Sub-imperialism in Crisis? South Africa’s Government-Business-Media Complex and the Geographies of Resistance

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Abstract

This study develops a geographic theory relating to sub-imperial states and resistance to them. The theory is centred on what can be called the government-business-media (GBM) complex, whilst resistance to such states is characterised as counter-imperialist discourses. The theory is applied primarily to South Africa’s (SA’s) interactions with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. The aim is to assess the state of SA’s sub-imperialism and evaluate the claim that this sub-imperialism is in crisis. The research findings are based on media material drawn from, and interviews conducted in, Botswana, Zambia and SA.

The thesis outlines how sub-imperialism should be regarded as a distinct analytical and theoretical phenomenon. It explores the theoretical context in which the GBM complex and counter-imperialist discourses may be viewed. Using this theoretical framework, the study then traces the historical geographical development of SA’s GBM complex. Building on this, the thesis identifies and examines regional responses and attitudes to SA’s post-apartheid political, business and cultural-media engagement with the region, by analysing counter-imperialist discourses to SA during this period. In order to assess the current state of SA’s sub-imperialism, case studies were taken from the following four areas which cover crucial aspects of SA’s post-apartheid engagement with the region: SA’s parastatal expansion (Eskom); SA’s peacemaking role (Zimbabwe); SA’s state-driven rhetoric of multiculturalism and tolerance (xenophobia); and SA’s hosting of mega-events (2010 Football World Cup). In each of these areas the intended geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses of the GBM complex, and the corresponding responses in the region, are investigated. It is concluded that there is a discrepancy between the intended discourses of the GBM complex and the responses from the region, giving rise to counter-imperialist discourses. These discourses support the claim that SA’s sub-imperialism is in crisis.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr Tony Lemon for his guidance and support. Without his wise counsel and patience this thesis would not have been possible.

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AAC  Anglo-American Corporation (of South Africa)
ABSA  Amalgamated Banks of South Africa
ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific
AIM  Agencia de Informacao De Mocambique
AISA  Africa Institute of South Africa
ANC  African National Congress
APRM  African Peer Review Mechanism
AR  African Renaissance
ARI  African Renaissance Institute
AU  African Union
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
BEC  Black Earth Communications
BEDIA  Botswana Export Development and Investment Authority
BEE  Black Economic Empowerment
BFA  Botswana Football Association
BLNS  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland
BLS  Bechuanaland (later Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland
BOCARI  Botswanan Chapter of the African Renaissance Institute
BOCCIM  Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower
BPC  Botswana Power Corporation
BRIC  Brazil, Russia, India and China
BSAC  British South Africa Company
BTB  Botswana Tourism Board
BTV  Botswana Television
CEO  Chief Executive Officer
CODESRIA  Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa
COMESA  Common Market of East and Southern Africa
CONSAS  Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
CRP  Common Revenue Pool
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility
DA  Democratic Alliance
DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
DSTV  Digital Satellite Television
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry
EAC  East African Community
EPA  Economic Partnership Agreement
Eskom  Electricity Supply Commission
EU European Union
FDI Foreign direct investment
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FLS Frontline States
FNB First National Bank
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FWC Football World Cup
GBM Government-Business-Media
GEAR Growth Employment and Redistribution
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GPA Global Political Agreement
HCT High Commission Territories
HiTV High Television (Nigeria)
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa
ICT Information Communications Technology
IDASA Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IDC Independent Development Corporation
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
IFSC International Financial Services Centre
IGD Institute for Global Dialogue
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGC Instituto Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades / Institute for Management of Calamities
IOC International Olympic Council
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks
ISCOR Iron and Steel Corporation
ITAC International Trade Administration Commission (of South Africa)
JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange
LCM Lunashya Copper Mines
MD Managing Director
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MEC Minerals-Energy Complex
MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa
MNC Multi-National Corporation
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA Movement for People’s Liberation in Angola
MW Megawatts
N$ Namibian dollar
NAM Non-Alignment Movement
NBB National Broadcasting Board
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NERSA</td>
<td>National Energy Regulator of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTB</td>
<td>Namibian Tourism Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTDC</td>
<td>Nigeria Tourism Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUCIW</td>
<td>National Union for Commercial and Industrial Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>RGS</td>
<td>Royal Geographical Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Revenue Sharing Formula</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>South African Breweries – now SABMiller</td>
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<tr>
<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>SAMP</td>
<td>Southern African Migration Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SAPP</td>
<td>Southern African Power Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARRI</td>
<td>South Africa in Africa Rhodes (University) Research Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASA</td>
<td>Somali Association of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sasol</td>
<td>Suid Afrikaanse Steenkool en Olie (South African Coal and Oil)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATS</td>
<td>South African Transport Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMME</td>
<td>Small, micro and medium enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-Owned Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSKB</td>
<td>Sir Seretse Khama Botswana Stadium</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSKIA</td>
<td>Sir Seretse Khama International Airport</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCIDP</td>
<td>Textile and Clothing Industry Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDCA</td>
<td>Trade Development Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBHO</td>
<td>Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WECA</td>
<td>West and Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZACCI</td>
<td>Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAM</td>
<td>Zambian Association of Manufacturers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>ZAR</td>
<td>Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZBC</td>
<td>Zimbabwean Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zambia Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>Zimbabwean Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ZESCO</td>
<td>Zambian Electricity Supply Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNBC</td>
<td>Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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Chapter one

Subverting an empire: Sub-imperialism and resistance

*I am sure that Cecil John Rhodes would have given his approval to this effort to make the South African economy of the early 21st century appropriate and fit for its time.*

[Extract from a speech delivered by Nelson Mandela at the launch of the Mandela Rhodes Foundation at Rhodes House in Cape Town (South African Press Association, 2003, cited in Bond, 2006a: 100). The speech was delivered in 2003 when South Africa’s government-business-media complex was at its height (3.4.1).]

*It is an embarrassing failure of social models and policies which have been pro-business at the expense of the very people who are committing these [xenophobic] acts. The political compromises that have been struck at the expense of the majority of our people are leading to regrettable acts. The illusion of the ‘rainbow nation’ and the stability created to attract foreign investment, with no benefit to the majority, are showing cracks…Is this the fizzling out of the African Renaissance?*

[A resident of Gugulethu informal settlement writing to the Cape Times during the xenophobia attacks of May 2008 (Mzukwa, 2008).]
1.1 Aim of the study

This study presents and attempts to defend a geographic theory of sub-imperial states that use discourse to construct imperialist discursive formations to sustain their dominance and accumulate capital. In South Africa (SA) this theory is, it is argued, embodied within what may be called the government-business-media (GBM) complex (1.4). The theory draws from critical geopolitics literature (1.3.4), David Harvey’s analysis of imperialism (1.3.5) and Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1.3.6). The study also makes a case for understanding resistance to the GBM complex as counter-imperialist discourses (1.3.4.3).

In this study the concept of the GBM complex is applied primarily to SA’s interaction with the SADC region. In order to assess the effectiveness of the geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses of SA’s GBM complex, and the resistance to it, this study will adopt a case study approach. Drawing predominantly from regional media sources and elite interviews conducted in Botswana, Zambia and SA, attitudes and responses to the following four key events or themes involving SA will be investigated: the energy crisis; SA’s latest mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis; the xenophobia attacks; and SA’s hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup.

The central aim of the study is therefore to analyse and assess the current state of SA’s sub-imperialism, exploring the claim that SA’s sub-imperialism is in crisis. The investigation is guided by the following three sets of questions (hereafter identified as central questions 1, 2 and 3):

1) Is it correct to speak of SA’s sub-imperialism? Does this still have relevance in post-apartheid southern Africa? Is the GBM complex an effective way to analyse sub-imperialism and are there any noticeable weaknesses in the theory?
2) What are the geographies of the GBM complex? What are counter-imperialist discourses? How are they analysed and is there evidence of counter-imperialist discourses to SA’s sub-imperialism?

3) Given SA’s GBM complex, what has been the impact of the following on SA’s geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses: the energy crisis; SA’s handling of the Zimbabwean crisis; the xenophobia attacks; and the 2010 Football World Cup? What has been the impact of these events on perceptions of SA’s regional standing and its broader sub-imperialism?

Subsidiary questions to be addressed include:

- What policy suggestions can be made from this research in terms of developments in regional government, business and media policy?

- In what way does this research challenge literature on regional relations in southern Africa and geographical literature? What can this study contribute to the understanding of processes of social and economic equity in southern Africa?

1.2 Introduction

SA attained democracy in the final decade of the twentieth century, up to three decades later than most other African countries. Yet much like its predecessor, the new democratic regime has been viewed by some as adopting an imperialist approach
towards southern Africa. This has sparked a range of questions about SA’s role in the region post-isolation, and what shape this will take in the ensuing years. These questions prompted researchers, mostly South Africans, to investigate SA’s trade relations and corporate expansion into the rest of Africa over the past seventeen years, often eliciting unpopular questions about a supposed hegemonic relationship with Africa given SA’s relative economic strength within the region.

The mapping of SA’s corporate expansion and increased trade with Africa has given rise to a great deal of literature on the economic and political power that SA wields within southern Africa, further fueling debates about the nature of this relationship (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998a, 1998b; Alden and Soko, 2005; Arora and Vamvakidis, 2005; Besada, 2006; Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, 2003; Davies, 1992; Grobbelaar, 2004; Hamman and De Cleene, 2005; Kornegay and Landsberg, 1998; Makgetlaneng, 2003; Miller, Saunders and Oloyede, 2008). Geographers, typically based in the United Kingdom, have also made important contributions to the political and economic debates concerning post-apartheid SA’s relationship with the region (Bond, 2004; Carmody, 2002; 2012; Gibb, 1997; 1998; 2002; 2006; 2007; Lemon, 1996, 2000, 2007; Lemon and Gibb, 2002; Sidaway and Gibb, 1998; Simon, 1996; 1998a). The communications and geographical literature has focused on the media and cultural dimensions of this relationship (Barnett, 1999; Kandji, 2001; Ndlovu, 2003; Teer-Tomaselli, Wasserman and De Beer, 2007).

Within a relatively short academic lifespan this line of inquiry has become heavily subscribed. Yet despite all the attention this issue has received, what has not been investigated to any great extent and what will undoubtedly become of increasing importance, is a critical and nuanced assessment of how SA exercises power through regional geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses.
Despite various advances in the global geopolitical literature – such as, the rise of critical geopolitics and its focus on discourse (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 1996a; Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998), an instructive shift to geoeconomics (Luttwak, 1990; Cowen and Smith, 2009), and the development of a critical literature on power networks (Farish and Vitale, 2011; Lutz, 2011; Morrissey, 2011; Pinkerton, Young and Dodds, 2011; Vitale, 2011) – geographers writing about southern Africa have surprisingly not made concerted efforts to explore the relationship between SA and the region using the analytical tools of power networks and discourse.

One of the most notable geographical contributions to the somewhat crudely named ‘SA in southern Africa’ debate was Simon’s (1998a) edited book, published shortly after SA attained democracy. However, Simon states that ‘no attempt has been made to impose a particular theoretical or analytical toolkit…’ (8). The assimilation of such aspects as SA’s dominance in the energy sector through the state-owned power utility, Eskom (Horvei, 1998), and the private sector’s drive to invest in sugar production throughout the region (Atkins and Terry, 1998), could have provided rich theoretical insights concerning state and capital relations and their role in driving SA’s regional expansion. Although the book focuses on southern Africa, Simon also wishes to extrapolate to the regional and globalisation literature by assessing ‘the prospects for regional integration and trading bloc formation against the backdrop of the…newly formed World Trade Organization’ (4).

A later article by Simon (2001) points to a strong complementary relationship between SA’s business and government in expansionary processes. Simon suggests this by closely documenting post-apartheid SA’s business expansion (through MTN, Shoprite-Checkers and South African Breweries) and political engagement (via trade and multilateral organisations) with the region. He also includes SA’s media expansion
through television channels such as M-Net, and hints at the complementary role played by the media in relation to government and business.

The importance of the media in processes of SA’s regional expansion and their complementary relationships to business and government is further explored by Barnett (1999). Barnett suggests that telecommunications reform in southern Africa in the mid-1990s had been ‘[l]ed by the assertive “new” South Africa’ and that ‘a neo-liberal agenda of liberalisation and privatisation…[was] embedded in a range of regional regulatory and policy frameworks for telecommunications development’ (104-105). Regarding the strong confluence of the three spheres regionally, he notes how in policy-discourse and in SA business strategy, the country was viewed as a ‘gateway’ to the Southern African telecommunications markets for international capital, and that SA capital was considered the potential ‘engine’ of regional economic growth in conjunction with international capital (106). Barnett concludes: ‘In short, the regional integration of communications markets has been identified as a central plank of the South African government’s export-oriented economic growth strategy’ (106).

Geographer and political economist Patrick Bond (2004), manages to pull together the strands in government, business and media; and he does so in a manner which binds with global patterns of power relations. He does this by using the concept of sub-imperialism. Drawing from imperial geopolitics, Bond focuses on discourse to the extent that such sub-imperial powers use discourse to maintain their dominance and accumulate capital. Bond’s analysis of SA in the region further underlines the importance of relating power networks such as a Pretoria-Johannesburg state-capitalist nexus to SA’s sub-imperialism (see also Simon, 1991 for a geographical perspective on SA’s sub-imperialism).
Carmody’s recent article (2012) examining SA’s ‘geo-governance’ is probably the strongest example of the value of using power networks and discourse to explain the relationship between SA and the region. Drawing from Paquet (1996: 3), Carmody (2012: 2) describes geo-governance as ‘the ways in which effective coordination is affected [between private, public and civic actors] in a world where resources, knowledge, and power are distributed through geographical space’. Recognising the need to look beyond a state-centric discourse, Carmody’s analysis reminds us that a deeper analysis of the power relations of the state and its relationships with business, media and other civic actors is long overdue in the context of SA’s relations in the region (see also Carmody, 2002). Such an analysis would have to account for the multiple and varied actors and spheres involved in this process, giving rise to the description of a SA power network spanning the areas of government, business and media, but one which, if transposed with the necessary contextually-based sensitivities, could be applicable to emerging powers generally.

However, such an analysis would be incomplete without assessing the regional responses to such discourses and power networks. Although there is some geographical literature on resistance written from the perspective of neighbouring countries (see below), it is not surprising, given the lack of focus on discourse and power networks, that theorisation on processes of resistance in southern Africa remains underdeveloped.

For example, several case studies in Simon (1998a) focus on ‘the changing geographies of production and economic integration’ as a result of post-apartheid SA’s integration into the region (87). The book covers insights ranging from SA’s one-way relationship with Zimbabwe (Stoneman, 1998), to the SA-controlled Walvis Bay’s reintegration into Namibia (Simon, 1998b). Yet he chose not to develop the theoretical component of resistance.
Elsewhere Simon (1996) contributes methodologically and theoretically to the literature pertaining to regional resistance to SA using a critical geopolitical framework. In this paper, he also discusses the struggle to reintegrate the SA-controlled Walvis Bay into Namibia. Of particular interest is the methodological focus on written and conversational discourse material. Simon draws from official texts and discourses, analysis in the regional news media, and in-depth interviews with state elite members responsible for the negotiation of the changing status of Walvis Bay (195). The primary material is combined with thick geopolitical description provided by secondary sources on SA-Namibia relations. Simon suggests: ‘These first-hand insights and reflections mesh together well with the secondary material to provide a richly textured account while also underlining the very personal and individual influences on statecraft and geopolitics, something all too easily forgotten in the “big picture”’ (195). On the value of interviewing elite members, he states: ‘Scholarly accounts still too often represent geopolitics as essentially the interaction between impersonal forces and strategies. In reality, the process is often highly contextualized: along with issues of representation, the intertextual and the interpersonal [issues between SA and regional elite members] are essential to a fuller appreciation of the whole’ (204).

Simon’s focus is on the deconstruction of representational practices portrayed in texts and talk (see 1.3.4). Consistent with this approach, during the final stages of the SA-Namibia negotiations for Walvis Bay, he notes how the Namibians referred to ‘reintegration’ of the bay, suggesting the reinstatement of a previous and legitimate status. On the other hand, the South Africans spoke of ‘incorporation’ or ‘transfer’ of Walvis Bay, indicating their belief that this represented a new development in what amounts to an act of magnanimity on their part (210). Simon describes the account which emerges from his use of a critical geopolitical framework to analyse regional
resistance to SA, as ‘rich and highly textured, reflecting the interplay between key
gatekeepers and interlocuters (in this case all “big men”), serendipity and opportunity,
and carefully scripted strategies and plans’ (215-216).

Also using a critical geopolitical framework, Hammet (2011) discusses how a
satirical pack of cards and a ‘Guide to dangerous snakes in Zimbabwe’ caricaturing
state and military elite members, were designed as a form of resistance against an
authoritarian elite. More generally, Hammet (2010a, 2010b) and Dodds (2010) do much
to encourage popular geopolitical analyses concerning processes of resistance in
southern Africa by focusing on political cartoons.

2002, 2006, 2007; Gibb and Sidaway, 1998) have also made important geographical
contributions to the regional literature. They were particularly interested in
understanding the opportunities and challenges posed by post-apartheid SA to processes
of regional integration in southern Africa. In analysing this question they cover aspects
primarily centred on trade, foreign investment, aid and post-apartheid SA’s relationship
with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU) and the European Union (EU). Gibb, in particular, focuses on
the effects of post-apartheid SA’s integration into southern Africa and into the global
economy on the institutional arrangements of SACU and SADC, and the unfair
consequences for weaker states. Much of this literature was written from a general
perspective of resistance to post-apartheid SA (see Gibb, 2006; Lemon, 1996).
However, the analytical relevance of this literature pertains mainly to changes at the
regional scale more broadly and not necessarily the nature of resistance to SA, and its
expression through power networks and discourse.
A focus on power networks (spanning government, business and media) and discourse therefore allows for the necessary reflexive discussion of the excercising of SA’s power, and the resistance elicited in local regional communities. It can, according to Bond and Simon, be effectively couched within sub-imperial and imperial processes. The implicit assumption is that if the assertion of SA’s sub-imperialism can operate through power networks, then the resistance to such networks and their discourses should also be analysed in the same, or a similar, manner (see Keith and Pile, 1997).

Although one should be cautious about transposing a uniquely southern African case study of sub-imperialism and resistance to it, many of the challenges and problems facing southern Africa are consistent with other emerging powers in the global South. For example, Sidaway draws from his work on southern Africa (Gibb and Sidaway, 1988; Sidaway, 1996) and elsewhere to extract broader lessons concerning the global South and North-South relations. By conducting research on the geographies of emerging markets (Sidaway and Bryson, 2002; Sidaway and Pryke, 2000), analysing ‘first world’ geographers writing about the ‘third world’ (1992), and developing a geography of the post-colonial in the face of renewed imperialism (2000), Sidaway has managed to capture the subversive spirit of the global South and the challenge presented to imperialist knowledge production.

Importantly, Sidaway (2012) has recently noted how the ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries have come to be seen as the epitome of this increasing geopolitical interest in the global South. He states: ‘These new labels [such as BRIC] rest on more than two decades of discourse about “emerging markets” and are embodiments of and agents in the decomposition of the Third World as denoting a meaningful geopolitical and epistemological category’ (49).
The geographer Marcus Power, who also draws from his knowledge of Lusophone southern Africa (2000; 2004; 2012) and typically in collaboration with Giles Mohan, develops similar critiques about the Western and imperial construction of geographical knowledge. Mercer, Mohan and Power (2003), in attempting to develop a critical political geography of African development, talk about ‘decolonising our knowledges’ (419) and ask questions such as: ‘what would a post-colonial development geography of Africa look like…?’ (428). Mohan and Power (2009) also attempt to develop a ‘new’ development geography with Africa and China at the core. Building on this, they (2010) further advance a critical geopolitics of China’s engagement with African development discussing the seemingly paradoxical emergence of ‘Chinese neo-liberalism in Africa’ (470). In the introduction to a special edition of Geopolitics on geopolitics and ‘development’, Power (2010) argues that the terms ‘development’ and ‘development studies’ are too often framed in a Western-orientated and slightly patronising conception of the global South.

It is in this spirit, that this study will also attempt to extrapolate larger lessons from the southern African context to develop theory pertaining to emerging powers of the global South and the non-West more generally. The somewhat grandiose leader for the title of this chapter, ‘Subverting an empire’, therefore refers to the multiple locations where sub-imperialism is exercised in the world and the regional resistance which is elicited against such sub-imperialism, not only at the local and regional scales, but against the broader global inequalities of an imperialist system. More importantly, the title of this chapter points to the imperative of non-Western geographical knowledge production, even if it is by subverting the language and practices of those established by the West: (sub)imperialism.
1.2.1 General background: Post-apartheid South Africa’s relationship with the region

Although SA moved quickly to distance itself from its former pariah status by engaging in a host of continental diplomatic fora, and has led the way in some areas with initiatives such as the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and President Mbeki’s vision of an African Renaissance, the face SA has projected to the rest of Africa has sometimes appeared ambiguous (Naidu, 2004).

Regardless of SA’s actual intentions, the country’s post-apartheid political and corporate expansion into southern Africa has proved both disappointing and controversial (see Miller, Saunders and Oloyede, 2008). After the establishment of democracy, regional governments and businesses had expected that SA would be able to fast-track economic and infrastructural investment as well as facilitate regional integration. These hopes were particularly strong in the small and mostly landlocked states of SACU which are heavily dependent on SA economically (Daniel, 1984; Faye, McArthur, Sachs and Snow, 2004; Gibb, 1987, 1991, 2006), but also extended to the fourteen-member SADC. Developing the region was to be achieved through the expansion of its corporates into the region, increased regional investment by government and its parastatals\(^1\), and through the establishment of fair trade practices.

However, political and economic developments over the last decade have been mixed and many argue that SA has clearly not delivered on the initial expectations. Such criticism tends to be focused on the ongoing self-centred and extractive outlook that SA has towards the region (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998a; 1998b). SA’s expansion into the region has been further complicated by the legacy of the apartheid government’s attitude of racial superiority.

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\(^1\) A parastatal is a company or agency which is entirely or partly government-owned. The three big parastatals in South Africa are Eskom, Telkom and Transnet. All the transport and freight logistics’ parastatals are housed under Transnet, such as Spoornet for rail and Portnet for shipping. Eskom and Transnet were both very active in developing major infrastructural projects on the continent.
Perhaps in its most extreme manifestation, negative attitudes towards SA stem from a perception that SA intervenes within war-torn countries under the guise of a generous benefactor promoting humanitarian concerns, but that its real intentions are to extend its commercial interests deeper into African markets. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, where SA state elite members were instrumental in brokering peace, SA corporates are likely to find peace very lucrative (Kabembe, 2007).

Scepticism over the nature of SA’s relationship with the region, has arguably deepened due to recent events in SA which have had a direct impact on the region. These events came to a head largely during 2008 and towards the end of President Mbeki’s tenure (1999 to 2008). They include: the failure of Eskom and the SA government to keep abreast of the demand for electricity, especially given that SA used to supply about 80% of SADC’s electricity (Chapter 5); the SA government’s ongoing failure to provide effective guidance and mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis (Chapter 6); the two-week-long xenophobia attacks in May 2008 perpetrated against African nationals living in SA’s poorest communities, which left over sixty people dead and tens of thousands homeless (Chapter 7); and, the unrealistic and largely unmet regional expectations of benefiting through the 2010 Football World Cup (Chapter 8).

These events and issues – in combination with the ongoing service delivery protests and the leadership struggle within the ANC that has both subverted Mbeki’s legacy and called into question President Zuma’s suitability as president (3.5) – might be expected to impact heavily on how the region perceives SA. Consistent with a Zuma administration that has, as expected, proved more domestically focused than its predecessor and a global financial climate that has stalled capital accumulation in the region, there is now an expectation that SA’s corporate and state involvement in the region will level out, and possibly even decline (3.5).
This is supported by a wave of literature which doubts SA’s ability to continue to fulfill a political and economic leadership role (Andreasson, 2011; Draper, 2011; Feinstein, 2007; Gevisser, 2009; Gumede, 2007; Johnson, 2008; Pottinger, 2008; Russell, 2009; Southall, 2010). This literature suggests that the initial euphoria of the transition period has clearly come to an end. It is reasonable to assume that rapid change in the domestic political situation in SA is bound to impact on its regional relations and on perceptions of SA. These issues will be extensively examined in Chapters 4 to 8.

In summary, SA has struggled balancing, on the one hand, its pretensions towards an idealistic regional praxis as espoused through its involvement and leadership in multilateral bodies with, on the other hand, its realist, self-motivated interests and ambitions on the continent. This is clearly reflected in the speculation concerning the nature of SA’s relationship with the region. Hence, the difficult-to-measure yet increasingly important attitudinal realm is pivotal to understanding the limits and strengths of SA’s regional relations and its future direction.

1.3 Literature review and theoretical framework

1.3.1 Imperial geopolitics as an area of study

Modern geopolitical discourse started in the era of imperialist expansion between 1870 and 1945. During this period opposing empires clashed and fought several wars, thereby actively changing the world political map. The dominant imperialist power of the age was the British Empire, which, despite its growing territorial size, was struggling to keep abreast of the transforming conditions of world power. The other imperial powers of the time were Russia, France, Italy, the United States, Germany and later Japan. These states were rivals of the British Empire and sought to benefit from its difficulties and relative decline. Each of these imperialist states produced their own leading
intellectuals of statecraft and, on the basis of their own unique geopolitical cultures, developed various imperialist geopolitical discourses (Ó Tuathail, 2006: 17).

Imperialism has therefore not only been a subject of study for geographers, but political geographers in particular have played an instrumental role in actively promoting imperialism. Halford Mackinder was particularly prominent in the formation of imperialist geopolitical discourses for the British Empire. His well-known paper presented at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) at the beginning of the 20th century, ‘The Geographical Pivot in History’ (1904), was largely seen as an attempt to promote a decidedly Anglo-Saxon and European depiction of the globe. At that stage, the RGS was known for its role in promoting the British Empire through expeditions. The rising imperial aspirations of Germany in central Europe following the First World War were also driven by geographers such as Karl Haushofer and Friedrich Ratzel. Influenced by the work of these geographers, Adolf Hitler himself was instrumental in popularising the rationale for German state expansion through Mein Kampf (1942) and the concept of Lebensraum.

Gilmartin (2009: 117) notes that for many decades the realist and deterministic perspectives dominated political geography with few minor objections raised mainly by anarchist geographers such as Elisée Réclus and Peter Kropotkin. Referring to Berg et al. (2007) and Peters (1997; 1998), Gilmartin (2009: 117-118) goes on to note that after the two major periods of decolonisation (in Asia immediately after the Second World War and in Africa from the late 1950s), ‘some geographers highlighted the enduring political, economic and cultural legacies of imperialism’. Hudson (1977) highlighted how the advancement of the discipline was based on its utilitarian value to the actual practice of imperialism.
Late 20th century Western geographers continued to shine light on the complicity of geography and imperialism, particularly through what became known as ‘critical geopolitics’, after Ó Tuathail’s now famous thesis by the same title. Crucially, critical geopolitics provided the necessary reflexive understanding behind the processes of imperialism and the constructed nature of geographical knowledge (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 1996a; Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998), and is the chosen analytical framework employed in this thesis to examine the behaviour of imperial states and the responses elicited (see 1.3.4).

However, parallel to the mainstream Western geopolitical discourse, other forms of geopolitical discourse were arising from the periphery of imperialism. Following the decolonisation processes in Asia, South America and Africa, the former colonial territories were to break up into independent states. Having struggled to attain independence, these territories sought to establish their sovereignty and assert their national and regional identities in response to the continuing inequities of colonialism. Typically such geopolitical discourses were driven by their own intellectuals of statecraft who developed according to their own distinctive geopolitical traditions steeped in a sense of resistance (Amin, 1977; Fanon, 1965; Said, 1978). These processes were also documented by Slater (2004). Throughout the second half of the 20th century, such geopolitical discourses made important intellectual contributions to understanding the impact of imperialism on recipient nations.

At the start of the 21st century, the post-September 11 global atmosphere had revived an interest in the analytical basis of the concept of imperialism. This was driven by a desire to make sense of America’s interests in the Middle East and its ‘war against terror’. Geographers in particular had taken up this mantle, placing American imperialism at the centre of their analyses (Gregory, 2004; De Zengotita, 2003; Hardt
and Negri, 2001; Harvey 2005). They had managed to deal with the subject in a particularly nuanced way, and provided valuable critiques of the political economy and culture of imperialism. Of the recent post-September 11 geographical literature on the subject, Harvey’s historical geographical materialist analysis of American imperialism in his book, *The New Imperialism* (2005), arguably provides the best set of tools to critically and systematically evaluate the ambitions and practices of imperialist powers in varying contexts and regions.

Despite the revived interest in imperialism and the rise of intellectuals of statecraft from outside the West, sub-imperialism was never really given serious consideration in geography or other disciplines. It was assumed to be a natural by-product of historical subjugation. Although there are studies which have treated sub-imperialism from a historical perspective and should be considered as important (see 1.3.3), the phenomenon of sub-imperialism deserves re-examination and should not merely be understood as an unspecified by-product of historical conquest by Western colonial powers. What is unique about the modern state-capital relations forming at that level? How do they complement or challenge global processes of accumulation and neoliberalism? What are the physical spaces and places where sub-imperialism arises? These questions are especially important given the current crisis facing Western-led global capitalism and the corresponding shifts in global power relations, as explained in the next sub-section.

### 1.3.2 Regionally dominant states and sub-imperialism

The literature on regionally dominant powers can be confusing because of the terminology used. The two main terms are ‘regional powers’ (Destradi, 2010; Flemes, 2007a; Kappel, 2010; Nolte, 2010; Nel and Nolte, 2010) and ‘regional hegemony’
(Mares, 1988; Nabers, 2010). Theoretically these two terms are distinct. However, in practice they are often used loosely and interchangeably. Generally, ‘regional powers’ are believed to be states which have a clear advantage in terms of economic and political resources compared with the states based within their sub-system, region or continent. Regional hegemons are states which are not only able to define the norms and values of the region, but are able to get other states to follow those rules. Regional hegemons typically operate on the same scale as regional powers. Other scholars refer to ‘pivot states’ (Habib, 2003; Landsberg, 2004). A ‘pivot state’ is an important state, but not a dominant state. There is also a debate within the international relations literature distinguishing between ‘middle powers’ (Efstathopoulos, 2011; Mares, 1988), and ‘emergent middle powers’ (Flemes, 2007b; Jordaan, 2003; Schoeman, 2003; Van der Westhuizen, 1998). Middle powers tend to be states which are traditionally powerful within their regions and play a significant role in international multilateral fora. Emergent middle powers are those states which are yet to fully realise their middle power status.

Yet, despite the rather obvious link between sub-imperialism and the general growth of studies focusing on the regional scale, none of these studies engage seriously with the matter of sub-imperialism. Although some of the regional literature clearly locates regions within broader patterns of contemporary American imperialism and the pressures exerted by neo-liberalism (Allen and Allan, 2007; Bracking, 2003; Destradi, 2010; Hentz, 2005; Nel and Nolte, 2010; Prys, 2010), no sustained and explicit theoretical link has been made in the regional literature between regionally dominant powers and sub-imperialism, particularly in the context of the ‘new wave’ of emergent non-Western countries.
Since the end of the Cold War and the winning over of neo-liberalism globally, a prosperous cycle of expanded rounds of accumulation has given rise to new poles of accumulation outside of the West amidst a relative decline in American power, leading to the prospect of a distinctly more multipolar world. This shift in the global power relations is reflected in the recent regional literature which has mostly focused on the rise of non-Western regionally dominant powers (in the broadest of senses), such as: China (Harris, 2005; Roy, 1994; Shambaugh, 2004); India (Gupta, 2010; Pardesi, 2005; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, 2010); Brazil (Bandiera, 2006; Bethel, 2010; De Lima and Hirst, 2006); a resurgent Russia (Kokoshin, 2002); South Africa (Ahwireng and McGowan, 1998a, 1998b; Alden and Le Pere, 2009; Alden and Soko, 2005; Kagwanja, 2009; Flemes, 2007a, 2009; Prys, 2009); and to a lesser extent, Iran (Rubin, 2006); Turkey (Erickson, 2004); Nigeria (Bach, 2007; Souare, 2005); Egypt (Breytenbach, 1997); Uzbekistan (Bohr, 2004); Ethiopia (Iyob, 1993); and, Indonesia and Vietnam (Emmers, 2005).

The focus on non-Western regional powers was given further impetus by the new wave of studies focusing on the BRIC nations, after the now famous Goldman Sachs report which coined the term in 2001. Since the founding of the formal grouping of BRIC in 2006 (it became BRICS in 2010 when SA joined), a body of literature has developed surmising the prospects of a ‘new wave’ or ‘second tier’ of imperial powers. This literature generally focuses on the prospects of such powers to engage in expanded rounds of accumulation regionally and then to spread to other continents as they develop into what is called a major or superpower (Armijo and Burges, 2010; Dellios, 2003; Roberts, 2010; Sinha and Dorschner, 2010; Wadhva, 2006). This literature highlights the fact that the BRIC nations are estimated to outstrip the G7 in terms of economic size by 2027. Another strand within this literature suggests that the BRICS
states will alter the global balance of power through their influence over political and economic global institutions. They argue that this is likely to result in a restructuring of the world order (Kurečić and Bandov, 2011; Pisani-Ferry, 2005; Renard, 2009; Roberts, 2011; Shaw, Cooper and Antkiewicz, 2007; Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009). Others are more cautious about these claims believing that it is just another multilateral body which faces the same limitations as any other (Glosny, 2010; Martynov, 2011). The India, Brazil and SA (IBSA) trilateral initiative adds to the prominence of these emergent powers on the global stage (Alden and Viera, 2005; Taylor, 2009). Implicit in much of this literature is the assumption that in a post-recessionary global environment, these countries are less trusting of Western-led globalisation and neo-liberalism, and that their immediate regions have become more important. The assumption is that regional cooperation has been enhanced by the financial crisis due to uncertainties in the global macro-economy. The recession has had an impact on the direction of industrial development and industrial inputs at the regional scale, and the role played by dominant powers in these processes.

Therefore, as global capitalism enters a period of deep uncertainty, it appears that the time is right for a critical re-assessment of the role of sub-imperial states, grounded within their regions, to be understood as independent actors directly seeking to devise their own form of ‘imperialism’ and perhaps alter the global neo-liberal architecture as we know it. The initiatives by the BRICS states to develop their own Development Bank signals a fundamental challenge to the American and European dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The term ‘new imperialism’ has been applied to a few historical imperial epochs (Gilmartin, 2009: 115; Hudson, 1977) and was recently used to refer to a resurgence of American imperialism (Harvey, 2005). However, this study argues that the real ‘new’ imperialism appears to
be the wave of non-western powers whose rise will most likely shape the 21st century. Surprisingly, despite the obvious rise of this ‘new wave’ of imperial powers the link with sub-imperialism has not been reflected in the literature.

1.3.3 What we know about sub-imperialism

The first attempt at developing a sustained critique of sub-imperialism was made by Ruy Marini in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1965 Marini, a Brazilian sociologist, drew from the work of German Marxist Ernst Talheimer (no reference given), describing how ‘as a result of the influx of Northern American investments, [other industrialised states] became…centers of the export of capital and simultaneously extended their economic frontiers within the world-wide process of imperialist integration’ (Marini, 1965: 12).

He did however concede that these processes were open to internal contradictions. Further drawing from the work of Talheimer, who in the 1920s developed the idea of ‘antagonistic cooperation’, Marini stressed that imperialist integration of states results in conflict with the local working class and labour, which has ‘the effect of obstructing the process of [imperialist] integration…[opening] fissures in the structure of the imperialist world, strongly favouring the forces bent on destroying the very bases of the [imperialist] structure: revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries’ (ibid.). Resistance to sub-imperial processes is further explored in sub-section 1.3.4.3. By describing the relationships between the Brazilian military dictatorship of the 1960s and its support for American capitalist expansion, Marini laid the foundation for the understanding of Brazil as a sub-imperial state in South America, although the term sub-imperialism only features once in his article.

In 1972 he used a more forceful application of the term sub-imperialism and developed some general observations about the behaviour of these states. He defines
sub-imperialism as ‘the form which dependent capitalism assumes upon reaching the stage of monopolies and finance capital’ (Marini, 1972: 14). Elaborating on his economically-focused definition, he outlines three fundamental tenets of sub-imperialism: ‘First, export of manufactured goods, durable as well as non-durable. Note that the expansion of exports requires the rising of the technological level, which in turn implies greater possibilities for the absorption of capital goods’ (Marini, 1972: 16). In the present study, Chapter 3 highlights how SA was able to secure the regional sub-system as a ‘captive market’ for its exports giving its industries a larger market to dominate.

Marini’s second observation concerns an increase in state expenditure on infrastructure related to transportation and electrification, and the re-equipping of the armed forces. This expands the market for capital goods (ibid.). Chapters 3, 4 and 5 also point to a similar state-driven expenditure in key infrastructure areas related to natural resources or basic services. The primary intention of such expenditure was to support the main drivers of the economy – mining and manufacturing. Chapter 3 also describes the formation of an industrial-military complex in SA forging a closer relationship between state and capital.

Marini’s third observation relates to the formation of a ‘consumer society’ created through a transfer of income from the poorest strata to the middle and upper strata, in order to secure the market for a high-technology industry which is becoming increasingly removed from the ‘real needs of the masses’ (Marini, 1972: 20). Chapter 3 discusses the almost total wiping out of a self-sustained African peasantry and the formation of an urban African middle class designed to fulfill the needs of labour and consumption. However, the state sought simultaneously to restrict the rights and
privileges of this group and dictate where they could live, how much they could earn and what land they could own.

However insightful, Marini’s use of sub-imperialism is highly context-specific and would clearly have benefited from further theoretical elaboration. Understanding of Brazilian sub-imperialism would also have been enhanced when viewed from other South American states, or through a detailed description of Brazil’s spatial expansion into the region. Nonetheless, his work is insightful in its penetrating understanding of the class formations driving these processes and in highlighting the processes of resistance to sub-imperialism.

In the 1970s the term sub-imperialism had spread in academic circles and appeared in the context of Iran (Ahmed, 1973) and SA (Bienefeld and Innes, 1976). It also featured in the work of Marxist theorist Amin (1974; 1977), and in the work of developmental economist, Frank (1979). The political scientist, Shaw (1978; 1979), drew links between the global semi-periphery, semi-industrialised states and sub-imperialism. He applied what was understood of sub-imperialism in Latin America to the African political economy. However, in the mid-1970s an essay by Väyrynen and Herrera (1975) consolidated much of what was understood on the topic at the time. They sought to develop a structural framework for sub-imperialism and a greater understanding of the internal and external dynamics.

Drawing from Galtung’s (1971) ‘go-between relations’, Väyrynen and Herrera note: ‘In Galtung’s view Western Europe, for example, goes between the United States and Eastern Europe; Japan between the United States and South East Asia; Mexico between the United States and Central America…’ (1975: 167). They add that Galtung’s viewpoint is akin to understanding the international system as composed of a number of ‘dependence chains’ within the capitalist and socialist worlds which operate
as a link between them, as well as between them and the third world countries (ibid.). In much the same way, SA plays an important role in bridging the gap between the developed countries and the rest of southern Africa (see Chapters 3, 4 and 8).

In developing a structural framework for sub-imperialism, Väyrynen and Herrera state that there are ‘three levels of dependence chains; [the] imperialist centre, sub-imperialist agents and dominated periphery countries’ (1975: 168). The notion of inter-linked global capitalist processes is similar to Wallerstein’s (1987) world-systems analysis (see also Taylor, 1985 and more recently Flint and Taylor, 2007). The imperialist centre, according to Väyrynen and Herrera, comprised America, countries from Europe and Japan. They discuss Brazil, SA and Iran as examples of sub-imperial states. Drawing from Galtung, they further accentuate the importance of trade and technology in maintaining these relationships of dependence (1975: 168). Chapter 3 of the present study highlights the advantage that European technology linked to mining gave SA over its neighbours. This was followed by more general technical, managerial and administrative skills and technologies turning SA into a modern capitalist economy. The importance of trade relations between SA and the region is also explored in Chapter 3. Väyrynen and Herrera also emphasise the role played by the state, transnational corporations and elite members in these processes. They contend that the alliance between state and business elite members forms ‘a coherent interest alliance’ which serves as ‘a precondition for (sub)imperialist policy’ (1975: 170). Similarly, an analysis of the relationships and networks between state and corporate elite members forms the backbone of the theory developed in this study (see 1.4).

According to Väyrynen and Herrera (1975: 171-172), the internal dynamics of sub-imperialism include the sub-imperial state moving from a system of colonial dependence to post-colonial subordination because of exploitation by the dominant
imperialist power. Favourable conditions for such exploitation include a strong, often military state (such as the apartheid state), which is able to denationalise industry (a policy pursued by the post-apartheid government, Chapter 3), monopolise raw materials (Chapters 3 and 5), has a massive indebtedness to international financial institutions, and is able to exploit labour whilst depriving the marginalised population of any real profits (Chapters 4, 7 and 8).

In describing the external dynamics of sub-imperialism, Väyrynen and Herrera highlight how the sub-imperial states and the periphery states are manipulated by the core imperialist powers, typically through corporations, in the pursuit of ‘economic expansion…under auspices of transnational capital’ (1975: 173). In this connection, Chapter 3 describes the role played by British multi-national corporations (MNCs) in using SA as a ‘gateway’ into the region. Väyrynen and Herrera further note that economic integration and its rhetoric in the Third World often serves sub-imperialist purposes (as is argued throughout this study and especially in Chapters 3 and 4), and that expansion by the sub-imperial state is not only restricted to the economic sphere but includes political, military and ideological institutions and initiatives (1975: 173-174). The full range of expansionary measures through which SA operates is covered in Chapters 3 and 4. Väyrynen and Herrera highlight military intervention as the ‘ultimate strategy of preserving the dominance structure, as well as of preventing any autonomous, independent development in the peripheral countries’ (1975: 175). The role of the military in maintaining SA’s regional economic dominance is also explored in Chapter 3.

Analysis of the concept sub-imperialism appears to have stagnated after the 1970s, appearing loosely in the literature as a feature of historical imperialism (Warhurst, 1984). However, once the Cold War ended and American-driven neo-
liberalism had gathered momentum globally, a re-examination of sub-imperialism in the ‘new’ neo-liberal world order was certainly needed. This occurred belatedly. Only in the first decade of the 21st century did the concept appear regularly in the work of Patrick Bond in the context of democratic SA’s re-emergence globally and as a leading power on the African continent (Bond, 2004; 2006a; 2006b). SA attained democracy in 1994, just in time to capitalise on the neo-liberal induced round of expanded accumulation. Many would argue that by the late 1990s, SA’s ‘new’ elite members carried the mantle of sub-imperial power very comfortably by providing the necessary ‘linkages’ for Western capitalism in southern Africa (3.4.1; for a similar argument from a historical perspective see Atmore and Marks, 1974).

Bond typically analyses the African National Congress (ANC) government’s relationship with America through the prism of sub-imperialism describing how the SA government is notorious for “talking left but walking right”, insofar as [the SA government attempts to] veil the underlying dynamics of accumulation, class struggle and geopolitics’ (2004: 219). Bond describes how ‘modern imperialism…in Africa combines an accumulation strategy based on neoliberalism and the extraction of ever cheaper minerals and cash crops, with increasing subservience to US-led, indirect, neocolonial rule’ (2004: 220). He goes on to describe how ‘imperialism is facilitated in Africa by the Pretoria-Johannesburg state-capitalist nexus, in part through Mbeki’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and in part through the logic of private capital’ (ibid.).

In line with Bond’s analysis, this study uses the concept ‘sub-imperialism’ to encapsulate the idea that SA is subject to broader systemic rounds of capital accumulation driven by neo-liberalism and American interests. These interests are secured globally through the influence of Wall Street, the IMF and the World Bank. The
term ‘sub’ is also used as a means to delineate a ‘mini’ or smaller form of imperialism that is regionally located.

Academics such as Miller, Saunders and Oloyede (2008), Taylor (2011) and Sampson (2009) concur broadly with the understanding of SA as a sub-imperial state. Others refer to SA’s ‘imperialism’ more directly, as if SA were some form of ‘primary’ imperial power itself (Lesufi, 2004; 2006). However, none of these authors has attempted to develop a geographical theory of sub-imperialism, let alone any coherent theory on the phenomenon, despite a clear acknowledgement of a gap in the literature.

1.3.4 Critical geopolitics as an analytical approach

The present study draws from the works of Dodds (2005), Gregory (1994), Ó Tuathail (1996a; 1996b), Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992), Ó Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge (2006), Mann (1993), Peet (2002) and Routledge (1998; 2003; 2008), amongst others. Writing mostly within the critical geopolitical tradition, these authors and sources inform the analysis and guide the emphasis on discourse and resistance.

1.3.4.1 Geopolitical discourse

The issue of how sub-imperial states exercise power will be answered with reference to critical geopolitics literature. Here it will be explained how elite members construct discursive formations to sustain and assert their power, and the resistance which is elicited. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992: 192), in their seminal work published in Political Geography Quarterly, made an influential claim for a ‘critical’ re-reading of geopolitics. They asserted:

*Geopolitics, we wish to suggest, should be critically re-conceptualised as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’...In our understanding, the study of*
geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states...Discourses like grammars, have a virtual and not actual existence...[Discourses] are real sets of capabilities whose existence we infer from their realization in activities, texts and speeches...The study of geopolitics in discursive terms, therefore, is the study of the socio-cultural resources and the rules by which geographies of international politics gets written.

Therefore, critical geopolitics was to differ from classical geopolitics in important ways. According to critical geopolitical scholars, space was understood to be constructed discursively and was the product of discourses of power. Critical geopolitics was premised on what was said to be the ‘God’s eye’ view of geopolitics, based on the sub-discipline’s ability to disentangle power relations and ‘see through’ the more descriptive, one-dimensional approach of classical geopolitics. Using this critical lens, these scholars deconstructed much of what was taken for granted in geographical theorising and exposed it for being largely the product of European imperialism and colonialism (Gregory, 1994; Ó Tuathail, 1996a). As highlighted above, this literature is informative in the sense that it allows for the necessary reflexive understanding behind the processes of imperialism and the constructed nature of geographical knowledge.

Critical geopolitics is also useful in so far as it focuses on who is responsible for the articulation of the dominant discourses in international politics. Here Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992: 193) contend:

The notion of ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ refers to a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world who comment upon, influence and conduct the activities of statecraft.

To further differentiate the above group Ó Tuathail and Agnew loosely divided geopolitics into practical, formal, and later, popular geopolitics. Practical geopolitics refers to ‘the practitioners of statecraft, of state-persons, politicians and military commanders’. Formal geopolitics involves ‘strategic thinkers and public intellectuals’
Popular geopolitics involves representations of geopolitics expressed in popular culture. These spheres in reality interact and merge, and are not neatly divided.

1.3.4.2 Power networks

The literature on power networks will be used to illustrate the spheres and actors involved in the creation of geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses. Intrinsic to the concept of power applied in this study, is the understanding that power is multidimensional and originates from multiple sources and actors in society. This concurs with the work of Foucault (1980) who, as the leading theorist on discourse, stressed the prevalence of power networks in the creation of discourses through his power-knowledge dichotomy. There is also a body of critical literature drawn from various fields focusing on elite networks spanning the political and business spheres (Cox and Rogerson, 1985; Brayshay, Cleary and Selwood, 2006; Moore, 1979). A strand within this literature focuses on the transnational nature of these networks through the promotion of a hegemonic capitalist class (Carroll and Carson, 2003; Robinson, W. 2005).

The present study relies on Mann’s (1993) analysis of power networks. He discusses the multiple locations and sources of power in society – the political, ideological, economic and military forms of power – and how they converge and intersect with one other. He also focuses on the manner in which elite members in these spheres construct discourses through which they assert themselves and legitimise their decisions (see 1.4).

The most common power network is undoubtedly the military-industrial complex. The concept ‘military-industrial complex’ was coined by Mills (1956) in his book, The Power Elite. It was also formally named by American President, Dwight
Eisenhower, in his 1961 farewell speech. Although the concept or term did attract a great deal of attention, not much of it was from geographers (Farish and Vitale, 2011: 778). However, a recent special edition of *Antipode* drew together a number of geographers to focus exclusively on the ‘complex’. Therefore, a brief digression is necessary at this point in order to discuss some of the recent geographical literature relating to ‘complexes’.

Lutz (2011), who wrote the conclusion for the special edition on the military-industrial complex, identifies ‘networks’ and ‘complexes’ as being largely synonymous, or, at the very least, ‘complexes’ can be viewed as a subsidiary of larger ‘networks’. Drawing from Der Derian (2009), Lutz pulls together the strands discussed in the journal by stating that the various aspects covered by the edition ‘were all shaped by cultural hegemonies that emerged within the military-industrial-media-entertainment network…or, more fully, the military-industrial-media-entertainment-academic network’ (903).

Lutz (2011) refers to ‘invisible…war workers’ in the military-industrial complex (903) as being the ‘experts’ who go about maintaining the military-industrial complex through their affective labour. She discusses experts in the fields of propaganda, communications, public relations and advertising (see also Pinkerton, Young and Dodds, 2011). She notes how these experts are also experts in ‘domestic social order – such as urban planning or home economics – who did the work of war, if less obviously’ (904). She adds that ‘[t]hese experts are all, in a sense, professional geographers of the human terrain of the US population. They develop methods of selecting, training, and retaining, their uniformed employees, and those practices would then migrate out to the civilian world’ (904). Besides the necessary affective labour, it also takes infrastructural labour to maintain the military-industrial complex. Lutz
argues: ‘This range of military experts uses the technologies of pledges, leaflets, and less obviously, but no less importantly, road building, urban renewal, and suburbanization to create practices and affects’ (905).

Vitale (2011), who also co-edited the edition, focuses on the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, a significant American arms manufacturer during World War II. He describes how throughout World War II, the state and industry developed the groundwork for a complex set of relationships that would go on to form the basis of the American military-industrial complex. Part of the strategy of the military-industrial complex was soliciting the help of citizens, often through their relationship to work. The state and defence contractors thereby created the ‘war wage’ – a non-monetary, recognition-focused ‘wage’. It is argued that the war wage played a role in developing a sense of national belonging amongst citizens and their contributions to the war. Vitale argues that this sense of belonging, centred on the military-industrial complex, remained strong from the early periods of the Cold War to the present with devastating consequences at home and abroad (813).

Geographers have also developed similar terms for studying relations between the state and the private sector in SA. Rogerson (1990) asserts that the rise of Armscor (the SA state-owned arms manufacturer) as a ‘military-industrial enterprise’ was at the centre of the post-1960 growth of the arms industry in SA. Although SA underwent escalating restrictions on the production of arms, due to the advancement of the military-industrial enterprise the country had managed to reach a point of relative self-sufficiency in its military production. The military-industrial enterprise was to play a defining role in the economic geography of the apartheid state. Rogerson concludes: ‘Military production…[emerged] as a powerful implicit spatial policy shaping the South
African space economy favouring…the development of the… Johannesburg-Pretoria axis’ (241).

In addition to the intertwined relationship between the state and the private sector, the role of academia, information systems and media in processes of the ‘complex’ warrants attention. Also in the special edition of *Antipode*, Pinkerton, Young and Dodds (2011) build on the themes of Cold War social science, civic education and propaganda by examining Project Revere. Project Revere consisted of experiments in leafleting and the power of word-of-mouth message dispersal. The various experiments were carried out in targeted American communities. Building on what Senator William Fulbright termed the ‘military-industrial-academic complex’, they discuss ‘the manner in which universities, the military and intelligence agencies became bound up with one another at the start of the Cold War…’ (822).

Geography was to play a pivotal role in this process. Pinkerton et al. comment on ‘the “tangled” relationship between civilian, military and intelligence funded research and the “mangling” of geography with other academic disciplines’ (822). Therefore, prominent centres of geographical research such as the University of Washington were instrumental in the development of an emerging military-industrial-academic complex in the 1950s (822-823). The academic field of communications studies (informed by the behavioural sciences) was also one of the main beneficiaries of funding from government agencies and military organisations. In collusion with the state and business, US universities and research institutions were considered crucial partners in the production and dissemination of communications materials (823), and therefore, in the creation of propaganda to both domestic and foreign audiences.

Similarly, Peet’s (2002) analysis of how globally constructed hegemonic discourses ‘colonise’ alternative ones, also focuses on academic and media processes.
associated with ‘complexes’. Peet wishes to demonstrate how these spheres along with the influence of global and domestic financial institutions influence decisions and thinking of elite members and the general public. Placed within the context of SA, Peet develops what he calls the ‘academic-institutional-media complex’ through which he describes how a neo-liberal discourse ‘disciplined’ the ANC into adopting a neo-liberal policy in the 1990s after the leftist Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was effectively abandoned (see 1.4, also 3.4.1).

Another well known ‘complex’ developed to describe the SA political economy, is the ‘minerals-energy complex’ developed by Fine and Rustomjee (1996). They note how historically the SA economy is centred on mining. Their concept is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. However, the point that should be made at this stage, is that the literature on ‘complexes’ should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. Each concept highlights similar, yet slightly different aspects of the functioning of an imperial or sub-imperial society.

1.3.4.3 Counter-imperialist discourses

To understand how these sub-imperial discursive formations are being received and interpreted, this study also attempts to assess the responses from states. Here the study draws from the literature on geographies of resistance and counter-hegemonies. These counter-hegemonies (see Buchanan, 1997; Carroll, 2006, 2007; Evans, 2000; Robinson, W. 2005; Warf and Grimes, 1997), or what I will call counter-imperialist discourses, can be characterised as a form of anti-geopolitics (Routledge, 1998; 2003). According to Routledge (1998: 245) anti-geopolitics represents an ‘ethical, political and cultural force within civil society’ that questions whether ‘the interests of the state’s political class are identical to the community’s interests’. By civil society, Routledge is referring to those
institutions and organisations that are not part of either material production in the economy or the formal sphere of the state, including state-funded organisations. In its broadest sense, the literature on anti-geopolitics typically focuses on resistance to colonialism and imperialism (Fanon, 1965; Said, 1978), resistance to the Cold War (Frank, 1967; Smith, 1999), and by discussing various anti-globalization movements (Ettlinger and Bosco, 2004). However, a common problem with this literature is the pretension to want to romanticise resistance and notions of struggle. This is based on the idea that it is an inherently ‘good’ endeavour to represent the marginalised in society (Dodds, 2005: 172).

Literature on the geographies of resistance tends to focus on case studies of activist groups working through transnational political movements in response to neoliberalism (Routledge, 2000; 2008). They also focus on the manner in which individual journalists are able to invoke an ‘anti-geopolitical eye’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996b). Pile and Keith (1997) provide an authoritative overview of the geographies of resistance, stating that ‘resistance needs to be considered in its own terms, and not as simply the underside of domination ...’ (xi). There is indeed a need to understand the multiplicity of actors and spheres involved in these processes, including the role of the state.

Drawing from the literature on resistance, this study will therefore assess who and what is responsible for the construction of these counter-imperialist discourses within regional communities (see Chapters 4 to 8).

1.3.4.4 A limitation of critical geopolitics

Whilst critical geopolitics certainly allows for an analytical framework to investigate a sub-imperial state’s geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses, it does not necessarily answer the question of why states expand territorially. Although imperialism is an
established focus of critical geopolitics (critical geopolitics came about largely as a response to the dominance of imperialist geopolitical discourses, see Dalby, 2008) it is argued that critical geopolitics tends to focus on the how and what questions regarding state expansion, but not necessarily the why questions. What provides the driving force behind state expansion? Why do states engage in expanded rounds of capital accumulation in distant lands and regions, and what are the internal elite formations and class contestations that drive this process? In this sense, the thesis concurs broadly with the criticism levelled against critical geopolitics by Sparke (2000) and Mamdouh and Dijkink (2006: 352). They suggest that given its post-structural focus on deconstruction, critical geopolitics provides a set of tools to be applied in varying contexts and analyses – a means of analysing and unpacking the production of knowledge – rather than a theory which has been developed from the ‘bottom-up’ and based on generalisable empirical observation. The assumption is that critical geopolitics is more akin to an analytical approach than a theory (see also Megoran, 2006; Paasi, 2000, 2006).

In order to grasp why states expand territorially, deeper analysis and understanding of the processes of capital accumulation and class formation are required. A historical geographical analysis of SA’s capital accumulation in the region will therefore be necessary in order to contextualise, and lay the foundation for, the study.

1.3.5 Harvey’s theory of imperialism

In this study Harvey’s ideas of imperialism are applied on a regional scale. As a Marxist scholar, Harvey’s concepts are useful in understanding the primacy of capital accumulation and the various forces and relationships driving these processes.
1.3.5.1 The two logics of imperialism

Harvey defined imperialism primarily as a dualism or tension between the state and capital (Harvey, 2005: 26). Drawing from Arrighi (1994), Harvey further states that imperialism is driven by state as well as capitalist logics. He asserts (2005: 26-27):

*The capitalist holding money will wish to put it wherever profits can be had, and typically seeks to accumulate more capital. Politicians and statesmen typically seek outcomes that sustain or augment the power of their own state vis-à-vis other states. The capitalist seeks individual advantage...and is responsible to no-one other than his or her immediate circle, while the statesman seeks a collective advantage and is constrained by the political and military situation of the state and is in some sense or other responsible to a citizenry or, more often, to an elite group, a class, a kinship structure, or some other social group. The capitalist operates in continuous time and space, whereas the politician operates in territorialised space and time...[C]apitalist firms come and go out of business, but states are long lived entities...confined to fixed territorial boundaries.*

Harvey further notes that the fundamental point is to see the two logics as distinct but interlinked. For example, the institutional arrangements embedded in the state have an important role to play in setting the stage for capital accumulation (2005, 28-29). However, Harvey does concede that the two logics are not always complementary and are sometimes in direct conflict, noting that: ‘In practice the two logics frequently tug against each other, sometimes to the point of outright antagonism’ (2005: 29).

This study applies the two logics of imperialism to describe the territorial and commercial expansion of SA into the region from a historical geographical perspective (see Chapter 3).

1.3.5.2 Accumulation by dispossession

Harvey’s concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is particularly informative as an extension of Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’. Marx believed that capital accumulation should be viewed primarily as a relationship between production and control over wage-
labour. For Marx this relationship between production and wage-labour was instrumental in the formation of classes. The two main classes are the owners of the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and the workers (the proletariat). Harvey notes that an analysis of Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’ reveals many supporting processes, such as: the colonial appropriation of assets (including natural resources); forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the suppression of indigenous forms of production; the slave trade; control over land rights; the national debt; and even the credit system as a radical form of accumulation (2005: 145).

Harvey accordingly examines ‘how the “organic relation” between expanded rounds of accumulation on the one hand and the often violent processes of dispossession on the other have shaped the historical geography of capitalism’ (2005: 141-142). For Harvey, as well as Arendt (1968), overaccumulation was the primary driving force behind spatially expanded rounds of accumulation. Harvey therefore notes: ‘The processes that Marx, following Adam Smith, referred to as ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation constitute in Arendt’s view, an important and continuing force in historical geography of capital accumulation through imperialism. As in the case of labour supply, capitalism always requires a fund of assets outside of itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of overaccumulation’ (2005: 143). He further asserts that if those assets, such as unoccupied land or new raw materials do not lie to hand, then capitalism must somehow produce them (ibid). The obtaining of those assets can be achieved through persuasion, force or trickery, and typically involves taking that which is not rightfully yours from territories of lesser capitalist development. Harvey therefore concludes: ‘A general reevaluation of the continuous role and persistence of predatory practices of ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation within the long historical geography of capital accumulation is, therefore, very much in order…’ (2005: 144).
Harvey proposes the term ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as a means of updating and expanding our understanding of ‘primitive accumulation’. ‘Accumulation by dispossession’ in the context of imperialism, refers to a wide range of activities that imperial states and their corporates use to dispossess people and countries through extractive processes that enrich entities from the imperialist nation, but leave the recipient nation and its entities worse off, or at least, no better off. This process typically takes the form of extracting financial, natural and intellectual resources without any real profits or benefits going to the country of extraction. Harvey states that the rise of neo-liberal theory in the 1970s and the associated politics of privatisation were the primary driving forces of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. He notes that ‘accumulation by dispossession’ became increasingly prominent after 1973, primarily as a means to avoid the problem of overaccumulation arising within expanded rounds of accumulation in America and other established centres of capital (2005: 156). However, he further adds that the opening up of territories in the global South and the East to capitalist development and markets also played a role, as did the ‘primitive accumulation’ accomplished in those countries (such as South Korea, Taiwan and China) that allowed for their insertion into global capitalism as active players (ibid.).

This study argues that increasingly under the neo-liberal world order sub-imperial states sought to re-enact similar processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in their respective regions. The neo-liberal induced round of expanded accumulation exacerbated regional uneven development, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, as the poorer and weaker states suffered acutely from multiple, layered and varied forms of dispossession (see Chapters 3, 4 and 8).
1.3.5.3 ‘Spatial fixes’ and regionality

Harvey’s (2005) idea of a ‘temporal-spatio fix’ whereby imperialist states locate their geographical expansion and capitalist crises within a particular space, however defined, is particularly useful in relating his ideas of imperialism to the regional scale. This study uses the term ‘fixed space’ to describe the processes whereby sub-imperial states, through various state entities and their corporates, expand into and invest their capital within a regionally-defined territory (see Chapter 3). Harvey’s distinction between ‘regionality’, as opposed to regionalism is also instructive. He states of regionality (2005: 101):

The fundamental point to recognise is that a certain formal, porous but nevertheless identifiable territorial logic of power - ‘regionality’ - necessarily and unavoidably arises out of the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time, and that the interregional competition and specialisation in and among the regional economies consequently becomes a fundamental feature of how capitalism works.

Sub-imperialism can operate at the continental, regional or sub-regional level, but it need not. Its location can be defined in other critical ways according to a ‘territorial logic of power’ that emerges through the practice of regional economies and politics (see Chapters 5 to 8). Although this idea is nothing new (see Krugman, 1995), the point here is that sub-imperialism is not entirely synonymous with regionalism as conventionally understood. The focus on regionality, particularly in the southern African context, is supported by the work of Taylor (2011) on ‘South African “imperialism” in a region lacking regionalism…’.

1.3.6 Gramscian analysis

Harvey’s analysis attributes some of the driving forces of imperialism to elite members. However, as Gramscian analysis would suggest, a greater focus on the role and agency
of elite members behind sub-imperialist powers and the motives driving them, will prove useful. It is argued that the processes of hegemony impact on issues of capital accumulation and of access to regional markets for sub-imperial states.

1.3.6.1 Hegemony and elite members

For a full analysis of SA’s relations with the region, the ideological component of power needs to be made more explicit. Here the study will draw from Gramsci’s idea of hegemony which is based on the consensus which is formed in culture, and is spread by institutions that are instrumental in forming values and ideals that induce consent to the status quo, or dominant power. For Gramsci, elite members play a central role in this process whereby the prevailing hegemony is said to represent the intellectual and cultural values of the elite (see generally Gramsci, 1971). The notion of hegemony is closely linked to the role of intellectuals in society (see 1.3.6.2).

The state is also an important unit of analysis in hegemonic processes, although not as it is conventionally understood. According to Gramsci the state should be viewed ‘as a balance between political society and civil society’, by which he meant ‘hegemony of one social group over the entire nation, exercised through so-called private organisations like the Church, trade unions, or schools’ (cited in Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 20, referring to Gramsci, 1974: 204). Buci-Glucksmann (1980: 20) notes that the hegemonic apparatuses or consent-forming practices of the dominant group within society include such means as ‘the educational apparatus (from primary school to university), the cultural and publishing apparatus (from libraries to museums), the organization of information (magazines, daily papers, reviews), not forgetting the church, the everyday environment and even street names’.
The idea of hegemony is to be applied in this study as a term denoting struggles between groups for domestic dominance within the sub-imperial state (see Chapter 3). The concept of hegemony is also applied at the regional scale denoting a transnational hegemonic ruling elite which is tasked with maintaining and creating regional consent and legitimacy towards the sub-imperial state for purposes of capital accumulation (see Chapters 3, 4 and 8).

1.3.6.2 Gramsci and intellectuals

Gramsci’s theorisation of intellectuals and their role in hegemonic processes is also important to this study. This helps to understand the contestation over the dominant ‘ideas’ in societies; how social, political and economic programmes and initiatives are constructed; and whose interest they serve (see Chapters 3 and 4). Gramsci defines two main types of ‘functional’ intellectuals in society: the ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ intellectual. Gramsci defined ‘traditional intellectuals’ as: ‘Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in economic but also in the social and political fields’ (1971: 5). This group of intellectuals typically promotes the interests of, and are themselves drawn from, the dominant group in society. They consist of professionals, such as those from literary and scientific fields, and have a certain inter-class nature about them. They are generally the product of historical class formations (Hoare and Smith, 1971: 3). Buci-Glucksman (1980: 36) states with reference to this group: [T]he traditional intellectuals…really do form a governing elite charged with achieving consent between state and society. They are “superstructural functionaries” in the strong sense, direct agencies of the dominant
group, who exercise the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political
government’.

