in conflict can be analysed in greater depth. In order to do so, I will now introduce each one of the families involved following roughly their order of appearance in the violent episodes illustrated in chapter one: 1162 – Usodimare, Piccamiglio; 1164 – Avvocato, Castello, Guercio, Volta; 1166 – Scoto, Baraterio, Iuscello, Sigismondo, Galeta; 1167 – Cendato, Bertfolio.

In 1162, the annalist Caffaro wrote of the efforts to appease the tensions between Piccamiglio and the sons of Oberto Usodimare.

USODIMARE

With the Usodimare family I start to build the economic and social profiles of the Genoese families. I must start this analysis recalling with a few words of warning. I discussed in the introduction above what has been previously said regarding the Genoese families that are going to be analysed in this dissertation and about what are the consequences of these

²⁴⁰ Interestingly it should be noticed that Epstein sustains his statements regarding the relative randomness of civil violence in Genoa by relying on examples of conflicts from Savona and rural Liguria describing later episodes of violence. The fundamental difference however is that these later episodes of violence survived in court records, which for the period of my study rarely survived in Genoa. I do not argue that all episodes of violence that must have occurred in Genoa happened because of ‘high-minded differences’, however I argued in chapter one that the violent episodes that found their ways into the communal chronicles were inherently political and had a logic that can be observed. (Epstein, S., *Genoa & the Genoese...*, p.109.) It should be underlined that in his cautious approach Epstein is very much in line with the position of Italian historiography on the phenomenon of early civil conflicts, as discussed in the introduction.

previous analyses for the understanding of conflict.²⁴¹ According to the nineteenth-century genealogical studies of Belgrano, the Usodimare family descended from the families Mari and Caramandino.²⁴² However, this reconstruction is not supported by any document and it is essentially based on weak nominal affinities between the families.²⁴³ As we shall see later in this dissertation, both the Mari and Caramandino families played a role in the Genoese civil conflicts. Therefore, if we rely solely on the traditional genealogical reconstructions of the Genoese families, we risk being misled in our interpretation of the episodes in which they were protagonists.²⁴⁴ Aware of this risk, we must rely on the actual evidence available.²⁴⁵ The notary Giovanni Scriba, for instance, recorded several traces of the families' activities. From these documents it appears that the family made use of the services of this notary almost exclusively to record marriage agreements.²⁴⁶ As a consequence all the documents relating to the Usodimare family are agreements involving at least two Usodimare family members. In relation to this point the reference of the annalist Caffaro to the participation in the war of the 'sons of Oberto Usodimare' assumes a clearer meaning since at least four sons of Oberto Usodimare emerge from the documents. Oberto supervised closely the marriage agreements of each of them. Therefore it is not a surprise that the conflict with the powerful Piccamiglio family was also seen by the annalist as a brothers' affair.²⁴⁷

From the point of the family's economic activities, these agreements contain little information and nothing can be inferred regarding the eventual economic preferences of the family. On the other hand, they do contain an indication about the family's wealth, since the monetary

²⁴¹ See the introduction and chapter three for an reappraisal of Belgrano's reconstructions.

²⁴² Belgrano, L., *Tavole*, tav. 25.

²⁴³ Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.19.

²⁴⁴ For the role of the Mari family see period three in this chapter, for the role of the Caramandino family see, chapters three and four. Similar risks are present for most of the eminent Genoese families. Accepting as a given fact the reconstructions of Belgrano and others, for instance, misled Day and Greif on a number of occasions as discussed already in the introduction.

²⁴⁵ As a consequence of the weaknesses of some of these genealogical reconstructions, I will only include the ones not properly supported by historical evidence in a footnote at the beginning of the relevant family profile.

²⁴⁶ The records of the activities of the family Usodimare contained in the *Carte of San Siro* are posterior to the period here considered and do not contain much information on eventual factional affiliations or economic preferences; however they indicate a proximity to the bishop of Genoa and that in a sense will be a common trait of most of the families that will become known and analyzed as members of the de Curia's faction.

²⁴⁷ See chapter three for the consular ranking of the family Piccamiglio.

values of the dowries and *antefacta* relative to the Usodimare's marriage agreements compare favourably with those of other families involved in civil conflicts. Giovanni Scriba recorded also the marriage agreement between the Piccamilio and de Volta families. The monetary value of this agreement was £200, identical to that of the Usodimare family, indicating that the families Usodimare and Piccamilio were able to muster similar resources at the time of their confrontation.

While the Usodimares' rival family, Piccamilio, was linked with the family de Volta, none of the marriage agreements discussed above linked the family Usodimare to other individuals involved in the Genoese conflicts. This particular factor can be seen in the overview illustrated by Cluster Map One, where the Usodimare node has no connections with the other families involved in episodes of civil violence. To a certain extent the Genoese chronicles compensate for this lack of information. Oberto Cancelliere recorded how in 1165 a galley commanded by Bonvassallo Usodimare and Guglielmo Pevere captured two Pisan galleys carrying ninety-two merchants and their goods on board, for an estimated value of £1200 in booty.²⁴⁸ This episode indicates that the Usodimare and Pevere families were close at the time of the Usodimare conflict with the Piccamilio family. Such a connection could offer a contribution to our analysis of conflicts because Pevere, as discussed, was connected to the family Avvocato, and it would become one of the main protagonists of internal violence in the 1180s-1190s.²⁴⁹ The connection between the families Usodimare and Pevere, together with the connection between the families Piccamilio and de Volta, which is going to be illustrated shortly, could plausibly indicate that the early tensions of 1162 already took place along the factional fracture that would start to become evident after 1164.²⁵⁰

This hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that the confrontation with the Piccamilio family was not the only episode of internal violence in which the Usodimare family took part. As noted in

²⁴⁸ *Annales*, Vol.I, p.170.

²⁴⁹ See below for the position of the Pevere family in the de Curia network.

²⁵⁰ However, it should be considered that a long time had actually passed.

the previous chapter, in 1164 Gandolfo Usodimare was among the casualties in the confrontation between Avvocato and Castello. Considering the evidence presented in the previous paragraph, therefore, it can be hypothesized that Gandolfo Usodimare fought and died on the side of Rolando Avvocato in 1164.

However, chapter one also illustrated that the Usodimares were not involved in any episode of civil violence in the following decades. This family therefore offers an interesting image of a transition from violence to peace.²⁵¹ The few surviving documents recording the later activities of the family help us to understand such a transition. In 1191 Drua, widow of Ugone Cane and sister of Oberto and Guglielmo Usodimare sold a parcel of land in Genoa to Ingone de Volta for £100.²⁵² This agreement indicates that by that crucial year for the Genoese conflicts, the Usodimare family's economic decisions were not influenced by factional considerations.²⁵³ The 1191 real estate transaction demonstrates that the Usodimare family's exclusive ties with one side only of the Genoese families involved in episodes of civil violence had been interrupted, therefore removing the main feature common to all the families involved in episodes of conflict.²⁵⁴ This changed state of affairs was mirrored by a disengagement from violent actions, a course of action that was typical of all the families that followed a pattern similar to the one of Usodimare. This will be illustrated further below.

PICCAMILIO

The enemy of the Usodimare family in 1162, the Piccamilio family, appeared connected to the family de Volta on Cluster Map One. From an economic point of view the analysis of the Piccamilio family activities indicates a predilection for long distance trade, with a focus on Egypt and the East.

²⁵¹ Even with one family member killed and apparently not avenged.

²⁵² *Cassinese*, docs. 852, 853.

²⁵³ For a synthesis of the dramatic intensity reached by conflicts in 1191 see above, p.38 For a consideration of the importance of real estate transactions in differentiating between friends and enemies see Wickham, C., *Land and Power...*, p.57.

²⁵⁴ Exclusive relations remained the one common feature of civil conflicts connected to factionalism during the period.

I would like to concentrate on two documents that well illustrate both this family's interests in the eastern trade and its connections with the de Volta family. In 1157 Oberto Piccamiglio received £12 as a sea loan from Marchese de Volta, to whom he promised to send back £16 from Alexandria, his final destination.²⁵⁵ This loan was secured by a mill owned by Oberto in Sturla's wife. In 1160 the same Oberto Piccamiglio gave Bongiovanni Malfigliastro £12 as a sea loan; the latter was to travel again to Alexandria on Oberto's ship and return 32 *bisanti*.²⁵⁶ This record illustrates not only a continuous commitment to trade in Egypt, but also the fact that the Piccamiglio family also conducted the trade with its own ships.

These agreements shed some light on the relationship between the families Piccamilio and de Volta. Such commercial connections were soon to be reinforced by linking the two families via marriage. In February 1163 Ingone de Volta promised Ardizzone Piccamilio that his son Guglielmo would marry Piccamiglio's daughter.²⁵⁷ Ardizzone, in return, promised that his daughter would marry Guglielmo.²⁵⁸ Later on, in August 1163, Guglielmo de Volta himself made the same promise. In each one of the documents it was stated that to break the engagement for any reason but death would have incurred a penalty of £300.²⁵⁹

In conclusion, the evidence linking the families Piccamilio and de Volta is substantial and therefore it could be argued that the 1162 conflict was probably a sign of a preceding state of tension that – starting in 1164 – erupted in a conflict involving several families that coalesced around the de Volta and Avvocato families. However, as with the family Usodimare, the Piccamilio family also did not get involved in any further episode of civil violence. In order to deepen our understanding of this development we must turn again to the later evidence for the family.

²⁵⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 180. The sum was to be sent back on the ship of Giovanni Stralleria, one of the partners of Volta.

²⁵⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 718.

²⁵⁷ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1027.

²⁵⁸ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1028.

²⁵⁹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1144. Furthermore the Piccamilio had already connected with a family of the de Volta group, the Burone, a few years earlier; in 1160 Guglielmo Burone declared, in the presence of Ingone de Volta, Giacomo de Volta and Giovanni Malfigliastro, that the dowry for his defunct daughter had been given back to him by Lanfranco Piccamiglio and his brothers. (*Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 790). The Burone family was essentially part of the Volta family.

From the documentation following the Piccamiglio's participation in civil violence it emerges that the family remained close to the de Volta family until the 1180s.²⁶⁰ One example will suffice to confirm this state of affairs. In 1186, when Carlo Livasco promised to pay Midania de Volta £40 for some pepper, Guglielmo Piccamilio committed to covering any loss that Midania might have incurred as a consequence of the agreement.²⁶¹ The fact that Lanfranco de Castello was among the witnesses to this agreement reinforces the feeling that the operation was internal to families close to the family de Volta.²⁶² All the same, the Piccamilio family dropped out of factional conflict after the 1160s and their ties with the families closer to the de Volta faction were also discontinued by the early 1190s.

First occurrences of conflicts between groups of families

In 1164 Oberto Cancelliere wrote of a great battle fought between Rolando Avvocato and Fulcone de Castello that left Gandolfo Usodimare, Baldovino Guercio and Sardo Avvocato prone on the ground, killed by arrows and stones. The importance of this episode, particularly in terms of its consequences, is immediately visible because it involved, for the first time, groups of families fighting, rather than individual families. Indeed, the episode stands out as the most significant event in shaping the factional construction that will be discussed later in this chapter. Cluster Map One provides an overview of the casualties on each side. I shall now explore in greater depth the nature of the links represented there.

A possible *casus belli*

Twelfth-century Genoese might indeed have had several reasons to start a fight, but it was the configuration of their relations that created the conditions for an escalation.²⁶³ However,

²⁶⁰ The evidence for this contained in the cartularies of Lanfranco Scriba and Giovanni Guiberto is also substantial. .

²⁶¹ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 76. Lanfranco de Castello acted as witness, strengthening the feeling that the Piccamiglio was close to the de Volta coalition.

²⁶² *Oberto 1186*, doc. 76. By 1186, as I demonstrate in this chapter, we could speak of a de Volta coalition.

²⁶³ Rigby, S., 'Historical Causation: Is One Thing More Important than Another?' *History*, 1995, pp.227-242.

exceptionally for the 1164 *durissimum prelium*, we might be able to uncover a specific underlying reason for the explosion of violence. In 1147 the inhabitants of Recco, a maritime settlement twenty kilometres east of Genoa, started to request of the commune of Genoa that they be allowed swear loyalty to Genoa and – therefore – be relieved from their feudal obligations towards Rolando Avvocato. In 1162 the consuls of Genoa ultimately bestowed upon the inhabitants of Recco this right.²⁶⁴ The consuls of Genoa for the year 1162 were two members of the de Volta family (Guglielmo Burone and Ingone de Volta) as well as Enrico Guercio, Oberto Grimaldo and Nuvelono. In the light of the findings of chapter one, and from what will emerge in chapter two, it is striking that the great majority of the consuls have been proven to be the opponents of the Avvocatos during the 1164 violent episodes (both Ingone de Volta and Enrico Guercio lost a son in the conflict that very year). It appears possible, therefore, that Rolando Avvocato attacked the members of the Genoese elite that were assembled waiting for the galley of *Iudex* Barisone to arrive from Sardinia. As will be discussed later in greater detail, the Genoese diplomatic efforts to control Sardinia were hardly a matter of factional strategy. Nevertheless, it appears clear from the sources that the consul Ingone de Volta was one of the masterminds behind the Genoese effort to have the emperor declare Barisone King of Sardinia – an attempt that, if successful, would have boosted the Genoese position in the constant struggle with Pisa for the control of the island. There are two possibilities, either Rolando Avvocato actually desired to thwart the Sardinian operation, or, more simply, decided to attack when all those by whom he had been offended were present. Either way, the impression that the explosion of violence was planned and did not simply erupt casually is reinforced by the fact that the head of the family led his men into battle himself when it was usually the younger generations that engaged in violent

²⁶⁴ CDG, docs. 172, 302.

episodes.²⁶⁵ Certainly another exceptional aspect of the 1164 conflict that may have played a role in transforming this event into a real cataclysm beginning the factional warfare in the city was the unprecedented number of casualties among the members of the Genoese elite (Rolando Avvocato also lost his son Sardo). Trevor Dean shows that civil conflict was not the automatic, irrational response of a kin group in the face of injury or threat, but a rationalised process, demonstrated by the fact that ‘kin could choose the vendettas they wished to pursue’.²⁶⁶ Be that as it may, the 1164 episodes left many deaths to be vindicated and issues of wounded honour and economic calculations became a powerful detonator for the beginning of actual factional conflict in Genoa.²⁶⁷ Having discussed a possible *casus belli* of the factional conflict, this chapter will now analyse the structures that fuelled the violence and shaped their development.

AVVOCATO

The Avvocato family was to play a central role in the unfolding of the internal conflicts of Genoa during the whole period covered by this thesis.²⁶⁸ According to the traditional genealogical reconstruction of Belgrano, the Avvocato traced its origins back to the viscount clans that ruled over Genoa in the Carolingian period.²⁶⁹ Whether or not this was true, it is certain that the family derived its name, and its status, from the fact that its ancestor Lanfranco *advocatus* and his family acted as lawyers for the Genoese Archbishop in the eleventh century.²⁷⁰ When I describe the structure that held together the group of families that fought alongside Avvocato in the following decades, I will show how this family shared

²⁶⁵ Zorzi stresses that a confrontation between factions was often far from irrational, and ‘could come about after long tactical planning’, (Zorzi, A., ‘La cultura della vendetta’, p.139.) Specifically on the Genoese case, Hughes argues convincingly that Genoese families ‘behaved as a hierarchical unit’, Hughes, D.O., ‘Urban Growth...’, p.10.

²⁶⁶ Dean, T., ‘Marriage and Vendetta...’, p.10.

²⁶⁷ On the legitimacy of pursuing revenge for fallen relatives, see Zorzi, A., *Magnati e popolani*, pp.94-98.

²⁶⁸ See period three for the evidence that the family Avvocato was the driving force behind the construction of the de Curia’s faction.

²⁶⁹ See a discussion on these aspects in the introduction.

²⁷⁰ Petti Balbi, G., *I Visconti*, p. 55; Belgrano, L., *Le Tavole*, tav. 19-22.

genuine common ancestors with Turca and Pevero. I will also demonstrate that although the three families were separate by the 1160s, these longstanding links were to play a fundamental role from an economic and military perspective. However, at this stage I simply wish to stress the fact that the Avvocato family wealth, as a consequence of its origins, largely depended on the properties given, or leased, to its members by the Genoese Church.²⁷¹ Further traces of the economic activities of the family for the 1150s-1160s survive in three documents recorded in the Cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. In all of them Rolando Avvocato – the protagonist of the 1164-1169 conflict - acted jointly with his son Sardo who was killed in 1164. The documents record a real estate transaction and a loan.²⁷² In August 1160 Rolando Avvocato and his son Sardo sold to Ansaldo Doria and Guglielmo Malocello 492 *tabule* of land in Genoa for £783.²⁷³ In 1163 Rolando Avvocato received from Lanfranco Pevero £500 as a short term loan to be paid back in a month.²⁷⁴ This handful of records are of great interest for a variety of reasons: they demonstrate the extreme wealth and access to liquidity the Avvocato family had (sums as high as £500 or £783 very rarely figure in a Genoese agreement of the period); they underline the close connections between the Avvocato family and several of the most prominent Genoese families such as the Doria and the Pevero. In particular, the connection with the Pevero family was to be instrumental in the unfolding of civil conflicts. The wealth of details contained in the second document, furthermore, deepens our understanding of the variety of layers on which the links between Genoese families operated. The collateral offered by Avvocato to Pevero consisted in the immediate right of use, and eventual transfer of property, of the bakeries that the Avvocato family owned next to the houses of Pevero in Genoa. Moreover, further underlining the depth of the connections between these families, the guarantor of the debt - who swore that he would make sure that such agreements were respected - was Rolando's son Sardo. The economic integration

²⁷¹ *Le Carte del Monastero di San Siro*, doc.342.

²⁷² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 713. Lanfranco Pevero assisted the transaction as witness.

²⁷³ In a successive agreement Malocello donated his share of that property to Doria. (*Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 717.)

²⁷⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1033.

between the two families appears to be all but complete. Their properties were connected and they supported each other when liquidity was needed. The only issue that appeared to require a certain precaution was making sure that the next generation respected the commitments they eventually inherited, although, as was the case for Rolando and Sardo Avvocato, who died in the 1164 conflict, a son did not always survive a father.

From the evidence found in the surviving documents it can be concluded that the wealth of the Avvocato family was primarily constituted by land. The family had access to large amounts of capital, but its members seemed to have chosen not to take an active part in the growing opportunities offered by long distance trade, preferring – it seems - to invest in economic activities in the city, such as the bakeries used as collaterals in 1163.

CASTELLO

Having analysed the economic activities of the Avvocato family up until the eruption of conflict in 1164, I will turn my attention to its opponent, Fulcone de Castello. Let us begin with the Genoese narratives: in the same year, 1164, the annalist wrote that Fulcone de Castello came to meet the *iudex* Barisone of Sardinia ‘on behalf of’ the Marquis Malaspina. So that we can understand Fulcone’s actions, it is necessary to briefly untangle the meaning of these words. The Marquis Malaspina was one of the most powerful lords who held political rights over parts of what was to become the territory of Genoa. Around the turn of the millennium the family of the Obertenghi, lords of Genoa in the tenth century, had split into four main families who built up their power in the eastern territory of Genoa and beyond.²⁷⁵

From the mid eleventh century to the thirteenth century the commune of Genoa deployed consistent resources to expand its control over Liguria by including local lords in its system of power.²⁷⁶ However, it is important to remember that this annexation process was never complete as ‘*communes* encountered strong resistance, and they often lost’; As late as the

²⁷⁵ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, pp.20-21; De Negri, T., *Storia di Genova...*, pp.1190-1193.

²⁷⁶ Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial Dynamics...*, p.38.

fifteenth century there were still large fiefs which were completely independent from, or even hostile to, Genoa. Those of the Malaspina family at the eastern end of the Riviera di Levante were perhaps the most obvious examples.²⁷⁷ The fact that on this particular occasion Fulcone de Castello seemed to have acted as an envoy for Malaspina offers an opportunity to suspend briefly my economic analysis and consider how the violent episodes of 1164 have been evaluated by Gerald Day, author of the most recent attempt to understand Genoese civil conflicts.²⁷⁸

Day claims that most episodes of Genoese factionalism were a consequence of power struggles involving an old-fashioned group fearing the radical changes brought about by communal policies. One piece of evidence for this that he provides is the fact that Lanfranco Pevere, who was later to be involved in the civil confrontations, served on one occasion as advocate for Malaspina, 'who was both the personification of the old ways and one of the great adversaries of the communal government'.²⁷⁹ Interestingly, Day does not mention the fact that, as we have seen in chapter one, the annalist is quite precise in communicating to the reader at least one of the allegiances of the fighting parties, stating that Fulcone de Castello came to the shore as envoy of Malaspina. Still, if we downplay the rigid division between expansionist and conservative families, Day is right when he states that '[i]n an effort to restore political and economic strength to the expansionist cause, Ingone de Volta became involved in 1164 in a scheme to place a puppet king on the throne of Sardinia'. In Day's representation, the 1164 battle, therefore, broke out between 'expansionists', represented by Fulcone de Castello, Ingone de Volta's son in law, and their 'conservative' opponents, represented by Rolando Avvocato – whose 'anti-della Volta feelings cannot be doubted'.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Heers, J., *Family Clans*..., p.231.

²⁷⁸ Later in this chapter I also consider how Day interprets an episode of internal conflict that took place in 1166. Together these two sections demonstrate on one hand the risks present in any attempt of interpreting the phenomenon of conflict in Genoa and on the other hand how necessary renewing such attempts is in order to deepen our understanding of a crucial period of Genoese history.

²⁷⁹ Day, G., *Genoa's response to Byzantium*, p. 94, (Giovanni Scriba, doc. 163).

²⁸⁰ Day, G., *Genoa's Response to Byzantium*, p. 96. This certainty is an example of another problem with Day's work. It reads history backwards. Because in later years the animosity between the families Avvocato and de Volta becomes clear,

The 1164 events, however, are a reminder of the fact that the reality was much more complex. The text shows that it was the ‘expansionist’ Fulcone de Castello who came as an envoy of the marquis of Malaspina, and not the supposedly ‘conservative’ Rolando Avvocato. What is left of Day’s claim of a confrontation between old and new ways playing out in Genoa is further diminished by another particular. Enrico Guercio, who fought and was killed in the 1164 battle, probably on the side of de Castello, had also acted as an envoy for Malaspina on several occasions. At the same time – as we shall see shortly and as is acknowledged by Day - he was a member of one of the Genoese noble families that took most advantage from the opportunities that Mediterranean trade presented to them. Both Fulcone de Castello and Enrico Guercio invested heavily in eastern trade and owned merchant galleys. But if we were to follow the rigid paradigm proposed by Day between expansionist and conservative economic and political strategies, in the 1164 confrontation they found themselves on the side of ‘the old ways’ of Malaspina.²⁸¹ While the conceptualisation of strategic behaviours of the Genoese factions is a problematic reconstruction for such an early stage of Genoese conflicts, I do agree with Day in his understanding of the violent episodes that saw Rolando Avvocato confronting Fulcone de Castello and Ingone de Volta. This episode effectively initiated a protracted period of factional violence in Genoa that unfolded according to the pre-existent links connecting the Genoese elite that are going to be studied in this chapter. The most crucial information in evaluating the eventual factional affiliations of the de Castello family comes from Oberto Cancelliere himself. He recorded how, pressed by the people of Genoa to swear a peace oath to interrupt the conflicts of 1164-1169, Fulcone de Castello stated that he could not do so without the consent of his father-in-law, Ingone de Volta. From this passage we know that, whatever other affiliations and connections Fulcone de Castello had at the time, what was considered as being of fundamental importance in relation to the issue of conflict

Day assumes that it was there all along. See chapter one for my consideration of the fact that quite possibly these two families had never confronted each other before.

²⁸¹ As we shall see in part two of this dissertation, a further issue with the work of Day is that Avner Greif heavily relied upon it; importing its weaknesses in his analysis. See introduction.

between him and Rolando Avvocato by the Genoese observers and by Fulcone himself was his affiliation with Ingone.

The documents preserved in the notary records of Giovanni Scriba show that the family and political connections between Fulcone de Castello and his father in law Ingone de Volta were very much economic in nature as well. Fulcone appeared in three documents. On two occasions Giovanni Scriba recorded the agreements regarding a loan of £500 made by Ingone de Volta to his son-in-law Fulcone de Castello.²⁸² On another occasion Fulcone received a loan - again for £500 – from a certain Bontommaso. Interestingly, while on the first occasion, uncharacteristically, no one acted as guarantor and no collaterals were offered, in the agreement between Fulcone and Bontommaso collaterals were given. Embriaco guaranteed for de Castello, while de Volta witnessed the whole transaction.²⁸³ The differences between these two loan agreements, formally identical, offer an insight into the value of family alliances from an economic point of view. Access to credit was clearly a lot simpler when one had powerful family connections. For one thing, this meant that one could receive a loan on the basis of family trust without the need for a guarantee, and on the other hand it meant that richer relatives were of fundamental importance in securing funds on a somewhat more impersonal market (Bontommaso was a large-scale Genoese lender).

Long distance trade too played an important role in the economic strategy of the family de Castello. Apart from the evidence so far considered, which records only the activities of Fulcone de Castello, the family's activities can be analysed in depth thanks to a total of sixty-five surviving documents. Importantly, on none of these agreements does a member of the de Castello family figure jointly with members of those families that were at the time connected with the family Avvocato. On thirty-six occasions a family member acted as witness, sometimes for members of the family Volta.²⁸⁴ While no other members of the family de

²⁸² *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 443-444.

²⁸³ For a profile of the family Embriaco see chapter three.

²⁸⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 193, 410, 674.

Castello received large loans from members of the family de Volta, as Fulcone de Castello did, on all four of the occasions in which other members of the family de Castello borrowed or lent money, they did so with the guarantee of a de Volta.²⁸⁵ Trade, as I had briefly anticipated, was an important component of the activities of the family, although only on two occasions, out of fifteen transactions recorded, did a member of the family de Castello trade directly with a member of the family de Volta.²⁸⁶ Instead the links between these two families appeared much stronger in the transactions involving donations to the Church.²⁸⁷ In conclusion, the family de Castello and Fulcone de Castello in particular had no links with its 1164 opponents, while the deep connections with the de Volta are very clear.

DE VOLTA

The actions of Fulcone de Castello during the 1160s were conditioned by his father-in-law, Ingone de Volta, who held significant influence over him. The Cartulary of Giovanni Scriba contains sixty-three agreements relative to the transactions of the family de Volta.

The family's marriage agreements with Spinola and Piccamiglio well illustrate the fact that the family was connected to the other members of the Genoese elite at the highest level.²⁸⁸ As was the case for the family de Castello, long distance trade was an important feature of the economic strategy of the family de Volta. Members of the family invested in Sicily and in the eastern Mediterranean, together with members of the families Mallone, Castello, Doria and Scoto among others.²⁸⁹ However, the surviving real estate transactions show that the family de Volta considered ownership of land as a central part of its economic strategy. All of the

²⁸⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 3, 4, 444, 709.

²⁸⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 238, 879.

²⁸⁷ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 51, 375.

²⁸⁸ Chapter three shows that, during the period considered in this thesis, the de Volta family is the one which obtained the Consulate most often.

²⁸⁹ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 96 (Mallone), 443 (Castello), 673 (Doria), 1276 (Scoto).

seven records relative to this sector see members of the family purchasing land.²⁹⁰ One document in particular gives us an idea of the landed wealth of the family. In 1157, Ingone de Volta sold to his sons Marchese and Guglielmo the properties that he owned in Sturla – a fertile valley just outside Genoa – for the exceptionally high sum of £1000.²⁹¹ Real estate transactions, naturally, also contain interesting information regarding the links of the family. For instance, it emerges from an 1158 document that the families de Volta, Embriaco, Doria and Burone, owned several adjoining houses in Genoa.²⁹² More interesting still from the point of view of future factional structure in Genoa is an 1157 rent agreement. It records that Guglielmo de Volta and Lanfranco Pevere rented Poncio and Pietro a farm - known as Gazerego – which they owned jointly.²⁹³ The agreement points to the existence of an important link in the 1150s between two families that will become opponents in later decades. More important still is the fact that in the 1160s Rosso de Volta was married to one of the daughters of Lanfranco Pevere.²⁹⁴ The significance of these links cannot be underestimated, their existence indicate that factions were not immemorial. Indeed, the factional division in Genoa that started in the 1160s and became all-encompassing from the 1180s, extended more widely as a consequence of the polarisation of the city elite following the first episodes of conflict. For much the same reason, it is important to underline that in 1160, Embrone received from Marchese de Volta £80 to finance his commercial expedition to Egypt.²⁹⁵ At the height of the Genoese civil conflict in the 1190s, the Embrone family was one of the leaders of the opponents of the de Volta faction by then established around the family de Curia. While it must be stressed that at the time of these records the families Pevere and Embrone had not yet been involved in any episode of civil violence, however it is important

²⁹⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 234, 277, 296, 309, 407, 476, 505.

²⁹¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 309.

²⁹² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 505.

²⁹³ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 296.

²⁹⁴ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 140.

²⁹⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 610.

to notice that the factional divisions that were to split the city in two distinct halves could not be explained by a supposed continuous competition between two opposing clans that had fought for the control of Genoa since the Carolingian period.

Before moving on to explore the profiles of the other families involved in Genoese conflicts, it is necessary to consider the activities of the Burone branch of the de Volta family, because of its political and economic significance. Guglielmo Burone, was consul of the commune in 1162, 1192 and 1194. He was the brother of Ingone de Volta.²⁹⁶ In terms of a factional analysis, the Burone family must therefore be considered part of the family de Volta. The fact that in the vast majority of the documents recording his activities Guglielmo Burono acted jointly with Rosso de Volta, Fulcone Castello and Oberto Spinola is a further indication of this.²⁹⁷ The interests of the family were predominantly commercial. For instance, on September 23 1186 Bufaro Sarago received £100 from Guglielmo Burono to invest in Syria. The witnesses of the transaction are Pietro Vento, Bonifacio de Volta and a certain Opizo. The act was recorded in the house of Bonifacio de Volta.²⁹⁸ On October 20 Ansaldo Sardena received £100 for the same purpose from Guglielmo Burono to trade in ‘any Sicilian port’. Again the act is registered in the house of Bonifacio de Volta.²⁹⁹ On November 10 Enrico Muso declares that he is going to trade in Sardinia with the capital of a society consisting of £18 of Guglielmo Burono’s money and £9 of his own. Once again, the document is prepared in the house of Bonifacio de Volta.³⁰⁰ During 1186, members of the Burono family acted as witnesses on five occasions. Each time the occasion was a commercial agreement and each time it took place in the house of de Volta.³⁰¹ Also in the later cartularies, from 1190 onwards, the activities and the connections of the family do not change. On the 2nd March 1190, a Mari

²⁹⁶ Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response*,..., p. 79; Byrne, ‘Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century’, *American Historical Review*, 25 (1919-1920), p. 198.

²⁹⁷ For a breakdown of the economic activities of Guglielmo Burono, see Bach, E., *La Cité de Genes*..., pp.109-111.

²⁹⁸ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 14.

²⁹⁹ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 169.

³⁰⁰ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 238.

³⁰¹ *Oberto 1186*, docs. 24, 152, 171, 188, 192.

and a Burono agreed on a real estate transaction.³⁰² On the 19th April 1190 Bufaro Sarago recognised having received £222 in accomendacio from Iacoba, wife of Guglielmo Burono, to invest in goods in Sicily.³⁰³ On the 17th and 18th August two further documents linking the family Burono with members of the de Volta faction were recorded in the house of Bonifacio de Volta. On the first occasion Guglielmo Burono acts as witness for an accomendacio between Oberto Spinola and Ingone di Frexia. On the second occasion Guglielmo Burono declared that he would advance £52 to Oberto Spinola, in case Guidone Spinola failed to repay him in the east.³⁰⁴ The political evidence relating to the activities of the Burono is scarce. No one from the Burono family is involved in any case of internal violence. However from the commercial records available, it is evident that the Burono branch of the de Volta family was aligned with the main branch of the family. It is important to bear these findings in mind, particularly in view of the later analyses proffered in chapters three and four. Ottobono Scriba recorded that Guglielmo Burono was consul once again in the years 1192 and 1194, years which were characterized as we shall see by a marked dominance of the de Volta faction over the institutions of the commune.

Having explored the economic and social profiles of the families whose collocation in the 1164 episodes of conflict was clearly stated by the annalist Ogerio Pane, I must now explore the links of the individuals who died in the conflict in order to assess how they had become involved in conflict.

³⁰² *Oberto 1190*, doc. 206. It should be remembered that by that date also the family Mari had taken part in the civil violence alongside de Volta.

³⁰³ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 404.

³⁰⁴ *Oberto 1190*, docs. 642, 647.

GUERCIO

The earliest factual evidence documenting the Guercio family's activities emerges in the mid twelfth century, again mostly from the Cartulary of Giovanni Scriba.³⁰⁵ There, traces of the activities of the family for the mid twelfth century survived in sixty-one *imbreviature*.

From these documents it appears that the family was deeply involved in long distance trade.³⁰⁶ On several occasions the family Guercio acted jointly with the families de Volta and Castello in matters of trade.³⁰⁷ For example in 1158, Marchese de Volta lent £100 to Enrico and Rubaldo Guercio, who were going to trade in Alexandria.³⁰⁸ The proximity with the families that we have seen as associated with the families de Volta and Castello also emerges from the transactions witnessed by members of the family Guercio.³⁰⁹ Such links were certainly important but far from exclusive. Furthermore, while a 1159 document records a marriage agreement between the families Embriaco and Guercio, no traces survive of potential family links between the families Guercio and de Volta or Castello.³¹⁰ Moreover, while it is true that this family had several connections with families that were political and economic partners of the de Volta family, they also had solid connections with the de Curia in the 1150s and early 1160s.³¹¹ The association is substantial both from the point of view of the

³⁰⁵ According to Belgrano this family too descended from noble Carolingian origins. The ancestor of the Guercio family was, according to this tradition, a certain Viscount Waraco, however the history of the family is obscure until the mid twelfth century when it figures on a large number of documents.

³⁰⁶ The deep family interests in the development of trade with the Byzantine Empire encourages Day to say that, 'Although the family did not try to exclude other businessmen from commerce with the Byzantines, their control became so complete that the Genoese twelfth-century trade with Byzantium might be considered to have been a family business'. Leaving aside for the moment Day's predilection for strong statements not always properly sustained by the evidence available (for instance in the same chapter Day states that 'From the very beginning the Guercii attached themselves to the powerful group of citizens headed by Ingo della Volta, who ruled twelfth-century Genoa like the Florentine de Medici of a later period'.), I largely agree with him in his analysis of the Guercio family as deeply involved in long distance trade and in having an important role in the diplomatic relations of Genoa with the Byzantine court. However, at this stage, I must focus on what information regarding the Guercio family's affiliations can be glean from the sources.

³⁰⁷ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 361, 466, 467, 974.

³⁰⁸ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 466-467.

³⁰⁹ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 3, 4 (Castello); 180, 718 (Piccamilio); 377, 631, 708, 739, 741 (de Volta).

³¹⁰ Giovanni Scriba, doc. 540.

³¹¹ Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, p. 121. But not with the family Avvocato.

importance of the agreements and from their number. In 1160, for instance, Adalardo de Curia lent to Guercio £200.³¹²

On the basis of these findings it appears that the Guercio family links observed in Cluster Map One were business relationships, but that these links were not exclusive. Perhaps, to help us understand what role Enrico Guercio had in the events of 1164 as they unfolded, the key information is contained in a document of 1164 recording that a Guercio family member acted as an envoy for marquis Malaspina.³¹³ Considering that the annalist states clearly that Fulcone de Castello came to meet the *iudex* Barisone on behalf of Malaspina in that year, it seems plausible that Guercio was there for very much the same reason. As we have seen for the Castello family, the high level of commercialisation of the economic activities of a large Genoese family should not make us forget that the communal aristocracy was still connected to the major lords of the Genoese territory. These elements could point to the conclusion that the Guercio family took part in the violent confrontation of 1164 because of its allegiances to Malaspina (and therefore, and only under those circumstances, Castello), not because it was a strong political ally of the de Volta - Castello faction. Indeed, the Guercio family was to continue playing a fundamental role in later Genoese political events but, significantly – given its links with families that were going to become affiliated with both factions - it was not involved in later episodes of civil violence. The Guercios' involvement in the Genoese conflicts of the 1160s demonstrated how a rigid factional system that divides the fighting parties into two sides, while certainly a useful tool, must allow for the inclusion of outliers. Furthermore, despite these outliers taking part in episodes of civil violence on the side of one of the factions, they cannot be considered part of them. The Guercio family acted on its own behalf.

In 1166, the Guercios were involved in another episode that could be ascribed to the tensions present in the city at the time. Baldovino Guercio, a brother of the deceased Enrico, was

³¹² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 666.

³¹³ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1254.

captured by Pisan forces because of infighting in the Genoese fleet he was leading in pursuit of the Pisans in the Western Mediterranean. On that occasion Baldovino Guercio and Guglielmo Galleta were taken as prisoners by the Pisans because several of the six galleys - theoretically under Baldovino's command - did not join the battle. Day analyses this episode in his *Genoa's Response to Byzantium*. Consequently, it is appropriate for me to return to his work and uncover some further problems with previous interpretations of Genoese conflicts. Day claims that during the 1166 events, 'one of the six galleys under Guercio's command had been unwisely placed in charge of Guglielmo Galleta, a political opponent of Baldovino's'. However, he does not produce any evidence of this supposed opposition. Day goes on 'after an unsuccessful search, Guercio anchored his ships in Corsica to rest the crews. There a squabble broke out between the two factions, perhaps occasioned by [Galleta] dissatisfaction with his subordination to Guercio'. In fact, the chronicles simply state that the fleet stopped in Corsica;; no squabbles are reported. The real problem, however, is that the hypothesis of Galleta's jealousy over having been surpassed in the chain of command by Baldovino Guercio is not only excessively creative but simply anachronistic, since the commune probably had very little authority in deciding who commanded which galley (plenty of evidence demonstrates that, as late as 1481, preparing and leading a Genoese galley into battle was very much a private affair and generally speaking the family paying for arming a galley was also the one choosing who led it), it is unlikely that such a decision had originated any jealousies.³¹⁴ Day completes his analysis by saying that: 'After order had been restored, the force set sail and was soon intercepted by a Pisan flotilla. In the ensuing battle, the Genoese fought...but neither Guercio nor Galleta were willing to come to the aid of the other, and the Pisans were able to capture both of them and their ships'. In reality - correctly translated - the annals record that 'Guercio and Galleta fought, but were not supported by the other galleys and therefore were captured after having almost dispersed the enemy'. And, leaving aside the

³¹⁴ Heers, J., *Family Clans...*, p.103.

embellishments by Day, it is striking to note that the scholar did not use the notarial documents available to explore the connections between Galleta and Guercio and support or refute his hypothesis. Twenty-one documents record the activities of the family Galleta for the 1150s-1160s. On eighteen occasions a Galleta acted as witness, eight times for a de Volta and five for a Guercio.³¹⁵ On one occasion Galleta purchased some land, and on two further occasions a member of the family acted as a commercial agent, once receiving goods on behalf of de Volta by Capra and once receiving £12 to trade by Idone Gontardo, his father in law.³¹⁶ Again, Day's analysis is undermined by a partial analysis of the evidence. What would have emerged considering the documentation available is that, in reality, these families were not political opponents and were on the contrary very much connected, not just from an economic point of view but also by family ties. This makes perfect sense since they did not fight each other, but were in fact abandoned together by other, unfortunately anonymous, Genoese commanders. We must not think that no sense can be made out of these events, but still, it is not sufficient for an interpretation to merely 'make sense' if it is based on a selective analysis of the sources available.

The episodes of conflict in Genoa between 1164 and 1169 which I have discussed so far were the ones perceived by contemporaries as having had the most serious repercussions on the Genoese internal order. I have now conducted the necessary analysis to understand how those episodes unfolded. I shall now consider those other violent episodes, which the chronicles described in a markedly less informative manner, while claiming that they too were connected to the tensions and violence of 1164. As noted in chapter one, describing these episodes of civil violence, the chronicles drily recorded the names of the individuals killed. However, while it is certainly difficult to uncover the web of connections of these individuals, by the end of this section our comprehension of the phenomenon of conflict will be enhanced by a

³¹⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. (Volta) 214, 261, 267, 270, 298, 673, 738, 924; (Guercio) 298, 512, 585, 586, 1133.

³¹⁶ Respectively, *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1300, 519, 384. Interestingly Idone Gontardo had married a daughter of Idone Guercio, niece of Baldovino Guercio.

deeper understanding of the circumstances under which less prominent Genoese families supported the military efforts of the families of the Genoese elites when these were involved in internal conflicts.

In 1166 Oberto Cancelliere simply mentioned the fact that four men, Scoto, Baraterio, Iuscello and Sigismondo, fell victim to the conflicts that spread in the city ‘like the flames of a big fire’.³¹⁷ Unfortunately, the author did not add any information to this simple list – not even the first names of the victims. However, once again turning to the evidence allows us to go some way towards disentangling this complex situation. Researching the complete surviving documentation, it was not possible to determine whether Iuscello and Sigismondo should be considered as family names or simply as individuals.³¹⁸ On the other hand, notarial evidence survives for the families Scoto and Baraterio and therefore I restrict my analysis to these two families.

SCOTO

Scoto – the only one of these families that was going to be involved again in episodes of internal violence - was most probably targeted because of its connections with the family group de Volta-Castello.³¹⁹ The activities of the Scoto family are recorded in six documents contained in the Cartulary of Giovanni Scriba.³²⁰ The most important evidence connecting the Scoto family with the de Volta family is contained in a 1164 document recording that Ugo Scoto was to invest in Alexandria £100 belonging to the sons of the deceased Guglielmo de Volta.³²¹ On five further occasions, in the period 1160-1162, members of the Scoto family

³¹⁷ *Annales*, Vol.I, p.34.

³¹⁸ In chapter three I analyse the profile of the family Muscola; whose male members were very often called Sigismondo, so the murdered Sigismondo might have been a member of that family.

³¹⁹ See also the connections with Guercio; Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...*, p. 122.

³²⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 607, 642, 876, 1136, 1150, 1276.

³²¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1276.

acted as witnesses.³²² They never did so for families close to those that sided with Avvocato in the 1164-1169 conflict, but on three occasions they did for families – Guercio and Piccamiglio – that can be considered close to the group de Volta-Castello.³²³ Considering the available documentation it is extremely plausible that the Scoto family member that was killed in 1166 had been fighting on the side of de Volta-Castello.³²⁴

BARATERIO

In the 1150s and 1160s, on five occasions Baraterio family members acted as witnesses for agreements drafted by Giovanni Scriba.³²⁵ On two of these occasions these agreements involved the families de Curia and Usodimare, which can be considered close to the group of families that coalesced around Avvocato (referred to – later - as *illi de Curia*) in opposing the ones coalescing around de Volta-Castello.³²⁶ This impression is strengthened by the only document recording an active role of the Baraterio – receiving a payment in 1163. On this occasion Baraterio's partners were Usodimare and Zerbino.³²⁷ From the aforementioned evidence it appears that the Baraterio who fell victim to an episode of internal violence in Genoa in 1166 must have been targeted because of his proximity with the Avvocato/de Curia group, and therefore on the opposite side to Scoto. However, unlike Scoto, Baraterio never again took part in such episodes. We do not know why this was the case. But we do know that by 1190 – in the midst of some of the most violent episodes - the Baraterio family was external to factional dynamics to the extent that one of its members acted as a witness for an agreement between Castello, Spinola and de Volta, recorded in the house of the latter.

³²² Giovanni Scriba, docs. 607, 642, 876, 1136, 1150.

³²³ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 607 (Piccamiglio), 642, 1136 (Guercio).

³²⁴ The family Scoto was to be involved again in episodes of civil conflict as part of what can be by then called a de Volta faction.

³²⁵ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 84, 735, 1026, 1037, 1084.

³²⁶ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 84, 735.

³²⁷ The first direct evidence of the typology of activities of the family is however dated 1186, when a Baraterio bought fustian from a Milanese merchant for £116. *Oberto 1186*, doc. 218.

Conversely, Scoto as I will illustrate later in this chapter – became even more involved in such dynamics.³²⁸

CENDATO, BERTFOLIO

As was the case in 1166, the annals' description of the conflicts that took place in 1167 is plagued by a lack of detail. We simply know that, in that year, 'Cendato' and his followers met 'Bertfolio' and his followers on the city streets. A fight ensued and both were fatally wounded.³²⁹ The only record of the activities of the Cendato family for this period is contained in an 1157 document which records the brothers Guglielmo and Giovanni Cendato selling Ribaldo Sarafia all the properties they own in Rapallo for £4.³³⁰ The document, while it is not useful to place the Cendato family within the framework of Genoese conflict, contains limited information regarding the status of the family. The sum of £4 was not particularly large for a real estate transaction, indicating that the aforementioned properties were not very large or valuable. However, we also know that the family did not visibly take advantage of the opportunities for long distance trade.³³¹ The surviving records of the family Bertfolio are more substantial: its activities are recorded on six documents contained in the Cartulary of Giovanni Scriba.³³² From these agreements it emerges that Bertfolio's principal economic activity was to act as travelling agent for the overseas investments of the de Volta family. The activities of Nicola Bertfolio well illustrate this focus of the Bertfolio's economic activities. In 1156 Ingone de Volta and Nicola Bertfolio formed a partnership in which Ingone gave Nicola £200 and the latter added £100 and took the capital to trade in Antalya.³³³ In

³²⁸ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 655.

³²⁹ *Annales*, vol.II, p.207.

³³⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 167.

³³¹ A trait that, as we shall see later on in this chapter, it shared with most of the families of the de Curia faction.

³³² *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 127, 267, 270, 1061, 1262, 1298.

³³³ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 127.

1157 we again see Nicola travelling with a sum of £14 invested by Marchese de Volta.³³⁴

Nicola was carrying this sum on top of a much larger sum of £269 that he was to invest on behalf of Marchese's father, Ingone de Volta.³³⁵ Therefore, it is highly probable that the street fight between Cendato and Bertfolio was part of the ongoing violence originated by the *bellum* of 1164. Although we cannot show it, it is quite likely that Cendato were on the side of Avvocato.

In the light of these findings, the 1166-1167 episodes assume a more important role in the analysis of the conflict dynamics of Genoa than scholars have assumed so far. Up until this point, what we have seen was essentially a violent confrontation between two eminent Genoese families, Avvocato and Castello, spreading to families connected by marriage ties, such as de Volta. Now we can see that economic affiliations were enough for families to be a part of these civil confrontations, or at the very least to be targeted on the city streets as an involved party.³³⁶ The involvement of the families Scoto and Bertfolio in violent episodes demonstrate once more that commercial relationships played an important role in the recruitment effort necessary to sustain an engagement in violent behaviour, and in particular reinforced the marriage links.

As has been discussed in chapter one, the Scoto family was to play an important role in later occurrences of civil violence; on the contrary the family Bertfolio was not involved in such episodes again during the period considered by this dissertation. This difference is partially reflected in the families' successive economic activities. In 1186 Rubaldo Bertfolio completed the purchase of a property outside Genoa for £300 and of a plot of land in the city for £35.³³⁷

In 1190, Adalasia, widow of Primo Bertfolio, donated one tabula of land to the church of

³³⁴ Giovanni Scriba, doc. 267.

³³⁵ Giovanni Scriba, doc. 270.

³³⁶ Indeed, whether Cendato or Bertfolio attacked is not relevant since the attacked party was able to effectively defend itself, as demonstrated by the fact that both sides had casualties.

³³⁷ Oberto 1186, doc. 275.

Santa Maria de Vesallo.³³⁸ In comparison to earlier documentation, one development is most evident. Namely, that these agreements were the first documented ones concluded by the family that saw it involved in real estate transactions as opposed to long distance trade ones. While the family did not abandon trade altogether, for in April 1190 Rubaldo Bertfolio travelled to Sicily carrying £87 for a certain Bufaro,³³⁹ it appears that the Bertfolio family had acquired sufficient wealth in its activities as a long distance trade agent for larger Genoese families to be able to invest in relatively large properties. It is important for our analysis of the structure of conflict that by the 1180s the Bertfolio family did not depend on de Volta's commissions as much as in 1150s and 1160s. This diversification in the family's economic activities, as well as a newly acquired independence from its most important principal, seems to have meant that the family was more likely than the Scoto family to avoid further violent episodes involving the group of families coalescing around the de Volta. As will be shown later in the thesis, the Scoto family's economic strategy appears to have been unchanged for the whole period under consideration.

Period One Conclusions - and an evaluation of the effects of family group interconnections

Generally speaking, the violent episodes that were recorded in the Genoese chronicles involved some of the major families of the Genoese ruling elite. A number of minor actors were later brought into the picture in a way that appeared at first sight casual. However, it has now been shown that when apparently random events entered the *Annales*, this did not depend exclusively on the memory of the annalist. Nor was it purely down to chance. The clashes involving less important Genoese families were recorded when they were clearly perceived as being part of the confrontations between Genoese elites. This happened essentially when Genoese families – such as Scoto, Baraterio, Bertfolio and Cendato - joined more powerful

³³⁸ Oberto 1190, doc. 183.

³³⁹ Oberto 1190, doc. 365.

ones in their conflicts. The pattern, again, was not casual; these families were connected in several ways prior to taking part in the episodes of internal violence.

Once we took into consideration the 1166-1167 episodes, it was shown how the main protagonists of violent episodes – Usodimare, Piccamiglio, Avvocato, Castello, de Volta, Guercio, Galeta - were connected by family relationships, economic ties or both. Below, syntheses which type of link connected the different families involved in episodes of civil violence. From the data it emerges that nearly all of the families that took part in the 1160s episodes of civil violence were linked by business ties.³⁴⁰ Commercial ties alone, however, were not sufficient to ensure the participation of a family in future episodes of civil violence, starting in the 1180s, which could be considered a sign of participation in the factional structures that in those years were starting to define the city. For such a factional development, the building or reaffirming of a family relationship was also necessary. In the 1160s we have seen examples of de Volta's business partners (such as Bertfolio and Guercio) and relatives (such as Piccamiglio) that took part in episodes of civil conflict once, but were not involved at later stages. On the contrary when family relationships and business interests were strongly interlinked, as in both the cases of the Castello's (in the 1160s) and of the Scoto's (in a later period) relationships with the family de Volta, a further involvement in episodes of civil violence and a participation in the city's partition is the most frequent outcome. Given the individuals that were protagonists in the conflicts fought in Genoa in the 1160s, most of the evidence on factional structure so far collected is relative to the group of families that will be known in the successive periods as *illi de Volta*.³⁴¹ In the following sections of chapter two I will analyse how this factional structure was preserved and developed, and I will compare it to that of its opponents' group, that coalesced into what was to be known as *illi de Curia*.

