P&C4

[Note on author]

Martin Ceadel is Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Oxford and Fellow of New College where he taught politics and international relations from 1979 to 2015. His research has focused mainly on the politics of war prevention, and includes five single-authored books published by Oxford University Press.

[Title page]

THE LONDON PEACE SOCIETY AND ABSOLUTIST-REFORMIST RELATIONS WITHIN THE PEACE MOVEMENT, 1816-1939.

by Martin Ceadel

[Abstract]

This article revisits the author's pioneering archival work on the world's leading peace association of the nineteenth century, the London Peace Society (LPS), in order to focus on its distinctive strategy for dealing with the fact that from the outset the peace movement had two distinct wings, absolutist (the small core of pacifists) and reformist (the rather larger penumbra of *pacificists).* Unlike other early such associations, which adopted different membership strategies, the LPS catered for both wings but in a two-tier hierarchy: its top tier, the national committee that determined its policy, was strictly pacifist and rejected even defensive war; but no such stringency of belief was required of the bottom tier of ordinary members, which therefore contained many *pacificists*. Top-tier pacifism served the LPS well for half a century, in particular enabling it to outperform its American counterpart, but for the next half-century caused it to fall between two stools by disappointing absolutists as well as reformists. It was tacitly abandoned as the LPS plunged into steep decline on passing its centenary, and was repudiated on the eve of the Second World War.

[Article]

The Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace – which from its establishment in June 1816 called itself the Peace Society and was known internationally as the London Peace Society (LPS) – was the first peace association with a national reach, and became the acknowledged world leader of the peace movement for three quarters of a century before entering a period of accelerating decline. The LPS's privately held records, which for a long period were only intermittently available to researchers, require time-consuming

contextual work for their meaning to be elucidated: although the minutes of its committee meetings have mostly been preserved, they are laconic in the extreme; and very little accompanying correspondence still exists. I was the first scholar to publish detailed accounts of the LPS based on its entire surviving archive, which I did in 1996 and 2000.[1] In this article occasioned by the society's bicentenary[2] I draw again upon that original research, supplemented by other material that has subsequently become available, to revisit the cradle-to-grave story of the LPS. To attempt this within the constraints of an article requires the selection of a single organizing theme to the exclusion of many possible alternatives. I have chosen the one whose centrality has recently become even more apparent to me from comparative work on the international peace movement.[3] In particular, I now consider the LPS's greater early success than its American counterpart to be largely attributable to the distinctive formula, top-tier pacifism, which it adopted for harnessing both the absolutist and reformist wings of the peace movement. I also now regard the LPS's eventual decline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as to a considerable extent the consequence of its having stuck for too long to this original formula in a changed intellectual climate; and in that connection I here give a fuller account than previously of the LPS's final decades when it finally abandoned top-tier pacifism.

A PEACE MOVEMENT OF ABSOLUTISTS AND REFORMISTS

The peace movement came into existence in order to reject not only aggressive war but also "the general belief that the better our means of defence, the less is the likelihood of our having to make use of them", as *The Times* put it on March 10, 1847, in a denunciation of the LPS that marked the latter's attainment of sufficient political importance to merit editorial disapproval. I have classified this "general belief" that strong defences deter aggression as a distinct ideology called "defencism",[4] whereas most scholars of International Relations have implicitly incorporated it into their category of "realism". Defencism or realism believed that

the best to which the inter-state system could aspire is an armed truce. By contrast, the peace movement believed in the achievability of the "permanent and universal peace" mentioned in the LPS's full title: it was convinced, in other words, that war could be abolished.

Yet as early as the world's first peace campaign, which began soon after Britain became embroiled in its French wars of 1793-1815, there were two distinct approaches to the abolition of war. The absolutist approach, for which I reserve the word "pacifism" (though it was not coined until 1901 and initially had a broader meaning), assumed that it could be abolished by unconditionally rejecting military force. Always very much a minority viewpoint even within the peace movement, it originated intellectually in the rejection as sinful by some protestant sects of certain mainstream social practices, in this case military service. Pacifism argued, in effect, that war would be abolished by mass conscientious objection. Largely because of growing respect for the Quakers, a British sect which had declared itself non-resistant in 1661 and had thereafter remained almost universally loyal to that declaration, pacifism began to spread, albeit on a very small scale, into mainstream churches and denominations. The first texts arguing that it was the correct reading of Christianity for all believers, and not just for heterodox sectarians such as the Quakers, appeared in London during 1796.

By contrast, the reformist approach was a product of the enlightenment view that primitive social practices, in this case international conflict, could be reformed out of existence by rational political action. How this was done depended on which reforming ideology was adopted: as in domestic politics, liberals, radicals, socialists, feminists, and ecologists differed somewhat from each other ideologically as well as uniting to oppose conservatives, reactionaries, and fascists. However, until their chosen reforming ideology bore fruit and war was abolished, *pacificists* all accepted that military force might be needed to protect the enlightened against the upholders of primitive ways. War could therefore still be legitimate

provided that it was neither aggressive nor reactionary. I have called this reformist position *pacificism*, following a casual suggestion by A.J.P. Taylor,[5] because it was pacific in its aspiration to abolish war but not pacifist in the sense of immediately renouncing it. In Britain *pacificism* was deduced from utilitarian principles by Jeremy Bentham, who in 1789 made the first known suggestion of a peace association (in imitation of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, established by Quakers two years previously)[6], and wrote an essay that anticipated many of the *pacificist* ideas of the next hundred years. It was derived from radical principles by the political thinker William Godwin. And it was inferred from a rational-Christian conception of the divine purpose by the Unitarian merchants who led the campaign against the French wars.[7]

During those wars, however, no peace association was formed: the idea was discussed after the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade dramatically achieved its objective in 1807; but the institutionalization of peace activism was generally held to be unwise while the conflict with France continued. The Quaker-led evangelicals who were to found the LPS in 1816 met in London on June 7, 1814, and again on June 6, 1815; but both gatherings jumped the gun – or, rather, jumped the silencing of the guns.

So the LPS did not quite manage to become the world's first peace association. That honour belonged to the United States, which extricated itself from its own War of 1812 before Napoleon's final defeat: in consequence, associations were created in New York during August 1815 and Massachusetts during December 1815.[8] And even in London another association stole a march on the LPS, when the Unitarian politician and publisher Sir Richard Phillips formed a Society for Abolishing War on March 20, 1816.[9] The LPS was not launched until June 14, 1816.