The second group are ‘organic intellectuals’ who according to Gramsci ‘put
themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group’
(1971: 7). They are the intellectual and organising custodians of the class to which they
organically belong. This group is distinguished less by their profession and more by
their attempts to direct the development and ideas pertaining to the interests of their
class (Hoare and Smith, 1971: 3). Like the bourgeoisie, the working class and poor can
form their own ‘organic intellectuals’ who provide a link with the dominant group.
‘Organic intellectuals’ are therefore instrumental in articulating the needs of the poor in
the face of dominance by other groups (ibid.).

This study applies Gramsci’s typology of intellectuals to the formation of a
sub-imperial ‘state intelligentsia’ (see Chapter 3) and in the context of the various
resistance movements throughout the region which give rise to ‘organic intellectuals’ –
promoting the interests of the marginalised and dispossessed (see Chapters 4 to 8).

Based on the above discussion, this study seeks to provide a geographical
theory of sub-imperialism and resistance to it. In order to do so, this study embraces a
multi-dimensional concept of power consisting of the state, corporates, media and other
civic institutions. It is argued that within these spheres elite members are responsible for
articulating their claims and legitimations to power through discursive formations. Yet,
equally so, the position of other states are also constructed through discursive practices.
These responses operate within the formal, practical and popular geopolitical spheres,
and by means of this multi-dimensional model of power.
1.4 Developing grounded theory: The Government-Business-Media Complex

Guided by the conceptual framework described above and through the development of grounded theory which emerged during the collection and analysis of data (see Chapter 2), this study develops a theory based on sub-imperial states. It is modelled on what I will call the government-business-media (GBM) complex. The GBM complex is effectively a network of state and corporate elite members who interact, collaborate or collude to facilitate capital accumulation located within a ‘fixed space’. These elite members are responsible for constructing imperialist discursive formations to sustain their dominance and accumulate capital. This is achieved largely through their influence over various corporate-endowed research institutions and media organisations. Class formations further reinforce these patterns of accumulation driving the interests of the dominant elite.

The underlying premise of the GBM complex is that the state works in tandem with business for purposes of accumulation over space. The state is not only an administrative and technical centre, but acts as a financial and institutional facilitator of capital accumulation. Parastatals or state institutions are used to support capital accumulation through the development of monopolies, spatially selective policies, or industrial and manufacturing complexes that support and encourage the organic processes that adhere the state to regional processes of accumulation. By so doing the state seeks to shut out competition in crucial areas such as energy, transport and communication. This is often achieved through the winning of tenders for major infrastructural projects in the region. From this flows the development of infrastructure and the creation of assets that are often literally fixed to the land in other countries to support its business investments. The state thereby supports business in several ways. The state-driven projects serve as a way to award tenders to its corporates. Here, there is
often a high degree of collusion between state and corporate elite members. Ventures are assessed on their ability to benefit both sectors and typically operate through ‘Public-Private Partnerships’ (PPPs). These impulses could also extend to peacemaking and the creation of diplomatic environments conducive for its business. This is often achieved through regular summit diplomacy in the region or attending and hosting high profile meetings, conferences or events pertaining to this locality. For example, it is now commonplace for state presidents to be accompanied by a large entourage of business representatives when on official duty or state visits, and the rise of pan-continental or regional summitry serves to drive this two-pronged agenda. The strong focus on infrastructure means that the state is seeking to make doing business transactions in the region easier. This leads to a snowball effect. The movement of commercial banks into the region further paves the way for other businesses to follow and stimulates a sense of reliability in these markets. Securing one-sided trade relations is another way in which the state supports and promotes its industries. ‘Multi-national Corporations’ (MNCs) from the sub-imperial state therefore seek to expand into the region in pursuit of maximising profits and can operate with or without the state’s direct support. However, they invariably benefit (at least tacitly) from state discourses.

Yet, the state and business discourses are not always in harmony. Official state discourses emphasise ‘development’ and the reciprocity of regional integration. These are infused with a business discourse emphasising the benefits of a neo-liberal, market-driven approach. Yet when business discourses become too prevalent or business is exposed for unscrupulous behaviour, the state runs the risk of having its self-interest and exploitative practices laid bare.

The ideological power behind such expansion is driven by two key areas and institutions: the corporate-endowed research community and the more conventional
state-linked and corporate media institutions. The former provides most of the impetus and ‘intellectual’ contributions behind the GBM complex through position papers, policy briefs, conferences, popular articles, expert interviews and public participation platforms. This group comprises the ‘state intelligentsia’ who for better or worse are compelled to chase government tenders linked to official state discourses. Although the commercial research environment typically receives some of its funds from non-governmental sources or other donor governments, its major client is often government, if they are not directly accountable to it. Thus much public money will go into establishing centres, institutes and multi-year projects dedicated to exploring the regional role played by the dominant state. These forces also permeate the universities in so far as they are compelled to respond to market pressures or the demand for consultancy in research institutes. Universities also respond to state discourses through course design and content, and have at least a nominal duty to be ‘society relevant’ by conforming to market pressures facing graduates. They also play a role in educating the intellectual and financial elite from the region, often drawing them in as experts on their own country, and socialising them into the dominant state’s values and ideals.

The role of the media is particularly important in this. Pieter Fourie, Professor of Communications at the University of SA (interview, 04/02/2009), contended that the media are ‘business through ideological means’. Here the media not only represent a form of ‘non-neutral’ business, but also act as a mediator and often independent actor shaping the government-business informational flows. The media hold a privileged position in the GBM complex given its powerful role in shaping discourses and agendas. Depending on their ownership, they can be critical of both spheres simultaneously, or represent the grievances of the one against the other, particularly when the state’s capitalist interests are under threat.
The media play an important role in this process through their expansion into the region, including media such as newspapers, radio and television. The movement of the state broadcaster into the region, often with its own regional news network, is the strongest form of this. Channels and programmes are designed to capture a focus on this locality for both entertainment and factual purposes. Satellite services providing for paid television services further carry programmes developed in the source country. Implicit in these forms of communication is a socialisation into the dominant state’s culture which includes aspects as diverse as movies, music and sport. For the sake of simplicity the notion of ‘cultural-media’ that assumes the media are always context-specific, will be adopted. The ‘cultural-media’ play an important role in developing a national identity for the dominant state.

There are many counter-imperialist discourses emanating from within the sub-imperial state that serve to uncover the GBM complex. The relationship between the state, business and civil society is a complex and dynamic one. Civil society serves to unpack and unravel much of the collusion between government and business and is therefore not always welcomed or appreciated. The same applies to labour organisations and trade unions. However, partnerships between the state and these organisations create the ‘illusion’ of serious political contestation and a possible co-opting of the left-wing, as long as they are not so powerful as to threaten investment or control by the elite. At the same time, these organisations often need support from the state to survive. Independent media houses can also antagonise and expose these relations. Furthermore, resistance from regional governments and businesses, often in collusion with the media, construct counter-imperialist discourses that serve to question the GBM complex. This study seeks to further understand these regional counter-imperialist discourses and how they impact upon SA’s GBM complex.
1.5 **Introduction to case study countries**

In order to assess regional attitudes and responses to SA’s GBM complex this study will focus on the SADC region. This will be achieved by adopting a case study approach focusing primarily on Botswana and Zambia. The choice of case study countries is not meant to be fully representative of SADC. Rather, they were chosen because of the contrasts they provide. Botswana can be said to represent the inner core of SADC and Zambia the periphery of SADC. Botswana has a historically accommodationist approach to SA (Daniel, 1984), belongs to SACU and has economic and political ties with SA which stretch throughout the twentieth century. It also houses the SADC headquarters.

This is contrasted with the relative lack of historic involvement by SA in Zambia. Zambia does not belong to SACU. In colonial times its major trade route was via Zimbabwe to the Mozambican ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques, now Maputo (Griffiths, 1989). After independence, Zambia looked north rather than south and relied heavily on the Tan-Zam railway. Zambia used to support anti-apartheid movements prior to the 1990s, but in the post-apartheid period trade between the two countries has increased dramatically, such that Zambia is now SA’s leading export destination in Africa (SA Department of Trade and Industry, 2012).

1.6 **Outline of the thesis**

Chapter 2 outlines the qualitative methods and, to a lesser extent, the quantitative techniques involved in the study. It also discusses the epistemological assumptions of the study and the development of grounded theory. The chapter further examines various aspects of the interview method including sampling, the number of respondents,
the questionnaire design and methods of analysis. Details of the media searches are also provided. Issues concerning power dynamics and reflexivity in the interview setting, and ethical issues are also considered.

Chapter 3 discusses the rise (and the real or apparent fall) of SA’s power. The chapter will outline the historical geographical development of SA’s capital accumulation in southern Africa and how this developed into a full-blown GBM complex. The chapter begins by tracing the early history of SA from 1652 to 1910. The period leading up to and during apartheid, from 1910 to 1994, is considered against the further entrenchment of capital accumulation through the growing regionalism of the colonial and apartheid states. Regional responses are also assessed. The democratic years, from 1994 to the present, are discussed against a consolidation of capital accumulation practices amidst the rapidly changing political landscape. The GBM complex became fully engaged during president Mbeki’s tenure. The final section of this chapter describes the transition from a Mbeki to a Jacob Zuma presidency along with the dramatic political events which culminated in 2008 – many of which had a clear regional slant (Chapters 5-8). This section is also an introduction to the thematic case studies and poses the question: is SA’s sub-imperialism in crisis?

Chapter 4 is a foundational empirical chapter that precedes the four narrower thematic case studies. It will further make the case for understanding SA’s regional relations through a GBM complex and how elite members within these three sectors interact and collude for purposes of capital accumulation. The chapter focuses on counter-imperialist discourses in Botswana and Zambia towards SA’s GBM complex. It is demonstrated how these discourses arise by analysing incongruencies and discrepancies in SA’s interaction with the region in the areas of SA’s foreign policy and trade; business engagement; and cultural-media. Chapter 4 suggests that there are
concerted regional counter-imperialist discourses to SA’s GBM complex and that SA’s state and business discourses are being exposed for their self-interest and exploitative practices. This chapter sets the stage for the remaining case studies which focus on specific aspects of SA’s relations with the region and the counter-imperialist discourses elicited.

Chapter 5 investigates counter-imperialist discourses to SA’s energy crisis. The chapter begins by exploring the background to the crisis followed by a description of the crisis in SA. The focus then shifts to the region. The analysis is divided into SACU and SADC states. The construction of counter-imperialist discourses by regional governments, businesses and media is discussed. The impact of the energy crisis on SA’s capital accumulation in the region is also considered. The final section in the chapter discusses the impact of the energy crisis on perceptions of SA’s regional standing. The chapter suggests that the energy crisis struck at the core of the GBM complex through its impact on capital accumulation. The SA state discourses have for a long time stressed the inter-reliance of regional energy systems through the ‘Southern African Power Pool’ (SAPP), whilst really using this as an opportunity to secure a ‘fixed space’ for Eskom’s monopoly. However, the counter-imperialist discourses at the time of the crisis largely exposed the GBM complex for these practices.

Chapter 6 examines counter-imperialist discourses to SA’s mediation in Zimbabwe during the negotiations period leading up to the signing of the peace agreement in September 2008, and immediately thereafter. The chapter begins by discussing the events which led to the signing of the agreement. The chapter then investigates the formation of counter-imperialist discourses by analysing responses by regional governments, businesses and media to SA’s mediation. Assessments are made of the impact of the events in Zimbabwe on SA’s capital accumulation. The impact of
SA’s mediation on perceptions of its regional standing is also determined. Chapter 6 demonstrates that whilst regional peace-making initiatives were instrumental to the discursive formations legitimising SA’s capital accumulation, its handling of the Zimbabwean crisis exposed these discourses for their self-interest. This was demonstrated by a certain callous disregard for the ‘actual’ suffering of people in the region, and a tendency to frame conflicts as elitist constructs.

Chapter 7 investigates counter-imperialist discourses to the xenophobia attacks in SA. The chapter starts by outlining the major reasons for the attacks followed by a description of the events of May 2008. The analysis then focuses on the counter-imperialist discourses in SADC and beyond, where applicable. As in the other chapters, this is achieved by examining the responses from regional governments, businesses and media. The effects of the xenophobia attacks on SA businesses operating in the region are also considered. Evaluations are made on the impact of the attacks on perceptions of SA’s regional standing. The chapter suggests that the counter-imperialist discourses in the region at the time of the xenophobia attacks provide an indictment of the very nature of the GBM complex; that the GBM complex promotes the interests of SA elite members who continue to benefit from regional inequality. It also exposed the GBM complex for the disjuncture between its state and business discourses. Not only is the GBM complex indifferent to the poor and marginalised, but can be inimical to their interests.

Chapter 8 examines regional patterns of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ through SA’s hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup. The analysis is structured differently from the other chapters in the sense that it has a temporal frame built into it, with a pre- and post-event analysis modelled on regional expectations of benefiting through the event, and the actual outcomes. The analysis is further divided into SADC
states and those beyond SADC where appropriate. The actual regional outcomes related to the event are calculated in the areas of infrastructure, tourism, employment, image enhancement, investment, media and Information Communications Technology (ICT).

The final section of the chapter focuses on the impact of the World Cup on perceptions of SA’s regional standing. The chapter submits that although the World Cup provided a powerful opportunity for the GBM complex to assert itself, the counter-imperialist discourses exposed the lack of tangible benefits to flow to the region as a result of the event. This contrasted strongly with the SA state and business rhetoric of an ‘African Games’ displaying a certain tokenism towards Africa in these discourses.

The concluding chapter of the thesis, Chapter 9, brings together the main theoretical and empirical points in order to develop conclusions in respect of the central and subsidiary questions, and overall aim of the thesis. The key conclusions of this chapter relate to the centrality of counter-imperialist discourses in questioning aspects of SA’s sub-imperialism. The conclusions drawn in this chapter do not only have political ramifications for SA’s relations with southern Africa, but have broader theoretical implications for a ‘second tier’ of global imperial powers. Suggestions for future studies are made.
Chapter 2

Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the design of the research project and methods of analysis. It also covers the epistemological assumptions and the overall orientation of the study. A brief discussion of ethical considerations concludes the chapter.

2.2 Methods and approach to the subject

2.2.1 Qualitative research: Embracing elements of a mixed-methods approach

Although the current study embraces mixed methods (see Creswell and Tashakkori, 2007; Hesse-Biber, 2010; Philip, 1998; Tashakkori and Teddle, 1998), it is primarily a qualitative study drawing from structured interviews and media sources. Quantitative data were also derived from the questionnaire to verify the reliability of the qualitative data and to cover a wide range of supporting topics and themes, the breadth of which could not have been covered through qualitative questioning alone.

One of the main techniques of qualitative data collection is the interview method. I am particularly interested in elite interviewing as a defined type of interviewing. Although most good qualitative research handbooks would at least have a sub-section dealing with elite interviewing (Holloway, 1997; Kvale, 2007; Marshall and Rossman, 2011) there is also a distinct body of literature pertaining to elite interviewing drawn from the fields of, amongst others, political science, sociology, business, education and geography (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Dexter, 1970; Goldstein,
2002; Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987; Pettigrew, 1992). The methods employed in this study also entailed the collection and analysing of documents and supporting material, such as media sources and policy documents.

I have been based in SA for two and a half years during the research, gathering data and writing-up my findings. Being based in SA for this amount of time has been particularly useful given the unfolding nature of my case studies. It afforded me sustained and concentrated exposure to media debates and first-hand experience of political developments.

2.3 Data collection

2.3.1 The interview process

The interviews forming the basis of my thesis, took place in three countries: South Africa (SA), Botswana and Zambia. This entailed a series of interviews in SA, the main focus of the study, as well as interviews in Botswana and Zambia. The interviews were conducted in late 2008 and early 2009. I started my interviews in SA in November 2008 to gain insight into the thinking of government and business in the region. I was able to complete approximately half of the SA interviews before traveling to Gaborone in Botswana during December 2008 to begin the regional round of interviews. I then moved on to Lusaka in Zambia during January 2009. I completed most of the SA interviews in February 2009.

The weight to be attached to the subjective attitudes and opinions of the respondents is considerable on account of the fact that they are experts and leaders in their fields (see list of respondents after appendix A). Meetings with Deputy Ministers, CEOs, Directors and leaders of regional organisations are, needless to say, difficult to secure and often demanded persistence. The interview with now Minister, then Deputy
Minister, Rob Davies, took about three to four months to secure. Interviews were substantial, often lasting between an hour and a quarter to one and half hours. I interviewed 14 elite members in SA, 15 in Botswana and 17 in Zambia, totaling 46. The intention with these 46 interviews was to have a more or less even spread of 5 respondents in each sector (government, business and media) with the aim of totaling 15 in each country, although such a neat division was not always possible. A further 6 focused follow-up interviews were conducted telephonically when clarification or additional information was required. The value of my chosen method was that I had a considerable degree of control over the choice of respondents, interview setting and standardisation of interviews (see 2.3.3).

Much thought went into the sixty-six questions in the questionnaire. If the statements presented in tables in the questionnaire are considered single questions, it consisted of over one hundred questions (see appendix A). Consistent with techniques of interviewing elite members, I made observations in the interview setting. I scheduled at least a day per interview, spending 15 days in Botswana and 17 days in Zambia. The data collected in the two countries are used to hold a mirror to SA; they relate introspectively to SA. I am effectively using data gathered in the region (grounded in a strong contextual setting of SA’s political situation) to make statements about SA and its role in the SADC region. My focus is not on SA’s relationship with Botswana and Zambia per se, but on using data from interviews in Botswana and Zambia to gain insight into SA’s relations in SADC.

2.3.2 Sampling: Grounded theory and the Government-Business-Media Complex

My sampling method was based on purposeful sampling. According to the model discussed above, I targeted individuals who were at director level or above. In
government, I selected departments such as foreign affairs and trade and industry. Corporate actors from local firms in Botswana and Zambia dealing with, competing with, or partnering SA companies were also targeted, as were the SA companies concerned. Selection of media companies followed the same pattern. Within the corporate and media sectors, the selection of companies was made by means of a qualitative assessment of the media material and previous studies based on the prominence of companies and the nature of their links with SA companies.

In some cases it was useful to interview leaders of regional organisations, advocacy groups, or those at the head of business chambers in these countries. These respondents have a good overview of the situation and themes dealt with in the study. In the case of regional organisations and advocacy groups, respondents were categorised as civil servants on the basis of their knowledge of the governance systems of the country in which they reside. Respondents heading business chambers were classified as corporate actors. I also decided to allow scope to include the ‘theoreticians’ or intellectuals within these sectors, where I thought it would be strategically valuable. This group included prominent academics or those who have retired from civic duty, but still play an important role in the policy and intellectual debates within their countries. This group can be viewed broadly as the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ (1.3.4.1).

I identified my respondents as elite members in their respective countries and fields. The literature defines elite members very broadly. Kvale (2007: 70) defines elite members as ‘persons who are leaders or experts in a community, people who are usually in powerful positions’. Holloway (1997: 53) defines elite interviews as ‘an interview with particularly powerful, wealthy or high-status people’. The definition of elite members by Marshall and Rossman (2011: 155) is more elaborate: ‘Elite individuals are considered to be influential, prominent, and/or well-informed in an organization or
community; they are selected for interviews on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research and for their perspectives on, for example, an organization, a community, or specialised fields.’ Drawing from the above definitions, my operational definition for elite members was simply people who were sought for their expert knowledge in a given area and/or because of a position they hold in an organisation or company.

Interviewing elite members is important for a range of reasons, not least because of their decision-making and influential role that they fulfill in society. Focusing on elite members also raises questions concerning the nature of the claims made in the study. Arksey and Knight (1999: 122) rather bluntly assert the value of interviewing elite members:

[T]heir belief systems, activities, roles in decision-making processes and relationship with the rank and file ought to be the subject of empirical examination. By neglecting elites, social scientists, who typically study 'underdogs' on the grounds that this is one way to tackle social equity issues and empower subordinates, are in fact limiting the purchase of their enquiries.

Whilst my study clearly benefited in content from interviewing elite members, they themselves also became a focus of the study. The interview process went from being classified as interviews with ‘key informants’ to treating elite members as the subject of study itself. This shift was a small but important one, and also accompanied a slight shift in how I was to treat and understand the interview process. Initially I thought interviews would be a looser affair where discussion would meander as I would be receiving information from a fairly uninformed, ignorant position of 'poking around in the dark'. However, once I had conducted a few interviews, I realised that I was treating the interview process more as an interview with a respondent (as the subject of the study) as opposed to an interview with an informant. Along with this shift from informant to respondent, I decided to include a more official consent form – to draw
attention to the more conventional researcher-respondent relationship – and began to think of the interview schedule as a *questionnaire*, something to be worked through diligently and in a standardised fashion, instead of an informal *interview schedule*.

As my enquiry into SA’s corporate and state expansion grew, I became particularly interested in the individuals driving this process. It is in this spirit that the real value of my chosen method became evident. The theory of a network of elite members based in the sectors of government, business and media supporting each other for purposes of capital accumulation (1.4), underpinned my methodology and overall approach. However, when I conducted the interviews I was unaware of the extent of the theory I was to develop. This was because the idea of a GBM complex was to develop out of grounded theory. As Charmaz (2006: 3) states:

> *Grounded theorists start with data. We construct these data through our observations, interactions, and materials that we gather about the topic or setting. We study empirical events and experiences and pursue our hunches and potential analytic ideas about them.*

Through my interactions with these elite members, I became aware of the full extent of the interconnectedness between the sectors of government, business and the media, and the people in them (see Chapters 3 and 4). The system of referral which emerged organically through the interview process was indicative of this, although not without problems (2.3.3, below).

2.3.3 Problems encountered

Interviewing elite members also presented challenges. As the literature suggests the biggest problem with interviewing elite members is undoubtedly negotiating access and gaining trust (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 122). Securing interviews at this level always requires persistence. Where possible, the interviews were arranged prior to arriving in the country. My experiences of securing interviews were generally good. Only once did
I feel that I was purposefully being blocked. I sought permission from the Botswanan and Zambian governments to conduct interviews with government officials in their countries. Such permission was granted. In Zambia, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs still needed further permission from their Permanent Secretary and I was told it would take a few months. In this instance, I had to conduct more interviews in the Department of Trade and Industry and the Communications Department to meet the required number of government respondents in that country.

When seeking appropriate respondents, I initially relied on connections I had developed through my associations as an employee, now former employee, of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of SA. These associations were mainly related to networks established through projects where I worked with the Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the South Africa in Africa Rhodes [University] Research Initiative (SARRI). My entry point into interviewing was consistent with what Dexter describes and qualifies as follows (1970: 40):

*Generally speaking, an interviewer or investigator will start a project by looking for introductions and references from those who have or have had contact with an organization, situation, or institution. Such persons will normally be asked for suggestions as whom to see first. It is important to remember that their unchallenged responses may very often be seriously misleading, wasteful and time-consuming.*

The connections mentioned above provided the necessary entry points into the countries and assisted me in brokering initial contact with the elite members. A typical problem with this method is also further described by Dexter in his book ‘Elite and specialised interviewing’ (1970: 39-40):

*The interviewees with which one starts are more apt to be “one’s own kind of people” and to share the preconceptions of the investigator; hence starting out with them may in fact lead the interviewer to rely too much and too long on unchallenged*
assumptions which would be more quickly questioned through interviews with others...

As I moved through the interview process, I sometimes had to rely on referral by those who had already been interviewed. The problems mentioned above, and more, are all based on problems pertaining to referral. However, given the unique challenges posed by interviewing people of high status, referral was a necessary, albeit problematic way of acquiring interviews. It is not an exaggeration to state that as a student it could take many months to secure a slot in the diary of a captain of industry or Minister, if at all. This is often on account of the interview being rescheduled at the last minute. Referrals are a necessary part of gaining the trust of elite members and thereby greatly enhance the chances of ‘getting through the door’.

However, as Dexter further notes, there is a difference between the respondents whom you start out interviewing and those whom you interview later. He describes the process of interviewing elite members and specialist respondents as ‘a process of continuing discovery’ (1970: 43):

One is learning how to reformulate or at least modify one’s formulation of a problem; one is locating new data. So, the decision as to whom to see depends largely upon one’s on-going reflection about the issue, upon new data and hypotheses that come to one’s attention, from whatever source – often from earlier interviews.

As I progressed through the interview process, I became more questioning of the choice of respondents and the nature of their relationships with each other. This emerged as an important and natural way to qualify and further refine my sampling method. When selecting respondents who were referred to me, I would keep an additional two points in mind. First, I would only use a referral technique in so far as it allowed me to meet my set criteria for respondents. Second, extra care would be taken in the interview itself by using question prompts to seek further points of clarification. After an interview, further critical reflection as measured against my intended goals would occur concerning the
respondent. Through these means I was able to continually refine my sampling techniques. Occasionally, this led me to discount respondents who were referred to me, but were deemed unsuitable because they fell outside my established criteria for respondents.

The actual interview would be preceded by emailing the questionnaire to a given respondent beforehand. The email included an introductory letter stating who I was, my qualifications and expertise in the area of study and the objectives of the research. The interview started with me asking the interviewee to sign a consent form stating what the data would be used for and that they could withdraw from the study at any time should they wish. Issues of confidentiality and sensitivity with data are particularly important when interviewing elite members because of the level of risk involved in them being misquoted or misrepresented (see 2.5.3).

2.3.4 Questionnaire design

The questionnaire was designed in a structured format (see appendix A), consisting of seven sections covering sixty-six questions in total. The questionnaire contained questions grouped according to thematic areas and case studies. It started with three sections dealing with attitudes towards SA’s foreign policy, perceptions of SA businesses active in the region, and impressions of SA’s cultural-media. This was followed by a further four sections of questions grouped according to the four thematic case studies. The questionnaire was designed so that it could be administered in the three countries and the three sectors within each country, with only minor adjustments.

However, the fact that the questionnaire was structured did not rule out the need to remain flexible and open to the more conversational style of interviewing which is appropriate for elite respondents. When interviewing elite members it is important to
allow sufficient time for them to elaborate and cast the subject matter in their terms. Allowing them to develop an argument is an important way to gauge their thoughts on a matter. As Arksey and Knight state (1999: 124):

> [E]lites are used to being asked what they think; all things being equal, they are likely to converse freely and at length...This is one reason why elites are often resistant to structured interviews, especially any who may be bombastic or bullying. They do not want to be pigeon-holed into particular categories, or become part of statistical aggregates.

My limited experience suggests that with a balanced, well-structured and well-worded questionnaire, even the busier and more heavy-handed elite members will see merit in ‘staying the course’. For the duration of the interview respondents contributed freely to each question, but were also aware of the facilitating and guiding role of the questionnaire. Thankfully, a high level of respect was shown for the questionnaire as a research instrument that needed to be worked through systematically.

I encouraged the respondents to develop their own style and structure when answering by punctuating the flow of questions with lengthy and regular pauses. This was also achieved through question prompts. This was particularly the case at strategic points or when dealing with the more summative open-ended questions.

I designed the questionnaire with a balance between closed-ended questions and open-ended questions, to extract both qualitative and quantitative data. The quantitative data extracted from the questionnaire merely represent an indication or impression to guide the reader as to the direction and extent of the subjective attitudes of my sample. It does not purport to represent the views of elite members in these countries as a purposeful sampling method was used. The sample is also too small. When presenting the quantitative data, I generalise to the total sample (46 respondents) and the national level (+/- 15 respondents). I do not generalise to a sector within a country (+/- 5 respondents), as this further reduces the number.
There were two main types of closed-ended questions in the questionnaire. The *first* type was when a closed-ended question would precede an open-ended question. Respondents were first asked to place their response on a scale and then to substantiate their answer (see appendix A, for example question 3). The *second* type involved a question matrix which included a table of statements, also asking elite members to respond to each statement by placing their response on a scale (see appendix A, for example question 17). In both instances, a Likert scale was used. Responses ranged from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, and included a ‘neutral’ category. In the second type of questioning as described above, where statements were posed for the interviewee to respond to in a question matrix, the style of questioning sometimes involved subtle changes in the wording of statements to check consistency. This style of questioning also involved the posing of ‘extreme’ statements in exploratory fashion. It leaves scope for the use of negative (and positive) statements, requiring the respondent to confirm or refute such a statement (see appendix A, questions 44, 51, 57, 59 and 68).

Three important matters must be identified with regards to the negative (or positive) statements. First, these questions were placed last or in the middle of the thematic section in which they appear, when most of the issues had already been raised and covered in a qualitative sense. They did not introduce new themes, but rather sub-topics or reiterative matters. They were often used to recapitulate, in a quantitative sense, the direction and extent of attitudes on issues which had largely been covered qualitatively. The strategic ordinal value of questions is a key consideration here, as the questionnaire and each section develops deductively as questions start off broadly but move to the more specific and more challenging.

Second, the respondents were chosen because of their specialist knowledge and positions of authority. Based on this, respondents were presumably well educated,
although this was not a selection criterion. It is reasonable to assume that business and media elite members were mostly independent from government, except for officials from state broadcasters and editors of government-owned newspapers. Respondents were also familiar with the issues. They were well briefed on the objectives of the study. Given their positional power, levels of education and otherwise relaxed nature of the interview setting respondents were comfortable enough to ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with a statement if they thought it appropriate. Their levels of expertise also allowed me to pitch the questions at a slightly more advanced level than if I were dealing with someone who does not understand the context or who does not deal with such issues regularly.

Third, respondents could also opt out of expressing an opinion as in each question there was a ‘neutral’, and in many cases a ‘not applicable’ category to choose from.

Leading questions can typically also be a problem when designing a questionnaire. Dexter (1970: 27) states of leading questions:

*The only universal value here is that the interviewer should try to determine what tactics he did in fact employ and make at least an informed guess as to how the chosen tactics may have affected what the interviewee said.*

However, a certain degree of context to questions is necessary and the right balance needs to be struck through careful wording. When analysing the data I would revisit the wording of questions and attempt to assess how the wording or sequence of questions might have influenced the answers received (see 7.8.3 and 8.6.1).

2.3.5 Why media?

Once the grounded theory of the GBM complex had evolved, a clearer understanding of the role of media in these processes became apparent. The media provide the substance
behind the regional ‘responses’. The regional media material presented in this study not only enables a chronology and factual account of events thereby contextualising the interview data (see sections 5.4, 6.2, 7.4 and 8.4), but also provides the primary medium through which counter-imperialist discourses toward SA are articulated by regional governments and businesses (see sections 5.5, 5.6, 6.3, 6.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 8.5). However, the media themselves are also viewed as important actors in these processes. They are viewed not only as a medium through which other actors can communicate, but also as independent agents in the informational flows that give rise to these discourses (see sections 5.7, 6.5, 7.7 and 8.5.4).

2.3.6 The process of searching the media

Supplementation of the interview material occurred through thorough yet focused searches in the English and electronically available local media of the relevant countries. Case studies were delimited by particular timeframes, typically three-month periods, and therefore have corresponding media searches. When articles are used outside of the stipulated timeframe, it is generally indicated. The database AllAfrica.com provided a rich source of media material from the region. AllAfrica.com is a database of original African news media covering the major English and electronically available newspapers on the continent. As far as I could establish through searches at tertiary institutions in SA and in conversation with librarians or information specialists, AllAfrica.com is possibly the only, and almost certainly the most comprehensive, database of its kind. Searches of the regional media also involved searching newspapers’ websites individually.

To a lesser extent media searches were also conducted in SA. The SA media searches focused primarily on the SA Media database. This is a rich source of archival
media material compiled at the University of the Free State and drawn from a wide range of SA news sources. More general internet searches were also conducted for SA media. In some cases individual SA newspaper websites were searched.

2.3.7 Selecting newspapers

The main English daily and weekly newspapers were searched in the case study countries. Considerations of independent and government-owned media were taken into account where necessary, so was the personal bias of individual journalists, as far as was possible (see 5.5.2 and 5.8.1). In Botswana, the Mmegi, Sunday Standard and Botswana Gazette were the most useful newspapers for purposes of this study. They are all independent newspapers. The Mmegi is the leading newspaper in Botswana and the only independent daily newspaper in the country. The Sunday Standard is the main Sunday newspaper in Botswana and is edited by Outsa Makone, one of the elite members interviewed. The Botswana Gazette is a mid-week newspaper. By its own estimation it has a readership of over 150,000.

In Zambia, the government-owned Times of Zambia, and the independent The Post and Lusaka Times, proved to be the most useful sources. John Phiri, the editor of the Times of Zambia, is also one of the elite respondents. Lusaka Times is an online publication drawing from Zambian newspapers and media agencies. The Lusaka Times has a ‘comments’ section under articles. These are useful when assessing the responses from online readers, effectively serving as a blogging forum (see 4.3.4). Additional media materials used in this study are drawn primarily from Namibia and Zimbabwe, as well as Mozambique, Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria and Ghana (see Chapters 5 to 8). Similar criteria were followed when selecting newspapers in these countries as I sought to cover

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4 http://www.lusakatimes.com/about/
the major daily (and weekly) English newspapers as well as strike a balance between
government and independent-owned newspapers. This was particularly important in
Zimbabwe and Namibia given the prominence of the government-owned *The Herald*
and *New Era*, respectively. When I suspect that the objectivity or political impartiality
of an article has been compromised, I make a point of declaring the possibility and
cross-referencing the article with other sources (see 6.3.1).

2.3.8 Problems encountered

A number of practical problems were encountered when collecting media material.
These ranged from poorly managed to no available electronic newspaper archives (5.1,
6.1 and 7.1); on occasion newspaper archives did not stretch back far enough to cover
the time period in question (4.1); and, there were various linguistic limitations
depending on the country (6.1 and 7.1). However, when there was a problem with the
website of an individual newspaper, these problems were overcome through
supplementation using the AllAfrica.com database, mentioned above. In the more
extreme cases, I had to phone editors or staff in charge of web content to assist me in
running searches on my behalf (5.1 and 7.1). When gathering media material for
Chapter 7, I had to add media from Kenya, which is known for its regional syndication
and general coverage of East Africa, to assist in gathering information on responses in
Somalia (7.1). However, generally media searches yielded more material than I could
reasonably include and selectivity according to relevance had to be exercised.

2.4 Analysis of data

2.4.1 Discourse analysis
Drawing from my interview data and media material, the study uses discourse analysis to analyse the findings. Discourse analysis is an established method of analysis within the qualitative paradigm. It is, however, a very broad term. As highlighted in Chapter 1, this study will be guided by the critical geopolitical literature when dealing with discourse. From a methodological point of view, and for further reference to what is actually meant by discourse analysis, I relied on Potter (1996, cited in Silverman, 2006) who defines discourse analysis as follows:

*DA has an analytic commitment to studying discourse as texts and talk in social practices... the focus is on language as... the medium for interaction; analysis of discourse becomes, then, analysis of what people do. One theme that is particularly emphasized here is the rhetorical or argumentative organization of talk and texts; claims and versions are constructed to undermine alternatives.*

Responses of regional elite members broadly represent the views of government, business and media. These responses are indicative of the attitudes and sentiments giving rise to counter-imperialist discourses towards SA within the region. Responses of SA elite members provide perspective and background from SA’s point of view (see Chapters 4 to 8). The thorough use of media material serves to corroborate interview data.

Further analysis of the media material is based on critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis, drawn from communications literature. Critical linguistics was developed in the 1970s as an influential early school of discourse analysis (Trew, 1979; Fowler, 1986). According to Schrøder (2002: 104) critical linguistics is able to document ‘a close relationship between the linguistic details of media texts and the production of ideology and, by implication, to substantiate that media ideology contributes to the reproduction of a social order founded on inequality and oppression’.

Explaining further, Schrøder (2002: 105) contends:
Since the formation of public opinion in capitalist societies is controlled by those with economic and organizational power over the mass media, who will see to it that representations do not jeopardize their interests and privileges, public communication has a pervasive ideological thrust that renders current social arrangements natural, even inevitable, while discrediting alternatives as contrary to common sense.

She therefore states that ‘linguistic choices made…by journalists…articulate and enact social power in practice’ thereby seeking to preserve the interests of a ruling capitalist elite (ibid.).

Out of critical linguistics arose critical discourse analysis which has since the 1980s been primarily developed by Norman Fairclough (1992; 1995). Critical discourse analysis was more focused on relating textual factors: first, to the concrete social situations in which texts are produced and consumed, and second, to broader social processes. Such a process is usually displayed as a model of three concentric circles in which each circle represents a layer of analysis starting in the middle with the text and moving outwards embedding the analysis in discursive practices, as the second layer of analysis, and ultimately in the wider social context (Schröder, 2002: 106-107).

However, as argued in Chapter 1, this study wishes to move beyond mere theories of domination and explores the processes of regional resistance. Here the communications literature focusing on audience agency and resistance is instructive (McMillin, 2007: 158-169). This literature highlights the role played by the media in formulating responses and articulating the interests of the marginalised or oppressed. McMillin refers to many studies to draw attention to audience agency and resistance. Drawing from Ma (2000), McMillin (2007: 158) describes how in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident in China, journalists and students subverted the dominant government-created discourse which cast the massacre as the result of youthful fanaticism, by planting their own conflicting anti-government messages in newspapers.
Referring to Nyamnjoh (2004), McMillin (2007: 160) further discusses how new Information Communications Technology (ICT) was used in SA to protest against giant pharmaceutical companies and to campaign against globalisation at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and G8. McMillin (2007: 160) comments on these processes: ‘Websites represent the interests of indigenous minorities by the Baha Pygmies of the rainforest and the Bushmen of the Kalahari and the large community of Yoruba of Nigeria and Zulu of South Africa’. She concludes that although it is normally elite intellectuals, NGOs and activists that are using the media to represent the interests of the marginalised, they are generally attempting to do this in good faith.

Similarly, the current study uses quotations from newspaper articles as a rich source of data demonstrating how elite members in the region use discursive formations to actively shape and construct counter-imperialist discourses. This is for purposes of representing regional communities and groups who are dispossessed or marginalised as a result of the unfair consequences of SA’s sub-imperialism. The study therefore proposes that the content of newspapers represents the economic and political values of regional elite members, steeped in a sense of resistance. Media elite members express their views directly through editorials and opinion pieces by specialist and veteran journalists. Journalists also write reports covering, or expressing the views of, regional governments and businesses. The economic and political values of the regional elite members are also represented in newspaper articles, letters and opinion pieces personally written by regional government officials, business representatives, experts, academics and those from regional think-tanks. Collectively these messages work to construct counter-imperialist discourses towards SA’s sub-imperialism. Further, verification of the qualitative arguments occurs through the quantitative data extracted from the questionnaire.
2.5 Ethical considerations and power dynamics in the interview setting

2.5.1 Interviewing elite members

The literature on interviewing elite members typically discusses the power differential between interviewee and interviewer in the context of the interview setting (Rice, 2010). It is suggested that interviewers might be overawed talking face-to-face with elite respondents and would need to be well prepared, typically having to demonstrate some kind of proficiency in the subject matter themselves. Besides mentioning that I am a DPhil candidate at Oxford and that the interview was for a DPhil thesis, in the introductory email to the respondent I would also mention that I was an employee in the HSRC of SA. This might have played a role in helping to balance the power differential. For the SA respondents this would seemingly assist in building trust. Elite members expected a certain level of competence on the subject. However, this could also have worked against me. I could have been labelled as a particular type of researcher, working within a certain paradigm; I could have been seen as ‘in’ with a particular group of researchers and academics. However, in my experience this was not the case and the connection worked largely in my favour, if only to assist in getting me ‘through the door’. In the other countries, this would probably not have had much of an impact. The fact that I was a candidate from a prestigious university in the United Kingdom doing fieldwork in Africa, might have assisted me through some kind of ‘novelty’ or ‘stand-out’ effect.

2.5.2 Reflexivity

A further issue deals with reflexivity in terms of my national and racial identity. I am a white South African studying in the United Kingdom and researching issues concerning
SA’s sub-imperialism. Although the respondents were aware of my identity and could have viewed me as someone who had unfairly benefited from apartheid, their willingness to participate, the manner in which they approached the interview and their frank responses, suggest that they were not influenced by my background. There were sufficient non-verbal cues to support this suggestion.

Even though identity factors can never be entirely removed from inter-personal communication, it appears that my identity was neither a noticeable limitation nor subtle hindrance in the interview setting.

The data I gathered thorough questionnaires were supplemented by informal conversations with approximately ten experts in fields such as international relations, geography or regional politics in southern Africa.

2.5.3 Confidentiality and elite members

Individuals in the study are not talking on behalf of their organisation or company, unless stated, but in their personal capacities. Their subjective experiences as elite members are important. Where I consider a statement particularly provocative or casting the respondent in a negative light, I do not provide the name of the person. The principle of fairness and accuracy when quoting is the abiding rule applied in this study. There were no electronic recordings of interviews. Written notes were kept by me.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to explain the overall design and methods of data collection and analysis employed in this study. It also illustrated how the grounded theory ‘emerged’ whilst in the process of data collection and analysis.
The next chapter draws attention to the historical geographical development of the GBM complex, further embedding the theory in the southern African context. This provides the necessary background for the empirical chapters that follow later.
Chapter 3

3. The rise (and fall?) of South Africa’s power

3.1 Introduction

The historical development of the government-business-media (GBM) complex evolved around capital accumulation premised on a spatially and commercially expanding state controlled by a ruling English and Afrikaans oligarchy. This oligarchy’s power was premised on mining which gave rise to control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy through conglomerates (centred on inter-linking ownership in mining, manufacturing and finance), with strong links to the government and/or a capacity to influence politics. These conglomerates had a significant regional footprint through various holding companies or stakes in Multi-national Corporations (MNCs). They were able to exercise monopolistic control of the region by means of capital flows, labour and production. The ruling oligarchy therefore managed to concentrate capital accumulation in the region in the hands of a few, and did so by means corresponding closely to Harvey’s (2005) accumulation by dispossession.

3.2. Concise history of South Africa 1652–1910: Settler regimes, territorial conquest and commerce

The initial historical phases of South Africa’s (SA’s) expansion into the African hinterland were characterised by the ‘cut and thrust’ of the relationship between the state and commerce. This territorial expansion was initially seen as expressing the
Afrikaners’ wish to govern themselves, and then as an extension of British imperialism driven by the discovery of diamonds and gold in the interior.

3.2.1 The arrival of the Dutch in the Cape and their movement into the interior

The first successful attempt at settlement in the Cape was made by the Dutch East India Company. In 1652 a group of one hundred and twenty-five men and four women landed at Table Bay and established the first permanent European settlement. Germans were also on the three ships that landed that day (Riley, 1991: 1). Giliomee and Mbenga (2007: 41) refer to the Dutch East India Company or VOC, and the English East India Company, as ‘the first multinational corporations’. The Cape was of strategic mercantilist interest en route to the East. However, when the Dutch arrived they were clearly not the first people to inhabit the Cape. The new settlers were to dispossess the local inhabitants of cattle and land for grazing. Riley (1991: 1) notes that when Van Riebeeck arrived he found the Cape area inhabited by the Khoi-Khoi and, to a lesser extent, the Bushmen. She also points out that the indigenous people at first were friendly, but within two years displayed an openly hostile attitude.

French Huguenots (Protestants) arrived in the Cape in the late sixteenth century. Davenport (1989: 23) notes that the Huguenots settled along the Berg River among Dutch settlers and ‘an originally diverse European population was thus coaxed into cultural uniformity, with the language of the Netherlands and the religion of the Reformed Church for cement’. He further states: ‘The Afrikaner people, an amalgam of nationalities, came gradually into being during the… [1700s]’ (ibid.). On the expansion of the settlers into the interior, Davenport (1989: 30) observes that in the early eighteenth century the ‘first white frontiersman’ known as the ‘trekboer’ emerged.
These men were to thrive under the informal loan farm system which facilitated their gradual claiming of land.

The trekboers had maintained tenuous links with the Cape government. But once the British arrived the Boers’ interests in the Cape colony were more seriously challenged. Butler (2009: 8) claims: ‘[T]he Cape colony became inhospitable to Boers. Britain, which had taken direct control over the Cape in 1795…introduc[ed] cultural and legal changes which damaged [the Boers’] interests and threatened to curtail their hitherto untrammeled power over their labourers’.

As a result, the Boers later embarked on what is known as the Great Trek, which was a mass exodus of about 10,000 Afrikaner men and women from the Cape Colony. They were known as the Voortrekkers. The push factors for the migration were also due to a more general crisis being experienced by the Afrikaners. Venter (1985: 16-21) divides the reasons for the exodus into ‘material’ and ‘psychological’ causes. The material causes were ‘capital losses’, ‘hunger for land’, ‘frontier insecurity’ and ‘labour problems’. The psychological causes were generally attributed to the developments in the Cape, as described by Butler above. Three Boer republics were established as a result of the Trek: the Republic of Natal in 1839; the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) in 1852 (later the Transvaal), and the Republic of the Orange Free State 1854 (now Free State). The ZAR and the Republic of the Orange Free State continued to exist until 1902.

3.2.2 Diamonds, gold and British imperialism

The discovery of diamonds and then gold had a profound effect on the economic geography of southern Africa. Diamonds were discovered in 1867 near Kimberley in Griqualand West. This was followed by the discovery of gold in the Lydenberg district
of Transvaal, which brought great wealth to the Boer republic. This led to an attempt by the British in 1877 to seize the Transvaal as a first step to gain control of the mineral rich interior. In 1881 a Boer rebellion led by Paul Kruger, who was president of the Transvaal at the time, was able to restore the Transvaal’s independence (Riley, 1991: 4). However, it was the discovery of a larger gold deposit in the Witwatersrand in 1886 that was to really heighten global capitalist interest in SA, and specifically in the ‘Rand’ area as it was commonly known. The discovery of diamonds and gold in SA changed it from a white colonial settlement, of minimal significance to the British Empire, to a regional centre of mining industry (Libby, 1987: 20). The mineral wealth of the country’s interior had also profoundly altered the relationship between the Cape government and Boer Republics. Davenport (1989: 202) notes that the founding of the Rand goldfields ‘radically altered the balance of advantage...’ and that ‘the coastal states sought to attach themselves to the Rand commercially’. The need to transport the raw minerals to the major ports and bring machinery from Europe to the mines sparked the rapid construction of railways. The infrastructure for a regional economy was created through the burgeoning minerals trade. The city of Johannesburg soon became the regional focus of mining, finance and banking. There was a rapid influx of workers and other forms of industries which congregated around Johannesburg and other urban centres, as industries developed to support these populations. In short, SA developed a capitalist and industrial economy (Worden, 1995: 37). A significant by-product of the rise in demand for labour was the migrant labour system which became a defining feature of monopolistic ‘control’ exercised by the GBM complex over the region throughout the twentieth century (see below).

The mining towns and cities became synonymous with the rise of an English mining elite. Giliomee and Mbenga (2007: 201) comment: ‘Gold made some so rich
that the London Press referred to the top 20 or 30 as the Randlords’. Some of the more successful Randlords were Cecil Rhodes, Barney Barnato, J.B. Robinson and Alfred Beit. In the words of Wheatcroft (1986: 7): ‘Standing above all others in Johannesburg were the great plutocrats who owned and controlled the city. “The Randlords”…two dozen very powerful and rich financiers…”’ Much to the chagrin of Paul Kruger, who was based in the nearby town of Pretoria, the mining industry was controlled by English corporations with greater access to capital, technology and international markets. The English Randlords leading these corporations had the experience, values, connections, skills and administrative abilities necessary to thrive in a modern capitalist economy. A class of mostly English professionals was to emerge in Johannesburg in the early 1900s. Welsh (2000: 302-303) argues that the position of the Republic was one of accommodation and opportunity. Yet the Boer Republic was slow to truly embrace the developments that minerals were to bring. Ultimately, stubbornness to the impending change and a reluctance to embrace a modern economy contributed to the South African or Anglo-Boer War.

Despite a multiplicity of mining claims and counter-claims (some of them by Afrikaners), a deliberate strategy to monopolise ownership of the mines was made by the Randlords. The intention was to enhance the efficiency of extraction, lower production costs and control yields to regulate the market. Needless to say, this significantly aided the accumulation strategy of the Randlords thereby enabling them further to consolidate their wealth (Van Zyl, 1986: 36-38; Gilomee and Mbenga, 2007: 201). The foundations of the GBM complex were well and truly being laid.

The Randlords often had explicit and overlapping political interests. For example, Cecil John Rhodes was elected governor of the Cape in 1890. Rhodes, with Beit, founded a new British colony to the north of the Transvaal named Rhodesia. The
extent to which Rhodes’s economic ‘empire’ was to finance his political ambitions is well documented. For these individuals the state and capitalist logics of imperialism were clearly synonymous. Rhodes was obsessed with expansion and also founded the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The BSAC received a charter from the British Government in 1899 which gave the Company effective sovereignty over Rhodesia, and was created with the extraction of minerals in mind. The BSAC was to give Rhodes control over large tracts of the sub-continent and became a way to open up new colonies in southern Africa (Wheatcroft, 1986: 144). Rhodes was driven by the dream of extending British territory from the ‘Cape to Cairo’. Part of this dream involved the idea of a large SA federation comprising most of southern Africa (Thompson, 2001: 150).

The monopolies of the Randlords were further directly aided by the Cape government and Boer Republics. According to Libby (1987: 23), the mining monopolies were given ‘legislative support’ through The Diamond Trade Acts of the 1880s and The Transvaal Consolidated Gold Law of 1885. Some of the Randlords openly supported Kruger’s government. However, those involved in deep-level mining were far less supportive due to the government’s inefficient and expensive practices relating to railways, dynamite and alcohol (Giliomee and Mbenga, 2007: 198 and 201).

The British interests in the minerals of the Republic culminated in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. Pakenham (1979: xxii), recounting the events leading up to the conflict, states that in 1895 it was the political desire of the Uitlanders (an Afrikaans term meaning ‘foreigners’, given to the British in the Transvaal) – backed by the wealth of Rhodes and Beit – that seemed to present the British with a chance of once again gaining control over the Transvaal. This culminated in 1896 in the failed Jameson Raid which greatly embarrassed Rhodes and caused him personal loss. Then in 1899, according to Riley (1991: 5), ‘a mass petition signed by the Uitlanders was sent to the
British government asking for protection’ and war was officially declared. The British ultimately won the war, but had significant trouble overcoming a motivated and shrewd Boer resistance, despite having far greater numbers. The overall strategy of the British is succinctly captured by Butler (2009: 12): ‘Unification was the ultimate goal of war…British power built the machinery of state control through which it…ensured that the mineral wealth of South Africa could be exploited by British-based conglomerates’.

In 1910 the former Boer Republics merged with the Cape and Natal to form the Union of South Africa. Worden (1995: 30) suggests that the creation of the union secured the interests of not only the British but the whites generally. This was because the creation of a union ‘marked the end of the protracted process of conquest of [SA] by settler and imperial powers’. Thus the Afrikaners were incorporated into the political structures of the new state, but not the Africans – other than minimal enfranchisement in the Cape. The conquest of land was thus formalised by the Act of Union which entrenched white political power in a unitary state (Worden, 1995: 32). The interests of the future GBM complex were thus secured. Although at the time there was speculation that the British protectorates would later join the union, this did not happen after the state created in 1910 effectively fixed the boundaries of modern SA. At that stage, the so-called British High Commission Territories (HCTs) were Bechuanaland (later Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho), and Swaziland (BLS). Both Britain and SA envisaged that they would eventually join the Union, but with the development of apartheid after 1948 and SA’s departure from the Commonwealth after becoming a Republic in 1960, it became clear that this was politically impracticable. Southern Rhodesia voted not to join the union in a referendum in 1922.
3.3 1910–1994: Entrenchment of capital accumulation

The ‘cut and thrust’ of the early settler and imperial expansion had laid the platform for the GBM complex. Yet it was in the twentieth century that the character of the GBM complex really took root. Fine and Rustomjee (1996) make an important contribution to this study. Their contention that SA’s political economy is premised on a Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) demonstrates the concentration in ownership that was a significant feature of the GBM complex. This was to stem from the monopolisation of mining. Drawing from Davies (1979 p. 50 quoting Frankel 1938), Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 98) contend:

*Corporate structure [in SA] has evolved around the MEC core. The origins of the MEC lie in mining. After exhaustion of the surface gold deposits, it was the enormous economies of scale required by deep mining conditions which led to early concentration of ownership: ‘Out of the 576 gold mining companies floated on the Rand during the period 1887-1932...only 57 remained in existence in 1932...The 57 goldmining companies in existence in 1932 were, with some minor exceptions, controlled by six finance houses or groups’.*

Fine and Rustomjee make the point that the six conglomerate forms that developed since then, and are still evident today, are extensions of an oligopoly whose power is in part rooted in the manufacturing and financial sectors (ibid.: 106). After describing how these conglomerates have extended their ownership into manufacturing and finance, Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 106) conclude: ‘[T]he structure of private corporate capital in South Africa is represented by six-broad-based, organically linked axes of capital, each with varying interests in mining, manufacturing and the financial sector’. The six capital axes were: SA Mutual; Sanlam; AAC; Liberty/Standard; Rembrandt/Volkskas; and Anglovaal. In 1988, 82.5% of the entire Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) was controlled by these six conglomerates (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996: 102). The important point, other than the highly concentrated ownership, is the ‘naturally lubricating’ and ‘mutually reinforcing’ role played between the areas of finance, mining and
manufacturing, and how collusion between these spheres was a deliberate strategy employed by the ruling oligarchy to gain control of the South and southern African economy. Once their control of the economy was secure, they were able to play a decisive role in southern African politics, with a powerful ability to shape political outcomes.

3.3.1 Segregation and the first resistance to the GBM complex

A significant feature of SA during the previous century was the capital and class struggles, typically forming along ethnic and racial lines. Ethnicity and race were used instrumentally by the GBM complex in the mobilisation of capital and resources for the advancement of one group above another. Given the political and economic geography of a racially segregated society, Africans were to live in segregated areas close to large industries. This was to lay the foundations for a highly profitable cycle for the GBM complex. A series of acts were passed to gain control of the flow of labour and ownership of land. The most prominent were the Mines and Works Act (1911); the Natives Land Act (1913); and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act (1923). The movement of Africans was also restricted through pass laws.

The initial period of reconstruction was therefore about maximising the spatial and commercial gains made by the GBM complex in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Butler (2009: 14) explains: ‘During post-unification reconstruction, labour supply remained at the heart of government policy. Native reserves, “influx controls”, and compliant “traditional authorities”, became reliable policy instruments for a state supporting mining and agricultural capital’. Marais (1998: 10) talks about ‘reserve armies of labour’, further noting: ‘In essence the “native reserves” (and later the homelands) would subsidise capitalist growth in [SA]’ (see ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’
in section 3.3.5). These ‘reserve armies of labour’ were not only for mining and agriculture, but also for manufacturing which only really started to grow after 1933. Due to the consolidation and centralisation of state capital as a result of unionisation, the GBM complex was increasingly able to broaden and diversify its activity in the economy. Marais (1998: 11) observes: ‘By the 1940s, manufacturing industry was growing in earnest, thanks to lavish support in the form of protective measures and tariffs, subsidies and major infrastructure projects that facilitated its growth. The shift from artisinal to mechanized production was rapid…’ World War Two increased demand in the North and aided in the rapid expansion of manufacturing in SA (Thompson, 2001: 178).

Besides a large controlled labour force and in order for the GBM complex to thrive, a significant proletarianisation of Africans had to occur. The concentration of ownership in the GBM complex steadily spread from mining and agriculture, to include manufacturing and finance. This meant that a greater skills base amongst Africans was required to sustain these industries and as well as a larger African consumer base. This went hand-in-hand with the increased urbanisation of the African population and an almost total wiping out of a self-sustained African peasantry (Bundy, 1979). Urbanisation was further fuelled by the rapidly declining living standards in the reserves (Marais, 1998: 10). However, the rise of a working class also led to union action, strikes and other forms of resistance towards the GBM complex, not only from Africans but also whites. Due to the gradual spread of large capital into agriculture, further class stratifications along ethnic lines were to emerge amongst the whites. Thousands of Afrikaans farmers had been forced to move to the cities in the face of economic depression. This tension between the GBM complex and the white working class was particularly prevalent on the mines. This culminated in the 1922 Rand Revolt which
was the result of dissatisfaction amongst the Afrikaans and English whites with capitalism, as well as the introduction of cheap African labour. It was suppressed by the military and cost two-hundred lives (Butler, 2009: 14).

### 3.3.2 Integration of the regional economy

After union in 1910, the GBM complex began to focus on the region as a ‘fixed space’ to absorb not only the country’s capital crises, but also as a growing source of minerals and labour. Thus another highly profitable cycle for the GBM complex was to be established, premised on asymmetrical regional development and expanded rounds of accumulation. Industrial development in SA was to be subsidised not only by the exploitation of the local black labour force, but also at the sub-continent level through the migrant labour system. Libby (1987: 38-39) observes that in 1905 85.4% of the SA work force was non-South African. This figure peaked again between 1970 and 1974 when it ranged from 75.8% to 79.0%. It was cheaper for large industries to attract workers from the region than to employ the locals. In addition, at that stage most regional economies were still in a pre-capitalist state of African peasantry and subsistence economies. Thus the region was integrated into the SA economy in a highly skewed manner.

MNCs were hoping that the other British territories and colonies would become ‘another Rand’ and the BSAC was established as a vehicle to exploit this. British-based MNCs moved to SA and with the ones that were developed locally, started moving into the region. MNCs sought to make regional expansion part of their broader strategy, effectively viewing SA as a gateway to the region. The largest corporation to operate in SA with interests in the region was the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. AAC was only formed in 1917. Giliomee and Mbenga
(2007: 201) contend that Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, its founder and owner, ‘became the greatest mining magnate of the century and a noted philanthropist’. They further state that it was to develop as ‘a genuinely South African company’ as a result of relocating its headquarters from London to SA. In the latter part of the twentieth century, AAC was to grow to control 56% of the SA economy (Cox and Rogerson, 1985: 223). Hanlon (1987: 67-68) notes that the AAC has significant interests in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and that De Beers (which was founded by Rhodes and later acquired by AAC) is in Namibia and Botswana and also has strong interests in Angola and Tanzania. The AAC’s monopolistic control of the region was significant. For example, of the eight largest companies’ active in Zimbabwe, AAC had a significant stake in all except one in 1984. The seven companies were Bindura Nickel (AAC had a 69% stake), Border Timbers (65%), Zimbabwe Alloys (65%), RAL Holdings (53%), Hippo Valley (41%), National Foods (24%) and Wankie Colliery (23%) (Hanlon, 1987: 202). AAC developed strong relations with governments throughout southern Africa and was a politically active corporation. AAC chairmen were generally regarded at the head of state-level, and they would frequently meet with regional presidents, pursuing what could be called ‘business diplomacy’. AAC sometimes appeared to support (at least tacitly or indirectly) the apartheid government (Hanlon, 1987: 14-15). At other times AAC played a strong role in opposition politics. They were closely linked to the Progressive Party and its successor the Progressive Federal Party in the 1980s, when the economic absurdities of apartheid were increasingly apparent (Hackland, 1980: 11-12).

Hanlon (1987: 223) points out that the other English monopoly group which had significant interests in the region was SA Mutual (or Old Mutual), the largest life insurance company in SA and in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and
Zimbabwe. SA Mutual was founded in Johannesburg in 1845. Towards the end of the following century, after a series of amalgamations, SA Mutual gained control of SA’s and the region’s international shipping. According to Hanlon (ibid.): ‘One side effect of the [amalgamations] was also to make it a force in regional tourism through Sun International, which controls casinos and hotels in Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Mauritius as well as South Africa’s Bantustans’.

The GBM complex created various ways to keep the region, and especially the HCTs, as a ‘fixed space’ or ‘captive market’ in which to invest its surpluses and from which to extract minerals. Although the HCTs were not formally part of a South African federation, by the early 1900s they were locked into a customs union without proper consultation. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is the oldest customs union in the world and came into being after the signing of the SACU Agreement in 1910. SACU played a large role in perpetuating the dependencies of these states on SA. The major problem in SACU was the Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF), which was to only be reviewed three times in a century, and each time it coincided with a significant event in southern Africa’s political history. The original RSF agreement was totally skewed in SA’s favour. Referring to Cattaneo (1990: 44-59), Gibb (1997: 75) contends: ‘The 1910 Agreement resulted in [SA] receiving 98.7 per cent of the joint revenue, whilst the [HCTs] received collectively 1.3 per cent’. This was to remain fixed until 1969 despite fluctuations in trade. South West Africa attained independence in 1990 at which stage it became Namibia. Although it was effectively a member of SACU since 1915, it formally joined SACU upon independence and united with the BLS states in arguing that SACU countered their developmental efforts (Gibb, 1997: 77). Before that its trade and foreign exchange statistics were generally incorporated into SA’s as it was directly
controlled by SA (ibid. referring to Simon, 1991: 385). During World War One the British Government asked SA to take South West Africa from Germany. After the war, in terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, SA was given the authority to administer the country (Ballinger, 1961: 47).

3.3.3 The rise of Afrikaner capital

After the founding of apartheid in 1948, the National Party (NP) government promoted the advancement of the Afrikaner people. Afrikaners were given preference in the economy, both directly and indirectly. In the 1940s a small number of Afrikaners occupied the top white-collar positions and the majority were working class. This was typically due to lower levels of education and fewer opportunities. However, as a result of job reservation, Afrikaners started to move into white-collar employment in the cities, with a slightly diminished focus on agriculture. This was to lead to wholesale changes in the class structure as they obtained far greater social mobility. There was also state support for aspirant Afrikaner capitalists, farmers and small-business owners. Fine and Rustomjee (1996: 149) note that the main beneficiaries of state-backed empowerment of Afrikaner capital were represented by four important groups, three of which (Volkskas, Sanlam, Rembrandt) were large and centralised, involving themselves in a number of diverse and overlapping activities. In the 1950s, the Afrikaners were almost entirely absent from mining, but a significant presence had been established in commerce. With the exception of financial institutions they could not compete with the strength of English capital. However, the apartheid government was to aid in strengthening Afrikaans financial institutions (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996: 148-150). Hanlon (1987: 11) states: ‘Through the use of government contracts [and] bank accounts, [the apartheid government] was able to boost Afrikaner business’. A case in
point was Volkskas, whose deposits grew from 2.8 per cent in 1947 to 18.6 per cent by 1967 largely as a result of increased government deposits (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996: 152).

A disjuncture developed within the GBM complex between English and Afrikaner capital. Historically the mining companies such as AAC were English. But by the 1960s Afrikaners played an important part in mining. This was initially focused on the state-backed extraction of coal through the parastatal, Eskom, but then spread to include other types of mining (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996: 160). The tension between English and Afrikaner capital started to diminish in the 1960s, leading to even stronger concentration in ownership. The ‘interpenetration’ of capital was largely due the withdrawal of foreign capital after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996: 160). A powerful ‘clique’ of Afrikaner state and English and Afrikaner corporate elite members became dominant within the GBM for many decades. This rather narrow, ethnically and racially-defined strand within the GBM complex, led by a conservative NP elite, was to forge a particularly close relationship between the government and business. Increasingly, the focus was on embedding their relationship in the region. Hanlon (1987: 68) points out that of the three Afrikaner monopoly groups, Sanlam was the most important regionally. He adds: ‘Sanlam is the second largest life assurance company, just behind Old Mutual, and has been a major force in the growth of Afrikaner capital; it has close links with the verligte wing of the National Party’. Its regional interests include mining, retail and construction, amongst others (ibid.).

3.3.4 Entrenchment of the GBM complex: State-owned enterprises

The relationship between the state and private capital was reinforced through the state’s investments in various sectors related to mining, such as energy and transport. This
allowed the GBM complex to sustain the conditions for monopolistic control of the region. It also helped consolidate and concentrate the wealth of the ruling oligarchy, with their roots in mining. Given the strong nexus between capital accumulation and energy provision, the regional expansion of SA’s MNCs was premised on the steady and reliable flow of electricity. Eskom was therefore founded in 1928 and mandated to sell low-cost energy to SA’s enterprises. It also serviced regional markets with its substantial surplus production (Chapter 5). The regional railroad system was part of the legacy of the discovery of minerals. An efficient and low cost transport system was vital to the competitiveness of SA’s MNCS, especially over the long distances to the coast and with the costs involved in mineral extraction. Consequently, the South African Transport Services (SATS), the precursor to Transnet, was to further exploit this historical legacy. It was to establish a monopoly of regional transport (and therefore trade) spanning railways, harbours, airlines and some road transport. Butts and Thomas (1986: 24), drawing from data obtained from SA’s Department of Foreign Affairs in 1982, observe that: ‘[In] the sub-continent (10 degrees south latitude and below), wherein most of the strategic minerals are located, one will find that South Africa accounts for 75 percent (32,000km) of the total rail linkages’.

The monopolistic control exercised by the GBM complex was further apparent in respect of basic services and goods, such as oil, coal, iron, steel, water and later telecommunications. Agencies such as Sasol (oil and coal), ISCOR (iron and steel), and vast water schemes, such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme, were created to extract such resources from the neighbouring countries. Regional initiatives in these areas often took the form of large infrastructure projects through the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The state would also collude with the domestic and international capital on these major projects. Hanlon (1987: 14) states that on the level
of state intervention in these industries, ‘[t]he role of…government in the economy [was] closer to that in socialist countries than capitalist ones. Many of the largest corporations are parastatals, including SATS…, ISCOR…, Sasol…, and Escom [sic]…The private sector is tightly regulated’. The state industrial corporations were instrumental in lowering the costs of production for MNCs, thereby enabling them to establish and retain regional markets. Armscor, Eskom and Sasol would keep their prices fixed sometimes for years at a time, thereby indirectly subsidising industrial development (Libby, 1987: 70-75). These conditions further aided the perception of SA as the gateway to doing business in the region.