³⁴⁰ This one necessary condition, however, was not a guarantee of military support, or else conflicts would have obviously involved many more of the families figuring on the Cluster Map One.

³⁴¹ The information collected for the second period will largely confirm these findings for this group of families while shedding light on the different organisational structure of the group of families that will be known as *illi de Curia*.

PERIOD TWO – 1170s

1170s (Suspension of factional violence due to exhaustion)

Chapter one recounted how in 1169, after a very elaborate ritual of pacification, the issue of civil conflict lost its prominence in the Genoese chronicles. As the figure below clearly illustrates, the 1170s were in fact the period, together with period four, with the fewest recorded episodes of civil violence.




Figure 2.4 Episodes of civil violence in period two, per number of episodes and number of families involved

Years	Side A	Side B
1178	Mazanello	Navarro
1179	Vento	Grillo

Table 2.2 Families involved in period two

In the 1160s, from the first mentions of tensions between Genoese families to the pacification of 1169, we saw a gradual increase in the complexity of conflicts from tensions, to fights between single families, to fights between groups of families. The violent episodes of the

1170s, on the other hand, can be catalogued just as ‘tension and violence between individual families’.

The reason for this is simple enough; the families involved in the 1170s episodes – with one significant exception - did not take part in further episodes of violence. In other words, the 1170s conflicts did not escalate in a manner similar to those of the 1160s. These episodes, therefore, should not be considered part of the larger confrontations played out in Genoa earlier and later. Ottobono Scriba, the annalist who recorded these episodes, does not offer any explanation or insight into the reasons behind such different outcomes. However, the evidence available has already been used in chapter one to untangle this puzzle.³⁴² Thanks to the surviving evidence I concluded that the families Mazanello and Navarro, and Grillo and Vento, both of whom fought each other in 1178-9, were solidly connected economically with each other, possibly at the time of the violent confrontation and certainly shortly thereafter. Consequently, these events were not part of the factional hostilities that started to form in the 1160s and were to gain a clear shape in the 1180s - 1190s. As discussed in chapter one, these were much more intense and carried more important consequences.

Period Two Conclusions

In conclusion, the 1170s marked a clear difference from both the earlier and later periods. In the 1160s all the families opposing each other in violent confrontations were linked to one another and violence escalated. The same, as we shall see in chapter two, happened in the 1180s and 1190s. However, in the 1170s we observe episodes of violence between families whose commercial links were not only strong, but nearly exclusive. Quite clearly we are faced with a different phenomenon. The commercial ties between these families quite possibly might have generated the tensions that then escalated in a violent confrontation but they also brought about an immediate resolution. In the light of these findings I must amend a

³⁴² The fact that Ottobono Scriba narrated both the episodes that took place in the 1170s and 1180s-1190s is important because it rules out the possibility that the changes in the contemporaries’ perception of conflict during those years was merely due to the stylistic choices of the writer.

hypothesis formulated from period one. Economic ties were clearly not a guarantee of peaceful relationships. However, they had an all-important role in the prevention of escalation and, therefore, in the repeated occurrences of factional violence. Two families that were connected by economic interests might have fought between themselves, but never found themselves on the opposite sides of a rather more dangerous type of violence involving larger groups of families. In other words, a confrontation between families that had economic connections could not easily escalate into such a divisive factional struggle.

The 1170s shed light on two further aspects of internal violence in Genoa. Firstly, it has been claimed, most recently by Avner Greif, that the Genoese factions originated in the very early days of Genoese history, and that from time to time they fought for control of the city. What the 1170s prove is that there was not such thing as well established historical Genoese factions. Rather, there was a state of factionalism. Families of the Genoese elite occasionally fought each other in the city. Under particular circumstances that will become clear by the end of the chapter, these violent episodes were immediately resolved with little consequence. On other occasions, they escalated. In the latter case, allies were needed to support prolonged, more violent and – as we shall see – more costly confrontations. Therefore, the family involved either formed the basis for a faction as in the case of *Avvocato*, *Castello* and *de Volta* conflicts in the 1160s; or joined an already existing one as we shall see for the families that took part in conflict episodes in the 1180s-1190s.

Secondly, the relative internal peace that characterised the 1170s can be considered the first evidence of an important aspect of civil violence. Internal violence was costly for the families involved and for the city as a whole. The failed pacification attempts of 1166 and the successful one of 1169 show that, when conflict came to be perceived as a real threat to the unity of the city, significant attempts were made to stop the fighting. As a consequence, the parties involved probably paid dearly in terms of wealth consumed and blood spilled, but also in terms of legitimacy lost. It is not a surprise, therefore, that periods characterised by intense violence such as the 1160s and 1190s were followed by periods of relative peace in the 1170s

and the 1200s. This is clear from what has emerged from the narrative reconstruction in chapter one and the findings in chapter two.

PERIOD THREE – 1180s-1194

1180s-1194 (Development of factional structures; escalation into civil war, political secession, institutional reform, opposition to change)




Figure 2.5 Episodes of civil violence in period three, per number of episodes and number of families involved

I discussed in chapter one how the violent events of the 1180s showed a marked change in chroniclers' perception of the phenomenon of civil violence in Genoa. Apart from the different sensitivities of Caffaro, Oberto Cancelliere and Ottobono Scriba, which are plausible, or perhaps the different preferences of the people to whom they were addressing their work, one real change in the dynamics of violence seems to have played a large role in such a change of tone. While the events of 1160-1169 were perceived by contemporaries as novel and troublesome episodes of violence and tensions between single Genoese families, the consensus was entirely different in the 1180s-1190s. Violent incidents were clearly recognised by contemporary observers as largely rotating around a much more dangerous –

for the survival of the commune - struggle between groups of eminent Genoese families.³⁴³

Moreover, the typologies of violent episodes that happened in Genoa varied considerably. Generic references were made to tensions and casualties leaving the stage to a more organised, and ultimately destructive, type of conflict. Thanks to those references and to a brief analysis of the documents available for each family, chapter one gave some order of the occurrences of conflict.

Year	Side A	Side B
1180	Scoto	Porcello
1183	Castello, Vento	Bulbunoso, illi de Curia
1187	Mari	Turca
		Porcello, Lecavele
1188	Volta	
1189	Volta	Vento
1190	Castello	Pevere
1193	Ingo de Frexia (Volta's son)	
	Volta	Bulbunoso
	Volta, Grimaldo, Spinola	Bulbunoso, Curia
1194		Avvocato, Curia, Embrone

Table 2.3 Families involved in period three

From 1180 to the middle of the 1190s, nearly all the occurrences of violence that we observe in Genoa can be understood through the logic of escalating violence and the strengthening of factionalism. This section covers both decades, since the conflicts that took place in the city are best analysed as a full cycle of conflict, starting from isolated episodes, developing into factional violence and full scale warfare until its eventual resolution.³⁴⁴ The graphical representation of the connections linking the families involved in episodes of civil violence – presented in Cluster Map Two - shows a division of the Genoese economy, more marked than

³⁴³ Ottobono Scriba, was in fact the first Genoese annalist to refer openly to the existence of two fighting parties in Genoa. (*Annales*, vol.II, pp.19-30).

³⁴⁴ This extremely complex decade is also characterised by a deep reform of the commune, intertwined with the conflicts that took place; the political dimension of the reform will be the object of a careful analysis in chapter three.

the one represented in Cluster Map One. For these decades it does seem appropriate to speak of a Genoese factionalism - meaning the prolonged confrontation between two groups that became more established, in time, in order to mobilise the resources necessary to sustain a gradually intensifying conflict. The sources available for this period are largely concentrated in the period 1186-1192, a period that in chapter one was described as the height of conflict due to the intensity of the internal divisions in the city.³⁴⁵ The picture illustrated by Cluster Map Two is the representation of a profoundly divided society; in which the perimeters of the factions appear to be well defined.

³⁴⁵ *Oberto Scriba da Mercato 1186, Oberto Scriba da Mercato 1190 and Guglielmo Cassinese 1190-1192.*




Figure 2.6 Cluster Map Two representing the families involved in episodes of violence in period three.

The first families whose economic and social connections I analyse in greater depth in this section are those that, from the analysis conducted in chapter one, can be associated in a faction referred to as *illi de Volta*, from the name of the most eminent of its components. The families de Volta, Castello, Scoto and Mari can all be considered part of this group. All of these families – apart from the family Mari – were already involved at some level in the violence of the 1160s. This confirms the hypothesis that, after the pause in the 1170s, factional dynamics once again were at the basis of conflict in Genoa.

ILLI DE VOLTA

The table below offers a breakdown of the documents preserved in the notaries of Guglielmo Cassinese and Oberto Scriba da Mercato regarding the activities of these families.

	Castello	Scoto	Mari	Volta	Total
Real Estate	2	4	1	5	12
Finance	11	21	14	9	55
Trade	23	25	9	11	68
Dowries	1	2	0	1	4
Rights	2	0	1	2	5
Donations	1	0	0	0	1
Wills	5	2	0	0	7
Court	2	0	1	0	3
Testimones	38	17	20	17	92
Total	87	71	47	46	251

Table 2.4 Activities of the families associated with the faction de Volta

The breakdown clearly indicates that the majority of these families were characterised by a marked tendency to invest in finance and long distance trade.³⁴⁶ These findings are consistent with the economic preferences of the families de Volta, Castello and Scoto in the 1150s and 1160s, illustrated in the previous section. The importance of long distance trade for the coalition can be further analysed by building a network excluding long distance trade agreements. In such a network the position of the Mari family remains similar, connected to the Scoto, Castello and Volta families but not strongly, leaving the latter to form a core. However, interestingly, the core emerging from Cluster Map – de Volta Trade compared to the one emerging from Cluster Map Two is unchanged from a point of view of cohesiveness.

³⁴⁶ As discussed in the introduction such a focus is partly responsible for the fact that we have much more notarial information available on their activities compared to the ones surviving for the families that will be considered as associated in the faction called de Curia. The de Volta families appear in 251 documents contained in the Cartulary of Guglielmo Cassinese and Oberto Scriba, while the de Curia families appear in 28 documents.

The families are connected and link their networks of agents that remain fairly distinct. The fact that all but one of the families involved in episodes of internal violence in this period had already been involved in similar episodes in the 1160s prompts two reflections. Firstly, in period one the most obvious links forming the bases of what was to become a coalition in later periods was the one connecting Volta and Castello. Secondly, the family links between the families de Castello and de Volta – proven for the 1160s – were further reinforced in later decades, possibly in order to strengthen the military alliance that was by then well established. One example of this comes from 31 March 1191. We know that Bellobruno de Castello sold some of the land that he had received from Rosso de Volta as a dowry for his daughter to the Abbey of San Quirico.³⁴⁷ While the Scoto family was associated in the 1150s-1160s with the family de Volta only as a commercial agent, in the 1180s-1190s the links between Scoto and Volta were enhanced and it is telling that new links emerged also connecting the families Scoto and Castello directly with each other. Although these families might have become closer for other, unknown, reasons the participation in the violent episodes of the 1160s might well have strengthened the economic connections of the Scoto family with the families de Volta and Castello; they clearly at least did not prevent this development.

Unlike the Castello, de Volta and Scoto families, the Mari family participated in episodes of civil violence for the first time in 1187. From the networks Cluster Map Two and Cluster Map Three, it can be seen that the Mari clan was connected to the de Voltas and Scotos, although its links were less strong.

SPINOLA and GRIMALDO

Before proceeding on to the analysis of the second faction that can be identified in Genoa by the third period of conflict, I must take into consideration the links of two further powerful Genoese families in addition to those that coalesced in the de Volta faction. In chapter one I

³⁴⁷ *Cassinese*, docs. 399, 400.

described how in 1194 the annalist Ottobono Scriba described carefully the episodes of siege warfare that paralysed the city. In one of the most dramatic moments in the history of internal conflict in Genoa, the families of the de Volta faction attempted to demolish the tower of the Bulbunoso family. In order to attack it, they built a 'bulzone' - a flying bridge - onto the tower of Oberto Grimaldo and the new tower of Oberto Spinola to allow them to invade the top of the Bulbunoso's tower, which was severely damaged. However, the de Curia faction responded with the construction of several war machines with which they cast stones against the Grimaldo and Spinola fortifications. The de Volta reacted in the same way, deploying war machines and hurling stones at all the properties of the de Curia.³⁴⁸ I have discussed in chapter one how the interpretation of this crucial passage has been thwarted by a mistaken translation that had located the de Volta on one side and the de Curia, Bulbunoso, Grimaldo and Spinola on the opposite.³⁴⁹ Instead, those two families were allies of the de Volta and launched the attack to the de Curia from their towers. I decided to consider them separately because essentially – rigorously speaking – none of the members of the two families is described as directly involved in episodes of civil conflicts, nor did they suffer any casualties, nor did they take part in any peacemaking ceremony.

However, a translation that correctly locates the de Grimaldo and the de Spinola on the de Volta side is supported by the commercial documents and makes it possible to reinterpret these crucial events. In 1190 Oberto da Mercato mentions Oberto Spinola four times. All the documents were registered in the house of Bonifacio de Volta; in all these contracts de Volta and de Castello members appear as witnesses along with those of Spinola. The documents were all registered at the beginning of the summer of 1190 and they all refer to overseas commerce financing.³⁵⁰ The fact that the Spinola and Grimaldo families were closely connected is demonstrated in a series of documents from 1188 to 1192 concerning the joint

³⁴⁸ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.45.

³⁴⁹ 'In 1194...the della Volta...tried to demolish the tower of Bulbonoso and the towers of Spinola and Grimaldo', (Moresco, M., 'Note...' p. 223); 'The de Volta fought a proper war against the Spinola and Grimaldo'; (Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, p. 6).

³⁵⁰ *Oberto 1190*, docs. 528, 642, 647, 655.

foundation and donation to the archbishop of Genoa of the church of San Luca by Oberto Spinola and Oberto Grimaldo.³⁵¹

The links between the Spinola, de Volta and de Castello families were also evidenced in their marriage strategies. Ingone de Volta, the elder of his family that held the most consular positions, had two daughters - Sibilla and Adalaxia. Sibilla was married to Oberto Spinola, and Adalaxia to Fulcone Castello.³⁵² I have already discussed how the de Volta and Pevere families were linked through marriage in the 1160s. Not surprisingly, while the marriage alliance between de Volta and Pevere was not renewed in the following generation, the marriage alliances between Volta, Castello and Spinola were all confirmed in the next generations.

ILLI DE CURIA

The analysis of the network and the activities of the de Volta, Castello, Mari and Scoto families, as a somewhat unitary group, have proven valuable. I shall now utilise a similar framework to take into consideration the families Avvocato, Lecavele, Bulbunoso, Pevere and Turca that, as I have illustrated, can be hypothesised to have formed a group opposed to the Volta faction. I consider separately the Porcello family, who joined the Genoese civil conflicts on the side of Pevere.

	Lecavele	Avvocato	Bulbunoso	Pevere	Turca	Total
Real Estate	7	6	2	2	0	17
Finance	3	1	0	0	0	4
Trade	1	0	0	0	0	1
Dowries	1	0	0	1	0	2
Rights	0	1	0	0	0	1

³⁵¹ *Cassinese*, doc. 1492.

³⁵² *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 124, 125 for the marriage between Spinola and Volta; *Cassinese*, doc. 58 and *Annales*, Vol.I, p.218; for the marriage links between Castello and Volta.

Donations	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wills	0	0	0	0	0	0
Court	0	0	0	0	0	0
Witnesses	3	0	0	0	0	3
Total	15	8	2	3	0	28

Table 2.5 Activities of families associated with the faction de Curia

To start with, it is important to reiterate that there are no surviving traces of any kind of economic or social relationships between families in this group and families that are thought to have been part of the other coalition.

Although the number of documents available for the analysis of the relationship between these families is more scarce than the one available for the families connected in the de Voltas coalition, a picture of the activities and links of these families for the 1180s and 1190s does emerge. Essentially, there are two possible reasons for this: that these families engaged less in trade and financial activities and therefore left a smaller record; or that these families used different notaries. The evidence available is sufficient to rule out the second hypothesis (we will see that these families indeed used the available notaries for very delicate agreements). Therefore, it seems likely that the lesser data available is a product of the source bias in favour of trading agreements, as discussed in the introduction. The Table 2.5 above shows one evident difference from the general economic activities of the de Volta's families shown in Table 2.4; the group of families sometimes referred to in the *Annals* as *illi de Curia* focussed their economic interests almost exclusively on real estate transactions. This group of families was strongly linked to the land and their economic power base rested on their properties in the city and its territory. The control of land was a central feature of the social and economic characteristics of most of the families that composed the Genoese elite, as will become evident in chapter three. However, a clear difference emerges in the economic strategies employed by the two groups regarding the investment of the surplus generated by

their real estate transactions and rents on land. Only in one case out of the twenty-eight transactions recorded involving the families Avvocato, Pevere, Turca, Lecavele and Bulbunoso, can any member of the families belonging to the latter group be seen as directly involved in long distance trade. Furthermore, there is a point that well illustrates the general distance that they maintained from the commercial world - that is the fact that only in two cases did a member of these families act as a witness in a long distance trade agreement.³⁵³

³⁵³ *Cassinese*, docs. 35, 547.




Figure 2.8 Cluster Map Four: representing the connections of the families associated to de Curia

Another difference emerging from the comparison of the agreements of the two groups of families – Cluster Map Two and Cluster Map Four – is that for the families in the de Curia

faction, it was much rarer to deal with the same economic partner twice – excluding the connections among themselves. In the case of the de Volta faction families, each of the core families was also connected to other partners. While it is normal that, given the fewer documents available for the families de Curia compared to the families de Volta, their links are less dense, it should be emphasised that the links within families of the core of the faction de Curia are as strong as those between the families of the faction de Volta.³⁵⁴ Therefore, the families of the de Curia faction were essentially as strongly connected as their opponents in the de Volta's faction. The nature of such strong connections within the families forming the core of the de Curia network must be analysed with consideration of the mechanisms of their relationship – a relationship that was to have such important effects on the political panorama of Genoa. From Cluster Map Four it emerges that the families Avvocato, Pevero and Turca were strongly connected and that the families Avvocato and Lecavele had a particularly strong connection.

AVVOCATO, PEVERO, TURCA

The nineteenth-century genealogical reconstruction of Luigi Tommaso Belgrano are, for the families Avvocato, Pevero and Turca, better supported by the evidence surviving than some of those we considered earlier in the chapter. The earliest evidence available to reconstruct the lineage and connections of the families Turca, Pevero and Avvocato, is the one related to a certain Lanfranco *advocatus* in 1020.³⁵⁵ Lanfranco was the common ancestor of the three families. His sons Buonvassallo, Guglielmo Pevero and Lanfranco, who left traces of their activities from 1099, would in fact start three well-defined family groups.³⁵⁶ Turca, the son of

³⁵⁴ This is possible because, on average, the ties linking the families of the de Curia core are 4.5 time stronger than the ties linking them to all the other nodes in the network.

³⁵⁵ *Codice diplomatico del Monastero di Santo Stefano*, doc. 45. Probably the same Lanfrancus *avocatus* as that recorded in a 1039 document, *Le carte del monastero di San Siro*, doc. 38. According to Belgrano, L., *Tavole*, tav.19-22, and Petti Balbi, G., *I Visconti*, p. 55, this Lanfranco Avvocato is the son of Dodo, who was the son of a certain Guido reputed to be the ancestor of the family Caramandino. However, I could not find any actual evidence supporting these claims.

³⁵⁶ These *fili quondam Lanfranci*, together with their mother Alguda and uncle Dodo, donated to the monastery of San Siro several houses in Recco. (*Le carte del Monastero di San Siro*, doc. 66.)

Buonvassallo Avvocato, was no longer a lawyer and abandoned the patronymic derived from that profession – and funded the homonymous family. The sons of Guglielmo received as surnames the nickname of their father, Pevere. The descendants of the younger Lanfranco adopted the surname Avvocato.³⁵⁷ These individuals were therefore cousins, and they may well have seen themselves as a single family at the beginning of the period considered. However, by the early thirteenth century, the state of conflict was to affect greatly their connections. It is of considerable importance to our understanding of the phenomenon of conflict in the twelfth century that Lanfranco Pevere, the elder of his family and a consul in the 1160s, had two daughters who married Guglielmo Vento and Rosso de Volta.³⁵⁸ At the moment of the outbreak of violence between the families de Castello and Avvocato therefore, the family Pevere, which in period three, supported their Avvocato cousins, rather than the family of the brother-in-law Rosso de Volta. The decision must not have been an easy one, and it was probably taken on the bases of the more developed economic interests which the family had with Avvocato rather than de Volta. This is another demonstration that economics beats marriage as a basis for linkage. By the 1180s-1190s the families Avvocato, Pevere and Turca were distinct and separated. However, unsurprisingly, a strong connection persisted during these decades. In the contemporary notarile the families Avvocato, Pevere and Turca are referred to as *familiari*. These families maintained a common aim of strengthening their ties economically through marriages. This economic strategy is evident in two surviving dowry agreements linking the families Avvocato and Lecavele, in the presence of Pevere and Turca as witnesses, relatives and advisors. Furthermore, this marriage agreement provided a stimulus to economic activities, also involving the families Turca and Pevere.

³⁵⁷ The fact that Turca was the son of Buonvassallo Avvocato is recorded in an 1149 document. (*Il Registro della Curia*, p.86). Guglielmo, son of Lanfranco Avvocato, and Guglielmo Pevere are undoubtedly the same person. Around the middle of the twelfth century, Guglielmo Pevere presented to the archbishop of Genoa a rent contract recorded by Lanfranco Avvocato, this document is inserted in the archbishop's record with the title "*Libellus Lanfranci Avocati patris Guilielmi Piperis*": *Il Registro della Curia*, pp.307-309.

³⁵⁸ Cassinese, doc. 399; Oberto 1190, doc. 140.

BULBUNOSO

In chapter one I have already discussed all the documentary bases that allow us to conclude that the Bulbunoso family – which was involved in the fightings in 1183 and in 1194 - was also solidly linked to the families above.³⁵⁹

LECAVELE

The economic engagements of the Avvocato family with the Lecavele family are possibly the clearest surviving example of a conscious effort to build or maintain, as well as to strengthen, a coalition in Genoa. The objective of the Avvocato family (Giovanni Avvocato in particular) seemed to be the integration of the properties of two families that, as seen in chapter one, were allied in the conflicts that were taking place in Genoa. This hypothesis stems directly from a careful analysis of the documents recording the economic relations between the two families. In 1191 Avvocato sold Mabilia Lecavele half a storage place that he had received from the latter as part of the dowry of his future wife Adalaxia, the daughter of Mabilia. In a succeeding document he agreed to give Mabilia back the other half of the same storage place. Furthermore, on the occasion of the first agreement, Avvocato declared that he was selling half the warehouse for £60, although when he received it as part of the dowry the whole *statio* was valued at £760.³⁶⁰ The huge cut in price – it could be hypothesised – was due to the necessity of giving the impression that the dowry received was much higher than it was in reality.³⁶¹ Such a hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that Giovanni Avvocato later sold goods to Suzobono while Adalaxia, his wife, declared that everything she owned was in reality property of her husband.³⁶² Suzobono declared that he would give back all the goods he bought, under the condition that Giovanni paid him a sum of £525.³⁶³ Interestingly, Mabilia Lecavele, the mother of Adalaxia, had contracted a mortgage by Suzobono during the same

³⁵⁹ Furthermore, much of the siege warfare that split the city military in the period 1192-1194 had as a focal point the conquest of the tower of the Bulbunoso family by the forces of the de Volta faction. See chapter one.

³⁶⁰ Cassinese, docs. 796, 797, 798.

³⁶¹ Polonio, V., 'Condentirone l'un l'altro...', discusses the existence of such buy back agreements, p.36.

³⁶² Cassinese, doc. 1729.

³⁶³ Cassinese, doc. 1730.

year, which she used to pay part of the dowry of her daughter Mabilia to Giovanni Avvocato.³⁶⁴ This complex series of agreements shows how the purpose of the marriage between Adalaxia Lecavele and Giovanni Avvocato likely served to increase liquidity and to support the Lecavele family. This hypothesis is sustained by several elements: Giovanni Avvocato accepted from Mabilia Lecavele a dowry that was – in reality - simply a token; he bought real estate from the Lecavele family on an overpriced evaluation and sold it back for a lower sum; and finally, he sold to Suzobono - a creditor of his mother-in-law - several properties as collateral. Furthermore, Suzobono committed to giving back the properties of the Lecavele's family if Giovanni Avvocato paid a large sum on their behalf. These operations clearly had the function of keeping the patrimony of the family alive, allowing Mabilia Lecavele, the head of the family, to pay back her creditor Suzobono.

Of course the question remains why Giovanni Avvocato acted in this manner. We can speculate that he hoped to profit from the possibility of acquiring and exploiting the estate of the Lecavele family in the long run. This would have protected him from the economic risks involved in acting as a guarantor by marrying Adalaxia and having her declare that her patrimony belonged to him. It is evident, either way, that the Avvocato family could access large amounts of capital. However, the risks involved in such operations were concrete. For instance, we know that Giovanni Avvocato had to pledge his *introitus* of the gate of the city – i.e. tolls payable at it - in July 1191 in order to gain access to credit and was later forced to sell it in March 1192.³⁶⁵ Given the evidence available, however, I believe that a purely economic interpretation of the whole process of integration of the economies of the families Lecavele and Avvocato is not satisfactory. This operation is better understood by considering an important aspect of the scenario in which the families Avvocato and Lecavele operated; they were both involved in the escalating civil conflicts. The importance of such a situation can hardly be overestimated. It was indeed the homicide of Opizone Lecavele in 1187,

³⁶⁴Cassinese, docs. 824, 825, 826.

³⁶⁵Cassinese, docs. 798, 1731. On both occasions, in July 1191 and March 1192, the agreements are reached with the *consilium* of members of the families Turca and Pevero.

discussed in chapter one, that by making a widow of Mabilia and orphaning Adalaxia, created the conditions for the intense interactions between them and Giovanni Avvocato over the following years. In a similar way, it was plausibly the prolonged state of conflict that strained the resources of Giovanni Avvocato that forced him firstly to seek credit using his resources as collateral and secondly to sell them. This interpretation is supported by the fact that all the agreements between the Avvocato and Lecavele families that I have mentioned so far took place under the supervision of members of the faction and were approved by the other members of the faction.³⁶⁶ This not only confirms the strong interrelation of the economies of a faction, but also proves the importance of oversight by the various components of a faction of each other's operations even when they were not directly involved in the deals. The weakening of one of the families, the passage from one to another of significant patrimony, and – certainly - the support to a family whose head had been killed fighting for the group, was also a coalition issue, not just a family one.

Before moving onto an analysis of the role played by the Porcello family in the Genoese factional dynamics, I would like to emphasise a further aspect emerging from my analysis of the links between the families Avvocato, Turca, Pevere and Lecavele. In Cluster Map Four (Curia), the family Lecavele occupied a central position. In light of the findings of this section, such a position appears to have been based more on the family's prestige and on the complexity of the agreements in which it was involved rather than having been based on economic links. This is confirmed by the fact that most of the documents drafted by Guglielmo Cassinese for these families (and many others, although never the families of the de Volta coalition) were written in the houses of this family. This serves as a useful reminder that applying methodologies such as network analysis to the medieval period, although valuable in synthesising large amounts of data, can mislead both the researcher and the reader and need to be integrated into an in-depth analysis of the other surviving evidence. So far,

³⁶⁶ Cassinese, doc. 796, was approved in the house of the de Turca, under the *auctoritate et consilio* of Guglielmo Turca, and the same formula was utilised in Cassinese, docs. 797, 1729, 1730, with both the Turca and Pevere families.

considering the links connecting the families discussed, it has emerged that these families coalesced around the Avvocato family and probably took part in the civil conflicts because of the conscious effort of this family to have their support.

PORCELLO

I shall now proceed to analyse the only outlier emerging from this picture; the Porcello family. Their links were first and foremost with the Pevere family. The Porcello family did not take part in civil violence in the earlier periods but became involved later, starting in 1180.³⁶⁷ The analysis of the evidence illustrating the activities of the Porcello family suggests that this family sided with the Curia faction because of its allegiances with the Pevere family. The Porcello had their patrons in the powerful Pevere family and therefore they sided with them when the Pevere joined the Avvocato family in its opposition to the Volta's coalition.

It appears that the family focused on trade and finance, as we shall discuss in a moment.

This aspect marks a further distinction between this family and the families of the coalition's core. The earliest documentation relative to the activities of this family offers an insight into the origins of the capital used for such enterprises. In 1156 Lanfranco Pevere acted as a patron for the Porcello family. He gave £50 to Bernardo Porcello 'to work in Genoa' and gave to him his family warehouses and a shop for a period of five years.³⁶⁸ We observed how the economic activities of the Porcello for the 1180s and 1190s were markedly focused on long distance trade. We also know that by then the family also owned and ran its own shops in Genoa, and they were not renting from the family Pevere anymore – at least not in the documents that survive.³⁶⁹ The Porcello family invested mainly in trade with the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria in particular.³⁷⁰ Other investments of the Porcello family appeared to

³⁶⁷ *Annales*, vol.II, p.15.

³⁶⁸ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 93.

³⁶⁹ *Cassinese*, docs. 1556, 1827.

³⁷⁰ Of the five occasions in which the Porcello family took part in long distance trade, four times it chose the east (Ultramarine and Syria) and once the west (Sardinia and Bugie).

have been linked with building investments in Genoa.³⁷¹ It is striking that during the 1190s the Porcello family got involved in more and more long distance trade operations. These transactions were carried out utilising the network of the Guercio family. Therefore, the family became indirectly connected to members of the de Castello family, one of the fiercest opponents of the families coalesced around the de Curia faction. This development depended on the success of the family's economic operations. The Porcello family started to accumulate wealth in the 1150s-1160s, operating commercially in Genoa and depending upon a strong and prolonged relationship with Pevero. However, some of the capital accumulated was invested overseas, bringing the family closer to the Guercio group and, indirectly, to the overseas investments of the Castello family. From a political point of view, these developments had a profound effect. The Porcello family – predictably, given the patterns observed for several families already – disengaged from factional war in the 1180s and 1190s.³⁷² After having taken part in it in order to support their old Pevero patrons, the Porcellos – faced by a decision – chose neutrality to preserve their long distance trade network, from where much of the family's wealth was by then derived. The Porcello family, after fighting Scoto in 1180 and after witnessing the murder of Rubaldo Porcello alongside Opizone Lecavele in 1187, did not take part in the most dramatic years of the civil war and – tellingly - the family apparently decided not to seek revenge for Rubaldo Porcello. Such a decision should not be mistaken for a pacifist turn on behalf of the family. In 1210, the annalist Ogerio Pane wrote how the brothers Porcellino and Corrado Porcello killed Guglielmo Pallo, a relative of theirs. The annalist states that the reasons behind this crime must have been of a nature internal to the family, and certainly the event did not fit into the logic of factional confrontation.³⁷³

³⁷¹ *Cassinese*, docs. 10, 757; regarding the purchase of bricks.

³⁷² Essentially following the same path outlined for the family Usodimare earlier in this chapter.

³⁷³ I will later show how most of the episodes that occurred in the last decades of Genoese history taken into consideration in my dissertation were characterised by a change from the previous ones: the factional component of the phenomenon of civil violence in Genoa became much less dominant.

So far, we have only three types of family. Firstly, those that started civil conflicts: Avvocato; de Castello. Secondly, those that decided to take part in on-going confrontation or were unwillingly involved in taking part: de Volta; Scoto. Thirdly, those that ceased to play an active role in the conflicts: Usodimare; Porcello. The following section will deepen our understanding of a further element, always overlooked in previous literature, of the Genoese civil conflicts. These conflicts were, to a certain extent, wars of shifting alliances.

VENTO: A CASE OF SHIFTING ALLIANCES

So far, the third period of Genoese conflict has appeared remarkably ordered. The families that took part in the ever intensifying episodes of civil violence can easily be placed in one of the two factions fighting in Genoa. However, on one occasion described in chapter one, a family took part in the escalating civil war first on one side and then on the other. In 1183, Fulcone de Castello, supported by the Vento family, attacked his adversaries: Bulbunoso and ‘those de Curia’; the Annalist spoke of a ‘great war’ fought by the two groups in the valley of Bisagno, just outside the city gates. In 1189, on the contrary, Guglielmo Vento attacked the de Volta family. Such a shift happened only once in the period considered and it is both necessary and fascinating to analyse how the connections between families readjusted to reflect the new situation. Furthermore, it has been described how the separation of the factions into two independent economic systems prevented, to a certain extent, the disruption of the city’s economic activities that would otherwise have been caused by the conflicts. However, the case of the Vento family switching from one side to the other offers a clear image of what happened when this separation could not be maintained or violence could not be anticipated. The social network of the Vento family in 1186, depicted in Figure 2.9, reveals very solid connections between Vento family members and the families of the de Volta’s coalition.³⁷⁴ For example, it is impressive to witness the confidence demonstrated by Vento members in

³⁷⁴ Granovetter, M., ‘The Strength of Weak Ties...’, p.1361.

spending time in de Volta buildings. Indeed, almost all the documents registered by Vento's members were registered in the house of de Volta.

The links of the Vento family to the de Volta faction mostly resulted from its connections with the de Castello family. From a document of 1190 we see that Pietro Vento was married to Maria, daughter of Ottone de Castello.³⁷⁵ Furthermore it should be noticed that Vento family members only acted as witnesses for agreements regarding the activities of the de Castello family. On September 24, 1186 Fulcone son of Fulcone de Castello, brought £307 from Rufo de Volta to invest in Constantinople.

³⁷⁵ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 276.

All the documents involving Vento and de Volta members suggest that these two families were indeed allied in 1186. The documents show also that Vento members acted as witnesses

for de Volta members and vice-versa. However, their economic ties were not strong. The only transaction in which a Vento invested his money in an operation involving a de Volta was the one already mentioned, significantly at the benefit of a de Castello, a family member. From the documents we can state with certainty that Vento members felt safe in the de Volta properties, but that their economic ties were not particularly strong. However, in 1189 these ties did not succeed in preventing the attack of the Vento against the de Volta.³⁷⁶

At first we could formulate a simple hypothesis. During the 1170s we have already seen the family Vento fighting against a very close economic partner, the Grillo family.³⁷⁷ Therefore, the 1189 attack of Vento on de Volta might also have been independent from the state of factionalism that was afflicting the city, thus could be simply considered an occasional skirmish among close families. Instead, the 1189 conflict was on a different level to the conflicts that saw fighting between Mazanello and Navarro in 1178, or Grillo and Vento in 1179. The bases of such a hypothesis rest on the clearly documented effects that the 1183-1189 switch had on the connections between the Vento family and the family's participation in the de Volta coalition. The social network graph, Cluster Map Six (Vento Social Network 1190-1192) (Figure 2.10), representing the connections of the Vento family after the 1189 fight against the family de Volta, shows how all the connections between the family and the families close to the de Volta's coalition basically stopped.

³⁷⁶ *Annales*, vol.II, p.30.

³⁷⁷ *Annales*, vol.II, p.12.



Figure 2.10. Cluster Map Six, representing the Vento network in 1190-1192

How was this possible? These episodes offer a valuable insight, and a reminder, of the complex nature of the ties that held together factions, which are often considered in the

literature as monolithic groups.³⁷⁸ We can formulate the hypothesis that the participation of the family Vento in the 1183 battle between de Castello and de Curia, had happened because of the family links between the families Castello and Vento. These links were not reinforced by strong economic ties and, more importantly, they never developed into a close link with the other families referred to as *illi de Volta*.³⁷⁹ These single component ties, as previously discussed, were not in themselves a sufficient guarantee of future cooperation in episodes of civil conflicts. They should, however, have been sufficient in preventing a direct attack between two connected families and, indeed, the Vento family did not attack Castello, but de Volta.

Once such a confrontation happened however, the connecting family, in this case Castello, had to decide which tie to preserve, a family tie with Vento, or a family, economic and factional tie with de Volta. The evolution of the network representing the connections of Vento demonstrates how Castello chose Volta and cut its links with Vento, although there had been no direct confrontation between the two families. In turn, Vento started to build new connections with the families known as being part of *illi de Curia*, as shown by the connections with Avvocato, Bulbonoso and Lecavele, represented in Cluster Map Six (Vento Social Network 1190-1192).

CONSULS DE CURIA

With the analysis of the economic activities and connections of the family Vento we have completed the picture of the families that took part in the civil conflicts raging in Genoa from 1180 to the election of the first *podestà* in 1191. However, in chapter one, I discussed how the election of the *podestà* happened after the de Curia faction had taken the important step of nominating its own Consuls and seceding from the *commune*. The economic and social profiles of these Consuls de Curia complete the complex picture of the structures of conflict

³⁷⁸ See introduction.

³⁷⁹ As for instance happened in the case of Scoto from 1160s to 1190s.

in the 1180s and 1190s. In 1194, the annalist Ottobono Scriba recalls, the whole city did not obey the regularly elected Consuls anymore, and the de Curias decided to nominate their own Consuls: Giovanni Avvocato, Rubaldo de Curia and Enrico son of Embrone. Once again, it appears that Giovanni Avvocato played a fundamental role in the development of Genoese factionalism. The names of his colleagues allow us to complete the picture of the families that comprised those supporting the Avvocato family conflicts.

DE CURIA

The annalist Caffaro recorded how in 1122 Guglielmo de Curia was the captain of a Genoese flotilla. This is the first reference to the existence of this family. In 1143 we learn that the archbishop of Genoa gave the brothers Rubaldo and Guglielmo de Curia and the brothers Ingone, Giornado, Alberto de Volta and Guglielmo Burone lands in the valley of Bisagno, that all of these were to administer jointly.³⁸⁰ From the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba we discover that Rolando Avvocato, the protagonist of the 1164 conflicts, acted as guarantor in 1161 for a loan obtained by Amico de Curia.³⁸¹ No later information regarding other activities of the members of the de Curia family survives. However, what we know already allows for some considerations. It appears that at the time of the first occurrences of Genoese civil conflicts, the de Curia family was closely linked both with families that were going to be part of the de Volta faction and with families that were going to be part of the de Curia faction. From an economic point of view, it could be argued, given the absence of the de Curia family from any surviving agreement concerning trade, that the family de Curia was closer to the family Avvocato. However, what is important to stress here is that, once again as it was the case for Pevero, it would be difficult to argue that the factions were already formed a long time before the beginning of the actual conflicts. Indeed, for the family de Curia it must be noticed that it was only in 1183 that the annalist Ottobono Scriba wrote of the conflict

³⁸⁰ 'Il Registro della Curia arcivescovile di Genova', vol. II, 2, docs. 89-91. See Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.84.

³⁸¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 717.

between two factions ‘*illi de Volta*’ and ‘*illi de Curia*’.³⁸² To believe that these factions were already in place risks a misinterpretation of civil violence.

EMBRONE

The information regarding the economic background of the Embrone family is very scarce. The first mention of the activities of the Embrone family is recorded in the Cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. It is stated that in 1158, Embrone son of Embrone was guarantor for a debt of £200, contracted by Rubaldo Bisacia and paid a sum of £130 to Rinaldo de Benizone.³⁸³ From the early days of the Genoese Commune, therefore, the Embrone family appears to have had an important patrimony.³⁸⁴ This capital, however, does not seem to be invested in trading enterprises, which would fit the scarcity of notarial documents relative to the activities of the family. Indeed, from a document dated 1186, it can be seen that the family had agricultural possessions in Agio. This may demonstrate that the family investments were land oriented.³⁸⁵ The evidence chronologically closest to the 1194 events is a document recording a transaction that took place between Guglielmo Pevere and Gandolfo – a cleric from Piacenza - in 1190, The parties met in the house of Embrone’s sons.³⁸⁶ The importance of this testimony from the point of view of factional information cannot be questioned. Not only do we see that Embrone owned a house in Genoa, but we also learn that Guglielmo Pevere, leader of the de Curia faction, felt safe in the Embrone house.³⁸⁷ This document is the first evidence of a proximity between the Embrone family and the de Curia faction. Most importantly, the alliance is also confirmed by the fact that Nicola Embrone, Consul of the Pleas in 1194 and brother of the Consul de Curia Enrico, would marry a daughter of Lanfranco Pevere.³⁸⁸ The

³⁸² *Annales*, vol. II, p.19.

³⁸³ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 304, 305, 369.

³⁸⁴ Filangieri, L., ‘Famiglie...’, p. 180.

³⁸⁵ *Oberto Scriba 1186*, doc. 264.

³⁸⁶ *Oberto Scriba 1190*, doc. 323. Therefore the house of that Enrico Embrone, who in 1194 served as consul de Curia.

³⁸⁷ Guglielmo Pevere paid to Gandolfo a sum for not better specified goods. However, Gandolfo was one of the main fustian traders in Genoa, therefore it can be assumed that Guglielmo was paying for a fustian shipment.

³⁸⁸ *Annales*, vol.II, p.19.

economic profile of the Embrone family – with its focus on real estate - fits perfectly with the profiles of the families that made up the core of the de Curia faction. Furthermore, it appears that the Embrone family too, was associated with other families of the coalition – with Pevere in this case – through an alliance fostered by marriage.

Period Three Conclusions

With the analyses of this family's links with the other families of the Genoese elite, I have completed my analysis of the structures behind the violence that unfolded in Genoa in period three. It is characterised by a marked consolidation of factional groups as a consequence of, or in order to sustain, a developing landscape of conflict that saw an escalation in the intensity, in the strategies and in the aims of civil conflict.

In chapter one, we observed a clear development in the attitude of the Genoese annalists towards the issue of civil violence in the 1180s. The conflicts of those years indeed came close to destroying the unity of Genoa. One of their most important characteristics was the breathtaking pace of their escalation, from tensions between families to full-scale siege warfare and political secession.

The analysis of period three shapes our contemporary understanding of how such an escalation could take place. The resources necessary to fight such a conflict forced the opponents to mobilise friendly families into actual coalitions. I have illustrated that the coalitions, though they had different economic focuses to which I will return in a moment, were built principally along the lines of family relationships. Therefore, they were maintained and reinforced by strengthening the family and economic integration of their members. In fact, keeping a family involved in the fighting was far from easy - possibly more difficult than having it join a conflict in the first place. Contrary to what has been claimed previously, the composition of a faction was not a given from times past. Contrary to what is generally argued regarding the dynamics of medieval conflict, many families decided to interrupt their participation in civil violence before a peace settlement took place or murdered relatives were

avenged as a result of what seem to have been a remarkably rational evaluations of their economic interests. The analysis of the period has also shown how it could be the case – for instance for the family Vento – that the interests of a family were better served by switching sides.

From a point of view of the structures of conflict, we can propose that participation in long distance trade seemed to have played a role in keeping the allies of the family de Volta involved in conflict, as was the case with Scoto.³⁸⁹ Within period three, we also started to observe that fighting a conflict involved a very high price for the parties involved. Sometimes it was human cost, as in the case of Lecavele. Other times it was economic, such as with Avvocato. Coalitions started to weaken under these pressures. Perhaps families that integrated a focus on real estate with large investments in long distance trade – such as the families linked to the de Volta – proved themselves more successful in the long run because they were able to mobilise more resources and integrate their allies more effectively.

PERIOD FOUR - 1195-1200s

1195-1200s (Near suspension of factional violence due to the exhaustion of fifteen years of conflict)

As discussed in chapter one, the description of violent events in the narrative of Ogerio Pane (1197-1219) occupied a much less prominent position than in the annals of his predecessor Ottobono Scriba (1178-1196).

³⁸⁹ More will be said on the de Volta faction's superior capability in retaining allies.




Figure 2.11 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period four

The violent events that took place in the years 1195-1209 had several common characteristics and, therefore, these fifteen years should be analysed as a defined period in Genoa's history of conflict. The table below summarises the two episodes of internal violence that took place during the fourth period covered by this dissertation.³⁹⁰

1197	Nicolò Doria nearly clashes with the <i>podestà</i>
1203	Sorleone Pevero wounded by servants in his house

Table 2.6 Families involved in period five

This fourth period started with a clear break from the previous one. In 1194, exhausted by fifteen years of almost continuous civil conflict that peaked in a full blown civil war and attempted secession, internal fighting essentially stopped. The Genoese accepted the mediation of Markward of Anweiler and appointed a *podestà*, Oberto de Olevano from Pavia, to put a stop to internal violence and – most important for the German emperor whom

³⁹⁰ In chapter one I described how in 1199 a Genoese army abandoned the siege of Ventimiglia when the city was about to be overwhelmed. The episode could be considered a sign of the internal tensions of the city, however we cannot be sure about this, since the Genoese army at the time was a vast large collage of troops provided by very different entities.

Markward served – to organise a maritime expedition to support the emperor’s attempt to conquer the Kingdom of Sicily.³⁹¹ One could argue that the election of a *podestà* had a central role in bringing about relative internal peace during the fourth period. However, the reader will remember that as early as 1191 a *podestà* – Manegoldo de Tetocio – had ruled Genoa. Since that did not prevent a further escalation of internal violence it can only be argued that the strain brought about by prolonged conflicts made the appointment of a *podestà* possible.³⁹² This hypothesis is sustained by our previous findings regarding Genoa’s conflict dynamics. The characteristics of period four closely resemble those of the 1170s, the second period of the Genoese civil conflict. After a prolonged struggle, several Genoese families had exhausted their resources. Consequently, they suspended their hostilities. Interestingly, in the same way that the 1191 election of a *podestà* did not immediately stop the violence, the attempted pacification led by the archbishop of Genoa in 1165 failed before a further attempt, in 1169, succeeded in bringing to an end the violence of the 1160s. These similarities indicate the way in which, in the 1160s as in the 1190s, institutional solutions alone could not interrupt the violence if the conditions were not correct. Factional structures and citizens’ perceptions of conflict were not ready for such a development. However, as was the case in the 1170s, the exhaustion of resources of rival families and of other Genoese alike did not bring about an all encompassing state of peace. Ogerio Pane started his work as official annalist of Genoa in 1197 stating that the city had been governed in peace by the *podestà* Drudo Marcellino, but he also recorded that the peaceful state of the city was disturbed. Civil war nearly erupted again when Nicolò Doria and his followers, returning from the Sicilian campaign, found that several of their towers and houses had been demolished by the *podestà*. Nicolò, unhappy with the state of affairs he found in Genoa upon his return, proceeded to disembark siege material, build a flying bridge and set up to attack the positions of the *podestà*. At that point, something remarkable in the history of conflict dynamics in Genoa happened. According to the annalist,

³⁹¹ For a more detailed analysis of the Sicilian campaign and of its significance for the Genoese factionalism, see conclusion.

³⁹² See chapter four for a focus on this institutional innovation and its importance for Genoese factionalism.

the *podestà* rallied the Genoese citizens and built an army to counterattack against Nicolò. Just before the situation escalated into a full-blown battle, Nicolò's family convinced him to renounce his plan and to swear an oath of peace. The peace of Genoa was therefore maintained. What made this outcome possible? From the scant information surviving we can suggest a reconstruction of how the military showdown was averted. Having decided to confront the *podestà* militarily, Nicolò Doria passed the word to his supporters to assemble and get ready for the confrontation. At the crucial hour, perhaps, only a fraction of his supporters appeared, or the *podestà* successfully mobilised more supporters than expected. In any case at this stage it became clear to the Doria family, if not to Nicolò Doria himself, that there was no chance of winning the confrontation, and no military engagement actually followed because the Doria family convinced Nicolò to give up his idea. The chronicler Ogerio Pane stressed the fact that the Doria family prayed for him to stop, and ultimately succeeded in convincing Nicolò to swear an oath of peace. However, it should be remembered that his family and supporters had a very effective way - namely failing to mobilise and support his actions – of preventing a violent confrontation.

A case of *historical* counterfactual analysis: the 1197 failed attack of Nicolò Doria

Unfortunately we have no indubitable way of knowing exactly what happened in 1197. However, the events that took place between 1190 and 1194 provide us with an interesting – and historically grounded – counterfactual analysis. In chapter one I described how in 1190 internal and external events intertwined in bringing about a dramatic escalation in civil conflict. When Fulcone Castello, Rosso de Volta and others left Genoa to participate in the defense of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Consuls of Genoa decided to elect a *podestà*, Manegoldo de Tetocio, whose first action was to destroy one of the properties of Fulcone de

Castello.³⁹³ Following these events, the intensity of internal violence rose, and in 1194 – upon the return of the crusaders – a civil war, characterised by the use of siege engines, erupted. The situation in 1197 must have appeared remarkably similar. Again the leaders of a military expedition returned to Genoa to find that their properties have been destroyed following the orders of a *podestà* elected in their absence. Again their first reaction was to disembark troops and military materials, rally supporters and prepare for war. The outcomes however were very different. On the one hand a prolonged and violent confrontation, on the other no military engagement. Ultimately, what maintained peace in 1197 in Genoa was therefore not the presence of a *podestà* – we have seen how this was not in fact a novelty. This outcome depended instead on two main factors, one of which was an attribute of Genoa and the other an attribute of the family involved. As a starting point, we can be sure that Genoa in 1197 was a very different place to what it had been just a few years before. The violence and destruction brought about at the height of the civil conflicts, unprecedented in the city's history, had represented a real challenge for the whole community and for the survival of the commune. The material costs paid by the warring families - not to mention the legitimacy costs – created the conditions for a prolonged suspension of the hostilities, just as in the 1170s. It is possible that these conditions convinced a large number of Genoese to rally around the *podestà* and, in doing so, deterred Nicolò Doria from going ahead with his attack. In 1191 Genoa had also been the theatre of continuous violent episodes for almost a decade and, while it is true that the intensity of internal conflict reached in 1191-1194 was unprecedented, the exhaustion of conflict alone might not explain entirely why upon their return to Genoa the crusaders were able to escalate the looming violence into a military confrontation. Additional factors behind this outcome must necessarily be found in the characteristics of the Doria family.³⁹⁴ While the

³⁹³ See chapter one. Also, the crusades and their importance to factional dynamics in Genoa are analysed at length in the conclusion.