THE ESPOUSAL OF TOP-TIER PACIFISM

An additional factor in the delay of two years since the LPS's first pre-meeting in June 1814 was a controversy about whether to be pacifist, *pacificist*, or some combination of the two. All the early peace associations understood the crucial importance of this issue, and took different approaches to it. The New York Peace Society began on a pacifists-only basis. Sir Richard Phillips' Society for Abolishing War was for *pacificists* only. The Massachusetts Peace Society catered for both pacifists and *pacificists* equally, on a diversity-of-opinions basis. Seemingly after considerable discussion, the LPS adopted a fourth position, top-tier pacifism. It required its national committee in London, which set policy, and initially also the committees of its local branches (known as auxiliary societies), to be strictly pacifist; but it invited *pacificists* to join its rank and file. Such *pacificists*, even though constituting a majority of members, thereby accepted a position of ideological inferiority: they had to defer doctrinally to a pacifist leadership that boasted of the "high ground" it occupied on account of its "grand principle" of rejecting even defensive war.

Many early supporters of LPS feared that such condescension towards *pacificists* would deter too many of them for the society to become numerically viable. The need therefore to allow for a possible future retreat from its initial position may explain why the LPS's rules did not specify that the top tier's objection was to *all* war – an omission soon commented on – though this was undoubtedly how they were understood from the outset. In 1818, moreover, these rules were formally re-considered at a meeting of members, though the only change made was the dropping of the requirement for committee members of auxiliary societies to be pacifist, a concession that led at least for a time to some variations in local ideological practice.[10] This reaffirmation of top-tier pacifism for the national committee proved an undoubted initial success, serving the LPS well for half a century during spells of foul and fair political weather alike. It however served it badly for its second half-century, and was abandoned as the society, by then in terminal decline, entered its second century.

TOP-TIER PACIFISM AS AN ASSET, 1816-66

The LPS had three reasons for insisting on pacifism for its London committee. The most important was to secure support from the Society of Friends. Britain's Quakers had consistently refused not only to serve in the militia but also to hire a substitute or pay a fine in lieu as the law prescribed, suffering confiscation of their property instead. Yet despite an almost universally rigorous understanding of their obligations as members of a non-resistant sect, not all of them inferred from their personal pacifism a general duty to campaign against war. Thus even the first secretary of the LPS, Evan Rees from Neath, had as recently as 1814 enjoyed "grand naval and military spectacles"; and it was only after "a great change" in his attitudes, seemingly derived from residence for health reasons in the south of France during the interval of peace before Napoleon's return from exile, where he witnessed the impact of conscription on a local protestant community, that Rees espoused pacifist activism.[ll] He thus missed the 1814 and 1815 pre-meetings, but attended in June 1816. In the event a sufficient minority of Quakers were prepared to follow Rees's example for the LPS to be provided with a ready-made network: even in its first year it could claim five auxiliary societies as widely spread as Hertford, Tavistock, Swansea & Neath, Darlington, and Newcastle, making it the first national peace association in the world. Quaker finance was also crucial, helping to explain why the LPS endured whereas Sir Richard Phillips's rival body petered out by about 1819. Such support would have been jeopardized if the society had failed formally to oppose all war.

The Christian pacifism of its top tier had a second advantage in the anxious political climate of its first decade and a half of existence: it helped the LPS to put itself forward as a pious rather than a subversive body – if not wholly quietist then more a missionary society than a pressure group. And because it was careful never to have a Quaker majority on its London committee, it presented its faith as ecumenical rather than sectarian. It pursued a strategy of

social respectability, reflected in its setting its subscription as high as half a guinea for a year or five guineas for life. Its main activity was issuing tracts that had been carefully vetted to avoid unnecessarily contentious material such as condemnations of the death penalty; and from 1819 it also published a sober monthly paper, *Herald of Peace*.

A third advantage of top-tier absolutism was that it spared the LPS the contentious task of judging which military involvements to support. Defensiveness, as pacifists have always argued, is a notoriously elastic excuse for fighting; and in addition at many times during the nineteenth century liberalism and nationalism provided temptations for British progressives to support crusading interventions in Europe. An example of how the LPS could easily have been caught up in political controversy on such issues is provided by the singular John Bowring, a commercial agent-turned-intellectual and later a government official now best remembered as Bentham's literary executor.[12] A devout Unitarian pacifist and a brilliant linguist, Bowring joined the LPS's committee in 1819 and was soon appointed its secretary for foreign correspondence. But, an impulsive man with wide interests, he was also drawn into European politics. In 1822 he was arrested in France for carrying information designed to alert Portugal's liberal government to France's interventionist intentions. On his release, he switched his attention to the Greek national cause, in 1823 becoming secretary of the Greek Committee in London which raised money for the war of independence against the Ottoman Empire. Realizing in consequence that he was not after all a pacifist, Bowring resigned from the LPS's committee and secretaryship, thereby sparing the society accusations of endorsing political violence.

Yet the LPS's opening of its bottom tier to *pacificists* – such as Bentham, one of the 190 subscribers in its first year – assured it a critical mass of support, despite early worries on this score. By 1823 membership reached approximately 1,450, not far below the figure at which it was to plateau. By contrast, the pacifist-only New York association had struggled to recruit

on its initial narrow basis, and in 1818, after correspondence with the LPS,[13] switched to the latter's two-tier model.

Further developments across the Atlantic soon demonstrated the advantages for the LPS not only of its top-tier pacifism but also of its strong and united Quaker presence. In 1828 an American Peace Society (APS) was created, subsuming existing associations as local branches. Initially, it adopted the Massachusetts Peace Society's diversity-of-opinions basis; but in 1837, in a doomed attempt to appease a group of anarcho-pacifists in New England led by the abrasive William Lloyd Garrison, it formally espoused pacifism, to the annoyance of its many *pacificists*, who had until then enjoyed parity of esteem. The implacable Garrison and his followers seceded anyway in 1838, to form the New England Non-Resistance Society, leaving the APS in an ambiguous and even disingenuous position: in theory it was pacifist; but in reality a majority of its members, and increasingly also its leadership, were unapologetically *pacificist*. The clarity of the LPS's hierarchical structure was thus absent. So too was the emollient tone that Britain's Quakers brought to the LPS. The American peace movement's angry fractiousness, exemplified by the Garrisonian secession from the APS, reflected the fact that it was led by Presbyterians and Congregationalists more than by Quakers, in part because in the United States these last were heavily distracted by their own doctrinal schism between orthodox and Hicksite factions.