3.3.5 Apartheid’s early regional policies

For many decades, the GBM complex had been protected by what was often termed a cordon sanitaire or ‘buffer zone’ of European-controlled states immediately to the north. These states were seen as providing a ‘protective’ layer from the threat of African nationalism sweeping through much of Africa starting in the 1960s. The GBM complex had also sought to use regionally orientated MNCs in maintaining this buffer zone, by trying to increase their leverage over these states and thereby hoping to restrain liberation movements in these territories (Libby 1987: 63-64). Of particular interest to the GBM complex was securing its immediate power base in the region, the so-called British High Commission territories. These territories remained under British control until their independence in the 1960s. The apartheid government sought to reduce them to the status of its Bantustans. However, when it became clear that in a time of decolonisation Britain would not accede to these demands, the Verwoerd government suggested in 1963 the establishment of a ‘common market/commonwealth’ in Southern Africa (Davies and O’Meara, 1990: 183). This
initiative failed, like the later ‘constellation of southern African states’ proposed by P. W. Botha in the late 1970s. Yet increasingly close links were forged, primarily as an attempt to install governments that would not be critical of Pretoria (Davies and O’Meara, 1990: 184). In the 1960s, the newly independent BLS states chose to remain part of SACU. The 1969 SACU Agreement resulted in a gradual increase in the amount of revenue going to the BLS states, particularly after minor renegotiations in the 1970s (Gibb, 1997: 76). But as Gibb (2006: 592) notes: ‘Although the 1969 Agreement established, for the first time, SACU institutions designed to help manage the Customs Union, South Africa’s complete and absolute domination remained unchallenged’.

Having secured its immediate ‘fixed space’, and having thwarted the threat of decolonisation in the immediate region, the GBM complex sought to forge cooperative links with governments further north. This was also in response to increasing criticism from the West. The attempts at a more cooperative foreign policy towards the region were manifested in Prime Minister B.J. Vorster’s ‘outward-looking’ policy founded in 1967. Nolutshungu (1975: 114) contends that the policy ‘differed from the earlier pan-African policy in its acceptance of the irreversibility of the transfer of power from European metropoles to African centres…’ He further notes that the policy was an attempt to build relations with African states that would ‘turn a blind eye to apartheid and not interfere in what the South African government considered its domestic affairs’. It was from 1976 onwards that some of the so-called ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ were created by the apartheid government as nominally independent, self-governing territories: Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). The apartheid government claimed that interaction with them was equivalent to interacting with independent African states (Nolutshungu, 1975: 116). The ‘outward-looking’
policy’s greatest success was forging diplomatic ties with Malawi (Jasper, 1988: 46). The dialogue initiative was eventually rejected by an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) resolution in 1971, but did gain some support (Davies and O’Meara, 1990: 185).

Despite the limited achievements of the ‘outward-looking’ policy, Pretoria’s efforts to secure support in the region were becoming increasingly difficult, especially with the Portuguese withdrawal from southern Africa in the mid-1970s leading to a crumbling of the cordon sanitaire. The GBM complex thus needed a strategy to defend its interests. This was to take the form of détente which was a diplomatic and political initiative constructed to further a ‘cooperative’ stance towards the region, but also included increasingly clandestine and military means (Davies and O’Meara, 1990: 185). The period of détente signalled a broadening of the GBM complex to include, in a more deliberate and expansive fashion, the information and intelligence agencies, and the media. The GBM complex started placing greater emphasis on the importance of information and intelligence agencies in ‘manipulating’ public opinion (Pfister, 2005: 68). Teer-Tomaseli (2008: 93) states that it was in the 1970s that the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) produced a 24-hour external radio service, Channel Africa, which was funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs. This transnational service broadcast in the three historically colonial languages as well as in three widely spread African languages. The channel covered most of sub-Saharan Africa. More ominously, however, the concerns sparked after the Portuguese revolution and the rapid decolonisation which followed, had resulted in significantly increased military spending after 1974. This eventually led to the ill-conceived intervention of SA in Angola in an attempt to prevent the Marxist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from consolidating its rule. SA faced international condemnation and
was forced to retreat in early 1976 as the MPLA received help from Cuban forces. SA’s military intervention in Angola in 1975-76 was an aberration from Vorster’s policy of détente and effectively sounded its death-knell (Jasper 1988: 68). After the brutal suppression of the 1976 Soweto uprising SA was almost totally isolated on the continent. Even the more moderate states were forced to end diplomatic efforts with Pretoria (Davies and O’Meara, 1990: 186).

3.3.6 The ‘Total National Strategy’

The rising faction of seucrocracts in the GBM complex in conjunction with monopoly capital, created the so-called ‘Total National Strategy’ in the mid-1970s in defence of ‘Western capitalist values’. This allowed the GBM complex to effectively equate attacks on apartheid as Marxist in nature. This underlines the fact that the economy was not conventionally capitalist as strong collusion was taking place between government and business. Besides the economy the other three branches of the total strategy involved diplomacy, social and psychological aspects, and security institutions (Hanlon, 1987: 9). Given the strong collusion in these spheres, a closer and more strategic alignment between capital and the security institutions led to a militarisation of the GBM complex. When the Minister of Defence, P.W Botha, became premier of SA in 1978, state reorganisation encompassed new decision-making structures in which the military played a key role (Davies and O’Meara, 1990: 181-182). The total strategy significantly strengthened relationships within the GBM complex. The policy of the parastatal Armscor was to maximise the use of the private sector. Armscor increased its use of sub-contractors from 800 in 1978 to 3,000 in 1982 (Hanlon 1987: 14). Besides military means, the interdependent nature of the southern African
economy meant that the GBM complex was able to exercise various ‘economic levers’
to control states in the region, sometimes with devastating consequences (see below).

The first part of the total strategy was largely modelled on increased ‘cooperation’ with Pretoria. It ran from the end of 1978 until mid-1980. It saw the launching of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) (Davies and O’Meara, 1990: 195). CONSAS was Pretoria’s attempt at forming a SA-dominated regional economic community supposedly encouraging ‘regional integration’. President Botha asked business to support the initiative by forming a Southern African Development Bank to fund regional infrastructure projects. The notion of ‘mutual reciprocity’ underlying CONSAS was, however, just rhetoric, as it was actually a blatant attempt to further entrench the interests of the GBM complex. Urnov (1982: 149-150) argues that: ‘One of the main purposes of the “Constellation” was to provide South Africa with a role of regional policeman and give it the right to intervention in the internal affairs of other countries on the pretext of “helping” them in putting down “terrorists” and maintaining “stability”’. However, officials in Pretoria wished not to elaborate on the military facets of the alliance. Attention was placed rather on economic cooperation (Urnov, 1982: 150). By referring to ‘cooperation’, Pretoria really meant that inclusion in CONSAS would further secure the involvement of SA’s MNCs in the countries concerned (Libby, 1987: 66). It was initially envisioned that CONSAS would consist of the entire Southern African region, but this was later reworked to include just the ‘moderate’ states. Jasper (1988: 82) estimates that the members of CONSAS would have been SA, the ‘homelands’ at the time
(Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda), Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, South West Africa and the three BLS states, and possibly Malawi.

The CONSAS concept, however, failed before it even started. This was primarily due to the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) instead, and the fact that ZANU-PF won the Zimbabwean election in 1980 installing a newly liberated, ‘radical’ government. Botha had anticipated a government headed by Muzorewa and Nkomo (Davies and O’ Meara, 1990: 196). Despite its failure, the ideas behind CONSAS were crucial to strengthening the relationships within the GBM complex.

3.3.7 Destabilisation

The softer approach of trying to ‘co-opt’ the region failed and a harder approach known as ‘destabilisation’ was adopted. Already in the 1980s, the ‘policy-think tank’ community and the ‘state intelligentsia’ provided the rationale and motivation for the actions of the GBM complex in the region. Deon Geldenhuys, an academic at the University of Pretoria in the 1980s and now at the University of Johannesburg, appeared to have been the theoretician behind destabilisation, arguing the case for it in papers published in the early 1980s in particular (Geldenhuys, 1981; 1982). His 1981 paper was commissioned by a policy-orientated institute based at the University of Pretoria. However, some have disputed a direct causal link with the work of Geldenhuys and the actual interventions in the region (Chan, 1990: 22).

Nonetheless, the destabilisation policy effectively encapsulated a range of strategic economic and military interventions (either directly or through proxies)

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6 Prior to independence in 1980 the country had been known by a few names: Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia reflected the final stages of negotiations between the white Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) government and an independent African government.
designed to debilitate or stunt the development of the region. Davies and O’Meara (1990: 198-199) contend that the destabilisation policy went through phases of ‘intensified and selective destabilisation’ throughout the 1980s. This culminated in the 1984 Nkomati Accord which was a ceasefire agreement signed between SA and Mozambique. SA capital benefited from the investment opportunities presented by the peace accord. Military sabotage would effectively occur parallel to the more ‘magnanimous’ acts by the GBM complex leading to a ‘two-faced’ foreign policy. This is a defining feature of the GBM complex, effectively, saying one thing, but doing another. SA was simultaneously presenting itself as regional ‘peace-maker’ and ‘stabiliser’ whilst pursuing its interventionist policies (Johnson and Martin, 1989: 159). The military would destroy and debilitate societies, whilst capitalists would take the lead in recreating them. The information branches of the state and state-linked media would legitimise these actions and further create an environment conducive to capital accumulation. This is how power within the GBM complex would ‘congeal’, in a mutually-beneficial and mutually-reinforcing manner. The ‘technology’ between the three spheres was ‘instinctively’ driven to accumulate capital.

3.3.8 Regional responses: Frontline States and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

The precursor to SADC was the loose grouping known as the Frontline States (FLS). The six FLS states were Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Angola. Khadiagala (1994: 10) defines the FLS as ‘an informal political alliance that has attempted to aggregate the power of its members for the pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives in southern Africa’. The FLS states initially focused on the decolonisation of Rhodesia and Namibia and made attempts at isolating the apartheid
regime. The collective efforts of the FLS gradually broadened to include security issues and searching for regional economic cooperation with other independent states in southern Africa (ibid.).

Although the FLS had some success in establishing a coherent regional response to the imperial and sub-imperial powers, a more concerted and deliberate strategy of breaking from the ‘bonds’ of the GBM complex was needed. Hence, a more formalised response was created through SADCC. SADCC was established in 1980 at a Heads of State meeting in Lusaka. It initially included the six FLS states, plus Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho. Oosthuizen (2006: 59) notes that four economic development objectives were agreed to in the SADCC founding declaration, one of which pertained directly to ‘reducing their economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on [SA]’.

Anglin (1985: 68) posits that economic independence was to be achieved through ‘disengagement’ with SA’s transport systems. He states that this strategy involved redirecting a significant amount of trade of the landlocked SADCC states via alternative ports (ibid.). Trade was primarily redirected to Mozambique but also Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Lobito in Angola.

Despite SA’s and its proxies’ attempts to damage the railway lines to alternative ports, SADCC slowly began to lessen its dependence on SA’s transport system throughout the 1980s (Oosthuizen, 2006: 67). Towards the end of the 1980s, SADCC’s focus turned to industrial development (Ostergaard, 1989: 7). The year 1992 saw SADCC transform itself into a ‘Development Community’ and in 1994 SA became a member. By that stage splits within the GBM complex were irreparable. English and Afrikaner capital started realising the value and irreversibility of the political changes. Corporate elite members in the GBM complex understood that they needed to align themselves with the ambitions of the new ANC elite, and to distance themselves from
the NP. The relationship between English and Afrikaner capital, driven by a dominant Afrikaner state elite, and formed through decades, if not centuries, of a bizarre ‘siege mentality’ and the defence of privilege and wealth, had all but crumbled. This happened under sustained international pressure, economic sanctions, internal instability and the increased need to create conditions truly favourable for an expanded round of capital accumulation in a post-Cold War era.

3.4 The democratic years 1994 – present: Consolidating practices of capital accumulation and the changing political landscape

In the post-apartheid era the focus of the GBM complex has been on consolidating and expanding capital accumulation within its ‘fixed space’ through a free market based on neo-liberal principles. This has been underpinned by an active discourse of ‘development’ and of the ‘mutual reciprocity’ to be gained by the inclusion of SA into the region. Yet little has been done to truly reverse the trends of regional uneven development. The current accumulation patterns and formation of the dominant classes continue to serve the interests of the GBM complex.

3.4.1 Full engagement of the GBM complex

The democratic period opened up a new political and historical epoch for SA’s capital accumulation and the continent availed itself as a ‘fixed space’ to absorb its excess capital. Throughout the post-apartheid phase, the state continued to support business in the region through monopolies established by its parastatals, cross-border Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) and major infrastructural projects in the region (Alden and Soko, 2005; Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, 2003; Rogerson, 2001). These institutional arrangements of the state facilitated rapid business expansion into the continent.
Between 1990 and 2000, SA was the largest investor in Africa, investing an average of $1.4 billion of its annual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the continent (Gibb, 2007: 432, drawing from South African Foundation, 2004). A new wave of regionally orientated SA MNCs was to emerge such as Shoprite, MTN and Multichoice (4.4). The first democratic dispensation under Nelson Mandela was focused on allaying the fears of the English and Afrikaner elite in the GBM complex. It was centred on accommodation of the old GBM complex and gave the elite members, along with the public, a chance to embrace (or co-opt) the new black state elite members. However, once political stability had been secured, the man who was to significantly further the ambitions of the GBM complex was Mandela’s successor, President Mbeki, who already started playing a decisive role as deputy president during Mandela’s tenure.

Mbeki’s presidency was the fulcrum of the post-apartheid GBM complex. In order to achieve this he surrounded himself with close allies. He also sought to centralise policy-making in critical areas such as the economy and foreign policy. His close-allies were: Essop Pahad, his life-long friend, general ‘enforcer’, ‘spin-doctor’ and Minister in the presidency; Alec Erwin in charge of Trade and Industry and also known for his ‘dexterity’ with words; and Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance whom Mbeki could trust to implement his policies. Mbeki overshadowed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, the brother of Essop. Mbeki himself was to forge a close relationship with business and was to also provide the ‘intellectual’ substance behind the state and business expansion. Through an ambitious mix of continental neo-liberal restructuring, multilateralism and inspirational speech-writing, he was able to concentrate and widen the African ‘spatial fix’. In an aptly titled article, ‘The curious career of an African modernizer: South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki’, Vale and Barret (2009: 445) suggest that when Mbeki returned from exile he set about ‘build[ing] relations, not
with the ANC’s internal allies, but with the country’s business community’. Monopoly capital was clearly cognisant of the role that he and other ANC elite members would play in SA politics. The ‘survival’ of the GBM complex relied on being able to co-opt, and later to incorporate in the ownership of the mines and large MNCs, the emergent black elite. Vale and Barret (2009: 448) add: ‘So, the embrace between business and the returned ANC…appeared to be an increasingly natural kind of development…The ease of rapport between the ANC and business in the years after Mbeki’s return’ eventually led to a rather unquestioned dropping of a socialist approach to the economy. Vale and Barret (ibid.) ask rhetorically: ‘What had happened to the countless dreams of a non-capitalist South Africa that had marked the long struggle against apartheid?’ Once the GBM complex had co-opted the new elite, it sought to maintain and expand its dominance throughout the region. This rested on an individual from the new black elite, like Mbeki, taking an active approach in the region. The prompting by the GBM complex and the opportunities for self-enrichment and recognition presented by it played into Mbeki’s personal quest for African leadership. Many commentators have focused on this and it is also noted by Vale and Barret (2009: 454), but personal ambition alone is insufficient to describe what happened. The desire and pressure by the GBM complex on the new state elite members to consolidate capital accumulation within its ‘fixed space’ eventually manifested in three crucial areas or actions instigated by Mbeki’s presidency: the African Renaissance, NEPAD and the broader ‘multilateralism project’ of government.

The African Renaissance was launched in 1998. It was effectively a vision of African economic and social rejuvenation. The post-apartheid GBM complex was held together by the ‘rallying call’ of the African Renaissance, which was to provide the motivation and ideational power behind its capital accumulation. The African
Renaissance was the perfect ‘foil’ for the GBM complex as it acted to allay fears concerning SA’s hegemony. The presidency hosted a conference on the African Renaissance, out of which a book was published. Mbeki opened the conference by saying: ‘It is a matter of great inspiration to see the intelligentsia of our continent come together…with the serious intention to add to the strengthening of the movement for Africa’s renaissance’ (Mbeki, 1999: xiii). In 2001 Mbeki addressed the Association of the African Central Bank Governors in Sandton: ‘There is a new dawn on the African horizon…It portends a rebirth of Africa that can and must occur’ (Mbeki, 2002: 131). Not only was there a grandiose comparison between a SA-revived Africa and an epoch of human development unparalleled in history, the fourteenth century Italian Renaissance, but also with the ancient Malian empire in Africa. At a state banquet in Mali in 2001 Mbeki commented: ‘We are profoundly inspired by the remarkable achievements of Timbuktu…at a time when much of the world was still in darkness and backward’ (2002: 158). A ‘renaissance’ project was created to restore the ancient scrolls of Timbuktu. Displays in SA’s Parliament were set up to demonstrate early African cartography. A Directorate in the presidency was created focusing on the African Renaissance and NEPAD. Mbeki was to be seen as the embodiment of ‘African renewal’. However, at the centre of this was an attempt to ‘conceal imperial ambition’.

As Harvey (2005: 50) states: ‘Much as European imperialism had turned to racism to bridge the tension between nationalism and imperialism, so the US sought to conceal imperial ambition in an abstract universalism’. SA sought to do this through an abstract notion of ‘African renewal’ that was at once both mutually beneficial and imperialistic. The GBM complex sought to bridge the tension between regional resistance and sub-imperialism through an abstract notion of ‘African-ness’ which was to transcend state boundaries. Harvey (ibid.) goes on to discuss American ‘universalism’ which is not
unlike SA’s broad sweeping ‘African renewal’: ‘The effect…was to deny the significance of territory and geography altogether in an articulation of imperial power’.

The new ANC and corporate elite members were instrumental in laying the institutional environment for capital accumulation through the creation of the neo-liberal macro-economic project, GEAR, in 1996, and through the creation of its continental equivalent, NEPAD in 2001. NEPAD was the macro-economic policy officially adopted by the reconstituted African Union in 2002, with Mbeki as chairman. Much of what the GBM complex was hoping to achieve was to be accomplished through NEPAD. The discourse underpinning NEPAD was that Africa needs to determine its own ‘destiny’, and it represented a marked departure from the dominant African international relations framework. In the last decade of the twentieth century the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was the dominant framework through which Africa was cast. This had the effect of maintaining and ‘normalising’ imperialist power relations. The NEPAD document\(^7\) states: ‘We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts’. In his weekly online letter titled ‘NEPAD is Africa’s response to globalization’, Mbeki (2003: 135) wrote: ‘…NEPAD seeks to achieve the situation…[where] African governments do not generate the conditions that result in their having to accept structural adjustment programmes in order to access foreign finance, …[to] avoid the collapse of their countries and societies’. The notion of an ‘African century’ was often linked to NEPAD in speeches and had the effect of drawing attention to the inevitability of Africa’s rise. In 2001, whilst addressing a Joint Sitting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces on NEPAD, Mbeki commented: ‘When, at the end of the century historians cast their eyes back over this,

\(^7\) http://www.nepad.org/nepad/knowledge/doc/1767/nepad-framework-document
the 21st and African century, what will they see?’ (Mbeki, 2002: 149). Harvey (2005: 50) notes a similar discourse with American imperialism when Henry Luce wrote an influential article in a 1941 cover editorial in Life Magazine entitled ‘The American Century’. Harvey (ibid.) asserts: ‘Luce, an isolationist, considered that history had conferred global leadership on the United States and that this role...had to be actively embraced. The power conferred was global universal rather than territorially specific, so Luce preferred to talk of an American century rather than empire’. A similar strategy was employed by Mbeki about the ‘natural’ historical progression of an African century, and how SA’s attainment of democracy in the last decade of the twentieth century was exactly the impetus the continent needed to ‘claim’ the following century.

NEPAD also included measures to enhance good governance, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), largely as a precondition for attracting international donor funds. A NEPAD investment council was established by Mbeki. SA and international capital colluded with state elite members as PPPs were the primary vehicle of NEPAD.

Closely related to the neo-liberal macro-economic project was a broader ‘multilateralism project’. A key feature of this was the SA-led restructuring of the OAU into the African Union (AU). Henry Short (19/11/08), Director of a Directorate in the Presidency, called ‘NEPAD, APRM and African Renaissance Fund’, noted: ‘SA was excellent in “linkages”, linking SADC, the AU, the NAM (Non-Alignment Movement) and the UN (United Nations)’. Mbeki himself was to play the leading role in this by acting as chairman of regional and international organisations. Mbeki was often termed a ‘foreign policy president’ and was certainly the most prominent, if not important, African leader of the early twenty-first century. At the opening summit of the reconstituted AU hosted at Durban Stadium in SA in 2002, Mbeki as chairman stated: ‘By forming the union, the peoples of our continent have made the unequivocal
statement that Africa must unite!’ (Mbeki, 2002: 186). The ‘multilateralism project’ was closely linked to the ambitions of the GBM complex to accumulate capital by means of consolidating its influence over the African ‘fixed space’. Here the various organs created in the AU were of strategic importance for the GBM complex to wield its influence, such as the Pan African Parliament (PAP). SA was to host the PAP and used the opportunity to further signal its leadership role. As part of this ‘multilateralism project’ the SA government also took the lead in peacekeeping and peacemaking throughout Africa (Chapter 6). Using the stature it had acquired from the fight against apartheid, SA was also to engage in vigorous summit diplomacy as a mediator in global matters by hosting the World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia and Other Intolerances in 2000, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (Chapter 7). SA also sought to host major international sporting events as a significant strategy to further entrench the interests of the GBM complex. Most notable of these was the 2010 Football World Cup, hailed as an ‘African’ event (Chapter 8). The plans for African leadership dovetailed perfectly with the broader project of global South leadership. Inherent in the ‘multilateralism project’ was the idea of establishing SA as the foremost African power. The India, SA and Brazil (IBSA) trilateral initiative founded by Mbeki in 2003 (Alden and Viera, 2005), and SA’s joining of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) in 2010, signalled these aspirations. The move to a broader focus on the global South coincided with a broadening of its business expansion as its MNCs looked to expand into emerging markets beyond Africa.

The creation of a neo-liberal macro-economic policy conducive to SA’s dominance in continental trade and industry was further complemented by the movements towards a SADC common market. This was to find expression through the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The RISDP is a fifteen-year
plan to be implemented in phases of five years outlining the gradual movement towards a SADC common market by 2015. A Free Trade Area was established in 2008. The deadline for the establishment of a customs union was missed in 2010, but will occur in the next few years (Chipeta and Schade, 2007: 36). The movements towards greater economic ‘integration’ through the SADC common market formed part of the NEPAD-driven attempt by the GBM complex to widen and consolidate its regional ‘spatial fix’. According to Dr Prega Ramsamy, SADC Executive Secretary: ‘[T]he African Union's NEPAD Programme is embraced as a credible and relevant continental framework, and the RISDP as SADC’s regional expression and vehicle for achieving the ideals contained therein’ (Chikale, 2005). The drive to consolidate capital accumulation through a SADC common market has also been hastened by competition amongst sub-imperial powers, especially China, as they increase their presence on the African continent.

Despite a magnanimous ‘façade’, nagging questions remained over enduring regional inequalities. This was especially relevant in SACU. However, some measures had been taken to overcome this. In negotiations on the post-apartheid SACU Agreement, which spanned from 1994 to 2002, it was stipulated that the BLNS states (plus Namibia) would receive over 70% of customs revenue from the Common Revenue Pool (CRP) of SACU, despite the fact that SA exports 90% of goods within the customs union (Grynberg, 2011). However, the CRP is a declining amount given tariff reductions following the EU-SA Free Trade Agreement (discussed below) and SA’s accordance with the Uruguay Round. SA would also continue to retain most of the excise revenues which represented about half the total CRP revenues in the period 1994 to 2000 (Gibb, 2006: 600-601). It should be noted that the excise revenues as a percentage of the CRP have increased since 2000.
In addition, there was still substantial dissatisfaction as a result of historical dispossession by the GBM complex. This manifested in cost-raising effects for industries in the BLNS states and what is known as the ‘polarisation effect’, where most industries tend to ‘gravitate’ to the regional industrial centre, Gauteng (4.3.1). The SA-EU Free Trade Agreement had caused particular problems for the BLNS states. SADC has strong trade relations with the EU through the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000. Determined by a new sixfold regionalisation within the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, SADC entered into negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which was to be finalised by 2008 (Venter and Neuland, 2005: 462, referring to Van den Berghe, 2003: 353). The Cotonou Agreement replaced the non-reciprocal trade agreements between the EU and ACP states of the Lomé Conventions instituted from 1975. However, once SA had attained democracy in the 1990s, it was considered too developed to become a full member of the Lomé agreement and was forced to seek a mutually beneficial trade agreement with the EU instead. This took the form of a bilateral FTA between SA and the EU signed in 2000, called the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). However, the TDCA impacted negatively upon the BLNS states, which were not represented in the negotiations (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2004: 176). Unsuccessful attempts were made to include SA in the EPA negotiations leading up to 2008, further drawing attention to the confusion caused by overlapping trade agreements. This brought into question the existence of SACU altogether (4.3.4).

Overall, the SA government’s handling of the EPA-induced SACU crisis reinforced the argument that the GBM complex uses SACU as a ‘bargaining chip’ in international trade negotiations and is not really interested in developing these countries (ibid.).

With the rise of black capital, a new black elite had joined the ruling oligarchy within the GBM complex. The new elite members emerged largely due to Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies favouring their advancement. They also had links to mining. An article in *Time* magazine (Robinson, S. 2005) ran the heading ‘The New Randlords’ with a picture of Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, Patrice Motsepe and Maci Macozoma on the cover. Cyril Ramaphosa was a presidential hopeful in the 1990s and Tokyo Sexwale returned to politics as Minister of Human Settlements in 2009 after being in the private sector for many years. He hosted the SA reality television show *Apprentice* modelled on the American show as the SA equivalent to Donald Trump. The article noted that the four ‘form a quartet of rich, well-connected black businessmen who symbolize South Africa's new corporate élite’ (Robinson, S. 2005). The post-apartheid era had led to a reconfiguration of the dominant classes. Dubbed the so-called ‘Black Diamonds’, government policies such as affirmative action gave rise to an emergent black middle class with strong connections in government and business (see also 9.1.5.7).

With the post-apartheid expansion of SA capital into the region, the image of SA needed to be changed. The ‘white’, supposedly ‘exceptionalist’, image of the apartheid government had to be overcome during the post-apartheid era. Cultural-media played a crucial role in this regard. SA’s capital accumulation needed a ‘new face’; and after the initial transitional phase overseen by Mandela, the GBM complex needed to create a positive ‘spin’ on capital accumulation in the region. The ‘ideological power’ behind the post-apartheid expansion into the region was primarily driven by the extension of the SA state broadcaster, the SABC, into the region. The SABC’s official slogan was ‘The pulse of Africa’s creative spirit’ and the news division branded itself as ‘Africa’s news leader’ (Teer-Tomaseli, 2008: 93). In 2003 the SABC launched SABC Africa, an external service which was carried by Digital Satellite Television (DSTV), a Multichoice service (4.4.1). SABC Africa was beamed to forty-nine African countries.
The weekdays were dominated by news and topical shows, whilst the weekends featured entertainment content developed in Africa (Teer-Tomaseli, 2008: 94). The regionally-focused MNCs would advertise on SABC Africa. In 2007, the SABC launched a twenty-four hour news network, SABC International. SABC International was trying to fulfill the role of what Al Jazeera does for the Middle East and the Arab states, but for Africa, effectively telling an African story. The marketers and branders played their role and an International Marketing Council (IMC) was established to promote the country as a tourist and business destination. Tourism was to be generated from the slogan: ‘Alive with possibility’.

One of the most persuasive means through which the GBM complex was to bolster the legitimacy of its capital accumulation, was through the policy research and think-tank community. SA has a well-developed commercial research environment and a history of research into its foreign affairs (Pfiser, 2005: 20-21). In the post-apartheid era these organisations provided much of the ‘intellectual’ drive behind the GBM complex and were to become persuasive purveyors of Mbeki’s message of a SA-led ‘African Renaissance’. Realising its strength, the ANC government transformed state-linked research institutions to institutions promoting the development of a black intellectual elite and African renewal. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), a tool of the former apartheid regime, is an example of such transformation. The Africa Institute of SA (AISA), based at the University of Pretoria, was established in 1960. It changed its mandate drastically after the end of apartheid, becoming a statutory body in 2001, and has a particular focus on SA’s ‘new’ role in the region. The South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIA) was founded in 1934. Although having an independent, English and liberal image (ibid.), it too benefited from the shift in discourses toward the region and the subsequent interest from international donors and
governments. The Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) was also particularly active in
this area. Such organisations were keenly aware of the importance of this research topic.
Many large-scale and multi-year projects were created, investigating aspects of SA’s
relationship with the continent, often leading to a series of annually-produced
publications on this topic. A naturally ‘lubricating’ relationship was to develop between
government, local and international donors, and commercial research. The SA
universities, also dependent on government funds, through their links to commercial
research sought to drive a similar ‘agenda’ through the establishment of African Studies
Centres, African Institutes and projects aimed at investigating aspects of SA’s foreign
policy in Africa. This was supported by a ‘conference industry’ concentrated amongst
academics, civil servants and business representatives. A new ‘state intelligentsia’ and
‘organic intellectuals’ were to emerge in the universities, trade unions, civil society and
state-owned enterprises, and were rapidly promoted, often because of their ability to
fund-raise given their links to government and other donors. SA universities also
attracted some of the brightest scholars from Africa and provided a sound and more
affordable alternative for African students than European and American universities.

The GBM complex was fully engaged.

3.5 Concluding remark: Sub-imperialism in crisis?
The GBM complex attained its highpoint in the first ten years after 1994 (see for
element Feinstein, 2007; Gevisser, 2009; Gumede, 2007; Johnson, 2008; Pottinger,
2008; Russell, 2009; Southall, 2010). Then, the carefully-crafted confluence of interests
spanning government, business and cultural-media, and driven by expanded rounds of
capital accumulation, started to come undone. By 2008 the ‘African agenda’, as it was
later derisively called, was in disarray and Mbeki made an ignominious exit from politics. The year 2008 therefore signalled the rapid unravelling of the network of relationships which had its nerve centre in the Mbeki presidency. It also ushered in the rise of a ‘new order’ post-apartheid GBM complex under a Zuma presidency (whose true character and key actors are still emerging, see below). The slow but steady shift from the ‘old’ to the ‘new order’ GBM complex gained momentum in the build-up to, and aftermath of, the African National Congress’ (ANC’s) elective conference in Polokwane in December 2007 where Mbeki was replaced by Jacob Zuma as the party leader.

The leadership struggle was also framed in terms of a broader debate in the tripartite alliance over the country’s economic policy, with large parts of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) choosing to support Zuma in the (thus far) false hope that he might bring about a ‘shift to the left’ in economic policy. Mbeki’s neo-liberal macro-economic policy, GEAR, was seen as inimical to the interests of the poor (Tshitekere, 2006: 131). A forceful overthrow of the ‘old order’ elite members was to be effected through a powerful and rebellious convergence of populist and disgruntled elite interests.

The dismantling of the ‘old order’ was complete in September 2008, when Mbeki was asked to resign as president six months prior to the end of his term. Key actors in the ‘old order’ were removed. The decision to recall Mbeki was taken at a special cabinet meeting where Mbeki was given a vote of no confidence. Judge Chris Nicholson had alluded to political interference by Mbeki and the then Minister of Justice, Penuel Maduna, in the decision to reinstate corruption charges (relating to the Arms Deal of 1999) against Zuma. The charge against Zuma was ultimately dropped by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in early 2009. Zuma’s path to the presidency
was then clear. The divisive leadership struggle within the ANC was to permeate all spheres of SA politics and was the defining issue framing political events throughout 2008 (4.3.1; 6.5.1; 6.6.3; 7.2.1; 8.5.4).

Against this backdrop, the ‘old order’ GBM complex under Mbeki’s presidency was rapidly crumbling through a sequence of dramatic political events in 2008. The electricity crisis (Chapter 5), the culmination of the Zimbabwean crisis (Chapter 6), the xenophobia attacks (Chapter 7), the ongoing service delivery protests (Chapter 7) and the nature of the leadership struggle – with Mbeki’s legacy arguably in tatters (Chapter 4) – had led to uncertainty over the country’s future. SA’s expanded rounds of capital accumulation on the continent, a hallmark of its engagement with the continent throughout the 1990s and early 21st century, had started to level out (Daniel, Lutchman and Comninos, 2007) particularly under the current global financial climate and with expansion projects and new businesses having to be put on hold or closed due to a lack of energy (Chapter 5). With the crumbling of the ‘old order’, there was also a tacit expectation that SA would have to ‘pull-back’ regionally because of its domestic problems. Initiatives such as the African Renaissance and NEPAD were likely to fade fast and the resources devoted to the continent to fulfill Mbeki’s vision of the ‘African century’, were likely to have been squandered (Chapter 4).

Whilst South and southern Africa were moving from one crisis to another (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), the one thing providing a common goal for the region, was the promise of a successfully hosted ‘African’ Football World Cup in 2010. This was amidst much speculation that the games would have to be moved due to political developments, and questions around the readiness of infrastructure and the supply of electricity (Chapter 8).
The dominant themes raised in this chapter will be further explored throughout the following five empirical chapters. Chapter 9 draws from the qualitative and quantitative data presented in the thesis, and assesses the question: is SA’s sub-imperialism in crisis?
Chapter 4

Counter-imperialist discourses to South Africa’s Government-Business-Media Complex

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on counter-imperialist discourses to South Africa’s (SA’s) sub-imperialism throughout the post-apartheid phase. It argues that throughout the region there has been significant resistance to SA’s government-business-media (GBM) complex. Yet these counter-imperialist discourses have arguably not been afforded the necessary focus in (what has rather crudely been called) the post-apartheid ‘SA in Africa’ literature.

The present chapter and the four that follow therefore seek to document, and draw attention to, the counter-imperialist discourses as a response to SA’s sub-imperialism. They do this by drawing from interviews and media searches conducted in Botswana and Zambia. As outlined in Chapter 1, this study embraces a multi-dimensional concept of power consisting of the state, corporate, media and other civic institutions. It is argued that within these spheres elite members from the sub-imperial state are responsible for articulating their claims and legitimations to power through discursive formations. Yet, equally so, the positions of other states are also constructed through discursive practices. These responses operate within the formal, practical and popular geopolitical spheres, and by means of this multi-dimensional model of power.

This chapter is a foundational empirical chapter and is thematically-driven. Due to a natural ‘thematic fit’, half of the questionnaire is represented in this chapter. Selectivity was therefore required in the presentation of interview data. The chapter is
expansive in scope, providing an overview of regional attitudes and responses to SA on a range of issues and preceding the four narrower case studies. Questions pertaining to this chapter were grouped around three core themes in the questionnaire (SA’s foreign policy, corporate engagement and cultural-media) and the chapter is structured accordingly. The different types of questioning employed in the questionnaire were covered in Chapter 2, all of which were used in the section of the questionnaire pertaining to this chapter (appendix A, questions 1 to 35).

The interview material was supplemented with thorough media searches in Botswana and Zambia. These searches covered the post-apartheid period. Initially the search focused on individual websites of newspapers in these two countries. Due to poor archiving (or the fact that a newspaper had not been in operation since 1994), some newspapers websites did not permit a search dating back to 1994. In order to verify that no important matters were missed, I repeated keyword searches on the AllAfrica.com database. AllAfrica.com also only stretches back as far as 1996, but it was by far the best resource available.

4.2 Counter-imperialist discourses to South Africa’s sub-imperialism

People and institutions responsible for creating counter-imperialist discourses within the region include: civil servants and politicians; members of corporate research organisations; more critical journalists and sections of the media (including social media and blog websites); intellectuals based at universities; the state intelligentsia and organic intellectuals in government or government-linked institutions; leaders of trade unions and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); and, business representatives and owners. The aim of these counter-imperialist discourses is to act as an ‘unveiling’ force in society in order to ‘see through’ the legitimising discourses of the sub-imperial state
and expose it for its desire to accumulate capital. This is achieved by investigating closely the geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses of the GBM complex. Such discourses are generally centred on the principle of ‘mutual reciprocity’ embedded in ‘regional integration’ rhetoric. Yet the counter-imperialist discourses seek to ‘unravel’ much of this rhetoric as being potentially dangerous to weaker states, and the actions of the sub-imperial state as being self-serving, extractive, and potentially exploitative.

This chapter contends that when analysing counter-imperialist discourses three factors or areas should be taken into consideration: the state’s interaction through foreign policy and trade; the private sector’s engagement with the region; and, lastly, the state’s cultural-media.

4.3 Foreign policy and trade

It is through the rhetoric embedded in foreign policy that the GBM complex attempts to conceal the ‘true’ nature of its engagement with the region. Yet, as noted in Chapter 1, the intentions of the GBM complex are often exposed through a disjuncture between the stated intentions of its foreign (and domestic) policy and its actual actions. This is typically manifested through a disjuncture between the actions of government and business.

4.3.1 Exposing the GBM complex

The interview data disclose two main inconsistencies in respect of SA’s regional foreign policy. These inconsistencies shed light on the ‘true’ nature of the GBM complex. The first was SA’s handling of the Zimbabwe situation despite an obvious stated commitment to human rights. The second was a continued sense of one-sided development despite claiming to ‘develop’ the region.
In Botswana, the major inconsistency in SA’s foreign policy was perceived to be its handling of the Zimbabwean situation (Chapter 6). Others felt that SA’s self-interest more blatantly overrode its pretention to act on behalf of the region. Duduetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08), Marketing Manager of Stanbic Bank in Botswana, contended that SA’s foreign policy is centred on ‘a grab and run thing’ and was ‘economically driven’. In Botswana, this viewpoint was primarily based on SA’s ostensibly deliberate attempts to undermine the Botswanan economy. As Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08), Communications and Public Relations Manager at MASCOM, believed ‘…SADC could have been far better off. If you look at multinationals [such as the] Hyundai plant in Botswana, which could have exported to SA, but closed the branch and moved to Bloemfontein’. According to Outsa Mokone (27/11/08), editor of the *Sunday Standard*: ‘Cosatu said that SA must protect its motor industry and SA put pressure on Botswana…The Botswanan government invested…millions [of Pula in the Hyundai plant] and lost it. Botswana blamed SA’ (see polarisation effect in sub-section 3.4.1). Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08) further noted that: ‘Botswana Railways used to transport many [goods] through the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). [Yet] SA ha[d] frustrated these efforts’ ostensibly by making it difficult for the landlocked Botswana to access its ports. The IFSC is a government entity created for cross-border financial and business services in the region. It acts as a central point to facilitate trade for the country.8 Gemma Masonga (04/12/08), Principal Trade Officer in the Department of Trade and Industry contended that: ‘Pencil, vinyl [and] tile [companies]… have all had to relocate to SA because they struggle to export to SA. The playing field is not level. SA is giving a tough time on textiles. Textile and clothing industries are on a programme of 18 months [giving the SA government a chance to

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8 [http://www.ifsc.co.bw/](http://www.ifsc.co.bw/)
develop its industries]. At the time of the interview the Textile and Clothing Industry Development Programme (TCIDP) was operational (April 2007 to March 2009) and was ‘aimed at assisting the textile and clothing manufacturing industry in SA to obtain efficiency of international standard’ (ITAC, 2008: 8). In 2010 it was reported that ‘Botswana’s [overall] textile exports decline[d] sharply by 21.8%, whilst imports grew by 13.3%’⁹. These changes are presumably at least partly as a result of the agreement with SA, but also due to the rise of competing sub-imperial powers such as China, known for their strength in this area.

Polemics in the Botswanan media material on SA relations with Botswana are consistent with this outlook. For example, an editorial in the *Mmegi* (2005a) titled ‘straight talk to “big brother”’ spoke of ‘[SA’s] record of total disregard of her powerless neighbours’ developmental efforts’ and how this was a form of ‘sabotage’. The article concluded: ‘Sometimes the actions of the South African government are obviously at variance with…the spirit of both the African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’.

In Zambia, SA’s handling of the Zimbabwean situation also emerged as the major contradiction between SA’s stated intentions and actions (Chapter 6). There was a noticeable disjuncture between its foreign policy and the behaviour of its corporates. Juliana Mwila (23/1/09), Director in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and Zambian Head of SADC, stated frankly: ‘[SA] is double-dealing’. The outspoken Bob Sichinga (27/01/09), former Zambian MP and now independent consultant, spoke of the ambiguous and incongruous aspects of SA’s foreign policy:

> There is a cloudy view of SA foreign policy because of Zimbabwe. SA has landed the rest of the region in disrepute because of Zimbabwe. 50% of [Zimbabwe’s] business is with SA. SA has not displayed leadership, not made a clear policy statement about how SA can bring

⁹ http://www.agoa.info/?view=.&story=news&subtext=1495
the region [to a comparative level of development]. SA has carried on with business as usual...It has not sought to develop the region...SA uses warehouses [situated throughout the region] for [the storage] of SA goods [and does not use local supply chains]. Economic policy has not encouraged development.

Polemics on Zambia-SA relations in the Zambian media material also indicated a dissonance between rhetoric and reality, particularly regarding NEPAD (see 2.1.3).

SA civil servant elite respondents were critical of such countervailing views towards its foreign policy and believed that the region was envious of SA. Ghulam Aslam (19/11/08), Director of SADC for SA, believed that ‘[e]nvoy or aspirations are effectively the same, people knock America, but if you offer them a green card they will come running. Much in the same way southern Africans are critical of SA, but also rather ambivalent in the criticisms of SA’.

When respondents were asked more directly if they felt there is a difference between the SA government’s rhetoric and how corporates operate on the ground, a cumulative majority at 64% agreed with the statement. The results were consistent across the countries. In Botswana, Gemma Masonga (04/12/08) from the Department of Trade and Industry, helped unpack some of the mechanisms through which the GBM complex operates, suggesting that the government played a more forceful role in paving the way for key industries. She noted: ‘[SA] [b]usiness people are supported by government [in the area of] vinyl tiles. The SA government is behind this. SA uses diplomatic language [during] textile negotiations for extension of the [Textile and Clothing Development] programme. It is between governments; it is government to government’. In Zambia, Chris Chirwa (27/01/09) Director of Image Publishers Limited, alluded to the sometimes indirect or covert manner in which government works to support business. He contended: ‘Corporates are visible by penetration
whereas the government doesn’t really get its hands dirty. They proclaim lots, but don’t really do much’.

SA corporate and media elite respondents shed further light on the workings of the GBM complex. Ray Hartley (05/02/09), editor of the *Times* (SA), stated outright: ‘Government is trying to project SA as a force for development, while SA business is focussed on expansion’. Corporate respondent, John Philips (17/11/08), Head of ABSA Africa, echoed Harvey’s idea on the two logics of imperialism by stating: ‘The two [have] different objectives, the one is political posturing and the other is driven by a sustainable profit motive…’ Similarly, Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08), a former SA diplomat who at the time of the interviews was Manager of Stakeholder Relations at Multichoice Africa, believed: ‘Business and government are not aligned at all. They have a very different way of operating’. Caroline Creasey (16/11/08), Corporate Affairs Manager of Multichoice Africa, believed: ‘Business is not listening to government’.

Elite respondents were asked if they felt there was a difference between how SA parastals behave and how SA private companies operate in the region. A cumulative majority of 54% responded positively. In Botswana, this was a particularly pertinent question given the extent to which Botswana is reliant on Eskom for electricity (5.4.1) and Spoornet’s involvement in Botswana. Spoornet is the railway division within the transport parastatal, Transnet (3.3.4). Civil servant respondent, Thanki Mothae (28/11/08), suggested that there was a clear distinction between the two. However, corporate and media respondents were more critical. Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08), Communications and PR Manager of MASCOM, contended: ‘SA wants people to believe that we would like to grow together, but they are selfish. The attitude [of parastatals and private companies] is pretty much the same’. Although parastatals are also *meant* to expand into the region for developmental purposes, Outsa Mokone
(27/11/08), editor of the Sunday Standard, asserted: ‘In 2000-2003 Spoornet caused the near collapse of Botswana’s railway. Spoornet used to use Botswana en route to Zimbabwe, but it did away with it and had to retrench Botswanan people’. In Zambia, no real discernible pattern emerged in the responses. This is surprising, given that ‘Spoornet has had a tough time’ (Banda, 28/01/09) in Zambia (Chapter 3). Media respondent, Chris Chirwa (27/01/09), believed that ‘[p]arastatals operate with restrictions’ suggesting that their behaviour is not entirely guided by the ‘capitalist logic of imperialism’ but also (supposedly) developmental imperatives.

In SA, elite respondents primarily outlined the extent to which parastatals had provided the backbone for SA’s sub-imperialism, indirectly illustrating the workings of the GBM complex. Civil servant respondent Henry Short (19/11/08), Director in the Directorate NEPAD, APRM and African Renaissance Fund, asked rhetorically ‘Who was going to carry out Mbeki’s vision [of the African Renaissance for him?] Was it going to be Eskom…[or Whitey] Basson [from Shoprite]…? Corporate respondent Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08) believed that ‘[t]hey differ particularly around risk management. Parastatals go in [to the region] because they have been given a political mandate, because the president says they must’. Media respondent, Peter Fabricius (03/02/09), commented: ‘Parastatals are viewed with an African Renaissance agenda. Eskom said we are going into the Inga Project on an Africanist mission’ \(^{10}\) (see also 5.5.1).

As noted in Chapter 1, a key feature of the GBM complex concerns the relationship between peacemaking and development, on the one hand, and the expansion of its corporates, on the other. Effectively, the state sets about creating the right conditions (diplomatically and infrastructurally) within a ‘fixed space’ for its business to follow. Respondents were asked if they thought that post-apartheid SA’s

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\(^{10}\) The Inga project would be the largest hydro-electricity project in the world, harnessing power from the world’s second largest river, the Congo.
diplomacy in Africa had undergone a shift from peace diplomacy to one based on economic diplomacy. 59% thought so. The results show that a high percentage of Botswanans and Zambians agreed with this statement (at respectively 60% and 71%) whilst in SA a not insignificant, but smaller group at 43%, agreed with this.

In Botswana, the responses of civil servant elite members were mixed and should probably be viewed critically due to the pervasive influence of the GBM complex. Some were critical of SA such as Gemma Masonga (04/12/08) from the Department of Trade and Industry. She declared that ‘SA is selfish. SA needs to compromise. SA wants to benefit more. What brings peace within a region is compromise’. Others preferred to look at the relationship as ‘complementary’ (Ntakhwana, 28/01/08) and as ‘balanced’ (Mothae, 28/11/08). But none denied the relationship. Corporate respondent Sybrand Coetzee, clearly frustrated with the Zimbabwean situation, stated that the SA government ‘would have been stronger on Zimbabwe’ if the focus had truly shifted from peace to economics. This viewpoint suggests that the conflict was hampering its corporates from moving into the Zimbabwean market. Yet the relationship between SA’s business interests and the SA government’s handling of Zimbabwe is complex and warrants closer analysis (6.4.2).

Media respondent, Mosetsanagape Maribe (01/12/08), directly connected SA’s peacemaking efforts in the DRC to its desire to accumulate capital. He stated: ‘Mbeki and SA look at what they can get from the DRC’ as they are interested in ‘the economic incentives to peace’.

In Zambia, civil servant elite Evelyn Mutubila (21/01/09) noted: ‘The centre stage has been capitalist, look at [SA’s failure to deal with] Zimbabwe’. This contradicts the viewpoint that the SA government would have acted quicker and more decisively if its economic interests were really at stake in Zimbabwe. SA’s weak handling of
Zimbabwe does (to some extent) also substantiate the idea of economic diplomacy first, as it appears to be an instance where pragmatism had won over principle. In other words, SA’s weak stance on Zimbabwe is symptomatic of a broader *superficial* commitment to democracy and human rights, superseded by economic gains vis-à-vis NEPAD (see 2.1.3). Corporate respondent, Marlan Kanada (27/02/09), Public Relations Manager at Multichoice in Zambia, stated bluntly that SA ‘is selling itself. SA is not talking about peace. Now the SA economy is [focused] just on improving its own economy’. Media elite members such as John Phiri (28/01/09) believed that NEPAD (launched 3 years after the African Renaissance) was a reflection of the shift from peace diplomacy to economic diplomacy. Muletambo Lingela (23/01/09), Broadcasting and Information Manager of MISA (Media Institute of Southern Africa), believed that SA’s focus has shifted to ‘infiltration of SADC economies. Political liberation in SADC is gone’.

SA civil servant elite respondents such as Ghulam Asmal (19/11/08), the SA Head of SADC, described a tightening of the relationship between government and business. He stated that there is a ‘[d]ifference of views between politicians and bureaucrats [on the matter of SA shifting to a focus on economic diplomacy]. [For example, in the] Lockerbie situation, SA invested a lot to resolve this [but] contracts went to European countries [instead of SA companies]. More pragmatism [is being shown by government now], also in the DRC [where a closer relationship is developing between the two]’. Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08), who was a former diplomat, believed that ‘there is a greater emphasis on economics. DFA [Department of Foreign Affairs] has the means to conduct diplomacy; DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] drives trade’. As a testimony to this emphasis Xinwa confirmed that ‘all SA embassies are staffed with 1 cadet from DFA and 2 cadets from DTI’. Media respondents such as Peter Fabricius
(03/02/09), the insightful journalist who specialises in foreign policy, believed that SA’s involvement in Burundi and DRC was premised on ‘peace as a vanguard for economic development’ and that ‘peacemaking is a way to disguise the economic agenda’. Anton Harber (02/02/09), Caxton Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at the University of the Witswatersrand, summed up the situation succinctly when he stated: ‘The initial push to settle conflicts has been superseded by trade relations’.

Lastly, another way to expose the GBM complex pertains to a disjuncture between the country’s foreign and domestic policies, on the one hand, and its perceived political values, on the other. This illustrates whether the GBM complex represents the wishes of the people or is, to some extent, attempting to shroud its ‘true’ motives. When respondents were asked if they perceived SA foreign and domestic policies to be consistent with its political values, a majority of 41% disagreed with the statement. The results were consistent across countries. In Botswana, civil servant elite respondent Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/2008) believed that there was a ‘disjuncture’ as ‘SA adheres to good governance locally, but doesn’t push the issue in Zimbabwe’. Media respondent Mosetsanagape Maribe (01/12/08) believed that SA’s policies are geared for ‘the elites and don’t cater for the grass roots and the middle classes’. Unlike in Botswana where ‘the government provides social benefits, free ARVs [antiretrovirals], education and health, SA doesn’t have the proper structures for the ordinary person’. In Zambia, civil servant elite respondents such as Shupi Mweene (29/01/09) believed there was a ‘disjuncture’ between the general public and those benefiting from ‘elitist [policies like] BEE [Black Economic Empowerment]’. As argued in sub-section 3.5, the political turbulence in SA in 2008, including the groundswell of support for Jacob Zuma as a protest against Thabo Mbeki, was partly caused by a popular uprising against the ‘old order’ post-apartheid GBM complex. A more active attempt was made at trying to
align SA’s policies with the perceived political values of ‘the masses’. Evelyn Mutubila (21/01/09) believed that ‘[p]opulism is winning in SA [as] demonstrated by Zuma’s rise to the top’.

In SA, corporate elite respondent Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08) thought that ‘[t]he leadership struggle ha[d] tested what SA stands for. It tested the political values we are expected to hold – that of respect for human rights, independence of the judiciary [and the occupancy of a] UN [Security Council] seat’. Media respondents such as David O’Sullivan (05/02/09) affirmed: ‘If the Constitution is the normative stance there appears to be a contradiction’ between policies and political values. Peter Fabricius (03/02/09) declared: ‘Stated political values is just rhetoric. Realpolitik is what matters’.

4.3.2 The African Renaissance (AR)
As argued in Chapter 3, the concept of an AR was effectively an umbrella term used to describe a vision of social and economic rejuvenation. Given Mbeki’s continental ambitions and his restructuring of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), the AR was to become a medium for SA to rejuvenate the continent. It was meant to be the primary source of SA’s ideological power in the region (3.4.1). But it arguably failed in terms of its goal to promote a South African ideology. As noted by Pieter Fourie (04/02/09), Professor of Communications at the University of South Africa (UNISA): ‘The term is nothing new and is not acknowledged by Africa as a big contribution to pan-Africanism’. The concept of the AR, although initially a Nkrumah idea (Tsimane, 2008), was revived by Mbeki in the 1990s. One can assume that SA did at least partly wish to earnestly develop the region. But much of the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, in reality, its policies and actions by its corporates tended to contradict this.
Respondents were asked if they thought that president Mbeki’s vision to rejuvenate the continent socially and economically has credibility regionally. 37% thought that this was indeed the position. The results were consistent across the three countries. In Botswana, elite respondents such as Tshepo Maphayane (26/11/08) suggested: ‘[The AR] sparked debate, in SADC especially. In Botswana they have another initiative – Vision 2016’. Dudetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08) specified: ‘While [Mbeki] was in office it had credibility, but the way he left office Africans are now sceptical’. Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08) believed that ‘[i]t was a good idea, but that it was not implemented properly. You could not sell [SA’s]…lack of credibility domestically’. Others such as Mosetsanagape Maribe (01/12/08) believed that Mbeki ‘has double standards, it’s difficult to trust him’ (Chapter 6).

The Botswanan media material indicates that the Botswanan Chapter of the African Renaissance Institute (BOCARI) was established in 2002. BOCARI was the Botswana arm of the continental body, African Renaissance Institute (ARI) (Tutwane, 2004). Yet BOCARI struggled with logistical problems and lack of leadership (ibid.). In September 2005 the Mmegi reported that ‘there is no evidence that [the AR] is taking root’ (Setsiba, 2005). A member of the youth wing of BOCARI, Jaconia Malunga, said: ‘We are not as active as other African countries in marketing the idea to the people’. He blamed this passiveness on lack of resources and the fact that there was no secretariat to run BOCARI. The chairperson of BOCARI, Dr Alfred Tsheboeng was reported as having stated that ‘lack of political will is another reason why Botswana is lagging behind with the [AR]’ (ibid.). There was also discussion in the media about the level of government censorship over academics and its stifling of public debate. This was seen as running contrary to the values inherent in the AR (Motlogelwa, 2006). Beyond 2006
there is no serious mention of the concept in the Botswanan media, perhaps other than as a very vague cultural reference.

Zambian elite respondents were also particularly critical. Ethol Mulenga (29/01/09), Regional sales manager for southern Africa at MTN, believed: ‘The region hasn’t bought into [the AR]’. Muletambo Lingela (23/01/09) contended: ‘The idea died – no SADC leaders talk about it. It’s a SA concept’. SA’s handling of the Zimbabwean situation had also impacted upon the credibility of the vision. Kathy Sikombe (19/01/09), Programme Coordinator for the Frederich Ebert Stiftung Foundation in Zambia, thought: ‘In the beginning it had credibility, but now people have lost confidence due to Zimbabwe’. Others drew a closer link between the credibility of the vision and Mbeki himself. Evans Nachilobe (24/01/09), Head of Radio 2 for ZNBC, thought that the credibility that Mbeki had lost as a result of Zimbabwe as well as ‘the call for him to step down’, had impacted on the credibility of the AR. Chris Chirwa (27/01/09) stated frankly: ‘Mbeki came with a bang but after that it fizzled out. The AR is going with Mbeki’. Evelyn Mutubila (21/01/09), Assistant Director Planning in the Zambian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, believed that the AR had credibility ‘economically, [but not] socially’. Philip Banda (28/01/09), Risk Manager for Stanbic Bank, thought that it consisted of ‘rhetoric and no implementation’.

No indication emerged from the Zambian media material that the AR had been given any kind of practical implementation in the country.

Perhaps not surprisingly, SA civil servant elite respondents were keen to divorce Mbeki from the AR, ostensibly due to the fact that Mbeki had recently been ‘recalled’ as president at the time of the interviews and the ‘African agenda’ was perceived to be under threat given his strong affiliation to it (3.5). Henry Short (19/11/08), who was director of a directorate in the presidency that carried the name of
the vision, believed that ‘Mbeki was good at leading the saying. He harnessed the saying’ but that it was ‘not [necessarily] linked to Mbeki’. Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08) believed that ‘African Renaissance – the word [sic], is no longer used’. He further felt that the AR sparked a lot of ‘concerns and jealousies’ amongst state elite members in Africa. He added that the AR was linked to ‘institutions that were intended to be in place such as…NEPAD’, reflecting on the extent to which the AR laid the foundation for NEPAD to follow.

4.3.3 NEPAD

NEPAD was to provide the cornerstone for SA’s capital accumulation in the region. Much of what the GBM complex was hoping to achieve was to be achieved through NEPAD. The GBM complex encouraged the creation of NEPAD as a programme to create a macro-economic environment conducive to investment by its corporates, and win the support of major international donors and investors. This ‘ploy’ was seen as being part of the SA-led restructuring of the OAU into the AU, with NEPAD as the neo-liberal macro-economic policy to be adopted by the AU. First the African Renaissance was to be launched in 1998, with NEPAD following in 2001. NEPAD was also to inform the actions of member states on matters of governance as a necessary precondition for attracting investment, largely through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (3.4.1).

Yet, as Regionald Selelo (24/11/08), Research Officer at Bedia (24/11/08), contended: ‘For NEPAD to be a success there are a lot of prerequisites – peace, transparency, accountability – all factors that are hampering the implementation of NEPAD’. However, given the failure of states, including SA, to take the APRM seriously (7.7.5) and as a result of SA’s weak handling of the Zimbabwean situation
(Chapter 6), it became apparent that NEPAD was born more out of a desire to accumulate capital by a few powerful African states, than an earnest effort to develop the continent (3.4.1 and 6.6.2). Far more robust and rigorous attempts at proper political governance were necessary, nor just attempts to appease donors and investors. Such contradictions and inadequacies in the NEPAD doctrine troubled regional states. Once ‘disentangled’ from the rhetoric of the GBM complex, the realisation was that it would not benefit weaker states in Africa.

When respondents were asked if they thought the region had been receptive towards NEPAD, 41% disagreed. This was the strongest response category. Results were consistent across the three countries.

In Botswana, civil servant elite respondent Gemma Masonga (04/12/08), Principal Trade Officer in the Department of Trade and Industry, said that she ‘last heard about NEPAD in trade in 2005’ and that it ‘had not made itself heard, it is not known. Maybe in agriculture, but not in trade’. Thanki Mothae (28/11/08), Director of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs for SADC, believed that the continent has been receptive towards NEPAD, but SADC had not embraced NEPAD. Corporate respondent, Dudetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08), stated: ‘In SA [NEPAD] worked. [However], Chinese are flooding Botswana and for Botswana it has not worked. SA has sea, aviation and population to make it work’. Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08) felt that it was a ‘good vision’ but ‘lacks implementation’. Media respondent, Mosetsanagape Maribe (01/12/08), believed that NEPAD is an ‘old institution’ and was ‘active’ in Botswana between 2000 and 2002. But ‘Botswana did not support the APRM. Botswana’s support for NEPAD is dead’. Ousa Mokone (27/11/08) felt: ‘The region was excited about NEPAD, but no real benefits [were forthcoming]…Now the region is sceptical of NEPAD’. 
The media material in Botswana suggests that strong counter-imperialist discourses emerged in response to NEPAD. In June 2002, President Festus Mogae already indicated that he was not going to endorse some aspects of NEPAD. The Botswanan government believed that much of what NEPAD was trying to achieve was already being done by a number of international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Mmegi, 2002). The Botswanan government was particularly critical of the APRM. Concurring with the government, the Mmegi reported: ‘While the peer review tenet…is a noble concept, it is not practicable in Africa. History shows that African leaders see no evil and hear no evil…’ (ibid.). Other concerns were that NEPAD members are already short of resources. The article went on to note: ‘Almost all the African countries south of the Sahara have limited resources. It is, therefore, ill advised for Africa to create institutions that have no…benefits’ (ibid.).

Foreign Affairs Minister, Mompati Merafhe, later defended Botswana’s position when he was reported as saying: ‘Botswana's view is that the review should focus on political governance rather than economic governance’ (Mmegi, 2003). In March 2003 the APRM was officially launched in a communique signed by African leaders in Abuja, Nigeria where Botswana immediately made it known that they were not interested in joining (Mmegi, 2007a). In February 2004 the Foreign Minister, Lt-Gen Mompati Merafhe, was quoted as saying: ‘We see a lot of reluctance by many African heads of state who fail to call upon their peers to behave or be accountable for the plight of their peoples and countries’ (Mmegi, 2004). Some were critical of the government’s stance towards the APRM, stating ‘that in rejecting the peer review mechanism so arrogantly, the government is risking a lot’ and that the ‘[t]he argument about the World Bank, the IMF and what not, just doesn’t hold water’ (Moabi, 2005). Another challenge was to incorporate ‘the new development ideas’ into the existing national development plans.
(NDPs) and Botswana’s Vision 2016 initiative. It was noted that ‘the Ghanaians have worked out that the implementation of [NEPAD] programmes will cost them in the region of US $5 billion (P30 billion) over a 10-year period’ (Mmegi, 2007a). However, by 2008 NEPAD was not spoken of anymore. An article titled ‘Will NEPAD survive after Mbeki's fall from grace?’ points to the extent to which the programme was synonymous with the SA president (Tsimane, 2008).

Similarly in Zambia, civil servant elite respondent Evelyn Mutubila (21/01/09) asserted that: ‘NEPAD’s policies are not clearly explained’ and it seems to be ‘more theoretical’. Corporate respondents such as Philip Banda (28/1/09) contended: ‘At first people were interested, but now people are quiet’. Carol Chirwa (20/01/08), who was a Document Analyst in the Zambia Business Forum and to whom I was referred by her directors, declared: ‘Business…does not talk much about NEPAD. Business talks about SADC’. Media respondents such as Evans Nachilobe (24/01/09) explained: ‘NEPAD is a silent thing and is not well publicised. There are no programmes and no political will by the Zambian government. Activities need to be felt. It needs to be political!’ According to Chris Chirwa (27/01/09), NEPAD is not part of the popular political discourse in Zambia.

The Zambian media claim that, compared with Botswana, there was a fair amount of ‘buy-in’ from the Zambian government. However, NEPAD was not without its problems as identified by the more critical ‘voices’ in the media helping to construct counter-imperialist discourses. One of the main concerns was the extent to which NEPAD will serve the interests of the wealthy nations and open the weaker states in Africa to domination by imperialist powers – ironically, drawing African states into a deeper cycle of dependency despite the stated intention of NEPAD to undo this historical cycle (3.4.1). Here the transient and ‘hollow’ measures pertaining to good
governance as a precondition to attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were commented on. In an editorial in The Post (2002) the point was made that:

_There's urgent need for a review of the neo-liberal economic policy framework at the heart of NEPAD which seems to repeat the structural adjustment policy packages of the preceding two decades and overlooks the disastrous effects of those policies...For now, it seems NEPAD’s vision of democracy is defined by the needs of creating a functional market and in spite of claims of African origins, its main targets are foreign donors, particularly in the G8._

The ploy by SA as a sub-imperial power, with the support of other major African powers, to create a macro-economic environment conducive to investment by its corporates, was clearly spotted in the Zambian media. This led to a certain ‘tokenism’ concerning Zambia’s involvement and the likelihood that Zambian corporates would not benefit from the NEPAD-induced round of capital accumulation. The Zambian _The Post_ (Punabantu, 2002) noted:

_If Zambian firms and people do not have an input in the formulation processes then they can expect nothing, while government will continue to rubber-stamp the process...At the end of the day NEPAD is a transition to the AU and it is already being used to create the next generation of mini economic superpowers within Africa just by getting their agendas into the programme. Being excluded from these processes could well mean Zambia becoming an economic weakling. It's time for Zambian people and firms to engage NEPAD as vigorously as the South African corporate empire, if Zambia is to emerge at the end of the day as an economic super power._

Consistent with the interview material, the other major issue in the Zambian media concerns the slow implementation of the APRM and NEPAD generally. The lack of delivery by NEPAD, made it seem like another scheme that was well-intended, but did not deliver. It appeared that the country steadily lost interest in NEPAD (Liche, 2011; _Lusaka Times_, 2008a; Mangani, 2008; _Times of Zambia_, 2004a, 2004b, 2007).

In SA, civil servant elite respondent Henry Short (19/11/08) acknowledged that ‘Botswana is not a member of the steering committee [of NEPAD]. Mozambique, Namibia and Angola [are] switched on [whilst] Lesotho and Swaziland [are] not active'.
Corporate respondents such as Noah Naidoo (15/11/08), Director in Standard Bank, a key beneficiary of NEPAD because of its financing role in NEPAD-driven Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Africa, acknowledged that: ‘Although NEPAD was agreed to at the AU, Kenya was very cynical’ as they sensed the underlying plans of continental leadership. Representatives from the major African regions namely Algeria, Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria and SA control the NEPAD Steering Committee (Punabantu, 2002). NEPAD was also intended to be a point of reference around a wide range of things, including health and education. Accordingly, Multichoice was running an e-schools initiative as part of the broader NEPAD mandate. According to the e-schools website it wishes to impart ICT skills to young Africans in primary and secondary schools. However, Caroline Creasy (16/11/08), Corporate Affairs Manager of Multichoice, believed that NEPAD was not well received in the region. She stated: ‘Mozambique was a NEPAD e-schools country [but] Botswana…and] Zambia did not sign’. She concluded: ‘Southern Africa did not support e-schools, but North Africa did’. This is consistent with NEPAD benefiting the wealthier northern African nations and not those in SADC. Diana Games (03/02/09), who through her consultancy Africa@Work had written a report for the UN focusing on the media and NEPAD, thought: ‘Governments have been receptive, but business and [citizens] are ignorant [about NEPAD]’.