³⁹⁴ An aspect that deserves a mention here – before it will be studied in greater depth in the conclusion – is the fact that while the Third Crusade emerged from the sources as a central priority of one faction – de Volta plus allied groups; the expedition to conquer the Kingdom of Sicily emerged as an operation less dominated by factional structures. For instance we have records of Avvocato commanding an attack in Messina; (*Annales*, vol.II, p.50.)

political prominence of the Doria family – second only to the family de Volta for number of Consular appointments obtained – is not in question, its family members had never been involved in episodes of civil violence before the events of 1197. The web of relationships of such an important family almost certainly meant that Genoese rival parties attempted to obtain their support, but that the family decided not to be involved. The reasons behind this, quite possibly, can be found by observing Cluster Map One. In the analysis of the first period of conflict earlier in this chapter, we saw how three families – including Doria – formed a bridge connecting the separate networks of what would become the factions de Volta and de Curia in the third period. During the years immediately preceding the events of 1197, the family Doria was certainly closer to the families of the faction de Volta than to the families of the faction de Curia, yet the family maintained its neutral approach towards the phenomenon of internal conflict.³⁹⁵ Let us briefly take into consideration the nature of the economic and social relationships of this family in order to understand what created the basis for this particular position.

DORIA

Typology/Year	1186	1190	1192	Total
Real Estate	0	2	0	2
Location	1	1	0	2
Finance	0	5	0	5
Trade	0	4	0	4
Donations	0	0	0	0
Witness	0	0	1	1
Total	1	12	1	14

Table 2.7 Summary of Doria activities 1186-1192

The table above summarises the activities of the family for the years preceding 1197, recorded in the notaries of Oberto Scriba and Guglielmo Cassinese. While they certainly do not offer a complete picture of the family activities, they can be used to illustrate the links

³⁹⁵ Very profitably, judging from its political success.

connecting the family Doria to other families involved in episodes of internal violence up until the 1197 confrontation between Nicolò Doria and the *podestà*. Several documents serve this purpose. An 1186 document mentions a farm owned by the Doria in Begato family.³⁹⁶ In 1190, the family sold one quarter of this property to Giovanni Allo, a transaction which took place in the house of Bonifacio de Volta.³⁹⁷ The notary also documents how the family was able and willing to invest large sums in trading goods. For instance, in 1190 Guglielmo Doria and his son pledged to pay £100 for goods to Martino Burino from Piacenza,³⁹⁸ £147 to Ferro Braccioforti and Giovanni Anguissola³⁹⁹ and £120 to Gerardo Natapelano.⁴⁰⁰ When Ingone Doria and his wife contracted a society with Anna Totuice for £30 to trade, the parties recorded their agreement in the house of Ingone de Frexia – a member of the de Volta family.⁴⁰¹ What these agreements show is both the wealth of the family and the clear existence, in the period 1186-1192, of friendship and trust networks with the families that formed the core of the de Volta coalition. These weak ties, while essentially ensuring neutrality and political cooperation, did not however translate into military cooperation in the Genoese internal conflicts.⁴⁰²

In the light of these findings, let us now consider the relationships of the family Doria as evidenced by the documents contained in the Cartularies of Giovanni Guiberto (1200-1211), and Lanfranco Scriba (1202-1226), for they show something of a contrast.

³⁹⁶ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 279.

³⁹⁷ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 124.

³⁹⁸ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 55. The Doria share this debt with Simone Agostino.

³⁹⁹ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 127.

⁴⁰⁰ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 147.

⁴⁰¹ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 304.

⁴⁰² It has been described in chapter one for instance how Doria family members took part in the Third Crusade's expedition with de Volta and Castello. Chapter five will go into greater detail regarding such episodes of cooperation.




Figure 2.12 Cluster Map Seven, Doria network 1200-1226

The cluster map above represents the connections of the family for the fourth and fifth periods. It offers a visual representation of the fact that by 1200 – and quite possibly already in 1197 at the time of the Nicolò Doria failed attack – the connections between the Doria family and the families of the faction de Volta were so weak that they do not appear in the surviving documentation. Indeed, from the contemporary documents, only one agreement connecting the family Doria with one of the families that had been involved in factional warfare emerges - the family Castello. This agreement, dated to May 1225, records how Giovanni de Bargagio received £25 from Merlo Castello to trade in Sardinia on behalf of Obertino Castello, a minor son of the deceased Fulcone Castello, of whom the aforementioned Merlo Castello and Daniele Doria were tutors.⁴⁰³ Although referring to a later period during which political relationships were very different, this document represents the surviving relationships with at least one of the families of what had been the de Volta

⁴⁰³ Lanfranco, doc. 1345

coalition. But it does not represent the existence of the sort of connections analysed in period three that would have been necessary to receive military support in internal war.

Having considered the network dynamics of the Doria family from the 1180s to the 1220s, it appears that the most important difference between the escalation of 1190-1194 and the failed one of 1197 could be found in the different factional network structures supporting the different families. In 1190 the families de Volta and Castello could rely completely on their pre-existing factional networks built up in the previous decades; when Nicolò Doria in 1197 decided to confront the *podestà* he did not have access to a similar network, as has been illustrated in this section of chapter two – and therefore his plan failed.⁴⁰⁴

The 1203 wounding of Sorleone Pevero: persistence of factional violence?

The 1197 attempted attack should not, then, be considered as a continuation of the factional confrontations that dominated the Genoese political scenario in previous decades. This is obviously not sufficient to hypothesise that factional violence ceased altogether in the fourth period. Indeed, when two servants of Sorleone Pevero wounded their master in his house in 1203, the annalist Ogerio Pane claimed that such a crime might have been committed under the instigation of some members of the de Volta faction. Although the annalist himself does not seem certain of the validity of his hypothesis, it seems likely – and certainly it was so perceived by contemporaries – that this event could have been linked to the tension that had persisted even after the conclusion of decades of open factional conflict.⁴⁰⁵

We have no direct way of testing Ogerio Pane's claim, but a dynamic evaluation of the factional networks in which Genoese families operated can give us important insights. Cluster Map Eight below (Pevero Network 1200-1226) represents the relationships of the Pevero family in the fourth and fifth periods of Genoese conflicts. Even a brief comparison with

⁴⁰⁴ For an analysis of the connections between de Volta and his supporters see chapter two.

⁴⁰⁵ It is interesting to notice how this is the only occasion where the annalist Ogerio Pane utilised a hypothetical form while discussing episodes of internal violence.

Cluster Maps One, Two and Four – containing network information for the family from 1154 to 1192 – illustrates the important changes that had occurred in the factional collocation of the family Pevere after the third period studied in this chapter.




Figure 2.13 Cluster Map Eight, Pevere Network 1200-1226

Of the families that in earlier decades had formed – with the family Pevere - the core of the de Curia faction, not one appears connected to Pevere from 1200. The only exception is the family Embrone, since Enrico Embrone had supported the action of the faction at the very end of the conflicts of period three. On the other hand, by 1200 the family had built links with the family Castello - one of the most prominent members of the de Volta faction in the previous decades. The image offered by the links of the family Pevere seems to indicate that by 1200 the de Curia faction had lost much of its cohesiveness, or at least that the family Pevere was no longer part of it. Once again an analysis of the individual records that form the basis of the cluster map helps in understanding the dynamics of such a radical transformation. The connection between Pevere and Embrone was constituted by the fact that in 1203 Ogerio Pevere and Rubaldo Embrone were both present as advisors of Adalasia, the widow of

Gambino, when she gave Guglielmo Rivara £57 to trade in Ceuta.⁴⁰⁶ This is not a very strong link. However, what is most striking about the Pevere network after 1200 is the lack of links with the Avvocato and Turca families. One document is particularly useful in evaluating the significance of this absence. On the 12th May 1205, Adalaxia, the daughter of the deceased Giovanni Pevere, recorded her will. She left her possessions to a number of religious institutions in Genoa and to her siblings Enrico, Lanfranco and Adele. The will contains no mention of members of the related families Avvocato or Turca either as family, *consiliatores* or beneficiaries.⁴⁰⁷ The difference with the previous connections within these families could not be more striking. The existence of Adalaxia's will implies that the absence of any connections is not due simply to lacunae in the surviving evidence, but rather to a deterioration of the families' relations. In the documents utilised to illustrate the links between the families Pevere, Avvocato and Turca in the previous decades, one of the most important traits of these families is that they always acted on each other's side as relatives and advisors; the absence of any mention of Avvocato or Turca in a document recording a will, is therefore telling. It seems appropriate to conclude this section analysing the one sign (a relic of the earlier complex ties between the families Pevere and Avvocato – once the leader of the faction de Curia) surviving in a real estate agreement between the families Pevere and Guercio.⁴⁰⁸ In 1203 Perselda, widow of Giovanni Guercio, exchanged the ownership – *nomine cambii et commutationis* – of two houses in Genoa with Ogerio Pevere. The house that passed from Pevere to Guercio was built on land belonging to the family Avvocato.⁴⁰⁹ No Avvocato family member was present on this occasion, not even as a witness. This agreement is both a confirmation of the solid links that had previously existed between the families

⁴⁰⁶ Lanfranco, doc. 346.

⁴⁰⁷ Giovanni Guiberto, doc. 1161.

⁴⁰⁸ The terminology multiplex ties, is here intended in the meaning used by Padgett when he describes the role of overlapping ties, across marriage and economics for example, (Padgett, P.J., 'Robust Action...', p.1280).

⁴⁰⁹ Lanfranco, docs. 143, 144.

Pevere and Avvocato, and a striking image of how these links were being eroded.⁴¹⁰ In conclusion, while it is certainly possible that the 1203 wounding of Sorleone Pevere was connected to the previous period's factional conflicts, from a careful analysis it seems clear that the family Pevere emerges as increasingly disconnected from the factional structures at the base of those confrontations. Therefore, Ogerio Pane was probably wrong to hint that the wounding might have a factional base.

Period Four conclusions

Period four, like period two, is best understood as a moment of post-conflict reassessment. Much energy and many resources were consumed during the conflicts in period three, and as a consequence the following years were characterised by a marked reduction in occurrences of civil violence. The two episodes of internal confrontations recorded by the annalist of the commune, however, contain much valuable information regarding the development of the structure of conflict in Genoa that seems to show that a somewhat deeper reassessment was taking place. We analysed on one hand the case of a family – the Doria – that failed to mobilise the necessary resources to carry on with its war plans because of its lack of factional affiliations. On the other hand, we scrutinized the wounding of a member of one of the families most involved in earlier episodes of civil violence – the Pevere. Analyses of both episodes demonstrated how in the fourth period the structure of internal conflict had changed markedly. The highly interconnected factions that had been the protagonists of the episodes of civil violence so far did not play a significant role in these events. The question that remains is whether this was only a momentary consequence of the erosion of resources following an intense period of conflict, or whether the events described so far had an actual and prolonged

⁴¹⁰ In the analysis of period three I have shown how communal ownership and ownership of attached properties were elements of the strong links between the families. The decision of the family Pevere to swap its house certainly severed another link, and was quite possibly a sign of animosity or lack of interest between the two families. It is important to notice that, as I will show in my analysis of period five, the Avvocato family was still present and economically active during those years, and therefore the lack of links – and the lack of an Avvocato family member as witness in the 1205 transaction – was not casual, nor a simple consequence of a lacuna in the sources relative to the family Avvocato.

impact on the factional structure of Genoa. Responding to this question will occupy part of the analysis conducted in the fifth, and final, period covered by chapter two.

PERIOD FIVE – 1210s

1210s (Recurrence of internal violence; dissolution of previous factional structures; emergence of new violent actors and repositioning of older ones)




Figure 2.14 Occurrences of civil conflicts in Genoa during period five

1210	Pallo killed by Porcello	Porcello	Pallo
1214	Pevere aassaulted by Turca and Camilla	Pevere	Turca/Camilla
1214	Mari wounded while defending Pevere	Mari/Pevere	Turca/Camilla
1215	Mari attacked	Mari	Polesino/Malocello
1217	Tensions	Richerio	Doria
1217	Camilla killed Bellamuto	Bellamuto/Pignoli	Camilla

Table 2.8 Families involved in period five

Period four, like period two in the 1170s, was followed by a recurrence of conflict. In this section I demonstrate that the similarities between periods three and five, however, terminate

here. In the 1180s, violence seemed to have resumed where it had been interrupted in 1169 by the peace procession led by the Genoese bishop. Earlier in this chapter we saw how the factional violence of the 1180s-1190s had its origins in the violent episodes that took place in the 1160s. The violent episodes that disrupted the internal peace of Genoa starting from 1210 did not mark a return to previous factional violence and were a clear break in Genoa's narrative of conflict.

Even from an overview of the links connecting the families involved in episodes of civil violence during the 1210s, the discontinuity of the fifth period from the earlier ones is clear. Figure 2.15 illustrates the links of the families involved in episodes of civil conflict in those years: Porcello; Pallo; Turca; Camilla; Peverere; Mari; Polesino; Maloncello; Richerio; Doria; Bellamuto; and Pignoli. The main feature of this representation is the lack of connections between most of these families. While in almost all the precedent cluster maps observed in this chapter it was possible to discern patterns of affiliation among the Genoese that fought in the civil conflicts in Figure. 2.15, the picture emerges as extremely fragmented. Studying the existing links it is not possible to uncover economic and social connections between several of the families that fought side by side - like Camilla and Turca, Mari and Peverere, Pignoli and Bellamuto - and, strikingly, there is evidence of connections among families that in fact fought against each other – like Malocello and Mari.

The conflicts that took place in Genoa during the 1210s seem to confirm, on first observation at least, the signs of factional disaggregation that emerged in period four. To find out more about the peculiarities of conflict in the fifth period I shall now turn my attention to the information surviving on the individual families involved. As in the previous periods I will proceed following the order in which the families were involved in episodes of internal violence.

PALLO and PORCELLO

The first episode of internal violence in the fifth period took place in 1210, when on the 23rd September Guglielmo de Pallo was killed by his relatives Corrado Porcello and Porcellino, the sons of Bartolomeo Porcello. This event, very much like the 1170s confrontation between Navarro and Mazanello, and Grillo and Vento appeared completely disconnected from any logic of factional violence. Most of the information available for the Pallo family dates around 1225 and indicates that by then the family's main focus was on long distance trade, particularly with Sicily.⁴¹¹ The connections of the family, illustrated below, are all investments of the family through their agents.




Figure 2.16 Cluster Map Ten, Pallo Network 1200-1226

⁴¹¹ *Lanfranco*, docs. 1560, 1561, 1562, 1563 (all relative to investments in Sicily with Maronio); 1335 (Carbone); 1578 (Mallone); 1586 (Guaraco); 1601 (Quarto); 1647, 1651 (Ugolino Ismaele).

Unfortunately, no surviving information allows us to shed light on the 1210 murder. The documented activities of the family Porcello, which had been extremely successful in long distance trade in the previous decades, were by the 1210s very limited. Thus, it would be inappropriate to read too much into the lack of connections among the two families.⁴¹²

However, analysis of the events of 1214-1215 allows for a deeper understanding of the new dynamics of conflict that were operating in the 1210s. Some of the protagonists of these violent episodes - Mari, Pevere and Turca - had already been involved in numerous episodes of civil violence, while new ones - such as Camilla, Polesino and Malocello - appeared on the scene,

In 1214 the families Turca and Camilla attacked Sorleone Pevere while he was riding towards the city from the valley of Bisagno with other noble citizens of Genoa.⁴¹³ In the section of this chapter concerned with the connections of the families associated in the de Curia faction I showed how the families Turca and Pevere were relatives and were also closely interconnected from an economic point of view.⁴¹⁴ By 1214 this situation was reversed. From 1200 there are no traces of links between these two families, and in the chronicles of Ogerio Pane we see them fighting each other.⁴¹⁵ Ansaldo Mari, witnessing the aggression from the distance, rode to help Pevere. Alone and armed only with a sword he chased Camilla and Turca until he was struck in the arm.⁴¹⁶ In a further twist to the dynamics of this violent clash, then, Mari, a family that had long been opposed to Pevere and the families of the de Curia faction, intervened to save an old rival.

⁴¹² Only one document records a loan received by a certain Mignanego, (*Lanfranco*, doc.1716). No documents surviving in the cartulary of *Giovanni Guiberto*, the *Carte of San Siro*, or any other contemporary documentary collection. It is possible that Porcello was failing economically by this period.

⁴¹³ *Annales*, vol.II, p.134.

⁴¹⁴ See Cluster Map Four.

⁴¹⁵ See Pevere Network.

⁴¹⁶ *Annales*, vol.II, p.137.

CAMILLA

With the Camilla family we witness the first new protagonist of Genoese civil conflict in period five. Unlike most of the families that we have seen as protagonists of civil conflicts so far, the Camilla family made its first political appearance only in 1199 when Simone Camilla was appointed *Rector* of the commune.⁴¹⁷ However, both the economic status and political ambitions of the family dated back to the mid-twelfth century; between 1158 and 1161 for instance, Anglerio or Angelerio de Camilla (the only family member documented for such an early period) invested almost £250 in mercantile voyages in Sicily and in the Southern Italian mainland.⁴¹⁸ Indeed, the wealth of Angelerio de Camilla has left permanent traces in modern day Genoa. A tombstone located in the church of Santa Maria del Prato in Albaro, records that Anglerio died in 1194 leaving £400 to the church and was to be buried in the central part of the church *sub arco*, and to receive a weekly commemoration *pro anima*.⁴¹⁹ The son of Anglerio, Simone, soon to be *Rector*, brought the family activities to a level that can be defined as more ‘political’ by buying for £130 part of the city’s butcheries in 1197. The political importance of the operation is that the right to butcher meats was an ancient privilege recognised by the commune in 1152.⁴²⁰ Such an investment, therefore, granted a public dimension to the family’s activities. From the point of view of the Camilla family involvement in episodes of violence not much emerges from the documents. Certainly, observing the family network for the periods four and five (as below) it can be seen that the family did not take part in civil violence by joining a pre-existing faction.

⁴¹⁷ Through chapter two we illustrated how most of the warring families were involved in important roles in the *commune* from its early years.

⁴¹⁸ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 326, 857, 935. These long distance trade activities were backed by a very prosperous trade in leather in Genoa. From *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1024, we know that Anglerio sold a large quantity of rough leather to several craftsmen. Furthermore we know that the family owned a house in Genoa, (see *Guglielmo Cassinese*, doc. 260); and two small plots of land, (see *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1018, 1203.)

⁴¹⁹ *Iscrizioni medievali della Liguria*, ed. M. Remondini, in ASLI, XII, vol. I, 1874, pp. 35-37, n. 43.

⁴²⁰ Petti Balbi, G., *I Visconti*. Filangeri, ‘Famiglie’, pp. 154-155. The document edited by Filangeri is in A.S.G., Manoscritti, n. 102. For the regulation of the butchering of meats in Genoa see, *Libri Iurium*, Vol I, doc. 157.




Figure. 2.17 Cluster Map Eleven, Camilla Network 1200-1226

The family, however, did leave behind one document which is important for the analysis of the phenomenon – and costs - of civil conflict. In 1210, just before getting involved in episodes of civil violence, Simone Camilla and his sons entered an agreement with Stefano *balisterius*, a crossbowman. Stefano committed to escort the members of the family, to prepare the family's crossbows and bows for battle and to train Nuvelone Camilla with the crossbow. In exchange, the Camilla family were to equip Stefano, pay 10 solidi per year on top of all his expenses and, crucially, offer him their protection, trust and friendship.⁴²¹

In the following year, 1215, with the attack of Carbono Malocello and Guidone Polesino, once again in the valley of Bisagno, against Erode Mari, two more protagonists enter the history of conflict of Genoa.

MALOCELLO and POLESINO

In contrast with the Camilla family, with the analysis of the family Malocello our evidence stretches back to the very beginning of the Genoese commune. In fact, the political involvement of the family in the commune's public offices was both early in its manifestation

⁴²¹ Lanfranco, doc. 667.

and steady in its continuity.⁴²² Oberto Malocello, Consul of the Commune from 1114 to 1118, was most probably the son or a descendant of *Malauxelus* recorded as a landowner in the valley of Bisagno as early as 1099.⁴²³ From then onwards the political continuity of this Genoese family went hand in hand with its solid economic conditions. Regarding the economic activities of the family for a period closer to the one analysed here, we know that in 1186, Rosso de Volta and Amegio bought a certain amount of pepper from Ugolino Malocello.⁴²⁴ This evidence of the Malocello economic activities during the 1180s leaves the impression of a family dealing in long distance trade with the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, trade and finance seem to have been the main economic activities of the family from an early period.⁴²⁵ In later decades this trend continued. For example, in April 1190 Ugone Polesino went to Sicily in order to invest more than £200, the capital of a society formed by Ido de Pallo and Guglielmo Malocello.⁴²⁶ Documents relative to the real estate activities of the Malocello show that the source of capital for such activities was quite evidently located in the lands owned by the families in Brazile, Tre Castagni and Rivarolo.⁴²⁷ These transactions confirm the proximity of these family possessions to those of the Polesino family. Not only did Guglielmo Malocello entrust Ugo Polesino with a large sum to trade in Sicily, but the link between the Polesino and Malocello families is further confirmed by the fact that Simone Malocello acted as witness for Ansaldo Polesino's partnership with Enrico Deotesalve in

⁴²² Although it must be stressed that from 1158 to 1193 Malocello family members figure solely as Consuls of the Pleas, somewhat of a downgrade from their constant presence as Consuls of the Commune in earlier and later decades.

⁴²³ *Codice Diplomatico del Monastero di Santo Stefano*, I, doc. 95. Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.70.

⁴²⁴ *Oberto Scriba 1186*, doc. 222. The document is incomplete, missing the reference to the amount to be paid and the names of the witnesses. A certain proximity to the de Volta emerges again in 1192 when Guglielmo Malocello and Bonifacio de Volta acted jointly as guarantors for the promise made by Nicola di Rodolfo and his son Ansaldo to pay £100 to Ugone Fornario as antefactum for his daughter Sofia, (See *Cassinese*, doc. 1540).

⁴²⁵ The Malocello family, for instance, lost one of the largest sums, 1070 hyperpers, in the Pisan attack to the Genoese trade quarter in Byzantium in 1162. Sanguinetti and Bertolotto, 'Documenti', docs. 390, 391, 396. Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, pp. 118-119. Day's conclusion, that the Malocello were part of something called the 'Guercio Bloc' supporting that family's political programme, is not very solid, since, as the author concedes, Guercio and Malocello family members appear together exclusively as witnesses on the cartularies, and never as business partners.

⁴²⁶ *Oberto Scriba 1190*, docs. 357, 358, 359. The Malocello family members usually acted as investors rather than travellers, however, one of the main enterprises of the family for the period under consideration was certainly the large ship that the Malocello brothers owned and captained. *Cassinese*, docs. 511, 512. Pezullo, Civolla and Diotesalve took part in such operations. From a similar agreement with Guido of Lodi it is clear that the initial destination of the ship was to be Naples, and that Ansaldo Malocello was captain of the ship. (*Cassinese*, docs. 546, 547).

⁴²⁷ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 251; *Cassinese*, docs. 1156, 1648.

1191.⁴²⁸ Moreover, Anna - the widow of Guidone Polesino - sold some of the family possessions in Brazile to Andrea of Brazile in March 1190. She did so in the interests of her sons, Ugo and Ansaldo, and followed the advice of Ugo, her eldest son, and Guglielmo Malocello, her neighbour. The surviving sources therefore support the argument that the single involvement of the Malocello family in episodes of conflict in 1215 when Malocello fought Mari together with the Polesino family, was due to the connections between these two families. The reasons behind such animosities are unclear; however it must be noted that the Malocello and Mari families were connected by business interests. But, factional dynamics still did not enter the picture. Malocello and Polesino fought together on the same side because of their proximity, business and trust ties, and only on that one occasion.

Ogerio Pane's last references to civil tensions are for 1217. Firstly, the annalist recorded a *discordia* that grew between the families of Richerio (Giovanni and Giordano) and Doria (Manuele and Percivale). However, the tensions between these two families were bridged and the peace was sworn on the eve of St John the Baptist day. Secondly, Bellamuto, the son of Rolando Bellamuto was killed by Nuvelone Camilla, while he exited the church of San Pietro. According to Ogerio Pane, this happened because of the war that the family Camilla had with the family Pignoli. The connections emerging from Figure 2.17 do not help us make sense of the structure behind these last episodes of civil violence. Unfortunately not much more emerges from taking into consideration the single families' agreements either.

BELLAMUTO

While the image of the Camilla family that emerges is that of a family that had been improving its economic and political status through the period studied by this dissertation; the picture that emerges of Camilla's victim Bellamuto is from the opposite end of the spectrum, that is, an old but declining Genoese family. From the evidence surviving the

⁴²⁸ Cassinese, doc. 378. Diotesalve and Malocello were business partners, reinforcing the perception that the role played by Malocello in this agreement was determinant.

Bellamuto family emerges as involved from an early stage in mercantile activities in Genoa and long distance trade in the Western Mediterranean. In 1156 Bellamuto received £14 for the goods he sold to Giordano, a merchant from Piacenza.⁴²⁹ In 1158 Bellamuto witnessed, along with Pevere and Stancono, a transaction between Giordano Tumber and Guglielmo Burono.⁴³⁰ In 1163 Bellamuto acted as a witness in the formation of a partnership between Lercario and Caramandino and the latter acted as witness for the partnership of £100 between Lercario and Bellamuto.⁴³¹ In 1164, a document records an agreement between Bellamuto and Doria in which Bellamuto gave £100 to Simone Doria, which Bellamuto was to have back when the galley of Iusta returned safely from Sardinia.⁴³² These documents demonstrate the existence, around the middle of the twelfth century, of trust and business connections with several of the most powerful Genoese families – such as Caramandino, Doria and Pevere – and of the family's thriving economic activities. These, however, slowed down considerably in later decades along with the Bellamuto's political participation. Only one commercial document relative to the family's activities survives for the 1190s, and nothing after 1200, and it records how in 1192 Bonadonna, the wife of Bellamuto, declared having received £50 from Guglielmo Collogruis. The existence of only one such document does little to improve our understanding of the family's activities towards the end of the century and probably does show 'decline' like the one of the Porcello family.⁴³³ After this, no evidence survives of the activities of this family. Therefore, we have no information to help us disentangle how Bellamuto's murder by Camilla came about.

PIGNOLI

The information surviving for the family Pignoli contains no details regarding possible connections between the families Pignoli and Bellamuto, or regarding what might have

⁴²⁹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 53.

⁴³⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 506.

⁴³¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1122, 1124.

⁴³² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1180.

⁴³³ *Cassinese*, doc. 1867.

caused the violence between these families and the family Camilla. From an economic point of view, the Pignoli family emerges as a small group of traders of cotton cloth.⁴³⁴

RICHERIO

Richerio is the last Genoese family that entered the landscape of internal violence in Genoa. Giordano Richerio, the only member of the Richerio family to become an official of the Genoese commune, was involved in many long distance trade investments during most of the period analysed.⁴³⁵ It is important to notice that while the family never took part in episodes of civil violence before 1217, for the earlier decades it was associated in business with the family de Volta. In 1186 Giordano Richerio acted four times as a witness for contracts involving a de Volta.⁴³⁶ This indication of proximity is strongly confirmed on the 24th of January 1190, when Ingo de Volta paid £100 to Giordano Richerio as part of the payment for the house and tower that he bought from him.⁴³⁷ If we think back to the level of intensity of civil conflict in 1190, such a real estate transaction, involving also a military asset like a tower, suggests that in that period these families were linked closely by business and friendship ties, especially considering that during the same year Giordano Richerio gave Ogerio de Volta £481 to trade in Naples.⁴³⁸ These findings are interesting because they illustrate that on a theoretical level, the family Richerio could probably have relied upon the support of the de Volta family and its associates if the violent episodes they were involved in could be considered factional. Instead, as was the case with nearly all the violent episodes that happened in Genoa during the 1210s, it is not possible to understand the rising tensions between the families Doria and Richerio as part of any factional confrontation.

⁴³⁴ *Lanfranco*, docs. 66, 1664.

⁴³⁵ See chapter four for an analysis of Giordano Richerio's political career. Regarding his economic activities, his name appears on 65 contracts recorded between 1186 and 1226. When he does not appear as a witness he usually acted as a 'principal' partner in a mercantile partnership.

⁴³⁶ *Oberto 1186*, docs. 21, 230, 269, 300.

⁴³⁷ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 48.

⁴³⁸ *Cassinese*, doc. 138.

Period Five Conclusions

In the 1210s the structure of internal conflicts changed completely in comparison to the periods one to three. Following a trend already delineated in period four, the two factions that dominated our account of the Genoese civil conflicts from the 1160s onwards seemed to have played scarcely any role in the concluding decades covered by this dissertation. This fundamental development could at first analysis be mistaken for something similar to what had happened in the 1170s – essentially a pause from factional confrontation. Indeed, new protagonists appeared on the scene of the Genoese civil conflicts. They were mostly involved in episodes of violence between single families and were sometimes supported by closely connected families. This is very much like we have seen in the 1160s and 1170s. However, there was an important difference for the period 1195-1220. While in the 1170s the families linked to the Genoese factional structures were not involved in the episodes of civil violence, in the later period they were very much present, but only as individual families, no longer supported by any factional structure, and actually sometimes fighting against old allies or on the side of old enemies as in the cases of Pevere against Turca and Mari with Pevere respectively. To explore this development further I shall take into consideration the 1200-1226 connections of the families that had formed the cores of the de Volta and de Curia factions in the years 1160-1195. The hypothesis of a dissolution in Genoese factional structure in the years 1195-1226 is strengthened by the observation of the cluster of links that in the period 1200-1226 connected the families which, from our analysis of periods one to three (1160-1195), emerged as solidly connected in the two well distinguished factions of de Volta and de Curia. The image below is clearly one of a much less polarised city.




Figure 2.18 Cluster Map Twelve

Let us pause to consider how the different links (formed by the families who had constituted the two main fighting factions) formed the cluster represented here.

The most striking evolution is certainly that of the families that formed the core of the group de Curia. We can essentially speak of a desegregation of their network. The families Turca, Avvocato and Pevere are separated in the network. Furthermore, the families Bulbunoso and Lecavele – the other two main families of the de Curia faction - do not appear on the network at all, contributing to an image of the dissolution of the network once connected in the *illi de Curia* group. On the other hand the links among the families of the de Volta faction – and their economic activities - were clearly still stronger. However, several differences also appear in the cluster of these families. The Mari family, from being the lesser connected of all the families in the de Volta network in the previous periods, became the bridge between the families Castello on one side and de Volta and Scoto on the other. The Scoto family returned to a position more akin to the one it held in period one in respect to the one it held in period three. It was strongly connected with the de Volta family and no longer connected with all the families in the de Volta faction.

In a sense, the image offered by the cluster network is one of post-conflict adaptation and disarmament. The families that formed the de Curia's network in the 1160s-1190s lost all their cohesiveness, while the connections between the families that had formed the faction de Volta were slightly weakened, possibly as a consequence of a less polarised political scenario, but all the same these connections were very much present in later decades.

As discussed in chapter one, the factional confrontations of those years – and their protagonists - simply disappeared from the later years of the Genoese annals. The later chroniclers made no mention of whether there had been a victor or a vanquished. In a very similar fashion, scholars of Genoa, even when they have addressed the issue of conflict, have never attempted to understand whether one faction or the other had won; they see in later reoccurrences of civil violence the same underlying tensions being played out in Genoa under different labels and by different protagonists. I disagree with this conclusion as I feel that the

evidence contained and analysed in this chapter points to the fact that the civil conflict that ravaged Genoa from the 1160s was not pointless, irrational or endless. One faction lost, and as a consequence of its defeat it lost all its cohesiveness and, on some occasions, its members even turned on each other. The victorious faction, although no contemporary narrative records speak of it, can be singled out because it preserved its structure.

Conclusions

In this dissertation, I started off by facing a historical dilemma. That is, given the acknowledged centrality of the phenomenon of civil conflict between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries in Genoa, why have scholars fallen short of giving us a better understanding of it?

In chapter one, I analysed the reasons behind this puzzle. Essentially, Genoese historians had for a long time followed the traditional opinion that civil conflicts in Genoa were a mere ‘chaos of clashes’ and that it was therefore not advisable to engage in the desperate operation of finding any order in them. Therefore, conflicts were relegated to the position of a background noise, characteristic of a violent era, more taken for granted than analysed *per se*. This state of affairs damages greatly our understanding of the history of this city at such a fundamental moment in its development. Indeed, recent attempts by social scientists to use Genoa as a historical ground on which to test complex institutional theories have failed to give a real contribution to this understanding, partly as a consequence of the state of the available historiography. Presumably these attempts have been ignored by Genoese scholars as exercises in economic determinism. However, the shortcomings of such operations are mostly explained by the fact that scholars of Genoa avoided for a long time this central dimension of the history of the city. Indeed, the narrative conducted in chapter one left us with a confusing image of the episodes of internal violence that occurred during the sixty years explored by this dissertation. However, the ‘chaos of clashes’ emerging from our coding

of the Genoese annals actually revealed a certain order and understandable patterns and these called for further analysis and explanation.

This is what I have set out to do in chapter two. The main intuition behind the analysis conducted here was simply to leave aside all the speculations about the motives of the parties in conflict and focus above all on the structures of conflict, that web of connections operating in Genoa, as in any other society, that created the necessary conditions for conflicts to actually take place and develop along the lines illustrated in chapter one. I took this decision because I believed that an obsession with questions such as ‘why did conflicts take place’, ‘what was at stake’, and ‘what were the parties fighting for’, produced precisely the two research outcomes that I wanted to avoid: either despair at the struggle to understand the bouts of self destruction that seemingly motivated so many eminent Genoese; or, in aiming to confirm an initial hypothesis, powering ahead and selecting only the episodes and individuals that supported my theory.

I believe that this approach has been rewarded by the findings illustrated in part one of this dissertation. In chapter two I demonstrated that in the 1160s a cataclysmic series of events unfolded. The conflict that was fought at the beginning primarily by the families *Avvocato* and *Castello*, escalated and came close to bringing the commune of Genoa to the brink of collapse. The consequences of these initial episodes shaped the political structure of the commune for the following fifty years. The key to understanding how this happened was found in the concatenation of links already in place among the families of the Genoese elite. At the beginning, the families involved mobilised the resources of closely associated families to which they were linked both by family relations and economic interests. What emerged from my analysis is that factional lines cut across pre-existing marriage links, essentially forcing factional families to take decisions that alienated former friends. The divisions in Genoa were in fact not immemorial at all, but emerged after the violence erupted. After the 1170s interruption of factional violence, explained mostly by the exhaustion of conflict and

the loss of legitimacy of the parties involved, factional conflicts resumed in the 1180s. During these years the two fighting factions attempted to mobilise more resources.

The analysis conducted in chapter two deepens our understanding of the way in which factions were constructed and maintained. Essentially, the political survival of one group depended on its ability to aggregate more Genoese families. How did the Genoese decide which, if any, faction to support? From my analysis it emerged that – initially – the most important link was certainly a family one. However, since the factional war broke out within a relatively cohesive consular elite, several important families found themselves connected to families that were now opposing each other. This is the reason why marriage appeared to be a weak link; it was often insufficient in preventing a violent confrontation. When faced by such a difficult choice, the families involved always joined the faction to which they had the strongest pre-existing economic links. More often than not, this meant joining the families to which one was connected through commercial interest, or the ones that would have been most easily broken in case of hostility. Similarly, the eventual breaking down of factional connections was characterised by a thinning of common interests among families and by a rapidly deteriorating economic outlook. These links were most certainly the strongest ties connecting the families that formed the Genoese factions.

This analysis also took into consideration the ‘weak ties’, to borrow Granovetter’s terminology. These can be considered less deep connections of trust and friendship. Good examples of these weak ties were principally: to be present in someone else’s home in a time of intense conflict; or to act as agent, witness or advisor for someone’s commercial dealings. The importance of these types of links was relative when connecting the families of the very top of the Genoese elite. Indeed, I demonstrated that they did not necessarily prevent a cutting off of alliances. However, they were extremely important in securing the support of less important families, with which it would have been impossible to form a marriage agreement and difficult to build strong reciprocal economic interests. The importance that the Genoese families gave to the different typologies of links appears to have been shared by nearly

everybody. However, the families that formed the two factions differed somewhat in the typologies of links that they used, principally because of different economic preferences. One faction – de Curia – relied mostly on marriage agreements and land transactions to strengthen the connections among its inner members – Avvocato, Pevero, Turca, Lecavele - and succeeded in mobilising new supporters only through the pre-existing networks of its associates – the patronage of Pevero over Porcello for instance. The de Volta faction, meanwhile, endeavoured to strengthen the links among its core families. Moreover, it mobilised new supporters through the formation of new (principally commercial) links. It could be hypothesised that the main difference between these strategies was that the first one relied heavily on the pre-existing social capital of the core families that eventually was exhausted, while the second relied on offering new business and political opportunities to the families that joined. Possibly, the main consequence of these differences was that while the de Curia faction was characterised by supporters disengaging themselves from conflict, the supporters of the de Volta faction maintained their support. Indeed, a consequence, and an accelerating factor, of this process might have been that while the de Curia faction lost cohesiveness, the de Volta faction maintained it. Indeed, although no narrative evidence contains reference to this, an analysis of the web of connections in Genoa at the end of the period analysed, demonstrates that the conflicts had terminated with a winner and a loser – de Volta and de Curia respectively. The analysis of the conflicts that took place in the last two periods considered also showed that without the different layers of pre-existing links, conflicts between individual Genoese families remained within limited boundaries of violence.

Additional conclusions emerged from the analysis of part one. Firstly, it should be stressed that the factions emerging during the period were not initially designed to fight in internal conflicts they simply emerged from a series of pre-existing links, and only later were consciously reinforced to win the confrontation, not necessarily to advocate for specific political goals. Secondly, and related, in the light of my findings not much can be salvaged

from previous analyses of the structures of internal conflicts in Genoa (the theories formulated in those studies will be the object of further analysis in part two of this dissertation). Finally, although the ultimate image of conflict emerging from this analysis could induce one to think that the conflicts broke out between families committed to landowning and families committed to trade, I consider this to be reading too much into the factional structure. This final image was a product of the fact that families that shared more economic interests with each other tended to cooperate in conflict and eventually coalesced in two factions that had relatively different economic strategies; not of the fact that families with similar economic strategies decided *a priori* to form a faction to pursue any specific policy.

Part II

The institutional structures, public officers and external actions of the commune and the ways in which they were affected by conflict.

Chapter Three: The consular commune and its officers 1160-1190

I constructed a database of all the Genoese families that held public offices in Genoa during the period under consideration. This chapter offers a brief outline of the development of legislative and political systems within the executive of the Genoese commune. This is followed by a study of the individuals who participated as public officers in the political life of Genoa. I utilise the data available to explore the hidden connections between peaceful and violent families. In this way the list of public officers recorded by the Genoese chroniclers to mark the beginning of the year – generally a mere chronological device typical of contemporary annals – can come to life. Instead they describe the world of family obligations, political affiliations and long-term interests that the different governments of the city were busy defending and serving. The chapter illustrates the years in which particular families, factions or interests were dominant in the city government. It also seeks connections between these governments and the factional dynamics outlined in part one.

The first part of this dissertation offered to the reader interested in the phenomenon of civil conflicts and internal violence in the Middle Ages an analytical narrative of the episodes of internal violence taking place in Genoa between 1160 and 1220, and of the structures of the connections between the fighting families that made them possible. Therefore, part one of this dissertation focused on the individuals and families that played an active role, as perpetrators and, or victims of violent episodes in Genoa. These events and their protagonists must now be further grounded in the wider economic, social and political milieu of Genoa; part two attempts to do this. To begin with, in chapter three, I offer a brief institutional outline of the development of the executive, judicial and political framework of the Genoese Commune from its origins to the appointment of the first foreign *podestà* in 1191. This is a necessary introduction to the real protagonists of our analysis: the Genoese consular families in the thirty years up to that appointment. The body of the chapter is in fact based on the analyses of the profiles and connections, based on all the surviving evidence, of these Genoese families.

The analysis will deepen our understanding of the connections between the ‘violent’ families studied in the first part of the dissertation. The wider prosopographical context I propose in chapters three and four allows us to explore how the political scenario of the city was shaped by civil conflicts. The structure of the analysis conducted in chapter three will reflect therefore that of chapter two.⁴³⁹ The thirty years taken into consideration will be analysed and evaluated as three distinct periods, so to fully understand the eventual differences between the decades analysed.

The aims of the chapter are to:

- 1) evaluate how connected were the individuals involved in violent actions to the Genoese government elites
- 2) see whether the violent and non violent families differed economically and socially in any way
- 3) see whether it could be demonstrated that the two Genoese factions succeeded in dominating, or at least aimed to dominate the city government in particular years

Thus, having already proven that the Genoese factions did not descend from tenth-and-eleventh century lineages that gave birth to a system of long-lasting political alliances, chapter three integrates the factional argument formulated in part one, and considers two further general hypotheses: were Genoese factions competing to seize the consulate and, therefore, the revenue of the commune? And, were violent episodes a connotation of the passage of power from one family group to another?

Early development of the role of the consuls and strengthening of the commune

The first reference to the commune of Genoa is contained, not surprisingly, in the chronicles of Caffaro. Referring to the year 1099 Caffaro described the first nucleus of the Genoese

⁴³⁹ In the same way, chapter four will also be subdivided according to the chronological divisions of chapter two.

commune with these words: “...in Civitate Ianuensium compagna trium annorum et sex consolorum incepta fuit.”.⁴⁴⁰ At this stage the commune should probably not be considered the formal institutional organ of Genoa. Rather, it must be view as an association of individuals. Its functions and structure remain unclear because of the scarce surviving contemporary sources.⁴⁴¹ However, one starting point is clear; the *compagna* time frame was limited to three years, after which it could have been renewed. This aspect probably derived from the origins of this organization. Current Genoese historiography largely agrees that the concept of *compagna* was most likely of commercial derivation and from such origin it inherited its elements of temporarity and consensuality.⁴⁴² Certainly, the aims of the association were also political, military and judiciary.⁴⁴³ Even if at its inception the adherence to the *compagna* was voluntary and required the swearing of an oath, it assumed a public character and the effects of the consular government were quickly extended to – and felt by – the whole city’s inhabitants. Chris Wickham reminds us that the question of ‘[h]ow and why city communes appeared in northern and central Italy, in the decades around 1100, has been the object of endless debate for a century and more’.⁴⁴⁴ While this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to remind the reader, once again using Wickham’s remarks, that while modern day historians might not have reached an agreement on how communes came to be, ‘[h]istorians of the twelfth century – [Genoa’s own Caffaro for instance] – of course know what they mean by communes, and do not really disagree about it: they are the autonomous cities which fought each other and burned down the castles of rural lords in say, the 1130s and 1140s...Such cities did have independently chosen groups of leaders (i.e. the consuls) at their

⁴⁴⁰ *Annali Genovesi*, vol. I, p.5.

⁴⁴¹ Renato Burdone gave a definition of the early commune as something along the lines of a ‘originally commercial association, temporary and consensual’: Bordone, R., ‘Le origini del comune di Genova’, pp.230-248.

⁴⁴² Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova...*, p.134; Van Doosselaere, Q., *Commercial agreements...*, p.37; ‘The Guild was a partnership of merchants, the Compagna was a partnership of warriors’. With these words he gives his interpretation of what the Compagna was at heart. Indeed a powerful counterfactual description of the foundations of the Genoese Commune, although it must be remembered how the finding of this, and other, researches show that the distinction between merchant-warrior-pirate is not at all clear.

⁴⁴³ As the election of the first consuls of the pleas to assist the consuls in matter of civil justice demonstrates.

⁴⁴⁴ Wickham, C., *Courts and Conflict in Twelfth-century Tuscany* (Oxford, 2004) p.16. Which also provides what is probably the clearest synthesis of the current debate, pp.16-28.

head...'.⁴⁴⁵ The analysis of the family profiles of these groups of leaders form the core of chapter three. From the very beginning of the *Annales* we found out that the foundation of the commune brought onto the Genoese scene a new political subject, the consuls of the commune.⁴⁴⁶ In the following session the pattern of development followed by the consular figure is discussed in order to provide a deeper understanding of the role of the consuls during the period covered by the thesis. The consular office was the most important of the commune's political positions for the ninety years of the Genoese consular commune. Its assertion, however, required a substantial development that is briefly outlined in what follows. For the first two decades of the twelfth century the commune was organised on the basis of the election of a varying number, up to six, of consuls for the duration of three or four years. From 1122 a fundamental innovation took place and four, five or six consuls were elected for a period of one year. Together with the consuls, the *clavarii* (the administrators of the budget of the city), scribes (essentially the personal secretaries of the consuls) and one chancellor were also elected. Everything, in the words of Caffaro, happened *pro utilitate rei publicae*, in a language that is revealing of the magnitude of the changes that must have been apparent to the contemporaries and certainly to the annalist – himself a major consular figure from 1120 on. The term *res publica* is introduced in place of *compagna* and the consuls – whose names from now on will accompany the *Annus Domini* at the beginning of each yearly section of the *Annales* – became a fundamental element of the chronological history of Genoa. In the 'preciso sincronismo' – exact synchronism – of the yearly narration of the chronicles and of the elections of the consuls, Vito Vitale sees the final 'compiuta identificazione' – accomplished identification – between the *compagna* and the *commune*.⁴⁴⁷

Between 1122 and 1133 the communal institutions stabilized further. In 1125 the figure of 'Public Witnesses' was created to guarantee the fairness of the consular decisions. In 1128 a

⁴⁴⁵ Wickham, C., *Courts and Conflict...*, p.17.

⁴⁴⁶ Obviously the consular institution had a prolonged gestation, longer than Caffaro claimed. For instance a document of 1098 already mentioned a certain Amico Brusco as 'consul civitatis'. (Olivieri, A., 'Serie dei consoli...', p.67).

⁴⁴⁷ Vitale, V., *Breviario...*, p.26.

fiscal system based on tariffs was introduced. In 1130 the consuls were flanked by the consuls of the pleas, to whom the administration of non penal justice was delegated. What is important to stress for the purposes of this thesis is that by 1133 the institutional framework of the commune of Genoa was clearly established. The structure was to remain essentially unchanged until the appointment of the first *podestà* of Genoa in 1191.⁴⁴⁸ Until then, and on several occasions thereafter, the fundamental political office, with full executive powers, military command, administration of civil and penal justice, and control over the finance and trade of the city, remained that of the consuls of the commune. Importantly, we are well aware of the all important political dimension of these officials, mostly because their functions are recorded in the contemporary evidence.

The functions of the consuls as emerging from the *breve* of 1143

From the 1140s, the competences of the consuls can be seen to be well defined, thanks to the redaction of *brevi* that the officers of the commune swore at the moment of entering office. The only one of these documents to survive is dated to 1143.⁴⁴⁹ It can be used as a guide to understand what the consuls were called to rule upon from their seats located at three main Genoese churches: Santa Maria di Castello; San Siro; and San Lorenzo. The brief portrays an image of the *consules pro comuni*, mostly active in matters of penal justice and in the control of violence in the city.⁴⁵⁰ After an initial reference to the need to avoid dishonouring the city and the church, the *breve* focuses on one of the principal roles of the Consuls. That is, to act – with the support of the consuls of the pleas – as criminal judges in the city. The brief states unsurprisingly that intentional homicide was the most serious crime, followed by the crime of violent assault.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁸ A reform the details and significance of which already been have made clear in chapter one.

⁴⁴⁹ Earlier briefs probably existed and a later one survives (although concerned with the office of the consuls of the pleas), see Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.36.

⁴⁵⁰ *CDG*, vol.I, doc. 128.

⁴⁵¹ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.36.

The brief also contains some indications of how the job of the consuls was to be carried out. In matters of justice, when consuls could not find an agreement, the majority ruled. This rule is important when attempting to establish whether a particular interest group dominated the communal government in any given year, because it means that in order for this to be the case, one faction did not need to exclude all members of a competing faction from public offices.⁴⁵² Another fundamental aspect of the work of consuls, as it emerges from the analysis of the Annals and of the Genoese diplomatic records, was their role in directing Genoese foreign policy. In the conclusion I will discuss at length the many occasions on which the consuls operated as army leaders, admirals or ambassadors for the commune. The *breve* sheds some light on the dynamics of such sales. For instance, it informs us that consuls were not allowed to organise an army, begin a new war or devise a new tax without the consent of a majority of the council.⁴⁵³

Finally, as has clearly been illustrated while describing the Genoese conflicts in part one of this thesis, another role of the consuls was to maintain the peace within the city walls, the *concordia et pax* so often invoked by the chroniclers of Genoa.⁴⁵⁴ The *breve* informs us that the consuls had the responsibility to destroy any tower built without their consent or to fine their owners. Furthermore, carrying weapons in the city required a special permission. Not doing so was punishable by a fine. The prestige of being a consul did not come without burdens. The consuls had to swear an oath, including the responsibility to maintain justice and defend the *compagna*. More than anything, the consuls promised to perform their duties with good faith and without fraud, and not to ignore their mission because of love, fear, hatred or any other reason. Any misconduct in their duties was to be judged by their fellow consuls and

⁴⁵² Although it must be remembered that the *breve* only speaks of this in relation to justice, not necessarily (e.g.) going to war.

⁴⁵³ Unfortunately, no document surviving records the composition, mandate and functions of such a council.