Having survived Britain's anxious post-war years, 1816 -31, the LPS entered a more welcoming political climate; and indeed the ensuing two decades, 1832-1851, were the most optimistic and influential in its history. Key indicators of the country's growing pluralism and progressivism were (at the legislative level) the Great Reform Act of 1832 and the abolition of slavery in 1833, and (at the popular level) the emergence of teetotalism in the early 1830s and of both the Chartist and free-trade movements from 1838, the last of these triumphing in 1846 when Peel conceded the repeal of the protectionist Corn Laws. Additional stimuli to

peace activism were controversial foreign-policy involvements, and scares about France's intentions which from the mid-1840s led to government attempts to revive militia service.

In this liberalized atmosphere, the LPS came out as a pressure group, sending deputations to the foreign secretary and petitions to parliament in respect of particular conflicts, campaigning for schemes of arbitration, dispatching lecturers around the country, collecting pacifist pledges (a technique borrowed from the teetotal movement), and – most courageously of all – organizing the first international peace congress (a technique borrowed from the anti-slavery movement), the General Peace Convention held in London during 1843. By 1847 the society was significant enough politically to be denounced for the first time by *The Times*, as already noted, for dissenting from the defencist conventional wisdom.

During the 1840s, moreover, the term "peace movement" entered English usage, reflecting not only the LPS's new activism but the emergence of rival campaigns, both absolutist and reformist. These mainly emanated from Britain's cities in the midlands and north, newly empowered by industrial and commercial development as well as by the electoral redistribution of the Great Reform Act; but some came from across the Atlantic.

One set of challengers tried to outdo the LPS on the pacifist front. These included a "moral radical party" of prosperous provincial businessmen, most of them Quakers or nonconformists led by nineteenth-century Britain's greatest all-round progressive activist, the Quaker corn merchant Joseph Sturge.[14] Moral radicals believed that the London philanthropic establishment was too complacent and insufficiently bold in its pursuit of its professed goals. They therefore set up rival organizations for anti-slavery, temperance, suffrage reform, and pacifism. In 1842, for example, Sturge formed a Birmingham Peace Association as an independent pacifist body rather than an auxiliary of the Peace Society; and there is some evidence that he then envisaged a new national organization, a British Peace Association, too.

In the event, perhaps because the LPS galvanized itself to hold the General Peace Convention of 1843, Sturge decided to co-operate rather than compete with it.

By then Sturgeite moral radicalism was itself being outflanked on the absolutist front by the anarcho-pacifism of William Lloyd Garrison, who visited Britain in 1833, 1840, and 1846. In addition, Garrison's acolyte Henry Clarke Wright toured the British Isles extensively in 1842-3, establishing a number of local Anti-War Associations, so named because Garrisonians thought "Anti-War" sounded more "aggressive" than "Peace". The most influential Anti-War Associations were in Bristol, former home of the slave trade, and Preston, home of teetotalism; but Garrisonism also appealed to influential religious radicals in Dublin, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Darlington, and Newcastle. It was too extreme a creed to catch on, however; and its anti-war associations seem soon to have withered, like Sturge's peace associations.

After thus surviving challenges to its position both from Sturgeite moral radicalism in the midlands and north, and from Garrisonian anarchism in some of the more distant cities of the British Isles, the LPS was confronted by a nationwide, class-based challenge. In 1846 the "learned blacksmith", Elihu Burritt, arrived from Connecticut to discover his British artisan counterparts not only politicized by Chartism but alarmed by the proposed revival of militia service. A devout Congregationalist, Burritt formulated an absolutist pledge against military service that became the membership basis for a League of Universal Brotherhood (LUB), which challenged the APS in his home country and the LPS in Britain. Soon attracting 6,000 pledges and being described by its founder as "a new social movement", this was the first mass peace association. However, despite its greater size and social reach, the LUB failed to topple the LPS from its leadership of the British peace movement. Burritt became distracted by his project of holding annual international peace congresses, which he did successfully in Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, and London in the years 1848-51. In consequence, his LUB lost

momentum. And the LPS, under a talented new secretary appointed in 1848, Henry Richard, skilfully smothered it in a co-operative but ultimately controlling embrace. (Eventually, in 1857, the LUB disappeared in a merger with the LPS.)

Despite his own unwavering pacifism, Henry Richard, a former Congregationalist minister whose intelligence, dedication, and courtesy enabled him to dominate the LPS for forty years, also worked constructively with *pacificism,* which itself enjoyed an upsurge at this time in two very different varieties, the by-products respectively of Chartism and the Anti-Corn-Law League.

Chartism believed that aristocratic political power would be broken only through general elections in which all men could vote and which were held annually – reforms that would bankrupt those at present able to bribe the electorate. In its propaganda it used both the radical-*pacificist* argument that wars "would seldom or scarcely ever occur" if aristocratic rule "were put down" in this way[15] and the laborist argument that militia service bore most heavily on the working classes. Though a remarkable national movement, Chartism was divided over the use of physical force, to which of course the LPS was strongly opposed. At the LPS's 1840 annual meeting one of its founding members, Joseph Tregelles Price, Quaker proprietor of an ironworks in Neath, claimed credit for talking a well-known and notoriously impulsive radical surgeon from nearby Pontypridd, William Price, out of joining in Chartism's abortive November 1839 attempt to seize Newport by force with his "seven pieces of cannon", a boast that historians of Chartism seem to have overlooked. As moral-force Chartists turned against their physical-force colleagues, some of them – notably the author of the Charter, Henry Vincent, and the minister of Birmingham's Chartist Church, Arthur O'Neill[16] – took up life-long careers as travelling lecturers for the LPS.

The Anti-Corn-Law League believed that aristocratic economic power would be broken only by ending the agricultural protectionism that raised food prices and thereby either starved workers or forced industrialists to pay inflated wages. Even before becoming the League's principal spokesman, Richard Cobden had argued that free trade would create economic interdependence and thereby assure lasting peace; and in the late 1840s he and his fellow members of the "Manchester School" began promoting arms reduction and arbitration as additional international mechanisms for abolishing war. (Their logic was as follows: to prevent the government compensating for the loss of protectionist duties by raising direct taxation, public expenditure should be cut; reducing armaments was an obvious way to do this; and signing arbitration treaties was a way of lowering any security risk attached to such a policy.) This package of ideas – free trade, reduction of armaments, and arbitration – reflected the self-confidence of the world's leading industrial nation, and ensured that liberal *pacificism* reached a peak of popularity during the period up to 1851 which it was not to enjoy again until it discovered the idea of a League of Nations during the First World War.