4.3.4 SADC

The creation of a neo-liberal macro-economic policy conducive to SA’s dominance in continental trade and industry through NEPAD was further complemented by the movements towards a SADC common market. This was to find expression through the

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Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which was a 15-year plan devised to create a SADC common market by 2015 (3.4.1). However, the real problem with the movement towards enhanced economic ‘integration’ was to be found in the long-term. A SADC common market was likely to perpetuate the cycle of uneven development. It would not allow industries in SADC an opportunity to ‘catch up’ with SA due to the cost-raising and polarisation effect (3.4.1). This has been experienced by SACU countries for many years as SACU has effectively remained a ‘captive market’ for SA. SA will therefore be allowed to continue to draw resources from SADC and according to Bob Sichinga (27/01/09), ‘sell it back to them’. This has allowed SA to consolidate and enhance the efficiency of capital accumulation within this ‘fixed space’. As Mpho Dibeela (27/11/08) argued: ‘Globalisation [or market liberalisation] has increased competition, but people can’t compete if the Free Trade Agreement [FTA] really takes root. Local suppliers will feel the pinch. [For example] local business will suffer if milk is less [expensive in another country]. Botswana needs to be more competitive across a closed market’.

It was also noted in sub-section 3.4.1 that the signing of a separate bilateral agreement between SA and the European Union (EU) had an adverse effect on SACU countries. This bilateral agreement was called the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). SA’s bilateral signing of the TDCA and then subsequent attempts to incorporate SA into the re-negotiated Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) under the Cotonou agreement, caused much frustration in SACU and resulted in a questioning of the purpose of the customs union (see below).

SA’s dealings with the EU at the expense of SACU countries were a primary focus in the Botswanan interview material. Civil servant elite respondent, Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08), Head of Public Relations and Communications for the Department
of Trade and Industry, contended: ‘When it comes to trade and general economic issues, it’s more about what SA gains than what the region gains. When it comes to the EPA…SA is negative with the EU [and interacts with the EU] in a self-serving manner’ by not taking SACU into account. Corporate respondent, Regionald Selelo (24/11/08), explained that ‘SACU is one market’. Therefore, as Botswana and other SACU countries are ‘one market’ they are effectively ‘subjected’ to the TDCA agreement between SA and the EU. This is a particularly difficult environment for Botswanan industries to compete in. The TDCA was signed only with SA on the pretext of its stronger economy relative to the region. The TDCA has therefore become a further ‘structural’ mechanism to subjugate the SACU market. Mpho Dibeela (27/11/08), editor of the *The Sun* in Botswana, described how there had been ‘serious protest in SACU’. He further asserted that SACU ‘[n]eeds a balance of trade [as] SACU has no goods to export to SA. The Minister of Trade [stated that] we expect a better deal. The links to the EU are in SA’s favour. Botswana doesn’t benefit’. Dibeela further asserted that as far as the ‘EPA [sic] Cotonou Agreement [is concerned Botswana exports] beef to the EU market. Had Botswana not signed the [EPA] agreement it would not have benefited’ and could have lost its position in the crucial EU market, largely due to the SA-induced delays in signing the EPA agreement.

The issue dominating media discourse on regional trade in Botswana also centred on trying to include SA in the EPA and its effects on SACU. The problem was that the drawn-out talks concerning ‘the tariffs to be applied for SA to enter into the EPA…led to “inordinate delay” and a generally untenable situation questioning the very existence of SACU’ (Mguni, 2011). The major problem was that ‘[t]he EU [was] reluctant to grant SA the full duty and quota-free access to be enjoyed by smaller SADC states…’ (ibid.), whilst ‘[SA] wanted to use [SADC] to extract more concessions from
[the] EU’ (Prof. Malema, alias for journalist from the Sunday Standard, 2010). This became a stalemate situation and was holding up the concluding of the agreement for the rest of the region. If SACU had collapsed because of the deadlock, Botswana would have lost ‘critical SACU revenues’ (Mguni, 2010). According to EU officials ‘[SA] had put unnecessary pressure on its poorer neighbours to resist initialising the [EPA] pact’ as it was not happy with the terms (Mosinyi, 2009). In August 2011 the agreement made available to African states in 2008 expired, but Botswana was able to fall back on a 2009 interim EPA which it had signed with the EU (Mguni, 2011).

Dot Keet, a trade policy expert, was reported as saying: ‘The mid-term review of the TDCA, the EPA-induced crisis in SACU and the potential collapse of SACU, or at least severe complications within its functioning, all demand that the entire TDCA be radically reviewed, revised, reduced or removed all together’ (first appeared in the Guardian Weekly in Zambia, cited in Nkonde, 2008).

The other theme to emerge from the Botswanan media material deals with consequences of the SADC FTA in Botswana as ‘[l]ocal industries fear they will be choked to death by a glut of South African imports as the SADC region opens up to a free trade zone’. The Chairman of the Botswana Poultry Association, Peter Kirby, stated: ‘With the launching of the free trade zone, I do not think we will be in business for very long…’ (Gaotlhobogwe, 2008). Ken Lewis, the Chairman of the Pig Producers Association of Botswana ‘also fear[ed] that the effects of the SADC free trade zone [would] be dramatic…’ (ibid). An editorial in the Mmegi noted: ‘There are concerns in the region about the protection of infant industries because the market is…dominated by South African products’ (Mmegi, 2008a). Apart from some arrangements to ‘impose a temporary measure or levy on the importation of certain products…to promote local
industries’ (Motlaloso, 2008) the chances that industries in Botswana would be able to really compete remained remote.

The issue of trade featured less in the Zambian interview material as Zambia is not a member of SACU. Philip Banda (28/01/09) believed: ‘Everybody looked forward to SA joining SADC, but when they did SA bulldozed. More goods are available [but SA] can slow trade’. Zambia is a member of SADC and the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA). COMESA includes an embryonic customs union and SADC wants to become one. The Zambian media material suggests that ‘Zambia [was] not sure of whether to belong to COMESA or SADC’ (Lusaka Times, 2007a). A report noted that ‘according to the World Trade Organization (WTO) rule, no member country should belong to two customs unions’ (ibid.). However, the Zambian government attempted to maintain its membership in both bodies for as long as possible.

The other theme in the media coverage pertains to SADC’s FTA and the lack of benefits for Zambia. Strong countervailing views emerged by ‘bloggers’ on the website of the Lusaka Times. The views expressed by the bloggers were generally far more critical than the contents of the articles they commented on. Under the rather uncritical article titled ‘FTA is launched’, two anonymous comments read as follows, presented in their original form with grammatical and spelling errors:

SA and Zimbabwe are the instant benefactors from this FTA. If we do not regulate ourselves smartly, which I doubt will happen, we will import pins, toilet paper, sugar, etc. And becoz our cost of doing business is high, we will sell alot of raw materials to SA and Zim, then import finished goods. I’m yet to read the blueprint, which I’m looking for at the moment, to understand the finer details. SA has pushed this as a counter to chinese business which has threaten their dominance in SADC (Lusaka Times, 2008b)

SACU and FTA, what is the difference. This is good news for [SA] whose economy wants to swallow weak ones, like Zambia’s and the rest in the Region. Smell a dead rotten rat. Empowering xenophobists (ibid.)
According to the Zambian government the plan was to create a tri-lateral FTA between SADC, COMESA and the East African Community (EAC). A meeting at head of state-level on this matter took place in June 2011, but it will still take many years before it can take effect (Lusaka Times, 2011a). Unfortunately, this larger FTA is also unlikely to truly benefit Zambia.

4.4 Business engagement with the region

As noted in Chapter 1, counter-imperialist discourses directed at a sub-imperial state’s businesses ultimately seek to expose its Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Further light is cast on the GBM complex by analysing discrepancies between the stated intentions of the state and business, and the actual actions of its corporates.

4.4.1 Exposing the GBM complex for ‘accumulation by dispossession’

SA was the largest FDI contributor in Africa in the 1990s and early 2000s as its corporates moved into the region under the banner of an African Renaissance. Such rhetoric created an expectation that SA’s businesses would work with the government and provide the ‘engine’ to develop not only SA but also the region. It was in this spirit that MNCs invested in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) projects and welfare organisations and also became involved in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) with regional governments. SA’s corporates needed to at least create the illusion of ‘giving back’ to the communities in which they operated. This was especially the case given the image of SA business in the region after apartheid (3.4.1).

Yet, SA’s corporates have also been at the forefront of controversy concerning the country’s regional relations. Being at ‘the sharp end’ of capital accumulation, they
are perceived to be at odds with the *rhetoric* of government. Instead, SA corporates are accused of continuing to benefit from the state of uneven regional development. The accumulation of SA capital has followed the same patterns in the region as it does back home of flowing to the already wealthy – and especially the large MNCs, banks and mining houses. Diana Games (03/02/09) contended that ‘the media [in conjunction with SA corporates] played a big role in exploiting these people’ and typically the ‘poor people [in the region] benefit less’. There is growing evidence to suggest that despite the developmental and positive aspects of SA’s business engagement with the region, many corporates benefit by means of dispossessing local communities.

An overview of the interview data suggests that dispossesson occurs in three main ways. First, monopolies stifle local livelihoods, eliminate the competition and are thereby able to exploit the local labour. Second, profits are repatriated back to SA. Third, the products and produce forming the supply chains for MNCs originate from SA and not from local suppliers.

In Botswana, media and corporate elite respondents were particularly critical of the dispossessing effects of SA corporates on local markets and business, helping to further reveal the *real* intentions of the GBM complex. Mpho Dibeela (27/11/08), speaking on the impact of SA business on local livelihoods, declared emphatically: ‘Chain stores have killed the small man. Huge [SA] restaurants have also killed the small man. Multinationals drown out the small man’. Dibeela further believed that dispossesson was taking place by means of ‘ship[ping] out profits instead of reinvesting [and that SA companies] prefer cheap labour’. Outsa Mokone (27/11/08) stated frankly: ‘The SA government is as bad as the apartheid government. Look at Ghana and Kenya. Don’t Woolworths get tomatoes from SA? Ghanians are up in arms about this’. He further stated that there was ‘growing resentment’ towards SA business,
adding that it ‘doesn’t empower local business’. Duduetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08), in effect, described SA’s MNCs as a *double-edged sword* for the country given the fact that they ‘do create jobs…[and contribute FDI, but the local suppliers] can’t supply [SA] chain stores’. She further noted the dispossessing effects of SA business on local communities: ‘Botswana doesn’t have controls like SA. Money goes straight to SA’. Chapelle-Molloy added that whilst SA corporates try to project the message that people ‘can make money’ and that they are ‘investor friendly, the banking charges are the same as the most expensive in the world’ (ibid.). Corporate respondent, Regionald Selelo (24/11/08), believed that the state played a more forceful role in this. He described how policies like BEE were giving SA businesses an unfair advantage and creating *preferred* partnerships between certain SA companies and SA providers in an attempt to remain BEE compliant. Selelo contended: ‘Tiger brands, the SA company, buys tins from a BEE company. It can’t [sic] buy tins from Botswana. Botswana doesn’t get the benefits of interacting with BEE companies’.

According to Botswanan media strong counter-imperialist discourses emerged in response to the SA-owned Multichoice. Out of all the SA private companies (and government-linked entities) operating in Botswana, Multichoice elicited the strongest resistance in the post-apartheid phase. An editorial in the *Mmegi* titled ‘The Sins of Monopoly…’ focused almost exclusively on Multichoice (*Mmegi*, 2005b). One client of Multichoice wrote in to the *Mmegi* speaking of the ‘very inaptly named Multichoice’ (Nash, 2011). The Botswanan government had tried to exercise some measure of control over Multichoice, through its National Broadcasting Board (NBB). However, Multichoice has been doing business in Botswana since 1993 (Mogende, 2011) before the board existed (Piet, 2005a). The NBB believed that Multichoice was a broadcaster and therefore should operate with a licence. However, MultiChoice contended that it is
a service provider that receives its content from elsewhere and is therefore technically not a broadcaster (Mmegi, 2007b). After Multichoice rejected a licence awarded by the NBB (Piet, 2005b) the chairman of the NBB, Dr Masego Mpotokwane, responded in turn saying that MultiChoice Botswana ‘will have to comply with conditions stated in the licence’ (Piet, 2005a). Multichoice decided to take the NBB to court over the matter of licensing. The judgement went in favour of Multichoice. The court ruled that ‘the relevant legislation has not kept pace with advances in technology’ (Gaotlhobogwe, 2007a).

Further resistance to Multichoice’s monopoly came in the form of business competitors. One such competitor was Black Earth Communications (BEC). Andrew Jones, the person heading the venture, was reported to be ‘of the feeling that Multichoice’s monopoly ha[d] made it arrogant and it does not have the customers’ interest at heart’ (Mokgoabone, 2006). BEC was a Johannesburg-based company, but was to run its television service from Botswana. In an article titled ‘End of Monopoly’ it was described how BEC had ‘entered the fray [of pay television market] after its application passed muster at the National Broadcasting Board (NBB)…’ (Odubeng, 2006). Yet the difficulties in establishing pay TV services proved too great. In an article titled ‘Where is Black Earth TV?’ it was stated how: ‘It was supposed to be up and running by now, airing its television signals from Botswana to the rest of the continent. Just where is the pay television, which was expected to end Multichoice's monopoly in Africa?’ (Gaotlhobogwe, 2007b). No further mention appears on BEC in the Botswanan media as the venture folded.

Sterner competition was to come from the rival pay television station, GTV, established by former Multichoice manager, Billy Sekgororoane. The new television channel was part of US television, Gateway Broadcasting Services, which had
embarked on launching services in Africa (Gaotlhobogwe, 2007c). GTV caused a significant public relations nightmare for DSTV in Africa when it acquired the rights to air all the English Premier League football games throughout sub-Saharan Africa. These rights were previously held by DSTV (Khutsafalo, 2007; Mmegi, 2007c; Motlogelwa, 2007). However, GTV’s parent company, Gateway Broadcasting Services, ‘unexpectedly’ went into liquidation in February 2009 (Shejavali, 2009). After the collapse of GTV, the rights to air Premier League games throughout sub-Saharan Africa went back to the SA-owned company (New Vision, 2009). The attempts at breaking Multichoice’s monopoly had failed.

In Zambia, elite respondents expressed strong countervailing views further exposing SA’s corporates for accumulation by dispossession, especially Shoprite. Corporate respondent, Ethel Mulenga (29/1/09), explained that due to a five-year tax break for new businesses, SA companies come in and move out before they have to start paying taxes. She added: ‘Local businesses don’t have tax breaks. [It is therefore] unfair because locals pay tax and…struggle’. She also stated that SA companies ‘will rent instead of build. They don’t build and are not here to stay’ (ibid.). Civil servant elite respondents such as Julia Mwila (23/01/09) concurred by stating: ‘SA shops close after five years and then come back in another form to avoid tax’. Shupi Mweene (29/1/09) drew attention to the collusion between SA corporates and the supporting role played by SA banks. She contended: ‘SA businesses always prefer their own kind. If [the Zambian Department of] Trade and Industry comes to Spar and asks [are you using local suppliers?] They will say there [are] not [suitable local suppliers to use]. SA business is not integrated. SA [businesses] ha[ve] resources. They go to Stanbic to get loans because they are…from SA. The Kasanchi Copper Mine is run by SA men and is nepotistic as they just employ SA people’. Bob Sichinga (27/01/09) believed that SA
businesses are ‘not putting anything back’. Evelyn Mutubila (21/01/09) believed that SA companies ‘get cheap labour [and the] profits are huge but the locals don’t benefit’. Corporate respondent, Marlan Kananda (27/01/09), believed: ‘People enjoy the products, but there is a problem with individuals, there is a perception that managers are arrogant and want to be called boss’. He went on to state: ‘Southern Sun and Shoprite are very hierarchical and abusing Zambians. Life is expensive in Zambia. Therefore SA businesses say they are overpaying Zambian workers’. Others suggested that it depends on the size of the business. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09), Executive Secretary of the Zambian Chamber of Small and Medium Business Associations, contended that the ‘[g]eneral impression is that SA business doesn’t have much of a good reputation. Big ones have a good image [but the] small, medium businesses are dishonest and exploitative’. John Phiri (28/01/09) believed that the main economic message that SA is projecting to the region was: ‘We want more, but are not willing to give back’.

Consistent with the interview data, the Zambian media material suggests that there is a dissonance between SA’s rhetoric of development and the actual behaviour of MNCs. There had been ongoing and sustained complaints from Shoprite staff in Zambia over poor salaries, lack of pension schemes and generally poor working conditions. The action taken by the Zambian government, in conjunction with unions, was ultimately effective, but the progress was slow and Shoprite appeared to have employed delaying tactics. In January 1998 the Zambian government intervened when the Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Enoch Kavindele, wrote in a letter to Shoprite management that ‘as a result of what your staff consider as slave wages, a series of work disruptions are planned in the very near future in all your retail outlets’ (*Times of Zambia*, 1998). Throughout the next few years this was indeed the case. In June 2003, Shoprite workers staged a country-wide strike to demand better conditions of service
(Sichalwe, 2003). The state again urged Shoprite management to expedite salary negotiations in order ‘to avoid further industrial unrest from employees’ (Times of Zambia, 2003). Exactly two years later a similar strike lasting a few days was reported at Shoprite branches across the country (Michelo, 2005) where workers continued with their protest demanding improved salaries and conditions of service (Times of Zambia, 2005a). The Shoprite workers were represented by the National Union for Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW). The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was also involved (Michelo, 2005). By July 2006, up to three Shoprite stores had burnt down almost completely (Paipi, 2006). After the store in Cairo Road in Lusaka burnt down, the causes of the fire were variously described as faulty maintenance and due to wiring in the bakery. However Inspector General of Police Ephraim Mateyo was quoted as saying: ‘We don't know whether it is sabotage or carelessness from the kitchen, we can't tell’ (Mulenga and Mwendabai, 2006). A report suggested that firefighters were prevented from extinguishing the fire in time by the owners of the store (Paipi, 2006). In January 2008, another Shoprite outlet in Solwezi was ‘reduced to rubble’ by a fire (Sichela, 2008). No articles were found that conclusively suggested that this was a form of sabotage. Yet the resistance towards Shoprite has been such that one cannot rule out this possibility.

In July and August 2009, countrywide strikes continued due to a lack of a pension scheme. Management was to close all the outlets (Times of Zambia, 2009a). The workers called off their strike after management agreed to provide a pension scheme (Times of Zambia, 2009b). Labour Deputy Minister, Simon Kachimba, had ‘warned Shoprite Zambia to desist from engaging workers on casual bases on the pretext of studying the country’s labour laws’ (Lusaka Times, 2010). The government summoned Shoprite management to appear before the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security ‘to explain why it is abrogating labour laws despite making assurances to improve conditions of service for its workers’ (Times of Zambia, 2010). This did not seem to put an end to disputes. After a four-day strike, which cost the company 6 billion Kwacha, Shoprite management had sacked all unionised workers countrywide (Times of Zambia, 2011). The ZCTU had strongly condemned the decision by Shoprite management (Lusaka Times, 2011b). Under pressure from governments and the unions, the workers were recalled (Lusaka Times, 2011c). As a result of these events, government summoned Shoprite once more following reports that ‘the chain store ha[d] allegedly issued letters of suspension and gross misconduct to some union officials and workers who participated in the recent countrywide strike…The meeting will aim to iron out the differences between Shoprite management and the Union’ (Lusaka Times, 2011d). As a result of the meeting, all Shoprite workers were given an amnesty (Lusaka Times, 2011e).

According to the media, pressure from the Zambian government and business representatives was, to some extent, successful in forcing Shoprite to include more local suppliers (Times of Zambia, 1999a; 1999b; 2005b). Other reports discussed the effects of Shoprite on local livelihoods by ‘hogging the entire market…with a multi million dollar capital base and a regional presence’, especially in the smaller towns such as Mazabuka (Chongo, 1999).

In SA, civil servant elite respondents such as Henry Short (19/11/08) suggested that ‘SAB Miller take over the local brand and “clean it up”, such as Zambezi Lager’. He also stated that ‘Willards batteries [were] developed in the copperbelt [in Zambia]. [But] SA companies closed them down’ (ibid.). Rob Davies (27/03/08) implicitly described another form of dispossession by stating that ‘sub-standard or damaged goods are sold in the region’ as the regional market becomes a way to profit from defects and
unwanted stock, whilst ignoring the rights of regional consumers and wholesalers. Corporate respondents such as Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08) spoke of how SA business has ‘displaced the local cornershop’. Caroline Creasey (16/11/08) from Multichoice contended: ‘SA is the only makers of [DSTV] decoders. SA transports local technicians [to other African countries and] local businesses are importers of satellite dishes…’ None is produced locally in African states.

4.5 Cultural-media

As noted in Chapter 1, counter-imperialist discourses directed at a sub-imperial state’s cultural-media ultimately seek to expose its media organisations and institutions of ‘control’ or ‘manipulation’. The GBM complex is further compromised by analysing discrepancies between the stated intentions projected through its cultural-media and the actual actions of the state and people.

4.5.1 Exposing the GBM complex for ‘control through ideology’

As highlighted in Chapter 3, the ideological power behind SA’s capital accumulation was driven by its cultural-media. SA’s cultural-media were used by the state and corporate elite as a form of ‘control’ over the region to endorse consumption and values consistent with a capitalist way of life. As a sub-imperial state SA played an important part in spreading this message throughout Africa. Pieter Fourie (04/02/09), Professor of Communications Studies at UNISA, suggested that the ‘media imperialism’ thesis be applied to SA’s media in the region. He believed that SA was ‘taking over the role of the US, dominating media in Africa through DSTV and Multichoice’ (3.4.1).

Although SA is part of a bigger pattern of capital accumulation, these messages needed to be ‘localised’ and made relevant to Africa. The state used various forms of
cultural-media to convey particular messages to domestic and international audiences. First the Rainbow Nation, and then in a more consolidated manner, the African Renaissance, were to provide the government-led substance and ‘rallying call’ behind its cultural-media. These two visions were to play important roles in altering SA’s image after apartheid (3.4.1).

An overview of the interview data suggests that effectively one interlinked area emerged as contradictory concerning SA’s stated ideology – as projected through its cultural-media – and the actual actions of the state and its people. The issue concerns the manner in which the mainstream cultural-media is welcoming of Africans and embraces diversity. Yet, at the same time, xenophobia has become pervasive in many areas of SA society. Related to this is a superficial treatment of the region in SA’s cultural-media, despite the claims to represent the region in various ways (3.4.1). Elite respondents were asked how they would describe the main cultural image that SA projects to the region. The critical responses implicitly drew attention to the use of SA’s cultural-media as a form of ‘manipulation’ by the elite. When ambiguity in SA’s cultural-media was detected by regional elite respondents, this was typically as a result of a disjuncture between rhetoric and actions.

In Botswana, civil servant elite respondent Gemma Masonga (04/12/08) noted such a disjuncture. She described SA as having a ‘confused culture’. Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08) spoke of how SA’s cultural-media are ‘not really purely African culture. [There is] some eurocentrism in [the] culture. Look at radio and tv [where there is] little consideration given to culture…[The] content is eurocentric’. Corporate respondents such as Regionald Selelo (24/11/08) cast further light on the GBM complex when he spoke of how SA’s cultural-media are meant to be one of a ‘Rainbow nation
[of] people of different races living in harmony, but BEE is serving a small section, [it is] elitist, [and is not inclusive as] white people are not given a chance…’

In Zambia, corporate elite respondent Bob Sichinga (27/01/09) drew attention to the incongruence between rhetoric and actions. He argued: ‘[Because of the] xenophobia [SA has] chased everybody out from [the country]. What did we make the sacrifices for? SADC wants to break down the borders [through the rhetoric of regional integration] but SA [through its xenophobic actions] deepens them. It’s in SA’s best interest to develop the region’. He asked rhetorically: ‘Does SA include Africans culturally in 2010?’ Media respondents such as John Phiri (28/01/09) stated that SA’s cultural-media was one of ‘confusion’. He added that during ‘apartheid, we related more towards the black culture…Now SA is too Americansed, all we see is American culture’. Chris Chirwa (27/01/09) contended that SA’s sub-imperialism is ‘linked to xenophobia. [It is] apartheid in disguise’.

In SA, civil servant elite Ghulam Asmal (19/11/08) lamented the incongruencies and vagueness in SA’s cultural-media. He asserted: ‘There has not been a cohesive…soft penetration. [It has a] momentum of its own. Football is not a coherent policy [sic]’. Media respondents such as Ray Hartley (05/02/09) clearly spotted the ambiguous and even hypocritical aspects of SA’s cultural-media. He defined the dominant cultural message as: ‘Insularity, parochialism, suspicious of foreigners and without any grounds, superior. [It is based on the idea that] SA is special which ties in with the xenophobia attacks’ (Chapter 7). Peter Fourie (04/02/09) suggested that there is a more sinister aspect to this two-facedness: ‘In terms of policies and rhetoric SA projects an image of multiculturalism, but xenophobia projects [sic] are the opposite of multiculturalism, and display tendencies towards imperialism. The region is scared of SA’. Tula Dlamini (04/02/09) spoke of a ‘normative rainbow’ whilst David O’Sullivan
(05/02/09) suggested that ‘Nigeria [‘s cultural-media] are more descript’ or distinctive than SA’s.

The Botswanan and Zambian elite respondents were asked if they felt that the SA media adequately represent the interests of the region. 57% disagreed with the statement. In Botswana, corporate respondents such as Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08) suggested: ‘The Mail and Guardian is informed regionally, only as far as politics is concerned but not culturally or not economically…’ Dudetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08) believed: ‘Because of the cultural difference [between SA and the region, SA media do not really represent the region]. Jakaranda FM [is in] Afrikaans, SA FM is balanced, Motswede FM is in Setswana [and that] appeals to Botswanans’, but generally the cultural difference is too great. Media respondents such as Thapelo Ndlovu (27/11/08) suggested that ‘only when there is a problem in the region’ do SA media bother to cover the region. Outsa Mokone (27/11/08) believed that SA is ‘sending culture into the region not vice-versa’.

Zambian corporate elite respondent, Chris Chirwa (27/01/09), believed that ‘[t]here [is] a strong Western media influence’ in SA’s cultural-media and that ‘the market can generate more sales if they can publish stories on America or England’. Muletambo Lingela (23/01/09) contended that there is ‘not much coverage of SADC’.

In SA, media elite respondents such as Peter Fabricius (03/02/09) expressed the countervailing view that the SA media are ‘too Eurocentric [and] rely too heavily on IOL, Reuters [and the] BBC’. He added that ‘part of the problem is that [the media] are ignoring the plight of the down-trodden’. This is indicative of how the interests of the GBM complex are maintained. The media generally fail to truly reveal the scale of poverty and desperation in the country and region (7.7.6). Diana Games (03/02/09) summed up SA’s lack of real representation of the region in its media by saying: ‘[The
SA media] do exactly what they accuse the West of doing. Only report the bad stuff of the region’.

4.6 Concluding remark

Despite being successful in its capital accumulation throughout the region during the post-apartheid period, the GBM complex has run into particular problems in the latter half of the previous decade (2000-2010). Towards the end of Mbeki’s tenure incidents such as the xenophobia attacks and the energy and the Zimbabwean crises, sharply contradicted the dominant geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses of the GBM complex.

Having considered the people and institutions responsible for the formation of counter-imperialist discourses within the region, the next four chapters will focus more closely on specific aspects of regional resistance towards the GBM complex. This will further illuminate the nature of the relationship between the GBM complex and the region, and help answer the overall question: is SA’s sub-imperialism in crisis?
Chapter 5

South Africa’s Energy Crisis

5.1 Introduction
Rolling blackouts or planned 'load-shedding'\textsuperscript{12} have been occurring in South Africa (SA) since 2006, primarily due to a lack of planning and investment by the SA government and its power utility, the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom). They did not respond to the predictable increase in demand due to the expanding SA economy and the post-apartheid state-led efforts to increase the number of citizens benefiting from electricity. In January and February 2008 blackouts were particularly severe when large parts of the country were thrust into darkness for prolonged periods of time. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for the first quarter in 2008 was estimated at 5% but ended up at 2% due to the crisis. The same happened in the second quarter (Naidoo, 15/11/08). In May 2008 the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) estimated that the total cost to the economy of the energy crisis was R50 billion (NERSA, 2008: 36). Given the prominence and importance of Eskom in the region, most of which relies on Eskom for electricity either directly or through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)\textsuperscript{13}, Eskom’s inability to meet demands signalled serious problems for regional energy security.

The present analysis examines the impact of SA’s energy crisis on its geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses, given SA’s government-business-media

\textsuperscript{12} Load-shedding refers to a rotational system whereby Eskom attempts to alleviate the strain on the main electricity grid by enforcing planned blackouts in alternating areas throughout the country and region.

\textsuperscript{13} The Southern African Power Pool is a twelve nation consortium of regional power utilities created in 1995 in an effort to foster the growth of the southern African electricity market. It achieves this through interconnectors allowing states to export and import electricity within the region.
(GBM) complex. As noted in Chapter 1, a dominant feature of the GBM complex is the expansion of parastatals into the region to facilitate capital accumulation within a ‘fixed space’. Eskom’s expansion into the region provides one of the strongest examples of a SA parastatal looking to establish a monopoly throughout the southern African space. Yet the energy crisis resulted in much regional resistance in the form of counter-imperialist discourses with significant consequences for SA.

This chapter draws from both interview and media material. The questionnaire was administered in late 2008 and early 2009. The timing was crucial as the energy crisis was still ongoing and the period when it was at its most severe – between December 2007 and February 2008, which is the focus of this analysis – was still relatively fresh in respondents’ minds. The section of the questionnaire dedicated to the energy crisis started off with a vignette that sought to contextualise the crisis and the time-period referred to. This section consisted of seven questions out of a total of sixty-six on the questionnaire, and comprised both open-ended and close-ended questions (see appendix A, questions 36 to 44).

The interview material was supplemented with thorough media searches of media in Botswana, Zambia and SA, as well as Namibia and Zimbabwe. These searches focused on the three months in question – December 2007 to February 2008. The SA media searches were conducted through the SA Media database. More general internet searches were also conducted. However, as the primary focus of inquiry, more exhaustive regional news media searches were conducted in Botswana, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Initially the search was restricted to the two primary case study countries of Botswana and Zambia using the AllAfrica.com media archives. Once I had completed the search on AllAfrica.com, the mass of media material suggested that a thorough analysis of regional attitudes and responses to the energy crisis would have to
include a discussion on Namibia and Zimbabwe due to the heavily interconnected nature of southern Africa’s power systems. I therefore decided to include these two countries in this analysis. In addition to the search on AllAfrica.com, I searched the individual newspapers’ websites in these four countries to verify that no material was missed on the AllAfrica.com database. A slight exception occurred in Zimbabwe where the ZimPapers search engine, that serves as the search engine for a collection of mostly government-owned papers, such as The Herald and the Sunday Mail, could suspiciously not be searched from outside the country, but perhaps it was just due to technical failure. I was nonetheless forced to turn to the Online Editor of ZimPapers to run searches on my behalf, specified as to time and keywords. The success of this was limited. However, given the quantity and quality of material extracted through AllAfrica.com, I am not concerned that the Zimbabwean media searches are lacking in depth. The comparative experience from the other countries suggests that the individual newspaper searches yielded very little that was not already traced through the AllAfrica.com searches. The government-owned media in Zimbabwe are analysed critically.

This chapter will examine the regional responses from government, business and media and the implications of the energy crisis for SA’s regional standing.

5.2 Background to the energy crisis
Since the founding of Eskom in 1928, SA has benefited from an abundant and cheap supply of electricity. The act establishing the monopoly mandated that electricity be sold at cost. Artificially low labour costs under apartheid, combined with SA's large coal reserves, enabled Eskom in effect to subsidise industrial development and to become a surplus producer, ultimately exporting electricity to neighbouring countries. The low cost of SA's electricity has deterred foreign power companies and the private sector
from entering the market. As a result, Eskom supplies 95% of the country's power (O'Flaherty, 2008).

Since democracy was attained in 1994 ANC governments have expanded service to rural areas and previously disadvantaged communities and successfully pursued policies to increase GDP growth consistent with the market-driven neo-liberal policy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). The policies pursued by the government of attracting foreign investment were dependent on a steady and secure electricity supply as the economy is heavily reliant on energy intensive industries such as mining. Since 1994 the government has more than doubled the population served by electricity. Eskom's 1.2 million customers in 1990 grew to 4 million in 2007. However, oddly the government did nothing to expand its baseload and even mothballed two existing plants, reducing generating capacity from 45,000 megawatts (MW) to 37,000 - 40,000 MW (O'Flaherty, 2008). This was despite being warned as early as 1998 that by 2007 demand would exceed supply without measures to expand their power-generating capacity. A White Paper tabled by the Department of Minerals and Energy (1998:41) reads:

*Although growth in electricity demand is only projected to exceed generation capacity by approximately the year 2007, long capacity-expansion lead times require strategies to be in place in the mid-term, in order to meet the needs of the growing economy.*

Despite the warning, government ordered Eskom not to build new stations in the hope that private investors would seize the opportunity. The White Paper further stated: ‘Licensed privately owned distributors will be allowed to co-exist alongside other public and private distributors to distribute their own generated electricity' (ibid.: 46). But the return on electricity was too low and government was unable to attract private enterprise. In the meantime, government did nothing to expand the power-generating infrastructure and by 2007 demand did indeed outstrip supply.
The investments that were made were directed toward the promotion of access to energy services for previously disadvantaged citizens and communities. This meant the government prioritised infrastructures such as powerlines over the construction of new power stations. Although rapid economic growth has been blamed for the electricity shortages in some quarters, some have disputed this. Energy researcher and columnist Andrew Kenny, having noted that SA's GDP 'grew by a feeble 3% until about 2003, and then increased to a slightly better 4.5% to 5%', went on to state that if economic growth was estimated at 6%, planning for electricity growth should have been at least 6%, if not more, to sustain the expected increase (Tissen and Mnguni, 2008).

The electricity shortage also resulted, in part, from a continued reliance on coal power, coal-transportation bottlenecks and a shortage of project engineers (O'Flaherty, 2008).

There is some suspicion that the indecision by government on energy policy was also the result of pressures from environmental activists. This demonstrates the consequences when compulsory reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are imposed on developing countries (Alexander, 2008). Ex-president, Thabo Mbeki, has since admitted that government was wrong. But why did the warning go unheeded? According to Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP): 'To be fair, the then-new democratic government was grappling with an array of what must have seemed more important public policy interventions. It is understandable, if not excusable that the policymakers' radar missed the early warning' (Power Technology, 2008).

Long dependent on exports from Eskom's surplus generating capacity, the consequences for the region were equally severe. SA generates 80.4% of electricity in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with Mozambique generating 5%, Zambia 3.6%, Zimbabwe 4.1% and DRC 2.6% (Sibeene, 2008a). Botswana and Namibia are insignificant players in power generation in the SADC region, falling
among the few countries that make up the remaining 4.3% of power generation in the region (ibid). Yet, steps had been taken in 1995, just one year after SA attained democracy, to enhance regional cooperation in electricity supply through the creation of the SAPP. The former Minister of Energy in Botswana points to the creation of the SAPP as an indication that the region knew of the impending crisis and saw enhanced regional inter-connectedness as the answer (Motlaloso, 2008). However, instead of using the SAPP as a medium to facilitate the steady accrual of regional energy-generating infrastructure, the creation of the SAPP seemed to lull the region into a false sense of security that Eskom would be able to supply them indefinitely.

The SAPP is so designed that, in theory, it should have been able to transfer electricity from one country to another, balancing out demand-supply imbalances in the region as required. The SAPP includes all the SADC countries except Mauritius and Madagascar. The existing and proposed interconnectors used to power the region demonstrate the extent of regional interdependence. The drawback of these interlocked grids is that if one country experiences problems a knock-on effect is bound to follow (see figure 5.1 below).

The SAPP has had some notable successes in establishing the infrastructure needed for a regional energy market, such as the completion of the Matimba-Insukamini interconnector linking the region's northern electricity grid – Zimbabwe, Zambia and the DRC – with the southern grid – SA, Botswana, Namibia and Mozambique. Plans to connect the southern and northern electricity grids with the power systems of Angola, Malawi and Tanzania are in varying stages of development but none could have brought relief in early 2008 (Oxford Analytica, 2008). Despite the SAPP knowing as early as 1998 that it would face a power shortfall by 2007 (Madakufamba, 2008), virtually no electricity generating capacity has been added to the overall SAPP system by any of its
members. As Lawrence Musaba, manager of the SAPP, stated: 'We've had no significant capital injection into generation and transmission, from either the private sectors or the public sectors, for fifteen, or maybe twenty years' (*Power Technology*, 2008).

**Figure 5.1: The Southern African Power Pool**

The material originally presented here is not currently available in ORA

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**5.3 South Africa’s energy crisis**

The beginning of the power crisis can be traced back to the first wave of power cuts that hit the Western Cape in 2006. It was called the 'Koeberg crisis' after the nuclear plant from which the crisis originated (Reddy, 2008). The station’s two reactors supply
1,800MW or 6% of SA’s electricity needs.\(^\text{14}\) Koeberg is on the west coast of SA and also supplies electricity to Namibia. Namibia had to implement load-shedding as a result of the events at Koeberg (Maletsky, 2007). According to Anton Eberhard (2008), energy expert at the University of Cape Town, the cause of the Koeberg crisis was ‘the bolt that destroyed the generator stator in unit one [a loose bolt was found here, ostensibly due to negligence or poor maintenance]…and the subsequent tripping of the second Koeberg reactor unit following a number of failures on the Eskom transmission feeders to the Cape...’ What happened at Koeberg became highly politicised as the official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), used the crisis as an opportunity to illustrate where the African National Congress (ANC) had fallen short in terms of service delivery and in the maintenance of crucial infrastructure needed to maintain the country (Fourie, 04/02/09).

Throughout 2006 and 2007 there were several blackouts in the Western and Eastern Cape due to the problems at Koeberg. This further compromised the national grid and also led to blackouts in Johannesburg, SA’s economic centre (Bell, 2008). The pattern persisted with varying intensity for two years. The winter periods were particularly difficult when demand rose substantially at peak times. As a result of the continued instability of the national grid there was a strong public outcry directed at the government (The Herald, SA, 2006). New industrial projects had to be put on hold, unemployment increased, and the chances of SA achieving 6% growth by 2014 receded. Despite talk about possibly moving the 2010 Football World Cup to another country, the government had given assurances that the Games would go ahead as planned (O’Flaherty, 2008). The long-term prognosis looked bleak when in November 2007 Eskom announced that load-shedding would be ‘a reality for the next seven years’

\(^\text{14}\) http://www.eskom.co.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=548
The Koeberg incident proved to be just the ‘tip of the iceberg’. What began as several power outages in the Western Cape led to almost two weeks of rolling blackouts across the country in early 2008 (Reddy, 2008). On 9 January 2008, a power shortage shut down SA’s critical mining sector for five days. Thereafter, the mines were operated at 90% capacity. However, on 5 March, the government announced they would begin operating at 95% (O’Flaherty, 2008). Also in January, service to the general public became subject to load-shedding. Businesses had to switch to generators, which work only for a limited time and are expensive to run. On 29 February, Eskom announced that in Johannesburg the power would be cut off for several hours for two to three days a week. The proximate cause of this was a shortage of coal at Eskom’s power stations and a very wet season that had flooded coal mines and impeded transport. In 2000, Eskom had 61 days of coal stockpiled. By January 2008 coal stockpiles averaged only 10 days, and in some places only two days, resulting in an inability to cope with increased demand (ibid).

5.4 South Africa exports its energy crisis

5.4.1 States belonging to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

Most estimates suggest that the Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) had been importing 70-80% of its power supplies from Eskom until exports were reduced from 450MW to 350MW on 1 January 2008 because of the latter’s domestic supply constraints. BPC signed a new five-year contract with Eskom in January, which scaled down supply annually (Benza, 2008) allowing Eskom to reduce supply when SA was experiencing power shortages. This agreement would see Botswana getting only 150MW from Eskom in 2011 (Mosinyi, 2008). Botswana was therefore forced to turn to Mozambique
to seek short-term alternative sources of supply, via the SA or Zimbabwean network. However, a damaged Zimbabwean power line added to Botswana’s problems as power was unable to come in from Mozambique via Zimbabwe. This exacerbated load-shedding. Eskom was using the same transmission line and experiencing similar problems (Mokoka, 2008). Botswana also had to turn to Zambia, but Zambia was having its own problems with the grid failure which also affected Botswana and Zimbabwe directly (Segwai, 2008).

Namibia's state-owned power-generating utility, NamPower, was notified by Eskom in October 2007 of its intention to reduce electricity exports by 30MW. Namibia imports 238MW from SA – roughly half its annual power requirement (Sibeene, 2007a). NamPower was therefore forced to rely more heavily on its imports from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique. Under an agreement between NamPower and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) Namibia contributed $50 billion for upgrading the four Hwange generators and in return Namibia would receive 150MW from Zimbabwe in the next five years. In January 2008 the first instalment of 40MW arrived (Kaira, 2008). It had to come through SA, because the Caprivi power line linking Namibia and Zimbabwe would only be completed in 2009, posing a further threat due to the problems with the SA grid (Maletsky, 2007). The Caprivi interconnector is a major NamPower project connecting the networks of six southern African states (Sibeene, 2007b).

5.4.2 States belonging to SADC

The Zambian Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO) has a total installed generating capacity of about 1,600MW, but is only able to generate some 722MW because of poor maintenance and ageing installations (Oxford Analytica, 2008). It is a net importer of
power and is not always able to secure the necessary capacity needed to meet national demand. Because of this Zambia suffers regular power outages (Schatz, 2008). On 19, 21 and 22 January, Zambia was hit by countrywide blackouts that lasted for unusually long periods of time (Times of Zambia, 2008a). Another nationwide blackout in Zambia had taken place in 2006 (Times of Zambia, 2008b). The root cause was the crisis in SA which had led to wider grid failure to the north (World Nuclear News, 2008). This manifested in a major system disturbance affecting the interconnected systems of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana (Times of Zambia, 2008c). Faulty equipment on the Zambian power grid was blamed for the knock-on effects in Zimbabwe and Botswana, although ZESCO and ZESA blamed each other for the outages. As a result of the problems emanating from its SAPP partners, the Zambian government directed ZESCO to temporarily disconnect the country’s power system from the regional interconnectors to the south (Times of Zambia, 2008d).

ZESA, reliant for 45% of its electricity on SA, Mozambique and the DRC, has been unable to purchase sufficient power supplies since 2000. This is due to acute foreign exchange shortages. Although the country has been subject to recurring blackouts for much of the past seven years, the early 2008 power cuts were the first to affect the entire country (Oxford Analytica, 2008). In December 2007, Eskom and ZESCO disconnected power to Zimbabwe because of its failure to service substantial accumulated debt. Even if Zimbabwe could have paid Eskom, it is doubtful whether Eskom had the capacity to export (Manyukwe, 2007). Zimbabwe had to turn to Mozambique and the DRC, although the former also disconnected power on 28 December due to unpaid bills. Mozambique reconnected on the 11 January once partial payment had been made (The Herald, 2008a). The DRC had also temporarily halted exports due to technical faults on its transmission networks (Kadzere, 2008). Zesa was
also withholding electricity from consumers so that power continued to go to key industries. The result was heavy blackouts. The torrential rains at the time added to the problems as coal supplies were wet (Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2008). These issues were exacerbated by poor maintenance and grid failure also affecting Zambia. The 19 January grid failure led to the complete shutdown of basic services, notably the water supply. These nationwide power failures would sometimes last for up to twenty-four hours at a time (Karimakwenda, 2008). Simultaneous power cuts persisted on 21 January (The Herald, 2008b) and 2 February (The Standard, 2008). Although Zambia had blamed Zimbabwe for the grid failure, Zimbabwe in turn blamed Zambia (The Herald, 2008b).

5.5 Regional government responses

Consideration of national responses to the energy crisis raises several questions: how the energy crisis affected power relations between SA and the region? how did governments communicate with each other and with their respective citizenries over the power crisis? how did this challenge or reinforce existing power relations in southern Africa? Two main issues emerged from the interview and media material regarding regional government responses. The first issue deals with the actions taken by governments in reaction to their dependence on Eskom. The second issue concerns the poor communication between the SA government and the region regarding supply constraints.

5.5.1 Breaking the cycle of dependency

Governments in the region were coming under increased pressure to become more self-sufficient. The region therefore had to rely less on importing energy from SA. In order
to do so regional governments needed to invest in energy-generating infrastructure and break the cycle of dependency on Eskom. In Botswana, the majority of elite respondents suggested that the government needed to manage the risk of energy supply independently. The assumption was, as stated by Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08), Head of Public Relations and Communications for the Department of Trade and Industry: ‘Botswana was sitting comfortably, without having a fall-back strategy. The crisis was a wake-up call’. Other civil service respondents such as Thanki Mothae (28/11/08), Director of the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Systems for SADC based at the SADC headquarters in Botswana’s capital, Gaborone, believed that it is a ‘regional problem’ and as a result ‘the region has looked to increase its outputs’. Corporate respondent Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08), who is a former Namibian and Senior Manager of Banking Services in the Bank of Gaborone, stated:

> The region is so dependent on South Africa. The region can’t do anything as it is held to ransom. Other countries need to be more self-sufficient and invest in their own energy creation.

Media actors such as Mosetsanagape Maribe (01/12/08), Head of News and Current Affairs for Botswana Television (BTV), stated that it was ‘irresponsible of government’ to have allowed this situation to develop. Mpho Dibeela (27/11/08), editor of the Daily Sun in Botswana, stated that as a result of crisis the government had been pressured to seek ‘alternative energies’, something largely considered to be one of the positives of the crisis.

The following editorial in the Mmegi (2008b), the popular independent newspaper in Botswana, clearly demonstrates the pressures being placed on the Botswanan government given the extent of their reliance on SA:

> This painful experience should be a lesson to government and the BPC. To the government, it should be clear that over-dependence on a foreign country can never be made policy...This dependency syndrome which cuts across all sectors, needs to come to an end now.
Hence rehabilitation projects and new projects were fast-tracked, such as the Mmamabula Project and Morupule B Project. The Mmamabula Project is a 1,200MW capacity power station and coal mine project in Botswana, developed to provide power mainly to SA. At the time of crisis the Mmamabula Project was the most advanced independent power producer project that could help meet the urgent demand for new baseload capacity in SA in the short term.\footnote{http://www.cicenergycorp.com/project/info_mamabula/}

In the past, the argument for the Botswanan government not to expand its power generation infrastructure was always that it does not have a market to sell it to, given the small Botswanan consumer base and Eskom’s monopoly. However, for some, the crisis had demonstrated that this was certainly not the case. *The Voice* (2008) noted on this matter:

> The rolling blackouts that have surged across the border from South Africa have come across as a bit of a shock, but a few long-term benefits could emerge out of the unwelcome darkness. There can be little doubt now that there is a genuine market for the export power station the government has been pushing, so the current shortage could lead to a major foreign exchange earning.

In Namibia, the media material suggests that the drive to break the cycle of dependency on Eskom through enhanced regional cooperation was particularly strong. Take, for example, the following article in the *New Era* (Sibeene, 2008b):

> On the 3rd of January Namibia started receiving the first 40MW from Hwange power station as part of the multi-billion dollar 150MW deal. ...[T]he power from Zimbabwe was to lessen Namibia’s dependence on South Africa...NamPower together with Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe are to also embark on a project that will ensure that Hwange Power Station is linked to Victoria Falls via Botswana and Namibia, thereby linking these four countries. According to Kaimu [NamPower’s spokesperson], the project known as Zizabona will complete the link and create a corridor for alternative power imports and exports to the four countries.

The Caprivi interconnector through which the electricity from Zimbabwe was to pass would also help create new regional avenues for trade and ‘lessen its [Namibia’s]
current dependence on South Africa’ (Sibeene, 2007c). In addition, NamPower started up the 120MW Van Eck power station in Windhoek to try meet demand, although it cost roughly N$1 million a day to operate at full capacity. The Ruacana hydropower station on the Kunene River could also deliver 240MW if the river was flowing strongly during the rainy season (Sibeene, 2008c).

In Zambia, responses from elite members concerning government actions were a little more muted compared to the SACU states, but still critical. This was because they are less reliant on Eskom for power. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09), from the Zambian Business Chamber believed that the response from civil servants was one of hopelessness: ‘What can we do to rectify this poor planning? It will take four to five years’. Ethol Mulenga (29/01/09), who is Regional Sales Manager for the SA-owned MTN in southern Africa and travels a great deal throughout the region, stated: ‘Our own [Zambian] politicians said it was a regional crisis, but the SA problem compounded the Zambian problem’. She had experienced the blackouts from a SA and Zimbabwean perspective whilst on her travels. She referred to the crisis in SA as ‘total chaos’ as she was at the Sandton Mall in the upmarket Johannesburg suburb at the time. She also saw how ‘hard hit’ Zimbabwe was due to the grid failures. Chris Chirwa (27/01/09), an independent media and management consultant based in the heart of Lusaka, believed that government was ‘unprepared, and should have invested a while ago’. This sentiment was further echoed by Juliana Mwila (29/01/09), Director in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Muletambo Lingela (23/01/09), who is Broadcasting and Information Manager for the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) in Zambia stated that governments and businesses were ‘calling for a long-term solution’ and as a result of the crisis they were having to ‘delay expansion programmes’.

The media material suggests that Zambia’s plans to expand power generating
infrastructure remain some of the most underdeveloped in the region, ‘despite the fact that Zambia possesses 40% of the region’s water with vast hydro-electricity potential’ (Schatz, 2008). Other steps taken by government include the building of new power stations such as the Itezhi-Tezhi (Macha, 2008). Zambia’s chosen method of dealing with the crisis suggests maintenance of the energy status quo, with continued regional cooperation (ibid.). Despite problems with its neighbours to the south, chronic shortages and poor planning have given Zambia no option but to look to the region once more.

In Zimbabwe the media material suggests that the power cuts were particularly severe, adding to the worst economic crisis in the country’s history. Unsurprisingly, the government was quiet on the issue. The power crisis was clearly linked to the sustained mismanagement of state resources and the overall poor governance in that country (Chimhete and Mandizvidza, 2008). A planned expansion of the Kariba and Hwange power plants could have eased the dire shortages whilst even giving Zimbabwe enough power to export. However, ‘the two plants continue[d] to deteriorate because of lack of maintenance and spares’ (Financial Gazette, 2008).

In SA, civil service elite respondent Rob Davies (27/03/08), the current Minister of Trade and Industry, stated that ‘Mozambiquan politicians complained’. Their complaints were presumably due to the fact that the Mozambiquan Mozal aluminium smelter had experienced reduced output as a result of the crisis.16 Henry Short (19/11/08), who was a Director in the Department of Foreign Affairs, stated that the regional governments wanted a ‘reaffirmation of the big infrastructure projects’ after the crisis. The state was relooking at large scale projects such as the Inga project (see Section 4.3.1) and wondering ‘how do we get these projects going?’ Media actor David O’Sullivan (05/02/09) who hosts the prime time slot on 702 Talk Radio in Johannesburg

and was typically inundated with angry callers during the regular blackouts in January and February 2008 stated that: ‘Politicians were as bewildered as everyone else’.

5.5.2 Poor communication from the South African government

The second major issue dealt with in the interviews and the media material was the poor response of the SA government given the extent of the crisis. This issue was primarily a problem in the SACU states which had to adopt synchronised load-shedding with SA in order to avoid a total breakdown of its grid. Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08), Head of Public Relations and Communications in the Botswanan Department of Trade and Industry, stated:

*The energy crisis shook the business community in the region. SA did warn the region, but maybe it was too subtle. SA should have been more explicit. The region was surprised.*

Blame was cast on the SA government for not informing the public about the extent of the impending problem and even once the crisis was underway the quality of the information being received from the SA government came under question. What is interesting to note here is the tone of much of the regional media material. At times it can be described as conspiratorial with regards to the extent to which regional governments were concealing their reliance on Eskom. The implication was that regional governments were hiding the fact from their citizens and, in turn, Eskom was trying to hide the extent of the impending problem from the region.

In Botswana, during 2007 in the lead-up to the crisis, the popular *Sunday Standard*, which is the main Sunday newspaper in Botswana, played a particularly activist role by lobbying government to demonstrate what independent planning it had in place to avert the coming crisis. Take, for example, the following article entitled ‘BPC should come clean on possible power crisis’, which was published as early as

*Classified information...signals that Eskom could be up to huge problems as a result of ageing power stations...The fact of the matter is that for some time up until the problem in South Africa got out of control, Eskom hid the extent of the problem. This denied businesses time to prepare for the impending crisis. The Botswana Power Corporation should not behave like Eskom by hiding pertinent information from the public on the extent of the looming crisis...BPC has not been candid enough in coming forward with information.*

The sub-text of this article is that the Botswanan government is complicit in Eskom’s energy monopoly because it was also benefiting by not incurring the cost of building its own power-generating infrastructure. This however perpetuated the ‘dependency syndrome’ of the country and left them vulnerable to problems in neighbouring states. The Botswanan government knew that the extent of the country’s reliance on Eskom would make businesses and household consumers nervous and chose to hide this knowledge from them. Tshepo Maphanyane (26/11/2008), Publicity and Public Relations Executive of the SA-owned Multichoice in Botswana, noted:

* [The electricity crisis in Botswana was] met with an outcry. Fingers were pointed to the Botswanan government about having to depend on SA. What is in place to assist local businesses? The only community that knew of the crisis was the Botswanan government. People didn’t know Botswana was reliant on South Africa for electricity.*

When the crisis was apparent a concerted ‘cover-up’ scenario was the only option for the government to pursue. This was because of the long planning time needed for building energy-generating infrastructure. In June 2007 a similar article in the *Sunday Standard* (2007b) titled ‘BPC has been less than honest with the country’s energy security’, reinforced this perception.

Given the nature and regularity of the outages, the information flowing between power utilities and consumers needed to be readily available and accurate. In Botswana, in January and February 2008 when the crisis was upon them, one of the
biggest issues BPC was criticised for was not informing the public about where and when the outages will occur, and not doing so timeously. Since the power cuts were mostly planned, it made sense that BPC could inform the public (Mmegi, 2009a). Businesses were particularly hard hit by the lack of a clear schedule. However, BPC appeared to not always know when and where the power cuts would happen as Eskom did not always let them know timeously, if at all. On 6 February, in response to pressure to communicate more effectively, BPC introduced a power outage schedule (Baputaki, 2008). But this did not always help. Take, for example, the following article that describes the business community’s meeting with BPC officials (Ganetsang, 2008):

“Many a time we told our workers not to come to work because the schedule indicated that there would be no power only for the power to be available on the specified day,” they [representatives from the business community in Botswana] said...At least if the corporation can give us a reliable schedule we can be able to work around it...the Director of Corporate Services [for BPC], John Helmund, told the business community that...while they would try to revise their schedule, there is not much that they can do about the intermittent power cuts because they only get very limited time to prepare for power supply cuts from Eskom.

However, the worrying trend in the chain of information flowing from one southern African country to another played into a bigger question: Exactly who was responsible for supply in states that were net importers of power, such as Botswana? As the Sunday Standard (2007a) stated, despite the fact that Botswana has its own grid the ‘…Botswana Power Corporation is more of a go-between or distributor than anything else, put more precisely, a kind of an agent of some sort for Eskom’. Yet, when things go wrong regional businesses and household consumers want their governments to account.

In Namibia, New Era also spoke about a ‘confidential report’ warning of an impending crisis. Yet no such stringent warning was coming from government. New Era which was also particularly vocal in the lead-up to the crisis, published the following
Despite assurances from power utilities NamPower and Eskom that the supply of electricity to Namibia from South Africa would continue uninterrupted, a confidential report made available to New Era contradicts the two utilities. The confidential report that paints a quite worrisome picture was compiled by the Department of Public Enterprises...It indicates the supply of power by Eskom should be regarded as grave.

Once the crisis was underway in Namibia, a similar problem occurred when the quality and lack of information coming from Eskom came under question. The insinuations were that Eskom was keeping the country informed on a ‘need-to-know’ basis and was indifferent towards its regional responsibilities. A forthright and clear statement recognising these responsibilities would have done much to rectify this. No apologies were made to the region, although Mbeki had apologised to the nation in parliament (Mahlangu, 2008). When outspoken commentator, Bob Sickinga (27/01/09), was asked about the response from regional politicians and businesses towards the crisis he stated: ‘No, they have been mute. The media have not portrayed them. Zuma and Mbeki have not been portrayed’. Consider the following angry article written by Daniel Steinmann, a New Era journalist who consistently wrote in the Namibian media on this matter (Steinmann, 2008a):

*The end result is what we have had to endure the past month [the load-shedding], and which has now progressed to the stage where an embarrassed NamPower management has to forward Eskom emails to inform us when and where the darkness will descend...Their only consolation was that they could simply ignore us since they viewed us as a nincompoop little irritation from a nincompoop country.*

Responses from regional elite members further reinforce this argument. In Botswana, Tanki Mothae (28/11/08) stated: ‘They [the SA government] didn’t explain well’. Mrs Maribe (01/12/08) believed that the SA government ‘[t]ook too long to address issues and respond and give an explanation’. Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08), Communications and Public Relations Manager at Mascom which is 65% owned by the
SA telecommunications giant MTN, characterised the SA government’s response as ‘[t]oo little, too late’. Zambia was more indirectly affected. Respondents had less to say on this matter. However, Amos Sakazhila (22/1/09) from Multichoice Zambia stated outright that ‘Zambia was terrible at explaining and so was Eskom’.

In SA, Noah Naidoo (15/11/08) who was a Director in Standard Bank, stated that Eskom’s response was ‘inadequate’ and that the ‘[i]nformation was not factual. Government needs to be more upfront’. Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08), Manager of Stakeholder Relations for Multichoice Africa and a former SA diplomat, believed that the SA government’s response can be characterised as a ‘blame game’. ‘Eskom wanted to expand but DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] said hold on, we first want to bring up the rates’. Pieter Fourie (04/02/09), a SA political commentator and academic contended, that the government’s response was ‘initially not’ adequate, ‘but now [February 2008] it’s fine’.

From a quantitative perspective, when regional elite members were asked if they felt that ‘the responses from the SA government and Eskom were seen as adequate given the levels of frustration’, 54% disagreed, 24% agreed and 17% remained neutral. According to nationality, the SA respondents had the strongest response. 64% felt that the response was inadequate and 21% remained neutral. Only one respondent thought the SA government’s response was adequate. Botswana and Zambia demonstrate a similar pattern with the majority saying the response was inadequate, in Botswana 53% and Zambia 47%. A not insignificant number chose to remain neutral, 13% and 17% respectively. Those who felt that the SA government’s response was adequate totalled 33% in Botswana and 29% in Zambia. This was largely because respondents felt they should apportion some of the blame to their own governments for being equally as incompetent in providing forthright information on the situation.
5.6 Regional business responses

Given the strong nexus between capital accumulation and energy provision, regional businesses were significantly affected by Eskom’s poor planning. As a result, they provided the most intense pressure point in galvanising the necessary regional authorities into action. Two issues can be identified here: the effects of SA’s energy crisis on regional businesses and the impact of the energy crisis upon SA businesses.

5.6.1 The effects of South Africa’s energy crisis on regional businesses

The response from regional businesses was particularly strong. Corporate elite respondents such as Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08) believed that the SA-induced energy crisis affected Botswanan businesses ‘a great deal’ in that some companies retrenched workers or closed down, whilst potential businesses could not be launched. Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08) who works in the banking sector remarked that the crisis ‘affects Botswana daily’. Tshepo Maphanyane (26/11/08) who works in the energy reliant telecommunications industry remarked that Eskom’s poor planning had led to a ‘loss of business, cutbacks on staff and what they [businesses] are able to produce, even with scheduled cuts’.

Civil service and media elite respondents concurred with their corporate counterparts. Gemma Masonga (04/12/08), Principal Trade Officer in the Department of Trade and Industry for Botswana, claimed that local Botswanan businesses were on account of the power shortages particularly hard hit ‘because most of big business in Botswana is linked to SA’ or SA-owned. Johanna Segotlong (01/12/08), another Principal Trade Officer in the Department of Trade and Industry, stated that Botswana is ‘co-dependent…What happens in SA affects Botswana…’ According to Outsa Mokone
(27/11/08), the response from regional businesses was to ask: ‘How was the crisis going to affect their own economy and is SA going to cut us off?’

The media material suggests that in Botswana the business community condemned government for what they called a ‘casual’ approach to the power crisis. The business community criticised the government for failing to present its short-term strategies to ease power cuts. Speaking on behalf of the Botswanan business community, Maria Machailo-Ellis, the Chief Executive Officer of the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) believed that ‘[t]hey are not giving us relevant information’. She went on to note that ‘…the lack of information has apparently led to the prevalent perception that the relevant authorities are treating the crisis as “business as usual”’ (Segwai, 2008).

The often unscheduled power outages were leading to tremendous losses in production and stock. The following article provides but two brief examples (Ganetsang, 2008):

*It emerged that Botswana Breweries at some point had to discard 60,000 litres of damaged traditional Chibuku beer after a power cut. Manufacturers in the textile industry also lamented the fact that…power cuts result in serious damages for which the corporation cannot compensate them.*

The need to find alternative and back-up power sources, such as generators, was particularly great for Botswanan businesses (Moloka, 2008). However, the running of generators proved costly (Moloi, 2008a). Small, micro and medium enterprises (SMMEs) were almost certainly running at a loss. These businesses are normally owner-managed and often deal in perishable goods (Chibua, 2008).

The same broad trends can be observed in Namibia. No new mines were opening and no new projects could commence. Businesses were subjected to the same problems (Sibeene, 2008d).
In Zambia, responses from elite members dealing with the effects of the crisis on business can be divided into two broad groups. The first group felt that the knock-on effects were particularly severe, either directly as a result of what was happening in SA, or as a result of ZESCO not being able to source enough power from the SAPP. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09), referring specifically to the SA-induced grid failures, said that they led to ‘serious...12 hour blackouts’. Evelyn Mutubila (21/1/09) stated that ‘[s]mall companies have had to close because they are not able to meet demand or [they have been forced to] lay-off workers’. Evan Nachilobe (24/01/09), who heads Radio 2 for ZNBC, stated that businesses were affected ‘[a] great deal’ and that ‘manufacturing went down’.

The second group of responses can be characterised by an implicit questioning of the link between what happened in SA and the power problems affecting Zambia. This group tended to believe that businesses in other countries were more severely affected by the crisis. Marlon Kananda (27/01/09) believed that ‘[t]he impact would not be that great unless there was a direct relationship [in terms of energy supply] between states’. Juliana Mwila (23/01/09), who from a Zambian perspective heads SADC, appeared eager to apportion the blame on the Zambian government. She stated that it was a result of ‘Zambia’s own deficit’ and that it was due to an ‘economic boom’ and ‘not due to SA’.

The media material suggests that there was a general ‘scaling down’ of operations in the mining and industrial sectors, and decreased production in agriculture due to the increased load-shedding in early 2008 (Times of Zambia, 2008e). The economy was also more directly affected by the problems in SA. Derek Webbstock, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Lunashya Copper Mines (LCM), a copper and cobalt mine, and who is also CEO of Chambers Metals Plc which specialises in smelting
services, said they ‘made a $4 million loss equivalent to four days’ as a result of the grid failures. Mr Webbstock added, ‘the estimated $4 million loss…does not include the damage caused by the power outages on mine installations’ (*Times of Zambia*, 2008f).

In Zimbabwe, the increased power cuts and grid failures were to further damage the economy. Most industrial concerns were running at less than 30% capacity – even when power was available (Makiwa, 2007). Zimbabwe’s National Chamber of Commerce Economist, Tichaona Mudzviti, said that businesses had lost about ‘twenty hours per week of production time’. He went on to note the significance of ‘the informal sector, the backyard businesses’ to the Zimbabwean economy. ‘These have also ground to a halt because the frequency of the power cuts has escalated’, Mudzviti said (Makoshori, 2008).

5.6.2 Effects on South African business in the region

As noted in Chapter 1, a key feature of the GBM complex is the way in which the state, through its parastatals such as Eskom, facilitates and supports SA capital accumulation in the region. Yet the discourses around the energy crisis were fraught with dangers for SA businesses. The security and competence of Eskom as the sole and major provider underpinning SA’s capitalist expansion was seriously questioned. The business and media informational networks provided a significant pressure point in lobbying government. Specifically, the costs incurred by SA mines – the main driving force of the country’s economy – and the effects on the country’s telecommunications monopolies, provided a significant tipping point in the policy and lobbying processes concerning energy.