⁴⁵⁴ The reader will recall the debate – contained in chapter one – of the relevance of the language used by the annalist in reference to the dialectic of war and peace. The figure of the consul is always shown as striving to maintain peace and the success of a consulate is largely assessed on the ability to do so. The other common image of the chronicles, is the one of the consul leading an army or chasing pirate fleets.

by the *compagna*. Only a clear impediment or forgetfulness could explain a lapse in their duties.⁴⁵⁵

Genoese consular families, and factions, as descendants from tenth and eleventh centuries' viscounts

The current interpretation of the episodes described in part one of my dissertation has been based on the assumption that the main consular families of the twelfth century descended from the viscounts that had ruled Genoa during the Carolingian period, until the tenth century. In particular the interpretations of Avner Greif and Gerald Day build on this view. Avner Greif states that 'by the late eleventh century, clans became important economic, social and political entities in northern Italy', and that 'two Viscountal clans, the Manecianos and the Caramandinos, were particularly important in Genoa. These clans, descended from a tenth century feudal viscount of the area'.⁴⁵⁶ In Greif's theory these clans had the economic and military resources needed to build the Genoese state, in particular 'In the early days of the commune, they had the resources required to launch large-scale piracy raids and obtain commercial privileges abroad'. This statement is fundamental because, according to Greif, the commune could gain commercial privileges abroad – and therefore obtain economic growth – only if these clans cooperated and mobilized resources jointly.⁴⁵⁷ As is an unfortunate characteristic of an historical inquiry based on an analytical narrative methodology, as applied by Avner Greif, hypothesis and historical evidence soon become blended. Thus on the basis that these clans existed in Genoa and that Genoa experienced episodes of civil war, Greif concludes that 'each clan decides in turn how much (income) to divert to sunk investment in military strength...Immediately after investing in military strength, a clan can decide whether to attack the other'... 'If a clan attacks, each clan's probability of winning increases with its

⁴⁵⁵ The *Annales* of the city could also be interpreted as a reference point for the characteristics of a successful consuls – *virii consulares*. (Guglielmotti, P., 'Recensione a Schweppenstette: *Die Politik der Erinnerung*', p.210.).

⁴⁵⁶ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.223.

⁴⁵⁷ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.224.

relative military strength. A winning clan becomes a controlling clan, which receives all future income from privilege'. It was, in Greif's view, when this mutual deterrence game between clans was undermined by a change in the conditions – typically the receding of external threats – that Genoa became the theatre of civil wars.

Gerald Day hypothesises a further element of the ongoing confrontations between the clans, which, according to the author, even had specific long term political goals for the Genoese commune. The author states that 'the viscountal clans of Maneciano and Caramandino were the dominant political groups in Genoa...these men and their friends formed the expansionist faction. The basic policy of this group was to use the resources of Genoa to expand commercial influence, and its own profit, throughout the Mediterranean'. According to Day, this plan was opposed to their opponents, 'The Caramandino families...opposed their expansionist cousins and would support a conservative, sometimes even reactionary political program based on maintaining the old German imperial system from which they derived their feudal power in Genoa...these Caramandino families in general remaining aloof, probably with some contempt watched the commune grow in power and waited for their opportunity to regain municipal control'.⁴⁵⁸ Day bases his analysis on the fact that 'it is generally agreed that these two viscountal clans were rivals'.⁴⁵⁹ Indeed, according to the eminent historian of family structure in medieval Genoa, Diane Hughes, '[w]ithin Genoa ties of lineage were the ones most frequently strengthened to bind aristocrats into common action groups...For purposes of political alliance in the twelfth-century these bonds could be extended effectively for five generations or more'. As a consequence, the scholar concludes, '[a] system of long-lasting alliance within lineages and enmity between them gave pattern to the seemingly pointless warfare played out on the streets of medieval Genoa...'.⁴⁶⁰ All the early genealogical information on which these conclusions are based comes from Tommaso

⁴⁵⁸ Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, pp.75-75.

⁴⁵⁹ Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.100.

⁴⁶⁰ Hughes, D.O., 'Urban Growth...', p.7.

Belgrano's nineteenth-century reconstructions. In this light it appears that Hughes' conviction that from a political perspective the lineage bonds could be extended for 'five generations or more', does not derive from a study of the actual Genoese families' behaviours in the twelfth century, but simply from the fact that Tommaso Belgrano's genealogical studies are all aimed at demonstrating a clear continuity from the tenth-century viscount regime to the twelfth century consular families.

Before taking into consideration how our analysis of the phenomenon of conflict in Genoa is reshaped by placing it into the much larger context of the Genoese consular elite, we must address the enduring view that the Genoese political scenario in the twelfth-century revolved around the competition of these viscomital clans. In fact, all the former statements and hypotheses are ultimately based on the way in which Genoa was administered before the foundation of the commune. Under the Carolingian system of counts, a viscount had controlled Genoa.⁴⁶¹ Although by the mid-eleventh century any public dimension of these families had disappeared, the nineteenth-century historiography of Genoa – in particular the genealogical reconstructions of Tommaso Belgrano – argued that the leading families of Genoa in the following centuries largely descended from Viscount Ido and could be divided in three viscount clans: Caramandino; Isola; and Manesseno. This dated back to the two supposed children of Ido Vicemoces, Oberto and Migesio, and to his brother Oberto of Manesseno. This initial assumption, in itself quite unstable, represented the starting point from which Tommaso Belgrano – occasionally with the support of the documentary evidence but more often only with the use of suggestive, albeit undemonstrable, deductions – attempted to reconstruct the genealogical origins of a large proportion of the families that formed the Genoese consular elite. All current analyses of the Genoese consular elite in the twelfth-century – and, as we have seen, of its sometimes violent internal divisions – is based on this nineteenth-century reconstruction. As a result of the extreme poverty of the tenth and eleventh

⁴⁶¹ Petti Balbi, G., 'I Visconti di Genova...', p.60.

century historical sources, nineteenth century scholarship decided to explore only one option: to trace back the continuity between the viscounts who – it was presumed – must have held onto the legitimacy obtained through the exercise of public functions, and the consular families of the twelfth century. The historical panorama in which these theories were formulated is well summarized by the words of Cornelio Desimoni in the mid-nineteenth century: ‘from the multiplication, division and reunion of the Viscounts, a new society, the nucleus of the Genoese commune was born’.⁴⁶² The first one to question this interpretative paradigm and to warn of the risks of relying exclusively on it was the Genoese scholar Giovanna Petti Balbi. Writing on the family structures of the medieval period, she affirmed that Genoese historiography lacks ‘a perception (of the society) based on a vast and complex prosopography, as it is demonstrated by the facility with which scholars continue to re-propose, and to believe in, genealogical reconstructions dating back to the nineteenth century, or even earlier’.⁴⁶³ However, exploring carefully, we could say that as early as 1940 Mattia Moresco was aware of this danger, when in his ‘Parentele e guerre civili in Genova nel secolo XII’, he argued that the conflicts of the twelfth century were conflicts among the largest noble families of Genoa and not between individuals, but – in Diane Hughes’ words – failed in ‘finding in them a patterned struggle between hostile lineages’.⁴⁶⁴ It is possible that Moresco might have silently expressed his skepticism towards the genealogical reconstructions of Belgrano and Olivieri, when he regretted that ‘given the available historiography we are forced to rely on the old works of Belgrano to identify the Genoese families’ groups...but it is a topic that awaits a modern exploration taking into account the available documentation’.⁴⁶⁵ This was a hidden warning that failed to have any effect, however, since all later scholarship on the early Genoese commune, ranging from the reconstruction of Erik Bach in 1955 to the

⁴⁶² Desimoni, C., ‘Sul frammento di Breve genovese scoperto a Nizza. Relazione letta alla sezione archeologica’, *ASLI*, I, pp.93-154 1858, p.117.

⁴⁶³ Petti Balbi, G., *Governare la città...*, p.16.

⁴⁶⁴ Hughes, D. O., ‘Urban Growth...’, p.7.

⁴⁶⁵ Moresco, M., ‘Parentele e guerre...’, p.434, n. 24.

one of Steven Epstein in 1996, uncritically accepted an image of Genoese consular families divided into lineages based on their viscomital roots.⁴⁶⁶

This state of affairs is beginning to change. Luca Filangieri in his 2010 dissertation decided to address this lengthy debate by taking into consideration the available documentation that supposedly connects several major twelfth consular families to their supposed viscountal forefathers in the tenth century. In particular, the scholar focusses on the tenth and eleventh century documentation available for the families Spinola, Castello, Embriaco, Brusco – Manesseno branch – and for the families Pevero, Usodimare, Lusio, Avvocato and Caramandino – Caramandino branch.⁴⁶⁷ The results are telling; in reality only very little anecdotal evidence allows a connection between the three viscountal branches in the mid-eleventh century and some of the consular families in the twelfth century.⁴⁶⁸ Filangieri states that ‘certainly we could connect this scarcity to the eleventh-century documentary dispersion’, but the truth is that ‘there is no possibility of tracing convincing genealogies, that would allow the quantification and evaluation of the contribution given by these *stirpi* - lineages – to the elite that ruled the commune in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’.⁴⁶⁹

Filangieri’s conclusions should have a far-reaching impact on any study of the phenomenon of civil conflict in twelfth and thirteenth century Genoa. Particularly in chapter three they allow me to cast aside the rigid paradigm of a city divided along centuries’ old lineages, whose political affiliations and enmities had originated somewhere in the remote past of Genoa.⁴⁷⁰ Therefore I am able to rely only on the actual evidence available, without interpreting those through the deforming lens of surpassed genealogical reconstructions that have affected any previous interpretation of civil conflict.

⁴⁶⁶ Bach, E., *La Cité de Genes...*, pp.41-45; Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...* Also, most recently, in Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova...*, this connection is uncritically accepted, pp.138-139.

⁴⁶⁷ In the genealogical reconstructions it appears to exist a third viscountal clan – Isola (Belgrano, L., *Tavole*, Tav. 38) which descendants did not take part in the Genoese political sphere. The main families of this lineage should have been Isola and Turca. However it is evident that the family Turca in reality was closely associated with the families Avvocato and Pevero.

⁴⁶⁸ See section ‘I Vicecomites a Genova X-XI: un problema aperto’ in Filangieri, ‘Famiglie’..., pp.8-39, in particular.

⁴⁶⁹ Filangieri, L., ‘Famiglie...’, pp.38-39.

⁴⁷⁰ Interestingly I was unable to find any reference to the reasons why the different viscountal branches should be considered politically opposed a priori – in the interpretation of Hughes and Greif - and even less explanation for the reasons why they should have been divided along anachronistic lines of reactionaries and modernizers – in Gerald Day’s interpretation.

The analysis of Genoese consuls for the period 1160 – 1190

In an effort to further understand the economic, social and political dynamics of medieval Genoa and the role that violence and conflict played in shaping them, this chapter will focus on the families that held the consulate. The continuity of the chronicles allows for a precise identification of the people and families that participated in the *commune*'s political life at the highest level. The names of the Genoese consuls of the *commune* were a key element of the annalistic tradition of the city. In fact, for some years the annalist recorded very little information apart from the names of the main officers of the Commune. This consistent list of 'personal data' can be used to further our knowledge of the political structure of the city of Genoa between 1160 and 1220. The database of Genoese citizens that held the office of consul offers a nearly complete image of the ruling elite of Genoa for the period under consideration, as well as a complete succession of Genoese communal governments. Then, as has been done in chapter two for the families involved in cases of violence, the analysis of the surviving commercial and diplomatic sources allows us to study the main political actors on the Genoese political scene from a social, economic and patrimonial point of view, allowing for the possible uncovering of the hidden links between the Genoese government and the conflicts analysed.

Chronology

This analysis begins in 1160, for the reasons underlined in chapter one, and terminates in 1190, before the election of the first *podestà* of Genoa in 1191.⁴⁷¹ This year, while not marking the end of the consular office in Genoa, did mark the beginning of a period during which Genoa was administered by either consuls or *podestà*, which is therefore better analysed as a separate chapter. I divided – for the purpose of the analysis - the thirty years

⁴⁷¹ See table.3.1.

considered into three decades, each of them corresponding to one of the five periods of Genoese civil conflicts evidenced in the first part of this dissertation:

- I) **1160s:** Conflict between individual families; political homicides and first instances of conflicts between groups of families that will later define the factional structure of the violence in the city.
- II) **1170s:** Suspension of factional violence; some episodes of conflicts between friendly families that did not escalate.
- III) **1180s:** Development of factional structures; escalation into civil war; institutional reform; opposition to change.

Families/Years	n.	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90
ALBERICO	11				C	C		C		C	C		C	C				C	C	C	C											
ANTIOCHIA	1														C																	
BACEMO	1											C																				
BELLAMUTO	2								C					C																		
BUFFERIO	2																								C				C			
BURONE*	1			C																												
CAFFARO	4						C			C	C		C																			
CARMADINO	3																					C							C		C	
CASTELLO	3				C											C														C		
CICALA	2			C			C																									
CRISPINO	1	C																														
DORIA	12					C	C					C	C	C		C		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	
EMBRIACO	6															C		C									C	C	C	C		
FORNARIO	3															C		C		C												
GARRIO	2									C														C								
GONTARDO	2						C	C																								
GRILLO	8				C	C		C				C				C		C		C						C	C					
GRIMALDO	3			C							C															C						
GUERCIO	9	C		C	C		C					C			C	C		C				C								C		
GUIDONE	1	C																														
LONGO	2															C		C														
MALLONO	4	C						C																	C	C						
MARI	3																								C				C		C	
MARABOTO	2							C	C																							
MAURO	5		C					C									C														C	C
MUSCOLA	3				C		C					C																				
NIGRO	3													C					C												C	
NUVELONO	4			C					C										C							C						
ODONE	1										C																					
PEVERE	8	C			C			C								C										C	C	C			C	
PICAMILIO	4				C																					C					C	C
PICIO	1																							C								
PORCELLO	1																									C						
RECALCATO	3						C			C								C														
RODOLFO	2								C						C																	
ROZA	3						C			C	C																					
SARDENA	2											C						C														
SPEZAPEDRA	2																								C						C	
SPINOLA	7	C	C		C			C					C																	C	C	
TANCLEO	3						C								C										C							
TORNELLO	3									C																	C		C			
TURCA	2																									C		C				
USODIMARE	1				C																											
VENTO	10				C						C						C	C		C	C						C			C	C	C
VOLTA	15		C	C	C	C								C	C	C	C		C	C		C	C		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C

Table 3.1 List of consular families and number of appointments for the years 1160-1190⁴⁷²

⁴⁷² The Burone family as discussed in chapter two was essentially the same of the de Volta family.

Table 3.1, above, lists all the families of the officials taken into consideration in this chapter and the years in which they acquired the position of consul of the commune.⁴⁷³ Prior to analysing these families' profiles and affiliations I shall briefly consider the general picture illustrated in tables 3.1.

Families	n.	Families	n.	Families	n.	Families	n.
VOLTA	15	PICAMILIO	4	CICALA	2	BURONE	1
DORIA	12	CARMADINO	3	GARRIO	2	CRISPINO	1
ALBERICO	11	CASTELLO	3	GONTARDO	2	GUELFO	1
VENTO	10	FORNARIO	3	LONGO	2	GUIDONE	1
GUERCIO	9	GRIMALDO	3	MARABOTO	2	ODONE	1
GRILLO	8	MARI	3	RODOLFO	2	PICIO	1
PEVERE	8	NIGRO	3	SARDENA	2	PORCELLO	1
SPINOLA	7	RECALCATO	3	SPEZAPEDRA	2	USODIMARE	1
EMBRIACO	6	ROZA	3	TANCLEO	3		
MAURO	5	MUSCOLA	3	TURCA	2		
CAFFARO	4	TORNELLO	3	ANTIOCHIA	1		
MALLONO	4	BELLAMUTO	2	BACEMO	1		
NUVELONO	4	BUFFERIO	2				

Table 3.2 Ranking of Consular Families and number of consulates for the years 1160-1190

During the three decades considered, one hundred and seventy-five consuls, coming from forty-eight families, were elected.⁴⁷⁴ A quick consideration of Table 3.2 confirms the

⁴⁷³ *Annales*, also summarised in Olivieri, A., *Lista dei consoli*. I will discuss the pre-1160 period in the prosopographic section of each family.

⁴⁷⁴ With an average of 3.5 consular appointments per family.

necessity of including an analysis of the Genoese consular families in any attempt to untangle the phenomenon of civil conflict in Genoa.

Seven of the eight families that held the consulate for most occasions during the period were involved in episodes of internal violence. Out of forty-nine families that held the consulate, fifteen took place in the civil conflicts. Chapters one and two discussed at length the several episodes in which the dramatic connections between the civil violence and the consular office became apparent, for instance with the homicides of the consuls. These tables underline the fact that the great majority of the episodes of civil violence that occurred between 1160 and 1190 involved Genoese consular families.

These finding and considerations offer a simple answer to the questions of whether civil violence mattered and how violent was Genoa. While it is certainly true that the vast majority of the Genoese were never involved as protagonists in episodes of civil violence, the political importance and family prestige of the individuals involved confirms the importance of a detailed study of the Genoese civil conflicts. Even if we are convinced by the thesis that the Genoese fought over all sorts of things, not only over what can be defined as high politics, it is likely that these conflicts had very far reaching outcomes politically because – as I shall demonstrate – they were the engines behind the formation of actual coalitions in the city.

The relationship between the consular office – or more generically between the political participation of a family – and the civil conflicts that took place in Genoa is also confirmed by considering the three decades separately. Most of the consular families that were involved in episodes of internal violence did so in the same years that saw them as protagonists of the *communal* governments.

FIRST PERIOD: 1160s

In the 1160s we have the earliest information regarding the emergence of structured episodes of civil violence in Genoa. Chapter two illustrated how the connections of the families that were involved in episodes of violence did not necessarily represent a previously divided

society (see cluster map one). Most of the families involved in the violent episodes were, or were closely related to, members of the consular elite of the city. During this decade thirty families obtained the fifty-five consulates of the commune.⁴⁷⁵ In part one I have discussed how the violent clash of 1164-1165, which placed the Avvocato and Castello families in opposition, was the one that shaped the structure of the Genoese conflict for the ensuing thirty years. The other families mentioned by Oberto Cancelliere as having been involved in the violent episodes were de Volta (Marchese de Volta was murdered in 1165), Guercio and Usodimare (killed in battle).⁴⁷⁶

While the Avvocato family did not have a member serving as consul of the commune in the 1160s, its links to one of the powerful consular families of the decade, Pevere, were extremely strong. Rubaldo Avvocato was a first cousin of the consul Lanfranco Pevere – who served three times during the 1160s. Fulcone de Castello, on the other hand, was not only a member of the same family as a 1163 consul, but was also the son in law of Ingone de Volta – head of the family that obtained the most consular positions in the 1160s and overall. Both the Guercio and Usodimare families were consular, as was the Piccamilio family which had opposed the family Usodimare in a war in 1162.⁴⁷⁷

Considering that it has been demonstrated in chapter two that the less important families involved in the violent episodes were each also connected to the consular families listed above, we can state with confidence that the civil violence of the 1160s was all internal to the Genoese consular elite.⁴⁷⁸ How did the consuls react to these events, which had the potential to affect the very core of the commune? In 1164 the intensity of the violence was such that the consuls did not dare to organise the '*parlamentum*' for the election of their successors; it was the archbishop Ugone that '*fretus Dei concilio consolatum intrans anni viriliter suo ordinavit arbitrio*'. In 1165, faced by the '*dissensio civium et bellum etiam plus quam civile*',

⁴⁷⁵ Average per family 1.8.

⁴⁷⁷ *Annales*, Vol. I. p.73.

the consuls of the commune again did not react with force, but they limited themselves to *‘hinc inde treguam iurare, quod quisque as Sanctum Laurentium inermis et secures veniat ac per urbem civilius et comodius semper incedat’*. As discussed in chapter one, the appeasement attempts of 1165-1168 were not successful.⁴⁷⁹ Faced by these failures, the consuls proposed to *‘stare de Guerra et pace et de omnibus litibus in ordinatione...consolum’*, but then the council of the consuls could not reach a decision on how to proceed on the matter – *‘ad tantum negotium finiendum’*. Finally the consuls simply stated that *‘cognoverunt...sex bella vel duella campestria inter cives maiores occurrere’* – essentially recognising the right of the opponents to meet in battle, outside the city walls, and solve their grievances.⁴⁸⁰ The decision was motivated by a clear aim *‘si bella minime facture civibus ostenderimus, comunem utilitatem nimio timore oppressam demonstrantibus’*. At this point – once again – the Genoese archbishop intervened and called for the opponents to swear a peace oath.

It is necessary to go beyond the picture of the Genoese government as a monolithic body and uncover the connections – or lack thereof – between its members, in order fully to understand the effects of violence on the cohesiveness of the communal government, I will start by observing the links existing between the consular families in the period 1160-1164, prior to the first evidence of structured civil violence. My aim in doing so is to understand whether the violence of 1164 happened along already well-defined factional lines – as stated in the literature, and argued against in part one – or whether the events of 1164 represented a cataclysmic moment in terms of the city’s history of conflict.

1160-1164. Family profiles

Between 1160 and 1164, twenty-eight consuls were elected. They came from nineteen families, with four of these families– Guercio, Pevere, Spinola and de Volta – occupying thirteen consulates and the other families holding one consulate each. The availability of the

⁴⁷⁹ For the mentions of the previous unsuccessful truces: *Annales*, Vol.I, p. 201 (1167) and p. 206 (1168).

⁴⁸⁰ *Annales*, Vol. I. p. 218.

cartulary of Giovanni Scriba allows a vivid illustration of the cohesiveness of the Genoese consular elite during these fundamental years.

As discussed in chapter two, when working on the twelfth century we must exploit to the fullest every piece of information available. I will therefore reconstruct the family profiles of all the consular families, in order to deepen our understanding of the links evidenced by the cluster maps representing the fighting families.

ALBERICO (consul of the commune 1152, 1160, 1164, 1165, 1167, 1170, 1171, 1173, 1174, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1197)⁴⁸¹

From the 1150s onwards the Alberico family emerges as one of the main actors on the city's political scene.⁴⁸² The Alberico family participated in numerous public activities on behalf of the Commune of Genoa. For instance, a diplomatic document dated 1177 records the presence of Ottobono Alberico and his son among the witnesses of the handover of several castles to the Commune of Genoa by Ottone, Count of Ventimiglia.⁴⁸³ Again in 1177 Nuvolono Alberico was present in Cremona to discuss a peace agreement with the Venetians, represented by Pietro Michiel and Jacopo Dandolo.⁴⁸⁴ In 1179, Ottobono Scriba reports that on the occasion of the Third Lateran Council, Pope Alexander III requested the presence of Ugo, the archbishop of Genoa, who travelled to Rome on a 'properly armed' galley, accompanied by Nuvelono Alberico and Enrico Doria, giving us an image of unity of the spiritual and political image of Genoa, and therefore describing the Alberico and the powerful Doria as equals.⁴⁸⁵

The image of the Alberico family emerging from the notary is certainly the one of a wealthy family. The numerous real estate possessions recorded in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba

⁴⁸¹ In brackets all the appointments of a family's member as consul of the commune.

⁴⁸² For a genealogical reconstruction of the Alberico's lineage, first mentioned in an 1146 document, see Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', pp. 112-115.

⁴⁸³ *Libri Iurium*, I/2, doc. 419. The count subsequently received the investiture of the castles as vassal of Genoa.

⁴⁸⁴ M. Giordano – M. Pozza, *I Trattati di Genova 1136 – 1251*, Roma 2000. Doc. 2. The document is referred to in Cesare Imperiale Di Sant'Angelo's introduction to the *Annales* of Ottobono Scriba (Vol. II, pp. 18-19).

⁴⁸⁵ An image of unity in some sense confirmed by Ottobono, who stated with satisfaction that the pope 'omnia privilegia confirmavit'. *Annales*, Vol. II, p. 13.

leave no doubt about this. On more than fifty occasions Giovanni Scriba refers to possessions of the Alberico family while giving the geographical details of transactions dealing with real estate. In contrast, the family was not heavily involved in other types of investments.

Close to the sea within the walls of Genoa, the family owned - together with the Bacemo family - an eighty-foot tower.⁴⁸⁶ In the documents concerning the management of the tower, a handful of other families are always present as witnesses: Bacemo; Tornello; Nuvelono; and Maraboto. These are all consular families that were not involved in any episode of civil violence. Considering the delicate issue at stake, this is very interesting evidence of the strong personal ties existing among these families. In a later period, the economic position of the family seems to have worsened considerably. In documents contained in the notary of Guglielmo Cassinese, the Alberico family is mentioned only a handful of times, in commercial accounts from the early 1190s. From these records we know that the family owned several properties. In Genoa there was a '*domus heredum Lanfranci Alberici*' and in Recco cultivated land with fruit trees.⁴⁸⁷ We also know of another house, owned by Federico Alberico, behind the house of Opizo Lecavele.⁴⁸⁸ The reference to this house is contained in a document, dealing with a major real estate reorganisation between the families Avvocato, Turca, Lecavele and Pevere. The presence of the Alberico house within the Curia families' compound could indicate proximity between these families.⁴⁸⁹ The Alberico family still owned the tower 'by the sea' in Genoa, jointly with the Bacemo family. Alberico family members acted as witness to the promise made by Simone Bacemo to his brother Bartolomeo – leaving on a business trip - that their tower would not be used by anybody intent on waging a war.⁴⁹⁰ However, it is not in real estate that the family made the majority of its investments.

⁴⁸⁶ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 667, 668.

⁴⁸⁷ Cassinese, docs. 187, 371.

⁴⁸⁸ Cassinese, doc. 618.

⁴⁸⁹ Hughes, D. O., 'Urban Growth...', stresses how living in joint housing is an important characteristic of the Genoese patrilineal family.

⁴⁹⁰ Cassinese, docs. 497-498.

Most of the transactions in which the Alberico family members had an active role related to credit operations.

On the first occasion, in 1191, Rolando from Soler promised that he was going to repay a debt of £100 to Opizone Arcanbosco, Riccardo from Brignano and Oddone Alberico.⁴⁹¹ In the same year, Giacomo Vola from Asti promised that he would pay a sum of £71 to the banker Enrico, Oddone Alberico and Opizone Arcanbosco. Thirdly, the same Giacomo promised that he would pay, once again £71, to Ugo Laurino and Ugo di Casanova, under the guarantorship of Alberico and Arcanbosco.⁴⁹²

In none of these cases did the notary record how these loans were used. However, the documents offer a picture of the ways in which the Alberico family started to use their extensive properties and wealth by providing funds, in the form of loans or guarantees, to foreign merchants travelling through Genoa or doing business there.

Lastly, from the mid-twelfth century onwards, members of the Alberico family figured in prominent positions in embassies and on the battlegrounds leading Genoese armies. The Alberico family navigated the communal history of Genoa without taking part in any occasion of internal struggles. Their economic activities too seem to have been conducted in a largely independent way. The family's concerns regarding the use of its tower in Genoa for military purposes is indicative of their care not to be involved in the civil violence. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the Alberico family appeared extremely close to the consular families Bacemo, Tornello, Nuvelono and Maraboto, none of which was ever involved in the Genoese civil wars. From the perspective of factional affiliation, it should be stressed that the Alberico family possessed a house close to the properties of the families that were going to form the core of the faction de Curia. It could be argued, therefore, that it was closer to these families. However, what emerges from a wider prosopographical analysis is the reality of a complex society that cannot be divided into two opposing factions. While the political

⁴⁹¹ *Cassinesen*, doc. 1044.

⁴⁹² *Cassinese*, docs. 1634, 1644.

importance of the Alberico family cannot be questioned, the family simply decided not to get involved in any episodes of civil violence.

CASTELLO (1163, 1175, 1188)

The Castello family was one of the protagonists of the civil violence that took place in Genoa during the period covered by this dissertation, and, as such, its profile and affiliations have been explored in the first part of this thesis. In 1163 the member of the Castello family holding the consulate was Rogerone Ita.⁴⁹³ However, the protagonist of the civil confrontation of 1164 was Fulcone de Castello, the son-in-law of Ingone de Volta.

CICALA (1161, 1165)

Guglielmo Cicala was elected as consul of the commune in 1161 and 1165, after three terms as consul of the pleas in 1152, 1155 and 1157. In 1159 the family was involved in a real estate transaction with the Alberico and Maraboto families.⁴⁹⁴ In 1161, however, we know that Cicala travelled to Spain on business.⁴⁹⁵ In 1161-1162 the Cicala family had to manage the separation of a family member from the daughter of Guercio - the family agreed to renounce the *antefactum* of the wife.⁴⁹⁶ In 1162 Cicala is again present as witness of an agreement between Pevere and Embrone to loan a sum to the Abbey.⁴⁹⁷ The image of a family economically involved on a variety of fronts, from real estate to investment in trade to direct trading activities overseas, shifted during the second half of the twelfth century. By the early 1190s, when the Cicala family members appear on 31 notarial entries, its members were not playing an active role. The Cicala always acted as witnesses and on three occasions the notary

⁴⁹³ The surname de Ita was a matronymic. See Olivieri, A., 'Serie dei Consoli...', p.299 and Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.90.

⁴⁹⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 596.

⁴⁹⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 625.

⁴⁹⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 982, 1037.

⁴⁹⁷ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1000.

refers to their properties to determine a location. From these we know that the Cicala family owned a house in Genoa and properties in Castagneto.⁴⁹⁸

The commercial agreements dating back to the years of the Cicala's involvement at the top level of the Genoese political affairs offer the picture of a family dealing with very powerful unaligned families, such as the Alberico, and participating in the activities of the Pevero and Embrone families, two of the main families that would go on to form the de Curia coalition. In chapter four instead we shall see that the Cicala family became very close to the Spinola family, with its members serving as agents for the commercial enterprises of the Spinola. However, from a point of view of a 1160s political scenario, it is clear that the Cicala family had no particular factional affiliation.

CRISPINO (1134, 1160)

The Crispino family did not leave a lot of information regarding its activities in the 1160s. On a handful of occasions they acted as witnesses for documents drafted by Giovanni Scriba.⁴⁹⁹ No information regarding the family is of use in understanding its eventual political affiliation.⁵⁰⁰

GRILLO (1163, 1165, 1168, 1172, 1176, 1184, 1186)

The connections of Amico Grillo have been assessed in chapter two where I underlined that the Grillo family's main characteristic relating to its affiliations was its close connections to the Vento family.

GRIMALDO (1162, 1170, 1184)

⁴⁹⁸ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 94 refers to the house; *Oberto* 1190, doc. 188 and *Cassinese*, doc. 1602 refer to the properties in Castagneto.

⁴⁹⁹ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 2, 7, 43, 1132.

⁵⁰⁰ Starting from the 1200s there is more information regarding the activities of this family, which, once again does not appear to have been connected to any of the families involved in the civil conflicts.

The family of the consul Giovanni Grimaldo was closely connected to the Spinola family. The relationships between the two families have been described in chapter two, so here I simply wish to remind the reader that the two families jointly founded and donated a church to the archbishop of Genoa in 1188.⁵⁰¹

GUERCIO (1160, 1162, 1164, 1167, 1172, 1175, 1177, 1181, 1188)

The family Guercio was involved in the episodes of civil violence of the 1160s. In part one I discussed the activities and connections of this family, concluding that although it was commercially closer to the families that were going to form the de Volta faction, it maintained a neutral stance in the face of the escalating conflict of the following decades.

GUIDONE (1160)

Ogerio Guidone and other members of his family acted economically with the families closer to the de Volta faction, but never took part in any episodes of civil violence.⁵⁰²

MALLONO (1160, 1167, 1182, 1182)

None of the Mallono family members played a role – direct or indirect – in the civil struggles. But the extensive commercial records left by the family provide important information in defining this family's position in relation to the factional divisions in Genoa. In the 1150s and 1160s the Mallono family appears to have been extremely close to the de Volta family, in particular through the connections of Idone Mallono.⁵⁰³ These economic connections are maintained during the whole period explored by this dissertation. Moreover, the Mallono family never figures as associated with the family Pevere, or to other families of the de Curia coalition. On several occasions Mallono family members acted as agents for de Volta and

⁵⁰¹ Cassinese, doc. 1492; Moresco, M., 'Note sulla fondazione della chiesa gentilizia...'.
⁵⁰² Giovanni Scriba, docs. 3,4,7,587,602.

⁵⁰³ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 96, 97, 401, 696, 705, 798, 892, 900, 901.

Castello. Once Idone Mallono brought Ingone de Volta's goods to Ceuta⁵⁰⁴ and on another occasion he contracted an *accomendacio* with a Castello, once again in order to trade in Ceuta.⁵⁰⁵ On another occasion Ingone de Volta witnessed a notary act recording that Ottobono had to pay back a sum to Mallono⁵⁰⁶ and, on three occasions, members of the Mallono family figured as witnesses along with de Volta.⁵⁰⁷ Even the locations where the family recorded its agreements seem to indicate a certain proximity to the de Volta family. On 17th January 1190, Ugolino Mallono rented land to Oddone Vario in the house of Bonifacio de Volta,⁵⁰⁸ and on 10th February 1190 in the house of Bonifacio de Volta. Ugo Mallono declared that he had received £50 from Raimondo de Volta.⁵⁰⁹ In a document dated 30th July 1190 and registered in the house of Bonifacio de Volta, Antechino received from Idone Mallono £35 to be paid back in the East as 93 *bisanti* of Acre, to be paid within 15 days of the arrival of his ship and of his trade partners there. De Volta was also a witness to this transaction, and Ansaldo Mallono acted as another witness to the transaction in the de Volta house.⁵¹⁰ On the 16th August 1190, in the house of Bonifacio de Volta, Giovanni and Riccardo Buona Fede from Gaeta signed up to travel on a ship belonging to Ansaldo Mallono and Lanfranco Malfigliastro that was sailing towards the port of Acre.⁵¹¹ Mallono and Volta also invested jointly, as is evident from the occasion on which Nicola Mallono and Bonifacio de Volta, in the house of the latter, declared that they owed £120 to Guglielmo Budello for leather goods.⁵¹² So, one could be an important consular family, and a close economic associate of the de Volta, without becoming embroiled in factional violence as a major protagonist.

⁵⁰⁴ Cassinese, doc. 710.

⁵⁰⁵ Cassinese, doc. 197.

⁵⁰⁶ Cassinese, doc. 233.

⁵⁰⁷ Cassinese, docs. 99, 388, 570.

⁵⁰⁸ Cassinese, doc. 26. For a detailed profile of the commercial activities of Ugolino Mallono, (see Bach, E., *La Cité de Genes...*, pp.113-114).

⁵⁰⁹ Cassinese, doc. 111.

⁵¹⁰ Cassinese, doc. 630.

⁵¹¹ Cassinese, doc. 640.

⁵¹² Cassinese, doc. 669.

MAURO (1106/1110, 1123, 1131, 1150, 1161, 1167, 1176, 1189, 1190)

With the analysis of the activities of the de Mauro lineage our analysis takes us back to the origins of the Genoese Commune. Mauro di Piazzalunga (*Platealonga*), along with Ansaldo di Brasile, Bonusmatus de Medolico and Ido de Carmadino, was a consul of the *compagna* of Genoa for the four-year mandate of 1106-1110. Mauro was the only one among these consuls to link his identity to a very definite and urban space. The Piazzalunga was a rectangular space stretching from the church of San Lorenzo towards the sea.⁵¹³ The evidence shedding light on this eminent figure is limited to his appointment as consul in 1106 and to his presence among the Genoese citizens swearing the oath of the Compagna in 1099. However, Caffaro informs us of the existence of a certain Guglielmo de Mauro, elected consul in 1123 and 1131. These are the first occasions in which the patronymic de Mauro appeared. After that, the references to the descendants of Mauro become a common element of the Genoese sources. Therefore, we discover a Tancredi, Guglielmo and Martino – all identified with the patronymic de Mauro – and Rodoano, identified as son of Guglielmo de Mauro only on the occasion of his election to the consulate in 1162, but most probably identifiable as the generic Rodoano who is elected as consul of the pleas in 1145 and of the commune in 1150, 1161, 1167, 1176, 1189. The first evidence of the economic foundations of the family come from a document dated December 1131. This records how Giovanni, the son of the deceased Mauro, donated a farm in the valley of Bisagno, *pro anima*, to the monastery of Santo Stefano.⁵¹⁴ In 1134 and 1156 the sons of Tancredi de Mauro continued to own land in the same area.⁵¹⁵ The real estate possessions of the family assumed an important political dimension in 1162. In that year Rodoano de Mauro was a consul and he used his land in Albaro to agree a mortgage with Marchese de Volta, offering his personal properties as a guarantee, in case his successors as

⁵¹³The most recent genealogical study of the descendents of Mauro de Platealonga and of his brother Lamberto is in Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', pp.86-111.

⁵¹⁴ *Codice Diplomatico del Monastero di Santo Stefano*, Vol. I, doc. 68.

⁵¹⁵ *Libri Iurium*, I/3, doc. 568; *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 56.

consuls were not able to repay the debt of the Commune.⁵¹⁶ The properties owned by the family were also extensive within the city walls of Genoa.⁵¹⁷ The reconstruction of the economic activities of the de Mauro family shows that the capital of the family was essentially made up of properties, farms and houses.⁵¹⁸ The notarial evidence for the commercial activities of the Mauro family is very scarce. For the period under consideration, only one document survives. It records the creation of a society between Oddone Casanova, Rolando di Bisagno and Adalasia di Mauro, to trade in Marseille. This document was drafted in the house of Bonifacio de Volta. However, this is evidence of nothing more than the fact that the families mentioned above were not in conflict.⁵¹⁹

The existence of this document also confirms that the Mauro family did rely at least occasionally on the work of Oberto Scriba, making it less plausible that the apparent lack of interest of the family in long distance trade was simply due to the bias of the notarial archive surviving in Genoa. Every piece of evidence also points to the fact that the de Mauro family remained neutral during the explosions of civil violence in Genoa. This did not stop them from holding important roles on the Genoese political scene.⁵²⁰

MUSCULA (1164, 1167, 1172)

Sigismondo Muscola and Corso, his son, were elected consuls in the 1160s and early 1170s. Most likely this was exclusively a land-owning family. Of the ten documents surviving, seven recorded Sigismondo Muscola as witness and three stated that he acted as procurator for Richelda, wife of Maraboto Lecamon, because her family was in another city.⁵²¹ For later

⁵¹⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 940. The de Mauro's family predilection for investing in real estate is confirmed in several other documents, for instance in 1160 Rodoano and his brother Bonifacio de Mauro swop two properties in Albario and already from 1137 we know of properties owned by the family in Sardinia, (*Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 734 and *Libri Iurium*, Vol. I, doc. 42.)

⁵¹⁷ Bonifacio de Mauro owned a house in Piazzalunga, *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 94, Rodoano de Mauro another one not distant from Piazzalunga, *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 530, and the heirs of Enrico de Mauro owned properties in Genoa, *Cassinese*, doc. 43.

⁵¹⁸ Filangieri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.103.

⁵¹⁹ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 431. The £7 invested by Adalasia are indeed a small sum, however this cannot be considered indicative of the capital available to the family, since the investment was made by a female member of the family without the supervision or consilium of a male member, therefore indicating that she was investing out of her own private savings.

⁵²⁰ Filangieri, L., 'Famiglie...', p. 106.

⁵²¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 553-555.

decades there is no surviving evidence relating to the activities of this family. The Sigismondo family did not, or could not, enter the commercial sector of the Genoese economy. The evidence surviving does not allow us to link this family to any of the consular families that were later involved in episodes of civil violence.

NUVELONO (1168, 1178, 1184)

The activities of the Nuvelono family are mostly documented in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. In the records available the family members usually figured in the role of witnesses.⁵²² It is interesting to note that on almost all these occasions the Nuvelono were linked with the Guercio, Porcello and to a lesser extent to Gontardo and Camilla. On the few occasions in which the family had an active role, these were usually real estate transactions.⁵²³ On one occasion, in 1158 Nuvelono gave to Rubaldo Porcello a sum - as a sea loan - to trade in Messina.⁵²⁴ For later decades the available information becomes even more sparse. In 1186, Nuvelono acted as witness for a small transaction between two craftsmen; the act was recorded under a Nuvelono *porticus*, indicating the ownership by the Nuvelono family of a storage space in Genoa.⁵²⁵ An agreement recorded in September 1191 sheds further light on Nuvelono trading activities. Rainaldo Strugnono and Guglielmo Grato declared that they had bought a shipment of incense in Bugie, from Rainaldo. However, they declared, half of the incense was owned by Nuvelono. Nuvelono himself declared that he was going to invest these goods as part of a society of £50 that he had with Enrico Guercio to trade in Bugie.⁵²⁶ The link between the Guercio and Nuvelono families emerges again later in the same month when Nuvelono acted as witness in a real estate transaction between Baldovino Guercio and Paolo the draper.⁵²⁷ The Nuvelono family appears not to have owned substantial amount of

⁵²² In 35 occasions out of 40 documents.

⁵²³ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 397, 452.

⁵²⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 329. Guercio was a witness in this transaction.

⁵²⁵ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 220. In other two occasions Nuvelono acted as witness, (*Cassinese*, docs. 628, 708).

⁵²⁶ *Cassinese*, doc. 940. It is also interesting to underline that Lanfranco Alberico and Guglielmo Grillo are the two witnesses to this agreement.

⁵²⁷ *Cassinese*, doc. 1161.

properties and to have invested overseas through the Guercio's family network.⁵²⁸ In terms of the factionalism emerging in the 1160s, the Nuvolono family was certainly close to the Guercio family – which was involved in the violent episodes of 1164-1165 – and to the Porcello family, which in the 1160s was certainly associated with the Pevero family – which was to be involved in the civil wars.

PEVERE, PICCAMILIO, SPINOLA, USODIMARE, VENTO, VOLTA

All these families took part in the Genoese civil conflicts and therefore their profiles and affiliations have been object of careful analysis in chapter two. In 1162 the families Piccamilio and Usodimare opposed each other in a violent confrontation that was successfully resolved by the consuls. Ingone de Volta became involved in the civil war in the 1160s because he sided with his son-in-law, Fulcone Castello, against Rolando Avvocato. The family Pevero did not take part in the civil conflict in the first period, but it did in the third period of Genoese civil violence, siding with its Avvocato cousins. Similarly the Spinola family did not take part in any episode of civil violence until the early 1190s, when it sided with the by-then established de Volta faction against their opponents the de Curia party. The Vento family took part in several occasions of civil conflict, in the 1170s against its close allies Grillo, and subsequently first alongside their relative Castello and later against de Volta – as we have seen, the only case of a family switching sides during the Genoese civil wars.

From the point of view of factional affiliations in the 1160s, however, in part one I concluded that there was very little factional division pre-dating the violent episodes of 1164. This aspect is extremely important for understanding the logic of violence in Genoa and it will be the subject of further analysis in the conclusion of the analysis of the profiles of the consular families of the 1160s.

1165-1169. Family profiles

⁵²⁸ The Guercio and Porcello families were relatives.

BELLAMUTO (1114/1116, 1124, 1126, 1130, 1138, 1142, 1144, 1168, 1173)

The Bellamuto family took its name from a certain *Bellamutus*, who had been consul of the *commune* for 1114-1116. From the evidence surviving, the Bellamuto family emerges as involved in mercantile activities in Genoa and long distance trade in the western Mediterranean. In 1156 Bellamuto received £14 for the goods he sold to Giordano, a merchant from Piacenza.⁵²⁹ In 1158, Bellamuto witnessed, along with Pevere and Stancono, a transaction between a certain Giordano and Guglielmo Burone.⁵³⁰ In 1163 Bellamuto acted as a witness in the formation of a partnership between Lercario and Caramandino, while the latter acted as witness for the formation of a partnership of £100 between Lercario and Bellamuto.⁵³¹ A document of 1164 records an agreement between Bellamuto and Simone Doria. Bellamuto gave to Doria £100, which Bellamuto was to have back when the galley of Iusta returned safely from Sardinia.⁵³²

The strongest commercial links of the family therefore, were with the families Lercario and Doria, while the Bellamuto was also acquainted with the families Burone (Volta) and Pevere. We can certainly conclude that in the 1160s the family had no evident preference between the feuding families. The thriving economic activities of the family slowed down considerably in later decades along with its political participation. Only one commercial document relative to the family's activities survives for the 1190s and it records how in 1192 Bonadonna, the wife of Bellamuto, declared having received £50 from Guglielmo Collogruis; it therefore does not contribute to our understanding of the family's activities towards the end of the century.⁵³³

CAFFARO (1122, 1125, 1127, 1128, 1140, 1145, 1146, 1149, 1166, 1169, 1171, 1174)

The formal involvement of the members of the family de Caffaro in the public affairs of Genoa started from the second decade of the existence of the Commune. The most evident

⁵²⁹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 53.

⁵³⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 506.

⁵³¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1122, 1124.

⁵³² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1180.

⁵³³ *Cassinese*, doc. 1867.

expression of such participation is clearly to be found in the career of the annalist Caffaro who was consul six times – 1122, 1125, 1127, 1141, 1146 and 1149. In later decades the family became less successful, or interested, in obtaining consular positions, until it ceased – completely to hold the consulate of the commune after 1174 and any office-holding after the consulates of the pleas in 1181 and 1182. The dedication of Caffaro to the destiny of the Genoese Compagna and his practical commitment to it as warrior, crusader, diplomat, politician and chronicler has already been described in chapter one.⁵³⁴ From the point of view of Caffaro's perception of the civil violence in Genoa, it should be recalled how Oberto Cancelliere, opened his section of the Genoese *Annales* saying that he was going to resume the history of the city from where the venerable Caffaro had left it suspended because of the sadness and grief that the climate of tensions within the city walls generated in him. This detail, along with the fact that Caffaro's annals never mentioned any specific episode of civil violence, makes it quite clear what his position towards the Genoese civil conflicts was. Indeed, while there is continuity from the work of Caffaro to that of Oberto the chancellor when it comes to the detailed description of the Genoese external military involvement, the Annals of Caffaro remain silent and elusive when it comes to the issue of internal violence and war.

Caffaro's heirs appear to have maintained the same approach to the civil conflicts that were raging through Genoa in their time. After all, no member of the Caffaro family was ever documented as being involved in them. However, the family did not have a passive stance towards the conflict. In 1169 the consul Ottone de Caffaro marched on Lavagna, accompanied by his colleague Anselmo Garrio and leading an armed force in order to crush the *civilia bella* – civil battles - that were waging through the countryside and weakening the respect there for the Genoese.⁵³⁵ In a sense, therefore, Caffaro's family members were actively involved in the

⁵³⁴ Possibly the clearest example of the warrior qualities of Caffaro emerge in 1125 when, as consul of the Commune, he chased a fleet of seven Pisan galleys to the castle of Piombino and then destroyed both the fleet and the fortress. (*Annales*, vol.I, p.22).

⁵³⁵ *Annales*, vol.I, p.220.

conflicts of the late sixties. The notary Giovanni Scriba wrote the name Caffaro on 16 documents. On twelve occasions family members acted only as witnesses, but the remaining documents offer an insight in the activities of the family. In 1160 Simone Doria sold two plots of land in Genoa to Caffaro for £26. Furthermore, the latter promised the former that he was going to buy a further property from Iacaria de Castello for £18.⁵³⁶ The family, therefore, invested in real estate. However, the family was also an active player in long distance trade. In 1162 the young Ottone de Caffaro brought 348 *bisanti* to Constantinople, half of which belonged to his father Ansaldo de Caffaro and half to Marchisio de Volta.⁵³⁷ The same Marchisio promised Caffaro, the old patriarch of the family, that he was going to split his share of the capital into two halves, one that he had got from Ottone de Caffaro in Constantinople, the other half distributed to Caffaro's nephews operating there.⁵³⁸ These documents provide a vivid image of a landed family, such as the Caffaro were, also involved in long distance trade. After all, it should be remembered that the very name of the patriarch of the family and later of the family itself, Caffaro, might have been a clear indication of his involvement overseas. It is likely that the Genoese chronicler simply latinised the Arabic term *kafir* - infidel - which he acquired fighting alongside Guglielmo Embriaco in Syria.⁵³⁹

The notary records produced by Oberto Scriba and Guglielmo Cassinese present a very different picture of the activities of the de Caffaro in the eighties and early nineties however, a period which corresponded to the family's disengagement from the Genoese public affairs. The 39 records surviving for the period 1186-1192 show that Caffaro family members acted mostly as witnesses. The occasions on which they had an active role were however related to trade. For instance in 1191 Angelotto de Caffara invested £109 in an *accomendacio* with Ingo de Galiana and £61 with Oberto de Dandolo to trade in Naples.⁵⁴⁰ Guglielmo de Ventimiglia

⁵³⁶ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 777, 778.

⁵³⁷ Giovanni Scriba, docs. 1014, 1015.

⁵³⁸ Giovanni Scriba, doc. 1016.

⁵³⁹ Petti Balbi, G., *Caffaro e la cronachistica...*

⁵⁴⁰ Cassinese, docs. 25, 116.

had a society with Bonvassallo de Caffaro to trade in Ceuta.⁵⁴¹ The family activities thus became concentrated on the western Mediterranean. Furthermore, business links between Caffaro and the Doria and Volta families appear to have been weakened considerably by this time, along with the family's active involvement in the city's political scene. It is quite possible that Caffaro's heirs decided not to be involved in the political activities of the city once they became characterised by conflict. In 1169 the consul Ottone de Caffaro attempted to stem conflict in Lavagna, but afterwards the family did not take further political action, and reduced its connections with families, such as Volta, who were very much protagonists of civil conflicts.

DORIA (1165, 1166)

The economic profile and factional affiliations of the Doria family have been evaluated in chapter two. The conclusion was that in successive decades the family became much closer to the families that coalesced around the de Volta family during the civil confrontations. But in the 1160s we could consider this family essentially neutral.

GARRIO (1169, 1181)

When he was a consul in 1169 Anselmo Garrio took part in the expedition punishing the rebels of Lavagna.⁵⁴² This remained the only time the Garrio family had any involvement in the civil conflicts affecting Genoa. Anselmo Garrio was consul again in 1181. On 12th November of 1191 he was present, along with a very limited number of other witnesses, in the palace of the Genoese archbishop when the German Emperor Henry VI nominated notaries Bongiovanni and Bonvillano as scribes.⁵⁴³ Thus the family, through the eminent figure of Anselmo, played an active role in the Genoese political landscape.

⁵⁴¹ *Cassinese*, doc. 351.

⁵⁴² *Annales*, vol.I, p. 35.

⁵⁴³ *Cassinese*, doc. 1323.