Just as the LPS took moral-force Chartists onto its lecturing staff, so it collaborated happily with liberal *pacificists*. Henry Richard forged a close relationship with Cobden, and devised a front organization, the Peace Congress Committee, that enabled Cobdenites to work with the LPS and the LUB without deferring to their pacifism. In consequence Cobden neither formed his own *pacificist* association nor supported the one created in December 1847, the Peace of Nations Society, which proved scarcely more successful than Sir Richard Phillips's Society for Abolishing War thirty-one years previously.

Thus the LPS's highly successful second phase from 1832 to 1851 saw it comfortably retain the leadership of a peace movement strong enough to block the government's revival of militia service and to achieve such authority by the time of the London Peace Congress as to cause some its supporters to hope that defencism was finally in retreat. It had survived

simultaneous challenges from absolutists and reformists; and much of the credit for this must go to its two-tier structure. The resolute Christian absolutism of its top tier protected it against pacifist rivals such as Sturge, Garrison, and Burritt. And the longstanding reformism of its bottom tier helped it collaborate with *pacificists* energized by Chartism and Cobdenism.

However, the tide of popular sentiment turned sharply against the peace movement from the autumn of 1851 onwards, inaugurating a decade and a half of travail. Most distressing for the LPS was increasing support among British progressives for crusading in support of the liberties of Europe and against autocrats, particularly the Russian tsar, which culminated in widespread enthusiasm for entering the Crimean War in 1854. The LPS's top tier largely held firm and courageously condemned British intervention, thereby becoming the first pre-existing peace association ever to oppose from the outset an overwhelmingly popular national war. It was a tribute to its perceived influence that defencists blamed it for having led the Tsar on, and worked hard to denounce its "peace at any price" policy. Faced with such hostility, neither the society nor its ally Cobden attempted to hold meetings against the war until public enthusiasm subsided, by which time their thunder had been somewhat stolen by a Stop-the-War League in 1855 created by London radical-*pacificist* journalists.

Even in his depressed post-Crimean-War condition, Cobden achieved in 1857 a landmark in peace activism: the bringing down of the Palmerston government over its Arrow War with China. Ironically, the man most responsible for this unnecessary conflict was the LPS's former committee member and secretary, Sir (as he had become) John Bowring, now the British government's Plenipotentiary and Chief Superintendent of Trade in the Far East and Governor of Hong Kong (hence his knighthood), who had concluded that even *pacificist* principles could not be applied to "the Oriental mind".[17] However, Cobden and his supporters mostly lost their seats at the ensuing general election, as Palmerston bounced back. Though discredited in progressive eyes, Bowring was in the 1860s to contribute significantly to the

development of international law by attaching arbitration clauses to the commercial treaties that he negotiated on behalf of first Hawaii and then Siam with a total of eight European countries.[18]

For Henry Richard, even more discouraging than the 1857 election was support from progressives – including both Garrisonians and the APS – for the northern cause in the American civil war of 1861-5. As Richard put it to a British Quaker who had previously been a staunch non-resister but now put the anti-slavery cause first: "Every new war that arises detaches us from some class of our friends… I am … strongly tempted to throw the whole thing up."[19] But he kept going, his pacifism showing its true mettle during this time of particular despair.

TOP-TIER PACIFISM AS A LIABILITY, 1867-1915

As the LPS passed its half-century mark, its two-tier structure started to become a handicap. While pacifism as well as *pacificism* had been gaining ground, it had enabled the society to keep control of both wings of the movement. But the absolutist Christian evangelicalism that had underlain Sturge's moral radicalism, Garrison's anarchism, and Burritt's belief in universal brotherhood failed to renew itself in similarly activist form, giving way to Christian evangelicalism of a politically cautious and socially conservative kind. As the Quakers prospered and became acculturated during the final third of the nineteenth century, moreover, and as the militia duties which had once stimulated them to take a pacifist stand became a dead letter in a country that refused to introduce conscription, an increasing number started to regard their peace testimony as formalistic rather than requiring them personally to justify a policy of non-resistance. Absolutism therefore stagnated; and the LPS increasingly presented its top-tier pacifism as a statement about an ideal future rather than a guide to current action. As a result, the society was to be outflanked on the absolutist front by Tolstoyism.

At the same time, Chartism having collapsed, secular liberalism became more than ever the principal driving force behind the peace idea. Consequently, its brand of *pacificism*, most notably in the form of support for arbitration, rapidly gained ground in Britain, helped in particular by William Gladstone and his new Liberal Party. The LPS responded to this liberal-*pacificist* upsurge by emphasising that, just it had always admitted *pacificist* members, it had since the 1830s advocated arbitration. But, whereas Cobden had preferred to use the LPS (mediated through the Peace Congress Committee) for "out of doors" support of his parliamentary peace work, the next generation of *pacificists* came to regard it as a hindrance to their efforts and established effective associations of their own. The two-tier LPS thus fell between two tools, satisfying neither absolutists nor reformists.

During 1867-82 British peace activism had experienced a limited recovery: a reaction set in against the Crimean intervention; worries developed about militarism and imperialism; and the Second Reform Act of 1867, which enfranchised artisans, helped political Liberalism to gain ground – an early symptom of which was Henry Richard's election to parliament in 1868. Fear of British involvement in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 produced an enduring artisan movement, the Workmen's Peace Association(WPA), led by Randal Cremer, a London carpenter who later became the first British winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The WPA was ideologically happiest with the laborist argument: "Without us wars must cease, for without us standing armies would not exist"; but in return for financial support it deferred to the bourgeois LPS, and thus initially avoided criticizing the latter's absolutism. Gladstone's decision of 1872 to disguise a diplomatic concession to the United States over the *Alabama* dispute as an arbitration[20] greatly increased world-wide support for that cause, enabling Richard to pass a pro-arbitration motion in the Commons in 1873. Even more important was Gladstone's positioning of his party during the Eastern Crisis of the late 1870s

as – rhetorically at least – a *pacificist* alternative to the imperialist defencism of Disraeli's Conservatives.