As a result of the crisis, SA mining companies in the region suffered lowered output and expansion projects had to be put on hold. According to Rob Davies
(27/03/08), SA’s Minister of Trade and Industry, the ‘IDC (Independent Development Corporation) was involved in Mozal’ and that it ‘affected the project’. He also contended that the energy shortages ‘hampered the ability to promote the region’ to investors. Noah Naidoo (15/11/08) of Standard Bank, stated that the ability of SA companies to do business in the region was ‘[v]ery much’ affected by the crisis, ‘especially mining’. Tula Dlamini (04/02/09), who is a particularly insightful researcher and Zimbabwean national working for the SA state broadcaster, to whom I was referred by his directors believed that ‘[i]n Zimbabwe SA companies in mining were affected, but [they] found a solution to it’. He added slightly mysteriously that ‘SA-linked mines have ways and means’. I assume he was alluding to the special treatment they received in terms of energy provision. As Peter Fabricius (03/02/09), who is Foreign Editor for Independent Newspapers in SA, pointed out, ‘Mozal got a special dispensation’. David O’Sullivan (05/02/09) contended that ‘mines aren’t able to function properly’ and that ‘SA has ageing infrastructure and doesn’t keep pace’.

The telecommunications giants of MTN and Multichoice were also affected. According to Ethol Mulenga (29/01/09), for a company such as the SA-owned MTN, which is the largest cellular phone service provider in the country other than Zain, the power crisis heavily affected the cost of operation as generators use diesel which is expensive. In order for the cellphone network to work, the signal towers need to be working and that requires electricity. There is more than one signal tower in each Zambian province. Similarly, Tshepo Maphayane (26/11/08) from Multichoice in Botswana stated emphatically that they clearly ‘can’t deliver’ their satellite service if there is a crisis. Amos Sakazhila (22/01/09), who is Public Relations manager for Multichoice Zambia, stated that it had led to ‘low production, less supply’.

17 The IDC is a government-owned entity that supports business development, it is a key feature of the GBM complex.
Pressure from inside SA was also immense. As Pieter Fourie (04/02/09) had noted at the time, ‘[e]veryone is so aware of the crisis. If something isn’t done immediately’ there was likely to be some kind of popular uprising, spearheaded by the business community. According to Philip Banda (28/01/09), who works for the SA-owned Stanbic Bank in their Zambian offices, the energy crisis had led to SA ‘businesses expanding [in Africa] because there is a problem in SA’. He went on to add that the logic of SA businesses was ‘[l]et’s increase business in Africa. Operations can grow elsewhere, but the elsewhere [regional utilities] must provide energy’. This view was echoed by Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08), who stated that ‘big businesses’ have been ‘expanding outside’ SA as a result of the crisis. Uncertainty over the economic and political future of SA drove businesses to look beyond its borders.

In SA, various views were expressed about the impact of the energy crisis on its businesses. Civil service elite respondents such as Ghulam Asmal (19/11/08) stated that there had been ‘bemusement in the region’ from SA businesses, emphasising the extent to which government had ‘harnessed regional initiatives to secure energy supplies’ and wanted to ‘invest more in energy’ to support the country’s businesses in the region. Henry Short (19/11/08) stated that the energy crisis had impacted ‘seriously’ upon SA business in the region and was raised at a ‘NEPAD steering committee’, a key actor in the GBM complex. SA corporate roleplayers such as John Philips (17/11/08), Head of ABSA Africa, stated that the crisis had affected SA businesses ‘very adversely’. Diana Games (03/02/09) made a distinction between the effects on SA businesses in the region, and the effects on Eskom’s ability to do business in the region. She believed that the energy crisis would have no impact on the latter’s business prospects and penetration of regional markets.

The responses from regional elite members largely mirrored their SA
counterparts. The majority of responses suggested that the crisis had had a negative impact on SA businesses and its ability to expand into the region. Botswanan corporate respondent, Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08), stated that it had affected them ‘severely’. Civil servant respondent, Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08), echoed this, but added that ‘it’s temporary’. Media actor, Ousa Mokone (27/11/08), believed that the energy crisis had ‘slowed them [SA businesses] down’. In Zambia, civil servant respondents suggested that the power crisis had ‘reduced trade’ (Mwila, 23/01/09) and lowered productivity (Nachilobe, 24/01/09).

5.7 Media responses

This section does not wish to repeat what has already been covered – or give descriptive accounts of media stories – but rather to uncover implicit assumptions expressed in the media concerning their role as active agents in informational flows and lobbying processes. Three major aspects of regional media discourses will be considered: the extent to which the media was instrumental in exposing the region’s reliance on Eskom; the assumption that it was a regional SAPP crisis largely caused by the collective non-action of member states; and how the energy crisis detracted from the notion of SA’s supposed ‘exceptionalism’ in the region.

5.7.1 Exposing the extent of reliance on Eskom

An analysis of the interview and media material suggests that the media were very effective in putting pressure on governments to account for the lack of energy, with the exception of the government-owned media in Zimbabwe. In sub-section 5.5.2 it was noted that the media in Botswana played an activist role in the lead-up to the crisis, particularly weekly newspapers such as the Sunday Standard and the popular daily
The energy crisis had elicited a backlash from the regional media, directed at their own governments and respective utilities (Mmegi, 2008c; Moloi, 2008b; Sunday Standard, 2008). The predominant ‘narrative arc’ of such media reports was that the problem was due to a lack of independent planning and lack of foresight (Chapelle-Molloy, 04/12/08; Maribe 01/12/08; Segotlong, 01/12/08). What is important to note here is that there was not only a ‘lament of bad [regional] policies’ (Ntakhwana, 28/11/08) in the media, but also of the SA government's inability to ‘plan and create capacity’ (Coetzee, 25/11/08).

The Namibian media were also effective in lobbying government concerning the crisis. This was particularly the case with the newspapers New Era (see Sibeene in the bibliography) and The Namibian (2007a; 2007b).

The government-owned Times of Zambia (2008g; 2008e) was effective in putting pressure on its sole stakeholder to investigate the causes of the grid failure. The state broadcaster also played its role in putting pressure on government (Nachilobe, 24/01/09).

The causal link between what was occurring in SA and in Zambia was not well established in the Zambian media. The media in Zambia tended to frame the problem as regional in scale and origin. Joeseph Salasini (26/01/09), Director General of the Zambian state broadcaster, believed that the media characterised the events of early 2008 as a ‘regional crisis’. John Phiri, editor of the Times of Zambia, also thought the predominant way of framing the issue was as a ‘regional problem’. Muletambo Lingela (23/1/09), Broadcasting and Information Manager for MISA in Zambia, also stated that the energy crisis was seen as a ‘regional problem’. The issue of spatiality and scale behind the root causes of the crisis as reproduced through media framing, will be further explored in the next sub-section.
In Zimbabwe, the disinformation spread by the government-owned Herald on the power cuts made the situation look better than it actually was. The distorted truth spread by the Herald was exposed through the media in other countries that refuted what was being said (Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2008). The independent media such as the Financial Gazette (Harare) and the Zimbabwean Independent were more critical. Articles featured in these publications usually had the same ‘narrative arc’ as those in Botswana and Namibia (Financial Gazette, 2008). Causal links between the grid failures affecting Zimbabwe and what was happening in SA were more readily established in the Zimbabwean media. Ostensibly, this was due to their closer proximity and more obvious economic dependency. One-liners in the Zimbabwean press stated that the grid failures in Zambia and Zimbabwe were (Karimakwenda, 2008):

> Eventually attributed to power failures at Eskom in South Africa which is grappling with power shortages because of...lack of forward planning by government.

### 5.7.2 A South African-induced regional crisis

Describing the problem as a ‘regional crisis’ with no one country to blame had become a predominant way of framing the issue in the regional media, particularly in how the responses to the crisis were conceptualised and implemented (5.5.1 and 5.7.1). As a result of this repeated framing, a renewed sense of importance was bestowed on the SAPP.

But this begs the question: how independent is SAPP from Eskom? The reality is that the SAPP is more of a ‘fixed market’ for Eskom. The crisis was clearly the result of poor planning and over-monopolisation of energy supplies in southern Africa. A more radical outlook was adopted by Bob Sichinga (27/01/09), who felt that the events of the
energy crisis were consistent with SA’s ‘self-interest’ in the region. Although the crisis was ‘not just Eskom’ but ‘reflected the inadequacy of planning of the entire region’ the fact remains that ‘SA should have shown leadership’.

Much of the sub-text in this argument suggests that it is unfortunate that the SA government had to wait until a crisis was on its hands before it decided to take regional power supply initiatives seriously. Only then did SA realise that it is part of symbiotic energy relationships and not only in a position of one-way supply through exports. Potentially, regional co-operation has a lot to offer in terms of energy supply.

5.7.3 South Africa’s ‘exceptionalism’

Another issue to emerge from the interview and media material was how the regional media reflected ‘surprise’ at what was happening in SA (Banda, 28/01/09; Bloch, 2008; Kananda, 27/01/09; Phiri, 28/01/09). An extension of this logic suggests that ‘South Africans thought it would never happen to them’. According to Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08), Manager of Stakeholder Relations for Multichoice, the idea of SA’s supposed exceptionalism in the context of the energy crisis was a source of much jest – in a ‘welcome to Africa’ kind of way. Many people in the region enjoyed the fact that SA was ‘similar to other African states’. The following article which appeared in the Zimbabwean Independent demonstrates the ‘quiet pleasure’ the region took in their neighbour’s misfortune (Muckraker, 2008):

There is a German word that reflects the feelings of many Zimbabweans towards the power crisis South Africa is undergoing: Schadenfreude. It means taking a quiet pleasure in others’ misfortune, Zimbabweans can only rub their hands in barely-contained glee that their powerful and occasionally bossy neighbour is now experiencing what we have been going through for years...
5.8 The impact of the energy crisis on perceptions of South Africa’s regional standing

This section outlines the responses to a series of questions that were devised to test the attitudes of regional elite members as to how the energy crisis might impact on SA’s regional standing (appendix A, question 51). In the questionnaire the questions were presented in a different sequence which has been slightly altered here to facilitate debate and the flow of argumentation.

Table 5.1: What implications does the energy crisis have for South Africa's standing in the region? (percentages rounded off to the nearest whole number)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The energy shortages signalled a broader crisis in SA with regards to skills, infrastructure and service delivery, one which through time will lead to its decline as the regional economic leader</td>
<td>B Z SA*</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>B. The crisis in basic services and infrastructure suggests that SA will go down the same path that many post-colonial African countries have gone</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>Z</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>C. Although the blackouts were severe, SA will be able to re-establish itself as a reliable and trustworthy supplier of services and goods to the region</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>9</td>
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D. The energy crisis will lessen dependency on SA and alleviate inequality in the region because skilled immigrants and businesses will look elsewhere to invest.

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<td>SA</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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E. The problems with service delivery suggest that SA’s sub-imperialism is in a state of crisis, and the energy crisis will naturally trigger a waning of SA’s sub-imperialist tendencies.

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*The first row of each question comprises the total sample of Botswana, Zambia and SA. The following three rows reflect single countries, indicated B, Z or SA.

5.8.1 Skills, infrastructure and service delivery

This chapter has already established that the energy crisis was a ‘wake-up call’ to government in the areas of skills, infrastructure and service delivery. Anton Harber (02/02/09), Caxton Professor in Journalism and Media Studies and a well-known media and political commentator in SA, stated: ‘They [the region] reassessed SA’s economic stability’ as a result of the crisis. On this matter, Bloch (2008) stated as follows in the *Zimbabwe Independent*:

> Until recently, South Africa not only had the largest economy in the region, but also extreme economic stability, with minimal inflation and a highly effective infrastructure. Suddenly, some crevasses in that economy have begun to surface...And the infrastructure is showing intensifying stress and lack of capacity to meet the economy’s needs.

The following article in *Mmegi* further questions the future of southern Africa’s economic hub (Dingake, 2008):

> Load-shedding in Johannesburg for a few days, I discovered a city where I grew up and have visited at short intervals since re-settling here [Botswana], dramatically changed...[W]hat will happen to the
Responses to question A illustrate that the majority of respondents believed that SA's ageing infrastructure and decline in services will ultimately lead to its decline as the regional leader. Cumulatively, as many as 53% agreed with this statement whilst 20% remained neutral. Only 28% disagreed with the statement. According to nationality, it is not surprising that the majority of respondents who agreed with the statement were from Zambia and Botswana, at 46% and 58% respectively. In SA there was an even spread of those who agreed and disagreed, both at 36%.

Associated with the concern about the decaying infrastructure is a concern about the number of skilled people able to build and maintain power stations, particularly given the number of white skilled people who have emigrated since the early nineties. According to Pieter Fourie (04/02/09), Professor in Communications at the University of South Africa (UNISA), ‘the mainstream media’ framed the issue ‘from a political perspective’. Given the extent to which political discourses in the country are still interwoven with racial identity, the discourse in the mainstream media concerning the energy crisis was prone to taking on implicit racial dimensions. As Fourie (ibid) further noted, Eskom was seen as ‘losing competence’ as a result of the departure of ‘white engineers’ that have been offered a package and forced into retirement or retrenchment as a result of ‘affirmative action’.

The sub-text of this politicised discourse in the mainstream media was that the new black government had squandered the strong infrastructure that it had inherited from the apartheid government. Although there have been poor decisions in the energy sector by a succession of ANC governments, such a discourse appears to play into a misplaced, and perhaps slightly racist hankering of how well things were supposedly
planned and implemented during apartheid, when whites were ruling. The problem with a comparison of this nature is ultimately the very different issues and priorities facing the two regimes. Many of the policy challenges facing the post-apartheid government arise from the exploitative and uneven effects of apartheid.

Reflections in the regional media point to a concern about the competency and skill levels in the country due to affirmative action. This questioned the SA government’s ability to adequately address the situation. An angry article which featured in the *Economist* (Namibia) highlights these issues, albeit with racist overtones:

> Eskom’s problems started some ten years ago, when an aggressive Affirmative Action plan ensured that all its white, competent engineers and managers basically said ‘We have had enough’, and went into very lucrative positions outside the state utility’s sphere or simply emigrated. The new Eskom policy was quick to replace skilled people with all sorts of Jack-knows-what bullshitters as long as they were black (Steinmann, 2008a).

About a fortnight later in a column in the same newspaper, Steinmann wrote a particularly facetious piece about a ‘fact-finding mission’ to SA. He further questioned the practices of Eskom’s ‘newly empowered’ upper management who ‘suspended so-called Scheduled Maintenance as it requires people to do this work’ (Steinmann, 2008b).

Embedded in this politicised discourse was an assumption that SA might go down the same path that many post-colonial African countries have gone. This outlook assumes that, despite having many features of a first-world economy, the energy crisis signalled SA’s inevitable journey to becoming ‘another failed African state’. This is arguably present in the sub-text of the following statement by Outsa Mokone (27/11/08), editor of the *Sunday Standard* in Botswana:

> Afrikaans people built a strong economy in SA. During sanctions SA developed its own petrol. The apartheid regime had their eyes on the ball. The new guys [the post-1994 democratic governments] didn’t plan well. Although they gained independence they lost their
economic sixth sense [a reference to the alleged technical abilities of the apartheid government].

Question B shows that the majority (67%) believe that SA will not go down the same path that many post-colonial African countries have gone. The pattern is consistent across all three countries with Botswana being slightly less optimistic than the other states, with 27% believing that it will happen to SA. According to Bob Sichinga (27/01/09) the reason for believing that this will not happen to SA is due to the ‘strong business presence’ in the country and the ‘strong [international] interests’.

Despite the problems outlined above, responses to question C indicate that the overwhelming proportion of respondents, cumulatively 69%, believe that ‘SA will be able to redeem itself as a reliable and trustworthy supplier of services and goods to the region’. This pattern was consistent across the three countries. When the above statement was posed to Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08), he added that ‘it will take time, over five years’ for SA to re-establish itself. Bob Sichinga (27/01/09) remained neutral and stated that it will require ‘work’ and that SA must use ‘practical measures’ to demonstrate its commitment to the region.

5.8.2 South Africa as a gateway to doing business in the region

Johannesburg normally served as a base for investors looking to expand into the region. This was because of its well-developed communications and transport infrastructure and networks. But the long-term prognosis due to the energy crisis looked bleak. Potential investors were being actively discouraged from investing in SA until the year 2013 when the first of the new generators come online. Investors would have to think twice about using SA as a launching pad into Africa in the future.

Some countries saw opportunity in SA’s misfortune. As far north as Uganda competing energy utilities were excited by the prospect of a weakening of Eskom’s
monopoly. In an editorial titled ‘Watch South Africa’s power crisis closely’ in Uganda’s The Monitor (2008a) newspaper, it was argued:

What is likely to happen if the situation persists or worsens is investors down south might consider taking the next train north...and the likely destination could be anywhere where power is sufficient and reliable...The crisis in South Africa is an opportunity to dig into.

Question D of table 5.1 demonstrates that a more or less equal number of respondents agree and disagree that ‘[t]he energy crisis will lessen dependency on SA…as skilled immigrants and businesses will look elsewhere to invest’. According to country, the majority of respondents who agreed with the statement are in Botswana with a total of 60%, whilst equal numbers of Zambians agreed and disagreed with the statement at 47%. Of the SA respondents only 21% thought that the energy crisis will lessen dependency on SA.

Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08) noted: ‘For SA to decline [as the regional economic hub] other countries need to stand up, but who? It’s not a see-saw effect…Who would take over in the region?’ Coetzee further contended that ’[o]ther countries realise that they need to be more independent, but the real skills are going to the West’. The energy crisis is likely to feed into the broader ‘brain drain’ rather than benefit the region. This is clearly underscored by the fact that the region’s problems are closely intertwined with the problems of Eskom.

In the perceptions of respondents the chances that the energy crisis would cause a wholesale power shift across the region remained remote. Outsa Mokone (27/11/08) and Thapelo Ndlovu (27/11/08) both believed that the region would become more self-sufficient as far as electricity is concerned, but in other sectors it was likely to still be as reliant on SA as before the crisis.
5.8.3 \textit{Sub-imperialism in crisis?}

To conclude this section and link up with the mega-narrative of the thesis, attention is drawn to question E of table 5.1. Responses demonstrate that an almost equal number of people agreed and disagreed with the statement that ‘SA’s sub-imperialism is in a state of crisis…’, at 30% and 35% respectively. The responses demonstrate an even spread across all response categories with a slight majority choosing to remain neutral at 35%. According to country, a slight majority of Zambians agreed with this statement at 41% whilst 64% of South Africans, already weary of claims of its hegemony in Africa, were predictably cautious and disagreed. Montlenyane Maribe (01/12/08), Head of News and Current Affairs for BTV, stated that ‘SA’s sub-imperialism is ‘[n]ot really in a crisis yet, but will get there’. Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08) believed that ‘1994 was the honeymoon period’ for SA, but things have changed. ‘SA needs strong leaders. Politics in SA is self-interested. Botswana is altruistic’. As a qualification to the above question, Shupi Mweene (29/1/09) believed that ‘SA will forge ahead and reorganise itself’ despite the setbacks caused by the energy crisis.

5.9 \textit{Conclusion}

Although the initial knee-jerk reaction by regional governments was to become more self-reliant, the threat of over-correction and infrastructural divergence was very real. The answer to the crisis probably lay somewhere in between. The ideal scenario would be to reach a situation with regional alternatives and back-up plans in place, in the event of a crisis. The region should attempt to integrate and work together for long-term solutions. This would have to include Eskom. Although Eskom should clearly have planned better, the region was also to blame for perpetuating the ‘dependency syndrome’ in the energy sector. It is unfortunate that it took a crisis of such proportions
to initiate attempts at effective regional planning. The supply configurations in southern Africa certainly needed an overhaul. The crisis provided the necessary spark.

As noted in Chapter 1, the dominant geopolitical ‘script’ articulated through the GBM complex is centred on the mutual benefits of regional integration. This is because the success of SA’s capital accumulation partly rests on its ability to persuade regional states that the expansion of its state-owned enterprises and businesses is also in their interests. For that reason, the discourses around energy for a long time stressed inter-reliance through the SAPP, whilst actually providing a ‘fixed market’ for Eskom’s monopoly. However, the counter-imperialist discourses at the time of the energy crisis exposed Eskom’s monopoly practices. As a result of the SA government’s poor planning, energy security of the entire region was in jeopardy.
Chapter 6

South Africa’s mediation in Zimbabwe

6.1 Introduction
Zimbabwe held a presidential and parliamentary election on 29 March 2008. The three main candidates for president were President Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and Simba Makoni, who was an independent candidate. Tsvangirai received 48% of the votes and Mugabe 43%. However, as neither of these candidates received an outright majority, a run-off was scheduled for 27 June 2008 to decide the winner. A few days before it was to take place, Tsvangirai withdrew due to violence against and intimidation of MDC supporters. The run-off still proceeded as planned, despite widespread disapproval, and led to victory for Mugabe. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state decided that President Mbeki – who until then had failed to bring an end to the crisis and was under increasing pressure from regional constituencies – would mediate during the ensuing talks (Raftopolous and Effel, 2008).

As the SADC-mandated chief negotiator and possibly the only regional state powerful enough to bring the parties in Zimbabwe to an agreement, it was to SA that the region turned for leadership. The continued stalemate in Zimbabwe after the March 2008 election was particularly dire for the region as intensified state repression sparked mass emigration to neighbouring states. The sudden influx of Zimbabwean migrants into SA contributed to the xenophobia attacks in May 2008 (HSRC Report, 2010;
Chapter 7). For the month of July 2008, it was estimated that Zambia had been forced to accommodate an influx of one thousand Zimbabweans a day (Moola, 2008). Also in July, some estimates placed the cost of the Zimbabwean crisis to SA at R46 billion due to lost trade opportunities, the higher cost of obtaining international capital and the economic impact of refugees (ibid.).

The present chapter examines the impact of SA’s mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis on its geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses. The focus of the chapter is on SA’s involvement leading up to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and immediately thereafter. As noted in Chapter 1, the government-business-media (GBM) complex relies on its ideological power to create conditions which are favourable for its capital accumulation within a ‘fixed space’. SA’s peacemaking involvement in Africa was the cornerstone upon which SA state and corporate elite members sought to create the discursive instruments legitimising its capital accumulation in the region. Mediating a settlement in Zimbabwe was an important part of this. However, the Zimbabwean case presented significant regional resistance in the form of counter-imperialist discourses that had far-reaching implications for SA.

The chapter draws from interview and media material. The questionnaire was administered in late 2008 and early 2009. The timing was crucial as the agreement had been signed on 15 September 2008. This was both a useful and awkward dynamic for the case study, as some questions dealt with events that were still unfolding. As with the other thematic sections, the section of the questionnaire dedicated to the Zimbabwean crisis started off with a vignette that sought to contextualise the crisis and the time-period referred to. This section had nine questions, and comprised open-ended and close-ended questions (see appendix A, questions 60 to 68).
The media searches followed a similar pattern to that of the previous chapter. They were conducted in Botswana, Zambia and SA, as well as Namibia and Zimbabwe. The primary search was confined to a three-month period, August to October 2008. This three month-period straddled the month in which Zimbabwe’s power-sharing deal was signed. However, I also had to draw from media preceding this date as the events leading up to the signing of the deal were important for contextualisation purposes and further extrapolation of some of the main points. When I refer to media outside of the three-month period I generally indicate it. Once again, the SA searches were conducted through SA Media. This also entailed more general internet searches. In respect of the region which was the primary focus of the media searches, I initially started the search on AllAfrica.com. A third country, Namibia, was added to provide a counterpoint to the responses of Botswana and Zambia. Further searches in the Zimbabwean local media were conducted electronically, covering the primary focus period. This material provides some contextual background to what was unfolding in Zimbabwe.

This chapter will examine the regional responses from government, business and media and how SA’s mediation in Zimbabwe impacted on SA’s regional standing.

6.2 Signing the Global Political Agreement

Although the Zimbabwean crisis has a long historical build-up and Zimbabwe has gone through a succession of illegitimate ZANU-PF governments, the events leading up to the September 2008 agreement began in earnest during the March 2008 election. The inconclusive result of the election set in motion a series of events that were to culminate in the September agreement. The events of March 2008 were significant because for the first time in a decade the opposition party won the majority of the votes (Dlamini, 04/02/09).
The Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC), which was largely under ZANU-PF’s control, delayed the release of the election results by more than a month. When they were finally released they indicated what people already knew, that the MDC had won, but not by an outright majority. It was then decided that a run-off would be held. This gave ZANU-PF time to re-group and muster a final onslaught on the opposition. What ensued between the March election to the run-off in June, was a state-led campaign of terror in order to intimidate MDC voters. Human Rights Watch reported the following on the sustained violence in the southern African state (Elliot, 2008):

\[\text{At the end of May 2008, Human Rights Watch calculated the tally of misery and abuse in Zimbabwe since its 29 March elections: at least 36 dead; hundreds tortured; thousands beaten; and tens of thousands deprived of food or displaced.}\]

These tactics worked for Mugabe. Tsvangirai pulled out of the run-off and ZANU-PF enjoyed a ‘landslide victory’. Although the results of the run-off were by no means legitimate, they did provide a useful dynamic for the negotiators to use when bringing the parties to the table (Moola, 2008). Mugabe's 'landslide victory' gave the negotiators an opportunity to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with ZANU-PF’s pride somewhat intact. This also protected those who had committed many of the worst atrocities during Mugabe’s reign, from prosecution (ibid.).

With the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe deteriorating further during the post-election period, SADC decided that intervention was necessary. President Mbeki was to mediate on its behalf. The decision for Mbeki to lead the talks was met with much dismay by the MDC who had regularly accused Mbeki of siding with ZANU-PF. A great deal of pressure was placed on Mbeki to achieve results in Zimbabwe (Ncube, 2008). A firm commitment that the negotiations were officially to begin in July, was given when a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by
both parties stating that in principle they agreed to enter into a power-sharing agreement (Mugadza, 2008). Finally it appeared Mbeki was showing some urgency on the matter. Yet there was another motive for Mbeki to push ahead and get the parties to sign an agreement. Signing the agreement the same week that he was recalled as president emerged as an attempt to vindicate his handling of the matter (see 6.6.3).

The GPA was signed on the 15 September 2008. The historic deal was clearly a step in the right direction but the extent to which Mugabe would concede power remained questionable. The agreement stipulated that the two parties were to rule in a coalition government for two years until new elections could determine which party was ultimately to rule. However, the initial document was rather vague on the details of the agreement and left too much power in Mugabe’s hands. Executive authority was to be shared between President Mugabe, Prime Minister Tsvangirai and the cabinet. Although a coalition was necessary, the dual power centres created many problems for the new government (Plaut, 2008).

Whilst regional politicians and businesses were desperately hoping that the agreement would last, there was no consensus in respect of the vexing land issue. Smart sanctions aimed at ZANU-PF elite members would take a while to lift as the international community was to develop a sceptical, ‘wait-and-see’ approach. The agreement was seen as ‘a compromise for an African hero’ (Games, 03/02/09). Those more cynical believed that ‘ZANU-PF was pulling the wool over the MDC’s eyes’ (O’ Sullivan, 05/02/09) and that the agreement was ‘a poisoned chalice’, as there was no trust between the parties. There were also those who believed that ‘the MDC had signed Zanu’s deal’ (Games, 03/02/2009).

Cracks in the new agreement started to form almost immediately as disputes arose over who was to control key ministries. The MDC wanted to take control of
finance, international affairs, the military and security forces away from ZANU-PF. These ministries were notorious for being puppets of the previous ZANU-PF government. As the deadlock over ministries continued, SADC asked Mbeki – who was no longer president of SA – to return in an attempt to break the deadlock. A desperate and frustrated MDC was surprisingly in favour of Mbeki’s intervention as Mugabe was threatening to form a government (The Namibian, 2008a). The reality was that the agreement was not sufficiently detailed at the time of signing and the difficult decisions had to be made afterwards.

SADC decided to allow Mbeki to remain as mediator even though he had been recalled as president more than a year earlier. He was officially replaced by a team appointed by Zuma in December 2009 (Kaswende, 2009). Clearly the interests of the SADC region were heavily impacted upon by SA’s and Mbeki’s handling of the Zimbabwean situation.

6.3 Government responses

This section will outline the responses from regional governments to SA’s mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis. The emphasis is on how SA’s mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis raised issues concerning power dynamics between southern African states: how did other SADC states respond to SA’s handling of the matter? how was the progress of the negotiations communicated to SADC states? Two main issues emerged from the interview and media material. The first issue deals with the attempts by some SADC states to break away from SA’s leadership in the matter. The second issue concerns the mixed messages from the SA government during the fragile negotiations period.
6.3.1 Creating an alternative leadership dynamic

The Botswanan government was particularly critical of SA’s and President Mbeki’s mediation in Zimbabwe. The Botswanan government felt that SA was too slow in dealing with the conflict and was denying the severity of the situation (Baaitse, 30/12/08). At the time of signing the agreement the Botswanan government wanted fresh elections with international observers (Selelo, 24/11/08). Years later it is still lobbying for such elections. Although senior members in the Botswanan government thought SA could only do so much and that the parties in Zimbabwe needed to understand the seriousness of the situation (Ntakhwana, 28/11/08), the overall stance of the Botswanan government was that SA needed to do more as the situation was placing strain on Botswanan state resources. The Botswanan government had been ‘spending a lot on Zimbabweans’ in terms of food, shelter and transport (Maribe, 01/12/08).

The media material suggests that Botswana was to play a particularly strong role as an agent through which an alternative leadership dynamic in the Zimbabwean crisis was to develop. Following the March election, Tsvangirai sought refuge from ZANU-PF’s onslaught in Botswana where he met with President Ian Khama to discuss the matter. Upon Tsvangirai’s visit, the media in Botswana came out strongly in favour of Khama’s decisive stance. An editorial in the *Mmegi* (2008d) titled ‘Zim crisis: We say hats off to Khama’ stated:

*This Wednesday when Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the Zimbabwe’s main opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) fled to Botswana, he was given a hearing at the country's highest office. Coincidentally, before Tsvangirai’s hurried arrival here, President Khama had taken it upon himself to contact his Zambian counterpart, Levy Mwanawasa, requesting for an emergency SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government leaders to discuss Zimbabwe’s volatile situation. Mwanawasa is the current SADC chairman. Khama’s efforts appear to have paid off, at least for now, as that Summit is scheduled for the Zambian capital, Lusaka, tomorrow.*
The Botswanan media also spoke about the divides which were forming in SADC over the Zimbabwean issue and had started to become particularly clear during the period leading up to the run-off, as violence intensified in Zimbabwe. An article appeared in the *Mmegi* titled ‘SADC faultlines on Zimbabwe elections’ (Motlogelwa, 2008). Implicitly, throughout the media debates the Botswanan government’s approach was seen as being ‘morally superior’ to that of SA. In comparison, SA was seen to be a novice to democracy. The sub-text was that Botswana’s political leadership, as ‘Africa’s oldest democracy’, needed to educate SA on how to deal with the situation. An editorial in the *Mmegi* (2008e) argued:

*For a long time, Botswana has been too timid to take the leadership as Africa’s oldest and most vibrant democracy. We have a duty to export democracy to the rest of Africa and the world. If Botswana does not take leadership in matters such as these, upstarts such as South Africa would step in and mess up. This will give dictators such as Mugabe room to thrive and democracy will be threatened. We are one of the few countries in Africa that can climb the moral high ground to tell Mugabe that he is way out of line.*

Although the stance by Khama and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was hailed as a defining moment in Botswana’s foreign policy, Botswana struggled to convince other SADC states to adopt its point of view, clearly indicating the extent to which it needed to co-opt larger states such as SA in order to make a significant difference (Piet, 2008). A disappointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phandu Skelemani, was later to identify liberation ties between member states of SADC as a primary reason for the ‘soft’ way in which heads of state handled Mugabe. In an interview with SW Radio broadcast on 23 January 2009, Skelemani stated (transcript published in *Mmegi*, 2009b):

*My opinion is that too many of the leadership in SADC feel some kind of obligation towards Mugabe, probably because he has been such a good freedom fighter...*

In Botswana, a selection of responses from elite members suggested that the SA government needed to take stronger action in Zimbabwe. Civil service respondent,
Johanna Segotlong (01/12/08), Principal Trade Officer in charge of International Trade, believed that SA’s stance was one of ‘neutrality’ and ‘trying to please everyone’. Corporate elite members were particularly critical of SA’s approach to Zimbabwe. Odirile Mothale (25/11/08), Communications and PR Manager for MASCOM, characterised SA’s stance as a ‘kid gloves approach’. Duduetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08), Marketing Manager of Stanbic Bank, believed that the situation was ‘affecting Botswana’ and that they ‘need SA to step up’. Tshepo Maphanyane (26/11/08), Publicity and Public Relations Executive of the SA-owned Multichoice in Botswana, felt that SA’s stance was ‘not strong enough’ and that ‘domestic problems’ in SA explained its weak approach.

The Zambian media material suggests that its government was also particularly vocal about the Zimbabwean situation and in conjunction with the Botswanan government they were to challenge SA’s leadership in the matter. The following article in the *Lusaka Times* clearly outlines the manner in which Mwanawasa was the first African leader to break ranks with the SA-led mediation. As early as September 2007, Mwanawasa attempted to place the Zimbabwean issue on the agenda at SADC meetings. Mugabe’s outrage at such a suggestion was reported as follows (*Lusaka Times*, 2007b):

*Who are you, Mwanawasa? Who are you? Who do you think you are?... During the process Mwanawasa was shaken and he kept on saying: Mr President I didn’t mean to say that; you misunderstood me. No, Mr President, that was not my intention. Sources said Mugabe, after blasting Mwanawasa, walked out and did not return. Efforts by colleagues including Kikwete [the president of Tanzania] and Mbeki to persuade him to return to the meeting failed.*

Despite the confrontation in September 2007, which appeared to have genuinely shaken the late Mwanawasa, he continued to talk openly about the Zimbabwean situation using his tenure as chairman of SADC for these purposes. At the
extraordinary SADC summit in Lusaka which he had convened in early April to discuss
the events following the 29 March election, Mwanawasa again spoke out against events
in Zimbabwe. A report in the *Lusaka Times* (2008c) quoted him as follows:

> This Summit, therefore should focus on helping Zimbabwe to find an
answer that genuinely reflects the will of the people. I have no doubt
in my mind that the presence of the Zimbabwean leadership at this
SADC extraordinary meeting attests to their disposition to heed our
advice...The challenge before us is that we should identify ways and
means of assisting our Zimbabwean brothers and sisters in finding a
solution which will be acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe and all
parties involved in the recent elections.

Following Mwanawasa’s diplomatic yet piercing statements at the
extraordinary SADC summit, the MDC wanted him to take over as mediator in the
crisis. The MDC felt he should replace Mbeki as mediator because of his clearly more
forthright manner. However, the SADC heads of state agreed at the same summit that
Mbeki would continue to mediate. As SADC chair, the potential for Mwanawasa to be
seen as acting above the authority of Mbeki on the issue was apparent, yet he had stated
openly that he was not interested in taking over Mbeki’s role as mediator (*Lusaka Times*,
2008d).

Whilst at an African Union (AU) summit in Egypt in July, Mwanawasa had to
be rushed to hospital due to heart failure. He was bed-ridden for two months before
passing away in a hospital in Paris. As a result much of the momentum he had gathered
challenging SA’s leadership in the matter, was lost. The brave new movement within
SADC exemplified by Mwanawasa, and Khama, was seen as a ‘breath of fresh air’ and
threatened the established ‘old-boys club’ (Chirwa, 27/01/09) mentality that had become
so pervasive in SADC. This sentiment was well captured by Outsa Mokone (27/11/08),
editor of the *Sunday Standard* in Botswana, who believed that during the post-election
phase ‘Khama and Mwanawasa were heroes to the man on the street because they stood
up to Mugabe’.
An overview of responses from elite members in Zambia suggests that they were particularly critical of the SA government’s and SADC’s overall approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. The strong response came from government (Mweene, 29/01/09; Mwila, 23/01/09; Sikombe, 19/01/09), business (Chirwa, 27/01/09; Mulenga, 29/01/09; Sichinga, 27/01/09) and media (Lingela, 23/01/09; Nachilobe, 24/01/09; Salasini, 26/01/09) sectors in Zambia. The bewilderment felt in respect of SA’s overall mediation is perhaps best summarised by the response from Evan Nachilobe (24/01/09), Head of Radio 2 for ZNBC, when he commented rhetorically: ‘What is quiet diplomacy, if not a neutral stance?’ More frank expressions to describe SA’s mediation ranged from ‘catastrophic’ (Sichinga, 27/01/09) to ‘nonsense’ (Lingela, 23/01/09). Kathy Sikombe (19/01/09), Programme Coordinator of Frederich Ebert Stiftung in Zambia, stated that SA ‘hasn’t done much, as big brother [they could remove the Zimbabwean government] forcefully if possible [sic]’.

The response from the above two countries was contrasted with the response from states such as Namibia. The Namibian media material suggests that the government was more supportive of ZANU-PF and rather ambivalent towards SA’s mediation. Notice the tacit endorsement of ZANU-PF in the following statement by the Namibian government (Weidlich, 2008):

‘While the negotiations required compromise from both sides, the results represent a major step forward for the people of Zimbabwe...’ stated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs...The Namibian Government saluted...Mugabe for ‘his ability to work together with the opposition for the good of the people and the country’. It further applauded MDC leaders...Tsvangirai and...Mutambara for putting the interests of Zimbabwe first.

There was, however, a lack of clear and sustained government statements on Zimbabwe coming through the media in Namibia. After the June run-off an editorial in the independent *The Namibian* (2008b) remarked that the ‘[t]he Namibian government
ha[d] gone strangely silent on Zimbabwean issues’. It appeared that during the post-election period even the Namibian government would rather remain silent than openly endorse events in Zimbabwe. The government-owned *New Era* which was heavily under the influence of the state, much like *The Herald* in Zimbabwe, would vacillate between criticising Mbeki and defending him (*New Era*, 2008a):

*Bashing Mbeki and Mugabe is a way to earn acceptability and credibility, particularly from the West...Those jumping to pass harsh judgement on Mbeki are playing a game of poker. They want to score cheap political points...*

In the same article Mbeki’s role as mediator was described as follows (ibid.):

*We hope there is consensus that Mbeki’s mission was never to negotiate Mugabe out of office. He was not to become judge, jury, prosecutor or policeman over Zimbabwe. That is not his mandate.*

The civil service elite members in SA were predictably diplomatic regarding SA’s mediation in Zimbabwe. Rob Davies (27/03/08), a political economist who focuses on southern Africa and is now a minister, believed that it is ‘[n]ot an easy issue to deal with, [SA’s] approach [was] tilting towards ZANU-PF. SA came in as an honest broker [but] the capacity to make a change or intervene was limited’. Henry Short (19/11/08), Director of the special directorate called NEPAD, APRM and African Renaissance Fund and who is a former Zimbabwean, was even more diplomatic. He contended that there were three points to the SA government’s approach to Zimbabwe. ‘First, we support land reform, it is fast-tracking that is worrying. Two, we support the political process [underway], and three, we don’t kick them when they have fallen – that is the right approach’. Corporate respondent Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08), Manager of Stakeholder Relations for Multichoice Africa, believed that there was the ‘business slice, government slice and population slice’ concerning SA’s stance towards Zimbabwe.
SA media elite members were, if anything, even more critical of their government than their regional counterparts. Editor of The Times (SA), Ray Hartley (05/02/09), felt that SA’s stance had demonstrated ‘pragmatism above principle’ and that this was ‘fine up to a point’ but that it dragged on for too long. David O’Sullivan (05/02/09), media actor who hosts the afternoon slot on 702 Talk Radio in Johannesburg, considered it ‘disgraceful’ and that SA ‘could have shown more moral judgement’. Peter Fabricius (03/02/09), Foreign Editor for Independent Newspapers, stated outright: ‘Too indulgent with Bob [Mugabe]’. Caxton Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at the University of the Witswatersrand, Anton Harber (02/02/09), believed that it had ‘damaged [SA’s] image enormously, by not pushing for a proper and earlier settlement’.

However, even though Botswana and Zambia were particularly vocal there was a perception that ‘they are not powerful enough to make a significant difference’ (Motlhale, 25/11/08). SA was seen as the only country that could make a difference but effectively chose not to (Coetzee, 25/11/08). A more effective approach would have been a coalition between SA, Botswana and Zambia. A coalition of this kind would potentially have avoided the devolving of responsibility that occurred through the bureaucratic, multilateral procedures of SADC. It would also have circumvented the presidential and elite stranglehold over negotiations. A discourse critical of SADC’s approach to the crisis had developed in the regional media. Take, for example, the following excerpt from an article titled ‘Is SADC serving any real purpose in the region?’ (Whande, 2008a):

*For goodness sake, where is SADC? Does SADC accept its fellow member to continuously violate or fail to meet SADC recommendations on elections...SADC should just disband. It is a useless organization that protects and hides the excesses of presidents of its member countries.*
Implicit in this discourse was a critique of the elitist nature of SADC raising the question whether SADC leaders really represent the will of the people. The sub-text of these arguments suggested that SADC is just a ‘bunch of elites’ and regional integration is mostly an elitist project. The following extract from an article in the *Botswana Gazette* (2008a) illustrates the point:

> For a long time ordinary people have asked themselves what the role of SADC is in their lives and whether it has any relevance in the solution of their day to day problems.

A strong indictment of the ineffectual nature of SADC was to be found in a letter written to the *Botswana Gazette* titled ‘Why has SADC failed to tame Robert Mugabe’. It stated:

> For donkey years that SADC has existed nothing of significance has ever come out of its endless summits. The leaders just converge, wine and dine and business goes on as usual (*Botswana Gazette*, 2008b).

The extent to which the SA-led SADC initiative was blocking other initiatives against ZANU-PF from developing, was also a problem. The SA-led SADC initiative had, to some extent, prevented Botswana and Zambia from acting independently. The sub-text was that unilateral action on Zimbabwe was to be frowned upon as out of line with the regional body’s values and chosen method of handling the situation. This was ostensibly out of some kind of liberation solidarity felt by some regional state elite members, something which Zambian and Botswanan state elite members were largely able to ignore. As Jon Elliott, an Africa Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch, wrote in the *Mmegi* (Elliott, 2008):

> President Mwanawasa, as SADC Chair, has been constrained by the policy of the region’s major power, South Africa. Appointed by SADC to resolve the Zimbabwe problem, Pretoria has merely appeased Mugabe for months.

Therefore, the presidential and state elite stranglehold over negotiations was symptomatic of SADC’s and SA’s chosen method of dealing with the issue. It was partly
the result of an unimaginative, elitist conceptualisation of the problem. Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08), Head of Public Relations and Communications in the Botswana Department of Trade and Industry, noted on the matter: ‘The population and elites in SA have different views to Zimbabwe’. What was needed was a more mass-based, societal-driven approach involving all role players in Zimbabwe. As Tula Dlamini (04/02/09), a Zimbabwean who works as a Research Specialist for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), perceptively noted:

*Overall the approach adopted to the Zimbabwean situation was far too leader-centric and was not inclusive of all social and political actors. It had been narrow in the sense that the ‘leadership world’ became more insular rendering consensus building impossible. The agreement had also been focused on political accommodation between the ruling party and the main opposition as opposed to a more inclusive referendum-type consensus building.*

As Thanki Mothae (28/11/08), Head of the Organ on Politics, Governance and Diplomacy of SADC, and to whom President Mbeki had to account personally, noted: ‘Elites were well briefed on the issue but the public disillusionment towards SA’s mediation was immense’.

### 6.3.2 Mixed messages from the South African government

One of the biggest problems during the post-election negotiations was that the region was losing confidence and patience with Mbeki and his ability to mediate effectively (Sakazhila, 22/01/09). For many years SA’s cautious approach in Zimbabwe was seen as largely inappropriate, given the levels of suffering in the country. This had become particularly apparent during the post-election phase when President Mbeki was seen as not providing the necessary urgency during the negotiations (Salasini, 26/01/09). This was also a difficult time when the region and international community were monitoring events closely.
During the post-election negotiations period it became apparent that Mbeki’s fairly positive reports regarding the progress of negotiations were not consistent with actual events. This tended to form part of what Diana Games (03/02/09) termed the ‘schizophrenic approach’ to the Zimbabwean situation, characterised by a series of mixed messages by the SA government and Mbeki personally. SA’s confusing and contradictory messages at the time were significant as it weakened SA’s leadership in the matter, giving rise to regional protest.

During the lead-up to signing the agreement the Botswanan media played a particularly strong activist role in mobilising government officials to take action against the SA-led SADC initiative. However, note should be taken of the extent to which the Botswana government chose to directly intervene in the media to advance its position (Media Institute of Southern Africa, Botswana, 2008). The government and media would largely work in tandem on the matter, especially the Mmegi and Sunday Standard. The independent Mmegi in particular was trying to discredit and expose the SA government for their failures in Zimbabwe. The Zambian media would generally play less of an activist role, but at times would also be openly critical of the SA government.

Already in November 2007, an article titled ‘I am ashamed of my African leaders!’ which appeared in the Mmegi, made the following observation (Whande, 2007a):

_What progress are the South Africans always spouting about that we don't know of? Or are they saying they are satisfied with the daily political violence and death toll? What kind of progress is it when the other half of the negotiating partners does not report any such progress but complains?_

These concerns and suspicions over Mbeki’s personal style of communication had been developing before the failed election, but became worse during the negotiation
period when his role in the conflict increased. A significant part of the contradictory
messages and subsequent lack of trust in Mbeki was due to the accusations that he
supported ZANU-PF and was not a neutral mediator. Indeed, much of the region’s and
international community’s frustration with SA’s mediation comes down to issues
between the two leaders of these countries. Although such an individual-focused
analysis runs the risk of personifying foreign policy and thereby over-simplifying what
is really a myriad of actors and motives, in this instance the relationship between the two
presidents appears significant. The relationship between Mbeki and Mugabe had led to
much speculation and strong opinions in the region. Juliana Mwila (23/1/09), Director of
Press and Planning in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and Head of SADC
for Zambia, believed that ‘Mbeki has not been honest in his dealing [with] Zimbabwe’ as
he is ‘pro-ZANU’. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09) contended: ‘The assumption is that
Mbeki treats Mugabe as an uncle and it’s part of African culture not to question your
elders’. Chris Chirwa (27/01/09), Director of Image Publishers Limited in Zambia, felt
strongly about this:

*Mbeki does not have the necessary ‘sapiential authority’. He doesn’t have the knowledge to be able to mediate. Mugabe looks down upon Mbeki as he does not have enough experience. If they had Mandela or Tutu, there would have been a different result.*

Some have suggested that this respect for your elders is due to Ubuntuism – a
moral philosophy of traditional African societies steeped in respect for one’s elders (see
7.7.3 for definition). Added to this is a romanticism about Africa’s struggle for
independence, deeming certain leaders untouchable or legendary. As Pieter Fourie
(04/02/09), Professor of Communications at the University of South Africa (UNISA),
noted:

*Mugabe is the last black leader of the initial African freedom fighters, such as Kaunda and Nyerere – the last great African leader [and to challenge him is to challenge this legacy].*
Philip Banda (28/01/09), Risk Manager for Stanbic Bank in Zambia, contended of Mbeki’s mediation, ‘it is like telling Bush he is [to be] chief negotiator between Palestine and Israel, it’s a joke [as he is] not neutral or impartial’.

Mbeki vehemently denied that he was in favour of ZANU-PF. The following article outlines an occasion on which Mbeki wrote a letter in response to the MDC’s accusations that he was biased. The article in the Sunday Standard stated (Whande, 2008b):

Frustrated and well aware of his failure in mediation, Mbeki dropped whatever little pretence of diplomacy he had and responded to Tsvangirai in a surprisingly bad-tempered 4087-word ‘Dear Morgan’ letter...In a desperate effort in retaliation, Mbeki even resorted to Mugabe’s pronouncements of insulting Tsvangirai as a stooge of the western countries...ZimOnline expressed concern about the tone and thrust of the letter which “seems over the top coming from one in Mbeki’s position where as mediator he is expected to be impartial and moderate in his conduct”.

However, Mbeki really only had himself to blame for spreading confusing messages regarding his allegiances in Zimbabwe. Soon after the failed March election, on his way to an extraordinary SADC summit to discuss the Zimbabwean issue, Mbeki stopped over in Zimbabwe and was seen walking hand-in-hand with Mugabe saying that everything is under control and ‘there is no crisis in Zimbabwe’ (Mmegi, 2008f). Mbeki was berated in the regional and international media for this blatant show of solidarity with the southern African dictator. The Mmegi responded with a strong editorial titled ‘Is Thabo Mbeki really still in touch with reality?’ It stated (ibid.):

Yet in Mbeki’s wisdom, there is "no crisis". Any sane person cannot help but agree with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader, Morgan Tsvangirai that "unless, of course, they (Mbeki and friends) say the crisis should be demonstrated by bodies on the streets."

The strongest indictment of an unresponsive stance by SA was to be found in the extent of suffering leading up to the run-off. A disregard for the brutality of the
ZANU-PF regime was, however, not new to the SA government as it had appeared to turn a blind eye to atrocities in Zimbabwe for many years. There was clearly a generally adversarial relationship between the SA government and civil society on the Zimbabwean issue. The sheer brutality of the ZANU-PF regime was a source of much contention and fear in the region. Jon Elliott from Human Rights Watch wrote in the *Mmegi* (Elliot, 2008):

> Since the end of May, the situation has even deteriorated further. ZANU-PF thugs have now been deployed in urban areas. The mutilation of MDC supporters has continued, now with horrific reports of burning and hacking off limbs. The numbers of dead, maimed and brutalized will almost certainly increase...But Mbeki’s performance has been disastrous and ill-conceived. He has merely been shielding Mr Mugabe and his circle of abusers.

This disregard for upholding human rights, or a lack of compassion for those affected by the violence in Zimbabwe, tended to play into a broader pattern of denialism by the SA government (Creasey, 16/11/08). Potentially the biggest irony of the mediation led by the African National Congress (ANC) was the manner in which their response to the atrocities differed from when they were exiled during apartheid. The following opinion piece published in the *Mmegi* outlines the double standards of the ANC (Thebe, 2008):

> When the Boers had declared him [Mbeki] a "terrorist"...he used to plead with the world to take action against Pretoria...Whenever sanctions are mentioned [in Zimbabwe], he is quick to dismiss them saying they would hurt ordinary people, why then was he calling for them in those protest marches in London.

The sub-text of much of the media suggests that SA was keeping African states in the dark. It did not have to keep smaller SADC states informed as they were not important enough or significant to the mediation process. The sentiment partly created by Mbeki himself was that the SA government knew better than others. After the 15 September agreement had been signed the *Mmegi* went on to state that Mbeki had
'hoodwinked’ leaders of Africa. The insinuation was that he had purposefully attempted to mislead SADC that everything was progressing well when clearly it was not. In a strong editorial on 28 November 2008 titled ‘SADC must squeeze Mugabe’, it was stated (Mmegi, 2008g):

For a long time, the mediator in the Zimbabwean impasse and former South African president Thabo Mbeki had amazingly managed to hoodwink leaders of Southern Africa, African Union and, indeed, the entire international community that things will eventually change for the better in Zimbabwe. However, for those who read into Mbeki’s now discredited 'quiet diplomacy' knew this was a non-starter. Actually, that policy has been disastrous for the Zimbabwean masses...

These sentiments were echoed in the Zambian media (Times of Zambia, 2008h):

Unfortunately, his [Mbeki’s] efforts have long since ceased to inspire confidence, especially for the opposition and the international community. One of the reasons for this, which President Mwanawasa also alluded to, is the lack of information on the specifics of what President Mbeki’s mediation efforts have covered. Everyone seems to be in the dark.

Although at a diplomatic level SADC states were seemingly divided on Zimbabwe, the support the Botswanan and Zambian governments had gathered at a popular level was significant. It further illustrates the disjuncture between state elite members and citizens on this issue. The implied assumption was that SA was representing the wishes of some of SADC’s state elite members, whilst the Botswanan and Zambian governments were acting on the will of the people (Mmegi, 2008d):

As Batswana, we should take solace in the fact that our government has demonstrated its concern about the well-being of the ordinary Zimbabweans whose patience is being brutally stretched to its limit.

As a quantitative indicator, when respondents were asked if they felt that talks had progressed well a cumulative 77% disagreed. The results were more or less consistent across the three countries with SA being slightly less critical. Zambia was the most critical with 88% of respondents feeling that the talks had not progressed well.
6.4 Business responses

This section investigates the impact of SA’s mediation on regional businesses. Two major issues can be identified. The first concerns the implications of the agreement on regional businesses. The second concerns the impact of the agreement on SA business interests in Zimbabwe.

6.4.1 Implications of the South African-brokered agreement on regional businesses

Given the extent of the economic devastation in Zimbabwe, business was widely disappointed in the slow and non-responsive approach by SA. Both Zimbabwean and regionally-owned businesses had suffered heavy losses due to the political situation and economic meltdown in the country, particularly in the months leading up the peace deal. Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08) from the Botswanan Department of Trade and Industry believed that business owners thought that ‘SA [was] too slow’ and that ‘the impression [was] that SA was denying the situation’. According to Outsa Mokone (27/11/08), ‘[c]ountries with businesses in Zimbabwe were critical of Mbeki’ given the speed of negotiations and their inconclusive results.

The Zimbabwean crisis had severely impacted on the Zimbabwean economy. According to an article in The Namibian (2008c):

*Over the past decade, the country's economy has shrunk by at least 65 per cent, the manufacturing sector is operating at below 30 per cent, and the official inflation rate hit 11.2 million per cent in June.*

In the months leading up to the signing of the agreement the situation deteriorated further with government interference in pricing increasing as inflation continued to soar to record levels (Ntakhwana, 28/11/08). A concerted effort to ease the economic situation was made a few days before the agreement was signed, when the idea of dollarisation of the economy was wholeheartedly embraced. It was partly an attempt to
move goods from the parallel market to the mainstream market. This occurred as the prospect of investment began to emerge just before the signing of the deal (Zimbabwe Independent, 2008).

The country was for many months after the failed election effectively operating in a vacuum without an ‘official’ government regulating the economy. Hence the sense of urgency felt by business concerning the negotiations. However, when the agreement was signed there was an initial period of optimism. The past president of the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, Mariah Hativagone, responded: ‘Everything will now begin to take shape. The signing will create a lot of stability in the economy and lure back investment in the country’ (Lusaka Times, 2008e). Hours after signing the deal the International Monetary Fund (IMF) wanted to talk to the Zimbabwean parties (The Namibian, 2008c). Rob Davies (27/03/08), SA’s Minister of Trade and Industry, believed that there was ‘initial enthusiasm’ with ‘some indication of investments’.

Yet, despite the initial optimism, large sections of the business community remained sceptical and were to develop a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. Thanki Mothae (28/11/08) said that after the signing of the agreement ‘there was uncertainty, but business [was] lying waiting’. There was also a feeling amongst business owners that it was too little too late, as costs had gone up dramatically in the months prior to the agreement (Short, 19/11/08). The result was that businesses in Zimbabwe had developed survival mechanisms such as diversifying their products or expanding into the region in order to survive, such as Zimbabwean banks active in Zambia (Sichinga, 27/01/09).

Even with a peace deal the signs were not particularly positive. Despite the entrepreneurial spirit in Zimbabwe, the future of Zimbabwe's monetary and fiscal environment looked bleak as Gono was reinstated as governor of the Reserve Bank by
Mugabe shortly after the deal was signed. He was to work with the new MDC Minister of Finance. However, Gono himself had overseen many of the financial problems that were created in Zimbabwe and was accused of being ‘the epicentre of Zimbabwe’s financial system collapse’ (Ngwenya, 2008a).

Once the initial euphoria around the deal had settled, the chances for significant foreign investment and even international donor assistance remained fairly remote. This was largely as a result of Mugabe remaining official head of state, raising scepticism in the international community about the extent of the political change as a result of the agreement.

6.4.2 The effects of the power-sharing agreement on South African business in Zimbabwe

In Chapter 1 it was noted that a key feature of the GBM complex is the collusion between state and corporate elite members in their attempts to accumulate capital. Brokering peace deals is typically associated with paving the way for business, such as SA’s involvement in the DRC. Yet the Zimbabwean crisis had clearly led to much tension between government and business in SA. As Nyathi (2008) noted:

There are sections of business who hate Mbeki for his foreign policy, especially his supposed cosy relationship with President Robert Mugabe and would love to see him go. He "allowed" Mugabe to set a bad example with his land expropriations, and now his plans for the mining sector. But they liked Mbeki’s liberal approach to business back home.

Despite much protest by business and the media concerning the speed and inconclusive nature of the negotiations, the state discourses took preference over those of business. The following extract from an article in the Zimbabwe Independent outlined the control which state elite members have over resources and production in Zimbabwe (Mawere, 2008):
At the core of the land reform programme is a belief, strongly held by Mugabe and his colleagues, that it is an appropriate role of the state to become an active participant in resource allocation and productive activities. The contestation for political power is really between the labour movement and intellectuals with the business community taking the role of spectators. The business community is obviously silent because the risks inherent in challenging the political elites in government and the opposition are too significant.

The Zimbabwean situation became a curious case. Its impact on SA capital accumulation did not represent a significant tipping-point in the policy and lobbying processes. It was ironic that the man who was at the very centre of SA’s GBM complex had become a hindrance to SA capital accumulation in Zimbabwe. The extent to which Mbeki became removed from conventional neo-liberal discourses in Zimbabwe contributed to his growing domestic unpopularity, especially among corporate elite members.

Nevertheless, SA corporates clearly stood to gain from a peaceful resolution in Zimbabwe. Many believed that it would be a win-win situation for SA capital accumulation. Whande (2007b) states:

Many big companies in Zimbabwe closed down and relocated to South Africa and other countries in the region...And South African business is watching, don’t you see? Mugabe is going to go, one way or the other. He is about to expire, both physically and politically, and South African business is best poised to rush in and set up shop. They have the money; they have the means and they are nearest. So Mbeki is not losing sleep over Zimbabwe. Either way it goes, he and his country come out winners.

From SA’s point of view, the prospects for expansion in the platinum mining sector were particularly enticing. This would most likely lead to construction contracts for SA companies. A general ‘multiplier effect’ for SA businesses was likely to follow should the political settlement hold (Harrison, 2008). For SA-owned businesses such as Multichoice that had not left Zimbabwe, the talks promised much hope (Maphanyane, 26/11/08). At the time of the deal, MTN did not have a presence in Zimbabwe and
would look to expand in what has become one of the least connected countries in Africa. SA banks in Zimbabwe had also endured a difficult time. According to Duduetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08), Marketing Manager for the SA-owned Stanbic Bank in Botswana, ‘Stanbic bank in Zimbabwe [was] struggling’. It was reported that Standard Bank’s CEO, Jacko Maree, told Reuters that the bank ‘was ready to inject capital once a political solution is found’ in Zimbabwe (Harrison, 2008).

However, these hopes were dashed after it became apparent that the new agreement would not provide the necessary political change for a significant influx of foreign capital. Mugabe would not step down entirely and ZANU-PF would continue to hold some influence over business policy in the country. Other concerns by SA businesses were that the SA government never managed to sign a bilateral investment protection agreement. This left SA businesses feeling exposed (Fabricius, 03/02/09).

The prospect of SA state elite members brokering peace and then having their corporate counterparts moving into the country, had raised some scepticism in the regional media. Rejoice Ngwenya, a Zimbabwean freemarket activist and political analyst based in Harare, rather provocatively points to the elitist and often white interests of the GBM complex, and how it sought to exploit the Zimbabwean crisis (Ngwenya, 2008b):

*While...xenophobia explodes against Malawian and Zimbabwean immigrants [a direct consequence of the Zimbabwean crisis], white corporate 'imperialists' like Ray Ackerman are slithering covertly across the Zambezi River. Toyota Zimbabwe has banned all agencies in the country from servicing 'non South African' models, while South African universities gulp down genius academics from across the border. Only one man is responsible for this crisis - Robert Mugabe.*

SA businesses were therefore ‘lying in wait’ for the recovery period. Yet the post-conflict business boom was clearly stymied by the ongoing fragility of the power-sharing government.
6.5 Media responses

This section outlines the responses from the regional media to SA’s mediation in Zimbabwe. Consideration will be given to the role played by the media as an active agent in informational flows and lobbying processes. The focus will therefore be on the extent to which the regional media were instrumental in highlighting the SA government’s lack of success in Zimbabwe.

6.5.1 Exposing the South African government’s failures in Zimbabwe

An analysis of the interview and media material suggests that the media were effective in exposing the shortcomings of the SA government in Zimbabwe, with the exception of the government-owned media in Namibia. According to Pieter Fourie (04/02/09), who is a Professor in the Department of Communications at the University of South Africa (UNISA), ‘[t]he mainstream media, even the state media in SA…were all critical about quiet diplomacy. Previously the media were more neutral, but are now [during the negotiations period] openly critical. The black and white [owned] media are both critical’. Thapelo Ndlovu (27/11/08), who is the National Director of the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) in Botswana, believed that the regional media had gone through cycles when reporting on the issue. He believed that although the regional media had become more critical after the March election, ‘this came out late’ as ‘countries have been quiet [on the issue] since 2002’. In line with the cyclical nature of media coverage on Zimbabwe, Rob Davies (27/03/08) pointed to the possibility that in the post-election phase SA’s role was portrayed as slightly more positive.

The predominant way in which stories were framed was that SA was to blame not only for the failure of the parties to come to an agreement, but also for the
scale of the humanitarian crisis. According to Tula Dlamini (04/02/09), who is a Zimbabwean working for the SA state broadcaster: ‘The mainstream media characterised it [SA’s mediation] as classical failure and also as the main reason for the humanitarian situation’. An estimate by Outsa Mokone (27/11/08), editor of the Sunday Independent in Botswana, suggested that in the ‘regional media up to ninety percent of stories were negative towards SA’.

Many reports also questioned the relationship between Mbeki and Mugabe. Marlan Kananda (27/01/09), whose job as Public Relations Manager of Multichoice in Zambia requires him to follow media debates, stated that ‘[t]he media in Africa have attacked Mbeki and questioned his relationship with Mugabe’. Amos Sakazhila (22/01/09) believed that the media sought to uncover ‘what lies underneath [sic]’ their relationship and added that the media were speculating that there were ‘hidden agendas’.

Other media accounts contrasted Mbeki’s regional and domestic priorities. This was described by war historian Henry Short (19/11/08), a former Zimbabwean and now SA civil servant. He added that this was the predominant viewpoint of the SA media, especially as the leadership struggle was reaching its climax after the Polokwane conference in December 2007. Throughout 2008 Mbeki’s loyalty to his country and suitability as president were being questioned (3.5 and Chapter 7). These themes were increasingly explored by the regional media during the negotiations. Mbeki’s involvement in ending conflicts in Africa was increasingly being seen as being at the expense of the country in terms of the time and effort he was investing in these conflicts. This played into the notion of being an aloof and careless president preoccupied with being seen as the next ‘great man of Africa’ instead of a ‘good’ president of his country. A headline in The Nation (Gikonyo, 2008) newspaper in
Kenya, which was largely supportive of Khama’s and Mwanawasa’s stance, read: ‘Ex-

president brought down by arrogance’. The Monitor (2008b) in Uganda ran with the
headline ‘Mbeki’s exit shows true size of Mandela’s shoes’.

The media material presented in 6.3.2 noted the activist role played by the

media in Botswana during the lead-up to signing the deal, particularly the popular daily

Mmegi and the Sunday Standard. SA’s handling of the matter had clearly elicited

protest from the Botswanan media. The Times of Zambia and Lusaka Times praised and

encouraged the Zambian government when it started breaking ranks with other SADC

states. However, the media in Zambia were less overtly confrontational, but rather

sought to communicate effectively what government was already saying. After the

failed election, the Times of Zambia ran with an editorial titled ‘Mwanawasa’s move

signals a deep change in attitudes’ (2008h) and ‘Zim political situation embarrass-

(2008i) quoting their president in the title of the article.

The independent Namibian media were to some extent successful in exposing

the SA government’s failures in Zimbabwe, although this was often countered by the
government-owned media. In April the independent The Namibian carried the headlines
‘Zimbabwe: To what extent has Thabo Mbeki been involved’ (2008d) and in early
August ‘Thabo Mbeki’s compromised legacy’ (Hengari, 2008). When the deal was
signed the government-owned New Era carried the headlines ‘NAM Govt hails power-
sharing deal’ (2008b) and ‘Pohambo calls for lifting of sanctions on Zim’ (Tjatindi,
2008).

6.6 The impact of the Zimbabwean crisis on perceptions of South Africa’s regional

standing
This section outlines the responses to a series of questions devised to test the attitudes of regional elite members as to how the Zimbabwean crisis might impact on SA’s regional standing (appendix A, question 68). In the questionnaire the questions were presented in a different sequence which has been slightly altered here to facilitate debate.

**Table 6.1: How has South Africa's handling of the Zimbabwean situation impacted upon its standing in the region?** (percentages rounded-off to the nearest whole number)

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<th>Strongly disagree</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. President Mbeki's African Renaissance lost credibility in the region due to his handling of the Zimbabwean crisis</td>
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<td>B. The SA government’s handling of Zimbabwe has led to a decline in its moral authority and legitimacy in the region</td>
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<td>C. SA’s mediation in Zimbabwe illustrates the weaknesses and limits of SA’s negotiating ability in Africa</td>
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<td>D. President Mbeki's quiet</td>
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diplomacy has been vindicated as a settlement in Zimbabwe has finally been reached

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<td>SA</td>
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*The first row consists of the total sample of Botswana, Zambia and SA. The following three rows consist of single countries, indicated B, Z or SA.