The Garrio was a landed family, and the surviving commercial agreements reflect this. From a transaction dating back to 1162 we know of an extensive real estate readjustment of the family properties. Anselmo Garrio and his wife Richelda sold a farm cultivated with vines to Anfosso de Clavica, as well as a house and a third of all the land they possessed in Clavica.⁵⁴⁴ Through these transactions Rodoano de Mauro and Ansaldo Tancleo - relatives of Richelda - advised Anselmo and Richelda Garrio. The connections between these families are evident in all the other agreements recording the presence of Anselmo Garrio as witness, always with de Mauro and Tancleo.⁵⁴⁵ Only a handful of documents survive for the early 1190s - essentially confirming the picture outlined above. Just one document records the, tangential participation of the Garrio family in long distance trade activities. It records an *accomendacio* between Ugo Papazolla and Guglielmo Rataldo to conduct affairs in Castile. Ugo brought with him £150 belonging to Rataldo and contributed £108 himself. However, £100 of the sum was borrowed from Anselmo Garrio.⁵⁴⁶ Judging by this transaction the Garrio family appears very wealthy - £100 is a very large single investment – but the family did not take an active role in the transaction and limited itself to use the capital obtained through real estate to invest in the enterprise. Anselmo's role, therefore, emerges as similar to that of Rataldo. The latter, a wealthy Genoese banker was, however, the protagonist of many such transactions. But this is the only occasion on which Garrio participated in this way. The remaining documents provide a little more information referring to Garrio's properties outside Genoa. In two cases Anselmo Garrio acted as witness for agreements where a party committed to repaying a debt, again linking the Garrio family to the world of Genoese finance.⁵⁴⁷ From a record dated 1190 we learn that the family owned a courtyard in Genoa.⁵⁴⁸ In conclusion, in terms of the factional affiliations in the 1160s and in the following decades, the Garrio family should be considered neutral.

⁵⁴⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1001-1004.

⁵⁴⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 508, 546, 1088.

⁵⁴⁶ *Cassinese*, doc. 1573.

⁵⁴⁷ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 307 and *Cassinese*, doc. 1426. In the latter case Scoto commits to repay a sum to Vassallo Respeito to settle an outstanding debt of Guasco de Volta.

⁵⁴⁸ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 367.

GONTARDO (1126, 1128, 1131, 1135, 1145, 1158, 1166, 1168)

The Gontardo family saw its members appointed as consuls of the Commune in 1126, 1128, 1131 and 1135, before the first election of Ido to the consulate in 1145. Ido Gontardo was key to the family's involvement in Genoese communal politics, as he was also elected to the consular seat in 1158, 1166 and 1168. It is evident, however, that the family moved from a high level political involvement in the early decades of the commune to relative political disengagement, willing or forced, in the 1170s, 1180s and 1190s. They only appear as consuls of the pleas in that later period.⁵⁴⁹

From the point of view of family relations, Ido linked his family to the Guercio and Porcello families, marrying one of the daughters of Ido Porcello, and the niece of Enrico Guercio.⁵⁵⁰ These family relations appear central to the economic activities of the family. A document contained in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba shows that the Gontardo family favoured their kin and extended family when it came to business.⁵⁵¹ Indeed, Diane Hughes pointed out that the 'Gontardi were extremely diverse in their commercial interests...but in their dealings they acted almost exclusively with family members, adding new personnel through marriage'.⁵⁵² In the 1150s and 1160s, the notary Giovanni Scriba recorded the activities of Enrico, Fredencio, Ido, Oberto and Oto Gontardo. The Gontardo often acted independently, but they were always all present when real estate transactions were agreed, such as in the 1163 major real estate sale to Doria, and in marriage strategy, such as for the marriage of Leona Gontardo to Recalcato in 1163.⁵⁵³ This state of affairs broke down towards the end of the period under consideration here. In the 1170s, 1180s and 1190s the family's economic activities dwindled.

⁵⁴⁹ After the last consular mandate of Ido, the Gontardo family was to see its members elected six more times, but only to the consulate of the pleas: 1170, 1171, 1172, 1176, 1177, 1187 (*Annales*, Vol.I, pp.54-64.)

⁵⁵⁰ Enrico Guercio was married to a sister of Ido Porcello. One of the daughters of Ido Porcello was married to Ido Gontardo.

⁵⁵¹ In 1158 Ido Gontardo lent a sum to Baldovino Guercio with the guarantee of Bisacia and Enrico Guercio, the agreement was witnessed by Ido Porcello. (*Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 398).

⁵⁵² Hughes, D.O., 'Urban Growth...', p.16.

⁵⁵³ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1093, 1009.

However, we know that in 1186, the Gontardo still owned a storage space in Genoa.⁵⁵⁴ After this the family left no further trace. In terms of factional allegiances the economic and family connections to the Doria, Guercio and Porcello families, each of which were involved in episodes of civil violence during the period considered, should be noted. But it does not seem prudent to consider this family as part of any faction.

MARABOTO (1167, 1169)

The Chronicles of the city record that in 1169, while he was a consul, Ruggero Maraboto was chosen by the Commune to lead the Genoese army – which was 500 knights strong - sent to rescue Lucca from a Pisan aggression. The Maraboto family came to Genoa originally as vassals of the bishop and perhaps Ruggero's main business was linked to his military capabilities.⁵⁵⁵ The family owned a house in Genoa.⁵⁵⁶ Apart from this, very little is known of the possessions and activities of the Maraboto. The document recording the commitment of Maraboto to give Picamilio back £35 in 1164 is the only record surviving demonstrating an active role of the family.⁵⁵⁷ The family left no trace of its activities in later decades.

RECALCATO (1166, 1170, 1177)

Oberto Recalcato was consul of the pleas in 1155, 1158, 1160, 1162 and 1164, and was subsequently elected consul of the commune in 1166, 1170 and 1177. He was part of the highest levels of the Genoese political scene even when not in office. He took part, for instance, with Ottobono Alberico and Ingo Tornello, in the Genoese mission to King William II of Sicily in 1174, where the king confirmed the treaties existing between Genoa and his kingdom of Sicily.⁵⁵⁸ The commercial documents recording the activities of the Recalcato family are scarce. In the 1150s, Recalcato family members acted as witnesses of a transaction

⁵⁵⁴ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 321.

⁵⁵⁵ Belgrano, L., *Il Registro*, pp.30-31. Filangieri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.122. Unfortunately the family left no traces in the Genoese cartularies.

⁵⁵⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1300.

⁵⁵⁷ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1213.

⁵⁵⁸ *Libri Iurium* I/2, doc. 291.

between Grillo and Guercio, one involving Volta and one between Mallono and Filardo.⁵⁵⁹ In later decades the Recalcato family left no trace in the Genoese notary archives. The only commercial record surviving, from 1190, shows Giovanni Recalcato acting as witness in a transaction between Mariscoto Arcivescovo e Guglielmo Streiaporco.⁵⁶⁰

The Recalcato family's political success was clearly linked to Oberto Recalcato and his growing presence in Genoese public offices from the 1150s to the 1170s. The family's political influence did not survive Oberto and it was not involved in the episodes of civil violence.

RODOLFO (1168, 1173)

Nicola de Rodolfo, consul in 1168 and 1173, was the founder of his family's political, economic and personal strategies. Unfortunately, the records of activities relating to him are scarce. In 1157 he bought a house in Genoa from Grancio for £36, and on a handful of other occasions he acted as witness.⁵⁶¹

Most of the information regarding this family emerges instead from the records left by marriages of Rodolfo's children. In May 1191, Guglielmo de Rodolfo declared that he had received £130 as his wife Verde's dowry, and committed to giving her £100 as her *antefactum*. The agreement was made in the house of Bertolotto de Volta, with Marchesio de Volta and Bernizone Scoto were among the witnesses. Since the notary did not record the family provenance of Guglielmo's wife, the witnesses are all we have to allow us to guess that the marriage probably linked the Rodolfo lineage to the families of the de Volta coalition. The economic importance of such a marriage was evident a few months later when the same Guglielmo de Rodolfo bought a large quantity of pepper from Nicola Lecanozze on the 14th of August 1191 and promised to pay him £130. Lanfranco de Mari guaranteed that he would pay the whole debt if de Rodolfo did not comply. This shows once again that the de Rodolfo

⁵⁵⁹ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 35, 175, 265.

⁵⁶⁰ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 546.

⁵⁶¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 171, 233, 419, 594.

family had important patrons within the Volta allies. Mari was also the witness to this agreement, as it was recorded in his house.⁵⁶²

In a somewhat obscure agreement of 1192, Guglielmo's brother and father - Ansaldo and Nicola - promised to repay £200 for the dowry and the *antefactum* of Sofia, the daughter of Ugo Fornario, who had been married to Baldovino de Rodolfo, a deceased son of Nicola. Ansaldo Malocello and Bonifacio de Volta guaranteed this debt.⁵⁶³ The whole story seems quite obscure, and this feeling is reinforced by two further documents. In the first Ansaldo and Guglielmo Fornario declared that once they received the £200, they would not request anything else from Nicola and Ansaldo Fornario.⁵⁶⁴ However, such guarantees did not seem adequate, and in a final document the Fornario declared exactly the same intention to Raimondo de Volta, who appeared on behalf of Nicola de Rodolfo.⁵⁶⁵

In 1192 Guglielmo de Rodolfo committed to repaying £25 to Baldovino Gotofredo.⁵⁶⁶ His father, Nicola de Rodolfo, and Ansaldo Malocello guaranteed the debt. Such an agreement confirms a close proximity between the Malocello and Rodolfo families, which is evident in the agreements that the Rodolfo family members witnessed thorough the period. Of the eight occasions in which Guglielmo Cassinese recorded a de Rodolfo as a witness in a transaction, a Malocello was among the parties involved in five cases.⁵⁶⁷ It also reinforces role of overseer that Nicola Rodolfo seems to have had over almost all the family activities.

In the few documents suggesting that the family was interested in overseas investments, Nicola's role was less pervasive. Baldizo de Rodolfo acted as witness for two real estate transactions in 1191. These transactions concerned the exchange of properties in Levani, therefore it might have been the case that the family resided or at least had interests in the area.⁵⁶⁸ On the 8th of February 1191 Guglielmo di Rodolfo and Nicola Veseto committed to

⁵⁶² Cassinese, doc. 879.

⁵⁶³ Cassinese, doc. 1540.

⁵⁶⁴ Cassinese, doc. 1541.

⁵⁶⁵ Cassinese, doc. 1542.

⁵⁶⁶ Cassinese, doc. 1880.

⁵⁶⁷ Cassinese, docs. 378, 487, 546, 818, 1796.

⁵⁶⁸ Oberto 1190, docs. 71, 72.

paying £110 for the goods they received from Respeito, and Guglielmo Zerbino acted as guarantor of the debt.⁵⁶⁹ The role played by the Zerbino family in the economic activities of the Rodolfo family is evident from an agreement dated March 1191 when Raimondo de Rodolfo accepted, in accordance with the will of Guglielmo Zerbino with whom he was in society, £62 worth of various goods invested by Arduino de Canneto, to trade in Messina.⁵⁷⁰ This last aspect of the de Rodolfo family's connections was to play an important role in its affiliations in the Genoese conflicts.

ROZA (1114/1118, 1120/1122, 1130, 1166, 1169, 1171)

The Roza family's consular tradition started in the early years of the Commune. During the 1110s and 1120s the family certainly had an important political role. Nicola Roza, who served as consul of the commune in 1166, 1169 and 1171 had already been consul of the pleas in 1155, 1160 and 1161, and was clearly a major political figure in Genoa, and the first Roza to obtain the consular position since 1122. The early family records focus on the sale or rent of properties. In 1156 Nicola and Oberto Roza rented a property in San Pietro Arena to Ingone the banker for ten years.⁵⁷¹ In 1161 Baldizone Roza and his wife sold a vast property in Tortona.⁵⁷² At the same time the family invested the capital generated in commercial enterprises. In 1157, Nicola Roza and Lanfranco Fregabrenno formed a partnership to trade in Palermo where Lanfranco was headed.⁵⁷³ Nicola Roza, together with Marchione de Volta, contributed a sea loan of £200 and the use of a ship to Enrico Guercio and his brother Bisacia, who were directed to Alexandria.⁵⁷⁴ The parties also agreed that anything that the Guercio had to return to the de Volta could be given to Nicola Roza, Enrico Guercio's *propinquo* -

⁵⁶⁹ *Cassinese*, doc. 193.

⁵⁷⁰ *Cassinese*, doc. 300.

⁵⁷¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 155.

⁵⁷² *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 859-861.

⁵⁷³ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 276.

⁵⁷⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 466.

relative.⁵⁷⁵ In 1160 Bisacia received an additional £100 from Marchione de Volta to trade in Byzantium; once again the debt was to be repaid to de Volta or to Nicola Roza.⁵⁷⁶

Roza late-twelfth century commercial agreements follow a similar path to the real estate sales: lending within the commercial circle of Guercio and Volta. The family also became related through marriage to the Guercio and started to invest not only overseas, but also in the copper trade with cities of the interior of Italy. On the 10th of April 1190 Lanfranco Roza, Anasaldo Sardena and Bonifacio Guidone bought unspecified goods for £58 from Pietro di Canavazo of Piacenza.⁵⁷⁷ They did so on behalf of Airaldo, the bishop of Albegna, who was to repay them in the following February.⁵⁷⁸ In August of the same year Lanfranco bought £38 of copper from Vediano di Caim of Verona and committed to paying for it in a year's time.⁵⁷⁹ Rubaldo Guercio guaranteed this payment.⁵⁸⁰ The link between the Roza and the Guercio families is reinforced by a document drafted the following year. In January 1191 Maria, the daughter of Rubaldo Guercio, gave her father a receipt proving that she had received her share of the maternal inheritance. Maria did so with the advice of her relatives Lanfranco Roza, in whose house the document was recorded, and Guidone Porco.⁵⁸¹ It is therefore plausible that Rubaldo Guercio guaranteed Lanfranco Roza's debt of 1190, as his relative. The documents analysed up to this point demonstrate the availability of capital to the Roza family. This capital, as the following transaction demonstrates, originated outside the city walls of Genoa. In 1190 a brother of Lanfranco Roza, Baldizio, sold half of the land that he and Lanfranco owned in Orpalaxio to Giovanni Casanova. In 1191, Lanfranco Roza allowed the Abbey of Santo Stefano to use the water coming from his watermill in Pignixello in the monastery's watermill. He did so in agreement with Iterio Longo, with whom he shared such rights. In

⁵⁷⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 467.

⁵⁷⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 615.

⁵⁷⁷ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 375.

⁵⁷⁸ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 376.

⁵⁷⁹ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 625.

⁵⁸⁰ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 626.

⁵⁸¹ *Cassinese*, doc. 96.

1192, Ogerio Roza sold the Monastery of San Fruttuoso a part of his family's properties in Faxeto for £6.⁵⁸²

It can be concluded that the family's real estate wealth originated in the earlier decades of the commune. This wealth was later invested in the trade of copper and other goods, through the mediation of relatives more involved in commerce, such as Volta and Guerico.

TANCLEO (1166, 1173)

The cartulary of Giovanni the scribe records Ansaldo Tancleo's presence as witness on three occasions.⁵⁸³ These show the connections between Tancleo, Mauro and Garrio. No other documents concerning the Tancleo family activities have survived.

TORNELLO (1169, 1184, 1186)

The evidence available for the Tornello family during the 1160s indicates that members of the family acted often as commercial agents for the families Castello, Mari and Volta. This indicates a potential affiliation with the de Volta faction in later periods.⁵⁸⁴ The family left no later trace of its successive transactions in later periods.

Conclusion to the first period

In the decade between 1160 and 1169, access to the consulate was very much limited to the families that had held it in the previous decades. Only four of the thirty families that were appointed to the highest office in the commune - Maraboto, Recalcato, Rodolfo and Tornello - did so for the first time in the history of the commune. Regarding the effect of factionalism on the members of the Genoese consular elite, it should also be noted that of the eleven families that took part in episodes of civil violence during the decade, five were consular and six non-consular. The four new families, which entered the consulate in the 1160s, did so from 1165.

⁵⁸² *Cassinese*, doc. 1865.

⁵⁸³ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 508, 546, 1088.

⁵⁸⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 39, 88, 401, 834, 1056.

It appears therefore that the group violence that begun in 1164 had repercussion at the governmental level. Indeed, another striking difference between the years 1160-1164 and 1165-1169 was the fact that in the first five years the de Volta family held five consulates and in the following five years it held none. The homicide of Marchese de Volta in 1165, following the violent confrontation in 1164 between Castello and Avvocato, seemed to have put the family on the defensive, thus resulting in its rejection or exclusion from communal office. This void was perhaps filled by these four new families. However, this development does not appear to have been matched by a rise of families opposed to the de Volta family, since the families Rodolfo and Tornello appeared commercially close to the de Volta family, while Maraboto and Recalcato appear neutral compared to those families starting to organize themselves in opposing sides. In terms of the very important perspective of whether the Genoese consular elite was split into two distinct and opposing lineages that fought openly in the 1160s, a study of the families composing the consular government in the 1160s is telling. The marriage patterns of the consular families around the 1160s show a deep cohesiveness. Ingone de Volta, the elder of the family that held the most consular positions, had two daughters Sibilla and Adalaxia. Sibilla was married to Oberto Spinola, and Adalaxia to Fulcone Castello.⁵⁸⁵ This seems convincing evidence of a preexisting ‘solidarity of lineage group’.⁵⁸⁶ However, it must also be noted that Lanfranco Pevere, the elder of his family and the consul in the 1160s, had two daughters, who married Guglielmo Vento and Rosso de Volta.⁵⁸⁷ In addition, although less important in terms of factional division, it should be remembered, as discussed in chapter two, that Guglielmo Burone (a de Volta consul in 1162) married his daughter to Lanfranco Piccamilio.⁵⁸⁸

It appears that several of the most important consular families of the 1160s were connected by marriage in this first period considered. The families Pevere, Spinola and Volta in particular

⁵⁸⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 124, 125 for the marriage between Spinola and Volta; *Cassinese*, doc. 58.

⁵⁸⁶ Hughes, D. O., ‘Urban Growth...’, p.12.

⁵⁸⁷ *Cassinese*, doc. 399; *Oberto 1190*, doc. 140.

⁵⁸⁸ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 139, 691, 1027, 1028, 1145.

alone accounted for more than 20% of the consuls appointed. Regarding marriage bonds, Diane Hughes affirms that those ‘could not compete with the lineage tie, and Genoese aristocrats rarely married their enemies’. To justify the obvious presence of marriage links between Pevero and Volta, she argues that these represented an attempt to ‘concert some kind of alliance with their enemies’.⁵⁸⁹ It appears that this interpretation of the links connecting the consular families in the 1160s is based on Hughes’ decision to follow the genealogical reconstructions discussed in the introduction of the chapter. Knowing how the conflicts would develop, from the 1160s onwards, she seems to have made a conscious effort to represent a society that was divided *a priori* along lineage ties. However, in chapter two I argued that the first incidents of violence originated a pattern of conflict that developed along pre-existing family and commercial links; since of this elite was much more united than has been realized so far, this meant that several other links were severed in the process.

Finally, from the profiles taken into consideration in this section, it appears that there were several powerful families that did not have any connections with the families that were to become the cores of the two opposing factions. For instance, the family Alberico and its associates Bacemo, Maraboto, Nuvelono and Tornello, obtained a substantial share of the consular appointments, without being connected with one faction or the other.

SECOND PERIOD: 1170s

The fifty consuls elected in the decade, 1170 - 1179, came from twenty-seven families. Eight of these families, Antiochia, Embriaco, Fornario, Longo, Nigro, Odone, Ottobono, Sardena, had not been present in the consular list during the 1160s. Of these families, Antiochia and Longo achieved the consular position for the first time since the foundation of the commune,

⁵⁸⁹ Hughes, D. O., ‘Urban Growth...’, p.14.

while the families Embriaco (1106), Fornario (1120), Nigro (1153), Odone (1138) and Sardena (1127), returned to occupy a consular position after a more or less long absence.⁵⁹⁰

ANTIOCHIA (1174)

The only evidence surviving of the activities of Bonvassallo de Antiochia, consul of the commune in 1174, is his presence as a witness to the 1160 donation of all the goods of Eriberto de Rapallo to his son Guglielmo de Rapallo.⁵⁹¹ The Sigismondo, Caffaro and Grillo families were among the other witnesses confirming the Antiochia's presence among the Genoese elite, also in 1160.⁵⁹² However, the Antiochia family left no traces in more recent commercial records, making it an impossible task to analyse their affiliations.

BACEMO (1171)

Simone Bacemo was the first of his family to achieve a consular position, in 1171. Evidence of the family's political participation dates to 1164, when Lanfranco Bacemo was among the public witnesses of the agreement reached between Genoa and Barisone, *rex* of Sardinia.⁵⁹³ The economic background of the family is relatively easy to reconstruct. The Bacemo family is mentioned fourteen more times in the early 1190s. In nine cases a family member acted as a witness.⁵⁹⁴ It is telling, for the economic preferences of the family, that only once was the agreement for a trading partnership.⁵⁹⁵ Clearly the Bacemo family not only avoided trading activities, but was also not close to the environment where trade took place. Their preference for real estate investments clearly emerges from a document dated 1186, recording an agreement between two Bacemo brothers on how to invest the £235 received by one of them

⁵⁹⁰ In brackets are the years of their last appointments prior to 1160. Average positions per family 1.8.

⁵⁹¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 633.

⁵⁹² All these families were consular families.

⁵⁹³ *Libri Iurium*, I/2, doc. 283. The family also contributed £ 13 to the aforementioned Barisone to support his claim to the throne of Sardinia. Ibid. I/2, doc. 383. For an account of the Genoese involvement in Barisone's attempts see Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...*, p. 96.

⁵⁹⁴ *Oberto 1190*, docs. 46, 71, 80, 82, 252, 405, 677; *Cassinese*, docs. 1276, 1497.

⁵⁹⁵ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 252.

in dowry in houses in Genoa.⁵⁹⁶ Moreover, this document indicates that the Bacemo family was of comparable status to the most prominent Genoese families, since the dowry exchanged was essentially of the same level.

All the remaining documents relative to the activities of the Bacemo family relate to a tower that the family owned. These documents prove invaluable in shedding some light on the affiliations of the family in the wider Genoese context. The first of these documents, dated June 1160, reports that the Bacemo and Alberico families jointly owned the tower in Genoa.⁵⁹⁷ There is no question that a tower had a potential military use. The Bacemo use of it is therefore the best evidence of the attitude of this family, and of the Alberico, regarding the tensions in the city. This is directly demonstrated in 1191 when, at the height of conflict, Simone Bacemo promised his brother Bartolomeo, who was about to leave the city, not to allow anybody who wished to wage war to use the tower. The fact that Nuvelone Alberico acted as witness of this agreement further reinforces the links between the two families, but mostly underlines that to own a tower together also meant that one had to administer it as one from a military point of view.⁵⁹⁸

Of crucial importance for the political allegiance of the Bacemo family is a peculiar document dated 1179 linking the families Alberico, Bacemo, Galiana and de Volta. In August 1179 Baldizone de Galiana received £50 from Ingone de Volta and Ugo Alberico, to invest in long distance trade. However the capital was part of the patrimony of his wife Anna, who forced her husband to swear not to spend more than 10 *soldi* ‘*ad ludum*’ or ‘*in mulieribus*’ – gambling and paying women – and, most importantly, to come back to Genoa ‘*sub eandem condicione et ordinamento vestro sub quo modo sum*’ – essentially placing her capital, and husband, under the tutelage of Ingone and Ugo. Fundamentally for our factional analysis, Anna was assisted in the negotiation of this agreement by two relatives- Ugo Alberico and

⁵⁹⁶ Oberto 1186, doc. 64.

⁵⁹⁷ Giovanni Scriba, doc. 667. Four years later Bacemo promised to pay Alberico £46, ‘*de medietate expensarum que fecisti in levanda turri nostra*’ - half of the expenses that Alberico incurred to raise the tower, (Giovanni Scriba, doc. 1216.)

⁵⁹⁸ Cassinese, docs. 497, 498. All these agreements related to the tower show how long lasting the relations between the two families were.

Gandolfo Bacemo. This made it clear that the Alberico and Bacemo families were also connected by marriage ties.⁵⁹⁹

The documents analysed show that the Bacemo family, like the Alberico family, was closer to the de Volta faction than to the families of the de Curia faction. However, the 1191 document regarding the use of the family tower showed clearly the concern the Bacemo and Alberico families had to avoid taking an active role in the Genoese internal conflicts and, indirectly, that these families were probably asked to take part in them, for otherwise there would not have been any need for such a precise agreement.⁶⁰⁰

EMBRIACO (1102/1106, 1176, 1179, 1185, 1187, 1188, 1189)

The exploration of the economic activities and affiliations of the Embriaco family will take the reader on a journey back to the quasi-mythical origins of the Genoese commune. Guglielmo Embriaco was in fact the military commander who led the army of the Genoese to Syria and to the siege of Jerusalem, between 1098 and 1101, in the First Crusade, an event whose importance for the Genoese commune, clearly stated in the chronicle of Caffaro, cannot be underestimated.⁶⁰¹

As a result of his success as a crusader, and certainly through the rich booty conquered, the political prestige of Guglielmo Embriaco *Caputmallei* was enhanced, as is evident in his election to the consulate for four years in 1102.⁶⁰² However, such prestige was not initially directed towards a longstanding active role of the family in the Commune's politics. Indeed, after 1106 we witness a disengagement of the Embriaco family from any formal involvement

⁵⁹⁹ Anna accepted the agreement following the advice of her relatives Ugo Alberico and Gandolfo Bacemo. In A.S.G., *Manoscritti*, n.102, c. 11. R. (quoted also in Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.131). The proximity between the Bacemo family and the de Volta faction emerges also by the fact that Gandolfo Bacemo acted as witness for an agreement between Anselmo de Castello and Giorgio Alberico. A.S.G. *Manoscritti*, n.102, c.20.r. (Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.131).

⁶⁰⁰ Possibly on the de Volta's side, which was closer to both families from a business perspective.

⁶⁰¹ On the specific participation of Guglielmo Embriaco to the First Crusade see, Cardini, F., 'Profilo di un crociato. Guglielmo Embriaco' in *Archivio storico italiano*, 136, 1978.

⁶⁰² Furthermore, considering the fact that Guglielmo and his brother Primo were chosen by the Genoese as the leaders of the crusader army, the social eminence of the Embriaco family even before the crusade can hardly be doubted.

in the Communal politics. Only in 1176, in fact, would Nicola Embriaco bring the family back to the office of consul for the first time since the Commune's foundation.⁶⁰³

The reasons behind such a long absence from the consular office of such a reputable family are not clear. Probably, the rich benefits obtained by the Embriaco family as a consequence of its military successes were responsible. Following the crusade, a branch of the Embriaco family became feudal lords of Gibiletto in Syria and linked their fortunes more to this eastern sphere of action than to Genoa.⁶⁰⁴ Such rights and activities also left long-lasting litigation between the commune and the Embriaco family.⁶⁰⁵ Possibly the distance between the family and the consular office was thus also a consequence of the tensions created by the overseas interests of the family.⁶⁰⁶

This state of affairs changed from 1176 onwards – the year of the return to the consular position of an Embriaco. From then, until the election of the first *Podestà*, the Embriaco family saw its members elected as consuls six times.

The Cartulare of Giovanni Scriba sheds some light on the economic activities of the family for the period of its absence from the consulate. The few documents surviving provide the picture of a family whose interests covered pretty much the whole economic spectrum. A document dated July 1158 states that the heirs of Guglielmo Embriaco Caputmallei owned farmland in Albaro.⁶⁰⁷ In the October of the same year Ugo Embriaco – with Baldizio Fornario and Simone Doria - took part in a real estate transaction involving the sale of several houses owned by de Volta in Genoa.⁶⁰⁸ In the following year Ugo committed to paying back to Guglielmo Guercio half the dowry that he had paid for his daughter Dandala when she

⁶⁰³ It should be stressed that such absence from the office of consul did not correspond to an absence from the Genoese political scene; for instance in the first decade of the twelfth century Ugo Embriaco and Ansaldo Corso commanded a Genoese expedition of seventy galleys. (*Annales*, vol.I, p.120).

⁶⁰⁴ On the feudal lordship of the Embriaco over Gibiletto see Rey, 'Les Segneurs De Gilet' in *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, 3, 1895, pp.398-422. Furthermore it is important to consider that also the members of the family that remain in Genoa seemed to preserve their overseas rights. See Filangieri, L., 'Famiglie ...', p.36-37.

⁶⁰⁵ Origone, S., 'Gli Embriaci a Genova...'

⁶⁰⁶ On the interests of the Embriaco family in the East see, Origone, S., 'Gli Embriaci a Genova...', p.72. In 1147 the consuls of Genoa accepted the payment of £ 300 from the sons of Nicola Embriaco as refund for the fact that the family did not return to the *commune* their feudal possessions in the East after 20 years, as agreed in the concession granted by the Commune to Guglielmo Embriaco in 1125; (see *Libri Iurium*, vol. I, doc. 136).

⁶⁰⁷ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 406.

⁶⁰⁸ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 505.

married Rubaldo Gionata de Porta.⁶⁰⁹ The interests of the family also extended into the business of long distance trade and finance. In fact, in 1159 Embriaco contributed £100 to a maritime exchange with Ottobono Alberico for Trapani⁶¹⁰ and in 1162 Guglielmo Embriaco took part in a currency exchange with, among others, Oberto di Nigro.⁶¹¹

The economic activities of the Embriaco family for the period 1186-1192 closely resemble those I have outlined in the paragraph above for the preceding period.⁶¹² The family's real estate interests were matched by its involvement overseas. What was peculiar, as we shall see, to Embriaco activities was the level of interrelation between these two branches of the economy and the fact that every document points to the fact that the family's wealth was invested and administered in a collective way, that placed the interest of the family clearly above the interests of its single members.

The first document relating to the economic activities of the Embriaco family, from 1186, informs us of a society existing between Embriaco and Giovanni *calafator* to trade in Byzantium. Galiena and Barbavaria acted as witnesses to this agreement which – importantly – was recorded in the house of de Volta.⁶¹³ In the same year, Embriaco acted as witness for a commercial agreement reached between de Castello and Guarrano.⁶¹⁴ The commercial focus of the family activities was complemented by the fact that in the same year the family is shown to have had many vineyards, making clear that real estate remained a fundamental element of the family portfolio.⁶¹⁵ Indeed both the prestige and the wide interests of the Embriaco family are confirmed in an agreement dated 26th December 1190, which records that the Archbishop of Genoa, Bonifacio, rented for 20 years to Rolando and Embriaco some properties around Sestri Levante and between Lavagna and Portovenere.⁶¹⁶ The real estate possessions of the Embriaco family were also extensive within the Genoese city walls. From

⁶⁰⁹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 540.

⁶¹⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 543.

⁶¹¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 966.

⁶¹² Essentially the 50s and 60s decades of which we have some notion thanks to the survival of the cartulary of *Giovanni Scriba*.

⁶¹³ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 29.

⁶¹⁴ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 47.

⁶¹⁵ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 128.

⁶¹⁶ *Cassinese*, doc. 2. (Giovanni Castello and Martino Tornello acted as witnesses).

the surviving documents we discover the presence of an Embriaco house adjoining the houses of Scoto and Buferio, as well as another house where the Cavarunco family lived.⁶¹⁷ The Cavarunco were also the users of an Embriaco *porticus* and trading station close to the sea.⁶¹⁸ The mention of such properties -- real estate linked with long distance trade -- is the perfect way to double back to the other main focus of the Embriaco's family economic activities: long distance trade. On the 23rd March 1191, Ugo Embriaco declared that he received £25 from Alda Embriaco. Ugo was to use this sum to repay, in Genoa, Nicola de Mari a sum of 50 'bisanti saraceni' that he borrowed from him overseas, in Syria. Amigono de Castello made himself responsible to Alda to protect her against any loss in the case that Ugo Embriaco asked for the payment once again. Ugo Embriaco, on the other hand, swore that Amigono de Castello would not incur a loss doing this.⁶¹⁹ The document sheds further light on the intergenerational dimension of the Genoese families' agreements: Ugo Embriaco was the son of the deceased Nicola; and Nicola de Mari declared that he loaned the sum in *bisanti* to Ugo Embriaco because he had been requested to do so before his death by Nicola Embriaco. The confusion ensuing from the death of Nicola Embriaco, the initiator of this agreement and, possibly, the one whose trust Nicola de Mari could not doubt, complicated the repayment process. It probably required Nicola de Mari and Alda Embriaco to ask for the support of Amigono de Castello in order to protect themselves against a possible attempt by Ugo Embriaco to avoid his duties. Involving a number of families, this agreement is also particularly revealing in regards to Embriaco's position in the factional dynamics of the city. Closely linking the affairs of the Embriaco family with those of the Mari and Castello families, it confirms that this family – never mentioned in the annals of the city for its participation in the Genoese civil conflicts – was closer to the interests and activities of the de Volta family.

⁶¹⁷ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 117 and *Cassinese*, doc. 438.

⁶¹⁸ *Cassinese*, docs. 1436, 1769.

⁶¹⁹ *Cassinese*, doc. 349.

The last document that I will analyse offers a good conclusion to our study of the activities of the Embriaco family. It was recorded in April 1192 and, I believe, sums up the duality of the economic interests of the family. From the document we learn that Ugo and Guglielmo Embriaco leased the family possessions between Croce di Camogli and the Lavagna creek, including the rights in the river itself to Ogerio Templa and Ogerio de Arzellato for two years. The two Embriaco brothers did so under the authority and with the advice of their father Guglielmo, and they took this decision for their and for all their brothers' profit. However, if Nicola Embriaco, another brother, remained *Ultramare* – in Syria – for longer than two years, then this agreement was to be automatically extended for a period of further three years.⁶²⁰ This agreement offers us a clear picture of the interrelated activities and interests of the Genoese trading elites. The Embriaco family, we have seen, was very much concentrated on trading activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, most of the family revenue came from such sources. However, the family took very seriously their position of lords in Liguria too. The father and elder brothers acted in a way that freed Nicola to conduct his and the family business in Syria, while also securing the income and status resulting from ruling over extensive possessions upon his return. The agreement built in, with a 'return within two years' clause, an allowance for the uncertainties always present while travelling in the medieval Mediterranean. The document sheds some light on the implications of such agreements: Ogerio Templa and Ogerio de Arzellato had the *usus fructus* of the land and were explicitly required to keep it undivided, defend it against all men, not steal from it and keep up the property. To conclude, the document offers a clear picture of a very cohesive patriarchal family where the interests of the individuals came after the interests of the whole.⁶²¹

⁶²⁰ Cassinese, doc. 1862.

⁶²¹ Confirming, once again, how a family based analysis is well grounded.

FORNARIO (1106/1110, 1118/1120, 1175, 1178, 1180)

The Fornario family's active involvement in the public life of the Genoese Commune dates back to the origins of the institution. Ottone Fornario was elected consul twice before the reforms of 1122 when consuls were elected for multiple year mandates, in 1106-1110 and 1118-1120. The family returned to the consular seat in 1175 and 1180, with the election of Ugo de Baldizzone Fornario and in 1178 with Ottone Fornario, following a pattern similar to the one evidenced for the Embriaco family. The Fornario family was clearly focused on maritime trade. In 1158 Guglielmo Filardo and Tommaso Fornario formed a society for £47. Tommaso was to bring the capital to trade in Santo Egidio on his *galeoto*, a small galley.⁶²² In 1161, Tommaso brought £120 - the capital of a society formed with Guglielmo Vento - to trade in Alexandria.⁶²³ On the same trip Tommaso was also going to invest £100 belonging to Raimondo the banker and £20 belong to, once again, Guglielmo Vento.⁶²⁴ The preparations behind this commercial voyage were fervent, and Tommaso decided to raise his share of the investment by forming a sea loan of £5 with Puella, a female member of the Fornario family.⁶²⁵

The commercial foundation of the Fornario's family economic and political influence, which emerged in the 1150s and 1160s, continued in the later decades of the century. In the commercial agreements contained in the cartulary of Guglielmo Cassinese, it is evident that real estate was not significant in the family business strategy. This does not mean that the family did not necessarily possess land or properties. Simply that investing into these, or circulating these, was not the favourite choice of the Fornarios.⁶²⁶

The only notary entry related to a real estate investment by the Fornario family recorded an agreement between Enrico the banker, Guglielmo Fornario, Rainaldo Buonaventura and Ottobono of Clavica, to form a society of nearly £300. The capital was provided by the latter

⁶²² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 347.

⁶²³ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 877.

⁶²⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 883.

⁶²⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 885. His partners Guglielmo Vento and Raimondo the banker did the same by forming a second society with the merchant Ugo from Pavia, (*Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 886).

⁶²⁶ For instance we know of a Volta Fornario in Genoa, (*Cassinense*, doc. 1648.)

three partners, while Enrico was to invest it ‘*in terra et in banco*’ – i.e. good investment could be either in land or in finance - in order to make the highest return within a year.⁶²⁷ This agreement represents a good example of how the family saw its capital as the basis of its welfare. An inter-generational donation contract strengthens such an impression. On 23rd January 1191 Guglielmo Fornario donated £100 to his son Lamberto. This sum came from the patrimony of his mother. The witnesses to this agreement were Ogerio Scoto, Pietro Guercio and Ugo Fornario.⁶²⁸ One of these, Ogerio Scoto, had just given £200 to Lamberto Fornario, forming a society to which Lamberto contributed £100 to trade in Naples.⁶²⁹ For the same mercantile travel Lamberto also brought in *accomendacio* from his father £194, an *usbergo* and two *schinieri* – parts of armours.⁶³⁰

Such fascinating agreements offer a full picture of what the Fornario family valued in business. These records show one of Guglielmo Fornario’s sons while the son was about to make his mercantile debut, acting as a travelling agent for his father and for his father’s business partners. Lanfranco, in this first trip to Naples, could rely on his family capital and connections. Lanfranco’s parents donated to him a large sum so that he had significant personal capital to conduct business in Naples.⁶³¹ The preparations behind Lanfranco’s business trip also shed a clear light on the affiliations of the Fornario family. The Scoto family, by far the most common business partner of the Fornario family,⁶³² was followed in this league by the Guercio, Mallono, Castello and Malocello families.⁶³³

From a geographical point of view, these agreements tell of only part of the Fornario’s business interests, which at points reached Syria, Ceuta, Sicily, Naples, Maremma, Montpellier and Barcelona. For instance in 1190 Ansuix de Sancto Genesio received £100

⁶²⁷ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 154.

⁶²⁸ *Cassinese*, doc. 118.

⁶²⁹ *Cassinese*, doc. 117.

⁶³⁰ *Cassinese*, doc. 119.

⁶³¹ The fact that both parents were involved in this decision is confirmed by the fact that the sum came from the patrimony of Guglielmo’s wife, Sibilla. Furthermore Sibilla shared the mercantile preferences of her acquired family and occasionally invested – much smaller sums - in long distance trade herself. (*Cassinese*, doc. 116).

⁶³² The Fornario and Scoto families formed partnerships (*Cassinese*, docs. 542, 543) and the Fornario lent large sums to other families with the warrants of the Scoto (e.g. *Cassinese*, doc. 1396).

⁶³³ Guercio (*Oberto 1186*, docs. 142, 143; *Cassinese*, docs. 117-119); Mallono (*Oberto 1186*, doc. 33; *Oberto 1190*, doc. 138); Castello (*Oberto 1186*, doc. 142); Porco (*Cassinese*, docs. 1431, 1718); Maloncello (*Cassinese*, doc. 116).

in a society from Fornario to trade in Sicily and a further £100 in *accomendacio* to trade in Syria.⁶³⁴ A final element of the Fornario economic activities worthy of mention is their prolonged success as shipowners. In 1184 Oberto Fornario owned a bucio travelling to and from Sardinia.⁶³⁵ The success of the family in this field is evidenced by the fact that in 1200 Giovanni Fornario owned a galley, a much bigger kind of ship. Furthermore he promised to employ on it at least 100 mariners from Genoa to Montpellier and 124 from Montpellier to Barcelona.⁶³⁶ In 1201, Giovanni Fornario's galley conducted a return trip from Montpellier to Genoa.⁶³⁷ Such evidence offers a clear picture of a very successful mercantile family.

The Fornario family's participation and influence in the public affairs of Genoa continued throughout the period following the institutional reforms of 1191, as is confirmed by its members' frequent stints as consuls of the pleas and, most importantly, by the appointment of members of the family as rectors in 1196 and 1211.⁶³⁸

LONGO (1174, 1177)

The Longo family only acquired the consular office in the 1170s through Guglielmo. The political engagement of the Longo family started at the very top – no family member was elected as a consul of the pleas before the election of Guglielmo Longo as consul. However, it was also only linked to the figure of Guglielmo Longo – no Longo family members held any political office before or after him.⁶³⁹ Guglielmo appeared only once, as witness to a Vento real estate transaction in 1164, in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba.⁶⁴⁰

However, the house of Guglielmo Longo was elected by successive Genoese notaries as a location to register their agreements. As a consequence, of 73 documents mentioning the name Longo, 53 are simply recorded in the house of Longo or underneath the court of Longo.

⁶³⁴ *Cassinese*, docs. 434, 899.

⁶³⁵ *ASG*, sez. *Notaries*, f. 183, contained in Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, pp.68-69.

⁶³⁶ *ASG*, sez. *Notaries*, Lanfranco, ff. 157, 164, 223. contained in Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.106.

⁶³⁷ *Giovanni de Guiberto*, doc. 55.

⁶³⁸ Consuls of the pleas in 1156, 1163, 1170, 1174, 1179, 1195, 1196 and 1197.

⁶³⁹ It should be noticed, however, that Longo family members covered the role of Rector – assistant to the *podestà* – in 1196 and 1199 (*Annales*, Vol.I, p.54).

⁶⁴⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1196.

In nine other cases a member of the Longo family acted as witness, while in another two documents the properties owned by the family were used as geographical indicators. Firstly, it is important to appreciate the implications of the fact that so many documents were drafted in the houses of the Longo family. Essentially it appears that both Oberto Scriba and Guglielmo Cassinese chose these locations as convenient places from which to operate. Almost none of the documents drafted in the house of Longo contain any further reference to the family. The use of the house is thus not evidence of a network particular to the house of the Longo family.⁶⁴¹ It seems that both notaries simply found this location convenient.⁶⁴² In 1191, Manfredo de Rovereto formed a society with three women: Alda (widow of Ottone Guercio); Ermellina de Turri; and Sibilla de Poma. Manfredo agreed to invest the sum (a total of £36) in Tunis and then to return the capital and the profits to Giovanni Longo in Genoa, who had been nominated for the purpose by the three women. Lanfranco Guercio, the son of Alda, acted as witness for this agreement. So, Giovanni Longo was entrusted by the Guercio family (and by the other investors) to collect the investment, but he himself did not have any stake in the operation. On the 10th October 1191, Guglielmo Rava agreed to transport and invest in Ceuta £11 for Sibilla Longo – Guglielmo's widow.⁶⁴³ The sum was not negligible, especially if we consider the fact that a female member of the Longo family invested it. The latter document is, in fact, the only case in which a member of the Longo family invested in long distance trade. The only other mention of an involvement of a Longo family member in such operations is the guarantee offered by Oberto Longo to Guidone de Sori in his dealings with Orano da Lucca, thus once again not playing a direct role.⁶⁴⁴

The previous paragraph makes it clear that the fortunes of the Longo family did not depend on trade. From a donation conceded in May 1191 by Lanfranco Rozo to the Abbey of Santo

⁶⁴¹ For comparative purposes the reader should recall the extensive use made by notaries of the houses of de Volta and Vento for the same purposes. In that case the economic actors using these families' houses to record their contracts were usually business partners or anyhow associated with the families. Furthermore, Volta or Vento family members, often acted as witnesses of such agreements.

⁶⁴² It cannot be excluded that the Longo family was paid by the parties or by the notaries for this service.

⁶⁴³ *Cassinese*, doc. 1209.

⁶⁴⁴ *Cassinese*, doc. 1638.

Stefano, we learn that Rozo shared the rights of the water and of the watermill of Pignixello with Iterio Longo.⁶⁴⁵ Iterio Longo's will sheds further light on the income source of the family. In his will, Iterio leaves £100 to three different churches and everything else to his family. His property was composed of a house in Maguzeno that he left to his mother Sibilla and a house in Genoa that went to Ingo, his brother, with the condition that Ingo should not sell the house or anything in it while Sibilla was still alive. Iterio had an underage child and he left him under the authority of his mother. The witnesses of the will were Ogerio, Pietro and Tommaso Vento, Pietro Guercio and Ansaldo Sardena. This document confirms the impression that the Longo family was at this time living off the revenues of past activities and of land revenues. This is perhaps confirmed by the fact that none of the sons of Guglielmo Longo, Iterio and Ingo, acquired the consular position. The fact that the Longo family was present at a consular level in the 1170s and never again is probably linked to a reversal of its economic fortunes. Furthermore, the biological fortunes of the family played a fundamental role in its political success. From the documents considered in this section it is evident that Sibilla, the widow of Guglielmo Longo, was the real head of the family and that Ingo was relatively marginal. A document recorded in October 1191 illustrates this point further. In front of the notary, Ingo swore to his mother Sibilla not to play any more '*ad ludum ad quem perdat*' and to obey her. The witnesses were, as for the will of Iterio, Ogerio, Guglielmo and Pietro Vento, clearly showing that the Vento family played a supervising role over the activities of the Longo family.⁶⁴⁶ Clearly, individual abilities and attitudes mattered in the continuity of a Genoese family's political and economic successes, and this is all too evident in the passage from one generation to the next.

⁶⁴⁵ Cassinese, doc. 535.

⁶⁴⁶ Cassinese, doc. 1667.

NIGRO (1173, 1178, 1189)

The activities of the Nigro family are recorded in several documents. Let us take into consideration the following examples of the Nigro's economic interests. On the 29th September 1186 Guglielmo Nigro acted as witness for a land transaction. This act was registered in the house of Bonifacio de Volta.⁶⁴⁷ From a document dated 8th April 1190 and registered in the house of Bonifacio de Volta, we discover that Raimondo de Volta and Enrico Nigro pooled their resources to buy for £480 - £200 in 15 days and £280 when the ship was ready – a *quarterium* of a ship that Iacopo Gagensale da Noli was building in Finale.⁶⁴⁸ From a document from the 19th August 1190, registered in the house of Bonifacio de Volta, we learn that Guglielmo Spinola received £100 from Ingo de Flexo, £100 from Raimondo de Volta and £200 from Enrico Nigro, to bring to the Eastern Mediterranean and invest, along with £200 from himself, in a society. On the same trip Guglielmo Spinola was to invest the £197 that he received in society from Spezapreda, but was to keep the profits separate. Filippo de Castello acted as witness for this transaction.⁶⁴⁹ Oberto Nigro was to bring in *accomendacio* £96 from Giovanni Boleto, and Enrico Nigro, Oberto's father, was the witness of this transaction.⁶⁵⁰ It should be noted that Onorato, Giovanni Boleto's son, travelled with Oberto Nigro and received in *accomendacio* from Oberto from Nonatar £120 owned by Bernizio Scoto.⁶⁵¹ In this case, Pagano de Volta acted as witness. Furthermore Onorato Boleto was to bring in *accomendacio* £284 from the society formed between Bernizio Scoto, Giovanni Boleto, Baiamonte Barlaria and Pignolo.⁶⁵² From the analysis of the aforementioned documents it can be concluded that the Nigro family shared substantial business interests with

⁶⁴⁷ Oberto 1186, doc. 60.

⁶⁴⁸ Oberto 1190, doc. 355.

⁶⁴⁹ Oberto 1190, doc. 655.

⁶⁵⁰ Cassinese, doc. 1019.

⁶⁵¹ Cassinese, doc. 1020.

⁶⁵² Cassinese, doc. 1021.

members of the de Volta faction. Furthermore, its preferred realm of action in terms of investment lay in the Eastern Mediterranean.

ODONE (1132, 1137, 1138, 1170)

The Odone family once again acquired the consular position in 1170 after first holding it 1138. Giovanni the scribe referred to properties of Odone in the valley of Bisagno in 1157.⁶⁵³ Apart from this information very little is known of the family's economic background. In 1160 Odone received £ 150 from Guidoto Ita as dowry for his daughter Giusta.⁶⁵⁴ Odone gave £70 from this sum to Amico Grillo, to repay a debt he had with Baldovino de Castello.⁶⁵⁵

SARDENA (1124, 1127, 1171, 1177)

After the appointments of Rinaldo Sardena as consul in the 1120s, it was not until the 1170s that the Sardena family returned to occupy the highest office of the commune through Guglielmo. Twelve documents drafted by Giovanni Scriba contain references to the Sardena. However, on all but one occasion, Sardena family members acted as witnesses. In 1160, instead, Ansaldo Sardena committed himself to repaying a sum to Vento in Lavagna.⁶⁵⁶ We, therefore, cannot formulate a clear picture of the Sardena's activities prior to their return to the consulate in the 1170s. Instead, the activities of the Sardena family at the end of the twelfth century come to life through 22 documents. At this stage the scenario is completely different and the Sardena family, and more specifically Ansaldo Sardena, invested heavily in long distance trade. The year 1186, in particular, saw the Sardena investing over £600 overseas, especially in Sicily.⁶⁵⁷ All of the documents relating to Sardena long-distance trade activities were recorded in the house of Bonifacio de Volta. This is no coincidence, de Volta

⁶⁵³ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 101.

⁶⁵⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 846.

⁶⁵⁵ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 39.

⁶⁵⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 602.