Understandably, the LPS and the WPA both rallied to Gladstonian Liberalism, and thereby exposed themselves to Disraeli's shrewd and politically effective revival of the "peace at any price" taunt. In an effort to counter this, Richard (who had continued as LPS secretary despite his election as an MP) claimed in January 1879 that his society's top-tier pacifism was merely the belief of "a small body of persons" which had "never been imported into politics", and that the LPS more importantly stood for arbitration and the reduction of armaments.[21] But playing down its pacifism in this way tacitly acknowledged it as a campaigning handicap, and implied that associations without such baggage would fare better. Explicitly *pacificist* associations were duly created. In the summer of 1879 an Anti-Aggression League was established by the social theorist Herbert Spencer. And the following year, nursed into existence by an experienced LPS agent who had been dismissed for misbehaviour, an International Arbitration and Peace Association (IAPA) was formed. Not having an explicitly religious basis, the IAPA was well placed to forge links with a developing European movement that was increasingly secular in outlook. It also appealed to British feminists who were finding the LPS's conservatism on women's issues, which was in part derived from its evangelical Christian connections, increasingly irksome. Even the LPS's Women's Peace and Arbitration Auxiliary switched its allegiance to the IAPA, though a remarkable organizer from a Quaker banking family in Wisbech, Cambridgeshire, Priscilla Peckover, provided the LPS with a formidable replacement. Initially called the Ladies' Peace Auxiliary but later restyled as, first, the Local Peace Association Auxiliary and, then, the Peace Union, Peckover's resourceful organization exposed the inertia of the parent society, which it surpassed in purported size by including the membership of its affiliated women's groups in its national total.[22]

In 1882 all sections of the peace movement received a severe shock when the Gladstone government, despite its election on a *pacificist* ticket just two years previously, occupied Egypt and later also intervened militarily in the Sudan, imperialist acts that *pacificists* might have been expected to condemn. Such was Gladstone's prestige, however, that most Liberals acquiesced, including both Spencer's Anti-Aggression League, which collapsed, and the IAPA, which nonetheless survived. Yet, in what proved to be its last act of real political courage the LPS protested, as did both its secretary in his capacity as an MP and its artisan ally the WPA.

Having done so, however, the LPS found itself uncomfortably out of step with a progressive mainstream to which it had steadily been drawing closer, and also in financial trouble that forced it to stop funding the WPA. As the British peace movement entered another decade and a half of difficulty, the LPS's top-tier pacifism ceased to serve as a stiffening backbone. Indeed, disturbed by the society's political isolation after 1882, some of its members called on it to abandon its pacifist commitment, and resigned when it refused. However, in 1883, to appease *pacificists*, the LPS added the words "*and International Arbitration"* to the title of its monthly journal *Herald of Peace*; and the following year it briefly considered a merger with the IAPA. Even those happy for the LPS to maintain its independence and its top-tier pacifism began to argue that the latter was an "abstract doctrine" that applied only to the personal and not to the political sphere. Ideological dilution of this kind was becoming common among Quakers, who by 1888 needed to establish a Friends Peace Committee in order to shore up a pacifist commitment that could once have been taken almost for granted.

The second half of the 1880s marked the end of the LPS's campaigning phase. In 1885 Richard retired from the secretaryship: his successor William Jones, the only Quaker to hold the position, proved to be more engaged with his religious society than with the LPS, which continued to lean heavily on Richard in his new position of honorary secretary. In 1888 Jones

resigned and Richard died – a double loss that prompted the society again to discuss a merger. Its Christianity and top-tier absolutism proved insuperable obstacles, however, so it soldiered on, appointing as its secretary the Congregationalist minister W. Evans Darby, who was to serve for twenty-seven years. Darby was strongly committed to pacifism but interpreted it in a formalistic way, as in practice requiring no action. His campaigning innovation for the LPS was from 1889 to promote the sabbath before Christmas as "Peace Sunday", a characteristically bland initiative. And his main interest was in historical arbitrations, upon which he published learned books.

For its part the WPA, having lost the LPS subsidy that had silenced its reservations about pacifism, declared itself a *pacificist* body devoted above all to arbitration. On his election as a Liberal MP in 1885, Cremer used his parliamentary position to promote an Anglo-American arbitration treaty (though also to oppose female suffrage). During 1886-8, moreover, he rebranded the WPA as the International Arbitration League, opened it (for financial reasons) to bourgeois and even aristocratic patrons, and considered a merger with the IAPA. Because one of the latter's leaders, G.B. Clark, had also become a Liberal MP, the LPS felt at a parliamentary disadvantage after Richard's death. (It was symptomatic of the acculturation of the Society of Friends that the members of the Pease family, a Quaker banking dynasty from Darlington, who served as Liberal MPs as well as LPS presidents in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries did little to promote the society's cause at Westminster.)

Within the international as well as the British movement LPS was losing the dominant position to which it believed itself entitled by virtue of longevity. The revival in Europe of yearly international (now called "universal") peace congresses in 1889 was the work of a French *pacificist* with the help of Hodgson Pratt, who had emerged as the dominant figure within the IAPA. So too was the establishment in the same year of the Inter-Parliamentary Union for Arbitration, with Cremer as co-founder. Even within the LPS's specialist sphere of

Christian pacifism, intellectual leadership was passing to the continent where the Russian writer Leo Tolstoy, reacting against his hedonistic, aristocratic and military past, expounded an ascetic, socially radical, and uncompromising no-force absolutism in a series of books published in the 1880s and 1890s. Tolstoyism's impact in his own country was limited by censorship; but it appealed to a young generation of idealists around the world, most notably in Britain[23] where the LPS's message – summarized accurately and therefore prosaically by Darby as "the principles of the Sermon on the Mount, applied by means of Arbitration"[24] – had lost its capacity to inspire. The LPS was thus failing to harness all available pacifist idealism, as well as losing the loyalty of leading *pacificists.* As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the LPS's sole remaining comparative advantage, apart from its name recognition, was its generous support from certain wealthy Quakers who remained loyal to their peace testimony. In particular, on his death in 1893 the tea merchant John Horniman bequeathed the society an endowment of £10,000 that ensured its continued independent existence even as its activist base began to crumble. The IAPA was helped by the Scottish-American steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, as was the International Arbitration League which in addition received most of the Nobel Peace Prize money that Cremer won in 1903. But both arbitration societies were financially weaker than the LPS.