6.6.1 Mbeki and the African Renaissance

A successful resolution in Zimbabwe would have been the final cornerstone to Mbeki’s African legacy. But as Kathy Sikombe (19/01/09), Programme Coordinator of the Frederich Ebert Stiftung Foundation in Zambia, believed: ‘In the beginning it [the African Renaissance] had much credibility, but now people have lost confidence due to Zimbabwe’. As a quantitative indicator question A of table 6.1 demonstrates that a cumulative majority of 66% believe that President Mbeki’s African Renaissance lost credibility in the region due to his handling of the Zimbabwean situation, with 9% strongly agreeing.

A further distinction should be drawn between the levels at which this was felt. For example, Peter Fabricius (2009), Foreign Editor for Independent Newspapers in SA, argued: ‘The Renaissance lost credibility amongst the people of SADC [due to SA’s handling of Zimbabwe] as opposed to losing credibility in the eyes of the leaders’. Others point to a relativity in human rights between the global North and South. The Minister of Trade and Industry of SA, Rob Davies (27/03/08), contended that ‘the African Renaissance lost credibility in the eyes of the West, but not the region, due to SA’s handling of the [Zimbabwean] situation’. However, Bob Sichinga (27/01/09), a former Zambian MP and now independent political consultant, believed that:

* African states are equal partners in the Renaissance and it’s not just reflected in how South Africa conducts itself...Mbeki is not synonymous with the Renaissance. 
Yet, given the role played by Mbeki as the intellectual architect of the African Renaissance, and his personal mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis, the direct association was clear. This point was made in an article titled ‘Zimbabwe: a chance for Mbeki to showcase his “African Renaissance”’ which appeared in the *Sunday Standard* of Botswana (Whande, 2007c). After Mbeki had been recalled as president, an article featured in the *Mmegi* further explored this matter (Tsimane, 2008):

> Perhaps the biggest question that remains in the post-Mbeki era is: Will African leaders continue the legacy of the ideals he kept so dearly close to his heart, with the same vigour - the African Renaissance, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) along with his Afro-radicalism stance now that he is no more in power? Do regional leaders espouse Mbeki’s ideals of African Renaissance within the framework of the Southern African Development Community or was it just a personal crusade?

### 6.6.2 A southern African power struggle

There were a few reasons as to why the Zimbabwean situation had undermined SA’s regional leadership. The broader context concerns the implicit power struggle between the two countries as to who was southern Africa’s leading power. After years of isolation due to apartheid, SA emerged on the international stage as the undisputed strongest power in southern Africa. Until then, Zimbabwe had enjoyed this title as a politically stable country with the strongest economy in SADC. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Zimbabwe had a strong educational system producing a robust class of professionals. A thriving agricultural sector placed Zimbabwe in charge of food security in SADC (Danse, 2000). Although glad that their neighbour had finally defeated apartheid, Zimbabwean state elite members viewed SA as lacking in African credentials to lead the region having only recently ended white rule (Burgess, 2004).

Added to this was Mbeki’s poor relationship with SADC more generally, often engaging the AU before SADC. When Mbeki set about reforming the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) into the AU (3.4.1), he largely overlooked SADC partners. If he had adopted a more consultative approach starting with SADC, he would have been able to gain the trust of regional states. Okungu (2008) explains:

This stiffness [referring to Mbeki’s interpersonal manner] was quite evident even at the AU Summits where he limited his conversations to just a few heads of state he considered important. At the AU meetings, he would readily consult with Obasanjo [from Nigeria], Mubarak [from Egypt], the Algerian President and Abdulahi Wade of Senegal. These [along with Muammar Gaddafi of Libya] were the big five that shaped the principles and policies of NEPAD and the APRM.

The regional power struggle was also being fought in terms of how Africa’s socio-economic renewal was to take place. Part of this power struggle entailed a Zimbabwean resistance against the Western orthodoxy and the neo-liberal bent that was engendered in SA’s economic blueprint for the continent, NEPAD. SA had envisioned a transformation of the continent by engaging with international institutions. In contradistinction Zimbabwe had envisioned a much more isolationist, confrontational approach to the UN, the World Bank and the IMF and chose to ‘look East’ for partners. However, Zimbabwe’s failure to comply with World Bank and IMF demands led to a denial of aid and so to criticism from its neighbours. An article in the Botswana Gazette noted in this regard (Ngwenya, 2008b):

If Robert Mugabe has tied a contaminated millstone around his neck and leaped into the deep-end of political extremism by proclaiming that both the [IMF] and World Bank can f... off, why are his neighbours not jumping to his rescue? The answer lies in the fear of contamination. Poverty and bad governance are contagious diseases that Mugabe is spreading all over the SADC hinterland.

This largely silent power struggle was capped by the rivalry between the ANC and ZANU-PF as to who was the great southern African liberation party, and further exacerbated by Mugabe’s alleged jealousy of Mandela (Russell, 2009: 266). Although SA was thought of as the ideal country to mediate, the decision to have SA and Mbeki lead the negotiations played into this power struggle. Ironically, through the SA-led
mediation Zimbabwean state elite members were able to cast aspersions on SA’s regional leadership; and Zimbabwe, as the regional counter-hegemon, was able to subvert these power relations and reduce SA’s role into one of passiveness and helplessness. By so doing they were able to indirectly demonstrate SA’s inexperience in the intricacies of African diplomacy. The more patience displayed by SA through its policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’, the more it ultimately discredited SA. Question B demonstrates that a cumulative majority of 64% agreed that the SA government’s handling of the Zimbabwean situation had led to a decline in its moral authority and legitimacy in the region. As a consequence, SA’s role as mediator became seriously compromised.

Although there was a high degree of realpolitik in SA’s handling of Zimbabwe (Games, 03/02/09) and SA was arguably careful not to impose its own values on the Zimbabwean situation (Fabricius, 03/02/09), responses to question C demonstrate that a cumulative 63% agreed that SA’s mediation in Zimbabwe exposed the weaknesses and limits of SA’s negotiating ability in Africa. This was especially the case as Mbeki’s partiality and credentials as a peacemaker were being tested in other conflicts in Africa. Whande (2007d) observed as follows with reference to Mbeki’s engagement in Burundi:

> And just this past Tuesday, Mbeki was at it again. Burundi’s last active rebel group boycotted a meeting to put the derailed peace process back on track because, the rebel group said, “the South African mediator is biased” and by so doing “had disqualified himself as a mediator.” During South Africa’s mediation talks, the government of Burundi continues to physically attack supporters of the group with which it is engaged in peace talks...This is the man SADC picks to help the Zimbabwean people get out of the clutches of a murderous dictator.

An alternative viewpoint suggested by David O’Sullivan (05/02/09) was that the reason why SA was ultimately more successful in brokering peace in central Africa and not
Zimbabwe, is due to the fact that SA ‘didn’t owe [the] DRC or Burundi anything. [SA was a] neutral player, but in Zimbabwe the liberation struggle’ changed that dynamic.

6.6.3 The impact of South Africa’s leadership struggle on the Zimbabwean crisis

As noted in section 6.2, the signing of the peace deal occurred at a politically fragile period for Mbeki, when he was being undermined by his own party and government. In an article in the *Mmegi* titled ‘ANC to circumvent Mbeki’, it was noted how the ANC was also losing patience with Mbeki’s mediation efforts and chose to take action (Mbhele, Makefane and Mahlangu, 2008):

*The African National Congress has taken a decision to sidestep...Mbeki and directly intervene between...Mugabe's Zanu-PF party and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. The Sunday Times has established that the ANC National Working Committee (NWC) has asked the party's secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, to establish contact with Zimbabwe's two main protagonists in an attempt to bring them to the table."

Pushing for the peace agreement to be signed was therefore a last ditch attempt by Mbeki to secure his legacy before being asked to resign. If he at least could have settled the Zimbabwean dispute once and for all, it would potentially have restored some pride to a legacy already in tatters. Hence, the leadership struggle within the ANC was spilling over into the region and was impacting upon SA’s mediation. Mbeki managed to secure the deal on 15 September. Four days later he was asked to vacate his office even though he still had six months to go till the end of his second term. As a result of this pressure on the mediator it was argued that he pushed the MDC to concede to ZANU-PF’s conditions. The MDC was unhappy with the rushed nature in which the talks were concluded and how they were ‘forced’ to sign. In an article in *The Namibian* (2008e) titled ‘Zimbabwe's opposition says lost faith in talks’, a spokesperson for the MDC who asked to remain anonymous argued:
[Mbeki] is trying to rush us into a deal. The unfortunate thing is that Mbeki is trying to help Mugabe achieve his ends, not to solve the crisis.

The unceremonious stripping of Mbeki’s powers was to impact on the post-agreement phase which was a particularly fragile and tense period requiring constant intervention. The process was to go ahead with Mbeki as mediator even though he was not seen as fit to rule his own country. An article in The Namibian summed up the impact this would have on the deal (Matundu-Tjiparuro, 2008):

However, I for one believe that Mbeki brokered the deal that for now seems stagnated with the force of the South African presidential office behind him...Whether Mbeki, less the presidential influence and aura, can move the deal forward remains to be seen...Now that he is no longer president one wonders how this can impact on the deal given that he may be further removed from the axis of power and may have less sanction from the South African government.

However, the SA government continued to support him. The new SA president, Kgalema Motlanthe, said in a statement: ‘Mr Mbeki's facilitation efforts in Zimbabwe have proven his dispassionate vision for a lasting political solution to the challenges facing Zimbabwe’ (The Namibian, 2008f).

The final and desperate attempt to secure the deal before Mbeki vacated office, meant that the authenticity of the agreement was questionable. As Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08) stated: ‘There was an assumption that he had acted expeditiously largely for purposes of personal political gain’. The feeling in the region was that even though the agreement had been signed, the chances that it would work in reality were very remote. This was largely due to ZANU-PF’s apparent disregard for the opposition, stemming from its reluctance to relinquish power. ZANU-PF only decided to enter into the agreement as a way to cling to power. Mugabe did not enter into an agreement out of a desire to bring a fair and just resolution to the political impasse. This was well summed up by Dlamini (04/02/09):
The situation was characterised by a very low level of trust between the parties. The chances that the agreement was to be stillborn were very high, and the viewpoint was that only time will tell. Perhaps history will be a better judge of Mbeki’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ in Zimbabwe.

However, some would argue that despite the time it took to bring the parties together, Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe had been vindicated. This sentiment was expressed as follows (Kachingwe, 2008):

With the way things are progressing in Zimbabwe [referring to the month just before the deal was signed], one can say...Mbeki has been vindicated, at least against the West which preferred force in resolving the crisis there.

A cumulative majority of 56% disagreed with the statement that President Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy has been vindicated as a settlement in Zimbabwe has been reached. Botswana (80%) and Zambia (65%) demonstrated much higher levels of disagreement with this statement than SA (35%).

6.7 Conclusion

Although the response from SADC was generally one of concern towards the Zimbabwean crisis, member states did not take strong enough action. The SA-led SADC initiative was also poorly implemented. The answer for SA was probably to break away from the multilateral procedures of SADC and approach Zimbabwe through a coalition with Botswana and Zambia. These are all neighbouring states to Zimbabwe and collectively they would have been able to apply significant pressure on the regime. The assumption is that other states traditionally aligned with ZANU-PF, might slowly have joined them.

Whilst SA’s peacemaking involvement in Africa was the foundation upon which SA state and corporate elite members sought to articulate the legitimising discourses for its capital accumulation in the region, SA’s handling of the Zimbabwean
crisis exposed these discourses for their self-interest. This was because they were seen as being somewhat baseless and ‘hollow’. This was demonstrated by a certain callous disregard for the ‘actual’ suffering of people in the region, and a tendency to understand conflicts as elitist constructs.
7.1 Introduction

In May 2008 mainly African immigrants in various SA cities were violently driven from their businesses and homes by angry mobs. These incidents became known as the ‘xenophobia attacks’. The mobs concerned were frustrated because foreigners allegedly took their jobs and houses and absorbed basic services. The foreigners were often also successful at running small businesses. The attacks resulted in over sixty deaths, more than a thousand people being injured, and tens of thousands displaced. Some reports suggested that between 80,000 to 100,000 foreign nationals were displaced (IRIN, 2008a). The violence was widespread and occurred in eight of the nine provinces. Thousands were forced to return to their home countries and abandon their property and possessions. Others were compelled to seek shelter in designated camps, eventually attempting the difficult reintegration process.

Much of the migration literature suggests that migrants contribute to the SA economy, create employment, are transnational and generally do not plan to stay in the country permanently (Crush and McDonald, 2000; Crush, Williams and Peberdy, 2005; IDASA, 2008). However, xenophobia in SA has been a persistent and seemingly growing problem. These claims are supported by a body of literature which suggests that despite important changes since 1994, the major thrust of the SA official and popular discourse surrounding migration has not changed much since the demise of apartheid (Crush, 1999, 2000; Neocosmos, 2008).
Neocosmos suggests that ‘xenophobia must be understood as a political discourse in South Africa’, centred around the ‘politics of fear’ (2008: 587). He argues that ‘the politics of fear’ has three major components: a state discourse of xenophobia, a discourse of SA’s exceptionalism and a conception of citizenship based exclusively on indigenousness (ibid.). The state discourse of xenophobia is to be found in: an ambivalence towards migration by SA politicians and sometimes even blatant xenophobic attitudes; repeated claims of unnecessary questioning or harassment of migrants by the SA police and officials of Home Affairs; and the harsh and often illegal conditions and treatment that migrants are exposed to at the Lindela repatriation centre, amongst others. The idea is that the state is trying to protect ‘Fortress South Africa’ from hordes of unwanted migrants (Crush, 1999). The discourse of exceptionalism is rooted in the idea that SA is in, but not of Africa; that SA’s ‘intellectual and cultural frame of reference is in the USA or Europe’ and not Africa (Neocosmos, 2008: 590). The discourse of indigenousness is based on the ‘dominant perception that indigeneity is the only way to acquire resources, jobs, and all other goodies that should be reserved for the native peoples only. This necessarily leads to a debate on who is more indigenous, and hence to nativism, the view that there is an essence of South Africanness that is to be found in natives’ (Neocosmos, 2008: 591).

Data extracted from the longitudinal national survey administered by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) at IDASA between 1997 and 2000, and again in 2006, suggests that levels of xenophobia in SA have remained high as democracy has progressed, and are not diminishing, as might have been expected (Crush, 2000; IDASA, 2008). There are also regular isolated attacks on foreigners that range in seriousness and are widespread (IDASA, 2008: 9). Although the Aliens Control Act of 1991 was ultimately repealed in 2002, and was replaced by the
Immigration Amendment Act in 2005, some academics continued to argue that not enough had been done to break with the past (Crush and Dodson, 2007). Given these trends, it is not too far-fetched to suggest that the attacks of May 2008 were predictable, even expected, especially with the sudden influx of Zimbabweans into SA in early 2008 (Chapter 6; 7.4.1).

The attacks therefore exposed a major faultline between, on the one hand, the growing discourse of xenophobia in SA, and on the other, the regional geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses propounded by the government-business-media (GBM) complex in the interests of capital accumulation. As noted in Chapter 1, the dominant geopolitical ‘script’ articulated through the GBM complex is centred on the mutual benefits of regional integration. The ethos of ‘mutual reciprocity’ underlying regional integration is a necessary condition for a sub-imperial state’s capital accumulation within a ‘fixed space’. Following the logic of Harvey (2005: 39), in order to develop consent within a regionally-defined fixed space the dominant state ‘must at least…make a claim that it is acting in the general interest plausible to others even when, as most people suspect, it is acting out of narrow self-interest. This is what exercising leadership through consent is all about’. Consistent with the popularised ideas of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ and later the ‘African Renaissance’, discursive instruments employed by SA state and corporate elite members promoted a discourse of multiculturalism, tolerance and democratic ideals. This formed part of the attempts of the SA state and corporate elite members to project the country as a regional leader on issues of inequality, development and human rights in multilateral fora and through the hosting of major UN conferences, such as the 2000 World Conference Against Xenophobia, Racism and Related Intolerances. However, the xenophobia attacks of May 2008 resulted in much regional resistance with significant consequences for SA’s GBM complex. The
reactions to the attacks and the resistance elicited, were typical examples of counter-imperialist discourses directed at SA.

This chapter draws from both interview and media material. The methods and approaches to the interviews were discussed in Chapter 2. The section of the questionnaire dealing with the xenophobia attacks was structured in the same way as the sections pertaining to the previous two chapters (see appendix A, questions 36 to 44).

The interview material was supplemented with thorough media searches in countries belonging to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). These searches focused on the three-month period from April to June 2008. Although xenophobia-motivated attacks are a common occurrence in SA, the events commonly known as the ‘xenophobia attacks’ started on 11 May 2008 and continued for just over three weeks. The SA media searches were conducted through the SA Media database. More general internet searches were also conducted. The searches for regional news media (media outside of SA) were initially restricted to the two primary case study countries of Botswana and Zambia, using the AllAfrica.com archives and searching individual newspapers’ websites. However, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi were also included in the search because the citizens of these three countries were the most heavily affected by the attacks. The Zimbabwean media sources derived from the AllAfrica.com archives were substantial and the comparative experience from previous chapters suggested that an exhaustive search of individual Zimbabwean newspapers’ websites would yield little or no additional sources. As with the Zimbabwe case study in Chapter 6, the Mozambican media were disappointing in their coverage of the event. I therefore decided to supplement the Mozambican news sources with articles produced by the United Nations Integrated and Regional Information Networks (IRIN) and media derived from other countries. The coverage by the Malawian media was also
disappointing and yielded nothing of significance. Attempts to contact the newspapers proved unsuccessful. Malawi is therefore largely excluded from this analysis. Yet the exclusion of Malawi is adequately compensated for by the other four SADC case studies.

The attacks were not restricted to the citizens of SADC countries. The media material gathered through AllAfrica.com suggested that for a full assessment of the impact of the xenophobia attacks on SA’s GBM complex, states outside of SADC would have to be included. Although the current study focuses on the SADC region, note must be taken of media debates and strong responses in Nigeria and Kenya regarding the attacks. Media material from these countries was derived from AllAfrica.com. Although not featuring strongly in regional media debates, Somalian shop-owners in SA were also heavily affected and Somalians are perhaps the most consistently persecuted nationality in SA. The inclusion of Somalian government and organised business responses presented various challenges and was not feasible as a sustained case study, not least because of the ongoing civil war in that country. Nonetheless, a search of the English-language Somali media was conducted with partial success. In light of the limited media evidence and lack of formal government and business responses from Somalia, Kenyan media have also been used as they are heavily syndicated throughout East Africa.

This chapter will set out the regional responses from government, business and media and the implications of the xenophobia attacks for SA’s regional standing.

7.2 Background to the attacks

There was much speculation in the media about the reasons for the attacks. Most analyses tend to draw a link between poor provision and planning by government for
SA’s poor, and the increased number of Zimbabwean migrants in SA after the failed March 2008 election (Chapter 6).

7.2.1 Failures by government

The mob mentality which pervaded the attacks was based on the perception within poor communities that immigrants – who are not legally entitled to access certain social welfare benefits unless they have a permanent resident permit – manage to secure employment, access to housing and other resources at the expense of locals. Foreigners are often blamed for the real or imagined problems experienced by those in extreme poverty. Foreigners become a convenient scapegoat for the woes of the poor. This is notwithstanding a criminal element which used the attacks as an opportunity to steal and vandalise. Although in a causal sense, it is difficult to disentangle those attackers who genuinely felt hatred towards foreigners, and mere opportunists, the net result is the same. An article published by IRIN noted:

*The violence in Alexandra allegedly began after a community meeting to address social problems in the area. The local policing forum's [Thomas Sithole, Chairman of the Alexandra Community Policing Forum] claimed that ‘criminals were hiding behind xenophobia and organised the mob to be able to steal and loot’ (IRIN, 2008b).*

Many suggested there was some level of orchestration in the attacks. They pointed out that the violence spread quickly and widely, and that the attacks were of a particularly bloody nature. Community leaders from NGOs and churches played a crucial role in managing the situation on the ground and providing some kind of initial explanation as to what was going on. Bishop Paul Verryn of the Central Methodist Church reportedly stated that the attacks were ‘too targeted and too accurate to be just a xenophobic kick into space’ (Browde and Rabkin, 2008). Verryn added that another
clergyman ‘had seen two people in Carletonville being paid to commit acts of violence on the East Rand, and then being "chaperoned" by the police’ (ibid.).

There were also reports that a warning had been sent to the Department of Foreign Affairs. A month before the attacks African ambassadors had allegedly become aware of xenophobic pamphlets being handed-out. These pamphlets warned foreigners to leave SA or be killed (Fabricius and Gerardy, 2008). However, President Mbeki had denied this claim (Mwaura, 2008).

Although the term 'xenophobia attacks' quickly became an umbrella term for the violence, closer inspection suggests that the phrase was perhaps slightly misleading given that up to a third of the people killed were not foreigners. As Tula Dlamini (04/02/09), a Zimbabwean national working for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), contended: 'There was a lot of inaccuracy in the coverage of the attacks and the whole definition of what happened may have been displaced. It was a conflict [over] resources targeted at difference not necessarily [at] foreigners. For example, a person from the Eastern Cape in Alexandra is seen as different'. Dlamini (04/02/09) further contended that ‘intra-fighting between Zimbabwean people [was] mistakenly perceived as xenophobia attacks [but was really driven by] ethnic nationalism between the Ndebele and Tsonga’. The focus on ‘difference’ determined by ethnicity and geography was echoed by Peter Kagwanja, a Director in the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of SA and President of the African Policy Institute (Nairobi/Pretoria). Writing in the popular media in his native country, Kenya, he noted:

*South Africa's ethnic groups bordering "Africa" or who straddle the border with Zimbabwe and Mozambique such as the Pedi, Venda, Tsonga and Shangaan became fair game for xenophobic attackers...Gauteng is filled with migrant labourers from the Eastern Cape (Xhosa) and KwaZulu-Natal (Zulu), who might come under attack...for "stealing" the jobs of Gauteng locals. Ethnicity featured in attacks in Atteridgeville, a mostly Sotho-speaking area, with reports of Nguni speakers being chased away* (Kagwanja, 2008a).
This fuelled the idea that a so-called ‘third force’ was involved in the attacks, a force vaguely similar to the one which was believed to have stoked much of the violence between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) during the negotiations for a democratic SA. The reference to a third force was made by Essop Pahad, Minister in the Presidency and a key ‘spin doctor’ for the GBM complex (3.4.1). He likened these ‘sinister’ forces to elements inside and outside the former apartheid government. Such forces were believed to be trying to take advantage of the volatile situation in both the country and the region (Fabricius, 2008). It is highly likely that suggestions of a ‘third force’ being involved were just the government’s attempt to deflect attention away from its failures. As Arthur Mutambara (2008), the leader of the breakaway MDC faction in Zimbabwe, noted: ‘Even if such actors existed they would simply be taking advantage of systemic and structural policy failures...’

The broader leadership struggle in the ANC added to the volatile political situation in the country. This struggle stemmed from as early as 2004 and culminated in the Polokwane conference of 2007 when the then embattled President Mbeki was replaced by the populist Jacob Zuma as leader of the ANC. The idea was that Mbeki was to remain president of the country and Zuma was to be president of the ANC until the elections in April 2009, when it was believed Zuma would ascend to the presidency (3.5). However, the dual centres of power had created a ‘palpable power vacuum’ in SA in early 2008 (Kagwanja, 2008b). The influential SA Business Day described Mbeki as ‘a lame-duck president’ after the Polokwane conference as the real power had already shifted to Zuma (Omarjee, 2008). A front-page editorial in SA's Sunday Times said Mbeki ‘no longer ha[d] the heart to lead’ (quoted in Mwaura, 2008). The lack of strong and clear leadership in government during that period appeared to
support the idea that government was incapable of providing sufficient services to the poor and that the internal workings of government had possibly become slightly dysfunctional.

The slow delivery of government-built housing, or the manner in which the housing policy was being implemented, was one area of policy failure often cited as a major underlying reason for the attacks. This was particularly the case in situations where foreign nationals had been living in the country for many years and had received low cost housing ahead of SA nationals, as was the case in Alexandra where the violence initially erupted. Shortly after the violence the Gauteng housing department revealed a report to the legislature’s housing portfolio committee. This report stated that the ‘RDP houses’ in Alexandra, so named after the Reconstruction and Development Programme from which the policy originated, were officially allocated to people who are not SA citizens, but hold permanent resident status. The report said that in seven cases houses were allocated to people born in Mozambique and Zimbabwe and who had permanent residency (La Grange, 2008). In terms of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 those with permanent resident permits are technically entitled to housing.

There were further issues caused by South Africans who were allocated RDP houses and illegally renting them out to foreigners or other South Africans. Renting or selling of the property is prohibited for the first eight years of occupation. An investigation by The Star newspaper had shown that of the 19 houses allocated to South Africans in Alexandra's Extension 7, only 2 houses were being occupied by the South Africans allocated the houses (Radler, 2008).

In addition, what proved particularly problematic when trying to understand the causality behind the attacks were the links between the xenophobia attacks and the ‘service delivery protests’ which had become a regular feature of the SA political
landscape – and which were sometimes violent, such as the uprisings in Kathlehong in 2006. Although different, there were also striking similarities between the service delivery protests and the xenophobia attacks. As the United Democratic Movement (UDM) leader, Bantu Holomisa, stated:

*The common denominator between the recent violence and the unrest of the past few years is the hatred, anger and violence displayed by people. It surprised many that the government seemingly did not want to know who was behind the violence or expose the group or those individuals* (Holomisa, 2008).

The core of the violence is similar to the situation which has triggered the service delivery protests of the past few years, namely, the deep and growing dissatisfaction amongst SA’s chronically poor communities with the lack of improvement in the quality of their lives since democracy was attained. The xenophobia attacks should also be interpreted as part of a broader strategy adopted by such communities to communicate to government their dissatisfaction with their quality of life.

Therefore, with hindsight, the underlying reasons for the violence were clear: government’s failure to provide an effective safety net for the poor; competition over housing and social welfare; high unemployment; and resentment by local residents towards foreigners in townships and settlements, given escalating prices for food, accommodation and electricity. This was all happening at a time when government was seen as being increasingly unresponsive, lacking leadership and corrupt. Corruption in the Department of Home Affairs enabled foreign nationals to purchase SA identity documents and compete against South Africans on equal terms. This further compounded the latter’s frustration (Laurence, 2008). Tragically, however, the plight of SA’s poor and marginalised was largely overshadowed by the sheer horror of the event, partly deflecting attention away from the real issues (Dlamini, 04/02/09).
7.3 The xenophobia attacks

The violence started in Johannesburg in the informal settlement of Alexandra. People started going from door-to-door of RDP houses, demanding to see SA identity documents. Residents were forced to respond very quickly. SA nationals were also trying to stop the mob from coming into their homes. At that stage the mob predominantly used steel poles as weapons (Oatway, 2008).

The assumption was that Zimbabweans were living in RDP houses. There was an initial mob of about 300 to 400 people. Later on in the first week the violence spread through Diepsloot in Northern Johannesburg. During the first week there were not many fatalities, but many injuries and severe damage to property. Suspects of xenophobia were not to be given bail (ibid.).

What began as sporadic albeit serious acts of violence against African migrants, quickly escalated into a sustained assault throughout the greater Johannesburg area (Hartley, R. 2008). During the second week the violence had reached Thokoza, Ramaphosa (Reiger Park), Tembisa and Cleveland (see figure 7.1 below). It was chaotic and spread quickly. There was a general state of chaos as looters and vandals took advantage of the situation (Hartley, R. 2008).

As the violence spread throughout the deeply poor communities in Johannesburg, it was clear that xenophobia had become the 'new apartheid' and the perpetrators were the old victims of apartheid living in poverty in the ‘new’ SA (Johwa, 2008). The police were struggling to control the situation and quickly had to step up their efforts, with a few heroic police officials brave enough to confront the mob and try to aid in the evacuation of foreigners. Foreigners abandoned their homes and possessions seeking safety at police stations and civic centres.
When the violence got to Ramaphosa informal settlement in Reiger Park, east of Johannesburg, it took on a particularly brutal nature. At that stage there was a discernible difference between the service delivery protests and the ongoing violence. During the service delivery protests people would normally throw stones and bricks – but in the xenophobia attacks people were heavily armed. The worst affected informal settlements were by then resembling war zones and the police were firing live rounds (Oatway, 2008).

The sheer horror of the situation was captured by the shocking image of a Mozambican man burning in Rhamaphosa. In a protest move, The Times (SA) placed the picture of the burning man on its front page. The editor, Ray Hartley (05/02/09), stated in an interview: ‘The move was intended to give a wake-up call to the government that until then had been denying there was a problem’. The image was beamed around the world and invoked an international outcry.
Although many theories were advanced to explain the rapidly spreading attacks, it appeared that the media inadvertently played a role in spreading the violence throughout the country (see 7.7.6). This was perhaps clearest when the attacks rapidly spread to other provinces in the second week. But could this also have been the work of more organised forces? Similar attacks varying in intensity and scale were reported in all but one of the nine provinces.

Figure 7.2: Migrations and xenophobia attacks of May 2008 in South Africa*

The government had clearly lost control of the situation and the matter became an issue of national security. President Mbeki called in the army and the National Intelligence Service to assist the SA police. Yet with the top three politicians out of the

*Xenophobia attacks of May 2008 are indicated by red dots.
Source: Pravettoni, 2010
country at the time, it took national government a long time to grasp the gravity of the situation. As one citizen frustrated by the slow response from government commented: 'We find our government quick to dispatch peacekeeping forces elsewhere in Africa, but when violence escalates to unbearable levels at home, we use the wait and see approach' (Hoosen, 2008).

After about two weeks the attacks subsided. This was partly due to swift intervention by NGOs and the business sector in partnership with local and provincial governments (Xinwa, 18/11/08). National government was still seen as being unresponsive (O’ Sullivan, 05/02/09). NGOs and big business quickly stepped in to help care for the thousands of displaced people in the hastily assembled repatriation centres.

The government had chosen to pursue a strategy of reintegration for the displaced people, particularly in Gauteng and the Western Cape Provinces (Joubert et al., 2008). Yet, reintegration was to prove particularly difficult and dangerous for those involved. There were reports of those trying to return home to restart their lives and resume running their businesses, being killed upon their return (Joubert, 2008).

Just before troops were to be removed from the affected areas, Mbeki apologised at a national tribute to the victims of xenophobic violence and encouraged South Africans to behave in the spirit of 'ubuntu' (see 7.7.3 for definition): 'Never again will we allow anybody to bring shame to our nation by betraying the values of ubuntu and committing crimes against our visitors and travellers' (Mbanjwa, 2008). Among the dead, 25 were undocumented people – who could possibly have been illegal immigrants not identified at that stage. More than 1,400 people were arrested on charges ranging from murder to arson (ibid.).
7.4 Chasing foreigners away: Displacement of regional migrants

7.4.1 States belonging to SADC

Estimates of the number of Zimbabweans in SA at the time of the attacks ranged from one million to more than three million (IRIN, 2008a). The SA government had no coherent immigration policy towards Zimbabwe. Immigrants from Zimbabwe should have been given refugee status. This would have afforded them the necessary rights and have their status in the country officially recognised. Yet the SA government was hesitant to admit the full extent of the Zimbabwean crisis and such rights could not be afforded (Sparks, 2008). The majority of Zimbabweans displaced by xenophobic violence chose to flee to other SADC countries rather than return home. The Red Cross estimated that 25,000 Zimbabweans entered Zambia as a result of the attacks (Lusaka Times, 2008f). The Red Cross never specified the route they took. Presumably they would have been hesitant to go via Zimbabwe having left there because of political persecution, and would have instead chosen to go via the Botswana-Zambia crossing. However, estimates of displacement patterns are seldom that precise and the accuracy of this claim is questionable. This figure was rightfully queried by the Zambian government. Further estimates suggest that 5,500 Zimbabweans fled to Mozambique and 342 were received in centres near the border with Botswana (ibid.). Only 2,300 Zimbabweans voluntarily registered to return home (Maodza, 2008). This does not include the number of undocumented people who returned to Zimbabwe. On 4 June at least twelve Zimbabweans had been identified among the 62 people killed in SA (Maodza, 2008), a number which is likely to have grown as the identities of the deceased became known. About five days after the violence had erupted, the Zimbabwean Embassy in SA started to assist its displaced nationals (The Herald, 2008c). Despite the Zimbabwean government being in a state of disorder on account of
the inconclusive result of the March election, it was to coordinate the evacuation. Towards the end of May the Zimbabwean government sent 10 buses and 2 trucks to repatriate 1,000 Zimbabweans from the Johannesburg area (The Herald, 2008d). Evacuation of 2,000 Zimbabweans from Cape Town and 300 from Durban, was to follow (Maodza, 2008).

Some estimates suggest that 50,000 out of 60,000 Mozambican residents in SA were repatriated during the attacks (Chileshe, 2008). By mid-June, officials in Maputo put the number of Mozambicans killed at 23 (Valy, 2008). Towards the end of May the Mozambican government’s evacuation of its nationals from SA commenced. The evacuation was coordinated through the Mozambican embassy, which also provided temporary shelter and other assistance (IRIN, 2008d). Mozambique's Institute for the Management of Calamities (INGC) coordinated the transport for the returnees and set up a resettlement centre (IRIN, 2008c). The Mozambican government declared a state of emergency to deal with the sudden return of so many of its nationals (Fauvet, 2008).

Far fewer Botswanan and Zambian citizens were directly affected by the violence. This was ostensibly because many are professionals or students and would not have been based in areas heavily affected. However, the students felt vulnerable, particularly those studying in Kwazulu-Natal and easily identifiable as foreigners because they could not speak Zulu (Chileshe, 2008; Botswana Gazette, 2008c). On 26 May it was reported that a Botswanan train was attacked by a mob at Mmega village near Ramatlabama border post (Legodimo, 2008). There were no reports of government-led mass evacuations for Botswanan citizens.

The violence against Zambian citizens started as isolated incidents. On 22 May reports surfaced of at least two Zambian families affected by the violence (Lusaka Times, 2008g; Times of Zambia, 2008j). However, at the end of May an on-the-spot
check suggested that 57 Zambians victims were sheltering at police stations and churches throughout the greater Johannesburg area (ibid.). By the beginning of June this number had swollen to 149 (Lusaka Times, 2008h). However, only 77 out of those affected had expressed a desire to return home; others had decided to wait, hoping to resume the running of their businesses once the violence was over (Lusaka Times, 2008i; Chisamba, 2008). The Zambian High Commission in conjunction with local bus companies in SA facilitated the return of those who were willing (Lusaka Times, 2008h).

7.4.2 States beyond SADC

Nigerians were mostly affected in the Johannesburg suburbs such as Hillbrow and Yeoville where many own businesses (Akinsanmi, 2008). On the 20 May it was reported that ‘scores’ of Nigerians displaced by the attacks had besieged the Nigerian Consulate in Johannesburg for help, saying they had lost all their possessions following the attacks (Komolafe, 2008). Nigerians were also attacked in the Cape Town suburb of Philippi where acts of retaliation ensued, killing at least one of the attackers (Ohia, 2008a). Although no Nigerian was among those killed, many lost property or had their shops looted (Taiwo, 2008). Despite this no government-led mass evacuation was reported.

An estimated 20,000 Kenyans work, study and do business in SA. Shortly after the violence ensued, the government was in touch with the Kenyan High Commissioner, who issued an alert that Kenyans should operate in groups for their safety (Opondo et al., 2008). Kenyans were being asked to be careful in malls and when using public transport, and to avoid walking aimlessly in town (ibid.). The Kenyan High Commissioner, Mr Tom Amolo, was himself confronted by the mob. Police had to fire
rubber bullets at the mob to rescue the envoy and his team of mission officials (Mugwang'a and Wachira, 2008). The government asked those doing business in the affected towns to close down their shops (ibid.). By the 24 May mobs were burning Kenyans’ shops as violence spread to Cape Town (Mathenge and agencies, 2008). By the beginning of June a total of 424 Kenyans had been repatriated by the government. Those who had returned would be issued with return air tickets once the situation had stabilised. Some stayed behind to monitor the situation rather than return home (Shiundu, 2008). The government had set aside enough money to evacuate all the 20,000 Kenyans in SA should it be necessary (Mathenge and Mugwang'a, 2008).

7.5 Government responses

The national responses to the xenophobia attacks raise several questions: how did the xenophobia attacks affect power relations between SA and the region? how did governments communicate with each other and with their respective citizenries concerning the xenophobia attacks? how did events challenge or reinforce existing power relations in southern Africa? Two main issues emerged from the interview and media material. The first issue deals with the weak responses from SADC governments to the events in SA. The second issue concerns the poor response from the SA government, given the severity of the attacks.

7.5.1 SADC’s weak response

Whilst in principle, regional governments and politicians strongly condemned the attacks, there was little active protest. This reinforced the notion of SADC being an ‘old boys’ club’ which fails to criticise member states and refuses to hold them accountable. SADC politicians therefore tended to have ‘empathy with the SA government’
regarding the situation (Games, 03/02/09). Consistent with what is often described as 'African diplomacy', SADC heads of state were effectively seen as 'being too polite' and having their 'kid gloves' on when dealing with the matter (Chirwa, 27/01/09). None of the regional politicians were particularly critical, except perhaps those from Mozambique (Fabricius, 03/02/09).

In Mozambique President Armando Guebuza urged his people ‘not to react with hatred’; however rumours were circulating that the SA High Commission in Maputo would be attacked and that vehicles with SA registrations should be stoned (Fauvet, 2008). Lidia Geremias, a parliamentary deputy of the ruling Frelimo Party and elected by Mozambicans living in the diaspora, called on the SA government ‘to contain the situation as rapidly as possible, and to launch civic education in love for one's neighbour among the public’ (AIM, 2008). The idea that SA owes Africa a debt of gratitude for the times when it was supported by Africa in the struggle against apartheid was particularly prevalent. Geremias added: ‘[o]ur fellow countrymen often paid the highest price, that of their own lives, for this historic solidarity and friendship’ (ibid.)

In Zimbabwe, the media material suggests that the government-owned Herald was trying its best to disentangle the events in Zimbabwe from those in SA. In one column it stated (Zvayi, 2008):

_The xenophobia is not being reported for what it is...Suddenly all the immigrants are "desperate Zimbabweans"..."fleeing Mugabe's misrule"...South Africa is a preferred destination for immigrants...many of whom pass through Zimbabwe en route to South Africa._

The state media in Zimbabwe also erroneously claimed that the violence in SA was instigated by the MDC who wanted its supporters ‘to return home and vote for Tsvangirai’ (The Herald, 2008e).
In Botswana the attacks were seen as being symptomatic of a broader regional problem linked directly to the Zimbabwean crisis. However, despite the Botswanan government’s outspoken stance on the Zimbabwean crisis in general, the government was quiet on the issue. According to Mosetsanangape Maribe (01/12/08), Head of News and Current Affairs for Botswana Television (BTV), the newsroom had ‘tried to get a reaction from government, but government was silent. Government did not feel obliged to comment because Botswanan people were not hurt’.

Elite members in Botswana saw the attacks as the result of the SA government’s failure to take a strong stance on Zimbabwe and regulate the flow of people into the country. Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08), Director in the Bank of Gaborone, stated outright that ‘[b]order control was lax [and] people flocked in’. Ambassador Zibane Ntakhwana (28/11/08), Director of the Africa and Asia Development Desk in the Botswanan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, believed that regional governments were ‘a bit cagey’ in their response. Outsa Mokone (27/11/08), editor of the Sunday Standard, believed that ‘most regional governments did not want to fall out with [the SA] government’ and were therefore careful in their criticism.

The Botswanan media material also indicated that there were no strong and specific government responses directed at the attacks. President Ian Khama was silent on the issue. It was reported that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joeseph Skelemani, had travelled to Johannesburg to assess the situation. Yet still no form of condemnation emerged (Botswana Gazette, 2008c).

The Zambian government was more outspoken, although not very critical. The president appealed in the Zambian media to South Africans, ‘to reflect if their behaviour [was] in line with African unity’; he also commented that ‘South Africans may appear
to be clever but in future they would need SADC assistance and it would be bad if they were shunned’ (Times of Zambia, 2008k).

Elite responses in Zambia suggest a certain frankness and critical reflection regarding the attacks. Juliana Mwila (23/01/09), Director of Press and Planning who is based in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and is Zambia’s Head of SADC, believed that ‘SA was unreasonable, in light of expectations about them joining the regional block, [as the attacks demonstrated that they are] not accepting of regional integration. It is the difference between rhetoric and democracy on the ground – the double face of SA’. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09), Executive Secretary of the Zambian Chamber of Small and Medium Business Associations, believed that regional politicians were ‘disturbed and scared’ and were worried that ‘if it [could] happen in SA it [could] happen anywhere’. Muletambo Lingela (23/1/09), Broadcasting and Information Manager for MISA in Zambia, believed that ‘[p]rominent regional leaders condemned what was going on’.

Stronger criticism tended to come from beyond the SADC states, primarily from states such as Nigeria and Kenya who have, relatively speaking, greater business interests in SA than most SADC states. In 2008 Nigeria was SA’s biggest economic partner with a two-way trade of R17 billion (Warby, 2008). It had the largest number of bilateral agreements with SA compared to any other country (ibid.). Nigeria is one of only six countries with which SA has a Bi-National Business Commission as a forum for discussion (Games, 2008). Incidentally, the high-powered commission had its seventh meeting in Abuja during May 2008. The last meeting took place four years prior. Addressing the commission the SA Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngucka who was also leading the delegation, stated that ‘I cannot believe that the issue is about
jobs…I can say that South Africans have always appreciated the hospitality shown them during the dark days of apartheid' (Opara, 2008).

The meeting preceded a planned visit by the Nigerian President, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, to SA at the beginning of June (incidentally, at the time of some of the attacks). However, shortly before the state visit the Nigerian government sent a communique to the SA government, seeking compensation for the victims of the violence. Nigeria was the first African nation to ask for compensation (Oyedele, 2008).

The sub-text was that the Nigerian government, more so than SADC states and possibly any other African state, was powerful enough to summon the SA government to account. The respect held for Nigeria and the importance of their economic relationship became further apparent when the SA president extended ‘an unreserved apology’ to the Nigerian president upon his arrival in SA (Taiwo et al., 2008).

As noted in Chapter 1, Nigeria is a regional power in its own right and, although not having as developed or sophisticated an economy as SA, it has significant clout concerning debates on identity and ‘moralistic’ issues between African states, as some form of ‘authentic’ spokesperson on the continent. Bluntly stated, Nigeria is often positioned as Africa’s hegemon in a socio-cultural sense, whilst SA is Africa’s economic hegemon.

The sub-text of much of the Nigerian media discourse during the state visit was that Nigeria was seen as a ‘moral keeper’ for Africa and that SA was thereby morally obliged to apologise to Nigeria which it did. There was no evidence of such an apology being tendered to individual SADC states which were, relatively speaking, more severely affected by the attacks. Mbeki had apologised to the families of the victims, and made a more general apology.
At diplomatic level, the SA government needed the support of the Nigerian and the Kenyan governments to ‘sell the idea of an African Renewal’ to Africa beyond SADC. This raises the importance of a Pretoria-Abuja-Nairobi triangle for SA’s ambitions. The Mbeki-led vision of an African Renaissance rested on consent as well as alliances with these major African powers, thereby creating conditions favourable for its capital accumulation throughout greater Africa – and as supported by NEPAD. During his visit, the Nigerian president assured the SA parliament that ‘Nigeria and…South Africa are inextricably bound by the historical forces of…Africa's regeneration and repositioning…’, further adding that the two countries had a ‘moral responsibility’ to develop the continent (Aliyu, 2008). The speaker of the SA parliament, Mbete Baleka, reciprocated by saying that ‘South Africa and Nigeria share the vision of an African renewal’. Further adding that ‘African renewal is…an enterprise in which Nigeria is giving leadership…’ (Taiwo, 2008). However, despite the apologies from the SA government and the importance of Nigeria’s support, the SA government never did pay compensation to the victims (The Star, 2008).

A strong response also came from the Kenyan government. Much like Nigeria, Kenya is also viewed as a regional power. The Kenyan media material suggests that the Kenyan government’s response to the crisis also operated within a discourse of SA’s ‘moral debt’ accumulated during apartheid. The Kenyan Foreign Affairs Minister, Moses Wetang’ula, contended: ‘South Africa is the other fence of Africa, which has greener pasture, and the behaviour of the South Africans is a betrayal of the liberation struggle…’ (Opondo et al., 2008). Following Nigeria’s example, the Kenyan government sent a communique to the SA government asking for compensation for the victims affected by the violence (Mugwang’a, 2008a). However, the SA government failed to pay compensation (Nzioka and Shiundu, 2008).
For these substantial African powers the issue of compensation was clearly linked to SA’s quest to continue to play a moral leadership role in Africa. But SA chose not to pay, an issue which had great political consequences in the Kenyan media, as captured by the following article (Mwaura, 2008):

_Only compensation will serve to relieve some of the pain and suffering...It is a cost that cannot be discounted politically. There is no way South Africa can continue to play the Big Brother role in Africa unless it squares up...And there is no way President Mbeki can meaningfully continue championing his "Ubuntu" and "African Renaissance" cause without squaring up. He cannot have his cake and eat it._

### 7.5.2 Poor response from the South African government

Much of the reputational damage over the attacks was caused by the generally slow response from the SA national government and its inability to bring the attackers under control. The sub-text in much of the media discourse was that the SA government did not want to recognise the full extent of the attacks because they played into a broader pattern of ‘typical’ service delivery protests. The more government responded and therefore acknowledged the problem, the greater the admission of its own shortcomings. All this happened shortly before an election, and there was a growing restlessness amongst the poor. The ANC, furthermore, had a leadership struggle on its hands. Given all this, the last thing the ANC needed were the xenophobic attacks (Odirile, 25/11/08). As Amos Sakazhila (22/01/09), Operations Manager for Multichoice in Zambia, noted on the matter: ‘The ANC didn’t manage its affairs very well. The people were frustrated as they didn’t create jobs…Government didn’t address the root cause of the problem’.

Therefore, much of media alluded to the fact that the SA government attempted to downplay and cover-up the extent of the attacks for as long as it could until it escalated to unbearable levels. However, by then it was largely too late as the damage had already been done.
During the attacks the Nigerian media, particularly the dailies *This Day*, *Vanguard* and *Leadership*, played an activist role in lobbying their government into action. They exposed the SA government’s poor response. More concerned reports emerged around 20 May after violence had spread to central Johannesburg and when it had become clear that the situation was getting out of hand. Victor Ogugbue, a shop-owner who had his shop looted in downtown Johannesburg, was quoted in the *Vanguard* as stating (Komolafe, 2008): ‘We are…appealing to the Nigerian government to come to our rescue as these South Africans are continuing with their attacks’.

These concerns led *Leadership* (2008) to publish a strong editorial titled ‘Bring them home’ in which it encouraged the government to repatriate its citizens and not only to engage SA diplomatically. In the same issue *Leadership* ran with another article in which they quoted the Nigerian Labour Congress as stating: ‘[w]e are especially outraged by the massive scale of attacks and the apparent leisurely response of the law enforcement agencies, who seemed unable to muster the will to apprehend the savage attacks…’ (ibid.)

Caroline Creasey (16/11/08), Head of Corporate Affairs for Multichoice Africa who travels regularly to Nigeria, believed that ‘[t]he inability of the government to gain control of the situation shook confidence in [the SA] government’. Not only was there concern about the inability of the authorities to gain control of the situation, but the sub-text in much of the media was that the officials were complicit in the violence. An angry article in *This Day* (2008a) recorded:

> Agonisingly, the death toll...has been rising despite assurances by the South African government to check it...Most of the killings were reported to have taken place under the nose of the South African police...Are we to believe that the situation is beyond the control of the South African law-enforcement agencies?
The SA government’s denial of the severity of the situation lasted for at least two weeks after it finally realised the political costs of not acknowledging what was happening. The army was deployed. A cabinet level inter-ministerial task team called an emergency meeting on the 26 May and developed a five-point action plan. Mbeki appeared on television the same day (This Day, 2008b), but by then it was generally considered too late. An article in This Day (ibid.) concluded as follows:

*The response of President Mbeki’s government when it eventually came sounded firm. In reality, it was inexplicably slow, ponderous, and inadequate.*

Another article in *This Day* (Ohia, 2008b) described the televised address by Mbeki as doing nothing ‘to silence critics who have pointed out that he has still to visit any of the affected areas’. After the televised address Mbeki promptly left the country for a conference in Japan, and left his spokesperson to defend the government’s reaction. A report in the SA *Business Day* (Omarjee, 2008) later stated that since the violence erupted ‘19 days ago’ Mbeki has been in ‘Japan, Tanzania and Mozambique’ and that ‘[n]ot even deploying the army to help quell the mayhem gave Mbeki cause to pause’. As the outspoken political commentator, Max du Preez (2008), noted: ‘At least we saw Jacob Zuma and his supporters talking to people in the townships. Mbeki was somewhere else and his cabinet members were in hiding’.

The Kenyan media material demonstrates a similar critical assessment of the inadequate response from the SA government. An article in *The Nation* made the point that ‘[t]he government is accused…of wasting time before eventually deploying the army…By all accounts, the governmental authorities were negligent’ (Mwaura, 2008).

As a quantitative indicator, the respondents were asked if they thought the SA government’s response was adequate given the severity of the attacks. 71% felt that the government’s response was inadequate, 7% were neutral and only 20% thought it was
adequate. The results by country demonstrate that in Botswana 80% felt that the government’s response was inadequate with most respondents thinking that the government took too long to address the crisis and had a fairly ‘delayed’ and ‘casual’ attitude when it did, and that the government should have spoken out openly against the attacks. In Zambia, 70% thought that the response of the SA government was inadequate given the severity of the attacks and in SA itself 64% thought that government's response was inadequate.

Clearly the SA government had tried to make an educational or public awareness intervention (Dlamini, 04/02/09). However, these interventions were seen as being reactive and slow in coming. The cumulative effect was that the SA national government's efforts were mostly seen as ‘propaganda and PR and did very little on the ground’ (Mokone, 27/11/08). Responses from local and provincial governments, not to mention the many NGOs and businesses that got involved, were seen as being much more swift and meaningful (O'Sullivan, 05/02/09).

7.6 Regional business responses

At its core, the attacks were a strong indictment of the elitist and exploitative nature of the GBM complex: the current state and corporate elite members continue to benefit from an uneven regional economy, which is now reinforced by the ANC neo-liberal macro-economic policies. The historical regional patterns of capital accumulation have been further entrenched in the post-apartheid period. The regional poor get poorer; and a few, mostly South African and often state-connected people, continue to benefit. As a result, business also provided a significant pressure point in placing pressure on regional governments. Accordingly two major areas will be discussed. They are: the effects of
the attacks on regional businesses in SA and the impact of the attacks on SA businesses in the region.

7.6.1 The effects of the attacks on regional businesses in South Africa

According to Rob Davies (27/03/08), SA’s Minister of Trade and Industry, regional businesses were ‘very badly affected [but there were] not many big businesses [from other African countries] in SA’. This is especially the case in respect of SADC countries. The majority of Mozambican nationals are blue collar employees. Estimates suggest that there are 54,000 Mozambicans with legally recognised work contracts working in SA mines (AIM, 21 May 2008). Zimbabweans range from blue collar employees to those holding more skilled positions attained on account of their historically strong education system and ability to speak English well. Botswanans who are working in SA are generally in skilled or semi-skilled positions (7.4.1). The same is true for Zambians. However, there was a larger number of business people from SADC countries who typically go to SA to buy goods to sell at home (Chisenga, 22/01/09).

According to Shupi Mweene (29/01/09), Programme Officer in Zambia’s Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, the people who commute to SA to buy goods for their Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) were advised not to go for that period.

Although the attacks were initially directed at Zimbabweans and Mozambicans, they soon escalated to include most African foreigners. But the fact remains that certain nationalities were targeted more severely and frequently on account of their open presence in SA business, and especially those running businesses in the affected communities.

The majority of African-owned SMMEs in SA, are probably owned by Somalis. They have become well-known for running what are typically called spaza
shops in the informal settlements. They also operate as cigarette and sweets vendors on busy street corners. Spaza shops are small informal shops which offer basic supplies and are often run from private homes. These types of businesses were some of the primary targets of the attacks (Davies, 27/03/08). It was assumed that local business-owners may have played a role in inciting violence because the shops owned by foreigners had lower prices. The foreign business-owners were also accused of not integrating into the local culture (*Somaliland Times*, 2008). The Somali Association of South Africa (SASA) has recorded 471 fatalities in 11 years (Kagwanja, 2008c) as a result of these tensions.

The English-speaking Somali media and media material drawn from other countries suggested that Somali businesses had been especially targeted in the attacks. The specific targeting of Somalis was particularly the case in Cape Town where they are in higher concentration. On 19 May, about seven days into the attacks, it was reported that ‘30 Somali shopkeepers trading and living in Du Noon ha[d] received warning letters telling them to leave the area’ (de Vries, 2008). There were also reports of Somali shops being looted in Knysna, a resort town on the southwestern coast (Mathenge and agencies, 2008). The Somalis in SA have organised associations at local and provincial levels that represent their business interests, such as the Somali Community Board of the Western Cape. These organisations condemned the attacks, but state-level condemnation of the attacks was not evident in the media.

Kenyan businesses were also targeted during the attacks. However, within SA’s poor communities, Kenyans are far less vilified for their business practices. They are fewer than the Somalis. The Kenyan media material suggested that although Kenyan businesses were targeted in their own right (Mugwang’a, 2008b), there is a high
probability that some Kenyans were targeted precisely because they were of Somalian origin (Mugwang’a and Wachira, 2008).

Apart from the Somalis, Nigerians are probably the most persecuted nationals in SA because of their relative success in business. There is a pervasive perception that Nigerians carry cash on them or are wealthier than other African migrants (Ohia, 2008c). Nigerians, although hardworking, often find that they are perceived negatively. Such perceptions are centred on the real and imagined involvement of Nigerians in illicit industries ostensibly contributing to crime (ibid.). This accusation needs to be tested empirically. Many are well-educated, and a large number follow academic careers. Those who own businesses employ the locals.

An article in the Nigerian media outlined an unfortunate but typical experience of Nigerian night club and restaurant-owners on Jules Street in central Johannesburg. The report claimed that the owners watched as attackers ‘cart[ed] away everything in sight and destroy[ed] things they could not take away’ (Komolafe, 2008).

However, the attacks had created a strong opportunity for regional business to hold SA to account for the double standards of its business practices in Africa, especially in Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa’s biggest market with 140 million people. MTN has over 30 million subscribers in the country (Ohia, 2008a). Shoprite, Nandos and Multichoice are also prominent (Warby, 2008). A sub-text of the double standards of SA business was particularly prevalent in the Nigerian media. An opinion piece in Vanguard (Aihe, 2008) referred to the ‘sharp practices of their big businesses’ and how ‘South Africa has not repaid Nigeria with a good coin’.

In sub-section 7.5.1 the Bi-National Business Commission meeting held in Abuja during the attacks was discussed. One of the issues raised by the then Nigerian Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan, was the ‘exorbitant’ and ‘discriminatory fees’
imposed on Nigerians hoping to acquire a visa for SA (Opara, 2008). Sub-section 7.5.2 further discussed the state visit by the Nigerian president. During the Nigerian president’s visit to SA, both presidents stated that they were ‘interested in seeing Nigerian businesses more active in South Africa’ and that ‘[t]he South African government is very interested in opening the space’ (This Day, 2008c). The outcome was the establishment of a team of business people from both countries to unblock some of the problems for Nigerian businesses operating in SA.

7.6.2 The effects of the xenophobia attacks on South African businesses

The xenophobia attacks had created animosity towards SA business in the region. This was exacerbated by the fact that there was already resentment in the region regarding the extent of SA’s business penetration into African markets, whilst SA was perceived as failing to open its markets to the rest of Africa (4.3.1). A prominent sub-text of the attacks was that the strength of the SA economy was partly the result of labour extracted from the region. African migrants wanted to enjoy the hard labour of their forefathers – yet were being denied that right. The general sentiment was that the region had welcomed post-apartheid SA business – but that the invitation was not mutual. As Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09), Executive Secretary of the Zambian Chamber of Business, whose country's policies are very favourable for investors with a five-year tax break for new businesses, stated: ‘Before there was a red carpet for SA business, but now that carpet has been put aside’.

During the attacks a widely syndicated African commentator, Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, wrote that if decisive action was not taken to stop the pervasive xenophobia in SA, ‘South African businesses and other interests across Africa will soon become
legitimate targets, not just for demonstrations but campaigns of boycotts and even targets for sabotage and revenge attacks across the continent' (quoted in Games, 2008).

Yet the overwhelming response from elite members was that although SA had suffered heavy reputational damage, the region would still continue to enjoy SA goods and services. According to Diana Games (03/02/09), whilst the attacks certainly had the potential to affect the ability of SA companies to do business in the region it did not actually do so. Rob Davies (27/03/08) stated that ‘there was a fear that this would happen, but it was not serious’. The average citizen does not care, or is not aware that they are buying a SA product or shopping at a SA store. Even if they were aware they would not desist, mainly due to lack of alternatives. The limited impact that the attacks had on SA businesses in the region was short-lived. There were no real long-term consequences. The general sentiment was, as summed up by Rob Davies (27/03/08), that the attacks, although serious, were an ‘isolated event’ and that ‘nothing would be altered in terms of trade’. Some of the short-term effects included an alleged attack on Shoprite and widespread talk of boycotts of SA brands and retailers (Fabricius, 03/02/09). Such boycotts never materialised.

In Botswana, for example, reliance on SA companies was and is so heavy that ‘whether they like it or not they are simply not able to boycott Spar and Shoprite’ (Selelo, 24/11/08). This level of reliance on SA is largely attributed to Botswana’s small manufacturing base, but is also true for much of SADC. In Zambia, which has a slightly more diversified manufacturing base and is further north, the attacks also had little or no impact on SA business. According to Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09), there was only a minority of people in Zambia who were business minded and would where possible avoid buying SA products as a result of the attacks.
The business to media informational networks were swift in allaying fears over the attacks and a possible fallout with its African market. SA big businesses active in Africa moved quickly to minimise the public relations damage and make up for the government’s poor response. Some companies (such as Multichoice, who have tried to market themselves as a Pan-African company, but are often seen as a SA company) were quick to issue a statement condemning the attacks and made large donations to those affected (Xinwa, 18/11/08). MTN donated R1.5 million to the Red Cross and made an additional contribution in kind valued at over R670,000. MTN employees had been voluntarily helping the Red Cross (Senge, 2008).

The SA-owned Stanbic Bank decided to invite to their head offices the Dean of each Stanbic Bank across Africa along with African ambassadors to their head offices. They tried to use the attacks as a publicity opportunity to put an end to concerns about xenophobia levels in SA (Naidoo, 15/11/08). The bank also donated R3 million to the Red Cross and helped by providing food for the repatriation camps (Chapelle-Molloy, 04/12/08).

Although the direct effects of the attacks on SA businesses were not too severe, the attacks were instrumental in opening debates on the uneven economic relationship between SA and the region. They presented an opportunity for the region to question post-apartheid business practices and what, if anything, had changed since apartheid. This was, at the same time, framed by a deeper moral question given SA’s history of exploitation and destabilisation of the region.

7.7 Media responses
The media played a particularly powerful role during the attacks. Not only were they responsible for providing accurate information and lobbying governments, but they were also instrumental in defining how the attacks were to be understood.

Given the regional media discourse in reaction to the attacks, it is possible to identify five themes (Fabricius, 03/02/09; Mokone, 27/11/08). These themes are discussed in sub-sections 7.7.2 to 7.7.6 below, whereas sub-section 7.7.1 characterises the general regional outcry.

### 7.7.1 Protest against the attacks

A selection of elite responses suggests that the attacks were strongly condemned by the regional media. Montlenyane Baaitse (30/12/08), Head of Public Relations and Communications in the Department of Trade and Industry in Botswana, contended that the response from the ‘[r]egional media was disappointment and embarrassment that in the 21st century such attacks could occur’. This was echoed by Clifford Maribe (25/11/08), Director of Public Relations, Research and Information in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Botswana. Ambassador Zibane Ntakhwana (28/11/08) believed that the message to come from the region was that it was just ‘the nature of the violent culture of SA’. Gemma Masonga (04/12/08), Principal Trade Officer in the Department of International Trade in Botswana, believed that the regional media characterised the attacks as ‘barbaric’. The *Mmegi* (2008h) ran with the heading: ‘Complete Madness’.

This is consistent with responses from elite members in Zambia. John Phiri (28/01/09), editor of the *Times of Zambia*, stated that ‘The Times did its best to give coverage. It was outrage in the media, [both] the government and private media’. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09) stated the media believed the attacks were indicative of a
primitive society to allow this to happen’. Shupi Mweene (29/01/09) believed that the media ‘were objective’ as they ‘didn’t downplay it or exaggerate.’

Elite South Africans such as Anton Harber (02/02/09), Caxton Professor of Media Studies at Wits University’s Journalism Department, characterised the response from the regional media as ‘deep shock’ and ‘horror’. John Philips (17/11/08), Head of ABSA Africa, contended that the attacks became ‘a cynical reference to how barbaric SA is, yet they project a superior image’. Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08) characterised the media’s response as ‘all round condemnation and shock’. Rob Davies (27/03/08) believed that the coverage of the attacks caused ‘reputational damage to the country’.

7.7.2 South Africa owes Africa a debt of gratitude

The first and most predominant theme in the regional media, was that the attacks were an act of ingratitude for earlier support during the anti-apartheid struggle. Sub-section 7.5.1 demonstrated many examples of government officials suggesting this through the media. This was also a major theme spread by journalists themselves. However, the problem with using the reference to apartheid and the ANC in exile as a motivation for SA’s ongoing support for African states, is that it is dated. Writing for the Somaliland Times, Jerry Okungu (2008), made this point rather bluntly. He stated:

[D]on’t sell that old crap that Africa housed South African exiles in their hour of need. The boys rioting on the streets are a new breed whose fathers died in battlefields with nothing to show for it. They are the young generation that was probably ten years old or younger when Mandela walked away from Robben Island. These are the people who have been let down by Thabo Mbeki’s regime.

Debates in the Kenyan media suggested that this sentiment had been overplayed. In response to the ‘destructive articles’ SA was receiving in the mainstream media, the SA High Commissioner in Kenya, Mr Msimanga, wrote an article titled ‘South Africa doesn’t deserve rebuke’ in which he pointed out that:
It is...not factual as claimed by these articles to suggest that ANC leaders were bankrolled by all the African countries they resided in. Some of the African countries mentioned in some of these articles were not even friends of the ANC, as claimed, during the apartheid era (Msimanga, 2008).

7.7.3 South Africa betrayed its African values

The second major theme to emerge, and related to the above, is that SA had betrayed its Africanist values. The Nation (2008) in Kenya commented: ‘It might have come as a shock that the country often relied on to provide the lead in and find homegrown solutions to Africa’s problems can suddenly erupt so violently’. The Nigerian This Day (2008a) described how ‘[a]mazingly, South Africa is increasingly being associated with this [xenophobic] tendency’. Mr Msimanga also tried to counter this accusation in the Kenyan media by pointing to the double standards being portrayed by Kenyans who were questioning the pan-African credentials of SA:

[X]enophobia can be as bad and brutal as tribalism...as witnessed in Kenya during the post-election violence...It is, therefore, not fair that any African country’s pan-Africanism or comradeship be judged by such rare tragedies as these...(Msimanga, 2008).

Pieter Fourie (04/02/09) suggested that a discourse centred on the values of ‘ubuntuism’ emerged in the media as a means to condemn the attacks. Ubuntuism is ‘the capacity in African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interest of building and maintaining a community with justice and mutual caring’ (Nussbaum, 2003:1). Elsewhere Fourie (2008) has argued that ubuntuism is viewed as a framework for normative media theory against which media performance can be viewed and measured from an ‘African perspective’. The attacks clearly jarred with the inherent values of the concept.
7.7.4 Were the attacks xenophobic?

The third theme was that the SA and regional media were too quick to label the attacks as xenophobic in nature. In sub-section 7.2.1 the numerous and sometimes confusing underlying causes for the attacks were discussed. Many of the sources mentioned in this sub-section were published in the region, particularly in the Kenyan media.

An important theme here was that the SA media itself were responsible for how events were to be popularly understood and ‘categorised’. Perhaps the term ‘xenophobia’ was the easiest way to classify what was going on. However, it was not necessarily the most accurate term. Perhaps the media should have been more ‘careful’ in giving the violence a label. A more nuanced term might have been ‘ethnic nationalism’, as suggested in sub-section 7.2.1. The government-owned Herald in Zimbabwe appeared to have a point when it stated (The Herald, 2008f):

None of the victims of the violence in South Africa used the word "xenophobia". Yet they carry the experience the word claims to capture and convey. It was the white media which used it, infecting the rest of the auxiliary African media which must know better who to follow, what to copy.