⁶⁵⁷ *Oberto* 1186, docs. 164, 169, 178, 180, 181.

and Castello often figured as witnesses to the activities of the Sardena family.⁶⁵⁸ For instance, Ansaldo Sardena brought to Sicily a *societas* in which he invested £200 and Ingone de Frexia (son of Ingone de Volta) invested £400.⁶⁵⁹

On five further occasions the family was involved in what can be loosely defined as financial transactions. On two occasions Ansaldo Sardena committed to repaying a debt. On 10th April 1190 Ansaldo Sardena, Lanfranco Roza and Bonifacio Guidone committed to paying £58 to Pietro Canavazo from Piacenza, for the goods they purchased.⁶⁶⁰ On the same day and in the same place, Airaldo, bishop of Albenga, declared that he was indebted to Ansaldo Sardena, Lanfranco Roza and Bonifacio Guidone, for the same amount of £58.⁶⁶¹ It seems evident that the bishop used the three men as mediators for his purchases from the merchant of Piacenza. The family appears involved in the copper business as well. On 24th April 1190, Guglielmo Sardena, the son of Ansaldo, bought £145 worth of copper from Vedianello and Villano, two merchants from Verona. Anselmo Sardena, the brother of Guglielmo, swore that he was going to guarantee his brother's debt.⁶⁶² The liquidity necessary for such aggressive investments came from very traditional sources. For instance, on the 21st October 1186, Ansaldo Sardena borrowed £ 46 from his wife's dowry.⁶⁶³ Ansaldo immediately invested the sum in an *accomendacio* with Sibilla Longo, as well as in a society with Ingo de Frexia.⁶⁶⁴ The Sardena also had real estate possessions in Segula and Levanto, as is indicated in several documents.⁶⁶⁵ The family invested heavily in the improvement of its properties, for instance in 1186 Ansaldo Sardena and Nicola *pellaio* – an artisan in skins - created a society of £150 to 'work on the land'.⁶⁶⁶ However, the family's economic focus was clearly commercial, and the

⁶⁵⁸ Witnesses in: *Oberto* 1186, docs. 169, 178, 181. In, *Oberto* 1186, docs. 164, 177, Frexia is a business partner of Sardena.

⁶⁵⁹ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 164.

⁶⁶⁰ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 375.

⁶⁶¹ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 376.

⁶⁶² *Oberto* 1190, doc. 430.

⁶⁶³ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 180.

⁶⁶⁴ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 181. This document has already been discussed in the section relative to the activities of the Longo family. The link between the Sardena and the Longo families was rather strong, considering that Ansaldo Sardena acted also as witness for the will of Iterio Longo (*Cassinese*, doc. 1068).

⁶⁶⁵ *Cassinese*, docs. 516, 1841.

⁶⁶⁶ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 161. Also on this occasion the agreement was recorded in the house of Bonifacio de Volta and had Bonifacio de Frexia as witness.

real estate possessions were used as assets to back such a strategy. For instance, in an 1191 document, Guglielmo Sardena acquired £100 from Rubaldo de Levanto by mortgaging a family property.⁶⁶⁷ The Sardena emerged from the 1170s as a very important family, whose political success was certainly backed by large economic interests. The family focused on overseas trade and traded in copper over land routes. The Sardena economic pattern emerges as very similar to the Roza's. The only difference in the economic strategies of the two families is the geographical focus. The Sardena family invested heavily in Sicily, while the Roza focused more on the Eastern Mediterranean. However the origin of the families' wealth, from which they derived the resources to compete in these new markets, was very much based on land ownership. And they were not very committed to consular office, as shown by another big break.

Conclusions to the second period

In part one I have shown that the 1170s were characterized by a marked divergence from both the previous and the following decades. In fact Genoa successfully kept its internal peace. This difference did not depend on the fact that conflicts did not involve members of the political elite. Indeed, two out of four families involved in episodes of civil violence during this decade were of consular status. The particular nature of the violence of the 1170s, which was responsible for the relative peace of this decade, was that it did not escalate. I have shown that nearly all episodes of earlier and later civil violence brought some sort of retaliation, thus this characteristic was particular to the 1170s. From the consular lists we cannot discern a precise pattern characterized by the predominance or the exclusion of families associated with one faction or another from the consular office.⁶⁶⁸ However, it appears that families that were not strongly connected with either of the families that have been involved in the episodes of civil war of the 1160s took on a stronger position within the consular ranks. In this light we

⁶⁶⁷ Cassinese, doc. 517.

⁶⁶⁸ The statement 'between 1171 and 1189 the victorious Manecianos assumed control over the consulate', (Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.236), seems to be void of any historical basis.

can observe the rise of the Alberico family to the highest ranked family per consulship obtained and the decline of both the Pevere and the de Volta families. The important role played by the Alberico family is also part of a larger tendency of the 1170s; the consistent returning of old consular families to the consulate after more or less long breaks. These families, probably, returned to the consulate in an effort to reaffirm the legitimacy of the communal institution that was increasingly discredited by its constant infighting.⁶⁶⁹

THIRD PERIOD: 1180s

Between 1180 and 1190, the sixty-five officers elected as consuls came from twenty-seven families. This decade witnessed an evident retrenchment of the Genoese commune with a much more numerous repetitions of members of the same families year after year.⁶⁷⁰ On the other hand, seven families that were not present in the 1160s and 1170s entered the consular group: Bufferio, Carmadino, Mari, Picio, Porcello, Spezapreda and Turca. Of these families, Picio, Spezapreda and Turca arrived to the consular position for the first time while Bufferio (1114), Carmadino (1120), Mari (1127) and Porcello (1155), returned to the consulate after occupying such positions earlier in the history of the Commune. From a brief evaluation of the families present in the list of the 1180s, it is evident that there had been a major return of the families Doria, de Volta and Vento.

BUFERIO (1110/1114, 1183, 1187)

The members of the Buferio family did not take any active role in the Genoese civil conflicts, nor – as officers of the Commune or as private citizens – were they involved in any military or diplomatic action that was worth recording by the annalists of the city.

As early as the 1150s, the family's economic activities were focused on long distance trade. In 1157 Fulcone Bufferio is in Byzantium investing the capital of a society he formed with

⁶⁶⁹ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.138.

⁶⁷⁰ From an average of 1.8 consulates per family in the 1160s and 1170s to 2.4 consulates per family.

Oberto de Bontommaso.⁶⁷¹ In 1158 he is travelling on a ship to Messina with another business partner, Ugo Botino.⁶⁷² The commercial documents relative to the family's activities become more visible for the following decades.

The sole surviving document for 1186, recorded on 27th November, records that Ansaldo Buferio and Nicola Embriaco acted as arbiters in a dispute between Vassallo Stralleria and Anna, the widow of Guidone Tituica.⁶⁷³ The arbiters '*a partibus subscriptis electi*' – chosen by the parties involved – ruled that Vassallo Stralliera should gave £431 to Anna, and that she should gave him the house of de Castello that was once her husband's along with the adjoining tower. The document does not say anything definitive regarding the possible alignment of the Buferio family within the factions of Genoa. In circumstances such as the ones underlined by the document, each of the parties involved selected their own arbiter.⁶⁷⁴ Therefore, this event also says nothing of the connection between the Buferio and Embriaco families. On two further occasions in 1190 Buferio acted as curator for Agnese, wife of Ugone de Guelfo and family member of Ottone de Castello.⁶⁷⁵ These documents hint at a certain proximity to the de Volta faction. This suggestion is reinforced by a series of documents concerning Buferio marriages.

In February 1190 Simone Buferio promised to sell Baldovino and Ogerio Scoto for a fair price a house that was previously owned by Ugo Scoto, such house was to be part of the dowry given to Ansaldo Buferio, his son, by the family of his future wife Maria, daughter of Ugo and sister of Baldovino and Ogerio Scoto. The witnesses of this contract were the aforementioned Ansaldo and Ingone de Frexia.

A year later, in December 1191, it was another Ansaldo Buferio, the son of Guglielmo, whose wedding was being arranged. Ansaldo Buferio confirmed that he had received from Guglielmo Rataldo £100 as the *antefactum* of his wife Buferia, daughter of the

⁶⁷¹ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 254.

⁶⁷² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 489.

⁶⁷³ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 286.

⁶⁷⁴ It must be noted that in the year 1186 neither family covered any official role in the commune and that, therefore, the parts involved preferred to keep this litigation a private matter.

⁶⁷⁵ *Oberto 1190*, docs. 415, 416.

aforementioned Rataldo. Buferia, who was present, declared that it was her intention to leave the administration of this sum in the hands of her husband Ansaldo. The witnesses of this document – drafted in the house of Simone Buferio like the previous one – were Ansaldo Rataldo and Rainaldo de Castello.⁶⁷⁶

In 1192, it was the turn of Anna Buferio, daughter of Guglielmo and sister of Ansaldo, to marry. Matteo, son of Trincherio Piazzalunga, declared that he had received £100 from Ansaldo Buferio as dowry for Matteo's wife Anna Buferio.⁶⁷⁷ Another document, recorded on the same date and place, follows up this agreement. Matteo Piazzalunga and Ansaldo Buferio formed a *societas*. Matteo brought £142 belonging to Ansaldo Buferio, and £71 of his own, to Messina to trade in what 'seemed most profitable'.⁶⁷⁸

The documents relating to the marriage of Anna Buferio and Matteo Piazzalunga, therefore, shed an interesting light on the issue of marriage in medieval Genoa. In a sense, they allow the Buferio marriage strategy to be considered as an integral part of the wider economic strategy of the family. The fact that Opizo Guercio acts as witness in both occasions, once again, points towards proximity between the Buferio to the de Volta faction. Additional evidence of this comes from the five times in which the Buferio family acted as witnesses to someone else's affairs; on two occasions they did so for an Embriaco, in one for a Guercio and in the remaining two for a Gontardo.

Furthermore, the documents offer an insight into the way in which the dowries played a fundamental role in the accumulation of the capital necessary for long distance trade, and also the ways in which an investor, in this case Buferio, could obtain further guarantees by investing his capital in such a fashion. Such agreements were probably common. What is special about this exchange is the fact that, since the two documents were drafted at the same moment, we have a clear example of the way in which a marriage could fit into a family's economic strategy.

⁶⁷⁶ Cassinese, doc. 1452.

⁶⁷⁷ Cassinese, doc. 1721.

⁶⁷⁸ Cassinese, doc. 1721.

CARAMANDINO (1180, 1187, 1190)

Members of the Caramandino family held a number of prestigious public offices through the period under consideration and also in the 1190s.⁶⁷⁹ However the Caramandino family was never associated with the climate of political violence that dominated the city of Genoa in the same period. Eleven documents shed some light on the economic affairs of this family. On three occasions we learn the location of some of the Caramandino family land.⁶⁸⁰ From these we discover that a vast extent of land was owned by Idone de Caramandino in Rivarolo, next to the possessions of Nicola Lecanocce and Oliviero de Mari. On one occasion Idone de Caramandino conducted a commercial operation in the Tuscan Maremma⁶⁸¹ and on another he contracted a *societas* to trade in Messina.⁶⁸² On 23rd February 1192 Guglielmo di Giusta declared that he received 112 *saracenali* from Marino Dalmazzo which he had received from Enrico de Caramandino in Sicily.⁶⁸³ Finally, on 14th April 1192 Idone de Caramandino was involved in the sale of Sardinian goods to a merchant from Lucca.⁶⁸⁴ The Caramandino family appears to have concentrated most of its interests in the ownership of land, and its commercial interests remained within a Western Mediterranean framework. The family was never involved in any episode of civil violence, and its economic connections seem to reflect this neutral stance.⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁷⁹ Which will be object of close scrutiny in chapter four.

⁶⁸⁰ *Cassinese*, docs. 199, 225, 1018.

⁶⁸¹ *Cassinese*, doc. 209.

⁶⁸² *Cassinese*, doc. 207.

⁶⁸³ *Cassinese*, doc. 1615.

⁶⁸⁴ *Cassinese*, doc. 1846.

⁶⁸⁵ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.223. According to the genealogical reconstruction of Belgrano, L., *Tavole*, Tav. XIX-XXVI, the Caramandino should have been closely connected to the families Avvocato, Pevere, through the lineage of the viscounts of Caramandino. I did not find this to be the case for the twelfth century, as indeed Filangieri could not confirm that supposed connection from the documentation of the tenth and eleventh centuries. (Filangieri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.13.)

MARI (1183, 1187, 1189)

From the 1180s, members of the Mari family were involved in episodes of civil violence. Therefore, the family profile has already been reconstructed in chapter two. Here it is sufficient to recall that the commercial transactions of the family connected its members to the de Volta faction.

PICIO (1181, 1192)

Ido Picio, elected as consul of the Commune in 1181 and 1192 after an appointment as consul of the pleas in 1162, was the only member of his family to leave a trace in the Genoese sources. In 1163 he acted as witness twice.⁶⁸⁶ In July 1191, Segnorando, a merchant from Pegli, swore to Mollazane de Volta that he was going to pay a certain sum to Ido Picio, and that on that occasion he should not have requested any interest.⁶⁸⁷ The amount to be paid was not recorded. However, it seems plausible that Ido Picio was gravitating to the de Volta's orbit by then.⁶⁸⁸

PORCELLO (1184)

The Porcello family achieved the consular position in 1184 through Rubaldo.⁶⁸⁹ In the 1180s and early 1190s the Porcello family relied heavily on trade and finance as we shall see. Earlier documents offer an insight into the origins of the capital used for such enterprises. In 1156 Lanfranco Pevere gave Bernardo Porcello £50 'to work in Genoa' and rented to his family storage and shop to him for five years.⁶⁹⁰ It is therefore the Pevere family, one of the main components of the Curia faction, who acted as the patron of the Porcello.

The economic activities of the Porcellos in the 1180s and 1190s were markedly focused on long distance trade. However, we know that by then the family also owned and ran its own

⁶⁸⁶ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1047, 1137.

⁶⁸⁷ *Cassinese*, doc. 814.

⁶⁸⁸ Reinforcing this impression is the fact that the agreement was recorded in the house of Marchese de Volta.

⁶⁸⁹ Rubaldo Porcello had already been Consul of the pleas in 1180.

⁶⁹⁰ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 93.

shops in Genoa.⁶⁹¹ The Porcello family invested almost exclusively in trade with the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria in particular.⁶⁹² On 23rd September 1186 two agreements were reached. On the first occasion, Anselmo Porcello received £16 from Baiamonte Barlaria to invest overseas. In the second, it was Baimonte who received £31 from Anselmo Porcello to invest.⁶⁹³ Another document records that Baiamonte Barlaria formed a *societas* with Ottone de Castello to bring a fund to which he contributed £167 and Ottone £334 overseas. In addition Baiamonte declared that he was bringing with him a large sum, £415, on behalf of various investors, among whom was Anselmo Porcello with £31.⁶⁹⁴ On 20th July 1190 Giovanni Pontremolo received £3 from Bertolino Porcello to invest in the Levant. Filippo Castello, Pantaneo Pedicula and Guglielmo de Struppa were the witnesses of the transaction.⁶⁹⁵ Later, in 1192, the same Bertolino Porcello invested £4 in a business trip to Sardinia and Bugia.⁶⁹⁶ Other investments of the Porcello family related to constructions in Genoa.⁶⁹⁷

The Porcello family was one of the few cases of a family emerging from a non-noble background to the highest political office of Genoa. The Porcello seem to have had protectors in the powerful Pevere family, but when they invested overseas to the East, comparatively small sums, they did so, indirectly, within the network of Castello.

SPEZAPEDRA (1182, 1188)

In 1163 Spezapetra, along with Caffaro, witnessed the promise made by de Volta to marry the daughter of Piccamilio.⁶⁹⁸ From two later documents, dated September 1191, we discover

⁶⁹¹ *Cassinese*, docs. 1556, 1827. Interestingly, not renting any more from Pevere.

⁶⁹² Of the five occasions in which the Porcello family took part in long distance trade, four times it chose the east (Ultramar and Syria) and once the west (Sardinia and Bougie).

⁶⁹³ *Oberto* 1186, docs. 5, 6. Effectively such agreements had the effect of a regular *accomendacio* contract, with the difference that in this case both partners were going to travel overseas.

⁶⁹⁴ The other contributors were Oberto the notary, Guglielmo Bello, Gerardo the judge and Guglielmo de Aldo. (*Oberto* 1186, doc. 19.)

⁶⁹⁵ *Oberto* 1190, doc. 521.

⁶⁹⁶ In this case the witnesses were three members of the Gontardo family, and the document was recorded in their house. *Cassinese*, doc. 112.

⁶⁹⁷ *Cassinese*, docs. 10, 757, regarding the purchase of bricks.

⁶⁹⁸ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1144.

that Spezapreda had an active *societas* with Vassallo de Merlo⁶⁹⁹ and that Giacomo and Pietro Spezapreda owed £36 to Pietro Leonardo and Nicola de Petri. Guglielmo de Merlo and Ansaldo Fornario witnessed the latter, making the de Merlo family the one most closely associated to the Spezapreda family.

The scant surviving evidence of the activities of the Spezapreda family is not sufficient to ground it solidly in the Genoese social scene. Regarding its involvement in the civil tensions of the time, it can only be underlined that all the families to which they seem connected commercially did not play a major role in the conflicts subject to analysis in the first two chapters. On the other hand, Spezapreda was clearly acquainted with de Volta, Caffaro and Picamilio.⁷⁰⁰

TURCA (1184, 1187)

The Turca family was – together with the families Avvocato and Pevero – one of the core families of the de Curia faction. Effectively, the Turca were cousins of Avvocato and Pevero. Therefore, the economic activities and social affiliations of this family have already been explored in chapter two.

Conclusion

In the 1180s the consular commune of Genoa entered its most critical phase, which culminated in an institutional reform that brought about its demise. In part one I outlined how violence played a central role in these crucial years. Before conducting the analysis of the profiles of the families that occupied the consulates in the 1180s, I warned the reader that something was changing with respect to the distribution of the available positions among the families, with fewer families acquiring the consular position on a more frequent basis. In particular, the families Doria, Embriaco, Pevero, Vento and de Volta held the consular

⁶⁹⁹ *Cassinense*, doc. 990. We do not know the amount invested by the parties. Oberto di Nigro acts as witness.

⁷⁰⁰ For the involvement of the Grillo family see chapter 1, 2 and the relevant section in this chapter.

position with an unprecedented continuity. This, together with the emergence among the consular ranks of new factional families, such as Mari and Turca, illustrates the fact that the competition over the consulate was by this point – as confirmed by the chronicle of Ottobono Scriba – one of the main fields of confrontation between what were by now well defined opposing factions. The consular commune essentially responded to the development of conflict.

The analysis of the families and individuals that held the consular office in the period 1160-1190 has taken us through the period of maturity of the Genoese consular commune to the election of a foreign *podestà*. In chapter three, it emerged that the contemporary conflicts of Genoa progressively shaped the political structure of the city. In chapter four we will consider how the changing state of conflict analysed in part one affected the political structure of the commune in the last three decades considered in this dissertation.

The ultimate replacement of the consular *commune* with a different system of governance has traditionally been interpreted as a consequence of, among other factors, the state of conflict within the city walls.⁷⁰¹ Vitale argues that the transition to the *podestà* reflected a need to pacify the city's internecine infighting.⁷⁰² Heers makes the connection between factional warfare and this institutional development even more direct by claiming that the *podestà* possessed such military superiority that he was able to force the Genoese factions into peace.⁷⁰³ Gerald Day, building on Vitale's analysis and observing more specifically the Genoese conflicts of those transition years, stresses how such a transition was probably organised and supported by the de Curia faction, in order to challenge their de Volta opponents with the end result that the factions effectively shared control of the government.⁷⁰⁴ Building upon these analyses, Avner Greif interprets the key function of the *podestà* in Genoa as balancing power between the warring factions and the *podestà* himself.⁷⁰⁵ While 'not militarily strong enough to become a dictator...By the "threat" of assisting the other

⁷⁰¹ Vitale, V., *Il Comune del Podestà...* and De Negri, T., *Storia di Genova...*

⁷⁰² Vitale, V., *Breviario di Storia Genoves*, (Genova, 1955), pp.51-52; and Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, p. 9.

⁷⁰³ Heers, J., *Parties and Political Life...*, p. 206.

⁷⁰⁴ Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, pp.146-154.

⁷⁰⁵ Most recently in Greif, A., *Institutions...*, pp.217-268.

faction he deterred each faction from attempting to take control over the city’.⁷⁰⁶ The contribution that this chapter makes rests on identifying hidden factionalism within the components of the *podestarial* city government. In doing so, I aim to evaluate the role of factional structure across the transition. Integrating the findings of part one of this dissertation with the analysis of the Genoese families that occupied the seats of power in the years 1191-1216, will hopefully deepen our understanding of this crucial moment in Genoese political history. Using the findings of this chapter, I conclude by rejecting the theories previously formulated regarding the transition from the consular commune to the commune of the *podestà*.

One transition, many transitions

‘*In anno MCLXXXI cessavit consulatu communis; et fuit dominus Manegoldus de Brixia Potestas et Rector Ciutatis*’.⁷⁰⁷ With these words the annalist Ottobono Scriba described the end of the government of the consuls in 1191 when the city was ruled for the first time by a *podestà*, Manegoldo. His election began a Genoese period – lasting until 1216 – which was characterised by the alternation of two political systems that can loosely be defined, using Italian terminology, as consular and *podestarial*, from the names of the highest officers of the Genoese commune.⁷⁰⁸ The institution of the consulate remained central to the Genoese political structure, and it would be a mistake to speak of a solely *podestarial* period’.⁷⁰⁹ Chapter four analyses the twenty-five years of the history of the city that in chapter two had been divided in the following three periods as determined by the specific characteristics of the conflicts.

⁷⁰⁶ Greif, A., ‘On the political foundations of the late medieval commercial revolution: Genoa during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’, p.282.

⁷⁰⁷ *Annales*, vol.II, p.240.

⁷⁰⁸ Vitale, V., *Breviario...*, p.56.

⁷⁰⁹ The alternation between the consular and the *podestarial* system is not exclusive to Genoa and can be found in most Communes of Central and Northern Italy. For a synthesis of such tendency see Cristiani, ‘Le alternanze tra consoli e podestà cittadini’, pp.47-51.

- III) The years 1191-1195, were the last of the third period of Genoese conflicts characterised by an escalation into civil war, political secession and institutional reform.
- IV) The height of conflict was followed in the years 1196-1209 by a near suspension of factional violence due to the exhaustion caused by fifteen years of conflict.
- V) In the 1210s the city experienced a relapse into internal violence. This was characterised by the dissolution of the previous factional structures and by the emergence of new violent actors.

These decades, and the contemporary Genoese public officials, can also be ordered in institutional subsamples reflecting the formal structure of the Commune:

- Initial transition from a consular to a *podestarial* commune 1191-1194.
- In 1195 a second attempt to establish a *podestarial commune* was followed by a period (1195-1206) in which a *podestà* headed the Genoese *commune*.⁷¹⁰
- From 1207 to 1216 Genoa returned for the last time in its history to a consular *commune*.⁷¹¹

1191-1194. A complex transition

1191. The year of the first *podestà*

This year saw the first experiment of the Genoese *commune* with a foreign officer, a *podestà*. As the reader will recall from chapter one, this first transition was not an easy one. Indeed, the period was referred to in chapter one, without risk of hyperbole, as a civil war. Ottobono Scriba recorded how, in late 1190, the Genoese consuls decided that in 1191 the city would be ruled by a *podestà*. Immediately after the decision was taken Lanfranco Pevero, one of the sitting consuls - a core member of the de Curia faction - was killed by Fulcone and Guglielmo de Castello, the sons of Fulcone de Castello, a leader of the de Volta faction. This homicide

⁷¹⁰ Except in 1201, when, as we shall discuss, Genoa was ruled by consuls.

⁷¹¹ Likewise, in 1211, Genoa was governed by a *podestà*.

certainly gives the impression that in this case the decision to elect a *podestà* was more of a weapon in factional warfare than it was a conflict resolution mechanism, as Gerald Day has argued against common interpretations.⁷¹² This impression is reinforced by the fact that Ottobono Scriba recorded that earlier in 1190 Guido Spinola, Nicola Embriaco, Fulcone de Castello, Simone Doria, Baldovino Guercio, Rosso de Volta and Spezapreda had left Genoa to join the military operations of the Third Crusade. Therefore, the consuls in 1190 voted in a foreign *podestà* while all the leaders of the core families of the de Volta faction were overseas. It is plausible that the decision to elect a *podestà* aimed to exclude the faction led by the nobles who had left the city from the government of Genoa, and I will attempt to see if this was the case.

The analysis conducted in chapter three relied on a continuous year-by-year list of the consuls that governed the Genoese *commune*. Following the 1191 transition, during the *podestarial* years, these officers were not elected, reducing the information available regarding the internal balance of the commune. While, from 1196 onwards, a number of additional public officers would flank the *podestà*, in 1191 Manegoldo was simply assisted in the administration of justice, as the consuls of the commune had been before, by consuls *de placito* – of the pleas. As a consequence in 1191 and for several years analysed in chapter four, these officers provide the only available information regarding the individuals involved in the administration of the Genoese Commune for that year.

⁷¹² Abulafia, D., *The Two Italies...*, p. 204; Vitale, V., *Breviario...*, pp.51-55; Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.150; Steven Epstein – to offer the most recent supporter of this view – stated that ‘In 1190...a new, modern thing happened in Genoa. Because so much civil disorder, conspiracies, and divisions wracked the city, the anziani and counsellors decided that the consulate of the commune should be abolished and that Genoa should have a *podestà*’. Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p. 88. Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova...*, the most recent history of the city in Italian, aiming to provide a definite guide to the existing literature follows this view, speaking of a ‘failure’ of the *podestarial* system to assure the pacification it was designed for, pp. 140-167. Greif simply ignores the 1191 election, probably because it is obvious that it didn’t work if peace and power sharing were the objectives, ‘On the political foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution’, p.281.

Families/Years	1191	Affiliation
CARAMANDINO	CP	Neutral
CASTELLO	CP	Volta
GUARACCO	CP	Neutral
PALLO	CP	Neutral
SPEZAPREDA	CP	Volta
TORNELLO	CP	Neutral
ZERBINO	CP	Neutral

Table 4.1 Consuls of the pleas serving in 1191⁷¹³

From Table 4.1, it emerges that regarding the elected officers, the *podestarial* transition of 1191 was hardly a revolution. All of the families that provided the consuls of the pleas for that year had already held official roles for the city. Other factors, however, might speak of a certain discontinuity. In relation to the factional dynamics of Genoa for instance, it should be underlined that no members of the Volta, Pevere or Vento families took part in the city government, in contrast to most earlier years.

To evaluate the political meaning of the participation in city government of the families of the consuls of the pleas of 1191, we must first reflect on the Genoese elite's attitude towards the office of consul of the pleas. From 1130 onwards, the consuls of the pleas were elected on a neighbourhood basis, and the families that held the role were essentially recurrent, independent of the conflictual structure of the city. As a result, and given the availability of the names of the consuls of the commune, the information about the consuls of the pleas was not used in chapter three to establish the factional links of the Genoese governments. The identities and connections of the consuls of the commune carried a much stronger political and conflictual value than those of the consuls of the pleas.⁷¹⁴

⁷¹³ Caramandino, Castello, Spezapreda and Tornello had been consuls of the commune in the past.

⁷¹⁴ From the *breve* of 1143 (discussed in chapter three) it emerges that the consuls of the pleas were to be supervised by the consuls of the city in their actions and judgments.

With the exception of the Guaracco and Zerbino families, the activities and affiliations of all these families have already been taken into consideration.⁷¹⁵

GUARACCO (CP: 1135, 1169, 1172, 1177, 1183, 1191/1193, 1201, 1203, 1209; Rector: 1196)

According to a traditional reconstruction, the Guaracco family was named after a certain Viscount Waraco, who was reputed to be a common ancestor of the Guaracco and the Guercio families.⁷¹⁶ This tradition does not rest on any historical evidence. However, the economic interests of the Guaracco and Guercio families were similar, with a marked predilection for the eastern trade. Day, following Belgrano, states that the Guaracco family was part of a Guercio's bloc. However, only once in 1192 did the two family names figure on the same document.⁷¹⁷ From the point of view of factional affiliation, the Guaracco family appears essentially neutral. The position of Ottone Guaracco as consul of the pleas in 1191, however, probably reflects the family's long tradition covering that role.

PALLO (CP: 1187, 1189, 1191, 1200, 1203, 1204)

The available evidence concerning the Pallo family has been taken into consideration in chapter two, because a Pallo was killed by his relatives of the Porcello family. What emerges was a family disconnected from both factions.

ZERBINO (CP: 1191)

The Zerbino family members left no trace of economic activities contemporary or prior to the year of the election of Guglielmo Zerbino as consul of the pleas. All the information we

⁷¹⁵ For the profiles and affiliations of the other families see chapter two and three.

⁷¹⁶ Belgrano, L., 'Cartario genovese', *ASLSP*, 2, 1870, tables 40, 41. Day, G. W., *Genoa's Response...*, p. 108-109.

⁷¹⁷ *Cassinese*, doc. 1881. A Guaracco is witness to a real estate transaction of the Guercio family. The Guaracco family appears in 14 more documents, always as witnesses and never for families involved in factional violence. (*Cassinese*, doc. 1108.)

possess comes from the chronicle of the city. Ottobono Scriba recorded how in 1191 Guglielmo Zerbino and Oberto Nigro were sent by the *commune* as ambassadors to the king of Morocco.⁷¹⁸ In 1216 Guglielmo Zerbino acted as witness for families that were not affiliated to any of the factional families considered in part one.⁷¹⁹ As a consequence the Zerbino family can be considered neutral in the political scenario of Genoa, and also politically marginal.

The politics of the consuls of the pleas: the 1191 shift

It is plausible to hypothesize that, in the absence of the consulate of the commune, the attitude towards the post of consul of the pleas changed.⁷²⁰ In order to evaluate this possibility, let us consider the consuls of the pleas for the year 1191. Most of the families occupying the role of consuls of the pleas in 1191 had already been present in the consular lists of the Commune in the previous decades. Half of them had frequently, and exclusively, been consuls of the pleas: Guaracco; Pallo; and Zerbino. By contrast, the families Caramandino, Castello and Spezapreda usually saw their members serving as consuls of the commune and only rarely as consuls of the pleas. Finally, only one of the consular families of 1191, the Tornello, had previously held both offices with the same regularity. Each of these seven Genoese families was clearly part of the city elite, given that they had all previously held important roles. However, their status was not identical, and the consular families Caramandino, Castello, Spezapreda and Tornello, were clearly of higher standing than the families Guaracco, Pallo and Zerbino. Indeed, four consular families out of seven families elected in 1191 as consuls of the pleas, or a percentage of 57%, corresponds to a much higher percentage than the 36%

⁷¹⁸ *Annales*, vol. II, p. 30.

⁷¹⁹ *Lanfranco*, doc. 1279.

⁷²⁰ On this development in other Italian realities; Maire Vigueur, J. C., 'Gli "iudices" nelle città comunali' (Palermo, 1994), pp.161-176.

relative to the number of consular families occupying the consulate of the pleas in the 1180s.⁷²¹

The participation of comparatively more consular families in the consulate of the pleas in the government of 1191 may perhaps indicate that in the years following the *podestarial* reform, prominent families started to become interested in the position of consul of the pleas. The fact that families at the top of the commune's political elite became more interested in this office, in turn, could make the consulate of the pleas a reliable indicator, as we shall see, of the internal political balance of the commune. However, it is important to remember that the list of the consuls of the pleas should not be seen as a fixed indication of the political structure of Genoa under the one year rule of a *podestà*. This warning is motivated by two considerations. Firstly, while it is evident that the role of consul of the pleas in 1191 was held by families that traditionally occupied the position of consul of the commune, these were, with the exception of the Castello family, families that did not take part in the episodes of conflict studied by the dissertation. Secondly, to be part of a government did not coincide with being politically affiliated to the other members of a government and could certainly not rule out the possibility of a subsequent falling out. For instance, in 1191 Ottone Castello was a consul of the pleas, but this did not stop the *podestà* from ordering the destruction of palace of Fulcone Castello, in retaliation for the 1190 murder of Lanfranco Pevero. Therefore, while factional speculation should be attempted from the names of the consuls of the pleas, such analysis obviously cannot capture subsequent falling-outs and, therefore, the explanatory value of such an analysis is not absolute. What does the list of the consuls of the pleas tell us regarding the 1191 government of the *podestà*? It emerges that Day's hypothesis of a de Curia dominated

⁷²¹ Out of a total of 67 consuls of the pleas elected from 1180 to 1189, 43 came from families that had never seen their members elected as consuls of the commune, and 24 came from families that had also seen their members appointed as consuls of the commune (The families Nigro and Mallono, with five consuls of the pleas each, topped the peculiar ranking of the consular families that were very interested in occupying also the consulate of the pleas). From a comparative perspective it is important to consider that this percentage was of 31% - 17 out of 54 - for the 1160s and of 45% - 34 out of 75 - for the 1170s. The higher percentage for the 1170s is largely due to two consular families, Nigro and Gontardo, that obtained respectively six and five consulates of the pleas, while for instance in the 1160s the only consular family that obtained more than two consulate of the pleas had been the family Alberico with three posts. While the figure of 57% for 1191 is not as significant as the figures obtained for longer periods, it is an useful indicative value that will be compared to successive lists consuls of the pleas; which will confirm the political interest of consular families for the consulate of the pleas.

set-up to exclude the members of the de Volta faction, should be posed in rather weaker terms. The 1191 government, more likely, was probably an attempt at a neutral government, partly of traditional consuls of the pleas, with a very slightly greater interest of the de Volta faction. Considering the governments that came before and after the 1191 one, it appears that an effort was made on behalf of a faction – the de Curia – that was losing cohesiveness, to use the absence of the main leaders of the opposing faction to negotiate a less de Volta dominated government. This attempt however did not survive the return of the main leaders of the de Volta faction.

Families/Years	1192	1193	1194	Affiliation
CARAMANDINO		C		Neutral
DORIA			C	Volta
EMBRIACO		C	C	Volta
GRILLO			C	Neutral
GUERCIO	C	C		Volta
LERCARIO			C	Neutral
MALONCELLO		C		Volta
NIGRO		C		Volta
NUVELONO	C			Neutral
PICIO	C			Volta
TORNELLO		C		Neutral
USODIMARE	C			Curia
VENTO	C	C	C	Neutral
VOLTA	C		C	Volta

Table 4.2 Consuls of the commune in 1192-1194⁷²²

⁷²² Chapters two and three for the profiles of all these families.

1192-1194. Consular government at the height of conflict

In 1192, Genoa was once again administered by consuls of the *commune*. The first *podestarial* attempt in Genoa was therefore short lived. Why did the Genoese decide to switch back to a consular system? As I have previously discussed, the 1191 *podestarial* regime is best understood as an attempt to somewhat limit the predominant positions of the families closer to the faction de Volta. This is not to say that an initial attempt was made to exclude these families from the government of the city. The inclusion of a de Castello among the 1191 consuls of the pleas is indicative of this. Rather, the actions undertaken by the *podestà* - the destruction of the properties of Fulcone de Castello to begin with – were perceived by the members of the de Volta faction as a direct attack to their interests. The return to the consular commune in this perspective can be hypothesized to be the formal retaliation of these prominent families. I will seek the evidence of such a state of affairs in the names of the consular families for the years 1192-1194.

However, to start with it may help to recall briefly the particular characteristics of Genoese civil conflicts in these years. In the words of Ottobono Scriba, Genoa was in 1192 the theatre of many wars and seditions - '*multe guerre et seditiones*'.⁷²³ In 1193 the violence spread like a wild fire - '*Sicut validissimus ignis inter copiosissimam lignorum congeriem ventorum flamine copiosissime augmentatur*' and Ingone de Frexia, the son of Ingone de Volta, was killed, '*interfectus*'. In 1194, as described in chapter one, siege warfare divided the city. Importantly for our understanding of the internal political structure of the city in those years, the situation was such that Ottobono Scriba noted also that '*universus populus factus esset inobediens consulatui*'.⁷²⁴ The peculiarities of these violent episodes have already been the subject of analysis in chapter one. At this stage it is important to take into consideration Ottobono Scriba's last sentence; and remember that the state of internal conflict evidently undermined the legitimacy and functions of the consuls which allegiances we are about to

⁷²³ *Annales*, vol.II, p.42.

⁷²⁴ *Annales*, vol.II, p.45.

evaluate. The families elected to the consulate of the *commune* were: Vento (3); Volta (2); Embriaco (2); Guercio (2); Caramandino, Doria, Grillo, Lercario, Mallono, Malocello, Nigro, Nuvelono, Picio, Tornello and Usodimare.⁷²⁵ With the exception of the Lercario family, the factional affiliations of these families during the height of the Genoese civil conflicts have already been analysed in previous chapters.⁷²⁶

LERCARIO (CP: 1166, 1173, 1174, 1178, 1188, 1192, 1195, 1200, 1215)

Members of the family Lercario served as consuls of the pleas in 1166, 1173, 1174, 1178, 1188, 1192, 1195, 1200 and 1215. The 1194 appointment of Rubaldo Lercario was to remain the only time that a Lercario held the consulate of the *commune*. However, Rubaldo was later to serve four times, in 1196, 1199, 1202 and 1205, as a *rector* assisting the work of the *podestà*. Following the already underlined familiar trend of relatively less important families serving as consul of the pleas on a number of occasions before acquiring the position of consul of the *commune*, we see the Lercario family's progressive political emergence as a newer Genoese family. Significantly – a possible indication of the comparatively recent fortunes of the family - the family left no records of its economic activities in the earliest of the Genoese cartularies. The first indication of the family's activities are dated 1186, when Rubaldo Lercario, the son of Alberto, gave to Ugo of Montpellier £8 in maritime exchange, to be repaid in Sicilian gold.⁷²⁷ The relatively small size of the sum invested leaves the impression that the family either had limited means or did not focus on trade. The latter impression is strengthened by the fact that all the later information relative to the family's activities points to its ownership of lands outside Genoa and of houses in the city.⁷²⁸ No connections with any of the families involved in episodes of internal conflicts emerge. While

⁷²⁵ Of these Caramandino, once, Mallono thrice and Tornello, once, also covered the role of consuls of the pleas.

⁷²⁶ These findings summarised in Table 4.2.

⁷²⁷ *Oberto 1186*, doc. 328. It should be noticed, however that the act was recorded in the house of Bonifacio de Volta.

⁷²⁸ *Cassinense*, docs. 96, 343, 569, 577, 1219, 1220. In these transactions the Lercario family never had an active role. The properties of the family are merely listed to indicate the location of other properties, without any indication of the Lercario's properties value or extension.

it should be stressed that in 1205 a Lercario served as *rector* under the rule of the *podestà* Fulcone de Castello - whose affiliation to the de Volta faction is unquestionable - and therefore that it could be hypothesised that the Lercario family was not opposed to the families close to the de Volta faction. In my analysis I consider this family neutral in order to avoid a circular argument.⁷²⁹ The information relating to the connections of the Lercario family completes the picture of the consular appointments for the years 1192-1194. What emerges is an image of governments controlled by members of the de Volta faction – 53% of the consulates - and independent – 42% - families. Strikingly, no members of the core families of the de Curia faction were elected – in previous years they had commonly been represented by a member of the Pevere family.

An analysis of the families that obtained the consulate of the pleas in the same period confirms the argument of a dominance of the families close to the de Volta faction. The twenty-one consuls of the pleas for the period 1191-1194 came from eighteen families, of which five appear for the first time in this analysis.⁷³⁰ The eight families closer to the de Volta faction obtained nine of these appointments, unaffiliated families obtained ten appointments and families that were closer to the de Curia faction obtained only two appointments.

Families/Years	1192	1193	1194	Affiliation
BACEMO			CP	Volta
BOCCA		CP		Curia
CAFFARO	CP			Neutral
CARAMANDINO	CP			Neutral
CASTELLO	CP			Volta
EMBRONI			CP	Curia
GALIANA		CP		Volta
GUARACCO	CP	CP		Neutral
LERCARIO	CP			Neutral
MALLONO		CP	CP	Volta
MAZANELLO		CP		Neutral

⁷²⁹ If we consider serving in a government with a given majority to be an evidence of the fact that the family is affiliated to that majority obviously we end up with a very homogeneous, but possibly misleading picture of Genoese internal politics.

⁷³⁰ Bocca, Galiana, Mazanello, Palazono, Stancono.

PALAZZOLO	CP		CP	Neutral
PICAMIGLIO		CP		Volta
ROZA			CP	Volta
SCOTO			CP	Volta
SPEZAPREDA			CP	Volta
STANCONO		CP		Neutral
TORNELLO	CP			Neutral

Table 4.3 Consuls of the pleas in 1192-1194

An additional element emerging from the analysis of the profiles of the five ‘new’ families that were appointed as consuls of the pleas, together with the information already in our possession, indicates that even with the return to a consular government the political significance of the consulate of the pleas does not appear to have diminished much. 52% of the positions of consul of the pleas went to consular families.

BOCCA (CP: 1193) (Curia)

While the Bocca family did not participate in any of the civil unrest that took place in Genoa during the period under consideration, Guglielmo Bocca – the consul of the pleas in 1193 - can be linked with the main leaders of the de Curia faction. In three transactions dated July 1191 and involving the families Avvocato and Lecavele, Guglielmo Bocca figured not only as witness, but as a relative whose authority and advice were to be respected and followed by Giovanni Avvocato and Giacomo de Turca.⁷³¹

GALIANA (CP: 1193, 1203) (Volta)

The de Galiana family held a public office for the first time in 1193, when Ingone became consul of the pleas. The first economic information regarding this family is contained in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. In 1163 Ogerio Galiana borrowed £18 from Vento to pay his

⁷³¹ *Cassinese*, docs. 796-798. See chapter two for a discussion of the role played by family connections in the structuring of the de Curia faction. No contemporary indication of the economic activities of the family survives.

sister's dowry to Ingo de Torre.⁷³² At the time, the de Torre family was politically important, having seen Oberto de Torre elected as consul in 1133, 1140 and 1147. The de Galiana was therefore connected to the Genoese elite, but the value of the dowry did not compare well with those offered by other major Genoese families.⁷³³ On two other occasions Ogerio de Galiana acted as witness for Vento, once for a loan and another time for a real estate transaction.⁷³⁴ Later the family's fortunes appeared linked to long distance commerce. In 1179 Baldizzone de Galiana received £50 from Ingone de Volta and Ugone Alberico to invest overseas.⁷³⁵ In 1186 Ingone de Galiana (the future consul of the pleas) invested the considerable sum of £101 with Berardo Ricio to trade in Constantinople.⁷³⁶ In 1191 Ingone received from Caffara and Trencherio more than £200 to trade in Naples.⁷³⁷ The family was slowly beginning to deal in larger and larger sums of money, and was probably increasing its wealth. From a factional point of view, the Galiana family was closer to the families of the de Volta faction but it was also relatively close to the family Vento, whose political importance might have been behind the election of Ingone as consul of the pleas.⁷³⁸

MAZANELLO (CP: 1193, 1198, 1205, 1215) (Neutral)

Ogerio de Mazanello was elected as consul of the pleas in 1193. There is a surviving testimony of an earlier role played by a Mazanello in the public sphere of Genoa, when in 1152 Tancredi de Mazanello was part of a consortium of Genoese citizens that purchased the

⁷³² *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 1057.

⁷³³ Consider for instance Alberico, Bacemo, Castello and de Volta. By 1163, the Torre family political influence and – probably – affluence was probably reduced; it did not play any part in the events covered by this thesis.

⁷³⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, docs. 1222, 1292. On one later occasion, in 1190, Ingone de Galiana acted as witness, once again for a real estate transaction of Ogerio Vento, confirming a relative proximity to this eminent Genoese family. (*Cassinese*, doc. 13.)

⁷³⁵ He was going to carry his business out under the tutelage of the two investors; for more details see the profile of the Bacemo family. *A. S.G., Manoscritti*, n.102, c. 11. R.; (Filangeri, 'Famiglie', p.131.)

⁷³⁶ *Oberto* 1186, doc. 34. Ingo de Galiana also acted as witness for other three partnership agreements directed towards Constantinople involving respectively Ricio, Castello and Embriaco, (*Oberto* 1186, docs. 4, 8, 29.) All the aforementioned documents were recorded in the house of Ingo de Volta.

⁷³⁷ *Cassinese*, docs. 25, 43. In these cases the documents were recorded in the house of Fornario and no members of families close to the de Volta coalition were present.

⁷³⁸ The Vento family saw its members Ogerio, Simone and Tommaso elected as consuls of the *commune* on each year between 1192 and 1194.

monopoly on salt trading from the commune.⁷³⁹ The surviving evidence of Mazanello economic activities during the 1190s indicates a marked preference for the clothing industry. In 1190, Anfoiso Mazanello and his partner, Anselmo Navarro, committed to repaying a debt of £120 contracted for the purchase of goods from Gandolfo from Piacenza.⁷⁴⁰ A few months later, the same partners paid £72 for the goods of Ugone Gillano from Piacenza.⁷⁴¹ In July 1191, once again Anfoiso Mazanello and Anselmo Navarro, committed to pay £51 to Tebaldo and Gualo Revezola for their goods.⁷⁴² In 1197 another document mentions the brothers Mazanello, Anfoiso, Rubaldo and Ogerio, who owned houses in Genoa.⁷⁴³ Therefore, the early economic interest of the Mazanello family in the Genoese public sphere did not result in office-holding for the family until 1193. It is interesting to notice how the brothers divided up the roles of the family. Ogerio was the one elected as consul of the pleas in 1193. This is despite the fact Anfoiso was the principal economic actor of the family. From the surviving evidence, the Mazanello family can be considered neutral when it comes to the conflicts between the factions de Volta and de Curia.⁷⁴⁴

PALAZOLO (CP: 1167, 1180, 1192, 1194) (Neutral)

The family of Corso de Palazolo came from outside the city.⁷⁴⁵ The only evidence available from an economic point of view is a society that Corso formed with Raimondo Unaldo to invest in land acquisitions, and the fact that he acted as a guarantor for a debt contracted by a

⁷³⁹ *Libri Iurium*, I, 1, doc. 150 Such investment can be placed among similar attempts made by the Genoese commune in the '40s and '50s of the twelfth century to extinguish its debts after the overly costly attempt to conquer Tortosa; (Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.24.

⁷⁴⁰ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 312.

⁷⁴¹ *Oberto 1190*, doc. 629.

⁷⁴² *Cassinense*, doc. 813. It is relevant to underline that on this occasion the two witnesses were Manfredo Guercio and Rolando Picio.

⁷⁴³ A. S. G., *Manoscritti*, n. 102, c.38. Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.182.

⁷⁴⁴ Chapter one and two, for an analysis of the 'tensions' between the Mazanello family and its business partner Navarro.

⁷⁴⁵ The toponym Palazolo recurs often in the Genoese sources; it refers to a place close to the area of Mazena, where the Commune built the Castle of Chiavari in 1167, see (*Le Carte del Monastero di San Siro*, I, doc. 80 and *Annales*, I, p. 206.) Savignone is a mountain village north of Genoa, on the road to the Pianura Padana. See Filangeri, L., 'Famiglie...', p.174.

French merchant in Genoa.⁷⁴⁶ From the surviving evidence, Corso de Palazolo did not seem to share any business interest with families involved in the Genoese factionalism. As was the case for the family Lercario analysed earlier in this chapter, the Palazolo family was a neutral and politically marginal family that traditionally held the position of consul of the pleas.

STANCONO (CP: 1149, 1152, 1155, 1157, 1193, 1199, 1204, 1206) (Neutral)

The Stancono family figures in eighteen documents in the 1190s, with its members acting as witnesses in twelve cases. No allegiance information can be obtained through such contracts. The family owned a house in Genoa and Ido Stancono invested £4 in a *societas* with Regale to jointly run an inn in the city.⁷⁴⁷ Ido Stancono also acted as a travelling agent in long distance trade: in 1191 he went to Bougie bringing with him £10 capital of Attilia Ferriera and various goods, mostly textiles, of Gasparo Polastra and Guidotto di Cisanello.⁷⁴⁸ As was the case with the Palazolo, the Stancono family was neutral and had a long-standing experience as consuls of the pleas.

In the light of these findings we can draw some conclusions. From the point of view of factional affiliation, it is telling that 43% of the consuls of the pleas elected between 1192 and 1194 came from families closer to the de Volta faction. Therefore, the idea of a post-1191 de Volta faction backlash that emerges by looking at the consular lists for 1192-1194 – when the de Volta families occupied 42% of the positions - is confirmed. This finding is significant if we consider that the overall political significance of the consulate of the pleas was not reduced by a return to a consular government, since 52% of the families that obtained the position were consular families– in line with the 57% figure for 1191.

⁷⁴⁶ Cassinese, docs. 93, 1508.

⁷⁴⁷ Cassinese, docs. 740, 777, 974.

⁷⁴⁸ Respectively, Cassinese, docs. 1743, 1762, 1836.

Conclusions to 1191-1194

The evidence presented in this section allows for several considerations on the transition of 1191-1194. To start with the analysis of the officers elected in 1191 as consul of the pleas indicates that the first government of a *podestà* in Genoa, although it did not attempt to exclude the families of the de Volta faction from power, did seem to have curtailed their presence in the Genoese public offices – de Volta families occupied two out of seven positions and de Curia none. Thus Gerald Day's hypothesis is confirmed. The offices of the consuls of the pleas appear to have become another field of high political competition, with 57% of the consuls of the pleas coming from consular families; up from 36% in the 1180s. The findings relative to the period 1192-1194 are consistent with the analysis, conducted in part one, that showed that rising tensions in these years were connected to the return of the de Volta faction's members to Genoa after the Third Crusade. Families close to the de Volta faction effectively controlled the reinstated consular commune. This conclusion was reached through the analysis of the list of the consulate of the commune which was occupied in 42% of the cases by families close to the de Volta. The figure for the consulate of the pleas was 43% - up from 28% in 1191. The perceived control exercised by the de Volta faction families was such that in 1194, the de Curia faction seceded from the commune and elected its own consuls: Rubaldo de Curia, Giovanni Avvocato and Enrico Embrone. The development of the internal structure of the commune in these years reflected the ongoing conflict crises analysed in part one and, as discussed, the prolonged state of conflict was overcome, when the fighting parties following the advice of Henry VI's seneschal, Markward of Anweiler, who was in Genoa to negotiate the city participation to his emperor's second invasion of Sicily, came together in a council and elected Oberto de Olevano, from Pavia, as *podestà*. This *podestà* governed the commune until the end of 1194 and was confirmed for 1195.⁷⁴⁹

The public officers of the commune for the period 1195-1206

After the troublesome transition that has been analysed in the previous section of chapter four, the commune of Genoa entered a phase of relative institutional stability. In the same way that it is clear how the institutions of the commune were shaped by the conflict dynamics in Genoa for the period 1191-1194, so the successive – and more stable – period, closely reflected a marked decrease in episodes of civil violence, as discussed in chapter two.⁷⁵⁰

Between 1195 and 1206, with the exclusion of 1201, the commune was governed by a *podestà*. These officers, usually appointed for one year, were: Jacopo Manerio (1195), Drudo Marcellino from Milan (1196, 1197), Alberto di Mandello from Milan (1198), Cristiano de Bertrame from Pavia (1199), Rollandino son of Malapresa from Lucca (1200), Guifredoto Grassello from Milan (1202, 1203, 1204), Fulcone de Castello (1205), Giovanni Strussio (1206).⁷⁵¹ As Genoa was ruled by consuls in 1201, I divide the analysis of the years 1195-1206 into three sub-periods: *podestarial* 1195-1200; *consular* 1201 and *podestarial* 1202-1206.