Indeed, the organizational limitations of all three associations became apparent after 1898 when international events – the Tsar's summoning of the first Hague Conference, Britain's South African War, and Germany's naval challenge – increased public interest in the peace question. It was not the established associations but individuals and *ad hoc* bodies that led the response. Most notably, the maverick journalist W.T. Stead, previously an enthusiastic defencist, launched an energetic campaign in support of the Hague Conference.

Perhaps because the Boer declaration of war in 1899 had made it seem defensive, the South African War was more hazardous to oppose than any other British conflict. Yet Stead did

oppose it, helping the Methodist minister-turned-novelist, Silas Hocking, to create a Stop-the-War Movement, which received moral support from the two arbitration associations. By contrast, the LPS not only refused to condemn the war, on the bizarre grounds that its own views on all war were already well known and that criticizing the government would appear partisan: it also accused those who did condemn it of "misdirected zeal". It stated that it would merely carry on with its normal activities such as Peace Sunday. Its top-tier pacifism had thus become a belief that did not require believers actually to do anything.

Nor did the LPS make any contribution to the *pacificist* debate that ignited in the run-in to the First World War. It was significant, for example, that the first best-selling peace book, *The Great Illusion*, published in 1910, which argued that complex financial interdependence made aggression counter-productive for a great power, was the work of a journalist, Norman Angell, who stressed his independence of, and contempt for, the "old pacifism". Angell organized his own followers into International Polity Clubs; and when European war broke out on July 28, 1914, he created a Neutrality League that campaigned noisily against British involvement.[25]

When Britain nonetheless entered that war on August 4th, the "old pacifism" could not cope. Quakerism was divided: although the Friends Peace Committee remained staunchly pacifist and 45% of Quaker men of military age became conscientious objectors, another 33% fought for their country; and a third group sought a middle way by establishing the Friends' Ambulance Unit – a much less united stand than that taken by a comparatively new Christian-pacifist sect, the International Bible Students Association (known from 1931 as Jehovah's Witnesses).[26] Jack Pease, Quaker president of the LPS, preferred to remain in the Liberal cabinet. Quaker uncertainties help to explain why, though the LPS accepted Pease's resignation in order to maintain "an absolutely detached outlook", it kept silent and asked its members to quote "hold themselves in check" – in effect a repeat of its behaviour in the

South African War fifteen years previously, except that even Peace Sunday was not now attempted.[27] This time, however, two new absolutist associations stepped into the breach. In November 1914 the No-Conscription Fellowship, catering for those who believed that socialism prohibited the taking of human life, was formed by members of the ILP (a component of the Labour Party):[28] after the war it was re-founded as the No More War Movement. And in December 1914 the Fellowship of Reconciliation was formed by Christian pacifists confident that a spiritually intense yet politically quietist absolutism was possible in wartime:[29] it still exists. Might such rivals have been pre-empted if the LPS, rather than playing down its top-tier pacifism from the late 1870s onwards in a doomed attempt to hang on to *pacificist* support, had instead jettisoned its reformists and adopted a wholeheartedly absolutist, even proto-Tolstoyan, position? Just conceivably; but in practice social, religious, and political timidity prevented the LPS from even contemplating such a step.

The alternative counter-factual is even easier to deal with. Had the LPS repudiated its top-tier pacifism during the final third of the nineteenth century in order to become a wholly *pacificist* association, it would surely have suffered the same fate as the IAPA and the International Arbitration League, which – albeit only after painful hesitation – endorsed the British intervention of August 1914. Both these arbitration societies were almost immediately usurped by two new *pacificist* organizations that offered more specific remedies for war and in consequence achieved incomparably greater public impact. The Union of Democratic Control, established on August 10, 1914, blamed the conflict on secret diplomacy, and campaigned for a post-war settlement that respected popular wishes.[30] The League of Nations Society, founded in May 1915, promoted an alternative idea which had been enthusing many progressives since the first month of the war, namely that arbitration required an international organization to supervise and enforce it.[31]

Darby's predictable response to this influential new thinking was to criticize "so-called pacifists"' who were "remaking the world and laying down the law as to what *must* and *shall* be. Who can tell what *will* be when the War is over? Others are in a hurry to have more and ever more organization. It is not to be done that way either."[32] His negativity in practice, while in theory emphasising the absoluteness of his rejection of military force (even in the form of League of Nations sanctions, as will shortly be noted), was too much even for the LPS. He was pressured into retirement, his farewell message sneering characteristically at "other societies that exist for political or personal ends".[33]

TOP-TIER PACIFISM ABANDONED, 1916-39

Darby's departure produced a change of both tactics and doctrine. His replacement from January 1916, Herbert Dunnico, a Baptist minister and founding member of the Free Church Socialist League, had an activist temperament.[34] He immediately involved the LPS in a Peace Negotiations Committee, a radical initiative by a range of peace associations that may have contributed both to the cancellation by the Memorial Hall, Faringdon Street, of its centennial meeting scheduled for June 1916 and to physical attacks on its offices in New Broad Street.[35] But, despite his energy and strong opposition to the First World War, Dunnico differed from previous secretaries in two respects: he was not a pacifist; and he was primarily interested in his own political career.

As Dunnico took over, *Herald of Peace* began insisting that "Christian Non-Resistance does not mean *no resistance*", Christ having defined it as merely "the opposite of 'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth'."[36] The LPS also added "International" in brackets as a suffix to "Peace Society" in order to assert "what some 'pacifists' today have forgotten, namely that no peace movement can exist which is not truly international". This suggested that policies such as disarmament could not be adopted by one country in isolation – an implicit retreat

from top-tier pacifism. And in 1917 the society's annual report not only approved a League of Nations in principle but stated that "the question of sanctions or guarantees is a matter that demands careful consideration" – a willingness to contemplate the use of force that elicited a strong protest from Darby.[37]

In 1917 Dunnico, long active in the ILP, was adopted as a prospective Labour candidate; and in 1918 he stood unsuccessfully in the general election. However, in 1922, by which time opposition to the First World War had ceased to be a political handicap, he entered parliament, though he kept his LPS job, now styled "Director and Secretary", and took the society leftwards with him: for example, the sole Communist MP, Shapurji Saklatvala, attended the LPS's annual meeting in June 1923. And when Ramsay MacDonald became prime minister of the first Labour government in January 1924, Dunnico was formally asked "to convey the congratulations of the Society".[38] Even so, within two months he became the first Labour MP to vote against a government measure, when he backed a Liberal motion for reduced naval estimates.

