Journal article
Competing sales channels with captive consumers
- Abstract:
- We study strategic interactions in markets in which firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s size influences market outcomes when some consumers have limited price information. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, we show such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and harm consumers by weakening between-channel competition.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Version of record, 1.0MB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/ej/ueab075
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Economic Journal More from this journal
- Volume:
- 132
- Issue:
- 642
- Pages:
- 741-766
- Publication date:
- 2021-09-16
- Acceptance date:
- 2021-09-10
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1468-0297
- ISSN:
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0013-0133
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1194104
- Local pid:
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pubs:1194104
- Deposit date:
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2021-09-14
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Ronayne and Taylor
- Copyright date:
- 2021
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal Economic Society. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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