1195 – 1200. Power sharing?

With Oberto de Olevano in 1195 the Genoese started a period of consolidation of the *podestarial* system, visible in the fact that, in 1196 and 1199, together with the consuls of the pleas, an additional council, specific to the *podestarial* commune, was elected to support the government of the *podestà*.⁷⁵² It was the council of *rectores*, composed of eight *nobiles*.⁷⁵³

The *rectores* were responsible for the collection of the import and export taxes of the city, for the construction and up-keep of galleys and for the refurbishment and protection of the

⁷⁵¹ All were foreigners except Fulcone de Castello in 1205.

Genoese forts and castles along the Riviera. Clearly this institution potentially had a more marked political significance than did that of the consuls of the pleas.⁷⁵⁴

The fact that *podestà* usually came from outside Genoa and during their period in office were forbidden from acquiring properties, investing in commercial transactions or getting married, makes any effort to uncover evidence relative to the connections between these officers and the Genoese families unproductive. However, as was already the case in 1191, the *podestà* relied on a large number of public officers that supported his work, particularly in the administration of justice.

Family/Year	Affiliation	1195	1196	1197	1198	1199	1200	Family/Year	Affiliation	1195	1196	1197	1198	1199	1200
ALBERICO	Volta	CP		CP				MARINO	Neutral						CP
BUFFERIO	Volta	CP						MAZALE	Neutral					CP	
CAMPO	Neutral					CP		MAZANELLO	Neutral				CP		
CASTELLO	Volta	CP				CP		NIGRO	Volta		CP	CP		CP	
CAVARUNCO	Neutral		CP		CP		CP	PALLO	Neutral						CP
ELIA	Neutral		CP		CP	CP	CP	PANERIA	Neutral		CP				
FORNARIO	Volta	CP	CP	CP				PANZANO	Volta			CP			
GIONATA	Neutral	CP						PICAMIGLIO	Volta						CP
GRILLO	Neutral				CP			PORCELLO	Curia		CP		CP	CP	
GRIMALDO	Volta			CP				RICIO	Neutral				CP		CP
GUERCIO	Volta		CP		CP	CP		ROZA	Volta		CP				
ISOLA	Neutral					CP		SARDENA	Volta					CP	
LAUMELLO	Neutral			CP	CP			SAVIGNONE	Neutral						CP
LECANOCE	Curia		CP	CP	CP			STANCONO	Neutral					CP	
LERCARIO	Neutral	CP					CP	TORNELLO	Neutral			CP	CP	CP	
LUCCHESE	Neutral			CP				USODIMARE	Neutral					CP	
MALLONO	Volta			CP		CP	CP	VOLTA	Volta						CP
MARABOTO	Neutral	CP													

Table 4.4 Consuls of the pleas appointed for the period 1195-1200⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵⁴ The rectors were sometimes also called octo nobiles or discreti. This board was elected only salutary until 1224. In the following 25 years, instead, they were always appointed. They ceased to exist in 1250. Vitale, V., *Il commune...*, p. 340. Another institutional innovation of the period took place in 1198 with the election of a group of Consuls for the Foreigners, which essentially dealt with the administration of justice in causes involving individuals not qualifying as citizens

⁷⁵⁵ The family Cavarunco was neutral (see, Cluster Map. Chapter two), it remained so in later decades (*Lanfranco*, 68, 69, 884, 1156, 1410). All the evidence regarding the family Elia shows its members acting as witnesses for Mallono in three occasions (*Lanfranco*, docs. 1384, 1649, 1650). Mazale figures only on one document (*Lanfranco*, doc. 788) and appears neutral. The family Marino appears neutral (*Lanfranco*, docs. 445, 1603). Panzano was a trading agent to Alexandria for Volta and Spinola (*Lanfranco*, docs. 400, 401, 701). Ricio focused on real estate and appeared neutral (*Lanfranco*, docs. 117, 118, 129, 130); as did Savignone (*Lanfranco*, docs. 459, 826, 623), of whom we know that he was an uncle of Navarro, also neutral (*Lanfranco*, docs. 592, 593).

Table 4.4 above lists the Genoese families from which the consuls of the pleas were elected in the period 1195-1200. During these six years, fifty-nine consuls of the pleas, from thirty-five different families, assisted the *podestà* in the administration of justice. 52% of the positions were occupied by former consular families, confirming the trend of comparatively more important families getting involved in the administration of justice as consuls of the pleas.⁷⁵⁶

The fact that few families that had been involved in the Genoese conflicts appear in the list of consuls of the pleas, reinforced by the fact that for the first time in the history of the commune a foreigner – Vassallo from Lomello - was appointed as consuls of the pleas,⁷⁵⁷ must have played a role in the formulation of the hypothesis that the consuls of the pleas participated in non-factional governments of the *podestarial* commune in the years 1195-1200.⁷⁵⁸ Let us briefly consider a comparison between the polarised years, 1192-1194, and the first period of the supposed power-sharing years, 1195-1200.

In 1192-1194, 43% of the consulates of the pleas were held by members of families close to the de Volta faction. In 1195-1200, however, after the end of the fighting, there is not much change. Twenty-three of the fifty-nine positions – 39% - were held again by families de Volta. The factional picture also does not change if we consider the political participation of the families de Curia. The number of consulates occupied by families that had been associated to the Curia faction rose from just under 10% (two out of twenty-one consuls of the pleas) in 1192-1194 to, merely 12% (seven out of fifty-nine) in 1195-1200. A simple analysis of the percentages of the public offices occupied by families closer to the different factions clearly indicates that, even considering that an attempt was also made to include more neutral families as consuls of the pleas, the families closer to the de Volta's faction were clearly

⁷⁵⁶ From the Alberico, Buferio, Castello, Fornario, Grillo, Grimaldo, Guercio, Lecavele, Mallono, Maraboto, Nigro, Picamiglio, Porcello, Roza, Sardena, Usodimare and Volta families.

⁷⁵⁷ Note however that there was no overlap between the families Lecavele, de Castello and de Volta this was the case, for instance, of Vassallo de Laumello (consuls of the pleas for the foreigners 1197, 1198), who probably came from Lomello, in the territory of Pavia, along with the *podestà* Drudo Marcellino (from Milan).

⁷⁵⁸ Vitale, V., *Il Breviario*, p.52; Vitale, V., *Il comune del podestà*, pp.3-19 (anachronistically speaks of Guelfs).

predominant in the consular lists; and this did not change when the civil conflict ended and the *podestà* took over.

Gerald Day, in line with his theory of the *podestà* as a restraint on the de Volta's faction, commented on what he thought was a lack of factional polarization among the consuls of the pleas, noting that 'If the de Curia leaders did hope to use the *podestarial* constitution for their own political advancement, they were disappointed, because their influence cannot be seen in the wavering constitutional systems in Genoa from the 1190s to 1216. Any role played by the de Curia people in the *podestarial* regimes is hidden, and [also] when the *podestà* was assisted by rectors, little factional information is to be gleaned from the names of these assistants'.⁷⁵⁹ However, the scholar did not attempt to uncover the hidden factional information that can be extracted from the individuals that occupied the positions of consul of the pleas. Had he done so, he would have discovered that, while the role played by the de Curia might have been hidden, the one played by the de Volta was very much on the surface. But, we must also ask, was he right about the *rectores*? Let us look at the families that provided the *rectores* during these years.

Family/Year	Affiliation	1196	1199
CAMILLA	Neutral		R
DORIA	Volta	R	
EMBRIACO	Volta	R	
FORNARIO	Volta	R	
GUARACCO	Neutral	R	
LECAVELE	Curia	R	
LERCARIO	Neutral	R	R
LONGO	Volta	R	R
MALLONO	Volta		R
MALOCELLO	Volta		R
NIGRO	Volta	R	
PICCAMILIO	Volta		R

Table 4.5 Rectors appointed in 1196 and 1199

⁷⁵⁹ Day, G.W., *Genoa's Response...*, p.150.

Contrary to what Day states, from the information collected on all of these families it cannot be doubted that the absolute preponderance in the council of *rectores* in these two years was of families that were to the de Volta faction. I have shown how the families Doria, Embriaco, Fornario, Longo, Mallono, Malocello, Nigro and Piccamiglio, eight out of twelve, were connected on different levels to the families that constituted the core of the faction de Volta. The Camilla, Guaracco and Lercario families should be considered neutral with respect to Genoese factional divisions. The only exception to this was the presence of a member of the Lecavele family, from the de Curia faction, among the rectors chosen in 1196.

Conclusions 1195-1200

The additional evidence obtained by the list of *rectores* strengthens the impression that, rather than a 'hidden' influence of the families of the de Curia faction on the years of *podestà* government in Genoa during this time, and of an attempt 'made to keep out of power representatives of the major political families of della Volta', the families closer to the de Volta faction were in control of the *commune* through the period 1195-1200.

The problems at the heart of Day's evaluation of the 1195 transition from the consular *commune* to the *podestarial* commune are both theoretical and historical. Fundamental to Day's conviction that 'podestral_government marked a restraint on della Volta power and consulates indicate their control of city policy' is the theoretical conviction of using the *podestà*'s election of 1191 – which could well be considered a conscious attempt by the faction de Curia to curtail the power of the faction de Volta – as the template for every successive election of a *podestà*. According to this view, by escalating a military confrontation and reaching a ceasefire, the families of de Curia faction forced the opposing faction to accept the mediation of the German emperor and a foreign *podestà* guaranteeing a factional balance of power. The governments of 1195-1200, as I have shown, were anything but models of power-sharing agreements between opposing factions. The historical problems with Day's analysis are a direct consequence of this interpretative bias: following a rigid

interpretation, he then fails to properly consider the evidence available that denies this view. In his analysis of civil violence, Day follows Vitale's anachronistic view that traces the later thirteenth-century confrontations between Guelphs and Ghibellines to the conflicts of the late twelfth-century. Vitale proposed this because he wrongly placed the de Volta and Spinola families on opposing sides of the civil confrontation.⁷⁶⁰ This error originated in a mistaken translation of the annals and from the fact that, much later in the thirteenth centuries the two families would effectively be politically opposed.⁷⁶¹ However, a correct translation of the *annales* and an analysis of the notarial agreements, indicate, as discussed in chapter two, that Spinola was de Volta's son-in-law and fought with him against his de Curia opponents. A recent translation of the *annales*, edited by Gabriella Airaldi, rectified the earlier mistakes.⁷⁶² However by then these had already spilled on the analysis of Gerald Day. Those conclusions were then followed by Avner Greif, who stated that in 1194 'the della Volta faction conceded' and accepted a *podestà* that 'by enabling cooperation...brought about the "Golden Age" of Genoa'.⁷⁶³ Earlier interpretative mistakes therefore had long lasting consequences, if we consider that on the basis of the latter statement Greif interpreted the *podestaria* as an institution that gave to Genoa what many contemporary countries need: the ability to build 'states that effectively promote social stability, curtail political violence, and foster economic prosperity'.⁷⁶⁴

At the end of this chapter I shall offer a comprehensive assessment of Greif's institutional theory based on the history of Genoa. However, at this stage I wish to conclude this section of chapter three by comparing it with what we learnt regarding the phenomenon of Genoese civil

⁷⁶⁰ As discussed and demonstrated in part one, Spinola was son in law of Volta, business associate and comrade in the Middle Eastern expeditions, and in all these roles he sided with the families closer to the de Volta faction.

⁷⁶¹ This mistake has been discussed in chapter one.

⁷⁶² To be noticed, however, that the most recent analysis of the history of Genoa in Italian, *Storia di Genova* fails to rectify this mistake. It is simply stated that Vitale's traditional interpretation is anachronistic, but no alternative analysis is given. (Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova*, p.134.)

⁷⁶³ Greif, A., 'On the political foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution', pp. 281-283. A wider reflection on the issues plaguing Greif's analysis will be conducted at the end of this analysis. The "Golden Age" quote is from Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, p.69.

⁷⁶⁴ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.15.

conflicts in part one. Ottobono Scriba concluded his narration of the year 1194 by stating that due to the unprecedented level of violence, all the consuls resigned and in accordance with the advice of the seneschal of the Emperor Henry VI. The Genoese subsequently met in a council and accepted Oberto de Olivano as *podestà*. As the Genoese factions are not mentioned in the chronicles of the city post 1194, historians have traditionally argued that the civil conflict was ended through the mediation of the Imperial seneschal – much as had happened in 1169.⁷⁶⁵ Instead, it has been customary to believe that the same factions were still competing in a similar – albeit non-violent - manner, in the shadow of the *podestà*.⁷⁶⁶ However, nowhere in the text or in contemporary documents is it stated that the factions – or factional leaders - met and agreed to cooperate. Nor it is stated that the de Volta faction accepted the conditions imposed by the de Curia faction or by the seneschal – an event that the official chronicle of the city might not have overlooked if it had taken place.

On the other hand, judging from the subsequent development of the Genoese conflict and – most importantly – by the cohesion maintained among the families forming the core of the two factions, it appears that while the families that were linked to the de Volta faction were still characterised by the existence of extremely solid links, those families that had formed the core of the de Curia faction had interrupted all common activities. Important evidence points to the conclusion that they did not consider themselves allied anymore. I concluded in part one that the disintegration of cohesiveness among the de Curia faction families was possibly due to the fact that they had lost the confrontation with their opponents of the de Volta faction. Having now considered the evidence regarding the balance of power of the Genoese commune during the years following the aftermath of the civil war, the hypothesis of a de Curia's defeat is strengthened.

⁷⁶⁵ When the leaders of both factions met and swore a public peace in front of the bishop and the people of Genoa, in the words of De Negri a 'grandioso apparato di circostanza: una scena quasi grottesca ed incredibile se non la raccontasse Oberto Cancelliere'. As discussed in chapter one, the scepticism of De Negri is misplaced, since a public peace relied on such apparatus precisely because its aim was to be memorable.

⁷⁶⁶ Still in Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova...*, the interpretation of civil conflict as a continuous background noise without any resolute turning point is maintained.

1201

In 1201, when the commune was not ruled by a *podestà*, Genoa was once again governed by six consuls supported by thirteen consuls of the pleas.

Family	Affiliation	1201
DORIA	Volta	C
EMBRIACO	Volta	C
GUERCIO	Volta	C
MALLONO	Volta	C
RICHERIO	Volta	C
SPINOLA	Volta	C

Table 4.6 Consuls of the commune in 1201

Family	Affiliation	1201	Family	Affiliation	1201
BECHERIO	Neutral	CP	GUARACCO	Neutral	CP
BOCCACIO	No info	CP	GUERCIO	Volta	CP
CICALA	Volta	CP	MARABOTO	Neutral	CP
CRISPINO	Neutral	CP	MAZALE	Neutral	CP
DOMOCULTA	Volta	CP	TORNELLO	Neutral	CP
FICOMATARIO	Volta	CP	VOLTA	Volta	CP
GRILLO	Neutral	CP			

Table 4.7 Consuls of the pleas in 1201⁷⁶⁷

Table 4.6 shows that the families closer to the de Volta faction exercised a monopoly on the communal government in 1201.⁷⁶⁸ These families were also predominant in the list of the consul of the pleas. Out of thirteen consuls of the pleas, five came from families close to de Volta and six came from neutral families. In one case, the Boccaccio family, I was unable to find any evidence documenting their activities and affiliations. The 38% of the consulates of the pleas in 1201 controlled by families closer to the de Volta faction - very close to the 39% for the years 1195-1200 - demonstrates the continuity of the control of the de Volta families

⁷⁶⁷ Becherio, *Lanfranco*, doc. 1086. Cicala is an agent for Spinola, (*Lanfranco*, docs. 328, 400, 401). For the Crispino family in previous decades we had no information (see chapter three) in the early thirteenth century its activities are recorded (for instance *Lanfranco*, docs. 559, 1410, 1721) and the family is not connected to any factional family. Domoculta is – like Cicala – an agent of Spinola, (*Lanfranco*, doc. 722.) A dowry of £15 for the marriage of Giulia Domoculta with Rubaldo Aplero indicates that the family is wealthy but not among the richest ones (*Lanfranco*, doc. 1100). Ficomatario is an agent of Mallono (*Lanfranco*, doc. 1754).

⁷⁶⁸ For the profiles of the families see chapter two and three.

in that respect as well.⁷⁶⁹ By 1201, as discussed in chapter two, the Genoese civil conflicts that had their origin in the 1160s had all but terminated with the victory of the de Volta faction. Importantly, while the victory did not change the level of cohesiveness between the families de Volta, it did not freeze the internal development of the group either. Indeed families that were clearly allied, such as Doria and the other families de Volta, could disagree – even arriving dangerously close to a confrontation as happened in 1197 with Nicolò Doria. The consular lists of 1201 illustrate another important aspect of the internal vitality of these group dynamics; the Spinola family was acquiring more and more influence within the Genoese commune thanks to the inclusion of its commercial agents – like Cicala and Domoculta - in the Genoese seats of political power. This probably heralds the pre-beginnings of new factional rivalries later in the century.⁷⁷⁰

This analysis of the first decade of Genoese experimentation with a *podestà* has so far refuted the thesis that the *podestarial* years indicated power-sharing among factions. According to that theory, evidently, a return to the consular commune was to be understood as a momentarily successful attempt by the families closer to one of the factions to seize the control of the commune. For instance Gerald Day stated that ‘with a *podestà* in charge of the Genoese government from mid-1194 to 1200...the della Volta faction was powerless’.⁷⁷¹

1202-1206

The consular government of 1201 turned out to be only a year-long exception to *podestà* rule and from 1202 to 1206 Genoa relied once again on a *podestà*. From 1202 to 1204 the commune of Genoa was headed by Guifredoto Grassello from Milan, in 1205 the Genoese Fulcone de Castello occupied the position and, finally, in 1206 Giovanni Strussio ruled the city. The information emerging from the lists of the consuls of the pleas in 1202-1206, the

⁷⁶⁹ From the point of view of the political importance of the consulate of the pleas also with a return to the consular commune in 1201, it should be stressed that seven out of thirteen consuls of the pleas came from consular families – 54%, a slightly higher percentage of the period 1195-1200.

⁷⁷⁰ Although Maire Vigueur, J. C., argued that transition from family clashes to factionalism was not so common (*Cittadini e Cavalieri*, p.407.)

⁷⁷¹ Day, G.W., *Genoa's Repsonse...*, p.152.

rectores in 1202, 1203, 1205, and the consuls of the sea in 1206; allows for a careful evaluation of these years.

Families/Years	Affiliation	1202	1203	1204	1205	1206
ALPANE	No info		CP			
BELMUSTO	Neutral		CP			
BOCCACIO	No info					CP
CASTAGNA	Neutral				CP	
CASTELLO	Volta	CP	CP		CP	
CAVARUNCO	Neutral	CP				
CEBA	Volta				CP	
CICALA	Volta				CP	
DOMOCULTA	Volta	CP	CP			CP
DORIA	Volta			CP		
FINAMORE	Neutral					CP
GALIANA	Neutral		CP			
GINATA	Neutral					CP
GISULFO	Neutral			CP		
GRILLO	Neutral		CP	CP		CP
GUARACO	Volta		CP			
GUERCIO	Volta	CP	CP	CP	CP	CP
GUIDONE	Neutral		CP			
ISOLA	Neutral					CP
LECAVELE	Curia	CP			CP	
MALFANTE	Volta			CP		
MALLONO	Volta			CP		CP
MANIAPORRO	No info		CP			CP
MAZANELLO	Neutral				CP	
MEDOLICO	Neutral				CP	
MURTA	Volta			CP		
PALLO	Volta		CP	CP		
PEZULLO	Neutral	CP				CP
PICAMILIO	Volta			CP		
PIGNOLO	Neutral	CP				
PORCELLO	Curia	CP				
RICIO	Neutral	CP				
RODULFO	Volta		CP			
SPAVALDO	Neutral				CP	
STANCONO	Neutral			CP		CP
STRALLERIA	Neutral	CP				
TARALLO	No info	CP				
TORNELLO	Neutral	CP	CP	CP	CP	
TURCIO	No info				CP	
USODIMARE	Curia		CP			
VOLTA	Volta		CP	CP(2)	CP	CP

Table 4.8 Consuls of the pleas 1202-1206

Confirming a tendency that emerged in the previous ten years, the consuls of the pleas came from both consular families - Belmusto, Castello, Cicala, Doria, Grillo, Guercio, Mallono, Picamiglio, Porcello, Rodolfo, Tornello, Usodimare and Volta – and families that had previously been consuls of the pleas or were new to active political participation in the Genoese commune. In total, 46% of the positions were occupied by members of former consular families.⁷⁷² Considering the information available on the affiliations of the families of the consuls of the pleas, it emerges that with the 1202 return to a *podestarial* government not much changed regarding which group exercised the strongest control over the city government. Once again the dominance of the families that can be associated with the faction de Volta – 43% of the total - seems marked.⁷⁷³ Interestingly, these percentages did not change in 1205, when Fulcone de Castello served as the *podestà* of the commune, showing that from the perspective of de Volta's hegemony over the *communal* government little seemed to have changed with the appointment of Fulcone as *podestà*.⁷⁷⁴ As an additional confirmation of this state of affairs, it is noticeable that the de Volta family itself occupied the consulate of the pleas on five occasions.

For the years 1202, 1203 and 1205 we have additional information available from the list of the Genoese families that occupied the council of the *rectores*, which confirms the strong position of the families closer to the de Volta faction.⁷⁷⁵ However, it also shows that something was changing, in comparison to the council of the *rectores* of 1196 and 1199, when the families of the de Volta faction had essentially a monopoly of the council.

⁷⁷² Interestingly two members of the family de Volta occupied the position in 1204.

⁷⁷³ It should be noticed how in 1205 the *podestà* was Fulcone de Castello, leaving little doubt regarding the role played by families of the de Volta faction in that year. Interestingly, this situation did not prevent a member of the family Lecavele from acting as consul of the pleas.

⁷⁷⁴ Five out of twelve consuls of the pleas in 1205 were closer to the de Volta.

⁷⁷⁵ Half of the *rectores*.

Family/Year	Affiliation	1202	1203	1205
BARCA	Neutral		R	
CARMADINO	Neutral		R	
CROCE	Neutral		R	
LERCARIO	Neutral	R		R
MALLONO	Volta	R		R
NIGRO	Volta	R		R
SPINOLA	Volta		R	
TORNELLO	Neutral	R		R

Table 4.9 List of the rectors 1202, 1203, 1205⁷⁷⁶

Two of the families listed in Table 4.9, Barca and Croce, have never been taken into account in my dissertation. I shall therefore reconstruct here their profiles and affiliations.

BARCA (CC 1137, Consul of the commune 1140, Rector 1203) (Neutral)

The Barca family had participated in the life of the early Genoese commune through their representative Guglielmo Barca, who was elected as consul of the Commune in 1140. In 1142, Guglielmo was sent with Oberto della Torre as ambassador to the Byzantine Emperor John I Comnenus, who at the time was camped near Antioch.⁷⁷⁷ After that, however, the Barca family demonstrated a lack of interest, or failed to maintain its presence, in the highest spheres. The few surviving records of the activities of the family seem to point towards maintenance of its involvement in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. In 1191, Barca, son of Guglielmo Barca brought to Constantinople a large shipment of English clothes for a certain Rataldo.⁷⁷⁸ Subsequent information regarding the activities of the family also fails to provide any significant information regarding the family's activities and potential factional affiliations.⁷⁷⁹

CROCE (Rector 1203, Consul of the commune 1208) (Neutral)

⁷⁷⁶ In 1205 the *podestà* himself, Fulcone de Castello, was a former member of the de Volta faction.

⁷⁷⁷ *Annales*, vol. I, p.48.

⁷⁷⁸ *Cassinese*, docs. 1097, 1099.

⁷⁷⁹ *Lanfranco*, docs. 1522, 1523.

In the last quarter of the twelfth century Antolo, Oberto and Pietro de Croce constituted what can be called the most durable and active family partnership in the Genoese commercial world. The three brothers top the league of the Genoese ship owners as investors calculated by Krueger.⁷⁸⁰ Antolo and Oberto were brothers, and Pietro was their nephew.⁷⁸¹ The three men belonged to an ancient rural noble family that moved to Genoa from Camogli in 1173. The first known investment occurred in 1179, when the two brothers contributed £7 to a society of £21 to trade in the Tuscan Maremma.⁷⁸² From then on the three de Croce's family members' activities continued uninterrupted thorough the surviving records. The family's favourite destinations were Sardinia, Ceuta, Catalonia, Provence and Naples, although, on several occasions they invested capital and goods in Syria and Constantinople.⁷⁸³ Only on one occasion did the Cruce invest in Egypt, sending goods to Alexandria through Oberto Guercio, alongside the goods of Guglielmo Vento.⁷⁸⁴ The will of Antolo de Cruce, registered on January 24, 1192, sheds some light on the intergenerational survival of such family partnerships. Antolo nominated Pietro and Oberto de Cruce as legal tutors of his son Pietro, and executors of his commercial investments, including the right *mittendi res per mare et per terram* – to send goods by sea and land.⁷⁸⁵ The family partnership continued and its members decided in 1192 to record the shares of each of its members: Pietro owned £940, Oberto £300 and Pietro, the son of Antolo, £817.⁷⁸⁶ The scale of the profits accumulated illustrates the success of their trading enterprises. The activities of the family continued into the thirteenth century, although with smaller capital. Moreover, at that stage the family members frequently invested separately. Generally speaking they still focused their sphere of activity on the western Mediterranean, with the majority of their investments directed to Provence,

⁷⁸⁰ Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.124.

⁷⁸¹ *Oberto 1190*, docs. 56, 380.

⁷⁸² *ASG, notai*, ms. 102. (Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.125.)

⁷⁸³ *Cassinese*, docs. 1004, 1066, 1067, 1078.

⁷⁸⁴ *ASG, notai*, cart. 2, *Lanfranco* et al. f. 229. Cf. Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.129.

⁷⁸⁵ *Cassinese*, doc. 1512.

⁷⁸⁶ *Cassinese*, doc. 1549.

Montpellier and Sardinia. The little information available for the early 1200s shows the family investing in small real estate acquisitions and acting as witnesses, in one occasions alongside members of the Spinola family.⁷⁸⁷ From a political point of view, prior to his appointment as rector in 1203, Ottobono Croce was sent as ambassador to Byzantium in 1201.⁷⁸⁸ Following his appointment as rector, in 1208, he served one term as consul of the commune. The surviving information regarding the connections of the families Barca and Croce indicates that they had no strong affiliations to the factions that had operated in the city. However, in the case of Croce, who together with Gandolfo Croce witnessed Ansaldo Spinola's transaction, it should be stressed that in 1208, Ottobono Croce was going to take part in a consular government that, as I will shortly illustrate, was composed exclusively of families close to the de Volta faction. The findings relative to the families Barca and Croce do not undermine the impression that the council of the *rectores* in the years 1202, 1203 and 1205, was certainly not opposed to families close to the de Volta faction. Considering how - especially in the case of the Croce family - a large number of records have survived, it appears that a conscious effort was made on behalf of the Genoese government to appoint at least some neutral families to the position of rector of the commune. This impression is confirmed by the undoubted economic success and prestige of the Croce family, an evident demonstration of the possibilities that Genoese families had to avoid episodes of political conflict and still be very successful in their activities.

These conclusions are strengthened by taking into consideration, for 1206, the information emerging from the analysis of the families that saw their members appointed to a new council position, the one of consuls of the sea. This council was appointed for the first time in 1206 to help the *podestà* to supervise - the *annalist* stated - the construction and preparation for

⁷⁸⁷ *Lanfranco*, doc. 84, for the purchase of a property for £4. The documents *Lanfranco* docs. 293, 374, 444 record members of the Croce family witnessing commercial agreements, in one case (*Lanfranco*, doc. 374) for an agreement of Ansaldo Spinola.

⁷⁸⁸ Sanguinetti and Bertolotto, 'Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova con l'Impero Bizantino', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, 28, 1896-1898, pp. 469-475.

operations of the Genoese galleys.⁷⁸⁹ Idone Caramandino, Giacomo Piccamilio, Ogerio Scoto and Oberto Usodimare were selected for this role in 1206. From the activities and affiliations of these families – all already discussed - it appears that the consuls of the sea were selected on the basis of competence in matters of navigation, to provide expertise to foreign *podestà* who, coming mostly from Lombardy, were not particularly accustomed to seafaring, in the preparation of the fleet.⁷⁹⁰ Indeed for all of these families there is evidence supporting such a claim.

In 1191 Rolando de Carmadino and Bellobruno de Castello were given the command of a Genoese fleet of 33 galleys that was to support the Emperor Henry VI's effort to conquer the Kingdom of Sicily.⁷⁹¹ In 1195 Ingo Longo, Enrico de Carmadino and Otto Polpo commanded their own three ships – *Ialna*, *Carmaina* and *Venciguerra* - as part of a flotilla that attacked and sacked the Castle of Bonifacio.⁷⁹² Again in 1195, it is known that Enrico de Carmadino owned a ship called *Leonus* and that he was trying to sell it.⁷⁹³ For the Piccamilio family, we know that Oberto Piccamilio owned a ship directed to Alexandria in 1160.⁷⁹⁴ In addition, in 1198 Ogerio Scoto owned, with Porcello, a galley that was going *in cursu*.⁷⁹⁵ Furthermore, in 1216 he sold the *locus* of a ship.⁷⁹⁶ The information regarding the family Usodimare is contained in the *Annales*. In 1165 the galley of Bonvassallo Usodimare and Guglielmo Pevere

⁷⁸⁹ The *annalist* Ogerio Pane is always very detailed regarding this matter. For instance, in 1205, he records as one of the main successes of the *podestà* the fact that he had eight new galleys built, in 1206 the *podestà* received the help of the four consuls of the sea, again for eight galleys. Polonio, V., 'Da Provincia a Signora del Mare', pp 180-181, in Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova*, argued that the institution of the consuls of the sea might have been linked to the little maritime experience of the foreign *podestà*, who mostly came from the Milanese area.

⁷⁹⁰ Polonio, V., 'Da Provincia a Signora del Mare', pp.180-181, in Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova*.

⁷⁹¹ *Annales*, vol.II; p.39.

⁷⁹² *Annales*, vol.II, pp.55-57.

⁷⁹³ *ASG, notai*, ms. 102, f. 50; quoted in Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.93.

⁷⁹⁴ *Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 718.

⁷⁹⁵ *Bonvillano*, doc. 69.

⁷⁹⁶ Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.118.

captured two Pisan *galeotti* with 92 merchants on board and took them to Genoa.⁷⁹⁷ The annalist estimated the value of the booty to be of £1,200.⁷⁹⁸

All these families had a long lasting tradition as ship owners, ship captains and commanders of Genoese flotillas. Bearing in mind the affiliations of these four families, it seems that the selection of the consuls of the sea was driven by competence. If we consider the 1206 list of consuls of the sea in the light of what emerged from the analysis of the consuls of the pleas for the same year, that is six neutral consuls and four from families close to de Volta, it clearly emerges that, even though the de Volta was strongly represented in the 1206 government, they did not aim to monopolise every office.⁷⁹⁹ The lists of rectores and of consuls of the sea provide therefore a reminder that the political roles in Genoa in those years were not assigned exclusively as a division of spoils among competing factions. An effort was made to have competent individuals advising the *podestà* – such as the expert merchants and diplomats Croce and Barca, or the galleys' commanders, Caramandino, Castello, Scoto and Usodimare. This impression is consistent with the findings of part one of this dissertation. In the 1200s – the fourth period of Genoese conflicts studied in this dissertation - from the point of view of factional dynamics, the Genoese panorama is best understood through the logic of post-conflict reassessment. A lot of energies and resources had been consumed in nearly fifteen years of more or less intense civil conflict. The de Volta faction had emerged victorious but exhausted from the late twelfth century struggles. In this view therefore it is understandable that after a period of monopolization between 1195-1201, of all the public spaces available, this factional polarization was relaxed and successful neutral families started to obtain larger public roles in Genoa.

⁷⁹⁷ *Annales*, vol.I, p.178. The *galiotus*, or *lignum galiotus*, was a similar but smaller version of the galley. Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.156.

⁷⁹⁸ Krueger, H., *Navi e Proprietà Navale...*, p.179.

⁷⁹⁹ Half, as for the *rectores* in previous years.

The Genoese governments in the period 1207 – 1216

As discussed earlier, the consuls of the commune had been replaced by *podestà* after the bloody escalation of civil violence in 1194. Since then, with the exception of 1201, the consulate of the commune had been vacant. However, the 1207 election reintroduced them, and consuls were to rule over Genoa, with the exception of 1211 when Raniero Cotta from Milan was chosen as *podestà*, until 1216, the year that marks the end of the transition phase between the consular commune and the commune of the *podestà*; and of the analysis of chapter four. As in 1211 Genoa was to be administered again by a *podestà* for a year, following the structure I used to analyse the political officers of the years 1195-1206, I have subdivided the analysis of the years 1207-1216 in three periods: consular 1207-1210; *podestarial* 1211; and consular 1211-1216.

1207-1210

Families	1207	1208	1209	1210	Affiliation
AVVOCATO				C	Curia
CAMILLA				C	Neutral
CARMADINO			C		Neutral
CASTELLO	C				Volta
CROCE		C			Neutral
DIOTESALVA				C	Curia
DOMOCULTA				C	Volta
DORIA	C	C	C		Volta
EMBRIACO		C	C	C	Volta
GUERCIO		C			Volta
NIGRO	C	C	C		Volta
USODIMARE			C		Curia
VOLTA			C		Volta

Table 4.10 Consuls of the commune 1207-1210

Two families saw their members obtaining the consulate of the commune for the first time: Diotesalve and Domoculta. The contemporary evidence available for these families indicates that the first one should be considered closer to the families de Curia and the second to de Volta.

DIOTESALVE (Curia)

Very little information survives regarding the activities and affiliations of the family Diotesalve. However, in 1210, Giulia the widow of Guglielmo Embrone who had been consul de Curia in 1194, chose Rubaldo Diotesalve and his son Enrico as agents to invest a capital of £23 in Ceuta, indicating proximity between these families.⁸⁰⁰ In the absence of significant additional evidence therefore, the Diotesalve family should be considered closer to the families that had been part of the de Curia faction.⁸⁰¹

DOMOCULTA (Volta)

Oberto Domoculta had been a consul of the pleas in 1165. Since then, no Domoculta family members held a public office until 1201 when a Domoculta was again a consul of the pleas. Following that appointment, family members held such a position again in 1202, 1203 and 1206. In 1210, instead, Domoculta became consul of the commune. From an economic point of view, we know that the Domoculta family owned lands in Colloredo and in San Pietro Arena.⁸⁰² The latter property was particularly extensive and was purchased from Oberto Gontardo for £70.⁸⁰³ However, the activities of the family were mostly focused on commerce. In 1191, a Domoculta figured as debtor alongside Barbavaria for the purchase of goods.⁸⁰⁴ The sums invested, £60 on both occasions, were important but not uncommon considering that the investments were shared between two partners. A Domoculta was also active as a ship owner. In 1191 Ogerio Domoculta recorded a partnership with Ingo Pignolo and Michele Narcaro. His share of the capital to be provided for the *societas*, £135, was made up by his

⁸⁰⁰ *Lanfranco*, doc. 651.

⁸⁰¹ *Lanfranco*, docs. 114, 1296, record members of the families acting as witnesses.

⁸⁰² *Oberto 1186*, doc. 94; *Cassinese*, doc. 845.

⁸⁰³ The other property is mentioned in the document only as a geographical reference and therefore it is not possible to establish its dimension and value.

⁸⁰⁴ *Cassinese*, docs. 869, 1032.

galley, on which the merchants were to travel with their goods.⁸⁰⁵ The evidence surviving in the cartulary of Lanfranco Scriba, covering the period analysed here, indicate that the Domoculta family had solid connections with the families Castello, Malocello and Piccamilio, leaving no doubts regarding the family's proximity to the de Volta faction.⁸⁰⁶ The political advancements of the Domoculta family appear connected to their successes as traders. They had started these activities within the network of the families associated with the de Volta and, as is clear from the network of the connections of the consular families in the last decades studied in this dissertation, their connections with these families were very much in place in later periods.

Families closer to the de Volta obtained the consulate on thirteen occasions, with the Curia and neutral ones gaining it on three occasions each. Therefore, the consular governments of 1207-1210 offer a similar image to the one of the previous years. Once again the families closer to the faction de Volta appear to dominate the city government, especially in 1207-1208. However, in 1210 the balance of power appeared much more even.

Some changes of the political scenario in Genoa, emerge from the lists of the consuls of the commune – for instance with the political reappearance, as consul in 1210, of Giovanni Avvocato, the leader of the de Curia faction and consul of de Curia in 1194. This was indeed the first appearance of an Avvocato as consul of the city in the history of the Genoese commune. As for the years 1202-1206 when we saw an effort to include more prominent neutral families in the administration of the commune, in the years 1207-1211 we see an effort to include a few of the families that had been opponents of the de Volta faction during the civil war.

This impression is somewhat confirmed by an analysis of the consuls of the pleas. The percentage of consul of the pleas appointed from families closer to the de Volta faction slightly diminished from around 40% to 35%, confirming the impression of a move towards a

⁸⁰⁵ *Cassinese*, doc. 726.

⁸⁰⁶ See cluster map twelve.

less polarised government of the commune, though no former de Curia affiliated obtained the consulate.⁸⁰⁷

Families	1207	1208	1209	1210	Affiliation	Families	1207	1208	1209	1210	Affiliation
ALPANE		CP		CP	No Info	ISOLA	CP			CP	Neutral
ANGELOTTO	CP				No Info	MALLONO		CP	CP		Volta
BACEMO		CP			Volta	MANGIAPORRO			CP		No Info
BALNEO		CP		CP	Neutral	MEDOLICO	CP				Neutral
BARBAVARIA	CP		CP		Neutral	MUSSO			CP		Neutral
BOTARIO				CP	No info	ORTO			CP		Neutral
CAFFARA			CP		Neutral	PEZULLO		CP		CP	Neutral
CAMPO		CP		CP	Neutral	POLESSINO	CP				Neutral
CASTELLO		CP			Volta	RICIO			CP		Neutral
DORIA	CP		CP		Volta	SARDENA	CP(2)	CP		CP	Volta
FICOMATRIO		CP			Volta	TABACCO				CP	Neutral
GUARACCO			CP		Neutral	TORNELLO		CP	CP		Neutral
GUERCIO	CP	CP		CP	Volta	VOLTA	CP(2)			CP	Volta
GUIDONE			CP		Neutral						

Table 4.11 Consuls of the pleas 1207-1210⁸⁰⁸

⁸⁰⁷ With 51% - twenty-two out of forty-three - consuls of the pleas coming from consular families, the political importance of the consulate of the pleas was still marked.

⁸⁰⁸ The Balneo family began to accumulate its fortunes in the 1150s as agents for the Guercio family (*Giovanni Scriba*, doc. 84), however in the early thirteen century the family appears neutral (*Lanfranco*, docs. 189, 1107, 1480); Guglielmo de Orto's only connection to a faction was when he acted as witness in 1225 for a transaction between Filippo Lecanozze and Guglielmo Rosso de Volta; however considering the fact that the document is a later testimony I consider the family neutral for the purposes of the chapter (*Lanfranco*, doc. 1519); Idone Tabacco was involved in two real estate transactions and had no connections with any of the families involved in episodes of conflict (*Lanfranco*, docs.149, 663).

In 1211, with the election of Raniero Cotta from Milan as *podestà*, the government of the consuls was once again interrupted. The *podestà* was supported in the administration by thirteen consuls of the pleas and eight *rectores*.

Families	Affiliation	1211	Families	1211	Affiliation
BARBAVARIA	Neutral	CP	GUERCIO	CP	Volta
BELMUSTO	Neutral	CP	ISOLA	CP	Neutral
BONOTOMA	No info	CP	MEDOLICO	CP	Volta
CAMILLA	Neutral	CP	MUSSO	CP	Neutral
CARMADINO	Neutral	CP	RICIO	CP	Neutral
CASTELLO	Volta	CP	TORNELLO	CP	Neutral
DORIA	Volta	CP			

Table 4.12 Consuls of the pleas in 1211⁸⁰⁹

Families	Affiliation	1211
CASTELLO	Volta	R
DORIA	Volta	R
FORNARIO	Volta	R
GUERCIO	Volta	R
NIGRO	Volta	R
PEVERE	Curia	R
USODIMARE	Curia	R
VOLTA	Volta	R

Table 4.13 *Rectores* in 1211

Out of thirteen consuls of the pleas elected, eight came from neutral families and four from families closer to the de Volta faction, a share similar to the one of the previous consular years.⁸¹⁰ An analysis of the families that provided the *rectores* to assist the *podestà* indicates that from a point of view of the political influence over the activities of the *podestà* the de

⁸⁰⁹ Four new families figure in the consular lists: Barbavaria, Bonotoma, Medolico and Musso. 1210s documentation indicates that Barbavaria came from Milan alongside the *podestà*, (*Lanfranco*, docs. 386, 1185.) The only document documenting the activities of the family Medolico records how in 1216, Giovanna, wife of Giovanni Medolico, rented a mill and a farm in Pernoeco to Riccio of Pernoeco; she did so following the *consilium* – advice – of her *propinquum* – neighbour – Lanfranco de Mari, one of the core families of the de Volta faction, (*Lanfranco*, doc. 1272.) The evidence relative to the family Musso does not show any connection between this family and factional families (see *Lanfranco*, docs. 111, 112, 113, 140, 506, 528). Nine out of thirteen consuls of the pleas came from consular families (70%).

⁸¹⁰ I was unable to find evidence related to the family Bonotoma.

Volta coalition families still retained a large influence too. However, the inclusion in the council of the *rectores* of the families Pevere and Usodimare, which had been connected to the faction de Curia, shows an attempt – already evidenced in previous years - by the de Volta families to allow these families to participate to some extent in the political decisions of the *commune*.

As in 1201, once again we must consider what could have caused a one-year switch of political system, in this case from the consular system to the *podestarial* one. On this occasion it is possible that an episode of civil violence was again a reason for the decision. As discussed in part one, in 1210 a long period of relative internal stability in Genoa was perturbed by the homicide of Pallo, at the hands of his relatives Porcello and Porcellino. But we cannot really say, and the *podestarial* system only lasted one year.

1212-1216

families/years	Affiliation	1212	1213	1214	1215	1216	families/years	Affiliation	1212	1213	1214	1215	1216
AVVOCATO	Curia				C		MARI	Volta	C	C	C	C	
BULGARO	Volta					C	PEVERE	Curia	C		C		
CASTELLO	Volta				C		SCOTO	Volta	C	C			
DORIA	Volta	C	C		C	C	SPINOLA	Volta	C		C		C
EMBRIACO	Volta	C	C		C	C	TORNELLO	Neutral			C		
GRILLO	Neutral	C	C				TURCA	Curia					C
GUERCIO	Volta	C		C			VOLTA	Volta	C	C	C	C	C

Table 4.14 Consuls of the commune, 1212-1216

In 1212 six consuls were again appointed to preside over the commune. This would not change until 1217 when once again the consulate of the commune was replaced, this time permanently, by a foreign *podestà*.

BULGARO (Consul of the commune, 1216)

The only new family among the ones that saw their members elected as consuls of the commune in the years 1212-1216, was that of Simone Bulgaro who was elected consul in 121 – the very last year of the consular *commune* in Genoa. The Bulgaro family did not leave behind much evidence of its economic activities. However, in 1210 Marino de Bulgaro joined Oberto Spinola in guaranteeing the merchants Roberto Garreto from Asti and Guglielmo Aprilocchio from Milan that, if Guglielmo Embriaco failed to pay the £12 he owed them for their cloth, they would pay it in his place.⁸¹¹ This document shows a connection between the family Bulgaro and the family Spinola, which was closer to the de Volta faction.⁸¹²

In the light of these findings and of the information already analysed regarding the other consular families, it emerges that in 1211, as had been the case for the previous decade, the presence of families that had been considered close to the de Volta faction was strong. Of the thirty-three consuls that ruled over Genoa in the period, twenty-six came from families closer to the de Volta faction. Three should be considered neutral and four came from families that had been part of the de Curia faction: *Avvocato*; *Pevere*; and *Turca*.⁸¹³ However, the presence of the latter families shows a changed political scenario that allowed for their inclusions. Firstly, as emerged from the findings contained in part one of the dissertation, by this stage the families that had been part of the faction de Curia did not identify themselves any more as opponents of the de Volta faction. Therefore the *Avvocato*, *Pevere* and *Turca* families probably took part in the last period of the Genoese consular commune independently, not as part of a coalition that by then was no longer active. This mutated scenario had very clear manifestations in the conflict history of the city. In 1214, as we have seen, Sorleone Pevere (consul in 1212 and 1214) was attacked by his former ally *Turca* (consul in 1216) and

⁸¹¹ *Lanfranco*, doc. 743. The only other documentation surviving sees a Bulgaro acting as witness, (*Lanfranco*, docs. 172, 800, 1027.)

⁸¹² Interestingly in 1216, the year of the only consulate of Bulgaro, both Embriaco and Spinola were consuls too. Again we see the relative growth of influence of the Spinola family among the families of the de Volta coalition.

⁸¹³ This absolute predominance is also shown by the fact that the family de Volta saw one of its members as consul on every single year.

Camilla. Sorleone was saved by the intervention of his former opponent Erode de Mari (consul from 1212 to 1215).

The political scenario of Genoa had thus finally completely changed from its 1160s-1200s factional division into two halves. Old factional connections were to play a very small role in the episodes of civil violence of the late 1210s. For instance, we cannot discount the possibility that the Turca attack against Pevero was due to an old grievance against former allies that quickly realigned with the winning faction. The Pevero family had started to follow its own path immediately after the conclusion of the civil war, a path that soon brought it back into the small group of families that controlled the political direction of the city. Old factional families – such as Turca – found allies in newer families – such as Camilla, consul for the first time in 1210 - which were to be involved in future episodes of civil violence.

Families/years	1212	1213	1214	1215	Affiliation	Families/years	1212	1213	1214	1215	Affiliation
ALPANE		CP		CP	No info	GRILLO		CP			Neutral
ANGELOTTO		CP			Neutral	GUERCIO		CP	CP	CP	Volta
ARCANTO				CP	Neutral	LECAVELE				CP	Curia
ASCHERIO	CP		CP		Curia	MANGIAPORRO	CP			CP	No info
BACEMO	CP		CP		Volta	MANGIAVACCA				CP	Neutral
BALNEO			CP		Neutral	MAZANELLO		CP			Neutral
BINZERRO	CP				No info	MEDOLICO			CP		Neutral
BOIAMUNDI			CP		No info	PIGNOLO	CP				Neutral
BONTOMA				CP	No info	PORCONO	CP				Neutral
BOTARIO		CP			No info	ROZA			CP		Volta
BRUSEDIO	CP				No info	SARDENA		CP		CP	Volta
CASTELLO			CP	CP	Volta	SAVIGNONO	CP			CP	Neutral
DANDOLO		CP			No info	TABACCO		CP			Neutral
DOMOCULTA		CP		CP	Volta	TARALLO	CP				No info
DORIA		CP	CP		Volta	TORNELLO		CP			Neutral
DROGO			CP		No info	TURCIO	CP				No info
GATTOLOSIO	CP		CP		Neutral	VOLTA	CP	CP	CP		Volta

Table 4.15 Consuls of the pleas 1212-1215⁸¹⁴

⁸¹⁴ Guglielmo Angeloto appear as witness in 1210 (*Lanfranco*, docs. 654, 655) for neutral families; Rainaldo Arcanto does the same in 1216 (*Lanfranco*, docs. 960, 966, 969); Rubaldo Ascherio received a loan from Usodimare in 1216 (*Lanfranco*, doc. 1238); It is interesting to notice in cluster map 2.12 that the Gattolosio family is linked both with Mari (de Volta) and Pevero (de Curia); this is a further evidence of the developing panorama of conflict in Genoa – Mari defended Pevero from an assault by his former ally Turca (de Curia) and Camilla (a new factional family). In later decades the Gattolosio family is exclusively involved in real estate transactions in Pegli (*Lanfranco*, docs. 138, 139, 438, 544); Ansaldo Mangiavacca, neutral

An evaluation of the list of the consuls of the pleas confirms this developing trend, with the families of the de Volta faction once again controlling roughly one third of the consular seats. The political transformation of Genoa was also accompanied by the transformation in the administration of justice.⁸¹⁵ 1215 was also the last year of activity of the consulate of the pleas; from 1216 the administration of justice in Genoa was to be left to professional magistrates – *causidici* – coming from outside Genoa. In the words of the annalist Ogerio Pane: ‘*de voluntate totius consilii consulates placitorum cessat*’.⁸¹⁶ This was due both to a need to professionalise the administration of justice and the requirement for, in the words of Vitale, ‘more impartiality’.⁸¹⁷ This final statement is consistent with the fact, analysed in this chapter, that since the advent of a *podestà* – and the consequent reduction of public offices in Genoa – the consulate of the pleas had become a focus of close attention for the Genoese consular families, which even in 1215 obtained 42% of the consular seats.

Conclusion

The analysis conducted in chapter four evaluated the internal political structure and power balance of Genoa during the transition from a consular to a *podestarial* commune that started with the decisions taken in 1190.

My findings illustrate that the appointment of a *podestà* in 1191 is best understood as an attempt at a neutral government by the de Curia faction that in this way attempted to limit the growing power of their opponents of the de Volta faction; exploiting the absence of several of their leaders, who were fighting overseas.

(Lanfranco, docs. 837, 1107, 1128, 1184). Twenty out of forty-eight - 42% - of the consuls of the pleas came from consular families.

⁸¹⁵ Vitale, V., *Breviario...*, p.55.

⁸¹⁶ *Annales*, Vol.II, p.54.