But thereafter his rebellions against his own party came not from its left but from its right, as he evolved into one of the peace movement's most conservative figures. By 1927 he was complaining, almost as cantankerously as Darby before him, of the lack of gratitude shown by "the new organizations working for peace" for the LPS's trail-blazing work. Dunnico was also condemning Labour critics of the China policy of Conservative foreign secretary Austen Chamberlain "who refuse to put any trust in their own Government but are ready to take at face value the promises of a foreign government". And he was grumbling at "much loose thinking … today in pacifist circles and much hypocrisy", particularly on the part of those willing to condone a class war while claiming to be men of peace.[39] He felt sympathy for MacDonald during the sterling crisis of 1931 when, rather than resign as the second Labour

government had agreed, the prime minister was persuaded to stay on as the head of a National Government that incorporated the Conservative and Liberal Parties. Though initially Dunnico remained loyal to the Labour mainstream that expelled MacDonald, and in consequence went down to defeat in that year's general election, he thereafter worked to build bridges between the party and its former leader. In 1934 MacDonald, still prime minister of the National Government, addressed the LPS's annual meeting; and it is probable that private discussions on that occasion led Dunnico to join MacDonald's National Labour Party, his already-dwindling power base within an increasingly Conservative-dominated coalition, and to stand for it against Labour in the 1935 general election. Dunnico lost, but remained a prospective parliamentary candidate for a further five years. This support for the National Government must have helped him obtain a knighthood in 1938.

The prime minister's appearance on the LPS's platform in 1934 was part of a trend for its annual meetings to become showcases for political celebrities rather than gatherings of peace activists. Ironically, therefore, the 1935 meeting, held during the general-election campaign, provided Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin (who had just replaced MacDonald as prime minister) with an eirenic setting for his defence of the government's controversial rearmament programme, which all active peace associations then opposed. But the LPS was to boast: "No other peace organization in the world can take greater pride in the representative character of its platform", claiming that the willingness of politicians of all parties to attend was "a tribute to the sound policy pursued by the Society".[40] That it was now pleased to be thought "sound" by governmental leaders showed how far it had fallen since its courageous condemnation of the Crimean War and the occupation of Egypt. In any case, interest in its top-down meetings soon waned: when Viscount Sankey became LPS president in 1937 he found the press coverage of his address to that year's annual meeting "very disappointing", as he noted in his diary.[41] That year the society ceased putting a

membership figure in its entry in the *Peace Year Book*, its longstanding claim of 5,000 members having become wholly implausible.

Just as the Peace Pledge Union (established in May 1936) was achieving a public impact unmatched by any pacifist association in history,[42] the LPS was repudiating the last vestiges of its top-tier absolutism. The annual meeting held on October 18, 1938, its last such event, heard calls for rearmament from Sankey and Anthony Eden. And an almost simultaneous editorial in *Herald of Peace*, by then a very occasional publication, stated that abandoning armaments was "not a practical policy today" and that "so long as force and coercion are necessary in this imperfect world", they should be used exclusively "as instruments and sanctions of Justice and Right".[43] This was a *pacificist* rather than pacifist assertion, albeit an extremely vague one. Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, moreover, Sankey recorded having a "long talk about the policy of the Society" over lunch with Dunnico[44] yet did not mention what that policy was – perhaps because it was unclear, beyond support for the defeat of Hitler.

By then the LPS had found a convenient location in which to eke out its half-life. Its 84-year lease on its premises in New Broad Street having expired in 1925, it had rented an office close to the House of Commons, and re-styled itself the International Peace Society. Its committee minutes stopped in March 1926, when one of Dunnico's assistants left for the Fellowship of Reconciliation, though its agenda papers continued for another thirteen years. In 1932, just months after ceasing to be an MP, Dunnico became honorary warden of the Robert Browning Settlement in Walworth, a centre for social work in a deprived area of inner south London. Its founding warden, the Congregationalist minister F.H. Stead, brother of W.T., had been active in the peace movement during the First World War, which is possibly how Dunnico and the settlement first became connected. International Peace Society activities, now little more than organizing Peace Sunday, transferred to the Robert Browning

Settlement's premises, which gradually contracted to one building, 3 Browning Street. On Sir Herbert Dunnico's death in 1953 both the directorship of the society and the honorary wardenship of the settlement passed to his son, H. Rathbone Dunnico, who had served in the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Second World War; and on Rathbone's death in 1982 both were inherited by his son, Clive. The last mention of the society in *The Times* noted its promotion of Peace Sunday in 1954. When I first inquired about access to its records at 3 Browning Street in 1975, Clive R. Dunnico, at that time assistant secretary, sent me leaflets showing that the society was then still promoting this event.[45] In 1990, as honorary secretary, he informed the *doyen* of pacifist historians, Peter Brock, who had also been trying unsuccessfully to see the records: "The work of the Society is not in bad shape; far from it."[46] In 1991 Mr Dunnico very kindly granted me the access that at last made it possible to tell the LPS's full story.

This article has focused on one key factor that influenced the society's rise and fall: its strategy of 1816 for handling the fact that the emerging British peace movement consisted of a committed absolutist core and a larger but less reliable reformist penumbra. It has argued that the two-tier hierarchy was a significant asset throughout its first half-century but an increasing liability during its second, and that, as the LPS plunged into irreversible decline on passing its centenary and on entering what turned out to be its Dunnico century, top-tier pacifism was first tacitly abandoned and then, on the eve of the Second World War, explicitly repudiated without however anything beyond a nebulous (except for being explicitly Christian) *pacificism* being put in its place. In the post-war era, when the peace movement's principal demand was unilateral nuclear disarmament, the society even supported Britain's independent deterrent.[47] Its policy having lost credibility, and its endowment income having been eroded by inflation, it slipped from view.[48]

[Endnotes]

[1] These accounts appeared in studies of the wider movement of which the LPS was for a long time a prominent part: Martin Ceadel, *The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730-1854* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), and *Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). These monographs provide sources for otherwise unattributed claims and citations in this article.

[2] What is presented here is a revised version of my introductory lecture at the conference "Two Centuries of Peacemaking: From the Peace Society to Martin Luther King", organised by Daniel Lacqua and Nick Megoran under the auspices of Newcastle and Northumbria Universities and in conjunction with the Martin Luther King Peace Committee, June 7–8, 2016.