7.7.5 South Africa should have anticipated the attacks

The fourth theme concerns the warning signs reported on the issue of xenophobia, particularly in the 2007 report of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This report mentioned xenophobia as a problem in SA (Fabricius, 03/02/09). The Somaliland Times (2008) ran with an article entitled ‘If only…South Africa had heeded their APRM warnings…!’ However, more generally many articles had a ‘narrative arc’ that suggested that over a period of many years ‘[t]he SA government ignored warnings that xenophobia was becoming a serious problem’ (Kimemia, 2008).
7.7.6 Syndication of South African media throughout the region

A fifth theme deals with the importance of the SA media in the region. Thapelo Ndlovu (27/11/08), the National Director of the Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) in Botswana, and Mpho Dibeela (27/11/08), editor of The Sun in Botswana, felt that the regional media largely reproduced SA media through the syndication of SA-produced stories. Hence the role of the media in SA during the attacks was particularly important because of the ‘centrifugal’ force it exerts throughout the region (Short, 19/11/08). The vulnerable position of migrants in society and the controversial (and, at times, confusing) nature of the attacks would clearly have a significant impact on regional relations and had to be dealt with sensitively and accurately by the SA media.

According to Anton Harber (02/02/09) only one tabloid newspaper, The Sun, which appeals to the average blue collar township resident who is likely to see their lives as adversely affected by foreigners, was actually accused of being anti-foreigner in its reporting. This was corroborated by Pieter Fourie (04/02/09) who believed that The Sun emphasised the fact that foreigners took the jobs of locals. The Sun did not do this directly but its reports implied it. Inadvertently, this had the impact of underlining the ‘constant threat of xenophobia in SA and mistrust of the other’ (ibid.).

Despite the largely balanced and objective reporting the issue received in the SA media, Fourie (ibid.) further believed that the media failed to contextualise xenophobia as a ‘social behaviour’, typically by providing a lack of context or background on the matter. As a quantitative indicator it is interesting to note that 42% of the SA respondents interviewed agreed that the SA media adequately reflected the interest of the region in its reporting. 28% felt that the SA media did not adequately reflect the interests of the region in its reporting of the attacks. Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08) believed the SA media were caught off guard in terms of what was happening. Many
stories were captured about the perpetrators and victims. But there were ‘not stories that would make you appreciate the lack of opportunities for foreigners back home’ (ibid.).

However, as the reporting progressed on the issue, more and more personal narratives started to come to the fore. Although the coverage of the attacks was not very effective in reporting on the conditions back home that led people to migrate, the media were effective in highlighting the plight of foreigners in SA. Tshepo Maphanyane (26/11/08) believed that the attacks had revealed facts that would otherwise not have become known. The attacks exposed SA for the way its people had been treating foreigners. For Maphanyane (ibid.) the issue was fourfold:

First, [the attacks revealed] what type of lives these people had been living. Second, it took something bad to bring these life stories to light. Third, [the attacks demonstrated] that people had been going through a lot of conflict in SA [and that it is] not really “greener pastures”. Fourth, the SA government’s failures were...swept under the carpet, and the attacks had brought these issues to the fore.

By doing this, the media had effectively exposed SA for what was going on, in a ‘name and shame’ fashion (Lingela, 23/01/09). Yet, although it is proper to blame the poor insofar as they are the main instigators of the violence, the greater portion of moral blame should lie with the GBM elite members who have the ability to make a difference and make decisions that will alter the course of the country.

The role played by the GBM elite members in ‘articulating’ the violence should therefore be critically assessed. There is a certain level of paternalism in blaming the poor – those who cannot speak for themselves. It is very easy to dismiss the attacks as competition over scarce resources, but this was also a way to deflect attention from government’s policy failures in Zimbabwe; poor service delivery; anger directed at a few well-connected elite members; corrupt civil servants; and ‘irresponsible’ journalists.
7.8 The impact of the xenophobia attacks on regional perceptions of South Africa

This section outlines the responses to a series of questions devised to test the attitudes of regional elite members as to how the attacks might impact on SA’s regional standing (appendix A, question 44). In the questionnaire the questions were presented in a different sequence which has been slightly altered here to facilitate the flow of argumentation.

Table 7.1: How have the attacks affected South Africa's standing in the region?
(percentages rounded off to the nearest whole number)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. The attacks suggest that SA needs to be less ambitious in Africa and tend to the numerous pressing domestic problems first</td>
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<td>B. Although the attacks were severe, SA will be able to re-establish itself as a legitimate and moral leader in the region</td>
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<td>C. The attacks have undone much of the good work SA has achieved in Africa since democracy was attained</td>
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D. The attacks have deepened distrust between Africans and South Africans

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E. SA will be able to redeem its standing as a peaceful and prosperous nation and an attractive option for any would-be migrant in the region

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F. The attacks will lessen dependency on SA and alleviate inequality in the region because skilled immigrants and businesses will look elsewhere to invest

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G. The attacks suggest that SA’s sub-imperialism is in a state of crisis, and the attacks will naturally trigger a waning of SA’s sub-imperialist tendencies

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*The first row of each question comprises the total sample of Botswana, Zambia and SA. The following three rows reflect single countries, indicated B, Z or SA.

**7.8.1 South Africa as a regional power**

The attacks had thrown into question SA’s credentials as a regional and continental power. Kagwanja made the point that ‘xenophobia ha[d] weakened the moral leadership
of South Africa’ (Kagwanja, 2008d). Another article in the Kenyan media asked ‘how...South Africa could claim any regional or continental leadership role if it locks its borders to other sons of the continent?’ (Sy, 2008).

In question A elite respondents were presented with the statement, ‘[t]he attacks suggest that SA needs to be less ambitious in Africa and tend to the numerous pressing domestic problems first’. The cumulative majority at 61% agreed with the statement. Most of those who remained neutral or disagreed with the statement felt that SA should do both, and that it is not an ‘either-or-situation’. According to Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08), Manager of Stakeholder Relations for Multichoice Africa and a former SA diplomat, the international and domestic spheres should not be seen as competing priorities but separate areas, that is, ‘SA’s failure to provide a social safety net for the poor does not call for less involvement regionally’.

The assumption is that SA faces challenges both domestically and regionally and needs to remain involved, not least because it has a ‘moral duty’ to do so. Ambassador Zibane Ntakhwana (28/11/08) contended that the problem of xenophobia faces the entire region, but the major difference in other countries is that the reaction is ‘not so violent’. By the same token, Odirile Motlhale (25/11/08), Communications and PR Manager for MASCOM, believed that other states in the region such as Botswana ‘are seen [by fellow African states] as too inward looking’ and some interventions by SA, noticeably its peacekeeping initiatives in Africa, were particularly admirable. However, within popular political discourse, the emphasis placed on the international above the local is what concerned predominantly the poor. SA’s High Commissioner in Kenya noted that ‘South Africa ha[d] been providing financial and logistical support in its obligation to the renaissance of the continent and at times even sacrifices its domestic basic needs’ (Msimanga, 2008).
Despite these initiatives, the xenophobia attacks had seriously damaged the image of SA. Outsa Mokone (27/11/08) believed that the attacks had created a pervasive ‘perception…that SA is going to get worse’. As Philip Saunders, Investec Asset Management Head of Global Strategy, stated when talking about investor opinion of the country shortly after the attacks: ‘It's getting harder to sell the South African story’ (Bonorchis, 2008). The story of SA as a bastion of human rights after having reached a negotiated settlement and having averted an imminent civil war, was clearly strained. The stark contrast between the Mandela years and the hatred displayed by the attackers, sent a worrying message to the region. There was a feeling expressed by former SA diplomats that ‘we lost something’ as a result of the attacks, and that ‘regional leadership [was] in a crisis’ (Xinwa, 18/11/08).

Despite these problems, in question B 59% agreed with the statement that ‘SA will be able to re-establish itself as a legitimate and moral leader in the region’ after the attacks. The majority of respondents nevertheless felt that ‘the attacks have undone much of the good work SA has achieved in Africa...’ and also agreed that ‘the attacks have deepened distrust between Africans and South Africans’ (table 7.1).

### 7.8.2 Regional integration

The attacks had cut to the heart of the issue of regional integration, especially in light of finalisation of the SADC Free Trade Zone which went into operation later the same year. According to Tshepo Maphanyane (26/11/08), the attacks had signalled ‘an introspective moment for the region. The attacks had turned a mirror on all governments in the region and asked “what is the mirror saying?”’. As a measure of the effects of the attacks on regional integration, elite respondents were in question E presented with the statement ‘SA will be able to redeem its standing as a peaceful and prosperous nation
and a desirable destination for any would-be migrant in the region’. Only half of all respondents agreed with this statement, including 60% of Botswanan respondents and 41% of those from Zambia.

Among the former, those in the neutral category felt that SA had to be ‘engaged in the continent’ and ‘re-engineer themselves and create employment’ to address the root causes of the violence. More negative responses varied from ‘not in the near future’ and ‘it is not safe’ to ‘issues of trust’.

In Zambia, those remaining neutral equalled those agreeing. The neutrals are important here. They all had a caveat to make, namely that it will ‘take time’ and ‘SA will have to work hard’. Marlan Kananda (27/01/09), Public Relations Manager for Multichoice in Zambia, contended that to revive the free movement of people to and from SA ‘it will take a miracle, as people are not free’. He referred to the culture of violence bequeathed to the country by apartheid. In SA itself, where 50% felt that the country would be able to redeem its standing, respondents did not see SA as contributing to regional integration out of an altruistic duty to the region (Naidoo, 15/11/08) or because it has a moral obligation to do so.

Issues pertaining to a divergence of skills and capital from SA into the region were further probed in question F. In this question elite respondents were asked whether ‘the attacks will lessen dependency on SA and alleviate inequality within the region because skilled immigrants and businesses will look elsewhere to invest’. Nearly two-thirds disagreed, whilst among the minority Philip Banda (28/1/09), Manager of Risk at Stanbic in Zambia, believed that ‘the attacks caused Somalians to go to other states than SA’. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09) contended that there was ‘general apprehension’ and that ‘before people were rushing to SA, but now people are scared and unsure’. But
overall and with time the sentiment was that people and business in the region will continue to go to SA.

7.8.3 Sub-imperialism in crisis?

In question G elite respondents were asked if the attacks suggest that ‘SA’s sub-imperialism is in a state of crisis and that the xenophobia attacks will naturally trigger a waning of SA’s sub-imperialist tendencies’. A cumulative majority at 43% disagreed with this statement, 20% remained neutral and cumulatively 34% agreed with the statement. If we break this down by country, perhaps not surprisingly we find that the majority of South Africans at 71% disagreed with the statement. Interestingly, a plurality of Botswanans and Zambians interviewed, at 46% and 41% respectively, agreed that the xenophobia attacks will lead to a pulling-back by SA. Opinions appear generally hesitant regarding question G. This is seemingly because the people who are not academics have doubts about what is meant by ‘sub-imperialism’. The popular use of the term is decidedly malevolent. Given the existing claims of SA’s dominance in the region, SA respondents were particularly circumspect towards this term.

7.9 Conclusion

The response of SADC states to the attacks was one of general condemnation. However, the reaction was not particularly strong at the diplomatic level. Greater diplomatic pressure came from beyond SADC. It was also when dealing with powerful African states beyond SADC that SA state and corporate elite members felt compelled, in the interests of wider continental capital accumulation, to avoid fallouts and conflicts.

The attacks did, however, play a strong role in exposing the GBM complex for its part in maintaining an uneven regional economy. As noted in Chapter 1, the
dominant geopolitical ‘script’ articulated through the GBM complex is centred on the mutual benefits of regional integration. This is because the success of the sub-imperial state’s capital accumulation partly rests on its ability to persuade regional states that the expansion of its businesses is also in their interest. For that reason, the discourses around economic migration stressed inter-reliance within the SADC community, whilst actually providing a fixed market for SA corporate elite members.

Consequently, the rhetoric of a democratic SA was based on principles of racial acceptance and respect for human rights. The discursive landscape of the Rainbow Nation during Mandela’s tenure was particularly effective in this regard. Mbeki’s role was to consolidate the focus on Africa, largely driven by the ideational power of the African Renaissance. These two ‘philosophies’, the Rainbow Nation and the African Renaissance, provided the foundation upon which SA state and corporate elite members created the legitimising discourses for their capital accumulation in the region. Yet the attacks clearly exposed the gap between rhetoric and reality.

The two faces of SA were laid bare. The first is the benevolent and embracing state, business and media-created rhetoric, steeped in multi-culturalism and tolerance, and by implication welcoming of foreigners. The second is the realpolitik of the situation, namely that public opinion in SA suggests that the accommodation of large numbers of people from the region has proven increasingly problematic, whilst SA somewhat selfishly and even arrogantly would like to continue to do business in their countries and develop policies in their name.
Chapter 8

South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup

8.1 Introduction

In June 2010 South Africa (SA) hosted the first ever Football World Cup (FWC) on African soil. It was the largest and highest earning FWC to date. Thirty-two of the world’s best national teams competed in sixty-four matches and were watched by almost 3.5 million spectators and millions of television viewers around the world (Munyanyiwa, 2009). It was estimated that SA spent R63 billion on the tournament and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was believed to have grown by 0.5% as a result of hosting the event (Pillay, 2010). The 2010 event was unique in that it was the only one of its kind in the history of the Games where the host nation had incorporated the region in its planning. The government claimed that it would work with the southern African region on ‘peace and nation-building, football support and development, environment and tourism, culture and heritage, communications, telecommunication, and continental security’.  

This chapter examines the impact of SA’s hosting of the 2010 FWC on its geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses. Much has been written about the benefits that mega-events can bring host nations. This literature normally focuses on the developmental aspects that hosting these events can bring, such as: new and upgraded infrastructure; increased tourism; job creation; improved investment conditions; and developments in media and Information, Communication Technology (ICT) (Allmers and Maennig, 2008; Baade and Matheson, 2004; Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004;

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Chang, 2002; Gratton et al., 2000; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004). There is also a growing body of literature on the intangible benefits, and more specifically, the ability of such events to enhance the legitimacy of various political orders and their elite members through identity building and signalling (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelissen, 2004, 2006; Grundlingh, 1998; Heyne et al., 2007; Steenveld and Strelitz, 1998; Van der Merwe, 2007, 2009; Van der Merwe and Van der Westhuizen, 2007). Within this literature, very little focuses on the regional dimension on account of the scope and scale of data required, and few detailed empirical studies are based within the southern African context.

In the case of SA’s hosting of the FWC, some pre-event literature queried the claims of an ‘African’ Games and investigated the likely impact on the region (Cornelissen, 2006; Desai and Vahed, 2010; Pillay et al., 2009; Van der Merwe, 2007, 2009). Yet a detailed post-event analysis is needed to understand these impacts in real terms: did the 2010 event deliver on the hype and generate desirable, tangible outcomes for the region? Or, were the benefits mostly of the intangible kind and fleeting at best? A factor which further complicated the regional estimates of benefiting through the event was that SA’s own estimates of benefiting were highly optimistic (Cottle, 2007; Du Plessis and Maennig, 2009).

As noted in Chapter 1, the dominant geopolitical ‘script’ articulated through the government-business-media (GBM) complex is centred on the mutual benefits of regional integration. The ethos of ‘mutual reciprocity’ underlying regional integration is a necessary condition for a sub-imperial state’s capital accumulation within a ‘fixed space’. The rhetoric of an ‘African’ World Cup was therefore used to provide the legitimising discourse for the involvement of SA and global multi-nationals in the
region during the FWC, and was explicitly tied into the African Renaissance and attaining the objectives of NEPAD.

First-order events operate by means of accumulation by dispossession. This occurs in the first instance, by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) or the International Olympic Council (IOC) in conjunction with global elite members, and in the second instance, with the local GBM complex of sub-imperial states. These events therefore represent a prominent point of interaction between global elite members and the local GBM complex, as they set in motion ‘unusually’ expansive rounds of capital accumulation. Growing concentration of BRICS countries’ hosting of such events is indicative of this trend (2008 China Olympics, the 2014 Brazilian FWC, 2018 Russian FWC). In a frank interview with David Harvey, he contended the following on his concept (Logos, 2006):

> Accumulation by dispossession is about plundering, robbing other people of their rights...In some instances, it is taking away peoples’ rights to dispose of their own resources...[S]ome people are getting extremely rich...Are they getting rich because they are contributing to a global economy in productive ways or are they getting rich because they are taking away other people’s rights?

Host communities are dispossessed through carefully constructed legislative frameworks and contractual agreements between the sporting organisation and the host government outlining entitlements associated with the event. This allows sporting organisations, in conjunction with Multi-national Corporations (MNCs), to dictate who gets what, when and how, and extract the major profits. In the case of FIFA and the 2010 FWC, this included guarantees issued by the SA government and legislated in the Special Measures Bill, and which allowed FIFA to monitor the nation’s progress. This was supported by marketing and merchandising laws, particularly anti-ambush marketing provisions. According to Dr Owen Dean, partner at Spoer & Fisher (one of the large intellectual property law firms representing FIFA in SA) such provisions
allowed FIFA to pursue civil claims against those who were ‘causing damage to FIFA by prejudicing its relations with its sponsors’ (Dean, 2009: 5). This is enforced in and around the physical spaces of the stadia themselves leading up to and during the tournament (8.3), but also concerns all intellectual property pertaining to the event.

International sporting organisations in conjunction with the local GBM complex also decide the number and location of stadia and dictate the requirements for other infrastructure, such as airports, transport and hotels. Issues concerning the quality of the lives of the poor and access for the marginalised (the Cape Town Stadium is a few kilometres from the nearest train linking it to the football supporting, poorer communities) are not prioritised when building such infrastructure. Uppermost is boosting of profits. The host nation typically does not really need the new stadia and other infrastructure. The country will have no sustainable use for them after the event. In ‘selling-out’ to ‘spectacular’ locations and designs, rather than practical and sustainable ones, there is a strong probability that the stadia will become ‘white elephants’ and taxpayers will generally carry the burden. The Cape Town Stadium built for the FWC is a case in point. As a result of the scale of the stadium and relative isolation from the football (and rugby) supporting communities (Swart and Bob, 2009), the City of Cape Town is now struggling to meet the costs involved and find a sports club which is prepared to be based there on a permanent basis. In the twelve months after the event, the Cape Town Stadium which cost $600 million to build, had only hosted eight football matches (Allie, 2011).

Similarly, the improved and increased transport services and hotel rooms are now underused and unprofitable. For the host nation, there is also an ‘opportunity cost’ involved in diverting funds away from more pressing needs. Commercial research organisations and the corporate and government-linked media are responsible for
creating the legitimising discourses for hosting such events. Notions of ‘patriotism’ and ‘national pride’ are used instrumentally by GBM elite members to keep the population ‘in line’ with the broader mega-event project.

In the case of the 2010 FWC, the event was not only hosted on behalf of SA but the entire continent, and it is argued that accumulation by dispossession was extended to this regionally defined ‘fixed space’. As in SA, such dispossession was exposed largely through a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. The section of the questionnaire dealing with the 2010 FWC was structured slightly differently from the sections pertaining to the previous three chapters. Given the complex and cross-cutting nature of such events (infrastructure, tourism, employment, investment) the section dealing with the FWC included far more specific, closed-ended questions in order to cover a wider range of issues (see appendix A, questions 52 to 59). This is reflected in the use of slightly less discursive interview material and a stronger focus on quantitative measurements of regional expectations pertaining to the 2010 event. The interviews were conducted in late 2008 and early 2009, almost a year and a half before the tournament. Accordingly, the current analysis is thematically-driven and seeks to compare expected benefits with actual outcomes.

In order to assess the post-event outcomes and to supplement the interview material, media searches were conducted. These focused initially on the two primary case studies of Botswana and Zambia. However, given the interconnected and recurrent themes throughout SADC, a thorough analysis required further elaboration and supporting material drawn from Namibia and Zimbabwe. A cursory analysis of the media material further suggested that some discussion of African nations that actually participated in the FWC should also be included. This is due to the heightened
expectations of benefiting and heightened interest in these countries leading to greater expenditure and consumption patterns.

Including participating nations also builds on the claims made in the previous chapter about the GBM complex attempting to penetrate African markets beyond SADC and the country’s strategic alliance with states such as Nigeria. It was impracticable to analyse all the African participants here (Algeria, Nigeria, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, as well as the host nation). Therefore, Nigeria and Ghana, as traditionally important football-playing nations, have been selected. In these two countries the sport has strong links to government, business and the media through their respective football associations, sponsorship and publicity. The media searches therefore covered these two countries as well.

8.2 Winning the bid

The idea of hosting the FWC was first mooted in the early nineties when it was decided that SA would bid for the 2006 FWC. It was envisaged that the event would have three primary objectives. First, it would encourage capital construction and heighten the country’s international visibility for purposes of attracting tourism. Second, it would elicit national pride. Third, it would offer local powerbrokers in government, sport, media and business an opportunity to renegotiate or consolidate their role in the ‘new’ SA. It relied heavily on an emotive posturing of Africa by stressing the socio-economic marginalisation of Africa. SA lost the bid to Germany by one vote (Alegi, 2004: 3-4). SA came under strong criticism for not doing all in its power to secure enough votes. However, in hindsight these setbacks were learning curves for the country, and had the event been awarded at that stage, it could have proved logistically problematic (Cornelissen, 2004; Griffiths, 2000). As a result of the circumstances under which SA
lost the 2006 bid and the fact that Africa had never hosted a FWC in its eighty year history, FIFA decided to institute a rotational system of bidding whereby the host nation would be located on a different continent every four years beginning with Africa in 2010. After Brazil was awarded the 2014 event the rotational system was revoked (in 2007) adding to the exceptional nature of the decision for the African continent (Van der Merwe, 2009: 30).

The all-African bidding round also presented its challenges for SA. It was the fourth time that Morocco was bidding. Morocco is in close proximity to FIFA’s traditional power base, Europe, and is an established footballing nation. The other African bidders included Tunisia (with the possibility of co-hosting with Morocco), Egypt, Nigeria and Libya (Green and Matshe, 2003). SA launched its national bid in April 2003 (Craig, 2003). Writing in the Sowetan newspaper, known for its football analysis, Eddy Maloka (2003) from the Africa Institute, commented: ‘One thing for sure is that the slogan for our bid is Africa-focused; South Africa will just be the stage for what will be an African event’. The all-African bidding process had implicitly opened a debate as to which African nation was suitable to represent the continent; the merits of the bid were being assessed against its African credentials. Maloka went on to outline a few criteria for an African bid. One such criterion was that the bid in question must ‘contribute towards the continent’s implementation of Nepad and its projects...’ (ibid.).

In October 2003 the FIFA inspection team’s visit to SA went well and it was declared that SA could host an ‘excellent’ FWC. This was the highest honour the technical team could award. It was declared that Morocco and Egypt had the ability to organise a ‘very good’ FWC and Tunisia a ‘good’ one, but Libya would ‘face real difficulties’ in organising a FWC (Mthembu, 2004). On 15 May 2004 it was announced that SA would host the 2010 FWC. However, it is worthwhile to note what the
Johannesburg daily *The Star* noted on the final voting round, clearly sending an early warning to organisers about their ambitious promises to the region (Johnson, 2004):

> South Africa...did not get the support of Botswana, Cameroon, Mali and Tunisia. Not a single African vote went in favour of South Africa...[I]t does indicate that much must be done to make 2010 as inclusive as possible...and South Africa must take seriously simmering continental envy of the so-called superpower of the south.

Shortly after the games were awarded President Mbeki was quick to throw the government's support behind the tournament. The event was to provide a cornerstone of Mbeki’s African Renaissance (Van Rensburg, 2004). It was also to provide a significant opportunity for the GBM complex to further entrench itself as key partnerships were to develop between government and business in conjunction with the South African Football Association (SAFA). Large SA companies directly and indirectly involved in the event were to be the primary beneficiaries. Most of these companies have a significant African footprint. These included: the major construction houses of WBHO, Murray and Roberts, Group 5 and Aveng; the sponsors of the event such as MTN and First National Bank (FNB); the broadcasters of football games such as Multichoice and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC); and large breweries and retail outlets such as SAB Miller and Shoprite-Checkers.

### 8.3 South Africa’s hosting of the ‘African’ World Cup

Much of the public discourse preceding the event was dominated by controversy. This generally revolved around whether the stadia would be ready on time, safety and security issues, cost escalation and the daunting prospects of heavy maintenance costs for the stadia (Du Bois, 2006; Hartley, W. 2008; Mseleku, 2008). However, these concerns were quickly put aside once the month-long tournament finally started on 11 June 2010.
The only incident which reflected poorly on SA’s organisational ability was when commercial aeroplanes were unable to land at King Shaka Airport in Durban due to VIP jets standing in their parking bays. As a result, many fans missed or were late for the semi-final in the port city (Muckracker, 2010). Another issue which had the potential to embarrass the host nation was when security guards at the stadia in Durban and Cape Town staged a walk-out because FIFA had not paid them. Police stand-by units had to cover for them (Kiss, 2010). A threatened strike by Eskom workers was averted due to acceptance of an increased wage offer (Fin24, 2010a).

The event was hailed as a commercial success by FIFA and its sponsors although small business owners in SA were generally disappointed due to FIFA’s strict merchandising laws and exclusionary zones. FIFA would create an exclusionary zone of one kilometre radius around the stadia leading up to and during the tournament where only officially licensed merchandisers were able to trade and advertise. Within the stadia themselves sponsors’ rights were also jealously protected. Before the event, the Small, Medium Enterprises (SME) Survey showed that 86% of small businesses expected the FWC to boost business in general and 45% hoped their businesses would benefit from the event. However, after the event only 14% of SMEs said the FWC had made ‘a material contribution to their success’ (Fin24, 2010b). One newspaper headline read ‘Welcome to the Republic of FIFA’ (Fin24, 2010c).

At a rhetorical level, the tournament had succeeded in projecting itself as an African extravaganza. Former President Thabo Mbeki said: ‘For us our success in hosting the World Cup means Africa is well poised to continue its renaissance…’ (Ashebu, 2011). Yet amidst all the goodwill towards the continent, straight after the final whistle, xenophobia threats started to emerge putting SA police on high alert (The Post, 2010). The market-centred discourse of the GBM complex prior to and during the
event, contrasted strongly with the discourse of xenophobia that arose straight after the FWC. But the question remained: was the event able to deliver on the much talked about promises as an ‘African’ Games and what did this mean in *real terms* for the region?

8.4 Regional preparations for the 2010 Football World Cup

8.4.1 States belonging to SADC

None of the SADC states had qualified for the tournament. These states nevertheless hoped to benefit from the event in two main ways. The first was through the hosting of teams either leading up to the event or during the tournament itself. The second was through the increased tourism levels, believed to have the potential to spill over into the region (Kgankenna, 2010a). Botswana was strategically positioned to benefit due to its proximity to some of the SA provinces: Limpopo, Northwest and Gauteng (Mokone, 2010). A task-force comprising the Botswana Football Association (BFA) and Botswana Tourism Board (BTB) was appointed in November 2006 in an attempt to maximise the gains from the event (Mokgoabone, 2007). The Task Force was chaired by Minister of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism, Kitso Mokaila (Kgankenna, 2010b). In consultation with Alexander Ross, a British consultancy firm (Kgankenna, 2010a), a Botswanan National Strategy for the 2010 Soccer World Cup was devised in which it was decided that Botswana should aim to host two international football teams for their pre-training in Gaborone. It was envisioned that three stadia would be used for practice purposes, namely, the National Stadium, Sir Seretse Khama Botswana (SSKB) Stadium and the stadium of the University of Botswana. The National Stadium and SSKB Stadium needed upgrading (Kgwagaripane, 2007). Later on, it was decided that two new stadia would be built, the Lobatse Stadium and Francistown Stadium (Ngwawi,
The Sir Seretese Khama International Airport (SSKIA) was also to be upgraded, along with smaller airports throughout the country (Madibana, 2009). The hotel accommodation was deemed adequate and of the required standard (Kgankenna, 2010a).

Namibia was ideally placed to benefit from the two football tournaments hosted in southern Africa in 2010 given that it borders both Angola, which hosted the 2010 African Cup of Nations, and SA (The Namibian, 2007c). In 2007 a 2010 technical committee was set up by Cabinet in Namibia, headed by Permanent Secretary of Sports, Dr Peingondjabi Shipoh (Musariri, 2009). The technical committee was primarily tasked with developing a Namibian 2010 positioning strategy document, and Cabinet released N$3.3 million for an in-depth feasibility and costing assessment (The Namibian, 2007c). However, it is unclear whether a final report was ever issued and what this strategy entailed. Not all of the money issued was spent (Musariri, 2009). The Namibian government had meanwhile set in motion plans to upgrade state-owned tourism resorts, particularly Namibian Wildlife Resorts. Infrastructure at border posts was also improved (The Namibian, 2007c). Two of the main stadia in Namibia, the Sam Nujomo Stadium and Independence Stadium, were upgraded to meet the required FIFA standards. Parallel to this, the Namibian Tourism Board (NTB) also unveiled a strategy that it believed would enable the Namibian tourism industry to maximise its benefits from the FWC (Ndjiebela, 2009).

A committee was established in 2008 to steer Zimbabwe’s FWC initiatives. The plan was to offer Harare’s 60,000-seater National Stadium as a possible venue for a few practice matches before the event (Tigere and Mhara, 2009). Given the depleted state of Zimbabwe’s infrastructure, much work was needed to bring the country up to standard. Concerted efforts to improve infrastructure were focused on Victoria Falls and
hotels in Harare, but compared to some of the other SADC states, the Zimbabwe government did little to upgrade existing infrastructure. However, it still had hopes of benefiting: the authorities expected 30% of all tourists visiting SA to visit Zimbabwe as well (Zimbabwe Independent, 2010a).

Soon after SA had won the bid the Zambian government established a technical team to oversee preparations. Initially, government planned to build three new stadia and an international class hotel (Times of Zambia, 2004c). The three new stadia were to be based in Lusaka, Ndola and Livingstone (Katongola, 2006). However, a year later government back-peddled on its earlier pledge, announcing that it would construct one ‘ultra-modern’ stadium in Ndola before the FWC (Times of Zambia, 2006). The stadium was to be built by a Chinese contractor and both the Zambian and Chinese governments had entered an agreement for the construction of the stadium (Lusaka Times, 2007c). As early as 2007 the Livingstone Airport had been upgraded. This was followed by further work on infrastructure throughout Zambia (Mulenga, 2007). Other stadia such as Chililabombwe’s Konkola Stadium were also refurbished (Times of Zambia, 2008l).

8.4.2 States beyond SADC

The states beyond SADC were hoping to benefit through increased exposure and participation in the month-long tournament. The Nigeria Tourism Development Corporation (NTDC) planned to set up tourism villages in Johannesburg and Cape Town. This was a means to showcase the country during the event and to expose the visiting tourists to Nigerian culture. Nigerian dishes and cultural artefacts would be on display for visitors while transportation services and accommodation would also be made available to the tourists (Taiwo, 2010).
It was believed that Ghana’s appearance at the 2006 FWC was under-exploited (Aduonum, 2009a). Accordingly, RICS Consult Limited, Ghana’s foremost sports marketing, PR and sports events management consultancy organised a day's workshop to explore the opportunities for business that could be promoted as part of the overall Trade and Investment Promotion Strategy for 2010 (Aduonum, 2009b). One of the recommendations was to host, in conjunction with the Ghana High Commission in SA, a Ghanaian traditional cuisine, cultural and musical fair in SA during the FWC (Aduonum, 2009a).

8.5 Regional expectations and actual outcomes
The GBM complex, in conjunction with global elite members, was effective in convincing regional governments and businesses that they would benefit. By so doing, they were able to win the major infrastructure contracts – either directly or indirectly through supply chains – and further establish themselves in African markets. The expectations of benefiting were primarily created by: the SA state and corporate elite members; the Local Organising Committee of SA; FIFA and its hospitality service provider MATCH (allegedly owned by FIFA); and MNCs themselves. This was achieved through discursive formations of an ‘African’ Games and was backed-up by specious estimates of tangible benefits provided by corporate research. This led to unrealistic expectations of how the region might benefit, whilst really allowing SA and global corporates a ‘fixed space’ for an expanded round of capital accumulation. The following table outlines the extent of regional expectations as reflected by the GBM elite members interviewed. In the following section, each question in the table represents a sub-section.
Table 8.1: How will the region benefit from the event? (percentages rounded off to the nearest whole number)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. It will develop local skills, infrastructure and facilities</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>2 15 2 74 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Z SA*</td>
<td>7 27 60 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>7 12 6 82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>7 79 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. It will contribute towards the local tourist industries</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>2 2 4 72 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>7 7 7 67 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>7 82 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>7 64 29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C. It will create jobs</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>2 9 13 70 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>7 20 7 60 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>6 12 82</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>24 64 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D. It will help dispel Afro-pessimism</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>2 9 20 59 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>7 20 40 13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>24 71 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>7 14 64 7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E. It will increase investment in the region</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>13 15 63 7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>27 20 47 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>6 6 76 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>7 21 64 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F. It will enhance the</td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>2 9 9 70 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Z SA</td>
<td>2 9 70 11</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
media and ICT facilities and infrastructure in the region

<table>
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<th>B</th>
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<th>13</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The first row of each question comprises the total sample of Botswana, Zambia and SA, indicated by the letters B, Z and SA. The next three rows consist of the individual countries.

### 8.5.1 Infrastructure

Mega-events in host nations clearly have an impact on developing infrastructure such as local airports, roads and media facilities. The responses to question A of table 8.1 demonstrate that a cumulative 81% of respondents believed the event would develop local skills, infrastructure and facilities in their countries. A collective 34% of elite respondents in Botswana disagreed with the statement, whilst only 12% of Zambians disagreed.

In Botswana, of those elite respondents who disagreed with the statement, the primary concern, as expressed by Dudetsang Chapelle-Molloy (04/12/08) who is Marketing Manager for Stanbic Bank, was devoting vast resources to the upgrading of infrastructure only to see them become ‘white elephants’. She added that this was particularly worrying given the fact that ‘Botswana has no market to sustain the stadia after the event’. This was echoed by Sybrand Coetzee (25/11/08), Director in the Bank of Gaborone, who believed that ‘millions of Pula had been spent on the Lobatse Stadium [but that there will be] no return’. Tshepo Maphayane (26/11/08), Publicity and Public Relations Executive for the SA-owned company, MultiChoice, believed that from a Botswanan perspective the ‘planning and drive [for the FWC] should [have been] more consolidated’.

Zambian elite respondents were worried about the extent to which the region would really be included in the event. Maxwell Sichula (29/01/09) contended:

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19 The Lobatse Stadium cost around 200 million Pula (Tlhasele, 2010).
‘Neighbouring countries want some kind of assurance that they would be able to host warm-up games’. Marlan Kananda (27/01/09) believed that ‘SA will have to partner the region to a greater degree if it really wishes to put its money where its mouth is’. Shupi Mweene (29/01/09), Programme Officer in the Zambian Ministry of Trade and Commerce, believed that ‘SA needs to do more to incorporate the region in its planning and…to convince the region that they can benefit’. Bob Sichinga (27/01/09), former MP and now independent consultant, believed that SA is ‘self-centred’ and that ‘SA [will benefit] but not the region’. He added that the event is about ‘SA capacity with an African sideshow’ and that the talk of Africa is largely just ‘salesmanship’. Philip Banda (28/01/09), Manager of Risk at Stanbic in Zambia, believed there was a feeling in the region that ‘SA has a particular arrogance that will not allow it to rely heavily on SADC’.

In SA, the critics underlined the extent to which the lack of benefits in the region would play into a perception of SA as arrogant. Skhu Xinwa (18/11/08), Manager of Stakeholder Relations for Multichoice Africa and a former SA diplomat, thought that ‘[t]here is a feeling [in the region] that SA might turn around and say we did it and forget about the region’. Peter Fabricius (03/02/09), Foreign Editor for Independent Newspapers Gauteng, believed that ‘SA are seeing themselves as doing a favour for the region by including them’. The SA Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies (27/03/09) stated: ‘More technical work needs to [be] done if the region [is] to reap the full benefits…Africa stands the chance of falling between two stools on this issue’.

Subsequent to the interviews, these fears have materialised. Clearly, regional elite members should have been more critical. After the final draw in Cape Town in December 2009 to determine who would play who during the tournament, teams
indicated where they would be based. Not a single team chose a neighbouring country. The upgrading of stadia largely went to waste. Countries within reasonable travelling distance of SA were given the impression that they could host teams during the FWC (Mokone, 27/11/08). Despite the obvious linguistic advantages for Portuguese-speaking teams to be based in Mozambique, for example, this offer was not taken up as it would have proved logistically problematic. In addition, the extent to which the region hosted teams in the lead-up phase was also very limited with just one or two warm-up games being played in SADC countries.

How is it possible that such large sums of money were spent on the upgrading of infrastructure and stadia only to go to waste? The regional media material reflects the unrealistic expectations based on flawed estimates and empty promises, and the subsequent disappointment that this caused. In April 2007, Botswana was given early hope of directly benefiting from the tournament when the *Mmegi* (Ngwawi, 2007) reported:

> South Africa has asked the world football governing body, Fifa, to consider allowing teams in the 2010 World Cup finals to stay at bases in neighbouring countries and travel to South Africa on the day before their matches.

The request was eventually denied by FIFA who made the decision ‘at the eleventh hour’ (Serite, 2010) when most of the construction had already occurred. The decision was made in late February 2010 (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 2010b). Around the time of this announcement, an article in the *Mmegi* (Dube, 2010) stated:

> The new Francistown and Lobatse stadium[s] were constructed primarily with the 2010 World Cup in mind. But with most teams having settled for their base camps, the increased and improved facilities might turn out to be white elephants.

The emphasis then turned to attracting teams to play warm-up games before the tournament. Yet the construction of major infrastructure linked to the event, was
continually struggling to meet deadlines. What little chance Botswana had of benefiting was further hampered by poor planning. Ostensibly this was partly the result of contradictory messages. There were vague estimates of benefiting and nagging (although not properly investigated) doubts about the accuracy of predictions. An editorial in the *Sunday Standard* (2010a) written three months before the tournament, stated that ‘the newly constructed and refurbished stadiums in this country are way behind schedule and it looks they will only be completed after the World Cup’.

But it was not only the stadia that were behind schedule. According to the Civil Aviation Authority of Botswana, the SSKIA Terminal II buildings in Gaborone were to ‘miss the World Cup schedule by over two months’ (Madibana, 2009). It was believed that this would lead to ‘losing huge amounts of money’ (ibid.). However, government allegedly did ‘somersaults’ on the issue as it later claimed that the upgrading of the airports was never intended for the FWC deadline (Mokgoabone, 2010a).

Shortly before the event it had become clear that Botswana’s FWC task team ‘had failed to lure even a single team to use one of the refurbished facilities as its practice grounds’ and that ‘all stadiums that were either being constructed or refurbished [were] still incomplete’ (*Sunday Standard*, 2010b). One analyst suggested that FIFA’s decision not to allow teams to be based in neighbouring countries was made ‘at the request or even order from South African authorities’ (Serite, 2010). He also noted: ‘South Africa has the right to insist on all teams being accommodated in their country because they have invested a lot in accommodation and security for the visiting teams’ (ibid.).

The construction boom throughout South and southern Africa was described by *Africa Business* as the largest on the continent since the 1970s and had raised the
demand for building materials considerably (cited in Letsididi, 2008). Botswana and other neighbouring countries depend heavily on SA imports and so benefited the SA construction sector. It was reported that the construction boom was ‘very bad news for Botswana which imports virtually all [building] materials from South Africa’ (ibid.).

A similar discourse of missed opportunities arose in the Namibian media. Namibia had also failed to attract any warm-up games (The Namibian, 2010a). On the first day of the tournament an editorial in the government-owned New Era bemoaned the missed opportunities. The editorial stated how ‘[o]ne would hear endless tales of bilateral agreements being signed between Namibia and Germany, or Brazil, for that matter, sports-wise’ (New Era, 2010).

Shortly before the tournament ended, an article in The Namibian summed up the disappointment in Namibia by compiling a review of newspapers headlines. A selection of these headlines read:

‘Namibia should have cashed in on World Cup’, ‘World Cup created false euphoria for tourism industry’, ‘Namibia’s missed opportunities with the soccer WC 2010’, ‘African teams’ failures at the World Cup are mirror images of national failures’, ‘World Cup wake-up call for Africa’ (Kaure, 2010).

Independent economist, Klaus Schade, commented that ‘it was…not realistic to expect South Africa to share all the economic benefits of the Fifa World Cup, but bear the costs alone’ (The Namibian, 2010b).

In Zimbabwe, serious problems in key infrastructure areas had occurred due to insufficient resources, money and skills. The new unity government struggled to raise the money necessary to draw benefits from the event (Muringayi, 2009). A strong article titled ‘Facing truth: Zim not ready for 2010’ outlined the poor state of Zimbabwe’s readiness by referring to the ‘crumbling infrastructure’, the ‘potholes and craters on our roads’ and the ‘unending power cuts’ (Chakaodza, 2010). The sub-text
of the article suggested that the Zimbabwean government was deluded about the prospects of benefiting.

In February 2010 when FIFA announced the base camps for all 32 teams, it was reported to be ‘a big blow for Zimbabwe as football authorities and politicians in this country have in the past months waxed lyrical about…lur[ing] participating teams to camp in the country’. The problem was believed to be at the ‘political level’ in the sense that the Zimbabwean government had based its hopes on one country in particular that was said ‘to have made a commitment to come to Zimbabwe through its ambassador’ (Muchinjo, 2010a).

One month before the tournament more articles pointed to the fact that the estimates of Zimbabwe benefiting were inflated and not based on considered analysis. One article noted how the ‘promises of fast flowing dollars for locals now sound like the hollow lies they always were. To complain of being hoodwinked would be naïve…Evidently there will be no World Cup football teams camping in Zimbabwe’ (Mudzwiti, 2010). On the eve of the tournament, another article stated that ‘[e]ven [in] South Africa…some provinces are complaining…as…60 percent of the teams are camping in…Gauteng’ (Mushonga, 2010).

Much to the chagrin of Botswana and Namibia, Zimbabwe did host one pre-FWC game, albeit at an exorbitant cost. The Zimbabwean government had paid the Brazilian football team an appearance fee of US$1,8 million for one game against its national side at the National Stadium in Harare (Berger, 2010). Zimbabwe was also able to persuade North Korea to train in the country during the lead-up to the tournament. However, this was seen as a blow for the transitional government as its association with North Korea was likely to ‘confirm its status as an outpost of tyranny’ (Zimbabwe Independent, 2010a).
The same type of false hopes and empty promises featured in the Zambian media material. As in the other countries, a great deal of slippage occurred in terms of the stated intentions of organisers and the actual outcomes. Soon after SA won the bid, the Vice-President of Zambia, Nevers Mumba, after returning from a SADC summit in Tanzania, was reported to have said that ‘his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma …indicated that there was a great possibility of some World Cup teams [using] facilities from nations such as Zambia’ \citep{Times of Zambia, 2004c}. In April 2008, it was even reported that SA, with no authority to do so, had assured Zambia that as many as four countries would camp there and travel to SA during the tournament \citep{The Namibian, 2008g}.

The logistics of Zambia hosting four teams during the tournament seemed improbable and should immediately have been questioned. The event had clearly provided an incentive for a whole range of infrastructure projects, not least the ‘ultra-modern’ stadium in Ndola. The February 2010 announcement that not one team was to be based outside of SA dented Zambia’s plans. Zambian organisers then turned their attention to hosting teams in the build-up to the tournament. However, in 2009 it became clear that the new stadium in Ndola was to miss the FWC deadline by more than a year \citep{Lusaka Times, 2009}. Although the country had other stadia to fall back on, the Ndola Stadium was an integral part of enhancing Zambia’s allure as a southern African training destination. In the end, Zambia hosted no teams in the build-up to the event.

\subsection*{8.5.2 Tourism}
Event promoters all anticipated great benefits in the area of tourism. Question B demonstrates that a cumulative 92% of respondents agreed that the FWC would contribute towards local tourism industries.

The FWC was to serve as a catalyst for regional tourism initiatives. It was to provide impetus for the creation of seven transfrontier parks. These are major conservation parks covering all of SADC’s mainland countries (*Namibia Economist*, 2005). The creation of a single ‘univisa’ was also of top priority for SADC governments in order to ensure the free flow of visitors throughout the region come 2010 (Russouw, 2005).

However, a more focused approach to estimates of tourism arrivals was clearly needed. Initially, Grant Thornton, a consulting firm, estimated that SA should expect around 487,000 foreign visitors for the FWC (Grant Thornton, 2007). However, as the tournament approached it became clear that such estimates were optimistic, with international ticket sales going at a slower rate than expected. The lower sales were largely due to the recession, inflated costs and security fears. In April 2010, shortly before the FWC, Grant Thornton revised its figure down to 373,000 (*Fin24*, 2010d). A post-event analysis suggested that the actual figure was estimated at 400,000 of which an estimated 130,000 were from African countries (ibid.). However, a more detailed study by SA Tourism suggested that only 309,554 foreign arrivals visited the country for the ‘primary purpose’ of watching football (SA Tourism, 2010). Of these, only 5% indicated that they visited other African countries on their travels (ibid.).

Table 8.2 sets out the number of tourists that visited SA and other African countries during the FWC.
Table 8.2: Number of tourists that visited South Africa and also visited other African countries during the World Cup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of tourists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>1,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>535</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>381</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>275</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>124</td>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SA Tourism

The actual arrival figures are far below what was promised or expected. For example, Zimbabwe, which received the most visitors, was promised around 100,000 visitors based on Grant Thornton’s financial impact report which underpinned SA’s bid document (Munyanyiwa, 2009). These figures were reiterated by the Minister of
Tourism in Zimbabwe just before the event (see below). However, only 3,868 actually visited. A similar pattern can be observed in the other SADC countries.

Furthermore, the arrival figures in table 8.2 need to be looked at in context. Take, for example, Botswana, where the figure of 1,899 would suggest that total tourist arrivals increased by this number. Yet studies of mega-events have found a ‘crowd-out’ effect or substitution effect (Baade and Matheson, 2004). This is when event tourists supplant other travellers who normally visit these venues. The ‘other travellers’ choose not to visit in order to avoid the crowds associated with the event. The net result is that tourism levels often do not increase by a great amount and may stay more or less the same. For example, during the South Korea FWC in 2002, while the number of tourist arrivals during the event was high, it was offset by a comparable decrease in the usual visitors from Japan. Whilst 460,000 tourists visited South Korea during the FWC, the total number of tourists in 2002 was the same as in the previous year (Golovnina, 2002). Although SADC states were not hosting the event, the principle is the same, especially as these states are particularly susceptible to changes in the larger SA tourism market.

Once again, the question arises: how was it possible that there was such a disjuncture between the expectations of regional tourism authorities and the actual outcomes? With the teams not camping in the neighbouring countries, it was understood that the marketing drive would have to shift gears to focus on benefiting from the tourists that would come to SA. The regional media material suggests that the unrealistic expectations of benefiting in the tourism industry were primarily created by FIFA through its hospitality partner, MATCH, the SA Local Organising Committee, and the SA tourism authorities. The Botswanan media coverage suggests that in November 2009, FIFA spokesperson, Delia Fischer, was quoted as saying that MATCH ‘had contracted 4,500 rooms in nearby Mauritius, Botswana, Zambia, Swaziland and
Namibia’, adding that ‘[w]e are looking at 158 rooms in total in Botswana’ (Hamed, 2009). In February 2010 tourism companies still believed that they were well positioned to benefit. Plans had been hatched by independent operators in collaboration with partners in participating nations (Selabe, 2010). However, as the event came closer, reports concerning the inflated nature of expectations started to emerge. As in SA, there was scepticism of MATCH. Botswanans thought the packages offered by MATCH were overpriced and were warned by government ‘to be careful when dealing with MATCH in procuring accommodation for the…World Cup’. This was because of the commission fees that MATCH would add to the costs. One of the problems with pre-bookings was the chance of cancellations (Mokgoabone, 2010b). In February 2010 it was reported that MATCH had cancelled 441,695 room nights in SA. No cancellation fees were paid. The likelihood was that the majority of bookings in the region would have been returned. By March 2010, Sun International (or Gaborone Sun) was allegedly the only service provider that had signed an agreement with FIFA because of its network of hotels in SADC (Mokgoabone, 2010b). By 23 May it had become apparent that the Botswanan tourism industry would not benefit in any ‘meaningful’ way (Sunday Standard, 2010c). From having ambitious hopes of benefiting, these expectations had been reduced to hoping that ‘tourists that will in future return to SA may include Botswana as a part of their package’ (ibid.).

The Namibian media material suggests that the NTB had unveiled a strategy to benefit from the event, which appeared to run independently of the Namibian 2010 task force (Ndjebela, 2009). These initiatives were encouraged by MATCH and SA organisers. Adam Brown from MATCH was quoted in the Namibian media as saying that ‘[i]t is not unreasonable to think that some Europeans or Americans will stay in

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[neighbouring countries] and will fly into the venue for the match’. This was supported by Didi Moyle, President of the SA Tourism Committee, who stated that ‘[d]uring the World Cup in 2006 [hosted in Germany], people from the Netherlands went to Germany for the day. There is no difference’ (Debut, 2009). However, the same article that quoted Brown and Moyle went on to note: ‘Despite the enthusiasm from neighbours and organisers, travel agencies admit they have received very few requests for bookings in SA’s neighbouring countries’ (ibid.).

Towards the end of 2009, the backbone underlying much of the planned regional tourism initiatives, the univisa, failed to be ready in time for the FWC. The idea of visitors moving between countries was seriously tested. An article in The Namibian (2010b) contended how ‘a false sense of hope was created with initiatives such as the highly publicised Univisa’. To remedy the situation, the SA government announced that it would ‘issue a special Event Visa to fans travelling to the country for the World Cup’. Ostensibly this visa allowed access to some SADC countries (Debut, 2009).

The day the FWC started, The Namibian (2010c) exclaimed how contrary to predictions ‘we may even face a downturn in our usually good tourist season…because of non-availability of flights and higher prices’. This did appear to happen. On balance, the event appeared to have had a negative effect on Namibian tourism. According to Shareen Thude, NTB's strategic executive for marketing, ‘there had been a sharp decline in tourist arrivals’ in 2010. Bank of Namibia Governor, Ipumbu Shiimi, echoed this saying that ‘the country's European tourist arrivals had plummeted and that the Namibian economy was not scoring from the FIFA World Cup in South Africa’ (Shigwedha, 2010). However, an editorial in the New Era noted that the ‘increasing influx of foreigners into South Africa for the world cup ha[d] left many South Africans
having to seek refuge elsewhere’ and that Namibia was the ‘preferred destination’ for these South Africans (New Era, 2010). This was aided by the fact that Namibian tourism authorities had resorted to drastic measures of dropping prices by 50% to attract tourists (Shigwedha, 2010).

Although South Africans were entering the country, this was apparently not enough to offset the losses incurred by a drop in the traffic from Europe. According to the Governor of the Bank of Namibia, the problem with this was that ‘the spending power of South African tourists was much lower than those of European tourists’ (ibid.). In addition, the number of tourists from SA was ‘not even a quarter of the number [Namibia] could…have welcomed’ (The Namibian, 2010b). The vague proclamations of tourism spin-offs during and around the event had undoubtedly created ‘a false sense of euphoria’, but as one analysis also rightfully pointed out, Namibia ‘lacked a holistic approach towards the World Cup campaign’ (ibid). Namibia attracted only 1,268 visitors as a result of the event (table 8.2).

The media material in Zimbabwe suggested that the Zimbabwean Tourism Minister, Walter Mzembi, was relying on SA’s National Strategic Plan for 2010 for his contention that up to ‘100,000 tourism arrivals and a revenue generation of $200 million [were to be expected] if all the enablers are in place’ (Muchinjo, 2010b). Such figures created hope that the event could help revive Zimbabwe’s flagging tourism industry. This was despite the fact that the ‘[g]overnment ha[d] only committed a paltry $13,6 million for the…rehabilitation of…tourism infrastructure’ (Zimbabwe Independent, 2010a). A month before the event ‘reality ha[d] dawned on people that…expectations had been raised too high without any substance on the ground’ (Zvobgo, 2010). After the FWC, it was clear that Zimbabwean tourism operators did not really benefit. A spokesperson for Rainbow Tourist Group in Zimbabwe, a company which had
developed an ‘escape the World Cup’ package conceded that ‘[i]t is unfortunate that we did not benefit immensely in monetary value, but we benefited from good publicity, and we are expecting increased traffic, post World Cup’ (Zimbabwe Independent, 2010b). Unfortunately, these expectations also proved unfounded.

The media material in Zambia suggests that the event also had a variable and overall negative effect on Zambian tourism. According to the chairperson of the Livingstone Tourism Association (LTA), Kingsley Lilamono, ‘[d]uring the first half of 2010, Livingstone recorded a drop in tourist arrivals compared to the same period last year’. He added that ‘[s]ome tourists preferred to travel after the World Cup as they were avoiding congestion during this period’ (Moonga, 2010). The President of the Hotel and Catering Association of Zambia, Felix Mulenga, stated that the tourism sector ‘had not performed well in 2010 compared to the past few years’. He added that ‘growth [was] averaging 40 percent compared to about 55 to 60 per cent the previous year’ (Muganya, 2011). In the end, Zambia was able to lure a negligible 1,852 visitors to the country (table 8.2).

8.5.3 Employment

Job creation was another area in which organisers promised benefits. The answers to question C (table 8.1) demonstrate that 77% of elite respondents interviewed thought that the event would create jobs in the region. Consistent with the pattern established above, Botswanans were more critical than the Zambians with 27% disagreeing with the statement as opposed to 6% of Zambians. A significant proportion of the total sample chose to remain neutral.

Jobs created through mega-events are typically temporary in nature and often menial. They also tend to be limited to the construction and service industries, with the
majority of the latter being based in the tourism industry. There is typically no significant broad-based transfer of skills. Grant Thornton estimated that the event would create 196,400 jobs in SA (Grant Thornton, 2007). Figures for the region were unavailable partly due to the difficult nature of determining employment directly triggered by the event. One would assume that the building of infrastructure and anticipation of increased tourism (that largely failed to materialise) would have led to employment opportunities. However, no compelling evidence emerged from the media material that the event had any tangible impact on employment in the region. In the case of Zambia, the major infrastructure projects were awarded to the Chinese, who are known to bring in their own people as labour (Corkin et. al. 2008: 8-9).

Data concerning the percentage of employees from outside of SA employed by the major construction companies of WBHO and Murray and Roberts on FWC projects in SA were unobtainable. Apparently they do not keep data on employees’ nationalities, and even if they did it would be difficult to ascertain exactly who worked on FWC-related projects. Vincent Roxer (05/20/10), former Director of Human Resources for WHBO, contended that the security company tasked with security at the Cape Town Stadium, Zuma Security, was comprised ‘entirely’ of Congolese people, about 120 in total. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that rather than provide a boon for employment in regional economies, the FWC led to a slight influx of migrants from the region looking for employment in the construction, crafts and tourism industries in SA. This excludes the entrepreneurs who were self-employed and came to SA seeking opportunities during the event (see 8.6.2). Whether the ‘pull’ of the event was able to strengthen SA’s skills-base or lead to ‘brain drain’ from the the region in favour of SA in the long-term seems doubtful. The prospects of the SA economy being able meaningfully to absorb these individuals beyond the event were questionable. One
article in Zimbabwe asked rhetorically: ‘What about our brothers and sisters who trekked down south for World Cup jobs…what will become of them?’ (Mzumara, 2010).

8.5.4 Improving the image of Africa

The FWC was also about improving the image of the region and continent and not only SA. In fact, analysts agreed that the major benefits for the region were likely to be of the intangible kind in terms of heightening its international profile and improving the overall image of the continent (Pillay et al., 2009).

The response to question D (table 8.1) illustrates that 68% of elite respondents believed that the event would help dispel Afro-pessimism, 20% chose to remain neutral and 11% disagreed with the statement. By country, Botswanans were once again the most critical of the three groups. The stakes were particularly high for SA to make the first African World Cup a success. An unsuccessful event would have demonstrated some kind of ‘competency deficit’, not only for the country but the entire continent. Kathy Sikombe (19/01/09), Programme Coordinator for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Zambia, stated bluntly: ‘If the event is hosted successfully Africa is no longer the dark continent’. In the lead-up to the event, politicians described the attacks by both local and international media on SA’s readiness to host the event, as a thinly veiled racist statement (Mantambo, 2006).

Great emphasis needed to be placed on protecting the international visitors as it could potentially take just one murder or a rape for negative stereotypes to be reinforced about Africa. However, Pieter Fourie (04/02/09), Professor of Communications Studies at the University of South Africa (UNISA), believed that international visitors were likely to be surprised by their SA experience:
Due to interpersonal communication people may help dispel Afro-pessimism. People are likely to be pleasantly surprised as they will be expecting something bad given the history of not only Africa, but South Africa with apartheid, poverty and racism. The reality is much more likely to be something more ordinary or normal and that their day-to-day experiences will be fine.

Yet, a distinction should be made between what the FWC would do for altering perceptions towards Africa on an international level and what it might do for intra-regional relations. This was alluded to by Bob Sichinga (27/01/09), former Zambian MP and now independent political and business consultant. He contended that: ‘Afro-pessimism would be relieved to the extent that an African country has hosted the games successfully but nothing would really be done for the region’. The event was undoubtedly likely to be a success at an international level, but was unlikely to significantly alter perceptions regionally.

Subsequent to the FWC the media material suggests that the event reflected well on the organisational ability of the continent. However, the more critical articles suggested that the event, although a success, was likely to do nothing for Africa; it was a South African and not an African success. The media in Botswana suggested that the event had successfully ‘remove[d] the stigma attached to Black Africa, as a dark continent, renowned only for wars, disease and poverty’ (Botswana Guardian, 2010). Yet, an alternative viewpoint suggested that ‘Botswana ha[d] never been part…of this tournament’. It went on to note that ‘South Africans have successfully managed to portray Botswana as just another province of South Africa’ (Serite, 2010).

In Zimbabwe, the government-owned The Herald proclaimed ‘Africa stands tall’ and described the event as ‘incident-free’ (quoted in Muckracker, 2010), whilst the outspoken columnist for the Zimbabwe Independent, known only as Muckracker, suggested that SA’s success will not ‘rub off on Zimbabwe’ and that the FWC was ‘a South African achievement’ (ibid.). Drawing from Franz Fanon’s seminal work, an
article in the *Zimbabwe Standard* contended how ‘the circumstances of the vast majority of us Africans as *the wretched of the earth* have not changed an iota’ as a result of SA’s hosting of the event (Kumbuka, 2010).

The event was also seen as a success beyond SADC. About ten days into the event the Nigerian *Daily Independent* gave the event its stamp of endorsement describing how SA had unveiled ‘the new Africa as envisioned by the Mandelas, Mbekis and Zumais of this continent...You cannot but feel proud being an African’ (Amaechi, 2010). In the lead-up to the event, the ‘shared doubts [in the SA and international media] about the capacity of a black South African government to host these games’ (Daniels, 2010) were not taken to kindly in Nigeria. An article in the Nigerian *Next* newspaper bluntly stated that ‘South Africa ha[d] proven the Afropessimist who thought we will fail wrong’ (Ashebu, 2011).

The incidents where labour unrest nearly unsettled the FWC were noted in section 8.3, but these did not draw serious attention in the regional media, and certainly not in way that overshadowed the success of the event. The political situation in SA had indeed settled since the period leading up to the 2009 elections (3.5). As a result, SA’s local political issues did not feature in the regional media material.

### 8.5.5 Investment

Mega-events are also believed to bring immediate investment opportunities through the major infrastructure projects and upgrading of facilities in preparation for the event, and also in the longer-term through the increased and improved profile of host countries and regions. At a time of global financial crisis, investments associated with the event were believed to have buoyed the SA economy. The opportunities for investment were understood to be extended to the region.
Attitudes in the region reflected this positive outlook. Responses to question E (table 8.1) demonstrate that 70% of elite respondents believed that the event would enhance investment in the region. Botswana was once again the most negative of the three countries. The reasons for optimism were the intangible and long-term benefits that were supposed to flow from the event. It was thought that the event would also change the mindset of the world and dispel myths about the continent. The FWC was therefore not only SA’s but Africa’s big chance to project itself to the international community and prove that it had the necessary infrastructure to support investment. As Mosetsanagape Maribe (01/12/08), Head of News and Current Affairs for Botswana Television (BTV), stated: ‘There is a sense that the countries of the region understand each other, but that very little is known of Africa internationally.’ Related to this was the educational role played by the event in reducing international ignorance of the geography of Africa. Diana Games (03/02/09), Chief Executive of Africa@Work and former President of the Nigeria-South Africa Business Chamber, believed that an event of this nature could lead to a more nuanced and differentiated understanding of African states, as Africa is a highly complex and varied continent: Effectively she said, ‘the opposite of what the organisers [were] trying to project’. Tula Dlamini (04/02/09), Researcher in the SABC, phrased this sentiment in a particularly interesting way contending that ‘South Africa is Africa for beginners; a good introduction’. But the extent to which the region would really benefit from increased investment as a result of heightened awareness caused by the event remained far from certain.

The media material presented in 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 suggests that the SADC states had hoped to benefit from the increased media exposure as a result of the event. However, as Tony Twine, a senior economist at Econometrix in SA noted on the region’s expectations: ‘Nobody really expects investments made during the World Cup
to show a positive return in the same year. We may have to wait for between two and five years’. Twine added that it was unfortunate that the host, SA, was the only SADC country that had a team in the FWC (*Sunday Standard*, 2010d).

African states that participated in the event had hoped to benefit from the media attention. *Next* newspaper in Nigeria expressed a common but erroneous view held by African nations that ‘[t]he hosting of the World Cup on African soil will also have implications for businesses…especially for the countries participating in the tournament’ (*Next*, 2010). In 8.4.2 it was mentioned that Nigerian authorities sought to establish two ‘tourism villages’ to showcase the country during the event. One village was established in Johannesburg, which was really a decorated building that consisted of various displays and events to promote Nigerian culture.  

However, no evidence emerged in the media material suggesting that Nigeria had benefited from its appearance in the tournament. There was some evidence to suggest a correlation between Nigeria’s poor performance in the tournament and a loss of revenue. Nigeria was considered to have underperformed by not reaching the second round of the tournament. Due to Nigeria’s ‘early’ exit ‘[a]dvertising agencies in Nigeria lost a whopping N500 million…The amount represents fees and sundry revenue for unexecuted but planned campaigns’ (Okuhu, 2010).

Although business opportunities in SA were subject to FIFA merchandising laws and exclusionary zones, outside the regulated spaces there were opportunities through which the participating nations could market their nations competitively. Yet such initiative appeared to be lacking. In a strong article titled ‘World Cup: A missed opportunity for African nations’, Diana Games (2010) lamented the marketing opportunities by West African states in particular:

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Unless I have missed something, Africa north of the Limpopo has missed the branding opportunity of the decade...Classy billboards in Sandton flagging Nigeria as an investment opportunity or Ghana as a tourist destination would link these states to the success of the tournament and highlight their competitive edge...There have been some glimpses of the rest of Africa... [but] they will be forgotten in the minds of the thousands of foreign fans still enjoying Brand SA.

Given the success of the event outlined in 8.5.4, it is fair to assume that SA benefited as an investment destination, and certainly more than its neighbours. To some extent, SA’s hosting of the event would have played into the perception of SA as the gateway to doing business in the region and possibly the continent. However, soon after the event much of the good work appeared to come undone. The buoyed investor confidence in SA seemed to give way as a result of rising economic and political concerns. This was due to the debates on the nationalisation of mines; problems with SA labour law; and a persistent concern that high poverty levels and a lack of meaningful economic transformation might lead to widespread violence in SA, similar to the wave of uprisings in North Africa (see 9.1.5.7).

8.5.6 Media and ICT

Lastly, it is believed that one of the primary means through which the region will benefit is through the enhancement of media and ICT facilities and infrastructure. The New Partnerships for Africa’s Development Information and Communications Technology Broadband Infrastructure Net (Uhurunet) was a $2 billion submarine cable to link Africa to India, the Middle-East, Europe and Brazil.22 This initiative was part of the drive to increase telecommunications capacity ahead of the event. Accordingly, the responses to question F (table 8.1) demonstrate that 81% of elite respondents believed

that the FWC would enhance media and ICT facilities and infrastructure in the region, 11% disagreed and 9% chose to remain neutral.

Yet, in reality, the event was likely to allow the SA telecommunications companies to gain a firmer footing in African markets. SA’s telecommunication expansion into Africa is the most lucrative industrial sector of those active in Africa. MTN, a global sponsor of the event, is the most successful SA company active in Africa (Tleane, 2006). Digital Satellite Television (DSTV) has also had exceptional success in Africa.

DSTV broadcasts to more than forty African countries. It was a FIFA requirement that the host nation had to have such a satellite service in place (Pillay et al., 2009). As the state broadcaster of SA, the SABC was the official broadcaster of the event (Dlamini, 04/02/09). DSTV was the official pay-television broadcaster of the event (Zimbabwe Independent, 2009). SABC channels are also aired on the DSTV platform throughout Africa. The FWC would seemingly aid in expanding DSTV membership in Africa through high quality coverage of the event. This came at a subscription cost, but the coverage was likely to be superior to state channels, even if state broadcasters had acquired the rights to air the games. In many African countries this was doubtful, making DSTV the only means to see all the FWC games live. FIFA strongly forbade unlicensed broadcasters to air the games on radio, internet or television (Danquah, 2009).