⁸¹⁷ Vitale, V., *Breviario...*, p.56. This aspect was possibly partly true, however it must also be remembered how Genoa from the 1190s was also getting much more Roman in its legal practice, and therefore there was a need for expert advice from foreign – mostly Bolognese – legal experts; see Wickham, C., *Courts and Conflict...*, pp.4-8. See also Grossi, P., ‘Il Sistema Giuridico Medievale e la Società Comunale’, in Zorzi, A. (ed.) *La civiltà comunale italiana nella storiografia internazionale* (Firenze, 2008), pp.7-9.

That reform was met by a resurgence of the families closer to the de Volta faction, which occupied most of the public offices during the years 1192-1194. Contemporarily Genoa was the theatre of a violent civil war between the families of the de Curia faction, which in 1194 decided to elect its own consuls, and the families of the de Volta faction, which had returned from the crusades. The violent confrontation was resolved by the intervention of the seneschal of the German Emperor Henry VI, who suggested that the Genoese met in council and accepted a *podestà* to govern them and organise the naval support for the Sicilian expedition that his master was preparing. Traditionally these events have been seen as the beginning of a period of power sharing among the two factions that had fought in Genoa since the 1160s: the factions agreed to be governed by a *podestà*, who was to be the guarantor of their willingness to cooperate.

The findings of part one encouraged me not to take this traditional view for granted. Building upon these findings, I evaluated the information contained in the list of the Genoese officers for the period 1195-1216. What emerged is a radically different image of *post-conflict* Genoa. The families closer to the de Volta faction appear to have dominated the Genoese political scene in the years of the ‘alternativa’ between the *podestarial* and consular *commune*.⁸¹⁸ This state of affairs is particularly marked in the years in which Genoa relapsed into a consular commune but, thanks to the inclusion of the consuls of the pleas in the analysis, appears evident also for the *podestarial* years. Consistent with the conclusions reached in part one, what emerges from chapter four is the image of a city that had been the theatre of a civil conflict won by one of the factions, and not the one of a city where two fighting factions reached a ceasefire that was resolved through the appointments of a foreign ‘mediator’.

These conclusions have far reaching consequences for our understanding of the history of Genoa and of the conditions that made the commercial revolution possible. In Avner Greif’s words, ‘In 1194 an institutional development occurred that enabled the Genoese to end the

⁸¹⁸ The definition of the periods is Vitale’s, see Vitale, V., *Breviario...* and Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*

civil war, further mobilize their resources, and attain a new level of economic prosperity’, ‘the *podestaria* fostered inter-clan cooperation, political stability, and economic growth.’⁸¹⁹ Greif’s interpretation of the Genoese *podestà* and of the consequences of his appearance on the historical landscape of Genoa form one of the pillars of this scholar’s conviction about the role of institutions as the fundamental drivers of economic growth. Considering that his research project is currently expanding in order to provide an explanation for the economic divergence between Europe and China, it is necessary to reevaluate the power of Greif’s theory in the light of the findings of chapter four.⁸²⁰

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, Greif argues that the key function of the *podestà* was to serve as a balance of power between the factions. To do so he had to be strong enough to ensure that no clan would be powerful enough to attempt to take control on its own, but weak enough to be unable to take power himself. The second unconvincing approach uses the evidence relating to Greif’s interpretation of the *podestà* as a military commander supported by his own men, strong enough to act as a balance of power between the leading factions in Genoa. Greif’s *podestà* used his military capability to act as a deterrent towards clans willing to continue fighting each other. He did so by making clear that he would always support the attacked faction against the attacking one that would have been consequently defeated. Gregory Clark commented on Greif’s theory stating that ‘though he begins by interpreting the role of the *Podestà* in the language of speculation fitting to the limited sources at his disposal...as the chapters develops the tone become one of proof and certainty’.⁸²¹ Clark conceded that there probably is not enough evidence in the sources to test what the relative strength of the *podestà* was.

⁸¹⁹ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, pp.237-244.

⁸²⁰ Greif, A. and Tabellini, G., ‘Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation: China and Europe Compared’, pp.1-10.

⁸²¹ Clark, G., ‘A Review of Avner Greif’s *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*’ in *Journal of Economic Literature*, 45, 2007 p.740.

Indeed, the first question I would consider is related precisely to the actual strength of the *podestà*: Was he strong enough to maintain this balance?⁸²² Greif begins his interpretation addressing the *podestà* ‘theoretically’.⁸²³ Greif states the three assumptions needed to make the *podestà* model work. First, the *podestà* must not be militarily omnipotent lest he become a dictator. Second, he must not side with a particular faction. Third, he should reinforce inter-clan cooperation by deterring each clan from attacking the other.⁸²⁴ Assuming these, Greif constructs his model. What evidence allows Greif to be so assertive? Greif affirms that the *podestà* ‘was supported by twenty soldiers, two judges, and the servants that he brought with him’.⁸²⁵ Thus ‘his military force (possibly supported by Genoese who were unaffiliated with the main clans) was neither negligible nor considerable’.⁸²⁶ These passages rely on Vito Vitale’s history of the city, but Vitale says: ‘*venti servi, due giudici*’⁸²⁷ - twenty servants, two judges - there is no mention at all of soldiers or fighters of any sort. Moreover Vitale’s evidence is taken from a contract related to the *podestà* of Alba, not of Genoa.⁸²⁸ Without even taking into consideration if an army of twenty servants was able to maintain the status quo between factions powerful enough to send entire fleets to war,⁸²⁹ it seems clear that Greif attempts to confirm his hypothesis without having much evidence to rely upon.⁸³⁰

The key conclusion we can reach is that the role of the *podestà* did not have to be the one described by Greif, because there was no reason to have an institution enforcing balance of power between two factions. One of the factions had lost and was not contending power with the other, which in fact was solidly in control of the government, both when a *podestà* was elected and when consuls were elected.

⁸²² Clark, G., ‘A Review...’, p.740.

⁸²³ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.324.

⁸²⁴ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, pp.265-273.

⁸²⁵ Bates, R., *Analytic Narratives*, p.53.

⁸²⁶ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.241.

⁸²⁷ Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, p.27.

⁸²⁸ Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, p.28.

⁸²⁹ *Annali Genovesi*, vol II, p.42.

⁸³⁰ Although, for many of those, as discussed in the chapter, Greif holds very limited responsibility, given the fact that the historiography of Genoa did not explore the issue of conflict in the necessary detail.

Clark concluded his review of the work of Greif commenting on the fact that Greif's extremely specific theory of institutions does not allow for any comparison. For instance why was the *podestà* in Pisa a representation of 'the domination of one group over another'?⁸³¹ Greif answers, Clark concludes, would be that alone and uniquely in Genoa the *podestaria* succeeded in its inventors' design. However, the comparison between the *podestaria* in Pisa and the *podestaria* in Genoa would have demonstrated – building upon the findings of this dissertation – that the two institutions were remarkably similar from a point of view of factional balance. In both cases the *podestà* acted in the presence of a stronger and dominant faction in the city.

The shortcomings of Greif's *podestaria* theories leave unexplained several interesting aspects of the history of Genoa. Greif stated that until the *podestà* was in place the Genoese could not cooperate effectively and expand commercially. In practice this was due to the fact that without a *podestà*, any effective external involvement was nearly impossible for the city. However we can now see that the *podestà* was not the institutional development sought by Greif to understand the changes in Genoese overseas involvement. In the conclusion of this dissertation I will provide an alternative explanation of how the Genoese in fact succeeded in cooperating in the Mediterranean scenario, first with separate 'factional' involvements and then through an effort coordinated by the victorious faction.

⁸³¹ Greif, A., *Institutions...*, p.306.

Conclusion – Genoese factionalism and Mediterranean involvement

In the first part of my research, I explored the structure of Genoese civil conflicts and the individuals and families that took part in them. In chapter one I started by exploring the narrative of the Genoese chronicles to analyse every mention of violent clashes between Genoese families. Through this analysis, I established several findings. Firstly, twelfth-century civil conflicts appear to have started at a precise moment in the history of Genoa and not to have originated in the undocumented history of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Secondly, the typology, intensity and contemporary perception of the violent episodes changed markedly during the six decades studied, and it is therefore erroneous and simplistic to consider these events as an immutable set of ‘infinite repeated games’. Thirdly, contrary to the traditional warnings – discussed in the introduction – chapter one’s reconstruction of the episodes of violence, supported by the use of the available documentation to uncover the hidden links between families, offered a remarkably ordered image of the Genoese civil conflicts during the period studied. Finally, the fact that the marked differences emerging among the internal organization of the opponents and the potential goals they pursued came after a relatively long incubation suggested to me two necessary steps to avoid repeating previous interpretative mistakes. Firstly, that the Genoese conflicts’ participants and motivations must be studied without reading their history backwards by assuming that the picture that emerged at the end of the period had already crystallized at the beginning of the period. Secondly, that in order to deepen our understanding of the Genoese conflicts we must start from a careful analysis of the structures formed by the connections between the individuals and families that were involved in these episodes – about which we can potentially know a lot – rather than starting from the motives behind the violence – about which we know so little that any speculation not grounded in the structures of conflict is often fruitless.

Starting from these initial findings, chapter two explored in depth the structure of the connections between all the individuals and families that were involved in violent episodes in any way. Relying on the vast notarial records surviving, I was able to draw the profiles of the economic activities and of the personal connections between these families, and how they evolved thorough the period considered. The first aim of the chapter was to shed light on the logic and structure of the factionalism behind the episodes of conflict described in chapter one. The structures behind conflicts developed substantially during the sixty years considered. For instance, while in the 1160s the first episodes of violence recorded by the *Annales* saw individual families or slightly larger groups of families facing one another in street battles, with the driving factor of mutual support stemming close family relationships, at the height of internal tensions in the 1180s-1190s, much larger military conflicts took place along the lines of two defined factions which were characterised by shared economic interests. Indeed, from what emerged from my analysis for several of the families involved, the problem of which side to support was not as straightforward as previous analyses, based on assumed genealogical reconstructions. Hence, it would be erroneous to assume that these factions existed in any form close to their final one at the beginning of the civil conflicts, and it would be equally inaccurate to claim that they had had very clear political aims from the beginning.

Following this reconstruction, in chapters three and four, I grounded the events and families that formed the object of the analysis in chapters one and two in the wider economic, political and social reality of Genoa. I did so by constructing the profiles of the Genoese consular families during the period and studying them in relationship to the families studied in chapters one and two. By doing so, I was able to stress how the phenomenon of civil conflict was essentially internal to the Genoese consular elite and how our understanding of the political development of the commune of Genoa is seriously undermined by the lack of serious attention from which this phenomenon suffers. I constructed a series of databases of all the Genoese families that held public offices in Genoa during the periods 1160s-1180s (in chapter

three) and 1190s-1210s (in chapter four), a division which reflects the institutional changes of the commune, that in 1191 was ruled for the first time by a foreign official rather than by Genoese consuls. The resulting image of conflict and its effects on communal political institutions mirrored that of a rapidly escalating process observed in part one. On the basis of the data available to explore the hidden connections between peaceful and violent families, the public officials recorded by the Genoese chroniclers offer us an image of a world of family obligations and political affiliations. These chapters illustrate the years in which particular families, factions or interests were dominant in the city government. What emerges is a picture of a relatively cohesive consular elite at the beginning of the period considered, that breaks down along conflict boundaries until a much more polarised picture appears in the 1180s-1190s. Meanwhile, political competition over the consular positions held also developed from a latent condition to a fierce set of oppositions. By the time the Genoese *commune* begins its transition from a commune governed by consuls to one ruled by a foreign *podestà* - in the 1190s, the period analysed in chapter four – the influence of civil conflicts on the political structure is clear, and public offices became an object of factional competition. From the mid-1190s onwards the picture changed again, however, with a return to a mostly cohesive ruling elite. This peculiarity has always been explained by the successful resolution of the Genoese conflicts following the establishment of a *podestarial* administration. However, my findings show a rather different picture. The internal political balance of Genoa from the 1190s was not the result of a power sharing agreement, but rather the consequence of a prolonged period of violent conflict that saw one of the two factions opposing one other emerging as a clear winner – as demonstrated by both the analysis of the factions' internal cohesiveness and their influence over the communal government.

To conclude, I wish to further expand these findings by considering the significance of the phenomenon of conflict for one of the areas that have been traditionally considered fundamental by the scholarship on Genoa; the city's Mediterranean involvement. From my

findings it emerges that, while at the initial stages of internal conflicts it cannot be argued that Genoese foreign involvement responded to a clear factional logic, this aspect of Genoese history came to be heavily influenced by factions when the families in opposition pursued opposed foreign policies for the city and consistently tried to undermine their opponents' influence overseas. In this light, most of what seemed a disorganised foreign policy by many can be easily understood through the logic of internal division.⁸³²

As I discussed in the introduction, one of the dominant strands in Genoese historiography concerns itself with the fact that the development of Genoese long-distance trade depended largely on the commercial concessions acquired by the city through its foreign policy. The number and importance of these concessions depended on the city's role as an active player on the international scene. It is widely believed, as common sense would indeed suggest, that Genoa's ability to secure such expansion depended on its internal cohesion, or at least on the ability to present a united front outside the city.⁸³³ Both the most recent works – by Day and by Greif – that dealt with Genoese conflicts in the period considered by this dissertation linked the factional opposition within Genoa to the city's Mediterranean involvement. In Gerald Day's interpretation, one of the factions desired to strengthen the ties of the city with the Byzantine Empire (and the other attempted to thwart this); and according to Avner Greif, the Genoese could only muster sufficient resources to expand their influence overseas through a successful cooperation among factions. In the final section of this dissertation I will consider whether the factional framework I proposed in this thesis proves to be a good interpretative tool in understanding the Genoese actions overseas; and if, conversely, these actions further deepen our understanding of civil conflicts in Genoa.

Genoese involvement in the Mediterranean during the period considered can be reconstructed relatively well through the information contained in the Genoese *Annales* and in the

⁸³² Puncuh, D., *Storia di Genova...*, p.174.

⁸³³ Vitale, V., *Il Comune...*, pp.9-11.

diplomatic records of the city – records that at times simply appear to be a list of the Genoese successes.

The central themes of the Genoese foreign policy emerging from the contemporary sources are thus: a) the protection of the sea routes close to Genoa (with the sieges and sacks of pirates' outposts and castles, and Pisan wars, along the Riviera);⁸³⁴ b) the negotiations with Henry VI regarding the campaign to conquer the Sicilian kingdom;⁸³⁵ c) involvement in Sardinia, characterised by the competition with Pisa over the control of the island.⁸³⁶ This latter theme is closely linked to the previous one since the German Emperor consistently tried to lessen such competition and to prevent an open war between the two city states. In order to conquer Sicily, it was crucial that he had both the Genoese and Pisan fleets supporting his plans.⁸³⁷ Finally, d) the participation of a large group of eminent Genoese in the logistical preparation for, and military operations of, the Third Crusade.⁸³⁸

In chapters three and four I have stressed the effects that the divisions among the families of the Genoese consular elite had on the political structure of the city. Now I consider what effects these divisions had on Genoese political involvement abroad. This can be done because, in addition to the details of the foreign involvements, the *Annales* and the diplomatic documents record the names of individual Genoese protagonists of the commune's involvement in the Mediterranean. Several members of the families that were involved in the civil conflicts studied in this dissertation were at the forefront of the city's Mediterranean engagements.⁸³⁹ This is not surprising when one considers the political importance of the

⁸³⁴ *Annales*, vol. II, pp. 15, 24 and 42.

⁸³⁵ *Annales*, vol. II, year 1191, 42; *CDG*, vol. III, docs. 2,5 (concessions of Henry VI over Sicily).

⁸³⁶ *Annales*, vol. II, p. 22, 37; *CDG*, vol. II, docs. 163-167, 181-188; *CDG*, vol. III, docs. 3-4, 14-17.

⁸³⁷ *CDG*, vol. II, docs. 172-174.

⁸³⁸ *Annales*, II, p. 24; *CDG*, vol. II, docs. 155-162, 196 (granting of rights in Jerusalem), 169-170, 194-195 (granting of rights in Tyre), 184 (granting of rights in Antioch); 190-192, 198 (dealing with the transportations of French troops).

⁸³⁹ *Annales*: Tornello (1186 – Ambassador to Sardinia, 1191 – captures a pirate galley), Mallono (1186 – Ambassador to Constantinople, 1191 – Ambassador to Henry VI), Pevere (1186 – Ambassador to Constantinople), Castello (1187 – leads 10 galley against the Pisans), Picio (1191 – Ambassador to Henry VI), Caramandino (1191 – leads the fleet of the Commune in

families forming the cores of the two Genoese factions in the commune. Their presence allows us to understand the role played by factionalism in this important area of Genoese interests.

It appears that the role played by the Genoese factions in shaping the city's foreign policy across the different areas of Genoese action varied considerably. With regard to the constant Genoese effort to keep trading routes open and secure for the city's merchants by attacking pirates' outposts and challenging the Pisans in the western Mediterranean, it can be concluded from the evaluation of the potential affiliations of the protagonists of such actions that no particular faction made this a specific goal. Members of both factions took part in these activities. This conclusion stems from the fact that members of both factions appear as protagonists of these actions.

The same is true with regard to the Genoese diplomatic missions to Sardinia and Constantinople. Members of both factions took part in these operations. Although in the Byzantine Empire the ambassadors tended to be appointed from families that had extensive economic interests in the area, the typologies of agreements do not point to an attempt to exclude opponents. The same was true for Sardinia. This was essentially due to the fact that involvement in both areas had been very important for the Genoese diplomatic efforts well before factional divisions started to play a significant role; it cannot be argued convincingly that these operations were the specific policy goals of one faction or the other. On the other hand, a clear image of a dual foreign policy divided along factional lines emerges when we consider the Genoese engagements that were more specific to the decades when a clear division of the city between the two opposing factions can be documented in the 1180s and

Sicily, 1192 – Ambassador to Sardinia), Zerbino (1191 – Ambassador to Morocco), Nigro (1191 – Ambassador to Morocco), Burono (1192 – Ambassador to Sardinia), Vento (1192 – Ambassador to Sardinia). *Codice Diplomatico*: Mauro (1181 – Ambassador to the Balearic Islands); Embriaco (1186 – Feudal Lord of Gibleto); Lecanoce (1189– Ambassador to Sardinia); Spinola (1190-1192 – Ambassador to Tyre, Jerusalem, Constantinople); Streiaporco (1191 – Ambassador to Sardinia); Guercio, (1193 – Ambassador to Constantinople).

early 1190s The involvement in the Third Crusade and the participation in the conquest of the Sicilian kingdom.

Genoese participation in the Third Crusade

Considering the evidence emerging from the chronicles and the diplomatic correspondence, the Genoese participation in the Third Crusade can be considered a matter exclusively internal to the families of the de Volta faction.

In 1190 the kings of France and England met in Genoa in order to reach an agreement about the transportation of their troops, on their way to the East in the Third Crusade.⁸⁴⁰ Many Genoese pilgrims and soldiers left the city in order to help defend the Kingdom of Jerusalem. They were led, as we have seen, by Guido Spinola, consul of the commune, who was accompanied by Nicola Embriaco, Fulcone de Castello, Simone Doria, Baldovino Guercio, Rosso de Volta and Spezapreda.⁸⁴¹ These are the only mentions of Genoese citizens participating in the Crusade. However, in the diplomatic correspondence of the commune, the importance of Genoese participation in the defence of the Crusaders' States emerges clearly. In February 1190, Hugh III of Burgundy reached an agreement with the Genoese, and on behalf of the king of France, that the city would transport 650 knights, each followed by two esquires and two horses (a total of nearly 2000 men and 1300 animals).⁸⁴² The King of France and his army arrived in Genoa in early August 1190. In April 1191 the expedition reached its destination, and at that point the second element of the Genoese participation emerged. After transporting the troops, the Genoese took a leading role in military operations, most importantly in the siege of Acre by the crusaders. The participation of the Genoese is described in exalted terms in the diplomatic letters with which the rulers of the remaining

⁸⁴⁰ Epstein, S., *Genoa and the Genoese...*, p.87.

⁸⁴¹ *Annales*, vol.II, p.33.

⁸⁴² Balard, M., 'Les transports maritimes génois vers la Terre Sainte' in *I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, pp.141-174. (CDG. Vol. II, docs. 190,191,192.)

Crusading states granted Genoa large concessions in exchange for the Genoese participation in the military activities.⁸⁴³

What is most important for the purposes of this analysis, however, is the fact that all the negotiations and diplomatic agreements between the rulers of the crusading states and the commune of Genoa were negotiated by the leaders of the Genoese crusaders – all belonging to the de Volta faction – in all the cases recorded. It is also striking that Ottobono Scriba, who was in these years acting closely with members of the de Curia faction (as we are about to see), does not mention these events at all.

The Sicilian campaigns

On the other hand, the involvement of the families associated with the de Curia faction in the early preparations of Henry VI's Sicilian campaign was equally evident. The negotiations over the organisation of this campaign started with a rare episode of inconsistent foreign policy on Genoa's part. In 1186, at the request of Henry, son of the then German Emperor and soon to be Emperor Henry VI, the Genoese Lanfranco Pevere and Ottobono Scriba – the annalist of the commune - swore a truce with Pisa.⁸⁴⁴ Nonetheless, Fulcone de Castello attacked a Pisan fleet with ten galleys, and after destroying it sacked the Pisan castle of Bonifacio; effectively starting a war with Pisa.⁸⁴⁵ This confusing episode becomes clear if interpreted in the light of Genoese factionalism. Henry was preparing the invasion of the Sicilian kingdom and thus pressed for a truce between Pisa and Genoa, whose fleet was intended to form the bulk of Henry's military effort. The economic potential of this enterprise

⁸⁴³ In particular Conrad of Montferrat described the Genoese fighters as 'true Maccabees', (*CDG*. Vol. III., doc. 19.)

⁸⁴⁴ *Annales*, vol.I, p.206 'In that year the Pisans started the war again in Sardinia...the Genoese from their part prepared a great army and got ready to attack Porto Pisano...at that point to the army were presented letters from king Henry, son of the Emperor Frederick, that the Pisans had obtained, on which was written that the king himself was praying that for his reason and for his love the Genoese desisted from attacking the Pisans...'

⁸⁴⁵ *Annales*, vol.I, p.206, '...all the army returned to Genoa, however Fulcone de Castello with 10 galleys attacked the fleet of the Pisans and destroyed it, proceeding then – making the sword talk - to sack and destroy the castle of Bonifacio'.

was enormous.⁸⁴⁶ It is possible that the fact that a Pevere represented the commune on this occasion indicated that the de Curia faction aimed to occupy the front-line in such an operation. The de Curia coalition, therefore, had all incentives to agree to restore the city's relations with Pisa. However, this did not stop Fulcone de Castello – one of the main leaders of the de Volta faction – whose economic interests were more aligned with eastern trade, from attacking and destroying a Pisan convoy and sacking a Pisan castle. In this interpretation, the actions of the families Pevere and Castello simply reflected their coalition interests.

This interpretation is strengthened by further developments. Specifically, in 1190, while the main members of the de Volta followed the kings of England and France overseas to the East⁸⁴⁷ the members of the de Curia faction pushed to support Henry's attack on Sicily.⁸⁴⁸ In order to prevent their opponents hindering the plan, the members of the de Curia faction decided to fully exploit their momentary advantage in Genoa. Thus, as I discussed in chapter four, the consuls of the commune - or more accurately those who remained in the city after the members of the de Volta had left for the East - elected a *podestà*.⁸⁴⁹ The fact that this decision was not unanimously reached, as referenced in the *Annales*, has been clearly shown.⁸⁵⁰ The reaction of the families closer to the de Volta faction brought about a full-scale civil war.⁸⁵¹ Such an internal situation stopped the de Curia's plans to take advantage over their rivals by supporting a Sicilian campaign, but also blocked the plans of Henry VI, who attempted to solve the impasse by confirming large concessions in Sicily for Genoa, if the city would support his campaign.

⁸⁴⁶ *Annales*, vol.I p .221, Among the other promises made by the Emperor was the entire city of Syracuse.

⁸⁴⁷ *CDG*, vol. II, docs.194, 195, 196; *CDG*, vol. III, docs.7, 8, 19, 20.

⁸⁴⁸ *Annales*, vol.II, p.32.

⁸⁴⁹ *Annales*, vol.II, p.35.

⁸⁵⁰ *Annales*, vol.II, p.37.

⁸⁵¹ *Annales*, vol.II, pp.33-50.

Thus a new *podestà* was chosen in 1194, through the direct mediation of Henry's seneschal. This time he was an official recognised by members of both factions and appointed as a guarantor of the agreement with Henry that the spoils of the invasion of Sicily (this time supported by both) were going to be divided equally. It is very possible that the prospect of the economic gains of a participation in the conquest of the Kingdom was what made the agreement work.⁸⁵² As I have shown in chapter two, at this point one of the factions, the de Curia, lost all its cohesiveness, while the de Volta maintained itself. As usual, the subsequent expedition was characterised by skirmishes between the Genoese and the Pisans. However, eminent members of both factions took part in the conquest. The fact that in this case the conquest of Sicily was a rare example of cooperation was demonstrated by the composition of the embassy sent to the Emperor after the conquest. Along with the new *podestà* of Genoa, the mission included the Bishop of the city, Fulcone de Castello, head of the de Volta coalition, and Giovanni Avvocato, an eminent member of the de Curia faction; the latter had commanded the Genoese troops in Sicily.⁸⁵³ The de Curia faction, therefore, may have lost in the factional struggle and subsequently dissolved. However, its foreign strategies continued and profits continued to be made from them by both factions together.

The events taken briefly into consideration in this section of the thesis should make us reflect further on the problems inherent to an interpretation of Genoese factionalism based on the consideration of the political aims of the two groups. The success of each Genoese action abroad depended on its ability to mobilise the resources gravitating around the city, acquiring the participation of different galley commanders. Therefore, the role played by the powerful families that formed the Genoese factions was crucial. However, it should not be argued that the two factions acted according to pre-existing divergent agendas regarding the Genoese involvement in the Mediterranean. On most occasions Genoese foreign engagement was dictated by long-lasting aims that did not change because of the internal divisions. However, a

⁸⁵² *Annales*, vol.II, p.46.

⁸⁵³ *Cassinese*, docs.253, 618, 796, 1729, 1784.

factional dimension to the city's foreign policy manifested itself when the factions acted, or attempted to act, as a core in the city's involvement in a particular Mediterranean engagement. This was the case for the de Volta's lead participation in the Third Crusade and for the initially competing support by the de Curia for the Sicilian campaign of Henry VI.

Day's interpretation of Genoese factionalism as linked to different attitudes towards engagement abroad emerges as partially correct. The problem with his interpretation is that he considers, in overseas engagements as elsewhere, factional attitudes as immemorial and present at the beginning of conflicts. In truth, the oppositions over the Genoese foreign engagement instead were principally a product of a fifteen-year period of extremely intense internal civil conflict. Instead, Genoese foreign policy was usually not a source of disagreement. Another aspect to be taken into consideration when discussing the role of factions in Genoese overseas engagement is that both the Third Crusade and the Sicilian campaign required such big operational commitments that the commune could not effectively take part in them both, hence a further motive of disagreement over which to pursue. Indeed, the documents available show that Genoa did not need factional peace to operate successfully abroad in other contexts; only abnormal circumstances led to trouble. Throughout this thesis I have shown the changing aspects of Genoese conflicts, here again we must remember not to take any particular periods, 1180-95 in this case, as the norm.

The brief consideration of factional effects on the Genoese foreign involvement, further stresses the need to study conflicts in Genoa as a developing phenomenon deeply intertwined with the history of the city.

Also in light of these final findings, this thesis shows that factional conflict emerges as one of the most important driving factors in the history of Genoa between the twelfth and the thirteenth century. There has often been a tendency not to consider the details of civil conflict in Genoa, taking them both for granted and as inexplicable – the result of an overreliance on

outdated interpretation. This thesis attempted to fill that gap and to offer the future scholar of Genoa an additional, and perhaps vital, key with which to unlock a greater understanding of the intricate history of this city.

Bibliography

Primary Sources.

Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII, eds.

BELGRANO, L.T. and IMPERIALE, C., (Roma, 1890-1901).

Gli Annali di Caffaro (1099-1163), ed. AIRALDI, G., (Genova, 2002).

Annali di Oberto Cancelliere (1164-1173), ed. AIRALDI, G., (Genova, 2003).

Gli Annali di Ottobono Scriba (1174-1196), eds., MONTESANO, M., and MUSARRA, A., (Genova, 2010).

Cartario genovese ed illustrazione del Registro arcivescovile, ed. BELGRANO, L., (Genova, 1870).

Carte del Monastero di San Siro di Genova dal 952 al 1224, eds. BASILI, A., and POZZA, L., (Genova, 1974).

Carte del monastero di Sant'Andrea della Porta di Genova (1109-1370), ed. SOAVE, C. (Genova, 2002).

Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova, ed. IMPERIALE, C., (Roma, 1936).

Giovanni Scriba, eds. CHIAUDANO, M., and MORESCO, M., (Roma, 1935).

Giovanni di Guiberto (1200-1211), eds. HALL, M.W., COLE, C., KRUEGER, H.C., REINERT, R.G., and REYNOLDS, R.L., (Torino, 1939-1940).

Guglielmo Cassinese 1190-1192, eds. HALL, M., HILMAR, C. and REYNOLDS, L., (Genova, 1938).

Lanfranco (1202-1226), eds. H. C. KRUEGER, H.C., and REYNOLDS, R.L., (Genova 1951-1953).

Oberto Scriba de Mercato, 1186, ed. CHIAUDANO, M., (Genova, 1940).

Oberto Scriba de Mercato, 1190, eds. CHIAUDANO, M., and MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, R., (Torino, 1938).

Registro della Curia arcivescovile di Genova, ed. BELGRANO, L., (Genova, 1862-1873).

- Il secondo Registro della Curia arcivescovile di Genova*, eds. BERETTA, L., and BELGRANO, L., (Genova, 1887).
- Le carte di Santa Maria delle Vigne di Genova (1103-1392)*, ed. AIRALDI, G., (Genova, 1969).
- Codice diplomatico del monastero di Santo Stefano di Genova (1201-1257)*, ed. CIARLO, D., (Genova, 2008).
- Codice diplomatico del monastero di Santo Stefano di Genova, I (965-1200)*, ed. CALLERI, M., (Genova, 2009).
- Liber iurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, in *Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, VII, IV, (Torino 1854-1857).
- I Libri iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/1*, ed. ROVERE, A., (Genova, 1992).
- I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/2*, ed. PUNCUH, D., (Genova, 1996).
- I Libri iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/1*, ed. ROVERE, A., (Genova, 1992).
- I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/2*, ed. PUNCUH, D., (Genova, 1996).
- I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/3*, ed. PUNCUH, D., (Genova, 1998).
- I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/4*, ed. DELLACASA, S., (Genova, 1998).
- I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/5*, ed. MEDIA, E., (Genova, 1999).
- I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova, I/6*, ed. BIBOLINI, M., (Genova, 2000).
- Secondary Sources.**
- ABULAFIA, D., *The Two Italies* (Cambridge, 1977).
- AIRALDI, G., *Comuni e Signorie nell'Italia Settentrionale. Il Piemonte e la Liguria*, in GALASSO, G., (ed.), *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 5 (Torino, 1987).
- AIRALDI, G., *Studi sui cronisti della Marca Trevigiana nell'età di Ezzelino da Romano* (Roma, 1963).
- AIRALDI, G., and KEDAR, B., (eds.), *I Comuni Italiani nel Regno Crociato di Gerusalemme* (Genova, 1986).

- AIRALDI, G., *Genova e la Liguria nel Medioevo* (Genova, 2007).
- BACH, E., *La cité de Gênes au XII siècle* (Copenhagen, 1955).
- BALARD, M., *La Romanie génoise* (Roma, 1978).
- BATES, R., GREIF, A., LEVI, M., ROSENTHAL, J., and WEINGAST, B., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton, 1998).
- BATES, R., GREIF, A., and SINGH, S., 'Organising Violence', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46, 5, 2002, pp. 599-628.
- BELGRANO, T., 'Della vita privata dei Genovesi', in *ASLI*, vol. IV/II, 1866, pp. 79-273.
- BELGRANO, T., 'Spigolature genovesi tratte dall'Archivio Vaticano', in *Giornale Ligustico di Archeologia, Storia e Belle Arti*, XIV, 1887.
- BELGRANO, T., 'Tavole genealogiche a corredo della illustrazione del Registro arcivescovile', in *ASLI*, II/I, 1873.
- BORGATTI, S.P., EVERETT, M.G., and FREEMAN, L.C., *UCINET 6 for Windows* (Harvard, 2002).
- BORGATTI, S.P., EVERETT, M.G., and FREEMAN, L.C., *UCINET 6 for Windows: User's Guide* (Harvard, 2002).
- BOSSY, J., (ed.) *Dispute and Settlements, Law and Human Relations in the West* (Cambridge, 1983).
- BRACE, P., COHEN, Y., GRAY, V., and LOWERY, D., 'How Much Do Interest Groups Influence State Economic Growth?', *The American Political Science Review*, 83, 4, 1989, pp. 1297-1308.
- BORDONE, R., 'Le origini del comune di Genova', in *Comuni e memoria storica*, pp. 237-260.
- BORDONE, R., 'La società urbana nell'Italia comunale (secoli XI-XIV)', in *Documenti della Storia*, 1984.

- BORDONE, R., *'I visconti cittadini in età comunale'*, in BORDONE, R., (ed.) *Formazione e strutture dei ceti dominanti nel medioevo: marchesi, conti e visconti nel regno italico (secc. IX-XII)*, (Roma 1966).
- BURKE, P., *Eyewitnessing. The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London, 2001).
- CANALE, M. G., *Storia civile, commerciale e letteraria dei Genovesi* (Genova, 1844).
- CAPOCCIA, G., and KELEMEN, R., 'The study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism', *World Politics*, 59, 3, 2007, pp. 341-369.
- CARDINI, F., 'Profilo di un crociato: Guglielmo Embriaco', *Archivio storico italiano*, 136, 1978, pp. 405-36.
- CASARETTO, P.F., 'La Moneta Genovese', in *Atti della Società Ligure*, Vol. 55, (Genova, 1928).
- CHIFFOLEAU, J., GAUVARD, C., and ZORZI, A., (eds.) *Pratiques Sociales et Politiques Judiciaires* (Roma, 2007).
- CHITTOLINI, G., 'The "Private," the "Public," the State', *The Journal of Modern History*, 67, 1995, pp. 34-61.
- CIPOLLA, C. M., *Storia Economica dell'Europa pre-industriale* (Bologna, 1974).
- CLARK, G. 'A Review of Avner Greif's Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 45, 2007, pp. 727-743.
- COHN, S., *Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200-1425* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).
- COLEMAN, J.S., *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1990).
- DAVID, P., 'Path Dependence – A Foundational Concept For Historical Social Science', *The Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History*, 1, 2, 2007, pp. 1-20.
- DAY, G.W., *Genoa's Response to Byzantium, 1155-1204: Commercial Expansion and Factionalism in a Medieval City* (Urbana, 1988).
- DE NEGRI, T., *Storia di Genova* (Firenze, 2003).
- DEAN, T., 'Marriage and Mutilation: Vendetta in Late Medieval Italy', *Past and Present*,

157, 1, 1997, pp. 3-36.

DESIMONI, C., 'Sul frammento di Breve genovese scoperto a Nizza', in *ASLI, I/II*, 1859, pp. 91-154.

DESIMONI, C., 'Sulla tavola di bronzo della Polcevera e sul modo di studiare le antichità linguistiche. Lettere tre al professor canonico Angiolo Sanguineti', in *ASLI, III/III*, 1865, pp. 529-744.

DESIMONI, C.; 'Sulle marche d'Italia e sulle loro diramazioni in marchesati. Lettere cinque al commendator Domenico Promis', in *ASLI, XXVIII/I*, 1896, pp. 1-338.

DOUGLASS, C., and THOMAS, P., *The Rise of the Western World* (New York, 1973).

ELSTER, J., 'Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action', *Ethics*, 96, 1, 1985, pp.136-155.

ELSTER, J., 'Social Norms and Economic Theory', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 3, 4, 1989, pp.99-117.

ELSTER, J. 'Review: Rational Choice History: a Case of Excessive Ambition', *The American Political Science Review*, 94, 3, 2000, pp.685-695.

EPSTEIN, S., *Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 1150-1250* (Cambridge, 1984).

EPSTEIN, S., *Genoa & the Genoese, 958 – 1528* (Chapel Hill & London, 1996).

FACE, R., 'Secular History in XII Century Italy: Caffaro of Genoa', *Journal of Medieval History*, 6, 2, 1980, pp.169-84.

FENOALTEA, S., 'Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model', *The Journal of Economic History*, 44, 3, 1984, pp.635-668.

FILANGIERI, L., 'Famiglie e gruppi dirigenti a Genova (secoli XII-metà XIII)', *Tesi di dottorato di ricerca in Storia Medievale, Università di Firenze, XXII ciclo* (Florence, 2010).

FREUND, J., *The Sociology of Max Weber* (London, 1968).

GINATEMPO, M., and SANDRI, L., *L'Italia delle città: Il popolamento urbano tra Medioevo e Rinascimento (secoli XIII-XVI)* (Florence, 1990).

GLUCKAM, M., 'The Peace in the Feud', *Past and Present*, 8, 1955, pp. 1-14.

GOITEIN, S. D., 'Geniza Papers of a Documentary Character in the Gaster Collection of the

- British Museum', *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, New Ser., 51, 1, 1960, pp.34-46.
- GOITEIN, S. D., *A Mediterranean Society: Economic Foundations* (Los Angeles, 1967).
- GOITEIN, S.D., *A Mediterranean Society: The Community* (Los Angeles, 1971).
- GOITEIN, S.D., *Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders* (Princeton, 1973).
- GRANOVETTER, M., 'The Strength of Weak Ties', *The American Journal of Sociology* 78, 6, 1973, pp.1360-1380.
- GRANOVETTER, M., 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 3, 1985, pp.481-510.
- GREIF, A., *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade* (Cambridge, 2006).
- GREIF, A., 'Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders', *Journal of Economic History*, 49, 4, 1989, pp.857-82.
- GREIF, A., 'The Organization of Long-Distance Trade: Reputation and Coalitions in the Geniza Documents and Genoa During the XI and XII Centuries', *The Journal of Economic History*, 51, 2, 1991, pp.459-462.
- GREIF, A., 'Institution and Commitment in International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution', *American Economic Review*, 82, 2, 1992, pp.128-133.
- GREIF, A., 'Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition', *American Economic Review*, 83,3, 1993, pp.525-548.
- GREIF, A., 'On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa during the XII and XIII Centuries', *Journal of Economic History*, 54, 4, 1994, pp.271-287.
- GREIF, A., 'Political Organizations, Social Structures, and Institutional Success: Reflection from Genoa and Venice during the Commercial Revolution', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 151, 4, 1995, pp.734-40.
- GRENDI, E., *Profilo storico degli alberghi genovesi* (Roma, 1975).
- GRENDI, E., *Storia di una storia locale. L'esperienza ligure 1792 - 1992* (Venezia, 1996).

- GROSSI, P., 'Il Sistema Giuridico Medievale e la Società Comunale', in ZORZI, A.,(ed.) *La civiltà comunale italiana nella storiografia internazionale* (Florence, 2008).
- GUGLIELMOTTI, P., 'Book Review: Genoa & the Genoese', in *Studi medievali*, s.III, XLVII/II, 2006, pp.926-930.
- HARRIET, M.H., 'The Peasants Revolts of 1381 and the Chronicles', *Journal of Medieval History*, 6, (1980): 393-415.
- HATCHER, J., 'England in the Aftermath of the Black Death', *Past & Present*, 144 (1994), pp.3-35.
- HEERS, *Genes au XVe siècle*, (Paris, 1961).
- HEERS, J., *Le livre des comptes de Giovanni Piccamiglio homme d'affaires genoais* (Paris, 1961).
- HEERS, J., 'Urbanisme et structure sociale à Gênes au Moyen-Âge', in *Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani* (Milano, 1962).
- HEERS, J., *Le clan familial au moyen âge* (Paris, 1977); trans. *Family Clans in the Middle Ages: a Study of Political and Social Structures in Urban Areas* (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1977).
- HEERS, J., *Parties and Political life in the Medieval West* (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1977).
- HEYD, W., *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Age* (Leipzig, 1973).
- HOOVER, C.B., 'The Sea Loan in Genoa in the Twelfth Century', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 40, 3 (1926), pp.495-529.
- HYDE, J., *Society and Politics in Medieval Italy* (London, 1973).
- HUGHES, D. O., 'Urban Growth and Family Structure in Medieval Genoa', *Past and Present*, 66, 1, 1975, pp.3-28.
- HUGHES, D. O., 'Il matrimonio nell'Italia medievale', in DE GIORGIO, M., and KLAPISCH-ZUBER, C., *Storia del matrimonio* (Roma - Bari, 1996).
- LANE, F., *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore, 1973).

- LEWIS, A., *Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean. A.D. 500-1100* (Princeton 1951).
- LEWIS, A., and RUNYAN, T., *European Naval and Maritime History, 300-1500* (Bloomington, 1985).
- LOPEZ, R. S., *Genova marinara nel Duecento: Benedetto Zaccaria, ammiraglio e mercante* (Milano, 1933).
- LOPEZ, R. S., *Studi sull'economia genovese nel medio evo*, (Torino, 1936).
- LOPEZ, R. S., *Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo* (Bologna, 1938).
- LOPEZ, R. S., 'European Merchants in the Medieval Indies', *Journal of Economic History*, 3, 1, 1993, pp.164-188.
- LOPEZ, R. S., *The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350* (Cambridge, 1976).
- KRUEGER, H., *Navi e proprietà navale a Genova: seconda metà del secolo XII* (Genova, 1955).
- MAIRE VIGUEUR, J.C., 'Gli "iudices" nelle città comunali: identità culturale ed esperienze politiche', in *Federico II e le città italiane* (Palermo, 1994), pp.161-176.
- MAIRE VIGUEUR, J.C., *Cittadini e Cavalieri* (Firenze, 2004).
- MAIRE VIGUEUR, J.C., *I Podestà dell'Italia Comunale* (Roma, 2000).
- MARTINES, L., (ed.) *Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200-1500* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1972).
- McGOVERN, J., 'The Documentary Language of Medieval Business, A.D. 1150-1250', *The Classical Journal*, 67, 3, 1972, pp.227-239.
- McLEAN, J., 'Book Review of Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa', *American Journal of Sociology*, 116, 1, July 2010, pp.307-309.
- MISKIMIN, H., et al. (eds.) *The Medieval City. Essays in Honour of R. S. Lopez*, (New Haven, 1977).
- MOLHO, A., 'Review: Parties and Political Life in The Medieval West', *The American Historical Review*, 84, 1, 1979, p.134.
- MORESCO, M., and BOGNETTI, G.P., *Per l'edizione dei notai liguri del sec. XII*, (Torino

1938).

MORESCO, M., 'Note sulla fondazione della chiesa gentilizia degli Spinola nel 1188 in Genova', in *Studi di Storia e Diritto in onore di Enrico Besta per il XL anno del suo insegnamento*, vol. 4 (Milano, 1939).

MORESCO, M., 'Parentele e guerre civili in Genova nel secolo XII', first published in *Scritti giuridici in onore di Santi Romano*, (Padova, 1940), vol. IV, p.423-433; republished in *Scritti di Mattia Moresco* (Milano, 1959), pp.431-440.

NICCOLAI, F., *Contributo allo studio dei più antichi brevi genovesi*, (Milano, 1939).

OFFER, A., 'Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honor?', *Politics & Society*, 23, 2, 1995, pp.213-241.

OFFER, A., 'Review of Analytic Narratives', *The Journal of Economic History*, 60, 1, 2000, pp.312-314.

OGILVIE, S., 'Social Capital, Networks and History', *University of Cambridge, mimeo*, June 2005.

OGILVIE, S., *Institutions and European Trade, Merchant Guilds, 1000-1800* (Cambridge, 2011).

OLIVIERI, A., 'Cronologia dei Consoli del Comune di Genova', in *Atti della Società Ligure* (Genova, 1878).

OLIVIERI, A., 'Serie dei consoli del comune di Genova', in *Atti della Società Ligure*, (Genova, 1860).

OLSON, M., *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, 1982).

ORIGONE, S., 'Gli Embriaci a Genova fra XII e XIII secolo', in *Serta antiqua et medievalia*, V, 2001, pp. 67-81.

OTTERBEIN, K., 'Internal War: A Cross-Cultural Study', *American Anthropologist*, New Series, 70, 2, 1968, pp. 277-289.

PADGETT, J., and ANSELL, C.K., 'Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 6, 1993, pp. 1259-1319.

- PETTI BALBI, G., 'Caffaro', in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, vol.16, 1973
- PETTI BALBI, G., *Genova medievale vista dai contemporanei* (Genova, 1979).
- PETTI BALBI, G., *Apprendisti e artigiani Genova nel 1257*, in «ASLI», n. s., XX (1980), pp.137-170.
- PETTI BALBI, G., *Caffaro e la cronachistica genovese* (Genova, 1982).
- PETTI BALBI, G., *Una città e il suo mare. Genova nel medioevo* (Bologna, 1991).
- PETTI BALBI G., 'Magnati e Popolani in area ligure', in *Magnati e Popolani nell'Italia comunale, Atti del XV convegno di studi del Centro Italiano di studi di storia e d'arte*, Pistoia 1997, pp. 243-272.
- PETTI BALBI, G., *Governare la città: pratiche sociali e linguaggi politici a Genova in età medievale* (Firenze, 2007).
- PETTI BALBI, G., 'I Visconti di Genova: identità e funzioni dei Carmadino (secoli X-XII)', in PETTI BALBI, G., *Governare la città*, pp.51-82.
- PETTI BALBI, G., *I Fieschi e il loro territorio nella Liguria orientale* (Genova, 1983).
- PETTI BALBI, G., *I signori di Vezzano in Lunigiana (secoli XI-XIII)*, (La Spezia, 1982).
- PISTARINO, G., *La capitale del Mediterraneo: Genova nel medioevo* (Bordighera, 1993).
- POGGI, F., *La Società ligure di storia patria dal 1908 al 1917* (Genoa, 1917).
- POLONIO, 'Consentirono l'un l'altro: il matrimonio in Liguria tra XI e XIV secolo' in *Serta antiqua et medievalia*, V, 2001, pp.23-53.
- PORCHNEV, B., *Les soulèvements populaires en France au XVII siècle* (Paris, 1972).
- PRYOR, J., *Geography, Technology, and War* (Cambridge, 1988).
- PUNCUH, D., (ed.) *Storia di Genova: Mediterraneo, Europa, Atlantico* (Genova, 2003).
- PUNCUH (ed.), *Storia della cultura ligure*, (Genova, 2005).
- PUNCUH, D., *All'ombra della Lanterna. Cinquant'anni tra archivi e biblioteche: 1956-2006* (Genova, 2006).
- PUNCUH, D., 'I centocinquant'anni della Società Ligure di Storia Patria', in *ASLI*, XLVII/2 (2007), pp.7-18.

- PUNCUH, D., 'La fondazione della Società Ligure di Storia Patria', in LO BASSO, L., (ed.) *Politica e Cultura nel Risorgimento* (Genova, 2008).
- PUNCUH, D., (ed.), 'La Società Ligure di Storia Patria nella storiografia italiana', 1857-2007, *ASLI*, 50 (Genova, 2010).
- PUTNAM, R.D., Leonardi, R., and Nanetti, R.Y., *Making democracy work* (Princeton, 1993).
- RAGGIO, O., *Faide e Parentele* (Torino, 1990).
- REY, E., 'Les Segneurs De Gilet' in *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, 3, 1895, pp.398-422.
- RIGBY, S., 'Historical Causation: Is One Thing More Important than Another?', *History*, 1995, pp.227-242.
- ROBERTS, S., *Order and Dispute, An Introduction to Legal Anthropology* (London, 1979).
- ROOVER, F.E., 'The Business Records of an Early Genoese Notary, 1190-1192', *Bulletin of Business Historical Society*, 14, 3, 1940, pp.41-46.
- ROSENBERG, G., *Comportamenti sociali e ideali domestici*, (Torino, 1975).
- SCARSELLA, A., *Il Comune dei Consoli*, vol.III of *Storia di Genova dalle origini al tempo nostro* (Milano, 1942).
- SCHAUBE, A., *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Volker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzuge* (Munich-Berlin, 1906).
- SCHIERA, P., 'Legitimacy, Discipline, and Institutions: Three Necessary Conditions for the Birth of the Modern State', *The Journal of Modern History*, 67, 1995, pp.511-533.
- SCHWARZ, R., 'Two Sources of Medieval Business History', *The American Journal of Legal History*, 2, 3, 1958, pp.237-255.
- SWIDLER, A., 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies', *American Sociological Review*, 51, 2, 1986, pp.273-286.
- TABACCO, G., *The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy* (Cambridge, 1989).
- TABACCO, G., 'Il tema della famiglia e del suo funzionamento nella società medievale', *Quaderni storici*, 11, 1976.
- TVERSKY, A., and KAHNEMAN, D., 'Judgment under Uncertainty', *Science*, New Series,

185, 4157, 1974, pp.1124-1131.

VAN DOOSSELAERE, Q., *Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa* (Cambridge, 2009).

VITALE, V., *Il comune del podestà a Genova* (Milano, 1951).

VITALE, V., *Breviario della Storia di Genova. Lineamenti storici e orientamenti storiografici* (Genova, 1955).

WHITE, S.D., *Feuding and Peace-Making in Eleventh-Century France* (London, 2005).

WICKHAM, C., 'Review: Systactic Structures: Social Theory For Historians', *Past and Present*, 132, 1991, pp.188-203.

WICKHAM, C., *Land and Power: Studies in Italian and European Social History* (Roma, 1994).

WICKHAM, C., *Courts and Conflict in Twelfth-century Tuscany* (Oxford, 2004).

YORAM, B., 'The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange', *Population and Development Review*, 6, 1, 1980, pp.1-30.

ZORZI, A., 'La cultura della vendetta nel conflitto politico in età comunale', in DELLE DONNE, R., and ZORZI, A., *Le storie e la memoria* (Firenze, 2002).