[3] See Martin Ceadel, "Peace Movements", in Ingrid Sharp (ed.), *A Cultural History of Peace in the Age of Empire (1815-1920)* (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming).

[4] Martin Ceadel, *Thinking about Peace and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), ch.5.

[5] A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), 51. Taylor was deep into an account of *pacificist* dissent in Britain when he suddenly realized the need to explain his complete omission of the pacifist variety, and inserted a brief footnote suggesting that "pacificism" (which I subsequently italicized to avoid visual confusion) should be recognized as ideologically distinct from "pacifism".

[6] Stephen Conway, "Bentham on Peace and War", *Utilitas* 1 (1989), 93.

[7] J.E. Cookson, *The Friends of Peace: Anti-War Liberalism in England 1792-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[8] This account of the American peace movement is based on Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States from the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) and *Freedom from War: Nonsectarian Pacifism 1814-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); and Valerie H. Ziegler, *The Advocates of Peace in Antebellum America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).

[9] W.H. van der Linden, *The International Peace Movement1815-1874* (Amsterdam: Tilleul publications, 1987), 1-2.

[10] My information about local variations comes mainly from Keith Edghill, who is the principal expert on the early LPS and in particular on the religious affiliations of its supporters.

[11] [Jonathan Rees,] *Memoirs of Evan Rees: Consisting Chiefly of Extracts from his Letters* (London: Richard Barratt, Jr, 1853), 21, 30-4.

[12] For Bowring, see Joyce Youings (ed.), *Sir John Bowring 1792-1872: Aspects of His Life and Career* (Plymouth: Latimer Trend for The Devonshire Association, 1993); George Bartle, *An Old Radical and His Brood: A Portrait of Sir John Bowring and His Family* (London: Janus Publishing, 1994); and Philip Bowring, *Free Trade's First Missionary: Sir John Bowring in Europe and Asia* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014).

[13] Evan Rees to David L. Dodge, July 31, 1818 (copy): Peace Society Letter Book, 3 Browning Street.

[14] Alex Tyrell, *Joseph Sturge and the Moral Radical Party in Early Victorian Britain* (London: Christopher Helm, 1987).

[15] *Northern Star* (November 10, 1838), cited in Henry Weisser *British Working-Class Movements and Europe 1815-48* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), 95.

[16] For recent work on O'Neill see Stephen Roberts, *The Chartist Prisoners: The Radical Lives of Thomas Cooper (1805-1890) and Arthur O'Neill (1819-96)* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008).

[17] *Autobiographical Recollections of Sir John Bowring* (London: Henry S. King, 1877), 217-8.

[18] As recently recognized by Steve M. Harris: see his "Between Law and Diplomacy: International Dispute Resolution in the Long Nineteenth Century" (PhD diss., University of California at Davis, 2015), 166-73.

[19] H. Richard to C. Sturge, December 18, 1862, cited in Alex Tyrell, "Making the Millenium [*sic*]: The Mid-Nineteenth Century Peace Movement", *Historical Journal* 21 (1978), 95.

[20] Martin Ceadel, "The 'Alabama Claims', the Geneva Arbitration of 1872, and their significance in Britain", in Roger Durand with Jean-Daniel Candaux and Antoine Fleury (eds), *Genève et Paix: Acteurs en Enjeux: Trois Siècles d'Histoire* (Geneva: Association "Genève: un lieu pour la paix", 2005), 101-121.

[21] *Herald of Peace* (January, 1879), 184.

[22] Héloise Brown, *"The Truest Form of Patriotism": Pacifist Feminism in Britain, 1870-1902* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 10, 62-74.

[23] Charlotte Alston, *Tolstoy and his Disciples: The History of a Radical International Movement* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 7, 88.

[24] *Herald of Peace* (June, 1898), 71.

[25] For Angell, see Martin Ceadel, *Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1872-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

[26] See the comprehensive and carefully argued new study: Gary Perkins, *Bible Student Conscientious Objectors in World War I Britain* (Borwick, Lancashire: Hupomone Press, 2016).

[27] Minutes, LPS Committee, October 1, October 22, 1914: 3 Browning Street.

[28] Thomas C. Kennedy, *The Hound of Conscience: A History of the No-Conscription Fellowship, 1914-1919* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1981).

[29] Jill Wallis, *Valiant for Peace: A History of the Fellowship of Reconciliation 1914-1989* (London: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1991); Clive Barrett, *Subversive Peacemakers: War Resistance 1914-1918: An Anglican Perspective* (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2014).

[30] Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Sally Harris, *Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic Control, 1914-1918* (Hull: Hull University Press, 1996).

[31] Henry Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952).

[32] *Herald of Peace* (October, 1914), 105.

[33] *Herald of Peace* (November, 1915), 217.

[34] There are excellent accounts of Herbert Dunnico, an engaging and independent-minded man, by Keith Gildart in the *Dictionary of Labour Biography* (Vol. XII; edited by Keith Gildart and David Howell; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 83-94) , and by Hester Barron in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oct 2014; online edition, April 2016 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/58642, accessed 3 Oct 2016).

[35] *The Times*, May 19, 1916, 8; October 11, 1916, 12.

[36] *Herald of Peace* (January, 1916), 1.

[37] *Herald of Peace* (October, 1917), 72, 79.

[38] Minutes, LPS Committee, June 12, 1923; January 24, 1924.

[39] *Herald of Peace* (January, 1927), 34-5. *The Times*, February 5, 1927, 11; March 18, 1927, 11.

[40] *Herald of Peace* (October-December, 1938), 1.

[41] Sankey Diary, October 29, 1937: MSS Eng. Hist. e 291: Bodleian Library.

[42] Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain: the Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

[43] *Herald of Peace* (October-December, 1938), 5.

[44] Sankey Diary, October 25, 1939: MSS Eng. Hist. e 293.

[45] C.R. Dunnico to M. Ceadel, November 3, 1975: in my possession.

[46] C.R. Dunnico to P. Brock, January 4, 1990: copy in my possession.

[47] As Mr Dunnico informed a historian consulting the archives in the mid-1990s: Paul Laity, *The British Peace Movement 1870-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 237.

[48] The organizers of the Newcastle conference celebrating the LPS's bicentenary in June 2016 invited Mr Dunnico to attend as their guest, but received no reply.