The media material in Zimbabwe suggested that ‘[i]f by some fluke ZBC [Zimbabwean Broadcasting Corporation] TV secures rights to screen a few games, Zesa’s [Zimbabwe’s electricity regulator] unreliability can be relied on to stand in the way’ (Mudzwiti, 2010). The Namibian media material suggests that the Namibia Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) had provided an alternative to watching the games on
DSTV by broadcasting fifty-six of the FWC games live. The remaining eight had a delayed broadcast (Nunuhe, 2010). The pattern throughout SADC would have been fairly mixed. The less privileged would have watched on state channels and those who could afford it on DSTV.

However, the SA telecommunication companies tended to make more substantial inroads in what could be called the ‘frontier markets’ – those markets beyond SADC – as a result of its hosting of the event. Those in participating nations were particularly keen to watch the games in high definition. In Nigeria, DSTV sales went up by 30% as the FWC started, thereby loosening the Nigerian-owned HiTV’s monopoly on the pay television market in Africa’s most populous country (Okonenedo, Egugozie and Uzo Jr, 2010). Shortly before the World Cup, MTN also launched its DSTV mobile in Nigeria, which enabled subscribers to watch football games on their cell phones, demonstrating an interesting collusion between the SA-owned companies (ibid.). An article in the Vanguard stated: ‘MTN in conjunction with Multichoice, [are] opening up and deepening the television space in Nigeria’ (Okoruwa, 2008).

The telecommunications market in Africa is competitive with much scope for growth. MTN’s decision to be ‘Africa’s first global sponsor’ of the event was a calculated one owing to its desire to shut out competition and grow its share of the African market. Leading up to the FWC, MTN was particularly active in West and Central Africa (WECA) where the participating nations were coming from. One such nation was Ghana where one account estimated that MTN commanded ‘some eight million out of the close to 15 million mobile phone subscribers in the country’. In 2010, as a further sign of their growing dominance in the country, MTN confirmed that the Head office of the WECA region would be based in Ghana (Nonor, 2010).

In Ghana, the rights to broadcast the event were distributed across broadcasters giving them all the chance ‘to earn some income’ (Danquah, 2009). For those who could afford it, DSTV was likely to be more popular. Although it varied from one broadcaster to the next, benefits accruing to local broadcasters were considered minimal largely due to the ‘so-called authorized broadcasting agents of the World Cup being stingy in their dealings with…local broadcasters’ (Public Agenda, 2010).

To support the interests of the GBM complex, much hope of benefiting – however improbable and baseless – was created in the region. Meanwhile, SA and international corporates moved into the region to secure the major contracts and strengthen their position in African markets. By the time it became apparent that the region would not benefit in any substantial way, it was too late.

8.6 The 2010 Football World Cup and its effects on South Africa’s regional standing

Table 8.3: What overall impact will the event have on South Africa’s standing in the region? (percentages rounded off to the nearest whole number)

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<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<td><strong>b. It will enhance SA's legitimacy as the regional leader</strong></td>
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c. It will increase dependency on SA in the region and deepen inequalities

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*The first row of each question comprises the total sample of Botswana, Zambia and SA. The next three rows consist of the individual countries.

8.6.1 South Africa as a regional leader

Table 8.3 demonstrates interesting results. Whilst there is much evidence to suggest that the FWC would reinforce SA’s role as the regional leader, a more nuanced reading suggests that the reasons are attributed to its significant structural power in the region and not necessarily a growing penetration of its ideological power. For instance, the responses to question A demonstrate that a cumulative 72% agreed that the FWC would reinforce SA’s role as the leading power in the region and reinforce its sub-imperialist tendencies. The results were consistent throughout the three countries. However, a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, those who believed that the FWC would enhance the attractiveness and appeal of the SA state, and on the other hand, a resignation to the might of the SA state due to its structural power. This distinction was well demonstrated by Outsa Mokone (27/11/08):

> 2010 is closely aligned to the imperialist project of South Africa. The continent also needs to feel good, which has nothing to do with South Africa per se [sic]. The event will not change African perceptions of South Africa but they still want it to be a success.

The separation between the SA state and the FWC itself – and what each conjures up in Africans’ minds – is instructive and points to the two types of power at work. The fact

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24 Although this question was part of a larger matrix of questions on the actual interview schedule it did not come first in ordinal value as that could potentially be construed as a leading question. However, for purposes of this discussion it is presented first.
that infrastructurally SA was (according to the FIFA inspection team) the only country in Africa that could host an ‘excellent’ event in 2010, should not automatically be conflated with an enhancement of its ideological power. SA’s ability to host the event was attributable to its structural power – ironically, an apartheid legacy. Africans wanted the event to be a success because an African state was hosting it. Thus Mosetsanagape Maribe (01/12/08) believed that SA was a suitable nation to represent the continent ‘in terms of infrastructure’ but ‘not morally, politically or culturally’.

Related to the above question was the assumption that SA’s hosting of the FWC would in some way act as an enabler or legitimacy enhancer for the SA state in the region. The answers to question B demonstrate that a cumulative 61% agreed that the event would enhance SA’s legitimacy as the regional leader. By far the majority of Botswanans and 57% of South Africans agreed with this statement whilst there was a much more even spread in Zambia. Despite such expectations Outsa Mokone (27/11/08) believed that ‘through exclusion [the event will] serve to divide the region’. Although at a popular level, the event certainly provided entertainment for African citizens, the media material presented in 8.5.1 to 8.5.6 suggests that the event, contrary to expectations of elite members, was disappointing for regional business owners and government officials.

8.6.2 Who benefits?

The question of who benefits through the hosting of such events is particularly important. The answers to question C reveal a small majority believing that the event would not increase regional dependence on SA, although a majority of Botswana respondents took the opposite view. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the event will reinforce an already skewed relationship between SA and the region. The
benefits have largely accrued to SA elite members, big businesses and state-connected beneficiaries and not to African SMEs, and certainly not to those on the urban periphery and in poor, rural areas. However, SA corporates are part of a bigger global pattern of capital accumulation, enacting their role as sub-imperial agents. In a column published in the Ghanaian newspaper *Public Agenda* (2010), titled ‘Why it is not an African World Cup’, the following point was made:

*The reason for saying that the benefit of the World Cup to South Africa will be minimal is...that...it is FIFA’s World Cup and by extension the big multi-national companies that are often involved in World Cups. These include McDonalds, Adidas, Nike, Coca-Cola, Sony and PepsiCo...African owned businesses are only getting a tiny fraction of the advertising revenue and so forth whilst the big Western and Asian companies have creamed the lion’s share of the advertising revenue and cashed in on consumers buying their products.*

The African SMEs in the tourism, security and craft sectors that came to SA hoping to benefit, would have struggled to contend with the FIFA merchandising laws and exclusionary zones, just as the locals did (8.3). Therefore, foreigners would have relied on informal trade outside of the controlled spaces, with diminished returns as a result.

In addition, official bodies and partners linked to the tournament were also more likely to contract big businesses to manufacture African craft curios and paraphernalia, such as scarves and flags, associated with the event. Diana Games (2010) described how ‘the wooden souvenir soccer players licensed by FIFA for sale in South Africa’s shopping malls over the World Cup tournament had been made to order in Indonesia, with just their team outfits being painted on in South Africa’. She concluded that ‘[t]his is strange, given the longstanding expertise in West Africa’ of making wooden figurines, especially in places such as the Accra markets. A combination of limited access enforced by FIFA to protect its sponsors and profits, and strong competition from local cartels, would have proved challenging for African SMEs, particularly in the prevailing climate of xenophobia.
8.7 Conclusion

SA’s GBM complex, in collusion with international elite members and multi-national corporations, was effective in accumulating capital in the region preceding and during the FWC. At the same time, the weight of evidence presented in this chapter has suggested that there were no real benefits accruing to the region. The disjuncture between rhetoric and reality had exposed the manipulation and extractive behaviour of the GBM complex; ultimately, it demonstrated the paternalism in the discourse of an ‘African’ Games. This was notwithstanding a genuine concern by the SA government and the private sector that the tournament was so big that it had to earnestly solicit the region to host teams and football fans. However, as the tournament approached, it became clear that the estimates were false and the potential returns on the FWC started to diminish, especially with the onset of the recession in 2008. At that stage the prospects of a truly ‘African’ World Cup started making less sense financially and these claims started to retreat. It was increasingly apparent that these assertions were operating at a rhetorical level.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction: Assessment of central questions, subsidiary questions and main aim

This final chapter deals with the findings of this thesis within the context of the central and subsidiary questions, and the main aim of the study as stated in 1.1. The chapter draws conclusions to situate the thesis within the wider research context. It will also indicate areas for future research.

9.1.1 Central question 1: Is it correct to speak of South Africa’s (SA’s) sub-imperialism? Does this still have relevance in post-apartheid southern Africa? Is the government-business-media (GBM) complex an effective way to analyse sub-imperialism and are there any noticeable weaknesses with the theory?

The first sub-question posed as part of central question 1 is important to the overall argument of the thesis. In Chapter 1 it was noted that many academics choose not to use the term ‘sub-imperialism’. The terms ‘regional power’ and ‘regional hegemon’ are considered more acceptable. However, experiences from the interviews suggest that elite members were generally responsive to the term ‘sub-imperialism’, although this did vary according to the nationality of the respondent and the sector in which he or she was based.

An overview of the interview data gathered in Botswana, Zambia and SA suggests that respondents can be divided into three general groups. The first group believed that sub-imperialism is not the ‘correct’ word to describe SA’s relations with
the region. Although post-apartheid SA’s corporates and parastatals have expanded into the region, they believe that this expansion is merely profit-driven. This viewpoint is grounded in the assumption that the term implies a form of negative intent. Members of this group were primarily based in government and business. They were also mostly South Africans. It can be inferred that this group felt that the rhetoric projected by SA state and corporate elite members can – at some level – be taken at face value.

The second group, a slightly smaller group than the first, believed that although SA is dominant in the region, it has not done enough to be considered a sub-imperial power. In particular, this group would argue that SA has not done enough to capture African markets, a basic prerequisite for a sub-imperial power. Therefore, to call SA a sub-imperial power is to bestow upon it an ‘honour’ too great. They also argued that SA does not enjoy the necessary support from the region.

The majority of respondents fell into the third category. Most of these respondents were based in Botswana and Zambia. This group was comfortable with the term and understood SA’s sub-imperialism as a historical process of capital accumulation within southern Africa, centred on mining. They realise that this process was initially driven by British imperialism and then Afrikaner nationalism and that elite members have continued to benefit from an uneven regional economy into the post-apartheid phase. They generally believe that the rhetoric of the current SA government is used to facilitate such accumulation over space.

This thesis has argued that the third group is the most accurate in their assessment of the situation. Despite the obvious controversy over the term, the weight of evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the relationship between government and business is centred on spatially expanded rounds of accumulation involving
networking by elite members based in government, business and media, who support each other in the pursuit of capital accumulation.

Through a historical geographical analysis adopted in Chapter 3, this study began to demonstrate why sub-imperialism is still valid in post-apartheid SA. Chapter 3 illustrated that the core of the economy has remained relatively entrenched in the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) tending to maintain ownership in the hands of a few, whilst dispossessing the majority and exacerbating regional inequality. This gave rise to a ruling oligarchy directly involved in politics or able to influence politics. Elite formation was inextricably linked to the formation of the dominant classes and the dominant classes comprised the critical mass of people controlling government, business and media – the GBM complex.

It was further argued that the powerful elite remain fairly ‘hidden’ from public scrutiny primarily through the conglomerate-owned holding companies, shrouding the obvious connection in ownership of companies. This group, however ‘shrouded’ and overseas-based, continues to play a major role in SA politics and the economy whilst continuing to benefit from historical regional inequality in the post-apartheid phase. However, Chapter 4 suggested that by analysing the foreign policy, business engagement and cultural-media of post-apartheid SA, it is possible to expose the GBM complex for its underlying motive of capital accumulation. Chapter 4 provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate collusion between the spheres of government and business, and how elite members based in these spheres have developed a mutually beneficial relationship with each other. As discussed in more detail below, Chapters 5 to 8 provided further evidence of specific aspects closely related to the working of the GBM complex: SA’s parastatal expansion; SA’s engagement in regional peace
initiatives; a historical migration policy skewed in its favour; and SA’s hosting of mega-
events purportedly on behalf of the region.

Chapters 3 and 4 provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate strong mutual
interests and collaborative efforts within the sectors comprising the GBM complex. The
strength of the theory of the GBM complex, as presented in this thesis, stems from the
network of relationships driving sub-imperialism and the mandates given to elite
members in these processes. It was demonstrated that the elite members concerned are
driven by a common ‘impulse’ to accumulate capital.

An issue which was implicitly raised in Chapters 3 and 4, was whether
government or business was the leading protagonist. The theory of the GBM complex
implies a causal link or high degree of ‘intentionality’ by elite members in driving
processes of capital accumulation over space. Although the GBM complex allows for an
examination of the relationships between government and business, caution should be
exercised when assuming that it is either business or the state who is the main
protagonist – that it is exclusively driven by or the other. Demonstrating that there is
indeed a relationship is not necessarily the same as describing the direction or strength
of the relationship. As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, the relationship between
government and business is sometimes contradictory and is not always in harmony. The
secondary material discussed in Chapter 3 suggested that state elite members play a key
facilitating role through which business is able to actualise the goal of capital
accumulation. This was corroborated in Chapter 4, although the analysis in 4.3.1
suggested that government and business frequently alternate in driving this process
depending on the issues involved.

Both government and business elite members deny that they are primarily
driving the processes of capital accumulation. This was well summed-up by two
respondents who were asked more directly whether they believe SA is displaying sub-imperialist tendencies in Africa. SA’s Trade and Industry Minister, Rob Davies (27/03/08), blamed business for the perception of the country as imperialistic. When asked whether SA is a sub-imperial power, he stated: ‘Not the government, but some corporates are’. However, the corporate elite respondents were blaming the government for this perception. Corporate elite respondent John Philips (17/11/08) stated that SA is a sub-imperial power ‘[a]t a political level’ but ‘not at a business level’. Philips explained: ‘Imperialism is driven by the state, but there is no state support for business, no tax benefits from the state’ (ibid.). However, respondents were clearly aware of the relationship between government and business.

Related to the above point, is a cautionary note about the purported ‘fixity’ or coherence of the GBM complex, when such coherence does not necessarily exist. It is important to incorporate or allow for the ‘messiness’ of the social world, and acknowledge the potential for actors in the spheres of government, business and media, and related areas, to act independently of the GBM complex. For example, whilst drawing from the work of Mitchell (2002), in her discussion about how ‘experts’ maintain the military-industrial complex through affective labour, Lutz (2011) notes that these ‘experts have often been unaware that their objects [or workers and citizens being treated as objects]…exist nowhere so much as in the imagination and social practices of these professionals themselves’ (904), than in actual real terms.

A critical assessment of the GBM complex would also suggest that one cannot assume too much about the strength or reach of SA’s ideological power in the region. The extent of SA’s influence as a result of its cultural-media was generally difficult to ascertain. The evidence presented in 4.5.1 suggests that Western media purveyed through SA-owned media should not necessarily be conflated with SA’s influence
through its media. This reinforces the idea of SA as a ‘sub’ imperial power by being a purveyor of Western media, rather than being indicative of the strength or popularity of SA’s own media. Claims put forward about the strength of SA’s ideological power need to be substantiated further through in-depth content analysis of SA media in the region. This would assist in understanding whether SA media promote ‘African’ values and ideals consistent with the claims by state and corporate elite members, or ‘South African’ values and ideals. For example, is SABC International an African, a South African or a Western ‘voice’?

9.1.2 Central question 2: What are the geographies of the GBM complex? What are counter-imperialist discourses? How are they analysed and is there evidence of counter-imperialist discourses to SA’s sub-imperialism?

In Chapters 3 and 4 it was argued that the GBM complex operates at the national, regional and international scales, although the focus of this study has been on the regional scale. Geographies of the GBM complex operate through networks established between government, business and media elite members, within the borders of SA, but also through the transnational flows of information, capital and goods between elite members in the region and beyond. These networks play a defining role in the day-to-day decision-making and executable functioning of the state; the type, nature and locations of business transactions and trade; and, the role of the media in influencing citizens. Such geographies operate on trading floors, in boardrooms during high level policy deliberations, and in newsrooms where editorial decisions are made (Chapters 3 to 8).

This study has argued that the geographies of the GBM complex span both public and private spaces, and ‘open’ and ‘hidden’ spaces. Lutz (2011: 903), who wrote
the conclusion for the special edition of *Antipode* on the military-industrial complex (1.3.4.2), refers to ‘invisible’ war workers in the military-industrial complex. In a similar manner, practices within the GBM complex are sometimes ‘hidden’ from the public, occurring behind closed doors during meetings between state and corporate elite members. When such ‘hidden’ practices between elite members are exposed they are often labelled as corruption, collusion or insider trading (Chapters 4 and 8).

Lutz (2011: 904) also talks about the ‘experts’ and their affective ‘work’ in maintaining the military-industrial complex. The ‘experts’ and ‘workers’ in the GBM complex are those who play a role in maintaining a discourse favouring neo-liberalism and who are assumed to be following the lead of elite members. They could be journalists, marketers, advertisers, academics, managers or civil servants (Chapters 3 to 8). They need not be powerful, but can play a small role in maintaining the discourses which support the GBM complex through funding patterns, recruitment and training, and the encouragement of certain lifestyle and consumption choices (Chapters 4 to 8). They use corporate spaces and government-owned property and goods. They operate through the technologies of formal contracts; public-private partnerships; ‘revising doors’ between universities, commercial research, businesses and government; informal ties and favours based on race, ethnicity, nationality, familial relations or other forms of affiliation; kick-backs; patronage; tip-offs; and even bribery. Most obviously, the ‘workers’ gather around government tenders and other major construction projects or public works including the building of roads, hotels, airports and stadia (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 8). Less obviously, these ‘workers’ act as agents maintaining the GBM complex by seeking to inculcate sentiments in their support through the media, commercial research and other information systems (Chapters 3 and 4).
The geographies of the GBM complex are therefore to be found not only in the ‘everyday’ activities of the working spaces, but are pervasive throughout popular culture and the domestic spheres. These geographies are modelled on a culture of conspicuous consumption and are evident throughout the shopping malls (see Miller 2008 for a discussion on SA shopping malls in Africa), magazines, newspapers, television and movies (Chapter 4). Popular geopolitical elements should therefore also be taken seriously in the analysis of the GBM complex and their role in articulating counter-imperialist discourses (see 9.1.5).

This thesis has argued that regional counter-imperialist discourses are discourses which are constructed when regional elite members use discursive formations to assert claims in the face of domination by the sub-imperial state. The objective of these discourses is to question the ‘normalcy’ of regional inequality and, more broadly, the prevailing global inequality seen as a ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ by-product of globalisation and neo-liberalism. The elite members responsible for constructing these discourses are typically based in government, business, cultural-media and other civic institutions. It was shown how such discourses are instrumental in forming a societal response to, and systematic rejection of, the dominant state’s accumulation over space.

Chapter 4 demonstrated that it is important to take three main areas into account when investigating regional counter-imperialist discourses: state-to-state engagement through foreign policy and trade, business engagement, and cultural-media.

This thesis demonstrated how counter-imperialist discourses towards the SA state ultimately contest the power and control exercised in the region. They are typically manifested by questioning imbalances in trade and compliance with macro-economic neo-liberalism and political policies in regional economic communities or unions. Such
discourses could also stem from a more loosely defined geographical formation with its own ‘territorial logic of power’ (Harvey, 2005: 101), as demonstrated by the variable geographies of resistance throughout Chapters 5 to 8 (see also 9.1.5.2). Counter-imperialist discourses towards the SA state assume that although multilateral trade agreements and industrial policy are put in place through practical geopolitical channels, on-going lobbying efforts within the region occur parallel to this and involve an array of formal and popular geopolitical actors and sectors – giving greater agency to the region (Chapter 4). Such ‘pressure’ is ultimately aimed at altering the ‘unevenness’ and ‘asymmetrical development’ of trade and industry within regional ‘communities’ and particularly in SACU, where SA’s dominance is greater on account of its influence over a common market. Counter-imperialist discourses responding to SA are therefore typically stronger in the customs union, due to direct competition and higher levels of dependency. In the customs union regional governments work closely with business to provide ‘resistance’ to SA on issues of ‘protection’ and ‘customs duties’ for its industries (4.3.4). A contestation of SA’s overall economic and social ‘vision’ towards the region also occurs, as regional countries typically have their own initiatives and national development plans which need to be integrated into the one imposed upon them (4.3.3). Counter-imperialist discourses directed at the SA state also question the government’s political values, and the extent to which its policies and elite are perceived to be living up to these values both domestically and abroad. Such discourses also typically emerge in the face of incongruence between the actions of government and business (4.3).

This thesis has argued that counter-imperialist discourses directed at SA's Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) manifest through resistance in local markets and various civic institutions. They are typically
constructed when governments work with businesses, unions and the NGO sector to represent the interest of the local workers and consumers, and sometimes intervene directly in labour disputes. Such discourses are also constructed when concerned ministries choose to address issues of ‘fairness’ and ‘competition’ in response to MNCs or state-created monopolies (Chapters 4, 5 and 8). This also occurs more indirectly through regulators and boards that serve to constrain action by corporates and SOEs, and create the conditions for sufficient local competition to emerge. Often such regulators are independent from government, but work to protect the ‘public interest’. The governments of smaller states in southern Africa are eager to attract FDI and are rather unquestioning (at least initially) of the implications for local manufacturers and producers. Corporates primarily dispossess local communities through the repatriation of profits to the MNC’s headquarters and through the use of supply chains linked to SA. This corresponds closely with Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (4.4). Once this pattern has been established a more critical backlash toward the practices and procurement policies of SA’s corporates and state-owned enterprises occurs, particularly when the countries have become ‘vulnerable’ due to increased dependency for basic goods and services, largely due to a lack of independent planning (Chapters 4 and 5).

This thesis has demonstrated how counter-imperialist discourses in southern Africa are primarily conveyed through the media and commercial research, who adopt a ‘fact-creating’ as well as activist role. The policy and think-tank community works in tandem with the media to expose the policies of SA’s GBM complex, by bringing the issues mentioned above into the public domain. Both the government-owned and especially the independent media play an important role in marshalling government and business into action, and aid in effecting change in policy (Chapters 4 to 8).
9.1.3 Central question 3: Given SA’s GBM complex, what has been the impact of the following on SA's geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses: the energy crisis; SA’s handling of the Zimbabwean crisis; the xenophobia attacks; and the 2010 Football World Cup? What has been the impact of these events on perceptions of SA’s regional standing and its broader sub-imperialism?

For purposes of answering the first sub-question of central question 3, it is important to note that the four thematic case studies discussed in this thesis were crucial in identifying important aspects relating to the geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses of the GBM complex. However, within all the case studies, significant contradictions were evident in what the intended messages of the GBM complex were, and what the data gathered in the region actually suggested. This gave rise to strong counter-imperialist discourses further compromising the GBM complex and exposing it for its underlying motive of capital accumulation.

As noted in Chapter 1, a dominant feature of the GBM complex is the expansion of parastatals into the region to facilitate capital accumulation within a ‘fixed space’. The dominant geopolitical ‘script’ articulated through the GBM complex was centred on the mutual benefits of regional integration. This is because the success of the sub-imperial state’s capital accumulation partly rests on its ability to persuade regional states that the expansion of its state-owned enterprises and businesses is also in their interests. Chapter 5 demonstrated how Eskom had created a ‘fixed market’ to sustain its regional monopoly through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). However, the evidence presented in this chapter suggested that the energy crisis resulted in strong counter-imperialist discourses by governments, businesses and media in Botswana and Namibia in SACU, and Zambia and Zimbabwe in SADC. Ultimately, these counter-
imperialist discourses exposed Eskom for its monopoly practices. It was highlighted how as a result of the SA government’s poor planning, energy security of the entire region was under threat.

The theory stated in Chapter 1 further outlined how a sub-imperial state seeks to increase its ideological power by engaging in peace initiatives throughout the region. The GBM complex relies on its ideological power to create conditions which are favourable for its capital accumulation within a ‘fixed space’. Chapter 6 demonstrated how mediating a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe was an important part of this strategy. However, this chapter demonstrated how counter-imperialist discourses by mainly the Botswanan and Zambian governments, businesses and media, exposed SA’s peace initiatives for its self-interest, as they were seen as being somewhat baseless and ‘hollow’. In Chapter 6 this was demonstrated by an indifference towards the ‘actual’ suffering of people in Zimbabwe, and a predilection to understanding conflicts as elitist constructs.

A recurring thread throughout the theory stated in Chapter 1, is that the ethos of ‘mutual reciprocity’ underlying regional integration is a necessary condition for a sub-imperial state’s capital accumulation within a ‘fixed space’. Chapter 7 brought this issue into sharp focus. This chapter demonstrated how the state and corporate elite members had promoted the ideas of a ‘Rainbow Nation’ and ‘African Renaissance’, amongst other initiatives, to create discursive instruments encouraging the free movement of capital and people within the region. However, the counter-imperialist discourses constructed by governments, businesses and media in Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia in SADC, and Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia beyond SADC, exposed a significant disjuncture between, on the one hand, the regional geopolitical
and geoeconomic discourses promulgated by the GBM complex to support its capital accumulation, and on the other, the growing discourse of xenophobia in SA.

Chapter 1 also identified the hosting of mega-events on behalf of the region as a strategy used by state and corporate elite members within the GBM complex to strengthen the sub-imperial state’s ideological power and engage in expanded rounds of capital accumulation. This is achieved through the creation of discursive instruments used to generate regional support and spark the construction of major infrastructure projects throughout the region. Chapter 8 demonstrated how in the case of SA’s hosting of the Football World Cup (FWC) the GBM complex was instrumental in creating unrealistic expectations of how the region might benefit, whilst simultaneously allowing SA and global corporates a ‘fixed space’ for an expanded round of capital accumulation. Yet the counter-imperialist discourses in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Zambia in SADC, and Nigeria and Ghana beyond SADC, laid bare the difference between rhetoric and reality: the lack of tangible benefits for the region after the event, as opposed to the scale of promises and erroneous estimates made by the GBM complex before the event. Ultimately, this demonstrated the paternalism in the discourse of an ‘African’ Games.

The second sub-question under central question 3 asks what impact did these events have on perceptions of SA’s regional standing and its broader sub-imperialism? To answer this, further evidence can be drawn from the case studies. Using qualitative and quantitative data, 5.8 demonstrated how a racialised discourse concerning the competency of a black-led SA government to maintain SA’s strong infrastructure had arisen in the region as a result of the energy crisis. This was particularly in light of a purported connection between policies such as affirmative action and a decline in skills, infrastructure and service delivery in SA. Quantitative data suggested that the majority of respondents believed that the energy crisis is suggestive of a broader crisis in SA

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which will ultimately lead to SA’s decline as the regional economic leader. SA’s image as a regional business destination was also affected. Large energy-consuming investments in SA, mostly in mining, had to be actively discouraged due to a lack of energy. SA’s new power generating infrastructure was to only come online in 2013 at which point it was assumed that businesses could expect a considerably more reliable energy supply. Further quantitative data suggested that there was an even spread of elite members who felt that the energy crisis was indicative of SA’s sub-imperialism in crisis. A slight majority of Zambian elite members thought that this was the case.

It was further argued in 6.6 that SA’s poor mediation in Zimbabwe had had a severe impact on its legitimacy in the region. Using qualitative and quantitative data it was demonstrated how SA’s handling of the matter had affected the credibility of Mbeki’s African Renaissance. Discourse material suggested that SA’s mediation had played into the interests of the Zimbabwean elite when placed within the wider context of a historical power struggle between Zimbabwe and SA, largely because it detracted from post-apartheid SA’s claim to be able to exercise regional influence. Quantitative evidence further indicated a perceived decline in SA’s moral authority and legitimacy as a result of its mediation in Zimbabwe. Using discourse material it was added that the negotiations in Zimbabwe were compromised by the leadership struggle in SA, resulting in an agreement being signed prematurely. The premature signing of the agreement contributed towards an untenable power-sharing arrangement in Zimbabwe.

Section 7.8 demonstrated how the xenophobia attacks had harmed SA’s image as a regional power. The qualitative and quantitative data suggested that the attacks had cut to the heart of regional integration given their potential to act as a deterrent for migrants. Discourse material demonstrated concern over whether the SA government would adequately address the root causes of the violence. However, quantitative
evidence suggested that the attacks alone were not ‘significant’ enough to divert capital and people away from SA or alter the balance of power in the region in the long term. A plurality of respondents in Botswana and Zambia indicated that the attacks were indicative of SA’s sub-imperialism in crisis.

Relying on qualitative and quantitative data, it was argued in 8.6 that SA won the rights to host the FWC based on the strength of its infrastructure and not its popularity as a regional representative. Although the quantitative data suggested that the World Cup would enhance SA’s legitimacy as the regional leader, the discursive data indicated that caution should be exercised when assuming that the World Cup played a significant role in shoring up SA’s ideological power or legitimacy as a regional leader. Further discourse material demonstrated that the region did not benefit through the event, with foreign-owned businesses in SA also being disappointed. It was argued that most of the benefits flowed to the SA and global elite members connected to the event.

Whilst the energy crisis highlighted the problems concerning expanded rounds of capital accumulation and various technical challenges relating to SA’s standing as a regional power, the other three case studies were particularly critical of SA’s legitimacy or capacity to provide meaningful or principled leadership. The analysis of the FWC was a somewhat different case study in the sense that it presented not only evidence of a strengthening of the processes of capital accumulation towards the GBM complex, but also highlighted the issues pertaining to SA’s lack of legitimacy.

9.1.4 Policy suggestions concerning regional governments, business and media

This section will discuss a general regional policy suggestion. Further suggestions for regional policy are also drawn from the four case studies which represent areas where SA and the region could work more collaboratively.
9.1.4.1 Regional industrial policy

A general policy recommendation suggested in this study concerns the development of a coherent regional industrial policy in SACU, primarily as a counter to SA’s dominance. Chapters 3 and 4 have argued that SACU is a ‘captive market’ for SA’s industries. During the last round of SACU negotiations, SA did make concessions through a more equitable Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF) and by means of regulations protecting new and fragile industries in the region. However, long-term industrial development is still tilted heavily in favour of SA, as demonstrated by a deepening of the polarisation effect (4.3.1). The current SACU RSF has indirectly de-incentivised industrial development in these countries, as SACU states are guaranteed some revenue from trading with SA, whilst the price of business in these countries has escalated. At the same time, by means of its larger spending capacity, the SA government subsidises local industrial development which further exacerbates the existing regional inequalities, making it almost impossible for the region to attain comparable levels. The whole process maintains the cycle of dependency. Greater coordinated attempts need to be made by all SACU states to move towards a genuine regional industrial policy if a meaningful lessening of dependence is to be attained.

9.1.4.2 Regional energy policy

A reliable and cost effective energy supply is crucial to regional development. Eskom has a critical role to play in providing such future energy supplies. The main policy recommendations identified in 5.5 suggest that during the post-crisis phase, careful planning at the regional scale is needed in collaboration with Eskom. The aim is to avoid ‘infrastructural divergence’ or the overlapping of resources at a later stage.
Despite the vulnerability that comes with interconnected regional energy supply systems, the reality of southern Africa is such that some inter-reliance is necessary. The ideal situation for smaller states in the region would be to reach a situation with working alternatives and back-up plans in place, whilst remaining mindful of the competing spending priorities in the region. This is especially the case given the heavy costs of building energy-generating infrastructure. It was further demonstrated that Eskom’s propensity to keep the region informed on a need-to-know basis and hide certain information exacerbated the extent of the crisis for the region. Prompt and frank disclosure of impending energy shortages and the extent of the problem facing Eskom would enable regional businesses to minimise financial losses and make alternative plans.

9.1.4.3 Peace mediations and Zimbabwe

Successful peacemaking in SADC is essential to the development of the region. As the regionally dominant power SA plays a key role in such initiatives. Section 6.3 identified that a significant part of the regional frustration concerning SA’s handling of the Zimbabwean situation was due to the slow and divided nature of the SADC-mandated negotiations. SA also applied an insular interpretation of the conflict. A more defiantly independent approach to mediation, yet one which is conducive to broad-based consensus building amongst all relevant parties and groups, is required from the SA government when mediating in regional conflicts. Stubbornness towards the West and an eagerness to reach ‘home-grown’ solutions to conflicts in the region, whilst perhaps being a noble pursuit in itself, should not be at the expense of further suffering. Clearer and more decisive action will avoid conflicting messages which ultimately serve to undermine negotiations. Section 6.4 demonstrated that the nature of the power-sharing
pact is not conducive to investor confidence. This can act as a significant deterrent to investors during the reconstruction phase when attempts to court international capital are paramount. Section 6.5 further demonstrated that government-owned media in Zimbabwe and Namibia need to liberalise further to avoid disinformation on crucial unfolding events of regional significance. Such media can be problematic in the way in which they undermine delicate negotiation processes.

9.1.4.4 Xenophobia and migration policy

The free movement of skills and people is essential for a thriving and vibrant regional economy. The policy recommendations contained in 7.5 suggest that SA should focus more sincerely on socio-economic problems and conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood as these are directly linked to events in SA, and vice versa. This clearly pertains directly to the Zimbabwean crisis given the correlation between overcrowding in SA’s poorest communities and the Zimbabwean crisis. Moreover, leadership struggles of the ANC and government should not compromise service delivery to the point of breakdown. They should also not compromise effective communication and responses by government in a time of crisis. Section 7.6 further revealed that SA business should take seriously the concern in the region that whilst the region opens its markets to SA corporates, there is no reciprocal response when the region tries to access the SA market. Sub-sections 7.3.1, 7.7.4 and 7.7.6 demonstrated the responsibilities of the SA media in reporting sensitive matters pertaining to migrants and refugees. The manner in which the media frames events pertaining to migrants can have a defining role in how they are publicly understood. Sensationalism and inaccurate reporting without proper contextualisation, might even fuel violence towards migrants from other African countries.
9.1.4.5 The World Cup and the hosting of mega-events

The recommendations for policy arising from Chapter 8 (section 8.5) relate to the inaccurate local and regional assertions of how countries can benefit through hosting or being associated with mega-events. The findings suggest that such assertions should undergo rigorous scrutiny before spending begins. Such scrutiny should also be regularly updated to verify the accuracy of what is claimed. This is especially important given the numerous pressing social needs and competing spending priorities facing southern Africa. Claims that the infrastructure built for the event will be of benefit in the long-term also need to be critically evaluated. These matters pertain to governments, businesses and media, with the latter playing a particularly crucial role in exposing the collusion between government and business given the manner in which elite members coalesce around such events.

9.1.5 Challenges to literature on regional relations in southern Africa, geographical literature and contributions to understanding processes of transformation

The major contribution of this study has been to develop the theory of the GBM complex and counter-imperialist discourses, and how they operate in southern Africa. The aim of developing this theory was to contribute to understanding SA’s sub-imperialism in southern Africa and resistance to it. This thesis has highlighted the value to be gained from a critical approach to the phenomenon of sub-imperialism, despite a significant academic reticence towards the concept in the regional literature. By adopting this approach, this study has attempted to critique and contribute to the literature on SA’s regional relations, and presented challenges to the existing geographical literature.
9.1.5.1 A focus on the region

A significant contribution of this study was its focus on regional attitudes and responses. A challenge to the existing literature is therefore to be found in the methodology and overall epistemological approach towards the subject. The post-apartheid ‘SA in Africa’ literature tends to be biased towards SA. The bias towards SA within this literature is mainly due to a lack of empirical data extracted from local communities. Detailed case studies based on empirical data drawn from regional communities allow a greater understanding of how regional states contend with, accommodate and seek to subvert SA’s sub-imperialism. The current thesis argues that regional responses to sub-imperialism need to be investigated and developed as part of a theory outlining the phenomenon. A greater focus on the agency of local actors in shaping these relations should aid in rectifying this ‘one-sidedness’. This was demonstrated by the focus on counter-imperialist discourses.

9.1.5.2 Geographies of resistance

Within the post-apartheid ‘SA in Africa’ literature not enough focus has been afforded to the regional responses and their corresponding spatiality. Academic discourses focusing on resistance to SA tend not to be sensitive enough to the various geographies or scales at which they are operating. This thesis has argued that resistance varies in intensity according to proximity to SA. Generally, the closer in proximity the state is to SA, the greater the dependence, and hence the stronger the counter-imperialist discourses. The findings suggest that SACU states almost always demonstrated stronger counter-imperialist discourses than other SADC states.
However, more critically, this study has suggested that the defining features when trying to understand resistance in southern Africa are the particularly nuanced geographies through which they operate. By placing a greater focus on regional agency it was demonstrated how resistance to global processes of neo-liberalism can arise at the micro-scale of industry in a particular country, or through virtual communities on blogging websites and social media. Resistance can also occur bilaterally even though the same state enacting the resistance may simultaneously belong to SACU, SADC and the AU. The point is that our understanding of resistance need not be determined by official communities such as SADC and SACU, but determined also by a ‘territorial logic of power’ (Harvey, 2005: 101) independent of ‘fixed’ political and economic organisations. These geographies of resistance could be defined by common perspectives on human rights, such as Botswana’s and Zambia’s resistance to the SA-led SADC negotiations in Zimbabwe; or by common regional identities and histories, such as the alignment formed by SA, Namibia and Mozambique in ‘defence’ of Mugabe and in the face of Western and African criticism. Geographies of resistance could also be defined by levels of economic development. For example, resistance to the energy crisis was not only based on proximity to SA, but more importantly, the extent to which a country was able to meet its own power needs based on the level of development of its power generating infrastructure. Looking at these geographies in a new light is especially important as the conventional channels of resistance such as SADC appear ineffective, outdated and in a state of paralysis, as argued in Chapter 6. SACU does not have one cross-border project to its name (Davies, 16/02/10). The SAPP is highly neglected and struggling to find the necessary resources to upgrade its infrastructure. More dynamic coalitions and groupings are needed to solve some of the region’s
problems and to bring about constructive engagement with SA. More critical thought should go into these evolving geographies of resistance in southern Africa.

9.1.5.3 Regional integration for whom and what?

This thesis has argued that the rhetoric of ‘regional integration’ in public discourse is to be viewed sceptically, largely as discursive instruments used by elite members to promote capital accumulation. Accordingly, and as argued in Chapter 1, the term regionality was adopted as the preferred term to denote regional interactions. This was supported by the work of Harvey (2005: 101). The important question is: To what extent is the conventional understanding of geography in southern Africa based on ongoing elitist constructions and what are the consequences of this for academic discourses? More research should focus on deconstructing the nature of space and power in the region, and how this informs our conceptual and theoretical understanding of the region.

9.1.5.4 A focus on elite members

A further challenge to the existing literature has been the focus on elite members. Chapter 2 suggested that studies that are elite-focused are typically biased towards the already powerful, or can reinforce what we already know. Although it is important not to be paternalistic towards the poor in the design of the study, analysis needs to be based on a critique of the prevailing context of power. One way to assess this is to analyse the powerful. This study has argued that elite members are central to all processes of social and economic transformation due to their control over resources and the choices they make to promote economic and social advancement according to racial, ethnic and class lines. The formation of the dominant classes and the role played by elite members as
representatives of these classes are important to understand. Therefore, by focusing on elite attitudes, this study has attempted to assess the broader forces and motives driving the dominant classes in society. Placing elite members at the centre of the analysis raised questions pertaining to decision-making over scarce resources, access by the poor, control over media and business, and control of public resources. Such analyses are vital if change in the behaviour of people who are actually powerful enough to make a difference, is to be effected.

9.1.5.5 The significance of an historical approach

Throughout this thesis the value of a historical approach has been highlighted. Chapter 1 argued that sub-imperialism should be analysed from a historical geographical point of view. Chapter 3 argued that the GBM complex developed through a spatially and commercially expanding state that sought to secure expanded rounds of accumulation, leading to a privileged few who were really in control of the region (section 3.3). A historical approach allowed a proper contextualisation of the contemporary discussion illuminating why the structure of the economy remains the way it is and why the MEC is still so dominant (Chapters 3, 5 and 7). Importantly, the historical geographical approach allowed a deeper understanding of the processes of capital accumulation over space and how this process was ultimately driven by various elite and class formations.

9.1.5.6 Challenges to geographical literature

First, although this study has sought to build on the geographical literature related to ‘complexes’ (1.3.4.2), it has also sought to break out of this mould. It was demonstrated how the most common power network discussed by geographers is undoubtedly the
military-industrial complex, or a variation thereof (Farish and Vitale, 2011; Lutz, 2011; Morrissey, 2011; Pinkerton et al. 2011; Rogerson, 1990; Vitale, 2011).

However, this thesis has argued that such an analysis need not be fixed to the military and industrial relations when it is clear that the relationships and agents in imperial societies span many more sectors and operate through more subtle means of persuasion and influence. A concept which encompasses other types of industries, media and branches of the state would service greater explanatory power for imperial societies. This is particularly relevant in an era when the means of influence in imperial societies are becoming increasingly diffuse (Hardt and Negri, 2001). In apartheid SA, the military was once considered dominant in government (3.3.7), but in the post-apartheid phase the military plays a far smaller role in policy-making, greatly reducing the analytical use of the concept, ‘military-industrial enterprise’, in explaining complex political and economic phenomena in post-apartheid SA (see Rogerson, 1990).

Fine and Rustomjee’s (1996) concept of the minerals-energy complex is useful in understanding the structure of the SA economy and as a concept in political economy. However, during the post-apartheid era, a broader concept is necessary to describe the myriad post-apartheid business actors and branches of the state. For example, although mining growth is still important to the SA economy, telecommunications and retail industries have been dominant in SA’s post-apartheid business expansion (Barnett, 1999; Miller, 2008). In addition, the spheres of government, business and media not only represent the important role players in society, but also suggest important relationships with domestic and global civil society.

Although the GBM complex was developed in the context of SA’s relationship with the region, the technologies and modes of operating between the spheres of government, business and media are often similar to other sub-imperial and imperial
powers (Carmody, 2012; Carmody, Hampwaye and Sakala, 2012; Carmody and Owusa, 2007). In addition, based on the literature, it appears that imperial powers are the societies that typically develop ‘complexes’ to drive their ambitions and processes of capital accumulation over space (Farish and Vitale, 2011; Lutz, 2011; Morrissey, 2011; Peet, 2002; Pinkerton et al. 2011; Rogerson, 1990; Vitale, 2011), or, they are merely the societies where such complexes are most prominent. Nevertheless, it is believed that the ‘complex’ developed in this study should have traction when applied to other emerging powers of the global South or to the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries (see also the fifth point in this sub-section).

Second, this study argued that critical geopolitics tends to focus on the how and what questions regarding state expansion, but not necessarily the questions of why states expand territorially (1.3.4.4). It was argued that although critical geopolitics is far superior to uncritical geopolitical approaches (1.3.4.1), it provides more of an analytical framework than a theory (1.3.4.4). This is because of its focus on post-modern deconstruction and unpacking the production of geographical knowledge (Megoran, 2006; Paasi, 2000, 2006; Sparke, 2000; Mamdouh and Dijkink, 2006). The challenge to critical geopolitical scholars implicit in this study, is therefore to guard against over emphasising the representational practices at the expense of an embedded analysis in the historical geographical material structures underpinning power relationships, such as class and capital formations. Serious grounding in power networks appears to be an obvious and natural way of highlighting the complex relationship between discourse (representational practices embodied in talk, texts and images) and material power structures (class and capital formations).

Third, and related to the above point, is the challenge to the geographical literature on southern Africa to make greater use of the tools of power networks and
This thesis has argued that the concepts of the GBM complex and counter-imperialist discourses should aid in providing further analytical depth to studies focusing on SA’s regional relations.

Fourth, this study suggested that counter-imperialist discourses can be considered a form of anti-geopolitics (1.3.4.3). This study challenged the anti-geopolitical literature to locate the geographies of resistance in non-Western countries in the current era, more closely and explicitly to the ongoing and deceptively iniquitous global and regional imperialist processes (Ó Tuathail, 1996b; Pile and Keith, 1997; Routledge, 1998; 2003; 2000; 2008). The concept of counter-imperialist discourses also presents challenges to the geographical literature on domestic resistance in SA. For example, the critical geographies in the popular sphere such as the Jonathan Zapiro cartoons (Dodds, 2010; Hammet, 2010a; 2010b), are an example of resistance to the GBM complex. Other events or themes concerning domestic challenges to SA’s GBM complex, and which should be analysed using counter-imperialist discourses, are the recent Marikana mining tragedy (Satgar, 2012) and the popular movements against hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo, amongst others.

Fifth, this study has challenged geographers attempting to subvert the dominance of Western geographical knowledge production by suggesting that they use, and build on, the well-established concepts and literature on imperialism and hegemony to analyse the current rise of emerging powers in the non-West (Mercer, Mohan and Power, 2003; Mohan and Power, 2009, 2010; Power, 2010; Sidaway, 1992, 2000, 2012; Sidaway and Pryke, 2000; Sidaway and Bryson, 2002). If academics were to keep abreast of such developments, more creative theoretical and conceptual thinking should
go into the likelihood of the subverting of imperialism on the global stage by this ‘second tier’ of imperial powers – the sub-imperial powers. It was therefore argued that the emerging powers of the non-West represent the ‘real’, or soon to be, new imperialism (1.3.2). In light of this probable subversion, a thorough rewriting of the history and geography of state-capital relations in the global South using these tools, could prove illuminating.

9.1.5.7 Wider applications

What can this study contribute to the understanding of processes of social and economic equity in southern Africa? This study has raised a few pertinent issues, three of which will be discussed here.

First, this thesis has raised questions about the extent of transformation in the ownership of big business or monopoly capital in SA, particularly in light of the historical dominance of large conglomerates centred on mining. In sub-section 3.4.1 it was stated that there has been some inter-penetration of ‘white’ and ‘black’ capital in post-apartheid SA. However, some would argue that although the ‘colour’ of the GBM complex has changed slightly during democracy, the privilege and ‘control’ over the ‘masses’ was left intact, with the majority of ownership still in white and foreigners’ hands – the English and Afrikaans oligarchy which amassed their wealth over a century of capital accumulation. Some have suggested that these conglomerates have ‘co-opted’ a wealthy black elite as ‘tokenism’ during democracy. They created the illusion of change by selling equity shares where necessary and installing Africans in senior positions, as a form of ‘fronting’. It was also argued in sub-section 3.4.1 that government policies such as affirmative action gave rise to an emergent black middle class with connections in government and business. However, some argue that the so-
called ‘black diamonds’, are actually a small, aspirant group, and are yet to fully develop as the dominant class. This matter also requires further critical analysis if the country is to truly understand what still needs to be achieved in terms of meaningful economic transformation.

Second, this thesis has stressed the agency of regional actors in transformational processes. It was argued that the GBM complex needs to be further exposed and that an active citizenry will encourage the development of counter-imperialist discourses. Some of the more obvious measures through which a more aware and engaged citizenry can achieve such ends include writing for and communicating through the media, and participation in civil society and trade unions. Much can be done to illuminate the relationships in the GBM complex and set about changing policies and influencing decision-makers. One need not be particularly powerful or well-connected as controversially demonstrated by the influence of social media in the uprisings in North Africa in 2011 – the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.

9.2 Sub-imperialism in crisis?

Through the discussion of the central and subsidiary questions, I have demonstrated that there is evidence to support the fundamental contention of this thesis that SA’s sub-imperialism is in crisis. This crisis reflects the cumulative state of the current relations between government, business and media elite members.

The findings suggest that regionally there are counter-imperialist discourses towards SA’s sub-imperialism. The counter-imperialist discourses contribute to the understanding that SA’s sub-imperialism is in crisis exposing capital accumulation as its underlying motive. The research has also demonstrated that counter-imperialist discourses vary according to geographical differences which may or may not be bound
by conventional regional communities. There is clear evidence to suggest that perceptions of a crisis are also the result of a stalling in SA’s capital accumulation and a decline in various technical proficiencies needed to maintain its standing as the regional economic leader. This also stems from a perceived waning in SA’s legitimacy as the regional power as well as its diminishing ability to display moral leadership.

The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that post-apartheid SA still has a sub-imperialist relationship with the region, despite claims to the contrary. Claims of a magnanimous and benevolent regional power should therefore be contested and the workings of the GBM complex should continue to be challenged by counter-imperialist discourses.

9.3 Areas for future research

One area for future research pertains to competition among sub-imperial states within the southern African space. An important factor when assessing regional responses to SA’s sub-imperialism is to assess the expansion of other sub-imperial powers within the region (Mohan and Power, 2008; Power, 2012; Power and Mohan, 2008; Power and Mohan, 2010). Counter-imperialist discourses towards SA do not happen in a vacuum, but occur parallel to and amongst those directed at other major powers. This is particularly important in light of China’s increased involvement in southern Africa over the last few years. Preliminary findings suggest that the counter-imperialist discourses towards China within the region have eclipsed those towards SA. China appears to have a closer and more unapologetic relationship between government and business, as indicated by their system of state capitalism. A comparative study of China’s and SA’s GBM complexes operating in southern Africa, and counter-imperialist discourses towards them, would prove particularly illuminating. This would shed light on who
holds the strategic advantage in southern Africa and whether SA can compete with China in the region. One would also be able to assess comparatively what types of expansionary measures are eliciting the strongest responses and why.

Given the evidence presented in this thesis detailing SA’s troubled sub-imperialism, a more multipronged power relationship is likely to emerge on the continent. This would involve African states such as Nigeria, Egypt and possibly Angola continuing to grow rapidly and ultimately play greater roles in multilateral fora. Future research should focus on the prospects of SA forming partnerships with these countries and not viewing them as competitors only. Stronger neighbours are a welcome sign of regional growth and prosperity.

Finally, the theory of a GBM complex and counter-imperialist discourses should be applied to the other BRICS countries. This would further contribute to our understanding of geographies of resistance and their potential to produce dynamic new regional initiatives. Comparative studies across the different regions could prove particularly revealing in understanding the types of state-capital formations defining this ‘new wave’ of imperialism and how such alliances will operate in a potential post-neoliberal global order.
APPENDIX A

CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Attitudes and responses to SA in SADC: Case studies of Botswana and Zambia
Researcher: Justin van der Merwe, Oxford University Centre for the Environment
University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford, OX1 3QY, United Kingdom
Email: justin.vandermerwe@ouce.ox.ac.uk
Phone: (0044) 7833130085
Fax: 0865165277

Project Description:

The project assesses the attitudes and responses to post-apartheid SA’s corporate, political and media expansion into the region. Although the project attempts to generalise to the SADC region, case studies on Botswana and Zambia will form the primary focus. The study will also assess regional attitudes and responses to four events or themes in particular, namely, the recent xenophobia attacks in SA, the energy crisis in SA, SA’s hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup, and SA’s mediation in Zimbabwe on behalf of SADC.

Statement of informant rights:

“I have been fully informed of and understand the objectives of the project being conducted. I consent to being interviewed. I understand that steps will be undertaken to ensure that this interview will remain confidential unless I consent to being identified. I also understand that, if I wish to withdraw from the study, I may do so without any repercussions.”

Interviews will be conducted face-to-face or in exceptional cases over the phone. Information gathered from interviews will be analysed and form part of my DPhil dissertation at Oxford University. The information collected will also be used for policy-type briefs aimed at regional governments and organisations, peer-reviewed articles in academic journals, books or book chapters, and seminar or conference papers.

__________________________  ______________________  __________________________
Participant – Printed name  Participant – Signature  Date of Consent
Questionnaire

Contact details:

Name: 
Address: 

Tel: (w) 
(cell) 

Email: 

Please fill in the appropriate category: 

A. Government official

1) Department: 

2) Position of respondent: 

3) General responsibilities: 

B. Corporate actor

1) Company name: 

2) Position of respondent: 

3) Nature of business: 

If South African, how long has your company been active in the region, in how many countries is it active, and what type of business do you conduct

If non-South African, in what way do you deal with, compete with, or partner a SA company

C. Media actor

1) Company / corporation name: 

2) Position of respondent: 

If non-South African, in what way do you deal with, compete with, or partner a SA company

________________________________________________________________________

344
3) Nature of business

If South African, how long has your company been active in the region, in how many countries is it active, and what type of business do you conduct

If non-South African, in what way do you deal with, compete with, or partner SA companies

Section 1: Foreign policy

1. Since democracy was attained SA has been actively involved on the African continent. On the scale of 1 to 10, 1 being poor and 10 being excellent, rate post-apartheid SA's foreign policy in Africa overall.

2. In what areas do you feel SA's involvement in Africa has been successful?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Peace keeping and peace enforcement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mediation and arbitration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Institution building</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Economic policies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Other, please specify</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. We know the SA economy is by far the largest in SADC, but do you feel that SA enjoys the necessary political authority to be considered the leader in SADC?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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Please expand
4. Are SA state elites well respected in the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

Please expand

5. Do you think SA's foreign policies are seen as legitimate and carrying moral authority?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

Please expand

6. Do you think President Mbeki's vision to rejuvenate the African continent socially and economically through the African Renaissance, has credibility regionally?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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Please expand

7. Has the region been receptive towards NEPAD?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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Please expand

8. Some argue that SADC is a weak regional body and has little means for concrete intervention within pariah states. What do you think?
9. Some argue post-apartheid SA's diplomacy in Africa has undergone a shift from peace diplomacy to one based on economic diplomacy. What do you think?

10. What impact, if any, will SA's non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council have for Africa?

11. Which phrases are most relevant to SA’s political values? Please tick as appropriate:

   a. Non-racialism, equality of opportunity and the observance of human rights
   b. Africanism and elitism
   c. Eurocentrism and elitism
   d. Africanism, equality of opportunity and the observance of human rights
   e. Eurocentrism, equality of opportunity and the observance of human rights
   f. Other, please specify

12. Are SA’s political values consistent with the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

If you disagree, please expand

13. Do you perceive SA’s foreign and domestic policies to be consistent with its political values?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>

If you disagree, please expand

14. Is SA's foreign policy in Africa too ambitious given its numerous domestic problems?
15. How would you describe the main political message that SA is projecting to the region?

Section 2: Corporate expansion

16. Since democracy was attained SA businesses have expanded rapidly into the region. In which industry areas has SA's corporate expansion into the region been successful?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry Area</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Telecommunication</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Banking</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Retail</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Clothing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Fast food</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Mining</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Other, please specify</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

17. What problems do SA businesses face in the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Problems with labour laws and regulations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Locals resistant SA brands and products</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Local market is saturated and/or monopolized</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Local market is unpredictable with little room for expansion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Socio-economic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. In your view, how do the local people respond to SA businesses?

19. Do you feel that the response of the local people differs according to class or race?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

If agree, please expand

20. Do you feel that local people respond differently to SA businesses as opposed to, for example, Chinese or American companies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

If you agree, please expand

21. Please rate the benefits that SA has brought to local communities in the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. They contribute towards the upliftment and development of local communities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. They contribute towards the bolstering of the local middle class</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. They develop local skills, infrastructure and facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. They use local suppliers,</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>
 producers and distribution chains

e. Other, please specify

<table>
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</thead>
</table>

22. How do you feel local businesses and markets have responded to South African business?
______________________________________________________________________

23. Some have argued that SA businesses are exploitative and profiteering, and act in a self-serving manner in the region. What are your thoughts on the matter?
______________________________________________________________________

24. Is there a difference between the SA government's rhetoric and how corporates operate on the ground?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>

If you agree, please expand
______________________________________________________________________

25. Is there a difference between how SA parastatals behave and how SA private companies operate in the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</thead>
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</table>

If you agree, please expand
______________________________________________________________________

26. Some argue that SA is displaying sub-imperialist tendencies in Africa, even though apartheid has ended SA has continued to have an imperialistic stance towards the region. What are your thoughts on the matter?
______________________________________________________________________

27. How would you describe the main economic message SA is projecting to the region?
______________________________________________________________________

Section 3: Cultural media
28. Do you see SA culture as dominantly being (please tick one or more):

- a. Melting pot
- b. Black culture
- c. Rainbow culture
- d. Cosmopolitan
- e. Christian
- f. White culture
- g. Male dominated
- h. Other, please specify

29. Is there such a thing as a clearly defined SA national culture?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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Please expand

30. Does culture enhance the attractiveness and appeal of SA?

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<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>

31. If you agree, what aspects of SA's culture do you feel enhances its attractiveness and appeal? Please tick as appropriate:

- a. Film
- b. Music
- c. Television programmes
- d. Sport
- e. Cuisine
- f. Fashion
- g. Crafts
- h. Other, please specify

32. How would you describe the main cultural image that SA is projecting to the region?
If South African, proceed to question 34.

33. I would also like to briefly discuss your use of media. What type of SA-owned or SA-produced media do you use, if any?

| Newspapers |  |
| Magazines |  |
| Television programmes |  |
| Radio |  |
| Other, please specify |  |
| None of the above |  |

34. Do you feel that the SA media adequately represent the interests of the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
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<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>

If you disagree, please expand

35. Some argue that SA is colonising the African airwaves through the expansion of the SA state broadcaster and SA-based programming throughout Africa, what do you think?

Section 4:

I would also like to talk about 4 themes or events in particular. These themes speak directly to SA’s standing and role in the region and are having a powerful impact on how SA is being perceived regionally.

1) The xenophobia attacks

In May 2008 African immigrants in a number of SA cities were violently driven from their businesses and homes by angry mobs motivated by frustration at foreigners who allegedly take their jobs, houses and basic services – and who are often more successful at running businesses. This resulted in up to 60 deaths, more than 1000 people being injured, and up to 20 000 people being displaced. Many immigrants were forced to return to their home countries and had to abandon their property and possessions. Many are still displaced and living in designated camps awaiting the difficult reintegration process. These incidents have become widely known as the 'xenophobia attacks'.
36. Have the attacks affected the ability of SA companies to do business in the region?

______________________________________________________________________

37. Did you experience or hear of any acts of retaliation on SA people or operations regionally as a result of the attacks?

______________________________________________________________________

38. Do you have any knowledge on how the regional media portrayed the attacks?

______________________________________________________________________

39. Do you have any knowledge of the responses from regional politicians and businesses, particularly those regional businesses with operations in SA?

______________________________________________________________________

40. Do you think the SA government's response was seen as adequate given the severity of the attacks?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
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<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>

If you disagree, please expand

**If non-South African, please go to question 42.**

41. Did your company or department do anything to alleviate the situation?

______________________________________________________________________

42. Have the SA media adequately reflected the interests of the region in their reporting?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>

If you disagree, please expand

43. Will SA be able to redeem its standing as a peaceful and prosperous nation, and an attractive option for any would-be migrants in the region?
If you disagree, please expand

44. Have the attacks affected SA's standing in the region?

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>The incident signals the beginning of the end for SA's legitimacy and moral leadership in the region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Although the attacks were severe, SA will be able to re-establish itself as a legitimate and moral leader in the region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>The attacks will lessen dependency on SA and alleviate inequality within the region because skilled immigrants and businesses will look elsewhere to invest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>The attacks have deepened distrust between Africans and South Africans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>The attacks have undone much of the good work SA has achieved in Africa since democracy was attained</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>The attacks suggest that SA needs to be less ambitious in Africa and tend to the numerous pressing domestic problems first</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>The attacks suggest that SA's sub-imperialism is in a state of crisis, and the attacks will naturally trigger a waning of SA's sub-imperialist tendencies</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, please specify</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2) The energy crisis
Rolling blackouts, or planned 'load shedding', have been occurring in SA for over a year now, due largely to Eskom's poor planning as it failed to keep up with the rise in demand for electricity due to the rapidly expanding SA economy. In January and February 2008 blackouts were particularly bad when large parts of the country were thrust into darkness for prolonged periods of time triggering a general state of chaos. Many businesses suffered heavy losses and people were very frustrated and angry. Although the situation has stabilised since then it is still ongoing with the threat of blackouts always looming. This has become widely known as the 'energy crisis'.

45. Has the crisis affected the ability of SA companies to do business in the region?

46. In the states that SA supplies electricity to, have you heard any accounts of how it has affected local businesses?

47. Do you have any knowledge on how the regional media portrayed the crisis?

48. Do you have any knowledge on the responses from regional politicians and businesses, particularly those regional businesses with operations in SA?

49. Do you feel SA should continue to provide the region with electricity if it cannot keep up with the demand domestically?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

Please expand

50. Do you think the responses from the SA government and Eskom were seen as adequate given the levels of frustration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Please expand
51. What implications do the energy crisis have for SA's standing in the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. It signals a broader crisis in SA with regards to skills, infrastructure and service delivery, one which through time will lead to its decline as the regional economic leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Although the blackouts were severe, SA will be able to re-establish itself as a reliable and trustworthy supplier of services and goods to the region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The crisis in basic services and infrastructure suggests that SA will go down the same path that many post-colonial African countries have gone</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. The crisis will lessen dependency on SA and alleviate inequality in the region because skilled immigrants and businesses will look elsewhere to invest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. The crisis reinforces the notion that SA private and public companies operate by a different set of standards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. The problems with service delivery suggest that SA's sub-imperialism is in a state of crisis, and the energy crisis will naturally trigger a waning of SA's sub-imperialist tendencies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Others, please specify</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3) SA's hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup

In 2010 SA will host the first ever African Football World Cup. It will be the largest and highest grossing Football World Cup to date. A successfully hosted event will present an opportunity to dispel doubts that Africa is not suited to host such an event. SA has been
very keen to stress the significance of the event for the whole of Africa.

52. Do you think SA will host a successful event?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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If you disagree, please expand

53. How do you think the region will benefit from the event?

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. It will contribute towards the upliftment and development of local communities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. It will contribute towards the local tourist industries</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. It will develop local skills, infrastructure and facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. It will create jobs</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. It will help dispel Afro-pessimism</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. It will increase investment in the region</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. It will develop transport systems within the region</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. It will enhance the media and ICT facilities and infrastructure in the region</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. It will develop sport infrastructure and stadiums in the region</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Other, please specify</td>
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</table>

54. What message should the organisers project through the hosting of the event – both to the region but also internationally?

55. Is SA a suitable nation to represent the African continent?
Please expand

If non-South African proceed to question 57.

56. Is your company or department involved in the planning and/or execution of the event in any way?
   a. Yes
   b. No

If yes, please expand

57. Do you foresee the following problems and issues in staging the event?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Africans will be unwilling to come watch football games in SA after the xenophobia attacks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Power shortages will become a problem during the event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Crime will deter people from visiting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Political unrest will embarrass South Africa during the event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Terrorism will be a major concern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>The event will draw international media attention to the Zimbabwean crisis causing a clamping down by the Zimbabwean authorities</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
catalyst for the establishment of a viable democracy in Zimbabwe and boost the struggling economy

| g. Any others, please specify | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

58. What do you think the lasting legacy of SA's hosting of the event will be for the African continent?

59. What overall impact will the event have for South Africa's standing in the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. It will increase dependency on SA in the region and deepen inequalities</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. It will reinforce SA's role as the leading power in the region and reinforce its sub-imperialist tendencies</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. It will enhance SA's appreciation of the benefits of regionalism and cause it to acknowledge its growing reliance on the region</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>d. It will help SA consolidate its African identity after years of apartheid</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>e. It will help expand SA's media empire in the region largely through the developments in broadcasting and print media</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tr>
<th>f. It will lead to further resentment or envy towards SA by fellow African states</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tr>
<th>g. It will enhance SA's legitimacy as the regional leader</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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| g. Others, please specify | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

4) South Africa’s mediation in Zimbabwe on behalf of SADC
The MDC won the Zimbabwean elections of 2008. Yet the results were disputed by ZANU-PF and a run-off was held, which the MDC then subsequently pulled out of at the last minute. Although these events were suggestive of 'light at the end of the tunnel', they also signalled a potential deepening of the Zimbabwean crisis as President Mugabe appeared to want to tighten his grip on power. In order to try diffuse the situation, SADC heads of state decided that president Mbeki would mediate during the ensuing talks. It was hoped that these talks would result in a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe through some kind of power-sharing arrangement with the establishment of a transitional government.

60. Have the talks progressed well?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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If you disagree, please expand

______________________________________________________________________

61. Was President Mbeki the right person to mediate during the discussions?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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Please expand

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62. Are you confident that the talks will lead to a lasting and binding agreement between parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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Please expand

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63. Do you have any knowledge of the responses from regional politicians and businesses, particularly those regional businesses with operations in Zimbabwe?

______________________________________________________________________

64. What do you think of SA's stance towards Zimbabwe overall?
65. Do you feel SA's handling of the matter is consistent with the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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If you disagree, please expand

66. Do you have any knowledge of how SA's handling of the Zimbabwean crisis is portrayed by the regional media?

67. What do you think of the international media's response to SA's handling of the Zimbabwean crisis?

68. How has SA's handling of the Zimbabwean situation impacted upon its standing in the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. SA's stance of 'quiet diplomacy' has led to disillusionment and frustration amongst SADC heads of state</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tr>
<th>b. President Mbeki's quiet diplomacy has been vindicated as a settlement in Zimbabwe has finally been reached</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tr>
<th>c. SA's mediation in Zimbabwean illustrates the weaknesses and limits of SA's negotiating ability in Africa</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tr>
<th>d. SA's failed attempts at trying to bring an end to the Zimbabwean crisis suggests that its political values are not widely accepted</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tr>
<th>e. President Mbeki's African Renaissance lost credibility in the region due to his handling of the Zimbabwean crisis</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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</table>
f. The SA government’s handling of the Zimbabwean has led to a decline in its moral authority and legitimacy in the region

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<th>Others, please specify</th>
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The end, thank you for your time!
LIST OF RESPONDENTS


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